Createdness and Ethics: The Doctrine of Creation and Theological Ethics in the Theology of Colin E. Gunton and Oswald Bayer [Reprint 2012 ed.] 3110190737, 9783110190731, 9783110916874

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Hans Schaeffer Createdness and Ethics

Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann Herausgegeben von W Härle

Band 137

w DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

Hans Schaeffer

Createdness and Ethics The Doctrine of Creation and Theological Ethics in the Theology of Colin E. Gunton and Oswald Bayer

w DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

© Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier, das die US-ANSI-Norm über Haltbarkeit erfüllt.

ISBN-13: 978-3-11-019073-1 ISBN-10: 3-11-019073-7 ISSN 0563-4288 Bibliografische

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Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© Copyright 2006 by Walter de Gruyter G m b H & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Ubersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Rinspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany ümschlaggestaltung: Christopher Schneider, Berlin

Foreword This book would not have been written had I not received the support of many people. First of all, I want to thank my chief supervisor, Drs. A d de Bruijne, for the collegiality he showed from the very start of this project. His friendly conversation and the thorough opinions he offered, in many areas far beyond that which the subject of my study demanded, became oft-revisited resources, encouraging and spurring me on. His predecessor, Prof. Dr. Jochem Douma, evoked my interest in theological ethics, and helped me to go to Tübingen (Germany). I want to thank my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Barend Kamphuis, for his understanding comments and clarifying evaluations. I thank the other participants of the research-group of both the Theologische Universiteit Kampen and the Theologische Universiteit Apeldoorn for their contributions as well: Prof. Dr. Gerard den Hertog, Prof. Dr. Hans Maris, Drs. Hans Burger and Drs. Dolf te Velde. Here I want to thank all of the personnel and staff of the University in Kampen and its library. In their midst I have worked as a PhD-assistant (AIO) for five years. The friendships of Koert van Bekkum, as my former study-partner and colleague; of Tim Vreugdenhil, in his love for German theology; and of Corne Alderliesten, Marian, Tessa, Niels, and Rens during so many visits and the sharing of the experiences of being a pastor, have been of great encouragement. I owe much to the friendly and stimulating atmosphere of the Albrecht-Bengel-Haus in Tübingen (Germany). In 1997-1998, I had the opportunity of studying there and being part of that lively and intensely Christian community. It was in that year that I met Prof. Dr. Oswald Bayer. To his warm welcome and encouraging thought I owe my first intense encounter with the theology of Martin Luther. Our contact over the years has inspired much of my undertaking in this project. Thanks to a donation from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), I was able to do research at King's College (London) for two months in 2001. During that visit, I met Prof. Dr. Colin Gunton who twice readily gave of his time to meet with me. These encounters left me with the impression of a very stimulating

VI

Foreword

theologian, able to cover great areas of research with vigour and depth. It was with great sadness that we received the message of his untimely passing away on May 6, 2003. That time in England - short as it had had to be - also granted me the friendship of Dr. Brian and Stephanie Brock, who were so kind as to read the manuscript, not only out of theological interest, but even with respect to my (mis)use of the English language. Andy Draycott (Aberdeen) helped me greatly, and very generously, in improving my style. The community and council of the Gereformeerde Kerk (vrijgemaakt) in Wageningen, in whose midst I have worked since 2003, have given me more room for finishing this project than I dared to ask. Their interest and encouragement has been a stimulating factor in the last part of this journey. My thanks are also due to the promotion-committee, whose members have read the manuscript and improved it by their comments: Prof. Dr. Gerard den Hertog (TU Apeldoorn), Prof. Dr. Barend Kamphuis (TU Kampen), Prof. Dr. Gerrit de Kruijf (RU Leiden), Prof. Dr. Gert Kwakkel (TU Kampen), Dr. Wolter Rose (TU Kampen), and Dr. Bernd Wannenwetsch (Harris Manchester College, Oxford). Prof. Dr. Wilfried Härle (Heidelberg) and Prof. Dr. Oswald Bayer (Tübingen) I thank for their ready and wholehearted acceptance of this book in their series Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann. The editor and staff of Walter de Gruyter (Berlin) I thank for their careful support in the process of making a book out of digital files. Rinske, finally I want to thank you. Writing about marriage never became an enemy to living it: by making possible the latter you warranted the former.

Soli Deo Gloria Wageningen, November 2005

Hans Schaeffer

Contents Foreword Contents

V VII

1 About this Book

1

2 An Introductory Chapter

4

2.1 Introduction 2.2 Definition 2.3 Purpose 2.3.1 The Current State of Theological Ethics 2.3.2 Neo-Calvinist Tradition 2.3.3 The Apologetic Impact of Christian Convictions 2.3.4 Different Confessional Contributions 2.4 Outline 3 Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Doctrine of God 3.2.1 Doctrine of God and Karl Barth 3.2.2 Christology 3.2.3 Trinitarian Doctrine of God 3.2.4 Pneumatology and the Doctrine of God 3.3 The Programme of Enlightenment and its Failures 3.3.1 Reason 3.3.2 Language and Christian Tradition 3.3.3 Concepts of Freedom 3.4 Creation and the Doctrine of Creation 3.4.1 Creation Out of Nothing 3.4.2 Creation and the Beginning of History 3.4.3 Creation as Project

4 9 12 13 15 18 19 26 27 27 28 29 32 36 43 46 48 52 58 62 64 66 68

VIII

Contents

3.4.4 Creational Mediation 3.4.5 Doctrine of Creation and Ontology 3.5 Anthropology, Evil and Sin 3.5.1 Evil and the Doctrine of Sin 3.5.2 Anthropology as Reflecting the Trinity 3.5.3 Image of God 3.6 Ethics 3.6.1 Ethics and the Doctrine of Creation 3.6.2 Ethic of Sacrifice 3.6.3 Material Ethical Consequences 3.7 Concluding Summary 3.8 Evaluation 4 Bayer's Doctrine of Creation as God's Promise 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Promissio as God's Speech-act 4.2.1 Promissio as Luther's Reformational Discovery 4.2.2 Promissio and the Passivity of Man 4.2.3 Promissio and the Concept of Mediation 4.2.4 Promissio and Language 4.2.5 Promissio in a Soteriological Context 4.3 Theology as Conflictual Discipline 4.3.1 The Task of Theology 4.3.2 Theology and Philosophy 4.3.3 The Nature of Doing Theology 4.3.4 The Concept of Theology and the Doctrine of Creation.... 4.4 The Theological Concept of Critical Mediation 4.4.1 Bayer on Kant and Freedom 4.4.2 Bayer on Hamann's Metacritique 4.4.3 The Object of Systematic-Theology 4.5 Creation and the Doctrine of Creation 4.5.1 Creation and Salvation 4.5.2 Creation as God's Speech-Act 4.5.3 Creation as Anticipated Wish 4.5.4 Creation, Time, and Eschatology

70 72 75 76 81 83 84 84 88 91 93 95 101 101 102 103 107 109 113 116 118 119 122 127 130 131 132 133 138 141 142 146 151 153

Contents

4.5.5 Creation and Anthropology 4.5.6 Creation and the Doctrine of Sin 4.5.7 Creation and the Doctrine of God 4.6 Ethics 4.6.1 Ethics and the Doctrine of Creation 4.6.2 Ethic of Gift 4.6.3 Material Ethical Consequences 4.7 Concluding Summary 4.8 Evaluation 5 The Connection Between a Doctrine of Creation and Theological Ethics 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Creation and Epistemology 5.2.1 Jesus Christ and the Goodness of Creation 5.2.2 Knowledge in Christ 5.2.3 Conclusions 5.3 Creation and Nature 5.3.1 Creation as Interpretation of Nature 5.3.2 Creation-orders and Natural Law 5.3.3 Creation as Comprehensive Concept 5.3.4 Conclusions: Creation as Life-Context 5.4 Creation and Providence 5.4.1 Hamartiology and Order 5.4.2 Creation as a Relational Concept 5.4.3 Providence as Part of the Doctrine of Creation 5.4.4 Human Agency and Divine Providence - the Problem of Institutions 5.4.5 Conclusions 5.5 Creation and Eschatology 5.5.1 Continuity and Discontinuity 5.5.2 Eschatological Qualification 5.5.3 Eschatological Order? 5.6 Evaluation of Bayer and Gunton 5.7 Summary

JX

156 160 162 166 167 171 174 180 182

190 190 192 192 204 212 214 214 219 225 230 233 233 239 243 the 248 258 260 261 267 273 275 278

X

Contents

6 Marriage and the Doctrine of Creation 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The 'Observance' of Marriage 6.3 Marriage and Contractual-Liberalism 6.3.1 Marriage as a Contract 6.3.2 Critical Appraisal 6.3.3 Living Marriage as God's Gift 6.3.4 The Gift Contested and Preserved 6.3.5 Conclusion - The Reality of a Fallen World 6.4 Marriage and Natural Law 6.4.1 Natural Law on Marriage 6.4.2 Critique of the Natural Law Concept 6.4.3 The Naturalness of Natural Law and the Doctrine of Creation 6.4.4 Conclusion 6.5 Marriage, Constructivism and Providence 6.5.1 The Constructivist Approach 6.5.2 Critical Appraisal 6.5.3 Marriage as Created by God 6.5.4 Conclusion 6.6 Marriage, Constructivism and Eschatology 6.6.1 Historical Constructivism and Marriage 6.6.2 Creation, Eschatology and Marriage 6.6.3 Conclusion 6.7 Conclusion 6.7.1 Summary 6.7.2 Evaluation 6.8 Evaluation of Bayer and Gunton on Marriage

281 281 285 290 290 294 296 298 302 303 303 305

7 Recapitulation 7.1 Theological ethics 7.2 Neo-Calvinist Tradition 7.3 Apologetics 7.4 Ecumenical Contribution

350 350 352 354 355

306 310 314 314 317 320 324 326 327 331 341 342 342 345 346

Contents

XI

8 Summaries 8.1 English 8.2 Nederlands

358 358 372

9 Bibliography 9.1 Abbreviations 9.2 Bibliography 9.2.1 Quoted publications of Oswald Bayer 9.2.2 Quoted publications of Colin E. Gunton 9.2.3 Quoted publications of other authors

388 388 388 388 390 392

Index of Names

409

1 About this Book This study seeks to explore the doctrine of creation in relation to, and for the sake of, its consequences in theological ethics. The research began at first as a matter of private theological interest. Both Bayer and Gunton have written a lot about 'creation', and I thought it worthwhile investigating their different contributions. Gradually, however, reading both Gunton and Bayer made it clear that there was much more at stake than warranted merely private interest. The doctrine of creation involves a way of life, an explicit confession of one of Christianity's most pressing and controversial characteristics, namely that everything that exists receives its being from God the Creator. The current theological context at the beginning of the 21st century is in need of deliberate and thoughtful theological investigation of the creation-theme. In the course of writing, it occurred to me that the alleged centrality of creation was not actually at all clear. Distinct doctrinal topics eventually evolve into different aspects of the same thing: whether you start with creation, or Jesus Christ, or the doctrine of the sacraments - you always has to finish with theological ethics in order to come to a conclusion. What difference does starting with 'creation' make for ethics? Or is it merely a matter of taste and tradition which determine the theological starting-point? The findings of this study, however, might be an example of the doctrine of creation's ability to provide an interesting starting-point for theological ethics, especially in our post-modern context. On the other hand, whilst a theses is the rightly argued product of a particular research project, in theology one cannot hide one's existential preferences. This cannot and must not be avoided especially in Systematic Theology. As a systematic theologian, it is my task to coherently describe some aspects of Christian doctrine. Without fully defining the task of systematic theology, we can say that this study is about the consequences and explication of the credal statement: "I believe in God the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth." Such a description necessarily reveals the writer's background, which in this case is 'Neo-Calvinist' (cf. section 2.3.2).

2

About this Book

However interesting such a task may be, it might, nevertheless, be asked why such investigation is necessary. The simple fact that two theologians in Germany and the United Kingdom confine themselves to the theme is not reason enough. In order to warrant more, we must look to the field of theological ethics. During the 1990's, it was generally and quickly concluded that late- or post-modernism seemed to rule out any proclamation of fixed moral rules, but that 'life' at the same time demanded some norms and values. The field of sexual ethics changed especially quickly in the last decades of the twentieth century. Theological ethics still seems deeply divided as to its responses to these changed and changing conditions. At the same time, the counter-movements of 'communitarianism' and 'radical orthodoxy' were developing. Theologians like Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank were vehemently opposing the modernist and late-modernist approaches of theology, by stressing the importance of a non-violent community of the Church over against the vigorous individualism of a nihilistic age. Ethics for this counter-movement was not so much devoted to rules and prescriptions as to developing a counter-life: the life-style of the Kingdom. Gunton explicitly responds to this counter-movement, and, as Wannenwetsch has shown, Bayer is implicitly indebted to this countermovement at this point.1 So too does this study bear its marks. I do not intend, however, to focus on the conceptual problems of modernity and post-modernity. They are the background against which Bayer and Gunton present their contributions to the doctrine of creation as important means of both diagnosis and healing. Rather, I hope to show the significance of such a doctrine for ethics in the case of one specific field: the relation between man and woman within marriage. In describing these theologians, a Neo-Calvinist background and its favouring the doctrine of creation could perhaps be useful. Providing a frame-work for theological ethics by starting with the doctrine of creation, as both Gunton and Bayer do, is intended to 1

Gunton, Colin E.; Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2000, 101. For Bayer, see Wannenwetsch, Bernd; Gottesdienst als Lebensform - Ethik für Christenbürger, Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 1997, 82-92. Whenever a publication is mentioned for the first time in a chapter, the full bibliographical details are given. Otherwise, abbreviated titles will be used. Italics in quotations are original, unless otherwise stated. Literature is taken into consideration until the year 2003 A.D.

About this Book

3

answer contemporary questions. It is an effort to cope with the ongoing march of modernism cumulating in post-modernism, and to provide a possible direction in which to search for answers. It will be assessed, as such, in this study. The doctrine's practical significance will be shown by treating the concept of 'marriage' within its present life-context. In the outline of the conceptual prerequisites for a theology of marriage, related topical subjects like homosexuality, or non- or pre-marital sexual relations, will not be discussed at length.2

2

For an interesting attempt to deal with non- and pre-marital sexual relations in the context of a Christian doctrine of marriage, see Thatcher, Adrian; Living Together and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2002.

2 An Introductory Chapter In this chapter, I will introduce the subject of this study (2.2). As we will see, an important element of any study of the doctrine of creation is the definition of the term 'creation' (2.2). Having defined that, I will outline the purpose of the study and briefly introduce its two key figures in their theological context and tradition (2.3). In the fourth section, I will outline the path followed by the rest of this book (2.4).

2.1 Introduction The relation of the doctrine of creation to theological ethics has a long and fascinating history. Although it is not possible to relate all of that history in this introductory chapter, it is worthwhile considering it briefly. Five lines can be distinguished in the history of the doctrine of creation in the 20th century, of which the first three are more general, while the last two are specifically ethical. 1 In the first, Karl Barth plays an important role. In his dialectical turn, the distance between God and this world is strongly emphasized. Instead of taking human experience as the starting-point of theology, he claimed to start with revelation. His debate with Emil Brunner about natural theology and his fierce resistance to the theology of the Deutsche Christen, with its appeal to creation-orders, made it clear that, in his opinion, any appeal to creation without a Christological framework was doomed to fail. As has been remarked, however, this does not imply that Barth did not develop an 'ethic of creation'. On the contrary, the whole of part 3 of his Church Dogmatics (encompassing four substantial volumes) denies this vehemently. 2 His Church Dogmatics 1

2

The restriction to the 20 th century is arbitrary, although it coincides with the temporal arrangement by Johannes von Lüpke, 'Schöpfer/Schöpfung VH Reformation bis Neuzeit' (In: TRE [Bd. XXX], 319-323). Cf. Link, Christian; Schöpfung [HST 7/1], Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn: Gütersloh 1991, 257f. Barth introduces his treatment of the first article of the creed

Introduction

5

shows the way in which the doctrine of creation could be spoken of within a determinative Christological framework. After the misuse of the concept of 'creation-orders' by the Deutsche Christen during the Third Reich, theology found it hard to pay full attention to the doctrine of creation as a more or less independent subject of investigation. 3 A second development beginning in the twentieth century, concerns the the way that the Enlightenment has influenced the relationship between theology and science. The Enlightenment sharply distinguished between the hard facts of natural science and the loftier knowledge of metaphysics. This resulted in theology's withdrawal from the study of the created world (nature),4 and a theological reduction of the doctrine of creation to protology - and even that in increasingly existentialistic categories. 5

with the remark that the words creatorem coeli et terrae mean that "Gott ihr Schöpfer ist, d.h. dass der Himmel, die Erde und in ihrer Mitte der Mensch es von ihm haben, dass sie sind und wieder von ihm haben, was und wie sie sind. Vor diesen Worten wie vor dem ganzen Bekenntnis steht aber das Wort credo, ich glaube" (KD ΙΠ/1, 1). Cf. also KD ΠΙ/3, v: "Darf ich nicht wenigstens im Blick auf den Umfang, in welchem ich mich jetzt zu dieser Sache [i.e. the doctrine of creation] äussere, mit einem gewissen Vergnügen an die Zeiten zurückdenken, in denen man mir vorzuhalten pflegte, wie sehr doch der erste Artikel des Glaubensbekenntnisses bei mir zu kurz komme?" 3

According to John Webster, this is a common objection in the critical reception of Barth in Lutheran theology. Lutherans criticise this lack of research into the topic of creation, which is supposed to have its roots in Barth's over-emphasis of the second article of the creed (Barth's Moral Theology. Human Action in Barth's Thought, T&T Clark Edinburgh 1998, 153). Others also acknowledge the tendency that ensured that, during the 1950's, 'creation' was even replaced by 'liberation' and 'redemption' (cf. e.g. Brinkman, M.E.; 'Het moeilijke geloof in Gods schepping'. In: Beek, A. van de [red.]; Lichtgeraakt. Wetenschapsbeoefenaren over de relatie van hun gelovig christen-zijn en hun iverk, Callenbach: Nijkerk 1995, [85-97] 85-87). Christian Link has made clear that the systematic question of how to speak about 'natural theology' is still epochal, in spite of Barth's reproaches. He states that the debate should be about the location ("der theologische Ort") of natural theology in close connection to christology and revelation. "Es geht um das Verständnis des Satzes Joh. 1,14. Hier hat das neu gestellte Thema [sc. der natürlichen Theologie] seinen theologischen Ort" (Link, Christian; Die Welt als Gleichnis. Studien zum Problem der natürlichen Theologie, Kaiser Verlag: München 1976, 313. Cf also 101-107).

4

Link speaks of a "Rückzug der Theologie aus der Natur" (Schöpfung [HST 7/2] [Schöpfungstheologie angesichts der Herausforderungen des 20. Jahrhunderts], Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn: Gütersloh 1991,337). Link, Schöpfung 2,338-340.400f.

5

6

An Introductory Chapter

Subsequently the troubled relationship between theology and science was increasingly dominated by outright conflicts and mutual derision.6 This conflict, however, became less urgent when some natural scientists found that their results did not necessarily rule out every kind of metaphysics.7 Even in theoretical research, the observing subject was seen as playing an active role in gathering results.8 Furthermore, it is now more commonly acknowledged that "[t]he businesses of science and religion are [...] complementary, and both are equally necessary in order to cope with these demands[:] As human beings we need to explain, predict and control our factual environment, and equally to make sense of or ascribe meaning to the demands with which this environment confronts us." 9 This acknowledged complementarity10 brought about a less hostile relationship between 6

7

8

9

10

"More recently the dialogue between theology and the sciences has been forced into a rather radical conflict, a kind of modernist 'duel' where 'objective', universal scientific claims were starkly contrasted to conflict with subjective, 'irrational' theological beliefs, resulting in a relentless pressure toward the absolute polarization of religion and science" (Van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel; Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in a Postmodern World, Trinity Press International: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 1998,2). Cf. the remark of the Anglican priest and theoretical physicist John Polkinghorne: "I believe that our contemporary understanding of the physical universe is more hospitable to an ample metaphysical interpretation than has been recognized by those who pursue a narrow and crass reductionism" (Serious Talk. Science and Religion in Dialogue, SCM Press: London 1995, 61), and the somewhat less positive view of Van Huyssteen (Duet or Duel?, 3). Also relatively sceptic is Jörg Baur: "Es ist [...] die Frage, ob die neue Offenheit der Wissenschaft für die theologische Rede von der Schöpfung mehr ist als nur Ausdruck der individuellen Uberzeugung einzelner Forscher" (Baur, Jörg; 'Theologisches Reden über die Schöpfung - christlich oder vor-christlich?'. In: Baur, Jörg; Einsicht und Glaube. Aufsätze [Band 2], Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht: Göttingen 1994, [111-125] 113). E.g. Thomas S. Kuhn described the transition from one (scientific as well as lifeguiding) paradigm to another - formerly considered as being fully rational - as a kind of 'conversion'. As Allster McGrath comments: "The decision to accept one theory rather than another rests not so much on experimental evidence, as on various social values, vested interests, and institutional concerns" (Science and Religion. An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell 1999, 83). Briimmer, Vincent; 'Introduction: a Dialogue of Language Games'. In: Brümmer, Vincent (ed.); Interpreting the Universe as Creation. A Dialogue of Science and Religion, Kampen 1991, (1-17) 12. Cf. also Eberhard Wölfel's diagnosis in his article 'Naturwissenschaft' for the TRE ([Bd. XXIV], [189-213] 206f) that the relation between theology and science nowadays is fairly relaxed. Ingolf Dalferth, however, criticises this use of the word 'complementary' for according to him, natural science, theology, and philosophy do not give inter-

Introduction

7

science and religion. Scientific results were investigated and interpreted by theologians 11 as well. This development caused an explosion of literature about the relationship between theology and science. Not only were the preliminary questions for a theory of knowledge challenged by this new scientific attitude, but theology also took advantage of it by engaging in interdisciplinary investigations of creation-themes. In this way, theology was once more interested in the doctrine of creation and the possibilities of combining scientific developments and insights with major theological topics.12 The dialogue between science and theology can even be seen as impacting on the very core of Christian belief, i.e. that the fact that God created heaven and earth may contribute to the interpretations of that world by scientists.13 To some theologians, these developments concerning the relation between science and theology are even elaborated with respect to theological ethics. Framed in terms of this debate, one talks about 'moral cosmology 7 . 14

11

12

13

14

pretations of reality which belong together: they "are not arguing [...] merely about interpretations of reality but about what deserves to be called reality". These rival disputations can only be called 'complementary' if one does not acknowledge their mutual exclusion (Dalferth, Ingolf U.; 'Creation - Style of the World'. In: IJSTh 1 [1999], [119-137] 121). E.g. Wolfhart Pannenberg (Systematische Theologie [Bd. 2], Göttingen 1991, 78) writes: "Es ist nicht so, dass die Theologie es sich leisten könnte, sich um die Weltbeschreibung der Naturwissenschaften gar nicht zu kümmern", so that Pannenberg himself wants to combine theological and scientific interpretation of reality. So Christoph Schwöbel ('Theologie der Schöpfung im Dialog zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Dogmatik'. In: Härle, Wilfried; Marquardt, Manfred; Nethöfel, Wolfgang [Hgg.]; Unsere Welt - Gottes Schöpfung [FS Eberhard Wölfel], Elwert Verlag: Marburg 1992, 199-221), who writes: "Wenn [...] Gott nach dem Bekenntnis des christlichen Glaubens tatsächlich als die 'alles bestimmende Wirklichkeit' zu sehen ist, dann wird diese Wirklichkeit Gottes von uns in unserer natürlichen Verfassung als biologische Organismen und in unserer gesellschaftlichen Lebenswirklichkeit personaler Interaktion erfahren, so dass die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse von Natur- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften für theologische Erkenntnisbemühungen nie ganz irrelevant sein können" (204). So Allster McGrath: "The interface between Christian theology and the natural sciences is not merely an intellectually habituable zone; this exploration is to be seen as an essential consequence of core Christian beliefs, which have defined Christianity throughout its long and complex history" (A Scientific Theology [Vol. I], T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2001, xviii). So William Schweiker: "A moral cosmology is sets of beliefs and valuations, often tacit in a culture, about how human beings are to orient themselves rightly and

8

An Introductory Chapter

A third development needs to be mentioned. Though the theology of Karl Barth can be adequately described as having a Christological concentration, theology after Barth initiated a more pneumatologically oriented interest.15 Thereby, the attention given to 'reality 7 , 'praxis' or 'experience' in theology developed rapidly. The Holy Spirit, being the Third Person of the Trinity, is the one who actualizes the relation between God and this world. As soon as one tries to investigate the effects of belief in God, one has to deal with the Holy Spirit and His work. The more the focus of theological interest shifted from Christology to pneumatology, the more one was able to treat creation not explicitly apart from the triune God, but as the result of His involvement with it. So a theologically legitimate framework for investigating the doctrine of creation was developed. Stimulating this development was liberation theology, which tries to make theology effective in the practices of the believer in both the Third World and rich, Western countries; and also the influence of the secularization, to which practical theology turned its interest in order to show the relevance of the Christian faith for everyday life. Both movements gained great benefit from the turn towards a pneumatological emphasis. 16 With respect to the field of theological ethics, we can see a fourth development. The doctrine of creation was elevated in unfortunate ways as a response to the environmental crisis. Since the late 1960's, the

15

16

meaningfully in the texture of the physical cosmos. A moral cosmology thereby configures the intersection of two other perspectives on reality, namely, physical cosmologies aimed at understanding, explaining, and controlling physical processes [...] and speculative cosmologies that provide frameworks of meaning about what exceeds, but includes, the domain of human behavior and natural processes [...] A moral cosmology [...] articulates how human agents can and ought to inhabit a universe open to these other ways of construing the way things are" ('Time as a Moral Space: Moral Cosmologies, Creation, and Last Judgement'. In: Polkinghorne, John; Welker, Michael [ed.]; The End of the World and the Ends of God. Science and Theology on Eschatology, Trinity Press International: Harrisburg 2000, [124-138] 126). Cf. the remark of Jürgen Moltmann, that 'Geistvergessenheit' was replaced by 'Geistbesessenheit' (Moltmann, Jürgen; Der Geist des Lebens. Eine ganzheitliche Pneumatologie, München 1991,13), whose concern perhaps was evoked by Karl Barth himself, with his wish to rethink the whole of theology from the perspective of pneumatology (Barth, Karl; 'Nachwort'. In: Schleiermacher-Auswahl, München/ Hamburg 1968, [290-312] 311-312). Cf. for a description of this development: Beek, A. van de; De adem van God. De Heilige Geest in kerk en kosmos, Callenbach: Nijkerk 1987.

Definition

9

devastating consequences of western pollution of the (human) environment became obvious. Theology was forced to put this point on its agenda, mainly stimulated by the so-called 'conciliar process'. This process derived from liberation theology, and chiefly objected to oppression in Latin America and other economic matters. The work of C.Fr. von Weizsäcker also put the creation issue at the centre of attention. In the fifth place, the need for ethical guidance in special areas of science and medicine resulted in the development of bioethics and medical ethics. This led to a renewal of interest in the doctrine of creation as an ethical framework. In summary, we can state that the doctrine of creation during the 20th century attracted interest for five reasons. (1) In reaction to the alleged shortcomings of the Christocentric theology of Karl Barth, and (2) following general scientific developments, in which the marginalisation of theology was questioned and theology granted a voice regarding reality. The space for developing a doctrine of creation was broadened even more (3) by the rise of pneumatology in relation to the growing interest in praxis among theologians. In theological ethics, 'creation' received attention because of (4) the growing consciousness of the environmental crisis taking place and (5) the growing attention given to bio-medical problems and their ethical components.

2.2 Definition When using the word 'creation', one has to carefully define the meaning of a multi-faceted term. It is helpful to distinguish some related concepts of creation. First, 'creation' is used to describe something which might otherwise be called 'reality 7 , 'cosmos', 'world' or even 'being'. In this use, 'creation' is the translation of the Latin creatura. To use the word 'creation' thus, however, does not necessarily imply any religious aspect, since even secularized speech of the whole of reality can proceed using the word 'creation'. It then only denotes, then, that 'reality' is somehow developed and made in the course of time. Secondly, 'creation' can be used as a translation of the Latin creatio, which denotes the act of creating - by God or by someone or something else. In the history of Christian doctrine, several ideas became attached to this specific use of 'creation' as creatio. In the first place, creatio was

10

An Introductory Chapter

considered to be the initial act by which God established heaven and earth. Consequently, this act was not thought of as restricted to the first stage of history, but as the ongoing act of God, expressed as creatio continua or continuata. In this specific use, terms like conservation and providence were used as synonyms. Furthermore, the explicit Christian confession that God did not create out of existing material was expressed in the term creatio ex nihilo. In chapter 5 these meanings will be considered at some length. In the third place, 'creation' is used as a shorthand way of denoting the explicit Christian convictions on the origin, present state and eventual goal of the whole of 'reality'. This use is comparable to the way in which the words 'nature' or 'being' are used. To use the word 'creation' in this way is intended to explicitly acknowledge the implications of believing that God created heaven and earth and still upholds them towards the eschaton. As such, 'creation' is intended to play a role in the conversation between theology and other disciplines which try to explicate (aspects of) 'reality'. 17 This third use of 'creation' can be traced within the dogmatic context. Within the context of the doctrine of creation, 'creation' not only refers to the theoretical reflection on the creatura as we perceive it in our times, but is also used as an expression of the implications of the conviction that we can describe the whole of reality with the word 'creation'. Thus the constitutive factor on which reality depends, namely, the relation reality has with its Maker, is investigated for its consequences for the rest of, both our thinking about it, and our human behaviour in and towards it. This implies that this use of the term 'creation' in theology has connections with both dogmatics and ethics. By functioning here as a 'doctrine', 'creation' is used in a second order, or meta-level context. With respect to this use of the word 'creation' it is necessary to distinguish the relevant differences from words like 'nature', 'cosmos', 'being' or 'reality 7 . Let me illustrate this briefly. In Romanticism, the word 'nature' had specific connotations of being undefiled and pure. This meaning can be traced through into our own time in terms like 'nature reserve'. And the term 'being' can be used to indicate the 17

So Dalferth: "That the world is God's creation is not an article of experience but a reflective judgment that expresses an implication of the confession of creation, God is my creator" (Dalferth, 'Creation - Style of the World', 130). Cf. also section 5.3.1 n. 87.

Definition

11

process in which reality, including God, is involved. 18 In both these cases, using the word 'creation' instead would helpfully indicate some differences. The term 'creation' can imply the conviction that there is no pure nature, apart from its Creator and the history between him and his creation, or, using the word 'creation' instead of 'being' may imply the presupposition of a fundamental distinction between the creatura and its Creator. A presupposition which is absent, or at least not stressed, in, for example, process-theology. These examples make clear that the use of the word 'creation' can be an explicit confession of the fundamental beliefs of the user - though this is not necessarily the case. For this reason, the word 'creation' is sometimes held to indicate not only a view of (a part of) reality, but also a specific kind of behaviour towards both reality and God, and even point to a complete regulative category in a worldview. 19 But even were we not to go that far, the investigation and explication of a doctrine of creation offers some new perspectives for exploring new perspectives explaining certain trends in the present culture or giving direction to human behaviour. It is as a consequence of this conviction that the use of the word 'creation' has come into vogue over the last few decades. As indicated in the previous section, the growing awareness of the ecological crisis gave rise to a renewal of the study of 'creation'. In the context of this development, the term 'Ethic of Creation' was born. It was meant as a description of a new ethic which took more account of the specific needs of nature in this crisis. Thus 'Ethic of Creation' means the reflection on a responsible treatment of the creatura by human beings, in which, of course, an adequate description of the creatura for its own sake is included. There is, however, also a kind of ethics that seeks to explore the conceptual and practical implications of the doctrine of creation, which is sometimes called 'Ethic of Creation'. For the purpose of clarity and terminological coherence, I shall call any ethics which seeks to explore the practical and conceptual implications of the doctrine of creation an

18

19

E.g. the theology of Paul Tillich and the process-theologians J. Cobb and A.N. Whitehead could be mentioned here. Cf. Frey, Chr.; 'Neue Gesichtspunkte zur Schöpfungstheologie und Schöpfungsethik?'. In: ZEE 33 (1989), [217-232] 221f. See for example the definition of G. Gloege: "Der Begriff [sc. Schöpfung] regelt umfassend die Aussagen über das Verhältnis des dreieinigen Gottes zu Mensch und Welt." ('Schöpfung IV/B. Dogmatisch'. In: RGG3 [Bd. V], [1484-1490] 1484)

12

A n Introductory Chapter

'Ethic of Createdness'. 20 It seeks to give an answer to the question: What does the fact that this reality, including human beings, is created by God imply for the way human beings ought to behave? Or otherwise, an ethic of createdness seeks to explore the possibilities for reflection on the human condition and consequently for human behaviour, made available by the full consideration of the doctrine of creation.

2.3 Purpose My goal is to explore the possibilities for theological ethics when taking the doctrine of creation as the starting-point. The leading question will be: What does the fact that this reality, including human beings, is created by God imply for the way human beings ought to behave? Or: What does the consideration of the Christian doctrine of creation provide for theological ethics? This question combines the two reflective terms 'ethics' (reflection on behaviour) and 'doctrine of creation' (theological reflection on creation). The result of such a combination of 'createdness' and 'ethics' is described as an 'ethic of createdness'. To indicate what such an 'ethic of createdness' could practically mean, this study looks to 'marriage' as the chosen arena in which the doctrine of creation may be seen to bear consequentially on theological ethics. By doing so, four important aspects of doing ethics will be touched upon: some characterisation of the actual status of theological ethics, the place this part of dogmatics owns in my own tradition, and the impact of Christian convictions in an increasingly unchristian world. The fourth aspect lies in the contribution this thesis can make to an ecumenical exploration of the impact of the doctrine of creation on the study of theology and ethics. At relevant points, we will look briefly at the specifics of the traditions from which Colin Gunton and Oswald Bayer hale. I turn, then, to these four elements. 20

I o w e this term to Christoph Schwöbel (Schwöbel, Christoph; 'God, Creation and the Christian Community: The Dogmatic Basis of a Christian Ethic of Createdness'. In: Gunton, Colin E. [ed.]; The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, Edinburgh 1997,149-176).

Purpose

13

2.3.1 The Current State of Theological Ethics Theological ethics is increasingly confronted with the levelling impact of so-called 'post-modernism'. In his 1998 survey of the themes and tendencies current in theological ethics, Martin Honecker called attention to the increasing divergence of ethical standpoints, which ethical theorizing shares with post-modern culture. As more and more issues arise, fewer and fewer answers are available. It becomes impossible to guarantee the integration and unity of the many different areas of life. This situation is reflected in theological ethics, and the crisis is intensified because of a pluralism that strongly questions the theological proprium of ethics. 'There is no theological agreement any more on which one can build.' 21 The terms 'fragmentation' and 'indifference' are apt descriptions of this post-modern situation. It is helpful to classify theological ethics in terms of the way they deal with this post-modern situation. There can be either approval of the situation, or plain disapproval, or an attempt to solve the deadlock by analysing the roots of the situation and offering a new direction. A first response is to approve of the situation: we have to accept the fragmentation of life, the different roles which the individual has to play, and we have no duty to integrate the different aspects of life or the incompatible claims that different approaches towards ethics make. This can be done by restricting ethics to the task of description.22 Attempts can be made to integrate differing opinions with the aim of coming to a philosophical account of the concept of pluralism. 23 A third way of accepting pluralism is by limiting ethics to the role of sparking discussion, in which case the only remaint tast is that of regulating the

21

22 23

Honecker, Martin; 'Themen und Tendenzen der Ethik'. In: ThR 63 (1998), (74-133) 74: " E s gibt hier keinen theologischen] Konsens mehr, auf den man zurückgreifen könnte." Cf. Bauman, Zygmunt; Postmodern ethics, Blackwell: Oxford 1993; Bauman, Zygmunt; Life in fragments. Essays in postmodern morality, Blackwell: Oxford 1995. Cf. Krämer, Hans; Integrative Ethik, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M. 1995, and the publications of the Dutch ethicist F. de Lange (Lange, Frits de; Individualisme. Een partijdig onderzoek naar een omstreden denkwijze, Kok: Kampen 1989; Lange, Frits de; Ieder voor zieh? Individualisering, ethiek en Christelijk geloof, Kok: Kampen 1993; Lange, Frits de; 'Legio is mijn naam'. Het pluralistische zelf als thema in de theologie [Kamper Oraties 7], THU-Kampen: Kampen 1995).

14

A n Introductory Chapter

(public) debate in order to achieve the so-called 'narrow ethics' which will be approved by as many people as possible. 24 A second response is strictly negative towards the post-modern situation and claims some sort of universally and eternally applicable lawgiving authority, such as 'Reason' or God or creation(-orders). By claiming such a universal authority, the normative implications of pluralism are overcome. Whilst granting that post-modern pluralism must be dealt with, this position does so strictly in order to validate an integrative perspective on moral reality.25 A third way to deal with the phenomenon of post-modernism in ethics is by trying to analyse its historical and philosophical roots in order to look for an alternative. This approach seeks to avoid the problems that arose out of the modern Enlightenment approach to reality, which led to the appreciation of pluralism. The well-known analyses of Alasdair Maclntyre and Charles Taylor take this route26, and the ethical elaboration of these ideas can be found among narrative ethicists. In their work, the (Christian) community plays a central and important role. Community is the keyword to overcome both rigid uniformity and loose pluralism. Within these different approaches to post-modern pluralism in both life and ethics, the doctrine of creation is sometimes claimed as offering possibilities for overcoming this crisis, as well as offering possibilities for meeting the phenomenon of pluralism. 27 This is to make an

24 25

26

In the Netherlands, one might think of Bert Musschenga and Gerrit Manenschijn. Cf. the strive for discerning a transcendental language-game by Karl Otto Apel and the idea of a general basis from which the communication about norms and values can start (Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls). The religious appeals to God as the Universal Lawgiver is to be found in forms of 'Divine C o m m a n d Theories'. This type of ethics is traditionally called 'theological ethics' (cf. Rendtorff, Trutz; Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie [Bd. I], Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 2 1990,100-103). Taylor, Charles; Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1989; Maclntyre, Alasdair; After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 2 1984.

27

The doctrine of creation is, on the other hand, also used to diagnose the malaise of the current post-modern situation. As Jan van Riessen claims, it is because of a conscious denial of both the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo and the Reformational device sola gratia, that post-modernism could occur: "Met de afwijzing van het 'creatio' is het verval van de wereld ingezet, althans van de leefwereld zoals de

Purpose

15

(implicit) connection between ethics and reality in the form of some sort of 'realism'. 28 Either one points to God who made heaven and earth to state that there is only one right and fixed attitude towards reality, or one calls attention to the diversity of created reality. In both cases, the appeal to reality can be illuminated by an interpretation which is led by the doctrine of creation. After all, the doctrine of creation offers a possible interpretation or description of reality that deals with problems arising in current ethical debates. This study will discuss some of these proposals by analysing the possible use of the doctrine of creation in the work of contemporary ethicists and theologians.

2.3.2 Neo-Calvinist Tradition The tradition which forms the background of this study can be called 'Neo-Calvinism'. Although this word has been used as a perjorative label by opponents of this stream of Dutch Reformed theology, it can be used quite impartially to designate the tradition of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck in the late 19th and early 20th century. 29 In this

28

29

Europese mens die ervaart" (Riessen, Jan van; Verlangen naar God in een verlaten cultuur. Proeve van een sceptische theologie, Meinema: Zoetermeer 1998, [11-40] 20). The word 'realist' here is taken as claiming "that moral judgements can be true or false because valid moral norms are rooted in the nature of reality or the nature of human existence". 'Antirealism' on the other hand is claiming that values are not ontologically real as moral realism claims: "Antirealism in this form leaves open the question of whether or not fruitful comparisons between moral traditions take place, even as it insists that demonstrating the truth of any moral claim will always be community- or tradition-specific" (Schweiker, William; Power, Value, and Conviction. Theological Ethics in the Postmodern Age, The Pilgrim Press: Clevelend 1998, 27f). Schweiker himself elaborates the concept of 'responsibilit/ in order to overcome this dilemma, for it entails acknowledgment of the fact of plurality of morals on the one hand and the fact that we must strive for the integrity of life on the other (Schweiker, Prnixr, Value, and Conviction, 31; cf. also Schweiker, William; 'Verantwortungsethik in einer pluralistischen Welt. Schöpfung und die Integrität des Lebens'. In: EvTh 59 [2002], 320-335). The term 'Neo-Calvinist' covers a specific historical form of what is traditionally called 'reformed'. Cf. Brinkman, M.E.; De theologie van Karl Barth: dynamiet of dynamo voor Christelijk handelen. De politieke en theologische kontroverse tussen nederlandse Barthianen en Neocalvinisten, Ten Have: Baarn 1983, 13v; Brinkman, M.E.; 'Verantwoording'. In: Brinkman, M.E. (red.); 100 jaar theologie. Aspecten van een eeuw theologie in de Gereformeerde kerken in Nederland (1892-1992), Kok: Kampen 1992, (9-13) 10. With respect to the theological content of 'Neo-Calvinism' see: Klapwijk, J.;

16

An Introductory Chapter

tradition, the doctrine of creation has a special place.30 In the work of both Kuyper and Bavinck, revelation is the focus. Though this entails a stress on the special revelation in Scripture, there is room for the socalled 'general revelation' as well, for reasons that need not be discussed in this context. This attention paid to 'general revelation', however, leads to a special treatment of the doctrine of creation. It has been stated in this tradition that God makes himself known in the creatura to everyone who listens to reason.31 The ability to know God from creation is guaranteed by the specific epistemological stance of Neo-Calvinistic theology, characterized as 'realistic' and implying a kind of continuity between reality and human thinking. In this epistemological realism, Jesus Christ plays a central role, being the Logos through Whom heaven and earth were created. This Logos is

30

31

'Abraham Kuyper over wetenschap en universiteit'. In: Augustijn, C.; Prins, J.H.; Woldring, H.E.S. (red.); Abraham Kuyper. Zijn volksdeel, zijn invloed, Meinema: Delft 1987, (61-94) 62. Cf. Begbie, Jeremy; 'Creation, Christ, and Culture in Dutch Neo-Calvinism'. In: Hart, Trevor; Thimell, Daniel (edd.); Christ in our Place. The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World [FS lames Torrance], Paternoster Press: Exeter 1989, 113132; Wolters, Albert; 'Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality'. In: Hart, Hendrik; Hoeven, Johan van der; Wolterstorff, Nicholas (edd.); Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition, University Press of America: Lanham 1983, (113-131) 116. Cf.: "[M]en and women are rational and moral beings. That is how God created them and that, therefore, is how he treats them" (Bavinck, Herman; In the Beginning. Foundations of Creation Theology [TR John Vriend; ED John Bolt], Baker: Grand Rapids 1999, 205). Vgl.: "[D]e mensch is een redelijk en zedelijk wezen. Zoo heeft God hem geschapen, en zoo behandelt Hij hem dus ook; Hij onderhoudt wat Hij schiep" (Bavinck, H.; GD Π, 532).

Purpose

17

sometimes conceived as the 'world-idea' 32 , comparable to Berkeley's 'things are thinks'. 33 In theological ethics, Willem Geesink followed this precise same pattern. The sovereign God created a moral world-order, which He imposes on the spiritual as well as on the natural world. For the spiritual world - which is the moral one - God's ordinances are his commandments. 34 'The moral world-order can be seen as the ordinance, created and maintained by God, which has to be obeyed by his creatures to whom God gave self-consciousness and selfdetermination.' 35 Over against the rise of Barthian theology, the theology of K. Schilder (1890-1952) strongly emphasized God's immanent activity.36 The fact that God created the world is an important qualification of reality which determines the whole of God's history with his creation. As creation, this world is upheld by God's grace: though polluted by sin, the restoration in Jesus Christ gives back to the world its direction. This strong accent on creation by Schilder is even stronger than Kuyper's. 37 The ethical consequence is that human beings are held responsible for the good treatment of creation, guided by the Christological re-creation. 32

So for instance Bavinck: "First there is the Father, from whom the initiative for creation proceeds, who thinks the idea of the world; but all that the Father is and has and thinks he imparts to and expresses in the Son. In him the Father contemplates the idea of the world itself, not as though it were identical with the Son, but so that he envisions and meets it in the Son in whom his fullness dwells" (Bavinck, In the Beginning, 44). Vgl.: "Vooreerst is het de Vader, van wien het initiatief der schepping uitgaat, die de wereldidee denkt, maar alwat de Vader is en heeft en denkt, deelt Hij mede aan en spreekt Hij uit in den Zoon. In Hem aanschouwt de Vader de idee der wereld zelve, niet als ware deze met den Zoon identisch, maar zoo dat ze in den Zoon, in wien zijne gansche volheid woont, Hem voor oogen staat en tegemoet treedt" (GD Π, 388f).

33

Cf. Klapwijk, J.; 'Honderd jaar filosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit'. In: Wetenschap en rekenschap 1880-1980. Een eeuw wetenschapsbeoefening en wetenschapsbeschouwing aan de Vrije Universiteit, Kok: Kampen 1980, (528-593) 548. Cf. Geesink, W.; Gereformeerde Ethiek [Bd. I], Kok: Kampen 1931,187v. "Onder zedelijke wereldorde is te verstaan de door God zelf gestelde en gehandhaafde schikking voor Zijn met zelfbewustzijn en zelfbepaling begaafde schepselen, waarnaar zij zieh behooren te voegen" (Geesink, Gereformeerde Ethiek I, 190). Cf. Bekkum, K. van; 'De gereformeerde theologie van Klaas Schilder'. In: Radix 23 (1997), (123-166) 131. Van Bekkum, 'De gereformeerde theologie van Klaas Schilder', 137.

34 35

36 37

18

A n Introductory Chapter

It is because of this intrinsic relation between God and his creation in Neo-Calvinist theology that creation orders easily function as warrants of God's ongoing activity in guiding human life on earth.38 Thus the ethical implication of the doctrine of creation is intrinsically connected with both epistemology, the doctrine of common grace, and Christology (doctrine of the Logos), which makes it worthwhile reconsidering the status of this doctrine in the current theological and ethical debate.39

2.3.3 The Apologetic Impact of Christian Convictions Christian ethics starts from its own particular Christian position. But the universal claims it makes apply to the whole of creation (creatura). This state of affairs raises the spectre of that old dilemma of the particular and the universal. The doctrine of creation is an example of the Christian conviction that, though God always works in concrete specific ways, His work is for the benefit of all who live and all that is. As such, the doctrine of creation reformulates the dilemma in a specific way. The particular belief in God as the One who created heaven and earth claims to have consequences for everyone who lives within this universe as God's creatura. In the post-modern situation, the particularity of one's convictions is no longer despised as a starting-point, but the universal applicability of its consequences remains contested. The conflict arising from such a universal vision cannot be avoided. This conflict can, however, be 38

For a survey of the history and implications of the concept of creation-orders in NeoCalvinist theology, see: Egmond, A. van; Kooi, C. van der; 'The Appeal to Creation Ordinances: A Changing Tide'. In: Schrotenboer, P.G. (e.a.); God's Order for Creation [Wetenskaplike Bydraes van die P U vir CHO, Reeks F], Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys: Potchefstroom 1994,16-33; Egmond, A. van; Kooi, C. van der; 'Het beroep op scheppingsordeningen. Een wisselend getijde'. In: Egmond, A. van; Heilzaam geloof. Verzamelde artikelen bzorgd door D. van Keulen en C. van der Kooi, Kok: Kampen 2001,157-172.

39

Cf. Wolters, 'Dutch Neo-Calvinism', 120-122: "Creation is defined in terms of a cosmic law (decree, statute, word, ordinance), as the expression of God's sovereignty. [...] A postulated creational 'law' that must be responsibly implemented makes all [...] areas philosophically accessible as creation. This law thus enables philosophy to take seriously the comprehensive scope of creation in the Calvinistic understanding of the basic Christian confession" (121).

Purpose

19

adequately and coherently described. It is not my intention to fully describe the consequences of a doctrine of creation, but to restrict this study to the ethical implications of it. The aforementioned post-modern context of theological ethics (2.3.1) can be interpreted by analysing how the implications of the doctrine of creation for ethics are currently being explained and discussed. Thus the ethical implications of the doctrine function as a heuristic instrument to explore in what way the discussion about the universality of these implications can proceed. Such exploration can help Christians to choose their arguments with care for the sake of their apologetic aims and universal claims. But this study not only provides us with a heuristic instrument for analysing the context of specific Christian claims. It also offers a concrete example of how these particular convictions illuminate an area of Christian ethics. By showing how ethical convictions about the lifeform of 'marriage' can be dealt with using the doctrine of creation, the significance of the ethical resources within the framework of the doctrine of creation can be checked and evaluated. 40

2.3.4 Different Confessional Contributions A fourth contribution this study might achieve is the integration of different confessional proposals into an ethic of createdness. In a recent essay on the future of theology in the Netherlands, A. van de Beek stated that it is worthwhile investigating the contribution Dutch (Neo-)

40

For apologetic reasons, the concept of the Church witnessing to the gospel is important. I here refer to the eloquent elaboration of this standpoint by Stanley Hauerwas. In his Gifford Lectures (2001) Hauerwas made a stand against any kind of 'neutral' natural theology: "The god that various Gifford lectures have shown to exist or not to exist is a god that bears the burden of proof. [...] For a Gifford lecturer to maintain that the God who exists is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit seems wildly ambitious, if not foolish" (Hauerwas, Stanley; With the Grain of the Universe. The Church's Witness and Natural Theology. Being Gifjbr Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001, Brazos Press: Grand Rapids 2001,15). Hauerwas concludes: "All that is, all that is creation, is a witness to the One alone who is capable of moving the sun and the stars as well as our hearts. If we and the world existed by necessity, then no witness, no story of creation, would be required. But God did not have to create, much less redeem; yet we have it on good authority that God has created and redeemed. Creation and redemption constitute the story necessary for us to know who we are. Such knowledge comes only through the telling of this story" (207).

20

An Introductory Chapter

Calvinist theology can make to the ecumenical debate.41 It is with this ecumenical debate in mind that this study seeks to articulate the function of the doctrine of creation in the ethics of the German Lutheran theologian Oswald Bayer from Tübingen (Germany) and the Anglo-Saxon Reformed theologian Colin E. Gunton from London (England). By doing so, the confrontation between and divergences of these two traditions and that of Neo-Calvinism will not be overlooked but instead described. It is worth noting that, despite major differences amongst these traditions, the doctrine of creation offers one theological locus at which they bear comparison. Both Bayer and Gunton deal with the question of how to value the current post-modern levelling in ethics (cf. 2.3.2). In their solutions, they look for the philosophical roots of this levelling in the advent of the Enlightenment and try to find theological possibilities for thinking and living as a Christian. Post-modern pluralism is neither uncritically accepted nor violently contested. In their critical assessment of the current cultural climate, both Gunton and Bayer come to a critique of post-modern fragmentation on the basis of a doctrine of creation. The link between creation and ethics is strongly emphasised by both, though for different reasons. Oswald Bayer (born in 1939) comes from a long German-Lutheran tradition in which the role of the doctrine of justification can hardly be overestimated. Bayer wants to distinguish between two ways in which this doctrine of justification can be used. The first one places a metaphysical concept of 'atonement' in the centre, which in turn can be divided in two uses. The first metaphysical use of atonement is intended to overrule and overcome the breaches and irregularities of both every-day-life experiences and scientific standpoints. It is a kind of Hegelian search for unity. The second metaphysical use of atonement contains the idea that man has to obey the moral law. Such obedience will save him in a Kantian way: this human action is the key question of humankind. 42

41

42

Beek, A. van de; 'Tijd voor bezinning. Taak en toekomst van de systematische theologie'. In: De toekomst van de theologie in Nederland [Verkenningen 3], [KNAW]: Amsterdam 2000, [29-44], 39. Cf. Bayer, Oswald; Theologie [HST 1], Güthersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1994, 453-487. Bayer calls these two solutions 'Theoretisierung', 'Ethisierung' and adds a third one: 'Existentialisierung' by Bultmann c.s.. Bayer summarises these three

Purpose

21

The second approach inclines toward seeing life (and science as well) as thoroughly stamped by brokenness and disunity, overcome not by human thought or endeavour but by God's healing advent. The distinctive hallmark of both of these interpretations of the doctrine of justification is that they frame the evaluation of the worth of human action, thinking or 'feeling' in terms of the most existential questions life poses to man. In this way, this doctrine is used to describe the relationship between God and man. In order to indicate the position Bayer occupies in current German systematic theology, one can compare his position with Pannenberg's recent overview of the history of Lutheran (evangelische) theology in Germany since the late 18th century. Pannenberg seeks to determine why Kantian philosophy gained so much influence. He traces this history back to the religious wars (Religionskriege) in Germany. The outcome of these wars was that unitary truth seemed to be divided into several 'truths'. For this reason, the question of unity and diversity emerged at the centre of both philosophical and theological debate.43 The clear consequence of this development was the quest for one universal basis of morality, science, and social institutions, which resulted in a tendency to put man himself in the centre. God enters the stage increasingly only as the postulated necessary presupposition for human life and subjectivity. According to Pannenberg, this development establishes the new terms for the demand of theology's demand for universally accepted truth. 44 The decisive distinction between Pannenberg's overview and Bayer's position can be captured in the description of the way in which God is the warrant of unity within the broken and fragmented present. Pannenberg and Bayer are in line with each other on the idea that unity and universal validity is at stake, but they differ completely in their solution. For Pannenberg, God can be conceived as the One who, in his

43

44

standpoints with the keywords: 'Wissen', 'Tun' and 'Gefühl' - the latter in close connection with Schleiermacher's system. "Die christliche Theologie der Neuzeit steht ebenso wie die Kirchen in der Spannung zwischen dem Anspruch der christlichen Überlieferung auf allgemeine Wahrheit für alle Menschen und der Bestreitung dieses Anspruchs durch die neuzeitliche Einschränkung des christlichen Glaubens auf die Basis der privaten Glaubensüberzeugung" (Pannenberg, Wolfgang; Problemgeschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1997, 32). Pannenberg, Problemgeschichte, 350.

22

An Introductory Chapter

Tri-Unity, encompasses this world in its history; systematic theology should therefore try to encompass all things. 45 Bayer, on the other hand, stresses the fact that human beings have to keep two things in mind; firstly that God's being a warrant of unity is not a fact that can be stated, but a promise which is told to us in Word and Sacraments; 46 secondly that one always has to be reminded of the difference of our living 'by faith' and not yet 'by sight'. 47 Therefore, systematic theology should not so much try to encompass all reality but should use its apt tools to reframe the human perception of life and God. 48 Bayer is deeply influenced by the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). 49 It was Hamann's use of Luther's distinction between Law and Gospel that gave him the tools to criticise contemporary theological and philosophical positions. 50 Thus Hamann criticises Kant's vision of universal and timeless Reason and stresses its intrinsic determination by time and space.51 Bayer is now one of the leading scholars on Hamann, and his consistent use of both Luther's reformation 'discovery', and Hamann's use of it in his context, is still the leading element of his own theological framing of dogmatics and ethics. Bayer himself considers the way he combines the justification

45

46

47 48

49

50 51

"Systematische Theologie muss in jeder neuen Situation immer wieder den Versuch einer Gesamtdarstellung christlicher Lehre machen" (Pannenberg, Problemgeschichte, 355). This follows from Bayer's study on the decisive 'reformational' element in Luther's theology (cf. Bayer's dissertation and Habilitationsschrift: Promissio. Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie, WBG: Darmstadt 21989). This distinction stems from 1 Korinthians 5,7 and is elaborated in Theologie, 521-531. Cf. e.g. Bayer, Oswald; 'Einführung: Poietologische Theologie'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Gott als Autor. Zu einer poietologische Theologie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1999, (1-18) esp. 13-17; and Bayer, Theologie, 413-418. Cf. Bayer's opus magnum on Hamann: Vernunft ist Sprache. Hamanns Metakritik Kants [unter Mitarbeit von Benjamin Gleede und Ulrich Moustakas], FrommannHolzboog: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2002. This is stated in: Bayer, Oswald; Umstrittene Freiheit. Theologisch-philosophische Kontroversen, Tübingen 1981,135. Bayer, Oswald; 'Vernunft ist Sprache'. In: KuD 32 (1986), 278-292; and the chapter 'Vernunft ist Sprache. Hamann-Kant'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch. Johann Georg Hamann als radikaler Aufklärer, Piper: München/Zürich 1988,179-192

Purpose

23

criterion in creation-theology as a 'risky undertaking', but therefore worth investigation. 52 Colin Ε wart Gunton (1941-2003), on the other hand, is named among England's most influential Reformed theologians of the twentieth century. 53 He increasingly paid attention to the heritage of John Calvin. 54 Current English systematic theology is a 'lively' and 'central' discipline because of its position between the continent and America, in which Gunton played a major role.55 According to Gunton's own view, English systematic theology too long suffered from the fear of being influenced by German thought and thereby isolated itself.56 It also cut itself off from the fruitful systematic concepts stemming from other traditions. In this respect, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) functions as an example and lonely role model, bucking the tread.

52

Cf.: "Es hat lange gedauert, bis ich wagte, den Promissio-Begriff als Schlüsselbegriff auch für die Schöpfungslehre geltend zu machen [...]" (Oswald Bayer". In: Henning, Christian; Lehmkühler, Karsten [Hrsg.]; Systematische Theologie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Mohr/Siebeck Tübingen 1998, [300-315] 304 [italics JHFS]).

53

As Ingolf Dalferth writes: "Colin E. Gunton, Systematiker am King's College in London, ist gegenwärtig der wohl profilierteste Theologe der reformierten Tradition in England. [...] Souverän wie Wenige bewegt er sich in den theologischen Traditionen Europas und der angelsächsischen Welt" (In: ThLZ 127 [2001] 1, 93). "[...] Calvin, whose often warm, affirmative, lucidly intellectual, and for the most part open thought is rightly receiving attention at this time when it has become an ecumenical responsibility to explore the particularities of our heritage. [...] It becomes more and more borne upon me that his is one of the great minds of the tradition, hugely underestimated almost everywhere for all kinds of bad reasons, some but by no means all due to that movement called 'Calvinism'" (Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2000, vii-viii).

54

55

Cf. the account of lohn Webster on theology in England: "Sie [i.e. systematic theology in England] hat sich jetzt aber als eine zentrale, sich stark auf bedeutende kontinentale und amerikanische] Denker beziehende Disziplin etabliert (v.a. in den Arbeiten Colin Guntons)" ('England, Theologie in'. In: RGG4 [Bd. Π], [1308-1312] 1312).

56

Cf. Gunton, "The Nature of Systematic Theology. Anselm of Canterbury, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Possibility of an English Systematic Theology'. In: Gunton, Colin E.; Theology through the Theologians. Selected Essays 1972-1995, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1996,1-18.

24

An Introductory Chapter

He interacted deeply with German theology and philosophy, 57 and in that he was systematic without succumbing to system. He was concerned for - or rather, obsessed with, as Gunton puts it - truth as an essentially theological quest. Following Coleridge's example, Gunton defines systematic theology as "any activity in which an attempt is made to articulate the Christian gospel or aspects of it with due respect to such dimensions as its coherence, universality and truth". 58 Gunton follows this both theological and practical quest with an arduous zeal that stems from his Anglo-Saxon tradition, in which reason - in connection with both Scripture (tradition) and the human faculty of imagination - plays an important methodological role.59 In this tradition, the doctrine of creation functions as the expression of the view that "the truth, goodness and beauty of God (to use the Platonic triad which so influenced many writers of the period) could be discerned within the natural order, in consequence of that order having been established by God". 60 John Polkinghorne expressed this attitude with an argument stemming from the dialogue between science and religion: "We do not expect the universe to be full of objects stamped 'Made by God', but if there is a mind and purposive will behind cosmic history - and that is the substance of the claim that the universe is a creation - then we might (indeed we must) look for hints arising from scientific story that are at least consonant with such a metaphysical claim." 61 Coleridge's fundamental conviction that theology has to seek the convergences of both reason and revelation is a major inspiration for the method and content of Gunton's theology. By taking Coleridge as a starting-point, Gunton's theology can meet the standards that current 57

58 59

60 61

Cf. Wheeler, Kathleen; 'Coleridge's Theory of Imagination. A Hegelian Solution to Kant?'. In: Jasper, David (ed.); The Interpretation of Belief. Coleridge, Schleiermacher and Romanticism, Macmillan: London 1986, 16-40; and Gunton, 'Nature of Systematic Theology', 11. Gunton, 'Nature of Systematic Theology', 8. Vgl. Suggate, Alan M.; 'The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996, (2-25) 3; Happel, Stephen; Imagination, Method in Theology, and Rhetoric. On re-examining Samuel Taylor Coleridge. In: Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad gradum doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel in lure canonico consequendum conscriptis [Vol. 52, nr. 5], Katholieke Universiteit: Leuven 1980, [143-169] 144. McGrath, Science and Religion, 115. Polkinghorne, Serious Talk, 63.

Purpose

25

(moral) theology sets itself in the face of a fragmented culture. His use of Coleridge's thought is not restricted to repeating his words. He uses Coleridge's insights for the benefit of his own systematic writings. The connection between the Coleridgean idea of the Trinity and the doctrine of creation proves to be an especially fruitful concept for diagnosing the roots of the crisis in modern culture.62 It is striking that both Gunton and Bayer in their criticism of the outcome of the post-Kantian philosophical and theological traditions use ideas of a critic who has his roots in the Kantian period. Both Hamann and Coleridge are known as forerunners of the Romantic criticism of rationalism. In order to understand and evaluate the positions of Gunton and Bayer within their own tradition, due attention has to be paid to the way in which they use these 18th and 19th century writers, since an awareness of the similarities and dissimilarities between Hamann and Coleridge will be helpful in sketching the positions of both Bayer and Gunton. Because of the interest both Bayer and Gunton have in the way in which theology can and must criticise the current cultural, philosophical, and theological developments, they make their contributions not only to dogmatics but to ethics as well. The way in which the doctrine of creation, along with its ethical implications, occurs in their thinking is deeply rooted in their own tradition. To investigate the way they use the doctrine of creation and compare this with my own (Neo-Calvinist) tradition contributes to the development of an ecumenical and critical debate about the role this doctrine should play in ethics. In this way, a small part of the larger field of current theological ethics can be mapped, an endeavour from which NeoCalvinist theology can profit.

62

This is stated in the first part of Gunton's The One, the Three and the Many, which "can be understood as a seeking of the roots of the modern crisis of culture - its fragmentation and decline into subjectivism and relativism - in an inadequate exegesis of the opening chapters of Genesis and the other biblical focusings of creation" whereas the second part is an attempt to "draw out some of the implications for culture and our understanding of the world of a more explicitly Trinitarian approach to the texts" (The One, the Three and the Many. God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity [The 1992 Bampton Lectures], Cambridge 1993,2).

26

An Introductory Chapter

2.4 Outline In chapters 3 and 4, the context of the doctrine of creation in the work of Gunton and Bayer, their treatment of this doctrine itself, and the consequences they draw for ethics will be described. The questions of chapter 2 will be answered, and remaining points for discussion will be mentioned. Chapter 5 is devoted to the description of four of the main objections against any use of 'creation' for doing ethics. These objections have to do with the status of human knowledge, the concept of 'nature', the relation between 'creation' and God's providence, and finally the eschatological qualification of 'creation'. In chapter 6, the theories of an 'ethic of createdness' will be 'tested' by giving a practical-ethical example: the life-form of 'marriage'. By doing so, the advantages and disadvantages of taking the doctrine of creation as one's starting-point for doing ethics become clear. The conclusion of the thesis as a whole is found in chapter 7, in which a final description of the results of this study will be summarised.

3 Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation 3.1 Introduction Colin Gunton's theology can be summarised as a quest for a Trinitarian ontology. 1 In order to give an account of the implications for the connection between this Trinitarian ontology and an ethic of createdness, six aspects of his theology need to be expounded. In doing so, Gunton's theology will not only be described but analysed as well. First, Gunton's doctrine of God will be summarised along with his Christology and doctrine of the Trinity (3.2). Secondly, Gunton's treatment of the 'Enlightenment project' will be described, for Gunton's theology owes much - if not everything - to his evaluation of the positive and negative achievements of modernity and the relation of modernity to the place and task of theology (3.3). Thirdly, the doctrine of creation is described as the solution offered by Gunton for overcoming the problems engendered by this tension with modernity (3.4). This, in turn, bears consequences for both anthropology (3.5) and ethics (3.6). The chapter's last sections will summarise and evaluate the outcomes of Gunton's proposal for addressing the place and task of theology in the current situation (3.7; 3.8). It is appropriate to unpack this structure further here. The importance of the doctrine of creation in the whole of Gunton's theology is not difficult to deduce from his writings. As will be shown, Gunton's main concern is about a Trinitarian theology of creation. Therefore, we start our analysis by treating Gunton's doctrine of God (3.2). Starting here, moreover, highlights our conviction that Gunton's theology is developed along two converging lines. The first is a biographical one. Gunton's first interest was with this topic and particularly Barth's contribution to it, which resulted in the publication of his doctoral thesis. Secondly, and closely related to the first, "the

1

So e.g. Finke, Anne-Kathrin; Karl Barth in Grossbritannien. Rezeption Wirkungsgeschichte, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1995, 261-267.

und

28

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

importance of a suitable topic for research is that what is done at this crucial stage of intellectual development sets the direction for the whole of the intellectual life that follows," as Gunton himself remarked thirty years after he wrote his thesis.2 For these reasons, Barth plays an important role in the whole of Gunton's theology. Barth wrote and acted against the background of specific features of theology that had appeared within the 19th century. Both Romanticism and the Enlightenment were among Barth's targets, as Gunton remarks. 3 Gunton himself used Barth's Trinitarian doctrine to evaluate and criticise the Enlightenment (3.3). 'Creation' (3.4) is at the heart of his theology because for Gunton it is the central theological category by which the implications of the these two accounts (doctrine of God and the Enlightenment) can be judged appropriately. 4 And the relation between the Trinity and creation deserves specific attention, because here the crucial step towards anthropology (3.5) and ethics (3.6) is made. Thus, this chapter provides an analytical description of Gunton's theology.

3.2 The Doctrine of God Gunton's articulation of the doctrine of God plays an important role in his theology for several reasons. (1) First it bears the strong influence of Karl Barth. (2) The doctrine of God in Barth's theology points to the importance of Christology. (3) Within Barth's own Trinitarian framework, the Holy Spirit receives too little attention, for which Gunton compensates in his own Trinitarian theology. (4) This Trinitarian theology provides Gunton with the tools both to indicate

2 3 4

'Preface to the second edition'. In: Gunton, Colin E.; Becoming and Being. The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, SCM Press: London 2 2001, xi-xii. Becoming and Being, 245. According to Gunton, both modern and so-called 'post-modern' approaches of theology mostly begin with treatments of the very possibility of theology. They usually begin with proofs of God, accounts of the universality of religion or a defence of the authority of scripture and/or the Christian tradition. "I myself," as Gunton comments, "believe that they are right to suggest that the foundations of our culture have been shaken, but not in identifying what they are. It is essentially a crisis of belief in the reality of creation. [...] The right theological response to this is to reaffirm the doctrine of creation [...]" (Gunton, Colin E.; The Christian Faith. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Blackwell: Oxford 2001, x).

The Doctrine of God

29

the problems caused by earlier attempts at developing a doctrine of the Trinity, and to give solutions for the problems these developments have caused. 3.2.1 Doctrine of God and Karl Barth In 1978, Gunton's doctoral thesis was published under the title Becoming and Being. It is a description and evaluation of the doctrine of God in the theologies of Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth. Gunton chose these theologians because they represented two different forms of reaction against the classical doctrine of God as shaped by Thomas Aquinas and others. In this classical conception, God functions as the pinnacle of the whole hierarchy of being in which the natural and the supernatural can be distinguished. Both Hartshorne and Barth criticise this conception of God. But the ways in which they do so are very different. According to Hartshorne, God is an immanent, cosmic, and historical process. Conceived in this way, the relation of God to time is enormously affected. For Barth, theology has to stand on its own feet in revelation before it can start any discussion with philosophy, which implies a great distance between God and the world, bridged only by Christ's becoming man on earth as Jesus of Nazareth. After describing the doctrine of God as conceived by Barth and Hartshorne, their criticism of Thomas' classic doctrine, and the way in which they both try to avoid these kinds of misconceptions, Gunton comes to his evaluation. Despite his criticism of Barth's Trinitarian doctrine of God, Gunton opts for his way of doing theology. The advantage of Barth's conception is that theology can be rational without succumbing to rationalism. The starting-point for doing theology is not some kind of analogy between God and human beings, but the belief that certain things, described, passed on and promised in the Scriptures, could be attributed to God's acting "and such as to illumine consistently both human life and the world in which they happen".5 God's revelation through the Bible lets its light shine upon this world in order that we may interpret the world. The rational part of this conception is that human beings try to make statements whose truth relies on the grounds of this interpretation. It is the claim of Christian 5

Becoming and Being, 219.

30

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

faith, as Barth formulates it, that it describes reality. Theology, nevertheless, consciously sets out, not from human rationality, but from God's grace which enables rational thought. Barth's stress on God's revelation heavily critiques Hartshorne's conceptions of immanence. In Hartshorne's theology, says Gunton, God and the world-process are in danger of coinciding. In this way, evil and suffering are passively borne by God, and at the same time, there is the danger of an illicit optimism about the course of history which does not correspond with reality. In short: according to Gunton Hartshorne's conceptions provide a kind of 'theodicy' that is not convincing. The ultimately compelling datum, for Gunton's theology, is the fact that the Son of God became flesh as the human being Jesus of Nazareth. This is a kind of historical truth that should not be explained in terms of myth or illustration. To do so would be to deny the essence of Christian faith.6 In his evaluation of the doctrine of God of both Barth and Hartshorne, Gunton's own convictions take shape. (1) The classical doctrine of God is rightly unacceptable to modern thinking. (2) Furthermore, criticism of it by philosophers like Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche must be taken seriously. (3) A firm distinction between God and world is necessary for doing theology, especially if the question of 'theodicy 7 is to be taken seriously. (4) Barth's theology, with its heavy stress on God's grace as the starting-point for theology, appears to be Gunton's starting-point for doing theology as well. 7 Barth's influence is not limited to Gunton's early publications. Barth's theological concern is traceable throughout Gunton's corpus. Above all, Gunton appropriates Barth's resistance against any theology that offers an abstract treatment of God. 8 This resistance flows from the 6 7

Cf. Becoming and Being, 222. "The chief difference between Barth and Thomas Aquinas lies in a shift from static to dynamic terms, from a substance- to an event-conceptuality." (Becoming and Being, 142). Cf. also: "Since Barth's programme of theology begins with the assertion of the radical temporality of God in revelation, w e should expect to have to use a different set of terms in expounding his conception of the relation of God and the world." (Becoming and Being, 173). Later, Gunton described the attitude in his thesis towards Barth as "less critical [...] than I have since become" ('Epilogue' in Becoming and Being, 226).

8

Cf. Gunton's article about 'Salvation' in Barth's theology ('Salvation'. In: Webster, John (ed.); The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2000,143-158).

The Doctrine of God

31

Barthian conception of the nature of the relationship between God and world. Though affirming the distance between these relata, there is a kind of analogy between them. While the classical Thomistic analogia entis is not tenable, Barth introduced an analogia relationis or analogia fientis.9 Therefore, Barth used the doctrine of the Trinity: God is Beingin-relation, of which human beings are a kind of reflection.10 According to Gunton, Barth's Trinitarian theology is "right to develop [a] theology of analogy on the basis - foundation - of the implications of God's triune relatedness to that which is not God". 11 Though Gunton criticises the overly epistemic drive in Barth's theology, 12 his concern is to develop a Trinitarian analogy of being and becoming: a conception of the structures of the created world in the light of the dynamic of the being of the triune Creator and Redeemer. 13 But before we turn to Gunton's reflections on the Trinity, his Christology needs to be surveyed.

9

Barth, Karl; KD m/2, 262. Cf. Jüngel, Eberhard; 'Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie. Eine Untersuchung zum Analogieverständnis Karl Barths'. In: Jüngel, Eberhard; Barth-Studien, Benzinger/Gütersloher Verlag: Zürich/Köln 1982, 210-232; and Ottolander, P. den; Dens Immutabilis. Wijsgerige beschouwing oner onveranderlijkheid en veranderlijkheid volgens de theoontologie van Sint-Thomas en Karl Barth, van Gorcum: Assen 1965, esp. 100-112. A summary of Barth's criticism is given by Kreck: "Barth kritisiert an der Lehre von der analogia entis, daß hier mittels des Seinsbegriffs Gott und Geschöpf in solche Beziehung gesetzt würden, daß ihr 'Zusammensein zu einer allgemein vorfindlichen Tatsache und Zuständlichkeit' werde, statt reines Wunder und Ereignis zu sein." (Kreck, W.; 'Analogia fidei oder analogia entis?'. In: Antwort. Karl Barth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag am 10. Mai 1956 [FS Karl Barth], Evangelischer Verlag: Zollikon-Zürich 1956, [272-286] 273).

10

For an evaluation of Barth's Trinitarian theology in the context of the development of Christian doctrine, see e.g. Feenstra, Ronald J.; Plantinga Jr., Cornelius (edd.); Trinity Incarnation and Atonement. Philosophical and theological essay, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 1989. Gunton, Colin E.; The One, the Three and the Many. God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity [The 1992 Bampton Lectures], Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1993, 140f. See e.g. Gunton, Colin E.; The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Edinburgh [U991] 21997, 5: "a strongly epistemic drive" and 19: "the noetic rather than [...] the saving significance of Jesus". See also Gunton, Colin E.; Theology through the Theologians. Selected Essays 1972-1995, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1996, 60 ("the undoubtedly high noetic content of Barth's theology"). The One, the Three and the Many, 141.

11 12

13

32

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

3.2.2 Christology As has been pointed out, Gunton's desire is a theology that lays bare the connections between God and this world, and describes the forms these connections have. In order to have something to say about human life, however, theology is dependent on the kind of Christology to which it adheres.14 In Jesus Christ, God and man come together in a paradigmatic way. It is only with an adequate treatment of the question of the relation between God and man in Jesus Christ that the nature of God's involvement in human history can be understood. For in Christ's immanence lies the core Christological value.15 How Christology is conceived is, according to Gunton, heavily dependent on the contemporary cultural opinions of the time in which a theologian lives. In this respect, Gunton sees the modern Enlightenment conditions as very influential. It is in modern Christology that the question of how the transcendent (God) and perceivable reality can be thought of together. Therefore, Gunton seeks to treat Christology precisely within the context of the modern conditions in which this Christological involvement of God in his creation has become scientifically unacceptable.16 Some theologians appear to think of the relation between traditional theology and modernity in terms of an abyss that cannot be crossed, while others think more in terms of continuity of an unbroken and generally developing process, "albeit one which is uneven, episodic and sometimes disrupted". 17 The subtitle of his book on Christology, Yesterday and Today, makes clear in which way Gunton himself looks for an answer: Ά Study of Continuities in Christology'.

14

"It was Christology which enabled theology to conceive of a relation of God to the world, of eternity to time, in which the two are both contingently and internally, rather than necessarily or externally related." (Gunton, Colin E.; 'Introduction'. In: Gunton, Colin E. [ed.]; The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997, [1-15] 4).

15

Gunton here is consciously using these 'slippery terms' in ascribing 'transcendence' to Jesus Christ: "In Jesus Christ we are confronted by the eternal Son of God, made immanent in fallen matter by the recreating energies of the Spirit [...] But even as immanent, the incarnate Word, as the one who confronts us, is as transcendent, as our atoning Other [...]" (Theology through the Theologians, 118f).

16

Gunton, Colin E.; Yesterday and Today. A Study of Continuities in Christology, S P C R London 2 1997. Yesterday and Today, v.

17

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33

The 'reality of God's involvement in time and history' is crystallized in Christology. This point is stressed throughout all of Gunton's publications. This also makes it clear that Gunton's Christology is not abstract speculation about the metaphysical possibilities or impossibilities of the two 'natures', divine and human, coming together in the one 'person' Jesus Christ. "The Christian tradition is concerned with the transmission of a gospel, not simply with solving intellectual puzzles about the person of Christ." 18 At this point Gunton more than once opposes certain Lutheran Christological positions, such as its communication of the attributes, where they appear to slip into immanence (as is the case in Hegel's philosophy). 19 In the 'Preface' to his book on Christology, Gunton explains that his whole project is "intended to sketch the ontological implications of the linking of time and eternity in Christology and to clarify the status of the language in which this is done". 20 First, the status of Christological language is investigated. Gunton develops his view of the so-called 'Christology from below' and 'Christology from above'. The problem of the former is that the outcome is nothing more than the possibilities already owned by culture itself: "[W]e perceive only what we want to perceive and thus [...] build a Christology after the pattern of our own alienated humanity." 21 Some 'Christologies from above', however, are in danger of getting their content from a priori philosophical or theological strands of thought, rather than from the particularities of the biblical story. This is why Gunton tries to distinguish between two kinds of 'Christology from above'. One starts with the eternal divine being of Christ in a Platonising kind of theology, while the other "moves from rather than towards explicitly theological judgements about Jesus". 22 This second type of 'Christology from above' does not begin with the findings of historical research alone; it also takes the form of faith seeking understanding. In this way, the Gospels of the Bible can be understood. They describe the earthly life of Jesus, but from the perspective that this human Jesus was also God. The New

18 19 20 21 22

Yesterday and Today, 88. Cf. the presentation of the consequences of his doctrine of atonement (Gunton, Colin E.; The Actuality of Atonement. A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1988,143-203). Cf. Yesterday and Today, 90; Theology through the Theologians, 77f. 86. Yesterday and Today, vi. Yesterday and Today, 31. Yesterday and Today, 44 - in clear reference to Karl Barth.

34

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

Testament testimony about Jesus Christ, however, portrays him "as one in whom the work and presence of God are given through the medium of a human being". 23 This is an attempt to overcome several dualistic solutions for the interaction between God and world that are ultimately unable to relate them. Gunton's discussion of several Christological concepts makes clear that the ontological implications of Christology are of enormous importance for the whole of his theology. "At stake are not simply matters of irrelevant cosmology, but the ability of theology to bring to expression the love of God as it operates not only within the world but for it and, where necessary, against it." 24 Gunton expresses this in terms of the common dualistic opposition of time and eternity: "What happens with Jesus of Nazareth is first of all to be understood as the good news of the movement into time of the eternal." 25 This formulation transcends the dilemma of a Christology 'from below' or 'from above' because it reckons with both time and eternity, and it thus transforms our concepts of time and space as conceived in the Kantian tradition of modernity. With Pannenberg, Gunton states that the event of Jesus Christ becoming man transforms our being ontologically, which bears consequences for our understanding of both present and future.26 Gunton's core conviction, concerning the importance of the ontological implications of Christology, is expressed in his attempt to conceive Christology Trinitarianly. For he sees at the heart of both the modern and the premodern Christological statements a loss of their Trinitarian context. "If God is triune, and oriented from all eternity to what happened in Jesus of Nazareth, we shall not be tempted to conceive him or the world in terms that exclude the interrelationship of eternity and time." 27 A Christology that is embedded in the doctrine of the Trinity cannot make time and eternity competitors, each striving to subdue the other but must be conceived as giving due space to each other. The implications of this Trinitarian framework are discussed below.

23 24 25 26 27

Yesterday Yesterday Yesterday Yesterday Yesterday

and and and and and

Today, Today, Today, Today, Today,

86. 101. 128. 130. 136.

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This conviction has consequences for Gunton's view of the status of the language with which one expresses the reality of God's entering this world. According to most modern convictions about language, there is a radical discontinuity between language and reality. But for Gunton, there is, rather, a kind of continuity between them. 28 This has implications for Chistology: "The language of rational Christology is, then, that which attempts to give a true though indirect account of what is the case if human beings are indeed brought to God through Jesus Christ." 29 This kind of knowledge aims not at 'disembodied objectivity' but at 'personal engagement with the material at hand'. 30 This Polanyian theory of knowledge leaves Gunton the space to be helped by the Bible and the Christian tradition and Church to find an adequate description of the way the relation between God and our world in Jesus Christ could be expressed. To summarise, we have seen that the Christological debate draws the theological attention to matters of worldview (ontology) and epistemology (language), which belong inseparably together in Gunton's position. The way in which theology has to conceive of the relation between God and this world, as paradigmatically established in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, is important for the connection between Christian doctrine and Christian ethics.31 It also follows that sole concentration on the cross of Jesus reduces his impact to salvation and cannot come to terms with the way in which Jesus Christ is mediator of creation. If He is the latter as well, Gunton argues, then there is a theological reason to consider the economic Trinitarian involvement in the whole of Jesus' 'career' (the whole of incarnation, saving death, resurrection and ascension) as a "Trinitarian framework according to which the creating and redeeming work of God the Father is mediated by the Son and the Holy Spirit". 32

28 29 30 31 32

Yesterday and Today, 148. Yesterday and Today, 149. Yesterday and Today, 165. Yesterday and Today, 218. Yesterday and Today, 225. Gunton has elaborated this 'career' of Jesus Christ in eight sermons (Gunton, Colin E.; Theobgy through Preaching. Sermons for Brentwood, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2001,61-107).

36

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

3.2.3 Trinitarian Doctrine of God Gunton's speaking in terms of a 'Trinitarian framework' is far more than a pro forma tribute to Barthian influence or a relic of traditional theology. The doctrine of the Trinity is the centre of Gunton's theology. It is this doctrine that renders possible a correct treatment of both God as God and world as world. It not only leaves room for stressing the ontological difference of both God and world, but is also the way in which both divine and human essence are somehow warranted; the Trinity is 'the space to be human'. 3 3 The doctrine of the Trinity is the way to avoid common misconceptions of the relation between God and human being that cross the spectrum from pantheism to personalism. In pantheism of an Hegelian kind, the whole of reality swallows up the concrete and the particular. In personalism, the relation between God and man - and consequently the relation amongst human beings and the relation between humans and the rest of creation - can only have actual significance that may not be extended in time and space. 34 These somewhat 'bold' statements require explanation. What kind of Trinity is meant? How do the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity relate? How does a doctrine of the Trinity provide humans 'the space to be human'? In this paragraph, only Gunton's so-called immanent Trinity will be described, its relation to Gunton's treatment of creation, anthropology and ethics will be described later. To focus on the immanent Trinity in this paragraph accords with the critical remarks Gunton made before the forum of Trinitarian theology that is currently experiencing a revival. As Gunton ironically remarks: "Suddenly we are all Trinitarians, or so it would seem." 35 Gunton clearly wants to distinguish between different kinds of contemporary Trinitarian theology. 36

33 34 35

36

Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 107f; The One, the Three and the Many, 181: "a framework within which human life must take shape." Cf. Gunton, Colin E.; Enlightenment and Alienation. An Essay Towards a Trinitarian Theology, Marshall Morgan & Scott: Basingstoke 1985, 88f. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, xv. Cf.: "In recent decades, as scarcely requires observing, Trinitarian theology has become almost dangerously fashionable, dangerously because too many problems are sometimes too easily claimed to be solved by it" (Becoming and Being, 227). Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, xvii-xxi.

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According to him, there are two wrong paths. There are theologians who advocate the limitation of inquiry to the historical or economic Trinity. The practical consequences of the Trinity for human life are stressed, and the need of an immanent Trinity is minimised: God is God for us, and there seems to be no need for God to be for himself. The chief problem concerning the doctrine of God is whether such a God can still be free towards his creation or not.37 The question to be asked therefore is whether such theologians escape the peril of 'pantheism' in which God and the world are not clearly distinguished. The second set of perils derives from the opposite tendency. In these theologies, there is room for the immanent Trinity; but it is only used as a kind of explanation for this-worldly phenomena. The ontological Trinity provides a model for personal relations in human social order, and is therefore in danger of becoming an immanent principle of reality. Both tendencies result in a kind of pantheism which denies the proper difference between the Creator and his creation. Wanting to avoid these two kinds of theology and their corresponding perils, Gunton has to look for a kind of intermediate step between the immanent Trinity on the one hand and created reality on the other. In an essay on the character of the Church as an 'echo' of the Trinity, Gunton defends the need for such an intermediate step. Gunton's theology seeks to be a 'theoretical activity', exploring 'concepts', with the aid of which, the things we say about the Church - and creation as a whole - may be understood. 38 In relation to the phenomenon of the Church, Gunton states that "The church is called to be the kind of reality at a finite level that God is in eternity." 39 The intermediate step Gunton is looking for concerns the way in which this theoretical concept of the relation between the Creator and creation has to be conceived. According to Gunton, only an adequate concept of Trinitarian creation 40 can secure the proper distinction between God and his creation (thus avoiding the first set of perils), and prevent the Trinity from becoming only an explanatory tool for inner-worldly phenomena (the second set of perils). 37 38 39 40

The traditional formula of creatio ex nihilo in this respect warrants God's freedom towards his creation. See below, section 3.4. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 78. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 80. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 81.

38

G u n t o n ' s Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

We now continue with Gunton's use of the Trinity, in which he states that only if God in himself is triune is He able to provide (human) creation with the freedom necessary for being other than God.41 We turn first to Gunton's view of the immanent Trinity. In what way is God God? When Christians worship this God in their services as the Trinitarian God, theology has to find possibilities for developing this kind of speech about God. Theology has to rethink what is practiced in the church community in which God is worshipped as the triune God. 42 Because we are established in our being in the Trinity, we are enabled to think about the triune being of God. Gunton stresses that this effort does not take place in a timeless abstraction, but in close continuity with the tradition of the Church, and with the universal implications of our relationship with this triune God.43 So even the immanent Trinity cannot be described without reference to the economic one. Nevertheless, it is important to state that this immanent Trinity is not reduced to the economic one: The freedom of God is at stake. Here, we must turn to Coleridge. Gunton is greatly indebted to the nineteenth-century philosopher, poet, and theologian, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), as already observed in chapter 2. According to Gunton, Coleridge's biography shows us that his use of the doctrine of the Trinity is an alternative to his earlier attempts to establish human freedom intellectually. In both deism and spinozistic pantheism, the universe finally ended up in an impersonal and atheistic reality. Coleridge discovered that only the distinctively Christian deity, conceived Trinitarianly, generated a view of things in which objective reality was safeguarded, for in this Trinitarian dogma both reality and God are separated and yet related. Reality is not grounded in either our own efforts or in a kind of

41

42

43

Cf.: "The c o m m o n weakness of all merely economic doctrines, and that includes those that tend to reduce the Trinity to the economic Trinity, is that they lose the dynamic of w h a t is the essence of economy as theologically construed: a structured though open embracing of time by eternity. A theology restricted to the economy loses that which it wishes to affirm, the positive b u t not exclusive or idolatrous valuation of the world of time and space" (The One, the Three and the Many, 161). "The theology of the Trinity, even in its sometimes convoluted abstractions, is the intellectual articulation of this simple insight. In worship, Christians are brought into relationship with the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 19f). Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 6-8.

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undifferentiated and heteronomous unity outside us. " H e saw that the freedom and relatedness of human beings required a basis in the freedom and relatedness of the triune God." 4 4 Gunton uses Coleridge's ideas about the Trinity, but with strict limits. Even though Gunton realises that this kind of 'analogy 7 between God's being related in himself and human relationality is speculative, he states that his own use of the doctrine of the Trinity is 'heuristic'. The Christian tradition provides us with the intellectual tools to think human relatedness as ontologically prior to both the Ί am' in the Cartesian-Kantian sense of the word, and the 'It is' of any Hegelian idealism which collapses into pantheism. Thus, Gunton wants to restrict this use of the doctrine of the Trinity to its heuristic function. 45 This heuristic device Gunton uses as a tool to investigate the possibility for thought in which God and man, and God and world are both distinct and yet related. We need a kind of analogy that is shared by both this world and God. If we, with Coleridge, suppose that the triune God is the source of all being, "we must suppose that all being will in some way reflect the being of the one who made it and holds it in being". 4 6 Somehow, Gunton wants to combine his strictly heuristic use of the doctrine of the Trinity, with the presuppositional contention that God 'on his own' is a Trinitarian Being who created all of reality. For only if God is (immanently) triune can He provide solid ground for Gunton's heuristic attempts. Thus, the immanent Trinity is the presupposition for the heuristic use of the concept of the Trinity: "I want to ask whether concepts generated by theology, and particularly Trinitarian theology, bear any relation to those employed in conceiving the 44

Enlightenment and Alienation, 88. Elsewhere Gunton notices that " a concern for the conditions of a rich and free personal life on earth is at the heart of Coleridge's preoccupation with Trinitarian thought" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 97). "This w a s Samuel Taylor Coleridge's point: that a God who is not a bare unity but a unity within and by means of an interrelatedness of 'persons' can ground an understanding of a correspondingly free humanity. In this case, human life is conceived not as the play of impersonal and mechanistic forces, not as the impotent assertion of a false divinity, not as a collection of isolated atomic individuals, but as a community where the law of our being is worked out, however stumblingly and inadequately" (Enlightenment and Alienation, 107).

45

" W h a t he [sc. Coleridge] called ideas will act as heuristic devices, guides to possible lines of thought" (The One, the Three and the Many, 154). The One, the Three and the Many, 145.

46

40

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

world as it is presented to us in some of the discoveries of modern science. That is to say, I am going to ask some questions about conceptual similarities, and raise the question of whether the concepts developed in Trinitarian theology enable us not only to conceive the reality of God, but also have transcendental possibilities, and so enable us to come to terms with the fundamental shape of being."47 The crux of the matter is how Gunton uses the immanent Trinity for heuristic purposes. In order to make the Trinity 'useable' for the process of interpretation, Gunton describes the way Coleridge does this. Coleridge thought of the Trinity as the 'Idea Idearum', the Idea of Ideas. It is at once basic to the human mind, most fertile of relevance and of deep impenetrability. 48 Gunton expects that if the triune God is the source of all being, meaning, and truth, all being reflects this kind of being. This 'reflection' is only seen if we search for 'universal marks of being' that somehow stem from God's triune being. These universal marks of being are called transcendentals. The Idea Idearum gives rise to these transcendentals. Because this quest and search is an 'exercise of reason', in the next paragraph (3.3) the role played by reason will be examined. For, these transcendentals will be found "in the dynamic interaction of the mind and that about which it thinks". 49 Gunton's use of the Trinity expects that "[i]n the light of the theology of the Trinity everything looks different". 50 How these transcendentals ought to be distinguished and determined will be described in section 3.4, for they concern the structure of created reality and belong to a description of Gunton's doctrine of creation. The way in which Gunton uses Coleridge's concept of the Trinity as the Idea of Ideas, providing transcendental marks of being, is closely connected with the way in which John Zizioulas (1931) conceives the Trinitarian way of being. Zizioulas' concept is set out in his book Being as Communion51 and his essay on anthropology. 52 His concern, as utilised by Gunton, is to find an adequate position for human beings in 47 48 49 50 51 52

Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 140f. The One, the Three and the Many, 144. The One, the Three and the Many, 149. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 7.28. Zizioulas, John D.; Being as Communion. Studies in Personhood and Church, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press: Crestwood 1985. Zizioulas, John D.; 'On Being a Person. The Ontology of Personhood'. In: Schwöbel, Christoph; Gunton, Colin E. (edd.); Persons, Divine and Human. King's College Essays in Theological Anthropology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1991,33-46.

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the whole of created reality. In the traditional concepts of human being that arose in the Western theological context of Platonism and Aristotelism, human persons were thought of as beings who are particularised and concrete phenomena of underlying 'being'. As Zizioulas states, this conception overlooks some major achievements coming out of the context of the Trinitarian theology of the first centuries. In the Christological and Trinitarian debates, a revolutionary development took place: the common distinction between substantia and persona was overcome. The 'being' of the three persons of the Trinity cannot be treated apart from their being persons. It is the relation between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit that constitutes their being. Zizioulas here performs specifically orthodox theology in that the Father is treated as the eternal cause of the being and divinity of the other two persons. 53 Zizioulas calls this ontology an 'ontology of personhood' which consists in the logical priority of the personal over the Western logical priority given to 'being'. This ontology of personhood is not only restricted to the Trinity. Because God created human beings in his likeness and image, they are also constituted by their being related to others - to God in the first place. 54 In the elaboration of this concept of the Trinity as being-in-communion, Gunton uses the word 'sacrifice' to characterize the immanent Trinity. 55 Gunton criticises the Western theological tradition for not adopting these insights. Augustine receives particular blame for this neglect of 53 54

55

Cf. the disussion of this point: Promise of Trinitarian Theology, xxiii. "The logically irreducible concept of the person as one whose uniqueness and particularity derive from relations to others was developed by the Eastern Fathers in the heat of their concern for the loyalty of the Christian church to the biblical understanding of God. It has continued, like an underground stream, to water the Western tradition, and continues to be desperately needed in our fragmented and alienated society. A person, we must learn and relearn, can be defined only in terms of his or her relations with other persons, and not in terms of a prior universal or non-personal concept like species-being, evolution or, for that matter, subsistent relation (and the list could be much extended from current political debate)" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 96). "[SJacrifice [...] is the expression and outworking of the inner-Trinitarian relations of giving and receiving." And: "The life of the Trinity is nothing but what the persons give to and receive from each other: it is pure (concentrated) community or communion" (Gunton, Colin E.; 'The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices: From Metaphor to Transcendental?'. In: Feenstra, Ronald J.; Plantinga Jr., Cornelius [edd.]; Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement. Philosophical and Theological Essays, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 1989, [210-229] 221.223). Cf. also section 3.6.2.

42

Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

the traditional innovations and causing the whole of Western theology to become embedded in his platonic matrix. Gunton characterizes Augustine as the cause of the 'theological crisis of the West'. 56 According to Gunton, Augustine 'has scarcely if at all understood the central point' of the Cappadocians: despite the fact that even Augustine adopted the distinction between ousia and hypostasis and their Latin equivalents essentia/substantia and persona, this did not enable him to get the point, for "he admits that he does not really see why the term should be used. 'Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur'". 57 Gunton ascribes to Augustine an Aristotelian subject-predicate logic, a 'dualistic ontology which underlies the logic' and Neo-Platonic philosophy. 58 This ontology implies for Augustine that he does not distinguish between the identities of the particular persons that tend to disappear into the all-embracing oneness of God. 59 The outcome of this vision is "a view of an unknown substance supporting the three persons rather than being constituted by their relatedness". 60 Gunton identifies this 'supporting substance' as a kind of 'mind' and not as a kind of economic involvement in the process of salvation. Consequently, Gunton also provides this kind of 'being' of the triune God with an analogy to the human 'being' in the realm of mind, abstract intellectualism and Platonism. 61 This results in an 'account of the mental trinity' as memory, understanding and will.62 Gunton here also criticises the pneumatological assumptions of Augustine that will be discussed later in section 3.2.4. Gunton adopts the Cappadocian 'ontology of personhood', rediscovered by Zizioulas, stating that the triune Being-in-communion

56 57 58 59 60 61

62

'Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West'. In: Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 30-55. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 40. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 41-42. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 42. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 43. "The crucial analogy for Augustine is between the inner structure of the human mind and the inner being of God, because it is in the former that the latter is made known, this side of eternity at any rate, more really than in the 'outer' economy of grace" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 45 [italics omitted JHFS]). Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 47.

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is the source and fountainhead of all being.63 Reality and God do not share a kind of common 'being' which lies 'behind' the entities, but it is the relation that is shared by both relata. Gunton's "theology of relatedness" 64 is a heuristic device to explore possibilities of conceiving the whole of reality within the light of the Trinity. He is well aware of the perils involved in this process. Especially with the concept of 'relation', two dangers must be avoided. The first is the conception of 'relation' that ignores the fact that we have to have real relata that are related. In this case, the substantiality of the relata is slowly swallowed up into the only reality left: "a mere haze of homogeneously insubstantial relationality" as occurs in Hegel's idealism.65 This warning coincides with Gunton's stress on the immanent Trinity. The other danger is the other side of the same coin, in that the relata are treated almost independently of the relation. This occurs in both Descartes' theory and Scotus' concept of haecceitas. Their theories end ultimately in a non-relational treatment of the particular. What is needed therefore, according to Gunton, is a framework in which both particularity or substantiality and relationality can be conceived. Zizioulas' conception that the created reality is the finite echo of the infinite Trinitarian being as being in communion provides such a framework.

3.2.4 Pneumatology and the Doctrine of God Within the concept of the Trinity as being-in-communion, the Holy Spirit plays an important twofold role. First, it is the Spirit who relates the Father and the Son, who in this way enables the history of Jesus Christ on earth to be a distinct one. The Holy Spirit at once distinguishes and relates.66 It is the Spirit's function both to 'cross the boundaries' and to 'preserve particularity'.67 It is the Spirit who 63 64 65 66 67

Gunton describes this use of the Trinity in Promise of Trinitarian Theology as 'crucial steps' (xii), 'intellectual revolution' (9) and 'conceptual and ontological revolution' (54). Gunton uses this as a heading in The One, the Three and the Many: '"Through whom and in whom...' Towards a theology of relatedness" (155-179). The One, the Three and the Many, 195. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 48-55; The One, the Three and the Many, 180-209. The One, the Three and the Many, 184.

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Gun ton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

particularises Jesus of Nazareth to be Son of God in obedient and free relation towards the Father: "In shaping from the clay of earth a body for the Son, the Spirit enables this part of earth to be fully itself [...]·" 6 8 The 'career' of Jesus Christ shows us the way in which the Spirit is the warrant of both the relation of the Father and the Son, and the difference between them: relation in otherness. The Spirit enables Christ to be human and at the same time to be intrinsically linked with the Father in the several aspects of his life and work on earth, as for instance the virgin birth, his baptism, the temptations, the death on the cross, resurrection and ascension all tell us. 69 Augustine laid stress on the relating function of the Holy Spirit, but he forgot to stress the particularizing feature as well. Therefore, Gunton critically remarks that at this point the lack of economic treatment of the Trinity caused a lack of eschatological dimensions in the work of the Spirit. "In the economy it is the action of the Spirit not simply to relate the individual to God, but to realise in time the conditions of the age to come," 7 0 the realisation of which comes particularly through the creation of community. Here we see the second feature of the work of the Holy Spirit which is his eschatological orientation. This is closely connected to the way in which Jesus Christ and creation are linked together. In his book Christ and Creation, one chapter is devoted to outlining Christ as 'creature'. In that context, the connection between the created reality in which Jesus of Nazareth participates and the triune God is described in terms of its 'vertical relatedness'. Gunton describes what it means to be in a network of relationships that includes relatedness to God. There are three dimensions that correspond to the three tenses, past, present and future. Jesus Christ represents past, present, and future of the created reality. But it is the Holy Spirit through whom the relation with God and Jesus Christ, as creation's representative, both eschatologically (in time), and vertically (in space), can be conceived. 7 1 Gunton ties the work of the Spirit and the eschatological perfecting cause of creation tightly together. The Spirit is the mode of the 68 69 70 71

Gunton, Colin E.; Christ and Creation [The Didsbury-lectures 1990], Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1992, 52. As Gunton states in Christ and Creation (50-67) where he offers this Trinitarian and especially: pneumatological description of Jesus' career. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 50. Cf. Christ and Creation, 45f.

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anticipation of the eschatological future. He provides the actualisation or, as Gunton puts it, the 'particularisation' of God's action towards his creation. "By his Spirit God comes into relationship with the world, creating and renewing, as in Ezekiel's vision of the valley of the bones, in Luke's story of the new act of creation whereby the child is formed in the womb of Mary, and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. The result of this movement is that by his Spirit God enables the creation to be open to him." 72 This twofold function of the Holy Spirit characterizes his work within the immanent Trinity as well as his work on earth within the created reality. Here a third characterization of the work of the Holy Spirit must be mentioned. The relation between God and the created reality is established by the Spirit, who at the same time holds these two apart. This relation is marked by an explicit non-coercive feature. The Spirit enables reality (both human and non-human) to be 'freely itself'. According to Gunton, the Western (Augustinian) tradition is characterized by an increasingly hierarchical mind. In ecclesiology, this feature is easily traced back to Augustine, who believed that the clergy - and not first of all the community or the congregation of believers formed the real Church. 73 That is to say that the community of believers is first of all established by the coercive power of a hierarchically conceived God rather than by the free bringing into relationships of a Trinitarian God. As it is the Spirit who relates and distinguishes, it is the Spirit who freely brings together and relates God and his people. As the Spirit enables Jesus Christ to obey in free response to the Father, so He also brings the congregation together to freely respond to the triune God. Consequently, Gunton is in search of "an ecclesiology which echoes God's eternal being in relation" 74 and which therefore can be called 'free': Both in Christology and ecclesiology, as well in the doctrine of creation, "[t]he Spirit sets the creation free to be itself, and so directs it as God's other to yet find its perfection in the fulfilment of its relation to God. God's power, and that is a concept frequently used

72 73 74

The One, the Three and the Many, 182f. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 56-82. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 76.

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Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

of the action of the Spirit, consists in enabling, in directing the creation to perfectedness in freedom." 75 To summarise, we can state that the Spirit is the warrant of both the relatedness and the distinctiveness of the Trinity within itself and of a community that is freely related to God and towards each other (1). The second characteristic of the Spirit is his eschatological function. The Spirit directs the created life towards God and to his purposes for the whole of created reality (2). The Spirit therefore enables freedom to exist, so that the monistic or hierarchical drive in Trinitarian as well as ecclesiological thinking can be avoided (3).

3.3 The Programme of Enlightenment and its Failures In many of his publications, Gunton deals with the positive and negative consequences of that era in human history called the 'Enlightenment'. Though there is no scholarly consensus as to when this era exactly began or ended, nor a communis opinio on its exact characteristics, Gunton tries to evaluate its main impact on Western thinking and culture. According to Gunton, the Enlightenment is closely connected with several misconceptions within theology as well as with several misconceptions about theology and the implications of a genuinely biblical doctrine.76 Gunton uses the word 'alienation' 77 or 'disengagement' 78 to characterize the Englightenment, which is a critical evaluation as well as being descriptive. Among the effects of this chiefly eighteenthcentury intellectual movement is the attempt to rule out the role of faith or tradition in the process of perception and understanding of human being and human environment, resulting in a tearing apart of knowledge and belief. 79 Secondly, the thinking subject of the 75 76

Christ and Creation, 90f. For an account of Gunton's view of the relation between the activity of 'theology' and the content of Christian 'doctrine' see: Gunton, Colin E.; 'Historical and Systematic Theology'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1997,3-20.

77 78

Cf. the title: Enlightenment and Alienation. Cf. The One, the Three and the Many, 13-16 ('Modernity as Disengagement'), drawing on insights from Charles Taylor.

79

Enlightenment

and Alienation, 5.

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Enlightenment gradually alienated himself from his surroundings in order to adopt a stance over against reality, which in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant resulted in an 'inquisitional' stance of the investigating human subject over against nature: the "judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated". 80 The Enlightenment motto was sapere aude - "Have the courage to use your own intelligence." 81 Much modern thought, however, including much Christian thought in particular, did not use its own intelligence but followed others, especially Kant. Therefore, Gunton explores the way in which humanity has to use its intelligence, and why Christians may confidently use it. Therefore, Gunton wants to review common conceptions of epistemology 82 and the status of reason. These critical remarks about the Enlightenment project 83 do not rule out the benefits obtained from Modernity, such as, for instance, modern liberal systems of government 84 , increased living standards, better prospects in healthcare etc. Hence, Gunton speaks more than once about the 'dialectic' of Modernity. 85 Another example of this dialectic is that the Enlightenment correctly criticised the monistic tendency of theology and the Church with its authoritarian aspect, and thereby 80

Cf. Immanuel Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft: "Die Vernunft muss mit ihren Prinzipien, nach denen allein übereinkommende Erscheinungen für Gesetze gelten können, in einer Hand, und mit dem Experiment, das sich nach jenen ausgedachte, in der anderen, an die Natur gehen, zwar u m von ihr belehrt zu werden, aber nicht in der Qualität eines Schülers, der sich alles vorsagen lässt, w a s der Lehrer will, sondern eines bestallten Richters, der die Zeugen nötigt, auf die Fragen zu antworten, die er ihnen vorlegt." (Kant, Immanuel; Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Wilhelm Weischedel] [Bd. Π], WBG: Darmstadt 5 1983, 23 [B xiii]). Quotation in Enlightenment and Alienation, 6.

81

Enlightenment and Alienation, 153. Cf. "Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!" (Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? In: Kant, Immanuel; Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Wilhelm Weischedel] [Bd. VI], WBG: Darmstadt 5 1983, [53-61] 53 [A 481]).

82

The "epistemological dimension of the question of modernity" underlies his The One, the Three and the Many (106) and is already present in Enlightenment and Alienation.

83

Gunton speaks of "the programme of the Enlightenment" and owes the term 'Enlightenment project' to Alasdair Maclntyre (The One, the Three and the Many, 75.106.147) being a specific, historically determined quest for the foundations of truth.

84 85

The One, the Three and the Many, 62. Referring to the Frankfurt-School (Horkheimer, Adorno) (The One, the Three and the Many, 130; Enlightenment and Alienation, 80-83 e.g.).

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Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

attained greater freedom. 86 The philosophical quest for freedom as such is one of the main topics in which Gunton is interested. Freedom as "a function of relations between persons and between persons and their world" 87 is closely connected with other themes like 'relation', the freedom of God towards the created reality, authority, ethics, etc.88 The basic condition for freedom is not only 'relation' but also the way in which the 'otherness' of the relata is warranted. 89 This 'otherness' is connected to epistemology, because in the Enlightenment the 'otherness' of the human and non-human surroundings of the perceiving and interpretating subject - and its consequences for its treatment - is at stake. What functions do human reason (3.3.2) and language (3.3.2) have in the gathering of knowledge? How are these insights profitable for Gunton's conception of human freedom which exhibits his critique of the Enlightenment (3.3.3)?

3.3.1 Reason A formative aspect of the Enlightenment was the rediscovery of reason. Gunton traces the current 'alienation' in the relation of reality to the possibility for humans to know that reality, back to its roots in the Enlightenment where, starting with Descartes, human facilities of perception were explored. The passivity of the senses gave rise to a huge mistrust of the knowledge perceived by the senses, as this could not reach the status of certainty. This was why Descartes and others thought of a distinction between the passive senses that register perceptions and the real perceiving instrument of reason. Gunton 86

87 88

89

It may be noted here that Gunton was a lifelong congregationalist, thus bound to the anti-hierarchic tendencies of Enlightenment. Cf. Schwöbel's description of Gunton's congregationalist background (Schwöbel, Christoph; 'The Preacher's Art: Preaching Theologically'. In: Gunton, Theology through Preaching, [1-20] 16-19). Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 144. "Nowhere is there likely to be a better test of overall consistency than in a theologian's - or, for that matter, in any thinker's - grasp of the relation between authority and freedom. In the modern world they are widely thought to be in some form of opposition: freedom is to be achieved in freedom from authority, at least so far as that is conceived, after the manner of Kant's celebration of Enlightenment, in terms of traditional forms of authority" (Theology through the Theologians, 222). Cf. above, 3.2.4 where the concept of 'relation' is bound up with the work of the Spirit in both distinguishing and relating the relata.

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describes the philosophical developments in this area from Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. 90 According to Gunton, Berkeley and Coleridge were the 'dissenting voices' in this choir about perception and the role of reason. The common distrust of the perceptions was caused by what Coleridge called the 'despotism of the eye'. 91 In sight, we are essentially at a distance from the objects we perceive, as Gunton notes. 92 This causes a kind of alienation of the perceiving subject from the perceived reality. By introducing the twentieth-century philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, Gunton wants to give an alternative construal of perception. "Matter is not foreign to us [...] because we can indwell it. [...] What is indwelt is not completely outside; it is in real continuity with us." 9 3 This construal offers us interesting possibilities for an understanding of perception. We neither stand over against reality like gods in making our perception, as the rationalism of the Enlightenment caused us to think, nor are we completely without force or reasonability, as the existentialist reaction against the Enlightenment caused us to believe. We are human beings within the world, and yet able to transcend it. Just as Adam was created from the dust, in a direct series with the earth and the other animals, being part of that which is created; on the other hand, man was created in the 'image and likeness of God' and called to rule the earth. 94 Gunton here uses Coleridge's ideas about how the triune God created the human environment: "[I]t is clear that at the very least the mediation of creation through Jesus Christ points us to the reasonableness of what Coleridge is saying. A world that owes its origin to a God who makes it with direct reference to one who was to become incarnate - part of that world - is a world that is a proper place for human beings to use their senses, minds and imagination, and to expect that they will not be wholly deceived in doing so."95 Gunton uses the creation-mediatorship of Jesus Christ in his perception theory. But he also uses eschatological-pneumatological elements to 90 91 92 93 94 95

Enlightenment and Alienation, 11-25. "He believed that perception theory had gone astray through what he called a 'despotism of the eye"' (Enlightenment and Alienation, 34). Enlightenment and Alienation, 36. Enlightenment and Alienation, 41 Enlightenment and Alienation, 47f. Enlightenment and Alienation, 49. Cf.: "[A]t the very least, recent discussions encourage us to conceive a positive relation between human rationality and the structure of the universe" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 111).

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explain his aim. Our perceptions are, by the work of the Holy Spirit, gifts of a knowledge that is yet incomplete but expects that perfect knowledge we will eventually possess. 96 With Polanyi, Gunton states: "Those who live in time are those who live under the promise that what they are doing is not pointless or absurd, but will be seen in its full significance only from its end. Such successes as they do achieve are anticipations of the completeness at which they aim. As anticipations, they do merit the claim of knowledge." 97 We are able to grasp something of reality because something really is given to us. And this is a Trinitarian gift. The Father has created us within the whole of reality and yet we are able to transcend this world. To perceive is part of our calling as created in the image and likeness of God, to rule the world in due stewardship. Because the world is created through the Son who became incarnate, we can understand that the world is other than God and yet not foreign to him. Thirdly, the Spirit gives us this perception so that we are not bound to treat this world either as a blind mechanism or as a personalised god next to, or instead of, the triune God. Our indwelling this world as a gift of the triune God has immediate moral and ethical consequences, in that we are warned not to exploit this world arbitrarily, but to respond appropriately to the nature of the giver 98 Coleridge's use of reason is initiated by his Trinitarian view of reality. Because reality is the result of the act of creating and sustaining by the triune God, man is able to discover its inner rationality. This discovery, however, is not to be ascribed to human agency. Knowledge is rather the gift of God, and more specifically, the gift of the Spirit. In his 1993 Warfield Lectures, Gunton explicitly states that revelation is fundamental for every kind of knowledge. Reason cannot invent knowledge, nor impose structures on reality. Reason only discovers what is already there, being the result of the triune act of creating, as we have seen. Therefore, reason must be guided - in fact, is always guided - by revelation. 99 Gunton calls this a 'general theology of revelation'. 100 96

97 98 99

Cf.: "[OJur language about Christ must be the gift of God the Spirit and he gives us the capacity both to indwell the Christ and to speak authentically of him" (Yesterday and Today, 149). Enlightenment and Alienation, 51. Cf. Enlightenment and Alienation, 53f. The consequences of this view for ethics will be discussed in detail in section 3.6. Cf. Christian Faith, 51-54.

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Crucial for the argument is Gunton's explication of the 'tacit operation of a number of theological doctrines' among which the doctrine of creation is the most influential: "[T]here can be revelation because the world is made so that it may be known."101 But also anthropology and pneumatology are at stake. Nature, as a matter of fact, does not reveal its secrets apart from structures of human rationality, so that our rationality corresponds with the world 'outside'. 'Revelation' is the way in which Gunton appoints the mediation of knowledge (the gift of knowledge) by the Spirit. 102 In the time of the Enlightenment, reason displaced the Spirit's function in trying to collect knowledge of its own. As Gunton uses this pneumatological element in a 'general' theory of knowledge, what is the relation of the Spirit and revelation on the one hand, and knowledge of reality on the other? It is, what Gunton calls, the result of a theology of creation. The doctrine of creation asserts that the knowledge of created human beings corresponds in some way with the reality outside them. This presupposition, however, is not generally accepted. It therefore requires 'revelation' to be knowable. According to Gunton, the Spirit mediates this knowledge to us by means of Scripture and tradition. Even these 'means' do not completely differ from human beings, but are in continuity with them. As such, "our knowledge of general revelation is the fruit of the gospel, Christologically centred as that is. Without that, we do not see the world for what it truly is." 103 The doctrine of creation, Gunton acknowledges, is a matter of faith.104 The point is that this belief is not over against this reality, but in accordance with it. The doctrine of creation provides the basis for Gunton's opinions about reason. Gunton also states that this 'general theology of revelation' is needed, because "human sin and evil require that if he is to be known God should break through the barrier that man has erected against his love". 105

100 Gunton, Colin E.; A Brief Theology of Revelation [The 1993 Warfield Lectures], T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995, 33. 101 Brief Theology of Revelation, 33. 102 Brief Theology of Revelation, 34-36 and 68. "[T]he creator Spirit brings it about that human rationality is able, within the limits set to it, to encompass the truth of the creation" (34f). 103 Brief Theology of Revelation, 55. 104 Brief Theology of Revelation, 41. 105 Christian Faith, 52.

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In summary, we can state that over against the Enlightenment Gunton insists on reason's dependence on revelation, pneumatologically conceived. But having said that, reason can explore the inner structure of reality. This correspondence of reason and reality is based on the revealed gospel of Jesus Christ, being at once the mediator of creation and the incarnate Son: "To know that the world is created, and that God has visited and continues to visit it for its renewal and redemption is a form of knowledge available to those who will perceive what is there to be perceived." 106 We glimpse again here, what is at stake within Gunton's doctrine of creation.

3.3.2 Language and Christian Tradition Closely connected to Gunton's view of reason are his opinions about the character of human language. As human rationality receives its knowledge about the world and God in a mediated way, language is an important medium. The question that demands particular attention is how we can speak about the triune God in ordinary human language. 107 To investigate how theologians can use language, and especially metaphorical language, Gunton explores different concepts of 'atonement'. For in the doctrine of atonement, several metaphors traditionally occur that are ruled out in the Enlightenment-era: victory, judgement, and sacrifice. Gunton describes how traditional concepts of the atonement have been affected by rationalist criticism. Atonement in the vision of Immanuel Kant was the achievement of reason; in the vision of Schleiermacher, it was the achievement of experience; and in Hegel's vision atonement can be achieved by way of conceptualising history in terms of a Trinitarian history. 108 In all three examples of modern criticism on the traditional metaphors of the atonement, the character of the biblical metaphors is changed. Gunton even speaks of a 'transmogrification of Christianity to its opposite'. 109 Against this rationalistic 106 Gunton, Colin E.; Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2000,59. 107 Both in The Actuality of Atonement and in Yesterday and Today, Gunton deals with the metaphorical character of human language. 108 Actuality of Atonement, 3-23. 109 Actuality of Atonement, 7.

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reduction of language, Gunton agrees with Kierkegaard that authentic Christianity is intrinsically offensive.110 The concrete and particular narrative of Jesus Christ, his earthly 'career', is depicted in the gospel in metaphorical language. Therefore, Christian doctrine cannot but acknowledge such metaphorical language and so deal with its own legacy from the past in a more positive way than did the Enlightenment. Gunton states that metaphors "are not odd, unusual, improper or merely decorative. They are so pervasive a part of our experience that they are a, if not the, clue to what language is and does". 111 The common distinction between 'rational language' and 'metaphor' is hereby bridged, which is possible because words function as part of human interaction with nature. As reason does not set man over against reality but places man within his surroundings, language is also a way of interacting with reality. Gunton speaks about 'harmony' between language and world that 'enables the world to come to speech' so that metaphors can even have 'a revelatory function',112 in that using a metaphor can throw light upon a part of reality and somehow disclose it. After the description of the main metaphors in atonement (victory, judgement, and sacrifice), Gunton concludes that theology "by grace [is] enabled to speak of the rationality of the divine action with the help of language which is also used of such disparate albeit important human activities." 113 This view not only applies to the metaphors used within the doctrine of atonement, but concerns the whole narrative of the ways of God with this world, for they take their meaning from relationships: between people, between God and man, and within the Trinity. Gunton shows this by interpreting the atonement-metaphors trinitarianly.

110 Actuality of Atonement, 24. 111 Actuality of Atonement, 32. In Christology the same question is treated (Yesterday and Today, 6-8): is the traditional 'mythological' language apt for describing the coming of Jesus Christ on earth, or should Greek metaphysical language be used? 112 "Metaphor is a supreme instance of the harmony that can be attained between language and the world. Therefore: the world is the kind of thing that can be interpreted in language. It is, or has - metaphorically! - a kind of language." And: "Because the world is, so to speak, our shape and we are world-shaped, there is a readiness of the world for our language, a community of world and person which enables the world to come to speech" (Actuality of Atonement, 37-38.51). 113 Actuality of Atonement, 144.

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This use of language and metaphor is a gift of the Spirit to which an eschatological dimension is also tied. That implies that our knowledge is not yet perfect, and our language is not perfectly suited for describing reality. Rather, there is a constant 'struggle' within language to become ever more adequate to that which it seeks to describe. 114 Therefore, theology can use many different models to describe for instance the Christological reality. The word 'model' "enables us to realize that there is no absolute dividing line between concept and metaphor, reason and imagination" as Gunton states.115 He concludes by saying that models are the words and concepts "by which the tradition, and we, in so far as we can indwell the tradition in order to speak in our own words, attempt to articulate the reality of Jesus Christ." 116 Eventually, Gunton's concept of metaphor is designed to be able to express the conviction that (theological) language is suited to speak about God. Because God is involved in human history in the particular 'career' of Jesus of Nazareth, man is able to speak about this involvement. All this is favoured by Gunton's conception of language as being created by God along with the whole of reality.117 Humankind is responsible to express these insights, and theology, in particular, is called to testify to this state of affairs. It is the task of theology to point out that many thoughts are not as impossible as is sometimes believed, in a time in which so many possibilities of thought, necessary for a healthy theology, are hidden in a deep fog.118 "[Systematic theology is the articulation of the truth claims of Christianity, with an eye to their internal consistency, on the one hand; and, on the other, to their coherence with Scripture, the Christian tradition and other truth -

114 115 116 117

Cf. Yesterday and Today, 150. Yesterday and Today, 151. Yesterday and Today, 159. Cf.: "Interesting here is that the confidence in language displayed by some forms of philosophy appears almost to deny the fact that language is created" (Gunton, Colin E . ; 'Indispensable Opponent. The Relations of Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Religion'. In: NZSTh 38 [1996], [298-306] 303).

118 Enlightenment

and Alienation, 3.

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philosophical, scientific, moral, and artistic." 119 In concordance with Coleridge, Gunton explicitly insists on a Trinitarian theology, as the only way to give humanity and the whole of the created world its due place. In this respect, Coleridge is called upon as an 'example' for doing theology properly. 120 Doing theology is about establishing possibilities of thought that give space for an adequate treatment of human practice and ethics as well.121 Gunton aims at a complete 'ontology': a framework in which God and man, Creator and creation have their due place, without the former being reduced to the latter or the other way around. In formulating the task and purpose of doing theology, which has among other dimensions - the dimension of formulating language in which one is able to express the truth about God and the world 122 , Gunton has to rethink the relationship between philosophy and theology. As religion - in the broad sense of the word - is "that human enterprise which can be understood [...] as a rational engagement or interaction with reality, the world - perhaps, riskily, with 'the whole'" 123 , and philosophy is the theoretical account of such an engagement and interaction, there are great similarities in the tasks of both philosophy and theology. In fact, philosophy traditionally has the character of 'ontological reason' by which Gunton means "reason conceived as 1) in some sense continuous with the rationality or logos 119 Theology through the Theologians, 5; cf. 8: "[Systematic theology is any activity in which an attempt is made to articulate the Christian gospel or aspects of it with due respect to such dimensions as its coherence, universality and truth." 120 "He is therefore a model for an English systematic theology, not necessarily for all the content of his thought - though I believe that his mature thought in particular has much to offer in terms of content - but because of the way in which he approaches the subject. [...] He is a model for Englisch systematic theology because, like Irenaeus, Coleridge saw things whole, and yet in their parts as well" (Theology through the Theologians, 14f). 121 "[T]heology is a practical, not a merely theoretical, discipline: it aims at wisdom in the broad sense of light for the human path" {The One, the Three and the Many, 7; cf. also Brief Theology of Revelation, 9). 122 Gunton even defines the task of the theologian in these terms, keeping in mind, however, the problematic features of such a task: "[T]he responsibility of the theologian - whose concern is with the universal dimensions of meaning suggested by the concept of God - is to seek for ways to rehabilitate or reinvigorate the concept of truth, without, however, ignoring the genuine weaknesses of that against which much modern thought has reacted" (The One, the Three and the Many, 129). 123 'Indispensable Opponent', 300.

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of the whole; 2) and by its activities penetrating to, or in some way offering a description of, the fundamental structures or character of being as a whole". 124 This definition of philosophy, being occupied with 'ontological reason', means that philosophy and theology are necessary opponents, as can be seen in the case of the doctrine of creation which is developed in the conflict between philosophy and theology. 125 They have to do with the same questions, but their answers are different. This is why Coleridge insisted that "in all thought there is a choice of divinity to be made", 126 and why Calvin stressed that "[s]ome divinity is indispensable". 127 That is to say that in all thought a specific kind of divinity is fundamental for the way in which the relation of man towards his surrounding reality is conceived. A specific aspect of Gunton's view of language is that the language of the traditional Christian texts (Bible, confession etc.) are the vehicle of the Spirit's guiding our life. Tradition is the mediation of our knowledge about God and the world, 128 and a positive form of relatedness of the present to past and future, the 'bearer of sedimented wisdom'. 129 The language of the Christian tradition is embedded in the life and practice of the community of worship, which is closely tied to the triune God: "[T]o be a human being is to be related to the Father through the Son and in the Spirit, and it is the character of Christian experience to realise that relationship". 130 As this Trinitarian conception of what it means to be 'human' is a universal statement, Gunton also

124 'Indispensable Opponent', 302. 125 The doctrine of creation denied any continuity between the human and the divine apart from the incarnation, a denial which, historically, came about to be the result of the dialogue between theology and philosophy. "It is in that twofold respect that the doctrine of creation out of nothing provides a paradigm case of the way in which systematic theological doctrines emerge only as the result of a conflict over a common realm of being and thought, and that therefore philosophy is theology's indispensable opponent" ('Indispensable Opponent', 304). 126 Theology through the Theologians, 13. 127 Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, (158-177) 158. Gunton himself is searching for such a deity: "This book is a quest for [...] a deity, for a conception of God who is a principle not of blank unity but of variety, richness and complexity" (The One, the Three and the Many, 24). 128 Cf. above, section 3.3.1. 129 Brief Theology of Revelation, 89. 130 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 5f.

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states: "The God met and made known in Christ and the Spirit is the God of all, whether or not they acknowledge it. The theological task is therefore the conceptual exploration of the rationality of the God so experienced and made known." 131 Elsewhere, Gunton less optimistically speaks about the prerequisite position of 'being in Christ' for the revelatory knowledge provided by the relation with the triune God. This relation is mediated in and through the community of worship which is therefore indispensable. 132 In summary, we can state that the areas of language, Christian tradition, and theology coincide. The way in which Christians metaphorically talk about the triune God is 'by grace' able to express the truth of both God and the world. As all language is the created medium of knowledge and as such a gift of the Holy Spirit, it corresponds with reality just because of its createdness. The inner structures of reality can be known to us because human beings and their faculty of knowledge are closely tied together by the creating and sustaining power of the triune God, the Father who created out of nothing, the Logos-Son who became incarnate, and the Spirit who brings together both God and man. Gunton's view of reason and language is critical of several aspects of epistemology that arose out of the Enlightenment. (1) In the Enlightenment, reason was 'liberated' from tradition. Christian doctrine thinks of reason as being led by the Spirit, mediated through tradition. (2) Reason obtained a place outside reality, whereas Christian doctrine sees reason in continuity. Christian doctrine in this respect owes much to a doctrine of creation that encompasses a view of the whole of reality, including human beings, and that is based upon a specific kind of Christology. In this way the Enlightenment search for a proper place for transcendence within the transcending activity of human reason could be replaced by a Christian conception of God's transcendence enabling human reason to transcend. Thus, human reason begets a less metaphysical treatment and task within Christian doctrine. (3) Knowledge is obtained by a stance outside reality: man in the role of 'judge' over against nature, as Kant put it. With the help of Polanyi's concept of 'personal knowledge', language is a form of 131 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 7. 132 E.g.: "Being 'in Christ' involves a form of personal knowledge of God realised by participation in the worship and life of the Church" (Intellect and Action, 63). Cf. Intellect and Action, 96.

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continuity of man with reality. (4) The kind of knowledge that meets the standards of the Enlightenment is put in abstract terms rather than metaphors, whereas Gunton insists on the metaphorical character of much language. Metaphor is not inferior to human knowledge, but is on the contrary - basic for the human task of gathering knowledge. (5) At the heart of the Enlightenment project lays the quest for liberation of human reason from the bondage of an authoritarianly conceived Church and traditional (Christian) thought. Though Gunton acknowledges that along with this quest the gospel was rejected, "albeit for some understandable reasons" 133 , he nevertheless tries to conceptualise this presupposed 'bondage' in its historical function. With the help of Coleridge's 'heuristic device' of the Trinity as Idea Idearum, Gunton wants to solve the problems the Enlightenment rightly criticised. Among the outcomes of this project, the relational character of human reason and language - with due insistence on their distinct albeit related particularity - plays an important role. 'Relational' here points at the ontological truth of the relations between humans, between God and man, and within the whole of reality. We now turn to Gunton's treatment of the concept of freedom which is intertwined with his conception of relations within the Trinity as 'heuristic principle'.

3.3.3 Concepts of Freedom In Gunton's Trinitarian theology, he stresses the freedom of both God and man. We will start with the concept of human freedom. The Enlightenment concept of freedom can be defined as 'autonomy 7 , a concept that "anything that is not in its entirety the undetermined act of the agent is, to the extent that it is not, a denial of the agent's integrity". 134 This freedom is an inherent quality and an intrinsic possession of man. Thus Christian doctrines of sin, of the bondage of the will, of a God on whom creation is dependent cannot but be treated

133 The One, the Three and the Many, 1. 134 Gunton, Colin E.; 'Introduction'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in Historical and Systematic Theology, Edinburgh 1995, (1-12) I. Gunton here continues: "The teaching appears at its greatest in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant [...]".

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as unfree and oppressing. The Enlightenment therefore 'displaced' God in order that "the moral agent in effect replace [s] God as a selfcontained source of moral freedom/' as is the heart of Kant's view of freedom. 135 In terms of Isaiah Berlin's twofold conceptualisation of freedom, used by Gunton, this Kantian kind of freedom is "the realizing of one's true being or nature". 1 3 6 Berlin calls the other way in which freedom is used 'liberty from' others who should not interfere with my activity. 137 Another way to investigate the concept of freedom is with the help of the metaphor of the 'spectrum' of different theories of human freedom. Its two ends are represented by, on the one hand, modern theories of the absolute void, and, on the other, highly deterministic views like that of Spinoza. Kant's idea of autonomy and Nietzsche could be seen as examples of the former, in which "[f]reedom is only truly freedom when the agent creates, ex nihilo, the form of action which is entered". 138 The latter is represented by, for example, "ideals of total scientific explanation which will in principle predict all future actions on the bases of the knowledge of present and past" with their presupposed mechanistic worldviews. 139 According to Gunton, the problem with these kinds of freedom is that they start with a conception of "unmediated relation to the universe". 140 Therefore, "the quest is for freedom as a relational category," as the free human being is bound up with its relation with others and with the world outside. 141 To frame his own concept of freedom, Gunton draws on Luther's famous dictum that a Christian is free lord of everything and subject to nobody, and at the same time servant of everything and subject to everyone: "Freedom is that which I do with my own particularity, that which enables me to be and do what is truly and distinctively myself. Freedom is that which others do to and with my particular being, in enabling me to be and

135 136 137 138

The One, the Three and the Many, 65. The One, the Three and the Many, 63. The One, the Three and the Many, 62. Gunton, Colin E.; 'God, Grace and Freedom'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in Historical and Systematic Theology, Edinburgh 1995, (119-133) 119. 139 'God, Grace and Freedom', 119. 140 'God, Grace and Freedom', 120f. 141 'God, Grace and Freedom', 121.

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do, or preventing me from being and doing, that which is particularly myself."142 This distinction coincides with the function of the Spirit (3.2.4) as the One who establishes particularity as well as relation. This already points to another aspect of what Gunton calls the 'mediation of freedom'. Because no 'void' exists in which our actions and being take place, Gunton stresses our being related to and yet being different from God, other people and the whole of created reality. Freedom is only established within these relationships, however formed, and is therefore always 'mediated' freedom. "Freedom is a function of relations between persons and between persons and their world." 1 4 3 Within the relation of man with God, this conception of mediated freedom points at the theological topic of 'God's grace', understood as "a mode of God's action towards, or relatedness to, the creature and not as some kind of substance that God imparts to the creature". 144 "Grace is not something reserved for sinners, we might say, but the fundamental form of God's relation to the creature."145 God's being related trinitarianly to his created reality, whether in creation, salvation or eschatological perfection, 'is' grace, which is the cause and goal of human freedom. That is why Gunton calls the Trinity the 'place to be human' (cf. 3.2.3). It will be clear that Gunton uses a broad concept of freedom, encompassing the different relations of man: the relation with God, fellow human beings, and the non-human creation. Because the relation with God is included in this concept, Gunton has to explain the way in which he conceives the freedom of God. So we now turn to the second part of the concept of freedom that concerns God. God's freedom consists of two levels: an inner-Trinitarian level, and the level of the God-creation relationship. We will start with the latter. The word 'freedom' used in relation to God has everything to do with the word 'transcendence'. As Gunton shows, the word 'transcendence'

142 'God, Grace and Freedom', 122. Cf. "Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemandem Untertan. Ein Christenmensch ist ein dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann Untertan" (Martin Luther, 'Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen' [1520], WA 7; 20-38). 143 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 144. 144 'God, Grace and Freedom', 126. 145 'God, Grace and Freedom', 126.

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has to be carefully determined in order for its meaning to be grasped. The way in which Thomas Aquinas uses this word differs from that of Spinoza, Descartes and process theologians like Hartshorne. In all these conceptions 'transcendence' is used as a spatial metaphor, which raises questions about the omnipresence of God. For if God is somewhere 'out there' in his being transcendent, how could He also be 'in here'? In order to avoid these kinds of questions, Gunton distinguishes between spatial transcendence and ontological transcendence. The latter can be described not in terms of quantity but in terms of quality. "Transcendence on this account will not be something God possesses in greater or lesser quantity, at the expense of his immanence, but something he is and does."146 Here he draws on ideas of Karl Barth, who described God's transcendence in terms of freedom. Transcendence can therefore be defined as 'freedom to love: to create, to reconcile, and redeem'.147 In another essay on Barth's concept of the freedom of God, Gunton summarises this statement lucidly: "Freedom, to be freedom, must have a shape, a form. If God is to be free, and free not only in relation with the world but free to set the creature free to be itself, God's freedom must be conceived to take a form appropriate to its matter."148 Within the whole of Barth's theology, this 'form' is divine 'election', because man "must be determined in order to be free",149 and so the freedom of man is closely tied up with God's own freedom. In his critique of these ideas, Gunton remarks that Barth, for Christological reasons, tends to make both reconciliation and election universal. Gunton, however, wants to distinguish between a Christological redemption and a pneumatological election.150 Here, as we saw in section 3.2.4, the function of the Spirit is both to relate the (pretemporal) decision of God and the historical, particular realisation of that decision in history. The Spirit therefore does not guarantee 146 Gunton, Colin E.; 'Transcendence, Metaphor, and the Knowability of God'. In: JThS 31 (1980), (501-516) 511. 147 'Transcendence', 514. 148 Gunton, Colin E.; 'Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom'. In: ThTo 43 (1986), (316330) 318f. 149 'Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom', 321. Cf. Gunton's remark in the context of an essay on the theology of P.T. Forsyth that "Limited freedom is not freedom destroyed, but freedom empowered," (Theology through the Theologians, 226) as for freedom and authority are mutually constitutive. 150 Gunton here uses ideas from Edward Irving ('Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom', 329).

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God's immanence, but enables the relation of both God and man: "As Spirit [...] God is present to the world as other, as transcendent." 151 God's freedom consists firstly in his free and transcendent willingness to involve himself in the created reality through Jesus Christ. The second aspect of God's freedom is his triune identity. As has been remarked in section 3.2.3, God's being immanently related does not only provide 'the space to be human', but is also the way in which God himself 'is and does'.152 Father, Son, and Spirit constitute each other as free persons by virtue of the shape their interrelationships take in the Trinitarian perichoresis. Their freedom is, however, no individual freedom 'from' others, but a function of relatedness. Gunton concludes that "the essence of the being in relation that is the Trinity is the personal space that is received and conferred". 153 We can conclude that the concept of 'relation in otherness' is the one that enables Gunton to conceive of the inner-trinitarian freedom, as well as the freedom of God towards the world, as well as the freedom between human beings.

3.4 Creation and the Doctrine of Creation The doctrine of creation is a much neglected topic of Christian doctrine. It suffered long under its 'Babylonian captivity', as Gunton puts it.154 It is, however, a crucial doctrine for Gunton's whole systematic approach. As the doctrine of the Trinity provides a starting-point for his theology, the doctrine of creation could be said to explain this starting-point. The doctrine of creation as a clarification and application of the doctrine of the Trinity is therefore always a Trinitarian description of the creation doctrine. 155 As both the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the 151 'Barth, the Trinity, and H u m a n Freedom', 328. It is the Spirit " w h o frees God to be for the other" (Theology through the Theologians, 104). 152 "God's transcendence is his freedom to happen historically as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and any talk of an immanent Trinity", as Gunton describes Barth ('Transcendence', 513). 153 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 128. 154 Gunton, Colin E.; The Triune Creator. A Historical and Systematic Study, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1998,116. 155 Cf. Gunton's rather loose remark: "Only with the benefit of hindsight can w e read this whole passage [i.e. Genesis 1,1-2] in a Trinitarian way, and yet surely w e may

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Trinity are second order disciplines, functioning on a 'meta-level' (cf. section 2.2) there is also a first order use of the term 'creation' and 'Trinity 7 . On this first level Gunton views reality as the finite 'echo' of the infinite triune God, thereby giving the key understanding of the relationship between God and the created reality. Given the importance of the relation between the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of creation, their interrelatedness must be defined. Whereas both doctrines are about distinct but related kinds of being, and whereas creation is the finite 'echo' of the Trinity, Gunton is aware of the danger of moving too quickly or directly from the Trinity to creation.156 He states emphatically that the "crucial intermediate step involves a Trinitarian theology of creation." 157 To counter the danger of too direct a link between the triune God and this world, Gunton develops the concept of 'echo'. There is no direct analogy but only an indirect one, a "finite echo or bodying forth of the divine personal dynamics" as is distinguishable in the being of the Church. 158 The doctrine of creation therefore functions as an essential intermediate step because it entails the ontological distinction between God and this world central to the Christian tradition, and also because it implies their somehow being related. In order to assess Gunton's doctrine of creation and its consequences for his view of creation, I will firstly describe the main aspects of his doctrine of creation. Traditionally, several aspects are combined in the doctrine of creation. As anthropology and the doctrine of sin will be treated in section 3.5, it suffices to discuss here the main characteristics of the consequences of Gunton's doctrine of creation for the non-human created reality, including abstract entities like time and space. I will deal with the creatio ex nihilo in its Trinitarian aspects (3.4.2), the 'good beginning' and the eschatologically and pneumatologically conceived view of history (3.4.2), the concept of creation as 'project' (3.4.3), and the concept of creational mediation (3.4.4). Finally, a concluding part on Gunton's concept of the doctrine of creation will

and must" ('The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters: The Holy Spirit and the Created Order'. In: IJSTh 4 [2002], [190-204] 191). 156 I here develop the argument, mentioned in section 3.2.3 about the specific use of the doctrine of the Trinity by Gunton. 157 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 71. 158 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 73.

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describe his use of the word 'ontology' and the relation between a concept of creation and 'worldview' (3.4.5).

3.4.1 Creation Out of Nothing Gunton holds that, though the very idea of creation is universal, the specific Christian form of a creatio ex nihilo was "the unique contribution to thought made by Christian theologians of creation" and an "intellectual breakthrough of second-century Christian theology". 159 (a) It implies that, over against determinism, necessitarianism and impersonal causal thinking, creation, as an act of divine sovereignty and freedom, was the result of God's free and personal will that something other than himself exist, (b) It also implies that God's will is not rootless but grounded in God's Trinitarian love which leaves reality to be relatively itself.160 Here Gunton relies on Irenaeus of Lyon (second half of the first century). Against the Gnostics, Irenaeus formulated the doctrine of creation out of nothing. 161 "Irenaeus of Lyon [...] is a model of a theological integration of incarnation, saving death, resurrection and ascension, all embraced within a Trinitarian framework according to which the creating and redeeming work of God the Father is mediated by the Son and the Holy Spirit." 162 It is this concept of mediation that is Irenaeus' weapon against Gnosticism. God uses his two 'hands', Son and Spirit, in making this earth, and thereby gives it both due entity and relation. This doctrine of 'God's two hands' is crucial for Gunton's own Trinitarian doctrine of creation and its relevance for today as he senses that our modern world bears some remarkable resemblances to this old Gnosticism: "Modern culture is marked by a pathological inability to live in the present, while at the same time, as in the consumer culture, it is unable to live anywhere but in the present. Both arms of the paradox alike derive from a Gnostic

159 Triune Creator, 8. 160 Cf. Triune Creator, 8f; and: "Without it [sc. the doctrine of creation out of nothing], w e lose the finitude, contingency and otherness from God which are so important for an understanding of the limited but real autonomy of the created order" (Christ and Creation, 97). 161 Cf. Brief Theology of Revelation, 14f; The One, the Three and the Many, 120. 162 Yesterday and Today, 225.

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denial of the goodness of the creation." 163 Gunton refutes the objection that Irenaeus' formulation 164 of the 'two hands' implies subordinatianism: "The Son and the Spirit are 'of one substance with the Father', equal in divinity, but in the economy do the Father's will as his 'two hands', the agents of his creating and redeeming action in the world." 165 It is God's involvement in history without being identical to it that forms the basis of a genuine Christian answer to this 'modern Gnosticism'. The Trinitarian framework, 166 as well as biblical revelation - especially the resurrection of Jesus from the dead - and the defence of the Christian creed in the context of the philosophy which denied it,167 thus provided the possibilities for Irenaeus' answer. 168 As the doctrine of the creation out of nothing was an answer to Gnosticism in providing the tools to say that God involved himself in his creation without being identified with it, it also had a function in delineating the free will and the free personal action of God. 169 This function was stressed by theology in the course of the Middle-Ages, particularly by William of Ockham, who stressed the contingency of the created reality and God's free decision to make it.170 It coincided with other elements stressed by Augustine. 'Creation out of nothing', according to Augustine, meant that it was "a creative act in the purest sense of the word, in which God brought it about that, when there was 'once' nothing but God, there is now God and a world other than he". 171 The distinction, vital for a Christian doctrine of creation, between time and eternity was also stressed. There was a 'time' when the 163 The One, the Three and the Many, (94-100) 99. Cf. the 'Epilogue' to the second edition of Yesterday and Today: "Our modern culture, which thinks that it is world-affirming, is shown on the contrary to be Gnostic to a deep degree" (226). 164 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses IV,20,i. Cf. Torisu, Yoshifumi; Gott und Welt. Eine Untersuchung zur Gotteslehre des Irenaus von Lyon. Nettetal: Steyler Verlag 1991, 144150: "Die Schöpfung Gottes bedeutet für Irenaus die Tätigkeit der göttlichen Gemeinschaft von Vater, Sohn und Heiligem Geist" (148). 165 Christ and Creation, 79f. 166 In this respect, Irenaeus is held up as an example of doing theology (cf. Theology through the Theologians, 8.13.15). 167 Cf. 'Indispensable Opponent', 305. 168 Cf. Triune Creator, 210, where Gunton extrapolates this argument to his convictions about the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper with their use of water, bread and wine as physical elements (see section 3.6.2). 169 Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 72. 170 Cf. Theology through the Theologians, 136f. 171 Triune Creator, (65-96) 83.

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creation did not exist, for if it did exist it was coeternal with God which imposes a kind of necessity on him. 172 Furthermore, the notion of a judgement of the created reality implies the end of this world, which means that creation is not endless, "and that which must come to an end necessarily had a beginning, for it is finite in time", Gunton remarks. 173 The notion of a 'time' in which the dead will be resurrected and judged implies an eschatology of the whole created order. The finitude of creation therefore does not mean that creation will cease to exist; it will be a 'new' creation, in which God the Holy Spirit brings creation to its end and sustains its being. In summary, the aforementioned elements of the AugustinianIrenaean doctrine of creation out of nothing shape Gunton's doctrine of creation as well as his doctrine of the Trinity. "The doctrine of the Trinity, certainly in the form advocated in this volume, is derived from the involvement of God in creation, reconciliation, and redemption." 174 It encapsulates Gunton's explicit commitment to a theology that stresses both the distinctiveness of God and this world, and God's freewilled, personal relation with the created reality. The doctrine of the creation out of nothing functions for Gunton as a summary of his antiGnostic Trinitarian doctrine of the involvement of God with his creatures: The Father using his two 'hands', Son and Spirit, in bringing this world to its proper goal.175

3.4.2 Creation and the Beginning of History The second element of Gunton's doctrine of creation is his concern for the correct place of the 'concept of history' within theology. Because Gunton is aware of all the Hegelian speculations that normally surround Trinitarian dogmas, he thinks it essential to properly weigh 172 173 174 175

Triune Creator, 81. Triune Creator, 81. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 142 Gunton connects the importance of the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo with his diagnosis of the western tradition's neglect of this triune involvement in time and history, and charges the tradition of allowing gnostic elements to stay alive: "The real weakness of the Western tradition is that neglect of the Trinitarian mediation of the doctrine of creation enabled gnostic elements to enter the bloodstream of theology" (Triune Creator, 168).

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the concept of history within Trinitarian theology. He strongly disapproves of theologies that reorder the relation between creation and redemption in such a way that a real history becomes impossible. 176 Gunton's own concept of 'creation' and the beginning of history bears the following marks. First, the good beginning of history, as related in the first chapters of Genesis, is systematically important for Gunton's theology. It is an explicit anti-Gnostic contention that this contingent reality, related though not identical to God, is 'very good'. 177 It implies, secondly, that the same God who started this project, will also fulfil it in due time, so that the concepts of 'providence', 'conservation', 'preservation' and even 'redemption' are linked with this original purpose and goal of God for his creation.178 The problem of evil, which immediately arises in this context, will be treated in section 3.5. Thirdly, the good beginning is not intended to downplay the historical development of the world, leading Gunton to reject two other opinions. The first is the theological tradition in which the good beginning of history is treated as the systematic counterpart of an eschatology of 'return' or 'restoration'. Here creation is pictured as completely finished and perfected before the fall, and the subsequent redemption could only mean a return to that condition of perfection. At the end of time, creation will be eschatologically renewed in a return to the perfection which already existed before the fall.179 The other concept - an opposite of these 'eschatologies of return' - is shaped by Hegelian 176 As e.g. in the theologies of Thomas Aquinas, who drove too quickly from the temporal event to a divine order; or in that of Karl Barth, who identified creation and redemption, both embraced in the concept of election at the expense of an eschatological trajectory (Christ and Creation, 93-95). 177 Therefore, Gunton explicitly fights spiritualising tendencies in the exegesis of the first chapters of Genesis by for example Augustine, who argued that the material creatura was "close to being nothing". Gunton here comments: "Once again w e have evidence that the Platonic pull on Augustine is very strong, and seriously distorts his reading of the text, which it effectively contradicts or at the very least subverts" ('Between allegory and myth: the legacy of the spiritualising of Genesis'. In: Gunton, Colin E. [ed.]; The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997, [47-62] 57). 178 "Creation is very good: perfect. But perfect is not here a static concept. [...] There is therefore no creation 'in the beginning' without an eschatological orientation" (ιChristian Faith, 19). 179 Cf. Gunton's description of this 'eschatology of return' in Triune Creator, lOf.

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and Darwinian influences. It views the original creation as being in need of perfection. On the way to such perfection, the fall becomes (or may become) a necessary step. Gunton explicitly denies both these concepts of the 'good beginning of creation' in favour of the concept of 'creation as project'.

3.4.3 Creation as Project The concept of 'creation as project' allows Gunton to maintain the positive assesment of history, development, and progress, brought into theology during the 19th century. Yet he is aware of the tendencies which do so by marginalizing evil. He tries to maintain a careful balance between an eschatology of return and several, too optimistic, evolutionary concepts of history. He summarises his view as follows: "God created the world so that the created order should be offered back to its creator, perfected, and perfected as the result of the true dominion exercised by God's viceregent, the human creature." 180 This offering back will be achieved by Jesus Christ in spite of sin and evil: his redemptive power can fulfil the creation-project through the Spirit. The redemptive work of Jesus does not restore the paradise situation, but inaugurates a new beginning that ends eschatologically, which "suggests that the end of the redemption is not simply a return to a primal perfection, but a movement towards an end that is greater than the beginning. On such an account, redemption involves not only the defeat of evil, but its removal in such a way that the original direction or directedness of the created order is restored". 181 So the history of creation regains its positive value. God's creationproject is a teleological ordering of things to be completed or perfected, "and so projected into time" 182 or "projected, as an act of God, into the future". 183 Moreover, this concept deprives human beings of their position as in some way apart from the rest of the created world. Salvation does not - Gnostically - mean a release from creation, but a 180 181 182 183

Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 187. Triune Creator, 12. Cf. also his 'The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters', 191f. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 181. Triune Creator, 90.

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regaining of the human proper place in the created order. Salvationhistory is the history of creation as a whole, a timeful project of God, which deprives history of its assumed timelessness and anthropocentrism. 184 Gunton's emphasis on the concept of creation as project is an elaboration of the Trinitarian involvement of God in history as outlined in section 3.2.3. Irenaeus conceived the two 'hands of God' that "mediate the will and work of the Father in perfecting what can be called the project of creation: the final perfecting through redemption of what was created perfect in the beginning". 185 In this Trinitarian involvement, the Son is "the One through whom all things were made" who entered "the structures of fallen space and time in order to recreate - to reorder teleology, to direct again to perfection", 186 as it is the Spirit "whose function is to perfect creation: that is, to direct the world to its end as creation in saving relation to God". 187 In Gunton's description of this purpose of creation, the goal of God's project, the offering back of creation to its Maker is central. "What is the end of creation? That all things may through being perfected praise the one who made them." 188 This praise is the "movement out of self into free and glad relationship with the other [...] The praise of God is the style of the life which moves from perfected reconciliation to promised victory [...] Our worship is incomplete unless it offers to the creator, from the midst of our demonised world, the firstfruits of the creation liberated to praise its Lord". 189 In describing the history of God with his creation in terms of 'project', Gunton also allows for a systematically warranted place for human action. The concept is designed to encompass both God's active involvement in history and human action.190 184 Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 181f. In Yesterday and Today, Gunton remarks that "there is no interpretation of N e w Testament Christology which avoids questions of ontology, of the w a y our world is" (83), which expresses the relation of the history of God to his creation and the consequences for doing theology. 185 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, xxif; cf. Triune Creator, 183f. 186 Christ and Creation, 91. 187 Christ and Creation, 92. 188 Christ and Creation, 96. 189 Actuality of Atonement, 201f. 190 Cf. "The human calling is to enable the whole of creation to praise its creator by particular instances of faithful action towards both other people and the world: by proper relationality and by loving dominion. The eschatological completion of the

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Here we can already glimpse the eventual outcome of Gunton's content of Christian ethics as an ethic of sacrifice, closely connected to his anthropological considerations. As both ethics and anthropology are the subjects of other sections (viz. 3.5 and 3.6), we will now turn to the function of the doctrine of creation in Gunton's view of 'mediation'.

3.4.4 Creational Mediation Irenaeus' stress on God's involvement in the created reality by the Son and the Spirit as the Father's 'two hands', is part of Gunton's concept of mediation. Gunton has two reasons for his stress on creational mediation, (a) It is a warrant against idealistic and spiritualising ways of doing theology (tradition of Hegel); and (b) it provides Gunton with possibilities to answer questions about epistemology, about the relation between God's transcendence and his immanence, about the place of human beings within the whole of reality, etc. As (b) has already been discussed, 191 we will now concentrate on the use of creational mediation against Hegelian speculation and idealisation. Gunton states that historically the Reformers were right in their rediscovery of the doctrine of creation out of nothing, but were less successful in developing an account of the world's continuing relation with God the Creator. The lesson we can learn from Barth in this respect is "that a stronger Christology forms the basis for a more satisfactory account of mediation". 192 But, as Gunton remarks, Barth lacked a more strongly pneumatological orientation, attained by conceiving creation as project. However, this concept needs to be distinguished from Darwinist kinds of immanent progress and development of creation, which came to function as "an allencompassing dogma rather than a theory of how things happen to work in the world", i.e. as "an alternative to the doctrine of

project, inaugurated at the creation and re-establisched by Jesus, is thus anticipated in all forms of human action and worldly event that are enabled by the Holy Spirit as he relates the world to the Father through Jesus Christ, crucified, risen and ascended" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 192). 191 A d b: cf. section 3.3.1 in which the role of revelation as a kind of mediation is explained. 192 Triune Creator, 181f.

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providence". 1 9 3 Though theories of evolution, with their notion of progress and development, are not so serious a problem for a theology that considers creation to be a project directed to the future, there open questions remain. The problem of evil cannot be solved by idealistic and progressive theories like those of Darwin or Hegel. The cross of Jesus Christ and his atoning and redemptive activity cannot really be incorporated into such theories. In this respect, Christology, along with its hamartiological and redemptive aspects, functions as warrant for a truly Christian doctrine of creation. This brings Gunton to his central definition of providence: "[·••] [T]hat activity, mediated by the two hands of God, which at once upholds the creation against its utter dissolution and provides for its redemption by the election of Israel and the incarnation of the one through whom all things were made and are upheld, and to whom, as the head of the church (Colossians 1:18), in the Spirit all things move."194 Elsewhere, Gunton conceives of the Trinitarian character of this mediation in less Irenaean terms: "Simply put, the incarnation of the eternal creating Word in the human being, Jesus of Nazareth, betokens God's freedom of action within the material world, while the Spirit's sovereign action is the mark of God's freedom toward or over against it - from outside, so to speak". 195 Providence is the traditional way of expressing what Gunton calls the 'creational mediation' of God's sustaining and revealing activities to his creature. 196 It contains protological, contemporary, and eschatological dimensions of a Trinitarian framework. It also indicates the character of the relation of God and his created world. 197

193 194 195 196

Triune Creator, 186. Triune Creator, 192. Christian Faith, 10. "Providence involves a claim even more radical than that of the previous chapter [on 'creation']: that God does not merely uphold but actively directs and involves himself in the day to day life of his creatures" (Christian Faith, 21). 197 Cf.: "[P]rovicence must be understood eschatologically, from the end. In that light, we can encapsulate the meaning of providence by saying that it is conservation in eschatological perspective" (Christian Faith, 36).

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3.4.5 Doctrine of Creation and Ontology In this last part of this section, which enumerates the basic aspects of Gunton's doctrine of creation, a summary of the systematic consequences of Gunton's use of the doctrine of creation must be given. The main characteristic of his use of the doctrine of creation is the seemingly synonymous use of the terms 'creation' and 'ontology'. On the other hand, the word 'ontology' is also used to indicate the being of the Trinity. This double use of 'ontology7 implies that Gunton's economic Trinitarian framework leads to the treatment of 'ontology' in which his concept of the Trinitarian involvement is intended to consider (a) the immanent Trinity, (b) the relation between God and this world, and (c) created reality itself; whereas (d) the word 'ontological' is also used in contrast with 'ontic'. (a) The fact that Gunton refers to the immanent Trinity in terms of ontology is a consequence of his use of the economic Trinity.198 Gunton somewhere differentiates between a 'reformed' and a 'Lutheran' way of doing theology. The latter is more interested in God's being related to us, whereas the former has a concern for ontology.199 By doing this, Gunton both explicitly runs counter to those Trinitarian theologians, who state God's acting over against us at the expense of his being and thereby minimise the necessity of an immanent Trinity,200 and stresses that the historical, economic living of Jesus Christ in our world should lead to "ontology, to questions about the being of the God whose work is done both by Christ and by the Spirit who was understood to be in such close relation to him". 201 Following Zizioulas' and the Cappadocians' achievement in this area, this expression of the Trinity is the 'ontological revolution' which combines both substance and relation within the being of God.202 (b) Because the ontology of the Trinity consists in the combination of relation and otherness, the relation between God and that which this triune God created is also established in terms of relation and otherness. The ontology of the Trinity is 'echoed' in created reality:

198 199 200 201 202

Cf. above, 3.2.3. Promise of Trinitarian Promise of Trinitarian Promise of Trinitarian Promise of Trinitarian

Theology, Theology, Theology, Theology,

xvii. xvi-xvii. 8. 53-55.

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"The primary echoes of that being [i.e. of the three persons of the Trinity in their perichoretic interrelation] are to be heard in the ways of God to the world in creation and the perfection of that creation in both Jesus and the Spirit." 203 Though Gunton calls God and this world 'ontologically distinct realities', this is precisely the ground for their being related. 204 (c) In the third place, 'ontology' in Gunton's books refers to created reality.205 This is the counterpart of (b). By virtue of its relation with the triune God, creation can be itself. In this sense of the word 'ontology', it implies its being created. The very word 'creation' alludes to reality's relation with its Creator. This implies that, according to Gunton, a doctrine of creation has to be developed in which "the two, ontology and relation, stand or fall together rather than being opposed approaches to the way we understand things". 206 The being of creation can be described in terms of 'being in twofold relation', viz. the relation to God and created interrelatedness. We as human beings are related to God, and this world is in the course of history related to the triune God. It is the economic involvement of this God in this world that gives this reality its distinctiveness. It is part of creation's "specific ontology, as created and so as depending upon God for being as it is and for being what it is". 207 Creation, in its being what it is, can be considered as a 'whole', as an 'ontological homogeneity of creation' 208 in which "there is a continuity within discontinuity between the human and the nonhuman creation" 209 By using 'ontology7 for both the immanent Trinity, the relation of the triune Creator with creation, and created reality itself, the economic involvement and perichoretic character of God's

203 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 81. 204 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 72. Cf.: "Only a theology which distinguishes God from the world ontologically justifies the practices of science without succumbing to a pantheism or crypto-pantheism which effectively divinises the temporal" (Triune Creator, 39). The same distinction is repeated in: Christian Faith, lOf. 205 "The doctrine of creation is concerned [...] with the kind of reality that the created order is. It is concerned with ontology, with an account of being [...]" (Triune Creator, 134). 'Created reality' is used as a comprehensive term for a reality that Gunton refers to with different words, such as 'creation', 'universe', 'all that is' and 'world' (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, HOf). 206 The One, the Three and the Many, 193f. 207 The One, the Three and the Many, 81. 208 Triune Creator, 71. 209 The One, the Three and the Many, 3.

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action towards his creation is indicated: "Thus we are not here simply dealing with two perspectives, the divine and the human, but with two interrelated realms of being which bring with them two complementary perspectives, two ways of understanding the world as both the creation of the eternal God and a genuinely created reality." 210 (d) The relation between created reality and its triune Creator is established in the course of history, called the economic involvement of the triune God in the created world. This implies a historical teleology: God's purpose with his creation-project (cf. above, 3.4.3) at the end of time. Gunton here introduces the distinction between 'ontological' and 'ontic', the former being "the ontological relationship of creator and created, grounded in the Word and reordered in the enhypostatic humanity of Jesus", whereas the latter is the telos of ontology, in that the ontological has to "become ontic".211 Whereas in Christology the universe is redeemed, it has to be 'particularized' by the Spirit.212 In conclusion, 'ontology' means both the distinct realities of God and everything that is not God; it embraces the relation between God and created reality. In speaking of the created reality, 'ontology' implies its being related to the Creator and its being characterized by interrelatedness in otherness. The term 'ontology of relation' does entail both relation and substance. This is why (a), (b), and (c) have so much in common: "A theology of createdness is necessarily concerned with ontology: with the shape that things are given by virtue of their relation to their creator." 213 To avoid a static and timeless concept of ontology, Gunton adds the teleological factor 'time' by combining 'ontology' with his concept of 'creation as project' (d).

210 Triune Creator, 91. 211 Actuality of Atonement, 170. 212 "Ontologically, the creature is ordered to the completion of its particular end in space and time; ontically, it is caught up in a history and dynamic that would subvert its orderedness. Redemption thus means the redirection of the particular to its own end and not a re-creation" (The One, the Three and the Many, 230; cf. also 205207). The same idea can be seen in Gunton's essay of the Church as community, for the Church is "called to be" the community of the last times: "It therefore becomes an echo of the life of the Trinity when it is enabled by the Spirit to order its life to where that reconciliation takes place in time, that is to say, to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 81). 213 The One, the Three and the Many, 166.

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3.5 Anthropology, Evil and Sin It is clear by now that Gunton defines 'being created' as living in relation to God, who entered into relation with this reality through his two hands, the Son and the Spirit. As we live 'under the conditions of sin',214 the work of the Son constitutes redemption. Yet, according to Gunton, the role of Jesus is not confined to a post-fall condition, no more than the teleological purpose of the Spirit is only post-lapsarian. The economic involvement of the triune God in history is not simply a response to the fall. This can be deduced from several statements, such as that "grace is not something reserved for sinners, but the fundamental form of God's relation to the creature".215 Another statement concerns the need for revelation in order to know God. Gunton speaks of 'the necessity for revelation' if we are to know who we are as creatures of God: "The necessity is reinforced by the fact that as fallen creatures we can only know our creatureliness as it is redeemed from dissolution".216 This implies that revelation (as creational mediation) is no post-fall instrument, but a creational means for God to be known by his creation. Nevertheless, the fall has had its consequences. For as human beings are no longer free, nor creation directed to perfection, creation is in need of redemption by the Son and redirection by the Spirit.217 This demands an investigation of the role of sin and evil in Gunton's Trinitarian theology of creation (3.5.1). Regarding the question of the origin of sin and evil, Gunton is rather reserved. But it is clear that it has consequences for Gunton's anthropology, which has three aspects: anthropology and the Trinitarian God, anthropology and the created world, and anthropology and interpersonal relations (3.5.2). To summarise Gunton's anthropology, his remarks about the 'image of God' will be reviewed (3.5.3).

214 215 216 217

Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 113. 'God, Grace and Freedom', 126. Christ and Creation, 73f. E.g. Christ and Creation, 91f.

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3.5.1 Evil and the Doctrine of Sin What are the consequences of the problem of evil and sin for Gunton's Trinitarian doctrine of creation? How does the current disordering of the order of creation relate to God's 'good beginning' and the ultimate purpose and goal of the creation-project? Because this point is a crucial step in Gunton's theology, we will follow his argumentation closely through his publications. Sin and evil play an important role in Gunton's theology, mostly as a characterization of the current disorder of reality.218 As his project is the quest for ontology 219 with the adherent aspects of order and harmony, he draws attention to this disordering of God's plan several times. In Enlightenment and Alienation, Gunton refers to the quest for autonomy, so typical of Enlightenment philosophy, as something to be actively achieved by human beings. Gunton criticises this one-sided drive of man in favour of a more balanced view of autonomy, freedom and other correlated elements, "a kind of conversation between self and reality, in which gift and response are in different ways and at different times in interrelationship" 220 He realises that this 'is not as easy as it may have been made to sound' because it presupposes rational people and rational moral agents. However hard we may 'attend' to becoming rational, "there remain possibilities of error, self-deception and, simply, the gross human evil of which we are all too often guilty" 221 Even the well-known spokesman of the Enlightenment, Kant himself, was aware of this, judging by the attention he gave to the problem of 'radical evil'. For Gunton, this means that he can give no simple 'solution' to this problem. The only indication of the direction in which Gunton would make this point clear, is his claim that people have to obey the law of God freely in order to become free.222 Jesus Christ is an eminent example of this 'free obedience' to God. This is also an implication of Jesus' pre-eminently being 'human' or his being 'true humanity'. By acknowledging what Jesus Christ and the Spirit do for us, the 218 Gunton defines sin as "the disruption or distortion of the relation of personal beings with the personal creator God, a disruption that in mysterious fashion incorporates the whole created world in its structures" (Christian Faith, 59). 219 220 221 222

Cf. 3.1 η. 1. Enlightenment and Alienation, 91. Enlightenment and Alienation, 91 Cf. above, 'Concepts of Freedom' (3.3.3).

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consequences of sin can be overcome. "The Spirit is God making true humanity possible even in the present that is so stained by the sins and errors of history."223 In Christ and Creation, a similar movement can be seen. Christ as creature was part of a network of relationships, and as such a member of the earthly community of human beings. Thus, Jesus was part of a creation in which sin plays a role. Here Gunton gives a kind of definition of the doctrine of 'original sin': "The doctrine of original sin holds that somewhere in the past of the human race [...] there took place a determination of the human race to a disrupted or disorderly relation to the God from whom it takes its being. [...] On the other hand, the doctrine of actual sin - the present tense of the doctrine - teaches that all human beings have their being in a network of disrupted relations between the human race and God - in structures shaped by original sin - so that as a matter of fact apart from redemption, they are able to replicate only the patterns of disorder".224

Again, the sustaining and teleological work of the triune God restores and recreates creation's hopeful eschatological orientation which is destined for perfection and completeness.225 In the kind of Trinitarian theology Gunton advocates, Christology plays a central role. For it is the economic involvement of God in incarnation, death, and resurrection that redeemed the whole of creation with God. In this context, Gunton explicitly states: "Here, if we are to take seriously the radical nature of the evil that impedes the end of creation, the centre of the story in the crucifixion of Jesus must never be underplayed." 226 Though Gunton refuses to speculate about the origin of evil,227 he states that we cannot escape the implications that in some way the created order suffered a catastrophe of cosmic proportions in which human sin, defined as 'a disrupted relation with the creator', is in some

223 Enlightenment and Alienation, 104. 224 Christ and Creation, 45; Christian Faith, 61f. 225 Christ and Creation, 91f. Cf.: "Sin is [...] not only [...] the desire to worship the lie, that which is not truly God. It is something more than that. Sin is that which has no future, which will not have the last word over our lives, because it is overcome in Christ" (Theology through Preaching, 176). 226 Triune Creator, (167-169) 169. Cf.: "The world is a place in which evil has been let loose by human wickedness. Christianity grew and flourished because it taught that in the Word made flesh God has himself engaged with that evil in order to deprive it of its power" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 26). 227 Triune Creator, 171f and Christ and Creation, 45.

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way constitutive.228 In its destructive character, evil is not only privatio boni or das Nichtige. It has an active, almost 'positive' force, and as such can be described as 'parasitic upon the good'.229 Following Karl Barth, Gunton discerns between two forms of 'evil', the one being a kind of 'nothingness' which in no way belongs to God's good creation, the other being death as a kind of proper limit to our days on earth. "Sin is," Gunton continues, "that which causes the one to be the other, so that without Christ's bearing of death upon the cross and the promise of resurrection, death as the cessation of all relationships, above all that with God, would be the final fact to be narrated of us, and so the final nullifying of God's purposes in creation. That is why much of the tradition has held with Athanasius that it was in some way unfitting for God's goodness that he should have allowed the creation to go to ruin." 230

The cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ are signals that make clear that evil is only to be destroyed eschatologically.231 There is also another way in which Gunton speaks about sin and its consequences. He discerns two levels, the first concerning the doctrine of sin, and the second concerning the restoration of the relation between God and man by Jesus Christ.232 It seems here that the problem of evil is 'solved' - if we may use this word - in that the restored relationship is characterized with the word 'grace' which is - as already mentioned - "not something reserved for sinners, but the fundamental form of God's relation to the creature".233 Therefore, Gunton can be critical of too individualistic and soteriological forms of the doctrine of sin: "[W]e can no longer be content with the simul justus et peccator, for the presence of Christ through the Spirit must be conceived as the sphere in which sin begins to be outgrown in fact as well as in principle: whatever the risks of pride and complacency, that has to be the centre, as it was for Paul. Christian reality bears upon the world as the one network of relationships makes real, in interaction with the other, the form of Christ in and for the world." 234 228 229 230 231 232 233 234

Triune Creator, 172. Triune Creator, 172. Triune Creator, 173. Triune Creator, 173. 'God, Grace and Freedom', 123-126. 'God, Grace and Freedom', 126. Theology through the Theologians, 219f. Elsewhere, Gunton is somewhat less radical: "[The justified] are both justified and sinners, accepted children of God while still

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Because of the work of Jesus Christ, the consequences of evil and sin begin to be 'outgrown', and the eschatological orientation of created reality is the only 'real' reality. This could imply that sin is already overcome within the limits of this world, thanks to the involvement of the triune God. This can be deduced from Gunton's placing over against each other the concepts of 'simul justus et peccatof and the 'new being in Christ'. 235 It is important here to remark that the first characteristic of sin in its devastating consequences for order and reality becomes more apparent in his later publications, 236 at which point the second one is slightly less emphasized. In the third place, the use of the metaphor of 'echo' has to be mentioned in this context. For if, as Gunton states, this world can be said to be characterized by an ontology of relation, analogous to the being of the triune God-in-relation, this relationality is paradigmatically embodied in the Church. Therefore, Gunton speaks about an 'ontology of the church', 237 which is synonymous with 'ontology of relation'. "What kind of analogy between God and church, Trinity and community, may there then be? If there is one, it should be of an indirect kind, in which the church is called to be a, so to speak, finite echo or bodying forth of the divine personal dynamics." 238 The Church is called to be an 'echo' of the Trinity, which is an assignment to realise in its life the promised and inaugurated reconciliation of all things, in which the Spirit enables people to do so. The 'theoretical framework' called 'ontology of the church' finds its realisation in the Church's living in the reconciliation achieved by Christ through the Spirit.239 This use of the ontology of the Church along with the need for redemption

235 236 237 238

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living in large part by and in the world of death. [...] Sin does indeed remain, just as death does, but is no longer definitive of the being of the faithful because they are set on the way to something other" (Christian Faith, 155). Theology through the Theologians, 219. Intellect and Action (46-65) and Christian Faith (59-68). Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 70-80. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 73. Cf. 78: "The being of the church should echo the dynamic of the relations between the three persons who together constitute the deity. The church is called to be the kind of reality at a finite level that God is in eternity." Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 81; 'God, Grace and Freedom', 131: "The realization by the Spirit of community".

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and perfection indicates a considerable influence of sin and disorder on human life, which needs the redemption realised by Christ. Fourthly, also in the area of the doctrine of sin, Gunton fights his battle against Gnosticism. For not every kind of imperfection that characterizes this world is due to the fall. Gunton treats this point particularly in The One, the Three and the Many. It is part of the creationproject in its Irenaean form, that we ought to affirm the goodness of the created order, and abide its perfection eschatologically - which is embodied in the Church. 240 So imperfection is part of the creation's "specific ontology, as created and so as depending upon God for being as it is and for being what it is". 241 It was the false equating of imperfection and sinfulness that caused the enormous yearning of modernity for 'progress' towards the future. Because of this, "time became the realm of divine self-realization by means of human cultural achievement". 242 Over against this active flight out of the created human condition and the intended improvement of it, Gunton stresses that which we received passively from God. This is why Gunton stresses that creation, because of its createdness, depends on God and is analogous to him: "If God is God, he is the source of all being, meaning, and truth. It would seem reasonable to suppose that all being, meaning and truth is, even as created and distinct from God, in some way marked by its relatedness to its creator. Without wanting to ignore the fallenness that marks all created being apart from redemption, we should gladly affirm Paul's confession that 'Ever since the creation of the world [God's] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made'." 243

240 Cf.: "Eschatology for him [i.e. Irenaeus] is not oriented primarily to another world that is temporally and spatially discontinuous with this one, but to that eternity wherein lies the perfecting of the created order, a perfecting that continues to be shaped as recapitulation works itself out in the life of the church" (The One, the Three and the Many, 80). 241 The One, the Three and the Many, 81. 242 The One, the Three and the Many, 87. 243 The One, the Three and the Many, 167 - referring to Romans 1,20.

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3.5.2 Anthropology as Reflecting the Trinity Gunton's anthropology has much to do with the doctrine of the Trinity. As man is created 'in the image and likeness of God' according to the Biblical text, there is an explicit relationship between God and man. Because God is being-in-relation, man is being-in-relation as well as he is the image of God. This relatedness takes shape in a triple orientation: towards God, towards man and towards the non-human creation. 244 About the relation between God and man, Gunton says, " W e are persons insofar as we are in right relationship to God. Under the condition of sin, that means, of course, insofar as the image is reshaped, realised, in Christ." 2 4 5 That means, Christology functions criteriologi,cally as well, and it is the task of the Christian experience to realise this relationship. 246 Following Calvin Gunton states that to know God is the only way to know ourselves. 247 This takes paradigmatical form in Christology. Jesus Christ is both creature and God, thereby relating God and man uniquely. Just as Gunton stresses the 'inescapability of ontology' within Christology, 248 he says that only through Jesus Christ can we conceive reality as it really is. Those who deny that Jesus Christ was in real relation to the created world, being God through the medium of his human being, deny the possibilities of a relation of the Creator with his world at all by assuming a dualistic Christology. 'Dualistic' here does not refer to "a metaphysic in which two different kinds of reality are supposed, but one which conceives two realities as either opposites or contradictions of each other". 2 4 9 This implies that only a non-dualistic Christology (in this special sense of the word) can be loyal to the gospel of God as rescuing human life and the whole of creation. 250 This non-dualistic Christology conceives Jesus as human being, related to God through the Spirit. In his human presence he is the saving, gracious, and loving

244 245 246 247

Christian Faith, 38-54; Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 113f. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 113. Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 6. "As Calvin argued, without the knowledge of God as our creator and redeemer, we are unable to know ourselves as we truly are" (Christ and Creation, 74). 248 Yesterday and Today, 100. 249 Yesterday and Today, 86. 250 Cf. Yesterday and Today, 86-88.

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presence of the eternal God. 251 It is Jesus' being-in-relation with the Father and Jesus' sacrificing himself that forms an analogy for human relations to God, as we too are called to 'present our bodies as a living sacrifice'. Human relation with God is thereby characterized as 'sacrifice', 252 following the example of Jesus Christ. On the level of ontology, there is a direct connection between Jesus' being 'person' and humans being 'person'. For the concept of 'person' as derived from Trinitarian discussions is 'being-in-communion', 253 so our human 'being person' is depending on its relation with the Creator's 'being person-in-relation'. As being human is 'being-in-relation', Gunton explicitly involves the interpersonal relatedness in his argument. Because of Gunton's heuristic use of Coleridge's concept of the Trinity as 'Idea Idearum', he can see the transcendentals of perichoresis appear in human sociality and community. If being human implies being mutually dependent, related, and constitutive, this characterisation is derived from this world's reflecting the inner being of the Trinity.254 This is summarised as follows: "A doctrine of human perichoresis affirms [...] that persons mutually constitute each other, make each other what they are." 255 The relation with non-human creation is significant for Gunton's treatment of anthropology as well. As he is concerned with 'ontology', he is after a concept that heuristically illumines the whole of the created world. Therefore, he is not wholly opposed to one consequence of Darwin's evolution-theory, in that it throws man back to his organic place in nature. "There is a continuity between the human and the nonhuman creation." 256

251 252 253 254 255 256

Cf. Yesterday and Today, 101. Cf. The One, the Three and the Many, 225 and section 3.6. Cf. section 3.2.3. Cf. The One, the Three and the Many, 166-179. The One, the Three and the Many, 169. The One, the Three and the Many, 3. The difference between the non-human creation and the human creation is relative, not absolute (Christian Faith, 8). On the other hand, there is some anthropocentrism at stake in Christian theology ('The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters', 193).

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3.5.3 Image of God Being created in the image and likeness of God, as the creationnarrative tells us, has the following implications, (a) In the course of history, the doctrine of the imago Dei has been catastrophically misdefined, according to Gunton. He blames Augustine for having developed anthropology in terms of Neo-Platonic categories. According to Gunton, Augustine conceived the resemblances between God and man within the mind or soul. The outcome of this tendency was a kind of individualism in anthropology.257 Other possibilities of the 'image', tried in the course of history, were a kind of human stewardship of creation which resulted in 'domination' of man over the creation, and the Barthian concept of the image consisting in the manwoman-relationship.258 (b) The solution Gunton advocates is that being in the image of God refers to the being-in-relation with the triune God, human being, and the rest of creation.259 This relationality however suffers severely under the consequences of sin. Though notions of 'project' and 'eschatology' cover some of these consequences, there remain problems. How can our human moral corruption, seen in human enslavement to sin, be combined with 'being the image of God'? And how can the handicapped be said to reflect God's image? The answer to the first question should be to state that even "the perpetrators of monstrous evils [...] are made and, in some respects remain, in the image of their creator, uniquely of the whole created order" 260 As for the physically and mentally handicapped, Gunton says that they "retain the intrinsic dignity conferred by virtue of their inextinguishable relation to God the Father through Christ and the Spirit".261 The doctrine of sin, therefore, seems to do no harm to humans being in the image of God at the level of their interrelatedness and echoing of the triune God. This ontological relation to God and the rest 257 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 101-103. 258 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 112. 259 " H u m a n relations are to take a form similar to those intrinsic to God's triune being and action alike" ('Trinity and Trustworthiness'. In: Helm, Paul; Trueman, Carl R. (ed.); The Trustworthiness of God. Perspectives on the Nature of Scripture, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids/Cambridge 2002, [275-284] 283). 260 Triune Creator, 203. 261 Triune Creator, 203.

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Of creation cannot be 'extinguished'. Simply in being created, man is part of God's ontology, so that the 'image of God' cannot be taken away. 262 As is clear from Gunton's anti-Gnosticism, part of being in the image of God consists in being a bodily person. "We are material, bodily beings, and are so essentially." 263 Over against neo-Platonic tendencies in the course of the history of theology, Gunton stresses the earthly dimension of the image of God.

3.6 Ethics In this final section describing Gunton's theology, we turn to his ethical considerations. In the first paragraph, we will see how ethics relates to the doctrine of creation (3.6.2). We will then explore Gunton's ethic of sacrifice (3.6.2). Finally, some material ethical points will be distilled out of his publications (3.6.3).

3.6.1 Ethics and the Doctrine of Creation Gunton's view of ethics is intrinsically linked to the doctrine of creation, or rather with human createdness: "It is part of our createdness that what we truly are and do is, or should be, shaped by our relations to our creator. Ethics, as encompassing not simply principles of action but a whole way of being in the world, is thus integral to a Christian doctrine of creation". 264 In this way, ethics forms one of the main and distinctive elements of this Christian doctrine. Being part of an all-encompassing 'ontology', the study of the doctrine of creation is a study of the context in which all human activity we call culture takes shape. "The created world provides the framework within which human activity takes place." 265 In a sense, the doctrine of creation 262 Triune Creator, 204. It is not clear how this can be combined with the criteriological function of Christology (cf. section 3.5.2). 263 Triune Creator, 205. Being embodied also implies the continuity between the h u m a n and the non-human world (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 115; Triune Creator, 227.235). 2 6 4 Triune Creator, 13. 265 The One, the Three and the Many, xiii.

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as a second-order account of our framework concerning our use of, and living in the whole of the created order, is prior to questions of 'polity 7 and 'society'. It is 'more than social ethics alone'. Prior to those concrete themes, the question is: 'What form of human sociality echoes the social being of God and embodies the truth of the creation?' 266 It is clear: being is prior to action - and as such this is an important ethical statement; it implies that ethics for Gunton is primarily about our way of being, and only secondarily about particular issues: "Creation consists [...] of a giving of time and space in which men and women may grow into the maturity for which they are made. Ethics, accordingly, is directed to the right habitation of that time and space. For beings who are not God, a structure is required, and this is given in what are called the two tables of the law."267 As being created means being in the image and likeness of the triune God, an ethic of createdness means treating this relationality with responsibility. Being the 'echo' of the Trinity is a 'moral and social calling' for the Church and its members. 268 The relational concept of 'image of God', which differs from the concept of image as 'lord', dominating the rest of creation by treating it like a machine, is vital for Gunton's conception of the whole of human and the non-human creation, and so for ethics: "Ontology and ethics, creation and redemption, cannot be treated apart from one another." 269 In other words: the doctrine of creation really provides the conceptual framework to invent or discover ethics. As creation is not yet finished but consists in God's continuing project with reality towards the end, the eschatological dimension of the creation-project is important for Gunton's ethics. This can be divided into both active and passive aspects. We will start with the most important aspect, the passive, which can be described in terms of pneumatology. The work of the Spirit is 'sanctification', directed towards God's eschatological goal. The eschaton bears the following consequences for ethics: being one of the three tenses (past, present, future), the future is a dimension of our being present. The Irenean concept of the creation-project causes Gunton to think in terms of a concept of a good beginning, through 266 267 268 269

Actuality of Atonement, 181f. Christian Faith, 49. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 176. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 155.

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dynamic development and orientation, towards a final and purposed end in which man participates in God's plan. 270 In this respect, the human relation to the Spirit is important. It is the eschatological function of the Spirit, who creates 'authentic human reality in the here and now' 271 and also makes God's promises for the end of time possible, thereby overcoming the stains and sins of history. This eschatology is no return to the perfection of the beginning of creation, as with Origen and Augustine, in which the destiny of creation will be 'rolled back into the being of God', but a transformation in which human being participates in offering the creation back to the Creator. 272 The passive aspect of this eschatological orientation is important, for it shows how the ontological relation between the Spirit and man encompasses human activity in a project that God himself had inaugurated and that He will bring to an end. 273 Gunton explicitly notes that, for Christian ethics, the pneumatological stress does not imply some vague human responsibility. On the contrary: "Christian ethics does in certain respects consist in the imitation of Christ and of God, but to rest there is to encourage just that anxious striving which involves a return to the law. The content of sanctification is a freedom to be what one is created to be, a child of God living confidently and unafraid in the creator's world, even when surrounded and threatened by death."274 This relation between human action and our being created does imply some much delimited responsibility. It is our task to realise this perfectedness through our relation to God, through our relation with each other, and through our care of the non-personal creation which cannot be perfected without us. 275 So this ethical assignment encompasses the consequences of sin and evil, and forms the divine purpose with creation as well. 270 Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 115. 271 Enlightenment and Alienation, 103. 272 Theology through the Theologians, 149; cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 115. Gunton relates this activity of the Spirit to the creation out of love by the Father: "The love of the Father is given outward form in the free and urinecessitated creation of a world whose dynamically oriented form is that it should come to be perfected through time and in space in praise of its maker" (Christ and Creation, 96). 273 For the consequences for human activity, see e.g. Christ and Creation, 121; and section 3.6.2. 274 Christian Faith, 150f. 275 Christ and Creation, 96.

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Ethics therefore is part of being human in the responsibility given by our ontological constitution as 'relational beings'. To that degree, Gunton concedes that being the image of God is related to the idea of human stewardship of the creation.276 In this context, man has to be aware of one of the most devastating consequences of evil: that the active and the passive elements of God's eschatologically oriented project of the creation are torn apart. When this occurs, the place of God and man are exchanged. This is - broadly - the case in the history of the Western world, in which man has displaced God in being lord over creation and over his own life. This 'displacement of God' 277 can be traced back to the roots of Enlightenment philosophy. The abolition of God meant a subjection to other 'gods'. This kind of 'idolatry', as Gunton calls it,278 results in a false treatment of the whole of created reality, especially in the current ecological problems with which society is confronted. Human action is no longer the responsible answer to God who created this world out of free love, but it becomes the way in which man creates his world so as to take full control and responsibility of history and reality. At the root of these problems lies the false presupposition that any 'other' or 'otherness' are considered to be a heteronomous alienation and threat to oneself which has to be ruled out.279 Human action also usurps eschatological purposes, in that man becomes the creator of his own future.280 In collaboration with these false eschatologies, the delicate balance in thoelogy was disturbed between creation and redemption on the one hand, and divine action and human response on the other. So human fallibility and sin tend to be ignored in modern theology as well as in modern culture.281 However, as soon as the notion of 'otherness' is evaulated from a Trinitarian point of view, the 'other' is not a threat for the 'self'. The 'other' does not have to be eliminated in order that the 'self' may live, and there is no need for a totalitarian homogenisation to create a safe 276 So Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 115. 277 In The One, the Three and the Many Gunton describes the implications of this development. 278 Cf. The One, the Three and the Many, 39; Triune Creator, 7. 279 "When any human activity becomes the realm of pure will, of a putative creation out of nothing, the problems of particularity and freedom are exacerbated, not solved" (The One, the Three and the Many, 72f). 280 "Responsibility for the end of things as well as for their beginning is displaced from divine to human agency" (The One, the Three and the Many, 90). 281 Cf. The One, the Three and the Many, 93.

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place to live. This Trinitarian framework can treat 'otherness' within a 'relation'. And as soon as 'otherness-in-relation' is considered to be the constitutive ontological framework in which man can live, ethics will be able to treat the other as other with due respect. The 'displacement of God' by man leads to a false human responsibility. Man is now made responsible for the realisation of this perfectness without taking the relation to God into account. There is also a consequence of this 'otherness-in-relation' with respect to our experience of time. As being created means being related to the triune God, it also implies being related in time to God's future, so that we can live adequately as we are: limited in time and space within this world towards the end. This implies the full creational acceptance of man living in the present, not trying to flee - almost Gnosticly - from the present into either past or future. This relation to God and his future is the condition for our offering back our life to God in an 'ethic of sacrifice'. 3.6.2 Ethic of Sacrifice When speaking about an ethic of sacrifice, Gunton is consciously referring to a Christological metaphor. It is in the life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ that the original meaning of God with his creation is revealed. As Jesus' sacrifice takes up humanity in the redeeming activity of restoring the relation between God and man, it makes us participants in the life of God.282 In Jesus' work, the active overcoming of evil is the meaning of his career. But even apart from that, as Gunton's 'prelapsarian' point of view implies, the end of creation is its being offered back to its Creator.283 As the work of the Son cannot be divorced from that of the Father and the Spirit, the whole activity of the triune God can be characterized as 'sacrifice', in that even creation - in the sense of creatio - can be viewed as an unconditional giving of the triune God himself.284 As 282 Actuality of Atonement, 140. 283 Actuality of Atonement, 150. 2 8 4 "It is not a mistake to conceive creation, too as a function of the self-giving of God, in which out of the free, overflowing goodness of his life he gives reality and form to something that is other than he, simply for its own sake" (Actuality of Atonement, 151).

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such, 'sacrifice' indicates and characterizes the whole of God's economic involvement in history. With respect to human responsibility, Gunton uses the metaphor of sacrifice in a threefold way. Firstly, it indicates the offering of man to God, following on Paul's admonition in Romans 12. We have to present ourselves before the throne of God, and therefore we have to relate to other human beings in a specific way. The ethic of sacrifice even functions in an almost criteriological285 manner: "If an act or form of relatedness with ourselves or with other people can be rightly offered to God as the praise of his creation, then it is appropriately called an exercise of the image of God." 286

In offering our bodies back, we paradigmatically offer creation back to its Creator. This offering is a consequence of our being transformed by the renewal of our mind, that we may prove what is the will of God. Secondly, Gunton's ethic of sacrifice gives direction to our treatment of the non-human creation. Man is the 'priest' who has to praise God in offering back the whole of creation to its Creator. In this respect, the ethic of sacrifice is also an ethic of priesthood. The idea that the non-human creation is dependent on human action for its eschatological destination, is an overestimation of human activity which Gunton has ruled out. Therefore, we are - as J.R.R. Tolkien rightly names it - only 'subcreators' on the ground that God is truly Creator. Only on the basis of a Christologically conceived Trinitarian involvement of God in his creation can the true meaning of the created reality be properly dealt with. Thirdly, 'sacrifice' is the correct description of the way in which we have to live a life of 'love'. For love in a sinful world requires the renunciation of the self for the sake of the other and the cost that that may involve.287 Gunton's ethic of sacrifice is represented in his theology of worship. As is outlined in section 3.4.3, it is the creation-project in which this Christian worship is rightly representing the sacrifice by which all human activity is formed. Within the context of worship, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is an example of this ethic of sacrifice. In this, the

2 8 5 Cf. "There is a criterion [for right and wrong], and that is the criterion of sacrifice" (Triune Creator, 235). 286 Christ and Creation, 117. 287 Christian Faith, 151f.

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metaphor of sacrifice is enacted.288 The community of believers offers itself back in worship to God.289 That which is offered back is not, as is rightly rejected in the confrontation between Rome and the Reformation, Christ himself, but "that which he came to realize, the gift to God in worship and life of the perfected creation".290 An ethic of sacrifice is therefore trinitarianly conceived and bears the marks of pneumatology as well 291 Such ethics has to be lived by the Church, which has not only a personal and social being, but is the representative of the whole of the created order: "The materiality of the sacraments reminds us that the transformation of matter292 is at the heart of the Church's being. [...] The gifts of the Spirit are given for the building of that community which is called to praise God in worship and life and so achieve in its worship and work anticipations of the reconciliation of all things in Christ."293 So the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is a visualisation of the communion realised by the relatedness to the triune God.294 It also represents and inaugurates the perfecting of the creation by using the elements of bread and wine.295 As such, the mentioning of the Lord's Supper enables one to maintain the Christological and pneumatological mediation of the doctrine of creation.296 Gunton's ethic of sacrifice gains almost transcendental status in that 'sacrifice', as characterisation of human life and action, is an 'echo' of the Trinitarian life, consisting in a mutual giving and receiving of the

288 Cf. "The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters', 199. Here Gunton borrows Irenaeus' thoughts about the Lord's Supper being the representative offering by the Church of the "whole created order". Bread and wine here are the manufactured natural things as a representation of the whole. 289 Cf. Triune Creator, 234-236. 290 'The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices', 225. 291 Cf. Gunton, Colin E.; 'Christ the Sacrifice. Aspects of the Language and Imagery of the Bible'. In: Hurst, L.D.; Wright, N.T. (edd.); The Glory of Christ in the Neiv Testament, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1987, (229-238) 238. 292 This 'transformation of matter' should not be read in a Roman-Catholic or Lutheran way. It is depicting the eschatological renewal of the 'new world'. 293 Theology through the Theologians, 121. 294 Theology through the Theologians, 203. 295 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 191. 296 Triune Creator, 149 - following on Oswald Bayer. Cf. also Triune Creator, 170, where Gunton refers to Irenaeus' theology.

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Trinity.297 The fact that this 'sacrifice' carries with it elements of giving up or suffering is due only to the consequences of the fall. As such, 'sacrifice' is a function of our fundamental createdness.298 In this sense, 'sacrifice' resembles the transcendental of relationality or sociality.299 3.6.3 Material Ethical Consequences Before mentioning some material ethical consequences of Gunton's ethic of sacrifice, a warning is necessary. Because of Gunton's stress on the passivity of man, and the abuse of his activity as can be seen in the course of history especially after the Enlightenment, his ethics should not be seen as an easy solution to all ethical problems. "The promise is not of solutions, but of the freedom sometimes to share through the Spirit in particular transformations of the world which are signalled by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."300 The gift of conformity to Christ does not provide us with a key that will open all doors, because there are no final solutions. But having said that, we can discern some concrete consequences of Gunton's ethic of sacrifice, following from his Trinitarian ontology of human being. The most evident of these is his mention of the ecological crisis. Along with his treatment of the imago Dei, Gunton criticises the overstressing of the dominium terrae. By treating the created world as a machine, man abuses it for his own sake, forgetting his duty to offer it back to its Creator. This misuse is due to a misconception of human relatedness to the non-human created world and to a misconception of human relatedness to the Creator.301 Human activity in science is indebted to the doctrine of creation in its positive encouragement to properly exercise the stewardship of the creation. At the same time, however, the more 'Faustian' side of science is often attributed to a

297 In Promise of Trinitarian Theology Gunton speaks of creation as "the sheer gift of God, the free giving of shape in otherness to that which echoes eternal giving and receiving of Father, Son and Spirit" in order that "it is our sacrifice - the living sacrifice - which is the human analogy of the Trinity in time" (205f). 298 The One, the Three and the Many, 226. 299 Cf. the remarks in section 3.5.2 on this transcendental. 3 0 0 Christ and Creation, 126. 301 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 13f; 115.

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specific concept of creation.302 In The One, the Three and the Many, Gunton elaborates the consequences of this Faustian side of human activity. His evaluation of the Enlightenment-project is negative: in its attempt to displace God in order to gain freedom, an adequate concept of otherness and relation is harshly ruled out. Having rediscovered this concept by using Coleridge's and Irenaeus' 'ideas', Gunton tries to reorient the project by offering an alternative concept of ontology.303 Thereby the relation between man and non-human nature changes, and it regains a coherent framework over against its modern fragmentation.304 At the level of social ethics, the Enlightenment displacement of God is criticised for its attempt to conceive a concept of society without 'god'. According to Gunton, "God or a focus of worship is inescapable"305 and 'indispensable'.306 Drawing on Calvin,307 Gunton states that once we forget God, we are fabricating idols, because all societies have some god as a kind of ideal or focus of social unity. 'God' in this sense is everything we hang our heart on - as Luther said.308 Unless we consciously worship the triune God, we will live in a 'naked public square' which will soon be filled with many demons.309 Modern culture has done the worst in unconsciously leaving its public life without God. The way in which Gunton would like to propose his Christian view on society (social ethics) might seem somewhat authoritarian. In Gunton's view, however, an alternative kind of 'power' or 'authority7 could be developed. It is not true that in this exertion of power no coercive or punishing elements have a place. It must, for instance, have the power to overcome human sin and obstinacy. But in that, it is a 302 Cf. Triune Creator, 211. 303 Cf. also: "If there is no absolute dualism of soul and body, it follows that w e are ontologically continous with the remainder of the created order. The dispute about whether the biblical doctrine of the image of God is responsible for the ecological crisis finds part of its solution here" (Triune Creator, 211). 3 0 4 So The One, the Three and the Many, 173. 305 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 161. 306 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 158-177 ('The Indispensable God? The Sovereignty of God and the Problem of Modern Social Order'). 307 Inst. I,xi,8. 3 0 8 BSLK 560,22-24. Cf. Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 161 and 168. 309 Referring to Neuhaus' The Naked Public Square and Matthew 12,45 (The One, the Three and the Many, 38-40).

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non-coercive power in love, in the sense that it accepts death on the cross so that the cross becomes the model of not only human but also divine power. 310 In this, the Trinity also contains the possibilities to conceive this pattern of authority. Christus Victor, as one of the three crucial metaphors in Christology, is an exemplary model of this authority. 311 Along with the modern resistance against 'revelation' and any authority giving direction, Gunton develops a kind of authority that does not violate human autonomy, in that it conceives autonomy within its proper relational context. 312 For the question is not 'do we rely on authority' - because everyone does - but 'on what authority do we rely?'. Thus, the concept of authority and power does gain positive value and conceptual force to invent new possibilities for a Christian, trinitarian concept, which can be characterized as the 'authority of grace, the grace of redemption through the cross of Christ'. 313 Finally, Gunton's ethic of sacrifice as an ethic of createdness is exemplified by the life of the Church. As this is an echo of the Trinitarian being-in-communion, within the Church it paradigmatically takes the shape of the Christian life as being-in-communion. 314 The Church is the redeemed sociality in which human beings offer back to the Creator that with which it was bestowed so graciously. It is the community of the saints, rather than a hierarchical institution, so reflecting the triune Being. 315 The Church is the visible communion, exercising a non-coercive power in reflection of Jesus Christ and the Trinitarian involvement in history.

3.7 Concluding Summary This chapter began with the statement that Gunton's theological project contains the conceptualization of a Trinitarian ontology out of the economic involvement of the triune God in the history of his creation. The key term in this ontology is 'otherness-in-relation', which means that the ontological framework of human living and action has to pay 310 311 312 313 314 315

Cf. Yesterday and Today, 218f. Cf. Actuality of Atonement, 180-183. Cf. Brief Theology of Revelation, 31-33. Cf. Theology through the Theologians, (221-242) 242. Cf. section 3.5.1. Cf. Theology through the Theologians, 187-205; Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 56-82.

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due respect to both the substantiality of God, other human beings and the non-human nature, and to the essential relationality that marks true life. In this project, Gunton follows two key figures, Irenaeus and Coleridge, who in their time and context discovered the truth of this ontological framework. Gunton stresses the crucial criteriological function Christology plays in this project, for it is in the 'career' of Jesus Christ that man can discover true substantiality and relationality. The economic involvement of the triune God for Gunton reaches its height in the incarnate God. Within the Christological debate after the Enlightenment, Gunton follows Karl Barth, who rediscovered the value of Trinitarian theology. Only within a Trinitarian framework can the meaning of Jesus' earthly career be discovered. Interpreted in this way, the coming, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ are parts of God's project with creation, and only in the light of Jesus' career can the true meaning of human life be seen. The doctrine of creation, seen within this Trinitarian framework, is an explication of the specific kind of ontology Gunton advocates. For 'being' and 'life' are ordered in some way, related to God, the human species, and the non-human creature. This relation, however, suffers under the consequences of sin, error, and evil. As Jesus Christ came to redeem us for God and redirect the whole of creation to its final end, our relationality can be renewed. The word 'ontology' contains several meanings in Gunton's writings.316 Following both Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth317, Gunton seeks possibilities for theology to articulate the kind of world in which we live. As this world is created by God, human beings should be able to discover its inner rationality and order. There is, however, no direct, immediate connection between the triune God and this world apart from his creational mediation. The concept of creation warrants that God and this world are ontologically distinct substances, and that they are somehow related. So Gunton's Trinitarian doctrine of creation on the one hand functions as the concept that opens the possibility "to understand something of how things are with our world as the creation of God," and on the other provides us with the criteria to explore the concept.

316 Cf. section 3.4.5. 317 Cf. section 3.2.1.

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Such a doctrine of creation encompasses ethics in that it offers a theoretical framework with which human action can be guided. The creation-project is God's ongoing involvement with his creation towards the end. Within this project, man as the image of God has the task to offer this creation back to its Creator so that it arrives at its destined goal, that is, perfection. The cooperation of God and man within this project is part of God's creational mediation and should not be opposed to Gunton's stress on the passivity of man. Gunton's use of the Trinitarian doctrine of creation is an explicit argument against mainstream modern, post-Enlightenment ethics, which view 'reality' (including human beings) as something autonomous in which the non-human creation could be treated as a machine. The doctrine of creation can thus provide some weapons to arm criticism of the Enlightenment-project. Gunton's Trinitarian ontological framework is in part designated as a framework in which sin and evil can be treated adequately. The criteriological function of Christology is an explicit signal that the devastating consequences of the human fall will be overcome by the redemptive activity of the cross and Jesus' resurrection. This victory will be carried out in the project of creation towards its eschatological perfection. With respect to theological ethics, this once more affirms the conviction that human activity cannot save creation.

3.8 Evaluation Here specific critical questions will be asked and some critical remarks will be made with respect to Gunton's Trinitarian doctrine of creation as the framework for theological ethics. In chapter 5 (section 5.6), the whole of Gunton's Trinitarian theology of creation will be evaluated with respect to the themes that are treated there. Firstly, some questions need to be posed about the limits of the Trinitarian framework as a methodological paradigm as used by Gunton. Critics contend that the ontological revolution of the Cappadocians, on which Gunton (following Zizioulas) is founding his project, is not that clear.318 But apart from that, a vital presupposition 318 Both Zizioulas and Gunton claim the Cappadocians (Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa) to have established this 'revolution' (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 8-10).

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for Gunton's project is that the being of the Trinity can somehow be echoed by our created reality. In the course of the history of theology, this project goes under the name of 'analogy7. As Gunton remarks, his project is related in some way to the great systems of Aquinas' analogia entis and Barth's analogia relationis.319 Criticism of these projects always stresses the ontological distinction between Creator and creation, something Gunton could fully agree with.320 His own conception of analogy contains some dangers, and Gunton is aware of these.321 Yet it is possible that his concept appears to be too open to misreading and might be accused of being merely speculative.322 The same suspicion may arise with respect to Gunton's opinion of the 'good beginning' of creation (section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). The reformed notion of the good historical beginning wants to avoid the more idealist speculation of the concept of project concerning its possible outcome. Apart from these dangers, the following must be noted. Gunton's Trinitarian ontology uses the word 'ontology' as a category that encompasses both God and creation. This complicates the matter (at least terminologically). For Gunton sees 'relation' as an 'ontological category7 that constitutes who and what we are. The fact that God and this world are related trinitarianly gives way to "an analogy of relation that generates a kind of analogy of being, for we are concerned with John Wilks is critical of Zizioulas' use of 16-century-old words and terms to decide contemporary discussions, and the lack of evidence Zizioulas provides from the Cappadocian Fathers. The typical orthodox tendency of subordinatianism in Zizioulas is not found in Gunton's theology, as Wilks remarks (Wilks, John G.F.; 'The trinitarian ontology of John Zizioulas'. In: Vox Evangelica X X V [1995], [63-88] 77.79.83f). 319 Cf. section 3.2.1. 320 This is w h y Gunton's project is "less susceptible" to the criticism urged on Zizioulas' project in that the res ens of man could not be warranted completely (Fermer, Richard M.; "The Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a Methodological Paradigm. "Between the Trinity and hell there lies no other choice" (Vladimir Lossky)'. In: NZSTh 41 [1999], [158186] 171). 321 As can be clear from several characterizations of his project, in his own words, as being 'vague and woolly' (The One, the Three and the Many, 143) and 'unfathomable and infinitely suggestive' (The One, the Three and the Many, 153f; cf. 161f). H e even describes it as 'perilous' (The One, the Three and the Many, 167) and speaks about 'caution' (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 73). 322 Cf. Theology through the Theologians, 10; Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 75 and 196 (where he speaks up for himself against the accusation of 'pointless speculation'); The One, the Three and the Many, 167 ('free if guided speculation').

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ontology".323 Creation being ontologically distinct from God implies being related to God; 'being related' in turn implies a kind of allembracing analogy and ontology. This is evident in the following 'definition' of Christian ontology: "That there are no degrees of being but two realities, God and everything else that he has made, the created order,"324 which implies that the word 'ontology' embraces two realities that each can have their own 'ontology' as well. It can be called an internal weakness of Gunton's project that he seems not to be aware of this inconsistency. The category of 'ontology' by definition can hardly be reasonably used in describing both the distinct realities of God and creation, as being 'ontologically distinct', and the relation between them in which the former is a source for the latter, and the latter an echo of the former.325 This is why it is not clear whether it is the triune God or the doctrine of the Trinity that as Idea Idearum gives rise to the created reality with its transcendentals. According to Gunton, the 'doctrine of the Trinity', being 'a way of characterization of the being of God', is as 'idea' 'making known something of the character of the source of all being', while it is 'the triune God' himself who is expected to be 'the source of all being, meaning and truth'. Therefore we must 'suppose that all being will in some way reflect the being of the one who made it and holds it in being'.326 In other words: the theoretical conceptualisation of the inner being of the Trinity in the doctrine of the Trinity gives rise to other theoretical activities, such as the quest for transcendentals as universal marks of all being, because the triune God himself is supposed to be reflected by creation.327

323 Triune Creator, 206. 324 Triune Creator, 54. 325 Fermer criticises the same point in stating that "if Gunton and Zizioulas move from an ontology of God to a general ontology, they have introduced God into the subject matter of metaphysics in a way which Aquinas would never have allowed" ('Limits of Trinitarian Theology', 173). 326 The One, the Three and the Many, 145. 327 A lengthy quotation might serve as an example of this 'theoretical' approach. "The word 'fragmentation' is often used to characterise the apparent disorder that marks modern culture [...]. At the heart of the disorder is a fragmentation of experience, so that our worlds of thought, action and expression appear to exist independently of, or in conflict with one another. The causes of the development are many, but the intellectual shape of the fragmentation can be expressed quite simply. The three great transcendentals of traditional philosophical enquiry - truth, goodness and

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In addition to this apparent internal inconsistency, the use of the doctrine of creation as an intermediate step in order to avoid unwanted pantheistic side-effects is only theoretical. The content of the relation between the material world and God is not clearly described, though Gunton explicitly fights the Gnostic tendencies in all ages.328 How can his theoretical framework refute the charge of 'mere speculation'? Gunton's main solution to this reproach is epistemological. Given his doctrine of creation, there is continuity between our theoretical activities and the material world. Reason is by grace enabled to grasp something of reality in words, so that words can represent reality in a way. Polanyi's concept of 'indwelling reality' is of great help here. Yet this epistemology gives rise to further questions. It is for these epistemological arguments that Gunton develops his theoretical framework by using Coleridge's Idea Idearum in opening up immeasurable possibilities of thought. The Trinitarian ontology, carefully delimited with his doctrine of creation, is 'only' theoretical on the one hand, but - central for his epistemology - practical and 'real' on the other as well. The crux of the argument is the question of how God is related to his creation. The question is, in what kind of relation God stands towards his creation. According to Gunton, this relation can be characterized with the word 'love' as an adequate description of both beauty - are no longer seen to be all truly universal features of our world existing in harmonious interrelationship" ('Foreword'. In: Begbie, leremy S.; Voicing Creation's Praise. Towards a Theology of the Arts, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 21999, [xi-xii] xi). The Christian solution to that fragmentation according to Begbie - who Gunton in this respect joins - has to be found in both Christology and Trinitarian theology for "[i]t is as the one who became incarnate that the eternal Son enables us to encompass at once the sovereignty of God over the world and the goodness of the human culture which takes place on the soil of the material creation" (xii). Therefore, according to Gunton, the explicitly negative 'fragmentation' can be overcome intellectually. 328 In Christology, Gunton fights the dilemma between 'from above' and 'from below'. He relates the different approaches 'from above' and 'from below' to different cultural preoccupations concerning the relation between time and eternity. B. Kamphuis, however, comments that this qualification does not match the real differences between these approaches, which, among other features, do bear consequences on the historical reality of salvation. In fact, Gunton could be said to be too benevolent here towards the Gnostic consequences of the dilemma 'abovebelow' (cf. Kamphuis, Barend; Boven en beneden. Het uitgangspunt van de Christologie en de problematiek van de openbaring, nagegaan aan de hand van de ontwikkelingen bij Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer en Wolßart Pannenberg, Kok: Kampen 1999, 466).

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the innertrinitarian being of God and his motivation to'create. Even the event of the cross is said to be the expression of God's love for his world. This implies that 'being related' almost equals 'loving'.329 Within Gunton's theology, God's action towards human sinfulness is never qualified as 'anger' or 'wrath'. Only with respect to Gunton's treatment of the eschatology and the Last Judgement do these characteristics come into play.330 Arguments from biblical theology, however, could easily be used to nuance this one-sided characterization of God's relation to his creation.331 Gunton himself has somewhat corrected this one-sidedness in his latest publications, in which he gives attention to the notion of the Last Judgement and other, more Calvinist, tones in theology.332 The other side of this argument is that this created reality cannot univocally be considered as 'reflection' or 'echo' of the Trinity. One might critically ask, if the reality of the fall did not severely distort the analogy between God and this world. As we saw in sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, the influence of hamartiology on anthropology and the role of Jesus Christ in the restoration of our being the image of God, is not clear. Whatever attention Gunton gives to the fall and the subsequent evil, sin and distortion, it does not seem that this attention leads to possible answers for concrete ethical questions in the present. The character of our current world is not so 'ideal' that it really reflects the being of God, which is the ground for the existence of ethics at all. Whereas Gunton does not pay attention to the consequences of the fall for the character for the relation between God and this world and vice versa, the impact for ethics that reaches further than a description of one's directedness, for this reason is somewhat disappointing. 329 To give one example: "Without a foundation for culture in a doctrine of creation that affirms both the trustworthiness of creation and its basis in the love of God w h o is faithful and reliable, there is no escape from the permanent threat of the void" ('Trinity and Trustworthiness', 277). This 'trustworthiness' of God, however, is 'hardwon'. But the fact that the created world is not as it should be does not change this 'love'. Even the appeal to God's promises with respect to God's trustworthiness (278f) is, according to m y opinion, misleading. For these promises of God as testified in Scripture are not only positive or 'loving'. 330 Cf. Christian Faith, 157-172. 331 Cf. e.g. Paas, Stefan; Schepping en oordeel. Een onderzoek naar bij enkele profeten uit de achtste eeuw, Groen: Heerenveen 1998. 332 Christian Faith, 161-166; Intellect and Action, passim.

scheppingsOoorstellingen

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Gunton's Trinitarian Doctrine of Creation

Gunton's Trinitarian doctrine of creation is an attempt to overcome major failures in the history of Western theology which he ascribes to Augustine. This mostly negative reading of Augustine itself could be criticised, but that is not part of this study.333 Following the metaphysical solutions of Hegel and others and not explicitly taking the theology of the Reformers to the centre of his theology, Gunton wants to combine the rediscovery of the Trinity and the recent attempts to reframe modernity and the consequences of the Enlightenment. The aforementioned critical remarks show that this attempt is not immediately convincing. Is Gunton's framing of an ontology itself the most apt instrument in overcoming metaphysical failures? In order to look for an answer to this question, we now turn to the theology of Oswald Bayer. His use of the Lutheran heritage of Hamann can provide us with the tools to further explore this question.

3 3 3 Cf. the (unpublished) dissertation by Bradley G. Green: Colin Gunton and the Failure of Augustine: An Exposition and Analysis of the Theology of Colin Gunton in Light of Augustine's De Trinitate (Baylor University, Waco, Texas).

4 Bayer's Doctrine of Creation as God's Promise 4.1 Introduction T h e t h e o l o g y of O s w a l d B a y e r c a n b e s u m m a r i s e d w i t h t h e k e y w o r d promissio.1

It is t h e title of his d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d Habilitationsschrift.

w o r d promissio promissio

The

is t h e m a t r i x of his w r i t i n g s , as B a y e r e x p l a i n s . 2 A s s u c h ,

f u n c t i o n s as a c r i t e r i o n . ' E v e r y d o g m a t i c s t a n d p o i n t h a s its

c r i t e r i o n in t h e o c c u r r i n g of the promissio'.3

In the c o u r s e of this c h a p t e r ,

this c r i t e r i o n a n d B a y e r ' s u s e o f it will b e e x p l a i n e d . D e s p i t e his o w n c o n v i c t i o n a b o u t this c r i t e r i o n for t h e w h o l e of t h e o l o g y , B a y e r d i d n o t d i r e c t l y a p p l y this insight t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f c r e a t i o n ; it t o o k s o m e t i m e before

he

'dared'

to

do

so. 4

Creation

within

this

'promissional'

f r a m e w o r k is v i e w e d as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is c a l l e d into e x i s t e n c e

by

God's promising W o r d . To be created by God m e a n s being inescapably p a r t o f t h e Wortwechsel creation-theology

( c o n v e r s a t i o n ) . B a y e r ' s ethics f o l l o w f r o m this

m o r e o r less logically: t h e f r e e d o m t o act is t h e

r e s p o n s e m a d e p o s s i b l e b y c r e a t i o n as a d d r e s s . 5

1

2

3

4

5

As most of Bayer's publications are in German, I will give my own translations of the quotations. In the footnote I will quote the original German text. Where an official English translation exists, I will use the English text without including the German original. "'Promissio' ist zur Matrix meiner gesamten systematisch-theologischen Arbeit geworden; diese orientiert sich an der die reformatorische Theologie Luthers bestimmenden promissio Dei, an Gottes Heilszuspruch" (Promissio. Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie, Darmstadt 21989, 1). "Es ist meine Überzeugung, dass alle dogmatischen Sätze im Geschehen der promissio ihr Kriterium haben." (Promissio, 1). Cf. Oswald Bayer'. In: Henning, Christian; Lehmkühler, Karsten (Hrsg.); Systematische Theologie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1998, (300-315) 304. "Es hat lange gedauert, bis ich wagte, den Promissio-Begriff als Schlüsselbegriff auch für die Schöpfungslehre geltend zu machen und Gottes schöpferisches Handeln als 'Anrede' wahrzunehmen" ('Selbstdarstellung', 304). Cf. the titles: Freiheit als Antwort (Zur theologischen Ethik, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1995) and Schopfitng als Anrede (Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen pi986] 21990).

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Before we turn to the relation between the promissional understandings of both the doctrine of creation and theological ethics, we have to explain the promisszo-criterion and how it can be used by theology in its scientific context. In the first section, promissio as a matrix will be explained systematically. It ends with a description of the soteriological context of the promissio, which is constitutive for Bayer's view of theology as a whole (4.2). The promissio is used to interpret the world, and as such it competes and conflicts with rival interpretations (4.3). In order to be able to enter into the conflict-arena, Bayer develops his own concept of 'critical mediation' between theology and other disciplines, which he owes to Johann Georg Hamann, who explored the critical value of Luther's theology in the time of the Enlightenment. I will describe Bayer's opinion about 'freedom' in order to clear the way for the treatment of ethics as the free response to God's address (4.4). Within the context of the worldview debate, the doctrine of creation can be considered as a worldview itself. In section 4.5, Bayer's doctrine of creation as a hermeneutic of experience will be discussed. The last section deals with the ethical consequences that follow from Bayer's understanding of the created world as product of God's promissio (4.6).

4.2 Promissio as God's Speech-act Because the category of promissio is fundamental for Bayer's theology, we have to define what is meant by it. Therefore we trace Bayer's use of it back to his dissertation and Habilitationsschrift, in which promissio is outlined as the reformational discovery par excellence of Martin Luther (4.2.2). The rest of this section 4.2 will indicate the systematictheological implications of Bayer's use of the promissio. Instead of giving an elaborate summary of the material consequences, I will here discuss the systematic-theological use of Bayer's founding category and matrix. In section 4.2.2, the implications of God's promissio for man will be briefly indicated. Bayer's use of the promz'sszo-category is closely connected to his view of God's way of acting in and towards his creation (4.2.3). This has consequences for his view of language in general and theological language in particular (4.2.4). All this has implications for the context in which promissio stands, or rather the context that is created by God's promissio (4.2.5).

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4.2.1 Promissio as Luther's Reformational Discovery In an essay narrating the interplay between his autobiography and his theological development, Bayer states that Barth's theology of the Word had a great influence on him.6 It was only when he became familiar with Luther that Bayer became critical of the dialectical Wordtheology. For in Barth's theology the worldliness of God's Word and its time-space-extent were severely criticised. In the Lutheran framework, however, the word of God is not only mediated by sensory means but it also creates the space in which it can be heard. This was the reason why Bayer in the early sixties took up the study of Luther's conception of this divine Word. This study is an examination of what exactly was reformed about Luther's theology, and is part church history and part systematic theology. In this section, I will not evaluate the succes of Bayer's attempt to grasp Luther's category of the promissio, so important for Bayer. We review this inner-Lutheran debate about the 'when' and 'what' of Luther's reformational discovery only in order to focus on the way in which this category could become the 'matrix' and 'criterion' for Bayer's theology. Bayer explicitly places himself in the tradition of Ernst Bizer, who was Bayer's teacher in Bonn and who summarises the debate about the dating of Luther's reformational 'conversion' in his book Fides ex auditu.7 Bizer encouraged the study of the question of when this reformational conversion exactly took place, along with the question of what this conversion contained. According to Bizer, most scholars agree on the fact that this conversion has something to do with Luther's understanding of God's justice. This is clear from Luther's Foreword to the Collected Writings of 1545.8 Luther here states that the true interpretation of Romans 1,17 was the key to open the door to paradise.9 6 7

8 9

'Selbstdarstellung', 303f. Bizer, Ernst; Fides ex auditu. Eine Untersuchung über die Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen [ Ί 9 5 8 ] 2 1961, 9-14. Cf. also Brecht, Martin; Martin Luther [Bd. 1], Calwer Verlag: Stuttgart 1981, (173-230) 215f. Brecht locates the reformational turn in Luther's understanding of God's justice (219f), more precisely in the role of penitence in the process of becoming justified by God (229f). WA 54; 179-187. " O d e r a m enim vocabulum istud 'Iustitia Dei' [...] pulsabam tamen importunus eo loco P a u l u m [Romans 1,17], ardentissime sitiens scire, quid S. Paulus vellet [...] Hie

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He himself dated this insight to the time of his beginning his second treatment of the Psalms (1518). When did Luther gain his new perspective? This question is closely connected with the (systematic theological) content of this perspective. What was Luther's conversion about? Those who date his conversion before 1517 are impressed by the many indications of 'reformational' thinking by Luther in this early period. 10 When exactly the conversion, as described by Luther in 1545, took place is not certain among these scholars. Bizer himself wanted to acknowledge Luther's own autobiographical statement and looked for the decisive interpretation of iustitia Dei in connection with Romans 1,17 in his writings from his first lectures on the Psalms to his late works. Bizer came to the conclusion that Luther's understanding of God's justice lay in the connection of God's Word with this iustitia,u This leads to the dating of Luther's so-called Turmerlebnis in the spring or early summer of 1518 and its consisting in the discovery of the Word as means of grace. 12 Bayer follows this late dating of Luther's conversion in his Lutherinvestigation. He looked for the essence of Luther's reformational conversion, which he eventually found in the reformulation of the relation of promissio and fides as Luther described in his 1520 book on the Babylonian Captivity of the Church. 13 After having defended this as Luther's central point, Bayer shows how and when this core

10

11

12

13

me prorsus renatum esse sensi, et apertis portis in ipsam paradisum intrasse [...] Iam quanto odio vocabulum 'iustitia Dei' oderam ante, tanto amore dulcissimum mihi vocabulum extollebam, ita mihi iste locus Pauli fuit vere porta paradisi" (WA 54; 185,17f; 186,If; 186,8f; 186,14-16 [Vorrede zum 1. Band der Opera Iatina 1545]). "Es besteht die Möglichkeit, dass der Fehler gar nicht [...] in grundsätzlichen Schwierigkeiten liegt, sondern vielmehr darin, dass man unter dem überwältigenden Eindruck der Beschäftigung mit dem 'jungen' Luther die eigene Datierung Luthers nicht wirklich ernst genommen hat" (Bizer, Fides ex auditu, 13). "Die Sache selbst [sc. der iustitia Dei passim] fordert ja diese dreifache Deutung: der Glaube entsteht als Werk Gottes, das er im Menschen wirkt; er gibt Gott recht in seinem Urteil über uns; aber vor allem und über allem: er umfasst das Wort, das ihm angeboten wird" (Bizer, Fides ex auditu, 171). The Statement of his investigation is, that - "dem Verfasser selbst zur Überraschung" as Bizer writes - "das 'Erlebnis' auf das Frühjahr oder den Sommer 1518 anzusetzen ist und dass die Entdeckung darin besteht, dass Luther das Wort als das Gnadenmittel entdeckt hat" (Bizer, Fides ex auditu, 7 [Vorwort]). "Wir sehen in der nach dieser Schrift [i.e. 'Von der babylonischen Gefangenschaft der Kirche', 1520] verstandenen Relation von promissio und fides den Kristallisationspunkt der reformatorischen Theologie Luthers" (Promissio, 12).

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105

reformational understanding of the relation of promissio and fides can be traced in Luther's writings before 1520. Apparently, Luther's understanding of promissio is closely related to his changed understanding of the term verbum in the context of the sacrament of penance.14 In his earlier period, Luther - along with the whole of the late-mediaeval tradition - saw God's word primarily as a word of judgement. In this word, God's grace is hidden and can only be experienced sub contrario. As such, the word of God is univocal in judgement but its effect is two-sided in that it results in judgement and grace - the latter being sub contrario. The believer is urged to seek his existence outside himself, in Jesus Christ. Not only is the believer never certain how his existence is judged by God, he can also never be sure about the character of God, while the judging God is as present as the graceful-God, and the deus absconditus is as near to the believer as the deus revelatus. This affects even the concept of God, according to Bayer, which shows an 'endless regression' (regressus in infinitum) in the movement of man towards his own salvation. Being part of this movement, man is never sure about God's positive judgement, which causes him to strive for a permanent exinanitio.K

Bayer's conclusion on Luther's early understanding of God's word in this context is that space as well as the essence of human existence can only be found along the via negationis: 'What is called "God", can only be said out of the denial and renunciation of human selfrealisation, only out of human need.'16 Such a via negationis eventually has consequences for Christology. God is only to be found as the Crucified one. Jesus Christ is the 'Urbild' of this negative view, in which man is doomed to penitence. The paradoxical turn is made on the cross, where God changes total negation of human existence into full recognition of it, death into life. The Christian has to follow this 14 15

16

In the following, Bayer's 'Conclusive summary' ("Rückblick") is summarised (Promissio, 339-351). "Die Einheit Gottes spricht sich nicht (wie nach Luthers reformatorischer Auffassung) in der Eindeutigkeit des mündlichen Vergebungswortes zu, u m so den Menschen in heilsame Gewissheit zu sammeln, sondern legt sich in der Bewegung ständiger exinanitio aus, in der m a n des Heils nicht gewiss ist, ja, u m ihrer Dauer willen, nicht gewiss sein darf" (Promissio, 340). " W a s 'Gott' ist, kann nur als Verneinung und Verwerfung des Versuchs menschlicher Selbstverwirklichung, kann nur von der menschlichen Bedürftigkeit aus gesagt w e r d e n " (Promissio, 339).

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example in his own life by putting his life in Christ. The Word of God urges people to follow this example. The image of Christ is constitutive for the existence of the Christian, who has to become identical in shape to this image by his penitence. There is no authority of the spoken Word of forgiveness to which the Christian can take refuge.17 These mediaeval conceptions concentrate on the sacrament of penance, i.e. on the way in which the spoken words function within the context of this sacrament. On this point Luther for the first time realised that the saying Ego te absolvo is not meant as a descriptive act, in that the priest could establish the feelings of penitence on the basis of which he could absolve the believer. 'That the spoken words themselves are the res, that they do not represent something absent but something present: that was Luther's great hermeneutical discovery, his really "reformational" discovery,' according to Bayer.18 The words spoken at the sacrament of penance are no declaratory act but a 'speech-act', so that Bayer very briefly summarises Luther's reformational conversion in this sentence: 'The absolution-formula does not detect, but it constitutes.'19 The formula is the legitimate promise which works immediately by the power that is given to it by God himself.20 Within the context of the sacrament of penance, this view meant a rift in the traditional Augustinian hermeneutic in which the signum of the sacrament has to become the res of God's gift. Luther supposed that the signum of the Word itself effectuated the gift of God. The believer (shortly: faith) accepts God's word, spoken by the priest, and by doing so he accepts the signum and res. According to Bayer, this is Luther's fundamental hermeneutical discovery.21 This understanding of God's word, the promissio, is transferred from the context of the sacrament of 17

Promissio, 340f.

18

"Dass das sprachliche Zeichen selbst schon die Sache ist, dass es nicht eine abwesende, sondern eine anwesende Sache darstellt: das war Luthers grosse hermeneutische Entdeckung, seine im strengen Sinne reformatorische Entdeckung" (Promissio, 6).

19 20 21

"Das Absolutionswort konstatiert nicht, sondern konstituiert" (Promissio, 6). Luther's promissio is "rechtskräftige Zusage mit sofortiger Wirkung" (Promissio, 347). Bayer states that the old "deklaratorische Verständnis des Wortes und mit ihm die augustinische Unterscheidung von signum und res" has been overcome by Luther, and the "Suffizienz des Glaubens ohne augustinischen Spiritualismus, weil allein mit der Effizienz des mündlichen Heilswortes" has been firmly stated (Promissio, 346). Cf. Bayer, Oswald; Theologie [HST 1], Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1994, 443).

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penance to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper as well. In the words pro me, God gives himself without condition. As such, these words form the core of the proclamation of the gospel itself.22 This is the reason why the believer's faith cannot function as a condition for being saved by God. Faith is not prior to God's promissio but is created by His promissio. Bayer's description of what exactly was entailed in Luther's reformational experience can be briefly described here. Luther's reformation has generally been described as concerning 'justification by faith alone'. Though true, this has to be formulated more precisely, according to Bayer. Luther's conversion originates from the sacrament of penance. The right sequence of promissio and fides plays an important role within the context of this sacrament, and from there also in the context of the other sacraments and loci. Man receives his salvation from the faith (fides), which in his turn is constituted by trusting the Word of God (promissio). To believe is to trust in the promise as speechact which does what it says.23 Bayer evaluates Luther's reformational discovery as a hermeneutical one by means of which the relation between God and man is described as one in which man is primarily 'passive'.

4.2.2 Promissio and the Passivity of Man If it is God's word that works out what it says, it is the absolution by God upon which the efficacy of the sacrament of penance depends. Thus, man need not aim at the full exinanitio in its specific late mediaeval form of the via negationis. This is true - at least - within the context of soteriology. Man is saved only by the grace bestowed on him by God. Bayer explores this theme in his treatment of human faith (fides). In Bayer's opinion, faith is God's work. As such, faith is even the

22

Cf. Promissio, 347.

23

This is w h y Bayer agrees with Luther's description of the reformational experience in 1545 as 'justification out of faith', which, nevertheless, has to be stated precisely as trusting in the adressed promise of God: "Darin, dass das Stichwort 'Glaubensgerechtigkeit' sich als Abbreviatur der Thesen über promissio und fides darstellt, so aber umgekehrt von diesen ausgelegt sein will, lassen sich die Rückblicke der Praefatio und der Genesisvorlesung in ihrem Konvergenzpunt wiedererkennen" (Promissio, 4).

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same as justitia Dei.24 The passivity of man with respect to his faith is the first and most important thing to say about faith.25 To believe is to be resting in God's grace to which nothing can be added. 'Faith' is the 'way of being' of the believer which is, in the strictest sense of the word, a passive 'bestowing'26 of God's grace.27 Man's passivity is obvious in the reformation view of soteriology: solo Christo is man justified by God. Though Bayer is aware of the soteriological context and origin of human passivity, he is very keen on following the same line into other areas of the Christian faith. He summarises a common caricature that is made of the Lutheran Christian: the Lutheran is, according to that view, kept in a dark room. He walks through the room but cannot see anything. Meanwhile he seeks deliverance by muttering one sentence to himself: Ί am saved through faith alone; I am saved through faith alone; I am saved through faith alone.'28 In this caricature, the passivity of man is - though stated firmly - not offered full scope to develop itself. Bayer himself at least wants to correct this view of Luther's and Lutheran theology, while asserting that this focus is no disadvantage but rather of great benefit to the openness and breadth of theology. Bayer describes the character of the passivity of man and the consequences of this passivity by referring to the sacrament of the 24

25

26

27

28

"Der Glaube, mit der Gottesgerechtigkeit eins, ist keine Tüchtigkeit oder Tat [...]. [E]r ist vielmehr [...] 'ein göttliches Werk in uns, das uns wandelt und neu gebiert aus Gott \John 1,13] und tötet den alten Adam, macht uns ganz andere Menschen von Herzen, Mut, Sinn und allen Kräften' [cf. Deuteronomy 6,5]" (Leibliches Wort. Reformation und Neuzeit in Konflikt, Mohr/Siebeck Tübingen 1992,32f). "Faith is wholly and entirely God's work. It is not our o w n decision, interpretive activity, or construction of meaning. This is the first and most important thing that w e have to say about faith" (Living by Faith. Justification and Sanctification, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 2003, 20; cf. Aus Glauben leben. Über Rechtfertigung und Heiligung, Calwer Verlag: Stuttgart 2 1990, 29). Bayer uses the w o r d 'Widerfahrnis' (mostly in the plural form 'Widerfahrnisse', in order to avoid any kind of monistic singularity) (Theologie, 413-418). I translate 'Widerfahrnis' with 'bestowing'. "Nicht etwas am Menschen, sondern sein Sein selbst ist der Glaube, das Angewiesensein darauf, dass mir das Leben und das z u m Leben Notwendige gegeben wird. Das Warten darauf und das sich danach Ausstrecken ist Glauben, zugleich mein Sein, wenn anders dies aus lauter Güte und, gegen die Bedrohung, aus lauter Barmherzigkeit gewährt w i r d " (Leibliches Wort, 21). Bayer treats this caricature of the 'sola fide' (probably stemming from Swedeborg) in: Leibliches Wort, 19f.

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Lord's Supper as paradigmatic. It is the Lord Jesus Christ who gives himself to the community of believers through the words, 'This is my body for you'. Bayer calls this formula the Gabewort of the Lord's Supper: a word in which the gift and grace of God are constitutive for the understanding of the sacrament. This passivity of the recipient is present in many texts of Luther where he extrapolates it to the being of man in relation to the being of God. In his analysis of Luther's song Nun freut

euch,

lieben

Christen

g'mein,

Bayer characterizes the 'ontology'

of the Christian - his way of being - as a 'communicative being', in that the believer finds himself within the context of God's loving and giving being. In this song the believer speaks of himself in the form of 'the dative of being given to', so that the believer is 'receptive' and 'passive'. Our salvation is communicated to us, given to us 'in the bodily word' of baptism and the Lord's Supper. By God's address to us, the believer is part of the 'conversation' within the triune God himself.29 The sacraments are paradigmatic in that man is passively being saved by the grace of the giving of God himself through Jesus Christ. Through faith, the believer can experience this 'bestowing' in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. It is here that the passivity of man can be felt: 'in the fellowship of celebration and joy man can experience himself not in the first place as doer but as someone to whom something has been given'.30

4.2.3 Promissio and the Concept of Mediation Though the passivity of man within the context of the doctrine of the sacraments can also be worked out in other areas, such as anthropology (cf. section 4.5.5), I will first turn to another systematic-theological element in Bayer's theology that is heavily dependent on Luther's promissio. As man is considered to be primarily passive because of God's promissio, God is seen as the essential actor in the relationship between God and man. The question is, how this relation, how God himself, is experienced within our reality. By which means does God 29

30

Man is "empfangend - 'passiv' - in das innere Gespräch Gottes von vornherein einbezogen" and our salvation happens to him passively, which happens to us "in das leibliche Wort der Taufe und des Herrenmahls" (Leibliches Wort, 120). "In der Gemeinsamkeit des Feierns und der Freude erfährt sich der Mensch nicht zuerst als Täter, sondern als Beschenkter" (Leibliches Wort, 333).

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relate to man? On this matter, Bayer firmly rejects all kinds of attempts to spiritualise this relationship. Bayer affirms that God is not present and related to us in a spiritual way, but by created means, so that his presence is always a mediated one. This mediation can take the form of language and matter. For this reason, Bayer's third collection of essays bears the meaningful title Leibliches Wort, i.e. 'Bodily Word'. The title comes from the Augsburg Confession in its fifth article, where it is emphasised against the enthusiasts31: God's 'word' is always 'bodily' mediated to us by matter or language. Because Bayer emphasizes the possibilities of experiencing God's promissio within the context of the created world, he examines extensively the way in which this 'experience of faith' has to be viewed. The consequences of this possibility of experience, with respect to the way in which the study of theology should be organized, and its consequences for the person of the theologian will be treated in section 4.3.

The stress on 'mediation' is, according to Bayer, the way to deal with the danger of spiritualising within theology. This danger arose in the days of Luther from the Anabaptist side, from those who denied that the Holy Spirit works through created means and stated instead that He works directly. Since the conflict between Luther and the Anabaptists, this concept of mediation evoked severe complaints up to the Enlightenment. Bayer treats this critique in two essays in Leibliches Wort.32 His starting-point is the Lutheran understanding of theology, in which "God is the definitively human God, who wills to take everyone and bring everything into community with him which is concretely accorded through bodily mediation".33 In a compact way, Bayer connects 'bodily' with 'institutional'. Institutional means God's creating and sustaining activity which works through created patterns, through visible, tangible, and graspable means. Body is taken in the fullest sense of the word: it is the sum of soul, heart, material corpus, and spirit. This 31

" U n d werden verdammt die Wiedertäufer und andere, so lehren, dass wir ohn das leiblich Wort des Evangelii den heiligen Geist durch eigene Bereitung, Gedanken und Werk erlangen" (BSLK 58,11-15).

32

'Gesetz und Evangelium' and 'Leibliches Wort. Öffentlichkeit des Glaubens und Freiheit des Lebens' (Leibliches Wort, 35-56; 57-72). The last essay is also available in English: 'Notae ecclesiae'. In: Lutheran Contributions to the Missio Dei, Lutheran World Federation: Geneva 1984,69-82.

33

'Notae ecclesiae', 70 (Leibliches Wort, 57).

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stress on 'bodily mediation' experienced great resistance within the context of the Enlightenment-era of the eighteenth century. Bayer describes this resistance as directed against the 'institutional' character of thinking, living, and being. The 'bodily word', however, is 'not something incidental and negligible', as the Enlightenment thought, but functions as that which 'grounds justifying faith'. God's bodily presence - his mediation - is not part of faith but constitutes it. The subjectivity of modernity wants to capture even its very constituting elements within the process of self-constitution, or to view these elements as innate.34 'This subjectivism of m o d e r n times a n d of neo-Protestantism gives rise to the kind of attitude rejected b y the Confession of A u g s b u r g as that of the spirituals, fanatics a n d enthusiasts w h o a p p e a l e d against the bodily, external W o r d , to the " i n n e r " W o r d ' . 3 5

This bodily, external element conflicts with subjectivity as described by modernity. By way of illustration, Bayer uses the example of social institutions. How do institutions on the one hand, and subjectivity and freedom on the other, relate? According to Hegel, dangerous and undetermined subjectivity is shaped by historical forces, which can be rationally understood on the basis of God's becoming man and His death on the cross.36 Historically embodied social forms are not capable of creating free subjectivity, but free subjectivity is what is being shaped. Hegel began with a presupposed general Christianity, taking a Christian 'spirit' for granted. Thus, the reformation means by which the Augsburg Confession, for example, thought human subjectivity to be shaped and inaugurated, became irrelevant. Man has only to become aware of some presupposed free subjectivity: 34

35 36

'Notae ecclesiae', 74. Cf.: "[D]ies in solchem Sinne Institutionelle des 'leiblichen Wortes' zu betonen und festzuhalten, ist kein beliebiges Moment, das auch wegfallen könnte, sondern das, was den rechtfertigenden Glauben begründet und sich nicht in diesen hineinnehmen lässt, sondern sich gegen solche Vereinnahmung sperrt. Die neuzeitliche Subjektivität dagegen sucht auch noch ihre Vorgabe in sich hineinzunehmen oder wenigstens immer schon in sich - und sei es im Gefühl schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit - vorzufinden" (Leibliches Wort, 59). 'Notae ecclesiae', 71 (Leibliches Wort, 59). "Hegel erkennt das epochale Problem des Verhältnisses von Subjektivität und Institutionalität am schärfsten. Der gefährlichen Leere der Subjektivität sieht er durch die Macht des geschichtlich Wirklichen gesteuert, das aufgrund der Menschwerdung Gottes und seines Todes als vernünftig begriffen werden kann" (Leibliches Wort, 61).

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"'This is the great principle" of the Reformation and of the Lutheran Confessions, "that all externality disappears in the point of the absolute relation to God; along with this externality, this estrangement of self, all servitude has also disappeared"'.37 Alternatively, Bayer insists on the external promissio that constitutes the freedom, which is taken for granted within Hegel's philosophy. For Bayer, free subjectivity does not have to be formed, the forms create free subjectivity. Bayer calls Hegel's system a kind of 'enthusiasm of the inwardness and content of consciousness', 38 against which Luther states the 'external signs' in, with and under which the Church not only can be known, but is constituted as well, and of which the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is an example. This sacrament is constituted by the tangible, bodily elements of wine and bread, which constitute community through the words (promissio) which are spoken with it. As the (Hegelian) concept of 'Spirit' (Geist) is opposed to Bayer's concept of mediation, Bayer elaborates the opposition of 'Geist' and 'mediation' in several ways. Though Geist bears the connotation of 'new', 'exciting' and 'lively 7 , it is nevertheless mediated in old and bodily words and characters. God's promissio is not only handed over and handed down in these characters, but is handed over 'to' them. 39 In this way, the Bible is not mere talk about its centre, Jesus Christ, but proclamation of him. 40 By the process of mediation of the Spirit in and by the written and spoken words, the specific Christian interaction of Spirit and written characters can be achieved. 41 'Apparently God does not speak, work, or act immediately, without mediation, indirectly - although he could; he just does not want to. He wants to reach his creatures by created means: creation, maintaining, steering and leading to the end, to the completion - by created means, mediators, messengers.'42 37

'Notae ecclesiae', 74 (Leibliches Wort, 64).

38 39

'Notae ecclesiae', 74 (Leibliches Wort, 64). "Gott hat seinen Schwur, sein Ehrenwort gegeben und dies nicht nur im Buchstaben überliefert, sondern dem Buchstaben überliefert, ihm anvertraut" (Gott als Autor. Zu einer poietologischen Theologie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1999,212). Gott als Autor, 213. Gott als Autor, 215. "Offenbar redet, wirkt, handelt Gott nicht unmittelbar, nicht unvermittelt, nicht direkt - obwohl er es könnte; aber er will es nicht. Er will seine Geschöpfe durch kreatürliche Mittel erreichen: schaffen, erhalten, lenken und z u m Ziel, zur Vollendung führen, durch kreatürliche Mittel, Mittler, Vermittler, Boten" (Gott als

40 41 42

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Bayer here confines God's action to that which is mediated.43 With this reduction of the way in which God acts, Bayer firmly resists any kind of speculation about the nature of God's acting apart from the mediated form in which we can experience Him. The process of mediation is therefore the only way in which God chooses to communicate with man and so the only possibility for man to experience God. Promissio in connection with the concept of mediation is, therefore, an expression of a specific view of the process of learning. Knowledge of God is not already present, to be dispensed only by the teacher or minister, but is given in the course of a process, constituted by the mediated promissio. Belief is not latently present, but is constituted by the promissio. This consequence will be explored in section 4.4, as this entails reassessing the peculiarly modern context in which these theories arose. In summary, we conclude that Bayer's concept of mediation stems from Luther's struggle with spiritualising tendencies in Anabaptism. Bayer applied it to the Enlightenment-theories of man's self constitution that assumed that mankind already possessed freedom and subjectivity (Hegel) or that he was able to achieve them on his own (Kant). Bayer, however, stresses the bodily mediation of God's promissio, as experienced in the spoken and written words of the liturgy and the bible, as well as in the context of the sacraments. For God's promissio constitutes what it says. As the metaphor of God's speech and the concentration on the bodily mediation of the promissio have great consequences for his theory of language, we now turn to Bayer's understanding of language. 4.2.4 Promissio and Language The concept of promissio is primarily a question of constitutive language within the context of the sacraments and the language of the bible. The priest (or minister) who utters the words is, as is his duty,

43

Autor, 230). Cf.: "Das Erstaunliche und einer spiritualistischen Gotteslehre höchst Anstössige geschieht, dass Gott sein gebendes und vergebendes Versprechen durch Menschenmund und andere kreatürliche Mittel - wie das Wasser der Taufe - gibt" (Gott als Autor, 4). For further consequences for Bayer's doctrine of God, see 4.5.7. Cf. Gott als Autor, 137. Bayer here states that God could, as Creator, work immediately, "[a]ber er wollte und will es nicht".

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communicating God's words that constitute what they promise. The text of the bible is a vehicle of God's speech as well. Bayer calls this promissional language verbum ejficax. Such promise is not mere descriptive language, but it is constitutive. Jesus Christ can be characterized as 'the Word' in this sense. It is efficacious language. It is the Word that says: Let there be light! And there was light (Genesis 1,3). Be freed from your suffering! (Mark 5,34) and she was freed. Your sins are forgiven! (Mark 2,5) and they were forgiven.44 Bayer's view of language as verbum efficax affects not only the status of liturgical or theological language but also has implications for his general theory of language. Bayer insists on the linguistic character of reason especially within the context of the relation between language and reason. In this sense, there is no 'pure reason', for 'reason is, created by God's promissional word, linguistic'.45 This linguistic view of reason affects Bayer's anthropology, for man cannot only be characterized as animal rationale, but this ratio is from the outset linguistic reason, so that man is Sprachwesen (linguistic being). Any attempt to construe a kind of reason that is abstracted from language (or mediation in general) is doomed to fail, according to Bayer. Such an attempt can only be seen as a kind of revolution against the way in which God chooses to communicate with man, and against the way in which man is constituted.46 Furthermore, language is not limited to 'the spoken word'. Metaphorically, every creature can be said to 'speak'. So everything contains God's message, as everything can be seen as an angel (messenger) of God.47 This means that the material mediation of God's relation with this world can be put in terms of a 'conversation' between God and his creatures 48 By describing this relation between God and

44 45 46 47

48

Cf.: "[D]as Wort, das dies alles wirkt, [ist] keine immanente Möglichkeit des Menschen und seiner Welt, sondern das Wort, das Gott ist" (Gott als Autor, 2). "Die Vernunft aber ist, durch Gottes promissionalen Sprachodem geschaffen, sprachlich" (Gott als Autor, 9). Cf. Gott als Autor, 4.8.229. " E s kann also, w e n n von Gottes 'Engeln' die Rede ist, nicht u m ein Mehr, u m etwas Zusätzliches zu Gottes Gegenwart oder u m etwas von ihr Unterschiedenes gehen, sondern allein um die konkrete Art und Weise dieser Gegenwart" (Gott als Autor, 230). "Die im Wortwechsel mit Gott lebende Welt und Menscheit hat ihre Geschichte darin, dass sie in Geschichten verflochten ist" (Autorität und Kritik. Zu Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1991,195). Cf. Gott als Autor, 221f.

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115

the world as 'conversation', Bayer gives an interpretation of Luther's promissio, 'for God never had to do with man in another way than in the Word of Promise. And the other way around: we cannot have to do with God in another way than believing his Word of Promise'. 49 By extrapolating the metaphor of language to everything that one can possibly experience, Bayer confirms his view of language as a 'speech-act'. God's saying is not merely describing, but is always something that constitutes reality. As this is true for His speech within the context of creation, it also applies to the context of salvation and recreation. Following Hamann - to whom we will shortly turn - Bayer even describes the being of God in terms of language: God is the poietes of the world. 50 The Greek word poietes is used in the Confession of Nicea to indicate God as the Creator of heaven and earth, the 'Poet', who composed and still composes the whole of creation. To be in relation with creation can therefore easily be described in terms of 'conversation', for this conversation is not only 'linguistic' but also encompasses all the bodily existence of God's creation. In the context of this conversation, God can even be called to be the 'Author' of our lives in that He speaks to his creation and thereby calls it into existence. 51 To summarise the connection of promissio and language, we can state that Bayer's insistence on the mediation of God's promissio stresses the fact that 'language' is not merely the vehicle of grace. It is language that constitutes what it says (verbum efficax). Metaphorically, all created means can function as 'language' in which God communicates with his creatures. In the next section, we will discuss the soteriological context of this 'conversation'.

49

50

51

"'Denn Gott hat mit den Menschen nie anders zu tun gehabt noch hat er anders mit ihnen zu tun als im Wort der Zusage. Umgekehrt können wir mit Gott nie anders zu tun haben als im Glauben an das Wort seiner Zusage"' (Autorität und Kritik, 187; quotation from Luther's De captivitate babylonica ecclesiae). Cf. "Im Gottestitel des 'Autors', des 'Poeten', der selbst 'der beste Ausleger seiner Worte', seiner Handlungen, und ihr letzter Kritiker [...] ist, spitzt sich Hamanns Verständnis der Sprache und Vernunft in charakteristischer Weise zu. [...] Will man überhaupt vom Sein reden, dann nur so, dass damit Gott als kommunikatives Wort gemeint ist - als sich ungeschuldet mitteilende Wahrheit" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch. Johann Georg Hamann als radikaler Aufklärer, Piper: München/Zürich 1988, 190f). Cf. the title: Gott als Autor. Zu einer poietologischen Theologie.

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4.2.5 Promissio in a Soteriological Context What, however, is the character of this 'conversation'? How does God communicate with mankind, or with the whole of the created order? Bayer insists on the explanation of the character of God's Authorship, for God does not associate with his creation in a vague or unperceptible way. God's speaking is 'speech of promise' or - to broaden the linguistic context into a 'bodily' one - 'poetry of promise'. This is the main and first word to say about the character of God's promissio. Bayer here points at Jesus Christ who, according to the New Testament, is the bodily form and story of God's promise by Whom God through the Holy Spirit mediates himself, or - better - Who mediates himself as true Promise: '"For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by me and Silas and Timothy," as Paul writes, "was not 'Yes' and 'No', but in him it has always been 'Yes'. For no matter how many promises God has made, they are 'Yes' in Christ" (2 Corinthians l,19f). God's poetry is poetry of promise.'52 It is important that this poetry, according to Bayer, not be viewed only as God's love. For the aforementioned 'Yes' is spoken to a creation that is not perfect. It is a promissory speech-act that concerns the present reality of God's creation, and its actor is well aware of the history and the future of this creation. Only the presence of God's salvation is the guarantee of the coming fulfilment of the world, and gives rise to the painful experience of the contradiction between the suffering and sighing creation of the old world and the promised, original creation.53 God's love cannot be treated as the timeless principle according to which reality can be seen as the reflection of this love.54 The reality of evil is too strong for such uniformity. It is exactly this current ambivalence of creation's situation, in which good and bad 52

53

54

"Jesus Christus is nach dem Neuen Testament ja die leibliche Gestalt und Geschichte, durch die Gott im Heiligen Geist sein Versprechen, genauer: sich als Versprechen, als wahres Versprechen vermittelt, als der, der gewiss hält, w a s er zusagt. [...] Die Poesie Gottes, des Poeten, ist keine beliebige Poesie; sie ist Poesie des Versprechens" (Gott als Autor, 3). " D a s gegenwärtig sich mitteilende Heil verbürgt die kommende Vollendung der Welt und lässt den Widerspruch der leidenden und seufzenden Kreatur der alten Welt zur zugesagten Schöpfung, der ursprünglichen Welt, mit Schmerzen erfahren" (Gott als Autor, 6). This is stated over against Karl Barth (Theologie, 356-365) and Hegel (458-462).

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are both present, which gives rise to the question of the nature of God's relation to this world. Within this problem area, Bayer uses the old Lutheran distinction between Law and Gospel. This distinction can be explained as follows. God's promise is safeguarded by its Christological (i.e. soteriological) content. Because God communicates himself in the gospel as the Word of Jesus Christ, it is an effective word.55 In order to protect this gospel from influences inimical to its character, Bayer distinguishes between the comforting, promising, and life-giving task of the gospel on the one hand, and the deterring, punishing, and killing task of the law on the other. For, according to Bayer, following Luther, it is the 'office' (officium) of the law to deter, to punish, and even to kill.56 So the law, as a speech-act of God, works what it says, just as the gospel constitutes the re-creation, the renewal of man. This radical contrast between law and gospel has to be used, according to Bayer, to protect the soteriological context in which the gospel operates. To prevent human activity from changing into any kind of self-constitution, the passive reception of God's promissio is given primary importance over against human action. For as the promissio is meant to cause life in a passive way, the deeds of man cannot contribute anything in this respect. Furthermore, this distinction is meant to be able to view reality as it really is, and therefore it has a hermeneutical function as well. By means of God's accusing questions, man is found guilty, of which guilt man was not previously aware.57 55

56

57

"So wichtig die Performanz des Wortes Gottes als eines 'mündlichen' und 'äusserlichen' ist, so tut es das, was es sagt, nur kraft seiner Christologischen Kompetenz, seiner Vollmacht. [...] Weil im Evangelium als dem Christuswort Gott selbst sich mitteilt, ist es wirksam (verbum efficax)" (Leibliches Wort, 39). "Tod und Leben, Schrecken und Trost sind das, was Gott durch Gesetz und Evangelium dem Menschen bereitet. [...] Schrecken und Trost sind Wirkweisen, Affekte des Wortes - das, was es ausrichtet, tut, wozu es dient, sein 'Amt'" (Leibliches Wort, 40). Cf.: "In ihm [i.e. im Gesetz] tritt mir Gott gegenüber - mit unausweichlichen, harten Fragen. [...] Solche Fragen überführen mich; was mir nicht bewusst ist, tritt ans Licht. Ja, ich werde überhaupt erst entdeckt [...]. Das kann ich mir nicht selbst sagen, das muss mir von aussen, von einem Anderen gesagt werden. Gleichwohl werde ich so überführt, dass ich, wie David vor Nathan, dem Propheten Gottes, mir selbst das Urteil spreche. Das mir widerfahrende Gesetz überführt mich zugleich von innen heraus; seine Externität ist keine Heteronomie, der gegenüber ich selbst nur ein mechanisches Echo wäre - aber auch kein Ich, das sich selbst bespiegelt" (Theologie, 413).

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By stressing the soteriological context of the promissio, Bayer not only prevents human action from taking part in God's salvation but also guarantees the totally positive content of God's promissio. The 'Yes' of God's constitutive speech-act is not mingled with His stance over against the consequences of evil and sin. Consequently, the law can be said to have heuristic value, as it detects human culpability, whereas the gospel, the promissio, has a constitutive character. The decisive original context of the promissio in soteriology leads eventually to the distinction of law and gospel, which affects and corrects Bayer's aforementioned criterion of his theology: "As a criterion [for theology] we must keep in view the correlation of promissio and fides, and (for the more precise understanding of the promissio) the distinction between law and gospel." 58

Theology therefore is about the distinction of law and gospel. Within the whole of experience, theology must make these distinctions in order to interpret the world in which man lives. We now turn to Bayer's understanding of the nature and task of theology, which will be described as the interpretation of the world.

4.3 Theology as Conflictual Discipline The task of theology, according to Bayer, can be summarised in several ways. We will begin with a formal definition, we will continue with an elaboration with respect to the character of theology, and we will show how these characteristics come together within the person of the theologian and consequently within a positive description of the task of theology.59 Finally, we will summarise and point to the consequences

58 59

Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996,158f. There are five main sources of this section: Bayer's Theologie-book (parts of which are translated in Worship and Ethics); 'Geistgabe und Bildungsarbeit. Zum Weltbegriff der Theologie' (in: Gott als Autor, 266-279); 'Theologie und Philosophie in produktivem Konflikt'. In: NZSTh 32 (1990), 226-236; 'Hermeneutische Theologie'. In: Körtner, Ulrich H.J. (Hg.); Glauben und Verstehen. Perspektiven hermeneutischer Theologie, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 2000, 39-55; and 'Wer ist Theologe?'. In: Beintker, Michael (Hg.); Rechtfertigung und Erfahrung [FS Gerhard Sauter], Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1995,208-213.

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for the whole of this chapter of Bayer's theology of God's promise, and especially for his doctrine of creation. 4.3.1 The Task of Theology Luther, following the tradition of Gabriel Biel, considered theology to be oriented around three questions. The first question concerns the kind of knowledge theology wants to explore, the second is about the object to which theology is directed, and the third is the question whether theology is 'practical' or 'theoretical'.60 In following Luther's answers to these questions, Bayer has conceived theology as Sprachwissenschaft (a linguistic discipline), or to be more precise: a doctrine of linguistic forms, for theology is concerned with language as it is used in the life-context of worship: "To align theology with the forms of worship - that is the project."61 As a doctrine of forms theology is, so to speak, a grammar of the language of the Bible, of the living and life-giving voice of the gospel, which relates to the death-dealing law.62 This view of theology has the following implications for responding to Biel. (1) Theology is not scientia or sapientia, not science or wisdom, for these two do not part company. Theology reflects on the language used in the context of worship, in the prayers of intercession, the promised and bestowed blessing; it reflects on texts like a song by Paul Gerhardt or a clause of Luther's catechism. As such, it is "part of the faith which hears, which loves God". 63 Bayer, in this area, insists on holding together what the tradition of the Enlightenment tore apart: faith and theology.64 Schleiermacher turned theology from a doctrine of the word into a doctrine of faith, and Hegel transformed it into a philosophy of mind and identified it with thought. But "[t]he real human being, one who not only thinks but also has passions, is thereby forgotten"65 - an implication Bayer wants to avoid. Therefore, theology, according to Bayer, "is rather practical, in the sense of an experience, as occurs in 60 61 62 63 64

Theologie, 31f. Worship and Ethics, 158. Worship and Ethics, 159. Worship and Ethics, 157. Bayer blames Setnler as the initiator of this disparagement (Theologie, 391-394).

65

Worship and Ethics, 158.

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meditation - that is the listening and learning encounter with the biblical texts - in temptation and in prayer: it is vita passiva".66 (2) The object of theology is not 'God', without reservation, but it is - following Luther - homo peccator et Deus iustificans (sinful man and justifying God). The adjectives are not accidental but essential. Theologically, the human being is essentially the one who is accused by God and justified by his grace. 67 On this point, Bayer is very critical of those descriptions of theology that take the being together of God and man for granted. It is not self-evident that the deathly confrontation between this God and this man ends well, as Jacob experienced at the Jabbok (Genesis 32). 68 In his re-appropriation of Luther's definition, Bayer's own object of theology is fourfold. Theology is about the discernment of 'law' and 'gospel', and apart from that, and not reducible to one of them, he distinguishes God's hiddenness and the primus usus legis, i.e. the usus politicus.69 (3) As for the question of whether theology is practical or theoretical, Bayer points again to Luther's understanding of theology. Luther distinguished between vita activa and vita contemplativa, the former being the way of self-constitution, the latter being a kind of mystical or rational speculation. He chooses a third way: the vita passiva. In the context of this 'passive' life, theology does not primarily reflect a kind of knowledge about God or the deeds of man, but about the gift of faith that constitutes these two. Bayer comments: 'This conception of faith not only contains a revolution within the traditional conception of science, particularly the Aristotelian one. It also criticises current understanding of science'. 70 This - briefly summarised - conception of the task of theology has consequences for Bayer's understanding of the relation of philosophy and theology. For if theology has to do with the bodily mediated 66 67 68 69

70

Worship and Ethics, 160f. Theologie, 409. Cf. Theologie, 410. Because this distinction can only make sense after we have seen how Bayer's theology is influenced not only by Luther as 'the leg he stands on', but also by Hamann as the 'swinging leg', we will describe this later (4.4.3). "In diesem Glaubensverständnis liegt nicht nur eine Revolution des tradierten Wissenschaftsverständnisses, vor allem des aristotelischen, beschlossen. Es bringt auch die heutigen Spielarten dessen, was als Wissenschaft gelten will, in das Feuer fundamentaler Kritik" (Theologie, 421).

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promissio of God, or more precisely the experience of both gospel and law as experienced by man, then theology is at least partially a reflection about the way in which man perceives the world. Though this may be true, and true it is in Bayer's theology, it is not the most distinctive feature of his conception of the task of theology. For theology is not in the first place about 'human experience or perception' as such, but fixes its immediate attention on God's promising word that constitutes our experience. Thus, the receiving, experiencing human being has to be defined by the God who speaks and not the other way around. 71 Theology, therefore, is no analysis of human experience (Existenz) as such, but analysis of the received promising word of God. 72 Theology is 'science of experience in the broadest sense as it is about everything which the categorical gift as God's promise gives to man, along with everything which contradicts this promise'. 73 To provide an example of what Bayer means with such an analysis, we point to one Bayer himself offers: 'An eminent example of such a performative word which I think theology is all about, is the selfpresentation "I am the Lord, your God" which evokes communication. Theology as linguistic discipline analyses the performative aspect of this sentence, and clarifies its real effectiveness'. 74 This promise of God evokes a two sided reaction: either endorsement or resistance. The conclusion about the task of theology and the illustration of God's self-presentation exemplify the way in which Bayer wants theology to be a 'discipline of conflict'. For in defining theology as about God's promissio, he enters into conflict with mainstream theology which characterizes itself as reflection on human experience in the 71

"In diesem Sinne gilt es, von dem als promissio widerfahrenden W o r t und nicht v o m gläubigen Selbstverständnis auszugehen; es gilt, den h o m o recipiens nach dem deus dicens zu definieren und nicht etwa umgekehrt zu verfahren" ('Hermeneutische Theologie', 43).

72 73

Cf. 'Hermeneutische Theologie', 43. "Die Theologie [...] ist Erfahrungswissenschaft im weitesten Sinne, indem sie all das z u m Gegenstand nimmt, w a s dem Menschen aus der kategorischen Gabe als der Zusage Gottes zukommt und was dieser Zusage widerspricht" (Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1995,19).

74

"Ausgezeichnetes Beispiel eines solchen performativen Wortes, in dem ich die Sache der Theologie sehe, ist die kommunikationsstiftende Selbstvorstellung 'Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott!'. Theologie als Sprachwissenschaft analysiert die Performanz dieses Satzes und expliziert die in ihm aktuelle Kompetenz" (Autorität und Kritik, 145).

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tradition of Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, Heidegger and Bultmann: Theology is not an analysis of existence, but of the language of the Church's proclamation of the gospel. In this respect, Bayer's concept of theology is modest. He wants no (re- or de)construction of reality or existence. Theology is about human perception of reality which is brought forth by God's promising word. On the other hand, Bayer's concept is about everything we can possibly experience, for it is about the whole of created reality in the light of its being created by God's word. This concept of theology is self-critical over against major parts of its tradition. It evokes self-esteem with respect to the enormous challenge lying in the critical engagement with other interpretations of God's creation. The challenge evoked by this conflict of interpretations is the subject of the next section.

4.3.2 Theology and Philosophy Conflict characterizes Bayer's conception of theology. This conflict is inaugurated by God himself. In the Christian faith, God is the Creator of heaven and earth. As such, this faith contains the invitation to confront all other interpretations and explications of this world. The confession of a doctrine of creation therefore is the most constitutive element for theology in its place among other scientific disciplines.75 The conflict is described primarily with respect to the supposed 'systematic' of much philosophy and systematic theology.76 Over against much philosophy and theology in the tradition of Aristotle, Augustine, Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach, in whose thinking the variety of concrete experiences is reduced to an intellectual unity, Bayer

75

" A hermeneutics based on the theology of creation is therefore the foundational discipline not only for academic theology but for any intellectual endeavour" ('Poetological Theology: New Horizons for Systematic Theology'. In: IJSTh 1 [1999], [151-167] 153). Cf: "Die Theologie muss den Bezug zu den Naturwissenschaften wahrnehmen, wenn sie das Bekenntnis zu Gott dem Schöpfer Himmels und der Erde, zu Gott dem Schöpfer des Weltalls ernst nimmt. Dann kann sie keinem schiedlich-friedlich Nebeneinander von Schöpfungslehre und naturwissenschaften das W o r t reden, wie es Karl Barth tun zu können meinte" (Gott als Autor, 240).

76

"Die Gefahr Systematischer Theologie ist die einer Abstraktion, in deren verallgemeinernder Bewegung das konkrete D a t u m und sinnliche Faktum aus dem Blick gerät" (Autorität und Kritik, 183).

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wants theology to explore the reality of the experienced world by means of the distinction of law and gospel. 'The world' is no unity77 in the sense that it has to say something unambiguous78, any more than 'history' exists in a plurality of 'histories'.79 The scientist always has his own perspective, constituted by a concrete time and place in and for which he writes and investigates. The person of the scientist therefore is constitutive for the kind of work he does. There is no abstract world or history that man can experience or investigate. So the scientist has always to be aware of this restricted and temporal perspective. This awareness is, according to Bayer, the awareness of the 'story7 that one is part of. It is impossible to explain the world without paying tribute to the story which one believes the world to be participating in. There is no explanation without story.80 This implies that (1) every scientific explanation is, perhaps unconsciously, guided by the perspective of the scientist or the theory. Even within science, the personal aspect cannot be avoided or excluded. Bayer's proposal with respect to this personal perspective is to explore its constitutive element, the unavoidable question even within science: "Who am I?". The theological answer to this question is: I am the one to whom - as to every creature - has been said: Ί am the Lord, Your God, who brought you out of Egypt. You shall have no other gods before me'.81 By means of this 'promissional' anthropological definition, the historical and spatial aspects of one's life cannot be overcome, and every attempt to do so is either doomed to fail or to create another story. By means of story, perspectives are closed or

77

" W e r das nur Aphoristische und Rhapsodische vermeiden will, scheint nicht umhin zu kommen, nach einem wie auch immer gegebenen oder aufgegebenen Einheitspunkt zu fragen. Nur eine solche Einheit scheint ein systematisches Verfahren - nach der Seite der Philosophie wie nach der Seite der Theologie hin - zu gewährleisten." Thus Bayer characterizes the c o m m o n strive for unity in science as a whole ('Theologie und Philosophie in produktivem Konflikt', 232).

78

79 80

"Jenseits [...] Furcht und Liebe, jenseits von Gnade und Gericht, Gesetz und Evangelium, Glaube und Unglaube, Tod und Leben und dem, w a s der Zusage Gottes in unbegreiflicher Weise widerspricht, ist weder von Gott noch v o m Menschen noch v o n der Welt zu reden" (Autorität und Kritik, 184). Cf. Living by Faith, 4; Aus Glauben leben, 16. "Keine naturwissenschaftliche 'Erklärung' ist ohne 'Erzählung'" (Gott als Autor, 244).

81

Cf. Exodus 20,2f (Gott als Autor, 243).

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opened; a story fixes the attention and determines the focus.82 Theology has to take its relation with science seriously, as it must take seriously its own confession that God is the Creator of heaven and earth. The investigation of the created world by scientists, and the results they gather, cannot be left out of the discussion. Theology, however, has not primarily to observe the analogies or similarities between a theological and a scientific interpretation of the world, because it would thereby lose its ability to criticise.83 On the other hand, theology can not merely assert a principle of non-convergence of the two. Bayer's solution is that theology should critically relate to science, in order to enter the 'conflict of interpretations'.84 Another implication of Bayer's position is that (2) theology is a strongly historical discipline.85 A theologian can only investigate the contingent, historical way in which God's promissio comes to him. There is no abstract knowledge, known from the outset, nor a kind of knowledge that man himself has to produce. Theology has to consider the concrete occurrence of God's promissio, which will be experienced by many means. That is: theology has to study the texts in which God shows himself to be the One who made heaven and earth, and who also, by His word, constitutes everyone's being. Theology, therefore, is primarily Sprachlehre, as it studies the speech-acts by which God makes himself known, in which He constitutes the very being of the created world. But as these texts cannot be read without considering their historical position and the historical position of the reader, theology is even more Formenlehre. 'Form' here points to the historical setting in which texts play a role, and the scientific discipline investigating these 'forms' distinguishes between several forms of living, such as Law and Gospel. For there is no universal, univocal form by which God relates to his creation. God is always talking (acting, creating) in differentiated ways. This ambiguity of human interpretation of God's speech is, in its turn, not to be reduced to the anthropological tension that is always present in humanity. The 82

"Durch die Erzählung werden Perspektiven erschlossen oder auch verschlossen. Die Erzählung steuert die Aufmerksamkeit und legt deren Fokus fest" (Gott als Autor, 245).

83 84 85

Cf. above, η. 75. Cf. Autorität und Kritik, 8. Cf. for the following: 'Systematische Theologie als Wissenschaft der Geschichte' (Autorität und Kritik, 181-200).

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ambiguity is the result of God's mediated promissio, for He elicits a reaction in response to His First Commandment: do we serve God, or other gods? This ambiguous situation is the 'objecf of theology, very consciously defined by Bayer. It is the historically perceived, mediated promissio, which is basic for the very being of God's creation, and which also differentiates within God's creation. God's speech is no univocally experienced promissio. Though God's 'Yes' is primary, his promissio also evokes protest. Therefore, theology can study neither a univocal and merely positive divine speech-act, nor a univocal human reaction, nor a consistent reality. The question of 'theodicy', of how evil can exist within God's world, is the touchstone of theology. According to Bayer, any theology that leaves this question aside, or any theology that wants to treat reality as univocal in a speculative and presupposed 'oneness', or any theology that wants to overcome this ambiguity by human effort, does not view reality as it really is.86 The dilemma between either a speculatively invented or a moralistically achieved oneness is the matrix by which Bayer seeks to interpret the special contribution of Luther within the theory of science. As mediaeval theology distinguished between vita contemplativa and vita activa, this dilemma can be equated with thinking and doing, reason and action, Hegel and Kant. Luther's innovative category of the promissio left him a third way: the vita passiva. Bayer's use of Luther's vita passiva is the third implication of his view that theology is a discipline of conflict (3). For it is not the person of the scientist, the theologian or the believer that inaugurates this conflict. On the contrary, the conflict is often denied. For although human experience tells us about the fundamental ambiguity, pain and suffering characterizing our world and life, this open question is all too often prematurely answered by an attempt to make the world univocal and clear. Within the context of a denial of this fundamental ambiguity and our attempts to overcome it, it is primarily God's promissio itself that constitutes and evokes the conflict. Anyone who experiences this broken situation should acknowledge it (not deny it), and bring it into relation with God's promising Word. Thereby, Bayer avoids the solution whereby the interpreter is forced either to deny the ambiguity or to overcome it in some way (i.e. by thought or action). The concept 86

Cf. 'Die offene Frage der Theodizee' (Autorität und Kritik, 201-207).

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of theology as a discipline of conflict leaves room for the human longing for a future, perfect world on the one hand, and the experience and realisation of the present lack of this perfect world on the other. Bayer calls this longing a 'metaphysical' one, as it seeks the ultimate unity that is not disturbed by historical contingency.87 Such longing is principally eschatological, as it longs for the end which is not already present.88 Within the situation 'in between', theology has to be critical of every human attempt to obtain the oneness which is uniquely a gift of God, or to 'explain' the problem of evil. The only way theology is allowed to go in this respect, is the way of complaint,89 which in its simplest form consists in the question of man towards God: "Why?". The complaint takes seriously both God's promise and the experience of a reality that is not in accordance with this promissio. Such a complaint even takes notice of the fact that it is God's promise itself that evokes the complaint. Theology therefore has to protect and explore this form of complaint. In the end, the complaint is the hope for the lifting of the 'hiding of God', 90 a matter of faith evoked by God's promise against a present of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

87

88 89 90

"Indem Aristoteles das göttliche Weltprinzip als unwandelbar eines denkt, bringt er der Sache nach zweifellos die beiden 'Typoi' Piatons zur Geltung. Erstaunlich dabei ist, dass er seiner sich von allem Sinnlichen und Zeitlichen abhebenden Theorie mit leichter Verschiebung - eben den Namen gibt, den die Tradition für die zeitlich strukturierten sinnenfälligen Göttergeschichten gebraucht hatte, die gerade kein in sich zusammenstimmendes unwandelbar Eines sagen. Aristoteles entreisst also den Geschichten ihren Anspruch, Göttliches zu sagen, und erkennt ihn ganz dem philosophischen Begriff zu. Die 'Theologie' des Aristoteles erzählt keinen Mythos, keine Geschichte; sie sagt vielmehr 'ein ewiges, unbewegliches und vom sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren abgelöstes Sein' aus [Metaphysik 1073a]. Theologie ist ganz und gar nicht mehr Mythologie; Theologie ist [...] jetzt ganz und gar Metaphysik: Anfang und Ende der Philosophie" (Theologie, 25). Cf. Theologie, 521-531. Cf. for the following: 'Erhörte Klage' (Leibliches Wort, 334-348) and Bayer, Oswald; 'Zur Theologie der Klage'. In: JBTh 16 (2002), 289-301. "Die Aufhebung von Gottes Verborgenheit erwartet der Glaube, der Gottes Zusage hört. Zu sehen ist nichts. Nicht im Schauen und Wissen, sondern allein in der Hoffnung des Glaubens gilt, 'dass Gott, dessen Gericht jetzt noch von unbegreiflicher Gerechtigkeit zu sein scheint, von höchst gerechter und ganz offenkundiger Gerechtigkeit ist' (Luther am Ende von De servo arbitrio). Diese 'Lösung' der Theodizeefrage erledigt die Klage nicht, sondern hält sie wach und damit zugleich die leidenschaftliche Hoffnung auf die Vollendung der Welt, in der sich Gott selbst endgültig recht gibt und die Erhörung der Klage ohne Anfechtung

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If philosophy does not want to avoid attempts to minimize or solve the questions raised by the problem of evil, or if it does not offer a way in which the present situation on the one hand and legitimate hope for the future on the other can be experienced, theology has to adopt a critical attitude towards it. This is the fundamental stance that constitutes theology as a 'discipline of conflict'. In the following section, we will turn to the person of the theologian. For if theology is not a 'timeless' discipline, it has to take the historical person of the theologian into consideration. 4.3.3 The Nature of Doing Theology As we saw in section 4.3.2, theology is about interpretation, the hermeneutics of the world in which we live. Therefore, theology has to enter the conflict of interpretations of human experience (i.e. the interpretations given by philosophers, 4.3.2). This conflict only arises if 'faith' and 'science' are seen as being inseparable, even to the degree that Bayer agrees with Luther's dictum Omnes dicimur Theologi, ut omnes Christiani.91 A cornerstone of this Christian-theological interpretation of the world is the recognition of its being created by God. Created reality is full of tales about God and his promise and his reaction to human sinfulness.92 Because everyone is created, everyone is addressed by God.93

91

92

93

gilt" (Schöpfung als Anrede. Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen [11986] 21990, 139). Cf. Theologie, 391; and "Ein wissenschaftlicher Theologe unterscheidet sich von anderen Christen, die als Christen immer schon begonnen haben, auch Theologen zu sein, nur dadurch - das ist sein besonderer Beruf - , dass er im Bezug auf sein Christsein in wissenschaftlichen Sätzen Rechenschaft geben können muss: d.h. in Sätzen, die den höchstmöglichen Grad von Bestimmtheit erreichen" (Gott als Autor, 269). "Theologie wird als hermeneutische Theologie ihrer Weite und Tiefe nur in einer schöpfungstheologischen Besinnung inne - vorausgesetzt, dass die Schöpfungslehre als Worttheologie entwickelt und sprachphilosopisch reflektiert ist" ('Hermeneutische Theologie', 45 [italics omitted JHFS]). "Das Menschsein des Menschen besteht darin, dass er von Gott ins Leben gerufen, mithin angeredet ist und deshalb hören und antwortend selbst reden kann, sich aber auch verantworten muss. [...] Jeder Mensch gehört als Mensch, das definiert ihn als Menschen, zur Schöpfungsordnung der Kirche, die freilich durch des Menschen Undankbarkeit, durch seine Sünde korrumpiert und daher faktisch nicht mehr

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Who am I? This personal question cannot be left outside the debate, for the answer determines the direction in which we look for other interpretations of our experience: I am the one to whom God has spoken. I owe my existence to God's promise. I am the one to whom in the midst of others God has said: Ί am the Lord, your God'. Because I know about God's creative activity in his calling me in this way, I have to interpret the world in this way. My worldview is constituted by God's promise to me, and with me to the whole of the world. As I am constituted by God's promise, my being a theologian is also constituted by God's promising address. Bayer explains his conviction about the nature of doing theology by stressing its personal character: 'We can only speak about "theology", because one is constituted to be a theologian by God's address, who awakens me with all creatures to life, in order that I live in loving and thankful reaction to his promise.'94 This personal character of my being a theologian is the counterpart of the personal relation of God with his creation. Because being a theologian starts with the recognition and experience of God's address to me along with all the creatures, theology is primarily a 'linguistic discipline', concerned with the 'forms of life' and the forms of worship such as prayer, the blessing, and classical liturgical texts.95 As a preliminary remark, it must be said that theology as a linguistic discipline implies the theological dialogue with other disciplines by means of using, defining, and striving for the right 'words'. Whereas theology should not cut itself off from other disciplines, neither should it long for a unity or identity with them. It

94

95

Kirche ist" (Theologie, 395). In section 4.6.1 we will return to the concept of creationorders in Bayer7 s theology. "Von 'Theologie' kann nur deshalb die Rede sein, weil einer oder eine zum Theologen, zum Theologin konstituiert ist: nämlich durch Gottes Anrede, der mich samt allen Kreaturen ins Leben gerufen hat - so, dass ich antwortend, als Antwort, existieren darf, meine Existenz dem mich anredenden Schöpfer verdankend und damit zur Schöpfungsordnung der Kirche, zur Kirche als Schöpfungsordnung gehörend" ('Wer ist Theologe?', 209 et passim). "[The goal is] to pursue theology as a linguistic discipline - or to be more precise, a doctrine of linguistic forms. Mindful of general worship and the corrupted order of the Church, it is directed to the forms of specific worhip; it aligns itself with these forms, which are at once a linguistic game and forms of life: above all with praise and complaint, the cry of Kyrie, the prayers of intercession, the promised and bestowed blessing" (Worship and Ethics, 158).

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has to participate in life by means of 'language', 'word', and thus the interpreting of our life. Out of one's own 'life-form' (for instance the reformational principle simul iustus et peccator) one enters the conflict of different and diverging interpretations of life. This participation is called Kommunikative Urteilsform (communicative form of judgement), 96 and takes place when theology uses a "concept of critical mediation". 9 7 This means that theologians use concepts like 'responsibility' or 'freedom' to define in what respect they consider themselves to be saying something different from and critical towards other interpretations. Because the use of words can never be abstracted from the life in which they are used, theology is not only about 'language' but about 'forms of life' as well. The first consequence of this orientation towards 'forms of life' is that theology cannot confine itself to a repetition of the sequence of loci or to the order of the Creed. It cannot move progressively from creation to eschatology, because it has to show the interconnections between all the parts of doctrine in order to avoid any abstract kind of speculation. 98 The qualifiers of 'present' and 'address' are constitutive for the right theology, thereby avoiding any kind of speculative theology that wants to treat God, creation and man without these concrete and particularizing aspects. 99 Secondly, theology cannot be subsumed under the heading of either 'theory 7 or 'praxis'. "In the 'form' social and individual lives are bound up with the elemental experience of the world [...] and this does not only imply but continually presupposes theory and praxis." 100 With respect to the 'theoretical' aspect of theology, Bayer remarks that theory is not to overcome the present, broken state of creation by any means,

96

"Die urteilende Teilnahme an diesem Sein als Wort, an diesem kommunikativen Sein, nenne ich 'Kommunikative Urteilsform'" (Leibliches Wort, [6-15] 7). 97 Worship and Ethics, 189. For a more elaborate explanation of this term, see section 4.3. 98 Bayer gives an example of this so-called 'systematic of the Catechism' in Schöpfung als Anrede (80-108). The centre of all confessing activity is the thankful recognition of being bestowed and addressed by God in the present. Confessing 'creation' is confessing one's own being created by God: "I believe that God has created me with all creatures [...]". Thereby the Creed and the Decalogue interact in that it is the God who creates me, who at the same time addresses me as the Lord my God - rescuing me from the forces of evil of Egypt. 99 Cf. Schöpfung als Anrede, 82 and 84. 100 Worship and Ethics, 159.

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whereas with respect to the 'practical' aspect man cannot overcome this state by action. Thirdly, a right view of history is entailed in this view of theology. Creation is not independently on its way from creation to eschatology, nor is its history a new unity. "If theology entails knowledge of sin and waiting for the gift of justification, it renounces the concept of a unity and refuses to conjure up a meaning of history. It does not give meaning to the meaningless."101 In this respect, theology is concerned with some form of theodicy; we cannot justify God but we hope and expect God will keep to his promises which build our future. Finally, theology cannot confine itself to ethics or human action. "It is rather practical, in the sense of an experience, as occurs in meditation - that is the listening and learning encounter with biblical texts - in temptation and in prayer: it is vita passiva."W2

Having outlined the fundamental theological presuppositions for doing theology, the relation between theology and scientific business may now be established positively. For Bayer does not advocate an esoteric theology, without connections with other areas of human investigation. As the object of theology is homo peccator et Deus

iustificans, theology is about the concrete life, and the same phenomena of this life are seen by Christians and non-Christians, by theologians and scientists as well. Theology is a question of 'hermeneutics', as we saw earlier. It is about the connection of the conviction that man is addressed by God to concrete life.

4.3.4 The Concept of Theology and the Doctrine of Creation We now have to summarise what Bayer's concept of theology yields for his treatment of the doctrine of creation. (1) Theology is a discipline of conflict, which arises in the midst of contradictory interpretations of 'life'. (2) 'Life' is not a unity as such, nor can it be granted as a presupposition for our being. Our being addressed and created by God is the starting-point for (a) being human; (b) being a theologian; and (c) our reflection and response to God. Bayer calls this conception of 'living' in and through God's promise fundamental for both life and 101 Worship and Ethics, 160. 102 Worship and Ethics, 160f.

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theological reflection on it. As such, this promise can be said to have constitutive and formative influence on Bayer's doctrine of creation: promissio is both the creational, life-giving and the justifying, lifesustaining activity. (3) Theology is called to interpret human experience accordingly. The unity of experience man is longing for is accordingly not achieved in (a) thought, nor in (b) action, but (c) is to be bestowed on us 'passively7.

4.4 The Theological Concept of Critical Mediation Before we turn to Bayer's doctrine of creation, his own 'conflict' as a theologian with one of the most influential interpretations of reality has to be described. His theology, summarised as a 'theology of creation as God's promise', is influenced a great deal by the thought of Immanuel Kant and his arch-critic Johann Georg Hamann. As Bayer himself describes it: 'Along with Luther as the leg one stands on came Hamann as the swinging leg, who made Luther's theology relevant to - and opposite to, where necessary - the Enlightenment.'103 The concept of freedom, which according to Bayer deeply characterizes the history of Western thinking since modernity, is especially crucial in this 'conflict'. I summarise the conflict between Kant and Hamann under the heading of 'concept of critical mediation',104 because this is the specific form in which the dispute with respect to the doctrine of creation took its form. Therefore, I leave aside most of the other aspects of the divergence of views between the two, and I concentrate on Bayer's use of it.

103 "Zum Standbein Luther kam das Spielbein Hamann, der Luthers Theologie im Zusammenhang der Aufklärung - wo nötig, im Widerspruch zu ihr - zur Geltung brachte" ('Selbstdarstellung', 309). 104 Cf. above, 4.3.

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4.4.1 Bayer on Kant and Freedom Immanuel Kant105 is one of Bayer's most important intellectual opponents. Both Kant's epoch-making ethical writings and the philosophical framework which influenced and determined the philosophical discussions for three centuries after him are dealt with. H i s distinction b e t w e e n mundus intelligibilis a n d mundus sensibilis is the

fundamental presupposition for his view of freedom. Whereas in the intelligible world freedom is presupposed and postulated, at the same time man has to win this freedom in the world of the senses. Freedom, however, is a prerequisite for human action. Without freedom, human responsibility is not possible. Therefore, the lack of freedom, experienced in real life, is put aside in the world of thought. Bayer describes Kant as being antinomian with respect to the realm of thought, in which we are already free, without boundary or law other than the moral law inherent to man.106 On the other hand, man is bound by life in the realm of real, sensory life, for which reason we have to liberate ourselves. This aspect Bayer calls 'nomistic' in that we are subjected to the law of freeing ourselves.107 With the help of the criterion of the promissio, Bayer illustrates this Kantian dilemma. In Kanfs philosophical presuppositions, man is what he has to become. The common, 'natural' promissio of freedom for everyone at the same time presents us with the call to become free, to liberate ourselves. We must realize our own destiny. 'This generalisation of the "gospel" of human freedom implies that the Enlightenment is antinomian, but at the same time increasingly nomistic.'108 The main reason for this ambiguous view of human freedom is entailed by Kant's treatment of human experience. Knowledge, pure reason, the realm of thought is abstracted from 'real life'. Here the concept of 'critical mediation' comes into play. Bayer sharpens his own 105 I here confine myself to the descriptions by Bayer in Freiheit als Antwort: 'Theologische Ethik als Freiheitsethik' (97-115) and 'Gesetz und Freiheit. Zur Metakritik Kants' (164-182). 106 "Der Mensch ist frei, gut und spontan. In diesem Sinne ist die Neuzeit antinomistisch" (Freiheit als Antwort, 182). 107 "[I]ch darf nicht frei sein, sonder muss mich befreien. So ist die Kehrseite des Antinomismus ein Nomismus" (Freiheit als Antwort, 182). 108 "In ihrer Verallgemeinerung des Evangeliums ist die Neuzeit antinomistisch, wird zugleich aber zunehmend nomistisch" (Gott als Autor, 162).

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view of freedom against that of Kant. His thesis is this: Because man cannot take his own freedom for granted, neither in the mundus intelligibilis n o r in the mundus sensibilis, there h a s to b e a m e d i a t i o n of

this freedom to man. This Lutheran concept of freedom is maintained over against Kant by his contemporary Hamann, to whose views we now turn. 4.4.2 Bayer on Hamann's Metacritique

Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) is called the 'brightest spirit of his time' by Goethe. Hegel wrote an elaborate monograph for his complete works.109 Yet, Hamann was only a minor civil servant in the service of the customs of Königsberg. Nevertheless, he was in contact with Herder, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Kant, Jacobi, and many others.110 Our main concern here is to illustrate Bayer's description of Hamann's critique of Kant. This critique implied the recognition of Kanfs statement that the time of the 'Enlightenment' was a thoroughly 'critical' time.111 Hamann, however, did not accept this statement uncritically. It was his goal to investigate and test Kant's 'authority'.112 'In the controversy with Kant, as in his whole life's work, Hamann wanted to elucidate the relation between authority and critique.'113 Hamann's criticism of Kant was mostly devoted to controverting two 109 Cf. Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 9. 110 Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 18. 111 "Unser Zeitalter ist das eigentliche Zeitalter der Kritik, der sich alles unterwerfen muss. Religion, durch ihre Heiligkeit, und Gesetzgebung, durch ihre Majestät, wollen sich gemeiniglich derselben entziehen. Aber alsdann erregen sie gerechten Verdacht wider sich und können auf unverstellte Achtung nicht Anspruch machen, die die Vernunft nur demjenigen bewilligt, w a s ihre freie und öffentliche Prüfung hat aushalten können" (Kant, Immanuel; Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In: Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Wilhelm Weischedel] [Bd. Π], WBG: Darmstadt 5 1983, 13 [A xi, Anm.]. Quoted in: Autorität und Kritik, 3). 112 This confrontation paradigmatically took form in Hamann's comment on Kant's essay " W a s ist Aufklärung?" in a letter to a friend of both H a m a n n and Kant, Christian Jacob Kraus. The theme of this letter is: "Meinte Kant jedoch von selbstverschuldeter Unmündigkeit reden zu müssen, so überführt ihn H a m a n n der selbstverschuldeten Vormundschaft" (Umstrittene Freiheit, 76). 113 "In seiner Kontroverse mit Kant wie mit seinem ganzen Lebenswerk ging es H a m a n n darum, das Verhältnis von Autorität und Kritik aufzuklären" (Autorität und Kritik, 65).

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elements in his thinking which caused a false 'Enlightenment'. The first was the presupposition of the human ability to undertake criticism, which implies freedom. The second objection concerns Kant's view of unmediated, timeless, and spaceless reason which Hamann wanted to replace with historical language. For this kind of criticism he coined114 the word 'metacritique', which is not only critique on critique but for Hamann also implies an intention to heal the wounds caused by the sharp knife of the criticism of his days.115 The first of Hamann's criticisms that Bayer stresses throughout his writings concerns the freedom which is presupposed as a human ability to undertake criticism. This is an anthropological-educational phenomenon which is crucial to the understanding of Bayer's view of the 'interpretation of reality'. We perceive reality through patterns of conception that are given to us, by tradition, education, heritage, etc. Our knowledge is, according to Bayer who follows Hamann, neither invention nor remembrance, but is obtained by the medium of language in which we communicate and interpret.116 Along with this 'education', we are taught to become free. This implies for Bayer that education is not a realisation of potentials already immanent in this reality, but that all ability, including freedom, is a gift of God. Bayer connects this with the Christian doctrine of creation, in which reality or history is no exploration of immanent potential, but rather the ongoing creating and sustaining activity of God the Creator.117 Freedom is the 114 "Das Wort 'Metakritik' dürfte seine eigene Erfindung sein" (Bayer, Oswald; Knudsen, Christian; Kreuz und Kritik. Johann Georg Hamanns Letztes Blatt. Text und Interpretation, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1983,136f). 115 By analogy with his father's profession as a surgeon, H a m a n n wants to heal like his father. " H a m a n n als 'Wundarzt' unternimmt es, die 'Wunden', die die Kunstrichterei seiner Zeit schlägt, blosszulegen, d.h. die Vorurteile und die Intransigenz aller Gesetzlichkeit in ihrer Heillosigkeit sichtbar zu machen, ohne Ansehn der Person, und - sie zu waschen und zu salben" (Kreuz und Kritik, 137f). Cf.: "Der Metakritiker wahrt durch Destruktion und Reinigung menschlicher Vorurteile, Gesetzlichkeit und Enthusiasmus den R a u m für eine neue und gute Hoffnung" (Kreuz und Kritik, 144). 116 Cf. Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 42.120f.185. 117 "Gehen wir der Frage nach, wie sich Freiheit bilden kann, dann stossen wir in der Diskussion darüber auf fundamentalanthropologische Argumente, die aus der griechischen Philosophie kommen und - zwar umgeformt und v o m Christentum nicht unberührt geblieben - bis heute vor allem in den Humanwissenschaften gelten; sie sind deren Axiome. Das entscheidende Argument dabei ist der Entwicklungsund Verwirklichungsgedanke, der im Widerspruch z u m jüdisch-christlichen

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gift of the Creator, mediated by people, tradition, and language. God, who gives freedom, also bestows on us the competence and authority to criticise. The asymmetry between authority and criticism qualifies its mutual relation, and stresses the need of a process of learning and education with respect to freedom. 118 Hamann's critique of unmediated freedom is theologically important in that the process of acquiring knowledge cannot occur without human experience. Hamann's stress on the mediation of freedom and knowledge are parallel to Bayer's promissio and the concept of mediation (4.2.3), as well as the nature of doing theology (4.3.4), because the inescapable mediation of freedom and knowledge requires a concept of doing theology that stresses the experience of the theologian over against speculative, non-linguistic thinking.119 The second element, resting on the former, is Hamann's critique of Kant's presuppositions on reason. 'Reason is language', as Hamann boldly states over against the question put aside by Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, of how the ability to think might be possible at all.120 I cannot explore the philosophical debate on the relation between reaSchöpfungsglauben eine Potentialität voraussetzt, die dem Menschen und seiner Welt immanent ist. Im Prozess der Bildung, der Erziehung des ganzen Menschengeschlechtes wie des einzelnen Menschen werden die Anlagen, die 'Potenzen', methodisch entwickelt, ausgebildet. Die rationalen, intellektuellen, theoretischen Fähigkeiten werden geweckt, entbunden; der Erzieher ist dabei Geburtshelfer. [...] Das Ziel, das sich in jedem Menschen verwirklichen will, das sich in ihn hineinbildet, indem er sich in es hineinbildet, ist der Mensch, der seiner selbst Herr ist, der sich im freien Gebrauch seiner körperlichen und geistigen Fähigkeiten bewegt, der sich zu sich selbst bestimmt [...] Fragt man im Sinne dieser starken Tradition nach dem Grund der menschlichen Freiheit, dann kann die Antwort, um eine Formulierung Hegels zu gebrauchen, nur lauten: 'Der Mensch ist durch sich selbst bestimmt, frei zu sein' [...] Menschliche Freiheit und Vernunft begründen sich selbst" (Autorität und Kritik, 146f). 118 Cf. Autorität und Kritik, 2f. 119 Cf.: "Luther will aus der theologischen Existenz das Lesen und Erkennen gewiss nicht ausgeschlossen haben, hebt er es doch an zahlreichen Stellen als unabdingbar hervor. Doch ist dies dann umsonst, ja schädlich, wenn es nur als Spekulation geschieht" (Gott als Autor, 261). 120 "Hamann [macht] die von Kant in der KrV an den Rand geschobene Frage, wie das Vermögen zu denken möglich sei, zur Hauptfrage und wendet die transzendentale Frage nach der Bedingung der Möglichkeit zurück ins sprachlich Wirkliche: 'das ganze Vermögen zu denken beruht auf Sprache'" (Bayer, Oswald; 'Raum und Zeit. Hamanns Metakritik der transzendentalen Ästhetik Kants'. In: Freund, Annegret [et al.] [Hgg.]; Tragende Tradition [FS Martin Seils], Lang: Frankfurt a.M. 1992, [25-33] 33).

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son and language; it suffices here to outline Hamann's view of this relation. Basic to his assumptions is the conviction that all human beings long for unity which nevertheless cannot be obtained on earth. Hamann here refers to the biblical history of the Tower of Babel. Since Babel, the human race is only united in its evil thoughts. 121 Though God confused the language of the whole world, that did not imply the end of his grace and providence. This divine grace is mediated by his creative promise: 'Without word, no reason - no world. Here lies the source of creation and government', as Hamann comments.122 Therefore, Hamann's dictum 'Reason is language' is important for the doctrine of creation and eschatology. The Babylonian confusian of language and distorted communication can only be overcome by God's eschatological work. Any attempt to overcome the battle on interpretation by trying to establish a 'meta-language' without acknowledging the need to 'translate' is a denial of reality, concrete experience, and suffering. 'Our language exists only in a plurality of speeches which have to face the competition of each other, so that the success of understanding one another is no self-evident rule, but always a miracle'.123 Convinced that this interpretation of the relation of language and reason is true, Hamann metacritically points at Kant's supposed 'pure reason', which builds on earlier thoughts of Leibniz, Locke, Plato and Hume 124 (et al.), and in this sense is not at all 'pure', 'abstract', time- and spaceless. By stressing the linguistic character of reason, all unification of thought which denies the brokenness of human experience and mediation is condemned. However offensive this interpretation of reason may be, Bayer takes it as criticizing all attempts, by theologians and philosophers alike, to establish unity by means of thought. Every system which unites all thought without acknowledging the struggle and incompatibility of individual elements denies the conflict in which God himself engaged and still engages in this world. His choosing the medium of language

121 Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 181 - alluding to Genesis 6,5 and 11,1-9. 122 "Ohne Wort, keine Vernunft - keine Welt. Hier ist die Quelle der Schöpfung und Regierung" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 181). 123 "Diese Sprache existiert nur in einer Vielzahl von Sprachen, die miteinander konkurrieren, so dass das Gelingen einer Verständigung nicht selbstverständliche Regel, sondern immer ein Wunder ist" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 184). 124 Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 188.

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t o c r e a t e a n d sustain this w o r l d implies the inescapability of o u r u s i n g l a n g u a g e a n d entering the conflict of interpretations. 'By virtue of his name, God, the Author, gives man along with all creatures a share of himself. By this sharing himself, He achieves the hard labour of translation, and He does not eschew entering this world, becoming a human being, dying on the cross. In his pride, the author is humble. In his omnipotence, He descends in love to our weakness to address the creation by the creation. God is Poet, talking in the genus humile.'125 A t this point B a y e r stresses the i m p o r t a n c e of the C r o s s of Jesus Christ w i t h r e s p e c t t o the e x p e r i e n c e of suffering it implies, the historicity it contains, a n d the h u m i l i t y of G o d it s h o w s . T h o s e w h o a c k n o w l e d g e the suffering of Jesus Christ o n the cross cannot, at the s a m e time, h o l d a vision in w h i c h the c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e of suffering is s u b l i m a t e d before the e s c h a t o n in a t h e o d i c y w h i c h explains evil w i t h o u t the c o m p l e x e n g a g e m e n t of G o d w i t h evil o n the cross. T h e c r o s s also c a n n o t be b r o a d e n e d into a ' s p e c u l a t i v e G o o d F r i d a y ' , as H e g e l did, elevating the contradictions w e e x p e r i e n c e into a 'thinkable' unity. 1 2 6 S u c h u n i t y is only a m a t t e r of G o d ' s promissio, eschatologically as well as for the present. 1 2 7 B y trusting this p r o m i s e , a n d w i t h o u t g r a s p i n g it in a d v a n c e , w e c a n e n d u r e the disunity a n d b r o k e n n e s s of o u r 125 "Kraft seines Namens teilt sich Gott, der Autor, dem Menschen samt allen Kreaturen mit und leistet in solcher Mitteilung selbst die harte Arbeit des Ubersetzens, in der er sich nicht scheut, sich ganz in die Welt zu begeben, Mensch zu werden und am Kreuz zu sterben. In seinem Stolz ist der Autor demütig. In seiner Allmacht lässt er sich in Liebe zu unserer Schwäche herunter, um die Kreatur durch die Kreatur anzureden. Gott ist Poet, der im genus humile redet" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 191). 126 "Zum Wort vom Kreuz gehört unaufhebbar das harte historische Faktum der Kreuzigung Jesu von Nazareth sub Pontio Pilato. Es lässt sich weder spekulativ, wie es Hegel zu tun versucht hat, begreifen noch in praktischer Absicht, dem systematischen Typus nach im Anschluss an Kants Auflösung der Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft, in Anspruch nehmen" (Autorität und Kritik, 119). 127 "Die Frage nach dem Ganzen, die mit aller Leidenschaft zu stellen wir nicht unterlassen können, zerbricht also daran, dass der Weltenrichter keine abstrakte und darum ferne Idee ist, kein Einheitsprinzip, kein imaginärer Konvergenzpunkt, ohne dessen hypothetische Setzung man den Gedanken der Möglichkeit gelingender Verständigung nicht denken kann, kein Symbol für den 'inneren Gerichtshof in jedem Menschen. Er ist vielmehr, um dies nochmals hervorzuheben, eins mit dem Menschen Jesus, in dem Gott seine Freiheit dazu gebraucht, Knecht zu werden, der fern davon, die Reinheit der Theorie zu suchen - seine Gottheit darin bewährt, bei uns zu sein im Dreck und in der Arbeit, dass ihm die Haut raucht - wie Luther in einer Predigt des Namens 'Immanuel' ('Gott ist mit uns') sagt; der Herr und Richter aller ist er als dieser Knecht aller" (Freiheit als Antwort, 268f).

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situation.128 The cross also denotes and shows the essential character of God's relation to the world, according to Bayer. The humiliation of God is the most powerful weapon against speculation, because those who deny or step over the cross want to avoid the concrete medium by which He communicates himself to his creation.129 4.4.3 The Object of Systematic-Theology We now turn to Bayer's use of the promissio criterion as 'law' and 'gospel' for the specific task of systematic theology. Because theology cannot make use of some 'universal language' after Babel130 to achieve oneness in thought, action or belief, it can only use the same words as other sciences. Theology, however, has to make clear what their theological content is. According to Bayer, this process is called 'critical mediation'. 'Critical' in the sense that we do not assume any unconditional harmony in meaning, 'mediation' in the sense that we assume no apriori antithesis either, and that in order to obtain concordance we have to acknowledge that there is a long way from disagreement to accord, a way which includes means (media). According to Bayer, theology is about experience. Theology is "rather practical, in the sense of an experience, as occurs in meditation - that is the listening and learning encounter with the biblical texts - in temptation and in prayer: it is vita passim."131 What 'experiences', however, do we discover by interpreting the world with the help of Bayer's method of promissional critical mediation? First of all, there is 128 "Gibt sich Geschichte in dieser Weise zu leiden und zu lernen, dann kann die sie bedenkende Theologie keinen Begriff einer Einheit der Geschichte bilden. Ja, sie kann ihn gar nicht bilden wollen; sie hat - ohne daraus wiederum ein Prinzip zu machen - die Frage nach der Einheit der Geschichte offen zu halten" (Autorität und Kritik, 193). 129 "Der spekulative Aufstieg ist nicht nur müssig, sondern, unsolid wie Geldspekulationen, gefährlich. Es fehlt der Spekulation der feste Boden der Erfahrung; deshalb verstehen die gelehrten und subtilen Disputatoren selbst nicht, w a s sie erörtern. Sie verkennen Gottes Erniedrigung; sie verkennen die demütige menschliche Gestalt seiner Ehre, die leiblich wird und sich greifen lässt" (Gott als Autor, 262). 130 Cf. Genesis 11 (Autorität und Kritik, 173 n. 21). H a m a n n compares Kant's philosophy with a "'Turmbau' der Sünde" (Autorität und Kritik, 175 n. 29). 131 Worship and Ethics, 160f.

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no such thing as 'the world' as a unity. We only experience a manifold and manysided reality in all its diversity. Bayer interprets this complex experience as the complex of 'law' and 'gospel': 'The 'gospel' promises and effectuates n e w M a n as well as a perfected world. W e have to distinguish 'law' from this gospel. The law w o r k s in t w o ways. First, it proves sin. It tells us God's will, and teaches us thereby to acknowledge [ourselves] before God, that w e miss our destination, that w e are sinners, entangled in evil - not only enduring it, but also actively contributing to it: not being beneficial to life, not preserving and building community, but e v e n disrupting it. The sin-proving law affects Christians no less than non-Christians. There is n o difference between the Christian as far as h e is 'old Man', and the non-Christian. In the second place, God's law serves the worldly 'Kingdom' [Regiment] and preserves life notwithstanding evil and sin.' 1 3 2

So the first two experiences are 'law' and 'gospel'. The third experience Bayer mentions is God's hiddenness. Therefore, theology also has to be about the interpretation of the 'hiddenness' of God. 133 The experience that God is not present to us, though He has promised the contrary, is the most powerful temptation we can experience. It seems even to deny God's life-giving promise to us, and occurs in experiences such as flagrant injustice, natural disasters, war, illness, etc. Particularly on these occasions, the only reaction left to man is that of 'complaint': to plead with God for the fulfilment of his promise contrary to one's present experiences. 134 Fourthly, Bayer distinguishes the so-called usus politicus legis from the law in its sin-proving work. It corresponds with the distinction between 'providential grace' and the grace of the new creation, which

132 "Das 'Evangelium' [...] sagt und wirkt den neuen Menschen und die vollendete Welt. Vom Evangelium zu unterscheiden ist das 'Gesetz'. Es wirkt in zweifacher Weise. Erstens überführt es der Sünde. Es sagt, was Gottes Wille ist, und lehrt uns dadurch vor Gott erkennen, wo wir unsere menschliche Bestimmung verfehlen, worin wir Sünder und in das Böse verstrickt sind - es nicht nur erleidend, sondern auch mitbetreibend: das Leben nicht bewahren und fördern, Gemeinschaft nicht bauen und bewahren, sondern zerstören. Das der Sünde überführende Gesetz trifft den Christen nicht weniger als den Nichtchristen. Zwischen dem Christen, sofern er alter Mensch ist, und dem Nichtchristen besteht kein Unterschied. Zweitens dient dem Gesetz Gottes dessen weltlichem Regiment und erhält Leben trotz und inmitten des Bösen und der Sünde" (Freiheit als Antwort, 299). 133 Theologie, 415f. 134 Cf. above at η. 89.

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is t h e g o s p e l . 1 3 5 T h i s u s e of t h e l a w is d e s i g n a t e d to l e a v e r o o m for a ' r e l a t i v e l y i n d e p e n d e n t ' t r e a t m e n t of t h e a r e a in w h i c h n e i t h e r a total a p p r e c i a t i o n n o r a total rejection of t h e g o s p e l o c c u r s , a n a r e a f o r m e r l y c a l l e d ' c o m m o n g r a c e ' . A s a m a t t e r of fact, t h e primus

usus legis is t h e

c o n d i t i o n for t h e o l o g i c a l ethics, as it w a r r a n t s the e x i s t e n c e o f a w o r l d which

cannot be reduced

to

the 'either-or'

dilemma

o f belief

or

unbelief. 1 3 6 R e a s o n a b l e h u m a n i t a r i a n t h o u g h t a n d a c t i o n h a v e to b e s e e n a s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f G o d ' s p a t i e n c e a n d m e r c y w i t h this, t h e o l d world.137

Because

of t h e e m o t i o n a l l y

charged

use

o f this

relative

i n d e p e n d e n c e in G e r m a n t h e o l o g y , B a y e r a d m i t s t h a t h e d e v e l o p e d this i d e a of t h e usus politicus r e l a t i v e l y latein his c a r e e r . 1 3 8 T h e r e a s o n B a y e r stresses t h e m u l t i p l e object of t h e o l o g y is t h a t h e w a n t s , at all costs, t o a v o i d a strict s y s t e m . T h e o l o g y m a y n o t s t i p u l a t e o r p o s t u l a t e a ' o n e n e s s ' t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h s o m e k i n d of m o n a r c h i c r e a s o n o r w i t h s o m e o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l object. T h e o n l y w a y t o a v o i d

135 Theologie, 417. 136 Bayer speaks of "ein [...] Raum [...], der zu beiden Seiten der Alternative hin relativ selbständig ist": "Die in Frage stehende relative Selbständigkeit - sie sollte nicht mit dem belasteten Begriff der 'Eigengesetzlichkeif bezeichnet werden - ist keine Sache der Anpassung oder des Zugestängnisses an den Zeitgeist, sondern mit einem unaufgebbaren Theologumenon gegeben. Sie kommt nämlich jenem Raum und jener Zeit zu, die Gott als vergehende Welt auf seine Zukunft hin trotz der Sünde jeden Augenblick bewahrt und erhält - jenem Raum und jener Zeit, die von der altprotestantischen Orthodoxie mit dem Lehrstück de Providentia dei und von Luther beispielsweise mit seiner Erklärung der Brotbitte im Kleinen Katechismus bedacht wurde" (Freiheit als Antwort, 90). 137 "Wird dabei die reformatorische Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium wahrgenommen, dann ist klar, dass auch ein aus der Weisheit Israels und dem Evangelium Jesu Christi erwachsener Sensus communis, der die vernünftige Verständigung der Menschen untereinander im Einklang mit den Mitgeschöpfen organisiert, als Gesetz gewordene Humanität nicht zur neuen Welt gehört, sondern zur vergehenden alten Welt. In diesem Sensus communis, der - im Bereich des primus usus legis - nicht intensiv genug gesucht werden kann, wirkt Gott als Schöpfer in seiner Langmut und Geduld" (Leibliches Wort, 103). 138 "Lange hat es gedauert - sehr lange. Aber nun beginne ich, von den 'Berührungsängsten gegenüber dem primus usus legis' [...] frei zu werden, um mich als systematisch Theologe 'auf die Weltanwesenheit Gottes außerhalb des Glaubensvorgangs' so zu beziehen, daß dabei nicht nur die Extremerfahrungen des tötenden Gesetzes, sondern die positiven Wirkungen der lex in den Blick kommen, mit der diese alte, vergehende Welt auf ihre Zukunft hin erhalten wird. Diese lex ist nicht das Evangelium; es ist aber auch nicht das tötende Gesetz. Tertium datur: eben die lex im usus politicus" (Selbstdarstellungen, 309 n. 23).

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theology becoming so unified is to renounce the idea of theology having a unified object; to avoid dualism or monism, theology's object must be 'at least' threefold. 139 This fourfold description of the ultimate object of theology, as inspired by Luther's description of the object as homo peccator et Deus iustificans and shaped by Hamann's metacritique, is now sufficiently outlined to turn to Bayer's doctrine of creation.

4.5 Creation and the Doctrine of Creation Bayer's doctrine of creation can be described as a 'hermeneutic' of creation, i.e. an explanation of a way of interpreting the world. 140 This interpretation is guided by the main criterion of the promissio, as Bayer distinguishes between two moments within the process of creating: God's promissional address to creation along with his transcendence over against creation, and God's use of creational means for this address along with his immanence. Thus, the category of the promissio is meant as a solution for the main dilemma within theology, either to think of a creation without Creator (pure immanence) or a Creator without creation (extreme transcendence). Bayer characterizes these positions as 'pantheism' and 'personalism', and proposes a third way between these poles. 141 The following reconstruction of Bayer's opinion on the relation between creation and the doctrine of creation will elucidate this third way. In order to begin with a description of Bayer's promissional understanding of creation, the relation between the original soteriological meaning of promissio and creation will be described (4.5.1). 139 "Es ist die Schwäche der grossen theologischen Theoriebildungen seit 200 Jahren, sich dem Machtspruch eines solchen Systembegriffs gebeugt und dabei die Härte und Schärfe verkannt zu haben, in der sich die drei bezeichneten Widerfahrnisse unterscheiden. Im Blick auf sie und ihre unaufhebbaren Differenzen ist vielmehr von einer mindestens dreifältigen Bestimmung des Gegenstandes der Theologie zu reden; ein theoretischer Dualismus ist ebenso zu vermeiden wie ein theoretischer Monismus" (Theologie, 417). 140 Cf. the subtitle of his book Schöpfung als Anrede: "Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung". 141 "Im Bezug auf diese beiden Extreme - auf den Personalismus wie auf den Spinozismus - und auf die zwischen ihnen liegenden Mischformen hat sich eine theologische Schöpfungslehre zu artikulieren" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 5).

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In the second section, the linguistic mediation of God's creating activity will be discussed (4.5.2). In the doctrine of creation, the relation of transcendence and immanence is at stake. Hamann captures this relation by his statement that creation is the address to creation by created means (4.5.3), which statement implies a specific understanding of time (4.5.4). The description of the relation between the doctrine of creation and ethics will be facilitated by the description of the anthropological consequences of Bayer's doctrine of creation (4.5.5), the constitutive role of the doctrine of sin within the doctrine of creation (4.5.6), and the conclusive summary of Bayer's doctrine of creation in relation to the doctrine of God (4.5.7).

4.5.1 Creation and Salvation For Bayer, the whole of theology and doctrine is about 'creation', as it is concerned with the reality of God's interaction with the created world.142 In that sense, Bayer also almost equates the soteriological and the creational act of God.143 As theology explores texts and their Sitz im Leben, Bayer bases himself on several texts of Luther. The most important is Luther's Small Catechism: Ί believe that God has created me together with all that exists [...] out of pure, fatherly, and divine goodness and mercy, without any merit or worthiness of mine at all.'144 In this sentence, Luther takes the word 'merit' from the context of the doctrine of redemption into the doctrine of creation. The same movement can be seen in Romans 4,17: "The God who gives life to the dead and calls things that are not as though they were." In this text, resurrection, salvation sola gratia, and creation ex nihilo are parallel in

142 So Bayer explicitly states: "Auch die Eschatologie ist wie die gesamte Dogmatik Schöpfungslehre" ('Schöpfer/Schöpfung VIII. Systematisch-theologisch'. In: TRE [Bd. XXX], [326-348] 346). 143 Cf. the title of a section of one of Bayer's articles: "Justification as creation; creation as justification" ("The Doctrine of Justification and Ontology'. In: NZSTh 43 [2001], [4453] 44). 144 "Ich glaube, dass mich Gott geschaffen hat sampt allen Kreaturn [...] aus lauter väterlicher, göttlicher Güte und Barmherzigkeit ohn alle mein Verdienst und Würdigkeit," BSLK 510,33-34; 511,3-5.

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movement. 145 The same connection between creation and salvation is studied in Paul Gerhardt's song Wach auf, mein Herz, und singe..., in which the poet combines words from the context of the doctrine of creation with the praise of God, who dispels the dark of the night and calls into existence the light of the day: 'Creation is praised as salvation out of elementary threat, as a liberation that is new every morning (Lamentations 3,23)/ 1 4 6 In this way, Bayer defines the relation of creation and salvation as follows: 'Creation is God's giving, in that He is "fromm", which means just and faithful. God the Creator gives himself in his promise and holds it.'147 The context of praise of the victory of light over darkness, as the believer in Gerhardfs song experiences, is the proper context to articulate one's faith in God the Creator. As the words of darkness also refer to powers of chaos and evil, so the deliverance from evil is described in terms of creation. God's word promised the light to shine forth, and there was light. By keeping his promise to man, God shows himself to be a faithful Creator, who creates what He promised and promises what He created. In this sense, the usual distinction between creation and preservation is overcome, as 'creation is preservation, and they ought not to be separated'. 148

145 Cf.: "Das kosmologisch und ontologisch in seiner Weite und Tiefe zu bedenkende rechtfertigende Schöpferwort Gottes widerspricht aufs schärfste neuzeitlichem Willen zur Selbstkonstitution, zur Selbstverwirklichung" (Leibliches Wort, 23), which is founded on the following conviction: "Die iustificatio impii (Rom 4,5) steht parallel zur resurrectio mortuorum und creatio ex nihilo (Rom 4,17)" (Leibliches Wort, 23 n. 9). "Es besagt Entscheidendes für das Verständnis der Rechtfertigung, wenn ihre Sprache in den Raum des Schöpfungsartikels rückt. Umgekehrt besagt es Entscheidendes für ein Schöpfungsverständnis, wenn es zu seiner Artikulation ausdrücklich zur Sprache der Rechtfertigung greift [...] Indem Luther nun Begriff und Sache der Rechtfertigung im Schöpfungsartikel geltend macht ist gesagt: Gott schuldet nicht nur nicht eine Belohnung als Richter. Ungeschuldet ist vielmehr, wie Luther im Einklang mit Hiob 41,3 und Rom 11,35 hervorhebt, schon meine Herkunft und die Gewährung der Gegenwart" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 105). 146 "Schöpfung wird als Errettung aus elementarer Not gelobt, als eine Befreiung, die 'alle Morgen neu' ist (Thr 3,23)" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 113). 147 "Schöpfung ist Gottes Geben, in dem er 'fromm', gerecht und treu ist. Gott der Schöpfer gibt sich in seiner Zusage und hält sie" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 118). 148 "Schöpfung ist Bewahrung; creatio und conservatio sind nicht voneinander zu trennen. Die 'Erneuerung' ist bleibend Gottes Schöpferwerk, der zuletzt jenen Tag heraufführt, auf den keine Nacht mehr folgt" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 127).

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The relation between creation and salvation therefore lies in the actual meaning of the doctrine of creation as 'preservation'. It is here that Bayer's critique of the assumed manipulability of life takes final shape. The doctrine of the creation out of nothing implies the confession that man cannot make his own life. Even our very existence is a gift of God, as He creates our origin and preserves our being by his ongoing creational and graceful activity. Bayer considers creation to be God's promise that man is given time and space to live in peace and will be freed from evil. God's promise is God's comfort, i.e. his 'lifecreating power/ which is given in the mode and medium of his promise.149 At this point, Bayer's own characterization of his doctrine of creation as 'hermeneutic of creation', i.e. a way to interpret the actual experience of an ambivalent and ambiguous reality, is put into practice. The doctrine of creation functions as a way to interpret one's own life in terms of God's life-giving promise. As we worry about our daily existence, we can trust God's promise.150 Bayer interprets the words of Jesus not to worry (Matthew 6,34) as a requirement that does not counter human efforts, pain and worries. Jesus wants to reduce our concerns to the levels of this life only. So Jesus liberates us from the burden of striving for endlessness and absoluteness by human action alone.151 Thus, the doctrine of creation functions as the expression and confession of the experience that this world can neither free itself from 149 "Die Schöpfung als Kampf gegen das Chaos und dessen Überwindung geschah und geschieht - durch das Wort [...] das Wort der Liebe, das sich Zeit lässt. [...] Gottes Trost ist seine Leben schaffende Macht (2Kor 1,3-11). Er spendet diesen Trost im Modus und Medium seiner Zusage" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 122). 150 "Alle [...] Elementarbereiche menschlichen Lebens durchherrscht [...] eine einzige Grundbewegung: die Sorge. [...] Die Sorge tötet ihn, wenn es ihm nicht gelingt, von der unvermeidlichen und berechtigten Sorge um sein Dasein und seine Zukunft, von der Daseinsvorsorge, sein Vertrauen zu unterscheiden. Hängt er mit seinem Vertrauen sein Herz an die Aufgabe der Existenzsicherung, dann wird diese ihm zum Götzen und Fetisch - wie der Mammon (Mt 6,24). Diesem Götzendienst gegenüber redet Jesus in der Autorität des ersten Gebotes und damit des Reiches Gottes und seiner Gerechtigkeit: Weil das 'Ich bin der Herr dein Gott, du sollst keine anderen Götter neben mir haben' gilt, deshalb sage ich euch: 'Sorget nicht!'" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 143f). 151 "Diese Zumutung [i.e. Mt 6] hebt menschliche Arbeit, Mühsal und tägliche Plage nicht auf, weist sie aber in den Raum der Endlichkeit und befreit sie von dem Druck der Unendlichkeit, das heisst absoluter Ansprüche an sich und andere [...]" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 132).

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the burden of evil, nor create its own existence, nor obtain eschatological value. To do so would imply the practice of idolatry. In other words: to confess the doctrine of creation is to answer the first commandment, to give God the honour and not hand over any divine characteristics to one of God's creatures (i.e. man himself). It is a way of being which immediately implies an ethic of createdness that consists in the reception of God's promissio at the expence of other ways to salvation. These examples of Bayer's studying the doctrine of creation in texts of faith leads to the conclusion that (1) the doctrine of creation and that of redemption are in fact one and the same. Man not only owes his salvation, but even his pure existence to God. The confession of the doctrine of creation implies a way of being in which existential worrying about our daily life is addressed to God. To articulate that one is created therefore means to articulate the constant dependence on God's preservation of his creation - which can be also called 'creation'. (2) Both salvation and creation can be called the same on account of the constitutive promissio, which is given to man along with the whole of creation as the undeserved mark of God's goodness. (3) By taking as his starting-point for the doctrine of creation God's promissio, Bayer also grounds his anti-speculative way of doing theology. The doctrine of creation, and even creation out of nothing, is no speculation about the origin of time, but a confession within the context of the life of the believer. To articulate one's faith in God as the poietes of heaven and earth is to confess God's creating love within a context of fear and disorder. It is no timeless confession, but a time- and space-bound confession that everything comes from the promising God. In order to explain this third conclusion, we will describe what Bayer means with his stress on the fact that God cannot be speculatively 'thought' but only experienced. Because of this particular understanding of the experience-ability of God, Bayer's explicitly anti-speculative doctrine of God in relation to his doctrine of creation will be treated deliberately in the last section of this chapter (4.5.7). In order to come to that, we will first turn to Bayer's view of the mediatedness of God's act of creation, conceived both as creatio ex nihilo a n d a s

conservatio.

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4.5.2 Creation as God's Speech-Act In Bayer's theology of creation, the act of God's speaking is linked with his promissio,152 Bayer more than once quotes passages from Scripture to illustrate this (such as Genesis 1, Psalm 19 and 33, Isaiah 45). To create is to promise creation time and space in which to live. As well as with God's promissio in general, the way in which this promise reaches us is not arbitrary. Bayer stresses that the promise is mediated by speech.153 The first meaning of creation as God's speech-act is that everything exists through God's speech-act. God's speaking is creating, as we have already seen in the treatment of the promissio as God's speech-act. Bayer stresses this feature of promissio particularly in his resistance against influences of any idea of selfconstitution of human beings in the era of modernity. The concept of creation can be said to explain undeserved human existence, about which man himself must not worry. The second element of this speech-act is that it constitutes the very presence of God. Against Schleiermacher or Hegel, Bayer stresses that God is not self-evidently present with or within creation. This is the case, because normal human experience simply tells us that God, conceived as the loving Father of his own creation, is not the only One we experience within reality. Human experience of the created reality is ambiguous, and it is only by means of God's explicit act of presenting and promising himself to be present, i.e. by the promissio, that He really is present amidst other experiences. The promise of God therefore is the way in which He comforts us with his presence amidst 152 Cf. also Schöpfung als Anrede, 174-176 ('Das primär soteriologische Interesse christlicher Schöpfungslehre'). 153 Two examples: "Nachdem die Schöpfungsgeschichte als Geschichte wunderbarer Errettung [...] erzählt ist, greift [Paul Gerhardts Morgenlied] zurück und bringt ausführlich zur Sprache, auf welche Weise der zuvor lapidar festgestellte Sieg des Schöpfers über das Chaos errungen worden war. Die Schöpfung als Kampf gegen das Chaos und dessen Überwindung geschah - und geschieht - durch das Wort" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 122). And the other: "Mit diesem vollmächtigen Wort Jesu Christi [i.e. Mt 6: ,Sorget nicht!'] kommt [...] nichts anderes zur Geltung als Gottes Urzusage: ,Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott!' Aufweiche Weise sie zur Geltung kommt ist höchst bemerkenswert. Wir hören und erkennen hier nämlich paradigmatisch, wie Gott, der auch ohne unsere Anerkennung Herr ist, bei uns Herr wird, wie seine Herrschaft, sein Reich, das auch ohne unsere Zustimmung kommt, zu uns kommt. Das Reich Gottes [...] zu sagen und zu bringen, ist das Amt Jesu Christi" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 144).

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evil, pain, and chaos.154 This is clear from Luther's translation of Psalm 33,4

(Was

er zusagt,

das hält er gewiss):

God

promises

that

He

accomplishes what He says. The assurance that God is present within the experienced reality can only be the consequence of God's selfpresentation. This promise is a divine gift. Man cannot, of his own self, be sure of God's presence.155 Only by way of listening to this promise and receiving it as a gift can we experience God's presence within creation. Those, however, who deny God's presence within creation in his promissio, are called to lose the world as a inhabitable place and receive a desert instead. Not to confess and believe this present world to be God's promise is - according to Bayer - to interpret this world wrongly. If this world is not believed as promise, then it becomes nature to be feared, in which the killing law of the powers of chaos hold dominion. He who excludes himself from this promise will experience fear and anxiety and so God's wrath.156 In this interpretation of reality, Bayer uses the aforementioned promissio, specified in its twofold character as law and gospel.157 The third element is that, accordingly, the created world can be viewed as a text that can be read, or a speech that can be heard by man, telling us about God. Bayer compares the world with the text that speaks about its Maker. Though every creature can function as a

154 "'Dir' ist Gott da in der Zusage verlässlicher Gemeinschaft, in der der Angeredete jetzt schon inmitten aller Bedrohung frei sein darf. [...] Die Gewissheit des Heils, d.h. verlässlicher Gemeinschaft, hängt am Ort und Modus seiner Begegnung. [...] Ausserhalb seiner Zusage, in der er dir 'sich definiert hat', ist er der unzugänglich ferne und zugleich zudringlich nahe Gott, der 'in Majestät verborgen, den Tod nicht beklagt und aufhebt, sondern Leben, Tod und Alles in Allem wirkt'" (Schöpfring als Anrede, 30f). 155 Cf. Schöpfung als Anrede, 38. 156 "Wer sich der zugesagten Welt verschliesst, dem verschliessen sich Herz, Mund und Hand; die ganze Welt wird ihm zu eng. Er bekommt Angst und erleidet darin Gottes Zorn. Wer sich der zugesagten Welt verschliesst, der verliert die Welt als Heimat und handelt sie sich als Wüste ein" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 61). 157 "Wird die Welt nicht als zugesagte geglaubt, dann wird sie als 'fürchterliche Natürlichkeit erfahren, als unerbittliches Gesetz, unerbittlich nötigendes, zwingendes Gesetz, das sagt: Du musst diesem Chaos, dieser fürchterlichen Natürlichkeit in ihrer ganzen Unbestimmtheit einen Sinn abringen, du musst dieser in sich und aus sich chaotischen Welt einen Sinn erst geben; du musst Ordnung erst stiften" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 45).

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medium of God's message to us,158 Bayer is also aware of the problem of so-called 'natural theology', for this creation does not univocally speak the language of God. In fact, the only place at which creatura fully speaks of God is in Jesus Christ. Only in him are Creator and creation one and the same.159 Apart from Jesus Christ, there is no such 'natural' speaking of or by God in his creation, as this world is affected by sin. Because of sin, this world does not naturally speak of God.160 Again, this state of affairs shows us how Bayer uses his concept of God's promissio, specified as law and gospel, to come to a hermeneutic of creation. How is it possible for man to read the 'text' of this world if it is corrupted and stained? We have to discern between the 'two' words of God, between law and gospel. Nature and history speak in a twofold way of God: or better still, they mediate God in a twofold way. God is present both as the loving Father and the Judge. According to Bayer, we can only discern these two words if we acknowledge human guilt. Otherwise, all talk about the world as a text would become speculative, in forgetting the human condition in which we read the text. By our own guilt and the destructive consequences for the world as God's text, we are not able to hear God speaking 'naturally'. In other words: we have to be liberated from the bondage of sin in order to be able to read the text or to hear the speech. In order to hear God's promissio as it is mediated by creation, this promissio itself has to free us, i.e. to constitute our very being. Bayer illustrates this view with an analysis of a sermon of Luther's on Mark 7,34: "Jesus looked up to heaven and with a deep sigh said to him, 'Ephphatha!' (which means, 'Be opened!')." Following Luther, Bayer draws attention to the fact that Jesus here addresses a deaf person with a speech-act. In accordance with this miracle, the attention is drawn to the duality of hearing and deafness, of blindness and seeing, of unbelief and believing. The entire world is full of speech - the entire world is deaf! Though this description fits reality, it is not Bayer's intention to state a static fact. As with Jesus' 'Ephphatha!', Bayer wants to evoke reaction: again, this miraculous speech of Jesus works what it says.

158 Cf. section 4.2.4. 159 Cf. Luther's dictum·. 'Ibi creator et creatura unus et idem est' (Schöpfung als Anrede, 18). 160 Schöpfung als Anrede, 19f.

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In the fourth place, consequent to the former elements, Bayer uses this kind of conversion to illustrate that, after being 'spoken' by God, every creature can speak of God. This is not the naive speech of a kind of natural theology; it is a 'second naivety' as Bayer calls it (following Ricoeur). This naivety is achieved only by being born again, as Bayer claims,161 and it can be described as 'to be amazed' or 'to be astonished'. Bayer claims the Aristotelian maxim that the the prima philosophia begins with amazement,162 which he criticises because of its assumed one-sidedness: Aristotle's philosopher can only see the beauty and order of the cosmos, whereas the Christian believer sees both order and disorder; the god of Aristotle is a god of static happiness in which he sees nothing but himself, whereas the Christian God sees the misery of the world and wants to come to it.163 The ability to see and acknowledge not only the harmony but the chaos and distress as well is the distinguishing feature of the Christian 'second naivety': 'The amazement is linked to the complaint'.164 Out of this amazement rises the praise of the Creator, that this world exists and that I may exist within and with it, and that powers of chaos do not rule and extinguish the world. Bayer views Lamentations 3,22f as an example of this combination of complaint and praise: "Because of the LORD'S great love we are not consumed, for his compassions never fail. They are new every morning; great is your faithfulness." He comments: ' T h e a m a z e m e n t amidst complaint is a different kind of a m a z e m e n t t h a n that of Aristotle. If for h i m the w o r l d is everlasting, a n d at the s a m e time the principle applies w h i c h says that out of nothing nothing c o m e s (ex nihilo nihil fit), the radical threat to this w o r l d b y the void is denied. Therefore the a m a z e m e n t w h i c h is the beginning a n d goal of all philosophy is different from the a m a z e m e n t of Christian faith.' 1 6 5

161 " U m die Kraft des schaffenden und vergebenden Wortes Gottes in den Ständen zu erkennen und zu glauben, ist nicht weniger als eine Wiedergeburt nötig, eine von Gott bewirkte Renaissance [...]" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 57; cf. 66 and 178). 162 Schöpfung als Anrede, 170 (quoting Metaphysik A, 982b 11-13; 983 13-17). 163 As Luther remarks: "Primum ens videt se ipsum; si extra se videret, videret mundi molestias. In eo loco tacite negat [Aristoteles] Deum" (quotation in: Schöpfung als Anrede, 170). 164 "Das Staunen ist dabei mit der Klage verbunden [...]" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 172). For an account on 'complaint', see above at note 89. 165 "Das Staunen inmitten der Klage ist ein anderes Staunen als das des Aristoteles. Indem für ihn die Welt ewig ist und zugleich der Grundsatz gilt, dass aus nichts nichts wird (Ex nihilo nihil fit), ist die radikale Gefährdung der Welt und ihre keinen

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Again it must be remarked that this Christian amazement, this second naivety can only be seen as the consequence of God's own words of salvation and redemption. Only if God himself lets his creation speak and break through our stubbornness, as Jesus says: "Be opened!", can we really understand the call of creation. Bayer clarifies this second naivety by highlighting the rift between a cosmological, Aristotelian, and unbroken amazement and the Christian amazement amidst experiences of chaos. Those who believe in Jesus Christ cannot experience the sunlight apart from the remembrance of the time in which the sun stopped shining and darkness came over the whole land (Luke 23,44f). By means of the cry of Jesus on the cross, He at the same time tears apart both an aesthetic attitude and this second naivety, in which the lilies of the field and the birds of heaven speak of the care and goodness of our heavenly Father.166 Only because of the mediation that Jesus achieved, which has become effective by his word, nature speaks as creation; Jesus is the Mediator of creation.'167 In section 4.5.7, we will discuss this creationmediatorship of Jesus Christ in more detail. To summarise Bayer's view of creation as God's speech-act, we can see three elements. (1) The first element concerns the creatio ex nihilo: the existence of the world is a consequence of God's speaking. As well as God's promissio working what it says, we see the same movement in the doctrine of creation: God speaks and reality exists. (2) The second element concerns God's being present in this world. There is no presence of God to be taken for granted, for God is only present by means of his speaking. God's continuous creating (creatio continua or conservatio) therefore is always mediated. (3) The third element is the way in which God's creation (creatura) can be viewed as God's speechact. As with Bayer's concept of mediation, this 'speaking' is not only Augenblick aufhörende Bedrohung durch das Nichts verkannt. So ist das Staunen als Anfang der Philosophie und das Schauen als ihr Ende und Ziel ein anderes Staunen als das des christlichen Glaubens" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 173). 166 "Schöpfung als Anrede lässt sich nur in einer zweiten Naivität hören: durch den Tod hindurch, durch das Gericht hindurch, durch die Negativerfahrung hindurch. Schöpfungsglaube ist ein neues Staunen: dass wir noch sind, dass diese Welt noch ist" (Neuer Geist in alten Buchstaben, Freimund Verlag: Neuendettelsau 1994,75). 167 "Erst in der von [Jesus] hergestellten, durch sein Wort wirksamen Vermittlung redet die Natur als Schöpfung; er ist der Schöpfungsmittler" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 76; cf. also 167 and 178f).

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heard in literary 'words' of God. The whole creation can be said to speak about God. (4) However, in order to be able to listen to this 'speech', man has to be freed from the guilt and the consequences of sin. There is no 'naive' listening to the speech of creation. The cross of Jesus Christ reveals a deep rift between such naive amazement and a Christian amazement, which consists in trust in God amidst experiences that seem to deny his presence within his creation.

4.5.3 Creation as Anticipated Wish To call 'creation' a speech-act implies a lateral linking of two different elements of Bayer's doctrine of creation, the creatio as speech-act and the creatura as the medium of God's speaking. These intertwining meanings of 'creation' result in a specific understanding of time, because the creatio ex nihilo can be said to be past, whereas the creatura

speaking of God is present. The question is how the present creatura can be said to be constitutive for the past creatio. Bayer at this point follows the ideas of Hamann. One of his famous sentence reads as follows: 'Speak, so that I may see you! - The wish of creation came true in the address to creatura by creatura.'168

Hamann's sentence is the key to Bayer's understanding of God's creation as his speech-act; he characterizes it as the precis of a Christian doctrine of creation par excellence.169 Whereas Bayer interprets the doctrine of creation not primarily as a cosmological explanation but as a confession of God's continuing preservation of his creation, this 'actual' creating activity of God can also be seen as God's address to his creation. In Hamann's sentence however, the present call for God to

168 "Rede, dass ich Dich sehe! - Dieser Wunsch wurde durch die Schöpfung erfüllt, die eine Rede an die Kreatur durch die Kreatur ist" (Hamann, Aesthetica in nuce). Cf. for the following, Bayer's explanation in Schöpfung als Anrede, 15-19 and Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 93-107. The first part of this sentence is mostly ascribed to Socrates, though it stems from Lucius Apuleius of Madaura (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 247 η. 31). 169 "'Schöpfung' ist, so heisst es lapidar, 'Rede an die Kreatur durch die Kreatur'. Die Prägnanz und Aussagekraft dieser, Psalm 19 aufnehmenden Formel lässt sich kaum überschätzen. Sie ist die Kurzformel einer christlichen Schöpfungslehre schlechthin" {Schöpfung als Anrede, 16).

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show himself is linked with the past occurrence of the creation. This contradicts the normal logic of time, for it presupposes a conversation between Creator and creature which is anachronistic. For it is not only a creature that challenges the Creator to let himself be known; this 'wish' 'had come' true with the creatio, so that it was fulfilled before it could be uttered. God anticipates our wish, as He authorizes man to complain and make his wishes known to Him. Elsewhere Bayer explicates this phenomenon of the anticipated wish with reference to God's promissio. In order to let our complaint be addressed to God, one needs the promise that God will hear and grant our wishes. 'Before they call, I will answer' (Isaiah 65,24).170 Returning to Hamann's dictum itself, Bayer remarks that this sentence is a specific 'reconstruction' of the creation-story. That God shows himself by letting himself be heard, indicates his freedom over against his creation. To be heard is different from being seen, as in a picture. 'No one has seen God' {John 1,18a). The created mediation of God's letting himself be heard in his address to man, means nothing but the creation-mediatorship of Jesus Christ. 'No one has seen God'. But: 'the only begotten Son of God [...] has told him' (John 1,18b). 'God the Creator doesn't let himself be seen, but heard, and rather in such a manner that one can see Him.'171 Another element of this reconstruction is the place of the prepositions 'by7 and 'to' and their mutual relation. The word 'to' indicates the relation between Creator and creation, as well as the distinction between these two; there is a guaranteed difference between them. Only if this distinction is experienced, is there space for wonder, according to Bayer. Only if there is speech 'towards' creation is it possible that anything other than creation can be heard at all; only in this way, can speech look for an answer from someone other than the one who speaks. The word 'by7 is as important as the 'to'. In Hamann's dictum, the addressee of the message is at the same time the medium: world is addressed by world. Therefore, the world, in the process of being 170 "Lament and petitionary prayer are possible only on the basis of the promise. 'Call on me in the day of trouble; I will deliver you.' [Psalm 50,15] God is he who addresses and hears us, and he has answered even before we call upon him. 'Before they call I will answer.' [Isaiah 65,24]" (Living by Faith, 72; Aus Glauben leben, 78). 171 "Gott der Schöpfer kommt also primär nicht zu Gesicht, sondern zu Gehör, freilich so zu Gehör, dass man ihn - sieht" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 16).

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addressed, can gain distance from itself and become free from itself.172 Furthermore, Bayer here alludes to the problem of the relation between God's transcendence over against creation, and his immanence within creation. Instead of this abstract dilemma, Bayer proposes to speak about the 'lateral linking of God's freedom and love': Only the two prepositions together make theological speech of creation true. With the preposition 'to' one aims at God's freedom in love, with the preposition 'by' one aims at the bodily mediation of his freedom, at his love.'173

Let us summarise Bayer's use of Hamann's dictum thus far. Creation is a speech-act of the Creator which guarantees that it effects what it says. To speak of the lateral linking of God's freedom and love aims at the difference and distance between Creator and creation, necessary in order to prevent theology from becoming pantheism. It also aims to show the loving relation between Creator and creation taking place by means of creation (creatura). As indicated, this precis of Bayer's doctrine of creation has consequences for his conception of time. 4.5.4 Creation, Time, and Eschatology The aforementioned dictum, 'Speak, so that I may see you! - The wish of creation came true in the address to creatura by creatura', may seem at odds with our logical understanding of time, in which creation (ιcreatio ex nihilo) is something that is prior to any human or creational wish that could be uttered. According to Bayer, however, we must draw other conclusions from this sentence. Bayer wants us to take a closer look at the specific understanding of the concept of time concealed in Hamann's writings.174 As with the whole concept of promissio, speech, and the 172 "Ebenso wichtig ist, dass der Adressat der Botschaft zugleich deren Mittler ist, mithin Welt durch Welt angeredet und in solchem Angeredetwerden von sich selbst frei wird" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 17). 173 "Erst beide Präpositionen zusammen machen theologisches Reden von der Schöpfung wahr. Mit der Präposition 'an' ist auf Gottes Freiheit in seiner Liebe, mit der Präposition 'durch' ist auf die Verleiblichung seiner Freiheit, auf seine Liebe abgehoben" (Schöpfimg als Anrede, 17). 174 Cf. for the following: Schöpfung als Anrede, 128-139.

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linguistic character of God's being mediated to his creation, the concept of time can only be treated rightly from the viewpoint of language. On this point Hamann stands radically over against the conceptions of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, the concept of time is a capability of the soul, a 'pure form'. Bayer accuses Kant of following Augustine in his Confessiones, for though both view the past as remembrance, the present as observation, and the future as expectation, they ignore the fact that it is only concrete experience that mediates past, present, and future as such. It is necessary to acknowledge the institutional, bodilylinguistic presuppositions of the experience of time in its most thorough way. This implies that we have to look at the concrete way in which man handles time: our - obedient or disobedient - dealing with time, given to us by the Creator, qualifies our time. Time is a gift, concretely mediated by God's creational and promissional speaking to us in law and gospel, thereby at the same time evaluating and judging our time. The primal mode of God's time is the present. From God's promissional, creational presence in the promissio, the past is qualified as the 'old world', a qualification which gives rise to the experience of pain, and initiates our complaints about the suffering and sighing of the old creation compared to the promised creation. The promissio gives rise to the expectation of the new world that is to come. As Bayer looks for proof of this thesis in the texts of the Christian tradition, he finds several instances of the interweaving of present, past and future, and the primary presence of God in the mode of the present. The First Commandment is an example: Ί am the Lord, your God. You shall have no other Gods before me.' This present exhortation is closely interwoven with the past: Ί brought you out of Egypt'. The present requires the explanation of the story of the past. As such, the past history is not past past but present past. The same movement can be seen in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. 'This is my body' must be connected with the story of Jesus' arrest (1 Corinthians 11,23-25). The future, on the other hand, is not only a promised future, but consists in the promise that makes this present life bearable: only if I trust God's promise will I be able to endure the present. This understanding of the future contains a specific eschatology, in that Bayer draws attention to the fact that it is God's self-presentation, Ί am the Lord, your God', 'the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob', that has consequences for the future. Jesus explains this self-presentation in Matthew 22,31f by referring to God being the God of the living and not of the dead. This self-

155

Creation and the Doctrine of Creation presentation

contains

a promise

of the future as well

as for

the

p r e s e n t . 1 7 5 H e r e again, B a y e r p o i n t s t o t h e specific m e a n i n g of G o d ' s promissio

in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e First C o m m a n d m e n t . Idols

cannot

g u a r a n t e e o u r future, a w a r r a n t w h i c h c a n o n l y be g i v e n b y t h e C r e a t o r himself:

'Therefore

eschatology,

it

is

the

most

t o let it b e f o u n d e d

solid

foundation

in G o d ' s

of

Christian

past and present

self-

presentation.'176 This o p i n i o n o n t h e i n t e r w e a v i n g o f t h e t h r e e t e n s e s c a n b e t r a c e d in B a y e r ' s e v a l u a t i o n of h u m a n efforts t o o v e r c o m e t h e b r o k e n n e s s of t h e p r e s e n t b y c l a i m i n g a n d initiating t h e f u t u r e w i t h i n t h e p r e s e n t . If t h e f u t u r e m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a c r e a t i o n o f G o d b y m e a n s o f his promissio,

it f o r b i d s e v e r y h u m a n a t t e m p t to b r i n g t h e f u t u r e a b o u t . T o

g o b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e p r e s e n t d i s o r d e r a n d c h a o s in o r d e r t o establish p e r f e c t i o n , either b y t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n 1 7 7 or idealistic activity, 1 7 8 is b l a s p h e m y , b e c a u s e it d o e s n o t g i v e G o d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o d o his w o r k . In o r d e r to p r e v e n t this e s c h a t o l o g y f r o m b e c o m i n g a speculative,

all-embracing,

a n d a priori

p o s i t i v e f u t u r e of

creation,

175 "Mit dem gegenwärtig in seinem Wort auf mich zukommenden Gott, der zusagt: 'Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott', kommt der Herr zu mir, geschieht seine über mich entscheidende Zukunft, der adventus domini. Er kommt im Mahl zu mir - als der, auf den und dessen letztes Gericht ich samt allen seufzenden Kreaturen gespannt warte und bitte: 'Komm, Herr Jesu!'" {Schöpfung als Anrede, 152). 176 "So ist es das solideste Fundament auch einer christlichen Eschatologie, alle ihre Sätze in Gottes ergangener und ergehender Selbstvorstellung begründet zu sehen" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 134). 177 Bayer at this point criticises Pannenberg's project of the hypothesis of an eschatological ground and goal of the world. According to Bayer, this perspective negates the concrete experience of the present: "Zwingt nicht ein in sich zwar strukturierter, am Ende aber doch formaler Einheitsbegriff von 'Sinn' dazu, Sinnloses und Sinnvolles miteinander gedanklich zu vermitteln und so die schmerzende Differenz zwischen positiven und negativen Erfahrungen zu überspielen?" (Leibliches Wort, 329). 178 Bayer at this point criticises the positivistic attitude of the Enlightenment: "Was die Neuzeit als unüberbietbar Neues ins Werk zu setzen sucht, sieht eine unkritische Theologie in der Nachbarschaft zum Neuen der Neuschöpfung Gottes; sie gerät dabei in die Gefahr, beides zu identifizieren. Solches Zeitbewusstsein der Neuzeit und einer ihm zuneigenden Theologie verkennt die eigentümliche Verschränkung der Zeiten, die für die paulinische Theologie und die Theologie Luthers kennzeichnend ist: Aus dem gegenwärtig Neuen der Gegenwart Gottes kommt die zukunft der Welt; die gegenwärtig in der Taufe und im Herrenmahl sich eröffnende Neuschöpfung macht die alte, pervertierte Welt zur alten vergangenen Welt und stellt die ursprüngliche Welt als Schöpfung wieder her" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 52).

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Bayer uses the Biblical notion of the Last Judgement. 'The creationtheological and anthropological points of view as such already contain an eschatological point of view: the Creator is the Judge; it is only through judgement that God makes it possible to view the world as creation/ 179 This promissional, creational understanding of God's promissio, which occurs in the present, thus constitutes the warrant for the future and retells the past. So promissio is effective even for the concept of time. According to Bayer, the benefit of this interwoven understanding of time is that it gives the opportunity to really view the world as God's creation. Whereas human perception has to deal with experiences of both good and evil, it is impossible to attribute the world as such to God's promissio. By stressing the lateral linkage of our present with the future and the past, i.e. God's judgement and the ordered creation at the beginning, present creation can be seen in the right perspective. It provides those who believe in Jesus Christ the ability to view this present world as God's creation, and to distinguish between good and evil within this world, to hear both law and gospel. To summarise, Bayer's view of time - the interweaving of past, present, and future - is the modus of his applying the promissiocriterion, as God's speech-act in law and gospel, to the doctrine of creation. According to Bayer, we can only view this world as creation if we see it through the Last Judgement and the cross. The linkage of the tenses is a way of ascribing the future to God's action, as opposed to other views in which man theoretically or actively brings the future about. Therefore, the present is the most important category in which we have to observe our world and God's presence.180 4.5.5 Creation and Anthropology Bayer on more than one occasion gives a description of what it means to be human. In all of these, being addressed by God plays a major 179 "Der schöpfungstheologisch-anthropologische Gesichtspunkt ist als solcher schon eschatologischer Gesichtspunkt: Der Schöpfer ist der Richter; nur durch das Gericht hindurch lässt er die Welt als Schöpfung wahrnehmen" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 55). 180 Cf. Bayer, Oswald; 'Schöpfung als Geschichte'. In: NZSTh 45 (2003), (62-70) 69.

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role.181 This being addressed is eminently a statement out of Bayer's doctrine of creation, for it is God's creating speech that not only addresses man whose existence is taken for granted, but, on the contrary, it is the address of God, the poietes, that constitutes my being his poiema. God is the 'author' of my biography, for He 'makes' my history in the most literal sense of the word. 182 In the same manner as the Reformational sola, Bayer's concept of promissio within anthropology implies the passivity of man, as outlined in section 4.2.2. Apart from this passivity, there are some other elements which need to be set out as preparation for the description of Bayer's ethics. The first of these is our being determined by history. The answer to the question 'Who am I?' can be determined in a twofold way. The first, from the questioner who passes a judgement on himself, whereas the second is given by those around him. My life takes place in between these two answers.183 This immediately implies my being part of a history I share with those around me, in the past and present. I am entangled in history,184 as creation is a history, told by its divine Author who by speaking creates it. As the Bible testifies to this history, it is by reading this book that I learn to discern my own history

181 E.g.: "Das Menschsein des Menschen besteht darin, dass er von Gott ins Leben gerufen, mithin angeredet ist und deshalb hören und antwortend selbst reden kann, sich aber auch verantworten muss" (Theologie, 395). Or: "Ich bin der, zu dem samt allen Kreaturen gesagt ist: 'Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott, der ich dich aus dem Lande Ägypten, aus dem Sklavenhaus, herausgeführt habe; du sollst keine andern Götter neben mir haben.' (Ex. 20,2f)" (Gott als Autor, 243). "Als Sprachwesen ist der Mensch Angeredeter, von Gott ins Leben Gerufener. Seine Freiheit ist Antwort" (Freiheit als Antwort, 82). 182 "So bin ich Gottes poiema (Eph 2,10). Er ist mein poietes, wie es das nizäno-konstantinopolitantische Glaubensbekenntnis bekennt: mein Poet, der mich samt allen Kreaturen geschaffen hat und noch erhält und der mich so geschaffen hat, dass er mich angeredet hat. Sein Werk ist ein sprechendes Werk - wie sein Sprechen ein wirksames Sprechen, verbum efficax ist. Er spricht mich nicht nur so an, dass ich dabei vorausgesetzt wäre, sondern er spricht mich, indem ich mein Sein erst empfange, indem er mich spricht. Er erzählt mich, er schreibt meine Lebensgeschichte und rezensiert sie auch - als der letzte Richter" (Gott als Autor, 267). 183 "Zwischen Urteilen anderer über mich und Urteilen meiner selbst über mich werde ich hin und her geworfen. Auf diese beiden Seiten - nennen wir sie die Seite der Individualität und die Seite der Sozialität - ist nun zu achten" (Gott als Autor, 21). 184 From the outset "gilt [ . . . ] - als anthropologische Grundbestimmung 'dass sich das Menschsein erschöpft im Verstricktsein in Geschichten, dass der Mensch der in Geschichten Verstrickte ist" (Gott als Autor, 28).

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as being part of God's history with his world. 185 Reading God's history in the text of the Bible incorporates my 'self' into this history. 'Asking for the presupposition for the possibility to turn oneself towards the text with understanding: How and by what can I understand the text? is turned around by Hamann. He firstly asks how and in what this self is constituted: How am I in the text?' 186 Bayer thus emphasizes that the interpreter is primarily passive. The quest for identity is thereby relocated187 from the self to God who judges him, who writes his history. Bayer here takes up notions from the doctrine of atonement: the identity is 'outside himself, in another One: in him who by a miraculous shift and exchange of human sin and divine justice had taken his place and speaks for him'. 188 By confessing this God, who comes to him by told stories, God interprets him who listens to these stories in such a way that he changes and becomes a new creation.189

185 Cf. Gott als Autor, 30-33. 186 "Die Frage nach der Bedingung der Möglichkeit, sich dem Text verstehend zuzuwenden: Wodurch und wie kann ich den Text verstehen? kehrt Hamann um. Zuerst fragt er, worin und wie das Selbst konstituiert ist: Wie stehe ich im Text?" (Autorität und Kritik, 29). 187 About the word 'relocation', cf.: "Dieser Externität unseres menschlichen Seins werden wir in der iustitia aliena des verbum externum, des rechtfertigenden Heilswortes immer wieder neu inne - wie dies im dritten Artikel des Glaubensbekenntnisses zur Sprache kommt. Aber gerade in der Rechtfertigung sola fide [...] werden wir inne, dass wir schon von vornherein Menschen nur sind durch das verbum externum des schaffenden Gottes, durch Gottes Geist, der identisch ist mit seinem Wort, durch Gottes Schöpferwort, durch das er uns ins Leben gerufen hat, durch den Geist, mit dem er uns lebendig macht. Die Externität unseres Seins, der Sachverhalt, dass wir extra nos in solo deo existieren, gehört also nicht erst in den dritten Artikel des Glaubensbekenntnisses, sondern schon in den ersten Artikel, in den Schöpfungsartikel. Diese Externität liegt in der elementaren Angewiesenheit des Lebens auf das, was ihm gewährt wird und gewährt ist. Freilich will diese Externität und Angewiesenheit auch erkannt und anerkannt sein - und zwar in elementar leiblichem Zusammenhang mit dem Atmen. Deshalb ist es lebensnotwendig, lobend zu singen" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 116f). Cf. also 'Das Wunder der Gottesgemeinschaft' (Gott als Autor, 128-136). 188 "Die durch den Bibeltext konstituierte Identität des ihn meditierenden Mensch liegt bleibend ausserhalb seiner, in einem Anderen, Fremden: in dem, der in einem wundersamen Wechsel und Tausch menschlicher Sünde und göttlicher Gerechtigkeit an seine Stelle getreten ist und für ihn spricht" (Autorität und Kritik, 30). 189 "Hamann bekennt Gott als den, der im Wort, in erzählten Geschichten zu ihm kommt - ihm zuvorkommend und zuvorgekommen. Gott begegnet in Geschichten

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The questioner is thereby relieved of the obligation to save himself by creating his own story and freedom, or by being determined by the stories others tell about him. 'My true life story is not identical with that balancing between individuality and sociality. It does not disappear, but it is surrounded by the limitless justifying Word of God'. 190 The definitive answer to the question 'Who am I?' is found in the relation to God, which by sin has become a disproportion and needs to be saved by God's promissio.191 The second element of Bayer's anthropology is man's being linguistic. The classical definition of man as animal rationale is redefined by Luther and Hamann. Man is animal rationale, Habens cor fingens,192 as Luther formulated in relation to Genesis 8,21: man makes up visions of his own instead of obeying God. Luther here again takes the present state of man as a fallen being into the definition. Hamann takes up this statement in speaking about the 'critical and archontic value of the political animal'.193 Human critical behaviour, vital to being human, is, in accordance with the Greek krinein, to be able to discern, to order that which we discern and thereby to rule.194 Bayer more than once refers to Adam's archontic worth as described in Genesis 2,19f,

190

191 192

193 194

und legt den diese alten Geschichten Hörenden durch sie so aus, dass dieser verändert, ein neuer Mensch wird" (Gott als Autor, 27). "Meine wahre Lebensgeschichte ist nicht identisch mit jenem Balanceakt zwischen Individualität und Sozialität. Dieser verschwindet zwar nicht, ist aber umfangen vom bedingungslos rechtfertigenden Wort Gottes, in ihm gerichtet und aufgehoben" (Gott als Autor, 39). "[Der Mensch] ist ganz und gar durch das Verhältnis zu Gott bestimmt, das er - in der Sünde - in ein Missverhältnis verkehrt hat" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 131). Cf. e.g. Umstrittene Freiheit, 143. "[Der Mensch] hat als Sprachwesen ein Herz, das unentwegt Bilder und Idole produziert. So sind alle rationalen Anamnesen, Diagnosen und Prognosen - auch solche, die sich selbst im Sinne eines 'Kritischen Rationalismus' verstehen - von Bildern gesteuert, die das menschliche Herz fingiert, gebildet, entworfen hat, von Bildern der Furcht und der Hoffnung, die wiederum in bestimmten Erfahrungen gründen. Dieser anthropologische Sachverhalt ist zu berücksichtigen, wenn wir unser Thema nicht verfehlen wollen" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 142). "Hat doch Gott dem Menschen 'die kritische und archontische Würde eines politischen Tiers' zugesprochen" (Umstrittene Freiheit, 143). "Das kritische Tun, das dem Menschen wesentlich ist, besteht entsprechend dem griechischen Wort krinein darin, Unterscheidungen zu treffen, das Unterschiedene einander zuzuordnen und dadurch zu herrschen [archein, JHFS]" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 105f).

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where Adam names the animals.195 This definition, though stressing the linguistic aspect of our being human, also implies both the individual and social aspects of it. To 'rule' indicates the human place both above and within the whole of creation. To be a 'critical and archontic' human being is to exercise the freedom bestowed on us by mediation of God's promise, a freedom - for the use or misuse of which we are responsible - which presupposes 'no inner worth or merit'.196 Here again we see the regulative principle of Bayer's concept of promissio, along with the widening of this definition by Luther's use of this concept within the doctrine of creation, to be constitutive for Bayer's anthropology.

4.5.6 Creation and the Doctrine of Sin Bayer's use of Luther's definition of the object of theology being homo -peccator et Deus iustificans already indicates the important place he wants the doctrine of sin to have. To avoid any abstract speculation within theology, we have to interpret the world through these glasses. It colours our experience of creation (as creatura and history) to the profoundest degree. "If theology entails knowledge of sin and waiting for the gift of justification, it renounces the concept of a unity and refuses to conjure up a meaning of history. It does not give meaning to the meaningless".197 Firstly, Bayer makes clear that we cannot naively talk about creation as speaking of God, mediating his promissio to us. We need to be 'converted' in order to be able to hear with a 'second naivety'.198 This second naivety he elsewhere calls 'eschatological wisdom':199 to be liberated from anxiety for our existence by the trustworthy promises of Jesus Christ (Matthew 6,25).200 195 Cf. Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 103-105; Schöpfung als Anrede, 27.177; Freiheit als Antwort, 258.287. 196 Hamann speaks of freedom "die zugesprochen ist und deren Gebrauch oder Missbrauch der Mensch vor dem zu verantworten hat, der sie ihm als 'ein unmittelbares Gnadengeschenk' gegeben hat; sie setzt 'keine innere Würdigkeit noch Verdienst unserer Natur [...] voraus"' (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 131). 197 Worship and Ethics, 160. 198 Cf. above, 4.5.2. 199 E.g. Schöpfung als Anrede, 146. 200 For the treatment of the problem of natural theology, cf. Theologie, 511-517.

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Secondly, the stress on the importance of sin and evil draws the attention to the eschaton by which present and future are promisionally bound together.201 Elaborating this eschatological judgement gives Bayer the opportunity to oppose any systematic theology which tries to overcome evil in the present, which in the end denies evil in this world.202 This is why Bayer speaks about the 'open question' of theodicy.203 This, in the third place, leads to Bayer's 'aesthetics of the cross'. This means that we have to view our life and the whole of creation 'through' the cross.204 This aesthetic is especially important as it provides the basis for an adequate location for human activity and consequently for ethics and morality. We must firstly observe God's creation before we can choose and decide.205 It is the so-called 'preethical' that is articulated in Bayer's doctrine of creation. Both in German and in English, the verb wahrnehmen or 'observe' contains both elements: the first being a conscious perception, and the second the taking of one's chance.206 The first is necessary to be able to do the second. An adequate perception or observation of creation contains two elements, one of praise and one of complaint. Praise has its source in the perception of creation mediating God's promise to us.207 Complaint comes from the tension between this promise and experienced reality; in it, first human guilt is acknowledged208 and secondly deliverance from evil is sought from God.209 201 "Mit dem gegenwärtig in seinem Wort auf mich zukommenden Gott, der zusagt: 'Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott', kommt der Herr zu mir, geschieht seine über mich entscheidende Zukunft, der adventus domini. Er kommt im Mahl zu mir - als der, auf den und dessen letztes Gericht ich samt allen seufzenden Kreaturen gespannt warte und bitte: 'Komm, Herr Jesu!'" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 152). 202 Cf. Living by Faith, 78-80; Aus Glauben leben, 84-86. 203 Autorität und Kritik, 201-207. 204 "In seinem Schrei am Kreuz reisst Jesus Christus zugleich auch die Differenz zwischen eine naturfromm ästhetische Haltung und jene zweite Naivität, in der er die Lilien auf dem Felde und die Vögel unter dem Himmel für die Sorge und Güte des himmlischen Vaters sprechen läßt - er, der Gekreuzigte, der lebt" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 76). 205 Cf. for this: Schöpfung als Anrede, 169f. 206 Cf. Schöpfung als Anrede, 158. 207 Schöpfung als Anrede, 71. 208 Cf. Romans 8,20 (Schöpfung als Anrede, 177). 209 Schöpfung als Anrede, 178f.

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The connection between the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of sin can, after what has been written above in this chapter, be adequately summarised with this quotation: 'If L u t h e r ' s a n d H a m a n n ' s thesis of the Christological identity of C r e a t o r a n d creation 2 1 0 within the context of a doctrine of creation is to b e elaborated, then the sentence about the creation as ' s p e e c h ' - after w h a t has b e c o m e clear about the indecipherability of the book of N a t u r e a n d History, about the v e r y 'extinction' of its s p e e c h - c a n only apply if at the s a m e t i m e h u m a n guilt is e m p h a s i z e d , w h i c h m a k e s this speech inaudible. Otherwise, talking about creation ignores its life-context, a n d our actual situation will b e obscured s p e c u l a t i v e l y / 2 1 1

4.5.7 Creation and the Doctrine of God Ending our treatment of Bayer's doctrine of creation with a description of the relation between the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of God is in accordance with Bayer's view of the location of this doctrine. 'Contrary to all metaphysical construction of the doctrine of God, God's truth and will are not abstract characteristics, but they are that which orally and publicly concerns a specific hearer in the form of a concrete promise in a specific situation.'212 The doctrine of God can only be formulated a posteriori, instead of being a description in advance of the One we are looking for. As theology is concerned with primary texts of faith which it seeks to elucidate, it is not self-referential, according to Bayer, and it cannot build a kind of logical doctrine of God before this hermeneutical quest of engaging with these texts has been started. Bayer even claims that this is a direct consequence of his doctrine of

210 Cf. above, n. 158. 211 "Soll Luthers und Hamanns These von der christologischen Identität von Schöpfer und Geschöpf in einer Schöpfungslehre zum Zuge kommen, dann kann nach dem, was vom unlesbar gewordenen Buch der Natur und Geschichte, ja von dem 'Ausgestorbensein' ihrer Sprache deutlich wurde, die Formel von der Schöpfung als 'Rede' nur gelten, wenn zugleich von der sie unhörbar machenden Schuld des Menschen geredet wird. Sonst wird das Reden von der Schöpfung situationsvergessen und unsere faktische Lage spekulativ überspielt" (Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch, 103). 212 "Im Unterschied zu jeder metaphysischen Konstruktion der Gotteslehre sind danach Gottes Wahrheit und Wille nicht abstrakte Eigenschaften, sondern das, was sich mündlich und öffentlich als konkreter Zuspruch auf einen bestimmten Hörer in bestimmter Situation bezieht" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 39).

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creation which forms the basis not only for academic theology but for any intellectual endeavour.213 This is because the language (Sprachformen) theology studies, is no word that makes declarations; it studies the verbum efficax which is the word of the Creator and Sustainer of creation, of the Deus poeta, poietes of heaven and earth.214 The hermeneutical way of doing theology is implied in the confession of God being the poietes of creation, which, for its part, is traditionally mediated to us and passively received by us; these confessions and other texts are - as God's promissio - creating faith, and at the same time subject to theological investigation. So the development of a speculative and metaphysical doctrine of God is excluded by stressing God's being poietes, whose Word creates, sustains, and explains us, and who is mediated to us in the course of history. This God is the triune God, whose Word is pure gospel: creation, liberation, salvation, and re-creation - a gospel which can only be understood Christologically. That is why, out of this basic presupposition, Bayer distinguishes three kinds of doctrines of God.215 (1) The first tries to establish the doctrine of God as a framework for Christology; the doctrine of the commonly experience-able God, as a kind of natural theology has to be specified and perhaps corrected Christologically. (2) A fundamentally different kind of doctrine of God totally identifies Christology and the doctrine of God; one can only speak of God in an atheistic age by referring to Jesus. (3) The third disparages 'God' and 'Jesus' in such a way that it could be possible to

213 "This hermeneutical orientation corresponds to a doctrinal emphasis, primarily focused on the theology of creation, which, following the prologue to St John's Gospel, can be expressed in the thesis that the one who is essentially the power of communication and the one who empowers for communication, who vivifies and illuminates, has addressed me together with all creatures. In this (communicative) way I am enabled and empowered to be and to think. Because of this communicative mediation its specific linguistic character is a fundamental datum for theology which cannot be surpassed by the impatient grasp of premature logicizing. A hermeneutics based on the theology of creation is therefore the foundational discipline not only for academic theology but for any intellectual endeavour" ('Poetological Theology', 153). 214 Cf. 'Poetological Theology', 154. 215 Leibliches Wort, 290f. Though this distinction arises from the question of how to speak soundly about the 'death of God', it can be said to be systematically consequent on Bayer's (later developed) doctrine of the Trinity.

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believe in Jesus without believing in God.216 Bayer explores the second, following Luther, as the one way to speak properly about God. Particularly when speaking about the Lord's Supper, we discern that we can only speak about God as about the One who raised Jesus from the dead. If we should obscure the relation between the Lord's Supper, the crucified and risen Lord, and the doctrine of God, it would be useless to speak about God at all.217 This Christologically concentrated doctrine of God - for its part - can be unfolded trinitarianly, the Trinity being "nothing but the gospel of the freedom that Christ attained for us and which he imparts to us in the present by the word through the Holy Spirit".218 To identify, however, the three other experiences theology reflects on (the word of killing usus elenchticus legis, the usus politicus, and God's hiddenness219) with the triune God the poietes, would be erroneous. The death-dealing law ought not to be seen as the action of the triune God.220 According to Bayer, we have to discern this doctrine of the Trinity from a 'general' doctrine of God along with anthropology. Such general doctrines of God and anthropology deal "with the preChristian human being, which is subject to God's demand and accusation. It asks what it means to deal with 'God' outside Jesus Christ and thereby outside the love of the triune God".221 To confuse the general with the Trinitarian doctrine of God obscures the gospel, for it makes the gospel of love and freedom a 'general' theory of God as has been done by "the followers of post-Christian natural theology, which 216 The classical example Bayer uses to illustrate this kind is the book of D. Solle, Atheistisch an Gott glauben. 217 "Die in einzigartiger Konkretion im Herrenmahl beschlossene Lehre von Gott besagt, dass wir von ihm nicht nur reden können, sondern reden müssen [...]: als von dem, der den gekreuzigten Jesus v o m Tode auferweckt hat. Sähen wir von diesem Bezug ab, müssten wir von Gott schweigen, hätte es keinen Sinn, von Gott zu reden" (Leibliches Wort, 301). 2 1 8 'Poetological Theology', 164. 2 1 9 Cf. above, 4.4.3. 220 "Bedenkt die Trinitätslehre das reine Evangelium und nichts als das Evangelium, dann lässt sich dem dreieinen Gott nicht einfach das tötende Gesetz zuschreiben. W e r bekennt, dass der, der im Gesetz gegen mich spricht, und der, der im Evangelium für mich spricht, ja für mich eintritt, einer und derselbe ist, sagt das Paradox eines Wunders, das nicht etwa durch die Annahme einer selbstverständlichen Selbigkeit Gottes entschärft werden kann" (Gott als Autor, 14). 221 'Poetological Theology', 165.

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has developed since Lessing and Kant and found its ultimate form in Hegel's speculative philosophy of religion".222 To discern a general doctrine of God from the Trinity corresponds with the fourfold description of the object of theology. It also matches Bayer's use of God's promissio as a criterion for doing theology, as it confines theology to dealing with the mediated, diverse experience of God.223 It implies an eschatological reservation, for it forbids theology to speculate about the unity224 of God's triune love that would be 'general' already, and locates this 'metaphysical longing'225 to see God's love in the eschatological promissio of God himself. "This distinction is met in the faith and hope that it will be resolved in the Eschaton, together with the distinction between the law and gospel. Then the triune God - he alone - will be all in all".226 Only if we have discerned this 'general' doctrine of God from the gospel of the Trinity, and see God as He made himself known in Jesus Christ, can we speak about Jesus Christ as 'mediator of creation'. Bayer wants this creation-mediatorship to be not only hermeneutical but ontological.227 The question is, how is Jesus the ontological creationmediator. Here all speculation is abandoned as this ontology deals with reality as both created and corrupted at the same time. "Reality therefore is a battle between faith and unbelief. This is why God's selfintroduction which institutes community - Ί am the Lord your God' (Exodus 20,2) - needs the addition: 'You shall have no other gods before me' (Exodus 20,3). So, humankind is in a battle of justifications. The

222 'Poetological Theology', 165. 223 Cf. above, section 4.2.3. 224 "Gottes Einheit und mit ihr die Einheit der Wirklichkeit und ihrer Erfahrung stehen nicht als unangefochtenes ewiges und notwendiges Prinzip fest, sondern sind faktisch und praktisch sowie in durchaus 'äusserer' Weise umstritten. Wer das erste Gebot meditiert, ist damit in den Streit zwischen dem einen Herrn und den vielen Herren (vgl. IKor 8,5f.) verwickelt" (Gott als Autor, 296). 225 Cf. Theologie, 521-531. 226 'Poetological Theology', 165. Bayer here writes about current developments in theology: "It is one of the grandiose errors of modern history of philosophy and theology, to want to grasp this omnipotence in a Trinitarian way. This error does nothing but obscure the gospel, the sole object of the doctrine of the Trinity" ('Poetological Theology', 165). 227 Schöpfimg als Anrede, 76f.

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fight is about what is of ultimate validity. Who has the last word? Who keeps the right?"228 It is in this reality, this mixed experience of law and gospel, that the promissio of God's love comes to us. God's Word totally communicates Him to us, He gives himself to us. This is the pure gospel, and an antispeculative, historical definition of the 'essence' of God: God's being is Gift.229 Finally, this 'definition' of God's being is both the result of Bayer's wish to use promissio as a criterion for doing theology, and the startingpoint for doing theological ethics properly.230

4.6 Ethics The ethics Bayer advocates is not the goal of theology, as if theology were about human action. His second-order theological ethics is firmly rooted in the promissio-guided 'aesthetics' of creation (as creatura). Before one can 'observe' ethics, creation has to be 'observed' aesthetically: 'The language that enables the world to be known is before the ethos'.231 This language is God's address to creation as His promissio which enables created man to answer this address. Creation is both promise and claim.232 As God's promise reaches man by mediation, it is in the mediation of the Lord's Supper that we experience the bodily 228 'The Doctrine of Justification and Ontology', 49; cf. Living by Faith, 7f ("God in the Dispute of the 'Justifications'" [Aus Glauben leben, 18-20]) and: "'Sein' lässt sich dann als von der Zusage Gottes eröffnete verlässliche Gemeinschaft, als Sein in ewig neu gewährter Beziehung verstehen" (Leibliches Wort, 12). 229 Bayer writes that w e have to see "Gottes Sein als Gabe und testamentarisches Versprechen, in d e m er uns sich selbst ganz und gar gibt: sich uns endgültig kommuniziert" (Gott als Autor, 144). 2 3 0 Cf. Schwöbel, Christoph; 'Die Trinitätslehre als Rahmentheorie des christlichen Glaubens. Vier Thesen zur Bedeutung der Trinität in der christlichen Dogmatik'. In: Schwöbel, Christoph; Gott in Beziehung. Studien zur Dogmatik, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 2002, (25-51) 50f. 231 The first part of Bayer's theological ethics is designed to show "die elementaren Vorgaben [...], die, bevor sie ethisch wahrzunehmen sind, ästhetisch wahrgenomm e n sein wollen. Die Sprache, die die Welt wahrnehmen lässt, ist vor d e m Ethos" (Freiheit als Antwort, xi). 232 Cf. the subtitle of one of Bayer's essays: "Schöpfung als Zuspruch und Anspruch" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 155-168).

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form in which God's promise constitutes, criticises, and renews the relation - not only between God and his people, but also among people themselves. Thus this sacrament is no mere 'social idea', but the very constitutive of human sociability. Thus, the form of God's promise - its occurring in time and space and bodily mediation, and its formulation in liturgical texts - is the concrete point of reference for doing ethics.233 This form also puts into perspective the current problematic relation of theory and praxis within theological ethics. While 'theory7 exemplifies one end of the spectrum, which implies we have to understand and justify life 'as it is', 'praxis' on the other hand has to re-create the reality at hand.234 Bayer wants this polarity to be qualified in that, by looking for the mediated form, 'the social as well as individual way of existence is bound up with elementary experience of the world', and 'it does not presuppose theory or praxis, but it is itself presupposed and distinct from these'.235 God's life-giving promise calls being into existence; out of this being - trustworthy community invoked by God Himself - the ethical ought comes forth.236 This short, fundamental outline of Bayer's ethics is rooted firmly in his doctrine of creation, which we will elaborate (4.6.1) before we turn to the content of it as an 'ethic of gift' (4.6.2). The last section is devoted to some material ethical consequences Bayer gives us examples of in his theological ethics (4.6.3). 4.6.1 Ethics and the Doctrine of Creation The relation of ethics and the doctrine of creation is, as we saw, one of promise and claim. The aesthetics of observing creation as God's promise results in three characteristic features of Bayer's ethics.

233 Freiheit als Antwort, 5f. 234 Freiheit als Antwort, 7-9. 235 "In der 'Form' ist ja die soziale wie individuelle Existenzweise mit elementarer Welterfahrung verbunden und der Theorie wie der Praxis nicht nur impliziert, sondern bleibend vorausgesetzt und entsprechend von beidem zu unterscheiden" (Freiheit als Antwort, 8). 236 Cf.: "Das Sein kann dann als von der Zusage eröffnete verlässliche Gemeinschaft, als Sein in ewig neu gewährter Beziehung, verstanden werden. Das Sollen gründet in diesem Sein, wie aus Jesu Zumutung der Feindesliebe hervorgeht" (Freiheit als Antivort, 8f).

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In the first place, the ethic of creation is passively formulated. This is foremost a reaction against most ethics after Kant. Life is not firstly about the 'categorical imperative', urging man to follow the universal moral law to establish life, freedom and action. Bayer warns against this kind of 'exaggerated ethical ardour', as he calls it.237 'When faith acknowledges God's categorical giving, it is an answer.'238 Over against the characterizations of human life in terms of 'thinking' and 'understanding' (vita contemplativa) on the one hand, and 'doing7 or 'making' (vita activa) on the other hand - to which Bayer relates, respectively, Hegel and Kant - Bayer stresses Luther's vita passiva, which implies an ethic of 'being created'; this passivity corresponds with the aforementioned anthropology (4.5.5). Secondly, Bayer's ethics is concerned with the 'observation' of creation. Following Luther,239 the world has to be interpreted along the lines of the traditional 'three creation-orderings', which prevent 'reality' from being treated as a unity.240 Building on his doctrine of creation as address, these orderings are not timeless or past, fixed orderings, but they are addressed to man. " T h e highest dignity of h u m a n being as a linguistic being lies in this: that God entrusts his w o r d to humanity in this w a y , places his w o r d in our m o u t h s and on our lips. [...] With this, the church is entrusted to us, manum data, literally 'given in hand'; it is a 'mandate'. Economy, marriage and the family as well as the state are also mandates, things given to us in hand. They are all constituted by language - through the poetry of God's promise - and entrusted and handed over to our reason - a reason which is embodied in language, and which w a s imparted in fidelity and faith to humanity, by God's breath of language." 2 4 1

237 Cf. Schöpfung als Anrede, 169 ("ethische[r] Übereifer") and Theologie, 456-458 ("Ethisierung - Kant"). 238 "Indem der Glaube [...] Gottes kategorisches Geben bekennt, ist er Antwort" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 162 [italics JHFS]). 239 Cf. Theologie, 395. 240 "Seiner Dreiständelehre bedient sich Luther als eines gleichsam katechetischen Mittels, die Welt-, Selbst- und Gotteserfahrung in ihrer Totalität anschaulich, begreifbar, artikulierbar und kommunizierbar zu machen - ohne 'Wirklichkeit' auf ein einziges Prinzip zu reduzieren und von ihm her verständlich werden zu lassen" and he wants to articulate a "gegliederte Wahrnehmung der Art und Weise, in der Gott handelt, in der er die Welt regiert" (Gott als Autor, 291). 241 'Poetological Theology', 156.

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The three mandates - ecclesia (worship or religion in general), oeconomia (containing economy, marriage and family), and politia (the state) - in their linguistic form are an eminent example of the interweaving of the doctrine of creation and ethics. Critically mediating the data of anthropology and philosophical ethics, Bayer states that for the 'designing of the - not yet fixed - nature of man' (Gehlen, Nietzsche), language is decisive. Only language gives nature its law, constitutes certainty, orders the action-process and makes human life as constituted by the perspective of remembrance and hope possible'.242 This state of affairs is addressed by Luther's doctrine of the three orderings, according to Bayer, by the insoluble connection of 'element' and 'institution' as is clear from the doctrine of the sacraments. Bayer's concept of the three mandates243 can be summarised as follows.244 Luther used the traditional doctrine of the three estates. The most fundamental of these is man being addressed by God, destined to answer God thankfully and freely (ecclesia). Man as such belongs to this Church, which, however, is corrupted by human sin. Inserted in and encompassed by the Church is the mandate of the Haus (oikonomia), to which belong the relation between parents and children, husband and wife, man and earth, and work. This oikonomia is also addressed by the third supplication of the Lord's Prayer (about our 'daily bread'). The third mandate is the state of politics, which is not strictly a 'creationorder' but an 'emergency-order' in reaction to the fall. The relation between these three mandates and Luther's wellknown distinction between 'two Kingdoms' (worldly and spiritual) is difficult. It is not the case that one or two mandates belong to the one kingdom and two or one mandates to the other. They are not fixed in this way, and the two concepts (mandates and Kingdoms [Regimente]) are interwoven as Luther used them in different polemical contexts 242 "Die Sprache gibt der Natur eine Verfassung, stiftet Bestimmtheit, ordnet die Handlungsabläufe und macht so menschliches Leben als in Errinnerung und Hoffnung perspektivisches erst möglich" (Freiheit als Antwort, 117; referring to Gehlen). 2 4 3 Bayer himself used the word 'estates' (Theologie, Freiheit als Antwort), but in his later publications he speaks about 'mandates' in order to stress the linguistic-actualresponsible aspect of it ('Poetological Theology'). 244 Cf. 'Natur und Institution. Luthers Dreiständelehre' (Freiheit als Antwort, 116-146) and 'Die Ordnung der Welt: Kirche, Ökonomie, Staat' (In: Bayer, Oswald; Martin Luthers Theologie. Eine Vergegenwärtigung, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck 2003, 110-139). For the practical content, cf. section 4.6.3.

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(such as the polemic against Rome, monasticism, or the Anabaptists). Once a monk himself, Luther comes from a radical tradition of an ethic of discipleship. After his reformation-discovery, however, he shifted to a more 'world-affirming' ethic in which he wanted to combine the 'ethic of discipleship' with an 'ethic of the Household codes' (Haustafeln). The new element in this combination is the rediscovery of worldly elements like parenthood, the world of law, or state which can now be evaluated spiritually.245 Thirdly, the contours of such an ethic appear when we interpret human action from the perspective of the First Commandment. All human beings are addressed by God so that they may acknowledge Him, but as they sinfully deny their relation with Him, they deny their being in the mandate of the Church, and deny the gifts of family and state being given to them by the Creator. To regain the correct life-form, fitting to the world's being created by God, the Church has to enter the conflict of interpretation of this world. This conflict Bayer addresses as the conflict between general and Christian 'humanity7, between a separate 'ethic of the Household codes' and a separate 'ethic of discipleship'. As with the Lord's Supper, where bread and wine speak about God only if in connection with the institutional words, so here 'reality7 and its ordering speak about God only if being interpreted through God's word which gives the world into our hand (mandate).246 Summarising this aspect of Bayer's theological ethics, we state that the interwoven spheres of an ethic of the Houshold-codes and of discipleship both represent dimensions of the same state of affairs. Discipleship points at the radicality with which the lovecommandment is fulfilled, whereas the Household-codes point to the life-forms that shape our basic needs - for Christians and nonChristians alike.247 The three mandates form the creational basis for

2 4 5 "Luthers grosse theologische und geschichtliche Leistung [...] liegt darin, HaustafelEthik und Nachfolge-Ethik unauflöslich miteinander zu verbinden und sich gegenseitig gleichsam bewachen zu lassen" (Freiheit als Antwort, 133 [italics omitted JHFS]). 2 4 6 Cf. also Theologie, 511-517 ('Das Problem der natürlichen Theologie'). 247 "Die beiden Begriffe sprechen keine materialethisch verschiedenen Bereiche an, sondern meinen Dimensionen eines und desselben Sachverhaltes. 'Nachfolge' meint dabei die Intensität und Radikalität, mit der das Liebesgebot erfüllt wird. Die 'Haustafel' weist auf grundlegende, auf basic needs bezogene Lebensformen in je

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Bayer's ethic of responsibility, human action being the response to God's address. The First Commandment is vital for Bayer's ethic, as he views it to be addressing man in general.248 It is the most elementary instrument by which to observe the world as it identifies the mandate of the Church. As a consequence of the fall, this mandate is corrupted, and Jesus Christ has come to restore the corrupted creation-order of the Church. But the first commandment is still valid for everyone, as the Reformers tied the lex naturae with the Ten Commandments, which in a sense repeats the connection between an ethic of the Houshold-codes and an ethic of discipleship. The First Commandment is valid for all human beings in the sense of the usus politicus legis, which as such has a relative independence.249 Bayer's use of the primus usus legis is, again, an example of theology entering the field of interpretations of reality which inevitably leads to a conflict of interpretations, as man does not self-evidently serve this God. To summarise the connections between Bayer's ethics and the doctrine of creation, we see that an ethic of createdness stresses the passivity of man as being addressed and being created. It forbids any kind of exaggerated ethical ardour (1). Theological ethics is about the interpretation of this world, being constituted by God's speaking and authorizing man to live reasonably within the three mandates God institutes (Church, Economy, and State) (2). God's address, which implies such an ethic, is paradigmatically formulated in the First Commandment, which immediately stresses the conflict of interpretations of this world (3). We now turn from the creation-theological presuppositions of Bayer's theological ethics to the positive content of it in general. 4.6.2 Ethic of Gift The content of Bayer's theological ethics is an ethic of gift. Whereas the doctrine of creation, basic for this ethic, discloses creation as the neu zu gestaltender Ausprägung, die ihrem materialen Gehalt nach Christen wie Nichtchristen betreffen" (Freiheit als Antwort, 146). 248 Cf. for the following: "'Ich bin der Herr, dein G o t t . . . " Das erste Gebot in seiner Bedeutung für die Grundlegung der Ethik" (Freiheit als Antwort, 83-93). 249 Cf. here section 4.4.3 about the primus usus legis.

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Vorgabe, ethics is about the Aufgabe. As Bayer paradigmatically opens his theological ethics: "Theological ethics is about the question: " W h a t a r e w e - a n d a m i d s t the others: W h a t a m I - to d o ? " It does not start w i t h this question, h o w e v e r , b u t w i t h the question: " W h a t has been given to u s ? " For h u m a n action d o e s not start w i t h itself, but it lives out of the gift of f r e e d o m ' . 2 5 0

As stated above, God's very being is 'gift' in his relation to his creation. The Lord's Supper also, in this respect, functions as the paradigmatic form in which this gift is given to man. 'In the fellowship of celebration and joy man can experience himself not in the first place as doer but as someone to whom something has been given'.251 This categorical gift not only functions as the motivation for Christian action. It contains material-ethical directions as well: 'whoever understands his life as a categorical gift, along with all life, and therewith confesses the creatio ex nihilo, can amidst his fellow creatures only view them as existing within the same situation'.252 Out of this ethic of gift, Bayer stresses the primal fact (Urdatum) which arises from the mediated freedom given to man, which is 'power'.253 Bayer's concept of power is about 'provided power' ('Gewährte Macht), which is never 'amorphous' but which comes along with human relationships with God's human and nonhuman creation. It is language-power,254 in that language orders creation, as is clear from the doctrine of the mandates. If we can say that power-relations order our lives, relations are not pre-eminently symmetrical; we live in

250 "Theologische Ethik befaßt sich mit der Frage: 'Was sollen wir - und inmitten der anderen: was soll ich - tun?' Doch sie beginnt nicht mit ihr, sondern mit der Frage: 'Was ist uns gegeben?' Denn menschliches Handeln fängt nicht mit sich selbst an, sondern lebt aus vorgegebener Freiheit" (Freiheit als Antwort, 1). 251 "In der Gemeinsamkeit des Feierns und der Freude erfährt sich der Mensch nicht zuerst als Täter, sondern als Beschenkter" (Leibliches Wort, 333). 252 "Wer mit allem Leben sein eigenes Leben als kategorische Gabe versteht und damit die 'Schöpfung aus dem Nichts' bekennt, der kann inmitten aller Mitgeschöpfe seine Mitmenschen nur als die wahrnehmen, die sich in derselben Situation befinden" (Freiheit als Antwort, 19). 253 Cf. Freiheit als Antwort, 283-302. 254 "Nach der biblischen Schöpfungserzählung ist die in der Sprache liegende menschliche Freiheit Lebensmacht: die mit dem Zuspruch verliehene Macht, den Tieren Namen zu geben und sich damit in einen ordnenden und geordneten Umgang mit seinen Mitgeschöpfen zu begeben (Gen l,19f)" (Freiheit als Antwort, 68).

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the asymmetry of hearing and speaking, receiving and giving.255 As we live after the fall, this power can be corrupted into violence which is abuse of power. The distinction between power and violence is vital, for the first is not morally bad in se, whereas the second can only be legitimately used by the state. To totally identify the state with violence would be a negation of the original function of relations as God gave it into our hands (manum datum). This social concept of human power is the correlate of human freedom in that it is the way in which freedom is used to practice responsibility. In social ethics, power is also connected with the concept of 'labour'. The biblical narrative of the first chapters of Genesis makes clear that the anthropological notion of man as linguistic being implies being in power-relationships which require labour to fulfil this vocation. 'Labour' is, contrary to the Marxist concept, secondary. It is not the way to establish freedom, but the consequence of given freedom. Therefore, the observance of the Lord's Day256 is the basis for Bayer's concept of labour.257 The concept of 'vocation' is the primary concept under which 'labour' has to be observed.258 Our vocation is structured by the ethic of gift. My vocation is not to be fulfilled by myself: the passivity here is constitutive as well, in that I 'am called' in the first place to become a new creature through baptism. 'Vocation therefore is closely connected

255 "The one who speaks, who addresses another, challenges him, demands his attention, exercises power towards him, yes, over h i m " (Bayer, Oswald; 'Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996, [187-201] 192). " W e r hört, begibt sich in die Macht dessen, auf den er hört, in die Macht dessen, der redet. W e r redet, wer einen anderen anredet, stellt ihn, richtet ihn auf sich aus, übt Macht auf ihn, ja über ihn aus" (Freiheit als Antwort, 188). 256 Cf. Freiheit als Antwort, 47-59: 'Von der W ü r d e des Sonntags'. 257 "Der Mensch, der sich und seine Welt durch Arbeit und geschäftigen Konsum selbst erzeugen will, verkennt damit den Sabat und Sonntag; er verkennt die Rechtfertigung allein aus Glauben, die in der Unterscheidung von Sonntag und Werktag wirksam ist und sich in ihr darstellt" (Freiheit als Antwort, 52). 2 5 8 "Eine sozialethische Besinnung auf die Arbeit ist einer Lehre v o m Beruf unterzuordnen. Denn diese reflektiert vor allem die im Begriff der Arbeit nicht schon enthaltene Freiheit, aus der heraus zu den Problemen der Arbeitswelt Stellung genommen werden kann. Das Wort 'Beruf' darf nicht allein auf den Bereich der Wirtschaft bezogen werden. Es umfasst menschliches Sein in der Welt und das Sein der Welt insgesamt (Rom 4,17)" (Freiheit als Antwort, 63).

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with creation - it even means the same.' 259 Again, the connections between Bayer's theological ethics and his doctrine of creation become clear. Finally, it must be noted that Bayer, in the context of an ethic of gift, returns again to Christology. Jesus Christ is God's gift to us, as well as the example for us. Even our good deeds are considered to be following Jesus Christ: Christ as gift creates faith, Christ as example represents the works of love. According to Bayer, this is the right place for speaking of the tertius usus legis, the so-called usus in renatiis.260

The

distinction between law and gospel is hereby to some extent repeated within Christology. 'Law' here, however, is not to be identified with the usus elenchticus, but as the exhortation to live as a Christian.

4.6.3 Material Ethical Consequences Bayer's theological ethics are elaborated mostly in the field of 'social ethics'. Here, Bayer uses and develops Luther's three estates, which Bayer calls 'life-forms' (Lebensbereiche): social institutions like Church, family, marriage, and state. His stress on sociality has a creational rationale, for man is created amidst other creatures, among fellow humans. The freedom given to us is not individualistic freedom, but, from the outset, points to fellowship. Only within the context of sociality can personal freedom be experienced at all.261 Marriage is one example in which the promissio-criterion is used by Bayer.262 In most treatments of marriage the problem of freedom plays a major role, for the institutional character of it is often critically addressed by the idea of Romantic love. 'Love' and 'institution' seem to be irreconcilable. This is the case because often the partners carry the 259 "Beruf steht also im engsten Bezug zur Schöpfung, ja meint dasselbe" (Freiheit als Antwort, 61). 260 "Christus als Gabe schafft den Glauben, Christus als Exempel bildet die Werke der Liebe vor. [...] Das ist Luthers Votum zum Problem des tertius usus legis" (Leibliches Wort, 41). 261 Cf. Freiheit als Antwort, xiii. 262 Cf. Freiheit als Antzvort, 199-246; 'Evangelisches Ehe- und Familienverständnis'. In: Gottes Gabe und persönliche Verantwortung. Zur ethischen Orientierung fiir das Zusammenleben in Ehe und Familie. Eine Stellungnahme der Kammer der EKDßr Ehe und Familie, Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1998, 68-80.

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burden of bringing about their own happiness and that of their partner as well. Marriage has to be freed from this burden, because the Christian acknowledges God as the Creator of his and her happiness. Because the Christian does not understand his life-form as a 'self-made' one, as the product of his own will, his marriage has its centre in the confession that it is God who created sociality in general and this relationship in particular. The wedding service in which this is confessed is indispensable, for here God promises bride and bridegroom that He will bless this relationship, whose promise is received, acknowledged, and confessed. This promise is the only warrant in a world in which perseverance and loyalty in marriage are contested. We must rely on God's word, with which He instituted a particular marriage, on the institutional character of marriage as such.263 For Bayer, marriage is a 'vocation', in that God calls people to this 'state' (Stand). Within the context of conflict, husband and wife have to interpret their reality through this promise, the 'gift-word of marriage'. Bayer here interweaves the language of the sacraments with that of marriage, in order to stress the promissional character of this institution. Because of this, marriage is called a 'life-form'. By looking for this mediated form, 'the social as well as individual way of existence is bound up with elementary experience of the world'.264 Husband and wife experience both 'law' and 'gospel' within this life-form. Because marriage relies on the word of the Creator, its reliability in the long run is important, just as God's promise is everlasting. As Luther stated, this life-form has to be fulfilled with love - for love surrounds and surpasses all institutions and mandates. According to Bayer, this love has to reckon both with the institutional character of life itself (seen from the perspective of the doctrine of creation), and with the critical treatment of life (as 'life', 'nature', and 'reality' are characterized by both law and gospel). 263 "In der Anfechtung tröstet nicht die Stabilität des sittlichen Entschlusses [...]. W a s tröstet, ist allein das Wort, das die Gemeinschaft verbürgt. So werden wir wiederum in die Frage nach dem Wort zurückgebracht, an d e m alles hängt - nach d e m Wort, mit dem Gott die Ehe eingesetzt hat, nach dem Wort ihrer Einsetzung, ihrer Institution. Die Worte, mit denen die Ehe gestiftet ist und gesegnet wird, sind ihre Einsetzungsworte, ihre verba institutionis" (Freiheit als Antwort, 218). 264 "In der 'Form' ist ja die soziale wie individuelle Existenzweise mit elementarer Welterfahrung verbunden und der Theorie wie der Praxis nicht nur impliziert, sondern bleibend vorausgesetzt und entsprechend von beidem zu unterscheiden" (Freiheit als Antwort, 8).

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Family is another example of Bayer's ethics.265 The family is addressed by God's explicit commandment: "Honour your father and your mother" (Exodus 20,12). This commandment addresses the space which embraces all other activity; it should be connected with creatio ex nihilo: I am created by God, through my parents. So it addresses the pre-ethical condition for my existence. Its form as commandment however is caused by the fall, so on the other hand it presupposes God's creational word. The parents themselves are 'called to parenthood' in that this corresponds with the character of the Christian's life-form: what one has received one should also pass on. Human beings are not absolutely free, for they are free only within the context of communication, of receiving and passing on, of tradition.266 To have children requires a specific attitude of husband and wife; they have to re-order their treatment of time, for the child or children need time. It requires a responsible treatment of time as the gift of God, which should not be abused for the sake of the parents, husband and wife, pursuing, making, and creating their own happiness. The family, as one of the mandates, is also a place in which the Christian life is learned and taught. Recognizing mutual guilt and forgiving each other are Christian virtues par excellence, received by the social life within the family: between the spouses, between parents and children, and children amongst each other. The Christian message of the cross, the 'aesthetics' of the cross, can be practiced within the process of mutual giving and receiving.267

265 Freiheit als Antwort, 203-205; 'Evangelisches Ehe- und Familienverständnis', passim. 266 "Stellen und bekennen wir uns zu unserer Abhängigkeit von unseren Eltern und allen vorausgegangenen Generationen - im Guten wie im Bösen - , dann zeigen wir damit, dass wir nicht in isolierter und absoluter Weise frei sind, sondern unsere menschliche Freiheit und W ü r d e nur in einem Kommunikationsprozess erhalten und bewahren: im Empfangen und Weitergeben, im Überliefern" (Freiheit als Antwort, 203). 2 6 7 "Die kirchliche Verkündigung hat vielmehr realistisch v o m Kreuz zu reden, das Gott auf den Stand der Ehe und Familie gelegt hat. [...] [D]ort, w o Krisen und Konflikte kommen und sich darin auch das Kreuz einstellt, ist es anzunehmen und nicht zu fliehen. Die Sehnsucht nach 'reinem' Glück sollen wir z w a r nicht unterdrücken; wir haben aber keinen Anspruch darauf. [...] [Ü]bersteigerte[] Erwartungen können Ehe und Familie nie erfüllen. Ein evangelisches Ehe- und Familienverständnis, das an der Wahrheit des Evangeliums orientiert ist, bietet Antworten, die solchen illusionären Erwartungen wehren und eine realistische

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Bayer's use of the promzsszo-criterion with respect to marriage and family has several aspects. It firstly stresses the institutional, mandatecharacter of these life-forms: they are concretely mediated - by the wedding-formula or the parent-child relationship - words of God. This could be called the creational aspect. Secondly, it provides relief from the obligation to become the creator of one's own happiness, which could be called the soteriological aspect. And thirdly, it evokes the observance of the reality of family and marriage, containing both 'law' and 'gospel', so that a Christian realism can be obtained through learning to use this perspective. The institutional aspect is basic for Bayer's promissional-creational ethic of marriage. It metacritically mediates other views on this topic. The Roman-Catholic natural-law tradition of marriage is based on the concept of a treaty, either based on an act of will or on human selfrealization.268 In the tradition of the Enlightenment, marriage as a treaty is seen from the standpoint of the individual will to enter obligation; the 'partners' of this treaty are not mutually dependent, so that the fellowship of marriage is just an effect of the partner's action rather than an expression of an anthropological sociality.269 In Romanticism, the institutional character of marriage is undervalued, in which (Romantic) love is the presupposition and goal of marriage, seen as the human's own achievement.270 Over against this Romantic point of view, Hegel combined both the subjective and the objective in his doctrine of institutions, though he reduced religion to its motivational power which allows men to enter marriage with the right inner feelings.271 Within the context of this typology of 'institution', Bayer adopts his own point of view.272 He uses the concept of 'institution' for marriage to stress that man 'naturally' tends to 'culture'. The concept of natural-law cannot distinguish between 'nature' and 'culture', which leads to the misconception of nature speaking univocally. If we acknowledge the chaotic nature of (fallen) man, the institutions could be seen as intended to tame nature rationally (Gehlen), or as the outcome of a

Lebensperspektive eröffnen. Die Gabe unaufkiindbarer Gemeinschaft ist Glück genug" ('Evangelisches Ehe- und Familienverständnis', 78-80). 268 Freiheit als Antwort, 230-233. 269 270 271 272

Freiheit Freiheit Freiheit Freiheit

als Antwort, als Antwort, als Antwort, als Antwort,

234-235. 235-237. 237-238. 238-246.

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subjective, internal longing to be the 'form' of the inner feelings (Schelsky). The institution of marriage is the consequence of neither such a pessimistic nor such an optimistic anthropology. Marriage as such is not either 'gospel' or 'law'; it depends on peoples' living this lifeform: in grateful acceptance of God's gift, trusting His promise, observing His promissio in their life. A third example of concrete ethics by Bayer is that of state and society. Bayer develops Hamann's metacritique of Mendelssohn's concept of the 'treaty of nature'. If we use the fiction of such a treaty, man is obliged to obey its laws. To define these rights, to interpret reality, however, man is bound to use language so that this 'treaty of nature' cannot be logically prior to human response to it. The primal right to use this linguistic reason, in its turn, stems from God's promise which authorized man to speak and answer soundly. So Mendelssohn's characterization of man as the conscientious guardian of nature is both radicalized and qualified.273 The state as a primal, natural fact, which enabled man to exercise his social rationality naturally, is a fiction when we put it into theological perspective; according to Bayer, such a Utopia firstly denies reality in its fallenness, and secondly wants to overcome it by extrapolating the eschatological into the present through human achievement. If we, on the other hand, view the state only with respect to the consequences of human sinfulness, it tends to become only a vehicle of violence. A third option is to connect the concept of state both with the original human state and with sin. This implies a different concept of power, in terms of granted authority and exercised critique. Whereas in our broken reality this power is often changed into violence, responsible and sound dominion restricts and restrains this violence. Political dominion is destined to face the corruption of power, a distortion of that which was originally given and intended by the Creator. The right to use violence by either the state against citizens or citizens against the state is never justified beforehand. It must always be put into the perspective of God's right and the Last Judgement: human action can never be totally pure and sound, so that it has to be judged by God himself.274 Evil has to be

273 Cf. Freiheit als Antwort, 247-259. 2 7 4 Cf. Bayer's concluding paragraph of 'Gesetz und Moral. Zur ethischen Bedeutung des Rechts': " A u c h wer glaubt, wer auf Jesus Christus, auf Gottes letztverbindliches W o r t sich verlässt, ist den Zweideutigkeiten seines Handelns nicht enthoben. [...]

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withstood, but this does not imply that within our broken reality violence has to be renounced completely. Peace can only be experienced eschatologically in the 'mode' of promise, so violence will be used. To reckon with this eschatological restriction points to the fundamental many-sidedness of reality. 275 In his treatment of the social-ethical implications of his ethic of promissio, Bayer makes clear that possibilities arise out of this criterion for dealing with social institutions in a way that warrants both the bodily mediated, linguistic origin of God's creating word that guarantees their eschatological fulfilment, and a realistic observance of the broken reality we experience in which both 'law' and 'gospel' can be heard. The organisation of the state does not need a metaphysical or fictional explanation out of an original 'natural treaty 7 nor an eschatological Utopian vision which has to be realized by man. A biblical concept of power enables Bayer to criticise abuse of power (violence) and to acknowledge the need for restrictions of this abuse that use violence themselves. For the institutions of family and marriage, Bayer also uses promissio. The mediated, institutional character (manum datum) of it also gives us the warrant for their success even if evil and sin are contesting the spouses' dedication to each other and the children. Thus, the criterion functions both critically and pastorally; it criticises both human dedication as the ground for marriage and the criterion of selfrealization as the ultimate goal, whereas the same promise evokes faith to hold on eschatologically.

Die Erwartung des Letzten Gerichts entlastet uns davon, letzte Urteile fällen und in der Gesetzgebung letzte Festlegungen treffen zu müssen; sie befreit v o m Legalismus. Ebenso befreit sie v o m Moralismus, davon also, sich ungeduldig in einem abstrakten Gegensatz zur herrschenden Rechtskultur zu stellen, sie systematisch zu verdächtigen [...]. Die Erwartung des Letzten Gerichts hält damit den R a u m frei für jenes kritisch-politische Gleichgewicht, das dem Recht Zukunft offen hält" (Freiheit als Antwort, 282). 275 " E s gehört z u m Realismus der christlichen Anthropologie, die Augen nicht davor zu verschliessen, dass wir in bleibender Mehrdeutigkeit und in der damit gegebenen Ungewissheit entscheiden und handeln müssen - w a s schwer zu bejahen und schwer zu ertragen ist, da uns gleichsam von Natur aus nach Eindeutigkeit verlangt" (Freiheit als Antwort, 302).

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4.7 Concluding Summary In this chapter we have described the theological method of Oswald Bayer. We began with the statement that promissio is the key-word for his theology. Promissio is God's life-giving, life-sustaining, and liferenewing loving Word to his creatures. As such it covers the doctrines of God, creation, justification, and eschatology. Being the fundamental reformational discovery of Martin Luther within the context of the doctrine of justification and the sacraments, as Bayer has shown, promissio also functions within the elaboration of the doctrine of creation and theological ethics. Important elements of this promissio are elaborated to describe its criteriological character. Firstly, the passivity of man is discussed, because human justification, along with human observance of reality, is characterized by God's action. Secondly, the bodily mediated character of promissio is vital for Bayer's theology. Thus the way in which God is related to his creation is concretely named, which implies, in the third place, that this mediation - first of all by language - in its broadest sense is so important. Finally, promissio in the context of soteriology has to be understood in a twofold way: God's speaking can be both 'law' and 'gospel'. The distinction between these two constitutes the criteriological implications of promissio. As the criterion is explained, its use within Bayer's view of the concept and task of theology as a whole is explored. Theology is about the discovery of the effects of law and gospel within reality. As such, theology is a hermeneutical discipline that treats the human experience of reality. Amidst other interpretations of the same reality, theology is constitutively a discipline of conflict: it enters the battle between rival or contradictory explanations of reality; it resists unifying principles for our reality as well as dividing it, on principle, into separate areas. Theology therefore does not deal with reality (or realities) as such, but observes and interprets it as being God's promise to us; it tries to distinguish between law and gospel, it does not treat abstract reality but has the different life-forms as its object. The unity of our life is not achieved in thought or action, but is bestowed upon us passively. Bayer's concept of theology draws heavily on the vital position of the doctrine of creation, for out of this doctrine flows the basic conception of human society as Church, which is the primary life-form of every human being who is, qua creatura, addressed by God. Because human life within this life-form (Church) is corrupted, God's promissio is not only the graceful, life-giving activity, but it also points at His justifying

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and life-sustaining activity. Theology has to bring this interpretation of our experience into the limelight. Along with Luther, as the first leg Bayer stands on, came Hamann as the swinging leg, who made Luther's theology relevant to - and, where necessary, opposite to - the Enlightenment. Bayer follows this example of how we should interpret and observe the world 'metacritically'. One of the most distinctive words in this interpretation is freedom. For Bayer, to deal with this concept metacritically implies using promissio as its criterion; freedom is no postulate for action, nor can it be achieved through action. It is bestowed on us by God. Hamann's metacritical attitude is the reason he resists all unifying tendencies, for such unity can only be an abstract postulation, contradictory to our experiences of life. This causes Bayer to distinguish - over against monistic concepts of theology - four different experiences (Widerfahrnisse) as the object of theology: law, gospel, God's hiddenness, and the primus usus legis which consists in the civil or political use of the law. Bayer's doctrine of creation is based on promissio as well. Though the context of this criterion was the doctrine of salvation and justification in the first place, the concept of God's promising word which creates new life coincides with that of the creatio ex nihilo. As such, creation is treated as speech-act in the sense that God spoke and this world came into existence (creatio as speech-act), and also in the sense that through creation, through created means, God still speaks to his creation (creatura as speech-act). The implications for Bayer's understanding of time and history are also outlined, as our attention is directed through the interwoven past, present, and future towards a fundamental eschatological aspect of our interpretation and observance of the world. In line with the passive aspects of promissio, Bayer's anthropology stresses the linguistic character of the (concrete and personal) definition of man: "I am the one to whom - as to every creature - has been said: Ί am the Lord, Your God, who brought you out of Egypt. You shall have no other gods before me'." Within our reality, the last part of this definition follows from Bayer's doctrine of sin: we are creating our own gods. Over against human efforts to avert evil or fight against it, Bayer stresses the promissional aspects of eschatology in which God eventually overcomes evil. Finally, the doctrine of God which Bayer advocates distinguishes between a general doctrine of God, used, on the one hand, in conversation with other disciplines and other 'gods' to demonstrate gospel, law, God's

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hiddenness in our experience, and the usus politicus legis, and, on the other hand, the doctrine of the Trinity who is purely gospel. Theological ethics are outlined by Bayer along the lines of promissio as well. It does not start with the question of what to do, but answers the question of what has been given to us. Summarising the connections between Bayer's ethics and the doctrine of creation, we see that an ethic of createdness stresses the passivity of man as being addressed and being created. It forbids any kind of exaggerated ethical ardour. Theological ethics is about the interpretation of this world, being constituted by God's speaking and authorizing man to live reasonably within the three mandates God institutes (ecclesia, oeconomia, and politia). God's address, which implies such an ethic, is paradigmatically formulated in the First Commandment, which stresses the conflict of interpretations of this world. The positive content of Bayer's ethics is an ethic of gift. The central concept here is that of 'power', which implies the asymmetrical relation of giving and receiving without its common association with violence. The concept of labour, under the heading of 'vocation', builds on the idea of man as linguistic being; this implies living in power-relationships which require labour to fulfil God's vocation. Here Bayer stresses the importance of the observance of the Lord's Day as a starting-point for our working life. The material ethical consequences: family, marriage, and state are elaborated. In them, promissio is the criterion.

4.8 Evaluation An overview of Bayer's publications allows one to easily discern his intent to write systematically about theology without building a theological system. Bayer's most prominent instrument for reaching that goal is his use of the category of promissio: God's mediated relation towards his creation, by which He creates it. This promissio has not only become the criterion, but it also functions as the organizing element for Bayer's theology around which all the traditional parts of theology are gathered; it is the centre of his theology. Though Bayer does not offer a systematic theology in the sense of an ordered, logical book or series of books, starting with prolegomena and the doctrine of God and ending with eschatology, it is systematic in the sense that Bayer relates all of the common loci in dogmatics to the category of promissio. In a sense, the elaboration of this criterion is an

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example of Bayer's application of it, for it even criticises some of Bayer's earlier convictions.276 One can, however, ask whether this systematic application of such criterion leads to a kind of system. I will give two examples which show this tendency. Wherever the promissio-criterion is used, it is not - and ought not to be - a monistic, loving principle that relates God and man only positively.277 Bayer stresses its twofold explanation as 'law' and 'gospel'; and even God's 'Yes' to creation bears in mind that it is addressed to a reality that is sinful and broken. Promissio in such a broken reality evokes conflict, such as we discovered to be present in the first commandment: Ί am the Lord, your God [...]. You shall have no other gods before me'. God's redemptive and creative action towards such a sinful and broken reality therefore is always linked with other theological topics like eschatology and the Last Judgement. This interweaving of dogmatic loci renounces all speculative, univocal speech about God's unconditional love for the present reality. The question is how this twofold criterion applies to this broken reality. How can we see God's loving gospel and His killing 'law' to be 276 Cf. above, n. 4 and 6 about the growing distance with respect to Barth's theology, and about the slowly developed insight to apply promissio to the doctrine of creation as well. 277 In its critical and criteriological way, promissio therefore could be used to criticise overly naive interpretations of reality. William Schweiker, for instance, writes: "The fact of the new creation means that Christians can let the sciences have their full say in any account of the nature of reality, because that reality in all its wonder and limitation will be seen as part and parcel of God's good creation. This is not to deny the obvious sinfulness, brokenness, and horrors of life; it is not to deny that Christians can and must and may work to end forms of injustice and suffering. What it does say is that Christian faith - as a form of real joy - can see through the brokenness of the world to the good that shines in reality. Is this not the moral cosmological meaning of the incarnation? Christians combat evil and injustice because life is good and a divine gift to be treasured. [...] To live the new creation is to dedicate one's life to combat all that unjustly demeans and destroys life out of a profound love of live and in the name of divine goodness" ('Time as a Moral Space: Moral Cosmologies, Creation, and Last Judgemenf. In: Polkinghorne, John; Welker, Michael (ed.); The End of the World and the Ends of God. Science and Theology on Eschatology, Trinity Press International: Harrisburg 2000, [124-138] 138). In line with Bayer's argument, one should be very reluctant to speak about the positive results of such a 'combat', however true our Christian calling to such a combat is. The fundamental brokenness of our reality and even of our attempts to overcome it must never be underestimated. On the other hand, neither should God's own activity through created means (of which we are part) be underestimated.

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at work? Bayer wants the law to have the same 'promissional' character as the 'gospel' in that it works what it says: deterrence and comfort, death and life (both!) are effects of the Word.278 God's law traditionally has the function of convincing man of his actual guilt, a function both heuristic in detecting guilt and constitutive in that it thereafter works what it says: death. The gospel, on the other hand, cannot be said to have heuristic value in Bayer's concept. The gospel is only constitutive in that it works faith, redemption, even life itself.279 Bernd Wannenwetsch at this point comments that 'law' and 'gospel' in Bayer's use are interpreted in a very specific and pointed way. As such, Wannenwetsch says, this distinction can be used as an important hermeneutical tool in order to structure the ethical 'observance' of the good gifts of God in a broad sense of the word.280 At the heart of this problem is the interweaving of both the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of redemption. In Bayer's theology, the two are treated as if they were almost identical, so that the differences between them are easily overlooked. It would, however, be theologically more justified to make some distinction. Within the context of a broken reality (soteriology), law is both heuristic and constitutive, whereas gospel is only constitutive. Within the context of the doctrine of creation, however, one can ask whether the law can be said to have a constitutive function. The law does not 'create' human sinfulness in the same sense as the gospel creates life. Within the doctrine of creation, human responsibility and guilt do play another role than within soteriology. So the explanation of the promissio criterion consisting in law and gospel281 is in a sense misleading. The careful balance implied in Bayer's definition is no balance. As verbum efficax, the gospel is constitutive for human life and action, whereas the law is its interpreter. God's 'no' is not constitutive for human guilt, but sin is.

278 Cf. above, n. 56. 279 Cf. above, 4.2.5. 280 Wannenwetsch, Bernd; Die Freiheit der Ehe. Das Zusammenleben von Frau und Mann in der Wahrnehmung evangelischer Ethik [Evangelium und Ethik Bd. 2], Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1993,87 n. 151. 281 Cf. above, η. 58: "As a criterion [for theology] we must keep in view the correlation of promissio and fides, and (for the more precise understanding of the promissio) the distinction between law and gospel" (Worship and Ethics, 158f).

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This brings us to the second element: the balance implied in the statement that God's creation is a speech-act. Both creatio and creatura are said to be God's promise. Hamann's sentence that creation is 'address to creation by creation' interweaves these elements.282 That God's creating activity - mediated though it might be - can be said to be 'pure promise' in that it gives life, creates life out of nothing, 'without any merit or dignity on my side' as Luther stated, is theologically correct. But the speech-act of nature in the present, stained by evil, human sin and guilt, cannot be said to be pure gospel alone. Though this imbalance is detected as Bayer avoids speaking naively about any kind of 'natural theology7, and in his stressing the 'second naivety7 that can only be gained after one has heard Jesus' cry from the cross,283 he does not pass this caution on to Hamann's 'definition'. His criterion - promissio as it consists in law and gospel is not applicable to both creation as creatura and creatio, for God's act of creation cannot be said to be both law and gospel. Therefore, one should distinguish between God's promissio as His speech-act, and human application of it in its criteriological sense. This distinction corresponds with a distinction between a first-order-use and a second-order-use of promissio. We should also distinguish between the application of it within the doctrines of creation and redemption related though these doctrines are. In first-order-use, promissio implies the actual speaking of God, both in the doctrine of creation (creatio) and in soteriology (God's mediated speaking that we experience through His creatura). With respect to the origin of life, God's promissio is gospel alone as the gift

282 At this point, we can refer to Veldhuis' study on Hamann. Veldhuis states that Hamann's treatment of the linguistic character of reality as God's speech-act radically critiques the existence of fixed patterns of knowledge as adopted in science during the Enlightenment-era. Such eternally true patterns should make human knowledge and life autonomous and could set it apart from God's revalatory act, so runs Veldhuis' interpretation of Hamann. Veldhuis considers this itself to be a fall into the pitfall of the Enlightenment, for the search for reason and unity and systems as such should not be too critically condemned. Therefore Hamann's dictum Vernunft ist (contingent) Sprache is to be replaced by the adagium: verbum quaerens intellectum (Veldhuis, H.; Een verzegeld boek. Het natuurbegrip in de theologie van J.G. Hamann (1730-1788), s.l.: Merweboek 1990, [357-366] 365f). 283 Cf. section 4.5.2.

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of life everlasting is passed on to His creatures.284 Whereas the doctrine of creation does not only cover this origin, even life's being upheld and sustained by God's gracious activity - even broken and sinful life can be said to be God's creation - means there has to be a relation between promissio and brokenness, to which we will turn later. Within the doctrine of redemption, which only takes place in a fallen world, promissio is both life-giving gospel and penalty-promising law. In second-order-use, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of redemption are bound inseparably together, for a second-order-use can only be established within reality as it is now, which is broken, fallen, and sinful. Here, promissio is a heuristic instrument, detecting the distinct voices one hears in a broken reality. Over against two extremes - reality is God (pantheism) and reality is absolutely qualitatively different from God - Bayer stresses God's mediated presence in reality. To avoid this presence being one-sided and unreal, one should distinguish between God's love and his wrath. If one agrees with this distinction, between first- and second-orderuse as well as between the doctrine of creation and redemption, Bayer's identification of the two is questionable. It could be said that God's redemptive speaking is creative as well, but not the other way around: God's creative speaking is not as such redemptive in character. The two elements, the constitutive character of the law and the imbalance between creatio and creatura as God's speech-act, have one thing in common: the question of how God is present within our fallen reality, in which good and evil both are intermingled. At the heart of both elements is the theodicy-problem, a problem that arises wherever the world after the fall is connected with God's present relation to it. 285

284 Despite the scientific problems, resulting from this theological claim, the theological statement that 'the doctrine of creation' is about the origin of the world is a valuable statement. Because theology can be viewed as a conflictual discipline, these problems should not be the reason not to state what is theologically correct: that the existence of creation in time and space depends on God's constitutive speech-act. 285 With respect to Hamann's view on the relation between creation and redemption, and the alleged problem of theodicy, H. Veldhuis describes Hamann's opinion as 'supralapsarian' in that creation is per se directed to its fulfillment through Christ. The classic reproach that such supralapsarianism should underestimate the consequences of sin and evil, is clearly not applicable to Hamann (Veldhuis, Een verzegeld boek, 333-343).

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We can trace a thread through Bayer's earlier publications towards his later ones. Bayer started with the elaboration of the promissiocategory in Luther's writings about soteriology, and gradually applied it to the doctrine of creation.286 As creation not only mediates the gospel, Bayer distinguished within the promissio between 'law' and 'gospel', death-dealing and life-giving words. Though Luther in his later work also applied categories from soteriology to the doctrine of creation,287 the question remains whether we should also apply categories from the doctrine of creation in soteriology. One could - with Paul in Romans 4,17 - say that resurrectio mortuorum or iustificatio impii show the same power of God as creatio ex nihilo does. Is it therefore possible to say that such an act of justification is creation out of nothing? Is it not the case that justification has to do with reality as fallen reality, not with God's original creation? This state of affairs is further complicated by the fact that a human doctrine of creation only emerged after the fall. What can fallen human beings say about the time before the fall, beyond the post-fall account of it in Genesis 1-2?

In Neo-Calvinism, this question becomes all the more imporant. In it, the doctrine of creation is always said to indicate both the constitutive relationship between Creator and creatura, which includes ethics, and its notion of origin.288 The idea of origin is stressed over against any religion or philosophy in which creatura somehow emerges apart from God. The biblical narrative concerning creation in Genesis 1 and 2 is considered to be God's revelation to us about a time that is otherwise closed to our knowledge. This narrative makes clear that this creation was 'good'. Despite problematic features of combining scientific results concerning the character of 'nature' (as presupposed in theories about evolution, for instance) and the alleged original 'goodness' of creation, it is stated that the theological content of a good beginning is theologically important.289 Because of our need for guidance, both ethically and existentially, the Genesis-account gives 286 Cf. section 4.1. 2 8 7 Cf. section 4.5.1. 2 8 8 "Most certainly it [i.e. the 'teaching of creation'] also offers an answer to the question of the origin of all things. Yet its significance is first and foremost religious and ethical" (Bavinck, Herman; In the Beginning. Foundations of Creation Theology [TR John Vriend; ED John Bolt], Baker: Grand Rapids 1999,24; cf. Bavinck, H.; GD Π, 371). 289 Cf. Bavinck, GD ΙΠ, 2.

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exactly that. According to K. Schilder, it is exactly because of that presupposition - which touches on the nature of Scripture - that we may not call Jesus Christ the mediator of creation. That would denote that creation and God had to be reconciled from the outset, whereas the biblical account of the good beginning denies that.290 The idea, however, that God used some means (medium) in creation - the Word - is not to be rejected. Soteriology is a doctrine that emerges only within a context in which evil, sin and guilt are present. In Neo-Calvinism, therefore, the aforementioned doctrine of a good creation as the original state of the world, implies the temporal distinction of soteriology and the doctrine of creation. To identify soteriology with creation out of nothing - as Bayer does - relates God and evil in a very pronounced way, in that God is Creator even of evil - which evokes the theodicy-problem. Because of this problem, Bayer distinguishes a fourfold object of theology, in which - apart from 'law' and 'gospel' - God's unbearable and inexplicable hiddenness plays an important role. The category of 'complaint' voices this problem: God is addressed as the One who gives both life and death, which is incompatible with His promissio as gospel. The fact that the believer addresses God implies that He is responsible for human well-being. The inconceivable disparagement of God's promise on the one hand, and human experiences on the other, is laid before Him. On the other hand, the positive function of the law, in its lifesustaining capacity which orders society, has its place within the fourfold object of theology as well. This so-called usus politicus of the law is different from its death-dealing function. Bayer calls it the 'sustaining grace' of God.291 Bayer's explicit statement, that this fourfold object cannot be reduced to any of the four elements, corresponds with the antimonistic, anti-speculative drive in his theology. The question, however, of how these four elements exactly relate to each other, and how their distinction in a human, sinful reality can be made, is not as easily

290 Schilder, Κ.; Heidelbergsche Catechismus [Dl. Π], Oosterbaan & Le Cointre: Goes 1949, 83-103; Schilder, Κ.; Heidelbergsche Catechismus [Dl. ΙΠ], Oosterbaan & Le Cointre: Goes 1950,190-192. 291 "Erhaltungsgnade" as different from "Gnade der Neuschöpfung" (Theologie, 417).

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answered as it would seem. The relation between the four elements and their relation to the doctrines of creation and redemption is not clear.

5 The Connection Between a Doctrine of Creation and Theological Ethics 5.1 Introduction This chapter is devoted to describing the systematic-theological connection between a doctrine of creation and theological ethics. Whereas in the past chapters the theologies of Colin E. Gunton and Oswald Bayer were described with a view to their interconnecting 'creation' and 'ethics', this chapter will not focus on particular individual theologians. Instead, it will provide a more general account of how this connection should be conceived. This chapter is therefore organized as a systematic treatise which defines itself in terms of 'creation'. The chapter is arranged according to the following principle. The appeal to 'creation' for theological ethics is emotionally charged. In this chapter I will treat four well-known objections to appeals to 'creation'. Thereby, the concept and doctrine of creation will be elaborated along the lines of and in discussion with these objections. Thus, the consequences for theological ethics will be incorporated into the broader discussion of this topic. This chapter starts with the problem of how 'creation' can be known at all, and how this epistemological problem works out for a doctrine of creation. As the preceding chapters have shown, the theologies of both Gunton and Bayer attempt to provide a genuine theological account of the concept of creation, including some ethical implications or stipulations. Theologically, however, the primordial question is whether man is capable at all of discerning norms out of creation. Does an acknowledgement of the devastating consequences of 'sin', theologically named as 'hamartiology', for both the creation as we discern it and the human ability to know it not place a premium on clarifying these epistemological questions? Therefore, the basic assumption that creation and the doctrine of creation provide us with sources of moral knowledge is an epistemological one, in which the human capacity to know creation is somehow presupposed. Therefore, this epistemological presupposition will be treated first (5.2).

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In the third paragraph, the relation between 'nature' and 'norms' will be discussed, as far as many traditional accounts of the relation between 'creation' and 'ethics' are presented within the framework of these words. Recent efforts to conceptualise the relation between 'nature' and 'norms' will be discussed. The charges brought against the appeal to nature can be avoided by using the Christian concept of creation, as will be shown. The tradition of 'natural law' has had a great influence in the history of the connection between ethics and creation. The claim that moral knowledge gained from 'nature' is not just a particular insight by certain individuals about questions of good and evil, but bears general or universal consequences, is of great importance in this tradition. The question is whether the conscious use of the concept of creation alters the presuppositions of this tradition or not. This not only affects the traditional 'natural law'-concept, but current cosmological concepts as well. Therefore, the concepts of 'nature' and 'creation' have to be clarified (5.3). Another pressing objection against the appeal to 'creation' for doing ethics is its alleged static character. Therefore, the concept of 'creation' has to be flexible enough to avoid the accusation of being outdated. This can be achieved by analysing the relation between the concept of 'creation' and that of divine providence. For as the concept of 'creation' is not limited to the past of a creatio ex nihilo, the difference and correspondence between the concepts of 'creation' and 'providence' have to be discussed. Within the context of a doctrine of divine providence, the relation between God and his creation can become clear without passing over the problems of sin, evil, and a naive use of 'nature'. That is exactly the function of a doctrine of divine providence, as will be shown (5.4). The fourth objection follows on from the third. As soon as 'creation' is not viewed as the timeless beginning of history, but is also used as a description of the reality we experience, its teleological directedness must be treated. Within the history of theology the doctrine of the last things has had the function of describing creation's destiny, along with the consequences of that destiny for the view of and treatment of 'creation' in the present. Many discussions have been held about the way in which origin and destiny have to be weighed in their mutual relation. The classical positions within theological ethics between an ethic of creation and an ethic of the (future) Kingdom bear the marks of this discussion. Since the 'order of creation' is not conceived in terms of static ordinances, the question is raised whether the concept of

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'eschatology' is not more appropriate to determine the character of Christian ethics. As the triune Creator is bringing His creation to the purposed goal, should that not radically qualify the appeal to 'creation orders'? Therefore, the consequences of taking the eschatological destination of creation seriously are reflected upon in the fifth paragraph (5.5). The four elements described (epistemology, nature, providence, and eschatology) are but one attempt to systematize the problem of the connection of morality and reality, of ethics and creation. It is nevertheless not arbitrary, as the preceding explanation tried to make clear. Along with these four elements that have to be discussed in order to reach a sound treatment of the appeal to creation in questions of morality, the proposals of Bayer and Gunton will be evaluated. In the final sections of this chapter, I will summarise these critical remarks (5.6) and the outcome of this chapter for theological social ethics in general (5.7).

5.2 Creation and Epistemology 5.2.1 Jesus Christ and the Goodness of Creation As I have stated in chapter 2, there can be no knowledge of creation without Jesus Christ. That is why one confesses that the Father of Jesus Christ created heaven and earth.1 That starting-point is not elaborated in Dutch Neo-Calvinism as much as it should be. Its starting-point is different. As Jeremy Begbie shows, theologians like Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck and philosophers like Herman Dooyeweerd have a thorough treatment of the 'orders of creation' grounded in the 'eternal decrees' of God.2 Thus, Kuyper refers in his last 'Lecture on Calvinism' 1

Cf. e.g. the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord's Day 9, question 26. Cf. Ingolf U. Dalferth, who starts with the Apostles Creed in which God is addressed as Creator and (in the second article) as the Redeemer of the world: "Christians confess the God who in Jesus Christ has brought the world to salvation as creator of this world, and therefore (and only in this order!) also confess the world to be God's creation [...]" ('Creation - Style of the World'. In: IJSTh 1 [1999], [119-137] 129).

2

Jeremy S. Begbie has given an overview of Neo-Calvinist creation theology in relation to his research on a 'theology of art' in which he compares the theology of

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to the Calvinist doctrine of 'election', which involves "the determination of the existence of all things to be created": "Election in creation, election in providence, and so election also to eternal life".3 The leading principle of Kuyper's theology is the 'sovereignty of God', traced back to the all-embracing and comprehensive view of man's place in creation under God in Calvinism as such.4 As the sovereign Ruler, God orders and regulates all things according to certain fixed principles, which concern physical, social, moral, as well as religious life. God exercises his rule over creation by 'common grace'. Begbie notices that this common grace, though rooted in Christ as the Mediator of creation, can ultimately be thought of in terms of the eternal decrees of God.5 Common grace delimits the devastating consequences of the fall, and positively equips man to develop the possibilities of creation. According to Dooyeweerd, common grace preserves the structural laws of creation and contains special gifts of God to ensure orderly human life. This doctrine of common grace in Dutch Neo-Calvinism - as put by its interpreters - is highly sophisticated and provides an all-embracing framework to ensure human (Christian) contribution to the development of culture in the ultimate obedience to God. The more problematic side of this conception is the place of Jesus Christ in it. As creation is viewed as being first and foremost the object and result of God's law-giving activity, which is severely damaged by human rebellion since the fall, the role of Jesus Christ is to restore the once perfect obedience of mankind, so that creation is prior to Christ's activity. The danger of this conception is that "the inner meaning of creation will be sought apart from Jesus Christ," as Begbie comments.6 Moreover, Christology in Neo-Calvinism is in danger of loosening the

3 4

5 6

Paul Tillich and that of Neo-Calvinism in this respect (Begbie, Jeremy S.; Voicing Creation's Praise. Towards a Theology of the Arts, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2 1999). For the treatment of Neo-Calvinist theology, see pp. 81-141; for the eternal, created orders see esp. pp. 85f. Kuyper, Α.; Calvinism. Six Stone-lectures, Höveker & Wormser: Amsterdam/ Pretoria [1899], 271f. Begbie, Jeremy; 'Creation, Christ, and Culture in Dutch Neo-Calvinism'. In: Hart, Trevor; Thimell, Daniel (edd.); Christ in our Place. The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World [FS James Torrance], Paternoster Press: Exeter 1989, (113132) 114. Begbie, 'Creation, Christ, and Culture in Dutch Neo-Calvinism', 116. Begbie, Voicing Creation's Praise, 145.

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intrinsic connection between the humanity of Jesus Christ and the created order as a whole.7 Kuyper explicitly states that with respect to his humanity, Christ is not Lord over the created world - He is the head of the regenerated and reborn creation. "The overriding tendency in Dutch Neo-Calvinism, therefore, is to limit the significance of the humanity of Christ to the salvation of the elect, and to lose sight of what it might reveal about God's attitude towards, and plans for, the entire created order."8 This results in a kind of dichotomy between the orders of creation and redemption.9 In general, it can be stated that the explicit mentioning of Jesus Christ in a doctrine of creation has become increasingly important throughout the history of modern theology. As Christian Link has thoroughly shown, the doctrine of creation concerns the acknowledgment of a world created by God, so that a doctrine of creation always presupposes faith in God. This faith does not reckon with an unknown God, but is explicitly bound to the history which He has set forth.10 This implies that the explicit starting-point for a doctrine of creation in our times has to be found in the most explicit selfrevelation of God's character and purpose in the world: Jesus Christ. Thus, the confession must be interpreted accordingly: the Father of Jesus Christ is confessed to be the Creator of heaven and earth. As Karl Barth so vehemently stressed: the doctrine of creation is part of the creed of the Church - which from the outset is framed Christologically.11 Whereas this framework in a pre-modern situation perhaps did not 7

8 9

10 11

Cf. Kooi, C. van der; Ά Theology of Culture. A Critical Appraisal of Kuyper's Doctrine of Common Grace'. In: Kooi, Cornells van der; Bruijn, Jan de (edd.); Kuyper Reconsidered. Aspects of his Life and Work [VU Studies on Protestant History 3], VU Uitgeverij: Amsterdam 1999, [95-101] 101. Begbie, Voicing Creation's Praise, 147. Begbie, 'Creation, Christ, and Culture in Dutch Neo-Calvinism', 126. Cf. the elaboration of this theme by J. Douma (Algemene genade. Uiteenzetting, vergelijking en beoordeling van de opvattingen van A. Kuyper, K. Schilder en Joh. Calvijn aver 'algemene genade', Oosterbaan & Le Cointre: Goes 2 1974, 264-269). Douma comes to the conclusion that "In de theologie van Kuyper wordt [...] een dualiteit (Scheppings- en Verlossingsmiddelaar) openbaar, die veel (onoplosbare) tegenstrijdigheden in zijn bepaling van de verhouding tussen de gemene gratie en de particuliere genade verklaart" (266). Link, Christian; Schöpfung [HST 7/2], Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn: Gütersloh 1991, 496. Barth, KD m/1,1-44.

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have to be framed in explicitly Christological terms, in the current - at least post-Kantian - situation, a doctrine of creation cannot do without such framework. Such interconnection of creation and Christology is needed in order to avoid the problem of secularization of creationtheology.12 Besides this general historical reason, we might remark, secondly, that this insight ought to have yielded more systematic treatments than it has. A doctrine of creation of any kind, or a creation-faith as held by the chosen people of God, has always to be intertwined with the confession that it was the saving God who created heaven and earth. The specific faith in God's saving power is traced back to the very beginning of God's history with the world, as written down in the first chapters of Genesis. God's creating and caring powers are not different in importance, nor carefully distinguished from each other. Because God created, He saves; and by saving God shows his creative power. Therefore, the New-Testament testimonies of Jesus Christ as in John, Ephesians and Colossians are elaborations on both the saving and recreating power of God in Jesus Christ, bestowed upon those who are, by faith, intimately connected to Jesus Christ.13 Against this systematic and historical background, the first chapters of Genesis become highly important for the purpose of this thesis.14 What do these descriptions of God's creatio and creatura bring to theology? Do they provide us with knowledge of creation, and if so, what can we know about it? In what respect does the relation between creation and redemption alter this picture?

12

13 14

Cf. e.g. Link, Christian; Die Welt als Gleichnis. Studien zum Problem der natürlichen Theologie, Kaiser Verlag: München 1976, 101-107; Link, Schöpfung [HST 7/2], 335-341; Milbank, John; Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell: Oxford 1990, 1-6. These analyses point also to the fact that by not explicitly drawing a doctrine of creation within a confessional framework, theology itself has led to the process of secularization. John 1; Ephesians 1-2; Colossians 1. Cf. Gunton's remark that Ireneus refered to Genesis very little "for his concern is with the theology of creation as an interpretation of the first article of the Christian creed, itself a summary of the teaching of scripture as a whole", but because of the fact that the texts of Genesis "have bulked large in the tradition" Gunton calls explicit attention to them (Gunton, Colin E.; 'Between allegory and myth: the legacy of the spiritualising of Genesis'. In: Gunton, Colin E. [ed.]; The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark Edinburgh 1997, [47-62] 48).

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In the first account of the creation of the world in Genesis, the comment is made: "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good" (1,31). How is this 'good' to be interpreted? In the history of Old Testament-exegesis, the debate between Christians and Gnostics made it quite clear that Christian theology stated the goodness of creation. 'Ironically, the Gnostic attack on the God of the Old Testament and on creation has led to a theology which initiated the sharpest defence of the Creator and his good creation.'15 It is this point which Gunton explicitly borrows from the anti-Gnostic theology of Irenaeus of Lyon in order to defend the goodness of creation over against Gnostic tendencies in our times.16 Bayer, on the other hand, is more inclined to stress the brokenness of the present creation against optimistic use of texts like Genesis 1,31. He speaks about the 'primary soteriological interest of the Christian doctrine of creation'. Whereas in the Old Testament the goodness of creation is stated, the New Testament does not know such appraisal of God's created world order, because all the attention is focussed on the new creation made by Jesus Christ. According to Bayer, following Luther, texts like Genesis 1,31 and 1 Timothy 4,4f aim to rule out a sceptical, world-denying attitude. In the latter, it is stated that "everything God created is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving, because it is consecrated by the word of God and prayer".17 The 'goodness' of creation is not a quality of creation itself: it can only be experienced as 'good' if it is received with thanksgiving. Only in a kind of second naivety, in the victory gained over the powers of death, creation does exist: as a new creation'.18

15

16 17 18

"Ironisch genoeg heeft de gnostische aanval op de God van het Oude Testament en op de schepping geleid tot een theologie die juist de scherpste verdediging geeft van die schepper en zijn goede schepping" (Wansink, P.L.; Irenaeus en het Oude Testament. Gnostische en heilshistorische exegese in de tweede eeuw, Boekencentrum: Zoetermeer 2000, 241). Cf section 3.4.Ϊ. Cf. Bayer, Oswald; Schöpfung als Anrede. Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen [U986] 2 1990, 157L "Nur in einer zweiten Naivität, durch den Bruch des Todes und Gerichtes hindurch, in der Überwindung der Todesmächte, ist 'Schöpfung': als neue Schöpfung" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 176). Cf. Wannenwetsch, Bernd; Die Freiheit der Ehe. Das Zusammenleben wn Frau und Mann in der Wahrnehmung evangelischer Ethik [Evangelium und Ethik Bd. 2], Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1993,68f.

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The differences between Gunton and Bayer at this point reflect two different standpoints in Old Testament Theology concerning the weight of creation faith in the Old Testament. The well-known American Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann provides us with an account of the main debates about creation theology among Old Testament scholars.19 A major shift took place at the end of the twentieth century in the description of Old Testament faith with respect to 'creation'. During that century, Old Testament theological interpretation was dominated by Gerhard von Rad.20 In the midst of the fierce attack on German National Socialism, Von Rad contrasted the Israelite faith and the Canaanite Baal religion and thereby took over Karl Barth's programmatic contrast between faith and religion. What has traditionally been called 'creation faith' came to be closely linked to fertility religion and its celebration of the natural processes of reproduction. Von Rad stated that Israel's faith is primarily concerned with redemption. Brueggemann lists six scholarly contributions to the shift away from Von Rad's interpretation, the most important of which are those of Claus Westermann21, Hans Heinrich Schmid22, James Barr23, and Bernhard Anderson24. Westermann, who studied the Book of Genesis extensively, sets a 'theology of blessing7 alongside a 'theology of deliverance', and so 19

20

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22

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Brueggemann, Walter; Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, Fortress Press: Minneapolis 1997, 159-164. Cf. also the introduction in the Dutch translation of Claus Westermann's Theologie des Alten Testaments by the Duth Old Testament scholar Ed Noort (Noort, E.; 'Inleiding'. In: Westermann, Claus; Hooßlijnen van een theologie van het Oude Testament, Kok: Kampen 1981,9-15). Rad, Gerhard von; 'Das theologische Problem des alttestamentlichen Schöpfungsglaubens' [1936], In: Rad, Gerhard von; Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament, Kaiser: München 1958,136-147. "[E]s soll innerhalb der alttestamentlichen Glaubenswelt der spezifische theologische Ort des Schöpfungsglauben ermittelt werden. Noch bestimmter formuliert heisst das: Es soll die Frage nach seiner Selbständigkeit oder Bezogenheit gegenüber dem im Alten Testament herrschenden Heilsglauben beantwortet werden" (136). Westermann, Claus; Schöpfung, Kreuz-Verlag: Stuttgart/Berlin 1971; Westermann, Claus; Theologie des Alten Testaments in Grundzügen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1978. Schmid, H.H.; 'Creation, Righteousness, and Salvation. "Creation Theology" as the Broad Horizon of Biblical Theology'. In: Anderson, B.W. (ed.), Creation in the Old Testament, Fortress Press: Philadelphia 1984,102-117. Barr, James; Biblical Faith and Natural Theology [The Gifford Lectures for 1991], Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993; Barr, James; The Concept of Biblical Theology. An Old Testament Perspective, SCM Press: London 1999. Anderson, B.W. (ed.); Creation in the Old Testament, Fortress Press: Philadelphia 1984.

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juxtaposes both concepts instead of marginalising the first to the benefit of the second. Schmid presented a concept of Yahweh's ordering activity, in which righteousness plays an important role, based on the Wisdomliterature. Creation faith is seen as the proper way of speaking about YHWH, who orders the world in good, generous, and reliable ways toward life. Barr's study on natural theology makes room for the idea that creation was the horizon of Israel's faith. Finally, Anderson stated that creation is a proper theme of Old Testament theology. This does not mean that the debate on the relation between creation and redemption in the Old Testament has ended. Others protest against this kind of creation theology.25 They claim, following Von Rad, that the prime emphasis is on Israel's historical connection to its God who chose to lead His people. Creation faith is only an extrapolation of this soteriological interest to the beginning of time.26 In the Old Testament, it is said, the battle about God's justice is fought. Put in systematic terminology, the relation between 'law' and 'gospel' can be seen as its centre.27 It can be said that the more one takes the history and development of Israel's faith and of Yahweh's identification with the gods of the old Canaanite religion and the reflection on this history in the biblical texts as a starting-point, the less creation is seen as an appropriate basis from which the structure of Old Testament theology can be determined. For it is stated among the defenders of this historical account of Israel's religion that creation faith is a relatively late development in Israel's

25

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27

Cf. Preuss, Horst Dietrich; Theologie des Alten Testaments [Bd. 1], Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 1991, 29; Kaiser, Otto; Der Gott des Alten Testaments. Theologie des Alten Testaments [Tl. 1], Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1993. "Schöpfungstheologie ist [...] ein d e m JHWHglauben zugewachsenes Element sedentärer Kulturlandfrömmigkeit. Was dabei mit d e m Gott El z u s a m m e n h i n g [...], konnte d e m JHWHglauben weithin integriert w e r d e n . [...] Auch ein bestimmtes Weltordnungsdenken, das mit d e m Thema Schöpfung eng z u s a m m e n h i n g , w u r d e d e m J H W H g l a u b e n stark u m g e p r ä g t eingeordnet, d e n n aus der kosmischen O r d n u n g u n d ihrem Gott X7p w u r d e n geschichtliche Heilstaten JHWHs. Folglich k a n n auch eine mit d e m altorientalischen O r d n u n g s d e n k e n eng verzahnte Schöpfungstheologie keine zentrale theologische Bedeutung für das AT bekommen, wie H.H. Schmid dies befürwortet" (Preuss, Theologie des Alten Testaments, 272). According to Kaiser, in doing Old Testament theology " k o m m t das Verhältnis von Gesetz u n d Evangelium, göttlicher Verheissung u n d göttlicher Forderung v o n selbst in d e n Blick, weil es die Tora u n d schliesslich das AT als Ganzes theologisch strukturiert" (Kaiser, Der Gott des Alten Testaments, 88).

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religion. Those, however, who stress the canonical shape of the text of the Old Testament argue that its opening chapter is not arbitrary: it presents itself as a wonderful piece of craftsmanship with no signs of earlier traditions underlying Genesis l,l-2,4. 28 In the Neo-Calvinist tradition, the canonical shape of the text of Genesis also implies that Genesis 1 is the revelation about the beginning of the history of the world.29 hatever the positions are, with regard to the place of creation faith in biblical theology, there is little debate on what this opening chapter wants to express. The main conclusion on the character of Genesis 1 is that it confronts the reader with an expression of God's creative power which upholds the world after He created and ordered it.30 Within this overall character of Genesis 1, it is common to see the tob me'od in Genesis 1,31 as an expression of the world order, in which everything was fit for its own purpose.31 The word tob expresses God's own characterization of His creation-work, which thereby denies the place human beings want to occupy in evaluating God's creation.32 Westermann states that creation is 'very good' in God's eyes notwithstanding the fact that many men and women may have their questions with regard to the meaning of life in a reality in which much

28

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Steck, Odil Hannes; Der Schöpfungsbericht der Priesterschrift. Studien zur literarkritischen und überlieferungsgeschichtlichen Problematik von Genesis 1,1-2,4a, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1975. Wenham, Gordon ].; Genesis 1-15 [WBC], Word Books: Waco, Texas, 1987. In Kuyper's theology the impact of the historicity of the orders of Genesis is less explicitly stated, for the foundations of these lie in the eternal decrees of God (Douma, Algmene genade, 371v). In the view of K. Schilder, on the other hand, the historicity of creation and fall is most important, for against Karl Barth, he stresses God's historical interaction with the world, beginning with creation (Douma, Algemene genade, 372v; Bekkum, K. van; 'De gereformeerde theologie van Klaas Schilder'. In: Radix 23 [1997], [123-166] 134-136). Cf. the survey on this point by William J. Dumbrell (The Search for Order. Biblical Eschatology in Focus. Baker Books: Grand Rapids, Michigan 1994). For a recent Dutch survey of the explication of Genesis 1, see: Doedens, J.J.T.; 'Taal en teken van trouw. Over vorm en functie van Genesis 1'. In: Trimp, C. (red.); Woord op schrift. Theologische reflecties over het gezag van de bijbel, Kok: Kampen 2002, 71-108. Cf. ThWAT s.v.; NIDOTTE s.v.. "Primarily, it [the word tob] draws attention to an object's quality and fitness for its purpose. But the Hebrew term as used by the Israelites is more closely related to the mind and opinion of God than is the English word. God is preeminently the one who is good, and his goodness is reflected in his works" (Wenham, Genesis 1-15,18).

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is unclear and meaningless: God has the whole of creation in view in declaring it to be 'very good'. This divine evaluation of creation makes room for human enjoyment of it, for we are freed of the burden to evaluate creation ourselves.33 In a recent essay on the 'goodness of creation', James Barr comes to somewhat the same conclusion. Against the background of the problem of evil which confronts every reader, the first verse of the Bible provides an answer: "[T]his is what we are going to tell you, in essence: God created the heaven and the earth".34 With regard to the consequences of the fall, Barr rhetorically asks: "[I]f the goodness of creation was destroyed through human sin, then how does it help us to know that creation was (originally) good but no longer is so?" 35 This means that the interpretation of Genesis 1,2 remains the background against which God's loyalty to his creation is expressed.36 The question whether Genesis 1,2 is the expression of a pre-creation chaos, is not the main interest of this chapter. Other texts explicitly state that everything that exists comes from God the Creator (cf. Psalm 33,9; 148,5; Isaiah 48,13). So the question of where evil comes from, will not be resolved by pointing to Genesis 1,2. Another element regarding the goodness of creation is the place and influence of the so-called 'fall' in Genesis 3. According to Barr, this fall cannot be the source of creation's no longer being 'good'.37 An even more radical interpretation views the whole of Genesis 1-11 as the story of God's intention that the earth should be filled and explored. According to this view, the fall is designed by God himself. In the end, it was God who created the tree of knowledge, placed it in the centre of the garden, introduced the prohibition (something negative), and even introduced the sanction of death, created the snake, and created the woman. As the Dutch Old Testament scholar Ellen van Wolde 33

34

35 36 37

Westermann, Schöpfung, 88-93. Westermann concludes: "Dass alles sehr gut war, was Gott geschaffen hat, das hat der Geschichte des Kosmos und der Geschichte der Menschheit einen unzerstörbaren Sinn gegeben, weil es ein Gutsein in den Augen Gottes war" (93). Barr, James; 'Was Everything That God Created Really Good? A Question in the First Verse of the Bible'. In: Linafelt, Tod; Beal, Timothy K. (edd.); God in the Fray. A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann, Fortress Press: Minneapolis 1998, (55-65) 62f. Barr, 'Was Everything That God Created Really Good?', 64. Cf. Doedens, 'Taal en teken van trouw', 85f. Barr, 'Was Everything That God Created Really Good?', 64.

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rhetorically asks: "Is not all this enough ground for drawing the conclusion that it was God's design that the human being (after a first stage in the garden) should leave the garden in order to 'bd the 'dmhl Here, the character of the so-called Urgeschichte is at stake. Though most interpreters acknowledge the special character of Genesis 1-3 with respect to specifically scientific and historical questions, in orthodox reformed theology the historicity of the fall is considered vital. In the Neo-Calvinist tradition, this chapter plays a very important role.39 Instead of exploring the arguments pro and contra here extensively, I follow Gordon J. Wenham's interpretation of the Genesis-account of the origin of the world.40 Wenham advocates a rhetorical reading of the whole of the text of Genesis, though dominant approaches to Genesis have examined its parts in isolation rather than looking at the book as a whole.41 Wenham distinguishes three main parts in the book of Genesis: 1,1-2,3 as the 'hymnic overture' to the book; 2,4-11,26 as the second exposition; and 11,27-50,26 as the third part, which parallels many episodes of the second part. Within the 'prologue' of Genesis 1,1-2,3 the polemical thrust of God being the sovereign Creator of the ordered cosmos draws attention. In the second part the formula 'these are the

38

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Wolde, Ellen van; 'Facing the Earth: Primaeval History in a New Perspective'. In: Davies, Philip R.; Clines, David J.A. (edd.); The World of Genesis. Persons, Places, Perspectives [JSOT.S 257], Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1998, (22-47) 31. Such a positive interpretation of the Fall is already advocated by G.W.F. Hegel (cf. Gestrich, Christof; Die Wiederkehr des Glanzes in der Welt. Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde und ihrer Vergebung in gegenwärtiger Verantwortung, Mohr/Siebeck Tübingen 1989,108f). The Synod of Assen 1926 of the Reformed Churches (Gereformeerde Kerken) condemned a pastor who stated that it was possible that extra-biblical information could reveal that entities like the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the speaking snake etc. could possibly be intended metaphorically. For a recent overview of the literature on this topic, see: Harinck, George (red.); De kwestie-Geelkerken. Een terugblik na 75jaar [AD Chartas-reeks 5], De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 2001. Wenham, Genesis 1-15; Wenham, Gordon J.; Genesis 16-50 [WBC], Word Books: Waco, Texas, 1994; Wenham, Gordon J.; Story as Torah. Reading the Old Testament Ethically, T&T Clark: Edinburg 2000. W. Verboom defended this 'classical Reformed' view of the historical sequence of creation-fall-redemption, explicitly drawing on the Confessio Belgica: "Te zeggen dat het kwaad er bij gekomen is, verliest zijn bijbels fundament op het moment dat je de historiciteit van Genesis 1-3 loslaat" (Verboom, W.; 'De trits schepping-zondeval-verlossing'. In: ThRef45 [2002], [345-348] 346). Wenham, Genesis 1-15, xiv.

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generations of...' appears five times, thereby drawing attention to human action, which is a pattern reflected in the third part of the book. As Genesis 2,4 begins with the formula 'this is the history of...', the story of the fall has to be seen as part of the history of the people of Abraham. As such, it does not describe this history in clean, scientific language. For the story of the creation of heaven and earth clearly reflects a highly sophisticated approach, not only to the beginning of history but also to perennial problems which man has faced ever since. Therefore, Wenham concludes, Genesis 2-3 is both paradigmatic and proto-historical: "It is paradigmatic in that it offers a clear and simple analysis of the nature of sin and its consequences, albeit in rich and symbolic language. Disobedience to the law of God brings physical pain and suffering and alienation from him. This is indeed the experience of every man. In this sense, the story is paradigmatic. But in all societies, and especially the tightly knit family society of ancient Israel, the behaviour of parents has great impact on their children for good or ill. It therefore follows that the disobedience of the first couple from whom Genesis traces the descent of the whole human race must have had grave consequences for mankind. In this sense, then, the story offers a proto-historical account of man's origins and his sin." 42

To say that Genesis 3 is only symbolic is therefore an exegetically contentious systematic-theological point of view.43 The Genesis-account of the origin of the world and its first history thus gives us the assurance that the world in its ambiguity as man experiences it is not as God intended it. It also gives the assurance that it will not be so either: God stands behind the world, and He is a God who can be trusted exactly because He is the Creator and because He will sustain his

42

43

Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 91. This point of view is compatible with the use of 'Adam' in the context of Article 17 of the Belgic Confession as presented by the classicist and theologian J. van Eck (En toch beweegt Hij. Over de godsleer in de Nederlandse belijdenisgeschriften, Van Wijnen: Franeker 1997, [15-35] 35: "En Adam, dat zijn wij alien"). So the Roman-Catholic theologian Leo Scheffczyk concludes: "Der Lehre der Schrift und der Kirche wird nicht Genüge getan, wenn man den Urständ rein aktualsymbolisch als eine Aussage über die Situation des Menschen überhaupt versteht. Es handelt sich vielmehr um einen einmaligen Vorgang am zeitlichen Anfang der Menschheitsgeschichte" (Einflihrung in die Schöpfungslehre. WBG: Darmstadt 1987, 135 [quoting Mysterium Salutis]).

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creation.44 Therefore, the goodness of Genesis 1,31 encapsulates the fact of the cosmos being made orderly by God the Creator, who evaluates his creation as being good. The devastating consequences of the fall as described in Genesis 3 mean both physical suffering and alienation from the Creator for creation as a whole and for human beings in particular.45 Therefore the main question is, to what extent may it be possible to designate creation, as we experience it, as 'good'. A systematic doctrine of creation here draws attention to the doctrine of divine providence, which did not only come into play after the fall, but is the expression of exactly the creative force shown by God in his act of creation. Thus the divine evaluation of the 'goodness' of the whole of creation turns out not to be an attribute which can be objectively ascribed to creation. It is a characteristic which depends on God's view of and his sustaining activity towards it. The relation of creation to its Maker is indispensable for its goodness. This implies that the goodness of creation is an attribute that functions within the trusting relation of the believer and his Creator. This is why Christians turn to the role and importance of Jesus Christ, who restored this relation. In conclusion, we may say that the 'goodness of creation' (Genesis 1,31) therefore states the order in which God created the world, against a background of chaos with which the reader could easily identify himself. 'It provides the answer to the experienced tension between the life-giving, but also life-threatening elements of creation'.46 Furthermore, we may conclude that the notions which the first chapters of Genesis provide us, about the goodness of creation and the subsequent narration of the fall, mean that (1) God is not responsible for the evil man experiences; (2) the current situation of reality after the fall cannot be univocally described as 'ordered' or 'disordered'; (3) the characterization of reality as 'creation' is not self-evident; (4) so-called

44 45

46

Cf. Doedens, 'Taal en teken van trouw', 85. Cf. the account of William J. Dumbrell, in which he states that the order of Genesis 2,18-25 is: God, man, woman, animals, an order which is inverted in Genesis 3, and it is this inverted order that God punishes. "The reversed order strongly suggests that sin is not merely a moral lapse; it is a deliberate human assault upon the established order of creation" (Dumbrell, The SearchforOrder, 27). "Daarmee geeft Genesis 1 een antwoord op de ervaren spanning tussen het levengevende, maar ook het leven-bedreigende van de schepping" (Doedens, 'Taal en teken van trouw', 104).

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'theodicy7 becomes increasingly important; and (5) that the consequences of the fall for both reality and the knowing subject are to be investigated in relation to God's plan for this world in Jesus Christ. 5.2.2 Knowledge in Christ We have seen two reasons for the intrinsic connection between knowing creation and Jesus Christ. The first is that creation cannot be known by Christians apart from their relation with the triune God, Father, Son, and Spirit. The second is that after the fall, the relation between this God and man is broken, with all the devastating consequences for creation itself, experiencing needs which God graciously met in sending his Son for the redemption and salvation of creation. Therefore, the relation between epistemology and Jesus Christ deserves special attention.47 The Anglican theologian Oliver O'Donovan has made this clear in his book about evangelical ethics.48 The key word in his opinion is 'order', because according to O'Donovan, creation is not only the raw material of this world, but also "the order and coherence in which it is composed".49 He explicitly connects this creation-order and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, by which he pays attention to the critical Christological approach of Karl Barth. This resurrection from the dead is, firstly, God's fulfilment and reassurance of the created order, as well as the promise of its complete fulfilment. Secondly, the resurrection of Jesus Christ affects the actions of mankind. In the first part of his book, O'Donovan describes this order as 'objective reality7. This order exists in a generic, horizontal component on the one hand, and a teleological, vertical component on the other. By this - partly Aristotelian - approach, O'Donovan wants to stress that the elements of created reality arem in their mutual and reciprocal relationship, ordered in a multiform way, and ordered towards their Creator before whom this creation is a unity. This order will not be suspended in the eschaton, as it is not by the resurrection. 47

48 49

Cf. on this point: Maris, J.W.; Schepping en verlossing. Het kader van een bijbelse spiritualiteit, Kok: Kampen 1994, 31: "Er is geen 'toegang' tot de kennis van de schepping dan door de verzoening van de schuld door Christus". O'Donovan, Oliver; Resurrection and Moral Order. An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, Eerdmans/Apollos: Grand Rapids/Leicester 2 1994. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 31.

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The goal of both eschaton and resurrection is the confirmation and vindication of God's created order.50 Knowledge of this order always covers the whole of reality, it is knowledge from within this reality, it reckons with God's history with and through it, and it is given to those who participate in the life of Jesus (for He is still living as the resurrected one), so that it has to be knowledge which hopes and trusts God who is bringing this world to its fulfilment. The second part of the book is devoted to the transformation of the knowing and acting subject. O'Donovan criticises the voluntarist view of the subject, who wants to form reality itself and who behaves himself self-willedly over against the created order. Contrary to this position, O'Donovan advocates an attitude of obedience to Jesus Christ, obedience which results in a participation in the created order, however, which does not deprive the subject of its freedom. In the last part, O'Donovan pays much attention to the form this obedient life should take. Here he frequently refers to Augustinian notions which stress that man's life becomes real life if it is directed towards God. By taking his starting-point in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, O'Donovan is able to respond to most of the five aforementioned systematic points derived from the biblical creation-narratives. In line with Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Karl Barth, he describes the resurrection as the vindication of God's creating activity: the obedience of Jesus Christ to God's order is 'rewarded' by his resurrection.51 The assumption that such real order is created by God and not by man, supplies us with the most basic ground for Christian ethics, as O'Donovan states.52 This order is not only objectively present in reality, but also involves the knowing subject. Knowledge of this order, created by God and vindicated in Jesus' resurrection, can only be achieved by participating in Jesus Christ, which involves conformity and obedience to the God who orders.53 For this participation God's revelation and human conversion are necessary, for only thus can man receive both

50 51 52 53

Cf. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 58. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 85. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 36f. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 87.

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his freedom to obey God's order and the knowledge of this reality as being ordered by God.54 For O'Donovan, evil, sin, disorder and chaos are not 'real' to the same degree as the order which is created by God and vindicated in Christ. Speech of Jesus Christ does, as such, reveal an element of recognition of these notions, for He came to redeem and to restore what was broken. Nevertheless, this does not imply that everything is disorder or chaos, or that humankind after the fall is unable to discern this order.55 Reality 'in its true being' is order - that is O'Donovan's solution for the problem whereby we cannot experience reality as unbroken order. By putting the resurrection of Jesus Christ in the centre of an ambiguous reality, he also provides us with a solution to the question, to what extent is the knowing subject afflicted by the consequences of the fall. Only participation in the life of Jesus is able to redirect our cognitive power. The concentration on the resurrection of Jesus Christ is not intended to downplay the third person of the Trinity: the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, O'Donovan links the ordering activity of God's creation, the vindication of that order by the resurrection, and human obedience to that created order in terms of the activity of the Holy Spirit: "[T]he Spirit forms and brings to expression the appropriate pattern of free response to objective reality"56, a pattern best described as 'love'. O'Donovan hastens to say, however, that the Spirit always requires the enforcement of the 'in Christ', because it is the history of Jesus Christ which defines our relation to God.57 "The unreality of [the world's] existing coherence and continuity is exposed; and there is 54

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57

"The authority of redemption lies in its power to determine the present reality of the world with which we have to do. Our freedom as agents depends upon our acting in accord with reality. Reality is the point on which both freedom and authority rest, and at which they complement each other" (O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 109). "Disorder, like misknowledge, is attributable only to things which are in their true being ordered. And the universe, though fractured and broken, displays the fact that its brokenness is the brokenness of order and not merely unordered chaos. Thus it remains accessible to knowledge in part" (O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 88 [italics JHFS]; cf. also 109 and 226f). O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 25; cf.: "[T]he Spirit makes the reality of redemption, distant from us in time, both present and authoritative; secondly, [...] he evokes our free response to this reality as moral agents" (102). O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 102f.

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introduced a new series of events which present a truer coherence and continuity. [...] The Holy Spirit brings God's act in Christ into critical opposition to the falsely structured reality in which we live. At the same time and through the same act he calls into existence a new and truer structure for existence." 58 In this last quotation, O'Donovan brings together the most important elements of what he considers to be the importance of the resurrection for the human experience of God's created order. The triune God opposes the fallen, disordered reality, and 'at the same time and through the same act' God recreates this reality into a 'truer' existence. This means that 'reality7 is qualified by the resurrection, and that Christians have to discern between the 'true reality' of what we experience - if necessary without Christ - and the 'truer reality7 in Christ. Thus, knowledge in Christ has gained the most important weight in the process of discerning what the connection between a doctrine of creation and theological ethics comprehends. Within the Neo-Calvinist tradition, the aforementioned five concluding elements of section 5.2.1 play their role as well in its epistemology. For Kuyper and Bavinck, the fact that God did stay loyal towards his creation, even after the fall, implies that God shows himself to be its real Creator. This loyalty implies their treatment of the doctrine of general revelation or general grace. For in reality, it is not only the Christian who is capable of knowledge: man as such is upheld by the grace of God, who continues to bestow upon the human race the ability of true knowledge. In both Kuyper's and Bavinck's theology this results in a kind of 'epistemological realism'. Kuyper's epistemology can be philosophically described as 'naive' and Bavinck's as 'critical'. 59 Furthermore, both theologians stress the way in which Jesus Christ occupies a place as mediator of creation as well as of redemption. To this relation between Christ and epistemology in Neo-Calvinism we will now turn. Both the epistemological and Christological standpoints result from a specific conviction about the way in which the Logos is conceived to be in their theology. This doctrine is an epistemological concept, founded in the unity of the mediator of creation and redemption in 58 59

O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 103. Cf. Klapwijk, J.; 'Honderd jaar filosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit'. In: Wetenschap en rekenschap 1880-1980. Een eeuw wetenschapsbeoefening en wetenschapsbeschouwing aan de Vrije Universiteit, Kok: Kampen 1980,528-593.

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Jesus Christ as the eternal Logos. He is the One, through whom this world is created. So the knowing subject and the known object are in accordance with each other: man can know reality because it rests in God's thoughts.60 It is remarkable, however, that the consequences of sin and evil after the fall affect these assumptions only marginally. In line with classic tradition, evil is considered to be privation of the good.61 As it has no substance, it can neither destroy nor create reality. It is able to affect the forma of creation, but not the materia, as it is by grace that the deformed forma after the fall is reformed again.62 This implies that many 'ordinances' already existed before the fall, which only change concerning their outer form in the course of time. For epistemology, the following remarks are of interest. Although in Neo-Calvinism the influence of sin is considered to be total (corruptio totalis), its influence on the faculty of knowledge seems to be limited. In this tradition, 'sin' is the expression of the disruption of that most important human relationship with God. In a recent account of the epistemological consequences of sin in Neo-Calvinist theology, it is stated that this broken relation means that the element which is most important in the Augustinian tradition - indispensable love by the knowing subject for the known object - is lost, which implies that the harmony between knower and object is disrupted. Secondly, the physical instruments for gaining knowledge are affected by the consequences of sin. These elements seem to point to Christological 60

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Cf. Veenhof, J.; Revelatie en inspiratie. De Openbarings- en Schriftbeschouwing van Herman Bavinck in vergelijking met die der ethische theologie, Buijten & Schipperheijn: Amsterdam 1968, 392 n. 6. This conclusion is confirmed by the dissertation of S.P. van der Walt, who writes: "Die algemene openbaring is te danke aan die Logos wat in die begin by God was en deur wie alle dinge geskape is, terwyl die besondere openbaring aan dieselfde Logos te danke is soos wat Hy vlees geword het in Christus" (Walt, S.P. van der; Die wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck, Pro Rege-Pers Beperk: Potchefstroom 1953, 54). For the neothomistic background of this doctrine of the Logos, see Bremmer, R.H.; Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, Kok: Kampen 1961, 328331. Cf. Augustine, Confessiones VII,18. Cf. e.g.: "The stuff (materia) of all things is and remains the same. However, the form (forma), given in creation, was deformed by sin in order to be entirely reformed again in the sphere of grace" (Bavinck, Herman; In the Beginning. Foundations of Creation Theology [TR John Vriend; ED John Bolt], Baker: Grand Rapids 1999,209; Dutch original: Bavinck, H.;GDn, 535).

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solutions, for the consequences of sin in epistemology. Yet, the influence of sin on the human mind is said to be restricted. For, as man continues to be man even after the fall, his faculty of knowledge has not disappeared; even the fundamental laws of logic are still valid: 'Sin does not destroy the objective laws and ordinances of God'.63 So far we can conclude that the redeeming activity of Jesus Christ, therefore, is not at the centre of reformed epistemology, just as His cross is absent in the Neo-Calvinist doctrine of creation as a whole. The only Christological point that is made, concerns the unity of both the mediator of creation and that of redemption within Jesus Christ as the Logos. Due to the importance it attaches to the doctrine of God's eternal decrees, the human nature of Christ and his suffering on the cross do not influence Neo-Calvinistic epistemology as much as they do O'Donovan's.64 At this point, we return to the doctrine of creation provided by Gunton as elaborated in chapter 3. For the concept of creational mediation - the Irenaean trinitarian concept of the Father who creates 'by his two hands', i.e. the Son and the Spirit - is Gunton's answer to the epistemological misconceptions which arose out of the Enlightenment era.65 Given his doctrine of creation, there is continuity between our theoretical activities and the material world. Reason is by grace enabled to grasp something of reality in words, so that words can represent reality. Polanyi's concept of 'indwelling reality' is of great help here. Thus, Gunton not only expresses what he believes to be the main problem of modernity, but even criticises the post-modern accounts of reality.66 Christian theology has to reframe human

63

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Woudenberg, R. van; 'Greijdanus' kentheologie'. In: Harinck, George (red.); Leven en werk van prof. dr. Seakle Greijdanus [Ad Chartas reeks 3], De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 1998, (165-174) 172. Cf. also: Woudenberg, R. van; 'Over de noetische gevolgen van de zonde. Een filosofische beschouwing'. In: NedThT 53 (1998), 224-240. According to one observer, Kuyper on this point proves himself to be a forrunner of the so-called 'Reformed Epistemology' of Plantinga and Woltersdorff: Brink, Gijsbert v a n den; ' W a s Kuyper a Reformed Epistemologist?'. In: Kooi, Cornells v a n der; Bruijn, Jan de (edd.); Kuyper Reconsidered. Aspects of his Life and Work [VU Studies on Protestant History 3], V U Uitgeverij: Amsterdam 1999, [158-165] 165. Van den Brink critiques this position by stating that the influence of 'sin' is underestimated in these conceptions. Cf. above, section 3.3 and 3.4.4. "I myself believe that [the postmodernists] are right to suggest that the foundations of our culture have been shaken, but not in identifying what they are. It is essentially

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experience in accordance with the history of the triune God who directs this world to its proper goal. Gunton very much advocates a form of theology in which this historical project of creation is carried out by God, though mediated through his two 'hands' and accordingly through human action as well. Gunton's The Christian Faith can be said to summarise this argument very well. Contrary to some earlier publications, this history is not exclusively described as one of 'love' or 'reflection of the Trinitarian ontology', for the forces of evil and death receive much more attention within this book than elsewhere. Perhaps Gunton's attempt to structure the whole of the Christian faith within the framework of the apostolic creed gave him the opportunity to deal with these problems. For epistemology, Gunton's concept of the Trinity as Idea Idearum opens up immeasurable possibilities for thought. His Trinitarian ontology, carefully delimited by his doctrine of creation, is 'only' theoretical on the one hand, but - due to his epistemology - practical and 'real' on the other. By grace, man is able to grasp much of the knowledge of God and this world, and consequently of the order of creation. As Gunton himself declares: "To know that the world is created, and that God has visited and continues to visit it for its renewal and redemption is a form of knowledge available to those who will perceive what is there to be perceived".67 In reaction to forms of Enlightenment-optimism about human voluntarist possibilities for knowledge, Gunton stresses the need for divine revelation and mediation of knowledge. At this point, the doctrine of sin is elaborated.68 The grave and serious consequences of sin for epistemology are, however, not the only things to be reckoned with in theology. For the divine and Trinitarian involvement in the course of the world's history also shows that God's providential care is able to restore and promote the right knowledge of both God and the world. In fact, it is the responsibility of theology to perceive things to be what they are.69 Only by grace is theology able to do this.

67 68 69

a crisis of belief in the reality of creation. [...] The right theological response to this is to reaffirm the doctrine of creation, not as an act of irrational assertion, but in such a way as to demonstrate its rational viability" (Christian Faith, x). Intellect and Action, 59. Cf. section 3.5.1 in which I also pointed at the changes in Gunton's position. Intellect and Action, 57.

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The realist standpoint Gunton occupies regarding epistemology is therefore a thoroughly theological one. Due to the providential Trinitarian involvement of God in created time and space, created reality can, as a whole, reflect or 'echo' its Creator and created human beings can know the created order. This knowledge however is unattainable apart from participation in the community of believers, which in turn participates in the life of Jesus.70 This theological warrant is a correction of some other, more Barthian ontological epistemologies. For Bayer knowledge of both God and the created reality is mediated knowledge. Over against the Enlightenment quest for universal knowledge, Bayer stresses his concept of critical mediation which involves the process of learning. Only by discriminating between God's promise as law and gospel in the course of the liturgical formation of the Christian can knowledge be obtained. The object of knowledge is bipolar from the outset, for reality as a whole has to be thought of in terms of law and gospel, so that no 'created order' can be discerned apart from its existing in life-threatening and life-sustaining aspects. The ambiguity of reality is the distinctive feature of the Christian epistemological starting-point which is made known by God's own involvement in time and space through Jesus Christ. Knowledge in Christ then entails the conclusion that in the crucifixion of Christ reality's ambiguity is not only suffered by, but even made known to the believer. Such a Christological standpoint is not comparable to that of O'Donovan, the Neo-Calvinists, or Gunton, for in those epistemologies the 'order of creation' is, though polluted by human sin and its consequences, seen as vindicated and restored by the obedience of Christ crowned by his resurrection. Within the context of the NeoCalvinist reformational philosophy, the place of so-called 'naive experience' is important. This standpoint includes the notion that epistemology is not the first thing we have to be concerned about.71 Though concerned about the transcendental presuppositions for knowledge, Neo-Calvinist philosophers always insisted on the

70 71

"Being 'in Christ' involves a form of personal knowledge of God realised by participation in the worship and life of the Church" (Intellect and Action, 63). Cf. Woudenberg, R. van; "Theorie van het kennen'. In: Woudenberg, Rene van e.a.; Kennis en werkelijkheid. Tweede inleiding tot een Christelijke filosofie [Verantwoording 11], Buijten&Schipperheijn/Kok: Amsterdam/Kampen 1996, (21-85) 23.

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religious standpoints inherent in those primordial presuppositions.72 Dooyeweerd's concern - just to name one of the most influential of Dutch Neo-Calvinist philosophers - is for objective dimensions in such transcendental presuppositions over against the Kantian and neoKantian approach to epistemology. According to him, the divine order of creation is the 'horizon that makes experience possible' which in turn leads to knowledge.73 Alongside this objective dimension, the subjective mode of attaining knowledge is indispensable, for without perception of the divine cosmic order there is no (true) knowledge available. So, the apriori of Dooyeweerd is both a prerequisite and a presupposition for knowledge. In this sense, Dooyeweerd is a realist in line with the Neo-Calvinist theologians.

5.2.3 Conclusions We will now summarise the systematic account of creation and epistemology. In the course of the preceding chapters, the doctrine of creation has been shown to be intertwined with other topics of systematic theology. Christology and eschatology are but the most important of those. As theology is about God's action in creation, redemption, and eschaton, I share the conviction of both O'Donovan and Dooyeweerd that epistemology is not the starting-point for doing theological ethics: moral behaviour is not bound to the prerequisites and presuppositions provided by any reflective activity. Moral action is the human reaction to God's preceding activity. Therefore, the close link between morality and knowledge can be framed quite 'naively' to use this Dooyeweerdian term. Within the context of a scientific thesis of the relation between the doctrine of creation and theological ethics, however, such epistemological presuppositions have to be made clear. A doctrine of creation cannot be complete without mentioning the epistemological consequences. Those consequences, in turn, are not available outside the community of believers, for using the word 'creation' implies the awareness and acknowledgement of the triune Creator, the history of creation and fall, and the providential care for 72 73

Van Woudenberg, 'Theorie van het kennen', 64. Van Woudenberg, 'Theorie van het kennen', 65: "[Dooyeweerd] zegt dan dat de goddelijke scheppingsorde 'de horizon is welke de ervaring eerst mogelijk maakt'".

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creation. Within the context of the confessing community of believers, the life of Jesus Christ provides us with God's utmost testimony of both love for and judgement of the perceived order of reality. Such judgement is found more in Bayer's theology than in Gunton's. Gunton on the other hand, is much more concerned about the 'order' of creation than Bayer. Of course, the fact that the Word became flesh bears testimony of the fact that the fallen creation had to be reconciled with God. But the stress is more on the fact that Christ redeemed reality, with a view more to the goal God intended for creation than on the status quo one can now perceive. The testimony of the Bible with regard to the problem of a fallen reality perceived apart from the trusting and faithful relation with its Creator, as stated in the first chapters of Genesis, provides us with some important observations. First, the stress in these chapters is - as we have seen - on the order with which God created the world. The testimony of this order is given to man as a warrant and guarantee that God does not create disorder. Thus, secondly, the goodness of creation is something not ascribable to reality apart from God but a characteristic inherently dependent on the intrinsic relation between reality and its Creator. After the fall, reality as perceived in its ambiguity can only be seen and acknowledged within the context of the threefold relation between the knowing subject, the known reality, and God the Creator. Thirdly, if we use the word 'creation', therefore, the Christian perception is always bound to God's own activity in saving and redeeming reality which found its climax in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, His death on the cross, and His being raised from the dead. Apart from this redemptive career, 'creation' is meaningless. These three biblical notions - the ordered creatio ex nihilo, the exclusively relational existence of the created reality, and the Christological redemption of fallen reality - bear the following consequences for epistemology. (1) Human knowledge after the fall is in need of divine Revelation of origin, purpose and destination of reality; (2) this historical framework cannot be recognised without perceiving reality's current deviation from this intended road; (3) this deviation is not 'less real' than its divine destiny;74 (4) therefore Christians have to look for and subsequently endure the tension between good and evil, between God's destiny and human results, 74

I here refer critically to the notions of O'Donovan, mentioned in section 5.2.2.

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between true and false knowledge of the order of created reality; (5) the moral knowledge gained in this process is characterized by the consequences attached to this unsettled process of the gaining knowledge; this knowledge, therefore, is always provisional.

5.3 Creation and Nature Following the section on knowledge and interpretation, we come now to an interesting example of difference of opinion on the character of reality: whether to describe it as 'creation' or as 'nature'.

5.3.1 Creation as Interpretation of Nature Within the context of the quest for possible connections between ethics and the doctrine of creation, the interpretation of reality is important. Such an interpretation has to be carried out on both a macro- and micro-scale. As Oliver O'Donovan has argued, the meticulous and thorough investigation of the field of action is one important step involved in Christian moral reasoning. 75 The first step in such an interpretation is to ask how one should view reality as a whole. As described in chapter 2, to interpret reality as 'creation' is an explicit confessional statement, which is not obtained immanently, but calls for divine revelation. To call reality 'creation' is therefore a very important feature of the Christian faith which has to be articulated over against other interpretations, such as calling reality 'nature'. 76 It is not unusual to qualify 'nature' by the connotation of being 'pure' material, not defiled by human activity. Consequently, the concept of 'nature' is seen as an unspoiled concept. It must be clear, though, that 'nature' is as interpreted a notion as any concept, vulnerable to the challenge of deconstruction, as Alister McGrath observes. 77 'Nature is not the sum of 75 76 77

Cf. O'Donovan, Oliver; 'Christian Moral Reasoning'. In: Neiv Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, IVP: Leicester 1995, [122-127] 122-124. Cf. above, section 2.2. McGrath, Alister E.; A Scientific Theology [Vol. I], T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2001, 3f. "The concept of nature has lost its intuitive intellectual plausibility, and [...] has become little more than a synonym for 'the totality of all things'. [...] For the theologian, this raises the critical question: given that 'nature' is an interpreted and

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objective, natural facts, but some particular reference which conveys the characteristics of design'.78 'Nature' can be used in a misleadingly quasineutral way as a specific interpretation of 'the totality of all things' without explicitly mentioning those specific connotations. If 'nature' is used in this specific way, 'creation' can be said to be an opposed interpretation of 'the totality of all things'. 79 "Religious believers interpret their lives and the universe which they inhabit in the light of their faith. In terms of this interpretation, they ascribe the origin and order of the universe as well as the origin and status of life and of humanity, to the creative activity of God." Thus Vincent Brümmer opens his introductory essay on the interpretation of the universe as creation. 80 This is no neutral interpretation, however, for it entails an explicit commitment to the lifeforms in which such language is embedded. These forms and language in turn entail ontological claims about the character of the universe, for it "would be absurd to participate in a language-game without presupposing that the factual nature of the world is such that the form of life to which the language-game commits us and in which it is embedded, can be realized within the world". 81 Our experiences take shape according to the lines of our interpretations, which may be mediated by Christian liturgy or other world-views. 82 So any interpretation entails the commitment to a world-view, and can be critically evaluated from a theological point of view. 83

78

79 80

81 82

83

mediated notion, what interpretation is to be preferred? The Christian theologian will wish to explore another category as means of reclaiming the concept of 'nature' as an intellectually viable category, while at the same time interpreting it in a Christian manner. The category? Creation" (McGrath, A Scientific Theology, 133). "Natur ist nicht die Summe objektiver natürlicher Gegebenheiten, sondern ein Inbegriff, der den Charakter eines Entwurfs hat" (Frey, Chr.; "Theologie und Ethik der Schöpfung'. In: ZEE 32 [1988] [47-62] 53). McGrath, Α Scientific Theology, 138. Brümmer, Vincent; 'Introduction: a Dialogue of Language Games'. In: Brümmer, Vincent (ed.); Interpreting the Universe as Creation. A Dialogue of Science and Religion, Kampen 1991, [1-17] 1. Brümmer, 'Dialogue of Language Games', [5-7] 7. Cf. the account of the liturgy as the formative aspect, shaping the Christian interpretation of reality as God's creation by Pfeiffer, Matthias; Einweisung in das neue Sein. Neutestamentliche Envägungen zur Grundlegung der Ethik, Kaiser: München 2001,324-331. Cf. Banner, Michael; 'Prolegomena to a dogmatic sexual ethic'. In: Banner, Michael; Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, Cambridge University Press:

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The role of liturgy and worship as practices which 'in-form' the human character in the divine life has recently been rediscovered.84 The concept of the liturgy provides us with the means to speak about the human actor in terms of an historically and spatially located person, bound up with his or her fellow-believers in the community, confessing their passive constitution as dependent on God who creates, redeems and fulfils. In theological ethics, this concept is used in contradiction to the common Enlightenment-concepts of the human actor, in which 'action' is the element which defines the human person. Alan Suggate commented that the concept of 'liturgy' - including the celebration of the Lord's Supper - is contrary to the modern concept of autonomy because it entails the priority of God's action over human action. It revalues the creation by its use of created means sacramentally, and it touches on the topic of eschatology, for the Christian community is the sign of the Kingdom of God and 'lives this kingdom out' in an anticipatory way which qualifies our current experiences.85 This interconnectedness of experience and interpretation may lead to the idea that 'creation' is nothing but the Christian interpretation of what non-Christians call 'nature'.86 The doctrine of 'creation' thus exemplifies only some 'interpretation'. However, it is still part of the inner conviction attached to the core of the Christian doctrine of creation that calling nature 'creation' is not only due to human interpretation - as if interpretation creates the experienced object. As the Utrecht systematic theologian Muis justly states, there is also some reality-claim in this interpretation that should not be downplayed:

Cambridge 1999, (269-309) 270f: "[W]e shall give attention to the problem of the discernment or characterisation of the natural which obviously arises for any ethic which asserts its authority; here w e shall have cause to maintain that this discernment is properly a theological task, since what is known as natural cannot, as a matter of fact, be securely naturally known". 84

The work of Stanley Hauerwas is perhaps its most well known example. A m o n g the other contributions is e.g. the collection of essays on this topic by Anglicans and Lutherans: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996.

85

Suggate, Alan; 'Worship and Ethics. Reflections on Conversations between Anglicans and Lutherans'. In: Studies in Christian Ethics 15.1 (2002) 54-65. So Allster McGrath ("Christians see nature as creation") could be interpreted (A Scientific Theology, 137).

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'Creation-faith is more than just a vision of reality'. 87 It somehow discloses knowledge about 'nature'. 88 Briimmer's use of the word 'life-forms', and the 'interpretation' which such a Christian life-form implies, reminds us of Oswald Bayer's use of the words Form and the 'conflict of interpretations'. 89 The difference between the two, though, must be noted as well. Briimmer views the disciplines of science and religion as complementary in answering the different questions and demands of life, and rhetorically asks whether presupposed conflicts between science and religion merely point to conceptual differences between two language games and the forms of life in which they are embedded. 90 Bayer on the other hand firmly asserts that the business of theology presents itself as the most comprehensive and far-reaching interpretation of reality, for, without the regained 'second naivety', the complexity of simultaneous brokenness and order could not be properly esteemed. 91 In Bayer's opinion, there is no a priori complementarity: theology may have to oppose scientific pretensions on any coherent interpretation of reality. For only theology is able to take all the relevant elements into account. Here we trace one of the most outspoken aspects of Bayer's theology of creation which determines his whole concept of doing theology: the problem of evil. Interpreting the universe (reality) as 'created by God' evokes this problem, for it raises the question of whether the evil that is experienced is part of creation. 92 Bayer considers theology the best candidate to adequately describe the history of reality and its interpretations by man, for only the depth of the death of Jesus Christ opens up the possibilities for acknowledging such evil. Bayer criticises the attempt - made by some scientists - of 87

88 89 90 91 92

Muis, J.; Credo in creatorem. Christelijk denken over God als Schepper [Utrechtse Theologische Reeks deel 39], Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid Universiteit Utrecht: [Utrecht] 1998, 9. Muis explicitly places the discussion about 'creation' and 'God the Creator' in the framework of prayer - as such a 'life-form' (5f). This starting-point, however, does not play a formative role in the explication of Muis' creation-faith. Cf. Muis, Credo in creatorem, 32 n. 18 and 19. Cf. above, section 4.3. Briimmer, 'Dialogue of Language Games', 12-15. Cf. above, section 4.5.2. This criticism is comparable with that of Dalferth (Dalferth, Ingolf U.; 'Creation - Style of the World'. In: IJSTh 1 [1999] 119-137). In Bayer7s own terminology, one could say that the text of the Book of Nature is "gründlich verderbt" and "nicht mehr gelesen und verstanden werden kann" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 20).

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giving one single monistic explanation and interpretation of the world, whereas it is exactly the power of the Christian faith to endure the tensions between rival explanations and solutions for a broken world. Theology should therefore critically relate itself to science and philosophy in order to raise its voice as soon as such brokenness is avoided or overruled (4.3.3). The Christian interpretation of reality as 'creation' cannot be expelled from its life-context in the liturgy of the Church. Here Bayer draws on Wittgenstein's concept of language and its being embedded in life-forms. The liturgical shape of Bayer's ethics is not a tribute paid to a faddish theological concept, but stems from his most basic assumptions about the art of doing theology: 'Theology flows from worship and moves towards if. 93 Thus it is in accordance with the explicit confessional standpoint about the doctrine of creation as part of the trinitarianly structured confession of the Christian Church. In his later publications, Gunton takes somewhat the same direction. Whereas humanity's offering creation back to its Creator was earlier seen as the eschatological goal of creation, it now becomes related more and more to the ministry of the Church in a sacramental way: "[T]he church is a way of being socially whose life is ordered to God by means of words and actions which are evoked by the Spirit's action".94 To be a Christian therefore involves being ordered socially (horizontally) and teleologically (vertically) to grow in grace, to develop virtues which are "the matrixes for forms of human action which enable us to be that which we were created to be". 95 Gunton here directly links the creational destination of man in offering96 creation 93

Bayer, Oswald; 'Worship and Theology'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996, [148161] 157. Cf. Bayer, Oswald; Theologie [HST 1], Gütersloh 1994, 395-407; Bayer, Oswald; Peters, Albrecht; 'Theologie'. In: HWP 10 (1998), [1080-1095] 1093. For recent summaries of Bayer's liturgical theology see: Wannenwetsch, Bernd; Gottesdienst als Lebensform - Ethikßr Christenbürger, Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 1997, 8892; Terstriep, Dominik; Weisheit und Denken. Stilformen sapientialer Theologie [Analecta Gregoriana 283; Sectio B, n. 99], Universitä Gregoriana: R o m a 2001,401-427.

94

Gunton, Colin E.; The Christian Faith. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Blackwell: Oxford 2001, 128. Gunton, Colin E.; 'The Church as a School of Virtue? H u m a n Formation in Trinitarian Framework'. In: Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2000, [101-120] 120. Cf. above, section 3.6.2.

95

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back to its Creator - grounded in God's election 97 - with the moral information of man in the community of the church which is characterized by worship, and the Spirit's anticipation of the eschaton in right human action.98 This interpretation of reality as creation in the liturgy and worship of the Christian Church seems the only appropriate starting-point for theology. It is not altogether clear, though, how such an interpretation should be linked to the human experience of evil. In this respect, Gunton seems to be more optimistic in stating that the Christian community has the calling to 'offer back' creation, whereas Bayer is far more reluctant to talk about such a human activity and focuses more about the necessary Christological re-interpretation of it. When it has become clear how important the notion of 'interpretation' is, and how such an interpretation is closely connected with the particular confessional standpoints of the Christian community, the question is: what is the character of this reality, perceived and interpreted by the community of believers? We will turn to this question in the next section.

5.3.2 Creation-orders and Natural Law Whereas Bayer stresses the ambiguity of creation being God's promising word, distinctively perceived as both law and gospel, Gunton is less 'Lutheran' in this respect and stresses the order of creation. The systematic point which has to be clarified here is whether creation can be said to be ordered and how such 'order' should relate to the ethic advocated in the tradition of 'natural law'. In the course of this section, the main points of critique of the concept of 'natural law' will be discussed. From the outset, it is clear that in post-Enlightenment theology, concepts like 'natural law' and 'creation orders' usually have a bad name. They convey images of old-fashioned and out-dated orders, static concepts with the odium of mere conservatism and protection of 97

"If the Church is to be the Church in the post-Constantinian age, she must renew her sense of her (passively constituted) calling to be a particular people serving a universal end" (Gunton, Colin E.; 'Election and Ecclesiology in the Post-Constantinian Church'. In: Gunton, Intellect and Action, [139-155] 154).

98

Gunton, Intellect and Action, 81.

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the status quo, the appeal to medieval social order, ascribing legitimacy to human artefacts by ascribing 'God's will' to them, and - worst of all - it reminds us of the cruelties of the Third Reich, sometimes justified by the Christian appeal to 'creation-orders' of Blut und Boden and its authoritative framework. Moreover, in the course of history the concept of order was said to be conceived and mostly controlled by ecclesiastical authorities who used it oppressively." In the traditional, pre-Enlightenment content of a 'doctrine of creation', however, there was no dispute about creation being ordered or not. On the contrary, concepts of 'order' and 'creation' could be said to be almost synonymous. The cultural shifts that took place in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment changed the concept of creation in this respect. 'Ordering' ceases to be the privilege of God only to become that of man. 1 0 0 Thus, the status of 'creation orders' became problematic, for it is not clear that any 'order' is traceable in reality at all, nor whether such order is made up by God or by man. 101 The situation becomes even more complicated when the tradition of 'natural law' is connected with the term 'order'. Within the current Roman-Catholic doctrine, 'natural law' still has its place despite many attacks and critical studies. 'Natural law' usually stands for a concept that emerged in early modern Roman-Catholic theology and subsequently was incorporated into official Catholic teachings. It presupposes a definite idea of human nature, and incorporates subsequent morality concerning human sexuality. Moreover, it implies a strong commitment to moral universalism. For this 'nature' of human beings is not confined to some territory, and is not dependent on revelation to be acknowledged. It therefore implies the possibilities of man to rationally 'invent' the criteria for moral behaviour. 1 0 2 99

Cf. the description of this critique by Michael Keeling (The Mandate of Heaven. The Divine command and the Natural Order, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995,17-19).

100 Cf. the thesis of Hans Blumenberg "that modernity arises when the basis of rationality is displaced from divine to human agency" (quoted in: Gunton, The Triune Creator, 125). 101 Cf. Cornells van der Kooi's monography on knowledge of God in the theology of both Calvin and Barth, divided by the watershed of Kant's epistemology: "For Calvin, God is the One who imposes ordo; for Kant, that is the role of pure reason" (Kooi, Cornells van der; As in a Mirror. John Calvin and Karl Barth on Knowing God. A Diptych, Brill: Leiden/Boston 2005, 237). 102 Cf. Porter, lean; Natural and Divine Law. Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1999, 29f.

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Within the context of Neo-Calvinism, the concept of 'creation orders' has been very important and in some respect parallels the concept of natural law. For if God, who created heaven and earth, did not withdraw and leave his creation alone even after the fall, such divine involvement entailed the upholding of His created order. The concept of 'creation orders' is therefore related to the very core of NeoCalvinist theology: the sovereign grace of God which allows creation to be itself both as different from and related to its Creator. 103 If God in his grace were not to care for His fallen creation, it would immediately be swallowed by some hellish nothingness. 104 This Neo-Calvinist approach makes clear that the concept of 'orders' is not intended to be static, for it immediately points to God's indispensable and gracious activity which is needed at every moment. Therefore, this Neo-Calvinist concept of 'creation-orders' is inextricably bound to the concept of common grace. At this point, it tries to avoid Roman-Catholic presuppositions about the human capacity to find such natural orders. Whereas in Roman-Catholic theology, the 'invention' of 'natural' laws was not bound to revelation, the 'creation-orders' and there acknowledgement are immediately dependent on God's general, providential and gracious care for his creation. Reality's dependence on its Creator plays an important role in recent discussions on the tradition of 'natural law'. 105 According to its critics, this tradition of 'natural law' is an obsolete institution that is not able to deal with epistemological and theological issues.106 Perhaps the 103 In the secondary literature on Neo-Calvinist ethics, an illuminating quotation is given of the programmatic statement of A. Kuyper: "'s Heeren Ordinantien of Ordeningen, waardoor, wijl de Schrift ons daarin voorgaat, alle creatuurlijke zijn en leven wordt ontvangen; waaraan, als Bestel van den hoogen God, voor het denken v a n ons, Kalvinisten, niets noch het groote, noch het kleine valt te onttrekken" (In: Egmond, A. van; 'Een spannend leven: gereformeerd van 1892-1992'. In: Brinkman, M.E. [red.]; 100 jaar theologie. Aspecten van een eeuw theologie in de Gereformeerde kerken in Nederland (1892-1992), Kok: Kampen 1992, [283-318] 296). 104 Cf. Van Egmond, 'Een spannend leven', 297. 105 Examples of such defense are found in Porter, Natural and Divine Law; and Cromartie, Michael (ed.); A Preserving Grace. Protestants, Catholics, and Natural Law, Ethics and Public Policy Center/Eerdmans: Washington/Grand Rapids 1997. 106 For an exposition of the critique, see: Douma, J.; Natuurrecht - een betrouwbare gids? [Kamper Bijdragen XXI], De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 1978, 70; Westberg, Daniel; 'The Reformed Tradition and Natural Law'. In: Cromartie, Michael (ed.); A Preserving Grace. Protestants, Catholics, and Natural Law, Ethics and Public Policy Center/Eerdmans: Washington/Grand Rapids (Mi.) 1997,103-117.

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most pressing critique is that this tradition severs reality ('nature') from its life-giving and -sustaining source: the triune God. It seems as if 'nature' by itself issues its own 'laws'. The defenders of 'natural law' grant that this critique attacks some specific kinds of 'natural law'theory which have an explicit voluntarist, individualist, and subjectivist orientation. Defenders of natural law readily admit that in this case nature's independence from God can be rightly criticised. 107 Others have made clear that it was not until the 19th century that RomanCatholic theology 'divinised' the historically developing situation in for instance - the area of marriage and sexuality. They declared reality at that time to be the 'natural law' and hence to be God's created order. This implied a kind of divinisation of the natural law, an interpretation of 'natural law' which from then on strongly influenced the terms of debate. 108 Recent research on the theological, pre-Enlightenment, use of 'natural law' in defence of its tradition and current use makes clear, however, that the connection between the triune God and 'nature' is explicitly stated in pre-modern writings and plays an important role in its application. 109 Thus, the doctrine of divine providence is closely connected with 'natural law' - for instance in the works of John Calvin: "[H]e used the principle of natural law as an extension of his doctrine of providence to explain the survival of civilization". 110 For the Reformer, 'nature', and 'creation' were one and the same in this respect. It is interesting that the explicit connection between such a doctrine of providence, creation, and 'natural law' resulted in the identification of 107 This is done by Joan Lockwood O'Donovan ('The Concept of Rights in Christian Moral Discourse'. In: Cromartie, A Preserving Grace, 143-156). 108 Cf. Beemer, Th.; 'De hindering van de seksuele moraal in een door God ingestelde morele orde. Analyse en commentaar op grond van enkele recente kerkelijke documenten'. In: Beemer, Th. (e.a.); Het kerkelijk spreken over seksualiteit en huwelijk. Een bundel filosofische, gedragswetenschappelijke en theologische studies, Ambo: Baarn 1 9 8 3 , 1 5 - 52. 109 "Contrary to what is commonly assumed, medieval natural law thinkers did not attempt to derive moral principles from a supposedly self-evident and fixed conception of human nature. The concept of nature w a s a theological and not merely a philosophical notion for them, thanks to the extensive work on the theological significance of the natural world that began early in the twelfth century" (Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 17). 110 Schreiner, Susan E.; 'Calvin's use of Natural Law'. In: Cromartie, A Preserving (51-76) 74.

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the Decalogue with 'natural law'.111 God's providential care as experienced in His giving the Ten Commandments is also shown in his upholding the order of creation. Such an interpretation of 'natural law' makes clear that over the centuries, the content of the word 'nature' has changed: whereas it is nowadays viewed as something apart from any God or Creator, Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin closely connected it with God's providence. The importance of the doctrine of 'natural law' for the subject of this thesis is that it provided men with a concept of a socially and physically ordered reality. This order was quite obvious, epistemologically, and directly connected with the activity of the Creator. This order also gave moral directives for human behaviour in the broadest sense of the word: man's relation towards nature, fellow humans, society, and God was regulated by all kinds of moral prerequisites that could be traced back to the order of creation, so that the experienced 'order' could be identified with the will of God. So far, we have seen the problematic features of 'natural law' in current theology. Prominent among the critical remarks is, first, the question whether the 'law' discovered really is 'natural', in that it is not imposed on nature by man. Secondly, that the word 'natural' is used in many different ways; and thirdly, whether this version of natural-lawtheory does not presuppose a far too optimistic view of human rationality, finding universally applicable laws apart from God's revelation. Finally, such a natural law bears the connotation of being timeless, static, monolithic, and undifferentiated.112 We have also seen that the stress on the relation between God's ordering and sustaining activity is used in defence of the idea of both natural law and creation orders. Although a direct appeal to divine ordering activity in defence of some social order for these reasons is not common in theological ethics,

111 Schreiner, 'Calvin's use of Natural Law', 75: "The Reformer adopted the traditional identification of natural law with the moral law of the Decalogue". 112 "Die hauptsächlichen Vorwürfe richten sich gegen die geschichtslose Starrheit einer vermeintlich prälapsarischen Schöpfungsordnung, die als solche der postlapsarischen Wirklichkeit des Menschen nicht gerecht werden könne, sowie gegen die Unterstellung, eine Schöpfungsordnung sei von jedermann auch ausserhalb der Offenbarung Gottes in Jesus Christus erkennbar, was zu einer 'Eigengesetzlichkeit' der Welt führe, die ethischer Kritik entzogen sei" (Rosenau, Hartmut; 'Schöpfungsordnung'. In: TRE [Bd. XXX], [356-158] 356).

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there are some recent proposals to re-examine the concept of 'order'. Among those, Oliver O'Donovan's concept is the most prominent. This concept has already been introduced in section 5.2.2. According to O'Donovan, the concept of 'order' is inherent to the concept of 'creation'. As it was the triune God who created heaven and earth as ordered, He has remained close to his creation in the course of human history. In Jesus Christ, God became a human being who was raised from the dead, thereby affirming God's goal for creation. This active Divine influence on the creatura is part of the doctrine of creation, and can be summarised under the heading of 'order', for the creation is ordered towards its various parts and towards its Creator, both synchronically and diachronically. In order to discern this order, the knowing subject has to be part of the community of believers and his knowledge must be knowledge 'in Christ'. This community has the theological burden to investigate reality. This concerns the field of morality in particular, in which we have to search for generic and teleological orders. 113 The use of the concept of 'creation orders' is bound to the same developments as can be traced within the history of the doctrine of creation in general. As we saw earlier, the doctrine of creation is becoming increasingly dominated by the need to explicitly take Jesus Christ, his history and his prominent place in the origin and continuation of creation seriously (cf. 2.2, 3.2.2, and 4.5.2). The same Christological concentration is evident in O'Donovan's theology. On this point, theology in general cannot underestimate the contribution of Karl Barth in his christological concentration. Within this christological concentration, however, different aspects can be distinguished that bear consequences for the concept of 'order'. It can be debated, for instance, whether w e should start with the 'cross' of Jesus Christ when writing about the doctrine of creation, or whether we should take 'resurrection' as our starting-point. W e now formulate the question to which the rest of this chapter is devoted: Can a doctrine of creation provide the necessary tools to - on the one hand - affirm the notion of a created order that bears consequences for theological ethics, and - on the other hand - prevent such an order from being static or sundered from its Creator?

113 Cf. above, section 5.2.2 and O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, passim.

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5.3.3 Creation as Comprehensive Concept Gunton explicitly states that theology should be about 'living' and 'life' as a whole, for this is the leading idea in scripture itself: God created life in the beginning, life is restored through Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit guides us to creation's eschatological goal. In exploring this idea, the doctrine of creation is at stake, especially in our late- or postmodern culture.114 Bayer, along a somewhat similar line, argues that the Christian Faith is not about salvation from this world, but that the core of the doctrine of justification is the re-illumination of the doctrine of creation.115 Both these theologies demonstrate the taking of the doctrine of creation as a comprehensive concept. In such a concept, 'creation' can comprehensively regulate the talk of the relation between the triune God and the world.116 It is especially interesting that both Bayer and Gunton explicitly draw implications for doing theological ethics from their comprehensive conception of 'creation'. The relation between God and man, aptly described in the doctrine of creation, affects human behaviour. To that degree, the doctrine of creation can be equated with any worldview.117 In order to establish the specific contribution of the doctrine of creation for any discussion about the relation between 'reality' (in the broadest sense of the word) and 'ethics', we shall now turn to similar concepts about this relation. For in what sense can creation be called 'comprehensive'? Nancey Murphy provides us with a clear concept of the connection between 'cosmology7 and 'ethics'. Together with George Ellis she w r o t e On the Moral Nature of the Universe. Theology, Cosmology,

and Ethics.m The core thesis of the book is that the time has again come to relate cosmology and ethics. One of the most distinguishing features of modernity was, according to Murphy and Ellis, not only the failure to

114 Christian Faith, xf. 115 Leibliches Wort, 19f. 116 "Der Begriff [sc. Schöpfung] regelt umfassend die Aussagen über das Verhältnis des dreieinigen Gottes zu Mensch und Welt" (Gloege, G.; 'Schöpfung IV/B. Dogmatisch'. In: RGG3 [Bd. V], [1484-1490] 1484). 117 Cf. e.g.: Wolters, Albert M.; Schepping zonder grens. Bouwstenen voor een bijbelse wereldbeschouwing. Buijten & Schipperheijn: Amsterdam 1988. 118 Murphy, Nancey; Ellis, George F.R.; On the Moral Nature of the Universe. Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics, Fortress Press: Minneapolis 1996.

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elaborate a connection between worldview and ethics, but - even worse "its positive insistence on maintaining the logical gulf between them". 119 In the worldview Murphy and Ellis advocate, the influential place given to ethics and its accompanying theology or metaphysics above that of the social sciences is remarkable. The cosmology taken as the most intellectually satisfying follows from the anthropic principle they develop: "Comparing the different possibilities, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the design concept is one of the most satisfactory overall approaches, necessarily taking us outside the strictly scientific area." 120 The theistic explanation for such a concept allows for a more coherent account of reality. However, not every account of the deity involved is coherent with the character of nature we perceive. As we see "[I]n biology, the suffering of nonhuman life can be seen as a 'non-moral harbinger7 of conscious selfsacrifice. In physics, a theory of divine action as non-coercive can be made consistent with quantum theory, wherein the indeterminacy of quantum events serves as an analogue for human freedom". 121 Thus, the sciences seem to be embraced by a metaphysic or theology in which God's noncoercive character is revealed and mirrored. This in turn leads to an ethic of non-violence, advocated by Murphy and Ellis: "It implies a 'kenotic' or self-renunciatory ethic, according to which one must renounce selfinterest for the sake of the other, no matter what the cost to oneself."nz The approach of Murphy and Ellis contains a problematic feature. The biological suffering they explicitly take into account is also used in defence of aggression over against the violent actor who causes such a suffering. So there are two sides in reality: the actors and the victims. The question therefore is, which of the two 'sides' of reality has to be taken as normative for human ethical presuppositions? Furthermore, they explicitly build on Simone Weil's idea that self-renunciation, for the sake of the other, is the highest good of humankind. Weil therefore stated that real self-renunciation has to be valued as good in itself. Murphy and Ellis, on the other hand, seem to presuppose a more far-reaching goal attached to this self-renunciation: "Genuine self-sacrifice for the good of the other [...] is the way to open oneself to a greater good: to make generosity the

119 120 121 122

Murphy/Ellis, Murphy/Ellis, Murphy/Ellis, Murphy/Ellis,

On On On On

the Moral the Moral the Moral the Moral

Nature Nature Nature Nature

of of of of

the Universe, the Universe, the Universe, the Universe,

2. 59. 203. xv; chapter 6 (passim).

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order of the day transforms the situation, totally transcending the miserly ethic of nicely calculated debts and duties".123 To attach such greater goods to the concept of self-renunciation is a sign of incompleteness in their theory of kenosis. They thereby weaken the strong internal force of Weil's. Advocating the same kind of logic as Murphy and Ellis, the Dutch ethicist Frits de Lange also wants to establish an ethic that flows from a cosmology or worldview. The outcome of his project is, however, completely opposite to that of Murphy and Ellis. According to De Lange, the Darwinist evolution-theory provides us with a combination of ethics and worldview. In reaction to the modern distinction of ethics and worldview, which cuts the bond between man and nature, the reintroduction of this bond gives rise to reconsideration of the relation between cosmology and ethics.124 One of the most pressing arguments against such a relation is the fear of the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy'. The gap between 'is' and 'ought' that Hume made us aware of was supported by the ontological dualism between nature and thought which had characterized modern thinking since Descartes and Newton's mechanical worldview. For Hume, knowledge of reality is knowledge of 'Matters of Fact', provided with a relation of cause and effect by human thinking. From a 'nature' interpreted within this scheme, no goals and ideals for human action can be distilled, because every goal or telos is removed from it by such modern physics.125 So De Lange's solution is to interpret reality with the help of Darwin's evolution-theory. If one lives without discerning the telos, one cannot live in accordance with it. If one views nature as a creative process of which man is product and part, one wants to bring morality into line with these insights - i.e. to live in accordance with nature. Over against all kinds of voluntarist ethics, De Lange stresses the importance of the relation between nature and ethics. Such a relation does not coincide with the older forms of theological ethics called 'creation orders' for we cannot say that morality is rooted in the one, eternal, and unchangeable order of being, but it is rather the fruit of the multicoloured dynamic of cultural evolution.126 Yet the character of De Lange's ethic is not very clear. It consists in taking the kinship of all life-forms 123 124 125 126

Murphy/Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 121. Lange, F. de; Gevoel voor verhoudingen. God, evolutie en ethiek, Kok: Kampen 1997, 96. De Lange, Gevoel voor verhoudingen, 111. De Lange, Gevoel voor verhoudingen, 129

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seriously in a kind of evolutionary, ecological awareness, for we not only 'are related' but we 'are relation', as De Lange programmatically states.127 Subsequent to our being related, we have to develop a 'sense for proportion'. This describes the attitude by which one's ethical framework is tuned to reality. The problematic feature of De Lange's concept is the relation between evolution and God. In the last chapter of his book, De Lange remarks that classical theism is inadequate for this debate. Two alternatives are examined: the recent proposals of process-theology by J.B. Cobb Jr. and A.N. Whitehead on the one hand, and James Gustafson's theocentrism on the other. Both proposals make clear that God is not only the source of life, but He is also the One who orders this world towards its goal. Nevertheless, the first seems to know too little and the second too much about the goal God intends for this world and about the way God and this world seem to be related. According to De Lange, the concept of panentheism is more apt to describe this relation, and to conceive both God's immanence within and his transcendence towards creation. As this section is devoted to the relation between concepts of creation as 'comprehensive' concepts and their consequences for theological ethics, it may be possible to use the concepts of Gunton and Bayer to evaluate the proposals of both Murphy and Ellis and De Lange, and vice versa. It is clear that De Lange's concept fits within the commonly acknowledged worldview based on the evolution-theory. Its strength is the correspondence between scientific results and theology, thereby relating both branches of science as materials for a unified worldview. Gunton disapproves of such a concentration on the goal of creation for three reasons: the vagueness of the goal intended, the ordering implied, and the human activity involved. Gunton is much more theologically outspoken about the goal being the glory of the triune God, who is not only 'within' this world (panentheism) but also is free over against this world. This point is stressed by Gunton's insistence on the maintenance of the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo. Gunton's ethic of sacrifice might agree with the findings of Murphy and Ellis, but their concept of design does not make clear that God as the Creator did not only start an ordered process, but that He is still related to his creation by leading it to its proper goal. Of this relationship the life, death, resurrection and 127 De Lange, Gevoel voor verhoudingen, 176.

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ascension of Jesus Christ is the most impressive and comprehensive example. The place and importance of human activity involved in the concepts of both De Lange and Murphy and Ellis is marginal compared to both Gunton's and Bayer's concepts. In particular, the acknowledgment of the formation of the human actor is not given its proper place in the concepts of De Lange, and Murphy and Ellis. These concepts therefore tend to have a somewhat self-evident and rational character: one only has to accept the non-coercive character of the universe, the ordering of the sciences, the important place of metaphysics or the 'sense of proportion' - and the corresponding ethic will emerge. Bayer's concept is strongly disapproving of this kind of rationalism. The God who created the universe is not related to us by intellectual 'knowledge' of concepts of an ordered reality. His presence can be felt through our taking part in the worship of the Creator. Man cannot just 'interpret' reality as 'creation' intellectually, but he has to be 'in-formed' by the promising word of this Creator in the context of the liturgical worship of the Church. As soon as this mediated presence of God is taken into account, the unconditional characterization of God's action as 'non-coercive' cannot be maintained. God's promise, consisting in both law and gospel, is not univocally 'love' as Murphy and Ellis suppose. We can state that for both Gunton and Bayer, 'creation' is a worldview in that it is the outcome of a tradition of many centuries, developed over against Gnostic tendencies in the early Church, medieval distortions of the doctrine of justification in the time of the Reformation, Romantic aberrations in the 19th century, and global ecological problems arising in the 20th century. Thus, the doctrine of creation is particularly appropriate for an up-to-date confrontation with the (post)modern worldview, not only in direct opposition to it for post-modernism rightly detects some of the weaknesses of earlier projects - but in providing a worldview as well as an encompassing view of moral behaviour within the life-context of this created world. In conclusion, we can state that as far as the topic of 'creation as worldview' is concerned, Gunton and Bayer can be said to have convergent opinions, notwithstanding their differences on other points. If we confront their theologies with recent proposals of binding some concept of 'reality' to theological ethics, we find some important shortcomings in those proposals. They pay too little attention to the 'formation' of the human character by the Church and its members as the inherited gospel of the triune God is handed on. Furthermore, the

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character of God and his relation towards his creation is not clarified, nor is God's goal for creation explained, so that their concepts lack concrete guidance for theological ethics.128 5.3.4 Conclusions: Creation as Life-Context 'Creation' as the interpretation of the human life-context is something that conveys the following elements: an explicit account of creation's origin, the relation between creatura and its Creator, its historical existence in the past and present, and the destination it is set to reach. The connotations of the concept of 'nature' are timelessness, some monistic characteristics, and the absence of human contributions to it (cf. 5.3.2). These can be avoided by using the concept of 'creation'. In Gunton's approach, theology concerns 'life'. This comprehensive term is immediately qualified by its being created by God. Thus, the doctrine of creation is located in a central place and so fills it out with rich conceptual content.129 The same can be said of Bayer's use of the doctrine of creation in his critique of the Enlightenment-project. Over against its stress on human action, starting with the doctrine of creation immediately frames interpretations of the human condition with awe

128 Rufus Black (Christian Moral Realism. Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue and the Gospel, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2000) comes to the same conclusion with respect to other participants in the same debate. In his treatment of the classical tradition of 'natural law', he makes clear that "there is some form of integral relationship between at least what people believe the facts of the world to be and moral values", but he immediately continues: "What remains unclear is the exact nature of that relationship" (45). Black concludes that the approaches of moral realism (both in the tradition of 'natural law' and in the Christian ethics of O'Donovan) and narrative ethics (Hauerwas) are complementary. According to Black the "worship of the Church" is "the paradigmatic place for observing the complementary operation of narrative ethics and Christian moral realism" (318). Cf. also Hauerwas, Stanley; With the Grain of the Universe. The Church's Witness and Natural Theology. Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001, Brazos Press: Grand Rapids 2001,205-241. 129 Cf. also Muis' exposition on the doctrine of creation: "De vragen naar de zin en bedoeling van het hele natuurproces, van de aarde als milieu, van het mens-zijn en van mijn leven worden theologisch verdiept tot vragen naar God als Schepper" (Muis, Credo in creatorem, 8).

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and thankfulness.130 The concept of Luther's three 'estates' or 'mandates', in its connection with this doctrine (to which we will turn in section 5.4.4), is particularly able to avoid the problems connected with 'natural law'-theories.131 The Lutheran concept of 'order' is immediately connected with God's act of institution. Thus it prevents these institutions from being merely 'natural'. The concept is broad enough to cover many fields of action conceived and experienced in both pre-modern and modern society. It, thirdly, allows us to hold together the critical discussion with other interpretations of life. The doctrine of creation is called 'pre-ethical' by Bayer, Wyller, and Wannenwetsch, in the sense that 'creation' is given to us before we have to act in response; moral behaviour therefore is principally secondary in relation to that bestowal upon us. Theologically, therefore, reality cannot be thought of without it being created by God, with all the consequences involved (God's speech-act, law-and-gospel, orderings, priority of passivity over activity etc.). To what extent, however, can this reality be said to address everyone, Christian and non-Christian alike, with its orderings, law-and-gospel, and so on? Does the pre-ethical character of reality lead to an autonomous directivity of reality, perceived without theological interpretation?132 At least it can be said that, de facto, the character of reality is discussed in the different sciences - in which discussion theology should play its 130 This is exactly the point Markus Huppenbauer borrows from Bayer to establish his theory on developing patterns of ecologically right behaviour (Theologie und Naturethik. Eine schöpfungstheologische Auseinandersetzung mit ethisch-normativen Ansätzen umweltverantwortlichen Handelns, Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 2000, 56f: "Schöpfungswahrnehmung würde somit für existentielle Situationen stehen, in denen Menschen eo ipso nicht als Handelnde auftreten und anfangen dürfen, weil sie vor Gott stehen, dem sie sich 'verdanken'. [...] Solche vor-moralischen Lebensvollzüge haben aus theologischer Perspektive als anthropologische Grundlage von Handeln zu gelten. 'Umweltverantwortliches' Handeln müsste also primär diesen Lebensvollzügen entsprechen"). For Huppenbauer, this starting-point does not uncritically mediate some 'order' w e have to fit in. 'Creation' is really a help for the human activity of orientation: God's categorical gift (Bayer) must be 'observed' (Huppenbauer, Theologie und Naturethik, 57; cf. above, section 4.5.6 for a description of this 'observance'). 131 Cf. above, section 4.6.1. 132 So asks Trygve Wyller (Glaube und autonome Welt. Diskussion eines Grundproblems der neueren systematischen Theologie mit Blick auf Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Oswald Bayer und K.E. Legstrup, De Gruyter: Berlin 1998, 11: "Wie weit ist es für Bayer möglich, diese Wirklichkeit als eine Instanz zu verstehen, die keine 'Begründung ausserhalb ihrer selbst' kennt?").

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own critical part.133 Bayer's use of the doctrine of creation makes clear that Brümmer's concept of 'language games' 134 contains a harmless metaphor: the debate between the theological and scientific interpretations of nature is a very 'critical' one, in which the assumed complementary attitude can hardly be maintained. "Theological description does not [...] deal with an additional aspect of reality and possibility, but sets all reality and possibility together in a different perspective and horizon in which they are determined in relation to God". 135 On this point Bayer and Gunton converge: the Christian life-form, paradigmatically present in the Church's liturgy, in-forms the Christian interpretation of reality. The exclusivity of this life-form is implied in the confessional summaries of believing in God who, as the Father of Jesus Christ, is our Creator. Bayer is much more aware of the radical problem of 'evil' as the touchstone of theology than Gunton seems to be.136 This problem is the core of Bayer's suspicion about all idealistic kinds of theology which try to overcome the difficulties of reality. As the systematic treatment of 'evil' within the doctrine of creation is part of the conceptualization of God's being related to his creation in the course of history, named as 'providence', we will now turn to the relation between 'creation' and 'providence'. Here we will further examine the difference between Bayer and Gunton, and the consequences this has for the connection between a doctrine of creation and theological ethics.

133 Cf. Wyller, Glaube und autonome Welt, 215: "Diese 'vorethische' Lebensform ist allgemein diskutierbar. Gleichzeitig aber verhält sie sich antagonistisch zur 'Neuzeit', weil sie inhaltlich durch eine scharfe Distanzierung zur neuzeitlichen Autonomie geprägt ist". 134 Brümmer, 'Dialogue of Language Games'. 135 Dalferth, 'Creation - Style of the World', 127. 136 This is evident from his own formulation in an interview: "Die Theologie kann, wenn sie die Frage der Theodizee offenhält, gerade nicht ein stimmiges System bieten, in dem sich alles reimt. [...] Es geht nicht darum, die Frage der Theodizee abzuwehren, sondern ihr standzuhalten [...]" (Neuer Geist in alten Buchstaben, 71f).

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5.4 Creation and Providence In this section, the relation between order, often connected with a doctrine of creation, and disorder, as was mentioned in the foregoing sections, will be treated systematically. First, the concept of sin theologically called 'hamartiology' - is discussed (5.4.1). In order to pay attention to this concept, 'creation' is defined in terms of 'relation' (5.4.2). So the relation between the concepts of creation and providence can be established (5.4.3). Within this context, the relation between human and divine agency is examined (5.4.4). 5.4.1 Hamartiology and Order The biblical expressions on God's creating and creative power all have the same characteristic in common. They all are designed to ascribe lifegiving and life-sustaining power to the One who originally created heaven and earth, and so to express the trusting attitude of the believer who places himself under the providential caring power of the Father.137 The impact and imaginative power of such a confession can only be estimated against the background of sin and evil which characterizes the human condition.138 To treat the topic of 'hamartiology' within the context of the doctrine of creation might seem to imply that 'sin' belongs to creation from the outset. It is used in this way in the creation-theology of A. van de Beek. For him the creation-story as a creatio continua is about the constant falling of man: "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans 3,23).139 137 E.g. the creation-stories in Genesis, but also Psalms like 89 and 148, Isaiah 40-66 and Amos. Therefore the liturgy of many Reformed Church-services starts with the confession that our only help is in the name of the Lord, who made heaven and earth. This confession is an example of the connection of the doctrine of creation and providence. 138 "We live in a world full of sin, evil, injustice and suffering. We believe this world has been created by a God who is both omnipotent and good. This creates a serious problem" (König, Α.; 'Providence, Sin and Human Freedom. On Different Concepts of Human Freedom'. In: Egmond, A. van; Keulen, D. van [edd.]; Freedom [Studies in Reformed Theology 1], Callenbach: Baarn 1996, [181-194] 181). 139 Beek, A. van de; Schepping. De wereld als voorspel voor de eeuwigheid, Callenbach: Baarn 1996, [297-316] 300. Leo Scheffczyk, however, vehemently opposes to such an identification of creation and Fall, because in case of such an identification "die

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The basic question concerning this human freedom to fall and sin is how God can be said to create creatures that violate the limits set upon them by the Creator itself. According to Van de Beek, we are not allowed to speculate about this question but to take this reality seriously: 'God did create man with the possibility to sin. As such, we are creatures'. 140 According to Herman Bavinck, the first couple was created in order to follow a history and reach a final goal. In the first stage of this history, Adam and Eve still had the opportunity not to sin and not to die (posse non peccare, posse non mori), and had not reached the stage of the non posse peccare. This implies for Bavinck that Adam in paradiso was in the state of one who could sin and die, and therefore he was "in some fear and dread". This ability to sin is not part of the 'imago Dei' but denotes its borders, as the Reformed tradition observed. 141 It is characteristic of this 19th-century Reformed vision of the (intended) history of God's creation, that 'development' is the keyword, in which even 'fear and dread' belong to man's original state of affairs. At this point, Van de Beek coincides with Bavinck and the reformed tradition. The difference between the view of Van de Beek and Bavinck becomes clear with respect to the question whether the fall is really a decisive moment in history, at which the human potentia to sin is actualized (Bavinck), or whether the fall is a pattern which is part of creation as the constant falling of mankind (Van de Beek). As we stated earlier, the story of the fall in Genesis 3 has to be interpreted as both historical and symbolic. 142 It is presented to us by means of the Genesisaccount. Many questions about the interpretations may arise, but the conclusion is clear: it also informs us about the interpretation of the present state of God's creation in which we are located. As William P. Brown makes clear, the spatial metaphor is not meaningless here: the story of Genesis 1-3 and onwards 'locates' us in that it defines the roles, Sünde zu einem Wesensbestand der menschlichen Natur wird, der auch durch eine nachfolgende Erlösung nicht mehr geändert werden könnte" (Einführung in die Schöpfungslehre, 133). 140 "God heeft de mens geschapen met de mogelijkheid om te zondigen. Ζό zijn we schepsel en met die realiteit hebben we rekening te houden" (Van de Beek, Schepping, 303). 141 Bavinck, In the Beginning, 208f. "Hij verkeerde nog in de mogelijkheid van zonde en dood, en dus ook nog in eenige vreeze en angst" (Bavinck, GD Π, 534f). 142 See above, section 5.2.1.

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the surroundings, and the actors who and which 'form' our habitat in which we have to play our part as morally responsible actors: "Although not a genre in itself, the creation account plays an indisputable role in moral formation, since it defines how the community is appropriately to discern its environment and thereby act within it." 143 I would make reference to the consequences of the history of the fall, as described in Genesis 3, for the topic of relating the doctrine of creation and theological ethics as follows. The carefully maintained balance between order, disorder, and the history of regaining order is displayed wonderfully, so that the momentary fall of humankind should not be treated apart from the history of creation, redemption, and the eschatological goal toward which God is striving. In this chapter, 'sin' is used in a specific way, not referring to the trivial and sexual misdeeds committed by human beings, but referring our inappropriate, human attitude towards living and nonliving creatures arising from our anxious care for our own interest in dismissal of God our Creator - to quote Christof Gestrich in his epochal study on the doctrine of sin.144 'Sin' is the Christian background to all our speech about reality, as it reveals the character of that reality. As Alistair McFadyen paradigmatically formulates: "The doctrine of sin is not so much an isolated case of Christian embarrassment concerning anachronistic aspects of Christian faith, as a crucial test of our ability to speak of God in relation to the world at all." 145 For McFadyen, 'sin' is the theological interpretation of certain pathologies normally described in the fields of criminology, medicine, sociology, social science, psychology, philosophy, etc. He considers "the question of the meaningfulness and explanatory power of the doctrine of sin to be in essence the same question as that of God as an active and dynamic presence in the world". For if the language of sin is significantly

143 Brown, William P.; The Ethos of the Cosmos. The Genesis of Moral Imagination in the Bible, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1999,18. 144 "Sünde ist die von allen Menschen im Zuge ihrer angstvollen Sorge um sich selbst produzierte (oder hingenommene) unangemessene Beziehung zu anderen Lebewesen und Dingen" (Gestrich, Die Wiederkehr des Glanzes in der Welt, [199-203] 199). 'Sin' in relation to God as the creator of human beings is mentioned in the beginning of this profound study (18-25). 145 McFadyen, Alistair; Bound to Sin. Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2000.

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different from the atheistic interpretations of the destructive elements in our world, talking about G o d himself also has to make some difference. 1 4 6 This makes clear that, though h u m a n (so-called immediate) experiences of the creative power of G o d are important, the character of those experiences is inextricably intertwined with the theological characterization of 'sin'. A n y presentation of the doctrine of creation without explicit acknowledgement of 'sin' is misleading, for only the concept of 'sin' "raises the questions concerning both the ability of the h u m a n agent to discern the character of G o d from its rendering in creation, 147 and the direct correspondence of nature, as an empirically observed entity, with what G o d created, or ultimately intends that creation to become". 1 4 8 The concept of sin also designates the possibility to discern between G o d ' s will and reality as w e perceive it. For without this notion, reality could easily be reduced to G o d ' s will, in which case G o d w o u l d be responsible for the evil w e experience. At this point, the importance of the concept of sin is shown to be enormous with respect to the question of this thesis, what can the consideration of the Christian doctrine of creation bring to theological ethics? The reformed tradition at this point is quite clear: as sin results from h u m a n choice, G o d cannot be responsible for it. The relation between the doctrine of sin and the concept of 'order' can b e captured b y the question of h o w the relation between 'order' and 'disorder' ought to be defined. According to T h o m a s F. Torrance, "[e]vil would present no problem to us at all - w e would not even be aware of it - if there were no objective and coherent rational order, for what 'constitutes' evil as 'evil' is its contradiction of objective order on the one hand and its negation by that objective order on the other hand". 1 4 9 Such presuppositions take their starting-point in the conviction that G o d ' s creative activity is ordered, which is confirmed b y the biblical texts as presented in section 5.2.1. But these presuppositions tend to ignore the history of G o d ' s creative activity. Order has b e c o m e disordered, and G o d had to react to the h u m a n treatment of His 146 McFadyen, Bound to Sin, l l f . 147 Cf. above, section 5.2, about epistemology.

the consequences

of the concept

of 'sin'

for

148 McGrath, A Scientific Theology, 287. 149 Torrance, Thomas F.; Divine and contingent order, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1981,114.

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creation, as described in the story of fallen creation in Genesis 3 onwards. Human sin corrupted God's created order, in which sense 'sin' is said to bring 'death' (Romans 5,12) and to be a kind of 'anticreation'.150 To what extent does one have to reckon with this disharmony in a doctrine of creation? According to Bayer, disorder is the most profound experience we can acquire, which cannot be overruled by action, thinking, or feeling. "If theology entails knowledge of sin and waiting for the gift of justification, it renounces the concept of a unity and refuses to conjure up a meaning of history. It does not give meaning to the meaningless."151 The experience and theological interpretation of sin as disorder is nothing but taking our life-context seriously, without speculatively retiring from it. This does not mean, however, that for Bayer no trace of God's creative, ordering activity can be found. On the contrary: it is the core of the doctrine of creation that God still orders our chaotic, disordered life-context. The point is that this order we experience can never be treated apart from its existential relation with its Creator who provides us with this order. This relation is called 'providence'. As we have seen, Gunton is much more inclined to speak about creation as an ordered whole without the elements of sinful disorder. Such an order is not to be thought of apart from the redemptive activity of Jesus Christ, so that it is not secularized. The use of the metaphors of 'echo' and 'reflection', however, pay tribute to a concept in which the disorder is not the most evident characteristic of the Christian perception of reality. Though the providential relation of God to his creation is the warrant of the created order being upheld, and though this providence is immediately connected with the goal towards which God directs this creation152, Gunton nevertheless is quite clear about the existence of 'order' rather than disorder. According to him, 'order' is inextricably bound up with the concept of 'creation as project'. Order is 150 So Gestrich, Die Wiederkehr des Glanzes in der Welt, 234: "Sünde bewirkt Tod und ist in ihrer Tendenz Anti-Schöpfung". 151 Worship and Ethics, 160. Cf. above, section 4.5.6. 152 "God's providence has [...] a direct concern with the destiny of this world, whose structures - represented in the material realities bread and wine - are inextricably bound up with those who bear the image of their creator. God provides, that is to say, not for a spatial ascent out of the material world, but for a temporal movement in and with it, in eschatological perspective" (Christian Faith, 25).

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not simply existing and visible but it is the creational, providential, redemptive and - above all - eschatological goal toward which God intends his creation to strive.153 In matters of ethics, at least, one has to take his starting-point in this ordering activity of God which colours the Christian interpretation of reality as being ordered. For our purposes, by way of summary, the importance of the concept of 'sin' within a doctrine of creation is as follows. It has to be clear from the outset that a doctrine of creation is not only concerned with the original state of God's creation. As creation is intended to follow a course of history during which God guides it towards his intended goal, the actual form of this history has to be taken seriously. The history of creation ( c r e a t u r a ) is one in which 'sin' and 'evil' play an important role. The traditional characterization of 'sin' as pride, as our turning our back on God, affects the created order in its very ordered character. Furthermore, 'sin' affects our being human in that all human relations (with God, fellow human beings, the non-human creation) are distorted. To take the history of Jesus Christ seriously is to acknowledge the profound disorientation we ourselves, and our current life-context, face. The cross of Jesus Christ makes clear that there is something wrong with the world, something that is not healed by coercive action from God's side, but by God's self-renunciation and self-giving action.154 The fact that we are able to discern the differences between disorder and order, between good and evil, can be ascribed to God's providential care, through which the depravity of creation is not literally 'total' in that no good could be found. To say that there is no good left in this world is a denial of God's care for his creation.155 The concept of sin, therefore, is a reminder for Christians that to confess that our help is in the name of the Father, who created heaven and earth, really implies that we need this help desperately and that God is willing to help us through Jesus Christ. The original order God bestowed upon creation with is disguised by human fault as disorder. Every appeal therefore to a created order accounts for an

153 Cf. above, section 3.4.3. 154 Cf. the illuminating account by A. van de Beek (Schepping, [passim] esp. 174-184). 155 So Gunton's dismissal of the concept of 'total depravity' has to be understood: it is empirically false because we see instances of goodness in all kinds of people; and theologicially false, because it denies divine providence (Christian Faith, 62).

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acknowledgement of the actual disorder, which can only be dealt with while trusting God's providential care. For theological ethics, the concept of sin means that the quest for discerning moral right and wrong starts with the acknowledgement of human disobedience, so that God is not to be blamed for its consequences. On the other hand, the concept of sin - based on the biblical evidence in Genesis 3 onwards - warns us that human beings are not accountable for the course of creation alone, in the sense that the present and future of creation do not depend on human activity or lack of human activity. God does not let his creation go, but continues his activity for and within his world, directing it to the goal He intends. In the course of history, God's ordering of his creation can still be discerned, for it is being restored and perfected towards his goal for it.

5.4.2 Creation as a Relational Concept The attention being paid to the concept of sin within the context of the doctrine of creation, following the story in Genesis 3, and reckoning with the implied disorder, makes clear that talking about creation cannot be confined to the original state of affairs described in Genesis 1 and 2. The confession that God is the Creator of heaven and earth implies the current relation between creation and its Creator. To some extent, to call creation 'creation' is the core of the relationship between creation and Creator. Traditionally such an account of 'creation' is described

either

as

conservatio

or

as

creatio

continua

or

creatio

continuata.156 According to its critics, such an account of creation could endanger the autonomy, identity, or continuity of the created order, and especially of human beings and their freedom. Such a critique can be contrasted with the remark that the upholding and continuing activity on God's side expresses his allegiance to his creation. 157 It is a

156 Cf. for an account of the relation between Providentia and creatio continua(ta): Härle, Wilfried; Dogmatik, De Gruyter: Berlin 1995, 423f. Härle himself concludes: "Das Spezifische a m Schöpfungsgedanken ist nicht das Element des Anfangs, sondern der Daseins-Gewährung und des Dasein-Lassens". As w e have seen in section 5.2.1, this is a false dilemma. 157 So e.g. Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Systematische Theologie [Bd. 2], Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1991, [50-76]: "Die göttliche Weltregierung ist Ausdruck der Treue Gottes in den Veränderungen der geschöpflichen Wirklichkeit" (69).

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consequence of God's allegiance to his own creating activity, that we can still call this cosmos 'God's creation'. This implies that our naming our surroundings as 'creation' is the expression of the relation which exists between the Creator and his creature. In Gunton's creation-theology, this relational view of creation is dominant, for theology is about the relation between God and his creation. The character of this relation is indicated by words like 'conservation', 'preservation', 'providence' and 'redemption'. God's intentions for creation in turn lead to human responsibilities: "If God's purpose is for the redemption and perfection of the whole creation, than all human action will in some way or other involve the human response to God that we call ethics. It is part of our createdness, that what we truly are and do is, or should be, shaped by our relations to our creator. Ethics, as encompassing not simply principles of action but a whole way of being in the world, is thus integral to a Christian doctrine of creation as distinct from a mere cosmology or ontology."158 'Creation' in connection with redemption and eschatological destination is an expression of God's loyal relation to his creatura, in which 'sin' plays an important role. 'Sin' is a description of the character of reality. More specifically, it is the characterization of the human relation to its Creator. This characterization is seen as 'pride' through which man makes himself 'god', as described in Genesis 3. In Gunton's words: "The essence of sin is to attempt to be like God in ways other than that laid down for those who, because they are finite in time and space, are also limited in their capacity for knowledge and achievement. Sin is for the creature to think and act as if it were the creator." 159 Or, to define 'sin' in terms of what man does not do - in the words and conceptuality of Bayer's promissio - sin is that we do not accept God's good gifts. 160

158 Triune Creator, 13. "[PJrovidence can be understood in our world only in respect of the fact that its present shape is now distorted, so that within God's providing are embraced acts devoted at once to maintaining the direction of the universe to its perfecting; and to redirecting its movement away from dissolution to its proper destiny" (Christian Faith, 35). 159 Christian Faith, 60. 160 "[D]as ganze Feld des Ethischen [erschliesst sich] nicht aus der Güte des kategorischen Imperativs, sondern aus der Güte der kategorischen Gabe. Sie sich nicht gefallen und schmecken zu lassen, ist Sünde" (Leibliches Wort, 333).

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The fact that the story of the fall is told us immediately after the creation-narratives points - among many other elements - to the fact that we cannot speak about 'creation' without acknowledging the devastating consequences of 'sin'. As 'sin' is a relational concept,161 it points at the way in which that relation (distorted by sin) has been intended by God from the beginning (creatio). It is the relationality implied in the doctrine of creation which interests us here. For the relation between the Creator and his creation cannot, therefore, be confined to the mere doctrine of creatio ex nihilo as the beginning of history. The concept draws immediately on the process involved in the course of history towards the intended goal. Within this history, humankind plays an important and distinct role compared to non-human creation. As the doctrine of sin makes clear, humankind from the outset (i.e. starting within the Garden of Eden) had the possibility to break the relationship with its Creator. The core of Gunton's ethical considerations consists in the explication of the relationality between the Creator and creation. This perspective does not entail a solely Father-oriented 'ethic of creation', as if contrary to an ethic of redemption or an eschatological one. The relation between Creator and the created human being consists in the mediatedness of the triune God who, through his two hands (Son and Spirit), is related to humankind and to the whole of his creation. This relationality places man in the framework of the rest of the (nonhuman) creation and this triune God. To call this relation 'creation' is an explicit effort to place Christian doctrine within the framework of the debate over what in more neutral and philosophical terms, is called 'ontology'. The dynamic of Gunton's use of relational terminology in the context of 'creation-theology 7 is one of the distinguishing features of his theology as a whole. The question, however, posed in section 3.8, is all the more urgent in the context of this section: how is the triune God related to us? The history of the cross does not only tell us about God's love for his creation, but also about elements of wrath and revenge, apparent in aspects of the biblical history of redemption as completed by the triune God: the imagery of the battlefield and of the broken relation between God and his people.

161 Cf. the traditional Reformed characterization of sin as the breaking of the covenant (paradigmatically: Genderen, J. van; Velema, W.H.; Beknopte Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Kok: Kampen 1992, [361-369] 366).

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This 'how' of God's relatedness to human beings is closely connected with human responsibility, as is apparent in the field of theological ethics which is none other than the reverse side of the same coin. It is about the 'how' of our relation to God, and the attitude towards the rest of creation implied by this relation. The order of God's creation has to be preserved and restored - the urgent need for man to accomplish this task is part of the project entitled 'creation'. For a coherent view, these elements of Gunton's relational approach to theology have to be combined with the colour Bayer adds to exactly this point. Bayer's concern is with the nature of the relation between God and man under the heading of 'law and gospel'. In order to avoid the peril of substantializing or ontologizing the improperly monistically conceived 'loving' relation between God and the world which would speculatively overrule the actual experience - Bayer conceives theology to be about the distinction between 'law' and 'gospel'. As has been remarked, this distinction can be useful within the context of the sinful world after the fall (4.8). For ethics in general, the specific relation God maintains with his creation must start with the acknowledgement of God's giving, including man's passivity in this area. As far as ethics consists in the forming of moral character, this notion is important for it forbids all the aberrations of modern ethics as listed by Bayer. 162 For social ethics, the concept of 'creation' as a relational one points to the continuous relatedness and interaction between God and his creation. The concept of creation therefore is not restricted to the once and for all world order established (physically, socially, and morally) at the beginning of history. 'Creation' expresses God's loyalty to the work of his hands despite evil and sin. Thus, the notion of creation as a relational concept bears consequences for the mapping of the social order. Such order is not to be conceived as existing apart from its Creator, but on the contrary, in its disorder, it has always to be redeemed by the Creator who upholds and institutes it. In order somehow, an important qualifier - to trace any social order back to the concept of creation, this doctrine has to comprehend the providential aspects of God's work in and to his creationW e will now turn to this specific element.

162 Theologie, 453-487.

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5.4.3 Providence as Part of the Doctrine of Creation Reformed systematic theology tends to distinguish the doctrine of divine providence or conservatio from what it assumes is the proper content of a doctrine of creation.163 It does so for various reasons, most of them circling around one point: the doctrine of creation has to be about the origin of the world, in order to prevent the world and its history coinciding with 'God'.164 Another argument in favour of the distinction is the concern for the facticity of God's initial act of creation. Though the creation stories come to us in a world which is characterized by the consequences of the fall, it nevertheless provides true revelation of God's work in beginning this world. The well-known (reformed) scheme of creation-fall-redemption also leads to a distinction in time between creation and the ongoing history of the world.165 'Creation' is the unique work of God with which the history of the world once began, and which is now finished. This is why Bavinck can state: "Creation and providence are not identical."166 Though these considerations have their due weight, the danger of the distinction is also apparent. The Deist conception of creation, with God as its inaugurator and a semi-autonomous continuation of the history of the world, is at least as dangerous as the pantheist one. Over against these kinds of aberrations, Bavinck can also approve of some k i n d of creatio continua or creatio continuata: " S o then p r o v i d e n c e as an

activity of God is as great, all-powerful, and omnipresent as creation; it is a continuous or continued creation. The two are one single act and

163 So states G.C. Berkouwer: "In de belijdenis der kerk werd deze kracht Gods tot onderhouding altijd onderscheiden van de Goddelijke daad der schepping, waardoor de wereld uit het niet tot aanzijn werd geroepen. De onderscheiding tussen schepping en onderhouding werd altijd sterk geaccentueerd" (De voorzienigheid Gods, Kok: Kampen 1950,60v). 164 Bavinck, for instance, discerns three goals with the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: contra platonism, contra emanation-theories, and it places the Christian faith between pantheism and deism (Bavinck, In the Beginning, 37f; GD Π, 382f). 165 Cf. the account of J.T. Bakker on the question 'What do w e mean with "creation"?' ('Wat zeggen w e als w e "schepping" zeggen?'. In: GThT 92 (1992), 113-120). Bakker contrasts the reformed temporal scheme with the Lutheran dialectic of 'law-gospel'. In the latter context, the sinful creation coincides with 'law' and God's providing and saving actions with 'gospel'. 166 Bavinck, In the Beginning, 246; GD Π, 567.

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differ only in structure." 167 Gunton, less clearly, only remarks that the concept of providence is "in close relation" with the doctrine of creation, not specifying this relation.168 Nevertheless, the whole of Gunton's theology makes clear that he almost identifies creation and providence, as far as both are understood eschatologically: God's project with creation is carried out in due time.169 Some recent reformed contributions on this topic are less inclined to see creation and providence lining up. For the Dutch systematic theologian W.H. Velema, the deep rift of human sin does not allow us to speculate about some goal for which God's creation is intended. Accordingly, providence can only be seen as limiting the consequences of the fall.170 J. Kamphuis on the other hand has stated clearly that, despite the distinction between creation and providence in principle, their continuity within the creation story is of equal importance.171 167 "Zoo is dan de voorzienigheid eene even groote, almachtige en alomtegenwoordige daad Gods als de schepping; zij is eene creatio continua of continuata; zij zijn beide eene daad en verschillen alleen ratione" (Bavinck, In the Beginning, 246; GD Π, 566). In a recent account, Dirk Evers summarises the relation of creation and providence as follows: "Die Erhaltung der Welt, die Mitwirkung Gottes an den geschöpflichen Prozessen und ihre Lenkung durch Gott sind insofern ein höchst kreatives Geschehen, als sie die Bildung der differenzierten Gestalten der Schöpfung ermöglichen und begleiten. Allerdings ist gerade deshalb die creatio continua in ihrer bis in dei Gegenwart andauernden kreativen Potenz eine creatio mediata, in der Gott sich auf die unverbrüchliche Wirklichkeit seiner Schöpfung bezieht und ihr immer neue schöpferische Möglichkeiten zukommen lässt" (Evers, Dirk; Raum - Materie - Zeit. Schöpfungstheologie im Dialog mit naturwissenschaftlicher Kosmologie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 2000,261). 168 Gunton, Colin E.; 'The Doctrine of Creation'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1997, [141-157] 143. 169 Christian Faith, 36. 170 Velema, W.H.; 'Schepping en verlossing'. In: Kamphuis, J. (e.a.); Hoe staan wij ervoor?, De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 1992, (69-102) 87-95. "Het herstel van de breuk door Gods verlossingswerk is nu verder het thema van de geschiedenis. Het einde van de geschiedenis wordt bepaald door Gods voltooiing van dat herstel" (92). Albert M. Wolters comes to the opposite conclusion (Schepping zonder grens. Bouwstenen voor een bijbelse wereldbeschouwing. Buijten & Schipperheijn: Amsterdam 1988, 84f). 171 Kamphuis makes his comment in the context of the question whether God's providence should be said to begin with or after the sabbath, or from the very beginning. Kamphuis takes Genesis 1,3 as the expression that makes clear that the Holy Spirit from the very beginning providentially sustains and governs this world

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If we take a look at the confessions of the Reformation, the doctrine of providence is part of, or at least treated within the context of, the doctrine of creation. As Jan Röhls states in his summary of the theology of the Reformed Confessions: 'Over against any dualism the Christian creation-faith holds that there is only one free cause of the visible and invisible, who is good himself and whose creation is the mirror of this goodness. As "creation" is not only about the origin of the world, but also about its maintenance (conservatio) [...] God is not in such a way Creator of the world that he could be the cause of its origin but not of its maintenance'. 172 In the Heidelberg Catechism, the answer to the question about the meaning of the first article of the creed is framed in terms that parallel 'creation' and 'providence'. The Father of Jesus Christ - who created heaven and earth out of nothing, who still maintains them - is through His Son Christ even 'my' God and Father. 173 The place of the doctrine of providence under the doctrine of creation is perhaps even more evident in the Lutheran tradition. As Luther's Small Catechism accounts, the first article of the Apostolic Creed is about God creating 'me' and maintaining me with everything Ύ need. 174 Oswald Bayer denotes the relation between creatio and conservatio as the 'neuralgic point' of every doctrine of creation, in that they can be paralleled and almost identified within the description of

(Kamphuis, J.; 'Het begin - meer dan een begin'. In: Wethmar, C.J.; Vos, C.J.A. (red.); 'n Woord op sy tyd. 'n Teologische feesbundel aangebied aan Professor Johan Heyns ter herdenking van sy sestigste verjaardag, N G Kerkboekhandel: Pretoria 1988, 67-76). 172 "Gegenüber jedwedem Dualismus hält der christliche Schöpfungsglaube daran fest, dass es nur eine einzige freie Ursache alles Sichtbaren und Unsichtbaren gibt, die selbst gut und deren Schöpfung Spiegel dieser Güte ist. Da unter der Schöpfung nicht nur die Entstehung der Welt, sondern auch ihre Erhaltung (conservatio) zu verstehen ist, muss ausser dem Dualismus noch eine weitere Auffassung verworfen werden. Gott ist nicht in der Weise Schöpfer der Welt, dass er zwar Ursache ihrer Entstehung, nicht aber ihrer Erhaltung ist" (Röhls, Jan; Theologie reformierter Bekenntnisschriften. Von Zürich bis Barmen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1987, [64-75] 67 - referring to the Belgic Confession, Article 13). 173 Heidelberg Catechism, Lord's Day 9, q. 26. 174 BSLK 510,29-511,8. Cf. Pöhlmann, Horst Georg; Austad, Torleiv; Krüger, Friedhelm; Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften, Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1996, 67-70.

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'creation' as God's promise.175 According to Bayer, creation and conservation are one coherent activity of God.176 For our theme, the relation between 'providence' and 'creation' is important for two reasons. (1) Firstly, the doctrine of divine providence is concerned with the question of how a world, in which evil exists, can be said to be upheld by its Creator, who is good and has created reality well. The evil we experience is on the one hand part of the created, discovered reality which is God's creation; on the other hand, it was not part of God's intention for creation, but caused by human disobedience and brought into this world by our fault. The confessional content of the doctrine of providence is one of comfort and assurance: though we might experience the created reality to be chaotic, painful, and troublesome, this does not imply that such a description of reality covers the whole range of what reality really is. Despite those experiences, God is still in control and leads creation to its proper goal.177 For theological ethics, the doctrine of divine providence therefore states that reality does not allow of an autonomous treatment, as if it could exist without its most important formative factor of reality, viz. its continuous relation with the Creator. Human beings should be aware of the fact that acting as if reality is independent of God would harm this world - of which the current ecological crisis could function as an example. So the doctrine of providence warns us to be aware of the fact that we are not the creators of this world but only 'subcreators'.178 It also makes clear that the chaos and disorder, caused by evil and human sin, are not the only factors to be reckoned with. 175 Schöpfung als Anrede, 118. 176 This point is also observed by Christian Herrmann: "Die geschichtliche Wesensdefinition der Schöpfung liegt in dem fortgesetzten Handeln und durchgängigen Voraus Gottes begründet; Schöpfung und Erhaltung sind nicht voneinander zu trennen, sondern ein zusammenhängender Vorgang" ('Gewissheit durch Differenz und Konkretion. Zum Verhältnis von Schöpfung und Erlösung bei Oswald Bayer'. In: ThZ 58 [2002], [114-139] 115). 177 Therefore, Daniel Hardy can describe 'creation' in the simplest terms as "that which keeps the universe from ending and brings it to its end" ('Creation and Eschatology'. In: Gunton, Colin E. [ed.]; The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy. T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997, [105-133] 117). This formula is an expression of what here is called 'divine providence'. 178 As Gunton quotes J.R.R. Tolkien (Gunton, Colin Ε.; Ά far-off gleam of the gospel: salvation in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings'. In: King's Theological Review 12 [1989], 6-10).

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Despite the devastating consequences of evil and human sin, the ordered structure of this universe is not altogether lost. On the contrary, God still upholds reality to allow his creation to live in it. This is the core of the reformational confessions on the doctrine of creation: that I am created by God, and that I am fed and upheld by Him day by day. The perceived order in reality is one of the markers that God still cares for his creation, even though much of this order is hidden by the consequences of sin and evil.179 For social ethics, which is about the social institutions, as Martin Honecker states,180 this confession also implies that the social structures I live in, can be said to be created by God. Oswald Bayer - among others - has made clear that the explanation of the first article of the Apostolic Creed, in Luther's Kleine and Grosse Katechismus, means that not only basic needs are fulfilled by God, but also that the gut Regiment, Friede, Sicherheit belong to this confession of God the Creator.181 So Bayer, explaining Luther's summary of this article, states that: 'The combination of the perfect tense ("has given") and the aorist present tense ("still upholds") is typical of Luther's content of the doctrine of creation, in which creatio and conservatio cannot be distinguished'.182 For Luther, this meant that he could confidently rest on the medieval scheme of the three estates - not as semi-autonomously created, invented, or projected by man, but as three life-forms God continuously bestows upon his creation.183 (2) Secondly, and related to the first point, these created and providentially sustained life-forms are meant as the framework for our living, implying our passivity in this respect. Thus, God deserves all the credit for our existence, not abstractly but in its most concrete form: 179 So Keeling, The Mandate of Heaven, 16: "The positive notion of a 'natural order' was taken into Christian thought under the influence of the Biblical concept of God's care for the creation". 180 Cf. Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, De Gruyter: Berlin 1990, 289: "Sozialethik befasst sich mit den Sozialstrukturen. Ihr Gegenstand sind die sozialen Ordnungen und Gebilde, die Strukturen des Zusammenlebens, die Institutionen" (cf. also 304313). 181 BSLK 510f and 648. 182 " W a s sich im präsentischen Perfekt ('gegeben hat') und aoristischen Präsens (hiermit und jetzt 'noch erhält') unauflöslich zusammenschliesst, kennzeichnet in repräsentativer Weise Luthers Schöpfungsverständnis, in d e m sich 'Schöpfung' (creatio) und 'Erhaltung' (conservatio) nicht unterscheiden lassen" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 101). 183 This will be explained in the next section about the social institutions.

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'No one can uphold "life" himself - for that is included in the word "Creator"'. 184 One might easily ask whether this concept of 'creation' or 'providence' allows man to be free and perform any 'action' at all. The question of freedom is connected to the doctrine of providence in may ways.185 In the next section this point will be elaborated further. 5.4.4 Human Agency and Divine Providence - the Problem of the Institutions One of the problems for divine providence is the relation between human and divine agency. Can man be said to act, if God's providence is confessed? This question is particularly pressing in the field of ethics.186 For without human freedom and responsibility, the whole field of ethics would be rendered superfluous. For reasons of brevity and coherence, I will focus this question on one specific area, confining it to the field of social ethics, to the question whether social institutions (such as state and marriage) are created by God as the life-forms in which our life is best embedded, or human artefacts, alterable where deemed necessary or desirable. 184 "So dass man aus diesem Artikel lerne, dass keiner von uns das Leben noch alles, was jetzt aufgezählt ist und aufgezählt werden kann, von sich selbst hat noch erhalten kann, wie klein und gering es ist. Denn es ist alles einbegriffen in das Wort 'Schöpfer'" (BSLK 648,26-32). 185 Cf. the summarising statement on the relation between freedom and providence: "In der Auseinandersetzung mit philosophischen Konzepten der Lebens- und Geschichtsdeutung sieht sich die theologische Vorsehungslehre mit dem Spannungsverhältnis von Notwendigkeit und Kontingenz konfrontiert. Auf der Ebene des naturhaften Geschehens stellt sich das Problem als Frage nach der ontischen Realität des Zufalls [...], im Kontext der (individuellen wie kollektiven) Geschichte als Frage nach der Realität personaler Freiheit [...]" (Bernhardt, Reinhold; Was heißt 'Handeln Gottes'? Eine Rekonstruktion der Lehre der Vorsehung, Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1999,32f). 186 In advance, one could point at Link's conclusion that Luther's stress on the vita passiva is warrant for human responsibility: "Gott selbst also macht sich für das Sein des Menschen verantwortlich, der nun freilich seinerseits verantwortlich wird für das, was er aus diesem Sein macht. Seine Passivität löscht seine Aktivität nicht aus, sondern begründet und ermöglicht sie neu. So wird er - was ihm von sich her gar nicht möglich wäre! - zur Mitarbeit (cooperatio) an Gottes Schöpfung befähigt" (Link, Christian; 'Vita passiva. Rechtfertigung als Lebenvorgang'. In: EvTh 44 (1984), [315-351] 350).

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The concept of 'institutions' - part of the larger concept of 'social ethics' - is a relatively new topic in theological ethics. Originally, social ethics was developed over against two other concepts: 'personal ethics' and 'social physics'. The former covered an ethics which concentrated on the personal moral choices, whereas the latter covered the sociological attempts to describe society according to its own 'laws', as a kind of physics. In this second concept, the concept of freedom is hardly present, whereas in the first the idea of living in conformity with some kind of given order is lost. 'Social ethics' wants to reinvestigate these two elements. The necessary presupposition for this is that freedom and institution are compatible. 187 In line with this problematic relation between 'freedom' and 'institution' or order, Michael Keeling wrote his monograph on the relation between God's commandment and the natural order. As it is illustrative and paradigmatic for the dilemma this paragraph is devoted to, we will treat Keeling as an example. His book is about the relation between the semi-self-evident, objective order, and the necessity of the momentary, additional aspect of interpretation of that order as God's will or commandment. Keeling argues in favour of the subjective choice necessary to determine what is God's order and what is not, thereby making all the specific elements of objectivity, inherent in doctrines of 'natural law' or 'natural order', ultimately dependent on human choice. 188 The history of the concept of social order, especially since the Enlightenment, asserts clearly that the social order is changeable after all, and that human action - in both in interpreting and doing - makes all the difference.189 The problem with Keeling's description is the potential conflictual opposition between divine and human action, and between human

187 Cf. Huber, Wolfgang; 'Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit'. In: Huber, Wolfgang; Folgen christlicher Freiheit. Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im Horizont der Barmer Theologischen Erklärung, Neukirchener Verlag: NeukirchenVluyn 1983, [113-127] 113-116. 188 Cf. Keeling, The Mandate of Heaven, 22: "This brings us back to 'situation ethics'. For with all the information which the world can provide about how human beings work, think and love, and how the world around them is ordered, and all the agreement w e can find about general moral principles, the specific human act always depends upon a specific human decision, and this is always taken in a moment which brings us under the possibility of judgement". 189 E.g. Keeling, The Mandate of Heaven, 54.57.98f.170f.

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freedom and steadfast institutions. Within the Lutheran tradition, this dilemma is solved to some degree. In the Augsburg Confession, it is stated that the politia and all political ordinances are 'created by God and instituted'.190 Hereby, the orders of family, work, economy, law and justice, society and state, and even the Church, are traced back to God's ordering activity. Along the same lines, Bonhoeffer wrote about the four 'mandates' of Church, family and marriage, culture (labour), and government.191 He insisted on their being instituted by God, so concentrating more on God's ordering activity than on the results we experience. The same aspect is stressed by Hartmut Rosenau who - in describing the problems attendant to the term 'creation-order' - outlines a more sapiential use of this term along the lines of Augustine's De ordine. The concept of creation-order is about the fundamental relation between human beings as created, and God who creates them. This relation is the criterion 'for the observance, reception, and formation of social order'.192 Thus, the doctrine of creation, as outlined above, provides the possible elements for developing a concept of 'creation-orders' in which the ordering activity of God is still present. Out of these 190 "Von Polizei und weltlichem Regiment wird gelehret, dass alle Obrigkeit in der Welt und geordente Regiment und Gesetze gute Ordnung, von Gott geschaffen und eingesetzt seind" (BSLK 70,9-13; lat: 'bona opera Dei'). 191 "Unter 'Mandat' verstehen wir den konkreten in der Christusoffenbarung begründeten und durch die Schrift bezeugten göttlichen Auftrag, die Ermächtigung und Legitimierung zur Ausrichtung eines bestimmten göttlichen Gebotes, die Verleihung göttlicher Autorität an eine irdische Instanz" (Bonhoeffer, Dietrich; Ethik [DBW 6], Kaiser/ Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 21998, 392f). According to Bonhoeffer, he could have used the word 'Ordnung' "nur dass ihm die Gefahr innewohnt, den Blick stärker auf das Zuständliche der Ordnung als auf die die Ordnung allein begründende göttliche Ermächtigung, Legitimierung, Autorisierung zu richten" (393). 192 "[D]er Akzent [liegt] nicht auf der Herleitung und inhaltichen Festschreibung historisch gegebener (und dann auch immer in ihrem Geltungsanspruch strittiger und unter Umständen ideologieverdächtiger) Ordnungsgefüge. Vielmehr geht es um das Grundverhältnis des Menschen als Geschöpf zu Gott dem Schöpfer als Kriterium für die Wahrnehmung, Übernahme und Gestaltung sozialer Ordnung" (Rosenau, 'Schöpfungsordnung', 357). This points at the quandary of elaborating concrete life-forms as 'creation-orders' (Rosenau, Hartmut; 'Die Ordnungen der Schöpfung - zwischen Ideologie und Weisheit'. In: Stock, Konrad (Hrsg.); Zeit und Schöpfung, Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1997, [91-113] 93f).

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orderings, ethical demands arise. On this point, the metaphor of 'address' arises, as if creation 'addresses' us.193 This address, however, cannot be said to be univocally 'good' or unambiguously perceived, so here the consequences of our hamartiological considerations have to be borne in mind.194 The confessional point of view, without which the doctrine of creation as a whole is inconceivable and a forteriori any concept of creation-orders is rendered superfluous, makes clear that to express one's faith in the Creator guides perception of reality; to confess God's providential care for, and maintenance of his creation also guides the interpretation of the whole of created reality in order to find the structures of life in which life is best lived. This is the way in which the concept of creation orders has been recently advocated, in line with the Old-Testament 'sapiential' structures.195 We now turn to the question with which Keeling's exposition left us: how can the imposition of any order by the Creator leave space for man to live and be responsible? For most of the resistance against the concept of creation orders of divine origin is felt because of the imposition of these orders on man which arguably prevent him from acting freely. The formation of one's life is considered to be a duty and responsibility of man, not to be interfered with by God's ordering activity. At stake is the concept of human freedom. Those whose concern is the preservation of freedom criticise the institutions for their lack of freedom, whereas, from within the institutions the criticism is voiced that this concern for freedom is mistaken. This mutual criticism reinforces the common idea that institution and freedom are incompatible. 196

193 Cf. Bayer, Schöpfung als Anrede, passim; and the definition of Trutz Rendtorff: "Als Schöpfungsordnungen gelten ethische Strukturen, die den Menschen durch ihre positive, bestimmte und tatsächliche Verfasstheit in Anspruch nehmen" (Rendtorff, Trutz; Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie [Bd. I], Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 2 1990,125). 194 Cf. Rendtorff: "Wenn der ethische Sinn des Menschen durch Sünde korrumpiert ist, dann betrifft diese Korruption auch die Versuche einer Wesensbestimmung des Sittlichen. Die Verbindlichkeiten der Welt als guter Schöpfung Gottes müssen dem Menschen deshalb als äussere Ordnung, als positive, gesetzte Ordnung entgegentreten" (Rendtorff, Ethik 1,125). 195 Cf. Rosenau, 'Die Ordnungen der Schöpfung', 96-99; Brown, The Ethos of the Cosmos, 271-317. 196 Thus concludes Wolfgang Huber: "Der Abschied von den Institutionen im Namen der Freiheit und die Kritk der Freiheit im Namen der Institutionen entsprechen

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Both Colin Gunton and Oswald Bayer make clear that their theology is deeply influenced by the problem of human freedom. They both advocate a way diametrically opposed to the usual, Enlightenment concepts of freedom. In those Enlightenment concepts, freedom is only real if it gives man the possibility to create ex nihilo the form of action he chooses. 197 Over against this concept, Bayer and Gunton among others - conceive of freedom as the given possibility in time and space to act. This concept is compatible with the doctrine of creation outlined above; indeed, it assumes the doctrine as a basic premise. For simple observations of human creativity make clear that human actions are not totally 'free' in the absolute sense in which God's creative actions are understood to be. As Brian Home comments: "Here we see the importance of stressing what at first sight seems so obvious a proposition that it appears banal to state it: that we cannot, in the strict sense, create anything out of nothing."198 Moreover, the character of human freedom is positively tied up with the concept of creation. As Christoph Schwöbel notes: "Finite, created freedom is the freedom which is a gift of God the Creator, freedom which is passively constituted for the human agent and dependent for its exercise on this passive constitution."199 Schwöbel makes clear that the necessary prerequisites for exercising freedom and responsibility are continuous orders of creation, for without the stability implied, neither human intentions nor actions could be possible: "The relative constancy of the contingent order of creation, the gift maintained in the faithful giving of the Creator, is in this way understood as the ground of the possibility of human freedom and responsibility."200

197 198

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einander. Denn beide behaupten sie, dass zwischen Freiheit und Institution eine prinzipielle Differenz besteht, dass sie miteinander unvereinbar sind" ('Freiheit und Institution', 116). Gunton, Colin E.; 'God, Grace and Freedom'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in historical and systematic theology, Edinburgh 1995, [119-133] 119. Home, Brian; 'Divine and Human Creativity'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy. T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997, [135-147] 146. Schwöbel, Christoph; 'God, Creation and the Christian Community: The Dogmatic Basis of a Christian Ethic of Createdness'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, Edinburgh 1997, [149-176] 167. Schwöbel, 'God, Creation and the Christian Community', 168.

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In conclusion, we can state that within their argument, in line with Gunton's and Bayer's theology, the doctrine of creation and the concept of created life-forms which guide human action are not contradictory to human freedom and responsibility, but are the indispensable ingredients for it. So the concept of creation forms the basic assumption underlying any human action. So the usually problematic concept of social institutions can be defended as far as the theoretical objections with respect to human freedom are concerned. There remains the practical question remains of the extent to which we can actually perceive real 'orders' as created by God, the observance of which is healthy for man and the whole of creation. Oswald Bayer staunchly advocates the concept of the three estates, taken from Luther and his medieval predecessors: Church (ecclesia), family and work (oeconomia) and the state (politia).201 Though its roots can be criticised for being contingently historical, it has been recently rediscovered as containing some potential for discernment within the current, so-called 'post-modern' context of theological ethics. Bernd Wannenwetsch uses Bayer's re-discovery of the three estates to challenge the current classification of ethics.202 As no classification is neutral, Wannenwetsch criticises the division of ethics into seemingly non-related fields of action, each of which is provided with its own 'ethic'. 203 Examples of such fields could be: economics, labour, medicine, sexuality, and family - each with their own ethic: economic ethics, medical ethics, sexual ethics, and family ethics. The problem with this division is that each of the fields stands alone, seemingly without connection to the other fields of action. Wannenwetsch elaborates the example of 'sexual ethics' in order to come to the 201 Bayer, Oswald; Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1995,116-146. 202 Wannenwetsch, Bernd; 'Wovon handelt die "materielle Ethik"? Oder: warum die Ethik der elementaren Lebensformen ("Stände") einer "Bereichsethik" vorzuziehen ist. Oswald Bayer zum sechzigsten Geburtstag'. In: Fritzsche, A. (Hg.); Kirche(n) und Gesellschaft [Ökumenische Sozialethik 3], München 2000, 95-136. 203 Martin Honecker advocates the solution for the same problem in a totally different way (Einfihrung in die Theologische Ethik, 314-326). Following an interpretation of Luther's distinction of Law and Gospel, he advocates a relative autonomy of institutions - both from one another and from God. This autonomy is not absolute. It is not clear, however, what criterion Honecker has to apply in order to determine the relativity of this autonomy.

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conclusion that there are important presuppositions playing a part here. According to Wannenwetsch, sexual ethics is a coercively separated part of the whole of 'family ethics'. To distinguish a separate sexual ethics is to detach the 'sexual aspect' of human behaviour from the relations and even from the created and given life-forms in which human sexuality can be (or has to be) lived. This distinction is traced back to its basic assumption, in which the inner logic of each field is reduced to its proper 'functionality': 'As "sexually indigent" beings, the sexually mature human being has a natural right and - if we look at the popular psychological talk about 'sickening abstinence' - in the face of one's psychological health even the duty to be genitally active'. The life-forms and social relations only appear in the context of the functioning of a 'healthy' sex-life.204 Such a functional logic can lead to the treatment of 'marriage' as one form within a broader horizon of 'partner-ethics'. In his critique of this 'functionality'-apprach, Wannenwetsch falls back on Luther's doctrine of the three estates. According to him, these estates are not to be interpreted as the medieval division of society but as the 'paradigmatic life-relations of human beings as God's creatures'.205 Wannenwetsch uses the word 'life-forms' to indicate these 'creation-orders' in order to avoid the usual connotations. He insists on the constitutive relation between God's creative Word and these lifeforms, connecting them as he does, with the doctrine of the sacraments. As Bayer indicates, the necessary connection between 'element' and 'institution' - stemming from Luther's reflection on the Lord's Supper is also applicable here: God's word is decisive. The Lutheran connection between the sacraments and the life-forms gives Bayer and Wannenwetsch the opportunity to restate the interpretation of the word institutio. In this word, the promissional character of God's creative Word is present, by which He creates life and its forms with 204 "Als 'sexuelles Bedürfniswesen' hat der geschlechtsreife Mensch ein natürliches Recht und - so scheint es angesichts psychologischer Popularismen von 'krank machender Abstinenz' - auch die mindestens seiner psychischen Gesundheit geschuldete Pflicht zur genitalen Aktivität" (Wannenwetsch, 'Wovon handelt die materielle Ethik?', 105). 205 "Hier sind nicht die sozialen Schichtungen einer ständischen Gesellschaft wie der des Mittelalters angesprochen, sondern die paradigmatischen Lebensverhältnisse der Menschen als Gottes Geschöpfe" (Wannenwetsch, 'Wovon handelt die materielle Ethik?', 123).

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which man is graciously bestowed. Such highly sophisticated use of the concept of God's creating Word - connecting the doctrine of creation, justification, the sacraments, and theological ethics - could easily lead to the suspicion that reality itself is 'sanctified'. Everything we perceive is God's creation and therefore sacrosanct. Luther himself avoided this consequence by the distinction between 'holy7 and 'blessed' (heilig and selig). The life-forms make people's lives 'holy', although not everyone who observes God's life-forms is thereby blessed with eternal life.206 Bayer, therefore, distinguishes between the 'estates' as observed by those who believe and those who do not believe in God as their Creator: 'To observe the power of the creating and forgiving words of God within the estates, and to believe them, one is in need of some kind of rebirth, a renaissance by God.' 207 The life-forms of ecclesia, oeconomia and politia are for Wannenwetsch the 'heuristic' tools for the treatment of social ethics. Only by using this triad is the connection between the seemingly distinct and neutral life-forms themselves, and between the Creator and his creatures, taken seriously. Thus it is possible for social ethics to really be social ethics.208 The doctrine of creation provides us with a concept of God's creative speech, which institutes not only the life of the individual but also the life-forms in which this life takes place. The Lutheran triad of estates is the reformational form of doing 'social ethics'. 209 As such, this doctrine is far more important than the widely treated Ζwei-Reiche-

206 "Selig werden wir allein durch Christus, heilig aber sowohl durch diesen Glauben als auch durch diese göttlichen Stifte und Orden. Es können auch Gottlose gewiss viel Heiliges haben, sind aber darum nicht selig drin" (Luther, WA 26, 505,18-21; quotation in Wannenwetsch, 'Wovon handelt die materielle Ethik?', 128). This is in line with Wilhelm Maurer's observations that the doctrine of the three estates belongs to the 'law' and not to the 'gospel' - to use the characteristic Lutheran distinction (Luthers Lehre von den drei Hierarchien und ihr mittelalterlicher Hintergrund, Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: München 1974,3). 207 "Um die Kraft des schaffenden und vergebenden Wortes Gottes in den Ständen zu erkennen und zu glauben, ist nicht weniger als eine Wiedergeburt nötig, eine von Gott bewirkte Renaissance [...]" (Schöpfung als Anrede, 57; cf. 66.178). 208 "Erst dieser Bezug auf die verbindlichen Lebensformen macht die Ethik zur Sozialethik" (Wannenwetsch, 'Wovon handelt die materielle Ethik?', 132). 209 Cf. Honecker, Martin; 'Von der Dreiständelehre zur Bereichsethik. Zu den Grundlagen der Sozialethik'. In: ZEE 43 (1999) [262-276] 263.

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Lehre.2W The historical background of this doctrine of the three estates is disputed. Wilhelm Maurer's much cited study traces Luther's three estates back to Luther's use of the contemporary explanation of the fourth211 commandment, which was coloured by the late-medieval social order. Maurer wants to show how, under Aristotelian influence, this doctrinal schema became the normative pattern for society.212 Nevertheless, Maurer has to admit that the threefold platonic distinction between Lehr-, Wehr- and Nährstand can be said to crop up in many different ways in late-medieval society. Thus, Maurer construes a colourful doctrine of a threefold pattern in society, coinciding with many other contemporary threefold distinctions which were reinterpreted under Aristotelian influences. With respect to these influences, he has to state, however, that Aristotelism never appeared in 'pure' form. This caused a mixing of Aristotelian, platonic and Christian elements concerning the ordering of society.213 However, Maurer's conclusion that Luther's use of these three orders should be reduced to some theoretical late-medieval 'amalgam' of platonic, Aristotelian and Christian elements, seems not altogether convincing. This would imply that these orders are bound to the historical context in which Luther appropriated them. There is, however, another solution for the question of how Luther's three estates should be interpreted, given by Reinhard Schwarz.214 He provides us with elaborate evidence that the three estates are not some given reality but the repeatedly instituted and ordered activity of the Creator God, and the word Stand is not a static concept but the point where one actually 'stands' in society.215 That those Stände are not static can be shown by providing the evidence of the specific reformational changes given to this concept, in which, for 2 1 0 So Honecker, 'Von der Dreiständelehre zur Bereichsethik', 153f; Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 121. 211 The fourth commandment, in the counting of the Lutheran and Roman-Catholic Churches: "Honour your father and your mother, so that you may live long in the land the LORD your God is giving to y o u " (Exodus 20,12). 212 "Die Dreiständelehre entwickelt sich unter aristotelischem Einfluss aus einer Beschreibung zu einer allgemeinen normativen Soziallehre" (Maurer, Luthers Lehre von den drei Hierarchien, 121). 213 Cf. Maurer, Luthers Lehre von den drei Hierarchien, 122. 214 Schwarz, Reinhard; 'Luthers Lehre von den drei Ständen und die drei Dimensionen der Ethik'. In: Lu] 45 (1978), 15-34. 215 Schwarz, 'Luthers Lehre von den drei Ständen', 17f.

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instance, the sociological borders of the priestly estate were done away with. 216 According to Schwarz, the doctrine of the three estates Luther uses stemmed from the traditional, Aristotelian pattern for ethical theory: ethica oeconomica, ethica politica, and individual ethics (ethica monastica). This common pattern is seen in many late 15th century ethical treatises.217 Schwarz concludes: 'Late-medieval moral philosophy was developed by using the threefold dimension of individual ethics, the household-ethics as well as of political ethics.' 218 If we follow Schwarz's interpretation, Luther's threefold distinction is not altogether outdated, as if he based it on contemporary society in its actual appearance. It is more in line with Wannenwetsch's use of it, in which the social division in three 'estates' is paralleled by a religious division in two dimensions: one of belief and one of unbelief, 219 and the 'estates' are considered to have hermeneutical, theoretical significance, rather than to be concrete empirical facts.220 As Honecker observes, the division of the field of social ethics by Schleiermacher is almost identical with that of Luther, for Schleiermacher divided between political community (state), religious community (Church), and the household. Furthermore, Schleiermacher saw a fourth area emerging in

216 This is described by Gerhard Müller by emphasizing Luther's convictions about the doctrine of divine Beruf and consequently the estate of the Haus ('Biblische Theologie und Sozialethik. Zum Denken Martin Luthers'. In: EvTh 59 [1999] [25-31] 26f). 217 Schwarz, 'Luthers Lehre von den drei Ständen', 21-32. 218 "[D]ie spätmittelalterliche Moralphilosophie [entfaltete] sich in den drei Dimensionen der Individualethik, der Hausstandsethik sowie der politischen Ethik [...]" (Schwarz, 'Luthers Lehre von den drei Ständen', 32). 219 This is the doctrine of the two Kingdoms [Regimente], Cf. Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 122f: "Weder die Zwei-Regimente-Lehre noch die Dreiständelehre darf auf Kosten der jeweils andern in Anspruch genommen werden. Eine Bezugnahme auf Luther muss, jedenfalls in einem Minimum, der erstaunlichen Beweglichkeit entsprechen, in der Luther die Akzente seiner Schriftauslegung als Gewissensunterweisung in konkreter Situation setzte und auch wieder verlagerte - einer Beweglichkeit, der auch die Art und Weise entspricht, in der er sich einmal im Schema der Unterscheidung der beiden Regimente, dann wieder in der Unterscheidung der drei Stände bewegt, oft aber die eine Unterscheidung mit der andern verschränkt". 220 This is misunderstood by Martin Honecker who, though using the analysis of Reinhard Schwarz, still conceives the estates as real empirical entities which have changed in modern social constellations (Honecker, 'Von der Dreiständelehre zur Bereichsethik', 266f).

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his age, and consequently he discerned the field of 'science' as a separate field of action.221 Honecker's remarks strengthen our case, that the three estates of Luther, in their reinterpretation by Wannenwetsch, serve as an example of a conceptualisation of the field of theological ethics which is closely connected to the doctrine of creation advocated in this chapter. 222 Theological ethics has, among other things, the duty to interpret the field of action and develop interpretation-patterns. 223 In the next chapter, we will elaborate Wannenwetsch's concept of the three estates in its concrete application of the doctrine of creation within theological ethics to the case of 'marriage'. Can theological ethics, conceived along the lines of Bayer and Wannenwetsch - that is, starting from a doctrine of creation which is concerned with the actual creating (and thereby sustaining) Word of God - lead to a new and useful insight into the topic of 'marriage'?

5.4.5 Conclusions The doctrine of creation, advocated in this section, broadens its horizons from the exclusive attention paid to the origin of the world towards its historical features. 'Creation' ( c r e a t u r a ) as we perceive it, is still being called 'creation' for legitimate reasons. To bring the doctrine of divine providence under the heading of the doctrine of creation is the explicit confession that God's creative activity is not confined to 221 Honecker, 'Von der Dreiständelehre zur Bereichsethik', 269: "Die Güterlehre tritt bei Schleiermacher an die Stelle der Dreiständelehre". 222 Contra Honecker's application [i.e. transformation] of the concept of the three estates in the modern version of it as 'Bereichsethik' which is a part of some late-modern Enlightenment project: "Bereichsethik nimmt [...] den Anspruch einer aufgeklärten Ethik auf, universale Verständigung und vernünftige Evidenz zu erreichen" (Honecker, 'Von der Dreiständelehre zur Bereichsethik', 272f). Cf. the critical remarks on the topic of 'Bereichsethik' by Wannenwetsch ('Wovon handelt die materielle Ethik?', passim). 223 So also the Roman-Catholic author Günter Wilhelms: "Die Ethik, in Gestalt der Sozialethik, hat immer wieder Ordnungsmodelle zu entwickeln, die auf die gesellschaftlichen Probleme zugeschnitten sein müssen, Modelle für ein vernünftiges und gerechtes Miteinander von Individuum und Gesellschaft" (Wilhelms, Günter; Die Ordnung modemer Gesellschaft. Gesellschaftstheorie und christliche Sozialethik im Dialog, Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 1996,22).

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some deistic conception of the Watchmaker leaving his creation to slowly unwind, ticking away merrily. The loyalty of the triune God to his creation is part of His intended plan for it. That loyalty makes it reasonable that God leads this reality towards some goal.224 At this point, we may look to the concept of 'covenant'. For this concept does pay tribute to the historical sequence necessary to prevent 'creation' from being confined to its original creatio ex nihilo. It covers both the divine, providential sustenance and eschatological goal intended: "From a Reformed covenantal perspective [...] creation order is constant but not static."225 The main problem concerning the relation between creation and providence with respect to theological ethics and social theory is, to what extent the currently perceived structures and 'orders' can be said to be God's creation or human artefacts. Bayer's and Wannenwetsch's effort to reinvestigate Luther's doctrine of the three estates allow us to avoid weaknesses of the current treatment of theological ethics within the so-called Bereichsethik. Within this context, the doctrine of the three estates can be used as an inherited instrument from a theological tradition, with regard to the interpretation of the field of ethics. The passive constitution of man does not deprive him of the alleged dignity of choice and action - on the contrary. The anti-Enlightenment concept of freedom is of great help here. It stems from the doctrine of creation in which it is part of God's providential care for his creatures that He provides them with the time and space in which to be free. So human action is totally human, and at the same time provided by God. 224 This is in line with what Zacharias Ursinus wrote on providence as creationis continuatio which means "dat men de schepping niet kan begrijpen wanneer niet ook tegelijkertijd aandacht wordt besteed aan de voorzienigheid" (Hartogh, G. den; Voorzienigheid in donker licht. Herkamst en gebruik van het begrip 'Providentia Dei' in de reformatorische theologie, in het bijzonder bij Zacharias Ursinus, Groen: Heerenveen 1999, 76). 225 Bartholomew, Craig; 'Covenant and Creation. Covenant Overload or Covenantal Deconstruction'. In: CTJ 30 (1995), (11-33) 32. That is also the conclusion of Van Egmond en Van der Kooi: Creation ordinances "exist for the sake of the covenant. That is their value. And therin lies their relativity" (Egmond, A. van; Kooi, C. van der; 'The Appeal to Creation Ordinances: A Changing Tide'. In: Schrotenboer, P.G. [e.a.]; God's Order for Creation [Wetenskaplike Bydraes van die PU vir CHO, Reeks F], Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys: Potchefstroom 1994, [16-33] 33; Egmond, A. van; Kooi, C. van der; 'Het beroep op scheppingsordeningen. Een wisselend getijde'. In: Egmond, A. van; Heilzaam geloof. Verzamelde artikelen bzorgd door D. van Keulen en C. van der Kooi, Kok: Kampen 2001, [157-172] 172).

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Though the orders that are assumed by Bayer and Wannenwetsch (ιecclesia, oeconomia, and politia) are not compelling as the only tool to interpret society, they are not to be considered as merely residual inheritance from medieval society. They form a valid hermeneutical instrument distinguishing three aspects of human society and (which is even more important) providing us with the possibility of relating the different parts of this field. The most severe critique of the concept of creation-order, however conceived and developed, is its assumed 'conservative' character. The mandates or orders are said to be used by the dominant elite. It was able to use (or rather: abuse) its authority to impose the status quo on its subjects. So, the orders or mandates refer to some historic origin, pleasing to the happy few, instead of being intended for all those who are taken up into the eschatological goal the Creator has in mind for the whole of created reality.

5.5 Creation and Eschatology In Christian ethics, the distinction between conservative and eschatological ethics is a persistent one.226 This distinction is closely linked to the one between creation and eschatology, for to stress the importance of the concept of creation almost inevitably seems to lead to some kind of conservative ethics, and to conceive reality in terms of the future or God's plan and goal mostly results in some kind of eschatological ethics of a radical and progressive kind. In the topic of eschatology, the question of the balance between human and divine agency reocurrs. To the extent that man supplies his very own life he is also able to create his own telos and future.227 Only the triune God who

226 For a historical survey, see Frey, Christofer; 'Eschatology and Ethics. Their Relation in Recent Continental Protestantism'. In: Reventlow, Henning Graf (ed.); Eschatology in the Bible and in Jewish and Christian Tradition [JSOT.S 243], Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1997, 62-74. For a systematic account of the dilemma, cf. e.g. Trillhaas, Wolfgang; Ethik, De Gruyter: Berlin Π970, 4-10; Rendtorff, Ethik I, 176-181. Rendtorff downplays some very stringent oppositions of the two alternatives, whereas Trillhaas is more inclined to uphold the differences. 227 For an eloquent explication of this point of view, cf. Riessen, Jan van; Verlangen naar God in een vertaten cultuur. Proeve van een sceptische theologie, Meinema: Zoetermeer

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said "Let there be..." is the One who in the end can say as well: "I am making everything new" (Revelation 21,5).228 Taking one's starting-point in the doctrine of God means that, according to Oswald Bayer, eschatology and providence are in accord.229 Nevertheless, in the words of Colin Gunton, man is bound to act responsibly following his duty to preserve this earth and offer it back to its Creator. Though this responsibility is true, it is the point of Jesus' life and office to promise us God's eschatological Kingdom, present to us through this promise, which takes away the ultimate responsibility of humankind for the world's future. Our comments on the eschatological aspect of the relation between creation and ethics will be sorted out in this direction. We turn first to the question of the continuity or discontinuity between 'creation' and 'eschaton'. We will see that the dilemma itself is bound to some specific concept of 'creation' in which the dilemma can easily be raised, and which can be solved by considering 'eschatology' more as a legitimate aspect of the present which qualifies it (5.5.2 and 5.5.2). In the last subsection, the consequences of these deliberations for the concept of 'order' will be discussed (5.5.3). 5.5.1 Continuity and Discontinuity The importance of the distinction between 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' between 'creation' and 'eschaton', with respect to the proper weight and place of social structures, and thereby for human responsibility in action and preservation or continuation of 'creation', is unquestionable.

1998, 138-154. Van Riessen's consequent sceptical approach, however, tends to deny the need for a Christian attempt to observe reality as God's creation. 228 Hans Ulrich wrote his book on 'eschatology and ethics' as an attempt to survey the relation between the two both historically (theology after Schleiermacher) and systematically. Systematically, the questions can be summarised in the doctrine of God: many aspects of this topic come together " w o die theologische Aufgabe gestellt ist, von Gott als d e m zu sprechen, der endgültig a m Menschen handelt, der dem Menschen in seinem Handeln zuvorkommt und der ihm so Glauben und Hoffnung gibt und ihn darin bewahrt" (Ulrich, Hans G.; Eschatologie und Ethik. Die theologische Theorie der Ethik in ihrer Beziehung auf die Rede von Gott seit Friedrich Schleiermacher [BevTh 104], Kaiser Verlag: München 1988,16). 229 Schöpfung als Anrede, 140-154.

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To put the question as boldly as possible: does not the New Testament as a whole incontestably lay stress on the eschatological point of view which puts the past and present into perspective? Even if we confine ourselves to the significance of the dilemma for theological ethics, there is a lot of material, for the discussion about this topic is a vast and complicated one. As Douglas J. Schuurman in his monograph on the topic observed, the biblical narrative which is structured from creation, fall, redemption, to eschatological consummation, is itself a sign of a complicated relation between creation and eschatology, which is immediately reflected in theological ethics: "It is no small task to sort out what aspects of creation should be envisioned as perduring into this fallen world, on the one hand, or as surviving into the eschaton, on the other. Discernment in these matters, however, is important for determining the religious value of the social order, and the principles which should guide moral stance toward and actions within the orders." 2 3 0 The relation between 'creation' and 'eschaton' is often framed in terms of 'within or beyond history 7 . That is: does the eschaton take place in history, or is it something which abrogates history in order to establish the new creation? This relates to the place assigned to Jesus Christ. Did He come to restore what was fallen and to point to the eschaton that is still to come - or did He inaugurate the new creation and in persona bring the Kingdom of God? 2 3 1 This is important, for instance, in the discussion on the use of 'violence'. To put it boldly: if the Kingdom is still to come, the orders of creation are somewhat Notordnungen, to which we have to surrender our own intentions, implying that the use of violence is permitted if necessary. If the Kingdom has been brought to us in Jesus Christ, the orders of creation are already transformed accordingly, so that we have to follow His example, not using violence but living according to ontology of peace. 232 At this point, the old opposition between Reformed and Anabaptist emerges again. The Reformed are traditionally more inclined to let 230 Schuurman, Douglas J.; Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics. The Ethical Significance of the Creation-Eschaton Relation in the Thought ofEmil Brunner and Jürgen Moltmann, Lang: N e w York 1991, 5. 231 Cf. Murphy/Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 97.165f.192.237f. 232 Cf. for an account of the relevance of such an 'ontology of peace' and the consequences for science and ethics: Milbank, Theology and Social Theory.

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'creation' outweigh 'eschaton', whereas the Anabaptist are more concerned with the realisation of the 'eschaton' at the expense of created reality.233 Another attempt to frame this point becomes clear when looking at a recent debate. In 1995, a debate concerning the relation between creation and eschatology took place in the Calvin Theological Journal. Involved were Lee Hardy234, Miroslav Volf235, and Douglas J. Schuurman.236 The point under consideration was: can our human work be said to gain its significance from the eschatological purpose to which God is directing us? Or is the continuity between this created world (including human artefacts) and the world to come so important that God's eschaton in fact is "parasitic"237 on the protological in that the eschaton is nothing more than the restoration of creation to its "originally intended condition"238? The debate is of interest, because the positions taken by the participants allow us to get an overview of the questions and interests involved in the material. Schuurman is the most outspoken - though not exclusively restorationist239, in that redemption and eschaton are only necessary to

233 Cf. for an overview of this dilemma: Haas, Guenther; 'The Effects of the Fall on Creational Social Structures: A Comparison of Anabaptist and Reformed Perspectives'. In: CT/ 30 (1995) 108-129. Haas comes to the conclusion that the Biblical evidence makes clear that the institutions are for the benefit and wellbeing of human beings. To ignore them in favour of the eschatological relativization in a "denunciation of the social order as a universal social ethic" "reflects an improper understanding of the Fall and its impact upon Creation, and it incorporates an unbiblical dualism into one's social ethic" (129). I would complete his argument by not only pointing at the doctrine of sin, in which the institutions prevent the Fallen creation from falling into complete decay, but to the full doctrine of creation in which the institutions function as the positive, God-given life-forms. 234 Hardy, Lee; Review of: Volf, Miroslav; Work in the Spirit. Toward a New Theology of Work, Oxford University Press: New York 1991. In: CTJ 28 (1993) 191-196. 235 Volf, Miroslav; 'Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics'. In: CTJ 30 (1995) 130-143. Cf. Volf, Miroslav; Work in the Spirit, Oxford University Press: New York 1991. 236 Schuurman, Douglas J.; 'Creation, Eschaton, and Social Ethics: A Response to Volf'. In: CT/30 (1995) 144-158. 237 So Lee described the opinion of Volf (Lee, 'Review', 195). 238 Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 165. 239 For Schuurman also pleads for some "relative discontinuity between creation and eschaton within this emphasis upon continuity" (Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 161f).

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restore the devastating consequences of sin.240 As the social structure in its "personal, impersonal, limiting, opening, authoritative, and communal qualities" was rightly ordered in creation, "so too in their fallen state all these qualities have become distorted". Therefore, "creation and eschatology ought not to direct Christian social ethics to value any one of these qualities over the other or to disvalue some of these qualities of social life as per se corrupt and corrupting. Instead it should alert ethics to the distorted and distorting forms of each of these qualities as they appear under sin, and to the fitting forms of each of them as they appear under creation and eschaton". 241 According to Volf, this approach leads to the negation of either creation or eschaton. For if the eschaton is the mere restoration of God's creational intentions, overcoming the consequences of evil and human guilt, the historical process of creation after the fall becomes redundant, so that eventually "[ejither eschatology or protology become redundant in social ethics. Everything that you find in eschatology you will find in protology and vice versa". 242 In other words: the continuity between creation and eschaton which is characteristic of Schuurman's view makes the positive contribution of human and world history redundant, whereas Volfs eschatological "primacy" - which is explicitly "not monopoly" - advocates the view that creation and eschaton are "partly continuous": "The eschaton is not a radically new creation but a transformation of the present creation". 243 Hardy, in turn, takes some kind of 'middle position'. According to him, neither eschatology nor creation should be called 'primary 7 : "Why [...] not maintain that a truly comprehensive theology of work would have to consider the phenomenon of human labour in the light of all three doctrines - Creation, Fall, and Redemption?" 244 This debate makes clear that different opinions are held on the problem of the relation of continuity and discontinuity between creation and eschaton. For if someone advocates the existence of some 240 Cf. also the view of W.H. Velema ('Schepping en verlossing', 94: "Eschatologisch is er tussen schepping en verlossing een eenheid"). 'Verlossing' (redemption) is here synonym for 'eschatology'. 241 Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 165f. Schuurman positively uses the term 'restorationist' (170). 242 Volf, 'Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics', 137. 243 Volf, 'Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics', 137f. 244 Hardy, 'Review', 195.

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social order in the pre-lapsarian creation (e.g. the Garden of Eden), the question arises to what extent this order prevails after the fall, let alone the question to what degree this order can be said to be upheld in the new creation, in the eschaton. Schuurman advocates a proposal in which the continuity of the created order prevails, instead of the discontinuity. 245 Along the lines of some Dutch (partly Neo-Calvinist) theologians, Schuurman advocates the schema of the biblical-narrative of 'creation-fall-reconciliation-consummation'. 246 Schuurman does not make clear, however, why he chooses to accentuate continuity, whereas Volf chooses a 'partly continuous' relation consequent on the New Testament terminology of 'transformation'. In order to distinguish between the two concepts, we have to consider the right definition of 'creation' and the doctrine of creation. This chapter makes clear that the word 'creation' is not confined to the origin of the world and its order, but that it designates the whole of the created reality, including the historical processes it passes through and the goal to which God is directing it. If the historical component is included and elaborated systematically within the doctrine of creation, many of the seemingly opposed views on the relation between creation and eschaton disappear. If we take the history of creation to be a constitutive part of the doctrine of creation, the eschatological goal is not so opposed to its starting-point - at least no more so than any starting-point is to the intended goal. Because the doctrine of creation outlined here is one in which the main Actor is the Creator Himself, the continuity between this world and the world to come depends on Him and His action. The continuity is warranted by God, and is not some habitual characteristic of reality in itself.247 This view of the doctrine of creation can help us with respect to the ethical evaluation of the 'social orders'. According to Schuurman, "[t]he orders, as part of the works of God, are to be valued positively insofar as they reflect and anticipate the patterns of rightly ordered relationships depicted in creation and eschaton". 248 These orders are for the most part continuous with God's eschatological goal. The only discontinuity Schuurman wants to acknowledge is the discontinuity in 245 Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 9. 246 Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 11 n. 14 and 153 n. 5. 247 The concept of God's perpetual giving, constituting reality by giving Himself is elaborated by Daniel H a r d y ('Creation and Eschatology', 105-133). 248 Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, 166.

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terms of the "insufficiency of creation to overcome sin": "Though creation perdures within a fallen world and so is not utterly destroyed by it, a special and new act of God is necessary. This 'act' is the order of redemption whose centre is the death and resurrection of Christ, and whose goal is the new creation, transformed and purged of sin and its effects."249 The alleged 'insufficiency of creation to overcome sin' is evidence for some specific definition of 'creation' by Schuurman, i.e. as the static, once-and-for-all created material and order which is viewed as at least (and perhaps unconsciously) semi-independent from its Creator who sustains His creation. Thus, Schuurman's 'creation' is to be sharply discerned from the providentially lead, historic creatura as advocated in this chapter. According to Schuurman, the orders are 'created orders'. Therefore no messianic or redemptive powers should be ascribed to them which themselves are in need of redemption and consummation.250 This view of social institutions and orders, adopted by Schuurman, is helpful to ensure that no soteriological qualifications become attached to them which could lead to the sanctification of the existing order, as if they, apart from redemption through the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, could redeem and save mankind. On the other hand, the relation between creation and providence is not taken into account in this view. If the creation-orders are seen as the providential means by which God sustains life and gives us His life-forms and through which He leads creation towards its intended eschatological goal, the social order can be viewed as the redemptive created means by which God is able to sustain our life in a world after the fall, and to establish life as He intended. Thus, we can conclude that the doctrine of creation developed above implies the end of the opposition between 'creation' and 'eschaton', as if the former refers to some original materia on which the latter imposes some final form. The continuity between origin and goal is warranted by God's unremitting care for, and upholding of, His creation. Origin and goal cannot be contrasted, because of the unity of the triune Creator, Redeemer, and Renewer.251 249 Schuurman, 'Creation, Eschaton, and Social Ethics', 156f. 250 Schuurman, 'Creation, Eschaton, and Social Ethics', 157. 251 Cf. the conclusion of Link on the preliminarly elements of any Christian eschatology: "This perishable life that exists and ends within time, that reaches for the glory of

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Does this view also imply that no differences between perceived reality and the world to come can be traced? Does not Scripture itself indicate the specific qualification of the reality of the fallen world in which we live by the vision of the world to come? Therefore, the eschatological component of the doctrine of creation can be said to qualify creation. To this 'qualification' we will now turn. 5.5.2 Eschatological Qualification "In Genesis creating is a purposive act. [...] And Genesis also makes clear what the world's purpose is. [...] The genealogies of Genesis 1-11 are the very point of the chapters: they establish the sequence of connected events from the 'genealogy' of the universe itself to Abraham and the other patriarchs. But the patriarchal history is itself a prelude of a remarkable sort: the patriarchal history tells how God was the God of Israel before there was Israel."252 This determination of creation's history is characteristic of God's work. He takes his time, and time as such is not gnostically to be despised. This determination, however, is special in character. It is 'promissory' and not possessive: "Eschatological certainty takes the form of confidence in the promises of God", as John Webster comments.253 This eschatology qualifies human action, as well as the field of action described as 'creation': "Eschatology informs moral practice by indicating that the field of human action (including the identity of the human agents in the field) is ordered, and ordered teleologically."254 The reason why eschatology informs human action and its field is that God's eschatological action with his creation "evokes and sustains

the children of God but cannot escape the clutches of death, this very life will be reinstated by God in its fullnes and made eternal" (Link, Christian; 'Points of Departure for a Christian Eschatology'. In: Reventlow, Henning Graf [ed.]; Eschatology in the Bible and in Jewish and Christian Tradition [JSOT.S 243], Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1997, [98-110] 110 [italics JHFS]). 252 Jenson, Robert W.; 'Aspects of a Doctrine of Creation'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997, [17-28] 22f. 253 Webster, John; 'Eschatology and Anthropology'. In: Webster, John; Word and Church. Essays in Christian Dogmatics, T&T Clark: Edinburgh/New York 2001, [263-286] 275. 254 Webster, 'Eschatology and Anthropology', 284.

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patterns of action". 255 This eschatological qualification of reality as such, and of human action, is part of God's original intention for creation. This eschatological perspective on creation is especially of service in the fragmented post-modern situation in which an account of human action in correspondence to reality has become difficult in that it lacks 'ontological depth', i.e. "its being in accord with what is and will be". 256 Webster here draws on the same lines of the doctrine of creation as outlined above, in which the eschatological dimension is present from the beginning for it is its teleological order. The doctrine of creation as we have defined it so far has to do with the origin, maintenance, and final goal of God's creatura. All this is due to God's own creative activity towards the work of His hands. In this respect, one can even say that eschatology is the ultimate aspect of the doctrine of creation 257 To say this is not to downplay the possible eschatological changes made to creation. Some would argue that stretching the doctrine of creation so far renders the differences between the topics superfluous. This is not necessarily intended by the remark about the relation between eschatology and creation. It only stresses the fact that the process in which God is involved along with his creatura, including its 255 Webster, 'Eschatology and Anthropology', 285. 256 Webster, 'Eschatology and Anthropology', 285. 257 As one commentator remarks: "[Eschatology] is widely understood to be the study of the last things [...]. In basic aspects, therefore, eschatology is similar to creation, the discipline(s) concerned with the features of existence, since it attempts to delineate the structure or order of the end, such post-existence as there may be and the normative authority by which these are constituted as what they will be" (Hardy, 'Creation and Eschatology', 110). Cf. the proposal of Christian Link to connect creation and eschatology: "Als Schöpfung also ist die Welt nichts Aufweisbares, nichts Vorhandenes: keine unabänderlich gegebene Wirklichkeit, sondern eine aus der Zukunft sich bestimmende Möglichkeit. Gibt die biblische Tradition die Welt als Schöpfung zu verstehen, so lehrt sie deren eigenste Wahrheit in jener Zukunft zu erkennen, aus der sich die Gegenwart Tag für Tag erneuert. So verstanden aber ist 'Schöpfung' bereits im Alten Testament ein eschatologischer Begriff" (Link, Christian; Die Welt als Gleichnis. Studien zum Problem der natürlichen Theologie, Kaiser Verlag: München 1976, 106). Link states that this Möglichkät has been realised in Christ Jesus (336) which he can call "das Paradigma des neutestamentlichen Jesus als kritisches Mass dieser Erkenntnis [sc. Gottes und der Welt]" (337). God is only known where He, in Christ, makes reality a Gleichnis. In my opinion, this seems to be a confusion of the epistemological category of the interpretation of reality as creation, and the credal statement that reality is creation (Genesis 1).

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final goal, have to be understood from the all-defining starting-point of the process: God's intentional creative activity. This doctrine of creation covers the whole narrative of the world, from its beginning towards the promised end: "The structure of a single (though complex) line of history of redemption, stretching protologically to the divine action of creation out of nothing and eschatologically to the consummation of all things, with a centre in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the ground and manifestation of its teleology, is one so deeply embedded in the canonical texts of the Christian faith that it is almost impossible to envisage forms of Christian belief and practice, forms of theology, prayer and pastoral nurture from which that teleology has been excised." 258 Talking about eschatology as an aspect of the doctrine of creation with all the qualifying abilities it thus contains is, however, only reasonable if we conceive the eschaton as something that will happen finally. If one should restrict the concept of eschatology to something which only informs our present situation, one could easily "make eschatology adjectival to the self-understanding of man in the present". 259 Only by and through its future reality can the eschaton inform and qualify our life and action.260 Eschatology as the qualification of 'creation' bears immediate consequences for the status of human action. As Hans Weder has shown in his illuminating essay on the relation between 'hope' and 'creation', "hope provides for a relaxed relation to the present. If there were no hope, the realm of the visible would have to bear the burden of bringing true life. The visible, then, would be heavily weighted and in fact overloaded with the ultimate. 'It's now or never' would be the approach to the world, and the secular things, human relations, goods of the earth would all be consummated by this approach that overloads the world by far. Patience, on the other hand, implies a distinction between the ultimate, which cannot be absolutely present in the world,

258 Webster, 'Eschatology and Anthropology', 273. 259 Hardy, 'Creation and Eschatology', 112. 260 Cf.: "They are deeply implicated in each other and within God's activity. But they are also different: they should not be merged or conflated, tor that would lead eventually to a denial of the otherness of the two from each other and from God which conflicts with God's purpose for them" (Hardy, 'Creation and Eschatology', 105). Hardy comments that eschatology "imparts an irreducible tension" to creation pointing towards and beyond its end (114).

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and the relative. This distinction implies that a human being who hopes receives from the world that which it can provide, and leaves perfection to the future of God".261 The connections between the original creation and the ultimate promised eschaton are vital for theological ethics. They make clear that creation was good, though not perfect. "The view that creation corresponded perfectly to God's purpose need not mean that God created an absolutely perfect world. Indeed, a less-than-perfect creation leaves room for the absolute perfection of the new creation and for the eschatological finality we find in Revelation 21-22."262 The exposition of the relation between eschaton and original creation by Colin Gunton points in the same direction. According to Gunton, creation is intended to pass through a history, guided by God's action, towards the goal intended. "God created the world so that the created order should be offered back to its creator, perfected, and perfected as the result of the true dominion exercised by God's vice-regent, the human creature."263 Human action, therefore, is closely linked to the eschatological goal of creation: mankind has to offer creation back, perfected. This human action is closely linked to the action of the triune God: the Father with his two 'hands' is involved in bringing this world to its proper destiny.264 Though this goal is positive, this does not rule out the notion of divine judgement. Gunton is critical of Barthian 'realised eschatology' as if Christ had already borne God's eschatological judgement on all flesh so that all are already in some respect reconciled: "The weakness of this position lies in its overrealized eschatology."265 The created reality is still in need of redemption and transformation.266 For Oswald Bayer, the notion of eschatology is tied up with that of the Last Judgement. 'The creation-theological and anthropological

261 Weder, Hans; 'Hope and Creation'. In: Polkinghorne, John; Welker, Michael (ed.); The End of the World and the Ends of God. Science and Theology on Eschatology, Trinity Press International: Harrisburg 2000, (184-202) 187. 262 Dumbrell, The Search for Order, 21. 263

Gunton, Colin E.; The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh [U991] 1997, 187. 2 6 4 Cf. Gunton, Colin E.; Christ and Creation [The Didsbury-lectures 1990], Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1992, 91f. 265 Gunton, Christian Faith, 163. 266 "In needing this transformation, all are in similar need, believer and unbeliever, good and evil alike" (Christian Faith, 165). 2

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point of view as such already contains an eschatological point of view: the Creator is the Judge; it is only through judgement that God makes it possible to view the world as creation.'267 His concept of creation as God's promise which takes place in time and history towards the end, is meant to prevent the history of the world from ending in some univocal 'goodness' which is realised already by anticipation. Though there is an eschatological qualification of our current situation, this qualification is not unambiguous: the promise, consisting in both law and gospel, is intended to let his human beings make a choice: to accept the gift of God, or not. Eschatology is the place in which the consequences of the fall, evil and sin, are definitively washed away. This 'eschaton' is not present already in the sense that it should be at hand. As creation is God's gift, so the eschaton is creation's goal. By trusting God's promise, we can endure the disunity and brokenness of our situation without grasping the victory in advance.268 With the discussion of the relation between continuity and discontinuity in mind, we may be able to evaluate the place and character of 'eschatology7 in the creation theologies of Bayer and Gunton. The continuity between our current world and the world to come is not a human task, but the gift of the Creator who sustains and leads his creation. Both Bayer and Gunton agree on this point. Nevertheless, it is clear that Gunton accentuates the role of human action in this process, whereas Bayer is more concerned about the passivity of the human reception of God's gift towards his creation. On the other hand: Bayer could benefit from Gunton's use of God's trinitarian involvement in the history of his creation. Just as the Lutheran theologian Jörg Bauer makes clear in his treatment of the doctrine of creation, talking about the character of creation's existence as a gift within the permanent and constitutive relation with the 267 "Der schöpfungstheologisch-anthropologische Gesichtspunkt ist als solcher schon eschatologischer Gesichtspunkt: Der Schöpfer ist der Richter; nur durch das Gericht hindurch lässt er die Welt als Schöpfung wahrnehmen" (Bayer, Oswald; Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch. Johann Georg Hamann als radikaler Aufklärer, Piper: München/Zürich 1988, 55). 268 "Gibt sich Geschichte in dieser Weise zu leiden und zu lernen, dann kann die sie bedenkende Theologie keinen Begriff einer Einheit der Geschichte bilden. Ja, sie kann ihn gar nicht bilden wollen; sie hat - ohne daraus wiederum ein Prinzip zu machen - die Frage nach der Einheit der Geschichte offen zu halten" (Bayer, Oswald; Autorität und Kritik. Zu Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1991, 193).

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Creator does not downplay creation's giving itself back to the Creator.269 The confession of the Christian Church immediately connects the eschaton with the divine Judgement, executed by the Son. A. van de Beek uses this confessional image to protest against too much stress on human action, as if it is our duty to bring about the Kingdom of God.270 He thereby opposes theories which view the Kingdom of God as something to be increasingly achieved in the course of time, as in liberation theologies 271 It also corresponds with Van de Beek's stress on the radical difference between this world and the world to come, in that 'creation' always has to be viewed as part of the history of the cross. This 'critical' concept of creation can easily be used in developing a 'critical' eschatology. In so far as Van de Beek's concepts are 'critical', they are in danger of not taking the full content of the confession of divine providence into account. For him, the eschaton is the only factor which qualifies creation: 'Creation as a prelude to eternity' - as his monograph on creation-theology is entitled272 For theological ethics, Van de Beek's standpoint accentuates human passivity in a way comparable to the way in which Bayer stresses it. The main difference, however, lies in the way in which God is present 269 Cf. e.g.: "Die Schöpfung ist das in göttlichem Geben, kreatürlicher Annahme und Rückgabe ausgespannte Geschehen, dessen Gewicht dadurch gegeben ist, dass der Schöpfer mit dem Geschaffenen ist" (Baur, Jörg; "Theologisches Reden über die Schöpfung - christlich oder vor-christlich?'. In: Baur, Jörg; Einsicht und Glaube. Aufsätze (Band 2), Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht: Göttingen 1994, [111-125] 122). 270 Van de Beek, Schepping, 212. 271 "Met de idee van de vooruitgang moeten we voorzichtig zijn. [...] Hiermee verzet ik mij tegen de gedachte van de elevatie van de schepping die in de hedendaagse theologie vrijwel gemeengoed is geworden. Elevatie wil zeggen dat we de schepping zien onder het perspectief van de vooruitgang en dat met name in Christus de wereld op een hoger plan geheven is" (Van de Beek, Schepping, 170). Cf. also Van de Beek, Schepping, 208-211; A. van de Beek, ]ezus Kurios. De Christologie als hart van de theologie, Kok: Kampen 1998, 209-232; A. van de Beek, 'The Kingdom of God: A Call for Worship and Obedience'. In: Egmond, A. van; Keulen, D. van (edd.); Christian Hope in Context, [Vol. Γ] [Studies in Reformed Theology 4], Meinema: Zoetermeer 2001,86-103. 272 "Het aardse bestaan is een opmaat voor de eeuwigheid. Het is bedoeld voor de werkelijkheid bij God" (Van de Beek, Schepping, 228). Cf. for this point also: Kruijf, G.G. de; 'The Primacy of Eternity. A Discussion of Bram van de Beek's Eschatology1. In: Egmond, A. van; Keulen, D. van (edd.); Christian Hope in Context [Vol. Γ] [Studies in Reformed Theology 4], Meinema: Zoetermeer 2001,222-230. De Kruijf even accuses Van de Beek of 'Platonism' (230).

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to this world. According to Bayer, created mediation is indispensable, which includes a positive evaluation of the created orders through which God provides his creation with life. Van de Beek, on the other hand, accentuates the radical change. The Last Judgement will influence the created order severely. 5.5.3 Eschatological Order? Thus, we come to the last subsection of our consideration of the relation between 'creation' and 'eschaton'. We have seen that the debate about the balance between 'continuity7 and 'discontinuity7 is dependent on the content of one's doctrine of creation. Though perhaps unconsciously, many of those who oppose 'creation7 and 'eschaton7 define 'creation7 in terms of origin, static orders, etc. When creation is viewed more in line with providence and God's goal for it from beginning to end, this opposition is less pressing. According to Van de Beek, the New Testament is very critical of the social orders, because the divine Judgement is cutting them through radically. As Jesus spoke to the Sadducees: 77At the resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven" (Matthew 22,30). Therefore, the future Kingdom is no reunion for people who miss their spouses here on earth.273 We may critically ask, to what extent does created reality continue in the eschaton in Van de Beek7s view. That is to say: what does he make of God7s providential care for his creation and its value for eternity. Does not the unity of God7s plan prohibit such an extremely critical and discontinuous view of the relation between the created reality and its eschatological goal? On the other hand, the biblical testimony on the future of God7s Kingdom does give rise to these questions. If we look at the Gospels in their reflection on the life of Jesus Christ on earth, it is clear that Jesus is seen as the arrival of the Kingdom of God.274 His qualification of our 273 "Niet alleen tijd en ruimte verliezen in het Koninkrijk hun betekenis, maar ook sociale verbanden als het huwelijk. [...] Het Koninkrijk is geen reünie. Het is een vervulling van ons menselijk bestaan, waarbij alles in een ander perspectief komt en alles in een ander verband" (Van de Beek, Schepping, 237). 274 Cf. Brüggen, Jakob van; Het evangelie van Gods zoon. Persoon en leer van Jezus volgens de vier evangelien [CNT. Derde serie], Kok: Kampen 1996, 68-71.

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created reality, breaking through many fixed patterns of behaviour and interpretation, by itself reveals the eschatological qualification of reality and the consequences for social patterns and inherited social orders. As such, Jesus' "contrafactic wisdom demonstrates that the perception of creation is never an immediate event, but relies on finite actual situations and reflections framed by an eschatological definition of reality" as Christofer Frey comments.275 What does the breaking into world history by of Jesus Christ himself, along with the eschatological qualification of this reality by the Kingdom of God, imply for the social structures as created by God? We will not support the radical qualification of them as does Van de Beek. As we seek the unity of God's creation, which is the linear creation-fallredemption-eschaton, we would agree with the description of John Webster: "Moral action, if it is to be hopeful, courageous, and free from anxiety about its own possibility, requires a sense of its ontological depth, its being in accord with what is and will be."276 Such 'ontological depth' is found in the lasting creation orders, by which God endows his creation with the life-forms necessary to live. According to the doctrine of creation we have presented, the orders God has created are in line with his eschatological goal. As the unity of God's plan unites both 'creation' (here in the meaning of the original starting-point of history) and 'eschaton' (as the reality to come), the eschatological order cannot contradict the order we now perceive. This is in line with Gunton's reference to the activity of the Holy Spirit in the present, which is striving towards the eschaton. Whereas the Spirit is the 'perfecting cause' of reality, He is also the warrant for the continuity between the present and the future. The Spirifs redirection of man, ordering him in the Church, as the new paradigmatic community, is His way of bringing 'creation' after the fall providentially in line with His sovereign intentions 277 In this respect, Bayer could have been less reluctant in offering a trinitarian perspective on reality. The prudent way in which Jörg Bauer explicates such a trinitarian framework for speaking about creation would be an example of the way in which Bayer himself could develop his reflections on creation 278 Because of the unity of the 275 276 277 278

Frey, 'Eschatology and Ethics', 73. Webster, 'Eschatology and Anthropology', 285. Christian Faith, [119-172] 137. Cf. Baur, 'Theologisches Reden über die Schöpfung', 121.

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triune God and the reliability of his plan for creation, the unity of creation in origin and goal is given theological warrant. This view, however, is not uncontested. For if we take the institution of 'marriage', Jesus' comment in Matthew 22,30 suggests the opposite: people will neither marry nor be given in marriage - which implies the end of this institution in the eschaton. And the teachings of the apostle Paul in the first letter to the Corinthians 279 seem to point in the same direction. It is the task of Christians "to reflect the expansive love of the Redeemer, who wills that all share in the eschatological community of male and female that even now may be found in proleptic fashion in the Church. Single Christians, therefore, who because of their abstinence from genital sexual expression are often 'in touch' with their affective sexuality, have a unique ministry of love to offer in service to the Lord within the fellowship of the community of Christ". 280 Marriage, therefore, seems to be not the ultimate life-form given to Christians. This example makes clear that the doctrine of creation, elaborated above, should be applied to some concrete 'order' or institution in order to see how an 'ethic of createdness' (made available by the full consideration of the doctrine of creation) opens or cuts off possibilities for reflection on the human condition and consequently on human behaviour. That the example is 'marriage' may not be too surprising by now.

5.6 Evaluation of Bayer and Gunton In sections 5.2 - 5.5 we have examined four well-known, mostly 'modern' objections against an appeal to creation in ethics: the epistemological problem about knowing creation, the contending concepts of 'nature' and 'creation', the historically extended relation between God and creation mostly known as 'providence', and finally the question to what degree eschatology influences the appeal to creation. Throughout the chapter, one of the distinguishing features of Christian doctrine in all four areas has become clear: the devastating

279 Cf. 1 Corinthians 7. 280 Grenz, Stanley J.; Sexual Ethics. A Biblical Perspective, Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville, KE 2 1997,196.

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consequences of sin have to feature in any doctrine of creation. In the course of discussing these topics, the projects and suggestions of Gunton and Bayer have been evaluated. Their different, though, over time, gradually converging, treatments of the concept of 'sin' within their own doctrines of creation has become clear. In this section, the material in the foregoing sections will be summarised and used for a final treatment and evaluation of their doctrines of creation. When we look at the specific historical context of Bayer's and Gunton's doctrine of creation, the conclusion that their theology is critical of the modern project of the Enlightenment is obvious (3.3 and 4.3). The most pervasive criticism is directed against the idea of human autonomy and its corresponding stress on human freedom. The doctrine of creation in this respect functions as a heuristic instrument by which the believer can detect this idea as the source of many problematic features of modernity. Taking creation seriously provides them with both a solution to these problems and an alternative, constructive proposal. In both doctrines of creation, the elaboration of the concept of 'sin' is evident. Notwithstanding their similarities in this respect, differences are apparent as well. Gunton's starting-point for doing creation-theology - the rediscovery of the Trinity - is very different from Bayer's Lutheran promissio. We may conclude here that Gunton is more inclined to look for intellectual solutions for overcoming the consequences of sin. Thinking trinitarianly, he is trying to establish the 'echo' of the triune God in reality - which in turn already proves to be present. Bayer insists on one's commitment to the life-forms of the Church by which one is 'in-formed' and becomes part of God's goal with creation. In this respect, one can trace a development in both theologies. Gunton was much more impressed at first by the intellectual challenge offered by Coleridge's critique of modernity, and gradually returned to a more explicitly Calvinist way of doing theology. Bayer is deeply influenced by Hamann's metacritical way of exploring Luther over against modernity, and from there gradually allows for the treatment of more 'modern' themes like the Trinity and the doctrine of the Spirit. The radicality of Bayer's metacritical treatment of the doctrine of creation within a life-context which is thoroughly influenced and characterized by human sin seems more realistic than Gunton's somewhat intellectual approach. This conclusion is underlined by the developments in Gunton's later publications which are more consistent with Bayer's stress on broken reality.

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The concept of 'order' is among the prominent themes in the arena. It has evident interconnections with the concept of autonomy, for here also human freedom over against social orders is at stake. We have seen Bayer's and Gunton's critique of the Enlightenment concept of freedom, which contains a positive stress on 'order'. For only those who live in God's order are able to be really free. Gunton, however, is more inclined to stress the objectivity of the remaining order than Bayer. Far from charging Gunton with a too optimistic worldview, I want, rather, to stress Bayer's realism. Bayer in every respect wants to stress God's activity as essential for this world and its remaining order in spite of the devastating consequences of sin. This essential relation, sustaining the world and every living being, changes the character of the concept of 'order'. Instead of the objectivity of the order, its relation to its Maker is stressed. In Bayer's theology, the constitutive relation of reality to its Creator also leads towards a specific kind of eschatological component of the doctrine of creation. First, human efforts to save the world are doomed to fail, because they collapse under the weight of their own burden. Secondly, because of God's reliability and his loyalty to his present creation, its ordering in the present is no less important in the light of the eschaton. The eschatological qualification of reality does not decrease the importance of the present structures. It is in this respect that Bayer criticises radical eschatologies. Bayer's fear of speculation prevents him from saying too much about the goal of history. Gunton, on the other hand, is more inclined to describe the content of the eschatological qualification of the present order. For Gunton far more than Bayer, this present order is being redirected much more visibly by the presence of the Holy Spirit. Gunton's pneumatological considerations are the reason for his moderate optimism. Whereas Bayer is more inclined to speak about the hiddenness of God, Gunton describes the Spirit's presence and power within reality. In conclusion, we can say that Bayer's refusal to refer to a presence of God in reality without its mediatedness, stresses the undeniable need for human conversion within the context of the Church and its liturgy. Only within this context can creation be observed as 'creation'. The gradual shift in Gunton's oeuvre towards the same topics confirms this evaluation. However, once one acknowledges the liturgical context of speaking about creation, one touches on pneumatology as well. Theology should also investigate here the biblical evidence that the

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Spirit is at work in creation in his perfecting work. God enables us to experience by grace a foretaste of the perfected eschatological reality. This corrects Bayer's reluctance to treat topics like the work of the Holy Spirit and sanctification of the believer. Once Bayer's prudence is taken seriously, the attention given to the work of the Spirit will not be easily interpreted overly optimistically. As a general conclusion, we can say that Bayer's doctrine of creation offers the basis for theology and worldview, including morality. Within this context, the emphases given by Gunton can help in establishing an even more concrete picture of the relation between the doctrine of creation and theological ethics.

5.7 Summary Against the background of the doctrine of creation of Bayer and Gunton, we can now formulate a conclusion about the relation between the doctrine of creation and ethics. Gunton's stress on reality as an echo of the Trinity leads to an ethic which remains largely 'theoretical'. Gunton's ethic of sacrifice is a way of redirecting one's mental map towards God's plan for the world - from Eden to eschaton. Bayer on the other hand stresses the importance of the process of in-formation of one's ethical behaviour within the context of the liturgy. Again, Gunton's later publications show his growing interest in this function of the Church's liturgy. With respect to the problematic features of epistemology in theological ethics, we can conclude that both Bayer and Gunton look to this concept of 'in-formation' for a solution. As is made clear in section 5.2, the biblical texts about 'creation' play an important role in the shape of one's view of reality as the 'field of action'. The doctrine of creation informs us about both the field and the knowing subject. The doctrine of creation offers newly complex perspectives from which to speak about 'order'. Because the doctrine of creation stresses the constitutive relation between creation and its Creator, this order is not available to objective observation. 'Creation' therefore offers a worldview, and a characterization of the human context of living. Christian doctrine also stresses the important and devastating consequences of the human fall. This points to the indispensable connection between 'creation' and 'providence'. The concept of God's sustaining activity that upholds the earth should be integral to the

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doctrine of creation. As 'creation' is not only the description of the world's origin but is still used to describe our present reality, the differences between the concepts of creation and providence gradually disappear. For in that case, both terms refer to God's activity by which reality is not only sustained but also given new shape and content in the course of history over against the destructive forces of evil and sin. This view also contains the consequence that man is embedded within God's constant institutional activity which characterizes the interpretation of the moral field of human sociality. As soon as 'the course of history7 is mentioned, one has to clarify the relation between creation and eschaton. In both Bayer's and Gunton's doctrine of creation, eschatology is both the goal and the fulfilment of God's plan for creation. In that sense, our moral behaviour should not assume any radical contrast between our responsible behaviour towards present realities, and discernment of God's future goal for them. Arguing for the unity of God's plan from the beginning, Gunton's 'creation as project' is a correct interpretation of the relation between creation and eschaton. Bayer's reluctance to identify this eschatological goal in the present is - again - intended not to overemphasize the importance of our human interpretation and activity. The stress on continuity between creation and eschaton relying on God's activity is one of the decisive elements of their doctrines of creation. Such continuity has consequences for the created institutions in social ethics. In conclusion we can state that a doctrine of creation in line with Bayer and partially corrected by elements from Gunton will offer a specific view of ethics. As the doctrine of creation covers creation from its origins ex nihilo, through its present, providentially upheld as creation, towards its final eschatological goal, such a doctrine necessarily includes providence and eschatology. In a way, they can be treated as 'aspects' of a doctrine of creation. This doctrinally formed worldview bears consequences for moral subjects: one has to be part of the process of in-formation in the Church in order to live the life that God gives to people. It bears consequences for the moral field: the idea of an ordered society which in its ordering is constantly dependent on God's creative activity. It bears consequences for the scientific discipline of theological ethics: this discipline is from the outset designed to confront other perspectives (if necessary).

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In the next chapter, the practical consequences of this connection between the doctrine of creation and theological ethics will be evaluated for the social institution of 'marriage'.

6 Marriage and the Doctrine of Creation 6.1 Introduction What can the doctrine of creation offer Christians in their considerations about marriage? The following chapter is devoted to this question. This chapter, however, is not a complete theology of marriage, family, or sexuality. Though these areas will be taken into consideration, the aim of this chapter is to investigate and research the consequences of taking the doctrine of creation seriously for doing social ethics. 'Marriage' thus functions as a test case. Other 'life-forms' or social institutions could just as well have been used, such as the Church, the state, or themes like labour and property. There are, however, several reasons to investigate 'marriage'. First, the usual Christian doctrine of marriage is full of references to the creation-story in Genesis to which Jesus also refers. Therefore, investigating what these references and connotations imply for the connection between a doctrine of creation and ethics will prove fruitful. A second reason is found in the evaluation of the current context for doing theological ethics. For probably none of the usual social institutions have changed their character in the last five decades more than that of 'marriage'. Intertwined with questions of procreation, sexuality, and sexual orientation, 'marriage' is probably the institution that has been most 'post-modernised'. 1 As outlined in section 2.3.2, referring to a doctrine of creation is itself an answer to cope with this

1

Adrian Thatcher opens his book on marriage in the post-modern context with this statement: "The purpose of this book is first to offer an unreserved commendation of Christian marriage at a time when it is widely disparaged and disowned; and secondly to contribute to a renewed vision for Christian marriage at at time of unprecedented social change" (Thatcher, Adrian; Marriage after Modernity. Christian Marriage in Postmodern Times, Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1999, 9). Later on, Thatcher comments: "Marriage without doubt is one of the 'established sexual institutions' which are now rendered problematic by the crises of modernity" (27).

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post-modern situation. 2 When applied to the subject of 'marriage', the doctrine of creation can offer guidelines for interpretation of both the institution itself and its current (post)modern use. These guidelines will be mostly conceptual, and detailed practical applications must await further elaboration. 3 Here, I want to outline the ethical framework for such elaboration within the context of a doctrine of creation. As such this chapter aims at providing tools to cope with the current situation in (second order) theological ethics and not in (first order) christian life. Thirdly, marriage is an example of how the Christian doctrine of creation is a valuable instrument in some form of Christian apologetics (as referred to in section 2.3.3). Repeating the well-known truth about something is not a convincing apologetic strategy. Showing the insightful depth and the applicability of aspects of a Christian doctrine of creation to the commonly experienced field of the formation of sexual relationships could be an opportunity: both for the Church to understand its urgent need to preserve its inheritance and so live by its content, and also for the Church to witness to the gospel for all created human beings amonst those who are not yet Christians. Fourthly, treating the social institution of marriage within the current cultural context is apt for demonstrating continuity and discontinuity with Christianity and with theology itself. 'Marriage' can function as a touchstone for what separates and distinguishes different theological traditions - such as the Lutheran or the reformed-Calvinist. A concentration on 'marriage' can be used to reach a genuine ecumenical standpoint by showing how the content of Christian doctrine can 'in-form' the practice of moral reasoning in the academic discipline of theological ethics. This has to be done, however, without succumbing to the demand for cultural plausibility at all costs (cf. section 2.3.4). For this is precisely what the specific content of the doctrine of the Christian Church forbids. In aiming at this ecumenical goal, the positions of both subjects of this study, Colin Gunton and Oswald Bayer, will be evaluated as well. Some terminological remarks are necessary here. The word 'marriage' in this chapter refers to the life-form of a man and woman

2 3

Cf. Gunton, Colin E.; The Christian Faith. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Blackwell: Oxford 2001, x. One might think of practical questions about the marriage of homosexuals or the relation between the gender roles of man and woman.

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together, who have publicly commenced a marital relationship which is promised to be lifelong, exclusive, and based on a more than human foundation, explicitly celebrated in the act of sexual intercourse and open to procreation.4 Thus, the so-called homosexual marriage is, by definition, excluded here. Although the treatment of the biblical texts will provide some arguments in favour of this decision, an elaborate treatment of non-marital sexual relationships in general will not be developed. This leads to the second terminological remark. I deliberately do not write about sexual ethics. The subject of this chapter is marriage. As Wannenwetsch observes, the current division of ethics that speaks about 'sexual ethics' apart from 'family ethics' in general is a symptom of an altered conception of the role and place of sexuality (cf. section 5.4.4). I also do not agree with those who start ethical observations about 'marriage' with the anthropological observation that every human being is 'sexual'. Stanley Grenz begins his monograph on 'sexual ethics': "Humans are undeniably sexual beings. As Christians, we declare that this sexuality belongs to our existence as creatures of God." 5 Such an anthropological starting-point for doing theological ethics is in line with the concept of his friend and teacher, Wolfhart Pannenberg, for whom the concept of 'person' is decisive in doing ethics.6 Though the conclusions of these positions may not lead us

4

5 6

Cf. the definition of H.W. de Knijff: "Een op totale levensgemeenschap (met name volledige wederzijdse persoonsparticipatie) gericht, exclusief (derden, in het bijzonder sexueel, uitsluitend), duurzaam (tot de grens van het leven), juridisch beschermd maatschappelijk instituut, dat zijn grond heeft in de sexuele expressie van het natuurlijke liefdesverlangen tussen man en vrouw, daarmee de ruimte schept voor het voortbrengen en opvoeden van nageslacht (met bijzondere rechten als erven) en dat ervaren wordt als iets dat rust op een bovenpersoonlijke grondslag" (Knijff, H.W. de; 'Kroniek. Homosexualiteit enhuwelijk'. In: KeTh 52 [2001], [281-284] 282). Elements are therefore: exclusivity, duration, public character, divine lifeform. Another definition captures the "essence of marriage" - according to "a deepseated theological tradition" - as being found "in the commitment and donation of a man and a woman of their person to each other in a committed relationship which is consummated by intercourse" (so Thatcher, Adrian; Living Together and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2002,62). Grenz, Stanley J.; Sexual Ethics. A Biblical Perspective, Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville, KE 21997, ix. Cf. for the anthropological perspective on marriage and sexuality: Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttin-

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astray at all, the main problem is their starting-point in a semi-neutral anthropology which allows for as much resemblance between Christians and non-Christians on this topic as possible. 7 This chapter will show how a connection between the Christian doctrine of creation and theological ethics prohibits taking anthropology as such as a starting-point for doing theological ethics. Thirdly, 'marriage' is closely connected to the 'life-form' oeconomia, which includes the relation between the spouses as well as the space for offspring. The marital relationship between a man and a woman forms the core-relationship from which 'family' derives its content and meaning. The reason why I do not take 'family' instead of 'marriage' as the subject of this chapter is that the life-form of marriage is of primary importance in elaborating the consequences for the extended parental relationships which may follow within this context. The definition of the content of 'marriage' in contemporary society is problematic. Many will perhaps even deny that it is meaningful to speak about marriage if that, then, would serve as the framework for the discussion about sexuality, parenthood, authority, commitment, etc. In section 6.2, therefore, the question of the 'observance' of marriage will be treated. There are several convictions about marriage in society today. Without attempting to provide a complete survey, I will outline the most evident and pressing ones: the contractual-liberal view (6.3), natural law theory (6.4), and the constructionist view. This last, constructivist view is dealt with in two parts, for the theological reaction can be unpacked into two intertwined lines of inquiry: the relation between constructivism and providence as the concrete framing of the more abstract relation between God's and human action in general (6.5), and the relation between constructivism and eschatology as the concrete framing of the general relation between God's goal for creation and human progress (6.6). The arrangement of this chapter can be compared to the preceding chapter. It is an attempt to describe four positions on the institution of

7

gen 1983, 415-431; Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Grundlagen der Ethik. Philosophisch-theologische Perspektiven, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1996,124-131. For a theologically similar critique of Pannenberg, cf. Gunton, Colin E.; 'Trinity and Trustworthiness'. In: Helm, Paul; Trueman, Carl R. (ed.); The Trustworthiness of God. Perspectives on the Nature of Scripture, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids/Cambridge 2002, [275-284] 279.

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marriage, and to analyse and evaluate these with the help of the Christian doctrine of creation. In the penultimate paragraph, these convictions will be systematically discussed (6.7). In conclusion, the content of both Bayer's and Gunton's doctrine of creation will be treated with respect to the test case of marriage (6.8).

6.2 The Observance' of Marriage There is a widely spread conviction that 'morality7 is independent from 'religious worldview'. Especially in the area of sexual ethics, sexual morality is said to have become 'a private affair'.8 Privatization seems to indicate a process by which one's sexual preferences and the lifeform one is dedicated to become a matter of personal, individual choice. This does not imply, however, that sexuality is independent of 'worldview' as such: it can easily be shown that "sexual moralities are always embedded in a worldview, including a view on the social order".9 The Dutch ethicist Gerrit Manenschijn hereby refers to the observation that sexuality has always been connected with some view of the order of society - and therefore changes in step with any other social and economic change.10 The same can be said on the topic of the 'family'. The materialist critique of the bourgeois conception of the 'family7 in the tradition of 8

Cf. e.g. Manenschijn, Gerrit; 'Sexual Morality, Worldview, and Social Change'. In: Musschenga, Bert (ed.); Does Religion Matter Morally? A Critical Reappraisal of the Thesis of Morality's Independence from Religion, Kok: Kampen 1995, (59-88) 62: "If there is one sphere of life where morality appears to have become completely independent of religious world views, it is sexuality. [...] [S]exual morality has indeed become a private affair". The same account is given by Hans-Wolfgang Strätz ('Ehe und Familie als Institute des bürgerlichen Rechts - Eine Bestandsaufnahme im Hinblick auf die faktische und rechtliche Gleichstellung der nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft'. In: Essener Gespräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche 35 [2001], hrsg. von Heiner Marre; Dieter Schümmelfeder; Burkhard Kämper, 13-39), who states: "Im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts hat die staatliche Ehe die Gemeinwohlorientierung immer mehr verloren. Jetzt, am Ende des Jahrhunderts, ist sie vornehmlich auf die Verwirklichung der privaten Interessen des Paares hin ausgestaltet" (19).

9 10

Manenschijn, 'Sexual Morality', 86. Cf. also the illuminating comment on Manenschijn by Bert Musschenga (Musschenga, Albert W.; 'Comments'. In: Musschenga, Does Religion Matter Morally?, 89-93).

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Marx and Engels reveals the undeniable conclusion that "to treat the family, whether in its present or in an earlier form, as a natural given, standing outside the forces of history, persisting as a natural good no matter what, is not so much innocent as foolish". 11 A third concept, related to that of sexuality and family, is that of 'love'. The concept of love, commonly acknowledged under the heading of 'Romantic love', seems to be especially influential. It is a concept with the following characteristics: "the attractiveness of love understood as yearning desire, the banality or triviality of ordinary sexual intercourse (contrasted with its enormous symbolic importance in exceptional cases), and finally the necessity of suffering and ultimate loss: death as the culmination of romance" - all summarised in the statement: "True love can't last." 12 One encounters this attitude literally everywhere - popular music, jazz, radio-songs, movies, television programs, etc.: Romantic love is natural and universally unavoidable. The key to this view is that it is not possible to resist this love: it is a spell, a fate, which can overwhelm all established institutions in which one is embedded. 13 These tendencies show the mutual dependence between historical developments and circumstances on the one hand, and the interpretation of important elements of marriage, like sexuality, familylife, and love. The concept of 'marriage', therefore, is in need of interpretation. This chapter attempts such an interpretation. Basic assumptions from the doctrine of creation are of great importance here. One characteristic notion from the doctrine of creation is its alleged 'goodness' (cf. section 5.2.1). The three concepts and their elaboration in different traditions, have this one element in common: The 'form' in which sexuality, family-life, and love takes place, does not seem to

11

12 13

So Michael Banner ("'Who are my mother and my brothers?" Marx, Bonhoeffer and Benedict and the redemption of the family'. In: Banner, Michael; Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999, [225251] 230f). McClendon Jr., James Wm.; Ethics: Systematic Theology [Vol. I], Abingdon Press: Nashville 1986, 138. Cf. also Knijff, H.W. de; Venus aan de leiband. Europa's erotische cultuur en Christelijke sexuele ethiek, Kok: Kampen 1987,233v. Cf. Clapp, Rodney; 'From Family Values to Family Virtues'. In: Murphy, Nancey Murphy; Kallenberg, Brad J.; Nation, Mark Thiessen (edd.); Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition. Christian Ethics after Maclntyre, Trinity Press: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 1997,185-201.

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have any intrinsic or 'natural' goodness at all. The meaning of a lifeform is completely dependent on human interpretation and evaluation of certain phenomena (like sexuality, love, and procreation). Only by human evaluation can the value of the chosen life-form be established. Thus, an old interpretation scheme is used, in which reality itself is not worthwhile, but its value can only be derived by its human evaluation. Michael Banner has severely critiqued this attitude which he even identifies the old heresy of the Manicheans. For the idea that life-forms need an a priori human interpretation and approval before their goodness can be attested takes its starting-point in the presupposition "that our bodily life is not possessed of a form or character which comes from the hand of a good God".14 From the outset, a Christian doctrine of creation bears consequences for the 'observance' of the lifeforms in general and that of marriage in particular. The aforementioned social tendencies have of course influenced the status of and view of 'marriage'. Social changes encourage living in other life-forms, such as the non-nuptial cohabitation, pre-nuptial cohabitation, serial monogamy, etc. The sexual revolution of the 1960's with the invention of the pill is commonly acknowledged as the starting-point for the wide-spread use of these 'alternative' life-forms.15 It is considered a fact that "the development from an obligatory sexual morality to a freedom of choice to live according to one's own sexual preferences" is "irreversible".16 Morals are private affairs, with which the Church and religion have no concern. This standpoint immediately bears consequences on the 'observance' of marriage. 'Marriage' is increasingly viewed as an option one can choose from among many other options which are available and acceptable in contemporary society. A kind of 'hermeneutics of marriage' is at stake here. How do the Church and Christians view marriage - as some optional life-form or as

14

Banner, Michael; 'Prolegomena to a dogmatic sexual ethic'. In: Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, (269-309) 281. Cf. also Clapp, 'From Family Values to Family Virtues', 198: Romantic love "is first and finally gnostic, antiphysical".

15

Manenschijn, 'Sexual Morality', 75-77. Strätz is more critical: "Diese Entwicklung war schon längst eingeleitet, bevor die moderne Naturwissenschaft das ermöglichte, w a s als 'sexuelle Befreiung' apostrophiert wird" (Strätz, 'Ehe und Familie als Institute des bürgerlichen Rechts', 19).

16

Manenschijn, 'Sexual Morality', 86.

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the God-given life-form in which sexual and familial relationships should take place? How should Christians join the current marketplace of opinions on life-forms in order to sell their own view? According to Manenschijn, "recognizing the irreversibleness of a development which strives for the liberation of individual men and women from collective moral pressure does not mean that the church and theology must forfeit their own Christian view on the relationship between faith and sexual morality. Precisely not." 17 This standpoint implies the conviction that Church and theology have to develop their own view of marriage. Thus, they can make their contribution to the debate about the best way to organize all the correlative aspects of family, sexuality, gender-relations etc. In this chapter, 'marriage' is a heuristic concept which is not per se discernable from the data of empirical investigations. I will test the hypothesis that on the basis of the doctrine of creation, as outlined with the help and contributions of Oswald Bayer and Colin Gunton in the foregoing chapters, we now are theologically taught to discern a lifeform which is worth living. In the course of this chapter, some of the (expected) benefits of living such 'marital' life will be investigated. If 'church and theology do not forfeit their own convictions' (Manenschijn), it must be clear from the outset that this investigation is not toothless. The acknowledged 'irreversibility' of the development towards a large variety of possible life-forms does not imply that all life-forms are theologically acceptable. The concept of theology as developed by both Bayer and Gunton leaves more than enough space for the radical critique of some of the concepts underlying the indicated liberal trends. Therefore, this chapter's quest is not given the quasi neutral name 'hermeneutic', but the qualified term 'observance' of marriage. The life-form of marriage is not just one option among others, but is the God-given opportunity which must be 'observed' both by those who are married as well as by the teaching of Christians in Church and theology (4.5.6).

17

Manenschijn, 'Sexual Morality', 87.

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The crucial aspect of this 'observance' is the question of 'freedom'. 18 Firstly, the theologies of both Bayer and Gunton are critical of the assumptions on 'freedom' which evolved in theology after the Enlightenment. It has become a general truth that the forms in which life is lived are optional and built from our imagination. But such radical human responsibility is, in the end, not an option but a heavy burden for everyone according to his or her preferences. 19 At stake here is the denial or acceptance of the goodness of the created order - the belief that we are, both as human beings and in our involvement in concrete life-forms, the creatures of a good God. This attitude of having to construct the good life is an expression of the belief that human beings are free to choose whatever life-style they want. Secondly, freedom is at stake within the chosen life-style. For once the options are decided, one has to be able to develop within them. This freedom determines every aspect of living within the chosen life-form: the use of contraceptives, the balance between married life and work, the endurance of the marital bond. It even seems to include one's sexuality. 20 Several commentators point to the increased pressure for people to fulfil these demands of freedom: "More than at any other time in Christian history, the present generation has been cast on its own resources. The freedom of private decision offered by secularized culture means that persons living in contemporary Western society find themselves entrusted with unparalleled responsibility for shaping and expressing their own sexuality. We may be discovering to our regret

18

Cf. Bernd Wannenwetsch (Die Freiheit der Ehe. Das Zusammenleben Όση Frau und Mann in der Wahrnehmung evangelischer Ethik [Evangelium und Ethik Bd. 2], Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1993). Following Bayer's concept of theology as a Konfliktwissenschaft, he neither starts his reflexion with the original orders of creation, nor with the pressing context of secularization giving rise to all kinds of questions. By starting with the concept of 'freedom', Wannenwetsch finds himself able to distinguish and critique different concepts of marriage and their theological foundation.

19

This is clearly observed by Banner's summary of this attitude: "The natural order needs grasping and humanising just because, presumably, it lacks any inherent good apart from this grasping and humanising" ('Prolegomena to a dogmatic sexual ethic', 279).

20

I can only refer here to the questions of gender-roles and the question whether or not one's hetero- or homosexuality is changeable. The nurture/nature-debate in this area is still vivid and has not reached a definitive standpoint (Cf. e.g. Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 223-246).

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that the possibilities of the present have outpaced the moral capabilities of many persons, perhaps even of society as a whole." 21 We will investigate to what degree different concepts of marriage have the capacity to cope with this crucial aspect.

6.3 Marriage and Contractual-Liberalism In this section, we will deal with a concept of marriage based on the idea of a contract, between a man and a woman, concluded in order to achieve some specific goals (6.3.1). This concept is intended to overcome specific problems, but in the end generates some (unintended) uneasiness with marriage as well (6.3.2). By taking the doctrine of creation into account, some of this uneasiness can be discerned and directions for solving it can be sought (6.3.3). Most pressing in this discernment is the realisation that marriage can never be intended to neglect or ignore the fundamental conflict which life imposes on the spouses (6.3.4). Therefore, the biblical witness of the story of the fall - immediately following the creation-narratives - offers insightful elements for evaluating the contractarian view of marriage (6.3.5).

6.3.1 Marriage as a Contract The concept of marriage as a contractual covenant is an old one. In documents and literature from the Ancient Near East, many examples of such contracts can be found. 22 This contractual form is due to the fact that "[i]n marriage the economic motivation was more important than

21 22

Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 11. "In de Babylonisch-Assyrische wereld werd het huwelijk bij schriftelijk contract geregeld. De wet van Hammurabi zegt, dat, als een burger een vrouw genomen heeft zonder contractuele overeenkomst, zij dan geen echtgenote is (§ 128). Bij de opgravingen zijn veel van zulke huwelijkscontracten gevonden" (Schoneveld, J.; Huwelijk en huwelijksrecht in de wereld van het Oude Testament, Boekencentrum: s.l. 1953, 12v). The Elephantine-documents (Upper Egypt) provide many examples of such marriage contracts (cf. CANE [Vol. 1], 45).

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the romantic". 23 Therefore, the contract involved more or less extensive regulations concerning the dowry and other matters ancillary to the marriage itself. The contract also regulated the indispensability of marriage, and the legal obligation of marital, sexual loyalty between the spouses. Biblical testimony, finally, stresses the importance of the moral obligation of exclusive sexual fidelity upon the marriage-partners. 24 The specific contribution of Christian thought to the history of marriage within the Western world and the contribution it made to both marital life and the (ethical) reflection on it, is too vast an area to be described here. We limit ourselves to post-Enlightenment concepts of marriage, in which contractual aspects play a role. Thus, we encounter the specific prerequisites marriage had to meet and examine their benefits and weaknesses. For within the post-Enlightenment liberal tradition, marriage comes to be thought of as a contract between the spouses. 25 As soon as the concept of individual freedom became decisive in matters of life-forms, in the aftermath, as it were, of the Enlightenment, marriage altered accordingly. No divine prerequisite for human freedom was necessary, so human freedom had to be kept in bounds by some form of contract. 'Marriage' came to be viewed in terms of 'property', which imposed its own logic upon the depiction of the life-form itself. The marital relation was now referred to in terms of the contract between two 'partners'. 26 The anthropological assumptions

23 24

25

26

King, Philip J.; Stager, Lawrence E.; Life in Biblical Israel, Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville/ London 2 0 0 1 , 5 4 . Cf. Hugenberger, Gordon Paul; Marriage as a Covenant. A Study of Biblical Law and Ethics Governing Marriage, Developed from the Perspective ofMalachi, Brill: Leiden 1994, 342f. " W h a t w e have [...] been witnessing in the course of the twentieth century is the gradual rise to legal prominence of an Enlightenment contractarian model of marriage. This model has slowly eclipsed Protestant and Catholic models of marriage and the ideas and institutions that those models have introduced into the Western legal tradition" (Witte Jr., John; From Sacrament to Contract. Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville Kentucky 1997,196) "Die Zuwendung in der Ehe kann auch in Begriff und Vorstellung der Partnerschaft gefasst werden. Dieses moderne Verständnis der Ehe bringt deren innere Verbindlichkeit gut zur Geltung, wenn damit die Selbstbestimmung zur Gemeinschaft ausgesagt werden soll, deren Partner die Eheleute sind und in die sie sich als Teil einbringen. Der Begriff 'Partnerschaft' ist deutlich abgesetzt gegen feudale, patriarchalische oder feministische Vorstellung der Zu- oder Unterordnung, die aus dem gesellschaftlichen Umfeld auf die Ehe übertragen werden" (Rendtorff, Trutz; Ethik.

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were sustained in the terms of a kind of individualism in which the partners only incidentally entered into relationships. The individuals involved were increasingly thought of as transferable. Rights of partners had to be carefully articulated and the grounds of obligation of their duties equally carefully argued.27 This view is classically expressed in Kant's definition of marriage as the association of two persons of different sexes for a life-long mutual possession of their sexual characteristics.28 That this view of marriage came to be reflected in civil law on marriage and divorce may appear inevitable.29 It nevertheless requires a particular moral view of marriage. "Like the society it generally reflects, American family law increasingly recognizes adult family members as little different from business partners, free to design the terms of their relationships; consciously, permitting - even encouraging, prospective parents to bargain and to exchange money for the biological parts and services need to create a baby."30

27 28

29

30

Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie [Bd. Π], Kohlhammer: Stuttgart 21991,42). So Bayer, Oswald; 'Die Ehe zwischen Freiheit und Gesetz'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik, Tübingen 1995, [224-246] 234f. Natural sexual intercourse according to the universal law is called "die Ehe (matrimonium), d.i. die Verbindung zweier Personen verschiedenen Geschlechts zum lebenswierigen [sie] wechselseitigen Besitz ihrer Geschlechtseigenschaften. [...] Es ist nämlich, auch unter Voraussetzung der Lust zum wechselseitigen Gebrauch ihrer Geschlechtseigenschaften, der Ehevertrag kein beliebiger, sondern durchs Gesetz der Menschheit notwendiger Vertrag, d.i., wenn Mann und Weib einander ihren Geschlechtseigenschaften nach wechselseitig gemessen wollen, so müssen sie sich notwendig verehlichen, und dieses ist nach Rechtsgesetzen der reinen Vernunft notwendig" (Kant, Immanuel; Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre. In: Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Wilhelm Weischedel] [Bd. IV], WBG: Darmstadt 51983, 390 [§ 24, Β 108] [italics orig.]). "Marriage is viewed increasingly at law and at large today as a private bilateral contract to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the couple sees fit" (Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 195; cf. 202-215). Dolgin, Janet L.; Ά Rendezvous in the Marketplace? Transformations in Family Law'. In: Krabbendam, Hans; Napel, Hans-Martien ten (edd.); Regulating Morality. A Comparison of the Role of the State in Mastering the Mores in the Netherlands and the United States, E.M. Meijers Institute / Maklu-Uitgevers nv: Antwerpen / Apeldoorn 2000, [193-211] 211. In the same volume, Gerda Kleijkamp explains and underpins the thesis that law reflects the morality of society rather than constitutes changes to it (Kleijkamp, Gerda Α.; 'The Influence of the 1960s on Developments in Family Law in

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Behind this liberal concept of marriage hides a more fundamental conviction about human sexuality. Sexuality - so it is stated - is one of the basic human needs, just like drinking and eating.31 As for all basic human needs, sexuality needs a 'form' so as to be expressed in a socially acceptable way. Marriage is such a 'form' which bears immediate consequences for its content. If seen as a form to express one's sexuality in a socially accepted way, it is designated to fulfil some specific human aims. The liberal view of freedom implies that this form is chosen by the partners like a contract.32 Some describe this conviction as depersonalising or dehumanising.33 Within the Christian tradition, however, there have been elements of a similar conviction, i.e. that of the 'ends' of marriage. Traditionally, these ends have consisted in the procreation of offspring, mutual help and companionship between the spouses, and the mitigation of sexual lust.34 A fourth element could be seen in the idea of marriage as a spiritual metaphor, in that it somehow reflects the community of the Trinitarian God.35 Wannenwetsch shows that in recent times, new kinds of secularized marital goals have emerged: self-realisation, marriage as a place to recover from social stress, and (under the influence of the idea of Romantic love) the expectation that the marital bond is a guarantee for happiness.36 The role of sexuality within this concept of contractarian, democratically structured form of intimate relationship, is characterized by the view that sexual relationships "no longer involve the collective transformation of individual needs and desires

31

the United States and the Netherlands'. In: Krabbendam, Regulating Morality, [213228] 217). Cf. Pöhlmann, Horst Georg; 'Ehe und Sexualität im Strukturwandel unserer Zeit'. In: Bayer, Oswald (Hg.); Ehe: Zeit zur Antwort, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1988, (29-59) 32 (quoting Bertrand Russell and Alex Comfort).

32

Cf. Honecker, M.; Grundriß der Sozialethik, De Gruyter: Berlin 1995, 162: "Die Aufklärung macht im Vertragsdenken die Ehe zur bürgerlichen Lebensform schlechthin. Mit Hilfe des Vertragsdenkens wird die Ehe zur rein weltlichen, rational-zweckhaften Einrichtung. Die traditionelle Lehre von den Ehezwecken Erzeugung und Erziehung der Nachkommenschaft, gegenseitige Unterstützung und geregelte Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs - konnte damit durchaus verbunden werden".

33 34 35 36

Pöhlmann, 'Ehe und Sexualität im Strukturwandel unserer Zeit', 32. Cf. Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 143f. Cf. Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 70f. Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 143-163.

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into transpersonal social forms, with all the moral obligations this involves, but instead that they rest merely on the reflexive construction of a mutually beneficial confluence of interests and needs".37 6.3.2 Critical Appraisal The liberal concept of marriage, as we have briefly described it, contains some major benefits. It is intended to stress the freedom of the spouses to choose their partner and thereby to (start to) realize some goals. Upon entering a marital relationship, the borders and boundaries set by a strict system of parental government are loosened. The burden of simply economic or social acceptability as a criterion for marriage is put into perspective. The dignity of the female partner of the contract is taken much more into consideration, and, as such, these tendencies are "noble attempts to bring greater equality and equity within marriage and society".38 Along with these 'noble attempts', marriage and the formation of the family become increasingly set apart from their former social and economic embedding. This development is largely acknowledged - and positively evaluated - among Christians all over the world. "Today, Christians in most cultures idealize the personal functions of marriage and family above the socioeconomic."39 Notwithstanding these advantages there are also some disadvantages. Verhey and Hauerwas, in their essay on the Church's teaching on sexuality, describe the benefits of the liberal view, in that the glory of the liberal tradition is its guarantee to each the liberty to pursue the good life as he or she sees it as long as it is compatible with the equal right of all others to a similar pursuit. Liberalism, however, provides a minimalist account of sexuality, and trivialises the debate on sexuality as one about private visions. That tendency increases the opinion that

37

Mellor, Philip Α.; Shilling, Chris; 'Confluent Love and the Cult of the Dyad: The Precontractual Foundations of Contractarian Sexual Relationships'. In: Davies, Jon; Loughlin, Gerard (edd.); Sex These Days. Essays on Theology, Sexuality and Society, Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1997, (51-78) 51.

38 39

Witte, Front Sacrament to Contract, 196. Cahill, Lisa Sowie; Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1996,167.

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sexuality is individualist expression of one, or between two, consenting adults. 40 Connected with this feature of sexuality is the implication that within such a marital relation, the spouses have to live up to their high personal expectations. The liberal-contractarian view of marriage stresses the work of building a life, and specifically marital life, which has major problematic features. For this concept tends to overlook fundamental uncertainties with which human beings have to live. It is clear to any observer that this view causes many marriages (and intimate relationships in general) to end for reasons of failure to reach the high level of expectations. 41 The burden of 'making' one's own life happy, promising and fulfilling is easily so heavy that expectations are not met by the reality of a concrete marriage. Thus, the goals become a heavy law one has to obey in order to let the relationship be worthwhile inhabiting. Within liberal and contractarian views, this problematic side of life is not altogether overlooked. In order to defend the necessity and indispensability of the marital bond for sexual human beings in reaction to these uncertain circumstances, liberal and contractarian views provide several responses. In the case of the sexuality involved in intimate (either marital or non-marital) relationships, one points to the 'pre-contractual foundations of contractarian sexual relationships' as described by several authors 42 Secondly, this argument can be easily extended towards the idea that the sex-act contains some kind of intrinsic 'sacramental' value. Out of this anthropological description of the sex-act, some deduce the indispensability of some formalized, marital bond as the best context for sexual relationships 43 40

41 42 43

Hauerwas, Stanley; Verhey, Allen; 'From Conduct to Character - A Guide to Sexual Adventure'. In: Thatcher, Adrian; Stuart, Elizabeth (ed.); Christian Perspectives on Sexuality and Gender, Eerdmans/Gracewing: Grand Rapids/ Leominster Herefordshire 1996, (175-181) 177. Cf. Cornes, Andrew; Divorce and Remamage. Biblical Principles and Pastoral Practice, Hodder & Stoughton: London 1993,13-17. Mellor/Shilling, 'Confluent Love'; Thatcher, Living Together and Christian Ethics. So e.g. Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 78-97; De Knijff, Venus aan de leiband, (298-303) 301: "De sexuele acte, de coitus, het samen-gaan-tot-een - het genotsgevoel toont het zelf impliceert in nuce het gehele huwelijk". Also Verhey and Hauerwas point to such defense: "Sex has a meaning beyond the quality of its performance. [...] People have skills, but they are sexual, and there is something as mysterious about sex as there is about persons - and about temples" (Hauerwas/Verhey, 'From Conduct to

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Apparently, such intrinsic, anthropological assumptions for sexuality and marriage are tempting. These interpretations and speculation about the essentiality of marriage, however, have some disadvantages. First, they can easily be disputed by means of descriptions of the communis opinio: one can simply state that such deep insights are not necessary for experiencing the deep feelings involved in non-marital relationships. Secondly, these interpretations can be contested by other explanations of the same phenomena. For these reasons, the seemingly neutral and commonly acknowledged anthropological foundations of the essentiality of the marital bond are in need of a more profound and Christian basis. 6.3.3 Living Marriage as God's Gift In order to find a way of life in which one can think highly of the goodness of marriage on the one hand, and also be realistic about the uncertainties of life on the other, the Christian notion of God's promise could help. In this concept, the goals of marriage do not determine its level of success. The achievement of such goals is important, but the success of a marriage is not restricted to reaching certain ends. As Wannenwetsch shows, living a marriage is not striving toward certain goals. The basis of marriage is living according to God's institution. As a kind of side-effect, viewed with the benefit of hindsight, one can discern certain ends that are achieved. But they are the gift of God.44 'This has to do with the fact that my natural passions and desires are

44

Character', 178). Hauerwas and Verhey concede, however, that this mistery is a profoundly Christian one. In their opinion, the alleged anthropological depth of sexuality can only be seen from a Christian point of view. "Erst wenn die Ehe nicht mehr auf Kinder, Sex, ökonomische Sicherung etc. hin verzwecklicht wird, sind die Wahrheitsmomente dieser traditionellen Bestimmungen und ihrer modernen Modifikationen wahrzunehmen: eben als Momente sind sie wahr, und nur so kommen sie zu ihrem Recht und der ihnen zustehenden eigenen Betrachtung; dass etwa Kinder nicht Zweck der Ehe sind, heisst für die Kinder und für die Ehegemeinschaft zus der sie hervorgehen, eben auch, dass sie mehr sind, als sich in dieser Bestimmung unterbringen liesse. [...] Dagegen mag es [i.e. das Glück] einstellen als willkommene Beigabe einer Gemeinschaft, die u m ihrer selbst willen gelebt wird. Glück wird also stets eher in rückblickender als in planerischer Sicht vorkommen, eher im Dankgebet als in der Bitte. [...] Je weniger die Sexualität zweckrational als Hauptsache begriffen wird, desto mehr findet sie die Freiheit z u m Spiel" (Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 167.172).

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uncertain and many-folded. They, therefore, are in need of formation and fixation. God's word lends the chaotic nature of human passion a qualification and determination, by distinguishing marital and nonmarital ways of living together clearly.'45 As is made clear in the chapter on Oswald Bayer (chapter 4), this notion of God's qualifying and determining word is closely connected to the doctrine of creation. It is God's promising word that constitutes reality, and therefore we can trust this word. 'In conflict, no comfort can be found in the stability of moral determination. [...] Only the word which provides community can offer comfort.'46 If this is correct, we have to trace human marriage back to the promising word of God. At this point, the creation stories in Genesis hold potential for interpreting this way of life. For here, the creation of human being as man and woman is mentioned as the pinnacle of God's creative work. The complementarity of male and female is secured and sanctioned in the command to govern creation as stated in Genesis l,26f: 'Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, in accordance with our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground." So God created man, in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.'

God created adam as the union of male and female, which is blessed by the promise of procreation: 'God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground'" (Genesis 1,28).

Out of the broader context of the doctrine of creation, it can be said that this divine blessing encourages human beings to commit themselves to this task. The uncertainties with which this assignment is beset in the world we experience are met by God's promising word.47 Thus, the creation of man and woman and their mutual bond is warranted by 45 46 47

Bayer, 'Zeit zur Antwort'. In: Bayer, Oswald (Hg.); Ehe: Zeit zur Antwort, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1988, (12-28) 26. Bayer, 'Zeit zur Antwort', 27. Even in paradise, Adam already experienced loneliness and fear - a view which is comparable with the account Bavinck gives of the prelapsarian position of man (Bavinck, Herman; In the Beginning. Foundations of Creation Theology [TR John Vriend; ED John Bolt], Baker: Grand Rapids 1999,208f; Bavinck, H.; GD Π, 534v).

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God's own commitment to bless them. Here any intrinsic human ability to accomplish God's commission forms the basis of neither the marital bond, nor the goals man himself sets on this relationship. Bayer states, following Luther, that a profoundly realistic view of the created marital bond is intended to cope with its context of fundamental temptation by the trivialities of life. Over against any optimistic idea of self-reliant human fulfilment, Bayer turns his attention towards the indispensability of God's creative word, which instituted marriage as the basic life-form to meet our human needs: 'Even the creation-orders cannot be understood as a self-evident order of the world, but something which is only traceable in a faithful attitude towards the institutional word.' 48 Therefore, marital life - like the whole world - is in the midst of a battle between belief and unbelief, which can only be met by God's promise of Genesis 1,28.49

6.3.4 The Gift Contested and Preserved Marriage within the context of the doctrine of creation can be said to be God's gift to mankind. However, the context in which we speak of marriage is characterized by conflict. This observation is fundamental to the discussion of the liberal view of marriage. As we have already seen, the liberal-contractarian theory of marriage carries with it the awareness of this context of conflict. The whole concept of marriage as a contract, as we have discussed here, is based on the assumption that there has to be a kind of regulation of the relationship between a man and a woman, particularly because this relationship is not lasting and 48

49

Bayer, Oswald; Schöpfung als Anrede. Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, Mohr/Siebeck Tübingen [11986] 21990, 58 ("Auch die Schöpfungsordnungen sind nicht etwas, was als Ordnung der Welt aus sich selbst heraus verständlich wäre, sondern was nur im Glauben an das Einsetzungswort dieser Ordnungen recht wahrgenommen werden kann"). Cf. the quotation from Luther (WA 10/Π, 294, 22-33): "Die [das eheliche Leben] erkennen, sind aber die: die festiglich glauben, dass Gott die Ehe selbst eingesetzt, Mann und Weib zusammengegeben, Kinder zu zeugen und auferziehen verordnet hat. Denn sie haben Gottes Wort darauf; dessen sind sie gewiss, dass er nicht lügt, 1. Mose 1,28. Darum sind sie auch gewiss, dass ihm der Stand an sich gefället mit allem seinem Wesen, seinen Werken, Leiden und was drinnen ist. Nun sage mir, wie kann ein Herz grösseres Gut, Frieden und Lust haben als in Gott, wenn es gewiss ist, dass sein Stand, Wesen und Werk Gott gefället?" (Bayer, Schöpfung als Anrede, 59f).

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good in itself.50 As far as this conflict is recognized, both Christian and the liberal-contractarian views agree. From here, however, they each go their separate ways. For the solution, to overcome this instability of the marital relationship, is found in two opposite places: for the contractarian view in the solidity of the partner's obedience to the contract, and for the Christian view in God's promising and comforting word. The capability to endure this conflict, in the Christian view, is traced back to the trusting of God's promise which instituted marriage. 51 Here we encounter one of the elements of any definition of 'marriage': marital fidelity. This fidelity is not confined to the absence of sexual relationships with someone to whom one is not married (though this is explicitly included). The concept of marital fidelity is an intrinsic aspect of marriage, and has to be interpreted not only with respect to the aspect of sexuality, but as part of the life-form in general. This concept of marital fidelity is clearly stated in the biblical expression of the second creation-narrative. In Genesis 2, the focus on the creation of man as male and female is more explicitly treated. In 2,18 it is stated that God acknowledges the loneliness of 'man' not to be good, so that God will make a helper suitable for him. Among the animals, no such helper is found (2,19-20). The solution God arrives at is not the independent creation of another 'adam, a replica of the first, but rather to 'build' a complementary being from a portion of 'adam's own self, a 'rib' (2,21-22). Bayer here explicates the immense comfort of God's fulfilment of man's wish for company. God answers the human complaint of loneliness with his creative word. 52 This, however, does not imply the absense of conflict. Precisely because marriage is God's own institution,

50

51 52

Cf. the elaboration of marriage de lege in Kant's Rechtslehre, in which he condemns the concept of pure natural lust, and the concept of concubinage (Kant, Immanuel; Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Wilhelm Weischedel] [Bd. IV], WBG: Darmstadt 5 1983,391-393 [§ 26f, Β 109-112]). In section 6.5 the problem of the relationship between divine and human activity in the constitution of marriage will be discussed. "Mit diesem Schöpferwort hat Gott die Klage menschlicher Einsamkeit erhört, ist er ihr schon zuvorgekommen. Mit diesem Schöpferwort wehrt er der Einsamkeit, indem er Mann und Frau zusammenbringt, 'zusammengibt', 'zusammenspricht' in einer Mitmenschlichkeit, in der einer den anderen - staunend - erkennt und anerkennt" (Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 212f).

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conflict will not fail to occur.53 It becomes clear what comfort God's word gives, and what power of hope. Whereas the liberal-contractarian view only leaves room for human capacity to endure the conflict, the God of the Bible offers a radically different solution for preserving the good gift of marriage. God himself creates marriage by his effective word, but also gives mankind the promise to sustain marriage and to overcome its conflict. Furthermore, this authority of God's word is not present in a dehumanizing way, but as a liberating force; it is the power to live in community which does not stem from man or his emotions or circumstances, nor from his decisions; it is the divine power to create and sustain community even through crises and conflicts. As such, God's word is a pastoral comfort.54 To acknowledge this word of God is to commit oneself to God the Creator and to view human persons as created, changeable beings who rely on God's promise.55 Thus, the biblical texts also present the indissoluble bond between man and woman from which the theological tradition of both Catholicism and Protestantism derive the indissolubility of marriage.56 In response to the creation of the woman, Adam acknowledges that the 53 54 55

56

Cf. 4.3.2 where is stated that God's promissio evokes the conflict within this broken reality. Cf. Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 217. "Indem Mann und Frau ihr ganzes Leben miteinander teilen, welches Alter, Krankheit und Gebrechlichkeit einschliesst, bekennen sie sich zu Gott als dem Schöpfer. Sie nehmen sich als Geschöpfe an, als Menschen die sich verändern, deren äusserliche Attraktivität im Laufe ihres Lebens ebenso schwinden mag wie ihre körperliche und geistige Spannkraft, und nicht als Idole, die stets gleichbleiben" (Wannenwetsch, Die Freiheit der Ehe, 187). "Nach evangelischer Auffassung ist somit die Ehe auf der einen Seite die besondere Ordnung des Schöpfungs- und Heilswirkens Gottes, auf der anderen Seite übersteigt sie als innerweltliche Wirklichkeit in ihrer Qualität jede Art von Vertrag. [...] Als solche ist sie wesenhaft unauflösbar. Die lutherische Ethik hat sich damit in ihren ehetheologischen Aussagen von der in der Aufklärung durchgängig vertretenen Vorstellung gelöst, dass es sich bei der Ehe um ein Vertragsverhältnis handle. Diese Ablehung des Vertragsgedankens erfolgt aus Gründen der Bewahrung eines Verständnisses von Ehe als Stiftung Gottes, die dem Menschen unverfügbar und von ihm daher auch nicht auflösbar ist; dagegen wäre die Ehe als Vertrag und säkulares Rechtsgeschäft durch die Vertragspartner jederzeit kündbar" (Selge, KarlHeinz; Ehe als Lebensbund. Die Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe als Herausforderung ßr den Dialog zwischen katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischer Theologie, Peter Lang: Frankfurt a.M 1999, [321-324] 323). Cf. Tenholt, Gerhard; Die Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe und der kirchliche Umgang mit wiederverheirateten Geschiedenen, LIT Verlag: Münster 2001, 215-225. For the indissolubility of marriage, see also section 6.4.4.

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woman is not just 'like himself', but 'from himself' as well, which can be celebrated in a lifelong union: 'This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called 'woman', for she was taken out of man' (Genesis 2,23).

The next point the commentator57 points at is the complementarity of man and woman in being each other's sexual other: 'For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and they will become one flesh' (Genesis 2,24).

Within the context of the unspoiled relationship between Adam and Eve, sexuality is the celebration of oneness. "The Genesis narrative indicates that the sexual nature of the human person forms the impulse that drives an individual beyond the self to seek bonding with others. Adam's solitude arose from a void that could be filled neither by his companionship with the animals, nor - interestingly enough - by the presence of the solitary Adam before God. The appropriate antidote for this situation was the creation not merely of a counterpart, but more specifically of a female counterpart."58 The awareness of the fundamental reciprocity of mankind following from the intense void Adam experienced and God's comforting creation of the woman is here stated to be the reason for a man to leave his family and to form a bond with his own wife. Therefore, Genesis 2,24 points not only to the sexuality involved in the marital relationship, but also to the life-long union in which they are 'as one'.59

57

Genesis 2,24 is a comment by the author of Genesis, which becomes clear if we see that it could not have been made about Adam and Eve, for they had no father or mother to leave. Therefore this statement will 'in-form' current life in its negative and positive features (cf. Schmitz, Klaus; 'Das biblisch-christliche Grundverständnis von "Ehe" und seine Bedeutung für die Frage nach Scheidung und Wiederheirat. Eine hermeneutisch-theologische Betrachtung gemeindlicher Dokumente und biblischer Texte'. In: Bochmann, Andreas; Treeck, Klaus-J. van [Hg.]; Ehescheidung und Wiederheirat. Ein pastoral-theologisches Symposium, Theologische Hochschule Friedensau: Friedensau 2000, [33-79] 60).

58 59

Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 32. Comes expressedly states the passivity involved in 'becoming one flesh' (Cornes, Divorce & Remarriage, 58-61). This coincides with the word of Jesus: "What God has joined together [...]" (Mark 10,9 et parr.), and the consequences for the doctrine of creation at this point.

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6.3.5 Conclusion - The Reality of a Fallen World The most evident way in which Christians can deal with the problematic side of life in general and married life in particular is to rethink the creation-narratives in their totality. For these biblical witnesses testify to God's creative power by which He meets our human need for steadfast relationships. The biblical story of the fall, however, which immediately follows the creation-narratives, presents us with an account of the historical change of this intimate bond between man and woman. The concluding statement of the creation narrative says that 'man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame' (Genesis 2,25). It is clear that there was no need to hide anything from each other at that time. Therefore, the contrast with Genesis 3,7 is clear. As soon as it is described that both man and woman ate of the fruit of the tree, 'the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realised that they were naked'. From then on, undistorted interpersonal relationships are gone, and lust (Matthew 5,28) and desire (Genesis 2,16) will govern human life. For this reason, there is something special in the marital sexual intercourse as it occurred after the fall. Both man and woman have to 'undress', to lay aside the shame of nakedness, and be very close to God's creative will for man and woman. 'Adam lay with his wife Eve, and she became pregnant and gave birth to Cain. She said, "With the help of the LORD I have acquired a man'" (Genesis 4,1). Wannenwetsch's interpretation of the words 'have acquired' is interesting. According to him - and contrary to most commentators - it is not said of Cain but of Eve's husband, Adam. With the help of the Lord, the alienation caused by the fall and expressed in the shame of each before the other, 60 is overcome and transcended by the intense

60

Dietrich Bonhoeffer gives the same explanation on shame and how it is overcome by new life: "Erst mit dem geborenen Leben, mit dem vollendeten Werk bricht durch das Geheimnis der Scham die jubelnde offene Freude hindurch. Das Geheimnis seiner Entstehung aber trägt es für immer in sich" (Bonhoeffer, Dietrich; Ethik [DBW 6], Kaiser/ Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 2 1998, [304-308] 308).

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personal 'knowledge' (yada')61 of each other in the act of sexual intercourse which eventually results in the birth of Cain.62 To conclude, we can say that from reading the whole of Genesis 1-4, it is clear that the context of marriage is one of conflict. Sin affects both the relation with God and between man and woman. Only 'with the help of the LORD' can this be overcome - referring to God's indispensable promise.

6.4 Marriage and Natural Law One of the most elaborate concepts of marriage stems from the tradition of natural law. The following section is devoted to this tradition (6.4.1), to its problematic features (6.4.2), the critical confrontation between the doctrine of creation and natural law-theory on marriage (6.4.3), and some conclusions on this tradition's most pressing item: the indissolubility of the marital bond (6.4.4).

6.4.1 Natural Law on Marriage The traditional foundation of marriage in a doctrine of natural law is most clearly found in Roman-Catholic ecclesial teaching. Marriage is considered to be the appropriate life-form for human beings (apart 61 62

Cf. Westermann, Claus; Genesis [BKAT1/1], Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1974,393. Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 81f. This interpretation is based on the occurence of qnh and 'ish, words which are unusual in this context. The verb qnh - usually translated as 'buying' or 'aquiring' - is used four times as 'bringing forth', 'produce', three of which have God as subject (Deuteronomy 32,6; Psalm 139,14; Proverbs 8,22). Only in Genesis 4, qnh in this sense should have a human being as a subject, which would be unusual. Furthermore, the word Sish to denote a newborn baby, is also unusual. The expresion, 'With the help of the LORD I have acquired a man', could therefore denote the following. Eve's return to Adam in sexual intercourse, thereby overcoming the interpersonal rift caused by the Fall, eventually resulted in the extension of the personal bond between Adam and Eve because of the birth of a third human being (Cain), which brings Eve to optimistic and thankful expression. This would also make the transition from Genesis 3 to 4 more consistent. The theme of shame and separation thereby recurs in 4,1. In conclusion, we may state that the ambiguity of Eve's expression in 4,1 has to be carefully maintained, and should not too easily be interpreted as referring to Cain only.

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from the calling of celibacy or singleness). The most striking feature of this concept of marriage is its strict indissolubility. For the RomanCatholic tradition, the indissolubility of marriage is founded firstly in the biblical texts (e.g. Matthew 19,6; Ephesians 5). Secondly, it generally assumes some teaching about marriage from natural law. The scholastic theologians considered procreation and the upbringing of children as the primary, natural goal of marriage, and the mutual help of the spouses as the secondary one. 'Primary' here indicates that which is common to human and all the animals, whereas 'secondary' is that which is proper to humans.63 The dissolution of a marriage, following this line of thought, would do harm to both goals of marriage.64 As has recently been stated: in marriage, a man and a woman become one flesh, something one cannot ignore without causing pain and traumatic experiences.65 The concept which lies behind this idea of marriage is that natural law is defined in terms of those actions which are common to humans and all animals. To use words like 'nature' and 'natural' in matters of sexuality is meant to express the idea that "humans share with the animal world the fact of the sexual union whereby male seed is deposited in the vas of the female".66 "As a created, natural institution, marriage was subject to the law of nature, communicated in reason and conscience, and often confirmed in the Bible. This natural law, 63

64

Cf. Curran, Charles E.; 'Natural Law in Moral Theology'. In: Curran, Charles E.; McCormick S.J., Richard A. (edd.); Natural Law and Theology [Readings in Moral Theology 7], Paulist Press: New York/Mahwah 1991, (247-295) 258f. Cf. Tenholt, Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe, 217: "Man erkennt also deutlich, dass das Wesen bzw. die Natur der Ehe bei Scheidung nicht zur Verwirklichung kommen kann. Daher ist die Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe bereits von der eigenen Natur, wie sie von uns rational erfasst werden kann, d.h. naturrechtlich begründet". Tenholt also describes recent proposals to recognize and accept remarriage (and thereby also some kind of dissolubility of marriages) on the ground of 'mercifulness' of the Church concerning remarried people (245-261).

65

Cf. the quotation from the influential advocate of natural-law theory Germain Grisez: "Since they complete each other to become, as it were, one person, a man and a woman truly joined in marital communion cannot attempt to divide without severe trauma, analogous to, and in some respects even worse than, the loss of a substantial part of one's own body" - quotation by Gareth Moore ('Natural Sex: Germain Grisez, Sex, and Natural Law'. In: Biggar, Nigel; Black, Rufus (edd.); The Revival of Natural Law. Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, Ashgate: Aldershot 2000, [223-241] 226).

66

Curran, 'Natural Law in Moral Theology', 256.

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medieval writers taught, communicated God's will that fit persons marry when they reach the age of puberty, that they conceive children and nurture and educate them, that they remain naturally bonded to their blood and kin, serving them in times of need, frailty, and old age. It prescribed heterosexual, lifelong unions between a couple, featuring mutual support and faithfulness. It required love for one's spouse and children."67 6.4.2 Critique of the Natural Law Concept Though the whole body of Catholic, scholastic teaching on natural law and marriage cannot be discussed here, it is worthwhile listening to recent commentators. Here we trace important elements of both critique and support to the doctrine of creation. As some commentators have shown, one can discern a certain tendency in the teaching of the Catholic Church on marriage. In the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, natural law is immediately traced back to God's creating, sustaining, and governing relation with creation. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, a tendency arose which dehistoricized the natural order, and transformed it into transcendent metaphysical law. The connection with God was gradually eclipsed in ecclesial teaching.68 At stake here are not the particular outcomes of such a use of the concept of natural law. It is the context in which one uses this concept. "The use of natural law by moral theologians has always been Janus-faced. Natural law can be used to express specifically theological propositions about divine providence, or it can be used to ground or mount arguments about particular disputed issues of conduct. In modern times, we observe a steady drift toward the latter use, and with it a gradually diminishing sense of the

67 68

Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 25. Beemer, Th.; 'De fundering van de seksuele moraal in een door God ingestelde morele orde. Analyse en commentaar op grond v a n enkele recente kerkelijke documenten'. In: Beemer, Th. (e.a.); Het kerkelijk spreken over seksualiteit en huxvelijk. Een bundel filosofische, gedragswetenschappelijke en theologische studies, Ambo: Baarn 1983, 15-52. I do not intend to evaluate Beemer's thesis that the natural law in the course of the nineteenth century became a warrant for the upholding of the current situation by those in charge. This critique deserves a far more thorough comment than can be provided here.

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sapiential context afforded by theology proper." 69 'Natural law' has been increasingly used to defend the rational character of marriage, being generally acceptable as in accord with a generally accepted 'order of nature'. It is the 'general acceptance' which can be doubted in current society. As Hittinger shows, the use of the natural-law-concept may be valuable in the intra-ecclesial, Christian debate. But for any conversation or debate with non-Christians, the appeal to 'nature' has to be accompanied by the appeal to follow on God's preserving grace in matters of morality.70

6.4.3 The Naturalness of Natural Law and the Doctrine of Creation If, however, we are to build a Christian doctrine of marriage with the help of (elements out of) the Christian doctrine of creation, perhaps we could avoid the tendencies mentioned above. For even apart from the question of what can be considered to be 'natural' in the sense of once and for all given in nature, and what can be considered artificial in the sense of invented by human beings (which will be discussed in section 6.5), the point made by critics of natural law, that it is made independent of God's creative action, is worth considering. If theologians in the tradition of 'natural law' trace marriage back to some kind of 'nature', it is the specific 'kind' of nature that is at stake. As the critique of both Beemer and Hittinger suggests, the development of the history of western thought is one of gradually increasing independence of the natural order from the creative and sustaining activity of God. As Gunton has asserted with some strength, the concept of the Trinity is involved here. According to Gunton, the 69

70

Hittinger, Russell; 'Natural Law and Catholic Moral Theology'. In: Cromartie, Michael (ed.); A Preserving Grace. Protestants, Catholics, and Natural Law, Ethics and Public Policy Center/Eerdmans: Washington/Grand Rapids 1997, (1-30) 11. Cf. also C u r r a n ('Natural Law in Moral Theology', 263-269) w h o characterizes this development in terms of worldview that changed from a classisist, static one t o w a r d s a historical, evolving one. Hittinger, 'Natural Law and Catholic Moral Theology', 19-30. Cf. Moore, 'Natural Sex', 239: "The resulting arguments [of Grisez] m a y convince the converted, i.e. those w h o d o not need m u c h convincing; but the suspicions of those w h o need genuine arguments are b o u n d to be aroused - as it turns out, w i t h some considerable justification. Inconvenient facts are ignored, and elementary logical and philosophical points overlooked in the efford to get the desired conclusion".

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thoughts of Duns Scotus and Ockham were to a certain degree a 'second overcoming of Gnosticism' (Blumenberg), in that they reaffirmed "the fundamental distinction between creator and creation which had always been in danger in any thought influenced by Neoplatonism".71 Their radical stress on creation's dependence on the Creator led to a rightful stress on contingency, but in its course very little is said about the stability of the created order which leaves the created order relatively independent. Gunton criticises these outcomes for their lack of trinitarian thought. Eventually, even their good beginnings ended in a form of monistic, voluntarist relation between Creator and creation. This eventually led to concepts which were vulnerable to strands of mechanism and pantheism, in which a relation between God and the world which included development was impossible.72 The only way to overcome the dilemma between classical, static, or historical, evolutionary concepts of 'order' is to accept the doctrine of the Trinity. For it is a Trinitarian involvement of God in his creation that allows this creation to have a past, a present, and a future - and consequently, to have development.73 If God can be said to work trinitarianly throughout history towards a goal for God's own creation, the concept of 'natural order' is not from the outset obliged to be a static and monistic one. The relation between God and the alleged order of creation does allow for development and change. The changes in the concept of marriage and family which have evidently been taking place over the centuries are not, from the outset or principally, contrary to 'nature'. For 'nature' and the natural order are not finite echoes of a fixed and static God, but they are dependent on God's providential care for and creative activity towards them. Here we can use both Gunton's stress on God's Trinitarian involvement in the history of creation and Bayer's stress on the ongoing constitutive relation of God by his promising and creative Word. By 71

Gunton, Colin E.; The Triune Creator. A Historical and Systematic Study, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1998, (117-145) 120.

72

Gunton, The Triune Creator, 143-145. In relation to theological ethics it is remarked that "Since the 19th century, Neo-Scolasticism as a theological method has hardened ecclesial ethics. Neo-Scolasticism presents a static concept of marriage, developing the idea of an enduring nature that is relatively recent in theological history" (Kramer, Hans; 'Changes in the Ethos of Marriage, Faithfulness, and Divorce'. In: Scott, Kieran; Warran, Michael (edd.); Perspectives on Marriage. A Reader, Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York Ώ001, [355-366] 357). See above, section 3.2.3 and 3.4.3.

73

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conceiving the life-form of marriage both as instituted by the Trinitarian God who allows for development and growth, and as constantly dependent on his providential creative power, the assumed 'naturalness' of the created order is attacked. At this point, it is worth investigating the discussion between Gareth Moore (O.P.) and the influential spokesman of natural-law theory Germain Grisez on the concept of 'natural sex'. According to Moore, what is wrong with this concept consists of both the factual and logical failures of the theory. The latter are shown by tracing Grisez's assumed 'naturalness' of marriage back to presuppositions, about the indissolubility of the spouses who became 'one flesh', which are not logically binding but silently relying on biblical revelation - and therefore not appealing to those who do not share these presuppositions. The former (factual) failures are criticised by an appeal to 'feelings'. As is rightly shown by Moore, spouses and children confronted with divorce are not always engaged in deep traumatic experiences, as Grisez is saying. And even if such feelings are involved, these feelings do "not rely on the putatively objective fact" that the married couple did form an indissoluble marital unity of 'one-flesh', "but on the intention of one or both of the marrying partners".74 Here Moore places the warrant for a successful marriage between the spouses in the intention and actual elaboration of it: "If the union they are about to form is to be exclusive and permanent, then it will be because they work to make it so [...]. The purported one-flesh union [...] is said to guarantee the future unity of the couple whatever they later choose and do, and this is just not the kind of unity they are interested in. Instead of a real personal relationship involving a loving sharing of life, which is what they want, it offers only a guarantee that even if they do not have this they will have some kind of metaphysical unity. While the purported one-flesh union is presented as guaranteeing the couple what they want, it assures them only something they do not want." 75

Moore may be right in attributing no guaranteeing ability to the institution of marriage or the marital bond as such, however the conclusion that the success of a marriage lies in the hands of the spouses is theologically incorrect. The felt intentions and events in the course of marriage are made the warrant for marital success. The constitutive relation between God's instituting word and human reality

74 75

Moore, 'Natural Sex', 227. Moore, 'Natural Sex', 228.

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is not taken into consideration. The point is that both Grisez and his critic Moore appeal to 'feelings' or 'nature' apart from the constitutive relation with the Creator. For the concept of one-flesh union is not 'natural', nor is the concept of any natural inclination towards a successful marriage. The marital stability that is looked for by the spouses cannot be found in natural human characteristics of marriage per se or in human feelings. As is made clear in section 6.3.4, the only warrant for marital happiness - which also pays tribute to the perception of the context of conflict - is found in God's promising word which creates and sustains marriage. There is, however, an additional point that has to be made about the place and function of human feelings. For it seems that Moore's argument is intended to allow for feelings as an argument contra the alleged 'natural law' which is supposed to teach the indissolubility of marriage. On the other hand, it is possible for people not to experience this indissolubility in case of a divorce. The problematic side of both arguments is the status of 'feelings'. Feelings have always gone through a process of formation in which they are 'in-formed' by social settings.76 The experienced feeling of indissolubility or dissolubility of marriage therefore has to be traced back to this social setting of the spouses involved.77 As Rufus Black argues, it is necessary to pay explicit 76

77

With respect to the due place of 'love' in theological ethics, Wannenwetsch has explicitly made clear the relation between such a 'formation' of feelings and the moral conduct (Wannenwetsch, Bernd; 'Caritas fide formata. "Herz und Affekte" als Schlüssel zum Verhältnis von "Glaube und Liebe'". In: KuD 46 [2000], [205-224] 223f). Cf. McGowan, Jo; 'Marriage versus Living Together'. In: Scott, Kieran; Warran, Michael (edd.); Perspectives on Marriage. Α Reader, Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York 22001, 83-87. In her account, the benefits of the institution of marriage are especially seen in the permanency of it: "Since constancy is a virtue that very few of us possess at all times, it is important that we see marriage as something beyond ourselves. [...] It is precisely because marriage is so difficult that we must see it as permanent. [...] Simply living together, without 'benefit of marriage,' does not provide the security of knowing that this is forever" (84). However interesting and warm her account is, here the critique of Moore could be used as well. For one does not always 'feel' the need for constancy. The crux of McGowan's interpretation can be traced at the end of her essay. Marriage "expresses, in its ideal form, a belief in the goodness of community, a belief in the beauty of two people who love each other coming together to live in communion, a belief in the wonder of hman life, a belief so strong that it expressed itself in the creation of new human life" (87). The context of contesting here seems to be forgotten, whereas the doctrine of creation from the outset reckons with human failure.

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attention to the community in which people's attitudes and values are formed. This is the obligatory complementary side of any appeal to both the created order to which one has to conform oneself, and the feelings the individual experiences.78 6.4.4 Conclusion Concerning the question about the indissolubility of marriage, an appeal to both 'natural law' and alleged 'natural' feelings conveys clear weaknesses. How can this indissolubility be conceived convincingly without an appeal to 'natural law'? In order to provide an answer, we will turn to a reading of Ephesians 5. Here we encounter the necessary warrant for the indissolubility of marriage because of the explicit Christological qualification of the marital bond. Paul "develops a reciprocal connection between the spiritual and the marital aspects. Thus, the bond between husband and wife serves as a metaphor of that between Christ and his people. But the analogy moves in the other direction as well. The roles fulfilled by the Lord and the church in their relationship provide a model for husbands and wives". 79 Paul situates the bond of marriage within the dynamic of Christ's relationship to the Church. By doing so, he "gives to the male-female bond a special status as a metaphor of the gospel" - as Grenz comments. 80 According to Grenz, the content of this metaphor is one of general 'mutual submission'.81 This qualifies the content of Paul's saying about the submission of wives to their husbands. This specified submission has its key in the addition 'as to the Lord' (5,22). According to Wannenwetsch, this addition is to be interpreted in terms of 'freedom'. Wives are liberated from some kind of 'natural' hierarchic position below their husbands. Such a position is rejected by strands of thought expressed in Galatians 3,28: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus." Here it is made clear that such hierarchic disparity is the consequence

78 79 80 81

Black, Rufus; Christian Moral Realism. Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue and the Gospel, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2000 (cf. above, section 5.3.4 note 127). Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 63. Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 63. Cf. Ephesians 5,21: "Submit to one another out of reverence for Christ".

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of the fall (Genesis 3,16) and is abolished. Therefore, the submission is a 'free' one, by which wives can show their liberty. Furthermore, the link with the behaviour of the Church is made. The Church also submits to Christ, a submission which is the most important one in this letter. An important element of discontinuity is nevertheless found here, in that the Church is to be saved by Christ - an aspect which is fully absent in the submission of wives to their husbands. This means that the kathoos of 5,25 ("Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church") also has fundamental meaning: 'because...'. To 'imitate' God (5,1), therefore, is not only trying to act analogously, but also to investigate how God's action is fundamental for one's own acts.82 The primacy of the Church's submission to Jesus Christ indicates an important aspect of Wannenwetsch's exegesis of Ephesians 5. In contrast to the Roman-Catholic teaching on the 'sacrament' of marriage, he points to the need for any marriage to be constantly drawn back to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, as it is celebrated and lived-out in the 'praxis' of the community of believers. We have to interpret marital life not in terms of something natural or something ready to have analogies or to be subordinated to any analogy. On the contrary, marriage is to be seen as something that is situated in the 'saved community' and thereby is able to recognize its own need to be saved. 'Marital life does not come into consideration as simply natural or analogous, which could be said to be "salvation" for reasons of divine initiative or easy analogy, but as a life which will have to realise the necessity of its salvation by finding itself to be in the context of the "saved community". [...] The analogy of marriage with the communion of Christ and the Church cannot be one of natural law functioning according to the logic of the analogia entis, nor a matter of private religious observation.'83 So, according to Wannenwetsch, the 'as to the Lord' (5,22) qualifies the whole of this framework. He thereby connects the practical

82

Cf. Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 104-108.

83

"[D]as eheliche Leben [kommt] nicht einfach als natürliches oder analogables in den Blick, welches aufgrund göttlicher Stiftung oder vollziehbarer Entsprechung a priori 'heil' wäre, sondern als eines, das in seinem Hineingestelltsein in die 'gerettete Gemeinschaft' seiner eigenen Rettungsbedürftigkeit gewahr wird" (Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 108). The analogy of marriage with the communion of Christ and the Church can be no "naturgesetzlicher [...], der nach der Logik der 'analogia entis' funktionierte" nor "Sache privatreligiöser W a h r n e h m u n g " (112).

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admonitions of Paul with the theme of the epistle as a whole, unity within the redeemed community of believers. Wannenwetsch gives here his interpretation of the famous concluding passage of Ephesians 5. Just as Christ feeds and cares for the Church, a husband should love his wife "for we are members of his body. 'For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh'. This is a profound mystery - but I am talking about Christ and the church" (Ephesians 5,30-32). This word ('mysterion') is taken as meaning 'sacrament7 relatively early in the history of the Church. It was seen as a token of the indissolubility of the marital bond, just as the bond between Christ and the Church was indissoluble. The confessed commitment to one another was a firm, vowed bond.84 Apart from that, the quotation from Genesis was taken to refer to Christ's union with the Church as if it were a prophecy by God through Adam. In line with this interpretation, Augustine assumes that "marriage is a great sacrament insofar as it exists between Christ and the Church". 85 Wannenwetsch's opinion seems to be in line with this aspect of Augustine.86 The recent thorough exegetical work on this scriptural passage by Gregory Dawes makes clear that Paul does not explicitly 'quote' Genesis 2,24, but simply weaves it into his argument. He uses the words of Genesis in the argument on the relations within the community of the Church, one of the major themes of this epistle.87 Dawes takes Paul's comment (Ί am speaking, however, about Christ and the Church') on 84

Cf. Reynolds, Philip Lyndon; Marriage in the Western Church. The Christianization of Marriage during the Patristic and Early Medieval Periods, Brill: Leiden 1994, 282; cf. 291f where it is stated that Augustine interpreted Ephesians 5 in line with the sayings of Jesus on divorce and remarriage in the gospels.

85 86

Reynolds, Marriage in the Western Church, 289. Cf. Dawes, Gregory W.; The Body in Question. Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5,21-32 [Biblical Interpretation Series Vol. 30], Brill: Leiden etc. 1998, 233: "Therefore, the love which is demanded of wives and husbands is not only based on their marriage union; it is also based on their common status as believers. While married couples are joined in a particularly intimate, bodily union (Eph 5,31), a union which demands that they care for and take responsibility for one another, it is because they are 'members of [...] [the] body' of Christ (cf. Eph. 5,30), and therefore 'members of one another' (Eph 4,25), that they are bound to this new and distinctively Christian ethic".

87

Dawes, The Body in Question, 180.

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this implicit quotation to explicate the meaning of the word 'mystery'. This word refers to Christ and the Church.88 By doing this, Paul makes clear that he uses the words 'one flesh' as "an implicit metaphorical identification of the two unions, insofar as the union of Church and Christ is described in words drawn from the bodily union of husband and wife". 89 Here Pannenberg adds a valuable thought. The mysterion is not simply identical with the communion between Christ and the Church. It exists in the relation of the creational communion of man and woman as husband and wife with the incarnation of Jesus Christ and his communion with the Church. 'The tertium comparationis in that case is given by the depiction of the Church as body of Christ, in accordance with the creational goal of man and woman to be "one flesh".'90 Thus, we can say that Christ's liberation of man and woman from the sinful, hierarchic marital constellation caused by the fall is taking place within the context of the Christian community (Church). The marital bond is based on the relation between Christ and the believers. Therefore, the marital bond can be used analogously to describe the indissoluble bond between Christ and the Church and vice versa.91 'Marriage' is not thereby rescued from its creational meaning or from its being instituted by God once in the beginning (as Wannenwetsch is suggesting). On the contrary: Because of Paul's deliberate interweaving 88

"We may conclude that to mysterion touto in Eph 5:32 refers to Christ's relationship with the Church and, in particular, to the fact that Christ has become one with the Church in a manner which may be described using the words of Gen 2:24. It is this which is described as 'a great mystery'" (Dawes, The Body in Question, 184).

89 90

Dawes, The Body in Question, 185. "Das tertium comparationis dürfte dabei durch die Vorstellung der Kirche als Leib Christi (Eph 1,23; vgl. 5,23) gegeben sein, entsprechend der schöpfungsmässigen Bestimmung von Mann und Frau, 'ein Leib' zu sein" (Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Systematische Theologie [Bd. 3], Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1993,392). Cf. Schmitz, Klaus; 'Das biblisch-christliche Grundverständnis von "Ehe" und seine Bedeutung für die Frage nach Scheidung und Wiederheirat. Eine hermeneutischtheologische Betrachtung gemeindlicher Dokumente und biblischer Texte'. In: Bochmann, Andreas; Treeck, Klaus-J. van (Hg.); Ehescheidung und Wiederheirat. Ein pastoral-theologisches Symposium, Theologische Hochschule Friedensau: Friedensau 2000, 33-79. Schmitz argues that Paul does not even speak directly about marriage here. Instead, Paul is talking about Christ and the Church, reframing the meaning of marriage by way of a "fundamentale Christologisierung" (67): "Es geht hier um eine symbolhafte Wirklichkeit, die nicht einfach auf die Ehe an und für sich eins zu eins übertragen werden darf" (67).

91

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of Genesis 2,24 in the whole of the argument, it can be deduced that now the full creational meaning of marriage can be discovered. To conclude, we can state that an approach towards marriage which is 'in-formed' by the Christian doctrine of creation is able to stress the constitutive relation between human life and God's providential care. This approach is critical of the place and value of human feelings if considered apart from social settings. Starting with the doctrine of creation immediately places any comment on marriage within the community of the Church which is to preserve and acknowledge God's sustaining power. This approach is likewise critical towards any 'natural' capacity of the concept of marriage and its implied indissolubility as stated in the natural law tradition. The community of the Church is the place in which the indissolubility of the marital bond is informed and strengthened by Chrisfs indissoluble bond with the Church. The ecclesiological framework of marital ethics can - because of the content of Ephesians 5 - be interwoven with an ethic of createdness.

6.5 Marriage, Constructivism and Providence In this section, we will look at the constructivist approach towards marriage. The question whether the concept of constructivism also bears consequences for the form relationships can or have to take in the future will be discussed in section 6.6. In this section, the characteristics of constructivism are treated first and then connected to the doctrine of creation (6.5.2). Secondly, the problematic side of this connection is illustrated by discussing the concept of 'autonomy' (6.5.2). The third subsection is devoted to the elaboration of the concept of 'marriage as created by God' (6.5.3). In the last subsection, conclusions are drawn with respect to the relation between the doctrine of creation and human action with regard to marriage (6.5.4).

6.5.1 The Constructivist Approach One of the major problems concerning the concept of marriage and its alleged basis in a doctrine of creation is the relation between God's action and human responsibility. For it is not at all common to see the current social institution of 'marriage' as stemming from God Himself. In many cases, the concept of 'marriage' is thought of as a life-form that

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has taken many different forms in the course of history. 'Marriage', so it is stated, is just one historical option among others. For marriage in this concept is considered to be a kind of human invention for controlling the living together of man and woman. This not only concerns 'marriage', but the intertwined concepts of sexuality, family, and relations in general. Kevin T. Kelly has proposed a new sexual ethic which is based on the presumption that these phenomena are to be considered as human constructions. We will elaborate his point of view, because he himself connects his constructivist approach with a specific use of the doctrine of creation. As the world on the threshold of the twenty-first century increasingly has to face the devastating consequences of the AIDSepidemic, new roads have to be found in order to inform human and Christian sexual ethics. In order to understand this concept, a lengthy quotation can serve as an example. "It seems to be generally agreed that, to a large degree, our sexuality, whether in the form of heterosexuality or homosexuality, is a social construct. In other words, our sexuality, as a human phenomenon, does not exist outside of history but can actually be influenced, modified and even changed through the interplay of various cultural variables in the course of history. If this is true, it would seem to follow that our sexual ethics needs to be open to modification and reappraisal to take account of significant changes occurring in our sexuality."92

Kelly even traces this view back to the doctrine of creation. "Our Christian God is not a divine clock-maker who, through an initial act of creation, sets the whole process of evolution in motion and then sits back to let it operate on its own. While the whole of creation is 'other' than God, it is also continuously held in being by God. [...] Theologically, therefore, creation is not understood as some initial act of God. It is an on-going process and relationship. As such, therefore, creation is not some finished product of God which demands our respect through a kind of 'do not touch' response. Creation is on-going here and now. It is a 'doing' of God, in which human persons, as intelligent beings made in 'God's image, are called to play an indispensable role."93

Here we see that presumptions about the doctrine of creation to a large degree determine the theological framework of ethical theories and evaluations of the life-forms for human beings. Firstly, Kelly - among 92 93

Kelly, Kevin T.; New Directions in Sexual Ethics. Moral Theology and the Challenge of AIDS, Geoffrey Chapman: London/New York 1998,29. Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 26.

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others94 - expresses his view of creation as being no 'initial act'. For these authors, their use of the concept of creation is intended to distinguish between two different concepts. The one is called 'nature', the other called 'creation'. Whereas 'nature' does "not carry moral imperatives inscribed within it, [...] a sound theology of creation [...] reminds us that we are called to exercise responsible stewardship for our world, for ourselves and for future generations". 95 In accordance with this concept, Kelly argues that talking about God as the author of marriage does mean that we may assume that both men and women in fact have to use their God-given intelligence to reflect on their developing experience, which eventually leads to the conclusion that marriage is the 'good' way for most men and women to live together. "We allow God to be author of marriage to the extent that we are open to discovering how best marriage should be lived today." 96 The task of inventing ways of living together is thereby a way to overcome a simple appeal to nature as conveying a static concept of the monogamous, indissoluble order of marriage directed at procreation. According to Kelly, we are called to 'play God', which reminds us that

94

95 96

Cf. e.g. the following quotation from Kurt Lüthi: "Ich versuche in diesem Versuch einer Sexualethik [die Verbindung] mit einer 'Theologie der Befreiung' zu finden. Sexualethik soll in diesem Entwurf als 'Ethik der Befreiung' gestaltet werden. Diese theologische Argumentation bedeutet, dass auch die Erfahrung der Befreiung mit dem Gottesproblem zusammenhängt, dass Gott nicht knechtende und ängstigende Über-Ich-Instanz ist, sondern Impuls zu Wegen der Befreiung und Emanzipation. [...] Gott wird dann nicht als Gott der Ordnungen verstanden, sondern als personales Gegenüber des Menschen, als 'Du', das die Wege des Ichs freigibt. Gott ist dann auch nicht der eine Pol im Bereich eines dualistischen Wirklichkeitsverständnisses, der dem andern Pol (des Bösen) schroff gegenübersteht, sondern er begleitet den Menschen in Bereichen, die einmal als 'gut' und einmal als 'böse' erlebt werden; er begleitet den Menschen auf allen Wegen. [...] Jetzt ist auch die Möglichkeit gegeben, das Christliche (bzw. das Biblische) und das Natürliche in eins zu setzen; jetzt haben natürliche Abläufe der Sexualität Chancen. Allerdings enthält die Befreiungsaussage auch Aufgaben, an denen man nicht vorbeigehen kann. Es geht um die Aufgabe, sich selber und anderen gegenüber Verantwortung zu übernehmen und es geht um die anspruchsvollen Aufgaben, eine Solidarität mit Behinderten, Diskriminierten, gerade auch im Bereich des Sexualverhaltens, wahrzunehmen" (Lüthi, Kurt; Christliche Sexualethik. Traditionen. Optionen. Alternativen, Böhlau: Wien 2001,57f). Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 31. Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 30.

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we are engaged in a God-given task. "In a sense, we are continuing God's creative work."97 6.5.2 Critical Appraisal In Kelly, we encounter a specific species of the constructivist view. He has already attempted to combine both the doctrine of creation and constructivism. The underlying concept of creation can be summarised as intended to describe the human capabilities for inventing and constructing life-forms. To some degree, the concept of creation as outlined in chapter 5 is comparable to Kelly's. The conclusions of chapter 5 leave room for evaluating the important contribution human efforts have on the current organisation of society. Thereby, the content for theological ethics - which is among other things the reflection on the human condition and human behaviour98 - is addressed. There is human responsibility and freedom of action which can be evaluated theologically. The opinions of society on topics such as the life-form of marriage do make a difference for the way one can organise these institutions. This important human responsibility stressed here is to a large degree a fruit of rethinking the doctrine of creation itself. According to Gunton, it is exactly the rediscovery of the Christian doctrine of creation which caused the rise of the importance of human action. For in the late Middle Ages a tendency towards the acknowledgement of contingency arose.99 The awareness of this contingency cleared the way for the stress on human action which can actually form the world. Thus, no blind fate or inaccessible divine powers govern the inner-worldly processes, but we are made responsible for them. The problematic side of this concept of human construction is found in two related topics: the question of whether 'creation' does or does not contain the notion of some 'initial act' by God, and the concept of human freedom and action. 97

Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 32.

98 99

Cf. section 2.3. Gunton, The Triune Creator, 112f. In section 6.4.3, Gunton's appraisal of Scotus and Ockham is described, as well as his objections over against the monistic, voluntarist outcome of their thought.

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With respect to the first question, we may say that the creation stories in Genesis contain true revelation of creation being God's initial act. This aspect of the doctrine of creation is dogmatically warranted in the expression of God's creatio ex nihilo.100 As we saw in the foregoing chapter (section 5.4), the concept of divine providence can - just as Kelly wants to do - lay stress on the fact that 'creation' is no fixed and static concept. This specific kind of openness, as intended by Kelly, is often denoted by the term 'human autonomy 7 . Kurt Lüthi, for instance, writes: 'If man from the creation onwards is intended to be God's partner and co-operator, also human independence and autonomy is a fact.'101 The stress on the responsible action of Christian believers over against their Creator and their created context is more than once labelled 'autonomy'. According to the argument of chapter 5, this aspect is important and should not only be considered negatively. Gunton warns us not to evaluate the concept of autonomy without acknowledgement of its benefits.102 In a recent orthodox Dutch proposal to reinstate the value of 'autonomy', Bert Loonstra is to a large degree positive about the possibilities this concept offers for doing Christian ethics.103 Another

100 Cf. also section 5.4.3 where 'creation' is not identified with 'providence' in order to forfeit the notion of God's creatio ex nihilo - on the contrary. The creatio ex nihilo is the basis of any doctrine of divine providence. 101 '"Lässt sich die Autonomie als Moralgrundlage mit der Befreiungsethik verbinden?' Ganz grundsätzlich ist zunächst theologisch festzuhalten: Indem der Mensch von der Schöpfung her Gottes Partner und Kooperator Gottes ist, ist auch die Unabhängigkeit und Autonomie des Menschen gesetzt. Das Geschöpf wird nun im Räume geschichtlicher Prozesse selber z u m Schöpfer, die Schöpfung ist damit ein nicht abgeschlossener Prozess und also auf Zukunft bezogen. Mit anderen Worten: Gottes Schöpfertum und menschliches Agieren und Gestalten stehen zueinander nicht im Verhältnis einer Konkurrenz, sondern der Kooperation. Damit kann nun das Verhältnis von Befreiung und autonomer Moral dahingehend bestimmt werden, dass Autonomie als Struktur des Menschlichen Voraussetzung der Ethik ist; andererseits ist die Befreiung die ethische Perspektive autonomer Moral" (Lüthi, Christliche Sexualethik, 147f). 102 Cf. above, section 3.3. 103 Loonstra, Bert; Zo goed en zo kwaad. Naar een ethiek van de Christelijke gemeente, Boekencentrum: Zoetermeer 2 0 0 0 , 4 0 .

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orthodox Dutch ethicist, Ad de Bruijne, can also say that 'human beings perform their acts as relatively autonomous creatures'.104 The problematic side of this concept of human construction is found in the presuppositions of the concept of human freedom and action. As De Bruijne immediately comments on the Enlightenment being the secular heir of the biblical and Christian tradition, people are also 'defined' in their existence by the works and words of God, on whom they are dependent even in their breathing (Genesis 2,7).105 The concept of created and creative autonomy, which we encounter here, stresses human responsibility in living and activity. Kelly and others, however, equate creation and autonomy. Those advocating the concept of 'autonomy7 with respect to the life-form of marriage usually start their convictions about marital life with observations about 'sexuality7. Sexuality, in turn, is framed within the context of anthropology. Sexuality is treated here as a function of the person. So a specific anthropology can be traced leading up to this identification. Therefore, Kelly speaks about a 'person-centred sexual ethic'. The Christian Church, according to Kelly, has gradually learned to grow in wisdom and understanding with regard to the sexual dimension of being a human person made in the image of God. This concept is transferred to the individual who has to grow in this wisdom. From adolescents, for instance, no mature Christian behaviour is demanded, which is about discerning the progressive path we are called to follow as unique human persons: "Doing the best we can today may be a necessary stage in our becoming empowered to do even better tomorrow."106 Casual and uncommitted sex, therefore, is understood by Kelly as sexual behaviour not in line with God's demand. But we also have to keep in mind that most adolescents who engage in this kind of sexuality as part of their youth culture must have the opportunity to grow in wisdom.107

104 "Mensen zijn handelende en relatief autonome schepselen" (Bruijne, Ad de; 'Christelijke ethiek tussen wet, schepping en gemeenschap: Een positionering naar aanleiding v a n R o m e i n e n 12,1 en 2'. In: Radix 27 [2001], [116-148] 137). 105 " M a a r tegelijk zijn mensen in hun bestaan gedefmieerd door de werken en woorden van God, waaran zij zelfs al voor hun ademhaling afhankelijk zijn (Genesis 2,7). Met hun relatieve autonomie geven zij antwoord op die werken en woorden van God" (De Bruijne, 'Christelijke ethiek tussen wet, schepping en gemeenschap', 137). 106 Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 175. 107 Kelly, New Directions in Sexual Ethics, 184-187.

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To take one's starting-point in sexuality as the basic phenomenon is likely to lead to a kind of ethics in which marriage is just a way humanity wants - as autonomously created beings - to organise their sexuality. Marriage and all the specific aspects attributed to this institution, however, can become outdated. As Wannenwetsch has shown, to treat the phenomenon of 'sexual ethics' apart from marital ethics therefore implies that marriage is just one way we decide to deploy our 'sexuality7, (cf. section 5.4.4). Sexual ethics, along with marital ethics or family-ethics, is increasingly composed from elements of personal fulfilment. "Sex," so Lisa Cahill comments, "interpreted in light of the individual's intersubjective experiences, is valued for allowing intimacy as reciprocity, and as supplying mutual pleasure which enhances intimacy. Parenthood too is valued for its affective rewards."108 She continues by tracing the current view of sexuality back to a view of marriage, which can be said to be 'constructivist'.109 In conclusion, we can state that the doctrine of creation has in fact served to frame a constructivist view of marriage as the result of a long tradition of people searching for social ways of informing couples to regulate their sexuality. This view conveys some important aspects of the doctrine of creation as outlined in chapter 5 with regard to the space for human action and responsibility. The concept of 'autonom/, however, which seems to be intimately linked with this specific content of the doctrine of creation, also contains problematic features. There is a line of thought in which 'creation' and 'human action' tend to coincide. Here, the difference between the specific character of God as the Creator and His creative acts on the one hand, and human action on the other tends to be overlooked.

6.5.3 Marriage as Created by God The experienced problematic side of the relation of God's creative action and human, autonomous freedom has been shown above. An answer to this issue has not yet been outlined. In order to do so, we now turn to the opposite concept of marriage which seemingly denies 108 Cahill, Lisa Sowie; Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1 9 9 6 , 1 6 7 . 109 Cahill, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, 1671.

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space for human autonomy. In this concept, marriage is seen as being instituted and created by God. By doing so, we will be able to see if in this opposite concept human freedom is theoretically or practically denied. In its most strict form, this conviction only applies to the institution of marriage, but it also concerns actual marriages. According to T.F. Torrance, marriage "is grounded in God's own creative activity; it has its true place within God's redemptive work; and it belongs to the inner structure of the Church as the Body of Christ".110 This immediately bears consequences on the way in which we evaluate any man's and woman's coming together in an interpersonal unity. Referring to the first creation-story in Genesis 1, Torrance appeals to an anthropology in which the image of God is seen in the unity of man-and-woman. This is extended to the concrete marriage of one man and one woman: "When a man and a woman come together in this way, they are made to participate in the active will of their Creator, and in their union and society they reflect the image of the Holy God."111 Note here, how Torrance uses the passive expression 'are made to participate'. It is the work of the Creator himself, Who brings a man and a woman together, which causes any breaking of this bond to be called wicked and falling short of God's intentions.112 Without this doctrinal basis, Torrance argues, marriage is just an aspect of evolution, a pattern of life as man's own devising - in other words: marriage is a human construct. What reasons can be given to support Torrance's argument from the doctrine of creation? There is some biblical evidence that God 'creates' a given marriage. For the creation-stories of Genesis are recaptulated in the New Testament by the Lord Jesus. In Matthew 19, Jesus comments: 'So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore w h a t God has joined together, let m a n not separate' (Matthew 19,6).

The context of Jesus' words here is a question by some Pharisees of whether it is lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any and every 110 Torrance, Tom; The Christian Doctrine of Marriage, The Handsel Press: Edinburgh [1984], 3. 111 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of Marriage, 4.

112 "Christian marriage, then, is not just the blessing of a couple, the solemnisation of a contract, or the taking of vows in mutual responsibility and service, but in and with all that, it is the work of God the Creator bringing a man and a woman together, and joining them in one flesh" (Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of Marriage, 7).

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reason. The God-given unity of husband and wife is at stake, as well as the underlying assumption that too radical a bond is not practicable. Jesus also reacts to this assumption by saying that "anyone who divorces his wife [...] and marries another woman commits adultery" (19,9).113 Not only the Pharisees but even the disciples reacted to this statement: "If this is the situation between a husband and wife, it is better not to marry" (19,10). Jesus's words are spoken in a context which was not at all characterized by the "goodness" of the marital bond between husband and wife. His words make clear that he considers marriage to be a life-form that is God's will since creation. Furthermore, it contains a notion of 'creation' which makes it possible to connect God's action to what is seen in the reality of actual marriages today (or at least in the days of Jesus), and to what is done by human beings.114 Creation is the acknowledged fact that God does form and inform our human life. This act of the Creator is not unmediated. On the contrary, Christians believe God to be working in and through creation itself. Here we encounter the first aspects of the doctrine of creation which can offer answers in overcoming the alleged problems concerning human freedom. To confess that even human action - which can be evaluated ethically - can be described as the mediated act of the Creator implies that the freedom, in which we can act, is a God-given freedom.115 With respect to the doctrine of marriage, Christians explicitly confess that a marriage is created by God, as an explicit confirmation of the intrinsic value of the human responsibility for living this life-form. This is meant by the admonition of Bayer that we must look for God's address to and through creation. For in order to be able to exert this responsibility, 113 The text here should be interpreted as follows. The subordinate clause "except for marital unfaithfulness" should not be read as depicting marital unfaithfullness as the only case in which divorce is legitimate. As Jakob van Brüggen has shown, it is intended to state that the Jewish (Mosaic) possibility of the 'certificate of divorce' (19,7; cf. 5,32 and Deuteronomy 24,1) is by definition not applicable in the case of adultery. In such a case of (sexual) unfaithfullness, the bond between husband and wife is already violated (Brüggen, J. van; 'Om een andere reden dan hoererij. Matteüs 19:9 en 5:32'. In: Lemmens, Dirk; Vriese, Jef de (e.a.); Verdriet in het huwelijk. Pastorale en theologische studies aver scheiden en hertrouwen, Gideon/Centrum voor Pastorale Counseling: Hoornaar/Heverlee 1997,15-23). 114 Cf. Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 72. 115 Cf. above, section 4.4.1 and 3.3.3.

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Christians need to look for the Word of God coming in and through created means. The core of the doctrine of creation is precisely to stress our task to discern God's creative Word in the midst of a disordered reality, in the field of marital ethics as in any other field. For when a man loves a woman, not only is God's Word heard but many voices can be discerned. Many motives come into play when a man and a woman like each other: sexual, economic, and social motives, for instance. In order to discern God's Word, two people who want to live together can gain much benefit from the support of the Christian community. Discerning God's Word amidst other voices is a task which is intended to unite people around the created means by which God wants to uphold community. This can be seen paradigmatically in the worship-service in which a man and a woman confess their love for each other and trust God's creative Word in sustaining the marital bond. Over against any stress on our human 'will', such a worshipservice is intended to confess God who created community.116 On the other hand, the indispensable blessing of the Creator is given to enable the spouses to express the divine gift of human community in marital life. Without this basis of a Christian doctrine of creation, any Christian doctrine of marriage is rendered superfluous.117

116 Cf. Bayer: "Weil Christen ihre Ehe nicht primär als Ergebnis eigenen Willens verstehen können, hat der evangelische Traugottesdienst seine Mitte im Bekenntnis zu Gott, der die Gemeinsamkeit geschaffen hat" (Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 215). 117 Cf. Torrance: "Take away this doctrinal basis, and at once all notions of marriage, of m a n - w o m a n relations, all our ideas of sex, and all the ethics they involve, become merely relative. They are then only aspects of human evolution and change, only matters of social custom or psychological convenience; the pattern of life they involve is of man's own divising and can have only pragmatic justification. On this view w e are not concerned in morality with relating human behaviour to permanent truth, for then 'ethic' is only the expression of how society happens to function and order its life at the time" (Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of Marriage, 8). W e here trace an important strand in the doctrine of creation, which suggests that this doctrine offers possibilities to both investigating the plurality of values and norms on the one hand, and searching for a w a y to overcome the pitfalls of a loose pluralism on the other (cf. above, section 2.3.!).

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6.5.4 Conclusion Connecting the doctrine of creation with the concept of marriage, therefore, bears consequences for the evaluation of human action on two levels. The first level is the institution as such, the second is the level of the particular marriage. On the first level, a doctrine of creation insists on a concept in which life-forms convey a meaning which exceeds pure human construction. By stressing this aspect, the basic relation of human beings with their Creator comes into view. To consciously live as created beings, therefore, also bears consequences for the social surroundings and institutions we encounter. They cannot be viewed only as human artefacts, for the Christian also reckons with God's creative activity in the present. Though the acknowledgement of God's creative power in and through the institutions cannot be easily deduced from reality, the conscious and careful living within the context of the Christian community invites the Christian to explore even his social setting. For here we have to look for manifestations of God's creative power. This is the task of the Christian 'observance' of reality in general and of marital life in particular. Secondly, on this first level, the aspect of God creating in and through created means can be given due space. For the Christian concept of 'providence' states that we do not simply inherit life-forms which are applicable to any current situation. As the outer circumstances alter, the content of the institutions changes. With respect to the institution of marriage, one can easily trace these changesm such as the social embedding of the extended family narrowing to the 'nuclear family', the socio-economic value of marriage which has declined and is generally forgotten within the prosperous context of the Western society. As for life in general, marriage can also easily be conceived of as the self-chosen way to design one's living together. To trace these possibilities back, however, to the gift of the Creator is an expression of an ethic of createdness. Despite the wealth of most of Western culture and the possibilities to create one's life, the companionship for life to which man and woman joined in marriage are called, is still dependent on God's providential care. Acknowledging this aspect of life literally 'in-forms' one's life-style with respect to living together as man and wife in a specific way. The institutions of marriage as they are traditionally inherited have to be explored. They must be tested as the means by which God works in our

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lives. Here also the life-form of marriage has to be 'observed' in the double sense of the word. Firstly, acknowledging the doctrine of creation in its full sense involves looking for God's creative power in the reality - even that of our social embeddedness in inherited lifeforms. Secondly, the 'observance' also conveys elements of submission to the created means by which God exerts his creative power to us. Those who hold such a submission as conflicting with human freedom will probably differ with respect to the form in which freedom is lived. For any freedom for people to construct their marital life is from the outset dependent on God's gift of life and power. The doctrine of creation as outlined in chapter 5 is an elaboration of the conviction that human freedom to act responsibly can only be secured by God's sovereign and life-giving power. To view marriage as the created lifeform for a man and a woman to live together is nothing more or less than an extension of this view.118 The second level of a particular marriage is only slightly different from the former. For just as the doctrine of creation does not only speak about 'reality7 in general but also about what we experience of reality in particular, the doctrine of marriage does not only speak about marriage as a general institution, but also of any specific marriage in particular. There can be no consideration of the general life-form of marriage apart from concretely lived marriages. The creative Word of God cannot be heard from an abstract institution, but has to be observed in the way Christians let their own life be governed by God's Word. In this context, Bayer reminds us of Luther's strong saying: 'Here do you have the Word by which God promises and gives you this wife or this husband, and says: This shall be your husband, this shall be your wife'.119 This particular Word of God, by which He institutes a marriage, has to be 'observed'. 'It all comes to the question, in which way one views the fact of living together, which point of view one has 118 Cf. the theological account of the doctrine of marriage as a divine institution by Bernd Wannenwetsch: "Die Menschen [...] sind nicht dazu da, mit ihrem Leben bestimmte Ordnungen zu erfüllen, sondern jene sind da, damit die Menschen in ihnen den bestimmten Willen Gottes erfiillen. Institutionen sind keine sozialen Daseinsformen, die immer schon dem Willen Gottes entsprechend 'stiftungsgemäss' funktionierten; sondern sie funktionieren dann als Institutionen, das heisst 'stiftungsgemäss', wenn Menschen in ihnen ihre Berufung leben" (Freiheit der Ehe, 224). 119 "Denn hier hast du das Wort, durch das dir Gott diese Frau oder diesen Mann zuspricht und schenkt und spricht: Das soll dein Mann, dies soll deine Frau sein" (WA 34/1, 57, 21-28; quotation in: Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 221).

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or does not have, who or what one summons to let the relation with one's husband or wife be governed by Jesus' word on marriage'. 120 This point of view can be of help in the practice of pastoral counselling as well. Whereas many spouses sometimes find it hard to 'feel' that their marriage is dependent on God's promise, this promise is still a given fact to which they can turn for strength and comfort. Their marriage in the end is not dependent on their efforts, but on God's word in which they can rest. 121 It is here that pneumatology could be used. Despite Bayer's reluctance to speak of the Holy Spirit, here we can speak of his use of the created means, the promissio, to ensure marital life. The first level, then, cannot be separated from the second - for neither the doctrine of creation, nor its consequences for married life may be separated from the particularities in which people encounter God's creative word. To separate these levels would imply the false comfort that the practical, marital problems could be overcome by providing a general concept of marriage. The problematic relation between human action and God's creative word cannot be solved in general - because any solution relies on the explicit confession of God's creative providence for His creatures, divine action which cannot be easily deduced or discerned. To confess marriage as created by God through pneumatological mediation by God's promissio implies the personal conviction of the believer in the midst of the context of the Christian community.

6.6 Marriage, Constructivism and Eschatology One of the so far unmentioned problematic features which are entailed in the connection between the doctrine of creation and marriage consists in the eschatological qualification of marriage. This qualification is sometimes viewed so strongly, that it would downplay the doctrine of creation, and leave space for human efforts to invent new 120 " E s kommt darauf an, wie man den Sachverhalt des gemeinsamen Lebens ansieht, welchen Blick m a n hat oder nicht hat, wer oder was einen dazu bringt, sein Verhältnis zu seiner Frau, sein Verhältnis zu seinem Mann durch Jesu Wort zur Ehe bestimmt zu sehen" (Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 221f). 121 Concrete application of this element to the setting of pastoral counselling should be done consciously, for the appeal to God's creative promise should not deny the human responsibilities.

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life-forms which qualify marriage. One of its most extreme examples is found in the attempt of the Anabaptists in the aftermath of the Reformation of the sixteenth century to establish the Kingdom of God in disregard of many institutions such as marriage. In this section, we will focus on the relation between the eschatological qualification of the institution of marriage, and the constructivist view of marriage. As Oliver O'Donovan has made clear, the awareness of our human historicity bears consequences on the status of human action. "Man's relation to his own natural constitution is radically affected by the historicist point of view." 122 For the historicist, marriage is simply the product of cultural development peculiar to a certain time and place. When the institution of marriage in our times conveys some problematic features, it has to be reformed, for any institution is moving towards some kind of metamorphosis "so that if there are currents of dissatisfaction evident in a society's practice of marriage, such as might be indicated by a high divorce rate or a prominent homosexual culture, they will be treated with great seriousness as signs of the evolution for which the institution is destined". 123 At that point, however, O'Donovan makes an intriguing comment: "For classical Christian thought, too, believed in the transformation of marriage." 124 In this section, we will turn to the problems which this remark causes. Firstly, we will discuss some characteristics of a gradually evolving historical constructivist view of marriage (6.6.1). Secondly, this standpoint will be commented on by means of the doctrine of creation (6.6.2). Thirdly, we will summarise the conclusions.

6.6.1 Historical Constructivism and Marriage One of the most intriguing questions put to the institution of marriage concerns the historical development of this institution, and the continuation of this development in the future. Such views mostly take their starting-point in a conviction about human sexuality, of which the historically determined sociological and anthropological aspects are

122 O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 69. 123 O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 70. 124 O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 70.

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decisive. The encompassing framework, in which these views can be examined, is that of the historical development of the so-called 'social institutions' in general. The theological anthropology of Wolfhart Pannenberg can be taken as an example of such framework.125 According to Pannenberg, the complementary cohesion of actual life and the reflection on it puts our lives in some kind of order, which is characterized as the 'regular forms of living-together of individuals, known as institutions'.126 Given his anthropological starting-point, the question remains open whether the individual or the institution comes first.127 Theologically, however, Pannenberg concludes that some kind of religious myth or Sinnbewusstsein is prior to any order which is the result of the interaction between individuals on the basis of such myth.128 This position is for Pannenberg the replacement of a theology which speaks about divinely created and maintained orders.129 Such historically developed institutions are the concrete forms of abstract 125 In his Systematische Theologie, however, Pannenberg's anthropology is more rooted in the doctrine of God than in his earlier publications (cf. Systematische Theologie [Bd. 2], Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1991, 203-364; and: Grenz, Stanley; Reason for Hope. The Systematic Theology of Wolfiart Pannenberg. New York: Oxford University 1990, 79-81). 126 According to Pannenberg, the cohesion of reflexion and life called 'culture' is warranted "nur insoweit und in derjenigen Gestalt, in der [die Reflexion] die Ordnung der gemeinsamen Welt tatsächlich durchdringt und bestimmt. Bei dieser Ordnung handelt es sich um die regelmässigen Formen des Zusammenlebens der Individuen. Sie werden als Institutionen bezeichnet" (Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1983, 385f). 127 Pannenberg even calls the priority of institution over individual a 'pseudotheological' assumption. For though the institutions factually precede the individual's life, they are, as well, subject to changes by the behaviour of the individuals (Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 387). 128 Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 394-398. "In der gesellschaftlichen 'Natur' des Menschen liegt nur sein Angewiesensein auf Sozialisation. Die konkrete Form der Vergesellschaftung ist damit noch nicht gegeben. Sie kann auch ausbleiben, und wo sie zustande kommt, entsteht sie auf dem Grunde eines kulturellen Sinnbewusstseins der Ordnung der menschlichen Zusammenlebens, deren Vorgegebenheit vor den Individuen im Bereich von Mythos und Glauben wurzelt" (395). 129 "Die Beschreibung der Verknüpfung von Partikularität und Gemeinschaftlichkeit im Prozess der Institutionalisierung - in der Folge aber auch in der lebendigen Ausfüllung des durch die Institutionen gegebenen Rahmens - dürfte geeignet sein, die traditionelle theologische Lehre von den Schöpfungs- und Erhaltungsordnungen zu ersetzen" (Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 403).

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anthropological presuppositions in accordance with some specific culture. 130 With respect to the institution of marriage, Pannenberg remarks that the integration of sexual behaviour in the life of the family is a very instructive example of the anthropological function of historically developing institutions.131 Reflecting on human sexuality, Pannenberg states that from an anthropological point of view the relation between man and woman gradually led to some kind of lasting relation. Such relation is caused by both the need of the children and the longing for long-term enterprises in general and a 'partner-relationship' in particular. 132 In the course of history, the former broad familial embedding of marriage gradually lost its formative power, so that in its new fashion marriage is said to determine the family. 133 Only by inventing marriage as the context for its own sake could it become the example of the human destination of a living together which forms the individual's life.134 According to Pannenberg, Jesus' qualification of the marital and family life which summons the believer to give God priority over family bonding (e.g. Luke 14,26), and the admonition of the apostle to 'submit to one another' (Ephesians 5,21), can be seen as the heralds of a conception of marriage which is more 'partner'oriented than the patriarchal system. 135 By way of summary, we can state that for Pannenberg, the standard of marriage is founded on an anthropology in which the sexual differences of human existence are tied up with the identity of human beings, an identity which finds its expression in the lasting, allencompassing community of man and woman in marriage. 136 The full

130 Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 403f. 131 "Die Integration des sexuellen Verhaltens in das Leben von Familie und Sittenverband [Sippenverband JHFS] bietet ein besonders instruktives Beispiel für die anthropologische Funktion der Institutionenbildung" (Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 415). 132 Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 417. 133 Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 426. 134 "Erst dadurch, dass die eheliche Gemeinschaft als Selbstzweck begriffen wird, wird die Ehe zur exemplarischen Darstellung der Bestimmung des Menschen überhaupt zu einem Leben in Gemeinschaft mit anderen, d e m das individuelle Personsein seine Substanz verdankt" (Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 427). 135 Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 426. 136 "Der Grund für die Normativität der Ehe ist die Verbindung der sexuellen Differenzierung menschlicher Existenz mit der Personalität des Menschen, die in der

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development of the personal destination of man, however, is not found in marriage. This is reserved for community with God, to which every human being is destined and from which every human being receives his or her value. 137 Pannenberg, taking his starting-point in the historical development of the social institutions on the underlying ground of some kind of Sinnbewusstsein, comes to conclusions in favour of the institution of heterosexual marriage. Others, however, taking their starting-point in the conviction that "thanks to Foucault and others we are now aware of ourselves as socially constructed beings", come to diametrically opposed conclusions which stem from questions like: "How are we to perform Christianity in a post-modern world, in a way that honours our recognition of cultural diversity, of theological construction and sexual diversity? How is it possible to be a Christian in a context which recognizes that Christianity is in fact a bunch of Christianities, a sexual Christianity in a context that recognizes homosexualities and heterosexualities? How dare we speak at all?" 138 Here, a combination of eschatology and sexual ethics is worth considering. According to Elizabeth Stuart, the Church and Christian theology in general have not been able to listen sufficiently to the biblical eschatological saying of Jesus' in Matthew 22 about marriage. Stuart claims that this was part of Jesus' general overturning of the familial structures of his society for the reason that they "bound people in relations that prevented them enjoying the radical equality of the reign of God, systems of exclusion and privatized love". 139 In the heavenly kingdom, "hetero-patriarchal structures such as marriage (as so far constructed socially and theologically) and the nuclear family can have no place" and "the fact that Western Christianity can only bother

dauerhaften, das ganze Leben beanspruchenden Gemeinschaft von Mann und Frau in der Ehe ihren Ausdruck findet" (Pannenberg, Wolfhart; Grundlagen der Ethik. Philosophisch-theologische Perspektiven, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1996,128). 137 Pannenberg, Grundlagen der Ethik, 129. 138 Stuart, Elizabeth; 'Sex in Heaven: The Queering of Theological Discourse on Sexuality'. In: Davies, Jon; Loughlin, Gerard (edd.); Sex These Days. Essays on Theology, Sexuality and Society, Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield 1997, [184-204] 189.191. This quotation is taken as one example which could be multiplied easily (cf. they essays in Davies, Susan E.; Hanay, Eleanor H. [ed.]; Redefining Sexual Ethics. A Sourcebook of Essays, Stories, and Poems, Pilgrim Press: Cleveland 1991). 139 Stuart, 'Sex in Heaven', 201.

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at present to envisage 'life after' as an extension of this world with some of the unpleasantness removed is a massive indictment of its insularity" 140 The eschatological qualification of human constructions of relationships as envisaged by Jesus in his answering the Sadducees, Stuart argues, will necessarily criticise the monogamous 'idolatry7 of marriage as a remnant of an out-dated hetero-patriarchal construction. In order to liberate all kinds of human sexuality, we have to focus less on sex those days and sex these days and more on sex in the next days, "which is a profoundly Christian methodology".141 Taking one's starting-point in a historically developing anthropological account of sexuality can lead to both a strong defence of marriage and a radical denial of it. The specific kind of eschatological qualification of marital relationships here plays an important role. How is it possible that the starting-point in historical developments, including their eschatological component, can lead to such diametrically opposed convictions? In order to answer this question, we must turn to the relation between the doctrine of creation and the eschaton. We will now turn to explaining the relation between a doctrine of creation and the eschatological qualification of marriage. 6.6.2 Creation, Eschatology and Marriage To what degree does taking one's starting-point in the doctrine of creation alter and influence Christian eschatology? On a more general level, this was the subject of section 5.5. In that section we concluded that eschatology, conceived as God's purposive end of creation, bears immediate consequences on creation as we now perceive it. As such, eschatology informs our action. The question here is how, and to what degree is informs human action. Can we say with O'Donovan, that "classical Christian thought, too, believed in the transformation of marriage"?142 Thus, the general question is framed on the level of marriage as well. In an essay on the relation between eschatology and reflection on family-life, Colin Crowder has given us a brief survey of the history of

140 Stuart, 'Sex in Heaven', 202. 141 Stuart, 'Sex in Heaven', 204. 142 O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 70.

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eschatology with respect to the question of whether family- and marital relationships will last in heaven. Crowder distinguishes the 'theocentric' vision, which stresses the discontinuity between this life and the life to come, and the 'anthropocentric' vision, which stresses the continuity between earth and heaven.143 The latter came into vogue as a Romantic reaction over against the theocentric eschatologies of Protestant and Catholic orthodoxy alike. In the nineteenth century in particular, exhaustive treatments of a 'modern heaven' arose - the modern heaven which offered "the ultimate family reunion".144 This in turn caused the rise of a critical countermovement, so that towards the twenty-first century theologians have become acutely aware of the charge that Christian eschatology promises "a sort of Disneyland, with fun for all the family".145 Those advocating a radical continuity between the present and the world to come point to the love of God for his creatures. Crowder suspiciously remarks that this stress on God's love has perhaps more to do with "the strength of our human affections than with the force of any reasoning from theological first principles". On the other hand - "it is hard to see how it could be any other way without denying something essential to us".146 Therefore, Crowder comments, and I agree, that we must take this anthropocentric tradition seriously without succumbing to it. The question thus framed as a matter of content and continuity, can perhaps gain benefit from the broader question as to what effects the perspective of eschatological qualification of marriage has for human subjectivity: How does eschatology affect the Christian subject?147 The 143 Crowder, Colin; 'The Family Reunion: Reflections on the Eschatological Imagination'. In: Barton, Stephen (ed.); The Family in Theological Perspective, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1996, [329-344] 334. 144 Crowder, 'The Family Reunion', 336 145 Crowder, "The Family Reunion', 337 (quoting: Wilson, 'Life After Death', 188). 146 Crowder, 'The Family Reunion', 342. 147 Cf. Sauter, Gerhard; Einführung in die Eschatologie, WBG: Darmstadt 1995, 215f.219; Bayer, Oswald; 'Wer ist Theologe?'. In: Beintker, Michael (Hg.); Rechtfertigung und Erfahrung (FS Gerhard Sauter), Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1995, 208-213; and: Bayer, Oswald; Gott als Autor. Zu einer poietologischen Theologie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1999, 172-186. Sauter stresses the personal component of eschatology in which we do not know what will come but we do know who will come, i.e. Jesus Christ as the alpha and omega of history. Bayer stresses that in general whatquestions are in need of a more encompassing framework, i.e. the «Λο-question. On

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objective question with regard to the content of marriage is thereby changed into the personal question as to what characterizes a Christian marital partner. Framed in a personal way, the most characteristic element of the doctrine of creation can be preserved without problem. The Creator providentially sustaining his creature is the One Who shapes the identity of everybody and so of any married person as well. The vital relationship with God as such, framed as the personal address of the Creator to and through the creature, does not change in the eschaton. The problematic questions are with respect to the alleged eschatological change within relationships among created human beings, and especially the relationship between a man and a woman who are married. However, if we say that the identity of human beings is qualified and characterized by the relations they live in (of which the marital and familial relationships here deserve our attention), does this necessarily imply that these relationships, vital for a person's individuality, are preserved in the eschaton? To find an answer to this question, we must first look at the biblical texts concerning the importance of interpersonal relationships in family and marriage. There, we can discern three different kinds of qualification of relations. The first is the eschatological qualification of Jesus in Matthew 22 (et parr.). The second consists in Jesus' admonition that obedience to God outweighs the importance of interpersonal relationships. The third consists in the so-called 'Household Rules'. (1) Firstly, one can readily acknowledge a specific eschatological qualification of marriage in the sayings of Jesus in Matthew 22. In Matthew 22,23-32 an account is given of a conversation between the Sadducees and Jesus about the resurrection. Suppose, so the Sadducees ask, a woman is married successively to seven brothers - at the resurrection, whose wife will she be? Jesus' answer is intriguing:

this level, the Christian doctrine of creation is evident: "Die Frage 'Wer bin ich?' kann angemessen und zutreffend nur beantwortet werden, indem ich von Gott als dem Autor meiner Lebensgeschichte rede - eben: von meinen Poeten, zunächst freilich nicht von ihm, sondern zu ihm rede, ihm antworte" (Bayer, 'Wer ist Theologe?', 208). Bayer also applies this category of the personal address to the doctrine of the last things: "Die Rede vom Letzten Gericht ist aus jeder (nur) neutrisch-anonymen Fassung herauszunehmen und klar personal zu fassen. [...] Diese Anthropologie und Eschatologie liegt in Gottes Selbstvorstellung beschlossen: 'Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott!'" (Bayer, Gott als Autor, 173).

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'You are in error because you do not know the Scriptures or the power of God. At the resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven. But about the resurrection of the dead - have you not read what God said to you, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob"? He is not the God of the dead but of the living' (Matthew 22,29-32 [et parr.]).

As Crowder has made clear, Jesus does not give a straight answer to the Sadducees. Their question was about one specific woman and her seven successive marriages. Jesus' answer concerns the future of marriage as such. It can be argued that the Sadducees' question was not a straight one either, for they did not believe in the resurrection at all. Jesus' answer, therefore, can be interpreted as an answer with regard to the underlying discussion about the resurrection itself, rather than its precise character, because this was the point that really mattered.148 Though that may be true, the question remains - and is not 'solved' in Jesus' answer to the Sadducees - what will happen to particular marriages in the eschaton? If connected with Ga.latia.ns 3,28 ('There is neither [...] male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus'), Jesus' answer could seem to imply that marriage in general as well as the sexual differences between male and female are suspended: 'they will be like angels'.149 Does this mean that we will be 'spiritual bodies'? With respect to the relationality of human identity, it can be stated that the relation between husband and wife will be suspended because of the allencompassing relation to God, 'like angels' have.150 What does that imply for our human identity? With regard to the identity of particular people, the traditional exegesis has always stated that in the end, eschatologically, only the brokenness of creation is suspended, not the created structures themselves or the identity of men and women.151 148 Cf. Crowder, 'The Family Reunion', 329-332. 149 The mentioning of 'angels' however, is not so much about our becoming a-sexual beings as with our being fully devoted to the relation with God, and is even more pressing if we acknowledge the fact that the Sadducees did not believe the existence of angels. 150 Cf. Schwankl, Otto; Die Sadduzäerfrage (Mk. 12,18-27 parr). Eine exegetisch-theologische Studie zur Auferstehungserwartung, Athenäum: Frankfurt a.M 1987,108-112.615-620. 151 "Es ist [...] von den Auslegern von Augustin bis Barth immer wieder betont worden, dass die eschatologische Erwartung des vollkommenen Neuwerdens der Menschen in der Auferstehung der Leiber nur die Aufhebung der Gebrechlichkeit und Gebrochenheit ihrer Identität impliziert, nicht aber die ihrer Identität selbst, zu der das

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In order to solve the question of whether marriage is radically qualified by Jesus' saying to the Sadducees, it has been argued that such an eschatological qualification has to be read in the eschatological perspective either of Jesus or of the first-century Church. Then, most of this pressing qualification is taken away, for such an eschatological Nah-erwartung is then a thing of the past. Even if this argument were true - which it is not152 - there may still be another important qualification of interpersonal relationships by Jesus. We have to distinguish between the alleged qualification of current relationships with regard to the eschatological perspective on the one hand, and Jesus' call to radical discipleship and obedience to God on the other. These two categories are not to be confused. (2) This second line of thought is also expressed by Jesus. He more than once told those who would follow Him, that his disciples must be prepared to bear their cross. If necessary, even the bond of blood has to be sacrificed for the cause of following Jesus' vocation (Luke 9,57-62; Matthew 10,37; Luke 14,26). In the parable of the great banquet (Luke 14,15-24), even the marital relation is somehow qualified in the light of the apparent urgency of the Lord's invitation. Here we encounter what I would call the second explicit qualification of marital and familial relationships by Jesus, in the call to obey God more than people. This qualification as such is not a specifically New Testament one, as is clear if we read passages such as Deuteronomy 13.153 Frau- bzw. Mannsein in einem ganz ursprünglichen Sinn gehört" (Wannenwetsch, Die Freiheit der Ehe, 229). 152 I here refer to Wolfgang Schräge, w h o characterizes Jesus' ethics as an eschatological one: "[D]ie eschatologische Botschaft Jesu [ist] entscheidendes Motiv und Stimulanz menschlichen Tuns und Lassens [...], genauer: die verheissene und nicht die zu verdienende und zu erwirkende Herrschaft Gottes" (Ethik des Neuen Testaments, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 5 1989, 33). Nevertheless, he denies this ethic to be in any way apocalyptic: "[D]ie Eschatologie Jesu [kann] nicht mit Apokalyptik identifiziert werden und die Deutung von Jesu Ethik im Sinn der Interimsethik [kann] darum nicht zutreffen [...]" (36). 153 "If your very o w n brother, or your son or daughter, or the wife you love, or your closest friend secretly entices you, saying, 'Let us go and worship other gods' (gods that neither you nor your fathers have known, gods of the peoples around you, whether near or far, from one end of the land to the other), do not yield to him or listen to him. Show him no pity. Do not spare him or shield him. You must certainly put him to death. Your hand must be the first in putting him to death, and then the hands of all the people. Stone him to death, because he tried to turn you away from the LORD your God, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. Then

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(3) The importance of the difference between these two kinds of qualification is underlined by the third kind of qualification of interpersonal relationships, i.e. Paul's admonitions in the so-called 'Household Rules'.154 As the New Testament scholar James Dunn has made clear, these cannot be viewed as opposite to the radical admonitions of Jesus.155 The proper ordering of the important cell of society, the extended family including slaves, was a matter of faithful regulation and an integral part of Christian responsibility: "The relationships within the family and household were themselves part of Christian vocation and indeed, we may say, were the first place where responsibility to the Lord should come to expression and be put to the test. Discipleship begins in the home."156 This focus on the house is not the result of a delay of the parousia, as has sometimes been suggested.157 We therefore have to look for a way to systematically combine three elements: the eschatological qualification of marriage, Jesus' admonition to obey God more than one's parents or spouse, and the Household Rules. Oswald Bayer has made an explicit effort to combine the second and third lines of thought by connecting them with the Christian doctrine of creation. Following Luther's argument against both the Anabaptist stress on radically following Jesus Christ and the RomanCatholic stress on a world-denying monasticism, Bayer tries to maintain the equilibrium between an ethic of the Household Rules and

154 155 156

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all Israel will hear and be afraid, and no one among you will do such an evil thing again" (Deuteronomy 13,6-11). Colossians 3,18-4,1; Ephesians 5,22-6,9; 1 Peter 2,18-3,7; 1 Timothy 2,8-15.6,1-2; Titus 2,110. Dunn, James D.G.; 'The Household Rules in the N e w Testament'. In: Barton, Stephen (ed.); The Family in Theological Perspective, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1996,43-63. Dunn, 'The Household Rules in the N e w Testament', 56. Cf. also Jesus' admonition in Mark 7,9-13, where Jesus reminds the people of Israel to obay the commandment to honour one's father and mother. "The assumption, on the one hand, w a s that Christians had been on tip-toe expectation about the Lord's coming for thirty or forty years and found the disappointment of their hope a shattering experience which occasioned a radical transformation of theology and praxis. In this form the hypotheses founders on the absence of any clear evidence in its favour. [...] The assumption, on the other hand, was that more or less all congregations in the Pauline mission were like the church in Corinth - despite, once again, the absence of any clear evidence in favour" (Dunn, 'The Household Rules in the N e w Testament', 54).

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radical discipleship. According to Bayer, we have to maintain this careful balance in order to preserve life within the house, world, work, family, and politics, and to characterize it by following the call of Jesus Christ. That is: to listen to God's first commandment to fear God above all things, to love Him and to trust Him.158 With respect to the balance between two of the three elements (being a disciple of Christ and living in this world), we can conclude that the radicality of being a disciple of Jesus Christ does contain an element of qualification of the created structures as such. As soon as obedience to these structures threatens the radicality of following the commandment to love God above all things, any obstacle needs to be overcome, including relational structures. This radicality, however, does not qualify the structures as such and cannot be equated with any eschatological qualification of relations. On the contrary, the careful balance between following Christ and living in this world points at the relational character of created life. In this complex of relations, the constitutive relation between the Creator and His creatures is the most important. But this is not intended to downplay eschatologically the other relationships with which God has bestowed his created human beings.159 We now come back to the first element, the eschatological qualification of the created reality. This element can be framed as the biblical tension, described by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, between the 'natural', psychic body people live in now, and the 'spiritual', 158 The comparison between the radicality of Jesus' saying in Luke 14,26f and Mark 7,913 leads Bayer to the conclusion: "Allein schon aus dem Vergleich der beiden zitierten Jesusworte, d e m keiner entrinnen kann, der Christ und Theologe sein will, ergibt sich die Aufgabe, die Luther als Ethiker in Atem gehalten hat: nämlich das Leben im Haus, in der Welt, der Welt der Arbeit, Familie, Politik - dieses Leben im 'Haus' zusammenzuhalten und zu durchdringen mit dem Leben in der Nachfolge auf den Ruf Jesu Christi hin, und das heisst für Luther: mit dem Gehorsam des ersten Gebotes, Gott über alle Dinge zu fürchten, zu lieben und ihm zu vertrauen. Es ist Luthers grosse Leistung, das Problem, das in der Kirchengeschichte verschiedene Lösungen gefunden hatte, in unüberbietbarer Schärfe formuliert und die nötigen Bestimmungen angemessen zur Geltung gebracht zu haben" (Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort, 158). 159 Contra Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 247-251. Grenz states that the loneliness A d a m expressed in Genesis 2 is fulfilled only provisory with the creation of the woman, but is intended to be fulfilled by the relation with God: "The ultimate goal of human sexuality, therefore, is corporate fellowship with the Designer of our existence as sexual beings" (249).

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pneumatic body that will be ours in the eschaton (1 Corinthians 15,44). At first sight, the continuity seems to be in man being 'body', whereas the difference is expressed in the words 'natural' and 'spiritual'. The important element, however, is that Paul speaks about a body at all. With this word, Paul expresses not only the material body, but the whole person (consisting of material body, soul, and spirit). Such a bodily existence is an existence that - at its best - is rich in relationships. In the eschaton, our body will be transformed into a true body, because it will be determined by God's creative relation.160 But what does this say about the difference interpersonal relations make for a person? Here we have to discuss Matthew 22 again. For though it is clear that the importance of marital relationships is addressed here, there is another element which has not yet been mentioned. The question of the Sadducees is not about the endurance of marriage in the resurrection in general, but about the so-called 'levirate' marriage. According to the law of Moses, if a married man dies without having a son, his brother should marry the woman and give her a son "so that his [brother's] name will not be blotted out from Israel" (Deuteronomy 25,5-6). This worrying about the future, however, is not necessary any more in the life after death. The community there will be full and complete, and no one's name will be wiped out any more for it will be written on a white stone (Revelation 2,17).161 This would make it understandable why Jesus only speaks about new marriages: "At the resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage" (Matthew 22,30).162 Just as the 160 For an extensive account of the importance of relationships for creation in the eschaton, see Weder, Hans; 'Hope and Creation'. In: Polkinghorne, John; Welker, Michael (ed.); The End of the World and the Ends of God. Science and Theology on Eschatology, Trinity Press International: Harrisburg 2000,184-202 (esp. 191-196). With respect to the testimony of Jesus to the Sadducees, cf. Schwankt, Die Sadduzäerfrage, 622: "Die Zugehörigkeit des Menschen zu Gott ist der Grund und der Kern der Totenauferstehung". 161 Schwankl captures this systematic consequence of the resurrection: "Die Auferstehungshoffnung [...] befreit ihn damit vom Zwang der 'Selbstverwirklichung', der Selbstvollendung und -erfüllung, der nur in der Selbstzerstörung enden kann, weil er das Erstrebte nicht erreicht" (Die Sadduzäerfrage, 624f). 162 "In der Tat gilt es zu beachten, dass Jesus vom Aufhören des Freiens 'im Himmel' redet und nicht, wie aufgrund der Anfrage hätte erwartet werden können, von der eschatologischen Irrelevanz bestehender ehelicher Gemeinschaften überhaupt"

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angels are not worried about the future, but are serving God without delay, the community of God will serve Him without anxiety.163 It also implies that familial and marital relationships do not determine one's identity completely - in the present as well as in the future - because one's eternal identity is founded in relation to God.164 If this interpretation is right, one may find converging elements in the three lines of thought considered here. The eschatological qualification of Jesus in Matthew 22, His admonition that obedience to God outweighs the importance of interpersonal relationships, and the so-called 'Household Rules' all point to the qualification of marriage as being subordinate to the relation with God. With respect to the question of how particular marriages last in the resurrection or eschaton, we cannot provide a complete picture. But it seems to me that Paul's speaking about 'body', about the whole human person, implies that the qualification eschatology gives to creation is firstly made by the constitutive relation to God. This fundamental relation, however, will not overcome the constitutive elements by which our being a person is characterised in the present. This 'will not' is no expression of God's inability to do so, but it expresses God's intentional goal for creation which He has begun and which He will lead to its final destination. If we acknowledge that relationships form and in-form our human created identity, these relationships cannot be said to be absent in the eschaton. Though we have to be very careful with respect to the particular picture this view contains, and of course, we should pay attention to the fact that we cannot produce a complete survey of created reality after Jesus' return in glory, it is clear that 'community' is an important feature of the character of life in the resurrection.

(Wannenwetsch, Freiheit der Ehe, 228). The connection between Matthew 22,32 and Genesis 26,24 ("I a m the God of your father Abraham [...] I will bless you and will increase the number of your descendants for the sake of m y servant Abraham") also points to God's careful and loving promise for the preservation of one's household, which is not dependent on human efforts. 163 For a theological account of the function of angels, cf. Bayer, Gott als Autor, 230-239. 164 "Ein Mensch wird aus der Sicht des Glaubens nicht primär durch den Ehepartner definiert. Er gewinnt die für das Dasein wesentlichen Relationen nicht erst als 'Mann der ...', als 'Frau des ...', als Vater oder Mutter, Sohn oder Tochter von X; vorgängig zu all diesen Beziehungen ist er Beziehungspartner Gottes, Sohn oder Tochter des Vaters im Himmel" (Schwankl, Die Sadduzäerfrage, 628).

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Here, we can draw on the doctrine of creation which forms Gunton's eschatology. According to Gunton, an important aspect of the eschatological fulfilment of history and created reality is redemption, alongside death and judgement. This redemption does not take place on the individual level. "In some sense, our groupings are of eschatological significance," as Gunton remarks. 165 Here Gunton draws the line between his opinions on the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity and the importance of relationships of human beings eschatologically. He points to the conclusion of the book of Revelation that, in the end, the people of God will worship Him as the One who is the Alpha and Omega. This is the liturgical community which consists in a polis of believers. We may combine this concept of the eschaton with our conclusion about being a disciple of Christ. Such discipleship, we saw, does not consist per se in the radical disqualification of interpersonal relationships. Following Christ can mean the rending of those relationships, but it is not always the case. Only if the relation between God and the believer would be damaged does this relation have priority. As the Household Rules make clear, interpersonal relationships have to be carefully preserved in order to be a Christian household. The Christian community can effect and safeguard this preservation within marriages and families. The eschatological community stresses both elements we have considered thus far: the relational character of the redeemed and liberated eschatological community, along with the importance of the relation with the God who is worshipped. The marital relationship will of course in the eschaton have changed in character, for there will be no procreation. The relational aspect, however, can have the same place as in the created reality we now experience. To stress this kind of continuity is not to sanctify and eternalize this penultimate life as such. The relation to God forbids such a generalisation. Only through the eschatological judgement will created reality - including created relationships - be saved. But it will be this created reality that will be saved.

165 Gunton, Christian Faith, 167.

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6.6.3 Conclusion With respect to the question with which this section began, we can now formulate some conclusions. The problem was, in what respect does Christianity believe marriage to change in the eschaton? This question was answered by referring to questions concerning the historical development of the social institution of marriage. If one takes this starting-point in historical development, we have shown two possible outcomes. Either one evaluates the development from patriarchal marriage towards a more partner-oriented one as being within the limits of the teaching of Jesus Christ (Pannenberg), or one takes Jesus' words on marriage as being a radical eschatological qualification to which Christians must learn to live in conformity (Stuart). What does the eschatological goal toward which creation is led by its Creator mean for the institution of marriage? Within the teachings of Jesus and His apostles, the relational structure of human life is strongly validated. This is made clear by Jesus (Mark 7,9-13) and in the so-called Household Rules. These relations, however, are not sacrosanct, for they are submitted to obedience of God above all. As far as any relationship endangers one's relation to God, it has to be qualified. Thirdly, the eschaton is to be seen as a redemption and judgement of this world, including our interpersonal relations. Thus, God will provide a new creation which is a fulfilment of this world. The personal relation between God and the believer will be decisive for the world to come. Other relations, however, will have their due place as well. Though the exact content of the marital relation in the life hereafter cannot be spelled out, its value is indisputable. As 'community' is the Creator's goal, our current community will not completely be wiped out. Marital relations will be transformed with regard to the place they take in the new creation. This does not mean that they will be absent. Jesus' saying that in the resurrection one will not marry (Matthew 22,2932) means that worrying about procreation, the future, and the continuity of our identity will not be necessary as it was in the days of the people of Israel. In the context of the Sadducees asking about the levirate marriage and the resurrection, Jesus' saying that we will be 'like the angels' has more to do with the directedness towards God, the Creator who will be all in all, than with asking about our being a material 'body' in any sense. The eschatological qualification of marriage, we may now conclude, is the assurance of God leading those who trust Him towards a goal in

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which the relation between the believer and God will not be endangered any more. The way in which the present, including our relationships, can threaten the relation with God will be definitively set aside and created anew. The created address by God the Creator towards human beings as His creatures will be uncontested: The definitive answer to the question 'Who am IT is found in the relation to God, which has become distorted by sin and needs to be redeemed by God's promissio. This eschatological goal leaves the believer in a community of believers by which his identity has been formed in the past. On the other hand, this community will be eschatologically continued by the Creator. He gathers his eschatological community through judgement. It is the judgement, however, of Jesus Christ Who is both Judge and judged. He is longing for this eschatological community which will be "prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband" (Revelation 21,2).

6.7 Conclusion 6.7.1 Summary In this section, I will summarise the conclusions of the preceding sections of this chapter. The question, to which this chapter is devoted, is: What can the doctrine of creation offer Christians in their considerations about marriage? In the course of this chapter, four concepts of marriage have passed under separate review. The first concept was that of marriage as a contract. This concept, developed in the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, was designed to solve problems concerning the freedom of marriage-partners. First, marital relationships were conceived of in terms of free choice. Over against the socio-economic determination to enter into marriage with someone, this concept was able, on the one hand, to in-form the freedom of the spouses to choose each other. On the other hand, the concept was also able to regulate freedom within the marital relationship. In order to bind the spouses to each other, the goals of the relationship were coined in terms of mutual benefits to reach goals concerning procreation, the upbringing of children, and sexuality. In the course of the twentieth century, new kinds of marital goals have emerged, such as self-realisation, marriage as the place to recover

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from social stress and the expectation that the freely concluded marital relationship should guarantee one's happiness. The need for the organisation of such marital freedom can be clearly discerned in the background of this liberal-contractarian view of marriage. The way in which the conflict of this life-form is met, however, is problematic. First, the pressure to make one's promises come true is totally on the marriage-partners. Second, it tends to evaluate marriage only in terms of its goals. The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, is able to confront the contesting of the marriage-partners without succumbing to burdening the partners or defining marriage in terms of its goals. By reading the biblical texts of the first creation-story, the following can be concluded. First, the bond between man and woman is traced back to God the Creator, who graciously gives man and woman to each other. This implies that the creative Word of God is at once also the promise that the relation does not depend on human efforts but on God himself. Second, although such a lasting relationship is instituted by God, conflict will not occur. For creation is never free from the seduction to trust human capabilities instead of God's promised comfort. The depiction of marriage as a life-form that will inevitably suffer from human failure, and is likewise inevitably sustained by God's promise, is clearly less optimistic than the liberalcontractarian view of marriage. This far more realistic approach is one benefit the treatment of marriage in the context of the doctrine of creation can offer. The second concept of marriage is taken from the tradition of 'natural law'. The indissolubility of marriage is particularly stressed in this tradition because it is essential to reach the marital goals. The concept of 'nature' standing in the background of this tradition has changed in the course of history. In the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, 'natural law' was immediately traced back to God's creating and sustaining relation towards his creation. Later on, the concept was increasingly used to demonstrate the rationality of marriage without the appeal to God's providential care for creation. However, as soon as the indissolubility was no longer 'felt' and experienced, the alleged rationality of this indissolubility became fiercely debated. The appeal to the alleged 'naturalness' of the indissoluble marital bond became weakened by the appeal to 'feelings' or experience. The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, rightly stresses the process of 'information' of human feelings in the context of the church community. As the explanation of the famous passage from Ephesians 5 is intended

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to show, the context in which marriage takes place is the relation between Jesus Christ and the Church. By framing marriage in this context, these two different relationships mutually intensify each other. Only the indissoluble bond between Christ and the Church is both warrant and example of the mystery of the indissolubility of the marital bond. The implicit appeal in this scriptural passage to Genesis 2 intensifies the created structure of the marital bond. The third concept of marriage is called the constructivist approach. This concept of marriage is considered to be a kind of gradually developed human invention for controlling the living together of man and woman. The concepts of sexuality and gender are treated as social constructs and so are the social institutions that regulate them. The fact that human beings consciously try to develop forms in which marital life should be lived is not to be evaluated as wrong in advance. For conscious human behaviour is a full part of an ethic informed by the doctrine of creation as well. Problems only occur if the development of life-forms is thought of in terms of 'autonomy'. In the context of the treatment of marriage, this 'autonomous' line of thought has gone from 'sexuality', as the initial starting phenomenon, to 'marriage' as the form in which humans choose to organise their sexuality. The doctrine of creation is critical towards this autonomy, for it stresses the overarching activity of the Creator in giving life-forms to human beings against the stress on human invention and action. The complementary concept of marriage treats marriage as God's own activity. This concept of marriage is in line with the arguments developed in section 5.4. The life-form of marriage is created by God, which counts for the general level of the social institution as well as for any particular marriage. Here human activity is viewed in line with God's providential and creative activity. The pressing question of how to determine this divine activity in the present, is a task of conscious and faithful living, and discernment by the community of believers under the guidance of the Holy Spirit by faithful listening to the in-forming words of the Bible. The fourth concept of marriage is that in which - mostly from a specific Christian standpoint - the eschatological qualification is intended to downplay the institution of marriage in the present. According to some commentators, the eschatological qualification by Jesus Christ in Matthew 22 is intended to state that in the heavenly kingdom, the hetero-patriarchal structures such as marriage will have disappeared. The question therefore is what this saying of Jesus tells us about the eschatological qualification of marriage. Will there be a

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radical transformation of human relationships in general and of marriage in particular? Traditionally, exegesis of this scriptural passage has favored this view. Some critical points have been made, which may call these assumptions into question. For it is not at all clear whether this word of Jesus is about marriage as such or about the leviratemarriage. In the last case, Jesus could qualify the particular Jewish stress on procreation with an appeal to the future in which this kind of worrying is not necessary. Furthermore, biblical teaching strongly validates relational structures. This is made clear both by Jesus (Mark 7,9-13) and the so-called Household Rules. All relationships, however, are submitted to obeying God above all as the first and greatest commandment. The eschatological goal of the community of believers gathered around God, Who will be living among them, is the warrant for one's individual identity - including the fulfillment of its being shaped in this life by interpersonal relationships (such as marriage).

6.7.2 Evaluation The concept of the doctrine of creation has been used in this chapter to inform the Christian doctrine of marriage as the life-form in which husband and wife live together. It explicitly reckons with the lifecontext of the conflict in which the marital relation is lived. Because the institution cannot be saved by human efforts as such, the trusting relationship between the Creator and his creation, which includes human beings and their life-forms, can be comforting. The question, whether this life-form matches natural human needs and feelings has been answered negatively. There is no such thing as 'natural' life apart from the constitutive relation with the Creator. The doctrine of creation not only stresses this relation as such, but is also intended to provide tools to investigate this relation in practice. In this process of determination of God's creative providence, the indispensable place of the Christian community is also stressed. For only within a context in which trust in the triune Creator is lived and exemplified can marriage as a life-form gain the most value. Within the context of the Church, human action is not credited with life-saving power. It is liberated from the burden of the need for any 'creativity7 in the deepest sense of the word. Human beings do not have to be the creators of their happiness or eschatological goal. As the Creator is providentially leading history towards its eschatological destination, this also applies to our

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marriages. The Creator can be trusted, because of his loyalty to his own creation, to cleanse the spoiled sinful reality including its relational structures, and recreate it through judgement towards the eschaton. This concept also accounts for the ability to rightly stress the importance of those created interpersonal relationships. The value of the created life, including its relational structures, is affirmed by the teaching of Jesus and the apostles. This implies the responsibility of the Christian community to explicate this value with the help of the doctrine of creation in the light of current cultural trends to ignore or deny these structures.

6.8 Evaluation of Bayer and Gunton on Marriage Whereas in the preceding paragraphs the doctrine of creation has been evaluated with respect to the topic of marriage, here the contribution of Gunton and Bayer to such a doctrine will be summarised. Referring to the evaluation of chapter 5, we can once more say that Bayer's doctrine of creation provides us with the necessary tools to identify the devastating consequences of sin on the institution of marriage, and to direct us to the only possible solution: to trust God as the Creator of this world, our marriages included. Bayer's use of the concept of 'promise' as God's creative word comforting and creating human life has been elaborated for the concept of marriage. His concept of 'observance' of creation is equally important for the hermeneutical elaboration of the doctrine of creation. For in order to determine God's creative word in the midst of our present context, the use of heuristic tools is required. Taking Bayer's doctrine of creation as a starting-point, we can also evaluate the contribution made by Gunton's doctrine of creation. It may be clear that Bayer is very reluctant to talk about certain topics: Trinity, pneumatology, or the historicity of some creatio ex nihilo. Bayer can be corrected by some of the concepts Gunton has developed. The teleological structure of history, stressed by Gunton's use of Irenaeus' concept of the trinitarian involvement of God in history leading to the eschatological goal of creation, is one example. For the determination and discrimination within the whole of created reality between 'law' and 'gospel', between God's creative, life-giving Word and the denial of this relation by human sin - as Bayer emphasizes - is also a matter of living faithfully out of God's eschatological goal for creation.

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To illustrate this, one can point to Bayer's treatment of marriage. Marriage is the life-form God graciously bestows on human beings, according to Bayer. But this life-form does not only gain its value from its present content. Both the marital relation between a man and a woman, as Bayer describes it, and the relation between God and human beings, are tenuously connected to the final goal of God's creation-project outlined eschatologically in the Bible. The qualification of any action and any relation by the 'first commandment', as Bayer repeatedly stresses, does not only function as the criterion by which we can judge between true and false relationships. The same commandment can also function as a description of the reality of God's future Kingdom on this recreated earth. The qualifying comments of the Lord Jesus Christ on interpersonal relationships are but an explication of the New Testament content of the first commandment: those relations may never obstruct the service of the Lord. Jesus' sayings are the specific reminder of the qualification of relationships in general with respect to the first commandment in its eschatological mode. Thereby, the eschatological tension can be used positively to qualify relations in both the present and their fulfilment in the future. Bayer's anxiety about the improper use of the concept of eschatology, such as by Hegelian speculation about the final goal of history, may be the reason for his hesitation to use any concept of eschatology as depicting a line from the beginning to the end. 166 This takes us to the second point in which Bayer's concept can be supplemented with Gunton's ideas. For as Bayer's criterion for theology is explained in the word promissio, this promise of God is mostly explicated in the context of the personal address by God to his creation. This address is in-formed by taking part in the liturgy of the Church and receiving the sacraments. With respect to these aspects, the constitutive relation between liturgy, sacraments, and the concrete community of believers should be elaborated more. Bayer's concept of promissio tends to become too abstract. Only within the context of prayer does Bayer treat the interpersonal relationship of the praying community, of which the believer is part.

166 Likewise, the same anxiety about any speculation on the starting-point of this line of history may cause Bayer's hesitation to speak about 'creation' as a category of beginning (cf. section 4.8).

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Gunton on the other hand, is far more interested in the systematic consequences of the Church and ecclesiology. Though Bayer has successfully overcome the traditional accusation that Lutheran theology is too concerned with human beings at the expense of the created reality as a whole, this relationality of human existence may still benefit from Gunion's concentration on the community of believers in the present (Church) and in the future (as the community of all believers of all times and places). This correction can be directed to the role played by the Church's community in the preservation of particular marriages despite severe difficulties. Bayer uses the doctrine of creation to explicate how God's promise both warrants one's marriage as such and strengthens the marriage-partners in the context of conflict. Bayer conceives this promise in a very individual way. This promise, however, has to be experienced and received in the community of believers. This not only concerns the blessing the couple is bestowed with at the beginning of marriage, but is also applicable to the life of the married couple within the context of the Church. The role the community can play in the preservation of a marriage should be seen as one of the created means God can use in providential care for his creation. The third element which should correct Bayer's concept is the appropriate attention to the Holy Spirit. Despite the speculative use of the concept of 'spirit' in post-Enlightenment theology and philosophy, including speculative theories about trinitarian theology, Bayer is overly concerned with these negative uses of the Holy Spirit. For, though Bayer is right to stress the Spirit's binding himself to created means, it is nevertheless not the means that count but the Spirit that comes with it.167 It is important in Gunton's elaboration of both the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the treatment of the community, that he uses the word 'sanctification'. For it is the Spirit of Jesus Christ, Who is said to indwell the believer and Who, because of this process of indwelling, also changes people. To accentuate the work of the Holy Spirit would have led Bayer to not only stress the comfort of God in the midst of conflict, but perhaps also to elaborate the positive consequences of His work in the life of the Christian marriage-partners. As the reading of Romans 8 makes clear, such an accent on the Spirit does not at all imply speculative ideas of progress, and the overcoming 167 Cf. e.g. Gott als Autor, 220.

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of evil, which Bayer fears. It could, on the contrary, function as an example of how the power of God can be experienced in the midst of a fallen world which is directed towards the goal God himself leads us to. Gunton's elaboration of sanctification in the context of pneumatology is especially relevant for the concrete marriage-partners who want to be informed by God's plan for husband and wife. By means of the congregation of the Church, the Creator is inclined to sustain the spouses in their efforts to sanctify the marital estate. The explicit confession that such a sanctification is God's work through the Spirit can direct attention to the fact that the community of the saints is a token of God's unprecedented care for his creation through history towards the eschatological goal. That the different accents of both Bayer and Gunton, and the mutual completion of the doctrine of creation with respect to theological ethics, bear the marks of different confessional traditions may sound obvious. The specific Lutheran stress on human beings as simul iustus et peccator and the specific Calvinistic evaluation of human action are well reflected by their heirs treated in this study. What can be equally clear, however, is the positive outcome of the interconfessional dialogue between two exponents of these traditions. With respect to the doctrine of creation, the dialogue between Bayer and Gunton has made clear that the Lutheran tendency to concentrate on the individual may be broadened by the Calvinist accent on the whole of the created order in general and the community of the believers in particular.168

168 Here especially the relation between the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the sacraments could be interesting (cf. Christian Faith, 131-134 in relation to Bayer's treatment of the Lord's Supper [4.2.2]). Martien Brinkman has achieved this with respect to the broader context of Lutheran, Calvinist, Roman-Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. His conclusion is that in order to perceive creation and observe it, we need the sacraments. In the sacraments the wide range of creational experiences is traced back to their Creator through Christ in the Spirit (Brinkman, M.E.; Schepping en sacrament. Een oecumenische Studie naar de reikwijdte van het sacrament als heilzaam symbool in een weerbarstige werkelijkheid, Meinema: Zoetermeer 1991,167-171).

7 Recapitulation What does the consideration of the Christian doctrine of creation bring to theological ethics? Now that this study is nearly at its end, the overall conclusion to this question must be drawn. Here I would confine the answer to the following aspects: theological ethics; the NeoCalvinist tradition; apologetics; and the ecumenical goal (cf. section 2.3).

7.1 Theological ethics In most theological ethics, the doctrine of creation is narrowed to the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo. Given the elaboration of the creationdoctrine by Bayer and Gunton, we readily conclude that it is far more than that. A doctrine of creation is a framework in which the creative action of God is treated in relation to the human reaction. Therefore, ethics can be encompassed in the doctrine of creation. As the form of the Apostolic creed makes clear, however, in doctrine one topic cannot be treated in complete isolation from other doctrinal aspects. Consequently, the doctrine of creation cannot be used as some quasineutral natural theology, for it immediately connects creation to Christology. It is the Father of Jesus Christ, Who created heaven and earth and Who created me. The specific Barthian stress on Christology, which became so dominant in twentieth-century theology, is also present in Gunton's view of the doctrine of creation. But in accordance with Barth's own intentions, Gunton is much more inclined to elaborate the trinitarian aspects connected to both Christology and creation. The dominance of Barthianism also influenced Bayer's theology, although in a different way. Bayer's theological work can be seen as a Lutheran objection against the monistic tendency of Barthianism. 1 For Bayer, 1

Cf. 'Oswald Bayer'. In: Henning, Christian; Lehmkühler, Karsten (Hrsg.); Systematische Theologie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1998, (300-315) 303.

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creation may not be treated apart from the Creator being the Father of Jesus Christ. Some kind of hermeneutic of reality is at stake here: how does one view reality in a Christian way? Whereas trinitarian theology is more likely to stress harmony, a Lutheran stress on Christology will be more prone to leave room for the treatment of evil and sin. The explicit treatment of Gunton's and Bayer's doctrines of creation is meant to stress the conclusion that the 'doctrine of creation' is not some fixed content but the theological activity of describing the consequences of 'creation' for both the believer and the world as created by the triune God. In this way, the doctrine of creation can become one of the determining elements of a 'way of life', of an ethic of createdness. One of the major tasks in theological ethics is the discernment of the ethical field (cf. 5.3.2). How can the contribution of the outlined doctrine of creation with respect to theological ethics be situated within the whole of the field (cf. section 2.3.2)? To some degree, the attention given to epistemology in this study is comparable with the attitude, as formulated within certain other projects that are intended to "reclaim the world by situating its concerns and activities within a theological framework".2 In some of the contributions to projects like these, the doctrine of creation plays an important role, for it wants to view 'reality' not as the separated dominion of mankind but as 'created being' with all the implied consequences even for ethics.3 This project also resembles the evaluations that arise from communitarianism. The social ontology which is developed in communitarianism is much 'richer' than its liberal counterparts, and communitarianism confronts the moral debate with the legitimate longing for an embodied morality. As De Bruijne has recently outlined, this communitarian aspect can be used especially within a framework which is coined in terms of 'creation'.4

2

3

4

Milbank, John; Ward, Graham; Pickstock, Catherine; 'Introduction. Suspending the material: the turn of radical orthodoxy'. In: Milbank, John; Pickstock, Catherine; Ward, Graham (edd.); Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology, Routledge: London 1999, (1-20) 1. Cf. e.g. the essays of Laurence Paul Hemming ('Nihilism. Heidegger and the grounds of redemption') and Michael Hanby ('Desire. Augustine beyond Western subjectivity') in: Milbank e.a., Radical Orthodoxy, 91-108 viz. 109-126. Bruijne, Ad de; 'Christelijke ethiek tussen wet, schepping en gemeenschap: Een positionering naar aanleiding van Romeinen 12,1 en 2'. In: Radix 27 (2001), 116-148.

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The doctrine of creation as outlined in this study can contribute to these discussions. One of the most fundamental criticisms of communitarianism is the observation that any community is counted as positive because it exists: community as such is good.5 This view does not leave room for critical examination of such a community. The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, reckons with reality as explicitly related to Jesus Christ, by means of a hermeneutic of creation informed by the cross. The doctrine of creation is intended to reckon the created reality in terms of relatedness to each other and to God, but to evaluate the nature of these relations as well. Criticism that leads towards Milbank's social ontology of peace may consist in pointing to the primacy of peace over war.6 Such an appeal to harmony and peace, however, can only be theologically valid if it is explicitly traced back to the Creator of this world, Who alone is able to create such harmony and peace in a sinful world. Milbank's 'counter-ethics' of the kingdom7 may benefit from the Lutheran 'passive' element. The doctrine of creation is - in other words - able to provide a framework which can be used as a hermeneutic tool in discerning missing elements in ethics that are concerned with 'ontology7. It can also provide some alternatives and point to directions in which a solution may be sought.

7.2 Neo-Calvinist Tradition Within Neo-Calvinist ethics, and its allies within the Dutch theological landscape, the appeal to creation is very common. This theological tradition takes the testimony of the Bible concerning the origin of this world, as created ex nihilo by the triune God, very seriously. Because of the importance of the biblical evidence, the biblical-historical line from 5

6

7

Cf. the criticism of communitarianism in a recent Dutch overview of this movement by Buijs, Govert; 'Höge, al te hoge verwachtingen van ons samenzijn. Een portret van het communitarisme'. In: Radix 28 (2002), (4-22) 19v. Cf. Milbank, John; Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell: Oxford 1990, 390: "the ontological priority of peace over conflict" stemming from Augustine. This view is recapitulated on the last page of Milbank's book: "And the absolute Christian vision of ontological peace now provides the only alternative to a nihilistic outlook" (434). Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 398-422.

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Eden to eschaton plays an important role.8 Within this tradition, much attention is given to what now may be called 'public theology7. The doctrine of creation proved to be relevant here because of its immanent force to relate Christians to this world instead of fleeing it.9 The biblical sequence of creation, fall, redemption, and eschatological re-creation is the main reason why in Neo-Calvinism, the doctrine of creation is bound to 'Eden' and confined to a doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo. Within the field of theological ethics, 'creation' therefore was readily identified with God's original plan for the world which was formulated accordingly in terms of God's creation-orders. Man should be obedient to God, Who by his commandments directs man to act in accordance with his creation-orders from the beginning. Dogmatically, however, a doctrine of creation cannot be confined to a doctrine of the original creatio ex nihilo. It should also be about its present shape, the consequences of the fall, and its eschatological goal. The doctrine of creation has to be about the history of creation in relation to its Creator. Within Neo-Calvinism, there have been many debates about the relation between Eden and eschaton and thereby about the historical shape of creation. In section 5.5 one of them was treated. The conclusion here is that due to the unity of God's plan, there can be no radical or essential disagreement between the eschaton and creatio ex nihilo. The sustaining of unity and continuity here is ascribed to the Creator, who graciously bestows his creation with his life-forms. This definition of 'creation' should have its impact on ethics. As De Bruijne has shown, the relation between law, community, and creation has to be redefined in the post-modern context. Only if the ethical subject is re-placed within the context of the community will he or she be transformed through the triune God with respect to the observance of reality as creation.10 So the Christian is located within the community,

8

Cf. Velema, W.H.; 'Ethiek tussen Eden en eschaton', and: Jochemsen, Η.; 'In orde. Scheppingsordeningen en verantwoordelijkheid in de christelijke ethiek'. In: Schaeffer, J.H.F.; Smit, J.H.; Tromp, T. (red.); Nüchtere noodzaak. Ethiek tussen navolging en compromis [FS J. Douma], Kok: Kampen 1997, 62-74 viz. 96-105.

9

Cf. Mouw, Richard J.; 'Schilder als theoloog van de samenleving'. In: Harinck, George (red.); Alles ofniets. Opstellen aver K. Schilder, De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 2003, 145-168.

10

Bruijne, Ad de; 'Christelijke ethiek tussen wet, schepping en gemeenschap: Een positionering naar aanleiding van Romeinen 12,1 en 2'. In: Radix 2 7 (2001), 116-148.

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and, informed by faith, he will be able to discern reality as 'creation' both in its present content and its future shape. Within the context of present Neo-Calvinist theology, the presence of the Creator by means of his promissio has recently been advocated by the practical theologian C. Trimp.11 By doing so, Trimp also wants to avoid a strict division of the promised salvation of God and the demanded obedience of man. This has immediate consequences for theological ethics. Human action, hereby, can never be treated apart from the context of God's promise. I see this as a confirmation that within the Neo-Calvinist theological ethics, the Reformational content of promissio could be well-used in redirecting the classical content of the doctrine of creation. God's promissio therefore defines the content of the doctrine of creation with respect to the moral subject and to the moral field itself. Man is himself found to be amidst the whole of creation being addressed by its Creator, and is thereby able to interpret the field of action as 'creation'.

7.3 Apologetics To treat ethics within the framework of the doctrine of creation also bears consequences on the apologetic content of Christian doctrine and ethics in general. Over against other worldviews, this specifically Christian contribution to the debate could be fruitful. The doctrine of creation is both realistic and hopeful. Realistic against Utopians who stress that by means of human action the world can be made a better place in which to live. In this respect, the doctrine of creation could be used in the field of ecological ethics12, medical ethics, and business ethics. If human action is given the status of saving the world, the more realistic tones of the Christian doctrine of creation should be heard. On the other hand, those who are desperate because

11

12

Trimp, C.; Klank en weerklank. Door prediking tot geloofservaring, De Vuurbaak: Barneveld 1989, esp. 52-64. Trimp here explicitly reactivates the reformational connotations of the word 'promise' for the ethical exhortations in Neo-Calvinist preaching. Cf. for an example of such an approach: Frey, Christofer; "Theologie und Ethik der Schöpfung'. In: Z E E 32 (1988), (47-62) 58f.

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of all the signs of human failure to do exactly that, save the world, they could benefit from the hopeful promise by the Creator Himself. He will never abandon the works of his hands (Psalm 138,8). Secondly, an apologetic benefit is gained from the implied universality of God's creative action. The classical post-Enlightenment debate about relativism or universalism, about the applicability of God's norms for moral behaviour, should be redirected. Christian moral reasoning is not relevant to all human beings because of some intrinsic characteristic of reality. Its applicability depends solely on God's care for his creation by which He upholds the necessary lifeforms. The universality of God's promissio - in time and space - is not a matter of inherent features of reality. Even the ethical demands are not bound to created reality itself. All ethical demands are dependent on the Creator who in Jesus Christ has shown the true character of reality. This emphasis on God's personal but universal creative activity is very different from other kinds of universalistic ethics. It criticises both the relativistic post-modern ethics and the typical Enlightenment projects. A third apologetic benefit is found in the role and place of the Christian community. Within this doctrine of creation, the formative role of the Church for the human character is evident. This implies that the Christian community is entitled to live, by grace, the life of the redeemed polis of the believers. The Church is not the redeemer of the believer, but it receives its role from its Creator. As such, the style of the Church may be characterized by the character of the triune Creator. At the same time, the Creator himself does not confine his attention to the Church: the ecclesia, as the relation between God and the believer, is necessarily extended outside itself to all kinds of created relations. The saving character of the relation between God and his creation can be shown to the world.

7.4 Ecumenical Contribution Both Bayer and Gunton do not disguise their Lutheran and Calvinist approaches towards theology. Bayer is an explicitly Lutheran theologian,13 a commitment which stems from the quite manifest 13

In 2001, Bayer published an article entitled: '"Die ganze Theologie Luthers'" (In: KuD 47 [2001], 254-274). Two years later, Bayer even published an overview of Luther's

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preference for Luther's alleged vivid conception of the relation between God and man, over against Calvin's more static correlation between knowledge of God and man.14 More than once Gunton has written critical remarks on Lutheran theologians, such as his otherwise warmly appreciated teacher Robert Jenson,15 and he grew more and more aware of his Calvinist background and its value.16 In Christology in particular, the different positions of Calvin and Luther receive Gunton's attention. On the other hand, Coleridge was one of Gunton's most influential teachers, for whom Luther was a major spiritual guide - according to Gunton.17 To stress the differences of both traditions, and of both exponents as described in this book, stresses the importance of the ecumenical discussion as well. Bayer and Gunton describe the roots of their own inheritance and more than once compare them with opinions of theologians from outside their own tradition. For Bayer, this even forms the core of the theological habitus as theology is Konfliktwissenschaft. The honesty with which Bayer and Gunton reveal the relevant differences between the confessionally diverging opinions is disarming - for it keeps the conversation going. The ecumenical conversation could benefit from starting with the doctrine of creation. Notwithstanding the major differences between

14

15

16

17

theology (Bayer, Oswald; Martin Luthers Theologie. Eine Vergegenwärtigung, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck 2003). This qualification is most clearly described in: Theologie, 163-166; 181f. To some degree this opinion is shared by Gunton: "Lutheran theology's tendency to restrict what we may say of the being of God to his being for and in relation to us contrasts with a concern, more characteristic of the Reformed tradition, for ontology" (Promise of Trinitarian Theology, xvii). Gunton, Colin E.; 'Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert W. Jenson: An Encounter and a Convergence'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); Trinity, Time, and Church. A Response to the Theology of Robert W. Jenson, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 2000, 80-93. Gunton writes about him: "[...] Calvin, whose often warm, affirmative, lucidly intellectual, and for the most part open thought is rightly receiving attention at this time when it has become an ecumenical responsibility to explore the particularities of our heritage. [...] It becomes more and more borne upon me that his is one of the great minds of the tradition, hugely underestimated almost everywhere for all kinds of bad reasons, some but by no means all due to that movement called 'Calvinism'" (Gunton, Colin E.; Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark Edinburgh 2000, viif). Gunton, Colin E.; Theology through the Theologians. Clark: Edinburgh 1996, 33.

Selected Essays 1972-1995, T&T

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the approaches of Bayer and Gunton, we have also come to the conclusion that with respect to important doctrines like the Trinity, hamartiology and justification, both theologians gradually converge. As Gunton gradually shows interest in the classical doctrine of sin with respect to our dealing with reality, Bayer is carefully trying to expose the contribution of the doctrine of the Trinity at least for our eschatological expectations. As is made clear in section 6.8, the doctrine of creation is a topic that offers possibilities to discern different accents in Bayer and Gunton's work. The ecumenical contribution of the presented comparison between the Lutheran and Calvinist approaches lies in the fact that the sense of reality of the Lutheran approach has never to be underestimated, whereas it can benefit from the Calvinist stress on the sovereignty of God. Whereas the doctrine of creation has been the battle-field of many theological struggles, the reflection on its form in both Bayer's and Gunton's theology makes clear that standing over against a (post-) modern approach to theology and life, the doctrine of creation in particular provides theologians with the necessary tools to identify relevant themes for both society and Church. This doctrine is appropriate for identifying the relevance of other doctrines as well. Furthermore, the doctrine of creation could, if applied to theological ethics, work heuristically and materially - heuristically in discerning the life-context, materially in many ways. The doctrine of creation is intended to encompass both God and man, and it thereby serves as an interesting starting-point for doing theology ecumenically. As might be clear from the description of both Bayer's and Gunton's theology, this starting-point is only the prelude to the rest of the theological work, containing all the different aspects of Christian doctrine. Above all, this prelude can only be rightly discerned by living and thinking in a true Christian community which is committed to the whole of Christian doctrine, and which prohibits the isolation or neutralization of the doctrine of creation.

8 Summaries 8.1 English This study is devoted to a description of the relation between createdness and ethics, particularly in the theology of Colin Ewart Gunton (1941-2003) and Oswald Bayer (1939). The results from this systematic-theological analysis will be applied to the topic of 'marriage' as a social-ethical example. After some preliminary remarks (chapter 1), the theme is introduced in chapter 2. The twentieth century gave rise to a more elaborate treatment of the doctrine of creation than in the preceding centuries. In reaction to the alleged Christocentric theology of Karl Barth, and following general scientific developments in which the status of theology was questioned and theology thus allowed to say something about reality as well, the space for developing a doctrine of creation was broadened even more by the rise of pneumatology in relation to the growing interest in the praxis among theologians. In theological ethics 'creation' was focused on because of the growing consciousness of the environmental crisis taking place and the growing attention given to bio-medical problems and their ethical components. With respect to the word 'creation' we have to carefully define its content. It can be used as denoting the creatura, or the act of creating (ιcreatio). It also can imply the specifically Christian convictions on the origin, present and eventual goal of the whole of 'reality 7 . As such it virtually contains a whole worldview. For theological ethics, the question can be posed: what are the ethical consequences (ethics) of the conviction that human beings and the whole of reality are created by God (createdness)? That question can be summarised as: What does the consideration of the Christian doctrine of creation bring for theological ethics? This study wants to consider this question for four reasons. Within the current, (post- or late-)modern scientific field, the theological proprium of ethics is severely challenged by its pluralist context. The doctrine of creation is sometimes said to be able to raise possible solutions for this

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problem, in diagnosing and curing the main problem of pluralism. In Neo-Calvinist theology, which is the author's background, the doctrine of creation has historically played an enormous role, and this tradition may be capable of elaborating this doctrine for theological ethics in the present as it did in the past. As to the doctrine of creation makes universal claims, this study also contains some apologetic features. By analysing a German Lutheran theologian (Bayer) and a British Calvinist-Reformed theologian (Gunton), different ecclesial positions and their traditions are brought into play as well. Gunton's theology can be summarised as a Trinitarian theology of creation (chapter 3). It is a conceptualization of a Trinitarian ontology out of the economic involvement of the triune God in the history of his creation. The key term in this ontology is 'otherness-in-relation', which means that the ontological framework of human living and action has to pay due respect to both the substantiality of God, other human beings and the non-human nature, and to the essential relationality that marks true life. In this project, Gunton follows two key figures, Irenaeus and Coleridge, who in their time and context discovered the truth of this ontological framework. Gunton stresses the crucial criteriological function Christology plays in this project, for it is in the 'career' of Jesus Christ that man can discover true substantiality and relationality. The economic involvement of the triune God for Gunton reaches its height in the incarnate God. Within the Christological debate after the Enlightenment, Gunton follows Karl Barth, who rediscovered the value of Trinitarian theology. Only within a Trinitarian framework can the meaning of Jesus' earthly career be discovered. Interpreted in this way, the coming, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ are parts of God's project with creation, and only in the light of Jesus' career can the true meaning of human life be seen. The doctrine of creation, seen within this Trinitarian framework, is an explication of the specific kind of ontology Gunton advocates. For 'being' and 'life' are ordered in some way, related to God, the human species, and the non-human creature. This relation, however, suffers under the consequences of sin, error, and evil. As Jesus Christ came to redeem us to God and redirect the whole of creation to its final end, our relationality can be renewed. The word 'ontology' contains several meanings in Gunton's writings. Following both Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, Gunton seeks possibilities for theology to articulate the kind of world in which

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we live. As this world is created by God, human beings should be able to discover its inner rationality and order. There is, however, no direct, immediate connection between the triune God and this world apart from his creational mediation. The concept of creation warrants that God and this world are ontologically distinct substances, and that they are somehow related. So Gunton's Trinitarian doctrine of creation on the one hand functions as the concept that opens the possibility "to understand something of how things are with our world as the creation of God," and on the other provides us with the criteria to explore the concept. Such a doctrine of creation encompasses ethics in that it offers a theoretical framework with which human action can be guided. The creation-project is God's ongoing involvement with his creation towards the end. Within this project, man as the image of God has the task to offer this creation back to its Creator so that it arrives at its destined goal, that is, perfection. The cooperation of God and man within this project is part of God's creational mediation and should not be opposed to Gunton's stress on the passivity of man. Gunton's use of the Trinitarian doctrine of creation is an explicit argument against mainstream modern, post-Enlightenment ethics, which view 'reality' (including human beings) as something autonomous in which the non-human creation could be treated as a machine. The doctrine of creation can thus provide some weapons to arm criticism of the Enlightenment-project. Gunton's Trinitarian ontological framework is in part designated as a framework in which sin and evil can be treated adequately. The criteriological function of Christology is an explicit signal that the devastating consequences of the human fall will be overcome by the redemptive activity of the cross and Jesus' resurrection. This victory will be carried out in the project of creation towards its eschatological perfection. With respect to theological ethics, this once more affirms the conviction that human activity cannot save creation. Bayer's theology has its main criterion and systematic centre in Martin Luther's discovery of the importance of God's promissio (chapter 4). Promissio is God's life-giving, life-sustaining, and life-renewing loving Word to his creatures. As such it covers the doctrines of God, creation, justification, and eschatology. Being the fundamental reformational discovery of Martin Luther within the context of the doctrine of justification and the sacraments, as Bayer has shown, promissio also

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functions within the elaboration of the doctrine of creation and theological ethics. Important elements of this promissio are elaborated to describe its criteriological character. Firstly, the passivity of man is discussed, because human justification, along with human observance of reality, is characterized by God's action. Secondly, the bodily mediated character of promissio is vital for Bayer's theology; thus the way in which God is related to his creation is concretely named, which implies in the third place that this mediation - first of all by language in its broadest sense is so important. Finally, promissio in the context of soteriology has to be understood in a twofold way: God's speaking can be both 'law' and 'gospel'. The distinction between these two constitutes the criteriological implications of promissio. As the criterion is explained, its use within Bayer's view of the concept and task of theology as a whole is explored. Theology is about the discovery of the effects of law and gospel within reality. As such, theology is a hermeneutical discipline that treats human experience of reality. Amidst other interpretations of the same reality, theology is constitutively a discipline of conflict: it enters the battle between rival or contradictory explanations of reality; it resists unifying principles for our reality as well as its division, on principle, into separate areas. Theology therefore does not deal with reality (or realities) as such, but observes and interprets it as being God's promise to us; it tries to distinguish between law and gospel, it does not treat abstract reality but has the different life-forms as its object. The unity of our life is not achieved in thought, or in action, but is bestowed upon us passively. Bayer's concept of theology draws heavily on the vital position of the doctrine of creation, for out of this doctrine flows the basic conception of human society as Church, which is the primary life-form of every human being who is, qua creatura, addressed by God. Because human life within this life-form (Church) is corrupted, God's promissio is not only the graceful, life-giving activity, but it also points at His justifying and life-sustaining activity. Theology has to bring this interpretation of our experience into the limelight. Along with Luther, as the first leg Bayer stands on, came Hamann as the swinging leg, who made Luther's theology relevant to - and, where necessary, opposite to - the Enlightenment. Bayer follows this example of how we should interpret and observe the world 'metacritically'. One of the most distinctive words in this interpretation is freedom. For Bayer, to deal with this concept metacritically implies using promissio as its criterion; freedom is no postulate for action, nor

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can it be achieved through action. It is bestowed on us by God. Hamann's metacritical attitude is the reason he resists all unifying tendencies, for such unity can only be an abstract postulation, contradictory to our experiences of life. This causes Bayer to distinguish - over against monistic concepts of theology - four different experiences (Widerfahrnisse) as the object of theology: law, gospel, God's hiddenness, and the primus usus legis which consists in the civil or political use of the law. Bayer's doctrine of creation is based on promissio as well. Though the context of this criterion was the doctrine of salvation and justification in the first place, the concept of God's promising word which creates new life coincides with that of the creatio ex nihilo. As such, creation is treated as speech-act in the sense that God spoke and this world came into existence (creatio as speech-act), and also in the sense that through creation, through created means, God still speaks to his creation (creatura as speech-act). The implications for Bayer's understanding of time and history are also outlined, as our attention is directed through the interwoven past, present, and future towards a fundamental eschatological aspect of our interpretation and observance of the world. In line with the passive aspects of promissio, Bayer's anthropology stresses the linguistic character in the (concrete and personal) definition of man: "I am the one to whom - as to every creature - has been said: Ί am the Lord, Your God, who brought you out of Egypt. You shall have no other gods before me'." Within our reality, the last part of this definition follows from Bayer's doctrine of sin: we are creating our own gods. Over against human efforts to avert evil or fight against it, Bayer stresses the promissional aspects of eschatology in which God eventually overcomes evil. Finally, the doctrine of God which Bayer advocates distinguishes between a general doctrine of God, used, on the one hand, in conversation with other disciplines and other 'gods' to demonstrate gospel, law, God's hiddenness in our experience, and the usus politicus legis, and, on the other hand, the doctrine of the Trinity who is purely gospel. Theological ethics are outlined by Bayer along the lines of promissio as well. It does not start with the question of what to do, but answers the question of what has been given to us. Summarising the connections between Bayer's ethics and the doctrine of creation, we see that an ethic of createdness stresses the passivity of man as being addressed and being created. It forbids any kind of exaggerated ethical ardour. Theological ethics is about the interpretation of this world,

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being constituted by God's speaking and authorizing man to live reasonably within the three mandates God institutes (ecclesia, oeconomia, and politia). God's address, which implies such an ethic, is paradigmatically formulated in the First Commandment, which stresses the conflict of interpretations of this world. The positive content of Bayer's ethics is an ethic of gift. The central concept here is that of 'power', which implies the asymmetrical relation of giving and receiving without its common association with violence. The concept of labour, under the heading of 'vocation', builds on the idea of man as linguistic being; this implies living in power-relationships which require labour to fulfil God's vocation. Here Bayer stresses the importance of the observance of the Lord's Day as a starting-point for our working life. The material ethical consequences: family, marriage, and state are elaborated. In them, promissio is the criterion. In chapter 5, the systematic-theological connection between a doctrine of creation and theological ethics is described. The chapter is ordered around four well-known objections against an appeal to creation in theological ethics. In the first place, the question of how we know creation is treated (epistemology). The connection between knowledge and Christology is vital, though not as present in Neo-Calvinist theology as it should be. In Christ we see and experience what God intended for his creation. The biblical creation-texts in Genesis cannot be read by Christians without referring to Christological texts in John, Ephesians, and Colossians. After a short survey of Old-Testament theology and exegesis, it is concluded that the Genesis-account of the origin of the world and its first history gives us the assurance that the world in its present ambiguity is not as God intended. It also gives the assurance that God will change that. God stands behind the world, and He is a God who can be trusted - exactly because He is the Creator who sustains it. It is also made clear that within the account of creation, socalled theodicy is of great importance. After a description of several theological positions (O'Donovan, Neo-Calvinism, Bayer and Gunton), it is concluded that the Geneszs-account stresses God's original order of creation, which exist because of God's creating providence, of which the cross and resurrection of Christ are the temporary climax. These three biblical notions - the ordered creatio ex nihilo, the exclusively relational existence of the created reality, and the Christological redemption of fallen reality - bear the following consequences on epistemology. Human knowledge after the fall is in need of divine

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Revelation for origin, purpose and destination of reality; such historical framework cannot be obtained without perceiving reality's current deviation from this intended road, which is no 'less real' than its divine destiny. Therefore Christians have to look for and subsequently endure the tension between good and evil, between God's destiny and human results, between true and false knowledge of the order of created reality. The moral knowledge gained in this process is characterized by the consequences attached to this unsettled process of gaining knowledge, and therefore is provisional. Secondly, the relation between the concepts of nature (as in 'natural law') and creation is explained. Creation is an interpretation of nature which is shaped by the Christian liturgy. There is constant rivalry between this interpretation and others. The concept of natural law was originally embedded in Christian theology, and as such equivalent to God's providential care. The Enlightenment, however, emancipated nature from this context into an autonomous order. Other concepts are that of cosmology and its antropic prinicple (Murphy/Ellis), and a Darwinist evolution-theory (De Lange), concepts which are critically reviewed by means of Gunton's and Bayer's arguments. In the confrontation between their theology and the other proposals, these concepts appear to lack the necessary attention to the formation of the human character by the Church's witnessing to the inherited gospel of the triune God. In addition, their misinterpretation of the character of God and his relation towards his creation, their vagueness on God's goal for creation, and, consequently, their lack of concrete guidance for ethics are exposed. The concept of creation as the life-context for ethics offers possibilities for theological ethics in exactly this respect. The relation between creation and providence is the third topic. As creation is not unspoiled, the consequences of hamartiology for both God's providential care in sustaining his creation and human responsibility for their use of it have to be mentioned. Every appeal to a created order accounts for an acknowledgement of the actual disorder, which can only be dealt with while trusting God' providential care. Christian hamartiology also implies both human responsibility for evil, and God's continuing care for his creation. Whereas sin is a distortion of the relation between Creator and creation, the mode of that relation and its consequences for reality itself are at stake. The fact that we still speak about reality as creation shows the fact that God still providentially sustains the creatura. After a short survey of the relation between creation and providence in Reformed thinking, we conclude

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that the doctrine of providence is part of the doctrine of creation. Providence is concerned with the question of how a world in which evil exists can be said to be God's creation. This counts for social institutions as well. Furthermore, providence is an explicit confession of the primarily passive constitution of human beings. With respect to social insitutions, the relation between human and divine action is important, particularly with respect to human freedom. As is shown, the concept of freedom is not in danger within the context of God's created providence. On the contrary, God's creatio is shown to be the prerequisite for human freedom. The created insitutions are the Godgiven possibilities for free human action in time and space. The traditional triad of institutions (ecclesia, oeconomia, and politia) can be traced back to the Middle-Ages and its classical aristotelian roots. Their recent use as heuristic tools in the description of the field of ethics shows the flexibility and usefulness of the triad (Wannenwetsch, Honecker). Finally, the relation between creation and eschaton is explored. In Christian ethics, the corresponding distinction between conservative and eschatological ethics is a persistent one. Using the doctrine of creation in ethics, however, can overcome that dilemma. A survey of specific Reformed contributions to solving this dilemma (Lee Hardy, Volf, Schuurman) leads to the conclusion that the eschatological goal God is providing is not contradictory to the providentially sustained creation we receive from the Creator. The continuity between origin and goal is warranted by God's unremitting care for, and upholding of, his creation. Origin and goal cannot be contrasted, because of the unity of the triune Creator, Redeemer, and Renewer. Eschatology is a qualification of reality in the light of God's intentional goal for his creation. This standpoint also implies that the orders God created are in line with his eschatological goal. This view, however, is not uncontested. The example of the institution of marriage will make that clear. The survey of contributions to the relation between createdness and ethics provides us with the necessary framework to evaluate the contribution of Gunton and Bayer on that issue. As their theology is crititcal to the Enlightenment-project, their doctrine of creation functions as a heuristic instrument by which the believer can detect a specific kind of freedom and autonomy as the source of many problematic features of modernity. Taking creation seriously provides them with both a solution to these problems and an alternative,

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constructive proposal. In both doctrines of creation, the elaboration of the concept of 'sin' is evident. Notwithstanding their similarities in this respect, differences are apparent as well. Gunton's starting-point for doing creation-theology - the rediscovery of the Trinity - is very different from Bayer's Lutheran promissio. Here we may conclude that Gunton is more inclined to look for intellectual solutions to overcoming the consequences of sin. Thinking trinitarianly is trying to establish the 'echo' of the triune God in reality - which in turn proves to be there already. Bayer insists on one's commitment to the life-forms of the Church by which one is 'in-formed' of God's goal with creation. In this respect, one can trace a development in both theologies. Gunton was much more impressed at first by the intellectual challenge offered by Coleridge's critique on modernity, and gradually returned to a more explicitly Calvinist way of doing theology. Bayer is deeply influenced by Hamann's metacritical way of exploring Luther over against modernity, and from there gradually allows for the treatment of more 'modern' themes like the Trinity and the doctrine of the Spirit. The radicality of Bayer's metacritical treatment of the doctrine of creation within a life-context which is thoroughly influenced and characterized by human sin seems more realistic than Gunton's somewhat intellectual approach. This conclusion is underlined by the developments in Gunton's later publications, which are more consistent with Bayer's stress on broken reality. The concept of 'order' is among the prominent themes in this arena. It has evident interconnections with the concept of autonomy, for here also human freedom over against social orders is at stake. Bayer's and Gunton's critique of the Enlightenment concept of freedom is discussed, which contains a positive stress on 'order'. For only those who live in God's order are able to be really free. Gunton, however, is more inclined to stress the objectivity of the remaining order than Bayer. Far from charging Gunton with a too optimistic worldview, I want, rather, to stress Bayer's realism. Bayer in every respect wants to stress God's activity as essential for this world and its remaining order in spite of the devastating consequences of sin. This essential relation, sustaining the world and every living being, changes the character of the concept of 'order'. Instead of the objectivity of order, the relation to its Maker is stressed. In Bayer's theology, the constitutive relation of reality to its Creator also leads toward a specific kind of eschatological component of the doctrine of creation. First, human efforts to save the world are doomed

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to fail, because they collapse under the weight of their own burden. Secondly, because of God's reliability and loyalty to his present creation, its ordering in the present is no less important in the light of the eschaton. The eschatological qualification of reality does not decrease the importance of the present structures. It is in this respect that Bayer criticises radical eschatologies. Bayer's fear of speculation warns him not to say too much about the goal of history. Gunton, on the other hand, is more inclined to describe the content of the eschatological qualification of the present order. For Gunton far more than Bayer, this present order is being redirected much more visibly by the presence of the Holy Spirit. Gunton's pneumatological considerations are the reason for his moderate optimism. Whereas Bayer is more inclined to speak about the hiddenness of God, Gunton describes the Spirit's presence and power within reality. In conclusion, we can say that Bayer's refusing to refer to a presence of God in reality without its being mediated, stresses the undeniable need for human conversion within the context of the Church and its liturgy. Only within this context can creation be observed as 'creation'. The gradual shift in Gunton's oeuvre towards the same topics confirms this evaluation. However, once this position is taken, one should also investigate the biblical evidence that the Spirit is at work. God does enable us to experience by grace a foretaste of the perfected eschatological reality. This is corrective of Bayer's reluctance to treat topics like the work of the Holy Spirit and sanctification of the believer. Once Bayer's prudence is taken seriously, the attention given to the work of the Spirit will not be easily interpreted only optimistically. As a general conclusion, we can say that Bayer's doctrine of creation offers the basis for theology and worldview, including morality. Within this context, the emphases given by Gunton can help in establishing an even more concrete picture of the relation between the doctrine of creation and theological ethics. In chapter 6 the doctrine of creation is applied to the social institution of marriage. This example is used for several reasons: the Christian doctrine of marriage is full of references to creation; marriage is very much post-modernised and the doctrine of creation is an answer to cope with post-modernity; this example may be able to show something of Christian apologetics; finally, marriage may be able to

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function as a touchstone for what binds and divides different theological traditions. The question to which this chapter is devoted is: What can the doctrine of creation offer Christians in their considerations about marriage? In the course of this chapter, four concepts of marriage pass under separate review. The first concept is that of marriage as a contract. This concept, developed in the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, was designed to resolve problems concerning the freedom of marriage-partners. First, marital relationships were conceived of in terms of free choice. Over against the socio-economic determination to enter into marriage with someone, this concept was able, on the one hand, to inform the freedom of the spouses to choose each other. On the other hand, the concept was also able to regulate freedom within the marital relationship. In order to bind the spouses to each other, the goals of the relationship were coined in terms of mutual benefits to reach goals concerning procreation, the upbringing of children, and sexuality. In the course of the twentieth century, new kinds of marital goals have emerged, such as self-realisation, marriage as the place to recover from social stress and the expectation that the freely concluded marital relationship should guarantee one's happiness. The need for the organisation of such marital freedom can be clearly discerned in the background of this liberal-contractarian view of marriage. The way in which the contesting of this life-form is met, however, is problematic. First, the pressure to make one's promises come true is totally on the marriage-partners. Second, it tends to evaluate marriage only in terms of its goals. The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, is able to confront the contesting of marriagepartners without succumbing to burdening the partners or defining marriage in terms of its goals. By reading the biblical texts of the first creation-story, the following can be concluded. First, the bond between man and woman is traced back to God the Creator, who graciously gives man and woman to each other. This implies that the creative Word of God is at once also the promise that the relation does not depend on human efforts but on God himself. Second, although such a lasting relationship is instituted by God, conflict will not occur. For creation is never free from the seduction to trust human capabilities instead of God's promised comfort. The depiction of marriage as a lifeform that will inevitably suffer from human failure, and is likewise inevitably sustained by God's promise, is clearly less optimistic than the liberal-contractarian view of marriage. This far more realistic

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approach is one benefit the treatment of marriage in the context of the doctrine of creation can offer. The second concept of marriage is taken from the tradition of 'natural law'. The indissolubility of marriage is particularly stressed in this tradition for it is essential to reach the marital goals. The concept of 'nature' standing in the background of this tradition has changed in the course of history. In the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, 'natural law' was immediately traced back to God's creating and sustaining relation towards his creation. Later, the concept was increasingly used to demonstrate the rationality of marriage without the appeal to God's providential care for creation. However, as soon as the indissolubility was no longer 'felt' and experienced, the alleged rationality of this indissolubility became fiercely debated. The appeal to the alleged 'naturalness' of the indissoluble marital bond became weakened by the appeal to 'feelings' or experience. The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, rightly stresses the process of 'in-formation' of human feelings in the context of the church community. As the explanation of the famous passage from Ephesians 5 is intended to show, the context in which marriage takes place is the relation between Jesus Christ and the Church. By framing marriage in this context, these two different relationships mutually intensify each other. Only the indissoluble bond between Christ and the Church is both warrant and example of the mystery of the indissolubility of the marital bond. The implicit appeal in this scriptural passage to Genesis 2 intensifies the created structure of the marital bond. The third concept of marriage is called the constructivist approach. In this concept, marriage is considered to be a kind of gradually developed human invention for controlling the living together of man and woman. Because the intertwined concepts of sexuality and gender are gradually treated as social constructs, the social institutions that regulate them are considered to be social constructs as well. The fact that human beings consciously try to develop forms in which marital life should be lived is not to be evaluated as wrong in advance. For conscious human behaviour is a full part of an ethic informed by the doctrine of creation as well. Problems occur only if the development of life-forms is thought of in terms of 'autonomy'. In the context of the treatment of marriage, this 'autonomous' line of thought goes from 'sexuality', as the phenomenon to start with, to 'marriage' as the form in which humans choose to organise their sexuality. The doctrine of creation is critical towards this autonomy, for it stresses the

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overarching activity of the Creator in providing life-forms for human beings against the stress on human invention and action. The complementary concept of marriage treats marriage as God's own activity. This concept of marriage is in line with the arguments developed in earlier chapters. The life-form of marriage is created by God, which counts for the general level of the social institution as well as for any particular marriage. Here human activity is viewed in line with God's providential and creative activity. The pressing question is how to determine this divine activity in the present, a task of conscious and faithful living and discernment by the community of believers under the guidance of the Holy Spirit by faithful listening to the informing words of the Bible. The fourth concept of marriage is that in which - mostly from a specific Christian standpoint - the eschatological qualification is intended to downplay the institution of marriage in the present. According to some commentators, the eschatological qualification by Jesus Christ in Matthew 22 is intended to state that in the heavenly kingdom, the hetero-patriarchal structures such as marriage have disappeared. The question therefore is what this saying of Jesus tells us about the eschatological qualification of marriage. Will there be a radical transformation of human relationships in general and of marriage in particular? Traditionally, exegesis of this scriptural passage has done this. Some critical points have been made, which may call these assumptions into question. For it is not at all clear whether this word of Jesus is about marriage as such or about the levirate-marriage. In the last case, Jesus could qualify the particular Jewish stress on procreation with an appeal to the future in which this kind of worrying is not necessary. Furthermore, biblical teaching strongly validates relational structures. This is made clear by both Jesus (Mark 7,9-13) and the so-called Household Rules. All relationships, however, are submitted to obeying God above all as the first and greatest commandment. The eschatological goal of the community of believers gathered around God Who will be living among them, is the warrant for one's individual identity - including the fulfillment of its being shaped in this life by interpersonal relationships (such as marriage). In chapter 7 the results of this study answering the question, What does the consideration of the Christian doctrine of creation provide for theological ethics?, are summarised with respect to the four elements of chapter 2. It concerns firstly the consequences of the creation-doctrine as

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elaborated by Gunton and Bayer for theological ethics in general. The contributions of communitarianism (Maclntyre, Taylor) and 'radical orthodoxy7 (Milbank) can be adjusted by using their contributions. So, the alleged neutrality of the concept of community can be redefined by treating it as created. Thereby community can derive criteria from its constitutive relation to the Creator. Milbank's ontology of peace can be refined by being traced back to the Creator's power. Secondly, the relation between the classical Neo-Calvinist stress on creation and that of Gunton and Bayer is summarised. In its attention to 'public theology', the Neo-Calvinist confinement of creation to creatio ex nihilo can be suspended by taking providence and eschaton into consideration within the doctrine of creation. The accent on the community of believers expressing their faith in creation can be an addition to Neo-Calvinist theology as well. Thirdly, the doctrine of creation can be useful for apologetic reasons in the debate of the worldviews. Where world-saving quality is ascribed to human action, the qualification from the Christian doctrine of creation downplays those aspirations by referring to the Creator who sustains this world. That creative activity of God can be brought into the debate against resignation or cynicism with regard to the future. The postEnlightenment debate about relativism and universalism can also benefit from this doctrine. For Christian moral reasoning is not relevant to all human beings because of some intrinsic characteristic of reality. Its applicability depends on God's particular action which serves his worldwide goal. The third apologetic benefit is the redefinition of the role, within this world, of the Christian community as one of the means of God's creative and redemptive action. In conclusion, the ecumenical contribution of the attention to the doctrine of creation is shown by bringing a Lutheran and a Reformed-Calvinist theologian together. The divergence between Bayer and Gunton shows the importance of ecumenical debate. The honesty with which they emphasize their view gives others the opportunity of drawing more convergent lines into the future - or else of explicating the necessary differences. With respect to Lutheran and Reformed-Calvinist theology, we may conclude that the Lutheran accent on the doctrine of creation makes clear that the sense of reality - in all its brokenness - is not to be underestimated, whereas it can benefit from the Calvinist stress on the sovereignty of the triune God. As it becomes clear from the description of both Bayer's and Gunton's theology, taking one's theological starting-point from the doctrine of creation is only the prelude to the rest of the theological

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work, work which contains all the different aspects of Christian doctrine. Above all, this prelude can only be rightly discerned by living and thinking in a true Christian community committed to the whole of Christian doctrine, prohibiting the isolation or neutralization of the doctrine of creation.

8.2 Nederlands Deze studie is gewijd aan een beschrijving van de relatie tussen het geschapen-zijn (createdness) en ethiek, vooral in de theologie van Colin Ewart Gunton (1941-2003) en Oswald Bayer (1939). De resultaten van deze systematisch-theologische analyse zullen worden toegepast op het onderwerp 'huwelijk' als een sociaal-ethisch voorbeeld. Na enige inleidende opmerkingen (hoofdstuk 1) wordt het thema ge'introduceerd in hoofdstuk 2. De twintigste eeuw heeft aanleiding gegeven tot een uitgebreidere behandeling van de scheppingsleer dan in voorgaande eeuwen het geval was. In reactie op de zogenoemde christocentrische theologie van Karl Barth en geleidelijke algemeenwetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen waarin het buitenissige karakter van de theologie ter discussie werd gesteld en de theologie zodoende in Staat was eveneens haar zegje te doen over de werkelijkheid, werd de ruimte om een scheppingsleer te ontwikkelen nog meer vergroot door de opkomst van de pneumatologie in relatie tot een groeiende aandacht onder theologen voor de praxis. In de theologische ethiek werd schepping bestudeerd vanwege de groeiende bewustwording van de ecologische crisis die plaatsvond, en de groeiende aandacht voor biomedische problemen en hun ethische componenten. De inhoud van het woord 'schepping' moet zorgvuldig worden gedefinieerd. Het kan gebruikt worden als beschrijving van de creatura, of de scheppingsdaad (creatio). Het kan ook de specifiek christelijke overtuigingen omtrent oorsprong, heden, en mogelijk doel van de gehele werkelijkheid betekenen. Als zodanig omvat het bijna een complete wereldbeschouwing. Voor theologische ethiek kan de vraag gesteld worden: wat zijn de ethische consequenties (ethics) van de overtuiging dat mensen en de gehele werkelijkheid geschapen zijn door God (createdness)? Deze vraag kan worden samengevat als: Wat levert

de overweging

van de christelijke

scheppingsleer

op voor de

ethiek?

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Deze Studie wil deze vraag om vier redenen bespreken. Binnen het veld van de huidige (post- of laat-) moderne en pluralistische wetenschap wordt het theologische proprium van de ethiek sterk uitgedaagd. De scheppingsleer zou wellicht in Staat zijn om mogelijke oplossingen voor dit probleem te bieden, zowel in het onderkennen als het oplossen van het probleem van het pluralisme. Binnen de neo-calvinistische theologie - die de achtergrond vormt van de auteur - heeft de scheppingsleer vanouds een grote rol gespeeld, en deze traditie zou in Staat kunnen zijn om deze leer voor de theologische ethiek in het heden evenzeer uit te werken als zij in het verleden deed. Voorzover de scheppingsleer universele claims maakt, vertoont deze Studie bovendien enige apologetische trekken. Door een Duitse lutherse theoloog (Bayer) en een calvinistisch-gereformeerde Engelse theoloog (Gunton) te analyseren worden ten slotte eveneens verschillende posities binnen de oecumene en hun tradities belicht. Guntons theologie kan worden gekarakteriseerd als een trinitarische scheppingstheologie (hoofdstuk 3). Het is een conceptualisatie van een trinitarische ontologie vanuit de economische betrokkenheid van de drieene God in de geschiedenis van zijn schepping. Kernwoord in deze ontologie is 'andersheid-in-relatie', wat betekent dat het ontologische raamwerk van menselijk leven en handelen gepaste aandacht moet geven aan zowel de substantialiteit van God, andere mensen en de nietmenselijke natuur, als aan de essentiele relationaliteit die het ware leven kenmerkt. In dit project volgt Gunton twee spilfiguren, Irenaeus en Coleridge, die in hun tijd en context de waarheid van deze trinitarische ontologie ontdekten. Gunton benadrukt de cruciale criteriologische rol die christologie in dit project speelt, want slechts in de lijn van Jezus Christus' leven, sterven, opstanding en hemelvaart kan men ware substantialiteit en relationaliteit ontdekken. De economische betrokkenheid van de drieene God bereikt voor Gunton haar hoogtepunt in de incarnatie van de Zoon. Binnen het christologische debat na de Verlichting volgt Gunton Karl Barth na, die de waarde van trinitarische theologie herontdekte. Ge'interpreteerd binnen dit denkkader is deze levenslijn van Jezus Christus onderdeel van Gods project met de schepping, en slechts in het licht van wat Gunton 'Jezus' carriere' noemt, kan de ware betekenis van menselijk leven gezien worden. De scheppingsleer, bezien vanuit dit trinitarische kader, is een uitwerking van de specifieke ontologie die Gunton voorstaat. Want

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'zijn' en 'leven' zijn in zekere zin geordend, betrokken op God, de mens, en de niet-menselijke natuur. Deze relatie heeft echter onder de gevolgen van zonde en het kwaad te lijden. Nu Jezus Christus gekomen is om ons met God te verzoenen en de gehele schepping opnieuw te richten op haar uiteindelijke doel, kan onze relationaliteit nieuwe impulsen krijgen. Het woord ontologie heeft diverse betekenissen in Gunton's publicaties. In navolging van zowel Thomas van Aquino als Karl Barth zoekt Gunton mogelijkheden voor de theologie om te benoemen in wat voor soort wereld wij leven. Daar deze wereld door God geschapen is, zou de mens in staat moeten zijn om haar intrinsieke rationaliteit en orde te ontdekken. Er is echter geen directe, onbemiddelde verbinding tussen de drieene God en deze wereld, los van Gods schepselmatige bemiddeling. Het concept schepping waarborgt zowel het ontologische onderscheid tussen God en deze wereld - zij zijn immers onderscheiden substanties - , als het feit dat zij in zeker opzicht toch verbonden zijn. Zo kan Guntons trinitarische scheppingsleer enerzijds functioneren als een concept dat mogelijkheden opent om iets te begrijpen over hoe de dingen zijn in onze wereld als de schepping van God. Anderzijds biedt zij ons de criteria om het concept te verkennen. Een dergelijke scheppingsleer omvat ook ethiek, daar zij een theoretisch raamwerk presenteert waarbinnen menselijk handelen gestuurd kan worden (theologische ethiek). Het scheppingsproject is Gods voortdurende betrokkenheid met zijn schepping tot het einde. Binnen dit project heeft de mens als beeld van God de taak deze schepping terug te öfteren, zodat zij haar vastgestelde doel bereikt, nl. de volmaaktheid. De samenwerking tussen God en mens in dit project is deel van Gods schepselmatige bemiddeling en moet niet als weerlegging van Guntons nadruk op de passiviteit van de mens worden ingebracht. Guntons gebruik van zijn trinitarische scheppingsleer is een duidelijk argument tegen de gangbare moderne, post-Verlichtingsethiek die de werkelijkheid (inclusief de mens) als autonoom beschouwt en waarin de niet-menselijke natuur als een machine behandeld kan worden. De scheppingsleer is een kritisch wapen om andere, meestal niet-theologische kritiek op het Verlichtingsproject van een theologische basis te voorzien. Guntons trinitarische ontologische raamwerk is gedeeltelijk bedoeld als kader waarbinnen een adequate behandeling van zonde en kwaad mogelijk is. De criteriologische functie van de christologie is een

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duidelijk signaal dat de verwoestende gevolgen van de menselijke zondeval door de verzoenende activiteit van Jezus' kruis en opstanding zullen worden overwonnen. Deze overwinning zal uitgevoerd worden in het scheppingsproject dat gericht is op haar eschatologische volmaking. Voor theologische ethiek betekent dit dat menselijke activiteit opnieuw ontdaan wordt van levensreddende waarde, alsof wij de schepping naar haar doel moeten geleiden zonder God. Bayers theologie kent haar voornaamste criterium en systematische centrum in Martin Luthers ontdekking van het belang van Gods promissio (hoofdstuk 5). Promissio is Gods leven-schenkende, levenonderhoudende, en leven-herstellende liefhebbende Woord jegens zijn schepselen; daarmee dekt het de leer over God, schepping, rechtvaardiging, en eschatologie. Hoewel promissio Luthers fundamentele reformatorische ontdekking binnen het kader van de leer over de rechtvaardiging en de sacramenten is, zoals Bayer heeft aangetoond, functioneert zij eveneens binnen de uitwerking van scheppingsleer en theologische ethiek. Belangrijke elementen van deze promissio worden uitgewerkt om het criteriologische karakter ervan te beschrijven. Allereerst is hierin de passiviteit van de mens begrepen, aangezien de menselijke rechtvaardiging evenals de menselijke waarneming van de werkelijkheid worden bepaald door Gods handelen. Verder is het concreet bemiddelde karakter van deze promissio voor Bayers theologie van vitaal belang. Daarmee is de manier waarop God met zijn schepping in relatie staat, concreet gemaakt. Dit betekent, in de derde plaats, dat deze bemiddeling - in de allereerste plaats via taal - in haar breedste zin zo belangrijk is. Ten slotte dient promissio in de context van de soteriologie op tweevoudige wijze verstaan te worden: Gods spreken kan zowel 'wet' als 'evangelie' zijn. Het onderscheid hiertussen is gevolg van de criteriologische implicaties van promissio. Nadat dit criterium is uitgelegd, wordt het gebruik ervan in Bayers opvatting over concept en taak van de theologie als geheel uitgewerkt. Theologie gaat over de ontdekking van de effecten van wet en evangelie binnen de werkelijkheid. Als zodanig is theologie een hermeneutische discipline die de menselijke ervaring van de werkelijkheid behandelt. Temidden van andere interpretaties van dezelfde werkelijkheid is theologie essentieel een conflictdiscipline: zij betreedt het strijdperk tussen rivaliserende of tegenstrijdige verklaringen van de werkelijkheid; zij verzet zieh evengoed tegen uniforme principes voor onze realiteit als tegen het principieel opdelen

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ervan in gescheiden gebieden. Theologie behandelt derhalve niet de werkelijkheid of werkelijkheden als zodanig, maar neemt hen waar en interpreteert hen als Gods belofte aan ons; zij tracht te onderscheiden tussen wet en evangelie; zij behandelt geen abstracte werkelijkheid maar heeft de verschillende levensvormen als haar object. De eenheid in ons leven wordt niet bereikt in denken of handelen, maar wordt ons passief geschonken. In Bayers concept van theologie neemt de scheppingsleer een vitale plaats in, en hieruit volgt het fundamentele concept van de menselijke samenleving als kerk. Dit is de primaire levensvorm voor ieder mens die qua creatura door God aangesproken is. Omdat het mensenleven binnen deze levensvorm (kerk) is verworden, is Gods promissio niet slechts de genadige, levenschenkende activiteit, maar wijst zij tevens op zijn rechtvaardigende en levenonderhoudende activiteit. Theologie dient deze interpretatie van onze ervaring voor het voetlicht te brengen. Naast Luther als Bayers standbeen kwam Hamann als diens vrije been. Hamann maakte Luthers theologie relevant voor - en ging waar nodig in tegen - de Verlichting. Bayer volgt diens voorbeeld na voor wat betreff de metakritische manier waarop wij deze wereld moeten interpreteren en waarnemen. Een van de meest karakteristieke woorden in deze interpretatie is 'vrijheid'. Een metakritische behandeling van dit concept betekent voor Bayer dat hij promissio als criterium neemt. Vrijheid is geen postulaat voor het handelen, noch kan zij door het handelen bereikt worden - zij wordt ons door God gegeven. Hamanns metakritische houding is de reden waarom hij zieh tegen alle uniformerende tendensen verzet, aangezien een dergelijke eenheid slechts een abstract postulaat kan zijn, tegengesteld aan onze levenservaring. Dit noodzaakt Bayer om tegenover monistische concepten van theologie te onderscheiden in vier verschillende ervaringen (Widerfahrnisse) als object van de theologie: wet, evangelie, Gods verborgenheid, en de primus usus legis die bestaat in het burgerlijke of politieke gebruik van de wet. Bayers scheppingsleer is eveneens op promissio gebaseerd. Hoewel de context van dit criterium vooreerst in de heilsen rechtvaardigingsleer lag, valt het concept van Gods beloftevolle woord dat nieuw leven schept samen met dat van de creatio ex nihilo. Schepping wordt behandeld als een taaldaad in die zin dat God sprak en deze wereld in het aanzijn kwam (creatio als taaldaad), en bovendien in die zin dat door de schepping, door geschapen middelen, God nog steeds tot zijn schepping spreekt (creatura als taaldaad). De

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gevolgtrekkingen voor Bayers opvatting over tijd en geschiedenis worden ook besproken, daar zij onze aandacht, via de kruisverbinding van verleden, heden en toekomst, richten naar een fundamenteel eschatologisch aspect van onze interpretatie en waarneming van de wereld. In overeenstemming met de passieve aspecten van promissio benadrukt Bayers antropologie het talige karakter in de (concrete en persoonlijke) definitie van de mens: "Ik ben degene tot wie - samen met ieder schepsel - gesproken is: 'Ik ben de HEER, uw God, die u uit Egypte heeft bevrijd. Vereer naast mij geen andere goden'." Binnen onze werkelijkheid is het laatste gedeelte van deze definitie een logisch gevolg van Bayers zondeleer: wij scheppen onze eigen goden. Tegenover menselijke pogingen om het kwaad af te wenden of ertegen te strijden, benadrukt Bayer het belofteaspect van de eschatologie waarin God ten slotte het kwaad overwint. Ten slotte onderscheidt Bayer tussen een algemene Godsleer, die in gesprek met andere disciplines en andere 'goden' gebruikt wordt om evangelie, wet, Gods verborgenheid in onze ervaring, en de usus politicus legis duidelijk te maken enerzijds, en de leer van de Drieeenheid, die puur evangelie is, anderzijds. Theologische ethiek wordt door Bayer eveneens längs de lijnen van promissio uiteengezet. Zij begint niet met de vraag wat wij moeten doen, maar beantwoordt de vraag wat ons geschonken is. Wanneer we de verbindingen tussen Bayers ethiek en de scheppingsleer samenvatten, zien we dat een ethiek van het geschapen-zijn de passiviteit van de mens benadrukt in zijn aangesproken en geschapen zijn. Dit spreekt iedere vorm van buitensporige ethische ijver tegen. Theologische ethiek betreff de interpretatie van deze wereld, die door Gods spreken in het leven geroepen is. De mens is gemachtigd om redelijk te leven binnen de drie mandaten die God ge'institueerd heeft (ecclesia, oeconomia, en politia). Gods aanspraak, die een dergelijke ethiek impliceert, is paradigmatisch geformuleerd in het eerste gebod, waardoor het interpretatieconflict over deze werkelijkheid wordt benadrukt. De positieve inhoud van Bayers ethiek is een ethiek van de gave. 'Macht' is hier het centrale concept en deze betekent de asymmetrische relatie tussen geven en ontvangen zonder de gebruikelijke associatie met geweld. Het concept van arbeid, onder de noemer 'roeping', bouwt voort op de idee van de mens als een taalwezen; dit wijst op het leven in machtsrelaties die noodzaken tot arbeid om Gods roeping te vervullen. Bayer benadrukt hierbij het belang van de waarneming van de Dag van de HEER als het uitgangspunt voor ons arbeidsleven. Als

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materieel-ethische uitwerkingen passeren gezin, huwelijk, en Staat de revue, waarvoor promissio het criterium vormt. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de systematisch-theologische verbinding tussen scheppingsleer en theologische ethiek beschreven. Dit hoofdstuk is geordend volgens vier bekende tegenwerpingen tegen het beroep op schepping in theologische ethiek. Allereerst wordt de vraag behandeld hoe wij de schepping kennen (epistemologie). Het verband tussen kennis en christologie is wezenlijk, hoewel niet zo aanwezig in neocalvinistische theologie als zou moeten. In Christus zien en ervaren wij wat God voorhad met zijn schepping. Het christelijk lezen van de bijbelse scheppingsteksten in Genesis kan niet gedaan worden zonder te verwijzen naar christologische teksten in Johannes, Efeziers en Kollossenzen. Na een kort overzicht van oudtestamentische theologie en exegese wordt de conclusie getrokken, dat de beschrijving van het ontstaan van de wereld en haar eerste geschiedenis in Genesis ons de verzekering geeft dat de wereld in haar huidige dubbelzinnigheid niet is conform Gods bedoeling. Bovendien verzekert zij dat God dit zal veranderen. God Staat achter de wereld, en Hij is te vertrouwen - juist omdat Hij haar Schepper is die haar onderhoudt. Tevens wordt duidelijk gemaakt dat binnen de vertelling van de schepping de zogenaamde theodicee van groot belang is. Na een beschrijving van verschillende theologische posities (O'Donovan, neo-calvinisme, Bayer en Gunton) wordt geconcludeerd dat de Genesis-vertelling Gods oorspronkelijke scheppingsorde benadrukt, die bestaat dankzij Gods scheppende voorzienigheid waarvan het kruis en de opstanding van Christus het voorlopige hoogtepunt vormen. Deze drie bijbelse noties de geordende creatio ex nihilo, het exclusief relationele bestaan van de geschapen werkelijkheid, en de christologische verzoening van de gevallen werkelijkheid - hebben de volgende consequenties voor de epistemologie. Menselijke kennis na de zondeval heeft goddelijke openbaring nodig omtrent oorsprong, doel en bestemming van de werkelijkheid; een dergelijk historisch kader kan niet verkregen worden zonder in ogenschouw te nemen hoezeer de huidige werkelijkheid afwijkt van de uitgezette route, en dat deze afwijking niet 'minder werkelijk' is dan de goddelijke bestemming. Daarom moeten christenen oog hebben voor de spanning tussen goed en kwaad, tussen Gods bestemming en menselijke resultaten, tussen ware en valse kennis omtrent de orde van de geschapen werkelijkheid - en deze vervolgens verdragen. De morele kennis die in dit proces wordt

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verkregen, wordt gekenmerkt door de gevolgen die aan het onbesliste proces van kennisvergaring kleven, en is daarom voorlopige kennis. In de tweede plaats wordt de relatie tussen natuurconcepten (zoals in 'natuurwet') en schepping uiteengezet. Schepping is een interpretatie van de natuur die door de christelijke liturgie is vormgegeven. Er is voortdurende rivaliteit tussen deze interpretatie en andere. Het concept van de natuurwet was oorspronkelijk ingebed in christelijke theologie, en als zodanig gelijkwaardig aan Gods voorzienige zorg. De Verlichting echter brak de natuur los uit deze context, en maakte haar tot een soort autonome orde. Andere concepten zijn die van kosmologie met haar antropische principe (Murphy/Ellis) en een darwinistische evolutietheorie (De Lange). Deze concepten worden kritisch besproken met behulp van argumenten van Gunton en Bayer. In de confrontatie tussen hun theologie en andere voorstellen blijken deze concepten de noodzakelijke aandacht te missen voor het feit dat het menselijk karakter gevormd dient te worden doordat de kerk getuigt van het haar overgeleverde evangelie van de drieene God. Ook treden hun misinterpretatie van het karakter van God en zijn relatie jegens zijn schepping, hun vaagheid omtrent Gods doel met de schepping, en vervolgens hun gebrek aan concrete sturing voor de ethiek aan het licht. Het scheppingsconcept als de levenscontext voor ethiek biedt juist in deze opzichten mogelijkheden voor theologische ethiek. De relatie tussen schepping en voorzienigheid is het derde onderwerp. Aangezien de schepping bedorven is dienen de gevolgen van de hamartiologie voor zowel Gods voorzienige zorg in het onderhoud van zijn schepping, als de menselijke verantwoordelijkheid in het gebruik ervan genoemd te worden. Ieder beroep op een geschapen orde vraagt om erkenning van de huidige wanorde, waarmee alleen omgegaan kan worden wanneer wordt vertrouwd op Gods voorzienige zorg. Christelijke hamartiologie impliceert zowel de menselijke verantwoordelijkheid voor het kwaad als Gods voortdurende zorg voor zijn schepping. Aangezien zonde de vervorming van de relatie tussen Schepper en schepping is, staan de modus van deze relatie en de consequenties hiervan voor de werkelijkheid zelf op het spei. Het feit dat wij nog steeds spreken over de werkelijkheid als schepping laat zien dat God in zijn voorzienigheid de creatura onderhoudt. Na een kort overzicht over de relatie tussen schepping en voorzienigheid in het gereformeerde denken, wordt geconcludeerd dat de voorzienigheidsleer onderdeel is van de

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scheppingsleer. Voorzienigheid is gericht op de vraag hoe een wereld waarin het kwaad bestaat, toch Gods schepping genoemd kan worden. Deze vraag betreft eveneens de sociale instituties. Verder is voorzienigheid een uitdrukkelijke belijdenis van de vooreerst passieve constitutie van de mens. Met betrekking tot de sociale instituties is de relatie tussen menselijk en goddelijk handelen van belang, wat nog sterker geldt met betrekking tot menselijke vrijheid. Aangetoond wordt dat het vrijheidsconcept geen gevaar loopt binnen de context van Gods scheppende voorzienigheid. Integendeel: Gods creatio blijkt voorwaarde voor menselijke vrijheid te zijn, waaraan de mogelijkheid gegeven wordt in tijd en ruimte te handelen. De traditionele drieslag aan instituties (ecclesia, oeconomia, en politia) kan worden teruggevoerd op de Middeleeuwen en hun aristotelische wortels. Het feit dat zij recentelijk benut zijn als heuristische Instrumenten in de beschrijving van het veld van de ethiek toont aan hoe flexibel en nuttig deze drieslag is (Wannenwetsch, Honecker). Ten slotte is de relatie tussen schepping en eschaton besproken. In de christelijke ethiek is de hiermee corresponderende onderscheiding tussen conservatieve en eschatologische ethiek hardnekkig. Door de scheppingsleer in de ethiek te gebruiken, zou dit dilemma echter overstegen kunnen worden. Een overzicht van specifiek gereformeerde bijdragen aan de oplossing van dit dilemma (Lee Hardy, Volf, Schuurman) geeft aan dat het eschatologische doel dat God bereidt geen tegenstelling vormt met de voorzienig onderhouden schepping die wij van de Schepper ontvangen. De continu'iteit tussen de oorsprong en doel wordt gewaarborgd door Gods onophoudelijke zorg voor en onderhouding van zijn schepping. Oorsprong en doel kunnen niet tegen elkaar worden uitgespeeld vanwege de eenheid van de drieene Schepper, Verzoener, en Vernieuwer. Eschatologie is een kwalificatie van de werkelijkheid in het licht van Gods bedoeling met zijn schepping. Dit standpunt betekent ook dat de door God geschapen ordeningen in overeenstemming zijn met zijn eschatologische doel. Deze visie is echter niet onomstreden. Het voorbeeld van het instituut van het huwelijk zal dat duidelijk maken. Het overzicht van bijdragen aan de relatie tussen het geschapenzijn en ethiek levert ons het noodzakelijke denkkader op om de bijdrage van Gunton en Bayer op dat punt te evalueren. Aangezien hun theologie kritisch Staat tegenover de Verlichting, fungeert hun scheppingsleer als een heuristisch instrument waarmee de gelovige een specifieke opvatting omtrent vrijheid en autonomie als de bron van

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vele problematische karaktertrekken van de moderniteit kan ontdekken. Door 'schepping' serieus te nemen, ontvangen zij zowel een middel tegen deze problemen als een alternatief. In beider scheppingsleer is de uitwerking van het concept 'zonde' duidelijk zichtbaar. Niettegenstaande de overeenkomsten in dit opzicht zijn de verschillen eveneens duidelijk. Guntons uitgangspunt voor het beoefenen van scheppingstheologie - de herontdekking van de triniteit - is duidelijk verschillend van Bayers lutherse promissio. We kunnen hier concluderen dat Gunton meer geneigd is te zoeken naar intellectuele oplossingen om de gevolgen van de zonde te overwinnen. Trinitarisch denken probeert de 'echo' van de drieene God in de werkelijkheid te bewerken - die op haar beurt al aanwezig blijkt te zijn. Bayer benadrukt dat men zieh moet overgeven aan de levensvormen van de kerk waardoor men ge-'informeerd' wordt omtrent Gods doel met de schepping. In dit opzicht kan men een ontwikkeling in beider theologie ontdekken. Gunton was eerst veel meer ge'imponeerd door de intellectuele uitdaging die door Coleridges kritiek op de moderniteit gepresenteerd was, en keerde langzamerhand terug tot een meer expliciet calvinistische manier van theologiebeoefening. Bayer is diep beinvloed door Hamanns metakritische wijze waarop Luther benut werd tegenover de moderniteit, en liet vandaaruit gaandeweg meer invloed toe van 'modernere' thema's zoals de triniteit en de leer over de Heilige Geest. De radicaliteit van Bayers metakritische behandeling van de scheppingsleer binnen de levenscontext die diepgaand door menselijke zonde is gekenmerkt lijkt realistischer dan Guntons enigszins intellectuele benadering. Deze conclusie wordt bevestigd door ontwikkelingen in Guntons latere geschriften die meer overeenstemmen met Bayers nadruk op de gebrokenheid van de werkelijkheid. Het ordeconcept is een van de veelbesproken thema's in het veld van onderzoek. Het heeft dwarsverbindingen met het concept van autonomie, want hier is eveneens de menselijke vrijheid tegenover sociale ordeningen in het spei. Bayers en Guntons kritiek op het Verlichtingsconcept van vrijheid is besproken, die een positieve nadruk op orde behelst. Want alleen wie leeft in Gods orde is in staat werkelijk vrij te zijn. Gunton is echter meer geneigd om de objectiviteit van de overblijvende orde te benadrukken dan Bayer. Zonder Gunton te beschuldigen van een te optimistische wereldbeschouwing, wil ik Bayers realisme voor het voetlicht halen. In elk opzicht wil Bayer Gods

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activiteit benadrukken als essentieel voor deze wereld en de overblijvende orde ondanks de gevolgen van de zonde. Deze wezenlijke relatie, die de wereld en alle levende wezens onderhoudt, verändert het karakter van het ordeconcept. In plaats van haar objectiviteit wordt haar relatie met haar Maker benadrukt. In Bayers theologie leidt de essentiele relatie van de werkelijkheid met haar Schepper tot een duidelijk eschatologische component in de scheppingsleer. Allereerst blijkt dat menselijke pogingen om de wereld te redden, gedoemd zijn te falen, omdat zij bezwijken onder hun eigen gewicht. In de tweede plaats wordt, vanwege Gods betrouwbaarheid en volharding tegenover zijn huidige schepping, de orde die haar nu kenmerkt niet minder belangrijk in het licht van het eschaton. De eschatologische relativering van de werkelijkheid vermindert het belang van huidige structuren niet. Radicale eschatologieen worden derhalve door Bayer onder kritiek gesteld in dit opzicht. Bayers angst voor speculatie waarschuwt hem om niet teveel over het doel van de geschiedenis te zeggen. Gunton daarentegen is veel meer geneigd om de inhoud van de eschatologische relativering van de huidige orde te omschrijven. Gunton laat veel meer ruimte voor de hervorming van de huidige orde door de aanwezigheid van de Heilige Geest dan Bayer zou kunnen toestaan. Guntons pneumatologische overwegingen zijn reden voor zijn gematigde optimisme. Waar Bayer meer geneigd is te spreken over Gods verborgenheid, beschrijft Gunton de aanwezigheid en kracht van de Geest in deze werkelijkheid. Concluderend kunnen we stellen dat Bayers terughoudendheid in het spreken over een aanwezigheid van God in de werkelijkheid zonder bemiddeling, de nadruk legt op de onmiskenbare noodzaak van menselijke bekering binnen de context van de kerk en haar liturgie. Alleen binnen deze context kan de schepping als 'schepping' worden waargenomen. De geleidelijke verandering in Guntons oeuvre in de richting van deze onderwerpen, lijkt deze evaluatie te bevestigen. Zodra deze positie echter is ingenomen, zal men ook het bijbelse bewijsmateriaal dat de Geest aan het werk is moeten proberen te onderzoeken. God maakt het ons dankzij zijn genade mogelijk om een voorschot van de volmaakte eschatologische werkelijkheid te ervaren. Dit is correctief ten opzichte van Bayers aarzeling om thema's als het werk van de Heilige Geest en de heiliging van de gelovige te behandelen. Mits Bayers aarzeling serieus genomen wordt, zal aandacht voor het werk van de Geest niet lichtvaardig als slechts optimistisch kunnen worden geinterpreteerd.

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Als algemene slotsom kunnen we zeggen dat Bayers scheppingsleer de basis vormt voor theologie en wereldbeschouwing, inclusief ethiek. Binnen deze context kunnen de accenten zoals die door Gunton worden gezet, dienen tot het verkrijgen van een nog concreter beeld van de relatie tussen scheppingsleer en theologische ethiek. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de scheppingsleer toegepast op het sociale instituut 'huwelijk'. Dit voorbeeld is gekozen vanwege verschillende redenen: de christelijke leer over het huwelijk is vol verwijzingen naar schepping; het huwelijk is sterk be'invloed door het postmodernisme en de scheppingsleer is een antwoord om met postmoderniteit om te gaan; dit voorbeeld kan iets laten zien van christelijke apologetiek; en ten slotte kan het huwelijk als toetssteen fungeren voor wat verschillende theologische tradities verbindt en Scheidt. De vraag waaraan dit hoofdstuk gewijd is, luidt: Wat kan een scheppingsleer voor christenen betekenen in hun nadenken over het huwelijk? In de loop van het hoofdstuk worden vier huwelijksopvattingen besproken. Het eerste concept is dat van het huwelijk als contract. Dit concept is ontwikkeld in de liberale traditie van de Verlichting, en was bedoeld om de problemen omtrent de vrijheid van de huwelijkspartners te verlichten. Huwelijksrelaties worden allereerst omschreven in termen van vrije keus. Tegenover de sociaal-economische bepaaldheid om met de ander te trouwen, was dit concept in staat om de vrijheid van de echtelieden om elkaar te kiezen, vorm te geven. Anderzijds was dit concept in staat om de vrijheid binnen de huwelijksrelaties te regelen. Om de echtgenoten aan elkaar te binden, werden de doelen van de relatie omschreven in termen van wederzijdse voordelen met betrekking tot het bereiken van doelen omtrent voortplanting, opvoeding van kinderen, en seksualiteit. In de loop van de twintigste eeuw kwamen nieuwe huwelijksdoelen op, zoals zelfontplooiing, het huwelijk als de plaats om te herstellen van sociale stress, en de verwachting dat de vrijelijk aangegane huwelijksrelatie het geluk kon garanderen. De noodzaak om een dergelijke huwelijkse vrijheid te organiseren is duidelijk de achtergrond van deze liberaal-contractuele visie op het huwelijk. De manier waarop aan de aanvechting van deze levensvorm recht wordt gedaan is echter problematisch. Allereerst wordt de druk om de eigen beloften na te komen volstrekt bij de huwelijkspartners gelegd. Verder neigt deze visie tot het evalueren van het huwelijk alleen in termen van gehaalde doelen. De scheppingsleer daarentegen is in staat om de aanvechting

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van de huwelijkspartners recht te doen, zonder de partners te belasten of het huwelijk te definieren in termen van zijn doelen. Door de bijbelteksten in het eerste scheppingsverhaal te lezen, kan het volgende geconcludeerd worden. Allereerst wordt de band tussen man en vrouw herleid tot God de Schepper die in zijn genade man en vrouw aan elkaar geeft. Dit impliceert dat het scheppende woord van God tegelijk ook de belofte is dat de relatie niet afhangt van menselijke inspanningen maar aan God zelf. Voorts zal, juist omdat een dergelijke blijvende relatie door God zelf is ingesteld, beproeving niet uitblijven. Want schepping is nooit vrij van de verleiding om menselijke kunde te vertrouwen in plaats van Gods beloofde troost. Het beeld van het huwelijk als een levensvorm die onvermijdelijk te lijden heeft onder menselijk falen, en even onvermijdelijk door Gods belofte onderhouden wordt, is duidelijk minder optimistisch dan de liberaal-contractuele opvatting van het huwelijk. Deze veel realistischer benadering is een voordeel dat de behandeling van het huwelijk in de context van de scheppingsleer oplevert. Het tweede huwelijksconcept komt uit de traditie van het natuurrecht. Vooral de onontbindbaarheid van het huwelijk wordt in deze traditie benadrukt vanwege de noodzaak ervan om de huwelijksdoelen te bereiken. Het natuurconcept dat in deze traditie op de achtergrond Staat, is in de loop van de geschiedenis gewijzigd. In de opvattingen van Thomas van Aquino werd de natuurwet onmiddellijk herleid tot Gods scheppende en onderhoudende relatie ten opzichte van zijn schepping. Later werd dit concept in toenemende mate gebruikt om de rationaliteit van het huwelijk te demonstreren zonder het beroep op Gods voorzienige zorg voor de schepping. Zodra de onontbindbaarheid van het huwelijk echter niet langer werd 'ervaren', kwam de vermeende rationaliteit van deze onontbindbaarheid onder vuur te liggen. Het beroep op de vermeende 'natuurlijkheid' van de onontbindbare huwelijksband werd verzwakt door het beroep op gevoelens en ervaring. De scheppingsleer legt echter terecht de nadruk op het proces van vorming van menselijke gevoelens in de context van de (kerk)gemeenschap. Zoals de uitleg van de bekende passage uit Efeziers 5 wil aangeven, is de context waarin het huwelijk plaatsvindt de relatie tussen Jezus Christus en de kerk. Door het huwelijk in deze context te ontwikkelen versterken deze twee relaties elkaar wederzijds. Alleen de onverbreekbare band tussen Christus en de kerk is zowel waarborg als voorbeeld van het geheimenis van de onontbindbare

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huwelijksband. Het impliciete beroep in deze bijbelse passage op Genesis 2 versterkt de schepselmatige structuur van de huwelijkband. Het derde huwelijksconcept wordt de constructivistische benadering genoemd. Huwelijk wordt in dit concept beschouwd als een geleidelijk ontwikkelde menselijke uitvinding om het samenleven van man en vrouw te beheersen. Omdat de onderling nauw verweven concepten van seksualiteit en gender geleidelijk beschouwd werden als sociale constructen, werden de sociale instituties die deze reguleerden eveneens als zodanig beschouwd. Het feit dat de mens bewust getracht heeft levensvormen te ontwikkelen waarin het huwelijksleven geleefd moest worden, hoeft op voorhand niet als onjuist te worden beoordeeld. Bewust menselijk gedrag is immers volledig onderdeel van een ethiek die door een scheppingsleer wordt vormgegeven. Er ontstaan slechts dan problemen, wanneer de ontwikkeling van deze levensvormen gedacht wordt in termen van autonomie. In de context van de behandeling van het huwelijk loopt deze gedachte over autonomie van seksualiteit als het fenomenologische startpunt naar het huwelijk als de vorm waarin de mens zijn seksualiteit verkoos te organiseren. De scheppingsleer is kritisch over deze autonomie, omdat zij de overkoepelende activiteit van de Schepper benadrukt, die levensvormen aan de mens geeft, tegenover de nadruk op menselijke uitvinding en daadkracht. Het hierdoor vormgegeven huwelijksconcept ziet het huwelijk als Gods activiteit. Dit huwelijksconcept ligt in de lijn van de argumenten die in eerdere hoofdstukken zijn ontwikkeld. De levensvorm van het huwelijk is geschapen door God, wat geldt voor het algemene niveau van de sociale institutie, als voor ieder concreet huwelijk. De menselijke activiteit wordt hier beschouwd als in overeenstemming met Gods voorzienige en scheppende daadkracht. De prangende vraag hoe deze goddelijke daadkracht in het heden op te merken is, is de taak van een gewetensvol en gelovig leven en ontdekken ervan door de gemeenschap van gelovigen onder leiding van de Heilige Geest en in gelovig luisteren naar de vormende woorden van de bijbel. Het vierde huwelijksconcept is dat waarin - meestal vanuit een duidelijk christelijk standpunt - de eschatologische relativering ervan is bedoeld om het huwelijksinstituut in het heden af te zwakken. Volgens sommige commentatoren is de eschatologische relativering door Jezus Christus in Mattheüs 22 bedoeld om te stellen dat in het hemelse koninkrijk hetero-patriarchale structuren zoals het huwelijk zullen verdwenen zijn. De vraag is daarom wat deze woorden van Jezus ons

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verteilen over de eschatologische relativering van het huwelijk. Zal er een radicale omvorming plaatsvinden van menselijke relaties in het algemeen en van het huwelijk in het bijzonder? Exegese van dit bijbelgedeelte heeft, zo zegt men traditioneel, dit beeld bevestigd. Enkele kritische kanttekeningen zijn hierbij geplaatst, die deze veronderstelling in twijfel zouden kunnen trekken. Het is immers in het geheel niet duidelijk of dit woord van Jezus het huwelijk als zodanig betreft, of het leviraatshuwelijk. In het laatste geval zou Jezus de specifiek Joodse nadruk op de voortplanting relativeren met een beroep op de toekomst waarin deze zorg voor de toekomst niet meer noodzakelijk is. Bovendien waardeert de bijbelse leer relationele structuren sterk. Dit wordt duidelijk gemaakt door zowel Jezus (Marcus 7,9-13) als de zogeheten 'huistafels'. Alle verhoudingen worden echter onderworpen aan de gehoorzaamheid aan God boven alles als het eerste en grote gebod. Het eschatologische doel van de gemeenschap van gelovigen, verzameld rondom God die onder hen wil wonen, is de waarborg voor de menselijke individuele identiteit - inclusief de vervulling van haar vorming die gedurende dit leven plaatsvond door intermenselijke verhoudingen (zoals het huwelijk). In hoofdstuk 7 worden de resultaten van deze Studie in antwoord op de vraag: Wat levert de overweging van de christelijke scheppingsleer op voor de

ethiek? opgesomd met betrekking tot de vier elementen van hoofdstuk 2. Dit betreft allereerst de gevolgen van de scheppingsleer zoals die is uitgewerkt door Gunton en Bayer voor theologische ethiek in het algemeen. De bijdrage van het communitarisme (Maclntyre, Taylor) en radical orthodoxy (Milbank) kunnen worden bijgesteld door hun overtuigingen. Daardoor kan de vermeende neutraliteit van het gemeenschapsconcept opnieuw worden gedefinieerd door haar als geschapen te zien. Zo kan gemeenschap criteria ontlenen aan de constitutieve relatie met de Schepper. Milbanks ontologie van de vrede kan opnieuw worden gedefinieerd door haar terug te voeren op de macht van de Schepper. Voorts wordt het verband tussen de klassieke neo-calvinistische nadruk op schepping en die van Gunton en Bayer samengevat. In haar aandacht voor public theology kan de neocalvinistische beperking van schepping tot creatio ex nihilo worden opgeheven door voorzienigheid en eschaton in beschouwing te nemen binnen de scheppingsleer. Het accent op de gemeenschap van gelovigen die hun geloof in de schepping uitspreken kan eveneens een aanvulling zijn op neo-calvinistische theologie. Ten derde kan de scheppingsleer

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tevens nuttig zijn in apologetisch opzicht binnen het gesprek tussen wereldbeschouwingen. Waar aan menselijk handelen wereld reddende kwaliteiten worden toegeschreven, kan de relativering vanuit de christelijke scheppingsleer deze aspiraties afzwakken door te verwijzen naar de Schepper die deze wereld onderhoudt. Deze scheppingskracht van God kan ingebracht worden tegenover gelatenheid of cynisme met betrekking tot de toekomst. Het post-Verlichtingsdebat over relativisme en universalisme kan ook van deze leer profiteren. Christelijk moreel nadenken is immers niet relevant voor alle mensen vanwege bepaalde intrinsieke kenmerken van de werkelijkheid. De toepasbaarheid ervan hangt af van Gods concrete daden die zijn wereldwijde doel dienen. Het derde apologetische winstpunt zou te behalen kunnen zijn in het opnieuw definieren van de rol van de christelijke gemeenschap in deze wereld, daar zij een van de middelen van Gods scheppende en verzoenende handelen is. De oecumenische bijdrage van de aandacht voor scheppingsleer ten slotte wordt duidelijk door een luthers en een gereformeerd-calvinistisch theoloog bij elkaar te brengen. Het verschil tussen Bayer en Gunton geeft aan hoe belangrijk het oecumenische gesprek is. De eerlijkheid waarmee zij hun visie benadrukken geeft anderen de gelegenheid om meer convergerende lijnen naar de toekomst te trekken - of anders om de noodzakelijke verschillen uiteen te zetten. Met betrekking tot lutherse en gereformeerd-calvinistische theologie kan geconcludeerd worden dat het accent op de scheppingsleer duidelijk maakt dat de realiteitszin - in al haar gebrokenheid - van lutherse zijde nooit onderschat mag worden, terwijl zij kan profiteren van de calvinistische nadruk op de soevereiniteit van de drieene God. Zoals duidelijk geworden is uit de beschrijving van zowel Bayers als Guntons theologie, is het betrekken van het uitgangspunt in de scheppingsleer slechts het voorspel op de rest van het theologische werk, inclusief alle verschillende aspecten van de christelijke leer. Voor alles kan dit voorspel slechts op de juiste manier worden ontdekt door te leven en te denken in een echt christelijke gemeenschap die zieh committeert aan het geheel van de christelijke leer, dat een isolatie of neutralisatie van de scheppingsleer verbiedt.

9 Bibliography 9.1 Abbreviations Abbreviations used in the bibliography are according to: Schwertner, Siegfried M. [zusammengestellt von]; Theologische Realenzyklopädie. AbkürzungsOerzeichnis [2., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage], De Gruyter: Berlin 1994 Alexander, Patrick H. (et al.) (edd.); The SBL Handbook of Style for Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical and Early Christian Studies, Hendrickson Publishers: Peabody 1999 Exceptions to this rule are: GD - Bavinck, H.; Gereformeerde Dogmatiek [Bd. I-IV], Kok: Kampen 61976 IJSTh - International Journal of Systematic Theology

9.2 Bibliography 9.2.1 Quoted publications of Oswald Bayer 'Oswald Bayer'. In: Henning, Christian; Lehmkühler, Karsten (Hrsg.); Systematische Theologie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1998,300-315 Bayer, Oswald (Hg.); Ehe: Zeit zur Antwort, Neukirchener Verlag: NeukirchenVluyn 1988 Bayer, Oswald; Knudsen, Christian; Kreuz und Kritik. Johann Georg Hamanns Letztes Blatt. Text und Interpretation, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1983 Bayer, Oswald; Peters, Albrecht; 'Theologie'. In: HWP10 (1998), 1080-1095 Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, Berlin/New York 1996 '"Die ganze Theologie Luthers'". In: KuD 47 (2001), 254-274

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'Evangelisches Ehe- und Familienverständnis'. In: Gottes Gabe und persönliche Verantwortung. Zur ethischen Orientierung für das Zusammenleben in Ehe und Familie. Eine Stellungnahme der Kammer der EKD für Ehe und Familie, Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1998, 68-80 'Hermeneutische Theologie'. In: Körtner, Ulrich H.J. (Hg.); Glauben und Verstehen. Perspektiven herrneneutischer Theologie, Neukirchener Verlag: NeukirchenVluyn 2000,39-55 'Notae ecclesiae'. In: Lutheran Contributions to the Missio Dei, Lutheran World Federation: Geneva 1984, 69-82 'Poetological Theology: New Horizons for Systematic Theology'. In: IJSTh 1 (1999), 151-167 'Raum und Zeit. Hamanns Metakritik der transzendentalen Ästhetik Kants'. In: Freund, Annegret (et al.) (Hgg.); Tragende Tradition [FS Martin Seils], Lang: Frankfurt a.M. 1992, 25-33 'Schöpfer/Schöpfung VIII. Systematisch-theologisch'. In: TRE [Bd. XXX], 326-348 'Schöpfung als Geschichte'. In: NZSTh 45 (2003), 62-70 'Social Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996,187-201 'The Doctrine of Justification and Ontology'. In: NZSTh 43 (2001), 44-53 'Theologie und Philosophie in produktivem Konflikt7. In: NZSTh 32 (1990), 226236 'Vernunft ist Sprache'. In: KuD 32 (1986), 278-292 'Wer ist Theologe?'. In: Beintker, Michael (Hg.); Rechtfertigung und Erfahrung [FS Gerhard Sauter], Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1995,208-213 'Worship and Theology'. In: Bayer, Oswald; Suggate, Alan (edd.); Worship and Ethics. Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, De Gruyter: Berlin 1996,148-161 'Zeit zur Antwort. Ehe als freie Lebensform, Elternschaft und Beruf'. In: Bayer, Oswald (Hg.); Ehe: Zeit zur Antwort, Neukirchener Verlag: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1988,12- 28 'Zur Theologie der Klage'. In: JBTh 16 (2002), 289-301 Aus Glauben leben. Über Rechtfertigung und Heiligung, Calwer Verlag: Stuttgart 21990 Autorität und Kritik. Zu Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1991 Freiheit als Antwort. Zur theologischen Ethik, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1995 Gott als Autor. Zu einer poietologischen Theologie, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1999 Leibliches Wort. Reformation und Neuzeit in Konflikt, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1992 Living by Faith. Justification and Sanctification [TR Geoffrey W. Bromiley], Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 2003

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Martin Luthers Theologie. Eine Vergegenwärtigung, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 2003 Neuer Geist in alten Buchstaben, Freimund Verlag: Neuendettelsau 1994 Promissio. Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie, WBG: Darmstadt 21989 Schöpfung als Anrede. Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen P1986] 21990 Theologie [HST1], Gütersloher Verlagshaus: Gütersloh 1994 Umstrittene Freiheit. Theologisch-philosophische Kontroversen, Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 1981 Vernunft ist Sprache. Hamanns Metakritik Kants [unter Mitarbeit von Benjamin Gleede und Ulrich Moustakas], Frommann-Holzboog: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2002 Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch. Johann Georg Hamann als radikaler Aufklärer, Piper: München/Zürich 1988

9.2.2 Quoted publications of Colin Ε. Gunton Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in historical and systematic theology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995 Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997 Schwöbel, Christoph; Gunton, Colin E. (edd.); Persons, Divine and Human. King's College Essays in Theological Anthropology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1991 Ά far-off gleam of the gospel: salvation in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings'. In: King's Theological Review 12 (1989), 6-10 'Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom'. In: ThTo 43 (1986), 316-330 'Between allegory and myth: the legacy of the spiritualising of Genesis'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997,47-62 'Christ the Sacrifice. Aspects of the language and Imagery of the bible'. In: Hurst, L.D.; Wright, N.T. (edd.); The Glory of Christ in the New Testament, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1985 'Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert W. Jenson: An Encounter and a Convergence'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); Trinity, Time, and Church. A Response to the Theology of Robert W. Jenson, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 2000,80-93 'Foreword'. In: Begbie, Jeremy S.; Voicing Creation's Praise. Towards a Theology of the Arts, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 21999, xi-xiii

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'God, Grace and Freedom'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in historical and systematic theology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995,119-133 'Historical and Systematic Theology'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1997,3-20 'Indispensable Opponent. The Relations of Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Religion'. In: NZSTh 38 (1996), 298-306 'Introduction'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); God and Freedom. Essays in historical and systematic theology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995,1-12 'Introduction'. In: Gunton, Colin E. (ed.); The Doctrine of Creation. Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1997,1-15 'Salvation'. In: Webster, John (ed.); The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2000,143-158 'The Doctrine of Creation'. In: Gunton, Colin E.; The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1997,141-157 'The sacrifice and the sacrifices: From metaphor to transcendental?'. In: Feenstra, Ronald J.; Plantinga Jr., Cornelius (edd.); Trinity Incarnation and Atonement. Philosophical and Theological Essays, Notre Dame 1989,210-229 'The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters: The Holy Spirit and the Created Order'. In: IJSTh 4 (2002), 190-204 'Transcendence, Metaphor and the Knowability of God'. In: JThS 31 (1980), 501-516 'Trinity and Trustworthiness'. In: Helm, Paul; Trueman, Carl R. (ed.); The Trustworthiness of God. Perspectives on the Nature of Scripture, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids/Cambridge 2002,275-284 A Brief Theology of Revelation [The 1993 Warfield Lectures], T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1995 Becoming and being. The doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, SCM Press: London 22001 Christ and Creation [The Didsbury-lectures 1990], Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1992 Enlightenment and Alienation. An Essay Towards a Trinitarian Theology, Marshall Morgan & Scott: Basingstoke 1985 Intellect and Action. Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2000 The Actuality of Atonement. A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1988 The Christian Faith. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Blackwell: Oxford 2001 The One, the Three and the Many. God, creation and the culture of modernity [The 1992 Bampton Lectures], Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1993 The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, T&T Clark: Edinburgh [11991] 21997

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The Triune Creator. A Historical and Systematic Study, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1998 Theology through Preaching. Sermons for Brentwood, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 2001 Theology through the Theologians. Selected Essays 1972-1995, T&T Clark: Edinburgh 1996 Yesterday and Today. A Study of Continuities in Christology, SPCK: London 21997

9.2.3 Quoted publications of other authors Anderson, B.W. (ed.); Creation in the Old Testament, Fortress Press: Philadelphia 1984 Bakker, J.T.; 'Wat zeggen we als we "schepping" zeggen?'. In: GThT 92 (1992), 113120 Banner, Michael; "'Who are my mother and my brothers?" Marx, Bonhoeffer and Benedict and the redemption of the family'. In: Banner, Michael; Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999,225-251 , 'Prolegomena to a dogmatic sexual ethic'. In: Banner, Michael; Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999,269-309 Barr, James; 'Was Everything That God Created Really Good? A Question in the First Verse of the Bible'. In: Linafelt, Tod; Beal, Timothy K. (edd.); God in the Fray. A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann, Fortress Press: Minneapolis 1998,55-65 , Biblical Faith and Natural Theology. The Gifford Lectures for 1991, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993 , The Concept of Biblical Theology. An Old Testament Perspective, SCM Press: London 1999 Barth, Karl; 'Nachwort'. In: Schleiermacher-Auswahl, Siebenstern: München/ Hamburg 1968,290-312 > KD ΠΙΑ, Evangelischer Verlag: Zollikon-Zürich 1945 , KD III/3, Evangelischer Verlag: Zollikon-Zürich 21961 , KD III/2, Evangelischer Verlag: Zollikon-Zürich 1948 Bartholomew, Craig; 'Covenant and Creation. Covenant Overload or Covenantal Deconstruction'. In: CT] 30 (1995), 11-33 Bauman, Zygmunt; Life in fragments. Essays in postmodern morality, Blackwell: Oxford 1995 , Postmodern ethics, Blackwell: Oxford 1993

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Index of Names Names that occur in footnotes are referred to by page numbers in italics. Adorno, Th. W. 47

Begbie, J. S.

Anderson, B. W. 197,198

Bekkum, K. van 17,199

Apel, K. O. 14

Berkeley, G. 17,49

Aristotle 122,126,149

Berkouwer, G. C. 243

Athanasius 78

Bernhardt, R. 248

Augustine

Bizer, E. 103,104

41, 42, 44, 45, 65, 67, 83, 86,

100, 122, 154, 205, 208, 250, 312, 334,

16,98,192,193,194

Black, R. 230,309,310 Blumenberg, H. 220,307

352

Bonhoeffer, D. 250,302 Bakker, J. T. 243

Brecht, M. 103

Banner, M.

Bremmer, R.H. 208

215,286,287,289

Barr, J. 197,198,200

Brink, G. van den 209

Barth, Κ.

Brinkman, Μ. E.

4, 5, 8, 9, 27-31, 33, 61, 62, 67,

5,15,349

70, 78, 94, 96, 103, 116, 122, 183, 194,

Brown, W. P. 234,235,251

197,199,204,205,220,224,334,350

Brueggemann, W. 197

Bartholomew, C. 259

Brüggen, J. van 273,322

Basil of Caesarea 95

Bruijne, A. L. Th. de 319,351,353

Bauman, Z. 23

Brümmer, V. 6,215,217,232

Baur, J.

Brunner, Ε. 4

6,272,274

Bavinck, H. 15,16,17,187, 192, 207,208,

Buijs, G. 352

234,243,244,297 Bayer, Ο.

1, 2, 12, 20-22, 23, 25, 26, 90,

Cahill, L. S. 294,320

100-190, 192, 196, 197, 211, 213, 217-

Calvin, J. 23,56,81,92,220,222,223,356

219, 225, 228-232, 237, 240, 242, 245-

Clapp, R. 286,2S7

247, 251, 252-255, 256, 257, 258-261,

Cobb, J. 11,228

270-274, 276-279, 282, 285, 288, 289,

Coleridge, S. T. 23-25, 38-40, 49, 50, 55,

292, 297-299, 300, 307, 322, 323, 325,

56, 58,82, 92,94, 98, 276, 356

326, 332, 333, 336, 337, 339, 346-351,

Cornes, A. 295,301

355-357

Crowder, C. 331,332,334

Beek, A. van de

8, 19, 20, 233, 234, 23S,

Curran, C. E. 304,306

272-274 Beemer, Th. 222,305,306

Dalferth, I. U. 6,7,10,23,192,217,232

Index of Names

410 Darwin, C. 71,82,227

Habermas, J. 14

Dawes, G.W.

Hamann, J.G.

86,312,313

Descartes, R. 30,43,48,49, 61,227 Doedens, J. J. T.

199,200,203

22, 25, 100, 102, 115, 120,

131, 133-136, 138, 141, 142, 151-154, 158,159,160, 162, 178, 181, 185,186, 271,276

Dolgin, J. L. 292 Dooyeweerd, H. 192,193,212

Hanby, M. 351

DoumaJ.

Happel, S. 24

194,199,221

Dumbrell, W. J.

199,203,270

Dunn, J. D. G. 336

Hardy,D.W.

246,265,268,269

Hardy, L. 263,264 Harinck, G. 201 Härle, W. 239

Eck, J. van 202 Egmond, A. van

18,221,259

Hartogh, G. den 259

Ellis, G. F. R. 225-229,262

Hartshorne, C. 29,30,61

Evers, D. 244

Hauerwas, S.

2, 19, 216, 230, 294, 295,

296 Feenstra, R. J. 31 Fermer, R. M. 96,97 Feuerbach, L. 122

Hegel, G. W. F. 30,33,43,52, 70, 71,100, 111-113, 116, 119, 122, 125, 133, 137, 146,165,168,177,201

Finke, A.-K 27

Hemming, L. P. 351

Forsyth, P. T. 61

Herrmann, Chr. 246

Frey, Chr.

Hittinger, R. 306

11,215,260,274,354

Honecker, M. 13, 247, 253, 255, 257, 258, Geesink, W. 17

293

Gehlen, A. 169,177

Horkheimer, Μ. 47

Genderen, J. van 241

Home, Β. 252

Gestrich, Chr.

Huber, W. 249,251

201,235,237

Gloege, G. 11,225

Hugenberger, G. P. 291

Green, B.G. 100

Hume, D. 49,136,227

Gregory of Nyssa 95

Huppenbauer, Μ. 231

Greijdanus, S. 63 Grenz, S. J.

275, 283, 289, 290, 293, 295,

301,310,328,337 Grisez, G.

304,306,308,309

Irenaeus 55, 64, 65, 69, 70, 80, 90, 92, 94, 196,346 Irving, E. 61

Gunton, C. Ε. 1,2,12, 20-26, 27-100,190, 192,195,196, 197, 209, 210, 211, 213,

Jenson, R. 267,356

218, 219, 225, 228-230, 232, 237, 238,

Jochemsen, H. 353

240-242, 244, 246, 252, 253, 261, 270,

Jüngel, E. 31

274, 276-279, 282, 284, 285, 288, 289, 306, 307, 317, 318, 340, 346-351, 355-

Kaiser, O. 198

357

Kamphuis, B. 98 Kamphuis, J. 244

Haas, G. 263

411

Index of Names Kant I.

22, 30, 47, 48, 49, 52, 57, 58, 59,

McGowan, J. 309

76, 113, 122, 125, 131-136, 138, 154,

McGrath, A.E. 6,7,24,214,215,216,236

165,168,220,292,299

Mellor, Ph. A. 294,295

Keeling, Μ. 220,247,249,251

Mendelssohn, M. 133,178

Kelly, Κ. Τ. 315-319

Milbank, J. 2,195,262,351,352

King, Ph. J. 291

Moltmann, J. 8

Klapwijk, J.

Moore, G.

15,17,207

304,306,308,309

Kleijkamp, G. A. 292

Mouw, R. J. 353

Knijff, H. W. de

Muis,J. 216,217,230

283,286,295

König, A. 233 Kooi, C. van der

Müller, G. 257 18,194,220,259

Murphy, N. 225-229,262 Musschenga, A. W. 14,285

Kramer, Η. 307 Krämer, Η. 13 Kreck, W. 31

Newton, I. 227

Kruijf, G. G. de 272

Nietzsche, F. 30,59,169

Kuhn, Th. S. 6

Noort, E. 197

Kuyper, A. 15-17,192-194,199, 207,209, O'Donovan, O.

221

204-207, 209, 211, 212,

213,214,224,230,327,331 Lange, F. de 13,227-229

Ockham, W. of 65,307,317

Leibniz, G.W. 136

Origen 86

Link, Chr. 4,5,194,195,248,266-268 Locke, J. 49,136 Lockwood O'Donovan, J. 222 Loonstra, B. 318 Lüpke, J. von 4 Luther, M.

22, 59, 60, 92, 102-109, 112,

113, 115, 117,119,120, 125,126, 127, 131,133,135,137,140, 141,142, 143, 147,148,149,159,160,162,164,168170,174, 180, 181, 185, 187, 196, 231, 245, 247, 248, 253-259, 276, 298, 325, 336,337,355,356 Lüthi, K. 316,318

Ottolander, P. den 31 Paas, S. 99 Pannenberg, W. 7, 21, 22, 34, 155, 239, 283,284,313,328-330,341 Pfeiffer, M. 215 Plantinga Jr., C. 31 Plantinga, A. 209 Plato 49,122,136 Pöhlmann, H. G. 245,293 Polanyi, M. 49,50,57,98,209 Polkinghorne, J. 6,24 Porter, J. 220-222 Preuss, H. D. 198

Maclntyre, A. 14,47 Manenschijn, G.

14,285,287,288

Rad, G. von 197,198

Maris, J. W. 204

Rawls, J. 14

Marx, K. 286

Rendtorff, T.

Maurer, W. 255,256

Reynolds, Ph. L. 312

McClendon Jr., J. Wm. 286

Riessen, J. van

McFadyen, A. 235,236

Röhls, J. 245

14,251,260,291 14,15,260,261

Index of Names

412 Rosenau, H.

223,250,251

Ulrich, H . G . 261 Ursinus, Z. 259

Sauter, G.

118,332

Scheffczyk, L.

202,233

Van Huyssteen, J. W. 6

Schelsky, H. 178

Veenhof, J. 208

Schilder, Κ. 17,188,199 Schleiermacher, F. D. Ε.

Veldhuis, H. 52, 119, 122,

185,186

Velema, W. H.

241,244,264,353

Verboom, W. 2 01

146, 257 Schmid, Η. Η. 197,198

Verhey, A. 294,295,296

Schmitz, Κ.

Volf, M. 263-265

301,313

Schoneveld, J. 290 Schräge, W. 335

Walt, S. P. van der 208

Schreiner, S. Ε. 222,223

Wannenwetsch, B.

2, 184, 196, 218, 231,

Schuurman, D. J. 262-266

253-255, 257-260, 283, 289, 293, 296,

Schwankl, O.

300, 302, 303, 309, 310-313, 320, 322,

334,338,339

Schwarz, R. 256,257 Schweiker, W.

7,15,183

325,335,339 Wansink, P. L. 196

Schwöbel, Chr. 7,12,48,166,252

Webster, J. 5,23,267,268,269,274

Scotus, D. 43,307,317

Weder, H. 269,270,338

Selge, K.-H. 300

Weizsäcker, C. Fr. von 9

Shilling, C.

Wenham, G. J. 299,201,202

294,295

Solle, D. 164

Westberg, D. 221

Spinoza, B. 59,61

Westermann, C.

Stager, L. Ε. 291

Wheeler, K. 24

Steck, O.H. 199

Whitehead, Α. Ν.

Strätz, H.-W.

Wilhelms, G. 258

285,287

Stuart, E. 330,331,341

W i l k s J . G . F . 96

Suggate, Α. M. 24,118,216

Witte Jr., J. 291

197,199,200,303 11,228

Wittgenstein, L. 218 Wolde, E. van 200,201

Taylor, C. 14,46 Tenholt, G.

300,304

Wölfel, E. 6

Terstriep, D. 218

Wolters, A.M.

Thatcher, A. 3,281,283,295

Woudenberg, R. van

Thomas Aquinas 29,30,61,67,94,96,97,

Wyller, T. 231,232

16,18,225,244 209,211,212

205,223,305,343 Tillich, P.

11,193

Tolkien, J. R. R.

Zizioulas, J. D. 40-43, 72,95, 96, 97 89,246

Torisu, Y. 65 Torrance, Τ. F. 236,321,323 Trillhaas, W. 260 Trimp, C. 354