Crusading in Frankish Greece, Chrissis: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282 2503534236, 9782503534237

Citation preview

Crusading in Frankish Greece

MEDIEVAL CHURCH STUDIES

Previously published volumes in this series are listed at the back of this book.

Volume 22

Crusading in Frankish Greece A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282 By

Nikolaos G. Chrissis

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Chrissis, Nikolaos G. Crusading in Frankish Greece : a study of Byzantine-Western relations and attitudes, 1204-1282. -- (Medieval church studies ; v. 22) 1. Crusades--13th-15th centuries. 2. Latin Empire, 1204-1261. 3. Byzantine Empire--History--1081-1453. 4. Greece--History--323-1453. 5. Papacy--History--To 1309. 6. Church history--Middle Ages, 600-1500. I. Title II. Series 949.5'04-dc23 ISBN-13: 9782503534237

© 2012, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2012/0095/187 ISBN: 978-2-503-53423-7 Printed on acid-free paper

To my family and in memory of my father

Contents

Illustrations

xi

Acknowledgements xiii Introduction xv 1. A Historiographical Gap: xviii The State of Research on Crusading in Frankish Greece 2. Background: Crusading Aggression against Byzantium xxvii in the Twelfth Century 3. Crusading in Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century: Overview of the Political Situation, Main Themes of the Examination, and Sources xxx Chapter 1. Justification (1204–16): Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks 1. The Latin Conquest and the Crusade for its Defence: Imperial Initiative and Papal Response 2. Factors and Motives for Innocent’s Approval of Crusading in Frankish Greece: Policy and Theory 3. Papal Crusading Policy in Romania, 1205–08, and the Crusade of Bishop Nivelon of Soissons 4. The Latin Empire as a ‘Crusader State’ 5. Church Union and Crusading in Frankish Greece 6. Papal Policy and Crusading in Frankish Greece in the Latter Part of Innocent’s Pontificate 7. Conclusions

1 2 12 20 32 45 51 53

viii

Contents

Chapter 2. Consolidation (1216–27): Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade for the Kingdom of Thessalonica 1. Honorius III: Crusade Policy and Priorities 2. The Crusade for the Liberation of Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Cardinal Legate John Colonna 3. The Montferrat Crusade for the Defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonica 4. Conclusions Chapter 3. Apogee (1227–41): Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 1. Frederick II and the Election of John of Brienne: Gregory’s Early Crusade Involvement in Romania (1227–32) 2. Temporary Peace and Resumption of Hostilities: Church Union Negotia­tions with Nicaea (1232–34) as an Alternative to Crusading in Frankish Greece 3. Ut Israelem veteris: Initial Phase of the Crusade for the Latin Empire and the First Attempted Diversion of Holy Land Crusaders (December 1235–October 1236) 4. Ad subveniendum imperio: Intensification of the Efforts for the Constantinopolitan Crusade and the Introduction of the Argument of Heresy (December 1236–November 1238) 5. Baldwin’s Crusade (November 1238–1239/40) 6. The End of Gregory’s Efforts for the Latin Empire 7. Conclusions Chapter 4. Retrenchment (1241–61): Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Gradual Abandonment of the Latin Empire 1. Continuities and Departures: Key Factors and Themes for the Period 1241–61 2. Innocent’s Early Attitude to Crusading in Romania: Rhetoric and Reality 3. The First Council of Lyon and its Aftermath (1245–47) 4. Church Union Negotiations and Rapprochement with Nicaea: The Abandonment of Crusading Support for the Latin Empire 5. The Policy of Alexander IV 6. Conclusions

57 58 61 68 79 83 87 93 99 102 120 126 130 135 136 139 146 159 172 175

Contents

Chapter 5. Revival and Reorientation (1261–82): Papal Crusading Policy between Michael Palaiologos and Charles of Anjou 1. 1261–82: Outline of Main Events and Factors 2. The Crusade for the Restoration of the Latin Empire and the Defence of the Principality of Achaia under Urban IV (1261–64) 3. The Rise of Charles of Anjou during the Pontificate of Clement IV (1265–68) and the Vacancy of the Apostolic See (1268–71) 4. The Rejection of Crusading in Frankish Greece: Papal Policy under Gregory X (1271–76) and the Union of the Churches at the Second Council of Lyon (1274) 5. The Fate of Church Union and the Crusade in Frankish Greece under Gregory X’s Successors (1276–80) 6. A Final Reversal: The Annulment of Union under Martin IV, the Sicilian Vespers, and the End of Angevin Designs on Constantinople (1282)

ix

179 180 182 201 217 231 238

Conclusion 251 Appendix i. Maps of Romania

275

Appendix ii. Table of Rulers

277

Appendix iii. Main Crusade Calls for Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century

279

Appendix iv. Preaching the Cross for Frankish Greece

283

Bibliography 291 Index 321

Illustrations

Cover image ‘Seal of Baldwin II (1228–73)’, currently in a private collection. Photo courtesy of the Classical Numismatic Group (www.cngcoins.com). This bilingual seal (Latin in the obverse: BALDUINUS DEI GRATIA IMPERATOR ROMANIE SEMPER AUGUSTUS; Greek in the reverse: ΒΑΛΔΟΥΙΝΟC ΔΕCΠΟΤΗC Ο ΠΟΡΦΥΡΟΓΕΝΝΗΤΟC Ο ΦΛΑΝΔΡΑC) closely follows contemporary western iconographic models but the Latin emperor is dressed in distinctively Byzantine garb. This is illustrative of the Latin empire’s dual nature, that is, its professed role as the successor of the Byzantine state and its crusader foundation.

Maps Map 1, p. 275. Romania and the Frankish States, c. 1214 Map 2, p. 276. Byzantine and Latin States in Romania, c. 1265 Map 3, p. 284. Innocent III’s call to the faithful to stabilize the Latin Empire, 1205 Map 4, p. 285. Preaching of the Montferrat Crusade ordered by Honorius III, 1223–24 Map 5, p. 286. Gregory IX’s crusading efforts for the Latin Empire, 1235–40 Map 6, p. 287. Innocent IV’s crusading call for the Latin Empire, following the First Council of Lyon, 1245–47 Map 7, p. 288. Urban IV’s crusade call for the recovery of the Latin Empire and the defence of the principality of Achaia, 1262–64

Acknowledgements

P

reparing this book (both in its initial incarnation as a thesis and in its final form as a monograph) has been a long and at times difficult road and I cannot but acknowledge my debt to many people who helped me along the way, though I must ultimately take full responsibility for any shortcomings. First, I owe gratitude to my Ph.D. supervisor at Royal Holloway, Dr Jonathan Harris, whose guidance, expert advice, and support were essential for the completion of my doctoral research. Furthermore, I have greatly benefited from the exchange of ideas and the stimulating atmosphere provided by senior and junior colleagues at the School of Advanced Study of the University of London and the History Department of Royal Holloway College. Outstanding in this respect has been the experience of participating in the Crusades and the Latin East seminars at the Institute of Historical Research. Useful counsel has been sought and kindly provided, at various points over the years, by several specialists in relevant fields. Though it is not possible to name everyone, I would like to thank in particular for their useful advice and stimulating feedback on different stages of this work: Professor Jonathan Phillips, who acted as the adviser for my thesis; Professor Norman Housley, who as the external examiner of the thesis offered his unparalleled expertise on the Later Crusades; Dr William Purkis, who read and commented on sections of the book in preparation; and Professor Bernard Hamilton, who most obligingly read the final draft of the book, making helpful suggestions which improved the work and saved me from some embarrassing mistakes. For similar reasons, I would also like to extend my thanks to the anonymous reader and to the helpful staff at Brepols. Finally, special mention should be made of Dr Chris Schabel, whom I would like to warmly thank for volunteering proofs from his forthcoming edition of Pope Honorius III’s bulls relating to Romania, for providing copies of several manuscripts from the Vatican Registers,

xiv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

and for even transcribing some of them. His eagerness to assist and advise has been a very inspiring and encouraging example of all that academic co-operation should be about. I would also like to acknowledge the support provided by several funding bodies, which enabled me to carry out the greatest part of my research unhindered by financial concerns: a Doctoral Award by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, an Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation Scholarship, and generous grants from the A. G. Leventis Foundation, the Hellenic Institute at Royal Holloway (George of Cyprus Bursaries, for which I would like to especially thank the late Director Julian Chrysostomides and Dr Charalambos Dendrinos), the Royal Historical Society, and the History Department of Royal Holloway. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, friends, and all the people who stood by me, supported me, and believed in me throughout this period. I find that such an essential human debt would be ill-served by a long list of names, and accidental omissions might further defeat the aim. You know who you are, and I am forever grateful. I must, nonetheless, thank George Mastrakoulis, who took care of all the technical aspects regarding the design and preparation of the maps in the appendix. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my father, whose death in the last year of my Ph.D. degree was a grave challenge, but far surpassed by his kind-hearted support and enthusiastic encouragement throughout my studies and, truly, throughout my life. London, June 2011

Introduction

D

uring the first half of the twentieth century there was a broad consensus that Byzantine relations with the West from the eleventh century onwards were dominated and dictated by the schism between the Churches that was held to have begun in 1054. From the 1950s onwards, a number of scholars questioned just how influential the events of 1054 were on the interaction between the two societies, given that there is almost no evidence of any widespread memory on either side of their having taking place. It was suggested instead that the decisive factor was the irruption of the crusades into the Byzantine world.1 The crusades are certainly a more convincing influence on policy and perceptions during the twelfth century than a squabble among clergymen on issues of theology and hierarchy. On the one hand, the notion of the Crusade came to occupy a predominant position in the mindset of the Latin West concerning the affairs of the East. On the other, the actual or imaginary threat posed by passing crusades to the security of Constantinople and the integrity of the empire became a major concern and a constant thread of Byzantine policy right up to 1204. Consequently the theme of Byzantine-western relations in the context of crusading between 1095 and 1204 has preoccupied numerous historians writing over the past sixty years.2

1  See for example: Kolbaba, ‘Legacy of Humbert and Cerularius’; Mayne, ‘East and West in 1054’; Nicol, ‘Byzantium and the Papacy in the Eleventh Century’; Runciman, The Eastern Schism, pp. 159–68. 2  See for example: Lemerle, ‘Byzance et la croisade’; Charanis, ‘Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzantium’; Daly, ‘Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople’; Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West; Runciman, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States; Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades.

INTRODUCTION

xvi

Given that preoccupation, it is curious that the role of crusading ideology and activity in Byzantine-western relations after 1204 has been almost completely neglected even though the capture and sack of Constantinople mark a watershed in the very essence of Byzantine interaction with the crusade. These events constituted a turning point because, for all the heated encounters between crusaders and Byzantium, direct crusading action against the empire — though contemplated by some — had been avoided during the twelfth century.3 However, after 1204, the establishment of Latin states on former Byzantine lands led to the use of the crusade for their defence and consequently the legitimization of military action against the Christian Byzantine Greeks. This is a development that has never been systematically investigated, not even by those scholars whose work focused most closely on Byzantium and the crusades. For example, RalphJohannes Lilie in his Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge devoted only a short appendix to the thirteenth-century crusades directed against the Byzantines and attached little importance to them. Indeed he dismissed them because, in his view, ‘these “small” crusades were so different from each other, that it is not meaningful to look for overarching connections and structures’.4 This book will fill the gap left by Lilie and others by examining the series of crusading expeditions, whether planned, proclaimed, or launched, for the defence and later reconquest of the Latin Empire of Constantinople and the other Latin possessions in ‘Romania’ (Ρωμανία).5 Contrary to Lilie’s assertion, crusading in Frankish Greece played a major role for the history of the area and displayed identifiable characteristics, the evolution of which can be traced over a period of time. To justify and activate this new crusade goal, the papacy had to develop and manipulate what might be termed ‘crusading mechanisms’, such as the proclamation and preaching of the cross (with the concomitant rhetoric and argumentation); the granting of crusading indulgences; the taking or commutation of crusade vows; privileges and protection conferred upon the crusaders; and the financing through taxation on ecclesiastical revenues, redemption of crusade vows, or other ‘crusading’ funds. The extension of these mechanisms to encompass attacks on Christian Greeks would not only ensure 3 

See below, Introduction, Section 2. Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, p. 200: ‘Kreuzzüge dieser Art richteten sich auch gegen die Byzantiner. Auch wenn diese “kleinen” Kreuzzüge sich so sehr voneinander unterschieden, dass es nicht sinnvoll ist, nach übergreifenden Zusammenhängen und Strukturen zu suchen’ [...]. 5  The term Romania, denoting the lands formerly constituting the Byzantine Empire, is rather more inclusive than ‘Frankish Greece’ but the two will be used interchangeably in the present study. For the development of the term’s usage, see in general: Wolff, ‘Romania’. 4 

INTRODUCTION

xvii

that crusading in Romania would have a lasting effect on local policies and relations between Latins and Greeks throughout the thirteenth century. It also represented a major shift in crusade ideology and practice. This development cannot be understood in isolation from the wider evolution of Holy War and the proliferation of crusading fronts. In this period crusades were launched not only in the Holy Land but also the Iberian Peninsula, the Baltic, southern France, Italy, and elsewhere. They targeted not only Muslims, pagans, and other ‘infidels’ but also ‘internal’ enemies of Christendom, such as heretics and secular opponents of the papacy. This expansion of crusading has been a central consideration of the ‘pluralist’ school of thought which has gained a position of prominence within crusade studies, a thriving field of scholarship over the past decades.6 The topic is of great importance as it ties in with wider issues, particularly the influence of the papacy and the respective roles of ecclesiastical and secular authorities within western society, as well as the political, commercial, and religious context of the interaction between the expanding Latin Christendom and the cultures around it. Yet, despite all this scholarly attention, the crusades in Frankish Greece have been overlooked, although they formed an important part of this process. The deployment of crusade mechanisms in Romania influenced, and was influenced by, contemporary developments in other fronts, for example the Albigensian Crusades against heretics in southern France. In striking contrast to the more well-known manifestations of crusading against other Christians, such as heretics and ‘disobedient’ secular rulers, which have attracted considerable interest, this is the first in-depth examination of crusades against Orthodox Christians.7 An attempt to fully interpret the history of Frankish Greece necessitates an understanding not only of local circumstances but also of the wider context of western involvement in the area. To discuss Latin Outremer and ChristianMuslim relations or north-western Europe and the German and Scandinavian 6 

Particularly influential have been the contributions of Jonathan Riley-Smith and his students. It should be evident that an acceptance of the pluralist approach to crusading (though with some qualifications) underlies the present work; for a recent overview of relevant historiography and the methodological questions involved, see Housley, Contesting the Crusades, esp. pp. 2–13; and Constable, ‘The Historiography of the Crusades’. 7  For crusading against other Christians in Western Europe, see particularly Housley, The Italian Crusades; Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’; and Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe. Regarding crusading against Orthodox Christians, there has been only some examination of expeditions against the Russians in the context of the Baltic Crusade, for example, Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 215–24; Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, pp. 132–37.

xviii

INTRODUCTION

expansion in the Baltic in the late Middle Ages without reference to the crusades is inconceivable. Why then has the history of Frankish Greece not been examined in this light, even though the Latin outposts in Romania were just as much ‘Crusader States’? This book reconsiders Greco-Latin contact in the thirteenth century by bringing into the equation the crusade as a major factor that defined cross-cultural interaction and challenges the dominant focus of scholarship on attempts for Church union in the late Byzantine period.

1. A Historiographical Gap: The State of Research on Crusading in Frankish Greece Approaching Frankish Greece as a crusading front is long overdue. While there has been a good deal of writing concerning the interaction between Byzantium and the West, the crusades in Romania have been disregarded not because the subject is unimportant but as a result of the traditional delimitation of subjects and periods and because of the interpretative approaches that dominated the relevant discourses in the past. First, crusading in Frankish Greece straddles not only the sub-disciplinary boundaries of crusade and Byzantine studies but also the traditional periodization within those fields: earlier and later crusades, pre-1204, and post-1261 Byzantine history. Crusading in Romania appears, so to say, like an unwanted child that both Byzantinists and crusade historians considered as belonging on the other side of the ‘fence’ of scholarly interests, where somebody else would be responsible or better qualified to take care of it. It is easy to discern this tendency in relevant scholarship. Most works on the impact of the crusading movement on Byzantium and its relations with the West do not proceed further than the Latin conquest of 1204. Studies on the ‘Later Crusades’, on the other hand, tend to set the Second Council of Lyon (1274) or the fall of Acre (1291) as their starting point, while historians of late Byzantium usually pick up the thread of contacts with the West after the restoration of the empire at Constantinople under the Palaiologan dynasty in 1261. Thus the best part of the crucial thirteenth century is very often overlooked. Second and most importantly, for most Byzantinists the issue of Church Union dominates examinations of Byzantinewestern interaction of the later period, and they often do not take into account much of the general literature on the crusades that could help place the subject in its wider context. Turning to crusade historiography, there is a very striking contrast between the scant attention given to the crusades in Frankish Greece and the extensive and outstanding scholarly examinations of the other fronts of crusading activity. Tyerman, for example, has identified seven distinct such fronts: the Holy

INTRODUCTION

xix

Land, Spain, the Baltic, Romania, the crusades against the Albigensian heretics, the ‘crusades against Christian enemies of the papacy’, and, later, Africa, the Atlantic, and the Americas.8 Romania is the only case which has not yet been treated in a monograph or a dedicated examination. The ‘crusades against the schismatic Greeks’ are rather relegated to passing references alongside the expeditions against heretics and those against Christian temporal powers (or ‘Political Crusades’, as they are often called), as a lesser partner in this triptych of ‘divergent’ crusades. A good example of such an approach, which led to the omission of a specialized study of crusading in Frankish Greece, is offered by the multi-volume A History of the Crusades with Kenneth Setton as its editor-in-chief. 9 Three contributions on ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’ have been included: the first one by Joan Hussey covering the period 1081–1204, and the other two by Deno Geanakoplos covering the periods 1261–1354 and 1345–1453 respectively.10 The period from 1204 to 1261 is treated in two separate contributions concerning the conquest, the internal structure and the local policy of the Latin states in Romania; neither takes an interest in the way the crusade was applied in the area, except for marginal references.11 Furthermore, in the second volume of that work, which deals with the thirteenth century, there are dedicated chapters to the Albigensian and Political Crusades but, yet again, no treatment of the crusades in Frankish Greece.12 This approach has not changed much in recent times, as the same pattern is observable in the New Cambridge Medieval History. One can find entire chapters on both the Albigensian and the Baltic crusades but only passing references to the crusades in Romania.13 Literature on the connection of Byzantium with the crusades has focused over­whelmingly on the period before 1204, as is evident, for example, in the contributions of Paul Lemerle, Steven Runciman, and Charles Brand, to mention 8 

Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades, pp. 42–44. A History of the Crusades, ed. by Setton, particularly vols ii–iii. 10  Hussey, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’; and Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453’. 11  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp.  209, 219–22, 225; Longnon, ‘The Frankish States in Greece’, p. 243. 12  Evans, ‘The Albigensian Crusade’; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’. 13  Hamilton, ‘The Albigensian Crusade and Heresy’; and Burleigh, ‘The Military Orders in the Baltic’. References to crusading in Frankish Greece in Housley, ‘The Thirteenthcentury Crusades in the Mediterranean’, pp. 571, 585–87; and Jacoby, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece’, p. 530. 9 

INTRODUCTION

xx

some of the best known and most influential ones.14 Similar is the chronological focus of the most recent works on the subject by Ralph-Johannes Lilie and Jonathan Harris. Lilie’s excellent examination of relations between Byzantium and the Crusader States stops at the Latin conquest of Constantinople.15 His more recent book on Byzantium and the crusades, as already noted, only deals with the period after 1204 in a brief appendix, where the sole anti-Byzantine ‘crusade’ examined is the expedition of Charles of Anjou — which, as will be shown, is the least characteristic case for Romania and in most respects hardly a crusade.16 Harris’s extensive treatment of the way the crusades came to clash with the empire’s ideology and policies is the most thorough analysis of Byzantine interaction with the crusading movement, but it is mainly concerned with the events and attitudes leading up to the debacle of 1204. Harris refers to the developments after 1204 and up to 1291 only as an epilogue to his main thesis. He briefly mentions that crusades were deployed against the Greeks in Romania, pointing to the arguments and justifications invoked and stating that these efforts met with limited response from the West.17 On the other hand, the works dealing with Byzantine-western relations in the period after 1204 are conditioned by the focus on the schism, and particularly the negotiations for union between the Greek and the Roman Church, allowing very little space for the examination of crusading in Frankish Greece. This is clearly the case with D. M. Nicol’s various studies,18 as well as with the major works on relations between Byzantium and the papacy in the Later Middle Ages by Walter Norden, Kenneth Setton, and Joseph Gill.19 Setton’s imposing study The Papacy and the Levant is of particular interest. Despite his statement that he considers the examination of his subject in the thirteenth century as ‘essentially a history of the later crusades’, his references to crusading in Frankish Greece are relatively few and dispersed, while he devotes much more space to Church Union negotiations.20 Setton’s work is an admirable and painstakingly detailed 14 

See the works cited in note 2 above. Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States. 16  Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 200–10 at 200–03. 17  Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 163–82, at 171, 177–81. 18  For example: Nicol, ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons’; Nicol, ‘Popular Religious Roots of the Byzantine Reactions to the Second Council of Lyons’. 19  Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy. 20  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i: quotation p. vii; references to crusading in Frankish Greece: pp. 2, 14 (note 52), 50–54, 57, 63–66, 98–100, 132, 138, 163–69. 15 

INTRODUCTION

xxi

achievement, immensely valuable for any examination of the period. But because of the work’s strict chronological order of presentation, there is no synoptic analysis of how the implementation of crusading affected policy and attitudes in the Greek East, or the way it was affected by them. Deno Geanakoplos is a rare exception in investigating Byzantium and the crusades after the twelfth century and stressing that crusading was an important and recurrent factor in late Byzantine history. 21 He points out that crusades against the Greeks — which he terms ‘a perversion of the original crusading ideal’ — could only be deployed and seen as justified after 1204 through the arguments of the ‘healing’ of the Greek Schism and the help afforded to the Holy Land. However, his examination starts from 1261, entirely omitting the period that saw the genesis and shaping of the essential characteristics of the crusades in Frankish Greece, on which all subsequent developments depended. Furthermore, Geanakoplos ultimately does not escape the pre-eminence of the issue of Church Union which, in his view, ‘gives an element of continuity to the total picture’.22 Only a very recent study, by Chris Wright, avoids this restrictive focus while examining the impact of the crusades on Byzantium both before and after 1204. But even this thoughtful, balanced, and thought-provoking synthesis fails to deal at any length with the deployment of crusading against the Byzantines.23 The emphasis on ecclesiastical negotiations has resulted in a skewed view of Byzantine-western interaction in the thirteenth century which disregards a prominent factor of policy-making in Frankish Greece. Crusading was a major and consistent consideration for the Apostolic See and the western powers, as well as for the local Latin and Greek rulers in Romania. The negotiations for Church Union, by contrast, were a reactive approach to this reality. The initiative for such negotiations came, by and large, from the Byzantine side, and the main objective was to forestall the danger western crusading expeditions posed to the security of the successor Greek states and to their efforts to reclaim formerly imperial territories, most of all Constantinople. This can account for the fact that the Byzantine leadership adopted unionist policies which were widely unpopular with the majority of the Greek clergy and population. Byzantine rulers were not so cut off from reality as to consider that the pope held the sole and ultimate 21 

Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453’. Nicol’s examination of Byzantine interaction with the crusading movement also extended into the post-1204 period but, as in his other works, his interpretation was conditioned by the emphasis on Church Union: Nicol, ‘The Crusades and the Unity of Christendom’. 22  Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, pp. 29, 32–33. 23  Wright, ‘On the Margins of Christendom’, pp. 64–66.

INTRODUCTION

xxii

political authority over all western peoples and that he could single-handedly return Constantinople to its rightful owners. The insistence on negotiating with the papacy was a direct result of the central role the latter played in proclaiming crusades. The Byzantine leadership was familiarized by this stage with crusading theory and practice, while the experience of the Fourth Crusade provided instruction, if any was needed, of the potentially devastating results of such expeditions. It was an explicit objective of their policy to disqualify themselves as crusading targets by posing as obedient sons of the Church and securing papal acquiescence for their efforts to reclaim or, after 1261, retain Constantinople. Crusading in Frankish Greece could have an important impact not only on policies but also on attitudes between Greeks and Latins. The crusade was a central element of the way westerners interacted with the world around them in a period of assertive and often aggressive expansion of Latin Christendom. Designating ‘others’ (Muslims, pagans, heretics, heterodox Christians) as enemies of the Faith, and therefore crusade targets, could not but affect attitudes and perceptions on both sides. Hearing the official church, through local clergy and specially commissioned crusade preachers, declare Holy War against such ‘enemies’, with whom the vast majority of people in the West had little or no direct contact, could not fail to shape certain assumptions and influence initial perceptions. On the Byzantine side, the experience of 1204 embittered attitudes towards the West, while the overhanging threat of further crusading expeditions in Frankish Greece aimed at defending or repeating the outcomes of the Fourth Crusade could only exacerbate the situation. Yet these points have not been explored, mostly because studies of attitudes and perceptions between Byzantium and the West follow a pattern similar to the one described above. Many of them examine the period up to 1204,24 while in those that treat later developments the crusade takes second place to ecclesiastical conflict and the reception of Church Union negotiations. 25 It is only recent research on Latins’ views of the Byzantines during the crusades that transcends the pre- and post-1204 dichotomy and tries to assess more systematically the continuities and changes throughout this period. The doctoral theses of Savvas 24 

For example: Schieffer, ‘Zum lateinischen Byzanzbild vor 1204’; Arbagi, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes’; Ebels-Hoving, Byzantium in westerse ogen; Ebels-Hoving, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes’; Hermans, ‘Byzantine View of the Latin West before 1204’; Schmandt, ‘Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth Crusade’; Ciggaar, Western Travellers to Constantinople; Abrahamse, ‘Byzantine Views of the West’. 25  For example: Angold, ‘Greeks and Latins after 1204’; Kolbaba, ‘Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious “Errors”’.

INTRODUCTION

xxiii

Neocleous and Marc Carrier, both on the image of the Byzantines in western eyes, choose to take their examination from the First Crusade to 1230 and 1261 respectively, in order to investigate the immediate impact of the conquest of Constantinople on perceptions.26 Neocleous rejects the view that there was a generalized hostile view of the Byzantines in the West during the twelfth and the early thirteenth century. He argues forcefully that too much has been made out of disparate and unrepresentative statements. There was no unitary view or even a polarized perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Latin views of Byzantium: ‘Latins and Byzantines were members of a religious community, namely Christendom’, while the empire was another one of the entities making up medieval Europe, ‘an integral part of the Christian world’.27 Neocleous appears too quick at times to explain away the evidence that he has gathered himself on anti-Byzantine sentiments in western sources; nevertheless, he offers an important corrective and a crucial reminder that we cannot expect a monolithic western view of consistently growing hostility towards Byzantium, certainly not in the twelfth century. Marc Carrier also argues that not all westerners shared the same view of ­Byzantium and that there were significant variations at any given time. Nevertheless, Carrier’s assessment is more nuanced. Acknowledging the notion of Christian fraternity and co-operation, as well as the admiration for the splendours of Byzantium, Carrier nonetheless notes the presence of a ‘cultural rivalry’ with alternating phases of calm and hostility. Carrier takes into consideration cultural aspects that are mostly overlooked by Neocleous, such as the differences in the value systems of westerners and Byzantines, for example the ideas of chivalry and the feudal code that inspired the former. Although Carrier, like Neocleous, rejects the view of a generalized and constantly growing sentiment of hostility towards Byzantium in the West in the twelfth century, his opinion is that the Fourth Crusade and the capture of Constantinople brought about a ‘concretization’ of the religious and cultural schism between Greeks and Latins. He detects the most virulent and practically unanimous criticism of the Byzantines in western sources in the aftermath of 1204, to a large extent motivated by specific political and ‘psychological’ considerations, namely to legitimize the conquest of Constantinople and to exculpate themselves from the violence committed against other Christians.28 26 

Neocleous, ‘Imaging the Byzantines’, esp. pp. 328–77; Carrier, ‘L’Image des byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les chroniqueurs’, esp. pp. 393–458. 27  Neocleous, ‘Imaging the Byzantines’, pp. 370 and 376 respectively. 28  Carrier, ‘L’Image des byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les chroniqueurs’, for example pp. 393–95, 414, 452–53.

xxiv

INTRODUCTION

But even in these works no attention has been given to crusading in Frankish Greece, although this could have provided fuller explanations for some of the conclusions reached: for example the fact that certain recriminations, particularly the characterization of Greeks as schismatics, became much more pronounced after 1204 than they had been in the twelfth century, a development noted by both Neocleous and Carrier.29 What these studies make clear is that attitudes towards the Byzantines in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have been imperfectly understood and have been presented in rather simplistic terms in earlier historiography. Evaluating how the proclamation of crusades against the Greeks in the thirteenth century affected western opinion becomes an even more important consideration now that is has been established that western views were far from unanimously hostile before 1204. Of course, it cannot be claimed that the deployment of crusading in Frankish Greece went completely unnoticed by research. This could have hardly been possible, as it is a recurrent theme in the sources of the period. However, it was never allowed centre stage. Writers on the Latin conquest and the Frankish states in Romania allude to the use of the crusade for their defence but offer no systematic treatment, apparently considering the issue peripheral to their main subject of internal organization and local policy of these states. However, the number of those disparate references to crusading in Frankish Greece hints at its actual importance for the history of the region.30 The realization of this fact is gaining ground. Several relevant references are found, for example, in Michael Angold’s recent monograph on the Fourth Crusade and its aftermath, as well as in Filip van Tricht’s book on the Latin Empire.31 References to crusading in Frankish Greece occur with greater frequency in the context of crusade historiography. Older studies on the Later Crusades had virtually nothing to add about thirteenth-century crusading in Romania, as they commonly started their examination from the fall of Acre (1291) and their focus remained firmly on the Holy Land.32 However, more recent works, which mostly 29 

Neocleous, ‘Imaging the Byzantines’, pp. 318–21, 326, 363, 370–71; Carrier, ‘L’Image des byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les chroniqueurs’, pp. 410–11, 430–32. 30  Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 56, 61–65, 83–86, 112–15; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 209, 219–21, 224–25; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 53–55, 81, 101–02, 156, 162–63, 171, 173–74, 179–82, 185; Longnon, ‘The Frankish States in Greece’, p. 243. 31  Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 116, 122–23, 134, 185, 226–27, 261; Van Tricht, The Latin ‘Renovatio’ of Byzantium, pp. 95–99, 137, 193, 244, 279, 297–98, 301, 378, 382–85, 457–59. 32  Atiya, The Crusade in the Late Middle Ages; Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient;

INTRODUCTION

xxv

adhere to the ‘pluralist’ approach of the Crusade as an ‘institution’ deployed on several fronts besides the Holy Land, tend to set the Second Council of Lyon (1274) as their starting point. Touching upon the later part of the period we will be dealing with, they seem to accord a more noteworthy place to crusading in the Greek East. Prominent among them, of course, is the work of Norman Housley who includes a chapter on ‘The Crusade in Romania, 1274–1396’ in his survey of The Later Crusades.33 Christopher Tyerman also refers to expeditions against the Greeks when considering the crusades against Christians and comparing them to the ones for the Holy Land.34 Indeed, literature that deals with crusading against Christians makes more or less frequent references to the crusades in Frankish Greece, but they are only tangential.35 In fact, Rebecca Rist explicitly excludes the expeditions against the Orthodox Greeks from her study of crusading against Christians in Europe.36 Relevant references can also be found in works focusing on the ideology, propagation, and criticism of the crusades.37 But in all these cases the issue of crusading in Frankish Greece is dealt with cursorily and incidentally — and at times also inaccurately. For example, Maureen Purcell claimed that indulgences were not granted for a crusade in Romania until Innocent IV and mostly later, in the context of Angevin involvement in the Balkans.38 In fact, indulgences were Iorga, Philippe de Mézières et la croisade; and Heidelberger, Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende — an exception in that it makes some reference to ‘the Greek question’, pp. 25–30. 33  Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 49–79; see also Schein, Fideles crucis, with references to crusading in Romania and the connection of Byzantium and Constantinople in crusade theory and planning of the period 1274–1314, pp. 30–31, 61–62, 105–07, 138, 175–79, 182–86, 208–10, 256, 259–60, 268 (notes 8–9); and also Schmieder, ‘Enemy, Obstacle, Ally?’. 34  Tyerman, ‘The Holy Land and the Crusades of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’; Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades, pp. 42–45, 68, 90–94; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 91, 311–13. 35  Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’; Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 234–66, esp. pp. 242, 247; Housley, Contesting the Crusades, pp. 99, 105, 116–17, 121; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 367, 369–70; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 132–33, 139–40, 143–45, 147–48, 156–58. 36  Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, p. ix. 37  See, for example, Cole, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, pp. 99–100, 163, 189–90; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 33–34, 37–43, 52, 69, 79, 84, 101–02, 124–27, 145, 163; Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, pp. 86–88; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, pp. 18–20, 87; Villey, La Croisade, pp. 228–35; Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land, pp. 25– 26, 32–33, 75–76, 90–91, 99–100, 138–44, 173; Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 168–75; Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, pp. 30–31, 63–64. 38  Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, pp. 86–87.

xxvi

INTRODUCTION

granted as early as 1205, whereas it is actually unlikely that they were offered for Charles’s planned expedition.39 Elizabeth Siberry has stated that ‘it was only in 1236 […] that the papacy actually launched a crusade with the avowed intention of attacking the Greeks’,40 whereas such crusades were already initiated by Innocent III, and the Greeks were explicitly described as the targets of the expeditions organized by Honorius III.41 Nevertheless, there has been some research touching more substantially on certain aspects of crusading in Frankish Greece in the period 1204–82 which we will be using and comparing to our own conclusions. One of the most important pieces is the relatively brief but insightful contribution by Malcolm Barber on western attitudes towards Romania, including the introduction of the crusade in the area.42 Alan Forey has also included important materials pertaining to Frankish Greece in his examination of the use of the military orders against Christians.43 Innocent III’s policy in Romania after the conquest of Constantinople is included in the extensive work on the pope’s overall crusading policy by Helmut Roscher.44 Gregory IX’s far-reaching efforts for the mobilization of a crusade for Constantinople in the 1230s, which surpassed those of any other pope, have understandably drawn most of the attention, including an article by Richard Spence and substantial parts of Michael Lower’s recent book on the Barons’ Crusade.45 For the crucial reign of Michael Palaiologos and generally the period

39 

See below, Chapters 1.1, 1.3, and 5.6. Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, p. 174. 41  See below, Chapters 1 and 2. Similarly, Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62, considers that the crusade under Marquis William of Montferrat was the first and only one that arrived in Romania, but see below, Chapter 1.3, for Nivelon’s expedition, and Chapter 3.5 for Baldwin’s crusade. See also Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, whose persistently apologetic approach to the policy of the papacy leads him to the surprising conclusion that the crusade was never deployed against the Greeks (pp. 244, 247–48) and that the Latin Church never approved western aggression against Byzantium — contradicting himself: Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 106, 112 (crusades of Urban IV against Greeks in Constantinople and the Morea), 188 (papal support for Philip of Taranto’s expedition), 249 (popes from Honorius IV to Clement V seemed ‘inclined to approve [Latin] projects for [Constantinople’s] reconquest’). 42  Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’. 43  Forey, ‘The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians’, esp. pp. 2–5. 44  Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 119–31. 45  Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade. 40 

INTRODUCTION

xxvii

around and after 1261, Geanakoplos’s works are indispensable.46 Finally, the various western plans and efforts to reclaim Constantinople after 1261 have been examined by Erwin Dade.47 Despite a growing awareness of the importance of crusading in Frankish Greece, a systematic examination elucidating its characteristics and development is still lacking. Such a synthesis is necessary, as it will not only restore the factual framework of the involvement of Latin powers in thirteenth-century Romania, correcting misconceptions and inaccuracies, but also lead to the reinterpretation of the history of the region by including an important factor which has been overlooked. At the same time it will contribute to our understanding of the crusading movement at large, through the investigation of a hitherto unexplored crusade front and the opportunity for comparisons with the better-known ones.

2. Background: Crusading Aggression against Byzantium in the Twelfth Century Crusading exerted a lasting and formative influence on Byzantine-western interaction after 1204. The radical difference from the earlier period lies in the launching of crusades directly against the Greeks, with full and explicit papal sanction and backing. This is a clear break from the policy followed in the twelfth century. The crusades were closely connected to Byzantium ever since their inception, as it was an appeal for help to the beleaguered empire in 1095 ‘that set off the chain of events that led to the First Crusade’.48 It had certainly been far from a smooth and peaceful co-existence from that point on. A lot of ink has been spilt over the ‘growth of popular animosity’ between the Greeks and the Latins during the twelfth century.49 Without dwelling long on it, suffice it to say that, despite 46 

Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’; Geanakoplos, ‘Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration’. 47  Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, esp. pp. 1–65 for the period up to 1285. 48  Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, p. 1. See also, for example, Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 47–55, and Charanis, ‘Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade’. 49  See, for example, Runciman, The Eastern Schism, pp. 124–44, 78–101; see also the studies on attitudes before 1204 cited in note 24 above, and the works dealing with interaction between Byzantium and the early crusades, in note 2 above. The literature on the subject is immense and varied in its conclusions.

xxviii

INTRODUCTION

occasional and sporadic efforts of co-operation, the prevalent attitude was that of hostility. Although recent research, such as the aforementioned works by Carrier and Neocleous, has pointed out that there was no uniformly negative view of Byzantium in the West, it remains the case that the empire found itself frequently engaged in hostilities with western powers during the twelfth century. Many factors contributed to this, such as the political antagonism between the empire and the Normans, the commercial expansion of the Italian maritime republics, the ecclesiastical differences between western and eastern Christendom, and the often contrasting aims of the crusaders and the Byzantine state. The crusades played a crucial role. First, by bringing Byzantines and Latins in closer contact, they allowed for the realization of differences and multiplied the occasions for friction. Furthermore, crusading lay at the basis of one of the most persistent accusations against the Greeks, namely that they were unhelpful or even a hindrance to the cause of the Holy Land. The way the interests of the empire were pursued — especially when contrasted with the expectations the westerners had of it — was often dismissed as treacherous towards Christendom, since it occasionally involved conflict with the crusaders as well as alliances with the Muslims.50 In combination with accusations that the Byzantines were false Christians, who spurned the Latin rite and disobeyed the Roman pope, this could prove dangerous, as the crusade could potentially be turned against them. The crusade was, then, a new instrument through which aggression towards Byzantium could be channelled. Skirmishes between crusaders and Byzantine forces took place even during the First Crusade. Several members of the French army of the Second Crusade, prominent among them Bishop Godfrey of Langres, proposed an attack on Constantinople on the grounds that the Greeks were deceitful, unhelpful, and ‘Christians only in name’. However, such proposals were turned down by the king and the majority of the crusading army. During the Third Crusade, the army of Frederick I Barbarossa actually clashed with Byzantine forces hindering the German crusaders. Nevertheless, the German emperor desisted from any further action once Isaac Angelos granted free passage, even though some of the knights insisted that he should press on with 50 

The relevant literature is extensive; see, for example, Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp.  90–91, 98–100, 103, 127–42, 146–51; Harris, ‘Collusion with the Infidel’; Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, pp. 177–78, 182–84, 190, 254; Runciman, The Eastern Schism, pp. 92–94, 124–28, 132; Neocleous, ‘Imaging the Byzantines’, pp. 81–85, 140–42, 146–48, 212–31, 238–46, 333–40; and Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 59, 67–68, 85, 99, 112–13, 120–23, 131–33, 139, 156, 164–65, 180–81, 232–40, 250–53, 255–57, for the effect such western perceptions had on Byzantine policy.

INTRODUCTION

xxix

an attack against Constantinople. In all these cases opposition to plans against Byzantium proved stronger.51 Even during the Fourth Crusade, the proposal to attack Byzantium met with considerable resistance from within the army.52 And the attack on Constantinople, it must be remembered, was a diversion from the original aim of the crusade and was considered as such by all of the protagonists involved, whether they denounced it or tried to justify it. The most striking case of an alleged crusade against Byzantium is probably the invasion of the empire by Bohemond in 1107–08. In his fight against Alexios I Komnenos the Norman leader indeed used an army of crusaders, and while recruiting them in France he had called for the punishment of the iniquitous Greeks, denouncing the ‘treacherous conduct’ of the emperor towards the First Crusade. Such events have led several scholars to consider that the crusade was then for the first time employed against the Christian Greeks.53 But Rowe has argued convincingly that papal approval was given only for an expedition to the Holy Land and not to Bohemond’s plans against Byzantium. Therefore the Norman leader misled both the papacy and many of the participants in the army, and his attack was in effect a diversion of the crusade.54 This impression is further strengthened by the fact that most of Bohemond’s soldiers, after their leader’s defeat by Alexios, continued to the Holy Land, obviously considering their crusading oath unfulfilled.55 As our examination will make evident, there is a world of difference between the ambiguous character and the unclear circumstances 51 

See, for example, Daly, ‘Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constan­ tinople’, and Schmandt, ‘Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth Crusade’, for a synoptic presentation of such proposals and their rejection. See also: Laiou, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century’. 52  See, for example: Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, pp. 85–89, 92–95, 97– 99; Queller, Compton, and Campbell, ‘The Fourth Crusade: The Neglected Majority’, esp. pp. 454–63; Neocleous, ‘Imaging the Byzantines’, pp. 273–86. 53  See, for example, Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 67–74; Runciman, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’, p. 20; Charanis, ‘Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzantium’, pp. 129–30; Phillips, ‘Odo of Deuil’s “De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem” as a Source for the Second Crusade’, pp. 85, 87; Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 51, 117–19, 129–30; Laiou, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century’, pp. 19–20. 54  Rowe, ‘Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire’. 55  Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader, p. 123; see Whalen, ‘God’s Will or Not?’, esp. pp. 120–23, who argues that even if the pope and the participants were aware of Bohemond’s plans and intentions and did not necessarily disapprove, they nonetheless envisaged a crusade to the Holy Land, and not a ‘holy war’ against the Byzantines, as the main aim of the expedition.

INTRODUCTION

xxx

surrounding Bohemond’s attack on Byzantium and the explicit proclamation of crusades against the Greeks in the thirteenth century. Allowing for the very different institutional framework of crusading — or rather lack thereof — in the early twelfth century by comparison to the thirteenth, the contrast between the indisputable evidence of the later cases with the inferred aims and status of Bohemond’s campaign is nevertheless telling. Some scholars have also claimed that hostility towards Byzantium as expressed after the collapse of the Second Crusade in both lay and clerical circles in the West (including figures like Peter the Venerable, Abbot Suger of St Denis, Bernard of Clairvaux, Roger II of Sicily, and even Louis VII of France) led to the planning of a crusade against the empire with the consent of Pope Eugenius III around 1149– 50.56 However, such claims have been disproven and it has been conclusively shown that the sole aim of the planned expedition was to provide help to the Franks of Outremer. Except for the anti-Byzantine tirades of Peter the Venerable at the time, the relevant sources make no mention of an attack on Byzantium. At most a parallel, but unrelated to the crusading plans of 1150, French-Sicilian expedition against the empire might have been envisaged by some; and evidence for this is slim, to say the least.57

3. Crusading in Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century: Overview of the Political Situation, Main Themes of the Examination, and Sources The main aims of the present study will be, first, to sketch the development of crusading in Frankish Greece by tracing the gradual deployment of crusade mechanisms in the area; second, to put this development in context with reference to the political realities of the time, locally and more widely (in western Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, and other crusade fronts); and finally, to assess its impact on the politics of the region, on the relations between Greeks and Latins, and on the overall evolution of crusading in the thirteenth century. It would be useful to set the scene first by briefly outlining the political situation in Romania in the wake of the Latin conquest, as the extreme fragmenta56 

For example: Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 81–87; Runciman, A History of the Crusades, ii, 286; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, p. 162; Mayer, The Crusades, p. 104; Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 129–30; Schmandt, ‘Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth Crusade’, pp. 291–92. 57  Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, pp. 112–18; Constable, ‘The Crusading Project of 1150’; Reuter, ‘The “Non-Crusade” of 1149–1150’.

INTRODUCTION

xxxi

tion of authority in the area can be confusing.58 In general terms, the spoils of the Fourth Crusade were shared between the Franks and the Venetians. According to the partition agreement between the crusaders, the emperor would receive onequarter of the empire while the rest of the land would be divided equally between the Franks and the Venetians. The original distribution, however, was an exercise on paper. In reality, considerable stretches of territory were never conquered by the Latins, while there were also several trade-offs between the interested parties; for example, Boniface of Montferrat sold his rights over Crete to the Venetians, in exchange for their support to his claim on Thessalonica. The political settlement of Romania was, in essence, a mixture of two different traditions: Byzantine imperial rule and western feudal customs (with elements of Italian communal administration brought in for good measure, particularly in the Venetian domains and their relation to the empire). The Latin emperor at Constantinople was, in theory, the supreme ruler of the land as the successor to the Byzantine emperors, something which was stressed in his coronation and title. In practice, however, he was was little more that the feudal overlord of a number of semi-autonomous lordships. His power over them depended on the resources and the abilities of individual emperors to impose their will. The area under the direct control of the Constantinopolitan emperor (the Latin Empire proper, so to say) included the land west of the town of Makri in Thrace, some islands mostly in north-eastern Aegean (such as Lemnos and Lesbos), as well as an area of north-western Asia Minor, which the empire was not able to hold on to after the first two decades. An assortment of feudal states covered the bulk of the other, formerly Byzantine, territories. Initially, the most important of them was the kingdom of Thessalonica, created around the empire’s second city, a consolation prize to Boniface of Montferrat for having lost out to Baldwin of Flanders for the imperial title. In its heyday it encompassed the greater part of northern and central Greece. Further to the south was the duchy of Athens, created by fiefs handed out by Boniface. Stretching along the eastern coast of central Greece was the island of Euboea (Negroponte), which from the early days was split into three large feudal units whose lords were known as the triarchs or terzieri. In the Peloponnese was 58 

What follows is, by necessity, a very brief and simplified description of the situation in Frankish Greece. For more details and discussion, see: Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 49–77 (esp. pp. 61–69); Longnon, ‘The Frankish States in Greece’, pp. 235–48; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 187–95; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 5–8, 45–51, 57–60, 88–92, 142–55, 161–92 (esp. pp. 162–67); Jacoby, La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale, pp. 19–27, 185–95, 223–26, 271–80, 295–99, 309–11; Jacoby, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece’.

xxxii

INTRODUCTION

established the principality of Achaia, whose conquest was carried out by William of Champlitte and Geoffrey of Villehardouin, for the most part independently of the main effort of the crusaders north of the Isthmus. The principality soon became the strongest and most stable of the Latin states of Frankish Greece. The Latin Empire would repeatedly depend on Achaian reinforcements for its survival, while a chivalric culture flourished in the court of the princes at Andravida. However, the principality’s fortunes changed after Prince William of Villehardouin was captured by Michael Palaiologos at the battle of Pelagonia (1259); from 1267 it found itself under Angevin suzerainty and then, in 1278, under their direct control. Nevertheless, although its territory was slowly eroded by the Byzantine recovery, it remained the most potent bulwark of Frankish presence on mainland Greece in the thirteenth century. The list of the great feudal lordships was completed with the duchy of the Archipelago, centred on Naxos and including most of the islands of central and southern Aegean. Several of these islands were handed out to Venetian families, like the Ghisi, to be held as fiefs from the duke. Although the dukes of the Archipelago were Venetians (the founder Marco I Sanudo was a nephew of the doge), they held their land as a fief directly from the Latin emperor. Besides the Frankish states, there were also the Venetian possessions. Although Venice was supposed to receive three-eighths of the empire’s land according to the division pact, eventually it contented itself with direct rule over a much smaller portion which, however, included crucial naval and commercial outposts, setting the foundations for the Serenissima’s maritime empire in the centuries to come. Venice only started the conquest of the territories that had been assigned to it in 1207. The lands directly controlled by the representatives of the metropolis included the ports of Modon and Coron in southern Peloponnese, temporarily Corfu (1207–17), and Crete, the most important Venetian possession, which only fell to the Ottomans in the seventeenth century. There was also the considerable Venetian quarter in Constantinople where, besides its commercial centre of activities, Venice had furthermore been given control over the patriarchate. In 1209, both the prince of Achaia and Ravanno dalle Carceri, the greatest lord of Negroponte, recognized the overlordship of Venice, retaining at the same time their liege homage to the Latin emperor. In the case of Achaia this translated into little more than an alliance, but Venetian influence in Negroponte grew over time. The Latin emperor was the ultimate overlord of Romania, to whom both Venetians and Frankish lords owed military service for their lands, although he was in turn bound by the advice of a mixed Veneto-Frankish council. The emperor’s control over the other Frankish states was asserted most dynamically under Henry of Hainault (1206–16), who put down the challenge of the

INTRODUCTION

xxxiii

Lombard lords of Thessalonica to his authority and intervened to settle the kingdom’s succession, while he also received the direct submission at the first meeting of Ravennika (1209) of the lords of Euboea and of Otto de la Roche of Athens, as well as of Prince Geoffrey I of Achaia. On the other hand, the relationship of Venice with the empire was rather special as, in the words of David Jacoby, it ‘combined elements of subordination and equality’.59 Although the Venetians within the empire, like the Franks, had to swear an oath of fealty to the Latin emperor and supply him with troops, Venice acted as an intermediary between the emperor and the fief-holders in her domains, while the podestà at Constantinople was responsible for the collective Venetian military obligations to the emperor. In return, Venetians enjoyed administrative, juridical, and commercial privileges and freedoms, while the enemies of the republic were also the enemies of the empire. Venice was, thus, firmly integrated into the structure of the Latin Empire, and had a stake in it that would make the Serenissima the most consistent protector of Frankish Greece among western powers. It should be kept in mind, of course, that the situation in Romania was fluid throughout the thirteenth century and there was a constant flow and ebb of the fortunes of the various protagonists, both Latins and their opponents. The above mostly describe the situation in the early 1210s, when the conquest had for the greatest part been concluded, when the major political entities had been consolidated, and before the Frankish states started to unravel. Power relations changed frequently, however, defying attempts to describe them in overly constitutional terms. For example, as the power of Achaia grew and that of the Latin Empire declined in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, several of the lords of Frankish Greece became the Achaian prince’s vassals. In 1248, the Latin emperor granted the latter the overlordship over the duchy of the Archipelago and over Negroponte, in exchange for his help in defending Constantinople. In 1258 the duke of Athens also recognized the prince’s overlordship, following a war between them. Besides such shifts in the internal dynamics of the Latin states, the major changes to the above configuration of Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century included, as we will see, the destruction of the kingdom of Thessalonica (1224) and the fall of the Latin Empire (1261) at the hands of the Greeks, as well as the Angevin involvement and suzerainty over Achaia from 1267 onwards. The Frankish conquerors did not manage to subdue the Byzantine territory in its entirety. Three states sprung up in the areas still under Greek control: 59 

Jacoby, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece’, p. 531.

xxxiv

INTRODUCTION

Trebizond, Epiros, and Nicaea, all of them claiming to be the continuators of the Byzantine Empire. Trebizond, on the south coast of the Black Sea, under the Grand Komnenoi, had actually broken away from the empire shortly before the conquest of Constantinople. However, it played only a marginal role in the affairs of Romania, particularly after Nicaea gained control of the area of Paphlagonia and thus deprived Trebizond of direct contact with the Latin Empire. The two main antagonists for the Latins were Epiros on the west and Nicaea on the east, created in the first years after the conquest. The state of Epiros in western Greece, with the city of Arta as its capital, was established by Michael Doukas Komnenos, a relative of the emperors of the Angelos dynasty. The empire at Nicaea, in Asia Minor, was set up by Theodore I Lascaris, a Constantinopolitan noble. After the death of Patriarch John X Kamateros in 1206, it also became the seat of the exiled Byzantine patriarchate. Both Epiros and Nicaea professed the recovery of Constantinople and the restoration of the Byzantine Empire as their aim. The Epirotes initially came closer to achieving this, after capturing Thessalonica in 1224 and putting an end to the Latin kingdom there. However, it was Nicaea that eventually succeeded in reclaiming the Queen of Cities in 1261, under Michael VIII Palaiologos, the founder of the last imperial dynasty of Byzantium.60 The Greeks of Nicaea and Epiros were the main targets of the crusades in Romania, while their pressure and the defeats they inflicted upon the Latins were the basic trigger for the proclamation of these expeditions. To complete the image of thirteenth-century Romania, mention should also be made of two other powers that acted as a check on the strength and ambitions of the Greek and Latin states. In the west, in the northern part of the Balkans, were the Bulgarians, who played a crucial role in the fortunes of the area. They proved a formidable enemy to Greeks and Latins alike. Under Tsar Kalojan (1197–1207) they inflicted the first major defeat on the conquerors of Constantinople, crushing the army of the Latin Empire at Adrianople in 1205, where Baldwin I was taken prisoner and never seen again. Similarly, the victory of John Asen (1218–41) over Theodore Doukas in 1230, at the height of the latter’s power, brought about the collapse of Epiros. Having replaced Theodore as the greatest power in the Balkans, and harbouring ambitions of his own towards Constantinople, Asen spent the rest of his reign alternating between an alliance with John Vatatzes of Nicaea and an understanding with the Latins. After Asen’s death, however, Bulgarian power declined on account of internal instability 60 

For the Greek states in Romania, see, for example: Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261); Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile; Angold, ‘Byzantium in Exile’ (with extensive bibliography).

INTRODUCTION

xxxv

caused by the minority of his heir and the fractiousness of the nobility.61 In the east, on the other hand, the Seljuk sultanate of Rum was the greatest competitor of Nicaea and more of a threat to its survival than the Latin Empire ever was, as the Seljuks contested the Anatolian provinces which formed the backbone of the Greek state. Theodore Lascaris’s great victory at Antioch-on-the-Maeander in 1211, where he reportedly killed the sultan in single combat, gave Nicaea the necessary breathing space, but the long frontier with the Seljuks remained a major preoccupation down to Vatatzes’s victorious campaigns in 1225–31. When the Seljuks were decisively defeated by the Mongols at Köse-Dagh, in 1243, and the sultanate was turned into a Mongol protectorate, it ceased being a threat to Nicaea, with the result that political and commercial ties between the two states grew stronger. Seljuk weakness brought new perils, however, as pressure on the Byzantine eastern frontier grew again in the 1250s and 1260s, this time from the nomadic Turkomans; eventually the Byzantines lost control of the area after the Turkoman onslaught became completely unchecked following the collapse of Seljukid power in 1276–77.62 Having outlined the general setting within which crusades in Romania operated, we should now look at the main themes for the examination of these expeditions and their development. As noted earlier, the justificatory arguments for crusading aggression against the Greeks were readily available by the late twelfth century. The Greeks were hostile to the crusades, and therefore a replacement of their rule in Constantinople with a Latin one would be very helpful to the Holy Land. It would keep the route free for any further expeditions to Palestine and provide additional reinforcement and protection to the Latin states of Syria by itself. To this was now added the point that, through their subjugation, the Greeks would be purged from their schism and ‘return to the mother Church of Rome’. As we will see, the view that the Greeks were schismatics, or even heretics, was only sporadically expressed and had not gained widespread currency in the West before 1204.63 It was only then that this argument was widely propagated in order to legitimize the attack on the Byzantine capital, and 61 

See in general: Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, pp. 60–216; and the works cited in the previous note. 62  Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile, pp. 97–102, 116; Langdon, Byzantium’s Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor, esp. pp. 1–13; Savvides, Byzantium in the Near East, pp. 53– 122, 187–89. 63  Technically schism refers to separation in terms of hierarchy whereas heresy means dissension from the accepted dogma; but the distinction could become blurred as the one was seen to imply, or lead to, the other.

xxxvi

INTRODUCTION

it consequently became part and parcel of the justificatory rhetoric for crusading expeditions in Frankish Greece. But these arguments meant nothing without papal endorsement, for it was only the papacy that had the authority to proclaim a crusade.64 This explicit papal endorsement is the key change for the thirteenth century, which transformed Byzantine interaction with the crusades. In effect, crusading against the Greeks became possible only after the Fourth Crusade, when the establishment of the Latin states in Romania allowed for the use of the crusade for their defence, along with the concomitant rhetoric, ideological apparatus, and organizational framework (preaching, recruitment, and funding). It was only then that a series of expeditions against the successor Greek states or the reconstituted Byzantine Empire were either proclaimed as crusades by the papacy itself, or attained papal ‘consecration’ as such, even though other powers lay behind their inception and organization. With a marginal exception in the early period, immediately after 1204, the aim of such expeditions was explicit and unambiguous. The crusade was proclaimed and the cross was preached for the Latin Empire, while the crusaders took (or commuted) their vows and were granted the plenary indulgence in order to fight in Romania against the Greeks or, occasionally, the Bulgarians. The papacy was also ideologically ripe for such a move. Developments regarding the application of the Holy War against Christians within Europe had set the precedents and prepared the ground for the use of crusading in Frankish Greece. The progressively institutionalized organization of the crusade, particularly after the Fourth Lateran Council, further facilitated its full implementation in various fronts, other than the Holy Land.65 Therefore, the crusades in Frankish Greece formed an important part of wider developments in the medieval world which, however, has been inadequately understood. In order to redress this situation, our examination will begin by exploring the reasons and specific circumstances behind the introduction of crusading mechanisms in the aftermath of 1204 by Innocent III and will then go on to investigate the continuation and consolidation of crusading in Frankish Greece by his successors. It will bring to light the changes to the rhetoric and practice of crusading in the area, as well as the way clergy and laity across Europe responded to such calls. A series of expeditions will be analyzed, including the early efforts to buttress the Latin conquest with crusade reinforcements in 1205 64  On this point, see, for example: Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, pp. 119, 124– 25, 202–06, 210–11; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, pp. 27–35; Villey, La Croisade, pp. 97–100. 65  See Chapter 1.2 below.

INTRODUCTION

xxxvii

and 1207; the crusade launched in 1222–25 for the defence of the kingdom of Thessalonica; the far-reaching attempt undertaken by Gregory IX in the 1230s to succour Constantinople against the combined attacks of John Vatatzes of Nicaea and John Asen of Bulgaria; and the universal call issued by the First Council of Lyon (1245) for the protection of the Latin Empire. The examination will also map the gradual retrenchment of crusading policy in Frankish Greece to the point of its effective abandonment during the last years of the empire. It will then turn to the revival and transformation of crusading efforts for Latin Romania after the Greek recovery of Constantinople (1261) and, subsequently, to the involvement of a major new temporal power, Charles I of Anjou. Angevin activity in Romania is the most frequently cited case of crusading aggression against Byzantium;66 this is ironical since this was in most respects not a crusade, in contrast to the other projects under examination. The year 1282 provides a convenient end point for our examination, as it marks the end of western attempts to conquer Byzantium in the thirteenth century with the collapse of Angevin plans and power after the uprising of the Sicilian Vespers, followed by the death of Michael Palaiologos. The Catalan-Angevin struggle would be the foremost preoccupation of western powers in the Mediterranean for the remainder of the thirteenth century. When the Peace of Caltabellotta (1302) effectively put an end to this conflict and crusading activity in Romania became again a theoretical possibility, circumstances had changed in the Levant. The plans of western claimants to the Latin Empire, such as Philip of Taranto and Charles of Valois, came to nothing. Most importantly, the rise of Turkish power in Anatolia and the Aegean combined with the irreversible loss of Latin Outremer by 1291 would reconfigure crusading priorities in the eastern Mediterranean. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the weakened Byzantine Empire would come to be seen as a potential ally rather than an enemy and eventually as a Christian state in need of rescue from Ottoman expansion.67 A central question for this examination concerns the impact of the crusades in Romania. Overall, it will be argued that crusading in Frankish Greece was an important and recurrent feature which defined the policy of Latin and Greek powers in the area, and particularly that of the papacy, in the thirteenth century. Practically all the pontiffs from 1204 to 1282 (with the exception of a period in the 1270s) proclaimed crusades for the Latin Empire or maintained that this would

66  See, for example, Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 200–03; Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, pp. 86–88. 67  See below, Chapter 5.6 and Conclusion, Section 3.

xxxviii

INTRODUCTION

constitute a beneficial course of action for the Church even if the circumstances of the time and other preoccupations did not allow for such plans to materialize. A significant secondary strand of our examination will be to assess the importance of crusading in Frankish Greece by connecting and comparing it to Church Union negotiations, which have commonly been considered to be the key factor for Byzantine-western interaction for this period. Crusading took precedence in papal policy in the area, while negotiations with the Greek Church constituted only an alternative that became significant mostly in the early 1250s and in the 1270s.68 The main focus of the book, as is already evident, will be on the development of papal policy towards crusading in Romania. This is, in many ways, a natural choice. The papacy occupied a central position at the inception, authorization, organization, and occasionally even the conduct of a crusading expedition. Hence the policy of the Apostolic See is a reasonable starting point for the examination of crusading in any particular front. This is also a choice dictated by the source materials. The papal registers provide the core of evidence through which the crusades in Frankish Greece can be reconstructed, particularly since several efforts did not go far beyond the stage of planning and initial proclamation, and consequently have left little record elsewhere. The examination will not be limited to the papal curia, however, but will also include: the role of the Latin emperors of Constantinople, who played a vital part in advocating crusading support for their realm; the policy of other powers, such as Hungary, France, Frederick II, Manfred, and Charles of Anjou, vis-àvis the crusades in Frankish Greece; the evidence for response and reactions to crusading calls in the West; and the reactions and policy of the rump Greek states (particularly Nicaea) and the reconstituted Byzantine Empire with regards to the fact that they were targeted by a series of crusades. Furthermore, by investigating parallel themes and mutual influences in other crusading fronts, such as the Baltic and the south of France, it will be shown that Frankish Greece played an important part in the overall evolution of crusading in the thirteenth century. Finally, a few words about the sources for this study. As has been argued, the lack of attention paid to the crusades in Frankish Greece is due mostly to the delimitation of fields of historical research and to interpretations that focused on ecclesiastical relations. It has certainly not come about because of a dearth of evidence. There are, in fact, a sizeable number of extant documentary sources from the thirteenth century, not comparable to previous periods, owing to a more 68 

For the issue of Church Union within the context of crusading in Frankish Greece, see below, Chapters 1.5, 3.2, 4.4, and 5.2–5.6.

INTRODUCTION

xxxix

stable bureaucratic organization and function of chancelleries all over Europe, most importantly the papal one starting with the pontificate of Innocent III.69 Therefore, as already noted, the main sources used to examine the policy of the Apostolic See in the area will be the thirteenth-century papal registers, which have never been systematically exploited with regards to crusading in Frankish Greece. Necessary caution should, of course, be exercised when assuming that a papal letter actually reproduces a particular pope’s thoughts and actions. The curia had to deal with an enormous volume of correspondence from all over Europe, ranging from the most mundane matters of day-to-day church administration to issues of international politics involving the greatest secular and ecclesiastical figures of the time. Naturally, not every single letter bearing the pope’s name was actually composed by him. Letters were generally drafted by the staff of the papal chancery following established formulas. The pope probably never set eyes on many of the letters that were sent off from the curia. That said, however, we can be confident that the pope would be more directly involved in matters of greater importance and urgency, and crusading certainly falls within this category. Even if the pope did not compose such letters himself, as evidence from stylistic traits and personal choices of rhetorical themes sometimes suggests, it is to be expected that he dictated or approved their content. A senior figure of the chancery, such as the chancellor or vice-chancellor, or even a group of cardinals would at any rate be involved, who would be well informed about the aims and priorities of papal policy and who would not be expected to adopt a significantly different position in the documents in question. With these points in mind, we can assume that the evidence from the registers adequately reflects the papacy’s position with regards to crusading in Frankish Greece.70 Although a good part of that material has been preserved, there are, nevertheless, various lacunae in the surviving registers on account of volumes being lost over time or letters not entered there in the first place.71 Even when extant, the 69 

See, for example, Zutshi, ‘Innocent III and the Reform of the Papal Chancery’; Cheney, The Study of the Medieval Papal Chancery, pp. 14–15. 70  See relevant discussions, for example in The Letters of Innocent III, ed. by Cheney and Cheney, pp. xi–xviii; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 16–18; Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III, pp. 15–49. 71  On the papal chancery and the process of enregistration during this period, see Delisle, ‘Mémoire sur les actes d’Innocent III’; Cheney, The Study of the Medieval Papal Chancery, pp. 15, 27–29 (who estimates that only about a tenth of the letters actually dispatched were entered in the registers for the period 1198–1417); The Letters of Innocent III, ed. by Cheney and Cheney, pp. xx–xxi; Hageneder, ‘Die päpstlichen Register des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts’,

INTRODUCTION

xl

full text of the bulls from the registers is not always readily available (much less in up-to-date critical editions), but rather dispersed among different and frequently overlapping editions.72 It should also be noted that, though not all relevant papal bulls are to be found in the registers, some have been preserved locally by the recipients, or survive in other collections.73 For our examination, most of these various editions and summaries of papal letters have been used and compared against each other. An effort has been made to cite the most recent or common edition and, when different, also one which provides the full text of the bull in each specific case. On some occasions, when only a summary was available or when the published text seemed to require verification, the corresponding manuscripts from the Vatican registers have also been consulted. Overall, a considerable number of extant papal documents allows for the reconstruction of the formation and development of policies in Romania. pp.  59–68; Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III, pp. 50–57, 65–93, esp. 71–72 (whose estimate is that ‘only about one-quarter of Honorius’s letters were registered’); Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 15–18; Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 9–11. 72  The most recent critical edition of the registers of Innocent III is the ongoing one by the Austrian Academy: Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder. For the years of Innocent’s pontificate that have not yet been published there, one can consult, among others, the older edition of the registers in Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina (vols 214–17). Summaries for the registers of Honorius III can be found in Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, whereas the full text is often available in the (rather rare) edition Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy. A new critical edition of the letters of Honorius dealing with the Greek East is currently under preparation: Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba. The registers of the popes from Gregory IX to the late fourteenth century were published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the École française d’Athènes et de Rome. Furthermore, for papal acts concerning the East, where several documents of interest with regards to crusading in Frankish Greece can be found, there is the more recent series of Vatican editions by the Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, covering the entire period that is of interest to us, and reaching up to the fifteenth century — although it should be noted that these editions are fragmentary, and the criteria for selection of bulls to be included appears rather idiosyncratic, resulting in many relevant letters being left out. Additional papal bulls are dispersed in other collections of published sources, such as Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea; Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand; Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum, ed. by Martène and Durand; and, of course, the Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus. For a list of papal bulls from 1198 to 1304 one can also consult Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, ed. by Potthast. 73 

For example, ‘Lettre de Grégoire IX’, ed. by Van de Gheyn; ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme; ‘De praedicationae cruciatae’, ed. by Delorme; ‘Documenta hucusque inedita’, ed. by Sevesi. See also the bulls published in the collections mentioned in the previous note.

INTRODUCTION

xli

This material will be supplemented with evidence from other documentary and literary sources, Latin and Greek, in order to provide a fuller image and to help assess the impact this policy had and the way it was perceived by contemporaries. Documentary sources of interest include the surviving letters and documents of the Latin emperors, as well as those from the other local powers (such as Nicaea, the reconstituted Byzantine Empire, Venice, and Hungary) or western powers involved in the area (for example the correspondence of Frederick II or the Angevin archives).74 Testimonies from the negotiations between the Greek and Latin Churches are also preserved either in documentary form or as reported and incorporated in literary sources,75 though they deal mostly with ecclesiastical matters and less with crusading, with the exception of the report of George Metochites.76 Several useful and relevant sources, mostly — but not exclusively — on Constantinopolitan relics from the early period after the conquest, have been collected and published by Riant.77 There are, furthermore, numerous but dispersed literary sources that can be of help.78 On the Greek side, the main narrative sources are the works of Akropo74  For the surviving or alluded to documents of the Latin emperors the most complete list (with details of available editions) is ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx. For Byzantine imperial acts, see Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger; special mention should be made of the crucial (for our topic) letter of John Vatatzes to Gregory IX: Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’; see also Michael VIII’s letter to Clement IV: ‘Lettera inedita dell’imperatore Michele VIII Paleologo’, ed. by Festa. For Venice, see Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, containing many crucial documents for the period and the topic. For Hungary, see Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner. For the correspondence of Frederick II in general there is Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles; and specifically for his Greek policy the documents published in Friedrich II, ‘Le Lettere greche’, ed. by Festa, and Friedrich II, ‘Quattro lettere greche’, ed. by Merendino. For the Angevin archives, see I registri della cancelleria Angioina, ed. by Filangieri and others. Some relevant items from the English and French court are found in Fœdera, ed. by Rymer, and in Layettes de trésor des chartes, ed. by Teulet, respectively. This is, naturally, only an indicative selection of available materials. 75  See, for example, Canart, ‘Nicéphore Blemmyde’; ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum’, ed. by Golubovich; Heisenberg, ‘Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion’; and Dossier grec de l’Union de Lyon, ed. by Laurent and Darrouzès. 76  See editions by Laurent, ‘Le Rapport de Georges le Métochite’; and ‘Le Récit d’une mission diplomatique de Georges le Métochite’ ed. by Giannelli. 77  Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant. 78  For the sources mentioned in this paragraph, see relevant entries in the ‘Primary Sources’ section of the Bibliography. For an overview of available sources for the Latin Empire, see also Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 187–88; Geoffroi de

xlii

INTRODUCTION

lites, Pachymeres, and Gregoras. It must, however, be pointed out that in general there are precious few explicit references to crusading in Greek literary sources. Given that the focus and original contribution of the present study is the examination of Frankish Greece as a crusade front, western sources will feature more prominently, but this should not give the impression that the Greek sources, which are indispensable for establishing the factual framework and the reactions of the Byzantine leadership, have been neglected. On the Latin side, Villehardouin and, to a lesser degree, Robert of Clari provide useful information, though the most revealing source for crusading in Romania in the early days is Henry of Valenciennes, while the Gesta Innocentii III is also valuable for a view from the curia. Continuous narratives for Frankish Greece after the early years of the conquest become scant. Marino Sanudo Torsello’s Istoria di Romania provides useful information and a handy outline but hardly a detailed narrative, and the Chronicle of Morea can be valuable, though its reliability is often questionable. Information coming from literary sources from the West is particularly important and essential in reconstructing responses to papal crusading calls for the Latin Empire, but it is elusive and dispersed. Such materials are scattered through a variety of sources from nearly all parts of Europe: from the chronicles of Flanders and north-eastern France, where many of the papal calls were centred (for example, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, the Annales Reineri, and most prominently the rhymed chronicle of Philippe Mouskes) to troubadours from Provence and Languedoc (Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, Guilhem Figueira); from the civic histories of the maritime republics (Annales Ianuenses, Martino da Canale) to the memoirs of companions of kings ( Jean de Joinville); from chroniclers writing in distant England (Matthew Paris, Annales de Burton) to those in neighbouring Sicily and Italy (Bartolomeo of Neocastro, Richard of San Germano). Evidence for reactions from the clergy to papal requests for funds to be raised for the Latin Empire is also preserved in both literary and documentary sources, at least from England, France, and Spain.79 It cannot be hoped that the collection of relevant references from existing materials has been exhaustive, but at least a representative portion has been surveyed and incorporated in this examination. Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, i, pp. lvi–lxiii; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 16–28. 79  See, for example, Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard; the memoirs of Arch­ bishop Odo Rigaud of Rouen (‘E visitationibus Odonis Rigaudi’, ed. by Bouquet and others, pp. 587–88); as well as the documents from Spain, published as appendices to the articles: Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’; and Benito Ruano, ‘La Iglesia española ante la caída del Imperio latino de Constantinopla’.

Chapter 1

Justification (1204–16): Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

A

n attack on Constantinople had never been the officially proclaimed aim of a crusade until the thirteenth century, despite the occasional acts of aggression and the rather hostile attitudes on both the Byzantine and the Latin sides in the earlier period.1 The same is obviously true of the Fourth Crusade, which was not a ‘crusade against the Greeks’ in anything but its notorious culmination. Notwithstanding individual motives or possible plotting by some of the protagonists, it is an undisputed fact that Pope Innocent III proclaimed the crusade by calling the faithful to reconquer Jerusalem that had fallen to Saladin in 1187, since the Third Crusade had failed to bring back the Holy City to Christian hands.2 However, Innocent’s decision, after the con­quest of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade, to support the Latin presence in Romania through the gradual introduction of crusade mechanisms set an important precedent that conditioned papal policy and developments in the area. It was at this time that the first steps were taken towards legitimizing crusading activity against the Byzantines, and thus towards the institutionalization of Greco-Latin hostility. These developments raise a number of interrelated questions that need to be addressed: when, how, and most importantly why were 1  2 

See above, Introduction, Section 2. Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, i, no. 336, 15 August 1198.

Chapter 1

2

crusading mechanisms introduced for the defence of Frankish Greece? Which factors contributed to this development? How did crusading in Frankish Greece evolve over the first crucial and formative years? Finally, how important a factor was it for policy-making in the area?

1. The Latin Conquest and the Crusade for its Defence: Imperial Initiative and Papal Response The first step in the process that led to papal approval of the deployment of the crusade in Frankish Greece was already taken in the first months of the Latin conquest. Innocent III issued a delighted — to an almost undignified degree — response when he received the news from the crusading host firmly in control of the Byzantine capital, and he approved of the creation of the Latin Empire, tying its defence to the crusaders’ duties.3 This is particularly striking, for throughout the course of the Fourth Crusade he had clearly indicated that the conquest of the empire was not within his intentions and had explicitly prohibited the diversion of the expedition towards Constantinople. The role of the Latin Emperor, Baldwin I, was instrumental in bringing about this development. The shift in papal policy came about as a response to the imperial initiative, even though Innocent had his own reasons for following this course of action. The issue of the diversion of the Fourth Crusade has been extensively, if inconclusively, dealt with and is mostly outside the scope of our examination.4 Suffice it to say here that Innocent had issued prohibitions against any attack on Christian territory.5 Furthermore, Innocent was opposed to an attack on Byzantium. Prior 3 

November 1204: Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, nos 153–54. See below, Chapter 1.1. 4  The relevant literature is immense. The most detailed account of the Fourth Crusade is Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, while recent works include Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context; and Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople. The most recent overview of relevant historiography is Balard, ‘L’Historiographie occidentale de la quatrième croisade’. 5  The prohibition (issued in 1201) was against any attack on territories of Christians ‘unless perhaps they wrongfully impeded the crusaders’ journey, or for some other just and necessary reason [the crusaders] could not act otherwise’, and then only with the approval of the legate of the Apostolic See. It is repeated several times in the registers: Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, v, nos 160(161), 161(162), vi, nos 101, 231(232), vii, no. 18; see Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 43, note 177; Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, pp. 18–19.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

3

to the crusade, Innocent had extensive contacts with Alexios III, in an attempt, among other things, to secure the emperor’s co-operation with the expedition.6 While the crusade was on its way, the pope explicitly forbade the diversion to Constantinople, rejecting the crusaders’ arguments and warning them that they risked incurring a second excommunication, after the one imposed on them for the capture of Zara.7 Innocent would soon adopt a different approach. The initiative which led to the deployment of crusading mechanisms in Romania, however, did not lie with the pope but rather with the Latins in Constantinople. The first request for a crusade to be preached for the Latin Empire was made by the newly elected Latin emperor. Baldwin was quick to try to gain papal approval of the Latin possession of Constantinople, mindful of the fact that the pope had prohibited any violence against Christians and had excommunicated the crusaders as a result of the violation of this order at Zara, while a similar sentence was threatened after their diversion to Constantinople. In his letter, by which he announced his election as emperor and recounted the events that led to it, Baldwin used the entire array of arguments that would justify the conquest of the city. He included the ‘disobedience’ of the Greek Church to the Holy See, the perfidy and aggression of the Greeks, and the fact that the empire had been not only unhelpful, but an active hindrance to the cause of the Holy Land.8 Such arguments had been invoked in practically all proposed attacks against the Greeks during the earlier crusades. 9 This was particularly the case with the alleged Byzantine obstructionism towards the crusades. On the other hand, greater emphasis was given to the schism of the ‘disobedient’ Greek Church at this point than had been the case in the twelfth century, most probably in an effort to present the venture in terms that would be 6 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, i, nos  352–54, ii, nos  200(209), and 201(210); Gesta Innocentii III, pars 63–64. See Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 33–34 and note 124; Powell, ‘Alexius III and Innocent III’. 7  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 101, c. 20 June 1203. 8  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, after 16 May 1204; Gesta Inno­ centii III, par. 91. 9  For such grievances and arguments against Byzantium and the Greeks, see, for example, Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 90–91, 100, 127–35, 142, 146–51, 154–55, 161; Harris, ‘Collusion with the Infidel’; Daly, ‘Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople’, pp. 53, 57–58, 62, 63, 65, 79; Schmandt, ‘Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth Crusade’, esp. pp. 286–95; Ebels-Hoving, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes’; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 59–87; Arbagi, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes’, pp. 193–204, 230–41 (misnumbered as 224–35[bis]).

Chapter 1

4

agreeable to the papacy. These arguments were very widely used as a justification for the events of 1204 by both contemporary and later sources.10 However, before the crusade’s diversion, Innocent had dismissed these arguments as ‘worthless opportunities and pretended crises’.11 After the first capture and the elevation of Alexios IV to the throne, Innocent had reprimanded the crusaders’ involvement in Constantinople and warned that they were at risk of a second excommunication since they again turned their swords ‘to the ruin of Christians’, pointing out that the argument of the return of the Greeks to the Roman Church could be construed as an excuse for their self-interested actions: To be sure, as we have learned from your letter, you urged our beloved son in Christ, Alexios, the illustrious emperor of Constantinople […] to canonically render full obedience to us and our successors […]. Nevertheless, some people firmly believe that you did it to camouflage your digression rather than that the daughter return to the mother, the member to the head, and the part to the body.12

It should also not be forgotten that when these arguments were put forth by the leaders during the Fourth Crusade, they failed to impress a great part of the 10 

See, for example, Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, pars 93, 99, 143, 224–25; Robert of Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Lauer, par. 72, p. 71; Gunther of Pairis, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, ed. by Orth, par. 8 and 11, pp. 128–29 and 137–38; and in the correspondence of the crusaders: Count Hugh of St Pol’s letter to the West (Annales Colonienses maximi, ed. by Pertz, p. 814); Doge Dandolo’s letter to the pope (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 202); the barons’ letter to the West (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 210(211); see Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 79–85); second letter of barons to the pope (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152), and the pope’s answer (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 153); see also in later accounts of the conquest, such as Ralph of Coggeshall, Chronicon anglicanum, ed. by Stevenson, pp. 284–85; and Alberic of TroisFontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 880. 11  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 101, June 1203, p. 165: ‘occasionibus frivolis et necessitatibus simulatis’ (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 63). 12  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 229(230), February 1204, p. 388 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 88–89): ‘Licet enim, sicut ex litteris vestris accepimus, apud karissimum in Christo filium nostrum Alexium, Constantinopolitanum imperatorem illustrem, institeritis […] se omnem devotionem nobis et successoribus nostris substituendis canonice impensurum […]. Valde tamen presumitur a quibusdam, quod id ad excusationem vestram feceritis, ut per vestrum velaretis excessum, quam ut ad matrem filia, membrum ad caput et pars rediret ad corpus’; see Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, nos 230(231), 231(232), vii, no. 18; and also later, Gesta Innocentii III, par. 93.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

5

host, who, unhappy with the turn of events, left the army and proceeded to the Holy Land on their own.13 Therefore, papal approval and sanctioning of these arguments would be crucial, as it would amplify their effectiveness. The Latin emperor, in his letter, went on to ask Innocent to become leader of the effort and to support the empire by stirring up help from the West through the grant of crusade indulgences and preaching, as well as by enticing recruits with the riches to be gained in Greek lands. Baldwin urged the pope to impel with salutary admonitions those devoted to your apostolic Holiness, particularly the inhabitants of the West, both nobles and commoners […] towards the acquisition of true and immense wealth, temporal as much as eternal, by offer­ing an Apostolic indulgence to all who come and faithfully serve us and our empire either for a while or for life.14

This was a crucial development, not only because the emperor was himself suggesting a crusade for the defence of the Latin Empire to the pope, but also because at the same time — and without waiting for papal authorization — he had taken the liberty of forwarding such requests to various recipients in the West, such as the Archbishop Adolph of Cologne, the abbots of the Cistercian order, and to ‘all the Christian faithful’.15 In effect, Baldwin hijacked the crusade and put even more pressure on the pope to accept a fait accompli. At the same time, he offered Innocent the option of taking advantage of the opportunity to accept the nominal leadership of the effort. Baldwin was, however, careful to state that it was within the crusaders’ intentions to proceed to the Holy Land and ‘complete the pilgrimage’, once the conquest had been finalized.16 Innocent 13  See, for example, Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, pars 95–97, 197–99; see also Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, pp. 61–62, 86–89, 92–94, 97–99, 179–81; Queller, Compton, and Campbell, ‘The Fourth Crusade: The Neglected Majority’. 14  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, p. 260: ‘apostolice sanctitati devotos vestri precipue incolas Occidentis nobiles et ignobiles […] ad veras immensasque divitias capescendas temporales pariter et eternas salutatoribus monitis accendatis proposita venientibus omnibus apostolica indulgentia nobis et imperio nostro aut temporaliter aut perpetuo fideliter servituris’. 15  For the slightly different versions sent to the recipients in the West, see De Oorkonden der graven van Vlaanderen, ed. by Prevenier, ii, 577–603, nos 272–74; Baldwin of Constantinople, ‘De expugnata secundò urbe Constantino’, pp.  520–23; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 14–16, nos 4–6. 16  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, p. 260 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 109): ‘But our desires do not lie

6

Chapter 1

would indeed remain sensitive to that issue until a later stage.17 Furthermore, Baldwin also suggested to the pope the convocation of an ecumenical council in Constantinople, ‘a city graced by ancient councils’, to establish peace and unity.18 This was an equally bold initiative of Baldwin in his effort to legitimize his empire. Innocent had been in talks with the emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople on the eve of the Fourth Crusade, and the question of a council to discuss Church Union had been broached on that occasion.19 Baldwin and the other crusade leaders were obviously aware of those contacts and tried to make use of these issues to strengthen their case.20 Both the suggestion for a council and the emphasis on the ‘return’ of the Church of Constantinople to obedience were meant to portray the conquest in terms that would be acceptable in papal eyes. It must not be forgotten that at that critical point the crusaders could not divine what the reaction of the pope would be to the conquest, or to that letter bringing news of it. This is evident by the closing sentences of Baldwin’s letter, where he displays his customary mix of flatteries and forceful suggestions, as he himself acknowledges: here, and we will not abide that the royal standard be laid aside from our shoulders until, with that land stabilized by the settlement of our people, we should visit the regions across the sea and, with God granting it, fulfil the purpose of the pilgrimage’ (‘Sed nec in hiis desideria nostra subsistunt, nec ab humeris nostris sustinebimus vexillum regale deponi, donec terra ipsa incolatu stabilita nostrorum partes debeamus invisere transmarinas et Deo dante propositum peregrinationis explere’); ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 34–35, no. 37; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p. 135. 17  See, for example, the pope’s communications with the doge (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 206, 29 January 1205), where the idea that the army should sail on to the Holy Land, after a further delay of one year to consolidate the empire, seems to be adopted by both sides; see the permission in April/May 1205 for the crusaders to remain a further year in Constantinople, without being relieved of their vow: Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 64(63). See Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 122–35 (esp. p. 130). 18  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, p. 261; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 110–12. This point was not reproduced in the letters to the other recipients in the West. 19  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ii, nos 200(209), 201(210), 202(211); ‘John X Camaterus Confronts Innocent III’, ed. by Papadakis and Talbot. 20  This is clearly the case as Baldwin, after proposing for a council to be held in Constantinople, exclaims: ‘But we already have forgotten you invited rebellious Greece to a council!’ (‘Iam enim ad concilium Greciam rebellem vos invitasse didicimus’): Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, p. 261 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 110).

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

7

If out of ardent desire we importune beyond the norms of propriety, Reverend Father, pardon our passion with your usual benevolence, and consider further the point of the suit rather than the words. Moreover, there is no reason for us to keep silent regarding the fact that our reverend bishops and abbots and the venerable clergy of lesser station […] fought for God with mighty weapons so steadily and triumphantly that […] they ought even more clearly to bear away the full measure of Apostolic favour and grace as something so well merited.21

Baldwin’s daring initiative and suggestions were not out of character for the count who had in the recent past successfully manipulated papal power in his conflict with the French king over Flanders, in 1197–1200, and had clearly deceived Innocent in order to avoid ecclesiastical censure for his rebellion against his suzerain.22 Yet it was not an isolated act of an opportunist ruler either. In fact, Baldwin was, consciously or not, following the established practice of the rulers of Crusader States in the Holy Land, who regularly turned to the West for reinforcements.23 That was to become the cornerstone of the policy of the Latin Empire as well, and Baldwin took to the task speedily. Apart from the aforementioned letters, he sent requests to bishops in the West for prayers, for preaching, and for more crusaders for the Latin Empire.24 He also sent orders to his brother Philip, marquis of Namur, and his baillis in Flanders to use the revenues from the emperor’s homeland to fund the knights who would like to come to the help of the Latin Empire.25 A year later Henry of Hainault, Baldwin’s 21 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152, pp. 261–62 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 112): ‘Si quid ex ardenti desiderio, ultra quam decet, ingerimus, ex benignitate consueta, reverende pater, ignoscite affectumque nostrum apicemque negotii ulterius et potium quam verba spectate. Illud autem silere nulla ratione debemus, quod reverendi pontifices et abbates nostri et inferioris status venerabilis clerus […] armis Deo potentibus tam constanter ac triumphaliter dimicavit, ut […] apostolici favoris et gratie cumulum pro tam bene meritis evidentius reportare.’ 22  Moore, ‘Count Baldwin IX of Flanders, Philip Augustus and the Papal Power’, esp. pp. 79, 81–86. 23  Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, pp.  291–92; Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, passim. 24  De Oorkonden der graven van Vlaanderen, ed. by Prevenier, ii, 631–33, no. 290; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 34–35, no. 37 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, i, cols 791–92). The surviving letter is addressed to the bishops of Cambrai, Artois, Thérouanne, and Tournai, that is, the bishoprics under which the lands of Flanders lay. It is possible that the letter was also sent to other recipients but was preserved only in the emperor’s homeland. 25  ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p. 38, no. 42; the

8

Chapter 1

brother and his successor in the empire, would likewise take the initiative to ask Innocent for a crusade in support of Latin Constantinople, but also to request help directly from the West.26 Baldwin’s appeal was apparently perceived as it was intended by its recipients, namely as a call for crusaders. Both the rhetoric and the eventual aim are corroborated by the Annales Reineri, which reported, for the year 1204, that after his coronation Baldwin sent his letters and messengers to Flanders, France, and Lotharingia, so that monks and clerics and laymen adept at fighting, however many were willing, would come to him, for he intended to make everyone rich and to change the rite of the Greeks to the Latin one […]. Without delay, large crowds of monks, clerics, and suitable laymen from the aforementioned regions, after being signed with the cross of the Lord, flocked to him.27

This imperial initiative is also indicative of the general loss of papal control that was already made manifest in the course of the Fourth Crusade. 28 Except for the pope’s inability to exert influence over the direction of the expedition, there were also worrying signs that even the right to call for a crusade and to grant the indulgence, which was by definition reserved for the papacy, was being appropriated. This had been the case in the summer of 1203, after the first conquest of the city and the elevation of Alexios IV to the throne, when the crusade leaders issued calls to the West for more crusaders to join them, letter is not extant but the relevant information is provided in Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 195(197). 26  See Henry’s letters of June 1205, while he was still regent of the empire, not only to the pope (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131)), but also to the western clergy and laity: Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, pp. 199–202; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, nos 46, 47a–b (though, in this case, Henry apparently waited for papal authorization to be granted first). Henry also wrote to the West for reinforcements in September 1206 and January 1212/1213 (Henry of Flanders, ‘De varia latinorum in imperio fortuna’, ed. by Delisle, and Henry of Flanders, ‘De quatuor imperii hostibus a se pervictis’, ed. by Delisle; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, nos 59, 123–24). See below, Chapter 1.3 and 1.4, for more details on Henry’s policy and letters. 27  Annales Reineri, ed. by Pertz, p. 658: ‘Balduinus litteras suas et nuntios in Flandriam et Franciam et Lotharingiam misit, ut tam monachi quam clerici, et habiles ad pugnandum laici quotquot vellent ad eum confluerent, quia disponebat eos omnes ditare et ritum Graecorum in Latinum transmutare […]. Nulla mora fit, sed de praedictis regionibus turba multa tam monachorum quam clericorum et habilium laicorum, cruce Domini signata, ad eum confluit.’ 28  See, for example, Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, p. 67.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

9

much as Baldwin would do in the following year.29 But most importantly, in April 1204, before the final attack on Constantinople, the crusading clergy had offered the indulgence ‘in the name of God and by the authority of the apostolic see’, according to Robert of Clari, for an action that was patently against the instructions of Pope Innocent III and clearly without any authorization.30 This trend of devolution of papal authority over crusading ventures was to become painfully obvious and embarrassingly repeated during the thirteenth century.31 In his response to Baldwin’s letter, Innocent’s reaction to the Latin conquest was positive, to say the least. The pope replied to the Latin emperor that he was taking the empire under his protection, since it appeared that God ‘has deigned to work magnificent miracles with you for the praise and glory of his name, for the honour and profit of the Apostolic See, and for the benefit and exaltation of the Christian people’.32 He also granted permission to the crusading army to remain in Romania and consolidate the conquest. Since their work there would be beneficial for the Holy Land — in effect, part of their crusading duties — it also shared in the promised indulgence.33 Innocent furthermore promised that 29  Versions of the letter of the crusade leaders to the pope (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 210(211), c. 25 August 1203) were also sent to Otto IV of Germany and to ‘all the Christian faithful’: De Oorkonden der graven van Vlaanderen, ed. by Prevenier, ii, 538–45, nos 259–60. At about the same time, Count Hugh of St Pol sent his own letter to several recipients in the West; see Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 177–201. 30  Robert of Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Lauer, par. 73, p. 71: ‘Et disent li vesque qu’il assoloient de par Dieu et de par l’apostoile tous chiaus qui les asaurroient’ (= Robert of Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, trans. by McNeal, p. 94); see Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, pars 224–25. See also Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, pp. 173–74, 180–81; Madden, ‘Vows and Contracts in the Fourth Crusade’, p. 464. 31  See Kennan, ‘Innocent III, Gregory IX and Political Crusades’, esp. pp. 26–28. 32  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 153, 7 November 1204; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 114. 33  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 153, p. 263 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 114–15): ‘We also charge and command all clerics, as well as the lay crusaders who are with you in the Christian army by reason of hope for remission of sins and the indulgence that the Apostolic See offers them, to assist you prudently and mightily in defending and holding onto the empire of Constantinople. Through the aid of its assistance the Holy Land might be more easily liberated from pagan hands’ (‘universis etiam tam clericis quam laicis crucesignatis consistentibus tecum in exercitu Christiano sub spe remissionis et indulgentie, quam eis sedes apostolica pollicetur, iniungimus et mandamus, ut ad defendendum et retinendum Constantinopolitanum imperium, per cuius

10

Chapter 1

he would in the meantime procure help for them. The emperor was similarly admonished ‘for the remission of [his] sins’, to preserve the Greek Church and the empire of Constantinople to the obedience of the Apostolic See.34 In his letter of April or May 1205, the pope returned to the issue of the army’s delay in Romania, when he ordered the crusaders to tarry in the empire for a year, unless their presence was much more needed in the Holy Land, tying the crusade indulgence to service in the empire but without relieving them of their obligation to fight in the Holy Land.35 Innocent’s subsequent actions closely corresponded to Baldwin’s requests. Around late May 1205, he wrote to the clergy of France describing how the Greek Church had withdrawn from unity, and how ‘the right hand of the Lord […] striking down those worthy of punishment’ (‘dextera Domini […] illos digna ultione percutiens’), transferred the empire ‘from the proud to the humble, from the superstitious to the religious, from schismatics to catholics, from the disobedient to the devout’ (‘a superbis ad humiles, a superstitiosis ad religiosos, a scismaticis ad catholicos, ab inobedientibus ad devotos’). Innocent presented and supported Baldwin’s call (reproducing the emperor’s own words), stating that ‘in this way the Holy Land can be aided more usefully’ (‘per illud Terre sancte possit utilius subveniri’). He granted ‘the same crusader indulgence that the Apostolic See has granted to other crusaders’ to those who would undertake to help the emperor stabilize the empire and Church in Constantinople, so that he might eventually be able to proceed to the Holy Land.36 This was the first instance in which the crusading indulgence was granted to new recruits from the West coming to the help of Constantinople; the stated final aim was still the Holy Land but it was presented in a rather vague way. The papal call was apparently forwarded by the hierarchy, as is shown by a document preserving the instructions of the bishop of Arras regarding the recruitment of crusaders for Constantinople. It is interesting that in this brief document the connection subventionis auxilium Terra sancta facilius poterit de paganorum manibus liberari, tibi prudenter et potenter assistant’). 34  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 153, p. 263 (trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 114–15). 35  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 64(63). The army was, then, presumably to remain in Romania until spring 1206. 36  The letter was addressed to the archbishops of Reims, Rouen, Bourges, Vienne, Sens, Bordeaux, Lyon, Tours, and their suffragans. Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 70(69), p. 128; Gesta Innocentii III, par. 94: ‘Nos enim hiis, qui accedentes ad ipsum in Terre sancte subsidium laboraverint, illam concedimus indulgentiam peccatorum, quam aliis crucesignatis apostolica sedes indulsit.’

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

11

to the Holy Land is particularly emphasized, and it is stated that ‘those who will go to Constantinople are in no way to expect the [plenary] indulgence if they do not intend to assist the Holy Land’.37 At the same time, Innocent made sure that a series of other requests of Baldwin, such as calls for liturgical books, clergy, and scholars from the West, were looked to.38 These activities constitute an important turning point. The pope, at the request of the Latin emperor, authorized the use of crusading mechanisms for the defence of the empire and included Romania in the list of valid crusading targets, endorsing as justification the arguments of the help offered to the Holy Land and the subjection of the Greek Church to the Apostolic See.39 That would form the basis of all subsequent crusading activity in Romania. The call to the French archbishops in spring 1205 is the precursor of such expeditions, the first one of which was actually to be launched by Innocent a few months later.40 It also marks an important development in the relations between the western and eastern halves of Christendom, as this particular crusader state was created on lands conquered from other Christians with none other than the imperial city of Constantinople as its centre. The Latin Empire and the other Frankish states in Romania would have to struggle for their expansion, or more often for their survival, not against the ‘infidels’, but against their co-religionists (even if heterodox): Greeks, Bulgarians, and Slavs. This way, they ironically verified what Innocent had prophetically warned against in June 1203, when he had admonished the crusaders to proceed to the Holy Land, ‘taking from the spoils of the enemy those items that, if you were to tarry in the regions of Romania, you might perhaps need to wrest from brothers’.41 The fear that had haunted the minds of the Byzantines, and had fuelled their suspicions concerning the motives 37  Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, i, cols 792–93: ‘de indulgentia nullatenus potest praesumere, qui vadit Constantinopolim, ut dicetur, nisi Terrae Sanctae subvenire intendit’. The verb intendo creates an ambiguity as to whether it refers simply to a ‘noble intention’ (commonly considered a necessary characteristic for a crusader), or whether it means that the crusaders were actually expected to proceed to the Holy Land in order to merit the indulgence. The former, however, is more likely. 38  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, nos 71(70), 73(72), 72(71); the pope explicitly stated that these requests were made by Emperor Baldwin. 39  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, nos 152–54, 204, viii, nos 64(63), 70(69), 131(130). 40  For the expedition organized and launched under Bishop Nivelon of Soissons, see below, Chapter 1.3. 41  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 101; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 63.

Chapter 1

12

and the real aim of the crusaders ever since the First Crusade, had been finally made real.42 The pre-existing hostility between Latins and Greeks was now being institutionalized through apostolic sanction and the introduction of crusading in Frankish Greece.

2. Factors and Motives for Innocent’s Approval of Crusading in Frankish Greece: Policy and Theory The papal volte-face appears quite impressive, given Innocent’s earlier explicit disapproval of the crusade’s diversion. This prompts a series of questions: which factors led the pope to introduce crusade mechanisms to support the conquest? Why did he now appear enthusiastic, after having heavily criticized the Constantinopolitan involvement at the beginning? Was his enthusiasm genuine, and how far-reaching actually was this shift in papal policy? To be sure, Innocent’s letter of 13 November 1204 to the clergy of the crusading army appeared ‘wildly exuberant’.43 Drawing scriptural analogies, some of which were rather farfetched, the pope presented the subjection of the empire of Constantinople and the return of the Greek Church to obedience in an eschatological context. The conquest was interpreted as a conspicuous event in God’s plan for mankind, a precursor of the new age, the last stage before the Second Coming.44 This theme was further elaborated in another letter to the clergy sent about two months later.45 The tone and arguments of these letters have understandably led most scholars to the conclusion that Innocent was caught up in the euphoric moment of triumph and jumped at the advantages this opportunity presented for the papacy in the East.46 The papacy at the time could also be consid42 

The Byzantines had been always been suspicious of the westerners’ motives and, as Anna Komnene’s Alexiad amply demonstrates, many of them considered that an attack against the empire and the take-over of Constantinople were the real aims of crusading. See, for example, Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, p. 56, passim; Lemerle, ‘Byzance et la croisade’, pp. 597–99, 617–19; Charanis, ‘Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzantium’; Gounaridis, ‘L’Image de l’autre’, pp.  81–95, at 81–83; and Kolia-Dermitzaki, Συνάντηση Ανατολής και Δύσης στα εδάφη της Αυτοκρατορίας. 43  Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 115. 44  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 154; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 115–26. 45  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 203, 21 January 1205; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 131–39. 46  See, for example, Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 280–81; Sayers, Innocent III, Leader

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

13

ered particularly receptive towards the news from Constantinople; ‘Innocent and his curia were especially hungry for some sign of God’s favour’, as the fortunes of Otto of Brunswick, who was supported by Innocent in the strife for the German empire against Philip of Swabia, had taken a turn for the worse.47 Innocent did, in fact, refer to the events in Constantinople as proof of divine favour when dealing with Otto’s imperial candidature.48 At the same time papal thought was influenced by apocalyptic writings like those of Joachim of Fiore that favoured such an interpretation of events.49 In any case, the arguments of the Latin emperor were designed to allay the pope’s fears and boost his hopes and expectations. Baldwin had, no doubt, played his cards well. Now it was time for Innocent to show his hand. His letter to the crusading clergy was not very dissimilar to Baldwin’s missive: a propagandist statement, aimed at projecting a confident public image. However, Innocent was much more restrained when replying to Baldwin.50 Moved as he might have been by the news, his actions do not reveal an enthusiastic overhaul of his previous policy. What comes out of them is an effort to reaffirm papal control over the expedition and generally not to be left behind in those potentially crucial developments in the Levant. He made it particularly clear to both the laity and the clergy of the crusading army that the empire could not be sustained without the support of the Roman Church.51 Innocent also fiercely resisted Venetian control over the patriarchate of Constantinople and tried to assert his authority by annulling the election of Thomas Morosini before himself reappointing him.52 He did not of Europe, pp. 174–75; Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 120–22; Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, pp. 299–300; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 112, 115–16, 131–32; Luchaire, Innocent III, iv, 132–38; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 45. 47  Moore, Pope Innocent III, pp. 132–33. 48  Regestum super negotio Romani imperii, ed. by Holtzmann, pp. 168–69, no. 113. 49  Andrea, ‘Innocent III, the Fourth Crusade and the Coming Apocalypse’; Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, p. 300. 50  Most scholars refer to the pope’s joy and exaltation (see, for example, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 112–13; Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, p. 299) but some note the papal restraint: Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 27: ‘with no excessive display of enthusiasm’; Moore, Pope Innocent III, p. 132: ‘it was a subdued letter’. 51  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 153, p. 263; Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 154, pp. 269–70. 52  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 203, 21 January 1205, pp. 358–59.

14

Chapter 1

yield and excuse Venetian irregularities because of his enthusiasm, as has often been claimed.53 The pope’s action was in line with his general policy to uphold the canonicity of ecclesiastical elections and retain his right of jurisdiction and arbitration, but on the other hand to compromise over the issue of specific persons for offices.54 Innocent followed the same pragmatic policy in his struggle with the crown over the Church of England, for example when he rejected the election of both the royal candidate and the one chosen by the chapter for the bishopric of Winchester, only to confirm the former himself in 1205, before relations with King John broke down completely on account of the appointment of Stephen Langton as archbishop of Canterbury.55 In any case, the pope acted in a similar manner in Romania, in the affair of Morosini’s successor, Gervase, and in the election of Antelm as archbishop of Patras in November 1205.56 The pope also rejected the petition of Emperor Baldwin, Doge Dandolo, and the other crusaders to confirm the Partitio Romaniae (that is, the agreement between the crusaders and the Venetians for the systematic division of lands and assets of the Byzantine Empire and Church), on the grounds that it was harmful to ‘the honour of the Roman Church’ and encroached upon its rights.57 Innocent was not accommodating towards Dandolo’s other request either, as he refused to absolve the doge from his crusading vow despite the latter’s age.58 Innocent was obviously not getting carried away, rashly following the impulses of his enthusiasm. There was a sense of urgency in the pope’s reactions, particularly in providing for the ‘reborn’ Greek Church,59 but that is understandable after the See Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 228–31, 236–44; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp. 10–17. 53  For example: Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 131–32; Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, p. 300; Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, p. 280. 54  For the importance Innocent ascribed to ecclesiastical liberty and the election of prelates without secular intervention, see, for example, Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 79–102. 55  Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 80–81; Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe, pp. 130–31. 56  Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 250–54; Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 154(153). 57  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 208. For the Partitio Romaniae (or ‘March Pact’) see Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 205; Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade, pp. 175–76; Carile, ‘Partitio terrarum imperii romanie’. 58  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 206; Gesta Innocentii III, par. 97. 59  See Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, nos 19–26, 57: a series of letters sent in March-April 1205 regarding the authority of the patriarch, ecclesiastical property, the arrival

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

15

way events had slipped out of his control in the recent past. His resolve to proceed with caution is evident by the way he deferred decision until further consideration on the major issues, such as the confirmation of the Partitio Romaniae and the permission for the army to remain longer in Romania. Innocent had already stated his misgivings about the Partitio on 21 and 29 January 1205, when he had annulled the election of Morosini and asked for a moratorium on the provisions concerning Church property, but he gave his final decision ‘after consideration’ on 8 February 1205.60 As for the delay of the army, in November 1204 Innocent had consented for the crusaders to help Baldwin stabilize the empire, in the letter that acknowledged the emperor’s election, but that was not a final decision, as the pope stated in January 1205 that he would consider the issue and ‘decide what seems to us to be advantageous’.61 He only proclaimed a formal decision to allow the army to remain in Romania one (additional) year around April 1205.62 The major development with regards to papal policy in Frankish Greece was the use of crusading mechanisms, such as the granting of indulgences for service in the Latin Empire. But the relevant steps were taken mostly in the spring of 1205, after the pope had been informed of the Partitio Romaniae, and hardly in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the Latin conquest of Constantinople, so Innocent’s early enthusiasm cannot account for them.63 Why did the pope, then, decide to follow that course of action and ‘harness a fundamental element of the crusading concept to the immediate priorities of Emperor Baldwin’?64 The desire to accommodate the new ruler and to seize the opportunity to remain ‘ahead of the game’, though important, does not sufficiently explain why Innocent was so ready to go along with the daring innovation of introducing crusade mechanisms in Romania. Innocent’s decision to pursue such a policy in Romania was facilitated by the background of ideological developments concerning the application of the crusade in the preceding period. The use of Holy War against Christians for the furtherance of political aims within Europe essentially predated the inception of the crusading movement. The reformed papacy had already invoked the notions of clergy from the West, and the dispatch of Cardinal Benedict of St Susanna as papal legate. 60  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, nos 203, 206, and 208. 61  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, nos 153, 206; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 147. 62  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 64(63). 63  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 70(69). 64  Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, p. 299.

Chapter 1

16

of just and holy war in the eleventh century in an attempt to contain the Norman threat to papal lands. Armed service in that context was justified as a meritorious act for the defence of the Church and consequently of Christendom. As a reward for such a service the remission of sins was soon incorporated to similar calls.65 The issue of the Church’s authority to commission wars, let alone ones against Christians, was problematic, but after the First Crusade the notion of Holy War was enriched in both imagery and popular response. Even then, however, unlike the crusades against Muslims which were enthusiastically accepted by the majority of people in the West as an important duty of the faithful, the remission of sins for wars against Christians did not escape criticism.66 Nevertheless, canonists like Gratian concluded that the fight against heretics and excommunicate Christians as enemies of the Church constituted a just war — though it was not yet equated to a crusade for the Holy Land.67 But some would soon consider that the use of violence against Christians was justified as legitimate protection against the ‘enemy from within’ who threatened the Faith and the peace and security of Christendom more than the external foe. Peter the Venerable, in the middle of the twelfth century, would ask: ‘Well, who deserves to be attacked more […], the pagan who does not know God, or the Christian who acknowledges God with his words but fights against him with his deeds?’68 — an opinion that was to be echoed and further elaborated by Hostiensis in the thirteenth century, who would claim that a crusade against the ‘disobedient’ Christians was ‘more reasonable, even though less desirable for the simple’.69 The distinction between heretics and 65 

Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, pp. 17–19; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 19–23. 66  See Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, pp. 19–20, 24. For criticism of crusading against Christians in general, see Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 156–89; Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, pp. 34–65. 67  Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 23; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p. 345; Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, pp. 72–85, 112–19; Pissard, La Guerre Sainte en pays chrétien, pp. 1–7; Brundage, ‘Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers’, pp. 106–09; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 27–35. 68  The Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. by Constable, i, 409, no. 172: ‘Sed quis magis a vobis vel a vestris impugnandus est, Deum nesciens paganus, aut ipsum verbis confitens, et factis contra eum dimicans Christianus?’ (trans. by Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 24). For the development of the idea of crusading against the internal enemies of Christendom in the thirteenth century, see, in general, Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe. 69  Hostiensis, Summa aurea, iii, 34 (‘De voto et voti redemptione’), par. 19 (‘In quo casu’), col. 1141; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p. 345; Villey, ‘L’Ideé de la croisade chez les juristes’, pp. 574–77; Gallagher, Canon Law and the Christian Community,

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

17

schismatics was not always important in this context and, in any case, there was perceived to be a link between the two. Those who did not obey the divinelyappointed head of the Church could be expected sooner or later to deviate from the path of the true faith. Gratian’s Decretum followed St Jerome in declaring that: ‘[schism] may be understood as different [from heresy] in some respects; but there is no schism which does not fashion some type of heresy for itself, in that it seems right to have departed from the Church’; and this view was repeated by several twelfth- and thirteenth-century canonists.70 Similar measures could thus be taken against both groups. Gratian spoke of the right of secular authorities to coerce both schismatics and heretics, while the canonist Bernard of Pavia stated in the late twelfth century: ‘We have spoken about heretics, but because schism leads to heresy, it follows that we are also dealing with schismatics’.71 By the beginning of the thirteenth century it had been established that coercion and violence could be used against Christians who posed a threat to the Church and the faith. Theory developed in such a way that by the early thirteenth century James of Vitry could claim, without the need for any further justification, that the duty of the military orders was to wage war against external enemies but also against schismatic Greeks and heretics.72 It was more than a question of theory. In 1135 the Council of Pisa granted to those who fought against Roger of Sicily the same indulgence as that reserved ‘for all who set out to Jerusalem to free the Christians’.73 In 1139, a plenary indulgence was also granted to those who were killed fighting against ‘routiers’, bands of unemployed mercenaries who roamed and terrorized the French countryside.

pp. 184–201; Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades, p. 38; see also Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, pp. 195–97, 201–06, 256, 284–87, 293–94; Brundage, ‘Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers’, pp. 111, 122–23; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 24–25. 70  Gratian, Concordia discordantium canonum, ed. by Friedberg, col. 997 (C.24 q.3 c.26): ‘Quod quidem in principio aliqua ex parte intelligi potest diversum, ceterum nullum scisma nisi heresim aliquam sibi confingit, ut recte ab ecclesia videatur recessisse’; Hageneder, ‘Der Häresiebegriff bei den Juristen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts’, pp. 52–54, 58–71; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 33–34. 71  Bernard of Pavia, Summa Decretalium, ed. by Laspeyres, p. 214, titulus vii: ‘Diximus de haereticis; sed quia schisma inducit haeresim, ideo consequenter de schismaticis agamus’. Gratian, Concordia discordantium canonum, ed. by Friedberg, col.  943 (C.23  q.5  c.43): ‘Scismaticos et hereticos seculi potestates coherceant’. 72  Analecta novissima, ed. by Pitra, ii, 405; see Forey, ‘The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians’, p. 2. 73  Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 23.

Chapter 1

18

This declaration was made in an edict of the archbishop of Auch, in the context of the Peace and Truce of God Movement.74 War against the heretic Cathars was included in the list of expeditions worthy of the remission of sins by the 1170s and that was expressly stated in canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council under Alexander III in 1179.75 However, the full deployment of crusade mechanisms against Christians was a very recent development, in which Frankish Greece was to feature from the early stages. In 1196–97, Pope Celestine III excommunicated Alfonso IX of León, who had sided with the Almohad Caliph al-Mansur against Alfonso VIII of Castile, and granted those who would fight against him the same remission of sins granted to the crusaders against the Muslims in the East, while Alfonso’s subjects were released from their obedience to the king.76 Though this was a significant application of holy war against a Christian king, there is no evidence of crusade preaching, vows, or warriors signed with the cross specifically against Alfonso. A more famous and pertinent case, and the one usually described as the first ‘Political Crusade’, took place a little later. It was Innocent III who took the decisive step in his struggle against Markward of Anweiler in 1199–1202. Markward was a seneschal of Henry VI, who, after the death of the German emperor, continued to fight against the papacy, trying to assume control of southern Italy and Sicily. The pope responded to this challenge to papal authority on its doorstep by calling a crusade against Markward. Those who would fight against him were granted the same indulgence as those who ‘cross over to the defence of the eastern land’. The justification was provided by arguments of collusion with the ‘infidels’ (because of Markward’s alliance with the Saracen colonies of the area) and the benefit to the Holy Land. It was claimed that ‘through Sicily it will be possible to come to the help of the Holy Land more easily’, while if it fell to Saracen hands all hope for Jerusalem would be lost. Unlike the case of Alfonso IX, however, it was clear that Markward’s collusion with Muslims, true or not, was not the main reason the campaign was proclaimed against him in the first place. The clash with the papacy was the real issue for the holy war against the Christian ruler of Sicily. Furthermore, the crusade against Markward was the first to be funded through taxation of ecclesiastical property and revenues. It is unclear whether participants in the expedition against Markward made crusading vows and took the cross, though it is quite probable. In any case, the actual military impact of 74 

Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, p. 26. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 224–25; Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 26; Pissard, La Guerre Sainte en pays chrétien, p. 27 and following. 76  O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain, pp. 62–63. 75 

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

19

this venture was minimal, and it was mostly an act of desperation on behalf of the papacy rather than an affirmation of its authority. Nevertheless, it constituted an important precedent.77 The arguments invoked for the crusade against Markward were very similar to those used to justify crusading for the Latin Empire. This is no coincidence. While the opinion that it was legitimate to exercise force against other Christians in order to protect the Church at large dated as far back as Augustine, the use of a crusade against them was something new. The papacy needed to send a clear message regarding the legitimacy and the validity of crusades against schismatics in Frankish Greece, as was also the case with crusades against heretics in Western Europe which came into being in the same period. This was done through the association with crusading to the Holy Land, the archetypal holy wars of Christendom, with which western audiences had become familiar. The language of the papal bulls, the rewards, and the obligations for the participants in crusades against Christians were very similar to those for the Outremer campaigns, while the rhetoric employed was meant to link these crusades to the fate of the Holy Land.78 Help to Jerusalem would be more easily provided through Constantinople. The argument had some verisimilitude as the route through the Byzantine Empire was the one commonly followed by crusaders in the twelfth century. Furthermore, Byzantium had been conquered by an army that was on course to the Holy Land and for a while was still expected to make its way there. These direct links with Outremer largely explain why Innocent was willing to grant the plenary Holy Land indulgence to new recruits for the Latin Empire already in 1205, while he only allowed for a partial indulgence with regards to crusades in the Baltic, and it took him at least two more years before authorizing the plenary indulgence for those fighting against the heretics in southern France.79 The pope would soon take more steps in the direction of a wider use of the crusade. Crusading was gradually and cautiously introduced by Innocent against the Albigensian Cathars from 1198 to 1208, after which time all the external characteristics and mechanisms of a crusade were deployed. 80 The 77 

Kennan, ‘Innocent III and the First Political Crusade’; Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, pp. 27–28; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 346–48; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 175–78. 78  See Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 3–7, 12–13, and 29–32. 79  Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, p. 97; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 62–66. 80  Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, pp. 28–30; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 45–71.

20

Chapter 1

institutionalization of the crusade in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) facilitated its full implementation on fronts other than the Holy Land. 81 It was also at that Council where it was decreed that a sovereign who fosters heresy, or fails to rid his lands of it, can be deposed by the papacy and replaced by means of a crusade if necessary.82 Innocent’s strong belief in his authority as the Vicar of Christ, along with his legal training and background, had been instrumental in bringing about these developments.83 The introduction of the crusade in Romania, then, coincided with and played an important part in the beginning of a trend that would recur throughout the thirteenth century, of a very wide deployment of crusading expeditions in several fronts, many of which were waged against Christian opponents. The innovations, though based on previous developments in theory, were mostly introduced by Innocent III, whose actions affected crusade practice profoundly. Innocent’s actions in Frankish Greece constituted one aspect of his multifaceted and persistent involvement with the Crusade, which had led him more than once to take bold steps.84

3. Papal Crusading Policy in Romania, 1205–08, and the Crusade of Bishop Nivelon of Soissons The important issue, nevertheless, was whether the policy of deploying the crusade in Frankish Greece would stand the test of time and changing circumstances. In the following period (1205–08), the calls for new recruits to come to Romania were repeated, while an actual crusade was organized and set out for Constantinople. Innocent’s support for the Latin Empire through the crusade, however, was not an unwavering one. The importance of Constantinople for the crusading movement was closely linked to the help it could offer to the Holy Land. In the letter by which the pope had given his formal approval for the 81  Housley, The Later Crusades, p.  236; but note the disagreement of Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades, p. 40: ‘Institutional flexibility, not […] definition, allowed the crusade to be employed widely as a military and spiritual exercise’. 82  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 233–35; Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 29; Housley, The Later Crusades, p. 236. 83  See, for example, Watt, ‘The Papacy’, pp. 114–18; Morris, The Papal Monarchy, pp. 430– 33, 569. 84  See, for example, Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 147–76 (esp. pp. 148–49), 166, 173–76; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p. 346; Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, p. 277; Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 260–91.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

21

army to remain a year longer in order to consolidate the Latin Empire, he claimed that Jerusalem might not have fallen had Constantinople been transferred to the Latins earlier, and that now a new opportunity was presented for the liberation of the Holy Land, as, in his words, ‘to hold one [Constantinople] is almost to recover the other [ Jerusalem]’.85 Innocent would also claim that Sultan al-Adil (Saphadin) was so terrified by the Latin conquest of Constantinople that he would have preferred Jerusalem itself to have been conquered by the Christians.86 But such argumentation that connected Frankish Greece with the fate of Outremer could cut both ways, particularly as disastrous developments soon unfolded on both fronts. On 14 April 1205 the army of the Latin Empire was defeated by the Vlacho-Bulgarians of Kalojan at Adrianople; Emperor Baldwin was captured and many Latin nobles were killed in the battle.87 Meanwhile, King Aimery of Jerusalem and his wife Isabella died that same year within a short period of time, leaving a minor as queen regnant, while strife broke out again between Leo II of Cilician Armenia and Bohemond IV of Tripoli.88 Innocent seemed to lose his nerve. In his letter of 12 July 1205 to his legate in the East, Peter Capuano, cardinal priest of San Marcello, he angrily reproached him and his fellow cardinal legate, Soffredo of Santa Prassede, for going from Jerusalem to Constantinople.89 The pope appeared indignant not only that the legates had abandoned the Holy Land, along with many men who could defend it at this hour of need, but that Peter had also dispensed the crusaders at Constantinople from their oath and their obligation to head for Outremer in the following year. The ecstatic praises for the conquest of the Byzantine Empire amounting almost to the recovery of Jerusalem itself were no more. Innocent reminded the legates that their mission was ‘not to capture the empire of Constantinople but for the defence of the remnants of the Holy Land and the restoration of what has been 85 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 64(63): ‘detentio huius quasi restoratio sit illius’. 86  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 126(125), July 1205. This statement is reflected in some chronicles in the West, see, for example, Robert of Auxerre, Chronicon, ed. by Holder-Egger, p. 269. 87  Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp.  39–51; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 77–80. 88  See, for example, Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, p. 125; Mayer, The Crusades, pp. 249–54. 89  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 127(126). For the role of Peter Capuano as a legate to the crusade, see Maleczek, Petrus Capuanus, pp. 117–212 (esp. pp. 191– 95, 202–05).

Chapter 1

22

lost […], not to seize temporal riches but to earn eternal riches’.90 The crusaders, who had assumed the cross to serve the Lord and the Holy Land, ‘strayed from the path unto an impassable road’ and ‘have pursued temporal wages right up to today’. Innocent would go as far as to say that Peter Capuano had thus perverted the crusaders’ ‘solemn and pious vow’.91 In this letter, Innocent condemned the atrocities committed by the crusaders during the sack of Constantinople, details of which, it seems, he had recently heard. The crusaders were strictly reproached for ‘staining their swords with the blood of Christians’ and indulging in rapine, theft, and every kind of sacrilege, so that the Greeks now ‘rightly detest them more than dogs’.92 Moreover, the crusaders’ behaviour was rebuked as detrimental to future recruitment for either the Latin Empire or the Holy Land. Innocent summed up these negative developments and the disappointment of his earlier hopes by saying ‘by that from which we appeared to have profited up to now we are impoverished’.93 Nevertheless, Innocent’s reproach was milder when he replied to Boniface of Montferrat’s letter, in August or September 1205. The pope did refer to the atrocities committed by the crusaders during the sack of the city and to the fact that these actions constituted a violation of their oaths and of papal instructions. He avoided, however, a direct condemnation of Boniface, since he did not wish to ‘judge rashly regarding such a profound judgement’. Instead, reiterating — albeit more reservedly this time — the argument that Latin Romania could be helpful for the Holy Land, he granted permission to Boniface to stay there and strive to defend the empire.94 More importantly, at about the same time Innocent issued a 90 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no.  127(126), p.  231: ‘non ad capiendum Constantinopolitanum imperium sed defendendas reliquias Terre sancte […] non ad capescendas temporales divitias sed promerendas eternas’; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 165. 91  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 127(126): ‘ad hoc principaliter assumpserint signum crucis et hoc presertim voverint Domino Deo suo, ut in Terre sancte subsidium transfretarent, et a via postmodum errantes in invium temporalia comoda usque hodie sunt secuti’; ‘pervertere […] votum tam sollempne ac pium’; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 165–66. 92  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 127(126). Repeated in the letter of August/September 1205 to Boniface of Montferrat, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 134(133). 93  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no.  127(126): ‘unde videbamur hactenus profecisse deficimus’; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 166. 94  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 134(133), pp. 247–48: ‘Nos de

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

23

call to the faithful who wished to help the Holy Land to provide their services to the Latin Empire, granting them full indulgence, since ‘through the preservation of the empire of Constantinople […] there is hope, for sure, that Jerusalem will be liberated from the hands of the pagans’.95 These actions seem at first to be in striking contrast with the complaints addressed to Legate Peter Capuano a little over a month earlier; but they pose less of a problem if we realize that the letter to Peter Capuano was an internal papal document directed to Innocent’s own agent. There, the pope manifested freely all his frustration about the obstacles to his policy for Romania and the Holy Land and expressed his indignation at the handlings of the legate that further aggravated them. It is significant that the pope angrily reproved Peter for having jeopardized further crusading calls not only for Jerusalem but also for Constantinople. The pope obviously included the Latin Empire among the valid crusading targets and did not consider withdrawing support from it. Indeed, in a letter to the French bishops, sent almost simultaneously with the reproach to Peter, the pope, recounting the negative developments in the Levant, was much more restrained in his criticism when he mentioned the absolution of the crusaders from their vow. The pope stated that he was ‘very saddened’ by Peter’s action (‘de quo valde dolemus’), as no reinforcements could be expected for Jerusalem now. Furthermore, he expressed the concern that the dire situation of the Latins might prompt attacks on both Jerusalem and Constantinople.96 By the time Innocent replied to Boniface, balancing both the arguments that the crusaders brought forward for their actions and the accusations that could be directed against them, the pope had decided on a new formula of justification: that, regardless of Latin actions, the Greeks deserved to be punished, as this was a decision of the divine will, incomprehensible in its ways.97 The pope’s decision to support the Latin Empire was reaffirmed and his stance further softened by the plea of Baldwin’s brother, Henry of Hainault, regent of tam profundo iudicio nolentes temere iudicare’; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 175; Gesta Innocentii III, par. 93. 95  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 131(130), 16 August 1205: ‘Cum per Constantinopolitani detentionem imperii […] pro certo speretur Ierosolimitana provincia liberanda de manibus paganorum […] universis Christi fidelibus iniunxerimus in remissionem omnium peccatorum, ut Constantinopolim accedentes ad Terre Sancte subsidium laborarent’. See Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 127–28. 96  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 126(125), c. 10–15 July 1205. 97  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 134(133), pp. 247–48; Gesta Innocentii III, par. 93.

24

Chapter 1

the empire after the disaster of Adrianople. Henry had sent a letter to Innocent (5 June 1205), asking for the pope’s help and protection for the empire, which was facing dire threats from the Bulgarian Kalojan and the rebellion of the Greeks because, as Henry put it, of the Latins’ sinfulness.98 Henry was quick to remind the pope that the empire was helpful to the cause of the Holy Land, and that the Latins there were labouring for the unity of the Church. He referred to the pope’s obligation to provide ‘counsel and aid’ (‘consilio et auxilio’) to the crusaders, who were ‘your knights and stipendiaries of the Roman Church’ (‘militibus vestris et ecclesie Romane stipendiariis’).99 Henry, like his brother before him, asked the pope to preach a crusade in Italy, France, Germany, and the other lands of the West, granting the same plenary indulgence to those who would come to the help of the Latin Empire, as to those who stayed a year in Syria at the service of the cross. His request was undeniably couched in crusading terms.100 Innocent, apparently reconsidering the potential dangers arising from the loss of Constantinople and a Greek restoration there, accepted the supposed ‘contrition’ of Henry and the Latins, and was strengthened in his decision to continue extending his protection to the Latin Empire. The pope later pointed out, in a letter to Patriarch Thomas Morosini, that if the Greeks were to recover the empire of Romania, they would impede the way to the Holy Land, since they had always been unhelpful to it, but even more so at this stage, as they had come to hate the Latins profoundly after the conquest.101 The moment of paralysing panic that the letter to Peter Capuano revealed had passed, and Innocent was about to resume action. The pope set himself to organizing a crusade for the Latin Empire. Innocent’s crusade call was a direct response to Henry’s request and the expedition was organized in close co-operation with the emperor’s agent, Nivelon de Quierzy, bishop of Soissons (1176–1207). Nivelon was a prominent participant of the Fourth Crusade and had acted as an emissary of the crusading army to the 98  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131); Gesta Innocentii III, par. 105; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p. 41, no. 47. 99  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131), p. 242. 100  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131): ‘Legatos igitur cum auctoritate apostolica a latere vestro in Ytaliam, Franciam et Alamanniam et alias occidentalium regiones dimitti petimus, qui integram indulgentie plenitudinem in auxilium nostrum et subventionem ad nos propter predicta venturis deferant, que a sede vestra apostolica indulta est per annum integrum in servitio Crucifixi in terra Sirie moraturis.’ 101  Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols 353–54, no. 184 (= Acta Innocentii PP III, ed. by Haluscynskyj, no. 173), (7 December 1210).

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

25

pope and as one of the electors for the Latin emperor.102 Such credentials probably explain why Henry dispatched Nivelon (along with the knights Nicholas of Mailly and John Bliaud)103 after the disaster at Adrianople, to carry both his aforementioned letter to Innocent and a similar call for help to the sovereigns, laity, and clergy of the West.104 Nivelon arrived at Rome by August 1205, where the pope agreed to grant a plenary indulgence for any crusaders going to Constantinople.105 Innocent consequently instructed ‘the Christian faithful who wish to go to Constantinople for the help of the Holy Land’ to remain in contact with him concerning their arrival date, so that he — who at that time was also regent of the kingdom of Sicily — could provide safe passage to Apulia and then transport from Brindisi, and they would avoid wasting their provisions in needless delays.106 It appears that the pope had learned from the experience of the Fourth Crusade and was trying to avoid a repetition of his loss of control over it. In the meantime, Nivelon got on with his part in preparing the planned crusade. At some point after papal approval had been obtained, he dispatched a letter calling the Christian faithful to come to the help of the empire. This missive basically reproduced Emperor Henry’s letter, with an introductory and a concluding section by Nivelon, in which the bishop emphasized the indulgence that had been granted by the Apostolic See.107 The coming of a large western army 102  See: Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 115–16; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 223–28; Claverie, ‘Un illustris amicus Venetorum du début du xiiie siècle’, esp. pp. 502–15. 103  Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 199–200 and 173–74, respectively. 104  For Nivelon’s embassy see Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, par. 388; Nivelon’s own letter, in Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 66, no. 15; Anonymous Chronicler of Soissons, ‘De Terra Iherosolymitana’, p. 8; Ralph of Coggeshall, Chronicon anglicanum, ed. by Stevenson, p. 161; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p.  57; Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 129–30. For Henry’s letter to the West, see Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, no. i, pp. 188–92. 105  Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, pp. 191– 92, 202. 106  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 131(130), pp. 238–39, 16 August 1205: ‘Universis Christi fidelibus ad succursum Terre sancte volentibus Constantinopolim proficisci’. This letter provides additional instructions to the original call for the crusade through ‘generales litteras’, now lost (see Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 131(130), p. 238, note 1); see Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 127–28, who notes a lacuna in the papal registers of this period. 107  Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, pp. 199, 202.

Chapter 1

26

to the Greek lands was also announced by Innocent to Kalojan in a barely concealed threat to release Baldwin and make peace with the Latins.108 The pope would in return write to Henry and ask him to agree to peace, a letter he actually dispatched at about the same time.109 Innocent’s statement regarding the arrival of the army might have been premature or overly optimistic but it was certainly more than a ‘phantom army’, as Wolff has described it.110 Plans for the crusade were apparently making progress. Nivelon seems to have been doing most of the groundwork. The pope actively intervened twice in this process, in April and September 1206, each time after several months of silence on the matter, during which he seemed to be more engrossed in the recurring problems of the property of the Latin Church in Romania and Venetian control over the patriarchate of Constantinople.111 After Rome, Nivelon went to northeastern France and Flanders, and later probably to central France as well, bringing relics and apparently recruiting crusaders.112 By spring 1206, the crusade’s organization had reached an advanced stage. Marquis Philip of Namur (Baldwin’s and Henry’s brother), was apparently the designated leader of the expedition to Constantinople.113 On 10 April, Innocent urged Philip and the crusaders with him to set out for Constantinople.114 This time the pope made it clear that not only remission of sins would be granted — as help would be afforded to the Holy 108 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 130(129), c. 16 August 1205; Gesta Innocentii III, par. 107. 109  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 133(132). 110  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 203. 111  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, nos 136(135), 137(136), 154(153), ix, nos 100, 126–34, 140–42, 148; Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, esp. pp. 234–44, 255–59. 112  Nivelon was in the northwest (Troyes, Soissons, Châlons, Namur) by autumn 1205 and in March 1206; he probably also visited Bourges. See Nivelon’s own letters in Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 65–69 and 75, nos 15–18 and 24; see Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, pp. 191–92. 113  Perhaps he had been appointed around March 1206, when Henry had dispatched a relic to his brother (Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 74, no. 23; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p.  101) and Nivelon was at Soissons (Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 75, no. 24). Henry would again request his brother’s assistance in September 1206, as we will see below. 114  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 45: ‘To the nobleman the marquis of Namur and to all the Christian faithful who wish to set out with him to Constantinople, for the help of the Holy Land’ (‘Nobili viro marchioni Namurcensi et universis Christi fidelibus volentibus cum eodem ad succursum Terre sancte Constantinopolim proficisci’).

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

27

Land this way — but also that those who would participate would be considered as having fulfilled any other pilgrimage vows, except for the Holy Land, and would, therefore, be freed from them. This appears to be the first case of vow commutation (that is, the transference from one front to another of the obligations and rewards arising from taking a pilgrimage or crusade vow) for the Latin Empire.115 However, there were obviously delays regarding the expedition’s departure and Philip proved to be less than eager to participate. In September 1206, while on campaign against the Bulgarians, Emperor Henry would again make a request for Philip to reinforce the empire, in a letter to their brother, Godfrey, the praepositus of St Amé of Douai.116 Innocent also returned to the issue of the crusade for Constantinople by sending instructions to Bishop Nivelon in December 1206. In this series of letters the pope was trying to address some issues of funding and arrange the transportation of the crusaders that the prelate had gathered. 117 Evidently Philip of Namur had not only withdrawn from participation in the crusade, but had also turned down requests to finance the crusaders from the income of his county. Nivelon had urged the pope to compel the count to make the payments but the pope rejected this, as Baldwin, who had granted the money initially, was dead and Philip now had full authority to dispose of the income of his own lands.118 The pope also gave directions to the bishop and the other crusaders to depart simultaneously, approving their plans for Genoa as the port of departure, but guaranteeing that he would see to it that Brindisi remained a safe alternative. Furthermore, he informed them that Emperor Henry had been victorious against his enemies, so they should find it easier to serve the cross.119 In late March 1207, Innocent was writing to the ‘crusaders in Romania’ that a large crusading army would soon join them, to assist them in the completion of their work, namely to help the Holy Land.120 115  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 45: ‘ut vota, que circa peregrinationes quascumque preterquam de visitanda Ierosolimitana provincia emiserunt, in istius necessitatis itinere compensetur’. 116  Henry of Flanders, ‘De varia latinorum in imperio fortuna’, ed. by Delisle; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 49–50, no. 59; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p. 101. 117  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, nos 195(197), 196(198), 197(199), 198(200). 118  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 195(197). 119  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, nos 196(198), 197(199). Among the recipients of the letters and the organizers of the crusade was Godfrey, the prepositus of Douai and brother of Baldwin, Henry, and Philip. 120  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 38, 30 March 1207.

Chapter 1

28

It is hard to gauge the exact response to this crusade call for the Latin Empire. Nivelon’s efforts have left little record in the narrative sources of the period, except for Henry’s initial call for help.121 Nivelon’s preaching had, nevertheless, been successful in raising support for the Latin Empire in France and Flanders, as is attested by a handful of entries in chronicles for the year 1207.122 In a previously overlooked passage from the Annales Reineri, explicit reference is made to the army raised for the Latin Empire by Nivelon’s preaching: ‘an innumerable multitude of clergy, monks, and laymen, were inflamed with the zeal of faith and, convinced by the bishop of Soissons, set out for Constantinople’.123 Nivelon was apparently at the head of a crusading host when he died in Bari, in September 1207.124 Norden and Gerland claim that the crusade dispersed after Nivelon’s death.125 However, the sources they cite offer no positive confirmation of this assertion. On the contrary, a different tradition reported by Du Cange, stated that Nivelon did manage to return to Constantinople with the reinforcements and then died on his way back to meet with the pope.126 Most importantly, the 121 

For example, no further mention, besides Henry’s initial call, is made by Geoffrey of Villehardouin. Similarly, there is no reference to help sought from, or raised at, Flanders, in any of the chronicles published in Corpus chronicorum Flandriae, ed. by De Smet; or in Istore et croniques de Flandres, ed. by de Lettenhove. 122  See, for example, the Continuation to Sigebert of Gembloux (‘Anonymi continuatio appendicis Roberti de Monte ad Sigebertum’, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 343): ‘The bishop of Soissons went to Constantinople along with a great multitude [of men]’ (‘Episcopus Suessonum cum magna multitudine Constantinopolim adiit’); and the Anonymous Chronicle of Laon (Anonymous Chronicler of Laon, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 713): ‘At that time, passed away the noble man and preacher, Nivelon, bishop of Soissons, who had been elected to the archbishopric of Thessalonica. As he was returning to Constantinople, leading with him many men that had been gathered from the whole of France for the help of the Latins, he ended his days at Bari in Apulia’ (‘Per idem tempus, vir nobilis et praedicandus Nevelo, Suessorum episcopus, in Thessalonicensem archiepiscopum electus, obiit. Hic cum Constantinopolim remearet et multos ex omni Gallia collectos in auxilium Latinorum secum duceret, apud Barum in Apulia diem clausit supremum’). 123  Annales Reineri, ed. by Pertz, p.  660: ‘Annus 1207 […] Innumerabilis turba clericorum, monachorum, laicorum zelo fidei accenditur, et suassione episcopi Suessionensis Constantinopolim proficiscitur’. 124  Anonymous Chronicler of Laon, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 713; Alberic of TroisFontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 880; Longnon, Les Compagnons de Ville­ hardouin, p. 116; Claverie, ‘Un illustris amicus Venetorum du début du xiiie siècle’, pp. 513–14. 125  Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p.  176; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p. 137; also Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, p. 130, following Norden. 126  Du Cange, Histoire de l’empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs françois, ii, 43. See ibid., i, 257, 340.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

29

information that the considerable crusade army that had been gathered by Nivelon reached Romania where it was cut down by the Greeks of Epiros is provided by a passage in an earlier redaction of Niketas Choniates’ History (the LO version, most probably composed in the early 1210s). According to the historian, [Michael Komnenos Doukas] did not act in a cowardly manner toward the Latins but very bravely engaged them when they sailed to Dyrrachion and proceeded ahead. Because they lacked the necessary supplies and because he surprised them in frontal attack, he won a great victory and prevailed against many thousands, as many as the bishop of Saisos [Soissons] had recruited from Italy and gathered from all the Latin lands to be shipped to the borders of the Romans.127

In any case, the two other envoys of Henry, Nicholas of Mailly and John Bliaud, found their way back in Romania, as they can be seen fighting against the Bulgarians in 1207–08.128 Whether to be identified with, or related to, Nivelon’s crusade or not, some reinforcements did, in any case, arrive in Constantinople from Flanders.129 A body of crusaders under Peter of Douai, sent by Philip of Namur, arrived sometime in late 1207 or early 1208. Peter participated in Emperor Henry’s expeditions against the Vlachs and Bulgarians under Boril and in the conflict with the Lombard lords of the kingdom of Thessalonica, and departed in September 1209.130 127 

Niketas Choniates, Historia, ed. by Van Dieten, i, 631, apparatus criticus at line 16: ‘οὐδὲ οὗτος ἀγεννῶς ἀντεφέρετο τοῖς Λατίνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλα γενναίως, καταχθεῖσιν εἰς τὸ Δυρράχιον καὶ χωροῦσιν ἐς τὰ πρόσω πῇ μὲν σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πῇ δὲ καὶ ἐνωπίῳ μάχῃ τὴν νίκην λαμπρὰ ἀνεδήσατο καὶ πολλὰς κατηγωνίσατο χιλιάδας, ὅσας ὁ Σαισοῦ ἐπίσκοπος ἐξ Ἰταλίας στρατολογήσας καὶ ὅπῃ δὴ Λατινικῶν μερῶν συλλεξάμενος εἰς τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὃρια διεπλωΐσατο’; see Simpson, ‘Before and after 1204’, pp.  206–07 (where also the translation). Interestingly, the LO version might have been prepared at the request of Theodore Mesopotamites, metropolitan of Thessalonica, who had found refuge at Epiros after the Latin conquest of the city, and can be connected with an attempt by Choniates to seek favour at the court of Michael Doukas: Simpson, ‘Before and after 1204’, pp. 209–11. 128  Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 173, 199–200. 129  Note that the aforementioned chronicle of Laon states, shortly after reporting Nivelon’s death in 1207 (Anonymous Chronicler of Laon, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 713), ‘During that same year 1208, a great expedition of men from France and Flanders set out for the lands of Constantinople against the Greeks, to help the Latins’ (‘Durante adhuc […] anno mccviii, fit magna profectio Francorum et Flandrensium in partes Constantinopolitanas contra Graecos, in auxilium Latinorum’). 130  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, p. 12, and pars 512–18, 529–30, 574–91; see also Longnon, ‘Sur l’histoire de l’Empereur Henri de Constantinople par Henri de Valenciennes’, pp. 198–99, 206–10; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, p. 56; Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 182–83.

Chapter 1

30

Regardless of its eventual outcome, the crusade planned by Nivelon and Inno­ cent in 1205–07 was important on several counts. Crusading in Frankish Greece had advanced to a further stage. A full expedition had now been planned and, for the most part, carried out. There was coordination between the pope and the imperial envoys, as well as persistence in organizing the crusade and moving ahead with it, with the pope overseeing several aspects more closely than he had been able to do with the Fourth Crusade. Even though the scale was smaller, it was still an indication that the papal effort to regain control of affairs in Romania was bearing fruit. As far as ideological developments are concerned, this was the first crusade to get off the ground which had Constantinople as its objective. Naturally, legitimization was attempted through the argument of the help afforded to the Holy Land. But it is clear in this case that this was becoming mere rhetoric: there is no explicit statement or evidence that the crusaders were expected to proceed eventually to the Holy Land.131 On the contrary, in his letter of April 1206, the pope explicitly stated that service in the empire would mean fulfilment of vows. This statement indicates that clarifications were necessary, perhaps because the rhetoric for the help of the Holy Land had obscured the exact terms under which indulgence was to be gained, or because there was some hesitation and doubt in the West concerning the standing of this expedition as an equivalent to a crusade for the Holy Land, which the pope had to allay by assuring that participation ensured remission of sins and fulfilment of crusading vows.132 On the practical level, the reinforcements from the West probably assisted the empire’s survival and revival under Henry more than it has so far been credited. The Latin Empire had been at the brink of collapse after the defeat at Adrianople. Henry might not have been able to carry out his victorious campaigns against the Bulgarians, and then against the recalcitrant Lombards, without the help of such reinforcements. Indeed, Peter of Douai, the leader of the Flemish contingent, features prominently in the history of Henry of Valenciennes which narrates these expeditions.133 131 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 45, viii, no. 131(130): the calls were to ‘All the Christian faithful who wish to go to Constantinople for the help of the Holy Land’ (‘Universis Christi fidellibus volentibus […] ad succursum Terre Sancte Constantinopolim proficisci’); they were urged ‘to work for the help of the Holy Land by going to Constantinople’ (‘ut Constantinopolim accedentes ad Terre Sancte subsidium laborarent’), or they were enjoined ‘for the release from this kind of [pilgrimage] vows, to set out without delay for Constantinople, for the help of the Holy Land’ (‘in remissionem huiusmodi votorum iniungimus, quatinus pro Terre Sancte subsidio non tardetis Constantinopolim proficisci’). 132  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 45; Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, p. 129. 133  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon,

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

31

After this first extensive attempt, a relaxation of Innocent’s policy towards crusading in Frankish Greece is evident. In the years 1207–08, crucial developments were taking place regarding papal interests in Europe. The conflict of Innocent with King John over the English Church and especially the archbishopric of Canterbury reached its climax with the imposition of an interdict over the kingdom of England (March 1208). The struggle for the German throne was going against the papal favourite, Otto, and the pope had to realign his policy in order to recognize Philip of Swabia, until the latter was unexpectedly murdered in June 1208. Another murder, that of the papal legate Peter of Castelnau in Toulouse in early 1208, sparked off the Albigensian Crusade against the heretics of the area.134 The state of the Latin Empire also fuelled papal concerns. The precarious situation in Romania is a recurrent theme in the papal correspondence of the period.135 Except for the external threats from Bulgarians and Greeks, the emperor had to fight against the Lombard lords over the succession of Boniface of Montferrat in Thessalonica.136 Amidst this chaos, Patriarch Thomas Morosini, Emperor Henry, and the Venetians were bickering over Church property in Constantinople,137 while Innocent expressed his grievances concerning Venetian control over the patriarchate and threatened the Latin patriarch with deposition if he did not follow papal commands immediately.138 p. 12, and pars 512–18, 529–30, 574–91. 134  See, for example, Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 81–82; Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe, p. 160; Evans, ‘The Albigensian Crusade’, pp. 277, 282–86. 135  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 56, 24 April 1207: ‘the dangers of the wars and other disturbances that are rife in the lands of Romania’ (‘guerrarum et turbationum periculis quae vigent in Romaniae partibus’); Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no.  37, 30 March 1207: ‘As the empire of Constantinople has not yet been stabilized so far, but rather for the greatest part its status is still in flux’ (‘Cum Constantinopolitanum imperium nondum sit adeo solidatum, quin adhuc ex magna parte fluctuet status eius’). 136  For the Lombard War, see, for example, Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp. 161–90; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 106–11; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 206–08. 137  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no.  120, ix, no. 241(243), xi, nos 11(12)–15(16); Luchaire, Innocent III, iv, 180–89, 201–09, 219–27; Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 255–74; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 39–41 138  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, no. 72(76); see Gesta Innocentii III, pars 92, 97–99. See Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 230–32, 234–44.

Chapter 1

32

4. The Latin Empire as a ‘Crusader State’ An important element of the nature of the Latin Empire was that it was essentially a crusader state, both in terms of its creation and in terms of its perceived mission. In the papal letters dealing with the affair of the patriarchate of Constantinople, in April 1208, terms relevant to the crusading provenance of the Latins in Romania reappeared, as reference was made to the ‘clergy among the pilgrims remaining in Romania’.139 The pope had continued to regard the Latins in Constantinople as crusaders: he still called them crucesignati at least up to 1207.140 Until that time, Innocent was referring to their eventual arrival to the Holy Land and probably believed it was still feasible.141 Given the importance the affair of Outremer had in his mind and heart, this is not particularly surprising. The concern of Innocent III for the crusaders to move on to the Holy Land was, however, also strengthened by his realization that as long as they tarried in Romania they were open to accusations of violating their vow and mission and being ‘false crusaders’ by attacking fellow Christians. He had repeatedly reproached them on this account himself, although not entirely consistently, during the course of the diversion but also after the sack of Constantinople.142 In his letter to Boniface, in late summer 1205, the pope stressed that the crusaders could be accused of having ‘rashly turned away from the purity of [their] vow when [they] took up arms not against Saracens but Christians, not aiming to recover Jerusalem, but to occupy 139 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, nos 72(76)–75(79): in all four relevant letters the pope makes reference to ‘clericis de parte peregrinorum apud Constantinopolim commorantibus’. 140  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 38, 30 March 1207; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 132. Also later, in a letter of October 1211, Innocent addressed Emperor Henry and his followers as ‘you and the other crusaders’ (‘tu et alii crucesignati’): Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, col. 470, no. 109. 141  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 38. See Roscher, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge, pp. 130–31; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 132; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 267, note 107; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, p. 40; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 176. Both Baldwin and Henry had made statements that they would proceed to the Holy Land, see Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p. 135. 142  See above for the crusaders’ excommunication regarding Zara, the threat of second excommunication for Constantinople (for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vi, no. 229(230)), and the strong reproach to Cardinal Capuano (Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 127(126)).

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

33

Constantinople, preferring earthly wealth to celestial treasures’. Innocent also repeated the marquis’s defence that he was striving for remission of sins, and not ‘to sin more gravely and wantonly under the cover of religion and the banner of the cross’.143 Such accusations were also picked up by third parties hostile and antagonistic to the Latins. As we have seen, in August 1205 Innocent had urged Kalojan of Bulgaria to make peace with the Latin Empire, under the threat of the impending crusade organized by Bishop Nivelon of Soissons. 144 Kalojan’s answer, as preserved in the Gesta Innocentii, is of particular interest. The Vlacho-Bulgarian king accused the Latins of conquering Constantinople unlawfully, Baldwin of having usurped the imperial crown, and — most importantly — called the Latins of Romania, ‘those who were wearing false crosses on their shoulders’ (‘qui falsos cruces suis humeris praeferebant’).145 The letter in the Gesta Innocentii is in reported speech, unlike those of Innocent and Henry, which the author of the Gesta includes whole, so it is unclear whether the source reports Kalojan’s argument verbatim. The letter, unfortunately, is not extant in the papal registers. Nevertheless, whether these exact words were indeed included in Kalojan’s letter or not, it does not alter the fact that such an accusation could be levelled against those who sacked Constantinople. The same accusation was made, unsurprisingly, by Theodore Lascaris, as is obvious by the papal reply of 17 March 1208. The Greek ruler had accused the Latins who captured Constantinople of ‘the crime of apostasy’, since after taking the cross and pretending to set out for the Holy Land ‘against barbarous nations’, they instead turned their swords against Christians. Thus they committed ‘treason and sacrilege’ by sacking Constantinople and the empire.146 And while Innocent put forth the excuses of the Latin side (namely the 143 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 134(133), p. 246: ‘a puritate voti vestri temere declinasse videmini, dum non contra Saracenos sed contra Christianos arma movistis, non intendentes ad recuperandum Ierusalem sed Constantinopolim occupandum, terrenas opes celestibus divitiis preferendo’, ‘non ut gravius et licentius sub umbra religionis et crucis vexillo peccares’; trans. taken from Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 173. See Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 206 (to Doge Enrico Dandolo) and ibid., ix, no. 139 (to Doge Pietro Zianni). 144  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 130(129); Gesta Innocentii III, par. 107. 145  Gesta Innocentii III, par. 108; Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXIV, col. 147A. 146  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, no. 44(47): ‘Latinos apud Constan­ tinopolim commorantis de apostasiae crimine reprehendis, quia cum Domenicae crucis signaculo, ad terrae sanctae succursum simulaverint properare contra barbaras nationes, hiidem

34

Chapter 1

Greeks’ perfidy, the healing of the Schism, and the help to the Holy Land), he avoided adopting them wholeheartedly or extricating the crusaders of blame, and he distanced himself with the statement that the crusaders acted on their own and not with the participation of the Roman Church. 147 The concern was also shared by some westerners. The troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, a member of the entourage of Boniface of Montferrat, made the obvious connection already in the summer of 1204 by criticizing Baldwin for his delay in proceeding to the Holy Land, as only such an action would justify the crusaders’ sins during Constantinople’s sack: For he [Baldwin] and we alike bear guilt for the burning down of churches and palaces […] and if he does not succour the Holy Sepulchre and if the conquest does not advance, then our guilt before God will be greater still, for the pardon will turn to sin.148

The accusation of false crusading would lose potency, however, if the crusaders’ actions in Romania were seen as directed to a worthy cause. In practically all the abovementioned cases, the pope’s misgivings and reproaches were coupled with admonitions for the crusaders to minimize their sin by working for the help of the Holy Land or the return of the Greek Church to obedience. In those two senses their presence in Romania was a service to the cross. The Latins there were not crucesignati simply because they were bound for the Holy Land but by virtue of their service within the empire. Most importantly, this was how the Latins in Romania perceived themselves. That was the ‘founding myth’ by which they could justify and legitimize their conversi retrorsum in Christianos suos gladios converterunt, Constantinopolitanam urbem et Constantinopolitanum imperium impugnantes; proditionem et sacrilegium eidem impingens’. 147  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, no. 44(47): ‘we do not excuse the Latins, whom we have reproved many times for their excesses’ (‘non excusamus Latinos, quos super excessibus suis multoties redarguimus’); ‘granted […] that they are not entirely without blame’ (‘licet […] ipsi omnino inculpabiles non existant’); ‘they did not act with the assistance of the holy Apostolic See’ (‘non coactos sacrosancte apostolicae sedis’). Innocent did, however, state that the Greeks seem to have been ‘punished by the just judgement of God’ (‘Grecos iusto Dei iudicio credimus fuisse punitos’); the two reasons mentioned are the Schism (‘they tried to tear Jesus Christ’s seamless tunic’: ‘tunicam inconsutilem Iesu Christi scindere sunt moliti’) and the fact that they did not help the Holy Land, despite the proximity of place and the abundance of resources. 148  Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, The Poems, ed. and trans. by Linskill, pp. 226, 228: ‘Q’el e nos em tuig pecchador | del mostiers ars e dels palais, | […] e se·l sepulchre non secor | serem vas Dieu plus pechaire, | q’en pechat tornara·l perdos, | e se·l conqis no ’stai enan’, translation p. 228.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

35

presence there, and on which they based the calls for help from the West — the myth, therefore, which guaranteed their existence and survival. This perception developed only after the initial stages of the conquest. In the major narratives of the Fourth Crusade, namely those written by Geoffrey Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, there is little use of explicit holy war imagery regarding the conquest. The only exception is the incident before the final attack on Constantinople, when the crusader clergy pronounced the fight to be just and to merit the indulgence.149 To that, one can perhaps add the repeated but rather generic statements of Villehardouin that victory was granted by God’s will and providence. 150 The Devastatio Constantinopolitana definitely does not include any such comments as it does not subscribe to the view that this was a divinely inspired campaign;151 and while Gunther of Pairis’s account is carefully tailored to present the conquest as part of God’s plan for humanity, there is still no explicit reference to the war waged against Constantinople as a holy war.152 However, such references gained prominence in the way the Latins in Romania, and especially the Latin emperors, chose to represent themselves towards the West. This was done via three avenues. First, by the persistent use of imagery and rhetoric of holy war in their communications, presenting the Latin Empire as a crusader state, the Latins there as crusaders, their presence as a service to the Church, their enemies as enemies of the cross and the Church, and the struggle against them as God’s war. Second, through gifts of relics: after the first months of the conquest, this became practically the exclusive privilege of the Latin emperors, a recurrent feature of their foreign policy in their effort to secure assistance from western sovereigns. Baldwin I had already sent some relics to King Philip II Augustus of France in 1205, while his brother and successor, Henry, effectively made the grant of relics a persistent feature of his western policy. Bishop Nivelon of Soissons also brought relics with him when he was sent to the West in 1205 to stir up impetus for a crusade for the Latin Empire.153 149 

See above, pp. 8–9 and note 30. For example: Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, pars 104, 131, 133–36, 181–82, 190, 216–20, 251, 253, 320, 323. 151  Devastatio Constantinopolitana, ed. by Pertz, pp. 9–12; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, pp. 205–21. 152  See: Gunther of Pairis, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, ed. by Orth, esp. pp.  37–39; Swietek, ‘Gunther of Pairis and the Historia Constantinopolitana’, pp. 67–70. 153  Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, part iii, nos 8, 14 (for Baldwin); 23, 27, 30, 32 (for Henry); and 4, 15, 16, 18, 24 (for Nivelon); all these cases were directly or indirectly linked to calls for assistance (monetary or military) from the West. See Klein, ‘Eastern 150 

36

Chapter 1

The most famous case, though, was Baldwin II’s ‘cession’ of the Crown of Thorns to King Louis IX.154 Finally, the culminating point and final objective of the previous approaches: actual calls for crusading help, addressed to the pope and to the laity and clergy of the West. After the conquest, the task of stirring up crusading support from the West was taken up, as we have seen, by Emperor Baldwin.155 Baldwin’s letter to the pope naturally included the argument that the crusaders’ actions were justified as a service to the Holy Land and to the Roman Church, but he also added the request for an indulgence to be granted to those who would ‘faithfully serve our empire either for a while or for life’.156 So, from the assertion that the deeds of the crusaders were commendable so far, he further elaborated the idea that the service of the Latins in Romania from that time on should also be considered the meritorious work of a crusader. Henry’s reign witnessed an intensification of this programme of self-identification and projection of the image of the Latins in Romania as crusaders. Already in his first letter to the pope, Henry, as moderator imperii, requested a crusade for the help of the Latin Empire, with participants to be awarded the same indulgence as that granted ‘to those that remain for a year’s service in Syria’. Henry accused Kalojan, the Bulgarian king who had inflicted the crushing defeat on the Latins at Adrianople, of allying with the Turks and ‘other enemies of the cross of Christ’. The pope had the obligation to help the Latins who were knights and stipendiaries of the Church, toiling ‘for the reform of the unity of the Church and the help to the Holy Land’.157 In the parallel call that Henry sent to the West, as well as in Nivelon’s accompanying letter, the Latins in Romania were described as an exercitus christianus constantly fighting in service to Christ, which the people in the West should rush to assist.158 It is unclear whether this extensive use Objects and Western Desires’, pp. 302–03, 306–08. 154  ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, nos 191–97, 233; Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 118–23, 133–35, nos 59–63, 79; Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 237–40. 155  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152; for the variant versions sent to other recipients in the West, see ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 14–15, nos 4–6. 156  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152 (translated in Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 110). 157  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131); Gesta Innocentii III, par. 105. 158  Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe’, ed. by Pokorny, no. i,

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

37

of ­crusading imagery was conjured by Henry in the state of emergency that the empire found itself, or whether it had been cultivated by his brother in the previous months, but the climate of holy war against Kalojan is corroborated by the other sources. Villehardouin mentions that in June 1206, before Henry set out for his campaign against Kalojan for the relief of Demotika, ‘the Cardinal [Benedict of St Susanna], whom the pope had appointed as his legate in Constantinople, preached to the troops and promised full indulgence to all those who went on this expedition and met their death in battle’; then, before launching into battle, the troops made confession and took communion.159 Henry himself, describing these events to his brother Godfrey in September 1206, talked about ‘[Kalojan’s] customary contempt towards his oaths’ and described the Cumans and Vlachs as ‘worse than Saracens’. More importantly, he referred to the Bulgarian king as an ‘enemy of the cross and of the Holy Roman Church’ (‘crucis et sanctae Romanae ecclesiae inimicus’). Closing his letter, Henry addressed a call to his brother and all the Christians to help ‘not only the Latins in Constantinople, but also those in the Holy Land and the whole of Christendom’, by assisting him in three things: a) in preserving the empire ‘for the honour and obedience of the Roman Church and the salvation of all Christendom’; b) in mending the torn tunic of the Lord (that is, healing the schism); and c) in avenging Baldwin and his soldiers who fought ‘for the exaltation of the Roman Church’. Henry urged Godfrey to convince their brother Philip, marquis of Namur, and as many others as possible, to come to the help of Romania. He estimated that six hundred knights and ten thousand soldiers should certainly be sufficient to promote the negotium Dei.160 for example, p. 201, lines 78–81: ‘you should all be willing to rush to us for Christendom and particularly for the Holy Land, and to strengthen the small army of Christ, which already for a period of three years and more has sustained the day’s burden and the heat (Matthew 20. 12) remaining in the service of Christ with great expenses as well as toils’ (‘toti in nobis christianitati et precipue Terre sancte velitis incurrere et pusillum Christi exercitum, qui per trium iam annorum spatia et eo amplius pundus diei et estus non minus sumptuose quam laborose in Christi servitio commorando sustinuit […] confortare’). 159  Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Faral, pars  427, 429–30, 432 (Chronicles of the Crusades, trans. by Shaw, p. 139): ‘Li chardonaus qui ere de par l’apostoille de Rome en preescha et en fist pardon a toz cels qui iroient et qui morroient en la bataille’. 160  Henry of Flanders, ‘De varia latinorum in imperio fortuna’, ed. by Delisle; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 49–50, no. 59. For similar conclusions on Henry’s policy, see Van Tricht, ‘“La Gloire de l’empire”’, esp. pp. 234–37 (and also pp. 231–34), who, however, insists on the quasi-universalist imperial claims of Henry — somewhat excessively in my view.

Chapter 1

38

The most striking testimony for the climate of holy war and the most colourful depiction of Latins in Romania as crusaders comes from the history of Henry of Valenciennes, often considered the continuation of Villehardouin’s chronicle. Henry, who has been identified as a troubadour, was in Emperor Henry’s en­tourage around 1208–09 when his history was apparently composed. 161 His chronicle was initially written to narrate Emperor Henry’s campaign against the Bulgarians of Boril, which ended in the great victory of Philippopolis (31 July 1208); it was then expanded to include the conflict of the emperor with the Lombards of the kingdom of Thessalonica. Longnon, the editor of Valenciennes’s history, considers that, among other things, it was also a propaganda piece intended to encourage the arrival of new crusaders in Romania.162 When describing the preparations for the campaign of the emperor in 1208 against the Bulgarian Boril, the successor of Kalojan, the chronicler reported that the imperial chaplain, Philip, preached to the army and urged them to confess, reminding them that they were serving the Lord and that, with His help, they should protect what they had gained. After the sacraments of confession and communion had been administered to the soldiers, the army rode forth, with the chaplain carrying the relic of ‘the Holy Cross of our redemption’ (‘la sainte Crois de no redemption’).163 Before the great battle of Philippopolis (31 July 1208), the marshal of Romania and well-known chronicler, Geoffrey Villehardouin, addressed the soldiers in a language charged with crusading allusions, reminding them of the glorious feats of their ancestors and pointing to the rewards for their service: ‘Lords, in the name of God’, said Geoffrey, ‘make sure that this attack is so well sustained and so skilful, that you are not reproached or mocked by our enemies. And he who will not comport himself well here must be banished from the glory of Our Lord. In the name of God, remember the noble ancestors who came before us, who are still talked about in history books. And you should know well that the soul of him who will die for God on this endeavour will go to heaven in all its glory [to stand] before Him; and he who will come out of this undertaking alive will be honoured for all the days of his life and will be eulogized after his death.’164 161 

See Longnon, ‘Le Chroniquer Henri de Valenciennes’; Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 180–82; Paris, ‘Henri de Valenciennes’. 162  See: Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, pp. 12–13; Longnon, ‘Sur l’histoire de l’Empereur Henri de Constantinople par Henri de Valenciennes’, pp. 210–12. 163  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, pars 522–24. 164  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon,

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

39

Similarly, the chaplain Philip, holding the True Cross in his hands, made a speech full of holy war references: the fight was for God, he exclaimed, and against His enemies who do not believe in Him and His power (and it should be remembered that it was the Christian Bulgarians and Vlachs that the Latins were facing).165 The Latins, on the other hand, were good Christians, who were assembled from many countries by the orders of the pope and had been cleansed of their sins through confession. Closing his sermon, Philip granted the Latin warriors absolution from their sins.166 Then the chaplain raised the True Cross and the knights charged shouting the crusader war-cry, ‘Holy Sepulchre!’.167 Another interesting detail concerns the description of the clothes and arms of Henry, which, according to the chronicler, were purple and decorated with little golden crosses, as an indication of both his imperial and his crusader status.168 Henry of Valenciennes speaks of divine help in the victory that ensued, a miracle effected by God for ‘the Christians’, which led to ‘the increase of the empire of Constantinople’ and ‘the exaltation of the Roman Church’.169 It should be noted that no comparable imagery and language are used in the description of the conflict between the emperor and the Lombards of the kingdom of Thessalonica which follows in the narrative. Emperor Henry kept up the rhetoric that presented the empire in the service of the Church when he announced the victory over Boril at Philippopolis. In his par. 534: ‘Segnour, por Diu, dist Joffrois, or gardés que chil poindres soit si bien furnis, et si adroit que nous n’en soiesmes blasmé de nos anemis ne gabé. Et chil qui chi fera mauvais samblant doit bien iestre banis de la gloire Nostre Segnour. Por Diu, souviegne vous des preudomes anciiens qui devant nous ont esté, qui encore sont ramenteu es livres des estores. Et bien sachiés que qui por Diu morra en ceste besoigne, s’ame en ira toute florie en paradis par devant lui; et chil ki vis en eschapera, serra toz les jors de sa vie honnerés et ramanteus en bien apriés sa mort.’ 165  Longnon (in Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, p. 44, note 1) thinks that this is an allusion to the pagan Cumans or to the heretic Paulicians within the Bulgarian army, but there is no need to search for such an elaborate explanation, given the use of crusading rhetoric and mechanisms in Romania. 166  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, pars 536–38: ‘je vous assoil, de Diu, de toz les pechiés que vous onques feistes jusques au point d’ore’. 167  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, par. 539. 168  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, par. 541 (see Longnon’s comment, p. 45, note 2). 169  Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Longnon, par. 544: ‘Tels miracles comme vous avés oï, et tel acrossement a l’empire de Constantinoble et si grant essaucement a l’Eglise de Rome, fist Nostre Sires as crestiens a celui termine’.

Chapter 1

40

letter to the pope, in September 1208, the emperor stressed repeatedly that God had acted through the Latins and that they had received divine help not only in founding the Latin Empire but also in restoring it to power after the recent victory against the Bulgarians. Henry asserted that the Latins would not shy from fighting and sacrificing themselves ‘for the faith of the Church of the holy Prince of the Apostles’. All their actions were done in the pope’s name, Henry affirmed, and they wanted to be the executors of the mandates of the Church, as they were its servants. The letter came to a close with a general request for the pope to keep supporting the empire, as without his help the Latins would soon succumb.170 Even in his boastful letter of 1212 or 1213, by which he informed the West about his victories over the four opponents of the empire (Michael of Epiros, Strez of Prosek, Boril of Bulgaria, and Theodore of Nicaea), Henry stated that the Latins proceeded to the great battle against Theodore Lascaris placing all their hope ‘only in God and in his holy cross, which was carried before us’ (‘in solo Deo et in ejus sancta cruce, que ante nos ferebatur’). Then they defeated, auxilio Dei, the superior forces of the enemy, which included Latins ‘under the excommunication of the Lord Pope’. This letter, as usual, ends with a call for more reinforcements to arrive from the West, since ‘nothing is lacking for a complete victory except for a multitude of Latins’ (‘Nihil autem nobis deesse sciatis ad habendam plenam victoriam et possidendum imperium, nisi latinorum copiam’).171 The perennial need of the Latin Empire for more men from the West was again the subject of the last extant letter of Emperor Henry, ‘to the venerable fathers, archbishops, bishops, abbots, and other prelates beyond the mountains’, which was published by Lauer. Henry informed them that with the help of God the Latins had punished the pride and loftiness of the Greeks, who had risen ‘against the Roman Church’ (‘contra Romanam Ecclesiam’), and called the Latins dogs because of their religion — a recurrent theme in Henry’s correspondence with the West, obviously meant to excite the spirits against the Greeks. However, the numbers of the Latins remained small and help was needed, otherwise it was to be feared that the land which was won for the honour of the Roman Church, at the expense of much Latin blood, would be lost. Even the title that Henry used for himself on 170 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, no. 202(207); ‘Innocentii III (et ad ipsum) epistolæ duodecim et trecentæ’, ed. by Delisle, p. 514; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p. 68, no. 89. 171  Henry of Flanders, ‘Der Brief ’, ed. by Prinzing ; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p.  87, no.  123; see also Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, p. 122. For the letter’s date, see now Van Tricht, ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople’, pp. 221–27, who argues for 1213 instead of 1212.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

41

this occasion (Dei et Romane ecclesie beneplacito imperator) was meant to denote his subjection to the service of the Roman Church.172 It was reasonable for the Latin emperors to adopt this approach of portraying the defence of the Latin Empire as a divinely sanctioned war fought in the name of the Church. For the Latins in Frankish Greece, the Crusader States of Outremer, which also depended heavily on western reinforcements for their survival, provided the model both conceptually and practically. Many of the Frankish leaders came from families with extensive crusade connections in the East or were crusade veterans themselves. The comital house of Flanders was steeped in the tradition of crusading like few others in Europe, having been involved consistently in holy wars since the First Crusade. The uncle of Emperor Baldwin and Henry, Count Philip I of Flanders, went to the Holy Land twice and died in the Third Crusade, while their grandfather, Thierry, had participated in four campaigns in the Levant. Baldwin was related to the royal family of Jerusalem through both his mother and his wife. Boniface of Montferrat’s father had taken part in the Second Crusade, and three of his siblings had followed impressive careers in the East; his brother Conrad, and his nephew, Baldwin V, actually became kings of Jerusalem. The father of Louis of Blois had died at the siege of Acre in 1191. Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Hugh of St Pol had gone on the Third Crusade themselves, as had several other participants of the Fourth Crusade.173 Latin Outremer was a world they were already familiar with and this experience conditioned their reactions after 1204. As they found themselves conquerors of a foreign land inhabited by potentially hostile populations, to stress the religious difference was a way to set some protective barriers between them and their new subjects (they were the faithful among infidels or false Christians) and at the same time to strengthen their sense of divine mission. This would help attract recruits and secure the necessary papal support, which would ultimately guarantee the spiritual benefits for those who would join them in defending their newly acquired territories. The Latin states in Syria and Palestine could expect assistance from the West precisely because it was felt they were fulfilling such a divine mission: they were reclaiming Christ’s patrimony and avenging the injury done to Him, taking possession of the lands that rightfully belonged to Christians, where the Saviour had lived and died, and protecting Christendom from its 172 

‘Une Lettre inédit d’Henri I d’Angre’, ed. by Lauer, p. 201. Regarding the dating, Van Tricht’s argument is for 1213 (see previous note); see Van Tricht, ‘“La Gloire de l’empire”’, pp. 229–30 (note 67) and p. 224 (note 51). 173  Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, pp.  48–50, 82–85; Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, pp. 79, 195, 227–28.

Chapter 1

42

enemies. The legitimization of crusading outside the Holy Land was made along similar lines. The Christian states in the Iberian Peninsula were recovering from the hands of the infidel what was rightfully theirs and turning back the Muslim tide while also opening another way to assist Jerusalem. In the Baltic, justification was sought through the fiction that those lands constituted the dowry of the Virgin Mary, along with the argument that the crusaders were protecting the new Christian converts in the area from the attacks of the pagans.174 In the case of the Frankish states in Romania it was claimed that they were created by an act of divine providence and their preservation was meant to be a service to the Church and God; this provided the essential justification of crusade expeditions for their defence. They were comparable to Latin bulwarks elsewhere. This view was not limited to the Latins settled in Frankish Greece, as many people in the West were ready to see them in those terms. The combination of papal crusading policy in Frankish Greece with the selfportrayal of the Latin Empire as a ‘crusader state’ had the result of establishing early on this image and the legitimacy of the crusade against the schismatics in Romania, at least in the minds of some notable ecclesiastics and chroniclers in the West. Arnaud Amaury, abbot of Cîteaux and papal legate to the Albigensian Crusade, reporting in 1212 the great Spanish victory against the Moors at Las Navas de Tolosa, placed the event in the context of a three-part crusade, against three types of enemies: ‘schismatics of the east, heretics of the west, and Saracens of the south’, all three groups characterized as ‘pestilential peoples and enemies of Christ’s holy Church’.175 James of Vitry, in the early thirteenth century, would make a similar comment regarding the mission of the military orders: namely that they have been appointed to defend the Church against the Saracens in Syria, the Moors in Spain, the pagans in the Baltic, and also against the schismatics in Greece and the heretics wherever they might be.176 In 1204 the attack on the Christian 174 

See, for example, Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, pp. 7–12; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, pp. 9–18; Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 116–17, 161–62; Tyerman, God’s War, pp. 212–19, 656–71, 686–88. 175  ‘Selecta ex variis chronicis ad Philippi-Augusti regnum pertinentibus’, ed. by Delisle, pp. 250–54 (p. 253): ‘Benedictus per omnia Dominus Jesus-Christus, qui per suam misericordiam in nostris temporibus, sub felici apostolatu domini Papae Innocentii, de tribus pestilentium hominum et inimicorum ecclesiae sanctae suae, videlicet orientalibus schismaticis, occidentalibus haereticis, meridionalibus Sarracenis, victorias contulit catholicis christianis.’ 176  Analecta novissima, ed. by Pitra, ii, 405: ‘ad hoc igitur fratres ordinis militaris ordinati sunt, ut Christi ecclesiam gladio materiali defendant, maxime contra eos qui extra sunt, id est contra Sarracenos in Syria, contra Mauros in Hispania, contra paganos in Prutia, Livonia

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

43

city of Constantinople could be seen as a perversion of the crusaders’ mission, as Innocent had commented himself. However, a few years later the defence of the Latin Empire against the schismatics was recognized as a sacred cause for Christendom, under the normalizing influence of the crusades proclaimed with that aim. Frankish Greece was thus incorporated in the conceptual framework of crusading, which defined the West in terms of opposition and conflict with the cultures around it. In a similar vein, the chronicler Alberic of Trois-Fontaines listed Greece among the other crusading fronts where setbacks had occurred in 1221, namely in Damietta and Languedoc (the Albigensian Crusade), commenting on how detrimental that year had been for the affairs of the Church.177 Likewise, the anonymous chronicler of Laon perceived the expedition against the Greeks in Romania and the one against the Albigensians in Provence as of roughly similar standing.178 The Latin Empire’s crusading pretensions, specifically the claim that it could afford help to the Holy Land, had convinced at least some contemporaries. The Annales Reineri reported Henry’s death, stating that ‘the whole of Christendom was saddened, for he had made many promises to our crusaders and he was to set out with arms and soldiers for the affair of the Holy Land’.179 It is not a coincidence that the author of the Annales Reineri, who was aware of both Henry’s and Baldwin’s calls to the West for recruits, at the same et Comania, et nihilominus de mandato superioris contra schismaticos in Graecia, et contra haereticos ubique dispersos in universali ecclesia’. 177  Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 912: ‘itaque apud Damietam, apud Albigenses et in Grecia hoc anno detrimentum patitur sancta ecclesia, unde Spiritus, qui omnia scrutatur, papam ad hoc, ut multimode predicatores aggregaret inpulit’. 178  Anonymous Chronicler of Laon, ed. by Bouquet and others, pp. 713–14: ‘Durante adhuc eodem anno mccviii, fit magna profectio Francorum et Flandrensium in partes Constantinopolitanas contra Graecos, in auxilium Latinorum. […] Item, eodem anno, fit alia profectio multo plurium quam prius, tam nobilium quam ignobilium, contra haereticos in partes Albigensium commorantes debelandos’ (my emphasis). 179  Annales Reineri, ed. by Pertz, p. 675: ‘Eodem anno non multo post obiit Henricus imperator Constantinopolitanus […]; de cuius morte tota christianitas doluit, quia signatis nostris multa promiserat, et se iturum in virtute armorum in negotium orientalis ecclesie predixerat’; see Van Tricht, ‘“La Gloire de l’empire”’, pp. 231–32, and Van Tricht, ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople’, pp.  430–34, who however does not make the connection with Henry’s crusading rhetoric and policy. In his recent book, that same scholar notes the crusading mission of the Latin Empire as part of the imperial ideology, although he does not give it a particularly central place in his examination: Van Tricht, The Latin ‘Renovatio’ of Byzantium, pp. 95–99.

Chapter 1

44

time acknowledged the crusading role of the Latin Empire.180 The imperial propaganda was at least able to get that much of its message through. Other institutions characteristic of Crusader States also made their appearance in Frankish Greece. Following the conquest, lands and property were given to the military orders, including fiefs and castles in the Peloponnese and Thessaly, sometimes with the explicit statement that they were expected to assist in the defence of the land. A new military order, that of the Hospital of St Sampson, was actually founded in Constantinople. However, these grants were not extensive and the presence of the military brothers was minimal.181 More pronounced, but eventually equally ineffective, was the presence of the religious orders in Romania sent to work on the affair of Church Union. Though the Cistercians had a strong presence initially, they were soon overtaken by the Franciscans and the Dominicans. Other orders, including the Augustinians, the Premonstratensians, and the Carmelites, also established houses in Frankish Greece. Although the mendicants, in particular, were responsible for the diffusion of western theological writings (such as the works of Thomas Aquinas) in the Byzantine world and though they managed to recruit some educated Greeks, they failed to make significant progress in winning over the hearts and minds of the majority of the local population.182

180 

Annales Reineri, ed. by Pertz, pp. 658 and 660. See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131), ix, no. 179(180), xi, nos 32(35), 33(36), 47(50), 118(123); Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, col. 470, no. 109. See in general: Forey, ‘The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians’, pp. 2–5; Nicholson, ‘The Motivations of the Hospitallers and Templars’; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 233–39; Lock, ‘The Military Orders in Mainland Greece’; Houben, ‘La quarta crociata e l’Ordine Teutonico in Grecia’. See also below, Chapter 4.3, for the abortive agreement between Baldwin II and the Order of Santiago. For the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson see: Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, p. 135; Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers in Twelfth-century Constantinople’, p. 231; Richard, ‘The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople’, pp. 52–53; Van Tricht, The Latin ‘Renovatio’ of Byzantium, pp. 343–47; and more comprehensively, Stathakopoulos, ‘Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades’. 182  See Bolton, ‘A Mission to the Orthodox?’; Brown, ‘The Cistercians in the Latin Empire’; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 222–26, 228–33; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans’; Ranner, ‘Mendicant Orders in the Principality of Achaia and the Latin Communal Identity’; Tsougarakis, The Latin Religious Orders in Medieval Greece. 181 

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

45

5. Church Union and Crusading in Frankish Greece Where, then, does the issue of Church Union fit into this picture and how prominent was it for papal policy in Frankish Greece in the period after the Latin conquest? The healing of the schism and the return of the Greek Church to obedience to Rome was, along with the help afforded to the Holy Land, one of the two main justifications for the conquest of Constantinople as well as for crusading activity in Romania.183 Undoubtedly it was also one of the priorities of papal policy in the Levant. Innocent himself made numerous references concerning this meritorious work and repeatedly admonished the Latin clergy and army to make sure the union of Churches was realized.184 The pope, in his correspondence, reaffirmed several times his concern and solicitude for the reunited Greek Church, this ‘new plantation’, this daughter ‘reborn as in new infancy’ whom the mother Church of Rome should look after.185 However, by unity and obedience of the Greek Church, Innocent basically meant the Latin hierarchy that had been set up in Romania. Indeed, the vast majority of his ecclesiastical correspondence with Frankish Greece deals with administrative affairs of the Latin clergy. There is very little reference to the faith of the Greek people or discussion of the doctrines of the Greek Church. The issue of primary concern regarding the Greek clergy was the recognition of papal primacy and jurisdiction.186 It was mostly around that issue that the first, 183 

See notes 8–10 above. Emperor Henry repeatedly claimed that he was working for the Church: see above, for example Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 132(131). 184  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, nos 154, 164, viii, nos 26, 56(55), xi, no. 20(21). 185  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 71 (‘novella illa plantatio in disciplina Domini erudita fructum reddat suis temporibus oportunum’); and Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, no. 26 (‘Cum ecclesia Constantinopolitana in novam nunc quodammodo infantiam renascatur et tamquam parvula nec habens ubera officiosa matris sollicitudine noscatur plurimum indigere, ipsam uberibus consolationis nostre lactare disponimus’). 186  See, for example, Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 140 (Patriarch Thomas Morosini was instructed to allow Greek bishops who recognized the pope to preserve their sees); Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, xi, nos 20(21), 22(23). See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 31–32; Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe, pp. 185–86; Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 263–64; Vries, ‘Innozenz III (1198–1216) und der christliche Osten’; see also Andrea, ‘Innocent III and the Byzantine Rite’, esp. pp. 114–20, for the grudging and temporary toleration of Greek rite after the initial unsuccessful intention of Latinizing the Byzantine Church.

46

Chapter 1

brief and unsuccessful negotiations between Greeks and Latins, in 1205–06, revolved. On that occasion, Nicholas Mesarites, a noted theologian and deacon of Constantinople, later to become metropolitan of Ephesus, and his brother, John, represented the Greek side, while Nicholas of Otranto, the Greek abbot of the monastery of Casole in Apulia, acted as the interpreter.187 Indicative of the pope’s stance is the fact that he had lost interest in a unionist council that would settle the differences between the Churches, although, before the Fourth Crusade, he had himself announced such an intention to Emperor Alexios III.188 After 1204, Innocent did not appear willing even to consider this option, even though Emperor Baldwin made mention of it and subsequently the Greek clergy of Constantinople requested that a general council be convened on the question of Church Union. The pope could not bring himself to agree to the Greek request, as the relevant letter written by Mesarites in 1206 was apparently left unanswered.189 This is even more striking when compared with the importance that a general council seemed to have on other aspects of his policy, when faced with important decisions, such as imposing a tax on the clergy for the Fifth Crusade, confirming the deposition of the count of Toulouse who was accused of supporting heretics, or taking actions that might contradict existing legislation or the ‘divine law’.190 Pope Innocent was not an unreasonable man. He had advocated a cautious and lenient approach on the part of the Latin prelates towards the obedient Greek clergy. Greek bishops were to retain their sees if they recognized the pope’s authority, and the sacraments by Greek clergy to the Greek population were to be performed in their own rite, at least until a final decision was reached on the matter. On the one hand, the decisions were based on Innocent’s pragmatism, as he realized the magnitude of this recent change in the empire and the need to avoid a completely intransigent policy in the area. He advised Patriarch Thomas of Constantinople and Archbishop Antelm of Patras 187  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 32–34; Hagedorn, ‘Papst Innozenz III und Byzanz am Vorabend des IV. Kreuzzugs’, pp. 18–19; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 93–96; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 183–87; Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums, ed. by Heisenberg, i, 9–11, and ii, 15–25; Hoeck, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, pp. 34–52. 188  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ii, no. 202(211); Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 11–12; Powell, ‘Alexius III and Innocent III’, p. 98. 189  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, vii, no. 152; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 32–36; Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, p. 37; Vries, ‘Innozenz III (1198–1216) und der christliche Osten’, pp. 95–96; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 226–30. 190  Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 29–31, 34, 36–38, 237–38, 282.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

47

to proceed with the maximum caution and maturity in all matters, ‘because of the recentness of the change in the land and the new circumstances’.191 On the other hand, these measures reflected the pope’s tolerant and cautious approach that he also displayed towards dissident elements in the West, such as heretics and the movements of apostolic poverty, as long as they did not pose a threat to ecclesiastical authority.192 Nevertheless, for Innocent there was to be no discussion of Church Union on the basis of doctrine and dogma. The issue had been solved in his legalistic mind, which interpreted obedience (and consequently union) in a strictly hierarchical sense, and, therefore, he was not ready to negotiate a point that had already been won and something that he considered as the natural right of the Apostolic See.193 This is not to say that his approach to the affair was political rather than religious, since he appears to have hoped that Greeks would eventually turn to the ‘true teaching of Rome’ with the gradual replacement of the Greek rite with the Latin one and the proper instruction from the ecclesiastical and political hierarchy.194 But this stance did exclude the possibility that negotiations for Church Union could have a considerable effect on Innocent’s policy, especially in the early days of the Latin conquest. Negotiations of a theological nature could not be held with regards to the churches that were already under the jurisdiction of the Apostolic See, which now included Frankish Greece. The conquest meant ipso facto the subjection of the Greek Church. The Greek clergy in the territories under Latin control was expected to obey the head of the Church, much as was the case for their peers in the West. Any divergence from the norms set by the Roman Church would be seen as disobedience, obstinacy, or even heresy. The theology of the reformed papacy was not to be put in doubt or challenged. There was to be no negotiation with the populations that were already under the control of the Roman Church, only an affirmation of their obedience and of the rectitude of their belief. Negotiations could be held only with Churches that remained outside papal control and were closely linked or identified with sovereign political entities outside Latin Christendom. The papacy had conducted such negotiations with the Byzantine Empire prior to 1204, and it would do so again 191 

Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 140, 2 August 1206; Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 51, 19 April 1207. 192  Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 242–48; Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe, pp. 125– 63, esp. pp. 127, 137–40, 144–45. 193  Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 264, 267; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 10–11; Vries, ‘Innozenz III (1198–1216) und der christliche Osten’, esp. pp. 98–100, 104–05, 108–09, 121. 194  Regarding the Latinization of Greek rite, see Andrea, ‘Innocent III and the Byzantine Rite’.

Chapter 1

48

with Nicaea, Epiros, and the restored empire of the Palaiologoi in the thirteenth century.195 It is not without significance that in these attempts the discussions were held not only with the ecclesiastical authorities but also with the political leadership of the Greek side. The emperor often appeared to play a more central role than the patriarch. These characteristics are also evident in the only noticeable negotiations for union that took place during Innocent’s pontificate after the conquest, those conducted in 1213–14 between the Cardinal Legate Pelagius of Albano on behalf of the pope and Nicholas Mesarites, metropolitan of Ephesus and exarch of all Asia on behalf of Emperor Theodore Lascaris of Nicaea.196 Though theological discussions took place in Constantinople and Heraclea of Pontus, it is evident that one of the prime objectives was the establishment of peace between Greeks and Latins, most probably connected with the upcoming Fourth Lateran Council and the preparations for the new crusade to the Holy Land, Innocent’s major projects at the time.197 It has been further argued that the ‘political aspect’ of the negotiations was made manifest, among other things, by the complete absence of Theodore Eirenikos, the Nicaean patriarch, the direct involvement of Emperor Theodore Lascaris, and the brief ecclesiastical discussions in Heraclea, which lasted only one day.198 The authorities of the Latin Empire were noticeably absent from these negotiations. The Latin patriarchate of Constantinople was at the time vacant and there was a dispute regarding the succession of Thomas Morosini who had died in 1211.199 The Latin emperor also did not participate 195 

See for example Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 11–13, 64–72, 88–96, 107–15, 120–41. The various negotiations for union in the thirteenth century will be discussed in the corresponding chapters. 196  Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums, ed. by Heisenberg, iii. For the negotiations in general see: Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 144–47; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 39–43; Hoeck, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, pp. 56–61; Papayianni, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the Empire of Nicaea and the Latins’, pp. 155–63. 197  Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 115; Luchaire, Innocent III, iv, 264–65; Gill, Byzan­ tium and the Papacy, p. 40. Note that in his letter to the prince and nobles of Achaia, Innocent informed them of the dispatch of the legate for both temporal and spiritual benefit (‘utilitas non solum spiritualis, sed etiam temporalis’): Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols 903–04, no. 106 (= Acta Innocentii PP III, ed. by Haluscynskyj, no. 212), 31 August 1213. 198  Papayianni, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the Empire of Nicaea and the Latins’, pp. 153–63, esp. p. 162. 199  Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 246–53.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

49

in the talks in Constantinople. The argument that this happened because he was not interested is very weak.200 These were direct negotiations between the papacy, the most important supporter of the Latin presence in Romania, and Nicaea, an enemy state, whose ideology and raison d’être came in direct opposition to those of the Latin Empire.201 A more probable explanation lies in the strained relations between Henry and Innocent at the time, as the pope intended once more to assert papal influence and initiative in the area, whereas the Latin emperor was trying to limit it and extend his own.202 Symptoms of that development include the strife in the Latin Empire between clergy and laity over church property203 and Henry’s contravention of the policy of the papal legate Pelagius concerning the Greek clergy, particularly by releasing the Greek priests who had been imprisoned by the cardinal upon the latter’s arrival at Constantinople in 1213.204 The issue of lay encroachment on church property apparently reached such a point that the pope excommunicated the emperor’s barons in 1216, only to die before the sentence was promulgated.205 Regardless of the situation in the Latin Empire, it is unlikely that Innocent’s initiative in establishing contact with Nicaea on the eve of the Lateran Council, could have been solely, or even mostly, aimed 200  Papayianni, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the Empire of Nicaea and the Latins’, pp. 162–63. 201  See Ahrweiler, L’Idéologie politique de l’empire byzantin, pp. 101–14 (esp. pp. 106, 108– 12); Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile, pp. 13–14, 27–33 (esp. p. 29); Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea, pp. 5–7; Angelov, ‘Byzantine Ideological Reactions to the Latin Conquest of Constantinople’, pp. 296–302, 310. 202  See Wolff ’s comment (Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, p. 284) that the papacy managed to check the authority of the Latin patriarchate by negotiating directly with the Greeks and the laity through papal legates. 203  Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, x, no. 120, xi, nos 11(12), 15(16), 49(52). Note esp. Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols. 470–71, no. 110 (October 1211), regarding Innocent’s strong reproof for Emperor Henry’s appropriation of Templar property in Romania. See also Luchaire, Innocent III, iv, 184–89; Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 255–74; and esp. Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp. 224–37. 204  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 39. 205  See Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, p.  264. However, relations between Rome and Henry had improved during the last part of Pelagius’s legation (see Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp. 240–43, esp. pp. 242–43) and by late January 1216 it appears that Henry and Innocent had reached an understanding (Hampe, ‘Aus verlorenen Registerbänden der Päpste Innocenz III und Innocenz IV’, pp. 561–62, no. 15). Van Tricht, ‘“La Gloire de l’empire”’, pp. 239–40, seems to think that, despite tensions, relations remained mostly amicable between Henry and Innocent.

Chapter 1

50

at theological discussions, given that the issue of Greek Union was for the greatest part absent from the council’s agenda. The only decree that pertained directly to the Greek Church was ‘On the pride of the Greeks towards Latins’, which basically consisted of a strict admonition towards the Greeks to remain obedient to the Roman Church. Also relevant was the decree ‘On different rites within the same faith’, which pronounced that in a population of mixed rite there would only be a Latin bishop, though a vicar ‘appropriate for the nations in question’ could be appointed.206 There was not a word on issues of dogma between Greeks and Latins such as the filioque question. In any case, the mutual mistrust and Greek hatred for the Latin conquerors left little hope for an agreement on Church Union. This resentment was expressed, and at the same time provoked further, through the circulation of works such as the anonymous pamphlet which described the ‘Latin Atrocities in Constantinople after the Capture’, or the list of Latins’ errors by Constantine Stilbes which, although in many ways similar to older works of this genre, made reference for the first time not only to the atrocities during the sack but also to the practice of crusading indulgences.207 The papacy’s role as protector of the Latin Empire was not likely to endear it to the Greeks;208 nor was Innocent’s reluctance to accede to concessions towards the Greek clergy of Constantinople when they asked for a church council over the issue of union and when they requested a Greek patriarch after the death of John X Kamateros.209 The response of the Greek clergy in Romania to papal initiatives was cool: Innocent’s great council was attended by only one Greek prelate, Theodore of Negroponte.210 The replacement of the Greek hierarchy by a Latin one had also incited feelings of hostility and 206 

Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 235–36, 239 (nos 4, 5 and 9); see Foreville, Latran I, II, III et Latran IV, pp. 227–317, esp. pp. 232–33, 255–57; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 42–43, 45. 207  For the pamphlet, see Ecclesiae graecae monumenta, ed. by Cotelerius, iii, 495–517; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 42; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 42. For Stilbes’s list see ‘Le Mémoire de Constantin Stilbès’, ed. by Darrouzès, pp. 57, 69, 77, 81–86; Kolbaba, The Byzantine Lists, esp. pp. 27, 178, 200–01. See Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 196–202. 208  See Andrea, ‘Innocent III as Crusader and Canonist’. 209  Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums, ed. by Heisenberg, i, 52–53; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 34–35; Gallina, ‘La reazione antiromana nell’epistolario di Michele Coniata metropolita d’Atene’, esp. pp. 443–46. 210  Andrea, ‘Innocent III as Crusader and Canonist’, p. 134; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 147–48; Foreville, Latran I, II, III et Latran IV, pp. 255–56.

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

51

outrage among the Greeks.211 At Nicaea, around 1208–10, Patriarch Michael Autoreianos had even offered indulgences for those who would fight against the Latins.212 This was another indication of the prominence that crusading practices and notions were gaining in the affairs of Frankish Greece.

6. Papal Policy and Crusading in Frankish Greece in the Latter Part of Innocent’s Pontificate It is very difficult to be precise about the development of crusading in Frankish Greece during the last years of Innocent’s pontificate. The papal registers for a great part of the period have been lost, while the Gesta Innocentii and Henry of Valenciennes do not proceed further than 1209.213 The other sources offer hardly any information on the issue. A recent attempt to reconstruct the events and policy of Henry in the latter part of his reign (1210–16), though helpful, is highly speculative.214 Gill and Gerland have claimed that that there was a change of papal policy towards the Latin Empire after the autumn of 1207, when Innocent realized that there was to be no help for Jerusalem through Constantinople. 215 Indeed, it appears that the pope made little effort to provide the Latin Empire with further assistance during the last part of his pontificate. However, this does not mean that there had been a radical change of policy concerning the empire’s usefulness or the decision to support it. Innocent reiterated several times over the following years that the preservation of the Latin Empire would be most beneficial for the Holy Land, and that Emperor Henry had the duty to provide help to the latter.216 The contraction of western resources deployed for the defence 211  Angold, ‘Greeks and Latins after 1204’, pp. 67–70, passim; Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, p. 188; see Richard, ‘The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople’, pp. 47–49, 58. 212  Michael Autoreianos, ‘Cinq actes inédits’, ed. by Oikonomides, pp. 117–20, 144–45; Angelov, ‘Byzantine Ideological Reactions to the Latin Conquest of Constantinople’, p. 298. 213  See, for example, Moore, Pope Innocent III, p. 228; Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. by Andrea, p. 8; Hampe, ‘Aus verlorenen Registerbänden’, pp. 546–47; The Letters of Innocent III, ed. by Cheney and Cheney, p. xx. 214  Van Tricht, ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople’. 215  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 45; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, p. 137. 216  For example: Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols 353–54, no. 184 (7 December 1210) and col. 470, no. 109 (5 October 1211).

52

Chapter 1

of the empire after an intensive effort to support it was, in any case, to become a periodic characteristic of crusading in Romania. Despite the friction with the emperor over church property, the pope supported Henry’s fight against Michael of Epiros and Theodore Lascaris by prohibiting under pain of excommunication all Latins from serving in Greek armies. Once more, the argument was that the Greeks had always been unhelpful or even hostile to the crusades, but, Innocent observed, their opposition would be even more bitter now because of their hatred of the Latins and the Apostolic See, which they blamed for the conquest of Constantinople.217 The papacy was coming to realize at an early stage that, once the decisive step to protect the Latin Empire through the crusade had been taken, disentanglement would not be easy. Apart from the potential consequences of the conflict with Emperor Henry, as well as the disappointment at the apparent failure of the earlier calls for crusading assistance for the Latin Empire, papal policy in Frankish Greece was also influenced by the other preoccupations of the Apostolic See at the time. In his letters of August 1213 to the lay and clerical authorities in Romania, by which he announced the dispatch of Cardinal Pelagius as his legate, Innocent made no reference to any forthcoming assistance for the Latin Empire or the help it could provide for the Holy Land, but he stressed the theme of the reform of the Greek Church.218 Nevertheless, it is not altogether surprising that once Innocent’s thinking had crystallized on the two basic concerns for the Fourth Lateran Council, namely Church reform and the crusade, he chose to focus his work within the empire of Constantinople on the former rather than the latter. His fear of diverting resources from the planned expedition to the Holy Land had already led him to suspend the crusades both against the Albigensian heretics in 217  Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols 353–54, no. 184. Henry’s letter of 13 January 1212/1213 (Henry of Flanders, ‘Der Brief ’, ed. by Prinzing) similarly mentions the papal excommunication of the Latins in the army of Lascaris. The condemnation of those Latins who served in Greek armies is also attested in the Assizes of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, composed by John of Ibelin around 1264–66, where those who served with Saracens and Greeks ‘against Christians’ (‘Ces […] qui ont servi an et jor sarrasins contre crestiens ou gres’) are listed alongside perjurers, traitors, and other such groups who had reduced legal rights before the High Court: John of Ibelin, Le Livre des Assises, ed. by Edbury, par. 58, p. 167. 218  Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne, CCXVI, cols 902–04, nos 105–06 (= Acta Innocentii PP III, ed. by Haluscynskyj, nos 211–12), 30–31 August 1213: for example, ‘and since the Church of the Greeks was reborn, in a way, in a new infancy, wishing to nurse it with full udders we strive to efficaciously devote our power and efforts to its reform’ (‘et cum [Graecorum Ecclesia] in novam quodammodo infantiam sit renata, plenis eam lactare volentes uberibus, ad reformationem ipsius opem et operam impendere nitimur efficacem’).

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

53

southern France and against the Moors in Spain, with the abolition of crusading indulgences except for local participants.219 The case was similar for the Latin Empire. Innocent had issued two parallel bulls: Vineam Domini for the summons to the council, and Quia maior for the organization of the crusade. Spain and Frankish Greece seem to be the only areas where the former was sent without the latter.220 The crusaders in both regions were expected to cope on their own with the defence of their realms, but they were exempted from the obligation to serve in the crusade to the Holy Land. They were already fulfilling their duty locally.

7. Conclusions The policy and events of the reign of Innocent III have been examined at length because they constitute the basis and the model for crusading in Frankish Greece during the thirteenth century. We can now come to some conclusions about its formation and summarize its main characteristics. From 1204 onwards, the papacy gradually incorporated crusading practices into the defence and consolidation of the Latin Empire. Initially it was in immediate response to current developments and the need to control them. But there was some hesitation, as the whole venture was open to, and indeed the target of, criticism: the ‘enemies’ were, after all, Christians. A need was felt to justify such expeditions. The arguments put forth by the crusaders themselves for the legitimation of the conquest and subsequently of the use of crusading for its defence were drawn from the past of Byzantine-western interaction and were to display notable longevity through the thirteenth century. Prominent among them was the use of rhetoric and imagery that tied the empire to the fate of Outremer. Possession of Constantinople was useful for the recovery of Jerusalem. This was founded on the well-established, by that time, accusation: Byzantium had in the past been unhelpful or even treacherous to the cause of the Holy Land, whereas it could have been eminently helpful because of its resources and proximity. A parallel argument which was now fully exploited was that conquest and crusade was the way to heal the schism and bring the ‘daughter’ (the Greek Church) back in obedience to the ‘mother’ (Rome). The establishment of a Latin hierarchy in Romania was tangible proof of that.

219  See, for example, Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 167, 171; Tillmann, Pope Innocent III, pp. 231–32, 236–37. 220  Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 16–17.

Chapter 1

54

The papacy came to endorse these arguments. By 1205, Innocent had formulated the view that the Latin conquest, despite its excesses, was a just decision of the unfathomable divine will. This was based on western perceptions of the Greeks: they were perfidious, unwarlike, disinterested in the fate of the Holy Land, disobedient to the Holy See, and consequently bad Christians who had forfeited their empire and were worthy of God’s punishment through the crusaders. Some of these stereotypes were long-standing, for example the denunciation of Greek effeminacy and trickery which hailed from Roman antiquity.221 Others were only now exploited to maximum effect, such as the accusation that Greeks were schismatics, which had hardly been commonplace in the twelfth century. The crucial element, in any case, was that papal endorsement of the conquest was coupled with the granting of indulgences, which opened up the way for the deployment of the crusade in Frankish Greece. The daring act of Innocent to accede to the requests of the Latin emperor on that point is comparable to and compatible with his innovative approach to crusading in general. He was the first to call for a crusade against Christian secular authorities, in his conflict against Markward of Anweiler, while crusading mechanisms were fully, if gradually, employed against heretics during the Albigensian Crusade. This is not to say that Innocent single-handedly transformed the crusade. These developments were made possible through an evolution of crusading ideology and practice in the previous century, which allowed for its wider application. The arguments used to justify the crusade in Romania correspond closely to the ones used by the papacy in the Political Crusades as well as the crusades against the heretics: the collusion with the ‘infidels’, the disobedience or threat to the Church, and — most importantly — the help to the Holy Land. Furthermore, if the argument of the iter per Hispaniam played a major role in the introduction of crusading in Iberia in the 1120s,222 it could have only been more credible to propagate the iter per Constantinopolim for the Holy Sepulchre, given the historical precedent of the route followed by the armies of the First and the Second Crusade and by Frederic Barbarossa in the Third Crusade. The birth of crusading in Frankish Greece, however, was a hybrid case. It did not come out of an independent stimulus. Constantinople was captured by an army of crusaders on an active expedition bound for the Holy Land. Initially papal approval and indulgences were granted on the proviso that the crusaders 221 

Hunger, Graeculus perfidus, pp. 22–27, 34–39. Purkis, Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and in Iberia, pp. 130–38; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, pp. 16–17; Tyerman, God’s War, pp. 664–65. 222 

Innocent III and the Legitimization of Crusading against the Greeks

55

would eventually fulfil their vows and complete their journey towards Jerusalem. The Latin Empire was seen as an extension of the Holy Land or, perhaps, as a stop along the way. Indulgences were for ‘the crusaders going to Constantinople for the help of the Holy Land’. Innocent’s decision was a combination of emotion and opportunism. On the one hand he wished to see the crusade reach the Holy Land, and for a while he believed this was still feasible. On the other, he wanted to reassert his control over the situation in the Levant through the stabilization of the empire. The additional benefit of the preservation of a Latin Empire in Romania was that, from the point of view of the papacy, it resolved the Greek Schism and effected the return of the Greek Church to obedience. While the goal of direct help from Constantinople to the Holy Land was becoming untenable, the emphasis of the crusading indulgence shifted to the stabilization of the empire as a worthy goal in itself. Innocent came to authorize a crusade where participants’ vows were explicitly to be fulfilled by serving solely in the Latin Empire. The expedition preached and eventually led by Bishop Nivelon of Soissons set out from the West for Constantinople in 1207. Crusading in Frankish Greece had taken on a life of its own. The conquest of Byzantium had depended on a series of ad hoc decisions and had not been a conscious step in the expansion of crusading. The theoretical justification had to catch up with the practical need of defending the conquered territory, and this makes the case of Frankish Greece indicative of the growing flexibility and adaptability of crusading in various settings. The Latin authorities of the land, particularly the emperors of Constantinople, soon began to consider and project themselves as crusaders, defending and expanding a crusader state in service to God, the Church, and the Holy Land. Though this view was gaining credence, it was not accepted unconditionally. Some among the western clergy, such as the Benedictine abbot and chronicler Arnold of Lübeck, and the Cistercians Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Abbot Adam of Perseigne, and possibly even Bishop Conrad of Halberstadt who had participated in the Fourth Crusade and was involved in its diversion, had misgivings about the affair and had expressed doubts as to whether the capture of Constantinople had been divinely inspired.223 Innocent himself, though he had accepted the usefulness of a Latin Empire and remained firm in his decision to support it against a Greek resurgence, still subordinated its crusading status to the eventual service it would 223 

See Andrea, ‘Cistercian Accounts of the Fourth Crusade’, pp. 4, 14–17, 33–34; Andrea, ‘Adam of Perseigne and the Fourth Crusade’, esp. pp. 34–36 and note 81. See also Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 114–16, 120.

56

Chapter 1

offer the Holy Land and voiced his concerns when developments seemed to defeat that aim. Nivelon’s crusade was envisaged as an ‘auxiliary crusade’, in that it would assist the Latin emperor to fight eventually against the occupiers of Jerusalem. After 1207, Innocent did not proclaim another crusade for the Latin Empire. He might have done so, if the internal disarray of the empire, the situation in Europe, and his concentration on the general council and the great crusade for the Holy Land had not obstructed such a development. But the important steps had been taken and it was left to his successor, Honorius III, to go further down the road of dissociating the crusades in Frankish Greece from the help to the Holy Land in every aspect except for justificatory rhetoric.

Chapter 2

Consolidation (1216–27): Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade for the Kingdom of Thessalonica

U

nder the leadership of the able Henry of Hainault and with the support of Pope Innocent III, the Latin Empire had overcome the various crises of the early years and had managed to keep its numerous opponents at bay.1 But after both protagonists died in 1216, an era of almost uninterrupted decline began for the Latin Empire. The situation called for some active intervention by the papacy. This could be done only by resorting to that same instrument which had been introduced after 1204: the use of crusading in Frankish Greece. Pope Innocent III had sanctioned the transformation of the conquest of Constantinople, from ‘the perversion of a solemn and pious [crusading] vow’ to a part of the divine plan for the deliverance of Jerusalem and the return of the Greek Church to the Roman fold. Through this association the way for a proclamation of a crusade in Frankish Greece lay open. Indeed, Innocent made use of crusade mechanisms for the defence of the Latin possessions in Romania between 1205 and 1207. Although his calls were still linked with the original mission of the crusaders to fight in Outremer, emphasis had been steadily shifting to the more vague aim of providing help to the Holy Land through stabilizing the conquest. 1 

See, for example, Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 120–28; Gerland, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I, pp. 51–251 esp. pp. 248–51; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 203–11.

Chapter 2

58

Innocent’s successor, Honorius III, also supported the Latin Empire but he was initially more reluctant to deploy the crusade for its defence, hesitating to divert resources from the Holy Land. Nevertheless, his pontificate would witness a gradual widening of the crusading mechanisms implemented in Frankish Greece and also a shift of the concomitant justificatory rhetoric. Despite his evident reluctance — or arguably because of it — he legitimized the help to the Latin Empire as an independent crusading aim, to a large extent dissociating it from the Holy Land. Honorius turned to the deployment of the crusade in Frankish Greece in two distinct cases: to effect the liberation of Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Cardinal Legate John Colonna who had been captured in 1217 and to relieve the beleaguered kingdom of Thessalonica (1222–25). As both crusade calls were tactically irrelevant to Outremer, the argument of the help to the Holy Land was played down and not always invoked. Rather the focus shifted to the ‘schismatic Greeks’, as the professed target of these expeditions.

1. Honorius III: Crusade Policy and Priorities Before dealing with those two expeditions, it is useful to provide an overview of Honorius’s attitude to the Latin Empire and his crusading policy in general. Cencio Savelli had been a cardinal since 1193, had held key posts in the curia (where he particularly excelled as papal treasurer), and had been entrusted with important duties by both Celestine III and Innocent III.2 Though he was considered a less forceful personality than his predecessor, he put all his efforts and talents to work in realizing the plans of Innocent and the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Council regarding the preparation of the Fifth Crusade. Jerusalem had remained in Muslim hands ever since the crushing defeat of the Latin army by Saladin at Hattin (1187). Given the fact that the Third Crusade had been only partially successful in restoring the fortunes of Christian Outremer, and the Fourth had been diverted, a successful outcome for the Fifth Crusade was viewed as imperative. The affair of the Holy Land became a priority of Honorius’s pontificate.3 Immediately after his consecration (24 July 1216), he methodically 2 

Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 1–5. See, however, the argument put forth by Rist, ‘Papal Policy and the Albigensian Crusades’, that Honorius was to a large extent paying lip-service to the notion that the Holy Land was an absolute priority as he often advanced the Albigensian Crusade at the expense of the former, a view which is somewhat moderated in Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 97–106 (esp. pp. 104–06). 3 

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

59

set about his task. His first actions were to try and get the crusade off the ground as soon as possible, since the Lateran Council had set the summer of 1217 as the starting point of the expedition.4 While the main organizational efforts for the crusade were taking place, Honorius also displayed remarkable activity in trying to pacify Europe as a prerequisite for common crusading action. He intervened in the conflict between England and France which had flared up on account of the rebellion of the English barons against King John, he worked tirelessly for the reconciliation of the squabbling Italian cities, and he supported the authority of Frederick II in Germany, while his other efforts extended from the Iberian Peninsula to Scandinavia, and from Scotland to Cyprus and Armenia.5 Except for the care for the affair of the Holy Land, Honorius had also inherited from his predecessor the belief in the special role of the Latin Empire. This was made evident already in his first letters to the secular and spiritual authorities in Romania. In his letter to Emperor Henry (the pope had not yet been informed of his death), Honorius, after the generic announcement of his elevation to the apostolic dignity sent to all sovereigns, added a special reference to the empire’s outstanding mission and to the emperor’s duties: the latter was exhorted to uphold the divine will and tame the arrogance of the schismatics. He should strive to stabilize the Eastern Empire against the attacks of the Greeks, so that it could fulfil its role as a stronghold from which the Saracens and the invaders of the Holy Land could be attacked.6 Similarly, in his letter to Patriarch Gervase, the pope stressed the importance of the ‘eastern land’ (‘terra orientalis’), whence the light of religion and faith shone forth. Gervase was exhorted to cooperate with the emperor, as both of them, the spiritual and the temporal sword, had been given their authority from God ‘for the recovery and the preservation of the aforementioned land’ (‘ad recuperationem et conservationem dictae terrae’).7 Honorius repeated the argument that the preservation of the Latin states in Romania constituted essentially a service to the Holy Land in July 1218, when he gave permis4  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 1–14; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 45, 110–12; Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 10–11, 93–104; Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., pp. 29–34. 5  Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 12–93. 6  The letter to the emperor is Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 5 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 2). However, the additional text is only mentioned in Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 5–6, no. 3, note 1. 7  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 20 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 25–26, no. 16); see Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 497 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 360–62, no. 294).

Chapter 2

60

sion to Prince Geoffrey of Achaia to use the crusaders of his lands for the defence of his realm, granting them the corresponding remission of sins.8 The pope would reaffirm his concern for the Latin Empire several times over the following years.9 Nevertheless, Honorius was determined not to let anything, including the Latin Empire, get in the way of the crusade to the Holy Land. He made that clear in the letter he sent to King Andrew of Hungary, in January 1217, to congratulate him on his election as a candidate for the imperial throne of Constantinople. Following the death of Henry without an heir, the barons at Constantinople had elected as candidates for the succession the Hungarian king and Peter of Courtenay, both of whom were related to the deceased emperor by marriage: Peter was married to Henry’s sister, Yolanda, and Andrew was married to Henry’s niece, one of Yolanda’s daughters (also named Yolanda).10 While Andrew had originally declared his commitment to fulfil his vow to the Holy Land at the time set by the Lateran Council for the Fifth Crusade, he now claimed that the new situation of his candidature forced him to delay his departure. Honorius acceded to the king’s request to inform universis crucesignatis that he would take the land route to Jerusalem, and to urge them to join him around Easter. However, he warned Andrew that this should cause no delay to the help for the Holy Land, as that would be ‘to the offence of God, to the injury of the Apostolic See, and to your own perpetual disgrace’ (‘in Dei offensam, Apostolicae Sedis injuriam, et tui sempiternum opprobrium’).11 Was a diversion towards Constantinople — at least a temporary one — envisaged by King Andrew? It cannot be excluded, given the context of his imperial candidature and the choice of the land route for his crusade — which, interestingly, he did not take after Peter of Courtenay was eventually elected emperor.12 Whatever the case, Honorius had clearly set the Holy Land as his priority and strongly opposed any possibility of delays or 8 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 1490–91 (= Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 749–50, nos iv–v). 9  For example, Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5202, 5186, 5189, 5270, 5277. 10  See Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 153–54. 11  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  291 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 4, no. 5). 12  Furthermore, the pope referred to requests of the king that he could not grant in full, and sent the bishop of Ostia as a legate to settle ‘the remaining issues’: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 291 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 4, no. 5). Kosztolnyik also seems to think that the imperial throne of Constantinople was one of Andrew’s main motives with regards to his crusade, but without providing much additional evidence: Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 60–63 and 69–70.

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

61

diversions. This commitment, which he would repeat in his later dealings with Romania, conflicted with the pope’s other stated intention of protecting the Latin Empire. His resolution was bound to be challenged once the Latin possessions in Greece were seriously threatened and their destruction seemed imminent. This was already the case a few months later.

2. The Crusade for the Liberation of Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Cardinal Legate John Colonna Since Nicaea had agreed to a long-lasting peace with the Latin Empire after the victory of Henry over Theodore Lascaris near Prusa,13 the main threat came from Theodore Angelos Doukas Komnenos, who had succeeded Michael as the ruler of Epiros. Theodore actively and aggressively continued his brother’s campaigns against the Latins of the kingdom of Thessalonica.14 Epiros’s expansion at the expense of the Latin possessions in Greece proceeded apace, with the annexation of the largest part of Thessaly, the capture of Durazzo, and the conquest of Ochrid and Pelagonia on the Via Egnatia (1216). Furthermore, Theodore did not lose the opportunity to pose as the champion of Orthodoxy in contrast to the ‘Latinizing’ policy of Theodore Lascaris and the clergy of Nicaea.15 The first crucial blow to the prestige and stability of the Latin Empire came very quickly. After being crowned outside Rome by Pope Honorius, in April 1217, 13 

The battle is usually dated in 1211 and the truce most often in 1214 (for example, Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp.  127–28; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 55–56; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 90–91, no. 129), but see also the arguments of Van Tricht, ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople’, pp. 413–17, 221–27, who dates the battle in 1212 and the truce in 1213. 14  Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 32–43 (esp. p. 33); Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, p. 60. 15  See Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 162; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 86–99; Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea, pp. 120–35. Nicol dates the conquest of both Thessaly and Durazzo in the reign of Michael of Epiros, but see Van Tricht, ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople’, pp. 227–31 (Thessaly) and p. 237, note 82 (Durazzo), who argues that those conquests took place under Theodore. For the Epirote clergy’s reactions to Lascaris’s ‘betrayal of the Greek cause’ (that is, the diplomatic marriage with Henry’s niece, and especially the proposed negotiations with the papacy) and the conflict between the archbishop of Ochrid, Demetrius Chomatianos and Patriarch Germanos II, see also Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 48–51; Karpozilos, The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros.

Chapter 2

62

the new emperor, Peter of Courtenay, decided to land in Epiros before heading for Constantinople. It was a fiasco. After wasting valuable time unsuccessfully besieging Durazzo, he tried to make his way through the mountainous passes to Macedonia, where his army was ambushed by Theodore Doukas. Both Peter and the papal legate John Colonna who was escorting him were captured.16 The exact circumstances of Peter’s capture are unclear, as there are significant differences among the primary sources. According to certain Latin sources, such as the Chronicle of Ernoul and the Eracles, the emperor was captured through trickery, after Theodore had first sworn homage to him and promised to be his ally. However, the chroniclers report very different versions of the events: the main common element seems to be that they are equally sensationalist. It is hard to escape the impression that they elaborate upon a tale of the enemy’s disloyalty and treachery which, in this case, might have been more of a preconception and less of a fact. Two Greek sources, on the other hand, the history of Akropolites and a letter by the metropolitan of Corfu, George Bardanes, to Patriarch Germanos II, mention a great victory of Theodore in a head-on confrontation. And while Bardanes certainly meant to eulogize his master, Akropolites was unlikely to fabricate praise for a ruler considered as a usurper by the emperors of Nicaea, in whose service the chronicler was. Besides, the defeat of Peter and his men in battle seems to be corroborated by the Italian chronicler Richard of San Germano.17 Honorius’s reaction is registered in a series of letters around July 1217 to the leadership of Frankish Greece, such as Prince Geoffrey of Achaia and Conon of Béthune, the bailli of the Latin Empire, as well as to other Latin powers with vested interests in the empire, namely King Andrew of Hungary and the doge of Venice.18 16 

See Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp.  50–52; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 153–55; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 212–13; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 44–46. For Peter’s coronation see Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 44; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 318–19. 17  Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, par. 14; ‘Lettre de Georges Bardanès’, ed. by Loenertz, par. 12 at 112–13; Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 403; Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. by De Mas Latrie, pp. 391–93; Eracles, pp. 290–94; Robert of Auxerre, Chronicon, ed. by Holder-Egger, pp. 281–82; Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. by Garufi, pp. 77–78 (= Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. by Pertz, pp. 338–39). Alberic of Trois-Fontaines (Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 906) dryly observes that Peter was captured through the just judgement of God — Peter had a bad reputation in the West for his violent disposition and his frequent scuffles with the bishop of Auxerre. 18  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 684–85, 688–91.

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

63

Honorius also wrote directly to Theodore of Epiros.19 With a mixture of exhortations and threats, the pope — himself or through other parties — tried to convince the Greek ruler to release the emperor and the legate. Honorius asked the Latin powers to put pressure on Theodore, and he went as far as to urge King Andrew to threaten the Epirote ruler that he would use against him the soldiers he had gathered for his crusade.20 Besides the security of Frankish Greece and consequently the benefit to the Holy Land, a variety of additional arguments were used by the pope in order to further motivate the several parties. With regards to the Venetians, Honorius focused on their civic interest and pride, as Peter had been captured while fighting for their cause at Durazzo.21 To the Hungarian king the pope stressed family ties and honour, since it would be a disgrace for Andrew to abandon his father-in-law. 22 As for the prince of Achaia it was a question of both fame and interest: the pope noted that Geoffrey could take the credit for the liberation of the emperor and the legate, and nothing would make him dearer to the Apostolic See than that.23 This was a crucial argument, because Geoffrey had at that time appealed to the papal curia against the excommunication and interdict laid on him and his lands by Patriarch Gervase for the appropriation of ecclesiastical property;24 the excommunication was indeed lifted in August 1217. 25 Finally, addressing Theodore, Honorius stressed that his duty as a catholic prince would be to help and not to impede the cause of the Holy Land. The pope warned that the ruler of Epiros had given, by his actions, ‘an obvious reason’ and ‘a just cause’ for a crusading army to turn against him and his lands: 19 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 687 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 481–82, no. 9; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 24). 20  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  684 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 8, no. 14; Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 479–80, no. 7; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 25); see Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., pp. 40–41. 21  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  689 (=  Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 748, no. ii). 22  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  684 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 8, no. 14). 23  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 685 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 28). 24  See Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 46–47. 25  Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, p. 264.

Chapter 2

64

Truly, if you were a catholic, you would exhibit the works of a catholic, and you would extend your hands to the help of the affair of the Holy Land, and not to its impediment; you would appease the Lord through your service, and not provoke him through injustice. But we see that you have given an obvious reason and a clear cause, so that an army of crusaders might turn against you and your people to avenge this outrage, and thus you have wantonly exposed yourself to dangers and your land to harm.26

These letters provide important indications of Honorius’s intentions, ideas, and priorities. Just a few months after urging the Hungarian king not to allow the crusade to the Holy Land to be in any way delayed, and while the Fifth Crusade was effectively under way, the pope now presented the actions of Theodore and the distress of the Latin Empire (and consequently of the Holy Land which expected help from Frankish Greece)27 as an adequate reason for the diversion of the Hungarian crusading army. Furthermore, Honorius stated that he considered as just cause for the use of crusading force: a) the hindrance posed to the crusade, and generally to the affair of the Holy Land; b) the damage caused to the Latin Empire; and c) the action against the papal legate and therefore against the papacy itself. Finally, on 4 November 1217, Honorius ordered all the archbishops of France and their suffragans to preach a crusade for the help of Emperor Peter. The archbishop of Sens, Peter of Corbeil, was also to try and enlist the help of Robert of Courtenay, Emperor Peter’s brother. In return for his service in the Latin Empire, Robert would be released from his obligation to go to the Holy Land which had been imposed on him as penance for his attack against the kingdom of England despite papal prohibitions.28 This bull represents another turning 26 

Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 24: ‘Verum si catholicus esses, opera catholici exhiberes et ad Terre Sancte negotium auxilii, non impedimenti, manus extenderes et placares servitio Dominum, non iniuria provocares. Sed videmus evidentem te dare materiam et manifestam causam, ut ad ulciscendum hoc facinus in te ac tuos crucesignatorum exercitus convertatur, et sic ultro te periculis et terram tuam dampnis exponis.’ See Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 690 (= Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 747–48, no. i; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 29): ‘dando materiam et iustissimam causam ut ad ulciscendum hoc facinus in ipsum ac suos crucesignatorum exercitus convertatur’. 27  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 8, no. 14: ‘consternabuntur animi Latinorum existentium in partibus Romanie per hoc in gravi discrimine positorum; Christiani quoque existentes in partibus transmarinis, qui a Constantinopolitano imperio personarum et rerum auxilium expectabant, his auditis rumoribus obstupescent; et assumet audaciam feritas paganorum’; Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., pp. 40–41. 28  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 859 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30, no. 52; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

65

point for crusading in Frankish Greece and is also a very telling document that demonstrates Honorius’s attitude to the issue. Writing to the French prelates, Honorius made no reference to the benefit that the crusade for the Latin Empire would afford to the Holy Land.29 Instead, he preferred to appeal to French pride by stating that the capture of Emperor Peter was a blow to all Latins, but especially to the French, because of the emperor’s provenance and because of the glory the French race had acquired through the conquest of the empire, which was now in grave peril.30 Most importantly, however, he explicitly declared that the danger to the Latin Empire, coupled with the affront to the Apostolic See, was adequate cause for him to ‘most willingly incite the crusading army for the liberation [of the emperor and the legate], if it were not for the fear that this might offend Jesus Christ, in whose service this army has been prepared’.31 The solution that the pope devised, so that help was given to Romania and the captives ‘without offence to Christ’ (‘sine Christi offensa’), was for the bishops to preach a crusade, but not to allow those who had had already taken the cross for the Holy Land to commute their vows towards Constantinople and to be diverted from the forthcoming expedition for Jerusalem: Therefore, having thought out an avenue through which, without offence to Christ himself, Emperor [Peter] and the others who are detained with him, as well as all the Latins who reside in the empire [of Romania], can be helped efficaciously, we order through apostolic letters each one of you to urge the faithful in your dioceses, and to enjoin them on our behalf for the remission of their sins, so that, having taken the sign of the cross, they may go manfully to the help of the aforementioned emperor; however, [we order] also that those who are already signed with the cross Duba, no. 35). The letter is addressed to the archbishop of Sens, and similar letters were written ‘omnibus archiepiscopis Francie et suffraganeis suis’, except for the clause referring to Robert of Courtenay; see Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 293 and note 2. 29  It should be noted that the summary by Pressutti (Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 859) is misleading: there is no explicit reference to the benefit or damage of the Holy Land in the text of the bull. 30  Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30 (at 529), no. 52 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 35): ‘specialiter tamen gentem noscitur tangere Gallicanam’. 31  Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30 (at 529), no. 52 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 35): ‘attendentes et devotionem illius [imperatoris] et Apostolice Sedis iniuriam, cuius legatus detinetur cum ipso, ac periculum quod Latinis existentibus in imperio memorato [Romanie] imminere videtur, quod ad liberationem ipsorum libentissime excitassemus crucesignatorum exercitum, nisi eum, pro cujus est paratus obsequio, timuissemus offendere Jesum Christum’.

Chapter 2

66

for the help of the Holy Land should not be diverted from their resolution on account of this affair, but they should strive to fulfil in the nearest future expedition the vow which they have taken for the help of that land.32

The instructions regarding Robert of Courtenay essentially constituted an exception to this rule, but this was a special case: Robert was the Latin emperor’s brother and his vow for Jerusalem was not a voluntary one, so the pope apparently felt free to commute one imposed penitential activity to another. The implication of the pope’s letter is not only that the empire was a worthy crusading aim, but that it now stood independently from — and in this case even in juxtaposition to — the Holy Land. As Keutner has pointed out, the two objectives were clearly distinct in the pope’s mind, despite his proclamations to the contrary, since the vow for Jerusalem should suffice without the need of any particular commutation for the relief of Frankish Greece, if the campaign against Theodore was indeed a real step for the conquest of the Holy Land.33 Despite his rhetoric, Honorius was rather reluctant to actually employ the crusade against Theodore. In his letters of July 1217 it was to be understood that the crusade primarily constituted a threat so that Theodore would agree to liberate the legate and Emperor Peter. The pope was unwilling to divert any resources from the Holy Land, which took precedence over all other affairs, especially while the Fifth Crusade was underway. He realized resources were too limited to stretch them over too many fronts. The fate of the Latin Empire was a serious enough consideration for him to state that he was tempted to divert the army which had been prepared for the Fifth Crusade, and indeed to call for new preaching and recruitment specifically for this purpose throughout France. But Honorius preferred not to go the whole way at this given point. At the same time he dispatched the order for the crusade to be preached, he also sent the bishop of Croton to Theodore to negotiate the release of 32 

Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30 (at 529), no. 52 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 35): ‘Excogitata igitur via qua sine ipsius Christi offensa imperatori predicto, et aliis cum eo detentis, ac etiam Latinis omnibus in sepedicto imperio consistentibus potest […] efficaciter subveniri […] mandamus quatenus singuli moneatis fideles per vestras dioceses constitutos et ex eis parte nostra in remissionem peccaminum iniungatis ut, crucis assumpto signaculo, ad succursum imperatoris predicti viriliter se accingant, ita tamen quod hii qui iam crucesignati sunt pro subsidio terre sancte propter hoc a suo proposito non divertant, sed proximo futuro passagio votum exequi studeant quod de ipsius terre subsidio emiserunt.’ See Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 293 and note 3 (and also p. 294 and note 4). 33  Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., pp. 41–42.

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

67

the captives.34 Honorius was, indeed, too quick to abandon the idea of that crusade once Theodore consented to set the legate free (the pope did not seem equally disturbed about the fate of Emperor Peter, who eventually died in captivity). In return, the pope agreed to place the Greek sovereign and his land under papal protection, and consequently he forbade the crusaders and the Venetians to harass him.35 He then sent the archbishop of Brindisi for further communications with Theodore.36 This amicable climate between Theodore and Honorius was not meant to last long, however, given the Epirote’s ambitions and activities in northern Greece. By December 1220, the pope was threatening with excommunication the Latins who assisted Theodore, who was himself, once more, an excommunicate.37 Meanwhile, the wife of Peter, Yolanda, acted as the regent of the Latin Empire until her death in late 1219. Robert of Courtenay, one of Peter’s sons, finally succeeded his father to the imperial throne of Constantinople and was crowned by the Latin patriarch in March 1221. However, Robert (1221–28) failed to impress his contemporaries and to steer the empire away from danger.38 The tensions underlying Honorius’s policy of supporting Frankish Greece, with the use of the crusade if necessary, while wishing not to divert any resources from the primary objective of the Holy Land, become evident in the pope’s letter of September 1219 to Cardinal Pelagius, papal legate with the army of the Fifth Crusade, which was at that time at a critical stage of the siege of Damietta. The letter’s general tenor is a spirited — perhaps tellingly so — defence of the pope’s commitment to the affair of the Holy Land. The legate had apparently accused the pope of diverting crusaders from the Holy Land to Provence and Greece. Honorius’s denial was categorical, albeit rather disingenuous. He upheld the importance of both expeditions, claiming that the Albigensian heretics were worse than Saracens and that the empire of Constantinople was at great risk of being lost. He stated, 34 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 1024, 1029 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, nos 23, 25); Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 52–53. 35  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 1023–24 and 1029–31, January 1218. The Venetians were the ones that had more to earn from a crusade against Theodore, in the hope of recapturing Durazzo; see Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 51–53. 36  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  1261 (= Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 749, no. iii), (April 1218). 37  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 2858 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 73). 38  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 213–14; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62, 65, 177.

Chapter 2

68

however, that he had only requested ‘non-crusader faithful’ to assist these ventures, explicitly forbidding crusaders for the Holy Land to change their objective. Some people had indeed taken the cross ‘de novo’ for the Albigensian crusade but no crusaders initially signed for the Holy Land were diverted elsewhere.39 While this tension between diverging objectives was not entirely resolved, Honorius would soon decide to take further steps in deploying crusade mechanisms in Frankish Greece in view of the deteriorating position of the Latins there.

3. The Montferrat Crusade for the Defence of the Kingdom of Thessalonica The most far-reaching crusading involvement of Honorius in Frankish Greece was the expedition he organized for the defence of the kingdom of Thessalonica in 1223–25. In this affair the pope gradually expanded the use of crusading mechanisms, including the permission for (limited) commutation of crusading vows and the introduction of crusade taxation in Romania as the situation became progressively graver. The pope had taken an early interest in the affairs of the kingdom, which had been faring poorly ever since the death of Boniface of Montferrat in 1207. There had been hardly enough time for the wounds of the rebellion of the Lombard lords against Emperor Henry (1207–09) to heal, when the kingdom, under the infantking Demetrius and his regent mother, Margarita, suffered from the attacks of the Greeks of Epiros.40 Within the first month of his pontificate, Honorius took the king and his realm under his special protection, a commitment he would repeat several times in the following years.41 However, this did not improve the fortunes of the kingdom, nor did it deter Theodore from pursuing his victorious campaigns against the Latins. By capturing Serres, in 1221–22, he encircled Thessalonica. Soon afterwards, the young King Demetrius, escorted by Archbishop Warin of Thessalonica, went to Italy in search of help. There, he first met with the pope and later, in the company of his half-brother, Marquis William VI of Montferrat, with Frederick II, while the emperor was campaigning in Italy.42 Meanwhile, Queen 39 

Honorius’s letter in Honorius III, ‘Delectus ex epistolarum libris decem’, ed. by Delisle, pp. 690–91; see Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 97–106. 40  Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 32–60; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 206–08, 212–14; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 57–60. 41  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 19, 499, 506, 508, 2856. 42  Demetrius appears to have been in Rome with the pope around March 1222: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 3854; Usseglio, I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente, ii, 274–75. Then, in March 1223, William VI, Demetrius, and the archbishop

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

69

Margarita fled to her native Hungary early in 1223, and Guy Pallavicino, marquis of Bodonitsa, was left as the bailli of the kingdom.43 By 1222 Greek pressure on the kingdom of Thessalonica and the Latin Empire would be felt so threatening that Honorius would be forced to take crusade action for their protection. Since the Fifth Crusade had collapsed at Damietta in August 1221,44 it was easier for the pope to turn his attention — and some of the crusading resources — back to Romania at that point. Hubert of Biandrate, who had in the past been regent of the kingdom of Thessalonica, was dispatched with an army, and the emperor and laity of Constantinople were asked to cooperate with him. The participants in the expedition were granted the same indulgence as ‘those who go to the help of the Holy Land’, while the Latins who were fighting on the side of the Greeks were excommunicated for colluding with ‘the enemy of the Faith’.45 Still, Honorius, hesitant as ever, vainly tried to convince Theodore to desist from further attacks by writing him an exhortatory letter. The Greek ruler was reminded of his former conduct, when he had insulted the Church by capturing the legate but had eventually made amends. Theodore, as a Christian himself, was urged to make peace with the ‘most Christian emperor’ (‘Christianissimo imperatori’) Robert. Otherwise, the pope threatened, he would have no choice but to turn to other methods.46 In May 1223, Honorius finally called for a full-blown crusade under William of Montferrat for the relief of Thessalonica, which was by that time under siege by Theodore.47 Additionally, the pope forbade the Latins, under pain of excommunication, to join the ruler of Epiros or trade with him.48 In September of Thessalonica appear as witnesses in a document of Frederick II, in Ferentino: Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, ii, 328–29. 43  Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 61–62. 44  See, for example, Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 175–91; Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 170–83. 45  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4059–60 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 135–36), (27 June 1222). This was the first time that the crusade indulgence for Frankish Greece was offered on the same terms stipulated at the Fourth Lateran Council for Holy Land crusaders: ‘eandem indulgentiam que statuta fuit in succursum transfretantibus Terre Sancte’. 46  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4121 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 148), (26 September 1222); Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), p. 61. 47  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4353, 4360 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 162, 165). For Theodore’s attacks on Thessalonica, see Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 60–64. 48  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4354 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 112).

Chapter 2

70

1223, the papacy intervened to resolve the conflict between clergy and secular authorities in Latin Greece which had been going on for years. Honorius absolved Geoffrey Villehardouin, prince of Achaia, and Otto de la Roche, lord of Athens, from the excommunication that had been in effect since 1218 on account of their appropriation of church property in their realms in violation of the terms agreed in the second parliament of Ravennika (1210). Furthermore, the pope granted Geoffrey long-term use of the revenues from certain ecclesiastical properties in his realm. The explicit justification for these concessions was that they were made ‘on account of the pressing needs of the time and for the defence of the empire of Romania’ (‘pro necessitate temporis et defensione imperii Romaniae’).49 In the beginning of 1224, Honorius increased his diplomatic activity in support of the Montferratine crusade. He took the marquis and his soldiers under papal protection,50 and he instructed numerous prelates in Italy and southern France to exhort the faithful to join William’s expedition, ‘which can be very useful to the cause of the Holy Land’. The papal call was addressed to the patriarch of Aquileia, to the archbishops of Genoa, Lyon, Milan, Ravenna, Pisa, Tarentaise, Arles, Besançon, Embrun, and Aix and their suffragans, as well as to the bishops of Lucca, Luni, Verona, Parma, Arezzo, Florence, Padua, Vicenza and Le Puy.51 The call obviously represented a substantial mobilization and not a localized affair connected only to the interests of Montferrat as has been claimed.52 This becomes particularly clear if one takes into consideration that the Albigensian Crusade was at that point at the brink of total defeat and the pope was desperately trying to enlist the help of Louis VIII of France against Raymond VII of Toulouse,53 so crusading support to Latin Greece from French 49 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4478–80, 4489, 4493 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, nos 114–15, 117, 119). See Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 46–49; Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 259–74; Schabel, ‘Antelm the Nasty, First Latin Archbishop of Patras’, pp. 109–21. Schabel shows that the terms of the Ravennika agreement of 1210 did not apply to Achaia and, although Innocent III had extended the pact to include the principality in 1216, Geoffrey only subscribed to it in 1223, after repeated ecclesiastical sanctions. 50  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4704 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 204) 51  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4753 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 206), (7 February 1224). See Appendix iv, map 2. 52  Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62; see Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, p. 113. 53  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4615 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, iv, cols 483–84, no. 66), (13 December 1223); Kennan, ‘Innocent III, Gregory

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

71

lands further to the north or to the west was not to be expected. In fact the archbishopric sees north of the Alps that received Honorius call were under the remit of the Holy Roman Empire rather than the kingdom of France.54 In other words, Honorius appears to have used practically all the resources available to him at the time for his summons to Thessalonica. The pope also tried to mobilize all the Latin powers in Romania towards the same aim, urging them to assist the marquis. Instructions were sent to Emperor Robert, Geoffrey of Achaia, Otto de la Roche of Athens, the nobles of Negroponte, and Hubert of Biandrate (who had in the meantime arrived from the West).55 A force was indeed dispatched by Robert, under Thierry of Walincourt, probably to act in conjunction with the expedition of William, who was expected in the spring of 1224. By the time Thierry was besieging Serres, however, William’s departure had been postponed due to illness, and the army of the Latin Empire had been defeated by Vatatzes in Poimanenon. Thierry chose to withdraw, but his army was annihilated by Theodore.56 In May 1224, Honorius also made an effort to enlist the support of Louis VIII of France for his cousin, Emperor Robert, through the good services of the queen, Blanche of Castile.57 The French king had now been released from his engagement in southern France, as the pope rather abruptly decided to suspend operations in the Albigensian Crusade in April 1224.58 Robert appealed to Louis himself, sometime after the defeat at Poimanenon, sending the castellan of Arras as his envoy.59

IX and Political Crusades’, pp. 23–24; Evans, ‘The Albigensian Crusade’, pp. 314–16; Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, pp. 209–13; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 94–97. 54  In general terms this area corresponded to what was known as the ‘kingdom of Arles’, which was under the theoretical authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, though it often eluded his direct control; see, for example, Cox, ‘The Kingdom of Burgundy, the Lands of the House of Savoy’, pp. 358–61. 55  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4754, 4758 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 207, 209), (7–8 February 1224). 56  Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 409; Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, par. 22; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 162–63; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), p. 63. 57  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 5006 (20 May 1224). 58  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos  4919–20 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, iv, cols 589–90, no. 181), (4 April 1224); Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, p. 95; Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 213. 59  Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 539; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 105–06, no. 156.

Chapter 2

72

During the preparation of the Montferrat Crusade the use of crusading mechanisms escalated along with the pressing circumstances. This is the case with both the granting of indulgences and the commutation of crusading vows, as well as with the funding of the expedition. In Honorius’s initial call, in May 1223, Holy Land crusaders were allowed to join William’s army but on the condition that they would fulfil their vow in Outremer within two years. Plenary indulgence would nonetheless be granted to those who were killed in Romania.60 In this bull it is unclear whether participants not previously signed with the cross for the Holy Land would also be granted the plenary indulgence and under what terms. Nonetheless, judging from another letter of the same period, it appears that plenary indulgence was indeed granted to new recruits without any conditions other than participating in the expedition.61 In any case, the pope made sure to clarify the situation when he stepped up his activity in Romania. In his bull of February 1224, he explicitly distinguished between the participants who had initially taken the cross for the Holy Land and those who had not. The former would again have to proceed to the Holy Land to fulfil their vow (within a year), but would be granted plenary indulgence if they died in the meantime — and the phrase ‘as for the Holy Land’ was added in this bull to describe the remission of sins. The latter category of participants was now explicitly described as receiving the plenary indulgence, without any restrictions.62 Finally, in late 1224 and early 1225, after William’s departure had been postponed, Honorius also allowed for the commutation of crusade vows, at least in part: local crusaders in Romania would be considered as having fulfilled their vows, even for the Holy Land, if they were to assist William’s crusade.63 This series of awkward formulas regarding the granting of indulgences and the restriction of vow commutations is indicative of Honorius’s dilemma, namely his wish to procure help for Frankish Greece 60 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4353 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 162); Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 295. 61  The letter of 13 May 1223 to the nobleman W. of Cotignac: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4355 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 164). 62  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  4753 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 206); see Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4754 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no.  207). There is also reference to some participants who would receive the plenary indulgence (only) if they died on the expedition; however, they were evidently mercenaries, hired for their services, and therefore the indulgence was meant as an additional advantage: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4757 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 208). 63  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5189, 5270 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 227, 231).

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

73

and his reluctance to damage the affair of the Holy Land. Nevertheless, his measures in 1223–25 went further than he had previously allowed for in his reply to Pelagius a few years earlier, when he had affirmed that no crusaders originally signed for the Holy Land were diverted to other fronts. A similar trend is noticeable with regards to funding for the Montferrat Crusade. In general, William’s expedition was financed through: a) sums given to him by the papacy; b) money that William secured himself; and c) funds raised locally in Romania. The intensification of crusading activities in early 1224 saw the implementation of the first two methods, while the third one came into play after the campaign’s postponement. The papal camera financed the marquis’s expedition mainly with a grant of 15,000 silver marks ‘from the money for the Holy Land’ (‘de pecunia Terrae Sanctae’), that is, from the proceeds of the crusade twentieth that had been decreed at the Fourth Lateran Council.64 This sum had initially been assigned to William in order to participate in an expedition to Outremer.65 William himself secured another lump sum to finance his crusade, by mortgaging the marquisate of Montferrat to Frederick II in March 1224.66 The next step was the funding of the Montferrat Crusade through taxation on all ecclesiastical revenues and property in Romania.67 The taxation was deemed necessary 64 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4754 (7 February 1224); see Le Liber censuum, ed. by Fabre, Duchesne, and Mollat, i, 261b. For other sums see Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4814–17 (= Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, iv, cols 549–51, nos 138–40); Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 81–82. 65  See Usseglio, I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente, ii, 275–76), for a statement that the aim of William’s expedition in 1221 is uncertain. However, it is clear that the expedition William was committed to was bound for the Holy Land, at least as late as May 1222. See the letters of 20 June 1221 (Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 3478 = Epistolae saeculi xiii, ed. by Rodenberg, i, 122, no. 176); 24 July 1220 (Epistolae saeculi xiii, ed. by Rodenberg, i, 88–91, no. 124) (see Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 100–01); 5 January 1222 (Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 3696 = Honorius III, ‘Delectus ex epistolarum libris decem’, ed. by Delisle, p. 718); 28 May 1222 (Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4005 = Registra Vaticana MSS, vi, fol. 242, epist. 397). 66  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, ii, 425–27; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 50, note 29. 67  The contributions would consist of a) half of the revenues and mobile goods of the clergy in Romania citra Macram (that is, east of the town of Makri in Thrace, the Latin Empire proper); and b) a tenth of the revenues and half of the mobile goods for those ultra Macram (west of Makri, the rest of Frankish Greece): November 1224, Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5186, 5189 and 5202 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 128; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 226–28). The contribution of the clergy ultra Macram was further moderated to a fourth of their mobile goods in January 1225: Regesta Honorii Papae

74

Chapter 2

to cover the additional expenses because of the marquis’s delay due to illness. So, the first crusading taxation in Frankish Greece came about as ‘the extreme medication, necessary for extreme sickness’ (‘acerbioribus morbis necesse est acerbiores opponere medicinas’); and the pope did his best to justify it by invoking the benefit for the Holy Land as well as the payers’ own good, and by promising that the money would be returned once the lands of the kingdom had been restored.68 At the same time, there had also been a notable shift in the legitimizing and motivational rhetoric regarding the crusade in Frankish Greece. The argument that the stabilization of the empire would be beneficial to the Holy Land was retained and invoked several times;69 however, its prominence was considerably reduced. There were now cases in which indulgences ‘as for the Holy Land’ were granted without any reference to the help supposedly given to Outremer this way.70 Additional motives, particular to the various addressees of his calls, had already been invoked by Honorius in 1217, as we saw, for example in the cases of Hungary and Venice.71 This trend was continued with the appeal to French national pride and chivalry and the invocation of the duty to defend the Nova Francia of Romania, in the pope’s letter to Queen Blanche in May 1224.72 Honorius had already raised a similar point in his crusade call to the French clergy in November 1217.73 Most importantly, however, the focus of papal rhetoric now turned on the Greeks, presenting them explicitly as the enemies and targets of these crusading efforts. In June 1222, when a crusading indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’ was granted to the participants of Hubert of Biandrate’s expedition, there was no overt reference to the help potentially afforded to Outremer. Rather the emphasis was on the defence of the empire against the Greeks, who were for III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5270, 5277, 5279 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 231–33). See also Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 56. 68  Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 128 (= Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 5186): ‘quam necessarium sit negotio Terrae Sanctae ut status Latinorum in ipso imperio consistentium roboretur’. 69  For example: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 1490–91 ( July 1218), 4353 (May 1223), 4753–54 (February 1224). 70  For example: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 859, 4059–60, 5006, 5202. 71  Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 748, no. ii; Vetera monumenta historica Hun­ gariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 8, no. 14. 72  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no.  5006; Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, p. 114; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 167. 73  Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30, no. 52.

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

75

the first time characterized as ‘enemies of the Faith’ (‘inimicos fidei orthodoxe’).74 Shortly afterwards, the brothers of the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson were granted the right to use weapons and horses, ‘for the defence of the [Latin] empire which is harassed by the Greeks in many ways’ (‘pro defensione imperii quod multipliciter infestatur a Grecis’).75 The use of the language of Holy War against the Greeks continued over the following period: Theodore was the ‘son of Belial’ (‘filio Belial Theodoro’);76 the Latins in Romania were urged to assist Marquis William to effect the humiliation of the schismatics, ‘so that they might not dare again to raise their heels against the Roman Church or the Latins’;77 and the Greeks were ‘enemies of God’ (‘inimici Dei’), to be crushed by the faithful with His help.78 It is not without significance that in most of these letters there was no mention of the help supposedly afforded to the Holy Land through this expedition.79 The repeated implementation of the crusade in Frankish Greece was progressively bringing in sharper focus the enemies of those enterprises, prompting the legitimizing rhetoric to become more specifically aimed at the ‘schismatic Greeks’, even if the traditional argument ‘for the help of the Holy Land’ was still invoked at times. This image of the Greeks as enemies of the Faith was reproduced, for example, in Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, who noted that by capturing Emperor Peter and his equipment Theodore ‘became stronger in persecuting the catholics’.80 74 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4059–60 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 135–36). 75  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4088 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 141), (15 July 1222); Stathakopoulos, ‘Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades’, p. 258. For the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson, see above, Chapter 1, note 181. 76  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 3877 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 122), (21 March 1222). 77  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4754, 4758 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 207, 209), (February 1224): ‘taliter humiliabuntur scismatici Romanie quod de cetero contra Romanam ecclesiam vel Latinos erigere calcaneum non presument’. Pressutti’s summaries stating that the pope exhorts the Latins to fight against the ‘heretics’ (for example, Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 5270) are misleading, as the pope consistently refers to ‘schismatics’. 78  Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 212 (20 May 1224) and 228 (5 December 1224) (= Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1224, nos 23, 26). 79  With the exception of Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos  4754, 4758 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 207, 209). 80  Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 906: ‘factus est fortior et potentior ad persequendum catholicos’.

Chapter 2

76

Before the Montferrat Crusade set out, Honorius reminded the Latins in Romania of the support provided by the papacy for William’s expedition, with regards to both funding and recruitment (through the granting of apostolic indulgences). The pope pointed out that the clergy was, likewise, doing its part by offering a considerable amount of its property and revenues. The laity should, therefore, live up to their duty by fighting vigorously against the enemies and ‘opening up the way to the Holy Land’. The strategic plan set down by Honorius was that Emperor Robert would be given the funds raised in the empire ultra Macram, so that he could move forth from Constantinople in time to coincide with the arrival of the marquis, who would be supported by the lords of Greece (Achaia, Athens, and Negroponte) and the funds from the empire citra Macram. That way, the forces of Theodore would be encircled, attacked on both sides and destroyed.81 In the event, William did not manage to set out until spring 1225. It was already too late, as Thessalonica had fallen into the hands of Theodore by December 1224.82 The army landed at Halmyros, near Volos in Epirote-held Thessaly, but achieved nothing. In September, William died along with a great number of his soldiers in an epidemic of dysentery and the crusade disintegrated.83 The crusade itself was a complete failure but it is important at least in that it did manage to make its way to Frankish Greece.84 It is undeniable that it was closely linked to the interests of the Montferrat family, but the dismissive claims that it met with very limited support should probably be re-examined. The expedition enjoyed extensive papal endorsement, plenary indulgences, crusade funding, and preaching in a wider geographical area than it has sometimes been asserted (see map 2 in Appendix iv).85 While there is little direct evidence for the 81 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5189, 5202, 5270, 5277 (= Bullarium Hellenicum, nos 227–28, 231–32), (November 1224 – January 1225). In this context ultra Macram, refers to the lands of the Latin Empire proper, east of the town of Makri, in Thrace, whereas citra Macram refers to the other Latin lands in Greece, west of Macri. For the possible ambiguity of this terminology, see Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, p. 263. 82  Longnon, ‘La Reprise de Salonique par les grecs’; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 51. 83  Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 163–64; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 63–64; Usseglio, I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente, ii, 276–78. 84  Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62, considers it was the first and only crusade that reached Romania. However, see above, Chapter 1.3, regarding Nivelon’s crusade in 1207, as well as the contingent from Namur under Peter of Douai in 1208. Later on, crusading contingents would arrive under the Latin Emperors John of Brienne (in 1231) and Baldwin II (in 1239): see Chapter 3.1 and 3.5 below. 85  A striking example of out-of-hand dismissal, which actually contradicts the evidence presented can be found in Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 50: ‘A crusade was preached,

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

77

extent of response to (and recruitment for) William’s crusade, a crusading army did undoubtedly reach Greece. The participation of knights from Lombardy, Tuscany, and Burgundy is attested.86 Furthermore, the Greek Metropolitan of Naupaktos, John Apokaukos, writing soon after the events, referred to ‘the arrogant marquis whose ships filled the sea and whose horses the plain of Halmyros’, giving clearly the impression of a sizeable expeditionary force.87 Another issue, then, is the way this crusading effort was received and perceived by contemporaries. We have already noted Honorius’s own misgivings about the diversion of forces from the Holy Land, which could be considered an offensa Dei. Cardinal Legate Pelagius had evidently made a similar reproach when the army of the Fifth Crusade was encamped before Damietta.88 There also seems to have been some criticism in the West concerning the use of the crusade against the Greeks. The condemnation of papal crusading policy by the troubadour Guilhem Figueira a few years later (1229), at the height of the Albigensian campaign, is telling: Treacherous Rome, avarice leads you astray […] Rome you will never have a truce with me because you are false and perfidious with us and the Greeks. […] Rome, you do little harm to the Saracens, to which there was no response, but Honorius helped to gather a considerable force at Brindisi which [William and Demetrius] were to lead into Greece’ (my emphasis). Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62, refers only to the call for preaching in Arles, in 1223, but makes no mention of the generalized call of 1224 (Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4753). See for similar assertions that this was a localized effort which met with practically no response: Richard, The Crusades, p. 255; and Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, pp. 113– 14. No source or secondary work cited supports such negative claims. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 60–64, is less clear-cut: he only refers to a failure to arouse interest (and money) in Italy and France in early 1223, but not so when dealing with the expedition in 1223–24. 86  Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4704 (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, no. 204); Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. by Garufi, pp. 113b–114b and 119a–120a. The knights from Tuscany and Lombardy could, of course, include William’s own men and vassals. 87  ‘Epirotica saeculi xiii’, ed. by Vasilievsky, p. 292, no. 26: ‘τὸν ἀγέρωχον ἐκεῖνον Μαρκέσιον [...], τὸν πολύξυλον στόλον ἐκεῖνον, τὸν [...] πληρώσαντα καὶ γῆν ὁμοῦ καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τὴν μὲν μυριοφόρων τῶν πλοίων, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἵππων καὶ ἁρμάτων καὶ στρατευμάτων’; trans. in Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), p. 74, note 43. 88  Honorius III, ‘Delectus ex epistolarum libris decem’, ed. by Delisle, pp. 690–91 (see above, Chapter 2.2).

Chapter 2

78

but you massacre Greeks and Latins. In hellfire and perdition you have your home Rome […].89

Regardless of the personal viewpoint and sympathies of the troubadour (who wrote his sirventes in Toulouse, while the crusaders were besieging his city), it is evident that he considered the two cases comparable and the papacy as responsible for both. Although of a diametrically opposed outlook, the Cistercian Alberic of Trois-Fontaines similarly listed the reverses in Romania among the setbacks for the Church in other fronts of Latin Christendom, such as Damietta and the Albigensian affair.90 The involvement in Frankish Greece was evidently perceived by observers in the West as a crusade, regardless of whether it was denounced as a false one or evaluated as a genuine undertaking on behalf of the Church. The crusade for its defence could not eventually save the kingdom of Thessalonica. Demetrius fled defeated to Italy where, upon his death in 1230, he transferred his title and rights to Frederick II. 91 Furthermore, the unwise involvement of the Latins of Constantinople in the succession of Theodore Lascaris, which ended with their defeat in Poimanenon at the hands of John Vatatzes, brought the period of peaceful co-existence with Nicaea to an end at about the same time that Theodore destroyed the kingdom of Thessalonica and was himself crowned emperor.92 Those were ill omens for the Latin presence in Romania, faced now with two ambitious and capable Greek emperors. Honorius appears not to have taken any further crusading action for Frankish Greece in the remainder of his pontificate after the debacle of the Montferrat Crusade.93 89 

Guilhem Figueira, ‘D’un sirventes far’, ed. by De Bartholomaeis, pp.  98–99: ‘Roma trichairitz, cobeitatz vos engana […] | Roma! No m’ entrecs, | Car es falsa e trafana | Vas nos e vas Grecs […] | Roma, als Sarrazis faitz vos pauc de dampnatge, | Mas Grecs e Latis metetz e carnalatge; | Inz el foc d’ abis, Roma, faitz vostre estatge, | En perdicion […]’; trans. in Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 174–75. See Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, pp. 30–31. 90  Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 912. 91  Benvenuto di San Giorgio, Historia Montisferrati, ed. by Muratori, pp. 381–82; earlier works, following Benvenuto, date Demetrius’s death in 1227, but see Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, p. 62; see Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, iii, 206, and note 2. 92  See Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 51, note 34, for the imperial coronation of Theodore of Epiros. 93  Except for the affairs of the patriarchate of Constantinople at the time (see Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp.  281–83), Honorius’s only other involvement in Frankish Greece would be to send again Bishop Nicholas of Regio as his legate to ‘the clergy in the kingdom of Thessalonica and in Achaia’, in July 1226: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 6015.

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

79

4. Conclusions How, then, did crusading in Romania evolve, and what were its main characteristics during the pontificate of Honorius III? What were the reasons behind those developments? One thing that seems certain is the priority that the crusade to the Holy Land had in the plans and policy of Honorius, particularly while the Fifth Crusade was underway, but also after its collapse, as is evident by the pope’s persistent efforts to organize a new expedition, to be led by Frederick II.94 Indicative of Honorius’s priorities is the fact that he even put the crusade for the Holy Land before papal interests in Italy, in order to reach an agreement with Frederick.95 The pope was unwilling to divert resources from the Holy Land, as was made clear by his letter to King Andrew of Hungary in 1217 and his prohibition for crusaders signed for the Holy Land to head to other fronts.96 Similarly, Honorius rejected the request made by the German and Flemish crusaders who had participated in the victory of Alcácer do Sal against the Moors (autumn 1217) to remain and fight in the Iberian Peninsula instead of proceeding to Syria to join the Fifth Crusade.97 Nevertheless, Honorius, like his predecessor, professed his belief in the importance of the Latin Empire, on account of the help it could offer to the Holy Land, of the service to the Roman Church, and of its role as an instrument for the chastisement of the schismatics. He displayed an active interest in its fate, by supporting the Latins in Romania and twice summoning help from the West in the form of a crusade. Yet, Honorius appeared more reluctant than Innocent to go through with the actual crusading operations in Romania. In July 1217, it was clear that he was using the crusade mainly as a threat to Theodore of Epiros, so that the latter would release the captured emperor and legate. Even after ordering a crusade to be preached, in November 1217, he was quick to step down from this plan once Theodore partly satisfied the papal demands. The pope apparently allowed for a similar possibility in October 1224, in the late stages of preparation 94 

Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 183–226; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 196–98. Powell, ‘Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade’, esp. pp. 529–31 and 534. 96  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 4, no.  5; Honorius III, ‘Delectus ex epistolarum libris decem’, ed. by Delisle, pp. 690–91; Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 528–30, no. 52. 97  Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp.  112–13; Lomax, The Reconquest of Spain, p.  132; O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain, pp. 79–80; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 125–27. On the other hand, see Rist, ‘Papal Policy and the Albigensian Crusades’, esp. pp. 99, 104–07. 95 

Chapter 2

80

for the Montferrat Crusade, when he entrusted his legate with the authority to absolve even Theodore from excommunication, should he agree to make peace with Marquis William. This morsel of information was left out of the letter sent to William at the same time.98 Honorius’s reluctance was due to the possible hindrance to the affair of the Holy Land through the diversion of crusading resources. Honorius voiced his concern explicitly when he ordered preaching for a crusade to liberate Emperor Peter of Courtenay. The commutation of vows from Jerusalem to Constantinople was, in that instance, prohibited. In fact, the timing of the crusade to the Holy Land proved crucial for both planned expeditions for Frankish Greece. In 1217, the assembled crusading army of King Andrew was a powerful means of coercion of Theodore but, on the other hand, the actual launch of the Fifth Crusade swayed Honorius to shelve the project once some of his demands were met. Conversely, the Montferrat Crusade was planned, organized, and launched after the collapse of the crusade at Damietta — and virtually during the interval from the agreement for a new crusade to the Holy Land between Honorius and Frederick (at Ferentino, March 1223) and the projected departure date of the emperor ( June 1225)99 — in other words, at a time when crusading resources were not actively committed in an enterprise for Outremer. Nevertheless, Honorius gradually deployed more crusading mechanisms in Romania, surpassing his predecessor in both commitment of resources and wealth of justification. It is very important that in his letter of November 1217 to the French clergy, Honorius expressed his concern that the use of Holy Land crusaders in Romania might be offensive to God, thus in reality distancing himself from the position of his predecessor, or indeed his own rhetoric, that crusading for the Latin Empire was justified as a service to the Holy Land. In that context, it is telling that in the same letter Honorius stated that the danger to the Latin possessions in Romania and the offence to the Apostolic See were sufficient causes for him, not only to call new crusaders to arms, but even to contemplate the diversion of the army already prepared for the Fifth Crusade. The pope repeated this point when he warned Theodore that with his actions he had given a tangible and just cause for a crusade army to turn against him.100 98 

Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 5132 and 5133 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, nos 126 and 126a), (21 October 1224). 99  Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 196–97; Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 186–202 (esp. pp. 189–90). 100  Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy, ii, cols 481–82, no. 9; Norden,

Honorius III and the Montferrat Crusade

81

Therefore, Honorius to an extent dissociated the crusade for the Latin Empire from the Holy Land. In an almost paradoxical way, by putting the usefulness of the Latin Empire for the Holy Land in doubt, crusading in Frankish Greece was promoted to a worthwhile cause per se. There were also other advances regarding the deployment of the crusade in Romania. Justificatory and motivational rhetoric was enriched, constituting a further step in the evolution of crusading in Frankish Greece away from total dependency on the cause of the Holy Land. Honorius adjusted his calls to include incentives particular to each recipient, most notably by appealing to French pride. But most importantly, in 1222, the ‘schismatic Greeks’, ‘the enemies of God’, were for the first time explicitly portrayed as the targets of the crusade; fighting them was now presented as the main rationale for crusade action in Frankish Greece, instead of some vague formulation regarding the benefit of the Holy Land. At the same time, the grant of plenary indulgences ‘as for those who cross the sea for the Holy Land’101 raised the crusade in Frankish Greece, theoretically, to the same status as the crusade to the Holy Land. There are striking parallels with the development of crusading on other fronts during the pontificate of Honorius III. In Frankish Greece, as well as in the Baltic and in the Albigensian Crusade, Honorius moved from a vague and probably partial remission of sins (remissio peccatorum) in the early part of his pontificate, to a plenary indulgence equivalent to that granted for the Holy Land. Furthermore, the use of revenues from crusade taxation was extended to all three fronts, while Honorius apparently encouraged plans for the deployment of local military orders at roughly the same time in Romania (the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson), Prussia (the Knights of Dobrzyn), and Languedoc (the Order of the Holy Faith of Jesus Christ). A further similarity lay in the prohibitions for Holy Land crusaders to be diverted towards these campaigns, and the overall priority given to the cause of Outremer over these undertakings. Crusading in Frankish Greece clearly formed an integral part of the wider evolution of crusading in this period.102

Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 747–48, no. i; (= Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba, nos 24 and 29 respectively). 101  For example: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos  4059–60, 4753; see Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., p. 41. 102  Chrissis, ‘New Frontiers’; see also Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 138–49, 251; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 97–106; Clausen, Papst Honorius III., pp. 198, 235–36, 242, 246–58, 263; Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III., pp. 34–40, 45–46.

82

Chapter 2

On the whole, the use of crusading mechanisms in Frankish Greece was significantly expanded in the period 1216–27. Preaching for both expeditions was ordered in extensive areas of Europe. Commutation of vows (though with certain restrictions) was allowed. The mobilization of resources for the Montferrat Crusade was considerable, particularly with regards to funding, one of the strong organizational points of Honorius’s pontificate. Crusade taxation on ecclesiastical property was for the first time ordered in Romania, to be exploited locally. Crusading in Frankish Greece, nascent under Innocent III, gradually matured during the pontificate of Honorius III. It was now ready to reach its peak at the hands of Gregory IX.

Chapter 3

Apogee (1227–41): Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

W

hen Gregory IX ascended the papal throne, on 21 March 1227, crusading in Frankish Greece could claim an established background after the first, tentative but crucial, steps taken by Innocent III and the wider use of it for the defence of the kingdom of Thessalonica by Honorius III. Gregory was to go further than his predecessors both in the scale and in the elaboration of crusading mechanisms applied for the defence of the Latin Empire. He was to organize the most ambitious crusade of all for the protection of Latin Constantinople. Gregory was no stranger to crusading, having been actively involved in the organization of the Fifth Crusade as Cardinal Ugolino of Ostia, when he had been responsible for pacifying the quarrelsome Italian cities as well as for preaching, recruitment, and funding, particularly in Lombardy, in 1221. 1 His pontificate would be very rich in crusading activities on many fronts, both at the frontiers of Latin Christendom and within Western Europe. Expeditions were organized to the Holy Land, the Baltic, and Frankish Greece, as well as against heretics and political opponents in France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the Balkans. In several of these fronts Gregory would introduce crucial new elements such as the inquisition in the fight against heresy and the use of the mendicant 1 

Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, p.  18; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 68–71, 73–74, 112–13, 183–84; Brem, Papst Gregor IX., pp. 24–52.

Chapter 3

84

orders for the preaching, recruitment, and fundraising of the crusades, as well as for the conversion of the opponents, whether heretics, pagans, or schismatics. Gregory’s pontificate would also witness the streamlining of the crusade in the Baltic with the introduction of the Teutonic Knights, and, of course, the first wide-scale use of crusading against Christian lay opponents of the papacy, most importantly Emperor Frederick II.2 Another important element was Gregory’s elaboration and extension of the idea of crusading as an obligation for all the faithful by opening up avenues to non-warrior participation, both in his rhetoric and through funding, commutation, and redemption of vows.3 As regards Romania, the new pope took an interest in the affairs of Constan­ tinople already in the early years of his pontificate, particularly in the case of the election of John of Brienne as emperor (1228/29). However, at that point his involvement was limited and his calls for crusading support to the Latin Empire rather restricted, owing to other preoccupations. Then, in 1232 to 1234, union negotiations with the Greek Church followed, at the instigation of Emperor John Vatatzes and Patriarch Germanos II, during which time papal crusading activity in Frankish Greece was entirely suspended. Soon after the collapse of those negotiations, Gregory returned to the policy of deploying the crusade in Romania. From December 1235 Gregory set out on a consistent effort to relieve the pressure on Constantinople, where the situation had further deteriorated on account of the alliance of Vatatzes with the Bulgarian tsar, John II Asen. In organizing this crusade Gregory attempted to mobilize substantial resources, including some which had initially been allocated to the crusade for the Holy Land that he had proclaimed in 1234 (also known as the Barons’ Crusade).4 2 

See in general: Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp.  20–62; Cole, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, pp.  156–64; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 187–224 (esp. pp. 193–99), 246– 47, 252–53; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 119–58, 181–87. 3  See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 13–36. 4  For the Barons’ Crusade, which would eventually reach the Holy Land under the leadership of Thibaut IV of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, the most comprehensive work is Lower, The Barons’ Crusade. See also: Röhricht, ‘Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis’; Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’; Jackson, ‘The Crusades of 1239–1241 and their Aftermath’. Two points of caution should be made with regards to Lower’s otherwise excellent account: the misunderstanding of the background of crusading for the Latin Empire (for example, p. 59, where it is stated that ‘[Innocent III] never preached a crusade on its behalf ’), which of course is understandable in view of the lack of prior published work on the subject; and, most importantly, the issue of Thibaut’s alleged vow ‘commutation’, on which see below.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

85

That would prove a very lengthy, arduous, and ever-changing process, with at least three distinct phases: first, the instigation of a crusade for Constantinople, directed mostly to Hungary and France (bull Ut Israelem veteris, December 1235), which included requests for several nobles to commute their vows from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire, under the leadership (from October 1236) of the count of Brittany, Peter of Dreux.5 The second phase was a reorganization of the call from December 1236 (bull Ad subveniendum imperio), with several innovations such as the introduction of heresy as an argument for crusading in Romania, the use of the mendicants, and the eventual extension of the call to England. The final phase was initiated in November 1238, when Baldwin II, ‘the heir to the empire of Romania’, was placed at the head of the crusading effort. In the meantime, in January 1238, Gregory had called for a parallel crusade, against John Asen, to be undertaken by King Béla IV of Hungary. The pope tried to lure Béla with the prospect of gaining control over the lands of the ‘deposed’ and ‘heretical’ Bulgarian tsar who had been constantly changing sides in the war between Nicaea and the Latin Empire. Despite many setbacks and negative reactions caused among other things by the unwillingness of many crusaders and the hostility of Frederick II the crusade under Baldwin eventually set out in late summer 1239. It arrived safely in Romania, where it achieved only marginal success. After that point, the pope had to limit his support for the Latin Empire, as he was faced with the much more pressing needs of his conflict with Frederick nearer home. In any case it had been the (often uneasy) peace between the pope and the emperor in the 1230s that had allowed Gregory to turn his attention to the crusades for the Holy Land and the Latin Empire. Following the Treaty of San Germano (1230), there had been a period of co-operation, with papal support for Frederick against his rebellious son Henry (VII) in Germany and, conversely, imperial assistance to Gregory during riots in Rome; this co-operation lasted until the second excommunication of Frederick in 1239, or at least up to 1235/36, when papal-imperial relations deteriorated again over the emperor’s determination to fight against the Lombard League.6 5  Peter of Dreux was, in fact, count of Brittany only up to November 1237, when his son John came of age and succeeded him into the inheritance of his mother: see Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, pp. 28–29, 32, 99. 6  See Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 61–114, 278 (see esp. 73–98 for the tension regarding the Lombard League); Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 237–39, 290–320; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, pp. 374–75, 380; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 20–21, 38, 39–40; Weiler, ‘Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land’.

Chapter 3

86

Before examining Gregory’s involvement in Frankish Greece in more detail, it would be useful to clarify two issues and explode two myths that have persisted in the relevant historiography regarding the crusade of Gregory IX for the Latin Empire. First, the complete diversion of the Barons’ Crusade towards the Latin Empire was never attempted by Gregory: it was rather two parallel expeditions that were planned practically from the start. This misunderstanding has arisen from the misinterpretation of certain documents. Gregory never asked Thibaut of Champagne or Richard of Cornwall, the leaders of the Holy Land crusade, to go on a campaign to Constantinople, as has been widely claimed, although he did make such requests to some other members of the crusading nobility. Thibaut received only variant versions of the crusade bulls for the Latin Empire in 1235 and 1236, which did not ask him to commute his vow, but rather to use his influence and authority in his domains in urging relatives of Baldwin II and John of Brienne to take the cross for the Latin Empire. This misunderstanding has led to the claim that the pope intended to divert the whole crusade for the Holy Land towards Constantinople before the operation split into two distinct campaigns. However, the rerouting of the entire army to Frankish Greece was never envisaged. The plan for Constantinople developed at the same time as the Holy Land expedition, with new recruits being signed with the cross for the Latin Empire, alongside some resources that were indeed reallocated from the Outremer campaign.7 Second, the crusade for the Latin Empire was not initially organized around the person of Baldwin II. He was placed at the helm of the planned expedition only late in 1238, after the withdrawal of Peter of Dreux, the projected leader up to that point.8 7 

For the alleged diversion, see, for example, Mayer, The Crusades, p. 256 (‘at one time, though without achieving any noteworthy success, [Gregory] had attempted to send [the crusade of Thibaut] to Constantinople to help John of Brienne’); Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, p.  187; Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, pp. 166b, 172b; and Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 93–115 (who actually dedicates a whole chapter to ‘The Appeal to Count Thibaut’, based on the assumption that Thibaut was indeed asked to go to Constantinople). This misunderstanding arises mostly from the misinterpretation of two papal letters to Thibaut (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2877 (16 December 1235), and Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, i, cols 998–99 (9 December 1236)), two letters to Richard (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4095 (25 February 1238) and 4608 (25 November 1238); see also Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4965 (23 November 1239)), and a papal reply to a letter from Thibaut and other leading Holy Land crusaders (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4741 (9 March 1239)), all of which are discussed below. See for more detail, Chrissis, ‘A Diversion that Never Was’. 8  See below, Chapter 3.4 and 3.5.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

87

1. Frederick II and the Election of John of Brienne: Gregory’s Early Crusade Involvement in Romania (1227–32) During the first years of his pontificate, Gregory IX was too preoccupied with crucial developments in both Europe and the East to provide any active support to Frankish Greece, particularly on account of the organization of the crusade to the Holy Land and the (not unrelated) beginning of his struggle with Frederick II in Italy.9 The only exception was his sympathetic response to the plight of Emperor Robert concerning the lack of resources necessary for the defence of the Latin Empire10 and, later on, to the emperor’s personal complaint against his barons who had disgraced him and mutilated his wife. When Robert fled to Rome, Gregory received him graciously, gave him some money, and convinced him to return to Constantinople, although Robert died on his way back in early 1228.11 Besides these personal interventions, however, the pope could do little else for Frankish Greece at that moment. One of Gregory’s first actions as pope had been to urge Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Sicily, to fulfil his crusade vow. Frederick had first taken the cross in 1215 and had renewed his vow in 1220, but had been repeatedly postponing its fulfilment throughout the pontificate of Honorius III. The final agreement, made in 1225, had set the date of departure for 1227 under pain of excommunication.12 When the emperor, about to set out from Brindisi, claimed illness and turned back, the pope was quick to excommunicate him on 29 September 1227.13 Even though an excommunicate, Frederick did set out for the Holy Land the following year, where he managed to negotiate the return of Jerusalem to Christian control (Treaty of Jaffa, February 1229).14 9  See, for example, Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 348– 53; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 194–201; Van Cleve, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, pp. 445–51; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, pp.  194–233; Weiler, ‘Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land’. 10  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 47 (7 April 1227). 11  Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 167–68. 12  Van Cleve, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, pp. 430–46; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 138– 39, 148–54. 13  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, iii, 23–30; Van Cleve, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, pp. 446–47; Kennan, ‘Innocent III, Gregory IX and Political Crusades’, pp. 32–33. 14  Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 180–88; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, pp. 219–20.

88

Chapter 3

In the meantime, imperial and papal forces started clashing in Italy.15 Those were events of great importance and are of interest to us in two ways. First, of course, the prolonged struggle between the Hohenstaufen and the papacy would dominate European politics for decades and would become the main preoccupation of the Apostolic See, especially after 1239, reducing other concerns to secondary importance and absorbing crusading resources from other fronts, including Frankish Greece.16 The second point, which is of direct interest for crusading and papal policy in Frankish Greece, is the growing involvement of Frederick in the politics of the region. Frederick was no great friend of the Latin Empire. For one, he appears to have viewed the title of the Latin emperors as a potential threat to his own ecumenical imperial claim. In fact, his first involvement dated back to 1217, when he had objected to the coronation of Peter of Courtenay inside Rome as an infringement of his own imperial rights.17 Frederick had then been indirectly involved in the Montferrat Crusade: William VI had pawned the marquisate to the emperor as a way to raise funds for his expedition to save the kingdom of his half-brother, Demetrius of Thessalonica 18 — but that was incidental and had to do more with the marquis of Montferrat being a vassal of the emperor rather than with Frederick identifying with the cause of the Latins in Romania. After the conquest of Thessalonica by the Greeks of Epiros in 1224, King Demetrius found refuge in Frederick’s court, and escorted the emperor on his crusade to the Holy Land. Upon his death, in 1230, he ceded to Frederick his rights over the kingdom of Thessalonica. Without ever acting upon these rights, however, Frederick, would return them to Marquis Boniface II of Montferrat in 1238.19 Thus, Frederick had been suspicious or at best indifferent towards the Latin states of Greece. 15  Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p. 349; Kennan, ‘Innocent III, Gregory IX and Political Crusades’, p. 32; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 195–97. 16  Although Gregory hesitated to use the crusade outright against Frederick II during the first phase of their struggle in 1228–30, some relevant elements, such as the granting of remission of sins, were put in the service of the papal army. Nevertheless, this army served under the banner of the Keys of St Peter and not under the cross, while Gregory carefully avoided the use of the crusading indulgence in the precise terms Innocent had used against Markward of Anweiler: see Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 348–50; Kennan, ‘Innocent III, Gregory IX and Political Crusades’, pp. 32–33; Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 51–52; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 181–84. 17  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 44; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 318–19. 18  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, ii, 425–27 (see above, Chapter 2.3). 19  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v, 380–82; Benvenuto

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

89

On the other hand, Frederick would, from the late 1220s, maintain close relations and at times form alliances with Greek rulers in Romania, to the dismay of the papacy. There were contacts with Theodore of Epiros in 1229, with Manuel of Thessalonica in 1230–31 and 1235–36, and with Michael II of Epiros in 1238–39.20 But most important was the alliance with John Vatatzes of Nicaea from 1238, which culminated in the marriage between the Greek emperor and Frederick’s daughter Constance/Anna in the early 1240s. 21 Frederick’s policy towards the Greeks has been attributed to several motives, such as his need to find allies, particularly ones with mutual interests against the papacy, and his sympathetic view of their similar traditions of ‘caesaropapism’. But to the extent that his actions can also be construed as hostility against the Latin Empire, as, for example, in the case of obstructing the crusader army under John of Béthune from reaching Romania in 1238,22 there is another element to be taken into consideration. Following the death of Robert of Courtenay, the election by the nobles of Constantinople of John of Brienne, former king of Jerusalem, as Latin emperor could have hardly endeared the Latin Empire to Frederick. John of Brienne was another link between the affairs of Frankish Greece and those of Frederick II, since he had a central role in the emperor’s conflict with Pope Gregory. John bitterly resented the way Frederick had brushed him aside from the kingdom of Jerusalem after marrying his daughter Isabella in 1225. An experienced and acclaimed warrior, as well as a faithful ally of the pope, John became an inveterate opponent of his son-in-law. He was chosen by Gregory to lead the papal armies in their invasion of Frederick’s Sicilian Regno in 1228/29.23 At about the same time, the nobles of the Latin Empire, headed by the bailli, Narjot of Toucy, requested assistance from the pope and offered the throne of di San Giorgio, Historia Montisferrati, ed. by Muratori, pp. 383–85. 20  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v, 586, 630; Hoeck, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, pp. 155, 164–68; Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, p. 280; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 106–07; Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II., pp. 37–50. 21  See: Merendino, ‘Federico II e Giovanni III Vatatzes’; Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, pp. 283–91; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 321–29; Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II., pp. 130–41. The marriage took place in 1241–42 or 1242– 43: Brezeanu, ‘Notice sur les rapports de Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen avec Jean III Vatatzès’; argument amended by Angold, ‘Byzantium in Exile’, p. 557, note 22. 22  Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 626, 632–34; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 179–80 (see below, Chapter 3.4). 23  Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 152–53, 172–73, 198.

Chapter 3

90

Constantinople to John of Brienne, since Emperor Robert had passed away in early 1228. After negotiations, an agreement was finally reached, whereby Baldwin II, Robert’s younger brother and still a minor, was to marry John’s daughter, Maria, while John would be emperor-regent for life. The pope was asked to ratify the agreement in a meeting at Perugia in early April 1229, attended by, among others, John of Brienne, the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, and the envoys of the Constantinopolitan barons.24 The confirmation of the election of John of Brienne as emperor of Constantinople is, in fact, the first time Pope Gregory appears to have taken an active interest in the developments in the Latin Empire. The pope is reported to have encouraged John to take up the offer, promising him assistance in men and money.25 In any case, Gregory took no immediate action after ratifying the agreement, since John of Brienne was still fighting against the imperial forces in Italy. However, Frederick’s swift return from the Holy Land, in the summer of 1229, forced the papal armies to retreat. By autumn 1229, the emperor had restored full control of the Regno, and John had fled defeated to France.26 After protracted negotiations, peace was finally arranged between the pope and Emperor Frederick in San Germano in May 1230.27 With the conflict with Frederick temporarily set aside, Gregory was now free to assist the new Latin emperor in recruiting men for Constantinople by means of the crusade indulgence. In December 1229, in a letter full of expressions of divine approval for the choice of John, ‘the most Christian prince and true athlete of Christ’ (‘christianissimus princeps et Christi verus athleta’), the pope offered those who would go with the emperor for the help of the empire of Romania and would stay there for at least a year the same indulgence and privileges ‘as if they crossed over for the help of the Holy Land’ (‘eadem indulgentia et libertate gaudere quam haberent si transfretarent in subsidium terre sancte’). The pope invoked the precarious situation of the Holy Land and argued that the stabilization of the Latin Empire would facilitate the defence and reinstatement 24 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 290–91; Urkunden zur älteren Handelsund Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, ii, 265–70, no. 273. The embassy from Constantinople was apparently sent by December 1228 and negotiations were carried out until April 1229: see ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 114–20, nos 168–76; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 54–55 and notes 45–46; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 169–71; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 216–17. 25  Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. by De Mas Latrie, pp. 470–71; extract from the compilation of Baldwin of Avesnes (fragment), ed by de Wailly, pp. 426–27. 26  Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 198–200; Van Cleve, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, pp. 460–61. 27  Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 52–59.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

91

of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Therefore the faithful should take up this godly cause (Dei causam) ‘for the affair of the Holy Land and the interest of the entire Church’ (‘terre sancte negocium et interesse generalis ecclesie’), since through the Latin Empire, they would be bringing help to the Holy Land ‘as through a shortcut’ (‘per ipsum [imperium] quasi per quoddam compendium ad dicte terre sancte succursum subvencionis commoda transferentes’).28 Despite the pope’s pronouncement regarding the precarious situation of the Holy Land, it can be rather safely assumed that this was little more than the (by now) established justification for crusading in Frankish Greece, and that it was the Treaty of Jaffa and the ten-year truce stipulated therein that actually allowed Gregory to turn crusade efforts towards the Latin Empire. For the truce temporarily disqualified the Holy Land as a crusading target,29 and thus crusade resources could now to be directed elsewhere. In the meantime, the situation had changed in Romania. After the conquest of Thessalonica, in 1224, Theodore of Epiros had been crowned emperor there by the archbishop of Ochrid, Demetrius Chomatianos, despite the protestations of the Greeks of Nicaea who claimed they were the genuine continuators of the Byzantine imperial government.30 However, by the time of the arrival of John of Brienne, it was Nicaea that posed the major threat for Constantinople, as the Latins had signed a truce with the Epirote ruler in 1228. More importantly, the defeat of Theodore at the hands of John Asen, at the battle of Klokotnitsa in April 1230, had brought about the immediate collapse of Epiros and had led to the annexation of a considerable part of its territories by the Bulgarian kingdom. As Theodore was 28 

‘Lettre de Grégoire IX’, ed. by Van de Gheyn, pp. 231–32 (letter of 13 December 1229). The surviving copy is addressed to the archbishop of Reims. Since the call is not preserved in the papal registers, but only in the letter sent by the archbishop to his suffragans, it is impossible to be sure how wide its circulation might have been. It would not be an unreasonable assumption — judging by other relevant orders — that it was addressed to other prelates as well. This omission from the registers (and the haphazard survival of the document in the archive of an ‘obscure priory’ of Louvain — ‘Lettre de Grégoire IX’, ed. by Van de Gheyn, p. 233) is a warning of the possibility that there might be other lacunae in the correspondence for the Latin Empire in the early years of Gregory IX’s pontificate. 29  See the events in 1237/38, when Frederick made it clear that he would not tolerate the crusade of Thibaut of Champagne setting out for the Holy Land and violating the truce before its expiration: Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, p. 467; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 159. 30  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 51–52; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204– 1261), pp. 64–102; Karpozilos, The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros, pp. 40–86.

Chapter 3

92

to remain a captive of Asen for the next seven years, his brother Manuel succeeded him as ‘emperor’ at Thessalonica, while his nephew, Michael II, eventually gained control of the heartlands of the domain in Epiros. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian tsar — briefly the saviour of the Latin Empire — was to take his place next to the emperor of Nicaea as a grave threat to Constantinople once his overtures towards the Latins were ignored in favour of the election of John of Brienne as emperor-regent.31 In August 1231, having mustered five thousand men-at-arms and five hundred knights and having signed a treaty with Doge Jacopo Tiepolo, John of Brienne set out for Constantinople on Venetian ships. The destination of the passagium was ‘Constantinople, the land of Vatatzes, or wherever else in Romania the emperor and the [Venetian] captain might agree on’.32 The pope urged leading Hungarian prelates and nobles to join the emperor, or, in case they could not go in person, to redeem with an appropriate monetary contribution the crusading vows they had made for the Holy Land. Gregory justified his instructions for the commutation of vows by claiming that the service provided by the Hungarian crusaders would be more acceptable to God, more useful to the Church, and more convenient to themselves if they assisted the Latin Empire rather than going to the Holy Land at this particular moment.33 No help was raised, however, for Emperor John from Hungary, since the agents appointed to this mission proved rather lukewarm in their tasks and the crusaders did not fulfil their vows, as the pope stated himself in early 1232 when he issued a new call to the bishop of Győr to commute his vow and that of three hundred other Hungarian crusaders. The pope commended the bishop for his determination to avenge the injuries done to the Lord but once again argued that the best way to serve the Holy Land under the present circumstances would be through Constantinople. He claimed that ‘if the Lord had effected the translatio of the empire of the Greeks to the Latins — and the consolidation of Latin rule there — earlier, Christendom would not now be weeping for the desolation of the Holy Land’; therefore, whoever wished to liberate the one (that is, Jerusalem) 31 

Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 53–57; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 215–17; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 107–15, 128–34. 32  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 656; Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, ii, 277–97 (at pp. 285, 293), nos 277–79: ‘ad urbem Constantinopolitanam, vel in terram Vatacii, ubi voluerit, vel alibi in Romaniam, sicut erunt concordes dictus dominus Rex et capitaneus domini Ducis’. 33  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no.  657 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 97, no. 171), (9 May 1231): ‘Deo acceptius, Ecclesiae generali utilius, et eis [cruce signatorum de Ungaria] erit commodius […] quam si transfretarent hoc tempore ultra mare’.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

93

should strive to defend the other (that is, Constantinople). The bishop was to make sure that crusaders would fulfil their vows, irrespective of whether they had initially taken them for the Holy Land or for the Latin Empire, and would set out by the agreed date, as the state of the empire allowed for no further delays. Ecclesiastical censures were to be used if necessary, since ‘the vow might be voluntary in taking, but once taken it is compulsory to fulfil’. 34 Both the need to repeat his earlier call and the element of compulsion in the fulfilment of vows indicate that there was reluctance or lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Hungarian crusaders for the Latin Empire. Gregory’s second call was apparently equally unsuccessful, as a letter of 1234 shows that Hungarian crusaders had remained unwilling to set out for Constantinople and the bishop of Győr had placed them under interdict.35 However, Gregory was determined to support Latin possessions in Romania through crusading, a policy he would follow more persistently from 1235 onwards. This would become necessary, as the arrival of John of Brienne did not alter the balance of power, for all the hopes placed on him. The new emperor proved hesitant or unable to take decisive action against the empire’s enemies either in the east or in the west, while Latin knights started to abandon his service due to lack of pay. In the meantime Vatatzes and Asen consolidated their power and the threat to Latin Constantinople grew further.36

2. Temporary Peace and Resumption of Hostilities: Church Union Negotia­tions with Nicaea (1232–34) as an Alternative to Crusading in Frankish Greece Nevertheless, the intensification of Gregory’s crusading efforts for the Latin Empire was preceded by the temporary suspension of any such activities during the period 1232–34, when Church Union negotiations with the Greeks of Nicaea were pursued. This temporary suspension serves to illustrate both the 34 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no.  774 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 102–03, no. 177), (12 February 1232): ‘quod si prevenisset dominus vota supplicum et ante terre orientalis excidium, Constantinopolitanum Imperium ad Latinos a Grecis, sicut postea transtulit, transtulisset, mansissetque adeo solidatum, ut ex nulla parte status eius penitus fluctuaret, desolationem terre sancte hodie forsitan christianitas non defleret’; ‘attendentes, quod etsi volontarium sit vovere, votum tamen necessario est reddendum’. 35  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 1957 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 125–26, no. 212). 36  Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp.  171–72; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 217–19.

Chapter 3

94

centrality of crusading for papal policy in Romania and a potential alternative avenue for the furtherance of papal objectives in the area which was to play an important role under Gregory’s successors. However, despite the importance of the introduction of Church Union negotiations, the crusade was and remained the main thrust of Gregory’s policy in Frankish Greece. Negotiations for Church Union were initiated in the summer of 1232 by the Nicaean patriarch, Germanos II, at the behest of Emperor John Vatatzes.37 The pope, in his somewhat arrogant reply, welcomed the prospect of the acephali Greeks returning to the Head, that is, the Roman Church, since it was because of their schism that they had lost their empire.38 There were adequate motives on both sides to attempt such a rapprochement, even if only temporarily. Vatatzes’s initiative was most likely inspired by tactical considerations. Since 1225 his priority had been the eastern front where a major offensive against the Seljuks was underway. Nicaean involvement in the west was impracticable until the Turkish threat had been dealt with. Once the operations in Asia Minor were concluded, Vatatzes would be free to follow a more aggressive policy towards the Latin Empire, as, indeed, was the case from 1235 onwards. When John of Brienne arrived at Constantinople, Vatatzes’s Seljuk campaign was nearly over but he was still involved in expeditions on Crete and against Leo Gabalas at Rhodes.39 An understanding with the papacy would be crucial in minimizing the risk of further crusading aggression from the West and in preparing his own offensive against the Latin Empire by depriving it of vital support.40 The pope had already welcomed the subjection of Manuel Doukas Komnenos, ‘emperor’ at Thessalonica, to the Roman Church in April 1232 and had taken him under papal protection.41 Manuel’s presence in Thessalonica, where he had succeeded his brother Theodore, was only possible at the toleration of his father-in-law, John Asen, essentially the overlord of the area after the battle of 37 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 803–04 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, nos 179a–b). 38  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 849 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 179). The event was deemed important enough by some people in the West, since Matthew Paris, writing in distant England, not only reported it but also chose to preserve in his chronicle the letters of both the patriarch and the pope: Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 446–70. 39  See Langdon, Byzantium’s Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor, pp. 1, 21, 33, 36–39. 40  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 72; Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, p. 286; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 172. 41  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 786 (1 April 1232).

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

95

Klokotnitza in 1230. Given that Asen was also professing his obedience to the Apostolic See at the time, it probably looked like a propitious set of circumstances in which the pope could establish his spiritual authority in Romania. Eventually, however, Manuel preferred to come to terms with the patriarch at Nicaea, putting an end to the schism within the Greek Church already in the summer of that same year.42 Papal negotiations with Nicaea would last considerably longer. It was only after the exchange of several letters, two embassies, and a mission of friars to the court of Vatatzes at Nymphaeum, that the attempt finally fell apart in May 1234.43 If anything, these negotiations for union indicated that, for the first time since the conquest, the papacy was seriously considering an alternative to supporting the Latin Empire through the crusade as a means of furthering papal influence in Romania: a potential union of the Greek Church with Rome under papal terms. The background of talks between popes and Byzantine emperors before 1204, as well as the recurrence of the issue of Church Union from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards, have often obscured the fact that the negotiations of 1232–34 were indeed an innovative approach to the situation in Frankish Greece. For before 1204 talks between the papacy and the Byzantine Church and emperor were of a different character, between sovereign entities trying to resolve the schism. After 1204, the schism was resolved, at least in the eyes of the papal curia and the Latin conquerors. Papal dealings with the Greek clergy in Romania focused only on the issue of obedience, making sure that the new order of things was accepted by the conquered. Negotiations regarding dogma and ecclesiological issues did not take place; they would indeed be inconceivable after the subjugation of ‘the empire of the Greeks, and the return of the Greek Church to the Roman fold’. True, there had been negotiations between Innocent and Theodore Lascaris in 1213–14 but they had been particularly brief and evidently more attuned to the political affairs of the time.44 Honorius held no such negotiations whatsoever. It was only under Gregory IX, briefly in the 1230s, that Church Union was discussed again, as an 42 

Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 63–64; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 58; Karpozilos, The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros, pp. 87–95. 43  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 1316 (= Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu, no. 193); ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum’, ed. by Golubovich; Canart, ‘Nicéphore Blemmyde’. See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 64–72, for a detailed presentation of the negotiations; another account is Doran, ‘Rites and Wrongs’. 44  See Chapter 1.5 above.

Chapter 3

96

issue between two sovereign (though in no sense equal) parts.45 That was a de facto recognition of the power of Nicaea that could no longer be denied. Nicaea had, for the most part, resumed the role of the Byzantine Empire before 1204. Even the question of a resumption of Greek control over Constantinople was tentatively brought up, with the emperor asking the friars whether the pope would restore the Greek patriarch to his rights in case he obeyed the Roman Church. The papal delegation replied evasively, but not negatively, that if the Greek patriarch gave due obedience, ‘we are convinced that he would find greater mercy than he expects from the Lord Pope and the whole Roman Church’.46 This specific effort was abortive, with Gregory once again turning to the crusade in Frankish Greece, and on an unprecedented scale at that. But, as we will see, the discussions on union, including the issue of sovereignty over Constantinople, would be repeated between Vatatzes and Gregory’s successor, Innocent IV, and would become a major feature of Byzantine diplomacy and Byzantine-papal relations for the rest of the thirteenth century. Two further points, which indicate attitudes on both sides, can be made about the negotiations that took place at Nymphaeum. On the one hand, Greek recriminations regarding Latin atrocities during the conquest by the crusaders played a part in exciting spirits during the discussions, with the Latin side denying all papal responsibility and involvement in such actions.47 On the other hand, the friars were quick to accuse the Greeks of heresy on at least three occasions, two of them quite provocatively.48 This was an indication of the mindset with which Gregory’s envoys were approaching the situation in Romania. The issue of heresy would indeed loom large in Gregory’s crusading efforts in Frankish Greece, in contrast to both Innocent III and Honorius III who had consistently only referred to ‘schismatics’ and the ‘schism’. 45 

See Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 12–14 (14), for the importance of the first Synod of Nymphaeum, despite its failure, as ‘a lesson’ for similar efforts in the future, such as the embassy of John of Parma (for which, see below Chapter 4.4). 46  ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum’, ed. by Golubovich, p.  445: ‘Si Patriarcha obedientiam et ea que matri sue debet, solvat, credimus quod misericordiam maiorem inveniet, quam credat, coram domino Papa et tota Ecclesia Romana’; trans. by Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 67. 47  For example: ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum’, ed. by Golubovich, pp. 451–52; see also Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 218. 48  ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum’, ed. by Golubovich, pp. 451, 454, 458, 463 (only in the last case was the accusation returned by the Greeks); see Doran, ‘Rites and Wrongs’, pp. 138, 140, 142, 143.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

97

No sooner had the discussions come to an abrupt end than Gregory renewed his calls to Hungarian prelates to urge the crusaders who had failed to fulfil their vows for Constantinople to do so now, under threat of interdict or excommunication (11 June 1234).49 Vatatzes lost no time either in resuming hostilities with the Latins. After the capture of Lampsacus and Gallipoli, and the marriage of his son and heir to John Asen’s daughter, Vatatzes moved against Constantinople in alliance with the Bulgarian tsar, ravaging the area around the city (1234–35). 50 John of Brienne had to dispatch an embassy to the Venetian doge, Jacopo Tiepolo, requesting urgent help.51 The circumstances for the Latin Empire seemed desperate. By late 1235 it had become a pressing need to redeploy the crusade in its assistance on a wider scale. Gregory would soon take this step by issuing new crusading calls for Constantinople and by redirecting towards Frankish Greece part of the resources that had initially been allocated to the crusade for the Holy Land. Michael Lower, in disagreeing with Richard Spence on the importance of Church Union for Gregory’s policy at the time, does not consider the breakdown of the negotiations of 1232–34 as instrumental to the pope’s call for crusade resources to be diverted from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire. Rather, he believes it was purely a reaction to the emergency facing Constantinople in 1235, as related in John of Brienne’s request for help. He argues that the pope, unaware that reinforcements under Geoffrey Villehardouin of Achaia had in the meantime broken the siege, issued his call for help to Constantinople on 16 December 1235, along with repeated instructions that the expedition should not delay to set out because of the urgency of the situation.52 However, a closer examination of the events indicates otherwise as to Gregory’s policy. Union negotiations, as we saw, were initiated in summer 1232 and collapsed in May 1234. Gregory’s last call for Hungarian crusaders to support Constantinople took place in February 1232, and then, after complete silence on the matter for over two years, the call was repeated in June 1234, before the culmination of the alliance between Vatatzes and Asen. The close concurrence of dates suggests that this could have hardly been a coincidence. Furthermore, in 49 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 1957 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 125–26, no. 212). 50  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 57; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 172–73. 51  ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp.  121–22, no. 180. 52  Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 58–63 (esp. p. 61); see Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 163.

Chapter 3

98

a letter requesting Emperor Frederick’s co-operation some years later, Gregory himself explicitly linked the failed union negotiations with the need for a crusade for the Latin Empire.53 This is not to say that the crusade aimed to bring the Greek Church into submission to Rome rather than to provide assistance and relief to the Latin Empire. But it does mean that the two issues were intertwined in the eyes of the papacy: Gregory resumed his crusading support after the failure of union, or, rather, crusading in Romania was a constant thread of Gregory’s policy, briefly interrupted by unionist negotiations as an alternative avenue. Another point against Lower’s explanation of urgent necessity as the main incentive for the diversion of Holy Land crusaders towards Frankish Greece is the fact that Gregory did not back down from his plan even after Nicaean pressure abated but instead, as we will see, went ahead with his organization of the crusade for Constantinople for nearly four years in the face of growing reactions in the West. The extensive and constant use of crusading in Frankish Greece by Gregory was not an accident, nor was it a course of action necessitated by the force of circumstances alone. Rather, it was the pope’s conscious policy, conditioned by the accumulated background of such expeditions under his predecessors and shaped in its details by the developments in both Romania and the West. Support for the Latin Empire was one of the key elements of papal policy in the Levant, and the means to effect it was through the crusade. Gregory went back to crusading calls in support of Constantinople in 1234 because that was dictated by his general outlook. That said, it should be acknowledged that the situation in Frankish Greece in 1235 sufficiently alarmed Gregory to prompt him to take the next step in widening his crusade call. In any case, Gregory was hardly in a position to take extensive action in Romania before that time. In 1234–35 Gregory had trouble on the home front. A rebellion of the Romans forced the pontiff to flee the city in September 1234. The situation was serious enough to merit not only intervention by Emperor Frederick, who came to the pope’s aid with an army, but also to force Gregory to call for help from prelates and nobles all over Europe in language reminiscent of a crusade bull.54 The papacy’s attention and resources were thus fully engaged, leaving very little possibility for crusading action elsewhere at that point. In fact, in late 1234, only a month before he issued his pleas for help against the Romans, 53 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4110 (17 March 1238). See Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 469–70, who also directly connects the failure of union negotiations with Gregory’s crusading actions against the Greeks. 54  See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 38–39; calls were made to Germany, France, and Iberia, while reinforcements arrived even from England.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen

99

Gregory had issued his call for the Barons’ Crusade to be ready to set out for the Holy Land by the expiration of the Treaty of Jaffa. But it was only after the Roman rebellion had been quelled and Gregory had entered negotiations with the Romans in April 1235 that the organization for this expedition effectively took off.55 Evidently it would not have been any easier for the papacy to organize a crusade in Frankish Greece before that time either.

3. Ut Israelem veteris: Initial Phase of the Crusade for the Latin Empire and the First Attempted Diversion of Holy Land Crusaders (December 1235–October 1236) In December 1235, Gregory, sufficiently alarmed by the developments in Romania and free enough to take action, decided to divert part of the crusading effort for the Holy Land in order to assist the Latin Empire. As had also been the case in 1232/34 in Hungary, Gregory called for the commutation of vows of some Holy Land crusaders as well as for the signing of new ones specifically for Constantinople.56 His call, the bull Ut Israelem veteris, was sent to Hungary and France. Gregory wrote to King Béla IV of Hungary to ask him to make haste for the help of Constantinople, which was under attack by the ‘schismatics’ John Vatatzes and John Asen. The pope stated that this would constitute double service, worthy of a double reward, as it would be beneficial to both the Latin Empire and the Holy Land.57 Thus, Gregory invoked the traditional argument that the former helped sustain the latter and claimed that their fate was intertwined, as the empire provided easy access for crusaders to Syria. Furthermore, if Constantinople were to fall back to the hands of the Greeks, ‘who hate the Latins more than the pagans do’, the fall of the Holy Land would be imminent, presumably through hostile 55 

See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 38–39. See, for example, for Hungary: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 2874–76; and for France: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2879 (= Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, i, 179–80, no. 185): ‘both those [that is, the four hundred crusaders who were to commute their vows], and others who, led by your admonitions, will have taken a new time the sign of the cross for the help of the Latin empire’ (‘tam eos, quam alios, qui de novo tuis inducti monitis in succursum ipsius [imperii] assumpserint signum Crucis’ — my emphasis). See similarly Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 2877–78, where the pope is instructing Thibaut to urge Erard of Chacenay and other relatives of Baldwin II and John of Brienne ‘to take the cross for the Latin Empire’ (‘ut signum crucis in ipsius imperii succursum assumant’). 57  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2872 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 140, no. 249). See Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 296, and Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 73. 56 

100

Chapter 3

action on the part of the Byzantines and their collaboration with the ‘infidels’. Gregory added the argument that Hungary was nearer to the Latin Empire, and thus better placed to assist. The same call was addressed to Béla’s younger brother, Coloman, duke of Slavonia, who was in the meantime carrying out a crusade against the heretics of Bosnia.58 At the same time, the prelates of Hungary were asked to commute the vows of Holy Land crusaders in their provinces and to urge others to take the cross for the Latin Empire.59 Indulgence as for the Holy Land was granted to the participants of the expedition.60 The pope also contacted Thibaut of Champagne and Navarre, one of the leaders of the projected crusade to the Holy Land, concerning the cause of Frankish Greece. Thibaut was asked to urge Erard of Chacenay and other relatives of Emperor John (of Brienne) and ‘the nobleman’ Baldwin to take the cross for the Latin Empire and make haste to go there, though there was no request for Thibaut himself to commute his vow or go to the help of Constantinople.61 The same instructions were given to the archbishop of Sens.62 Further orders were issued to the pope’s crusade agent in France, the Franciscan William of Cordelle.63 Gregory urged the friar to commute the vows of four hundred knights who would be willing to go to the help of the empire, and also to enlist others who would be convinced by him to take the cross de novo.64 58 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2873; Coloman, like Béla, was offered the plenary indulgence. For the Bosnian expedition see Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 170; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 130–32, 138–39, 150–51, 155–56; Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, pp. 143–45; and Fine, The Bosnian Church, pp. 137–45. 59  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 2874–76. 60  For example, Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 140–41, no. 249: ‘we concede to those who will go to the help of that empire the same remission of sins which they would have received if they assisted the aforementioned Holy Land in person’ (‘illam eis qui in eiusdem imperii succursum accesserint, concedimus veniam peccatorum, quam habituri forent, si predicte terre sancte personaliter subvenirent’). 61  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2877; Registra Vaticana MSS, xviii, fol. 90r–v, epist. 313. This letter is a variant version of Ut Israelem veteris (see below for the variant of Ad subveniendum imperio, sent to Thibaut in 1236); Chrissis, ‘A Diversion that Never Was’, pp. 128–31. 62  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2878. 63  See Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 34, 126–27, and Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 93, 103, 172–73, for the role of William of Cordelle in the crusade efforts of the period. William was responsible, in France, for organizing both expeditions to Constantinople and to the Holy Land; he eventually took part in Thibaut’s crusade. 64  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2879.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 101

About a month later, Gregory intensified his efforts, stressing the immediate need of the empire that might not be able to hold out much longer. The call, this time, was a general one dispatched to all the archbishops, bishops, and other prelates of France and Hungary.65 The pope assigned two agents to help speed up the process of preaching, recruitment of crusaders, and commutation of vows. William of Modena, who had been a papal legate in the Baltic, was dispatched to France to assist William of Cordelle.66 Since William of Cordelle was responsible for both the crusade to the Holy Land and the one to Constantinople, it is evidence of the growing importance of the latter that the pope now decided to assign a dedicated agent for it. William of Modena was also to inform the French that the doge of Venice had offered free passage to all the crusaders who would go to the help of Constantinople.67 The Cistercian abbot of St Thomas of Torsello was sent in a similar capacity to coordinate vow-commutation and recruitment in Hungary.68 The crusade bull of January 1236, like that of December 1235, made it once more clear that the crusaders would receive the same indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’. The repetition of the call and the additional incentive of free transport probably indicate limited response or at least an effort to pre-empt such a prospect. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the crusade call for the beleaguered empire had any tangible result at that time. Several months later, in December 1236, the vow commutation of four hundred French crusaders and the recruitment of the relatives of John and Baldwin were discussed again, which implies that neither group had set out in the meantime.69 Eventually, Constantinople was released from the stranglehold of Vatatzes and Asen thanks to John of Brienne’s display of courage and ability, and particularly through the good services of Prince Geoffrey II of Achaia who managed to break through the Greek blockade with his ships in the spring of 1236.70 This offered some respite and it seems that the 65 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 2909–11 ( January 1236). William of Modena is mostly known for his three legatine missions in the Baltic and his important work there from the 1220s to the 1240s: see Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 242, 260–63, 271–74; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 170–76, 188–89, 200–02, 206–08. 67  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2909 (16 January 1236). 68  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 2911. 69  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no.  3395; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p.  174, and Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 219, also believe that there was no response in the West to the crusade calls of 1235–36. 70  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 219; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 173–74. 66 

102

Chapter 3

pope temporarily stopped issuing calls for immediate help for the Latin Empire. His only relevant action in Romania between January and October 1236 was the excommunication of Asen because of his alliance with Vatatzes, despite repeated papal admonitions.71 However, Gregory did not give up on his efforts to organize crusading help for Constantinople and he resumed activities by late October 1236, when he announced that Peter of Dreux, count of Brittany, had agreed to take the cross for the Latin Empire, evidently as the expedition’s leader.72 Bishop Ranulf of Quimper, Peter’s chancellor and close ally,73 would stay and act as warden of the count’s lands, and for that reason he was absolved of his own vow for the Holy Land while receiving the corresponding indulgence. The crusader’s privilege of apostolic protection was extended over Peter’s family and lands.74

4. Ad subveniendum imperio: Intensification of the Efforts for the Constantinopolitan Crusade and the Introduction of the Argument of Heresy (December 1236–November 1238) The two years following Peter of Dreux’s enlistment for the Constantinopolitan crusade would be the climax of Gregory’s efforts to assist the Latin Empire. The pope widened the scope of his call to the faithful, sending requests for more crusaders not only to France and Hungary but also to England. Furthermore, Gregory energetically strove to procure funds for the planned expedition through taxation of the clergy, the use of Holy Land legacies and donations, the granting of indulgences to those who made financial contributions in favour of Frankish Greece, and, most of all, through an organized system for large-scale redemption of crusade vows, particularly of the infirm and poor crucesignati. At the same time, he naturally called upon the resources of the Latins in Romania, as 71  Asen’s excommunication was announced to the archbishops of Hungary on 24 May 1236: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3156. 72  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3363–64, 23 October 1236 (= Registra Vaticana MSS, xviii, fol. 203v, epist. 254–55); see Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, pp. 90–91 (and note 3), 105–06; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 42. Regarding Peter’s leadership, see Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, p. 105, and Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, pp. 467–68; see the clearly prominent role of Peter in Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 630; and Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 387. 73  Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, pp. 99, 50. 74  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3364–66 (23 October 1236).

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 103

for example in December 1236, when the clergy of Frankish Morea was ordered to provide the necessary funds that would allow Prince Geoffrey of Achaia to continue his defence of the Latin Empire.75 Throughout this period there were parallel preparations for both the Constantinopolitan crusade and the Holy Land one. In coordinating this wide-ranging plan, Gregory made use of the local ecclesiastical hierarchy as well as his own crusade agents (such as William of Cordelle in France) while he also enlisted the services of the mendicant orders, particularly the Dominicans. Peter of Dreux was expected to lead the host to Constantinople, and efforts were made for several other French nobles to be recruited. However, their departure was repeatedly postponed, and Gregory was to be frustrated in most of his efforts, as even Peter eventually opted for the Holy Land. Although Baldwin II was mentioned several times, his role was peripheral in the crusade planning of this period. The ‘heir of the empire of Romania’ would become prominent after Peter’s withdrawal, when, in November 1238, he was set at the head of the crusading effort. Finally, a notable new element of Gregory’s policy was the introduction of heresy as an additional justificatory argument for crusading in Frankish Greece. The pope would make full use of it when calling Béla IV of Hungary for a crusade against John Asen of Bulgaria in January 1238. The crusade bull Ad subveniendum imperio issued on 8 December 1236 (and the various versions that followed) introduces this new period and encapsulates its most important aspects regarding Gregory’s policy towards crusading in Frankish Greece. The renewed crusade call for the Latin Empire was addressed to prelates in north-eastern France (Cambrai, Tournai, Arras) and in Hungary.76 In that call Gregory brought in several innovations, next to some well-established practices regarding the crusade in Romania. Perhaps the most striking change was at the beginning of the letter. Summoning support for the Latin Empire, Gregory naturally invoked the traditional arguments that it was helpful to the cause of the Holy Land while its loss to the Greeks would be an impediment to any further assistance to Outremer and that the Latin occupation was a means of healing the schism of the Eastern Church. But Gregory further elaborated those points, warning of heresy spreading in the East and of the danger for all the Latins who reside there. His call was for the help of the empire of Constantinople […], as in case of its destruction the body of the Eastern Church would be torn apart to pieces by grievous schisms, and 75  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3408–09 (23 December 1236); Brown, ‘The Cistercians in the Latin Empire’, pp. 108–09. 76  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3395–96.

104

Chapter 3

the help of the Holy Land would be very much impeded; in case of its destruction, the Lord’s field would be taken over by the thorns and thistles of various heresies, and there would be fear of great peril for all the Latins residing in the Eastern parts.77

The pope also used similarly charged language for the empire’s role and enemies: the empire, which suffered for the benefit of the Church and the Faith (‘prefati imperii, oppressi pro Ecclesia et fide catholica’) was assailed by Vatatzes who had apparently been ‘promoted’ from a mere schismatic to an ‘enemy of God and Church’ (‘Vatacius, Dei et Ecclesie inimicus’).78 Gregory’s preoccupation with the spread of heresy originated in his experiences as a cardinal, when he had become acquainted with the problem during his wideranging diplomatic missions (particularly in northern Italy), as well as through his close connection with the Franciscans. During his pontificate he authorized a series of campaigns against heretics throughout Europe, not only in southern France where his predecessors’ activities had mostly been confined, but also in Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bosnia. Though he evidently made the effort to present his activities within the framework and language of his predecessors, he nevertheless significantly widened the scope of anti-heretical crusading.79 This was an expansion not only in geographical terms: as thirteenth-century canon lawyers explored the definition of heresy and came to include within it any obstinacy or defiance towards the doctrines and commands of the Church, the distinction between an enemy of the papacy on political grounds and one who actually held heretical beliefs became blurred. Both kinds of people could be branded as heretics and become the targets of crusades, as Gregory would do in the case of Emperor Frederick II no less.80 Furthermore, the argument of heresy could be particularly useful, as it could be linked with the recent experience of the Albigensian Crusade and especially with the provisions of the Fourth Lateran Council, which decreed that sovereigns who sheltered heresy could be divested of their lands. Indeed, as we will see, Gregory exploited that possibility a year 77  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray: ‘Ad subveniendum imperio Constantino­ politano […] in cujus exterminio corpus orientalis Ecclesie in gravium frusta scismatum scinditur, ac subsidium Terre Sancte plurimum impeditur; in cujus exterminio ager dominicus diversarum heresum spinis occupatur et tribulis et omnium Latinorum timetur periculum in partibus habitantium Orientis’. See Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, pp. 168–69, 173, who was the first to note that Gregory introduced heresy as an argument in Romania, though he misdated its introduction in 1238. 78  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3395. 79  Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 119–58. 80  See Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 171–74, 184–87, 196–202, 221–22.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 105

later, by ‘deposing’ the ‘heretical’ John Asen and calling Béla of Hungary to lead a crusade against him.81 The rest of Ad subveniendum imperio followed closely the crusading bull of the previous year (Ut Israelem veteris), but with a few rather important differences. The argument of double service, that is, to Constantinople (against Vatatzes and the Greeks ‘who despise the Latins more than the pagans do’) as well as to the Holy Land through the former, was once again invoked. However, the additional formulation that the empire provides ‘the only easy access for the crusaders to the Holy Land’ was dropped. This is another indication that Gregory was now keen to put more stress on the argument of heresy than on the help to the Holy Land. The papal letters referred again to the commutation of crusade vows in Hungary and France and to the signing of crusaders de novo for the Latin Empire, who were to receive the full indulgence which was applicable for Holy Land crusaders, but this time the bull also made explicit mention to the other crusade privileges, namely immunity and protection of the crusaders’ possessions. Furthermore, the bull included provisions for the redemption of vows of those crusaders who were physically or otherwise unsuitable for the expedition. The possibility for large-scale redemption of the vows of unsuitable crusaders, that is, the release from the crusade vow in return for an appropriate amount of money (based on the circumstances of each individual crusader), was mentioned in Innocent’s crusade bull Quia maior for the Fifth Crusade. But it was Gregory who took the practice to the next level through an organized system of redemptions, making it both an essential aspect of crusade financing and a means of ensuring the participation of the wider Christian community and not only the elite combatants.82 Baldwin now appeared for the first time as an active participant in the preparations for western help to the Latin Empire, though not yet in a leading position: he was to provide advice for the use of the money gathered for the help of the empire through redemptions or other means.83 Overall, the crusading bull Ad subveniendum imperio was a mixture of long-standing and new arguments and directives for a crusade in Frankish Greece, essentially incorporating all the major provisions of the Fourth Lateran Council concerning the organization of a crusade. It set an important precedent for crusading activities in Romania 81 

For the crusade against Asen, see below, pp. 119–20. See Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 173–76; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 14–17, 31–36, 69–72. 83  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3395, 3397. 82 

106

Chapter 3

over the following years, and it was used as the model for Gregory’s subsequent bulls concerning the Latin Empire.84 The preparations for the Constantinopolitan campaign ran parallel to the ones for the Holy Land crusade, which was to be led by Thibaut of Champagne.85 Significantly, the bull Ad subveniendum imperio stipulated that money from redemptions of crusaders’ vows coming from Baldwin’s own lands and that coming from the cities and dioceses of Cambrai, Tournai, and Arras would be used for the Latin Empire, as long as the lords of those lands were not signed with the cross for the Holy Land86 — a stipulation which confirms that both expeditions were meant to go ahead and that there was no attempt to suspend the Outremer campaign in favour of the Constantinopolitan one. The pope, in fact, contacted Thibaut again regarding the affair of Constantinople, as he had done the previous year. This has often been interpreted as a request to the count to commute his vow to the Latin Empire, and as an effort to have the entire Holy Land crusade be diverted towards Constantinople.87 This is not so. As had also been the case in 1235, the letter to Thibaut was a variant of the crusade bull. The opening paragraph of Ad subveniendum imperio was retained, including the references to the danger of heresy and to the harm that would be caused to the cause of the Holy Land if the Latin Empire fell. The pope also added some points specifically meant for Thibaut, such as the exploits of his predecessors in the Holy Land, and their service to the Church, as well as the count’s consanguinity with Baldwin. But when the letter came to the specific requests from the count, Gregory dropped the argument of the Holy Land and simply asked Thibaut in rather vague terms to provide help to Baldwin; there was no request for him to commute his vow or personally go to Constantinople. Similarly — and unlike the crusade bull itself — there was no mention of an indulgence. Thibaut was considered a crusader for the Holy Land anyway, so he was simply to receive the pope’s gratitude for intervening on behalf of Baldwin. The nature of this 84 

See Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3937, 3945, 3946. See for example the instructions to William of Cordelle, regarding the preparations for the Holy Land crusade in France: for example, Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3632 (9 May 1237), 3642 (13 May 1237), 3923 (28 October 1237). See the exhortation to King Louis IX of France and Queen Blanche (9 February 1237) to make sure that the count of Toulouse would set out in the next passagium for the Holy Land (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3498–99). 86  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3395. 87  Most importantly and extensively: Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 101–02; see also above, p. 86, and note 7. 85 

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 107

intervention becomes clear in Gregory’s instruction to Thibaut to help Baldwin regain his possessions in France (the legacy of his parents, Peter and Yolanda), with which the letter ended.88 Though Thibaut’s participation was not requested, the pope did try to enlist additional French crusaders for the Latin Empire in May 1237. He commanded the bishop of Sées and the crusaders of his diocese, who were preparing to participate in the passagium generale to the Holy Land, to commute their vows to the expedition for Constantinople, set to depart the following March; crusade indulgences and privileges were granted to all those who would participate or assist financially.89 He also tried to tempt Henry of Bar-le-Duc to participate by writing to the archbishop of Reims and William of Cordelle to set funds from vow redemptions at the disposal of the count in case he chose to commute his vow from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire.90 At about the same time, Gregory IX jumped at the opportunity to bring John Asen to the Latin side. The tsar, under the threat of Hungarian and crusader pressure, but probably also prompted by the belief that Vatatzes was getting the better deal out of their alliance, had approached the papacy with the request for a legate to be sent concerning the affairs of Constantinople. The pope replied promptly and advised the Bulgarian tsar to help the Latin emperor, without failing to mention the forthcoming crusade apparently as both an encouragement for Asen to side with the Latins and a threat in case he did not, for soon, through the Lord’s agency, this land and empire will be helped with a strong hand and an extended arm by crusaders — of whom, by the grace of God, there is a great multitude — as well as by other Christian faithful.91

He also dispatched the bishop of Perugia as his legate to carry out further negotiations and to co-ordinate the Bulgarian tsar, the Hungarian king, and the clergy of the two countries.92 Gregory was conscious of the limits of Asen’s reliabil88 

Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, i, cols 998–99; Chrissis, ‘A Diversion that Never Was’, pp. 131–36; see Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, p. 466. 89  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3638 (10 May 1237). 90  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3633 (9 May 1237); Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 40. 91  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 155, no. 275, (21 May 1237): ‘In proximo enim, auctore domino, eisdem terre ac Imperio tam per crucesignatos, quorum per Dei gratiam est maxima multitudo, quam per alios Christi fideles in forti manu et extento brachio succurretur’. 92  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3694–95 (= Vetera monumenta historica

108

Chapter 3

ity and commitment and at the same time hopeful that the combined pressure would break the determination of Vatatzes’s attacks against Constantinople; he thus wrote to King Béla to take care so that Asen would remain devoted to the Church and so that Vatatzes might also be brought into its bosom.93 Apparently judging that exhortations for peaceful co-operation and Church Union were of little use without some armed ‘encouragement’, Gregory’s letters to Béla and the Hungarian clergy were simultaneously a call for further crusade preaching for the Latin Empire. Gregory even offered a twenty-day indulgence for the audiences of the crusade sermon.94 In June 1237, Asen was asked again to comfort and protect the Latins of Romania until the crusading force arrived from the West and achieved the final triumph with his help.95 That would afford the Latin Empire a valuable respite, particularly as the crusade — which was initially set to depart the following March — was likely to be delayed. In May 1237, the French crusading nobility (for the Holy Land as well as for the Latin Empire) were given permission to postpone their departure in order to contain the aggression of the count of Toulouse against the count of Provence and especially his encroachment upon the city of Marseilles.96 Encouraged by Asen’s shift of policy, Gregory also tried to convince John Vatatzes to desist from his attacks on Constantinople, attempting to intimidate him with the threat of the impending crusade: So many noble and powerful and so many vigorous warriors have taken the sign of the cross that their multitude is almost innumerable; through them and other Christian faithful, whose number is nearly infinite, it will be possible to provide help to the empire of Romania soon […] in such a way that all the efforts of its Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 155, nos 275–76); Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 170. 93  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3716 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 155–56, no. 277), (31 May 1237). 94  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3717 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 156–57, no. 278). This practice had been introduced by Innocent III, and during the thirteenth century the grants of such indulgences gradually grew to exceed one hundred (or in some cases even four hundred) days. This was a rather clear indication that it was becoming progressively harder to elicit enthusiastic response to crusade calls: see Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 107; and Mayer, The Crusades, p. 321, note 143, for a quick overview. 95  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3720 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 157–58, no. 280). 96  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3705 for Count Peter of Brittany (for Constantinople), and nos 3699–3704, 3706–07 for the other French nobles (for the Holy Land), (18–19 May 1237).

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 109 enemies will be crushed and the empire will breath freely as it obtains the coveted peace. We think that we should carefully admonish Your Lordship and exhort you to consider your interest and salvation prudently, and to take precautions perceptively for your security in the future […]; you should not devise any danger or damage against the aforementioned empire, nor cause any vexation or trouble to our most beloved son in Christ the illustrious Emperor John of Constantinople and his people, but rather you ought to provide help and counsel, and demonstrate your benevolence, so that you may show yourself a devoted son of the Roman Church both in faith and in deeds.97

Vatatzes was not impressed by the threats but he was positively outraged by the tone and demands of the papal letter. In a reply replete with indignation and irony (so much so, that the letter was considered a forgery until the 1930s),98 Vatatzes stressed his exalted title and military victories in response to the pope’s condescending and menacing suggestions, while he assured ‘his Holiness and all the Christians’ that the Greeks of Nicaea would never stop fighting against those who unlawfully possess Constantinople, not only with their arms but also with the help of God who assists just causes; the pope, he continued, as the successor of the apostles and acquainted with divine and human laws, would surely praise them for their sacrifice in defence of their ‘motherland and innate freedom’ (‘ἐπαινέσεις ἡμᾶς ὑπερμαχοῦντας τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῆς ἐγγενοῦς αὐτῆς ἐλευθερίας προκινδυνεύοντας’). Vatatzes also did not miss the opportunity to respond ironi97  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no.  3693 (21 May 1237); see Grumel, ‘L’Authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès’ pp. 455–56, for a newer, corrected edition: ‘tot nobiles et potentes ac tot strenui bellatores assumpserint signum crucis quod pene illorum est innumerabilis multitudo, per quos et alios christifideles quorum fere infinitus est numerous, sic poterit Imperio Romanie […] in proximo subveniri, quod omnis conatus adversantium destruetur et optata pace idem Imperium respirabit. Nobilitatem tuam monendam duximus attente et hortandam, mandantes quatenus utilitati tue prudenter consulens et saluti, ac indempnitati provide precavens in futurum, […] nichil periculi, nichil dispendii contra dictum imperium machineris, nullamque karissimo in christo filio nostro Iohanni Imperatori Constantinopolitano illustri et suis molestiam inferas vel gravamen, sed potius impendas auxilium consilium et favorem, ita quod te Romane ecclesie filium et devotum tam fide quam operum exhibitione demonstres.’ 98  The letter (surviving in a late sixteenth- or early seventeenth-century manuscript from Patmos) was first published as Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, pp. 372–78. Its almost violent tone and constant polemical irony were so striking that it was considered an Orthodox antipapal forgery until Grumel, ‘L’Authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès’, proved the authenticity of the letter, displaying that its contents, details, and references are accurate, corresponding exactly to Gregory’s letter, which was neither published nor widely known before the early twentieth century; Grumel dated its composition around the summer or autumn of 1237.

110

Chapter 3

cally to Gregory’s request not to attack John of Brienne, since he was ‘long dead, but for you he is still alive and moving’ (‘ὃς πάλαι μὲν τὸν τῇδε κατέλυσε βίον, παρὰ σοὶ δὲ ζῶν ἐστι καὶ κινούμενος’).99 John had indeed passed away in March 1237 but Gregory, writing in May, had not yet been informed of his death.100 Vatatzes’s letter is very important for the way it reveals the Byzantines’ attitude and perception of crusading in a period that it was actually and increasingly implemented against them. Commenting on the pope’s warning that the cross had been preached and a new crusading army had gathered, Vatatzes replied ironically that he was overjoyed, since he hoped that the avengers of the Holy Land would start their revenge from our homeland, inflicting just punishment on the conquerors [of Constantinople], as desecrators of churches, defilers of holy vessels, and perpetrators of all kinds of impious crimes against Christians.101

Vatatzes had already reproached the pope, faking disbelief that he had approved and justified the ‘predatory plans and actions, and the thieving and murderous occupation of Constantinople by the Latins, who attacked us with such cruelty that not even the Ishmaelites had displayed when they fell upon the lands of Syria and Phoenicia’.102 It is not surprising that the experience of the Fourth Crusade loomed so large in the thoughts of the sovereign of a state that was created by the refugees of Constantinople, a state which considered itself exiled and which had as its professed raison d’être the re-establishment of the empire against the usurping Latins.103 What is striking is the ironic dismissal of this crusade against the Greeks, both on account of the negligible results it might have (Vatatzes says that he will not even comment ‘what useful thing [the pope] hopes to achieve with 99 

Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, pp. 376–77. Grumel, ‘L’Authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès’, pp. 457–58. 101  Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, p. 376: ‘ὅτι οἱ τῶν ἁγίων τόπων οὗτοι ἐκδικηταὶ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἄρξονται πατρίδος τῆς τοιαύτης ἐκδικίας, καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλωτιστὰς αὐτῆς ἐνδίκῳ καθυποβαλοῦσι τιμωρίᾳ ὡς βεβηλώσαντας ἁγίους οἴκους, ὡς τοῖς θείοις σκεύεσιν ἐνυβρίσαντας, ὡς πᾶσαν ἀνοσιουργίαν επιδειξαμένους κατὰ χριστιανῶν’. 102  Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, p. 375: ‘τὴν ἄδικον καὶ πλεονεκτικὴν […] γνώμην καὶ χεῖρα, καὶ τὴν λῃστρικὴν καὶ μιαιφόνον κατασχεσιν […], μεθ’ ἧς ἀρχῆθεν οἱ Λατῖνοι τῇ τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου πόλει παρειςεφθάρησαν, καὶ μετὰ τόσης τῆς ὠμότητος ἡμῖν ἐπεστράτευσαν, ὁπόσης οὐδὲ οἱ ἐξ Ἰσμαὴλ τοῖς τῆς Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης μέρεσιν ἐπῆλθον’. 103  See Ahrweiler, L’Idéologie politique de l’empire byzantin, pp. 101–14 (esp. pp. 106, 108– 12); Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile, pp. 13–14, 27–33, esp. p. 29; Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea, pp. 5–7; Angelov, ‘Byzantine Ideological Reactions to the Latin Conquest of Constantinople’, pp. 296–302, 310. 100 

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 111

such plans and proclamations’) and on the grounds that it constitutes ‘an affront to the Holy Land and games at the expense of the cross’ (‘τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἁγίων τόπων εἰρωνείαν, καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοῦ σταυροῦ παίγνια’), being merely a cover for greed for money and power.104 Vatatzes seems thus to be aware of and familiarized with what the crusade was supposed to stand for, as the terminology he employed also confirms: for example, ‘the preaching of the cross’ (‘τὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ κήρυγμα’), crucesignati (σταυροφόρους), ‘to avenge the Holy Land’ (‘εἰς ἐκδίκησην τῆς Ἁγίας Γῆς’). Consequently, he was also aware of the criticism that could be directed towards it when it was turned against other Christians, as was the case with the expedition that Gregory had alluded to. In good Byzantine tradition, he concluded by denouncing the whole enterprise as a false pretext for western aggression and avarice. Similar views on western crusading activity had been repeatedly expressed in the twelfth century, by Anna Komnene, John Kinnamos, and other Byzantine authors.105 Whatever faith Gregory put in the willingness of Asen to assist the Latin Empire and whether he hoped that threats and admonitions would deter Vatatzes from continuing his onslaught against Constantinople, the preparations for the crusade intensified with an underlying sense of urgency from the last months of 1237 onwards. One of the main concerns of the pope was to raise adequate funds for the expedition. Several of his letters reveal this preoccupation and the resources he was trying to tap into for the Latin Empire: legacies and beneficia of canons, money from ‘Jewish usury’ confiscated by the French king, and mostly the insistent instructions to papal agents in France and England for the collection of money from the redemption of crusading vows, donations, legacies, and taxation of ecclesiastical property.106 A considerable part of those resources, and particularly the proceeds from the provinces of Brittany, Poitou, and Anjou, was earmarked for Peter of Dreux.107 Count John of Mâcon, Peter’s brother, was also added to the list of crusading nobles to be helped by such funds in order to provide assistance for Constantinople.108 104 

Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, p. 376 See, for example, Kolia-Dermitzaki, ‘Die Kreuzfahrer und die Kreuzzüge im Sprach­ gebrauch der Byzantiner’, esp. pp. 170, 179, 184–88; Kolia-Dermitzaki, Συνάντηση Ανατολής και Δύσης στα εδάφη της Αυτοκρατορίας, esp. pp. 30–54; Gounaridis, ‘L’Image de l’autre’, pp. 81–83. 106  For example, Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3737, 3899, 3903, 3907, 3936, 3944–45, 4025–26; Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, p. 434. 107  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4025–26 (8 January 1238). 108  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3907 (20 October 1237). John was granted the funds from vow redemptions in his lands, and also in the cities and dioceses of Lyon, 105 

112

Chapter 3

The pope was anxious for the crusaders to set out. In his orders to both the Dominicans and the secular clergy concerning the preaching of the cross, the recruitment of new crusaders, and the commutation of vows, there is a note of desperation evidenced by the extension of the indulgences offered to the audiences of crusade sermons for the Latin Empire (from twenty to forty days) and a wider set of privileges for the crusaders.109 The need for speedy actions was emphasized and the crusaders were to be reminded that they should depart the following March.110 The call for the crusade was indeed widely spread and well organized, as the activity of the local clergy, the mendicant friars, and the appointed papal agents was coordinated across England and France. In France the call was addressed to the provinces of Paris, Bordeaux, Anjou, Brittany, and Poitou, and the papal agent was the Dominican William of Oleron. The call to England was issued throughout the kingdom and the papal agents were the bishop of Winchester and the bishop-elect of Valence.111 Gregory’s anxiety was justified, for, despite his efforts and organization, not everyone seemed to agree with his crusading policy, as is evident by papal prohibitions, under pain of ecclesiastical censure, for crusaders to set out for the Holy Land before the set date ‘for fear of the commutation or redemption of their vows’ (‘alios qui, metu commutationis vel redemptionis votorum, ante generale passagium iter arripiunt transmarinum’). This is evidence of the resistance to enforced vow redemptions in general, as well as of the unwillingness of some crusaders to be diverted towards Frankish Greece.112 Notwithstanding his anxiety for the crusade to make its way to the East on time, however, Gregory granted Baldwin the right to postpone his departure from March to August 1238, ‘since his presence in France was beneficial for his cause’.113 The pope would soon allow other crusaders to move their deparMâcon, and Chalon-sur-Saône, except from the lands of nobles signed with the cross for the Holy Land. 109  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3937 (30 October 1237): the archbishop of Bordeaux was authorized to offer indulgences up to forty days, as he deemed expedient (‘prout expedire videris’). 110  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3936–37, 3941; these calls were modelled on the bull Ad subveniendum imperio (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3395). 111  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3936–37, 3941, 3944–46. 112  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3945 (9 November 1237). 113  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3938–40 (31 October 1237) — that is, just one day after his orders to the Dominican prior of Paris to compel the crusaders to set out the following March (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3936).

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 113

ture to August. The new delay seems to have been agreed upon to accommodate the count of Brittany, who still figured as the leader of the coming campaign.114 On 12 January 1238, in a move indicative of Gregory’s hopes for the help that the count would offer, as well as of his fears regarding the inadequacy of funds, he asked Peter to decrease the number of the forces he was to take with him, from two thousand knights and ten thousand foot-soldiers to fifteen hundred knights and six thousand foot-soldiers.115 At the same time, the pope instructed the bishops of Sées and Le Mans (both of whom were supposed to join the expedition) to collect all the crusade funds for the Latin Empire and send him the relevant information, so that he might decide how to put this money into use.116 Monetary requests were, naturally, addressed to the Latins in Romania as well, where (with reference to the arrival of the count of Brittany) the clergy of the Morea was asked to pay one third of their revenues and property for the support of Constantinople. The count of Cephalonia and Zakynthos, Maio Orsini, was asked to offer similar financial support and to rush personally with his warriors to the help of the empire. Indulgences ‘as for the Holy Land’ were granted to contributors in both cases.117 Meanwhile, things came to a head with John Asen who withdrew from the alliance with the papacy and once more joined forces with Vatatzes.118 Gregory promptly ordered for a crusade to be preached against him in Hungary, invoking again the argument of heresy, which Asen was allegedly supporting and fostering. King Béla was called to fight for ‘the propagation of the faith, the preservation of

114 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4012, 4025–26. For the leadership of Peter of Brittany see also Gregory’s letter to the Latin clergy of Romania in January 1238 (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4035): ‘when the nobleman [Peter], count of Brittany, according to our instructions, arrives with a great force of knights and other warriors to assist the empire of Constantinople’ (‘cum nobilis vir […] comes Britannie de mandato nostro ad succurrendum imperio Constantinopolitano se cum grandi exfortio militum et alliorum bellatorum accinxerit’). 115  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4027. 116  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4028–29. Both bishops were to depart for the Latin Empire: the bishop of Le Mans had been appointed to act as papal legate with the army (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 3941), while the crusader bishop of Sées would accompany Peter of Brittany (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4010–12). 117  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4035–36 (18 January 1238); Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 64–65. 118  Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 180; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 220–21.

114

Chapter 3

ecclesiastical liberty, and the defence of the Christian religion’.119 Gregory urged Béla to undertake the crusade, granting him the plenary indulgence and ceding to him the ‘infected with heretical wickedness’ (‘haeretica pravitate infectam’) land of Asen, since, according to the provisions of the Fourth Lateran Council, a sovereign could be deposed and replaced if he was unable to rid his lands of heresy.120 The pope ordered for the crusade to be preached all over Hungary, with the participants enjoying the full crusading indulgence and privileges.121 Gregory obviously tailored his arguments and justification for the campaign according to the recipients of his letters, like Honorius III, who had done the same. It is noteworthy that in this call to the Hungarian king, warriors, and clergy Gregory made no reference to the help this would afford to the Holy Land or even to the Latin Empire. His argumentation was obviously attuned to the interests of Béla, so the pope concentrated on the accusation of heresy and the corresponding cession of Bulgarian lands.122 However, when the pope contacted Baldwin on the same issue, asking him to resign from any claims he had on the lands of Asen and entrust them to the decision of the papacy, Gregory did present Béla’s campaign as the only hope for the Latin Empire.123 Furthermore, in the letters to the French clergy calling them to preach the cross for the Latin Empire in March 1238, unlike the call to Hungary, it was the argument of the help to the Holy Land which was used rather than that of heresy.124 The crusade against Asen might have briefly distracted the attention of the papacy and diverted the Hungarian resources away from the crusade against Vatatzes, but the pope would soon resume his efforts to get this campaign under way. Besides, the two projects were parallel and to be pursued in conjunction with 119 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4056 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 159–60, no. 283): ‘ut per te fides catholica propagetur, conservetur libertas ecclesiastica, et defendatur religio Christiana’. 120  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4056 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 159–60, no. 283). For the Fourth Lateran Council’s provisions on heresy, see Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 233–35. For the crusade against Asen, see also Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 132–33, 139–40, 143–45, 148, 156–57. 121  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4058–64 (27 January 1238); Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, nos 285–86. 122  See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 85–86. 123  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4057 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 160–61, no. 284). 124  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4209–17; Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, p. 308.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 115

each other as their common aim was the relief of Constantinople. In early 1238, the papacy launched a major effort to provide the expedition to Constantinople with the necessary manpower and funding. At that time England was in an uproar because of the struggle between King Henry III and his barons. Gregory had to write repeatedly to Richard of Cornwall, Henry’s brother and heir presumptive, and other English crusaders urging them to postpone their departure for the Holy Land, since their presence was needed at home.125 This situation most probably explains the lack of English involvement at that stage of preparations for the Constantinopolitan crusade, so France bore the brunt of the mobilization. No other crusade for Frankish Greece had been organized in such a scale before. Orders for the preaching of the crusade were given to the archbishops of Vienne (who was also the papal legate), Lyon, Besançon, Bourges, and the bishops of Cambrai, Toul, Metz, Liège, and Verdun. Those who took the cross against Vatatzes, ‘the enemy of God and Church’ (‘Dei et ecclesie inimicus’) or made a corresponding monetary contribution to that aim would receive the same indulgence as for the Holy Land.126 The Dominicans were similarly commissioned to preach the cross throughout France, granting the plenary indulgence to all the recruits who would either take new crusade vows for Constantinople or commute any previous ones towards that aim. Further crusading privileges, namely the protection of their family and property, were also extended to the crusaders for Frankish Greece. The friars, who would themselves receive the indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’ for their services, had to make sure that all the vows would be fulfilled at the time of the coming crusade.127 Gregory also tried to make sure that more nobles would participate in the crusade, either by facilitating the commutation of their vow, as was the case for Humbert V, lord of Beaujeu,128 or by threatening punishment if it was not fulfilled, as in the case of Count John II of Soissons.129 Humbert of Beaujeu was famous for his participation in the Albigensian Crusade, which had earned him a reputation as ‘the hammer of Languedoc’.130 His great expenditure in that affair was one of the reasons Gregory 125 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4094–96 (February 1238) and 4268 (April 1238); see also Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, p. 482; Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, pp. 32–39. 126  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4209–17 (22 March 1238); full text in Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, Appendix, no. 13, pp. 308–09. 127  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4206. 128  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4219 (29 March 1238). 129  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4315 (4 May 1238). 130  See, for example, Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 187, 168–69.

116

Chapter 3

invoked in his requests to French clergy to provide Humbert with financial aid for his expedition to Constantinople.131 John of Soissons, on the other hand, was ordered to fulfill under pain of excommunication and interdict the vow he had taken the previous year to join Peter of Dreux in helping the Latin Empire. As far as funding was concerned, Gregory issued orders to William of Cordelle to make sure that money from vow redemptions in Reims was given to Count Henry of Bar-le-Duc, who was to lead a hundred knights ‘either to the help of the Holy Land or to the empire of Constantinople’ (‘in subsidium Terre Sancte vel Imperii Constantinopolitani’).132 Similar orders were given to the archbishop of Lyon, who was asked to provide the count of Mâcon, who had already taken the cross for Constantinople, with four thousand Parisian livres from bequests and donations for the Holy Land or the Latin Empire.133 More money confiscated from the Jews by the French crown was channelled to the Latin Empire.134 The count of Brittany was apparently still expected to lead the crusade to Romania: one third of the money that had been gathered in north-western France (in Normandy, Brittany, Poitou, Anjou, and Maine) through vow redemptions, bequests, and donations was to be given to him. The rest would be carried and administered by the prelates themselves upon their arrival at Constantinople.135 On 12 March 1238, the pope contacted both Frederick II and Béla IV concerning the impending crusade, asking them to provide safe passage to the troops when they reached their lands. The argument of action against heresy and those who foster it featured prominently: in the letter to the Hungarian king the spread of heresy was listed alongside the help to the Holy Land; in the one to Frederick it was the only justification that was offered. Gregory told Béla that he called the crusade ‘because through the preservation of the [Latin] empire a door was seen to be opened for the recovery of the Holy Land, and the retention of the former is the restoration of the latter’, while the faithful set out ‘especially in order to overthrow the heretics, by whom nearly all of Greece is infected’.136 Frederick, on the other hand, was urged to assist the crusaders who ‘having taken the life-giving 131 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4631–33, 4662–67. Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4105–06 (6 February 1238). 133  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4204 (26 March 1238). 134  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4205. 135  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4265–66, 4316 (April-May 1238). 136  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4155 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 162, no.  288): ‘quod per conservationem ipsius imperii ad recuperationem terre sancte apperiri ianua videbatur, huiusque retentio restauratio est illius […] presertim propter hereticos profligandos, quibus pene tota Grecia est corrupta’. 132 

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 117

sign of the cross against the aforementioned schismatics and heretics, according to our admonition, have courageously prepared themselves for the help of that empire’.137 The co-operation of the Holy Roman Emperor was hardly guaranteed. Less than a week later, the papal curia drafted a second letter to Frederick regarding the safe-conduct for the crusaders setting out ‘against Vatatzes and his supporters’ (‘contra dictum Vatacium et eius fautores’). 138 This letter was more extensive and even more forceful regarding the need for the suppression of Greek heresy. The pope reminded the emperor of the failed earlier attempts for Church Union, and argued that it was more for the protection of the catholic faith in the East than for the protection of the Latin Empire that this expedition was organized.139 The pope was probably hoping that such an argumentation would be helpful in the case of Frederick who was rather hostile to the Latin Empire, especially while it was under the rule of John of Brienne, but was sensitive to the issue of heresy which he viewed as a challenge to his authority, as was shown by his measures against the Cathars in the Sicilian Regno (in the Constitutions of Melfi), in Lombardy, and generally in the imperial territories.140 This time, Gregory also warned Frederick that it would be to the detriment of his soul and reputation if he chose to impede the crusade (something that seemed likely); the pope added (rather ominously) that the Church was not going to take lightly such actions against the faith: Truly, since, as we have come to understand, you intractably obstruct our requests, we think that Your Imperial Highness should be urged and admonished (even more diligently, as this is the second time) to allow free and safe passage through your land and your empire to the crusaders who go to assist the city of Constantinople; and you should prudently consider that by refusing their passage in this way, you 137 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4154 (= Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v.1, 180–81): ‘ad commonitionem nostram assumpto vivifice crucis signo se contra predictos scismaticos et hereticos in eiusdem imperii subsidium magnanimiter accinxerunt’); see Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 168b. 138  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4110 (= Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v.1, 181–83), (17 March 1238). 139  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4110 (= Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v.1, 181–83): ‘non tam pro subsidio Constantinopolitani imperii, quam pro corroboranda et defendenda fide catholica in partibus Orientis’. See Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, p. 283; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 73, note 91. 140  For Frederick’s stance towards heresy see, for example, Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 155, 211–13, 292–93; Weiler, ‘Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land’, pp. 195–96, 203.

118

Chapter 3

will incur a detriment to your soul before God, and to your reputation before people, as you will be seen to favour the aforementioned schismatics in their error. Besides, you should know that the Church cannot close its eyes and pass over any attempts made to damage the catholic faith.141

Gregory had good reason to be concerned about the emperor’s stance. Involved in the struggle against the Lombard League, a long-standing ally of the papacy, Frederick was not likely to be favourably impressed by the pope’s overtures. On the contrary, he was about to enter a period of closer co-operation with the Greeks and to conclude an alliance with Vatatzes. In 1238, while Nicaean troops fought alongside the imperial forces at the siege of Brescia,142 Frederick impeded the passage of crusaders for the Latin Empire through his territories, holding their leader John of Béthune hostage, an action which probably prompted Gregory’s second letter in March. John of Béthune died soon after his release while on his way to Venice, and the greatest part of the host dispersed except for some who sailed from Venice and joined Geoffrey II of Achaia. 143 Meanwhile, the emperor’s fight against the Lombards and the resulting tension with the papacy would finally, in 1239, lead to the collapse of the fragile peace treaty of San Germano (1230). A crusade was subsequently preached against Frederick which introduced a period of unrelenting and bitter confrontation between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen.144 In any case, the crusade against Vatatzes was, apparently, postponed once again. Except for a vague admonition to Queen Blanche to provide ‘counsel and aid’ 141 

Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v.1, 181–83: ‘Verum, cum, sicut intelleximus, precibus nostris obicem difficultatis opponas, imperialem celsitudinem, sicut iterum, sic attentius rogandam duximus et monendam quatenus, prudenter attendens quod, hujusmodi denegando transitum, apud Deum anime ac apud homines fame tue, eo quod dictos scismaticos in suo videreris errore fovere, incurreres detrimentum, crucesignatis Constantinopolitane civitati succurentibus per terram prefatam et imperium transitum concedas liberum et securum. Alioquin scire te convenit quod Ecclesia non posset coniventibus oculis pertransire quod in subversionem fidei catholice contingeret attemptari.’ 142  Annales Placentini Gibellini, ed. by Pertz, p.  479; Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, pp.  283–84; Merendino, ‘Federico II e Giovanni III Vatatzes’, p.  372; Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II., p. 137. 143  Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 626, 632–34; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 179–80; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 150–51, and especially p. 224, note 13; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 221. 144  Abulafia, Frederick II, pp.  313–20, 340–428; Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 73–135.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 119

(‘consilium et auxilium’) to the Latin Empire,145 Gregory’s actions for Romania during the summer of 1238 were confined to promoting the crusade against Asen in Hungary.146 Béla had responded earlier that summer to Gregory’s call for a campaign against the Bulgarian tsar, stressing the difficulties of such a venture. Nevertheless, the Hungarian king proclaimed his willingness to embark on the effort as long as the pope acceded to some of his requests, ‘without which it might not be possible to undertake such a difficult work in a suitable manner’ (‘nostris peticionibus, sine quibus opus tam difficile commode aggredi non possemus’). Béla’s requests were very far-reaching, as he essentially demanded a free hand in controlling the Bulgarian lands and their ecclesiastical reorganization after the conquest, as well as to be released from the Oath of Bereg which regulated the privileges of the Hungarian clergy and prohibited non-Christians from assuming governmental positions within the Hungarian kingdom.147 The pope satisfied most of Béla’s demands, which clearly showed the importance of the planned expedition. The Hungarian army was permitted to use the symbol of the cross in its fight against the schismatics and heretics.148 All crusading privileges, including the indulgence and the protection of crusaders and their lands, were granted to the Hungarian king, along with the concession of Asen’s lands and the right to organize their ecclesiastical administration and hierarchy through a legate of his choice.149 The prelates of Hungary, the mendicants (both Dominicans and Franciscans), as well as the papal legate were all asked to support the affair and help with the preaching, the commutation of vows, the recruitment, and the other organizational aspects of the campaign.150 It seems, however, that even after receiving such concessions Béla hesitated to take action, and when he eventually 145 

Layettes de trésor des chartes, ed. by Teulet, ii, 384, no. 2729 (20 July 1238). For an illuminating analysis of the negotiations and their Hungarian background, see Lower, ‘Negotiating Interfaith Relations in Eastern Christendom’; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 74–92, esp. pp. 77–90; see Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 171. 147  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 170–72, no. 308 (misdated 7 June 1239, instead of 8 June 1238). For the Oath of Bereg, see Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 79–80, 88–89; Berend, At the Gate of Christendom, pp. 158–60. 148  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4489–90 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 164–65, nos 293–94), (8–9 August 1238). 149  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos  4482–83, 4486, 4487 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 165–67, nos 295–98). 150  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4483–85, 4488, 4490; Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 167, no. 299. 146 

120

Chapter 3

replied after several months, he avoided committing himself.151 In any case, the devastating Mongol invasions soon overran Hungary and most of Eastern Europe, making it completely impracticable for the expedition to take place.152

5. Baldwin’s Crusade (November 1238–1239/40) In September 1238 Pope Gregory was still trying to raise funds for Peter of Dreux and his expedition to Constantinople, while it seems that there was opposition to (and efforts to evade) papal requests in both the West and Romania.153 Despite the papal efforts and concessions, this project for Frankish Greece foundered, since Peter eventually chose to set out for the Holy Land. His example was followed by others, such as the counts of Soissons and Mâcon.154 So by late November 1238, Gregory seems to have formulated a new plan for the coming crusade. Letters were dispatched to the royalty of England and France. The recipients (Louis IX of France, his mother Queen Blanche, Henry III of England, and his brother Richard of Cornwall) were asked to approach the prelates of their realms ‘secretly and individually, starting with those who are connected to you with especially close friendship’, and convince them to donate 151 

See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 90–91. The reasons for the king’s vacillation should probably be sought in the kingdom’s internal instability, especially in the early years of his reign; in his attempt to secure the best possible deal from the papacy; and perhaps in the fact that he was related to both Vatazes and Asen by marriage. Another reason could be the growing rumours of the Mongol menace in this period, which, however, were mostly met with complacency at this point: see Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 60–62. 152  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 221; Richard, The Crusades, pp. 332–34; Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 230–33. For the Mongol invasion of 1241–42 in general, see Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 58–75. 153  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4522, 4527, 4546–47. Peter Dreux, former count of Brittany, was obviously still stipulated as the leader of the Constantinopolitan campaign in September 1238, since crusading funds were assigned to him for that purpose in Tours and in Rouen. Therefore references to him do not stop at May 1238 — nor do references to the crusade for Constantinople start again on 5 July 1239 — as stated by Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, pp. 467–68; it is only in November 1238 that references to the crusade do not include the count’s name and Baldwin appears to assume a leading role in the preparations for the coming expedition. For the difficulties in collecting funds see Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4527, 4546; see also Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 121, and Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, p. 106. 154  See Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, pp. 105–06; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 123– 24. For Peter’s exploits in the Holy Land, see Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 167–69, 175; Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, pp. 110–17.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 121

a thirtieth of their revenues for a period of three years.155 Both the fact that the pope ‘delegated’ the kings to convince the clergy and that he suggested to them not to announce it publicly, constitute clear evidence of strong opposition to papal requests for the help of the Latin Empire and for further crusade taxation. The arguments invoked for this subvention were along the lines established in 1236: a possible reconquest of Constantinople by the Greeks would bring the Eastern Church back into schism, it would be detrimental to the Holy Land, and it would result in the spread of heresy and constitute a threat for the Latins living in the East. The same orders were forwarded to the papal legate in England, Cardinal Deacon Otto of St Nicholas in Carcere Tuliano, and to the heads of the Dominican houses in France and England, while indulgences were granted to all those who would make contributions.156 On 1 December 1238 the archbishops of France and England (Rouen, Reims, Sens, Lyon, Bordeaux, Bourges, York, and Canterbury) also received directions to deal with the prelates of their provinces concerning the same affair, that is, the thirtieth.157 The situation was now smoother in England, and so the kingdom was available to contribute to the affair of Frankish Greece.158 Nevertheless, Richard of Cornwall was once again advised to set aside his crusade plans for the Holy Land because his presence was needed in England and was instead urged to redeem his vow and send to the Latin Empire the amount of money he would have otherwise spent if he had gone to Outremer.159 According to the new instructions, the crusade was now set to depart in March 1239 and the Dominicans of France were ordered to compel those who had taken or commuted their vows for the Latin Empire to fulfil them at the time of the passagium.160 Similarly the bishop of Sées was instructed to compel those who were unsuitable for military service to redeem their vows when the crusaders were set 155 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4605–08: ‘quatenus secreto et singillatim apud prelatos regni tui, et primo apud eos qui familiaritate speciali sublimitati regie sunt astricti’. 156  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4610, 4619–21. 157  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4611–18; Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 194–96. 158  Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, pp. 35–40. 159  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4608–09 (25 November 1238); Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, p. 482; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 129–48 (esp. pp. 136–37); Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, pp. 38–39; Chrissis, ‘A Diversion that Never Was’, pp. 140–42. 160  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4621–24; Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 167–68, no. 300 (26 November 1238).

122

Chapter 3

to assemble.161 Furthermore, Gregory contacted Duke Coloman of Slavonia to ask him to provide safe passage and assistance to Baldwin, the ‘heir of the empire of Romania and count of Namur’, and to those who would come with him. The pope admitted that the Lord had castigated the Latin Empire, but expressed the hope that His favour would soon return, when the crusaders came to the empire’s help in the coming year.162 Venice was asked not only to provide help in the forthcoming expedition but also to help preserve the empire in the meantime, in exchange for the same indulgence as that granted for the Holy Land.163 Now set to lead the campaign, Baldwin was taken under the protection of the Church and was awarded further privileges. 164 Funds collected in France and the British Isles for the help of the Latin Empire were to be given to him either immediately or once he had arrived in Romania.165 There was no further mention of Peter of Dreux, and the count of Bar-le-Duc among others appears to have also withdrawn. However, some French nobles would evidently join Baldwin’s expedition. Prominent among them was Humbert of Beaujeu, who now enjoyed additional papal support in the form of funding and privileges.166 The Annals of Erfurt confirm that the papal call had met with some success, by reporting the commutation of the vows of about two thousand French crusaders towards the Latin Empire. According to the same source Baldwin (called Theo­ 161 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4635 (4 December 1238). Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 167–68, no. 300. The pope reminded Coloman that those who would help the empire would receive the same plenary indulgence as for the Holy Land. 163  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4624. 164  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4623, 4625, 4634, 4671 (November – December 1238). 165  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4635, 4641, 4672–87. Baldwin was granted money coming from vow redemptions, bequests to the Holy Land, and the confiscation of ‘Jewish usury’, in France (from the provinces of Sens, Vienne, Reims, Rouen, Lyon, Tours, Bordeaux, Bourges, Besançon, and the dioceses of Metz, Cambrai, Verdun, Toul) and in the British Isles (instructions to the archbishops of Canterbury, York, and Dublin). 166  Humbert was given funding from vow redemptions in his own lands and in the dioceses of Mâcon, Lyon, Clermont, Genève, and Belley: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4219, 4631–33, 4627, 4662–67; protection of his widowed mother Sibilla: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4644–45. The other nobles to participate in the crusade to the Latin Empire included Robert of Tanlay, Thomas of Marle, William of Cayeux, Josseran of Brancion, and the castellan of Beaumetz: see Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4626, 4628; and Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 181–82. 162 

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 123

baldus, rex Grecorum in the text) visited Germany in 1239, where he was honourably received at Wiesbaden by Archbishop Siegfried III of Mainz, who was acting as regent for Frederick’s son, Conrad IV, king of the Romans. Baldwin was apparently on his way to Constantinople, but it is possible that he tried to publicize his expedition and raise additional support for it while he was in Germany, since it was in the context of his visit that the chronicler referred to the vow-commutation of French crusaders and reported that the schismatics in the empire of Constantinople were flagrantly disobeying the emperor and the Holy Roman Church.167 While in France, Baldwin tried to procure additional funds for his expedition. He effectively sold the Crown of Thorns, one of the most famous relics of Constantinople, to Louis IX.168 Then, after settling his affairs in Namur, including the sale of some of his lands, he pawned the whole county to the French king for fifty thousand Parisian livres.169 The pope offered continuous support to the Latin Empire and Baldwin’s crusade preparations in 1239. In January he repeated for a second year the request to the clergy of Frankish Greece to provide one third of its revenues for the defence of Constantinople. In his letter to the prelates of the Morea, the pope mentioned the dispatch of two forces for the relief of Romania, one to depart immediately from France and one following soon afterwards under Baldwin himself: Having recently sent to France our venerable brother, the bishop of Anagni, in order to prepare aid for the Latin empire, we propose to send shortly a suitable multitude of knights and other warriors to the lands of Romania and to subsequently direct, God permitting, another one with our beloved son, the nobleman Baldwin, heir of the aforementioned empire.170 167 

Annales Erphordenses, ed. by Pertz, p. 33 (the entry is under the year 1239); see Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, pp. 114–15. 168  See, for example, Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, ii, 122–23, nos 61–63; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 127–30, nos 191–97 (with references to sources and bibliography); Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 237–40. 169  ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 131–34, 135– 36, nos 198–201 (esp. 199), 203–06, 209 (late spring/summer 1239). 170  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4711 (23 January 1239): ‘nos, pro eius [i.e., imperii Romanie] preparando succursu transmisso nuper in Franciam venerabili fratre nostro episcopo Anagnino, militum et aliorum etiam bellatorum multitudinem competentem ad Romanie partes in brevi proponimus destinare, aliam cum dilecto filio nobili viro Balduino, herede imperii prelibati, subsequenter, dante Domino, directuri’ (my emphasis).

124

Chapter 3

In October Gregory took Baldwin and his lands under papal protection and made this known across France, so that Baldwin’s property could be preserved, while he was providing help to the empire.171 Persistent papal support for the Latin Empire was, nevertheless, stumbling in the face of growing opposition. A mixture of motives, including resentment of constant crusade taxation and a mistrust for papal crusading ventures against Christian targets at the expense of the Holy Land, coupled with a disinterest in the fate of the Latin Empire, meant that Gregory was soon faced with strong resistance to his plan. In England, both the call for funding in 1237 and the levying of the thirtieth for Constantinople in 1238 were apparently unsuccessful, while Richard of Cornwall not only rejected the papal suggestion to commute his vow, but he furthermore made along with his followers a solemn oath in Northampton (12 November 1239) that they would proceed to the Holy Land and would not allow ‘for their honest vow to be impeded by the objections of the Holy See and be diverted to the spilling of Christian blood in Italy and Greece’ (‘ne per cavillationes Romane Ecclesie honestum votum impediretur, nec ad effusionem sanguinis Christiani vel in Greciam vel in Ytaliam distorqueretur’).172 The pope was forced to accept the choice of the English prince and provide him with funds from vow redemptions, crusading tithes, and Holy Land legacies from England, thus rescinding his previous grant of such resources to the Constantinopolitan crusade.173 It also seems true that ‘most of the great French nobles were unwilling to fight any enemy in the East except the Saracens’.174 Apart from the obvious problem that many of the nobles who had been asked to commute their vows for Constantinople had changed their minds and opted for the Holy Land instead, including Peter of Dreux and Henry of Bar-le-Duc, there was also straightforward criticism of the pope’s crusading policy in Frankish Greece. The preparations for the crusade to the Latin Empire and the repeated 171 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4944–45, 4952–53. Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 620; Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 194–96, 434–35. See Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, pp. 172–73; Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, pp.  38–44 (esp. p.  40); Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, p.  171; Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 174–75; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 91. 173  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4965 (23 November 1239). See Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 139 (who makes the reasonable observation that Gregory’s decision was independent of the Oath of Northampton, of which he could have had no knowledge, since it was taken only a few days earlier). 174  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 222. 172 

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 125

efforts to convince several crusaders to commute their vows to Constantinople seemed to Thibaut and the other leaders of the Holy Land crusade as an impediment to their expedition. Pope Gregory had to reply to their accusations by assuring them that the affair of the Holy Land was close to his heart but it could be achieved only through the preservation of the Latin Empire, which was also crucial for the unity of the Church. Therefore, the crusaders should not be in unrest because of his decision to help Constantinople but rather be prepared to depart for the passagium generale to the Holy Land in the coming feast of St John the Baptist (August 1239).175 The fact that the leadership of a crusade to the Holy Land directly criticized the pope and his crusading policy in Frankish Greece is of particular importance. The myth that it was to the benefit of the Holy Land was apparently wearing thin. The unfavourable circumstances were further aggravated by more pressing problems on the home front for the papacy. In March 1239 the tenuous peace between the pope and the emperor fell apart. In Gregory’s excommunication of Frederick, the emperor’s alleged obstruction to the cause of the Holy Land and of the Latin Empire featured among the recriminations.176 The papacy would be so deeply involved in this struggle from that point onwards that it could hardly afford to press the case for the Latin Empire anymore. In any case, both the crusade of Baldwin and that of Thibaut departed in late summer 1239. Baldwin — and along with him, Humbert of Beaujeu, Thomas of Marles, William of Cayeux, Josseran of Brancion, and others — made his way uneventfully through Germany (thanks to the good services of King Louis IX of France), Hungary, and Bulgaria, where Asen once more changed sides, and arrived at Constantinople, where his coronation took place. In 1240, Baldwin and his crusaders besieged and stormed the important city of Tzurulum in Thrace. This afforded some breathing space for the empire, at a time when Vatatzes was 175 

Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4741 (9 March 1239). The force of the crusade leaders’ criticism is evident by the wording of the papal reply: ‘litteris vestris […] ex earum tenore collegimus […] ammiratione duci non modica’, ‘animos vestros nebula turbationis involvit’, ‘non igitur debent hec esse causa commotionis in vobis’. See also Spence, ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, p. 167; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 178–79. 176  Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v, 288 (20 March 1239): ‘Item exommunicamus et anathematizamus eumdem pro eo quod per ipsum impeditur negotium Terre Sancte et reparatio imperii Romaniae’; Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5092 (7 April 1239): ‘Insuper negotium impedit Terre Sancte nec non etiam imperii Romanie’. For Frederick’s excommunication in general, see Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 313–20; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, pp. 427–41.

126

Chapter 3

finishing off the Latin possessions in Asia Minor.177 Baldwin wrote a triumphant letter to the English king about his success. However, little else was achieved despite the resources at Baldwin’s disposal. According to Akropolites, the army led by Baldwin from the West numbered sixty thousand Franks. Alberic of TroisFontaines mentions seven hundred knights and thirty thousand horse, without counting foot-soldiers. Though both numbers are undoubtedly exaggerated, it does appear that Baldwin was at the head of a considerable force, as he wrote himself to Henry III, even if one accepts Lower’s reasonable counter-arguments.178

6. The End of Gregory’s Efforts for the Latin Empire After the first months of 1239 the number of Gregory’s letters that concern the Latin Empire declines significantly.179 This was in all probability because of his preoccupation with Frederick, as from the spring or at least the autumn of 1239 the crusade against Frederick was preached in France and elsewhere in Europe with warriors and funds being diverted to that aim from other crusading 177 

Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by de Reiffenberg, ii, 661–64, 666–69; Annales Erphordenses, ed. by Pertz, p. 33; for the course of Baldwin’s crusade see also Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 181–82; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 150–57, esp. pp. 155–56. 178  Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, par. 37; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, pp.  946–47. Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 469–70, similarly reports a multitude of crusaders for Romania; see Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 54–55 for Baldwin’s letter to Henry III. See, however, Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 155, who argues against those who accept that Baldwin led a large army to Romania. He points out that three times as many knights went to the Barons’ Crusade as to Constantinople (according to Alberic of Trois Fontaines’ testimony), while only five relatively minor secular lords joined the latter expedition as opposed to ‘well over forty’ for Syria, some of whom were also great princes able to field much larger contingents. But, although the Constantinopolitan crusade was most probably much smaller than the Holy Land one, the evidence cited points nonetheless to a considerable army. 179  In contrast to the torrent of correspondence from the period 1235–38, there are very few letters related in any way to the crusade in Frankish Greece after that point: seven in 1239, nine in 1240, and three in 1241. Most of them have to do with the use of local resources or the protection of Baldwin’s possessions in France. Only a few actively advocate help from the West: two from February-March 1240, addressed to the Dominicans of France and Hungary (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 5075, 5123, the latter being the last call for crusade preaching for the Latin Empire); and a series of letters in October-November 1240, regarding monetary support for the Latin Empire (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 5296, 5302–06). All these letters are discussed below.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 127

fronts.180 Nevertheless, the pope still tried to provide some additional support to Baldwin. On 9 February 1240, he urged Prince Geoffrey of Achaia to commute his crusading vow and, instead of joining Thibaut’s campaign, to help the Latin Empire.181 The Dominicans in France were ordered to gather additional funds for Baldwin.182 Meanwhile, their colleagues in Hungary were instructed to preach the crusade for the help of the Latin Empire for three years, commuting all the vows and donations from the Holy Land to Constantinople.183 It is worth noting that, while in his letter to the French Dominicans the pope stressed his determination to assist the Latin Empire, since ‘its defence is known to be beneficial to the Church’,184 his letter to the Hungarian friars saw the return to the traditional formulation regarding the help to the Holy Land which would be threatened from a possible Greek reconquest.185 The pope also felt it useful to instruct the friars to stress to prospective crusaders that their service to the empire would merit an eternal divine reward.186 This was a rather superfluous statement, since 180  Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 129–35; see also pp. 122–28 for crusade preaching against Frederick in Italy. 181  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4983. 182  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5075 (25 February 1240). 183  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5123 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 175, no. 320), (23 March 1240). Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 90, commenting on this letter talks of ‘emphasis on fundraising’ in order to ‘liquidate what crusade enthusiasm there was’ in Hungary for the help of the Latin Empire. This comment is probably premature, since on this occasion there were actually instructions — for one last time — for the preaching of the cross and commutation of vows. The emphasis on funds would be characteristic of the period from October 1240 onwards (see below). 184  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5075: ‘Desiring with all the disposition of our heart to help the empire of Romania, whose defence is known to be that much more useful to the Church, as much more hurtful its loss might become to it’ (‘Desiderantes toto mentis affectu succursum imperii Romanie, cujus defensio eo utilior Ecclesie noscitur, quo sibi ejusdem ammissio dispendiosior redderetur’). 185  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 175, no.  320: ‘Because through the reinforcement of the empire of Romania help is clearly provided to the Holy Land, it is right to reach forth efficaciously to its aid. […] because, if the Greeks, who seem to abhor the Latins more that the pagans do, might be able to subject the aforementioned empire to themselves, danger will follow for the Holy Land’ (‘Quia per subsidium imperii Romanie terre sancte succursus liquide procurator, oportet, ut ad illius subventionem efficaciter intendamus. […] quia si Greci, qui potius quam pagani videntur abhominari Latinos, prefatum imperium subicere sibi possent, eiusdem terre periculum sequeretur’). 186  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 175, no. 320: ‘induce them, by proposing to them the firm hope that, while they help the Holy Land through the Latin Empire,

128

Chapter 3

the pope went on with the usual formula of granting indulgence and privileges ‘as for the Holy Land’. Arguably, this is another indication that there had been doubts and reactions regarding the papal calls, or at least some reluctance on the part of crusaders to participate in an expedition for Frankish Greece that the pope tried to allay through his preaching instructions which emphasized the reward and insisted on the connection of that venture with the fate of the Holy Land. Furthermore, in both letters, the pope stated that (only) those ‘who are willing’ would commute or redeem their vows. This was a change of policy from his earlier instructions for forced commutations and redemptions, which had met with limited success or downright resistance.187 By October 1240, while Thibaut was returning to the West from the Holy Land and Richard of Cornwall had just landed at Acre,188 Gregory was already making new crusade plans. Writing to the prelates of France, he made mention of the money that had been gathered from the redemption of crusade vows (half of which had already been used for the help of the Latin Empire) and of reports that many crusaders of the kingdom had not fulfilled or redeemed their vows. The French prelates were ordered to make sure that all these crusaders would either set out with the passagium of next March or redeem their vows by that time.189 It appears that Gregory had two parallel expeditions in mind, according to the model of 1239, since he referred to participation in a crusade to ‘either the Holy Land or the Latin empire’.190 But the emphasis was on monetary subsidies, which they will obtain from the Lord an eternal recompense’ (‘inducas, eis spe firma proposita, quod dum in eodem imperio terre predicte subveniunt, eternum a domino premium obtinebunt’). 187  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5075: ‘crucesignatos omnes in imperii prefati subsidium, qui voluerint redimere vota sua’; Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 175, no. 320: ‘vota crucesignatorum et aliorum, qui bellatores vel aliud congruum subsidium in prefatam terram transmittere promiserunt, dum tamen ad id consentiant, in succursum Imperii prefati commutans’ (my emphasis). 188  The count of Champagne departed in September 1240, leaving both the treaty negotiations with Egypt and the rebuilding of Ascalon incomplete. The earl of Cornwall arrived at Acre on 8 October. Richard was more successful, if only for completing the two tasks left unfinished by Thibaut: see Painter, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, pp. 483–85. For a more positive assessment, see Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 158–77 (esp. pp. 173–77). 189  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 5296 and 5302–05 (October-November 1240); Registra Vaticana MSS, xx, fol. 29v, epist. 164–66. 190  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 5296 and 5302–05 (October-November 1240): ‘ut in Terre predicte vel Imperii prefati subsidium in proximo passagio martii transire procurent’.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 129

were solely intended for the latter of the two. The argument for the subventions was again the usefulness of the empire ‘for the liberation of the Holy Land, for which much catholic blood has been spilt’ (‘ex liberatione Constantinopolitani imperii Terra Sancta, pro qua multus sanguis extitit catholicorum effusus, facilius poterat liberari’). Gregory’s call for contributions and vow redemptions for the Latin Empire covered the whole of France and the task of the collection was assigned to the Dominicans with the help of the local secular clergy.191 Gregory tried hard to procure funds for the Latin Empire, to which he diverted almost all the crusading revenues that had remained unused at that period, but he did not ask for any further recruitment of crusaders after March 1240. In October and November there was only a call for the fulfilment of pending vows, which in any case seemed to take second place to vow-redemptions and the collection of funds. And it should be pointed out that it is exactly in that call where the destination for the crusaders is mentioned as being either Constantinople or the Holy Land. The reason behind that seems to be that the idea of crusading in Frankish Greece was proving to be unpopular. The inclusion of the Holy Land might help mitigate the reactions towards another call for the Latin Empire; but the provisions concerning allocation of resources indicate that Constantinople was indeed the main aim of the call. The letters of autumn 1240 serve as a clear illustration of the fact that Gregory’s crusading calls for the Latin Empire had largely gone unheeded or had even been actively resisted. Particularly striking is, for example, the reference to some crusaders who ‘will not take care to redeem or pursue their vows, but rather some of them are said to have rashly cast down the cross from their shoulders’ (‘vota sua redimere seu prosequi non curarint, quin potius quidam ex eis signaculum ipsum ab humeris suis temere abjecisse dicantur’).192 One need only note the repeated instructions to the prelates to compel the crusaders into fulfilling their vows as corroboration of the problematic response. It seems that the only crusaders headed for Constantinople in the early 1240s were the heretics of southern France who were forced by the inquisition to take the cross for the Latin Empire as penance. The surviving register of the inquisitor Peter Seila for the period from May 1241 to April 1242 records the 191  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 5302–03, 5305. The following funds were assigned to the Latin Empire: the whole sum collected from the dioceses of Cambrai, Tournai, and Arras, and half of the sum from the kingdom of France, Metz, Liège, Verdun, and Toul; included were also half of the sums from Rouen, Tours, and Poitou, which had been assigned to the count of Brittany, who ‘had proposed to go to the help of the Latin empire, but changed his mind and had resigned from them’; see Painter, The Scourge of the Clergy, p. 106; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, p. 124; Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, i, 117–18. 192  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5296.

130

Chapter 3

cases of about six hundred heretics in Quercy and the punishments imposed on them: approximately a hundred of them were ordered to serve in Constantinople for a period of between one and eight years.193

7. Conclusions Those were the last crusading activities of Gregory for the Latin Empire in the West, though in 1241 he again requested subsidies to be given by the prelates of Frankish Greece to the help of impoverished Constantinople. The pope could not help expressing his disappointment by adding that there was no one who wanted or was able to offer help: [The Church of Constantinople] was formerly most opulent and the preeminent leader over the neighbouring provinces […] but now, with the empire of Constan­ tinople in turmoil, it is wretchedly and pitiably reduced almost to complete extinc­ tion; and there is no one who wants to or can extend a helping hand.194

There was an anti-climactic end to Gregory’s efforts in Romania. In February 1241 he consulted with Béla IV concerning an initiative of Vatatzes for Church Union. The pope exultantly congratulated the Hungarian king for mediating in the return to the mother Church of Rome of ‘the nobleman Vatatzes, along with his people, his lands, and his clergy and church’.195 Gregory did observe that there had been no concrete details as to the means and the ways in which this ‘return’ would be effected at the time or preserved in the future. Nonetheless he 193 

L’Inquisition en Quercy, ed. by Duvernoy; Segl, ‘“Stabit Constantinopoli”’, esp. pp. 211– 14; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 69–70. 194  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 6035 (29 May 1241), 6089 (18 July 1241): ‘quondam opulentissima et princeps provinciarum adjacentium preminebat, […] nunc, imperio Constantinopolitano turbato, pene usque ad inanitionem extremam misere ac miserabiliter est deducta; nec est qui velit vel valeat subsidii porrigere sibi manum’; see Segl, ‘“Stabit Constantinopoli”’, pp. 216–17 and note 59. 195  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 178, no. 326 (10 February 1241): ‘so that by means of your zeal, the nobleman Vatatzes, with his lands and people, with all his clergy and churches […], who are known to have remained outside the unity of the Roman church, might wish to return humbly to her as to the head and mother of the flock, truly making use of an exceedingly sound counsel’ (‘ut tuo studio mediante nobilis vir Battacius cum terris suis et populis, cleris et ecclesiis universis, qui […] extra unitatem Romanae ecclesie permansisse dinoscitur, ad eam quasi ad caput et matrem ovium sano, quamvis vero usus consilio desideret cum humilitate redire’).

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 131

asked the king to look into the matter and inform the Apostolic See as fully and truthfully as possible, so that the papacy could ‘take the appropriate steps for the honour of the Church and the salvation of [the Greeks’] souls’.196 It was certainly a much different reaction from the previous years, when the pope vehemently condemned the failure of union efforts and proclaimed a crusade against the Greeks and Vatatzes, ‘the enemy of God and Church’.197 No doubt this change was brought about by the failure of papal crusading plans for the Latin Empire, as well as the more pressing need to limit the active crusade fronts and redeploy resources elsewhere. Two days after his letter to Béla, Gregory in fact issued instructions to his legate in Hungary, John of Civitella, to commute Hungarian crusade vows and funds from the Holy Land to the crusade against Frederick, whose army was marching against Rome.198 It would make little difference. Hungary and the whole of Eastern Europe was swept by the Mongol invasion in 1241 and Gregory would have to proclaim a crusade against this new Tartar threat shortly before his death.199 John Asen also died the same year, while Vatatzes offered a two-year truce to the Latin Empire, most probably in order to have a free hand in dealing with the Doukai of Epiros, particularly in Thessalonica. Asen’s death provided an opportunity for the Nicaean emperor to expand his influence and control further to the west in Macedonia.200 Nicaea would find little opposition from the papal curia for the next few years. Pope Gregory’s death on 22 August 1241 marked the end of a period of intense crusading activity in Romania. He had been the first to use the crusade so widely and consistently for the protection of Frankish Greece. However, his 196  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 178, no. 326 (10 February 1241): ‘ut ex tua relatione sufficienter instructi procedamus exinde, prout honori ecclesie ac animarum ipsorum saluti viderimus expedire’. 197  For example, Gregory’s letter to Frederick on 17 March 1238 (Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4110), see above. 198  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5362 (= Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 178, no. 327), (12 February 1241); Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, p. 201; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p. 352; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, p. 186. 199  Spence, ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’, pp. 230–32; Jackson, ‘The Crusade against the Mongols’; Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 65–68. 200  Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp.  222–23; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 183; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 134–39.

132

Chapter 3

efforts had achieved minimal results. His repeated calls bear testimony both to his persistence and to the failure of the undertaking, as crusaders more often than not proved unwilling to set out for the Latin Empire. The choice to organize two parallel expeditions, to Constantinople and to the Holy Land — even if unavoidable on account of the local needs at both fronts — was, in the event, unfortunate. The crusade for the Latin Empire had to compete directly for resources with the one for the Holy Land. Despite persistent papal efforts, Frankish Greece failed to inspire the loyalties of most French nobles, who had traditionally strong crusading bonds with Outremer. English resources were initially unavailable due to domestic turmoil, but even after that point Richard of Cornwall and his compatriots, much like their French counterparts, confirmed their preference for the Holy Land. After all, they had even fewer motives to get involved as, unlike the French, the English had no vested interests or ties of kinship and race with the Latins in Romania. Hungary might have been a more fruitful option on account of proximity, but Béla’s reluctance and other preoccupations hindered Hungarian participation, which in any case became impracticable after the devastation wrought by the Mongol invasion.201 Furthermore, papal calls for funding the crusade in Frankish Greece through taxation of ecclesiastical revenues were universally unpopular among clergy, especially since requests for the Latin Empire were added to those for the Holy Land. Papal crusading policy for the Latin Empire came under fire by the leaders of the crusade for the Holy Land who protested the diversion of resources from Outremer, as seen both in the Oath of Northampton and in the letter of Thibaut and other nobles to Gregory in 1239. Besides such open acts of criticism, response to crusades for Frankish Greece, as we saw, was less than enthusiastic particularly when it came to the commutation or redemption of vows. Time and again, the pope found himself repeating his calls to crusaders to fulfil their vows, often with the threat of ecclesiastical censure. The bishop of Győr resorted to placing under interdict Hungarian crusaders who failed to do so despite repeated admonitions in 1231, 1232, and 1234. Similarly, a group of four hundred French crusaders who had been asked to commute their vows to the Latin Empire in December 1235 had obviously not set out by the end of the following year. The pope felt obliged to repeat his 201 

Béla had other priorities and problems, especially the efforts to impose royal authority over his barons and the issue of the participation of non-Christians in the administration of the kingdom; furthermore, Transylvania and Dalmatia-Bosnia (and in the recent past Halych/ Volhynia) were more crucial for Hungarian interests than was Bulgaria, which could pose more of a challenge: see, for example, Pál, Realm of St Stephen, pp. 88–100; Berend, At the Gate of Christendom, passim.

Gregory IX and the Crusade against John III Vatatzes and John II Asen 133

crusade bull Ad subveniendum imperio of December 1236 a month later with the added incentive of free transport offered by Venice. Gregory did his outmost to mobilize response and convince recruits of the status of the proposed expedition. He had to repeat in even clearer terms that participants would receive exactly the same plenary indulgence and other crusade privileges as those who went to fight for the Holy Land. He also offered indulgences of twenty to forty days to the audiences of crusade sermons for Frankish Greece. Things, however, did not improve much. In November 1237 there were reports of crusaders rushing to depart for the Holy Land before the papal agents had a chance to commute or redeem their vows towards Frankish Greece; by 1240 some crusaders were said to refuse to fulfil their vows and even ‘cast down the cross from their shoulders’. The pope seems to have become progressively more cautious of possible reactions. In November 1238 he advised for a thirtieth to be levied for the Latin Empire in a rather clandestine manner, while in March 1240 he apparently turned to the commutation and redemption of crusade vows on a voluntary rather than compulsory basis.202 A crusade did materialize in 1239 under Baldwin II, but its achievements were inadequate to significantly tip the balance in favour of the Latin Empire. The results hardly seemed to be worth the far-reaching efforts made by the pope. Confronted with a negative reaction to his calls for the help of Constantinople and faced with the much more pressing needs of the conflict against Frederick, the last months of Gregory’s pontificate witnessed a retrenchment of papal policy in Frankish Greece. The defence of the Latin Empire was restricted to local resources, with occasional requests for financial subsidies from the West, while negotiations with Nicaea were considered as an alternative. All these elements would define the policy of Gregory’s successors in Romania, down to the Greek recovery of Constantinople.

202 

See, for example, Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos  657, 774, 1957, 2877, 2909, 3395, 3717–18, 3937, 3945, 4605–08, 5075, 5296; Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, nos 177, 212, 320.

Chapter 4

Retrenchment (1241–61): Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Gradual Abandonment of the Latin Empire

I

n contrast to the pontificate of Gregory IX, the Latin Empire’s most ardent and constant protector, the period 1241–61 would witness a contraction of crusading in Frankish Greece, as it was first confined to mostly local resources and by the end virtually abandoned. The disparity between Gregory’s relentless efforts in the late 1230s and the lack of practically any crusading support on the part of the papacy after 1249 is striking. Even more remarkably, by 1254 the papacy was in negotiations with the empire of Nicaea over Church Union and had provisionally agreed to acquiesce to a possible Greek restoration at Constantinople. The factors which led to that change of policy merit examination. This process was not linear, nor was there a clear and immediate break in papal policy upon Gregory’s death. In sketching the outline of the development of crusading policy in Romania in this period, we should make note of two major but contrasting turning points: the First Council of Lyon in 1245 and the mission of John of Parma to Nicaea in 1249–50. In his early days, Innocent IV (1243–54) followed the trend that had become apparent in the last months of Gregory’s pontificate, that is, entrusting the defence of Latin Romania to local resources (most notably the prince of Achaia and the local Latin hierarchy) and sporadic calls for monetary subventions from the West. Nonetheless, crusading in Frankish Greece gained a new impetus at the Council of Lyon, where concern for the fate of the Latin Empire was pronounced as one of the five

136 Chapter 4

main preoccupations of the papacy and as a duty for all the Christian faithful. As a result, a short-lived reinvigoration of crusading activity for Romania can be traced from late 1245 onwards, which included calls for recruitment but mostly focused on raising funds. A positive response was not forthcoming, however, and since papal priorities lay elsewhere, particularly in the struggle with the Hohenstaufen, that effort was tacitly set aside by 1247. The papacy, then, attempted another approach to the affairs of Romania. In 1249 Church Union negotiations with Nicaea were initiated, following overtures by Emperor John Vatatzes. These negotiations were pursued up to the deaths of both Innocent and Vatatzes in 1254, which prevented the culmination of the procedure. The promising preliminary agreements were taken up by Theodore II and Alexander IV in 1256 but talks eventually failed. Despite their failure, these efforts had important implications for developments in the area. While negotiations for union were conducted, the crusade was effectively abandoned as an instrument of papal policy in Romania. There was only a temporary recourse to it, but it was limited and strictly localized. As a result, and despite its earlier pronouncements of commitment to this ‘godly cause’, the papacy did not lift a finger to help the Latin Empire as the day of reckoning was approaching. It would be only after the fall of Latin Constantinople in 1261 that a generalized crusade would again be called for the affair of Frankish Greece.

1. Continuities and Departures: Key Factors and Themes for the Period 1241–61 For crusading in Frankish Greece to be eventually set aside, it was not its ideological basis, that is, its status as a legitimate and meritorious enterprise, that was challenged but rather its viability. While the former was being affirmed, the latter was undermined by the eventual failure of the crusade to generate adequate support and by the different priorities of the papacy and other powers. In several respects, there was marked continuity between Innocent IV’s policy in Romania and that of his predecessor. Cardinal Sinibald Fieschi, one of Gregory’s earliest choices for the cardinalate, had served for a period as vice-chancellor of the curia.1 By the time he came to the papal throne, the crusade had been well established as the means par excellence through which the Latin Empire could be assisted, while Gregory’s persistent efforts had brought it to the forefront of papal activity and 1 

Watt, ‘The Papacy’, p. 137; see Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 3–4, 226.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

137

concerns. Crusading in Frankish Greece had been constantly promoted by the papacy as a meritorious act in defence of the Faith and the Church, worthy of the plenary indulgence. On the other hand, in Gregory’s later years such activity had undergone a retrenchment as it had stumbled in the face of growing opposition — which, to an extent, was a reaction to the pope’s forceful requests — as well as of the pressing needs of the struggle against Frederick II. Furthermore, the twoyear-long vacancy of the Apostolic See after Gregory’s death resulted in a hiatus of crusading in Frankish Greece until the election of Innocent IV. Innocent’s rhetoric was to continue along the lines of his predecessor’s, even taking the next step of pronouncing — at a general council, no less — that help to Latin Constantinople, ‘that exalted limb of the body of the Church Universal’, was an obligation for all the faithful.2 In practice, nevertheless, with the exception of a relatively brief period in 1245–47 (after the Council of Lyon), the pope limited the scope of his effort to local powers and monetary subventions before effectively withdrawing all crusading support to the Latin Empire. Exemplifying these trends, one of Innocent’s first letters regarding the affairs of Frankish Greece copied verbatim large sections of one of Gregory’s last communications, as it arranged for subsidies to be paid to the patriarch of Constantinople from ecclesiastical revenues in Romania, while making reference to the miserable state of the empire and complaining that no one was able or willing to provide assistance to it.3 Papal policy towards Romania was conditioned by crucial preoccupations on other fronts. By far the most important factor for the period was the struggle with the Hohenstaufen, which soon became an obsession for the papacy. The 1240s were dominated by the clash between Innocent and Frederick II, which culminated in a fierce, all-out war. Frederick was eventually excommunicated and declared deposed in 1245. Furthermore, whatever resources were not absorbed in the war against the emperor, were taken up by the Seventh Crusade, King Louis IX’s ambitious expedition to the Holy Land. Desperately short of resources under the circumstances, the papacy could ill afford to press the case for crusading support for Latin Constantinople too forcefully. The problem was compounded by internal factors. The crusades in Frankish Greece had failed to reverse the fortunes of the increasingly frail Latin Empire. Consequently the papacy saw less and less benefit in deploying valuable crusading resources to what progressively appeared as a lost cause. It would not be long before alternative policies were sought. 2 

See below, Chapter 4.3. Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no.  33, copying extensive sections of Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 6035. 3 

138 Chapter 4

The most radical step in this direction would be taken from 1249 onwards, when union negotiations with the Greek Church were initiated. To an extent, Innocent could again rely on a precedent from the pontificate of Gregory IX, who had held similar talks with the Greeks of Nicaea in 1232–34 and had encouraged Béla IV of Hungary in 1241 to mediate with Vatatzes with regards to the latter’s initiative for Church Union and ‘submission to the Apostolic See’. What constituted a departure from earlier policy, however, was the fact that the issue of sovereignty over Constantinople, and consequently the possibility of a Greek reinstatement there, was actually put on the negotiating table and conditionally accepted by both Innocent IV and Alexander IV. That meant that the papacy was eventually willing to write off the Latin Empire, if its objectives could be met through Church Union. This would also render the deployment of crusade mechanisms in Frankish Greece irrelevant. That is not to say that other motives for unionist negotiations, such as missionary zeal and a sincere desire to restore communion with the Greek Church, were absent on the papal side. But the choice of that specific avenue for the healing of the schism at this juncture was for the greatest part dictated by the pressure of circumstances and the needs of the overall policy of the Apostolic See, and not by an allegedly sympathetic attitude of Innocent IV towards the Greeks. Given that during this period it was not possible for the papacy to maintain a flow of crusading resources from the West towards Romania, the responsibility for the defence of the Latin Empire fell more heavily on the local authorities, whether by papal appointment or on their own initiative.4 Most important were the efforts of Baldwin II and his wife, Mary of Brienne, who were actively involved in advocating crusading support for their empire. The Latin emperor cast his net far and wide. As we will see, he undertook a second trip to the West (1243–48) during which he briefly evolved into an important factor of European politics. He mediated between the pope and Emperor Frederick in 1243–44, and he took the place of honour next to the pope at the First Council of Lyon (1245), before visiting the royal courts of France, England, and Castile. But his efforts at securing tangible support were frustrated and he failed to repeat the achievement of his previous visit to the West, when he managed to return to Constantinople 4  See the papal instructions for the local clergy to raise funds from their own revenues, and for the lay powers (the prince of Achaia, the barons of the empire, and the Venetians) to contribute garrisons for the protection of the empire: Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos  706–07 (May 1244), 5923 (August 1252); Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 34 ( January 1255).

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

139

at the head of a crusading army in 1239–40. Similarly, Mary of Brienne tried unsuccessfully to procure aid for Constantinople from both France and Castile.5

2. Innocent’s Early Attitude to Crusading in Romania: Rhetoric and Reality Papal ability to support the Latin Empire was failing already at the end of Gregory’s pontificate but the problem became more acute during the prolonged vacancy of the Apostolic See. Between August 1241 and June 1243 there was no incumbent on the papal throne, with the exception of the two-week pontificate of Celestine IV. It also happened that at that time other potential allies for the Latin Empire were similarly incapacitated from taking action in Romania. Most importantly Hungary, the nearest catholic power to which the papacy had frequently turned for support of their crusading plans in Romania, was in a state of disarray, already ravaged by the Mongol invasion of 1241 and constantly fearful of further blows from that direction.6 The Mongols accounted for much of the decline in importance of two other counterweights to Nicaean power, on which the Latin emperors had in the past depended: the Seljuks of Rum and the Bulgarians, inconstant allies as they might have proven themselves to be. The Seljuks were decisively defeated by the Mongols at Köse-Dagh in 1243 and the sultanate of Iconium was effectively turned into a Mongol protectorate. The Sultan Kai-Khusrau II, in fact, turned to an alliance with Vatatzes after this defeat.7 John Asen died in 1241, and soon after his death Bulgaria suffered from CumanMongol inroads. Under Asen’s successor, the minor Kaliman (1241–46), the Bulgarian alliance with Nicaea was renewed.8 In the meantime, the power of Nicaea was in the ascendancy as it increased its influence in the Balkans and tightened the stranglehold around Constantinople, 5 

For French crusaders promising Mary to assist the Latin Empire, see Jean de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. by de Wailly, par. 30; for Mary’s sojourn in the French court and the abortive marriage alliance with Castile, see Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 56–71, 80–82. 6  See, for example, Berend, At the Gate of Christendom, pp. 34–38, 163–71; Pál, Realm of St Stephen, pp. 98–107; Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 58–164. 7  Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, pars 40–41; Regesten der Kaiser­ urkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1775; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 137–39; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 61. 8  Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, pars 39–40; Regesten der Kaiser­ urkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1773a; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 64; for the Mongols and Bulgaria, see Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 65 (and note 55), 103 (and note 133).

140 Chapter 4

especially by taking advantage of Bulgarian and Epirote weakness to assert its supremacy in Macedonia. But Vatatzes had to withdraw to Asia Minor before actually taking over Thessalonica or becoming more dangerous to Constantinople, when he received news of the Mongol invasion of Anatolia and the Seljuk defeat at Köse-Dagh. An attack on Constantinople was evidently not a priority for Vatatzes at the time, and in order to have a free hand to deal with his other preoccupations he had agreed to a two-year truce with Baldwin II in 1241, which was then renewed for a year in 1244, with the mediation of Frederick II.9 The respite from Nicaea was bound to be temporary, and the absence of papal protection was a crucial problem for the Latin Empire. Baldwin tried to make up the lack of such support by fostering contact and close ties with the French crown, without, however, any concrete results. Queen Blanche apparently had little more to offer in her correspondence except for the dubious advice that the Latin emperor should avoid using Greeks as his counsellors.10 Realizing that more radical measures were necessary in order to procure help for his realm and having in mind the relative success of his previous trip to the West, Baldwin eventually set out for his second round of visits to the great European courts in 1243, during which he would meet with Pope Innocent, Emperor Frederick, King Louis IX of France, King Henry III of England, and the Infante Alfonso of Castile.11 The lengthy vacancy of the Apostolic See was terminated when, after much delay on account of disturbances caused by Frederick and infighting among the cardinals, a new pope was finally elected in June 1243.12 Innocent IV would have to cope with several pressing issues, most notably the strife against Frederick, but 9  For the truce of 1241 see: Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by SchefferBoichorst, p.  950; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 137–38, no. 212; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1773; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 183. For that of 1244 see Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 299; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 144–45, no. 224; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1781a; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 224. 10  Layettes de trésor des chartes, ed. by Teulet, ii, 518–19, no. 3123; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 140–44, nos 217, 219–22; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 223–24; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 184–85. 11  For an outline of Baldwin’s itinerary, see Longnon, ‘L’Empereur Baudouin II et l’Ordre de Saint Jacques’; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 185–86; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 80–84. 12  For the protracted vacancy and Innocent’s election, see Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 350– 54. Celestine IV had actually been elected pope in October 1241 but died after only two weeks.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

141

from the start of his pontificate he declared his commitment to support the Latin Empire.13 In his pronouncements regarding the empire, the pope presented the preservation of Latin Constantinople as one of the cornerstones of his policy, essential for papal prestige and for the benefit of the Faith and the Church. In a letter written a few days after his election, he noted, we consider carefully the distress of the Apostolic See and the opprobrium to the whole of Christendom and particularly the detriment to ourselves, since our status depends on the aforementioned empire, if (God forbid!) on account of a lack of the necessary things it happens that the honour of the Christian dignity and religion is effaced and the condition of the Latin empire is upset as the catholic defenders retreat from these lands.14

Without such an exalted member, the Church would be ‘deformed like a body missing a limb’, as the pope declared in his letter to Prince Geoffrey II of Achaia and later repeated at the Council of Lyon and in his calls for a crusade to help Constantinople.15 In his rhetoric, Innocent fell back on the same arguments that his predecessors had invoked. He asserted that the Latin Empire was worthy of crusading support 13  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 22 (13 July 1243): ‘For the preservation of the empire of Constantinople […] the Apostolic See should most willingly and diligently direct its eyes with a pious and considerate gaze, and should most generously provide assistance to its needs’ (‘Ad Constantinopolitani conservationem imperii […] libentius et attentius Apostolica Sedes debet circumspectionis sue oculos pia consideratione dirigere suisque necessitatibus liberalius subvenire’). 14  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no.  22 (13 July 1243): ‘consideramus attente confusionis [sic] Apostolice Sedis et totius Christianitatis opprobrium ac nostrum precipue detrimentum, cum status noster ab imperio dependeat memorato, si (quod absit) pro necessariorum defectu Christiane dignitatis et religionis honerem, recedente catholico defensore de illis partibus, aboleri contingeret et prefati statum imperii immutari’ (my emphasis); see Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 6829 (2 July 1253): ‘through the assistance to the aforementioned empire, the catholic faith and the increase of ecclesiastical liberty are particularly taken care of ’ (‘per imperii prefati succursum catholice fidei et ecclesiastice libertatis augmentum specialiter procurantur’). 15  Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 12 (= Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 706), (16 May 1244): ‘The loss of such a noble limb of the body of the Church, namely of the [Latin] empire, will result in a shameful deformity and will inflict the damage of a perilous disability’ (‘Ecclesiae corporis tam nobilis membri eius imperii videlicet praefati, carentia notam probrosae deformitatis induceret et iacturam periculosae debilitatis inferret’); see Arduis mens in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295; ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, p. 309; Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 6829, 6845.

142 Chapter 4

as it was helpful to the Holy Land.16 On the other hand, its importance for the healing of the schism was generally conveyed through the imagery of the deformed body of the Church missing a limb. Suggestive as this image may be, one cannot help noticing that specific references to the schism, which had been repeatedly evoked over the previous four decades, were now often diluted into more generic and token allusions that the Latin Empire was essential to ‘the propagation of the Christian Faith’ (‘propagationem fidei Christiane’) and ‘the honour of Christian dignity and religion’ (‘Christiane dignitatis et religionis honerem’), or that the prelates should assist in its deliverance as it would lead to ‘the increase of faith and of ecclesiastical liberty’ (‘fidei et ecclesiasticae libertatis augmentum’).17 That was an indication that crusading in Frankish Greece had by that time established itself in the curia’s consciousness as a legitimate endeavour, assistance to which was to an extent coterminous with service to the Church and to Christian Faith in general. Further evidence of the importance that the accumulated background of crusades launched in Romania had attained by the 1240s is provided by another argument conjured by Innocent IV: that the Latin Empire had been acquired and preserved through great toil, expense, and the shedding of much blood, the inference being that additional efforts were required for the earlier ones not to go to waste. Innocent IV had already introduced this image at the beginning of his first letter requesting a subsidy for Constantinople, less than ten days after his election.18 The pope further elaborated on that theme a year later, in his call to the prince of Achaia to provide help to the empire,19 and then perfected it in the 16 

For example, Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 22: ‘the prosperity of the [Latin] empire is to the benefit of the Holy Land’ (‘prosperitas ipsius imperii ad utilitatem pertinet Terre Sancte’). 17  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no.  22; Arduis mens, in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295, and Inter cetera desiderabilia, in ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, p. 309. 18  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 22 (13 July 1243): ‘For the preservation of the empire of Constantinople, which was acquired by the Christian faithful with many toils and expenses, and also with the spilling of much blood’ (‘Ad Constantinopolitani conservationem imperii a Christi fidelibus non absque multis laboribus et expensis ac etiam non modica effusione sanguinis acquisiti’). 19  Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 12 (16 May 1244): ‘Truly, as the Apostolic See always desires the liberation [of the empire of Constantinople] with all its heart, and hitherto has shown great care and diligence for it in many different ways, as far as it has been able to do so laudably, proudly extending its right hand to its help and likewise requesting the aid of others, we are greatly and justly pained that up to this point, on account of our sins, this undertaking has not been successful; an undertaking for which the catholics have been striving for a long time with costly labours and laborious costs and anxious sweat

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

143

decree of the Council of Lyon, Arduis mens, when he stressed the ‘firm intention’ of the papacy to assist it, urging the faithful to likewise do their duty: Yet though the Apostolic See has eagerly sought a remedy on [the empire’s] behalf by earnest endeavour and many forms of assistance, though for long catholics have striven by grievous toils, by burdensome expense, by care, sweat, tears and bloodshed, yet the hand that extended such aid could not wholly snatch the empire from the yoke of the enemy, hindered by sin; thus not without cause we are troubled with grief. But because the body of the church would be shamefully deformed by the lack of a loved member, namely the aforesaid empire […], we firmly propose to come to the help of the empire with swift and effective aid.20

This passage was also repeated, in a slightly modified form, in Innocent’s subsequent crusading calls for the Latin Empire.21 No doubt intended as an additional incentive to motivate would-be crusaders, the stress on previous efforts also testified to the pedigree of crusading in Frankish Greece, which was now an argument for its self-perpetuation — at least in theory. In reality, Innocent IV had to flee Italy to escape imperial pressure, already in the first year of his pontificate.22 The subsequent ‘deposition’ of Frederick at the ecumenical Church Council of Lyon (1245) and the crusade that was called against him, especially from mid-1246 onwards,23 initiated a new phase in the and the lamentable spilling of blood.’ (‘Sane, cum Sedes Apostolica, liberationem ipsam toto semper mentis affectu desiderans, grandis hactenus diligentiae studium, ut posset laudabiliter provenire, duxerit multipliciter adhibendum, auxilii sui dexteram ad hoc magnifice porrigens et operam nihilominus postulans aliorum, gravi non immerito dolore turbamur, quod ad hoc votum hucusque, peccatis impendientibus, non extitit subsecuta, pro qua iamdiu catholici non sine laboribus sumptuosis et laboriosis sumptibus, anxiisque sudoribus et effusione deflenda sanguinis certaverunt.’) 20  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295–96: ‘Et licet apostolica sedes pro ipsa grandis dilligentiae studio et multiplicis subventionis remedio ferventer institerit, ac diu catholici non sine gravibus laboribus, et onerosis sumptibus, anxiisque sudoribus, et deflenda sanguinis effusione certaverint, nec tanti auxilii dextera imperium ipsum totaliter de inimicorum jugo potuerit, impedientibus peccatis, eripere, propter quod non immerito dolore turbamur. Quia tamen ecclesiae corpus ex membri causa cari videlicet imperii praefati carentia notam probrosae deformitatis incurreret […] firma intentione proponimus, eidem imperio efficaci et celeri subsidio subvenire.’ 21  ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, p.  309 (29 September 1245); Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 6829 and 6845 (2 July 1253). 22  Watt, ‘The Papacy’, p. 138; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 363–66. 23  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 278–83; Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 1993, 2935; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’,

144 Chapter 4

deadly struggle between the Hohenstaufen and the papacy, which would keep Innocent IV occupied for the rest of his pontificate. Moreover, the Mongol threat was always present, causing serious disturbances in Eastern Europe,24 and the situation in the Holy Land became likewise hopeless in the summer of 1244, following the capture of Jerusalem by the Khorezmian Turks and the crushing Latin defeat at La Forbie. In the wake of this disaster, Louis IX took the cross in December 1244, but Innocent IV could do little for Outremer apart from offering nominal support to the expedition of the French king, who nevertheless took care of most major organizational aspects himself.25 The Hohenstaufen conflict would similarly hinder papal assistance to Eastern Europe against the Mongols. Several years later, in 1259, Alexander IV, having to respond to the Hungarian king’s accusation that the papacy had not provided assistance against the Tartars, explained that the struggle with the Hohenstaufen took up all papal resources with the result that the Apostolic See could hardly protect itself, let alone assist others, despite its desire to do so.26 In those circumstances, it is not surprising that the papacy would not do much more for the Latin Empire. Tangible crusading support for Frankish Greece was evidently less forthcoming than rhetoric extolling its importance and desirability. It is true nonetheless that the pope made some efforts to assist the Latin Empire financially from early on. Already in July 1243 he had called for monetary subventions to be given to the empire from the revenues of the churches of Romania; the prelates of Frankish Greece were to give ten thousand hyperpyra for the defence of Constantinople, while an additional tenth of the ecclesiastical revenues of the Morea, Negroponte as well as of the islands and other territories under Latin control, would be given to the Latin patriarch of Constantinople. The pope reminded the prelates that such a subsidy would be, of course, to their own collective and individual interest (‘proviso insuper quod hoc ad vestrum omnium ac etiam singulorum pertinet interesse’).27 The request for a tenth of ecclesiastical revenues in Romania was repeated in September 1243, and further requests of one or two thirds of ecclesiastical revenues (for resident clergy and for absentees respectively) and half of pp.  354–58; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp.  375–407 (esp. pp.  384–89); Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 63–68, 72–77, 79; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 187–90, 200–02. 24  See in general, Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 58–112 (esp. p. 104). 25  Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 189–95; Strayer, ‘The Crusades of Louis IX’, pp. 488–94; Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade, esp. pp. 65–104; Richard, Saint Louis, pp. 303–05; Tyerman, God’s War, pp. 775–81. 26  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 239–41, no. 454. 27  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 22, 33.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

145

their moveable property were made for the year 1244.28 Requests for subventions from the West were, on the other hand, quite rare. Only one mention of western crusading funds used for the Latin Empire survives in the papal registers for the early years of Innocent IV, when the pope asked for money from the redemption of crusade vows to be given to a Roman merchant to pay off a loan of Emperor Baldwin, amounting to four hundred livres tournois.29 There was also some recruitment for the Latin Empire at this time, but it seemed to have been supplied by enforced penitential service rather than through the preaching of the cross for the help of Constantinople. This included Latins who had requested absolution from the excommunication imposed on them for serving in Greek armies;30 those who had received dispensation for marriage in the fourth degree of consanguinity in exchange for a year’s service in the Latin Empire or the payment of the expenses of one or more soldiers instead;31 and, finally, some reformed heretics of southern France who, as we saw in the case of Peter Seila’s inquisition register, were sent to serve the Latin Empire in the early 1240s.32 It was again the Latin powers of Romania who were called to provide troops for the defence of Constantinople, because of their ‘proximity and close connection’ (‘ex vicinitate, quin potius connexitate [sunt] consortes’). This was particularly the case with Prince Geoffrey II of Achaia who, in 1244, was reminded of his duty as a catholic prince to assist the empire and was urged to rush to the help of Constantinople in the emergency it was currently facing. Furthermore, the pope instructed the prince to garrison Constantinople with a hundred soldiers for one year. As an incentive and means of funding, Innocent confirmed Honorius III’s grant of the usufruct of ecclesiastical properties in the prince’s lands. The clergy of Romania was at the same instance asked to provide a considerable portion of 28 

1244). 29 

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 94 (2 September 1243) and 707 (30 May

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 122–23 (17 September 1243). Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 73 (26 August 1243). 31  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 1313–14 and 1323 ( June 1245): expenses of one soldier (unum militem) from ‘Helyas Gilberti’ and William ‘de Sancto Martino’, and of eight knights (octo equites) from the ‘nobili viro G. domino de Mauritania’. Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 2421 (February 1247): dispensation for ‘Gilberto de Buchiercort’, ‘who is ready to go to the empire of Romania, in order to serve the Lord there, in its [the empire’s] defence, for a year’ (‘quum paratus sit se transferre in imperium Romaniae, per annum ibidem in eius subsidio Domino serviturus’). 32  Segl, ‘“Stabit Constantinopoli”’; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 69–70, who also argues that since no other crusade destination was included in Peter Seila’s register, it was probably a conscious papal decision for such heretics to be sent primarily to the Latin Empire. 30 

146 Chapter 4

their property and ecclesiastical revenues for a year to finance the aforementioned reinforcements for the Latin Empire.33

3. The First Council of Lyon and its Aftermath (1245–47) It was only on the occasion of the First Council of Lyon in 1245 that Innocent IV made a general call to the West for the help of the Latin Empire. The council was called to treat ‘five wounds’: the abuses in the Church, the danger for the Holy Land, the struggle between pope and emperor, the Tartar threat, and the afflictions of the Latin Empire.34 These afflictions were the Greek Schism and the threat to Constantinople, according to Innocent’s speech at the council: Thirdly [the pope spoke] about the schism of the Greeks: in which way Vatatzes, the emperor of the Greeks, along with the Greek schismatics occupied and destroyed the land almost up to the walls of Constantinople, and the fear for the fate of the city unless there was to be swift help from the Christians.35

The deposition of Frederick II was by far the most influential decision of the council. The emperor’s association with ‘schismatics’ and the marriage of his daughter to Vatatzes were included among the long list of his ‘crimes’.36 Notwith33  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos  706 (=  Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 12) and 707 (May 1244). 34  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 1354–56 (3 January 1245): ‘et afflicto Romanie imperio propere valeat subveniri’; Watt, ‘The Papacy’, pp. 138–44 (139); Wolter and Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, pp. 51–57; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 366–74; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, pp. 484–97. 35  Relatio de Concilio Lugdunensi, ed. by Weiland and others, pp.  513–16, at p.  514: ‘Tertio de scismate Grecorum, quomodo Vatacius imperator Grecorum, cum Grecis scismaticis occupaverant and destruxerant terram fere usque ad Constantinopolim et de civitate timeri poterat, nisi a Christianis velocem succursum haberent’; see also Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 225; Wolter and Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, pp. 64–65. 36  See the bull of Frederick’s deposition, Ad apostolice dignitatis (17 July 1245), in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 278–83, at 282: ‘and securing a bond by friendship and marriage with those who, wickedly making light of the Apostolic See, have separated from the unity of the church, […] he gave his daughter in marriage to Vatatzes, that enemy of God and of the Church, who, together with his counsellors and supporters, was solemnly separated from the communion of the faithful by excommunication’ (‘et illis qui damnabiliter vilipends apostolicam Sedem ab unitate Ecclesiae discesserunt, procurans affinitate ac amicitia copulari […] et Batatio, Dei et Ecclesiae inimico a communione fidelium per excommunicationis sententiam cum adiutoribus, consiliatoribus et fautoribus suis solemniter separato, filiam suam tradidit in uxorem’).

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

147

standing the pre-eminence of the issue of Frederick, a change with regards to the aid for the Latin Empire was also brought about. The affair was now given pan-European dimensions and the protection of the ‘beloved limb’ (‘membri cari’) was to be the duty of the whole ‘body’ of the Church Universal. The papacy emphatically reasserted its role as protector of Latin Romania. The importance of the Latin Empire was further stressed by the presence of Emperor Baldwin seated at the place of honour to the right of the pope during the council. Nicholas, the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, was also present at the council and portrayed to the congregation the threats his see was facing.37 It seems that Innocent IV was toying with the idea of using the Latin emperor as a counterweight to Frederick, while his attendance at the proceedings served as a means of secular legitimization of the council and as a confirmation of the superiority of the spiritual sword over the temporal. This marked the high point of the status of the Latin Empire as an instrument of papal policy. Baldwin’s presence had already had considerable propaganda value for the pope during the negotiations of 1243–44 in Rome between the curia, Frederick’s representatives, and the Lombards. Nevertheless, Baldwin was more interested in the restoration of peace between Innocent and Frederick: in Rome he had attempted to facilitate the reconciliation between the two sides and had advocated the lifting of the emperor’s excommunication. Baldwin evidently attended Frederick’s diet at Verona in 1245, before the Council of Lyon, and had even provided him with patent letters attesting to Frederick’s willingness to obey the Church and act within justice, which the Holy Roman Emperor had then sent to the nobility of England as evidence of his good intentions. No doubt Baldwin realized that the continued strife between the papacy and Frederick significantly undercut the chances of crusading support for the Latin Empire.38 Furthermore, Frederick’s services had proven valuable when he mediated a truce between the Latin Empire and Nicaea.39 Apart from the rhetoric and the arguments that Innocent invoked for the support of the Latin Empire during the council and upon its conclusion, which we have already examined, the decree Arduis mens also stipulated measures of tangible assistance. According to the provisions of the council, half of the revenues of 37  Relatio de Concilio Lugdunensi, ed. by Weiland and others, pp. 513–14; Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 431–32; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204– 1261’, pp. 224–25; Wolter and Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, pp. 59–60. 38  ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, ed. by Pagnotti, pp. 84–85; Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, vi, 259–60, 290–91; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 359–66, esp. pp. 361, 363; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 224. 39  See note 9 above.

148 Chapter 4

holders of benefices who were not resident for more than six months (with some exceptions, for example when their absence was on account of an ecclesiastical mandate or crusading duties), were to be collected for the next three years for the defence of the Latin Empire. The papacy on its part would offer a tenth of its revenues, aside from the tenth already given for the Holy Land.40 Innocent and the council additionally decreed that crusade preachers should also induce people to make testamentary donations to the Latin Empire and the Holy Land, through the grant of (unspecified) ‘special indulgences’.41 What is interesting is that the council made no provision regarding the preaching of the cross for the Latin Empire. Everything else was there: the crusading imagery and long-standing arguments (namely the help to the Holy Land, the protection of the catholic faith, and the allusion to the schism through the image of the mutilated body of the Church), the granting of plenary indulgence and other privileges and immunities, and the funding through taxation of ecclesiastical revenues. What was lacking was the call for the crusade itself. This stands in contrast with the relevant instructions in Afflicti corde, the council’s decree regarding the crusade for the Holy Land.42 The lack of references to preaching and taking the cross in Arduis mens, when seen in conjunction with the emphasis on funding in both the decree itself and the papal activities over the following years, as we will see, support the conclusion that Innocent hesitated to advocate recruitment of crusaders and instead focused on monetary support for the Latin Empire. This was probably not unrelated to the fact that at this point the situation in Outremer was critical because of the recent setbacks, particularly the fall of Jerusalem and the disaster at La Forbie at the hands of the Khorezmians and the Ayubids of Egypt in 1244.43 In any case, a burst of papal activity regarding crusading support for Frankish Greece followed shortly after the Council of Lyon. This included calls for crusade preaching for the Latin Empire, as well as instructions for funds to be raised on top of the taxes already decreed at the council. The whole effort proved shortlived, however, and it seems to have been mostly aimed at raising money rather 40 

Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295–96. For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the council, their later amendments, and reactions to them (which will be discussed later), see Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 250–55. See also Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 80; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 285. 41  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 296; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 145. 42  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 297–301. 43  See, for example, Mayer, The Crusades, p. 259; Tyerman, God’s War, pp. 770–72.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

149

than troops. Though no traces of this activity survive in the papal registers, it can be reconstructed from instructions sent to the mendicant orders, which have been preserved locally or are reported by some chroniclers. One of the most important sources is an original document of 14 December 1247, a letter from the Dominican provincial prior of Provence, Pons de Lesparre, commissioning a notable preacher, the friar John Balistar, to carry out earlier papal instructions. The letter incorporates six bulls of Innocent IV, thus preserving papal orders related to the crusade for the Latin Empire.44 The most important one, dated 29 September 1245, was Inter cetera desiderabilia, the crusade bull which Innocent reissued on all the occasions he authorized preaching for the Latin Empire: in 1245, 1246, and 1253.45 The pope started by stating that among the several things his heart desired, he particularly cared for the deliverance of the empire of Constantinople, to which he devoted his vigilance and his efforts. The wording of the rest of the bull followed closely that of Arduis mens, stressing the past toils for the empire, using the image of the ‘beloved limb’ whose loss would deform the body of the Church, and reiterating the papacy’s ‘firm intention’ for quick assistance to the empire. The main difference between the bull and the conciliar decree was the insertion of preaching instructions. The friars were ordered to preach the cross for the help of the Latin Empire, as it would be beneficial to the Holy Land, the catholic faith, and the liberty of the Church. They were to exhort the faithful to provide assistance through personal service or material contributions (in personis vel in rebus).46 Those who would assist the Latin Empire would enjoy the same 44  The letter is partly edited in ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme; according to the prior’s preamble, the papal orders were about preaching the cross for the Holy Land and the Latin Empire, as well as publicizing Frederick’s deposition (‘Mandata apostolica de predicanda cruce in Terre sancte subsidium et subventionem Constantinopolitani imperii, denunciatione quoque sententie depositionis late in Fredericum quondam imperatorem Romanorum’, ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, p. 308), but the bulls included in the letter to John Balistar seem to refer mainly to the Latin Empire; see Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 101–02, who summarizes and discusses all the bulls. 45  ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, pp. 309–10. The summary offered by Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 102, is misleading. He states that the bull was to the ‘Dominicans in Francia’, whereas it is actually addressed to both the Franciscans and the Dominicans, but of Provence. The bull, as we will see, was dispatched in parallel to (at least) Poland, and apparently somewhat later to England and, for a second time, Provence. The crusade bulls of July 1253 (on which, see below, pp. 168–69) were essentially identical: Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 6829, 6845. 46  ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, p. 309. There is nothing more specific as to what exactly this material help might be.

150 Chapter 4

rewards as crusaders for the Holy Land; the formulation of the grant was identical to that of Arduis mens: To all those who will aid the empire of Constantinople we grant the same indulgence of their sins and we wish for them to enjoy the same privilege and the same immunity, as is granted to those who go to the help of the Holy Land.47

This crusade bull was sent at the same time as a series of other letters, instructing the friars on funds to be raised for the Latin Empire from various sources: from money acquired unlawfully or through usury, and from testaments left (or to be left within the following three years) for the restitution of money acquired wrongfully or through usury, when the persons to whom restitution should be made could not be found; and also from legacies left for pious usages, when not bequeathed to specific people or places. All these letters are evidently part of the same project in the wake of the Council of Lyon. They were sent in short succession briefly after the council, mostly in the period from late September to early November 1245. The ones concerning funds are near-identical in their formulation, and almost all of them (except for the one regarding legacies for pious usages) bear the same incipit as the crusade bull: Inter cetera (or alia) desiderabilia. They survive in more than one instance, in very similar (but not identical) groups.48 Since relevant entries are not extant in the papal registers we cannot be certain as to the exact extent of the effort. Calls survive for the collection of subventions in Provence, Lombardy, and England (and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Poland), and preaching of the cross in Provence (twice),49 England,50 and 47  ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, pp. 309–10: ‘omnibus eidem imperio succurentibus illam suorum peccaminum veniam indulgemus ipsoque illo privilegio eaque volumus immunitate gaudere, que predicte Terre Sancte subvenientibus conceduntur’. 48  The surviving instructions were dispatched to the Dominicans and Franciscans of Provence (‘De praedicationae cruciatae’, ed. by Delorme, nos  i.1–5, pp.  101–03); to the Franciscans of Lombardy (Milan) (‘Documenta hucusque inedita’, ed. by Sevesi, nos i, ii, iv, v); and also, a year later, in 1246, to the mendicants in England (as reported by Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 564–66; Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, ii, 389–90, no. 472). See also Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 435–36; Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 125. The bull on legacies for pious usages (Etsi ex suscepto), was also sent to the mendicants in Poland (Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, i, 208–09, no. 247). 49  ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme (29 September 1245); and ‘De praedicationae cruciatae’, ed. by Delorme, no. i.6, p. 103 (13 November 1245). Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 102, states that the bull of 29 September 1245 was addressed to the Dominicans ‘in Francia’, but his statement is not supported by the text, at least as edited by Delorme. 50  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 564–66: ‘those who wish to be signed

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

151

Poland.51 It is probable that northern France and Germany were excluded as in these areas precedence was given to Louis IX’s crusade to the Holy Land and to the anti-Hohenstaufen campaign, respectively.52 After the initial dispatch of this group of letters, Innocent seems to have tried to offer new incentives and give some additional impetus to the effort in 1246. That was when the call was apparently extended to England: Matthew Paris enters his summaries of the relevant bulls for the Latin Empire under 1246,53 while another English testimony, for the same year, reports papal orders for the annates of vacant benefices to be given for the help of the Latin Empire.54 In February, Innocent instructed the mendicants in Provence, England, Lombardy, Portugal, and Poland to absolve those who had been excommunicated for committing fraud during the collection of subsidies for the Latin Empire, ‘as long as they provided adequate restitution to the help of the aforementioned empire’ (‘dummodo […] pro dicto imperio super hoc congruam satisfactionem impenderunt’).55 A few months after his initial calls for funding, therefore, the pope felt that he had to make a certain concession to maximize the effectiveness of the collection by insisting on payment rather than on punishment of the transgressors. Furthermore, in December 1246, Innocent wrote to the mendicant superiors in Poland and Provence stating that, since the crusaders for the Latin Empire would enjoy the same indulgences ‘as for the Holy Land’, the plenary indulgence would also be granted to the friars preaching the cross.56 All the surviving orders in the period 1245–46 are addressed to the mendicants. Based on that, Maier states that with the cross for the liberation of the [Latin] empire, or to send there a sufficient amount from their (movable) property, will be absolved from their sins’ (‘qui velint cruce signari pro liberatione praedicti imperii vel de catallis suis ibidem mittere sufficienter, de peccatis suis absolventur’). 51  Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, i, 207–08, no. 246. 52  Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 79. 53  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 564–66. 54  Annales de Burton, ed. by Luard, pp. 181–510, at pp. 276–78; Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, ii, 317, no. 419. 55  ‘Documenta hucusque inedita’, ed. by Sevesi, no. vi (12 February 1246, Lombardy); Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, i, 409, no. 126 (5 February 1246, Portugal); Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 565–66 (1246, England); Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, i, 211–12, no. 250 (13 February 1246, Poland); Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 102 (13 February 1246, Provence — Maier’s summary is most likely inaccurate, as this bull appears to be identical to the other ones cited here). 56  Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, i, 217, no.  257 (23 December 1246, Poland); Maier, Preaching the Crusades, pp. 101–02 (21 December 1246, Provence).

152 Chapter 4

there is no evidence of crusade preaching for the Latin Empire from the secular clergy at the time.57 However, in the abovementioned letters of February 1246, it is mentioned that instructions for collections had also been given to the secular clergy, which apparently have not survived.58 Therefore, we should not rule out the possibility that similar orders regarding preaching might have also been dispatched to the secular clergy, which are likewise not extant. Overall, the following conclusions can be made regarding Innocent’s effort for the Latin Empire following the Council of Lyon. For one, the exact geographic extent of the call is unclear, but in any case rather wide. Preaching of the cross was certainly authorized in Provence, England, and Poland, while collection of additional subventions was ordered at least in those areas as well as in Lombardy and Portugal. Second, these calls were confined to a rather brief period after the Council of Lyon, when Innocent endorsed this policy of more or less generalized western support for the Latin Empire, that is, in late 1245 and 1246. Third, the emphasis was apparently on the collection of funds rather than on recruitment, as most of the surviving evidence refers to the monetary provisions of the council, the pope’s subsequent instructions, and, as we will see, local reactions to them. This activity following the Council of Lyon was the climax of Innocent’s efforts to procure crusading help from the West for the Latin Empire. In 1247 the attempt was effectively suspended, while its practical impact seems to have been negligible. Innocent’s effort lacked the tenacity of his predecessor’s. He did make widespread calls after the council, but once it became evident that a corresponding response was not forthcoming, he did not persist. Overall, the request for subsidies for the Latin Empire did not fare well. The clergy was already hard-pressed and discontented with the mounting papal demands for crusade taxation.59 The council’s decree was immediately suspended in Germany, where taxation for the Latin Empire and the Holy Land was to be channelled to the conflict with the Hohenstaufen.60 The requests for Romania met with vehement opposition in England. Already during the Council of Lyon, a delegation of English barons, 57 

Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 79. ‘Documenta hucusque inedita’, ed. by Sevesi, no.  vi; Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, i, 409, no. 126: ‘The things which have been granted for the empire of Constantinople by the Apostolic See, we order to be collected both by the prelates of the churches and by you and the friars of your order’ (‘Cum ea que Imperio Constantinopolitano a sede apostolica sunt concessa, tam per ecclesiarum prelatos, quam per te et fratres tui ordinis […] mandavimus colligenda’). 59  See, for example, Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 60–61, 116–18, 126–49, 186–87, 217. 60  Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, p. 66. 58 

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

153

with Master William de Powick as their spokesman, objected to the twentieth and other taxes which the council voted for the Holy Land and the empire of Constantinople — though their reaction was apparently to no avail.61 The English clergy then raised objections to the subsidy in the Council of London (December 1246) and in a royal assembly (probably in February 1247), while the people and clergy of Canterbury also addressed two letters of complaint, one to the pope and one to the cardinals. In the latter, they made the dismissive statement that part of the requested money was ‘for the use of the French, who persecute us and our race, for the conquest of the empire of the Greeks’ (‘in usus Francorum, qui nos et gentem nostrum persequuntur, ad conquestum imperii Graecorum’).62 It looks unlikely that collection was ultimately successful in England.63 Similarly there was apparently no response to the request for additional subventions after the council.64 It has been asserted that collection of the subsidy went on in Italy and France and that it was successful in Poland and Portugal, but the support for such claims is slim: in fact most of the sources cited as evidence are simply the original papal requests or exemptions from them.65 Actually, in France the pope was soon faced by complaints from the clergy and requests for the provisions of the council to be 61 

Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 473, 521–22; Lunt, Financial Rela­ tions of the Papacy with England, pp. 212–13. 62  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 580–85; Annales de Burton, ed. by Luard, pp. 278–85; and Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 595–97 (quotation p.  597) respectively. See Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, p.  136; Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, p. 67. 63  See Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 250–54, for an extensive examination of the surviving English evidence for the council’s subsidy for Constantinople; his verdict as to the eventual outcome of the collection is that ‘knowledge […] cannot be advanced beyond the realm of probability’ and that there is ‘no proof that the attempt to collect the subsidy was actually carried out to a conclusion’ (p. 254). 64  See Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 435–37. 65  Such comments are made in passing by Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 273, note 7; and Wolter and Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, p. 95. They are based on Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p.  285, and Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, pp. 66–67. The sources cited are Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, ed. by Potthast, no. 12006 (Portugal); Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, i, 208 (Poland); and Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 5924 (France), and no. 6460 (Italy). The latter two cases are both in effect exemptions and prove nothing about the success of raising money for the Latin Empire through the subsidy decreed at Lyon. Similarly, the documents regarding Portugal and Poland are nothing more than the abovementioned instructions to the friars to absolve excommunicated fraudsters in the affair of the subventions for the Latin Empire, as long as they provided adequate reparation.

154 Chapter 4

moderated, to which he gave in by 1247.66 There is, furthermore, the complaint of Spanish prelates in 1262/63, when faced with renewed papal requests, that they had already paid a considerable amount to Innocent IV in the past for the benefit of Baldwin II. This is most probably a reference to the subsidy decreed by the council, and though this statement might be an indication of successful collection for the Latin Empire, it should, however, be kept in mind that the prelates were trying to make a point and avoid paying any further papal subsidies; therefore they might have exaggerated the sum actually collected in that instance.67 It appears that the difficulties the papacy encountered regarding the taxation in England and elsewhere dented its resolve to proceed with the organization of the crusade for the Latin Empire — even more so, as the Roman Church could devote but a fraction of its energies in the Constantinopolitan affair. One looks practically in vain in the papal registers for records of help raised — or even called for — after 1246.68 The English chroniclers are similarly silent about the subsidy for Constantinople after the early part of 1247.69 On the contrary, there was a constant flow of exemptions and cancellations of the aforementioned subsidy. Obviously under the pressure of reactions, Innocent started to give way to complaints with regards to the collections. Already in June 1246, we have the first relevant evidence surviving in the registers, as Eudes of Châteauroux, papal legate in France, was given instructions for the partial revocation of the twentieth for the Latin Empire.70 More exemptions followed, for a number of Augustinian and other religious houses in Spain and France, as well as for the Templars in England and the Hospitallers in Lombardy.71 Significantly, writing to the French archbishops in early May 1247, Innocent confirmed the ‘moderation’ that had been issued by the bishop of Albano, Peter of Collemezzo, on the terms of the 66  See below for the moderation by the bishop of Albano: Cartulaire de l’abbaye de St. Père de Chartres, ed. by Guérard, ii, 698. 67  According to their report, the Spanish prelates had paid forty thousand aurei: Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, p. 731 and note 4. Text in Benito Ruano, ‘La Iglesia española ante la caída del Imperio latino de Constantinopla’, p. 16, and see note 32 where it is indicated that one (of the two) manuscripts mentions four thousand aurei instead. 68  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 80, who also notes the lack of any such evidence for Constantinople, whereas calls for assistance to the Holy Land abound. 69  Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, p. 254. 70  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 1991, 9 June 1246. 71  For example, Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 2106 (25 September 1246), 2388 (6 February 1247), 2404 (15 February 1247), 2609 (2 May 1247), 2777 (30 May 1247), 6423 (17 March 1253).

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

155

council’s decree concerning the subsidy to the Latin Empire. The bishop had been appointed by the pope and the cardinals to draft this document, because the French prelates had requested ‘clarification and moderation’ of some of the clauses that were considered particularly burdensome. Peter proceeded to explain some grey areas of the original subsidy, to add some further categories of exemptions, and to ease certain obligations. Innocent gave his approval to these changes grumblingly. The pope characteristically remarked: ‘Granted that we do not modify willingly the statutes that have been decreed in a general council regarding such a pious affair, but rather wishing to satisfy your request on that issue’.72 Then, in December of the same year, he issued instructions to his collectors in France for the relaxation of the council’s provisions regarding the subsidy for Constantinople. His instructions in most respects amounted to a near-complete annulment of the subsidy. The reversal in language was no less striking. The pope stated that, although he cared deeply for the ‘tranquillity and the prosperity’ of the Latin Empire (gone are the lamentations of the extreme need and hardship and the empire’s desperate state!), it had not been his intention to impose an insufferable burden on the shoulders of the subjects of the Roman Church with the provisions of the Council of Lyon.73 As far as financial aid was concerned, therefore, the council and its immediate aftermath constituted only a brief spell of attempts to rally wider western support for the Latin Empire. As far as the preaching of the cross and recruitment of crusaders was concerned, there is hardly any evidence that it made any impact. Already from his early days Innocent IV had appeared apprehensive about preaching an organized crusade for the Latin Empire and steering crusading contingents towards Constantinople. Even at the height of his activity for the Latin Empire after the Council of Lyon, when the defence of Constantinople had been proclaimed as one of Christendom’s priorities, Innocent did not exert himself in trying to raise a crusading host for Frankish Greece. His first and only surviving calls for crusade preaching in the West for the Latin Empire are to be found in the months following the council and only then. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that this is also the period that Baldwin was present in the West, first at the papal curia and then at the French court. Apart from those efforts, however, Innocent — unlike his predecessor — 72 

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 2603 (= Cartulaire de l’abbaye de St. Père de Chartres, ed. by Guérard, ii, 698–700, at 698), (4 May 1247) to the archbishops of Bourges, Reims, Tours, Sens, and Rouen and to all the clergy of these provinces: ‘Licet autem non libenter immutemus ea que, pro tam pio negocio, in generali concilio sunt statuta, volentes tamen vestre in hac parte satisfacere voluntati’. 73  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 3468 (3 December 1247).

156 Chapter 4

did little to help raise an army for Baldwin to lead back to Constantinople. There is practically no evidence in the sources that those calls elicited any response or reactions. It is true that James I of Aragon announced that he was taking the cross for Romania in early 1246; however, that was connected with the king’s effort to revive his failing international prestige rather with the impact of the preaching itself, and James was eventually forced to ask for a commutation of his vow in order to deal with local problems the following year.74 Baldwin this time returned to Constantinople without a crusading army.75 Innocent IV’s reluctance can probably be explained to some extent by the growing complaints that recruitment for the Latin Empire deprived the Holy Land of crucial manpower. This accusation — present to a degree since the time of Innocent III, when some chroniclers commented that after 1204 many men abandoned the Holy Land and went to Constantinople, leaving Outremer virtually defenceless76 — had been explicitly voiced by Cardinal Pelagius who had criticized Honorius III for his crusading calls for Frankish Greece while the Fifth Crusade was underway.77 Similarly Gregory IX’s efforts to organize a full-blown crusade for the Latin Empire had produced reactions and criticism in the West by leading nobles who overtly expressed their disagreement, for example the letter of March 1239 by Thibaut and the other crusade leaders, and the Oath of Northampton by Richard of Cornwall and his companions. It was not only the leaders, however, as lesser crusaders also opted for the Holy Land despite papal admonitions, orders, or threats.78 74 

Burns, Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia, pp. 270–78. See Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 185. Baldwin considered — or at least advertised — his planned return from the West to Constantinople as a ‘service to God’, as attested in a document in which he arranged his affairs in Namur (12 June 1247): ‘que cum nos deusions aler au servise Dieu en l’empire de Constantinoble’, Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 144; Layettes de trésor des chartes, ed. by Teulet, iii, 10–12, no. 3604; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p. 148, no. 231. 76  For example, Robert of Auxerre, Chronicon, ed. by Holder-Egger, p. 269; ‘Anonymi continuatio appendicis Roberti de Monte ad Sigebertum’, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 334. Most strikingly, the Annales Reineri (Annales Reineri, ed. by Pertz, p. 660), after reporting on the crusaders who joined Nivelon’s crusade in 1207, remarked: ‘it should be known for the future and noted for the present that the affair of Greece greatly impeded the affair of the Holy Land’ (‘Sciendum est futuris et notum praesentibus, quod negotium Gretiae [sic] multum impedivit negotium orientalis ecclesie’). 77  See above, Chapter 2.2, pp. 67–68. 78  Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 4741; Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 620; and see in general Chapter 3 above (esp. pp. 124–25, 132). 75 

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

157

Those complaints were, of course, connected to the needs for crusading resources to be deployed in other fronts. Such preoccupations constitute another, more pragmatic, reason for Innocent’s reluctance or inability to commit a crusader army to the help of Constantinople. As repeatedly pointed out, Innocent’s overwhelming concern was the struggle with the Hohenstaufen, which had entered a new stage after the deposition of Frederick at the Council of Lyon and the proclamation of the crusade against him. In addition, the preparations for Louis IX’s crusade to Outremer were in full swing, more or less absorbing all available fighters in France, while the Mongol threat was hanging over eastern Europe, including — most importantly for Romania — Hungary. A letter of this period by King Béla IV to Innocent highlights both the pressures of external circumstances and the criticism to which crusading efforts for Frankish Greece were exposed. Béla at once besought Innocent to provide urgently needed help against the Mongols and reproached the pope for having, so far, failed to do so. Arguing for the necessity for Hungary to be defended as a bulwark of Christendom, Béla expressed his amazement at the pope’s priorities: [Many wise men] are amazed and do not stop wondering that the pope takes such care for the empire of Constantinople and for Outremer, which even if they were lost — God forbid! —, nevertheless, the inhabitants of Europe would not suffer as much as if our kingdom were to fall into the hands of the Tartars.79

Since no major opportunities for crusader recruitment for Romania were readily available, it was not long before Innocent started to look for an alternative way to boost the defences of the Latin Empire. In this context, an interesting insight is afforded by the pope’s support for Emperor Baldwin’s project to employ the services of the Spanish military Order of Santiago for the protection of the Latin Empire.80 Negotiations on this intriguing project were carried out and an agreement was reached between Baldwin and the Grand Master of the order, 79 

Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 230–32, no. 440: ‘Admiratur inquam et admirari non desinit, eo quod apostolica clemencia multis provideat, sicut Con­ stantino­politano imperio et ultramarinis partibus, que si ammitterentur, quod absit, non tamen nocerent Europe habitatoribus, quantum si regnum nostrum solum a Thartharis contingeret possideri.’ The date of this letter is debated, but the latest (and most extensive) examination dates it in 1247: see Berend, At the Gate of Christendom, pp. 165–66, note 80; see also Kovách, ‘Der “Mongolenbrief ” Bélas IV. an Papst Innozenz IV.’. 80  For this project see Benito Ruano, ‘Balduino II de Constantinopla y la Orden de Santiago’; Longnon, ‘L’Empereur Baudouin II et l’Ordre de Saint Jacques’; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 82–84; Forey, ‘The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians’, pp. 3, 5; Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, pp. 742–43.

158 Chapter 4

Pelay Pérez Correa, in 1246 at Valladolid, with the consent of both Innocent IV and Infante Alfonso of Castile. According to the agreement, the Grand Master undertook to lead in person to Constantinople three hundred knights, two hundred archers, and one thousand infantrymen. Any crusaders joining the force would be counted within those numbers. They were to stay in Baldwin’s service for two years, after which point the order would have established a ‘branch’ there, manned with as many troops as the order could afford. In return for its service, the order would receive the city of Vizye and the castle of Medeia, a sizeable share (a fourth or a fifth) in any conquests and booty, a lump sum of forty thousand marks sterling, as well as houses and vineyards in Constantinople and its environs. However, the Latin emperor was hard-pressed for the funds needed to keep his end of the bargain. In February 1247 Innocent wrote to the Grand Master, promising that, although Baldwin had been so far unable to come up with the promised payment, he would nonetheless be able to do so by the coming August, at which time the pope would also make a contribution. The pope obviously still wished to support the defence of the Latin Empire. However, having to reshuffle available crusading resources around Europe on account of the numerous parallel fronts, he decided to put his weight behind this project rather than insist on preaching the cross, thus ‘delegating’, at least partially, the duty of the empire’s defence. The use of a professional and permanent crusading force that a military order could offer in Frankish Greece was comparable to another of Innocent IV’s innovations, namely commissioning the Teutonic Order with the ‘perpetual crusade’ in the Baltic. In 1245, Innocent had granted the plenary indulgence to anyone who would take the cross to fight in Prussia ‘in response to the appeals of the Teutonic Knights and without public preaching’, in effect conceding control over crusading in the area to the order.81 Deploying the military orders to a crusade front was potentially more cost-efficient for the papacy and depended less on the spontaneous goodwill and enthusiasm needed for raising a crusade army, which was progressively harder to come by in the case of Frankish Greece. In that sense, papal backing of Baldwin’s plan regarding the Order of Santiago was another indication that papal ability to raise crusading support for the Latin Empire was failing. In any case, this approach proved hardly more successful, since the project eventually fell through. By early 1247 Innocent’s crusading effort for the Latin Empire, which had been so solemnly proclaimed at the Council of Lyon less than two years earlier 81 

See Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp.  197–98; Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, pp. 83–84; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 225–35 (esp. pp. 227–28).

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

159

was for all practical purposes over. On 30 January 1247, Innocent wrote a letter to Queen Maria of Hungary to thank and congratulate her for her efforts to bring Vatatzes and his people to the bosom of the Roman Church.82 A few days later, in a letter to King Béla, the pope promised to assist Hungary against the Mongol menace by diverting to its aid the crusaders signed for the Holy Land and for the Latin Empire as soon as this was necessary.83 The two letters can be seen as two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, resources which could be used for Constantinople were evidently more urgently needed elsewhere. On the other hand, Innocent was probably already looking, in a more positive light, at the possibility of resolving the situation in Romania through an understanding with the Greeks of Nicaea, a policy he would decisively follow from 1249 to the end of his pontificate to an almost successful conclusion, as we will see. There were to be no further efforts on the part of the papacy to procure support from the West for the Latin Empire after that point.84 In fact, the aforementioned commutation of crusading vows in Hungary towards the campaign against the Tartars is the last reference to ‘crusaders for the Latin empire’ before 1261. Similarly some of the funds gathered for the Latin Empire would be eventually diverted towards the crusade of Louis IX for the Holy Land.85 These ventures would absorb the last few resources that the papacy could direct towards Constantinople.

4. Church Union Negotiations and Rapprochement with Nicaea: The Abandonment of Crusading Support for the Latin Empire While Innocent’s effort to mobilize the crusading resources of the West unravelled, the situation in the Latin Empire had been steadily deteriorating. After making 82 

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 2954 (= Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 34). Little else is known about this initiative. 83  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no.  2957 (=  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 203–04, no. 379), (4 February 1247): ‘we will make all the crusaders for the help of the Holy Land and the empire of Romania, and others wherever they might be, come hastily to your help’ (‘omnes crucesignatos in succursu Terre sancte ac Imperii Romanie, ac alios ubicumque fuerint, in tuum cum festinatione succursum accedere faciemus’). 84  In the registers a single relevant call is preserved regarding the collection of the subsidy for the Latin Empire from the diocese of Strasburg and the province of Mainz, in June 1254: Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 7827. Otherwise, there was only one limited and clearly localized case of authorizing a crusade in Frankish Greece, about which see below, pp. 168–69. 85  See Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 3979, (19 June 1248).

160 Chapter 4

gains against the Bulgarians, Vatatzes annexed Thessalonica in 1246, and in 1247 he moved against the Latins, taking over Tzurulum (the only gain of Baldwin’s crusade in 1239–40), Vizye, and virtually all the possessions of the empire except for Constantinople itself.86 The empire looked doomed, but it does not appear that Innocent attempted to assist it through any further crusading activity. It seems that the pope considered the possibility that the situation in Romania could be resolved by means of a rapprochement with the Greeks through Church Union negotiations. That compromise would relieve part of the strain on the resources of the Apostolic See, and — provided it was done on papal terms — would provide a viable alternative to the support of the faltering Latin Empire through crusading. At the time it appeared that circumstances were propitious for such a settlement. Innocent IV had displayed considerable interest in the affairs of the Churches of the East, dispatching legates on missions to the Armenians, Copts, Jacobites, Nestorians, Russians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, with the main aim being ecclesiastical union or, from a papal viewpoint, to bring the eastern Christians ‘back to obedience to the Roman Church’.87 The first missions, of Dominic of Aragon and Andrew of Longjumeau, were sent as early as March 1245, while in 1246–47 the pope sent the Franciscan friar Lawrence of Portugal as his legate in the East to deal with the Oriental Christians, including the Greeks in Antioch, Cyprus, and Jerusalem. Foremost among the pope’s orders was the protection of the Greek clergy from Latin excesses, as long as it obeyed the pope.88 Although Innocent’s missions achieved few tangible results in the end, at the time they seemed very promising for an ecclesiastical reunion of West and East. Vatatzes was also ready to go down the road of negotiations once more, and in 1249 he initiated contact by dispatching the half-Greek Dominican Salimbene to the pope to deal with the matter of Church Union.89 The motives of the Nicaean 86  Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, pars 42–45; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 62–63; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 141, 144–48; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 185–86; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 226. 87  See Vries, ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’; Richard, La Papauté et les missions d’Orient, pp. 59–61. 88  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 3046–47, 4051–53; Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 39; Vries, ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’, pp. 115, 125–27; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 16–17, 123–24, 127–28, notes 7, 191, 194–95; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 82–86. 89  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 14–19.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

161

emperor for this rapprochement need some clarification. Vatatzes was an astute diplomat who did not let dogmatic and ecclesiastical friction get in the way of his ultimate goal of the recovery of Constantinople, towards which he had been methodically working throughout his reign. He had resorted to unionist negotiations in the past, in 1232–34, in an attempt to deprive the Latin Empire of the only power that could offer substantial and sustained assistance.90 It is very unlikely that a shrewd statesman, as Vatatzes had proven himself to be, was now expecting the papacy to actually hand over Constantinople to him, even though the request was made during the negotiations; the city was not in the pope’s hands anyway. His position was clearly not as ‘naïve’ as has been claimed.91 What Vatatzes was after was the concession that when the (increasingly more probable) Greek recovery of Constantinople occurred, the Apostolic See would acquiesce to the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire and accept the legitimacy of the Greek emperor and the Greek patriarchate. This, as we will see, is exactly the deal the Byzantines got from Innocent IV and Alexander IV in 1254 and 1256. This recognition would be useful for Byzantium to avoid any further crusade aggression. On the other hand, the negotiations with the papacy marked a change of Vatatzes’s policy as far as the alliance with the Hohenstaufen was concerned. There are several reasons why Vatatzes might turn his back on his powerful ally. Frederick was probably too deeply involved in his struggle with the papacy to be able to make a difference in eastern affairs. Furthermore, the eventual outcome of that conflict was by no means certain, especially after the imperial defeat at the siege of Parma in 1248.92 Vatatzes might have thought it useful to distance himself from the German emperor or at least make sure that he kept open an avenue of approach with the papacy.93 Besides, the alliance between Frederick and Vatatzes was an opportunistic match. The western emperor, on his side, had not hesitated to offer his assistance to the Latin Empire during his negotiations with the papacy. Frederick’s representative at the Council of Lyon, Taddeo da Suessa, proposed a reconciliation with the pope in exchange for the emperor’s offer to turn against the Mongols, to assist the recovery of Jerusalem, and to bring Romania back to Roman obedience.94 Furthermore, in a letter to Richard of Cornwall (27 February 90 

See Chapter 3.2 above. For example by Angold, ‘Byzantium in Exile’, p. 556. 92  See Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, p.  355; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 398–400. 93  See Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea, p. 177. 94  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iv, 432–33; Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 369–70; Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, p. 485. 91 

162 Chapter 4

1245), Frederick stated that he had repeatedly made such intentions known to both Gregory IX and Innocent IV, and also to Richard and other princes, and that he was still willing, once safely established in the Regno, to ‘take upon [his] own shoulders the affair of the Holy Land, the imminent Tartar onslaught, and the danger to the empire of Constantinople’.95 To the emperor that seemed an acceptable trade off for a settlement to be reached with the papacy. In any case, Vatatzes did not abandon the alliance at the time, as he apparently sent money to Frederick in 1248 to help him compensate for the loss of the imperial treasure at Vittoria, and in February 1250 he also sent troops to assist the western emperor.96 Nevertheless, Frederick was displeased. In 1250 he attempted to prevent the negotiations by detaining the Nicaean envoys to the papacy97 and wrote a stern letter to Vatatzes, reproving him for contacting the pope, who had never hesitated to call the Greeks schismatics and to fuel aggression against them and other Christians, including Frederick and his subjects. Frederick expressed wonder at the pope’s actions: This so-called great pontiff, who constantly and before everyone excommunicates your imperial majesty and all the Romans [that is, the Greeks] who are your subjects; who shamelessly calls heretics the most orthodox Romans, through whom the Christian faith has spread to the ends of the world — how did he not turn red with shame when he sent these religious men [Franciscans and Dominicans] to your majesty for that affair? How does he, who is responsible for the schism, deceitfully attempt to assign blame to those who are blameless? […] From where did those people, our prelates, receive weapons to bear against Christians, and to put on a breastplate instead of the holy tunic, to bear lances instead of the pastoral rod, and bows and poisonous arrows instead of pens; and [how can they] thus consider the salvific weapon of the cross as an affair of secondary importance? […] Those people, now, are not prelates of the Church of Christ and pastors of Israel but rapacious wolves, wild beasts who devour the flock of Christ.98 95 

Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, vi, 254–59, at 258: ‘totum transmarinum negotium necnon et imminentem Tartaricam tempestatem ac imperii Constantinopolitani discrimen […] humeris nostris imponere spondebamus’. 96  Friedrich II, ‘Le Lettere greche’, ed. by Festa, no. i, pp. 14–16; Friedrich II, ‘Quattro lettere greche’, ed. by Merendino, no. 1, pp. 318–21; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204– 1261), p. 150; Merendino, ‘Federico II e Giovanni III Vatatzes’, p. 375. It also appears that Nicaean troops were present at the siege of Parma in 1248: Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II., pp. 87–89. 97  The envoys were held for a year and a half (by Manfred after the death of Frederick in December 1250): Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 182–87; Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, p. 288. 98  Friedrich II, ‘Le Lettere greche’, ed. by Festa, no. iii, pp. 21–28; Friedrich II, ‘Quattro lettere greche’, ed. by Merendino, no. 2, pp. 322–31 (October 1250); Merendino, ‘Federico II

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

163

Frederick’s actions and tone indicate that he considered the negotiations between Nicaea and the papacy as a serious enough reason for concern. The importance that Innocent assigned to these negotiations is obvious by the fact that he consented to send none other than the minister-general of the Franciscans, John of Parma, who was even authorized to hold a general council in the East concerning the filioque, (the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit), should the Greeks request this. The convocation of an ecumenical council to deal with questions of dogma was indeed one of the main demands of the Greek Church that the papacy had long denied.99 The legate’s original authorization regarding the council was strictly limited to the addition of the filioque and not to any other issue that might be raised; however, this restriction was apparently lifted before negotiations went ahead in the Synod of Nymphaeum.100 Most telling, however, was the pope’s acceptance to negotiate the issue of sovereignty over Constantinople, to which we will return. These negotiations for union lasted long and came closer than any previous attempt to a conclusion. Antonino Franchi has argued that such a straightforward agreement on both sides was not repeated even in the union effected at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274.101 The willingness on both sides to negotiate and make concessions can be clearly seen in a series of letters and embassies that the papal curia exchanged with Vatatzes and Patriarch Manuel. Our main interest in the negotiations is that they represent a decisive step away from the use of crusading as the papacy’s dominant policy in Frankish Greece. This is made more evident by some of the terms discussed and agreed upon.102 e Giovanni III Vatatzes’, pp. 377–81; Wellas, Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II., pp. 18–25; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 141–53: ‘Πῶς; οὗτος ὁ λεγόμενος μέγας ἀρχιερεὺς, ὁ πάντων ἐνώπιον καθ’ ἑκάστην τὴν βασιλείαν σου ὀνομαστὶ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ σὲ Ῥωμαίους ἀφορισμῷ καθυποβάλλων, αἱρετικοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοδοξοτάτους Ῥωμαίους, ἐξ ὧν ἡ πίστις τῶν Χριστιανῶν εἰς τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐξῆλθε πέρατα, ἀναισχύντως καλῶν, τοιούτους ἄνδρας πνευματικοὺς κατ’ αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν σου ἀποστέλλειν οὐκ ἠρυθρίασε; πῶς; ὁ τοῦ σχίσματος αἴτιος δολερῶς ὑπεισέρχεται, ἵνα τοῖς ἀναιτίοις εἰσφέρῃ ἀντέγκλημα; […] Πόθεν δὲ οὗτοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀρχιερεῖς παρέλαβον ὅπλα φέρειν κατὰ Χριστιανῶν καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς διπλοΐδος ἐνδύεσθαι θώρακα, ἀντὶ δὲ βακτηρίας ποιμαντικῆς λόγχας, καὶ ἀντὶ καλάμου τόξα φέρειν καὶ πικροφόρους ὀιστούς, κατὰ πάρεργον τὸ σωτήριον ὅπλον τοῦ Σταυροῦ κατέχοντες; […] Τοιοῦτοι σήμερον ποιμένες ἐν Ἰσραὴλ καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἀρχιερεῖς, ἀλλὰ λύκοι ἅρπαγες, θῆρες ἄγριοι κατεσθίοντες τὸν λαὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ.’ 99  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos  4749–50; Franchi, La svolta políticoecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 28–36; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 88–92. 100  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 36, 63–64. 101  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, p. 203. 102  The definitive work on the negotiations of 1249–54 is the monograph by Antonino Franchi (Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio), a detailed reconstruction

164 Chapter 4

Responding to Vatatzes’s initiative and request, Innocent dispatched John of Parma at the head of a delegation that arrived in Nicaea in late 1249. A synod was then convened at Nymphaeum. A wide range of issues were discussed, including the filioque, papal primacy and relevant ecclesiological issues, rites and liturgical practices, and, significantly, the Greek claims over the city of Constantinople and the patriarchates of the East.103 The synod was apparently fruitful, resulting in specific and far-reaching proposals for union, the Capitula pacis or Capitula recognitionis et petitionis. These proposals were then sent to the pope to consider, discuss, and finalize. Bringing them to the curia, in the summer of 1250, was a large and imposing Byzantine delegation, ‘the second most “solemn” one, after that present at the Council of Florence in 1439’, according to Franchi, with the participation of at least four archbishops, sixteen bishops, and several dignitaries and noblemen of the empire of Nicaea.104 In the subsequent meeting with the pope in Perugia, which was delayed for a year and a half as the envoys had been detained by Frederick II and Manfred until late 1251,105 Innocent gave his answer (the Responsum) to the proposals of the Synod of Nymphaeum.106 The Byzantine delegation then returned to Nicaea for deliberation and, eventually, ratification of the resulting agreement for union. After some additional delays (on account of a temporary resumption of hostilities in 1252–53 and the detention of the embassy this time by Conrad IV from the summer to December 1253),107 the delegation brought the ratified text to the pope by early 1254 and probably departed for Nicaea early in the summer with the final agreement. But before more steps could be taken towards implementing Church Union, the protagonists on both sides died in short succession: Patriarch Manuel II in late October 1254, Emperor John III Vatatzes on 3 November 1254, and Innocent IV on 7 December 1254. Negotiations were interrupted, to be taken up two years later by Theodore II Lascaris and Pope Alexander IV but with little success. and analysis of the negotiations, based on virtually all available evidence, some of which was previously unpublished. All other accounts should be read against it (for example, Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 70–71; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 88–92; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 226–27). 103  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 75–82. 104  See Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 135–39. 105  Borsari, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, p. 288; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 182–87. 106  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 194–99. 107  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 92; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 234–39; for the resumption of hostilities in 1252–53, see below, pp. 168–69.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

165

The agreement on union, as already stated, was based on the deliberations of the Synod of Nymphaeum (the Capitula) and Innocent’s reply to them (the Responsum). These terms survive in the correspondence of Alexander IV, when negotiations were resumed in 1256. 108 The main points can be summarized as follows: papal primacy was recognized in both the ecclesiological and the dogmatic plane, that is, the pope was owed canonical obedience; he was to have the precedence in councils and the first word in questions of dogma — as long as he did not contravene the scriptures and the decrees of previous councils — while the papal curia was to be a court of appeal and arbitration for all cases (Capitula recognitionis). In exchange, the pope was requested to recognize and reinstate the rights of the Greek side over the city of Constantinople and the patriarchates of the East, and by extension to remove the Latin emperor and the Latin patriarchs, with the exception that the Latin patriarch of Antioch — who was Innocent IV’s nephew — was to be tolerated for his lifetime (Capitula petitionis).109 In his response, the pope more or less straightforwardly approved the concessions made by the Greek Church. He noted his disagreement on the fact that the Greek side had requested for the filioque to be excepted from his dogmatic authority, but conceded that a final solution could be achieved later on and that the Nicene Creed did not need to be altered. As for the Greek requests, he acknowledged them, but he stated that his reply could only be based on law and justice and that he saw no legitimate reason to depose Baldwin. Nevertheless, ‘in order for nothing that could help the reconciliation with the Greek Church to be left out’ (‘ut nichil de hiis, quae reconciliationi Orientalis Ecclesiae cooperantur, omitteret’), the pope offered to act as an arbitrator between Baldwin and Vatatzes so that they could reach an ‘amicable agreement’. If that failed, the pope offered to the Greek emperor an ‘exact complement of justice’ (‘exactum iustitiae complementum’). Franchi, noting that this papal offer is hard to translate accurately, has opted for the interpretation that the pope offered to make satisfaction to the rights of Vatatzes, which confirmed ‘the political orientation of abandoning the fragile and moribund Latin Empire of Constantinople’, since for Vatatzes nothing else would do but for the return of Constantinople to Greek sovereignty; a different interpretation has been offered, however, by Bernard Stolte, who argues that what Innocent offered was a juridical procedure, a litigation of Vatatzes against 108 

Published in Schillmann, ‘Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV’, pp.  115–18 (= Acta Alexandri PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 28; Franchi, La svolta políticoecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 83–87, 194–99). 109  For an extensive discussion and analysis of the terms, see especially Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 110–33, 202–15.

166 Chapter 4

Baldwin before the curia.110 In either case, the papal reply was a potent confirmation of current curial political theory, that the pope had the right to judge the legitimacy of temporal power and pronounce decisions as to the incumbents of any imperial or royal throne, something that Innocent IV had forcefully demonstrated in the Council of Lyon by ‘deposing’ Frederick II.111 However, it is most unlikely that Vatatzes would be willing to actually submit the legitimacy of his rule to the judgment of the Apostolic See. His main aim, as already stated, was to achieve the de jure papal recognition of his authority over Constantinople once he had managed to impose it de facto. This prospect would deprive the Latin Empire of crucial papal support and protect Nicaea from further crusading aggression. That this was the main objective on the Greek side is corroborated by the testimony of the historian George Pachymeres, who related that Michael VIII, in order to defend his policy of Church Union leading up to the Second Council of Lyon (1274), invoked the precedent of John Vatatzes. In summarizing in this context the negotiations of 1249–54, Pachymeres, twice in his narrative, stated that the Greek side had agreed to make concessions to the pope regarding papal primacy and commemoration, if the pope broke off his alliance with the Latins who held Constantinople and promised not to send any further assistance to them. In the first instance, the Greek historian reported that, in order to win over possible opponents to his unionist policy, [Michael Palaiologos] referred to what had happened at the synod [of Nymphaeum] that had taken place under John Vatatzes for that purpose, namely that our prelates were ready to carry out the liturgy there and commemorate the pope, if he promised that no help would be sent to those who held Constantinople, and that he would have no alliance with them […]; comparing thus that situation with the one at hand, and finding that the present need was more pressing than the earlier one, since then they were striving to gain the things they did not have [that is, Constantinople], whereas now they risked losing what they already held, he [Michael] proposed the same course of action as then; for there was no other way to convince the pope to take the side of the Greeks, if they did not say and do these things.

A little later in his narration, Pachymeres similarly mentioned that, drawing support from history, which was imparted to him [Michael VIII] by his advisors [Constantine Meliteniotes, George of Cyprus, and Manuel Holobolos], he mentioned as an example the Emperor John Vatatzes and the prelates around 110  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 208–12; Stolte, ‘Vatatzes versus Baldwin’. 111  See Abulafia, Frederick II, pp. 372–74.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

167

him, and their patriarch, Manuel, and how they conceded for the prelates who had gone there to perform the liturgy and commemorate the pope, if only he abstained from the help of those who held Constantinople.112

Discussing the question of Constantinople was already a victory for Nicaea. It is unsurprising that Innocent affirmed his consideration for the legal rights of the Latin emperor, a faithful son of the Roman Church and, up to that point, the beneficiary of nearly unrelenting papal support. Most telling, however, as to how far papal policy was ready to go towards satisfying the Greek request, was Innocent’s reply on the matter of the Greek patriarchate. Innocent consented for the appellation ‘patriarch of Constantinople’ to be used from that point onwards by the Greek patriarch; up to that point the papacy addressed him as ‘Archbishop of the Greeks’ (‘Archiepiscopo Graecorum’), which was actually the form of address retained even after the Church Union of 1274.113 Furthermore, the pope continued, he would accept his return to the ancient patriarchal see, ‘after the city of Constantinople passes to the authority of the [Greek] emperor — in whichever way this might come about’.114 This statement indicated that the Latin Empire was now officially written off as an instrument of papal policy in Romania and there was to be no further crusade for its rescue. But before the agreements were put in practice, the consecutive deaths of the protagonists prevented any further action and practically annulled the results of the negotiations.115 There are two more issues to be examined with regard to the union negotiations of 1249–54, namely the papal stance towards crusading in Frankish Greece 112 

Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent, ii, 471, 479, pars v.10 and v.12: ‘Συγκρίνων γὰρ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δούκα Ἰωάννου συνοδικῶς γεγονὸς παρ’ αἰτίαν τοῦ ἀποστέλλειν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ συμμαχεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀποσχέσθαι, ὡς ἑτοίμων τῶν ἡμετέρων ὄντων λειτουργεῖν ἐκείσε καὶ μνημονεύειν τοῦ πάπα ταῦθ’ ὑπισχνουμένου […] συγκρίνων οὖν ἐκεῖνο πρòς τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαστικώτερον εὑρίσκων τò νῦν ἢ τò πρότερον, ὅσῳ τότε μὲν προσλαβεῖν ἠπείγοντο τò μὴ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὄν, νῦν δ’ ἀποβαλεῖν τὰ ἐν χερσὶ κινδυνεύουσι, τὰ αὐτὰ προὔτεινε καὶ οὗτος τοῖς πάλαι μηδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἔχειν πείθειν τòν πάπαν ὑπερμαχεῖν τῶν Γραικῶν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα λέγοι καὶ πράττοι’; ‘Καί γε λαμβάνων καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν συνάρσεις, προὐβάλλετο μὲν τὸν Δούκαν Ἰωάννην καὶ βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ’ ἐκεῖνον ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ τὸν πατριάρχην σφῶν Μανουήλ, ὅπως ἐνεδίδουν ἀπελθόντας ἀρχιερεῖς λειτουργεῖν τε καὶ μνημονεύειν, εἰ μόνον ὁ πάπας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει βοηθείας ἀπόσχοιτο’. 113  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, p. 213 and notes 332 and 334. 114  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 199, 213–14: ‘postquam Constantinopolitanam civitatem ad eiusdem imperatoris [= Graecorum] dominium devolvi — casu quolibet contigisset’. 115  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 95; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 250–59.

168 Chapter 4

during that period and, second, Innocent’s attitude towards the Greeks. Despite the obvious interest on both sides in the negotiations, it appears that there was a temporary break in communications. In 1252, the threatening presence of large Nicaean forces in the Balkans, where they were fighting against Theodore and Michael II of Epiros,116 probably induced Innocent to call the clergy of Frankish Greece to provide subsidies to Venice and to the prince of Achaia for the defence of Constantinople against Vatatzes.117 In February 1253, absolution from excommunication was granted to Latin mercenaries in the service of Vatatzes if they reverted to the Latin side.118 Moreover, Innocent did not take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the vacancy of the patriarchal see of Constantinople from mid-1251 to reach some compromise with Nicaea.119 Instead, he appointed in February 1253 the Venetian Pantaleone Giustiniani as patriarch ‘and legate to the Latin Empire and the Christian army for its help’, with the professed hope that Venice would take special care for the empire’s protection.120 The new patriarch was given far-reaching privileges concerning the resources in Frankish Greece and funding through loans to be used ‘for the help of the empire and for his own needs’.121 The patriarch was, furthermore, given the right to preach the crusade for the Latin Empire in both Romania and Venice.122 This relapse into a confrontational approach towards Nicaea is significant in two ways. On the one hand, it highlights how engrained crusading had become in papal dealings 116 

Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, p. 227; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp. 151–54. 117  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 5923 (20 August 1252). 118  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 6337. 119  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 92; see Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, p. 123 and note 190. Patriarch Nicholas had been at Lyon at least since the council in 1245 and it seems that he never returned to Constantinople, as he died in 1251 at Milan — see Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 290–92. 120  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 6804: ‘having a firm hope and trust that the Church of Constantinople, through your diligence, and the protection of the Venetian people, whom (after God) we wish to honour through your promotion, will thrive, propped up by an increase in both spiritual and temporal matters’ (‘firmam spem fiduciamque tenentes quod [Constantinopolitana] ecclesia per tuam industriam, [Venetorum] populi presidio, quem in tua promotione secundum Deum honorare intendimus, fulciendam spiritualibus et temporalibus proficiet incrementis’); Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, p. 292. 121  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 6828, 6831–33, 6835–36, 6838–39, 6848–50; Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 292–93; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, p. 222. 122  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 6829, 6845.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

169

with Frankish Greece, since Innocent was ready to fall back to it immediately once the alternative avenue of Church Union ran into difficulties. On the other hand, it also confirms the papacy’s choice during most of the 1240s and 1250s to limit assistance for the Latin Empire to strictly local resources, avoiding any generalized appeals to the West. On the contrary, Franchi denies that there was a temporary change of policy and argues against the ‘so-called “crusade” against Vatatzes in 1253’.123 One of his main arguments is that the alterations in formulation and terminology between the bulls of 1253 and the pronouncement of the Council of Lyon, Arduis mens, are to be explained by the more positive attitude of the papacy towards the Greeks because of the efforts for Church Union which had been underway since 1249. Setting aside the fact that it is precarious to argue for a friendly attitude based on the wording of what is, after all, a crusade bull against Nicaea, Franchi’s thesis is problematic, since he fails to identify the bulls of 1253 as essentially reproductions of the bull Inter cetera desiderabilia, issued by Innocent already in September 1245. Therefore the argument that significant changes were made on account of the negotiations in 1249–52 loses all foundation and credibility: the differences noted by Franchi between the conciliar decree and the crusade bull were already in place in 1245.124 Nonetheless, and despite that temporary setback, the papal curia and the Nicaean court eventually returned to the negotiating table and pushed ahead for a commonly acceptable compromise. No doubt the union negotiations of 1249– 54 represented overall a break from crusading aggression as the prevalent papal policy in Romania, while a considerable willingness for concessions was declared and displayed by both sides. This change of policy has led some scholars, most notably Joseph Gill, to argue that there was a general change of attitude under Pope Innocent IV, who ‘had a great sympathy for the Greeks’.125 This assertion, however, can hardly be sustained, once one looks into papal formulations and the curia’s point of view during this period. The consistent dismissal of Greek practices and rites, accusations of schism and of heresy, and the standard grouping of Greeks with ‘other infidels’ (‘alios infideles’) were the rule under the pontificate of Innocent, no less than it had been in the days of Gregory. The change of policy 123 

Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 221–25. See above, pp. 148–50, for Arduis mens (Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295–96) and the crusade bull Inter cetera desiderabilia of 1245 (‘Bulle d’Innocent IV’, ed. by Delorme, pp. 309–10); the differences between the bull of 1245 and those of 1253 are insignificant in this respect. 125  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 96. 124 

170 Chapter 4

was not preceded or followed by a change of wording, and probably not of attitude, either. The Greek side was consistently blamed as responsible for the schism, even in the context of negotiations for union and in papal instructions for the protection of uniate clergy in the East. For example, the relevant bull for Cyprus in July 1250 spoke of the Greeks who should ‘tear away from the odious schism by which the East was separated, and return to the indivisible unity of catholic purity’, while in the brief of 1249 concerning the mission of John of Parma it was again noted that ‘the Greek Church, having for a long time abandoned the path of truth, has strayed in error’.126 Instructions to the mendicant orders made reference to the friars who were ‘at the lands of Saracens, pagans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Cumans, […] and of other infidels of the East or of any other places’.127 Similarly Nicholas da Calvi, the pope’s biographer and close friend, whose account can be expected to represent the point of view of Innocent’s curia, related the pope’s activity which was aimed at the salvation of ‘the souls of lost nations’ (‘animas gentium perditarum’), and, among his missions to the Norwegians, Ruthenians, Letts, Mongols, and Muslims, he also included John of Parma’s mission to the Greeks and to Emperor Vatatzes, to bring them back to the certainty of the faith and the unity of the Church, […] and by asking them questions about their errors, in which they kept erring, and about their obstinacy in which they persisted, […] to finally reach the point and denounce them, so that they could be detached from their views, which had no solid basis.128

It is true that Innocent dispatched numerous missions to the Christian East and at times allowed for greater concessions than his predecessors had done, for example in being prepared to accept Greek liturgical practices, the marriage of 126 

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 4769 ( July 1250): ‘Grecos se a dampnato discessionis orientalis scismate abscindentes et redeuntes ad individuam sinceritatis catholice unitatem’; Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 4749 (May 1249): ‘Grecorum ecclesia jamdiu deserto veritatis tramite per devium erroris incessit’. See also the accusation of heresy in Cyprus: Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 2058 ( July 1246). 127  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 7753 ( July 1253): ‘in terras Sarracenorum, paganorum, Grecorum, Bulgalorum [sic], Cumanorum, […] aliorum[que] infidelium Orientis seu quarumque aliarum partium’; see Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 1362 (March 1245), 2122 (October 1246), 6819 ( June 1253, p. 279). 128  ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, ed. by Pagnotti, pp.  91–93, par. 17: ‘ad Grecos quoque et Baccium imperatorem […] ad reducendum illos ad fidei certitudinem et Ecclesie unitatem, […] ordinatis hinc inde questionibus super […] eorum erroribus quibus errabant et in sua pertinacia se tenebant, […] decidentes ipsi a suis opinionibus, cum non haberent eorum stabilem fulcimentum, deventum est tandem et denuntiatum’.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

171

priests, and perhaps most strikingly, the existence of a Greek hierarchy parallel to, and independent from, the Latin one, under direct apostolic jurisdiction. Most characteristic in this respect was the legation of the Franciscan Lawrence of Portugal to the East, in 1246–47, who was instructed specifically to protect Greeks from any violence and injustice perpetrated by the Latins, and who proved more than keen to come to an understanding with Greek prelates and establish a uniate Greek Church, subject to the papacy without intermediaries and with no obligations to the local Latin hierarchy. This policy caused resentment and reactions on the part of the Latin prelates in the East, which eventually resulted in the failure of this attempt, but in the short term, during Innocent’s pontificate, it succeeded in bringing about the submission of both the Greek patriarch of Antioch and the archbishop of Cyprus to the pope. Furthermore, Innocent had declared that he was ready to discuss some of the issues with the Greek Church in a unionist Council.129 But his outlook was consistently conservative. Inescapably, he shared in the papacy’s own conception of its role and power within the Church Universal, which differed radically from that of the Eastern Churches, leaving little ground for a union on an equal footing the way the Byzantine Church might envisage it. The concessions he allowed were conditional upon obedience to the Roman See and only to be tolerated as temporary aberrations. As Wilhelm de Vries has concluded upon examining the pope’s policy towards Eastern Christians: ‘in Innocent IV’s eyes, ideal union was the complete assimilation to the Roman Church, also in respect of rite and usages’.130 In some respects Innocent’s position was even more rigid than his predecessors’, for example, in the introduction of the Purgatory in the creed of the Greek Church of Cyprus, or in his initial insistence for the filioque to be incorporated into the Nicene Creed, a request that had clearly not been made by Gregory’s envoys in 1232–34 (Innocent himself would eventually drop this clause).131 And, of course, one should always keep in mind that Innocent IV had made a generalized call, in the Council of Lyon, for all the faithful to strive for the defence of the Latin Empire against the Greek ‘enemies’ and ‘the blindness of their errors’, proclaiming crusading action and offering indulgences to those who would fight against them, and equating them with the other enemies 129 

Vries, ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’, pp. 115–17, 122–28, 131; Roncaglia, ‘Frère Laurent de Portugal’; Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States, pp. 322–24; Coureas, The Latin Church in Cyprus, pp. 287–96. 130  Vries, ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’, pp. 120–21. 131  Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 61–64, 203–08; Vries, ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’, p. 128.

172 Chapter 4

of Christendom.132 In general, therefore, such papal views and pronouncements can hardly support the aphorism that ‘both Latins and Greeks were intolerant, but the Latins less than the Greeks’.133 Even if one is inclined to ignore so totally the historical realities of the time and the psychological impact of 1204 and the Latin conquest, it cannot be denied that the Greek Church offered major concessions during the union negotiations of 1249–54. Although the motivation was undoubtedly mainly political (the effort to avert Latin aggression), the same was the case with the papacy at the time. The healing of the schism, meaning ‘the return of the Greek Church to obedience’ from the Roman point of view, was a constant thread of papal policy in the East. Supporting the Latin conquest of Byzantium was one way of resolving the issue; direct negotiations for union with the leadership of the Greek Church was another and between 1204 and 1249 a secondary one, to which the papacy did not devote more that fleeting attention. The shift from the one avenue to the other under Innocent IV was to a large extent dictated by the pressure of contemporary circumstances and the needs of the overall policy of the Apostolic See, rather than by any deep-felt amicable attitude to the Greeks.

5. The Policy of Alexander IV While Innocent IV made little effort to procure crusading help for Frankish Greece after 1247, his successor was going to do even less for the Latin Empire. Alexander IV displayed almost no interest in the defence of Constantinople, and it is indicative of this lack of interest that there is not a single reference to Emperor Baldwin in his registers. Practically his only relevant action was in the first days of his pontificate, when, following in the steps of his predecessors, he issued the token letter expressing his concern for Latin Romania and pronouncing his willingness to take measures on its behalf.134 However, the measures, as in the recent past, involved only local resources. In his letter, the pope deplored the state of the empire but focused mostly on the needs of Frankish Morea. He instructed his agents to urge all laity and clergy in the principality of Achaia to provide 132  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Tanner, i, 295–96: ‘from the yoke of the enemy’ (‘de inimicorum jugo’), ‘if [the empire] were deprived of the support of the faithful, and left to be freely oppressed by the enemies’ (‘si fidelium destitueretur suffragio, et relinqueretur hostibus libere opprimendum’), ‘after the crushing hammer of the enemies […], and after the blindness of error’ (‘post conterentem inimicorum maleum […] et post assertionis erroneae caecitatem’), etc. 133  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 96. 134  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 34 (2 January 1255).

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

173

subsidies for its defence against the attacks and the violence of the ‘common enemies’.135 Alexander also stressed that the papacy was constantly trying to find ways to assist the empire and that, despite past toils and expenses, the effort should continue. But he was to disprove his own rhetoric through his actions (or rather inaction) towards Frankish Greece during the rest of his pontificate. Apart from that letter, he sent only a handful more to the Latin clergy and laity of Romania, most notably trying to resolve the friction between them and the Latin patriarch and to convince them to provide him with much-needed subsidies, on account of the Greek aggression.136 In none of his letters is there any allusion to a crusade for Frankish Greece or to the relevant arguments regarding the benefit for the Faith and the Holy Land. The only element reminiscent of crusading was the confirmation of Patriarch Pantaleone Giustiniani in 1255 as ‘legate in the empire of Constantinople and in the Christian army for the help of that empire’, which was nothing more than a formality.137 Assistance was limited to minor financial subsidies and was strictly localized. The only piece of correspondence with the West surviving in Alexander’s registers which makes mention of Romania is the confirmation of the exemption of the people and clergy of Parma from any subsidies and crusade taxation to the Holy Land and the Latin Empire.138 One assumes that it was the issue of the Holy Land that prompted the inhabitants of Parma to ask for this confirmation rather than any interest in the Latin Empire (which just happened to be part of the original formulation of the exemption by Innocent IV).139 The pope’s other preoccupations further undermined any interest in the Latin Empire. Alexander was not a forceful personality but a peaceful man who was overwhelmed by the problems plaguing the Church and by the numerous enemies who threatened its authority.140 The death of Frederick II in 1250 135  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 34 (2 January 1255): ‘for the preservation of the aforementioned regions [that is, the Morea and Achaia] against the hostile assaults and the violent attacks of the common enemies’ (‘ad dictarum regionum conservationem adversus hostiles insultus et impugnationes hostium communium violentas’). 136  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 2072 (15 July 1257); see also Wolff, ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople’, pp. 293–94. 137  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, nos 182–83 (25 February 1255). 138  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 2703 (13 December 1258). 139  Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 6460 (29 March 1253). 140  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 104; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 361–62; Schillmann, ‘Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV’, p. 108.

174 Chapter 4

had not removed the Hohenstaufen danger. The main problem Alexander was urgently called to face concerned the kingdom of Sicily, where Manfred, the illegitimate son of Frederick II, had gained control of the island and challenged the authority of the papacy very close to its own power-base. Furthermore, the rise of other Ghibelline powers seemed once more to jeopardize the security of the Papal States, which was always a particularly sensitive issue for the Apostolic See. Alexander responded to the situation in Italy by calling crusades against Manfred, as well as against the Ghibelline leaders in the March of Treviso, Ezzelino and Alberich of Romano.141 In the same period, the pope also authorized crusading expeditions in Spain, as well as in Eastern Europe and the Baltic.142 The defence of Frankish Greece did not seem to rate very high in his priorities. The only other instance in which Alexander was involved in the affairs of Romania was afforded by the overtures of Theodore II Lascaris. In 1256, the emperor of Nicaea sent an embassy to the pope with the proposal of resuming their predecessors’ negotiations for Church Union. Alexander promptly responded by sending Bishop Constantine of Orvieto as his legate.143 In accepting the agreement between Innocent IV and Vatatzes as a platform for the negotiations, Alexander also continued the policy of discounting the Latin Empire as an instrument of papal policy in the East and as a recipient of crusading support. The legate was urged to make an attempt to gain greater concessions from Theodore, but nowhere in his instructions were the local Latin interests upheld. Furthermore, these instructions made it clear that the pope was eager for an agreement to be reached, as the legate was authorized, in turn, to make a series of concessions towards that goal, if necessary.144 The Greek side, however, was not satisfied with the extent of the legate’s authorization with regards to the demands 141 

See Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 16–17, 167–69; Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 361–63; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, i, 94–289; Toubert, ‘Les Déviations de la croisade au milieu du xiiie siècle’. 142  See Cole, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, p. 186; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 241–44. 143  Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others, no. 1406. Our most important source is a series of papal letters to the legate, detailing his mission. See Schillmann, ‘Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV’ (= Acta Alexandri PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, nos 28–28k); and Laurent, ‘Le Pape Alexandre IV’, pp. 37–54. It was in this instance that Alexander summarized the negotiations and the preliminary agreement (the Capitula and the Responsum) between Innocent IV and Vatatzes; see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 92–94, 97–100; Franchi, La svolta político-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio, pp. 83–90. 144  Acta Alexandri PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, no. 28, pp. 41–42; Laurent, ‘Le Pape Alexandre IV’, pp. 46–47.

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

175

of the emperor, and particularly the request for an immediate recognition of Greek rights over Constantinople. Constantine was sent back with a letter from Patriarch Arsenios Autoreianos stating that more progress could only be achieved when such authorization was given. The patriarch commented that ‘the legate had plenary authority to receive [the Greek concessions], but not even a portion of that authority to offer anything, and words remained words’. No further negotiations followed. Theodore Lascaris felt strong and confident enough not to care too much about the stance of the papacy and was not willing to proceed with the negotiations without more tangible concessions on the pope’s part.145 Alexander showed no further interest in the affairs of Romania for the rest of his pontificate, abstaining from both union negotiations and crusading support for the Latin Empire. Apparently Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259–82) sent an embassy regarding Church Union, to which Alexander did not respond.146 According to the testimony of a letter written by a Templar in the Holy Land, Alexander had proclaimed a council to convene in July 1261 to discuss five topics, among which was also the affair of Constantinople.147 However, Alexander IV’s own letter from 1261 referring to the council only mentions the Tartar threat.148

6. Conclusions There are two general observations that can be made on Innocent IV’s policy towards Frankish Greece. The one is that he eventually took the decision to abandon crusading in favour of Church Union negotiations as his main approach to the affairs of Romania. The other is that there is a marked disparity between this eventual choice and his rhetoric, which extolled the importance of the Latin Empire to the point of advocating universal action on its behalf at the First Council of Lyon. Evidently, then, Innocent IV, like his predecessors, regarded 145  Arsenios’s letter is published in Acta Alexandri PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar, Appendix, no. 6, pp. 133–36, at p. 136: ‘Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὗτος μέρος μὲν εἶχε τñς ἁγιωσύνης σοῦ ἐξουσίας […], πρὸς γὰρ τὸ δέξασθαι τετελειωμένος ἦν λεγάτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀντιδοῦναι οὐκ εἶχέ τι λεγάτον οὐδὲ πολλοστημόριον — διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ λόγοι μεμενήκασι λόγοι’. See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 98–100 and note 9, p. 277 (Constantine apparently died in the East in 1256 before being able to return to Rome); Laurent, ‘Le Pape Alexandre IV’, pp. 47–55. 146  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 77. 147  Monumenta Boica, xxix.2, 202; Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 118–19. 148  Alexander’s letter is preserved in Annales de Burton, ed. by Luard, pp. 495–99, esp. pp. 496–98; similarly reported by the Hermanni Altahensis annales, ed. by Jaffé, p. 402.

176 Chapter 4

Frankish Greece as a valid crusading front, and the change of policy did not mirror a radical ideological shift. Rather it was imposed by a combination of the pressure from external circumstances and the failure of the crusade to produce any satisfactory long-term results regarding the security of the Latin Empire. Innocent proclaimed his concern for the Latin Empire from the beginning of his pontificate. The designation that he used for the Latin patriarch, as his ‘plenipotentiary legate in the empire of Constantinople and in the Christian army for the help of that empire’,149 indicates that he also considered the existence of the empire as an ongoing crusade venture. His proclamations regarding Constantinople at the Council of Lyon were traditional in the sense that, like his predecessors, he called for help from the West within the context of crusading. The ‘innovation’ was the fact that the collective responsibility of the Church Universal for its ‘exalted member’ was formalized and confirmed through a general council. So, in terms of rhetoric the Latin Empire remained a worthy recipient of crusading assistance and, in theory, that role was even upgraded. The defence of Frankish Greece had been established among the crusading responsibilities of Christendom in western perceptions, and that was not limited only to the papacy. In this respect, King Béla’s forceful letter to Innocent IV around 1247 was as much a confirmation of the theoretical status of the crusades for the Latin Empire, as it was a challenge to their necessity. The Hungarian king referred to the Latin Empire and the Holy Land in a single breath, as ventures that diverted crusading resources away from the much more urgently needed defence of the eastern frontier of Europe against the Mongol threat.150 Furthermore, earlier in his letter, Béla had also argued for the importance of the defensive preparation of his kingdom, particularly along the Danube, since security in the region was essential in order for help to be able to reach both the Latin Empire and the Holy Land.151 The Latin Empire was thus mentioned twice in the same framework as 149 

Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 8: ‘plenum legationis officium in imperio Constantinopolitano et in exercitu Christiano pro subsidio eiusdem imperii’; see Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, nos 32 ( July 1243), 4561 (May 1249), and for the next patriarch, Pantaleone Giustiniani, nos 6668 and 6676 ( June 1253). 150  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 230–32, no. 440 (see above, p. 157). 151  Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam, ed. by Theiner, i, 231: ‘we intend and hope […] that we will able (with the help of the Hospitallers) to expand the catholic faith, along the Danube and up to the sea of Constantinople, and in this way suitable reinforcements will be able to reach the empire of Romania and even the Holy Land’ (‘intendimus et speramus […] quod propagines catholice fidei, sicut protenditur Danubius usque ad mare Constantinopolitanum,

Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and the Abandonment of the Latin Empire

177

the Holy Land, and help to it was acknowledged in a matter-of-fact way as one of the concerns of the Latin West. Similarly, Frederick II had stated that he would undertake efforts for the Holy Land, for Romania, and against the Mongols, if the pope were to make peace with him.152 Thus Frankish Greece was again included among the causes which were important for Christendom, most probably under the influence of the main themes announced for the Council of Lyon. In a similar vein, it was reported that, in 1260–61, the French king and his nobles had agreed on a plan for taxation to be imposed on all the laity and clergy of the kingdom, the funds from which would be used for the help of the Holy Land or the Latin Empire in case they were not eventually needed for the defence of the kingdom of France.153 Yet the reality of crusading in Frankish Greece was quite different at this juncture. Innocent’s pontificate started where Gregory’s had left off, namely in a phase of retrenchment where support for Constantinople was confined to monetary subventions and local resources, because of the pressing needs of the struggle with the Hohenstaufen and, possibly, on account also of the earlier reactions to Gregory’s efforts to divert part of the Holy Land crusade towards Romania. The Council of Lyon marked a departure from this model by calling on resources from all over the Latin West, though arguably still focusing on funding rather than recruitment. This proved short-lived, however, and the pope took no further action to promote the cause of the Latin Empire in the West after 1247. In effect, by 1249 Innocent turned to Church Union negotiations with the Greeks of Nicaea. Such a compromise could be cost-effective at a time when papal resources were extremely strained, and it appeared more promising than the apparently ineffective crusading support for Frankish Greece. The negotiations made considerable progress, and the pope appeared willing to consider the issue of a restoration of Greek rule over Constantinople. Except for a temporary reversal in 1253 (when, in any case, reinforcements to the empire were again confined at a local level), the pope pursued this policy to the end of his pontificate. This signified the abandonment of both the Latin Empire and the crusade for its protection. Alexander followed this approach to its logical conclusion by taking practically no action for the defence of Frankish Greece. Whatever references there were to […] per ipsos poterimus propagare, et sic Romanie imperio et eciam terre sancte poterunt impendere subsidia oportuna’). 152  See above, pp. 161–62. 153  Monumenta Boica, xxix.2, 201–02.

178

Chapter 4

the issue involved only local resources. The pope did respond positively to the overtures of Theodore Lascaris to resume the negotiations for Church Union which had been cut short by their predecessors’ deaths. However, nothing came out of this effort. Papal indifference to the fate of Frankish Greece seemed to be complete by the late 1250s. At this late stage it was the secular powers in Romania that tried to step in. It was already too late. Baldwin II and Mary of Brienne turned, once more, to Castile, as Alfonso X seemed to be at this point the only western sovereign able and willing to assist, but the plan for a marriage alliance failed to bear fruit.154 An alliance between William of Villehardouin, Michael II of Epiros, and Manfred of Sicily was shattered at the battle of Pelagonia, where Michael VIII’s army defeated its opponents and captured the prince of Achaia.155 Venice also made a last minute attempt. Doge Reniero Zeno authorized the garrisoning of Constantinople by a permanent force of a thousand men, to be raised and paid jointly by the Venetians and the Frankish lords of Romania.156 There was probably no time for its implementation, and it mattered little, for in the summer of 1261 Michael became the master of Constantinople. That brought about the rebirth not only of the Byzantine state but also of crusading interest in Frankish Greece.

154 

See Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 64–71, 80–81. See Geanakoplos, ‘Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration’. 156  Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 759–60, no. 13; Wolff, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, pp. 229–30. 155 

Chapter 5

Revival and Reorientation (1261–82): Papal Crusading Policy between Michael Palaiologos and Charles of Anjou

T

he Greek recovery of Constantinople, in July 1261, marks the beginning of a new era for crusading in Frankish Greece.1 Although the ultimate fate of the Latin Empire should not have been an unexpected development given its lamentable weakness during the last years of its existence, the fall of the imperial city was still a major event bound to stir the Latin world into action. It is, in a way, symbolic that the city fell into Greek hands at a time when the Apostolic See, the empire’s most dedicated protector, was vacant: Alexander IV had died on 25 May, while Urban IV was elected on 29 August 1261. Although since the late 1240s the papacy had shown itself progressively less inclined to use the crusade to support Latin Constantinople, the events of 1261 prompted a revival of crusading in Frankish Greece for the defence of the remaining Latin possessions and the reinstatement of the Latin Empire. It would prove a complex affair, because, as well as the reconstituted Byzantine Empire under Michael VIII Palaiologos, another new factor would soon make its appearance: the stellar rise of Charles of Anjou in Mediterranean politics. Angevin ambition, Palaiologan diplomacy, and the attempts of both sides to influence the policy 1 

For the events leading up to the Greek recovery of Constantinople, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 75–115.

180

Chapter 5

of the Apostolic See would take crusading in Frankish Greece in new and often conflicting directions. Crusading activities and western policy in Romania after 1261 have actually drawn more scholarly attention than has the preceding period.2 The factual framework has been sufficiently established. However, a lack of familiarity with the background of crusading in Frankish Greece in the period 1204–61 has affected interpretation. For example, some scholars have considered the use of crusade mechanisms in favour of the Latin Empire as an innovation of the period.3 Others have ignored this factor in appraising the importance of the other major theme of the period, the negotiations for union between the Latin and the Greek Churches,4 which, in our view, cannot be fully assessed without reference to crusading. It is essential, therefore, to revisit the developments of this period in light of the background that was established in the previous chapters, focusing on the continuities and changes in crusading in Frankish Greece and assessing the impact that the altered circumstances had on its characteristics, aims and outcome.

1. 1261–82: Outline of Main Events and Factors Urban IV (1261–64) reacted to the news of the fall of Constantinople with a crusade call for its reconquest and for the protection of the remaining Latin outposts in Romania, particularly the principality of Achaia. This call was dispatched through most of Europe, and its scale was reminiscent of the days of Gregory IX or of the First Council of Lyon. This, however, proved to be the last ‘traditional’ crusading call by the papacy for Frankish Greece. The appearance of Charles of Anjou significantly changed the character of western aggression against Byzantium. The crucial point was the signing of the Viterbo Treaties in May 1267, by which Charles was granted extensive rights over the Latin 2 

See especially Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstan­ tinopel; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West; Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 49–79; and Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’. 3  See, for example, Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 33, where he claims that Urban’s crusade call in 1262 was ‘the first [papal directive] in history to order the preaching of a crusade specifically against the Greeks’; see Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 83–84, similarly stating that the campaign planned for the principality of Achaia in 1264 was ‘the second crusade preached in the West specifically against the Greeks’. 4  See, for example, Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 32.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

181

Empire and the overlordship of the principality of Achaia, in exchange for his commitment to lead a campaign of reconquest against Byzantium. The treaties were to be the stepping stone as well as the legitimizing argument for Angevin designs in Romania from that point on. Clement IV (1265–68) sponsored the treaties and supported Charles’s plans. But, in fact, crusading mechanisms (such as indulgences, crusade preaching, and taxation) were not explicitly placed at the disposal of the king of Sicily for a campaign in Frankish Greece, either by Clement or later by Martin IV. During the long papal vacancy from 1268 to 1271, Charles dominated western policy in Romania. However, his efforts were frustrated when a decisive turn of papal policy away from crusading plans against Byzantium took place under Gregory X (1271–76). An enthusiastic proponent of reaching an agreement with the Greek Church, Gregory took negotiations, which had never been entirely abandoned, much further than his predecessors had. The climax was at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, where the reunification of the Greek and Latin Churches was proclaimed. Church Union precluded crusade action against the Greeks, so papal approval and support was denied to Charles’s designs in Romania, not only by Gregory, but also by his three successors, Innocent V (1276), John XXI (1276–77), and Nicholas III (1277–80), who persisted in the implementation of union even if their overall attitude towards the Greek side was stricter than Gregory’s. A final reversal of papal policy occurred under Martin IV (1281–85). A partisan of Charles, he annulled the Union of 1274 and gave his support to Angevin plans, though without preaching a crusade or granting indulgences for the planned expedition in Romania. Those plans were eventually shattered by the uprising of the Sicilian Vespers, which brought an end to Angevin domination in Sicily in 1282. The restoration of the Byzantine Empire at Constantinople and the involvement of Charles of Anjou were the two main new factors which shaped crusading in Frankish Greece during this period. Greek control over the Queen of Cities and its ancient patriarchate gave new weight to the rather worn arguments regarding the healing of the schism and the help to be offered to the Holy Land by way of Romania. The western policy of Michael Palaiologos was meant to address both points. He persistently pursued Church Union negotiations with the papacy, while also holding out the prospect of Byzantine assistance for the Holy Land, in order to deflect any western threats to the empire. The gravest such threat was Charles of Anjou, who, after the Viterbo Treaties, essentially took control of crusading in Frankish Greece out of the hands of the papacy and the Latin emperor, Baldwin II, who had been up to that point actively trying to procure support from Italy, France, and Spain for the restoration of his realm.

Chapter 5

182

Most of the period between 1267 and 1282 would evolve into a diplomatic and occasionally military duel between Charles and Michael. While the former vied to gain papal approval and allies for an attack against Byzantium, the latter strove to frustrate his efforts, by securing alliances with western powers, particularly Genoa and Venice, and by pushing for an ecclesiastical union with Rome, which would disqualify Byzantium as a crusading target. One of the striking features of the period is the policy of the Apostolic See, which as a result of these pressures oscillated between sanctioning anti-Byzantine aggression and pursuing negotiations with the Greek Church. This apparently contradictory approach was, to an extent, a conscious policy which served as a balancing act, exercising pressure on the Byzantine emperor for further concessions while keeping the expansion of Angevin power in check. At the same time, however, it was also a display of papal inability to pursue a vigorous policy in Romania while other preoccupations were more pressing in the Holy Land and especially in Italy. There, the clash with the Hohenstaufen (Manfred up to 1266 and Conradin in 1266–68) was followed by the Angevin-Ghibelline struggle, which included the involvement of the emperors-elect, Alfonso X of Castile and Rudolph of Hapsburg. One cannot overlook, as a contributing factor, the instability on the papal throne on account of the quick succession of pontiffs. Over a period of twenty years, which included a three-year-long vacancy, there were eight popes, three of them within a single year; all pontificates, with the exception of Gregory X, lasted less than four years.

2. The Crusade for the Restoration of the Latin Empire and the Defence of the Principality of Achaia under Urban IV (1261–64) On 15 August 1261, three weeks after Constantinople had fallen almost by accident to one of his generals, Michael Palaiologos made a triumphal entry to the city and ceremoniously proceeded to the Great Palace to signify the resumption of Byzantine imperial rule.5 It was not long before the tidings from Romania reached the newly elected pope in Rome. Urban IV did not remain indifferent towards the loss of Constantinople and issued a series of calls for the cross to be preached and funds to be raised for the Latin Empire and the principality of Achaia. However, as had always been the case, papal policy in Frankish Greece was dependent upon engagements elsewhere, and particularly on the situation in Italy. The conflict with Manfred in the Sicilian Regno, now entering its final stage, 5 

Akropolites, Opera, ed. by Heisenberg and Wirth, pars 85–88.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

183

was absorbing most of Urban’s attention. The exiled Latin emperor Baldwin II attempted to mediate between the two sides, prompted by Manfred’s promise to launch a campaign in support of Latin Romania if the papacy would have peace with him. However, Baldwin’s efforts eventually succeeded only in alienating the papacy, since Urban persisted in the anti-Hohenstaufen policy, sponsoring Charles of Anjou as a papal champion for Sicily. In the wake of the news of the Greek capture of Constantinople, Urban issued a series of letters in 1262 ordering the cross to be preached by the Franciscans in France6 and the Dominicans in Poland and Aragon.7 The pope deplored the fact that ‘the sword of the schismatics has been drawn against the faithful’ in Greece and that Christian religion was embattled by ‘the enemies of the orthodox faith’.8 Urban denounced Michael as a schismatic and usurping tyrant who occupied Constantinople by treason. He lamented the loss of such a great and famous city, which Innocent III had brought to catholic unity and for which the Roman Church had devoted so many efforts: for, indeed, the mother Church of Rome, upon hearing that [Constantinople] has been so shamefully lost and taken away from the obedience and devotion to her, felt her heart pierced with a sword of sharp pain, as she contemplated that it has for a long time kept an anxious and vigilant eye, combining eager care with laborious efforts, in order to preserve such a celebrated, famous, eminent, and beloved city; and also as she recollected the solicitude, expenses, and toils with which our predecessor, Pope Innocent III of happy memory, conquered this imperial city for catholic unity.9

6  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO (21 May 1262) [RO = Registre ordinaire]; in the manuscript there is a lacuna in the body of the letter at the point where there should appear the name of the kingdom where the preaching would take place (ibid., note 1), perhaps an indication that this was a generic letter which was issued to the Franciscans in other countries as well, though only the entry for France survives in the papal registers. 7  Bullarium Ordinis fratrum praedicatorum, ed. by Ripoll, i, 422–23, nos 12–13. 8  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO: ‘Ecce siquidem in regione illa contra fidelem populum scismaticorum exortus est gladius […] fidei orthodoxe hostilibus […] Christiana religio impugnatur’. 9  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO: ‘Recolens etenim quod multo tempore anxie vigilavit [Romana mater ecclesia], laboriosa studia intentis vigiliis annectendo, ut civitatem tam inclitam et famosam tamque insignem et amabilem obtineret, memor etiam sollicitudinum, sumptuum et laborum, quibus felicis recordationis Innocentius papa tertius predecessor noster, illam imperialem urbem ad unitatem catholicam conquisivit, ac audiens eam sic probrose deperditatam et ab ejus obedientia ac devotione subtractam acuti doloris gladio sua presensit viscera perforata’.

184

Chapter 5

It is noteworthy that by this point the papacy had identified so much with the cause of the Latin Empire and its protection that the conquest of 1204 could be presented as an act of Innocent III even in the curia, although in fact he had played no part in it and had actively resisted the diversion of the Fourth Crusade. Crusading for the defence of the Latin states in Romania had retrospectively added the mantle of papal legitimization to the events that brought about their creation. Urban went on to assert that, although these news were painful, the papacy was not going to despair but, trusting in God, would attempt to recover the city and the empire of Constantinople. The pope also warned of the looming danger that the remaining part of that empire, namely the principality of Achaia, might soon be lost if no help was given to it. Urban announced that Emperor Baldwin and the doge of Venice, along with the prelates and the nobility of the principality, had committed themselves to a major effort by land and sea for the empire. The pope asked the faithful to assist them. In an effort to motivate recruitment of crusaders against Palaiologos, Urban instructed the friars to remind the faithful, when preaching the cross, that through the help of the empire they would provide for the increase of the Faith and for the liberation of the Holy Land.10 He also announced that the doge of Venice had offered free transport to all crusaders for the Latin Empire. Those who joined the expedition would enjoy the same indulgences, privileges, and immunities ‘as for the Holy Land’. The friars were also authorized to grant between forty and one hundred days of indulgences to members of the audience. In June, Urban dispatched papal agents with instructions for subsidies to be collected for the aid of the Latin Empire in France,11 Castile,12 and Hungary,13 as 10  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO: ‘turning their attention to the fact that through the help to the aforementioned empire, the increase of catholic faith and ecclesiastical liberty as well as the liberation of the Holy Land are particularly provided for, […] they should swiftly and manfully move against the aforementioned Palaiologos and his supporters, after taking up the sign of the cross’ (‘advertentes etiam quod per imperii prefati succursum, catholice fidei et ecclesiastice libertatis augmentum necnon et Terre Sancte liberatio specialiter procurantur […] contra praefatum Paleologum et fautores ipsius, assumpto crucis signaculo, viriliter et festinanter exurgant’). 11  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 133–35RO (9 June 1262); the collector would be Bishop William of Agen. 12  Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, Appendix i, pp. 746–47 (26 June 1262), and pp. 733–34 for an analysis. 13  The request for subventions in Hungary is not extant, but an exemption from the subsidy for the Latin Empire survives, granted to the province of Kalocsa in October 1263 on account of Mongol devastations: Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 421RO.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

185

well as England and Wales.14 Those subsidies were modelled upon the provisions of the Council of Lyon and were to be collected for three years (apparently one year only in Castile).15 Urban authorized Emperor Baldwin to dispense such funds in order to enlist the help of French nobles who would be willing to go to Romania, or in any other way that might be useful for the Latin Empire. 16 At about the same time, the pope also wrote to Louis IX informing him of the situation in Frankish Greece and the planned crusade. Urban called the French king to extend his hand to the help and protection of the Venetians and the Latins in Romania and to convince his prelates to contribute to the requested subventions. The pope expressed his confidence that he would find the king willing to contribute, and stated that if France, which is ‘the exemplar and mirror of all Christian kingdoms’, were to make the start in providing assistance to such a pious affair, then the others would follow suit.17 All this activity constituted a major undertaking and an important commit­ ment on behalf of the pope. This begs the question why Urban followed this course of action in the first place. Why did he strive to restore the Latin Empire after the papacy had abandoned any effort to protect it for over a decade? Although it can indeed be claimed that the Apostolic See ‘suffered […] a loss of 14 

On 19 January 1262 (Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 130RC [RC = Registre caméral]) instructions were given to Master Leonard to collect a subsidy for the Latin Empire in England and Wales, which appears to refer to arrears of the subsidy imposed by the Council of Lyon in 1245 (see Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, p. 229). However, it seems likely that a new request, modelled upon the provisions of 1245, followed, since a council of English prelates and clergy was convened at Westminster around May 1263 to discuss a papal request for subventions to the Latin Empire (Flores historiarum, ed. by Luard, ii, 478–79). Lunt considers that the council discussed the aid described in the letter of January 1262; however, there are several indications against that: first, it looks unlikely that a local council would be convoked to deal with arrears of subsidies requested some eighteen years earlier; second, the procedure followed in England appears similar to the councils convened in France and Castile (which are discussed later in this chapter), where the convocation of a local council was included in the instructions to the papal agents sent to collect subventions ‘modelled upon the Council of Lyons’ (Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 228–29); third, another papal nuncio, Berard, is mentioned in the Council of Westminster next to Leonard, an indication that additional instructions had been sent from the curia after Leonard’s initial mission; and finally, the date of the convocation, May 1263, is a rather late response for instructions sent in January 1262. 15 

See Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 228–29. Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 136–37RO (= Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, ii, 448, no. 37), (20 June 1262). 17  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 132RO (= Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, nos 39–43), (5 June 1262). 16 

186

Chapter 5

political prestige [and] damage to its spiritual authority’ with the fall of Latin Constantinople and consequently the loss of control over the patriarchate, 18 it still is the case that it had already been negotiating with Nicaea the possibility of the return of the city into Greek hands. The crucial point, however, seems to be that this transition happened without the opportunity for the papacy to secure any concession from the Greeks. For all the papal unwillingness to divert resources to Frankish Greece after 1247, Constantinople was a powerful bargaining card for the papacy to use in order to enforce Church Union on its terms. By reclaiming the city after 1261 the papacy could restore this advantage, or at least replace it with the threat of a western crusade of reconquest against Byzantium. But apart from such considerations, one should not underestimate the shock value of 1261. A takeover of Constantinople was a rare occurrence by any standards (its walls had successfully withstood foreign enemies for nearly nine centuries before 1204) and in that sense daunting news under any circumstances, especially facing a new pope at the beginning of his pontificate. Urban IV himself described how stupefied he was by the news.19 He could have hardly remained inactive. His response to the crisis, in turn, was anchored to the established background of crusading in Frankish Greece: he deployed traditional crusading mechanisms, couching his actions in traditional imagery and arguments. Finally, it should not be overlooked that the initiative for launching this campaign did not lie, strictly speaking, with Urban. Baldwin II had already started making his first contacts in order to organize a reconquest of the empire a short time after his expulsion from the Queen of Cities. He discussed the prospect with Manfred at the time of his arrival in Italy, 20 and he had also communicated with Doge Reniero Zeno before arriving at the papal curia; there, it was actually the common proposal of the emperor and the Venetian envoys that set the events in motion, as is also testified by the pope’s own instructions regarding the preaching of the cross for Romania.21 In effect, as far as crusading in Frankish Greece was concerned, Urban turned the clock back nearly fifteen years. Such a wide crusade call for the Latin Empire 18 

Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 140. Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, no.  40; see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 139–40 and note 5. 20  See below for Manfred’s offer of undertaking of a crusade for the Latin Empire. 21  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO; Martino da Canale, ‘La Chro­nique des Veniciens’, ed. by Polidori and Galvani, par. 192, p. 502; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, p. 71. 19 

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

187

had not been proclaimed since the days of the First Council of Lyon and had not been actively pursued since the days of Gregory IX. The legitimizing arguments were naturally drawn from the background of previous crusades in Romania, now dating back over half a century. The help to be afforded to the Holy Land through Constantinople and the return of Greek Church to obedience were, as always, the prominent themes.22 The imagery and language of Urban’s bulls also relied heavily on earlier rhetoric. He drew directly from the decree Arduis mens of the Council of Lyon and Innocent IV’s subsequent bulls, reiterating themes such as the image of the body of the Church Universal which would be deformed if such a ‘beloved and noble limb’ as the Church of Constantinople were to be severed,23 as well as that of the past toils of the Roman Church for the Latin Empire: Urban spoke of the ‘great multitude of the faithful who have already shed their blood in such a salutary combat, happily consummating their worldly life under the glorious triumph of martyrdom’.24 Of course, Urban modified and elaborated such themes in order to better suit contemporary circumstances and to boost their appeal to the various recipients. So, for example, the deformity threatening the body of the Church would be incurred and the resulting feebleness would be sustained if ‘the remaining part of the empire (namely the principality of Achaia)’ were allowed to fall to Palaiologos.25 In his contact with the pious Louis IX of France, whose fervour for the Holy Land was well known, Urban repeatedly stressed the way that the affair of the Latin Empire would assist that of Outremer by pointing out the danger that, if the remaining part of the empire were to fall to the hands of the Greeks, the road to the Holy Land would be blocked.26 Additionally, he extolled the virtues of the French king and his eagerness to undertake the battle 22 

See, for example, Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 131–33RO. See above, Chapter 4.2. 24  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 131RO: ‘ex quibus [fidelibus] innumeri, jam effuso in pugna tam salutifera sanguine, cursum vite presentis sub glorioso triumpho martirii feliciter consumarunt’. 25  For example, Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no.  131RO: ‘quod ecclesie corpus ex membri tam cari scilicet imperii prefati carentia, si predictum residuum [videlicet principatus Achaye ac Moree] (quod absit) occuparetur ab illo [Paleologo], notam probrose deformitatis incurreret et sustineret debilitatis dolende jacturam’. 26  Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, nos 39–43: ‘considering that if the remainder of that empire (God forbid!) was to be occupied by the aggression of the aforementioned Greeks, the way and the crossing over of those who wish to help the Holy Land would be blocked’ (‘considerans, quod si residuum ejusdem Imperii, quod absit, dictorum Graecorum pateret aggressibus occupandum, via praecluderetur, et transitus dictae Terrae Sanctae volentibus subvenire’). 23 

188

Chapter 5

for the Church, and praised his realm, which set an example for other Christian kingdoms.27 In his letter that requested subventions from the Castilian Church, he provided some additional information on the principality of Achaia, which was probably unfamiliar to the Spanish prelates, stating that four archbishoprics and at least eight bishoprics were located there.28 In any case, Frankish Greece had been established as a valid crusading target after a series of such calls and proclamations by the papacy in the thirteenth century — so much so that it was now used in turn as a legitimizing argument for other ventures. Urban was to argue repeatedly that Manfred should be ousted from the Sicilian throne, ‘since the promotion of the affair of the Holy Land and of the empire of Constantinople is known to depend for the greater part on the affair of Sicily’.29 This argument was also presented to — and acknowledged by — King Louis IX.30 The damage incurred to the cause of the Latin Empire was also presented as one of the papal arguments in the effort to mediate a truce between Venice and Genoa in 1264.31 Doge Reniero Zeno, trying to curry papal favour, had himself been quick to stress ‘how great, how honourable, and how eminent the empire of Romania has been and is for the strengthening of Christian faith … [something which] is plainly evident to the entire world’, and to point out that Venice had always supported it and was ready to continue doing so.32 Significantly, the argument of helping the Latin Empire was invoked by 27 

Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, nos 39–43: Urban called Louis ‘the strongest athlete and robust fighter of Christian faith, and the chosen champion [who has] risen for the defence of the Church, with [his] heart always ready and with the standard of devotion unfolded’ (‘Christianae fidei athleta fortissimus, ac robustus pugil, et propugnator electus ad ejusdem Ecclesiae praesidium vexilio devotionis explicito, prompto semper assurrexisti animo’). 28  Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, Appendix i, pp. 746–47. 29  For example, Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 804 and 813RO: ‘Cum promotio negotii Terre Sancte et Constantinopolitani Imperii a negotio regni Sicilie pro majori parte dependere noscatur, nos, attendentes quod facilior erit eorundem terre ac Imperii liberatio is hujusmodi ejusdem regni negotium fuerit efficaciter, Deo favente, promotum’; see Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 68, 98–99. 30  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 2812RO (= Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, no. 21); Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, pp. 131–32. 31  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 852RO (20 June 1264). 32  Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, iii, 56–59, no.  350: ‘quam grande, quam honorabile et quam excellens Imperium Romaniae fuit et est ad robur fidei Christianae […] universo orbi terrarum sit plenius manifestum’. See also Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 96–97.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

189

both sides in the conflict over the Sicilian throne: Manfred offered to launch a crusade for Constantinople at his own expenses, if the pope were to grant him peace and recognition of his authority, while Urban affirmed that the election of Charles of Anjou would be, among other things, beneficial to the affair of the Latin Empire.33 Clearly a good part of papal rhetoric regarding Frankish Greece had gained currency in the language of diplomacy by the mid-thirteenth century. Besides acknowledging the importance of past crusading activity in Romania, however, Urban should have been aware of the fact that most previous calls had fallen flat. He obviously anticipated negative reactions towards his requests for subsidies. In his instructions to Master Raymond of Paphos, papal nuncio to Castile-León, Urban advised him to approach King Alfonso X first and, after securing his goodwill, to assemble the prelates and exhort them to make voluntary subventions to the cause of the Latin Empire invoking the established arguments. He was to proceed cautiously and discreetly. If the prelates and the king were favourable, he was to present the additional papal orders for taxation to be levied on the benefices of absentee clergy along the lines of the decree of the Council of Lyon, and threaten with ecclesiastical censures those who did not comply. If, however, it appeared that the king or the prelates might object and a scandal might be caused, the nuncio should not proceed with announcing the additional measures, and instead he should contact the pope for further instructions. 34 Similar were the instructions to the bishop of Agen, papal agent for the collection of subsidies for the Latin Empire in France. He was only to proceed with the collection of the subsidies if the whole affair regarding the help to the Latin Empire progressed smoothly with the king and the prelates of France; otherwise he was instructed to write back and wait for new papal instructions.35 In spite of Urban’s caution, and exactly as feared, there were reactions aplenty. The prelates and clergy of Castile-León appealed to the pope against the subsidies, reportedly before even hearing the exact content of the papal letters. They argued that the Spanish Church was in difficult straits on account of the many papal requests for subsidies and other evils that had befallen them. They claimed that they had already made extensive payments for the Latin Empire in the past — which most probably referred to the taxation imposed by the First Council of Lyon. In any case, they asserted, they had fulfilled their crusading 33 

Martino da Canale, ‘La Chronique des Veniciens’, ed. by Polidori and Galvani, pars 189– 91, p. 500; see also below, pp. 194–95. 34  Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, Appendix i, pp. 746–47 (for an analysis see ibid., pp. 733–34). 35  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 135RO.

190

Chapter 5

duties to Church and Faith by supporting the king in his fight against the Moors in Spain.36 On 24 April 1263, a council of Aragonese prelates and clergy at Lérida similarly turned down papal requests for subsidies in the presence of King James I and Emperor Baldwin himself.37 At about the same time, an English council at Westminster followed the same course of action, rejecting papal requests for the Latin Empire and for Baldwin, on the grounds that England was exhausted because of ‘sedition’, that is, the civil war between King Henry III and his barons, led by Simon de Montfort; the clergy considered that they and their king were more in need of external aid rather than able to assist a foreign prince. 38 The response of the ‘exemplar of Christian kingdoms’ was hardly more encouraging. The French prelates and clergy had already unanimously given a negative reply to papal requests several months earlier at a council in Paris, after a day of deliberations, similarly on account of the many problems plaguing the French Church, which included the burdens of previous papal requests for the help of the Holy Land, the Roman Church, and Constantinople.39 Urban’s reply to those reactions was stern. Writing back to the French prelates, the pope began by emphasizing the benign intention and aim of the papal requests. He expressed his amazement at the assertion that the Roman Church had made ‘frequent and immoderate’ demands. Turning to the specific case of the subsidies for the Latin Empire and the Holy Land, he stressed the importance of the ‘noble limb’ of Constantinople for the Church Universal. Urban rebuked the prelates, stating that they should be ashamed for that display of insensitivity, since, instead of feeling agony at the loss of that limb, they considered the papacy’s moderate requests as appropriate material for complaints. The pope urged the prelates to assist Emperor Baldwin against the schismatics who hold the empire ‘to the 36 

For reactions of the Spanish Church in December 1262–January 1263, see the letter of the bishop of Cuenca (supporting the appeal of the chapter of Toledo): Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, Appendix ii, pp. 747–49; for analysis and more details on the Spanish reactions in general, see ibid., pp. 730–31, 734–35; Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 116–17. 37  As reported in the seventeenth-century catalogue of the archiepiscopal archive of Tarragona: see Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, p. 735, note 1. For Baldwin’s presence at the time, see Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, p. 72. 38  The council is reported in Flores historiarum, ed. by Luard, ii, 478–79; see Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, p. 229. According to Lunt, the council took place shortly after 27 May 1263; see also above, note 14. 39  The Council of Paris (30–31 August 1262) is reported by Archbishop Odo Rigaud of Rouen: ‘E visitationibus Odonis Rigaudi’, ed. by Bouquet and others, pp. 587–88; Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, p. 142.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

191

opprobrium of Christian religion’ (‘in Christiane religionis obprobrium’).40 Similar in tone was the papal reply to the appeal of the prelates of Castile-León some months later. Urban again presented the pressing circumstances in Frankish Greece after the shocking and saddening news of the fall of Constantinople. He stated that some action was necessary, seeing that Greek arrogance had now turned against the principality of Achaia and the neighbouring Latin territories. The pope had decided that ‘for such an affair of the Faith, which indiscriminately touches upon all Christians and particularly the clergy’ (‘tamquam fidei negotium, communiter omnes, et presertim ecclesiasticos viros tangat’), he had no choice but to implore them for help by sending Master Raymond with a request for subventions. The pope expressed his surprise at the appeal and the reactions of the Spanish prelates: We were greatly amazed at hearing the things that your messengers and procurators wanted to propose to us in person and to our brothers [the cardinals], as we had been hoping most confidently that we would find you very willing to carry out our wishes regarding such an important affair. It seems to us that your appeal has been devised as an excuse to elude our entreaties and commands and as a subterfuge in the matter of the requested subvention. Therefore, we believe that we should admonish, exhort, and carefully advise all of you to prudently consider that the arrogance of the Greeks will keep on growing in strength to the extent that the remaining Latins, if they are not swiftly provided with some help, will no longer be able to subsist or to resist their forces and their trickeries. You should, furthermore, contemplate that it will reflect badly on your honour if you choose to withdraw your hands from such a pious work of assistance and to refuse the consolation of protection to those who have been afflicted.

Therefore, Urban enjoined them to pay, piously and freely, a fitting contribution from their ecclesiastical revenues. The pope added ominously that it would be more pleasing to him to receive voluntary contributions, than to obtain larger sums through forced imposition.41 Urban was more amenable, nevertheless, to 40 

Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 187RO (23 January 1263). Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 740–41RO (23 October 1263): ‘Nos autem, auditis hiis que dicti nuntii seu procuratores vestri […] coram nobis et predictis fratribus proponere voluerunt, tanto majorem ammirationem de hoc in mente concepimus, quanto confidentius sperabamus vos invenire in adimplendis nostris circa huiusmodi negotium beneplacitis promptiores. Attendentes igitur quod huiusmodi appellatio in elusionem nostrorum precaminum et mandatorum et subterfugium ejusdem subventionis adinventa fuisse videtur, universitatem vestram monendam, rogandam attente duximus et hortandam, mandantes quatinus, attendentes provide quod predictorum Grecorum superbia sic jugiter invalescit quod, nisi predictis Latinorum reliquiis de celeri provideatur subventionis remedio, nequaquam ulterius 41 

192

Chapter 5

Hungarian requests for exemption from the subsidy for the Latin Empire, on account of the devastation inflicted by Mongol invasions.42 Along with his instructions and exhortations to clergy in the West to provide for the Latin Empire, Urban made efforts in the East as well, in 1263, in order to isolate Michael and bolster Latin resistance in Romania. The pope persistently tried to break the alliance between Palaiologos and Genoa, which was one of the most important features of Michael’s western policy at the time, especially after the Treaty of Nymphaeum. The treaty, which was signed in March and ratified by Genoa in July 1261, gave the Genoese merchants preferential treatment and total exemption from duties in the Byzantine Empire, as well as the right to set up self-administering quarters in various important towns and islands (which included taking up the Venetian quarter in Constantinople), in exchange for a Genoese fleet of up to fifty vessels which would be at the emperor’s calling to be used against Venice.43 Michael’s alliance with Genoa was a serious impediment to any concerted effort for a crusade of reconquest of Constantinople, as it neutralized Latin naval superiority. Furthermore, it undermined the moral argument of a unified Latin Christian effort against the ‘schismatic’ enemy. Urban was furious. He issued a series of letters calling on the Genoese to break away from their alliance with the Greek emperor ‘for the benefit of Christendom’ and to withdraw their ships and warriors, currently at Michael’s service and deployed ‘against the Latins of the empire of Constantinople, and consequently against the Roman Church and the catholic faith’. 44 The pope absolved the subsistere vel resistere poterunt viribus et fraudibus eorumdem, considerantes etiam quod honori vestro nequaquam expedire dinoscitur a tante pietatis opere auxilii vestri manum subtrahere, ac afflictis vestre consolationis presidium denegare, hujusmodi negotio de vestris ecclesiasticis proventibus subventionem congruam tam pie quam libere providere curetis, scituri pro certo quod acceptius nobis erit et gratius id quod de bonis vestris, pro subventione hujusmodi, libenter duxeritis impendendum, quam si multo majora per coactionem, que meritum consuevit excludere, propter hoc solvere vos contingat’; see also Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, pp. 730–32. 42  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 421RO (14 October 1263). 43  Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1890. For the Treaty of Nymphaeum in general, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 81–91. 44  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 182RO (19 January 1263): ‘ad prospero statui rei publice christianitatis’, ‘bellatores ac galeas et naves contra Constantinopolitanum imperium et Latinos existentes ibidem, immo verius contra Romanam ecclesiam et catholicam fidem’. This is the first surviving letter in the papal registers but it is clear that the pope is repeating earlier requests. Papal exhortations and threats were periodically repeated: see Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 228–29 and 230RO (May 1263); and nos 719– 20RO (October 1263).

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

193

Genoese from their oaths and agreements with the schismatics and threatened them with serious censures in case they did not comply, which included not only excommunication but also stripping the city of its archiepiscopal dignity and privileges; Urban went as far as to say that, should they disregard his warning, his hands would be clean of their blood. Papal language was particularly harsh: Genoese actions were ‘detestable and perverse’ (‘tam detestabilia quam perversa opera’), ‘to the danger of all Christendom’ (‘dispendiosa totius Christianitatis pericula’), and a ‘grave offence to Christ’ (‘gravi Christi offensa’). If they persisted, they would be proclaimed ‘persecutors of the catholic Christians and enemies to the entire Christian people’ (‘catholicorum Christianorum persecutores et hostes a cuncto christiano populo’).45 Papal efforts were, however, fruitless.46 Urban also attempted to help organize Latin resistance in Romania, instructing the clergy, all monastic orders, and the four military orders (the Templars, the Hospitallers, the Teutonic Knights, and the Order of St Sampson) in Achaia and the other Latin-held lands to contribute money and warriors to their defence. The pope reminded them that the fight was not only for God, for the Church, and for the prince, but also for their own benefit.47 The papacy could only afford to dedicate so much of its attention to Frankish Greece, however, as it had more crucial preoccupations elsewhere. By far the most pressing among them was the struggle with Manfred over Sicily, on the outcome of which papal policy in Romania depended to a very large extent.48 In 1263 and 1264 crusades were preached locally in the Italian mainland and in Sardinia against Manfred, his lieutenants, and his allies. The papal plan to install Charles of Anjou on the throne of Sicily, which was negotiated in 1262–63, was understood as a crusading venture from the beginning.49 But even before the final breach between Urban and Manfred, the Hohenstaufen heir had become an important factor for crusading in Frankish Greece, most importantly through his association with Baldwin. Two interrelated episodes stand out: Manfred’s offer to 45 

For example, Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 230RO. See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  147–54, 161–64, 168–71. 47  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 231–32RO (27 April 1263). 48  See, for example, Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 8, 12; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 143; Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, pp. 54–82; Hampe, Urban IV und Manfred; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 291–514. 49  Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 17–19; Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, pp. 119, 130; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 403–04, 420–54 (esp. p. 426). 46 

194

Chapter 5

assist Baldwin in launching a crusade for the recovery of his realm; and Baldwin’s ensuing efforts to mediate between Manfred and the papacy, which ended up alienating Urban. After fleeing Romania, Baldwin first called at Manfred’s court in Apulia. Manfred not only received the Latin emperor graciously but also proposed to undertake an expedition at his own expense to help restore Baldwin on the throne of Constantinople, if the pope agreed to have peace or at least a truce with him. Even if the pope rejected his offers, Manfred asserted, he would still help Baldwin’s campaign. According to the testimony of Martino da Canale, Baldwin presented Manfred’s offer to the curia when he arrived in Rome to plead his case. While Urban promised to preach the cross for the empire, he gave no reply regarding Manfred’s proposal.50 Nevertheless, the offer was among the contributing factors in Urban’s decision to hold negotiations with Manfred in the summer of 1262, after the mediation of Emperor Baldwin, James I of Aragon, and Louis IX of France.51 It is understandable that the Latin emperor counted on Manfred’s promise for help, given that the latter had the resources of the Sicilian Regno at his disposal, was already in possession of bridgeheads in Epiros and the Ionian Sea (that is, Durazzo, Avlona, and Butrint on the coast, along with the island of Corfu),52 and had in the past been involved in Romania against Michael Palaiologos, when one of his contingents had participated in the coalition that was defeated by the Nicaean army at Pelagonia.53 Furthermore, Manfred had at least one significant motive for getting behind Baldwin’s cause. In exchange for helping Latin Romania, he hoped to gain papal favour and possibly recognition of his crown. This was probably foremost in Manfred’s mind, whether or not he was also harbouring any ambitions of his own towards Constantinople, as has been suggested in the past.54 The negotiations of 1262, however, proved 50 

Martino da Canale, ‘La Chronique des Veniciens’, ed. by Polidori and Galvani, pars 189– 91, p. 500; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 8, Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 65–66; Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, p. 117. 51  Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, esp. pp. 116–19, 123–24. 52  The Hohenstaufen possessions had been recognized by Epiros as the dowry to Helena, Manfred’s wife and daughter of Michael II: see, for example, Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261), pp.  166–67, 170–71, 177–78; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479, pp. 6–7; Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and the Greek East’. 53  See Geanakoplos, ‘Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration’; Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and the Greek East’. 54  Some incidents (such as the alleged plot of the Genoese podestà, Guercio, to betray Constantinople to Manfred) indicate possible imperial, or in any case expansionist, designs

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

195

unsuccessful. Papal mistrust of the Hohenstaufen won the day, while the papacy was probably also not very enthusiastic at the prospect of Manfred extending his influence in Romania with crusading mechanisms at his disposal.55 Eventually, Urban persisted in the choice of Charles of Anjou for the crown of Sicily.56 Legitimizing rhetoric involving the affair of Romania was used in that case as well: from the beginning of the negotiations with the count of Anjou, Urban had announced that the replacement of Manfred by Charles would be beneficial for Latin Romania.57 Baldwin, however, did not give up on his efforts to secure peace and recognition of Manfred’s claims in the Sicilian Regno, which would in turn guarantee Manfred’s assistance for Frankish Greece. In July 1263, the Latin emperor tried to warn Manfred about the curia’s negotiations with Charles of Anjou and offered to mediate with the French king. Baldwin’s letter, however, was intercepted. Urban was furious at the Latin emperor’s clandestine dealings and forwarded the intercepted letter to Albert, his notary in France, with the instruction to beware Baldwin, ‘the accomplice of Manfred’ (‘fautor Manfredi’) and to inform Charles of Anjou and possibly King Louis of the situation. This incident effectively meant that Baldwin fell out of favour at the papal curia and was to be considered as an ally of Manfred for at least the following three years.58 on the part of Manfred (see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 143, 168–71 and note 72); however, other scholars have argued against such an interpretation, maintaining that the restoration of relations with the papacy was Manfred’s main motivation: see Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, p. 112, and Merendino, ‘Manfredi fra Epiro e Nicea’, p. 252; see Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 16. 55  Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  143, 164–65; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 107–08; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 8, 10; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 98. 56  See, Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, esp. pp. 125, 128–29, who argues that Urban was never particularly serious about the negotiations with Manfred, and that he was mostly buying time waiting for Louis IX’s reply regarding his brother’s candidacy for the Sicilian throne. 57  Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1262, no.  20; see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 164, note 14; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 403. 58  Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, cols 23–26, no. 10 (Urban’s cover letter to Albert, 28 July 1263) and no. 11 (Baldwin’s intercepted letter to Manfred, 2 July 1263). See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 143–44; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 67–68; Berg, ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV’, pp. 130–36; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 398–401, 407–08.

196

Chapter 5

This reversal of papal attitude towards the Latin emperor brought about a change in the Apostolic See’s policy in Romania which was noticeable immediately: it made easier a positive papal response to Michael Palaiologos’s overtures for Church Union.59 Michael had tried to negotiate with the papacy immediately after the capture of Constantinople.60 There can be little doubt that the motivating factor behind his initiative was the need to protect the empire from a possible crusade of reconquest at a time when imperial authority was being stabilized in Constantinople and an offensive against the remaining Latin outposts was being carried out. Union with the Church of Rome would effectively remove Constantinople from the list of legitimate crusading targets. As we have seen, a similar approach had been followed by Vatatzes, but Michael was about to make unionist efforts a much more central feature of imperial policy than they had been in the past. Michael had already sent an embassy to Urban IV in the summer of 1262. Urban’s reply had been rather positive but brief and in effect noncommittal.61 The next papal letter taking up the matter was sent nearly a year later, on 18 July 1263.62 It was a long, detailed reply, and it is striking how far-reaching the papal proposals were. In short, Urban promised to recognize the legitimacy of Michael’s authority in case the emperor acted upon his promises for Church Union. With regards to the emperor’s request for peace to come first, before spiritual matters could be resolved, the pope replied that there could not be real peace if there was no spiritual unity, and that the two issues should be settled at the same time. The pope said he would dispatch an embassy of four Franciscans to treat on those two issues and the emperor was advised to follow up this embassy with plenipotentiary representatives on his side, so that the affair could 59 

For more details on Church Union efforts up to 1274, including dogmatic and ecclesiological issues, see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 106–33, 142–60; Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 138–47, 164–67, 175–80, 200–06, 223–25, 237–45. 60  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 106–07; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 140–41. 61  Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, ii, 449–50, no. 40. See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 146–47 and notes 35–36; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, p.  456; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 106–07. 62  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 295RO; see also Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp.  107–09; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 22–23.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

197

be consummated. Just as important as Urban’s proposals was the timing of the papal communication. It is clear from the letter’s content that the pope had not been prompted by a new embassy from Michael, but he was rather replying to the earlier initiative of 1262. Urban stated that he had postponed sending his envoys on account of the news that the emperor had attacked Achaia and on account of ‘other preoccupations’. Nevertheless, he had now decided that the affair should not be delayed indefinitely. The timing, therefore, was chosen by the pope, and it could have hardly been coincidental. This letter was issued in July 1263, the same month that Baldwin’s letter to Manfred was intercepted. Urban’s letters requesting safe conduct and providing instructions for the friars going to Constantinople were actually issued on the same day as the letter to the papal envoy in France informing him of Baldwin’s collusion with Manfred.63 Particularly telling are the pope’s statements regarding the recognition of Michael’s legitimacy, where no reference is made to the rights of the expelled Emperor Baldwin. At the same time, Urban urged Michael and Prince William of Achaia to desist from any further aggression against each other.64 Union negotiations were pursued further by both sides. Michael sent another embassy, probably in late 1263, headed by Bishop Nicholas of Croton. Michael made extensive reference to the armed conflict and the spilling of blood which had plagued the two sides on account of the schism. Putting forth his renewed and more extensive offers, Michael closed the letter stating that he has made all the proposals he could and the matter was now at the hands of the pope: ‘therefore Our Majesty henceforth cannot be accused before God’ (‘et exinde de cetero Imperio nostro in Dei testimonio accusatio aliqua non potest opponi’).65 In other words, a holy war against Byzantium would no longer be justified. The papal reply was again positive, with Urban dispatching two additional envoys to take the affair even further. The tone of Urban’s letter was exultant with several expressions of recognition of Michael’s imperial status.66 Nevertheless, the need for actions to follow words — and quickly — was stressed. 63 

Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 322–24, 326RO. Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 295, 325RO. 65  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 748RO; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 176–78. 66  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 848RO (23 May 1263): for example, ‘at the time of your predecessors, the emperors of the Greeks’ (‘predecessorum tuorum imperatorum Grecorum temporibus’), ‘most eminent emperor’ (‘excellentissime Imperator’), ‘an emperor of such power, who holds the reins of such a great empire’ (‘Imperator tante potentie, et qui tam magni imperii moderatur habenas’), ‘illustrious emperor, excellent emperor’ (‘Imperator inclite, Imperator eximie’); see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 178–80. 64 

198

Chapter 5

No doubt the union negotiations between Urban and Michael represent an important aspect of papal policy in Romania and seem to indicate a shift away from the uncompromising crusading effort for the restoration of the Latin Empire which the pope appeared to advocate the previous year. Besides the cooling of relations between the papacy and Baldwin, the situation in Italy was most probably among the main papal motives for this approach. The war against Manfred was at a critical juncture, as the papacy was about to throw its full weight behind Charles of Anjou. The need to maintain a parallel crusading front in Frankish Greece could be conveniently avoided through a temporary understanding with Palaiologos.67 A further consideration encouraging such an approach was the apparent failure of the crusade calls for Latin Romania in 1262– 63 to generate any considerable response other that the widespread resistance to papal requests for funds. Finally, this was not an altogether novel approach, as union negotiations with the Greek Church had reached an advanced stage in the 1250s. It would not have been unthinkable for the papacy to fall back to this alternative option if circumstances called for it. The extent of this shift of papal policy in Romania should not be exaggerated, however. Ten days before the last papal response to Michael’s renewed offers, Urban had issued new crusading calls for the Latin Empire and, particularly, for the principality of Achaia, which had been under sustained pressure from imperial forces. The pope stressed his concern for the Latins in the empire of Romania, ‘who have been afflicted by the tyranny of barbarous nations’ (‘dum illos affligi conspicimus barbarum tyrampnide nationum’) and for the fact that ‘the schismatic Greeks’, who after the capture of Constantinople had grown in arrogance, had turned their destructive hands against the principality of Achaia, ‘where they have almost extinguished the name of the mother [Roman] Church’ (‘ibidem […] extinguant penitus nomen matris [ecclesie]’). Warning that the Latins there would not be able to ‘preserve that land in the true faith of Christ’ without speedy assistance from the faithful (‘terram illam vero Christi cultui conservare’), he called the bishop of Utrecht to preach the cross in his own diocese and in that of Liège, granting the crusaders the same indulgences, privileges, and immunities as for the Holy Land. 68 A similar call was sent to Duke Hugh IV of Burgundy to take the cross for Achaia and rush 67  See Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 326; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 399. 68  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 577RO (13 May 1264); Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 176.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

199

to assist the prince and ‘the faithful athletes of his lands’ (‘Achaye principem […] et ejusdem terre fideles athlete’) to persevere in their devotion to God and Church. According to the papal registers, a letter nearly identical to the one sent to Hugh was sent to the bishop of Utrecht calling him to take the cross, but for the Latin Empire rather than for the principality, which possibly indicates a plan for a double-pronged campaign for both the Morea and Constantinople, with the duke of Burgundy and the bishop of Utrecht at the head of the respective contingents.69 The language of the papal bulls presented the Latins of the Morea virtually as permanent crusaders, a notion that had also been expressed in past calls for crusading support to Frankish Greece. Urban was to take the idea one step further. On 13 May 1264, he instructed the bishop of Coron to urge the Latins of the land to fight ‘God’s war’ (‘Dei bellum’) for the deliverance of the principality of Achaia, granting to all of them the crusading indulgence, since ‘those who actually live on the land can fight more eagerly for its defence’.70 By the summer of 1264, the pope was trying to raise some additional funds for the Latin Empire. Master Synesius was sent to Aragon, Catalonia, Gascony, Narbonne, and Bordeaux in order to collect money still owed to the papacy for the affairs of the Roman Church, of the Holy Land, and of the empire of Constantinople.71 Some funds may have actually been channelled to Achaia by the papacy by late 1264, as indicated by a passing reference in a letter of Doge Reniero Zeno to Urban that the Roman Church assisted the Prince of Achaia with subsidies.72 At the same time, Urban was apparently in negotiations with the Infante Felipe, brother of King Alfonso X of Castile, in order for the Spanish prince to lead a campaign to Romania and ‘expunge the schismatic race of the Greeks’.73 These crusade calls and the language in which they were expressed indicates that there was no deep-seated change of attitude on the part of the papacy regarding Michael and the Greeks on account of union negotiations at this point. The fact that these calls are found both before and after Urban’s positive reply to Michael in May 1264 speaks against an interpretation of papal ‘reversion’ to crusading 69 

Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 579RO. Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 578RO: ‘quodque degentes in illa eo libentius se ad ejusdem terre defensionem exponant’. 71  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 462RC (23 July 1264). 72  Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, iii, 57, 8 September 1264. 73  Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church’, p. 743 (and note 2), 6 August 1264: ‘[ad] partes Romanie ad expugnandas Graecorum gentes scismaticas’. 70 

200

Chapter 5

after the first contacts of 1263, on account of problematic communications or of evidence for Michael’s apparent insincerity because of imperial attacks in Achaia, as argued by Donald Nicol.74 Both sides were opportunistically keeping their options open (Michael had also tried to negotiate with Manfred before turning to the papacy),75 and while promising undoubtedly important concessions, none of them was irreversibly committing to the project of Church Union. Michael carried on with his offensive against Latin possessions, especially in Achaia,76 while the papacy was bracing itself for the imminent struggle between Charles of Anjou and Manfred. In any case, Urban’s renewed crusading efforts, like his earlier ones, did not produce any tangible result. Louis IX was unwilling to allow his attention or the resources of his realm to be diverted from the fight against the infidels. Germany was in interregnum. Even less could be expected from Italy and Sicily on account of the papacy’s conflict with Manfred and other Ghibellines. England was undergoing its own internal crisis, as King Henry III was captured by the rebel army of Simon de Montfort. Hungary was under pressure from the Mongols of the Golden Horde who had devastated Poland, Lithuania, and Prussia in 1259–60, while it was further weakened from internal upheavals in the wake of Béla’s defeat at the hands of Ottokar of Bohemia. Meanwhile, the war between Venice and Genoa dented any hopes for significant western naval assistance to Latin Romania and caused general disruption in the Mediterranean.77 Circumstances in the West were clearly unfavourable for a crusade in Frankish Greece at the time.

74 

Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, p. 457. 75  See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 144–45, 164–65. 76  For the operations in the Morea, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 157–59, 166–67, 171–75; Longnon, L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp. 231–34. I disagree with Geanakoplos’s interpretation that Michael restarted operations in the Morea after mistakenly believing that Urban had rejected his overtures on union; the sequence and dating of events (especially the defeat of Makryplagi) also disproves some of his assertions regarding Michael’s motives in resuming negotiations with the papacy (see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 112, note 54). 77  Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 142–43; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp.  10–12; Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 123–24, 128, 199–204; Pál, Realm of St Stephen, pp. 105–07.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

201

3. The Rise of Charles of Anjou during the Pontificate of Clement IV (1265–68) and the Vacancy of the Apostolic See (1268–71) In the period following Urban’s death, the rising power of Charles of Anjou came to dominate and transform crusading in Frankish Greece. Charles turned his attention to the reconquest of Constantinople shortly after obtaining control of the Sicilian Regno. The turning point was the signing of the Viterbo Treaties (May 1267), by which Angevin overlordship or direct control over a great part of Latin Romania was recognized, while Charles was effectively confirmed as the spearhead of the crusading effort for the re-establishment of the Latin Empire. Clement IV sponsored the Viterbo Treaties but his support was not unqualified, as he did not place any crusade mechanisms at Charles’s disposal. For all the crusading rhetoric that was used by both Charles and Clement and which was prominent in the treaties, there were no orders for preaching of the cross, nor crusade funds and indulgences to be given to the new king of Sicily for his planned campaign in Romania. This has to be taken into account, along with the situation in Italy and papal negotiations with Greeks over Church Union (about which Clement was clearly not enthusiastic), in order for a complete picture to be drawn regarding the policy of the Apostolic See and the development of crusading in Frankish Greece at this stage. In fact, the traditional approach to crusading in the area seems to have expired along with Urban IV. Until 1281, none of his successors was to deploy any crusading mechanisms in Romania, despite occasionally backing Angevin aggression. One of the first actions of Clement IV upon his accession was to take up his predecessor’s agreement with Charles of Anjou regarding the affair of Sicily and to authorize crusade preaching and funds to be levied in France in support of this undertaking. Events developed rapidly. Charles arrived in Rome in May 1265, was crowned on 6 January 1266, and defeated and killed Manfred at the battle of Benevento on 26 February 1266. He was soon in control of the Regno with very little other resistance.78 A new factor had been introduced into the equation of crusading in Frankish Greece. As was becoming standard practice at the papal curia, Charles’s cause had also been promoted as a beneficial one for Latin Romania. Already on 7 March 1265 Clement had authorized Simon of Brie, the cardinal legate in France, to commute crusading vows from the Holy Land to the affair of the kingdom of Sicily, with the justification that ‘the promotion of the 78 

Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 18–19, 175, 216–17, 223–29; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 132–34; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 515–602.

202

Chapter 5

affair of the Holy Land and of the empire of Constantinople is known to depend for the greatest part on the affair of the kingdom of Sicily’.79 A few days later Clement had also stated that Charles, once installed at the Regno, would provide help to the empire of Romania.80 After the Angevin victory over Manfred, the pope had announced jubilantly: ‘Tuscany flourishes anew, the whole of Italy is revived, Achaia rejoices, the Holy Land breathes again’.81 It turned out that there was more than simply legitimizing rhetoric there. Charles started harbouring plans for an eastward expansion early on. His first relevant actions were his efforts to take over Manfred’s possessions in the Ionian Sea and Epiros. When Michael II of Epiros attempted to gain control over these possessions by first arranging a marriage alliance with Manfred’s admiral, Philip Chinardo, and then having him murdered, Philip’s Latin knights turned to Charles for help.82 Charles, in turn, asked Clement to grant indulgences for those who would participate in an expedition to assist the sons of Philip Chinardo against the schismatic Greeks. Clement’s reply is indicative of his attitude to several issues of interest to us. The pope turned down this request, stating, It would be neither plausible nor judicious to grant the indulgence which you ask for helping the sons of that most excommunicated of men, the late Philip Chinardo. Much as the Greeks are indeed hateful to us, it would, however, be like granting the indulgence to the Tartars for helping to fight the Saracens, or to the Greeks themselves for helping against either of them, which nobody in his right mind would suggest […]. The indulgence cannot be granted in this manner to all and sundry, or what is intended as a means of salvation will be exposed to disbelief and derision.

If, on the other hand, those who had the island in their possession were to place it in the care of either Charles or Baldwin or some other person in the name of 79 

Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 216: ‘Cum promotio negotii terre sancte et Constantinopolitani imperii a negotio regni Sicilie pro majori parte dependere noscatur’. This was a repetition of an argument used by Urban IV (for example, Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 2812, 804, 813RO). 80  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 224 (28 March 1265): ‘subsidium […] imperii Romanie […] dabit’. 81  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1025 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, cols 287–88, no. 240): ‘Refloret Tuscia, tota demum Italia reviviscit, levatur [variant: letatur] Achaia, Terra Sancta respirat’. See also Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 320. 82  For these events, see Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp. 320–21; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 192–94; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479, pp. 13–14.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

203

the pope, then Clement was ready to offer the indulgence to those who would offer help, as long as they were not tied to the defence of the land anyway (that is, excluding the permanent garrison).83 This reply reveals that Clement was not ready to offer limitless and unquestioning support to Charles, particularly as far as crusading was involved. Certain conditions had to apply, regardless of the king’s wishes. It is an early indication of the policy of Clement, who, despite statements of support, eventually never granted indulgences to Charles of Anjou for his planned expedition to Romania. The letter is also indicative of the papal attitude towards the Greeks who, as detestable schismatics, are once more considered among the other ‘infidels’ (Tartars and Saracens) for all practical purposes, and by extension as a legitimate crusading target. One can compare this with a letter of Clement IV to William VII of Montferrat, where the pope expressed his regret for not being able to offer the marquis the assistance he had asked for against his enemies in Lombardy. The pope stated that even if the Church might be expected to attend to the expenses of lawful wars, its resources do not even suffice for its own affairs, as required by the innumerable expenses for Spain, Constantinople, the Holy Land, Prussia, Livonia, and many other areas where there is nearly incessant war between the faithful and the infidels.84

Once more Frankish Greece features in the list of major, established crusading fronts. The rest of the story regarding Corfu is, furthermore, indicative that Charles was not one to be easily dissuaded from any target he had set his mind on. Pope Clement had a plan of his own for the island. Corfu had been the dowry of 83  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1131 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, col. 409, no. 382), (1 October 1266): ‘Nec colorem habet aliquem nec saporem, quod pro juvandis filiis excommunicatissimi quondam Philippi Chonardi indulgentia detur quam postulas; quantumcumque Graeci sint and fuerint odiosi, alioquin contra Saracenos adjuvantibus Tartaris, vel contra alterutros ipsis Graecis indulgentia danda esset, quod nullus recte sentiens crederet faciendum […] quae [indulgentia] non est ita passim omnibus concedenda, ut quod statutum est in salutis remedium, in fabulam et ludibrium convertatur’; trans. by Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 35–36 (slightly modified); see Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 321. 84  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 920 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, col. 172, no. 113), ( July 1265): ‘Quod si sumtus in bellis legitimis teneretur Ecclesia ministrare suae sibi nequamquam sufficerent facultates, cum requirant expensas innumerabiles Hispania, Constantinopolis, Terra Sancta, Prussia, Livonia, et multae aliae regiones in quibus fidelium cum infidelibus fere continuus est conflictus’ (my emphasis).

204

Chapter 5

Manfred’s widow, Helena, the daughter of Michael II of Epiros. Clement was advocating that she be be married to Infante Enrique of Castile, who would then apparently support Baldwin’s efforts to reclaim his empire.85 Charles had evidently consented to assist the project but, outmanoeuvring the pope, he negotiated a handover of the island to him instead, a few days after Clement’s last communication on the matter.86 The affair of Corfu was simply the beginning of Charles’s active involvement in Frankish Greece. His victory at Benevento had set in motion a process of realignment of allegiances in Romania: some powers gravitated towards him, like Prince William and Emperor Baldwin, and some turned away from his eastern plans, most notably Venice. Baldwin had remained out of favour with the papacy since 1263 on account of his connection with Manfred. However, reconciliation was achieved by June 1266, with Baldwin shifting to the winning side shortly after Benevento. The pope, responding to a letter from the emperor, commended him for promising to assist the affair of the Roman Church, ‘although in the past you were known to be allied with Manfred, the pestilential (and now prostrate) enemy of the Church’.87 This opened the way for Baldwin to come to an understanding with Charles, who now seemed to offer the most promising prospect for a restoration of the Latin Empire. The crucial step in defining the characteristics of Angevin policy as well as crusading in Frankish Greece for the following years took place with the signing of the Viterbo Treaties. In May 1267, at the papal residence in Viterbo and in the presence of the pope, Charles of Anjou, Baldwin II, Prince William of Achaia, 85  That this marriage alliance would be to the benefit of Baldwin is seen by the papal letter referring to it as ‘most profitable for the emperor of Constantinople, the Roman Church, and the entire Christendom’ (‘imperatori Constantinopolitano […] et ecclesie Romanae ac toti populo christiano plurimum […] fructuosum’): Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, nos 1164–65 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, cols 437–38, nos 422–23), (5 January 1267). For the project and Enrique of Castile in general, see Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 76–79; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 24–27. 86  See Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp.  322–23; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 192–94. 87  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1075 (= Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, cols 354–55, no. 312): ‘quamvis olim notatus fueris quod cum hoste pestifero M. nunc prostrato fedus contraxeras amicitie’. For Baldwin falling out of papal favour in 1263, see above, Chapter 5.2, p. 195]. That was, apparently, still the case in March 1266: see Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp. 64–71; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 26; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 406.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

205

and a number of officials, prelates, and cardinals, two treaties were signed within a few days of each other. On 24 May, William of Villehardouin, with the approval of Baldwin, ceded the principality of Achaia to the house of Anjou, through the marriage of his daughter Isabella and one of Charles’s sons. William was to retain his land and rights for his lifetime. Charles and his heirs undertook to recover and defend the lands of the principality. On 27 May another treaty followed, this time between Baldwin and Charles. By the terms of this treaty, Baldwin’s son, Philip of Courtenay, was to marry Charles’s daughter, Beatrice. Besides direct sovereignty over the Morea, Baldwin also ceded to Charles: Manfred’s prior possessions in Epiros and the Ionian Sea; all the islands of the Latin Empire outside the Dardanelles (with the exception of Lesbos, Samos, Kos, and Chios); and a third of all the conquests they would make together or separately, with the exception of the city of Constantinople. The empire was also to devolve to Charles and his successors, should Baldwin and his son die without legitimate heirs. On his side, Charles promised to assist the recovery of the Latin Empire by his own expenses and forces within six or seven years, while a series of clauses detailed the forces to be used in the expedition.88 The treaties then, and especially the second one, were in effect a detailed plan for a crusading expedition for the recovery of Constantinople and other territories in Romania. Their provisions made it clear that Charles would be now spearheading any effort for the restoration of the Latin Empire. Furthermore, their preambles abounded in language, imagery, and arguments drawn from the past of crusading in Frankish Greece. In the first treaty, Prince William stated that he was in difficult circumstances, as a great part of his land was occupied by the ‘schismatic Michael Palaiologos, who calls himself emperor, […] to the great expense of the orthodox religion’ (‘per Michaelem Palleologum scismaticum, qui imperatorem vocari se facit, […] in grande religionis orthodoxe dispendium’). William, putting his faith in Charles’s virtue and strength of character as well as in the power and proximity of his realm, called on him ‘not only in order to assist ourselves and our lands but also because, by recovering and defending the principality, it would be easier to fend off the perils to the faith and the Holy Land’. William, ‘intending to provide 88 

For editions of the Viterbo Treaties and for discussions of their provisions see the following. For the first treaty: ‘Le Traité de Viterbe’, ed. by Longnon; Actes relatifs à la principauté de Morée, ed. by Perrat and Longnon, pp. 207–11. For the second treaty: Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 30–37. For the discussions: Longnon, ‘Le Rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile’; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 103–05; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 197–200. See also ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 184–85, nos 300–01.

206

Chapter 5

for [his] own needs as well as for Christendom (‘rei publice christianitatis’) and the Holy Land’, called for Charles’s help to recover his land, since his own power was not adequate and had not found sufficient help elsewhere.89 In the second treaty, Charles spoke of the growth of ‘the arrogance of the Greeks’ (‘superbia Graecorum’). He stated that the schismatic Michael Palaiologos ‘cruelly rose in insurgency against Baldwin and his empire’ (‘contra vos vestrumque imperium crudeliter insurgente’), captured Constantinople, and ejected the Latins, ‘usurping the imperial title’ (‘imperatori sibi nomen usurpans’). Michael had thus violently occupied the whole of the empire but for a part of the principality of Achaia ‘to the injury of orthodox faith’ (‘in fidei orthodoxe injuriam’). Repeating almost verbatim the relevant section of the first treaty, it was again stated that this agreement for the recovery of the Latin Empire was for the benefit of the emperor, but also for the good of Christendom, of the Faith, and of the Holy Land. Charles, on his part, pronounced that he was taking action moved by the deplorable circumstances of the emperor and the miserable desolation of the empire, as well as by the dangers to the Faith and the Holy Land, and also because he desired to restore to the mother Church of Rome, that ‘noble limb’ which had been separated from the body by the schismatics. He was furthermore taking into consideration the salvation of his own soul, by undertaking ‘such a pious and such a useful affair’ (‘tam pium tamque utile negotio assumentes’).90 The wording of the treaties clearly attempted to place Charles’s forthcoming expedition in the framework of crusading in Frankish Greece, by borrowing heavily from the decree Arduis mens of the First Council of Lyon and other relevant crusade bulls. The papal role in the Viterbo Treaties also requires some examination. Except for the obvious fact that the treaties were both drawn in his presence at the curia, Clement certainly consented to their provisions, as is expressly stated in the second.91 He was to ratify both agreements and act as a guarantor with the authority to impose any penalties, sentence, or censures he saw fit. 92 Finally, the 89  ‘Le Traité de Viterbe’, ed. by Longnon, p. 309: ‘non solum ad succurendum nobis et eidem terre nostre, sed ad occurendum per ipsius recuperationem et defensionem orthodoxe fidei et Terre Sancte periculis prompcior est facultas, unde nobis intendibus tam rei publice chris­tianitatis et eidem Terre Sancte consulere quam nostris utilitatibus providere’. 90  Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 30–31. 91  Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 32: ‘in the presence of the most holy father, the lord pope Clement IV, by the grace of God, and furthermore with his consent and with his authorization of the provisions below’ (‘in presentia sanctissimi patris et domini Clementis, divina providentia papa IV, ac ipso insuper consentiente et ad infrascripta auctoritatem prestante’). 92  For example, Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 37.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

207

pope gave a dispensation for the marriage of Philip of Courtenay with Beatrice and was to choose which of Charles’s sons would marry Isabella. Nevertheless, Clement never followed up this support with the use of any crusading mechanisms, such as preaching, indulgences, or crusade tithes for Charles’s planned expedition in Romania. Be that as it may, in the aftermath of the Viterbo Treaties, Angevin crusading policy in Frankish Greece absorbed or displaced all other independent initiatives to that aim, imperial as well as papal. As was stressed in the preambles of the treaties, both Emperor Baldwin and Prince William had (unsuccessfully) tried to procure help from several temporal powers in the West before turning to Charles. Baldwin, in particular, had developed an intense diplomatic activity trying to secure support for a crusade for the Latin Empire. Not only did he cooperate with the doge of Venice and with Manfred on the matter, as we saw, but he also addressed the royal houses of Europe (in France, England, and particularly Spain)93 and made individual crusading agreements with western nobles. In January 1266, while he was still out of favour with the papacy, Baldwin had granted the kingdom of Thessalonica and some other baronies along with monetary subsidies to Duke Hugh IV of Burgundy in exchange for his service in the Latin Empire, for which Hugh had taken the cross.94 In April 1267, Baldwin called the Hospitallers of the priory of Hungary and Slavonia to come to the empire’s aid, ‘in service to God’, in exchange for the restitution of all possessions that the order used to have in the empire and for a proportion of the newly conquered lands to be given to those who would fight.95 In March 1269, Baldwin made an agreement with Thibaut (V), king of Navarre and count of Champagne, 93 

Baldwin’s activity in the West dated back to the late 1230s and was continued throughout the 1240s and 1250s, see: Chapters 3 and 4, and in general Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’; with regards to Baldwin’s Spanish connections, see also above for Infante Enrique and James of Aragon; see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 219–20. 94  Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 18–29 (and note 1 on p. 29): ‘the noble baron Hugh, duke of Burgundy, has taken the sign of the cross, to go in the service of God to the help and recovery of the empire of Constantinople’ (‘li nobles barons Hugues, duc de Bourgoigne, ait pris lou signe de le croix, por aller au servise de Dieu, au secors et recouvrement de l’empire de Constantinople’); ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 181–82, nos 295–96; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 18–19. 95  Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers, ed. by Le Roulx, no. 3252: ‘de venir le trouver avec autant de gens de guerre qu’il se pourroit pour le service de Dieu et de l’empire’; Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers in Twelfth-century Constantinople’, p. 231.

208

Chapter 5

to whom he ceded a fourth of the empire in exchange for his personal help in Romania. Baldwin promised to assist in the preservation of Thibaut’s share against everyone, ‘and especially against the enemies of the Christian faith’ (‘et specialiter contra inimicos fidei christiane’).96 However, Charles’s heavy shadow was now felt in Baldwin’s actions for the recovery of his empire. The agreement with Thibaut noted carefully and repeatedly that the treaty with the king of Sicily was going to be respected, notwithstanding the concessions made to the count.97 Charles was also prominently involved in Baldwin’s negotiations and agreements with Alfonso of Castile, and with Ferrante Sancho, the illegitimate son of James I of Aragon. In November 1269, Alfonso agreed to provide three hundred knights, two hundred men-at-arms and one hundred crossbowmen ‘in the service of God and Church, and of Emperor Baldwin, his son Philip, and Charles’ (‘in servitio Dei et Ecclesie et illius principis Imperatoris Constantinopolitani et filii eius Philippi et nostro’). On 8 April 1270, Ferrante Sancho, on his part, promised to serve for a year with forty knights, forty squires, and twenty mounted crossbowmen, in the kingdom of Sicily, in Constantinople, or anywhere else Charles wished. In the end, both attempts seem to have been short-lived and without any actual results, while Charles and Alfonso would soon become bitter enemies on account of their conflicting interests in Northern Africa and Italy.98 Pope Clement, likewise, did not take any independent measure for the active defence of Frankish Greece after the Viterbo Treaties. His last such action was the frustrated plan for Enrique of Castile to take up Manfred’s inheritance in Epiros and the Ionian Sea.99 After 1267, the pope seemed content to delegate the affair of the Latin Empire to Charles, although without, as we have said, providing any crusading or financial support to the effort. It is important to try and interpret the pope’s policy towards Romania by putting it in context. 96 

Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 38–40; ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constan­ tinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, pp. 187–88, no. 307; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 218–19; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 37–39. 97  Buchon, Recherches et matériaux, i, 38–39. 98  Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti riguardanti Carlo I, pp. 81, 97, 104–05, 110; I registri della cancelleria Angioina, ed. by Filangieri and others, viii, 274, no. 27 (16 November 1269, treaty with Alfonso), iii, 109, nos 91–92, and iv, 130, no. 861 (instructions regarding expenses and provisions for Ferrante and his men); ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople’, ed. by Hendrickx, p. 189, nos 310–11; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’, pp.  79–80; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  219–20; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 40–41. 99  See above, pp. 203–04.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

209

There was no radical change in viewing Frankish Greece as a valid crusading venture. As we have already seen, the pope repeatedly used legitimizing statements for the value of the Latin Empire and for Charles’s potential contribution to that cause.100 It was rather the practical approach which had undergone a transformation. In a sense, delegating the affair of the recovery of the Latin Empire to Charles was not unlike the pivotal role which had been delegated to him in the affair of the Sicilian Regno. But this analogy, it must be admitted, has its limitations, for Clement ordered no preaching of the cross, granted no indulgences, and procured no funds to support Angevin plans for the restoration of Latin Constantinople; this is unlike the case for Charles’s campaign in Sicily, but also unlike what Urban IV (and other popes before him) had done for Romania in the past. Some additional explanations for Clement’s stance are needed. Practical considerations on account of other preoccupations certainly played a role. The situation in Italy and Sicily had not yet been stabilized enough for a new crusading venture to be undertaken in Frankish Greece. The fight against Manfred had been waged up to 1266, and by autumn 1267, a few months after the signing of the Viterbo Treaties, Conradin invaded Italy in his turn, while parallel revolts against Charles broke out in Sicily and Rome. The situation looked critical as Clement preached the cross against Conradin in Perugia, Tuscany, and Sicily, in 1268.101 Nearly all the Angevin forces were engaged in that effort, while even the prince of Achaia participated in the operations.102 The decisive battle took place at Tagliacozzo on 23 August 1268. Conradin was defeated, captured, and eventually beheaded in Naples on 29 October. Only then did the Hohenstaufen threat disappear, and it was only a month later that Clement followed Conradin to the grave.103 At the same time, crusading help for Romania was hardly to be expected from France, where Louis and many French nobles had taken the cross for the Holy Land in 1267,104 or from England and Germany, on account of their 100 

For example, Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, nos 216, 224, 920, 1025. Housley, The Italian Crusades, p. 19; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 56–58, 135–36. 102  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1336 (= Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d’Angiò, ed. by Del Giudice, ii.1, 140–42); Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 105; Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp. 341–42. 103  See, for example, Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 35; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 119. 104  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, nos 595, 1162, 1194, 1210–12; see, for example, Richard, Saint Louis, pp. 303–05; Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, esp. p. 187; Housley, ‘The Thirteenth-century Crusades in the Mediterranean’, pp. 582–83. 101 

210

Chapter 5

domestic troubles, as Clement himself had stated in his letter of reconciliation to Baldwin II.105 But apart from contemporary circumstances elsewhere, there were also some considerations more specific to the affair of Frankish Greece. Previous attempts to raise crusading support for the Latin Empire, most recently by Urban IV, had not only failed but had also provoked intense reactions. Clement’s policy in Romania represents a contraction after the intensive but failed activity of his predecessor. This is a parallel with the situation in the 1240s and the effective withdrawal from crusading efforts in Frankish Greece by Innocent IV, after the persistent and ambitious efforts of Gregory IX and, then, the Europe-wide call of the First Council of Lyon, which had similarly failed to produce any significant results and had generated a series of negative reactions. Furthermore, an additional explanation is that Clement was probably becoming apprehensive of the growth of Angevin power and ambition and did not wish to put his absolute support and his entire arsenal behind Charles.106 In combination with all these things, it is necessary to consider that at the same time Clement was also conducting negotiations for Church Union with Michael Palaiologos.107 Was Clement’s policy in the matter a sincere effort to effect union by using Charles of Anjou as a means to put pressure on Michael?108 Was it meant as a counterweight to Charles’s power?109 Or, perhaps, was it just a way to reduce the open fronts at the time, and gain time until the situation in Italy was resolved? Clement’s decision to respond to unionist overtures, once again initiated by Michael, should not be taken as a reversal of papal policy away from crusading in Frankish Greece.110 Clement’s views of the Greeks remained as negative as those of most of his predecessors: they were schismatics who should be brought into 105 

Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1075. See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  199–200; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 31–32; Jordan, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, ii, 408–09. 107  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 113–19; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 457–60; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 200–06. 108  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 116. 109  See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 199–200. 110  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 101–02, is wrong in stating that it was Clement who opened negotiations. Michael’s letter was clearly carried by imperial apocrisiarii (not papal ones), who needed translators to communicate with the curia; they are most probably the Greek envoys mentioned by Clement in his letter of 5 February 1267: Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, ii, cols 443–44, no. 432. 106 

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

211

obedience by force or negotiations, while a crusade against them would be justified.111 Clement was in fact much more inflexible in his reply to Palaiologos than his predecessor had been. The pope’s response was generally unenthusiastic, contrary to the claims of Gill and of Geanakoplos.112 While expressing his joy at receiving the Greek emperor’s offers for Church Union, Clement quickly adopted a stricter tone. Reiterating the papal position that agreement over faith should precede any motion for cessation of hostilities (against the emperor’s wish to have peace first and for spiritual matters to be discussed afterwards), the pope stated that it cannot be held against the doctor if he has to apply painful treatment with iron and fire to effect the cure when softer antidotes have proven ineffective. The pope also rejected the draft of an agreement sent from Constantinople, which had been drawn up in the negotiations with Urban IV’s nuncios. Clement’s requests in the matter of union were uncompromising. He appended to his reply a lengthy profession of faith including the recognition of papal primacy, which was to be accepted, under oath, by the emperor and the Greek clergy. Clement also stated — contrary to what Urban had accepted in the recent past — that there was no need for a council to discuss the matter. Once the Greek emperor and Church subscribed to the profession of faith which he had sent, then a council could be held to announce and celebrate the union. Most importantly, Clement’s letter closed with a warning: Your Highness should know that on the occasion of these discussions, we neither intend to overlook (as we should not) the rights of those who complain that they have been wronged by Your Excellence, nor will we desist from pursuing such a 111  See, for example, Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no.  1131, regarding crusading in Romania; see Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 321; Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, nos 540 and 1891 for more references to the schismatic Greeks who occupied the city of Constantinople. 112  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 115, hypothesizes that Clement’s reply indicates a difference of tone between the letter that Michael had sent to him and the one he had sent to Urban in the past. This hypothesis seems unwarranted: the change in the papal tone is evident and demonstrable, whereas the change in Michael’s letters is merely a guess — and an unlikely one, if we judge from later correspondence (as union negotiations were always to Michael’s interest) or from a surviving letter of Michael which, according to its editor, corresponds to Michael’s overtures to which the pope responded in March 1267: ‘Lettera inedita dell’imperatore Michele VIII Paleologo’, ed. by Festa. Geanakoplos also believes that Clement was quite eager for union negotiations, at least as a counterweight to Charles, and especially as an alternative way of effecting the submission of the Greek Church without having to unleash the Angevin power (and thus strengthen Charles’s position to a dangerous extent): Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 200–06 (esp. pp. 200, 205–06); Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, pp. 35–36.

212

Chapter 5

great affair through other avenues, which the Lord might provide for the salvation of souls.113

This was clearly a reference to the complaints against Michael by the Latins of Romania, that is, Emperor Baldwin and Prince William, and a barely concealed threat of a military campaign as an alternative method of bringing the Greek Church into submission. Michael was not to be discouraged. A new letter by the Greek emperor soon brought an additional offer, alongside Church Union. Deploring the evils that had befallen the Holy Land, Michael stated his desire to assist in that affair but expressed concern for the possibility of an attack from the West against his empire in case he departed from Constantinople at the head of his army. Clement’s reply, dispatched only a few days before the Viterbo Treaties were signed and while the discussions were actually under way, was reserved to say the least. Clement welcomed Michael’s feelings for Outremer, but stated that they would be more pleasing if they were followed by actions. The opportunity would be offered soon, the pope informed the emperor, as King Louis had taken the cross, and the ‘infidels’ could be easily brought to heel if the emperor attacked on the one side while the French king was attacking on the other. As for the danger of a western attack, the pope was blunt. The answer was simple: Michael had to make sure that he adhered to the profession of faith and thus return to obedience to Rome. Clement dismissed Michael’s excuse that there were great reactions on the part of the Greek clergy and the argument that the emperor and his people could not be held responsible for recalcitrant clerics.114 Geanakoplos believes that ‘negotiations had progressed far’ and were ‘suddenly brought to a halt’ with Clement’s death on 29 November 1268, something which was ‘a disaster for Michael’, since it allowed Charles ‘to exercise a completely free hand against Constantinople’ in the following years.115 It appears, however, that 113 

Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 585 (= Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 23), (4 March 1267); Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Sbaralea, iii, 111, no. 122: ‘scitura [tua sublimitas], quod occasione tractatus huiusmodi nec hiis qui a tua Magnificentia se gravatos esse queruntur, sicut nec debemus, in sua iustitia deesse proponimus nec a prosecutione tanti negotii per alias vias, quas ad animarum salutem Dominus ministraverit, desistemus’. 114  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1201 (= Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 25), (17 May 1267). See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 117; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  204–05; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, p. 459. 115  Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 36; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 205–06.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

213

he has overestimated how successful and advanced the negotiations had been. The papal reply to Michael’s renewed overtures and offers of crusade participation was rather frigid. Although the pope was prepared to send a new embassy of Dominican friars to Constantinople, it is evident that he was only too quick to repeat emphatically the heavy terms placed on the Greek Church. Clement, once more, made the point that other avenues could be pursued against the emperor, not only in his letter to Michael, where some diplomatic pressure was to be expected, but also in his instructions to the Dominicans themselves. There he stated that, if the Greeks were to prove unwilling to effect union, then the friars should expose their deceit so that: ‘We may preserve our hands unstained lest their blood either now or hereafter be required of us by the Lord’ — an ominous sentence, especially since it was written a few days after the conclusion of the Viterbo Treaties.116 It is quite evident then, that Clement had no ardent desire for Church Union to be consummated through negotiations.117 He did, nevertheless leave this option open, either as a balancing act regarding Charles’s designs in Romania, or as a way to settle the question temporarily until the situation in Italy with Conradin was resolved, after which point some freedom of action might be afforded.118 However, since Clement died shortly after Conradin’s execution, it cannot be certain whether he intended to further support the plans of Charles of Anjou against the Byzantine Empire with crusading mechanisms as soon as the papacy’s — and Charles’s — hands were relatively free. Clement’s death was followed by a lengthy vacancy of the papal see, which, in combination with the eclipse of the Hohenstaufen threat in Italy, confirmed Angevin preponderance in the affairs of Frankish Greece. A number of scholars have argued that the vacancy proved beneficial to Charles of Anjou.119 In general, it appears that this holds true. He was now free of any papal restraints in his 116 

Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1209 (= Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 26), (9 June 1267): ‘vel eorum detectis fraudibus et mendaciis, manus nostras servemus innoxias, ne a nobis nunc vel in posterum eorundem sanguis a Domino requiratur’; trans. by Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 116. 117  See Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 329; Roberg, Das zweite Konzil von Lyon, pp. 72–73. 118  On the apparent contradiction of Clement’s policy, see Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 445; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 32; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 200. 119  See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  216, 223; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 120; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 37.

214

Chapter 5

preparations for a campaign in Romania which were clearly intensified during this period. On the other hand, a fully compliant pope would have been more useful to Charles and more dangerous for Byzantium, given that he could support Charles’s expedition with crusade mechanisms. Charles had continued to present his expedition in crusading terms, but the absence of a pope meant that this connection could not be manifested in a more tangible way. In any case, Michael tried — successfully in the long run — to neutralize Angevin plans through extensive diplomatic activity towards the West. As there was no incumbent on the Apostolic See, Michael turned to Louis IX of France, the only power capable of staying Charles’s hand at the time, while he continued his negotiations with the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa. It is striking that Michael’s policy resulted in the continuation of negotiations for Church Union, even in absence of a pope, thanks to the good services of Louis IX and his mediation with the college of cardinals. In 1269 Charles increased his efforts to build up a coalition against Michael, which included Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Venice, and to prepare both Achaia and his bridgeheads in Epiros for an attack on Byzantium.120 The language that Charles used in his contacts with Hungary and particularly Venice clearly shows that his plans were still perceived, or at least advertised, within the context of crusading in Frankish Greece. The treaty that Charles signed with the Hungarian king on 15 September 1269, sealed with a double dynastic marriage, included an alliance ‘against everyone outside the faith of the church’ (‘contra omnes existentes extra fidem Ecclesie’).121 Such language was bound to have some resonance with the intended audience. It should not be forgotten that, before the devastating Mongol invasion of 1241, Hungary had been one of the main addressees of papal calls for crusades in defence of the Latin Empire. Much more explicit was the use of crusading rhetoric in the effort of the king of Sicily to win over Venice. Dispatching envoys to the doge, Charles issued two edicts, on 7 and 15 September 1269, where crusading language abounded. Charles referred to 120 

For the Angevin preparations, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 216–18, 221–23; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 120, 122–23; Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, pp. 188–90, 192–95; Cerone, ‘La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea’, 41 (1916), esp. pp. 38–64; 42 (1917). 121  Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d’Angiò, ed. by Del Giudice, iii, 138; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p.  216; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 39–40; Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp. 344–45; Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, p. 190; Sternfeld, Ludwigs des Heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis 1270, pp. 159–60, also believes that the treaty could be turned against Byzantium.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

215

the injury committed by Palaiologos and other Greeks against the Holy Roman Church and the Christian faith, and against the magnificent princes, Baldwin, by the grace of God Constantinopolitan emperor of Romania, and Lorenzo Tiepolo, the doge of Venice and most beloved friend of ours, and William, the prince of Achaia, and against the Venetians and other faithful Christians,

and declared his intention ‘to restore to the Holy Roman Church, to Emperor Baldwin, to the doge and commune of Venice, and to all the other Christians the rights which they had and ought to have in the Constantinopolitan empire’. The war, he proclaimed, would be ‘against the schismatic Palaiologos and all the others who are against the Holy Roman Church’, as well as ‘in honour of God, the Holy Roman Church and Christian faith in the whole’.122 Charles was clearly rehearsing the terms and the formulations of the Viterbo Treaties. The alliance with at least one of the maritime republics, preferably Venice, was crucial since a strong fleet was a prerequisite for an Angevin invasion of Byzantium. However, Michael’s negotiations with both Genoa and Venice proved much more successful, at least up to 1279.123 This diplomatic failure was one of the two major impediments to Charles’s launching of his attack against Byzantium in the period before 1271. The other was his brother, King Louis IX of France. Louis, famous for his piety and soon to depart on his fateful expedition to Tunis (1270), was rather indifferent to the

122  Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d’Angiò, ed. by Del Giudice, i, 300–01 (at note): ‘ad honorem dei et sancte Romane Ecclesie et totius fidei Christiane intendimus dare consilium et auxilium ipsi Romane Ecclesie ac Illustri principi Balduino dei gratia Imperatori Constantinopolitano Karissimo affini nostro et Magnifico viro Laurentio Teupulo duci Venetiarum domino quarte partis et dimidii totius Imperii Romani Karissimo Amico nostro, Communi et hominibus Venetiarum fidelibus Ecclesie et omnibus aliis Christianis ad recuperandum omnia jura que habent et habere debent in dicto Imperio […] facere vivam guerram bona fide contra Palialogum scismaticum et omnes alios qui sunt contra sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam […] iniuriam factam Sancte Romane Ecclesie et fidei Christiane et magnificis principibus Balduino dei gratia Imperatori Constantinopolitano Romanie et Laurentio Theopolo Duci Venetiarum Carissimo Amico nostro et Guillelmo principe Achaye et hominibus Venetiarum et aliis fidelibus Christianis Dilectis Amicis nostris a Paleologo et aliis Grecis’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 221; Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp. 345–46; Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, pp. 189–90. 123  See in general: Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 189–207; Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp.  334–41; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 182–85, 206–11, 213–16, 218, 221; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 20–23, 33–36.

216

Chapter 5

cause of the Latin Empire and wished for Charles to join him on his crusade.124 As Louis was the only one who could contain his brother, Michael turned to him and appealed to his sensitivities. Michael contacted Louis at least three times before and after the king’s departure for Tunis.125 The Byzantine emperor affirmed his readiness for Church Union and submitted unconditionally to Louis’s arbitration regarding the matter. Louis was interested in this prospect and interceded with the college of cardinals on the emperor’s behalf requesting them to send the bishop of Albano to Constantinople for discussions. The cardinals obliged, expressing, however, some reservations as to the sincerity and commitment of the Greeks. A high-ranking Byzantine embassy then reached Louis in Carthage, in August 1270, with an appeal for the king to restrain Charles from his aggressive designs against the empire. However, the Byzantine envoys found Louis gravely ill, and he was able to receive them only the day before he died, when he declared his willingness to impose peace between Michael and Charles. Louis’s death, just as Charles’s forces landed at Tunis, negated Michael’s efforts in that direction. A western source reports that the Greek ambassadors wept at the news of Louis’s death, as they believed that Charles would now turn against the empire.126 The blow to Michael’s policy was obvious and it was made even worse by the fact that the bishop of Albano, who had been appointed by the cardinals to conduct unionist negotiations with the Greeks, also passed away in the Tunis crusade, a few days after Louis.127 Charles quickly wrapped up the 124 

See, for example, Lemerle, ‘Saint Louis et Byzance’; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 465–66; Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, pp. 187–88, 190–91, 193–94; Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, pp. 140–41. 125  Regarding the relations between Michael and Louis, the first embassy evidence survives in the notes of a New Testament manuscript in Paris, apparently a diplomatic gift from Michael to Louis. See Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1968; Berger de Xivrey, ‘Notice d’un manuscrit grec’; Lemerle, ‘Saint Louis et Byzance’, pp. 18–19. For the negotiations over Church Union with Louis’s mediation, see Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, nos 29–29a. The sources for the third embassy are Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent (ii, 463–67, par. v.9) and the Primate (a French monk of St Denis): ‘Chronique de Primat’, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 73. In general, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 223–26; Bréhier, ‘Une Ambassade byzantine au camp de Saint Louis devant Tunis’; Lemerle, ‘Saint Louis et Byzance’, esp. pp. 18–24; Dabrowska, ‘L’Attitude pro-byzantine de Saint Louis’; Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, pp. 346–48; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 465–69; Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche, pp. 65–77. 126  ‘Chronique de Primat’, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 73; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 226–27, note 144. 127  Borsari, ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio’, p. 348 and note 1.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

217

crusade and departed for Sicily. According to a letter by one of Louis’s clerks, Peter of Condé, to Abbot Matthew of St Denis, dated 11 November 1270, after the king’s death and the conclusion of peace with the emir of Tunis, some in the crusader camp advocated the continuation of the expedition to the Holy Land, whereas others (including Charles and many barons) proposed to turn towards Greece, against Palaiologos.128 Nevertheless, any plans the king of Sicily might have had for a quick attack against Byzantium became impracticable, when, on 22 November 1270, a storm off Trapani destroyed a great part of his fleet.129

4. The Rejection of Crusading in Frankish Greece: Papal Policy under Gregory X (1271–76) and the Union of the Churches at the Second Council of Lyon (1274) Despite earlier setbacks, in the beginning of the 1270s prospects looked bright for Angevin designs on Romania. Charles of Anjou had been able to intensify his diplomatic efforts and material preparations unrestricted, as the prolonged vacancy of the Apostolic See (since 1268) and then the death of Louis IX (1270) had allowed him a free hand. Nevertheless, the end of the vacancy could offer Charles a chance to bring about the official papal consecration of his campaign as a crusade and consequently secure additional support through crusading mechanisms. For all his relevant rhetoric, this had eluded him thus far. However, the election of Pope Gregory X in 1271 put developments in Frankish Greece on a quite different path. Gregory was determined to assist the Holy Land and, in the process, effect peace within Christendom. He was very positively disposed towards an understanding with the Greeks and the pursuit of Church Union, a policy which gained momentum particularly from 128 

Spicilegium, ed. by d’Achery, iii, 667–68, at 668A: ‘However some were murmuring about what was to be done at that point: that some of the army might go to the Holy Land, such as, particularly, the count of Poitou and Lord Peter, the chamberlain, with many soldiers; and that others might go to Greece, against Palaiologos, such as, particularly, the king of Sicily and many barons, with many soldiers’ (‘Murmurabant tamen nonnulli quod ibi ordinandum esset: quod quidam de exercitu in Terram Sanctam proficiscantur, sicut forte comes Pictavie et dominus Petrus cambellanus cum multis stipendariis; et alii proficiscantur in Greciam contra Paleologum, sicut forte rex Sicilie et multi barones cum stipendariis multis’); Longnon, ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis’, p. 192, note 3. 129  Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 227–28; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 41–42; Lemerle, ‘Saint Louis et Byzance’, pp. 22–23.

218

Chapter 5

late 1273 onwards. This policy, in effect, negated any possibility for a revival of crusading against Byzantium, at least up to 1280. Taking the initiative to contact Michael Palaiologos, Gregory quickly came to an understanding with the Greek emperor. Both sides overcame a series of internal and external reactions in order for Church Union to be proclaimed at the Second Council of Lyon (6 July 1274).130 During the period leading to Lyon, Gregory successfully managed to restrain Charles of Anjou’s activity against Byzantium and force him to postpone the expedition stipulated in the second Treaty of Viterbo. Gregory’s activity in the matter was even more decisive after the Council of Lyon. He obliged Charles to renew a truce with Palaiologos twice, while he was evidently planning for a permanent peace agreement. This was a radical departure from papal crusading policy in Frankish Greece. Not only was the legitimacy of a Latin reconquest of Constantinople compromised, but the pope also actively obstructed an expedition with that aim, arguing that it would actually impede the return of the Greeks to unity rather than effect it. Both in theory and in practice, then, Gregory would go much further than any of his predecessors in his rapprochement with Byzantium. Even Innocent IV, whose negotiations with the Greeks of Nicaea over union had reached a very advanced stage, had never actively intervened to stop western plans of aggression in Romania. On the contrary, all popes after Innocent III had maintained that a crusade to bring the Greeks back to obedience and to heal the schism was a meritorious enterprise. Gregory X was elected in September 1271, after the longest vacancy in papal history, caused by the factional infighting among the cardinals who supported a stauncher pro-Angevin policy and those opposing it. The election of Tebaldo Visconti, archdeacon of Liège, was considered a compromise solution.131 Tebaldo was in Outremer at the time, and only returned to Italy in March 1272. His priority was the Holy Land, as he had first-hand knowledge of its problems. Among his first acts, Gregory appointed Thomas Agni, archbishop of Cosenza, to the vacant 130 

For the Union of the Churches at the Council of Lyon see the following studies and editions of sources: Dossier grec de l’Union de Lyon, ed. by Laurent and Darrouzès; Wolter and Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, pp. 129–234; Roberg, Das zweite Konzil von Lyon, pp. 59–87, 219–81; Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche, pp. 65–170; Lehmann, ‘Das II. Konzil von Lyon und die Ostkirche’; Nicol, ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons’; Nicol, ‘Popular Religious Roots of the Byzantine Reactions to the Second Council of Lyons’; Geanakoplos, ‘Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons’; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 120–41; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 520–36; Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 273–354. 131  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 120; Watt, ‘The Papacy’, p. 145; Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 72–102.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

219

patriarchal throne of Jerusalem. He envisaged a new crusade for the Holy Land to be launched soon, despite the recent debacle of Louis IX’s expedition at Tunis, and the papacy made concerted efforts to raise adequate funds for that aim from the clergy of France and England, the military orders, and a number of influential figures of the time, including King Philip III of France, Charles of Anjou, Count Philip of Savoy, as well as the English princes, Edward and Edmund. He also urged the communes of Pisa, Genoa, Venice, and Marseille to provide a fleet for the coastal defence of the kingdom of Jerusalem, while the pope himself raised a total of 102,650 silver marks and sent thirteen hundred mercenaries to Outremer, between 1271 and 1273. The pope also dedicated a great part of his early activity in pacifying Europe, and particularly Italy, and trying to settle the dispute over the imperial throne of Germany, as necessary prerequisites for the campaign to Outremer. The great crusade for the Holy Land was to be a major issue to be discussed at the ecumenical council the pope summoned at Lyon.132 In the context of his care for the Holy Land and the reconciliation within Christendom, Gregory also proved a great believer in the need and the possibility for co-operation with the Greeks. Gregory’s policy of rapprochement with Byzantium was made evident early on, along with his ability to overcome the equally obvious resistance of Charles of Anjou on that issue. A number of letters and embassies were exchanged between Rome and Constantinople. Gregory had taken the initiative to send a letter to Michael while he was still in the Holy Land, to announce his election as well as his disposition for union. Union with the Greeks also figured among the three main issues (alongside ecclesiastical reform and the affair of the Holy Land) for the Second Council of Lyon, announced by Gregory in March 1272.133 The following summer, Michael’s embassy, under the Franciscan John Parastron, brought a letter which expressed regret that the pope did not call at Constantinople on his way back from the Holy Land and spoke of the emperor’s ‘deep and heartfelt disposition for peace and unity among the Christian people, and the fervent zeal against the impious enemies of the cross’.134 132 

For Gregory’s policy and views regarding the East, see Laurent, ‘La Croisade et la question d’Orient sous le pontificat de Grégoire X’; Claverie, ‘Un Aspect méconnu du pontificat de Grégoire X’; Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 104, 135–36, 209–71 (esp. pp. 226–33). 133  The announcement for the council was made on 31 March 1272 (four days after Gregory’s enthronement in Rome), to meet on 1 May 1274: Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, nos 160–61; Concilia, ed. by Mansi, xxiv, cols 39–42; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 123. 134  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 194 (24 October 1272), from the papal reply: ‘praecordialem affectum quem observas thalamo cordis tui pro pace ac unione populi christiani ac ferventem zelum contra omnes impios Crucis vivifi-

220

Chapter 5

Gregory responded with the dispatch of an embassy and warm letters, inviting the Greek emperor, patriarch, and prelates to the forthcoming council and exhorting them to co-operate for Church Union.135 Michael wrote back to assert, once more, his wish for Church Union to be brought about. Accusing the Angevins of ‘unjustly preventing the achievement of peace […] and introducing enmity to the common detriment of all’, he asked the pope to guarantee the security of the imperial representatives who would be sent to the council.136 On 21 November 1273, Gregory replied jubilantly, providing the necessary safe conducts and requesting that the imperial representatives at the council to be plenipotentiaries so that union could be consummated.137 These communications between the pope and the emperor allow us to reconstruct the fluctuation of Gregory’s policy and attitude towards Michael and the union negotiations, and consequently towards Charles of Anjou and his plans in Frankish Greece. Initially, in October 1272, Gregory appeared more reluctant towards the emperor’s overtures, at least on the surface. He requested the same uncompromising profession of faith as Clement IV had and admonished the emperor to proceed quickly; otherwise the pope, uncertain of Michael’s intentions, might turn to other avenues.138 Nicol, rather exaggeratedly, has commented cae ac honorabilissimae inimicos’. See Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent, ii, 473–77, par. v.11; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 1986; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 124; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 462–63. 135  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, nos 194, 196; see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 239–41; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 124–25, 127; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 463–64. 136  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, nos 313–14: ‘injuste pacis executionem prohibentes […] inimicitiam ad communem interitum omnium introduxerunt’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 241–43; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 129; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, p. 472. 137  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 315. 138  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 194: ‘we would like you to know that if it happens that our messengers are delayed against our wishes, we, uncertain of your response, do not intend to overlook or postpone the pursuit of such a beneficial affair through other ways that the Lord will deem appropriate to reveal for the salvation of souls’ (‘Scire quidem Te volumus, quod si eosdem nostros nuntios contra huiusmodi nostrum desiderium retardari contingat, Nos de tua responsione incerti, tam utilis negotii prosecutionem, per vias quas ad animarum salutem Dominus aperire dignabitur, propterea nec omittere intendimus nec differe’).

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

221

that ‘Gregory’s reply was almost an ultimatum’.139 However, Gregory’s actual policy and personal view were more positive towards union that these reservations indicated, for, despite the fact that Gregory requested the same profession of faith as Clement, he nevertheless relaxed the signs of submission expected from the Greeks and allowed for several alternatives should there be unwillingness or difficulties on the part of the Greek Church. Gregory also made a real concession by not pressing for complete union to take place before secular peace, but allowing for precedence to be given to the latter after some initial recognition of the former; this was a crucial departure from the policy of his predecessor and a clear move towards Michael’s position.140 Gregory’s apparent reservations were the product of sustained pressure from the Angevin party. This is evident in Gregory’s next letter to Michael, in November 1273, in which he urged the emperor to hasten the acceptance of union so as to disprove his critics, powerful and influential people present in the curia who advocated the discontinuing of the negotiations and accused Michael of hypocrisy. Gregory stated that he was disinclined to lend an ear to the accusations, but the emperor was advised to shut the mouths of those who spoke unjustly by acting decisively on his promises.141 It is clear who these people were. 139  Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 463–64. 140  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 195; see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 239–41; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 125–26. 141  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 315: ‘certain powerful and important people assert that the aforementioned discussion over union has been drawn in fictitious words and dissimulation for a very long time on the part of the Greeks; and for that reason they have very often tried to dissuade us from our resolve to send envoys to you, rather urging us to another avenue which seemed to lie in our hands. Although we might not be inclined to lend credulous ears to them, nevertheless we set these things forth to spur and incite Your Excellence […] to aim skilfully and to proceed efficiently and truthfully in consummating the aforementioned affair [of union], as you are obliged. This way, as your deeds will provide clear evidence that your promise is carried out, you might shut the mouths of those who speak unjustly; those who would gladly and forcefully criticize Your Highness if you were not pursuing this most salutary affair with the sincerity that you ought to’ (‘quamplures magne condicionis et status asserunt, unionis praedictae tractatum ex Graecorum parte diutius in figmentis verborum et simultate deductum; propter quod et nobis super apocrisiariorum nostrorum qui ad tuam pervenere presentiam, deliberantibus missione, id dissuadere frequentius, viam aliam, quae se videbatur offere prae manibus, potius suadentes. Licet autem illis credulitatis aures non duxerimus inclinandas, haec tamen Excellentiae Tuae ad stimulum quasi sollicitationis exponimus […] ad consumationem praedicti negotii quasi obligasse videris, ad illam sic sollerter

222

Chapter 5

Unlike his predecessors, Urban IV and Clement IV, Gregory was not tied to the Angevins, so Charles was anxious to establish his influence over him. The king of Sicily was often in the pope’s presence, especially in the first period after Gregory’s arrival in Italy, in an obvious effort to pressurize or even intimidate the newly elected pope. On the pope’s return from the Holy Land, in early 1272, Charles met him at Benevento and escorted him on a tour of the cities of the kingdom; he then acted as Gregory’s attendant, along with Baldwin II, holding the reins of the pope’s horse during his entrance to the Eternal City around 20 March 1272. Charles was in Rome with the pope from late March until early June 1272, as well as in October of the same year. The king of Sicily was present in the papal curia once more in November 1273, along with Philip of Courtenay (Baldwin II’s son and successor as titular Latin emperor), when Gregory’s aforementioned letter to Michael was written.142 It appears that Gregory, who was hard-pressed to adopt an aggressive stance towards Palaiologos when he came to the papal throne, had progressively gained confidence and control of the situation, particularly as the Greek emperor appeared to respond positively and work in the interest of union, thus refuting criticism against him and validating Gregory’s choice of policy. By November 1273, Gregory’s confidence is evident not only by his instructions to Michael to send plenipotentiary envoys so that the affair could be consummated,143 but also by the pope’s rather imperious requests towards Charles of Anjou and Philip of Courtenay at that time.144 Charles was forced grudgingly to concede safe-conducts for the imperial envoys and, most importantly, a truce. This truce explicitly entailed the commitment on the part of Charles and Philip to postponing the execution of the Viterbo Treaties until May 1275.145 By late 1273 Charles had lost intendas, sic efficaciter et in veritate procedas, quod, tuae promissionis effectu per evidentiam operis apparente, obstruantur ora inique loquentium, qui Celsitudinem Tuam libenter forte notarent, quasi non in sinceritate debita hoc tam salubre negotium prosequaris’). 142  Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 135–41, 144–47; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 123 and note 9; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 239 (note 40) and 243 (note 54). 143  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 315. 144  Safe conducts were requested from Charles of Anjou, Philip of Courtenay, and Prince William of Achaia: Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 316, 20 November 1273; see also Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, nos 317–19 (= Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, vii, cols 235–38, nos 14, 18; Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 39); Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 243–44; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 129–30. 145  This can be deduced from Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

223

the diplomatic game of influence over Gregory, and the pope was able to impose his own policy, which was much closer to that of Michael. The affair of Church Union was taken to its conclusion. The Greek delegation departed for the council in March and arrived at Lyon on 24 June 1274. It was honourably received by the pope. In the following days there were many displays of good will on both sides, but no actual discussion on any point of dogma or ecclesiological issues. After the representatives of the Greek emperor and clergy had made the professions of faith required by the pope, the Union of the Greek and Latin Churches was officially celebrated on 6 July 1274.146 After the union had been celebrated at the Second Council of Lyon, Gregory took further steps regarding Angevin plans for Frankish Greece. The truce, which was set to expire on 1 May 1275, did not remove the threat to Byzantium presented by the Viterbo Treaties permanently, as the pope had agreed that the rights of the king of Sicily and the Latin emperor would not be prejudiced by the postponement. But Gregory now wished for permanent peace to be established. The instructions to Abbot Bernard of Montecassino, whom Gregory sent to negotiate with both Charles and Michael, are revealing. The pope described the way the now deceased Emperor Baldwin and Charles had signed the treaties ‘about the affair of Romania’ (‘circa negotium Romaniae’) and noted that the king had been making military preparations to carry out the agreement. However, the pope stated that he had his mind set on the peaceful return of the Greeks to unity, which would be greatly impeded by such an expedition and by the presence of the king in Romania. Since, Gregory continued, the king of Sicily and the Latin emperor were catholic princes and zealots of the Faith, and as such they placed the common good, the expansion of the Faith, and the salvation of souls above their dispositions, they had agreed with Gregory’s request to put off their expedition for one year. The pope, in turn, had consented to their petitions and had guaranteed that, notwithstanding the postponement, their rights arising and Cadier, no. 491; the truce was concluded some time before the council (according to the Viterbo Treaties, the offensive in Romania was set to begin in 1273 or 1274). See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 243–44 and notes 58–59; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 517–20; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, p. 473; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 127, 129–30. 146  Brevis nota eorum quae in secundo concilio Lugdunensi acta sunt, ed. by Mansi, cols 61–68, pp. 65–66; ‘Ordinatio Concilii generalis Lugdunensis per dominum Gregorium papam X’, in Franchi, Il concilio II di Lione, 1274, pp. 67–100; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 133–41, esp. pp. 135–39; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 260–61; Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche, pp. 135–56; Roberg, Das zweite Konzil von Lyon, pp. 59–87, 219–81; Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 297–313.

224

Chapter 5

from the treaties would be preserved. However, Gregory told his envoy, since the affair of the return of the Greeks to unity had now been successfully set in motion, it was essential for its complete consummation that the truce be turned into permanent peace (federa concordie plenioris). The abbot’s mission was to renegotiate the truce and to request from Philip and Charles a further extension, for as long as he saw necessary, until a permanent agreement and lasting peace could be arranged. The abbot was instructed to promise again that the rights of the parties involved would not be prejudiced by this second postponement.147 In other words, Gregory was planning to manipulate Charles and Philip and delay their expedition, until he could achieve the effective cancellation of the Viterbo Treaties. This would round off Gregory’s policy regarding Angevin designs in Romania. Bernard was indeed successful in negotiating the extension of the truce for an additional year, to expire on 1 May 1276.148 Gregory’s pontificate, therefore, represented a real change in both policy and attitude. Gregory was sincerely accommodating to the Greek side, and the friendly tone of his letters was reflected in his use of language. Throughout the negotiations he talked of union and unity, not of return to obedience. He relaxed the guarantees requested by his predecessors for an agreement on Church Union and tried to devise more flexible formulas. He did not really use the threat of a campaign against Byzantium to coerce Michael; the only reference he made to that possibility was evidently made as a warning on account of intense external pressures. Eventually, he managed to hold back Charles and his planned expedition. It is important that Gregory repeatedly stated that such a campaign — which had been frequently presented as a crusading venture by its proponents — would actually be an impediment to the affair of union, not a way to enforce it.149 Particularly striking are Gregory’s secret instructions to Master Simon, the chancellor of the kingdom of Sicily, to try to influence Charles in the affair of Church Union, so that he might prefer ‘this immense gain of souls, to temporal commodities’.150 Referring to the Viterbo Treaties, Gregory stated that they 147  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 491 (see no. 490), (28 July 1274). 148  See Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 871; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden, ed. by Dölger, no. 2015; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 549–50; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 285–86 and note 39 for the new expiration date. 149  See, for example, Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, nos 853, 198, 491. 150  Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, vii, cols 231–32, no. 10: ‘we strictly enjoin your devotion, in the virtue of obedience and under the pain of

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

225

could ‘gravely impede the affair of union or harm the souls of King Charles and Emperor Philip out of ignorance or negligence’.151 The view that union was to be effected through diplomacy and not through bloodshed had actually been shared by Humbert of Romans, in his Opus tripartitum, which he had prepared at the request of Gregory for the Council of Lyon. Humbert stressed that the Latins should use spiritual weapons against the Greeks, and not weapons of the flesh as they had been doing. He further advised that the Latins who are neighbours of the Greeks, or rule over some of them, should stop scandalizing them with their words and deeds; and he even noted that papal envoys to the Latins of Achaia should have ‘caused them to put an end to their excesses and grave misdeeds which they unjustly inflict on the Greeks’.152 Crusading in Frankish Greece had reached its ideological as well as its practical nadir. It was not only its effectiveness which was put in question but the legitimacy of its actual aim, namely the reinstatement of the Latin Empire. excommunication, to keep secret what we write to you about this affair, and to bind the king [Charles], with as much diligence as you can, to the observance of this secret […]; and to speak to him most secretly and most carefully on our behalf about the aforementioned issues, and to convince him, to your own merit, not to prefer temporal interests, however great they might be, over such a good and such an immense and inestimable profit of souls’ (‘devotionis tuae in virtute obedientiae ac sub excommunicationis poena districtius injungentes, quatenus quae tibi super hoc scribimus, secreto conservans, et eumdem regem ad hujusmodi secreti observantiam diligentia qua potes astringens, […] ipsum super praemissis secretius et diligentius alloquaris ex parte nostra, et ad meritum tibi persuasurus eidem, ut tanto bono, tam immenso et inaestimabili animarum lucro quantumlibet commodum temporale non praeferens’). 151  Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, vii, cols 231– 32, no. 10: ‘Additionally, this consideration greatly troubles our mind, that there are known to be some agreements between our most beloved son in Christ, the illustrious emperor of Constantinople [Philip of Courtenay] and the king [Charles], which can greatly hinder such an important affair [that is, Church Union], or through ignorance, perhaps, or negligence, they might severely harm the souls of the aforementioned emperor and king’ (‘Illa insuper mentem nostram consideratio gravius anxiat, quod inter carissimum in Christo filium nostrum imperatorem Constantinopolitanum illustrem et regem eumdem aliqua tractata dicuntur, quae vel grave possent tanto negotio impedimentum afferre, vel per ignorantiam forte vel negligentiam graviter ipsorum imperatoris et regis animos perturbare’). 152  Humbert of Romans, Opus tripartitum, pp. 185–229, at pp. 207–23 (quotation p. 221): ‘quod si Ecclesia Romana misisset frequentius nuncios solennes […] qui etiam Latinos is Achaia visitarent […] et Latinos ab excessibus et gravaminibus, quae injuste inferunt Graecis facere cessarent’; Concilia, ed. by Mansi, xxiv, cols 120D–129E. See: Brett, Humbert of Romans, pp. 186–191, at p. 190; Roberg, Das zweite Konzil von Lyon, pp. 106–26; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 124 and note 12; Schein, Fideles crucis, pp. 30–31; Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, pp. 147–213 (on Humbert’s discussion of crusading).

226

Chapter 5

The Church Union of 1274 was a great diplomatic victory for Michael Palaiologos exactly because it meant that his empire was now protected from a crusading attack. Michael had consistently and tenaciously pushed this policy forward and had remained focused on that aim, even in the face of ferocious internal opposition, which included members of the imperial family and of the aristocracy, as well as the majority of the common people and clergy. The emperor’s own sister, Eulogia, actively conspired against her brother, while Patriarch Joseph of Constantinople could not bring himself to agree with imperial policy on union with Rome, so he was eventually led to abdication. Many nobles and clerics were excommunicated, deprived of office or exiled, including Manuel Holobolos, a court orator and close adviser of Michael. The imperial stance hardened even more, as anti-unionist pamphlets circulated in Constantinople, and there were acts of open defiance against the emperor’s policy. Two of the emperor’s nephews were blinded and imprisoned, while one of his cousins died in jail.153 Michael could only be so stubborn against such widespread reactions because he was aware of what was at stake. Both the danger represented by the Angevin expedition under preparation and the opportunity offered by Gregory X’s outlook on union and crusading were immense. How greatly the Angevin threat loomed in Michael’s mind can be gauged by the fact that, in his brief autobiographical note (which precedes the founding act of the church and monastery of St Demetrius in Constantinople), he devoted to his defence of the empire against Charles’s attacks nearly as much space as to all his other victories and conquests over his Latin or Greek opponents.154 Michael had the chance to cancel out the arguments for a crusade against Byzantium by appealing to the sole power responsible for authorizing such a venture, the papacy. 155 This was the motive Michael consistently invoked to defend his unionist policy against internal opposition: some concessions to the papacy were a small price to pay in order to induce papal assistance to the Latins of Romania to cease. He insisted that this was an occasion where the Byzantine Church and people should have 153 

For the extensive reactions to the union in Byzantium, see Nicol, ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons’; Nicol, ‘Popular Religious Roots of the Byzantine Reactions to the Second Council of Lyons’; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 465–72, 474–76; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 264–76; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 128–29, 131–32, 163–65, 169–71, 176–77. 154  ‘Imperatoris Michaelis Palaeologi de vita sua’, ed. by Grégoire, pp. 455–61. 155  See Nicol, ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 116, 121; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 178–79.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

227

to exercise oikonomia for the benefit and the protection of the empire. As we have already seen, Michael invoked the precedent of Vatatzes’s Church Union negotiations in 1249–54, stressing that the aim had always been to stop papal support for the Latins.156 This political aim was evident in Byzantine contacts with the papacy during and after the Council of Lyon. Even the synodical letter, by which the Greek clergy subscribed to the union, closed with a statement that along with ecclesiastical unity the hierarchy also supported the solution to temporal matters, as their emperor had requested from the pope.157 Gregory was to hold separate meetings regarding such temporal matters, with George Akropolites and ex-Patriarch Germanos III.158 Several of the points under discussion were in essence Byzantine requests for the papacy not to intervene in potential disturbances in the empire and for the pope to do his best to protect the empire from western aggression.159 A further step in Michael’s efforts in that direction was his promise, made by his representatives at the Council of Lyon, to assist the Holy Land ‘with his army, money, provisions, and in any other way, as long as he would have peace with his Latin neighbours’.160 This explicitly outlines the connection between Michael’s attempts to appeal to western sensitivities by promising assistance to the Holy Land and his general aim of securing the empire from any further western attacks. Michael’s policy of offering Byzantine participation in a crusade had been consistent since the recovery of Constantinople, though it had grown in momentum and importance. He had previously made references in his communications both with western sovereigns, such as James I of Aragon and Louis IX,161 and with the papacy, to the potential help he could offer to the Holy Land. In a letter to Urban IV, Michael had promised to ‘stretch the empire’s 156  Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent, ii, 471, 479, pars v.10 and v.12; see above, Chapter 4.4, pp. 166–67. 157  Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 42, par. 270 (February 1274). 158  Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, nos 46–47, 49–50. 159  Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, no. 50, esp. pars 290, 293–94. 160  Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu, nos 49–50, pars 288, 290 ( July 1274): ‘ad faciendum totaliter adiutorium in Terra Sancta et per exercitum et per pecuniam et per victualia et per omnimodam aliam providentiam, solummodo si habuerit pacem cum vicinis suis Latinis’. 161  Michael had contacted James I of Aragon in 1269, offering assistance to his projected crusade for the Holy Land: Chronicle of James I, trans. by Forster, ii, 599–600; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 60; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 220. Regarding Louis IX, see Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 36.

228

Chapter 5

arm, with the help of God, and subject all the nations and the patriarchal sees to devotion, obedience and love for the mother Church [of Rome]’.162 Even more explicitly, in a letter to Clement IV, Michael had expressed his concern for the Holy Land and its tribulations, while claiming that he hesitated to go there with his army in case there was some attack from the West against Constantinople during his absence.163 But the climax came under Gregory X. After the aforementioned agreement at the Council of Lyon, an imperial embassy headed by George Metochites was sent to discuss with Gregory a plan for the projected crusade to the Holy Land.164 In the meeting, a shared interest was expressed for a common enterprise in order to wrest the formerly Christian lands of Anatolia from Turkish hands, so that they could be returned to the empire. The imperial envoy, acting on Michael’s instructions, suggested the land route for the forthcoming crusade to Outremer. As the pope displayed an interest on the situation in Asia Minor, Metochites spoke at length about the importance of the cities and bishoprics there. Gregory was moved to propose that an effort should be made to restore these territories to the Christian faith and to imperial control, either before or after the recovery of the Holy Land. A meeting between the pope and the emperor was set to take place in the following Easter (1276) at either Brindisi or Avlona, whichever was safer at the time, where they would discuss the crusade against the enemies of Christ. Gregory stated that this task depended on ‘the two arms of the Church, namely the two emperors, that of Constantinople, and the one of Rome elected by himself [the pope]’.165

162  Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, no. 748RO: ‘Ipsi matri nostre ecclesie […] omnes gentes et patriarchales sedes, extento divina potentia brachio nostri imperii, ac omnes nationes ad devotionem, obedientiam et amorem ejusdem ecclesie nostri tranquilli imperii potentia subjugabitur’; for a reasonable crusading interpretation see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 178; Roberg, Das zweite Konzil von Lyon, p. 74; for a different one, however, see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 110, 112, note 54. 163  Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, no. 1201. 164  Our source for that meeting is the report by George Metochites: ‘Le Rapport de Georges le Métochite’, ed. by Laurent, pp. 240–47; and ‘Le Récit d’une mission diplomatique de Georges le Métochite’ ed. by Giannelli, pp. 435–43. See in general: Laurent, ‘Grégoire X (1271–1276) et le projet d’une ligue antiturque’, esp. pp. 263–64; Laurent, ‘Georges le Métochite, ambassadeur de Michel VIII Paléologue’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 285– 94; Gatto, Il pontificato di Gregorio X, pp. 261–71. 165  ‘Le Récit d’une mission diplomatique de Georges le Métochite’ ed. by Giannelli, p. 440: ‘τοῖς δυσὶ βραχίοσιν ἔφασκε τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐνστηριχθῆναι τὸ ἔργον, βασιλεῦσι δυσὶ δηλονότι, τῷ τε Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἡμετέρῳ καὶ τῷ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς Ῥώμης ἐκλελεγμένῳ’.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

229

This remarkable proposal actually meant that Michael could now put the crusading powers of western Christendom at his service in reclaiming Byzantine territories in Anatolia, rather than trying to dodge their blows. This was the highpoint of Michael’s manoeuvring with regards to crusading in Frankish Greece; it was also a foretaste of crusading expeditions to come, when the focus would progressively shift towards Anatolia and the Turkish threat. Michael had astutely manipulated western crusading sensitivities to his advantage, apparently not only through his rhetoric but also through some tangible gestures. If Sanudo is to be believed, Michael ‘had a beautiful and great tower built at Acre at his own expenses’. This public relations stunt was apparently well received in some quarters as Sanudo, himself a fervent propagandist of crusading, mentioned it in the context of Michael’s unionist efforts, remarking that ‘no Greek emperor has done so much for the Church and for the benefit of Christendom, as the aforementioned Lord Michael’.166 Eventually the project for a joint Greco-Latin expedition in Asia Minor did not proceed, as Gregory died a few months before the arranged meeting with Michael. Negotiations for the crusade were continued under Gregory’s successor, Innocent V, but eventually nothing came out of them.167 Regardless of this, however, Michael had managed to neutralize the danger of a crusade being proclaimed against Byzantium. Although this did not altogether preclude aggression on the Angevin side, the Council of Lyon was a serious setback for Angevin plans in Romania. Charles had been carrying out intensive preparations for his projected campaign, particularly by buttressing defences in Achaia and by establishing his influence in Albania where he was recognized as king of Albania by the local nobles in exchange for Angevin protection against the Greeks (21 February 1272). Michael tried unsuccessfully to dislodge Charles from the area, realizing the importance of Albania, 166 

Marino Sanudo Torsello, Istoria di Romania, ed. by Papadopoulou, p.  157: ‘alcun’ Imperator Greco non hà fatto tanto per la Chiesa, e per ben della Christianità, quanto il sopradetto Sior Michieli, il qual anco fece fabricar in Acri una bella e Gran Torre a sue proprie spese’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 343. According to Papadopoulou, the editor of the Istoria (Marino Sanudo Torsello, Istoria di Romania, ed. by Papadopoulou, pp. 287–88, note 165), the information about the tower is not mentioned in any other souce, but it is repeated by Sanudo in a letter of 1324 to Hieronymus, the bishop of Caffa: ‘dominus Imperator Pallialogus fecerat aedificari in Acon unam maximam turrim, cum moenibus valde magnis ad defensionem civitatis’ (Sanudo, Epistolae, no. 8, p. 300). 167  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 2, pars 2, 5. See also Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 290–91, 293; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 40; Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V, pp. 271–79.

230

Chapter 5

which provided the king of Sicily with a convenient bridgehead on the other side of the Adriatic in direct contact with Thessalonica and Constantinople through the Via Egnatia.168 Charles had actually tried to make the May 1274 deadline stipulated by the Viterbo Treaties for the launch of his expedition, but eventually he was forced to settle for a truce with Byzantium and a postponement of the execution of the treaties on account of the ecclesiastical negotiations between Constantinople and Rome. The ensuing Church Union at Lyon, and Gregory X’s policy in general, seriously compromised the legitimacy of Charles’s plans, especially by calling for the cancellation of the Viterbo Treaties. Of course, one should not overlook practical factors, especially Charles’s failure to reach an agreement with Venice (and thus secure the necessary fleet), and Castilian-Ghibelline opposition to the Angevins in northern Italy.169 But although these had played an important role in impeding Charles from launching his invasion in Romania, papal approval or at least acquiescence was essential to his plan, because it was from the start presented as a crusading enterprise. It should not be forgotten, for example, that the phrasing of the Viterbo Treaties was based on the background of crusading in Frankish Greece or that Charles had relied heavily on crusadeinspired rhetoric when he had attempted to win over Venice in 1269.170 Similar language was occasionally used in his communications with his own officials as well. In March 1270, while sending a flotilla under Hugh of Conches to assist the defence of Achaia, he informed his justiciar at Bari that the force was dispatched ‘to the lands of Romania, for the honour of God and for the help of the magnificent prince of Achaia, our beloved relative’.171 In his orders to his barons, some months later, he spoke of ‘the Achaian crusade against the schismatic Greeks, to the help of the faithful’.172 168 

Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 233–35, 279–80; Nicol, ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, pp. 178–80. 169  Michael Palaiologos was involved in both issues: see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  252–57; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 44, 50; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 129–30. 170  Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d’Angiò, ed. by Del Giudice, i, 300–01; see also Chapter 5.3, above. 171  Cerone, ‘La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea’ 41 (1916), pp. 51–52 (and note 1 at p. 52): ‘ad honorem Dei et subsidium magnifici viri principis Achaye dilecti affinis nostri ad partes Romanie proficisci’. 172  I registri della cancelleria Angioina, ed. by Filangieri and others, vii, 95, no. 20: ‘pro itinere Achaye contra Grecos scismaticos, in subsidium fidelium’. This circular letter is found in a register which includes documents dating from August 1271 to January 1272; judging by the

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

231

Overall, Gregory’s pontificate represented a striking change of papal policy towards Frankish Greece, exemplified in the proclamation of the Union of the Greek and Latin Churches at the Second Council of Lyon. The consummation of union had now become the priority of the papacy’s policy in Romania, whereas the restoration of the Latin Empire through a crusade had been removed from the list of papal objectives. However, it remained to be seen whether this reversal of policy would prove a lasting one or not.

5. The Fate of Church Union and the Crusade in Frankish Greece under Gregory X’s Successors (1276–80) Gregory’s three short-reigned successors did not share his enthusiasm and his trusting approach towards the Greek side.173 They generally adopted a more uncompromising stance, making extensive requests from the Greek Church and emperor regarding the implementation of Church Union, and occasionally invoking the Angevin danger to Byzantium as a means of putting pressure on the Greek side to make tangible concessions. Nevertheless, the basic orientation of the policy adopted at the Council of Lyon was retained. Church Union was the priority for the Apostolic See in Romania in the 1270s, whereas a crusade for the Latin Empire was hardly an option. Papal references to the plans of Charles of Anjou and Philip of Courtenay were always followed by statements of the popes’ desire for peace between the Latin rulers and Michael. Such plans, the popes maintained, were obstacles to the affair of union rather than an alternative way for the return of the Greek Church to obedience. No help, or even statement of support, was offered by the Apostolic See to the projected Angevin campaign in Frankish Greece. More than that, Gregory’s successors, particularly Nicholas III, urged the king of Sicily to conclude a truce with Palaiologos and explicitly forbade an attack on Constantinople. The stricter approach on the matter of Greek obligations for the consummation of Church Union was made apparent shortly after the death of Gregory X.174 The other letters around it, it should probably be dated in the later part of this period. 173  Namely: Innocent V (21 January to 22 June 1276), John XXI (8 September 1276 to 20 May 1277), and Nicholas III (25 November 1277 to 22 August 1280). The five-week long pontificate of Hadrian V (11 July to 18 August 1276) was of no consequence. 174  For the negotiations between the papal curia and Michael at the time, see, in general, Grumel, ‘Les Ambassades pontificales à Byzance’; Van Moé, ‘L’Envoi de nonces à Constantinople par les papes Innocent V et Jean XXI’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West,

232

Chapter 5

new pope, Innocent V, held talks with the imperial envoys who were still in Italy when Gregory passed away. In May 1276, Innocent prepared a series of letters to be carried by a papal embassy to Constantinople, headed by the minister general of the Franciscans, Jerome of Ascoli, who had already served as Gregory’s envoy to the Byzantine court. Innocent was obviously interested in union but on more stringent terms than his predecessor. Such terms included the demand for the filioque to be added in the profession of faith of the Greek Church, along with the request for additional oaths and guarantees from the Greek emperor and clergy, especially regarding the recognition of papal primacy. Innocent used the more rigid formula of Clement IV rather than that of Gregory X. 175 The view that Innocent V was not as wholeheartedly and unconditionally devoted to the affair of union as Gregory X was also held by George Metochites, who conducted negotiations with both popes, and it was apparently shared by Jerome of Ascoli.176 The papal embassy had not yet left Italy, however, when they were informed of Innocent’s death on 22 June 1276 and had to turn back. Negotiations were continued by John XXI, who dispatched to Constantinople the letters prepared by Innocent but changed the composition of the embassy.177 John also requested a fresh confession of faith from the emperor, along with a recognition of Roman primacy, to be made orally. As Gill has observed: ‘the embassy of Pope John XXI only laid new burdens on Palaiologos and released him of none’.178 After the arrival of the papal embassy there were ceremonies at Constantinople during April 1277 affirming the union between the Churches. Michael performed the oral oaths pp. 290–94, 305–25; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 162–78; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 123–26, 128–34; Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche, pp. 171–213; Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V, pp. 256–86, at pp. 267–86. 175  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 8–9; see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 167 for the more rigid formula, and generally, pp. 167–68 for the stricter tone adopted by both Innocent V and John XXI in comparison to Gregory. See also Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V, pp. 277–79, 282–85; Laurent, ‘Georges le Métochite, ambassadeur de Michel VIII Paléologue’, pp. 147, 151–56. It should be noted, however, that Innocent did modify his instructions to allow some room for manoeuvring to his legates: Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 9–11. 176  ‘Le Récit d’une mission diplomatique de Georges le Métochite’ ed. by Giannelli, pp. 440–43. 177  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p.  165 and note 21. The legates apparently departed early in December 1276. See also: Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 305–06; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 126; Van Moé, ‘L’Envoi de nonces à Constantinople par les papes Innocent V et Jean XXI’, pp. 48–49. 178  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 170–71.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

233

and along with his son, Andronikos, sent letters to the pope which included the requested profession of faith. The Greek clergy eventually signed Patriarch John Bekkos’s letter, which similarly included a profession of faith and a recognition of papal primacy.179 However, Pope John also died before long (20 May 1277), and further negotiations were taken up by his successor, Nicholas III. In his letters, Nicholas praised the zeal of both Michael and Andronikos, and urged them to persist in strengthening the union. Nevertheless, Nicholas’s instructions (his memoriale) to his envoys were very close to those of his predecessor as far as the contents were concerned but even ‘harsher in tone and more uncomprehending of the Greek mentality and situation’.180 One of his additional instructions was for the envoys to spur Michael into requesting the dispatch of a permanent cardinallegate for Constantinople, a development that would most certainly irritate the Greek side as it was a heavy-handed intervention of the papacy which essentially violated the patriarchate’s autonomy.181 The firmer requests to the Greek emperor and clergy regarding the consummation of union were coupled with a similarly strict tone adopted in the papal communications and, most importantly, with warnings about the intentions of Charles of Anjou and Philip of Courtenay. These warnings were intended to put pressure on Michael to proceed with the affair of union without delays and to agree on a truce with Charles and Philip.182 The only time that they were used as an actual and direct threat against Michael was under Innocent V. Referring to the claims of Philip and Charles over Constantinople and the empire and their grievances against Michael, Innocent advised the Greek emperor to take under consideration their stated intentions to reclaim their rights and to work swiftly for the consummation of union. Innocent quite explicitly threatened that he would not be able to prohibit them from claiming their rights ‘through permissible remedies’ without doing injustice to them, if Michael was to display negli179  Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, nos 220–21, 228–30; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 306–09; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 168–71; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 126. 180  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p.  173; see also Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 310–11; Nicholas’s memoriale in Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 376. 181  Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 376, p. 130; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 315–16. 182  See, for example, Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 3, pars 11–12 (Innocent V); Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 368 ( John XXI and Nicholas III).

234

Chapter 5

gence and inordinate delays in his actions.183 Without unreservedly sanctioning the position of Philip and Charles, Innocent nevertheless declared his neutrality towards the conflicting Greek and Latin claims.184 The pope also reverted to the pre-Gregorian position that fulfilment of spiritual union should precede temporal peace in order for the rights of Philip and Charles not to be prejudiced.185 This stance was not altogether surprising for Innocent V who was more of an Angevin sympathizer than Gregory X and did not continue his predecessor’s policy of shaking off Charles’s influence over the papacy.186 Such pronouncements were only a step away from reviving the legitimacy of crusading for the Latin Empire, but Innocent V was alone in talking about the ‘rights’ of Philip and Charles. John XXI and Nicholas III only referred to the ‘complaints’ and ‘dissension’ between the Latin princes and Michael, which were a hindrance to the affair of union and peace.187 It was clear that the emphasis 183 

Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 3, pars 11–13 at 13 (see no. 2, par. 8), (23 May 1276): ‘nec Nos ipsis ius suum permissis remediis prosequi sine iuris iniuria prohibere possumus’. 184  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 2, par. 8: ‘certain Latin princes have been making petitions for some time, and they still make petitions pressingly, which are known to turn entirely against you; therefore, so that it might not be thought that some injustice is, perhaps, done to either of the two parties which make such different requests, we believe that our response to them should purposely be neutral regarding these affairs’ (‘cum a nonnullis principibus Latinorum ab olim aliqua petita fuerint et adhuc petantur instanter, quae huiusmodi petitionibus tuis omnino dinoscuntur adversa, Nos, ne alterutri partium ad tam diversas petitiones instantium fieri forsan putaretur iniuria, consulto neutri earum super illis duximus respondendum’). 185  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no.  3, for example par. 11. 186  See Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V, pp. 327–37. 187  See, for example, Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 368 (letter of Nicholas III to Michael, 7 October 1278): ‘so that no harm might come to this union because of the dissension, which has been brought about on account of temporal matters between you, on the one hand, and our most beloved sons in Christ, the illustrious emperor of Constantinople and King Charles of Sicily, on the other’ (‘ne unio eadem ex dissensione, quam inter te ex parte una, et carissimos in Christo filios nostros imperatorem Constantinopolitanum et C. Sicilie regem illustres ex altera temporalium subministrat occasio, dispendium sentire in aliquo’); ‘to preserve the common security as well as the purity of his conscience, [ John XXI] with pious intentions denounced the dangers which were looming on account of this dissension’ (‘[predecessor noster] ad comunem cautelam sueque puritatem conscientie conservandam pia denuntiavit intentione pericula, que dissentio eadem comminatur’); and ‘how great tranquility will be afforded not only to the two sides, but practically to the whole of Chistendom, from this pacification of the discord; how many dangers will be avoided on account of this, which will be beneficial to the salvation of souls and helpful for the consolidation of the status of yourself and your people’

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

235

was on progress being made in the consummation of union, rather than on sanctioning Angevin aggression. In fact, all three popes declared their desire for peace between Michael and the Angevins and actively mediated the conclusion of a truce, taking up the role of arbitrators and requesting plenipotentiaries from both sides to come to the curia.188 Far from providing any assistance to Charles’s planned expedition, the popes instructed the king of Sicily to agree to a ceasefire and not to hinder the cause of union. In May 1276, Innocent V informed Michael that Charles and Philip had already been convinced by the papacy to agree to a truce and urged the Greek emperor to take steps in the same direction.189 But the most decisive action on the matter was undertaken by Nicholas III. A member of the Orsini family, who were bitter enemies of the Angevins, Nicholas was determined to curb Angevin influence over the papacy. He limited Charles’s powers in Italy by inducing him to give up both his senatorship in Rome and the imperial vicariate of Tuscany shortly after his accession to the papal throne.190 Furthermore, the pope effectively forbade an attack on Constantinople, making it clear to Charles that the conflict with Michael hindered the commendable cause of unity, which had been his predecessor’s priority also, 191 and that the king was not to obstruct papal communication with Michael but to offer his full co-operation in the negotiations for peace.192 The pope instructed Charles (‘quanta ex hujusmodi sedatione discordie detur non solum utrique parti sed etiam toti quasi Christianitati tranquilitas, quanta vitentur ex ea pericula, quam sit eadem animarum saluti congrua et solidati tui tuorumque status accomoda’); see Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 378 (to Charles of Anjou, 18 October 1278). 188  See, for example, Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 3 (par. 12), 8 (pars 31, 36), 9 (par. 49), and 20; Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, nos 368, 378, 708–10; see also ibid., no. 220, p. 77A. 189  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 3, par. 13. 190  Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, p.  139; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 133; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 310. For the conflict between the Angevins and the Orsini faction, see, for example, Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 340, 352; Sternfeld, ‘Das Konklav von 1280 und die Wahl Martins IV’, esp. pp. 16–19, 22 and following, 32–33, 45; Sternfeld, Der Kardinal Johan Gaëtan Orsini, for example, pp. 28–47, 147–52, 309–11. 191  See, for example, Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 378: ‘[ John XXI] being disposed towards peace, and devising ways and means through which it would be possible for the discord about these temporal matters to be settled, and for concord to come about over these issues’ (‘[ Joannes papa predecessor noster] disponens ad pacem, ac vias et modos excogitans, per quos posset super eisdem temporalibus sedari discordia, et concordia provenire super illis’). 192  The relevant letters are Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, nos 368, 378–81, 708– 10, 896; Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 40–42.

236

Chapter 5

to provide, within a short time and for the duration of the negotiations, safeconducts for the papal envoys to Constantinople and for any envoys sent from Michael193 and to make sure that they would be protected from the machinations of his officials. Charles and Philip were asked to send their own plenipotentiary nuncios to negotiate a truce so that nothing could get in the way of ‘this spiritually and materially beneficial peace’.194 Nicholas’s instructions and tone made it clear that the papacy’s strategic choice for the Greek East during this period was to enforce union and ensure peace, with a truce between Michael and Charles as the first step, while Charles’s campaign was considered a hindrance to those aims which should be removed. These developments were a victory for Michael as far as his western policy was concerned. However, this victory was bought at a dear price, since the increased papal requests for proof of the implementation of union exacerbated the tensions within the Greek Church and intensified the anti-unionist reactions. Michael had to resort to even more violent measures against the opponents of union and did not hesitate to show the full prisons of Constantinople to the papal envoys as evidence of his commitment to the cause.195 The emperor’s problems with the anti-unionists were not limited to his own lands. Nikephoros of Epiros and John the Bastard of Thessaly took the opportunity to pose as defenders of Orthodoxy against union with Rome (rather cynically, as at the same time they had allied themselves with Charles of Anjou), and their realms became rallying places for those who opposed Michael’s ecclesiastical policy. John had even held an antiunionist church council at Neopatras in May 1277, anathematizing the emperor, See especially a passage where Nicholas instructed Charles: ‘thus, you should take care, and you should see to it that the emperor of Constantinople [Philip of Courtenay] also takes care, that neither you nor he are found responsible for any impediment to this pacification’ (‘ita provideas et ab eodem imperatore Constantinopolitano provideri procures, quod ei vel tibi sedationis ipsius impedimentum non valeat imputari’): Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum, ed. by Martène and Durand, vii, cols 275–76, no. 46. 193  Michael had been given a five-month deadline to send plenipotentiary envoys to the curia to negotiate the truce with Charles and Philip; see Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 368. 194  Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no.  378: ‘because the pacification of this dissension is most useful both spiritually and temporally […], the envoys should be provided with sufficient authorization for the purpose of accepting this truce’ (‘quod sedatio dissentionis ejusdem spiritualiter et temporaliter est multipliciter utilis […] nuntii cum mandatis sufficientibus sint parati pro treugis ineundis eisdem’). 195  See, for example, Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 175–77; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 317–25; Nicol, ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons’, pp. 129–35.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

237

the patriarch, and the pope as heretics. Michael Palaiologos attempted to turn the papacy against Nikephoros and John, but his repeated requests for the ‘apostates’ to be excommunicated (which was aimed at breaking their connection with the Angevins) were turned down by both Innocent V and Nicholas III. Nicholas, in fact, instructed his envoys to be careful not to excommunicate anyone simply because he was allying with Charles and Philip against Michael, but only if they actively hindered the implementation of union and the acknowledgement of papal primacy.196 This would have been a disappointment, but hardly a disaster for the Byzantine emperor. Michael’s remonstrations with the papacy might well have been meant to demonstrate both his sincerity and the difficulties in implementing union, even if his immediate demands were not satisfied. In any case, the most important thing was that Charles’s efforts to gain papal sanction for his enterprise had been frustrated despite his persistent denunciation of Michael’s unionist endeavours as deceitful. The orientation of papal policy in the 1270s meant that no crusade could take place in Frankish Greece, and indeed there is no indication of any such activity on the part of the papacy in the period. In fact, the only relevant letter in the papal registers for the years 1276–80 is the instruction to the bishop of Oleni to forward the sum he had collected ‘in Romania or in the lands of Achaia’ (‘in Romania seu partibus Achaie’) from tithes for the Holy Land.197 Frankish Greece was expected to provide, rather than receive, crusading assistance at this point. Nevertheless, Charles eventually decided to launch an attack on Byzantium. Having strengthened his positions in Albania and Epiros, where Despot Nikephoros had become his vassal,198 he appointed Hugh le Rousseau de Sully to lead a large army which eventually besieged Berat (1280). However, on 3 April 1281 the relieving Byzantine force defeated the Angevins and captured Hugh, subsequently occupying much of Epiros.199 This was a major setback for the Angevin 196  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 2 (par. 3), 19; Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, nos 384, 376; Loenertz, ‘Mémoire d’Ogier, protonotaire’; Nicol, ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Report of Ogerius, Protonotarius of Michael VIII Palaiologos’; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, pp. 164–65, 170, 174; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 306–09. 197  Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay, no. 81 (5 February 1278). This belongs to a series of letters regarding funds collected all over Europe for the Holy Land. 198  Nicol, ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, pp. 181–94 (esp. pp. 185–88); Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479, pp. 23–24; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 328–29. 199  See Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 177; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus

238

Chapter 5

cause, which put the viability of the land route from Durazzo to Constantinople in question. In combination with the unavailability of a suitable fleet to pursue the sea route (as both Genoa and Venice had signed treaties with Michael, while the Sicilian fleet was weak),200 Charles was in need of a reversal of the policy of the Apostolic See in order to proceed with his plans, as papal sanction and crusading support for the expedition could prove decisive. And indeed, the election of Martin IV to the papal throne seemed to offer such an opportunity.

6. A Final Reversal: The Annulment of Union under Martin IV, the Sicilian Vespers, and the End of Angevin Designs on Constantinople (1282) The dramatic final phase of our examination is characterized by two striking antithetical developments in quick succession: namely the revival of crusading in Frankish Greece in 1281 and the cancellation of Angevin plans for such an expedition in 1282. The former was brought about through the reversal of papal policy in Romania under Martin IV, and the latter by the uprising of the Sicilians against Angevin rule which is known as the Sicilian Vespers. These developments were, to an extent, the respective masterstrokes of Charles of Anjou and Michael Palaiologos, whose struggle had dominated the period from the mid-1260s onwards. It was Angevin influence over the papacy that revived crusading in Frankish Greece, which had effectively been abandoned by the Apostolic See at least since the pontificate of Gregory X and the proclamation of Church Union in 1274. Although Gregory’s successors followed a stricter line towards the Greeks in the affair of union, they nevertheless upheld the main elements of his policy as formalized at the Second Council of Lyon. This policy, however, was abruptly reversed by Martin IV, a markedly pro-Angevin pope. Nevertheless, as we will see, a re-evaluation of the character and extent of support offered by Martin to Charles’s involvement in Romania is necessary. After the death of Nicholas III, on 22 August 1280, there was a prolonged struggle between the Angevin and Orsini factions in the curia which led to a six-month conclave. Eventually the Angevins prevailed with the election of and the West, pp. 325–34; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 53–56; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 135–38; Nicol, ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, pp. 188–91. 200  Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  300–04, 336; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 197–207; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herr­ schaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 50–53.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

239

a Frenchman, Simon of Brie, cardinal-priest of St Cecilia, as Martin IV on 22 February 1281.201 Martin was no stranger to the cause of Charles of Anjou, having served as papal legate in France in charge of the crusade organized against Manfred in 1264.202 While previous popes, such as Urban IV and Clement IV, had favoured the Angevin cause, none of them had been as partisan as Martin would prove himself. One of his first actions on the papal throne was to restore Charles’s senatorship in Rome, of which his predecessor, Nicholas III, had stripped the king of Sicily.203 Martin’s partisanship became evident almost immediately in the affairs of Romania as well. The envoys sent by Michael Palaiologos (the Metropolitan Leo of Heraclea and Theophanes of Nicaea) were coolly received and were made to wait for a long time before an audience was granted. Then, Martin denounced the emperor for bad faith, according to Pachymeres, because the pope had been informed of the Greek reactions to union; the envoys were then dismissed rather unceremoniously.204 Subsequently, Martin took an even more striking step: on 18 November 1281 the pope excommunicated Michael, ‘who calls himself emperor of the Greeks, as patron of the Greeks who are inveterate schismatics and fixed in the ancient schism, and therefore also heretics and as patron of their heresy and schism’, and declared void all treaties and alliances made by the Latins with Palaiologos.205 Martin reissued Michael’s excommunication in March, May, and November 1282, while he also prohibited the commerce of war materials with him (such as weapons, horses, iron, timber, and ships) on pain of excommunication, interdict, and deprivation of ecclesiastical revenues.206 201 

Sternfeld, ‘Das Konklav von 1280 und die Wahl Martins IV’; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 134–35. 202  Housley, The Italian Crusades, p. 18; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 130, 141. 203  Saba Malaspina, Rerum Sicularum historia, ed. by Del Re, p. 329; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, p. 141; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 340; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 55. 204  Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent, ii, 637–39, par. v.30; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 178 (and note 63); Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 344. 205  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no. 53: ‘Michaelem Palaeologum, qui Graecorum imperator nominatur, tanquam eorum Graecorum antiquorum schismaticorum et in antiquo schismate constitutorum et per hoc haereticorum necnon et haeresis ipsorum ac schismatis antiqui fautorem’; trans. by Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 178 (modified). 206  Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 54, 58; see Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 179. Michael was excommunicated again after the Sicilian

240

Chapter 5

Michael’s excommunication was a striking reversal of papal policy, something which was also noted by contemporary sources. The Annales Ianuenses observed that Martin had shown himself ‘remarkably partial to Charles’, while Marino Sanudo stated, ‘Ι affirm as reverently as I am able [that the excommunication] was ill-advised, because this affair of King Charles completely upset the union of Greek and Roman Churches which was on the way to be completed’.207 Saba Malaspina, likewise, commented that Charles found in Martin ‘an accomplice to his plan and a promoter of his affair’ with regards to the passagium Romaniae.208 Furthemore, the Dominican Ptolemy of Lucca commented that Martin’s excommunication of Michael VIII was made ‘at the insistence of King Charles and was ‘the cause of scandal and disaster to King Charles, as well as most harmful to the Church’.209 It is indicative of how essentially unprovoked this reversal was that Martin excommunicated Michael as a patron of schismatics and heretics but made no effort to justify the accusation of schism and heresy by including in the excommunication any reference whatsoever to the alleged failure of Michael and the Greek Church to consummate the union.210 Martin obviously reverted to the old generic accusations against the ‘schismatic Greeks’ without basing his condemnation of Michael on the union negotiations which had proven so irksome to the Angevin cause and which were not even alluded to in Martin’s Vespers, alongside Peter of Aragon, for their intervention in Sicily, when they were given an ultimatum to withdraw from Sicily, to return to obedience to the Roman Church, and to offer satisfaction to Charles of Anjou within a set time; otherwise, the pope would proclaim them deposed: Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, nos 59–59a (= Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, nos 276, 310), (18 November 1282 and 21 March 1283 respectively). 207  Annales Ianuenses, ed. by Pertz, p. 293 (= Annales Ianuenses, ed. by Belgrano and De Sant’Angelo, v, 16): ‘favorabilis dicto regi mirabiliter existens’; Marino Sanudo Torsello, Istoria di Romania, ed. by Papadopoulou, p. 161: ‘Il che dico tuttavia con emendazione e riverenza quanto posso esser stato mal fatto, perche essendosi in Via d’unir la Chiesa Greca con la Romana, questa cosa di Rè Carlo la disturbò del tutto’; trans. by Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 342. 208  Saba Malaspina, Rerum Sicularum historia, ed. by Del Re, p. 329: ‘fautorem sui propositi, ac sui negotii promotorem’. 209  Ptolemy of Lucca, Historia ecclesiastica, ed. by Muratori, col. 1186 (see also 1190): ‘Hic Pontifex in primo anno sui Pontificatus ad instantiam Regis Caroli Palaeologum Principem Constantinopolitanum […] denuntiare fecit excommunicatum […]. Quod quidem factum fuit dicto Regi Carolo caussa scandali, et ruinae, […] nec non et ipsi Ecclesiae plurimum fuit damnosum’. 210  See the evaluation of Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche, pp. 216–17.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

241

bulls. If he had done so, in any case, he might have provided an opportunity for Michael to try to satisfy any new terms imposed by the papacy in order to have the excommunication lifted. After its effective eclipse over the past years, crusading in Frankish Greece now appeared to gain a new momentum. It was not only that the papacy had reverted to sanctioning Angevin designs against Byzantium, but Charles had also come to an agreement with Venice, an alliance which had long eluded him. Venice had apparently been in negotiations with Charles at least since the expiration on 19 March 1279 of the two-year pact it had made with Michael.211 On 3 July 1281, Charles of Anjou, Philip of Courtenay, and Doge Giovanni Dandolo signed the Orvieto Treaty ‘for the recovery of the empire of Romania’ (‘ad recuperationem imperii Romanie’). According to its terms, the signatories would participate in an extensive passagium to Romania, set to depart in April 1283, with at least eight thousand knights and forty Venetian ships. In the meantime a smaller VenetoSicilian contingent would protect the Latin possessions in Romania. 212 The traditional supporters of the Latin Empire had once more realigned themselves in support of a ‘crusade’ for that cause. The effort was backed by massive Angevin preparations and a series of Balkan alliances, including Bulgaria, Serbia, John of Thessaly, and Nikephoros of Epiros.213 However, before the expedition was launched, the uprising of the Sicilian Vespers broke out on 30 March 1282, as a minor incident turned the growing resentment of the local population towards their French masters into a generalized revolt.214 It brought an end to Angevin domination of Sicily, as well as to Charles’s plans for a campaign in Romania. Charles sent some additional reinforcements to Avlona in May 1282 but was soon forced to discontinue any activity there and to redirect to Sicily the resources that 211 

Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 336–37; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 50–52, 54. 212  Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, iii, 287–308; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 335– 40; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 56–57; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 135 and notes 53–54; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 208–09. 213  On Angevin preparations, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 360–64; and Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 58–59. For Nikephoros of Epiros and his connection with Charles and the Orvieto Treaty, see Nicol, ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, p. 191; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 339. 214  Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, pp. 214–27; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 364–67; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 99–113.

242

Chapter 5

had been prepared for the expedition in Frankish Greece.215 The involvement of Aragon and, subsequently, France changed the focus of papal, Angevin, and generally western and Mediterranean policies for the years to come.216 To what extent did Martin IV provide crusading support to Charles before the Sicilian Vespers upset his plans? Did the pope actually call for a crusade against Michael and the Greeks? Deno Geanakoplos, among others, has argued that Martin ‘excommunicated Michael and “urged” Charles to lead a crusade against “the Greek schismatics”’.217 According to Geanakoplos, Martin ‘altered papal policy with respect to Michael, lending the Church’s prestige to the forthcoming expedition against Constantinople by sanctioning it as a pious crusade against schismatics and usurpers’.218 A similar view is held by most crusade historians when they refer to the events of the period; for example, Sylvia Schein also considered that Martin authorized a crusade against the schismatic Greeks, and spoke of ‘the diversion of papal crusading policy from the Holy Land to other places — Byzantium, Aragon and Sicily’.219 It will be shown that these scholars have overstated the case and that such statements require at least some qualification. It should be made clear right from the beginning that there does not appear to be any surviving crusade bull of Martin IV aimed at Frankish Greece or against Michael, nor any relevant calls for the preaching of the cross and recruitment of crusaders. Similarly there is no explicit mention of indulgences to be granted. 220 215 

Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp.  365, 368–71; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 63–65; Nicol, ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, pp. 192–93; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 95–98. 216  See, for example, Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 140–43; Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 20–24; Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, pp. 242–87, esp. pp. 286–87; Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp. 634–55. 217  Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, p. 41. 218  Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 340. See also Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 363, where he states that Charles of Anjou ‘had at last secured the sanction of the papacy to lead a crusade against Byzantium’. 219  Schein, Fideles crucis, pp. 58, 60–62. Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, p. 87, and Housley, The Later Crusades, p. 53, also consider that crusading mechanisms were put at Charles’s service for his expedition in Romania; see Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, p. 180; Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land, p. 94. 220  I was unable to locate any relevant evidence in the papal registers or in other sources, while the relevant claims in secondary bibliography are not supported by any such evidence. Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, p.  87, and Housley, The Later Crusades, p.  53, state that indulgences were granted, but they appear to have been misled; see below, note 234.

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

243

The situation with crusading funds is less straightforward, but we will return to it shortly. Some significant evidence, however, comes from the language and legitimizing rhetoric used by the papacy and the other actors upon which Geanakoplos also bases, for the most part, his argument. The main justification for Michael’s excommunication was his alleged role as ‘a patron of schism and heresy’. The pope stressed the importance of the matter and went as far as to say that any violation of the prohibition of trading war materials with him would be ‘to the detriment of the orthodox faith’. 221 Nothing in the excommunication bulls, however, has more explicit crusading connotations or suggests that any crusading action should be undertaken against Michael and the Byzantines. The imagery and rhetoric used in the Orvieto Treaty, on the other hand, is undoubtedly drawn from the background of crusading in Frankish Greece. The campaign was to be conducted for the exaltation of the orthodox faith, the restoration of the apostolic authority, which has suffered the painful mutilation of such a noble limb to the mystical body of ecclesiastical unity on account of the loss of the empire of Romania (which has already withdrawn from obedience to it on account of the ancient schism) […], and for the recovery of the empire of Romania which is held by Palaiologos and other occupiers.222

Of course, it should be remembered that the treaty was not a papal document and that Martin was not one of the signatories. It was rather an Angevin propaganda statement, presenting the projected expedition to Constantinople within the framework of the legitimizing rhetoric of earlier crusades in Frankish Greece, much like the Viterbo Treaties or the pronouncements to Venice in previous 221 

Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu, no.  54: ‘in derogationem huius nostrae inhibitionis et orthodoxae fidei detrimentum’; see Martin’s statement in that same letter: ‘Truly, because the Roman Church, the mother and instructress of the faithful, has this affair foremost in her heart, she takes great care, lest something might be attempted there [in Romania] at the expense of the Christian faith’ (‘Verum quia Romana Ecclesia, mater fidelium et magistra, huiusmodi negotium potissime cordi gerens, multa redditur attentione sollicita, ne in hac parte aliquid attemptari contingat in fidei christianae dispendium’). 222  Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, iii, 289: ‘ad exaltationem fidei orthodoxe, reintegrationem potestatis Apostolice, que de subtractione Imperii Romanie, quod se ab ipsius obedientia scismate iam antiquato subtraxit, gravem in corpore mistico ecclesiastice unitatis tam nobilis membri mutilacionem sensisse dinoscitur, […] ad recuperationem eiusdem Imperii Romanie, quod detinetur per Paleologum et alios occupatores et detentores eiusdem Imperii occupatum’; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 341; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 178.

244

Chapter 5

years.223 Charles would soon use similar language in his effort to seal an alliance with Pisa against Constantinople.224 Unlike the case with the Viterbo Treaties, however, there is no explicit statement that the pope sanctioned the proceedings which led to the Orvieto Treaty. Although it would be a reasonable assumption to argue that he did,225 there is at least one testimony to the contrary: Cardinal Hugo Atratus, in his letter to King Edward I of England, reported that the treaty was made ‘without the consultation of the lord pope and the cardinals’ (‘domino papa et cardinalibus inconsultis’) and the campaign was planned ‘without any help from the Roman curia’ (‘sine aliquo Romane curie adiutorio’).226 Overall, then, there is no conclusive evidence, surviving at least, that a ‘formal’ papal call for a crusade in Frankish Greece was made by Martin. It seems, however, that this impression might have been created in the eyes of some contemporary observers in the West. A statement by William of Nangis, for example, has been cited as evidence, as he speaks of ‘the most Christian King of Sicily, Charles, the crusader’ (‘Christianissimus Rex Siciliae Karolus, cruce signatus’).227 However, it is precarious to argue from references to Charles as a crusader in general, since the king of Sicily had taken the cross and had promised to lead a crusade to the Holy Land as early as October 1275, for which he was granted crusade funds by Gregory X.228 It is precisely in this context that William of Nangis’s characterization is found, as the chronicler refers explicitly to the Holy Land campaign later in the same paragraph. Furthermore, after the Sicilian Vespers, Martin IV proclaimed the war against Charles’s Aragonese opponents to be a 223 

See Chapter 5.3 above. Addressing Martin IV on that affair, Charles wrote that it was ‘in order to pursue the affair of the empire of Constantinople, with the exalted crown of which the mother church has crowned us’ (‘Ad prosequendum imperii Constantinopolitani negotium, cuius nos sancta mater ecclesia excelso diademate coronavit’): Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, ed. by Kern, p. 15, no. 25. 225  As, for example, Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 341 and notes 21–23. 226  Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, ed. by Kern, p. 11, no. 19; Dade, Versuche zur Wieder­ richtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 56 and note 314; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p. 293, note 65. 227  Guillaume de Nangis, ‘Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici’, ed. by Bouquet and others, p. 516; quoted by Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 341, note 20. 228  See Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 636 (13 October 1275); Schein, Fideles crucis, p. 45; Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 138, 227. It was Gregory who at that point granted the tithe for six years, in Sicily and Provence-Forcalquier, which Martin would later renew. 224 

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

245

crusade,229 so Charles would have been considered a crusader on either of those counts. Nevertheless, there is a very interesting reference which explicitly links Charles’s crusader status with his plans against the Byzantines. The chronicler Bartolomeo of Neocastro expresses a native Sicilian’s negative view of Charles’s war ‘against our friends the Danaeans [that is, the Greeks] of Romania, against whom he [Charles] assumed the cross of a robber, under the guise of which he was accustomed to shed innocent blood’.230 It should also be noted that the chronicler points out a pattern, that is, that Charles ‘was accustomed’ (‘consuevit’) to carry the false cross against his (Christian) opponents — as had been the case against Manfred, Conradin, and now the Sicilian rebels and the Aragonese. In any case, it cannot be certain whether Bartolomeo refers to a specific crusading commission for Frankish Greece given to Charles by Martin, of which we have no other conclusive evidence, or whether he was just reproducing the impression that Charles himself had been cultivating by constantly phrasing his expedition plans for Romania in crusading language. The latter, however, appears as the most likely answer. The examination of possible crusade funding for Charles’s expedition has been left for the end because a clarification is necessary and also because it is within this context that Martin’s most overt statement can be found. Once more, there is no surviving explicit evidence that Charles was granted crusading money in order to carry out his campaign in Romania.231 True, on 18 March 1282, Martin granted Charles the proceeds from a six-year tithe on Sardinia and Hungary and from vow-redemptions in the Sicilian Regno and in Provence-Forcalquier. Those funds, however, were granted for an expedition which Charles would lead to the Holy Land and for which he had taken the cross, as is explicitly stated in the 229 

Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 20–21; Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, pp. 116–18. 230  Bartolomeo of Neocastro, Historia Sicula, ed. by Paladino, p. 11: ‘jam contra amicos nostros Danaos, videlicet Romaniae, contra quos latronis crucem assumpsit, sub cujus specie consuevit effundere sanguinem innocentum’; trans. by Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 360; see also Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 63 and note 353; see Saba Malaspina, Rerum Sicularum historia, ed. by Del Re, pp. 329–31, who also notes the opposition of the Sicilians to the exactions of the Angevins on account of the planned passagium in Romania. 231  I have been unable to locate any evidence for such a grant. All scholars who claim that Martin granted crusade tithes to Charles for Romania cite the same document, which is examined below (see the next two notes); this is also the only document that Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, p.  116, mentions in conjunction with Charles and Romania in his extensive study of crusading taxation in the thirteenth century.

246

Chapter 5

bull, and were only to be released at that time.232 In fact, this grant was in part a renewal of a grant already made by Gregory X when Charles had originally taken the cross for the Holy Land in 1275.233 Therefore, the connection of this funding with Charles’s plans in Frankish Greece is at best conjectural. It is not a fact, as is implied by Gill and Dade, who list it among Angevin preparations for the campaign in Romania, and as is explicitly stated by Geanakoplos, among others, who refers to it as ‘the collection [by Charles] of the tithe for the crusade, authorized by Pope Martin in the Treaty of Orvieto’.234 This view has become so established that, in order to uphold it, Setton actually attempts to argue against the evidence, by making the assumption that the tithe from Sardinia and Hungary was to be used against Byzantium even though the aim of the Holy Land was clearly stated in the bull: On 18 March, 1282, before the Sicilian Vespers, Martin granted Charles of Anjou the crusading tithe for six years in both the island of Sardinia and the kingdom of Hungary. Since Charles professed to be a crusader, this was quite in accord with the decree of the Second Council of Lyon. The object of Charles’s ‘crusade’ was, of course, Byzantium, although one commonly spoke of the perils of Christians in the Holy Land. Charles would rescue them after the re-establishment of the Latin empire on the Bosporus.235

232  Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, nos 116–17 (= Annales ecclesiastici ab 1198 ad 1565, ed. by Raynaldus, an. 1282, nos 5–6). 233  Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier, no. 636. 234  Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, p.  179; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, p. 58; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p.  360; Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im XIII. Jahrhundert, p. 116; see also Schein, Fideles crucis, pp. 58, 60–62, where she states: ‘for the crusade against Constantinople, Charles was granted by the pope (18 March 1282) the crusading tithe for six years in the island of Sardinia and in the kingdom of Hungary. This was in accord with the decree of the Second Council of Lyons as Charles was a crucesignatus’; Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, p. 87, states that Martin supported ‘Charles’s crusade against the Byzantine empire with a full crusading indulgence and all the consequent material advantages’, but she can be challenged on both counts, as she only cites Martin’s aforementioned grant of funds for the Holy Land (Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, no. 116) and ‘admits’ that ‘In strict fact Charles had taken the cross to go to the aid of the Holy Land, and it was ostensibly for this that he was granted crusade privileges […]. It was no secret that he intended to move first against the Byzantine emperor’; see Housley, The Later Crusades, p. 53, probably drawing from Purcell. 235  Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 142; he apparently draws his argument from Purcell (see previous note).

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

247

This is questionable argumentation. The papacy, as we have seen, had never been so reticent in spelling out the actual target of a crusading expedition or of crusade funding for Frankish Greece, even if it frequently also invoked the help to the Holy Land that such a venture would offer in order to motivate participation. The popes had no reason to hide, since Romania was by and large considered a legitimate crusading front through most of the thirteenth century, and Martin IV seems to have subscribed to this view as well. Furthermore, after the Sicilian Vespers, Martin had no qualms in explicitly stating that crusading funds raised for the Holy Land would be used for the affair of Sicily, once more with the argument that this affair was instrumental for the eventual liberation of the Holy Land.236 Why, then, would he need to be so circumspect if the grant of March 1282 was indeed aimed at the recovery of Constantinople? Nevertheless, it is in the context of these later grants of crusading funds that we encounter Pope Martin’s most overt recognition of Frankish Greece as a valid crusading target and Charles’s expedition as effectively a crusade. In 1284, when Martin granted tithes for a crusade against Peter of Aragon, he stated that the latter’s invasion of Sicily had hindered the cause of the Holy Land, as well as that of the empire of Romania, which Charles was ready to reclaim from Palaiologos: While these affairs are preventing help from being sent to the Holy Land, we consider with great distress that not only is the Holy Land in danger of losing hope and, indeed, of being destroyed, but also that the recovery of the empire of Romania is impeded in the same way. The removal of Palaiologos, and the acknowledged readiness of the king of Sicily to carry out this work, offered a well prepared, and in truth an easy [way of achieving that goal]; and alas, there is no immediate hope of a similar opportunity arising.237

So crusading in Frankish Greece was relegitimized on the theoretical level by Martin IV and was used, in turn, for the legitimization of crusading in Sicily. This had also been the case under Clement IV, when Charles was called to fight against Manfred. Like Clement, Martin did not actually proclaim a crusade in Romania or deploy any crusading resources there, despite the relevant rhetoric. Again like 236  See, for example, Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, nos 583, 587; see Setton’s own text, Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 142–43. 237  Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, nos 583 (13 May 1284, for France) and 587 (3 June 1284, for Sicily): ‘dum Terre Sancte per hec impeditum subsidium consideramus, non sine amaritudine nimia, terram ipsam desperationis periculo immo et perditionis exponi et recuperationem imperii Romanie, quam Paleologi subtractio et dicti regis Sicilie ad eam prosequendam nota dispositio paratam et facilem verisimiliter offerebant proh, dolor, absque spe proxime facultatis similis impediri’.

248

Chapter 5

Clement, Martin had other, more pressing, preoccupations nearer home, such as the assertion of papal control over Italy and Sicily, which was crucial for the security of the Apostolic See and was now threatened by the Aragonese, as it had been in the recent past by the Hohenstaufen. Ultimately, as had been the case with his predecessor in 1265–68, it cannot be certain whether Martin would have taken the step of actually proclaiming a crusade for the restoration of the Latin Empire, had he been free from urgent needs in other fronts.238 In the event, the last ‘traditional’ crusades for Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century, that is expeditions supported by the preaching of the cross and the granting of indulgences, were those by Urban IV immediately after the Greek recovery of Constantinople. The appearance of Charles of Anjou on the scene had been the catalyst. He assumed control of all initiatives for the Latin Empire. The papacy under Clement IV and later under Martin IV was content to delegate the issue, supporting Charles’s plans in rhetoric but without deploying in practice any crusading mechanisms in Frankish Greece. This situation suited both sides to an extent. Charles had the overall control over the situation in Romania, while the papacy had a champion — albeit a potentially troublesome one — in Sicily and did not need to devote extensive resources to the affair of Frankish Greece. It was only in the 1270s that the orientation of papal policy had changed, when Church Union prevailed as a priority. Perhaps it is worth considering whether one factor contributing to this change had also been the dissociation of the papacy from the effort to restore the Latin Empire, which was now firmly under Angevin control. After 1282, the Sicilian affair absorbed the attention of western powers and any crusading resources that might have been directed to Frankish Greece for the following twenty years. Michael Palaiologos’s exact role in the conspiracy which led to the Sicilian Vespers cannot be determined with certainty, but evidence is overwhelming that he did play a part in it, probably more than a peripheral one.239 It is another reminder of the importance of crusading in Romania that Michael’s reaction to the danger arising from it provoked, at least in part, such far-reaching developments for the entire Mediterranean. It was only in the early fourteenth century that the papacy, and particularly Clement V, would again support with crusading mechanisms the plans of Philip of Taranto and of Charles 238 

For Clement IV see Chapter 5.3 above. See Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp. 346–65, 375–77; Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 59–65; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 138–39; Tsirpanlis, ‘The Involvement of Michael VIII Palaeologus in the Sicilian Vespers’. 239 

Papal Crusading Policy between Michael VIII and Charles of Anjou

249

of Valois for the reconquest of Constantinople.240 By then it was a different set of circumstances in the East, with Andronikos II’s isolationist policy towards the West, the dynamic appearance of the Catalans, the fall of the last Latin outposts in the Holy Land, and, most importantly, with the Turks steadily becoming a major issue for the Levant and for crusading in general. This last development would eventually make Byzantium a target of crusading help rather than crusading aggression.

240  See, for example, Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Kon­stantinopel, pp.  72–157 (esp. pp.  137–46); Housley, The Later Crusades, pp.  53–56; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, pp. 42–47; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, pp. 129–30, 200–42; Schein, Fideles crucis, pp. 157–60, 182–86, 256 (note 41); see Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, p. 181 and note 58.

Conclusion

T

he crusade was a recurrent and important factor in the affairs of Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century. It can only be ignored at the risk of distorting the understanding of the region’s history. Contrary to dismissive views, crusading constituted a constant thread of papal policy in the area, with identifiable attributes displaying a notable degree of continuity through most of the period.1 It came to shape local policies and to be widely acknowledged as a valid ‘war of the cross’ in the West, even if response was not always enthusiastic. In concluding this examination, it will be helpful to offer some general observations by summarizing the development and the main characteristics of crusading in Frankish Greece, briefly outlining its theoretical status as a crusading venture in the thirteenth century, assessing whether its deployment was a failure and why, and, finally, offering some general conclusions and lines of further enquiry with regards to its overall impact.

1. Crusading in Frankish Greece: Development, Characteristics, and Legitimacy The capture of Constantinople in 1204 was an absolute turning point for the introduction of crusading in Romania. Though the Fourth Crusade was certainly not proclaimed against Byzantium, it did result in the creation of Latin crusader states in Orthodox Christian territories. This, in turn, provided the occasion for the apparatus of crusading to be deployed in defence of those Latin outposts: the cross was preached and crusaders were recruited for Frankish Greece, while funds 1 

Contrast, for example, the evaluation by Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, p. 200 (quoted in the Introduction, note 4).

252

Conclusion

were raised through ecclesiastical taxation, donations, and other such means. This development was facilitated by the evolution of the ideology of Holy War, which had come to justify crusading action against other Christians as defence against the ‘internal enemies’ of Christendom. This provided both the precedents and the ideological justification for the use of crusading in the Greek East. The role of the papacy was obviously central in this process, since the authorization of a crusade was, in theory and by definition, reserved for the Apostolic See. Papal support was, however, not necessarily guaranteed a priori, nor immediately granted. The initial stimulus for the use of crusading in Romania came from different quarters. Calls for more warriors and settlers to come and reinforce the Latins in Constantinople in the consolidation and expansion of the conquest were the thrust of the Latin emperors’ policy towards the West. Baldwin I and his brother, Henry, at the very beginning of their respective reigns, appealed to Innocent III to incite the faithful to the help of the empire through the grant of indulgences. In later years, Baldwin II went twice in person on trips through Europe to procure reinforcements for the defence of his realm, returning on one occasion at the head of a crusade army; he repeated the effort once more after the capture of his capital by the Byzantines. Innocent III chose to support the course of action advocated by the Latin emperor, apparently in an effort to regain some control over the affairs in Romania, to strengthen papal presence and influence in the Levant, and to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by Latin control over the Constantinopolitan patriarchate and empire. Nevertheless, Innocent vacillated in his support of the Latin Empire in the early stages. It was a critical moment, as the legitimacy — and thus, potentially, the fate — of the Latin conquest hung in the balance. The pope, however, soon threw his weight behind the defence of Constantinople, even if assistance was initially contingent upon further help to the Holy Land. Innocent’s choice was of paramount importance. Once the decisive step to protect the Latin Empire through the crusade had been taken, the popes would have to follow this line of action until it became untenable. It was a position from which the papacy could not easily disentangle itself. This became apparent under Innocent’s successors. Theoretically a reversal of papal policy in Frankish Greece was still possible, particularly since Honorius III was clearly reluctant to divert resources from the Holy Land and the Fifth Crusade. But he eventually also had recourse to crusading when dealing with pressing circumstances in Romania. When Theodore of Epiros captured the new Latin emperor, Peter of Courtenay, and the papal legate, Cardinal John Colonna, the pope threatened to launch a crusade against the Greek ruler in an effort to bring about their liberation. Even more importantly, he called for a fully-

Conclusion

253

fledged crusade for the defence of the kingdom of Thessalonica, with no tactical connection and with very limited reference to the Holy Land (1222–25). The deployment of the crusade had clearly been established as the papal weapon of choice vis-à-vis Frankish Greece. Crusading efforts in Romania climaxed during the pontificate of Gregory IX, especially in his persistent efforts of 1235–39 to provide relief for Constantinople against John Vatatzes and John Asen. Gregory went as far as diverting resources from a crusade organized for the Holy Land. The failure to generate an adequate response, however, led to a retrenchment of papal efforts. Innocent IV appeared rather hesitant at the beginning of his pontificate, although he, too, made a generalized call for the Latin Empire at the First Council of Lyon in 1245. However, he seems to have focused his call on financial subsidies rather than recruitment, and he did not display his predecessor’s persistence in trying to get the plan off the ground. Eventually Innocent IV turned to Church Union negotiations with Nicaea as it became progressively obvious that the Latin Empire had failed as an instrument of papal policy, and it was abandoned along with the crusade which had likewise failed to protect it. Innocent’s successor, Alexander IV, followed in his footsteps and displayed practically no interest in preserving the Latin Empire through crusading action, despite sporadic pronouncements to the contrary. Nevertheless, the shock of the fall of the Latin Empire in 1261 was followed by a revival of calls for a crusade in an abortive attempt to reconquer Constantinople and to defend the remaining Latin outposts. Urban IV’s efforts in that direction were to be the last time the full array of crusading mechanisms were deployed in Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century. The appearance of Charles of Anjou was a catalyst. Following the Viterbo Treaties of 1267 with Baldwin II and Prince William II of Achaia, Charles effectively assumed control of all efforts for the restoration of the Latin Empire. Popes Clement IV and, later, Martin IV supported his plans, which were presented in the established rhetoric of earlier crusades for Frankish Greece, but neither of them put crusading mechanisms at his disposal. In the period between the pontificates of Clement and Martin, however, the most radical reversal of papal attitude towards Frankish Greece took place. In the 1270s, Gregory X rejected the crusade for the restoration of the Latin Empire as a meaningful and legitimate enterprise, devoting his efforts instead to the Union of the Greek and Roman Churches, which was eventually celebrated at the Second Council of Lyon (1274). This was the apex of protracted unionist negotiations, which were largely Michael Palaiologos’s reaction to Angevin aggression and an effort to avert crusading action against his empire. Union with the Greek Church remained the papal priority in Romania until 1280, as Gregory’s successors abstained from any support to Charles of Anjou,

254

Conclusion

despite their stricter attitude towards the Greek side. When Martin IV ascended the papal throne in 1281, however, the Apostolic See reverted to an aggressive policy towards Byzantium. Charles of Anjou did not enjoy this advantage for long. Angevin plans were ended with the Sicilian Vespers in the following year, and so was crusading in Frankish Greece for the thirteenth century. Overall, the use of the crusade was a defining feature of papal policy in Romania for most of the period 1204–82, even if the extent of papal efforts fluctuated widely. Crusading mechanisms were introduced gradually but on an increasing scale and pace up to the 1240s, with Gregory IX playing a particularly prominent role. Crusade preaching for the Latin Empire was first ordered in May 1205, with participants granted ‘the same indulgence that has been granted to other crusaders’ (‘illam indulgentiam peccatorum, quam aliis crucesignatis apostolica sedes indulsit’). Fighting on this new front was clearly acknowledged as equal in spiritual merit to campaigning in Outremer, when indulgences ‘as for the Holy Land’ were explicitly granted to crusaders in Frankish Greece at least as early as June 1222. Commutation of vows from other fronts to Romania was first allowed as early as April 1206. And although Honorius III prohibited crusaders for the Holy Land from commuting their vows towards the crusade for Thessalonica, he did make an exception for those who were already based in Achaia and the Latin Empire. Gregory IX would go one step further by not only allowing but virtually ordering some Holy Land crusaders to commute their vows to the defence of the Latin Empire (starting with Hungarian crusaders in 1232), as part of his intensive efforts for the protection of Frankish Greece in the 1230s. Under Gregory, already in 1231, we also have the first evidence for the (occasionally obligatory) redemption of crusading vows for Romania. Then, in December 1236, generalized instructions were issued for the redemption of the vows of the ‘infirm and poor’ crusaders. Furthermore, with regards to funding, Gregory introduced crusading tithes for the Latin Empire in England and France in November 1238. Honorius had already ordered similar taxation on ecclesiastical property within Romania itself by 1223. Extensive funds from various other sources, such as legacies, donations, and benefices, were redirected from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire in the 1230s, though the first reported case came as early as 1224. A Europe-wide call for funds through both taxation and voluntary contributions was made by Innocent IV at the First Council of Lyon and in the months following. Papal protection for crusaders is already attested under Honorius, but one has to turn again to Gregory’s pontificate to find the general formulation regarding protection and privileges, as set out at the Fourth Lateran Council, being applied for the first time to all crusaders in Frankish Greece. It was Gregory, furthermore, who introduced indulgences

Conclusion

255

for the audiences of crusade sermons for the Latin Empire, as well as for those who would make monetary contributions to that cause. The same pope was responsible for bringing in the mendicants to preach the cross and collect crusade funds for Romania. All the mechanisms associated with crusading, therefore, had been deployed in Frankish Greece by the time of the First Council of Lyon.2 The crusade calls for the Latin Empire were accompanied by relevant justificatory rhetoric. In the eyes of the Apostolic See, fighting in Frankish Greece was a valid and commendable service to the cross. In general, it appears that this view was mostly accepted in the West, despite several negative reactions to calls for the Latin Empire. The rhetoric that the papacy used to legitimize such crusades evolved over time but its core remained remarkably stable. The two main arguments invoked were that the preservation of the Latin Empire was beneficial to the Holy Land and that it helped bring about the healing of the Greek Schism. The first argument, in particular, had a rather long history. The recriminations of crusaders against the Byzantines for indifference or obstructionism towards the cause of Outremer were repeated throughout the twelfth century. The denunciation of the schismatic nature of the Greeks, on the other hand, grew in prominence at the time of the diversion of the Fourth Crusade (a point to which we will return). After Innocent III adopted these arguments, they were repeated in practically all crusade calls for Frankish Greece. A few notable shifts are evident in papal rhetoric. Honorius downplayed the theme of the Holy Land, while the language of his bulls focused more clearly on the ‘schismatic Greeks’ as enemies. Gregory introduced the danger of heresy as a further argument in his calls. However, this latter point was not taken up by Innocent IV, although he otherwise invoked the same arguments as his predecessors, an indication that the introduction of heresy in the 1230s, besides revealing Gregory’s general preoccupation with the issue, did not mirror a deep conviction on the status of the Greeks, but was rather intended as a tactical means to amplify the impact of papal calls. No other major themes were added. If anything, rhetoric rather 2  See, for example, for crusading indulgences Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, viii, nos 70(69), 131(130), Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, no. 4060. For vowcommutation: Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder, ix, no. 45, Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 859, 1490–91, 5189. For redemption of vows: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 657, 1957, 3395. For crusading tithes and other funds: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 4605–06, Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4478– 80, 4754. For crusaders’ protection and privileges: Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti, nos 4704, 4757, Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3395–96, 4206. For indulgences for sermon audiences and for monetary contributions: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, nos 3717–18, 3937, 3638, 4026, 4056.

256

Conclusion

turned to more generic statements of how these expeditions were in the service of Church and Faith.3 There was no need for additional justification. In the eyes of the papacy, crusading in Frankish Greece had been established as a meritorious enterprise. In fact, it was soon invoked to legitimize, in turn, other expeditions. The benefit or damage to the affair of Romania featured among the justifications for Frederick II’s excommunication in 1239, for the crusade organized in support of Charles of Anjou against Manfred from 1262 to 1266, and for Martin’s crusade bull against Peter of Aragon for invading Sicily in 1284.4 A further point that needs to be made, even if obvious by now, is that crusade calls for Frankish Greece were explicit and unambiguous. The cross was preached for the Latin Empire and the crusaders were to gain indulgences fighting for it. It is entirely pointless and misguided to try to argue that some grants for the Holy Land or elsewhere were actually ‘meant’ to be used for the Latin Empire — as, for example, in the case of Charles of Anjou. 5 If that were the case, the bulls would say so explicitly; there was no need for the papacy to shy away from such a proclamation. It would embellish perhaps (by invoking, for example, that it was also for the benefit of Outremer) but not hide such an intention, since practically from their inception crusades in Romania were considered, by and large, as legitimate enterprises in one of the several crusading fronts available. The view was not limited to the papal curia. Chroniclers such as Alberic of Trois-Fontaines and eminent churchmen such as James of Vitry and Arnaud Amaury of Cîteaux enumerated Frankish Greece among the crusading fronts, where war was waged for the Church and Faith.6 Béla IV of Hungary and Louis IX of France acknowledged the validity of the cause, while both Frederick II and Manfred thought it appropriate to include Romania alongside the Holy Land in 3 

See, for example, Innocent IV declaring in one of his calls that the crusade would be in defence of ‘the honour of Christian dignity and religion’ (‘Christiane dignitatis et religionis honerem’): Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger, no. 22. 4  See, for example: Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Huillard-Bréholles, v, 288; Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray, no. 5092; Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud, nos 804, 813, 2812RO; Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan, nos 216, 224, 1025; Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin, nos 583, 587. 5  See Chapter 5.6, pp. 245–47 above, esp. Setton’s argument (Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 142). For the examination of another case where similar erroneous assumptions and associations have led to the misinterpretation of developments in the East, see Chrissis, ‘A Diversion that Never Was’, esp. pp. 136–39, 145. 6  ‘Selecta ex variis chronicis ad Philippi-Augusti regnum pertinentibus’, ed. by Delisle, p. 253; Analecta novissima, ed. by Pitra, ii, 405; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, p. 912; see above, Chapter 1.4.

Conclusion

257

their offers of crusading assistance, in return for a reconciliation with the papacy. Charles of Anjou legitimized his plans for Constantinople by adopting rhetoric from earlier crusading efforts in Frankish Greece.7 Last, but equally importantly, those crusaders who chose to take the cross for the Latin Empire should obviously have shared the view that this was indeed a legitimate holy war. This is not to deny that there were negative reactions to papal crusading calls for Romania. In fact evidence for such reactions is ample. We can identify four different ways in which papal calls for the Latin Empire encountered resistance. First, there were relatively widespread reactions on the part of the clergy against mounting requests for funds for Constantinople. Second, there were those leading nobles as well as anonymous crusaders who evidently preferred to fight in the Holy Land and were unwilling to commute or redeem their vows towards Frankish Greece, even when ordered to do so by the papacy. Third, there were explicit protests directed to the popes for diverting much-needed resources away from the Holy Land, as was the case with Cardinal Pelagius towards Honorius III and with Thibaut of Champagne towards Gregory IX. Finally, there were a few cases when objections were raised as to the actual aim of crusades in Romania and the use of force against the Christian Greeks. In the first three cases the legitimacy of crusading in Frankish Greece per se was not put in question. The priority of the cause of the Holy Land is evident, but this does not negate the validity of alternatives. It was clear that the main concern in the complaints of Pelagius and Thibaut, both of them leaders of a Holy Land crusade, was not to express qualms on the theoretical status of crusading for the Latin Empire, but for adequate resources to be dedicated to Outremer. In their replies, the pontiffs reminded their correspondents that they could similarly not overlook the ‘pious affair’ of Constantinople. The fourth category is different, as it does put the ideological basis of the crusades in Romania in doubt. There was apparently unease about the issue in some quarters. For example, the troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, a participant of the Fourth Crusade, warned after the conquest of Constantinople that if the army did not proceed to the Holy Land ‘the pardon will turn to sin’ on account of burning down Christian churches and palaces. This view was echoed by the anonymous chronicler of Langres who blamed the ‘blind cupidity’ of the crusaders for the desecration of churches and the theft of relics at the capital of Byzantium and commented that the crusade leaders and prelates ‘feared lest such a great victory would turn to their ruin’. In the 1220s Guilhem Figueira, another famous troubadour, virulently attacked the papacy’s wars against Christians in Romania and in southern France while it took no action against 7 

See above, for example Chapters 4.6, 5.1, and 5.2.

258

Conclusion

the Saracens. Similarly, several years later, the Genoese Calega Panza protested Charles of Anjou’s attacks on Greeks and Latins at the same time that he had made a truce with the Muslims of Lucera. It is evident, however, that a large part of such criticism was connected either to some initial disapproval regarding the spoliation of Christians in 1204 or to incidental references by troubadours who were hostile to the papacy on other grounds, as was the case with Guilhem and Calega who, on account of their personal involvement in the areas of conflict, were mostly concerned about the Latin victims of papal and Angevin ‘holy wars’ even if references to the Greeks provided additional ammunition for their invective.8 Then there was, of course, Richard of Cornwall’s oath at Northampton in which he stated that he and his companions would not be diverted by the papacy from the Holy Land into spilling the blood of Christians in Italy and Greece.9 The main issue in this case seems to have been again the priority of the Holy Land, but some objection to the use of crusading against Greeks is also evident. It is possible that similar views were shared by other crusaders who preferred to set out for the Holy Land instead of going to Constantinople, but further explicit statements to this effect are hard to come by. There is very little evidence of criticism of crusades against the Greeks made spontaneously, unrelated to either an anti-papal bias or to the diversion of crucial resources from the Holy Land. It is true that Roger Bacon stated that the use of force against the Greeks was counterproductive and that other means, particularly instructing them in their own language, should be used to convince them to convert to the proper faith. The wars of the cross, he argued, besides being often unsuccessful, ended up alienating the survivors even more. But Bacon held the same view with regards to the conversion of the Muslims, pagans, and Jews, and such opinions, enlightened as they may appear in modern eyes, were firmly in the minority for his time. Furthermore, Bacon himself did not hesitate to advocate military action against the ‘obstinate infidels’ who could not be won over through preaching. And we should not lose sight of the fact that Bacon, like other thirteenth-century authors, categorized the schismatic Greeks alongside the ‘Saracens, pagans, Tartars, and other infidels’ as 8  Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, The Poems, ed. and trans. by Linskill, pp. 225–34, at pp. 226, 228; the anonymous chronicle of Langres in Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Riant, i, 28; Guilhem Figueira, ‘D’un sirventes far’, ed. by De Bartholomaeis, pp. 98–99; Calega Panza, ‘Un Sirventés contre Charles d’Anjou’, ed. by Jeanroy, p. 148. See also Siberry, Criticism of Crusading, pp. 173–74, 186 (with inaccuracies as far as the use of crusading against the Greeks is concerned); Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, pp. 30–31, 63–64; Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, pp. 120–21. 9  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 620.

Conclusion

259

he discussed the issue of the efficacy of crusading action in general.10 Disinterest, not disapproval, seems to have been behind most crusaders’ unwillingness to set out for Constantinople. It appears that in most cases the legitimacy of Frankish Greece as a crusading front was accepted as a matter of fact.

2. Response and Impact Regardless of the more or less general acknowledgement of their validity, it would be fair to say that papal crusading efforts in Romania do not come across as immensely successful undertakings overall. Would it be right, then, to dismiss crusading in Frankish Greece as a failure, as several scholars appear to have done? The answer depends on whether such crusades are judged by the level of papal effort devoted to them, by the response they actually generated, or by the end result they were supposed to achieve: the preservation of the Latin Empire. Judged by the outcome of the fall of the Latin Empire and the inability to recover it, crusading in Romania was indeed unsuccessful. However, that was not for a want of effort or, for the most part, papal commitment. Several times the failure of crusading calls was due to external, unrelated and unavoidable circumstances that drained resources that might have been deployed in Romania. This included most prominently the Albigensian Crusade in France, the Mongol invasion which shattered Hungary in 1241, the papal-Hohenstaufen conflict, as well as the internal strife in England between Henry III and his barons. Summary rejections of crusading in Frankish Greece as insignificant, however, are hardly justified, especially on the grounds of the extent of crusading calls. Several scholars seem to base such negative assessments on the assertion that crusades in Romania were limited to local interests and family ties.11 Such connections were indeed evident to a certain extent in the case of the Montferrat Crusade or of the French contingents recruited for the Latin Empire. One has to ask, however: were not local interests crucial for every single crusading front, 10  Roger Bacon, Opus majus, ed. by Bridges, iii, 121–22, pt 3, chap. 13: ‘Graeci et Rutheni et multi alii schismatici similiter in errore perdurant quia non praedicatur eis veritas in eorum lingua, et Saraceni similiter et Pagani, ac Tartari, et caeteri infideles per totum mundum. Nec valet bellum contra eos quoniam aliquando confunditur Ecclesia in bellis Christianorum’; Kedar, Crusade and Mission, pp. 177–80. 11  See, for example, Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 61–62, on the Montferrat Crusade; Lower, The Barons’ Crusade, pp. 58, 93–95 on the French nobles from Champagne; Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, esp. pp. 113–14, 125–26.

260

Conclusion

except perhaps for the Holy Land, the mother of all crusading ventures? Were not networks of kinship and family ties generally important for the recruitment and mobilization of crusaders, even for the Holy Land?12 As for the breadth of crusading calls, it can be argued that the ones for the Latin Empire enjoyed a wider geographical spread than most other fronts (again with the exception of Outremer). One would be hard-pressed to find Spaniards fighting in the Baltic, Polish crusaders deployed against the Cathars, or Hungarians engaged in the Spanish Reconquista. Yet, these nations, among others, were called to contribute to the affair of Romania. Papal calls for the Latin Empire extended far and wide, in contrast to the rather limited geographical scope of the efforts for Iberia, the Baltic, and the Albigensian Crusade, each of which depended almost exclusively on the resources of the respective Christian hinterland. Preaching of the cross for Romania was repeatedly authorized in large areas of France (including Champagne, Burgundy, Brittany, Normandy, and Flanders), northern Italy, the British Isles, and Hungary.13 It appears that the problem was rather the opposite. The crusades in Romania could not depend on any major Latin power with permanent vested interests in the area to provide a sustained flow of manpower. Venetian support was instrumental for the defence of the Latin Empire but this was manifested through the regular activity of the Venetian fleet in the area, not through crusader recruits. Furthermore, the Serenissima’s primary concern was the protection of its own possessions and trade interests in the Aegean.14 The only possible exception was Hungary which, however, had its own problems and priorities even before it was incapacitated by the Mongol invasions. Béla IV had to expend great efforts to impose royal authority over his baronage, so extensive involvement too far south in the Balkans was hardly desirable, quite aside from the fact that the Hungarian king was related to both John Asen and John Vatatzes. Furthermore, the Hungarian crusading record had been unimpressive to that point: only Andrew II had led a substantial Hungarian force to the Holy Land in 1217, during the Fifth Crusade, in a mostly disappointing and half-hearted effort that saw him depart from Outremer after a mere three months.15 This is what mostly separated 12 

For the importance of family ties in crusade mobilization, see, for example, Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, esp. pp. 81–105, 189–90. 13  See maps in Appendix iv. 14  See, for example, Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 148–87. 15  Berend, At the Gate of Christendom, passim; Pál, Realm of St Stephen, pp. 88–100; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp. 116, 127–35; see also above, Chapter 3, for Béla IV’s involvement in Gregory IX’s crusade plans for Constantinople.

Conclusion

261

Romania from other crusading fronts in terms of recruitment: the Baltic crusades could depend on the Teutonic Knights as well as on the kingdom of Denmark; the Iberian kingdoms shouldered the burden of the Reconquista in the peninsula; while the French crown and the northern nobility provided the bulk of the manpower for the Albigensian Crusade.16 In default of an available reserve of crusaders close at hand for Frankish Greece, the papacy could only turn to the crusading resources of Latin Christendom farther afield. However, this meant that crusades in Romania had to constantly compete for recruitment with the Holy Land, as well as with the respective local fronts and needs on various occasions. In general, extraordinary motivation was required for considerable resources to be mobilized from any area for a venture abroad which was not directly connected to that area’s own interests. Such motivation was afforded by the Holy Land. In that respect Romania could hardly compare as an ‘emotional focus’.17 But then again, neither could any other crusade front. Furthermore, it is often overlooked that the response to papal calls for Romania was not wholly negative and that several expeditions did get off the ground, even if they met with little success in the end. Reference should be made to a number of crusades, such as that led by Bishop Nivelon of Soissons in 1207 or the contingent from Flanders under Peter of Douai the following year. The expedition under Marquis William of Montferrat in 1224–25 appears to have been of considerable size, while one should also not forget the troops that followed Emperor John of Brienne to Constantinople after his election. Perhaps most importantly, support for the Latin Empire did materialize in the crusade headed by Baldwin II on his return from the West in 1239–40. Starting from that last point, we can reach some conclusions regarding the impact of the deployment of the crusade in Frankish Greece in 1204–82 and suggest some directions for further research. The first two points relate mostly to contemporary issues: namely the impact of this crusading activity on the preservation of the Latin Empire and on the formation of local policies during this period. The third one takes a longer-term point of view, regarding the possible effect on Greco-Latin attitudes and perceptions of each other. Although it is obvious that, in the long run, the crusade did not save the Latin Empire, it can be argued that at least it allowed it some breathing space. It would appear, for example, that the reinforcements in 1207–08 and the crusade of 1239–40 had a more important role in the revival of the empire under Henry 16  See, for example, Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe; O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. 17  Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, pp. 113, 125–26.

262

Conclusion

or the prolongation of its survival under Baldwin II than has been acknowledged. On the former occasion, manpower as well as an injection of morale were badly needed after the crushing defeat at Adrianople in 1205, which had been made worse by the death of one of the most experienced lords of Frankish Greece, Boniface of Montferrat, killed while defending his kingdom of Thessalonica in 1207. In the latter case, the Latin Empire had its back against the wall, as the Greeks of Nicaea had successfully closed their other major front against the Seljuks in Asia Minor and were in the process of wiping out Latin possessions around Constantinople, when Baldwin’s crusade temporarily stemmed the tide by reclaiming Tzurulum. More important is the point that crusading provided the fundamental frame of reference for the interaction between Latins and Greeks in the thirteenth century. Thus it can offer an underlying element of unity to the examination of the fragmented world of post-1204 Romania. Crusading was the defining factor that shaped all local policies in Frankish Greece during this period. For the Latin Empire, it was an essential element of its identity, and it formed the basis of its ‘foreign’ policy towards the West. For the papacy, it was the dominant approach towards the affairs of Romania, even with regards to resolving the Greek Schism. With the exception of Gregory X and his immediate successors (1271–80), practically all thirteenth-century pontiffs preached crusades for the Latin Empire or at least maintained that such a course of action would be to the benefit of the Church. Overall, each pope followed closely on the steps of his predecessor in their policy towards crusading in Frankish Greece. Gregory X and, conversely, Martin IV aside, the popes’ views and actions were heavily conditioned by the precedents set by their predecessors, especially since the papacy was a conservative institution, where personality was by-and-large subsumed by office, and where the college of cardinals ensured a degree of continuity in the conduct of affairs. Most shifts in papal policy in Romania took place under the impact of contingencies, particularly the papacy’s preoccupation with developments in Italy and the Holy Land. The incumbents of the Apostolic See, particularly in the first half of the thirteenth century, enjoyed relatively long pontificates and this allowed for distinctive approaches to the affairs of Frankish Greece. However, this was mostly the case in terms of the resources they were ready to commit to the cause and the priority they ascribed to it among their many other preoccupations, rather than in the sense of profound differences of conviction on the ideological validity and the strategic aims of the undertaking. Following Innocent III’s pontificate, crusading action became a tenet of papal policy in Romania, at least in theory if not always in practice. The importance of Church Union negotiations, on the other hand, has been exaggerated in the past. Undoubtedly, particular importance

Conclusion

263

was attached to the healing of the schism (that is, the ‘return’ of the Greek Church to obedience), which was indeed one of the priorities of papal policy in Romania. However, both the crusade and the union negotiations were seen as possible ways of resolving the issue: the former through the preservation of Latin control over the patriarchate of Constantinople and hence, in theory, over the Greek Church; the latter through the voluntary submission of the Greek hierarchy. As it has been shown, crusading was the dominant approach in the thirteenth century whereas unionist negotiations were taken up only occasionally. The remarkable Church Union negotiations with Vatatzes, in 1249–54, and the repeated relevant efforts at the time of Michael VIII are mostly important in that they became a viable alternative to crusading in Frankish Greece.18 On the Byzantine side, contacts with the West were now geared to preempting or averting the threat of such expeditions against Nicaea or against the reconstituted empire at Constantinople. For the greatest part, this objective prompted the emperors’ initiatives for the aforementioned unionist negotiations with the papacy in order to avert these threats and undermine their legitimacy. Western secular powers were also aware of the importance of crusading in Frankish Greece, at least in the language of diplomacy. As noted earlier, both Frederick II and Manfred offered to lead crusades for the Latin Empire in order to curry favour with the papacy. Charles of Anjou took pains to present his plans in the Eastern Mediterranean in such terms. Even in Spain, on the other side of the Mediterranean, the argument carried considerable currency. James of Aragon attempted to restore his prestige as a defender of Christendom in 1246 by taking the cross for Constantinople.19 Similarly, Alfonso X of Castile strove to enhance his reputation as a leader of the Christian world by showing an interest in the plight of the Latin Empire, among other things.20 It becomes reductionist in the extreme to assess the impact of the deployment of crusading in Frankish Greece only in terms of recruitment and of the military success or failure of the various operations. One of the most vibrant aspects of research on the crusades is how they proceeded from the political, social, intellectual, and economic climate of the time and how, in turn, they contributed in shaping the world of medieval Europe, both in the lands where crusaders came from and in the regions that became theatres of crusading activity. It will not do, 18 

For the issue of Church Union within the context of crusading in Frankish Greece, see above, Chapters 1.5, 3.2, 4.4, and 5.2–5.6. 19  Burns, Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia, pp. 270–78. 20  Rodríguez García, ‘Henry III (1216–1272), Alfonso X of Castile (1252–1284)’, pp. 102, 107; Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son’.

264

Conclusion

therefore, to reduce our evaluation of the repercussions of crusading in Frankish Greece to a mere headcount of the troops that set out for the Latin Empire. The impact of such developments can be more elusive and much deeper at the same time than the ripples created on the surface, that is, the immediate, tangible, and measurable consequences. A modern parallel, incongruous as it might appear at first, can help illustrate this point. In recent years, the constant calls of the international community for the alleviation of poverty, for the respect of human rights or, even more recently, for ecologically-conscious policies (none of which was as self-evident a topic of world politics a few generations ago as it might appear today) have obviously not solved these problems. Nonetheless, the repetition and wide dissemination of relevant initiatives have effectively promoted these aims to a prominent position in the agenda of discussion in the various fora, and have turned them into issues which most respected international players have to pay at least lip service to. Similarly, calls for Frankish Greece might not have led to massive crusade armies materializing, but they did serve to establish in the collective consciousness of the audience that crusading for the Latin Empire was a meritorious and legitimate enterprise and, by extension, that the Byzantine Greeks were the enemies of these pious undertakings, much as Muslims, pagans, and heretics were in the other fronts. Defining the extent to which crusading in Romania had a longer-term effect on attitudes between Greeks and Latins is a complex and far-reaching issue, but some general trends can be observed. The repeated deployment of crusades against the Greeks hardened attitudes on both sides and led to an institutionalization of Greco-Latin hostility, which had been growing in certain quarters but was mostly latent during the twelfth century. In other words, elements of popular hostility towards Byzantium in the West now became part and parcel of the official policy of the papacy in the thirteenth century and were publicized as such through the medium of crusading in Frankish Greece. After the introduction of crusade mechanisms in Romania and as the emphasis shifted from the help for the Holy Land to the defence of the Latin Empire per se, the Greeks were transformed from obstacles along the way to the main enemies targeted by those crusades. Evidence for this process can already be seen in the crusade bulls of Honorius III, where the legitimizing rhetoric became more specifically aimed against the ‘schismatic Greeks’ as ‘enemies of the orthodox faith’. This was not an unexpected development but it was an important one nonetheless, for it meant that aggression against the Greeks could be legitimized and incited even after the original aims had become irrelevant. Recent research on western attitudes towards the Byzantines has confirmed that the emphasis on the religious difference of the Greeks intensified in the thir-

Conclusion

265

teenth century. Both Neocleous and Carrier noted that the accusation that the Greeks were schismatics became particularly pronounced after 1204, although it had little currency in the twelfth century.21 Carrier explained this on the grounds of culpability and guilt felt by westerners after the spoliation of Constantinople, which they needed to justify. Although this argument might be defensible to an extent, it cannot be expected to have general validity: a common psychological motor of guilt or a shared political motivation of legitimizing the conquest is rather unconvincing for a diverse group of authors writing under different circumstances. Rather, the similarity of these views points to a growing consensus shaped by the repeated crusade calls, proclamations, and preaching that made the image of schismatic Greeks a staple argument and brought it into the mainstream of western perceptions of Byzantium. It was, to put it differently, the reproduction of an oft-repeated slogan. Proclamations of crusades against the Greeks could, indeed, have such an impact on western perceptions. Papal bulls and pronouncements often set the agenda and the tone of discussions in a Europe-wide context. An example is offered by the First Council of Lyon in 1245. Despite the fact that it failed to produce any tangible aid for the Latin Empire, it nevertheless included this aim among the five major concerns of Christendom, alongside the moral condition of the Church, the perilous situation in the Holy Land, the Tartar threat to Europe, and, most importantly, the alleged crimes of Frederick II against the Church. This list was essentially repeated by Frederick II who (in order, of course, to exclude himself from it) promised to offer help to the Latin Empire, to the Holy Land, and against the Mongols. Similarly Béla IV promoted the one issue from the list which was of particular interest to him, namely the defence against the Tartars, by comparing it to two of the other points raised in the council: the Holy Land and the Latin Empire. In order to promote his interests, the Hungarian king had to frame his petition in the context set by the council’s agenda and the wider discourse of the time.22 The importance of the affair of the cross, particularly with regards to the Holy Land, was not limited to the papal curia, from which much of this rhetoric initially originated, but it came to permeate political discourse and served as the conceptual framework for the legitimization of policies as well as being a potent lever for political action throughout Latin Christendom in the thirteenth century.23 21 

See Introduction, pp. xxii–xxiv, above. See Chapter 4.6, above. 23  Weiler, ‘The Negotium Terrae Sanctae in the Political Discourse of Latin Christendom’. 22 

266

Conclusion

The language of hostility and the view that the Greeks were to be included along with other ‘infidels’ as enemies of Church and Faith was also reproduced in non-papal sources in the thirteenth century. One can detect the influence of such rhetoric in statements, for example, by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, when he enumerated Romania among the fronts where enemies were fighting against the Church in 1221 or when he asserted that Theodore of Epiros was ‘persecuting the catholics’.24 Matthew Paris reproduced both the argument and the language of papal bulls, when he called the Greeks ‘enemies of the Roman Church’ and reported that, because the Greek Church was disobedient to the Roman one, a crusade had been proclaimed and many crusaders had taken the cross.25 The Rhymed Chronicle of Cologne eagerly included the Greeks as a target for crusading action, as the author called for the pacification of quarrels and the establishment of peace among the faithful in Germany to be followed with a great effort against ‘the great Sultan overseas, the remaining pagans, the schismatic Greeks, [and] the blasphemers and enemies of Christ and cross’.26 Rutebeuf, an ardent proponent and propagandist of the crusade in general, also penned a poem advocating assistance for the Latin Empire. In La Complainte de Constantinople, written around 1262, he closely echoed Urban IV’s crusade call, warning that Achaia might soon fall like Constantinople and connecting the issue with the danger for the Holy Land.27 The Greeks were thus becoming an essential component of the list of ‘infidels’ or enemies of Christendom. Their role also became more pronounced in apocalyptic literature in the thirteenth century. Their ‘return to obedience to the Roman Church’ would be a sign of the end of days, along with the extirpation of the Saracens and the conversion of the Mongols, as noted, for example, by the English Franciscans Adam of Marsh and Roger Bacon.28 This mood in western attitudes towards the Greeks did not entirely escape Byzantine observers. Pachymeres, when relating the arguments used by Michael VIII to defend his unionist policy, noted that the papacy would not be convinced in any other 24 

Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Scheffer-Boichorst, pp.  906, 912; see Chapters 1.4 and 2.3 above. 25  Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Luard, iii, 386, 469–70, 517, iv, 432, 564–65. 26  Chronici rhythmici Coloniensis fragmenta, ed. by Wattenbach, p. 374: ‘Undique pacatis et amore sibi solidatis | Trans mare soldanis summis reliquis paganis, Graecis scismaticis, blasphemis ac inimicis | Christi sive crucis, pleno conamine ducis’. 27  Onze poèmes de Rutebeuf concernant la croisade, ed. by Bastin and Faral, pp. 28–42 (esp. pp. 29, 36); Barber, ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece’, p. 116. 28  Schmieder, ‘Two Unequal Brothers Split and Reunited’, pp. 644, 645–51; Schmieder ascribes this change mostly to the influence of Joachim of Fiore.

Conclusion

267

way to come to an agreement with the Greeks except through the negotiation of Church Union, ‘because the scandal [of the schism] stood in the way, and for the greatest part [the Latins] considered the Greeks as white Saracens’.29 Tracing Byzantine reactions to the use of the crusade against them can prove more elusive. The experience of 1204 embittered attitudes towards the West, and the overhanging threat of further crusading expeditions in Frankish Greece intended to defend, expand, or reclaim the conquests could only serve to exacerbate the situation. However, it could, perhaps, be questioned to what extent there was an awareness of those developments on the Greek side — especially since many of these crusading proposals and calls did not progress further than the planning stages. But the fact that the Byzantine leadership perceived the gravity of what was happening can hardly be doubted. The recriminations of Theodore I Lascaris and John Vatatzes against the ‘false’ crusaders, and the terms in which they were expressed indicated a precise understanding of the crusading context of this recent western aggression.30 Furthermore, the repeated overtures and the tenacious efforts for Church Union negotiations, particularly by Michael VIII, showed the lengths to which imperial policy was ready to go to counter this threat. However, ascertaining whether this understanding of the nature of the western threat was widely shared by other sections of Byzantine society is much more difficult, given the scantiness of evidence at our disposal. Antiunionist reactions certainly reveal a disagreement with the proposed solution to the problem, but they do not prove that the Byzantines were unaware of the threat of holy war against them; one could claim that they point to the exactly opposite conclusion, as religious fervour underlaid the conflict between the two sides. It is true that Byzantine historiographical sources practically never refer to western aggression in any explicit crusade terms, but it would be rather surprising if they did, as this acknowledgement would offer some legitimacy to the Latin claims. It would not be the first time that Byzantine authors would make use of studied silences and intentional ignorance of western affairs as an ideological device. They displayed such ‘calculated indifference’ (in the words of Nicol), for example, with regards to the geography and history of the West in order to confirm the special status of their own realm and the uniqueness of their imperial authority.31 Nevertheless, an insight into how Byzantines understood western 29 

Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Failler and Laurent, ii, 471, par v.10: ‘προσίστατο γὰρ τò σκάνδαλον, καὶ τò λευκοὺς Ἀγαρηνοὺς εἶναι Γραικοὺς παρ’ ἐκείνοις μεῖζον ᾔρετο’. 30  See Chapters 1.4 and 3.4, above. 31  Nicol, ‘The Byzantine View of Western Europe’; Ducelier, ‘L’Europe occidentale dans les textes grecs médiévaux’, p. 248; Ducelier, ‘L’Europe occidentale vue par les historiens grecs’.

268

Conclusion

aggression might be given by the list of ‘Latin errors’ composed by Constantine Stilbes in the early thirteenth century. This list comprised a wide assortment of traditional accusations, but, unlike earlier works of its kind, it included for the first time the grant of crusading indulgences — as well as, of course, the atrocities the Latins committed during the sack of Constantinople.32 At any rate, the importance of crusading in Frankish Greece is not limited to the history of the region; rather, it is intimately connected to wider developments in medieval Europe. It is impossible to examine and understand the crusades in Frankish Greece in isolation from the wider evolution of Holy War and the proliferation of crusading fronts in the period, which, in turn, is connected to the socio-political, economic, and religious background which prompted the expansion of Latin Christendom. Crusading in Romania was affected by the development of holy wars at large, as well as being an integral part of their further evolution. The crusades proclaimed against Orthodox Christians played an important role in the self-definition of Latin Christians against the various ‘others’ they came in contact with in the High and Late Middle Ages: Muslims, pagans, Eastern Christians. The deployment of crusade mechanisms in Frankish Greece fuelled the transformation of coreligionists into ‘deviant’ Christians who could be lumped with other categories of ‘infidels’ and ‘enemies of the faith’. We already noted the importance of the argument that the use of violence against Christians could be justified as legitimate protection against the ‘enemy from within’, who posed an even greater threat than external enemies to the security of Christendom. These views were essential for the suppression of heresy in the thirteenth century, and particularly for the Albigensian Crusade.33 This background affected the course of action to be followed in Romania. However, crusading in Frankish Greece was not merely an imitation of developments elsewhere. It was an important part of this process, developing hand in hand with operations against heretics and other Christians in the West. There was considerable overlap between the various fronts in terms of rhetoric aimed at de-Christianizing the opponents, as well as of practical measures regarding preaching, recruitment, and funding. The experiences in one front seemed to inform the actions taken on the others. The launching of crusades against the Byzantine Greeks in several respects anticipated the more famous crusades against heretics in the south of France. Innocent III granted a full remission of sins to those who would come to support the Latin Empire already in 1205. This 32  ‘Le Mémoire de Constantin Stilbès’, ed. by Darrouzès, pp. 57, 69, 77, 81–86; Kolbaba, The Byzantine Lists, esp. pp. 27, 178, 200–01. 33  See above, Chapter 1.2; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 3–12, passim.

Conclusion

269

was remarkable considering that he never granted the plenary indulgence for campaigns against the pagans in the Baltic and that it would be at least two more years before the authorizing of the full crusade indulgence for those who fought against the heretics of southern France.34

3. The Fate of the Crusade in Frankish Greece after 1282 The collapse of Angevin power in Sicily and the war which embroiled French, Italian, and Aragonese powers in the Mediterranean until the Peace of Caltabellotta (in 1302) halted any crusade activity in Romania. But crusading in Frankish Greece was not entirely put to rest, either in theory or in practice. Treatises offering advice for the recovery of the Holy Land, such as those written by Ramon Lull, Peter Dubois, or William Adam, advocated the capture of Constantinople as a first step on the way.35 There were still claimants to the Latin Empire who appeared ready to give substance to their titles. In 1301, Charles of Valois, the brother of King Philip IV of France, married the heiress of the Latin Empire, Catherine of Courtenay. Charles tried to act on his claim on Constantinople by preparing an expedition and building a network of alliances that included Venice, Burgundy, Charles II of Naples (the son of Charles I of Anjou), Latin lords in Romania, the Catalan Company, the Serbs, and even discontented elements within the Byzantine Empire. The plan of Charles of Valois enjoyed the support of popes Benedict XI and Clement V, who offered indulgences and tithes for a crusade that would bring the schismatic Greeks back to the Church and pre-empt the fall of the empire into the hands of ‘Turks and other Saracens and infidels’. But Charles’s array of allies was more impressive on paper than in reality. Nothing came out of these plans and the crusade for Constantinople was abandoned after 1308. The effort was then taken up by Philip of Taranto, son of Charles II of Naples. Through his marriage to Charles of Valois’ daughter, Catherine of 34 

See Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, pp. 94–98; Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, pp. 62–66. Innocent had earlier granted to those who would fight against heresy in southern France an indulgence equivalent only to a pilgrimage to Rome or Compostela; in 1205 he offered the plenary indulgence but only to the French king to encourage him to lead a campaign in the south against the heretics. I have drawn more extensive comparisons between developments in Romania and other crusading fronts in another paper: Chrissis, ‘New Frontiers’. 35  Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land, pp.  138–43; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, p. 181; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, pp. 43–56, 239–40; Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 53–55.

270

Conclusion

Valois (1313), the Angevins gathered again in their hands all the Latin claims in Romania, as Philip had already taken up the title of prince of Achaia. Clement V and John XXII gave their backing through the grant of crusade indulgences and proceeds from ecclesiastical taxation. But despite the nominal support of powerful sovereigns, including the king of France, Frederick III of Sicily, as well as Philip’s nephew Charles Robert, the Angevin king of Hungary, the operations in Romania were on a rather limited scale and generally ended in failure.36 After Philip’s death in 1331, efforts for a Latin recovery of Constantinople petered out. The need to tackle the menacing Turkish expansion changed the objectives of crusading in the area and led to efforts for rapprochement between Byzantium and the Latin powers.37 The campaigns planned by Charles of Valois and Philip of Taranto operated within the theoretical framework of earlier expeditions for Frankish Greece. The idea that fighting against the Greeks in Romania was a legitimate crusade undertaking had been established by the end of the thirteenth century and was reproduced in the early fourteenth. In 1307–09 the Hospitallers, who had fled to Cyprus following the fall of Acre in 1291, relocated their base to Rhodes after wresting it from the Byzantines. In May 1313, the Grand Master Fulk of Villaret issued a call to the West for settlers to come and help defend the territories that the order had conquered from the Greeks and the Turks in exchange for grants of land. The call was couched undeniably in crusading language, as the Hospitallers apparently perceived their role in the Aegean not very differently than they had done in Outremer: By the disposition of divine clemency, we and our order have acquired with the force of arms from the schismatic Greeks and the Turks [and] Saracens, the impious enemies of the orthodox faith, castles, towns, fortified locations, and fertile lands overflowing with all kinds of produce, both on the islands and on the mainland on this side of the sea. These [places] are in need of Christian people to cultivate them and to take care of them, for the destruction and the extermination of these Turks and for the exaltation of the orthodox faith. We, therefore, fervently desire to find ways to stabilize and populate these towns, castles, and lands with good and noble men and others from the lands beyond the sea, who would defend these places 36 

Dade, Versuche zur Wiederrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel, pp. 72–157; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, pp. 54, 200–242 (esp. pp. 202–04, 237–42), 249–60; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, pp. 42–48; Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 53–55; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 163–69; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, pp. 66–67, 97–104, 106, 128–29. 37  Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 55–79.

Conclusion

271

and lands against the aforementioned Turks and Greeks and would strongly resist them under the standard of the holy cross; and who, in the company of ourselves and the notables of our order, would damage, destroy, and entirely eradicate them. […] Wherefore, we call and invite all of you who are willing, and we exhort you attentively in the name of the Lord, to come to us as quickly as possible from over the sea for the aforementioned reason, in order to acquire honour, and for the salvation of your souls, and for the ruination of the said enemies of the faith, and for the exaltation of the catholic faith.38

The perception that the Byzantines were to be classed as enemies of the cross did not entirely go away even when crusades against the Greeks had ceased or even when there were actually efforts for common action against the Turks. For example, there were calls for collections of funds in the West ‘against Saracens, Turks, Greeks, and other infidels and heretics and rebels of the Roman Church’, as late as 1413.39 The thirteenth-century crusades for the defence of Frankish Greece provide the crucial background to crusading activity in the eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth century with regards to the attitudes and experiences on both the Latin and the Greek sides. The resentment generated by repeated western efforts to prop up the Frankish conquests (and not only the memory of 1204) can account for the unwillingness of many Byzantines to find common ground with the Latins in the face of the Turkish threat and the often bitter accusations of selling out to the Franks directed against those who advocated such a course of action as, for example, Demetrios Kydones in the 1360s. Equally, the reluctance of some Latins to include the empire in an alliance against the Turks was probably 38 

Luttrell, ‘Feudal Tenure and Latin Colonization at Rhodes’, pp. 757–58, 771–73 (quotation p. 771): ‘Nos et domum nostram divina disponente clemencia acquisivisse per vim armorum in partibus cismarinis a grecis cismaticis et Turchis de saracenis inpiis inimicis orthodoxe fidei tam in Insulis quam in terra firma, castra, villas et fortelliccia, ac terras fertiles et in cunctis fructibus copiosas, que cultu et solacio indigent populi christiani, ad ipsorum turchorum destructionem et exterminium, et ad exaltacionem fidei orthodoxe. Nos itaque ferventi cupientes desiderio et vias ac modos indagantes quibus ipsas villas castra et terras bonis gentibus ac hominibus nobilibus et aliis de ultramarinis partibus oriundis stabilire et populare possimus qui ipsa loca et terras contra predictos turchos et grecos deffendant, ac eis cum vexillo sancte crucis viriliter resistant, et in societate nostra ac procerum domus nostre ipsos dampnificent destruant radicitus et evellant […] Quocirca universitatem vestram et vestrum quemlibet Requirimus et Rogamus, et vos in domino sollicite exortamur quatinus pro acquirendo honore et vestrarum animarum salute, ac dictorum inimicorum fidei confusione, et catholice fidei exaltatione, ad Nos citra mare ex causa predicta cicius quem poteritis veniatis’. 39  Calendar of Papal Letters, ed. by Bliss and others, vi, 176, 180; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 312; Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, 549–50.

272

Conclusion

rooted in the suspicions of these crusaders towards co-operating with schismatics and erstwhile enemies of the cross. Byzantine participation in anti-Turkish naval leagues in the 1330s, 1340s, and 1350s was limited or entirely absent, despite common interests and some relevant discussions.40 There was considerable delay for tangible help to the beleaguered Byzantium to materialize. Two minor crusades took place, under Count Amedeo VI of Savoy in 1366 and under Marshal Boucicaut in 1399, offering limited relief to Constantinople. Eventually, major crusading expeditions were launched against the Turks, in defence of the Christians in the East as much as for the protection of western Christendom’s own flank. They led to two spectacular disasters at the hands of the Ottomans at Nicopolis, in 1396, and at Varna, in 1444.41 In between these campaigns, in 1398, Pope Boniface IX called for a crusade to be preached through Europe and for funds to be collected, with the grant of indulgences as for the Holy Land, in order to assist the Byzantine emperor, Manuel II, against the Turkish onslaught.42 Negative attitudes between Greeks and Latins, however, could and did persist to the very end. The statement allegedly by the Byzantine Grand Duke Loukas Notaras that ‘it would be better to see the sultan’s turban in Constantinople than the Latin mitre’ is too famous to need much elaboration. Despite promises of western assistance, the majority of the Byzantine population rejected the Church Union which was effected under the pressure of circumstances at the Council of Ferrara/Florence in 1438–39 and denounced their representatives who had come to an agreement with the Latins. Most Byzantines shunned the unionist liturgies performed at the Church of Hagia Sophia until the eve of the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans on 29 May 1453.43 Opinions were not 40  Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, pp. 172–75, 198–99, 202–03, 234–35, 260– 61; Housley, The Later Crusades, pp. 55–79 (esp. pp. 58, 62–64, 66–67); Nerantzi-Varmazi, Το Βυζάντιο και η Δύση, esp. pp. 53–59, 111–21, 142; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, pp. 50–68. 41  Housley, The Later Crusades, pp.  67–69, 72–79, 80–81, 84–90; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, i, 285–312, 341–69, 370–73, ii, 64–107; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453’, pp. 74–99; Atiya, The Crusade in the Late Middle Ages, pp. 379–97, 435–62; Wright, ‘On the Margins of Christendom’, pp. 66–67; Nerantzi-Varmazi, Το Βυζάντιο και η Δύση, pp. 111–43; Cox, The Green Count of Savoy, pp. 204–30; Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, i, 327–96; Harris, The End of Byzantium, pp. 14–19, 127–54. 42  Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, pp. 549–57; Harris, The End of Byzantium, pp. 17–18. 43  See, for example, Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, pp. 355–61, 369–93 (the reference to Loukas Notaras’s alleged statement, according to the Byzantine historian Doukas, pp. 377–78); Harris, The End of Byzantium, pp. 127–206 (p. 159).

Conclusion

273

necessarily more positive on the Latin side either. A manuscript composed by an anonymous Dominican and addressed to the pope in December 1452, only a few months before the fall of Constantinople, noted the views of those who disagreed with offering help to the Byzantines against the Ottoman Turks and who argued that ‘there should be no contact with heretics, schismatics, and excommunicates, and even less so any offer of help’; instead, these critics insisted, coercion should be used against them to correct their wrongs. The author went on to present at length the other side of the argument and to support the view that it was the Christians’ duty to offer help to the Greeks ‘despite their sins, their enmity to the Latins, their disobedience to the Roman pope, their schism, and all their heresies’.44 Notwithstanding the author’s conclusion, this is still a testament to the way attitudes that had hardened over the previous centuries could pose significant difficulties in the effort for co-operation before the Turkish advance. The grudging acceptance that it was the chivalric duty of the Christian West to defend Constantinople against the Ottomans, despite the fact that the Greeks were schismatics, was also expressed by Philip de Mézières and Marshal Boucicaut when they described their visits to the Byzantine capital in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. A generation later, the views of visitors like the Burgundian Bertrandon de la Broquière and the Castilian Pero Tafur were even more negative: the Greeks were not to be trusted as allies against the Turks and the sorry state of their empire was a reflection of their own failings, which, for Bertrandon, referred mostly to their schism.45 * * * In any case, a fuller examination of attitudes between Byzantium and the West in the later period is beyond the scope of the present study. A great deal of work remains to be done: further research could help re-evaluate the way attitudes changed from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries in light of a clearer understanding of the crusade deployment in Frankish Greece and of the relevant thirteenth-century rhetoric as examined in these pages. Another area 44  Hankins, ‘Renaissance Crusaders’, text pp.  148–68, quotations p.  149 (‘Hereticis et scismaticis et excomunicatis non est comunicandum et multo minus auxilium prestandum’) and p. 165 (‘omnes Christiani […] obligantur […] subvenire Grecis, non obstantibus peccatis eorum, inimicitia in Latinos, inobedientia Romano pontifici, scismate et heresibus quibuscunque’ — see p. 150: ‘non obstante Grecorum scismate et ingratitudine eosdem iuvare tenemur’); Poumarède, Pour en finir avec la croisade, pp. 31–33. 45  Angold, ‘The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of Western Travellers’, pp. 217–20, 222–26.

274

Conclusion

where additional research could yield interesting results is a detailed and in-depth examination of responses and reactions to crusade calls for Romania, with an exhaustive use of local archival materials, both published and unpublished. Private charters of crusaders for Constantinople, for example, have most probably escaped detection or have been erroneously bundled along with Holy Land ones, as most earlier scholars had no conception of Frankish Greece as a separate crusade destination. Most importantly, comparative study of the crusades in Frankish Greece and those deployed elsewhere in Europe and the Mediterranean will provide an additional angle illuminating the common traits and the local peculiarities of confrontation and interaction between various Christian and non-Christian groups in the period. It is hoped that the present work can serve as a starting point for such examinations and as a stimulus for a wider and long-overdue discussion of this crusading front. This will help break through the insularity that sometimes plagues the study of the history of Byzantium after 1204. Interpreting the bewildering mosaic of states and lordships left behind after imperial unity was shattered by the Fourth Crusade is complicated enough already, so it is understandable that specialists of the region often shy away from exploring and comparing developments in other areas, such as Iberia, the Baltic, or Languedoc, in any great detail. Of course, it is necessary to examine Romania on its own terms as well, but limiting the view too much has had some rather unfortunate consequences. Examinations of late Byzantine history in handbooks and collective volumes that survey medieval history often feel like appendices tacked on to the ‘main part’ dealing with developments in the West, even if this area of the eastern Mediterranean was no more isolated or less a part of the evolution of the medieval world than, for example, the northeastern fringe of Europe. Byzantinists, not entirely on their own responsibility, are generally perceived as standing somewhat apart from their medievalist colleagues who study the West. Approaching Romania as a theatre of crusading activity, with its distinct characteristics but also subject to broad trends that had a pervasive influence in all areas where holy wars were proclaimed, would be one way to redress this problem. This approach should offer a broader vista for understanding the history of the Byzantine East: one that is not limited to the local circumstances of a ‘marginalized’ region, but one which integrates it more firmly in the context of wider developments in medieval Europe and the Mediterranean.

Appendix i

Maps of Romania

Map 1. Romania and the Frankish States, c. 1214

Appendix i

276

Map 2. Byzantine and Latin States in Romania, c. 1265

Appendix ii

Table of Rulers

Latin Emperors of Constantinople Baldwin I Henry of Hainault Peter of Courtenay Yolanda of Flanders Robert of Courtenay John of Brienne Baldwin II Philip of Courtenay

1204–05 1206–16 1216–17 1217–19 1221–28 1229–37 1228–73 (1261–73: titular) 1273–1301 (titular)

Kings of Thessalonica Boniface I of Montferrat Demetrius Frederick II of Hohenstaufen Boniface II of Montferrat William [VII] of Montferrat

1204–07 1207–30 (1225–30: titular) 1230–39 (titular) 1239–53 (titular) 1253–84 (titular)

Princes of Achaia William I of Champlitte Geoffrey I of Villehardouin Geoffrey II of Villehardouin William II of Villehardouin Charles I of Anjou

1205–09 1209–c. 1229 c. 1229–46 1246–78 1278–85

Appendix ii

278

Emperors of Nicaea Theodore I Lascaris John III Vatatzes Theodore II Lascaris John IV Lascaris Michael VIII Palaiologos

1204–21 1221–54 1254–58 1258–61 1258–82 (1261–82: at Constantinople)

Rulers of Epiros Michael I Doukas Komnenos Theodore Doukas Komnenos Michael II Doukas Komnenos Nikephoros I Doukas Komnenos

1204–c. 1215 1215–30 (1225–30: emperor at Thessalonica) 1230–71 1271–96

Popes Innocent III Honorius III Gregory IX Celestine IV Innocent IV Alexander IV Urban IV Clement IV Gregory X Innocent V Hadrian V John XXI Nicholas III Martin IV

8 January 1198 – 16 June 1216 18 July 1216 – 18 March 1227 19 March 1227 – 22 August 1241 25 October – 10 November 1241 25 June 1243 – 7 December 1254 12 December 1254 – 25 May 1261 29 August 1261 – 2 October 1264 5 February 1265 – 29 November 1268 1 September 1271 – 10 January 1276 21 January – 22 June 1276 11 July – 18 August 1276 8 September 1276 – 20 May 1277 25 November 1277 – 22 August 1280 22 February 1281 – 28 March 1285

Latin Patriarchs of Constantinople Thomas Morosini Gervase of Heracleia Matthew of Jesolo John Halgrin Simon of Tyre Nicholas of Castro Arquato Pantaleone Giustiniani

1204–11 1215–19 1221–26 1226 (declined) 1227(?)–1233 1234–51 1253–86 (1261–86: titular)

Appendix iii

Main Crusade Calls for Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century The table on the following pages summarizes the surviving information for the main crusade or crusade-related projects in Frankish Greece. It includes all crusading expeditions that were proclaimed regardless of whether they materialized or not. It also includes Charles of Anjou’s planned campaign, which was technically not a crusade.

Expedition for the help of the kingdom Count Hubert of Biandrate of Thessalonica (precursor of the ‘Montferrat Crusade’)

‘Montferrat Crusade’, called by Honorius III for the relief / restoration of the kingdom of Thessalonica

Gregory IX offers crusade indulgence to those who would accompany the new Latin emperor

Gregory IX exhorts Hungarian crusaders to commute their vows from the Holy Land to Constantinople

Gregory IX organizes a crusade for the help of Constantinople against John Vatatzes of Nicaea

3a. June 1222

3b. May 1223–spring 1225

4. December 1229

5. May 1231–June 1234

6. December 1235– summer 1239

Count Peter Dreux of Brittany (October 1236 – mid-1238) Emperor Baldwin II (November 1238 onwards)

Emperor John of Brienne

Marquis William VI of Montferrat

Honorius III calls for a crusade against Robert of Courtenay Theodore of Epiros for the liberation of Emperor Peter of Courtenay and Legate John Colonna

2. November 1217

Marquis Philip of Namur (by April 1206) Bishop Nivelon of Soissons (December 1206 onwards)

(Projected) Leader

Innocent III calls the faithful to help stabilize the Latin Empire

Description

1. 1205–07

Date

Plenary indulgence (‘as for the Holy Land’), preaching, indulgences for monetary contributions, indulgences to audiences of crusade sermons, commutation of vows, redemption of vows, crusader privileges and protection, ­crusade taxation (in Romania and in the West) and other crusade funds and contributions

Vow commutation (incl. obligatory), redemption of vows, funding (through redemptions), preaching (?)

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’, preaching

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’, preaching, commutation of vows (limited), crusade taxation (in Romania), crusaders under papal protection

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’

Indulgence, preaching, [prohibition of vow commutation]

Plenary indulgence, preaching, commutation of vows (?)

Crusade Mechanisms

280 Appendix iii

Innocent IV’s call for preaching of the cross and monetary subsidies for Constantinople, after the First Council of Lyon

Innocent IV authorizes limited preaching of the cross for the Latin Empire by the patriarch of Constantinople

Urban IV calls a crusade for the reconquest of Constantinople and for the ­protection of the principality of Achaia

Clement IV provides papal support to Charles I of Anjou Angevin plans for an expedition against Constantinople

Martin IV annuls Church Union and Charles I of Anjou provides papal support to Angevin plans for an expedition against Constantinople

7. 1245–47

8. 1253

9. 1262–64

10. 1266–68

11. 1281–82

King Béla IV of Hungary

(Projected) Leader

Gregory IX calls for a Hungarian crusade against John Asen of Bulgaria

Description

6b. January–August 1238

Date

[No crusade mechanisms deployed; only relevant rhetoric and excommunication of Michael Palaiologos]

[No crusade mechanisms deployed; only relevant rhetoric]

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’, preaching, indulgences to audiences of crusade sermons, crusader privileges and immunities (as for the Holy Land), crusade taxation and subsidies

Indulgence (‘as for the Holy Land’), preaching (Venice and the Latin Empire only)

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’ (also for those who would make testamentary donations), preaching, crusader privileges, and immunities (as for the Holy Land), crusade taxation and other crusade funds and contributions (in the West)

Indulgence ‘as for the Holy Land’ (also to those who would contribute financially), preaching, ‘deposition’ of ruler who fosters heresy

Crusade Mechanisms

Main Crusade Calls for Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century 281

Appendix iv

Preaching the Cross for Frankish Greece

In the maps that follow (created with the assistance of George Mastrakoulis), the highlighted areas are those for which there are surviving orders1 for the cross to be preached (and, secondarily, for monetary contributions to be raised)2 in the West for Frankish Greece. These maps are meant to be indicative and cannot be expected to be entirely accurate in all their details. There are two main issues involved. For one, it cannot always be verified whether orders for preaching were actually dispatched to more (or, perhaps, less) extensive areas than those for which evidence survives; nor have I attempted to show whether preaching was actually carried out in these territories. Second, regarding the geographical limits of the highlighted areas, a degree of uncertainty is to be expected. Except for shifting frontiers, an accurate depiction is further complicated on account of the fact that some calls are addressed at the level of ecclesiastical provinces, some at the level of dioceses, some at the level of provinces of the mendicant orders, and some at the level of kingdoms, counties, or other secular divisions. For more information on the specific areas where crusade preaching was authorized, as designated in the original calls, please consult the list of Surviving Crusade Calls below. 1 

This refers to any papal orders (preserved in the papal registers or elsewhere) that I have been able to locate. On some occasions, this includes evidence (such as exemptions, modifications, and further instructions) of previous orders which are themselves no longer extant. 2  This includes papal instructions for crusade taxation on ecclesiastical revenues and property, funds raised through vow redemptions, contributions through donations, bequests, etc.

Appendix iv

284

Map 3. Innocent III’s call to the faithful to stabilize the Latin Empire, 1205

Preaching the Cross for Frankish Greece

Map 4. Preaching of the Montferrat Crusade ordered by Honorius III, 1223–24

285

Appendix iv

286

Map 5. Gregory IX’s crusading efforts for the Latin Empire, 1235–40

Preaching the Cross for Frankish Greece

Map 6. Innocent IV’s crusading call for the Latin Empire, following the First Council of Lyon, 1245–47

[It is very probable that the call was universal throughout Latin Christendom but only those places for which direct information survives are noted.]

287

Appendix iv

288

Map 7. Urban IV’s crusade call for the recovery of the Latin Empire and the defence of the principality of Achaia, 1262–64

Preaching the Cross for Frankish Greece

289

Surviving Crusade Calls for the Latin Empire (by area) First call by Innocent III (May 1205) To the archbishops of Reims, Rouen, Bourges, Vienne, Sens, Bordeaux, Lyon, Tours, and their suffragans. Crusade called by Honorius III for the liberation of Emperor Peter Courtenay and Legate John Colonna (November 1217) To all the archbishops of France and their suffragans. ‘Montferrat Crusade’ for Thessalonica, by Honorius III (1223–24) To the patriarch of Aquileia; to the archbishops of Genoa, Lyon, Milan, Ravenna, Pisa, Tarentaise, Arles, Besançon, Embrun, Aix, and their suffragans; and to the bishops of Lucca, Luni, Verona, Parma, Arezzo, Florence, Padua, Vicenza, and Le Puy. Call for crusaders to join Emperor John of Brienne on his way to Constan­ tinople, by Gregory IX (December 1229) To the archbishop of Reims and his suffragans. Call for crusaders from Hungary to commute their vow or take the cross de novo for the Latin Empire, by Gregory IX (1231–34) To Hungarian prelates (namely the archbishop of Esztergom, and the bishops of Győr, of Eger, and of Pécs). Crusade efforts of Gregory IX (1235–40) To prelates throughout the kingdoms of Hungary, France, and England. This includes separate/additional calls to: the Dominicans of Hungary; the dioceses of Cambrai, Tournai, and Arras; the archbishop of Bordeaux; the territories of Anjou, Brittany, and Poitou; the archbishops of Vienne, Lyon, Besançon, and Bourges; the bishops of Toul, Metz, Verdun, and Liège; the Dominicans of (the kingdom of ) France. Anti-Bulgarian Crusade preached in Hungary, by Gregory IX (1238) To prelates throughout Hungary. Cross preached for the Latin Empire, in the aftermath of the First Council of Lyon, by Innocent IV (September 1245 onwards) To the mendicants of Provence, England, and Poland.

290

Appendix iv

Patriarch Pantaleone Giustiniani of Constantinople authorized to preach the cross for the Latin Empire, by Innocent IV (July 1253) Preaching authorized in the empire of Constantinople and in Venice. Crusade preached for the reconquest of Constantinople and for the defence of the principality of Achaia, by Urban IV (1262–64) To the mendicants of France, Poland, and Aragon, and to the dioceses of Utrecht and Liège.

Bibliography

Primary Sources Acta Alexandri PP IV (1254–1261), ed. by Theodosius T. Haluscynskyj and Meletius M. Wojnar, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 4, pt 2 (Città del Vaticano: Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966) Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana, ed. by Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, 6 vols (Wien: [n. pub.], 1860–90) Acta Honorii III (1216–1227) et Gregorii IX (1227–1241), ed. by Aloysius L. Tàutu, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 3 (Città del Vaticano: Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950) Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae ab anno 1267 ad annum 1313, ed. by Fritz Kern (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1973) Acta Innocentii PP III (1198–1216), ed. by Theodosius T. Haluscynskyj, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 2 (Città del Vaticano: Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1944) Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Theodosius T. Haluscynskyj and Meletius M. Wojnar, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 4, pt 1 (Roma: [n. pub.], 1962) Acta Romanorum Pontificum ab Innocentio V ad Benedictum XI (1276–1304), ed. by Ferdinand M. Delorme and Aloysius L. Tàutu, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 5, pt 2 (Città del Vaticano: Poly­ glottis Vaticanis, 1954) Acta Urbani IV, Clementis IV, Gregorii X (1261–1276): e registris vaticanis aliisque fontibus, ed. by Aloysius L. Tàutu, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis: Fontes, 3rd ser., 5, pt 1 (Città del Vaticano: Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1953) Actes relatifs à la principauté de Morée (1289–1300), ed. by Charles Perrat and Jean Longnon (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale, 1967) Akropolites, George, George Akropolites: The History, trans. by Ruth Macrides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) —— , Opera, ed. by August Heisenberg and Peter Wirth, 2 vols (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1978)

292

Bibliography

Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. by Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, in [Chronica aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xxiii (1874), 631–950 Alexander IV (registers): see Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by De la Roncière and others; Acta Alexandri PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar Analecta novissima: Spicilegii Solesmensis altera continuatio, ed. by Jean Baptiste Pitra, 2 vols (Paris: Tusculanis, 1885–88) Annales de Burton, in Annales monastici, ed. by Henry Richards Luard, Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores (Rolls Series), 36, 5 vols (London: Longman, 1864– 69), i (1864), 181–510 Annales Colonienses maximi, ed. by Karl Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826– ), xvii (1861), 723–847 Annales ecclesiastici ab anno 1198 usque ad annum 1565, ed. by Odoricus Raynaldus, 7 vols (Lucca: [n. pub.], 1738–59) Annales Erphordenses, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xvi (1859), 26–40 Annales Ianuenses, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826– ), xviii (1863), 1–356 Annales Ianuenses, ed. by Luigi Tomasso Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale de Sant’Angelo, in Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de’suoi continuatori, Fonti per la storia d’Italia, 11–14 bis, 5 vols (Genova: [n. pub.], 1890–1929) Annales Placentini Gibellini, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xviii (1863), 457–581 ‘Anonymi continuatio appendicis Roberti de Monte ad Sigebertum’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xviii (1822), 333–45 ‘Anonymous Chronicle of Laon’, in Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, trans. by Alfred J. Andrea (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 223–38 Anonymous Chronicler of Laon, ‘Ex chronico anonymi Laudensis canonici’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xviii (1822), 702–20 Anonymous Chronicler of Soissons (Anonymus Suessionensis), ‘De Terra Iherosolymitana et quomodo ab urbe Constantinopolitana ad hanc ecclesiam allate sunt reliquie’, in Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Paul Riant, 2 vols (Genève: [n.  pub.], 1877–78; repr. Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2004), i (1877), 1–9 Baldwin of Avesnes (compiled chronicle), in Istore et croniques de Flandres (Recueil des chroniques de Flandre), ed. by Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols (Brussels: Hayez, 1879– 80), ii (1880), 555–696 (extracts)

Bibliography

293

Baldwin of Avesnes (fragment) in Geoffroi de Ville-Hardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, avec la continuation de Henri de Valenciennes, ed. by Natalis de Wailly (Paris: FirminDidot, 1882), pp. 423–27 Baldwin of Constantinople, ‘Balduinus Imperator Constantinopolitanus de expugnata secundò urbe Constantino’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xviii (1822), 520–23 Bardanes, George, ‘Lettre de Georges Bardanès, métropolite de Corcyre, au patriarche oecuménique Germain II, 1226–1227c’, ed. by Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, Epetēris Etaireias Vyzantinōn Spoudōn, 33 (1964), 87–118 Bartolomeo of Neocastro, Historia Sicula, ed. by Giuseppe Paladino, Rerum italicarum scriptores, n.s., 13, pt 3 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1921) Benvenuto di San Giorgio, Historia Montisferrati, ed. by Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum italicarum scriptores, 25 vols (Milano: [n. pub.], 1723–51), xxiii (1738) 304–762 Bernard of Pavia, Summa Decretalium, ed. by Ernst A. T. Laspeyres (Regensburg: Manz, 1860) Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi, ed. by Konstantinos N. Sathas, 6 vols (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1872–77) Brevis nota eorum quae in secundo concilio Lugdunensi acta sunt, in Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. by Joannes Dominicus Mansi, 54 vols (Firenze and Venezia: [n. pub.], 1759–98; facsimile repr. of original by Graz: Akademische Druckund Verlagsanstalt, 1960–61), xxiv, cols 61–68 Buchon, Jean Alexandre C., Recherches et matériaux pour servir à une histoire de la domination française aux xiiie, xive et xve siècles dans les provinces démembrées de l’Empire grec à la suite de la quatrième croisade, 2 vols (Paris: Desrez, 1840) Bullarium franciscanum, ed. by Joannes Hyacinthus Sbaralea, 7 vols (Roma: [n.  pub.], 1759–68) Bullarium hellenicum, i: Pope Honorius III’s Letters Involving Frankish Greece and Constantinople, ed. by Christopher Schabel and William Duba (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming) Bullarium Ordinis fratrum praedicatorum, ed. by Thomas Ripoll, 8 vols (Roma: [n. pub.], 1729–40) ‘Bulle d’Innocent IV en faveur de l’empire latin de Constantinople’, ed. by Ferdinand M. Delorme, Archivum franciscanum historicum, 8 (1915), 307–10 Calega Panza, ‘Un Sirventés contre Charles d’Anjou (1268)’, ed. by Alfred Jeanroy, Annales du Midi, 15 (1903), 145–67 Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, ed. by William Henry Bliss and others, 18 vols (London: HMSO, 1893–1989) Canart, Paul, ‘Nicéphore Blemmyde et le mémoire adressé aux envoyés de Grégoire IX (Nicée, 1234)’, Orientalia christiana periodica, 25 (1959), 310–25 Cartulaire de l’abbaye de St. Père de Chartres, ed. by Benjamin Edme Charles Guérard, 2 vols (Paris: Crapelet, 1840) Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem, 1130–1310, ed. by Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, 4 vols (Paris: Leroux, 1894–1906)

294

Bibliography

Choniates, Niketas, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. by Jan Louis van Dieten, 2 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975) Chronici rhythmici Coloniensis fragmenta, ed. by Wilhelm Wattenbach, in [Gesta saec. xiii.], ed. by Georg Waitz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xxv (1880), 369–80 The Chronicle of James I, King of Aragon, trans. by John Forster, 2 vols (London: Chapman and Hall, 1883) The Chronicle of Morea, ed. by John Schmitt (London: Methuen, 1904) ‘Chronicle of Morea’ (Italian version), in Chroniques gréco-romanes, inédites ou peuconnues, ed. by Carl Hopf (Berlin: Weidmann, 1873), pp. 414–68 Chronicles of the Crusades: Joinville and Villehardouin, trans. by M. R. B. Shaw (Harmonds­ worth: Penguin, 1963) Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. by Louis de Mas Latrie (Paris: Renouard, 1871) ‘Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean de Vignay’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xxiii (1876), 1–106 Clement IV (registers): see Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Jordan; Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu Codex diplomaticus Majoris Poloniae, 5 vols (Poznań: Kraszewski, 1877–1908) Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d’Angiò, ed. by Giuseppe del Giudice, 3 vols (Napoli: Università, 1863–1902) Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. and trans. by Alfred J. Andrea (Leiden: Brill, 2000) Corpus chronicorum Flandriae (Recueil des chroniques de Flandre), ed. by Joseph-Jean De Smet, 4 vols (Brussels: Hayez, 1837–65) Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of Morea, trans. by Harold E. Lurier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) Dandolo, Andrea, Chronica, ed. by Ester Pastorello, Rerum italicarum scriptores, n.s., 12, pt 1 (in 7 vols) (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1938–58) ‘De praedicationae cruciatae saec. xiii per Fratres Minores’, ed. by Ferdinand M. Delorme, Archivum franciscanum historicum, 9 (1916), 99–117 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990) Devastatio Constantinopolitana, ed. by Karl Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xvi (1859), 9–12; trans. in Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, ed. and trans. by Alfred J. Andrea (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 212–21 ‘Disputatio latinorum et graecorum seu Relatio apocrisariorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia 1234’, ed. by Hieronymus Golubovich, Archivum franciscanum historicum, 12 (1919), 418–70 ‘Documenta hucusque inedita saeculi xiii pro historia almae Fr. Minor. provinciae Mediolanensis (seu Lombardiae)’, ed. by Paolo M. Sevesi, Archivum franciscanum historicum, 2 (1909), 561–74

Bibliography

295

Dossier grec de l’Union de Lyon (1273–1277), ed. by Vitalien Laurent and Jean Darrouzès, Archives de l’Orient chrétien, 16 (Paris: Institut français d’études byzantines, 1976) Ecclesiae graecae monumenta, ed. by Johannes Baptista Cotelerius, 4 vols (Paris: Muguet, 1677–92) ‘Epirotica saeculi xiii’, ed. by Vasilii Grigorevich Vasilievsky, Vizantiski Vremennik, 3 (1896), 233–99 Epistolae saeculi xiii e regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae, ed. by Karl Rodenberg, 3 vols, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Epistolae (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94) Eracles (L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur), in Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux, 5 vols (Paris: Académie royale, 1844–95), ii (1859), 1–481 Eudes Rigaud, ‘E visitationibus Odonis Rigaudi, Archiepiscopi Rothomagensis’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xxi (1855), 571–93 Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae, ed. by Paul Riant, 2 vols (Genève: [n. pub.], 1877– 78; repr. Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2004) Flores historiarum, ed. by Henry Richards Luard, Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores (Rolls Series), 95, 3 vols (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1890) Fœdera: conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliæ et alios quosuis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates, ab ingressu Gulielmi I. in Angliam, a.d. 1066, ad nostra usque tempora habita aut tractata, ed. by Thomas Rymer, 3 vols (London: [n. pub.], 1816–30) Friedrich II von Hohenstaufen, ‘Le Lettere greche di Federigo II’, ed. by Nicola Festa, Archivio storico italiano, 5th ser., 13 (1894), 1–34 —— , ‘Quattro lettere greche di Federico II’, ed. by Erasmo Merendino, Atti della Accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo, 4th ser., 34.2 (1974–75), 293–343 Geoffroi de Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Edmond Faral, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1961) Gesta Innocentii III, in Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Migne, 1844–64), ccxiv, cols  17–218; later ed. by David Gress-Wright, ‘The “Gesta Innocentii III”: Text, Introduction and Commentary’ (un­published doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1981); and trans. by James M. Powell, The Deeds of Pope Innocent III (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004) Gratian, Concordia discordantium canonum, in Corpus iuris canonici, ed. by Emil Friedberg, 2 vols (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879–81), i (1879) Gregoras, Nikephoros, Nicephori Gregorae byzantina historia, ed. by Ludwig Schopen and Immanuel Bekker, 3 vols (Bonn: Weber, 1829–55); trans. by Jan Louis van Dieten, Rhomäische Geschichte, 6 vols (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1973–2007); trans. by Dimitris Moschos, Ρωμαϊκή Ιστορία [Roman History] (Athens: Livani, 1997) Gregory IX (registers): see Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Auvray; Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu Gregory X (registers): see Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier; Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu

296

Bibliography

Guilhem Figueira, ‘D’un sirventes far’, in Poesie provenzali storiche relative all’Italia, ed. by Vicenzo de Bartholomaeis, 2 vols (Roma: Senato, 1931), ii, 98–106 —— , Guilhem Figueira: ein provenzalischer Troubadour, ed. by Emil Levy (Berlin: Liebrecht, 1880) Guillaume de Nangis, ‘Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici, regis Francie, et Gesta Philippi, regis Francie’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xx (1840), 309–538 Gunther of Pairis, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, ed. by Peter Orth (Hildesheim: Weidmann, 1994); trans. by Alfred Andrea, The Capture of Constantinople: The Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Pairis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997) Hampe, Karl, ‘Aus verlorenen Registerbänden der Päpste Innocenz III und Innocenz IV’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 23 (1902), 545–67 Henri de Valenciennes, Histoire de l’empereur Henri de Constantinople, ed. by Jean Longnon (Paris: Geuthner, 1948); trans. in Geoffroi de Ville-Hardouin, Conquête de Con­stan­ tinople, avec la continuation de Henri de Valenciennes, ed. by Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1882), pp. 303–421 Henry of Flanders and Bishop Nivelon of Soissons, ‘Zwei unedierte Briefe aus der Frühzeit des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel’, ed. by Rudolf Pokorny, Byzantion, 55 (1985), 180–209 Henry of Flanders, Latin emperor of Constantinople, ‘Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs von Kon­stantinopel vom 13. Januar 1212: Überlieferungsgeschichte, Neuedition und Kom­mentar’, ed. by Günter Prinzing, Byzantion, 43 (1973), 395–431 ——— , ‘Henricus imperator Constantinopolitanus de varia latinorum in imperio fortuna’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Léopold Delisle and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xviii (1822), 527–29 ——— , ‘Henricus imperator Constantinopolitanus de quatuor imperii hostibus a se pervictis’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Léopold Delisle and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xviii (1822), 530–33 Hermanni Altahensis annales, ed. by Philipp Jaffé, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xvii (1861), 381–407 Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. by Jean-Louis-Alphonse Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols (Paris: Plon, 1852–61) Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by César Auguste Horoy, 5 vols (Paris: Bibliothèque ecclésiastique, 1879–82) Honorius III, ‘Delectus ex epistolarum Honorii papae III libris decem, de rebus francicis regnantibus Philippo Augusto et Ludovico VIII’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Léopold Delisle and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xix (1828), 609–778 —— , (registers): see Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Pressutti; Honorii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Horoy; Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, ed. by Tàutu; Bullarium hellenicum, ed. by Schabel and Duba

Bibliography

297

Hostiensis (Henry of Segusio), Summa aurea (Venezia: Vitalis, 1574) Humbert of Romans, Opus tripartitum, in Fasciculus rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum, ed. by Ortuinus Gratius, 2 vols (London: Chiswell, 1690; facsimile repr. Tucson, 1967), ii, 185–229; summary/extracts by Bernard Gui, ‘Extractiones de libro’, in Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. by Joannes Dominicus Mansi, 54 vols (Firenze and Venezia: [n. pub.], 1759–98; facsimile repr. of original by Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1960–61), xxiv, cols 110–32 Innocent III (registers): see Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Hageneder; Acta Innocentii PP III, ed. by Haluscynskyj; Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, ed. by Migne Innocent IV (registers); see Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Berger; Acta Innocentii PP IV, ed. by Haluscynskyj and Wojnar Innocent V (registers): see Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu ‘Innocentii III (et ad ipsum) epistolæ duodecim et trecentæ, quæ ad res Francicas per­ tinent, ab anno 1198 ad 1216’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Léopold Delisle and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xix (1828), 327–605 Innocentii III, Romani pontificis opera omnia, in Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Migne, 1844–64), CCXIV and CCXVI (1855) Istore et croniques de Flandres (Recueil des chroniques de Flandre), ed. by Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols (Brussels: Hayez, 1879–80) Jean de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. and trans. by Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Hachette, 1868); ed. and trans. by Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Infomédia, 1998); trans. by Joan Evans, The History of St. Louis by Jean sire de Joinville (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) John of Ibelin, Le Livre des Assises, ed. by Peter Edbury (Leiden: Brill, 2003) ‘John X Camaterus Confronts Innocent III: An Unpublished Correspondence’, ed. by Aristeides Papadakis and Alice Mary Talbot, Byzantinoslavica, 33 (1972), 26–41 John XXI (registers): see Les Registres de Grégoire X et de Jean XXI, ed. by Guiraud and Cadier; Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu Layettes de trésor des chartes, ed. by Alexandre Teulet and others, 5 vols (Paris: Plon, 1863–1909) The Letters of Innocent III Concerning England and Wales, ed. by Christopher R. Cheney and Mary G. Cheney (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967) ‘Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l’empire latin de Constantinople’, ed. by Joseph Van de Gheyn, Revue de l’Orient latin, 9 (1902; repr. 1964), 230–34 ‘Une Lettre inédit d’Henri I d’Angre, empereur de Constantinople, aux prélats italiens (1213?)’, ed. by Philippe Lauer, in Mélanges offerts à M. Gustave Schlumberger à l’occasion du quatre-vingtième anniversaire de sa naissance (17 October 1924), 2 vols (Paris: Geuthner, 1924), i, 191–201 ‘Lettres inédites d’Innocent III’, ed. by Léopold Delisle, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 34 (1873), 397–419 Le Liber censuum de l’Église Romaine, ed. by Paul Fabre, Louis Duchesne, and Guillaume Mollat, 3 vols (Paris: Thorin, 1889–1952)

298

Bibliography

Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea, ed. and trans. by Alfred MorelFatio (Genève: Fick, 1885) Livre de la conqueste de la princée de l’Amorée: Chronique de Morée (1204–1305), ed. by Jean Longnon (Paris: Renouard, 1911) Marino Sanudo Torsello, Istoria di Romania, ed. by Eutychia Papadopoulou, National Hellenic Research Foundation / Institute for Byzantine Research, Sources, 4 (Athens: Institouto Vyzantinōn Ereunōn, 2000) Martin IV (registers): see Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by Olivier-Martin; Acta Roman­ orum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu Martino da Canale, ‘La Chronique des Veniciens de maistre Martin da Canal’, ed. by Filippo Luigi Polidori and Giovanni Galvani, Archivio storico italiano, 8 (1845), 229–766 Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. by Henry Richards Luard, Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores (Rolls Series), 57, 7 vols (London: Longman, 1872–83) Metochites, George, ‘Le Rapport de Georges le Métochite, apocrisiaire de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du Pape Gregoire X’, ed. by Vitalien Laurent, Revue historique du sud-est européen, 23 (1946), 233–47 —— , ‘Le Récit d’une mission diplomatique de Georges le Métochite (1275–1276) et le Vat. Gr. 1716’ ed. by Ciro Giannelli, in Marie-Hyacinthe Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps, Studi e Testi, 129 (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1947), pp. 419–43 Michael Autoreianos, ‘Cinq actes inédits du Patriarche Michel Autoreianos’, ed. by Nicolas Oikonomides, Revue des études byzantines, 25 (1967), 113–45 Michael VIII Palaiologos, ‘Imperatoris Michaelis Palaeologi de vita sua’, ed. by Henri Grégoire, Byzantion, 29–30 (1959–60), 447–76 —— , ‘Lettera inedita dell’imperatore Michele VIII Paleologo al pontefice Clemente IV’, ed. by Nicola Festa, Bessarione, 6 (1899–1900), 42–57 and 529–32 Minieri Riccio, Camillo, Alcuni fatti riguardanti Carlo I di Angiò dal 6 di Agosto 1252 al 30 di Decembre 1270, tratti dall’Archivio Angioini di Napoli (Napoli: [n. pub.], 1874) Monumenta Boica, ed. by the Academia scientiarum Boica, 60 vols (München: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1763–1956) Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion, ed. by August Heisenberg, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, 3 vols (München: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1922–23) Nicholas III (registers): see Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Gay; Acta Romanorum Pontificum (1276–1304), ed. by Delorme and Tàutu De Oorkonden der graven van Vlaanderen (1191–aanvang 1206), ed. by Walter Prevenier, 3 vols (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1964–71) Pachymeres, George, Relations historiques, ed. and trans. by Albert Failler and Vitalien Laurent, 5 vols (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1984–2000) Peter Seila (Pierre Cellan), L’Inquisition en Quercy: le registre des pénitences de Pierre Cellan, 1241–1242, ed. by Jean Duvernoy (Castelnaud-la-Chapelle: L’Hydre, 2001) Peter the Venerable, The Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. by Giles Constable, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967)

Bibliography

299

Philippe Mouskes, Chronique rimée, ed. by Frédéric de Reiffenberg, 2 vols (Brussels: Hayez, 1836–38) Ptolemy of Lucca, Historia ecclesiastica, ed. by Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum italicarum scriptores, 11 (Milano: Societatis Palatinae, 1727), cols 753–1242 Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, The Poems of the Troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, ed. and trans. by Joseph Linskill (Den Haag: Mouton, 1964) Ralph of Coggeshall, Chronicon anglicanum, ed. by Joseph Stevenson, Rerum britanni­ca­ rum medii aevi scriptores (Rolls Series), 66 (London: Longman, 1875) Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. by Petrus Pressutti, 2 vols (Roma: Vaticana, 1888–95) Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum natum mcxcviii ad annum mccciv, ed. by Augustus Potthast, 2 vols (Berlin: Decker, 1874–75) Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches: 1204–1282, ed. by Franz Dölger, 2nd edn, rev. by Franz Dölger and Peter Wirth (München: Beck, 1977) ‘Régestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople (1204–1261/1273)’, ed. by Benjamin Hendrickx, Byzantina, 14 (1988), 7–221 Regestum super negotio Romani imperii: das Register Papst Innocenz’ III. über den Deutschen Thronstreit, ed. by Walther Holtzmann, 2 vols (Bonn: Universitäts-Verlag, 1947–48) Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. by Othmar Hageneder and others, 9 vols to date (Graz: Böhlau, 1964–) Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. by Bourel de la Roncière and others, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 15, 3 vols (Paris: Thorin, 1895–1959) Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. by Edouard Jordan, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 11 (Paris: Thorin, 1893; repr. Paris: De Boccard, 1945) Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. by Lucien Auvray, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 9, 4 vols (Paris: Fontemoing, 1896–1955) Les Registres de Grégoire X (1272–1276) et de Jean XXI (1276–1277), ed. by Jean Guiraud and Léon Cadier, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 12 (Paris: De Boccard, 1960) Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. by Élie Berger, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1, 4 vols (Paris: Thorin, 1884–1911) Les Registres de Martin IV, ed. by François Olivier-Martin, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 16 (Paris: De Boccard, 1901) Les Registres de Nicholas III, ed. by Jules Gay, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 14 (Paris: De Boccard, 1898–1938) Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Jean Guiraud, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 2, 4 vols (Paris: Fontemoing, 1892–1958) [RO = Registre ordinaire; RC = Registre caméral] I registri della cancelleria Angioina, ed. by Riccardo Filangieri and others, 49 vols to date (Napoli: L’Accademia, 1950–) Reiner of Liège, Annales Reineri, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in [Annales aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xvi (1859), 651–80

300

Bibliography

—— , ‘Ex Reineri ad S. Jacobum monachi chronico Leodiensi’, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738– 1904), xviii (1822), 610–38 Relatio de Concilio Lugdunensi, ed. by Ludwig Weiland, in Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum inde ab a. mcxcviii usque ad a. mcclxxii, ed. by Ludwig Weiland, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Leges, sectio iv. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, 11 vols in 15 to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1893–), ii (1896), 513–16 Richard of San Germano, Ryccardi de Sancto Germano notarii chronica, ed. by Carlo Alberto Garufi, Rerum italicarum scriptores, n.s., 7, pt 2 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1937–38) —— , Ryccardo de Sancto Germano notarii chronica a. 1189–1243, in [Chronica aevi Suevici], ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xix (1866), 321–84 Robert of Auxerre, Chronicon, ed. by Oswald Holder-Egger, in [Ex rerum Francogallicarum scriptoribus. Ex historiis auctorum Flandrensium Francogallica lingua scriptis. Supple­ mentum tomi xxiv], ed. by Georg Waitz and others, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 39 vols to date (Hannover: Hahn, 1826–), xxvi (1882), 219–87 Robert of Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. by Philippe Lauer (Paris: Champion, 1924) —— , The Conquest of Constantinople, trans. by Edgar Holmes McNeal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936; repr. Toronto: Octagon, 1996) Roger Bacon, Opus majus, ed. by John Henry Bridges, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877–1900) Rutebeuf, Onze poèmes de Rutebeuf concernant la croisade, ed. by Julia Bastin and Edmond Faral, Documents relatifs à l’histoire des croisades, 1 (Paris: Geuthner, 1946) Saba Malaspina, Rerum Sicularum historia, in Cronisti e scrittori sincroni Napoletani editi e inediti, ed. by Giuseppe del Re, 2 vols (Napoli: Iride, 1868; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1975), ii, 201–408 Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. by Joannes Dominicus Mansi, 54 vols (Firenze and Venezia: [n.  pub.], 1759–98; facsimile repr. of original by Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1960–61) Sakellion, Ioannis, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή του Αυτοκράτορος Ιωάννου Δούκα Βατάτση προς τον Πάπαν Γρηγόριον, ανευρεθείσα εν Πάτμω’ [Unpublished Letter of the Emperor John Ducas Vatatzes to Pope Gregory, Discovered in Patmos], Athinaion, 1 (1872), 369–78 Schillmann, Fritz, ‘Zur byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV’, Römische Quartalschrift, 22 (1908), 108–31 ‘Selecta ex variis chronicis ad Philippi-Augusti regnum pertinentibus’, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. by Léopold Delisle and others, 24 vols (Paris: Palmé, 1738–1904), xix (1828), 239–66 Spicilegium, sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliothecis delituerant, ed. by Luc d’Achery, 3 vols (Paris: Montalant, 1723; facsimile repr. of 2nd edn by Farnborough: Gregg, 1967–68)

Bibliography

301

Stilbes, Constantine, ‘Le Mémoire de Constantin Stilbès contre les latins’, ed. by Jean Darrouzès, Revue des études byzantines, 21 (1963), 50–100 Theodore II Lascaris, Theodori II ducae Lascaris epistulae ccxvii, ed. by Nicola Festa (Firenze: Carnesecchi, 1898) Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, ed. by Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, 5 vols (Paris: Delaulne, 1717) ‘Le Traité de Viterbe entre Charles Ier d’Anjou et Guillaume de Villehardouin, prince de Morée (24 mai 1267)’, ed. by Jean Longnon, in Studi in onore Riccardo Filangieri, 3 vols (Napoli: L’Arte, 1959), i, 307–14 Urban IV (registers): see Les Registres d’Urbain IV, ed. by Guiraud; Acta Urbani IV, ed. by Tàutu Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-Geschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Gottlieb L. F. Tafel and Georg M. Thomas, Fontes rerum Austriacarum, ii.12–14, 3 vols (Wien: Hof- und Staat, 1856–57) Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, ed. by Augustin Theiner, 2 vols (Roma: Vaticanis, 1859–60) Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, dogmaticorum, moralium amplissima collectio, ed. by Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, 9 vols (Paris: [n. pub.], 1724–33) ‘Vita Innocentii IV scripta a Fr. Nicolao de Carbio’, ed. by F. Pagnotti, Archivio della Società Romana di storia patria, 21 (1898), 76–120

Secondary Studies Abrahamse, Dorothy, ‘Byzantine Views of the West in the Early Crusade Period: The Evidence of Hagiography’, in The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, ed. by Vladimir Goss (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 1986), pp. 189–200 Abulafia, David, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor, 3rd edn (London: Pimlico, 2002) Aerts, Willem Johan, ‘The Chronicle of the Morea as a Mirror of a Crusaders’ State at Work’, in East and West in the Crusader States: Context – Contacts – Confrontations, ed. by Krijnie Ciggaar and Herman Teule (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), pp. 153–62 Ahrweiler, Hélène, L’Idéologie politique de l’empire byzantin (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1975) Andrea, Alfred, ‘Adam of Perseigne and the Fourth Crusade’, Cîteaux: commentarii cistercienses, 36 (1985), 21–37 —— , ‘Cistercian Accounts of the Fourth Crusade: Were They Anti-Venetian?’, Analecta Cisterciensia, 41 (1985), 3–41 —— , ‘Innocent III and the Byzantine Rite, 1198–1216’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 111–22 —— , ‘Innocent III as Crusader and Canonist: His Relations with the Greeks of Constantinople, 1198–1216’, Church History, 39 (1970), 133–34

302

Bibliography

—— , ‘Innocent III, the Fourth Crusade and the Coming Apocalypse’, in The Medieval Crusade, ed. by Susan J. Ridyard (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2004), pp. 130–42 Angelov, Dimiter, ‘Byzantine Ideological Reactions to the Latin Conquest of Constan­ tinople’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 293–310 Angold, Michael, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) —— , ‘Byzantium in Exile’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2005), v: c. 1198– 1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 543–68 —— , ‘The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of Western Travellers’, in Travel in the Byzantine World, ed. by Ruth Macrides (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 213–32 —— , The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context (Harlow: Longman, 2003) —— , ‘Greeks and Latins after 1204: The Perspective of Exile’, in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. by Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton, and David Jacoby (London: Cass, 1989) (= Mediterranean Historical Review, 4 (1989)), pp. 63–86 Arbagi, Martin, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes, 800–1204’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1969) Atiya, Aziz Suryal, The Crusade in the Late Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1938) Balard, Michel, ‘L’Historiographie occidentale de la quatrième croisade’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 161–74 Barber, Malcolm, ‘The Impact of the Fourth Crusade in the West: The Distribution of Relics after 1204’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 325–34 —— , The Two Cities: Medieval Europe, 1050–1320 (London: Routledge, 1992) —— , ‘Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century’, in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. by Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton, and David Jacoby (London: Cass, 1989) (= Mediterranean Historical Review, 4 (1989)), pp. 111–28 Bartusis, Mark C., The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) Benito Ruano, Eloy, ‘Balduino II de Constantinopla y la Orden de Santiago: un proyecto de defensa del Imperio latino de Oriente’, Hispania: Revista Española de Historia, 12 (1952), 3–36 —— , ‘La Iglesia española ante la caída del Imperio latino de Constantinopla’, Hispania sacra, 11 (1958), 5–20 Berend, Nora, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and ‘Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) Berg, Beverly, ‘Manfred of Sicily and the Greek East’, Byzantina, 14 (1988), 263–89 —— , ‘Manfred of Sicily and Urban IV: Negotiations of 1262’, Mediaeval Studies, 55 (1993), 111–36

Bibliography

303

Berger de Xivrey, Jules, ‘Notice d’un manuscrit grec du xiiie siècle conservé à la Biblio­ thèque nationale et renfermant le Nouveau Testament’, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 24 (5th ser., 4) (1863), 97–118 Bolton, Brenda, ‘A Mission to the Orthodox? The Cistercians in Romania’, Studies in Church History, 13 (1976), 169–81; repr. in Brenda Bolton, Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), no. ix —— , ‘Too Important to Neglect: The Gesta Innocentii PP III’, in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to John Taylor, ed. by Ian N. Wood and Graham A. Loud (London: Hambledon, 1991), pp. 87–99 Bon, Antoine, La Morée franque: recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d’Achaïe (1205–1430), 2 vols (Paris: De Boccard, 1969) Borsari, Silvano, ‘Federico II e l’Oriente bizantino’, Rivista storica italiana, 63 (1951), 279–91 —— , ‘La politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angio dal 1266 al 1271’, Archivio storico per le province Napoletane, n.s., 35 (1956), 319–49 Brand, Charles M., ‘A Byzantine Plan for the Fourth Crusade’, Speculum, 43 (1968), 462–75 —— , ‘The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185–1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade’, Speculum, 37 (1962), 167–81 —— , Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–1204 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968) —— , ‘The Fourth Crusade: Some Recent Interpretations’, Medievalia et humanistica, 12 (1984), 91–104 Bréhier, Louis, ‘Une Ambassade byzantine au camp de Saint Louis devant Tunis (août 1270)’, in Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga (Paris: Gamber, 1933), pp. 139–46 Brem, Ernst, Papst Gregor IX. bis zum Beginn seines Pontifikats: ein biographischer Versuch (Heidelberg: Winter, 1911) Brett, Edward Tracy, Humbert of Romans: His Life and Views of Thirteenth-Century Society (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984) Brezeanu, Stelian, ‘Notice sur les rapports de Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen avec Jean III Vatatzès’, Revue des études sud-est européennes, 12 (1974), 583–85 Brown, Elizabeth A. R., ‘The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece, 1204–1276’, Traditio, 14 (1958), 63–120 Brundage, James A., ‘Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers’, in The Holy War, ed. by Thomas Patrick Murphy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), pp. 99–140 —— , Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969) Burleigh, Michael, ‘The Military Orders in the Baltic’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2005), v: c. 1198–1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 743–53 Burns, Robert I., Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Societies in Symbiosis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) Carile, Antonio, ‘Partitio terrarum imperii romanie’, Studi veneziani, 7 (1965), 125–305 Carrier, Marc, ‘L’Image des byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les chroniqueurs occidentaux des croisades, 1096–1261’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Uni­ver­ sité Paris I, 2006)

304

Bibliography

Cerone, Francesco, ‘La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine’, Archivio storico per le province napoletane, 41 (1916), 5–64, 193–266; 42 (1917), 5–67 Charanis, Peter, ‘Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzan­ tium’, Church History, 21 (1952), 123–34 —— , ‘Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade’, Byzantion, 19 (1949), 17–36 Cheney, Christopher R., The Study of the Medieval Papal Chancery: The Second Edward Lecture Delivered within the University of Glasgow on 7th December 1964 (Glasgow: Jackson, 1966) Chrissis, Nikolaos G., ‘A Diversion that Never Was: Thibaut IV of Champagne, Richard of Cornwall and Pope Gregory IX’s Crusading Plans for Constantinople, 1235–1239’, Crusades, 9 (2010), 123–45 —— , ‘New Frontiers: Frankish Greece and the Development of Crusading in the Early Thirteenth Century’, in Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204– 1453, ed. by Nikolaos Chrissis and Mike Carr (Farnham: Ashgate, forthcoming) Christiansen, Eric, The Northern Crusades, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 1997) Ciggaar, Krijne Nelly, Western Travellers to Constantinople: The West and Byzantium, 962–1204, Cultural and Political Relations (Leiden: Brill, 1996) Clausen, Johannes, Papst Honorius III. (1216–1227): eine Monographie (Bonn: Haupt­ mann, 1895) Claverie, Pierre-Vincent, ‘Un Aspect méconnu du pontificat de Grégoire X: les débuts de sa politique orientale (1271–1273)’, Byzantion, 68 (1998), 281–310 —— , ‘Un illustris amicus Venetorum du début du xiiie siècle: l’évêque Nivelon de Quierzy et son temps’, in Quarta crociata: Venezia, Bisanzio, impero latino, ed. by Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner, 2 vols (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2006), i, 485–523 Cole, Penny J., The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270 (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991) Constable, Giles, ‘The Crusading Project of 1150’, in Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer, ed. by Benjamin Kedar, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and Rudolf Hiestand (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), pp. 67–75 —— , ‘The Historiography of the Crusades’, in Giles Constable, Crusaders and Crusading in the Twelfth Century (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 3–43 Coureas, Nicholas, The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1195–1312 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) Cowdrey, Herbert Edward John, ‘The Genesis of the Crusades: The Springs of Western Ideas of Holy War’, in The Holy War, ed. by Thomas Patrick Murphy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), pp. 9–32 Cox, Eugene L., The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) —— , ‘The Kingdom of Burgundy, the Lands of the House of Savoy and Adjacent Territories’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2005), v: c. 1198–1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 358–74

Bibliography

305

Dabrowska, Malgorzata, ‘L’Attitude pro-byzantine de Saint Louis: les opinions des sources françaises concernant cette question’, Byzantinoslavica, 50 (1989), 11–23 Dade, Erwin, Versuche zur Wiedererrichtung des lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel im Rahmen der abendländischen Politik, 1261 bis etwa 1310 ( Jena: Biedermann, 1938) Daly, William M., ‘Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople, 1097–1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal’, Mediaeval Studies, 22 (1960), 43–91 Delaville Le Roulx, Joseph, La France en Orient au xive siècle: expéditions du maréchal Boucicaut (Paris: Thorin, 1886) Delisle, Léopold, ‘Mémoire sur les actes d’Innocent III’, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 19 (4th ser., 4) (1858), 1–73 Dendias, Michel, ‘Sur les rapports entre les Grecs et les Francs en Orient après 1204’, Epetēris Etaireias Vyzantinōn Spoudōn, 23 (1953), 371–79 Denholm-Young, Noël, Richard of Cornwall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947) Doran, John, ‘Rites and Wrongs: The Latin Mission to Nicaea, 1234’, in Unity and Diver­ sity in the Church: Papers Read at the 1994 Summer Meeting and the 1995 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. by Robert N. Swanson, Studies in Church History, 32 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 131–44 Du Cange, Charles du Fresne, Histoire de l’empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs françois, 3 vols (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1657) Ducelier, Alain, ‘L’Europe occidentale dans les textes grecs médiévaux: tradition impériale et redécouverte’, Byzantinoslavica, 56 (1995), 245–55 —— , ‘L’Europe occidentale vue par les historiens grecs des xivème et xvème siècle’, Byzan­ tinische Forschungen, 22 (1996), 119–59 Dunbabin, Jean, Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in ThirteenthCentury Europe (London: Longman, 1998) Ebels-Hoving, Bunna, ‘Byzantium in Latin Eyes before 1204: Some Remarks on the Thesis of the Growing Animosity’, in The Latin Empire: Some Contributions, ed. by Krijne Nelly Ciggaar and V. D. van Aalst (Hernen: Bredius, 1990), pp. 21–31 —— , Byzantium in westerse ogen, 1096–1204 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971) Engel, Pál, Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526, trans. by Tamás Pálosfalvi (London: Tauris, 2001) Evans, Austin P., ‘The Albigensian Crusade’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 277–324 Fine, John V. A., The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1975) —— , The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Iben, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254 (Leiden: Brill, 2007)

306

Bibliography

Foreville, Raymond, Latran I, II, III et Latran IV, Histoire des conciles œcuméniques, 6 (Paris: Orante, 1965) Forey, Alan J., ‘The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians in the Thirteenth Century’, English Historical Review, 104 (1989), 1–24 Franchi, Antonino, Il concilio II di Lione, 1274, secondo la Ordinatio concilii generalis lugdunensis (Roma: Francescane, 1965) —— , La svolta politico-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio (1249–1254): la legazione di Giovanni de Parma; il ruolo di Federico II (Roma: Pontificium Athenaeum Anto­ni­ anum, 1981) Gallagher, Clarence, Canon Law and the Christian Community: The Role of Law in the Church according to the Summa Aurea of Cardinal Hostiensis (Roma: Università Gregoriana, 1978) Gallina, Mario, ‘La reazione antiromana nell’epistolario di Michele Coniata metropolita d’Atene’, in Quarta crociata: Venezia, Bisanzio, impero latino, ed. by Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner, 2 vols (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2006), i, 423–46 Gardner, Alice, The Lascarids of Nicaea: The Story of an Empire in Exile (London: Methuen, 1912) Gatto, Ludovico, Il pontificato di Gregorio X (1271–1276), 2nd edn (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2007) Geanakoplos, Deno J., ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354’, in A History of the Cru­ sades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wiscon­sin Press, 1969–89), iii: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. by Harry W. Hazard (1975), pp. 27–68 —— , ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969– 89), iii: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. by Harry W. Hazard (1975), pp. 69–103 —— , Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study in Late ByzantineWestern Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) —— , ‘Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of Pelagonia, 1259’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 7 (1953), 99–141 —— , ‘Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons (1274)’, The Harvard Theological Review, 46 (1953), 79–89 Gerland, Ernst, Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. i: Geschichte der Kaiser Baldwin und Heinrich, 1204–1216, Geschichte der Frankenherrschaft in Griechenland 2 (Homburg von der Höhe: Selbsverlag des Verfassers, 1905) Gill, Joseph, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979) Gottlob, Adolf, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern im xiii. Jahrhundert: ihre rechtliche Grundlage, politische Geschichte und technische Verwaltung (Heiligenstadt: Cordier, 1892)

Bibliography

307

Gounaridis, Paris, ‘L’Image de l’autre: les croisés vus par les Byzantins’, in Quarta crociata: Venezia, Bisanzio, impero latino, ed. by Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner, 2 vols (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2006), i, 81–95 Grumel, Venance, ‘Les Ambassades pontificales à Byzance après le iie Concile de Lyon (1274–1280)’, Échos d’Orient, 23 (1924), 437–47 —— , ‘L’Authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès, empereur de Nicée, au pape Grégoire IX’, Échos d’Orient, 29 (1930), 450–58 Hagedorn, Gerd, ‘Papst Innozenz III und Byzanz am Vorabend des IV. Kreuzzugs (1198– 1203)’, Ostkirchliche Studien, 23 (1974), 3–20, 105–36 Hageneder, Othmar, ‘Der Häresiebegriff bei den Juristen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts’, in The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages (11th–13th c.): Proceedings of the International Conference, Louvain, May 13–16, 1973, ed. by Willem Lourdaux and Daniel Verhelst (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976), pp. 42–103 —— , ‘Die päpstlichen Register des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts’, Annali della Scuola speciale per archivisti e bibliotecari dell’Università di Roma, 12 (1972), 45–76 Hamilton, Bernard, ‘The Albigensian Crusade and Heresy’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ver­sity Press, 1995–2005), v: c.  1198–1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 164–81 —— , ‘The Albigensian Crusade and the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 335–43 —— , The Latin Church in the Crusader States (London: Variorum, 1980) Hampe Karl, ‘Aus verlorenen Registerbänden der Päpste Innocenz III und Innocenz IV’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 23 (1902), 545–67 —— , Urban IV und Manfred (1261–1264) (Heidelberg: Winter, 1905) Hankins, James, ‘Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 49 (1995), 111–207 Harris, Jonathan, Byzantium and the Crusades (London: Hambledon, 2003) —— , ‘Collusion with the Infidel as a Pretext for Western Military Action against Byzantium (1180–1204)’, in Languages of Love and Hate: Conflict, Communication, and Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean, ed. by Sarah Lambert and Helen Nicholson, International Medieval Research, 15 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), pp. 99–117 —— , The End of Byzantium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) Heidelberger, Franz, Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende des 13. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig: Rothschild, 1911) Heisenberg, August, ‘Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion’, in August Heisenberg, Quellen und Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte (London: Variorum, 1973), no. ii Hermans, Jos M. M., ‘The Byzantine View of the Latin West before 1204: Changing Ideas and Growing Fears’, in The Latin Empire: Some Contributions, ed. by Krijne Nelly Ciggaar and V. D. van Aalst (Hernen: Bredius, 1990), pp. 1–19

308

Bibliography

A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89) Hoeck, Johannes M., and Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, Abt von Casole: Beiträge zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen unter Innozenz III und Friedrich II (Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1965) Houben, Hubert, ‘La quarta crociata e l’Ordine Teutonico in Grecia’, in The Fourth Crusade Revisited, ed. by Pierantonio Piatti (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), pp. 202–14 Housley, Norman, Contesting the Crusades (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) —— , ‘Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216’, in Crusade and Settlement, ed. by Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), pp. 17–36 —— , The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) —— , The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar, 1274–1580 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) —— , ‘The Thirteenth-Century Crusades in the Mediterranean’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­sity Press, 1995–2005), v: c. 1198–1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 569–89 Hunger, Herbert, Graeculus perfidus, Ἰταλός ἰταμός: il senzo dell’ alterità nei rapporti Grecoromani ed italo-bizantini (Roma: Unione internazionale degli istituti di archeologia, storia e storia dell’arte in Roma, 1987) Hussey, Joan M., ‘Byzantium and the Crusades, 1081–1204’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 123–51 Iorga, Nicolae, Philippe de Mézières et la croisade au xive siècle (Paris: Bouillon, 1896) Jacoby, David, Byzantium, Latin Romania and the Mediterranean (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) —— , ‘The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Pelo­ ponnesus after the Fourth Crusade’, American Historical Review, 78 (1973), 873–906 —— , La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale: les ‘Assises de Romanie’, sources, application et diffu­ sion (Paris: Mouton, 1971) —— , ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by David Abulafia and others, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2005), v: c.  1198–1300, ed. by David Abulafia (1999), pp. 525–42 Jackson, Peter, ‘The Crusade against the Mongols (1241)’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 42 (1991), 1–18 —— , ‘The Crusades of 1239–1241 and their Aftermath’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 50 (1987), 32–62 —— , The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410 (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2005)

Bibliography

309

Joranson, Einor, ‘The Problem of the Spurious Letter of Emperor Alexius to the Count of Flanders’, American Historical Review, 55 (1950), 811–32 Jordan, Édouard, Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie, 2 vols (Paris: Picard, 1909; repr. New York: Franklin, 1960) Jordan, William Chester, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) Jotischky, Andrew, Crusading and the Crusader States (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2004) Karpozilos, Apostolos D., The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros (1217–1233) (Thessaloniki: Kentron Vyzantinōn Ereunōn, 1973) Kedar, Benjamin Z., Crusade and Mission: European Approaches toward the Muslims (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) Kennan, Elizabeth, ‘Innocent III and the First Political Crusade: A Comment on the Limitations of Papal Power’, Traditio, 27 (1971), 231–49 —— , ‘Innocent III, Gregory IX and Political Crusades: A Study in the Disintegration of Papal Power’, in Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, ed. by Guy Fitch Lytle (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 15–35 Keutner, Adalbert, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III. (1216–1227), Münstersche Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung, 3rd ser., 10 (Münster: Coppenrath, 1935) Klein, Holger A., ‘Eastern Objects and Western Desires: Relics and Reliquaries between Byzantium and the West’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 58 (2004), 283–314 Kolbaba, Tia M., The Byzantine Lists: Errors of the Latins (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) —— , ‘Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious “Errors”: Themes and Changes from 850 to 1350’, in The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001), pp. 117–43 —— , ‘The Legacy of Humbert and Cerularius: The Tradition of the “Schism of 1054” in Byzantine Texts and Manuscripts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’, in Porphyrogenita: Essays on Byzantine History and Culture and the Latin East Presented to Julian Chrysostomides, ed. by Charalambos Dendrinos and others (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 47–61 Kolia-Dermitzaki, Athina, Συνάντηση Ανατολής και Δύσης στα εδάφη της Αυτοκρατορίας: Οι απόψεις των Βυζαντινών για τους Σταυροφόρους [Meeting of East and West in the Lands of the Empire: Byzantine Views of the Crusaders] (Athens: Idryma GoulandriHorn, 1994) —— , ‘Die Kreuzfahrer und die Kreuzzüge im Sprachgebrauch der Byzantiner’, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik, 41 (1991), 163–88 Kosztolnyik, Zoltan J., Hungary in the Thirteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) Kovách, Aladár, ‘Der “Mongolenbrief ” Bélas IV. an Papst Innozenz IV. über einem zu erwartenden zweiten Mongoleneinbruch um 1250’, in Überlieferung und Auftrag: Festschrift für Michael de Ferdinandy zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. by Josef Gerhard Farkas (Wiesbaden: Pressler, 1972), pp. 495–506

310

Bibliography

Laiou, Angeliki E., ‘Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century: Why Was the Fourth Crusade Late in Coming?’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Conse­ quen­ces, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 17–40 —— , Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) Langdon, John S., Byzantium’s Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor: The Documentary Evidence for and Hagiographical Lore about John III Ducas Vatatzes’s Crusade against the Turks, 1222 or 1225 to 1231 (New York: Caratzas, 1992) Laurent, Marie-Hyacinthe, Le Bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps, Studi e testi, 129 (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1947) —— , ‘Georges le Métochite, ambassadeur de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du B. Innocent V’, in Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, Studi e testi, 121–126, 6 vols (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1946), iii: Letteratura e storia bizantina, pp. 136–56 Laurent, Vitalien, ‘La Croisade et la question d’Orient sous le pontificat de Grégoire X (1271–1276)’, Revue historique de sud-est européen, 22 (1945), 105–37 —— , ‘Grégoire X (1271–1276) et le projet d’une ligue antiturque’, Échos d’Orient, 37 (1938), 257–73 —— , ‘Le Pape Alexandre IV (1254–1261) et l’empire de Nicée’, Échos d’Orient, 34 (1935), 26–55 —— , ‘Le Rapport de Georges le Métochite, apocrisiaire de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du Pape Gregoire X’, Revue historique du sud-est européen, 23 (1946), 233–47 Lehmann, Michael, ‘Das II. Konzil von Lyon und die Ostkirche’, Ostkirchliche Studien, 12 (1963), 132–56 Lemerle, Paul, ‘Byzance et la croisade’, in Relazioni del x Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, 7 vols (Firenze: Sansoni, 1955), iii: Storia del medioevo, 595–620; repr. in Paul Lemerle, Le Monde de Byzance: histoire et institutions (London: Variorum, 1978), no. viii —— , ‘Saint Louis et Byzance’, Journal asiatique, 257 (1970), 13–24; repr. in Paul Lemerle, Le Monde de Byzance: histoire et institutions (London: Variorum, 1978), no. ix Leopold, Anthony, How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) Lilie, Ralph-Johannes, Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1095–1204, trans. by J. C. Morris and Jean E. Ridings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) —— , Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004) Linehan, Peter A., ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church in 1262–3’, English Historical Review, 85 (1970), 730–54 Lock, Peter, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500 (London: Longman, 1995) —— , ‘The Military Orders in Mainland Greece’, in The Military Orders, vol. i: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick, ed. by Malcolm Barber (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), pp. 333–39

Bibliography

311

Loenertz, Raymond-Joseph, ‘Mémoire d’Ogier, protonotaire, pour Marco et Marchetto nonces de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du pape Nicolas III (1278, printemps–été)’, Orientalia christiana periodica, 31 (1965), 374–408 Lomax, Derek William, The Reconquest of Spain (London: Longman, 1978) Longnon, Jean, ‘Le Chroniquer Henri de Valenciennes’, Journal des savants, ( July– December 1945), 134–50 —— , Les Compagnons de Villehardouin: recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade (Genève: Droz, 1978) —— , ‘L’Empereur Baudouin II et l’Ordre de Saint Jacques’, Byzantion, 22 (1952), 297–99 —— , L’Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée (Paris: Payot, 1949) —— , ‘The Frankish States in Greece, 1204–1311’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 235–74 —— , ‘Le Rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267’, Journal des Savants ( July-September, 1942), 134–43 —— , Recherches sur la vie de Geoffroy de Villehardouin (suivies du catalogue des actes des Villehardouin) (Mâcon: Champion, 1939) —— , ‘La Reprise de Salonique par les grecs en 1224’, in Actes du vie Congrès international d’études byzantines, 2 vols (Paris: École des Hautes Études, 1950–51), i (1950), 141–46 —— , ‘Sur l’histoire de l’Empereur Henri de Constantinople par Henri de Valenciennes’, Romania, 69 (1946), 198–241 —— , ‘Les Vues de Charles d’Anjou pour la deuxième croisade de Saint Louis: Tunis ou Constantinople?’, in Septième centenaire de la mort de Saint Louis: actes des colloques de Royaumont et de Paris (21–27 Mai 1970) (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1976), pp. 183–95 Lower, Michael, The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) —— , ‘Negotiating Interfaith Relations in Eastern Christendom: Pope Gregory IX, Bela IV of Hungary, and the Latin Empire’, Essays in Medieval Studies, 21 (2005), 49–62 Luchaire, Achille, Innocent III, 6 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1907–08) Lunt, William E., Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327, Studies in Anglo-Papal Relations during the Middle Ages, 1 (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1939) —— , Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934) Luttrell, Anthony T., ‘Feudal Tenure and Latin Colonization at Rhodes, 1306–1415’, English Historical Review, 85 (1970), 755–75 —— , ‘The Hospitallers in Twelfth-Century Constantinople’, in The Experience of Crusad­ing, ed. by Marcus Bull and Norman Housley, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), i, 225–32 Maccarrone, Michele, Studi su Innocenzo III (Padova: Antenore, 1972)

312

Bibliography

Macrides, Ruth, ‘1204: The Greek Sources’, in Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed. by Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines, 10 (Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp. 141–50 Madden, Thomas F., ‘Vows and Contracts in the Fourth Crusade: The Treaty of Zara and the Attack on Constantinople in 1204’, International History Review, 15 (1993), 462–68 Maier, Christoph T., Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) Maleczek, Werner, Petrus Capuanus: Kardinal, Legat am vierten Kreuzzug, Theologe († 1214) (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988) Mayer, Hans Eberhard, The Crusades, trans. by John Gillingham, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) Mayne, Richard, ‘East and West in 1054’, Cambridge Historical Journal, 11 (1954), 133–48 Meliarakes, Antonios, Ιστορία του βασιλείου της Νικαίας και του δεσποτάτου της Ηπείρου (1204–1261) [History of the Kingdom of Nicaea and of the Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261)] (Athens: Typographeion adelphon Perre, 1898) Merendino, Erasmo, ‘Federico II e Giovanni III Vatatzes’, in Byzantino-Sicula II: miscel­ lanea di scritti in memoria di Giuseppe Rossi Taibbi (Palermo: Istituto siciliano di studi bizantini e neoellenici, 1975), pp. 371–83 —— , ‘Manfredi fra Epiro e Nicea’, in Actes du xve Congrès international d’études byzantines (Athènes, septembre 1976), 4 vols (Athens: Comité d’organisation du congrès, 1979– 80), iv (1980), 245–52 Meschini, Marco, ‘Innocenz III. und der Kreuzzug als Instrument im Kampf gegen die Häresie’, Deutsches Archiv für die Erforschung des Mittelalters, 61 (2005), 537–83 Moore, John C., ‘Count Baldwin IX of Flanders, Philip Augustus and the Papal Power’, Speculum, 37 (1962), 79–89 —— , Pope Innocent III (1160/61–1216): ‘To Root Up and to Plant’ (Leiden: Brill, 2003) Morris, Colin, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) Neocleous, Savvas, ‘Imaging the Byzantines: Latin Perceptions, Representations and Memory, c. 1095–c. 1230’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2009) Nerantzi-Varmazi, Vassiliki, Το Βυζάντιο και ἡ Δύση (1354–1369): Συμβολή στην ιστορία των πρώτων χρόνων της μονοκρατορίας του Ιωάννη Ε΄ Παλαιολόγου [Byzantium and the West (1354–1369): A Contribution to the History of the Early Years of the Sole Rule of John V Palaiologos] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1993) Nicholson, Helen J., ‘The Motivations of the Hospitallers and Templars in their Involvement in the Fourth Crusade and its Aftermath’, Malta Study Centre Lecture, 2003 [accessed 3 March 2012] Nicol, Donald M., ‘The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons, 1274’, Studies in Church History, 7 (1971), 113–46; repr. in Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium: Its Ecclesiastical History and Relations with the Western World (London: Variorum, 1972), no. vi

Bibliography

313

—— , ‘The Byzantine View of Western Europe’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 8 (1967), 315–39 —— , ‘Byzantium and the Papacy in the Eleventh Century’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 13 (1962), 1–20; repr. in Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium: Its Ecclesiastical History and Relations with the Western World (London: Variorum, 1972), no. ii —— , Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) —— , ‘The Crusades and the Unity of Christendom’, in The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, ed. by Vladimir Goss (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 1986), pp. 169–80 —— , The Despotate of Epiros (1204–1261) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957) —— , The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) —— , ‘The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Preliminaries to the Second Council of Lyons, 1261–1274’, in Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn, ed. by John Anthony Watt, John Brimyard Morrall, and Francis Xavier Martin (Dublin: Lochlainn, 1961), pp. 454–80 —— , The Greeks and the Union of the Churches: The Report of Ogerius, Protonotarius of Michael VIII Palaiologos, in 1280, Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, 63, sect. C.1 (Dublin: Hodges & Figgis, 1962) —— , The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) —— , ‘Popular Religious Roots of the Byzantine Reactions to the Second Council of Lyons’, in The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals and Realities, 1150–1300, ed. by Christopher Ryan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989), pp. 321–39 —— , ‘The Relations of Charles of Anjou with Nikephoros of Epiros’, Byzantinische Forschungen, 4 (1972), 170–94 Norden, Walter, Das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung bis zur Untergange des byzantinisches Reichs (1453) (Berlin: Behr, 1903) O’Callaghan, Joseph F., Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) Painter, Sidney, ‘The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 463–85 —— , The Scourge of the Clergy: Peter of Dreux, Duke of Brittany (New York: Octagon, 1969) Papayianni, Aphrodite, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the Empire of Nicaea and the Latins, 1204–1254’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 2000) Paris, Gaston, ‘Henri de Valenciennes’, Romania, 19 (1890), 63–72 Phillips, Jonathan, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–1187 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) —— , The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople (London: Penguin, 2005)

314

Bibliography

—— , ‘Odo of Deuil’s “De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem” as a Source for the Second Crusade’, in The Experience of Crusading, ed. by Marcus Bull and Norman Housley, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), i, 80–95 Pissard, Hippolyte, La Guerre Sainte en pays chrétien: essai sur l’origine et le développement de théories canoniques (Paris: Picard, 1912) Poumarède, Géraud, Pour en finir avec la croisade: mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turks aux xvie et xviie siècles (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004) Powell, James M., ‘Alexius III and Innocent III: A Crusade Plan that Failed’, in The Experience of Crusading, ed. by Marcus Bull and Norman Housley, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), i, 96–102 —— , Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1986) —— , ‘Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade’, Catholic Historical Review, 63 (1977), 521–36 Purcell, Maureen, Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre, 1244– 1291 (Leiden: Brill, 1975) Purkis, William J., Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and in Iberia, c. 1095–c. 1187 (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2008) Queller, Donald E., ‘Innocent III and the Crusader–Venetian Treaty of 1201’, Medievalia et Humanistica, 15 (1963), 31–34 —— , Thomas K. Compton, and Donald A. Campbell, ‘The Fourth Crusade: The Neglected Majority’, Speculum, 49 (1974), 441–65 —— , and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997) —— , and Susan J. Stratton, ‘A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 6 (1969), 235–77 Ranner, Lori Frey, ‘Mendicant Orders in the Principality of Achaia and the Latin Com­ munal Identity, 1204–1453’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 31 (2007), 156–69 Reuter, Timothy, ‘The “Non-Crusade” of 1149–1150’, in The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences, ed. by Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 150–63 Richard, Jean, ‘À propos de la mission de Baudouin de Hainaut: l’empire latin de Con­ stantinople et les Mongols’, Journal des Savants (1992), 115–21; repr. in Jean Richard, Francs et orientaux dans le monde des Croisades (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), no. xxii —— , ‘Byzance et les Mongols’, Byzantinische Forschungen, 25 (1999), 83–100; repr. in Jean Richard, Francs et orientaux dans le monde des Croisades (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), no. xxiv —— , The Crusades, c.  1071–c.  1291, trans. by Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) —— , ‘The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople: 1204– 1227’, in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. by Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton, and David Jacoby (London: Cass, 1989) (= Mediterranean Historical Review, 4 (1989)), pp. 45–62

Bibliography

315

—— , La Papauté et les missions d’Orient au Moyen Âge (xiiie–xve siècles) (Roma: École française de Rome, 1977) —— , Saint Louis: Crusader King of France, ed. by Simon Lloyd, trans. by Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Riley-Smith, Jonathan, The Crusades: A History, 2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2005) —— , The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading (London: Continuum, 1986) —— , The First Crusaders, 1095–1131 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) —— , What Were the Crusades?, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002) Rist, Rebecca, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198–1245 (London: Continuum, 2009) —— , ‘Papal Policy and the Albigensian Crusades: Continuity or Change?’, Crusades, 2 (2003), 99–108 Roberg, Burkhard, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche auf dem II. Konzil von Lyon (1274) (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1964) —— , Das zweite Konzil von Lyon (1274) (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1990) Rodríguez García, José Manuel, ‘Henry III (1216–1272), Alfonso X of Castile (1252– 1284) and the Crusading Plans of the Thirteenth Century (1245–1272)’, in England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216–1272), ed. by Björn Weiler and Ifor W. Rowlands (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 99–120 Röhricht, Reinhold, ‘Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis nach dem Heiligen Land’, Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, 26 (1886), 67–102 Roncaglia, Martiniano, ‘Frère Laurent de Portugal, O.F.M. et sa légation en Orient’, Bollettino della badia greca di Grottaferrata, n.s., 7 (1953), 33–44 Roscher, Helmut, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969) Rowe, John G., ‘Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 49 (1966–67), 165–202 Runciman, Steven, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’, in The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, ed. by Vladimir Goss (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 1986), pp. 15–22 —— , The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the xith and xiith Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955) —— , A History of the Crusades, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–54) —— , The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) Russell, Frederick H., The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) Savvides, A. G. C., Byzantium in the Near East: Its Relations with the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, a.d. c. 1192–1237 (Thessaloniki: Kentron Vyzantinon Ereunon, 1981) Sayers, Jane E., Innocent III, Leader of Europe, 1198–1216 (London: Longman, 1994) —— , Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216–1227) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)

316

Bibliography

Schabel, Chris, ‘Antelm the Nasty, First Latin Archbishop of Patras (1205–ca.  1241)’, in Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000–1500: Aspects of Cross-Cultural Communication, ed. by Alexander D. Beihammer, Maria G. Parani, and Christopher D. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 93–137 Schein, Sylvia, Fideles crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274–1314 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) Schieffer, Rudolf, ‘Zum lateinischen Byzanzbild vor 1204’, in The Fourth Crusade Revis­ ited, ed. by Pierantonio Piatti (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), pp. 18–31 Schmandt, Raymond H., ‘The Fourth Crusade and the Just-War Theory’, Catholic Histori­ cal Review, 61 (1975), 191–221 —— , ‘Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth Crusade’, Diakonia, 3 (1968), 284–99 Schmieder, Felicitas, ‘Enemy, Obstacle, Ally? The Greek in Western Crusade Proposals (1274–1311)’, in The Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways: Festschrift in Honour of Janos M. Bak, ed. by Balázs Nagy and Marcell Sebők (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), pp. 357–71 —— , ‘Two Unequal Brothers Split and Reunited: The Greeks in Latin Eschatological Per­ceptions of Politics and History before and after 1204’, in Quarta crociata: Venezia, Bisanzio, impero latino, ed. by Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner, 2 vols (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2006), ii, 633–51 Segl, Peter, ‘“Stabit Constantinopoli”. Inquisition und päpstliche Orientpolitik unter Gregor IX’, Deutsches Archiv für die Erforschung des Mittelalters, 32 (1976), 209–20 Setton, Kenneth M., The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1572, 4 vols (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976–84) Siberry, Elizabeth, Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) Simpson, Alicia J., ‘Before and after 1204: The Versions of Nicetas Choniates’ Historia’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 60 (2006), 189–221 Spence, Richard T., ‘Gregory IX’s Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Con­ stantinople: The Crusade for the Union of the Latin and Greek Churches’, Journal of Medieval History, 5 (1979), 163–76 —— , ‘Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1978) Stathakopoulos, Dionysis, ‘Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades: The Hospital of St Sampson of Constantinople’, Viator, 37 (2006), 255–73 Sternfeld, Richard, Der Kardinal Johan Gaëtan Orsini (Papst Nikolaus III), 1244–1277: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der römischen Kurie im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Ebering, 1905) —— , ‘Das Konklav von 1280 und die Wahl Martins IV (1281)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 31 (1910), 1–53 —— , Ludwigs des Heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis 1270 und die Politik Karls I. von Sizilien (Berlin: Ebering, 1896) Strayer, Joseph R., ‘The Crusades of Louis IX’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols, 2nd edn (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 487–518

Bibliography

317

—— , ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols, 2nd edn (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 343–75 Stolte, Bernard H., ‘Vatatzes versus Baldwin: The Case of the Sovereignty of Con­stan­ tinople’, in The Latin Empire: Some Contributions, ed. by Krijne Nelly Ciggaar and V. D. van Aalst (Hernen: Bredius, 1990), pp. 127–32 Sumption, Jonathan, The Albigensian Crusade (London: Faber and Faber, 1978) Swietek, Francis R., ‘Gunther of Pairis and the Historia Constantinopolitana’, Speculum, 53 (1978), 47–79 Thiriet, Freddy, La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge: le développement et l’exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien, xiie–xve siècles (Paris: De Boccard, 1959) Throop, Palmer Allan, Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1940) Tillmann, Helene, Pope Innocent III, trans. by Walter Sax (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980) Toubert, Pierre, ‘Les Déviations de la croisade au milieu du xiiie siècle: Alexandre IV contre Manfred’, Le Moyen Âge, 69 (1963), 391–99 Tsirpanlis, Constantine N., ‘The Involvement of Michael VIII Palaeologus in the Sicilian Vespers (1279–1282)’, Byzantina, 4 (1972), 299–329 Tsougarakis, Nikephoros, The Latin Religious Orders in Medieval Greece, 1204–1500, Medieval Church Studies, 18 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012) Tyerman, Christopher, England and the Crusades, 1095–1588 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) —— , God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2008) —— , ‘The Holy Land and the Crusades of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, in Crusade and Settlement, ed. by Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), pp. 105–12 —— , The Invention of the Crusades (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) —— , ‘Some English Evidence of Attitudes to Crusading in the Thirteenth Century’, in Thirteenth Century England, i: Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference 1985, ed. by Peter R. Cross and Simon D. Lloyd (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1986), pp. 168–74 Usseglio, Leopoldo, I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli xii e xiii, ed. by Carlo Patrucco, 2 vols (Milano: Miglietta, 1926) Van Cleve, Thomas Curtis, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 429–62 —— , The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) Van Moé, Émile-A., ‘L’Envoi de nonces à Constantinople par les papes Innocent V et Jean XXI (1276)’, Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire (École française de Rome), 47 (1930), 39–62

318

Bibliography

Van Tricht, Filip, ‘“La Gloire de l’empire”: l’idée impériale de Henri de Flandre-Hainaut, deux­ième empereur latin de Constantinople (1206–1216)’, Byzantion, 70 (2000), 211–43 —— , ‘La Politique étrangère de l’empire de Constantinople, de 1210 à 1216. Sa position en Méditerranée orientale: problèmes de chronologie et d’interprétation’, Le Moyen Âge, 107 (2001), 219–38, 409–38 —— , The Latin ‘Renovatio’ of Byzantium: The Empire of Constantinople (1204–1228), trans. by Peter Longbottom (Leiden : Brill, 2011) Villey, Michel, La Croisade: essai sur la formation d’une théorie juridique (Paris: Vrin, 1942) —— , ‘L’Idée de la croisade chez les juristes du Moyen-Âge’ in Relazioni del x Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, 7 vols (Firenze: Sansoni, 1955), iii, 565–94 Vries, Wilhelm de, ‘Innozenz III (1198–1216) und der christliche Osten’, Archivum historiae pontificiae, 3 (1965), 87–126 —— , ‘Innozenz IV (1243–1254) und der christliche Osten’, Ostkirchliche Studien, 12 (1963), 113–31 Weiler, Björn, ‘Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land, 1230– 1239’, in The Holy Land, Holy Lands and Christian History (Papers of the 1998 Summer Meeting and 1999 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society), ed. by Robert N. Swanson, Studies in Church History, 36 (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2000), pp. 192–206 —— , ‘The Negotium Terrae Sanctae in the Political Discourse of Latin Christendom, 1215–1311’, International History Review, 25 (2003), 1–36 Wellas, Michael B., Griechisches aus dem Umkreis Kaiser Friedrichs II. (München: Arbeo, 1983) Whalen, Brett Edward, ‘God’s Will or Not? Bohemond’s Campaign against the Byzantine Empire (1105–1108), in Crusades: Medieval Worlds in Conflict, ed. by Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus, and Vincent Ryan (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 111–25 Wolff, Robert Lee, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), ii: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (1969), pp. 187–233; repr. in Robert Lee Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976), no. i —— , ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans’, Traditio, 2 (1944), 213– 37; repr. in Robert Lee Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976), no. vii —— , ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople’, Speculum, 29 (1954), 45–84; repr. in Robert Lee Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976), no. v —— , ‘Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 8 (1954), 228–303; repr. in Robert Lee Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976), no. ix

Bibliography

319

—— , ‘Romania: The Latin Empire of Constantinople’, Speculum, 23 (1948), 1–34; repr. in Robert Lee Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976), no. ii —— , Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (London: Variorum, 1976) Wolter, Hans, and Henri Holstein, Lyon I et Lyon II, Histoire des conciles œcuméniques, 7 (Paris: Orante, 1966) Wright, Chris, ‘On the Margins of Christendom: The Impact of the Crusades on Byzan­ tium’, in The Crusades and the Near East: Cultural Histories, ed. by Conor Kostick (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 55–82 Zutshi, Patrick, ‘Innocent III and the Reform of the Papal Chancery’, in Innocenzo III: urbs et orbis. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma, 9–15 Settembre 1998), ed. by Andrea Sommerlechner, 2 vols (Roma: Società romana di storia patria, 2003), i, 84–101

Index

Note: Page numbers in italics refer to the appendices (maps, images, and tables).

Achaia, principality of (also Morea): xxxii, xxxiii, 70 n. 49, 78 n. 93, 172–73, 180, 182, 187–88, 191, 197, 198–99, 200, 202, 205–06, 214, 225, 229, 230, 237, 254, 266 Angevin overlordship over: xxxiii, 180–81, 205–06, 270 crusading for the defence of: xxvi n. 41, 59–60, 180, 182, 184, 187, 193, 198–99, 205–06, 230, 266, 281, 288, 290 funding for: 172–73, 191, 193, 199, 237 provides military help to Latin Empire: 62–63, 97, 101, 103, 127, 135, 138 n. 4, 142, 145, 168 funding for the defence of Latin Empire: 103, 113, 123, 138 n. 4, 144–45, 168 provides military help to Thessalonica: 71, 76, 254 see also Geoffrey I of Villehardouin; Geoffrey II of Villehardouin; Peloponnese; William I of Champlite; William II of Villehardouin Acre: 41, 128 fall of (1291): xviii, xiv, 270 tower reportedly built by Michael VIII at: 229 Ad subveniendum imperio, crusade bull: 85, 100 n. 61, 103–07, 112 n. 110, 133 Adam of Marsh: 266 Adam of Perseigne, Cistercian abbot: 55

Adolph I, archbishop of Cologne: 5 Adrianople, battle of: xxxiv, 21, 24, 25, 30, 36, 262 Aimery, king of Jerusalem: 21 Aix, archbishop of: 70, 289 Akropolites, George: 62, 126, 227 Albania: 229–30, 237 Alberic of Trois Fontaines, chronicler: xlii, 43, 62 n. 17, 75, 78, 126, 256, 266 Albert, papal notary and agent in France: 195 Alexander III, pope: 18 Alexander IV, pope: 136, 138, 144, 161, 164, 165, 172–75, 177–78, 179, 253, 278 Alexios I Komnenos: xxix Alexios III Angelos: 3, 6, 46 Alexios IV Angelos: 4, 8 Alfonso IX, king of León: 18 Alfonso X, king of Castile: 140, 158, 178, 182, 189, 199, 208, 263 Amedeo VI, count of Savoy: 272 Andravida: xxxii Andrew II, king of Hungary: 60, 62–64, 79, 80, 260 Andrew of Longjumeau: 160 Andronikos II Palaiologos: 233, 249 Antelm, archbishop of Patras: 14, 46–47 Antioch: 160 patriarchate of: 165, 171 Apokaukos, John, metropolitan of Naupaktos: 77 Aquileia, patriarch of: 70, 289

322 INDEX

Aragon: 183, 190, 199, 242, 244–45, 248, 269, 290; see also James I; Peter III Archipelago, duchy of: xxxii, xxxiii Arduis mens, decree of the First Council of Lyon: 141 n. 15, 142 n. 17, 143, 147–50, 169, 187, 206 Arezzo, bishop of: 70, 289 Arles: 70, 71 n. 54, 77 n. 85, 289 Arnaud Amaury, abbot of Cîteaux: 42, 256 Arnold of Lübeck, chronicler: 55 Arsenios Autoreianos, patriarch of Constantinople: 175 Arta: xxxiv Athens, duchy of: xxxi duke of: xxxiii, 76; see also Otto de la Roche Avlona (Vlorë), port on the Albanian coast: 194, 228, 241 Baldwin I, Latin emperor: xxxi, xxxiv, 13–14, 21, 26, 27, 32 n. 141, 33, 34, 35, 37, 41, 277 instigates crusade for the Latin Empire: 2–11, 15, 36, 43, 252 proposes Church Council in Constantinople: 6–7, 46 Baldwin II, Latin emperor: 36, 90, 99 n. 56, 100, 101, 106–07, 114, 127, 140, 145, 154, 165–66, 172, 198, 202, 204, 277 and Charles of Anjou: 204–08, 212, 215, 222, 223, 253 and Manfred of Sicily: 183, 186, 193–95, 197, 204 at the First Council of Lyon: 138, 147 calls for help from the West: 138, 140, 178, 181, 186, 190, 207–08, 252 trip to Europe (1243–48): 138, 140, 147, 155–56, 157–58, 252 participates in crusading for Constan­ tinople: 103, 105, 112, 184–85 leads crusade to Constantinople (1238–40): 85, 86, 103, 120–26, 133, 138–39, 160, 252, 261–62, 280 Bardanes, George, metropolitan of Corfu: 62 Bartolomeo of Neocastro, chronicler: xlii, 245 Beatrice of Anjou, daughter of Charles of

Anjou: 205, 207 Béla IV, king of Hungary: 108, 130–31, 132, 138, 159, 176, 200, 260, 265 and crusade against John Asen: 85, 103, 105, 113–14, 119–20, 281 and crusade for the Latin Empire: 99–100, 108, 116, 132, 157, 176, 256, 260, 265 asks for help against the Mongols: 144, 157, 159, 176 Benedict XI, pope: 269 Benedict, cardinal priest of St Susanna: 15 n. 59, 37 Benevento: 222 battle of: 201, 204 Berard, papal nuncio: 185 n. 14 Berat, town in Albania: 237 Bernard, abbot of Montecassino: 223–24 Bernard of Clairvaux: xxx Bernard of Pavia, canonist: 17 Bertrandon de la Broquière: 273 Besançon, archbishop of: 70, 115, 122 n. 165, 289 Blanche of Castile, queen of France: 71, 74, 106 n. 85, 118–19, 120, 140 Bohemond I, prince of Taranto and Antioch: xxix–xxx Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and Tripoli: 21 Boniface I, marquis of Montferrat: xxxi, 22–23, 31, 32–33, 34, 41, 68, 262, 277 Boniface II, marquis of Montferrat: 88, 277 Boniface IX, pope: 272 Bordeaux, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 112, 121, 122 n. 165, 199, 289 Boril, tsar of Bulgaria: 29, 38, 39–40 Bosnia: 100, 104, 132 n. 201 Boucicaut, marshal of France: 272, 273 Bourges, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 26 n. 112, 115, 121, 122 n. 165, 155 n. 72, 289 Bulgaria, Bulgarians: xxxiv–xxxv, xxxvi, 11, 27, 29, 30, 31, 38–40, 114, 119, 125, 132 n. 201, 139–40, 160, 170, 214, 241, 289; see also Boril; John Asen; Kalojan Butrint, town on the Albanian coast: 194 Calega Panza: 258 Caltabellotta, peace of: xxxvii, 269 Cambrai, bishop of: 7 n. 24, 103, 106, 115, 122 n. 165, 129 n. 191, 289

INDEX Canterbury, archbishop of: 14, 31, 121, 122 n. 165, 153, Castile: 18, 230; see also crusading in Frankish Greece, and Spain Catalans: xxxvii, 249, 269 Catherine of Courtenay, empress of Constantinople: 269 Catherine of Valois, empress of Constantinople: 269–70 Celestine III, pope: 18, 58 Celestine IV, pope: 139, 140 n. 12, 278 Charles I (Charles of Anjou), king of Sicily: 179, 183, 193, 195, 198, 201–49, 277 and Baldwin II: 204–08, 212, 215, 222, 223, 253 and crusading against Byzantium: xx, xxxvii, xxxviii, 180–82, 189, 195, 201–10, 213–25, 230–31, 233–37, 238–48, 253–54, 256–57, 258, 263, 281 crusade mechanisms at his disposal: xxv–xxvi, 181, 201, 202–03, 207, 209–10, 214, 242–48, 253, 256 crusade rhetoric: 205–06, 214–15, 230, 241, 243–45, 256, 263 diplomatic contacts: 214–15 military preparations: 217, 229–30, 237, 241 operations: 237–38, 241–42 and Gregory X: 217–25, 230, 253 and Louis IX’s crusade to Tunis (1270): 215–17 and Martin IV: 238–248, 253–54 and the principality of Achaia see Achaia, Angevin overlordship over Charles II, king of Naples: 269 Charles of Valois: xxxvii, 248–49, 269–70 Charles Robert (Carobert), king of Hungary: 270 Chios: 205 Chomatianos, Demetrios, archbishop of Ochrid: 61 n. 15, 91 Choniates, Niketas: 29 Church Union: xxxviii, 44, 6, 45–51, 93–99, 108, 117, 130–31, 135, 138, 159–72, 174–75, 177–78, 180, 181–82, 196–200, 201, 210–14, 216, 217–37, 238–41, 248, 253–54, 262–63, 266–67, 272, 281

323

and crusading in Frankish Greece: xxxviii, 45–51, 97–99, 136, 138, 160, 167–69, 180, 182, 198–200, 213, 223–26, 230–31, 233–38, 240–41, 253–54, 262–63 focus of scholarship on: xviii, xx–xxi, xxii negotiations of 1213–14 (Innocent III): 48–59, 95 of 1232–34 (Gregory IX): 84, 93–96, 138, 161 of 1249–54 (Innocent IV): 96, 135–36, 138, 159–67, 253 of 1256 (Alexander IV): 136, 161, 165, 174–75 of 1262–64 (Urban IV): 196–98, 199–200 of 1267–68 (Clement IV): 210–13 of 1271–74 (Gregory X): 166–67, 217–23, 253 pronounced at the Second Council of Lyon (1274): 181, 218, 223–26, 253 efforts to implement it: 231–37 annulled by Martin IV: 181, 238–41, 254, 281 reactions to: 212, 226, 236–37, 267, 272 see also councils, for Church Union Clement IV, pope: xli n. 74, 181, 201–13, 220–21, 222, 228, 232, 239, 247–48, 253, 278, 281 Clement V, pope: xxvi n. 41, 248, 269–70 Coloman, duke of Slavonia: 100, 122 Conon of Béthune, bailli of the Latin Empire: 62 Conrad, bishop of Halberstadt: 55 Conrad IV, king of Germany: 123, 164 Conrad of Montferrat: 41 Conradin: 182, 209, 213, 245 Constance (Anna) of Hohenstaufen, daughter of Frederick II: 89, 146 Constantine, bishop of Orvieto: 174–75 Constantinople: xv, xxviii–xxix, xxxi, xxxii–xxxiii, 6, 19, 44, 48–49, 60, 62, 69, 76, 87, 192, 205, 219, 226, 230, 232, 238, 272–73 besieged by Vatatzes and Asen: xxxvii, 97, 99, 101 Byzantine recovery of (1261): xviii, xxxiv, xxxvii, 133, 136, 178, 179–80, 182–83, 206, 253

324 INDEX

Church Union and sovereignty over: xxi–xxii, 96, 138, 161, 163, 164–67, 233–34 conquest of (1204): xvi, xx, xxiii, xxxiv, 1–5, 9, 12–13, 15, 21–22, 32–35, 42–43, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 109–10, 251, 265 atrocities during the sack: 22, 33–34, 50, 110, 268 crusading for the defence of: xvi, xxvi–xxvii, xxxv, xxxvii, 1, 3–5, 8, 9–11, 15, 20–30, 43, 51–56, 67–68, 80, 83, 84–85, 86, 90–93, 97–98, 99–133, 135–36, 137, 138, 141–60, 166–69, 172–73, 176–78, 251–53, 254 crusading for the reconquest of: 179, 180–200, 201, 204–17, 218, 230, 234–36, 238, 242–49, 253–54, 269–70; see also Baldwin II; Charles of Anjou; Urban IV patriarchate of: xxxii, 6, 32, 48, 49 n. 202, 50, 78 n. 93, 137, 168, 173, 176, 181, 186–87, 233, 252, 263, 278 Greek rights over: 96, 161, 164–65, 167 Venetian control over: 13–14, 26, 31 see also (Greek patriarchs): Arsenios Autoreianos; John X Kamateros; John XI Bekkos; Joseph; Nicaea, Byzantine patriarchate at see also (Latin patriarchs): Gervase of Heracleia; Matthew of Jesolo; Nicholas of Castro Arquato; Pantaleone Giustiniani; Simon of Tyre; Thomas Morosini Corfu: xxxii, 62, 194, 202–04 Coron: xxxii, 199 councils: 46, 153, 165, 175, 185 n. 14, 190 Ferrara/Florence (1438–39): 164, 272 for Church Union: 6, 46, 50, 163, 171, 211; see also councils of Lyon II and Ferrara/Florence anti-unionist council at Neopatras (1277): 236–37 Lateran III (1179): 18 Lateran IV (1215): xxxvi, 20, 48, 49–50, 52–53, 56, 58–59, 60, 69 n. 45, 73, 104, 105, 114, 254 Lyon I (1245): xxxvii, 135–36, 137, 138, 141, 143, 146–59, 161, 166,

168 n. 119, 169, 171, 175–77, 180, 185, 187, 189, 206, 210, 253, 254, 255, 265, 281, 287, 289 Lyon II (1274): xviii, xxv, 163, 166, 181, 217–231, 238, 246, 253; see also Church Union Pisa (1135): 17 Crete: xxxi, xxxii, 94 crusades I (First): xxiii, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, 12, 16, 41, 54 II (Second): xxviii, xxx, 41, 54 III (Third): xxviii, 1, 41, 54, 58 IV (Fourth): xxii–xxiv, xxix, xxxi, xxxvi, 1–5, 6, 8–9, 24, 25, 30, 35, 46, 55, 110, 184, 251, 255, 257, 274; see also Constantinople, conquest of V (Fifth): 46, 52–53, 58–59, 60, 64, 66, 67–68, 69, 77, 79, 80, 83, 105, 156, 252, 260 against Christians: xvii, xix, xxv–xxvi, xxxvi, 15–20, 54, 84, 124, 162, 257–58; see also crusades, Political Crusades Albigensian: xvii, xix, 19, 31, 42, 43, 52, 54, 58 n. 3, 67–68, 70–71, 77–78, 81, 104, 115, 259–60, 261, 268 Baltic: xvii, xviii, xix, xxxviii, 19, 42, 81, 83–84, 101, 158, 174, 260, 261, 269, 274 Barons’ Crusade: xxvi, 84–86, 91 n. 29, 99, 100, 103, 106–07; see also Thibaut IV alleged diversion towards Constantinople: 86, 106–07 in Iberia: xvii, xix, 42, 53, 54, 83, 174, 260–61, 274 of Frederick II: 79, 80, 87, 90 of Louis IX to Damietta: 137, 144, 151, 157, 159 to Tunis: 209, 212, 215–17, 219 Political Crusades: xix, 18, 54 against Frederick II: 84, 88 n. 16, 104, 118, 126–27, 131, 143–44, 157, 162 against Manfred: 174, 193, 239, 245, 247, 256 against Markward of Anweiler: 18–19, 54, 88 n. 16

INDEX crusading in Frankish Greece and England: 85, 102, 111–12, 115, 120–21, 122, 124, 132, 138, 140, 149 n. 45, 150–53, 154, 185, 190, 200, 207, 209–10, 254, 259, 289; see also Richard of Cornwall and France: xxxviii, 8, 10–11, 24, 26, 28–29, 64–66, 70–71, 74, 77 n. 85, 85, 99–107, 111–13, 115–16, 120–25, 127–29, 132, 138–39, 140, 151, 153–55, 157, 177, 181, 183–85, 187–88, 189–90, 207, 209, 254, 259–60, 269–70, 289–90; see also Louis IX and Germany: 9 n. 29, 24, 122–23, 151, 152, 200, 209–10, 266; see also Frederick II and Hungary: xxxviii, 64, 74, 85, 92–93, 97, 99–101, 102–05, 107–08, 113–14, 119–20, 126 n. 179, 127–28, 132, 139, 157, 159, 176–77, 184, 192, 200, 207, 214, 245–46, 254, 259–60, 270, 280–81, 289; see also Andrew II; Béla IV and Italy: 24, 29, 68, 70, 77, 124, 153, 181, 200, 202, 209, 213, 258, 260, 262; see also Manfred; Sicily; Venice; William VI of Montferrat and Poland: 149 n. 45, 150–52, 153, 183, 200, 260, 289–90 and Portugal: 150–52, 153 and Spain: 145, 181, 207–08, 260, 263 Aragon: 156, 183, 190, 199, 208, 263, 290; see also James I Castile (or Castile-León): 138–39, 157–58, 178, 184–85, 188, 189–90, 191, 199, 204, 208, 263; see also Alfonso X; Enrique crusade bulls and decrees see Ad subveniendum imperio; Arduis mens; Inter cetera (or alia) desiderabilia; Ut Israelem veteris crusade mechanisms: xvi, xvii, xxx, xxxvi, 1–2, 3, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 39 n. 165, 54, 57–58, 68, 72, 80, 82, 83, 138, 180–81, 186, 195, 201, 207, 213, 214, 217, 242 n. 219, 248, 253, 254–55, 264, 268, 280–81 crusader privileges (protection and

325

immunities): 70, 90, 102, 105, 107, 114, 115, 119, 122, 124, 126 n. 179, 128, 133, 148, 150, 184, 198, 254, 280–81 funding: xxvi, xlii, 7, 27, 35 n. 153, 68, 73–74, 76, 81–82, 102–03, 111, 113, 115–16, 120–21, 122, 123, 124, 126 n. 179, 127, 128–29, 130, 132–33, 135–36, 137, 138 n. 4, 142, 144–46, 147–55, 158, 159, 168, 172–73, 177, 182, 184–85, 189–92, 198, 199, 201, 207, 209, 237, 245–47, 251–52, 253, 254–55, 257, 268, 280–81, 283–90 benefices: 111, 147–48, 151, 189, 254 confiscation of usurious proceeds: 111, 116, 122, 150 donations and legacies: 102, 111, 116, 122, 127, 148, 150, 252, 254, 281, 283 tithes (crusade taxation): 68, 73–74, 81–82, 102, 111, 113, 120–21, 122–23, 124, 132–33, 144–46, 148, 152–55, 173, 181, 207, 237, 245–46, 252, 254, 269–70, 280–81, 283 vow redemptions see crusading in Frankish Greece, vow redemption see also indulgences, to those making financial contributions indulgences: xxv–xxvi, 60, 254–55, 256, 268, 269–70, 280–81 after Lyon I (1245–47): 150, 151, 171 against Asen: 114, 119 for Charles of Anjou: 181, 201, 202–03, 207, 209, 242, 246 n. 234, 248 for Constantinople (1235–40): 100, 101, 102, 105, 107, 113, 115, 122, 128, 133, 137 for freeing Emperor Peter: 65 for John of Brienne’s men: 90 for recovering Constantinople (1262–64): 184, 198–99, 248 for stabilizing the conquest: 5, 8–11, 15, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36–37, 39, 54–55, 252, 268 for Thessalonica: 69, 72, 74, 76, 81 to audiences of crusade sermons: 108, 112, 133, 184

326 INDEX

to mendicants preaching the cross: 151 to those making financial contributions: 102, 107, 113, 115, 148 preaching: xxii, xxxvi, 145, 251, 254–55, 256, 260, 262, 265, 268, 280–81, 283–90 after Lyon I (1245–47): 148–49, 150–52, 155–56, 158, 168 against Asen: 113–14, 119 for Charles of Anjou: 181, 201, 207, 209, 242, 248 for Constantinople (1235–1240): 101, 108, 111, 112, 115, 126 n. 179, 127–28 for freeing Emperor Peter: 64–65, 66, 82 for recovering Constantinople (1262–64): 183, 184, 186, 194, 198, 248 for stabilizing the conquest: 3, 5, 7, 24, 28 for Thessalonica: 70–71, 76, 82 reactions and criticism against: 32–34, 53, 77–78, 85, 110–11, 121, 124–25, 128, 129, 132–33, 152–55, 156–57, 162, 177, 189–92, 198, 210, 224–25, 245, 257–59, 267 rhetoric and legitimization: xxxv–xxxvi, 3–5, 11, 19, 20–24, 30, 34–36, 42–44, 53–54, 58, 59–60, 63–64, 74–75, 81, 99–100, 103–05, 106, 113–14, 116–17, 121, 129, 141–43, 173, 181, 183–84, 187–89, 201–02, 205–06, 209, 243–44, 255–56, 263–67 healing the schism: xxi, xxxv–xxxvi, 3–4, 11, 24, 34, 37, 45, 53–54, 58, 96, 103–04, 121, 142, 148, 181, 183, 187, 206, 218, 243, 255, 262–63 help to the Holy Land: xxi, xxxv, 3, 11, 19, 20–24, 30, 34, 36, 43, 53–54, 58, 59–60, 63–64, 74–75, 81, 99–100, 103–05, 106, 116, 121, 129, 141–42, 148, 173, 181, 184, 187, 205–06, 255 heresy: 85, 96, 103–05, 106, 113–14, 116–17, 121, 255 Romania and other crusading fronts: 188–89, 195, 201–02, 247, 256 vow commutation: xxvi, 26–27, 65–66, 68, 72–73, 80, 82, 84 n. 4, 85, 86, 92, 99–101, 105, 106–07, 112, 115,

119, 121, 122–23, 124–25, 127–28, 132–33, 156, 159, 254, 257, 280, 289 vow redemption: 92, 102, 105–06, 107, 111, 112, 116, 121, 122 nn. 165–66, 124, 128–29, 132–33, 145, 254, 257, 280, 283 n. 2 see also Achaia; Constantinople; Thessalonica Cyprus: 59, 160, 170, 171, 270 Damietta: 43, 67, 69, 77, 78, 80 Dandolo see Enrico Dandolo; Giovanni Dandolo Demetrius, king of Thessalonica: 68, 77 n. 85, 78, 88, 277 Dominic of Aragon, missionary: 160 Dominicans see orders, religious Dublin, archbishop of: 122 n. 165 Durazzo: 61, 62, 63, 67 n. 35, 194, 238 Edward I, king of England: 219, 244 Embrun, archbishop of: 70, 289 England: xlii, 14, 31, 59, 64, 94 n. 38, 98 n. 54, 147, 219; see also crusading in Frankish Greece, and England Enrico Dandolo, doge of Venice: 4 n. 10, 6 n. 17, 14, 33 n. 143 Enrique, infante of Castile: 204, 207 n. 93, 208 Epiros: xxxiv, 29, 48, 61–62, 68, 88, 91–92, 131, 278 Angevin bridgeheads in: 214, 237 crusading against: xxxiv; see also Thessa­ lonica, crusade for the defence of ecclesiastical dispute with Nicaea: 61 n. 15, 95 Manfred’s possessions in: 194, 202, 205, 208 see also Michael I Doukas; Michael II Doukas; Nikephoros Doukas; Theodore Doukas Erard II, lord of Chacenay: 99 n. 56, 100 Euboea see Negroponte Eudes of Châteauroux, cardinal and papal legate: 154 Eugenius III, pope: xxx Eulogia Palaiologina, sister of Michael VIII: 226

INDEX excommunication: 102, 162, 193, 226, 237 for fraud in collecting crusade subsidies: 151, 153 n. 65 for non-fulfilment of crusade vows: 97, 117 of army of the Fourth Crusade: 3–4, 32 n. 132 of Frederick II: 85, 87, 125, 137, 256 of Latins serving in Greek armies: 40, 52, 67, 69, 145, 147, 168 of Michael VIII: 239–41, 242, 243, 281 over Church property in Romania: 49, 63, 70 Felipe, infante of Castile: 199 Ferrante Sancho, illegitimate son of James I of Aragon: 208 filioque: 50, 163–65, 171, 232 Flanders: xlii, 7, 41 and crusading for Frankish Greece: 7, 8, 26, 28–29, 260, 261 Florence: 70, 289 Council of: 164, 272 France: xlii, 59, 98 n. 54, 201, 219, 239, 242; see also crusades, Albigensian; crusading in Frankish Greece, and France Franciscans see orders, religious Frederick I Barbarossa, Holy Roman emperor: 28, 54 Frederick II Hohenstaufen, Holy Roman emperor: xxxviii, xli, 59, 68, 73, 91 n. 29, 98, 277 and Baldwin II: 138, 140, 147 and the Frankish states in Greece: 78, 85, 88–90, 98, 116–18, 125, 147 conflict with the papacy: 85, 87–90, 118, 125, 126–27, 133, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 146–47, 157, 166, 173–74; see also crusades, Political Crusades; excommunication, of Frederick II crusade to the Holy Land: 79, 80, 87, 90 proposes crusade for the Latin Empire: 161–62, 177, 256–57, 263, 265 relations with the Greeks: 89, 118, 146, 161–63 Frederick III, king of Sicily: 270 Fulk of Villaret, Hospitaller Grand Master: 270–71 Gabalas, Leo, ruler of Rhodes: 94 Gallipoli: 97

327

Genoa: 27, 70, 182, 188, 200, 214–15, 219, 289 alliance with Michael VIII: 192–93, 215, 238 Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, prince of Achaia: xxxii–xxxiii, 48 n. 197, 60, 62–63, 70, 71, 277 Geoffrey II of Villehardouin, prince of Achaia: 97, 101, 103, 118, 127, 141, 142, 145, 277 Geoffrey of Villehardouin, chronicler: xlii, 28 n. 121, 35, 38, 41 Germanos II, patriarch at Nicaea: 61 n. 15, 62, 84, 94, 95 Germanos III, patriarch of Constantinople: 227 Germany: 13, 31, 83, 85, 98 n. 54, 104, 125, 219; see also crusading in Frankish Greece, and Germany Gervase of Heracleia, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 14, 59, 63, 278 Gesta Innocentii III: xlii, 33, 51 Ghibellines: 174, 182, 200, 230 Giovanni Dandolo, doge of Venice: 241 Godfrey, bishop of Langres: xxviii Godfrey, brother of Baldwin I and Henry of Flanders: 27, 37 Gratian, canonist: 16–17 Gregory IX: xxvi, xxxvii, 82, 83–133, 135, 136–38, 139, 156, 162, 169, 171, 177, 180, 187, 210, 253, 254–55, 257, 278, 280–81, 286, 289 and innovations in crusading in Frankish Greece: 83–85, 102–06, 253–55 contact with John Vatatzes: 94–95, 108–111, 130–31 introduces the argument of heresy in Romania: 85, 96, 103–05, 255 see also crusades, Barons’ Crusade; Frederick II, conflict with the papacy; John Asen, crusade against Gregory X, pope: 181, 182, 217–31, 232, 234, 238, 244, 246, 253, 262, 278 and Charles of Anjou: 218, 220–24, 234, 244, 246 de-legitimizes crusading in Romania: 218, 223–25, 231, 238, 253 see also councils, Lyon II Guilhem Figueira: xlii, 77–78, 257–58

328 INDEX

Guy Pallavicino, marquis of Bodonitsa: 69 Györ (Hungary), bishop of: 92–93, 132, 289 Hadrian V, pope: 231 n. 173, 278 Helena Doukaina, daughter of Michael II of Epiros: 194 n. 52, 204 Henry II, count of Bar-le-Duc: 107, 116, 124 Henry III, king of England: 115, 120–21, 126, 140, 190, 200, 259 Henry VI, Holy Roman emperor: 18 Henry of Hainault (or of Flanders), Latin emperor: xxxii–xxxiii, 7–8, 23–30, 31, 32 nn. 140–41, 33, 35, 36–41, 43, 45 n. 183, 49, 51–52, 57, 59, 60, 61, 68, 252, 261, 277 calls for a crusade for the Latin Empire: 7–8, 24, 36–37, 40, 43, 252 Henry of Valenciennes, chronicler: xlii, 30, 38–39, 51 heresy: xxxv n. 63, xvii, xxii, 16–18, 19–20, 46–47, 54, 83–84, 100, 104, 114, 117, 264, 268–69, 281 as legitimization for crusading in Romania: 85, 96, 103–05, 106, 113–14, 116–17, 121, 255; see also John Asen, crusade against Greeks as heretics: xxxv, 117, 169, 170 n. 126, 162, 239–40, 243, 271, 273 heretics sent to serve in Constantinople: 129–30, 145 see also crusades, Albigensian Holobolos, Manuel, court orator: 166, 226 Holy Land: passim see crusades (I, II, III, V, Barons’, of Frederick II, of Louis IX); Jerusalem and Romania see crusading in Frankish Greece, rhetoric and legitimization; Jerusalem, and Constantinople; Michael VIII, offers help to the Holy Land Honorius III, pope: xl nn. 71–72, 56, 57–82, 83, 87, 95, 96, 114, 145, 156, 252–53, 254, 255, 257, 264, 278, 280, 285, 289 crusading language against the Greeks: xxvi, 58, 74–75, 81, 255, 264 introduces crusade taxation in Romania: 68, 70, 73–74, 82, 254

prioritizes the Holy Land: 58–59, 60–61, 65–68, 79–80, 252 see also Peter of Courtenay, crusade for the liberation of; Thessalonica, crusade for the defence of Hostiensis, canonist: 16 Hubert II, count of Biandrate: 69, 71, 74, 280 Hugh IV, count of St Pol: 4 n. 10, 9 n. 29, 41 Hugh IV, duke of Burgundy: 198–99, 207 Hugh le Rousseau de Sully: 237 Hugh of Conches: 230 Hugo Atratus (Hugh of Evesham), cardinal: 244 Humbert V, lord of Beaujeu: 115–16, 122, 125 Humbert of Romans: 225 Hungary: xli, 69, 125, 131; see also crusading in Frankish Greece, and Hungary Innocent III, pope: xxxvi, xxxix, xl n. 72, 1–56, 57, 58, 70 n. 49, 79, 82, 83, 84 n. 4, 88 n. 16, 95, 96, 105, 108 n. 94, 156, 183–84, 218, 252, 255, 262, 268–69, 278, 280, 284, 289 and the Greek Church: 4, 6, 11, 12, 14–15, 45–51, 55, 95, 218 attitude towards the Fourth Crusade and the conquest of Constantinople: 2–3, 4, 8–10, 12–15, 21–23, 32–34, 47, 54, 57, 183–84 crusade calls for Frankish Greece: 1, 9–11, 15, 20–21, 24–31, 51–53, 54–55, 56, 57, 252, 255, 268–69, 280, 284, 289 motives for introducing crusading in Frankish Greece: 12–20, 54–56, 252 see also Gesta Innocentii III Innocent IV, pope: xxv, 96, 135–72, 173, 174, 175–77, 187, 210, 218, 253, 254, 255, 278, 281, 287, 289–90 and Church Union: 136, 138, 159–172, 174, 177, 218, 253 attitude towards the Greeks: 169–72 crusade calls for Frankish Greece: 135–36, 137, 144–52, 154–56, 158–59,

INDEX 167–69, 171, 177, 210, 253, 254, 281, 287, 289–90; see also councils, Lyon I reactions to: 152–55, 156–57, 210 rhetoric and ideology: 135–37, 141–43, 171–72, 175–76, 187, 255, 256 n. 3 Innocent V, pope: 181, 219, 231–37, 278 threat of crusade against Byzantium: 233–34 Inter cetera (or alia) desiderabilia, crusade bull: 142 n. 17, 149–52, 169 Isaac II Angelos, Byzantine emperor: xxviii Isabella I, queen of Jerusalem: 21 Isabella II (of Brienne), queen of Jerusalem: 89 Isabella of Villehardouin, daughter of William II: 205, 207 Jacopo Tiepolo, doge of Venice: 92, 97, 101 Jaffa, treaty of (1229): 87, 91, 99 James I, king of Aragon: 156, 190, 194, 207 n. 93, 208, 227, 263 James of Vitry, cardinal and theologian: 17, 42, 256 Jerome, St: 17 Jerome of Ascoli, Franciscan minister general: 232 Jerusalem: 1, 17, 18, 21, 41, 42, 52 n. 217, 53, 58, 87, 89, 160, 161, 219 and Constantinople: 19, 21, 23, 33–34, 51, 54–56, 57, 60, 65–66, 80, 90–91, 92–93 captured by the Khorezmian Turks (1244): 144, 148 Joachim of Fiore: 13, 266 n. 28 John II, count of Soissons: 115–16 John III Vatatzes, emperor at Nicaea: xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvii, 71, 78, 84, 89, 92–118, 125–26, 129–31, 136, 138, 139–40, 146, 159–70, 174, 196, 227, 253, 260, 263, 278, 280 and Church Union negotiations: 94–95, 129–30, 136, 138, 159, 160–67, 174, 196, 227, 263 and Frederick II: 118, 140, 161–62 attacks Epiros: 109, 131, 140, 160 attacks the Latin Empire: xxxvii, 93, 97, 99, 101, 108, 125–26, 160 crusading against: 92, 99, 104–05, 108–11, 114–15, 117, 118, 131, 146, 168–69, 253, 280

329

defeats the Latins at Poimanenon: 71, 78 described as ‘enemy of God and Church’: 104, 115, 131 letter to Gregory IX: xli n. 74, 109–11, 267 marries Frederick’s daughter, Constance: 89, 146 truce with the Latin Empire: 131, 140 John IV Lascaris, emperor at Nicaea (minor): 278 John X Kamateros, patriarch of Constantinople: xxxiv, 6, 50 John XI Bekkos, patriarch of Constantinople: 233, 237 John XXI, pope: 181, 231–37, 278 John XXII, pope: 270 John, king of England: 14, 31, 59 John Asen, tsar of Bulgaria: xxxiv, xxxvii, 91–92, 93, 94–95, 99, 101–02, 111, 125, 131, 139, 253, 260 alliance with Vatatzes: xxxiv, 84, 97, 102, 107–08, 113 crusade against (1238): 85, 103, 105, 113–15, 119–20, 281 professes obedience to the papacy: 94–95, 107–08 John Balistar, Dominican preacher: 149 John Bliaud, knight: 25, 29 John Colonna, cardinal and papal legate: 58, 61–68, 252, 280, 289 John of Béthune: 89, 118 John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem and Latin emperor: 86, 89–93, 94, 97, 99 n. 56, 100, 101, 109–10, 117, 277 election as emperor of Constantinople: 84, 89–90 leads crusaders for the Latin Empire: 76 n. 84, 90–92, 261, 280, 289 John of Civitella, papal legate in Hungary: 131 John of Dreux (de Braine), count of Mâcon: 108 John of Ibelin, author of the Assizes of Jerusalem: 52 n. 217 John of Parma, minister general of the Fran­ ciscans: 96 n. 45, 135, 163, 164, 170; see also Innocent IV, and Church Union John Parastron, Franciscan, ambassador of Michael VIII: 219 John the Bastard, ruler of Thessaly: 236–37, 241

330 INDEX

Joseph I Galesiotes, patriarch of Constantinople: 220, 226 Josseran, lord of Brancion: 122 n. 166, 125 Kai-Khusrau II, Seljuk sultan: 139 Kaliman, tsar of Bulgaria: 139 Kalojan, tsar of Bulgaria: xxxiv, 21, 24, 38 and crusading for the Latin Empire: 26, 33, 36–37 Khorezmian Turks: 144, 148 Kinnamos, John: 111 Klokotnitsa, battle of: 91, 94–95 Komnene, Anna: 12 n. 42, 111 Kos: 205 Köse-Dagh, battle of: xxxv, 139, 140 Kydones, Demetrios: 271 Lampsacus, town on the Hellespont: 97 Languedoc: xlii, 43, 81, 115, 274 Latin Empire see Constantinople; see also names of individual Latin emperors (list at 277) Lawrence of Portugal, papal legate: 160, 171 Le Puy, bishop of: 70, 289 Lemnos: xxxi Leo II, king of Cilician Armenia: 21 Leo, metropolitan of Heraclea: 239 Leonard, papal nuncio: 185 n. 14 Lesbos: xxxi, 205 Lombard League: 85, 118, 147 Lombard War (for Thessalonica, 1207–09): xxxii–xxxiii, 29, 30, 31, 38, 39, 68 Lombardy: 77, 83, 117, 150–51, 152, 154, 203 Lorenzo Tiepolo, doge of Venice: 214–15 Louis VII, king of France: xxx Louis VIII, king of France: 70, 71 Louis IX, king of France: 106 n. 85, 125, 194, 195, 217 and help to the Latin Empire: 120–21, 140, 185, 187–88, 200, 209, 256 and the Crown of Thorns: 36, 123 between Michael Palaiologos and Charles of Anjou: 214, 215–16, 227 crusade to Damietta: 137, 144, 151, 157, 159 crusade to Tunis: 209, 212, 215–17, 219 Louis of Blois: 41 Lucca, bishop of: 79, 289

Luni, bishop of: 70, 289 Lyon: 10 n. 36, 70, 111 n. 108, 115, 116, 121, 122 nn. 65–66, 168 n. 119, 289 see also councils, Lyon I and Lyon II Maio Orsini, count of Cephalonia and Zakynthos: 113 Makri, town in Thrace: 31, 73 n. 67, 76 n. 81 Manfred, ruler of Sicily: xxxviii, 162 n. 97, 164, 178, 182, 188, 198, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 209 and help to the Latin Empire: 182–83, 186, 189, 193–95, 197, 202, 204, 207, 256–57 crusade against: 174, 193, 239, 245, 247, 256 Manuel II, patriarch at Nicaea: 163, 164, 167 Manuel II Palaiologos, Byzantine emperor: 272 Manuel Doukas, ‘emperor’ at Thessalonica: 89, 92, 94–95 Marco I Sanudo, duke of the Archipelago: xxxii Margarita (of Hungary), wife of Isaac II and of Boniface of Montferrat: 68–69 Maria (Laskarina), queen of Hungary: 159 Maria (Mary) of Brienne, wife of Baldwin II: 41, 90, 138–39, 178 Marino Sanudo Torcello: xlii, 229, 240 Markward of Anweiler: 18–19, 54, 88 n. 16 Marseille: 108, 219 Martin IV, pope: 181, 238–48, 254, 256, 262, 278 as Simon of Brie, cardinal priest of St Cecilia: 201, 239 excommunicates Michael VIII: 239–41, 243, 281 supports Angevin plans in Romania: 181, 182, 240, 248, 253, 281 and Charles of Anjou’s ‘crusade’: 181, 182, 242–48, 253 Martino da Canale, chronicler: xlii, 194 Matthew of Jesolo, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 67, 278 Matthew Paris, chronicler: xlii, 94 n. 38, 98 n. 53, 126 n. 178, 151, 266 Mesarites, John: 46 Mesarites, Nicholas, metropolitan of Ephesus: 46, 48

INDEX Metochites, George, Byzantine envoy to the papacy: xli, 228–29, 232 Michael I Doukas, ruler of Epiros: xxxiv, 29, 40, 52, 61, 278 defeats crusading army: 29 Michael II Doukas, ruler of Epiros: 89, 92, 168, 178, 202, 204, 278 Michael VIII Palaiologos, Byzantine emperor: xxvii, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvii, 166–67, 175, 178, 179–80, 181–82, 183, 192, 194, 196–200, 205–06, 210–48, 253, 263, 266–67, 278, 281 alliance with Genoa: 192–93, 215, 238 and Church Union: 166–67, 175, 181–82, 253, 263, 266–67 annulment by Martin IV: 239–41 implementation and reactions: 226–27, 231–37 negotiations with Clement IV: 210–13 negotiations with Gregory X: 218, 219–24 negotiations with Louis IX and the cardinals: 214, 216 negotiations with Urban IV: 196–200 crusade and crusading rhetoric against: 183, 205–06, 215, 239, 242–44 defeats enemy coalition at Pelagonia: xxxii, 178, 194 excommunicated: 239–41, 242, 243, 281 offers help for the Holy Land: 181, 212, 227–29 reclaims Constantinople: xxxiv, 178, 181–82 Michael Autoreianos, patriarch at Nicaea: 51 Milan: 70, 150 n. 48, 168 n. 119, 289 Modon: xxxii Mongols (or Tartars): 170, 202, 203, 258, 266 Béla IV asks for help against: 144, 157, 159, 176 council against Tartars called by Alexander IV (1261): 175 crusading against: 131, 159, 202 devastate eastern Europe (1259–60): 144, 184 n. 13, 192, 200 discussed at the Second Council of Lyon (1245): 146, 265 Frederick II promises action against: 161–62, 177, 265

331

invasion of Hungary (1241): 120, 131, 132, 139, 214, 259, 260 victory over the Seljuks (1238): xxxv, 139–40 Montferrat, marquisate of: 70, 73, 76, 88 ‘Montferrat Crusade’ see Thessalonica, crusade for the defence of see also Boniface I; Boniface II; William VI; William VII Morea see Achaia; Peloponnese Mouskes see Philippe Mouskes Narjot of Toucy, bailli of the Latin empire: 89 Naxos: xxxii Negroponte (Euboea): xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii contributes to the defence of Frankish Greece: 71, 76, 144 Neopatras, town in Thessaly: 236 Nicaea, empire of: xxxiv–xxxv, xxxviii, xli, 50, 51, 78, 85, 91, 109, 131, 139–40, 147, 168, 186, 262 Byzantine patriarchate at: xxxiv, 48, 95, 96, 161, 164, 165, 167; see also Germanos II; Manuel II; Michael Autoreianos; Theodore Eirenikos Church Union negotiations with: 48–49, 93–96, 133, 135–36, 138, 159–67, 174–75, 177, 218, 253; see also Church Union crusading against: xxxiv, 168–69, 263; see also Constantinople, crusading for the defence of see also John III Vatatzes; Theodore I Lascaris; Theodore II Lascaris Nicholas III, pope: 181, 231–37, 238, 239, 278 stance towards Charles of Anjou: 235–36 Nicholas, bishop of Croton: 197 Nicholas da Calvi, biographer of Innocent IV: 170 Nicholas of Castro Arquato, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 137, 144, 147, 168 n. 119, 278 Nicholas of Mailly, knight: 25, 29 Nicholas of Otranto, abbot of Casole: 46 Nicopolis, crusade of: 272 Nikephoros I Doukas, ruler of Epiros: 236–37, 241, 278

332 INDEX

Nivelon de Quierzy, bishop of Soissons: 24–31, 33, 35, 36, 55, 56, 76 n. 84, 156 n. 76, 261, 280 Northampton, oath of: 124, 132, 156, 258 Notaras, Loukas, Byzantine Grand Duke: 272 Nymphaeum negotiations for Church Union at (1233–34): 95–96 synod of (1249): 163, 164–67 treaty of (1261): 192 Ochrid: 61; see also Chomatianos, Demetrios orders, military: xxvi, 17, 42, 44, 81, 193, 219 Hospitallers: 154, 176 n. 151, 193, 207, 270–71 Order of Santiago: 44 n. 181, 157–58 Order of the Hospital of St Sampson: 44, 75, 81, 193 Templars: 49 n. 203, 154, 193 Teutonic Order: 84, 158, 193, 261 orders, religious: 44, 193 Cistercians: 5, 44, 55 mendicants: 44, 83–84, 95–96, 170 and crusading in Romania: 85, 103, 112, 115, 119, 121, 126 n. 179, 127, 129, 149–52, 153 n. 65, 183–84, 255, 283, 289–90; see also William of Cordelle; William of Oleron Dominicans: 44, 103, 112, 115, 119, 121, 126 n. 179, 127, 129, 149–50, 162, 183–84, 213, 289 Franciscans: 44, 104, 119, 149–50, 162, 163, 183–84, 196–97, 232, 266 Orvieto, treaty of (1281): 241, 243–44, 246 Otto IV (of Brunswick), Holy Roman emperor: 9 n. 29, 13, 31 Otto, cardinal deacon of St Nicholas: 121 Otto de la Roche, duke of Athens: xxxiii, 70, 71 Ottomans: xxxii, xxxvii, 272–73 Pachymeres, George: xlii, 166–67, 239, 266–67 Padua, bishop of: 70, 289 Pantaleone Giustiniani, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 168, 173, 176 n. 149, 278, 281, 290 papacy: xvi–xvii, xxxvi, xxxvii–xl, 15–19, 53–55, 95–96, 135–38, 143, 183–84,

248, 252–56, 262–63, 264, passim relations with the Greek Church see Church Union; schism vacancy of the Apostolic See: 137, 139–40, 179, 181, 182, 213–17, 218 see also names of individual popes (list at 278) papal primacy: 45, 164–66, 211, 232–33, 237 Parma: 70, 161, 162 n. 96, 173, 289 Partitio Romanie (March Pact): xxxi–xxxii, 14–15 Pelagius, cardinal bishop of Albano as papal legate in the Latin Empire: 48–49 complains about the diversion of crusaders to Frankish Greece: 67–68, 73, 77, 156, 257 Pelagonia: 61 battle of: xxxii, 178, 194 Pelay Pérez Correa, Grand Master of the Order of Santiago: 158 Peloponnese: xxxi–xxxii, 44; see also Achaia Pero Tafur: 273 Peter III, king of Aragon: 240 n. 206 crusade against: 247, 256 Peter Capuano, cardinal priest of San Marcello: 21–22, 23, 24 Peter Dubois, crusade propagandist: 269 Peter of Castelnau, papal legate in Languedoc: 31 Peter of Collemezzo, cardinal bishop of Albano: 154–55 Peter of Corbeil, archbishop of Sens: 10 n. 36, 64–65 Peter of Courtenay, Latin emperor: 60, 62, 67, 75, 88, 107, 277 crusade for the liberation of: 58, 61–68, 80, 252, 280, 289 Peter of Douai, leader of crusader contin­ gent (1207–08): 29–30, 76 n. 84, 261 Peter of Dreux, count of Brittany: 85 n. 5, 108 n. 96 crusade funding for: 111, 116, 120 projected leader of crusade for the Latin Empire: 85, 86, 102, 103, 113, 116, 120, 122, 124, 280 Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Cistercian chronicler: 55 Peter Seila (Pierre Cellan), inquisitor: 129, 145 Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny: xxx, 16

INDEX Philip I, prince of Taranto: xxvi n. 41, xxxvii, 248, 269–70 Philip II Augustus, king of France: 35 Philip III, king of France: 219 Philip IV, king of France: 269 Philip, chaplain to Latin emperor Henry: 38–39 Philip, marquis of Namur: 7, 26–27, 29, 37, 280 Philip Chinardo, admiral of Manfred of Sicily: 202–03 Philip de Mézières, crusade propagandist: 273 Philip of Courtenay, titular Latin emperor: 205, 207, 208, 222, 224–25, 231, 233–36, 237, 241, 277 Philip of Swabia, king of the Germans: 13, 31 Philippe Mouskes, chronicler: xlii Philippopolis, battle of: 38–39 Pietro Ziani, doge of Venice: 33 n. 143, 62 Pisa: 70, 219, 244, 289 Council of (1135): 17 Poimanenon, battle of: 71, 78 Poland see crusading in Frankish Greece, and Poland Pons de Lesparre, Dominican provincial prior of Provence: 149 Portugal see crusading in Frankish Greece, and Portugal Provence: xlii, 43, 67, 244 n. 228 crusade preaching and funds for the Latin Empire from: 149–52, 245–46, 289 purgatory: 171

333

Quercy: 130

crusade funds for the Latin Empire from the province of: 116, 122 n. 165 relics: xli, 26, 35–36 Crown of Thorns: 36, 123, 257 Holy Cross: 38, 40 Reniero Zeno, doge of Venice: 178, 184, 186, 188, 199, 207 Rhodes: 94, 270 Richard of Cornwall: 161–62 and his crusade to the Holy Land: 84 n. 4, 115, 121, 124, 128, 132 and the crusade for the Latin Empire: 86, 120–21, 132 swears the Oath of Northampton: 124, 156, 258 Robert, lord of Tanley: 122 n. 166 Robert of Clari, chronicler: xlii, 9, 35 Robert of Courtenay, brother of Peter of Courtenay: 64, 66, 280 Robert of Courtenay, Latin emperor (son of Peter of Courtenay): 67, 69, 71, 76, 87, 89, 90, 277 Roger II, king of Sicily: xxx, 17 Roger Bacon: 258–59, 266 Rome: 25, 26, 61, 68 n. 42, 85, 87, 88, 131, 147, 175 n. 145, 182, 194, 201, 209, 219 n. 133, 222, 235, 239, 269 n. 34 Church of see papacy Rouen, archbishop of: xlii n. 79, 10 n. 36, 121, 155 n. 72, 190 n. 39, 289 crusade funds for the Latin Empire from the province of: 120 n. 153, 122 n. 165, 129 n. 191 Rutebeuf, poet and crusade propagandist: 266

Raimbaut de Vaqueiras: xlii, 34, 257 Ramon Lull, crusade propagandist: 269 Ranulf, bishop of Quimper: 102 Ravenna, archbishop of: 70, 289 Ravennika first parliament of (1209): xxxiii second parliament of (1210): 70 Raymond VI, count of Toulouse: 46 Raymond VII of Toulouse: 70, 106, 108 Raymond of Paphos, papal nuncio to Castile-León: 189, 191 Reims, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 91 n. 28, 107, 121, 155 n. 72, 289

Saladin: 1, 58 Samos: 205 Sanudo see Marco I Sanudo; Marino Sanudo Torcello Saphadin (al-Adil), Ayubid sultan of Egypt: 21 Sardinia: 193, 245–46 schism (between the Greek and Roman Churches): xv, xx, 94, 95, 138, 162, 172, 197, 263 as justification for crusading in Frankish Greece see crusading in Frankish Greece, rhetoric and legitimization

334 INDEX

Greeks presented as schismatics: xxiv, xxxv, 10, 17, 19, 42–43, 54, 58, 59, 74–75, 81, 99, 104, 117–18, 123, 146, 162, 169–70, 183, 190–91, 193, 198–99, 202–03, 205–06, 210–11, 215, 230, 239–40, 242, 255, 258–59, 264–67, 269, 270–71, 273 see also Church Union Seljuks: xxxv, 94, 139, 140, 262 Sens, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 100, 121, 122 n. 165, 155 n. 72, 289; see also Peter of Corbeil Serbia, Serbs: 214, 241, 269 Serres, town in Macedonia: 68, 71 Sicilian Vespers: xxxvii, 181, 238, 239–40 n. 206, 241–42, 244, 246, 247, 248, 254 Sicily: xlii, 18, 174, 181, 200, 201–02, 209, 217, 240 n. 206, 241–42, 244 n. 228, 247–48, 256, 269 fate of Frankish Greece connected with: 188, 195, 201–02 kingdom of (Regno): 25, 89–90, 117, 162, 174, 182–83, 193, 195, 201–02, 208, 209, 224, 245; see also Charles of Anjou; Frederick II; Frederick III; Manfred; Markward of Anweiler Siegfried III, archbishop of Mainz: 123 Simon, chancellor of the kingdom of Sicily: 224–25 Simon de Montfort: 190, 200 Simon of Brie, cardinal see Martin IV Simon of Tyre, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 90, 278 Soffredo, cardinal: 21 Spain: xlii, 18, 203; see also crusades, in Iberia; crusading in Frankish Greece, and Spain Stilbes, Constantine: 50, 268 Strez, ruler of Prosek: 40 Suger, abbot of St Dennis: xxx Taddeo da Suessa: 161 Tagliacozzo, battle of: 209 Tarentaise, archbishop of: 70, 289 Tartars see Mongols Theodore I Lascaris, emperor at Nicaea: xxxiv, xxxv, 40, 48, 52, 61, 78, 95, 278 denounces the capture of Constantinople: 33, 267

Theodore II Lascaris, emperor at Nicaea: 136, 164, 174–75, 178, 278 Theodore, bishop of Negroponte: 50 Theodore Doukas, ruler of Epiros: xxxiv, 61–64, 66–67, 71, 89, 94, 168, 278 attacks the kingdom of Thessalonica: 68–69, 76, 78 captures Peter of Courtenay: 62 crusade against: 63–67, 75–76, 79–80, 252–53, 266, 280; see also Thessalonica, crusade for the defence of defeated and captured by John Asen: 91–92 imperial coronation of: 78, 91 Theodore Eirenikos, patriarch at Nicaea: 48 Thessalonica, Latin kingdom of: xxxi, xxxiii, 29, 31, 38, 39, 78, 88, 207, 262, 277 archbishop of: 28 n. 122, 68 attacked by Epiros: 61, 68–69 crusade for the defence of (‘Montferrat Crusade’): xxvi n. 41, xxxvii, 58, 68–78, 80, 82, 83, 88, 253, 254, 259, 261, 280, 285, 289; see also William VI of Montferrat destruction of: xxxiii, xxxiv, 76, 78, 88 under Byzantine control: 91–92, 94, 131, 140, 160, 230; see also Theodore Doukas; Manuel Doukas see also Boniface I of Montferrat; Demetrius Thessaly: 44, 61, 76; see also John the Bastard Thibaut IV, count of Champagne (and king of Navarre): 84 n. 4, 86, 91 n. 29, 99 n. 56, 100, 106–07, 125, 127, 128, 132, 156, 257 alleged vow commutation to Constantinople: 86, 100, 106–07 Thibaut V, count of Champagne (and king of Navarre): 207–08 Thierry of Walincourt: 71 Thomas, lord of Marles: 122 n. 66, 125 Thomas Morosini, Latin patriarch of Constantinople: 13–14, 15, 24, 31, 45 n. 186, 46, 48, 278 Toulouse: 31, 78 count of see Raymond VI; Raymond VII Tournai, bishop of: 7 n. 24, 103, 289 crusade funding for the Latin Empire from the diocese of: 106, 129 n. 191

INDEX

335

Tours, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 155 n. 72, 289 crusade funding for the Latin Empire from the province of: 120 n. 153, 122 n. 165, 129 n. 191 Trebizond: xxxiv Turks: xxxvii, 36, 249, 269, 270, 273 as targets of crusading: 228–29, 270–73 see also Khorezmian Turks; Ottomans; Seljuks Tzurulum, town in Thrace: 125, 160, 262

Verona: 70, 147, 289 Vicenza, bishop of: 70, 289 Vienne, archbishop of: 10 n. 36, 115, 289 crusade funding for the Latin Empire from the province of: 122 n. 165 Viterbo Treaties (1267): 180–81, 201, 204–07, 208, 209, 212, 213, 215, 243–44, 253 expedition stipulated in: 181, 205, 230 postponement and cancellation: 218, 222–25, 230 Vizye, town in Thrace: 158, 160

Union of the Churches see Church Union Urban IV: 178, 182–200, 201, 222, 227, 239, 248, 253, 278 Church Union negotiations with Michael VIII: 196–98, 200, 209, 211 crusade calls for Constantinople and Achaia: xxvi n. 41, 180, 182–84, 193, 198–99, 209, 248, 281, 288, 290 crusade funding for: 184–85, 189, 193, 199 motives for: 185–86 reactions to: 189–92, 198, 209 rhetoric and language: 187–89, 195, 198–99, 202 n. 79, 266 relations with Manfred of Sicily: 182–83, 189, 193–95, 197, 200 Ut Israelem veteris, crusade bull: 85, 99–102, 105 Utrecht, bishop of: 198–99, 290

Wales: 185 Warin, archbishop of Thessalonica: 68 William I of Champlitte, prince of Achaia: xxxii, 277 William II of Villehardouin, prince of Achaia: xxxii, 168, 178, 197, 204–07, 209, 212, 215, 222 n. 144, 230, 253, 277 William VI, marquis of Montferrat: 68, 80 leads crusade to relieve Thessalonica: xxvi n. 41, 69–77, 261, 280; see also Thessalonica, crusade for the defence of mortgages marquisate to fund expedition to Thessalonica: 73, 88 William VII, marquis of Montferrat: 203, 277 William, lord of Cayeux: 122 n. 66, 125 William Adam, crusade propagandist: 269 William of Cordelle, Franciscan crusade agent: 100–01, 103, 106 n. 85, 107, 116 William of Modena, papal legate: 101 William of Oleron, Dominican crusade agent: 112

vacancy of the Apostolic See see papacy Varna, crusade of: 272 Vatatzes see John III Vatatzes Venice: xli, 118, 219 and Charles of Anjou: 204, 214–15, 230–31, 241, 243 and Michael VIII: 182, 192, 214, 215, 231 possessions in Romania: xxi, xxxii–xxxiii, 192 Venetian control over patriarchate of Constantinople: 13–14, 26, 31 role in crusading in Frankish Greece: 62–63, 67 n. 35, 92, 74, 97, 122, 138 n. 4, 168, 178, 184, 186, 188, 207, 214–15, 241, 260, 269, 281, 290 offers free transport for crusaders: 101, 133, 184 see also individual doges

Yolanda of Courtenay, queen of Hungary (daughter of Peter of Courtenay): 60 Yolanda of Flanders, Latin empress (wife of Peter of Courtenay): 60, 67, 107, 277 York, archbishop of: 121, 122 n. 165 Zara (Zadar), town on the Dalmatian coast: 3, 32 n. 142

MEDIEVAL CHURCH STUDIES All volumes in this series are evaluated by an Editorial Board, strictly on academic grounds, based on reports prepared by referees who have been commissioned by virtue of their specialism in the appropriate field. The Board ensures that the screening is done independently and without conflicts of interest. The definitive texts supplied by authors are also subject to review by the Board before being approved for publication. Further, the volumes are copyedited to conform to the publisher’s stylebook and to the best international academic standards in the field. Titles in Series Megan Cassidy-Welch, Monastic Spaces and their Meanings: Thirteenth-Century English Cistercian Monasteries (2001) Elizabeth Freeman, Narratives of a New Order: Cistercian Historical Writing in England, 1150–1220 (2002) The Study of the Bible in the Carolingian Era, ed. by Celia Chazelle and Burton Van Name Edwards (2003) Perspectives for an Architecture of Solitude: Essays on Cistercians, Art, and Architecture in Honour of Peter Fergusson, ed. by Terryl N. Kinder (2004) The Voice of Silence: Women’s Literacy in a Men’s Church, ed. by Thérèse de Hemptinne and María Eugenia Góngora (2004) Emilia Jamroziak, Rievaulx Abbey and its Social Context, 1132–1300: Memory, Loyalty, and Networks (2005) Saints, Scholars, and Politicians: Gender as a Tool in Medieval Studies, ed. by Mathilde van Dijk and Renée Nip (2005) Text and Controversy from Wyclif to Bale: Essays in Honour of Anne Hudson, ed. by Helen Barr and Ann M. Hutchison (2005) Alison I. Beach, Manuscripts and Monastic Culture: Reform and Renewal in TwelfthCentury Germany (2007)

Lena Roos, ‘God Wants It!’ The Ideology of Martyrdom in the Hebrew Crusade Chronicles and its Jewish and Christian Background (2007) Weaving, Veiling, and Dressing: Textiles and their Metaphors in the Late Middle Ages, ed. by Kathryn M. Rudy and Barbara Baert (2007) James J. Boyce, Carmelite Liturgy and Spiritual Identity: The Choir Books of Kraków (2009) Studies in Carthusian Monasticism in the Late Middle Ages, ed. by Julian M. Luxford (2009) Kriston R. Rennie, Law and Practice in the Age of Reform: The Legatine Work of Hugh of Die (1073–1106) (2010) Gunilla Iversen, Laus angelica: Poetry in the Medieval Mass, ed. by Jane Flynn, trans. by William Flynn (2010) Kevin J. Alban, The Teaching and Impact of the ‘Doctrinale’ of Thomas Netter of Walden (c.1374–1430) (2011) Wycliffite Controversies, ed. by Mishtooni Bose and J. Patrick Hornbeck II (2011) After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England, ed. by Vincent Gillespie and Kantik Ghosh (2011) The Regular Canons in the Medieval British Isles, ed. by Janet Burton and Karen Stöber (2011) Federico Botana, The Works of Mercy in Italian Medieval Art (c.1050–c.1400) (2012) Nickiphoros I. Tsougarakis, The Latin Religious Orders in Medieval Greece, 1204–1500 (2012)

In Preparation Demetrio S. Yocum, Petrarch’s Humanist Writing and Carthusian Monasticism: The Secret Language of the Self Alice Chapman, Sacred Authority and Temporal Power in the Writings of Bernard of Clairvaux