Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges 9781626370838

Citation preview

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page i

Crafting the New Nigeria

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page ii

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/20/04 4:07 PM Page iii

CRAFTING THE NEW NIGERIA Confronting the Challenges

EDITED BY

Robert I. Rotberg

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page iv

Paperback edition published in the United States of America in 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published in hardcover in 2004. © 2004 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN 1-58826-356-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) Printed and bound in the United States of America

∞

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page v

Contents

Preface

vii

1 Troubled Nigeria: Great Opportunities, Tough Challenges Robert I. Rotberg

1

2 Unity with Diversity: Toward Democratic Federalism John N. Paden

17

3 Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question Richard L. Sklar

39

4 Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment Rotimi T. Suberu

61

5 Reordering Nigerian Federalism: Making It More Confederal Itse E. Sagay

85

6 Getting the Politics Right: Governance and Economic Failure in Nigeria Peter M. Lewis 7 Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse: Can It Be Achieved? Patrick Utomi

v

99

125

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page vi

vi

Contents

8 The 2003 Elections: Hardly Credible, but Acceptable Darren Kew

139

9 Principal Human Rights Challenges Bronwen Manby

175

10 HIV/AIDS in Nigeria: The Challenges of a National Epidemic Daniel J. Smith

199

11 The Roots of Sectarian Violence, and Its Cure William Reno

219

12 Needed: Better Leadership Mahmud M. Tukur

239

List of Acronyms Glossary Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

251 253 255 261 265 273

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page vii

Preface

When I first knew Nigeria, it was freshly independent and engagingly energetic. The aspirations and hopes of Africa rested on its ample shoulders. Now, in another century, the able people of Nigeria are once again focused on the arduous task of nation making after decades of despotism and profligacy. This book is about how to achieve the very best possible results for Nigeria and its peoples—about what still needs to be done to realize those early dreams in an entirely reordered and tougher context. Even in our globalized age, an informative volume about the present and future of a vast, complex African nation requires the close attention and elaborate cooperation of contributors spread across continents and coming from varied perspectives, united as they nonetheless are by their regard for Nigeria and Nigeria’s rekindled democracy. As the book’s editor, I am enormously grateful to the authors, whose fresh ideas and prose have been brought together in this volume, and to those many others (mostly Nigerians) who initiated Crafting the New Nigeria at a salutary conference in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Many others made significant contributions to the development of this book, notably General Yakubu Gowon, who participated fully in the conference and inspired everyone who attended; Pauline Baker and Princeton Lyman, whose criticisms of an earlier draft were very helpful; Deborah West, who assisted greatly in coordinating and editing the manuscript; Elisa Pepe, who kept the project organized; John Charlton, whose insights and support were extremely timely and much appreciated; and Sam Amadi, Judith Asuni, Sunday Dare, Bronwen Manby, and Richard Sklar, each of whom provided valuable advice when the book was still decidedly embryonic. I am also greatly indebted to the trustees of the World Peace Foundation vii

Rotberg-FM.pb.Final 12/17/04 4:22 PM Page viii

viii

Preface

and to Graham Allison and the Belfer Center of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for their solid support for the Nigerian project and this contribution to policymaking for Africa. — Robert I. Rotberg

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 1

1 Troubled Nigeria: Great Opportunities, Tough Challenges Robert I. Rotberg “As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa.” This phrase glibly oversimplifies the importance of Nigeria to the future of Africa, but not by much. Nigeria’s sheer population numbers—over 130 million of the full continent’s 797 million—and its proportionate weight in sub-Saharan Africa, where the next most populous countries are Ethiopia, with 68 million people, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 55 million people, make what happens in and to Nigeria critical. The country’s sizable petroleum production, 3 percent of global output and 7 percent of U.S. imports, adds heft to Nigeria’s significance even though, at present, Nigeria is a poor country per capita, even by the standards of sub-Saharan Africa (annual per capita gross national income [GNI] in 2001 was $290).1 But, if Nigeria’s leaders can harness the country’s underlying wealth and human resource capabilities effectively, Nigeria could lead the rest of western Africa to prosperity. There is abundant promise, if thus far rarely fulfilled and oft aborted by coups, instability, rampant theft, and vast failures of statesmanship. This book is about the rocky roads to Nigeria’s sustainable success, the many obstacles that need to be removed before that success can be fully realized, and the innumerable constitutional, institutional, and human challenges that must be overcome before Nigeria can attain its vast potential and its people begin to contribute more completely than now to the mature development of Africa. The chapters that follow, written by leading Nigerian, U.S., and British scholars and practitioners, are pessimistic in outlook and severe in tone. Together, the Nigerians strongly suggest that sub-Saharan Africa’s largest nation could well fail as a nation-state if current trends continue and its deeply rooted problems overwhelm Nigeria’s predominantly weak and self-serving leadership.2 None of the authors, or this writer, suggests that 1

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 2

TUNISIA MOROCCO

ALGERIA LIBYA WESTERN SAHARA

MAURITANIA NIGER

MALI

CHAD SENEGAL GAMBIA BURKINA FASO GUINEA BISSAU

GUINEA

BENIN

NIGERIA TOGO

SIERRA LEONE

COTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LIBERIA

CAMEROON Gulf of Guinea EQUATORIAL GUINEA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

GABON

Katsina Maiduguri Bauchi

Kaduna Jos

Abuja

r

ive

eR

nu

Ibadan Lagos Warri

Niger River

Be

Enugu Port Harcourt

N I G E R I A

CONGO

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 3

Troubled Nigeria

3

Nigeria is in consuming trouble because of a lack of talent, too few ideas, a paucity of individual verve, cultural blinders, bad borders, the global marketplace, or any of the other excuses that are sometimes advanced for the weakness and failure of the developing world’s more challenged nationstates. As the contributors make clear, Nigeria lacks political unity and political will, and, as at least one author explicitly indicates, Nigeria needs new, stronger, nationally minded leaders. Additionally, misfeasance and malfeasance in office continue apace. The prevailing culture of corruption is little changed. When mixed with Muslim irredentism, persistent rivalry between north and south, and a growing spirit of fundamentalism and mistrust (witness the reluctance in the north to vaccinate children against polio), the danger that northern Nigeria could become a haunt of international terrorists is also real. Nigeria deserves to be well governed in light of its history since independence in 1960 (see Table 1.1). Given the abundant ability of its citizens, the number of its university graduates, the sheer size of its middle class, the celebrated entrepreneurial abilities of Nigerians at home and abroad, the country’s troubled history before 1999, and their leaders’ oft-expressed determination to create a better Nigeria, good governance is both desirable and achievable. Yet, good governance begins with good performance, delivering political goods in the form of personal security and freedom from depredation; a predictable, recognizable, systematized method of adjudicating disputes and regulating the norms and mores of a society—an effective rule of law; the essential political freedoms to participate in political life and express dissent openly; medical and health care; schools and educational instruction; roads, railways, ports, and harbors—the physical infrastructure of commerce; a functional money and banking system; a fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals and potentially prosper; a vibrant civil society; and a sharing of the environmental commons.3 Nigeria, as a federal nation-state and as a collection of national and subordinate governments, by these criteria performs poorly as compared to other nation-states in Africa and in the developing world. As this book suggests, the supplying of political (public) goods in Nigeria is deficient, inhibited by political disorganization; political fragmentation; religious, linguistic, ethnic, and other intercommunal antagonisms; and problems of inconsistent and nonvisionary leadership. It is precisely these prevailing deficiencies, especially the failure of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s government to channel Muslim fundamentalism acceptably and to make the nation fully secure, that make Nigeria a potential reservoir of terror and a threat to itself, to its neighbors, and to world order. Nigeria is a centralized federation with thirty-six weak multiethnic states together serving at least three regions and dozens of prominent peoples who

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 4

4

Crafting the New Nigeria

Table 1.1 Timeline of Nigerian Governments Since Independence in 1960 1963–1966 1966–1979 1979–1983 1983–1999 1993 1999–

1st Republic military regime 2nd Republic military regime 3rd Republic (aborted) 4th Republic

display distinct, often conflicting, interests. Creating a Nigerian “nation” remains a challenge. Moreover, reconciling the strikingly different personal and group objectives of ascriptive northern Muslim-dominated emirates and achievement-oriented Christian and traditional communities in the south is a complex, continuing mosaic of excruciatingly difficult political choices. The existing Nigerian governing system, with a nominally strong executive and central revenue capture and control, the overhang of a suspicious army and numerous military and former military powerbrokers, weak law and order institutions, a battered bureaucracy, macroeconomic disarray, and rampant corruption, lacks the legitimacy to navigate those choices. The country’s lack of a cohesive democratic political culture offers little help. Neither do a predominant lack of national vision, weak consensual political and corporate leadership, and fragile ethical underpinnings. A single event—a reporter’s recent deportation from Nigeria because she refused to pay off information ministry officials—hardly provides conclusive evidence of Nigeria’s political malaise. Even used anecdotally, however, her reflections are instructive and illustrative: “A foreign correspondent’s woes are trivial,” she wrote, “when compared with the effect Nigeria’s dysfunctional public administration has on ordinary Nigerians. The civil service absorbs most of the budget but delivers little in the way of services. Needless duplication breeds waste. Embezzlement is rife. And . . . most dispiriting is a tendency among some bureaucrats to be pointlessly obstructive in the hope that someone will bribe them to lay off.” The anonymous correspondent suggests that the only way to accomplish anything of significance in contemporary Nigeria is to go straight to the top—to the president. He is busy, of course, but he does act as his own oil minister, and delegations from all over the country “beat a path to his office” hoping to win support for projects big and small.4 Despite such continued woes, Nigeria, its peoples, and Nigerian hopes for a better future are resilient. Nigeria suffered bitterly from 1975 through 1999, its opportunities for national greatness squandered by a succession of narrowly-focused military ruling juntas, and then by the obscene Abacha regime. Since 1999, participatory democracy has prevailed under President Olusegun Obasanjo, a former general, who was reelected in a much flawed,

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 5

Troubled Nigeria

5

dirty, but still accepted election in 2003. (Darren Kew, in Chapter 8, provides a critical, detailed exegesis of the electoral process and its controversial, in some cases bizarre, results.) The press is largely free and vociferous. The courts function, albeit not as well as they might. The legislature at the national level and in many of the states gives the various executives appropriately difficult times. Civil society is vibrant, especially in the south. No one outside of Nigeria, or in Africa, wants Obasanjo and his government to fail. No one seeks the kinds of strife that, on a large, recurring scale, occurred in the recent past and could again pull Nigeria apart in the future. No one wishes renewed sectarian violence. Few desire the kinds of human rights and authoritarian abuses that have blurred Nigeria’s record, and the records of many states, even after 1999. Everyone wishes broad and broadly based economic growth; Nigeria has the means, if not yet the political will, to become an economic powerhouse, as the chapters by Peter M. Lewis (Chapter 6) and Patrick Utomi (Chapter 7) make clear. This book examines the constitutional and institutional structure of Nigerian governance in depth.5 It explores the several ways in which the states interact with and react to the country’s overarching federal framework. It further analyzes the fiscal realities of the federal-state relationship and how revenue-sharing derived from oil royalties flows to the central executive and on to the states. The controversial manner in which those returns from petroleum are deployed poorly and well for the benefit of Nigerian economic growth is discussed, as well as the many existing impediments to prosperity, including the absence of a hegemonic bourgeoisie and trade openness. There are, additionally, candid investigations of Nigerian decisionmaking in the economic sphere, as well as prescriptive recommendations regarding the changes that are necessary if prosperity is to be sustained. The chilling chapter on HIV/AIDS puts Nigeria’s growing and most pervasive epidemic squarely before everyone concerned with Nigeria’s real future. Soon, as Daniel J. Smith makes clear in Chapter 10, Nigeria will surpass South Africa as Africa’s hotbed of HIV prevalence. Already 170,000 Nigerians are dying each year from AIDS, and the government is unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with this formidable additional challenge to Nigeria’s leadership. These are the main themes. The book says too little, however, about the current and likely future position of the Nigerian military. It is largely silent about Nigeria in Africa, and in African peacekeeping, and in global foreign policy. Despite the parlous condition of Nigeria’s schools and universities, educational questions are considered only briefly. The soldiers are blamed in almost every chapter for destroying the country’s original postcolonial democratic political culture; all of the contributors assume, possibly with greater insouciance than they should, that Nigerians are unlikely to tolerate military interventions in the foreseeable future. None of the authors

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 6

6

Crafting the New Nigeria

want to peek too insistently inside that troubling Pandora’s box. Moreover, Nigeria’s brief flirtation with North Korea, and with possible missile technology, was revealed only in 2004. The chapters that follow raise a multitude of key questions, among them: Is federation good and appropriate for Nigeria? Are there better federal forms that could improve the governability and harmony of Nigeria? Should confederal solutions be sought? Should a national convention be held to amend or rewrite the country’s militarily prepared constitution of 1999? Should more powers of certain kinds, possibly regarding police functions, be devolved to the states? Should the central executive exert itself even more than at present, particularly with regard to the twelve northern states that have challenged the unity of Nigeria by introducing Islamic law into criminal proceedings? Should Nigeria largely abandon its statist, interventionist economy for a truly market-based alternative? Should the national government privatize state-owned enterprises? Is corruption eradicable, and if so how? Are honest elections possible, especially in 2007? Chapter 2, by John N. Paden, reviews the development of Nigerian federalism since 1914, especially from 1983, after which the sprawling country hardened into a military-dominated, strong, centralized system. It is the Second Republic’s constitutional design, however, that determines today’s Fourth Republic presidential/federal model. It differs on paper from the French and Russian federal model by emphasizing (at least in theory) a division of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In practice, however, more and more power, even since 1999, has gravitated toward the center. Individual peoples, communities, elite blocs, and local powerbrokers have consequently felt disenfranchised and abused, leading inexorably to centrifugal agitation. Nigeria’s federal model, after all, is unique in channeling the expression of regional loyalties and affinities through twelve northern states of emirate origin, twelve Middle Belt states rife with minorities, and twelve states of Yoruba and Igbo, or related, confession. Nigeria suffers from overcentralization. At least that is the view of critics of current governmental arrangements. Paden is more judicious, pointing out that overcentralization tends to provoke countervailing pressures for decentralization, confederation, or even partition. A better balance is needed, with more attention to the very bottom tier of Nigerian government—the local authorities. Improved revenue-sharing formulas beyond the ones introduced by the Obasanjo regime in 2003 would help dampen agitation at the state level, especially from those states whose subsoils and sloping marine beaches provide nearly all petroleum revenues. (Rotimi T. Suberu in Chapter 4 includes a detailed and dispassionate examination of the critical and still controversial revenue-sharing imbroglio.) So would a new method of policing, since local communities have no confidence in a police force

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 7

Troubled Nigeria

7

run from Abuja, the federal capital, and staffed often by officers with no ties to the states or towns to which they are posted. Crime is as rife as corruption, and the combating of both is most often beyond the talents of the police—hence a general loss of confidence in the system as well as in its structure. Paden also suggests that judicial weaknesses reflect the legacy of long-term military rule as well as the bruising way in which power politics of a prebendal kind (relating to a subsistence allowance granted by the state) are played in contemporary Nigeria. Should ethnolinguistic identity—a kind of Wilsonian self-determination— now become the basis of Nigeria’s future governmental dispensation? That is the fundamental question raised by Richard L. Sklar in Chapter 3. Sklar is careful, too, to pose the question as between “a basis” and “the basis,” and not just as “no basis” versus “the entire basis” at the national level, as well as and more critically at the state and local levels of government. In a country of some 400 languages and approximately 350 ethnolinguistic groups (or possibly seventy genuine nationalities), with three dominant groups that comprise 60 percent of the population, only full-scale nation-building would relieve the centrifugal forces that are increasingly hostile to Nigeria’s federal arrangements.6 Such nation-building is a distant hope—indeed, given revenue disparities and widespread antagonism by the haves among the states against the state have-nots, as a popular cause nation-building is much more problematical now than it was at independence in 1960. But, increasingly, ethnolinguistic groups are claiming local priorities and sovereignty and are attempting to oust or marginalize supposed newcomers or foreigners. (Bronwen Manby’s Chapter 9 discusses these identity crises.) Much of Nigeria’s internal strife is caused by competition over resources and jobs—supposed entitlements—at the micro level. India has managed to diffuse much of these same kinds of disruptions, but Nigeria under democratic rule finds each new claim leads to newer claims and, often, to the kinds of agitation, human rights abuses, and warfare that the state and federal governments have been unable or unwilling to contain. Sklar and Paden both evaluate the virtues and claims of confederalism, with the current weak states under a confederal system thereby becoming stronger centers of government. Itse Sagay’s Chapter 5 contains a reasoned argument for a more confederal, or more truly federal, governing arrangement. In searching for a suitable formula to ensure the harmonious political association of ethnic nationalities within an umbrella government, Sagay also proposes an ingenious (and probably unworkable) double-decker federal system, with southerners being more autonomous and confederal, and northerners retaining their current relationship to Abuja. Sagay is among those who favor the summoning of a national conference to rewrite the 1999 federal constitution more fully to reflect the claims of states and local communities, especially in the south-south. Sklar, Paden, Suberu, and most

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 8

8

Crafting the New Nigeria

of the other authors write candidly of the weaknesses of the Nigerian state structure as currently configured. They also differ with Sagay in declaring that radical changes to the current system would lead to gross instability, violence, and further difficulties for the peoples of Nigeria. Theoretically, Sklar comments, it would be possible to reverse today’s centralism by further empowering each state, each of which has a population larger than those of dozens of existing nations in Africa. In practice, however, a centralized federal system will remain. Sklar suggests that the Nigerian federation could only be dissolved by bloodshed; “a breakup of the union could produce a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale.”7 Or even more states than exist at present could be established, following the Indian model of condoning ethnolinguistic fragmentation. However, the operative question really is how centralized should Nigeria remain, or how much or how little power will or should be devolved to the states? A middle ground could consist, as Sklar discusses, of a return to regionalism, either sixfold or threefold, with control over resources (i.e., oil) transferred from Abuja to the regions. (Given the fear of nearly all Nigerians that either Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo will come to dominate the whole, all solutions are determinedly set out in multiples of three.) Another relevant and powerful question today concerns whether the battle for states’ rights and ethnolinguistic separation should or will accept a special form of legal dualism. The twelve new sharia states of the north have been practicing a form of legal dualism in this century; if it continues and spreads, and the centralized federation avoids being weakened, states in the far north may create their own forms of home rule that will subtract from the centralized federalism but may not, as in India, destroy the Nigerian version of what would become an asymmetric federation. How weak, in other words, will federal Nigeria have to become to survive? If Nigeria is thus weakened, what role will it be able to play in Africa? There is no gainsaying Nigeria’s contemporary crisis of governance. Suberu joins Paden and Sklar in describing the country’s federal system as “riddled with multiple contradictions and tensions.”8 Because it is simultaneously unitary and federal, in practice an unhealthy hybrid, Nigeria has failed to accommodate the cumbersome country’s ethnolinguistic and religious divisions. Military mismanagement set the tone, not least because centralized military governments emasculated states and local authorities by transferring too little of the nation’s oil revenues to those subordinate branches of government and by prohibiting judicial redress. The drive for autonomy has consequently grown more passionate; it is more strident in the south, where all manner of ethnic groups have long felt disadvantaged by what they perceive to be a northern-dominated or northern-tilting federal arrangement. But even in the north, sharia states now glimpse the possible benefits of subverting federal legal arrangements in their favor. Those states

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 9

Troubled Nigeria

9

now join other states in campaigning for locally run police forces, which would by definition be more responsive to state-focused issues. But for a host of reasons, as Sklar indicates, any derogation of the police function would unravel Nigeria’s federal compromise. It could also unleash a host of unwitting adverse consequences, given the anticipated ethnic and religious partiality of any newly recruited subnational police detachments. William Reno’s Chapter 11 discussion of the roots of separatism in Nigeria, and Manby’s chapter on human rights’ challenges, together offer little confidence that local policing configurations would necessarily prove more evenhanded than federal brigades amid Nigeria’s volatile ethnolinguistic mix. In Africa’s largest polity, the third tier of government—local authorities—tends to be overlooked. But because Nigeria now is so predominantly urban, this order of the administrative system potentially affects more Nigerians on a daily basis than the federation and the states. Yet, federal and state control of the organization of local government is constantly at odds, and not all authorities have been constituted in a manner that third-tier leaders would regard as proper. Nevertheless, as Suberu indicates, affirming state control over their local authorities, which seems logical, has also led to the domination of the third tier by cronies of state governors. In any African nation, but particularly in a nation as internally conflicted and ethnically and religiously complex as Nigeria, a well-functioning, wellrespected, briskly independent, fair, and wise judiciary helps to achieve the governmental balance that Paden so rightly demands. In South Africa, the new constitutional court and the subordinate appeals and original jurisdiction courts together fulfill these criteria. In Nigeria, since 1999, the results are mixed. As Suberu’s review of seven compelling judgments by the Nigerian supreme court shows, the court has acted boldly to arbitrate key intergovernmental conflicts, tilting in several decisions toward the states, in others affirming the powers of the executive, especially with regard to revenue allocation arrangements. Suberu applauds the court’s unprecedented activism. Its independence could “significantly check and balance the exercise of political power, lessen the scope for behavioral abuses, reduce the ethnic and political stakes in winning political office, and promote fairness, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law.”9 That is the great aspiration and one of the positive signposts regarding prospects for the successful growth of democracy in Nigeria. But if Nigeria’s last best hope is to be realized, its massive developmental failure must be repaired. Economic performance since the 1960s has been abysmal, especially given the country’s abundant human and natural resources and its export earnings from petroleum since 1970 of about $400 billion. Those billions have unexpectedly brought increasing poverty, widening inequality, vast unemployment, a loss of agricultural self-sufficiency, little growth in manufacturing capacity, waste, and malfeasance and misfeasance—

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 10

10

Crafting the New Nigeria

all to the consternation of the long-suffering masses. In 2003, real per capita income in Nigeria, reports Lewis, was about one-third of real 1980 levels. There are many causes of this malaise, but woeful economic governance is at its core. Hence, the economic revitalization upon which sustainable democracy rests, and Nigeria’s people must rely, depends primarily on strengthening the institutions and performance of good governance. Weak or insufficient formal institutions, contentious civil society, and the politics of fractious elites accentuate distributive concerns and focus political and military actors on political survival. They also undermine incentives for productive investment and capital formation. In other words, individuals and groups pursue individual utilities at the expense of collective welfare; cooperation is rare. Political elites have short time horizons and are insecure, so they focus the state on expedient resource redistribution rather than on the mobilization of those resources for growth. “The inability of public authorities to furnish credible commitments for private economic actors,” Lewis writes, “has impeded the investment needed for economic diversification, growth, and poverty reduction.”10 The terrible economic record of the first three Nigerian republics is clear. Even now, under democratic dispensation, economic policy drifts, corruption continues, privatization is still a prospect rather than a reality, the banking sector is in trouble, and foreign direct investment avoids Nigeria.11 Lacking is the policy predictability that all investors require. Secure property and contract rights are also questionable. There is no institutional center to marshal the forces of economic growth and guide improvements. As one result, the domestic business class engages in avaricious rent-seeking rather than productive accumulation.12 The availability of petro-riches only exacerbates this tendency, and elevates the scale of corruption. Political fragmentation and uncertainty encourage speculation, liquidity, and capital flight; the rentier state focuses entrepreneurs on the central polity (with its petroleum largesse), not on responding to or performing for the underlying tax base and tax payers. Great resources paradoxically produce an inability to plan. Petroleum wealth also distorts budget horizons and erodes fiscal constraints. That windfall illusion of prosperity has reinforced the ideology of interventionist economic nationalism and state ownership, both of which continue to inhibit sustainable growth in Nigeria. There is an illusion stemming from size and abundant extractable riches that Nigeria on its own is or deserves to be strong and prosperous. Observable reality should drive policy, but not invariably. Instead, the state has almost always tilted toward statism mixed with populism (i.e., overvalued exchange rates to subsidize cheap imports, a reliance upon government marketing systems). Lewis cites survey data that demonstrate the attachment of Nigerians to outmoded and demonstrably ineffective economic ideologies.

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 11

Troubled Nigeria

11

A new, better-performing Nigeria would emphasize diversification. The state and new policies would encourage a shift toward productive activities in agriculture and horticulture, manufacturing, and services—away from a relentless concentration on petroleum. Conditions conducive to domestic, diasporic, and foreign investment would be created. Both of these shifts might come about by devolving power and policy discretion to the states and local authorities. Opening the national economy to trade is also vital. A more autonomous central bank would help, especially if it concentrated on fiscally driven rather than politically driven courses of action. So would a more robust and better-motivated bureaucracy, a refurbished infrastructure (roads are poorly maintained, airports and air travel poorly regulated, and ports and harbors chaotic), and an unbundled state enterprise sector. Corruption remains a major obstacle to economic performance and a stark contributor to Nigeria’s inability to compete internationally and regionally. The Nigerian culture, claims Utomi, has “not evolved values that strictly limit the conduct of public officials.”13 Reno provides a host of telling examples. Public officials accept the division of Nigeria into a people of privilege and a people without (70 percent of the whole), and this attitude discourages investment of long term value. So does the Big Man syndrome, which emphasizes conspicuous consumption rather than reinvestment in multiplier activities and the accumulation of capital. Utomi also is critical of his people’s work ethic and of the sorry state of their skill-sets, based on an educational culture that overvalues white-collar employment. Both Utomi and Mahmud Tukur (Chapter 12) decry the quality and want of vision of Nigeria’s current economic and political leadership. Indeed, President Obasanjo once wrote prophetically about the critical importance of leadership in Africa: “African leadership cannot claim legitimacy without courageously confronting the plight of the African peoples and their urgent quest for the universal ideals of human dignity.” Continuing, he wrote that it was time “to hold the leadership accountable for forging a better future for the peoples of Africa.”14 Tukur, agreeing, especially blames Nigeria’s problems on poor leadership, mismanagement, incompetence, arrogance, lack of consultation, nepotism, cronyism, and a disregard for public opinion. Nigeria lacks a middle class, especially a “patriotic” one—a sizable cadre of civil society leaders who care for the commonweal, and not just for themselves. Tukur is not bashful in his criticism of Nigeria’s top political leadership. By his criteria, President Obasanjo has led the country poorly since 1999. Tukur contrasts the estimable manner in which Obasanjo governed Nigeria between 1976 and 1979 with the many weaknesses of his 1999– 2003 presidency. Tukur writes that Obasanjo’s second period in office was notable for its disregard of the separation of powers, contempt for the judicial and legislative branches, and “active subversion of the constitution and

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 12

12

Crafting the New Nigeria

rule of law.”15 He was not evenhanded in his treatment of non-Yoruba, favoring prophets and marabouts, stopped ongoing projects, and frequently exercised poor judgment. For Tukur, Obasanjo’s business-as-usual attitude remains an obstacle to the political and economic revamping that Nigeria needs so urgently. Whether or not they agree fully with Tukur’s harsh critique, the contributors to this volume all appreciate that Obasanjo’s government has been far less certain, clear, forward-looking, and unifying in its words and deeds than the good governance, prosperity potential, and ethnic and religious harmony of Nigeria demand. A lack of credible leadership and an emphasis on the politics of personalist rule have certainly contributed both to sectarian violence and to continuing human rights concerns. So have the delegitimation of state institutions; the perceived absence of formal avenues for political participation by aggrieved groups, especially at the state level; and, given a federal government that has not successfully projected power, a fear on the part of minorities that they will be victimized or oppressed. Regime strategies in the past also intentionally cultivated disorder, as in so many other patrimonial, near-failing states.16 Given the scarcity of alternatives, and seeking defensive protection as well as preemptive advantage, minorities and other aggrieved groups turn to sectarian alternatives and to the alternative social spaces that they often provide. Reno samples them, the vigilante movements (e.g., the Bakassi Boys) to which they give rise, and the intercommunal fires that their leaders often stoke. He also evaluates the function (as does Manby) of the sharia movement in the northern emirates. The moderation of sectarian violence will occur, writes Reno, when there is a credible capacity on the part of the federal and/or state governments to secure the cities and the countryside. Effective enforcement of the law is essential. But doing so will mean exercising political will by legitimate leaders and providing greater opportunities for effective political participation at all levels, with emphasis on the word effective. Curbing the small-arms trade would also help; AK-47s and other lethal light weapons are readily available and affordable throughout the country, as in so much of war-torn Africa. Again, however, providing public order is an immense task for a country still recovering from the trauma of arbitrary military rule and essentially lacking all trust in the fairness of governments at all levels. Ethnolinguistic groups, sectarian entities, and the vigilante assemblages that have emerged as both predators and protectors all thrive in the absence of that order and authority. If Nigeria is to prosper and grow it must channel or deter the violence that so threatens the viability of its return to democracy. It must also overcome myriad human rights concerns that undermine those democratic pursuits. Even given the major improvements in Nigeria’s

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 13

Troubled Nigeria

13

human rights record after 1999, especially the release of political prisoners, the operational freedom of the media and civil society, and open policy debates, there is still much to be accomplished. Accounting for the past, for one, is difficult given the failure of the government to release and publish the report of the official human rights commission of 2000–2002. Another is strengthening the legitimacy of the 1999 constitution, respect for which bears on a vibrant regard for the rule of law. In particular, notes Manby, the 1999 constitution fails to settle the question of internal citizenship—an issue that contributes significantly to episodes of local violence. Who has what rights is a constant concern in Africa, no less so in a society so restless and vibrant as Nigeria’s. The 1999 constitution guarantees freedom from discrimination on the basis of ethnic group, place of origin, gender, religion, and so on but also promises that government shall be conducted so as to reflect the federal character of the country. It implies the allocation of official positions in accord with the composition of the national population. But the constitution does not decide who is indigenous in a state or locality, and supposed indigeneity has been used in states to privilege one group over another, and thus to provoke violence. All democratic governments are obligated to enshrine the rights of their peoples freely to choose their own representatives. But Nigeria’s electoral system, especially at the state assembly level if not also at the national level, has thus far delivered less than free and fair results. Kew provides an extensive catalog of the innumerable errors of the 2003 poll at several levels and he shows how fraud may have been introduced and by whom. Manby is equally critical of the lack of transparency during the run-up to the elections; of the lack of independence of the Independent National Electoral Commission; of the trickery and disorder that characterized the registration of voters prior to the election; and of the ballot-stuffing, lack of secrecy, disfranchisement of potential voters, harassment, and widespread intimidation that punctuated the polling days themselves. The lack of an accepted constitutional framework, the decay of public institutions, electoral weaknesses, and leadership failings all fuel intercommunal violence and human rights abuses. The collapse of the country’s criminal justice system (as opposed to the constitutional adjudications that Suberu praises), and effective impunity for the use of violence, contribute to a culture in which those behaviors are sanctioned. Arbitrary arrests and prolonged incarceration without trial—pretrial detainees comprise 70 percent of the entire prison population—only intensify the Nigerian people’s prevailing distrust of their justice system. So do long, multiyear delays in hearing cases and rendering judgments. The introduction of sharia for criminal offenses in twelve northern states further reflects the collapse of

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 14

14

Crafting the New Nigeria

the state justice system and a grass-roots frustration at the unresponsiveness of the nation’s security and justice mechanisms. Manby calls attention, too, to international silence about human rights abuses in democratic Nigeria. Her chapter discusses the Odi incident in Bayelsa State, Jukun-Tiv conflict, the government’s failure to take action against military violators of civilian human rights in Benue State, the continuing conflict in the Niger Delta and the claims of the south-south zone, and the government’s inability to prevent or bring to justice politically motivated killings during the 2003 elections. The Plateau State battles between Christians and Muslims over land took place in 2004. Together, the contributors offer a cautionary tale. There are disagreements among some of the authors about how Nigeria should or can best pursue reforms, but none are complacent. Each is aware of the upside potential and is just as cognizant of the dangers to Nigeria and Africa if continued internal conflict prevails instead of strengthened order. Tukur prescribes much better leadership. Kew calls for specific electoral reforms, looking ahead to 2007. Paden, Sklar, and Suberu favor adjusting the federal-state balance, the better to accommodate pressures from below and demands for greater revenue equity. Indeed, it is the widely perceived but not necessarily universally shared illegitimacy of the current federal-state nexus that is fundamental to much of the country’s troubling separatism, sectarianism, and strife. The manner in which the center governs, provides a high degree of order and fairness, and consults with other tiers of administration and its peoples obviously will influence the extent to which Nigeria will and can achieve its positive potential, or will fail. Likewise, Nigeria needs to harness its abundant petroleum revenues for the greater good of its peoples and the nation. If it can—and Lewis and Utomi point the way forward—and if Nigeria really can achieve the kind of management and decisionmaking transformations that are called for, then many of the vast country’s other problems will be subsumed, and Africa’s largest nation will truly be a beacon of hope for the continent. Notes 1. World Bank, “Nigeria Data Profile,” 2003. 2. For the concept of nation-state failure, see Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, 2004), 1–45. 3. See Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC, 2003), 3–4. 4. “Nigeria Expels The Economist: A Reporter’s Tale,” Economist, February 28, 2004.

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 15

Troubled Nigeria

15

5. This book emanates from a far-ranging meeting in late 2002 and distills much of the passionate discussion there about Nigeria’s challenges and opportunities. The meeting was sponsored by the World Peace Foundation and the Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard University. The chapters in this book derive from some of the papers delivered at the meeting, but all are much revised in light of subsequent events. One could not have been written until after the elections of 2003. The chapter on HIV/AIDS was also prepared subsequent to the meeting. 6. The very number of nationalities within Nigeria is controversial, and 350 is more accepted by scholars than it is an official figure. Likewise, since census-taking is a politically charged exercise, Nigeria’s population of 130 million is an estimate that probably seriously undercounts the true number of Nigerians. Extrapolations from the 1953 census, the federation’s last well-accepted enumeration, would give Nigeria many more than 130 million, with vastly more southerners than the 40 percent of the total that they are now said to comprise. 7. Richard L. Sklar, “Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question, Chapter 3, this volume. 8. Rotimi T. Suberu, “Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment,” Chapter 4, this volume. 9. Ibid. 10. Peter M. Lewis, “Getting the Politics Right: Governance and Economic Failure in Nigeria,” Chapter 6, this volume. 11. Nigeria has launched a number of investigations into prevailing corruption within state and national governments, and there have been scandal-provoking hearings. Additionally, in 2004 Nigeria began investigating at a high level allegations that the Kellogg, Brown & Root subsidiary of Halliburton, the Texas oil-services company once headed by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, had paid $180 million in bribes to land a contract to construct a $4 billion liquefied natural gas plant. Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was investigating. New York Times, February 7, 2004. 12. In 2004, the Nigerian high court began hearing a case against five indigenous defendants accused of bilking a Brazilian into paying millions. The press called the event the world’s largest scam; it was certainly among the more successful attempts by Nigerians to persuade foreigners to buy nonexistent assets, usually after an initial Internet or e-mail contact. Nigerians seem to have perfected the socalled 419 method of stealing money, after the clause in the Nigerian penal code that specifically prohibits conning victims in this way. See Boston Globe, February 22, 2004. 13. Patrick Utomi, “Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse: Can It Be Achieved?” Chapter 7, this volume. 14. Olusegun Obasanjo, “Preface,” in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement (Washington, DC, 2002), xvi–xvii. 15. Mahmud M. Tukur, “Needed: Better Leadership,” Chapter 12, this volume. 16. See Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States,” 1–45.

Rotberg-1.Final 12/17/04 4:30 PM Page 16

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 17

2 Unity with Diversity: Toward Democratic Federalism John N. Paden

Between the end of military rule in Nigeria in 1999—the establishment of a Fourth Republic—and the undertaking of civilian-to-civilian elections in April 2003, important issues and precedents emerged regarding democratic federalism. This chapter assesses patterns of federal-state-local relations within the emerging three-tier structure during this period, as a way of highlighting major challenges facing the new administration (2003–2007). Yet perspective on the larger context is also useful. Hence, this chapter focuses on (1) the nature of Nigerian federalism since independence; (2) the evolution of a states system in Nigeria; and (3) politics and federal character in Nigeria. In addition, there are the 1999–2003 era issues of (4) disbursements and budgets; (5) states’ rights and criminal law; and (6) future alternatives.1 Basically, the return to civilian rule in 1999, after fifteen years of centralized military rule plus an oil-driven economy, posed the challenge of how to decentralize Nigeria without moving to partition, or to those variations of confederation that might foreshadow partition. A political compromise is clearly some form of democratic federalism, although what such federalism will look like in the Nigerian context is a matter of ongoing debate.2 These developments in Nigeria have occurred within a global context marked by a general increase in democratic participation, an interconnected global economy in which comparative advantage rewards small as well as large units, the decentralizing impact of information technologies on forms of human organization, and, since September 2001, new forms of security cooperation across levels (from international, to national, state, and local) in which first responders are often most effective at the grassroots. Less 17

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 18

18

Crafting the New Nigeria

obvious, but equally important, has been the megatrend that crosscuts these other issues: the evolution and/or implementation of forms of federalism as a way of decentralizing political power and locating decisions at local or subnational levels, on the one hand, and providing a template for newer types of transnational regional organizations within a global context on the other. Most often this decentralization occurs within the existing national state system. Yet even the partition option is no longer taboo. The friendly divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia now finds both countries working within a European framework. The chaos of the Yugoslavia model is a reminder that most partition models are violent, and the extensive list of civil wars at any given time is a reminder of the human costs of partition. Still, various niche linkages within the global economy have inspired some theorists to look forward to a world of a thousand nations, many of them small but viable.3 As a countertrend, many oil-producing nations remain highly centralized, even authoritarian, as oil revenues tend to follow trickle-down patterns and there is a political premium on access to central power. As the example of Norway shows, however, an oil economy can also coexist with a more egalitarian state, with equitable national distribution of resource wealth. Federal models are an increasing phenomenon, whether in name or in practice, as a way of accommodating diversity with unity. From whence do these models come? The idea of federalism was hammered out in the United States in the wake of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when the Federalists—including Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay—wrote a series of eighty-five essays known as The Federalist Papers. At the time, those essays defended the idea of a federal government against the voices of those who would have reposed almost all powers at the subnational state level. Those debates about the balance of decisionmaking powers across levels, according to some scholars, constitute America’s most important contribution to political theory.4 The British indirect rule system of colonialism, which often became the basis for postindependence federalism, was in part a method of ethnic identity management, seldom followed strict ethnic boundaries, and more often was a tactic for divide and rule. In many cases, such as Nigeria, ethnic groups were intentionally divided so that interethnic strife would remain at local rather than national levels. The 1994 constitution of South Africa, with its three-tier federalism and mechanisms of power-sharing through proportional representation, stands less as a monument to an earlier British legacy, and more to hard bargaining between various sectors in South Africa, plus international encouragement. (Needless to add, it is not built around the discredited homeland system, in which ethnic identities were the major criterion for creating autonomous regions.)

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 19

Unity with Diversity

19

In almost all cases of the more recent constitutions, the legal drafters tended to focus on lengthy provisions covering a variety of contingencies, quite unlike the brevity of the U.S. Constitution at 10 pages. South Africa’s constitution is 150 pages. India may hold the record (its constitution has swelled to 500 pages), although in many ways the parallel between federalism in India and Nigeria merits further study, especially the autonomy and policing authority in the Indian provinces. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with 160 pages of provisions, closely follows the 1979 Nigerian constitution and outlines the structures and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments.5 An Assessment of Nigerian Federalism It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the history of Nigerian federalism. A recent report by the World Bank provides a useful reference, as indicated in Table 2.1.6 It must be emphasized that military federalism is a contradiction in terms, since all major state and local appointments came from above, not from below, and there was hardly any evidence of decentralization of decisionmaking powers. Hence, the military periods from 1966 to 1979 and 1984 to 1999 must be excluded as experiments in federalism, even though much of the current state-level reorganization took place during those periods, and a new federal capital territory was established (Abuja) in the center of the country. Indeed, during these periods, the political culture of Nigeria hardened into a strong centralized system. Yet, during the more limited civilian periods (1960–1966, 1979–1983) certain patterns and expectations were established. They may be more relevant to the recent period of transition to democratic federalism (1999 to the present). Table 2.1 The Search for a Viable Federation Year

Number of Regions or States

Extent of Regional or State Autonomy

Regime Type

1914 1954 1963 1967 1976 1979 1991 1996 1999

2 3 4 12 19 19 30 36 36

very high very high high low low medium low very low medium and rising

colonial colonial democratic military military democratic military military democratic

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 20

20

Crafting the New Nigeria

In the First Republic (1960–1966), regionalism was strong and the center weak, with a parliamentary model at regional and national levels. The transition to a republican model in 1963 led to some confusion about the roles of prime minister versus president. Traditional leaders still had strong influence, even as power shifted away from them to the regional level, including a shift of police powers away from local control.7 The political coalition between the north and east began to unravel in 1964, and political crises emerged in the west during the 1964–1965 elections. A junior officer led a set of assassinations and an unsuccessful coup, which led to reprisals, and to the Biafran attempted secession and civil war (1967–1970). In the Second Republic (1979–1983), a U.S.-style presidential model was initiated but with strong state autonomy emerging. Again, there was a national coalition between north and east, with a weak center. As oil revenues increased, this period witnessed the beginnings of a shift from Lagos to a new Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. There were messy elections after one term, a breakdown of credibility, and returning political problems in the southwest. A palace military coup was undertaken by senior officers. In the Third Republic (1993; aborted), the constitutional design was again based on a U.S. presidential-federal model, with two parties (left-center and right-center). The 1993 elections were partially canceled but with clear evidence for a southwest-northeast–dominant coalition, even though the results were annulled. Again, there was sustained turmoil in the southwest. In the Fourth Republic (1999 to the present) there is a presidentialfederal model, constitutionally based on a separation-of-powers concept— executive, legislative, judicial—rather than on the strong presidential model evident in both France and Russia.8 In 1999, the major issue was the transition from military to civilian rule. There was support for the winning coalition from five of the six zones, all except the southwest. (The selection of both major party candidates from the southwest in 1999 was seen as a concession to the political marginalization of the southwest, not only as a result of the annulled 1993 election, but also the shift of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja.) This winning coalition appeared to come apart after the 1999 elections, as the democracy dividend only partially materialized, and strong tensions developed between the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, states’ rights advocates set up sharia law in the criminal domain in the twelve northern states. The federal government was now fully based in the new Federal Capital Territory at Abuja. With most government revenues coming in through the federal level—a result of oil royalties—a set of issues arose about the proper balance of state and local authority versus federal authorities. The current presidential-federal model, with federal character balances enshrined in the constitution, questions the roles of the thirty-six states as

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 21

Unity with Diversity

21

surrogates for regional and subregional identities within the federal-level establishment. Although the six-zone formula for representation has never been legally articulated, it continues to play a major role in the political coalition-building.9 A number of challenges persist. First, overcentralization, a result of the oil and military rule legacies since the Second Republic, tends to provoke counterpressures for decentralization, confederation, even partition. Since political coalitions are weak or shifting, it is still the military that guarantees the integrity of the country. The shift from a federal capital as military command-and-control center to a civilian federal capital has not been made effectively. There is a clear need to improve the balance in the three-tier federal structure. The role of the federalized police is problematic in some situations where state and local security first responders are from a different party or faction from the president or simply are incapable of serving and protecting local populations. Also, since most revenues come from oil and gas at the national level, the distribution formula to states and local governments is still not in political balance, especially in the oil-producing areas. (The Land Use Decree, whereby all subsoil minerals, including oil, belong to all the people of Nigeria, not just those from the area, is incorporated into the 1999 constitution and would be difficult to change without going through the arduous task of amendment.) Finally, the presidency is turning itself into more of a French Fifth Republic model—as designed by General Charles de Gaulle—rather than a checks-and-balances model. That pits the federal legislature against the federal executive, especially on budget issues. The challenge remains of finding a balance between overcentralization at the federal level and within the executive presidency. Second, the weak role of the judiciary is partly a result of long-term military rule. Political interpretations of the constitution tend to be worked out through power politics rather than by judicial precedent. The issue of multiple legal systems at different levels of government would ideally be handled in ways that strengthen institutional and legal capacities rather than undermine them. Third, crime and corruption issues undermine even well-meant efforts at good government. There is no obvious solution to this problem, other than leadership by example, since political culture in Nigeria has allowed for a wink-and-a-nod approach favoring high-ranking individuals over ordinary citizens. Consequently, local violations of law and order are endemic, which again raises the issue of a federalized police force, versus a community-service approach. There needs to be better training for security and police forces for conflict prevention and management at all levels. Fourth, national leadership, as distinct from state and local leadership, has tended to come from the military ranks, even in a civilianized or retired

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 22

22

Crafting the New Nigeria

military guise. A big challenge is how to encourage national civilian leadership that does not simply reflect regional political constituencies. Some of the provisions for a national base in federal elections try to deal with this issue, but there are still weaknesses in the political recruiting system. (The most common pool of candidates for high national office in the United States are state governors and vice presidents.) Finally, national elections have always been problematic in Nigeria, given the high stakes in a winner-take-all partisan environment, where preelection coalitions may dissolve in the aftermath of elections and personalities tend to dominate. Elections also give rise to the emergence of ethnic youth organizations with strong separatist tendencies and the use of terrorism to achieve their goals. The growth of such vigilante groups since the return to democratic federalism in 1999 is a potential Achilles’ heel in the experiment of civilian rule, not least because it seems to justify the federalizing of all police activities, lest the police be co-opted by local notables and interest groups.10 The Nature of an Evolving States System What is the appropriate role for states and local governments in the future of Nigerian federalism? There are two aspects of federalism in Nigeria: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal refers to the balance of federal character issues associated with the national state. Vertical refers to the relations between federal, state, and local levels. Much of the political energy in Nigeria in the post–civil war era has experimented with the nature of the component state system. The lopsided federalism of the First Republic, in which the north demographically dominated the federation, was modified during the run-up to the civil war to include six northern states and six southern states. Later, this was modified to include ten northern states and nine southern states. This set of nineteen was later transformed into twentyone, thirty, and thirty-six, all numbers divisible by three, which was necessary for political balancing. The nature of the component states is central to the type of horizontal federalism that is emerging. Given southern fears of the big three northern Muslim states—Sokoto, Kano, and Borno—General Ibrahim Babangida divided each of these units in his 1991 reorganization. Thus, Sokoto was divided into Sokoto and Birnin Kebbi, Kano into Kano and Jigawa, and Borno into Borno and Yobe. During the Abacha regime, Sokoto was further downsized by the excision of Zamfara. Yet, because of the transethnic nature of emirate states (not just Hausa and Fulani but also Nupe, Yoruba, and minorities) the resultant northern cluster of states was not so much ethnic in composition as bounded by other historical realities. There has been no effort to create a Hausa-speaking

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 23

Unity with Diversity

23

state in Nigeria, except perhaps in the imaginations of certain nonnorthern intellectuals. Likewise, in the southern states, after the First Republic, the division of states has not clustered Yoruba and Igbo into specific states but used other historical or city-state designations. Nor has there been any effort to balance the number of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo states, since the demographical numbers are disproportionate. Much of the pressure for new states has come from southern minorities (or from Middle Belt minorities) who have an ethnolinguistic base to their claims. In the 1996 review of claims to new states, there were a total of 72 requests for new states, 2,369 claims for local councils, and 286 claims for boundary adjustments. With the Abacha regime, the concept of horizontal federalism shifted to a zonal clustering of states within six broad geocultural zones. These six zones have been given geographical designations as surrogates for cultural groupings. (A partial exception has been the clustering of Borno with some of the northeastern emirate states in order to modify the emirate zone propensity for dominance. Also, the number of minorities in a frontier emirate area such as Adamawa is much larger than in most of the core emirate states.) In short, the federal components of Nigeria are not religious. They are not ethnic. They are an explicit cross-cutting of ethnic and religious lines, so that the ethnoreligious conflicts that may arise can be handled at the local and state levels before they become national crises. A six-zone model of geographical state clusters in Nigeria is based, historically, on a sense of political culture which includes the following components: (1) emirate states; (2) Borno and environs; (3) Middle Belt minorities; (4) Yoruba states; (5) Igbo states; and (6) southern minorities. (The first three are northern; the second three are southern.) To some extent, this follows the original assessment of the British colonial period, which became reified in part because of the policy of indirect rule. These component zones have certain cultural and/or historical characteristics that have profoundly affected Nigerian efforts at unity and democratic rule. The emirate states share the legacy of having been part of the Sokoto caliphal experience in the nineteenth century. Within the northern region of the twentieth century, they stretch from Sokoto in the west to Adamawa in the east and to Ilorin and Niger states in the south. They are, by definition, predominantly Muslim in their traditional political structures. In the twentieth century, they evolved into distinctive emirates (with an emir, or equivalent, as symbolic head of the unit). While Hausa language tends to predominate as a lingua franca, the emirate states are multilingual. Often there are traditional rivalries among these states (e.g., Kano and Sokoto, which fought in the 1890s). There are many occasions where the linguistic cluster does not act as a unified block. Yet within this zone, the sultan of Sokoto has special salience in spiritual matters.

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 24

24

Crafting the New Nigeria

Borno (and its environs), in the northeastern corner of Nigeria, is the oldest continuous Islamic community in sub-Saharan Africa (dating from the eleventh century) and has the same sort of recognizable Muslim authority structures as Sokoto. Yet, in the nineteenth century, when Sokoto jihadists tried to conquer Borno, there was a standoff, and Bornon resistance to Sokoto became part of the historical legacy. Within the far north, the delicate balance between Sokoto and Borno was an important feature of colonial rule, and an important challenge in the postindependence political coalition process. The dominant language group in Borno is Kanuri, although, like Sokoto, Borno is multilingual (increasingly with Hausa as a lingua franca). Other northerners refer to those from Borno as Beriberi, or Bornawa. The Middle Belt minorities, within the north, are a residual cluster consisting of a large number of smaller ethnolinguistic groups, many of whom have historically resisted the large scale Muslim political powers (e.g., Sokoto and Borno) of the savanna/horse culture zones. Some of these minorities have structured political systems, with leaders such as the Aku Uku of Wukari (Jukun), the Och’i Idoma (Idoma), the Atta of Igala, the Atta of Igbirra, and so on. Others, such as the Tiv, the Gbagyi (Gwari), the Dass area peoples, the Ningi, the Bachama, and others, are segmental societies without hierarchical structures. (In some cases, like the Tor Tiv, the British policy of indirect rule created central authorities.) In the nineteenth century, these minorities were traditional in their religious beliefs. In the twentieth century, there were increasing inroads by both Christian and Muslim groups.11 Hausa has come to be a language of wider communication among the Middle Belt minority groups. In the southwest, the fifty or so traditional Yoruba city-states share a common linguistic heritage, as well as a political culture in which the citystates have chiefs (obas) who tend to be symbolic in their powers, with decisionmaking powers often vested in a council of representatives from the various lineages. A common myth of origin traces back to Ile Ife, and much of the cosmology is similar. In the eighteenth century, many Yoruba city-states (except the Ijebu) were loosely united under Old Oyo. They were later split into four states (Oyo, Egba, Ketu, and Jebu). By 1850, after Sokoto’s conquest of Ilorin, four new states emerged (Ibadan, Ilesha, Ife, and Ekiti Parapo). With British conquest, more fragmentation occurred. At present, it is generally acknowledged that the Yoruba states are about half-Muslim and half-Christian, with strong traditional elements permeating both faiths. (Moreover, there have been close intrafamily ties between Christian and Muslim adherents.) Notably, the emirate state of Ilorin (in the north) is predominantly Yoruba and hence indicative of an important overlap in cultural zones. In the southeast, the Igbo states share a common linguistic identity, as well as a political culture based on decentralized village structures (including age grade and gender grade associations). There are numerous locational identities, but the important descriptors are extended families and clan groupings. During the independence era, many of the Igbo political

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 25

Unity with Diversity

25

factions have associated themselves with dominant groups in the north and hence have been part of governing coalitions. However, the Biafran secession movement/Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) underscored the ambiguity of Igbo participation in Nigerian political life. The southern minorities cluster, as a residual zone, includes large ethnolinguistic groups, such as the Edo of Benin, with its powerful history along the Guinea coast, as well as a number of midwest and eastern groups, such as the Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, Ogoni, and others. Politically, such groups have often been suspicious of their larger southern neighbors (Yoruba and Igbo) and often find themselves in coalition with northern political partners. (Much of the oil-producing area is located within this minorities cluster.) As mentioned earlier, this cultural zone model is only a proximate template for the six geographical zones that emerged in the 1990s but that still have no legal basis. Yet, significantly, when new states were created in 1996 during the Abacha period, at least one was from each of the six geographical zones. The states created in 1991 during the Babangida era also reflect an attempt at geographical balance. The eleven states created in 1976–1987 were intended to balance the general sense of north and south. (See Table 2.2, for characteristics of the thirty-six states, including date of creation, and number of Local Government Authorities/LGAs.) It is also clear that in the process of dividing up larger preexisting states a certain amount of turmoil was created as physical and human assets had to be adjusted accordingly. Insofar as military rulers have created most of the recent states, it is also fair to ask whether some of the same divideand-rule tactics used in the colonial era were also used by military rulers. Whatever the historical reality, clearly these thirty-six states, plus the Federal Capital Territory, are here to stay. Having reviewed the original characteristics of zones and states, the facts remain: (1) State boundaries are based on a mixture of cultural, historical, and geographical criteria; although some local problems and controversies persist, it will be next to impossible to change boundaries in a democratic system, given the constraints in the constitution; (2) the thirty-six states are a political reality and have taken on a life of their own; and (3) all Nigerians may take up residence in any state, and, increasingly, the major urban centers of all states are multiethnic, multireligious, and multiregional in their demographics. The urban migrant communities are often the pledges (and perhaps hostages) to the need for unity in Nigeria.12 It is important to evaluate the role of such old and new states in the political contests that have characterized the independence era. Politics and Federal Character in Nigeria The three-tier elections in late 1998 and early 1999, which ushered in the last regime, implemented a federal character electoral provision such that

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 26

Table 2.2 Characteristics of Nigerian States (by zone)

Date of Creation

LGAsa

Sokoto Zamfara Kebbi Kano Jigawa Katsina Kaduna

1976 1996 1991 1976 1991 1991 1946

23 14 21 44 27 34 23

(NW total: 186)

Borno Yobe Taraba Bauchi Gombe Adamawa

1967 1991 1991 1976 1996 1976

27 17 16 20 10 21

(NE total: 111)

Benue Kogi Kwara Nasarawa Plateau Niger

1976 1991 1967 1996 1967 1976

23 21 16 13 17 25

(MB total: 115)

Anambra Ebonyi Imo Enugu Abia

1991 1996 1976 1946 1991

21 13 27 17 17

(SE total: 95)

Bayelsa Cross River Delta Edo Rivers Akwa Ibom

1996 1967 1991 1963 1967 1987

32 19 21 18 23 31

(SS total: 144)

Ekiti Lagos Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo

1996 1976 1976 1987 1991 1946

16 20 18 18 30 33

(SW total: 135)

Zone

State

Northwest

Northeast

Middle Belt

Southeast

South-South

Southwest

Zones: Total and Average LGAs, 1999–2003

(NW aver.: 27)

(NE aver.: 18.5)

(MB aver.: 19.2)

(SE aver.: 19)

(SS aver.: 24)

(SW aver.: 22.5)

Source: World Bank, Nigeria, 67. Notes: a. Number of local government authorities.

Dominant Political Party APP APP APP & PDP PDP APP PDP PDP APP & PDP APP PDP PDP PDP & APP PDP PDP APP APP PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP APP & PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP PDP AD AD AD AD AD AD

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 27

Unity with Diversity

27

for president a successful candidate was required to have not less than onequarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.13 The Nigerian idea of federal character is based on a formula of parity between the thirty-six states in virtually all areas, from elections to executive appointments. The Federal Character Commission is constitutionally mandated to accept one person to represent each of the states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory and to “work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assembly for the distribution of all . . . posts in the public service of the Federation and the states, the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force and other government security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the States; (b) promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government.”14 Clearly, there was a historic local incentive for the creation of states in terms of access to budget allocations and in representation in all executive branches. But the rush to statehood, often devised as a management mechanism by military regimes, left considerable disparity of strength between the states, and, in fact, consolidated national control over the states since during military periods all appointments were made by the central command. As mentioned earlier, the geographic zonal balance was important both locally and nationally. In the 1998–1999 elections, the three major political parties—People’s Democratic Party (PDP), All-People’s Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD)—put various coalitions together depending on the level of the election. Hence, some states might have different patterns at the state and local levels, as distinct from the national-level elections. Since these coalitions were all put together hastily, given the perceived need for the rapidity of a military-civilian transition, it is difficult to put too fine an analysis on the zonal voting blocks, other than to note that the PDP was dominant in five of the six zones. This clearly obscures some historic voting patterns, which have distinctive zonal- and state-level characteristics.15 A World Bank report on state and local and local governance in Nigeria provides a summary of the state party patterns, which can be arranged by zones, and dates of state creation as shown in Table 2.2.16 With the AD dominant in the six southwest states, and the APP dominant in some of the northwest and northeast states, the remainder are strongly PDP. Even in the northwest, Kano and Katsina (PDP) balance Sokoto and Zamfara (APP). In the northeast, Yobe and to some extent Borno (APP) balance the traditional emirate states (PDP). While this pattern reflects personality politics (the APP vice presidential candidate was from Yobe and Sokoto, while the PDP candidate was from Adamawa), there were more enduring regional politics

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 28

28

Crafting the New Nigeria

reflected in these results, especially the strong PDP showing in the north, southeast, and south-south, with Kwara (APP) tilting toward the AD/southwest.17 The results of the 2003 elections showed that the major shift was in the southwest, from the AD party to the PDP (with the exception of Lagos), which added to the impression that the incumbent PDP had swept the field. Yet, election results in the southeast, south-south, and in parts of the north have been contested by the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and the twenty-eight minor parties, and election tribunals were activated to adjudicate these matters.18 In the north, the major shift at the gubernatorial level was in Kano state, from PDP to ANPP. The sharia issue in the criminal domain in the twelve far northern states—which cross-cut all three northern zones—was an issue of both local and national salience.19 Federal Disbursements and State Budgets Since 1999, the federal-state conundrum has been evident in many specific issue areas. Two critical ones are: (1) federal disbursements and state budgets; and (2) states’ rights and criminal law (including sharia and the role of the police). Regarding federal disbursements and state budgets, the 1999 Constitution is clear: The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles especially those of population, equality of States, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density. Provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formulas as being not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources. . . . [Sect. 162.2] Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in each State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. . . . [Sect. 162.3] Each State shall maintain a special account to be called State Joint Local Government Account into which shall be paid all allocations to local councils of the State from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State. [Sect. 162.6] The Federation may make grants to a State to supplement the revenue of that State in such sum and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. [Sect. 164.1]

The constitution is clear on the basic formula for distributing block grants to states, even though there are controversies regarding related matters. The most notable of these is a 13 percent budget provision for those

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 29

Unity with Diversity

29

states (largely from the south-south) where oil and gas are found. The question of crediting offshore oil revenues to national or state accounts was contentious. Yet in 2002, prior to the political party congresses, the decision was made by President Obasanjo to credit the offshore oil to the oilproducing states. This decision was politically popular in the south-south but was protested in high population density states such as Kano, with its extremely high number (forty-four) of Local Government Areas (LGAs). More fundamental is the basic issue of who has rights to the gas and oil. Since the land use decree giving all subsoil minerals to the federal state is incorporated into the 1999 constitution, any change would require an unlikely constitutional amendment. However, since the National Assembly has the power to supplement the basic formula of block grants, there is room for political compromise without changing the constitution. An equally contentious issue linked to block-grant distribution guidelines is the distribution of population by state. At present, it is still based on the 1991 census. A census was planned for a ten-year follow-up, especially given the state creation process since 1991, but no census has occurred. Given the exact demarcation of LGAs within each state, incorporated as part of the 1999 constitution, this has not been as problematic as might have been expected since the LGAs can become an indicator of population clusters. Also, since political tensions have accompanied every census in Nigerian history, this issue is not easily resolved. Given the problems of voter registration in late 2002, the basic challenge of counting population— a fundamental part of federal distribution of budget resources and voting— remains to be resolved. A more basic concern to most Nigerian officials at the state and local levels is the actual disbursement of federal funds. Whatever the national formula, if funds do not reach state-local accounts in a straightforward, professional manner, the entire enterprise of federalism is jeopardized, not to mention any hope of grassroots infrastructural development and services. Given the national oil based economy in Nigeria, the politics of trickledown funding is always open to abuse. Since disbursements to states by the federal government are a matter of public record, it is appropriate to present the official version of such funding in Table 2.3.20 It is clear from Table 2.3 that the total disbursements from June 1999 to May 2002 are weighted heavily in favor of the south-south states, especially the oil-producing states of Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom. The average disbursement in the six south-south states is N52.6 billion (naira), which is almost twice the amount per state disbursed to the other five non–oil-producing zones. Considering that the average number of LGAs in the south-south is twenty-four per state, and a high-density state such as Kano has forty-four LGAs, this disbursement pattern is even more clearly tilted toward oil-producing states. Needless to say, this is a reflection

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 30

Table 2.3 Disbursement of Federal Funds to States, 1999–2002 (by zone, in billions naira) Zone (plus total & average) Northwest (NW total: 213) (aver.: 30.4)

Northeast (NE total: 152) (aver.: 25.3)

Middle Belt (MB total: 158) (aver.: 26.3)

Southeast (SE total: 128) (aver.: 25.5)

South-South (SS total: 316) (aver.: 52.6)

Southwest (SW total: 195) (aver.: 32.4)

Total

State

Governor

1999 (June– Dec.) 2000

2001

2002 (Jan.– May)

Total

Sokoto Zamfara Kebbi Kano Jigawa Katsina Kaduna

Attahiru Bafarawa Ahmed Sani Adamu Aleiro Rabiu Kwankwaso Saminu Turaki Umaru Musa Yar’adua Ahmed Moh. Makarfi

4.5 4.0 4.2 6.7 4.7 5.6 6.1

7.7 6.8 7.4 11.4 8.1 9.7 10.3

10.5 9.9 10.3 16.2 11.1 12.5 13.5

3.9 3.7 3.8 6.1 4.1 4.6 5.0

26.6 24.5 25.9 40.5 28.1 32.5 34.9

Borno Yobe Taraba Bauchi Gombe Adamawa

Malla Kachalla Bukar Abba Joly Nyame Ahmad Adamu Mu’azu Abubakar Hashidu Boni Haruna

2.7 4.1 4.2 2.5 3.6 2.4

9.1 7.1 7.3 8.1 6.2 7.8

12.5 10.3 10.0 11.5 8.9 10.8

4.6 3.9 3.7 4.3 3.3 4.0

29.0 25.5 25.4 25.2 22.1 25.0

Benue Kogi Kwara Nasarawa Plateau Niger

George Akume Abubakar Audu Moh. Lawal Abdullahi Adamu Joshua Dariye Abdulkadir Kure

2.7 4.3 4.1 3.6 4.3 5.1

8.9 7.5 7.2 6.3 7.3 8.8

12.2 10.7 9.6 8.7 10.2 11.8

4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.8 4.3

28.4 26.7 24.6 22.0 25.6 30.2

Anambra Ebonyi Imo Enugu Abia

Chinwoke Mbadinuju Sam Egwu Achike Udenwa Chimaroki Nnamani Orji Kalu

2.4 3.5 4.3 3.9 2.1

7.7 6.0 8.8 6.7 7.6

10.9 9.3 12.8 9.9 11.2

4.1 3.6 4.4 3.8 4.0

25.2 22.5 30.5 24.5 24.9

Bayelsa Cross River Delta Edo Rivers Akwa Ibom

Diepreye Alamieyseigha Donald Duke James Ibori Lucky Igbinedion Peter Odili Victor Attah

2.3 2.3 3.2 2.3 6.1 2.9

17.8 7.5 27.6 8.0 20.5 22.0

26.2 10.1 41.2 10.4 29.9 34.3

6.9 3.7 10.8 3.9 8.4 8.6

53.4 23.7 83.0 24.8 64.9 65.9

Ekiti Lagos Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo

Adeniyi Adebayo Bola Tinubu Segun Osoba Adebayo Adefarati Bisi Akande Lam Adesina

1.9 9.4 4.7 4.5 4.3 5.4

6.3 14.0 8.1 11.7 7.5 9.3

8.5 19.6 10.8 17.1 9.9 12.7

3.1 7.3 3.9 5.3 3.6 4.7

19.9 50.5 27.7 38.7 25.4 32.3

90.9

351.5

495.4 170.2 1,108.1

Note: Gross allocation of revenue: statutory, VAT, excess crude & GSM proceeds.

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 31

Unity with Diversity

31

of the constitutional provision for 13 percent additional funds to oil-producing states based on the principle of derivation. But these patterns may be a corrective to the widespread perception that the oil-producing states are otherwise being neglected. States’ Rights and Criminal Law In 2000, the governor of Zamfara State implemented legislation that had been authorized by the state assembly establishing sharia law in the criminal domain, applicable to all Muslims in the state. This enactment was based on two interpretations of the 1999 constitution: (1) The precedent for dual (or multiple) legal systems based on Muslim affiliation was clearly established in the domain of civil law (i.e., family law, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance) as per the 1979 and 1999 constitutions; and (2) legislation that was not specifically prohibited in the 1999 constitution, and which was a matter of state-level concern, was appropriate for state-level action provided that it did not contravene fundamental constitutional rights. Subsequently, eleven other far northern states also passed some form of sharia criminal law, applicable to Muslims only. It should be noted that some aspects of the sharia legislation, such as banning alcohol and prostitution, were applied to all citizens in those states that held to a stricter interpretation of the law.21 The legacy of sharia law in northern Nigeria has always been based on the Maliki school of jurisprudence. During the colonial period (1903–1960) the British indirect rule system kept the Maliki system at the emirate level but modified it in terms of certain punishments (e.g., amputation and stoning) that were regarded as repugnant. This modified Maliki system was in place until the reforms of 1959, when criminal laws were consolidated into a northern regional code, in preparation for national independence in 1960. At that point, a dual legal system was set up in the northern region, distinguishing between Maliki law in the civil sphere (for Muslims only) and criminal law in the common domain, with emirates losing virtually all of their legal powers. The key figure in the First Republic northern region legal system was Abubakar Gumi, who served as Grand Kadi. Since he also served as a key liaison with Saudi Arabia, the stage was set for a reevaluation of the historic legacies of both the Maliki and Sufi traditions in northern Nigeria. Increasingly, Gumi focused on going back to the original sources in the Quran and was one of the first to interpret the Quran into the Hausa language. Until his death in 1992, he served as a symbol for challenging the cultural legacies of Islam in northern Nigeria, insisting on a reformation that was Quranic-based. Many of the younger generation of educated northerners became his loyal students, and Kaduna, as capital of the northern

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 32

32

Crafting the New Nigeria

region and a new city, became identified with his Jama’at izalat al-bida’ wa-iqamat al-Sunna (Movement to Eradicate Innovation and Restore True Belief, known as Izala). Since Gumi was also a key link to the Saudis— intellectually and through the pilgrimage—this bond had the effect of strengthening Nigerian ties to the custodian of the holy places and weakening ties to the traditional West African roots of Islamic culture. The Saudi jurisprudential system follows the Hanbali, rather than the Maliki, school. During the long periods of military rule, the issue of sharia was largely dormant. The transition to the Second Republic in 1979 did see heated debate and a compromise on the sharia civil law issues. With the return to civilian elections in fall 1998, Ahmad Sani, the APP candidate for governor of Zamfara State, ran on a platform of establishing sharia in all domains. On his inauguration, Zamfara became the first state to institute sharia law in the criminal domain. The published statute was clearly a mixture of several different sources of Islamic jurisprudence.22 Since each of the twelve northern states had to pass its own version of sharia law, the key questions are the interpretations in each state, the processes of consulting with the learned Islamic legal scholars, and the appeals processes. Zamfara has earned the reputation of being hard-line in its interpretations of the law and its punishments, while states such as Kaduna apply a light touch, and then only in the predominantly Muslim LGAs. (As of 2004, Kano was the only state, based on the principle of consensus by the learned scholars, that explicitly linked theft with embezzlement by public servants. In other states, this category usually came under public trust provisions, which carried lighter penalties.) As the patterns of the twelve sharia state interpretations emerge, several contextual patterns may be relevant. First, the more recent states— Zamfara, Kebbi, Gombe, and Jigawa (those created in 1991 and 1996, often carved out of the larger traditional emirates)—have less historic experience with the scholarship and interpretation of sharia law and may be more inclined to be more eclectic in their mixture of jurisprudential principles. Second, Sokoto, Kano, and Borno (and Katsina) have special weight and standing due to their historic roles. Within this mix, Kano has been a center for Sufi learning, Borno for non-Sufi learning, and Sokoto a mixture of the Sufi and legal legacies. Kano and Sokoto have been historic rivals, although Sokoto always has pride of place as the capital established in the early nineteenth century by the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate, which included all of the twelve sharia states except Borno and Yobe. Third, Kaduna is clearly a twentieth-century political hub, but without historic roots (other than Zaria emirate in the northern portion of the state) and is currently a major center for Izala thinking, with its emphasis of going back to the Quran for guidance on legal and other matters. And fourth, all twelve states have significant populations of non-Muslim migrants, especially from southern

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 33

Unity with Diversity

33

Nigeria, who are frequently located in new towns within the major cities. During the colonial and postcolonial eras, non-Muslim populations were not subject to Muslim law. As of January 2003, when the major political party conventions were held in Nigeria, the timing of the electoral cycle had already led to competition within and between the two major parties in the north, PDP and APP, including (especially at the local level) interpretations of the sharia issue. The PDP and APP were about equally divided in strength in the twelve northern sharia states. Thus, the APP states included Jigawa, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. The PDP states included Bauchi, Niger, Kaduna, Kano, and Katsina. The states that were about equally divided included Borno, Gombe, and Kebbi. In general, the public political perspectives in the Muslim north seem to divide into four categories: (1) those that prefer a secularist, progressive/modernist approach to politics, including separation of religion and politics, but allowing the option of sharia law in the civil domain, like family law and inheritance; (2) those that prefer an increased linkage of religion and politics, including full implementation of sharia in criminal and civil domains, at the state level, for Muslims only; (3) those that see the problems of implementing sharia in the contemporary Nigerian system, especially in a multireligious context, but still hold sharia as an ideal; and (4) those that criticize the current implementation of sharia as flawed, due to corrupt practices and political favoritism. In each of these cases, there is a recognition that sharia is a powerful goal, even when there are ongoing debates about what it means. If and when the issues of states’ rights in the criminal domain (including sharia laws) are tested and challenged through constitutional review procedures, clearly the sharia states attorneys-general will argue that: They are not establishing a state religion, but continuing the legacy of dual systems, depending on religious affiliation; the system does not apply to nonMuslims, and hence non-Muslims do not have standing in the appeals process; due process has been followed at the state level in setting up such laws; and the penalty phase, especially in capital crimes, does not violate indigenous norms of justice, despite colonial era modifications. The counterarguments will depend on the particular case, but the issues will probably involve matters of vigilante justice; due process in terms of women’s rights in the legal process; processes of appeal; the cruel and unusual nature of some penalties; the apparent conflict with certain constitutional provisions, such as the right of individuals to change religion; and whether some states have overstepped their writ, such as in matters of issuing fatwas.23 In the end, a central question is how the states’ rights approach to the criminal law domain will emerge from the federal legal system, and indeed

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 34

34

Crafting the New Nigeria

whether such a fragile national system can accommodate the cross-currents of multiple perspectives on these matters. The framers of Zamfara’s sharia code tried to be careful not to violate the antiestablishment of religion clause in the constitution by focusing state legislation on the criminal code and using the precedent of the sharia civil code in applying the new code to Muslims only. The first round of legal protests, often by non-Muslim nongovernmental organizations, failed partly because the defendants did not have standing. The current round of appeals, many of which involve cases of theft or adultery, have attracted closer legal scrutiny at the appeals court level, and many lower court decisions have been reversed. The constitution of 1999 has several provisions that might be referenced if this federal-state conundrum reaches the Supreme Court, including Fundamental Rights (chapter 4), plus sections on the scope of police and the judiciary and the whole area of states’ rights. In some sharia states apostasy is an offense, even though the constitution (sec. 38) says that “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief.” By late 2002, all twelve sharia states were dropping any prosecution of apostasy cases, although earlier some cases were brought to the sharia courts. At the same time, the constitution of 1999 clearly establishes the federal police as the only legitimate police force, unlike most federal governments, which also allow for police capacities at state and local levels. Clearly, this vacuum at the state and local levels is being filled throughout the federation by statesanctioned vigilante groups, often youth groups with only a modicum of oversight. (Indeed, federal police in Nigerian states live in separate barracks and are exempt from the alcohol ban by local authorities. Many police do not even speak the local languages. This is hardly a positive recipe. As is all too clear, when the police fail to quell local disturbances, the army tends to be called in, which immediately makes the conflict a federal issue.) Some effort at interpreting the constitution seems to be in order to allow for more direct control of police at the state and local levels so that the federal government is not the only police authority to handle local matters. At present, half of the members of the Supreme Court are Muslim, and several are learned in sharia law. But the larger issue is how to solve this states’ rights issue politically before it destabilizes the federation. The compromise of the Penal Reform Laws in Northern Nigeria in 1959 provides a precedent as to how political leadership can mediate a solution, taking into account local needs but recognizing a national interest.24 Future Alternatives The major alternatives facing any large pluralistic country, in terms of political organization, are centralization, federalism, or partition. I argue

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 35

Unity with Diversity

35

that overcentralization, a legacy of military rule, and an oil economy will require special attention to creating a more effective balance between the three tiers of government, in order to achieve unity with diversity. The partition option has been tried in Nigeria (during the civil war) with disastrous consequences. Future attempts at partition might lead to renewed military rule. Furthermore, the modern world is no longer characterized by closed political or economic systems within nation-states. The flow of peoples, ideas, technologies, and goods and services makes it possible for people to vote with their feet if local conditions are too oppressive or economic opportunities denied. One consequence of military regimes in Nigeria has been to create incentives for Nigerians to emigrate. With the return to civilian rule in 1999, some Nigerians have returned, although the perils of overcentralization and/or partition still loom large. The key is to achieve balance between the three levels. This is the major challenge of the current political administration. Notes 1. For details, see Rotimi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC, 2001). 2. For an example of such debate, see Itse Sagay, “Reordering Nigerian Federalism: Making It More Confederal,” Chapter 5, and Mahmud M. Tukur, “Needed: Better Leadership,” Chapter 12, this volume. For a fuller explication of the latter, see Mahmud M. Tukur, Leadership and Governance in Nigeria: The Relevance of Values (Zaria, 1999). 3. See, for example, John Naisbitt, Global Paradox: The Bigger the World Economy, the More Powerful Its Smallest Players (New York, 1994). Thus, small states, such as Singapore or Qatar, may be more adaptive than larger states. 4. Alan Brinkley, Nelson W. Polsby, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, New Federalist Papers: Essays in Defense of the Constitution (New York, 1997), 2. 5. For recent trends toward decentralization in the U.K., see Tony Blair, “Preface,” White Paper on Devolution in Scotland and Wales (London, 1997). For Commonwealth examples, see Anthony DePalma, “Constitutions Are the New Writers’ Market,” New York Times, November 30, 1997. On May 5, 1999, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was promulgated by Decree No. 24 of the Federal Military Government (Apapa, Lagos, 1999). 6. World Bank, Nigeria: State and Local Governance in Nigeria (Washington DC, Report No. 24477-UNI, July 23, 2002), 7. 7. For a discussion of these First Republic patterns in the north, see John Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley, 1973); John Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Leadership and Values in Nigeria (London, 1986). 8. Increasingly, but not in this volume, the Fourth Republic is being termed the Third Republic since the 1993 transition from military to civilian rule did not occur at that time. 9. See Richard L. Sklar, “Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question,” Chapter 3, this volume.

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 36

36

Crafting the New Nigeria

10. See Tukur, Chapter 12, this volume. 11. See, for example, Niels Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in Middle Belt Christianity (New York, 1994). 12. For example, there are the tensions between Benue and Taraba States, resulting from Tiv and Jukun conflicts. “There shall be thirty-six States in Nigeria, that is to say . . . [names states]. Each State of Nigeria named in the first column of Part I of the First Schedule to this Constitution shall consist of the area shown opposite thereto in the second column of that Schedule.” Federal Military Government, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, chapter 1, part I.3 (1)–(2). See section 8 for complex processes of new states creation and boundary adjustments. There is no constitutional basis for a sons-of-the-soil requirement for residence in any state, whatever the local demographic legacies may suggest. See also Bronwen Manby, “Principal Human Rights Challenges,” Chapter 9, this volume. 13. Federal Military Government, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, sec. 133. Note: the constitution was not promulgated until May 5, 1999, but the provision for a federal character voting requirement was used throughout the transition to civilian rule. The author was part of a presidential election monitoring team in Kaduna City, February–March 1999, and was present in Abuja when the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) read the election results and confirmed the two-thirds of states provision. 14. Federal Military Government, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Third Schedule, part 1, section C, 7–8. 15. See John Paden, “National Unity and the Tensions of Democracy: GeoCultural Zones and North-South Legacies,” in Paul Beckett and Crawford Young (eds.), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (New York, 1997), 243–264. 16. World Bank, Nigeria, 67, app. B, “Characteristics of Nigerian States.” 17. See Richard Sklar, “Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question,” Chapter 3, this volume. 18. According to The Daily Trust, May 13, 2003, “The Buhari campaign organization has mounted an international campaign on the call by the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and 28 other political parties for the cancellation of the April 12 and 19 national elections . . . in Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States in the South-East; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Edo, Delta and Rivers States in the South-South, while elections results were manipulated or changed in favour of the ruling PDP in Ogun, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Plateau, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Katsina States and the FCT.” 19. The twelve far northern sharia states include: Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger, Borno, Yobe, and Kaduna. 20. See the cover story of the Nigerian journal, Analysis, vol. 1 (Lagos, August 2002), from which data in Table 2.3 are derived. 21. See also Bronwen Manby, “Principal Human Rights Challenges,” Chapter 9, this volume. 22. See Zamfara State of Nigeria, Shari’ah Penal Code Law (Zamfara, January 2000). 23. See, for example, “Nigerians Ordered to Ignore Death Call,” Washington Post, November 29, 2002: “Nigeria’s supreme Islamic body yesterday ordered Muslims to ignore a theological edict issued by a northern state calling for the death of a journalist whose article on the Miss World pageant sparked bloody riots. The Jamaatu Nasril Islam circulated its order a day after Christian leaders vowed that their followers would defend themselves by any means available after the sectarian clashes in the city of Kaduna killed more than 200 people. . . . Conservative Zamfara

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 37

Unity with Diversity

37

state issued the theological edict, or fatwa, against Isioma Daniel, a journalist in her early twenties, whose column on the Miss World pageant enraged Muslims. . . . ‘The Zamfara state government has no authority to issue fatwa and the fatwa issued by it should be ignored,’ the statement said. Only the Jamatu and the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, both headed by Nigeria’s powerful Islamic figurehead, the sultan of Sokoto, have the power to issue a fatwa, it said. The sultan had directed the fatwa committee of the two bodies to meet and deliberate on Daniel’s column, the statement said.” 24. See John Paden, “Judicial Reforms of 1959,” Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Leadership and Values in Nigeria (London, 1986).

Rotberg-2.Final 12/17/04 4:33 PM Page 38

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 39

3 Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question Richard L. Sklar

Nigerian political thinkers have long debated the merits of two rival approaches to their national identity. One view has maintained that ethnolinguistic identity should be recognized as the main legal basis for governmental institutions; another has resisted that idea. It was not until the 1990s, however, that this issue was given a specific name: the nationality question.1 In Nigerian political discourse, ethnolinguistic groups are known as nationalities. Linguists identify some 400 distinct languages in Nigeria. Historians estimate the number of ethnolinguistic groups to be in the vicinity of 350.2 A small but widely respected political group, namely Chief Anthony Enahoro’s Movement for National Reformation, contends that it would be appropriate to identify as few as seventy groups as genuine nationalities, but even that would still be a relatively large number. Three nationalities— Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo, in order of their widely assumed respective sizes—account for nearly 60 percent of the national population, now estimated to exceed 130 million. Other nationalities, as enumerated by historians and linguists, range in size from several thousand to several million. The concept of nationality is complex. While it signifies legal identity, on the one hand, it is also used to indicate cultural and political identities that are not legal, on the other. When posed in this form—“shall ethnolinguistic nationality be recognized as either ‘a’ or ‘the’ main legal basis for governmental institutions?”—the nationality question is pertinent to a wide range of constitutional and political issues. One example is the apparent constitutional requirement of parental descent for membership in a state or local authority; another is the debatable degree to which ethnolinguistic nationality should affect the demarcation of states in the federation.3 The 39

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 40

40

Crafting the New Nigeria

contending views of participants in current controversies relating to the nationality question are deeply rooted in Nigerian nationalist thought. Nationalist Origins of the Nationality Question Immediately after World War II, British colonial planners envisioned the construction of Nigerian national institutions on a foundation that would consist of suitably modified traditional governments of ethnolinguistic groups.4 Leaders of the nationalist resistance to colonial paternalism differed among themselves on both the political role of nationalities and the uses of traditional governments. The complex relationship between these two contentious matters may be illustrated with reference to the thought of the so-called Big Three politicians of the late colonial era: Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, and Ahmadu Bello. Awolowo, whose political career was identified with the Yoruba nationality movement in southwestern Nigeria, strongly favored the establishment of an ethnolinguistic foundation for national governmental institutions. Azikiwe, the foremost pan-Nigerian nationalist of the wartime and postwar eras whose career was also identified with the Igbo nationality movement in southeastern Nigeria, opposed Awolowo’s emphasis on ethnolinguistic autonomy. He did, however, favor the creation of a centralized commonwealth of Nigeria, consisting of eight geographical protectorates.5 By contrast with Azikiwe and Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, who personified the Hausa-speaking Muslim emirates of northern Nigeria, upheld the primacy of traditional authority in public life, provided such authority had been appropriately reformed to function effectively in modern times.6 His political perspective, unlike that of either Awolowo or Azikiwe, did not focus on the nationality question. Rather, he thought in terms of a multinational state controlled by his political party, not as a sole legal party but one that would be comprehensively dominant in the former Northern Region, which contained about 55 percent of the country’s population at the time of independence. His state-centered thinking, in opposition to Awolowo’s orientation toward ethnolinguistic nationality, produced one of the sharpest contrasts among Nigerian nationalists of the independence era. Today the spirit of Ahmadu Bello lives vigorously in the Muslim emirate sector of the northern part of the country. It is quite striking that the incumbent president, Olusegun Obasanjo, an Egba Yoruba, perpetuates the Azikiwe tradition that Nigerian nationality is transcendent and does not depend on ethnolinguistic identity. While President Obasanjo takes great pride in his ethnic heritage and traditional titles, jagunmolu and balogun, in the Egba and subordinate Owu kingdoms, respectively, he nonetheless believes in the legal independence of Nigerian

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 41

Unity or Regionalism

41

nationality and, for that reason, has referred to himself as a detribalized Nigerian. By contrast, Bola Ige, the late minister of justice and a devoted Awolowist, maintained that to be a good Nigerian one should first be a good member of one’s ethnic group. It should be noted that this difference of opinion marks a strictly intellectual issue, rather than a dividing line between ethnic groups. Thus the organized Igbo leadership, known as Ohanaeze Ndigbo, has adopted Awolowo’s belief in ethnolinguistic self-determination. This conclusion has been evident in the appearance of an informal alliance between Ohanaeze and its Yoruba counterpart, Egbe Afenifere. It is also manifest in the collaboration of Igbo and Yoruba intellectuals in a committee of citizens known as The Patriots. This committee, which includes influential persons of diverse ethnic origin, was formed to promote constitutional change based on the principle of self-determination for nationalities. It is highly significant that the two leading personalities in this group, Rotimi Williams and Ben Nwabueze, are also two of the most prominent and influential legal luminaries in Nigerian history. Chief Williams’s contribution to Nigerian political life, including his chairmanship of the historic Constitution Drafting Committee of 1976, is legendary. Nwabueze is a formidable scholar of world-class distinction; his remarkable ascent to political prominence could happen only in a country where the public truly admires erudite politicians because they are erudite. The emergence of an Igbo-Yoruba alliance based on Awolowist principles, in opposition to Obasanjo’s Azikiwean posture, is open to conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, those who are generally optimistic about the cause of Nigerian unity may be heartened by the integrative implications of increasing Igbo-Yoruba political collaboration in concert with leaders and thinkers who represent neighboring southern nationalities. On the other hand, more pessimistic minds may worry that the potentially dangerous emirate-nonemirate fissure in Nigerian politics will become more pronounced if most southern political thinkers embrace the Awolowist vision of ethnolinguistic nationality while many thinkers in the emirate sector of the north continue to view it with aversion. Optimists might rebut that pessimistic perception by observing, accurately, that people of all ethnic backgrounds come down on both sides of the nationality question. Furthermore, they could aver with conviction that within each camp the leading protagonists are democrats, so the debate takes place within a national family of democratic ideas and thinkers. Pessimists, however, might then counter with their doubts concerning the ability of democrats to manage certain extreme manifestations of the nationality question, including separatist regionalism and religiously motivated legal dualism. To be sure, the political party system has thus far failed to articulate major aspects of the nationality question in a manner that would facilitate their resolution by electoral means.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 42

42

Crafting the New Nigeria

The Federal Question Nigeria is the world’s fifth largest federation—after India, the United States, Brazil, and Russia. The Nigerian dream of federal democracy is similar to the famous Indian dream. Its realization and success will benefit the cause of multiethnic democracy everywhere; conversely, word of its failure would produce great disappointment, not only in Africa but also in multinational societies on all continents. The Nigerian federation is polyethnic in form, meaning that most of the thirty-six states have primary ethnic identities.7 Each of the three largest ethnic nationalities accounts for all but a relatively few people in five to seven states. A few medium-sized nationalities are identified with one or two states; fourteen states are emphatically multiethnic. The federal question has three distinct components: (1) How shall the constituent units of the federation be demarcated and how many of them shall there be? (2) What shall be the relationship between the government of the federation and the governments of its constituent parts? (3) What shall be the relationship between Nigerian citizens and the national government? The architects of Nigerian federalism have endeavored to reconcile the claims of nationalities to their places in the constitutional sun with the practical necessity of having a reasonable number of viable states as constituent units of the federation. Among the attempts to resolve this problem, none has been more fateful or less successful than that involving the formation of geographical clusters, known as regions or zones. The lessons of Nigerian political history teach that political regionalism is not compatible with the empowerment of a multiplicity of politicized ethnic groups. Once regions are established and endowed with political power, ethnic interests are routinely sacrificed to regional interests, which often prove to be the interests articulated by the leaders of large ethnic groups. While the large groups become regionalist, smaller groups look to the center for protection against their overbearing neighbors within the region.8 A federal system of government, comprising three regions (north, southeast, southwest), was created in colonial Nigeria in 1954 and preserved at the time of independence in 1960. Three years later, the Western Region was partitioned to create a fourth region for ethnic minorities in that part of the country. When the Eastern Region tried to secede from the federation in 1967, the federal military government appealed to minorities in the secessionist region and elsewhere by dividing the country into twelve states, six in the north and six in the south. That historic decision corrected a flagrant territorial imbalance, favoring the north, that had been a leading cause of political instability. Thereafter, regionalist thought and organization remained relatively dormant until 1993, when the military government abruptly terminated an electoral transition to civilian rule.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 43

Unity or Regionalism

43

Meanwhile, in response to popular pressures for local autonomy, military rulers increased the number of states to nineteen in 1976, twenty-one in 1987, and thirty in 1991. The widely despised military government of General Sani Abacha then sought to earn political credit by creating six additional states in 1996 for a total of thirty-six, which was three times the number deemed necessary to secure a stable balance of constituent states in 1967. Critics contend that proliferation has created an array of weak, and financially unviable, states that function as conduits for the transmission of federal resources and services to local authorities. To be sure, successive military governments relentlessly centralized the nation within a nominally federal framework. In the aftermath of the aborted transition to a prospective Third Republic, in 1993, disillusioned democrats revived political regionalism as a strategy of resistance to the federal military government. Ironically, their program resurrected a six-zonal blueprint of purely British colonial origin that had not been mentioned in Nigerian political debates for more than fifty years.9 While these zones are strictly unofficial, without constitutional sanction, they have become increasingly relevant as political entities, for example through meetings of groups of governors who have then announced common positions on issues. Yet there are profound political differences among the zones, and those differences minimize the potential for the success of regionalist solutions to the nation’s problems. In three of the six zones, a regional language is spoken by nearly all of the people: Hausa in the northwest, Igbo in the southeast, and Yoruba in the southwest. These three zones are relatively cohesive, both culturally and politically. Two of them, the southeast and southwest, have pronounced autonomist tendencies. The northwest, however, is not autonomist because the Hausa-speaking emirate leaders have transregional aims and interests based on both precolonial history and religious culture. Specifically, the emirate system, created by Hausa-speaking Fulani warriors and their allies during the first decade of the nineteenth century, extends into the northeastern zone and portions of the north-central. Furthermore, the emirate peoples share a common tradition of Islamic political organization, including a disposition to live in accordance with the precepts and practices of Islamic law. The other three zones are ethnically and linguistically diversified. In the northeast, there is a large Kanuri-speaking population as well as many other ethnolinguistic groups. Its traditional political organization includes many emirates, some of which acknowledge the traditional leadership of the Sokoto Caliphate of the northwest, in addition to the historic and staunchly independent Kanuri kingdom, which is also Muslim in belief and emirate-like in form. Hence, the region as a whole is not autonomist, and the desire for separation from the emirate sector is limited to areas within its southernmost states, where non-Muslim communities predominate.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 44

44

Crafting the New Nigeria

The north-central zone is extremely diversified; known popularly and historically as the Middle Belt, this zone contains a multitude of languages and ethnic groups—by far the largest number of nationalities among the zones. Most of the groups are motivated by an age-old desire to secure their separation from the Muslim emirates, nowadays within the context of a Nigerian federation. Lacking cohesiveness as a geopolitical zone, the political orientation of the north-central is defensive rather than autonomist. This is also true of the southerly zone that encompasses a broad band of ethnic and linguistic groups, from Itsekeri-, Urhobo-, Edo-, and Ijaw-speakers in the western and central sections to Ibibio, other Efik-speakers, and Ekoispeakers in the east. This zone, named at first southern minorities, then south-south, is defined by its separation from the Igbo (southeastern) and Yoruba (southwestern) areas. It includes the oil-bearing Niger Delta and adjacent wetlands sector that currently accounts for more than 90 percent of the value of Nigerian exports. Turning to the relationship between the government of the federation and the governments of its constituent parts, these alternative possibilities have been envisioned by participants in current debates: a federation of the presently existing states, a federation of regions, probably six in number but possibly a few more, or a confederation of regions. My observations on these alternative outcomes are strictly analytical rather than judgmental. A federation of the existing states would probably perpetuate the highly centralized form of federalism that was created by the constitution of 1979 and restored by the current (1999) constitution. Theoretically, it would be possible to reverse that tendency by empowering each of the thirty-six states to frame and adopt its own constitution in accordance with a minimum number of general guidelines. This proposal, made on various occasions by Peter P. Ekeh, would be an alternative to the existing provision of uniform rules for all state governments in the federal constitution.10 It may be of interest to observe that even the smallest of the Nigerian states has a larger population than some dozen African countries. The leading proponents of a reconstituted federation that would consist of regions are The Patriots, who favor the use of ethnolinguistic nationality as the basis of government in Nigeria. The Patriots advocate a federation consisting of six regions; were The Patriots’ proposal adopted, the existing thirty-six states would become administrative areas within the new constituent regions. Evolution toward a federation of large regions may be expected to intensify the autonomist tendencies of two regions that are relatively cohesive, namely, the southwest (Yoruba) and the southeast (Igbo). In Nigerian history, the economic foundation of regional autonomy is the constitutional principle of economic derivation, meaning that revenue derived from exports should be returned to the region of origin. When, in keeping with

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 45

Unity or Regionalism

45

their Awolowist orientation, The Patriots endorsed that principle, they exempted offshore oil revenues, which, they said, should be paid into the Federation Account (from which a portion is distributed to the state and local governments). “Hold on!” exclaimed leaders of the Delta/wetland states of the south-south. That, they declared, was our money because the oil was off our shore. The Patriots may have shown an appetite for oil revenue at the expense of a constitutional principle. In a landmark case, Williams, engaged to represent the federal government before the Supreme Court, argued successfully that the boundaries of littoral states do not extend beyond the low-water marks of the land surface or the seaward limits of inland waters. This ruling, widely known as the resource control judgment of 2002, provoked a storm of protest from the littoral states. Resource control connotes the demand of those people who inhabit the areas from which marketable resources are derived to control their ownership and management. Whether such control would be vested in local communities, ethnic groups, or state governments matters less to the proponents of this idea than the principle of an ancestral right upon which their claim is based. Later in 2002, the president made a politically motivated decision to abandon the distinction between onshore and offshore sources of revenue for purposes of disbursement from the Federation Account. But this issue was far too complex for instant resolution. Immediate objections to prospective losses of federal revenue were forthcoming from several northern states. The president then jeopardized his political standing in the littoral states by declaring that he would not sign a bill that conferred revenue rights on those states for oil extracted beyond a reasonable distance at sea. Eventually, federal legislation embodied a compromise, negotiated by the president with the governors of the littoral states, that provided for a considerable degree of offshore revenue derivation. Southwesterners may be reconciled to the principle of offshore derivation by the reported discovery of ample oil deposits in their own deep waters. Still, many leaders of the oil-bearing communities and their state governments desire nothing less than ownership and management of the oil fields both in their homelands and offshore. Unless they can be persuaded to accept a settlement based on revenue allocation that they perceive to be fair, they might decide to embrace regionalism as a purposeful step toward state and local resource control. The prospect of a regionalist constitution could stimulate movement away from the federal principle toward a confederation of regions, particularly if differences between the regions are accentuated during the course of constitutional deliberations. This outcome was anticipated by Nwabueze, a leading member of The Patriots and general secretary of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, in an address to a conference convened by a Committee of Concerned

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 46

46

Crafting the New Nigeria

Traditional Rulers in 2001. Speaking on behalf of delegates from the southeastern zone, he advocated the convocation of a national conference of ethnic nationalities and said that the option of confederation should be “on the agenda.”11 Subsequently, in 2001, President Obasanjo challenged advocates of a national conference to persuade the National Assembly to act on that contentious question. The Patriots responded by offering an ingenious proposal for the National Assembly to convene a national conference of delegates from the six geopolitical zones for the purpose of drafting a new constitution for the country. Delegates would be chosen by zonal councils comprising members selected by the five most prominent regional organizations, thus: Afenifere in the southwest, Ohanaeze in the southeast, the Union of the Niger Delta in the south-south, the Arewa Consultative Forum for delegates to represent the emirate peoples of the northeast, northwest, and north-central, and the Middle Belt Forum for the nonemirate peoples of those regions. A national conference of delegates chosen by ethnically oriented sectional organizations would almost certainly produce a draft constitution that would maximize both the legal consequences of cultural difference and sectional control of economic resources. Although The Patriots are avowedly federalist rather than confederationist in principle, a combination of salient issues—resource control, the selection of the national president by regional rotation, and legal dualism with respect to Islamic law— might persuade the members of a national conference, convened on the basis of nationality and regional representation, to consider the option of confederation. While many influential leaders of opinion have expressed their support for the convocation of a national conference to deliberate on the terms of national unity, there has been little indication thus far of agreement on a method for selecting conferees. Confederation means, in effect, that the constituent states (or regions) can nullify the laws and acts of the central government. Confederations are based on relationships between governments; direct relationships between citizens and the national government are few and weak, if they exist at all. Political scientists refer to this condition as a democratic deficit.12 In that circumstance, there is a strong tendency for the constituent governments of a confederation, which are directly accountable to citizens, to assert their own claims to sovereignty. A change from federation to confederation implies a growing weakness of the ties that bind the regions and might foreshadow an eventual dissolution of the Nigerian union, a perilous prospect that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish peaceably. Military intervention and civil war would result in the displacement of populations and the creation of a multitude of external as well as internal refugees. In short, a breakup of the union could produce a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 47

Unity or Regionalism

47

Legal Dualism and Nationality Toward the end of 1999, the government of Zamfara, a northern state in the emirate sector, announced its intention to adopt the legal system of Islam, known as sharia, as the official legal system of the state. Since then, eleven more northern states have taken that decisive step into the realm of theocratic government, which signifies the fusion of political and religious authority. The twelve sharia states contain an overwhelming majority of the forty-plus Muslim emirates in Nigeria. Their actions have nullified the historic compromise of 1960, which confined the application of Muslim law to personal status, family law, and civil law issues. In preparation for independence, the northern regional government had adopted a penal code based mainly on that of Sudan, which had been widely accepted by Muslim legal authorities as being entirely compatible with the Quran and prophetic teaching. The Sudanese precedent was important because it had shown that the legal system of an orthodox Islamic society could be adapted to modern life in a nation that was religiously diverse. Like its Sudanese model, the northern penal code did incorporate elements of Islamic law, for instance, the penalty of whipping, although this was administered in a manner that stressed public humiliation and minimized physical pain.13 Yet, as Nwabueze has observed, sharia did not thereby become the legal system of the region or of any of the nineteen successor states in the Nigerian federation. Furthermore, the penal code is a secular instrument, subject to the constitution, including its declaration of human rights.14 When, however, state governments decided that sharia itself would supersede the penal code and all other laws insofar as Muslim residents in those states are concerned, the historic compromise was violated together with section 10 of the constitution, which prohibits the adoption of an official religion by either the federation or any of its constituent states. Proponents of sharia argue that Islamic law will not be applied to nonMuslims, although the religious identity of individuals may not always be obvious to those who enforce the law. In any case, since sharia has become the highest law in certain states, there have been, in effect, two categories of citizens based on religion, each with its own set of rights and criminal penalties. Muslims are liable to be flogged in public for drinking an alcoholic beverage in a public place; they are subject to the penalty of amputation of a hand for theft, a hand and foot for armed robbery; they must participate in compulsory prayer at regular intervals during the day. Muslim women are subject to many restrictions, including a prohibition against travel with men, other than family members, in public conveyances. Women may be subject to caning for extramarital sex, and they are more likely than men to be sentenced to death by stoning for the offense of adultery. In one widely monitored case, a sentence of death by stoning was reversed by a

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 48

48

Crafting the New Nigeria

sharia court of appeals on the ground that the offense was committed before the establishment of a sharia penal code; three other widely reported sentences of death by stoning, involving two women and one man, have been appealed to higher sharia courts. In 2002, Chief Godwin Kanu Agabi, then attorney general of the federation, who was also minister of justice, sent a public letter to the governors of those states that had adopted sharia comprehensively. Stressing the incompatibility of differential punishments based on religion with the constitutional principles of equality before the law and freedom from religious discrimination, Agabi declared that the federal government had received hundreds of petitions from aggrieved Muslims in the sharia states. While Obasanjo has expressed his personal opinion that the establishment of sharia as the penal code of a state is unconstitutional, he appears to believe that the question should be resolved politically rather than judicially, because it is too laden with emotion to be adjudicated by the Nigerian Supreme Court without damage to that institution. Although public opinion on this issue has not been surveyed scientifically, or tested at the polls, there does appear to be a significant difference of opinion between Muslims in the emirate areas and those who do not belong to emirate communities. In the emirates, which contain approximately two-thirds of all Nigerian Muslims, the legal supremacy of sharia is extolled as a fundamental religious right as well as an antidote to both criminal behavior, which is rampant in the south, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly AIDS. Although the early introduction of comprehensive sharia in states controlled by a political party that opposes the president’s party may be attributable to political opportunism, the new legal order is now supported by an overwhelming majority of the emirate intelligentsia, with deep moral conviction. By contrast, it appears that the vast majority of Muslims outside of the emirates do not favor the establishment of sharia in their own states. Yet the question is extremely sensitive for believers; it is noteworthy that prominent Muslim champions of democracy and liberty in southern Nigeria have been uncharacteristically silent on this issue, including its implication for the constitutional protection of fundamental rights. Barring an enforceable judicial decision that restores constitutional supremacy in criminal proceedings, the establishment of sharia in states that contain the vast majority of emirates appears to be irreversible. However, it has been suggested that objectionable punishments could be “winnowed” without restoring secular supremacy in those states.15 Political scientists have a concept, constitutional asymmetry, for the accommodation of systemic differences within federations.16 Canada, Belgium, Spain, Russia, India, Malaysia, and now Nigeria exemplify this development in the science of government. Will recourse to the theory of constitutional asymmetry

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 49

Unity or Regionalism

49

suffice to accommodate legal dualism when it is based, in part, on theocracy? Only time will tell. Meanwhile, it may be both realistic and salutary to think of this issue as a manifestation of the legal nationality question, rather than an issue that is essentially religious in nature. The introduction of sharia is favored by a great many Muslims in the emirate sector of the northern part of the country. Muslims elsewhere in Nigeria do not, in the main, appear to favor the introduction of sharia as a replacement for the existing system of statutory law. The nonemirate Muslim population includes approximately half of the Yoruba, which is second in size only to the Hausa. In Yorubaland, where it is not uncommon for families to include both Christians and Muslims who practice their respective religions conscientiously, relatively few Muslims advocate the introduction of comprehensive sharia. This indicates that the issue is a consequence of cultural cleavage between emirate and nonemirate nationalities rather than specifically a religious differentiation. Intractable as they often appear to be, nationality questions are still more amenable to compromise solutions than religious disputes that involve sacred beliefs and doctrines. Yet religious issues, arising mainly from the sharia question, have sparked deadly conflicts between nationality groups in the northern cities of Kaduna, Jos, and Kano. In Kaduna, capital of the religiously diversified state of Kaduna, actions taken by the House of Assembly in early 2000 to prepare for the establishment of sharia resulted in deadly violence. Several hundred Christians, the vast majority of them Igbo, were killed. When a bus laden with corpses arrived in the southeast, enraged mobs attacked innocent and defenseless Hausa; thirty were murdered in the Igbo city of Aba, and Hausa property was destroyed in other southeastern towns. A Kaduna state judicial commission, highly critical of Christian community leaders, has alleged that approximately 1,300 people in the state lost their lives in religious conflicts during the year 2000. Others say that the total number of deaths was considerably higher. Subsequent conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Kano, capital of the emirate state of Kano, and Jos, capital of the Middle Belt state of Plateau, have been comparably deadly. In the immediate aftermath of the Kaduna massacre, all five governors of the Igbo-speaking southeastern states declared their support for a confederal form of government; as one of them said, “we subscribe to a future of a loose confederacy, with a weak, lean center for purely administrative purposes.”17 The Igbo governors’ statement was welcomed by the leading Yoruba political organization, Afenifere, to which all six southwestern state governors belonged. While the aim of confederation was endorsed by the broad-based Igbo political organization Ohanaeze Ndigbo, one wonders whether Igbo leaders truly seek that outcome, since the Igbo states are landlocked with modest resources. By contrast, the Yoruba, with an extensive,

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 50

50

Crafting the New Nigeria

and reportedly oil-rich, seacoast, could easily go it alone. The real intent of some, if not all, of the Igbo governors may have been to warn their northern emirate counterparts that confederation, and the consequent forfeiture of the northern states’ existing entitlement to oil revenues, would be the high price of comprehensive sharia. If the emirate nationalities choose to jettison the principle of a secular constitution in favor of a theocratic principle, they may have to pay for it in the form of discounted development. Were it not for the sharia question, southeastern (i.e., Igbo) views on resource control might be closer to the northern emirate view than to the Delta/wetland viewpoint. Given its multinational composition, the Christian south-south has much in common with the multinational and largely Christian Middle Belt (north-central) except with regard to the issue of resource control, which does not appeal to most Middle Belt thinking. In brief, the pattern of cross-cutting ethnosectional interests in Nigeria is far too complex for comprehension within a simple framework of analysis. The false conceptual frameworks of Christian versus Muslim and north versus south only obscure the interests and values of Nigerian political actors. Political Parties and Coalitions In early 1999, a sequence of elections, both state and federal, reproduced a pattern of political party formation that has persisted, with brief interruptions, since the emergence of nationwide political parties during World War II. There has often been a party of political barons or elites, widely distributed throughout the country, opposed by sectional parties or a coalition of sectional parties. While the party of widely distributed elites has always had ethnosectional strongholds and centers of gravity, its top-down national, as opposed to bottom-up coalitional, structure has been a major asset in national electoral campaigns. I suggest that national elite coalitions have regularly outperformed electoral coalitions created by politicians who have tried to reach out from a primary ethnosectional base to ally with similar parties and factions in other parts of the country. Nigerian history suggests that coalitions of sectional groups are unlikely to win national elections. The first coalition of modernizing Nigerians claiming to represent the national interest was the Nigerian Youth Movement, founded in 1936. Although the ethnic identities of its founders and leaders were almost exclusively southern, the political values of the Youth Movement were national. The Youth Movement’s chief aim was to wrest control of the Lagos town council from the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which represented the parochial interests of the indigenous community of the capital city. In 1945, the Youth Movement’s influence in national politics was eclipsed by a more broad-based political association, the National Council

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 51

Unity or Regionalism

51

of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which incorporated the communal party of Lagos. Subsequently, the Youth Movement became an instrument of the Yoruba intelligentsia. Guided by Awolowo, onetime secretary of its southwestern provincial organization, the Youth Movement evolved into the governing party of the Yoruba-controlled Western Region, with Awolowo acceding to the office of premier in 1954. The independence election of 1959 was contested by three major political parties: the Northern Peoples’ Congress, led by Bello; the NCNC, led by Azikiwe, with its center of gravity in the southeast; and the Action Group, led by Awolowo, which formed alliances with ethnic minority groups in the north and east, some of them being incorporated into the party itself. Since no single party had a majority in the House of Representatives (then the controlling chamber of the National Assembly), it was necessary to form a two- or three-party governing coalition. In light of Awolowo’s pronounced belief in strong party leadership for programmatic purposes, it was logical for the leaders of the other two major parties to form a coalition government headed by the deputy leader of the northern party, who had served in that capacity prior to independence. By the time of the next federal election, in late 1964, the governing coalition had collapsed, and two broad electoral coalitions had emerged to compete for control of the deeply troubled federation; they were the northernbased Nigerian National Alliance and the southern-based United Progressive Grand Alliance, each with important allies in the other’s primary sector. Electoral chaos and continued political turmoil culminated in the coup d’état of 1966. Political parties were dormant until the restoration of civilian government in 1979, when five parties were authorized to contest elections at the state and federal levels. The National Party of Nigeria embodied the tradition of the northern-based Nigerian National Alliance of 1964. However, the National Party was more broadly grounded as a nationwide elite party of heavyweights, or men of timber and caliber. Three of the other four parties were clearly sectionalist—the Yoruba-based Unity Party of Nigeria, led by Awolowo; the Igbo-based Nigerian People’s Party, led by Azikiwe; and the (northeastern) Borno-based Great Nigeria People’s Party, led by Waziri Ibrahim. The People’s Redemption Party, led by Aminu Kano, represented the ideological cause of populist democracy. Awolowo’s Unity Party rallied erstwhile allies of the old Action Group more effectively than Azikiwe’s People’s Party could energize the former NCNC’s network of affiliates. But its challenge to the National Party, a truly national elite coalition, fell short of success. Awolowo has been described as “the best president Nigeria never had.”18 His strategy of reaching out from a core constituency (the Yoruba) to allies who were disaffected from dominant political groups in other parts of the country had been defeated once again.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 52

52

Crafting the New Nigeria

Four years later, in 1983, Awolowo’s final attempt to reach out to other sectional leaders foundered in the face of resistance to his leadership by potential allies. That assessment is unlikely to be challenged by historians even though the official results were badly tainted by gross malfeasance in the electoral process and the results therefore utterly unreliable. The ensuing coup d’état on New Year’s Eve 1983 ushered in fifteen years of military rule, punctuated by the restoration of elected local and state governments in 1990 and 1991, federal parliamentary elections in 1992, and the annulled presidential election of 1993. These last electoral battles were fought by two political parties created by the military government in an avowed attempt to minimize ethnosectional and sectarian tendencies in party formation. In the presidential contest, Moshood K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba business magnate, stood under the banner of the Social Democratic Party; Bashir Tofa, an emirate-area financier, was nominated by the National Republican Convention. It is noteworthy that both parties were national elite coalitions. Although Abiola was solidly supported by the Yoruba, the Social Democratic Party itself was the end product of a coalition-building process that included core elements of the northern emirate elite.19 Before the military acted, for dubious and vague reasons, to annul the presidential election, reliable, albeit unofficial reports indicated that Abiola had won a decisive victory, with 58 percent of the vote and substantial support throughout the country. However, Nigeria was destined to endure six more years of military rule until the restoration of constitutional and civilian government in 1999. The 1993 pattern of balanced competition between national elite coalitions was not, however, reproduced for the three-tier electoral sequence— local, state, and federal—of 1999. In these elections, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), a new national elite coalition, incorporating diverse regional and parochial interests, bested a merger of two sectional parties with diametrically opposed political orientations, namely, the emirate-based All People’s Party and the southwestern Alliance for Democracy. Although the presidential election was marred by widespread fraud, the margin of Obasanjo’s victory in 1999, and the breadth of his support compared with that of the rival coalition’s candidate, indicate that he would have won handily even in the absence of gross malpractice. While the PDP was overwhelmed in the sectional strongholds of the Hausa and the Yoruba, it still captured a majority of gubernatorial offices and both houses of the National Assembly. A party of ostensibly common national purpose had yet again vanquished an ethnosectional coalition. In the immediate aftermath of that election, the PDP loomed over the Nigerian political landscape in the manner of a big tent. The incongruous coalition that had formed to oppose it fell apart; it appeared likely that the surviving opposition parties would become little tents, or satellite parties,

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 53

Unity or Regionalism

53

as many of their members and supporters gravitated from their redoubts of sectional dissent to the house of national power and influence. When the Obasanjo administration assumed office, the likelihood of effective competition for the PDP at the national, as distinct from the state or regional, level appeared to be remote. To be sure, political parties with national, rather than ethnic, religious, or sectional, orientations would be free to compete in federal and state elections so long as they qualified under relatively permissive registration requirements. But there was no national issue on the visible horizon that could sustain a truly competitive contest for the presidency. Proposals for a return to regional governments in Nigeria, resurrected by ethnolinguistic nationality thinkers in the southeast and southwest mainly, had been rejected by political leaders in the north-central, northeast, northwest, and south-south. Apart from the regional question, no other political or economic issue was sufficiently potent to inspire and sustain nationwide, as distinct from local and sectional, opposition to the big-tent party of national purpose. The introduction of sharia in the northern emirate states, however, resuscitated nationality thinking and regionalist politics elsewhere in the federation, particularly in the southeast and southwest. Nationality thinkers seized upon the adoption of Islamic law, especially the penal provisions, to reassert regionalist proposals for constitutional change, notably The Patriots’ proposal previously described. Still, they were unable to capitalize on nationality sentiments in the southeast and southwest to build a national political party in opposition to the PDP. Ultimately, they were powerless to prevent a shift of Yoruba opinion toward support of Obasanjo’s bid for a second term when it was challenged strongly by political leaders in the north. Eventually, the Alliance for Democracy, which had achieved electoral mastery in all six southwestern states when it opposed Obasanjo in 1999, endorsed his candidacy in 2003. Obasanjo’s presidency, including the appeal of its continuation into a second term, has induced an overwhelming majority of his Yoruba compatriots to forsake political strategies of ethnosectional coalition-building for occupancy of a portion the big tent, where ethnolinguistic nationality is a respected persuasion but not an official orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the Hausa people of the northwest were mobilized mainly by leaders of the erstwhile All People’s Party, subsequently renamed All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), who had joined with the Alliance for Democracy to oppose Obasanjo in 1999. Its 2003 presidential candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari of the emirate state of Katsina, was, like Obasanjo, a former head of state under military rule. For the vice presidential running mate, the ANPP selected Chuba Okadigbo, a prominent Igbo senator from Delta State, hoping thereby to garner support among Igbo that would partially offset the Yoruba shift toward Obasanjo. Had the ANPP gone so far as to embrace the principles of ethnolinguistic nationality and

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 54

54

Crafting the New Nigeria

economic derivation, it might have become a broad-based national party that could compete effectively with the PDP. However, it was not at all realistic to anticipate a volte-face of that magnitude by the leaders of the northern emirate states; they were not about to reverse their long-standing fiscal policies and suffer the economic consequences of a weakened federation. In effect, they opted to support a large satellite party—the ANPP—outside of the big tent as long as they could both enforce the sharia legal system in their own states and ensure their entitlement to a continued high volume of federal revenues. Since neither of the two big parties supported the principle of ethnolinguistic nationality and the related call for a national conference to deliberate the nature of the union, those ideas were scarcely contemplated by the electorate in 2003. Moreover, Obasanjo’s deft management of the offshore oil revenue issue strongly enticed the Delta/wetland and other littoral states to stay securely within the big tent. At the end of the day, sectional parties were restricted by the electorate to satellite status. Obasanjo defeated Buhari in all but ten states, all of the latter being sharia states. The ANPP won gubernatorial contests in seven of the twelve sharia states but nowhere else. In the six Yoruba states of the southwest, the resurgent PDP captured five of the six state gubernatorial offices that had been won by the regionalist Alliance for Democracy four years earlier, and made comparable gains in the various legislative elections. (See Figures 3.1–3.4.)20 The election of Obasanjo to a second term means that Atiku Abubakar, his Hausa vice president, will be favored to secure the PDP nomination for president in 2007. It seems reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the emirate state electorate and political leadership will then be inclined to leave their satellite party for a place in the big tent. In that event (or in the event that a similarly influential northerner is nominated), the currently low probability of an effective challenge to the PDP by another party at the national level would become lower still. The structure of politics in Nigeria implies consolidation of power by a dominant party while citizens are free to criticize the government and organize opposition parties. The defining quality of a national elite coalition, such as the PDP, is that its leaders and intellectual adherents consider the nation to be a primary political community rather than an aggregation of antecedent nationalities. Local and sectional elites who promote the fortunes of the PDP regularly place the needs and requirements of a comprehensive national organization, created to win elections, over and above the pursuit of sectional interests. Leaders and officials of the PDP represent Nigerian political opinions more broadly, but by and large less passionately, than do the leaders of parties based primarily on causes and foundations that are sectional, or regional, rather than national. The PDP itself is an arena of intense conflict on many issues; greater and lesser barons of the party routinely

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 55

Unity or Regionalism

55

Figure 3.1 2003 Presidential Election

ANPP (Buhari)

Figure 3.2 2003 Gubernatorial Election

challenge the views and decisions of ranking leaders and their agents. However, so long as active members can both assert themselves within the councils of the party and, should they wish to do so, leave it for another party, the big tent will be the principal venue for big events in Nigerian political life.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 56

56

Crafting the New Nigeria

Figure 3.3 2003 Senate Election

Figure 3.4 2003 House of Representatives Election

Conclusion As a result of the legal revolution in northern Nigeria, the idea of regionalism has been resurrected by political entrepreneurs in southern Nigeria. Naturally, northerners have been appalled by the perceived economic consequences of regionalism, in particular the prospect of a steep decline of the northern share of revenues attributable to oil. In 2003, southerners, too, rejected regionalism and the related prospect of confederation for a variety

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 57

Unity or Regionalism

57

of reasons, including anticipated economic disadvantages in the southeast, concessions to the south-south group of states in the form of revenue allocations from offshore oil production, and growing support for Obasanjo’s presidency in the southwest. For the time being, nationality questions are more likely to be debated in relation to the aim of comprehensive multinational inclusion within common institutions rather than proposals for regional separatism or a more explicitly ethnic form of federation. Yet, the resilience of regionalism in Nigerian thought and action, and its capacity to rebound from a steep descent to virtual irrelevance in the electoral exercise of 2003, should not be underestimated. Its future potency will probably depend mainly on the outcome of attempts to manage the question of sharia. Moderates on both sides of this defining issue of national unity seek to discover common ground between proponents of sharia in the emirate states and principled constitutionalists who reject a double standard for criminal conduct based on religion. If that quest proves to be futile and the sharia debate becomes increasingly acrimonious, we can anticipate the renewal of demands for a weakened federation with a high degree of regional autonomy tending toward confederation. And let us not forget that the confederal form of government tends to be unstable and liable to severe crises of legitimacy resulting from the aforementioned democratic deficit that is its congenital weakness. Whether or not a regionalist constitution would endanger the unity of Nigeria, it would almost certainly ensure a diminution of the nation’s role in both West African and continental politics. Nigerians might then be happier, and the regional entities, each in its own way, could become more democratic than the existing centralized federation. But Nigeria would be less likely to evolve as a continental power, comparable to South Africa, where a big tent political party presides over the effort to mobilize human resources for national development. One may wonder whether Nigerian intellectuals in general are prepared to abandon the idea of “high politics” in the form of continental power for the sake of “low politics” in the form of regional autonomy. Abuja, a new city at the edge of the north-central high plains, is the symbol of high politics, meaning statesmanship in the exercise of national power, as opposed to regionalism and localism, symbolized at the present time by Lagos, formerly the national capital, in the southwest and by Enugu, a former regional capital, in the southeast. High politics is not for every nation, and it may not be for Nigeria. Yet the option of high politics is available to Nigeria; it is not incompatible with a nation whose people have complex political identities.

Notes 1. Antecedent discussions in the 1980s include Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos, 1987), 196–202; S. Egite Oyovbaire, “Military Rule and the National Question

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 58

58

Crafting the New Nigeria

in Nigeria,” in Peter P. Ekeh and Eghosa E. Osaghae (eds.), Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1989), 384–396. 2. See, for example, J. F. Ade. Ajayi, “The National Question in Nigeria in Historical Perspective,” in Toyin Falola (ed.), Tradition and Change in Africa: The Essays of J. F. Ade Ajayi (Trenton, 2000), 232. 3. John Boye Ejobowah, Competing Claims to Recognition in the Nigerian Public Sphere (Lanham, MD, 2001), 139–140. 4. For a concise summary of colonial thought and nationalist dissent, see Richard L. Sklar, “The Colonial Imprint on African Political Thought,” in Toyin Falola (ed.), African Politics in Postimperial Times: The Essays of Richard L. Sklar (Trenton, 2002), 185–191. 5. The primary sources are Nnamdi Azikiwe, Political Blueprint of Nigeria (Lagos, 1943), and Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (London, 1947). For a concise summary of their views, see Eme O. Awa, Federal Government in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1964), 25–28. 6. C. S. Whitaker Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946–1966 (Princeton, 1970); John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria (London, 1986). 7. Use of the term polyethnic to describe federal systems in which the constituent units “coincide with . . . ethnic, tribal, or linguistic” boundaries is attributable to Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York, 1970), 293. 8. For another view, see Itse Sagay, “Reordering Nigerian Federalism: Making It More Confederal,” Chapter 5, this volume. 9. John N. Paden, “Nigerian Unity and the Tensions of Democracy: Geo-Cultural Zones and North-South Legacies,” in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds.), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, 1997), 243–245. 10. Peter P. Ekeh, “Nigerian Political History and the Foundations of Nigerian Federalism,” keynote address to a Conference on the National Question at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 2000. 11. B. O. Nwabueze, “The Imperative of a National Dialogue,” The Guardian Online (Lagos), June 28, 2001. 12. Ronald L. Watts, “Daniel J. Elazar: Comparative Federalism and PostStatism,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30 (2000): 167. 13. John P. Browne, “An Operational Study of the New Penal Code of Northern Nigeria,” University of Detroit Law Journal 39 (1962): 496–497. 14. Ben Nwabueze, “The Unconstitutionality of State Enforcement of Shari’a Law,” The Guardian Online (Lagos), July 3, 2000. 15. Report of an interview with Ahmed Kusamotu, a legal scholar, in The Guardian Online (Lagos), March 23, 2002. 16. Watts, “Elazar,” 164–165. 17. Chimaroke Nnamani, Enugu State Governor, quoted in The Guardian Online (Lagos), March 8, 2000. 18. This memorable tribute to Awolowo was uttered on the occasion of his death in 1987 by former political opponent Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who had been military leader of the secessionist Republic of Biafra (1967–1970). ThisDay Online (Lagos), March 2, 2003. 19. For a lucid account of the descent of these parties from political groups in the Constituent Assembly of May 1988, and other political associations animated by that event, see Babafemi A. Badejo, “Party Formation and Party Competition,” in Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds.), Transition

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 59

Unity or Regionalism

59

Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida (Boulder, 1997), 171–191. 20. See also Darren Kew, “The 2003 Elections: Hardly Credible, but Acceptable,” Chapter 8, and Bronwen Manby, “Principal Human Rights Violations,” Chapter 9, this volume.

Rotberg-3.Final 12/17/04 4:46 PM Page 60

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 61

4 Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment Rotimi T. Suberu

Effective federal institutions are key to the attainment of Nigeria’s critical, but largely elusive, national objectives of national unity, socioeconomic development, and democratic political stability. Yet, Nigeria’s contemporary crisis of governance is symptomatic of the travails of its federalism. At the heart of the Nigerian predicament is a federal system riddled with multiple contradictions and tensions. Especially consequential are the federation’s fragile roots in a unitary, but malintegrative, British colonial enterprise; its faltering institutional structures for accommodating Nigeria’s deep ethnoregional and religious divisions; its oil-centric fiscal base and dysfunctional revenue distribution practices; and its structural deformation and debilitation by decades of hypercentralized, authoritarian military rule. This chapter discusses the modest advances, as well as the underlying liabilities and pathologies, of federal governance in Nigeria since the establishment of the country’s fourth postindependence democratic experiment in 1999. There are five themes: the struggle for constituent state autonomy; the status of local government; the allocation of oil revenues; the judicial arbitration of intergovernmental fiscal conflicts; and the challenges of federal reform. The Inheritance The onset of military rule in 1966 marked the turning point in the postindependence evolution of the country’s federalism. Although all but one of Nigeria’s military administrations since 1966 have formally maintained the country’s federalism, the military effectively centralized the federal system 61

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 62

62

Crafting the New Nigeria

during its long spell in power from 1966 to 1999, with a brief civilian interregnum during the Second Republic from 1979 to 1983. A key instrument of centralization was the dissolution of the original three (four after 1963) regions of the Nigerian federation into smaller states, which increased from twelve in 1967 to nineteen in 1976, twenty-one in 1987, thirty in 1991, and thirty-six in 1996. Initially designed to correct the explosive imbalance in the size and composition of the regions and to contain the attempted secession of the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region (Biafra), state creation was progressively utilized by the military as a strategy for consolidating the hegemony of the center (in the name of extending political and economic devolution to the country’s numerous ethno-territorial communities), for the legitimization of military rule, and, especially under the perverse administrations of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, for the perpetuation of the personal rule of military dictators. The unfolding of the state-creation strategy coincided with the expansion and centralization of oil revenues in Nigeria. From one-third of the value of all Nigerian exports in 1966, oil revenues expanded to provide 90 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of public revenues. By decisively altering the old regional rules for sharing federally collected revenues (which had emphasized the return of such revenues substantially to the region of derivation), the military progressively consolidated the oil revenues in a common centrally managed pool, the Federation Account. This account is shared, according to federal law or decree, vertically between the center and subunits and, then, horizontally among the subunits, with interunit equality and relative population (rather than derivation) as the key principles guiding the horizontal (intratier) distribution formula (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The rationale for this distributive scheme is to ensure that the nation as a whole, rather than the oil-rich Niger Delta in the south alone, benefit from immense oil wealth. But the major impact of this distributional policy has been to promote the fiscal ascendancy and functional overexpansion of the center (which accounted for some 70 percent of total public revenues and expenditures under military rule), increase the financial dependency and insecurity of the states (and their localities) vis-à-vis the center, fuel powerful ethnic and subethnic pressures for the creation of new subfederal administrations as an easy avenue to the oil revenues, and engender both a creeping sense of economic alienation and a bitter political agitation for resource control in the Niger Delta. The centralization of the Nigerian federation through state-creation and revenue allocation was reinforced by the military’s tight supervision of the constitution-making and redemocratization processes that culminated in the enactment of the 1979 constitution for the Second Republic, the 1989 constitution for the stillborn Third Republic, the unimplemented 1995 draft

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 63

63

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

Table 4.1 Vertical Allocation of the Federation Account

Items

June 1992 to May 1999

Federal govt. 48.5 States 24 Local govt. 20 Special fundsa Derivation (mineral1 producing states)b Dev. of mineral 3 producing areasb Dev. of natural resources — Dev. of FCT, Abuja 1 Ecological problems 2 Stabilization 0.5 Savings/Reserve — Agric./Solid minerals R&D — Basic education — Subtotal of special funds 7.5 Total 100

Initial Revised RMAFC RMAFC May 1999 to Proposals Proposals 2004 (August 2001) (January 2003) 48.5 24 20

41.3 31.0 16.0

46.63 33 20.37

—

—

—

—

—

—

3 1 2 1.5 —

— 1.2 1.0 — 1.0

— — — — —

— — 7.5 100

1.5 7.0 11.7 100

— — — 100

Sources: Theophilus Danjuma, “Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism,” Nigerian Journal of Federalism 1 (1994): 43–68; ThisDay (Lagos) August 17, 2001, 8; ThisDay, July 17, 2002, 8; ThisDay, January 21, 2003, 1. Notes: a. Special funds were formally transferred directly to the federal government by presidential order in May 2002 with retroactive effect from May 1999. The order did not change the allocation and relative distribution of the funds to the relevant expenditure items, however. b. In deference to the provisions of the 1999 constitution, 13 percent of onshore mineral revenues have been paid since 2000 to the mineral producing states in place of the special funds for derivation and the development of mineral producing areas.

constitution, and the 1999 constitution for the Fourth Republic. These constitutions formalized and entrenched the consolidation of Nigeria as a centralized federal state under military auspices. They established a strong executive presidency (as distinct from the parliamentary executive of the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican constitutions under the First Republic) as a symbol of federal executive power. They legitimated the federal military government’s invasion or monopolization of several subjects of regional or concurrent jurisdiction in the First Republic, including police and prisons, local government, land use, personal income taxation, the distribution of mining rents and royalties, and

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 64

64

Crafting the New Nigeria

Table 4.2. Horizontal Revenue Sharing Formulas for States and Local Governments Percentage Weight Assigned

Indices Equality of units Population Social development factora Internal revenue effort Land mass Terrain Population density Total

1990 to 2004

Initial RMAFC Proposals (August 2001)

Revised RMAFC Proposals (January 2003)

40 30 10 10 5 5 — 100

45 25 10 8 5 5 2 100

45.23 25.60 8.71 8.31 5.35 5.35 1.45 100

Sources: Theophilus Danjuma, “Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism,” Nigerian Journal of Federalism 1 (1994): 43–68; ThisDay (Lagos), August 17, 2001, 8; ThisDay, January 21, 2003, 1. Note: a. The social development factor is based on the direct and/or inverse values of primary and secondary school enrolment, number of hospital beds, water availability and, since 2001, rural roads.

the powers of the subfederal units to craft their own basic law. What is more, these constitutions empowered the federal government to promote an omnibus schedule of “fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy” throughout the federation. This particular prerogative has meant—the federal constitutional division of powers notwithstanding—that the center can legitimately intervene in virtually all areas of public policy. Consequently, the autonomous, or residual, constitutional functions of the states would be “determined largely by what the federal government voluntarily chooses to leave to the states.”1 As claimed in 2002 by Justice Akintola Ejiwunmi of the Nigerian Supreme Court: “the 1999 Constitution . . . [is] not . . . a truly Federal Constitution. . . . It is a hybrid of a Federal and a Unitary System of Constitutional Government.”2 The following specific, but interrelated, operational features of military rule further aggravated the structural, fiscal, and constitutional overcentralization of the Nigerian federation: 1. The overwhelming concentration of executive and legislative authority in the military head of state. Among other consequences, this concentration encouraged considerable arbitrariness in such policy areas as statecreation and revenue allocation. 2. The unilateral appointment, routine deployment, and complete subordination by the central military high command of the relatively junior

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 65

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

65

officers who administered the states. Apart from their subordination to the center, these officers were often “outsiders who had little connection with or knowledge of the states to which they were assigned.”3 3. The financial emasculation of subnational governments through the underpayment by the central military authorities of federal oil revenues into the Federation Account. As acknowledged by a noted economist and central government adviser, such underpayment or “upfront deductions reduced the legitimate flow into the Federation Account by an average of about 52 percent during 1994–1998,” with the consequence that the subnational governments were “receiving annually . . . during this period . . . less than onehalf of their legitimate shares of the Federation Account.”4 4. The explicit prohibition by decree law of judicial scrutiny of the conduct of the military government. This meant, for example, that the states could not obtain legal relief from central excesses, including the brazen violations of revenue sharing rules. 5. The inherently narrow sectional political base and bias of successive military governments, which fueled explosive perceptions and allegations of ethnic, regional, and religious domination, as well as exclusion or repression. In the course of the second phase of military rule from 1984 to 1999, the depreciation of Nigeria’s multiethnic federal structure under four successive northern-dominated military administrations spawned a southernbased clamor for a regional power shift, for ethnoregionalist or quasiseparatist political restructuring, as well as for the convocation of a sovereign national conference that would debate the desirability, viability, and modalities of Nigeria’s unity. The campaign for a power shift ultimately produced the civilian political consensus that culminated in the induction of Olusegun Obasanjo, the ethnically moderate former Yoruba military head of state, as Nigeria’s first southern civilian executive president in May 1999. The restoration of civilian constitutional rule, by contrast, has seen the development of robust devolutionist, as distinct from secessionist or separatist, challenges to the hegemony of the central government. The Struggle for State Autonomy, or True Federalism The quarterly meetings of the seventeen southern governors since 2000, spearheaded by the six Yoruba southwestern states under the control of the opposition ethno-federalist Alliance for Democracy (AD) party, have provided a major platform for the vigorous, multifaceted challenge to central hegemony in the new democracy. Among the specific demands emerging from these meetings and related forums are the following: a constitutional amendment to overturn Nigeria’s unitary police system and to permit the establishment of independent state police units; the transfer of more revenues

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 66

66

Crafting the New Nigeria

to the states and localities from the Federation Account; greater transparency in the center’s management of the account; the enthronement of true fiscal federalism, with emphasis on the principles of regional resource control, internal revenue generation effort, and derivation; an acknowledgment of the rights of the northern Muslim states to apply or extend sharia law so long as the rights of resident non-Muslims are scrupulously respected; and an end to direct central intervention in local government affairs, basic education, public housing, agriculture, rural development, primary health delivery, and other subjects best left to the subnational authorities in a true federation. In addition, many state governments have denounced or resisted the centralization of the national minimum-wage structure, the imposition of a national anticorruption law on all levels of government, the center’s exclusive arrogation of authority to declare public holidays, and the establishment of centralizing institutions like the National Judicial Council and the National Primary Education Commission. A far more radical centrifugal demand, most commonly associated with advocates of a sovereign national conference, calls for a return to a modified form of ethnoregional federalism that would consolidate the current thirty-six states into about six autonomous federal regions.5 Although the northern states have often opposed the campaign for true federalism because of their relatively heavier dependence on the present system of centralized oil-revenue allocation, the extension of sharia law from personal/civil to criminal cases in a dozen northern Muslim states has been the strongest expression of subfederal autonomy since 1999. In spite of the domestic and international consternation and condemnation provoked by the enactment or implementation of stringent sharia penalties (floggings, amputations, and executions by stoning), the extension of the Islamic legal system may contain some promise for federal democratic governance in Nigeria. Thus, the extended sharia regime has been developed democratically in response to overwhelmingly popular pressures from below; its extension was insistently, although somewhat dubiously, justified on the basis of constitutional provisions regarding the competence of the states to establish, regulate, and define the jurisdiction of sharia courts; the appropriate legislative procedures, including the conduct of public inquiries, were carefully observed by the implementing state governments in enacting the new sharia codes; the implementing states have tried to concede the constitutional prohibition of a state religion by preserving the extant system of superior common-law courts in their respective states, and by substantially excluding the Christian residents of these states from the purview of the expanded sharia regime; a multiplicity of appellate opportunities, extending from the upper sharia court and sharia court of appeal through the federal court of appeals to the Supreme Court, can be invoked by those who

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 67

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

67

are convicted harshly by subordinate sharia courts; and the implementation of the sharia system has been undertaken by relatively moderate Muslim political leaders who are apparently committed to Nigeria’s federal democracy, as distinct from ultraradical elements (such as the prorevolutionary Ibrahim Zakzaky and the Muslim Brothers) seeking to entrench the sharia in a proposed Islamic Republic of Nigeria.6 In essence, insofar as it has involved the democratic and arguably constitutional accommodation of religious preferences at the subnational level within a broadly secular national order, the new sharia regime may represent an ingenious experiment in the application or extension of the federal formula in Nigeria’s otherwise centralized political system.7 The federalist implementation of sharia is, however, constrained by the constitutional centralization of policing in Nigeria. In essence, the shariaimplementing states have been forced to rely on the secular, ineffective, corrupt, understrength, and allegedly partisan unitary Nigeria Police Force for the enforcement of their Islamic codes. These governments or their civil populations have, however, established independent Hisba vigilance, or monitoring, committees to promote compliance with the sharia. The excesses of such committees, especially in Kano, have echoed the murderous lawlessness that has come to be associated with the activities of southernbased, state-supported, ethnic vigilante groups, including the Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys of Africa, O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB).8 The case for separate subnational police formations has been undermined by the impunity and sectarianism of these groups, as well as by public recollections of the politicization of local authority police forces in the First Republic, and by doubts about the capacity of Nigeria’s financially weak states to underwrite independent subfederal policing. Internally generated revenues as a proportion of total government revenues, for instance, typically have remained below 20 percent and 10 percent for the Nigerian states and localities, respectively.9 But the viability of subnational governments in Nigeria is impaired not only by this excessive dependence on volatile, centrally collected oil revenues but also by administratively weak, yet grossly overstaffed, bureaucracies, by economic mismanagement and waste (including huge outlays on the emoluments of political office holders), and by a preoccupation with corrupt patronage distribution (mainly through nontransparent government contracting and procurement practices) rather than with efficient service provision or policy innovation—all of which have plunged several state and local governments into financial uncertainty or bankruptcy.10 The crisis of subnational governance in Nigeria is sorely compounded by the confusion and contention over the position of local units in the intergovernmental maze.

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 68

68

Crafting the New Nigeria

Local Government In heated contention in Nigeria today is the legacy of military rule in promulgating the concept and practice of local government as the third order (after the center and the states) of Nigeria’s federal administration system. Initiated as part of the 1976 local government reforms, the elevation of the localities was partially incorporated into the 1979 constitution. But it found its boldest articulation under the 1989 constitution, which established what came to be regarded as a fully autonomous, presidential system of local government. The 1989 constitution entrenched the boundaries of Local Government Areas (LGAs); assigned the conduct of local elections to the national electoral commission and not to the erstwhile state electoral agencies; provided for the direct allocation of federal revenues to local governments; outlined the powers (and procedures for the election and removal) of local government chairmen and councilors; institutionalized an advisory role in local government for traditional rulers; and codified key local-level agencies such as the Local Government Service Commission and the Primary Education Commission. Widely regarded as an expression of the military’s assault on Nigerian federalism, this attempt to standardize and centralize the system of local government (in the name of granting localities considerable autonomy from states) produced spectacular conflicts and irregularities, including fatal protests that attended the creation of new localities by the federal government, rather than the states, during the period from 1987 to 1998. Although it has apparently restored the authority to control the localities to state administrations, the 1999 constitution contains some contentious vestiges of the military’s three-tier federalism. Section 8, for instance, includes some stringent and somewhat recondite guidelines regarding the creation of new LGAs. These guidelines require the approval, consecutively, of a request for a new area by: a two-thirds majority of members representing the area in the state assembly (legislature) and local councils; a two-thirds majority of the people in the local government area where the request originated; a simple majority of members in each of a majority of local councils in the state; and a two-thirds majority of members in a state assembly. In addition, a state assembly is required to make adequate returns to each house of the National Assembly (the Senate and the House of Representatives) in order to enable the national legislature to enact consequential provisions regarding the number and names of LGAs in the federation as codified in section 3(6) and the first schedule of the constitution. The aforementioned provisions, according to the Senate Committee on Local Government Administration, suggest that “it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to create any new local government [areas] . . . under the . . . Constitution.”11 Reflecting local political imperatives as well as the

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 69

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

69

sheer artificiality and remoteness of most of the 774 areas bequeathed by the central military authorities, however, state governments recently embarked on a wholesale proliferation of LGAs in their respective states. The constitutionality and viability of these new areas remain suspect, however. The areas have neither been ratified by the National Assembly nor recognized by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is constitutionally empowered to register voters and to oversee the procedures for local government elections as may be enacted by the National Assembly.12 Much intergovernmental conflict has surrounded not only the reorganization but also the election and tenure of local government. Section 7 of the 1999 constitution obliges a state government to ensure the existence of “democratically elected local government councils . . . under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.” In addition, the third schedule to the constitution establishes the States Independent Electoral Commissions (SIEC) “to organize, undertake and supervise all elections to local government councils within the state.” But the SIEC has found itself in conflict with the INEC, which directly conducts all elections except local government elections. The lack of coordination between these two bodies has led to the duplication of effort and strained the resources allocated to elections while producing inconsistency in standards among states. The creation of the SIEC has also fueled widespread concern regarding the packing by the governors of state-level electoral commissions with “known party members.”13 Compounding the confusion over the localities is the fact that the inaugural set of local government chairmen and councilors in the Fourth Republic emerged from elections that were organized by the national (rather than state) electoral commission under a federal (rather than state) decree law that provided for a three-year (1999–2002) tenure for the councils. Thus, in 2001, the National Assembly passed an electoral act that extended the tenure of local councils by a year. The following reasons informed the decision: the presumed constitutional authority of the federal government to legislate generally on electoral matters at the local level; the delay by the INEC in producing the updated national voters’ register required for fresh local elections; the attendant inability of the state electoral commissions to undertake local elections within the stipulated three-year tenure for the councils; and massive (and sometimes corrupt) lobbying by local government chairmen and councilors for a tenure that would be equivalent to the four-year terms for all elected functionaries at state and federal levels. The state governments, however, successfully fought for the invalidation of the extension before the Supreme Court, which affirmed the inherent powers of the states over the localities, prohibited the National Assembly from making “unwarranted and naked intrusions” into the residual legislative powers of the states, and restricted the powers of the National

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 70

70

Crafting the New Nigeria

Assembly in local government matters to the procedural (rather than substantive) regulation of local elections and the assignment of federally collected revenues to the localities.14 The judgment of the Supreme Court implicitly, but inadvertently, validated the decision of the state governments to impose transitional governing committees, composed mainly of political loyalists of the governors, on the localities at the expiration of the threeyear tenure of the councils. The expedient vitiation of the constitutional guarantee for democratically elected local government councils replays the unfortunate political trajectory of the Second Republic, when the decay of local-level democracy was but the prelude to the disintegration of the entire national democratic edifice. The political predicament of the local government system in the Fourth Republic, as in previous republics, has been compounded by its financial deprivation under the federal revenue allocation scheme. Revenue Allocation At its inception, the new democracy inherited a system of revenue allocation that was riddled with multiple inadequacies, including the overwhelming reliance of all governments (federal, state, and local) on centrally collected oil revenues; the fiscal hegemony of the central government vis-à-vis the subfederal authorities; the heavy reliance on the overtly political principles of population and interunit equality for the horizontal share-out of federal revenues among the subnational governments; the inadequate attention to the internal revenue generation factor and other efficiency-oriented or developmentally functional principles in the horizontal revenue sharing scheme; the limited compensation of the country’s oil-rich, but economically neglected and ecologically endangered, communities in the Niger Delta; and the absence of a transparent and broadly acceptable administrative framework for managing Nigeria’s intergovernmental financial relations. Since 1999, the major positive developments in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism have involved the increased political attention to the demands of the oil-producing sections, the development of vigorous political pressures and official proposals for fiscal decentralization, and the formal judicial protection of the subfederal governments from the systematic manipulation of the Federation Account by the central authorities. But many problems remain, including the failure to enact a new revenue allocation law despite five years of democratic rule, the persistence of irregularities in the center’s management of the Federation Account, the attendant financial vulnerability and insecurity of subfederal (especially local-level) governments, and the limited official attention to issues of fiscal efficiency, relative subnational self-sufficiency, and accountability in the distribution or utilization

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 71

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

71

of Federation Account revenues and in the design of revenue-sharing legislation and reform. The federal government, to reiterate, is constitutionally required to pay most federally collected revenues into a general distribution pool—the Federation Account. The account is then shared, according to federal legislation, vertically between the center, states, and localities, and horizontally among the subfederal tiers. Federally collected revenues constitutionally exempted from this general distribution pool include: the 13 percent minimum revenues from natural resources to be paid exclusively to the states of derivation; the net proceeds of centrally collected taxes on capital gains and stamp duties to be paid also to the states of derivation; the income tax of diplomatic, military, and police functionaries and residents of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja, regarded as independent revenues of the federal government; and the value-added tax (VAT), which replaced the state-based sales tax in 1994 and is shared according to a distinct allocation rule, vertically and horizontally.15 Under section 162 of the 1999 constitution, responsibility for the development of the national revenue allocation law lies with three institutions: the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), appointed every five years by the president subject to Senate confirmation and including a member from each state and Abuja, which designs, and advises the president on, revenue-sharing formulas; the president, who, upon receiving advice from the RMAFC, is required to table proposals for revenue-sharing before the National Assembly; and the National Assembly, which debates, decides, and enacts the final revenue law, subject to the relevant constitutional guidelines. These guidelines enjoin the Assembly to observe the aforementioned 13 percent minimum derivation rule. The National Assembly is also required to take into account the horizontal distributive principles of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain, and population density. No revenue allocation law had been ratified by the end of the first term of the civilian administration in 2003. This failure resulted partly because of the reluctance of the federal executive to undo the highly centralized revenue sharing law inherited from the military, the tardiness and technical and political weakness of the RMAFC as reconstituted by Obasanjo in 1999, and protracted intergovernmental legal disputes over revenue allocation. Nonetheless, a significant change in Nigeria’s revenue-sharing system came in 2000 with the implementation of the 13 percent derivation formula by the federal government. This implementation was quickly followed by the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, a centrally coordinated agency for alleviating the developmental and ecological problems of the oil-bearing communities. Both initiatives significantly expanded federal revenue allocations to, and direct federal infrastructure spending in,

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 72

72

Crafting the New Nigeria

the Niger Delta region. Thus, the Niger Delta states, with approximately 15 percent of the Nigerian population, now get some 25 percent (up from less than 15 percent in 1999) of federal revenues going to the states.16 Despite the persistence in the Niger Delta of agitations for subnational resource control and for a more comprehensive implementation of the derivation rule, the increased allocations to the region must be reckoned as an important achievement in the federalist management of the ongoing Niger Delta crisis. The momentum of federalist decentralization has also been advanced by the expansion of Federation Account transfers to the subnational governments, especially the states. Under the existing law inherited from the military, the Federation Account is vertically shared 48.5 percent to the federal government, 24 percent to the states, 20 percent to local governments, and 7.5 percent to a centrally controlled special fund for general ecological problems, the development of Abuja, revenue stabilization, and related purposes (see Table 4.1). Reflecting intense pressures, especially by all the governors, for a more decentralized sharing formula, however, the RMAFC in 2001 proposed to the National Assembly a new vertical Federation Account sharing formula as follows: 41.3 percent to the federal government; 31 percent to the states; 16 percent to local governments; and 11.7 percent to special funds.17 Following vigorous public criticisms of the continuing centralization inherent in this proposal, as well as the invalidation of the concept of special funds by the Supreme Court in 2002, the RMAFC in early 2003 amended its proposed sharing formula as follows: 46.63 percent to the federal government; 33 percent to the states; and 20.37 percent to local governments.18 This proposal represents a significant concession to the states, which are not unlikely to get even more funds from the National Assembly given its tendency to act as a conduit for regional, rather than national, interests.19 Yet Nigeria’s experience, especially under recent military rule, instructs that any formal decentralization in the allocation of the Federation Account can be rendered nugatory by the underpayment of federal revenues into the account. Thus, perhaps the most remarkable development in the Fourth Republic has involved the intervention of the Supreme Court in addressing some of the irregularities in federal revenue administration carried over from the era of military rule. The Role of the Supreme Court Reflecting the remarkable reassertion of its constitutional independence since May 1999, the Supreme Court intervened in at least seven major constitutional or intergovernmental fiscal conflicts during the initial four years of the new democracy.

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 73

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

73

In 2001, the Supreme Court decided that it would exercise jurisdiction in a suit instituted by the attorney general of the federation against the attorneys general of the thirty-six states over the determination of the seaward boundary of the country’s eight littoral states for the purpose of implementing the constitutionally mandated principle regarding the application of the derivation rule to the distribution of not less than 13 percent of federally collected revenues from natural (oil and gas) resources. A sevenmember panel of the Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, overruled the arguments of the littoral states that the suit was vexatious or preemptive of the pending national legislation on revenue-sharing, procedurally defective on account of the involvement of the nonlittoral states, an abuse of the judicial process, or beyond the juridical competence of the court.20 According to the dissenting justice, Adolphus Karibi-Whyte, from the oil-rich Rivers State, “any boundary disputes between the federation and the states” should be “left . . . to political determination through appropriate legislation and executive action.” Furthermore, “any attempt by the Court to exercise jurisdiction in political issues would lure it into a political thicket from which it will be difficult to extricate itself. . . . As angels of justice, the court should avoid treading dangerous alleys.”21 This echoed public opinion in the Niger Delta, which inveighed against Nigeria’s centralized constitution and the underrepresentation of the oil-rich areas on the Supreme Court, and so favored a political, rather than legalistic, resolution of the dispute. Nonetheless, the majority of the Supreme Court opined that the issue in contention was “not the determination of boundaries” per se, but the interpretation of the constitution “as to who, between the contesting parties,” would obtain more “shares in . . . the revenue accruing from oil drilling, particularly offshore drilling.”22 Deciding the substantive suit in 2002, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the federal government’s position that the natural resources on Nigeria’s continental shelf belonged to the federation as a whole and, therefore, could not be said to be derivable from the adjoining littoral states for revenue allocation purposes. The southern boundary of the littoral states, the Supreme Court said, is the low-water mark of their land surface or the seaward limit of their internal waters; it did not extend to Nigeria’s continental shelf or territorial waters. Three major reasons informed the Supreme Court’s decision. The first involved a series of colonial legislations and proclamations, dating from the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 to the institution of federation in 1954, which consistently defined Nigeria’s southernmost regions—the precursors to the current littoral states—as sharing a boundary with “the sea,” thereby implying that, “by logical reasoning, the sea cannot be part of the territory of any of the old regions.”23 A second consideration was the absence in the 1999 constitution of a provision similar to section 134 of the 1960 constitution or

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 74

74

Crafting the New Nigeria

section 140 of the 1963 constitution, according to which the “the continental shelf of a region shall be deemed to be a part of that region” for the purpose of applying the derivation rule.24 Third, and perhaps most important, the Supreme Court set great store in the fact that Nigeria’s continental shelf is ascribed to the country by virtue of international conventions and concessions that are given effect exclusively by the exercise of federal legislative competence outside of the jurisdiction of the constituent states, to whom the “provisions of international law do not directly apply.”25 Although it conceded the claims of the federation to offshore resources, the Supreme Court declared the following practices of the federal government unconstitutional: exclusion of revenues from natural gas from the application of the derivation principle; nonpayment of proceeds of federally collected capital gains taxation and stamp duties to the states of derivation; the making of first-line charges on federally collected revenues; and the unilateral allocation of 1 percent of the Federation Account as special funds for the development of Abuja. In addition, although it declined to grant any specific monetary relief to the states in the absence of the constitutionally mandated new revenue sharing law, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government was obliged to apply the principle of derivation as from May 29, 1999, when the new constitution became operational. The legal invalidation of the diversion of federally collected revenues to first-line charges and special funds particularly challenged the fiscal hegemony and aggrandizement of the federal government. In 2001, for instance, out of gross federally collected revenues of about N2403.6 billion, the sum of N804.1 billion was deducted officially as a first charge, while another N217.5 billion went into such constitutionally unrecognized, centrally controlled accounts as the federal reserve account (N20.4 billion), stabilization account (N17.4 billion), national judicial council fund (N8.8 billion), associated statutory special funds (N52.5 billion), and miscellaneous (N118.4 billion).26 The sum of N44.4 billion was retained as independent federal revenues, leaving only N1337.6 billion as the substantive Federation Account allocations to the three tiers of government (N1167.4), VAT pool account (N91.8 billion), and the 13 percent derivation fund (N78.4 billion).27 In essence, as in the military era, a huge chunk of federally collected revenues was being preempted illegitimately from the general intergovernmental distributable pool. The new civilian government maintained the military’s irregular revenue-sharing regime ostensibly because the 1999 constitution, section 313, provides for the continued application of an extant system of revenue allocation pending the enactment of a new revenue law by the National Assembly. However, such transitional application of the revenue system was explicitly made subject to the provisions of the constitution. But first-line charges, in particular, lacked any basis either in the constitution or in any

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 75

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

75

federal decree or statute. Rather, they involved discretionary central deductions from federally collected revenues in the name of such diverse items as external debt service payments (mainly those of the federal government), the joint venture contracts of the federal government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the priority projects of the NNPC and the Central Bank of Nigeria, and excess crude oil proceeds (oil receipts above a federal budget benchmark).28 Although explicitly codified in the federal revenue decree law, the special funds (for Abuja, ecological emergencies, etc.) similarly lack a basis in the constitution, which mandates the direct distribution of the Federation Account only “among the Federal and state governments and the local governments in each state.”29 What is more, the subnational governments have always denounced the special funds as “disguised,” indirect, or additional allocations to the federal government because the funds are controlled and disbursed centrally. The judicial disallowance of the funds and the first-line charges, therefore, potentially represents a major advance for fiscal decentralization. The Supreme Court revisited the issue of revenue-sharing management in another ruling in late 2002 involving a consolidated suit by five southwestern states (Ogun, Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, and Osun) against the federal government. The court reached or reiterated five major decisions in this ruling. 1. The maintenance of a stabilization account and servicing of the debts of the federal government can lawfully only be funded from the government’s share of the Federation Account, not by a direct charge on the account, which “belongs to the three tiers of government and cannot be properly described as the money of the Federal Government.”30 2. The federal government constitutionally cannot pay directly to local councils the monies standing to the credit of the councils in the Federation Account. Rather, these monies should be distributed, according to the applicable horizontal sharing formula, among the states. Each of the states, in turn, is constitutionally required to maintain a State Joint Local Government Account, as a repository for all allocations to the local government councils of the state from the Federation Account and from the government of the state. 3. The establishment, regulation, or distribution of the State Joint Local Government Account is constitutionally the responsibility of the state legislature. This particular decision of the court invalidated not only the purported establishment of a Joint Local Government Account Committee for each state under the existing revenue decree, but also the controversial practice by which the center unilaterally diverted the local councils’ statutory shares of federal revenues to such items as the funding of primary education (a joint responsibility of the three tiers under the National Primary Education Commission Act of 1993), the emoluments of traditional rulers,

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 76

76

Crafting the New Nigeria

and the reequipment of the unitary police. This practice invariably resulted in the phenomenon of zero allocation from the Federation Account to some local governments (particularly those with relatively large primary school populations). 4. Because it is constitutionally obliged to set aside some portions of federally collected revenues for payment to the states on a derivation basis, the federal government cannot be asked, as demanded by the plaintiffs, to pay all federally collected revenues, net of its own independent revenues, into the general distributable pool, or Federation Account. 5. Finally, in the absence of the required legislation by the National Assembly on revenue-sharing, the federal government cannot be judicially compelled to pay to the aggrieved states their “legitimate and correct shares of the Federation Account less all monies already paid” to them.31 In yet another major intervention regarding revenue allocation, the Supreme Court in early 2003 ruled that President Obasanjo was legally competent to modify the existing revenue allocation decree in order to bring it into conformity with the constitution. The ruling followed a petition by the thirty-six states challenging a 2002 presidential order that formally transferred all special funds in the Federation Account to the federal government. This was in line with the Supreme Court’s invalidation of direct allocations of the account to parties or items other than the three tiers of government. In essence, the existing four-part distribution of the Federation Account in the proportions of 48.50, 24, 20, and 7.50 percent to the federal government, states, localities, and special funds, respectively, was modified into a three-way division as follows: 56 percent to the federal government, 24 percent to the states, and 20 percent to the localities. But the states denounced the modification as a subterfuge to enrich the federal government at the expense of the states.32 In the opinion of the Supreme Court, however, the modification was consistent not only with the recent rulings of the court but also with section 315 of the 1999 constitution, according to which an “appropriate authority” (defined as the president in the case of a federal law) may “at any time by order make such modifications in the text of any existing law as . . . necessary or expedient to bring that law into conformity with the . . . Constitution.” The Supreme Court’s remarkable interventions in revenue allocation disputes were emblematic of its bold and balanced arbitration of other major constitutional and intergovernmental conflicts in the 1999–2003 period. Thus, as already indicated, the court in 2002 defended the rights of the states to control their localities by annulling the one-year extension of the tenure of local councils by the National Assembly. But, in another ruling, the court in 2002 affirmed the constitutional competence of the National Assembly to enact a federation-wide anticorruption law. Finally,

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 77

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

77

the court, in two related rulings in late 2002 and early 2003, restrained the INEC from misapplying or embellishing the constitutional provisions regulating the formation of political parties. This last intervention led to a dramatic liberalization of the Nigerian political space, including an expansion in the number of officially registered parties from three to thirty. The level of independent judicial activism exhibited by the Supreme Court in the Fourth Republic is unprecedented in Nigeria’s history. This achievement reflects not only the transition from autocracy to democracy but also the substantial insulation of the appointment and funding of the judiciary from the political executive, through the establishment of the autonomous National Judicial Council (NJC) under the 1999 constitution. Despite vigorous criticisms of its overcentralization under the office of the chief justice of the federation, the NJC represents a model of political insulation that can be adopted or adapted for other crucial regulatory agencies, including the INEC, the SIEC, the RMAFC, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the National Population Commission, the Police Service Commission, and the Federal Character Commission. Such insulation could significantly check and balance the exercise of political power, lessen the scope for behavioral abuses, reduce the ethnic and political stakes in winning political office, and promote fairness, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law.33 Reforming and Refinancing the Nigerian Federation The restoration of civilian constitutional rule since 1999 in Nigeria has reinvigorated the country’s federalism, but huge challenges remain. The implementation of sharia criminal law in the Muslim north is probably irreversible, at least in the short run. However, the central government can play an important role in supporting the many Muslim-rights groups that seek to avail Muslims who are subject to the sharia of the multiple appellate opportunities provided by the Nigerian judicial structure. There is probably little genuine popular support for the establishment of independent state police units in Nigeria.34 Consequently, a more compelling solution to Nigeria’s policing crisis could be to continue the expansion of the single Nigerian police, but to dilute its control by the central political executive and provide for a greater subfederal role in its management while simultaneously promoting its accountability to local populations or communitybased neighborhood watch associations. Two features of the management structure for the all-Nigeria police force in the First Republic particularly suggest themselves. These (1) vested the authority to appoint and remove the national head (inspector-general) of the police in the Police Service Commission, rather than in the federal

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 78

78

Crafting the New Nigeria

executive; and (2) required the commission to consult with the regional executive before appointing the head (commissioner) of the police contingent in the region. Yet, reintroducing these features in the Fourth Republic will involve an amendment to the constitution. Like the more radical proposals for regionalist political restructuring, such an amendment will require concurrent (federal-state) legislative supermajorities that, short of an unlikely development of consensus across Nigeria’s multiple ethnosectional fault lines, may be impossible to muster. Years of military rule have saddled Nigeria with an overcentralized federal system, but this is not a condition that can be changed fundamentally in the near future. Proposals for reform must proceed with a sense of pragmatism about what is democratically and peacefully achievable in the short term.35 Nigeria’s revenue allocation system does offer some modest opportunities for relatively achievable, incremental, and nonconstitutional renewal, as distinct from potentially contentious or onerous megaconstitutional change.36 The key deficiencies of this system remain the overconcentration of revenues in the central government, the lack of sufficient transparency in the center’s management of the distributable Federation Account, the persistence of a sense of deprivation in the Niger Delta, and the absence of any incentives to efficiency and accountability in the use of the distributed revenues. Because they have a common structural root in the overwhelming derivation of public revenues from centrally collected oil rents, these deficiencies will probably take decades of diversified socioeconomic development to overcome. Nonetheless, as underscored by the ongoing proposals to transfer more Federation Account revenues to the states and the judicial disallowance of irregularities in the administration of the Account, Nigeria’s revenue-sharing problems can be mitigated significantly by appropriate administrative action or change. Because the 1999 constitution explicitly empowers the RMAFC to monitor revenue payments into, and disbursements from, the Federation Account, the state governments can play an important role in improving the management of the account by lobbying to ensure that only presidential nominees with the requisite integrity, independence, and competence get Senate confirmation to represent their respective states in the commission. This may help prevent a repeat of some of the inadequacies of the RMAFC, including its inability to check the center’s manipulation of the Federation Account, its downgrading of the internal revenue factor in horizontal allocations, and its preoccupation with recommending huge, financially unsustainable, and potentially economically ruinous remunerations for political officeholders at federal, state, and local levels. All of the southern state governments, and a few northern states, have proposed an additional measure for promoting transparency in the management of the Federation Account. This involves the separation of the current

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 79

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

79

office of the accountant general of the federation from that of the accountant general of the federal government.37 The proposed accountant general of the federation would be responsible to the three tiers of government, rather than just the federal government, and would work closely with the RMAFC and the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) in maintaining proper oversight of the Account. The FAAC, which comprises the federal minister of finance and the commissioners of finance of the thirty-six states, meets monthly to share revenues in the Federation Account according to the prescribed formula.38 However, since they lack any control over what the federal government pays into the account, the commissioners effectively have been reduced to playing the perfunctory role of monthly collectors of federal financial handouts. The proposed accountant general of the federation could play an important role in restoring the confidence of the commissioners of finance in the proceedings of the FAAC. A viable solution to the continuing agitation in the Niger Delta would be to increase, in any new revenue allocation laws proposed, the current 13 percent minimum of onshore oil derivation revenues going to the oil-bearing states. An initial increase of the derivation payments to between 15 percent and 20 percent of onshore revenues, for instance, may help reassure the oilrich states of the continuing commitment of the federation to ending the decades-long neglect of the Niger Delta. This solution would also obviate the controversial, contradictory, and, in view of the Supreme Court’s 2002 verdict, apparently unconstitutional moves by the president and the National Assembly to include varying components of offshore revenues in the 13 percent derivation payment.39 Yet, a greater concern for anyone interested in the development of the Niger Delta is the level of effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency in the utilization of the monies currently going to the region. According to Human Rights Watch, these payments “have not led to significant improvements on the ground” because “little of the money paid . . . is actually spent on genuine development.”40 Perhaps the greatest limitation of the revenue allocation process in Nigeria is the absence of any effective mechanism to control the truly monumental levels of wasteful, corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective public spending at the three tiers of the federal system. Curbing such financial irresponsibility is partly the remit of the ICPC as established under the national anticorruption law. To date, however, the appointment, funding, control, and apparent manipulation of the commission by the federal executive has undermined its effectiveness. In this regard, a proposal by the National Assembly to make the ICPC a part of the independent judiciary recommends itself. Another attractive mechanism for promoting accountability, which was suggested by President Obasanjo himself in 2000, would be to make the submission of audited financial statements of federal allocation utilization

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 80

80

Crafting the New Nigeria

by all governments a statutory precondition for the disbursement of fresh blocks of Federation Account revenues.41 The need to strengthen the audit process by improving the institutional independence and capacity of the constitutional office of the auditor-general was, indeed, a major recommendation of an important 2002 World Bank report on state and local governance in Nigeria.42 The other pertinent recommendations of the report included the restructuring or rationalization of the public bureaucracy in order to enhance its efficiency and reverse its degeneration into a bloated “employment patronage machine,” the modernization and integration of current budgetary processes, the reform of the public procurement process in order to make it more open, transparent, predictable, and competitive, and external assistance for basic capacity-building, innovation, and modernization in the civil services. A more general option for improving the fiscal efficiency and independence of the subnational governments would be to make the criterion of internal revenue generation weigh more heavily in the horizontal formula for distributing revenues from the Federation Account. This is consistent with a 1989 recommendation of the RMAFC that not only proposed a weight of 20 percent (the current weight is 10 percent) for the revenue generation criterion but also argued that the weight be “increased from time to time with the sole objective of encouraging the states and local governments to improve on their internal revenue.”43 If it is appropriately formulated and implemented, this recommendation would not penalize resource poor states unduly but would restrain the current freewheeling sharing syndrome by rewarding efficiency in raising, collecting, and utilizing public revenues. Conclusion This chapter has focused on the liabilities and opportunities of federal governance in Nigeria’s fledgling Fourth Republic. On the one hand, years of centralized authoritarian rule have foisted a difficult and contentious political inheritance on the new democracy. Especially troubling are the multiple distortions of the revenue allocation process, the overcentralization of the national policing structure, the confusion and chaos over the status of local government, and the bitter controversies over the enactment of sharia criminal law in the north and the development of state-supported ethnic vigilantism in the south. What is more, the emerging trend toward hegemonic electoral domination of the federation by the ruling centrist PDP, which dislodged the federalist AD from its southwestern regional base in the controversial 2003 general elections, casts some doubts about prospects for the consolidation of noncentralized liberal democratic governance in Nigeria.

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 81

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

81

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the inception of civilian constitutional rule has launched the slow and difficult process toward the democratic decentralization of the military’s hypercentralized political legacy. Much as it may try to resist the erosion of its hegemony, the federal government cannot permanently impede the decentralization of revenue sharing or obstruct the judicial enforcement of states’ rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its ability and willingness to act as an impartial umpire of Nigeria’s federal balance. To be sure, the sharia issue and the conduct of democratic elections may provide the biggest test yet of the judiciary’s capacity to moderate and arbitrate Nigeria’s primordial and political contentiousness. But its record so far has been inspiring. Finally, for all the anxiety about the probable implosion or disintegration of Nigerian federal democracy, reliable opinion surveys indicate that there is very little support in the country for nondemocratic rule or the dissolution of the federation.44 Rather, public debate in Nigeria has focused mainly on the possibilities and options for federal democratic reform or renewal. These positive signs should engender some cautious optimism regarding prospects for unity, democracy, and development in Nigeria.

Notes 1. Michael Joye and Kingsley Igweike, An Introduction to the Nigerian 1979 Constitution (London, 1982), 94. 2. See Muhammadu Uwais, Abubakar Wali, Emmanuel Ogwuegbu, Uthman Mohammed, Aloysius Katsina-Alu, Samson Uwaifo, and Akintola Ejiwunmi, “Attorney-General of Ondo State V. Attorney-General of the Federation and ThirtyFive Others, 7 June 2002,” Supreme Court Monthly 9 (2002): 167. 3. The World Bank, Nigeria: State and Local Governance in Nigeria (Washington, DC, 2002), 13. 4. Dotun Phillips, “Options for Revenue Allocation in a Democratic Nigeria,” in Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, Proceedings of a Workshop for Commissioners (Abuja, 1999), 39–40. 5. Movement for National Reformation, A General Brief (Port Harcourt, 1992); The Patriots, “A Bill to Amend the 1999 Constitution,” The Comet (Lagos), January 29 and 30, 2000, 27–34. Also see John N. Paden, “Unity with Diversity: Toward Democratic Federalism” (Chapter 2), Itse E. Sagay, “Reordering Nigerian Federalism: Making It More Confederal” (Chapter 5), and Richard L. Sklar, “Unity of Regionalism: The Nationalities Question” (Chapter 3), this volume. 6. Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis (London, 2000), 178; Philip Ostien, “Ten Good Things About Sharia,” Newswatch (Lagos), July 9, 2001, 61–64. 7. See also Bronwen Manby, “Principal Human Rights Challenges,” Chapter 9, this volume. 8. See also William Reno, “The Roots of Sectarian Violence and Its Cure,” Chapter 11, this volume. 9. In 2001, for instance, receipts from the Federation Account, the federally collected Value Added Tax, and other external sources accounted for 89.6 percent of

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 82

82

Crafting the New Nigeria

the total revenues of the states. During the same period, internally generated revenues accounted for only N9.8 billion out of aggregate revenues of N166.1 billion for 572 reporting local councils. See Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 2001 (Abuja, 2002), 42. 10. See World Bank, Nigeria, 13–51. 11. Tunde Ogbeha, “Report of the Senate Committee on Local Government Administration,” Vanguard (Lagos), May 11, 2001, 13. 12. See the second and third schedules to Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Lagos, 1999), 135, 143. 13. Ogbeha, “Report,” 13; National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center, “Statement of the Pre-election Delegation to Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, Abuja, 22 November 2002,” 5. 14. Idris Kutigi, Muhammadu Uwais, Michael Ogundare, Emmanuel Owuegbu, Uthman Mohammed, Umaru Kalgo, and Akintola Ejiwunmi, “AttorneyGeneral of Abia State and Thirty-Five Others v. Attorney-General of the Federation, 28 March 2002,” Supreme Court Monthly 5 (2002): 1–138. 15. The vertical distribution formula for VAT receipts is 15 percent to the federal government (in lieu of administrative costs of VAT collection), 50 percent to the states, and 35 percent to the localities. The shares to the states and localities are distributed among the respective subunits on the basis of the following horizontal (intratier) formula: interunit equality, 50 percent; population, 30 percent; and derivation, 20 percent. See The Comet (Lagos), January 23, 2002, 20. 16. Human Rights Watch, The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend (New York, 2002), 23–24. 17. Hamman Tukur, “Addressing ‘Zero Allocation’ Controversy,” ThisDay (Lagos), August 17, 2001, 8. 18. ThisDay (Lagos), January 21, 2003, 1. 19. See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985), 638. 20. See Muhammadu Uwais, Adolphus Karibi-Whyte, Salihu Belgore, Abubakar Wali, Idris Kutigi, Michael Ogundare, and Emmanuel Ogwuegbu, “Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State and Thirty-Five Others, 11 July 2001,” Supreme Court Monthly 9 (2001): 45–110. 21. Ibid., 76, 77, and 81. 22. Ibid., 55, 57, and 88. 23. Michael Ogundare, Muhammadu Uwais, Abubakar Wali, Idris Kutigi, Emmanuel Ogwuegbu, Sylvester Onu, and Anthony Iguh, “Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State and Thirty-Five Others, 5 April 2002,” Supreme Court Monthly 6 (2002): 23. 24. Ibid., 32–33. 25. Ibid., 91. 26. Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 39. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, 66. 30. Sylvester Onu, Muhammadu Uwais, Salihu Belgore, Uthman Mohammed, Anthony Iguh, Samson Uwaifo, and Akintola Ejiwunmi, “Attorney-General of Ogun State and Four Others v. Attorney-General of the Federation, 13 December 2002,” Supreme Court Monthly 14 (2002): 17. 31. Ibid., 29. 32. See ThisDay (Lagos), February 1, 2003, 3. 33. Rotimi Suberu and Larry Diamond, “Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management and Democracy in Nigeria,” in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 83

Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment

83

of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford, 2002), 400–428. 34. See the result of a national opinion poll on the state police debate in The Guardian (Lagos), February 29, 2001, 1; see also Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Presidential Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution, 1 (Abuja, 2001), 62. 35. Suberu and Diamond, “Institutional Design,” 428. 36. See Harvey Lazar (ed.), Canada: The State of the Federation; Non-Constitutional Renewal (Kingston, 1998). 37. See editorial, “Governors and Revenue Sharing,” The Punch (Lagos), November 28, 2001, 14. 38. See also Itse E. Sagay, “Reordering Nigerian Federalism,” Chapter 5, this volume. 39. In a bid to win support in the Niger Delta, Obasanjo in September 2002 put to the National Assembly an onshore-offshore dichotomy abrogation bill proposing the incorporation into the 13 percent derivation rule of revenues from natural resources in Nigeria’s contiguous zone (24 nautical miles from the coastline). Reflecting pressures from the representatives of the Niger Delta, however, the National Assembly amended the bill by substituting the continental shelf (200 nautical miles) for the contiguous zone. Obasanjo withheld assent from the amended bill, even as the nineteen northern governors denounced both the original and amended bills as unconstitutional. See The Guardian (Lagos), December 17, 2002, 1–4. 40. Human Rights Watch, The Niger Delta, 23. 41. See ThisDay (Lagos), October 4, 2000, 1. 42. World Bank, Nigeria, 52–60. 43. Theophilus Danjuma, “Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism,” Nigerian Journal of Federalism 1 (1994): 65. 44. Peter Lewis, Michael Bratton, Ettanibi Alemika, and Zerich Smith, Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria (Washington, DC, 2001).

Rotberg-4.Final 12/17/04 4:34 PM Page 84

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 85

5 Reordering Nigerian Federalism: Making It More Confederal Itse E. Sagay

The constitution of a country is or should be a reflection of its historical and sociopolitical experiences. In this regard Nigeria cannot be different. The deliberate choice of federalism as the only viable and acceptable form of government for Nigeria was a product of the diversity of its peoples, politically, historically, culturally, and linguistically, and of the experience gained from the attempts to create a viable polity out the forced amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria beginning in 1912. Yet Nigeria’s current federalized system is much too centralized, leading to conflict between the national capital and the state capitals, and inhibiting the emergence of a strong, functioning democracy capable of serving all citizens. Ideally, federalism is an arrangement whereby powers within a multinational country are shared between a federal or central authority and a number of regionalized governments in such a way that each unit, including the central authority, exists as a government separately and independently from the others. Each operates directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of affairs. In a federation, each government enjoys autonomy, a separate existence, and independence from the control of any other government. Each government exists not as an appendage of another government (e.g., of the federal or central government) but as an autonomous entity in the sense of being able to exercise its own will. Thus, the central government, on the one hand, and the state governments on the other are autonomous in their respective spheres.1 In short, in an idealized federal system, there is no hierarchy of authorities, with the central government sitting on top of the others. All governments have a horizontal relationship with each other. 85

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 86

86

Crafting the New Nigeria

The above working definition of federalism does not exclude some degree of interdependence among the two levels of government. One level, for example the central government, may be the collector of revenues for all governments in the federation (as in Nigeria). As long as the revenue collected belongs to all the governments and the central government does not determine how much each government should get and what should be withheld, the notion of federalism is not necessarily jeopardized. It must, however, be admitted that the difference between true and/or real federalism, and a decentralized unitary system, could very well depend on the totality of centralized functions being exercised by the federal government in relation to regional and state governments. Nigeria at present deviates from the ideal or notional form of federalism because of the overweening power of the center. For example, the nationwide power of federal commissions under the Nigerian constitution tends to tilt the Nigerian federation toward a decentralized unitary system. Instances include the Independent National Electoral Commission, which has the power to conduct state gubernatorial and state houses of assembly elections; the Nigeria Police Council, whose fiat runs throughout the country; the National Population Commission, with exclusive powers to conduct a census of Nigeria; and the National Judicial Council, which recommends state judges for appointment and removal.2 What determines whether or not a country like Nigeria should be governed by a truly federal or a strongly unitary system of government? Obafemi Awolowo, a consummate student of federalism and the first prime minister of the Western Region of Nigeria, observed that: In any country where there are divergences of language and of nationality—particularly of language—a unitary constitution is always a source of bitterness and hostility on the part of linguistic or national minority groups. On the other hand, as soon as a federal constitution is introduced in which each linguistic or national group is recognized and accorded regional autonomy, any bitterness and hostility against the constitutional arrangements as such disappear. If the linguistic or national groups concerned are backward, or too weak vis-a-vis the majority group or groups, their bitterness or hostility may be dormant or suppressed. But as soon as they become enlightened and politically conscious, and/or courageous leadership emerges amongst them, the bitterness and hostility come into the open, and remain sustained with all possible venom and rancour, until home rule is achieved.3

Awolowo also said: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English,’ ‘Welsh,’ or ‘French.’ The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.”4

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 87

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

87

This view, though popularized by Awolowo, was the one almost universally held by the founders of modern Nigeria. In 1953, during the debate on the motion for Nigerian independence, Sir Ahmadu Bello, premier of the north and leader of the ruling National People’s Congress, made an eloquent case for true federalism: Sixty years ago there was no country called Nigeria. What is now Nigeria consisted of a number of large and small communities all of which were different in their outlook and beliefs. The advent of the British and of Western education has not materially altered the situation and these many and varied Communities have not knit themselves into a composite unit. . . . Whatever Nigerians may say, the British people have done them a great service by bringing all the different communities of Nigeria together.

The diversity of the Nigerian nationalities and their high level of individual social development and integration means that basically each is a ministate in its own right. In any case, many of these ethnic nationalities originally were independent states, kingdoms, and empires before they were conquered and colonized by Britain. Yet, given purely pragmatic considerations, federalism or even confederalism is the only system of government that can be operated successfully in Nigeria. An advantage of federalism in the Nigerian circumstance is that it promotes the protection of minority rights and interests. Apart from the elaborate human rights provisions in Nigerian constitutions since independence in 1960, the constitution of Midwest State (1964) contained a unique provision under which the minority nationalities in that region were granted guaranteed seats in the regional legislature. By sections 7 and 14 of the Midwestern Nigeria Act (1964), four special areas were created for the minorities of the Midwestern Region. These minorities were the Isoko, Itsekiri, Ijaw, and the Akoko Edo. Representation of these areas in the regional house of assembly was limited to members of the relevant minority ethnic group, in designated areas. This law was enacted in order to preclude a situation in which those areas would be swamped by ethnic majority nationalities who would then elect their own people to represent the homeland territories of the ethnic minorities. Contemporary Problems As a direct consequence of the concentration of powers and resources in the federal government, perpetuated under the 1999 constitution, Nigeria has been plunged into an unending series of crises. Nigeria is concurrently confronted with:

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 88

88

Crafting the New Nigeria

1. Fierce competition for the capture of power at the center leading to overheating and instability. The controversial impeachment proceedings against the president (August to October 2002) illustrate this development. 2. Mutual suspicion and fears of domination and marginalization between ethnic nationalities, leading to the rise of ethnic militias and violent conflicts. 3. The enactment of sharia criminal law in some northern states and the resulting confrontation between the Muslim and Christian religions, which has given rise to violent conflict. 4. The denial to the oil producing areas of any right of control and management of resources, causing environmental pollution, intensified poverty, and the militancy of the local populations. Consequently, oil production has been disrupted and the peoples of the Niger Delta have become disenchanted with the Nigerian federal state. One of the greatest disadvantages of the current overcentralization of powers and resources in Nigeria is that many states and nearly all of the local governments have become complacent and indifferent to sources of revenue in their territories and to the generation of independent incomes for themselves. The monthly pilgrimage to Abuja to collect their monthly allocations has strengthened a culture of greed and laziness in those states. Lawson Omokhodion has graphically described the debilitating consequences of abandoning fiscal federalism in favor of concentrated federal economic power. At the end of every month, the 36 honourable commissioners of finance of all the states of the federation gather in a classroom session in Abuja presided over by the Federal Minister of Finance to share money that [has] accrued to the federation account based on a formula no one really understands. This money comes from three main sources—the oil money from the Niger Delta, the customs duty collections from the coastal/ports states and the VAT money mainly from Lagos State. After the sharing, the commissioners now head back to their respective governors to report what they have received and how to allocate to the areas of defined priority. The way the funds [are] used is not the subject of this article but as you know easy come, easy go and because over two-thirds of the states do not suffer any pain in the generation of this federation account, they fritter the money away and wait for the next monthly allocation. And at the end of the next month, they all troop back to Abuja for the monthly routine. It is inconceivable for any state to grow with this type of economic structure that puts state governments on welfare benefits or what the Americans call the “dole.”5

The central control over states’ constitutionally established funds has created in its wake a federal Frankenstein’s monster. Two examples may be given. By an executive order made on May 8, 2002, and made retroactive

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 89

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

89

to May 29, 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo unilaterally increased the federal government’s share of revenue from the Federation Account from 48.5 percent to 56 percent, at the expense of the states. Such changes could by law be made only by the National Assembly on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.6 Under existing law, the formula for revenue allocation was: 1. Federal government, 48.5 percent 2. All states, 24 percent 3. All local governments, 20 percent 4. Special funds, 7.5 percent Under the new presidential order (S. 1.9 of 2002), the formula was altered to: 1. Federal government, 56 percent 2. All states, 24 percent 3. All local governments, 20 percent The thirty-six states instituted an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration that the presidential order was illegal and unconstitutional.7 In upholding the validity of the order, the Supreme Court said that by his powers under section 315 of the constitution the president had the power to modify an existing law to bring it into conformity with the constitution. That was what he had done. Since the constitution had no provision for special funds, the 7.5 percent allocated to that sector, in the court’s view, was incompatible with the constitution. Therefore, the president’s order transferring the 7.5 percent to the federal government was a valid exercise of power under section 315. The judgment of the Supreme Court reinforces the case for true federalism. For a system under which one tier of the federation can alter the revenue allocation formula at the expense of other tiers, even legally, is subversive of true federalism. Again in May 2003, the presidency announced that it had canceled the monthly Federation Accounts Allocation Committee meeting (the Abuja monthly pilgrimage). According to the presidency, the meeting was postponed to June, when the newly elected political officeholders would have been installed. According to the announcement, the aim or objective of the postponement was to forestall embezzlement by outgoing political officeholders. There was, in the view of the presidency, the possibility that a large percentage of the funds would be injudiciously utilized. Apart from the obvious implication of shutting down government, and the nonpayment of workers’ salaries in all of the states, the major implication of the federal

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 90

90

Crafting the New Nigeria

government’s unilateral and unconstitutional withholding of state funds was again damaging to federal-state parity. The Operation of Federalism In the series of constitutional conferences held by the Nigerian leaders from 1950 to 1958, there was one unanimous agreement: only a federal system of government was possible or acceptable in Nigeria. The National Conference held in Ibadan in 1950 was followed by others in Lagos and London, in 1953, 1954, 1957, and 1958. The content of the federalism unanimously agreed upon was progressively spelled out during this period and the 1960 independence constitution was the outcome. To the questions posed to each of the regional delegations at the 1950 national conference—“Do you wish to see a fully centralized system with all legislative and executive power concentrated at the center, or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy?”—the unanimous answer was federalism, with the existing regions as a starting point. What the negotiators finally arrived at in the form of the 1960 constitution was, subject to major nonstructural modifications, the only legitimate basis of association of all the different nationalities in Nigeria.8 One important feature of the 1960 constitution was the extensive powers granted to the regions, making them effectively autonomous entities. The revenue arrangements ensured that the regions had the resources to carry out their immense responsibilities. The 1960 and 1963 constitutions created a true federal system made up of strong states or regions and a central or federal state with limited powers. The following features emphasized the existence of a true federal system composed of powerful and autonomous regions and a center with limited powers: 1. Each region had its own separate constitution in addition to the federal constitution. 2. Each region had its own coat of arms and motto separate from that of the federal state or central government. 3. Each region established its own separate semi-independent mission in the United Kingdom headed by an agent-general. 4. The regional governments had residual powers, that is, where any matter was not allocated to the regions or the federal government, it automatically became a matter for regional jurisdiction. Thus, apart from items like aviation, borrowing of money outside Nigeria, control of capital issues, copyright, deportation, external affairs,

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 91

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

91

extradition, immigration, maritime shipping, mines and minerals, military affairs, posts and telegraphs, and railways, all other important items were on the concurrent list, permitting the regions equal rights to legislate and operate in those areas.9 A subject outside these lists, such as agriculture, housing, education other than higher education, health, water, resources, and local government, was exclusively a matter for regional jurisdiction. Other features indicative of the autonomous status of the regions included: separate regional judiciaries and the power of the regions to establish not only high courts but also regional courts of appeal; the regions had their own separate electoral commissions for regional and local government elections; however, the chairman of the federal electoral commission was the statutory chairman of each state commission; and the revenue allocation system under the 1963 constitution was strictly based on derivation. Mines, oil fields, geological surveys, and gas were put on the exclusive legislative list in the 1960 and 1963 constitutions. This was a carryover from the provisions of the 1946 Minerals Act, under which the colonial government gave itself the exclusive ownership and control of all minerals in Nigeria. This result was understandable under a colonial regime whose objective was the exploitation of the colonized peoples, but it was certainly not acceptable in an independent country composed of autonomous regions. It is therefore not surprising that what was lost by placing mines, minerals, oil fields, and the like on the exclusive legislative list was regained by a very strict adherence to the principle of derivation in the revenue allocation formula, particularly, the allocation of the proceeds from mineral exploitation to the regions where the resources originated. The regional constitutions in 1960 and 1963 described each of the three entities as “a self-governing Region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”10 To buttress the self-governing status of each region, adequate provisions were made to guarantee their economic independence, thus avoiding the hollowness of a declaration of self-governing status totally undermined by economic dependence—the Abuja monthly pilgrimage. Section 140 of the 1960 constitution, which made provision for the sharing of the proceeds of minerals, including oil, stated that “there shall be paid by the Federal Government to a region a sum equal to fifty percent of the proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in respect of any minerals extracted in that Region and any mining rents derived by the Federal Government from within any region.” It continued: “For the purposes of this section, the continental shelf of a Region was deemed part of that region.”11 By section 136(1), 30 percent of general import duties was paid into a distributable pool for the benefit of the regions. With regard to import duties on petrol, diesel oil, and tobacco, the total sum of import duty collected, less administrative expenses, was fully payable to the region for

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 92

92

Crafting the New Nigeria

which the petrol or diesel oil or tobacco was destined. A similar provision was made for excise duty on tobacco. With regard to produce such as cocoa, palm oil, groundnuts, rubber, and hides and skins, the proceeds of export duties were shared on the basis of the proportion of that commodity that was derived from a particular region. As noted above, the derivative basis of the allocation of revenue, and the proportionate share of such proceeds that went to the region from which it originated, clearly buttressed the operating basis of true federalism. Although the 1960 constitution did not provide for the ownership and control of mineral resources by the producing state or community, the entitlement of the producer state to 50 percent of the proceeds, and a share in another 30 percent, with the federal government being entitled to only 20 percent, was a true reflection of the derivative principle. It is unlikely that a state that is entitled to full ownership of its mineral resources, and that then has to pay taxes to the federal government for inclusion in the distributable pool, could have received more than 50 percent plus a percentage of 30 percent. To that extent, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions mitigated the injustice and, indeed, the illegality of declaring minerals produced from the soil of communities and states to be the property of the federal government. There had always been a strong secessionist tendency in the Muslim north of the country. In 1960, the northern elite only accepted conditions amounting to confederalism rather than federalism. Even during the conferences that followed the 1966 countercoup of northern soldiers and politicians, against the southern military head of state, the northern delegation submitted a memorandum demanding a confederation as the basis of association, including the right of regions to secede. Even after it subsequently modified its position, the delegation still clearly opposed a unitary system. It called for regional army commands. It also demanded a rotational presidency and prime ministership; each state was to contribute an equal number of members to a unicameral federal legislature. The Unitary Period: 1966–1999 With the military takeover in 1966, centralization of governmental powers followed the centralization of military command. General Yakubu Gowon, who was military head of state from 1966 to 1975, was mainly responsible for this development. Those who installed Gowon favored a loose federation. Yet it was under Gowon’s government that the regions—later states— systematically became emasculated. The very first decree issued by every successive military regime usually undermined the foundations of federalism. For example, sections 3 and 4 of Decree No. 1 of 1966 stated that:

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 93

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

93

1. The Federal Military Government shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever. 2. The Military Governor of a Region: a. Shall not have power to make laws with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List; and b. Except with prior consent of the Federal Military Government, shall not make any law with respect to any matter included in the Concurrent Legislative List. 3. Subject to subsection (2) above and to the constitution of the Federation, the Military Governor of a Region shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of that Region.12

The first federal military government completely vitiated the federal nature of Nigeria by giving itself the power to make laws for the whole of Nigeria with respect to any matter whatsoever. This arrogation reached its apogee in the Abacha era, when, by Decree No. 12 of 1994, the federal military government declared itself as being established “with absolute powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof (including of course all the states) with respect to any matter whatsoever.” The 1979 and 1999 constitutions maintained the trend toward centralization, even though they were made by the people for a democratic and federal system of government. Thus, instead of the forty-five items in the exclusive legislative list in the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, there were sixty-six items in the 1979 constitution and sixty-eight in 1999. Basic state matters like drugs and poisons, election of state governors, fingerprint identification and criminal records, labor and trade union matters, meteorology, police, prisons, professional occupations, stamp duties, taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, the regulation of tourist traffic, registration of business names, incorporation of companies, traffic on federal trunk roads passing through the states, trade and commerce, and censuses, were all transferred from the concurrent to the exclusive central list. The 1999 Constitution The legislative lists of the 1999 constitution clearly indicate the overwhelming dominance of the federal government. The exclusive legislative list includes not only matters that once were exclusively within the competence of states, but also many more matters that usually were on the concurrent list. One example was the borrowing of moneys by a state, local government, company, or any other entity on the exclusive legislative list. (Admittedly, states borrowed excessively between 1979 and 1983, saddling Nigeria with much of its current burden of foreign debt.) The following are

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 94

94

Crafting the New Nigeria

examples of items now under the exclusive legislative list, which could be concurrent or shared. 1. Mines and minerals, including oil and natural gas. This issue is contentious and explosive. Having been dispossessed for more than thirty years of their rights over local natural resources, the nationalities of the Niger Delta now demand those rights back. It is most unlikely that Nigeria can stay together if the Abuja government retains 100 percent ownership the of Niger Delta’s oil and gas wealth. 2. Censuses. Why can a state government not organize a population census of its state? The federally organized censuses since 1962 have been riddled with fraud. 3. Labor, trade unions, and industrial relations. Why should this be an exclusive federal subject? State and local governments employ workers and the question of the wages, conditions of service, workers’ welfare, and industrial disputes should be entirely a matter for the state concerned. The series of labor crises in 2000 arising from the issue of a national minimum wage would not have arisen if each state had been permitted to negotiate separately with labor unions in each state. 4. Police and other security services. In federations all over the world, both the federal and state authorities have police forces. Conceivably, despite potential risk that state governors would use state police forces for nefarious ends, states in Nigeria, as in other federal jurisdictions, might merit their own police forces. The Nigeria Police Force, under the exclusive control of the federal government, has proved incapable of maintaining security throughout the country. A New Constitution In a true federal system the federal government exercises exclusive power regarding basic matters of general relevance and importance, leaving other matters to the states.13 For Nigeria’s democratic growth, a federal government should exercise powers exclusively only in the following areas: national defense, foreign relations, currency, exchange control, immigration, customs and exercise, copyright, patents, designs, citizenship, and shipping in external waters. Any other matter currently on an exclusive legislative list (federal) should be put on a concurrent list (federal and states). The states and the federal government should exercise their powers in these matters in ways that do not result in interference with each other’s jurisdiction. What is here proposed is that the states should gain exclusive authority over the following, except that the Nigerian federal government could

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 95

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

95

lay down standards and guidelines and perhaps make grants toward some of these subjects: agriculture and fisheries, water resources, education (except higher education), labor (except federal employees), housing (except the federal capital territory, Abuja), local government, forestry, town and country planning, lands, and regional judiciaries. In addition, the following principles should apply: 1. Classifying the country into broad geopolitical regions, based on ethnic nationalities and using additional criteria, such as population and resources.14 2. All nationalities, regardless of size, should become autonomous federated units of equal value. (Arguments against giving each nationality its own territorial unit are numerous, not least the damage to the nation and the cost of many decentralized administrations.) 3. Where a region is made up of more than one nationality, each national group within the region will have its separate constitution and administration within each region. 4. Each region should have its own police force, regional defense force, and prison service. 5. Each region should also have its own judicial system. 6. There should be equal representation from the regions in a House of Representatives and representation of ethnic nationalities in a House of Nationalities. 7. The federal executive should consist of a president, who is head of state, commander in chief of the armed forces, and in charge of foreign relations, and a prime minister, who would be the head of government. The prime minister would be supported by an executive council made up of two ministers from each region. 8. The president should be elected by regional assemblies for a fiveyear nonrenewable term. The position would rotate among the regions. 9. The prime minister would be elected by the House of Nationalities and her/his tenure would be for three years, nonrenewable. The position would also be rotated among the regions, but no region would produce any two of the following executives at the same time, namely, president, prime minister, vice president, chief justice, chairman of House of Nationalities, and Speaker of the House of Representatives. No ethnic nationality would hold more than one of the following positions at the same time in a state: premier/governor, deputy premier/governor, speaker, or chief justice. Regions and states should be empowered to carry out their greatly increased political, social, and economic responsibilities under the new arrangement. A system of revenue allocation is proposed that would split oil and gas revenues, 50 percent of the proceeds being retained by the

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 96

96

Crafting the New Nigeria

region/community of extraction, 30 percent going into the general pool for distribution in accordance with an agreed-upon formula, and 20 percent to the federal government. For the purposes of revenue allocation based on derivation, the continental shelf of a state would be deemed to be a part of that state. Consistent with the doctrine of true federalism, resource control, justice, and equity, there should be no separation between ownership and control. The Petroleum Act would be repealed, and a new act and laws made to accommodate these changes. Double-Decker Federalism In the search for a suitable formula for the harmonious political association of the ethnic nationalities of Nigeria, no formulation should be ignored. The three southern zones and the old Middle Belt demand a fundamental restructuring of the country, involving extensive transfer of powers and resources from the federal to the proposed regional governments or the existing states. But the political elite of the northwest and northeast are unwilling to entertain such a restructuring. Instead, I propose establishing a double-decker federation in which the northwestern and northeastern zones, and parts of the north central zone, can retain the centralized federation of the 1999 constitution. Others can choose a looser, restructured federation. Under this system of double-decker federalism, the southern zones and the parts of the north central zone sharing the same view would establish their own independent police forces, regional or zonal commands of the Nigerian Army, a peoples militia, organize their own population censuses, and control their mineral resources independent of the federal police, armed forces, federal censuses, and federal resources. The reluctant zones, by contrast, could operate a single police authority with the federal government and allow the latter to continue conducting population censuses, generating electricity, and organizing armed forces centrally on their behalf. Under this arrangement, every zone and nationality would operate under the type of federalism that it prefers. In this manner the Nigerian federation or the Union of Nigeria, as the Movement for National Reformation draft calls it, will remain unbroken. National Conference Given the hurried circumstance in which the military surrendered power to a civilian government in 1999, and the fact that the present constitution was made by the military rulers and imposed on the country without the

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 97

Reordering Nigerian Federalism

97

involvement of the people of Nigeria, it is imperative and inevitable that a national conference of Nigeria’s nationalities should be held to fashion a voluntary, consensual, and democratic basis of new association.

Appendix Classification of Nigeria into Eighteen Regions by the Movement for National Reformation On the basis of these principles and criteria, it is proposed that the total number of regions should be eighteen, of which twelve will be mononationality regions as follows: Ibibio Federation, Ijaw Federation, Igbo Federation, Urhobo Federation, Edo Federation, Yoruba Federation, Nupe Federation, Tiv Federation, Fulah Federation, Gbagyi Federation, Hausa Federation, and Kanuri Federation. Six will be multinationality regions as follows: 1. One federation comprising minority nationalities in Cross River and Akwa Ibom State (i.e., Eket, Annang, Oron, Ibeno, Efik, Ejagham, Korop, Boki, Bakwara, Yakurr, Yala). 2. One federation comprising the minority nationalities in Rivers and Bayelsa States (i.e., Ikwere, Etchei, Ekpeye, Engeni, Ogba, Eleme, Ndoni, Ogoni, Andoni). 3. One federation comprising the minority nationalities in Delta State (i.e., Ika, Ndokwa, Warri, Isoko). 4. One federation comprising the minority nationalities in West Middle Belt (i.e., Zuru, Kambari, Bariba, Bussa, Karekare, Ngizim, Angamo, Bola, Funne, etc.). 5. One federation comprising the minority nationalities in Central Middle Belt, i.e., Ebira Group: Ebira, Uku, Ebira–Ugu, Ebira–Panda, Etuno–Igarra, Ebira Mozun, Bassa–Nge; Igala Group; Upper Benue Group: Alago, Eggon, Gwandara, Mada, Kakanda, Mighili, Bassa–Komu, Ninzom, Arum, etc.; Nok Group: Atyap, Ham, Bajju, Ninzam, Ikullu, Kamanton, Gwadara, Kahugu, Kwasam, Hori, Ninkyop, etc. 6. One federation comprising the minority nationalities in East Middle Belt, i.e., Plateau Group: Ngas, Berom, Afezere. Taroh, Goemai, Mavo–Jukun, Amu, Pyem, Youn, etc.; Taraba Group: Chamba, Jukun, Kuteb, Mambila, Kona, Kunni, Kaanab, Ndoro, Abakwa, Mumuye, Yububen, etc.; Savanna Group: Burra, Tangale–Waja, Bachama, Manghi, Kilba, Yungur, Mwanna, Bwazza, Mbula, etc.

Notes 1. See B. O. Nwabueze, Federalism in Nigeria Under the Presidential Constitution (London, 1983), 1. As Wheare put it, “the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of a federal system is that neither the central nor the regional governments are sub-ordinate to each other, but rather, the two are coordinate and independent.” Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1963), 10.

Rotberg-5.Final 12/17/04 4:35 PM Page 98

98

Crafting the New Nigeria

2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Third Schedule, part 1(F), Third Schedule, part 1(L), part 1(J), part 1(I). 3. Obafemi Awolowo, Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution (Oxford, 1966), 48–49. 4. Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (London, 1947), 48. 5. Lawson Omokhodion, “Anatomy of the Nigerian Economy,” Vanguard (Lagos), January 2, 2003, 35. 6. See section 162 of the 1999 constitution. 7. See Abia State and 35 Others v. The Attorney-General of the Federation 19, WRN 1 (2003). 8. Major or structural changes could be instituted by the same level of consultation and negotiation, i.e., through a national conference. 9. See the Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative lists in the 1963 constitution. 10. The preamble of each constitution. 11. S. 140(6), 1963 constitution. 12. S. 3 and S. 4, Decree No. 1, 1966. 13. The bulk of these proposals are based on the recent draft constitution prepared by the Movement for National Reformation. 14. The classification of Nigeria into eighteen regions by the Movement for National Reformation is attached as appendix 1.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 99

6 Getting the Politics Right: Governance and Economic Failure in Nigeria Peter M. Lewis Nigeria’s developmental failure is both extraordinary and paradoxical. The glaring discrepancy between the country’s abundant human and natural resources and the deficiencies of economic performance forms the reigning narrative of Nigeria’s postcolonial development. Indeed, few countries have as little to show for a comparable magnitude of resources and public spending. Petroleum exports, the lifeblood of the economy since 1970, have generated approximately U.S.$400 billion, a large portion of which has accrued as revenue to the government. These earnings fueled decades of outlays on social services, physical infrastructure, industry, and popular subsidies. Yet the dividends have been meager. The economic record since the oil boom is one of lackluster growth, increasing poverty, widening inequality, and a secular decline in performance. From 1980 to 2002, economic growth averaged just 2 percent annually, and real income per capita stands today at about one-third the level achieved in 1980. The incidence of poverty has climbed from less than a third of the population in 1981 to more than 70 percent in 2004.1 Nigeria’s once-thriving agricultural and solid mineral exports are moribund; manufacturing today constitutes a smaller proportion of the economy (about 6 percent) than at independence. The economy drifts on a sea of oil, blown by the capricious winds of international energy markets. Nigeria’s economic malaise has multiple causes and dimensions. Several factors must be considered in any explanation of long-term performance, including an unfavorable colonial legacy, structural problems within the economy, the country’s position in global markets, and harmful external shocks. Yet these factors cannot sufficiently account for the country’s flagging economy. The nature of economic governance, reflecting the strategies 99

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 100

100

Crafting the New Nigeria

of political elites, the composition of regimes, and the character of core institutions, shapes the crucial policy responses to these challenges. In short, Nigeria’s economic stagnation is rooted in particular features of the nation’s politics.2 Consequently, economic revitalization depends less upon specific policy remedies or a fortuitous external windfall than on a new political approach capable of shifting the central institutions and social coalitions toward good governance and economic growth. This chapter sketches the political bases for economic failure in Nigeria. The defining elements are the country’s fractious elites, a polarized and contentious civil society, and weak formal institutions. These central features of national life shape the political economy in fundamental ways: first, by hampering cohesion within the state; second, by accentuating immediate distributive concerns as a sine qua non of political survival; and third, by undermining incentives for productive investment and capital formation. The resulting political syndrome is a social dilemma in which actors and groups pursue individual utilities at the expense of collective welfare and third parties are unable to induce cooperation for improved outcomes. In other words, the state cannot effectively render public goods, and authorities are incapable of enforcing central rules or norms so as to structure exchange relations.3 The inability of public authorities to furnish credible commitments for private economic actors has impeded the investment needed for economic diversification, growth, and poverty reduction. The problem may also be cast in terms of principal-agent analysis: Nigeria has perennially lacked a principal to enlist the diverse agents of the state and civil society in a long-term project of growth and economic transformation. Political elites are impelled by short time horizons and chronic political insecurity, giving rise to strategies focused on the expedient redistribution of resources rather than the systematic mobilization of resources for production and growth. Nigeria’s poor economic performance often seems intractable, though it is neither predestined nor inevitable. The deterioration of the economy has been influenced by different regimes and phases of economic governance. The first period is associated with the distributive politics of the late colonial period and the postindependence First Republic (1960–1966), in which a weak federal state, combined with strong ethnoregional patronage structures, produced a fragile system of communal competition. Following the collapse of the parliamentary regime, an oil-fueled rentier state arose after 1970, facilitating statist and nationalist strategies under military rule. The civilian Second Republic (1979–1983) represented something of a departure from military statism, not so much because of its policies as its institutions and political organization. The second civilian regime moved toward a more diffuse model of patronage (or prebendalism) with increased

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 101

Getting the Politics Right

101

access points and growing elite polarization.4 The reassertion of military rule in 1984 gave rise to a period of institutional decay and growing personalization of power as Nigeria took on the attributes of an autocratic patrimonial system, culminating in the regime of General Sani Abacha. The economy reached a historical nadir in the late 1990s, as Abacha wantonly plundered public resources while systemically undermining institutions and incentives for economic activity. The story, then, is one of cumulative deterioration in economic governance, with a marked decline since 1991. The advent of civilian government in 1999, which capped sixteen years of authoritarian rule, presents opportunities for changing the nature of economic governance in Nigeria. The weight of the past bears heavily on the country’s economic prospects, as policy errors, institutional degeneration, and corrosive distributive struggles pose severe impediments to economic management. Despite early hopes of economic improvement, performance in the first civilian administration was lethargic, and policy initiatives or institutional reforms that might have shifted the country’s trajectory were wanting. Nevertheless, the path of Nigeria’s previous economic stagnation does not dictate continued failure. Economic recovery is, to an important degree, a political challenge. Democratization furnishes new political conditions that allow for improved economic governance over the medium term. Electoral institutions and wider civil liberties suggest opportunities for advancing coalitions of interest for better economic performance and for changing the political incentives facing elites. Effective reform and restructuring, however, will be contingent upon organizational innovation, changes in social coalitions, and shifts in basic economic ideas. This chapter focuses on the political factors underlying economic policy and performance, as well as the special problems of economic reform in Nigeria’s new political dispensation. The Record of Economic Change Nigeria’s colonial inheritance did not furnish an especially propitious platform for economic development. The nation emerged from British rule with a patchy infrastructure, sparse industry, a limited range of exports, and meager development of human capital. The economic structure, as in most other African countries, was open, reflecting export dependence on a small set of primary commodities and import dependence on foreign manufactures. Terms of trade for the country’s principal exports (cocoa, palm produce, groundnuts, cotton, and rubber) appreciated slightly from 1960 to 1970, but overall economic growth was modest.5 Table 6.1 shows trends in aggregate growth and income per capita from the 1960s through the 1990s.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 102

102

Crafting the New Nigeria

Table 6.1 Economic Growth and Per Capita Income

1965–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1998

Average Growth of GDP (%)

Average Growth of GDP per Capita (%)

1.56 7.00 0.93 3.43

–1.09 4.02 –2.04 0.35

Source: Calculated from World Bank data.

Economic performance was severely depressed by the civil war (1967– 1970), although the federal government’s wartime management yielded a measure of fiscal health. Oil production expanded rapidly after 1970, and Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC). The 1973 OPECinspired price rises fundamentally altered the economy. Oil exports grew by an order of magnitude, rapidly overshadowing other sources of output and revenue. By 1975, these export proceeds increased to more than threefourths of government revenues and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The economic transformation to a petroleum monoculture created heady opportunities, along with enormous liabilities. For many Nigerians, the revenue windfall raised prospects for rapid modernization of the economy and broad increases in standards of living. The military regimes of Generals Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Muhammad, and Olusegun Obasanjo pursued an ambitious program of import-substituting industrialization under state auspices, along with expanded social programs and an array of subsidies on essential services and commodities.6 Oil wealth, however, was not translated into diversified capital formation that could provide the basis for sustained growth. This result is reflected in Table 6.2, showing changes in economic structure. Despite enormous investments in state-sponsored manufacturing projects (including more than $6 billion in steel alone), the foundations of modern industry did not arise. Planning errors, shortcomings of administrative capacity, erratic revenues, and pervasive corruption stymied the implementation of large state industrial projects. Initiatives in metallurgy, petrochemicals, machine tools, automobiles, pulp and paper, and cement all foundered, at vast expense. In addition, the price distortions and fiscal behavior associated with Dutch disease (the harmful consequences of sudden large increases in a country’s foreign income) undermined nonoil sectors of the economy, and nationalist economic policies hampered investment and trade.7 Policies toward external capital substantially deterred foreign investment, while efforts to encourage domestic private capital, hampered by rampant corruption and

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 103

Getting the Politics Right

103

incentives for rent-seeking, yielded an anemic response. Agricultural production, in the face of low prices, weak investment, and institutional shortcomings, barely kept pace with population growth, and export activities became moribund. Solid mineral nonoil and gas exports also collapsed, and have not recovered since. After riding the brief, heady wave of the petroleum windfall, the downturn in global oil markets after 1980, along with a rapid accumulation of external debt, triggered an economic descent from which the nation has not recovered. Table 6.3 depicts the main trends in the oil bust. Government made a tardy, piecemeal response to the fiscal crisis. During the latter years of the Second Republic, the Shehu Shagari administration was unable to rein in the sprawling patronage politics of the civilian regime and was reluctant to curtail spending in the face of impending elections. Deficits

Table 6.2 Structural Change (value added, % GDP)

1965 1975 1985 1995

Agriculture

Industrya

Manufacturing

54.9 31.7 37.3 31.6

12.5 28.5 29.2 46.7

5.4 5.0 8.7 5.4

Source: Calculated from World Bank data. Note: a. Industry = manufacturing + mining. Table 6.3 End of the Boom: Export Revenue and External Debt

1980 1982 1984 1986

1978 1980 1983 1987 1990

Export Revenue (billion U.S.$)

Percent Change (from previous period)

27.1 12.7 12.3 5.3

— –53 –3 –57

External Debt (billion U.S.$)

Percent of GDP

5.1 8.9 17.6 29.0 33.4

14 14 50 124 118

Source: Calculated from World Bank figures.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 104

104

Crafting the New Nigeria

mounted along with external debt obligations, and investment and growth plummeted. General Muhammadu Buhari’s regime, which ousted the civilians on the eve of 1984, had little to offer apart from budget tightening and slogans. The ad hoc austerity measures of the military failed utterly to stabilize the economy, especially as it was unwilling to challenge the failed policy commitments of its predecessors. The economy spiraled rapidly downward through the mid-1980s. After deposing Buhari in 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida, promising fundamental change, put forward a sweeping agenda of economic and political reform.8 The government embarked on a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986 in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, followed by a timetable for a transition to democratic rule. These commitments, however, proved chimerical. The SAP embodied a package of reforms affecting exchange rates, trade and investment regulations, budget and fiscal priorities, state enterprise, subsidies, and public employment. The program yielded a stabilization of the economy in the late 1980s, including accelerated growth, a revival of some agricultural exports, and headway on debt restructuring. The government also took steps to liberalize financial services and to restructure or privatize the sprawling public enterprise sector. Implementation, however, was inconsistent, uneven, and fraught with political manipulation. The regime vacillated on exchange rate management and budget oversight, and bank liberalization and privatization measures were rife with clientelism and malfeasance. In 1990, when the fiscal position improved temporarily (following price hikes arising from the Persian Gulf crisis), economic management worsened markedly, and soon the reform program was adrift.9 Economic malaise was joined by political crisis when Babangida annulled the 1993 presidential election. The immediate political turmoil seriously depressed the economy in 1993, and General Abacha’s palace coup led to further deterioration. Abacha attempted to revert to the statist policies of the prereform period, but dismal performance soon prompted a restoration of some elements of the SAP. The rest of 1990s were characterized by a cynical dualism as the Abacha regime sought (without success) to present a veneer of economic reform and fiscal management while building a personal structure of patronage, economic plunder, and coercion. Not only were state resources looted with abandon; the ruler sought to restrict independent sources of wealth and entrepreneurship outside his own patrimonial control. Scarce revenues and deliberate government neglect fomented the decay of essential institutions and infrastructure. The results were disastrous for economic growth and popular welfare. The advent of democratic government in 1999 prompted expectations of improvements in economic policy and performance, yet those hopes

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 105

Getting the Politics Right

105

have so far been unfulfilled. Upon entering office, President Obasanjo pledged more effective governance, greater transparency, and a pragmatic economic policy. In its early months, his administration canceled major oil and land concessions made under the previous military regime, instituted a review of major contracts, and announced tougher anticorruption measures and asset disclosure rules for public officials. A fortuitous period of high oil prices helped to buoy the budget, and the government concluded an IMF standby arrangement little more than a year after taking office. The government introduced new initiatives for privatization and reform of key areas of production and infrastructure and conducted a shakeout of the banking industry. In addition, some observers hoped that forums such as the annual Nigerian Economic Summit and the previously concluded Vision 2010 conference could contribute a framework for better policies and cooperation among the public and private sectors. The possibilities for new policy coalitions within the nascent political parties also suggested political avenues to improve the economy. Many Nigerians anticipated that the country’s return to democracy, and the end of military-era foreign sanctions, would prompt new interest and involvement from foreign investors, as well as a possible write-off of foreign debt. These hopes and expectations have largely been frustrated. Economic policy seems adrift, relations with external creditors and donors are strained, political corruption appears to be unabated, privatization proceeds in fits and starts, the financial sector remains troubled, and external capital has largely shunned the Nigerian market. A Political Model of Economic Stagnation What are the political sources of Nigeria’s poor economic performance? Sustained economic growth relies upon the state’s provision of credible commitments to investors and producers. If private economic actors are to make investments in productive activities, they require assurances of policy predictability, secure property rights, and the effectiveness of contracts.10 Governments play a critical role in establishing these collective goods by providing them directly and facilitating coordination among market actors. Political and institutional credibility is the foundation of capital formation. Institutional perspectives furnish an explanation for the path of Nigerian development. Nigeria’s postcolonial economic malaise reflects the absence of a coordinating authority: a third party that can stabilize expectations, enforce rules, and induce cooperative behavior in administrative and market domains. The failure of economic governance stems above all from the absence of a political and institutional center to guide economic change. The leading power centers in the military, the bureaucracy, and political parties

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 106

106

Crafting the New Nigeria

have been internally fragmented, and consequently a central organization has not emerged to provide national integration or guidance. Political elites, divided by multiple cleavages, have proven incapable of consolidating a stable coalition among the country’s disparate interests and groups.11 Governments, whether military or civilian, construct bases of support principally through clientelism, rent-seeking, and the disbursal of state largesse.12 The problems of elite division, and the weakness of state institutions, present a classic social dilemma in which actors have few incentives to contribute to collective goods and the state cannot enforce cooperation. In consequence, actors compete for preferential access to public agencies and resources, and the state remains enmeshed in a chaotic contention over distribution. Groups within the state compete internally—and with private interests—over influence and assets. This political context gives rise to insecure property rights, uncertain contracting, and pervasive information asymmetries—all creating high risks of expropriation (or arbitrary loss of assets) for market actors. Under the pressures of competitive patronage, Nigerian regimes have failed to establish credible signals for private investment, and, consequently, a weak, fragmented business class has gravitated toward diffuse rent-seeking rather than productive accumulation. Political conditions encourage an emphasis on asset mobility, including speculative activities, high liquidity, and capital flight rather than investment in fixed, productive assets. Unstable and fragmented clientelist politics allow little possibility for private actors to forge relationships with state elites for the protection of assets. In consequence, political leaders have not established a viable producer coalition with private capital; nor have they stabilized a distributive compact with the broader society.13 Six successful coups, numerous failed revolts, two abortive democratic regimes, and three inconclusive democratization programs embody the basic problems of leadership and institutional development in Nigeria.14 The armed forces are fractured not only by ethnoregional identities but also increasingly by factions and personal alliances, as political ambition and rivalry have grown to dominate the organization. The civilian political elite, a roiling array of partisan, communal, and factional groups, is chronically insecure about its position under both authoritarian and democratic regimes.15 The political landscape creates short time horizons among rulers and narrow goals for the stabilization of regimes. A few leaders have shown initiative for reform—notably during Murtala’s brief rule and Babangida’s early years—but these were truncated by political instability and the exigencies of preserving power. Rather than setting out conditions for investment and capital formation, rulers commonly emphasize immediate inducements for political accommodation.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 107

Getting the Politics Right

107

The frequent turnover of regimes also hinders effective delegation to policy specialists (or technocrats), an essential element in successful developmental regimes elsewhere in the world.16 The political strategies of Nigerian executives require broad discretion over resources, which lead them to resist devolution of authority to specialist advisers or agencies. A technocratic circle of senior civil servants (known generally as the super permanent secretaries or “Super Permsecs”) wielded considerable influence under the Gowon regime (1966–1975). The Super Permsecs were purged in the wake of Murtala’s 1975 coup, and subsequent governments have failed to assemble a cohesive or capable economic team.17 Repeated cabinet changes, shakeups in the civil service, and an ever-changing array of advisory arrangements reduce the quality of policy advice and implementational capabilities while allowing broad leeway for the executive. Particular cabinet officials and advisory groups periodically attain some leverage, but they do not operate from a secure institutional position. In sum, unstable elite coalitions and a lack of technocratic delegation have eroded the capabilities of the state to manage the economy. The nature of support coalitions is a basic factor in institutional change. As noted above, Nigerian regimes rely upon rent distribution and fiscal perquisites to secure stability and control.18 These strategies are influenced by the bargaining structure of groups and the fiscal organization of the state. Nigerian leaders face strong distributive demands from ethnic or regional communities but few broad pressures from organized class strata. Governments respond to these disparate claims through piecemeal efforts at redistribution, a strategy facilitated by petroleum revenues and the growth of central resources. Civilian governments use state-mediated rents to cement political allegiances, build party coffers, and afford an economic base for an emergent political class. Military rulers disburse economic favors, business opportunities, and political sinecures to cultivate support within the armed forces and secure cooperation from politicians and business elites. These practices are centralized and concentrated under military regimes and are more dispersed in civilian systems. State elites and private-sector interests have converged around patron-client relationships and rentier activities, largely skirting formal institutions and competitive markets.19 The distribution of assets and political power hampers the formation of an effective producer coalition between the state and private actors. The major ethnoregional groups embody different economic interests and endowments. Southern groups have achieved a dominant position in the modern sectors of the economy, drawing upon comparatively strong educational attainments, closer proximity to major centers of commerce, and international linkages. Northern elites, while economically less competitive, have proven adept at forming political coalitions and have frequently controlled the central government.20

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 108

108

Crafting the New Nigeria

Herein lies a central problem for economic policy and institution building: competing elites, invariably representing a sectional minority or a weak central coalition, fear that concentrations of economic power among other sections of the country might translate into political leverage and control. Rulers are averse to broad economic growth, preferring to regulate economic allocations by expanding state prerogatives and controlling economic activity. Property rights are administered chiefly by political fiat. Immigrant Lebanese entrepreneurs and foreign investors were largely expropriated in the 1970s and have since remained wary of the market. Domestic business interests face unpredictable policies, erratic institutions, and insecure relations with state officials.21 The disposition of property rights, amid political instability and shifting alliances, precludes credible commitments to entrepreneurial groups. Uncertainty hampers the expansion of fixed assets and productive activities, yielding deficits in capital formation. The relation between elites and the mass public is another element of coalition formation. The frequent turnover of regimes and the fractiousness of ruling groups work against the establishment of a stable governing compact. During the oil boom, governments pursued populist measures to foster support, including price controls and subsidies, burgeoning public employment, extensive social provisions, protection and assistance for local entrepreneurs, and expansive fiscal, monetary, and borrowing policies to finance growth.22 This strategy garnered a degree of political acceptance, but it was economically unsustainable and collapsed in the early 1980s as oil revenues declined. Military governments have also sought to control organizations for labor, women, students, and academics as a means of co-opting those groups. Nigeria’s authoritarian rulers, however, have not shown the ideological coherence or organizational capacity to build a stable corporatist compact. As is the case in intraelite bargaining, political leaders commonly address popular demands through informal dispensations and bargains struck with sectional groups. Regimes commonly look to some form of multiethnic coalition as a basis for political consolidation. Electoral alliances or other public compacts have been fragile, leading different governments to pursue elite co-optation, patronage politics, and, in the case of dissident minorities, intermittent repression.23 Within this context of distributive politics, formal institutions are undermined by high levels of political discretion over resources, and state elites face extensive pressures for preferential benefits. Since the late 1980s, a more purely predatory form of rule has led to the degeneration of state capabilities and essential institutions. Political decay is bound up with economic decline. The economy has been plagued by imprudent policies and poor management, outlandish corruption, capital flight, and widening criminality, declining investment and production, and growing marginality

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 109

Getting the Politics Right

109

in the international system. In a setting of weak regimes and unstable social compacts, central authorities and institutions lack the coherence to organize the rudiments of economic life, with ruinous consequences for development. The current civilian regime has inherited this degenerative legacy. Democratization, while opening significant opportunities for economic change, takes place within these historical bounds. An attenuation of Nigeria’s social dilemma will require the emergence of distinctive leadership, the mobilization of new constituencies, and a concerted process of institutional transformation. The recent advent of democratic rule offers no panacea for the problem of economic governance; indeed, many observers see substantial problems in the current dispensation. It is argued here, however, that democratic politics furnish opportunities for improving accountability, reforming institutions, and shifting coalitions. Political Influences on Economic Performance Nigeria’s political economy has been shaped since independence by four broad developments. An entry point is the legacy of communal competition stemming from the colonial era and the formative period of postindependence politics. Communal rivalries have shaped elite divisions as well as popular contention over identity and resources. A second major factor—the formation of the rentier state—came into play with the arrival of the oil boom. The rise of mineral rents and the growth of the central state shaped distributive politics and policy choices. When the boom collapsed in 1982, the country entered a fitful period of austerity and adjustment. A third element in the politics of economic change has been the persistence of ideas and interests from the windfall era, as well as the difficulty of advancing a new model of reform. A fourth factor is the institutional decline arising from political instability and revenue constraints. Communalism and Distributive Politics

Nigeria’s communal polarization gives rise to political instability and invidious competition over resources. Divisions among elites and rivalries between groups foster an economic policy emphasis on strategic distribution. Political demands for patronage and rents encourage the dissipation of resources in current consumption, rather than capital formation and growth. The boundaries established by Britain in 1914 have proven especially troublesome for the country’s political and economic development. Encompassing more than 350 distinct language groups, the Nigerian polity is dominated by three large ethnoregional communities (northern Hausa-Fulani,

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 110

110

Crafting the New Nigeria

southeastern Igbo, and southwestern Yoruba) who together comprise about two-thirds of the population. Each of these culturally distinct groups, under strong nationalist leadership, gravitated toward regionally based parties in the years leading to independence. Politics were defined by the tripartite competition between these political movements, which quickly attained control of separate regional governments and eclipsed neighboring ethnic minorities.24 Communal politics have undergone considerable change since the 1960s. Minorities that were subsumed within the original regions have attained greater political leverage and representation. The fault line between northern and southern populations has coalesced into another dimension of national politics and social tension. Religion now parallels ethnicity as a source of contentious mobilization. And new regional groupings— notably in the Niger Delta—have come to the fore in contemporary politics. These cleavages and coalitions supplement, but do not efface, the contention among the major ethnoregional groups. Problems of institutional design are central to managing communal competition. The colonial administration set in place a federal parliamentary system based upon three regions with significant fiscal and legislative powers and a relatively weak central government. When ethnically dominant parties took control of the regions, they created separate electoral machines and patronage systems to bolster their control. The parliamentary framework gave rise to a winner-take-all syndrome in which the most powerful regional party (that of the most populous northern region) dominated the federation, inciting feelings of exclusion and resentment from other sections of the country.25 These tensions eventually toppled the First Republic in the 1966 military coup. Rising communal conflict sparked a civil war with the attempted Biafran (Igbo) secession the following year. The crisis and civil conflict of the 1960s created lasting concerns among Nigerian elites for national stability and distributive balance. At the formal level, this stability question was addressed through the creation of new states to supplant the regional structure. By subdividing the larger ethnic groups and awarding political units to minorities, leaders hoped to blunt the tripartite contention of major communal blocks and to broaden the distribution of resources. From twelve states in 1967, as Paden, Sklar, and Suberu indicate, the number grew to nineteen in 1976, twenty-one in 1989, thirty in 1991, and thirty-six in 1996. State creation is integrally related to the revenue distribution formula, which has been revised repeatedly from the early 1950s forward. Since independence, Nigeria has had about two dozen arrangements for the allocation of revenues, spelled out in various constitutions or specified by decree and ad hoc commissions. Revised constitutions in 1979, 1989, and 1999 have modified the powers and prerogatives of the federal authorities, states, and local governments.26

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 111

Getting the Politics Right

111

Much contention over the distribution of resources plays out at an informal level. At least since the early 1970s, distributive politics has taken the form of informal arrangements among parties and political factions, impromptu decisions by military rulers, and the dispersal of patronage and rents. Distribution is effected through multiple channels—formal and informal, legal and illegal—including emphases on planning, budgetary allotments, government contracts, fiscal and trade policies, state-owned enterprises, government services and subsidies, public employment, and off-budget dispensations. Collusive relations with private business and a permissive setting for corruption frame these dispensations. Inequalities among the regions give rise to multiple lines of conflict and rivalry. Initially, the three regions possessed distinct but equivalent revenue bases in export agriculture, which afforded the regional governments an independent revenue base. With the creation of new states and the rise of the oil economy, the fiscal autonomy of the regions evaporated.27 Export agriculture collapsed, and central government revenues quickly overshadowed all other resources. Although oil is designated a national resource by the state, it is extracted from the onshore and offshore fields in the southern Niger Delta. Residents of the Delta (and the southeast more generally) are resentful over the perceived imbalance between the wealth extracted from their territory and their meager returns in revenue, state services, and local growth. They have contested revenue allocation, development spending, and environmental policies that disadvantage their communities. Broad divisions among northern and southern populations in terms of education, skills, and competitiveness form another critical gap. Under colonial rule the southern states, by virtue of population density, coastal proximity, and cultural makeup, became the center of modern commerce, administration, and education. The northern region, which largely comprised the Islamic emirates as well as the historical Kanem-Bornu empire, was substantially insulated from these influences by geography and colonial policy. At independence, the entrepreneurial dynamism and cosmopolitan outlook of southern groups gave rise to insecurity among northern elites, who felt that they were liable to be excluded from economic advancement and political influence. Northern elites, who have controlled the central government during much of the postindependence era, have commonly favored a state-managed economy, including a large public enterprise sector, presumably because the state can compensate for regional disparities and furnish opportunities to disadvantaged areas. Southern groups have often been resentful of state patronage directed to the north, and have also been more amenable to the establishment of competitive markets. These different perspectives are especially salient as questions of privatization and liberalization come to occupy the center of policy debate.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 112

112

Crafting the New Nigeria

Oil and the Rentier State

The far-reaching effects of oil wealth on state structure, the outlook of elites, and relations between government and citizens also define Nigeria’s political economy.28 Petroleum activities became economically central after the end of the civil war in 1970 and have remained so ever since. Soaring export income and government revenues profoundly affected public spending and economic growth, especially after 1973. Politically, we can identify four important effects arising from the oil economy. The first is a marked centralization of resources, institutions, and policy.29 Petroleum fostered a rentier state, as the rents from mineral exports became the central source of income, flowing directly from foreign firms and buyers to the central government. Almost immediately, the federal government attained a virtual fiscal monopoly. The independent revenue capabilities of the states became moot, with the fiscal shadow of the center growing larger as locally derived agricultural exports withered and private manufacturing stagnated. Fiscal and administrative centralization was accentuated by the proliferation of states and local governments, since these lower tiers lacked autonomous revenues and had few reciprocal relations among themselves. The fiscal centralization of the rentier state gave rise to a second set of dynamics, the accentuation of state patronage and rent-seeking, along with a corresponding shift in distributive politics to the federal center. The distribution of rents has two forms in the petroleum state. Government officials directly allot resource rents through public contracts, employment, state-provided credit, or the provision of services and utilities. In addition to relatively direct forms of patronage, the government creates scarcity rents by regulating private markets.30 Trade protection (tariffs and other restrictions), exchange rate policy, and the indigenization decrees (regulating private ownership and investment) all created rental havens that could be exploited through collusion among state officials and private actors. All of these forms of rent distribution were encouraged by the political strategies of various regimes and were facilitated by weak administration and meager fiscal oversight. The process of rent distribution was accompanied by pervasive corruption. With the growth of the rentier state, the central government became the focus of distributive politics.31 Communal and factional groups contended over control of the federal state, while diverse interests sought special access to central resources and state officials. These pressures eroded political stability, undermined the autonomy of policymakers, and reduced the capacities of the bureaucracy. The rentier state reflects a basic paradox: prodigious resources and a widening domain of regulation and intervention, accompanied by a weakening ability to plan, manage, and administer the economy.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 113

Getting the Politics Right

113

A third effect is fiscal myopia. Petroleum wealth almost universally induces misperceptions about public finances. The soft budget constraint and a money illusion are aspects of this syndrome. The arrival of a revenue windfall distorts financial perspectives. Government officials and state enterprise managers, initially awash in unearned revenues, come to assume that fiscal constraints are illusory.32 Since revenues seem to be abundant and the government is wealthy, there is an expectation of a bailout for any shortfall in revenue—hence budgets are soft, and spending is substantially unconstrained. This outlook has a temporal dimension: the illusion that the windfall is permanent and that future revenue bonanzas will alleviate current distress. This leads to myopic behavior, notably a reluctance to adjust to adverse shocks or promptly to address fiscal crises. Finally, because of its independent external revenue, the rentier state is essentially divorced from a tax base in domestic production. This affords great latitude in making policy and conferring patronage, while allowing political elites to evade public accountability, and reducing incentives for leaders to promote domestic productivity. Distributive politics include populist policies and intermittent patronage to placate popular constituencies. Petroleum revenues substantially insulate political leaders from economic failure by sustaining the resources and perquisites of strategic elites even when economic performance and public welfare are in decline. Windfall resources have temporarily obscured the ill effects of imprudent policies, thereby staving off pressure for reform. Ideology, Values, and Economic Policy

The oil boom ended in 1982 as plummeting revenues and accumulating debt pressures instigated a fiscal crisis, triggering a protracted economic decline. Nigeria’s petroleum income has been limited since then by periods of low global prices and the constraints of OPEC production quotas. Episodic mini-windfalls in 1990, 1999–2000, and 2003–2004 did not mitigate the general trend. In the face of declining export receipts, Nigeria has had little success in generating significant nonoil revenues or supplementing foreign resources through direct or portfolio investment. The unfavorable external environment is aggravated by laggard policy responses to external shocks, as well as a low propensity to implement adjustment. These problems are rooted in the political incentives of the rentier state as well as prevailing ideas regarding economic strategy and policy. Nigerians are deeply ambivalent regarding markets and the shape of the national economy. At a basic level, the public is favorably disposed toward markets and supportive of a broad realm of private sector activity. At the level of rhetoric and discourse, there is limited opposition to market forces or private enterprise, and Nigerians engage widely in entrepreneurial

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 114

114

Crafting the New Nigeria

endeavors. Nigerian governments have commonly articulated a mixed economy in which the private sector and market forces hold a significant role.33 At the same time, there is a great deal of suspicion toward unfettered competition, large-scale (especially foreign) business, and open transactions with the outside world.34 Various governments, prompted by concerns over exploitation, inequality, and volatility, have intervened extensively in the economy. Interventionist and market-oriented visions of economic policy are constantly in tension. Nigerian perspectives on economic strategy have traditionally emphasized three themes: nationalism, statism, and populism. These ideas reached their apogee in public life during the boom era of the 1970s. Yet, despite the enormous changes in economic circumstances since that time, attitudes toward economic policy have been slow to change. Recent survey research conducted by the Afrobarometer network suggests that Nigerians are more statist in their views than the majority of Africans, including Tanzanians, Malians, and others who have lived under socialist policies.35 The persistence of these economic perspectives among Nigerian elites and the general public has a significant influence on the political context of reform. Economic nationalism generally connotes a preference for domestic ownership and production rather than foreign involvement, as well as a corresponding set of measures to protect or insulate domestic producers from foreign competition. These values have strong roots in the country. Nigerians share with most postcolonial Africans a historical skepticism toward the effects of foreign enterprise and trade. Nigeria is also the most populous country in Africa, and the vision of a strong, independent, modern economy holds broad appeal among the public.36 The rapid growth of investment and trade during the petroleum boom heightened public concerns about the relative position of domestic business, national control of the economy, and the need to promote domestic markets and production. These concerns were addressed through a restrictive investment and trade regime, a fixed (overvalued) exchange rate, state subsidies and credit for domestic business, the creation or expansion of state-owned enterprises, and the Nigerianization program, which was intended to put equity and management in indigenous hands. This menu of policy measures points to a second aspect of economic policy: the preference for statism. Statism refers to an expectation that government will take a leading role in planning development, guiding structural change, promoting growth, and regulating markets. Although private enterprise and market incentives constitute a large domain of the economy, the state occupies a principal role as catalyst, owner, regulator, and arbiter. This vision of economic strategy presumes that the state will act in the national interest to protect sovereignty, smooth inequalities, guard against exploitation, and plan the contours of economic change. Statist orientations

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 115

Getting the Politics Right

115

provide a large role for planning, control of important markets (such as agricultural commodities and petroleum), and the restriction of particular ventures and activities (i.e., defense production, public utilities, and strategic industries) to state ownership.37 Statist perspectives are associated with a third direction in economic policy, that of populism. As nationalist perspectives and statist ambitions grew during the petroleum boom, successive governments (military and civilian) also favored populist measures to gain legitimacy and address public needs. Populism generally refers to a variety of social programs and subsidies that appeal to popular sectors (including workers, farmers, and the middle class). Universal education and health care, student scholarships, subsidized fuel, transportation, utilities, and fertilizer; a managed exchange rate (to maintain cheap imports); and controlled food prices (through government marketing systems) are all important populist measures. Populism usually calls for expansionary fiscal policy (often monetary expansion as well) and a large domain of market regulation. These trends gained ground during the oil boom, when buoyant revenues and ambitions for rapid development animated economic policy.38 In addition, concerns for legitimacy among military leaders and politicians encouraged populist programs. By the middle of the 1980s, however, these policies were fiscally untenable. Nigerian leaders slowly and reluctantly turned toward orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment. The turn toward liberalization was supported by a limited constituency in the business community, the senior civil service, and segments of the general public who bemoaned the government’s sorry record of economic intervention. These groups comprised a distinct minority, however, and economic reform did not have a broad base of acceptance or support. Elites and the mass public tended strongly to favor a continuation of statist approaches and populist policies. The rentier and populist coalitions cemented during the windfall era continued to influence government policy and to shape the political incentives of leaders.39 The SAP experience under Babangida did little to increase popular acceptance of reform (or to enhance the public image of the Bretton Woods institutions). For average Nigerians, the program brought austerity, retrenchment, and rising prices and user fees, with few compensating signs of economic improvement. Furthermore, the public widely perceived that members of the regime and their cronies exploited reforms such as privatization, financial liberalization, and other measures to their own advantage, while ordinary citizens bore the brunt of adjustment. Indeed, recent Afrobarometer surveys confirm that the majority of Nigerians believe that economic reform has only benefited a tiny minority of privileged elites.40 More than eighteen years have passed since the initial Structural Adjustment Program, and in that time public views toward liberalization have

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 116

116

Crafting the New Nigeria

shifted considerably. The lessons of chronic state failure (especially the decline of the Abacha years) have been acknowledged, and many Nigerians now believe that the government should curtail some of its activities and abstain from broad intervention in markets. In addition, many in the business community and the broad middle class are concerned by Nigeria’s growing international marginality. The opportunities of economic globalization (along with its many hazards) are actively debated among policymakers and business elites. In short, there is now a substantial segment of the public that accepts the need for some degree of economic reform and liberalization, although many people remain skeptical about the ability of leaders and donors to pursue an effective course of recovery. Yet, this new realism should not be exaggerated. Large portions of the elite and the general public remain attached to nationalist ideals of autonomy, statist promises of a central guiding hand, and the populist values of welfare and distributive justice—regardless of the poor record of the past three decades. Survey evidence suggests that Nigerians are more attached to civil service employment, state enterprise, government control of oil and commodity markets, and trade protection than other Africans.41 Enduring attitudes toward the economy have created a considerable lag between the realities of poor performance and general agreement on the direction of reform. Declining Capacity: The Importance of Institutions

Political instability, fiscal constraints, patronage, and corruption have steadily undermined the capacity of major institutions to foster economic growth. The problem of institutional decline extends from the peak elements of the state—the military, the civil service, and central banking authorities—to encompass public utilities, the education and health sectors, state and local governments, and major organizations of the market and civil society.42 A weak institutional setting carries significant consequences for policy and performance. Political instability is both a cause and a consequence of institutional decline. Apart from the volatile nature of regimes, several leaders have purged or retrenched large portions of the public service (notably Generals Murtala in 1975, Buhari in 1984–1985, and Babangida in the late 1980s), yet no government has pursued a broader strategy of institutional reform. Abrupt changes in government and the public service batter morale, reduce effectiveness, and hinder the recruitment of talented personnel. Under civilian rule as well, profligacy and political intervention have been corrosive to state agencies. The declining performance of institutions in turn weakens government legitimacy, aggravates crises, and makes leaders more susceptible to challenge. Political uncertainty creates shorter time horizons for incumbent leaders, accentuating concerns with immediate stability and crisis

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 117

Getting the Politics Right

117

management rather than forward-looking perspectives on economic growth and institutional development. In circumstances of insecurity, leaders are inclined toward patronage, rent distribution, and popular policies. They are far less likely to embrace a strategy of long-term development and deferred gains. After nearly four decades of instability in Nigeria, the political incentives of immediate survival are powerful, and political leaders have difficulty in accepting the risks of accountability and reform. The failure of Nigerian institutions has a long genesis, from the disarray and corruption of the 1970s to the fiscal shambles of the civilian Second Republic, through the austerity of the early 1980s and the incomplete reform of the Babangida regime. The 1990s, however, marked a period of steep decline, as the political crisis surrounding the 1993 elections gave way to a new dictatorship under General Sani Abacha. His predatory autocracy plundered the economy and deepened the country’s international isolation. The paucity of resources, an ailing economy, and a general morass of governance fostered a rapid deterioration of public functions. When the new civilian administration assumed office in 1999, it inherited a badly depleted institutional landscape. The weakness of public institutions has far-reaching effects. Policymaking is obviously handicapped by an inconsistent economic team. Low capacity and corruption among the civil service and state enterprises seriously impair the implementation of central policies. The declining provision of social services impedes human capital, and a decaying infrastructure magnifies transaction costs. The specter of regime change creates additional uncertainty. In these circumstances, market actors are not inclined to make long-term investments in productive assets. Rather, they emphasize shortterm liquidity and gravitate to safer activities such as trade, real estate, and currency speculation. The trends toward criminality and parallel market activities are further symptoms of these circumstances. Unless and until Nigerian governments furnish essential public services, an elemental rule of law, and basic property rights, there will not be a sufficient private investment response to foster economic recovery. From the vantage point of institutional analysis, the Nigerian state must offer credible commitments to private market actors as a sine qua non for economic growth and restructuring. This is not simply a matter of executive choice, but is a broader political challenge. The political capacity for institutional change arises from a combination of leadership, the capacities of peak institutions, and the political coalition surrounding economic policy. Democracy, Coalitions, and Reform

The preceding analysis underscores the importance of political change as a requisite for Nigerian development. A decisive shift in the country’s political

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 118

118

Crafting the New Nigeria

economy entails complex political challenges: attenuating the damaging politics of communalism, shifting the prerogatives of the rentier state, changing economic ideas, and fostering policy credibility. The nascent democratic regime creates opportunities as well as difficulties in addressing such concerns. The executive no longer wields the authority of decree on budget matters or other macroeconomic policies, and contention between the president and the legislature is now a central feature of the policy process. There also is a degree of decentralization in the assertive political independence of many state governors, as well as the increasing weight being given to the derivation of revenues in distributing resources.43 Moreover, debates about economic issues and government policy now take place in a generally open atmosphere of free media and active civic associations. Some observers have suggested that these new dimensions of politics create impediments to economic reform, since contentious partisan politics, sectional lobbying, and patronage relations presumably divert policymakers and hinder implementation. These liabilities are evident in the current situation. Democracy, however, furnishes opportunities for change that are unavailable in other systems. A competitive political arena enhances opportunities for assembling new coalitions in support of better governance and economic change, increasing the accountability of political leaders, and creating a more enduring domestic political base for policy reform. Nigerians remain profoundly ambivalent about the direction of their economy and the prospects for reform, yet today there are more vigorous and diverse voices in support of good governance, economic liberalization, and policy change than when adjustment was first attempted in the 1980s. The advocates of reform—arising from the business community, the professions, segments of the media, selected politicians, elements in the civil service, and portions of civil society—do not have a political foundation in a single political party or civic organization. Yet there is much acceptance, even among those who are generally skeptical of liberalization, of the need for fiscal discipline, a measure of privatization, a more open trading system, and a greater acceptance of foreign capital. The question of whether a coherent reform coalition can arise in Nigeria is ultimately a domestic political concern. It will be decided by the actions of business associations, professional groupings, the media, diverse NGOs (in such areas as corruption, law, consumer issues, and various constituencies such as women and traders), groups in the political parties, and particular politicians and caucuses. Democracy certainly offers more space for a reform movement to coalesce than any type of authoritarian regime. Reform entails both political direction and institutional change. The fundamental question for Nigeria, in the wake of political transition, is whether the new regime can make credible commitments to investors and producers in the near term, and engender a rule of law over the longer term.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 119

Getting the Politics Right

119

The challenges are formidable and the prospects of success relatively narrow. Effective economic change will rely upon a selective devolution of decisionmaking, more inclusive social coalitions, and broader integration in international institutions and markets. Reform-minded Nigerian leaders will face the challenge of dismantling rentier coalitions and fostering new constellations of interest around a more competitive and equitable economy. As the fledgling democratic regime seeks to restructure the economy, greater political inclusion and a wider dissemination of benefits will be integral to stabilizing new institutional arrangements. A greater measure of distributive fairness is a political requisite for economic change. Conclusion Three final questions are key. First, what would a dynamic Nigerian economy look like? Second, what political and institutional changes would be needed to increase the developmental capacities of the Nigerian state? Third, what policy measures—both domestic and international—might encourage economic revitalization in Nigeria? On the first point, it is evident that a diversification of productive activities is a sine qua non for improved economic performance. A shift of output and revenues from the current concentration on the petroleum sector toward more varied composition in agriculture, manufacturing, and services is the requisite for a resilient, competitive economy. This entails a vigorous investment and supply response among private economic actors throughout the economy. Furthermore, domestic rather than foreign investors will be instrumental in broad-based growth. In this regard, it is important to consider the role of overseas Nigerian capital. Given the immense capital flight and considerable emigration from Nigeria, these external resources, if channeled into the domestic market, could yield substantial dividends. Diversification also implies the emergence of greater regional differentiation within the Nigerian economy, as well as the development of interregional complementarities in factor and product markets. A less centralized, more heterogeneous market can be facilitated by the devolution of power and policy discretion to state and local authorities, and the dispersion of economic power will facilitate the emergence of more varied business groups and sectoral interests. Internationally, economic restructuring implies an expansion of trade, particularly the entry of Nigeria into export markets outside the energy sector. The most feasible outlets are likely to be found in the subregion, as well as selected markets in continental Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. Although market actors and resources are instrumental in economic growth and diversification, a more capable state is also required to structure

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 120

120

Crafting the New Nigeria

market exchange, provide essential infrastructure and human capital, mediate inequalities, and, in some instances, shape incentives and channel resources. There should be few illusions about the emergence of a strong developmental state in Nigeria, along the lines of the East Asian and Southeast Asian successes.44 But there are a number of feasible reforms and adjustments in the political structure that can significantly improve the capacities of government to encourage growth, spur capital formation, and reduce poverty. One of the most important changes would be to strengthen centers of competence in the senior economic bureaucracy and to delegate authority to such critical units. If the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance attained greater effectiveness and autonomy, and a core team of economic advisers in the presidency supported these peak agencies, such changes would significantly enhance the ability of government to frame policies and sustain economic reforms. More robust regulatory capacities, especially with regard to anticorruption measures and capital markets, would also be important. Finally, efforts to tackle the deterioration of the civil service could significantly enhance budgetary oversight and service delivery while broadly reducing transaction costs throughout the economy. These institutional changes would facilitate the revival of basic education and health services, critical infrastructure such as power and fuel, and agricultural supports, which are fundamental to any trajectory of recovery. The reduction of transaction costs would also produce the investment needed for a strong supply response. Such reform and restructuring implies a shift in the political incentives for elites. Economic change will entail the emergence of new political coalitions that advance the interests of producers and investors. As this analysis suggests, the most constructive political setting would mitigate invidious communal competition, link political incentives more firmly to the expansion of nonoil production, and advance policy ideas to improve the setting for private investment. Democratic institutions furnish the greatest opportunities for reform, as an electoral regime allows for political competition, pressures for accountability from voters, more open public discourse and debate, greater access to information, and new formations within civil society to advance popular interests. Such changes are highly contingent, however; it must be recognized that the current political terrain is dominated by a political class oriented to patronage and rent distribution and a set of popular interests focused on competition for access to state largesse. Nonetheless, the elements of a developmental coalition are evident. They include important elements of the peak business associations; private-sector participants in the Economic Summit, the Lagos Business School, and other forums for policy discussion; activist state governors who have pursued innovative economic agendas;

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 121

Getting the Politics Right

121

disparate politicians in the legislature concerned with economic policy and political reform; groups pressing for reform of the federal system to allow greater state autonomy in framing economic policy and retaining locally derived revenues; and a variety of civil society groups active in health, education, anticorruption efforts, rural interests, women’s rights, minority rights, and antipoverty measures. At present these interests are fragmented, sometimes at odds over key issues of liberalization or institutional reform. Yet, one can discern opportunities for new alliances to pressure politicians and the emergent parties for improvements in economic performance. Finally, what policy framework might advance economic change in Nigeria? At the domestic level, it is clear that a medium-term economic program is needed to guide policy and institutional change. The rudderless ship of economic policy under the first civilian administration was a great liability in tackling a moribund economy. The task of crafting an effective economic program suggests an opportunity to improve the setting of macroeconomic policy formation. The mandate for such a program could be devolved to a specialist domestic advisory group, with political autonomy and linkages to peak ministries and departments. If Nigeria can improve macroeconomic performance over a two- or three-year period, the country will be in a stronger position to press for debt reduction and trade facilities from the OECD markets. Against the background of basic macroeconomic management, several areas seem particularly urgent for economic improvements: progress in anticorruption efforts; the revival of health systems and education; a resurrection of agricultural policy and necessary assistance to rural production; and the advance of privatization efforts in critical infrastructural areas such as power and oil refining. Policies for economic performance should also be accompanied by further governmental efforts to engage the private sector regarding policy changes, the enabling environment for investment, and business strategies for sectoral improvements. The broadest inclusion of different regional interests, groups, and activities among the private sector will not only provide better information for economic policy but also signal a more permissive setting for investment and production. This is an integral part of the political crafting needed for an effective producer coalition. External actors, though clearly limited in their influence and efficacy, can selectively engage Nigerians in the pursuit of better developmental performance. Assistance in framing better institutions of macroeconomic management (including domestic advisory groups and improved budgeting and regulatory systems) is a fruitful area of collaboration. Financial and technical assistance in rehabilitating key areas of infrastructure and public services may also provide outlets for addressing public needs and equity concerns. With better macroeconomic performance, the questions of debt relief and market access can be revisited, and initiatives by the G7 countries and the

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 122

122

Crafting the New Nigeria

Bretton Woods institutions could significantly improve Nigeria’s investment and trade prospects, and its balance of payments position. In the near term, however, one of the most important areas of external engagement will be collaboration with elements of civil society on an agenda of better governance, improved economic management, incentives for productive investment, and concerted attention to issues of poverty and equity. The greater the redistributive impact of economic reforms and growth, the stronger the social foundations of long-term revitalization are likely to be. Notes 1. See Omolara Ololade Akanji, “Incidence of Poverty and Economic Growth in Nigeria,” presented at the International Association for Official Statistics conference “Statistics, Development, and Human Rights,” Montreux, Switzerland, June 6, 2000, 8. 2. These linkages are elaborated by Peter M. Lewis, “Economic Statism, Private Capital, and the Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria,” World Development 22 (1994): 437–452; Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria, vol. 2 (Boulder, 1995); Eghosa Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence (Bloomington, 1998). 3. Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998): 1. 4. “State offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups. In Nigeria, the statutory purposes of such offices became a matter of secondary concern.” Richard Joseph, “Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel,” Current History 95 (1996): 195. 5. Gerald Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, IL, 1966). 6. This economic history is recounted by Douglas Rimmer, “Development in Nigeria: An Overview,” in Henry Bienen and V. P. Diejomaoh (eds)., The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), 29–87. 7. The dynamics of the Dutch disease are outlined by Henry Bienen and Alan Gelb, “Nigeria: From Windfall Gains to Welfare Losses?” in Alan Gelb (ed.), Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (Oxford, 1988). See also Lewis, “Economic Statism,” 442–444; Akorlie Nyatepe-Coo, “Dutch Disease, Government Policy and Import Demand in Nigeria,” Applied Economics 26 (1994): 327–336. 8. The period of the oil bust and subsequent adjustment is analyzed by Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria. 9. Peter M. Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996): 79–103. 10. See, for instance, Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, 1990); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990); Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49 (1989): 803–832. 11. The economic effects of communal polarization are explored by Michael Watts and Paul Lubeck, “An Alliance of Oil and Maize? The Response of Indigenous

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 123

Getting the Politics Right

123

and State Capital to Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” in Bruce Berman and Colin Leys (eds.), African Capitalists and African Development (Boulder, 1994), 205–234. 12. A seminal analysis is found in Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (Cambridge, 1987). See also Lewis, “Economic Statism”; Forrest, Politics and Economic Development. 13. This is discussed in the Mexican context by Stephen Haber, The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico (Cambridge, 2003). 14. Larry Diamond, “Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism,” in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, vol. 1 (Boulder, 1995), vol. 2, 416–491. 15. See, for instance, Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979–1984 (London, 1985), 18–19. 16. Adrian Leftwich, “Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State,” Journal of Development Studies 31 (1995): 400–425; Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, 1995). 17. See Gamaliel Onosode, Three Decades of Development Crisis in Nigeria (Lagos, 1993), 3. 18. Gavin Williams and Terisa Turner, “Nigeria,” in John Dunn (ed.), West African States: Failure and Promise (Cambridge, 1978), 133–135. 19. Lewis, “Economic Statism,” 443–444. 20. The social bases of political competition are analyzed by Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation (Princeton, 1963); Billy J. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics (Bloomington, 1982). 21. Thomas Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, 1987). 22. Michael Watts, “Introduction,” in Michael Watts (ed.), State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1987), 9–14. 23. Rotimi Suberu, “The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria,” Journal of Democracy 4 (1993): 39–53. 24. Communal patterns are discussed in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (eds.), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing, MI, 1970). 25. Diamond, “Nigeria: The Uncivic Society,” 465–467. 26. The politics of federalism and ethnic balance are analyzed by Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC, 2001). See also Rotimi T. Suberu, “Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment,” Chapter 4, this volume. 27. Henry Bienen, “Oil Revenues and Policy Choice in Nigeria,” in Henry Bienen (ed.), Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria (London, 1985), 11. 28. The comparative dynamics of rentier states are analyzed by Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (Berkeley, 1997). 29. Watts, “Introduction,” 10. 30. Lewis, “Economic Statism,” 441. 31. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics, 74–75. 32. Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria, 157–159. 33. Sayre Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley, 1977). 34. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy.

Rotberg-6.Final 12/17/04 4:36 PM Page 124

124

Crafting the New Nigeria

35. See Peter Lewis, Etannibi Alemika, and Michael Bratton, “Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria,” Afrobarometer Working Paper 20 (East Lansing, MI, 2002). 36. These ideas are discussed, for instance, by Eno J. Usoro, “Government Policies, Politics and Industrial Development Strategy in Nigeria, 1947–74,” and M. E. Blunt, “The Place of Ideology in the Origins and Development of Public Enterprise in Nigeria,” both in O. Teriba and M. O. Kayode (eds.), Industrial Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1977), 68–69, 74. 37. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, 40–45. 38. These policies are noted by Henry Bienen, “The Politics of Income Distribution: Institutions, Class, and Ethnicity,” in Henry Bienen and V. P. Diejomaoh (eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), 140. 39. Elements of these debates are noted by Patrick Utomi, Managing Uncertainty: Competition and Strategy in Emerging Economies (Ibadan, 1998), 314–320. 40. Lewis, Alemika, and Bratton, “Down to Earth,” 31. 41. Ibid. 42. Diamond, “Nigeria: The Uncivic Society,” 450–452. See also Bronwen Manby, “Principal Human Rights Challenges,” Chapter 9, and William Reno, “The Roots of Sectarian Violence and Its Cure,” Chapter 11, this volume. On decentralization, see also Rotimi Suberu, “Democratizing Nigeria’s Federal Experiment,” Chapter 4, this volume. 43. See, for instance, the World Bank, State and Local Governance in Nigeria (Washington, DC, July 2002). 44. On the modal developmental state, see Evans, Embedded Autonomy.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 125

7 Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse: Can It Be Achieved? Patrick Utomi Since 1999, when democracy was restored to Nigeria after many years of military rule, its path seems far more tortuous than that followed by Japan following the Meiji Restoration. Instead of renewal and growth, Nigeria’s stagnation persists.1 How can Nigeria reverse this trend, create wealth from reform, and grow in a sustainable manner at the double-digit rates projected in its vision 2010 document or the 7 percent demanded in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative? How can Nigeria become an economic powerhouse, create employment, and properly channel public spending toward the social sectors that propel national competitiveness? The challenge of lifting Nigeria to its potential has engaged scholars and development agencies for years. Explaining Economic Underperformance Nigeria’s potential as an economic powerhouse has remained essentially a pending phenomenon because policies, institutional challenges, structural factors, and prevailing cultures have prevented growth. These factors, in interplay with human capacity problems derived from the declining investment in education and the fact that human enterprise has been shortcircuited by pervasive rent seeking, have inhibited growth. A prebendal political tradition, consequent upon military centralization and concentration of power, further deepens underperformance. In the first development decade, following independence in 1960, investment flows into infrastructural development were seen as the heart of 125

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 126

126

Crafting the New Nigeria

the development challenge. Nigeria’s first and second National Development Plans reflect this emphasis. Import-substitution industrialization, as the three regions tried to outperform each other in development effort, complemented growth strategy in the 1960s.2 Reduced capital flows with the dawn of afropessimism, following coups and civil wars, are thus seen as a key factor in the underperformance of the Nigerian economy. Another paradigm that had much currency in the 1970s was derived from both the Marxist tradition and dependency theories. From this perspective, the structure of international capitalism, with its injustices and its obsession with economic metrics, rather than people, led to growth without development or no growth at all.3 By the 1980s, the problem of managing the oil cycle had taken root in Nigeria. From the dramatic increases in oil prices, following the use of oil as weapon during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Nigeria plunged into one round of Dutch disease after the other. Oil prices would rise and then crash. The net effect has been a structural trap, as traditional sources of income to the government vanished. This oil-driven overvaluation of the exchange rate left the traditional sectors uncompetitive. Nigeria became dependent on oil for more than three-quarters of government revenues. This revenue source was subject to high levels of price volatility. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was aimed at creating a balance of payments equilibrium and diversifying the base of the economy. The SAP’s explanation of underperformance was that devaluation would restore competitiveness to the laggard sectors; privatization would free the government treasury from the hemorrhage brought on by funding inefficient state owned enterprises, many of which were responsible for the infrastructural bottlenecks that had handicapped investment and growth. The SAP proposed that a market economy would ultimately permit Nigeria to attain its full growth potential. The jury is still out on issues of sequencing and poor implementation, which prevented the goals of the SAP from being realized. Clearly, a stable environment in which business can create wealth remains unattained.4 The Growth Drivers Framework The growth drivers framework suggests that rapid growth is a function of five sets of variables that interact with and reinforce one another. These variables are policy choices, institutions, education, and entrepreneurship. At the heart of these variables, affecting each of the others, is culture. Culture

The effect of culture on economic performance is profound. The existence of a patrimonial state orients Nigerians toward seeking their individual

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 127

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

127

piece of the national cake. It orients business toward seeking economic rents as against wealth creation. Patrimonialism strips that state of accountability. Those who control political power use it to control economic access and to extract economic gains for themselves. They thus resist the doctrine of separation of powers and of transparency in governance. These failures result in the abuse of public resources, inefficiencies that add to transaction costs for business, and major disincentives for investors. Senator Arthur Nzeribe publicly acknowledged bribing other senators to persuade them to cease impeaching President Olusegun Obasanjo. Where was the public rage? Such a scandalous admission that public office had been abused flagrantly failed to provoke more than chuckles because Nigeria’s culture has not evolved values that strictly limit the conduct of public officials. Corruption is a major obstacle to planning and a significant contributor to Nigeria’s uncompetitiveness.5 But the Nigerian public is so accustomed, even inured, to the corrupt actions of their politicians and bureaucrats that they react with apathy. In a similar sense, values regarding the dignity of the human person insulate public officials from the pain of citizens abused by siren-blaring motorcades of elected leaders and assaulted by policemen accompanying public officials. The consciousness of such public officials become unwittingly deadened to the effect of metrics suggesting that the Gini index is widening between society’s top income earners and the bottom. Public officials are thus not disposed to understand the need for poverty alleviation and are insensitive in making policy choices. In their minds, society is divided between people of privilege and power and others. This factor leads to a reluctance on the part of Nigerians, members of the diaspora, and foreigners to invest in Nigeria, with significant deleterious effects on growth. Such other traits significant in the culture, like the Big Man syndrome, prevent businessmen from sustained entrepreneurial success. Their energies are quickly diverted to holding court and conspicuous consumption. Expectations of the Big Man also lead to resources that could have been reinvested slipping away as a social tax to support community activities, sustain hangers-on, and engage in ego-massaging conspicuous consumption. The work ethic, which has suffered because those who gain the most monetary value from effort are not those with a strong culture of work but, instead, those with contacts to extract rent from government agencies, clearly continues to impede productivity. Other dimensions of the impact of culture on growth include a narrow elite that is external in orientation and prone to massive capital flight, with a high propensity to import. Some estimates indicate that, since the country produces so little other than oil for export, 80 percent of every naira spent by government is ultimately funded by oil receipts. This fact increases Nigeria’s vulnerability to volatile oil prices and adds to the impact of the dreadful Dutch disease.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 128

128

Crafting the New Nigeria

Institutions

Most of my work has been on the place of institutions and economic performance, especially how they explain the diverging performance of African and Southeast Asian economies.6 As Douglass North argues cogently, institutions are evolutionary in nature.7 The process of the evolution of institutions in Nigeria was first affected by their being decreed into existence within a colonial structure, being derived from practices and norms of the colonizer rather than from traditional patterns of social relations. In many cases the institutions grafted onto the colonial structure proved less able to set boundaries of conduct, especially when enforcement capacity was weak. This typically resulted in situations where moral hazard problems were widely prevalent in modern banking.8 If institutional weaknesses raise questions of effectiveness because there is a failure to build on the extant norms of the community, the current state of very weak institutions results from the effect of military rule. The nature of legitimacy and its relationship to governance is such, as Seymour M. Lipset points out, that all regimes require legitimacy to govern.9 Military coups take place when the politics of power erosion has eroded legitimacy. The new military regime then proceeds to damage institutions so that it can establish authority outside of the norms of the normal social order. Institutions such as the judiciary, property rights, and the rule of law are abused. They soon suffer crises of relevance. Nigeria thus came out of military rule with many of its institutions severely weakened. The effect is higher levels of uncertainty and consequent high transaction costs. Since people either do not engage in economic intercourse when the conduct of other parties is not predictable, or hedge their bets if they still choose to engage economically despite uncertainty, high transaction costs become prevalent, as in Nigeria. Weak institutions have affected investment flows. More important, high transaction costs have reduced competitiveness and ultimately decreased growth. Values affect risk-taking behavior, managing people, trust, the cost of doing business, and the work ethic. In Nigeria, attitudes vary across a spectrum of fatalistic disposition, in which all is literally left in God’s hand by fundamentalist Muslims and prosperity preaching Pentecostals alike. Of greater significance for the effect of culture on economic performance are issues of corruption and rent-seeking. Reverence for age, which invariably calls on the more competent to yield to their elders in leadership situations, has obvious consequences for performance. These values no doubt affect how policy choices are made and whether female children are educated, political institutions respected, and new economic venture opportunities captured.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 129

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

129

Education

In the age of the knowledge worker, to try to justify a premium being placed on education would overstate the obvious. Unfortunately, the advances of the 1950s and 1960s, which led the British colonial government’s study of the need for university education in Nigeria (the Ashby Commission) to conclude that the quality of Nigeria’s education compared favorably with the best in the world, has turned to retreat.10 A series of case studies of Nigerian universities backed by the MacArthur Foundation and others suggests very fundamental problems of decline as a result of underfunding by the government.11 Many manufacturers complain that output has begun to suffer because of the sorry state of skills and the attitudes of workers. It is not just quality that has suffered but the nature of the skill sets with which the educational system equips Nigerians. Here the impact of culture is also relevant. For many Nigerian parents, the absolute treasure is a university degree for their children, even if it leaves the recipient with little chance of deploying such training on a job. Artisanal and technical work skills are of such limited attraction that even as unemployment ravishes the land it is hard to find any but Ghanaian or Togolese bricklayers or carpenters. The challenge of the right skills mix, to make the economy more competitive, remains of prime importance. Entrepreneurship

Economic advance as a function of Schumpeterian creative destruction has long been established.12 Bringing about a quantum leap in value creation where a need was previously not met drives the wheel of progress. Nigeria’s entrepreneurial history is fairly well chronicled in Tom Forrest’s Advance of African Capital and in columns in Business Day.13 The spirit of enterprise in Nigeria has, however, been much affected by the prebendal culture and pervasive rent-seeking behavior associated with the dominance of wealth and power from crude oil rents and receipts. With people who had access to public officials earning huge rents without any creative effort, and policy often seeming to penalize those who committed to creating value, Nigeria’s entrepreneurial culture retreated. The Growth Drivers Framework and Business Strategy The sets of variables just discussed affect one another and determine business performance. They affect the strategy choices made by firms in response to national strategies. Corporate thinking thus responds to the environment in a

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 130

130

Crafting the New Nigeria

manner that determines performance outcomes and the structure of industry. Where there is a clear national strategy and where active civil society has intervened to produce strong institutions, uncertainty is reduced. In these better cases, questions of how firms should organize themselves are resolved in favor of longer-term, high-value-generating initiatives where the benefits of deferred gratification are harvested in a sustained and high-yielding manner. If, on the contrary, national strategy is unclear or nonexistent, a scenario often accompanied by weak institutions, and therefore characterized by higher levels of uncertainty, corporate strategy tends to incline toward avoiding enterprises with high transaction costs. As corporate strategy begets basic strategy, the consequence of corporate strategy in an atmosphere of high uncertainty is that basic operations more or less incline toward flexibility. In the Nigerian context, that has meant a preference for trading and service enterprises as against manufacturing. But where strong institutions reduce uncertainty, microeconomics will more likely favor competitive advantage arising from commitment in core competencies or other assets. The latter strategy of commitment tends to deliver outcomes that are associated with productivity gains, which drive national competitiveness and economic growth. Democratic Transition and the Reconstruction of the Nigerian Economy

After many years of military rule, including years as a pariah state during the rule of the military, Nigeria returned to an elected democratic government in 1999. Increased efficiency, following reduced corruption and a clearer focus on governance, were expected to result in better economic performance. However, without clear policy visions, and given the ballooning of government expenditures, macroeconomic fundamentals in democratic Nigeria have yet to provide stability for private-sector activity. Poor economic performance follows. A review of trends in macroeconomic management during the second Obasanjo administration shows that serious mistakes were made. In 2001, for example, the central government released funds to the various other tiers of government in a manner that led the Central Bank of Nigeria to perceive excess liquidity. To cope with inflation, it changed monetary policy guidelines to manage supply, which further ensured that the private sector could not access the funds necessary for the kinds of investments that spur growth. There are a few positive signs. The passing of the Corrupt Practices Act and the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, plus a few signal prosecutions, promise greater attention than ever before to the inefficiencies of speculation and contract abuse. Even though the work

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 131

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

131

of the commission has been slow, its existence helps to build integrity and may soon lower transaction costs for business. Another major development is the resuscitation of the external sector. Under the military, the external sector atrophied. Considerable donor flows and the possibilities of foreign direct investment should eventually bring more noninflationary money into the economy. For years, as government grew at the expense of the private sector, the business unit, and the household, there were no compensating flows of income from the external sector. Were external flows to increase and be sustained, and government expenditure be pruned, as has become imperative, new consumption patterns and investments may result in increased productivity and a more competitive economy. Another hopeful initiative is an agreement by the banking sector and the Central Bank of Nigeria to set aside 10 percent of profits before tax to take equity positions in small- and medium-scale industries. This has the potential for providing a fillip to entrepreneurship. What Must Be Done? To create wealth, increase employment possibilities dramatically, and become an economic powerhouse in this age of globalization, Nigeria will have to accomplish a number of tasks. Among them are the strengthening of institutions, increases in commitment to the social sectors, especially education and health care, and major public service reform as most economic initiatives collapse because of capacity problems and corruption in the public service. Also imperative is strong, focused, and impassioned leadership. At the heart of the failure of reform efforts pursued by several Nigerian governments since the mid-1980s to reduce poverty and sustain growth has been the inability of implementing agencies to focus on the goal of full employment. Making the economy competitive so as to create employment has been hindered by problems of capacity and commitment. Reconfiguring Nigeria’s response to the challenge of becoming an economic powerhouse therefore has to begin with a rebuilding and reforming of the public-service leadership’s commitment to national competitiveness. The public service has become too large and unproductive because of inadequate training and faulty recruitment traditions. It is so corrupt that it now sucks up an extraordinary proportion of the available resources for development. In spite of, or because of, these traits, it has not been able effectively to supervise the implementation of the infrastructural projects on which private sector–led growth depends. The state of Nigerian roads, which Obasanjo himself has lamented, are atrocious, and the comatose state of many state-owned enterprises such as the fertilizer company (NAFCON), the aluminum smelting venture (ALSCON), the paper mills, and the steel

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 132

132

Crafting the New Nigeria

plants indicates the very high cost of an ineffective public service and the imperative for reform. Reform has to involve a major reduction in public-service numbers, the injection of fresh blood from the private sector, and an aggressive program of human capital development and capacity-building. On the face of it, these proposals are daunting given a culture that views government jobs as welfare. Where this damages overall capacity to generate productive employment opportunities, then it must be self-defeating.14 Those separated from the service could be retrained as teachers and moved to the provinces so as to actualize major investments in education. Other public servants who are more entrepreneurial and inclined to take risks can profit from loans funded by privatization proceeds. These loan schemes would accompany entrepreneurial education and the support of extension agents for small business. Civil servants unwilling to accept these two tracks should be retrenched. Those remaining in the service should be reeducated by an intense program of unlearning, as well as by training programs aimed at transferring new skills, new values, and a new commitment to clearly defined goals as pioneered by the Malaysian Institute of Public Administration. Also useful as stimulant would be cross-pollination schemes by which middle to senior-level officers come into the public service for two-year rotations while remaining on company payrolls. Public servants would then have an opportunity to spend time in the private sector. A review of the circular flows of income in Nigeria since 1990 shows an inefficient government sector appropriating more and more income flows relative to households, as well as to the corporate and external sectors. Nevertheless, policy choices that concentrate government spending on education and health will be helpful while creating an enabling environment for private capital to engage in infrastructural development through build, operate, and transfer, and build, operate, and own schemes. Policy orientation has to change in the direction of greater stakeholder involvement in setting policy goals, monitoring implementation, and ensuring transparency. It is imperative that Nigeria move away from the current mode in which the annual budget is a public relations document rather than an instrument for planning, guidance, and control of incomes and expenditure. A process should be put in place for a budget cycle that allows for stakeholder inputs that reflect the priorities of the Nigerian people.

Sector Reforms Agriculture

With full employment as a desirable goal of policy, the agriculture sector should receive more attention than at present. The thrust of agriculture

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 133

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

133

policy should focus on food security, high-value horticulture for export, and crops for which Nigeria has comparative advantage as inputs into local manufacturing industries where the country has favorable factor endowments. Agriculture reform has to go beyond the idea of traditional exports, like cocoa. The example of coffee prices in the years leading up to the turn of the century and the pressure on consumers to buy fair-trade coffee illustrates the futility of traditional notions of comparative advantage. Nigeria must abandon the present dependence on rain-fed agriculture and turn to creative initiatives to ensure predictable harvests. Beyond incentives to invest in irrigation schemes and storage facilities, policymakers have to encourage reform and the spread of organizational capacity in the agriculture sector. The key to the whole agriculture program is reinventing agricultural extension services, supporting enterprises that organize small-holder farmers in the manner of the out-grower programs of the Nigerian Tobacco Company, and long-term, stable, low-interest-rate financing for farmers. This financing, propped up by a portion of the forced savings to be encouraged, when matched with activist and engaged Agricultural Research Institutes, should provide the necessary boost for agriculture. Manufacturing

The need for an industrial policy as a response to the process of deindustrialization was manifest in the rush to approve industrial policy late in 2002. There remains the possibility of succumbing to special interests that are unlikely to be competitive—not being based on the country’s factor endowments—but that are able to gain tariff protection to the detriment of both the consuming public and alternative economic activities. Further, to rejuvenate manufacturing the emphasis should be on enclaves—industrial concentrations in which infrastructure and culture are world-class, even if the rest of the country is less well endowed. Reorienting government purchasing would help, too. The various governments of Nigeria tend to purchase from abroad products already manufactured in Nigeria. A change in orientation could benefit local manufacturing concerns in ways much more valuable than high tariff barriers, which anyway provide incentives for corrupt customs officials. Imports invariably enter the country, their revenues flowing into the pockets of officials instead of the national treasury. Corruption also creates high transaction costs for importers. Nigeria needs a capacity for generating information to support manufacturing for export. Lost opportunities under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act—the National Assembly has failed to amend the law to allow Nigerians to take advantage of the act—are telling.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 134

134

Crafting the New Nigeria

Oil and Gas

Reforming the oil and gas sector is essential. It has too few linkages to the rest of the economy. Its value-added has lagged behind that of other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, and its contribution has largely been limited to the royalties paid to the government. In turn, oil revenues stoke a debilitative patron-client dependent state. This sector should be reformed, especially regarding how much should continue to be prospected, as well as how to use its returns for the benefit of all Nigerians. I have argued in favor of the dedicated use of oil income for infrastructural development in order to serve subsequent generations. I also advocate investing in a fund that will ensure future incomes while serving as collateral security for today’s productivity. My specific prescription— designed to rekindle tax reform and more reasoned fiscal federalism—is to limit revenue flows from oil into the distributable pool (i.e., the Federation Account) to 50 percent of earnings. Only 20 percent of this total revenue (40 percent of the Distributable Pool Account [DPA]) should go to recurrent expenditures of the three tiers of government. The balance should go to capital expenditure. Going forward, however, one must note that oil will remain important in Nigeria for some time, so that a strategy for maximizing its capacity for catalyzing growth, reducing poverty, and providing employment should receive priority attention. The first step is to identify entrepreneurs from among Nigerian professionals in the oil and gas industry, then to orient them differently from the rent-seeking indigenous businessmen who have built a parasitic dependence on existing oil flows. The making of industrial policy to provide focus and opportunity for entrepreneurs should then be pursued through a local content and linkages development program to which multinational oil companies would have to commit. The symbiotic nature of this nexus of oil companies and indigenous entrepreneurs needs be emphasized so that broad collaboration is achieved. For this process to be effective, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) subsidiary overseeing joint ventures needs to be strengthened. Local content improvement should be approached from the position of value—creating matchmaking in which all parties benefit. Finance Sector

Since the SAP-induced financial liberalization, the Nigerian banking sector has gone through a revolution. It is, however, still not inclined toward growth. The program that sets aside 10 percent of profits before tax of banks in exchange for equity stakes in small- and medium-scale enterprises presents a window of opportunity. Collaboration with emergent venture capital companies should strengthen the wealth-creating capacity of banks.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 135

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

135

Capital is made at home. But that aphorism flies in the face of a Nigerian leadership forever searching for foreign investment when the low-hanging fruit of diasporic money abroad has not yet been plucked. There is no question about the needs of the financial system. It is the experience of many capable entrepreneur wannabes that the banking system lacks the depth and experience to provide for them. Many banks have access to funds of very short tender, and these are concentrated on trade finance. The profits on such transactions, which were previously supplemented by the pricing and abuse of foreign exchange, have since declined. The Central Bank has sanctioned many banks that abused foreign exchange regulations in 2002. Conclusion: A Future Fund The foregoing ideas will amount to little unless the challenge of investing in the future and for the future is met, the distortions of government spending limited, and shocks from gyrations in the price of oil managed well. Such distortions lead to a consumption pattern that ultimately creates structural difficulties. Not allowing a significant amount of income to enter the system, directly, removes the economic rent incentive and presents a morale problem for those willing to take risks. They then see their risk-avoiding, pleasureseeking, lazy neighbors becoming rich from rents, not productivity. Second, stringent rules must be imposed on how infrastructure that will be of value to several generations can be provided through the fund and will moderate the spending behavior, goal displacement, and ethical challenges that currently plague the public service. Those rules will promote a culture of transparency that, with time, could become a settled habit of the community. Third, such a future fund will be a source of stabilization when oil price collapses occur. The harsh effects of Dutch disease are contained by such a fund, as the experience of Botswana illustrates.15 Fourth, the fund can become collateral security for foreign international capital coming into infrastructural development. Fifth, such a fund would lead Nigeria to rediscover taxation, a more fitting way to provide services to a population who will show concerns about how their tax monies are used, thus promoting accountability. Sixth—and of fundamental value—such a fund will give legitimacy to the fact that it is morally inappropriate for one generation to use up that which rightly belongs to all generations. Eighty percent of oil revenues now go into recurrent, instead of long-term expenditure. For sector reform and radical change, leadership is critical.16 Nigerian politics have systematically produced people of another tribe from Lee Kuan Yew’s Singaporeans. Should some of Lee Kuan Yew’s spiritual or intellectual tribesmen emerge in Nigeria it should be easy to see political reforms leading to cultural change.

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 136

136

Crafting the New Nigeria

Symptomatic of the failure of leadership in Nigeria is the failure to recognize the damage of scam letters from fraudsters. Not focusing enough on rooting it out has been a strategic error. In many ways it shapes the Nigerian persona. The names of Nigerians of the highest moral standing and integrity have been employed by scammers, thus lowering trust in all Nigerians. This fact will affect how people do business with Nigeria for some time. Notes 1. David Landes, “Culture Makes Almost All the Difference,” in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York, 2000), 7–13. 2. Patrick Utomi, Managing Uncertainty: Competition and Strategy in Emerging Economies (Ibadan, 1998). See also Patrick Utomi, “Bureaucratic Power and the Public Policy Process: A Nigerian Case Study,” unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Indiana University, Bloomington, 1982); Howard Stein (ed.), Asian Industrialization and Africa (New York, 1995). 3. David C. Korten and Randi Klauss (eds.), People Centered Development (West Hartford, 1984). 4. World Bank, “The World Bank Policy Research Report: Adjustment in Africa: Reform, Results, and the Road Ahead” (New York, 1994). 5. Ronald Hope Kempe Sr. and Bornwell Chikulo (eds.), Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies (London, 2000). 6. Patrick Utomi, To Serve Is to Live: Autobiographical Reflections on the Nigerian Condition (Ibadan, 1999). 7. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York, 1990). 8. Diana McNaughton, with Donald G. Carlson, Clayton Townsend Dietz, Peter Falletti, and Khalifa Ikramullah, “Building Strong Management and Responding to Change,” in Banking Institutions in Developing Markets, vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1992). 9. Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York, 1979). 10. Patrick Utomi, “The Nigerian Experience with Non-State Delivery of Educational Services: On Private Sector Participation on Education,” paper presented at UNESCO Conference, Lagos, May 16–17, 2002. 11. Case Studies, “On Nigerian Universities,” unpublished research documents of the Social Science Academy. 12. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986). 13. Tom Forrest, Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Charlottesville, 1994); Patrick Utomi, “Enterprise in Ascent,” Business Day columns (August–November 2002). 14. Whereas I recognize Stiglitz’s point about sequencing and the detriments of prescribing cuts that lead to efficiency without the system having the capacity to absorb those retrenched in other sectors, I am convinced those other sectors will have no chance of emerging in Nigeria’s current economic structure, if the public service remains as it is. In accepting some of the Stiglitz critique of IMF policies, I nonetheless believe that a creative disengagement of civil service personnel can be achieved. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, 2002).

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 137

Nigeria as an Economic Powerhouse

137

15. Michael Porter, “Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity,” in Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, 18. 16. I have made a point of repeating that Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs should be made required reading for any persons seeking public office in Nigeria. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (New York, 1999), and Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000 (New York, 2000).

Rotberg-7_v1.Final 12/17/04 4:37 PM Page 138

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 139

8 The 2003 Elections: Hardly Credible, but Acceptable Darren Kew

Despite predictions of massive violence and possible systemic collapse, Nigeria held generally orderly elections in April and May 2003—arguably the first ones successfully run by civilians in the nation’s history. A peaceful outcome and a veneer of coherence were enough to earn the embrace of the international community, but observer missions uniformly decried the process across Nigeria as deeply flawed. The problems were so numerous and the gap in credibility so vast that the victors writ large can hardly claim to hold the legitimate mandate of the Nigerian people. No one knows exactly how the people voted, given the widespread irregularities and outright rigging throughout much of the country. Nonetheless, Nigerians in general appear for the time being to have accepted the process as the only alternative. Yet, grudging acquiescence is not democratic legitimacy, and President Olusegun Obasanjo and his ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) will have to deliver tangible economic benefits and political reforms prior to elections in 2007 if they are to prevent an electoral crisis and, worse, a slide into increasing state dysfunction. The PDP scored what appeared to be stunning victories in gubernatorial, National Assembly, and state assembly races across twenty-eight of the nation’s thirty-six states, with the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) holding on to a mere seven states in the deep northwest and northeast, and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) retaining only one governor’s seat and state assembly majority in the southwest (Lagos). PDP won 73 out of 109 Senate seats, 213 out of 360 House races, 28 governorships, and majorities in 28 state assemblies. The jewel in the crown—the presidency—was retained by Obasanjo with 62 percent of the vote; his closest challenger earned only 32 percent.1 139

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 140

140

Crafting the New Nigeria

Credit: Daniel Young and Brick Maier

Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections by State, 2003

In some states, particularly the southwest, the PDP victories appear to have been genuine, driven by a throw-the-bums-out frustration among the electorate with the lackluster performances of their AD governors and legislators since 1999. In other states, significant irregularities in the process occurred, which in some cases cast doubt on the results, while others probably did not deviate significantly from what opinion polls and analysts indicated were the voters’ likely intentions. In at least eleven states, however, electoral outcomes ranged from deeply questionable to outright farcical. Obasanjo would likely have been reelected even had the results in those states been credible, although a runoff might have been necessary. In terms of the critical gubernatorial races and the balance of seats in the National Assembly and state assemblies, however, different outcomes would have left the PDP without such a commanding majority and would have given the opposition a stronger platform from which to mount a challenge in 2007. As it stands, the only significant opposition to PDP rule will likely come from where it did before: from within the PDP itself. The very fact that even semifunctional elections were held and that they were generally peaceful marks a significant moment in Nigerian political

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 141

The 2003 Elections

141

development. In addition, the 2003 elections saw much higher public engagement in the process, as well as more serious competition among the political parties than in 1999. The media also made much of the point that 2003 marked the first successful civilian-to-civilian political transition in Nigerian history, although this honor should perhaps be reserved for 2007, when President Obasanjo will hand over power to either his PDP successor or, more spectacularly, to an opposition candidate. Regardless, the very fact that the civilians managed the process with a modicum of rigor stands in marked contrast to their last attempt in 1983, when participants and observers alike condemned the elections amid growing political chaos that invited military intervention.2 The 2003 elections overall can, nonetheless, hardly be characterized as credible, given that the results in a third of the states were rigged and in another third were dubious. The results can, however, be seen as largely acceptable to the Nigerian public, given that the presidential victory and some of the other returns reflect their apparent wishes, and that few protested the outcomes. The problem, naturally, is that democratic legitimacy results not from approximations and divinations of public will, but from accurate counts of genuinely cast ballots. With memories of the disastrous military regimes of the 1990s still fresh, voters appear willing to abide by the current arrangement. Increasingly, however, such acceptance will be conditioned on the government’s ability to deliver prosperity, which has so far been minimal. If the pre-2007 results of the government’s efforts prove equally unresponsive to voters’ needs, their willingness to accept a further flawed election will diminish. To build democratic legitimacy in Nigeria, some deep structural concerns raised by the 2003 election process must be addressed before public confidence in the poorly performing political system wanes further—and in time for the watershed 2007 elections. Some of these deal with the electoral system itself, which is deeply compromised at the local level, and shows disturbing signs of external influence at the national level as well. These systemic concerns are rooted in the dispersed structures of power and society that vary state-to-state across Nigeria. These structures allow different degrees of citizen engagement and will take much longer to change. An analysis of these factors may, however, offer some modest possibilities for reform within the short time that remains before 2007. The 1999 Elections The 1999 elections were similarly problematic. Approximately a third of the states at that time, centered in the Niger Delta and the Igbo-dominated southeast, reported widespread fraud and voting irregularities, while another

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 142

142

Crafting the New Nigeria

third suffered patches of questionable activities, especially in the rural regions. A last third appeared to have held genuinely competitive elections, primarily in the southwest and parts of the north.3 Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. president and leader of one of the U.S. observer delegations, was outraged by what he saw and refused to endorse the 1999 elections. Nonetheless, none of the foreign observation teams, much less Nigerian observation efforts and civil society groups writ large, wanted to give the Nigerian military an excuse to scuttle the process and stay in power—as General Ibrahim Babangida had done in 1993. So the Carter Center and its partner, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), concluded that although these abuses “compromised the integrity of the process in the areas where they occurred,” the delegation had “no evidence indicating that the electoral abuses would have affected the overall outcome of the election.”4 Most of the other observer teams released even less critical assessments. By 2003, however, the restraining influence of the military had largely gone. President Obasanjo had succeeded in taming the armed forces’ political instincts—primarily by retiring most of the officers who had held political office under Generals Sani Abacha and Babangida—and the electorate continued to favor democracy far beyond the alternative.5 Some politicians raised the specter in the media of military intervention, and reliable sources reported that “although Obasanjo has worked hard to win the loyalty of the high command, there are fears that the junior officers are more ambivalent.”6 Nonetheless, most politicians clearly felt little need for self-restraint; they seemed to expect that the Fourth Republic would last at least another four years, and they were willing to invest accordingly. And invest they did. Billions of naira—and millions of U.S. dollars and euros—are said to have changed hands throughout the process, such that local banks in towns where party primaries were held were emptied of cash. Prospective candidates had to pay party officials at each successive level depending upon the offices that they were targeting, as well as community dignitaries, important organizations, and other powerful individuals able to influence the outcome. One party activist explained the path to election in Delta State: First you start at the ward level, where 10 party officials are in charge. Maybe two or three of them are the key ones, so you pay them maybe 15,000 naira or more each. The highest bidder typically gets the nomination, although local prominence helps. The same process takes place at the LGA [local government area] party level, and then at the state party level, where the Big Men exercise the most influence. Then you contest the election, when you and the party will seek to buy the state and local INEC election officers. To get elected to the National Assembly in the House, it will cost you perhaps 15 million naira if you are well known, maybe 20 to

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 143

The 2003 Elections

143

25 million if you are not. A Senate seat will cost you over 25 million naira [more than $200,000 in 2002].7

These estimates for the national level offices, however, may be conservative. As one gubernatorial aspirant testified, $2 million may not be enough to buy the plum job of governor, much less the presidency. Races where prominent individuals became involved, or where the party leaderships sensed vulnerability in the other side, saw bidding wars that benefited all the gatekeepers in the parties and communities. Moreover, money does not create traditional political structures or community identifications—it merely influences them. States in the southwest and the north, where more traditional power networks provided the backbone of the party structures in their regions, were able to hold down intraparty costs. As has been well-documented elsewhere, political mobilization in Nigeria in the past was primarily along ethnic lines, dependent upon a complex pattern of traditional loyalties and interethnic competition that played out in the First Republic and, to some extent, the Second Republic.8 Political office was distributed in the form of ethnic clientelism; Richard Joseph refers to it as prebendalism: “State offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups. In Nigeria, the statutory purposes of such offices became a matter of secondary concern.”9 The long years of rapacious, personalistic military rule in the 1980s and 1990s altered these prebendal patterns somewhat. First, military rule reduced Nigerian political culture increasingly to a cash-and-carry operation, exacerbating the looting elements in prebendal patterns across the country. Further, as the generals spread this largesse to their civilian allies, the civilians, too, extended or built extensive client networks across ethnic lines, diluting the ethnic element in the prebendal networks and giving increasingly less of their plunder back to their home communities. These rich and powerful civilian allies of the military, and some of the military leaders themselves upon retirement, became what Nigerians call Big Men—the driving force in Nigerian politics. They often maneuver within traditional ethnic and regional patterns, but increasingly they do so across the universal logic of financial realpolitik. The Servant Becomes Master: The PDP Primaries As the military sought to exit power in 1999, it turned to many of these trusted allies. A group of Big Men from all parts of the nation—except the southwest—who had long dominated Nigerian politics since the First and

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 144

144

Crafting the New Nigeria

Second Republics formed the dominant party, the PDP. Another group of Big Men who were closer to Abacha, and many of whom were younger and nouveau riche, formed the All People’s Party (APP; later ANPP), with its strongholds in the deep northwest, northeast, and pockets of the Middle Belt and south-south. A third party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), formed in the Yoruba region. With the partial exception of the AD, which drew largely on the Yoruba political party structures in place since the First Republic’s Action Group, Nigerian political parties were nothing more than alliances of convenience among the political elite. Each Big Man was expected to deliver his own constituency, wherever it was and however the network beneath him was constructed, whether by traditional or by financial loyalties or, more likely, by both. The PDP emerged as the frontrunner, but faced a critical problem. Yoruba leaders threatened to secede if the 1993 presidential mandate of the late Moshood Abiola were not respected with a power shift of the presidency to a Yoruba candidate. Northern PDP leaders recruited retired General Obasanjo, the only prominent Yoruba whom they thought that they could trust, given his willingness to hand power to Shehu Shagari in 1979. Obasanjo also appeared to have the added benefit of not sitting atop any political networks of his own, thus leaving him beholden to the Big Men that were to put him there. The presence of several of these individuals in his first cabinet seemed to confirm the influence of powerful party backers. For other Big Men in 1999, memories of the failed Babangida and Abacha transitions, and how the military manipulated them at the expense of many of the political mandarins, cast doubt among them as to whether General Abdulsalami Abubakar would actually hand over power or whether others in the military would allow the Fourth Republic to last for long. So rather than risking themselves directly, many of the bosses sent their deputies to run for governor or National Assembly. In addition, some of the most powerful among them harbored ambitions for the presidency, and they sought either to run in 1999 or prepare the ground for 2003. Over the course of the next four years, however, these deputies often proved to have minds of their own, and many, particularly the governors, used the fruits of power to build their own political machines. Several began to quarrel with their backers soon after taking office, while others saw relations sour once the Big Men realized that the Fourth Republic had some staying power and that they should now take office. Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State, for instance, soon fell out with his backer, Second Republic Senator Jim Nwobodo. By 2002, Enugu was an armed camp divided between the two factions, and the state assembly was closed after Nwobodo supporters tried to impeach Nnamani. In Kwara State, former Second Republic senator Olusola Saraki delivered the state to the APP in 1999, along with Kogi State. As 2003 approached,

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 145

The 2003 Elections

145

Saraki decided that he wanted his son to be governor of Kwara, but his protégé, Governor Mohammed Lawal, refused to step down. So instead Saraki decamped to the PDP, and Kwara quickly turned bloody, beginning with the assassination of the PDP state party chairman shortly after refusing to hand the party reins over to Saraki, the Kingpin of Kwara. President Obasanjo also proved to have a mind of his own from the start. Within months he had rankled his northern backers by removing the political officers from the military, many of whom were northerners, and shifting the balance among the officer corps to favor the south. Northern leaders also complained that they did not control the strongest ministries in government, and they disagreed over a number of critical policies. By 2002, Igbo leaders also felt marginalized in the Obasanjo government, and governors from the south-south were locked in a legal battle with the president over control of offshore oil fields. Vice President Atiku, meanwhile, whose vast political network—the Atiku machine—had delivered significant portions of the northeast and north-central zones, was outraged at talk that the president was thinking of choosing another running mate in 2003. At the same time, the National Assembly, egged on behind the scenes by the disgruntled northern leaders, was moving to impeach the president over his flouting of legislative budgetary powers. Thus President Obasanjo approached the PDP primaries in late 2002 politically wounded and with the old guard among the Big Men circling for the kill. Former head of state and multibillionaire Babangida was reportedly encouraging Vice President Atiku to forsake Obasanjo, and several of the PDP governors were also rumored to be close to abandoning the president. Members of the old guard were jockeying for the presidential nomination. Then, in November 2002, the anticorruption commission (the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, ICPC), which in its two years of existence had yet to convict a single prominent individual, suddenly announced that it was investigating the Senate president, the Speaker of the House, and eleven governors, most of whom were from the PDP. This threat, along with probable financial carrots and promises of support from the Obasanjo camp against any threats from their former bosses, ensured the loyalty of the PDP governors. In addition, Obasanjo struck a deal with Atiku, promising Obasanjo’s backing for Atiku’s 2007 presidential bid, and probably some commitments to giving the vice president control over additional policy areas during the second term. Obasanjo’s opponents among the Big Men found that the wily former general, whom they saw as a political neophyte, had outflanked them. With Atiku’s support, Obasanjo now had a lock on the PDP national party machinery. In the days leading up to the PDP convention in December 2002, the leadership sprung new convention rules on the party: delegates would be nominated by local governments rather than elected by the local

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 146

146

Crafting the New Nigeria

party members. Since the governors controlled the LGAs, and thus the local party chiefs, Obasanjo’s deal with the governors was complete; they would assure his nomination from the local delegates, and he would assure their approval by the national party leadership. Like clockwork, the PDP primaries returned all but one of its twenty-one governors as candidates in 2003, and the president trounced his opponents. Opposition Primaries and the AD Deal The ANPP was divided over who was to be the presidential candidate. They argued throughout the fall, losing critical time and wasting precious funds. In the days leading up to a rescheduled convention in January 2003, the other presidential candidates suddenly and collectively withdrew their names, leaving as the sole candidate Muhammadu Buhari, the former military head of state who had overthrown the Second Republic. Delegates chose him, with Chuba Okadigbo, the former PDP Senate president who had been forced to resign his post on corruption charges, as his running mate. The party leadership chose AD’s candidates. This elder-dominated, topdown process had frustrated many supporters in 1999. Yet most voters in 1999 in the Yoruba region faithfully voted the AD into all six governorships in the southwest and five of the six state assemblies, and they strongly supported Obasanjo’s opponent in 1999. Most of the AD politicians, however, performed poorly over the next four years, and the Oyo governor, in particular, proved highly unpopular. The party leadership spent most of those years fighting itself, with two different factions supporting their own chairmen. This rift was healed as the 2003 elections approached, but the AD leadership was in no mood to allow open contestation for its nominations, so it simply returned most sitting AD politicians. As the first round of elections approached on April 12, 2003, the party appeared confident that its base in the southwest was secure. It was even looking at potential gubernatorial victories in Delta, Plateau, and Borno States. Yet few outside the PDP appeared to notice that many voters in the southwest had lost faith in the AD. At the presidential level, however, AD party leaders chose a different tactic, stunning the Nigerian political establishment with the news in early 2003 that the AD would not field a presidential candidate. Newspapers crowed that a deal had been struck: the AD would implicitly support Obasanjo’s reelection, and the president would restrain the PDP from seriously challenging AD gubernatorial and assembly candidates and would also offer the AD additional ministerial posts.10 Faced with outraged PDP candidates in the southwest, Obasanjo coyly denied that any deal had been struck with the AD, but AD notables believed otherwise. Abraham Adesanya,

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 147

The 2003 Elections

147

leader of Afenifere and thus de facto godfather of the AD, referred to a deal before the elections and would speak afterwards of a PDP betrayal: “I believe in a gentlemen’s agreement . . . but from what happened on the field, it is quite clear that the PDP refused to keep their own side of the bargain.”11 Either the president deceived the AD leadership, or he simply declined to correct a fiction of their own creation, but the AD would soon rue their decision not to run a presidential candidate. Another twist was added to the 2003 elections when the Supreme Court in mid-2002 opened the legal doors to twenty-eight new parties for registration. One new party promptly joined the APP to form the ANPP, but most parties consisted primarily of the office staff at the national headquarters that the INEC required that they maintain, and were typically centered on a Big Man who was funding the operation and running for president. Among the more serious newcomers, United Nigeria People’s Party (UNPP) and National Democratic Party (NDP) were both said to be funded primarily by General Babangida and appeared to have minor support in parts of the southeast and pockets of the Middle Belt. Respected human rights activist Gani Fawehinmi formed the National Conscience Party (NCP), and the human rights organization Democratic Alternative transformed itself into a political party. Balarabe Musa, radical governor of Kaduna in the Second Republic, sought to revive the old northern progressive party, the People’s Redemption Party (PRP). The most promising newcomer in terms of election prospects was All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), led by former Biafran secessionist leader General Emeka Ojukwu, and with substantial local support in several Igbo states. Although Ojukwu, too, sought to be president, APGA also stood poised to gain the governorships and assembly seats in at least Anambra and Enugu, and fashioned itself to be to the Igbo what the AD was to the Yoruba—a party for the promotion of their ethnic interests. Much was initially made of the new parties’ possible dilution effect against the PDP, ANPP, and AD. For a brief moment this impact seemed possible, as all of the new parties met to negotiate an all-party coalition, which at times included the AD in its discussions. These talks soon collapsed, however, when none of the party leaders save the gracious Musa would agree to back a single presidential candidate. With little time left to organize serious national challenges on their own, some of the parties, led by the NDP, took the INEC to court to delay the elections, arguing that the electoral commission had violated the 2002 Electoral Act by not finalizing the voters register sixty days before the poll. Although NDP’s argument was factually correct, the Supreme Court found it substantively unpersuasive, just days before the April 12 elections. The NDP and many of its allies were left without an alternative strategy: “We are not prepared for this election. We have no party agents ready, and no one has been trained—the

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 148

148

Crafting the New Nigeria

manuals only arrived yesterday. We will field no Senate candidates in this state, and [just] one for the House.”12 Some of the PDP Big Men who lost out to Obasanjo’s deft maneuver in the PDP primaries, such as Nwobodo, quickly decamped to the ANPP or to the twenty-seven minor parties to run for various offices, including the presidency. Not one was successful. Voter Registration and the Calculated Incompetence of the INEC Despite the flawed 1999 elections, the Nigerian government did little to prepare the INEC for 2003. Inexplicably, the presidency refused to release any funding for the commission until late 2002. The president provided monies for the election itself just forty-eight hours before polling day. Both financing delays served as body blows to INEC efficiency, forcing it to scramble first to organize the registration of perhaps 55–60 million adult Nigerians within two months, then for another six months to set up the infrastructure for more than 120,000 polling stations across the nation. The final disbursement left the INEC only two days to hire and pay polling staff for these stations and to move sensitive election materials like ballots and tally sheets to myriad locations. The INEC’s first attempt at registration in October 2002 thus proceeded like a Hollywood train wreck. Many registration centers opened days later than scheduled, if they opened at all, often forcing confused citizens to give up the endeavor. Centers were understaffed, and across the nation critical materials were often of insufficient quantity or absent. Faced with mounting complaints from the political parties, the media, and voters themselves, INEC was forced to run a second round of registration in January 2003. Just a month before the elections, however, National Democratic Institute observers noted that “the voter registration process remains incomplete and the overwhelming majority of Nigerians have not had an adequate opportunity to review the voter register.”13 A week before the first election, the commission shockingly announced that it had completed the registration of 60.8 million voters in a nation of approximately 130 million people, half under the legal voting age. In effect, the INEC claimed that nearly every possible adult in Nigeria had been registered. More likely, as many as 10 million voters cards had been fraudulently issued. The ANPP chairman for the northeast claimed, for instance, that one registration center in Adamawa State registered only four out of 387 eligible adults in the village, while others who registered elsewhere found that they were deleted from the rolls when they came to pick up their voter’s

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 149

The 2003 Elections

149

card.14 The Catholic Church, which mounted the largest domestic electoral monitoring effort, estimated that at least 30 percent of eligible voters went unregistered, and commission chairman Abel Guobadia himself accused local INEC staff of “hoarding” election materials, presumably to sell to the highest bidder.15 Yet, somehow, the numbers of registered voters were bursting at polling stations across the nation, implausibly so for the rural districts in which I observed. This deluge proved pivotal in a number of elections, particularly in the northern states, where at some stations other monitors and I found that more than half of the people waiting to vote were children with fraudulent registration cards. One young girl’s card indicated that she was 127 years old. Further, the voter’s register was not released to political parties as promised, much less publicized with time for citizens to cross-check. Various resident commissioners released this critical information to the parties in piecemeal fashion on election eve across the nation. In addition, Nigerian monitors found no evidence that the INEC properly distributed voter’s cards anywhere in the nation prior to elections.16 Nevertheless, we received reports that entire neighborhoods presumed to be opposition strongholds showed up on election day to find that their members had been disqualified or not registered. The INEC’s claim that underfinancing caused its failures is fair, but that was not the only executive effort to undermine the electoral process. The president and the PDP leadership had also sought to tamper with the electoral law in 2001 and 2002 to favor incumbency and prevent new parties from joining the national contest, but Supreme Court intervention checked both attempts. Wrangling over the electoral laws, however, cost both the electoral commission and the new opposition parties precious time and resources to organize for 2003. These events also sent a clear message that the presidency and the PDP leadership were willing to alter the electoral rules in any way possible in order to ensure their victories. More ominous, the president effectively prevented local government elections, which the constitution mandates must take place every three years, from taking place in 2002. Instead, he and the PDP leadership arranged for the governors to appoint caretaker committees to run all local governments, delaying LGA elections until 2004. In the interim, the governors packed the LGA councils with their loyalists. The governors thus played two critical cards in the 2003 election calculus. First, they controlled the local governments, which were the central mechanisms for organizing elections at all levels, including assisting in hiring election staff, providing logistics and security for moving materials to the booths, and collating the results before they were sent to the state capitals. Second, the governors controlled the State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs), which oversee local government elections and are filled with gubernatorial appointments.

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 150

150

Crafting the New Nigeria

The INEC thus headed into the 2003 elections with a deeply flawed registration process and inflated voter rolls that had not been verified by the parties or the public. In addition, the governors had significant leverage over the INEC and SIEC election processes at the local government level. A UNPP leader in Enugu State summed up the perspective of many opposition leaders as the elections approached: “I have maybe 50 percent confidence in INEC. I have no confidence in the SIECs.”17 The INEC itself also suffered from a host of infrastructural problems that left it ripe for abuse, not least of which were the poor salaries for its critical polling station officers, who earned a mere N1,000 (less than U.S.$8) per day for the few days that they worked. In the context of Nigeria’s gripping poverty, poor pay provided further avenues for compromise. In Rivers State, for instance, we saw INEC polling station officials demanding promised payments from a local PDP leader, who assured them that the LGA chairman (also PDP) would settle accounts once the process was complete. This weakness of staffing, however, was not limited to the lower echelons. Opposition parties in a number of states accused the resident electoral commissioners (RECs), the highest INEC officials in each state, of being agents of the ruling party. Some of the RECs were shuffled to other states just days before the elections, but one ANPP zonal official complained in Adamawa that “the former REC was a PDP man, and I don’t know about the new one, but that does not matter. The groundwork was laid by his predecessor, regardless.”18 After the elections, the ANPP alleged that RECs across the nation were compromised. ANPP argued that many had obvious conflicts of interest: • the Katsina State REC was the brother of PDP national chairman, Chief Audu Ogbeh; • the Gombe State REC was the husband of vice president Atiku’s sister and allegedly a PDP member; • the Kogi State REC had contested and lost in the PDP gubernatorial primaries in Zamfara State; and • another REC was full cousin to the PDP governor of Imo State, also allegedly a PDP member.19 Violence and the Elections Given the dispersed structures of power in Nigeria among the nation’s many communities, each state in the federation featured its own peculiar political milieu that interacted with national trends but was shaped by developments locally. Consequently, much of the most intense political competition reflected local struggles between rival Big Men and their supporters

Rotberg-8.Final 12/17/04 4:38 PM Page 151

The 2003 Elections

151

or community rivalries that received expression through electoral machinery. In several instances leading up to the elections, especially where the outcomes were uncertain, this competition became violent. The president himself warned early in 2002 that politicians were raising private militias that could make the 2003 elections bloody.20 The most notable battle was in Warri in the Niger Delta, which suffered several bouts of interethnic violence over elections and control of local governments. Plateau State also saw incidents of communal violence of a lesser scale in the months preceding the elections. Anambra, Enugu, Kwara, and Bayelsa States, meanwhile, saw violent acts linked to the competition among local Big Men and their supporters.21 Kwara in particular proved rife with political assassination, with several party leaders for both the PDP and ANPP being attacked, including an ANPP state assembly candidate shot dead just days before the presidential election.22 The March 5, 2003, shooting death of Marshall Harry, however, sent fears of national violence across the nation. Harry was the vice chair of the south-south for the ANPP and was organizing the kickoff event for General Buhari’s presidential campaign in Rivers State when he was murdered. On the same day of the assassination, Buhari accused the PDP of masterminding it and even alleged that it had been ordered at the highest levels. Shortly thereafter the president called an all-party meeting to ask their leaders to eschew violence, which calmed tempers and fears. On the eve of the April 12 elections, the PDP stood poised for a strong return, but a number of states promised to be battlegrounds. Opinion polls showed that the president was comfortably ahead in the southwest, northcentral, and south-south, with a slight advantage in the northeast (see Table 8.1). Significantly, Buhari was polling favorably, between 25 percent and 35 percent of respondents in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom States, where he had promised increased local control of the oil and gas resources. He also had a lock on the northwest and appeared to be preferred by roughly a third of the voters in the Middle Belt states of Kwara, Kogi, Plateau, Nassarawa, and Kaduna. Most interesting, however, was that the Igbo-dominated APGA of Ojukwu was showing a very slight lead over Obasanjo in all the states of the Igbo southeast. Elections at the other levels of government, however, were much more competitive, although the PDP was still the party to beat (see Table 8.2). Despite establishment predictions of an AD sweep, the southwestern states were up for grabs between the AD and the PDP, with the PDP slightly ahead in races in Ogun and Ondo, and the AD slightly ahead in the others. AD was also enjoying slight leads over the PDP in Delta and Plateau States, with the ANPP close behind. ANPP was holding fast to its base in the deep northwest and northeast, although the PDP candidates appeared to be ahead in Yobe, Kebbi, and Kogi. ANPP candidates were within striking range of

Projected Votea Zone/State Southeast Abia Anambra Ebonyi Enugu Imo South-South Akwa-Ibom Bayelsa Cross River Delta Edo Rivers North-Central Benue Kogi Kwara Nasarawa Niger Plateau FCT, Abuja Northeast Adamawa Borno Bauchi Gombe Taraba Yobe

Actual Vote (%)

Victor (party and %)

Runner-up

ANPP

APGA

PDP

Others

Valid Votes

Rejected Votes

Registered

Turnout

1999 Turnout

PDP 43 APGA 43.2 APGA 27 APGA 32 APGA 45

APGA 30 PDP 41.2 PDP 25 PDP 29 PDP 45

11.27 9.22 2.05 1.68 5.31

34.88 32.4 2.58 15.71 27.66

51.7 54.15 94.5 79.66 64.62

2.15 4.23 0.87 2.95 2.41

748,034 862,193 796,626 1,126,945 1,016,481

21,133 35,052 11,141 17,942 36,404

1,285,428 1,859,795 1,002,771 1,479,542 1,630,494

59.84% 48.24% 80.55% 77.38% 64.57%

41.40% 37.80% 39.06% 57.11% 42.70%

PDP 71 PDP 37 PDP 63 PDP 56 PDP 66 PDP 38

ANPP 26 ANPP 25 ANPP