Critical Thinking: An Introduction To The Didactics Of Thinking Training [1 ed.] 3658415428, 9783658415426, 9783658415433

Table of contents :
Instruction Manual for the Book
Contents
About the Authors
Part I: Theory of Critical Thinking
Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking
1.1 Reason in Times of Shitstorms
1.2 Critical Thinking as a Rational Practice of Speech and Action
1.3 Uncertainty
1.4 The Program: Critical Thinking as Judgment
Analytical-Epistemic Thinking
2.1 Epistemological and Linguistic Critical Preliminary Considerations
2.1.1 Alternative Facts
2.1.2 ``There Are No Facts, Only Interpretations´´
2.1.3 On the Concept of a `Fact´
2.1.4 Facts, Logic, and the Law of Non-contradiction
2.2 Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims
2.2.1 What Is Claimed?
2.2.2 Conceptual Clarifications
2.2.3 Does Islam Belong to Germany? An Illustrative Example
2.2.4 Bullshit : An Excursus
2.2.5 Intention and Context
2.2.6 Language Game and Context of an Utterance
2.3 Examine Evidence: Proving and Disproving Truth Claims
2.3.1 ``A Composed Hypothesis Gives Us Lynx Eyes for Everything That Confirms It´´
2.3.2 Why It Is Difficult to Adopt a Critical Approach to Scientific Results
2.3.2.1 Popular Science
2.3.2.2 Different Results
2.3.2.3 Technical Defects
2.3.2.4 Science as Commissioned Work
2.3.2.5 Numbers
2.3.2.6 Conclusion
2.3.3 Excursus: What Is Scientific Knowledge? A Small Philosophy of Science
2.3.4 Media as Sources of Information
2.3.4.1 Images and Their Staging I
2.3.4.2 Images and Their Staging II : Contextuality and Apparent Authenticity of Images
2.3.4.3 Language - Choice of Words - Framing
2.3.4.4 Narrative and Plot: On the Embedding of Facts in Stories
2.3.4.5 Conclusion: Is Objective Reporting Possible at All?
2.4 Judging: Weighing Truth Claims
Ethical Thinking
3.1 Why Ethical Thinking?
3.1.1 Ethics and Morals
3.1.2 Explication of Hidden Moral Validity Claims
3.1.3 Is an Intersubjective Understanding of Moral Dissent Possible at All?
3.2 Modern Basic Positions of Normative Ethics
3.2.1 Consequentialist and Utilitarian Moral Reasoning
3.2.2 Deontological Moral Reasoning
3.3 Ethical Thinking as the ``Price of Modernity´´
3.3.1 Limitless Feasibility and Ethical Limitation
3.3.2 Hans Jonas: Ethics of Responsibility in the Technological Age
3.3.2.1 Near and Far Ethics
3.3.2.2 A New Concept of Responsibility
3.3.2.3 The Heuristic of Fear
3.3.2.4 Critical Appraisal
3.3.3 Applied Ethics
3.3.3.1 Domain Ethics
3.3.4 The Reflection Process of Ethical Thinking Using the Example of Animal Ethics
3.3.4.1 Starting Point Everyday Morality
3.3.4.2 Transition to Ethical Theory
3.3.4.3 Obtaining a Reasoned Position
Part II: Didactics of Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking as a Rediscovered Educational Goal
Systematization of Approaches to Thinking Training
Results of Empirical Educational Research on Thinking Training
6.1 Preliminary Remarks on Research on the Effectiveness of Thinking Trainings
6.2 Discussion of a Meta-analysis by Abrami et al. (2015)
6.2.1 Underlying Concept of Critical Thinking
6.2.2 The Selection of Individual Studies
6.2.3 Research Focus of the Meta-analysis
6.2.4 Effect Size as a Measure of Intervention Effectiveness
6.2.5 Central Results of the Meta-analysis
6.2.6 Discussion of the Results and Methodology in the Light of Practical Considerations
6.3 Promoting Critical Thinking with Digital Media
6.3.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Selection of Studies
6.3.2 Digital Thinking Training: A Brief Historical Outline
6.3.2.1 Synchronous and Asynchronous Communication Tools
6.3.2.2 Learning Programs to Promote Critical Thinking
6.3.2.3 Blended Learning Using Internet Sources
6.3.2.4 Social Software and Web 2.0 Tools
6.3.2.5 Virtual Learning Environments, Game-Based Learning, and Hybrid Teaching-Learning Scenarios
6.4 Conclusion: Importance of the Results of Educational Research for the Design of a Thinking Training Course
A Process Model as a Compass for the Didactic Design of Thinking Training Courses
7.1 Process Models of Critical Thinking
7.2 A Process Model as a Compass for the Didactic Design of Thinking Training Courses
7.3 Didactic Implications from the Process Model
7.3.1 Determine Own Concept of Critical Thinking for the Subject Area
7.3.2 Analyze the Conditions of Teaching Practice
7.3.3 Set Learning Objectives
7.3.4 Establishing the Necessary Learning Environment
7.3.5 Designing the Initial Phase (Trigger Event)
7.3.6 Accompanying the Phase of Forming a Judgment (Exploration)
7.3.7 Integration: Supporting the Development of Alternatives
7.3.8 Resolution: Creating Opportunities for Experimentation
7.4 Summary of the Promotion of Critical Thinking
Assessment of Critical Thinking
8.1 Introduction to the Assessment Concept
8.2 Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions
8.2.1 Observing Learners in the Process of Critical Thinking
8.2.2 Test Skills Through Standardized Written Tests
8.2.3 Evaluate Critical Thinking in Authentic Action Situations
8.3 Construction of an Own Assessment Instrument
Examples of the Practice of Thinking Training
9.1 Practical Reports on the Promotion of Critical Thinking
9.1.1 Introduction to the Practical Examples
9.1.2 Creating a Learning Atmosphere
9.1.3 Designing the Initial Phase
9.1.4 Accompanying the Exploration Phase
9.1.5 Support the Phase of Developing Alternatives
9.1.6 Create Opportunities for Experimentation
References

Citation preview

Dirk Jahn Michael Cursio

Critical Thinking An Introduction To The Didactics Of Thinking Training

Critical Thinking

Dirk Jahn • Michael Cursio

Critical Thinking An Introduction To The Didactics Of Thinking Training

Dirk Jahn Friedrich Alexander Uni Fortbildungszentrum Hochschullehre FBZHL Fürth, Bayern Germany

Michael Cursio Friedrich Alexander Universität ErlangenNürnberg Fortbildungszentrum Hochschullehre FBZHL Fürth, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-41542-6 ISBN 978-3-658-41543-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3

(eBook)

This book is a translation of the original German edition “Kritisches Denken” by Jahn, Dirk, published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH in 2021. The translation was done with the help of an artificial intelligence machine translation tool. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany Paper in this product is recyclable.

For Angela, Michi, and Pina

Instruction Manual for the Book

Dear Readers, This book on the didactics of critical thinking offers a variety of approaches, contents, and perspectives about its subject matter. Different chapters serve different purposes and are written for different levels of interest and reading habits. Of course, the two authors are happy for you to read the book in its entirety. However, this is by no means necessary. The individual chapters stand on their own. To be able to gain an overview, here is a little orientation: The book is divided into two broad parts. Part I – Theory of Critical Thinking – deals primarily with the question of what constitutes critical thinking as a concept and which different styles of thinking and occasions for thinking characterize a critical thinker. It deals with elementary conceptual and philosophical questions that are unfortunately often not sufficiently clarified in many educational and political discussions but which are central to the promotion of critical thinking: Those who cannot say precisely what constitutes critical thinking in their teaching and discipline will find it difficult to develop targeted support concepts and to initiate and accompany learning processes accordingly. Part I on the theory of critical thinking is based on two philosophical aspects of justification: an epistemological (“analytic-epistemic”) and an ethical one. The epistemological aspect of critical thinking (Part I, Chap. 2) discusses the question of the redeemability of validity claims first on the basis of linguistic-critical considerations (Sects. 2.1 and 2.2). This involves understanding and specifying truth claims. On this basis, substantiation and adequate judgment (Sect. 2.4) are discussed on the basis of scientific (Sects. 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3) and media (Sect. 2.3.4) sources. The possibility of objective knowledge in science and media is reflected. The ethical part (Part I, Chap. 3) first discusses the necessity of ethical reflection for critical thinking as well as the redeemability of ethical validity claims (Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). This is followed by a presentation of classical ethical positions (Sect. 3.2) vii

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and a reflection on ethical thinking in the sense of applied ethics under the auspices of a technologized modernity (Sect. 3.3). The presentation includes current examples wherever possible. Part II then focuses on didactics and the promotion of critical thinking. For this purpose, several didactic models and studies are used to provide orientation. Those who would like to approach the promotion of critical thinking from a more empirical and theoretical point of view have come to the right place in the first subchapters. Here, for example, a comprehensive meta-study on the promotion of critical thinking is discussed (Sect. 6.2). The question of how critical thinking can be promoted with digital media is explicitly discussed in a separate subchapter (Sect. 6.3). From Chap. 7 onwards, the book will become interesting for readers with concrete practical concerns. For example, a process model for planning lessons is discussed and illustrated here. The construction of suitable assessment approaches is also considered (see Chap. 8). In Chap. 9, two teachers present their concrete procedures in the training of thinking in exemplary teaching reports to also integrate concrete examples from the classroom. We hope you enjoy reading it! Michael Cursio Dirk Jahn

Contents

Part I Theory of Critical Thinking 1

Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Reason in Times of Shitstorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Critical Thinking as a Rational Practice of Speech and Action . 1.3 Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Program: Critical Thinking as Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 3 5 7 8

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Analytical-Epistemic Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Epistemological and Linguistic Critical Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Alternative Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 “There Are No Facts, Only Interpretations” . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 On the Concept of a ‘Fact’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Facts, Logic, and the Law of Non-contradiction . . . . . 2.2 Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 What Is Claimed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Conceptual Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Does Islam Belong to Germany? An Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Bullshit : An Excursus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.5 Intention and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.6 Language Game and Context of an Utterance . . . . . . . 2.3 Examine Evidence: Proving and Disproving Truth Claims . . . 2.3.1 “A Composed Hypothesis Gives Us Lynx Eyes for Everything That Confirms It” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.3.2

Why It Is Difficult to Adopt a Critical Approach to Scientific Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Excursus: What Is Scientific Knowledge? A Small Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Media as Sources of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Judging: Weighing Truth Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Critical Thinking as a Rediscovered Educational Goal . . . . . . . . .

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Systematization of Approaches to Thinking Training . . . . . . . . . .

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6

Results of Empirical Educational Research on Thinking Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Preliminary Remarks on Research on the Effectiveness of Thinking Trainings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Discussion of a Meta-analysis by Abrami et al. (2015) . . . . . . 6.2.1 Underlying Concept of Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 The Selection of Individual Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Research Focus of the Meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Effect Size as a Measure of Intervention Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Ethical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Why Ethical Thinking? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Ethics and Morals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Explication of Hidden Moral Validity Claims . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Is an Intersubjective Understanding of Moral Dissent Possible at All? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Modern Basic Positions of Normative Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Consequentialist and Utilitarian Moral Reasoning . . . . 3.2.2 Deontological Moral Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Ethical Thinking as the “Price of Modernity” . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Limitless Feasibility and Ethical Limitation . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Hans Jonas: Ethics of Responsibility in the Technological Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Applied Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4 The Reflection Process of Ethical Thinking Using the Example of Animal Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II Didactics of Critical Thinking

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6.2.5 6.2.6

Central Results of the Meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discussion of the Results and Methodology in the Light of Practical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Promoting Critical Thinking with Digital Media . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Selection of Studies . . . . . 6.3.2 Digital Thinking Training: A Brief Historical Outline . 6.4 Conclusion: Importance of the Results of Educational Research for the Design of a Thinking Training Course . . . . . 7

8

A Process Model as a Compass for the Didactic Design of Thinking Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Process Models of Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 A Process Model as a Compass for the Didactic Design of Thinking Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Didactic Implications from the Process Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Determine Own Concept of Critical Thinking for the Subject Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Analyze the Conditions of Teaching Practice . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Set Learning Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4 Establishing the Necessary Learning Environment . . . . 7.3.5 Designing the Initial Phase (Trigger Event) . . . . . . . . 7.3.6 Accompanying the Phase of Forming a Judgment (Exploration) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.7 Integration: Supporting the Development of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.8 Resolution: Creating Opportunities for Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Summary of the Promotion of Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . Assessment of Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction to the Assessment Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions . . . . . 8.2.1 Observing Learners in the Process of Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2 Test Skills Through Standardized Written Tests . . . . . 8.2.3 Evaluate Critical Thinking in Authentic Action Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Construction of an Own Assessment Instrument . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Examples of the Practice of Thinking Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Practical Reports on the Promotion of Critical Thinking . . . . . 9.1.1 Introduction to the Practical Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.2 Creating a Learning Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.3 Designing the Initial Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.4 Accompanying the Exploration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.5 Support the Phase of Developing Alternatives . . . . . . . 9.1.6 Create Opportunities for Experimentation . . . . . . . . . .

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References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 ..

About the Authors

Michael Cursio PhD in Philosophy, is managing director at the Center for Higher Education at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg. His main research interests are didactics of science, competence-oriented teaching, didactics of the philosophy of science. Website: www.fbzhl.fau.de/person/michael-cursio Mail: [email protected] Dirk Jahn PhD in Economic Education, is instructional designer, trainer, publicist, and, among other things, a trained salesman and musician. For many years he has been successfully qualifying teachers to promote future skills. His areas of expertise and research are critical thinking, e-learning, videos in teaching, designbased research and last but not least studies in idleness. Website: www.drdirkjahn.de Mail: [email protected]

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Part I Theory of Critical Thinking

1

Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking

1.1

Reason in Times of Shitstorms

At what point should one trust a source and believe a system of statements? When it appears to be a recognized and qualified expert opinion, when strictly quantitative research methods have been used, or when the arguments presented are skeptically examined, e.g., by giving at least one other perspective or by illuminating the limits of the methodological approach? Should only certain scientific sources be believed, or is there also truth in discussion forums, tweets, video messages from influencers, or the casual chat with the neighbor? How can true and false statements be distinguished in social networks, and can this distinction still be made? What and whom can I believe, what can I know at all, and how should I act? In the face of these questions and challenges of the twenty-first century, many educational policy discussions call for the promotion of critical thinking (CT). CT, it is assumed, is the antidote and immunization for fake news, one-sided reporting, or short-circuiting on the net. But what exactly does CT mean? Often, the term experiences an arbitrariness that is exploited depending on personal interests. In an online training course of a further education provider with the title Critical Thinking for Business, for example, CT is interpreted as a kind of tool for strategic action, to be able to convince better in economic contexts or to make optimal decisions (promotional email of a well-known webinar platform, received on 15 February 2018). In general, the word “criticism” often has the connotation of being negative, of finding fault, even though its Greek origin is more soberly understood as divide, examine. If one speaks of critical thinking, however, this softens the nagging undertone. The philosopher Karl Popper characterized his scientific-theoretical position with a similar combination of words; he called it “critical rationalism.” # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_1

3

4

1 Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking

By this he meant a practical attitude that is basically willing to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. Popper further characterized it by the famous formula of admitting that I may be wrong, that you may be right, and that together we may get at the truth (Popper, 1980, p. 276). With this quotation we have indicated the direction in which this book’s understanding of CT wants to go. CT distances itself from rash, reflexive judgments (whether approving or disapproving), hysterical, moralizing clamor, and pejorative defamation. The latter is often found in social media in the appearance of the so-called shitstorm, which has a particularly high degree of hysterical excitement. Not infrequently, a flood of unsavory and undifferentiated hate comments takes on a life of their own in the face of the content-related cause and develops into an emotional discharge of aggression. We name the shitstorm as an example of an attitude that stands in contrast to the one outlined by Popper. The shitstorm, or those involved in it, presumably see their own statements as a form of criticism. From the point of view to be developed here, however, the shitstorm is merely a distorted form of criticism. It is not characterized by the attempt to understand or the awareness of one’s own susceptibility to error but rather by one-sidedness, know-it-allism, and dogmatism, so one would hardly describe it as “rational” or “thinking.” Conversely, CT is an essential attitude and stands for a calm and examining attitude. Calm, insofar as it suspends rash impulses and puts the collection of reliable information before the formation of judgments. Examining, insofar as it judges claims to validity according to linguistic-critical, empirical, ethical, and epistemological criteria and makes judgments by consideration and justification rather than reflexively. This attitude is also scrutinizing concerning its sources of information, so questions of the following can always be asked: From whom does this information come? How did it come about? On what evidence is it based? What alternative information is available? CT will value scientific sources or information presented according to the rules of scientific work (such as argumentative comprehensibility, correct and transparent source references, etc.) more than opinions and everyday theories. However, CT will not accept scientific studies without reflection but will always remain autonomous and scrutinizing in the awareness that every science starts from self-imposed assumptions and presuppositions that influence its results. The same applies all the more to journalistic sources. CT is also opposed to one-dimensional approaches and uses changes of perspective to break down limited patterns of thought, aiming for the ideal of integrating different perspectives into an overall picture that is as coherent as possible (see Sect. 2.4). These are always supported by facts and – where appropriate – also by figures. However, a critical judgment will not regard facts and figures as “speaking for themselves” but as context-dependent and in need of interpretation. A critical

1.2 Critical Thinking as a Rational Practice of Speech and Action

5

attitude is aware of the irrevocable selectivity of information and the perspectivity of all knowledge (including scientific knowledge) without slipping into a groundless relativism that generally denies the redeemability of objective claims to validity.

1.2

Critical Thinking as a Rational Practice of Speech and Action

CT does not start from zero. Asking how a thesis is meant, demanding a reason for an assertion, or doubting whether a statement is “true” presupposes an already established cultural practice of giving and taking reasons and counter-reasons (Nida-Rümelin, 2018). This practice is part of a web of linguistic actions that philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein compared to playing by rules (Wittgenstein, 1984). He therefore speaks of “language games,” which is meant to highlight the interplay between speech and action. For example, “making an assertion” is a language game, and so is “justifying a thesis.” Language games are embedded in a comprehensive communication practice within which they are interrelated. Whoever asserts something claims that what is asserted is true and, at the same time, enters into the obligation to substantiate or justify this claim to truth, at least on demand. By engaging in this practice, then, one becomes familiar with distinctions such as that of true and false, of (substantiated) knowledge and (unsubstantiated) mere opinion. All CT always presupposes such a practice and the distinctions made available in it. And no CT can return behind these distinctions already made by a socially established practice or justify this practice of giving and taking reasons on its part. So, when we talk about CT in the following, we are addressing persons who, due to their ordinary socialization, are already familiar with language games such as asserting, specifying, commenting on, agreeing with, disagreeing with, substantiating by reasons or refuting a thesis. We can assume in every reader at least a prior understanding of “critical thinking” in the sense of practical familiarity with language games and do not have to teach anyone what “criticism” or what “thinking” is. Instead, the first step is to recall and differentiate a pre-understanding that each reader already brings with them. In the second step, the already existing thinking tools will be sharpened. The linking of CT to a socially established practice has the consequence that our focus is not primarily psychological. When we speak of critical thinking, we are not primarily concerned with what goes on “in the head” of a person but rather with how claims to validity can be met or judged according to criteria in a socially shared

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1 Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking

practice. The fundamental distinctions of true and false, justified and unfounded, knowledge and mere opinion, which every person must presuppose if they are to “think critically,” are not constituted within a person but in the language games of an intersubjectively comprehensible and socially shared space of interaction. As an empirical science, psychology must also already presuppose such distinctions (such as true/false). However, the above-mentioned sharpening of the instruments of critical argumentation and reflection seems necessary: Human knowledge is an increasingly complex entity in which, especially in the digital age, an oversupply of information is confronted with a lack of orientation. Added to this is the leveling of knowledge privileges. Professional journalism, which involves professional research, classification, and systematization, is no longer the only source of information. Whether one deplores this development or welcomes it as a step towards democratization, the increase in information has not made the need for independent and reasoned judgment superfluous, but rather increased it. Many young people today inform themselves exclusively on social media such as Facebook or YouTube or use the bandwidth of the Internet, in which information of extremely heterogeneous quality can be found side by side. Overall, on the Internet, well-founded scientific knowledge stands next to conspiracy theories and propaganda, serious reporting next to half-truths and fake news, and intellectual honesty next to half-baked bullshit.1 To navigate this complex and confusing web of information, it can be useful to familiarize oneself with methods, patterns of argumentation, and styles of thinking that have stood the test of time in science(s) and philosophy. What we are attempting to do in this book with our account of the theory and didactics of CT is to sharpen the tools with which we engage in the aforementioned practice of giving and taking reasons. We draw on science and philosophy (in the form of linguistic criticism, epistemology, and ethics) for the further development of these tools of thinking. CT tries to avoid a rupture between science on the one hand and life-world experience on the other, and instead establishes a coherence between science, practice, and philosophy (cf. Sect. 2.4). In this sense, we also understand CT as reason in the formation of judgment, rooted in the cultural practice of giving and taking reasons and counter-reasons. Philosophers Kamlah and Lorenzen call a person reasonable who is open to fellow human beings as dialog partners and to the objects discussed, who further allows his speech to be determined not by mere emotions, traditions or fashions, but by reasons

1

We do not use this expression as an insult in everyday language, but as a term following Harry Frankfurt (cf. Sect. 2.2.4).

1.3 Uncertainty

7

(Kamlah & Lorenzen, 1987, p. 128). In this sense, what we mean by Critical Thinking requires engaging with the thing at issue in each case, rather than immediately over-shaping it with well-worn interpretive patterns. The latter happens, for example, when in a discussion an argument presented on the question of migration is reflexively given labels such as “right-wing” on the one side or “do-gooder” on the other, instead of judging what is said with a view to the reasons given in each case. CT cannot be identified with a particular political opinion, e.g., from the “leftright“ schema. For CT, another dividing line is much more important than that of “conservative” and “progressive”: that of reason and unreason, which exist in both camps.

1.3

Uncertainty

At the latest, since the dynamics and events such as the refugee crisis in Europe or the election of Trump in the USA, a division of Western societies into irreconcilable camps, which no longer debate factually but increasingly fight a war of opinions and information against each other, can be observed. There is also a great deal of uncertainty (even mistrust) about the reliability of available knowledge and its sources. Journalism, politics, and even science have lost credibility as conspiracy theories flourish, and not only on the internet. As a result, many publications dedicated to the project of “saving the truth” in post-factual times have appeared.2 Thus, in the context of current social and political developments, Western societies are being confronted (as yet largely unnoticed) with problems that are otherwise more likely to be discussed in the secluded back rooms of the philosophical seminar. They confront Western societies with fundamental questions that still precede all political decision-making horizons, such as the possibility of reliable knowledge, the existence and status of facts, the objectivity of judgments, the reference to the reality of our sources of information, of the media, and even of science. This opens up the horizon of questions on a fundamental level that touches on philosophical questions, especially those of epistemology, which traditionally deals with questions such as the justifiability of claims to validity, the difference between knowledge and opinion, and the preconditions and limits of knowledge. The profoundness of the social uncertainty that has gripped Western societies in epistemological terms can be seen, among other things, in the way it is reflected in popular culture, especially in cinema. Numerous films address questions about the 2

For example (Kleber, 2017; Neiman, 2017).

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1 Attitudes and Thinking Styles in Critical Thinking

reliability of our experience of reality, such as Christopher Nolan’s “Inception” and “Memento,” or the boundary between reality and fiction, such as Peter Weir’s “The Truman Show” or Cronenberg’s “ExistenZ,” the reliability of media perception of the world, such as Dan Gilroy’s “Nightcrawler,” and so on.

1.4

The Program: Critical Thinking as Judgment

If the assessment just made is correct, then it makes sense to adopt an approach to CT that considers the fundamental epistemological character of uncertainty about our available knowledge of the world. Thus, the concern of this book will not be to provide a list of “How to Debunk Fake News” type tips. Such tips can be helpful, and there are numerous publications on the subject. Here, it is instead a matter of promoting CT in the fundamental sense of training and sharpening critical judgment. And this is in the sense of a fixed habitus, which in the successful case is stable in the face of changing fashions, fakes and tricks, etc., which are subject to constant change, especially in the media space. Judgment as a fixed habitus is also more likely to protect against the corrosive power of ideologies than a list of tips for debunking fakes, tricks, or errors in thinking. What is presented here as CT cannot replace engagement with concrete ideologies, nor can it replace engagement with history (which is more urgently needed for CT than modern curricula would like). Rather, it is to be seen as a pre-school of thought that can be picked up, built upon, and returned to again and again. Especially for the context of teacher education, which is of interest here, the development of a critical basic attitude as well as the examination, expansion or breaking through of one’s own thought patterns can become of utmost importance. Those who want to teach others CT cannot avoid fundamental questions of the justification of knowledge, the raising and redeeming of validity claims, i.e., questions like these: • How can we talk meaningfully about facts and objectivity? • How objective can information be? • Where can a reasonable line be drawn between objective reporting and manipulation? What role does the visual or linguistic presentation of information play in this? • To what extent can the media be neutral mediators of information at all?

1.4 The Program: Critical Thinking as Judgment

9

• Do scientific studies per se guarantee “truth” or an independent, unquestionable point of view? • What are the basic ethical assumptions underlying a particular argument? CT essentially aims at examining and reflecting on any claims to validity. Anyone who wants to teach CT should develop a well-founded attitude towards these questions.

2

Analytical-Epistemic Thinking

Analytic-epistemic should mean a thinking that is reflective and examining towards any truth claims. Analytical means thinking that identifies, clarifies and specifies meanings and truth claims. This is about the inner coherence of statements and argumentations, the effort for conceptual clarity, and the sensitization for linguistic ambiguities. However, analytical thinking is no longer sufficient to test and substantiate truth claims. For this, mostly experience-related, “empirical” information is necessary. Episteme is the Greek word for “knowledge.” Epistemic is meant here to denote a way of thinking that is able to integrate empirical information in the form of media reporting, but also in the form of scientific knowledge, into one’s own judgment and argumentation. In other words, a way of thinking that allows one’s own knowledge and opinions to be expanded or corrected by empirically verifiable insights. Since scientific knowledge also always has preconditions and limitations, this should at the same time denote a way of thinking that does not simply accept media reporting or scientific results without reflection, but always reflects on them with regard to their conditions of origin and validity.

2.1

Epistemological and Linguistic Critical Preliminary Considerations

CT in the analytic-epistemic sense can be broken down into steps that can be characterized as follows: • Clarifying meanings: Understanding and specifying truth claims • Examine evidence: Proving and disproving truth claims # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_2

11

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• Judging: Weighing truth claims and integrating them into a coherent overall picture Before we look at these steps in more detail from Sect. 2.2 onwards, we send a preliminary consideration that is intended to sensitize us to the linguistic-logical pitfalls that we encounter in CT. We do this using the example of talking about “facts.”

2.1.1

Alternative Facts

The former White House press secretary Sean Spicer claimed in the infamous January 21, 2017 press conference that there were more people at President Trump’s inauguration than ever before. All available data contradicted this claim: aerial photos, for example, showed a noticeably smaller crowd than at Obama’s 2009 inauguration, and mass transit recorded about 300,000 fewer passengers. Nevertheless, the administration stood by the statement, which eventually led to the famous statement by Trump’s adviser and campaign manager Kellyanne Conway that Spicer had presented nothing false, but “alternative facts” (Alternative Fakten, 2021). From the point of view of “common sense” this episode could also have had the status of a farce that one takes note of with amusement and then forgets again. In fact, however, it came up against a political climate in which opposing groups accused each other of lying and spreading fake news. Talk of post-truth politics had already become the word of the year in 2016. What makes the talk of alternative facts so explosive and dangerous, but also significant for our context, is that it gives the impression that there are actually no facts, but that it is always opinion against opinion (Nida-Rümelin, 2018, p. 32). The dispute of opinion is therefore not about truth, but about assertion. For the enforcement of one’s own opinion, however, the best means of choice would then not be the factual argument, but strategies of enforcement such as propaganda. Talking of “alternative facts” suggests a significant thesis, without, of course, explicitly asserting it: for every assertion there is a counter-assertion, which in each case is just as “true” for the one who asserts it. What is “true” is what the individual persons consider to be true.

2.1 Epistemological and Linguistic Critical Preliminary Considerations

2.1.2

13

“There Are No Facts, Only Interpretations”

This brings us close to a position that has also become fashionable in some academic and journalistic circles: relativism. This denies the possibility of a certain knowledge of the world and emphasizes instead the dependence of all efforts at knowledge (and their results) on certain presuppositions as well as the constant possibility of a revision of what has hitherto been considered knowledge. So far there is nothing to be said against this. Also, one merit of relativism certainly lies in rejecting a “naive realism” that takes one’s own perception of the world for “reality.” There is also merit in the criticism of chauvinistic and nationalistic world views, which take one’s own way of life for the only possible one and thereby fail to recognize how location- and culture-dependent one’s own view of the world can be. There are good reasons for this criticism. In relativist positions, it leads, among other things, to the thesis of the cultural dependence of all knowledge, as it is represented in postmodernist or poststructuralist theories. Finally, relativist positions can also be credited with questioning the supposed authority of “bare facts.” Statements such as “that’s a fact” or “the facts speak for themselves” are often more likely to suppress other opinions than to contribute to an enlightened discussion.1 Relativism becomes problematic, however, when it is taken to be a final standpoint no longer in need of reflection, and when one denies the possibility of an objective knowledge of reality in general, like “radical constructivism,” or when one engages in the “deconstruction” of such concepts as “fact” or “truth,” thus gradually leveling the dividing line between fact and fiction (Gabriel, 2019, pp. 131–135). This has now taken its revenge in times of fake news and post-factualism. Those authors, journalists, and intellectuals who wanted to criticize what they saw as a worrying development towards “post-factual politics” now found that they could not do so if they had adopted a maximum relativist position. As the philosopher Julian Nida-Rümelin notes, with Trump a president was now openly cultivating a “postmodern” approach to truth. This got his angry critics into trouble, for those who considered the separation of fact and fiction, of fact and interpretation, “stuffy” (Radisch, 2019) now lacked the basis on which to meaningfully criticize Trump. This is because he uses a jargon that has become standard for much of the humanities, cultural studies, and social sciences in recent decades” (Nida-Rümelin,

1

This is summed up very well in the following article: (Grüninger & Egli, 2016).

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2018, p. 33). According to Nida-Rümelin, this is precisely what led to deep insecurity among critics of the postfactual. How difficult it is to criticize Trump on the basis of such positions is shown by Nida-Rümelin in his insightful analysis of a feature article in the FAZ.2 There he shows how the author (who is not the subject of a personal but only exemplary criticism) tries to counter the post-factual on the basis of a constructivism that has not been thought through to the end, but in doing so gets entangled in contradictions because she cannot bring herself to acknowledge something like facts. Instead, she tries to get around this with vulgar constructivist theses like “knowledge is not objective, but a subjectively shaped interpretation” (translated). She quotes constructivist-oriented scientists like Rouven Porz who are convincend that there are no hard facts, only interpretations of the world. Nida-Rümelin’s analysis shows how the relativist thinking that has been thoughtlessly cultivated in newspaper feature pages over a long period of time fails because of its own inconsistency, when the same authors who have questioned the possibility of truth and objectivity now try to accuse Trump of lying. For the attribution of lies presupposes the recognition of facts and the distinction between true and false. A critique of “post-factual” propaganda, disinformation, fake news, or “alternative facts” is welcome. It is just unfortunately not possible on the basis of a relativist position.

2.1.3

On the Concept of a ‘Fact’

The (presumably deliberately) misleading talk of “alternative facts,” but also the unreflected talk of the “forgery of facts,”3 against which some well-meaning people take up arms, shows a deep confusion that starts with language, more precisely with the unreflected use of such words as “fact” or “factual.” It is therefore important to always think of CT as also thinking critically of language. Thus, instead of asking the naive question of whether facts “really exist”, it is more promising to ask how one can reasonably, here in the sense of consistently and without confusion, speak of facts or truths. Indeed, the whole discourse is based on a confusion of factual and linguistic levels that is not easy to see through. To show this, let us consult some insights of linguistic analytic philosophy.

2

(Friedrich, 2017). Thus in the FAZ article mentioned. As Rümelin notes, facts can by no means be falsified. True and false can be meaningfully attributed only to statements, not to facts.

3

2.1 Epistemological and Linguistic Critical Preliminary Considerations

15

Contrary to what the usual talk of “facts” or “truths” might suggest, it does not refer to something that is simply present in the world, so that one would only have to point to it, such as a stone lying around. The term “fact” can only be obtained by reference to propositions. “Facts” are what we call states of affairs that are represented by true propositions (Kamlah & Lorenzen, 1987, p. 136). This implies that facts are not accessible independently of language. Facts cannot be pointed to in the same way as objects; they can only be identified at all by means of propositions: “There are 25 chairs in this room” is a proposition of which we can say that it denotes a fact only if we already have the proposition just mentioned which expresses the corresponding fact (that there are 25 chairs in this room). This proposition is true or false, and expresses a fact in the first case, but not in the second. “True” or “false” are attributions that cannot be attached to facts directly, but only to statements about them. To speak of “alternative facts” or even “false facts” is therefore misleading. A statement is true or not and thus expresses a fact or not. To reflect critically in cases of such confusion means not to talk directly on the factual level about true or false facts or facts, but to take a step back and reflect on the linguistic means with which we can make facts the object of consideration in the first place. Only the propositional sentence opens up the possibility of referring to facts, and only to a propositional sentence “p” can there be an alternative, namely a statement like “not-p.”

2.1.4

Facts, Logic, and the Law of Non-contradiction

At this point it is worthwhile to consider the role of logic in speaking about facts. “True” or “false,” we had said, are attributions that cannot be attached to facts directly, but only to propositional sentences about them. Now, statements are related to other statements, for example, some imply others. But they can also be mutually exclusive, like the following: (1) “There were more people at Trump’s inauguration than there were at Obama’s” (2) “There were no more people at Trump’s inauguration than there were at Obama’s” (3) “There were fewer people at Trump’s inauguration than there were at Obama’s” Proposition (1) cannot be true at the same time as (2) or (3). If (1) is true, (2) is false, and likewise (3) is false. (1) is in a contrary opposition to (3) and in an contradictory opposition to (2). That is, (1) and (2) can neither be true nor false at the same time.

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The truth of one involves the falsity of the other and vice versa. (1) and (3) cannot both be true either, but they can both be false (if as many people were present in each case). Here, the indissoluble connection between fact, statement, and logic becomes visible, which is important for our context of talking about “alternative facts” and at the same time for every critical speech. The negation of a true proposition is simply a false proposition and not an “alternatively true proposition.” Remarkable is, that this connection of the two propositions has not at all anything to do with the actual number of visitors or any other content, but with the logic of statements. The law of (non-)contradiction says, in short, that one cannot ascribe and not ascribe something to a thing at the same time. But this logical ability is different from a physical one (I cannot jump 3 m high) or a mental one (I cannot stop taking drugs). The “constraint” of logic is not a physical or psychological one that manipulates thought, as it were. The constraint of logic, more precisely in the case of the law of contradiction, lies simply in the fact that whoever does not adhere to it can no longer say anything definite in terms of content. Aristotle, the founder of logic, already saw this. If someone says something at all, he has already claimed the law of contradiction. To claim the negation of one’s thesis would be like making a move in chess and taking it back again (Tugendhat & Wolf, 1986). You can do that, something physically happened, but there was no move in the game. We point out that these linguistic-logical considerations in no way preclude the possibility of meaningful disagreement as to whether the statement in question is true or not, and as to which method of determination is reliable. That the earth revolves around the sun we accept as a fact, but, as we know, it took centuries for astronomy to develop generally accepted observational instruments and mathematical models and equations that satisfactorily explained the phenomena and made reliable predictions possible. So whether a proposition is a fact or not can be very controversial. But it is precisely the dispute that implies the distinctness of true and false. One can meaningfully argue only if one presupposes that there is a fact here that we are arguing about, and that we just do not know whether “The earth revolves around the sun” is a true or false proposition. So in the case of Conway’s “alternative facts,” it is about something more fundamental than the lie in an individual case. It always has been there, and probably, it will always be. However, anyone who speaks in this way is not only telling the untruth in a particular case, but, with their (implicit or explicit) attack on logic, takes away the basis of any rational understanding. Two points of these preliminary considerations of fact should be noted:

2.2 Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims

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1. CT cannot succeed on the basis of an unreflective relativism that rejects concepts such as “fact” or “truth” or generally denies the redeemability of objective claims to validity. 2. Facts are not accessible without language, but only mediated by propositions. CT is therefore always also language-critical thinking, which must give account of the logic of its terms or their use. A way of thinking and arguing that calls itself critical must be able to give an account of the linguistic means with which reference is made to the facts being negotiated in each case. We said above that to think critically in the analytic-epistemic sense means to place oneself in a distanced, scrutinizing, and reflective relationship to truth claims. But how could one proceed when examining truth claims? For this purpose, we again take up the three steps mentioned above: 1. Clarifying meanings: Understanding and specifying truth claims 2. Examine evidence: Proving and disproving truth claims 3. Judging: Weighing truth claims and integrating them into a coherent overall picture

2.2

Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims

2.2.1

What Is Claimed?

From Ludwig Wittgenstein (1990, translated) comes the famous phrase: “Whatever can be said can be said clearly, and what cannot be spoken of must be kept silent.” Similarly, Karl Popper (1971) stated that if you can’t say it plain and simple, keep quiet and keep working until you can say it plain and simple. Both emphasize the virtue of intellectual honesty – by two very opposite personalities – by the minimal commitment to the intelligibility and comprehensibility of speech. In the event of not being able to meet this demand, both recommend precisely not to let the environment necessarily participate in one’s own half-baked thoughts, but rather to suspend one’s own judgment through silence. For the demand for clarity it does not play a decisive role whether it is ourselves who formulate a thesis or whether it is a matter of understanding what others have asserted. Even in the reception of statements, the meaning and the claim to validity of what is asserted must first be secured. All CT, then, has to begin with the

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understanding of meanings. We have introduced language criticism above as an important element of CT. We now need to continue this when we address in the following the claim to validity of intelligibility and comprehensibility of speech. To this end, clarification efforts are necessary, which still precede any examination of truth claims, for before I can substantiate the truth or falsity of a thesis with evidence or dispute it with refutations, it must be clarified what was claimed in the first place. To do this, speech must sometimes be freed from ambiguities or unclear metaphors. In some intellectual discourses, speech can do amazing capers. Erich Kästner caricatured this ironically in a famous short dialogue: “The customer to the vegetable woman: ‘What are you reading there, my dear? A book by Ernst Jünger?’ The vegetable woman to the customer: ‘No, a book by Gottfried Benn. Jünger’s crystalline lucidity is too pretentious for me. Benn’s cerebral magic gives me more’” (Kästner, 2017, translated). Language is known to be ambiguous, and it becomes all the more so the further it is removed from practical contexts of everyday life. Words in everyday language that are needed at the vegetable market, for example, may differ regionally (so the Austrian expression “Paradeiser” for “tomato” may raise question marks in Germany), but they nevertheless remain easily controlled by practice (Janich, 2000, p. 11). If someone wants a “Paradeiser” but the seller gives out an apple, it is easy to see that the word was not understood. The misunderstanding can be easily corrected in this context of action shared equally by both persons, e.g., by a pointing gesture towards tomatoes. The more abstract or metaphorical the language usages become, the less the possibility of control through practice. If, as in the Kästner example above, there is even talk of “crystalline lucidity” or “cerebral magic,” then mutual understanding is much more difficult to secure. It is not even a foregone conclusion whether a misunderstanding would be noticed at all. It is quite conceivable that the persons would “talk past each other” and that this dialogue would continue with the exchange of further unenlightened metaphors. These formulations, chosen by Kästner with ironic intent, belong to a style of language that we call here “Bildungssprache” (educated/educational language). In it, there is also talk of “social structure,” “values,” “paradigm shifts,” “memory systems,” among other things (Kamlah & Lorenzen, 1987, p. 24). Educational language, unlike everyday language, is rooted in the technical language of the natural science, social science, or humanities traditions (Janich, 2000, p. 54). In contrast to scientific conceptualization, for which we assume here the ideal of standardizing the respectively used expressions by explicit usage rules and making them unambiguous and comprehensible in their usage, in educational language the usage of the respective expressions remains unexplained. The latter find their way into public communication with its sometimes chaotic linguistic customs influenced

2.2 Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims

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by irrelevant motives and fashions, so that the use of these terms loses its methodical character and their users are content with their metaphorical and aesthetic euphony. CT meets such educational linguistic usages with a certain scepticism, and urges that the respective linguistc imagery be resolved by precise conceptual explanations. We are less sceptical, on the other hand, of everyday language, provided that it remains at all times comprehensible and controllable by the particular context of use. However, since even everyday language is not free of misleading ways of speaking, its expressions must also always be clarified when necessary.

2.2.2

Conceptual Clarifications

We would like to take up again the demand for clarity of speech, exemplified by Popper and Wittgenstein. For so far we have not explained what we mean by “clear,” so that the demand for clarity itself has remained “unclear.” In doing so, we draw on Wittgenstein’s pragmatic reconstructions of language and methodological constructivism (in a much simplified form). Many people immediately think of definitions when asked for conceptual clarification. However, these are a “later” stage of development. The starting point for the question of securing conceptual clarity is the simple consideration that the use of predictors for things like “tomato” or “apple,” but also action predictors like “walking” or “lifting” are learned by means of examples and counter-examples. Those who learn to master the concept of “apple” in this way can effortlessly distinguish which objects they would have to put in an apple basket, for example, and which they would not. In the case of misunderstandings, which occur again and again in comprehension contexts (as in the “tomato example” above), an understanding can often be restored by pointing to the objects in question or even by explanations and linguistic corrections (Janich, 2014). In this respect, explanations of meaning as we are familiar with them from language games, in which it is explained what was “meant” by a word or what a certain expression “means,” have an important role to play in establishing “clarity” (and thus the success of understanding). In scientific contexts, in which ideally cross-situational and intersubjective understanding is sought, definitions in the sense of explicit standardizations of language usage now become necessary. Precise definitions of technical terms are indispensable in scientific contexts. In everyday private and social communication contexts, on the other hand, it is not always necessary to precisely define something where communication is practically successful. Sometimes it is not desirable either

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(e.g., in artistic contexts, because conceptual standardization always means a reduction in the possibilities of expression). Nevertheless, one must realize that a claim to truth cannot even be made (let alone redeemed) if the expressions used are unclear. Thus, when terms are used that, for example, because of their abstractness, metaphorical ambiguity, or political explosiveness, run the risk of being non- or misunderstood, explanatory sentences that make the usage in the given context explicit are recommended. Conversely, when statements are received whose claim to validity is unclear, it should be asked in what sense the statement or certain terms contained in it are to be understood. In order to be able to redeem the claim to comprehensibility, it must be possible to indicate, at least when asked, how a term is used in the given context, to which objects it is applied and to which it is not. If the author of the statement in question is not available as an interlocutor, it should be made explicit how the statements in question could be understood and one’s own interpretation should be made clear before proceeding to a yes/no statement.

2.2.3

Does Islam Belong to Germany? An Illustrative Example

We will illustrate the importance of ensuring conceptual clarity by using the example of the famous statement “Islam (now also) belongs to Germany” (Hildebrandt, 2015, translated). This thesis, uttered by former German President Christian Wulff on October 3rd, 2010, was the prelude to an enthusiastic, sometimes hysterical discussion. The fact that the subject of Islam in Germany is generally one of those topics that are prone to irrational arguments is probably an important background to the debate. In this context, however, we are interested in the ambiguity and misunderstanding of the sentence, which, as the debate showed, can be interpreted in very different directions. The excited discussion that followed the utterance was characterized by agreeing or disagreeing with the thesis, but not by clarifying first and foremost its meaning and thus its claim to validity. Opponents of the thesis mostly argued with reference to historical roots or cultural differences between the Occident and the Arab world. Some proponents defended the thesis with regard to the Muslims living here and left the historical roots aside in their argumentation. Still other supporters looked for historical clues in which Islam had played a role for Europe after all, and so on. That such a discussion can be revived at any time without any factual progress was shown when Horst Seehofer announced in 2018 that Islam does not belong to Germany after all4 (citing the historical

4

(Breyton, 2018).

2.2 Clarify Meanings: Understanding and Specifying Truth Claims

21

influence of Christianity), so that the whole game started all over again. Accordingly, the title of an article in the Welt summed up the matter ironically: “Islam belongs to Germany, belongs not to Germany, belongs to. . .” (Breyton, 2019). We give the example not to criticize the author of the sentence in a cheap way, but to illustrate something that is important for CT: we first see that the sentence is not at all as easy to understand as it appears to those who react to it in a reflexive or emotional way with approval or disapproval. What would it mean to think critically here, in an analytical sense? First of all, it would not mean to take a stand immediately, but to strive for conceptual clarification: What exactly is meant? This can be asked back in conversation when someone expresses a thesis like this, or one can also strive for clarification oneself by explicitly naming the possibilities of how it could be meant – in this case: what exactly “Islam” refers to, for example. • Does Islam mean a belief system, does it mean its social-political manifestation (including legal instances such as the Sharia)? • Do they mean it by inclusion or by distinction from Islamism? • Does one refer to the cultural history of Europe and the Orient, so that deeper historical knowledge would have to be consulted to justify the thesis? • Or do they simply mean the Muslims living here (if integrated or not)? If one names the variant of interpretation for or against which one argues, the claim to validity of one’s own critical statement on the thesis is made clear at the same time. For one makes transparent that one’s own argumentation is based on a certain interpretation of the thesis. With the questions presented above, we cannot carry out the work of specification in detail here, but only hint at it, but these few considerations should show that before the statement, the understanding of the thesis is the primary task. In this case, this would consist in specifying and concretizing the terms in such a way that it becomes visible which claim to validity was made with the respective statement. When Joachim Gauck was asked what he thought of the sentence, he said, among other things, “I would simply have said that the Muslims who live here belong to Germany.”5 This modification can already be seen as a first clarification in the sense explained above. It would not have prevented every inquiry and discussion, which cannot be a sensible goal in a political context. Discussions there are not only

5

(Gauck rückt von Positionen Merkels und Wilffs ab, 2012).

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unavoidable but also necessary. Nevertheless, discussions can be conducted more fruitfully if the claims to validity are not obscured by unclear ways of using terms. When we ask questions as exemplified above, we leave the reactive behavioural pattern and adopt an analyzing attitude. We specify and concretize the terms that make up an assertion, e.g., by indicating what they are to be applied to by example and counterexample. A scientific investigation would proceed in a similar way. Before a question can be empirically investigated, a binding, precise terminology must be created. This is done through explicit standardizations such as the definition or operationalization of terms. Explicit definitions, as I said, are neither always possible nor desirable in the context of social and political interaction, but one can also secure meanings in a conversational situation by asking how exactly the thesis is to be understood or what the term „Islam “is supposed to refer to, and so on. If, on the other hand, one cannot question the author of a thesis, one can explicitly name and justify an interpretation in order to base one’s statements on it.

2.2.4

Bullshit : An Excursus

If one addresses intelligibility as a minimal claim to validity of statements, one also encounters a now widespread rhetorical phenomenon that the philosopher Harry Frankfurt has analysed under the keyword “bullshit.” The term “bullshit” is familiar to us from both public and private life, and we encounter it in advertising, in the media in general, and in politics. Consider the following sentence heard on the radio the other day: (1) “If Aries stays loose, it can set itself up for a lucky streak today” Analogous sentences followed with information about what “Pisces,” “Virgins,” etc. would have to expect on that day. Now we assume that people reading this book are rather skeptical about such sentences. But: what exactly is wrong with sentences like (1)? Purely on the grammatical surface, it seems to be constructed analogously to the following sentence: (2) “When a copper rod is heated, it expands” So it seems to follow the pattern: If x is done, then y happens. However, with (2) we know more precisely what is to be done and what should then happen, provided the proposition is true. If the metal rod did not expand after heat was added, this would mean: The proposition is false.

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In the case of (1), we need not even begin to specify its meaning (here: the conditions under which it is true) in any way, let alone examine it. Suppose I seriously wanted to pin down the author of the sentence on its meaning and if necessary even complain, provided that I (who actually am an Aries) did not have a lucky streak today, then the astrologer could object, that the reason for the absence of the lucky streak is that I then just certainly “did not stay loose.” But how is one supposed to “prove” that one was “loose” after all, without giving the astrologer the possibility of further and further reinterpretations of what was said? There is no argumentative way around that. We know this and therefore do not argue. Hardly any reasonable person would seriously think of holding the authors of this horoscope liable in any way. The reason for this is simply that this sentence was uttered without any interest in saying anything in particular (i.e., true or false) at all. In such a case, according to Harry Frankfurt, we are dealing with “bullshit.” As he tries to show, unlike the lie, which still has a kind of negative interest in truth, bullshit has no interest in truth at all. The liar must somehow be concerned with the truth of what he says. The bullshitter does not (Frankfurt, 2014). Hardly anyone would therefore come up with the idea of suing a candy bar manufacturer because after buying and eating quite a few candy bars one nevertheless did not become “cooler,” although the advertising claimed or at least suggested this connection, because that is simply bullshit. The relation of such propositions to empirical facts is thus arbitrary, and it remains so no matter what counter-arguments are advanced. This is what distinguishes a statement such as the above from the horoscope from a simply false sentence such as “When a copper rod is heated, it does not expand in any way.” This proposition, despite its falsity, has some epistemic value, because its truth value is in principle assessable. Also, it could be a hypothesis that leads us down the right path after its falsity has been shown. This is not the case with sentences like (1). It has no clarifiable relation to true and false. Bullshit is distinguished from false statements precisely by its completely arbitrary relation to reality. So much for Harry Frankfurt’s rough idea. Why is this of interest in our context? Because bullshit may be harmless in individual cases, but if practiced continuously it threatens the climate of opinion and debate just as much as lies. Bullshit is indeed spouted purposefully, but with irrelevant goals such as self-promotion, as often happens in political soapbox speeches with lots of warm words but no binding content. Frankfurt cites situations as an example in which people are forced to talk about things they know nothing about. This creates a discrepancy between the obligation to explain and expertise, which Frankfurt says is typical of public life. He identifies as a deeper cause of “the

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current proliferation of bullshit” the “diverse forms of skepticism that deny us the possibility of reliable access to objective reality and claim that we ultimately cannot know how things really are” (Frankfurt, 2014, pp. 46–47). We had already addressed this above under the heading of “relativism.” According to Frankfurt, this “undermines our confidence in the value of unbiased efforts to clarify what is true and what is false” (Frankfurt, 2014, p. 47). In place of the ideal of rightness, with its goal of an adequate representation of the common world, then comes the ideal of authenticity, which is concerned only with the sincere representation of one’s self (p. 47). This can also be observed, among other things, in moralizing ways of speaking, which we will discuss in the ethical section. Finally, in our context it is interesting to distinguish bullshit from conspiracy theories. In the case of the latter, it is also true that its proponents are difficult to commit to an authoritative interpretation and thus to verification. Unlike bullshit, however, this is not due to a lack of interest in truth, for that is very high among conspiracy theorists. Unlike bullshitters, they usually believe in what they say so much that they immunize any objection against criticism by reinterpreting what they say.6 In this way they resemble religious fanatics and political ideologues. The latter absolutize a particular idea which they believe to be true and which they are sometimes even prepared to defend at the risk of their own safety and lives, no matter what rational arguments are against it. The bullshitter, on the other hand, is completely indifferent to identification with any idea because of their relaxed relationship to truth. They are closer to the political opportunist than to the ideologue.

2.2.5

Intention and Context

We have not yet considered an important aspect of understanding meaning, namely the pragmatic, action-related side of language. It is not only possible to ask whether an utterance is true or false, but also what kind of action is performed with it (e.g., statement or insult) and with what intention it is connected. It is one of the enduring insights of the pragmatic theories of language of the twentieth century that speaking is never a mere reflection of what is given, but always also an action, i.e., something that a person says to other persons for a specific purpose. The above-mentioned pragmatic theories of language of the twentieth century, following Peirce, Austin,

6

We will discuss immunization strategies in more detail below.

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Searle, or Wittgenstein, have made it clear that understanding an utterance always includes understanding its action-instructing role (Schneider, 2003). When A says “it is raining,” this can be a mere observation or assertion that A makes when looking out of the window. But it can also be a warning, e.g., when A sees that B is about to leave the house. “It’s raining” can thus be said under different action-initiating roles (as an observation, a warning, a request to take the umbrella or stay at home, an expression of joy, etc.). Such words as “statement,” “assertion,” “warning,” “request,” we use in communication to characterize the specific action character of a linguistic utterance. Asserting something is a different (speech) act than warning, greeting, praising, rebuking, requesting, provoking, insulting, defaming, etc. someone. Now, linguistic (as well as non-linguistic) actions can succeed or fail. A joke, for example, fails if it is understood as an insult. If we point out in such a case that we only made a joke, but did not intend to insult anyone, then we address the speaker’s intention of the speech act. Against the background of the fact that speech acts can always be misunderstood, this is an essential part of understanding what was said. Why is this relevant for CT? We get a clue to this if we take up again the above example “Islam belongs to Germany.” The question can then be raised as to what intention Wulff was pursuing with the statement. Was it a statement that soberly asserted a fact and thus could be true or false? Or did he want to call on the majority society to better accept Muslims? Was it an affirmation of the value of tolerance? We do not want to answer these questions for this concrete case, but only to show by them that it can make a big difference for the understanding of even the same statement under which intention one understands it. This is especially true for the social and political context.

2.2.6

Language Game and Context of an Utterance

The intention of an utterance is important for understanding, but this example already shows that it, as the subjective intention of the speaker, does not alone decide the meaning of what is said. Anyone who intends to say something must already have recourse to previously established meanings. For example, I can only greet someone with a wave if waving is institutionalized as a greeting in a community. What counts as a greeting and what counts as an insult is not something I can establish as an individual. With Wittgenstein, one could say that it depends on which language game is being played. Only in a social context of established language games, in which I have learned through examples and counter-examples what counts as a greeting and what counts as an insult, can I intend to greet

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(or insult) someone with a specific action. So the meaning of what is said also depends on its social establishment. Now, speech acts such as an insult in the public sphere can take very subtle and complicated forms that are far removed from the teaching-learning situations in which we learned by example what counts as an insult. Here, the “context” (in the sense of the linguistic and non-linguistic environment) of the utterance now plays an important role. Often politicians who are accused of certain statements defend themselves by saying that the statement was taken “out of context.” This is sometimes an excuse, but again, that can only be clarified by including the context. What is valid about this defense is that it makes a big difference to the meaning of an utterance in what context it was made. Here, questions such as the following play a role: • Was the utterance in response to a question or to another utterance? What was the answer? • Does it represent an occasional statement, e.g., did it happen in the “heat of the moment,” or can it be assumed, on the basis of repeated similar statements, that it expresses a stable attitude? • What else did the person say? • In which situation was the statement made (e.g., in a private circle of friends or in the Bundestag)? • For texts: what comes before the quoted sentence, what comes after it? To which tradition, if any, does the author refer? Questions like these, which focus not on the sentence itself but its environment, are often very important in really understanding what a statement means. Guiding Questions Let us summarize what is important in the first step of analytical-epistemic thinking, which is about understanding or clarifying meanings and truth claims. We want to do this by means of guiding questions: • • • •

What exactly a particular statement assert? What terms still need clarification to answer this question? What could be the intention of the statement? What is the context of the utterance? (this is relevant for all previous questions)

2.3 Examine Evidence: Proving and Disproving Truth Claims

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Examine Evidence: Proving and Disproving Truth Claims

While Sect. 2.2 was about understanding or clarifying meanings and truth claims, this section is now about testing or proving and disproving truth claims. As we said above, CT does not take place in a social vacuum, but is embedded in the socially established practice of giving and taking reasons. Within the framework of this practice, it is true that whoever asserts something makes a claim to truth, and this implies obligations to give reasons and to provide evidence. CT in this step also has a receptive and an active side, i.e., in the first case it asks to what extent an assertion is substantiated by evidence, in the second case it is itself prepared, at least on demand, to provide reasons and evidence for what is asserted. In simple everyday relationships, one’s own observations or inquiries made by acquaintances and friends are often sufficient. However, as soon as it goes beyond questions of everyday interaction, this is no longer sufficient, but further sources of information are required. Evidence can be provided by scientific studies, theories, newspaper articles, internet sources, etc. The variety of evidence can be bundled into two central sources of information, the nature of which we will now consider in a little more detail: Science and the Media. For CT in the analytical-epistemic sense, it is of central importance to deal with both in a reflective and detached way. We begin with science.

2.3.1

“A Composed Hypothesis Gives Us Lynx Eyes for Everything That Confirms It”

What we call science already has its roots in antiquity. Since the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution in the seventh and eighteenth centuries, it has increasingly replaced religion in the Western world as the authority to interpret reality. Today, too, we see it as the most reliable source of knowledge. Nevertheless, in the course of the increasing digital availability of information, a certain levelling of the difference between science and pseudoscience can be observed. The free availability of unfiltered information has an undeniably democratizing side, but also leads to an indiscriminate coexistence of serious science, pseudoscience, eclectic halfknowledge, crude conspiracy theories, and propaganda. Now most people still consider science to be a salient source of knowledge, preferable to the others. How can this be justified? What is the distinguishing aspect of science? Karl Popper put forward a theory about this that is interesting for CT

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because it distinguishes knowledge gained through science from other sources of knowledge precisely because of its critical function. Before explaining this in more detail, let us consider the difference between scientific and non-scientific statements using a striking example of prediction. As is well known, there were also predictions in pre-modern times, some of which came true, some of which did not. Here is a short story from ancient times: Herodotus (fifth century BC), the “father of historiography” reports a famous episode according to which the king of Lydia Croesus, in order to decide whether he should attack the Persian empire, asked the oracle of Delphi what his chances were. The answer he received was, “If you cross the [border river] Halys, you will destroy a great empire.” Croesus had no idea that it would be his own empire that would be doomed to destruction. Croesus lost the battle against the Persians, and Lydia was incorporated into the Persian Empire. If we ask whether this disproved the prediction, the answer is unfortunately no, for the oracle was able to rely on the interpretation of having meant Croesus’ own empire. Thus it was right, and the prediction was “confirmed.” What can this story teach us for our context? It teaches us vividly how to immunize a statement against empirical refutation. The advantage of this prediction (for the oracle, not for Croesus) was that it could be “confirmed” by both Croesus’ victory and his defeat. By not clearly designating the empire to be destroyed, the risk of the prediction failing in experience was minimized (unlike if it had said “Persian Empire” instead of “Great Empire”).7 With this we can take up Karl Popper’s thought. In his view, the unscientific character of such a prognosis now lies precisely in the fact that it does not take the risk of failure and thus enables an immunization against criticism. Popper attributes the success of the sciences primarily to their critical attitude, which he opposes to the dogmatic one. In his view, scientists are “people with bold ideas, but who are highly critical of their own ideas, trying to find out whether they may not be wrong. They work with bold conjectures and rigorous attempts to refute their own conjectures” (Popper, 1995, translated). It is the interplay of “bold hypotheses” on the one hand and rigorous empirical testing on the other that, according to Popper, constitutes the high explanatory power and reliability of science. Among other things, a hypothesis is bold “when it runs a great risk of being false” (Popper, 1995, p. 104).

7

This shows us once again the importance of the precise use of terms that we discussed in Sect. 2.3.

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Thus, Popper viewed evidence and confirmations of theories with some skepticism. For Popper, what many consider to be the hallmark of science as distinct from pseudo-theories, namely, that it does not merely make unsupported claims, but brings evidence to support them, is precisely what science and pseudo-science have in common. What distinguishes them is that science regards its claims as provisional hypotheses, which it subjects to rigorous testing procedures and thus to attempts at refutation, rather than merely seeking confirmations. If these hypotheses stand up to serious attempts at disconfirmation, they are considered proven, though even that remains provisional, fallible, and subject to revision by later findings. The greater the risk of a theory failing in the face of experience, the greater its explanatory power. The world of the conspiracy theorist, on the other hand, is full of confirmation, as is that of the religious fanatic or the political ideologue. When Popper pondered what might serve as a criterion of demarcation between science and pseudoscience, he noted with great surprise the ceaseless stream of corroboration that adherents of pseudoscience (for Popper, e.g., astrologers, psychoanalysts, Marxists)8 claimed for their theories. A Marxist, according to Popper, could not open a newspaper without seeing his theory of society confirmed. But even in our everyday judgment, we are not immune to the tendency to select information in such a way that it confirms our worldview. As Schopenhauer once remarked, “A composed hypothesis gives us lynx eyes for everything that confirms it (Schopenhauer, 1998, translated).” Psychology calls this phenomenon confirmation bias,9 which psychologist Peter Wason studied back in the 1960s. According to many psychologists, the best way to avoid this erroneous strategy is to follow Popper’s recommendation in everyday judgment formation as well and, instead of unilaterally seeking confirmation, repeatedly choose the opposite strategy and look for data that would refute the thesis once it has been formulated (Mietzel, 2008, pp. 329–330). Therefore, perspective thinking, i.e., the inclusion of the counterthesis in one’s own judgement formation, is also of great importance in CT.

8 9

One could certainly criticize this list, but it is only exemplary. Wason (1960) and Kahnemann (2012, pp. 106–108).

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Why It Is Difficult to Adopt a Critical Approach to Scientific Results

If we follow Popper, we are well advised to trust scientific sources rather than others. Thinking critically then always means integrating scientific knowledge into one’s own judgment and argumentation, correcting or modifying one’s own body of knowledge and opinions through empirically testable insights. Indeed, in order to form an opinion on topics such as climate change, migration, health, etc., scientific information is indispensable. Many (popular) scientific publications expand our knowledge, help us to better justify or modify our judgement. The better one takes into account the best available research on an issue, the more well-founded – we hope – one’s own judgement will be.

2.3.2.1 Popular Science Nevertheless, the acquisition and integration of scientific results into one’s own body of knowledge is by no means a seamless undertaking, but a thoroughly complex process. A virologist or statistician will classify and judge published figures on an epidemic quite differently than a person without any medical or statistical training. Anyone who is not a specialist (and we all are in most fields) is usually dependent on the popular scientific presentation of research results by scientists or science journalists. Here it is important to realize that such presentations by no means simply reproduce scientific results, but already represent an interpretative step through the selection and emphasis of the content. Furthermore, simplifications are sometimes made which, while useful for the didactic purpose of such texts, can be a hindrance to critical classification. Thus, certain half-truths persist. In the OECD as well as in the cognitive sciences, for example, the phenomenon of so-called “neuromyths,” spread by popular scientific representations, is well known. This refers to false assumptions about how the brain works that many people believe to be scientifically proven, e.g., beliefs such as “we only use 10% of our brain” or “people learn better when information is presented in their preferred learning style (e.g., visual, auditory, kinaesthetic)” (Paridon, 2018). In addition to the danger of misinterpreting or simplifying scientific results, a fundamental problem of popular science presentations must also be taken into account: They seldom address the methodological limitations made by researchers, i.e., they do not reflect on science as a system of action in which sections of the world are selected, methodological decisions are made and normative rules are set, but rather focus more on the results, so that their reason for validity is often no

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longer reflected upon. This is particularly evident in TV formats such as “Galileo,” which take the validity of scientific results for granted and show them only in terms of their everyday utility and entertainment value. For this reason, Wittgenstein once criticized popular science as an endeavor that satisfies “the most despicable desires of modern man,” namely “the superficial curiosity about the latest scientific discoveries” (Wittgenstein, 1989, p. 9, translated), without making it comprehensible what hard work and what paths led to these results. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, it obscures rather than enlightens “what science is all about” (Drury, 1992, p. 167, translated. This judgment certainly does not apply to every popular science presentation, but it can sensitize to the difference between good and bad popular science.

2.3.2.2 Different Results

But even at the scientific “primary level,” scientific results do not simply speak for themselves. It is not uncommon for there to be different doctrinal opinions and perspectives on a topic complex, which can be due to different factors such as the respective interest in knowledge, the research question and the chosen methodological setting. Take, for example, scientific studies in the field of nutrition. Even the seemingly trivial question “Are eggs healthy or not?” can provide a wide variety of information. Do they promote strokes? Some studies point in that direction, but others cite evidence that the risk of a stroke can actually be reduced by eating eggs. In a recent article that takes a critical look at this, the author identifies the reason for this discrepancy regarding “egg studies” as the different methodological choices: “The contradictory results arose, among other things, from the fact that most studies did not ask about the test person’s entire diet and their exercise profile. It is well known that cholesterol levels can be lowered by eating fruit and vegetables with plenty of fibre and by exercising” (Preuk, 2020, translated). No methodological approach worthy of the term “scientific” can do without methodological limitations and exclusions. In this case, some studies have excluded the entire diet and the exercise profile of the test persons, while other studies have included this. Which aspects we include or omit has an impact on the results. This quotation thus shows us by means of a small example what must always be taken into account for the critical appropriation of science. The results of scientific studies depend on the methodological setting with which they were generated.

2.3.2.3 Technical Defects

Sometimes it also happens that studies are simply technically flawed. This is a problem recently faced by empirical psychology, which places particular emphasis on methodological rigor. In 2015, the “Reproducibility Project: Psychology”

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attempted to replicate the results of 100 psychological studies. To do this, it repeated the respective studies to check the reproducibility of the results and found that this was possible in less than half of the studies. Since then, psychology has tried to counteract this loss of credibility with various measures (Ballaschk, 2019; Heinrichs, 2019). John Ioannidis, medical doctor and statistics professor from Stanford University School of Medicine has criticized with regard to studies in nutrition in a famous essay that many studies had poor study design, measurement errors and statistical flaws.10 This also needs to be considered for critical appropriation of studies. At a Swiss conference in 2018, Ioannidis also accused many colleagues of being involved with the food industry (Heinrichs, 2019).

2.3.2.4 Science as Commissioned Work The next important aspect is the fact that scientific studies are often commissioned works which do not follow a need for knowledge or “objective facts,” but whose clients have interests. Thus, behind scientific-sounding institutions such as the European Research Association for Environment and Health in the Transport Sector (EUGT), large corporations from the automotive industry such as VW, Daimler, and BMW are hidden as clients. Now, it would be rash to suddenly place such institutions under suspicion of corruption. However, we would like to point out an important context that needs to be reflected upon. In an article on research funded by the automotive industry, Christian Kreiß, Professor of Economics at Aalen University, poses the thought-provoking question of whether critical aspects of driving still receive attention in such studies, i.e., whether research questions can possibly be expected to come from only one direction (Kreiß, 2018). Here we encounter not so much the phenomenon of poorly crafted studies as that of focusing on a narrow set of research questions that serve particular interests and neglect other, possibly critical, research questions. The fact that Kreiß himself carried out a commissioned study for the Green Party on planned obsolescence shows the complexity of the relationship between the scientific claim to objectivity and independence and the simultaneous use of science by interest groups. As said before, we do not want to place such commissioned work under general suspicion, but for the critical appropriation of scientific results it is always worthwhile to also ask the question about clients.

10

Cf. Ballaschk (2019); in more detail Ioannidis (2005).

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80 70 50 30 20 10

Reading

Seeing

Hearing

Seeing & Hearing

Collaboration

Doing

Fig. 2.1 Exemplary graph illustrating a learning theory of perceptual channels, reproduced and critically received from (Thalheimer, 2006). Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P., & Glaser, R. (1989). Self-explanations: How students study and use exmaples in learning to solve problems. Cognitive Sceince, 13, 145–182

2.3.2.5 Numbers Anyone who has attended a training seminar in which topics such as learning and communication were covered may be familiar with this graph (or a variation similar to it).11 It is the illustration, “proven” by numbers, of a theory that attempts to explain learning processes through perceptual channels. According to this, it is decisive through which “input” (hearing, seeing) or which activity one learns something. If you only read something, you only retain 10% of what you read, if you see something you retain 20%, and so on. Self-doing comes out best with 80%. Such a representation gives the impression of an exact measurement of learning. We have objective and universally valid figures. However, even simple considerations could make you wonder. One might ask, 10% of what exactly? When reading, for example, does this apply equally to all types of text, i.e., to a newspaper article written in generally understandable language as well as to a specialist text? How were such different aspects of a text as the details on the one hand, the argumentative structure on the other, made comparable so that they could be counted? Is each reading equivalent, so that deep

11 See Fig. 2.1 Exemplary graph illustrating a learning theory of perceptual channels. (Reproduced and critically received from Thalheimer, 2006)

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argumentative and source-critical engagement with the text counts as “reading” as does superficial quick “cross-reading” of the text, so that both reading strategies apparently yield only 10%? What about readers’ prior knowledge? Would not a Kant expert get much more out of reading a Kant text than a beginner? And would not this “more” translate into higher cognitive performance than mere recall? (The expert will read much less receptively than the beginner, who will lack references to other theories as well as a deeper knowledge of Kant’s position. And they will be more likely to develop their own constructive, perhaps critical, reading.) How has it been possible to compare such different cognitive performances as the mere recollection of details and the argumentative analysis of a text in such a way that they could be counted? To make a long story short: These figures are theoretically and empirically untenable! This has now also been scientifically clarified (Paridon, 2018),12 after it had been reported in this way for decades in further education courses and was even quoted again and again in pedagogical textbooks. The myth persists, even today continuing education institutes advertise with these figures on their websites. For this individual case, it is good to know that these numbers are fake. However, we want to get at something else. This example tells us something fundamentally important about dealing with numbers. These, and especially their graphical representations, are not simply objective images of reality, but the result of human efforts at cognition, and (sometimes) manipulation (Bosbach & Korff, 2012). This means that they can only be understood and reliably assessed in relation to their origin. Ideally, this is also taken into account in scientific studies. A serious scientific study is characterized at least by its methodological transparency. It states what the research question was, the methodological setting, the concrete procedure that led to the results; however, caution is always advised with regard to media presentations of figures. Just how problematic the media’s handling of figures can be was revealed not least by the COVID-19 crisis. Depending on how the figures are presented, their message changes. Does one equate the number of positively tested persons with sick persons or does one point out the difference? Do you add other parameters (e.g., occupancy of intensive care beds) or do you set the number of infected persons as an absolute value? Do you put the positive values in relation to the number of tests (which multiplied in the course of the year) or do you produce a graph which only

12 Incidentally, the graph does not come from the source given there (Thalheimer, 2006). In any case, the essay pursued a completely different question.

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shows the absolute number of people tested positive and thus a distorted picture of the real increase in positive results? The statistics professor Gerd Bosbach has repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers that arise from the unreflective use of numbers and statistics. His very accessible book “Lügen mit Zahlen” (Lying with Numbers), which he wrote with his colleague Korff, is expressly recommended here. The statistician Walter Krämer has described why numbers have such a suggestive power in the first place, using the example of percentages: “Well-intentioned or ill-intentioned users alike appreciate it for its aura of mathematical neutrality and objectivity. ‘Percent’ (. . .) smells like a merchant’s office and double-entry bookkeeping; seriousness just oozes out of it. Percentages stand for credibility and authority, percentages radiate certainty, percentages show that one can calculate, they confer authority and superiority, all the more (. . .) as many an addressee of a modern percentage sermon does not know at all what percentages actually are” (Krämer, 2001, p. 51, translated).

2.3.2.6 Conclusion

The phrase “studies have shown that,” which is often heard in discussions, should therefore be treated with caution and can always be answered with questions about the conditions under which such studies were conducted and their context of justification. For the reasons mentioned above, it is important for a critical appropriation of scientific knowledge to gain a reasonable and enlightened relationship to science. Such a relationship can only be convincing, however, if it acknowledges the successes of scientific knowledge (in contrast, for example, to conspiracy theories or blind criticism of science), but at the same time does not fall into the naïve belief that scientific methodology almost automatically produces something like an objective image of reality. Since we consider an enlightened relationship to science to be central to CT, we deem it appropriate to give an in-depth digression in the form of a “small theory of science” in the following section. We want to make a few remarks on the foundations of scientific knowledge, which should make plausible how the undeniable success of science and its “objectivity” are to be understood in such a way that they become compatible with the thesis of the perspectivity of scientific knowledge. Readers in a hurry could skip the chapter, but for epistemological deepening the following excursus is recommended.

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Excursus: What Is Scientific Knowledge? A Small Philosophy of Science

The term “science” usually does not only refer to the institution in the sense of belonging to a university, but also to a claim to validity and security of the knowledge it provides. Anyone who describes a statement or theory as scientific emphasizes characteristics such as objectivity, reliability, verifiedness, and general validity. This is done in distinction to errors, mere opinions, dogmas, and ideologies, so that with “science” a particularly valued form of knowledge is distinguished (Janich, 1997, p. 14). This distinction is no coincidence, since scientific knowledge, unlike everyday knowledge, is systematic and methodically secured. Its successes become tangible in the natural sciences and especially in technology, which has irreversibly changed the face of the planet as well as our everyday lives with the Internet and smartphones. These successes not infrequently invite misunderstanding. Thus, a naïve realism about scientific results is quite common. In short, this consists of seeing scientific theories as “objective” images of reality. Knowledge, in this view, is a “fit” of scientific theory and humanindependent reality (Janich, 2000). In contrast, we try to reconstruct scientific knowledge according to a pragmatic approach, as demonstrated, among others, in some of Wittgenstein’s reflections and systematically in methodological constructivism.13 Karl Popper prefixed his famous “Logic of Scientific Discovery” with a motto by the poet Novalis: “Hypotheses are nets. Only they who cast will catch” (Popper, 1989, translated). At the beginning – so one could interpret – there is no pure observation, but an action: the casting of nets. And nets have the property of catching only certain things, but letting others through. Thus the quotation gives us an indication of the connection between the character of action and the selectivity of the sciences. Natural science does not owe its impressive successes to a purely receptive attitude that merely observes or classifies phenomena with precision (which characterizes antiquity rather than modern science). The mere observation of falling leaves, for example, would never have produced Galileo’s laws of falling (Chalmers, 2007, p. 26). It is action, the planned and purposeful intervention in an event, isolating certain aspects of a process, keeping some stable, varying others, eliminating still others, that has made modern science so successful. This is especially true of the scientific experiment. Kant once remarked that before the

13

Not to be confused with the Radical Constructivism mentioned above, with which the ideas presented here have little in common.

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systematic inclusion of experiment, scientific research had been a “mere groping about.” As Chalmers (2007, p. 25) notes, not all but only relevant facts are of interest to science, that is, those that fit a research question formulated by scientists. Many facts that can be supported by observation, such as the number of steps in our university’s dining hall, are irrelevant to science. Which are relevant and which are not depends on the state of research and the particular methodological traditions. From these, researchers ask questions, which in turn determine which section of reality they deal with (Aeppli et al., 2011, pp. 47–55). Two examples may illustrate this: 1. Humans can be made the subject of empirical research in very different ways. If the goal is to calculate the carrying capacity of passenger airplanes, it is sufficient to consider humans exclusively under their physical properties such as mass and size (Janich, 2000). An aircraft does not become “heavier” if the passengers it carries are more intelligent. The intelligence of the people to be carried by an aircraft is irrelevant, as are their social relations, professional skills, etc., which become the subject of scientific research in other disciplines (e.g., psychology and sociology). So there is nothing critical about the exclusively physical consideration in the airplane example. It is exactly the adequate means for the research goal. It would only be worthy of criticism if one were to claim in general that people are “nothing else” than what can be described with physical measurands. Such a view would overlook the fact that the focus on physical aspects is due to the specific purpose of the research and is therefore nothing more than the epistemological perspective from which the subject matter was considered here. Other aspects, such as intelligence, have not disappeared, but have simply been methodically masked out. 2. Until the 1950s, psychology considered the question of internal, introspectively accessible processes to be scientifically unascertainable, even dubious to some extent, and asked for the lawful relationship of observable variables such as stimulus and reaction in laboratory experiments. In so-called behaviourism, the “mind” was regarded as a so-called black box about which no serious scientific statements could be made. This changed in the 1950s when, in the context of the cognitive turn, the computer became the central metaphor for mental performance and “inner processes” such as perception, thinking, or remembering began to be regarded as processes of information processing. Now, what had previously been faded out was not only included in research again, but represented the central dimension of research interest.

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Such episodes in the history of science can remind us that methodological limitations are not the result of empirical results, but rather soft preliminary decisions and pre-determinations that provide the methodological framework for empirical investigations. They are neither simply read off the subject matter nor measured empirically, but rather legitimated to the scientific community in a purposive manner, i.e., as a suitable means to achieve the research goal. Thus, already at this point, when starting research questions and the epistemological perspective on an object, we see to what extent science is not dealing with “reality” as a whole, but with a mostly very specific section of the world, which has to be chosen by researchers themselves. This suggests how the talk of the “perspectivity” of scientific knowledge is to be understood. However, not only must the relevance of facts be determined by researchers themselves, they cannot simply observe the relevant facts. In many cases, researchers must first produce them themselves, i.e., generate data. To do so, they must specifically seek out or arrange certain situations or environments, such as in scientific experiments or in the design of surveys or interviews in the social sciences (Aeppli et al., 2011). This brings us to a central point of view for a critically thinking engagement with science: science is indisputably something that only comes into the world through human (in the natural sciences: craft-technical) action and also always remains dependent on it (Janich, 1997). Those who see scientific results merely as an objective reflection of reality disregard the fact that science always starts from self-imposed ends, and that it must make decisions and choose appropriate means (“methods”) to achieve these ends. Scientific methods (from the Greek methodos = way) are less comparable to a mirror that neutrally depicts a given reality than to tools: they are means to achieve their goals, which is why the linguistic part of science consists not only of propositions that are true or false, but to a considerable extent of instructions for action or prescriptions. Unlike propositions, prescriptions are normative sentences. This means, among other things, that they cannot be true or false, nor can they be empirically confirmed or refuted. Rather, they must be legitimated argumentatively with a view to their usefulness. Methodological regulations also lay down certain standards to which the procedure must conform and according to which the scientific quality of a study or a research programme is judged. For example, a central criterion of scientific experience in particular (in contrast to random observations) is its repeatability. And this is a repeatability of events which, in principle, can be enforced by any person at any time by the manual production of certain initial states. Technical reproducibility

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thus ensures independence of persons and generality of results.14 The criterion of the technical reproducibility of experience thus does not result from a depictive description of nature, but is already presupposed in every concrete research effort as a normative requirement for the recognition of the results. It arises from the normative ideas of the research collective, into which each new member grows by doing everything as it is standard among the members of the respective discipline (Janich, 2009, p. 150). The fact that the production of corresponding experimental set-ups and measuring devices is the very first thing that allows strictly reproducible processes to be created, shows the extent to which an active step is being taken here that is far more than just a reflection of what is already there (Schneider, 1993, p. 368). With the scientific access to a research object, many constructional, conceptual and methodological preliminary decisions enter the research process, which shape the nature of the results. To avoid misunderstandings: We do not want to question the objectivity of science at all with these considerations, but rather to make it understandable. To this end, it should be emphasized that “objectivity” is neither to be understood as “from the object” nor given without presupposition. What we call “objectivity” or better “intersubjectivity” depends on a complicated network of pragmatic and linguistic presuppositions. In fact, science(s) only exist in the plural, i.e., in the disciplines, some of which have developed very different methodological traditions. Thus it may not be surprising that a discipline such as history has developed quite different methods from physics, and that the former focuses on the interpretation of sources rather than on measurement and experiment. But even within one discipline or group of disciplines, such as psychology or teaching-learning research, there are different approaches to the respective questions. Thus, an empirical survey can be designed in very different ways. Quantitative approaches will tend to use structured interviews or standardized surveys with predefined answer options in order to ensure representativeness and comparability, while qualitative approaches allow for more open interviews because they serve the purpose of taking into account the situatedness of human actions in everyday contexts, for example. They therefore leave room for justifications, narratives, and self-interpretations of the interviewees, which would be methodologically excluded in strictly standardized interviews. Whether one asks open-ended or standardized questions – both will provide data, but methodologically they will be different. The legitimacy of these different approaches is not based on the

14

Cf. in more detail Janich (2000, 2009).

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representation of the subject matter, but on their suitability for different research purposes and questions. The decision about which approach to choose is made by weighing up rational reasons, and it must be discursively defended before the scientific community. The point of all these considerations is: Science’s undeniable success in providing intersubjective knowledge for disposal and orientation is based on its character as action.15 At the same time, however, it is precisely this character of action that establishes the perspectival constitution of scientific knowledge. Scientific efforts to gain knowledge subject their respective methodological approaches to strict regulations and subject their assertions to controlled testing procedures. On the one hand, this takes away the arbitrariness of scientific efforts to gain knowledge; on the other hand, the respective object always appears only in the light of and through the filter of these methodological rules, which focus on certain aspects and hide others. Scientific methodology thus does not automatically produce something like an “objective image” of reality. Rather, the normative, setting character of linguistic standardizations and methodological rules entails that they can be violated, that is, scientific endeavors can in fact fall short of the standards of their discipline. However, they can also be deliberately set differently with regard to the research question and methodological tradition. Since there is no such thing as “the” science in the sense of a homogeneous effort to gain knowledge, but rather sciences only appear as specific disciplines that have very different question horizons, it is not to be expected that their results will fit together seamlessly like the pieces of a puzzle and produce a harmonious, contradiction-free world view (Schneider, 1993). On the contrary, different perspectives are to be expected, especially where research objects from different methodological traditions are taken into consideration. The results then point back to the specifically chosen procedures and assumptions. This also applies, among other things, to some results of brain research, which, for disciplinary reasons, views human action from a physiological, natural law perspective. It is hardly surprising that something like personal autonomy and responsibility of action eludes their methodological grasp. This is unproblematic as long as one does not associate it with the assertion that something like free and responsible action does not exist “in reality,” but is an illusion (the brain researcher Gerhard Roth, among others, spoke of a “useful illusion”). What comes across as a result in some presentations (e.g., freedom as an illusion) is, when viewed in the light of day, already enforced by methodological preliminary decisions and the

15

See the chapter on ethics (Mittelstrass, 2001).

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methodological setting (Leinemann and Schnibben, 1995). These results, too, are ultimately indebted to the epistemological perspective of the disciplinary matrix and must therefore be reconciled with other perspectives: On the one hand, with scientific disciplines, such as the psychology of action, which starts from completely different presuppositions16 and, on the other hand, with the lifeworld perspective of the acting persons themselves. The fact that science is perspectival does not diminish its claim to validity or usefulness for the formation of judgements, nor is it necessary for normal scientific operations to constantly reflect on this. But when – as in our context – it is a matter of dealing adequately with the problems of appropriation mentioned above (contradictory statements, research guided by interests, or conflicts with our personal selfunderstandings . . .), it is important to notice this fact and to consciously let it flow into one’s own judgment formation, in which reasons are weighted and evidence is evaluated in its scope. For the reception of scientific results for laypersons (which we are in most fields), this means to pay attention to which presuppositions have been made and which perspectives on the respective subject have been adopted. To deal critically and reflectively with scientific results and to integrate them fruitfully into one’s own body of knowledge means to use scientific results in an enlightening way where an uninformed debate believes it can do without them, but also to put them into perspective where they rhetorically come across as “absolute results,” e.g., as “bare figures” or as a phrase of the form “Studies have shown that . . .”. It is important for CT to gain a sustainable position on this: Scientific results do not simply stand for themselves, but are always to be judged in relation to their presuppositions, their methodological approaches, and also their consequences for the lifeworld perspective and everyday practice. This means that CT cannot simply be identified with scientific thinking either. A certain distance is also necessary to science, since otherwise scientific results can no longer be critically reflected upon, but only echoed. CT could thus be seen, by analogy with philosophy, as a methodical way of thinking, albeit one that is not bound to a particular discipline.

2.3.4

Media as Sources of Information

As the philosopher Hans J. Schneider once remarked, one can speak of “the media” in at least two senses: on the one hand, one speaks of the tools of expression, such as

16

Cf. e.g., Straub and Weidemann (2015) and Kaiser and Werbik (2012).

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words, text or photography. On the other hand, one means the institutions and the people working in them (Schneider, 2003, p. 26). The second sense, similar to science, emphasizes the pragmatic, action-related character of media creation. Texts or photographs are products produced by individuals and commissioned by institutions. This cannot be denied. We only want to recall this banal fact in order to shed light on the central problem facing critical reflection on media in our context: that of the objectivity of media reporting. Again, the question horizon of CT, as we understand it, cannot be reduced to the question “fact or fake?” This is only one facet of a more fundamental problem, which we now consider in more detail. The credibility of media reporting has suffered in recent years. The accusation of a lack of objectivity has been raised again and again from various sides. But what does objectivity in media reporting actually mean? Is it to be understood as a “pure” or “neutral reflection” of reality? And could such a claim be fulfilled at all? Attentive readers will assume that we answer this question in the negative. But does that then mean that the demand for objectivity is unjustified? Here, too, the aim is to develop a differentiated understanding of objectivity. In the following, we want to show to what extent the image of the media as a “neutral mediator” is misleading, but the demand for objectivity nevertheless remains meaningful. We will illustrate this with three important topics: 1. Images (and their staging) 2. Language – Word choice – Framing 3. Facts and narrative plots

2.3.4.1 Images and Their Staging I On January 11th, 2015, international and German media such as Tagesschau and heute reported on a funeral march on the occasion of the terrorist attack on the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, in which the state leaders of a wide variety of countries such as France, Germany, Israel, Palestine, the USA, etc. marched united side by side against terror. On that day, more than 1.5 million people were on the streets of Paris and the montage of images from the films shown gave the impression that the leaders of states were marching ahead of these millions. The films and photos went around the world, there was talk of a historic event. A little later, however, it turned out that the politicians were not marching with the

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millions, but that the photographs were taken separately from demonstrating people for security reasons. Was this fake? How is the reality of these pictures to be judged? Let us look at the perspective of the pictures, first at this photo.17 What do you see? The photo shows the heads of state in close-up. Close-ups are suitable for visualizing the inner attitudes of the people depicted – here, for example, the determination and solidarity of the heads of state against terror. If such close-ups are also combined in film reports with images showing crowds of people carrying banners,18 the viewer can easily get the impression that the heads of state were leading the funeral procession. Looking at another shot would have given a different impression.19 This is taken in a different size than the first one: In contrast to the close-up, it shows the events in long shot, i.e., a shot size that shows the events from a greater distance and places the people in relation to their surroundings. Here it becomes visible that the heads of state are clearly separated from the masses. In addition, the distance conveys much less emotionality than in the first photo. When it became known that the photo was staged, a discussion broke out. Some saw the “lying press” at work, others defended the procedure, after all, the heads of government of so many countries had been in such a confined space, it would be unthinkable if there had been an attack. Before we judge, let us first take a step back and remember an important lesson from this juxtaposition of the photographs: Photographs, even if they are “authentic” or “genuine” in the sense that no manipulation has been done to them, are not simply neutral representations of an existing reality. They are the result of a choice, and thus products of action, simply by virtue of the perspective created, for example, by the format of the image or the size of the setting. We see through a photograph not simply pure facts depicted, but the world as the photographer sees it or wants us to see it. A design student once told me that for her, the camera was an extension of the photographer’s eyes. In addition to mere perspectivity, there can also be a deliberate communication intent associated with a photograph. This can be, on the one hand, in the production of the image in the deliberate choice of perspective or cropping, and on the other hand, in the communication through its placement in the public space. One question that could be asked of the example case

17 to be seen at: https://meedia.de/2015/01/14/feministinnen-vs-ultraorthodoxe-photoshopduell-um-das-pariser-trauermarsch-bild/ 18 https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-01/anschlag-charlie-hebdo-paris-frankreich-liveblog?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F 19 https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/ausland/id_72472210/charlie-hebdo-trauermarsch-inparis-inszenierung-der-politiker-demo-.html

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above is, among others: Why were only images with settings such first mentioned photo initially shown, often in combination with images such as the second above in film reports, so that a misleading impression was created in the viewer? When viewing images critically, it is important to ask such questions. It is equally important to avoid premature judgments. Staging is not necessarily identical with lying and manipulation. Whether it is a lie, fake, or the like always depends on further contextual conditions. In this case, too, this was judged differently in the public discussion. The Süddeutsche Zeitung pointed out that the purpose here had been symbolic anyway and that it therefore did not matter whether the heads of state marched together with the millions or separately. The decisive factor was the symbolic message of international cohesion against terror sent by the pictures. The fact that it was a visual staging did not change this (Matzig, 2015). We can agree with this and the argument is certainly suitable to defend politicians against the accusation of manipulation. But why the major leading media initially communicated the images in such a misleading way remains as a question. We cannot and do not want to answer this here, because we are not interested in taking a position on specific cases ourselves. We only cite these cases as examples that show how complicated the reference to reality and the assessment of truth, falsity, or fake can sometimes be. Clearly manipulation was involved, however, in a bizarre side story to the case: in the ultra-Orthodox newspapers Hamodia and Hamevaser in Israel, all the women had been rubbed out so that neither Angela Merkel nor the EU’s foreign affairs representative Federica Mogherini could be seen. For religious reasons, these newspapers refuse to depict women (Feminists vs. Ultra-Orthodox, 2015). The point of all these considerations is to show by way of example that a theory of images is also misleading with regard to images shown in the media. “The photographer and the cameraman make representative selections in the visible world,” the media scholar Norbert Bolz once remarked (2007, translated). Media are, this is our thesis, by no means only what their wording would suggest, namely mere intermediaries, channels through which information quasi-mechanically flows. We want to make this clear with another visual example.

2.3.4.2 Images and Their Staging II : Contextuality and Apparent Authenticity of Images Images have the power to manipulate. In times of digital image editing, these are things that in principle every person in an enlightened society knows or can know. Nevertheless, time and again the media successfully play with the supposed

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authenticity of images. One example are the famous Situation Room photos of Obama and later Trump.20 The first photo (Obama) was communicated in the media after the operation against Osama bin Laden, the second one (Trump) after the killing of the IS leader Al-Baghdadi. Let us try to understand what is happening here in aesthetic terms using the example of the first photo (Obama). The photograph is a visual staging. This results not from the fact that the subjects were instructed by the photographer (which was not the case here, as far as we know), but from the selection of those photos among the many that the photographer had taken, as well as mass media communication in the public sphere. Through this selection and media communication in the public sphere, the visibility of this scene was removed from the context of its creation (the White House Situation Room) and placed in a different context of social communication. Through this process of “contextualization,” the image acquires a meaning that goes far beyond “neutral information,” namely the fact that members of the government were observing the operation in a room here. Mere factual information would hardly have been newsworthy either. The propaganda value for the government, however, rather arose from the fact that the photo conveys at least two things: Authenticity of the situation (we are “live” in the action) and action on the part of the government. It seems important to us that the authenticity is only apparent, because the people know that they are being photographed, and the mere fact that a photographer has been invited is already the beginning of the staging. The term “contextualization” used above seems important to us because it names a basic aesthetic operation that is very often found in media space. By “freezing” a moment, the event is detached from the context of its original situation and placed in a different context, namely in the public-media space, in which it becomes an object of observation and communication. Through this contextualization, the image acquires an excess of meaning beyond mere factual information, which we as media users have to critically decipher. This deciphering is part of the skill that media educator Heinz Moser called “media literacy” (Moser, 2010). Let us briefly turn to the second photo (Trump). Although it is a staging, the impression of authenticity in the first photo (Obama) is much better achieved than in the second one (if that was intended at all). The second photo (Trump), like the first one, is shaped by the intention to convey drive and vigor. The staging, however, stands out much more clearly, as the poses of the subjects seem more contrived. Many computer cables are not even plugged in, making the staging seem less

20 See both for example at: https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/foto-von-donaldtrump-nach-toetung-von-baghdadi-asymmetrisch-a-1293687.html

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professional than in the Obama photo. Still, the photo may communicate its importance because of another circumstance: Namely, it is a quote of the first picture. Thus it loses originality, but it can count on its meaning being grasped more unmistakably. There are many examples of such stagings, which are supposed to convey authenticity. The media appearances of Emanuel Macron, for example, are regarded as masterful stagings, whether in the self-staging as the “Sun King” like Cicero and other newspapers headlined (Brändle, 2018) or shirt-sleeved “at work” with his ministers, as presented to the French public in an “authentic” film recording. Indeed, the spectrum of media staging and objective reporting is broad and the boundaries fluid. In order to be able to differentiate, a distinction made by the media scientist Norbert Bolz seems helpful. He distinguishes between 1. Real events that occur independently of their media portrayal, e.g., earthquakes.21 2. “Mediatized events such as the Bundestag debate, which would probably have taken place even without the media, but now, because of the presence of the mass media, proceeds according to their rules” (Bolz, 2007, p. 39, translated). 3. “Staged events like the Greenpeace action, which takes place only for the media” (Bolz, 2007, p. 39, translated). The latter shows that staging is not only a matter of the powerful (like the photo examples above), but of all those who have managed to attach themselves to media systems.

2.3.4.3 Language – Choice of Words – Framing Media convey information not only through images, but also through language. Here, too, it can be shown that media communication is by no means a neutral mediator of facts, but always selects and chooses. Deliberate manipulation is an extreme case of the spectrum of action. In a recently published booklet “Glaube wenig, hinterfrage alles, denke selbst” (believe little, question everything, think for yourself), Albrecht Müller addresses, among other things, the possibility of manipulation through language regulations: “We call governments that don’t suit us ‘regimes’ or ‘dictatorships.’ We speak of the Mullah regime and the butcher Assad” (Müller, 2019, p. 23, translated). One does not have to agree with the author’s somewhat polemically presented assumption that the reason for designations such as “regimes” lies solely in the fact that governments “do not

21

One could add, however, that here too the selection and decision to bring the event as news represents an acting intervention on the part of the media creators.

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suit us.” However, his examples show that the linguistic naming of a person already shows them under a certain perspective. “Mutti” makes Angela Merkel appear in a different light than “most powerful woman in the world.” A formulation such as “the government in Ankara” casts a different light on Erdogan than “the regime in Ankara,” and “President Erdogan” casts a different perspective on the named person than “dictator of the Bosporus.” But is, for example, “government” a neutral term as opposed to “regime”? One is tempted to say “it depends on whether it is a regime.” Anyone who does not refer to North Korea, for example, as a “regime” could be accused of trivializing it. To speak of “government” is at the same time to recognize it as legitimate. Absolute neutrality is thus a difficult goal to achieve. We observe: speaking is action, as we argued above. In the sense of the action character of speaking, it is important to see that the choice of words is in fact a choice that could always have turned out differently. How consciously this choice is made is of secondary importance. The primary concern is to be fundamentally sensitized to the fact that “wording” is formative for the perception of facts. As media scientist Sabine Schiffer notes, assassins are called “terrorists,” “fanatics,” “nutcases,” “rebels,” or “freedom fighters,” among other things. Each of these designations casts a different light on the same person and the same act. This is not always deliberately set by journalists, but is also often taken from the text modules of press releases by official bodies (Schiffer, 2019). Schiffer continues, “In Syria reporting, for example, the designation ‘rebel’ is too often adopted without criticism, although it is not apparent in what way the Islamists of the Al-Nusra Front are supposed to differ from those of the so-called Islamic State.” (Schiffer, 2019, p. 288, translated). Through the choice of words, certain aspects, in this case value-related, are emphasized, while others are concealed. In this way, an interpretive framework is set for the respective facts or persons discussed. In psychological research, such cases are referred to as “framing” (Kahnemann, 2012; Wehling, 2018). The book by cognitive researcher Elisabeth Wehling (2018) contains interesting individual examples of framings. For example, she cites expressions such as “tax burden” or “tax haven” as examples through which framings are set for the corresponding political debate. “Tax burden” conveys a negatively colored view of taxes, namely as a burden that one would like to escape, e.g., in the “tax haven” or in the “tax paradise.” Such frames of interpretation obscure the socially important function of taxes, which are used, among other things, to finance transport infrastructure,

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education, social services, or internal security. Wehling’s book is to be recommended in view of the variety of examples. However, the mechanistic theory of language on which her approach is based should be treated with caution.22

2.3.4.4 Narrative and Plot: On the Embedding of Facts in Stories It should go without saying that objective reporting must stick to the facts. However, a news story does not usually consist of a list of “bare facts.” Facts are usually embedded in some narrative context. There is a good reason for this, because it is only through such a “narrative” embedding that isolated individual facts are made comprehensible in their context. Even in historical science, one cannot do without such embedding of facts in the telling of stories, which only bundle loose events into an understandable whole. This begins with the naming of events. “The 30 Years’ War,” after all, does not designate a single fact, but binds together a whole series of events into a coherent whole (analogously: “First World War,” “Middle Ages,” “Renaissance,” etc.). But already the facts themselves are not directly accessible to the historian, but only in the form of sources (e.g., chronicles, documents, letters, film documents, monuments, . . .). Now, historical events such as the First World War can be explained and interpreted differently with regard to their course or their causes (e.g., the “question of guilt”). Or the history of modernity can be told as a story of success or decline. By bundling individual events into a whole, attributing causes and responsibilities to historical events, or presenting them as a success or decline story, an order or structure is imposed on historical facts, which historian Hayden White has called “plots” (Baberowski, 2014, p. 211). These plots are the narrative forms or narrative encodings that have become established in historiography as literary conventions of representation. How the historian selects the facts contained in the chronicles and tells the story depends on the emplotment, that is, how the historian fits into these

22

Unfortunately, we cannot go into it here due to lack of space, although a critical analysis here would be delightful. The book is a treasure trove of paradoxes arising from mechanistic theories of human action. CT would not be possible at all on the basis of such theories, since it presupposes the ability to relate reflectively and argumentatively to word usages and their roles in attempts at manipulation. For Wehling, the countermeasure to manipulation is not enlightenment (in the sense of rational insight and the ability to act upon it), but countermanipulation, a kind of “overwriting” of one frame (tax burden) by another (tax contribution). This has most recently been vividly illustrated by her “Framing Manual” written for the ARD (Berkeley International Framing Institute, 2018).

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narrative structures (Baberowski, 2014). At the same time, these emplotments represent the epistemic perspective from which the historian views his subject and which he applies to the facts (e.g., history of modernity as progress or decline).23 If we transfer this consideration to media reporting, parallels emerge from which we can learn a few things. For news and information communicated through the media are not presented as an unformed list of facts, but are always embedded in narrative plots. For CT, this means that, especially in the case of information that is presented over a longer period of time on a topic, one can become aware of the operation of emplotment in narrative structures and always present oneself with questions such as these: How can the plot be described? Which aspects does it emphasize, which ones does it possibly omit? Does it follow a certain narrative scheme such as „perpetrator/victim “or “hero/villain”? What intention could it follow? There are numerous examples, such as reports on political scandals or even war coverage, which illustrate our thesis that through the emplotment, even when the facts are reproduced completely correctly, there is an acting intervention that sets certain accents that could, as a rule, also be set differently. Such a narrative, by analogy with historiography, is bound by facts, and not to adhere to them would be to object to them. However, emplotment does not simply follow from facts, but represents an active constructive activity on the part of the reporter. Even if the narrative embedding of facts in a plot is by no means a distortion or manipulation per se, it is nevertheless useful to be aware of the respective plot in order to identify the epistemic perspective from which the factual representation originates and thus the location or point of view of the reporter. The operation of emplotment can also be used to illustrate how manipulation is possible while at the same time presenting facts correctly. The film Nightcrawler offers a vivid example of how one crosses the line into manipulation even though one is reporting facts: a sensational reporter offers a news station pictures of a bloody carjacking. The agency head accepts the offer and commissions more such images and film reports. As a viewer, one initially suspects that the bloody spectacle is what will bring in the ratings. But the head of the agency justifies her choice differently. The blood is only the hook; the real headline is a „trend, “which she characterizes thus: Crime is spreading from the city to the suburbs. That, you might

23

So far, we may have given the impression that history cannot redeem intersubjective validity objections, but can only make narratives available in the literary sense (which was in fact Hayden White’s thesis). This is not our view. We revisit historiography below, though we cannot explore the issue in depth here.

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say, is the plot. This comes across as believable when combined with other reports of crime also taking place in the suburbs. These individual events actually take place (i.e., they are not invented), but it is only in the context of the plot that they are news that attracts attention, in a media landscape where attention spans are short (Bolz, 2007). The issue in Nightcrawler is the possibility and the temptation for news stations, due to quota pressure, not to reconstruct narrative plots from real experiences and facts, but to fabricate them. What is invented is not the events, which are real, but what is fabricated are the plots, the narrative schemes, for which facts are then selected in a very selective manner. The attractiveness of the plot then decides what is sent as a “message.”

2.3.4.5 Conclusion: Is Objective Reporting Possible at All? Do the above considerations show that the demands for objectivity in reporting are not at all redeemable? Here, too, it depends on what one understands by “objectivity.” For this thought, let us once again take a side glance at the science of history, for which the question of its claim to objectivity remained open above: there, too, the above-mentioned historian White had initiated a discussion by moving history into the vicinity of literature due to its use of narrative plots. Against this, the first thing to mention is what Kosellek calls the “veto power of sources” (Spode, 1995, translated). As Gabriel notes, “not having taken a source into account (. . .) is always an argument and the possible occasion for falsification” (Gabriel, 2019, p. 135, translated). The way facts are linked, sources selected and received contains margins, but these are not arbitrary. For one thing, not by the fact that the principle of methodological transparency also applies in history. The historian’s epistemological perspective can and must be made explicit (instead of conveying the illusion of pointless objectivity). The same applies to the narrative form of the account, which must be disclosed and justified. In this way, the procedure remains comprehensible at all times. Also, unlike in the literature, sources cannot simply be faked. In individual cases, it may no longer be possible to determine whether a particular source is genuine or a fake. But anyone who argues about it and examines it for authenticity is already claiming that its factual relevance is decisive for consideration. Every construction of the historian can be borne out (or at least burdened) by reference to sources which are themselves not fictions. The claim to knowledge of historiography is fundamentally different from that of literature and implies obligations of justification and proof from which literary fiction is exempt. The obligation to justify and substantiate on the basis of the sources and the intersubjective controllability associated with this takes the arbitrariness out of historical construction. Let us turn back to the media:

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For this purpose, it is helpful to keep in mind the common rules of serious journalism. The Bavarian Press Act speaks of a duty to report truthfully (Hooffacker & Meier, 2017, p. 102). Thus, one of the basic rules of serious journalism is: “The facts must be right. So the names have to be right, the age, the number of participants; what is attributed to a speaker as a quote must really have been said by that speaker, etc.” (Hooffacker & Meier, 2017, p. 102, translated). This also includes avoiding one-sidedness of the presentation, which is negotiated under the keyword of completeness of information.24 It is clear that reporting claims to be comprehensible and truthful. Otherwise it would have to see itself as fiction, which would be just as absurd for the producers of news as for its recipients. With the claim to truth, however, it is subject to certain obligations of care and proof, with which this can be redeemed. Those who report must be able to answer questions such as the exact place and time of the event, but also why this particular excerpt was chosen and why others were omitted, and so on. It is not a matter of adopting the demand for objectivity in reporting, but of forming a differentiated picture of it: The demand for objectivity in reporting is then not to be understood as a “neutral reflection,” but as a demand • • • • • •

to say something substantial and clear (and therefore also criticizable), to convey a realistic picture of a situation, to make different perspectives on the facts recognizable, to report truthfully, to open a helpful perspective instead of reinforcing prejudices, to contribute to enlightenment instead of embellishing self-deceptions or fuelling false fears (Schneider, 2003, p. 26).

Objective should therefore mean a representation in which, as a minimum requirement, the facts are correctly reproduced, and which also conveys a helpful picture of the situation and does justice to the situation of the persons involved. As Schneider once remarked, objectivity here is more comparable to the appraisal of a dispute in court, i.e., “judicial impartiality in relation to the disputing parties, it is not of the kind and representation of a scientific experiment. There is no quasi-mechanical information in the sense of a neutral reflection and no abstract duty to do so” (Schneider, 2003, p. 28, translated). Such an understanding of objectivity in the sense of judicial impartiality would then take account of the fact that the media, in the sense of acting persons and institutions, are never simply uninvolved observers

24

More detailed on this: Hooffacker and Meier (2017).

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and neutral reporters, but are always also agents. This applies to the production process of their products as well as to their public dissemination. As is the case with judges, who do not simply dispense justice but also have an understanding of human situations, it is also important for media professionals to maintain the necessary distance and not to take sides one-sidedly. This understanding of objectivity then also comes close to the spirit of the much-quoted statement by the journalist Hajo Friedrichsen: “This is what I learned in my five years at the BBC in London: keep your distance, do not identify with a cause, not even a good one” (Leinemann & Schnibben, 1995). It is therefore crucial for CT, based on a differentiated understanding of objectivity, to become aware of the action character of media reporting and therefore to always include the perspective of the form of representation and the intention of the authors in the assessment. Critical queries that can always be submitted: 1. What perspective on the matter is generated by the choice of words (e.g., who “kills” in a report, who “is killed,” who merely “perished” (Schiffer, 2019, p. 289, translated)? 2. What perspective on the matter does a pictorial representation convey, for example, through the choice of the detail, the size of the shot (e.g., close-up or long shot), the pose of the persons depicted? Does it show them in a confident posture or does it make them look ridiculous or unsympathetic? 3. Which plot does the presentation of the facts follow? Are there alternative plots of the same facts in other media or what other forms of contextualization are conceivable? 4. Which facts are emphasized by the form of presentation, which are omitted?

2.4

Judging: Weighing Truth Claims

Once validity claims have been clarified and empirical information has been secured with which to justify or refute theses, there is still the question of which conclusion to reach. That is, we have to judge. What we call judging here is a very demanding process of weighing after clarifying terms and validity claims and obtaining the available evidence. Weighing here is distinct from calculating. There may be figures on refugee policy, but what exactly they mean for the question of whether one is for or against a particular political strategy cannot be calculated on the basis of these figures.

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In contrast to the narrowly focused perspective of the subject-matter expert, judgement refers to the totality of a subject area or situation in which different factors can interact. Larger, e.g., political subject areas or situations of action, on which one wants to develop a well-founded opinion, are not as easily manageable, controllable, and delimitable as the field of subject expertise, which only sees a small section, albeit this very precisely. If A = B and B = C, then A = C. Would not it be nice if we could judge according to such a clear pattern? But that is not so easy even within a narrowly defined field. We have just experienced in the COVID-19 crisis how much scientific views can differ within a single discipline. But if you leave the methodologically secure paths of a discipline and go out into everyday, politically constituted life, you have to deal with the impurities of practice, which you also have to do justice to in your judgments. Even those who judge are in a situation comparable to that of a judge who has to consult experts but cannot leave the verdict to them. What the right path is in refugee policy cannot simply be calculated. There is something irrationally fantastic about the attempt to gain something like mathematical certainty here or to derive it from formal logic, and it is particularly appealing to intellectuals and is occasionally also presented in a rational pose. Hannah Arendt once described this on the basis of “professional problem solvers” in the Pentagon: “they were not only intelligent, but proud of their unsentimental rationality. (. . .) They were eager to find formulas, preferably formulas in pseudo-mathematical language, so that they could bring the opposing phenomena to a common denominator. They were thus eager to discover laws in order to use them to explain and predict political and historical facts, as if these were as necessary and also as reliable as natural phenomena once were for physicists” (Arendt, 2019, p. 14, translated). But if judging is not a calculation, but a weighing up and reasoning, how can this take place as sensibly as possible? Two complementary points of view are of importance here: the principle of revisability of all judgements and the striving for a coherent overall view by integrating other perspectives. First of all, it is important to realize that every judgment and every understanding of the world does not take place in a vacuum, but always from a certain point of view. When we approach an issue, a situation, or a particular subject area, we always do so in the light of certain presuppositions, however diffuse they may be. This point of view was elaborated by the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer in his hermeneutics (in short: “Die Kunst des Verstehens,” the art of understanding). Paradoxically, making oneself aware of the situation-boundness of one’s own position is of crucial importance precisely when it comes to making an “objective” judgement. If Gadamer is right, and we always judge from a certain standpoint, then something like absolute certainty is not attainable, no matter how much knowledge

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of facts, scientific theories, etc. we have. What is achievable, however, is a wellfounded point of view that, starting from one’s own prior understanding of an issue (and sometimes irritated by conflicting information), seeks to broaden one’s perspective to include evidence, but also rebuttals, as well as other opinions and perspectives. This engagement with additional information and counterperspectives can lead to the modification or even revision of one’s own pre-conception or to the fact that one can justify it in a more differentiated way. Paradoxically, someone who is aware of his or her own prejudices and the standpoint-bound nature of his or her own opinion comes closer to the ideal of an objective judgment than someone who does not see through their own perspective as a perspective, but abandons himself or herself to the fiction of a standpoint-less “view from nowhere” (as the philosopher Thomas Nagel once called it, 2012). If, however, such an absolute view is not available when seen in the light of day, there is one more point that is important for adequate judgement, to which we turn in conclusion, the striving for coherence. If I am as aware of the limitations of my point of view as I am of the limitations of all expert opinions and of the reporting of my favourite newspaper or my favourite YouTube channel, then it is reasonable to seek counter-positions, to include alternative perspectives. In judging, we then try to integrate these into an overall position that is as coherents as possible, so that the available factual knowledge (as far as we understand it in each case) as well as different perspectives, but also our own intuitions and life experience, come into their relative own. What does “coherent” mean? We adopt here the concept of coherence from Julian Nida-Rümelin (2018), who uses it in the sense of a coherent overall view of the different aspects mentioned. In our judgment process, we can always strive for a coherent overall judgment, despite the fallibility of reason. For example, person X might have a very different view of refugee policy than I do. I could simply reject their point of view as uninformed or irrelevant – in which case I learn nothing more. However, I could also try to understand their point of view on the basis of their reasons, and try to integrate it with my previous knowledge to form a coherent whole – an integration which, of course, always remains provisional and open to revision. Other example: I cannot directly assess a particular factual claim, but I know that it is logically compatible with a scientific theory that I can assess. In this respect, I establish a consistent connection (coherence) between the factual assertion and my knowledge of the theory. One last example: A scientific (nutritional) study X contradicts my life experience, a study Y corresponds exactly to it. This cannot definitively decide that Y is correct, but in matters of nutrition I can judge from experience what is good, at least for me. In that respect, it gives me reason enough to question X in its application to me (and ultimately in its generality). And yet I can remain open to the possibility

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that there may be some aspect of X that is right, that is helpful to others, for example, or that I may not be evaluating correctly at the moment. So we are looking for coherence of hypotheses and data, of life-world, science, and own experience. Nida-Rümelin suggests that a critical search begins anyway when this coherence is disturbed by contradictory experiences or arguments and we try to restore coherence by expanding our knowledge (Nida-Rümelin, 2018). Synopsis Judging is not about collecting facts and arguments, but about their classification, evaluation, and weighting. Judging requires weighing up reasons and counterreasons. There is no patent remedy for this. We cannot provide instructions on how to make the right judgement. Instead, it is important to pay attention to a number of aspects in the weighing process: • • • •

Where do I “stand”? From which presupposition, which prejudice do I start? What is the factual situation and the state of research as far as I can tell? What do opposing opinions and perspectives look like? How can all this be integrated into a coherent (but always revisable by new information) overall perspective?

Ultimately, the ideal of CT cannot be about an absolute and conclusive judgment, but always only about developing an autonomous position that is responsible for itself through reasons (Janich, 2000).

3

Ethical Thinking

3.1

Why Ethical Thinking?

3.1.1

Ethics and Morals

The word “ethics,” which gives its name to the corresponding philosophical discipline, derives from the ancient Greek “ethos,” in which three different yet related meanings can be distinguished. Firstly, it simply means the place where one lives; secondly, the socially established habits, customs, and traditions; and thirdly, the personal attitude or the character of a person (Höffe, 2018, pp. 9–10). There is a certain relationship between the social and the personal meaning of the word because individual attitudes and actions do not exist in isolation from traditional and socially established forms of action. To designate these traditional customs and traditions, as well as the well-rehearsed rules of living together in their entirety, the term “morality” (from the Latin “mores”) has become established in ethics. “Morality” refers to established and evolved ideas of how to act “good” or “right.” In contrast, “ethics” is only spoken of when moral conventions are no longer merely followed, affirmed, or demanded by real or presumed moral authorities but are the subject of argumentative reflection and debate. Historically, this development towards ethical thinking began in ancient Athens in the fifth century BC, when the Sophists challenged traditional ideas about morality and politics, and Socrates in particular challenged his fellow citizens to base the principles of their conduct of life on clearly alleged reasons and nameable criteria. At the beginning of Plato’s famous dialogue “Politeia,” which deals with justice and good government, Plato has Socrates discuss with an elderly wise man named Kephalos. The issue is what is just and what is not. Cephalus’ answers seem detached and saturated with experience and they have their support in tradition: it # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_3

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is just, for example, to keep moderation, to see wealth not as an end in itself but as an obligation to sacrifice to the gods, or even to repay everyone what is owed to them. The wise Cephalus arrived at his moral stance through lived experience rather than an abstract reflection on criteria. He embodies the ancient wisdom of the past, which develops within the framework of social traditions. However, when Socrates confronts him with a counterexample and asks what concept of justice he has based it on, Cephalus is at his wits’ end. Such questions about criteria require a different form of contemplation that is unfamiliar to traditional passed-on thought, and they arise when the present life is no longer self-evident.1 This traditional thinking may have borrowed intellectual support from poets or handed-down sayings such as “Know thyself!”, which it parroted, but it gave itself no account of the criteria of its own moral judgment. The Socratic insight that orientation in moral matters is not exhausted in repeating the established, but requires reflection on presupposed standards and critical debate, marks the transition from morality (we also speak of “ethos”) to ethics. Now this juxtaposition of morality and ethics seems a bit artificial. Do arguments not already play an important role in the field of morality? Even in private life questions and discussions about the respective good and right are daily business. Suppose a friend did not help me move house – do I as a friend have to understand that (because he had no time and a lot of stress) or does that show a certain disrespect towards me? Moral issues are also argued in public life: Is the housing of prisoners in prison X humane? Are we morally obligated to ensure that animals are kept in a manner appropriate to their species? Why do we slaughter pigs in inconceivable quantities but find the slaughter of a dog outrageous? ... The list of such controversial moral questions could easily be continued. And they are discussed even before one systematically encounters ethics. However, if we pay attention to the nature of the argument, we can notice shifts from moral to ethical issues. Let us take the moving example again: If I started an argument, I might accuse the friend of a lack of loyalty and appreciation. If he defended himself by pointing to the current stressful phase of his life, he would at the same time be acknowledging loyalty and appreciation as standards of value. His defense is based precisely on the fact that the stress justifies his absence and that the latter is therefore not a violation of fundamental virtues such as loyalty and appreciation. Similarly, when slaughterhouses refer to their “humane standards” of slaughter, they are not referring to standards such as animal welfare. The argument in such cases revolves around whether the particular standard has been

1

A little more detail on this (Safranski, 1997).

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factually met or not. However, it may happen that invoking the consensus of a commonly shared moral standard is no longer sufficient to legitimize action because there is a deeper dissent regarding the presupposed standards themselves. For example, many animal rights activists do not acknowledge that it should be permissible to kill an animal simply because it has been treated well beforehand and the killing is (mostly) painless and stress-free. We would find such reasoning cynical in relation to the killing of a human being. So why should it be any different with cows? On the basis of concrete moral problems and conflicts, it can therefore easily happen that the argumentation leads to a level that makes the underlying standards or criteria itself the object of critical reflection. Then, at the latest, we are dealing with an ethical argumentation. This is what happened in the case of Socrates, described above, who asked for a definition of the just. It should be noted, however, that the boundaries are fluid. Ethics and morality are in some tension, since the ethically good need not coincide with the customary, but they are not strictly separate and unrelated worlds. Rather, as the above example is meant to show, in a discussion there is the fundamental possibility of radicalizing a moral argument into an ethical one at any time without a break or clear boundary (Schneider, 1994). Ethics is relevant for CT because of its claim to provide a non-moralizing, but critical, rational analysis and discussion of moral problems according to comprehensible, transparent criteria. It thus holds out the prospect of making the normative presuppositions of argumentations, which often remain implicit, openly comprehensible, and thus rationally discussable. Inasmuch as rational understanding has entered ethics since its ancient beginnings in place of mere convention and dogmatic assertion, the critical-rational attitude is inherent in ethics and must not be confused with the habitus of moralizing, which can always be had cheaply. In the sense of Schopenhauer, ethics does not aim to preach morality, but to justify it.

3.1.2

Explication of Hidden Moral Validity Claims

To understand what justifying morality means, we have to clarify what kind of validity claims we are dealing with in the field of morality. In the area of what was called “analytic-epistemic thinking” above, we are dealing with assertions that can be true or false, i.e., with truth claims. In order to clarify the distinction from the validity claims to be presented now, let us consider the following example: (1) In 2019, the German government approved arms shipments to countries such as Algeria, India, Indonesia, and Israel (Gebauer, 2019).

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(2) No weapons should be supplied to countries such as Algeria, India, Indonesia, or Israel. Proposition (1) is a statement of fact. It makes a statement about something that is the case. In (2), on the other hand, it is not talking about something that is the case, but what (or what not) should be the case. This proposition is not descriptive, but prompting or prescriptive. The claim to validity it makes is correspondingly a normative one. In Chap. 1, we were centrally concerned with validity claims that are assessable in terms of true and false.2 In ethics, we are concerned with normative validity claims.3 In fact, the federal government approved the arms shipments addressed in (1). This has been criticized by opposition parties. Important for our context is that those who criticize this presuppose the validity of a norm.4 The mere fact that the government has given permission is not sufficient as a basis for a critical argumentation, although in the practice of discussion often only the fact is mentioned, and a normative basic consensus is assumed. When Katja Keul of the Green Party criticized the delivery to India in particular, pointing out that the Kashmir conflict was escalating, she argued with a fact. But the argument only worked because she could presuppose a consensus on a target situation, namely that this escalation in the conflict area is not a desirable state of affairs. But whether something is desirable or not cannot be inferred from the facts. The difference in the nature of the validity claims often remains unspoken in the actual practice of discussion. This is also facilitated by the fact that similarities on the linguistic surface obscure this difference in validity claims. Let us vary the example from above: (1) It is wrong for the federal government to have approved arms shipments to countries like Algeria, India, Indonesia, and Israel in 2019.

2

Normative validity claims in the sense of regulations, e.g., of a methodological nature, however, also played a role above. Here we concentrate on moral norms. 3 That there is also a descriptive ethics in the sense of the investigation of factually found moral concepts, we leave out of consideration here. 4 In order not to complicate the idea, we will refrain from arguing normatively in a non-moral sense, i.e., rationally in terms of purpose, e.g., that such arms deliveries damage Germany’s reputation. This in turn presupposes that the purpose towards which the argument is being made here (Germany’s positive reputation) is desirable. In justifying this purpose, in turn, we would have to reach a point at some point that can no longer be justified by higher-level purposes, but is good “par excellence”. This claim is what distinguishes moral norms from other norms.

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(2) It is wrong to supply arms to countries like Algeria, India, Indonesia, or Israel. What interests us about these sentences is the expression “false” because it does not have the same meaning in (1) as it does in (2). In (1), it is referring to an assertion of fact (which it denies). “False” here is to be understood as the opposite of “true.” In (2), on the other hand, “false” is understood in terms of “morally bad” or “morally forbidden.” This difference in the validity claims is concealed by the fact that the expression “false” occurs in both cases and, moreover, appears in the same place in the sentence position. Generalizing, one can say: A concrete target statement (“The arms deliveries to the countries Algeria or India should cease”) can only be derived conclusively if one presupposes at least a target premise (Höffe, 2018, p. 32). It cannot be legitimized from statements of fact alone (“Germany supplies arms to Algeria and India,” “Germany frequently supplies arms to crisis areas”). If this is not observed, one speaks in ethics of the is-ought fallacy. To avoid such false conclusions in thinking and arguing is one reason for critical thinkers to concern themselves with ethics. Especially because the difference between these kinds of validity claims often remain unspoken in the actual practice of discussion. But is this not trivial? Such simple examples of sentences might give this impression, especially since, as mentioned before, there is a broad normative consensus here. But in practice moral validity claims often remain implicit, which can lead to a supposed dispute about facts, although the actual disagreement is located on the normative level. Let us look at a more complex example: The decision on the lockdown in the COVID-19 crisis was political. An important basis for this was the scientific expert knowledge available at the time. Thus, the impression was easily created that the political decision followed logically compellingly from the results of empirical research (or “without alternative,” as political jargon sometimes articulates). However, many researchers stressed that they could only state the facts, they were scientists, it was up to politicians to decide (Malburg, 2020). In view of this, Julian Nida-Rümelin spoke of a communication problem between politics and science, which consisted in the fact that, on the one hand, politics claimed that it only followed science, but science said that it, in turn, could only present the facts but was not responsible for political decisions or overall strategies (Nida-Rümelin, 2020). Moreover, “the” science did not reach a consensus anyway, but there were different views, which were partly due to the origin of the experts from different disciplines (e.g., virology, general medicine, epidemiology, forensic medicine). The political perspective therefore could not avoid selectively referring to certain doctrinal opinions.

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But even assuming unanimity within the scientific community, the discussion of the economic, constitutional, and psychosocial consequences of the lockdown made it increasingly clear that the question of the proportionality of the measures cannot be answered by an empirical science such as virology. In fact, there was a moral basis for the decision in addition to the scientific one. On 26 April 2020, the President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Schäuble, gave a memorable interview to the Tagesspiegel: “When I hear that everything else has to take a back seat to the protection of life, then I have to say: That is not correct in this absolute form. Basic rights limit each other. If there is an absolute value at all in our Basic Law, then it is human dignity. It is inviolable. But it does not exclude that we have to die.” (Birnbaum & Ismar, 2020). The question of which fundamental right should be respected more is one that lies beyond virological expert knowledge. However, it is inescapable for political decision-making.

3.1.3

Is an Intersubjective Understanding of Moral Dissent Possible at All?

But if a justification of moral validity claims is not possible by appealing to empirical facts alone, is a dispute about moral norms at all rationally negotiable? Moreover, does not the frequent failure of moral discussions show the hopelessness of such an undertaking? And considering cultural relativism it is to be asked: Do different cultures not have different moral concepts? And in a differentiated society like ours with a variety of life models, does not each person have their own morals? Relativist positions have held such views since antiquity. The Sophists already believed that in the case of conflict between different opinions, no independent standard is available that could serve as a guideline for moral dissent. Today, this view manifests itself, among other things, in the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment’s conception of objectivity and reason. What Enlightenment protagonists such as Kant thematized as “reason” is, from a postmodern perspective, only one of many culture-dependent ways of orienting oneself in the world. A binding reason that encompasses all cultures seems absurd from this pluralistic point of view and is not infrequently suspected of being an ideology, namely of the Western claim to power. We cannot deal with these problems exhaustively here. Nevertheless, we will try to bring more clarity to the situation with a few considerations:

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1. On the question of the fundamental justifiability of morality How one answers the question of the rational justifiability of moral validity claims depends decisively on what claim one makes to rational justifications. That moral questions cannot be decided according to the model of empirical measurements should be obvious.5 One will not be able to “prove” to a person who holds a consistently amoral viewpoint, or even to a fictional alien who has no contact with an evolved moral practice, that they should listen to moral arguments. One cannot gain a reasonable argument about moral issues “from the outside.” Rather, it requires participation in a norm-guided, morally already formed and lived practice as a precondition of any ethical argument. Anyone who has not been confronted, for example, with the norm that as a rule one should not lie, return what has been borrowed, or keep promises, anyone who has not had the experience of the kind “I would rather keep the borrowed book for myself, but I should return it” is simply unfamiliar with the object of ethical argumentation. This is a circumstance first seen by Aristotle, the founder of systematic ethics. Ethics cannot produce familiarity with a morally formed practice and the experiences associated with it by argument. It can only remind us of them. This leads to the next point: 2. On the question of categorical and cross-cultural moral concepts Moral norms such as “promises should be kept” or “equal pay for equal work” are assumed to be generally binding in lived practice and are not relativized. And we also see commonalities across cultures: Killing innocent people, for example, is not only considered a crime in the Western world. The same applies to the prohibition of lying or cheating. But the moral self-image of the West with regard to fundamental rights is also by no means relativistic in everyday and political practice. Thus, the usually self-evident invocation of inalienable human rights and human dignity includes their unrestricted validity. When Western diplomats criticize countries such as China for their practice of torture, this implies that they by no means regard this practice as relatively good for China but relatively bad for Europe, but rather regard torture per se (in Kant’s words: “categorically”) as reprehensible. Even in private everyday life, acting justly is considered good per se, keeping promises or not lying is commonly assumed to be commanded. When we hear that parents cruelly mistreat their child, we do not

5 Although utilitarianism, which is close to such a view, also has adherents in our time, we will go into this later.

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say that this is satisfactory for the parents, i.e., relatively good, but relatively bad for the child, but we condemn it outright.6 With regard to the postmodern objection to the possibility of objective moral justification, it should be said that the representatives of this view themselves put forward a thesis whose validity they do not relativize as culture-dependent, but rather assert as intersubjectively binding. The rejection of racism, discrimination, sexism, etc., often advocated by postmodern positions, is usually presented as a categorical claim to validity. This is in the nature of the case. Racism can only be consistently criticized from a universalist standpoint. Anyone who wanted to relativize the validity of the thesis that racism is morally bad would involuntarily run the risk of arguing racism himself. Insight into cultural differences is certainly important in order to avoid a naïve objectivism that denies or disregards any cultural difference. However, the search for overarching standards is not based on an ignorance of cultural differences (Spaemann, 1999, p. 14), but raises precisely the question of what can be recognized as a common good across cultural differences. 3. Ethical thinking as a way of objectifying debates As not least the COVID-19 crisis, but also the heated debates about racism or distributive justice have shown us, moral questions and sometimes moral dilemmas are not constructed “brainchildren,” but something that life inevitably confronts us with, in private as well as in public life. They will not disappear because intellectuals declare them unsolvable. On the contrary, they are then negotiated dogmatically instead of argumentatively. This can be observed in the way public debates are conducted on many moral questions of our time, e.g., on important issues such as racism, climate protection, gender relations, etc. Again and again, moralistic zealotry and excited indignation take the place of reasoning, and one can observe the shouting down of the respective opposing position and the devaluation of its representatives (up to and including defamation). The media do not always play an objectifying role here, but sometimes contribute to the moralization of the discourse. Thus, if one tries to fade out ethical questions or to exclude them from rational discourse, it can happen that they return in the unsavory guise of dogmatism, which only further solidifies moral counter-positions instead of bringing the problems closer to a solution.

6

The example comes from Robert Spaemann’s book Moral Basic Concepts (Spaemann, 1999), which, despite its age, is highly recommended as an introduction to ethics.

3.2 Modern Basic Positions of Normative Ethics

3.2

65

Modern Basic Positions of Normative Ethics

In the course of its history, ethics has elaborated moral concepts and principles that enable ethical judgement according to criteria. For reasons of space, we will concentrate on the most influential and significant for CT, which stem from Enlightenment thinking.7 First, let us start with the following example: In the series “The Walking Dead,” Rick, the leader of the central group, is given the following choice by the leader of a seemingly superior opposing group: Either he extradites a certain individual (named Michonne) (who will then, predictably, face torture and death), thereby saving the entire group from probable annihilation, or he refuses extradition and risks the annihilation of his group. Rick feels compelled, as the leader in charge of the entire group, to consider extraditing Michonne. As a viewer, however, one hopes for a No to extradition. This is also given voice by Rick’s friend Daryl: “That (extraditing a member of the group) is not our style.” But supposing we are not uninvolved spectators but must make this decision, neither appeal to style nor sympathy for the person one does not wish to see suffer, etc., will suffice. But what are the appropriate viewpoints for this decision? There are reasons for both options (surrendering Yes or No) which we will now look as examples to trace the different moral concepts and forms of justification from which they originate. The following consideration speaks in favor of extradition, which is primarily directed at the expected consequences of the decision. It is to be expected that the surrendered person will suffer (torture and death). At the same time, however, many others will be spared suffering (severe wounding, homelessness, murder). According to this understanding, Rick as leader should weigh the expected consequences of each course of action. The suffering of many would then stand against the suffering of a single person. The preservation of the entire group from annihilation (or the avoidance of the greater suffering of the many) would then outweigh the avoidance of the suffering of a single person. Against the extradition stands a consideration that sees any “weighing up” of human lives against each other as immoral (even if it acknowledges that Rick is in a difficult situation in which every decision will result in suffering). Characteristically for this position, it regards certain norms of action as proscribed or forbidden even before any consideration of consequences. According to this understanding, human

7

We must largely leave aside the significant approaches of antiquity.

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lives cannot be set off against each other. No individual may be sacrificed at the expense of others. As we can see, both considerations originate from different understandings: the situation and the moral problem. If we disregard this example, we can generalize them to two ideal-typical conceptions of ethics. For this purpose, a fundamental distinction is made between consequentialist (consequence-related) and deontological (from the Greek “deon,” duty) positions.

3.2.1

Consequentialist and Utilitarian Moral Reasoning

The first position (corresponding to the pro-deliverance argument) comes from the most famous consequentialist position we focus on: utilitarianism (from Latin “utilitas,” use). It assumes that the well-being of persons (in the sense of pleasure and suffering) are quantifiable as consequences of an action and can be added up to an overall avail. In this consideration, one human life is compared with a multitude of human lives (in relation to the above example), and the severity of the respective suffering is added up and set against each other. Quantitative aspects therefore play a role here. This position was introduced by the English philosopher and Enlightenment philosopher Jeremy Bentham. The supreme principle of morality, according to Bentham, is the maximization of happiness for the greatest number possible. An action is morally right to the extent that it benefits. By benefit, Bentham means anything that produces pleasure or joy or prevents unpleasure or suffering (Sandel, 2019, p. 51). This is based on the assumption that human actions are guided by pleasure and pain. The norm of right and wrong is “fixed at its throne” (Bentham, 1992, p. 55). There is no such thing as categorically valid rights or duties of the individual, at least not independent of the idea of utility maximization. We find such a thing as fundamental rights important only because we assume that their compliance maximizes utility for the whole. There is no such thing as a fundamental right independent of such utilitarian considerations. Whoever denies the utilitarian principle does so, according to Bentham, on grounds which, without being aware of it, they derive precisely from that principle (Sandel, 2019, p. 52). Characteristic of utilitarianism are:8

8

The following description is largely based on Höffe (1992).

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• the principle of consequence, according to which the criterion for moral rightness is exclusively the consequences of the action (Ricken, 1998, p. 219). Thus, they cannot be judged from themselves, but only with regard to their consequences (Höffe, 1992, p. 11). • the principle of utility: consequences are judged according to the benefit they have for what is intrinsically good or worth choosing. According to classical utilitarianism, this is happiness or well-being in the sense of the degree of pleasure that an action produces or reduces by the degree of suffering associated with it. To take account of the fact that people can understand what is good for them in different ways, today we also speak of the respective preference of the persons concerned. • Social principle: The decisive factor is not the welfare of a particular individual or group, but that of all those affected by the action. Utilitarianism is thus not committed to egoistic benefit, but to the general well-being. However, this now implies a summation or maximization thesis (Ricken, 1998). Suffering and pleasure, or the good of those affected, must be added up and set off against each other. This is also referred to as the “hedonistic calculus.” This presupposes the assumption that the well-being of people can be expressed in numbers. As Ricken notes, the appeal of utilitarianism in a scientific world is precisely this hope of quantifying alternative actions and deciding them by mathematical calculation (Ricken, 1998, p. 219).9 This also makes it attractive to economic thought. Furthermore, what makes utilitarianism attractive to modern people is its empiricism. It is a conception of morality that can be informed by experience and empirical arguments and does not need to appeal to God, nature, or other metaphysical entities to justify morality. Rather, it is based on the actual needs and preferences of people and therefore seems to be a viable concept for modernity. Nevertheless, utilitarianism also brings with it certain problems that have never really been convincingly resolved and that pose a particular problem for people who see themselves as autonomous persons of modern constitutional states and their system of norms. Thus, utilitarianism cannot exclude the violation of fundamental rights and human dignity in certain cases, namely when this would lead to the enhancement of the common good. Since utilitarianism is concerned with the overall benefit for all concerned, the oppression or disadvantage of minorities may be permissible if it is associated with betterment of the majority and increases the collective balance of

9

On this also (Höffe, 1992).

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happiness (Höffe, 1995, p. 157). Also, it might be possible to impose the death penalty on a comparatively harmless crime such as bicycle theft if it could be empirically shown that this drastically reduced thefts of bicycles throughout the country, thus maximizing overall utility (to determine this overall utility, one would have to assign a numerical value to the life of the thief and offset it against the summed values that would result from the reduction in thefts). But this violates an elementary requirement of (corrective) justice, namely that the punishment must be commensurate with the crime. Thus we see the limits of the utilitarian ethical model, which must always be taken into account (without the model as a whole becoming worthless as a result).

3.2.2

Deontological Moral Reasoning

This leads us to the opposite position: those who, in the above example, are against the extradition of a person in favor of the collective good, could base their argumentation on individual fundamental rights or human dignity, which excludes any instrumentalization of the individual. This prohibition of instrumentalization was formulated in particular by Kant in his famous formula of self-purpose, according to which every person is always to be treated as an end, never merely as a means. In his reflections on the concept of human dignity, he also formulates the idea of the non-compensability of the person: within the framework of what we consider valuable in life, he remarks, “everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price, in its place something else can be put as an equivalent; what, on the other hand, is above all price, consequently does not confer an equivalent, that has a dignity” (Kant, 1984, p. 87, translated).10 On the one hand, Kant thus acknowledges that human action and decision-making can be reconstructed according to the model of the market, since it pursues goals and offsets them against each other in terms of their market value. At the same time, however, Kant withdraws humans as individual persons from such a market model. Humans can only understand themselves and others as a rational people if they do not completely subject his actions to the law of the market (Forschner, 1998, p. 105). A mode of argumentation like Kant’s is called deontological, as already mentioned, or also duty-ethical. It emphasizes the intrinsic value of moral actions and, irrespective of the consequences of an action for benefit or harm, regards certain actions as permissible, prohibited, or forbidden on the basis of principles. Such

10

The following consideration is inspired by Forschner (1998).

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principles can be, for example, justice or human dignity, the fundamental right to life, or freedom of speech, but also everyday familiar rules, such as “promises must be kept,” etc. Commonly, for example, breaking a promise would be considered morally offensive even if no harm resulted from this breach. Promises are to be kept, that is categorically true (although one could argue whether there might be justified exceptions. But these would still not touch the basic rule that one should keep promises, but give conditions why it was not possible to keep it in this particular case). In public discourse, the problem of offsetting human lives has recently been addressed in the context of “autonomous driving,” in which fully automated control of acceleration, braking, and steering allows driving a car without a human driver. In addition to the advantages of these technical developments, such as independence from human reaction or susceptibility to distraction, ethical problems were also discussed. What happens, for example, if a traffic situation leaves only the choice of whether to run over a group of younger or older people? Should the software be programmed to protect the younger people because their overall life expectancy is higher? An ethics committee convened for this purpose stated that in unavoidable accident situations, any qualification and weighing based on personal characteristics (age, sex, physical, or mental constitution) is strictly prohibited (Ethics Committee, 2017). To be sure, the report also emphasizes the preliminary nature of the state of the discussion, and the ban on offsetting remains not entirely uncontroversial. However, as Nida-Rümelin points out, it is part of the core of democratically constituted constitutional states to be deontological, not consequentialist (NidaRümelin & Weidenfeld, 2018, p. 96). In his view, the modern constitutional state is characterized precisely by the fact that it removes certain goods from any calculation of utility on the basis of principles such as human dignity. Such principles thus have an absolute or, as one might say with Kant, categorical character for the constitutional state. They apply unconditionally, i.e., not subject to certain considerations of consequences and benefits. Rather, they limit the scope in which considerations of utility can take place at all. The formulation of categorically valid fundamental rights articulates an image of human beings and thus at the same time a certain understanding of the practice that we have recognized since the Enlightenment as a constitutional state. Connected with the categorical understanding of certain principles of action in the sense explained above is another characteristic of deontological argumentation: universalization. For Kant, this means the generalizability of principles of action or “maxims.” This idea is then also found in Kant’s formulation of the supreme moral principle: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will

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that it become a general law. This is the so-called Categorical Imperative (Kant, 1984), which we briefly illustrate with the famous example of the promise: Suppose I borrow money from a friend and promise to pay him back, even though I realize that I cannot pay him back. If we take this as a principle or maxim (it could be formulated, for example, as “In need of money I may make a false promise, even though I know I cannot keep it”), the principle of generalizability gives me a consideration by which I can “test” this maxim. Kant wondered, however, not what the consequences would be if everyone did this, but whether my maxim can be thought of as a general law. In other words, whether all could follow this maxim without contradiction. On my own I can follow this maxim without logical contradiction, but as a general law it would mean that promises are not kept only in this case, but in principle. Conceived as a general law, then, the making of a promise would at the same time imply the breaking of the promise. This would make the institution of the promise itself impossible; the language game of the promise could not even get started. Even the violation of the rule in an individual case, i.e., the breaking of the promise, can only function because I can count on the other person not assuming that promises are always broken, but assuming that keeping the promise is the rule. I only make an exception according to my subjective interest, and this is precisely where the immorality of this attitude lies. The point of this figure of thought can be expressed with Nida-Rümelin in this way: The generalization of subjective principles or maxims of action must not lead to incoherence. The example chosen here of the self-cancelation of a maxim upon generalization is the strictest form of incoherence (Nida-Rümelin, 2002, p. 125). We have chosen it because it marks Kant’s thought most clearly. With this, we can now also consider that in the area of the rationality of action (“practical reason”), a distinction can be made between different levels. The most obvious level, which is also the lowest for Kant, is rationality of purpose. In view of given goals, it provides for the choice of efficient means to achieve the goal. For example, if I want to stay healthy, I exercise more, eat healthy, etc. Or: Suppose I want to cheat someone out of his money, I act rationally if I do this as cleverly as possible, e.g., with perfectly forged documents, etc. These forged documents are the means of achieving the goal. However, in the long run, such practices might put me in an unpalatable life situation where I have to be constantly on guard against detection and can no longer live a free life. Then, when I consider whether more cheating will make me truly happy, I move one rationality level above purpose rationality. For now it is a matter of justifying the ends themselves. I now place individual purposes that I can pursue under the overriding interest of leading a successful life as a whole, that is, of achieving happiness. Even in this consideration, according to Kant, I still follow my self-interest.

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But if I bind the principles of my actions to the claim of general validity as described above, then my practical deliberation takes place at the highest level of rationality. The highest level of rationality is not dependent on subjective interests and is not limited by conditions or objectives given in advance (doing X is rational when one pursues objective Y). It aims at what is par excellence and does not depend on other conditions. At this level, practical rationality is no longer constrained by given conditions. I can then justify my actions not only in the face of given ends or interests, but in general to any rational person with possibly quite different interests. As a human being, I have subjective interests, and it is, as it were, “natural” that I initially had more at stake in my interest than in that of others. Before claiming general validity, however, my subjective interest becomes relative. When I engage in this kind of deliberation, I take an impartial standpoint and place my interests under the claim of generality, so that my interest is no longer placed above that of others just because it happens to be mine. In this ability of man to distance himself from his own interests and to subject them to an impartial (“objective”) consideration lies, according to Kant, his incomparable dignity. This means at the same time the transition for the morality appropriate in the age of enlightenment, which can be no other than an autonomous (=self-legislating) morality. It is no longer legitimized by authoritarian instances such as God, church, or state, but exclusively by the self-binding of the individual to universally valid laws. Not only utilitarian, but also deontological positions have their limits, for example where moral dissent arises from different interpretations of a situation. In the refugee crisis, one of the issues was to transfer a consensus that had hitherto been far-reaching, at least in terms of its claim, regarding the duty to help refugees to a new, hitherto unknown situation. As is well known, this has only been achieved to a limited extent. One limit of deontological argumentation in the sense of needing to be supplemented by considerations of consequences is shown by the following example. At the beginning of the Corona pandemic, clinics were faced with a problem known as triage (from the French “classification”, “triage”). It occurs in cases where there is such a high volume of patients that it exceeds the available resources, e.g., disasters, train accidents, wars, etc. In such cases, prioritization of treatment of patients has to be done. In triage, medical criteria must be considered together with ethical criteria. What are the ethical guidelines to be applied here? When the images from Bergamo raised the possibility that such conditions could also affect other countries, the problem of triage was discussed in clinics and ethics committees. In March 2020, the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMS) revised its triage guidelines. In doing so, it emphasized that in the case of resource scarcity, the

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“short-term prognosis” is the decisive criterion for triage (admission and retention) in the intensive care unit. This means that a patient with short-term treatment has a good chance of surviving and leaving the hospital as healthy as possible. This is generally true regardless of age. If an old person has a good short-term prognosis, they would be admitted in the same way as a young person or preferred over a young person with a poor prognosis. However, as age represents an increased risk of death in the COVID-19 context, it is indirectly considered under the main shortterm prognosis criterion after all. That the criterion of short-term prognosis should apply in principle regardless of age is a deontological argument. The text of the guideline invokes a categorical prohibition of discrimination. This limits the scope of impact assessments and benefit calculations, which can then be added to deontological ones. In the further course, the text of the directive then also explicitly uses utilitarian formulations. The aim is to maximize the benefit for the individual patient and the patient collective as a whole, i.e., to decide in such a way that the greatest possible number of lives is saved. (SAMW, 2020; Radisch, 2019). Remarkable here is the difference to the “ad hoc recommendations” of the German Ethics Council of 27 March 2020. This text is formulated strictly deontologically and emphasizes the principle of the “indifference of life value” to which the state is obliged. A higher valuation or devaluation of life is forbidden to it. The price of this deontological “cleanliness,” however, is the lack of a concrete criterion such as that formulated in the Swiss guidelines. The Swiss position can be called the responsible ethics position (which is further elaborated below). We cannot discuss this example further. It should illustrate the limits and need for supplementation of deontological argumentation. In conclusion, universalism is something that Kant and utilitarianism have in common, but they interpret it differently. For utilitarianism, the generality of the principle hinges on the empirical fact that we as humans (or more broadly, as living beings) are all amenable to the principle of pleasure and pain, and therefore all factually prefer well-being to suffering. In contrast, the moral principle of the Categorical Imperative is derived solely from man’s capacity to reason in a universally valid way not only in the realm of empirical science but also in the realm of the practical. The discussion of who is right on this principle level is a technical philosophical one, which we cannot continue here. In the context of CT, all that matters to us is this: 1. Ethical thinking subjects actions and moral claims to validity to critical reflection by means of ethical criteria, and thus leads them to a process in which it can be critically weighed up to what extent they fulfil the claim to be objectively valid in the sense of being defensible in principle vis-à-vis any person capable of

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argumentation and of relativizing one’s own interests in favor of a universal perspective. 2. Ethical thinking provides points of view for identifying and analyzing concrete, often implicitly claimed morally relevant background convictions. In relation to one’s own moral standpoint, this means clarifying one’s own position, subjecting it to critical self-examination and thus gaining an enlightened and well-founded standpoint. This is not connected with the claim to guarantee a final solution valid for all cases. But there is certainly the prospect of coming closer to a well-founded solution to a specific problem than would be the case without the detour via ethical theory.

3.3

Ethical Thinking as the “Price of Modernity”

With the presentation of the two most important ethical concepts of the modern era and the Enlightenment, basic categories of ethical reflection were made available. Now, in the meantime, a rapid social development has taken place. In particular, through the explosive development of science and technology, a kind of culture has been reached that makes it necessary to convey basic ethical concepts with these changed framework conditions. So what does ethical thinking mean under the auspices of a modern, socially differentiated and highly technologized society?

3.3.1

Limitless Feasibility and Ethical Limitation

Modern science differs from the pre-modern model of science not only methodologically, but also in terms of its objectives. Instead of the ancient ideal of a contemplative and self-interested knowledge, science according to modern selfunderstanding legitimates its actions predominantly from the instrumental utility function “for the human practice of remedying suffering and satisfying needs” (Forschner, 1994, p. 16). In this transformation, man changes from being an observer to being a shaper of his world. He intervenes in his environment in a lasting way and makes it his own, changes it, uses it. In this way, the world becomes, in the words of the philosopher Jürgen Mittelstrass, a “Leonardo world” (Leonardo world), i.e., a world that is shaped and reshaped by man’s instrumental knowledge. In this process, irreversible elements are increasingly gaining influence (Mittelstraß, 2001, p. 70), as can be seen in the example of climate change, but also

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in the social transformation, e.g., through the progressive penetration of everyday life by digital media. The form of knowledge that is growing in the age of scientific and technical progress, however, is what Mittelstraß calls “Verfügungswissen” (disposition knowledge) and distinguishes from “Orientierungswissen” (orientation knowledge). As knowledge of causes and effects, factual and dispositional knowledge is an instrumental knowledge of means to achieve ends, whereas orientational knowledge is knowledge of justified ends themselves (Mittelstraß, 2001, pp. 75–76). Reproductive medicine is now able to influence every stage of human reproduction. This enormously increases the scope of human action compared to earlier centuries (Verfügungswissen). This expanded possibility of being able to dispose instrumentally, however, at the same time raises questions of orientation regarding the justification of goals of action. This is due to the ambivalence inherent in all instrumental knowledge. Medicine can use its knowledge to heal as well as to kill. Moreover, there are unintended side-effects of progress, which brings us unprecedented prosperity while at the same time carrying the potential to destroy the planet. Digital networking facilitates many everyday processes, makes information available as never before, and yet could be used for the total surveillance of individuals by corporations or states. One could say that research and technology, by expanding our instrumental possibilities for action, simultaneously create problems that are no longer scientific problems themselves and cannot be brought to a technical solution. However, since scientific and technical rationality has no inner measure (in the sense of limitation), but is always advancing, it must be given a measure by a form of rationality (as it were “from outside”) that is not derived from the model of scientific-technical rationality (Mittelstraß, 2001). The ethicist Otfried Höffe, however, has warned against a moralistic general condemnation of the sciences. In his view, the problem in the course of modernity is not that science and technology have become more immoral, any more than they are conversely “morally neutral” (as is implied in the frequently advocated thesis of the “valuefree” nature of science). Rather, science and technology are becoming increasingly morally relevant because of the changes they bring about in our sphere of action (Höffe, 1993, 2018). Höffe argues that whoever intervenes in the living world of human beings by means of experiments, charges responsibility for what they do in the world, including for the risks (Höffe, 2018, p. 111). According to Höffe, ethics in its application to the sciences thus becomes the “price of modernity.” Against the background of these considerations, the project of an ethics of responsibility, as undertaken by Hans Jonas, will now be made intelligible.

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Hans Jonas: Ethics of Responsibility in the Technological Age

“Das Prinzip der Verantwortung” (the principle of responsibility) was published in 1979 and with its meaningful subtitle “Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation” (attempt of at an ethics for technological civilization) it refers to the fundamental, in part irreversible change in the human situation of life. According to Jonas, this must be met with a new ethics.11 In this respect, his approach to ethics, which places responsibility at the center, is not in demarcation to ethics of attitude, but is understood as an answer to the challenges of the technological age. The title alludes to Ernst Bloch’s famous book “Das Prinzip Hoffnung” (the principle of hope), which is still carried by the Marxist spirit of utopia, by the optimistic confidence that hopes that the progress of technology will at the same time lead to progress towards a humane society. This is an idea that does not seek to impose limits on technology. For a long time, this optimistic mood prevailed in Western societies, which is illustrated by Bloch’s title. Bloch’s basic terms such as “utopia” and “hope” are countered by Jonas with the terms “fear” and “responsibility” (Höffe, 1993, p. 86). This reveals a clearly more pessimistic view of what science and technology have in store for the future. He reckons less with the endlessly continued blessings of technology than with its potential threat, conjured up by the enormous power of disposal of technology, which we can nevertheless no longer completely control. Prometheus, Jonas’ mythical image for this situation, is “finally unleashed.” This requires an ethics that does justice to this situation.

3.3.2.1 Near and Far Ethics

For Jonas, all earlier ethics was an “ethics of proximity.” Proximity is to be understood in spatial as well as temporal terms. The ethics of proximity was directed towards the “Nächster” (neighbor, as it is called in the Jesuan commandment of love) and towards the respective presence of action. In the modern age, however, technological knowledge and skills have taken on an order of magnitude that, in spatial terms, reaches global proportions and, in temporal terms, exceeds any individual life span. The incalculably prolonged causal chains of technological practice intervene in the living conditions of future generations and of people living further away, and make nature itself the ‘affected party’ of human action, over and above human beings. The ‘near ethics’ with its prescriptions of justice, honesty etc.

11

Reference should be made here to the presentation in (Gebauer et al., 2009), which is excellently suited for teaching purposes and which is included here, among others.

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has not lost its validity, but it is related to the sphere of everyday togetherness, the immediacy of human intercourse. This sphere, however, is “overshadowed by a growing sphere of collective action in which perpetrator, act, and effect are no longer the same as in the proximate sphere, and which, by the enormity of its forces, imposes on ethics a new dimension of responsibility never before dreamed of” (Jonas, 1984, p. 26, translated). Because our actions have consequences that reach far beyond us as agents, responsibility for the consequences of our actions must also be extended beyond the present to future generations and, moreover, beyond the sphere of the human being (Jonas, 1984, p. 29). Robert Spaemann later made an even stronger case for abandoning the anthropocentric perspective, for “as long as man interprets nature exclusively functionally in terms of his needs and orients his protection of nature to this point of view, he will successively continue in destruction. He will constantly treat the problem as a problem of weighing up goods, and in each case will leave of nature only that which, in such a weighing up, at the moment still gets away unscathed. In such a weighing of goods in detail, the share of nature is constantly shortened” (Spaemann, 1980, translated).

3.3.2.2 A New Concept of Responsibility Jonas thus, according to his own understanding, expands, even reverses, the structure of the previous understanding of “responsibility.” Jonas’ concept of responsibility goes beyond a legal understanding of the accountability and liability of an actor for his deed. In this understanding, the actor is liable, for example, for the damage he has caused (Jonas, 1984, pp. 174–176) or must answer to a customer he has not supplied in accordance with the contract. Jonas distinguishes from this an understanding of responsibility for which he sees the parent-child relationship as a model. I also bear responsibility for something that has no power over me and cannot claim this responsibility. Unlike in the legal understanding, I am not dependent on the instance to which I have to “answer” (e.g. God, the state, or the customer whose order I have not fulfilled properly), but I bear responsibility for something or someone who is dependent on me in certain respects, who is affected by my power to act. Jonas illustrates this with an example that is as elementary as it is forceful: the mere breath of an infant immediately shows us the responsibility we have for it. In the feeling of responsibility does not lie the ground of validity of responsibility, but in it we already intuitively and before all conceptual efforts at clarification infer the ought of our responsibility. In Jonas’ words, “Sieh hin und du weißt” (“look and you know,” Jonas, 1984, p. 235). Jonas’s ethics also takes its starting point from a “close-up experience.” He is concerned to show the asymmetrical character of the concept of responsibility, which is directed towards what we can build or destroy by virtue of our power, and which is directed towards the

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future, even the more distant future, in which the consequences of my actions will no longer fall back on me. For Jonas, responsibility is the concern for another being, recognized as a duty, which becomes ‘concern’ when its vulnerability is threatened (Jonas, 1984, p. 391).

3.3.2.3 The Heuristic of Fear Taking responsibility for the long-distance effects of our actions, however, now encounters the problem that the consequences and side-effects of technological developments are becoming increasingly unforeseeable. For the technological change of the world has a cumulative character: “Their effects add up, so that the situation for later action (. . .) is no longer the same as for the one who acted initially” (Jonas, 1984, p. 27, translated). It is this cumulative self-perpetuation of technological change that continually overtakes the initial conditions of its own action and thus generates altered conditions of later action (Jonas, 1984, p. 28). One example may illustrate this. For example, the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938 by Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner, and Fritz Straßmann already presupposed a certain state of the art, without which the corresponding experiments would not have been possible at all. Seven years later, Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the first cities where atomic bombs have been dropped. The scientists mentioned had neither seen nor intended these consequences. Jonas therefore attributed the greatest importance to the effort to know the consequences of actions. This knowledge of consequences should be equal in size to the causal extent of our actions, but it is not. Rather, Jonas sees a gap between the power of our actions and the predictability of the consequences of our actions. Not being able to live up to the duty to know the consequences justifies the duty of humility, namely, to acknowledge our ignorance (Jonas, 1984, p. 28). This means acknowledging that, on the one hand, we must strive for the greatest possible knowledge through research, but at the same time we cannot accurately predict the consequences of unforeseeably prolonged causal chains. Jonas therefore recommends always expecting the worst when assessing the consequences. He calls this procedure the “heuristic of fear.” This is illustrated by the example of nuclear power, which at the same time makes clear the difference to the impact assessment of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism would open up a calculus in which the expected positive effects are set off against the predictable negative effects. The risk of a super-GAU (Größter Anzunehmender Unfall, maximum credible accident) has a rather low probability. One might conclude that because of this low probability of a catastrophe and the expected positive benefit-harm balance, it would be rational and responsible to build safe nuclear power plants. The heuristic of fear, however, does not calculate positive/negative, but assumes the

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worst. If the GAU were to occur (and it has indeed occurred in Chernobyl and Fukushima), the consequences would be so devastating that they would result in incalculable suffering for humans, animals, and the environment. The heuristic of fear teaches us that we cannot exclude even the smallest residual risk because, as explained above, humans no longer have an overview of the consequences of their actions for the causal chains that they set in motion in the technological age, and they can do things that they nevertheless cannot control (Nickl, 2002). Being afraid of the extended causal chains that we ourselves set in motion is therefore the compass for the new ethics. When the old ethics are no longer adequate for the new situation, the standards for new duties become derivable from the danger that our agency entails (Jonas, 1984, p. 7). This results in responsibility for future generations as well as the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature (instead of merely making it usable for human purposes) and a corresponding duty of care for extra-human nature (Gebauer et al., 2009).12 Jonas thus also formulates a new imperative: “Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of human life on earth; or, put negatively, act in such a way that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life” (Jonas, 1984, translated).

3.3.2.4 Critical Appraisal After some 40 years, Jonas’ book deserves to be read more frequently again and to be subjected to critical analysis. Jonas’ approach can be used as an example to illustrate the idea formulated above, according to which science and technology create problems that are no longer scientific-technical, but ethical. His merit is certainly the forceful formulation of the ethical dimension of the ecological challenge in the technological age. The distinction between near and far ethics is also an important distinction in a globalized world. Meanwhile, his critical diagnosis that previous ethics was only concerned with the present and with human beings does not address the two main ethical positions of the modern era outlined above: utilitarianism and Kantianism (Nida-Rümelin, 2002, p. 259). Utilitarianism, for example, explicitly has in mind the weal and woe of non-human but suffering beings. Jonas’ critique perhaps applies less to philosophically elaborated ethics than to the morality of everyday actions (which, however, is also subject to generational change, as can be seen with regard to ecological awareness today).

12 However, Jonas does not yet emphasize the intrinsic value of nature as vehemently as other authors, e.g., Spaemann, do.

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As a counter-draft to an overly optimistic belief in technology, Jonas’ approach is still an important critical voice today. Critics have certainly rightly asked whether this approach is not too pessimistic, too one-sidedly emphasizing the dangers of technical progress and losing sight of its opportunities.13 Jonas, however, does not mean fear as mere timidity, but in fact as a heuristic that seeks to detect what it is responsible for. An attitude that, by analogy with caring for the child, asks “what will happen to him if I don’t take care of him?” The darker the answer, the brighter drawn the responsibility. (Jonas, 1984, p. 391). And Nida-Rümelin has drawn attention to the fact that the minimax criterion, which originates in decision theory, is a differentiated instrument that does justice to Jonas’s intention and at the same time goes beyond his pessimism. When making decisions under uncertainty, the minimax criterion calls for choosing the option whose highest risk, i.e., the option with the worst likely consequences, is the lowest compared to alternative courses of action. “Uncertainty calls for special caution – here lies the rational core of Hans Jonas’ ethics of responsibility” (Nida-Rümelin, 2002, p. 307, translated). In any case, Jonas’ book is not only a forceful plea for a global, ecological understanding of responsibility that also includes the distant future, as well as for transcending the anthropocentric perspective. It was a milestone in raising awareness of the ethical dimension of science and technology and, with figures of thought such as far ethics, the asymmetrical structure of responsibility and the heuristic of fear, set a stage for discussion that certainly requires further development, but which ignoring would mean taking a step backwards. Especially in view of the current discussions about “Fridays for Future,” whose arguments are rather naively presented and often answered with one-dimensional approval or rejection, an engagement with Jonas can put the important debate back on a rational footing. With regard to ethical thought, Jonas’s approach can be seen as a complementary position to Kantianism and utilitarianism. With his plea for the consideration of the remote effects of action, including its undesirable and unforeseeable side-effects, he forcefully raises a weighty part of the questions that are now being negotiated under the label of “applied ethics,” to which we now turn.

13

For example, Höffe advises a rational and sober balance that sensibly weighs opportunities and risks (Höffe, 1993).

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Ethical Thinking

Applied Ethics

3.3.3.1 Domain Ethics The project of ethical responsibility cannot be exhausted in a mere heuristic of fear. It must concretely address the ethical problems raised by the structural change of modernity. In the course of this, the so-called area ethics have emerged, such as medical ethics, environmental ethics, bioethics, animal ethics, technology ethics, science ethics, business ethics, media ethics, etc. These often specialize further in sub-area ethics, medical ethics, for example, in topics such as euthanasia, reproductive medicine, justice in health care, doctor-patient relationship, etc. (Pieper & Thurnherr, 1998; Höffe, 2018). Area ethics are characterized by the fact that they apply general ethical criteria and theories (e.g. human dignity, justice, deontological or utilitarian theories) to concrete cases or subject areas (hence also “applied ethics”). However, this “applying” is not a simple deduction, in which it simply follows logically from ethical principles what is to be done in a concrete case. In applied ethics, both are always required: ethical reflection on principles and field-specific expertise. Therefore, for example, only those who have also familiarized themselves with the relevant field of AI and are familiar with the corresponding factual laws and problems can contribute to ethical questions of artificial intelligence, which suggests interdisciplinary cooperation with subjectmatter experts (Höffe, 2018, p. 107). But not only on the expert level, also in the area of CT, which is relevant for every person, it should be noted that a legitimate judgment cannot be had without knowledge of the respective subject area. So the aspects we discussed above under the heading “Analytic-Epistemic Thinking” play a role. This is not the place to treat the subject with any claim to completeness. We refer to relevant literature.14 We only want to pick out a few exemplary subject areas in order to illustrate the typical nature of applied ethics. Environmental ethics is concerned with the way humans deal with non-human nature and the significance of the increasing depletion of resources and environmental damage for future generations (today, the focus is particularly on “climate protection”). The ethics of responsibility outlined above, which was initiated in particular by Jonas, can be attributed to this discipline. The presentation also shows that it touches on related areas such as the ethics of science and technology. At the

14

(Pieper & Thurnherr, 1998; Nida-Rümelin, 2002), recommended for didactic purposes (Goergen & Frericks, 2009; Gebauer et al., 2009; Nickl, 2002).

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same time, this shows that area ethics are not hermetically sealed off, but interdisciplinary subject areas. Medical ethics deals with questions that arise from the ever-increasing possibilities of intervention through technology and that affect fundamental rights and human dignity. For example, in the context of the possibilities of prenatal diagnostics, questions arise such as whether there is a right to healthy offspring and whether this right outweighs the right to be born with a disability. Here the controversies of deontological and utilitarian argumentation discussed above return. Does the protection of human dignity, which embryos and people in coma or dementia are also entitled to, take precedence over considerations of utility? Or must not the sober weighing of the benefits and harms of those affected be the deciding factor? Does not the interest of many sick persons, i.e., persons worthy of protection, who have interests and needs, count for more than those of ova who may not yet have any needs or interests at all? (Goergen & Frericks, 2009). Do the possibilities of organ transplantation degrade human beings into spare parts warehouses? How legitimate is the moral pressure to donate organs? Under what conditions is euthanasia permissible? The ethical dimension of triage, described above, is another example of medical ethics issues. So is the question of nursing home visitation bans enacted for the lockdown. Tanja Krones, the head of the Clinical Ethics Committee in Zurich, has recently criticized visitation bans, which she considers morally (and constitutionally) impermissible. There is evidence that the problem is not visitors but nursing staff who go from room to room. Instead, “visitors” are in fact relatives who provide care, create legal certainty in decisions and relieve nursing staff. For them, the new factual knowledge and the ethical consideration of the benefits provided by visitors justify a different approach to relatives (Krones, 2020). Another thematic field of applied ethics is business ethics, which deals with questions of the mediation of (justified) self-interest and moral norms. It is concerned with different levels, such as the normative framework of the market economy, the global economy, entrepreneurial action (“business ethics”), and individual consumer action (Pieper & Thurnherr, 1998; Hohmann, 2005). Media ethics starts from what we discussed in the media chapter in the first part, namely that information presented by media “invariably form constructions made from respective subjective points of view and that quasi ‘objective’ information (. . .) basically remains an ideal” (Pieper & Thurnherr, 1998, p. 12). How can norms be justified that can be communicated with this fact in mind? One sub-area ethics could be seen in design ethics, which starts from the fact that design is always also communication of meanings. It endeavors to develop a semantic alertness and

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sensitivity with regard to the messages communicated, whether in advertising or in object design, and to reflect on these under ethical criteria (Cursio, 2013). Finally, let us discuss a possible objection to the usefulness of applied ethics for CT: Does it really need to address such ethical questions? Does not the need for subject matter expertise argue against the assumption that all thinking can address them? And are we even competent in everyday life? Are not there ethics committees for this, in which experts discuss interdisciplinary issues and come to well-founded judgments? Two things become apparent from the above examples. On the one hand, one cannot deal with ethical questions of this kind without at the same time taking note of (medical, economic, media-theoretical) facts, which are also the domain of experts and ethicists. On the other hand, however, these issues concern us as human beings and as citizens of a society based on the rule of law. Every person can be forced to take a stand on issues such as these (euthanasia yes/no, ban on relatives visiting clinics, own consumer behavior, media reception). And for human beings and responsible citizens who see themselves as autonomous persons and not as subjects, a certain degree of judgement is also important in such questions. So the responsibility to face questions like these cannot simply be handed over to experts in the field or to ethics committees without thinking for oneself. Nevertheless, it is important to remain humble, to deal with the limitations of our knowledge, and to acknowledge the expertise of others. To conclude, the following example of animal ethics shows how confrontation with questions and reflection categories of applied ethics can promote critical reflection and expand one’s own thinking space. This should be done in such a way that not only thinking is touched – we are, after all, in the field of ethics – but also consequences for action become visible.

3.3.4

The Reflection Process of Ethical Thinking Using the Example of Animal Ethics

3.3.4.1 Starting Point Everyday Morality If you sit in a restaurant and order a steak, this is by no means morally irrelevant. Suppose that after a family visit to the petting zoo you then go out for dinner with the family and first order steak for everyone, it can happen that you encounter (or are encountered by your children) the question of how this “fits” and whether it is not contradictory. Here, more precisely, we would ask about the coherence of our actions and judgments. As Nida-Rümelin (2018) has pointed out, coherence is an important rationality feature both internally related to our system of judgments and

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to the relationship between judgment and action. Why would I never want to slaughter the goat in the petting zoo, why would I find it outrageous if someone wants to slaughter my dog and yet have no problem eating another animal that I know has been killed before? It could even be the piece of a goat that is on my plate, so an animal of the same species that I found so “cute” at the petting zoo. Occasionally, the moral relevance of eating in everyday life is dismissed with sentences such as “Can’t you even eat your steak now?!” or “God created animals for the benefit of man” or “The fish lives to be eaten by man” (a “real” quote, note MC). These statements arise from a certain “ethos,” an evolved moral conception that is not critically questioned (the first implicitly relies on a kind of “right to steak”, what animal ethicists like to call “luxury rights,” the second and third are based on a hierarchical natural order, which is ultimately a metaphysical assumption).

3.3.4.2 Transition to Ethical Theory The reflection becomes ethical when I notice the incoherence of my actions and my background beliefs and continue to ask what actually justifies such assumptions and claims as the above, i.e., how justified they ultimately are. I now begin to gain a certain distance from my actions and previous ethos or everyday morality by allowing certain questions to be asked, but also by researching facts: What actually gives us the right to keep animals solely for our benefit or to “consume” them in animal experiments15 or to slaughter them?16 As Pieper and Thurnherr note, such questions are all the more urgent because Darwinism and the more recent findings of behavioral research and animal psychology make the differences between humans and at least more highly developed animals appear to be only gradual (Pieper & Thurnherr, 1998). The questions underlying such findings are not normative but empirical. However, they do arise with regard to ethical theorizing. And do not considerations based on relatively elementary experiences with animals already suggest a different way of dealing with them? Hardly anyone would deny higher animals such as lambs, dogs, etc. something like sensitivity to pain. But this makes animals – and now theories of general ethics enter the picture – affected from a utilitarian perspective and our actions morally relevant. Whoever includes only human well-being, but not animal well-being, in an overall calculation of utility, makes an arbitrary, unfounded decision from a utilitarian point of view

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In 2019 in Germany alone 2,902,348 (Tierschutzbund, 2021). For example, according to the Federal Statistical Office, 55.1 million pigs were slaughtered in Germany in 2019 (Statisches Bundesamt, 2021). 16

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(Nida-Rümelin, 2002, p. 291). Here I am now confronted with the question of the rationality and justifiability of my point of view. When I make such considerations, I at the same time expose my everyday moral standpoint to the claim of rationality and thus general justifiability. The utilitarian Peter Singer also refers to this. For him, thinking morally means thinking from a universal standpoint that does not place one’s own interests higher than those of others. Thus, in the course of a moral consideration, I extend my interest to that of all others. But the animal-ethical question is then to what extent the consideration of interests is to be extended not only to other people but also to animals. What are the criteria that I should consider as ethical considerations of judgment? Singer, as a utilitarian, argues consistently with the capacity of animals to suffer. Bentham had already argued in a memorable text that the decisive point of view is not the ability to think, but the ability to suffer: (Singer, 2008, p. 30). According to Singer, this also justifies the claim of animals to have their interests taken into account. The decisive factor for this extension to animals is not whether a being is capable of higher mathematics, this is a marginal and incidental property for moral judgement. Rather, for Singer, the capacity for suffering and pleasure is the prerequisite for having interests at all (Singer, 2008). Thus, utilitarianism initially lends itself as a theory because it must use the capacity for suffering as a relatively low-prerequisite assumption. However, this approach also entails difficult queries and implausible implications: if only suffering mattered, painless killing would be morally indifferent (Nida-Rümelin, 2002, p. 299). This is a view that we would not accept with regard to human beings. It might even entail the unintended consequence that it would be morally imperative to eat pigs if this would increase the benefit for the collective (e.g., due to the increase in demand, the more pigs there would be, the more would be consumed; always assuming that this is seen as a collective benefit for pigs). Part of the core of even everyday moral beliefs, as Nida-Rümelin notes, is that our actions also affect animals as individuals, rather than a collective whose utility is to be aggregated (2002). At this point utilitarianism has difficulties. In the context of our reflection, let us therefore turn to a deontological position with the question of the extent to which the killing of a sheep is legitimized by the fact that one has previously ensured good husbandry conditions. Does it really only depend on the fact that the animal does not suffer, or must animals be granted the right to life in principle? Animal ethicist Tom Regan argues for the latter. He shares Singer’s universal view of morality and argues for the inclusion of animals’ interests in our moral considerations. However, as deontologists do with respect to humans, he rejects the offsetting of individuals. This is because, according to Regan, individuals have inherent value (Kant’s “end in itself”). This inherent value, he argues, does not depend – as we see in the example of human beings – on gender or

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race, religion or ancestry, intelligence, or achievement: “The brilliant and the retarded child, the prince and the pauper (. . .) all have inherent value, all possess it equally” (Regan, 2008, p. 35, translated). From here, however, the road to applying the concept of rights to animals is now not far. Regan, like Singer, points out that although animals cannot read or do higher mathematics, the same is true for many humans, without denying their inherent value and thus the right to be treated with respect. The decisive criterion for Regan is what we humans have in common with many animals (especially mammals): “Each of us is the experiencing subject-of-a-life, a conscious creature with an individual good that matters to us regardless of how useful we may be to others” (Regan, 2008, p. 37, translated). Under the term “subject-of-a-life” Regan summarizes the abilities to have desires and intentions and a reference to the future of one’s life (Wolf, 2018, p. 49). We see at this point, on the one hand, that the inclusion of different ethical approaches can lead to different results, but also raise different questions. Here we also see the intertwining of ethical, empirical and epistemological questions. Can animals be said to have subjecthood or intentionality in the same sense as humans? For example, does killing, as with humans, interrupt a life that has undertaken projects because of its ability to connect past and future? The ethical questions thus refer to empirical questions about animal sentience and intentionality (NidaRümelin, 2002, pp. 277–278). In the debate on animal ethics, however, the philosopher Carl Cohen has opposed the application of the concept of law to animals. For him, this concept is based on a confusion of categories, since the concept of “law” is located in the sphere of human interaction in the form of contracts and negotiations and can only be meaningfully applied there. Moreover, animals could not be moral subjects in the sense that they could take something like a universal moral standpoint and thus distinguish morally wrong from right (Cohen, 2008). For Cohen, this does not mean that we do not have duties against animals, but they would not arise from rights. Regan, among others, has objected that just because an individual cannot formulate or claim rights for themselves, it does not follow that they do not have rights, such as property rights (Cohen, 2001). This indicates an asymmetrical relationship in Jonas’ sense of responsibility ethics.

3.3.4.3 Obtaining a Reasoned Position We break off the discussion, which should be of an exemplary nature, at this point and refer to the literature already cited for further reading. What is gained when I engage in this level of reflection? Does it provide me with a certain outcome? The above discussion was intended to model the course of ethical reflection and at the

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same time to show the benefits and limitations of ethical thinking. It will not produce anything like a calculated result that can no longer be doubted. But this does not mean that their reflections are arbitrary. On the contrary, they show implications or presuppositions that necessarily follow from certain points of view. They may reveal incoherences between beliefs and actions. Such reflection can, moreover, bring home one’s ignorance and thus suggest a certain modesty in judgment. At the same time, however, it also makes demands on our actions. It is possible that these reflections exacerbate rather than resolve the incoherencies already felt originally in everyday morality, and lead a person to change his or her actions. This is how Tom Regan reports it with regard to his own development: “That animals have rights was not an outcome I wanted to bring about, (. . .) No one could have been more surprised than I [former meat eater, angler, dissector, butcher’s assistant, (. . .) defender of animal research (. . .) etc.]” (Regan, 2014). However, it can also lead to “just” gaining a reasoned and nuanced point of view. This too would be a step forward for a reasonable debate within which one can rationally justify one’s own point of view.

Part II Didactics of Critical Thinking

4

Critical Thinking as a Rediscovered Educational Goal

Citizens of the Western world are exposed to a myriad of information and messages on a daily basis as a result of digitalization. In this context, Shenk speaks of the “data smog” (2007) in which we all more or less (have to) move. A never-ending stream of news, pictures, videos, updates, apps, or files passes over our screens and displays of smart devices every day and demands our attention and reaction. For this reason alone, no authority in postmodernity can take independent and critical thought and action away from the individual. For children and young people in particular, it is a challenge to be able to assess information critically. This is shown by numerous studies, e.g., concerning Internet use (Götzke, 2020). However, more and more adults are also obtaining their information unreflectively from echo chambers in social media or self-referential filter bubbles on the Internet (Marx, 2019). In the digital age of alternative facts, compartmentalized world interpretations, and global threat contexts, there is therefore an increasing call for the promotion of CT. In several American surveys of employers and business representatives, for example, it became clear that CT, along with creativity, collaboration, and communication, is one of the four most important key competencies of the twenty-first century (Fadel et al., 2017). The US initiative P21 (Partnership for twenty-first Century Learning), consisting of representatives from business, education, and politics, summarized the results of these surveys and developed an educational model from them (4-K model), which has been attracting attention in the USA and Germany for several years. According to the model, CT as an educational goal is essential alongside the three other “Cs” to be able to better deal with “the global challenges of the present, the new demands of the future labor market, and the timeless challenges of individual and societal fulfillment in a rapidly changing world” (Fadel et al., 2017, p. 141). In German-speaking countries, the 4 Cs model # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_4

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has been disseminated by Andreas Schleicher of the OECD’s Directorate of Education (Samuelis, 2019). Such notions of education for the twenty first century, in which CT plays a prominent role, have found their way into many curricula, projects, conferences and competence target agreements (see, for example, the 2017 revised version of the Qualifications Framework for German Higher Education Degrees [QRDH]). CT training seems to be in demand again in society. However, what constitutes effective support in the various subject areas is no longer spelled out in detail in many educational policies and pedagogical discussions (Centeno Garcia et al., 2019). This chapter therefore attempts to fill this conceptual void with theoretical and empirical content and to offer a practical-didactic orientation for promotion. The aim is to develop an educational approach to CT on a scientifically sound basis, which should then provide important impulses as a guideline for planning one’s own lessons. In terms of content, the text refers to older publications on the promotion of CT, according to Jahn (2012a, 2019a, b), but supplements them with relevant aspects and new findings.

5

Systematization of Approaches to Thinking Training

In order to better differentiate and explore strategies for promoting CT, various authors have developed systems for teaching thinking. One that has become widely accepted in academics is that of Robert Ennis (1989). Ennis distinguishes four basic approaches to promoting CT in educational settings (Fig. 5.1). In the general approach, CT is established as an independent subject, e.g., as a course for first-year students. Curricular references to other subjects or subjectrelated content play no or only a subordinate role. Representatives of this approach often have a concept of CT committed to logic in mind. CT here means, for example, the detection of erroneous conclusions, irrespective of the respective subject matter, because errors in reasoning in conclusions are not related to content but are – according to the argumentation – related to the observance of formal rules. These, it is argued, need to be trained – regardless of content (Siegel, 1988; cited in Abrami et al., 2008, p. 1105). This version of CT is primarily about the formal quality of conclusions, which become clear without taking into account the respective facts. CT thus becomes a general competence that can be applied in all contexts without having to be promoted in a specific context of content (Norris, 1992). However, a broad theoretical foundation in logic must be laid and practiced in learners (e.g., inductive and deductive reasoning, fallacies, distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions, etc.). One-semester, introductory courses for the promotion of CT of this kind, which go under names such as “Critical Thinking”, “Informal Logic”, “Introduction in Reasoning”, etc., can be found, for example, in certain courses of study in Anglo-American countries. Pedagogically, these courses or the corresponding textbooks are often committed to the principles of instructed learning. After a small-step presentation of the respective theoretical foundations, e.g., for a deductive conclusion, exercises follow, which clarify whether the learners have understood the introduced concepts and can apply # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_5

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2. Infusion

1. General Approach -

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CT as a standalone subject/course Relation to other subjects does not play a role Exercises are designed with examples independent of the subject

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Direct promotion of CT within subject specific lesson(s) Fundamental principles of CT are explicitly dealt with and get applied to subject contents

Approaches to fostering CT

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4. Mixed Approach CT as its own course Plus aligned promotion with infusion or/and immersion approach in subject lessons

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3. Immersion Indirect promotion of CT within subject specific lesson(s) Concepts of CT are not explicated Promotion takes place silently through suitable teachinglearning scenarios

Fig. 5.1 Overview of implementation approaches to thinking training. (Own illustration, adapted from Ennis, 1989)

them. Repeated practice with a wide variety of examples is intended to consolidate the respective thinking skills and make them applicable to all contexts. In the infusion approach to CT promotion, the training of thinking takes place in the respective subject lessons. The targeted methods and principles of CT are explicitly introduced, related to the contents of the subject lessons, and practiced on the basis of subject-related examples or problems (Prawat, 1990). The cognitive skills pursued are thereby taught theoretically step by step and practiced by the learners on the basis of the subject-specific content. In addition to fostering the skills and dispositions of CT, proponents of this approach also hope for a deeper understanding of the subject content. Certain aspects of CT are thus both purpose and means: CT as a learning goal itself and as a method to deeply penetrate subject matter (Swartz, 2003). In order to realize this didactically, different approaches are

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mentioned in the literature. Some of the authors argue in a kind of deductive variant for first teaching the learners the skills of CT that are to be promoted in general and without reference to the subject, and in the next step letting them transfer or apply the learned methods or techniques to subject-related tasks and contents. On the other hand, there is the idea that learners should first be confronted with subject-related problems, which can then be adequately solved using appropriate CT methods. In addressing the problem, the teacher introduces the relevant concepts or processes of critical thinking and then applies them with the learners to solve the problem. This is to generate greater motivation for the particular thinking style as the benefits of critical thinking become vivid (Prawat, 1990). In doing so, the teacher supports learners’ thinking processes through verbal prompts to activate cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational processes or through visualization techniques such as mind maps, brainstorming, etc. After solving the problem, the learners describe through self-reflection which thought processes took place during the task processing. For example, what was difficult or easy to accomplish or how their own thinking could still be improved. CT should become observable and comprehensible through this procedure. In a final step, it is now up to the teacher to continuously promote the skills taught in other contexts of the subject and thus enable a transfer.1 On the other hand, the immersion approach to CT promotion in subject lessons takes place without explicating methods or principles of critical thinking. Rather, the lessons are planned and designed in such a way that certain aspects of critical thinking are practiced tacitly, so to speak, through appropriate learning environments and work assignments on the respective subject content. One example is conducting pro-con debates on complex issues in order to strengthen oral argumentation skills or the ability to adopt perspectives. In this context, offering rich and varied ideas for describing a subject is particularly important. Moreover, the individual critical construction of knowledge requires social interaction to produce shared knowledge and to modify it again individually (Prawat, 1990). A brief look at the literature makes it clear that there is a wide variety of methods and procedures for promoting CT in the immersion approach, which can have different

1

Swartz illustrates the described procedure with a lesson from the history lesson of an American school class (eleventh to twelfth grade, secondary education, age of the students between 16 and 17 years). Against the background of President Harry S. Truman’s decision at the time of World War II to use the atomic bomb as a means of ending the war with the Japanese, the students work out a general checklist that can be used as a strategy map for making well-founded decisions. Such a scheme could thus be used in a general CT course as well, since it is topic-independent and intended to promote general thinking skills (Swartz, 2003, pp. 222–247).

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characteristics depending on the discipline, the learning objectives, the respective target group, and other factors (see, for example, the four case studies by Grant, 1988). Nevertheless, general didactic guidelines can be found in the literature. For instance, one didactic principle for indirectly promoting CT is to enable access to multiple perspectives on a particular issue within a subject and to create opportunities to explore these perspectives through different approaches (Adams & Hamm, 1996). This requires social interaction but also periods of reflection (Prawat, 1990). Therefore, promoting critical thinking needs discourse and (self-) reflection as an important element. Another important principle which authors emphasize is the time factor (Meyers, 1986; Brookfield, 1987). Accordingly, learners need freedom to think in order to allow thoughts to mature. Moreover, promoting CT requires an impulse as a starting point that induces a state of wonder in students and creates cognitive discomfort. Initiating an experience of ambiguity as an incentive for CT is advocated by some authors within CT studies, as well as in the literature on Conceptual Change, and several empirical studies on this already exist (Bean, 2001; Brookfield, 1987; Meyers, 1986; Moon, 2008; Vosniadou, 2008). Learning units should be problem-centered and feature materials that unsettle, astonish, irritate, provoke, stimulate and arouse curiosity in learners, for example, through the use of art, media reports, quotations, case studies, role plays, etc. (Meyers, 1986; Moon, 2008; Brookfield, 1987; Buskist & Irons, 2008). CT, therefore, presupposes a challenging, problem-centered, resource-rich, activating learning environment characterized by a trusting, respectful, and appreciative learning atmosphere that provides a protective space, for example, when learners are wrong in their arguments and make mistakes. This learning climate should help to build self-confidence and playfully encourage CT. Depending on the professional and social context, the understanding of CT, the envisaged learning goals, etc., the above-mentioned and further design principles in the immersion approach have to be concretized appropriately in the respective practice. The mixed approach stands for a combination of the general approach with the integrative approaches (infusion and/or immersion) to promote CT (McKown, 1997). Promoting CT skills and dispositions takes place both generally and explicitly on subject-specific content. A general kick-off event on CT, e.g., at the beginning of the semester or school, is embedded in the subject-specific courses, subject lessons, or fields of action. Through this approach, the promotion of CT can be didactically implemented in a more versatile, long-term, and complete manner. So much more is practiced – also on subject-related contents. For example, the concepts introduced in subject-independent thinking training, such as the identification of assumptions, can thus be repeated and deepened in the subject lessons. A higher transfer of learning should therefore be ensured.

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Results of Empirical Educational Research on Thinking Training

6.1

Preliminary Remarks on Research on the Effectiveness of Thinking Trainings

Empirical research on whether CT can be promoted at all and which didactic strategies are most productive has existed since the 1930s and continues to this day (Abrami et al., 2015). Most of the studies have come from the Anglosphere, particularly America. In recent decades, however, the question of how to effectively train CT, especially using digital media, has also been explored in many other countries on different continents (Abrami et al., 2015; Jahn, 2012a). The controversy over whether CT is a generic or specific skill and which of the four approaches to promoting it is most effective has resulted in a large number of studies and position papers. For each of the four promotion approaches discussed, research can be found that supports their promotion success (Jahn, 2012a; McKown, 1997). The dispute over the approaches owes much to differing understandings of CT concepts. Authors, for example, who conceive of CT as a generic, universal competence that can be applied and transferred to all contexts, advocate direct promotion in which the formalized strategies, criteria, or methods of CT are made explicit and practiced. It is assumed that the clearer and more formalized the thinking steps, the higher the CT quality. Subject-specific content and contexts play no or only a subordinate role. Those who can, for example, distinguish good from bad arguments in principle can do so in any field. Those authors, on the other hand, who interpret CT as a purely context-dependent ability, draw the opposite conclusion: CT cannot be separated from subject content and must therefore be promoted in and with the respective subject content. Ideologycritical thinking, for example, is always connected with social processes and questions and must therefore be practiced on the basis of these. Representatives of # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_6

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this line of argument reject the general promotion approach and rather advocate infusion and immersion, since CT cannot be determined and practiced independently of subject content. The concrete didactic design of the promotion approaches and the scientific methods used to determine the promotion’s success therefore have a great deal to do with what is understood by CT in each case. If, for example, “critical thinking” means purely the evaluation of sentences according to formal and/or informal logic principles, then a training course is usually more instructivemediated with subsequent practice and application (see the work and approach of Astleitner, 1998). Learners are taught knowledge about a particular concept of logic, such as sufficient and necessary conditions in reasoning. Then this knowledge is applied using different examples (e.g., A: It has been raining ) B: The road is wet. Is statement A a sufficient or necessary condition for B?). The scientific examination of the success of the intervention is then usually carried out through standardized logic tests, which both control and experimental groups undergo, or a measurement is carried out on one group before and after the intervention. Depending on the CT concept and the context in which it is promoted and tested, authors arrive at different results, e.g., on the question of whether CT should rather be promoted in individual work or in cooperative learning or whether it should be made a subject of instruction itself or not (see McKown, 1997; Jahn, 2012a). As in other areas of educational research, meta-analyses or syntheses of metaanalyses are intended to provide definitive answers as to which methodological approaches have proven particularly successful in advancing dissent. One of these will be discussed in more depth in the next step in order to gain initial clarity about the usefulness or effectiveness of the approaches discussed.

6.2

Discussion of a Meta-analysis by Abrami et al. (2015)

6.2.1

Underlying Concept of Critical Thinking

Even if no uniform concept of CT can be identified, there are nevertheless representative research results that are based on a relatively broad understanding of CT and allow comparisons. Since the early 2000s, for example, the first meta-studies have appeared that aim to provide clear results on the question of which didactic approaches are particularly successful in teaching thinking (see Abrami et al., 2008, 2015; Niu et al., 2013). In particular, the work of Abrami et al. is characterized by meta-analyses that have been extended over several years and

6.2 Discussion of a Meta-analysis by Abrami et al. (2015)

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have a specific methodological-didactic focus. The following will highlight the structure and results of the 2015 meta-study. The understanding of CT on which the meta-analysis is based is the so-called APA concept (American Philosophy Association), which was elaborated by a Delphi survey (multi-stage survey of experts with feedback loops) at the end of the 1980s (Facione, 1990). In this way, an accepted and established definition of CT was to be found for the American educational discourse. This concept includes, among others, different skills of examining and constructive thinking, such as interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, or self-regulation: We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. (Facione, 1990, p. 3)

It also defines a whole range of attitudes and dispositions, such as openness, fairness, or impartiality, which make up an ideal critical thinker. According to this understanding, CT thus refers to a variety of cognitive skills (Table 6.1), sub-skills and dispositions. A number of concepts and criteria of formal and informal logic are also taken up. They are to be understood as thinking tools or standards that are applied in various ways within the thinking processes or skills described. Further concepts come increasingly from the field of cognitive psychology, such as selfregulation or metacognition. In addition to the respective main skills (left column), further sub-skills were identified (right column). Although Facione assumes that this notion of CT is universal, i.e. not dependent on subject contexts, he nevertheless concedes a certain relevance for the quality of CT to domain-specific expertise. Basic concepts and fundamental methodological considerations or practices within a discipline would have to be clear in order for CT to be fruitful (Facione, 1990).1 Abrami et al. (2015) were able to find 867 individual studies available in English that were compatible with the APA concept or presupposed it as a basic assumption for didactic design. The studies date from between the 1930s and 2009, with the majority of studies published after 1990. Thus, numerous studies were also evaluated in which the promotion of CT was implemented with digital media.

1

Despite the Delphi survey, this definition has also been the subject of criticism. For example, the rigidly defined and no longer further questioned criteria, methods and schemes, which are supposed to orient Critical Thinking in the respective skill, caused much opposition (see Biesta & Stams, 2001, p. 60, cited after Abrami et al., 2015, p. 278).

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Table 6.1 Cognitive skills for CT

Cognitive skills Interpretation

Analysis

Evaluation Inference

Explanation

Self-regulation

Categorization Decoding significance Clarifying meaning Examining ideas Identifying arguments Analyzing arguments Assessing claims Assessing arguments Querying evidence Conjecturing alternatives Drawing conclusions Stating results Justifying procedures Presenting arguments Self-examination Self-correction

Source: Facione (1990, p. 7)

6.2.2

The Selection of Individual Studies

Age groups from 6 years to adulthood were included in the meta-analysis. Thinking training experiments or quasi-experiments took place in both STEM and non-STEM subjects. The duration ranged from 6 h to one semester. Assessment of remedial success was conducted using standardized and established tests, such as the California Critical Thinking Test, a subject-independent multiple-choice test constructed from the APA definition. Other standardized, established, and subjectindependent tests such as the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal Test were used, but also included assessment instruments created by the respective instructors themselves. After a rigorous quantitative-methodological quality check, 341 studies were included in the meta-analysis.

6.2.3

Research Focus of the Meta-analysis

The research interest was, among other things, to clarify the question of which of the four promotion approaches discussed according to Ennis (1989) would prove to be the most successful. It was also of interest which concrete didactic-methodical approach would deliver the best results. In addition, it should be illuminated what effect the promotion period has on the success and which age groups react

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particularly well to the promotion. The question of whether learners show better subject-related learning performance as a result of thinking training was also included. In addition to CT skills as defined by the APA, learners’ attitudinal levels were also examined, again through standardized and self-created assessment procedures (e.g., self-assessments, etc.). In 2018, the educational researchers of the Clearing House Project at the Technical University of Munich summarized the extensive results of the page-long meta-study by Abrami et al. (2015) and translated them into German. The further explanations are based on the didactic terminology they chose. Three groups can be differentiated among the didactic-methodological approaches studied (Abrami et al., 2015; Clearing House Project of the Technical University, 2018): 1. Dialogue-based learning: discursive methods and social forms such as Socratic conversation, teaching conversation, various forms of debate such as pro-contra debate, group and partner discussions, etc. 2. Authentic or Anchored Instruction: use of authentic problems and independent problem solving, e.g. through anchored instruction, case study method, simulations, role plays, business games, etc. 3. Mentoring during the thinking training with peers, experts, teachers A fourth category, individual study, i.e. independent, reflective engagement with content to train thinking, e.g. through written assignments, videos, etc., could not be considered in the research because the methodological quality of the studies reviewed could not meet the requirements of rigorous experimental-quantitative research. But this does not mean that guided, independent work and learning cannot contribute to the promotion of CT or that these studies have nothing to say.

6.2.4

Effect Size as a Measure of Intervention Effectiveness

The most important indicator for the empirical comparison of funding successes is the so-called effect size. Effect sizes provide information about the size of a statistical effect. Many meta-analyses in the field of teaching-learning research use the “Cohen’s d” indicator. In short, this describes the effect size for mean differences between two groups with the same group sizes (i.e. control and experimental group). By “control group” we mean learners in traditional learning conditions who manage without a particular intervention (here: the promotion of CT). Effect sizes can be interpreted in the context of thinking training as

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probabilities of whether a randomly selected learner who has received CT support will show higher learning success (on standardized cognitive tests) than a learner who has not benefited from this intervention. Put simply, effect size shows how the particular intervention or trait being studied compares to other influencing factors on the tests. The educational researcher John Hattie (2013), who has produced the largest synthesis of meta-studies in educational research to date, concluded that an effect size in the investigation of didactic interventions or influencing variables is only worth mentioning at all from d > 0.4 with regard to the cognitive learning success achieved. From a size of d = 0.8, one assumes a strong effect. Abrami et al. (2015) do not rely on Cohen’s d to calculate the effect size, but use “Hedges’ g”. The computational approach is the same as for Cohen’s d, but Hedges’ approach includes a correction for the pooled standard deviation to minimize bias in the presence of widely varying sample sizes.

6.2.5

Central Results of the Meta-analysis

First of all, it should be noted that the interventions studied have an empirically verifiable influence on the fact that learners in test situations can better apply certain CT skills than learners without support. CT can therefore be trained at least for these situations. In the following, it is unfortunately not possible to go into detail on all the results and the methodological discussion. On the one hand, this would raise many further questions and entail digressions, which need not and cannot be discussed here. On the other hand, the didactic implications (and not test-theoretical and other relevant aspects) shall be discussed here. Therefore, only selected results on training level and age, intervention duration, learning success criterion, type of delivery, and support approaches will be discussed. Level of Education and Age The greatest promotion successes were found among students in elementary school and middle school, respectively, with a mean effect size of g = 0.37 in each case (6–10 years and 11–15 years, respectively). High school learners and students seem to benefit somewhat less from the support, with a slightly smaller effect size of g = 0.25 and g = 0.26, respectively. The lowest promotion success (g = 0.21) could be calculated for graduates and adults. One reason for the slightly decreasing promotion success with increasing age could be related to the cognitive development of the individuals. Another explanation can be found in the curiosity and

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openness towards new thinking styles and approaches, which is often more significant in children and adolescents. The results regarding the respective intervention duration are also interesting. The longer the promotion, the lower the learning performance in CT (1 h to 2 days: g = 0.66 vs. more than one semester: g = 0.23). Reasons for this may be found, for example, in the test procedures used (In short units, the skills tested are also more limited. vs. More comprehensive training also requires more thorough tests.) or through the long duration (content or skills are forgotten again.). The results make it clear that even short training units can be significant. Regarding the learning success criterion, a mean effect size of g = 0.57 showed that the interventions could strengthen content-specific CT in particular. This speaks for the elaboration of subject-specific concepts of CT. Subject-specific learning success can also be positively influenced by thinking training, but there is no guarantee of this. Especially in the acquisition of factual knowledge, CT promotion is less helpful (Abrami et al., 2015). The multi-layered results also shed light on the controversy as to which of the four promotion approaches discussed is most promising (Table 6.2). The immersion approach, in which promotion takes place indirectly, scored the weakest with g = 0.23. But also the general promotion (explicit teaching of CT without a specific topic) with g = 0.26 and the infusion approach (teaching of CT based on a specific topic; CT explicitly taught) with g = 0.29 performed only slightly better. Only with a combination of the three approaches (general approach + infusive or immersive promotion) was a higher promotion success found with g = 0.38. More didactic variety and content-related application contexts seem to be somewhat more conducive than only one approach. This also applies to the concrete didactic-methodical promotion approaches (Table 6.3). Authentic or Anchored instruction and dialogue-based learning alone achieve a rather low effect size of g = 0.25 and g = 0.23. In combination, i.e. in the processing of authentic problems in conjunction with different forms of discussion, a factor of g = 0.32 is achieved. If mentoring is then added, an effect size of g = 0.57 is achieved. A promising thinking training seems to require the use of authentic, challenging problems as well as dialogical elements in which ideas are developed or tested. In addition, mentoring with feedback is important, for example, to build bridges for learners or to provide productive thinking prompts. If learners can discuss challenging and relevant problems independently and are supported and guided in doing so, then there seems to be a high level of success in promoting CT.

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Table 6.2 Effect sizes for promotion approaches

Total result General approach Infusion (direct promotion) Immersion (indirect promotion) Mixed approach

Effect size k g+ 44 0.26 152 0.29 61 0.23 84 0.38

SE 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06

Source: Own simplified figure, adapted from Abrami et al. (2015, p. 297), k = number of interventions, g = effect size, SE = standard deviation Table 6.3 Effect sizes for methodological large-scale forms

Categories Authentic or anchored instruction (A) Dialogue-based learning (D) A+D A + D + mentoring

Effect size g+ k 22 0.25 43 0.23 45 0.32 19 0.57

SE 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10

Source: Own simplified figure, adapted from Abrami et al. (2015, p. 298), k = number of interventions, g = effect size, SE = standard deviation

6.2.6

Discussion of the Results and Methodology in the Light of Practical Considerations

At the same time, however, it is important to consider the significance of metaanalyses such as this one. There is much to criticize about the methodological approach alone, e.g. the age of the studies (studies from the last century), the disregard for qualitative studies, the general validity of aggregated mean values transformed into effects, the generalization of concrete contexts and concrete action steps of the interventions, the transferability to German conditions (only Englishlanguage studies), the omission of further moderator variables and conditions for success, etc. To take up just a few aspects in more depth: Meta-analyses can easily give the impression through the exact values and the terms used (factors, efficacy, effect, etc.) that the effect sizes are indications of causal relationships and not merely correlations. Teaching-learning situations such as those of a thinking training course, however, are open-ended, unique, co-determined by coincidences and free action, and therefore complex and not completely controllable and plannable (for more on this, see Wilbers, 2018; Arn, 2016; Reiter, 2012). Effect sizes are thus only a probabilistic measure: with a certain degree of probability, a given course of

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action may be more or less effective in a given context. Interventions with high effect sizes are thus generally more promising than those with low ones – no more and no less. Didactic situations, however, are never general, but always particular and individual. Whether an intervention is suitable for a particular context, how it should be designed in concrete terms and what other conditions should be present – meta-analyses are silent about this, which is consistent with the assumption about teaching and learning. In meta-analyses, numerous contexts and approaches are standardized and “made the same.” It then becomes apparent which interventions or methods have led to particularly high learning success (and which have not). Still, the relevant subtleties in the implementation of the interventions in the various contexts are lost. At best, these can still be received in the individual studies if the authors have undergone the trouble to describe the context and the procedure clearly. But it is precisely these subtleties that matter in the respective practice. The success of a specific course does not lie in the choice of the right method or the right media, but it depends above all on how coherently teaching and learning are designed in detail in the respective context. This means that it is not the method itself that is good or bad, but the subtleties of the design and implementation of an intervention. What works in one context under a very specific approach may, in extreme cases, already lead to undesirable results in a slightly different context. Methods – like media – are not a pedagogical no-brainer, even if the effect sizes of meta-analyses may tempt one to such a conclusion. It is not the method itself, such as the pro-contra debate in dialogue-based learning, that can make thinking training successful, but the coherent use of the method. In the process of CT it depends on when and how the pro-contra debate is used, under which auspices, with which intentions, with which target group, and with which orientation. For the reasons mentioned above, meta-analyses can only provide a very rough and incomplete orientation for didactic action. Their results cannot be easily translated for the respective practice. Abrami et al. themselves write: “A metaanalysis is only capable of answering questions that have already been asked in certain very specific kinds of ways, and its claims must always be somewhat modulated. Like a crude early map, a meta-analysis of education research charts terrain that has already been visited many times and provides some modest degree of guidance for future visitors to the area” (2015, p. 304). However, the results of the meta-analysis have at least shown that the combined use of forms of dialogue-based learning, authentic or anchored instruction, and mentoring can be of great importance for the success of thinking training. As already indicated, it is impossible to determine which of these methods should be used when, in which combination, and how. Furthermore, it is unclear which framework conditions play a role in the use of these methods. Individual studies

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on the promotion of CT are richer in descriptions but also more context-dependent. Some of them will be examined in the following chapter, with a focus on the use of digital media. Subsequently, a theory on the process of CT is presented, which takes up the discussed results again and brings them into a didactic structure.

6.3

Promoting Critical Thinking with Digital Media

6.3.1

Preliminary Remarks on the Selection of Studies

The deployment and use of media have always been the subject of critical analysis. What are media in the first place? What function do they have? How do media influence society, and how does society influence the media? What undesirable side effects does media consumption bring with it? What does it mean to cultivate a critical approach to media? Questions like these are part of applied CT. There is no media criticism without CT. Examining these questions has led to interesting theories, results, and didactic interventions in various disciplines. For example, in promoting media literacy (see Baacke, 1996) or media literacy (Chetty et al., 2017), learners should be enabled to engage critically with media – whether as recipients or users. The subject of CT is then the consequences and risks of media use. In the following, however, we will not deal with the (hidden) risks of media use,2 but we will show how digital media can be used to stimulate CT in appropriate teaching-learning contexts or to support the process of CT. Due to the rapid technological development and the associated didactic possibilities, there has been an intensive research interest for several years in how the use of digital media can enrich, supplement or even replace the traditional approaches of teaching CT, e.g., through extended forms of communication, interaction, or presentation. Therefore, many international studies can be found discussing the promotion of CT using digital media. Depending on the period from which these studies originate, the use of the then “new” digital media from this period is also usually examined. 2

For example, if you always orient yourself with a navigation device, you will soon lose your bearings. Those who completely transfer their calculations to Excel will suffer from a calculation weakness in the long run, e.g., in mental arithmetic. Those who are only at home in spectacular, virtual realities of neuronal continuous firing can find reality beyond the Internet boring and dull. Media criticism has many examples and contexts like this to offer (see e.g., Seel, 2002).

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In everyday language, the term digital media usually stands unreflectively for certain Internet-based, digitally coded devices and applications such as smartphones, tablets, Web 2.0 tools, etc., which are sometimes also referred to synonymously and not clearly with the term new media. The assumption here is that these digital devices and applications are new additions to the existing set of devices and applications and in some cases have replaced old media (in the sense of devices and technologies). In the literature, however, the concept of media is much broader and more fundamental and is discussed in the context of epistemology or philosophy of language (see Seel, 2002). Aristotle already conceived of media as transmitters or carriers of information and impulses. Air, for example, carries sound waves and smells; light in turn illuminates space, etc. (Marx, 2019). Without media, there would not be the possibility for humans to recognize sections of the world and thereby come to themselves. From this perspective, digital media therefore do not offer completely new functions of gaining knowledge, representation, or action, but rather expand, bundle, or intertwine familiar media or media functions (Seel, 2002). The guiding medium of CT is and remains language, whether in written or spoken form. The process of CT requires social interaction, dialogical exchange and relevant problems that must be brought to language in order to be able to penetrate them. Even the evaluation of sensory impressions cannot do without verbalization. No critical thinking without language and speaking, no reasoning without words like “because” or “therefore”, no questions without “why?” or “wherefore?”. The new digital media open up new possibilities to let this speaking and interacting take place in a creative way or to bring relevant problems into the horizon of the learners. For example, digital media and technologies can speed up or slow down dialogues and thus aspects of CT, visualize and preserve dialogue processes or enrich them with further media such as film or images. Sensory channels can be added or reduced in the digitally implemented dialogues, etc. The studies presented in the following cover some central questions regarding the promotion of CT in the context of learning with digital media. They are intended to further explicate and concretize the results already discussed on the promotion of CT. In this way, the abstract methodological-didactic approaches from the metaresults are to be made exemplary and the didactic principles used in the process are to be emphasized. In addition, the discussion of the studies should show that methods and digital media alone do not make for successful thinking training (and, by extension, successful teaching and learning), but that the didactically considered use of these methods and media, which is appropriate for the respective context, is decisive for success.

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Due to the enormous variety of studies and technical possibilities, it is currently impossible to deal with all facets of thinking training with digital media.3 A limitation of the multitude of research lines with digital media for the promotion of CT is necessary because an in-depth analysis would need a book of its own. However, the chosen restriction is not detrimental to the elucidation of the subject matter, because the didactic interventions and principles effective in traditional face-to-face teaching, which have already been introduced in Part II, Sect. 6.2.5 of the meta-analysis also come into play in teaching and learning with digital media: dialogue-based learning can be enriched or implemented in many ways with digital media, digital media enable creative ways of facilitating teaching-learning scenarios of application-oriented instruction, and they are suitable for stimulating learners to think critically during self-learning. But mentoring processes can also be supported by digital media and in some cases even completely taken over by them. A variety of dialogue-based learning, the use of authentic, inspiring problems (authentic and anchored instruction), mentoring or tutoring, or even the use of methods of written reflection or learning on one’s own (not investigated in the meta-study due to a lack of study quality under the category “individual study”) – all of these and other relevant measures find their counterpart in the digitally enriched teaching-learning scenarios investigated. However, the respective implementation takes place under different conditions and partly with different possibilities and limits than in traditional face-to-face teaching. The focus of the selected studies is on teaching-learning situations in which screen-based applications were used to promote CT (PC, smartphone, tablets, laptop), i.e., the common teaching screen output media of the last 30 years. Interactive objects such as smart boards, but also augmented reality and virtual reality applications were not considered, as either few studies are available or the use of these media tends to play a minor role in the context of university teaching. The studies presented can be roughly assigned to different periods of time in which certain media or methods increasingly found their way into the classroom and were examined for their suitability for training CT. The proposed classification of the lines of research is intended to provide a brief and thus abbreviated overview: • 1990s to early 2000s: learning programs for training in thinking, chats, online discussion forums, use of Internet resources in blended learning formats

3 A comprehensive overview of studies focusing on the use of digital media to promote thinking up to 2011 can be found in Jahn (2012a).

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• From the early 2000s: social software and Web 2.0 tools: E-portfolios, blogs, wikis, virtual classrooms, application sharing, collaborative web tools, etc. • From around 2008: “Playful” teaching-learning arrangements: game-based learning, simulations, digital storytelling, hybrid learning environments with mobile learning, etc. • From the 2010s onwards: apps to promote CT (similar to learning programs), flipped classrooms, augmented reality apps, etc.

6.3.2

Digital Thinking Training: A Brief Historical Outline

6.3.2.1 Synchronous and Asynchronous Communication Tools With the spread of the Internet in higher education and the emergence of digitally supported, asynchronous, and synchronous communication systems from the mid-1990s onwards, researchers began to explore the possibilities of online discussion forums or chats in terms of promoting CT in dialogue-based learning. The research focused primarily on communication processes and practices, but also analyzed the role of instructors in doing so. In a frequently cited study by Newman et al. (1995), controlled quasi-experiments demonstrated that CT develops differently in online forum discussions than in face-to-face seminars. To this end, a course on the Information Society at Queens University in Belfast was offered as a blended learning seminar, with both face-to-face and online discussions initiated to stimulate CT about controversial aspects of the Information Society. The teaching staff took an active facilitation role in both face-to-face and online discussions. Group size varied between 10 and 20 students. For the study, the authors developed an observation sheet to assess CT activities, the so-called and often used Newman method, a standard assessment tool for coding written argumentation, which refers to Garrison’s (1992) CT concept. CT in this concept is concerned with solving problems by gathering evidence, distinguishing facts from hearsay, analyzing arguments for weaknesses, justifying statements, and constructing and evaluating different points of view. A coding system was used to translate these CT skills into observable indicators of both negative and positive expression. When the transcribed audio recordings from the face-to-face discussions and the collected forum transcripts were analyzed using this coding system and qualitative questioning, it was found that CT was shown to be at a high level in both formats, with similar levels of expression measured for a large proportion of the indicators in both settings (ibid., 1995, p. 57). On average, slightly significantly higher indicator expression was found in the online version, regardless of group differences. In faceto-face seminars, however, more ideas were born in discussions. The face-to-face

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situation thus had a more creative and constructive component of CT. In contrast, however, in the online situation, ideas were better and more often linked, justified by argument, or considered important. The authors attribute this to the fact that learners are discouraged by the computer learning environment from contributing new ideas to discussions, as is the case with brainstorming. Instead, the contributions made are much more thoughtfully argued and justified: “a statement of opinion in a face-to-face discussion becomes an evidently justified point in a computer conference message” (Newman et al., 1995, p. 71). According to one conclusion, the justification and linking of ideas is related to the fact that all lines of argumentation are documented and can be viewed at any time. In asynchronous communication, less was said qualitatively overall. On the other hand, the contributions showed more CT than in the face-to-face situation. In the face-toface situation, uncritical thinking also occurred more frequently (negative indicators of the Newman method). This could be related to the time factor, since in asynchronous communication situations there is more time to think. Moreover, the line of reasoning can be read and recapitulated at any time, while the spoken word “fades away”. These findings have been confirmed in several other studies (see, for example, Guiller et al., 2008). However, the authors of these studies come to the pedagogically relevant conclusion that it is not a matter of classifying one of the two discussion variants as didactically better, but of finding out how the advantages of the two formats can be optimally used in a blended learning scenario (Guiller et al., 2008, p. 198). For example, the authors recommend that promoting CT through asynchronous online communication in collaborative e-learning is only useful when at least one or two initial face-to-face sessions are offered in which learners can brainstorm ideas, collect them and socially negotiate their meanings to solve problems (ibid., 2008, p. 197). These ideas can then be reflected upon and evaluated in the online phase. The advantages of asynchronous communication can thus be exploited. Studies such as those mentioned have shown that the intervention forms “dialogue-based learning”, “use of authentic problems” (evaluation of professional studies according to scientific aspects) and also “reflection in individual work” can be important principles in blended learning scenarios with asynchronous communication media. Hopkins et al. (2008) analysed several studies for the advantages and disadvantages of asynchronous online discussions, also with regard to the promotion of CT. A central, previously undiscussed result was that online discussions, as well as face-to-face events in which CT is applied, require a guiding authority in the form of a learning facilitator who acts in various roles as moderator and didactic designer. Within a review of studies, Artino (2008, p. 39 ff.) names a whole range of tasks that e-moderators need to implement in order for discussions to become and remain “critical”. These include modelling CT, guiding focus, motivating, praising

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and encouraging, highlighting agreement and disagreement, seeking consensus, asking for clarification of assumptions, encouraging broadening perspectives, etc. It is also the responsibility of the e-moderator to establish precise rules of communication with the participants so that CT can flourish and derailments are less likely to occur. Rules may include, for example: Making arguments with sound evidence, referring to existing posts, taking different perspectives, criticizing factually but not personally, etc. This study highlights the importance of the role of the teacher(s) in dialogue-based learning and the multiple tasks that need to be performed in order to cultivate CT in discussion groups, whether in digital or face-to-face settings.

6.3.2.2 Learning Programs to Promote Critical Thinking From the 1990s onwards, a large number of studies also investigated how CT can be specifically promoted through learning programs or simulations in solitary learning. In part, CT, mostly conceptually located in logic, is itself the content of the programs (general approach of thinking training).4 For instance, Astleitner, based on an analysis of some studies in the context of promoting CT with e-learning, concludes that purely solitary e-learning (interaction only between computer and human) in the form of logic software and simulations would achieve the strongest effects in thinking training (2004). However, in studies such as Varaki (2006), it is assumed that while such programs can promote CT, a human tutor is needed to support the process of CT. Mostly, such learning programs are designed according to behaviorist didactics. The learner first goes through a screen-based information transfer phase (e.g., What are sufficient or necessary conditions in logic?). This is followed by practice tasks in which the relevant concepts are applied (A: It was raining. ) B: The road is wet. Is statement A a sufficient or necessary condition for B?). Subject domains usually do not play a role. If the learner can solve the tasks, this is rewarded with a positive stimulus (e.g., “Congratulations!”, green traffic light, fanfare sound, etc.) and the next knowledge transfer phase is unlocked according to the same principle. If the learner does poorly on the test, a negative stimulus follows (“unfortunately wrong,” red traffic light, etc.) and the learner is prompted to recapitulate the required knowledge at the appropriate point. Then the tasks can be worked on again. Since the 2010s, learning programs for training thinking in the form of smartphone apps have been booming again.

See, for example, the web-based learning program “Krit.Net”: Available at https://www.sbg. ac.at/erz/kritnet4/menu.swf

4

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6.3.2.3 Blended Learning Using Internet Sources With the rapid growth of homepages and Internet services, several studies also emerged investigating the playful use of authentic Internet sources in teachinglearning settings. For example, in 1995, Bernie Dodge of San Diego State University developed the so-called WebQuest method, which aims to have learners independently and cooperatively, under a specific question, analyze and evaluate selected complementary or contradictory online sources and develop a solution to the question based on the information gained, usually through an action product such as a poster, a written concept, or a presentation.5 Within a design-based research approach, the use of web quizzes to promote CT in an elementary school in the USA was investigated (Ikpeze, 2007). Data collection was implemented through multiple channels. Observations, field notes, document analysis (students’ work), recorded audio, interviews, etc. were used to ensure triangulation within the study. Different WebQuest variants were made available to the learners. They were free to choose from them. The theme of all the WebQuest formats used was environmental protection in the community. For example, there were WebQuests for evaluating given websites through questions, for initiating a role-play in which different perspectives had to be taken (assuming the role of the mayor/a teacher in the city), etc. The teacher supported the learners in their learning. The teacher supported the learning efforts in CT through various strategies. These included modeling, scaffolding, activating questioning, graphic organizers, etc. It was found in the survey that thoughtful linking of content, collecting, summarizing, analyzing, and evaluating information from the Internet, and also different expressions of media literacy could be promoted overall through the different tasks. However, only if the tasks were carefully selected, sequentially organized, and thoughtfully taught. For example, the tasks had to be designed so that the topic was relevant to the learners or that different perspectives on an issue could be taken through the design of the task. Here, the teacher as a learning guide also has a particularly important role because it also became apparent that without support from the teachers, the learners let themselves be distracted from the work by surfing and also quickly became tired during the processing. Another problem for the learners was how to deal with the wealth of information provided by the selected websites. In recent years, there have been increasing research efforts investigating blended learning scenarios such as this using Internet resources to train CT. These include, for example, various forms of the flipped classroom approach. The idea of the flipped classroom (or “inverted classroom”) in the narrower sense is that learners

5

See https://webquest.org/

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acquire the learning content independently with provided self-learning materials (e.g., instructional videos, Internet sources, etc.), while the time in the face-to-face events is used for social processes such as application, consolidation, or discussion. In addition to information transfer, e-assessments are often used in the self-learning phase (e.g., knowledge tests with closed answers and sample solutions) in order to ascertain the learning status and make it transparent for teachers and learners. Through the learning level control, teachers receive indications of knowledge gaps and gain clues for the quality of the provided teaching videos/self-learning materials. The attendance time gained is used for hands-on practice, consolidation, or playful and social learning. Concepts such as “learning by teaching,” “learning by playing” and “learning by discussing” determine the presence time in these formats. Debusy was able to show at a college in North Dakota in 2016 that using the flipped classroom method during a semester resulted in students showing a greater openness to and appreciation of certain mindsets and attitudes associated with CT compared to standard lecture. Attitudes such as truth-seeking, open mindedness, confidence in reasoning, or inquisitiveness are worth mentioning, although a significant difference was only found for the criterion “openmindedness”, i.e., openness and appreciation towards the viewpoints of others (Dusenbury, 2016, p. 42). Results such as these indicate that teaching-learning settings such as flipped classrooms can be suitable for creating free spaces in classroom time to promote CT and strengthen dialogue-based learning, with a high degree of transparency of the learners’ prior knowledge.

6.3.2.4 Social Software and Web 2.0 Tools With the proliferation of Web 2.0 technologies, the early 2000s also saw the launch of several research projects that looked at the promotion of CT through the typical social software or Web 2.0 tools of the time (web blogs, wikis, e-portfolios, or other online tools of cooperation and interaction). For example, a study by Zhao et al. (2009) explored whether CT can be enhanced by writing reflections that other learners can access, comment on, and receive a grade on from a teacher. Seventeen students were required to write weekly critical reflections in a pedagogy seminar for one semester. The topic of the seminar was the design of learning media. Among other things, the learners addressed the question of how media can influence learning. In the blended learning seminar, nine face-to-face meetings and three online phases were held. The students also learned to use an authoring tool in exercises. After the exercises, they each wrote their reflections in the form of blog entries. This was followed by online learning phases for consolidation, in which asynchronous forum discussions also took place. No prompts were used to stimulate CT when writing the reflections. In addition, the asynchronous discussions were

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designed without e-moderation. All written transcripts were evaluated using the Newman method, a standard assessment tool for coding written argumentation that relates to Garrison’s (1992) CT concept. CT was not demonstrated in a majority of all blog entries. Rather, students only enumerated learning from the face-to-face course or described their experiences from using the authoring tool. The ratio of critical to non-critical thinking, measured in coded indicators, was approximately two to three. Although CT was more prevalent in the asynchronous discussions, these results were also rather sobering. The authors of the study believe the results are due to several reasons. In the blog entries, students had great difficulty writing critical reflections, for example, because they had not received instruction or thinking training for critical writing or reflection, because fellow students and the learning guides read the entries, and even because a grade was assigned for all reflections. During the online discussions, a common consensus quickly emerged that media would affect learning differently. This assumption was accepted by the students and was not questioned further in the course of the discussion. According to the authors, grade pressure and unclear expectations or lack of feedback also contribute to the fact that weblogs cannot be used effectively to promote CT. Nevertheless, the authors consider the medium to have great potential for CT promotion (Zhao et al., 2009, p. 102).

6.3.2.5 Virtual Learning Environments, Game-Based Learning, and Hybrid Teaching-Learning Scenarios A few years after the turn of the millennium, mobile devices have been discovered and researched regarding CT promotion due to increasingly powerful computers, Internet connections, and other technical and social developments such as the spread of smartphones. However, those technologies that require high computing capacities, such as virtual and augmented reality applications, have also come into focus for promoting CT (see, for example, research by Cheng et al., 2017). This period also saw the start of research efforts on serious games, i.e., computer games that are intended to contribute playfully to the acquisition of subject-specific skills or CT. Studies from this time often examine rather playful “hybrid” teachinglearning scenarios that combine some of the digital media or technologies just mentioned and connect them to traditional media in problem-oriented teaching situations to promote CT. In a study by Lee et al. (2016), for example, the research interest focuses on the use of a mobile-mixed reality serious game, a kind of role-playing game that combines geo-tagging, mobile learning (with virtual and physical artifacts) and blended learning. For this, learners slip into the role of business consultants who are confronted with a complex problem (the mobile phone company KIWI is

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experiencing economic difficulties, the causes of which are unclear). In their role as consultants, the learners are asked to analyze the initial situation and work out a coherent solution strategy for the company. To do this, the learners have to visit various physical and virtual locations (departments of the company) in order to obtain relevant information for assessing the problem situation and developing possible solutions. The five locations contain physical and virtual artifacts that need to be analyzed, such as documents or recorded interviews that can be accessed using a smartphone. However, the information to be extracted in the process is contradictory. For example, the actors from the different departments represent different and conflicting views on the company’s problems. Moreover, the artifacts to be examined by the learners are often inconsistent with the actors’ interpretations. For example, at the first location, the management’s office, learners find a newspaper article reporting that a mistake in the production of a battery series caused several of the company’s cell phones to self-ignite. The CEO, on the other hand, in an interview that learners can access via smartphone, says that the story may not be accurate and that the company’s predicament is due to poor marketing strategies and ineffective public relations. The role play is divided into five phases: In the first phase, called Teaser, the learners are introduced to their role and confronted with the complex problem. In the Elaboration phase, the learners collect relevant information and evaluate it. In phase three, Conflict Escalation, the situation of conflicting perspectives further intensifies (actors from the marketing and R&D departments accuse each other of being to blame for the developments). In phase four, the Climax, learners can gain crucial information that leads to greater clarity. In the final phase, Resolution, they reflect on the information and perspectives gained, define the problems based on the available evidence, and develop a resolution strategy for them. In this phase, the learners present the results obtained and conclusions drawn to the management. Phases one through four are completed in either a single-player or team-player setting with the support of mobile learning. Phase five (Resolution), in turn, is implemented in a blended learning approach. When preparing the final reports and the presentation, the learners should first intensively exchange their insights and findings in a first phase (Sharing Phase) and only then develop critical and creative resolution strategies in a second phase (Solution Phase). The respective teacher then takes on the role of management and lets the learners instruct him or her. The authors of the study questioned how CT can be promoted in such a roleplaying game, in particular whether individual players perform differently than players in cooperative learning teams. From another research perspective, the authors were also interested in whether knowledge asymmetries and reciprocity play a role in promoting CT, and if so, what role. Conceptually, the authors referred

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to the work of Garrison (1992), Newman et al. (1996) and alike. CT in this sense means analyzing contradictory information, drawing conclusions from it, broadening perspectives, assessing situations, and developing constructive or reflective approaches to solutions. The study was conducted with 25 students of the Industrial Engineering course at Hanyang University in Korea. On average, the learners were 24 years old and had roughly the same prior business and technical knowledge. The game was examined with the following variation: In variation 1 (control group), five individual players each had to deal with the problem situation. There was no exchange with teachers and other players. In variation 2 (knowledge asymmetry), five teams of two players each were to go through the game, whereby four of the five stations had to be completed alone and only three stations were the same. In this mode, each player had to go through one station that the other player did not know. In these stations, contradictory points of view were introduced, so the players had different information and conflicting perspectives. Only after each of the four stations had been completed were the players allowed to exchange ideas and work as a team. In variant 3 (knowledge symmetry), the teams of two were allowed to go through all stations together and cooperate from the beginning. After each station, the students were asked to write a short memo in which they recorded their impressions, ideas, doubts, and conclusions. In the resolution phase, the discussions of the team players were also recorded and written down as discussion protocols. The individual players were encouraged to think aloud at this point. The discussion transcripts as well as the memos and the written final report were examined and coded using the Newman method (see above) in order to find out how critical the conversations or the examination of the scenario of the mobile mixed reality serious game had turned out to be. The analysis of the memos still showed little difference between the groups. Overall, however, the authors were able to work out that the solo players, in contrast to the teams, only recognized simple organizational structures and contexts and only preferred those ideas and solution approaches that were already laid out in the individual sources. In this regard, however, it must be noted that the thinking-aloud protocols could not be evaluated because the students did not adhere to the instruction to think aloud. Overall, group two performed best under knowledge asymmetry. In almost all sub-indicators of CT, according to Newmann, such as “clarification,” “assessment,” “novelty,” “justification,” or “connecting idea,” this group achieved better results than group three (knowledge symmetry), although the students from group three were already able to exchange information at the beginning of the game and had homogeneous knowledge. Expressions of uncritical thinking were also higher in

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this group than in group two. Thinking and discussions under knowledge asymmetry were significantly more perspectival, thorough, and imaginative than in group three. This is made clear by the comparison of the counted codings in the mentioned and other categories (Lee et al., 2016, p. 110). The authors justify this progression by the knowledge asymmetry employed or the reciprocity created in the team. In this scenario (group two), the students were able to develop more appreciation for each other’s perspectives, as both players depended on each other’s knowledge and ideas for a mature consideration of the problem – according to one of the authors’ interpretations. In group three, on the other hand, the students settled on a common view relatively soon, did not question their positions as deeply as in group two, and developed fewer ideas. The authors explain this by the fact that the teams committed themselves early on and thus argued in a more constrained manner in their thought patterns. If basic assumptions about the problem were already accepted at the beginning, the following consensual framework of ideas was built on this and became so stable that it could hardly be shaken in the later course of the game.

6.4

Conclusion: Importance of the Results of Educational Research for the Design of a Thinking Training Course

The presentation of meta-analyses and studies like these could be continued for a long time or deepened further. However, the material presented is entirely sufficient to arrive at relevant findings about the didactics of CT, even though further studies would also illuminate other subtleties about the peculiarities of certain digital media when used to train thinking and also further specify the didactic procedure – of course always depending on the underlying understanding of CT, the chosen procedure or promotion context, the assessment approach derived from the concept, etc. However, this cannot and need not be done here. Instead, the most important insights from this and the chapter on meta-analysis, which are elementary for the promotion of CT, will be briefly and concisely summarized. A first important point is this: No medium or tool per se leads to learning success and is thus inherently better or worse than another. Many different forms of learning with digital media even show a low impact on learning success, regardless of the age of the learners or the type of (high) school (Hattie, 2013; Zierer, 2018) – which is often due to the fact that the respective media are used without a coherent didactic concept. Often, for example, old media are simply replaced by the new ones without didactically considering the specific potentials of the new technology (e.g., smartboard replaces blackboard).

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Critical thinking about how to promote CT with digital media is therefore required. To promote CT with a certain medium or a certain method hence means to first think through the ranges and limits of the medium with regard to the intended learning goals and one’s own teaching context and to check exactly which medium in combination with which work assignment could be suitable for the intended learning goals at all, taking into account the initial conditions. The presented studies can be helpful for the assessment. Thus, certain digital media have certain advantages for the promotion of certain facets of CT with simultaneous disadvantages that have to be accepted, e.g., through the speed and type of communication, the depth of elaboration or the structure of information, which the respective medium prescribes to a certain extent through its nature. The use of Twitter in dialogue-based learning can certainly be good for generating ideas and getting to the heart of statements. However, for elaborate analysis or construction of arguments, the medium itself seems to be of limited use, if only because of the character limit per tweet. Nevertheless, it is exactly how Twitter is used that matters. Under certain conditions and with creative use of the technology, critical debates can be conducted, for example, under the catchword “micro-blogging” (see Kergel & Heidkamp-Kergel, 2020). Similarly, a Twitter wall may help to critically unfold arguments in a teaching conversation in a face-to-face course. Whether interventions like these work, however, depends on a great many variables and preconditions. For example, the learners’ media literacy or their media socialization plays a major role in the extent to which they can develop their thinking in the particular medium. Some learners prefer oral dialogue and are not used to discussing arguments with others in writing, or have barriers to expressing themselves in writing, e.g., due to a spelling disability. Other learners, on the other hand, do not dare to contribute in oral discussions, for instance because their thinking is slower and they do not want to embarrass themselves. Consequently, it depends on how media and applications are designed and used in the classroom, in which context, with which purpose, in combination with which method and with which work assignment. In addition, it requires didactically thinking and acting teachers who use the media for their thinking training in their context and in their subject specifically to know and can accompany the process of CT accordingly and guide it at least in the beginning. In the study by Zhao et al. (2009), it became clear that using weblogs and e-portfolios without a didactically coherent concept and pedagogical support can lead nowhere. This is also shown by the studies on the use of e-learning units for thinking training according to Varaki (2006). The promotion of CT, like all other pedagogical intentions, must therefore be accompanied and carefully aligned to the concrete conditions. Digital media can

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play an important role, e.g., as an object of CT or as a medium for its promotion – but they do not necessarily have to. The question of how a medium is used didactically is more important than the question of which medium is used. Didactic thinking and acting is therefore more important for the success of thinking training than a specific medium. In almost all of the research presented, certain methods and didactic principles have been shown to be relevant for thinking training. In the meta-analysis discussed, some effective and central approaches were loosely addressed and given effect sizes. These include the use of authentic problems, dialogue-based learning, and mentoring. It was only through the combination of these methods that a high level of effectiveness in training success could be demonstrated. Self-learning as a method of thinking training was unfortunately not investigated due to the quality of the studies. However, in the individual studies presented here, it became clear that individual study, such as (written) reflection in individual work, can also contribute to clarifying thinking. Furthermore, in the studies, the didactic procedure was specified in more detail for a specific context in each case, and the methodological-didactic strategies were put into context by way of example, considering the use of specific media (see, for example, role-play scenario “KIWIMobile” in study Lee et al., 2016). The studies also showed how differently the methods and approaches can be designed for dialogue-based learning, applicationoriented instruction, or self-learning (see also Fig. 6.1). Another critical insight, which has already been indicated, is that the approaches or methods discussed should be coupled and brought into a didactically meaningful sequence (see, for example, the didactic design and phases in the role-play study by Lee et al., 2016). Consequently, promoting CT needs a structure, a well-considered sequence of phases, each of which employs very specific methods such as dialoguebased learning – the meta-study has demonstrated this and some of the individual studies have offered an illustration. Both in planning this structure and implementing the activities, the teacher has a central role as a learning facilitator or didactic designer, e.g., when it is necessary to enliven uncritical discussions, demonstrate CT, etc. Therefore, not apps, tools, and gadgets are necessary for successful thinking training, but rather well thought-out and coherent teaching-learning concepts that are oriented towards concrete conditions and developed and implemented individually. In order to develop a better understanding for planning the structure of CT training for practice, theoretical process models for CT can be helpful. Among other things, they describe what a critical thinker needs in order to get into CT in the first place, which interrelated steps of thinking and acting make up and accompany

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•

Dialogue

Authenc or Anchored Instrucon

Asynchronous and synchronous communicaon and cooperave media, e.g., chats, online forums, eporolios, Wikis, blogs, applicaon sharing, annotaon tools

•

Situated teaching and learning scenarios like role plays in hybrid learning environments, serious games, WebQuests, digital storytelling, etc.

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Through annotaon tools, virtual classrooms, etc.

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E-learning modules and CT apps Dynamic videos, reflecons through e-porolios

Mentoring

Individual Study

Fig. 6.1 Assignment of digital media and tools to methods of thinking training. (Own illustration)

the CT process, and which framework conditions are necessary for this in each case. At the same time, the respective conception of CT on which the respective model is based also influences how the process is typically theoretically modeled.

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7.1

Process Models of Critical Thinking

In the Anglo-Saxon pedagogical literature, some models can be found that describe the process of CT from an action-theoretical and cognitive perspective. These models have been developed and used mainly for pedagogical purposes (e.g., Brookfield, 1987; Ennis, 1989; Halonen, 2008). Many of the models build on the multi-step cycle of “reflective inquiry,” a process of exploration and research described by philosopher and educator John Dewey. Dewey points out that CT (he refers to it as “reflective thinking”) is called for when people reach their limits with their knowledge and skills in problem situations, their patterns of action and styles of thinking to cope with the situation fail, and their cognitive or organic equilibrium is shaken as a result. Only through the analysis of the problem, the mental penetration of the facts and potential solutions, through the application and testing of what they have devised, e.g., through experiments and observations, and finally, through the evaluation and reflection of the experiences made in the process, can they transform their knowledge and thereby also their practice and return to a state of equilibrium (Dewey, 1933, 1997). New meanings can be constructed when a person grapples with these open-ended situations, and thinking and action expanded thereby. Consequently, the process of inquiry is characterized by knowledge and theory acquisition. The knowledge gained in the process forms, so to speak, the conclusion of a methodically controlled problem-solving behavior in the sense of an experience generation that has reached a goal (Hampe, 2015, p. 149). The problems or phenomena dealt with, from which new insights and experiences are to be produced, are of a very different nature and – depending on the discipline – require separate answers. They range from everyday conflict situations to theoretical reflections or scientific problems. The experiences made # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_7

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are at the center of the phase model. They are both the driving force and the object of CT: In Dewey’s concept of “experience,” experience results from action. Action, in turn, can be understood as the connection between expected continuity and widerfahrnis. Widerfahrnis because the individual is disturbed in his experience of wholeness and flow when acting. Proven practices and heuristics are suddenly no longer sufficient to successfully shape the respective situation (Neubert, 2004). The individual pauses. CT comes into play and thus the aforementioned inquiry process begins. An abundance of seemingly incoherent perceptions, situations, intuitions, or thoughts is to be transformed into a describable, coherent, and thus influenceable, producible situation. Consequently, experiences are generated through a scientific problem-solving process using CT (Hampe, 2015). Therefore, Dewey’s concept of experience is to be distinguished from routine everyday experiences such as brushing one’s teeth. The sequence of this problem-solving process is strongly reminiscent of empirical research designs: wondering, raising questions, searching for relevant information, generating and testing hypotheses in experiments and observations, analyzing the results obtained and processing them. Dewey assumes that thinking cannot be taught but only positively influenced. Therefore, the problems, materials, and the interaction of the learners with each other that activate and accompany the thinking process in the classroom are of enormous importance (Dewey, 1997). In his view, knowledge should be gained by oneself in order to train CT. This way, learners become researchers and investigators who expand their thinking and actions through experience. Dewey’s problem-solving or inquiry and research process has been repeatedly taken up and modified. Most of the more psychological models today describe CT as both an inductive and deductive problem-solving or learning process in which scientific methods and criteria are applied, for example, in evaluating studies or conducting surveys. At the same time, however, the process should not be confused with a purely empirical research project. Depending on the problem, the process is more akin to an investigative inquiry or exploration, in which reflected intuition or consciously made everyday experiences can play a significant role. Even “unscientific” sources, such as a neighbor’s report or a quote from a song lyric, are not excluded from the outset. Critical thinkers are open-minded, interdisciplinary, interculturally, and historically aware gatherers of ideas and examiners of assumptions. Consequently, the process of CT calls for accessing an issue in a variety of ways (inductive, deductive, empirical, creative, spiritual, hermeneutic, etc.) depending on the situation and context, whether through science, art, the worldview of other cultures, spirituality, intuitions, etc. Perspectivity is an essential criterion for the quality of CT processes (Jahn, 2012a).

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Since Dewey, these models assume a multi-step cognitive and performative process at their core, which is characterized by certain phases and includes various conditions, actions, and forms of interaction: In order to be able to enter into the CT process in teaching-learning situations at all, the authors of the models presuppose certain conditions conducive to CT. These include, for example, the absence of repression (e.g., fear of saying something “wrong” and then being sanctioned for it, pressure to take grades), a protected space, a sense of security, tolerance for mistakes, appreciation, the opportunity to exchange and also to withdraw for reflection, a certain culture of communication (objectivity, giving arguments and reasons, hearing each other out, etc.), a certain cognitive maturity of the learners, openness of the teacher and learners, a learning environment rich in knowledge and materials, etc. (see Jahn, 2012a). However, just as important as the initial conditions is the development of a concrete and operationalized concept for CT with which the thinking training is aligned. Once these conditions are met, the critical thinker goes through a multi-step process that is usually presented linearly for the sake of complexity reduction. One assumption made is that CT activities require a trigger at the outset. Dewey refers to this as “felt difficulty,” a state of irritation and perplexity (Dewey, 1997). The more psychological literature talks about triggering events (Garrison & Archer, 2000), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), or emotional destabilization (Erpenbeck & Sauter, 2013), just to name a few examples. From the philosophical side, concepts or terms closer to everyday language tend to be used, or theories of aesthetic experience are drawn upon. The philosopher Karl Jaspers, for example, speaks of wondering, doubting, or experiencing borderline situations (Jaspers, 1992, p. 16 ff.) as triggers for profound thought processes. In turn, the philosopher Stefan Marx writes about the reception of art: “The work of art, through its existence, pushes us towards the contradictions that we consider normal in normal life and makes us look at them in a new way and perceive them as contradictions. The critical thing about the work of art is to make these contradictions visible” (Marx, 2019. p. 146; translated by authors). He invokes Adorno in his remarks, who in his theory of art sees the task of art as making suffering perceptible, sensitizing to it, and leading into critical thought (ibid., p. 144). In this theory, true work of art can evoke transformative experiences/feelings of being overwhelmed and assaulted (Adorno, 2012, vol. 7, p. 123 cited in Marx, 2019, p. 146). In the pedagogical literature, one can also find concepts such as “ambiguity experience,” “discrepancy experience,” “perturbation,” or “productive irritation” (e.g., Brookfield, 1987; Mezirow, 1990; Jahn, 2012a). Although different theoretical notions accompany these concepts (e.g., sometimes the focus is on the brain and its idiosyncrasies, sometimes on phenomenological experience), at the core lies a particular experience that jolts the

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individual’s thinking and leads to deeper reflection in order to regain clarity, certainty, or stability. As a result of that emotional experience, the individual finds themselves in a kind of state of tension that they strive to resolve, according to the assumption in the aforementioned theories. This state can be experienced both positively and negatively, which is why the literature also talks about positive and negative triggers (Brookfield, 1987). In order to release the cognitive or emotional tension and achieve cognitive or emotional equilibrium, the individual begins to think more deeply about and investigate the issue with which they are confronted. The perceptions and reflections, which are limited by the individual’s experience, selective, and possibly subject to error, are to be explicated through critical reflection and finally, if necessary, configured. The process of CT unfolds. The further steps deal with clarifying or overcoming the discrepancy experience. In doing so, learners must learn to understand the problem precisely, to receive or construct knowledge independently, and also to be able to test and apply it.

7.2

A Process Model as a Compass for the Didactic Design of Thinking Training Courses

An illustrative model that is particularly insightful for promoting CT has been presented by Garrison and Archer (2000) and Garrison and Anderson (2003), respectively. The model describes CT as an autonomous yet collaborative, constructivist learning and inquiry process in which the individual works with the community to acquire or generate new knowledge. In this, the two authors draw heavily on Dewey’s implied concept of “reflective inquiry” (see Fig. 7.1): At the center of the model is an individual’s experience. On the one hand, the term experience refers to a person’s knowledge and skills, which come to a limit that is to be overcome in the further course. On the other hand, it also refers to the individual emotional and sensual experience that carries and nourishes this process. A certain section of the world affects the individual (in a resonant or repulsing way) and the individual reacts to it, consequently affecting the world back. If things do not work out as they are used to, as imagined, as assumed, uncertainty arises, from which the specific experience that underlies the model can grow. In other words: learners actively and independently go through a transformative scientific inquiry or problem-solving process. This engagement with the problem leads to increased attention (Perception) and thoughtfulness (Deliberation), the urge to want to comprehend and develop ideas (Conception), and acting in practice (Action). The place for these activities is

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Private World

Reflection Deliberation (Applicability)

Exploration

Perception (Awareness)

Integration

EXPERIENCE

Triggering Event

Conception (Ideas)

Resolution

Action (Practice) Shared Word

Discourse

Fig. 7.1 Practical inquiry model. (Garrison and Anderson, 2003, p. 59)

divided into two areas: First, inwardness, reflection at a distance from the world, an inner and secluded location, the content of which is known only to the individual (Private World – Reflection). There, on the inside, thinking is bent backward, brooding, doubting, pondering. Experiences are interpreted, ideas are sorted, perspectives are sounded out, assumptions are tested, feelings are explored, or new ideas are developed. Cognitively, the individual moves along a continuum of focused attention, analysis, broadening perspectives, conceptualization, and evaluation. Second, Garrison and Archer (2000) introduce the so-called Shared World, the interpersonal realm of exchange with and in the world (Discourse). This is where the individual encounters their fellow human beings, with whom they discuss experiences, reconcile assumptions and ideas, or develop new ones. It is also where the enriching encounters with fellow creatures in flora and fauna and the material and cultural world occur. In this “outside,” the individual interacts and thereby makes new experiences. Consequently, the process of CT requires an interplay of action and reflection. There are alternations between action and contemplation,

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between discussion and thoughtful introspection. New experiences are made and penetrated in the process. The model clarifies that CT needs both spheres to train thinking and to be able to develop rich insights or experiences. CT is a contemplative, constructive, and collaborative learning process. If the necessary prerequisites for CT are given (see above), the process runs as follows: The acting individual stumbles in a particular situation (triggering event). Old ways of thinking and acting reach their limits. Something, a certain fact or a certain situation, suddenly becomes questionable. The existing knowledge and strategies of action are insufficient to clarify the facts or to cope with the situation satisfactorily. Thinking and feeling become misaligned. The individual wants to better understand and overcome this situation that puzzles and restrains them. They are puzzled and behave attentively, let the situation sink in, and observe carefully. Something seems strange, ambiguous, inconsistent, confusing, overwhelming, or surprising. Time to get to the bottom of things. CT is activated. The individual attempts to shed light on the issue and situation that has become questionable to them by first attempting to describe and get to the heart of the problem. This includes the individual clarifying their presuppositions about the thought occasion. Critical thinkers refrain from rash judgments or hasty reactions. In the subsequent exploration phase, the individual sets out to better understand and assess the questionable situation that has puzzled them. They analyze the situation, seek relevant information and interpretations to what has been experienced, look out for divergent perspectives, etc. (Garrison & Anderson, 2003). Thus, an attempt is made to form a rich picture of the issue to better understand it. On a practical level, this means brainstorming, searching for and evaluating literature, consulting the Internet, watching videos on the subject, putting thoughts on paper, taking notes, evaluating documents, checking sources, talking to relevant people, making observations, etc. These and many other investigative activities characterize the inquiry phase. It may be that the existing knowledge is sufficient to shed light on the subject under investigation. However, it is also possible that existing knowledge is not sufficient and new knowledge or hypotheses must be constructed. The individual alternates between the Private and Shared Worlds. Reflection and interaction work closely together. In the integration phase, the fog of being uninformed lifts. Whereas at the beginning of the process there was still ambiguity and vague conjecture, the individual is now in a position to make well-founded and informed judgments

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about the situation or the object. The concepts and insights gained from the exploration phase are valid and backed up by verified evidence. The individual now strives to incorporate the knowledge and insights gained into their thinking and actions and to solve the problems or resolve the situation successfully. This calls for developing and testing solutions and strategies. Brookfield describes this as follows: “Having decided on the worth, accuracy, and validity of new ways of thinking or living, we begin to find ways to integrate these into the fabric of our lives” (Brookfield, 1987, p. 27). The integration phase describes the process of developing and testing approaches. Reflection and social interaction complement each other to develop strategies and to examine and evaluate them in terms of their appropriateness. According to Garrison and Archer (2000), most of this phase takes place in the Private World. However, reassurance in practice by interacting with others is also an important part of this phase. In the fourth phase, the resolution of a problem or dilemma, the individual tries out the solution approaches or the alternative ways of thinking and acting in practice. The person acts and gains experience in the Shared World. Hypotheses are tested and new styles of thinking and acting are applied. In this way, the assumptions and insights gained from the phases before are subjected to a reality check, e.g., in experiments, observations or through implementation in everyday situations. The practice responds in a certain way to the acting individual. Sometimes the individual immediately succeeds in resolving the problem or dilemma and overcoming the cognitive or emotional imbalance. Often, however, experience teaches the opposite. Solution approaches fail or work only partially; hypotheses are refuted or at least limited by undesirable reactions. In addition, new ways of thinking and acting can be criticized by those involved in the environment or even acknowledged as undesirable. A new and different way of thinking and acting often leads to irritation. The outlined courses of action (failure, unexpected reaction) entail new experiences, which in turn are triggers for further CT processes (triggering event). The CT cycle starts again. Although the authors of models such as these never tire of emphasizing that the processes presented are of an ideal nature and should therefore only be understood as an approximation to practice, and clarify this by, for example, stating that the phases described do not have to run in a linear fashion, but that leaps backwards or forwards are characteristic of the process, there is nevertheless criticism of the models as a whole or of individual assumptions made. To take up just a few major points of criticism, the models are said to be too simplistic, too mechanistic, too little backed up by empirical research, too strongly designed for problem solving, too linear, too static. The list could be continued and extended (see Jahn, 2012a). Criticism is often linked to the respective understanding of CT and the

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underlying model. If, for example, CT is understood as scientific thinking along the lines of the natural sciences or as purely logical thinking, the process looks different in each case accordingly. But the epistemological assumptions involved also have to do with the dissent expressed. Those who, for example, only accept experimentally tested knowledge cannot trust some of the basic assumptions in the models, since those models, as outlined in this paper, usually do without an empirically based substructure. However, the merit of these action- and experience-oriented models is to raise important didactic questions and gain impulses by applying them, which are relevant for the practical promotion of CT. For example, the question of which initial conditions are important for thinking training and how they can be achieved is essential for planning a thinking training course. Also, the indications that thinking impulses are necessary for the start and that learners themselves have to make experiences and gain insights from them in order to start reflecting give important impulses for the planning of a promotion lesson. Likewise, the model suggests that CT is accomplished through the interplay of social interaction and reflection, and that sufficient space, time, and supervision must be provided for this in the classroom. Furthermore, the point that the full cycle of CT involves trying out and testing approaches to thinking and acting raises questions for teaching design. However, the respective answers to these questions turn out to be quite different. Teachers have to clarify with their learners for their respective context how the process of CT is presented and how it can be supported in the respective teaching. Due to the uniqueness, diversity and individuality of teaching contexts or teaching-learning situations, no clear methodological recommendations can be given. The theory on the process of CT is merely an interpretive model to grasp and structure social realities, i.e., to provide orientation in planning, implementing, and evaluating a thinking course. However, the model should never be understood as a work instruction to be worked through without reflection. In the following chapter, an attempt is made to derive possible didactic design implications from the model that are relevant for higher-level contexts. They can be understood as creative thought-provoking impulses that can be helpful for teachers to develop their own support ideas for their respective contexts.

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Didactic Implications from the Process Model

Through the discussed requirements of the Practical Inquiry Model (Garrison & Anderson, 2003) and its phases, a general planning scheme for the development of subject teaching can be unfolded, in which CT is to be explicitly promoted. The planning scheme was the basis for the conception of several promotion units for CT in seminars with students of economics and social sciences as well as in university didactic or company training courses with teachers from the university and company sector, which were tested several times and empirically examined in a designbased research approach (Jahn, 2012a). The planning scheme with its didactic design recommendations has proven helpful in structuring lessons, outlining didactic action, and promoting CT. The scheme contains the following five steps, which will be briefly explained below (Jahn 2012a): 1. Determine own concept of CT for the subject area 2. Analyze the conditions of teaching practice 3. Planning thinking training (a) Set learning objectives for thinking training (b) Establish the necessary learning environment (c) Design the initial phase (trigger event) (d) Accompany the phase of forming a judgment (exploration) (e) Integration: Supporting the development of alternatives (f) Create opportunities for testing (resolution) 4. Conduct and evaluate thinking training 5. Refine thinking training

7.3.1

Determine Own Concept of Critical Thinking for the Subject Area

The basis for the development of a didactic promotion concept includes an elaborated description of what CT means for a specific subject context, how it works, and which activities go along with it. In the best case, a clear idea of the thinking process followed emerges from the concept. Consequently, without a concrete idea of what CT means in the respective subject area, thinking training cannot be developed in a targeted manner. Therefore, the first step is to clarify what CT means in subject area x and how it manifests itself. As has already become clear in the first chapters of the book, the answers to this question can vary greatly.

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However, if it is unclear what issues, concepts, thinking styles, or methods CT is about in each case, CT can neither be modeled and made accessible for learners nor systematically promoted. To narrow the concept of CT, discussions with subject colleagues can be a great enrichment. But in some cases, perspectives from outside the discipline can also contribute to developing a richer conception of CT. Experiences from workshops on the promotion of CT have shown, for example, that the natural sciences and the humanities in particular can benefit from each other when it comes to defining CT. The visualization of the concept has also proved helpful for the development in order to make CT in the respective domain accessible to learners and to clarify which skills or attitudes are at the center of the promotional interest. CT thus becomes observable and more accessible to learners. Teachers can use the model to demonstrate what is important to them when thinking in the respective subject and how thinking processes should ideally proceed.

7.3.2

Analyze the Conditions of Teaching Practice

The promotion of CT always happens in a very specific social context, with very specific individuals, and under very specific framework conditions. Some of these are very conducive to the promotion, such as motivated, open, and interested learners or good media equipment. Other contextual conditions, on the other hand, can make the promotion more complicated, such as an unfavorable room or an even more unfavorable time. Some conditions can be improved in the short term, while others are relatively resistant to change. However, these conditions have a greater or lesser influence on the success of thinking training or any other didactic project. The whole complexity of the different conditions must be considered for planning. The planning of the thinking training must be adapted to the conditions, and the decisions taken must be coordinated. For this, the general framework must be clear. External conditions like technical infrastructure or spatial conditions can be easily found out. Concerning anthropogenic constructs such as prior knowledge or motivational situation of the learners, socialization experiences, inherited competencies in CT, epistemic beliefs, etc., the conditions cannot be easily clarified. However, targeted observations, interviews, conversations, or even tests can help to clarify these conditions. All further steps that take place in the planning of the thinking training must always be adapted to the framework conditions. For example, learning objectives should not under-, but also not over-challenge the learners.

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Set Learning Objectives

When a concept of CT is revealed in a particular subject area and for a particular question, it is didactically valuable for several reasons. First, operationalizing and defining CT can illustrate what is at stake. By showing, clarifying, naming, or demonstrating CT activities, the targeted thinking style can be experienced. On the other hand, the clarity gained in this way enables teachers to train certain thinking activities in a targeted manner by setting up concrete learning objectives in CT as target values and to align the design of their course and, if necessary, also the examination concretely with these. In this way, CT can be promoted precisely and, at least to some extent, tested. Learning objectives are the desired target values to be achieved through the teachers’ teaching efforts and the learners’ learning efforts. Learning objectives describe what learners should know, or to be able to do or want to do after the course. In the context of CT, many authors in the literature also speak of thinking skills and attitudes that can be covered by learning objectives (e.g., Facione, 1990). Learning objectives always have a content and an action component. A learning objective for a thinking course in the context of economics that is aimed at skills would be, for example, being able to analyze and judge television advertising in an ideology-critical way. Being able to analyze and judge ideology critically in the first example describes the action component of the learning objective, i.e., skills in CT. However, knowledge is also assumed in this action component, because what it means to be able to analyze and judge ideology critically, which thinking styles and concepts apply here, must be clear to the user. The content component, i.e., what the learner’s targeted knowledge, skill, or will relate to, is in this case “television advertising.” The targeted skills of CT are thus linked to very specific subject content. However, learning objectives in CT can also be self-referential, i.e., refer exclusively to CT as content itself. This becomes clear in the following examples: Learners can • differentiate between necessary and sufficient conditions. • discuss inductive conclusions from an epistemological point of view. • apply ideology-critical concepts such as “habitus,” “reification,” or “hegemony” to social situations. • suspend hasty judgment in information processing.

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These exemplary learning objectives clarify which concept of CT underlies each of them. Being able to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions is a goal located in the area of logic and can be illustrated and practiced with any examples. The learning objective to be able to apply concepts critical of ideology, such as hegemony, habitus, or reification, in turn, borrows from a tradition of CT that operates with Marxist-influenced social theories. The illustration and application of these concepts require a specific social object and must therefore always be discussed in relation to social constellations and developments. A lesson on this requires a different didactic context and a different didactic approach than the learning objective on the concepts of logic. Consequently, the respective understanding of CT is also inscribed in learning objectives – with far-reaching effects on the planning of lessons. It is important that learning objectives in CT are specific, observable, challenging, and at the same time realistic (for a detailed discussion on the formulation of learning objectives, see Cursio & Jahn, 2014a).1 For CT learning objectives on skills and knowledge. Operationalization, i.e., translation into observable actions of the learners, is usually still easy to achieve in thinking. However, suppose values and attitudes are the target of the support, e.g., a skeptical attitude that is to be cultivated in the learners. In that case, it becomes more difficult to imagine teaching situations in which these attitudes show themselves through concretely observable actions. Nevertheless, it is possible to describe behaviors that can be used to infer certain attitudes, at least to some extent. Cultivating a critical distance can mean, for example, that learners do not rush to judgment in certain situations, do not react hastily in interaction situations, abstain from giving opinions first, ask for time to reflect, etc. (see learning objective: “be able to suspend rash judgments when processing information”). Such behaviors resulting from a skeptical attitude can also be made visible in the classroom. However, they are no valid evidence that the corresponding critical attitude is really anchored in the learners. Learning objectives must always be developed in the light of the given framework conditions (e.g., by asking: Are the learning objectives found too demanding for target group x?). Furthermore, they serve, on the one hand, to find suitable teaching-learning activities (related question: Is teaching-learning activity x suitable to make the achievement of learning goal y likely?). On the other hand, they also provide information about the design of examination tasks (related question: Does

1

Guide to formulating learning objectives by Cursio and Jahn (2014) available at: https:// www.fbzhl.fau.de/files/2020/11/leitfaden-lernziele_fau.pdf (04.03.2020).

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examination task z actually test learning objective y?). At this point, however, it should be emphasized that not all learning objectives pursued by teachers should also be examined. This is especially true for learning objectives that focus on attitudes and values. In addition to the test-theoretical difficulties already alluded to, there are also ethical implications to be considered. When promoting CT styles and attitudes, there is always the danger that the promotion will turn into its opposite and degenerate into a rigid drill exercise – especially if strict performance assessments are associated with it. This applies in particular to values and attitudes as target variables.

7.3.4

Establishing the Necessary Learning Environment

CT can only develop properly if the framework conditions of the course allow it. In practice, however, the conditions are often anything but ideal. Educational culture in the western word is generally characterized by competition and is shaped by the maxims of the achievement and progress society. Students compete to say something clever and “right” in order to score points and get a good grade. Self-confident, clever behavior and speech are rewarded, while insecurity, silence or making mistakes are seen as signs of ignorance and incompetence. However, CT demands for groping, struggling, frittering and researching together in negotiation processes, in which trial and error play an important role. Therefore, students and teachers need to feel respected, accepted and valued, regardless of their background, education, gender, sexual orientation, etc. Teachers must have confidence in their students, because CT also requires courage to find and raise the voice of one’s own – which may seem strange to students from other cultures. In addition, fostering CT takes a lot of time, for example to deeply scrutinize and inquire sources and broaden perspectives. But Teachers repeatedly have to consider whether they have enough time in the course at all to critically examine things together with the learners; after all, this costs a lot of time and patience, which never seems to be enough in view of the imposed curricula and the content to be taught. Depending on the respective practice, very different factors can therefore make it difficult or easier to promote CT. Relevant aspects of a supportive CT culture are above all questions of togetherness and mutual recognition. The communication and interaction culture for CT promotion is characterized by openness, friendliness to mistakes, mutual trust, an encounter at eye level, and the rejection of egocentric sensitivities and strategic actions. This means not only that learners should open their thinking and suspend strategic action, but also that teachers do not automatically have the last word or the best argument. Promoting CT involves the promoters

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themselves: Educators should be open to examining and expanding their thinking, and be willing to jettison held views as necessary if new insights supersede the old. CT is a practice of continually practicing a mindset and way of thinking. CT also requires them to be open in their thinking, to acknowledge points of view other than their own, or to give preference to better arguments than their own. An ideal for togetherness in a thinking training can be found in the theory of communicative action by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. With the ideal discussion situation Habermas describes a discourse free of domination (1985), in which all relevant voices have their say, present reasonable and comprehensible arguments, and jointly examine their validity claims – and this in a language accessible to all participants in the discussion. The participants in the discussion act credibly, i.e., they mean what they say. Consequently, they do not act strategically in pursuit of their own egocentric interests but orient their thinking and speaking to criteria of truth and the goal of understanding. Therefore, participants in the discussion must also be able to discard previously held or cherished positions if more rational viewpoints are to be recognized through the discourse. Only the unconstrained coercion (zwanglose Zwang) of the most cogent arguments determines the outcome of these speech situations and not power relations or rhetorical skills (Habermas, 1992, p. 260; cited in Brookfield & Preskill, 2005, p. 272). Of course, the realization of an ideal speaking situation in teaching situations is a utopian undertaking. As an unattainable goal, it can nevertheless be helpful in reflecting on and shaping one’s own teaching climate. The first step in the intention to promote CT is therefore the effort to create an open, trusting, respectful, and friendly learning climate together with the learners, which invites communicative action according to Habermas. A variety of measures are cited in the literature to create this supportive learning climate. For example, and Brookfield and Preskill (2005, pp. 52–56) cite the establishment of rules of conduct – both for interactions online and offline – as an important contribution to open, collaborative, and rational interaction. This can be, for example, a netiquette for online discussions that specifies the way in which people discuss or argue with each other. The ideal of a critical attitude can be used as a frame of reference, e.g., suspending rash judgments or citing valid sources and evidence in arguments. Brookfield and Preskill (2005) recommend developing these rules with learners at the beginning of class. Johnson and Johnson present a set of rules (2009, pp. 42–43) that has at its core the realization of Habermas’ ideal speaking situation. For example, all voices should have their say and be heard, what is claimed should be well justified and substantiated, attempts should always be made to try to understand other perspectives, or the willingness should be

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expressed to actually reject assumptions that are no longer correct based on existing insights, and to change one’s own opinion. Another useful measure is to explain to the learners before the start of the thinking training exactly what the thinking training is about, what its aims are, and what it takes to achieve them. Relevant aspects such as the pressure of grades, unequal power relations, fear of embarrassment, etc. should be addressed and ways of dealing with these facts should be sought. The demonstration of a critical attitude as a teacher, e.g., in discussions, with subsequent reflection of the demonstrated actions, can also contribute to the fact that learners will engage in CT. An acknowledgement of the teacher’s own fallibility can be helpful. However, the influence of material and other organizational conditions on the training of CT is not insignificant and must be thoroughly considered when working on the framework conditions. This begins with the size of the room (suitable for individual and group work) and continues with media equipment, obligations to participate, or course times. These conditions are not always conducive and often only a few of them can be positively influenced. The constructive handling of them, however, is what makes the work on the learning climate. Working on the required learning climate for a thinking training extends over all phases of the support process and maintaining the learning climate must not be left out of sight during the entire support. Especially at the beginning, however, the efforts should be intensified, because this is where the further course is decisively shaped.

7.3.5

Designing the Initial Phase (Trigger Event)

CT is a difficult, exhausting, presuppositional, and sometimes stressful matter. Therefore, it often does not happen on its own. Often impulses are necessary to get deeply into thinking about an issue. But when a person is really affected, interested, or touched by a topic or an experience, the ground for CT is prepared. To this end, it can be helpful to break through habitual patterns of perception and thinking by allowing people to have experiences in which they encounter supposedly familiar things with a different view or approach. Techniques of zooming in or out, speeding up or slowing down, alienating, omitting, combining, etc. can play an important role in shaping thought impulses in order to make the experiences described possible. Impulses that lead to thinking can be implemented methodically in very different ways. Media and appropriate tasks play an important role. By using film clips with a suitable task, moments of astonishment, doubt, indignation, etc. can be created.

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Films have the potential to touch the viewer immediately, to absorb them in the reality shown, and in the process to produce an intense sense of being in tune. The intellect does not, as in other media, interpose itself between the viewer and the object being viewed, as it does, for example, when reading statistics. Film experience is immediate. The clarifying reflection only follows on after the film experience. Films can evoke many moods in the viewer. The film experience opens the door to the manifold interpretation and reinterpretation of what is shown in the film world, which finds its “real” counterpart in the everyday world. At best, the film experience encourages the viewer to look at the world beyond the film experience from a different perspective than the one they are accustomed to, or it even forces them to reinterpret their previous way of looking, their previous interpretation of what they have perceived. Depending on the learning objectives pursued in CT, the use of film must have certain characteristics for its didactic application. In the light of teaching economics, for example, films should above all consider economic, ecological, and social aspects and reflect their interplay. Films should describe grievances and offer utopian perspectives so that development possibilities become conceivable. Films that are strongly one-dimensional and ideologizing can also be suitable for teaching under certain circumstances, e.g., to raise doubts. Furthermore, it is important to plan the use of films didactically well. Film watching must always be purpose for a pedagogical goal of training thinking and must therefore be embedded in a teaching-learning context.2 Depending on the context, there are many possibilities. Here is a small selection (adapted from Jahn, 2012b, 2013a): • Emotionalization: show a film clip that illustrates a social problem in such a way that it is possible to experience how the problem is directly or indirectly linked to our lives and everyday life – in other words, we are part of the problem. Learners can then talk about their experiences of the problem, and from there go on to further and more abstract reflections. • Work with contrasts/ambiguity: use film clips on a particular issue, each of which makes contradictory statements and draws conclusions. The learners should discuss which view is the “right” one. • Storyline exercise: show a film clip up to certain key points; learners should then design possible initial scenarios for it, for example through presentation and discussion.

For a detailed introduction to film use in the classroom, see Jahn (2012b): https://www. researchgate.net/publication/322551643_Augenoffner_Film_-_Das_unterschatzte_Medium_ und_seine_didaktischen_Moglichkeiten 2

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• Extended action development exercise: learners see a concrete action situation with dilemma character, such as a controversy in a political or scientific discussion round in a talk show, and then continue it in a role play or simulation under a concrete task (e.g., pro-contra debate in the role of representatives of political parties etc.) • Cinematic exaggeration or understatement/false report: Present film clip in which an issue is misrepresented, abbreviated, or one-dimensional. The learners should then problematize this excerpt. Not only films are suitable for providing impulses for CT. The use of other thoughtprovoking sources such as quotes, newspaper excerpts, cartoons, or short stories can also provide impulses for the necessary emotionalization. Reducing the large, enlarging the small, slowing down the fast, speeding up the slow, playing with expectations, and other design principles of defamiliarization can be helpful in generating heightened, intense attention that can lead into deeper thinking. Also “real” experiences with the challenging reality beyond the classroom are suitable to enable vivid impulses. For example, hosting contemporary witnesses report about certain experiences as guests in class, inviting “real” persons to answer leaners’ questions, getting a picture of certain facts or institutions on site, or analyzing authentic or historical documents in class. In this way, what is abstract, distant, or hidden can be experienced up close and emotionally, and what is supposedly known and familiar can appear in a new light. Certain facts have to be shown and experienced in order to be able to understand them more deeply. “Talking about” is not always sufficient to make the indeterminate adequately clear. But aesthetic experiences or contact with unfiltered practice can be of service here. Concerning thinking impulses, it is always important to build a bridge to the leaners’ life world through the manner of the impulse. The approach to thinking should be chosen in such a way that the learners recognize the relationship of the subject matter to their lives and can bring their world of experience into harmony with what is being considered. The more the experience is relevant and significant for the learner, the more it appeals to them, the more they find themselves in it or are even thrown back on themselves, the more intensively a mental examination of what is shown can be stimulated. It is therefore important to pose authentic and complex problems and questions in such a way that they affect and concern the learners. The adequate use of ambiguity is also important. Learners are thus exposed to the dualisms of world interpretations and views. Which view is the right one? Who is actually right? It is important that the learners explain and justify their assumptions. This will be referred to again and again in the further process.

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To loosen up the heaviness of thought, another important element of thinking training is a cultivated sense of humor. Puns, irony, verbalization, inauthentic speech, taking things at their word, transferring situations into the fantastic, deliberately putting your foot in your mouth. The list of humorous stylistic devices is long. Humor encourages laughter, relieves stress, is conducive to learning, and arouses interest. Sober or sobering descriptions of reality can be softened and made interesting using humorous stylistic devices. Impositions can be better coped with in cheerful composure. A humorous approach can be used, for example, to explore perspectives that in the real world have strong affective connotations and quickly lead to rejection or polarization. In addition, the right degree of challenge must always be found when initiating the impulse to think. What is still beneficial for one learner and arouses their interest, already deters the other and overwhelms them.

7.3.6

Accompanying the Phase of Forming a Judgment (Exploration)

Once the necessary mindfulness has been established and the required attitude has been adopted, the task is to examine and explore the issue from different angles. This means approaching the problem from various perspectives, e.g., by researching and discussing information, examining sources, developing theories, or interviewing relevant actors. This requires a stimulating learning environment offline and online, that enables the learners to deal with the subject matter intensively, e.g., by providing research possibilities or different sources. In this phase, learners explore the subject matter from multiple perspectives through cooperative, dialogue-based, and research-based learning. It is important that learners are given the opportunity and space to think for themselves and to analyze their thinking in a guided way. Sufficient time is needed for this, because CT movements take place slowly and gradually. In the phases of communication and collaboration, learners broaden their perspectives and struggle together to rationally legitimize adequate descriptions of the issue under study. Cooperative-communicative forms of work have their advantage in that learners get a chance to learn and practice how to gather ideas, check sources, change and broaden perspectives, discover contradictions, discuss assumptions analytically, and so on. At the same time, these stages enhance learners’ self-worth and promote expressive skills. It is important that the learners can try out their arguments and discuss them together. However, it is not about

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learning to assert oneself. It is about finding valid, tested arguments, and points of view together. A central characteristic of CT is also the change of perspectives, which can be supported methodically-didactically. Thinking and acting always happens from a certain perspective, in which situations are perceived and interpreted based on one’s own experiences (Wahl, 2006, p. 56). By adopting other perspectives, however, it is possible to recognize one’s own point of view as a construction and to generally understand that different, well-founded points of view can exist. Think-Pair-Share method: After the learners have received an introduction to a certain problem, they then have to think about the problem independently on the basis of guiding questions (Think), then exchange their results with their partner or in a smaller group (Pair). Finally, the whole group discusses and expands the results (Share). Depending on the introduction and learning objectives, the methods are to be chosen and designed creatively. On the methodological-didactic level, there are a variety of methods and media to support this phase. Some of the methods are rather low-threshold and can be integrated into everyday teaching without much effort. In face-to-face teaching, these include buzz groups, think-pair-share, brainstorming, dilemma analysis, role-playing, or pro-contra debates. There are also easy-to-implement methods for digital teaching-learning scenarios, such as moderated forum discussions, supervised online group work with the necessary application-sharing tools, and so on. However, there are also more complex methods that cannot easily be implemented in traditional everyday teaching. For example, group puzzles, research, or case-based and problem-oriented learning. Garrison and Archer (2000), Brookfield and Preskill (2005) as well as authors like Meyers (1986) point out that besides discourse, which can be promoted by cooperative learning methods, phases of reflection, of thinking in silence and distance, are always necessary for the promotion of CT. In the cooperative and discursive phases of work, ideas are collected, different perspectives on an issue are anticipated, cognitive conflicts are generated or clarified, and claims to validity are discussed. Phases of reflection, on the other hand, serve to (re)critically examine one’s own assumptions, to conduct further research and check sources, to integrate the insights gained into existing schemata, and to develop new patterns of thought and action. In reflection, thinking distances itself once again from the impressions gathered and the trains of thought already set in motion. It bends back to what has already been thought, thoroughly examines and reconfigures the assumptions made and its own mental examination criteria once again (Jahn, 2013a). Reflection, then, means the critical recapitulation and configuration of thoughts already made. Garrison and Archer emphasize the importance of the interlocking of phases of

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exchange or collaboration and phases of reflection: “It is important to emphasize again that both collaboration and self-reflection are essential aspects of the complete critical thinking/learning cycle” (Garrison & Archer, 2000, p. 88). Written work is well suited to reflecting on one’s own thinking and actions to date, or on the experiences made in the group, and to identify or evaluate one’s own assumptions in the process. Writing is a particularly good way of making learners’ thinking observable so that appropriate feedback can be developed. Methods include openended tasks, critical incident exercises in which learners critically examine experiences they have had, or essays. The use of prompts, for example in the form of challenging questions, to guide thinking along particular lines in writing can be helpful. Learners in Brookfield’s (1987) approach, for example, are asked to reflect weekly on their experiences in class using guiding questions. The questions invite them to identify assumptions, examine them, take alternative perspectives, develop constructive suggestions, etc. However, action-oriented and dialogue-based methods and reflection assignments alone do not guarantee that learners actually expand their thinking. Dubs emphasizes that student self-activity without guiding influences in the processing of open and complex tasks, in which CT is to be trained holistically, can hardly show success, despite the required learning climate, especially with weaker and dependent learners, because the learners do not know strategies of CT and consequently will not use them (Dubs, 1992, p. 52). Only through stimuli such as hints, suggestions, impulses, or guidance from the teacher can thinking training become successful. Consequently, the goal is to make visible both the teacher’s and the learner’s thinking, as John Hattie (2013) writes. Making the teacher’s thinking explicit is important for model learning. Learners should be able to understand the teacher’s thinking and what strategies and concepts they are using, e.g., when checking validity claims for their correctness and logic, taking different perspectives on a topic, asking about power and structures of domination, etc. Teachers should therefore model their own CT activities in many ways, visually or auditorily, i.e., make them observable for the learner. The modeling of CT can be done e.g., by thinking aloud, but also by visualizations like mind- or concept-maps. In doing so, the thinking of the teacher is also questioned. The teacher is not the all-knowing mastermind and ultimate founder whose thinking style is to be imitated unquestioningly, but they are a role model who can give impulses for the development of CT in the learners. Making the learners’ thinking visible, on the other hand, is important for the teacher to understand what concepts and strategies are used by the learners, i.e., how they approach an issue in a thinking way. The visualization of the learner’s thinking, in turn, can be done through written or oral discussion of an issue. Based on this, the teacher must derive appropriate measures, e.g., to convey

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concepts and strategies in thinking, to broaden perspectives, to mirror assumptions, or to give the learner individual feedback on the thinking process. However, teachers must also help to shape the course of the discourse and, if necessary, also guide it. If, for example, discussions are rather superficial and uncritical, the teacher can try to transport the critical spirit back into the discussions by using certain questioning strategies. At their core, questions are about questioning assumptions, clarifying concepts, or allowing logical conclusions to be appreciated. Weil notes that there is no textbook formula for how to proceed. However, there are some basic strategies that can facilitate critical questioning, such as (Table 7.1). For answers, learners must also be given enough time to reflect. Teachers therefore take on a number of tasks and roles at this stage. Not only do they have to ensure that the discourse in the group or in the reflective phases remains critical and that relevant perspectives on the problem are thoroughly examined, but they also have to make CT concepts accessible, e.g., by modeling CT or giving learners targeted feedback on thinking processes. This also means that teachers provide rich learning environments and tasks in which CT can be applied. Once the relevant perspectives have been explored together and learners are beginning to show more mature judgment about the issue being explored, the next phase can be initiated.

7.3.7

Integration: Supporting the Development of Alternatives

If you really want to get serious about developing alternative ways of thinking and finding solutions, you have to want to leave the comfort zone of passive observation, cherished beliefs, and comfortable thinking routines, at least to some extent, and get involved with the adversities and complexity of practice. This needs to be facilitated and encouraged in the classroom, whether in a more playful “as if” mode or in genuine engagement with and in practice. This requires authentic problems of a serious nature that play a role for the learners. For the problems to be really relevant for the learners, it is important that the learners themselves play a leading role. They must be allowed to experience themselves as self-effective problem solvers, as persons who can make a difference in practice and who are believed to be effective and competent. Problem definitions as well as role profiles can be more or less fictitious and range from real practical projects to fictitious case scenarios in which learners can appear as alternative thinkers and problem solvers. Whether they enter with the intention of really wanting to change something in practice or playfully in a role just

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Table 7.1 Strategies for critical questioning Recommendation – Students often experience questions from the teacher as “questioning” in the context of oral performance. Therefore, questions should be asked empathically and without coercion. – Questions should be open-ended so that learners have to think for themselves, develop arguments, give and examine reasons and evidence, etc.

– The questions should invite learners to take different perspectives on an issue

– Questions should ask students to define, clarify, and apply concepts and terms in broader contexts

– In addition, the questions should encourage learners to think about what information they need to test assumptions and act constructively – Teachers can give thought-provoking impulses by using counterexamples or by pointing out contradictions that put the learners’ arguments in a difficult position

Examples – Have you ever had experiences with this in your everyday life? What were those experiences? Would anyone like to share their experiences? – What is the problem or the question? – What assumptions are being made here? – What speaks for the assumptions and what speaks against them? – How credible and meaningful is the empirical evidence cited? – From which angle is the topic approached? – What alternatives are there to the considerations made? – Could the data be interpreted differently? – How exactly is x related to y? – Could you elaborate this idea even better linguistically? – What exactly is meant by the concept/ term used? – Could you please form an example, comparison, metaphor, graphic visualization, etc. to illustrate the arguments? – What evidence (studies, theories, observations, etc.) speaks for or against the assumptions made? Where could you look? – How could the existing situation be improved? How could you contribute? – You say that z is the case. But it is clear from the example of y that z cannot be universally true

Source: Adapted from Jahn (2013b)

pretending to do so is not crucial. What is important is that the learners play a central role and have to take responsibility for solving a constructed or real problem. On the methodological level, some forms of problem-oriented, cooperative learning can be found that support the development of solution approaches to problems found. Methods that are “product-oriented,” i.e., that require a concrete

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approach to a solution in the form of an action product that has to be materially elaborated or designed and will be used in the subsequent phase of testing, are well suited. This can be a poster, a checklist, a video, a collage, an experimental set-up, a research design, a film or a presentation, and so on. In the action product, the results of the CT process should be expressed and take shape. Learners have to make decisive judgments and let CT come to answers. For the design of well-founded perspectives, of solutions to identified problems, and of alternatives to the given, it is primarily the promotion of the constructive level of thinking that is required. This also requires creative, intuitive, and unreasonable thought games and experiments in order to sound out possible new paths and to be able to follow them later. Garrison and Archer emphasize the importance of intuition in CT as follows: “Rational thought without intuition lacks inspiration. It is like taking a trip back and forth on the same road; while it is very predictable, we never discover new roads and vistas” (2000, p. 85). On the level of the pedagogical interaction of the teacher, all forms of interaction mentioned so far are still relevant. There is also CT modeling and giving feedback on the learners’ thinking processes by the teachers. Both should help learners to make well-founded and tested judgments on their own, to develop solution concepts, to anticipate and evaluate their implementation consequences in practice, to again question applied criteria, and so on. Furthermore, teachers may have to give further impulses if discussions or work phases are too uncritical. It is also important to maintain an open, error-friendly, humorous, and trustworthy cooperation, because at the latest in this phase the path is set for the later testing of the thoughts in practice. To show one’s colors mentally and to transform one’s thoughts into concrete concepts and implementations can bring pressure and stress to the learners and promote old dualistic patterns of thinking again (keyword: pressure of grades, etc.). There are many methods that extend into the integration phase to promote CT or are particularly suitable for this purpose. Most of them belong to certain forms of cooperative, action-oriented learning (Jahn, 2012a). One method that considers the essential phases for promoting CT and relies on purposeful, cooperative research of online sources is the so-called WebQuest. WebQuests can be understood as “Internet-based learning adventures” (Nolte, 2006). In order to solve Web Quests, diverse positions on a subject matter have to be developed, assessed, and evaluated by the learners in a work assignment on the basis of online sources of different quality. With the knowledge gained, the learners then have to work out constructive solutions to problems, mostly in the form of the action products already mentioned, such as presentations or written concepts, which are then discussed and evaluated in the class group.

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In a multi-stage structure, learners are guided step-by-step through the different phases of the WebQuest with their digital devices.3 In an introduction, they are familiarized with a specific topic on the first pages of the WebQuest. This can be done online via HTML pages or offline, for example via a PowerPoint slide. For the online variant, some WebQuest generators can be found on the net and are freely available. Then an authentic situation is presented to make the learners aware of the relevance of the topic and the task. Subsequently, the learners are confronted with a concrete, action- and product-oriented problem. Many WebQuest are designed in such a way that the learners have to take on a certain role in which they have to deal with the problem (as scientists, decision makers, etc.). Afterwards, learners are provided with the list of links and materials that form the basis for solving the problem. It is the core of a WebQuest and is compiled under certain pedagogical aspects. The links to the pages or materials have to be selected specifically and skillfully by teachers in advance. They can be used, for example, to generate the necessary emotionality, to create a diversity of perspectives, to offer contradictory validity claims or to show different ways of solving a certain problem. Authentic sources can also be used, such as sites where historical documents are made available or political spokespersons express their opinions on a particular issue. Working individually or in groups, learners can then explore the pre-selected websites or materials under the specific task or, if appropriate, in their assigned role. This is done in individual and group work. After the sites/materials have been combed, phases of cooperative learning follow in which learners share their assessments and findings to jointly create the particular action product to solve the task. This phase can help to promote the development of alternatives and approaches to solutions as discussed in CT, if it is didactically designed in a meaningful way. Within the WebQuest structure, the learners are also given concrete suggestions in the chapter “Process” on how they could proceed with the task. In the chapter “Presentation” it is further determined how the results of the work should be prepared and presented. Finally, the chapter “Evaluation” clarifies the criteria according to which the WebQuest will be evaluated by the learners as well as by the teacher. For this purpose, assessment schemes are suitable that describe the criteria in detail and cover several performance levels (Murbach, 2008, see also Chap. 5 on the assessment of CT).

3

A detailed introduction with examples of the WebQuest method can be found at: https:// www.e-teaching.org/lehrszenarien/pruefung/pruefungsform/webquest

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Resolution: Creating Opportunities for Experimentation

Designing the resolution phase can be demanding and challenging for both learners and teachers. For example, learners are asked to test the results of their CT in practice. This can mean something quite different in each subject and discipline. It may mean, for example, that learners conduct an experiment, defend a position in practice, apply an approach to a solution in a practical project, and so on. To realize this, learners have to expose themselves and their concepts to the adversities, chances, limitations, and incalculability of practice. They become vulnerable and may fail. This can be accompanied by uncertainty and anxiety. School practice shows that it is precisely the step of emancipatory behavioral change or extension that learners find difficult, as it requires courage, perseverance, or effort to replace old patterns of thought and action with new ones. Every person who has ever changed his or her life habits to some extent out of conviction knows about it. However, following up insights with action is not only a particular challenge for learners but also for teachers. Garrison and Archer (2000) report that especially the first three phases of the CT process are often carried out in courses, but that the fourth phase is often no longer implemented by teachers. This is for a variety of reasons. Many are due to the framework conditions for teaching, such as rigid and limiting time constraints, legal frameworks, too large groups, or a lack of equipment in classrooms or lecture rooms. Some, however, also have to do with the fact that teachers do not want to face up to the difficult undertaking, for example because of the high effort that this phase entails or also because of a higher loss of control that inevitably occurs during the phase. On the didactic level, despite the hurdles mentioned above, a variety of teaching forms and methods allow the implementation of alternatives and solution approaches in practice. Some of the approaches are complex and demanding, both in terms of the framework conditions and the didactic requirements. These presuppositional and elaborate forms can only be implemented with difficulty in everyday teaching: In the various forms of project teaching, for example, many approaches can be found to transform CT into conscious action, which then becomes the subject of reflection again. Service learning, for example, is a form that is becoming increasingly important in schools and universities. Learning through involvement is based on the principle of performing a social service in practice, which is interlinked with subject-specific learning in the classroom. Service stands for social engagement, whereby this is chosen in such a way that theoretical content from the classroom is linked to practice. Learning means the associated expansion of subject-

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specific and interdisciplinary competencies, which are characterized by relevance to action and depth of understanding (Sliwka & Klopsch, 2019; Jahn et al., 2012). At universities, research-based learning should also be mentioned as an important way of facilitating the trial phase. In the best case, learners go through the entire research cycle, from finding their own research question to constructing a coherent research design, through data collection and analysis to their own publication. The teachers act as research colleagues and offer individual support, in the sense of a learning guide (Kergel & Heidkamp, 2015). But not only demanding large-scale forms can didactically facilitate the trial phase. There are also many methods that require less effort and can be integrated into regular operations without major changes. The forms to be mentioned here are, for example, simulations, role plays, or various types of future workshops. Depending on the learning objectives and framework conditions, very different implementations are conceivable. Especially role plays, in which a piece of practice is performed, can be quite easily integrated into the lessons. There are hardly any limits to creativity. For example, controversies and discourses from the media can be continued in the classroom. Learners take on certain roles to defend or apply the insights and concepts they have gained in practice. It is important to offer a concrete task and to define clear role assignments (e.g., “You participate in talk show xy and represent the following character/position”). With all the methods mentioned so far, reflection on the experiences made in the trial or the results achieved is again central to the further process. This can be done both in writing and orally. By recapitulating the course of action and the results achieved, new cycles of CT can be initiated. However, if the promotion of CT in the classroom goes so far as to touch upon the learners’ personal thinking and actions, it is the teacher’s task to sensitize and prepare the learners about the possible harmful effects and consequences of integrating new assumptions into their ways of acting. The social environment does not always react positively to personal change, even if it is only on a “small” scale. Changes in ways of thinking and acting can lead to real conflicts when a change in behavior occurs that deviates from the previously lived norm in a group. Critical thinkers get in trouble. One quickly finds oneself forced into the role of the know-it-all or the intellectual or is ridiculed or rejected as a “do-gooder” or “utopian”, for example. Critical thinkers can be perceived as subversive, rebellious, revolutionary, arrogant, or even hostile. One of the leading experts on CT training, Stephen Brookfield (2003), reports from his training experience that some of his learners had negative experiences of CT when integrating it into their everyday lives. As a consequence, they lost esteem from colleagues, jeopardized their professional careers and even their jobs, or damaged their relationships with acquaintances

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and friends (2003, p. 152). Negative reactions from their environment, be it parents, classmates, work colleagues or fellow students, put learners under pressure and make them feel offended and misunderstood. However, changing one’s worldview and lifestyle is also perceived as threatening and risky. Brookfield describes this as follows: “Asking critical questions about our previously accepted values, ideas, and behaviors is anxiety-producing. We may well feel fearful of the consequences that might arise from contemplating alternatives to our current ways of thinking and living; resistance, resentment, and confusion are evident at various stages in the CT process” (Brookfield, 1987, p. 7). If teachers go so far as to encourage learners in emancipatory action, it is important that they support and educate their learners. Teachers need to act as advisors and coaches to learners, for example by offering feedback sessions. Brookfield points out that failing to raise awareness of potential dangers and consequences increases the likelihood that learners, when confronted with these effects, may blame the teacher for them (Brookfield, 2003, p. 156).

7.4

Summary of the Promotion of Critical Thinking

CT is a reflective, constructive, creative, exploratory, and collaborative learning process. Consequently, “critical” teaching moves along a continuum of exploration, interaction, and reflection, of asking questions and exploring meaningful responses to them, of challenge and support, of close observation by the teacher, and of giving directed feedback. Periods of discussion and social interaction alternate with periods of reflection and contemplation. Challenging tasks put learners in cognitive states of tension and, to resolve these states, they independently and cooperatively explore the issues involved. This process should not stop at mere judgment, however, but allow learners to participate critically in thinking and acting by testing and trying out their concepts and ideas in practice. The results of their thinking should resonate with reality. For teachers, this involves a variety of demanding tasks and roles. Even before critical teaching can begin, they act as designers of challenging, stimulating, and rich learning environments and tasks. Digital media can provide an effective service in designing information-rich and emotionalizing learning environments. In addition, teachers are responsible for promoting an appreciative and confidential learning climate in which learners can engage in the adventure of their own CT. In addition to clear rules of interaction, the use of humor can also make an important contribution to cushioning the gravity inherent in CT.

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Furthermore, teachers act as models of CT by exemplifying and demonstrating CT, making it explicit and observable (“modeling”). The demonstration and clarification of CT, as well as the visualization of thinking in the learners, coupled with targeted feedback, have a supporting function in the training of thinking. At the same time, teachers are asked to encourage, incite, entice, or guide students to think critically. The targeted use of impulses to think plays an important role here. Teachers must steer the discourse and intervene where thinking becomes one-sided and slow. However, they must not take CT away from the learners but help them to think for themselves. For the most part, promoting CT does not require new and elaborate methods, despite the demands placed on teachers. Effective thinking training can be incorporated into the classroom without much trouble – both in homeopathic and stronger doses. The use of authentic problems, role-plays, simulations, various forms of dialogue-based learning, or written reflection tasks, for example, all come into question for this purpose. They should be used in a coordinated manner in the process of CT. It should also be emphasized that, depending on the learning objectives and the concrete contents of the subject lessons, not all facets and phases of CT always have to be promoted or implemented. Depending on the subject, it is advisable to select only certain aspects of CT that are appropriate to the subject and to make these the objectives of the teaching. It is important, however, that the promotion of CT should not be tackled “incidentally,” but should be considered as an important objective in lesson planning and implementation – irrespective of the phase of the CT process to which the promotion is to lead in the lesson. In the following Table 7.2, the central phases of the CT process are once again presented, linked to helpful didactic principles from empirical research, and enriched with methodological examples (Jahn, 2012a).

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Table 7.2 Measures to promote the CT process Process of CT Creating conditions for thinking training: Shaping a conducive learning environment

Triggering event: Initiate CT

Didactic design principles – Clearly explain and discuss the purpose of the course. Explicitly address your learning objectives and how they relate to CT – Develop binding rules with the learners on how they want to interact and discuss with each other. – Address the learners’ expectations and consider how far these can be accommodated in the course – Meet learners at eye level. Invite learners to think and act independently – Choose the approach to a topic in such a way that the learners find themselves in it and realize that the issue also concerns them – Provide the necessary stimulus for thinking by, for example, allowing doubt or wonder, so that learners are challenged and invited to embark on unfamiliar paths of thinking – Use media and questions that stimulate perception and thinking – Facilitate “authentic” experiences with the challenging reality beyond the classroom as an occasion for CT – Have learners identify and evaluate the basic explicit as well as implicit assumptions and validity claims of each view – Do not let humor get in the way: If the playfulness in

Methodological examples – Create handout “CT Policy” as a basis for discussion that illustrates the purpose of the course and clarifies what learners will expect – Admit one’s own fallibility as a teacher – Develop binding rules of interaction with the learners (e.g., how to discuss and argue, etc.)

– Use of controversial, biased, suggestive, or contradictory film clips, reporting, short stories, blog posts, quotes, etc. – Use of stimulating questions or conversation techniques such as in Socratic conversation – Dilemma analysis: Introduction to an ethical, scientific, etc. dilemma – Scenario analysis or case study method – Query of spontaneous answers to a complex problem and comparison of the answers – Enabling stimulating experiences beyond everyday teaching, e.g., through guest experts, contemporary witnesses, contact with those affected, etc.

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Process of CT

Exploration: Accompany the exploration phase

Didactic design principles CT is lost, it can lead to strain and bitterness – CT needs a balanced “operating temperature.” ensure to the right extent that thinking and feeling heat up, but then also cool down again, in order to be able to take an analytical, sober distance to things – Ensure that a wide variety of perspectives are considered and interspersed, discussed, and assessed by the learners – Also introduce periods where learners are given time and quiet to think on their own, to sort out views, and to evaluate the assumptions involved and the cognitive processes behind them – Give learners sufficient time for contemplation and discussion. CT unfolds only with prolonged, persistent reflecting and talking about an issue – Make CT observable and entice it: Illustrate (your own) CT activities in a variety of ways, such as how you go about analyzing the accuracy and validity of sources, how you test arguments for logic, how you put yourself in other perspectives, how you practice ideology critique, how you constructively test assumptions, etc.

Methodological examples

– Methods of collecting and structuring ideas such as brainstorming, mind mapping, etc. – Think-pair-share method: Think individually, exchange with partner, present in plenary session – Methods of discursive learning such as pro-con debate, structured controversy, etc. – Written methods for selfreflection such as e-portfolios, learning diaries, structured interview with oneself, etc. – Use prompts and annotation tools in digital learning environments that encourage thinking in specific directions and invite purposeful discussion – Methods of illustrating CT processes such as flowcharts, concept maps, etc.

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Process of CT Integration: Helping to develop alternatives and solutions

Resolution: Testing approaches to action and thinking in practice

Didactic design principles – Create concrete situations in which learners can develop and reflect on ideas for improving practice (e.g., in a future workshop) – Provide concrete support for learners to develop approaches and alternatives – Encourage learners to constructively seek out opportunities to test assumptions and provide a framework for testing them, e.g., interactive learning environments, practice contacts, etc. – Regularly evaluate learners’ CT by making it observable: Written reflections, thinking aloud, and contributions to discussions provide information about learners’ thought processes – Provide learners with regular evidence-based feedback on the quality of thinking and help to further systematize and extend thinking – Create situations where learners can apply and reflect on their learning through concrete actions (e.g., role-plays) – Demonstrate how to turn insight into action, for example by using real-life examples to illustrate – Let the learners intensively reflect and discuss their achieved results and the experiences made

Methodological examples – Methods of cooperative learning such as the future workshop – Brainstorming (also online with programs like Padlet) – Methods of imaginative and constructive communication – Use of powerful practical examples – WebQuest method: Presentation of a complex problem that has to be defined and worked on from a certain perspective – Case study method – Simulations

– Research-based learning, e.g., have students conduct a field survey – Service learning – Project instruction – Role-playing games – Use of (e-)portfolios for documentation and reflection of the testing process

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Process of CT

Didactic design principles – Point out to learners the possible risks that CT and subsequent action may entail in practice. For example, share your own experiences and strategies for dealing with them

Source: Adapted from Jahn (2012a)

Methodological examples

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Assessment of Critical Thinking

8.1

Introduction to the Assessment Concept

The term “to assess” has various meanings, such as to judge, evaluate, estimate, gauge, or determine. Assessment is therefore a diagnostic inventory of certain characteristics of a section of observable reality on the basis of defined criteria. In a pedagogical context, assessments aim to make learners’ knowledge, skills, or attitudes observable in certain application situations and to assess them on the basis of observation criteria. This does not always have to involve performance assessment linked to a grade. Assessments can also be used to diagnose the knowledge and skills of learners well before the start of the lesson in order to plan teaching and learning situations accordingly or to identify special support needs. A distinction is therefore made between assessment of learning and assessment for learning. Assessment of learning provides information about what learners know, can do, or what attitudes they show. The form of assessment is intended to provide information about how successfully a learner has designed their learning processes and where they are to be placed in terms of performance. Assessments of this kind have a selection function and aim to evaluate the observed performance – usually linked to points or a grade. The grading of an individual’s performance is based either on the demonstrated performance of the group or on predefined performance requirements that result from the established learning objectives. This type of performance assessment is usually discussed under the term “summative assessment.” Summative assessment takes place at the end of learning processes, at the end of a course, or at the end of a teaching sequence. Usually written, oral, or practical examinations come into question. For example, an assessment for certain aspects of CT can show how well someone can construct valid arguments or take different perspectives on an issue. Assessment of this type can have behavioral conditioning effects on # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_8

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learners, especially regarding assessments that matter to learners (e.g., final exam grade). Biggs (2003) argues that learners will prepare to the level required in the exam if it matters. Thus, learning behavior can be controlled, at least to some degree, according to the theory. If the required level of knowledge and skill of the assessment is clearly comprehensible to learners, they will direct their learning to that level. In educational discourse, this assumed relationship is discussed under the slogan “assessment drives learning” (see, e.g., Sopka et al., 2013). However, this also means that teaching must be designed so that learners can also build up and consolidate the competencies required in the assessment. In this context, Biggs speaks of constructive alignment: teaching and summative assessment are aligned with the level of the learning objectives (Biggs, 2003). On the other hand, assessment for learning refers to the learning process in progress and has a feedback function. It should give teachers and learners concrete advice on what they could do to make learning even more successful. The assessment can take place before or during the lesson, depending on the objective. For lesson planning, the assessment can be done before the beginning of the lesson, for example, to align the planning with the prior knowledge or the learners’ skills, as already mentioned. But it can also take place at the end of a teaching unit to give hints for the design of the next one. On the learner’s side, however, this type of assessment during the lesson or learning process aims to give precise feedback on where they are in their learning process and what specific steps they can take to improve their learning further. The term “formative assessment” is often used for this type of assessment. In addition to classical tests such as oral, written, and practical tasks, many other sources, such as classroom observations, conversations with learners, or learners’ work in progress (portfolios, project work, etc.) can be the basis of assessment. The feedback is then given orally, in writing, or performatively (e.g., by demonstration) along with the performance shown by the learner. It is of a qualitative nature and always related to the learning process. For example, feedback identifies strengths and weaknesses in the completion of the task, describes challenges or recommends possible next steps for practice. In the area of CT, for example, this might mean that learners have to solve a logic problem by thinking aloud and applying concepts of logic. The teacher provides meta-level guidance on what questions the learner should ask and what concepts might help them. In general, however, assessments can not only show how the learners’ learning performance is doing. To a certain extent, they are also a testimony to how successfully teachers have designed and carried out teaching-learning situations. Poor exam results of a whole group can provide information about how didactically well thought-out and suitable a teaching-learning situation was designed for that

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group. The average grade achieved by the group is also an assessment of the teacher’s teaching quality. In addition to the two distinctions discussed regarding the purpose of assessments, many other types and forms of assessment are discussed in the literature (see Wilbers, 2019). Assessments can, for example, be computer-based. Then there is talk of so-called e-assessments (Handke & Schäfer, 2012). Assessment can refer to work processes or results (process and product assessment). If assessments take place in real and not in simulated problem-solving contexts, we speak of natural assessment. Authentic assessment, on the other hand, means observed performance in problem-solving situations that are strongly oriented towards complex practice, etc. However, all further specifications are not further decisive for the context of thinking training and will therefore not be further elaborated here. The main purpose of this book is to enable the reader to develop their own manageable assessment approach for their own everyday teaching in a well-founded manner. Each assessment is based on a specific action situation that the learners are supposed to master by taking action. The observed actions and/or the results of the actions should in turn provide information about how competent someone is in a certain area. The actions shown (the so-called performance) or action products are evaluated on the basis of concrete observation criteria. The action situation or the required action product must therefore be chosen in such a way that the respective observation characteristic pursued can be realized by the processing of the task and becomes visible in the action product at the latest when the learner carries out their actions. From the performance shown (action process and/or action product), the learner’s knowledge, ability or will is then inductively concluded – although this conclusion is susceptible to various errors in judgment. Assessments must therefore meet certain criteria to be considered reliable. For example, they must be measured against the criteria of test theory to be able to claim meaningfulness, reliability, or practicability. The first criterion is that of objectivity. Objectivity in this context is to be understood as a measure of the extent to which the results of a test are independent of the examiners. If, for example, different examiners arrive at the same result for the same candidates, this is evidence of a high degree of objectivity. In this context, the standardization of the test, i.e., the standardization of the implementation, evaluation, and interpretation of the results, plays a central role in ensuring objectivity (Grotjahn, 1999). In the literature, classical test theory also distinguishes between the objectivity of implementation, evaluation, and interpretation (Ingenkamp, 1985, p. 34 ff.). The former refers to the independence of the result from the behavior of the investigators during test conduct. Evaluation objectivity, on the other hand, concerns the evaluation of the

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observed performance according to fixed rules, whereas interpretive objectivity is associated with the degree of independence of the interpretation of the evaluated results from the investigator. This can be ensured, for example, by numerical values that are determined in the evaluation and subsequently interpreted by a fixed scale of points or grades. A second quality criterion within classical test theory concerns the accuracy of a measurement, which can often be a problem. The so-called reliability provides information about how accurately test results capture a trait, regardless of whether the test actually captures the trait intended to be studied (Grotjahn, 1999). Reliability, however, is interdependent with the objectivity explained above: if there is insufficient objectivity in implementation and evaluation, the results will inevitably vary when the tests are repeated. The criterion most emphasized in the literature of test theory is the validity of a test. This refers to the extent to which the test captures the intended characteristics (Grotjahn, 1999). A distinction is made between a large number of validity types. One important type, for example, is content validity. This indicates the extent to which the test items are suitable for reflecting the content intended to be covered by the measurement. Construct validity asks to what extent the observable test results are valid indicators of underlying theoretical constructs (ibid., 1999). The objectivity and reliability of a test influence the degree of validity: a test that is not very objective and not very reliable cannot be valid at the same time (ibid., 1999, p. 9). As already explained, the tests discussed also perform well in terms of validity, since the respective concept of CT on which the respective tests are based has been operationalized, tested, and evaluated in several phases, until mastering the respective task also requires the application of the skill being pursued. Here it should be noted that in the case of multiple-choice tasks, a certain degree of success can also be achieved by pure guessing. A final criterion is that of assessment economy. Assessment procedures should be practicable, depending on the context in which they are used, and should conserve the scarce resources in terms of time, space, personnel, or materials. Even if assessments can be designed neutrally and objectively through these criteria, their effect is not neutral. The use of assessments always has an effect on reality, just as scientific research methods have an effect on the object of research. This has already become clear, for example, in the theory of John Biggs (2003), who assumes the action orientation of learners to the test. This relation has both negative and positive aspects about teaching and learning. For example, the effect of action control through the way examinations are set can also lead to the training and conditioning of learners, to learners quickly forgetting the material, or to acting quite differently in practice than desired.

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8.2

Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions

8.2.1

Observing Learners in the Process of Critical Thinking

The desire for empirical assessment of competence in CT has spawned a variety of different lines of argument and assessment procedures based on them, depending on intent, tradition, and associated conceptual understanding (Jahn, 2012a). Depending on what is understood by CT and what function the assessment is supposed to have, there is an almost unmanageable number of assessment approaches and diagnostic procedures. Some of these have developed into internationally recognized, established procedures that have been used in many research projects (such as the so-called Newman method: Newman et al., 1996, see Part II – Sect. 6.3.2.1). Other approaches, on the other hand, failed to establish themselves or were designed from the outset as individual solutions for a very specific context, without any claim to generalization (Jahn, 2012a). Thus, the literature contains a variety of standardized, subject-independent, written assessment procedures that claim to measure both skills and attitudes in CT, mostly implemented through multiple choice questions, essay assessments, or self-assessment questionnaires. In addition, however, there are standardized, subject-specific, written assessments of specific CT skills, implemented through multiple-choice questions or essay assessment tasks. Most of these are related to CT in science. In addition, there are standardized, subject-independent diagnostic instruments for observations and for document analyses, i.e., assessment tools without concrete tasks, implemented by observation sheets (rubrics) or coding systems. These tools can be used for different application scenarios, e.g., forum discussions, group discussions, presentations, written papers, etc. (Jahn, 2012a). However, before complex and presuppositional assessment procedures or testing methods are used, every teacher always brings a very insightful and powerful assessment tool to at least begin to gauge the success of support: The gift of observation. If teachers can clearly state what CT means in their subject area and how it becomes “visible” in actions, they can also observe it in their learners – provided that the lessons demand CT through appropriate impulses and tasks. During the different stages of thinking training, teachers need to be somewhat mindful, attentive, and circumspect to find out about the quality of thinking training in the process. Garrison and Anderson (2003) have formulated indicators for observation for the different stages of the thinking process or thinking training to determine whether learners are thinking critically (Table 8.1).

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Table 8.1 Observation categories and indicators for the process of CT Phase of CT Triggering event

Description Evocation: learner’s thinking and actions are not sufficient to adequately understand and cope with the situation

Exploration

Curious exploration and careful penetration of the subject matter Increase in the group’s judgment, argumentative quality, and diversity of perspectives over time.

Integration

Points of view and approaches to solutions are developed in a thoughtful manner

Resolution

Concepts and solutions are tested

Indicators: description of the actions Learners – Will puzzle and stumble – Are amazed, are speechless for a certain time – Ask many questions and make initial assumptions – Seem over-questioned and challenged – Try to describe the problem in their own words Learners – Collect ideas, conduct brainstorming sessions – Sift, discuss, and evaluate different sources and perspectives – Take different points of view – Compile results – Are setting up thought experiments – Conduct their own investigations. Learners – Develop and discuss wellfounded approaches to solutions – Synthesize concepts – Make clearly reasoned judgments Learners – Subject their solution approaches to a practical test – Apply their concepts – Defend their points of view argumentatively

Source: Adapted from Garrison & Anderson (2003, p. 61)

Classroom observation provides the first indications of how thinking training proceeds. Two questions are relevant here: What do learners do at each stage (performative level) and how do they do it (content level)? Already at the

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performative level, at least rudimentary evidence can be found that learners are in the process of CT, e.g., because they ask many questions or collect ideas. Further and more detailed indications can then be found at the content level, through which it becomes clear at what level questions are being asked or ideas are being collected. Observation provides learners with sufficient overall information about whether the thinking training is more likely to work or whether major difficulties are emerging. By observing what learners say or do not say, how they say it or how they act, important conclusions can be drawn for the choice of appropriate teaching strategies. Teachers are given the opportunity to intervene pedagogically during the lesson in the sense of assessments for learning and to influence the further course, e.g., by asking stimulating questions, having questions clarified, offering assistance, or broadening perspectives.

8.2.2

Test Skills Through Standardized Written Tests

If individual learners are to be specifically supported in CT or if it is a question of obtaining an exact determination of the promotion success or even of grading the performance in CT, pure observation is no longer sufficient. Then conceptually coherent assessment procedures are needed. If, for example, CT is understood primarily as the application of generic concepts of logic or statistics, as some authors such as Astleitner (1998) do, and if subject-specific content, to which the thinking styles are to be applied, no longer plays a role, subject-independent, recognized, and standardized tests can be used for assessment (e.g., Cornell Critical Thinking Test or Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test, on this see Jahn, 2012a). Most often, these are multiple choice or essay tasks designed to test CT skills (e.g., Check off: For the statement “The road is wet.”, is the statement “It has been raining.” (a) a sufficient condition or (b) a necessary condition or (c) both?). Although the procedures show good scores in the sense of test theory (Jahn, 2012a), they are rather problematic for everyday teaching in German-speaking educational institutions. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that a large part of these tests is only available in English and, moreover, is usually subject to a fee. On the other hand, the skills tested in these tests, similar to many intelligence tests, are very strongly oriented towards logical thinking and thus – as already mentioned – towards logic and statistics. The constructed questions often no longer have much in common with authentic practical problems or human holistic experience of reality. Authors such as Halpern (2003) or Brookfield (2003) therefore express sharp criticism of assessment procedures in cognitive performance assessment, especially those that exclusively contain multiple choice questions. Halpern,

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for example, believes that standardized tests are only “little more than inferior tests of reading” (2003, p. 364) and can tell us nothing about whether, how, or when an individual applies CT in their life practices. Brookfield argues that CT is absolutely context-bound and therefore needs to be nurtured and observed in context (2003, p. 157).

8.2.3

Evaluate Critical Thinking in Authentic Action Situations

Halpern (2003) locates the ideal assessment of CT activities in multiple real-life situations in everyday life. In her view, the actions of individuals in authentic reallife situations should provide the best information about an individual’s dispositions and skills of CT. CT must be able to assert itself in the complexity of the holistic experience of reality, so the assumption goes. In open, unfiltered, and complex situations of practice, learners should be able to transfer CT activities to different situations of application, such as reading the news, making decisions, and so on. It is only then that their CT skills become apparent. Assessment situations in everyday teaching, however, can only approximate the complexity of practice, but never fully simulate it. Halpern therefore recommends problem-oriented assessments with open-ended questions in which “fuzzy problems” (2003, p. 363) are posed that allow for multiple answers, perspectives, and possible solutions. According to Halpern, only this type of test is valid, as it simulates, at least to some extent, complex sections of reality in which CT is to be applied. An assessment instrument in this context, which claims to be able to evaluate CT in authentic communication processes, is the already mentioned Newman Method (Newman et al., 1995), which is based on Garrison’s (1992) concept of CT. It should help to identify, quantify, and qualify certain aspects of CT in (speech) actions. Non-critical thinking is also to be recorded by the method in speech acts and put into relation with the critical contributions. Unlike the tests discussed, there is no task included in the Newman method. It is merely an instrument for assessing the quality of a discursive argument in terms of demonstrated CT skills. The teacher is therefore free to determine the problem or question on which CT is to be demonstrated. The method assesses, for example, how learners support or test validity claims argumentatively, how they test arguments for ambiguity, adopt and integrate different points of view, or construct solutions to problems. These and other skills in CT were transferred into a coding system for this purpose. The indicator system distinguishes both negative and positive aspects of CT (Fig. 8.1). To apply the codes, the learners’ language actions must be available in written form. Each time an assessor finds a statement that can be clearly assigned a

8.2 Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions Indicator

Positive

159 Negative

Relevance

R+ relevant statements

R– irrelevant statements, diversions

Importance

I+ important points/issues

I– unimportant, trivial points/issues

Novelty: new information, ideas, solutions

NP+ new problem-related information NI+ new ideas for discussion NS+ new solutions to problems NQ+ welcoming new ideas

NP– repeating what has been said

NL+ learner (students) brings new things in

NL– dragged in by tutor

OE+ drawing on personal experience OC+ referring to course material

OQ– squashing attempts to bring in outside knowledge

OM+ using relevant outside material

O– sticking to prejudice or assumptions

Bringing outside knowledge or experience

NI– false or trivial leads NS– accepting first offered solution NQ– squashing, putting down new ideas

OK+ evidence of using previous knowledge OP+ course-related problems brought in (e.g., students identify problems from lectures and texts) OQ+ welcoming outside knowledge

Ambiguities: clarified or confused

AC+ clear, unambiguous statements A+ discussing ambiguities to clear them up

Linking ideas, interpretation

L+ linking facts, ideas, and notions L+ generating new data from information collected

Justification

Critical assessment

Pratical utility (grounding)

Width of understanding (complete picture)

AC– confused statements A– continuing to ignore ambiguities L– repeating informaton without making inferences or offering an interpretation. L– stating that one shares the ideas or opinions stated without taking these further or adding any personal comments.

JP+ providing proof or examples JS+ justifying solutions or judgments

JP– irrelevant or obscuring questions or examples

JS+ setting out advantages and disadvantages of situation or solution

JS– offering judgments or solutions without explanations or justification

C+ critical assessment/ evaluation of own or others´ contributions

JS– offering several solutions without suggesting which is the most appropriate. C– Uncritical acceptance or unreasoned rejection

CT+ tutor prompts for critical evaluation

CT– tutor uncritically accepts

P+ relating possible solutions to familiar situations

P– discussing in a vacuum (treat as if on Mars)

P+ discussing practical utility of new ideas

P– suggesting impractical solutions

W+ widenning discussion (problem within a larger perspective; intervention strategies within a wider framework.)

W– narrowing discussion (address bits or fragments of situation; suggest glib, partial interventions)

Fig. 8.1 Indicators for the assessment of CT in discussions according to Newman et al. 1995. (Landis et al., 2007, p. 137)

corresponding code, they assign the respective code, positive or negative. For example, when learners relate facts, theories, or ideas to each other in terms of content, or generate new information from the available data, a point is awarded in the (L+) area for each.

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Once all statements in a text have been coded, the counting per indicator begins. Both the positive and the negative codes are counted. The “Critical Thinking Ratio” can now be calculated for each indicator using the following formula: Depth of CT Ratio =

ðx þ - x - Þ ðx þ þx - Þ

x+ and x- each represent the codes assigned within an indicator, such as (L). The fraction illustrates the ratio between positive and negative codes per indicator. The results range in an interval from -1 to +1 from uncritical to very critical performance. The evaluation of statements by raters in this mode does not lead to highly objective results despite the given coding system. The subjective scope and influence are bigger than in the multiple choice tests discussed. In addition, the method is based on a specific understanding of CT, which certainly cannot be applied to all areas. Furthermore, the system does not provide for any weighting of individual statements or indicators. A very weighty, critical objection from a learner, for example, always corresponds to only one (positive) code. The same applies to uncritical remarks, no matter how severe the error expression may be. Despite this and other criticisms, the Newman Method is a recognized tool for assessing CT in discussions that is frequently used in studies and can also provide good feedback opportunities for learners. Learners can use the assigned codes to understand exactly in which areas their statements were able to meet the requirements of CT and where there is room for improvement. Even more clarity for learners in terms of assessment for learning can be provided using scoring rubrics in corresponding open-ended action situations, the mastery of which requires the application of certain aspects of CT. Rubrics are grids of criteria in which specific categories of observation and associated performance characteristics (expectations) are transparently revealed at various levels of proficiency (Wilbers, 2019). In the rows, different assessment criteria are defined and in the columns these criteria are then described in “quality levels” in observable actions. Rubrics are particularly suitable for assessment situations in which learners have to master an open task (process assessment) or create a product to solve a problem, which is then assessed using the rubric (product assessment). The rubrics enable targeted feedback to learners by providing a concrete location for the performance shown, where exactly the learners stand with their knowledge and skills in the respective competency levels, and what it means to achieve a certain competency level (Table 8.2). Through the concrete description of the competences at the

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Table 8.2 Schematic representation of a rubric Criterion Criterion 1

Criterion 2

(. . .)

Level 1 Description of observable performance for criterion 1 in level 1 Description of observable performance for criterion 2 in level 1 (. . .)

Level 2 Description of observable performance for criterion 1 in level 2 Description of observable performance for criterion 2 in level 2 (. . .)

Niveaua 3 Description of observable performance for criterion 1 in level 3 Description of observable performance for criterion 2 in level 3 (. . .)

Level 4 Description of observable performance for criterion 1 in level 4 Description of observable performance for criterion 2 in level 4 (. . .)

(...)

Source: Own representation

different levels, the learners receive valuable feedback to reflect on their own demonstrated knowledge and skills and to develop an idea of what competent ability in the respective criterion looks like. Rubrics are highly prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world (Wilbers, 2019). The pedagogical use of rubrics has been investigated in empirical educational research through numerous studies and under different questions. Overall, the literature shows that there are many indications that rubrics can provide pedagogical benefits on several levels if they meet certain quality criteria (clarity, vividness, etc.) and didactic procedures (e.g., discussing the rubrics with learners, etc.). Rubrics can, for example, lead to increased transparency regarding learning expectations, both for the learner and for the teacher. Learners can better focus their learning processes through the concrete guidelines and align them to the clear objectives. The clarity gained can also reduce examination anxiety (Panadero & Jonsson, 2013). However, teachers also gain more orientation and accuracy in assessing demonstrated performance or for planning instruction through the creation of rubrics. In addition, it has been shown that criteria grids can prove useful for giving targeted feedback (Ibid., 2013), especially during learning processes in the sense of formative assessment. English language rubrics for assessing CT activities of varying quality can be found in abundance on the Internet.1 To provide orientation for learners and also to 1

To give an example: Holistic Critical Thinking Rubric from East Georgia College; Available at https://studylib.net/doc/7608742/east-georgia-college-holistic-critical-thinking-rubriccr. . . (04/03/2020).

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indicate the level and professionalism in the respective teaching, many universities in North America, for example, have developed and published their own rubrics for CT in teaching for different subject areas and tasks. In the German-speaking world, at least on the Internet, hardly any such criteria grids can be found. However, to make illustrate a German example, here is a short excerpt from a rubric that was developed on the basis of the concept of CT by Jahn (2012a) for written work. It has been tested and improved several times and used with learners of business education and human resource development. Shown in the figure is the criterion “Analytical-Epistemic Reasoning,” one of four main criteria, which is broken down into several sub-criteria (Fig. 8.2). The performance criteria “clarification of assumptions,” “examination of logic,” and “examination of epistemic correctness of evidence” can be seen (Jahn, 2012a in Wilbers, 2014, p. 77). In the rubric, four levels of performance are distinguished and described (pre-critical level to mastery). The individual criteria or performance levels can also be developed together with the learners, but should at least be discussed with the learners so that they can gain orientation and recognize what certain aspects of CT are about, e.g., how arguments are tested for their logical validity and their empirical support and what distinguishes a thorough (proficiency and mastery level) from a superficial test (beginner level). The operationalization of the actions in the rubric should be detailed but not too schematic, so that learners still can decide how they want to proceed in a task – otherwise the helpful rubric becomes a rigid instrument for training thinking. At least as important as a thoughtful rubric are the associated open, stimulating, and sufficiently complex tasks that lead learners into the process of CT. Open tasks are tasks in which no clear solution path is predetermined and no clear solution necessarily exists (Rieck et al., 2005, p. 12). Open tasks allow several approaches and solutions, which leave space for own questions and objectives (even wrong paths may be taken). Primarily, open tasks are used when the understanding of contexts and processes or individual ideas are to be ascertained (Ibid., 2005, p. 12). Depending on the learning goal and the concept of CT, open tasks should be set so that learners have to adopt and explore different perspectives, develop and justify points of view, or find and weigh up approaches to solutions and their implications. (Linguistic) acts of CT should become visible and thus assessable during the processing. The following steps have proven successful in the development of rubrics: 1. Determine the criteria of performance: Think carefully about which aspects of CT you want to evaluate [rows].

8.2 Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions

Assumption hunt

Realization of implicit and explicit assumptions

Review of the underlying logical structures

Basic assumptions of a view on a certain issue are not identified or resolved

Arguments are not checked for logical validity No own arguments are brought forward

Assumption test

Analysis of assumptions within argumentations

1: Precritical Stage

No observable manifestation of CT

Criteria

Dimension

Aspect

Review of the epistemic correctness of the evidence

Evidence is not checked for factuality & explanatory power Evidence like scientific research and theories or own experiences are not used for argumentation

2: Beginner Stage First recognizable signs of CT

Only obvious assumptions of a view are identified and resolved

3: Skilled Stage Strong & noticeable signs of CT

Explicit and implicit assumptions of a view are openly disclosed and sorted out

163 4: Mastering Stage Strong and profound manifestation of CT

Explicit and implicit assumptions of a view are disclosed indepth and cleared up

Arguments are partially checked for logical validity Own arguments are used partially Arguments still contain logical flaws and contradictions False conclusions

Arguments are checked for validity Own arguments seem conclusive, coherent, and comprehensible

Arguments are profoundly examined in regards to validity Own arguments are valid, substansive, and conclusive Limits to the used strategies for the examination of logic are reflected and discussed

Evidence is only reviewed rudimentarily for its factuality & explanatory power

Evidence is presented and checked for its factuality and explanatory power Extensive and wide-ranging evaluation is conducted Broad range of sources are used to support own arguments

Evidence is profoundly explored and assessed for its factuality and explanatory power An extenstive and wide-ranging array of sources is used to support arguments The epistolary analysis itself is reflected on with regard to the standards used and its significance

Evidence is only partially considered in own argumentation structures

Fig. 8.2 Excerpt from a Rubric for CT. (Jahn, 2012a, in Wilbers, 2014, p. 77)

2. Determine the dimensions of the performance shown [columns]. 3. For each performance dimension, describe the observable performance in each criteria row [Fill in the blank cells]. 4. Develop a point system. In doing so, also think about the weighting of criteria. 5. Develop an open task in which all developed criteria or performance forms are applied and observable (language) in actions. 6. Use the rubric and evaluate it constantly with your learners.

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Construction of an Own Assessment Instrument

Some experts such as Brookfield (2003) or Halpern (2003), as already explained, exclusively advocate the creation of one’s own context-specific instruments for the assessment of competence or promotion success in CT, and there is much to be said for a self-developed set of instruments. Through self-developed tasks and the associated observation or assessment tools, the assessment can be adapted quite specifically to one’s own teaching and one’s own concept of CT. In the best-case scenario, a self-development can precisely demonstrate those aspects of CT that the teacher is specifically concerned with – and this with assured subject relevance. This type of assessment, according to Halpern (2003), can also provide a far more accurate and comprehensive picture of learners’ CT activities to provide learners with feedback on where they still have deficits. In addition, models of cognitive development in learners or how certain support interventions affect learners’ thinking styles can be better derived from the use of these diagnostic procedures. For this, however, the relevant skills to be evaluated must first be precisely defined (Ennis, 2003; Halpern, 2003). The construction of a diagnostic instrument requires an elaborate and clearly operationalized definition of CT. Thus, the design of diagnostic instruments is always linked to a correlating definition of CT in each case. The definition should illustrate how CT manifests itself when applied by individuals in specific situations. This means that a definition should list both precise skills and dispositions of CT. The next step is to find an appropriate context in which these skills and dispositions can be demonstrated. Since thinking activities in a certain thinking style only become accessible to third parties as (linguistic) actions, open tasks should be designed whose successful completion involves the application of these thinking activities and makes the process of CT clear. Depending on the context, the construction of the instrument must consider in advance how the skills and dispositions can manifest themselves in “products” such as written texts, presentations, painted pictures, or in demonstrated actions themselves, and how these manifestations differ from other thinking styles. It is necessary to work out how CT becomes evident in each case and shows itself in its manifestation. In addition, depending on the observation or evaluation scheme to be designed, different quality levels of performance must be defined and described, e.g., by descriptors in a rubric. After the different aspects of CT have been defined, operationalized, and a suitable diagnostic instrument has been developed, an authentic problem scenario is developed, the successful processing of which requires the application of the operationalized characteristics of CT. It is important to note that there is not only one possible solution or assessment to the problem, but

8.3 Construction of an Own Assessment Instrument

165

that there are numerous possibilities and perspectives for solving the issue. As much and clear as necessary information must be given about the background of the problem. To support the CT process, guiding questions can be raised to help tread relevant lines of thought. At this point, it is worth mentioning the success criteria for open-ended tasks and problem-based learning environments, which Halpern unfortunately does not mention in her paper (Reinmann-Rothmeier & Mandl, 1999, pp. 39–41). • On the one hand, it is important to design the open task so authentically that the scenario is socially anchored. The reality content and relevance of the task should release intrinsic motivation in the learner to complete the task. • On the other hand, there should be a certain amount of instruction in the sense of the already described prompts for the learners. • The problem should also allow the application of the targeted skills to be done from different perspectives. The problem should be able to be viewed from different angles by the learners. • Furthermore, Reinmann-Rothmeier and Mandl mention learning in social contexts as another guideline to be considered. This reference is also interesting for the assessment of CT, since the social interaction, e.g., in the argumentation with other learners in the acquisition of further information, reveals the expression of the dispositions for CT. So, after developing the complex problem-based scenario, Halpern proposes a standardized set of different questions and tasks that learners have to accomplish. CT should be able to show itself here in various forms. For example, learners are now required to draw a diagram, a mind-map, or a concept-map that presents the available information in a structured way and relates it to each other (Halpern, 2003, p. 363). Furthermore, the tested individuals should now indicate what further information they needed to be able to give a correct answer to the questions. Then the offered solutions are to be analyzed in terms of their plausibility, judged, and ranked. The relevance of information is to be assessed and justified, false claims debunked, persuasion strategies uncovered, own solution approaches constructed, etc. (Halpern, 2003, pp. 363–364). The demonstrated quality of CT activities is subsequently assessed using the constructed diagnostic instrument. Finally, it should be noted for the construction of a diagnostic instrument that it has to be tested in several trials with regard to its informative value as well as its manageability and, if necessary, revised and improved several times. In summary, the following steps are relevant for the construction of an own assessment approach:

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1. Operationalize CT into observable actions. 2. Develop observation or evaluation scheme according to operationalization (criteria, performance levels, descriptors, scoring, etc.). 3. Develop complex tasks during which the selected actions of CT can become visible in their entire quality spectrum (process assessment) or manifest themselves in a product (product assessment). 4. Test, evaluate, and adjust assessment several times. In general, it is not possible to carry out exact observation in the assessment of CT in authentic action situations as described so far, since these are always influenced by the reference norms of the observers (social, individual, and factual norm). However, the accuracy of the diagnosis can be improved by observer training and exact formulation of indicators. The procedures described here can be regarded as useful methods to describe the expression of CT in different settings, but without the claim to be able to achieve an objective assessment. Thus, whether learners should receive a grade on their CT activities should be very carefully considered and thought through.

9

Examples of the Practice of Thinking Training

9.1

Practical Reports on the Promotion of Critical Thinking

9.1.1

Introduction to the Practical Examples

The two examples from university teaching practice presented below ha0ve been taken from two earlier publications on the practice of thinking training and have been slightly modified (Jahn & Trautner, 2019; Jahn, 2019b). Conceptually, both are rather to be assigned to promotion in subject teaching. However, they are not to be seen as a set of rules for CT promotion but only contain selected didactic approaches that have proven themselves in practice in the respective learning context. Each of the two teachers proceeds in their way and reports in the subjective perspective of a first-person narrative.1 It becomes clear that the concrete design of the CT promotion depends on the teacher, their conception of CT, the targeted learning goals, the learners, the individual course of the teaching units, the respective teaching context, and other influences. A completely different didactic approach may be required in a different (subject-related) context and under different conditions and objectives. It should also be noted that the strategies and phases presented are not intended to be linear but often interact with each other and allow for jumps back or loops. For example, it is often necessary to stimulate learners’ thinking in several phases and not only in the “initial phase.”

1

For another example from the context of philosophy of science by Cursio and Jahn (2014), see: https://www.fbzhl.fau.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Berichte_FBZHL_5_ 2014-Kritisches-Denken1.pdf, https://www.fbzhl.fau.de/files/2014/03/berichte_fbzhl_5_ 2014-kritisches-denken.pdf (03.04.2020). # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 D. Jahn, M. Cursio, Critical Thinking, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_9

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Before the actual practical reports, however, the most important didactic principles of thinking training in the respective phase are briefly repeated, which are oriented towards the design-based research of Jahn (2012a). The reports are structured according to the process model of Garrison and Archer (2000) and Garrison and Anderson (2003) presented in Part II – Sect. 7.2 (Table 9.1).

9.1.2

Creating a Learning Atmosphere

Stimulating CT in a university setting requires an open, relaxed, and (error-)friendly atmosphere. To establish this, sufficient time must be taken when planning the seminar or lecture to create the required learning climate, especially at the beginning. In addition, it must be considered in advance how this envisaged climate could be implemented and how the learners can be actively integrated in designing of the framework (keyword: discussion rules, etc.) The following design principles can help create the preconditions for thinking training: • Clearly explain the purpose of the course. Explicitly address your learning objectives and the connection to CT. • Together with the learners, develop binding rules on how to interact and discuss with each other. • Address the learners’ expectations and consider how far these can be accommodated in the course. • Do not let humor get in the way: If the playfulness in CT is lost, it can lead to strain and bitterness. • Meet learners at eye level. Example (a): Business Education Seminar “Promoting Critical Thinking” Anyone who wants to think critically needs a certain emotional and personal distance from the objects of reflection, so as not to get caught up in the maelstrom of affects, interests, or opinions. Moreover, critical reflection is arduous and sobering. Dualisms and abysses in the world open up, in which the thinker is usually also involved, e.g., as a consumer. Especially for young people like the learners, whose world views are often not yet spelled out or burdened, CT processes can have massive effects. For these reasons, there is a need for a learning climate that cushions this gravity of thinking and allows for distance. Therefore, encouragement in CT should always be approached playfully, with a twinkle in the eye and a dash of humor. Cheerfulness, exuberance, spontaneity, and not taking oneself so

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Table 9.1 Overview of the practical example of a teacher from the economic sciences Subject area and title (a) Promoting CT for business educators

Brief description The seminar was an attempt to sensitize future teachers to CT and to provide them with concrete support approaches

(b) Didactics of a subject: Prejudiceconscious learning materials

With the racism-critical seminar, the attempt is made to approach structurally anchored racisms, starting from the thematization of one’s own

General conditions Seminar in the master of business education. On average, 20–25 students per implementation. Two self-study phases and 43-h attendance dates 2.5 ECTS (75 working hours) average age of learners was in the early twenties. High motivation to participate, as elective. The proportion of women was slightly higher than the proportion of men. With exceptions, rather little prior knowledge of the learners Seminar offer for the second module is a subject lesson for up to 30 participants. Two block days, group work phases, online phases, and a final presentation of the work results.

Learning objectives Students should (a) Explain and theoretically justify their own understanding of CT (b) Be able to apply principles of CT (c) Be able to implement design principles for CT promotion in a planning and practical way in a concrete teaching scenario

Methodical repertoire Film and text analyses, forms of cooperative learning, microteaching, short lectures, teaching discussion, homework (creation of an own thinking training approach for teaching economics)

(a) Support component: Using CT to train language and image sensitivity regarding instructional materials (b) Analysis of pedagogical concepts with the help of CT

Video, textbook, and text analyses, cooperative small groups, short lectures, discussions, and creation of school materials

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Subject area and title

Brief description

General conditions

privileges and the associated possibilities for action. Following this self-reflective process, prejudiceconscious learning materials for the subject teaching and manuals for teachers are to be created in self-selected small groups, which are to be accessible to all students in the learning workshop

Three ECTS (90 working hours) The age of the students was mostly in the early twenties. Because of the elective area, participants are highly motivated. The proportion of women was somewhat higher than the proportion of men. Low prior knowledge of the students

Learning objectives

Methodical repertoire

seriously are, in my opinion, the best recipes for taking some of the heaviness out of CT. However, this playful yet highly focused and open learning environment, characterized by humor and irony, is not easy to establish but must be fostered again and again throughout the semester. For example, at the beginning of the seminar in the presentation rounds, I encourage each student to include a lie that he or she has always wanted to tell in the presentation. The other students then have to debunk it, in the sense of initial and also fun exercises in critical observation and inference. Many of the examples I use to illustrate the relevance of CT also have a humorous side. For example, the video artist Oliver Kalkofe rebuts xenophobic resentment of outraged citizens in media reports by emulating the shown actions and lines of argumentation, exaggerating them or introducing contradictory facts in order to invalidate the one-sided or simply false positions and lead them ad absurdum. He

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also takes a similar approach with sales videos for esoteric products that promise the buyers salvation, health, or a successful life.2 Through these videos, students not only engage with the practical life implications of CT but also come into a loose and communal frame of mind. Although the content shown is serious and drastic (here: xenophobia, fraud), CT meets it with a wink. But also in the interactions with the students I put a lot of emphasis on getting close to each other (e.g., 5 min small talk at the beginning of each unit: How was your weekend? How are you?) to jointly form the attitude needed for the course. This attitude is about putting one’s own thinking to the test and opening it up, exploring different perspectives on an issue, getting caught up in contradictions and making mistakes in the process. For students, this is often a risky step since otherwise, teaching is mostly about shining through knowledge and presenting the answers the teachers would like to hear. Therefore, in my opinion, it is essential to explain to the students exactly what the seminar will be about, what I expect from them, what they can expect from me, and what they should be able to do better after the seminar (learning objectives). I always try to meet the students on an equal footing and am also open if they want to bring in their own content-related focal points. Example (b) Seminar: Prejudice-conscious learning materials The topic of discrimination-sensitive teaching and the seminar structure (joint block days, group work phases, feedback sessions in the blended learning variant) call for joint processing and discussion of expectations and target agreements for cooperation. At the beginning, I ask the students to write down their expectations of the content, of the group, of themselves and of me as a lecturer. In addition, based on this, they are to consider which agreements they consider important for collaboration during the block days and the group work phases. For this purpose, the students receive colored moderation cards and can anonymously write down the expectations and target agreements. At the beginning of the first block day, I then present a summary of all noted aspects on two flipcharts, one for the seminar and one for the small group work. Here it is important to take time again to read the contents and ask if there are any requests for changes or additions. This step is necessary to show that these target agreements are recorded by the participants and are open for negotiation. The students and I pay particular attention to aspects such as: Do I feel represented? How should the (linguistic) interaction with each

2

For example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3%2D%2DbqIo71Ww

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other be designed so that my needs – e.g., working modes in group phases or dealing with injuries – become perceptible? The posters accompany the seminar from this point on, are photographed and are thus also available for the online phases. They serve as a reminder of our agreements and thus allow us to refer to these results in difficult situations, e.g., in the case of hurtful language or disagreements in the group work process, and to readjust them if necessary. A variant of this is to note down on flipcharts the different aspects, such as content, methodological design, expectations of me and the group, and to formulate the target agreements from these with the students. Especially thinking about what the students expect of themselves during the semester provides fertile ground for discussion: What does it mean for me to be open and curious? What do I need when I am hurt by content or other participants? How do we deal with hurt as a group? Through this opening phase, students can immerse themselves in the topic area of discrimination-sensitive design of learning environments.

9.1.3

Designing the Initial Phase

Impulses that lead to reflection are often described in the literature as triggering events (Brookfield, 1987; Garrison & Anderson, 2003). They intend to stimulate learners to question the given or the unquestioned through irritation, astonishment, or provocation. Through topical, interesting, and gripping questions it is possible to reveal the challenging moment of CT and simultaneously present the relevance of such a way of thinking. The following design principles can be helpful in developing and using these impulses: • Provide the necessary mood for CT by allowing for doubt, wonder, and boundary experiences so that learners are challenged and invited to explore uncharted paths of thinking. • Choose the approach to a topic in a way that the learners identify themselves with it and realize that the issue also concerns them. • Use film clips, short stories, quotes, cartoons, statistics, newspaper reports, etc. that involve thinking, feeling, both in contradiction, or doubt. • Allow “real” experiences with the challenging reality beyond the classroom as an occasion for CT. • Have learners identify and evaluate the basic explicit as well as implicit assumptions of each view.

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• CT needs a balanced “operating temperature.” Ensure to the right extent that thinking and feeling heat up, but then also cool down again, to be able to take an analytical and sober distance to things. Example (a): Business Education Seminar “Promoting Critical Thinking” My task is to get students thinking and discussing independently and to assist them in leaving old paths of thought and becoming flexible in their thinking. It is not about imposing my points of view on them or shining with my expertise. The topic of the nine classroom hours and two self-study phases is CT as a concept itself (logic and epistemology, perspectivity, ideology critique, constructivity, etc.) and the promotion of this thinking among prospective teachers. Student teachers should also learn how to foster CT in their future students. For me, this in turn means providing students with a stimulating and challenging approach to this content, bringing them into CT, so to speak, about facets of CT and its promotion. The occasions for thinking should be selected and designed in such a way that they tie in with the students’ lifeworld to a certain point. In other words, students should not only be challenged, but should also be able to “do something” with what they experience. To start CT processes, I like to work with video analysis, as already touched upon. I believe well-made films combined with a targeted work assignment are particularly suitable for bringing the viewer into targeted reflection, because film experience gets under the skin (Jahn, 2012b). For example, to illustrate ideology-critical thinking, I show a short film clip from John Carpenter’s “They Live” (1988)3 (Fig. 9.1). In the scene, we watch a worker find a pair of cool sunglasses by the trash cans in the backyard of a building in a big city. He picks them up, cleans them, puts them on, and cannot believe his eyes. The city appears transformed to him through the glasses. Behind all the urban hustle and bustle, behind the advertising posters, shop windows or screens, he discovers secret imperatives that seem to subconsciously guide society. On the bill of a customer who is buying a magazine, for example, is written “This is your God.” The statistics in the magazine turn into the slogan “no independent thought,” etc. I ask the students what they have seen here, what the glasses are all about, what the view through the glasses could stand for, what role these glasses play for the students, or whether this view is to be trusted at all. Many of the students are very quiet at first and need a short time to regain their

3

Watch the clip here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTK8eff1Zsk

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Fig. 9.1 Sleep, obey, consume. (Screenshot from John Carpenter’s “They Live” (1988))

composure. But then there is usually a lively and animated discussion about the film and its subject. In addition to several other film sequences, I also like to work with other media. For example, pictures in combination with questioning techniques help me to let students experience certain cognitive biases like the priming effect4 themselves. An example: A picture shows a monkey, a giraffe, an elephant, a bear, and other animals sitting happily in a boat. Next to it is the question: How many animals of each kind did Moses take with him into the ark? In addition, I try to shake up an unreflective trust in science by means of studies or scientific articles from educational science. To show one example: The point that CT also has to ask epistemological questions about methodology is made clear by the following article: via MRI, a brain researcher measured the brain waves of a frozen salmon from a supermarket freezer and was able to show that an uninformed interpretation of the

4

Priming (to prime) refers to a mostly unconscious and gentle influence on thinking and acting. Due to a certain preceding stimulus (priming), cognitive processing is steered into certain attention and association pathways (see Kahneman, 2012).

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data layers according to standard methodological procedures would suggest that the dead fish recognizes human emotions.5 What can also be very helpful in terms of setting impulses for thinking are techniques of under- or overstatement, exaggeration or trivialization, enlargement or reduction, slowing down or speeding up – all this can irritate habitual ways of receiving and thinking about an issue and open up new perspectives. The point is to address the learners emotionally and to shake them up! However, when using stimulating thought impulses, it is always important to ensure that no one is confronted too strongly and that positive anchors are set alongside negatively perceived impulses. The problem here is that students have very different sensibilities and are heterogeneous in their epistemic development. The use of trigger events therefore requires a good feeling and a good connection to the students. Example (b): Seminar: Prejudice-conscious learning materials Before creating prejudice-conscious learning materials, I use a discrimination awareness phase and a privilege check to enable students to change perspectives and make discrimination emotionally tangible. Making privilege visible is intended for students who take their privileged position for granted, e.g., being able-bodied or cisgender, to question how life realities can affect individuals. For the processes of changing perspectives, I use different impulses for self-reflection which are crucial for the later transfer of these cognitive processes into the seminar. For example, one possibility is the combination of written reflections before and after the first days of the seminar with exercises spread throughout days. At the pre-meeting, students are given the reflection assignment “Me and my language (s) – me and how I speak.” This assignment is unusual for many. I often read that students only open up to the topic in the course of the processing time, as it did not seem worth considering to them beforehand: I am just speaking, what is there to reflect on now? The reflections are submitted to me in writing by e-mail before the block seminar and are viewed by me. It is crucial for me to see which pre-conceptions the students have about language and language action. Based on this, I select suitable exercises for the seminar days. It is possible, for example, that I lead an exercise on the harmful potential of language, in which the students analyze

5

Text available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/neuronenforschung-ein-fisch-schautin-die-roehre-1.36460 The researcher has since won the lg Nobel Prize for demonstrating voodoo correlations in neuroscience.

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previously unquestioned designation practices and their effects. In small groups, they are given terms such as “pupils with a migration background”, “boys, and girls in class 3b”, or “the disabled boy”, which they discuss in terms of their meaningfulness, possible effects on the person being referred to, and possible alternatives. In doing so, they are helped by specialist texts on the terms to work out what is meant by the term, what alternatives there are, and what is positive and negative about these alternatives. It is important to discuss the topics of self- and external designation and the associated effects of discriminatory and selfempowering language during the evaluation to have a basis for reflecting their own text production for the subsequent material design: Who is speaking? Or who is speaking about whom, why, and how? During the elaboration of selfdesignations and discussion of other-designations, I also use videos, e.g., from Frag ein Klischee, or social media content too, for example, to break down heteronormative gender identities or expose racist language. While discussing media, it is important to highlight that, for example, this video represents a position on often broad spectrums. This triggers further uncertainties, as known pigeonholing is critically questioned, but without generating new pigeonholes.

9.1.4

Accompanying the Exploration Phase

In this phase, learners should form a rich picture of the subject matter and examine different views on it to be able to develop their own, well-founded point of view. In addition to providing materials and work assignments to broaden perspectives, the teacher also acts as a facilitator, thinking and learning guide, thought-viewer, feedback provider, or expert. The following design principles have proven to be helpful in the implementation: • Ensure that a wide variety of perspectives are considered, interspersed, discussed, and assessed by learners. • Also introduce periods where learners are given time and quiet to think on their own, to sort out views, and to evaluate the assumptions involved and the cognitive processes behind them. • Allow your learners sufficient time for contemplation and discussion. CT unfolds only with prolonged, persistent reflection and talk about an issue. • Make CT observable and entice it: Illustrate (your own) CT activities in a variety of ways, such as how you go about analyzing the accuracy and validity of sources, how you test arguments for logic, how you put yourself in other perspectives, how you practice ideology critique, etc.

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• Regularly evaluate learners’ CT by making it observable: written reflections, thinking aloud, and contributions to discussions provide information about learners’ thought processes. • Provide learners with regular evidence-based feedback on the quality of thinking and help to further systematize and extend thinking. Example (a): Business Education Seminar “Promoting Critical Thinking” Despite all motivating impulses to think, the students have to deal independently and intensively with the partly dry and also complex (promotion) concepts of CT to be able to penetrate and assess different facets of CT. At the same time, this is to encourage them in CT. Not only do they have to acquire a great deal of knowledge, but they also have to discuss, negotiate, evaluate, and apply this knowledge together and develop their own approach to promotion. In addition to busy selfstudy phases, this methodologically requires repeated phases of exchange and discussion. In addition to reflection activities, for which written assignments are particularly well suited, forms of cooperative learning are therefore needed. The central driving force for CT in these forms of teaching and learning is dialectical discourse. Students should interact with each other, exchange arguments, refute them, draw conclusions, form judgements, taking on different roles, and so on. A methodological variation to implement this is the group puzzle, also called jigsaw. I have used it several times in this context and had good experiences with it. The group puzzle works like this: First, the topic is broken down into sub-topics that are as equivalent as possible (in our example: CT divided into logic/epistemology, ideology critique, perspectivity, and the concept of assumptions). For each subtopic, a problem must be developed as a work assignment (e.g., What does logic have to do with CT?) and appropriate materials for research must be compiled or prepared (in this case: texts and videos on the various styles of thinking). The students are then divided into expert groups in which they work as experts on the respective topic and develop a solution approach (in my example: four groups of five learners each). The learners deal with the material and work on the task in a self-learning phase, in which they are given their own group area with authoring rights on the learning platform (tools for cooperative editing are, for example, application sharing applications such as Google Docs, a forum, chat). My job is to support and supervise the groups both online and, if necessary, in face-to-face exchanges. After the information phase, the students create an action product (in our case: a presentation with the most important info on CT from their respective perspective, including examples and an assessment of how relevant the respective aspect is for

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CT). Then the group members leave their respective expert group and change into so-called “core groups” in the face-to-face event. There is at least one expert for each subtopic in the group. In the core groups, the experts then present their respective tasks and solution approaches to the other group members. Thus, each student is an expert on one aspect and a novice on the other, unknown subtopics. After the lively exchange we bring the results together in the plenum. Especially the area of logic and epistemology is difficult for the students and there are many questions. I only intervene when the students themselves get stuck. At the end of this unit there is an elaborated concept of CT. In a subsequent written reflection, the students are encouraged to consider which views were new and surprising to them, where there is still a need for clarification, and which aspects of CT are particularly important to them. I cross-read the assignments and then use them to purposefully shape the upcoming course. Especially the points of ideology critique and aspects of epistemology engage some students strongly. The group puzzle does not always run smoothly. Sometimes students have not completed the tasks, do not show up for the class, or have only partly understood the content. Then improvisation and targeted support is called for. However, students soon realize that the quality of the discussions in the core groups and thus also the learning of their fellow students depend on their performance and make a great effort. Hardly any student wants to appear as an incompetent expert. Another simple but effective method in this phase is the Socratic conversation,6 based on the philosopher Socrates. In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates appeared as an ignorant person and allowed himself to be instructed by his interlocutors on a certain issue. Through his skillful questioning, however, it usually quickly became apparent that it was not he, but the supposedly knowledgeable person who was actually ignorant. But Socrates did not leave it at that: he assisted his partners in the birth of their own thoughts. This principle can be applied to teaching. It is about stimulating questions that encourage the exploration of different perspectives on an issue, illuminating the genesis of these perspectives, and examining their claims and conditions of validity. And it is about uncovering contradictions that lead to further thinking and, in the best case, to insights. The questions should be open and approachable from different points of view. Factual knowledge should not be asked under any circumstances. Likewise, it is important to avoid questions to which teachers already expect a clear answer. Here is an example from the seminar

6 For an introduction to Socratic conversation as a method, see https://www.prinzipwirksamkeit.de/was-ist-ein-sokratisches-gespraech.(04/28/2020).

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in which I used the Socratic conversation as a model. The conversation takes place after the students have dealt with different concepts of CT in self-study. Wondering: Through a question, students are asked to explain, justify, define, evaluate, and report on their experiences (e.g., What is the purpose of CT?). Assumption Explication: Students individually present their views (wide range of answers possible, e.g., CT is for better representing and asserting one’s own point of view; CT is for solving problems; CT is for truth, etc.). It is important that what is said is accurately understood and justified, e.g., by asking questions about the meaning of terms, etc. (What exactly do you mean by “being able to argue your point better”?) Examination: Individual contradictory views are dealt with or contrasted in greater depth. This is intended to uncover contradictions and inconsistencies (e.g., Is CT a tool for strategic action or is perhaps exactly the opposite the case and CT an instrument to uncover strategic action?) By revealing the inconsistencies or one-sidedness of the argumentations, CT should be stimulated and coherent perspectives should be sought. Confirmation or rejection of the assumptions: Students discuss the dualisms, inconsistencies, and commonalities of viewpoints they have found. I am busy finding new and contradictory aspects through further questions or encouraging the students to doubt their points of view or to introduce new points of view. In the best case, intersubjectively tenable statements crystalize that all participants in the conversation would agree with. At the end, the students reflect on the conversation and their CT process. Finally, there is a method which, in my opinion, also serves well in this phase. The so-called think-pair-share (think in silence, then exchange with the partner, then share the insights and results in the plenary). It is important that a space is opened up for different perspectives and voices and that these are heard and processed. This often requires well-developed moderation skills. Frequent speakers sometimes have to be slowed down and silent interlocutors encouraged to participate. Sometimes bridges must be built to divergent perspectives or premature judgements must be stopped. Sometimes, however, the learners surprise me with the variety of viewpoints and well-founded opinions they present.

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Example (b) Seminar: Prejudice-conscious learning materials I see textbook analysis as one way of promoting the ability to reflect and think critically. Textbooks are legitimized by the respective federal states and receive an authority through this legitimization, which can first be recognized and then questioned. Since my seminar is based in subject lessons, I choose textbooks recognized in Bavaria for this subject from different publishers and all grade levels. I enlarge the pages of the textbooks I have selected, which, for example, depict gender roles or deal with migration. I pay attention to different text designs and picture language and lay out the enlargements on the floor. The students receive two kinds of moderation cards: Firstly, to make comments on the textbook pages and secondly, to express discrimination-conscious criticism. Students discover the following aspects: Migration from Kenya, for example, is only presented in a problem-oriented way, while migration from Sweden is due to a change of job by the father. Here more questions line up: Why is it always the father who works for an international corporation? During a joint tour, the points of criticism are discussed as well as the comments, in which the students’ astonishment is often expressed, e.g., why this textbook page was chosen by me. The topic of children’s rights is particularly suitable for this, as it can be used to question visual habits. The selected textbook page consists of a short text about the importance of children’s rights, framed by photographs of different children, with the earth in the background: What is “bad” about it now? First we look at the text level, which contains information about children’s rights. This is followed by an analysis of the image design: Which children are represented and how? Which children are photographed and how? When discussing these questions, it becomes clear that the photographs of the children are very different due to the illumination of the faces, the direction of the children’s gaze and their clothing. These aspects lead to further topics such as the right to one’s own image or stereotypical ways of depicting poverty. Recognizing and questioning one’s own viewing habits triggers different reactions in students: From “I was expecting that it wasn’t all okay, but I did not imagine it like that!” to “But then why does this still exist when we know how prejudice and discrimination can affect us?.” These questions can then be used to deepen the topic of structural and institutional anchors of discrimination and racism.

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Support the Phase of Developing Alternatives

Insight is the first step to be able to act thoughtfully and to change (one’s own) practice. To develop and evaluate options for problem-solving, the learners broaden their perspectives again. Once more, the interweaving of reflection and action phases is important to be able to deal with the problem or one’s own experiences in depth. The following design principles can be helpful: • Create concrete situations in which students can develop and reflect on ideas for improving practice (e.g., in a future workshop). • Ask learners to constructively seek out opportunities to test assumptions and provide a framework in which these can be tested, e.g., interactive learning environments, practice contacts, etc. • Support learners in developing approaches and alternatives. Example (a): Business Education Seminar “Promoting Critical Thinking”. In this phase, a lot of liveliness comes into the seminar room. Based on the acquired understanding of CT and its promotion, the students develop a teaching scenario in groups, in which certain facets of CT are to be promoted. According to the assignment, the unit should be chosen and implemented as realistically as possible. This means that the students have to determine exactly for which target group the support approach should be effective (title, year of training, school class, etc.), in which subject or learning field the unit is to be located (establish reference to the respective curriculum), which learning goals are to be pursued in CT, which methods are to be employed, etc. After minor initial difficulties and intensive consultations, all groups find their topics. They are very creative in doing so. Possible contents for the CT training are leadership philosophies and human conceptions using the example of Lidl and DM, an analysis of the demand for constant economic growth, an appreciation of the concept of “quality of life” and the statistical parameters used for this, or also the evaluation of the work and influence of powerful management consultancy firms such as McKinsey. In the subsequent self-learning phase, they now work out the detailed planning of the teaching sequence and are asked to briefly present their support approach at the following attendance meeting and to simulate 5–10 min of it in a micro-teaching session. Most of the groups succeed very well. They often act as teaching teams, show stimulating videos or statistics, ask critical questions in simulated teaching conversations about concepts that seem quite clear at first glance, have students

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vote on moral dilemmas, etc. The other students and I slip into different roles. Sometimes we are trainees in the field of bank clerks, sometimes we are students of the technical secondary school, sometimes we are in the basic vocational training year. Most of the students have a lot of fun with the role play. After the presentations and simulations, students receive specific feedback from fellow students to promote CT. I also chime in when essentials are overlooked or too much is said on a content level about the technical topics, because most of the content is so interesting that CT as a topic is somewhat lost. Example (b) Seminar: Prejudice-conscious learning materials Based on the discussion about the textbook pages, the students choose three pages and distribute themselves in small groups at group tables. Here, three blank sheets and different pens are laid out for them, which are important for the task. While the gallery walk with commentary sheets – an opportunity to present all the results in an interactive reading walk – is intended to stimulate a change of perspective or to discuss ways of reading and seeing textbook pages, the students then work creatively on implementing their constructive criticism: How can I avoid stereotypical ways of representing children in textbooks? What narratives and images do I need to counter these? What are the pitfalls of my implementation attempt? These questions are only examples of possible questions during the group work phase. Within a set time of 5–10 min, the small groups are to redesign the previously critiqued textbook pages, considering what discrimination-sensitive criteria their work should meet. The transition from the discrimination-conscious analysis of materials to concrete strategies for action can certainly pose challenges for students: “But I can’t draw all possible family forms, is that really necessary? That takes up so much space!” After all three stations have been worked on by all groups, the thought processes are revealed in a plenary discussion and result in a catalogue of criteria for prejudice-conscious material design. This includes, among other things, the breaking up of dominant world views by subjects with agency who are otherwise represented in a marginalized way, the questioning of “us and them” constructs, or the use of context-specific representations.

9.1.6

Create Opportunities for Experimentation

Based on the theoretical approaches to solutions, the focus should be on concrete plans of the individual’s action, which can also go beyond the university framework and become part of one’s own life and professional practice. Attention should be

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paid to a learning environment that enables seminar participants to learn to deal reflexively with their own practice of thinking and acting and to work concretely on their options for action. For these implementations, opportunities are necessary that enable the learners to develop and reflect on their approaches to finally test them constructively. The implementation of action plans can in turn lead to a new cycle of CT. The following principles can be helpful in the implementation: • Create situations where learners can apply and reflect on their learning through concrete actions (e.g., role-plays). • Demonstrate how to turn insights into action (e.g., by illustrating examples from practice). • Point out the possible risks that CT and subsequent action may entail in practice (e.g., share your own experiences and strategies for dealing with them). Example (a): Business Education Seminar “Promoting Critical Thinking” In several written and oral exercises, students apply the thinking strategies and concepts they have developed. For example, they analyze and discuss a short polemical text on the concept of the secret curriculum.7 In doing so, they must apply specific CT skills through targeted questions (e.g., explicate all major assumptions, evaluate the quality of the argument, etc.). In one of the face-to-face classes, I also role-played a kind of pro-con debate in which students had to demonstrate their CT skills in a communicative situation. For example, they had to practice perspective taking or apply logical-epistemic thinking. To do this, I showed a talk show sequence in which the well-known brain researcher Manfred Spitzer rages against the excessive media use of young people and calls for computers to be banned from both classrooms and children’s rooms.8 He supports his theory of “digital dementia” with numerous studies and facts. The other two participants in the discussion, on the other hand, take a contrary position to Spitzer. For example, they call for computers to be used from the first grade onwards. They also use studies and figures to support their arguments. After showing the sequence and a preparation phase in which arguments are examined and developed, the

7

What is the hidden curriculum? An audio brief explanation: http://mobiwi.fernuni-hagen.de/ webapp/build_hi_lo/index.php?action=question&id=164&cat=Sozialisation. Retrieved 10/10/2017. 8 Video trigger for role play: a heated argument with Manfred Spitzer. Retrieved from https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePVSBg8nscA (03/10/2019)

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students continue the discussion in the seminar room. One group discusses as employees of Prof. Spitzer. Another group embodies the media advocates who plead for an early introduction of children to digital media. One student also acts as a moderator, and the audience, i.e., the other students observing the discussion, can also contribute arguments. Although it was only a role play, some of the students became so emotionally heated in the role play that it became necessary to reflect afterwards on rational speech situations as an ideal and the risks of an emotionally charged debate practice. It can be said that several phases of CT were passed through in this exercise. In the final seminar paper, the students present their planning of the teaching unit for the promotion of CT in a differentiated and detailed manner, justify their procedure, and reflect on the results of their simulation. In particular, they are encouraged to go into detail about the concepts and strategies for promoting CT that are relevant to them. Additionally, the developed criteria for CT are to be applied in the argumentations. For demonstration and orientation, the students receive an assessment sheet for “critical” argumentations.9 The written work shows very clearly to what extent the students apply CT and how confidently they can deal with the thinking standards. There are also indications that they have been encouraged in a critical attitude. The evaluation results of the seminar also reveal something similar. Assessments like the following are not uncommon: “Both in my studies and in my private life, the course has given me impulses to question things. Although this is not always entirely pleasant and easy, it brings me further in that I have the feeling that I am not at the mercy of things but can decide for myself what is good or bad, right or wrong through the knowledge I gain through it.” But I dare to doubt whether a sustainable promotion in CT has taken place. CT needs regular practice, but the course is over quickly with 15 weeks. The time is certainly not enough to develop deep skills in CT. Moreover, too much CT is detrimental to a vital and spontaneous life and should therefore only be used when it is necessary. Nevertheless, it would be nice if some of the students, as future teachers, would assist the coming generations of students in thinking independently and questioning things.

9

Rubric available at: https://books.google.de/books?id=Ts4ZAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77& lpg=PA77&ots=W5w4pKodQR&focus=viewport&dq=kriterienraster+critical+thinking +jahn&hl=en p. 77 f. Retrieved 10.10.2017.

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Example (b) Seminar: Prejudice-conscious learning materials Recognizing and reflecting on the differences and effects of external and selfdesignation practices is an indispensable prerequisite for the creation of prejudice-conscious learning materials. For example, while exploring the potential for violence in (figurative) language, students ask the question, “How am I supposed to speak now?” This question has the potential to show students that CT can question or break down existing patterns of thought and that new ways of acting can be found as a result. To illustrate this approach, I use my personal developments and reveal how my attitude of “How should I speak? What am I still allowed to do?” through CT processes to “How do I want to speak with this knowledge in the future?” Here, the question of political correctness is a point of discussion that moves many, since the sensitive handling of (figurative) language can often be connected with a lack of understanding by interlocutors or the accusation of oversensitivity. “How do I position myself in such a conversation? How do I deal with these critical inquiries?” are questions that are discussed in the plenum and again demand to deal with social discourses. Through the discussions we explore these questions and transfer them into the practical implementation of the seminar content, where small groups design prejudice-conscious material and a handbook for teachers. During the process there will be online feedback as well as face-toface meetings for feedback. After the presentation of the work results in the last session, the students receive feedback from the plenum, which they then incorporate. The seminar ends with an evaluation. In addition to anonymous feedback to me as the lecturer, I ask them to note down what was new for them, what still irritates them, and what they would like to work on further. The students’ notes are collected on the board and discussed together: Statements like “I now have an eye for teaching and learning materials because I can ask critical questions about them and discuss alternatives” become visible here. The structural and institutional anchoring of discrimination is irritating for students, but they also see an opportunity in their position as future teachers.

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