COVID-19's political challenges in Latin America (Latin American Societies) 3030776018, 9783030776015

Table of contents :
COVID-19's political challenges in Latin America
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Chapter 1: What Are the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America?
Part I: The Deniers
Chapter 2: Brazilian Response to Covid-19: Polarization and Conflict
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Bolsonaro: “The Negationist”
2.3 Pandemic Wars: The Role of Governors and Mayors
2.4 Popular Views on the Pandemic
2.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Mexico in the Face of Covid-19: In-Between Actions and Inefficiency
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Mexico’s Experience in the Face of the Pandemic
3.3 Mexico’s Reaction to the Covid-19: Lesson Learned?
3.4 Mexico: The Best of the Worst
3.5 AMLO and Covid-19: Do What I Say But Do Not Do What I Do
3.6 Conclusions
References
Chapter 4: Nicaragua: Denying the Health Crisis and the Political Crisis
4.1 The Political Crisis Has Conditioned the Health Crisis
4.2 Government Management of the Pandemic: Communications and Policies or Lack Thereof
4.3 Critical Voices from Civil Society and the Opposition
4.4 Conclusion
References
Part II: State Action During COVID-19 Pandemic
Chapter 5: Managing the Pandemic in Colombia: Between the Immediate Response and the Structural Consequences
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Pandemic in Colombia
5.3 The National Government’s Response to the Pandemic
5.3.1 Sanitary Measures
5.3.2 Economic-Administrative Measures
5.4 Institutional Political Effects of the Government’s Response
5.4.1 The Accumulation of Presidential Power and Its Relations with the Legislature
5.4.2 Individual Freedoms and Human Rights
5.4.3 The President’s Leadership
5.5 Conclusions
References
Chapter 6: The Uruguayan State’s Structure and the Management of the Pandemic
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Evolution of the Pandemic in Uruguay
6.3 Uruguay Before the Pandemic
6.3.1 Political Context: Political Alternation
6.3.2 Socioeconomic Context
6.4 State Structure and Governmental Policies to Confront the Pandemic
6.4.1 “Responsible Freedom”: The GACH and the Coronavirus Fund
6.4.2 Health System
6.4.3 Labor Market, Social Security, and Social Assistance
6.4.4 Education
6.5 Final Remarks: The Government and the State During the Pandemic
References
Part III: Social Movements and Pandemic
Chapter 7: Solidarity During the Pandemic in Brazil: Creative Recombinations in Social Movement Frames and Repertoires
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Frames, Repertoire, and Creative Action
7.3 From the Struggle Against Hunger to Grassroots Communication
7.4 Creativity and the Bricolage in Collective Action Repertoires
7.5 Creatively Connecting Frames
7.6 Conclusions
References
Chapter 8: Transformative Events and Collective Action in Chile During the Covid-19 Pandemic
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Closing a Country
8.3 Transformative Events and Collective Protest: Tracking Changes Across Time
8.4 Social Movements During the Pandemic
8.4.1 Workers: New Challenges and Grievances
8.4.2 The Demobilization of Students
8.5 Collective Action Beyond Social Movements
8.5.1 Pandemic and Survival Protests
8.6 Southern Mobilizations
8.7 Soup Kitchens and Solidary Campaigns
8.8 Conclusions
References
Part IV: Public Opinion and Pandemic
Chapter 9: Presidential Approval During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Argentina
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Political and Economic Context
9.3 The Management of the Pandemic and Presidential Approval
9.3.1 The Response to the Irregular Territorial Distribution of Cases: ASPO and DISPO
9.3.2 Health vs. Economy
9.3.3 Vaccines
9.4 Lights and Shadows of the Argentine Strategy Against the Coronavirus
9.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Identity Versus Fear of Death: Political Polarization Under the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil
10.1 Fueling Identity Connections But Losing the Grasp on Political Right
10.2 Methodology
10.2.1 First Round of Opinion Poll
10.2.2 Second Round: Conjoint Analysis
10.3 Results: A Divided Political Right
10.4 Conclusions
References
Chapter 11: Between Pessimism and Mistrust: Ecuadorian Attitudes in the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Before the Pandemic: Political Ruptures, Economic Recession, and Social Unrest
11.3 The Effects of the Pandemic’s First Year. Ecuadorians’ Attitudes and Well-Being
11.4 Ecuadorians’ Evaluation of the Government and the Legislature During the Pandemic
11.5 Ecuadorians’ Attitudes and Expectations for the 2021 General Elections
11.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 12: “For the Sake of All, the Poor First”: COVID-19, Mañaneras, and the Popularity of the Mexican President
12.1 Introduction
12.2 The Health Crisis
12.3 Chronicle of Announced Deaths
12.4 The Economic Crisis
12.5 AMLO Popularity
12.6 Reasons Behind AMLO’s Popularity
12.7 The Crisis of the Debate on Public Affairs: The Morning Conferences
12.8 Conclusion
References
Chapter 13: Comparing Cases to Understand the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America
Index

Citation preview

Latin American Societies Current Challenges in Social Sciences

Michelle Fernandez Carlos Machado  Editors

COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America

Latin American Societies Current Challenges in Social Sciences Series Editors Adrian Albala Instituto de Ciências Políticas (IPOL) University of Brasília Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil Maria Jose Álvarez Rivadulla Edificio Franco, Oficina GB 620 Universidad de los Andes Bogota, Colombia Alejandro Natal Department of Social Processes Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Lerma de Villada, Estado de México, Mexico

This series aims at presenting to the international community original contributions by scholars working on Latin America. Such contributions will address the challenges that Latin American societies currently face as well as the ways they deal with these challenges. The series will be methodologically agnostic, that is: it welcomes case studies, small-N comparative studies or studies covering the whole region, as well as studies using qualitative or quantitative data (or a mix of both), as long as they are empirically rigorous and based on high-quality research. Besides exploring Latin American challenges, the series attempts to provide concepts, findings and theories that may shed light on other regions. The series will focus on seven axes of challenges: 1) Classes and inequalities The first set of challenges revolves around the creation and distribution of symbolic and material rewards across social groups and their crystallization in stratification systems. How have social classes changed in Latin America? Which are the causes and consequences of the growth of middle classes with considerable education levels which nonetheless remain vulnerable to falling into poverty due to economic crises? Why has poverty declined but inequality remained persistently high? Moving to other kinds of inequalities, have the gaps in rewards between men and women and between ethnic groups changed, and do they vary across countries? Which are the territorial expressions of inequality, and how do they affect access to housing and the formation of lower-class ghettoes? 2) Crime, security and violence The second set of challenges stem from the persistence of violence and insecurity among Latin Americans, which consistently rank crime and insecurity at the top of their biggest problems. Crime organizations – from youth gangs to drug cartels – have grown and became more professionalized, displacing state forces in considerable chunks of national territories and, in some cases, penetrating the political class through illegal campaign funding and bribes. To this we should add, in some countries of the region, the persistence of armed insurgents fighting against governmental forces and paramilitaries, therefore creating cross-fires that threaten the lives of civilians. This results in massive human rights violations  – most of which remain in impunity – and forced population displacements. 3) Environmental threats A third challenge is related to the sources and consequences of environmental change – especially human-related change. These consequences threaten not only Latin American’s material reproduction (e. g. by threatening water and food sources) but also deeply ingrained cultural practices and lifestyles. How do existing models of economic development affect the natural environment? What are their social consequences? How have governments and communities faced these challenges? Are there viable and desirable alternatives to economic extractivism? What are the environmental prospects of Latin America for the next few decades and which are their social implications?

4) Collective action A fourth theme has to do with how collective actors  – social movements, civil society organizations, and quasi-organized groups – deal with these challenges (and others). How have labor, indigenous, student, or women’s movements adapted to environmental, economic and political changes? To what extent have they been able to shape the contours of their issue areas? Have they been successful in fighting inequality, patriarchy, or racism? Have they improved the lives of their constituencies? Why under some circumstances does collective action radicalizes both in tactics and goals? We welcome studies on a wide array of collective actors working on different issues, with different tactics, and diverse ideological stances. 5) Cultural change and resistance Culture – the understandings, symbols, and rituals that shape our quotidian – has never been static in Latin America, but modernization processes have affected it in complex ways. How has religion, lifestyles and values changed under market reforms and democratization processes? How multicultural are Latin American societies, and how they deal with the potential tensions derived from multiculturalism? Which are the causes and consequences of the decline in influence of the Catholic church, the awakening of new religious identities, and the growing sector of non-­ religious Latin Americans? How are new digital technologies and global consumption patterns shaping Latin Americans’ norms and beliefs about race, gender, and social classes? Are Latin Americans becoming “post-materialist”, and if so, why? 6) Migrations Political, economic, and environmental crises, as well as promises of better opportunities in other lands, have encouraged Latin Americans to migrate within their national borders or beyond them. While during the 1970s Latin Americans often migrated to other regions, nowadays national crises encourage them to seek other destinations in more nearby countries. What causes migration patterns and how do they affect both expelling and receiving communities? How do migrants adapt to their new residence places and coexist with native populations? How does migration contribute to social capital, national identities and gang formation? 7) Political inclusion and representation Dealing with social and ethnic minorities constitutes one of the most recurrent and unresolved challenges for the Latin American democracies. This topic includes the representation of the minorities, but includes also the study of the socio-political elites. Hence, how women are represented in the Latin American democracies? How are indigenous and blacks included into the socio-political arena? Which policies are being adopted for increasing the inclusion of such minorities? How representative are Latin American political elites? Both solicited and unsolicited proposals will be considered for publication in the series. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16592

Michelle Fernandez  •  Carlos Machado Editors

COVID-19's political challenges in Latin America

Editors Michelle Fernandez Institute of Political Science University of Brasília Brasília, Brazil

Carlos Machado Institute of Political Science University of Brasília Brasília, Brazil

ISSN 2730-5538     ISSN 2730-5546 (electronic) Latin American Societies ISBN 978-3-030-77601-5    ISBN 978-3-030-77602-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 What Are the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America?��    1 Michelle Fernandez and Carlos Machado Part I The Deniers 2 Brazilian Response to Covid-19: Polarization and Conflict����������������    9 André Borges and Lucio Rennó 3 Mexico in the Face of Covid-19: In-Between Actions and Inefficiency  23 Bruna Cavalcanti 4 Nicaragua: Denying the Health Crisis and the Political Crisis������������   35 Mateo Jarquín and Salvador Martí i Puig Part II State Action During COVID-19 Pandemic 5 Managing the Pandemic in Colombia: Between the Immediate Response and the Structural Consequences ����������������������������������������������������������   49 Nadia Pérez Guevara and María Eugenia Bonilla 6 The Uruguayan State’s Structure and the Management of the Pandemic��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 Germán Bidegain, Martín Freigedo, and Guillermo Fuentes Part III Social Movements and Pandemic 7 Solidarity During the Pandemic in Brazil: Creative Recombinations in Social Movement Frames and Repertoires��������������������������������������������   87 Rebecca Neaera Abers and Marisa von Bülow

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8 Transformative Events and Collective Action in Chile During the Covid-19 Pandemic����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  103 Nicolás M. Somma and Felipe Sánchez Part IV Public Opinion and Pandemic 9 Presidential Approval During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Argentina����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  121 María Laura Tagina 10 Identity Versus Fear of Death: Political Polarization Under the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil ��������������������������������������������������������������  133 Amanda Medeiros, Frederico Bertholini, and Carlos Pereira 11 Between Pessimism and Mistrust: Ecuadorian Attitudes in the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic��������������������������������������������������������  147 Angélica Abad Cisneros 12 “For the Sake of All, the Poor First”: COVID-19, Mañaneras, and the Popularity of the Mexican President����������������������������������������  163 Alejandro Natal 13 Comparing Cases to Understand the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America��������������������������������������������������������������  183 Carlos Machado and Michelle Fernandez Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  189

Contributors

Angélica  Abad  Cisneros  PhD in Political Science at University of Salamanca/ Spain. Research Fellow and Professor in School of Economic and Administrative Science at University of Cuenca/Ecuador. Rebecca  Neaera  Abbers  PhD in Urban Planning at UCLAR/USA.  Associate Professor in the Institute of Political Science at Universidade de Brasília/Brazil. Frederico Bertholini  PhD in Public Administration at Getúlio Vargas Foundation/ Brazil. Associate Professor of Political Science in the Institute of Political Science at University of Brasília/Brazil. Germán Bidegain  PhD in Political Science at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Professor of Political Science at Universidad de la Republica/Uruguay. Maria  Eugénia  Bonilla  PhD in Political Science at University of Salamanca/ Spain. Director in Political Studies Institute at Autonomous University of Bucaramanga/Colombia. André  Borges  PhD in Political Science at University of Oxford/UK.  Associate Professor of Political Science in the Institute of Political Science at University of Brasília/Brazil. Bruna  Cavalcanti  PhD in the Rule of Law and Global Governance from the University of Salamanca/Spain. Professor of Political Science at the Nacional Institute of Public Administration/México. Michelle Fernandez  PhD in Political Science at University of Salamanca/Spain. Researcher and Professor of Political Science in the Institute of Political Science at University of Brasília/Brazil.

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Contributors

Martín Freigedo  PhD in Social Science at Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO/México. Professor in Institute for Sustainable Development, Inclusion and Social Innovation, Universidad de la Republica/Uruguay. Mateo  Jarquín  PhD in History at Harvard University/USA.  Professor in the Department of History at Chapman University/USA. Carlos Machado  PhD in Political Science at Federal University of Minas Gerais/ Brazil. Associate Professor of Political Science in the Institute of Political Science at University of Brasília/Brazil. Salvador  Martí  i  Puig  PhD in Political Science at Autonomous University of Barcelona/Spain. Professor of Political Science at the University of Girona/Spain. Amanda Medeiros  PhD in Public Administration at Getúlio Vargas Foundation/ Brazil. Researcher and Professor of Public Administration and Political Economy at Getúlio Vargas Foundation/Brazil. Alejandro  Natal  PhD in Development Studies at London School of Economics and Political Science/UK.  Director of the Social Processes Department at Autonomous Metropolitan University/Mexico. Carlos  Pereira  PhD in Political Science at New School University/USA.  Full Professor of Political Economy and Comparative Politics at Getúlio Vargas Foundation/Brazil. Nadia  Pérez  Guevara  PhD candidate in Political Science at University of Salamanca/Spain. Researcher in Political Studies Institute at Autonomous University of Bucaramanga/Colombia. Lucio Rennó  PhD in Political Science at University of Pittsburgh/USA. Associate Professor of Political Science in the Institute of Political Science at University of Brasília/Brazil. Felipe  Sánchez  PhD in Sociology at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Nicolás  M.  Somma  PhD in Sociology at the University of Notre Dame/ USA.  Associate Professor of Sociology in the Institute of Sociology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

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Maria Laura Tagina  PhD in Political Science at University of Salamanca/Spain. Research Fellow and Professor in School of Politics and Government at National University of San Martin/Argentina. Marisa  von Bülow  PhD in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University/ USA. Associate Professor in the Institute of Political Science at Universidade de Brasília/Brazil.

Chapter 1

What Are the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America? Michelle Fernandez and Carlos Machado

After bursting in the Western pacific region and moving to European countries, the center of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has shifted to Latin America, in February 2020. So, Latin America was one of the last regions to register cases of COVID-19, and, in March 2021, it is one of the continents most affected by the pandemic. In order to understand what happens in this region during the first year of the pandemic, it is essential to understand the political issues that affect, differently, the countries of the region. In the preceding years to the outbreak of the 2020 pandemic, there was a period of intense pressure on the political systems of different Latin American countries, leading to dilemmas on the political coordination capacity needed to react to the health, economic, and social crisis resulting from the rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2. If, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a scenario of greater political stability was observed, the years leading up to the pandemic are marked by changes in political orientation prevalent in society, with an emphasis on policies coined in neoliberal principles. However, this occurs with different intensities and temporalities. The rise of Andrés Lopes Obrador in Mexico will mark a political change, since he was originally identified with a left-wing position. While in Colombia the conservative government of Iván Duque’s victory, in opposition to the Juan Manuel Santos presidency, signals a lean to a far-right agenda. In Brazil and Argentina, this political turn is accompanied by an approximation of international politics with the United States and right-wing politics, with a discourse emphasizing the shrinking of the state. In the context of Uruguay, the new government, adept at these premises, comes to power in the exact year of the beginning of the pandemic, delaying administrative and economic reforms, with special remarks about the aggressive political tone of the far-right Brazil’s President, Jair

M. Fernandez (*) · C. Machado University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_1

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Bolsonaro. In other countries, despite the continuity of political groups, as in the case of Ecuador, where Moreno is elected as a continuation of Felipe Correa’s left-­ wing government, there is a change in the posture from the former administration. When looking at Chile, we perceive a country immersed in social upheaval, whose popular manifestations, which led the government to commit to the realization of a new constituent, were affected by the virus’ arrival in Chilean territory. In order to highlight the diversity of scenarios, as a case of political continuity, it is also worth mentioning autocratic governments, such as the case of Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega (since 2007) currently has his wife, Rosario Murilo, in a central role in the position of vice president. To address the interaction between the pandemic and politics, the book was divided into four sections. We could add situations reinforcing the above examples, not selected for this book, such as the coup in Bolivia or the autocratic government in El Salvador. However, it is worth emphasizing how these political contexts pose challenges for political analysis in several dimensions. With this in mind, a challenge arises to allow the aggregation of the necessary information for the comparative analysis, while trying to characterize the specificity in each country. This book is the result of a series of lectures promoted by the Institute of Political Science of the University of Brasilia, which sought, during the first months of the spread of the virus in Latin American territory, to assess the interaction between the pandemic and different political dimensions. To this end, we divide the book in four sessions. The first session includes a discussion of the negationists, in the case of heads of state who have reduced or still reduce the negative impacts of the health crisis generated by the virus, recurrently linked to a position to counter the economic crisis and the health crisis, without fullness of the extent to which they both operate together. In the second chapter, Lucio Rennó and André Borges classified Brazil as one of the five countries in which its main political leader downplayed the disease and the pandemic. In fact, Jair Bolsonaro has been one of the most vocal critics of the World Health Organization recommendations and frequently defied them publicly, by disrespecting in actions and rhetoric social distancing and the use of masks. Nonetheless, Brazil is more complex than that, and subnational variation on response patterns has been diversified. In fact, it has followed, to some extent, a growing divide in Brazilian politics between Bolsonaro’s supporters and critics. It seems this might produce the new axis of polarization in the country. To achieve this conclusion, Rennó and Borges explore how the Federal government’s response to the pandemic has differed from that conducted in states governed by the opposition and then explore if this conflict reverberates in public opinion by analyzing reactions to the pandemic by the public as measured through surveys. The second case, in this same session, brings the case of Mexico. Bruna Cavalcanti exposes the decisions of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) during the pandemic. In this way, the chapter aims to describe the way Mexico has acted, its conjuncture, and to explain the public policies that have the country with over 1.9 million contagion. When compared to other Latin American countries, the President had an attitude of denial in the face of the serious problem

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he was facing, not following his government’s own recommendations and choosing not to wear a mask or social distancing himself while continuing to have close contact with his voting bloc. Despite all this, one point of major criticism toward AMLO has been the electoral opportunism he has exercised over the pandemic, even claiming “it has fitted like a glove” to a government whose main purpose is fighting corruption. The fourth chapter is brought by Mateo Jarquín and Salvador Martí i Puig analyze the administration of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. The authors characterize the government as a unique and tragic case of “denial” of the COVID-19 pandemic. Albeit not easy to explain the reasons for the government’s policies, it is only comprehensible in the context of social tensions, economic deterioration, and the political impasse caused by the violent authoritarian consolidation of the regime, in the late years. Described as one of the most erratic responses to the pandemic in the world due to the fact that the government sometimes warns citizens from the danger of the pandemic and others organize mass meetings and marches, the dynastic and sultanistic features of the regime must be taken into account to understand it. The second session addresses the actions taken by the states to contain the impacts of the different dimensions of the crisis resulting from the arrival and spread of SARS-CoV-2 in their respective territories. About Colombia, Maria Eugénia Bonilla, Nádia Perez, and Natália Hernández perceive the adoption of urgent measures by the government since last March 2020. However, the declaration of emergency that grants greater constitutional powers to the President in addition to the partial closure of the congress and to the leadership style adopted by Iván Duque, which is characterized by an erratic and confused political communication and by a conflictive relationship with different political sectors and territorial entities, has produced ambiguous results in his management of the pandemic. This intersects with the structural problems of his government, such as the increase in violence and the political crisis that has unleashed waves of social protest since 2019. As for Uruguay, Germán Bidegain and Martín Freigedo position it as an international success in controlling the expansion of COVID-19 and its related socioeconomic effects. To discuss the reasons for this exception in a region deeply affected by the pandemic, the authors focus on two fundamental aspects related to the role of the state in facing the crisis. Firstly, they show that the strong capacities of the country’s national integrated health system combined with some important decisions of the recently elected government were key to successfully control of the situation at the public health level. Secondly, they analyze the social and economic impacts of the crisis. As a result, they argue that the existing social protection matrix allowed the country to mitigate the social impacts for the moment, despite the fact that the government has not developed an ambitious agenda in this regard. The third session is dedicated to reflections on the reactions and impacts of the context produced by the pandemic on social movements. Organizing reactions from the society, despite the governments, or acting as a thermometer of the links between organized civil society and the state, the prominence of this dimension is central to evaluate the actions from governments.

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Marisa von Bülow and Rebecca Abers perceive Brazilian civil society mobilized in an extraordinary upsurge of solidarity, due to the upheaval of the pandemic. They see a diversity of social groups, from popular movements to large companies, carrying out emergency initiatives in response to multiple scarcities created or exacerbated by the pandemic: the lack of food, cleaning supplies, personal protection equipment, qualified information, physical and mental security, and so on. This chapter draws from the social movement literature to examine this heterogeneous process of mobilization in two dimensions. First, it explores how old social movement repertoires took on new meanings at the same time that actors created novel forms of action, leading to the creative combination of online and offline repertoires. Following this analysis, they examine how the mobilization process also occurred through the creative recombination of collective action frames through which actors disseminated messages defining problems and solutions and justifying action. As a conclusion, it is possible to infer that solidarity initiatives were often carried out through frames that connected them to political agendas that went well beyond the pandemic, such as anti-racism, feminism, and the struggle against economic inequality, produced through the preexisting mobilization. As for mass mobilizations, Nicolás Somma and Felipe Sanchéz examine how the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact was especially dramatic in Chile because the country had experienced a major uprising in late 2019. During this uprising, massive protests took place, displaying a wide array of tactics, from peaceful to disruptive and violent actions. Thus, when the extremely weakened government of President Sebastián Piñera mandated quarantines in March 2020, Chilean society was in a state of mobilization which turned it not prone to adopt a strict discipline. This explains why, during the months of quarantine, the number of collective protests – as measured by ACLD’s dataset – surprisingly increased compared to the previous year, even with the recommendations to avoid agglomerations from the WHO or the Chilean government. At the end of the book, the fourth session is dedicated to presenting the changes perceived by the public, in this period of approximately 1 year, particularly in relation to the support to the current governments and also to the support or not to the health security measures. For such, Maria Laura Tagina focuses on the changes in public opinion in Argentina amidst the actual crisis. Albeit the new economic crisis, while negotiating the payment of the country’s foreign debt with private creditors, the Argentine government was one of the earliest to impose a mandatory lockdown in order to slow down the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19), thus gaining time to prepare the health system. Initially, such measures enjoyed high levels of social support, which resulted in a respite from the dynamics of political polarization of public opinion. This scenario played along with a strategy of cooperation among the political elites, an unusual event in the country. At the same time, the social confinement measures implemented prevented the social unrest anticipated for the most vulnerable sectors of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, which was threatened by the lack of an income and the sanitary conditions that would allow them to face the pandemic. The political cooperation and strengthening of the presidential figure, however,

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deteriorated, as the lockdown was extended, giving rise to protests demanding the reopening of economic activities. In this sense, her chapter analyzes the dynamics of public opinion with respect to the management of the pandemic in Argentina and evaluates the factors that affected the levels of presidential popularity. Although before 2018, when Jair Bolsonaro was elected to the presidency, the country was sharply divided into two radically opposing sides, according to Amanda Medeiros, Carlos Pereira e Frederico Bertholini, there are changes in Brazilian polarization. Under the huge distress of the pandemic, a significant portion of voters, self-identified as right-wing and center-right  – supposedly, the core of Bolsonaro’s voters – refused to follow the President’s recommendation of relaxing social distancing and rejected his performance during the pandemic. Through two surveys, the second of which was conducted through an experimental conjoint analysis, it was found that right-wing voters not only abandoned Bolsonaro’s recommendation but also retracted their political support. The conjoint analysis showed that this effect was stronger among pragmatic voters than those with higher identity-­ based ideological connections with the President. The seriousness of the COVID-19 epidemic led people to minimize the potential economic losses that social distancing might cause. In sum, the “fear of death” seems to have brought together not only ideologically opposed segments but also people with different income levels, who are experiencing distinct economic losses as a result of social distancing policies. While in Ecuador, Angelica Abad sees the public opinion very critical toward the government but also toward representatives of the National Assembly and politicians in general. Corruption scandals, public health system incapacity to deal with the disease, political opportunist actions and declarations of the opposition, and increasing levels of unemployment and economic instability have increased citizen’s distrust and pessimism about the future. All in the mix of Equatorial elections in February 2021 having to mold their actions to establish connections with a very disappointed and distant electorate, resulting in the most fragmented presidential race in its history. As the last chapter about a specific country, Alejandro Natal brings out how the Mexican government dealt with communication about COVID and how this impacted public opinion. Particularly, it focuses on the discourses given by President Lopez Obrador during his morning speeches. It reports on how the pandemic forced the government to adapt its programmatic objectives. It analyses why despite mortality escalating and voices against government policies multiplied, the levels of public acceptance of Lopez were not shaken but rather maintained very high. Natal argues that the government used COVID communications as a populist tool to advance its goals. As a final reflection of the book, we present a chapter with a comparative emphasis seeking to look at the countries that make up each session. The four axes were understood as very relevant political aspects in the pandemic, but in no way do we intend that the discussions developed at home exhausted the debate on the different political scenarios and the COVID-19 pandemic in the region. Given the complexity of factors that are related to the connection between politics and the health crisis in different Latin American countries, this book is only the first step in the path of these discussions.

Part I

The Deniers

Chapter 2

Brazilian Response to Covid-19: Polarization and Conflict André Borges and Lucio Rennó

2.1  Introduction Brazil has had, until February 15, 2021, approximately 240,000 deaths by Covid-19, trailing only the USA. Like the USA of Donald Trump, it has been classified as one of the five countries in which its main political leader has consistently downplayed the disease and the pandemic (Meyer 2020). In fact, Jair Bolsonaro has been one of the most vocal critics of the World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations, frequently defying specialists publicly, by disrespecting in actions and rhetoric social distancing and the use of masks. Bolsonaro adopted a position of being the spokesperson of the poor people who could not afford to stay at home and of businesses who could not close their doors. Bolsonaro has also defended alternative treatments, supporting the use of chloroquine. More recently, the President engaged in a campaign of undermining the vaccine, questioning its collateral effects. In sum, Bolsonaro responded to the pandemic by mobilizing the full set of strategies that question specialists’ opinions based on science. He has become the prototypical negationist. However, Brazil is much more complex than that. Bolsonaro’s views do not encapsulate the totality of perceptions and actions on the issue of the pandemic. The opposition has been vocal, and there is significant variation in subnational response patterns (Fernandez and Pinto 2020). Some governors and mayors have adopted lockdown policies, have defended the use of masks, and have rigorously followed the WHO recommendations. Interestingly, these divides follow partisan/ideological lines. Better said, they have reflected a division between Bolsonaro, his allies, and the rest. A cutting divide in Brazilian politics is increasingly centered on Bolsonaro.

A. Borges (*) · L. Rennó University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_2

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The pandemic apparently deepened this gap, further demarcating differences already present in the 2018 elections (Rennó 2020). In this chapter, we describe Bolsonaro’s positions over the course of the pandemic. We then focus on the differences in positions with some governors. We will focus primarily on the positions of São Paulo’s governor, João Doria, which strongly rivaled Bolsonaro. We then explore if this conflict reverberates in public opinion by analyzing reactions to the pandemic by the public as measured through surveys. Finally, we conclude by looking at the electoral prospects of this conflict, considering what happened in the 2020 municipal elections (which took place during the pandemic) and the upcoming 2022 presidential race.

2.2  Bolsonaro: “The Negationist” Jair Bolsonaro has constructed repute and notoriety based on his polemic statements and positions. He became known as a staunch defender of the Brazilian Military Coup, which implemented an authoritarian regime from 1964 to 1985. He has also gained visibility because of his misogynous and sexist claims, clearly depicted in a discussion with a female representative of the Workers Party in which he violently offended her. He also has been strongly against gay rights and gay movements, insulting their representatives and spokespeople. Finally, during Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, Bolsonaro openly backed torture by the military regime, praising army colonel Ustra, who had been responsible for torturing Rousseff after her imprisonment by the dictatorship in the 1970s. Clearly, there were no limits to this man, and none were imposed upon him over the years, in spite of his extremely intolerant and antidemocratic positions. Instead, he was repeatedly reelected as a Federal Deputy, having held seven consecutive mandates, something very few have achieved. In 2014, when he was elected for his last mandate in the lower chamber, he received his most expressive return: over 460, 000 votes in Rio de Janeiro. Given his expressive 2014 result, long career, and the debacle of Dilma Rousseff’s administration after 2013, Bolsonaro launched his name for president, as early as the end of the 2014 elections. His impressive voting in 2014 and the mounting criticism of the Worker’s Party (PT) boosted his emerging presidential campaign. In fact, Bolsonaro consistently campaigned between 2014 and 2018. Initially, his attempt was, as usual, belittled by the Brazilian political elite. He was still seen as an eccentric, with insignificant chances of success. Bolsonaro, during his career, was always seen as a backbencher, consistently underestimated by his peers. It would not be different this time: Bolsonaro’s presidential bid was taken as a hoax and a joke; “He should not be taken seriously,” thought by most of the Brazilian political elite. All of that suddenly changed when polls started to come out with Bolsonaro scoring well. As can be seen in the Poder360 poll aggregator ­(https://www.poder360.

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com.br/pesquisas-­de-­opiniao/),1 as early as 2016, Bolsonaro premiered in the polls rating around 6% of vote intentions. This was already an achievement, given the fact that Geraldo Alckmin of the PSDB, a very well-known politician who had governed São Paulo state and run for president before obtained 11% of voters’ preferences. In September, 2017, a year before the elections, Bolsonaro had reversed these results, appearing with around 20% of vote intentions and Alckmin at a consistent, downward movement, with 8%. Bolsonaro and Alckmin maintained this pattern until August, 2018. During the campaign Bolsonaro spiked up, and Alckmin maintained his downward trend. Aécio Neves, who was a runner-up against Dilma in 2014, lost by mere 3% points in the second round. He started the new electoral cycle very-­ well-­positioned but disappeared after involvement in a major corruption scandal. Bolsonaro’s only real threat came from former president Lula da Silva, who consistently placed better on polls, but was impeded from running in September, 2018, due to the fact that he was imprisoned convicted of corruption (Rennó 2020). Bolsonaro benefited to a great extent from the growing rejection of parties and party politics in the wake of a major anti-corruption operation initiated in 2014 (Borges 2021; Fuks et al. 2021). The Lava Jato (Car Wash) operation started as an investigation of a bribery scheme in the Petrobrás state oil company, but gradually expanded and revealed several corrupt schemes involving other public companies, construction firms, and politicians affiliated with several different parties. Adding to the systemic corruption revealed by the Car Wash operation that led to the discrediting of all major parties, a deep economic contraction in 2015 and 2016 fueled popular anger against President Rousseff and the Workers’ Party (PT). Rousseff’s successor, Michel Temer, was no better: he not only failed to deliver robust growth rates, but several key government officials (including Temer himself) were caught in corruption scandals.2 Given Brazil’s successive and concomitant political and economic downfall, the scenario was ripe for the emergence of an outsider with a radical antisystem discourse and positions that were critical of the long PT spell in the government. Bolsonaro incorporated the anti-PT position, rivalling with Fernando Haddad, who substituted Lula as candidate after his campaign was impugned. Bolsonaro was elected in the second round of 2018 with a rhetoric that aligned conservative, right-­ wing positions until then not defended by a single candidate. Economic liberalism, hardline positions toward law and order, criticism of corruption, cultural backlash against gender politics, and questioning of affirmative action were for the first time clearly part of a single political agenda and rhetoric (Amaral 2020; Hunter and Power 2019; Rennó 2020). All of this was encompassed by his religious affinity with Evangelical churches. Controversy is in the essence of Bolsonaro’s positions, as is the case with most populists (Pappas 2019). He nurtures crisis and stimulates disagreements, usually  All websites visited on February 15, 2021  Brazil’s GDP decreased by 3.5% and 3.3% in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 2017 and 2018, yearly growth averaged 1.1%. At the time of the 2018 elections, unemployment affected almost 12% of the workforce. 1 2

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directly communicating with his core supporters through social media. In addition, Bolsonaro has been classified by many as a populist, due to his antisystem positions and a vague defense of the people. In spite of that, what is of more interest is his propensity to conflict and quarrel promotion. Crisis promotion is a key aspect of contemporary populist strategies (Moffitt 2015). In this sense, the pandemic was an opportunity for him to further differentiate himself from competitors and to use the external shock to stimulate conflict and polarize public opinion. Instead of promoting an atmosphere of cooperation and union to fight a common and impressive enemy, which might have allowed him to benefit from a “rally around the flag” effect, Bolsonaro chose to defend controversial positions that questioned the established consensus defended by specialists based on science. Throughout the pandemic, new dimensions of Bolsonarismo emerged: a clear defense of conspiracy theories and antiscientificism. Bolsonaro’s denial of the seriousness of the disease was blatant (Meyer 2020). He based his views on unproven treatments, on stubbornly questioning social distancing and the use of masks, and more recently on doubting the vaccines. He did the exact opposite of what responsible governance of the pandemic, as defended by many international agencies and governments, establishes. In doing so, he perpetuated a climate of conflict and unrest in the country, stirring contention. A significant turning point in the confrontation of the Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil was the President’s speech in late March (Ajzenman et  al. 2020; Mariani et al. 2020). It was then that Bolsonaro clearly spelled out his disdain and disregard for the pandemic, referring to it in pejorative and mocking terms, as a “little flu,” and that physical exercise should be enough to avoid contamination. From then on, Bolsonaro engaged in a vertiginous spiral of declarations against the pandemic that stunned critics, but may have emboldened supporters who shared his despise and disbelief on the solutions proposed. In an interview weeks after this speech, Bolsonaro stated that Brazilians should be studied, as they “swim on sewage” and nothing happens to their health.3 Bolsonaro adopted a clear position that juxtaposed measures to confront the pandemic and their economic repercussions, threatening the economy. He was clearly against lockdown and social distancing measures.4 Last, but not least, Bolsonaro was critical of the vaccines, especially the one developed in the Butantan Institute of São Paulo, in a partnership with Chinese laboratories – CoronaVac. Bolsonaro questioned the efficacy of the vaccines. He joked about their possible collateral effects, stating that if you take the vaccine and turn into an alligator, it is your problem.5 Bolsonaro went to the extreme of celebrating the interruption of vaccine tests  https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/26/brasileiro-pula-em-esgoto-e-nao-acontece-­ nada-­diz-bolsonaro-em-alusao-a-infeccao-pelo-coronavirus.ghtml 4  https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/05/14/bolsonaro-diz-que-­ lockdown-nao-da-certo-e-volta-a-criticar-governadores.htm 5  https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-volta-a-questionar-a-eficacia-das-vacinas-contra-a-covid-19/; https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-sobre-vacina-de-pfizer-se-voce-virar-um-jacare-e-problema-de-voce/ 3

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due to the death of a clinical trial subject, claiming he was right again.6 Later it was shown that the death was due to suicide and was unrelated to Covid-19.7 In addition to his toxic rhetoric, Bolsonaro’s actions also undermined efforts to confront the pandemic. He repeatedly appeared in public without a mask and without respecting social distancing. He attended several political demonstrations that defended antidemocratic positions, arguing for a military intervention with Bolsonaro in power. His allies in civil society adopted very radical stances against the Supreme Court, seen as an enemy, and against Congress, who consistently defied Bolsonaro. He also engaged in a serious confrontation with his first Minister of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, who adopted the WHO recommendations in the early stages of the pandemic and was successively disavowed by Bolsonaro. Mandetta was finally fired by Bolsonaro in mid-April, 2020, to be substituted by Nelson Teich, a well-known doctor, who stayed in office for less than a month. Bolsonaro then opted to appoint a top-ranking general as his Minister of Health, Eduardo Pazuello, who remains in the post until today. In sum, at all stages of the process, Bolsonaro’s positions were defiant and stubbornly against any measures based on scientific evidence and accepted international protocol to confront pandemics. Bolsonaro embodies an attitudinal posture of aggressive defiance toward any measure or person that defies his beliefs and judgments, based on very idiosyncratic opinions. There is a substantial disregard for community welfare, placing what he wants and believes over the interests of others. It is a very radical defense of self-centered positions, even in spite of evidence suggesting such views are wrong. He stubbornly defends views that are based on questionable grounds and weak data, but that are more comfortable to what his instincts and personal desires mandate. All measures that he, for some reason, dislikes, are questioned in the grounds of being exaggerated and overrated. Measures such as social distancing and the use of masks, which may be seen as uncomfortable and undesirable, are simply ignored. Everything about the pandemic seems exaggerated, from Bolsonaro’s perspective. It will be interesting to see to what extent this reflects a general attitude of Brazilians: does Bolsonaro emulate how a significant number of Brazilians really are? But his was not the only position in the country on the pandemic.

2.3  Pandemic Wars: The Role of Governors and Mayors Brazil is a federation. It is composed by the union, states, and municipalities, all governed in identical way with a division of power between the Legislative and the Executive branches. Popular vote elects a president and 27 governors every 4 years  https://www.dw.com/pt-br/bolsonaro-comemora-suspens%C3%A3o-de-testes-da-coronavac/ a-55558007 7  https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/11/10/morte-que-suspendeu-­ teste-nao-tem-relacao-com-coronavac-nem-com-covid-19.htm 6

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in concomitant elections and mayors in midterm elections. The Legislative branch is elected in a similar way, with concurrent elections at the Federal and State levels. The national legislature is bicameral, whereas the subnational legislatures are unicameral. Brazil’s federalism ranks among the most decentralized in Latin America, together with Argentina and Mexico (Niedzwiecki et  al. 2018). The 1988 Constitution devolved substantial policy authority and fiscal resources to states and municipalities. The central government and state and local governments have shared authority over policies in areas such as education, social security, health, and environmental protection. Moreover, subnational governments have a key role in the implementation of health and education policies (Mainwaring 1997; Samuels 2003; Souza 1997). In the last two decades, however, the Brazilian federation has centralized, and the federal government has assumed a preponderant role in the coordination and funding of social policies (Gomes 2012). Recentralization notwithstanding, state governors have continued to play a very important role in Brazil’s political system. Decentralized electoral institutions make the careers of senators and deputies predominantly state-centered (Borges and Sanches Filho 2016; Santos and Pegurier 2011). Furthermore, governors control important resources for the election (or reelection) of those politicians, such as candidate selection, state party organizations, and patronage. Last but not least, all decisions regarding the nomination or endorsement of presidential candidates are shaped to a very substantial extent by state party leaders and incumbent governors (Borges et al. 2017; Samuels 2003). Although the governors of the largest states are natural aspirants to the presidency and they often play a key role in the organization of the opposition to the national government, disruptive policy conflicts opposing the central government to state governments have been more of an exception than the rule in the last three decades.8 In Brazil’s highly fragmented party system, minority presidents have relied more often than not on the support of large, multiparty national coalitions, which in turn facilitates national-local cooperation. Moreover, the federal government has relied on centralized control over the formulation and funding of social policies to induce governors and mayors to cooperate with federal programs (Arretche 2004). Bolsonaro’s presidency has clearly deviated from previous patterns of intergovernmental relations, in part as a result of the negationist position assumed by the national government during the pandemic. Also, Bolsonaro has spent most of his 2 years of term without a majority coalition in Congress and his own party, the PSL, which he abandoned in his first year of mandate, controlled only four governorships. Three of the four most populous states  – São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and 8  During the PT federal administrations (2003–2016), for instance, the major leaders of the opposition were either sitting governors (Geraldo Alckmin, governor of the São Paulo state from 2001 to 2006) or former governors (Aécio Neves, who had governed Minas Gerais from 2003 to 2010). Neves and Alckmin were both affiliated to the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party), and they disputed presidential elections against PT candidates in 2006 and 2014, respectively.

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Bahia – have been governed by opposition politicians, all of which have been openly critical of the federal government.9 Bolsonaro’s deliberate attempts at undermining efforts to confront the pandemic led to an unprecedent alliance of state governors from different parties and regions of the country in the national governors’ forum. The forum sought to coordinate state-level responses to the pandemic, in view of the federal government’s omission. Conflict between the national executive and state governors was a matter of time, as opposition governors from both left and right used the national forum to criticize the Health Ministry’s (lack of) response to the pandemic.10 In April, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that the adoption of measures to confront the pandemic were not exclusive of the federal government, but concurrent with state and municipal governments.11 This was understood as one of the first defeats of the Bolsonaro government in the disputes about the pandemic. Governors and Mayors had the right to implement policies to confront the pandemic, independently from the federal government. Governors and mayors, then, continued adopting the measures they found most adequate to each specific reality, considering levels of contamination, deaths, and health units’ saturation. Situations varied significantly across the country, with governors and mayors adopting different measures in distinct moments (Fernandez and Pinto 2020). An important case to bear in mind is that of João Dória, Governor of the state of São Paulo, and Bruno Covas, Mayor of the state city capital (São Paulo), both from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). The state of São Paulo is the largest and most industrialized Brazilian state, whereas its capital is the most populous and wealthiest city in the country. Thus, both the mayoralty and the governorship of the city and state of São Paulo are very powerful and visible offices that have often served as a steppingstone for ambitious politicians willing to run for president. This is certainly the case of João Doria. He was elected mayor of São Paulo City in 2016, defeating the incumbent candidate, Fernando Haddad of the Workers’ Party (PT), in the first round. A TV celebrity and entrepreneur, Doria was a complete political outsider until then. In 2018, he was elected governor of São Paulo, in an informal alliance in the second round with the then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro. Bruno Covas, his vice mayor, assumed the mayoral office of São Paulo City. Since his election to the São Paulo mayoralty, Doria has never hidden his intention to run 9  Although the governor of Rio de Janeiro, Wilson Witzel, was formerly a close ally of Bolsonaro and his sons, he soon took distance from the president in order to prepare himself to run for president in 2022. Witzel was impeached under charges of corruption in June, 2020. Since then, the governor of São Paulo, João Doria, also a presidential aspirant, has become the major opponent of Bolsonaro at the state level. Romeu Zema, governor of Minas Gerais, which is Brazil’s most populous state after São Paulo, has tended to side with Bolsonaro (or to remain neutral), in part due to the state’s calamitous fiscal situation and dependence on the goodwill of the Ministry of Economy to avoid government shutdown. 10  https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/03/25/com-criticas-a-bolsonaroforum-­de-governadores-se-reune-com-maia.htm. 11  http://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=441447&ori=1

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for president.12 As the old generation of the PSDB lost ground after a shameful defeat in the 2018 presidential elections, Doria emerged as a major leader of the party and likely presidential candidate in 2022. Doria’s presidential ambitions explain, to a substantial extent, why it was in São Paulo and not elsewhere that the most aggressive reaction against Bolsonaro’s response to the pandemic took hold. Even though many governors and mayors adopted equally critical positions, who dominated the role of consistently opposing Bolsonaro was João Doria. Governor Doria saw in the president’s disastrous handling of the pandemic an opportunity to boost his popularity by presenting himself as a moderate, pro-science alternative to Bolsonaro’s negationism. Doria and the mayor of São Paulo, Bruno Covas, from early on adopted very responsible positions regarding the pandemic. They expressly followed recommendations by the WHO specialists and adopted stringent social distancing, lockdown, and mask usage measures. Furthermore, Doria, who controls the Butantan Institute, an internationally renowned and respected medical and biological institution in Brazil, heavily invested in producing Covid-19 vaccines in Brazil in a partnership with Chinese giant Sinovac. Doria and his CoronaVac, as the vaccine was labelled, became Bolsonaro’s most challenging rivals. Meanwhile, the federal government, through the Fiocruz Foundation, another very respectful health institution in the country, was also developing a vaccine alongside Oxford University. Initially, Bolsonaro was critical of both, but has gradually shifted his position. Doria became Bolsonaro’s loudest critic. As early as March, 2020, he openly criticized the president in a meeting attended by all governors and the president.13 This process escalated over the following months, and Doria became the most important counterpoint to Bolsonaro’s pandemic politics. The climax of this process broke out on January 17, 2021, when in an unexpected media stunt, Doria promoted the vaccination of the first Brazilian against Covid-19. Monica Calazans, a black woman, nurse in an infectiology institute was the first Brazilian to receive the Butantan Institute vaccine. This was presented nationwide hours after the vaccines were authorized by Anvisa (National Sanitary Vigilance Agency). Doria made it an emotional spectacle, with strong speeches against Bolsonaro. The federal government tried to sabotage Doria’s event immediately airing an improvised, last-minute event at the Ministry of Health, in which Minister Pazuello, sided by a single aide, tried to question Doria’s disrespect to an agreement that vaccination would start simultaneously in all states. This was an unprecedented and unforeseen event unfolding in the media in a sleepy Sunday afternoon, but it was the culmination of an ongoing process of profound conflict that occurred in Brazil during 2021. It gave Doria a definitive shot at the national spotlight. Even more recent developments have seen Bolsonaro back down from his criticism of vaccines, and the population has witnessed the Ministry of Health taking a  https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/psdb-de-alckmin-antecipa-disputa-estadual-para-pressionar-doriasobre-presidencia-1-21886618 13  https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/andreia-sadi/post/2020/03/25/em-reuniao-doria-criticapronunciamento-­­de-bolsonaro-que-chama-governador-de-demagogo.ghtml 12

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leading role in the purchase and distribution of vaccines.14 Hence, to a certain extent, Bolsonaro’s positions have shifted during the pandemic, especially regarding the vaccination process. This, probably, is a result of having been pushed to a corner by Doria.

2.4  Popular Views on the Pandemic The population has not been a passive bystander to this convoluted and complex process of increased conflict. The controversies raised at the elite level rebounded in the popular views about the pandemic. Several surveys allow us to gauge this aspect of the pandemic wars in Brazil. We will explore here some of these to illustrate how the population has reacted to the competing views about responses to the pandemic, basically juxtaposing Bolsonaro’s positions and those understood as suggested by the WHO specialists. Basically, this dispute only exists in Brazil as a consequence of how Bolsonaro has positioned himself. He has gained centrality as a divisive character in Brazilian politics since the 2018 elections. He certainly is the polarizing element in the discussion of the different dimensions of the pandemic as public and political issues. We focus first on the “A Cara da Democracia” (The Face of Democracy) survey, which captured reactions to the ongoing pandemic. It was collected in the first week of June, 2020, conducted over the phone during in 2020 the height of the pandemic in Brazil in the first semester of that year. The fieldwork span from May 30 to June 5, 2020, with a 3.1% margin of error and 95% confidence interval. The survey was on the field during a phase of acceleration in the number of deaths to reach its peak a few weeks later, following a plateau at high mortality rates. Hence, it was a moment of increased consternation with the disease as contamination, and death rates were on the rise. The main questions in our analysis are related to popular reactions toward the pandemic. We focus on four different aspects of the health crisis. During the pandemic, Bolsonaro has been critical of the Brazilian public health system. Hence, the first item is related to views on the Brazilian Health System’s (SUS) performance in combating the pandemic. The item reads: the new Coronavirus is leading the Brazilian Public Health System (SUS) (public hospitals and emergency rooms) to the limit of its capacity. In your opinion: (1) The pandemics shows the importance of the SUS, justifying an increase in its funding. (2) The SUS has done well in confronting the pandemic with the resources available, and no further increases are justified. (3) The SUS has performed poorly in combating the new Coronavirus (the pandemic), and its continuity should be discussed.15  https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/bolsonaro-muda-discurso-passa-defender-vacina-comprapor-empresas-2-24855345 15  Translation by the authors: A pandemia do novo coronavírus está levando o SUS (hospitais públicos e unidades de pronto atendimento) ao limite de seu atendimento. Em sua opinião: 1. A pandemia mostra a importância do SUS e justifica um substancial aumento em seu financiamento. 2. 14

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The second item refers to the discussion about centralizing or decentralizing powers during the pandemic. As stated, the Supreme Court was invited to position itself on which level of government had the responsibility to promote policies regarding the pandemic. We asked Brazilians to position themselves toward the following statement: The Supreme Court determined that governors and mayors should have autonomy to adopt measures to combat the new Coronavirus. In your opinion, such measures should be a responsibility of the: (1) federal government; (2) governors and mayors; (3) it depends (do not read).16 A third item addresses positions toward the president’s role during the pandemic and focuses on his negationist behavior. Bolsonaro has become a classic case of downplaying the seriousness of the pandemic. Through his actions and words, Bolsonaro has shown more concern with the economy than with the direct loss of lives with the spread of Covid-19. We asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following item: Some people believe that the president gave little importance to the impact of the new Coronavirus, undermining the efforts to confront the pandemic in the country.17 Finally, we asked an item about behavior, to complement the three above on opinions and attitudes toward the pandemic. We asked if, because of the Coronavirus pandemic, the respondent is: living normally, without changes in their routine; taking care, but still going out to work or do other activities; leaving home only when inevitable; or in complete isolation, staying home all the time. The question, therefore, captures respondents’ behavior during the pandemic, varying from complete disregard to social distancing measures to strict adherence to recommendations and regulations adopted to enforce social isolation.18 Table 2.1 presents the results. First, there is significant popular support for the Brazilian Public Health System. Only 14% of respondents are critical of the SUS – backing Bolsonaro’s positions. Also, one in five Brazilians are both critical of the Supreme Court’s position against Bolsonaro and in favor of his negationist positions. Finally, only 4% of Brazilians are acting as if nothing was going on, as if there was no pandemic.

O SUS tem se saído bem no enfrentamento do coronavírus (da pandemia) com os recursos que tem e não se justifica um aumento no financiamento. 3. O SUS tem se saído mal no enfrentamento do novo coronavírus (da pandemia) e sua continuidade deveria ser discutida 16  Translation by the authors: O STF determinou que governadores e prefeitos devem ter autonomia para tomar medidas no enfrentamento ao novo coronavírus. Na sua opinião, tais medidas deveriam ficar a cargo: (1) do governo federal; (2) de governadores e prefeitos; (3) depende da situação (não ler). 17  Translation by the authors: Algumas pessoas avaliam que o presidente deu pouca importância ao impacto do novo coronavírus, prejudicando o combate à pandemia no país. O sr(a). Concorda muito, concorda pouco, nem concorda e nem discorda (não ler), discorda pouco ou discorda muito. 18  Translation by the authors: Em função da pandemia de coronavírus, atualmente você: está vivendo normalmente, sem mudar nada na sua rotina; tomando cuidado, mas ainda saindo de casa para trabalhar ou fazer outras atividades; saindo de casa só quando é inevitável ou; está totalmente isolado, sem sair de casa de jeito nenhum.

2  Brazilian Response to Covid-19: Polarization and Conflict Table 2.1 Percentages for selected variables

Variables Critical of the Brazilian Health system Critical of the Supreme Court’s position Negationist position Leaving home normally Leaving home carefully Leaving home only when inevitable Not leaving home at all

19 Percentage 14 20 21 04 50 37 09

Source: A Cara da Democracia, 2020

These results show that Bolsonaro’s extreme positions toward the pandemic are consistently backed by about 20% of the Brazilian population. Even in an apparently valence issue such as the defense of the Public Health System amidst the pandemic, a portion of the population still backs Bolsonaro’s views. Bolsonaristas are apparently a solid group of Brazilians that support even the more extreme positions of their leader, who is called by them as “The Myth.” Survey results regarding support for negationist positions resonates with Datafolha opinion polls on citizens’ perceptions of the pandemic. For instance, DataFolha asked respondents to evaluate Bolsonaro’s performance during the pandemic: positive evaluations have varied from 35% in March, 2020, to 26% in the last poll, conducted on January 20 and 21, 2021. Twenty-eight percent of Brazilians in the same poll said Bolsonaro was the one doing the most to combat the pandemic in Brazil. Even though he is behind Doria with 46%, his numbers are impressive given his attitudes. By January 2021, Bolsonaro’s overall positive government evaluation was at 31%. Hence, Jair Bolsonaro has kept steady levels of popularity and support, despite his polemic claims about the pandemic.

2.5  Conclusion Jair Bolsonaro is a classic negationist. He has consistently downplayed the pandemic, refused to accept specialists’ recommendations, has behaved defiantly to the threats of the disease, has defended alternative cures that have not been scientifically proven, and has questioned the vaccine’s efficacy. He embraced the full package of negationist postures head-on, full throttle, and without hesitation. The question is, has this paid off regarding popular support? The data we present in this chapter shows a scenario that is rather favorable to Bolsonaro. If he has not won popular or elite adhesions, he has further consolidated his base of support. Instead of opting for a position that could attract more supporters, by defending union in the fight against a common enemy, he has bet on more division and conflict, perpetuating and deepening a dramatic crisis. Bolsonaro stimulated cleavages, polarized with all other political camps and further demarcated his

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position of a pole in the Brazilian political spectrum. Bolsonaro used the pandemic to further polarize the Brazilian political system, crystalizing the support of his “true believers,” further increasing the gap, distance, and rivalry with the opposition, which ranges from the moderate right to the extreme left. Bolsonaro’s polarizing, negationist strategy has also led to intense conflict between state governors and the national executive, as the former organized themselves in a national forum to compensate for the lack of a centralized, national response to the pandemic. Thanks to constitutional provisions that divide policy authority over health policy among all three levels of government, governors and mayors were able to devise local- and state-level lockdown measures amidst the omission of the federal government. Intergovernmental conflict has, in turn, allowed for the rise of a moderate, center-­ right alternative to Bolsonaro. Although the president is currently despised by a majority of the Brazilian population and his opponents come from all walks of the Brazilian political spectrum, one force in particular has gained prominence in confronting Bolsonaro over the politics of the pandemic: João Doria. Governor Doria has become one of the main leaders of the PSDB, the traditional, moderate center-­ right party that ruled the country from 1994 to 2002 and was the main national rival of the PT since, losing all consecutive elections from 2002 to 2014. The party suffered a significant defeat in 2018, after seeing Aécio Neves, its then president, involved in a major corruption scandal in 2017. As we discussed throughout the chapter, Doria is positioning himself to run for president in 2022 and has attempted to gain national prominence during his management of the pandemic in São Paulo. He has adopted a very responsible position, closely following the advice of specialists and adopting all of WHO’s benchmark recommendations. He has also invested in producing a vaccine and made a significant effort to be the first one to promote the vaccination of a Brazilian against Covid-19. What can we expect regarding the future? How will the pandemic affect the Brazilian electoral competition? It is hard to say, since the pandemic will probably be a less visible issue in 2022, especially if the population is vaccinated by then. For instance, there is no evidence that the pandemic affected the results of the 2020 municipal elections. It is true that the few politicians backed by Bolsonaro did not do well in the contest. But Bolsonaro was not an active player in the election.19 Who really won the elections, gaining voters and municipal offices were traditional centrist, catch-all parties that have participated of virtually all government coalitions formed in the last 20 years. These parties are now part of Bolsonaro’s base of support in Congress. Hence, it is possible to say that the municipal elections consolidated Bolsonaro’s new governing coalition. In sum, Doria has positioned himself as a major contender to face Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections. The president, by his turn, has consolidated his popular base and amplified his legislative support during the pandemic by including in the coalition

 An effect of the pandemic on the municipal elections was the significant decrease in turnout. In the country’s aggregate, abstention went up from 17% in 2016 to 23% in 2020.

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winners in the 2020 municipal elections. Bolsonaro has, therefore, weakened threats of impeachment, by constructing a more solid legislative shield (Perez-Liñan 1999) and by relying on an issue-based, polarizing mobilization strategy to maintain his core electoral constituency. President Bolsonaro is clearly a contender to the second round of the presidential election. The pandemic, however, may have an indirect effect on the 2022 elections through its economic aftermath. Bolsonaro has, quite astutely, shifted blame for economic downfall to governors and mayor’s draconian lockdown measures. It is undeniable that the Brazilian economy is suffering tremendously. What is still to be seen is if there will be a recovery underway that improves the country’s mood. Hence, a possible scenario is favorable to Bolsonaro: he blames governors for the economic downfall and claims credit for its recovery. Nothing could be better for an incumbent government. However, the key here is the word recovery. If it does not occur and the economy falters, it will be hard for Bolsonaro to shift blame. In fact, his dwindling popularity in recent surveys correlates with the end of the emergency financial aid disbursed to poor families in 2020. Unemployment is at record high levels (14%) and GDP growth in 2021, which is expected to amount to 3.8% according to official forecasts, will not be sufficient to compensate for the deep contraction observed in 2020 (−4.4%).20 Moreover, as the federal government has failed to secure, so far, vaccines sufficient to immunize the adult population, the country’s economic recovery may be undermined by significant delays in the official immunization schedule. Even if voters are unable to perceive the connection between the federal government’s negligence and incompetence in the handling of the pandemic, on the one hand, and poor economic performance, on the other, Bolsonaro, like any other incumbent president running for reelection, will have to be associated with economic success or will be punished by the unmerciful power of the retrospective evaluation of the economy.

References Ajzenman N, Cavalcanti T, Da Mata D (2020) More than words: leaders’ speech and risky behavior during a pandemic. Available at SSRN 3582908 Amaral OED (2020) The Victory of Jair Bolsonaro according to the Brazilian Electoral Study of 2018. Braz Polit Sci Rev 14: e0004 Arretche M (2004) Federalismo e políticas sociais no Brasil: problemas de coordenação e autonomia. São Paulo Perspectiva 18:17–26 Borges A (2021) The illusion of electoral stability: from party system erosion to right-wing populism in Brazil. J Polit Lat Am forthcoming Borges A, Sanches Filho AO (2016) Federalismo, coalizões de governo e escolhas de carreira dos deputados federais. Opin Pública 22:1–27

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 https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/ri/relatorioinflacao/202012/ri202012b4p.pdf

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Borges A, Albala A, Burtnik L (2017) Pathways to nationalization in multilevel presidential systems: accounting for party strategies in Brazil and Argentina. Publius 47:648–672 Fernandez MV, Pinto HA (2020) Estratégia intergovernamental de atuação dos estados brasileiros: o Consórcio Nordeste e as políticas de saúde no enfrentamento à Covid-19. Saúde em Redes 6:7 Fuks M, Ribeiro E, Borba J (2021) From Antipetismo to generalized antipartisanship: the impact of rejection of political parties on the 2018 vote for Bolsonaro. Braz Polit Sci Rev 15:e0005 Gomes S (2012) Fiscal powers to subnational governments: reassessing the concept of fiscal autonomy. Reg Fed Stud 22:387–406 Hunter W, Power TJ (2019) Bolsonaro and Brazil’s illiberal backlash. J Democr 30:68–82 Mainwaring S (1997) Presidentialism in Brazil: the impact of strong constitutional powers, weak partisan powers, and robust federalism. In: Mainwaring S, Shugart MS (eds) Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Mariani LA, Gagete-Miranda J, Rettl P (2020) Words can hurt: how political communication can change the pace of an epidemic. Covid Econ Vetted Real-Time Pap 12:104–137 Meyer B (2020) Pandemic populism: an analysis of populist leaders’ responses to Covid-19. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, London. [Google Scholar] Moffitt B (2015) How to perform crisis: a model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. Gov Oppos 50:189–217 Niedzwiecki S, Chapman Osterkatz S, Hooghe L et al (2018) The RAI travels to Latin America: measuring regional authority under regime change. Reg Fed Stud 31:1–26 Pappas TS (2019) Populists in power. J Democr 30:70–84 Rennó L (2020) The Bolsonaro voter: issue positions and vote choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections. Lat Am Polit Soc 62:1 Samuels D (2003) Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Santos FG, Pegurier FJ (2011) Political careers in Brazil: long-term trends and cross-sectional variation. Reg Fed Stud 21:165–183 Souza C (1997) Constitutional engineering in Brazil: the politics of federalism and decentralization. Macmillan, London

Chapter 3

Mexico in the Face of Covid-19: In-Between Actions and Inefficiency Bruna Cavalcanti

3.1  Introduction Quick reaction and political inefficiency are two sentiments so different that they could perfectly narrate what the Covid-19 crisis has been like in Mexico and the public policies that have been developed by the government of the Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). In this sense, it is important to highlight and understand the pandemic’s chronology in the country. On January 30, 2020, before the declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO), which decreed the coronavirus outbreak as a case of Public Health Emergency of International Importance, the first reaction of the Mexican government was to carry out a Preparedness and Response Plan carried out by the National Committee for Health Safety.1 The objective was to carry out alert measures and update epidemiological regulations based on the International Health Regulations.2 1  Pan American Health Organization. The WHO declares the new coronavirus outbreak to be a public health emergency of international concern. Recovered from: https://www.paho.org/hq/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15706:statement-on-the-second-meeting-ofthe-international-health-regulations-2005-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-­­ n ove l - c o r o n av i r u s - 2 0 1 9 - n c ov & I t e m i d = 1 9 2 6 & l a n g = e s # : ~ : t ex t = G e n eva % 2 F % 2 0 Washington%2C%2030%20de%20enero,de%20salud%20p%C3%BAblica%20de%20importance. Retrieved on February 9, 2021. 2  Government of Mexico. Mexico is prepared to face coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Mexico, January 30, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.gob.mx/salud/prensa/033-mexico-esta-preparado-para-­­ enfrentar-coronavirus-2019-ncov. Retrieved on February 14, 2021.

B. Cavalcanti (*) National Institute of Public Administration, Mexico City, Mexico Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of the Americas, Puebla (UDLAP) © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_3

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The first reported case of Covid-19 in Mexico was on February 28, 2020, 19 days after the statement made by the WHO and just 2 days after the confirmation of the disease’s first case in Latin America, more precisely in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. However, while trying to prepare the country through health measures that aimed to minimize the contagion of the population and avoid the collapse of public hospitals, AMLO assumed a rather irresponsible stance by not complying with the health protocols that his government had adopted, such as the use of masks and physical distancing. Throughout his management against the coronavirus pandemic, the Mexican President has not always realized that as a leader, the President should be the first to set an example to his population. In addition to this, another important issue to be debated is electoral opportunism and AMLO’s controversial statements when stating that the crisis caused by Covid-19 would fit his government “like a glove,” considering his government “fighting corruption first” approach. Despite the above, this article is focused on three segments. The first seeks to assess the public health system in Mexico through the country’s experience with other health crises such as the H1N1 flu in 2009. The second focuses on the first reactions and the campaign carried out by AMLO to combat the pandemic, in addition to the public policies implemented by his government. The third and last is regarding the political leadership of the president in the face of this serious health crisis. Finally, this article’s main purpose is to describe the Mexican sample and explain the whole conjuncture and the public policies that led the country to sum more than 1 million and 900,000 coronavirus infections and more than 166,000 deaths.3 Above all, it is about analyzing from the political sphere the decisions behind the entire health crisis that made the country the third with the most deaths from Covid-19 in the world.4

3.2  Mexico’s Experience in the Face of the Pandemic When the first case of coronavirus was confirmed in Mexico, on February 28, a large part of the population compared the new pandemic with the health crisis experienced by the country in 2009, with the H1N1 flu, a mutation of the influenza virus. For this reason, many health specialists affirmed that the experience acquired at that time would help Mexicans face the difficulties that were to come and that the country had a significant advantage when compared to other Latin American nations. 3  These numbers refer to the data disclosed by the Mexican government itself as of February 9, 2021. 4  Infobae. The lethality of COVID-19 in Mexico: it is already the third country with the most deaths, surpassing India. Mexico, January 28, 2021. Recovered from: https://www.infobae.com/america/ mexico/2021/01/29/la-letalidad-del-covid-19-en-mexico-ya-es-el-tercer-pais-con-mas-muertes-­ surpassing-india/. Consulted on February 14, 2021.

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In an interview with the Mexican news portal El Hospital, in March 2020, the health director at ​​KPMG Mexico, Ignacio Gómez Téllez, affirmed that the Mexican experience left by the H1N1 flu pandemic would serve as a basis for the population and its government regarding care protocols and containment measures on different fields to overcome the Covid-19 crisis that had just arrived in the country.5 The experience mentioned by Téllez, regarding the health protocols that were acquired by the country, in addition to his own political experience with the H1NI, is mainly related to the delay of the government of then Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) in notifying the population of the outbreak, in addition to the lack of faster implementation of security measures or protocols that could have mitigated the health crisis that was caused by the virus in Mexico at that time. The first alert about the H1N1 influenza virus occurred in March 2009, when Mexican health authorities began to detect the increase of pneumonia cases in young adults. Because it was late winter and early spring, it was thought that these cases could be the flu, a disease that had always been quite common in this period. However, on April 11, the first cases of H1NI influenza in the country were confirmed, more precisely in the state of Veracruz, Northern Mexico. However, it wasn’t until April 21 – 10 days after the first case was confirmed in Veracruz – that the media, in addition to the population, were informed of the real situation in the country. According to data acknowledged by the Ministry of Health, such delay caused false diagnoses and imprecise treatments for those who were already sick. As a result, a good portion of those people died without even knowing that they had contracted the influenza virus mutation. Responses to the epidemic in Mexico began only on April 23, 2009, with the closure of schools, universities, museums, cinemas, shopping centers, and other passive public meeting places. This decision, which was initially taken by the government of Mexico City, was followed, in the following days, by various other states of the country until May 11. In addition to this, hundreds of soldiers were mobilized to distribute face masks to all citizens around Mexico City and in other Mexican cities. Considering it was not well known what they were facing, in various cities of the country, the streets looked deserted for days, and there was a certain concern on the part of the population about the spread of the disease. At that time, President Calderón himself was already requesting and guiding people not to leave their homes and emphasized that, since cases were rising, there was no safer place to avoid catching the virus.

5  In the article published on the portal El Hospital, about Mexico’s experience against the AH1N1 virus, Téllez still affirms that the new Covid-19 pandemic could be a challenge as well as an opportunity to the Mexican government. Recovered from: https://www.elhospital.com/temas/Mexico,el-mas-experimentado-en-la-region-para-attend-una-pandemia+133714. Consulted on February 9, 2021.

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Besides human losses, with the death of more than a thousand people and more than 70,000 infections, as a consequence, the country acquired an important social and behavioral change that has been quite useful today: Mexicans learned to wear face masks and wash their hands with antibacterial gel at all times. In an article published in a medical scientific journal in 2017, the former Secretary of Health during the H1NI influenza crisis in Mexico, José Ángel CórdovaVillalobos, declared that the H1NI pandemic not only left positive consequences for hygiene changes and behavior of the Mexican population but also in the government itself and the country’s health institutions. During the epidemic, the national network of public health laboratories was strengthened, as well as the growing capacities of the intensive care units and the antiviral drug distribution system. Risk communication was conducted so that the population bonded with the implemented measures, such as social distancing. (Cordova-Villalobos et al. 2017: 102) Regarding the above, it is important to note that Mexico already had some plans to prepare against influenza since 2003 due to the SARS crisis and the spread of pathogenic H5N1 viruses in Asia. Such strategic plans consisted of risk communication actions, vaccination campaigns, and the fortification of public hospitals to serve the population. All this experience placed Mexico in a privileged position when compared to many other Latin American countries. However, this did not serve as a lesson in the preparation for the Covid-19 crisis. This happened for two reasons. The first, due to the lessons that were not learned by the country’s political authorities, as we will see later in this article. The second, because Mexico’s public health system was already facing serious problems that were mainly related to shortages of financial resources by various governments that had previously ruled the country. What was surprising (being a left-wing government) is that in the 2019 federal budget –when the XLIV Legislature, dominated by Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s MORENA Party, was already in office  – the health sector received 123.2 billion pesos (about $ 5 billion dollars), that is, 3.2% less than the amount approved in 2018. For 2020, the health budget increased modestly by 0.18%. However, resources to combat epidemics suffered cuts. (Mariñez Navarro and Santillán 2020: 19)

3.3  Mexico’s Reaction to the Covid-19: Lesson Learned? Unlike the health crisis that originated in the country by the mutation of the H1NI influenza virus, Mexico seemed to be more prepared to act in extreme cases. In this sense, the reaction of AMLO’s government, when compared to that of Calderón in 2009, was faster and more agile, both in health terms and also in communication with the media and with the population itself. However, it was also marked by criticism. The first suspicions about a Covid-19 case emerged at the end of January. It was about a teacher, in the state of Tamaulipas, north of the country, who had traveled to

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China. In addition to activating detection and isolation tests, the government also evaluated other negative cases. However, from that moment on, AMLO and the authorities responsible for health in the country began to issue daily reports and hold press conferences to promptly report on all the prevention measures that were being taken. On February 27, the Undersecretary for Prevention and Health Promotion in Mexico, Hugo López-Gatell, who has played the role of spokesman for the federal government in the face of the health emergency, announced that a patient – an Italian who lived in Mexico City  – had tested positive for Covid-19  in a first test. Confirmation, meanwhile, came the next day, and Mexico went on the list of Latin American countries with positive cases of the new virus. On February 29, the country had already accumulated four confirmed cases. Faced with the arrival confirmation of Covid-19 in Mexico, the government was supposed to rapidly act in the adoption of prevention measures and also to avoid the panic of the population. Meanwhile, presently, López-Gatell himself pointed out that there were still no reasons for the closure of schools or the suspension of activities since there was no risk of generalized transmission and that isolation was already being carried out around people who had contact with those infected. The biggest criticism, at this time, was concerning airport control, mainly on flights originating in countries that already registered, at that time, a fairly high number of infections and deaths confirmed by Covid-19, such as Italy and Spain, among others. On March 11, when the WHO officially declared that the coronavirus was already a pandemic, the health authorities and the government had not yet taken any measures to protect or isolate the population.6 On March 18, Mexico already had more than 100 cases reported throughout the republic and the confirmation of the first death of the new virus in the country. Many analysts consider that the government’s first reaction to the first suspected cases was relatively quick. However, there was questioning about the time it took to announce the closure of schools and the suspension of activities, as the authorities already knew of the severity of the disease and its transmission speed around the world. Finally, as of March 23, 2020, the government began implementing new policies against the coronavirus pandemic starting with a series of measures that were known as the National Healthy Distance Day and were marked, mainly, by social distancing. Also, the suspension of school activity was decreed at all educational levels until April 19. Various specific campaigns were also carried out toward the population that reinforced the need to wear face masks and promote hygiene through frequent hand washing.

6  Pan American Health Organization. The WHO characterizes COVID-19 as a pandemic. Mexico, March 11, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.paho.org/es/noticias/11-3-2020-oms-caracteriza-­­ covid-19-como-pandemia. Retrieved on February 16, 2021.

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On April 30, 2020, the General Health Council (CSG) finally declared Covid-19 as a health emergency “due to force majeure” and determined the immediate suspension of nonessential activities in the public, private, and social sectors. The main objective was to prevent the agglomeration of people and to contain the spread of the virus among the population.7 According to the CSG, these measures were coordinated by themselves and the Federal Government under a joint strategy. Not only questioning these measures introduced by the president and the country’s public health institutions, but AMLO’s government also had the challenge of proving to the population, and especially its voters, that they were prepared to face the serious problem that was to come. Regarding the above, it is very important to highlight that the Mexican administration made some decisions that were harshly questioned from a health and technical scope. One of the most controversial was the measurement system used by the government to count the number of COVID-19 cases on national territory. Called the sentinel surveillance model, the system was part of a strategy that came to be used by various countries to monitor diseases.8 The sentinel surveillance model uses an algorithm that is very similar to that used in surveys and one that aims to estimate the number of people who can contract the virus. The main criticism made by health specialists was not of its use, but rather the fact that the Ministry of Health decided to use such a methodology to determine new infections instead of applying massive tests in the population. At the beginning of May, the Ministry of Health estimated that approximately 104,562 people have had COVID-19, but the actual number of confirmed reported cases was 23,471. This number was estimated using mathematical models from a sample, but data scientists and statisticians criticized the lack of transparency of the methodology used to provide these estimates. (Ibarra et al. 2020: 18)

In an interview conducted by Deutsche Welle, in August 2020, the former Minister of Health and current dean at the University of Miami, Florida, Julio Frenk, condemned the measurement model adopted by AMLO and López-Gatell stating that, at that time, studies by experts suggested that the infection numbers were three times higher.9

7  General Health Council (CSG). Declaration of national health emergency by Covid-19. Recovered from: https://www.gob.mx/salud/prensa/consejo-de-salubridad-general-declara-emergenciasanitaria-­nacional-a-epidemia-por-coronavirus-covid-19-239301. Accessed on February 8, 2020. 8  Sentinel model. Secretariat of Health of the Government of Mexico. Recovered from: https:// coronavirus.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Vigilancia_Centinela.pdf. Accessed on February 10, 2021. 9  Deutsche Welle, Mexico. Mexico is as bad as Brazil in its fight against the pandemic. Mexico, August 16, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A9xico-est%C3%A1-tanmal-como-brasil-en-su-lucha-contra-la-pandemia/a-54586633. Consulted on February 9, 2021.

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3.4  Mexico: The Best of the Worst The lack of evidence available to its citizens and the lack of data transparency, by the Mexican administration, generated a strong negative reaction from the World Health Organization (WHO) that accused the country, in August 2020, of underestimating the pandemic. The statement was made during a press conference in Geneva, Switzerland, by Mike Ryan, Executive Director of the WHO Health Emergencies Department. According to the specialist, “the scale of the coronavirus pandemic in Mexico is ‘under-represented’ and ‘under-recognized’” and “testing is limited.”10 Three months later, the WHO, this time through its Director-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, asked the Government of Mexico to be more serious about the pandemic consequences in the country. “The increase in cases and deaths in Mexico is very, very worrying,” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus during an information session with the press. “This shows that Mexico is in bad shape (…) and we would like to ask Mexico to be very serious,” stated Tedros.11 In December 2020, “The British Medical Journal” (BMJ), one of the most important medical publications in England, published an investigation on the management of the pandemic in 35 countries around the world and ranked Mexico as one of the worst. AMLO’s mismanagement ranks 31st in contagion control and 30th in total deaths. The statement, according to the specialists who conducted the research, is that countries like Mexico and Brazil are doing particularly badly.12

3.5  A  MLO and Covid-19: Do What I Say But Do Not Do What I Do Entering the purely political field, the criticisms about the lack of seriousness with which the Mexican administration conducted the Covid-19 crisis carry even greater weight when we analyze the president’s behavior in the face of the pandemic. In this sense, it is necessary to emphasize that if on the one hand the government told the population that they should be at home, keep their distance, and use masks; on the

 Political Animal. The magnitude of the pandemic is underestimated in Mexico, says the WHO.  Mexico, August 22, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/08/ magnitud-­pandemia-subestimada-mexico-oms/. Accessed on February 9, 2021. 11  Los Angeles Times. WHO asks Mexico for seriousness in the fight against pandemic. Mexico, November 30. Recovered from: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2020-11-30/ oms-pide-a-mexico-serimonio-en-lucha-contra-pandemia. Retrieved on February 9, 2021. 12  The BMJ. Covid-19: How denialism led Mexico’s disastrous pandemic control effort. Recovered from: https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m4952. Accessed on January 10, 2021. 10

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other hand, AMLO himself appeared on television without a mask, hugging people and continuing his political tour throughout the country.13 Since the COVID-19 pandemic reached Mexico back in February, President López Obrador has minimized the pandemic’s potential impact on the health of millions of Mexicans. Despite his own government’s recommendation to use face masks, López Obrador continues to appear in press conferences and videos surrounded by people and in closed spaces without wearing one. In the most recent controversy, he said that ‘not lying, not stealing, and not betraying’ helps prevent COVID-19 infections, raising questions of whether he’s more concerned about pushing his political agenda than he is about the actual pandemic. (Ibarra-Nava 2020: 18) Regarding AMLOs position, in the face of the crisis caused by the coronavirus, Mike Ryan, Executive Director of the WHO’s Health Emergencies Department, said, “Mexico continues to be seriously affected by Covid-19. To all the leaders of the world, we would say that it is very important that they become role models in the use of masks. People require very clear communication. If what they see on a poster, the authorities do not comply with it, there is confusion.”14 In addition to not using face masks, since the beginning of the pandemic and the first infections in Mexico, AMLO had a denial stance in the face of a serious crisis that, at this time, was already ravaging the entire world. On March 4, 2020, when the coronavirus had already infected more than 340,000 people in 178 countries, the president was claiming to the population, during a press conference, that “you have to be hugging, nothing happens.” On the 23rd of the same month, through his social networks, he said: We are prepared, we should not be scared (…) not panic, we are going forward, and do not stop going out, we are still in the first phase. I’m going to tell you when not to go out, but if you can do it and have the economic possibility, then continue taking the family to eat at restaurants, at inns.15

Another point of great criticism toward the Mexican president has been the electoral opportunism that he has exercised over the pandemic with statements that the health crisis, in addition to being transitory, came “to fit like a glove on strengthening the transformation purpose.”16 Such positioning unleashed a reaction that

 El Financero. While AMLO leaves the CDMX to resume tours, the capital’s streets increase his mobility. Mexico, June 2, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/cdmx/calles-­ de-­la-cdmx-empiezan-a-cobrar-vida- while-amlo-reanuda-sus-giras. Retrieved on January 10, 2021. 14  Capital 21. For Covid-19, “situation in Mexico is very worrying”: WHO asks to be taken seriously. Mexico, November 30, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.capital21.cdmx.gob.mx/ noticias/?p=5988. Consulted on February 12, 2021. 15  El Universal. AMLO’s phrases about the coronavirus. Mexico, April 4, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/del-hay-que-abrazarse-no-pasa-nada-como-anillo-aldedo-­las-frases-de-amlo-sobre-el-covid- 19. Accessed on January 10, 2021. 16  Political Animal. COVID-19 and crisis came “like a glove” to strengthen the transformation: AMLO. Mexico, April 2, 2020. Recovered from: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/04/crisis-­ economica-­salud-transitoria-saldremos-ponto-amlo/. Retrieved on January 10, 2021. 13

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c­ ulminated in the decision, on May 29, that seven state governors would apply their strategies to overcome the health emergency. The states that decided to follow their own rules were Jalisco, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Durango, Colima, and Michoacán. The dispute would be that the decisions made by AMLO – mainly concerning health measures and the closure of some activities – did not correspond to the reality of most of these states. It is no secret to anyone that the problem of the pandemic in Mexico is not only a health issue but also a political one. We know that to defeat the coronavirus, cooperation between different levels of government is needed, as well as collaboration between society and governments. In Mexico, until recently, unfortunately, neither one nor the other worked. There was no clear strategy of the federal government in coordination with the states in cooperation to face the health crisis. (Mariñez Navarro and Santillán 2020: 19) Despite all this, in January 2021, after testing positive for the coronavirus, AMLO, upon returning to his political activities, continued to act in the same way as during the entire pandemic: he refused to wear a mask. Despite the innumerable criticisms, the President of Mexico, during a press conference, said: “No, no. Now, besides, according to what the doctors propose, I am no longer contagious.”17

3.6  Conclusions Criticized by political adversaries, by the WHO itself, and by several health crisis specialists, AMLO’s administration in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic has been marked by ineffectiveness. This ineffectiveness does not occur only in the public health plan but, mainly, in the political sphere and the management of the crisis by the president himself. To quote the president of the WHO himself, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, “we hope that the leaders are role models, that they lead by example.”18 Besides the President, the actions carried out at the beginning by its Undersecretary of Health, López-Gatell, were not strong enough to help the country avoid the more than 1 million and 900,000 infection cases by the coronavirus and more than 166,000 deaths. Also, many of these actions, mainly those related to the lack of tests for the coronavirus and the transparency of data on the virus, can be considered quite problematic and inefficient.

 The Financier. “No longer contagion”: AMLO says he will not wear a mask after suffering from COVID-19. Mexico, February 8, 2021. Recovered from: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/ya-no-contagio-amlo-dice-que-no-usara-cubrebocas-tras-padecer-covid-19. Retrieved on January 10, 2021. 18  Los Angeles Times. WHO asks Mexico for seriousness in the fight against pandemic. Mexico, November 30. Recovered from: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2020-11-30/ oms-pide-a-mexico-serimonio-en-lucha-contra-pandemia. Retrieved on February 9, 2021. 17

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To this day, the population is still waiting for the distribution of vaccines, while living fearful of the expansion and progress of the disease, both in the infection numbers and also in the number of deaths caused by the pandemic. Despite all this, the conflict prevails with their political adversaries and with the governors who, disagreeing with the actions carried out by the Mexican federal administration, decided to continue acting on their account.

References Animal Político (2020d) La magnitud de la pandemia está subestimada en México, asegura la OMS. https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/08/magnitud-­pandemia-­subestimada-­mexico-­ oms/. Accessed on 8 Jan 2021 BBC (2020b) Coronavirus en México: ¿Por qué AMLO enfrenta una rebelión de gobernadores en la etapa crítica de la pandemia de covid-19? https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-­america-­ latina-­52900134. Accessed on 15 Jan 2021 Capital 21 (2020) Por Covid-19, “situación en México es muy preocupante”: OMS; pide tomarlo en serio. https://www.capital21.cdmx.gob.mx/noticias/?p=5988. Accessed on 18 Jan 2021 Cordova-Villalobos JA, Macias AE, Hernandez-Avila M, Dominguez-Cherit G, Lopez-Gatell H, Alpuche-Aranda C, de León-Rosales SP (2017) The 2009 pandemic in Mexico: experience and lessons regarding national preparedness policies for seasonal and epidemic influenza. Gac Med Mex 153(1):102–110 Deutsche Welle, México (2020) México está tan mal como Brasil en su lucha contra la pandemia. México. Recovered from: https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A9xico-­est%C3%A1-­tan-­mal-­ como-­brasil-­en-­su-­lucha-­contra-­la-­pandemia/a-­54586633. Accessed on 15 Feb 2021 El Financiero (2020a) ‘Ya no contagio’: AMLO dice que no usará cubrebocas tras padecer COVID-19. Recovered from: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/ya-­no-­contagio-­ amlo-­dice-­que-­no-­usara-­cubrebocas-­tras-­padecer-­covid-­19. Accessed on 12 Feb 2021 El Financiero (2020b) Mientras AMLO sale de la CDMX para reanudar giras, las calles capitalinas aumentan su movilidad. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/cdmx/calles-­de-­la-­cdmx-­empiezan-­ a-­cobrar-­vida-­mientras-­amlo-­reanuda-­sus-­giras. Accessed on 10 Feb 2021 El Universal (2020) Las frases de AMLO sobre el coronavirus. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/ nacion/del-­hay-­que-­abrazarse-­no-­pasa-­nada-­como-­anillo-­al-­dedo-­las-­frases-­de-­amlo-­sobre-­el-­ covid-­19. Accessed on 30 Jan 2021 Ibarra-Nava I, Cárdenas-De La Garza JA, Ruiz-Lozano RE, Salazar-Montalvo RG (2020a) Mexico and the COVID-19 Response. Disaster Med Public Health Prep 14(4):e17–e18 Infobae (2021) La letalidad del COVID-19 en México: ya es el tercer país con más muertes, superando a India. México. Recovered from: https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/01/29/ la-­letalidad-­del-­covid-­19-­en-­mexico-­ya-­es-­el-­tercer-­pais-­con-­mas-­muertes-­superando-­a-­ india/. Accessed on 30 Jan 2021 Los Angeles Times (2020) OMS pide a México seriedad en lucha contra pandemia. https://www. latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2020-­11-­30/oms-­pide-­a-­mexico-­seriedad-­en-­lucha-­ contra-­pandemia. Accessed on 30 Jan 2021 Los Angeles Times, México (2020) México extiende el cierre tras aumentar casos de COVID-19. Recovered from: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2020-­03-­30/mexico-­ extiende-­el-­cierre-­tras-­aumentar-­casos-­de-­covid-­19-­video. Accessed on 9 Feb 2021 Mariñez Navarro F, Santillán JF (2020) México y la pandemia de Covid-19 ¿Cómo ha sido su gestión? El Colegio de Jalisco, a.c

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Torrealba-Rodriguez O, Conde-Gutiérrez RA, Hernández-Javier AL (2020) Modeling and prediction of COVID-19  in Mexico applying mathematical and computational models. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 138, 109946. The New York Times. Mexico is reopening after quarantine. Many worry it’s too early. https://www.nytimes.co/02///orl/merica/oronavirus-­mexico-­ reopening.html. Accessed on 10 Feb 2020

Chapter 4

Nicaragua: Denying the Health Crisis and the Political Crisis Mateo Jarquín and Salvador Martí i Puig

4.1  The Political Crisis Has Conditioned the Health Crisis To understand the management of the COVID-19 health crisis in Nicaragua, it is necessary to mention another, equally unexpected, earlier crisis. We are referring to the “Nicaraguan spring” of popular protests that broke out on April 18, 2018. It was in the course of this day that a “cycle of protest” began in Managua, driven by thousands of students demonstrating over a multitude of accumulated grievances. Although initial demands were focused on rejecting a reform in contributions paid to the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security (INSS), and the abysmal management by the government of a wildfire that destroyed part of the Indio Maiz Biological Reserve, they quickly transformed into mobilizations to reject the authoritarian, patrimonial, and plutocratic form of government exercised by the presidential couple. In light of these protests, the government accused the demonstrators of being “petty, terrorists, mediocre, and criminals” (Murillo’s own words) and responded with the use of disproportionate repression. The following reports on the repression measures deployed should be highlighted: “Human rights violations and abuses in the context of protests in Nicaragua” (OHCHR 2018), “Gross Human Rights Violations in the Context of Social Protests in Nicaragua” (CIDH 2018), and “Final Report on the Acts of Violence that Occurred between April 18th and May 30th 2018” (GIEI 2018). This crisis was deeply rooted in Ortega’s absolute control over the power apparatus and to the construction of an “authoritarian electoral regime,” which meant the political system was unable to channel dissent (Martí i Puig 2016). In this context,

M. Jarquín (*) Department of History, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA S. Martí i Puig University of Girona, Girona, Spain © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_4

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the regime’s only response, when accumulated discontent erupted in mass street protests, was brutal repression, which necessarily cast doubt on the very nature and survival of the regime. These became the most important protests in Nicaragua in the last four decades. But these mobilizations led to neither the fall of the regime nor to the government acknowledging its “delicate situation.” Despite experiencing an economic recession (due to a decrease in aid from Venezuela and sanctions imposed by the US government), international isolation, and mass street riots, it was the control over the institutions and the armed forces that kept the regime alive. To be more precise, it was the extreme repression deployed by the National Police and, above all, by mysterious armed groups of pro-government paramilitaries that kept the presidential couple, Ortega and Rosario Murillo, in power. From then on, both leaders developed a public discourse that ignored the protests and unrest, accusing the people who mobilized as “vandals and coup plotters.” Moreover, they remained firm in denying any kind of crisis in the political system and attributed the protests to foreign interests and conspiracies seeking to overthrow a legitimate government by means of a “soft coup.” Nicaragua was forced to confront the challenges posed by COVID-19  in the context of this preexisting rationale of denial (of the profound political crisis). In a country polarized between supporters of the Ortega family regime and those who oppose and detest it, an unprecedented health crisis broke out, which required just what Nicaragua lacked: proactive, diligent, trust-building government management. Only in the overlapping of two crises in Nicaragua – a political crisis and a health crisis – can we understand the government’s response to COVID-19, particularly since the way the first crisis was managed totally conditioned the management of the second (Martí i Puig and Alcántara 2020). In this regard, we can point out that the strategy adopted by the Nicaraguan government has followed three clear lines of action; namely, denying the crisis, generating ambiguous information, and prohibiting any form of dissent. The first – denying the health crisis in Nicaragua – has its origins in the previous denial of the political crisis (Martí i Puig 2020). The desire to make the April 2018 political conflict invisible led to the creation of a “cognitive framework,” which has also led to denying the COVID-19 health crisis. The second line of action – the government generating contradictory and ambiguous information  – can be explained by the same cognitive framework that burgeoned in the 2018 crisis. By denying the health crisis, the government was unable to establish a clear, firm messaging on how citizens should self-protect against the dangers of the virus. As a result, the population struggled to understand how, on the one hand, the government promoted a mass political gathering in the midst of the pandemic with the slogan “Love in times of COVID-19,” and on the other, established self-care recommendations and released (more than questionable) data on the incidence of the pandemic. Added to this ambiguity and lack of information transparency was a strong “politicization” of the health sector in which the public health system ignored WHO recommendations and bowed to government orders, while the private health sector (medical and healthcare workers’ associations and health

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centers) tried to follow and promote international healthcare guidelines. The lack of the regime’s legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of part of the society further frustrated clear and effective communications. Finally, the third line of action was to forbid any questioning of government measures and, by extension, any kind of dissent. This stance, which originated in the de-democratization process begun in 2007, was exacerbated by the 2018 crisis, since it entailed the closing of political spaces, repression, and political partisanship in the public administration. Only by considering the above it is possible to explain why the crisis management in Nicaragua has been one of the most erratic in the region and why, for the most part, Nicaraguans have felt powerless.

4.2  G  overnment Management of the Pandemic: Communications and Policies or Lack Thereof The way the pandemic has been “presented” in Nicaragua reflects two characteristics of Nicaraguan politics: the idiosyncrasy of the Ortega family’s political discourse based on concealment and ambiguity and extreme political polarization in all levels of society. When a global pandemic was declared by the WHO on March 11, 2020, the Ortega regime ruled out that it would affect Nicaragua. While all the countries in the region announced lockdowns and closed borders, the Head of the Ministry of Health (MINSA), Carolina Dávila, stated that Nicaragua “has not established, nor will it establish any type of quarantine.”1 This position remained unchanged following the WHO declaration. Although a leaked document from the Ministry of Health revealed that the authorities were aware of the risk of contagion and mortality, the government’s communications strategy was to insist on asserting that Nicaraguans should not worry,2 and contrary to what was advisable, Vice President Murillo summoned government sympathizers and state workers to take part in a massive rally to supposedly overcome the pandemic “with love.”3 Following the same logic, the Vice President and the Secretary General of MINSA – main spokespersons for the health crisis in Nicaragua  – appealed to people’s “faith,” “prayer,” and “trust in God” as forms of prevention. At the same time, other more impassioned pro-government spokespersons, such as radio host, William Grigbsy, stated that “COVID-19 was a disease of the rich and

1  “Gobierno: “Nicaragua no ha establecido ni hará cuarentena’ por coronavirus,” Confidencial, February 28, 2020. 2  “Protocolo de Preparación y Respuesta ante el Riesgo de Introducción de Virus Coronavirus (COVID-19),” Ministry of Health of Nicaragua, February 2020. 3  “El Gobierno de Nicaragua desafía al coronavirus con una marcha multitudinaria,” EFE, March 15, 2020.

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the bourgeoisie.”4 Amidst this polyphony (or cacophony) of information, the Secretary General of MINSA, Carlos Sáenz, had the difficult task of acting as spokesperson for the Ministry of Health during the crisis. His appearances – at first daily, becoming weekly by May – were of modest value given that, apart from government agency press conferences and radio news, the official information was always controlled by Rosario Murillo, Vice President of the Republic, First Lady, and Chief of Staff. Rosario Murillo has been the government’s public face during the health crisis. In contrast, the President of the Republic, Daniel Ortega, has remained silent. Daniel Ortega was one of the few Heads of State in the world who refrained from making direct appeals to the population on the outbreak of the pandemic. Although this modus operandi was viewed by the international press with some amazement, Ortega’s absence from the media is part of a pattern in the way he has managed power over the course of his career (Jarquín 2020). Suffice it to say that since his return to power in 2007, Ortega has only given ten interviews, and most of them to international media during the 2018 political crisis. By adopting this strategy of low media exposure, Ortega has aimed to avoid scrutiny and pass on the responsibility to his subordinates in difficult times. It has also deepened the feeling among his supporters that he is above the trifles of day-to-day politics. As a result of this lack of government transparency, it is difficult to explain the reasons underlying the government’s heterodox policies, for example, not following the same prevention strategies as neighboring countries (Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador) or not following WHO recommendations (Mather et al. 2020; Cupples 2020). No type of quarantine has been established in Nicaragua, nor have classes been suspended; no public activities have been restricted and the borders have not been closed. Not even was a preventive quarantine introduced for travelers from countries seriously affected by the virus until July (Moncada Bellorín 2020). In fact, most of the decrees issued in March and April referred to the “continuation” of State-sponsored massive activities; for instance, music and popular festivals to celebrate Easter, the main date in the Nicaraguan summer holidays. Another example of government irresponsibility came in April when Nicaragua – a quintessentially baseball-playing country – became the only country in the world where the professional soccer league was still in action.5 Moreover, the government promoted mass gatherings for nonessential activities, including the massive march under the banner of “Love in times of COVID-19.” All of this in spite of the concern shown by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and various human rights organizations (including the IACHR and Human Rights Watch) over the lack of social distancing policies.6  “Nicaragua: COVID-19 es un ‘virus de ricos y burgueses,” El País (Uruguay), April 6, 2020.  “CONCACAF concerned over Nicaraguan leagues’ continuation despite pandemic,” ESPN, April 14, 2020. 6  “CIDH y su REDESCA expresan seria preocupación por la situación de los derechos humanos en el contexto de la respuesta a la pandemia por COVID-19 en Nicaragua,” oas.org, April 8, 2020; “Nicaragua: Respuesta temeraria ante la COVID-19,” Human Rights Watch, April 10, 2020. 4 5

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Nonetheless, and despite the official discourse, in February 2020, health authorities began to carry out discreet epidemiological monitoring at points of entry into the country (Perry 2020b). They also created a new monitoring system at the national level based on direct home visits, and they mobilized resources to equip certain hospitals to cope with an eventual outbreak (Perry 2020a, b). Notwithstanding, actions taken by the government were always far fewer than those taken by the citizens, and information was never transparent. The Secretary General of MINSA confirmed the first case of COVID-19 on March 18 and publicly assured that it had been imported by a Nicaraguan who had travelled to Columbia via Panama. Subsequently, for the next 2 months, the Nicaraguan authorities reported extraordinarily low numbers of infections and deaths compared to neighboring countries. And it was not until July 2020 that MINSA recognized that community transmission might actually exist, even though the Cuban Ministry of Health – whose government had provided technical and medical support to manage the crisis – reported three positive cases arriving in Cuba from Nicaragua on April 8.7 According to the government’s narrative, the threat of the virus was real, albeit exaggerated by a disloyal opposition who had used it to spread fear as part of a plot to undermine the government. Although the government continued to downplay the scope of the virus and its implications for the health system, in mid-April they began to provide explanations for the unorthodox policies they had implemented. In his first public appearance since the outbreak of the pandemic, President Ortega hinted that a lockdown would be unsuitable for a developing country. The leader declared: “Work has not stopped (…) because if the country stops working, people die and the country dies.”8 Then, in his second reappearance, on May 1, Ortega pointed out that the sectors requesting quarantine measures were the same ones that had attempted a “coup” to overthrow his government in 2018, stating that “Now they want to take advantage of the pandemic to sink the country.”9 Following the same logic, in response to complaints from international organizations and the opposition, the government published a “white paper” to clarify and defend its management. This paper was entitled To the People of Nicaragua and to the World, COVID-19 Report, a Singular Strategy. In this document, the government denied accusations of concealing the figures, and although it did not clarify the number of tests carried out, it did cite MINSA protocol as evidence that the government was taking responsible actions, despite not having ordered a lockdown or suspended activities. On the other hand, the paper defended that the government had followed a “unique” model in response to the pandemic, which could be compared to the one implemented by the Swedish Government, which according to the report, avoided a draconian lockdown by trying to create “a balanced environment with

 “Cuba confirma tercer caso de Covid-19 procedente de Nicaragua,” La Prensa, April 8, 2020.  “Discurso del presidente de Nicaragua, Comandante Daniel Ortega,” El 19 Digital, April 15, 2020. 9  “Ortega lanza ataque frontal contra la campaña para prevenir el covid-19,” Confidencial, May 1, 2020. 7 8

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respect to the global economic crisis.” The report analyzed the situation from a political perspective and accused its detractors of being terrorists carrying out disinformation campaigns, linking them to the 2018 political crisis. The government’s accusation was clear and expressed in the following words: “With the current COVID-19 pandemic, the coup-mongering opposition in Nicaragua, along with the US covert action agencies that sponsor them, have launched a massive disinformation campaign, with their usual practice of lying daily to the people of Nicaragua in their attempt to undermine confidence in the government.”10 Be that as it may, the government did not believe everything set out in their paper either, given that at the end of June 2020, they announced that the celebration of the 1979 revolution, observed on July 19, would be held virtually. The problem, however, resided in the fact that no one (neither the government, nor the opposition, nor international organizations) had credible, consistent data. Indeed, Jarbas Barbosa da Silva, Assistant Director of PAHO, claimed his agency was having difficulties receiving updated data from Nicaragua.11 In the same vein, High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet on opening the 44th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on June 30, made a reference to Nicaragua, underlining the government’s mismanagement of the pandemic not only for its policy of disinformation but for the intimidation levelled against journalists, bloggers, and activists who offered a different version of Nicaragua’s real situation.

4.3  Critical Voices from Civil Society and the Opposition The most important consequence of this style of crisis management was immense confusion over information about the virus and its spread throughout the country. Faced with this situation, several actors unrelated (or directly opposed) to the government began to take action in order to communicate prevention measures against the pandemic to the population, or denounce the government’s strategy. Carrying out this type of task was not easy given that, since March 2020, some healthcare professionals have claimed to have suffered reprisals for spreading information about the health crisis. However, on April 23, 2020, the Nicaraguan Medical Association issued a statement criticizing the handling of cases while questioning the lack of coordinated measures to protect doctors and paramedics. They also denounced “the unclear manner in which statistical reports had been handled in relation to the incidence and progression of the pandemic, as well as the limited access to sampling and diagnosis of suspected cases and the healthy population.”12  Private Secretary for National Policies, 2020.  “Resisting Lockdown, Nicaragua Becomes a Place of Midnight Burials,” The New York Times, May 31, 2020. 12  “Asociación Médica Nicaragüense preocupada por aumento de contagios por Covid-19,” La Prensa, April 23rd, 2020. 10 11

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Two months after the start of the pandemic, it was striking that the Nicaraguan government had reported 32 times fewer cases than Costa Rica, taking into account migration flows and trade links between the two countries (at least one in ten inhabitants in Costa Rica is of Nicaraguan origin).13 In addition, by reporting 25 cases of infection and 8 deaths, the Nicaraguan government would have been forced to acknowledge a massive 32% mortality rate (when the average in the rest of the region did not exceed 3%). This inconsistency in numbers led to the creation of the so-called Citizen Observatory – run by a combined team of public health experts, doctors, and analysts – who went directly to the hospitals to keep an informal record of the scope of the pandemic. For the same dates, the observatory claimed there were at least 1270 cases of COVID-19 and 266 deaths.14 The same observatory also deployed the nongovernmental “Stay at home” campaign,15 pointing out that, faced with an “absent State,” citizens had to be active (Cuadra 2020a). Regarding this campaign, it is important to state that many of Nicaragua’s private schools closed their doors and promoted online learning, while public schools were never closed. Against this backdrop, and also in mid-May 2020, the Nicaraguan doctor, Jorge Miranda, pointed out that hospitals were overwhelmed by unusually high numbers of patients suffering from “atypical pneumonia” and burials were taking place at night.16 This is why the scientist, Jorge Huete-Pérez, founder and Vice President of the Nicaraguan Academy of Sciences, made it clear that Nicaragua lacked “credible public data to be able to understand COVID-19 progression rates in the country” (Huete-Pérez 2020). Yet, not only did some doctors denounce the government’s lack of expertise, but also a group of former Nicaraguan health ministers, including the ones that served during Daniel Ortega’s first term as President (1985–1990) and with the governing junta of the Sandinista Popular Revolution (1979–1984), wrote a letter to the Directorate-General of the WHO criticizing the measures – or lack thereof – taken by the government. They also denounced that “prevention and containment actions were not being taken,” particularly relevant in a country whose healthcare system had limited capacity. They claimed that MINSA had violated its constitutional mandate by not informing the people of Nicaragua “truthfully, objectively, and transparently about the real situation of the pandemic.” They also expressed concern for health workers, who, in their opinion, were working without “the necessary and sufficient protection” (up to July 8, 2020, at least 94 health workers had died).17 Finally, they recalled that civil society organizations, churches, business unions and human rights organizations, specialists in public health, and medical professionals had proposed actions and measures against the pandemic. However, the government 13  Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering, “Confirmed Cases,” https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html 14  “Report updated at 09/05/2020,” Citizen Observatory COVID-19 in Nicaragua. 15  “Ortega en contra de la campaña ‘Quédate en casa,” DW, May 1st, 2020. 16  “En Nicaragua vamos hacia el desfiladero,” (interview with Nicaraguan lung specialist, Jorge Iván Miranda), El País, May 23, 2020. 17  “La tragedia nacional: Más de 90 muertes en personal de Salud,” Confidencial, July 13, 2020.

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“had turned a deaf ear to these demands and proposals.”18 At the international level, the Costa Rican government echoed these concerns, and its Minister of Heath claimed that the high circulation of the virus in Nicaragua represented a major health risk for Costa Rica.19 Amid this dynamic of discontent and confusion, the political opposition criticized the government. An example of this is that opposition leader, Juan Sebastián Chamorro, a member of one of the main factions (Civic Alliance) of the dispersed opposition movement stated via CNN en Español that “in Nicaragua there was a propagation rather than a prevention program.”20 In addition, the sociologist, Oscar René Vargas, from the historical cadre of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), who had broken with the government when Ortega came to power for the second time, referred to the government’s health policies as “biological warfare” and interpreted them as a continuation of the paramilitary war waged in response to the crisis that had erupted 2 years earlier.21 Also worth noting are the words of the most prestigious think tanks in the country  – the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) – which declared that the pandemic could represent a new milestone in the authoritarian consolidation of the Ortega family regime with a view to the 2021 elections. Looking ahead to the 2021 elections, the pandemic has reduced the intensity of the political confrontation between the government and the opposition, which, given their inability to create a united platform, is increasingly fragmented. The lack of opposition unity is one of the factors which explains the stagnation in negotiations with the government along with the opposition’s lack of skill in exploiting and coordinating international pressure and their inability to achieve electoral reforms for the coming elections scheduled for 2021 (Jarquín and Thaler 2020). Thus, by the end of 2020, despite the government’s bizarre management of the crisis, international criticism, and unrest among much of the population, nothing would seem to indicate the end of the reign of Ortega and Murillo. What’s more, the passing of repressive laws by the National Assembly  – where the FSLN hold an absolute majority – and reforms to electoral governance, all point to the consolidation of the regime (Cuadra 2020b).

 Letter to the WHO and PAHO signed by former Health Ministers Lea Guido (1980–1985), Dora María Téllez (1985–1990), Lombardo Martínez (1997–1999), Martha McCoy (1999–2000), and Margarita Gurdián (2004–2007), May 11, 2020. 19  “Costa Rica: ‘Nuestra principal reisgo sanitario en este momento es el alto nivel de circulación del virus en Nicaragua,” La Prensa, May 27th, 2020. 20  “Juan Sebastían Chamorro: ‘En Nicaragua hay un programa de propagación, más que de prevención,” CNN, March 20th, 2020. 21  “Oscar René Vargas: De la guerra paramilitar a la guerra biológica,” 100% Noticias, June 9th, 2020. 18

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4.4  Conclusion The unusual response of the Nicaraguan authorities to the health crisis can be explained mainly by the way in which the FSLN – monopolized by Ortega-Murillo family since 2007 (Martí i Puig and Serra 2020) – have consolidated their authoritarian power in recent years, and by the way FSLN leaders understand future risks to their political project (Thaler 2017; López Baltodano 2019). In their reaction to the pandemic, the government remained trapped in its own “normalization” discourse, imposed since the wave of protests broke out in April 2018. Denying COVID-19 has been a natural extension of the lack of transparency in the political crisis in Nicaragua in which the government preferred to publicly ignore not only the economic and social consequences but also the popular and sectoral demands that fueled the protests (Ramírez 2020). The drive to insist on “normalcy” when faced with any disruption of the status quo has created serious problems for managing the health crisis, since in February and March 2020, the government publicly ruled out the threat of coronavirus, while, in private, the Ministry of Health (MINSA) made forecasts of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. To maintain a sense of normalcy and continuity at any cost, the government decided not to recommend any type of lockdown and instead promoted mass gatherings – political marches, summer festivals, and sporting events – that flew in the face of any internal mitigation or prevention plan. This also put Nicaragua at odds with the WHO recommendations, giving its government pariah status, coinciding in a surreal way with the right-wing administrations led by Trump and Bolsonaro. The drive for normalization also prevented any type of collaboration with civil society or healthcare workers’ unions, whose recommendations were interpreted as acts of political dissent or bad-faith attempts to undermine the stability promised to the population by the government. However, as of May 2020, the government moved away from its denial mentality and offered a “coherent” explanation for the decision not to impose lockdowns. According to a white paper drawn up by a Presidential Advisor, the social and economic costs of a lockdown far outweighed the health benefits. It was, then, allegedly a Swedish model for developing countries, where the economy/health dilemma is greater. Before and after this explanation, partisan politics prevailing in all state institutions hindered a professional, consistent response to the pandemic. In the ex post facto explanation offered by the government, some of the structural challenges faced by Nicaraguan society can be glimpsed. The authorities, when designing their health strategy, had to take into account the enormous social and economic inequalities, the precariousness of informal employment, and the weak infrastructure at the national level. These conditions also exist in the neighboring countries of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, where the authorities did heed the WHO recommendations regarding lockdowns and social distancing. But only in Nicaragua was there a situation in which the COVID-19 crisis overlapped with a political impasse, great social unrest, and a serious economic downturn.

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The difference between the case of Nicaragua and its neighboring countries – in addition to the above – lies in the fact that the management of the pandemic coincided with a drive by the government to implement measures of repression and control in the country. Thus, in the last quarter of 2020, the National Assembly, dominated by the FSLN, passed three laws and a reform of the Constitution in this direction. The first, passed on October 15, 2020, was the “Foreign Agents Regulation Law,” aimed at controlling the funds of NGOs and international agencies in the context of a pre-electoral campaign. The second was the “Special Cybercrime Law.” passed on October 26, with the purpose of controlling the information disseminated on social networks. And the third, passed on December 21, was the “Law in Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace,” aimed at criminalizing protest and dissent, accusing any critical activity regarding the government as terrorism and treason against the homeland. Added to these laws was the constitutional amendment approved on November 10, which introduced the sentence of life imprisonment for the so-called hate crimes. This new legislation, due to the scope of crimes and offences it encompasses, clearly makes it impossible to carry out any individual or collective activity in opposition to, or against, the government, not only with regard to the government’s ordinary political activity but also its management of the pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis has created challenges and opportunities for the main political actors in all countries worldwide. It should be noted that apart from the government’s reaction described above, the social and political opposition in Nicaragua has also proved wanting. The many groups critical of the management of the two crises (first the political crisis and then the health crisis) could not, or did not know how to, channel their discontent and lost the opportunity to negotiate reforms in electoral matters, civil rights, and health with the government from a position of strength. Thus, a few years after the 2018 crisis – and looking ahead to the 2021 elections – no one is considering the imminent fall of the Ortega government, which, like other semi-authoritarian regimes (such as Hungary, Russia, or Poland) in the same situation, has taken advantage of the health crisis to strengthen its position of power through repression and force at the expense of dissenting voices, despite the downturn of the economy and the human drama experienced by the majority of citizens in Nicaragua (Thaler 2020).

References Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) (2018). Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en el marco de las protestas sociales en Nicaragua. June 21, 2018. Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH) (2018) Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en el marco de las protestas sociales en Nicaragua. Informe de país: Nicaragua, June 21. https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Nicaragua2018-­es.pdf Cuadra E (2020a) Estado Ausente y Ciudadanía Activa en Nicaragua. Agenda Pública

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Cuadra E (2020b). http://agendapublica.elpais.com/elecciones-­para-­recuperar-­la-­democracia-­enn icaragua/?fbclid=IwAR1pmN2GQLCjpYEbCyhp619Bmmw_fJP2KjKlRoSmmoe5zlYk3 Vdbsal52ik Cupples J (2020) Love in the time of Covid-19: or, Nicaragua, the strange country where children still go to school. J Lat Am Geogr 20(10):1–11 GIEI (2018) Informe sobre los hechos de violencia ocurridos entre el 18 de abril y el 30 de mayo de 2018. https://gieinicaragua.org/#section00 Huete-Pérez JA (2020) La peligrosa fase de transmisión comunitaria del Covid-19 sin planes de mitigación. Confidencial Jarquín, M (2020) “Nicaragua: Dos crisis” Salvador Martí y Manuel Alcántara Política y crisis en América Latina. Reacción e impacto frente a la Covid-19. Madrid: Marcial Pons. Jarquín MCY, Thaler KM (2020) Two years after Nicaragua’s mass uprising started, why is Daniel Ortega still in power? Wash Post López Baltodano U (2019) Del sultanismo a la democracia: el régimen político de Nicaragua. In: Anhelos de un nuevo horizonte: Aportes para la construcción de una Nicaragua democrática. FLACSO, San José, Costa Rica Martí i Puig S (2016) Nicaragua: Desdemocratización y caudillismo. Revista de Ciencia Política 36(1): 239–259 Martí i Puig S (2020) “Covid-19 en América Latina: ¿Sólo un peligro más?” en Harvard Review of Latin America. ReVista. https://revista.drclas.harvard. edu/a-­reflection-­on-­the-­impact-­of-­covid-­19-­in-­latin-­america/ Martí i Puig S, Alcántara M (2020) Política y crisis en América Latina. Reacción e impacto frente a la Covid-19. Marcial Pons, Madrid Martí i Puig S, Serra M (2020) Nicaragua: de-democratization and regime crisis. Latin American Politics and Society 62(2): 117–136 Mather TPS et al (2020) Love in the time of COVID-19: negligence in the Nicaraguan response. Lancet Glob Health 8(6): 157–169 Moncada Bellorín L (2020) Dictadura y covid-19: la doble tragedia de Nicaragua. El Faro Perry J (2020a) Nicaragua’s response to COVID-19. Lancet Glob Health Perry J (2020b) Nicaragua battles COVID-19 and a disinformation campaign. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, DC Ramírez S (2020) The pretension on total power in the age of Covid-19. ReVista Harv Rev Latin Am. https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/the-­pretension-­of-­total-­power-­in-­the-­age-­of-­covid-­19/ Thaler KM (2017) Nicaragua: a return to caudillismo. J Democr 28(2) Thaler KM (2020) Nicaragua is stumbling into coronavirus disaster. Foreign Policy United Nations Human Rights Office of the High commissioner (2018). “Human rights violations and abuses in the context of protests in Nicaragua,” August 29, 2018.

Part II

State Action During COVID-19 Pandemic

Chapter 5

Managing the Pandemic in Colombia: Between the Immediate Response and the Structural Consequences Nadia Pérez Guevara and María Eugenia Bonilla

5.1  Introduction Since December 10, 2019, when the first positive case of coronavirus (SARS-­ CoV-­2) was reported in the city of Wuhan, China, the world has faced uncertainty and negative effects on health, economic, social, and political matters. Low- and middle-income countries are the most affected. Governments have taken rapid action in response to the crisis by issuing urgent, immediate, and temporary measures affecting the countries’ political and socioeconomic structure. Dire consequences have had implications in the face of the advances in terms of decentralization, transparency, open government, political control, democratization, and reduction of gaps, built over decades by governments and various political and social sectors. Colombia has not been the exception on this matter. Since March 6, 2020, when the first positive case of COVID-19 was reported in Bogotá, local governments and health and medical unions have been trying to adopt emergency measures to contain the spread of the virus and mitigate the risks. The crisis management has been strongly criticized, leaving Colombia among the worst countries managing the pandemic in South America along with Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. This chapter analyzes the management of the pandemic in Colombia, focusing on the provisions issued by the government of President Iván Duque of the Centro Democrático Party. Firstly, it presents a descriptive section of the pandemic in the country, emphasizing the evolution of the number of infections and deaths as well as its geospatial distribution. Subsequently, it analyzes the government’s response, supported by the issuance of a series of decrees and sanitary and

N. Pérez Guevara (*) · M. E. Bonilla Autonomous University of Bucaramanga, Bucaramanga, Colombia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 49 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_5

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economic-­administrative measures, adopted within the framework of the constitutional powers available to the President of the Republic. In the third section, the political and institutional effects of the response issued are described. It accounts for an accumulation of presidential power and complex relations with the legislature, the impact on individual freedoms, and human rights as well as the consequences over the president’s leadership. At last, conclusions are presented in this regard.

5.2  The Pandemic in Colombia The first positive case of COVID-19 in Colombia, known as a case brought in from Milan, Italy, was reported on March 6, 2020, in Bogotá. Since then, the contagion has reached Colombia’s 32 departments and 5 districts. As of February 19, 2021, 2 days after the first COVID-19 vaccine was administered in Colombia, official data reported by the Ministry of Health indicates that the total number of confirmed cases is 2,217,001. Fifty-eight thousand five hundred eleven cases have resulted in death; 2,110,562 have recovered; and 41,237 cases remain active. Bogotá City leads the number of cases with 648,712, followed by the Departments of Antioquia (338,935), Valle del Cauca (191,789), Atlántico (121,100), Cundinamarca (103,738), and Santander (89,269). Despite the fact that the highest amount of cases have occurred in the most populated cities and departments of the country, data per million inhabitants analyzed by the National Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud – INS) shows that the most affected territories in terms of the number of confirmed cases have been in Bogotá (78,335), Barranquilla (59,501), Amazonas Department (57,826), Cartagena (54,685), and Quindío (54,532), and, in terms of the number of deaths per million inhabitants, Amazonas was the most affected department (1956), followed by Norte de Santander (1911), the cities of Barranquilla (1763), Bogotá (1640), and Quindío (1593). According to the INS, the confirmed cases in Colombia have been mainly women (51.4%). The most affected age range has been between 30 and 39 (507,281), followed by those between 20 and 29 (478,439) and those between 40 and 49 (362,411). However, the number of deaths by the pandemic in Colombia have been mostly men (63.6%), and the most vulnerable age ranges have been those between 70 and 79 (15,865), followed by those between 60 and 69 (13,396) and those of 80 and 89 (13,039).

5.3  The National Government’s Response to the Pandemic The first confirmed case of coronavirus in Bogotá led the mayor of the city Claudia López and other local leaders to demand and take measures such as the closure of El Dorado International Airport and the mobility restriction in their municipalities

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due to the national government’s lack of action. The pressure put by local leaders, as well as the media and citizens, led President Iván Duque to close the nation’s borders and international flights and finally declare the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency on March 17, 2020.1 The government’s response to the crisis was developed within the framework of the constitutional and legal powers that the Executive power in Colombia has: (1) the Constitutional Exceptionality regime,2 which resulted in the declaration of two States of Emergency on March 17 and on May 6, 2020, and (2) the legal provisions to exercise surveillance and epidemiological control contained in Law 9 of 1979, which were materialized in the resolutions and decrees issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection and the President of the Republic, in which the sanitary emergency and the subsequent preventive isolations (quarantines) were declared. The last one was decreed on November 25, 2020, and it is valid until February 28, 2021. Figure 5.1 shows the chronology of these administrative acts. As noted, in light of the declared state of emergency and the President’s constitutional powers and ministerial laws, Ivan Duque signed an administrative document in order to address this public health problem. It focuses on sanitary or epidemiological control measures and on economic-administrative issues related to emergency management.

5.3.1  Sanitary Measures As in the vast majority of countries in the world, the first measure adopted in Colombia was a generalized quarantine as of March 22, 2020.3 The quarantine, known by the government as compulsory preventive isolation, was enforced from March 22 to April 13, 2020. During this isolation, the free movement of people within the entire national territory was restricted, with 34 exceptions, such as shopping for food and goods, health services, operation of critical infrastructure, and among others. The preventive isolation was preceded by the closure of maritime, land, and river borders, decreed on March 16, also prohibiting intermunicipal public land and air transport; only citizens were allowed to return by air.

1  Presidency of the Republic. Decree 417 of 2020. By which a State of Economic, Social and Ecological Emergency is declared throughout the national territory. 2  Article 215 of the Political Constitution of Colombia provides that the President may issue decrees with the force of law on matters concerning the declaration of emergency, where his measures are in principle transitory, which later, can be approved by the Senate of the Republic (High camera). 3  It should be noted that some departments and cities decreed quarantines and curfews in their jurisdictions since March 18 (as is the case of the countrys capital, the departments of Santander, Boyacá, Quindío, Sucre, and Valle del Cauca, among others) and that ended up tying with the one decreed by the national government since March 22.

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Fig. 5.1  States of emergency and health emergency in Colombia Source: Own elaboration based on https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/web/eva/gestor-­normativo

After the state of emergency was declared, the Ministry of Health has been in charge of developing all the regulations concerning sanitary and biosecurity measures during the pandemic. Within the powers granted to this Ministry, the requirements for requesting health records were made more flexible regarding medicines, medical equipment for the diagnosis, and treatment of the virus and the empowerment of “INVIMA” (the Colombia National Food and Drug Surveillance Institute) for this task. The bioprotocols and requirements for the health service provision to patients with COVID for coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) were also established. Those responsible for health services were the Health Provider Entities,4 while the health secretariats or the health directorates would only be in charge of exercising inspection, surveillance, and control of the services provided.5 By the end of the state of emergency, the President issued a decree that maintained the Isolation for 15 more days (until April 27, 2020) and that was extended again with a new declaration of state of emergency until June 6, 2020, with fewer restrictions by including new economic activities in the exceptions, which prompted the Ministry of Health to issue the required regulations for the operation of companies and commerce in the midst of the pandemic. Despite the gradual opening of the economy, restrictive measures for mobility were maintained, with night curfews, occupancy limitations, and the temporary closure of theaters and cultural venues, among others. In summary, in Colombia the measures on public health in the framework of the pandemic were linked to the management of security and public order. 4  In Colombia, the provision of health services is not completely public; it has been outsourced since the 1990s. 5  Presidency of the Republic. Legislative Decree 538 of 2020. By which measures are adopted in the health sector, to contain and mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic and guarantee the provision of health services, within the framework of the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency.

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5.3.2  Economic-Administrative Measures The state of emergency empowered the national executive to enact regulations aimed at overcoming the crisis not only in matters of public health and public order but also in economic and administrative matters. The creation of entities and appointments to deal with the crisis, modifications to the budget and taxes, the formalization of aid, and, to a lesser extent, the distribution of powers to territorial entities, were some of the decisions taken to manage the crisis. Despite being a decentralized country, the territorial entities in Colombia do not have the administrative and budgetary autonomy necessary to make decisions. Much less to face the crisis due to COVID-19, which with the declaration of the state of emergency were even more under the control of the national government. During the emergency, only local entities have been empowered to grant subsidies to people with lower incomes, to offer relief in the payment of public services and to absorb these6 costs; to hold the current tenders, as long as they were at an early stage; also to modify their budgets and the destination of income; and to request credits with financial entities. Meanwhile, funds, accounts, and entities were created at the central level to mitigate the crisis. The creation of the Fondo de mitigacion de emergencias (FOME7) (Emergency Mitigation Fund) and the subaccount for the Mitigation of Emergencies – COVID-198 for a 2-year period, with the intention of having liquidity, cash flow, and centralizing resources from other budget sources. The aim was to attend the emergency and its adverse effects, in the health system and in the productive and business spheres, where the financing of public and private companies and the financial sector is found, as well as the flexibility in the contracting processes. The creation of FOME and its respective subaccount was criticized by different sectors, including territorial entities. Firstly, due to the central level concentrating the decision-making power on all matters related to the health crisis. And secondly, because the resources diverted to the FOME as a loan are the Fondos de Pensiones Territoriales  – FONPET9 (Territorial Pension Fund). These directly affect the

6  Legislative Decree 517 of 2020. By which provisions are issued regarding public services of electric energy and fuel gas, within the framework of the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency declared by Decree 417 of 2020. 7  Legislative Decree 444 of 2020. By which the Emergency Mitigation Fund – FOME – is created and provisions on resources are issued, within the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency. 8  Legislative Decree 559 of 2020. By which measures are adopted to create a subaccount for the Mitigation of Emergencies – COVID-19 – in the National Fund for Disaster Risk Management and the rules for its administration are established, within the framework of the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency. 9  The FONPET is a fund without legal status administered by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, which aims to collect and allocate resources to the accounts of territorial entities and administer resources through autonomous patrimonies that are exclusively constituted in private or public pension and severance fund administrators (National Planning Department DNP, 2017).

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departments’ and municipalities’ pension budget. Also, because public debt securities called Solidarity Titles were issued as a mechanism to finance the FOME, making the need to protect the financial system through securities transfers a priority to maintain its liquidity (Article 4). Finally, socioeconomic aid and support were designed for individuals, productive sectors, and companies that mostly consisted of relief for monetary transfers. The creation of the Solidarity Income Program10 by the Ministry of Finance stands out, aimed at households and people in conditions of poverty or vulnerability who were excluded from social programs already arranged by the government. The program consisted of a COP $480,000 aid (approximately US $135), payable in three monthly transfers made by bank transfer to the beneficiaries. The program has had several extensions, the last set until June 2021. In the first stage, 1,162,965 people benefited. In October 2020, more than 3 million and 9 disbursements have been made, covering 1 million more beneficiaries (El Tiempo 2020). However, the way in which the program was conceived has received several criticisms, due to the fact that the beneficiaries had the obligation to bank in order to receive the monetary aid and that, in Articles 3 and 4 of the creation decree, the Ministry was empowered by the Treasury to enter into contracts and agreements with financial entities to be the operators of the money orders with operating costs charged to FOME. Tax relief is to be highlighted. These are related to the extension of the terms for the payment of commercial taxes, the renewal of commercial registrations for companies, presentation and payment of income statements, the exception of sales tax payments on three dates established in June and July 2020,11 and the creation of autonomous patrimonies to promote entrepreneurship and strengthen the business sector, among others.

5.4  I nstitutional Political Effects of the Government’s Response The Political Constitution of Colombia contemplates three types or modalities of exception (the external war, the internal commotion, and the economic, social, or ecological emergency) which are guided by the “nature” of the crisis that is to be managed. The first two make up the States of Constitutional Exception, while the State of Emergency is constituted as a public calamity, which means that each one  Legislative Decree 518 of 2020. By which the Solidarity Income Program is created to meet the needs of households in situations of poverty and vulnerability throughout the national territory, within the framework of the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency. 11  Measure popularly known as the day without VAT. Legislative Decree 682 of 2020. By which the special exemption from sales tax for the year 2020 is established and other provisions are issued with the purpose of promoting the reactivation of the Colombian economy, within the framework of the State of Economic and Social Emergency and Ecological decreed by Decree 637 of 2020. 10

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of them has a greater or lesser legislative and judicial control, as well as a different temporality. What is clear is that the appreciation and the power to declare them, which depends exclusively on the President and his entire ministerial cabinet, except in the case of foreign war where it is necessary to have the authorization of the Senate of the Republic (Upper House) to decree it. Given the nature of the public health crisis caused by COVID-19, a State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency was declared in Colombia. This modality has specific characteristics in terms of its powers, control, and timing necessary to make explicit, first, that the States of Emergency are intended to provide the President of the Republic with powers to issue Decrees with the force of law (Legislative Decrees). These are intended to exclusively confront the agents that generated the crisis that originated the declaration of emergency. Therefore and given the powers granted to the president, these decrees do not carry out the normal procedure before the Congress. In the states of emergency, the figure of “extensions” is not foreseen, so if more time is necessary, a new declaration should be made, with the only limit that said declaration may not exceed 30 days and that new declaration must satisfy in full the budgets required by Article 215 of the Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution provides that the measures adopted within the framework of the State of Emergency will cease to be in force at the end of the following fiscal period, unless the Congress, during the following year, grants them permanent character. Taking the above into account, the states of emergency only have control by the Constitutional Court, which exercises automatic control over all administrative acts derived from the declaration. On the other hand, the Congress of the Republic, despite maintaining the right of assembly during the emergency, do not exercise any type of legislative control over the applied rules. It is only empowered to express itself on the opportunity and convenience of these. Finally, the states of emergency have a validity of 30 days or a maximum total of more than 90 days, invoking the principle of abnormality of crises not of their permanent state (Tobón et al. 2020). As of February 2021, Colombia has signed two decrees that declare a State of Emergency: 417 of March 17, 2020, valid until April 17, 2020, and 637 of May 6, 2020, valid until June 6, 2020. The first declaration was justified in both public health and economy factual assumptions. The first is due to the declaration of the COVID-19 virus as a pandemic on March 11, 2020, by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the lack of effectiveness of the previous measures adopted to counteract the spread and transmission rate, the second, in the inestimable effects on the national economy that the virus could have, taking into account the high percentage of informal workforce in Colombia (47.6% in 2019 according to data from the National Department of Statistics – “Departamento nacional de estadisticas – DANE”), the low demand in oil in markets around the world with the subsequent fall in international oil prices, possible financial market shocks due to the fall in capital flows, and the inability to pay debts by workers and in the face of possible macroeconomic shocks that could have international effects. The second declaration was based, above all, on the negative effects of the decisions taken to control the pandemic on the national economy, in particular the

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mandatory preventive isolation (quarantines). Taking into account that economic growth in April 2020 was −4.6%,12 exports dropped −20.8% (Liendo 2020), and it was the only country of the OCDE group reporting the worst unemployment rate and gender gap in the labor market (Semana 2021). For this reason, all focus was on the tourism sector, air transport, and the informal economy within the factual budget to support the need to decree a new state of emergency and issue the necessary legislation to rescue these and other sectors of the crisis. It is important to emphasize that the President decreed the state of emergency 2 weeks after the first one ended. The figure of the extension in this case was not used. This could be as a mechanism to not exhaust this in the case the political or economic crisis would require more time for the executive and save criticism from public opinion. However, in practical terms beyond the institutional, from the presidency, the speech was made focusing on the permanent emergency. This created confusion about the country’s current situation, as the President was seen reporting on the extensions to the State of Sanitary Emergency, when it is the Ministry of Health’s responsibility. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the declaration of a State of Economic Emergency decreed by the President was accompanied by the declaration of Sanitary Emergency by the Ministry, which have had an impact on the Colombian political system. This chapter draws attention to the following topics: the accumulation of national executive power and its relationship with the legislative power, human rights, and the president’s governance.

5.4.1  T  he Accumulation of Presidential Power and Its Relations with the Legislature The specialized literature classify the Colombian presidential regime as one of the strongest in Latin America, given the scope of its constitutional powers (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Shugart and Carey 1992; Payne et al. 2006), which in the face of a declaration of exceptionality makes the president even more powerful de facto. This was evidenced in the legal decisions, which, of course, transcended the political sphere. As mentioned in the previous section, with the crisis’ outbreak, it was the local leaders who began to pressure the national government to adopt measures to contain the spread of the virus that had already shown a significant increase in cases in the municipalities. From the announcement about possible lockdowns and mobility restrictions, mainly from main cities to smaller municipalities. They raised the concern through

 According to figures from the International Institute of Finance, Oxford Economics, Latin Consensus Forecast cited in Legislative Decree 637 of May 6, 2020. By which a State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency is declared throughout the national territory.

12

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the country’s political and media agenda, which created friction between the President and local leaders. The main argument was with Bogota’s Mayor, who has great media power and did not hesitate to be concerned about the President’s slowness to make decisions. This led the presidency through the Minister of Internal affairs,13 during a national address live on all the national radio and television networks, to warn local leaders and, incidentally, public opinion that the national government was the only one competent to direct public order in the framework of the health emergency through Decree 418 of 2020.14 Both in his address and in Article 2 of the decree the following was established: The instructions, acts, and orders of the President of the Republic in matters of public order, within the framework of the health emergency caused by the coronavirus, COVID-19, will be applied immediately and preferentially over the provisions of the governors and mayors. The instructions, acts and orders of the rulers will be applied in the same way and with the same effects in relation to those of the mayors. (Legislative Decree 418 of 2020)

The image of the minister surrounded by the military leadership and the Minister of Defense, gave a clear message: the actions and decisions against the virus were going to be concentrated in the national government, and in any case they would go over any decision made in the municipal15 and departmental scope. Also, the sanitary measures adopted are essentially of public order, so the territorial entities do not have competence to deal with that. These frictions were repeated during the negotiation process for the purchase of vaccines with pharmaceutical companies in January 2021. Given the slowness and lack of news from the national government on this issue, some mayors announced the possibility of negotiating autonomously and complementing the purchase with local resources, with prior authorization from the Ministry of Health. Given this possibility, the central level included, in the draft decree to regulate the vaccine distribution process, a cut in the number destined for these cities. This generated discomfort among local leaders and sectors of public opinion, since a kind of blackmail was implied. Again, a political message about who has power over the crisis management was conveyed, with the support of some mayors and political parties who declared that the management of vaccines was the sole responsibility of the national government headed by the President. This announcement made the mayors abandon the proposal and the idea of approaching pharmaceutical companies for a possible purchase of vaccines (Infobae 2021).

 The then minister, Alicia Arango, is a fundamental piece and authority within the ruling party, as she is considered one of the closest to Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the natural leader of this political current. 14  Presidency of the Republic. Legislative Decree 418 of 2020. By which transitory measures are issued for regulations on public order. Among other things, the Decree required that the measures taken at sub-national levels be done in a coordinated manner with the national government, or else they could be sanctioned by the President. 15  Taking into account that in the Political Constitution, the municipality is defined as the fundamental entity of the political-administrative division of the state, within the framework of decentralization. 13

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During the two States of Emergency that framed the Colombian exceptional regime, more than 200 decrees were issued, which according to the constitution and jurisprudence, must meet two requirements: constitutionality and that of referring only to the issues that are the subject of the emergency declaration. Colombia has not been different to the Latin American tendency to govern by decree. This occasion has not been any different, as it has been seriously questioned for issuing decrees that go beyond these limitations. The aforementioned Decrees 444 and 559 of 2020 that create the FOME and the COVID-19 subaccount, respectively, have been due to the fact that within the sources of financing, there are resources from the regions, threatening decentralization since later, with the issuance of the Legislative Decree 678 of 2020, changed the modality of “loan” to territorial entities to the possibility that there was a dissaving of FONPET resources and that these were destined to the management of the health crisis. The Office of the Republic’s Attorney General, as well as different political and opposition sectors, expressed their concern about the violation of Article 48 of the Constitution, which prohibits the resources of social security institutions from being destined or used for objectives other than that, given its consideration as a mandatory public service. Despite the fact that these were declared by the Constitutional Court, the article of Decree 678 that allowed the dissaving of FONPET resources was declared unenforceable. As it was mentioned before, the allocation of resources was criticized, since part of this money was destined to the rescue of small and medium businesses. However, it was known that the government planned to make a disbursement with FOME resources in favor of the Colombian airline Avianca Holdings S.A. for US $370 million, an action that was subject to a precautionary measure under the assumption of violation of the nation’s collective rights and interests.16 Another decree questioned was the Legislative Decree 558 of 2020,17 which allowed companies to temporarily reduce (2 months) from 16% to 3% the ­contributions corresponding to the General Pension System, in order to give greater liquidity to companies affected by the crisis. Also, and given the possibility that workers were not obliged to make contributions to the pension system during the months of the emergency thanks to the decree, once they retire, they would have to work 2 more months to complete the minimum contribution time required by the law (Article 5). Finally, another article included the Colpensiones public pension fund, the programed retirement pensions of low amounts (minimum wage) managed by private funds.

 Administrative Court of Cundinamarca, first section, subsection A.  Admission of claim and emergency precautionary adoption. September 10, 2020. Retrieved from https://imgcdn.larepublica.co/cms/2020/09/11191210/2020-584-ADMITE-Y-ADOPTA-MEDIDA18677.pdf 17  By which measures are implemented to temporarily reduce the contribution to the General Pension System, protect pensioners under the modality of programmed withdrawal, and other provisions are issued within the framework of the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency. 16

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Some political sectors thought the President was overreaching with the measure, since practically with these provisions he would be incurring in a “mini-pension reform” that in the end would end up harming the workers and benefiting the private pension funds that are administered mostly by the financial sector (Semana 2020). The decree was declared unenforceable in its entirety by the Constitutional Court, considering that the measures adopted represented “an impairment of social rights, they have resources destined to the financing of pensions for purposes other than them, it does not ensure financial sustainability” (Sentence C258 2020). Also, because it does not meet the requirements of material connection and sufficient motivation in relation to the factual assumptions that justified the declaration of the State of Emergency, more so when Article 215 of the Political Constitution expressly warns that no decree issued during the State of Emergency can impair workers’ social rights. Regarding the role of the legislature during the crisis and its relationship with the executive, it is necessary to clarify that, by its nature, the State of Emergency empowers the Congress of the Republic to meet in its own right, among other things, to report on the convenience and timeliness of the measures adopted in the context of the emergency (Article 215). However, the pandemic and mandatory quarantine unexpectedly affected the functioning of Congress. On March 17, 2020, the day the State of Emergency was declared, the Congress was beginning the first period of its second term, scheduled from March 16 to June 20, 2020. Since March 11, the secretariat of the Senate and the House of Representatives took measures to reduce the flow of people in the Capitol and in the precincts; however, with the limitation of the capacity to a maximum of 50 people and the mandatory isolation, the normal operation of the corporation was ostensibly affected. The President of the Senate asked the secretary of the corporation to postpone the sessions until the April 13, 2020, and drafted a bill aiming to modify the Congress regulations and thus allowing the chambers to convene sessions, deliberate, and vote virtually in special circumstances; from the House of Representatives, a bill with the same content was also filed. Finally, the Senate postponed the sessions until April 20 and the House until April 13, 2020. While the country was in a State of Emergency, the Congress was not in session, so the debate focused on the possibility of meeting virtually. In a letter signed by all the representatives and senators of the opposition, they expressed the urgency and need for the Congress to continue to function at least virtually, for which they proposed the creation of the Virtual Congress (Senado de la República 2020) that sparked a debate about its legality. Thus, some congressmen endorsed the idea of meeting in this modality; others stressed the possibility that it had no validity due to the existing legal void with respect to the place of meeting, since, in the Congress Regulations,18 it is expressly

 Congress of the republic. Law 5 of 1992. “By which the Regulations of Congress, the Senate, and the House of Representatives are issued”.

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mentioned that for certain legislative processes, congressmen must be in the elliptical room, the venue where the plenary meets (Cepeda and García 2020). However, from different sectors of civil society, academia, and even political parties, attention was drawn to the institutional balance of Colombian democracy, which did not seem to surprise the Congress because it is one of the institutions least valued by the citizens,19 since sectors related to the government were not bothered by the power accumulated in their president. With the end of the State of Emergency and the flexibility of health measures, the Senate announced that it would begin to exercise political control over the regulations issued by the national government. During May and June, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, and the Minister of Health, among others, were summoned to political control and accountability, among others. The recurring themes in the political control debates were about the crisis economic aid, economic aid to low-income families, and police abuses in the middle of quarantines.

5.4.2  Individual Freedoms and Human Rights Quarantines and curfews were the most recurrent measures during the pandemic. At the beginning of the crisis, one of the decisions was the most requested and applauded by various political sectors and public opinion, but in the end it turned out to be one of the most critical because it further encouraged police abuse, which for months had been questioned, since the country came from the end of 2019 in a strong wave of protests against the government. Thus, the curfews and quarantines, which in principle were an exceptional measure in the context of the State of Emergency in favor of public health, became a permanent measure over time being part of the “new” normality designed to safeguard security and public order. During the pandemic’s first month, quarantine was quite effective. Thanks to the people’s mobility restriction and restriction of capacity, the rate of spread of the virus was reduced, which would help the government to prepare the health system for the imminent arrival of the first peak of contagion. However, as the weeks passed and with the relaxation of preventive isolation in April 2020, little by little, Colombian society began to resume its economic and social activities. This also allowed issues and agendas that had been left in the background by the coronavirus to reappear in public debate, some of them stronger, given the unleashed social economic crisis. As mentioned, Colombia was in the midst of a national strike since November 2019, motivated by the economic crisis, breach of the peace agreement, and an education reform that further underfunded public education. The strike was marked by

19

 Only 23.9% of citizens trust the Congress of the Republic (LAPOP 2018).

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a series of protests and demonstrations that lasted until January 2020, remaining on standby due to the quarantine. Nonetheless, at the end of the states of emergency, the strike was called again, exacerbated by the social discontent due to the lack of government aid to people and sectors affected by the crisis. Despite the fact that the restrictions to mobility were not 100%, social gatherings and meetings of more than 50 people were prohibited in September. Mobilization broke out in the capital city, after a citizen was killed with a taser gun by the police in an operation against the violation of the curfew in the city. The protests were violently repressed by the police and the ESMAD (Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron). On the night of September 9, in response to the “cacerolazos” and roadblocks by disgruntled citizens, the police fired firearms at the protesters and made illegal arrests, among other things, which was considered a subversion of the police to the civil power in Bogotá. The result was the murder of more than nine people and several other injured by firearms by the police20 (Oquendo 2020). The repression after the September mobilizations were the most dramatic case. However, throughout the pandemic, several cases of excessive use of force and violation of human rights by the national police have been documented. All these substantiated by maintaining public order during quarantines and curfews. Between 2019 and 2020, more than 10,000 cases of police abuse have been recorded in Colombia (El Tiempo 2020). In 2021, 11 months after the pandemic was declared, curfews, restrictions on mobility, and social distancing continue to be the main measures adopted by mayors and governors in Colombia. It has become a wild card measure for the rulers, which has served them to deal with problems such as insecurity, mobility, or road accidents.

5.4.3  The President’s Leadership President Iván Duque, since the beginning of his mandate, has had the necessary governance to carry out his initiatives. The ruling party, the Democratic Center, has the majority of senators in the Upper House and the second majority with more than 30 Representatives in the Lower House, who leads the coalition of more than 4 parties in the Congress of the Republic. However, this power is not reflected in the President’s leadership for two reasons in particular: his image and career for the presidency was built under the shadow of the former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and, as a consequence, Duque in his desire to show himself as a strong, independent, and innovative leader has ended up creating a negative image that have cost him several criticisms. As an example of this is Duque’s low approval ratings, at the beginning of his mandate, in August 2018,

 Currently, some police officers have open investigation files for the excessive use of force and others are already in jail.

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Duque had a 40% approval rating (INVAMER 2021), reaching one of the lowest ratings just before the pandemic (20%). The health crisis became a perfect opportunity for the President to position himself in the national public opinion, finding a specific issue or government agenda that seemed absent during a year and a half in office. The orange economy, one of the pillars of his campaign, did not have the support nor the recognition by the voters. They did not see his government plan as an opportunity to give victory again to the project set in motion by Uribe’s party and to contain the rise of the left-wing opposition party in the country. As expected, his image with the onset of the pandemic rose considerably, and it seemed that the President had finally found an agenda to position himself. The adoption of the measures within the framework of the States of Emergency and Health Emergency was accompanied by an aggressive media campaign that sought to put the President in the national media. At the beginning and in response to the struggle for leadership in handling the crisis, in which the President had been left in the background due to the role of some of the local leaders, mainly the mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López (Pérez Guevara 2020), the citizens were faced with presidential speeches at primetime, which ended up being institutionalized in a presidential program broadcasted by all the public and private television networks in the country. The program called Prevention and Action began as something temporary to inform Colombians about the crisis’ management; it ended up becoming a permanent government program in which not only the government’s management is communicated in matters related to the pandemic but also all the decisions and matters of the presidential agenda and of his party. The program has dealt with topics such as the actions carried out in the department of San Andrés, which was hit by a hurricane in November 2020 and, the Venezuelan situation, with the special guest to the program the Venezuelan opponent Leopoldo López in December 2020, and from there he gave more details on the draft statute for the regulation of Venezuelan migrants days ago. Every day the television program Prevención y Acción has the same staging: the President in a boardroom from the Presidential House leading a large table surrounded by his ministers and officials named to the program, this when he is not broadcasting from other cities. Then, the President reports on the number of infections and some measures and information from government sectors for an uninterrupted hour. There are those who compare his program with the famous “Hello President” of former president of Venezuela Hugo Chávez, because he uses it as a platform to report on his government without submitting to any kind of control by the press or opposition sectors. This last aspect generates problems in terms of institutional political power balances, since in Colombia the statute for the guarantee of the exercise of the

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opposition21 establishes that each presidential speech has a right of reply by the parties that declare themselves in opposition to it. The presidential speeches at the beginning of the pandemic allowed a response from the opposition in March 2020. However, with the establishment of the program, a legal “trap” was made for the right to reply, because this television format is not classified in the norm as a presidential address. With all this, the rebound in presidential approval in April 2020, which reached 52% (INVAMER 2021), again collapsed over the months, closing 2020 with an approval of just 31%, not to mention the presidential program that finished in the last places of the rating (Vargas 2020). Despite the fact that with the crisis the President managed to establish his agenda, he is still unable to position himself as his predecessors. In addition to the pandemic, the government is facing pressure by the economic crisis that had been deepening for some time: the breach of the peace process, the raise in violence and murder against social leaders and ex-combatants of the extinct FARC guerrilla, and its weakened foreign policy that received a boost thanks to the announcement of the regularization of Venezuelan migrants.

5.5  Conclusions Colombia has stood out as one of the Latin American countries with the worst management of the health crisis, along with Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. In fact, it was the last country in this region of the world to begin the vaccination process. Although the percentage of confirmed infected does not exceed 5% of the total population and the deceased 1.5%, the political costs have been high. The management of the pandemic has exposed the institutional weaknesses of the Colombian political system, with an impact on traditionally vulnerable sectors and generating high costs in terms of decentralization, balance of powers, political control, democratization, transparency, open government, and human rights. To face the pandemic, the government of Iván Duque declared two States of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency, as well as a series of resolutions and Legislative decrees with the aim of establishing epidemiological control measures and regulating economic-administrative issues, with special prominence of the Ministry of Health, in charge of developing all the regulations concerning sanitary and biosafety measures. Among the sanitary measures, the closure of the maritime, land, and river borders stands out, as well as the mandatory preventive isolation that lasted until June 6, 2020. The gradual opening of the economy maintained the restrictive measures to mobility, with night curfews, limited capacity, and closing of theaters and educational establishments, among others. For their part, the economic-administrative

 Congress of the republic. Law 909 of 2018. By means of which the Statute of Political Opposition and some rights to independent political organizations are adopted.

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measures were characterized by the creation of entities and appointments to face the crisis, the modifications to the national budget and the tax structure, the formalization of financial aid, and the distribution of powers to the territorial entities. Among the political-institutional effects of the management of the pandemic, the concentration of power in the national executive stands out, since by virtue of the declaration of the States of Emergency, the president was empowered to issue decrees with force of law, without the need for approval of Congress, remaining at the expense only of control by the Constitutional Court. 2020 was a year for Colombia with a clear trend of government via Legislative Decrees, several of which were seriously questioned. The political handling of the crisis left a clear message against decentralization, since it indicated that health decisions would be defined at the national level and prevailed over those that were defined at the municipal and departmental level. This speech was justified by pointing out that the sanitary measures were essentially of public order, so that the territorial entities had no jurisdiction. The shocks at the three levels of management were evident throughout the year, including regarding the possibility of accessing vaccines. Regarding economic-administrative measures, the territorial entities were only empowered with respect to limited powers, while funds, accounts, and entities were created at the central level to control the crisis, such as the Emergency Mitigation Fund (FOME) and the subaccount for Emergency Mitigation – COVID-19, which affected territorial finances by diverting resources from the Territorial Pension Fund. As for the legislative branch, empowered in the framework of the Emergency to meet in its own right and render reports on the convenience of the measures adopted by the President, the mandatory quarantine unexpectedly affected its operation, delaying the start of the second term. After modifying the Congress regulations and overcoming the legal debates on the legality of meeting in virtual mode and, under pressure from different sectors of civil society, academia, and even political parties, in April 2020, the sessions were resumed, and, with the end of the State of Emergency, the Senate began to exercise political control over the norms issued by the national government. The national government has found in the management of the pandemic an opportunity to appease social discontent and the wave of protests that since 2019 had been widely manifested in the streets of the country. Quarantines and curfews went from being exceptional measures to permanent ones, becoming part of the “new” normality designed to safeguard security and public order. Thus, in order to safeguard life by preventing the spread of the virus, social protests have been violently repressed by the public forces, triggering the violation of human rights. Finally, it is worth noting that the management of the pandemic has taken its toll on President Iván Duque in terms of governance and political leadership. Although his popularity and approval levels have generally been low (20% before the pandemic), the opportunity to position himself before the national public opinion with a specific government agenda in the face of the pandemic allowed him to improve his favorable image due to the adoption of emergency measures and an aggressive media campaign. However, with the passage of time, the transitory media spaces

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created to report on the management of the crisis ended up becoming a permanent communication platform for the government’s management on various issues, the presidential agenda, and the Democratic Center party. This last aspect generates problems in terms of the balance of institutional political power, since it violates the precepts of the statute for the guarantee of the exercise of the opposition, which contemplates the right of reply under the same conditions as the presidential. However, despite the media showcase, Duque closed the year with an approval of just 31%. In addition to the pandemic, the government is pressured by the economic crisis, noncompliance with the peace process, violence and systematic murder against social leaders and combatants of the former FARC guerrilla, and its weakened foreign policy that received a whiff of oxygen thanks to the announcement of the regularization of Venezuelan migrants.

References Cox G, Morgenstern M (2001) Reactive assemblies and proactive presidents: a typology of Latin American presidents and legislatures. Comp Polit 33:171–189 Cepeda E. & García S. (2020) ¿Cómo afectó, afecta y afectará el COVID-19 el Congreso de la República en Colombia? Obtained from Congreso Visible, April 7. https://congresovisible.uniandes.edu.co/agora/post/como-afecto-afecta-y-afectara-el-covid-19-el-congreso-de-la-republica-en-colombia/10527/ Departamento Nacional de Planeación DNP (2017) Panorama actual de los recursos del fondo nacional de pensiones de las entidades territoriales (FONPET). Obteined from: https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Inversiones%20y%20finanzas%20pblicas/Documentos%20GFT/ Bolet%C3%ADn%20financiamiento%20Fonpet.pdf El Tiempo (2020) Entre el 2019 y el 2020 Policía perpetró 10.071 agresiones físicas, September 29. Obtained from https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/abuso-policial-10-071-agresiones-fisicas-por-parte-de-la-policia-de-bogota-between-2019-and-2020-540657 Infobae (2021) Alcaldes anuncian que ya no comprarán vacunas contra el covid-19. Colombia, January 14. Retrieved from: https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/01/14/ alcaldes-anuncian-que-ya-no-compraran-vacunas-contra-el-covid-19/ INVAMER (2021) INVAMER, January. Retrieved from: https://www.valoraanalitik.com/wp-­ content/uploads/2021/01/Informe_022900200000_Poll-­140-­2.pdf LAPOP (2018) Barometer of the Americas. Retrieved from: https://obsdemocracia.org/ temas-­de-­estudio/democracia-­e-­instituciones/?question_id=11282#js_topic_graphic Liendo N (2020) Pandemia y gobernabilidad en América Latina y Colombia. In: Stark Esther J. (ed) ¿Quo vadis América Latina? Pronósticos políticos y socio-económicos en tiempos de Covid-19. Hanns Seidel Stiftung -La Imprenta Editores S. A. S, Bogotá. Oquendo C (2020) Las protestas callejeras se reactivan en Colombia tras meses de parálisis por la pandemia, September 21. Retrieved from El País: https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-09-21/ la-violencia-policial-y-las-matanzas-en-el-campo-potencias-las-protestas-en-colombia.html Payne M, Zovatto D, Mateo M (2006) La política importa. Desarrollo y democracia en América Latina. IDB-IDEA, Washington, DC Pérez Guevara N (2020) Claudia López y el manejo de la pandemia en Bogotá, June 22. Obtained from Razón Pública: https://razonpublica.com/claudia-lopez-manejo-la-pandemia-bogota/ SEMANA (2020) ¿Por qué ha causado tanta polémica el decreto 558 de pensiones? SEMANA, April 16. Obtained from: https://www.semana.com/pais/articulo/por-que-has-causado-tantapolemica-el-decreto-558-of-pensions/284359/+&cd=4&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=co

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SEMANA (2021) SEMANA, February 10. Retrieved from: https://www.semana.com/economia/ macroeconomia/articulo/colombia-­es-­el-­pais-­de-­la-­ocde-­con-­el-­desempleo-­y-­la-­brecha-­de-­ genero-­mas-­tall/202103/ Senate of the Republic (2020) Senate of the Republic of Colombia, March 17. Obtained from: https://www.senado.gov.co/index.php/prensa/noticias/810-­crean-­congreso-­virtual Sentence C258 of 2020 (Constitutional Court 23 of 07 of 2020). Shugart MS, Carey J (1992) Presidents and assemblies: constitutional design. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Shugart MS, Mainwaring S (1997) Presidencialismo y democracia en América Latina: revisión de los términos del debate. In: Shugart MS, Mainwaring S (eds) Presidencialismo y democracias en América Latina. Paidós, Buenos Aires Tobón ML, Burbano J, Santander J (2020) La declaratoria del Estado de excepción de emergencia económica, social y ecológica en Colombia por el COVID-19. In: Derecho en tiempos de pandemia. Transformaciones globales, costos locales. López O.A. & Fajardo L.A. (eds) Universidad Libre, Bogotá Vargas C (2020) Programa de Tv de Duque sigue cayendo en rating, tras ocho meses al aire, November 25. Obtained from La FM: https://www.lafm.com.co/colombia/ programa-de-tv-de-duque-sigue-caiendo-en-rating-tras-ocho-meses-al-aire

Chapter 6

The Uruguayan State’s Structure and the Management of the Pandemic Germán Bidegain, Martín Freigedo, and Guillermo Fuentes

6.1  Introduction Uruguay stands out in the international context for its success in controlling the health effects of the pandemic during the first moments of the virus’ expansion. Although the spread of the virus significantly increased in the last months of 2020, because of an almost total opening of economic and social activities, the control of its expansion between March and November has been successful and made Uruguay a unique case in the region. Taking into consideration this scenario, the following question guides this chapter: what accounts for the country’s relative success? In this work, we will concentrate on two fundamental aspects of the State’s role in facing the crisis. On one hand, we will pay special attention to the government’s public health response and the factors that may have influenced the success of its strategy at the beginning of the pandemic. We argue that the existence of an Integrated National Health System with strong capacities combined with some concrete actions carried out by the government allowed the successful control of the situation. On the other hand, we will focus on the impacts of the pandemic on social and economic matters and the role of the State to confront them. We argue that the historical tools of the Uruguayan welfare regime created conditions to mitigate the social impact, even though the government did not develop an ambitious agenda in this regard. Besides, the government’s decision to avoid the most restrictive measures at all costs reduced the pandemic’s economic effects. Interestingly, the first COVID-19 positive case in Uruguay was identified few days later that, when a right-wing coalition assumed the national government, after 15 years of left-wing orientation. One of the more important points of the coalition

G. Bidegain (*) · M. Freigedo · G. Fuentes Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_6

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during the campaign was to drastically cut public expenses to reduce the fiscal deficit. Therefore, a second question that guides this chapter is if the unexpected situation affected the new government political plans. The chapter counts with four main sections. The first one outlines the evolution of the pandemic in Uruguay, showing the relative control achieved from March to November 2020 and the radical change that took place since November due to the opening of activities. The second section analyzes the country’s political, social, and economic context when the first cases of COVID-19 were detected. The third section presents the government’s main measures and outlines some Uruguayan State features that account for its important role in facing the pandemic, in health, social, and economic terms. Finally, the chapter closes with a series of reflections on the possible effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the government’s political agenda in terms of the State’s role in society. We conclude that, at least for the moment, the pandemic did not modify the government’s orientation to reduce the weight of the State.

6.2  The Evolution of the Pandemic in Uruguay Latin America has been one of the most affected regions by COVID-19. Nonetheless, Uruguay was an exception from most of 2020 due to its capacity to control the expansion of the pandemic. The first case was detected on March 13, and for most of 2020, the control of the spread of the virus has been relatively successful, through the combination of restrictive measures on social and economic activities and important efforts of tracing and contacting positive cases. However, as the government lifted economic and social activities restrictions, in December 2020, an exponential growth of cases changed the situation. When countries were experiencing the second or third wave of infections, Uruguay began its first wave (Fig. 6.1). The relative control of the situation during the first months of the pandemic in the country led the government to reopen progressively economic and social activities. Figure 6.2 shows the abrupt reduction of social mobility in March–April, after the identification of the first case and the announcement of the government restrictive measures. Nonetheless, as the figure also shows, work and transportation mobility grew steadily when social and economic activities reopened. Each measure of this figure represents a 7-day rolling average. As we will discuss later, the government’s call for a “responsible freedom” effectiveness reduced considerably over time. In sum, the very few cases reported during the first months of the pandemic coincided with low levels of work and residential mobility. Once the government softened the restrictions for economic activities, people started moving again and the virus to spread.1 That change in the pattern of social behavior can be associated to the increase in positive cases, intensive care patients, and deaths.

1  The drop in social mobility identified in January 2021 is not associated to restrictive measures, but to the summer holidays.

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Fig. 6.1  Evolution of COVID-19 in Uruguay (cumulated cases and deaths) Source: Own elaboration with data from the World Health Organization (covid19.who.int)

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Fig. 6.2  Social mobility evolution Source: UMAD (https://umad.cienciassociales.edu.uy/)

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6.3  Uruguay Before the Pandemic 6.3.1  Political Context: Political Alternation After 15 years of progressive governments led by the Frente Amplio (FA), in 2019, the center-right coalition led by the Partido Nacional (PN) won the second turn presidential elections, with a narrow margin of votes (1.5% of difference). Luis Lacalle Pou (of the PN), the elected President, was supported in these elections by a center-right coalition integrated by five parties: the PN, the Partido Colorado (PC), the Partido de la Gente (PdeG), the Partido Independiente (PI), and Cabildo Abierto (CA). This is an unprecedented coalition in the Uruguayan party system, traditionally distinguished in the region due to its significant stability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Chasquetti and Buquet 2004). The parties that formed the “Coalición Multicolor” (multicolored coalition) have quite different ideological orientations. While the PN is a right-wing party, with strong liberal positions, PI and some sectors of the PC define themselves as social democrats, and the recently created CA has a strong nationalist and conservative discourse and count with an important proportion of military among its key figures.2 These parties signed a programmatic agreement before the second ballot, and four of the five parties integrated the ministerial cabinet when the new government took office.3 Their agreement set out some programmatic guidelines for the new government – with three important political directions that are worth mentioning. A first orientation, perhaps the one that generated the most agreement among the partners, was to reduce the fiscal deficit (4.7% of the GDP in 2019), which registered a growing trend in the previous years. With this objective, the government aims to cut State expenditures to save 900 million USD per year during the presidential period. This is equivalent to reducing the fiscal deficit in 2% of the GDP. In order to achieve this objective, the government proposes to reduce the State bureaucratic structure (e.g., through the nonrenewal of 21% of public positions) and to modify the role of public companies in the society. According to the authorities, more than a third of the spending cuts will come from public companies’ expenditures.4 In this matter, it must be highlighted that public companies in Uruguay play a crucial role in several priority areas (telecommunications, water, electricity, fuel refining). Second, one of the main campaign subjects was citizen security (Milanesi forthcoming). The strategies defined to combat crime and violence have been a subject of recurrent discrepancy between the political parties currently in government and the Frente Amplio. In this sense, the new government’s agenda has taken a punitive turn, proposing the increase of penalties and the discretion of the police to act.

 Its leader is a former Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Army.  The PdG had an extremely low vote and was severely shocked after the elections due to inner disputes. They only count with one deputy in the low chamber and do not count with ministers in the cabinet. 4  https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/-donde-recortara-lacalle-pou-para-ahorrar-us-900millones%2D%2D2019426175157 2 3

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Third, the FA governments have made important reforms regarding individual rights of traditionally discriminated groups, such as the approval of same-sex marriage, the decriminalization of abortion, and affirmative actions oriented to the Afro-­ Uruguayan and transgender population (Bidegain 2013; Johnson et al. 2019). Some of the members of the multicolored coalition directly opposed to this “new rights agenda” (as it is known in Uruguay) during the Frente Amplio governments. In some cases, besides voting against the reforms in Congress, they have even promoted direct democracy mechanisms to counter this agenda, but without success.5 In any case, during the electoral campaign and in the coalition’s programmatic document, the coalition has explicitly stated that they will not affect the current regulatory framework in these matters. Therefore, normative progress in this agenda is not expected during this presidential term, but neither a backlash. However, there are still doubts about the political will and resources that the government will allocate to implement the public policies at place. Since the first COVID-19 case appeared a few days after the new government took office, it is worth stressing the governmental strategy to promote its agenda in this unexpected context. Lacalle Pou insisted on the importance to conduct profound changes from day one of the government. To do so, during the electoral campaign, he announced that he would resort to an institutional resource available to the Executive Power: to propose a bill of urgent consideration.6 Despite the pandemic situation, the government did not change this strategy and sent the bill for discussion to Congress on April 23, a month after the detection of the first cases of COVID-19. The opposition criticized this strategy. In its opinion, this bill that affected several crucial policy arenas was excessively long (476 articles). The Frente Amplio denounced the Executive’s strategy for leaving very little time to the parliamentary debate, abusing of this institutional prerogative to impose its agenda. Anyway, the good results in health matters in the first months of government reinforced the traditional “honeymoon” period. The discussion of the bill did not affect the governmental approval despite the opposition’s critics.7 In short, when the pandemic arrived in Uruguay, there was a recently installed government (with many relevant positions still undefined), supported by an unprecedented multiparty coalition and a policy agenda focused on the reduction of the role and size of the State. In this scenario, the authorities did not substantively modify their action plan. They quickly promoted a bill of urgent consideration, which 5  They did it against the decriminalization of abortion law and against the transgender population law. Both initiatives obtained less than 10% of popular support. 6  The Law of Urgent Consideration exists since the 1967 Constitution. It provides the possibility for the Executive Power to send a bill to the Congress with a very short delay to treat it (90 days in total). If the Congress does not manage to vote it, the bill automatically becomes law. For more information about the mechanism in Uruguay: https://parlamentosite.wordpress.com/2019/09/30/ los-proyectos-de-ley-de-urgente-consideracion-en-uruguay. 7  According to an Opción Consultores survey, in April 2020, two out of three Uruguayans approved the presidential administration of Luis Lacalle Pou in the context of the health emergency. Only one in five described the administration as “bad” or “very bad.” Information available at: https:// www.opcion.com.uy/opinion-publica/aprobacion-de-gobierno-abril-2020/

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included substantive cuts in areas related to social protection and the role of the State. The government fostered this agenda in a national context of relative deterioration of several socioeconomic indicators, as we will develop below. In any case, from a comparative point of view, the country maintained high levels of income and general well-being in relation to the regional scenario and the recent history of the country.

6.3.2  Socioeconomic Context When the new government took position and the pandemic arrived, the Uruguayan economy counted with 15 years of uninterrupted growth. Nonetheless, in the last years of this period, a strong slowdown was taking place. While in 2017 the growth rate was of 2.6%, in 2019, there was a situation of almost stagnation, with a minimum growth of 0.2% of the GDP. This drop in economic growth had an impact on the unemployment rate, which shows a growing trend from its lowest point in the twenty-first century in 2011 (6.3%) to 8.9% in 2019 (Fig. 6.3). Despite that deteriorating situation, poverty and inequality indices did not show significant changes in recent years. In fact, Uruguay is the country in the region with the best records in both indicators (CEPAL 2019). In this sense, poverty remained at relatively low levels, with its lowest record in 2017 (7.9%) and rose less than one point in 2019 (8.8%). Regarding inequality, the Gini index shows a significant drop from 2007 to 2012 (from 0.46 to 0.39 during the period). In recent years, the index has stagnated (Fig. 6.4). Therefore, in spite of the fact that the economic situation presented some signals of alarm, Uruguay counted with important strengths to face the pandemic from a social point of view. Its low levels of poverty and inequality distinguish it in the regional context.

6.4  S  tate Structure and Governmental Policies to Confront the Pandemic In the beginning of the twentieth century, Uruguay consolidated its democratic system. This period is known as the “batllismo” due to the political leadership of José Batlle y Ordoñez, a politician of the Partido Colorado who served two terms as the President of the Republic. During this period, the State developed a preponderant role in the economic, social, and productive life. This process implied a set of structural changes in various areas, such as health care, labor, and social policies, and the beginning of an incipient industrialization process of the productive structure. This statist logic of facing public problems consolidated as part of the social imaginary

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in the country and guided a good part of the institutional framework in terms of social protection throughout the twentieth century (Filgueira et al. 2003). Toward the beginning of the 1940s, Uruguay consolidated a welfare scheme that can be characterized as “stratified universalism” (Filgueira 2007). During the period of import substitution industrialization, the country achieved a significant expansion of formal employment and unionization levels. This process coincided with a strong expansion of social insurance coverage (unemployment, illness, etc.), healthcare, and primary education (Filgueira 2007). This virtual universalization of coverage coexisted with differentiated structures and arrangements for access to certain goods and services, depending on the sector of the economy to which each worker belonged. To understand the relative successful control of the pandemic in Uruguay, it is important to take into consideration the specific measures taken by the government and the structural strengths of the Uruguayan State. In the following paragraphs, we will develop these two aspects. Firstly, we will review the general orientation of the governmental strategy to face the pandemic challenge. Secondly, we will focus on some structural strengths of the Uruguayan welfare system and the related specific measures taken by the government to confront the pandemic: the health system; the labor market, social security, and social assistance; and the education system.

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Source: own elaboration with data from the World Bank (https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=UY) Fig. 6.4  Gini index evolution (2007–2019) Source: own elaboration with data from the World Bank (https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=UY)

6.4.1  “ Responsible Freedom”: The GACH and the Coronavirus Fund Since the beginning of the emergency in Uruguay, the government’s response followed two general principles that oriented its general policy against COVID-19. Besides, the government quickly announced the creation of the Coronavirus Fund, specifically devoted to the attention of the pandemic. In the first place, while many restrictive measures followed the global trend (the suspension of classes, religious services, of public spectacles, the closure of borders, or the suspension of sports), Uruguay stands out in the region for avoiding the more radical ones: the curfew and the mandatory quarantine. From the first moment, the President set a firm stance in this regard and maintained a message about the importance of what the government called “responsible freedom.” The governmental message (“stay at home”), sustained by a public opinion campaign, sought that citizens limit mobility to the extent of as much as possible. This message was highly observed by citizens (see Fig. 6.2), especially in the beginning of the pandemic (at the end of March, 91% complied with the recommendation of staying at home

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unless necessary8). As the different activities progressively opened due to the controlled stability of the virus’ spread, mobility began to grow, and citizens began to have greater social activity. Interestingly, even when Uruguay started to experience its first exponential wave, the government maintained this approach (in spite of some important measures such as the closure of borders for foreigners). Asked in a press conference if the government would reduce social mobility due to the increase of cases, Lacalle Pou answered: “What is the proposal to reduce mobility? A mandatory quarantine? Well, they know that the answer is no. (…) In the end, this is about personal care”.9 In the second place, the government has stated the importance of counting with high-level scientific advice to support its decisions. One month after the first case’s detection, it created the Honorary Scientific Advisory Group (GACH, for its acronym in Spanish), to provide scientific advice to the government for decision-­making. More than 50 scientists linked to the academy, referents of the main universities in the country, especially from the public university, integrate the GACH. This group gave credibility to the government on the actions taken and generated a synergy of coordinated work that was fundamental when it came to understanding the management during the period. Even though the government did not follow many GACH recommendations,10 for instance, those regarding the importance of further restricting mobility, this advisory board has played an important role since its creation. In the third place, the government created the Coronavirus Fund, to attend the unexpected health and social expenses related to the pandemic.11 This fund has been important to face social demands such as unemployment or sickness benefits, as well as providing food baskets to vulnerable populations, among others. It was also a source of funding for actions aimed at strengthening the health system, through the purchase of diagnostic kits or respirators, among other inputs. This fund reunites public funding, national and international donations, and any specific multilateral organization loan to attend the emergency. It is interesting to note that the law that created the fund established a 2-month tax on the highest salaries of civil servants. This policy generated an important political discussion on the role of the State and the government’s differentiation between public sector and private sector workers. The three general orientations presented above were complemented specific policies in different fields. To account for the relative success of the Uruguayan case in controlling the pandemic, the following paragraphs focus on the preexisting capacities and the specific governmental initiatives in the following key arenas: the health system, the labor market and social security and assistance, and education.

8  Data from a CIFRA survey: https://www.cifra.com.uy/index.php/2020/05/14/el-cumplimiento-delas-recomendaciones/ 9  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rps-Q6RaPpA 10  elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/pidieron-cientificos-vs-finalmente-resolvio-gobierno.html 11  https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/19874-2020

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6.4.2  Health System Without any question, the strength of the Uruguayan health system is a crucial factor to understand the sanitary management of the pandemic. In 2008, Uruguay implemented the Integrated National Health System (SNIS) as a result of a comprehensive reform in the health system fostered by the Frente Amplio. This reform consolidated the historical mixed structure of health provision. At the same time, the reform followed the postulates the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) principle promoted by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). The main objectives of the health reform were to modify the financing system, the management system, and the healthcare provision system. Even though Uruguayan health system has always counted with high levels of coverage from a regional point of view, the new system contributed to guaranteeing effective access to healthcare services for a large part of the population. Moreover, it notably reduced the weight of direct out-of-pocket family expenses to access certain services such as consultations, diagnostic studies, medications, and/or interventions (Fuentes et al. 2021). Generally, high out-of-pocket spending is an important barrier to effectively access health services and is opposed to healthcare access based on contributions to social security or via contribution to general revenue. In the latter cases, the person contributes a percentage of their income, and this amount guarantees the use of a series of assistance services. In some systems, such as Uruguay, the worker can provide, through an extra contribution, formal coverage to dependent family members. This change in financing brought about a substantial increase in the resources collected through contributions to the National Health Fund (FONASA, for its initials in Spanish) made by workers and companies. In parallel, there was also a particularly important increase in the public budget allocated to the health system. These changes determined that per capita spending went from 27,100 USD in 2005 to 47,999 USD in 2017 (Fuentes and Rodríguez Araújo forthcoming). Another positive result of the reform was that the disparities between public and private providers in terms of per capita spending were notably reduced. The budget increase influenced the growth of salaries for medical and nonmedical staff and allowed the recovery of hospital infrastructure – fundamentally in the public sector. For instance, the main public provider, the State Health Services Administration (ASSE, for its initials in Spanish), raised the number of beds available for intensive care from 80 in 2008 to 191 in 2016.12 This type of advances was crucial once the pandemic arrived at the country. In 2018, taking into consideration both the public and private sectors, Uruguay counted with 880 places for intensive care, 60% of which approximately were in Montevideo (Ministerio de Salud 2019). However, the new government had to create new beds due to exponential growth of people in need of intensive care (Fig. 6.5). 12  https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/salud-asse-prestadorpublico-cti-camas-bajo-costos-mejoro-calidad-asistencial-muniz

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On the other hand, the reform had important results in terms of construction of institutional capacities that strengthened the role of the Ministry of Health to spearhead the National Health System. Some examples are the creation of the Division of Health Economics, the creation of the National Board of Health (a deconcentrated body with leadership responsibilities of the system as a whole), and the introduction of new management instruments, such as the management commitments and goals signed between the providers and the ministry. These changes generated better capacities to coordinate at the territorial level and between public and private providers, capacities that proved to be crucial to tackle a complex public problem like the pandemic. In short, when the first positive case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Uruguay, on March 13, the country counted with a stable health system in financial terms, with universal coverage and adequate infrastructure to face the possible complications derived from the epidemiological situation. Moreover, the strengthened Health Ministry role in the Integrated National Health System allowed the new authorities to successfully coordinate the general response to the challenges raised by the pandemic at the national level. They promoted some specific measures to contain and manage the pandemic, but they did it on a solid base created during previous years. The high speed in the detection of positive cases and their subsequent isolation is an important key of the Uruguayan capacity to control the progress of the pandemic and retard the first wave of contagions. In this sense, a key factor was the rapid development of diagnostic tests by public research institutions: mainly the

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Universidad de la República and the Institut Pasteur de Montevideo.13 In the first months of the pandemic, when diagnosis was essential, this capacity allowed the country to count with its own tests without depending on purchasing in the international market. Therefore, the existence of a coordinated and strengthened network of public institutions besides the specific health system was a key factor. Another relevant factor to understand the relative success that Uruguay had in the first months is the existence of a wide network  – mainly in Montevideo  – of Ambulance Medical Emergencies. These are companies that offer home care services as a complement to the care provided in health centers. In the beginning of the pandemic, they were particularly useful to prevent the emergency entrance doors in hospitals from collapsing. The situation described here until October consolidate the idea for many government actors and some part of the population that the situation was under control. Perhaps this was the reason why the authorities took so long to start to negotiate the acquisition of the vaccines available in the market. The delay in this process determined that by February of 2021, Uruguay had not yet started the vaccination process, while several countries of the region like Chile and Argentina started this process by the end of December 2020. In fact, even though the government integrated in 2020 the COVAX Initiative and announced on January 22 the agreement with two laboratories, by February 10, the country did not count with a precise date to receive any vaccine. The government has stated that the first vaccines should arrive on March–April 2021.

6.4.3  Labor Market, Social Security, and Social Assistance As mentioned above, the Uruguayan social protection regime has been historically considered as one of the strongest welfare systems in the region. Its structure resembles the European corporate regimes. The employment market structure has helped to reach this situation due to the high level of formalization in comparison to the rest of the region. According to data from 2019, Uruguay reaches 75% of formality, while the average of Latin America and the Caribbean is 47%.14 At the beginning of 2020, the employment situation was experiencing a deteriorating trend, but still presented relatively low unemployment rates. The high rates of formalization and employment should be considered in the light of an important

 In fact, Gonzalo Moratorio, head of the Laboratory for Experimental Evolution of Viruses at the Institut Pasteur de Montevideo and professor of virology at the Faculty of Sciences of the Universidad de la República, was the only Latin American on this year’s list of “Nature’s 10,” which selects ten personalities at the worldwide level for their contribution to science. (See: nature. com/immersive/d41586-020-03435-6/index.html). 14  Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-americas/%2D%2D-ro-lima/%2D%2D-sro-santiago/documents/publication/wcms_756332.pdf 13

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reform carried out during the first presidency of the Frente Amplio (2005–2009): the reinstatement of tripartite collective bargaining, through the Salary Councils. The Salary Councils existed in the country since the 1940s, but were discontinued during the military dictatorship in the 1970s and the neoliberal governments of the 1990s (Senatore 2010). The government’s initial measures to confront the pandemic combined the closure of specific businesses and activities, such as construction, with a new palliative instrument based on the capacities installed: a subsidy for partial unemployment. This subsidy was oriented to the formal workers in partial suspension of their activities due to the restrictive measures and the pandemic’s economic consequences.15 The subsidy for partial unemployment complemented the traditional unemployment subsidy. There was, as well, bipartite coordination between employers and workers in some sectors, as in the case of construction. In this sector, employers and workers reached an agreement to advance the workers’ leave as a way to maintain the levels of employment in that critical moment. The government called for telework when possible. As a result, many private companies and most public offices switched to this modality of work. Relatedly, there was a governmental call for remote teaching at all levels of the educational system. The change toward remote teaching, and toward telework in some sectors, occurred in a relatively harmonious way, largely due to the country’s installed connectivity capabilities. Uruguay has a leading role in many digital inclusion and connectivity indices in the region. It is the first country in Latin America to offer 5G technology.16 Most homes have home internet connection (81%), and it is one of the countries with the highest fiber optic connectivity worldwide (69%).17 It is noteworthy that the investment made by the Uruguayan State from the public company dedicated to telecommunications (ANTEL, for its initials in Spanish) was key to being able to access this type of technology and disseminate it quite widely throughout the territory. In fact, the fiber optic service is the monopoly of this state company. In terms of social assistance, the most important public institution is the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES). It was created in 2005 as a new institutional framework oriented to organize the social public offer to socially vulnerable people, excluded from the formal employment market and its associated welfare policies (Midaglia and Castillo 2010). Despite some weaknesses associated with a resilient fragmentation of public initiatives, MIDES has managed to build different channels of territorial penetration. Furthermore, it has managed to build a very exhaustive registry of people in vulnerable situations. These capacities have proven key to the government. They allow the government to offer specific programs and policies for population groups that participate primarily in the informal sector of the economy  See https://www.bps.gub.uy/17593/subsidio-especial-por-desempleo-parcial-para-trabajadores. html 16  See https://ladiaria.com.uy/politica/articulo/2019/4/uruguay-es-el-tercer-pais-en-el-mundo-enofrecer-tecnologia-5g/ 17  Data from the Presidency of the Republic, available at: https://presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/ comunicacionnoticias/internet-conexion-fija-fibra-optica-servicios-hogares-velocidad 15

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or that are completely outside of the labor market, through noncontributory transfers such as Citizen Income or old-age pensions.

6.4.4  Education On March 13, few days after the detection of the first positive case, the government suspended in-class courses of private and public education at all levels. Anyway, different solutions to provide remote courses quickly began to develop, allowing a good part of the country’s teaching tasks to continue. To a large extent, the success of this process, at least at the primary and secondary levels, was given by the existence of the Plan Ceibal. This plan was an important reform carried out in the 2005–2009 period, with the main objective of ensuring equal access conditions to information technologies to the Uruguayan population (Alarcón and Méndez 2020). The Plan Ceibal provided to each boy or girl who entered the public educational system with a personal laptop, with free internet access in each study center as well as free access in some public spots (social clubs, squares, etc.) and with educational content and resources by teachers. It currently covers 85% of students, reaching a 100% coverage in public education for children and young people between 6 and 15 years old and their teachers.18 This public policy makes Uruguay the first country in the world where all students in public schools count with a laptop of their own with free internet access. At the university level, there also was an important migration from traditional to remote teaching that allowed the courses to be maintained. For instance, 84.5% of the Universidad de la República’s students followed their study programs through remote teaching (more than 84,000 students).19 The Universidad de la República, a free public institution, brings together 90% of the country’s university students.20 Another particularity of the Uruguayan case is that it was the first country in the region to return to in-class teaching, a few months after the pandemic began. Although, as said above, face-to-face classes were immediately suspended in March, the control of the virus’ evolution allowed the government to quickly promote the return to the classroom. At the beginning, it was not a return to the previous normality: classes combined face-to-face and virtual dynamics since assistance to face-to-face was voluntary and partial (face-to-face courses were not every day and did not cover the whole schedule; groups were divided to avoid the concentration of students in the classroom). Moreover, the return plan followed different steps. At first, the rural schools were reopened (these are the ones with the fewest students). After this pilot experience, three different stages were established until they  Data available in the Plan Ceibal website: https://www.ceibal.edu.uy/es  Data from an Universidad de la República survey. See https://udelar.edu.uy/portal/2020/07/ primer-semestre-casi-85-siguieron-cursos-en-modalidad-virtual/ 20  See https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/educacion-estudiantesuniversitarios-crecimiento-promedio 18 19

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gradually resumed all levels of education. From that moment, and until the end of the courses in the end of December, education continued to operate in person. In the cases where the establishments’ infrastructure and personnel capacities allowed it, by the end of the year, the courses were normal (Alarcón and Méndez 2020). As a summary, Uruguay faced the first cases of people infected with COVID-19 with a strengthened health system (compared to the previous decade) and experiencing a period of relative stability in social and economic terms. The employment market had high levels of formalization in comparison to the rest of the region, and the government counted with a wide range of social security instruments and an educational system with a relatively adequate infrastructure to redirect the delivery of courses to virtual formats. The measures taken by the government proved successful to control the spread of the virus during most of the year, but as social and economic activity approached to normality, Uruguay was challenged by the first wave of contagions. In this context, the government maintained its general principle of avoiding the more radical restrictive measures.

6.5  F  inal Remarks: The Government and the State During the Pandemic This chapter has shown the importance of the role of the Uruguayan State to mitigate the effects of the pandemic, both in health and in social and economic aspects. Paradoxically, the government that had to face the pandemic was elected with an austerity agenda that implies the State retrenchment in many areas that were strengthened by the precedent governments. Taking into consideration that the pandemic affected the plans of every government around the globe, it is interesting to wonder if the new context will affect the orientation of Lacalle Pou’s administration. After 1 year in the government, the answer is negative. As presented above, the right-wing coalition has promoted actions to cut public spending and reduce the size of the State. The Frente Amplio opposition and many important social actors criticized the government for low public spending oriented to the most vulnerable sectors (those without links with the formal employment market). The government accused these critics as irresponsible at the fiscal level and followed a policy of reinforcing the allocations already established by the MIDES to the lowest-income families. From a comparative point of view, a report by ECLAC (2020) points out that Uruguay was the country in the region that invested the least to mitigate the effects of the pandemic in the poorest population. While the government contested the report arguing that it underestimated the fiscal effort carried out, the opposition pointed out that the report confirmed the government’s lack of commitment with vulnerable population. Regarding the contestation of the Uruguayan government, ECLAC manifested that the data published was accurate. The institution’s Executive Secretary argued that a possible explanation for the low new social spending as a response to the social and economic crisis provoked by

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COVID could be associated to the capacities already in place in Uruguay related to its historically strong welfare regime.21 Another important discussion of political economy opposed the government and the opposition: the question regarding how the crisis’ financial and social burden provoked by the pandemic would be distributed among social groups. The FA and the unique Uruguayan union central PIT-CNT (for its initials in Spanish) proposed to the government a series of measures to tax the capital and considered the possibility of establishing a universal minimum revenue for the most vulnerable population during the pandemic. According to a former senator of the Frente Amplio, the government’s measures were leading to the following situation: “The economic crisis will be paid by the workers and the State. Never the capital. The Coronavirus Fund is paid with national debt, pensions, and public salaries. Never the capital.22” From the government’s point of view, the market is the engine that will move the country away from the economic and social crisis. In response to the demands by opposition sectors, Lacalle Pou stated: “Today, to tax capital is to amputate the possibilities of those who are going to push when getting out of the crisis. That is why we are not going to do it.23” This quote shows that the government’s political orientation has not changed. In any case, the government, as mentioned, used or adapted some existing tools that made it possible to alleviate the economic and social situation, such as partial unemployment insurance or specific benefits for certain informal sectors. While the general political orientation of the government’s agenda has not changed, the pandemics did affect some of the government’s plans. For instance, even though the cuts in public spending are maintained, the Executive partially gave up its 2021 fiscal objective, especially due to the increase in unemployment.24 The approval of the budget law at the end of 2020 consolidated the political orientation announced in the electoral campaign and initiated from the Law of Urgent Consideration: the reduction of the participation of the State in the economic arena (fundamentally at the level of public companies) and in the social one (through the elimination of assistance programs and support to private providers to the detriment of public actors). In fact, the worsening of the pandemic since November 2020 with its related sanitary, social, and economic effects have not implied any modification in the projections of social public spending. Based on the speeches and scarcity of measures taken by the government in the face of the increase in infections, it is plausible to

21  Seehttps://ladiaria.com.uy/politica/articulo/2020/8/alicia-barcena-secretaria-general-de-cepal-dijoque-el-organismo-no-se-retractara/ 22   Tweet from Constanza Moreira: https://twitter.com/constanza_fa/statu s/1248042149532360705?lang=en 23  https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/los-argumentos-de-lacalle-de-por-que-no-gravar-masal-capital-y-las-criticas-de-la-­­izquierda-20204981329 24  https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/arbeleche-dijo-que-en-2021-el-gobierno-no-cumplira-con-metade-deficit-fiscal-prevista-en-presupuesto-­­202118142833

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hypothesize that part of this inaction is because ultimately it is not willing to modify the fiscal austerity guidelines. So far, the relatively controlled health situation has granted the government high levels of support in its first year in office. Nonetheless, in January 2021, this support has shown a first decline (from 60% to 56%25), in parallel with the worsening of the general situation. Furthermore, in February 2021, the two stronger allies of the presidential coalition (Cabildo Abierto and the Partido Colorado) have made public calls to increase public expending to help the more affected sectors, questioning the presidential economic orientation. The future is uncertain, like in the rest of the world. If the government keeps the situation under control, most likely it will maintain its political agenda. However, if the sanitary, social, and economic situation deteriorates, the government will face a great challenge between maintaining its cut spending program or assuming a more pragmatic stance that could change its objectives in terms of redefining the State’s role in the country.

References Alarcón A, Méndez G (2020) Seguimiento Del Retorno a Las Clases Presenciales En Centros Educativos En Uruguay. UNICEF, Montevideo. https://www.unicef.org/uruguay/media/3856/ file/Seguimiento%20del%20retorno%20a%20las%20clases%20presenciales%20en%20centros%20educativos%20en%20Uruguay.pdf Bidegain G (2013) Uruguay, ¿el Año Bisagra? Revista de Ciencia Política 33(1):351–374 CEPAL (2019) Panorama Social de América Latina 2019. LC/PUB.2019/22-P/Rev.1. Santiago, Chile ECLAC (2020) Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2020: fiscal policy amid the crisis arising from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. United Nations, Santiago Chasquetti D, Buquet D (2004) La Democracia En Uruguay: Una Partidocracia de Consenso. Política 42:221–247 Filgueira F (2007) Nuevo Modelo de Prestaciones Sociales En América Latina: Eficiencia, Residualismo y Ciudadanía Estratificada. Documento de trabajo 135. Serie Políticas Sociales. CEPAL Filgueira F, Garcé A, Ramos C, Yaffé J (2003) Los Dos Ciclos Del Estado Uruguayo En El Siglo XX. In: Nahúm B, Caetano G (eds) El Uruguay Del Siglo XX. Tomo II. La Política. Ediciones de la Banda Oriental – Instituto de Ciencia Política, Montevideo, pp 173–204 Fuentes G, Rodríguez Araújo M (forthcoming) La Reforma de La Salud En Los Gobiernos Del Frente Amplio (2005–2020): Del Cambio Profundo al Nuevo Statu Quo. In: Bidegain G, Freigedo M, Zurbriggen C (eds) Fin de Un Ciclo: Balance Del Estado y Las Políticas Públicas Tras 15 Años de Gobierno de Izquierda En Uruguay. Instituto de Ciencia Política, Montevideo Fuentes G, Carneiro F, Freigedo M (2021) Health care reform in Latin America: not all roads lead to Rome. In: Sátyro N, Del Pino E, Midaglia C (eds) Latin America social policy developments in the twenty-first century. Palgrave, Macmillan Johnson N, Gustá ALR, Sempol D (2019) Explaining advances and drawbacks in women’s and LGBTIQ rights in Uruguay: multisited pressures, political resistance, and structural inertias.

 https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/aprobacion-gestion-lacalle-pou-cae-equiposconsultores.html

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In: Friedman EJ (ed) Seeking rights from the left: gender, sexuality, and the Latin American pink tide. Duke University Press, Durham and London, pp 29–81 Mainwaring S, Scully T (1995) Introduction: party systems in Latin America. In: Mainwaring S, Scully T (eds) Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America, Reprint edn. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp 1–36 Midaglia C, Castillo M (2010) El Significado Político Del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social Uruguayo. In: Mancebo ME, Narbondo P (eds) Reforma Del Estado y Políticas Públicas de La Administración Vázquez: Acumulaciones, Conflitos y Desafíos. Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, pp 167–190 Milanesi A (forthcoming) El Frente Amplio En El Ministerio Del Interior: La ‘Era’ Bonomi. In: Bidegain G, Freigedo M, Zurbriggen C (eds) Fin de Un Ciclo: Balance Del Estado y Las Políticas Públicas Tras 15 Años de Gobierno de Izquierda En Uruguay. Instituto de Ciencia Política, Montevideo Ministerio de Salud (2019) Desempeño de Los Principales Prestadores Del SNIS. 2015–2018. Ministerio de Salud, Montevideo Senatore L (2010) La Política Laboral y El Sujeto Sindical: Un Análisis de Los Cambios Durante El Período 2005–2009. In: Mancebo ME, Narbondo P (eds) Reforma Del Estado y Políticas Públicas de La Administración Vázquez: Acumulaciones, Conflitos y Desafíos. Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, pp 149–166

Part III

Social Movements and Pandemic

Chapter 7

Solidarity During the Pandemic in Brazil: Creative Recombinations in Social Movement Frames and Repertoires Rebecca Neaera Abers and Marisa von Bülow

7.1  Introduction When the first cases of the pandemic arrived in Brazil, in March 2020, international experience had already shown not only that the pandemic would affect everyone but that the effect on more vulnerable social and economic groups would be particularly dramatic. However, knowledge about the dangers of the disease took time to arrive in Brazil’s poorest communities. Many believed that Covid-19 was an affliction of the rich, since the first to be infected were people who brought the virus to Brazil on their way back from vacations in Europe and the USA. When it did arrive in poor neighborhoods, contagion was more rapid and lethal. Most intensive care facilities are located far away from poor communities. Basic healthcare, already precarious in these areas, became more fragile with the spread of the disease. Data from the project “UTIs Brasileiras” (“Brazilian Intensive Care Units”) of the Brazilian Association of Intensive Medicine, collected between March 1, 2020, and February 10, 2021, show that the mortality rate for Covid-19 in government-run ICUs was almost twice as high (54.3%) as in private ones (28.1%) during that period.1 Furthermore, the most important measures to fight the pandemic – social distancing or isolation and constant washing of hands – were simply not feasible for people working in the informal labor market and living in overcrowded areas with limited access to water and hygiene materials. As the reality of the impacts of the pandemic on the poor became clear, civil society actors began to mobilize. This chapter draws from the social movement

1  http://www.utisbrasileiras.com.br/sari-covid-19/benchmarking-covid-19/, accessed on February 15, 2021.

R. N. Abers (*) · M. von Bülow University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_7

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literature and from the literature on creativity and politics to examine this process of mobilization in two dimensions. First, we explore how old social movement repertoires took on new meanings at the same time that actors created novel forms of action. In particular, we show that the peculiar conditions of the pandemic led to the creative combination of online and offline repertoires. Second, we examine how the mobilization process also occurred through the recombination of collective action frames, based on which actors defined problems and solutions and justified action. Solidarity initiatives were often carried out through frames that connected them to political agendas that went well beyond the pandemic, such as anti-racism, feminism, and the struggle against economic inequality. We argue that the analysis of both repertoires and framing provide important insights into how civil society actors respond to moments of intense uncertainty, such as the one that characterizes the Covid-19 pandemic. We combine contributions from the literature on social movements with theories of creative action to explain how, at times of crises, social movement actors devise new forms of action and new interpretative frames. We argue that a problem-solving process that involved creatively combining former collective action routines and frames with new ones was central to the capacity of movements to respond to the pandemic. This process emerged in the context of the pandemic, such as the routines related to the rapid spread of online communication and frames related to the interpretation of the pandemic itself. The research for this chapter is exploratory and is largely based on the analysis of information contained in the Repository of Civil Society Initiatives Against the Pandemic, created under our coordination in March 2020.2 The repository is an online resource that seeks to catalogue the diversity of initiatives that civil society and social movements have organized in response to the crisis, ranging from solidarity initiatives to protests to advocacy efforts. As part of this ongoing research effort, between September 2020 and February 2021, we analyzed the contents of dozens of documents and online “lives” organized by social movements and nongovernmental organizations. We also conducted ten semistructured interviews with key civil society actors to explore their experiences. This chapter is organized in four sections. First, we connect the literature on social movement repertoires and frames to theories of agency to explore how new routines and frames emerge under conditions of crisis. Second, we present an overview of what social movement actors have done during the pandemic. Third, we explore how these efforts have involved creative recombinations of collective action routines. Fourth, we explore how social movement responses have also involved creative recombinations of collective action frames. We conclude by highlighting not only what our research has shown but also how much we still need to learn from social movements’ responses to the pandemic.

2  The Repository is part of a broader research agenda of the research group RESOCIE (Rethinking Society-State Relations). See http://repositoriomobilizacovid.resocie.org/

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7.2  Frames, Repertoire, and Creative Action The social movement literature has long underscored that analyzing mobilization requires not just looking at actors’ grievances and interests but also at how actors create common meaning and decide about the appropriate form of mobilization. In this chapter, we focus on two concepts that have been key to better understanding these symbolic processes.3 Repertoires of collective action refer to prevailing notions from which collective actors choose how to mobilize, such as protests, petitions, occupations, and so on. Collective action frames refer to common meanings about grievances and demands, problems, priorities, and potential solutions. In general, the literature has suggested that although repertoires and frames draw on inherited cultural categories, successful mobilization also depends on the creation and dissemination of new routines and frames. How actors creatively construct new routines and frames, however, is an underdeveloped theme in the literature. In his seminal work, From Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly used the term “repertoire of collective action” to refer to the forms of action that are readily “‘available’ to a group” (Tilly 1978: 153), noting that North American activists typically knew how to organize street protests and considered them legitimate forms of mobilization, but they had little knowledge of how to hijack an airplane and would not consider doing so, even if they did. For Tilly, the term repertoire referred to “the forms of claim-making available to any particular set of political actors, including the government, and the likely consequences of making such claims” (2006: 22). A number of authors have further adapted the repertoire concept, going beyond Tilly’s focus on public and contentious action. They have explored how inherited routines also affect the less public side of collective action such as decisions about organizational design (Clemens 1993), acceptable modes of working inside government institutions (Abers et al. 2014), and strategic choices about when and how to engage in behind-the-scenes negotiations with government actors (Rossi 2017). Discussions of framing focus on how social movement actors formulate and communicate their grievances and demands. Inspired by the work of Erving Goffman (1974), David Snow and his collaborators adapted the concept to study social movements. A frame, according to Snow and Benford, is an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the world (1992: 137). Later, Benford and Snow (2000, p.  614) specified this definition, arguing that frames are “action-­ oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization.” Collective action frames are, in this perspective, both culturally given structures that influence how actors interpret the world and intentionally created and deployed by actors in the effort to influence how other people think. They are both conditions and creations of action. The creation of new collective action frames often relies on traditional cultural symbols. The Civil Rights movement, for example, mobilized the notion of “rights” 3  Other concepts and approaches are equally relevant in the recent cultural turn in social movement studies (chief among them the concept of collective identity), but they will not be explored here.

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at the heart of American political culture in favor of African Americans, who had historically been denied just such rights. However, Tarrow (2011) argues that just connecting to the past is not enough. The effectiveness of the civil rights frame relied on what he calls “bricolage,” which involves combining old and new frames in creative ways or mixing old frames with new collective action routines, such as nonviolent protest: Bricolage pulls together accepted and new frames to legitimate contention and mobilize accepted frames for new purposes… only through ‘bricolage’ between the traditional rights frame and the new and innovative forms of nonviolent collective action did rights become the central collective action frame of the [Civil Rights] movement. (Tarrow 2011: 146)

By exploring the idea of bricolage, Tarrow takes important steps toward explaining change and innovation in social movements’ repertoires and frames. In this chapter, we seek to move forward on this agenda, building on Tilly’s discussion of improvisation and on the recent literature on creativity to better understand the recombination of repertoires and frames by social movement actors in a context of crisis. Tilly’s discussion of repertoires evolved, over time, toward a greater attention to how actors draw on existing routines at the same time that they improvise in the face of a given situation. In his later work (Tilly 2006, 2008), he explored the relationship between repertoires and what he called “performances,” referring to particular instances in which a historical routine is enacted. The new terminology reflects a broader transition toward a more agentic notion of repertoires as not just structures that condition or limit what kind of mobilization can occur to a discussion of how actors creatively invent new routines (Alonso 2012). In his 2006 work, Regimes and Repertoires, Tilly explains his move toward a more “theatrical” language as an effort to: call attention to the clustered, learned, yet improvisational character of people’s interactions as they make and receive each other’s claims. Claim-making usually more resembles jazz and commedia dell’arte than the ritual reading of scripture. (p.35)

Gross (2010) argues that in this new approach Tilly not only moves away from structuralism but also adopts a “pragmatist” approach that conceives agency as both creative and situated in context and tradition. Repertoires are more than a set of cultural rules. They are a sort of tool box of cultural resources that can be used to adapt to particular situations. Like jazz standards, repertoires of collective action are the foundations from which actors improvise. Although the term “improvisation” suggests that somehow a creative actor is able to tap into entirely new sources, more often novelty is a result of a creative recombination of existing resources. Theorists of agency, such as Sewell (1992) and Emirbayer and Mische (1998), suggest that when actors face multiple rules and norms, they have diverse cognitive resources from which to draw on. Sheingate (2003) similarly argued that political entrepreneurs gain their creative capacity from the opportunities created by institutional complexity and ambiguity. Network theorists such as Burt (1995) have likewise argued that individuals at nodes connecting networks have exceptional power resources. Organizational institutionalists such as

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March and Olson (2010) have made similar arguments about how rule-following actors deal with situations in which multiple rules seem to apply. All of these perspectives negate the idea that creativity somehow emerges from the absence of structure or institutions. On the contrary, the resources located in the various contexts or structures in which individuals are located are the tools for agency. Based on this notion that agency involves the recombination of existing resources, pragmatist authors explore the process of problem-solving. Berk and Galvan (2009) understand creativity as an essentially “syncretic” (or recombinatory) work: “action within institutions is always potentially creative, that is, actors draw on a wide variety of cultural and institutional resources to create novel combinations” (Berk and Galvan 2009: 543). But what pushes people to engage in syncretism are emerging situations, to which “old solutions” no longer apply. As Ansell (2013) notes: “(…) people are often pushed to become creative and syncretic by problems that beg for resolution (…)” (Ansell 2013: 73). Crises, such as pandemics, can be understood as completely novel “problems” to which people have no choice but to respond. To do so, however, they must rely on the tools and resources that they had before the crisis started. In this sense, responses to crises tend to have a “recombinatory” nature, as actors thrust into a new situation seek to mix their existing resources in new ways. We argue in this chapter that, for social movements, this mixing is done largely through the recombination of existing routines and frames in new ways. Because the crisis is fraught with uncertainty, however, defining this creative process is a matter of open dispute and contestation among actors.

7.3  F  rom the Struggle Against Hunger to Grassroots Communication In the first months of the pandemic, thousands of civil society initiatives sought to provide a rapid response to the economic crisis hitting poor neighborhoods. Organizations requested donations for food, hand sanitizer, masks, and cash. Some focused on particular neighborhoods of favelas. Others sought to assist specific social groups such as indigenous peoples, the homeless, the elderly, artists, people living with HIV/AIDS, and so on. It was an upsurge in solidarity and mutual aid unseen in Brazil since the campaign against hunger led by Betinho in the 1990s. The majority were small operations, organized by local philanthropic organizations and neighborhood groups. Some, however, were national initiatives launched by social movement and nongovernmental organizations. One example is the Mães das Favelas (Favela Mothers) project, run by the Central Única das Favelas (Unified Favela Central – CUFA). According to its website,4 by the end of June, this project had delivered over 600,000 “physical” food baskets and more than 80,000 “digital  https://www.maesdafavela.com.br/, accessed on February 15, 2021.

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baskets” in hundreds of Brazilian cities. Another national organization that partnered with local groups throughout the country was the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST – Landless Rural Workers Movement). The MST delivered food baskets with produce from land reform settlements to urban mutual aid groups.5 Between these large and small initiatives, there was a variety of intermediary programs, such as Uma Rede Contra o Vírus (“A Network Against the Virus”), created by Ana Moser, an Olympic medalist.6 The Network organized food distribution in various cities. Some of these initiatives, such as Mães das Favelas, had major funding from businesses, while others relied only on the resources communities themselves could come up with. Many projects involved complex logistical operations to guarantee that food and supplies got to the families that needed them. One campaign in Belo Horizonte, Comunidade Viva Sem Fome (Community, Alive and Without Hunger) run by a group called Força Tarefa COVID-19 (COVID-19 Task Force), put a flowchart on its website explaining this complexity.7 Their system involved (a) an online mechanism through which individuals and businesses could donate money; (b) an interinstitutional commission that identified families in need; (c) partner supermarkets that delivered food and supplied kits to distribution centers; (d) volunteer teams that organized the kits and delivered them to families; (e) a monitoring team that accompanied all of these activities; and (f) an accountability system that published what was done each week. Of course, many organizations behind distribution projects did not have the resources for this kind of logistical operation. At best, they were able to post a bank account or an address to which donations could be taken, on Facebook or Instagram. In addition to distribution projects, some programs were dedicated to helping people gain access to the government’s emergency aid program. Others sought to provide psychological support for people who were dealing with the emotional ­difficulties of social isolation, especially when combined with economic hardship and uncertainty.8 In the Paraisópolis favela in Sao Paulo, local groups sought to resolve the problem of insufficient health services by going after donations to pay for a medical team and ambulances.9 Nongovernmental organizations such as the Instituto Socioambiental (Socioenvironmental Institute) partnered with indigenous

 https://mst.org.br/2020/04/17/em-jornada-nacional-de-lutas-mst-distribui-alimentos-saudaveis-­ por-todo-pais/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 6  https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/esportes/noticia/2020-04/covid-19-ana-moser-lanca-campanhauma-rede-contra-o-virus, accessed on February 15, 2021. 7  http://comunidadevivasemfome.org.br/a-campanha/, accessed on February 15th, 2021. 8  https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/cidades/2018/06/21/interna_ cidadesdf,689859/psicanalistas-criam-coletivo-e-fazem-atendimento-gratuito-na-rua.shtml, accessed on February 15th, 2021. 9  https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2020/04/07/paraisopolis-se-une-contra-o-coronaviruscontrata-ambulancias-medicos-e-distribui-mais-de-mil-marmitas-por-dia.ghtml, accessed on February 15th, 2021. 5

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organizations to send oxygen tanks to isolated regions of the Amazon that were badly hit by the pandemic.10 And to deal with the impossibility of traditional mourning rituals in times of social distancing, projects such as Inumeráveis (Innumerable) created online spaces for paying homage to those who have died from the disease.11 Another category of initiative focused on producing information by and for the urban peripheries. Media activism was already on the rise in Brazil’s favelas, propelled by the dissemination of access to cell phones and the Internet and in search of a voice that came from the periphery itself. In the pandemic, these movements have sought to disseminate information about the disease, its impacts and how people can protect themselves from it. The community newspaper, Voz das Comunidades (Voice of the Communities), based in the Alemão Complex of Rio de Janeiro, created a smartphone application to combat misinformation and to disseminate reliable information.12 In addition to reporting on everything going on in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, users received daily notifications with the tally of cases and deaths by Covid-19  in those territories. Other groups created podcasts about the pandemic directed to the favela population, such as Pandemia Sem Neurose (Pandemic without Neurosis),13 Lugar de Quarentena (A Place of Quarantine),14 and Papo de Quebrada (Conversation from the Slums).15 Other initiatives sought to mobilize the state to better respond to the pandemic. In April, the Rede de Coletivos Populares de Paulista (Network of Popular Collectives of Paulista – COPPA), in the Metropolitan Region of Recife, created an Atlas of Vulnerability to map the socioeconomic conditions of the town’s residents and to identify places where more vulnerable populations lived.16 The document was presented to the municipal government in the hopes that it would inform decisions on social programs. Another example is the Quartos da Quarentena (Quarantine Rooms) Campaign that urges municipal and state governments to work with local hotels to provide temporary living spaces for poor residents who need to isolate.17

 Interview 10, with authors, February/2021.  https://inumeraveis.com.br/, accessed on February 15th, 2021. 12  https://www.vozdascomunidades.com.br/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 13  https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDeReuIg3N7HbBebLr7rGuwYA1sCsrweC, accessed on February 15, 2021. 14  https://anchor.fm/arqueperifa/episodes/LUGAR-DE-QUARENTENA-1%2D%2D-Coletivos-­ Culturais-da-Quebrada-ed76kt, accessed on February 15, 2021. 15  https://open.spotify.com/show/4iJOSLd24y9cZlieGLmotE?si=5tF-­C kkhTwC3hC_ SJ19WYw&nd=1, accessed on February 15, 2021. 16  https://marcozero.org/mapa-de-vulnerabilidade-produzido-por-coletivos-pode-ajudar-areduzir-impacto-­do-coronavirus-em-paulista/?fbclid=IwAR3o4dgLZvVUPNnYRI8LRwVCcnvx aE8-­_A_in57ict5p0hLJrbuJWZjB8wA, accessed on February 15, 2021. 17  https://www.quartosdaquarentena.org/#block-14859, accessed on February 15th, 2021. 10 11

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Efforts to mobilize the state also included declarations, open letters, and petitions presenting reports and policy proposals.18 A network of groups created a campaign called Renda Básica que Queremos (The Basic Income We Want) to defend the continuity of the emergency aid program and to publicize problems many social groups have faced in gaining access to it.19 In April, another group of organizations wrote a document presenting proposals to combat the pandemic and its effects on the poor, systematized in short- and medium-term proposals.20 The number and variety of initiatives is so great that a new type of online effort became common: collaborative maps and other types of catalogues that listed solidarity projects and campaigns. The largest mapping project is the Mapa Colaborativo (Collaborative Map) led by a network of organizations based in São Paulo, ranging from academic institutions like the Federal University of ABC to social movement organizations such as the União Nacional por Moradia Popular (National Union for Popular Housing).21 By early 2021, this group has mapped more than 1300 activities by movements, civic organizations and collectives, and more than 800 university and laboratory initiatives. Another large mapping effort is the Banco de Iniciativas da Sociedade Civil no Combate ao Covid-19 (Bank of Civil Society Initiatives to Combat Covid-19), organized by the Rede Nacional de Mobilização Social (National Network of Social Mobilization – COEP) in partnership with the LABetinho.22 The Marielle Franco Institute created the Mapa #Corona nas Periferias (#Corona in the Peripheries Map) that focuses on favelas, especially in the city of Rio de Janeiro.23 The #RedeSolidária (#SolidaryNetwork) campaign of the Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, ABONG) also includes a map identifying initiatives throughout the country.24 Another cataloging effort is the page dedicated to Covid in the Marielle Franco Dictionary of Favelas, a project created by a group of scientific and civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro, which includes the Fiocruz (Oswaldo Cruz) Foundation, UERJ (State University of Rio de Janeiro), and UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro).25 The page lists hundreds of collectives and projects fighting the pandemic. In addition to these larger catalogues, which include

 https://resocie.org/projetos-e-eventos-repositorio-pandemia-mobilizacoes-contra-o-novo-­ coronavirus-manifestos-e-cartas/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 19  https://www.rendabasica.org.br/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 20  https://forumreformaurbana.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Documento-pol%C3%ADtico-­ unificado-­vFINAL-3.pdf, accessed on February 15, 2021. 21  https://mapacolaborativo.org.br/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 22  http://coepbrasil.org.br/iniciativas-da-sociedade-civil-no-combate-ao-coronavirus/#banco, accessed on February 15, 2021. 23  https://www.institutomariellefranco.org/mapacoronanasperiferias, accessed on February 15, 2021. 24  https://www.redesolidaria.org.br/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 25  https://wikifavelas.com.br/index.php?title=Coletivos_em_a%C3%A7%C3%A3o_contra_ coronav%C3%ADrus, accessed on February 15, 2021. 18

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activities throughout the country, maps for specific cities have been created in Belo Horizonte,26 Curitiba,27 and in the Federal District.28

7.4  C  reativity and the Bricolage in Collective Action Repertoires One of the most interesting characteristics of these initiatives is the creative way that old collective action routines have been joined with new ones. There is something “traditional” in a good portion of these initiatives, especially the emergency efforts to distribute food baskets. As Pedro Paiva, of the Movimento Rocinha Resiste (Rocinha Resists Movement), explained – during the Roda de Conversa (Conversation Circle) conducted by a Buddhist community radio program – many favela groups already had experience dealing with emergencies, such as the floods and mudslides that annually strike hillside residents.29 The success of the initiatives depended in large part on the profound knowledge that local actors had of their communities and of the people who lived there, as well as of the techniques for organizing emergency solidarity efforts. Much of this capacity was developed in the old way, largely through face-to-face communication. At the same time, the pandemic required innovation. Organizers increased their use of a larger variety of digital platforms. The Internet became a crucial instrument in the logistics of connecting donors, store owners, producers, distribution centers, beneficiaries, and accountability systems. WhatsApp was used to organize the formation of task forces and subcommittees that can get donations to households. Communication with the public increasingly occurred through platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, through which written documents and videos were disseminated. Groups mobilized Favela Youtubers to produce videos on how to prevent the disease.30 Online chats reinstated the tradition of “favela conversation

26  h t t p s : / / w w w. g o o g l e . c o m / m a p s / d / u / 0 / v i e w e r ? m i d = 1 o G 8 p f z N 5 o 4 o E U b G _ j7BIEhbK585HhWeg&ll=-19.95357249502963%2C-43.90440346247896&z=10, accessed on February 15, 2021. 27  https://sites.google.com/view/prcontracovid/mapa-da-solidariedade?authuser=0, accessed on February 15, 2021. 28  https://resocie.org/mapa-de-iniciativas-no-distrito-federal/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 29  https://www.acaoparamita.com.br/36-roda-de-conversa-favela-autoorganizacao-e-covid-19/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 30  https://www.agenciamural.org.br/em-santo-andre-moradores-usam-whatsapp-e-videos-para-­ informar-sobre-a-covid-19-nas-favelas/?fbclid=IwAR28RXSdCef6pKz_1jiCnxGCIiktFscbOZHu xEWVpBx2dGfFsV9K4Bs-­qOw, accessed on February 15, 2021.

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circles,” now available in the form of podcasts on Spotify31 or through weekly lives on Facebook and YouTube.32 In this context of increased digitalization of repertoires, several initiatives were launched to try to bridge the “digital gap.” Indigenous organizations and their allies installed Wi-Fi spots in otherwise isolated communities, and other organizations launched capacity-building initiatives that enabled otherwise digitally illiterate members to participate in online actions. The Coalizão Direitos na Rede (Rights in Network Coalition), for instance, proposed to use public funds to subsidize connectivity costs and hardware acquisition for low-income students.33 Another NGO, Intervozes, called on phone companies to stop cutting off services due to the lack of payment during the pandemic. In other cases, civil society organizations distributed cell phone chips and installed Wi-Fi spots in places with poor connections.34 Organizations such as Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) partnered with indigenous organizations to provide Internet in otherwise isolated communities. Digital inclusion is also about digital literacy, a key obstacle for organizations working with poor and older people with low educational levels and with people with disabilities. One activist, who leads an organization that works with poor people all over the country and has very little online presence, described his preoccupation and then his surprise with the results of their efforts at digital inclusion in the context of the pandemic: “The first two weeks were of a state of total distress (…) We did not know what to do, because, where do we act? In the streets? (…) nobody can leave their homes. What do we do now?”

And he continued to describe how they adapted: “What I found out was amazing. We talked so much to them about the relevance of meeting, that men and women who can barely write their own names, today they can use an app such as the one we are using right now (Zoom) and they are able to participate in meetings. There are difficulties, but they can express themselves, they can tell us what is happening. We had never imagined that this could happen. (…) We were mistaken. We have done meetings with 30, 40 people, with the humblest, grassroots people. It was very surprising.”35

31  https://www.agenciamural.org.br/em-santo-andre-moradores-usam-whatsapp-e-videos-para-­ informar-sobre-a-covid-19-nas-favelas/?fbclid=IwAR28RXSdCef6pKz_1jiCnxGCIiktFscbOZHu xEWVpBx2dGfFsV9K4Bs-­qOw, accessed on February 15, 2021. 32  For a comprehensive list of lives organized by civil society groups during the pandemic see: http://repositoriomobilizacovid.resocie.org/lives/, accessed on February 15, 2021. 33  https://direitosnarede.org.br/2020/05/20/fust-deve-subsidiar-acesso-a-internet-durante-­ pandemia-­especialmente-os-estudantes/ accessed on February 15, 2021. 34  For instance, in September the NGO Central Única das Favelas (Central Union of the Slums) began to distribute thousands of chips as part of their “Slum Mothers ON” project, and installed Wi-Fi spots in Brazilian slums (with funding from private donors and the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – UNESCO). See https://www.vozdascomunidades.com.br/destaques/cufa-distribui-chips-de-celular-na-rocinha/ and https://www.instagram.com/p/CGkcr_LJtk-/. Other types of actors, such as universities, also launched digital inclusiveness programs that included the donation of hardware and of connection chips. 35  Interview 7, with author, October 2020.

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As argued elsewhere (von Bülow 2020), for these activists, digitalization meant not only learning to do things in a new way but also changing the way that they evaluated digital possibilities. In the face of a stark problem, what seemed impossible – to meet online with people who can barely write their own names – became possible in a very short period of time. The trend toward the appropriation of digital tools overlaps with two additional trends: toward the diversification and the adaptation of collective action repertoires. At the same time, “offline” innovations proved to be necessary. Images of meetings of the 425 “street presidents” in Paraisópolis (a favela in São Paulo) to discuss procedures for their solidarity campaign – 6 feet separating each person in a soccer field – have become iconic expressions of pandemic improvisation.36 On March 21, the group G10 das Favelas (G10 of the Favelas) sent out a call, via Facebook, for volunteers willing to visit families, bringing them donations and monitoring their health. Those who joined up would have to learn rigorous protocols not only for holding meetings but also for conducting the visits, such as how to use personal protection equipment and to sanitize donations. In addition to online and offline innovations, many efforts demonstrate the actors’ capacity to combine creatively digital and nondigital repertoires. The experiences of media activists that sought to produce reliable knowledge from within the peripheries are good examples of these interesting combinations. If, on the one hand, the dissemination of cell phones among low-income people has made a new kind of “bottom-up” communication easier, on the other hand, many favela residents still do not have access to the Internet. In addition to using digital tools, these groups spread the word through banners and sound trucks.37 Meanwhile, the community radio programing aired simultaneously on YouTube channels and on the electromagnetic spectrum picked up by old devices.

7.5  Creatively Connecting Frames On a live aired in May 2020, Italian sociologist Donatella della Porta argued that social movements all over the world were connecting demands related to the pandemic to their prior agendas, a process that the literature on framing calls “frame 36  https://www.facebook.com/g10favelas/posts/150419739858228?__xts__[0]=68.ARA_8R if2vHqU7EgBlijoCtP4VUqmglww6oNz32gvwY5a3KNzYc3N80Tyxz6vYcJKAT5wVf0Aa gVFTXBy-­FaTx0-­urXQuUHBzeXjrhBofHqsVsTIgW5DSqX_gj28eRhL0dxQFq0YIYH1lzFoaHXK0wg6oyIIOp7cH_PEh0u8qxnMCcaO6-­ydqdPtIjA_7Sv_87GdOBcZOVfg37r3UHm Eh-BI_ZlGAROcv6haSX2lfcbCeJFmhM_VV-­HthUzK9-JhMLACv7LrH3jdJNdki8Tc9YVc zosQNC4QNZftOA4t1oeBe_v_befDtGlJ0QblnY2-­S GvIiWDW-­t KiJP-xpUs0Gpi-ec29b-­­ wqULjpboKwDFvTbaiMoYb9mz-0X1gZiW7uggd2riSvYHwtRuBIs8BkB9hZ17Knqwfh_ RmpVf5Euwa-­b Mm9nKvSDlU6yy0kC0XLTD7P2fLTfI6GLq84GRMTWZD5y6mO3JT7D jrUAIagkFmcnXzqoUcnMQ, accessed on February 15, 2021. 37  https://horadopovo.com.br/brasilandia-solidaria-o-enfrentamento-do-coronavirus-num-dos-­ bairros-mais-atingidos-de-sp/, accessed February 15, 2021.

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bridging.”38 By affecting more vulnerable groups more intensely, the pandemic accentuated historical social problems such as economic inequality, racism, violence against women, and deficient public health services. In this context, when social movements organized to pressure the National Congress to approve the emergency aid program, many understood it as a step in the direction of advancing the broader “basic income” agenda in Brazil. Data about the unequal impact of Covid-19 on Black people also mobilized long-time movements for human rights and against racism. Feminist groups organized to confront increased domestic violence caused by social isolation. While some groups focused on emergency solidarity action, the pandemic impelled others to intensify their struggles around these kinds of programmatic agendas. In many cases, however, programmatic agendas were advanced through solidarity initiatives themselves. Perhaps the most dramatic connections emerged after police raids in Rio de Janeiro favelas interrupted food distribution campaigns on more than one occasion.39 In April 2020, the Rio de Janeiro police killed 177 people, a 43% increase in comparison to April 2019.40 Outrage over these cases, especially the death of a 14-year-old boy,41 led the Frente Favelas Na Luta (Favelas in Struggle Front) to publish an open letter that made clear the connection between combatting the pandemic and the historic struggle against police violence. “Since the beginning of t2he Covid-19 Pandemic, favela and peripheral collectives have been the ones to have produced solutions to guarantee food security for thousands of favela residents in the state of Rio de Janeiro and to flatten the curve of contamination in those spaces by distributing hygiene kits and health information. We have tried to produce the public policy that the state is not interested in carrying out, because while we try to end hunger, the state tries to kill us. Police operations have repeatedly occurred when we are distributing food baskets and carrying out our public health efforts.”42

The above document mentions another programmatic struggle that is also directly connected to the solidarity initiatives of the favelas: the food security agenda. Partnerships among family farming organizations and urban groups have called attention to the importance of solidarity networks between city and countryside. One effort along these lines was a petition organized by the Articulação Nacional de Agroecologia (National Agroecology Articulation), signed by 877 movements and collectives. The document proposes revamping the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Acquisition Program, PAA), which was undergoing

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJO2xA0XgzE&feature=youtu.be, accessed February 14, 2021. 39  https://www.vozdascomunidades.com.br/comunidades/oito-operacoes-policiais-impediram-as-­­ distribuicoes-de-cestas-basicas-nas-favelas-do-rio/, accessed February 15, 2021. 40  https://correio.rac.com.br/amp/2020/05/agencias/944004-favelas-do-rio-nao-tem-paz-nem-­ mesmo-na-pandemia.html, accessed February 15, 2021. 41  https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2020/05/19/menino-de-14-anos-e-baleadodurante-operacao-no-complexo-do-salgueiro-rj.ghtml, accessed February 15, 2021. 42  https://www.instagram.com/p/CAd7mSlJwR0/?igshid=1qrmmoj7ybqlo, accessed February 15, 2021. 38

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major budget cuts.43 Created during the Lula Government under the guise of the Zero Hunger Program, the PAA purchased food produced by family farmers and transferred it to social assistance organizations combatting hunger. In an interview posted on the organization’s website, Denis Monteiro, the Articulation’s executive secretary, makes the discursive connection explicit: “In the context of this pandemic, strengthening the PAA is fundamental and urgent because the program has the dual capacity of supporting the productive activities of family agriculture at the same time that it permits the supply and assistance of families suffering from food insecurity.”44

Another important civil society initiative that connected the humanitarian emergency with broader agendas is the Observatório dos Direitos Humanos na Crise da Covid-19 (Observatory of Human Rights in the Covid-19 Crisis), launched in late April 2020.45 The Observatory is led by organizations from a diversity of sectors: LGBT+ Rights, indigenous peoples, human rights, feminism, the black movement, the landless movement, and the peasant women’s movement, among others. Its objective is to collect information and denouncements about human rights violations in the context of the pandemic. Similar experiences have occurred in other areas, such as housing46 and domestic violence.47 These cases demonstrate that the intensification of solidarity efforts in Brazil do not necessarily imply a distancing from more political agendas. On the contrary, it is possible that the network-building underway, enabled by the recombination of frames, will help strengthen more long-lasting struggles. There is no guarantee, however, that these initiatives will be successful. As one interviewee said, for example, attempts to link the vulnerability of indigenous communities to the illegal presence of miners in their territories has not yet yielded practical results, in spite of the launching of the campaign #ForaGarimpoForaCovid (#OutMiningOutCovid): “We could have understood the pandemic as an opportunity, (for example to) use it to guarantee the integrality of the (indigenous) territories, but that absolutely did not happen. On the contrary. The Yanomami still have to face 20 thousand miners on a daily basis.”48

 https://agroecologia.org.br/abaixo-assinado-pela-retomada-urgente-do-paa/, accessed February 15, 2021. 44  https://agroecologia.org.br/2020/04/08/paa-programa-de-aquisicao-de-alimentos-da-­ agricultura-­familiar-comida-saudavel-para-o-povo/, accessed February 15, 2021. 45  https://www.facebook.com/ObservaDHeCovid19/, accessed February 15, 2021. 46  https://www.vakinha.com.br/vaquinha/ajude-os-sem-teto-a-enfrentar-o-coronavirus, accessed February 15, 2021. 47  https://www.idp.edu.br/event/violencia-domestica-durante-o-isolamento-social-clinica-de-­ direitos-­humanos/, accessed February 15, 2021. 48  Interview 10, 2021. 43

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7.6  Conclusions The Covid-19 pandemic struck the world by surprise. In countries lacking in strong social safety nets, such as Brazil, the impact was not only an epidemiological crisis but also a humanitarian one. In this chapter, we have presented some preliminary results that not only demonstrate the extraordinary response that occurred in Brazil’s civil society but also contribute to explaining how they were able to do so. Our general argument is that the capacity to respond quickly to a major crisis such as the pandemic requires creativity, but that this is not simply a question of ad hoc inspiration. When it comes to organizing collective action in response to a problem, creativity is grounded in existing cultural and material resources. Here we have focused on two aspects of the symbolic component of organizing: the construction of new repertoires and frames. Inspired by the pragmatist notion of situated agency and problem-solving and by Tilly’s incipient ideas about improvisation, we have argued that creativity involved, at least to a large extent, a process of combining existing routines in new ways and of connecting older contentious frames to the new problematic situation of the pandemic. This chapter has emphasized the overwhelmingly positive characteristics of civil society mobilization in the context of the pandemic. It is too early, however, to evaluate the impacts of this process. Calling the attention to the initiatives mentioned in this chapter does not imply a romantic view of civil society. As social movement actors are keenly aware, a pandemic in a context of extreme inequality and poverty such as in Brazil requires not only solidarity from below but also mobilizing state institutions to fulfill their roles. At the same time, public policies aimed at social assistance and economic development in these territories would be much more effective if they worked in partnership with local organizations, taking advantage of their knowledge, legitimacy, and network connections. One important research agenda in the coming years is to examine the extent to which solidarity efforts were or could have been strengthened by links to state institutions. For example, formal participatory institutions such as Health Councils have likely operated during the pandemic as a channel of communication between the state and society, at least in cities where they have not been deactivated. An account by Professor Carla Martelli about the experience of Araraquara, São Paulo – a municipality that has maintained a strong participatory budgeting program in recent years – suggests that such participatory structures can produce micro-territorial connections between the state and society during the pandemic.49 Many favelas, however, are off the radar of most councils, even in cities where they are still in operation. Another important theme for future research refers to the impacts of the mobilization processes on Brazil’s associational tissue. At the same time that state institutions have had difficulty in penetrating the territories of urban peripheries, civil society organizations also face many obstacles. The need to confront the pandemic 49

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AwOZQAmF-8, accessed February 15, 2021.

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has led to the creation of new ties among organizations and new kinds of collective action repertoires. We need to observe the extent to which these changes will be sustained over time.

References Abers RN, Serafim L, Tatagiba L (2014) Changing repertoires of state-society interaction under Lula. In: de Castro F, Koonings K, Wiesebron M (eds) Brazil under the workers’ party: continuity and change from Lula to Dilma. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire/ New York, pp 36–61 Alonso A (2012) Repertório, Segundo Charles Tilly: História de Um Conceito. Soc Antropol 02(03):21–41 Ansell C (2013) Ecological explanation. In: Berk G, Galvan DC, Hattam V (eds) Political creativity: reconfiguring institutional order and change. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, pp 55–77 Benford RD, Snow DA (2000) Framing processes and social movements: an overview and assessment. Annu Rev Sociol 26(1):611–639 Berk G, Galvan D (2009) How people experience and change institutions: a field guide to creative syncretism. Theory Soc 38(6):543–580 Burt RS (1995) Structural holes: the social structure of competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Clemens ES (1993) Organizational repertoires and institutional change: women’s groups and the transformation of U.S. politics, 1890-1920. Am J Sociol 98(4):755–798 Emirbayer M, Mische A (1998) What is agency? Am J Sociol 103(4):962–1023 Goffmann E (1974) Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience. Harper Colophon, New York Gross N (2010) Charles Tilly and American pragmatism. Am Sociol 41(4):337–357 March JG, Olsen JP (2010) Rediscovering institutions. Simon and Schuster, New York Rossi FM (2017) The Poor’s struggle for political incorporation: the Piquetero movement in Argentina. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sewell WH Jr (1992) A theory of structure: duality, agency, and transformation. Am J Sociol 98:1–29 Sheingate AD (2003) Political entrepreneurship, institutional change, and American political development. Stud Am Polit Dev 17(02):185–203 Snow DA, Benford R (1992) Master frames and cycles of protest. In: Morris A, Mueller CMC (eds) Frontiers in social movement theory. Yale University Press, New Haven Tarrow SG (2011) Power in movement: social movements, collective action and politics, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, New York Tilly C (1978) From mobilization to revolution. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading Tilly C (2006) Regimes and repertoires. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Tilly C (2008) Contentious performances. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York Von Bülow M (2020) The impacts of the pandemic on digital activism, Research Report # 02, Repository of Civil Society Initiatives Against the Pandemic, Brasília, November 30. http://repositoriomobilizacovid.resocie.org/relatorios-de-pesquisa-do-repositorio/

Chapter 8

Transformative Events and Collective Action in Chile During the Covid-19 Pandemic Nicolás M. Somma and Felipe Sánchez

8.1  Introduction The study of collective action in Chile during the Covid-19 pandemic presents a paradox to social movement theories. Since March 2020, the national authorities have imposed restrictions on citizen mobility and public spaces at the virus’s outbreak. However, in the following months, there was an explosion of collective action of all sorts – which we document below with statistical data. This is unexpected. According to resource mobilization (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) and political opportunity theories (Meyer 2004), collective action flourishes when people have the freedoms to gather and organize and when the authorities are open to their demands as expressed in collective actions. Nevertheless, the Chilean government has imposed strict and sudden changing regulations. It has also enforced states of siege and curfew that resembled the authoritarian era of the 1970s and 1980s more than the democratic times of the last three decades. How to explain the spikes in collective action? We address this puzzle using the concept of transformative events. It refers to crucial turning points that drastically modify social mobilization, either increasing or decreasing the levels of contentious activity (Hess and Martin 2006). McAdam and Sewell define it “as specific and systematically explicable transformations and rearticulations of the cultural and social structures that were already in operation before the event. Events thus become turning points in structural change” (2001, 102). Researchers mostly identify transformative events with a particular event

N. M. Somma (*) · F. Sánchez Instituto de Sociología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), Santiago, Chile e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_8

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within a given political conflict (like a repressive event or an unexpectedly massive demonstration). In this study, we conceive as transformative events not only those taking place in the course of a protest wave but also any exogenous shock with a transformative capacity over the contentious cycle. With this approach in mind, we interpret the explosion of collective action in Chile during 2020 as resulting from the combination of two transformative events. One was the “social uprising” of late 2019 or “Chilean spring” (Somma et  al. 2020b), a sequence of thousands of mostly uncoordinated collective action episodes that spanned from October 2019 to March 2020. During the uprising, masses of protestors displayed a wide array of tactics – from peaceful to disruptive and violent actions  – putting the country at the brink of political collapse. Thus, when the extremely weakened government of President Sebastián Piñera mandated quarantines in March 2020, Chilean society was in a state of mobilization which turned it less prone to adopt a strict discipline. People were more susceptible to engage in further protests. A significant political consequence of the uprising of late 2019 was the beginning of a constitutional change process aimed at replacing Chile’s current constitution, approved under the dictatorship of General Pinochet in 1980. This led to a national plebiscite in October 2020, in which almost 80% of voters decided to change the constitution. The movement restrictions imposed by the authorities did not prevent groups favoring or opposing the constitution to mobilize in the streets. The Covid-19 pandemic was the second transformative event that superimposed and operated on a society already mobilized by the uprising. The revelation of the first Covid-19 cases forced the Chilean government to emulate its counterparts in countries where the pandemic hit before. Health authorities imposed strict quarantine measures that restricted spatial mobility. However, the economic consequences of these measures damaged broad sectors of the population. This produced new grievances and desperation that moved people to action. The economic grievances soon merged with discontent about how the central government was handling the crisis, encouraging people to overflow the restrictions and take the streets. These two transformative events had different origins. The drive for the social uprising was the persistence of long-term inequalities in health, education, and incomes among Chilean social classes. However, the grievances associated with the pandemic were suddenly imposed (Walsh 1981). Both transformative events combined in their effects. The social uprising created (and expressed) broad discontent toward political authorities and, in some sectors, also a rejection toward top-down regulations coming from authorities. Thus, it was easier to translate the sudden grievances brought by the pandemic into collective action. We also show that collective action during the pandemic overflowed preexisting social movement organizations. During the last two decades, several Chilean movements became stronger and managed to stage massive actions (Somma and Medel 2017). But protesting masses during the pandemic were often not articulated by or related to movement organizations. Popular neighborhoods facing the threat of hunger, small business owners affected by quarantine measures, and women coordinating soup kitchens, organized independently from the most consolidated movements – such as the labor and student movements. Their articulation logic was strongly

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territorial (Rossi 2019) and oriented to short-term solutions to urgent problems rather than national-level policies. However, social movements reacted in varied, sometimes diverging, ways to the pandemic. We emphasize the contrast between a reactivated labor movement and a demobilized student movement. Theoretically, our chapter contributes to a growing agenda of research that shows the relevance and complexities of collective action grievances (e.g., Simmons 2016). More specifically, it adds evidence about how economic threats can move people to action (Almeida 2018) even under unlikely political and organizational circumstances such as those imposed by quarantines and other restrictive measures during the pandemic. Our chapter also contributes to the conceptualization and understanding of the consequences of transformative events (Hess and Martin 2006; McAdam and Sewell 2001) by treating the pandemic as such.

8.2  Closing a Country Chileans’ lives changed radically in mid-March 2020 with the detection of the first cases of Covid-19. The national government suspended all public events with more than 50 people and declared a state of exception for 90 days initially – which was then extended to 180 and 270 days. It decreed nightly curfew and established “sanitary cords,” which prevented people from exiting or entering the affected cities and regions. In July, the government announced a “step-by-step plan” to gradually lift some restrictions. In the following months, Chile’s 346 communes were to be classified into five categories from quarantine (severe restriction) to no restrictions at all. Health authorities changed their status periodically to try to control the spread of the virus. These restrictions affected many areas of social and economic activity. Face-to-­ face classes in the whole educational system were suspended, and educational institutions suddenly had to reconvert to online education. While the public transportation system (including subway lines) continued working, there were controls of health symptoms to passengers, enforcing the use of masks in all public spaces. The police and elite army forces enforced these and other restrictive measures. They patrolled the streets during day and night to impose fines to transgressors. These measures severely impacted the economic activity levels. According to Chile’s Central Bank,1 by the mid-2020s, Chile’s GDP had decreased by 14%, and the level of economic activity dropped by more than 10%. Unemployment almost doubled – from 7% in October 2019 to 13% in August 2020. The employment rate dropped to 42–44%, the lowest levels since the mid-1980s (Bravo et al. 2020). This brought losses in many people’s acquisitive power, especially in the popular sectors, informal workers, women, and those unable to continue working from their homes. Given its manifold economic and social consequences, the pandemic might have

 See https://www.bcentral.cl/.

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acted as an event that transformed collective action. For ascertaining this, next, we show how collective action patterns changed during the pandemic in combination with the social uprising legacy – our additional transformative event.

8.3  T  ransformative Events and Collective Protest: Tracking Changes Across Time Protest events consist of gatherings of several individuals in public spaces engaging in protest tactics to make a claim. Some are violent; some are peaceful; some protests are staged by social movement organizations; others are staged by disorganized citizens. We argue that our two transformative events – the social uprising and the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic  – shaped protest dynamics. We resort to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which tracks protest across time and is – at the time of this writing – the only available source for the Covid-19 period in Chile. To have a general picture of recent protest trends, Fig.  8.1 shows the weekly number of protest events between January 2019 and November 2020 in Chile. Some protest events are coordinated by social movements, but some are not (more on this below). In Fig. 8.1, we highlighted different events and dates that have marked the trajectory of collective action in Chile during the last 2 years: the “social uprising” of October 2019; the International Women’s Day; the quarantine period in Metropolitan area; and the October 2020 plebiscite that formally started the constitutional process. The plebiscite was the major protest peak after the quarantine. This is explained not only by the contentious character of this election but also because it was close to the first anniversary of the “social uprising.” Figure 8.1 confirms the cyclical nature of protest during our period of interest, although of course with a major peak in late 2019 which corresponds to the social uprising. Are there systematic differences in protest levels across periods that could be attributed to the transformative events? For studying this, we define four chronological periods: (1) the period before the social uprising, which serves as a baseline2 (January 1, 2019, to October 17, 2019); (2) the social uprising period (October 18, 2019, to March 14, 2020); (3) the quarantine period (March 15, 2020, to September 15, 2020); and (4) the post-quarantine period (September 16, 2020, to November 7, 2020). If transformative events deserve that name, we should see considerable differences across these periods. We suspect that transformative events not only shaped the intensity of protest – measured by the number of events – but also its nature and composition. Thus, we not only look at the total number of events but also at whether protests were peaceful (like marches) or violent (such as riots) and the groups that

2  The level of protests during the baseline period was within the usual ranges of previous years (Joignant et al. 2020:5), making it a useful comparison point for assessing the following periods.

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Fig. 8.1  Weekly number of protest events in Chile (January 2019 to November 2020)

protest (like students or workers). As we shall see, the social uprising and the pandemic transformed collective action not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Figure 8.2 shows the average weekly number of protests in each period according to tactics (peaceful and violent).3 The uprising increased dramatically (by five or six times) the weekly number of events compared to the baseline period. It also changed the peaceful-violent balance, with violent events almost equaling in number the peaceful ones. The uprising meant not only more protest but also more violent protest (as well as more police repression, see Joignant et al. 2020). As expected, the quarantine reduced considerably  – in about one-fourth  – the intensity of protest compared to the uprising period. Nevertheless, despite the mobility restrictions and the fear of contagion, the intensity of protest remained above that of the pre-uprising period. While the weekly number of events before the uprising was about 20, during quarantine times, it was about 33. Moreover, violent protests grew comparatively more than peaceful ones, to the point that they both reach similar levels in the quarantine period. What forces could offset the powerful restrictions and fears during the pandemic, to the point of producing more rather than less protest than before the uprising? 3  We use the weekly average instead of the total number of protests in each period since the length of each period varies considerably, thus obscuring the actual intensity of protest.

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Fig. 8.2  Weekly average number of protest events across time period, by tactic Source: Our elaboration based on ACLED data

Following our transformative events’ argument, we hypothesize two. First, the uprising left a mobilized society in place; it could not be simply undone overnight. Masses of people – including many who had never protested – were activated politically during the uprising. They were ready to continue protesting despite restrictions and fears. They had experienced strong collective emotions and grievances. They had less respect toward political authorities and very repressive police forces, explaining why violent tactics grew more (Somma et  al. 2020b). Second, as we detail below, the pandemic brought new grievances linked to unemployment, economic anxiety, and even hunger. The government promised food boxes that did not always arrive on time or at the right places. Desperate people had new reasons to go to the streets  – what we called “survival protests” in a recent work (Somma et al. 2020a). Figure 8.2 also shows that during the post-quarantine period – when restrictions eased partially – the protest intensity increased, as expected with political opportunity theory. But only peaceful protests increased. Part of the fury of the uprising and quarantine days may have soothed, yielding a peaceful-violent balance more similar to the pre-uprising period – although still comparatively more violent. And yet, during the post-quarantine period, the intensity of protest was about twice as that of the pre-uprising period (20–40 weekly events) despite the still considerable limitations to public gatherings and mobility, and the continuous warnings about the risks of contagion by authorities and health experts. How can we make sense of this increase? By mid-September the number of new Covid-19 cases in Chile stabilized for about 2 months, perhaps prompting the public perception that the risk was not

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Fig. 8.3  Weekly average number of protest events across time period, by group Source: Our elaboration based on ACLED data

that high. Also, the October plebiscite sparked protests, increasing the average for the post-quarantine period (Fig. 8.1). Many social and political organizations mobilized peacefully in the streets for or against the plebiscite. The two transformative events not only increased protests or turned them more violent, but they also changed the composition of participating groups. Fortunately, ACLED registers the main group or groups staging protest events as reported by media sources. Groups are proxies of social movements: when ACLED reports a protest staged by “workers,” it likely means that it was coordinated by a labor union or some other organization tied to the Chilean labor movement. Figure 8.3 shows the weekly average number of protests in the four periods for six important groups: workers in general, health workers (particularly affected by the crisis), teachers, indigenous groups, students, and women. Students and workers (including teachers) formed the backbone of Chile’s protest landscape during the last decade, which is reflected in the pre-uprising period. These are two of the major social movements in Chile. But the two transformative events changed this in dramatic ways. Consider students. They were especially active during the uprising, but barely protested (at least as such) during the quarantine and post-quarantine periods. Teachers also protested at low rates in the last two periods of Fig. 8.3. Both groups share a concern with education, a permanently high-salience issue in Chile during the last two decades that was recurrently raised by the student movement. Yet it was displaced by other issues during 2020. Street protests reflect this change.

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Conversely, workers (excluding teachers) gained salience as a protest group during the quarantine and post-quarantine periods. While they were the second most active group during the uprising, they were the most active one in the two later periods, surpassing students by far. Data not shown suggests that workers performed about 50% of all protest events during the quarantine period and almost 40% of all during the post-quarantine period. Health workers also became very active, especially during the uprising and the post-quarantine period. Below, we explain how the pandemic revitalized labor mobilization. Indigenous groups and women were activated during the uprising and kept higher protest levels after that, both in absolute numbers (weekly events) and relative to other groups. Women went from stage about 5% of all protests before the uprising to 10–15% in subsequent periods, indicating a revitalization of the women’s movement in this juncture. A recurrent pattern in Chilean history is that women take the lead during national crises to feed their families and neighbors and protest for their rights. This was the case during the economic crisis of the 1980s under authoritarianism, in which women were key organizers of soup kitchens. As we show below, it was also the case almost four decades later, when the pandemic was hitting people’s wallets hard. This time the feminist mobilization wave also drove women’s mobilization since 2018, in which women protested male violence and sexual abuses. Finally, indigenous groups appeared in 8% of events before the uprising to 16–20% afterward. In a nutshell, the social uprising and the pandemic increased the level of mobilization of Chilean society and shifted the relative salience of different groups, suggesting changes in the dynamism of the social movements reflected empirically in these groups. In the remainder of the chapter, we make sense of these protest data by looking at the divergent reactions to the pandemic of the labor and student movements. Then we explore collective action dynamics beyond social movements.

8.4  Social Movements During the Pandemic 8.4.1  Workers: New Challenges and Grievances The pandemic brought new challenges for the labor movement and its capacity for collective action, but these varied across economic sectors. Many white-collar workers continued working from their homes using the internet, reducing face-to-­ face contact opportunities, which are central in mobilization processes. Another obstacle for collective action is that existing regulations for approving worker strikes require that workers vote physically about strike proposals. During quarantines, there were no permits for traveling for such a reason. Eventually, these conditions were eased. For instance, the government’s Labor Office allowed workers of a supermarket in the northern city of Iquique to vote electronically (Sindicato Complementos Chile 2020). However, not all workers can connect to vote

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electronically. Another challenge came from job instability and the fear of unemployment. Economic crises pose the threat of firings, making workers more reluctant to protest and likely to comply with worsening job conditions. For instance, workers in a large retail company apparently were forced to sign contract annexes that allowed them to work from home but reduced their wages. Workers also feared being fired if striking for an extended period (El Desconcierto 2021). However, this is not the whole story. It cannot explain why, as Fig. 8.3 shows, during the quarantine and post-quarantine periods, worker protests increased compared to the pre-uprising period. The pandemic also brought new grievances that fueled collective action. First, while some organizations could ask their workers to work from home, workers in economic sectors considered “essential” had to continue traveling and working face-to-face, thus being exposed to infection and experiencing fear and anxiety. This was most evident with health workers, which were also stressed by an increase in emergency services demand (CIPER Chile 2020a). Thus, it is no wonder that health workers took actions such as the strike of the Barros Luco Hospital workers in Santiago, who blocked the street and protested in front of the hospital. Health workers, however, were in a difficult ethical situation. They were aware that striking meant reducing their badly needed services for patients. Another source of new grievances resulted from the ways organizations treated their workers during the pandemic. Workers often asked their organizations for economic aids to help them navigate through the crisis. The Barros Luco Hospital workers just mentioned, as well as many other, once demanded for “Covid bonuses” for facing worsened economic conditions. Workers at the Chilean Security Association, an insurance company, went on strike because the organization did not give the bonus they asked for (Crónica Digital 2020). Workers also complained that the company managers were hesitant to show the organizations’ real financial situation and just said that conditions were bad enough to grant a bonus. Retail workers were angry when their companies took advantage of a law that allowed them to stop paying wages and resorting to worker’s unemployment funds for that end (CIPER Chile 2020b). Workers not only protested against their organizations but also against government policies. The union of domestic workers – a union almost wholly composed of women – complained that the government proposals for alleviating the crisis did not take into account their particular conditions and those of “atypical” workers in general. Other labor unions protested for having been excluded from the design of employment-protection laws (CIPER Chile 2020c). Interestingly, pictures and videos of protesting workers typically show them wearing masks, suggesting an attitude of compliance with health regulations.

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8.4.2  The Demobilization of Students The student movement was a major sociopolitical force in Chile during the last decade. By organizing massive mobilizations, students gained unprecedented political and cultural influence. They set the educational agenda and policies at the national level and energized other movements (Donoso and Somma 2019). Student protests were very intense during the uprising. But, as Fig. 8.3 shows, during the quarantine and post-quarantine periods, they plummeted. The contrast with the labor movement helps to clarify why. Large chunks of the active population kept going to their workplaces and maintained conditions favorable to mobilization. For students, it was different. The Educational Minister suspended face-to-face classes at all levels as soon as the pandemic hit, forcing educational institutions to reconvert to online activities. This prevented students from meeting face-to-face to stage demonstrations or organize assemblies and school takeovers. Students had a hard time during the pandemic. Adapting overnight to online classes was problematic for several reasons. Many did not have comfortable, quiet spaces at home for studying and computers, or decent internet connections. For those who did, reading long texts from screens or spending many hours with online classes was tiresome and stressful. The inability to access campus and school facilities was especially detrimental for students from popular classes. Also, shifting to an online environment was new for most. According to a study by the University of Chile, only 20% of students had taken online classes before. About 60% were unsatisfied by how educational authorities faced the crisis, and 81% considered that they were getting a lower-quality education than before (Pulso Estudiantil 2020). To the strictly educational challenges, we should add, for some students, the economic problems derived from the crisis and the emotional stress of having relatives at home infected with Covid-19. This impacted student attrition. About 30,000 university students froze or abandoned their studies during the second semester of 2020 (El Mostrador 2020). In the Catholic University of Chile, a leading Chilean university, 22% of students delayed their fee payments in March (Pulso Estudiantil 2020). Although students could not protest as usual, they organized online strikes. This new practice consisted of not showing up in online classes nor following course requirements. Students asked university authorities for free weeks for catching up with readings or just having some relief. They also demanded a reduction of university fees and lower the intensity of class contents and readings and more support and flexibility from their universities. While online strikes cannot be compared with face-to-face protests, their impact was not negligible. According to the CONFECH (the university students’ national confederation), by July 2020, more than 80,000 students from several universities were striking online. Strikes were especially intense during the first semester of 2020, but declined afterward as both students and professors got used to the new conditions. Strikes not only targeted university authorities but also reacted to an

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announcement of the Education Minister in August, which intended to resume face-­ to-­face classes (El Informador 2020).

8.5  Collective Action Beyond Social Movements We just saw how transformative events affected major social movements and their protest behavior. But the pandemic also energized collective action beyond movements. It fueled decentralized actions by local communities motivated by economic threats and the political mismanagement of the crisis. This involved not only protests but also solidary actions oriented to material and emotional survival. Next, we turn to these topics.

8.5.1  Pandemic and Survival Protests Chile is a developed country by international standards. It made significant advances in combatting poverty and hunger since the recovery of democracy – advances that an entire generation of Chileans took for granted (Matus-Lopez 2021). The economic recession brought by the quarantine was therefore all the more shocking. Economic threat partially explains the protest spikes during the quarantine and post-­ quarantine periods reported in Fig. 8.3. To flesh this point, we made a small convenience analysis of TV news covering the protests in the popular neighborhood of El Bosque in mid-May,4 when the numbers of infected people were growing at high speed. We find a plethora of survival protests, that is, protests motivated by “immediate material, physical, and environmental threats that affect people’s survival” (Somma et al. 2020a: 1304). This is typically represented by a woman claiming “Help, help! Food! Because these (the protests) are not for the quarantine. This is for help, food.” Discontent with political authorities also motivated protests. Neighbors complained that El Bosque mayor, following the central government’s orders, had prohibited informal sellers in popular farmers’ markets. A woman said that “Nobody is doing anything. There are many older adults in my street…lots of unemployed people. I also work in the farmer’s market. Nevertheless, now with the new law, the very Sadi Melo [El Bosque’s mayor] said that we cannot earn [money] in the market. How are we going to make a living? Do they want us to go out and steal?” Others complained that the mayor was not helping neighbors enough with food. A neighbor noted that “We can obey the quarantine, but the mayor has to partake on this. If the mayor works and has one hand on his heart and the other one on his 4  The links to the news are: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bm5xQW0c4Hw; https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=WwtbiAK4Om8&t=47s; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvBjNT7POvg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDG2fmI6Rpg.

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pocket, the quarantine will be enforced.” The mayor, however, blamed the central government for this issue. In his words, “[People] lack jobs and money, they have no food. The government was supposedly going to provide food boxes for them. [The President] made an important announcement on TV, but the boxes have not arrived yet. So, this is why people are making these disturbances.” Thus, people protested due to the sheer lack of food and because they felt that authorities were not adhering to a “moral economy” needed in times of crisis. Conventional notions of fairness and dignity were being deceived (Auyero 2006). According to our admittedly anecdotal evidence, protestors did not seem to want a systemic political change, but just that authorities take care of them. Another El Bosque neighbor noted that “The problem is not the quarantine. It is the absence of a state that takes care of its people.” Which strategies appear plausible in such a situation? Begging is one. A woman said that “On Friday, I went to beg at the rich neighborhoods. There they gave me some merchandise.” When the reporter asked her if this entailed risks, she replied, “I am risking for my daughter, look at that. What else can I do?” But stealing could be another strategy potentially open for some. An unemployed carpenter claims that “We lack jobs, they have us locked at home, we cannot make a living (…). They are pushing the Chilean, the laborer, to go out and steal.”

8.6  Southern Mobilizations Between November and December 2020, a new wave of mobilizations arose in Southern Chilean cities located on the Chiloé Island (Ancud and Chonchi) and in the Chilean Patagonia (Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales). They were led by self-­ employed workers and small and medium business owners linked to the tourism, gastronomic, and service sectors  – sectors critical to Southern local economies. They demanded an end of the quarantine, which lasted up to 3 months in some of these cities. With the highly profitable summer season approaching, business owners were getting nervous. As the President of the Chamber of Tourism of the Patagonian City of Puerto Natales pointed out: We are more than 600 companies, and the financial aid [provided by the government] has been insufficient […], and these aids do not last more than one or two months, and you have to continue to subsist. And if we miss the [summer] season, then a long winter comes, and we will not be able to resist.5

Business owners organized and protested to draw the authorities’ attention to their complaints. They used fire barricades to block the entry roads to the cities (in Ancud and Puerto Natales) and openly defied the quarantine. In Punta Arenas, Patagonia’s main city, they organized a protest campaign called “Punta Arenas rises” that aimed to “bury the lockdown and the curfew.” This mobilization  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fUi8d_kqfng

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consisted of opening restaurants, pubs, and coffee shops in the city.6 Something similar happened in the city of Chonchi, where local commerce fully opened, challenging the government’s restrictions upfront. An interesting aspect of the Southern protests was the active support from the mayors. Both in Punta Arenas and Chonchi, local authorities authorized the opening of businesses. Moreover, Chonchi’s mayor promised to provide legal assistance to those business owners eventually charged for disobeying the quarantine.7 This situation increased the tension between the mayors and the national government. This was not wholly new. Since the beginning of the “social outburst,” the mayors, even right-wing ones – close to the governing coalition – organized a series of initiatives to press the government with different citizen demands. The role that mayors played during the “outburst” increased their political capital and legitimacy vis-à-vis the government.8 In the southern protests, mayors mobilized along with business owners, forcing the government to end the lockdowns in these cities.9

8.7  Soup Kitchens and Solidary Campaigns The pandemic brought the threat of hunger and this reactivated soup kitchens in popular sectors. During the economic crisis of the 1980s, soup kitchens had been central for feeding thousands of Chileans. This time they reemerged in a country that had successfully abated hunger for the large majority of Chileans. A dataset on soup kitchens identified about 170 soup kitchens across the country, especially in popular neighborhoods. For instance, in the popular municipality of Lo Espejo, with about 100,000 residents, soup kitchens provided about 8000 weekly rations, indicating their relevance as a nutritional source. A map of soup kitchens in Santiago shows that they flourished in all neighborhoods except in the richest ones of the eastern side of the city.10 Anecdotal accounts suggest that soup kitchens emerged spontaneously, had a strong residential character, and were mostly organized by women. For instance, in Santiago’s San Borja neighborhood, three friends began to cook in their homes and distributed the food in their neighborhood. A resident of La Cisterna asked the local baker to keep each day the bread unsold, which he collected and distributed among old age neighbors. Another one organized a center for storing food in a community center headquarter and distributing it among those in need. A woman organized 30

 El Mercurio, December 15, 2020, p. 1  El Mercurio of December 16, 2020, p. 7 8  https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/03/19/980260/Papel-alcaldes-coronavirus.html 9  La Estrella de Chiloé, December 20, 2020, p. 6 10  See the map in: https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1LyUOJsze9ZYZpUMuUiLmg Nv69iPR8tX8&ll=-33.50027324359828%2C-70.6130646722622&z=13 6 7

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volunteers through Instagram. They cooked in their homes and also gathered tents, mattresses, medicines, and clothes.11 Soup kitchens were key for resisting the economic hardship brought by the pandemic. They had a solidary logic, feeding residents in need. They were local, self-­ administered initiatives organized by ordinary neighbors. While this is a different kind of collective action than the protests, which were the focus of the chapter, they evince that the highly commodified Chilean economy still harbors a place for cooperation and resilience in times of need.

8.8  Conclusions Two transformative events unfolding close in time – the late 2019 social uprising and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic – combined to reactivate different kinds of collective action in Chile. The short-term legacy of the social uprising was a mobilized society extremely distrustful of political authorities. The economic crisis that resulted from quarantine measures brought sudden economic grievances and economic anxiety. In a mobilized and aggrieved society (both economically and politically), different groups took the streets to defy the authorities and organized informal survival networks to feed those in need. The concept of transformative events is useful to understand changes in collective action levels like the ones reported in this chapter: structural explanations do not do the trick. From our study of the Chilean case, we highlight three stylized claims about the impact of transformative events on collective action: • New and sudden grievances produced by transformative events can counterbalance the demobilizing impact of quarantine measures. • Social movements react divergently to transformative events depending on their mobilization opportunities (as illustrated by the contrast between demobilized students and remobilized workers). • Transformative events mobilize beyond movements to encompass usually nonor less-mobilized sectors. Comparisons with other Latin American cases may show how far these claims may travel. ACLED data are available for the whole region, facilitating comparisons on the evolution of protests during the pandemic in different countries. Comparative studies should also consider, as potentially explanatory factors, national variations in the intensity and timing of the pandemic, as well as variations in the ways national governments reacted to it.

  See the following news: https://www.nodal.am/2020/07/ollas-populares-y-comedores-en-­­ america-latina-solidaridad-para-combatir-el-hambre-en-tiempos-de-pandemia/; https://www.laizquierdadiario.cl/Ollas-y-comedores-populares-una-respuesta-al-hambre-y-la-precarizacion.

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References Almeida PD (2018) The role of threat in collective action. In: Snow DA, Soule SA, Kriesi H, McCammon HJ (eds) The Wiley Blackwell companion to social movements. Wiley, Hoboken, pp 43–62 Auyero J (2006) The moral politics of argentine crowds. Mobilization: Int Q 9(3):311–326 Bravo D, Castillo E, Hughes E (2020) Estudio longitudinal Empleo-Covid19. Retrieved from: https://www.uc.cl/site/efs/files/11504/presentacion-­estudio-­longitudinal-­empleo-­covid19-­10-­ septiembre-­2020.pdf CIPER Chile (2020a) Actas del Minsal: 6.840 funcionarios de la salud se han contagiado y más de 10 mil han partido a cuarentena preventiva. https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/05/30/actas-­del-­ minsal-­6-­840-­funcionarios-­de-­la-­salud-­se-­han-­contagiado-­y-­mas-­de-­10-­mil-­han-­partido-­a-­ cuarentena-­preventiva/ CIPER Chile (2020b) Asesores de la ministra del Trabajo explican por qué “grandes empresas” pueden acogerse a la suspensión de remuneraciones  – CIPER Chile. https://www. ciperchile.cl/2020/04/26/asesores-­d e-­l a-­m inistra-­d el-­t rabajo-­explican-­p or-­q ue-­g randes-­ empresas-­pueden-­acogerse-­a-­la-­suspension-­de-­remuneraciones/ CIPER Chile (2020c) Sindicatos en tiempos de crisis: Reviven pero son ignorados por la autoridad  – CIPER Chile. https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/05/01/ sindicatos-­en-­tiempos-­de-­crisis-­reviven-­pero-­son-­ignorados-­por-­la-­autoridad/ Crónica Digital (2020) ACHS podría enfrentar huelga de sus trabajadores en plena pandemia COVID-19 | Crónica Digital. https://www.cronicadigital.cl/2020/08/20/ achs-­podria-­enfrentar-­huelga-­de-­sus-­trabajadores-­en-­plena-­pandemia-­covid-­19/ Donoso S, Somma N (2019) You taught us to give an opinion, now learn how to listen: the manifold political consequences of Chile’s student movement. In: Protest and democracy, pp 145–172 Edwards B, McCarthy JD (2004) Resources and social movement mobilization. In: The Blackwell companion to social movements. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, pp 116–152 El Desconcierto (2021) Cuando la crisis hace imposible ejercer el derecho a huelga: Las duras negociaciones colectivas de los trabajadores de CMR Falabella. Retrieved January 26th, 2021, from https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/nacional/2020/07/14/cuando-­la-­crisis-­hace-­imposible-­ ejercer-­el-­derecho-­a-­huelga-­las-­duras-­negociaciones-­colectivas-­de-­los-­trabajadores-­de-­cmr-­ falabella.html El Informador (2020) Noticias Chile | Estudiantes anuncian paro nacional virtual y presencial por declaraciones del ministro de retomar clases en pandemia—Noticias Chile—Noticias en Chile—El Informador. https://www.elinformadorchile.cl/2020/08/20/noticias-­chile-­ estudiantes-­anuncian-­paro-­nacional-­virtual-­y-­presencial-­por-­declaraciones-­del-­ministro-­de-­ retomar-­clases-­en-­pandemia/ El Mostrador (2020) Confech inicia este martes paro online: Acusa que el Gobierno no ha entregado respuestas a los alumnos durante la pandemia—El Mostrador. https://www.elmostrador.cl/dia/2020/09/01/confech-­inicia-­este-­martes-­paro-­online-­acusa-­que-­el-­gobierno-­no-­ ha-­entregado-­respuestas-­a-­los-­alumnos-­durante-­la-­pandemia/ Hess D, Martin B (2006) Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events. Mobilization: Int Q 11(2):249–267 Joignant A, Garretón M, Somma N, Campos T (2020) Informe Anual Observatorio de Conflictos 2020. COES, Santiago Matus-Lopez M (2021) Desigualdad y bienestar en el periodo postdictatorial: Chile 1990–1998 (Inequality and well-being in the post-dictatorial period: Chile 1990–1998). ScienceOpen Posters McAdam D, Sewell WH (2001) It’s about time: temporality in the study of social movements and revolutions. In: Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Meyer DS (2004) Protest and political opportunities. Annu Rev Sociol 30:125–145

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Part IV

Public Opinion and Pandemic

Chapter 9

Presidential Approval During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Argentina María Laura Tagina

9.1  Introduction In the midst of a new economic crisis and while negotiating the payment of the foreign debt with private creditors, the Argentinian government was one of the earliest to impose a mandatory lockdown, in order to slow down the spread of the coronavirus (Covid-19) and gain time to fine-tune the health system. These measures initially enjoyed high rates of approval, which resulted in an impasse in the dynamics of the public opinion’s political polarization. Such measures were accompanied by a strategy of cooperation among political elites, an event of unusual occurrence in the country (Tagina 2011). At the same time, the social containment measures implemented prevented the social overflows anticipated for the most vulnerable neighborhoods of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, threatened by a lack of income and proper sanitary conditions to face the pandemic. This scenario of cooperation and strengthening of the presidential figure, however, started cracking as the lockdown was extended, giving rise to protests demanding the reopening of economic activities. This chapter analyzes the dynamics of public opinion during the management of the pandemic in Argentina and evaluates the factors modifying the levels of presidential popularity. To do this, I will first describe the political and economic context in which the pandemic broke out. Next, I will review the presidential decisions, together with the variations in the approval levels of public opinion. Then, I will refer to the geography of the distribution of Covid-19 cases and the factors that explain it. Likewise, I will dwell on the tensions between the health and the economic aspects, generated by the policies aimed at containing the spread of Covid-19. Finally, I will review the strategies deployed for the supply of vaccines as well as the vaccination process, to

M. L. Tagina (*) National University of San Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_9

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finish with a reflection on the lights and shadows of the Argentine strategy against coronavirus and the effects of political polarization.

9.2  Political and Economic Context In March 2020, when the earliest cases of Covid-19 were detected in Argentina, Alberto Fernández had been serving as President for just 3 months.1 The 2019 presidential elections in October had led to an alternation in power that meant the return of Peronism to the Pink House. Such return took place at the hands of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, this time as Vice President of a ticket set up by herself, and led by a man who had been her chief of cabinet of ministers between 2007 and 2008. A united Peronism formed the Frente de Todos (Everybody’s Front), an electoral coalition that enabled the victory of Alberto Fernández in the first round, with 48% of the votes. On the opposite side, Mauricio Macri, with 40%, failed to get reelected president on behalf of Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change), the then ruling coalition. These figures reflect the political polarization that has characterized the country throughout the last decade.2 In the economic sphere, the country had accumulated a decrease of 5% in the gross domestic product (GDP), between 2018 and 2020. The external debt reached 89% of the GDP, which made Argentina the most indebted country in the region: interannual inflation had risen to 50%, unemployment to 9%, and poverty to 36% of the population, thus reaching 50% of the country’s children. Negotiations with private creditors of the foreign debt had begun in January, which conditioned the new government’s action plan, insofar as this renegotiation would determine the terms and magnitude of the disbursements that the payment of commitments made by the previous government. Although the pandemic found the Fernández’s government in its honeymoon with the electorate enjoying higher levels of approval than the percentage of votes that had brought him to power, it was a government without enough economic backup, that is, with scarce fiscal resources and a seriously compromised capacity to obtain international loans.

9.3  T  he Management of the Pandemic and Presidential Approval The first case of Covid-19 was detected on March 3, and on March 20, the national government imposed a mandatory lockdown on national territory, one that banned free circulation on the streets of the whole Argentine.3 From then on, the media  In Argentina, the presidential inauguration occurs on December 10, every 4 years.  The six were the formulas that competed in the presidential elections. 3  DECNU-2020-297-APN-PTE Preventive and compulsory social isolation. A few days before, on March 12, another Decree of Necessity and Urgency had been sanctioned, expanding the Health 1 2

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began to focus on recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus, and on presidential decisions in this regard, grabbing the public’s attention, and shifting the focus on the external debt crisis and economic paralysis away from the center of the public agenda. Between the third week of March and the first week of May, more than 80% of the news published on the front pages of the most widely read online newspapers in the country were about issues related to Covid-19 (Zunino and Arcangeletti Yacante 2020: 55). In the same vein, the pandemic modified the axis of the national government’s actions, from then on exclusively focusing on containing the spread of the virus and its economic consequences. The President held interministerial meetings, met with experts, governors of the most affected areas (the City of Buenos Aires and the Province of Buenos Aires), and legislators across the political spectrum; he spoke on the national radio and television networks, gave press conferences flanked by opposition leaders, and issued Necessity and Urgency Decrees, showing himself proactive in the early search for solutions. This resulted in an increase in the positive assessment of both his performance and his image, positioning him in April as the best valued politician in the country (Fig. 9.1). This sudden increase in his popularity can be explained by the so-called round-the-flag rally effect, whereby in periods of international crisis or war, leaders benefit from the support of the population that rallies behind their leader. If the health crisis tested the leadership and management capacity of heads of governments around the world, it also became an opportunity for the Argentinian president. Before the pandemic, Alberto Fernández was viewed by many people as the holder of a position he reached by the decision and with the votes of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. He was questioned by the politicians close to the vice president because he did not consider that the prosecuted and imprisoned government officials of the last Kirchner administration were political prisoners and because of the impatience generated by the lack of definition of an economic plan and of greater progress in the negotiation of the foreign debt. However, in the first months of the lockdown, gestures of support for the way in which he was handling the coronavirus crisis, from supporters and opponents, became common. Among the people who had not voted for him, it was usual to hear that “I [they] support[ed] the firmness with which he is handling this pandemic” or “I [they] applaud[ed] that he has summoned Rodríguez Larreta4 and that they both appear together at the press conference.” In the same vein, the head of the block of Deputies of Juntos por el Cambio, Mario Negri, from the Radical party, expressed: “The President is the commander of this battle because the country has decided it…we are going to accompany.”5 In this sense, political polarization seemed to Emergency, which had been approved by the National Congress in December 2019 (Law 27,541). Both DNUs and the successive ones that determined the extension of the confinement were later endorsed by the National Congress, which began to meet in mixed form, with some legislators present and others connected remotely. 4  Horacio Rodríguez Larreta is the chief of government of the City of Buenos Aires and leader of the opposition coalition Together for Change. 5  It is the main opposition coalition.

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Fig. 9.1  President’s image and the main political leaders (very good + somewhat good) Source: Poll satisfaction and public opinion survey – Universidad de San Andrés. Base 1015 cases. April 14–21

have entered a truce. According to data from Poliarquía, a public opinion consultant, between July 2019 and April 2020 the percentage of Argentines who considered themselves “excluded from the crack”6 rose from 40% to 54% (Klobovs 2020). Regarding the Congress, National Deputies and Senators gave up their travel expenses at the initiative of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Sergio Massa, a copartisan of Alberto Fernández, as a clear act of support for the extraordinary measures taken by the Executive Power. As for the Vice President, she traveled to Cuba on March 15 to accompany her daughter there, leaving leadership and also the responsibility, in the hands of the President.7 For Alberto Fernández, the battle against the coronavirus became not only a public health issue but also a communication and public opinion battle. Had he thought that the renegotiation of the foreign debt would be the litmus test of his presidency, the containment of coronavirus emerged as a greater challenge. As of April 10, when the rules of the mandatory lockdown were eased for the first time, the President delegated subsequent definitions regarding confinement to the governors,8 thereby sharing with them the political costs of the economic and social effects of the pandemic that were beginning to arise.

 “The crack” (la grieta) is the way the media, and even politicians and public opinion, refer to political polarization. 7  She returned to the country on March 22, the day before borders were closed. 8  Although each of the measures referred to confinement had to have the agreement of the chief of the Nation’s cabinet. 6

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9.3.1  T  he Response to the Irregular Territorial Distribution of Cases: ASPO and DISPO A factor that influenced the incidence of the disease was the irregular distribution of the population in the country. Thus, during the first 6 months of the pandemic, more than 90% of the positive cases were concentrated in the so-called Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (AMBA),9 where approximately 30% of the country’s population lives. This region has the highest population density but also the highest rates of overcrowding. In particular, in the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), there are almost 1000 slum settlements and shanty towns, where confinement should have been organized within the boundaries of the neighborhood but not within the household, given the precarious conditions of the homes and the lack of basic infrastructure, such as sewers and drinking water. Something similar happened in the almost 60 shanty towns in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA). For these reasons, it has been in the AMBA where the greatest restrictions on free circulation were maintained the longest, and it was de PBA where the national government allocated the greatest health and economic resources.10 Depending on the epidemiological situation of each location, as of June, the confinement measures were of two types: obligatory preventive social isolation (known in Spanish as ASPO), of a more restrictive nature, and obligatory preventive social distancing (known in Spanish as DISPO), of a more flexible kind. Specifically, it was decided that in the areas where there was community transmission of the virus, the ASPO scheme should continue, while in the interior of the Buenos Aires province and in general, in the rest of the country, a DISPO scheme was established, which meant the progressive reopening of commercial, industrial, and service activities. However, restrictions on face-to-face school lessons; events in public or private places, interurban, interjurisdictional, and international public passenger transport; and tourism were maintained. In addition, another feature of the country that explains the dynamics of the virus is that of the “porous borders” with the neighboring countries in the north of Argentina. As an example, it is worth noting that the province of Jujuy became the first province to reach a situation of sanitary collapse and had to be assisted by the national government and other provincial administrations. Despite the preventive measures, in August, when this province was close to resuming face-to-face school lessons, it was surprised by a wave of infections that soared after two police officers crossed the border into the town from Villazón, Bolivia, in order to buy coca leaves, and got the

9  The Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires includes the City of Buenos Aires and 24 municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires that surround that city. 10  According to a study by the consulting firm Aerarium, until June, the Province of Buenos Aires had received more than 51% of the discretionary transfers made by the National Treasury https:// www.infobae.com/politica/2020/06/06/fondos-discrecionales-y-reparto-desparejo-la-ayuda-delgobierno-a-las-provincias-en-la-­pandemia/.

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disease. In a few weeks, Jujuy could not face the health crisis on its own and had to be assisted by the national government and other provincial administrations. This uneven spread rate of the virus meant that each province had its own infection curve. Thus, in September, while in CABA and GBA, infections and deaths stabilized to begin to decline very slowly, in provinces such as Jujuy, Catamarca, San Luis, San Juan, and Santa Fe, infections increased significantly. The equation had changed, and the highest percentage of cases began to be distributed in the countryside, including the rest of the Buenos Aires territory that is not the GBA. In December, the number of infections reached almost 1.5 million throughout the country, while the cases of recovered patients reached 1.3 million. For their part, the number of deaths was close to 40,000 and the average rate of positive tests was 28.7%. The data showed a deterioration in the relative situation of Argentina compared to the world. If on June 6, the cumulative number of weekly confirmed deaths over the previous week was 2.65 per million people, on December 31 that figure had risen to 20.6 (Our World in Data (n.d.)). As I will point out later, this had a correlation in the President’s popularity levels.

9.3.2  Health vs. Economy The preexisting economic problems in Argentina worsened with the pandemic, along with their consequences. A possible default on the foreign debt and the consequent closure of access to international financing would have had the effect of further complicating the distributional bid that would necessarily occur as the pandemic progressed. In effect, the policies aimed to ease the effects of the pandemic increased the already high fiscal deficit as social spending grew day by day; tax collection and exports fell, as did the international prices of commodities and international foreign reserves. In addition to the economy’s contraction, there were rising levels of inflation and job losses. Hence, the President and his government team bet heavily on an agreement with external creditors. The negotiation lasted for several months and was successfully closed at the beginning of August. The reduction in both the interest rate and the capital owed, along with the grace period granted before starting payments, meant a breath of fresh air in the drowned Argentinian economy, which managed to enlist the support of government officials and opponents behind the agreement achieved. However, its effects were short-lived. The consequences of the economic crisis, aggravated by the serious economic and social effect of the restrictive measures, were quickly reflected on the hierarchy of priorities of public opinion. As the lockdown was extended and the health system was managing to meet the patients’ demands, together with the fact that the number of infections did not reach a peak, the fear of the virus gave way to other concerns. Toward the month of July, the surveys reflected a change in the distribution of the problems considered as the most serious by the population. Unemployment and inflation, hand in hand with insecurity and corruption, had already displaced the coronavirus from the first place (Figs. 9.2).

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Fig. 9.2  Argentines’ concerns Source: Poll satisfaction and public opinion survey – Universidad de San Andrés. Base 1010 cases. July 1–8. What or what would you say are the main problems affecting the country today? Multiple answer. % first mention and % total responses

At the same time, the structure of concerns was associated with the vote in 2019, an indication of the underlying political polarization (Fig. 9.3). Simultaneously, different elements activated street protests, mostly from sectors of the middle and upper middle classes, independents and opponents to the national government. Besides, some management errors on public significance11 led to the first “cacerolazo” (outdoor pan beating) on April 30, which was widely supported, especially in CABA. Moreover, certain government measures not linked to the management of Covid-19 generated resistance and managed to agglutinate the opposition against them,12 thereby prompting the return of polarization. Slogans of discontent over the lockdown’s extension, demanding greater freedom and the

 I am referring, on the one hand, to the incident that took place regarding the payment of pensions that exposed highly vulnerable sectors of the population to a situation of contagion, as a result of the long lines they had to do at banks. And on the other, the complaint about overpricing in the purchase of food products paid by the Ministry of Social Development of the Nation. 12  The main ones were, on the one hand, the announcement of the expropriation of Vicentín, one of the main cereal firms in the country that declared bankruptcy, which took place on June 8. On the other hand, the sending to Congress of the Judicial Reform bill, announced on July 30. Also, the so-called tax on large fortunes, which involved a one-time contribution of those with assets of more than 200 million Argentine pesos. Finally, the removal of a percentage point of the federal fiscal co-participation to CABA in September, to be handled by the PBA, in order to afford the rise of salaries of the Province of Buenos Aires police. It is important to say that the week before, police officers carrying weapons surrounded the presidential residence in Olivos, demanding a salary raise, something that was interpreted by a large part of the political arc and the society as an attack on the rules of democracies. The four policies were promoted by sectors of the Kirchnerist wing of the government. 11

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Fig. 9.3  Argentines’ concerns according to vote in 2019 Source: Poll satisfaction and public opinion survey – Universidad de San Andrés. Base 1010 cases. July 1–8. What or what would you say are the main problems affecting the country today? Multiple answer. % first mention and % total responses

reopening of economic activity followed suit. These calls were powered by social networks and amplified by the media. The main setting for the protests was CABA, the environment of the presidential residence, and some of the provincial capital cities, despite the restrictions on circulation and in parallel with a growth in infections. Several of these mobilizations took place during national holidays, at the rate of one per month, between May and November, although in August and September they were more frequent. Of particular importance was a call on August 17, which had the support of Partido Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal Party) of the former president Mauricio Macri, and was attended by relevant figures from that political space, which, however, was not supported by CABA’s chief of government, also a partner of the former president. These events exposed the internal tensions between the leaders of the opposition with management responsibilities and the ones who were not holding any positions in public office.

9.3.3  Vaccines The publication of the successful results of the first vaccine testing phases started a new chapter in the fight against Coronavirus, and the President took advantage of this soon. Toward the end of August, the national government signed a contract with the pharmaceutical company AstraZéneca, which guaranteed the supply of 22 million doses to Argentina during the first half of 2021. At the same time, it was agreed that the local laboratory mAbxience would be responsible for the production of the active principle of this vaccine, leaving the fractioning, packaging, and distribution processes in the hands of a company in Mexico. In the same vein, in the beginning of December, President Fernández signed a contract with the Russian Direct Investment Fund, which ensured the supply of 10 million double doses of the Sputnik V vaccine to the country. This was the first contract signed by a country outside the orbit of the States that used to be part of the

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Soviet Union.13 He also announced Aerolíneas Argentinas would carry the vaccines from Russia to Argentina, while the responsibility for internal distribution would fall on the Armed Forces. In addition, he reported that the entire vaccination operation would be in charge of the public health system, so the vaccine would not be available to private health institutions. As for the provincial governments, their function would be to organize vaccination operatives across the territory of their provinces and request the cooperation of municipal authorities. Thus, the decentralized modality in the provinces would mean differences in the degree of organization and effectiveness of the operations, with both political and public health consequences. In subsequent months, the government reported on progress in negotiations with other vaccine suppliers, such as Pfizer and the Chinese government. In another effort to show leadership, the President took the lead of the Strategic Vaccination Command, which consisted of the Ministries of Health, Interior, Defense, Security, and the Comprehensive Medical Care Program (known in Spanish as PAMI), with the aim of coordinating the delivery of these vaccines with the provinces’ governors.

9.4  L  ights and Shadows of the Argentine Strategy Against the Coronavirus The President centralized the management of the pandemic and the announcements around the strategy to combat Covid-19. From the beginning, he showed himself active and monopolized the initiative, in an attempt to capitalize on what could be the achievements of the said management. However, what was at the beginning a successful management of the crisis is today a questioned strategy, given the number of infections and deaths already recorded. It should be pointed out, however, that the so-called longest lockdown in the world managed to prevent the collapse of the health system, so that all the people in need of medical care could receive it. In this sense, the early reaction of Alberto Fernández’s government gained time for the creation of new hospitals and isolation centers; the number of intensive care beds increased, respirators were purchased, and the medical personnel were trained. In addition, restrictions on public circulation ensured that the spread of infection would slow down and let the people gradually acquire care habits, such as washing their hands frequently, using facemasks, and keeping social distance. Hence, it is possible to affirm that deaths from Covd-19 in Argentina have not occurred, nor are they still occurring today, due to the lack of respirators or intensive care beds. However, an early reaction by the government is just one of the many elements that determine the effectiveness of the fight against the pandemic (Martí i Puig and Alcántara Sáez 2020). In fact, it was not enough to stop the spread of the virus and its lethal effects. On the contrary the strategy to combat Covid-19 proposed by the

 In addition, Argentina also takes part in COVAX, the Global Access Fund for Covid-19 Vaccines, founded by the World Health Organization, European Commission, and the Government of France.

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national government did not keep the virus within the borders of the AMBA, where it first arrived. Nor did it cause a short-term drop in the incidence of the disease. Two factors associated with these failures are mainly low levels of testing, together with a faulty strategy to follow up on close contacts, who were only swabbed if they presented symptoms. The strategy proposed in the slum areas and shanty towns, with high rates of overcrowding, was not effective either. It was only in late 2020, when the cases had already decreased, that the PBA governorate began to clean up every close contact. At the same time, as people in the AMBA started showing clear signs of intolerance to isolation, the restrictions on public circulation were eased, when the levels of infection were still high, something that caused the virus to move toward the inland provinces of the country. This point is related to a central political element: the high levels of political polarization showed by both elites and society. Although at the beginning of the pandemic a strategy of government-opposition and central-­ provincial government coordination prevailed, polarization was resilient to dialogic attitudes and reinstated itself in the political and social scene. A sign of this, as mentioned before, is the dozens of street protests against the lockdown but also against some policies of the national government. These demonstrations showed the highest levels of attendance in CABA, in particular, the district most affected by the pandemic. As in the rest of the world, a characteristic of these demonstrations was that many of the people that participated did not observe the rules of social distancing or use of masks. As a consequence, not only did the risk of infection increased, given the agglomeration of people, but these people also exerted pressure on the authorities who had imposed the isolation measures in place to reopen activities and allow free circulation, thus promoting the spread of the virus. In addition, a public wake of soccer star Diego Armando Maradona was organized by the national government by late November, which meant a massive circulation of people and ended up in significant excesses. Similarly, the government’s errors also conspired against the success in controlling the pandemic. We can affirm then that the polarization played a part in the response of the population to the measures to stop Covid-19, as well as the relationship between the government and the opposition, making governance more difficult and calling the effectiveness of governmental measures into question. This is reflected in the evolution of the presidential popularity, which fell 30% points between March and December (Fig. 9.4).

9.5  Conclusion Political polarization, a political feature that Argentina shares with other countries on the continent, helps to understand the pandemic’s evolution. This feature, which is prior to the arrival of Covid-19, is present not only at the level of society but also of its political leadership. Hence, the government-opposition political cooperation strategy proposed by President Fernández was surprising and largely explains the initial

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Fig. 9.4  Alberto Fernández’s popularity (image + management) Source: Executive Approval Project (Carlin et al. 2019). Presidential approval series that combine the survey marginals of presidential popularity into a single smoothed series using Stimson’s (1991) dyad ratio algorithm. Computed from 167 data points

success of the prevention measures in the AMBA and the high rates of the President’s popularity. In this regard, my opinion is that this strategy resulted from both the President’s own style, which is subject, however, to the internal tensions of his own governing coalition and the particular physiognomy and social dynamics of the AMBA, a territory that belongs to two different jurisdictions (CABA and PBA) which are governed by the main opposition alliance and the official alliance, respectively. In this sense, I believe that cooperation between the three heads (the President of the Nation, the head of government of CABA, and the governor of PBA) was proposed as the only reasonable strategy, although this does not disregard the merits of those leading it, given the existence of a previous polarization dynamics, as I have already mentioned. Thus, the success in managing the pandemic during the first months was enabled by an agreement between the moderate sectors of both coalitions, the ruling party, and the opposition. President Fernández’s vocation for dialogue found its counterpart in Rodríguez Larreta, who, out of conviction and/or convenience, has continued to coordinate health and confinement policies with the President and with his PBA counterpart. However, the actions of sectors reluctant to dialogue with their opposition counterparts in both coalitions, which find political gain in the strategy of polarizing, had an effect on the dynamics of the pandemic, compromising the success of implemented policies and hindering governance. At the same time, the national government and the governors had to deal with the tension between the need to control the spread of the virus and the need to empathize with a large part of the population that had decided by themselves to end social isolation. In fact, the worst phase of the pandemic occurred in parallel with the population’s overtiredness of the confinement measures, complicating the health scenario, which, even today, remains uncertain. Expectations are placed on the vaccination process, subject both to the prompt supply of doses by the pharmaceutical companies and to a correct implementation by the corresponding authorities.

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References Carlin RE, Hartlyn J, Hellwig T, Love GJ, Martinez-Gallardo C, Singer MM (2019) Executive approval database 2.0. Available for download at www.executiveapproval.org Klobovs L (2020) El impacto del Coronavirus en la figura presidencial argentina. Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública, in press Martí i Puig S, Alcántara Sáez M (eds) (2020) Política y crisis en América Latina. Reacción en impacto frente a la COVID-19. Marcial Pons, Madrid Our World in Data (n.d.) https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/ argentina?country=~ARG Stimson. 1991. Public opinion in America: Moods, cycles, and swings. Boulder: Westview Press Tagina ML (2011) Política y polarización en Argentina: un estudio del comportamiento de las élites, los partidos políticos y la opinión pública. Revista de Derecho Electoral ISSN-e 1659-2069, Nº. 17, 2014:185–212 Zunino E y Arcangeletti Yacante C (2020) La cobertura mediática de la COVID-19 en la Argentina: un estudio sobre el tratamiento informativo de la pandemia en los principales medios online del país. Prácticas del oficio Investigación y reflexión en Ciencias Sociales 1(25):49–66

Chapter 10

Identity Versus Fear of Death: Political Polarization Under the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil Amanda Medeiros, Frederico Bertholini, and Carlos Pereira

10.1  F  ueling Identity Connections But Losing the Grasp on Political Right The coronavirus pandemic has been a shock with unprecedented repercussion in the contemporary world. Initially treated as a “mysterious disease,” possibly the result of human contamination by wild animals, COVID-19 quickly spread to various parts of the world, leaving a spectrum of fear and death. Regardless of underreporting, by the end of January 2021, it had already infected more than 113  million people, leading to the death of more than 2.5 million around the world. In Brazil alone, there are already more than 10.4  million confirmed cases and more than 250,000 deaths. Initially, the pandemic gave rise to extreme reactions from political players all over the world. On the one hand, those most concerned with the speed of contagion, the severity of the disease and the risk of death (in the Brazilian case, governors, mayors, and legislators), have expressed a preference for following the recommendations of the World Health Organization of social distancing, even in the face of negative consequences for the economy. On the other hand, segments of the population in some countries and even some governments, such as that of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, have minimized the virulence of the pandemic and its health consequences, alleging concern about the adverse economic effects generated by the

A. Medeiros Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil F. Bertholini (*) Political Science Institute, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] C. Pereira Fundação Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_10

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measures of social distance. This dichotomy, although factually false, as pointed out by several experts (Hassel 2020; Jorge 2020), permeates the political discourses of those who oppose social distancing. In this sense, it is appropriate to define this narrative, mainly because elite speeches can have a great impact on the adherence to social distancing, as shown by Ajzenman et al. (2020). At the beginning of the pandemic, Bolsonaro was not alone in refusing to enact social distancing measures and dismissing concerns about the virus’ lethality. The presidents of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega; Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko; and Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow; the United States, Donald Trump; Mexico, López Obrador; and Russia, Vladimir Putin were also reluctant to support social distancing measures. However, at some point of the pandemic trajectory, as the number of deaths increased, all of them decided to take a step back and face COVID-19 as the biggest challenge of our time, except for Bolsonaro. As of today, his negationist approach can be considered as unique. Kingstone and Power (2017) argued that there has been a sharp increase in political polarization since 2013 in Brazil. For Hunter and Power (2019), this increase was visible both to the great mass and to the political elites and took over the country during the 2018 elections. On the one hand, the left-wing, whose hegemony belongs to the center-left Workers’ Party and whose most prominent political figure is former President Lula da Silva. On the other hand, the right-wing, whose hegemony was conquered in the 2018 elections by the political group Jair Bolsonaro, currently without a party. As a candidate, Bolsonaro sought to fulfill the expectations of “cleansing” Brazilian politics by building a platform that was initially anti-PT, but essentially anti-party, advocating the idea that all political parties and their members are equally part of a corrupt elite. The electoral viability of this belief occurs through the identity-­based framework that denies institutions and praises the direct connection between the political leader and voters, with the homogenization and mythification of the categories “elites and people,” identified as antagonistic (Bos et  al. 2020; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). As a President, Bolsonaro governed in a kind of permanent polarization campaign. A conspiratorial tone has been a fundamental part of this government’s crusade against imprecise enemies that arise every day and everywhere (Kovic and Caspar 2018). The systematic denial of traditional instruments of government left Bolsonaro with little alternative, even during the pandemic. The uninterrupted and radical mobilization of his most loyal voters continued to be the standard model of governance. He desperately needed to feed his political supporters with a narrative to keep them united. This populist approach implemented by the President became, therefore, a kind of strategy for strengthening identity connections, and thus protecting its core constituency of voters against rival information. In fact, as Brewer (2001) argued, identity does not necessarily require values and policy attitudes; it simply involves, on the one hand, a sense of inclusion for in-group people and on the other a sense of exclusion for members of out-groups. Identity fills two basic competing psychological and social need  – one of inclusion (being part of the group) and one of

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exclusion or differentiation (distinguishing oneself from others). The motivated reasoning literature suggests that group members interpret information in a way that benefits the group itself (Bisgaard 2015; Bolsen et al. 2014; Leeper and Slothuus 2014) in order to reduce the pain generated by informational updates that contradict the values on which they rely. Thus, when realizing that a particular position is shared by the community to which they belong, it is expected that its members will develop their own narrative structures as a defense mechanism of that position (Bolsen et al. 2014). Feelings of attachment generate loyalty of the members of each group and provide feelings of security and prestige. On the other hand, individuals who do not belong to the group develop hostility and aversion to the values and beliefs of rival communities, and may even see them as enemies. An intrinsic importance can be perceived of sharing identities and reciprocal loyalties among individuals who belong to a group (in-group) and the distancing of individuals outside that group (out-group), evoking value biases in favor of their own band and contrary to the rival (Hameleers et al. 2017). Identities, therefore, creates a sense of belonging to a particular group and can promote a state of blindness in which its members tend to disregard factual information when it contradicts the group’s identity values (Druckman and Bolsen 2011). Some events, however, can have a strong influence on the individuals’ lives. In such an extreme situation as the COVID-19 pandemic, those who belong to a certain group may need to choose between their identity and the risks arising from that choice in their own lives. Even members of strong identity-based groups can see their beliefs and identity ties shaken by a shock of great magnitude like a pandemic. In other words, in extreme situations, identity may no longer be sufficient to justify some individuals’ adherence to the group (Kunda 1990; Mazar et al. 2008). People tend to activate a kind of “protected mode,” a primary-defense strategy to mitigate vulnerabilities and at the same time increase security and stability. It is precisely in moments like a pandemic, which causes lots of uncertainties and potential personal risks, that group identities become malleable and susceptible to changes. That is, the spell of identity that usually keeps in-group members united and cohesive tends to become weaker. The costs of changing beliefs, therefore, decrease significantly, and the chances of some members straying from the group when considering other identity alternatives increase. The bias against out-group people, which used to work as a barrier to interaction and a key fuel of political polarization, tends to decline. Supposedly, the fear of death watered down the glue that used to stick political right (both center-right and right voters) together. Just before the pandemic explosion, the game of polarized groups was in relative “balance,” with each group feeding on the radical opposition of political preferences. Such polar groups did not converse with each other and tended to consume information that only reinforced their previous beliefs, by rejecting any information that contradicted their values (Mason 2018). Therefore, they did not pay attention to news that could jeopardize their respective “comfort zones.” However, in the face of an unprecedented event such as the pandemic, and the need for some level of social cohesion around a challenge common to all, would it be possible to imagine some

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change in terms of polarization? This chapter particularly addresses to what extent the pandemic has entrenched these tendencies or eased polarized behavior, coalescing voters around opposite poles.

10.2  Methodology To answer some of those questions, we carried a series of web-based opinion polls, one of which was a survey experiment with conjoint analysis. In this chapter, we present the results of the first two rounds, carried in March 2020 and in May 2020. The final samples were 7848, in the first round, and 7020 in the second (with all valid responses) including respondents from all Brazilian states, with a greater concentration in São Paulo (44% and 40.34%), Minas Gerais (7% and 8.20%), and Rio de Janeiro (6% and 17.5%) in both rounds, respectively.1 In both rounds, roughly half of the participants were female (50.2% and 47.2%, respectively) and were more than 35 years old (78% and 59%, respectively), which closely represents the respective proportions in the Brazilian population. Most respondents earned an income of over three times the minimum wage (82% and 77%) and have college education (82%), that is, our sample is richer and way more educated than the Brazilian average. We did not use a probabilistic approach for the selection of the sample and chose not to perform any post-stratification in view of the potential risks of introducing bias due to unobservable variables (Shin 2012). It is known that “where sampling weights are solely a function of independent variables included in the model, unweighted OLS estimates are preferred because they are unbiased, consistent, and have smaller standard errors than weighted OLS estimates” (Winship and Radbill 1994:230), that is, a modelled approach can be more efficient than post-­stratification. Therefore, every attempt to generalize univariate descriptive findings of this study to Brazilian population as a whole must be avoided. It is important to note also that part of the respondents were different in each round of the survey, so comparisons should be interpreted with caution. Experimental data and especially modelled results, however, suffer a lot less from these validity issues.

10.2.1  First Round of Opinion Poll Respondents were invited to participate in a survey on perception and behavior in relation to the coronavirus. After consent, all responded about (1) their situation in relation to social distancing; the financial losses resulting from this distancing; the 1  All the details about the datasets and replicating material for the analyses is available upon request. The surveys were posted on social networks of the newspaper Estado de São Paulo and also distributed through the authors social networks and through the FGV mailing.

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social distancing measures implemented by state governors and by the President; and if they knew someone infected with COVID-19; (2) who they believed were the authorities responsible for pandemic control in Brazil; (3) how they evaluated the actions implemented to control the pandemic by the governors and the President; (4) the degree of agreement with the social distancing policy and how much they would be willing to be isolated; (5) sociodemographic aspects; and (6) a self-­ reported question about ideology.

10.2.2  Second Round: Conjoint Analysis Conjoint analysis (CA) is one of the most commonly used quantitative market research methods to understand and quantify consumer preferences for products and services (Raghavarao et al. 2010; Rao et al. 2014). Recently CA has also been applied in political science research (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2014; Aguilar et al. 2015; Franchino and Zucchini 2015). It is the best methodological approach to test this hypothesis because it is more comparable to real-­ world decisions by mimicking the choice-based situation voters experience at the ballot box. In addition, it helps to mitigate social desirability by offering the respondent an opportunity to rate not just their own attributes but to select candidates by comparing different attributes simultaneously (Ones and Viswesvaran 1999; Wallander 2009; Tomassetti et al. 2016), prompting respondents to face a tradeoff among different attributes of a candidate. The procedure was the following: after agreeing to participate, (1) respondents answered questions quite similar to the ones in the first survey; (2) they were engaged in a choice-based CA task; (3) they answered questions about their political support for Bolsonaro in a hypothetical future presidential election in 2022; (4) they self-reported their ideology; and finally (5) they provided basic socioeconomic information. In the choice-based CA task, we asked respondents to decide between two candidates that varied in a set of attributes orthogonally designed. In each of the four pairs presented, we showed a screen with a short description of the candidates and asked respondents (1) to choose one of them (binary dependent variable) and (2) to rate the candidates shown on a ten-point scale. The order of each pair of candidates was randomly assigned, and each candidate’s profile presented one level of the attributes randomly defined in our orthogonal design. Therefore, each respondent assessed four comparisons between pairs of candidates. Each candidate’s profile presented four attributes that were randomized in a full factorial design that was symmetric and fully orthogonal for the main effects. The attributes evaluated represented polar agendas with respect to four dimensions: (1) vision of the world (conservative with connection to moral and family values vs. progressive with emphasis on minority rights); (2) policy agenda (social inclusion vs. fighting against corruption); (3) economic policy (state-led development vs. liberalism); and (4) political parties (coalition-based government vs. governing

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without an alliance). The choice of attributes was determined by the results obtained in the first round of our survey as well as in previous studies (as pointed out in the previous sections).

10.3  Results: A Divided Political Right The vast majority of our sample give full or partial support to social distancing. Average support barely changed, from 4.18 to 4.17 on a scale from 1 to 5. On the other hand, the performance assessment of President Bolsonaro during the pandemic, which was already low, fell on average even more since the first poll, from 2.11 to 1.78. Governors also had worse perceived performance in the pandemic, from 3.9 to 3.14 on average. We do not intend to discuss these naive unweighted results here that can be better accessed with other data sources, such as DataFolha or Poder360. In this chapter, we want to stress the interaction between ideology, identity, exposure to COVID-19, and the relation with support to social distancing and Bolsonaro’s evaluation. As in the first round, most respondents who considered themselves as left, center-left, center, and center-right remained consistently in favor of social distancing in the second round. There was a drop among those who call themselves right in the second round (see Fig. 10.1). Whereas the majority right-wing respondents (59%) also provided greater support for the social distancing measure in the survey’s first round, their support declined to 41% in the survey’s second round. The assessment of the President’s performance in the pandemic was even more negative among left, center-left, center, and center-right respondents in the second round. While these respondents increased their support for social distancing, they

Fig. 10.1  Political support for social distancing: the performance of President Bolsonaro and state governors in the pandemic

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also began to assess Bolsonaro’s performance even more negatively. Opposite behavior, however, was observed among respondents calling themselves right-wing, with a decline in support for social distancing and a reduction in the negative assessment of Bolsonaro’s performance in the second round of the survey.2 The assessment of state governors changed considerably in the second round. Regardless of ideological orientation, voters significantly diminished their positive assessment of the state governors’ performance during the pandemic, especially with a substantial increase in the number of voters who started to rate them as medium. But who are these center-right and right-wing voters? What do they believe? Would they still be willing to reelect the President in 2022? Why are they divided over social distancing and opinion about the President? First, to identify whether there would be some kind of responses grouping by category, we conducted a multiple correspondence analysis using four variables: ideology, Bolsonaro’s approval, governors’ approval, and support for social distancing. A multiple correspondence analysis is a multivariate analysis strategy for categorical data that allows the identification of the variables that most contribute to data variability, as well as an inertia associated with each of the categories of these variables (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). In order to count only those who took a position in relation to the questionnaire themes and also in relation to ideology, we excluded respondents from the center, grouping left and center-left in the category “left” and center-right and right in the category “right.” We also exclude those who were indifferent in other variables. Results show that the first extracted dimension explains most of the data variance corresponding to about 61% of the total data variability, while the first two dimensions added up to almost 80%. The perceptual map’s reading works as follows: the farther from zero in a given dimension, the greater the inertia, that is, the more relevant. And the closer the categories are on the map, the greater the likelihood of association. There is a clear grouping of the categories against_bolsonaro, favor_ distancing, and favor_governors, and another group, formed by the categories against_governors and against_distancing (Fig. 10.2). Additionally, if we look only at the first dimension extracted in the multiple correspondence analysis, we can state that ideology is not the variable that best explains positions against social distancing, against governors, and favorable to the President. The distances between the opposite categories of social distancing (2.1), assessment of governors (1.8), and assessment of the President (1.8) are always greater than the distance between political left and right (1.4) in standardized loads of first extracted dimension (X axis). The bottom line of our MCA model is: social distancing is a more relevant source of variance than ideology. As a matter of fact, we can argue that the political right is divided. To take a closer look at the differences in the political right profiles, we invited the respondents to choose from four pairs of hypothetical presidential candidates in 2  It is worth mentioning that previous publications indicate no significant difference in evaluation by income levels when controlling for ideology (Pereira et al. 2020). We thank the reviewers for raising this point.

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Fig. 10.2 Multiple correspondence analysis of ideology, Bolsonaro’s approval, governors’ approval, and support for social distancing

2022, each representing polar agendas with respect to the four conjoint dimensions: values (progressive vs. conservative); economic policy (developmental vs. liberal); policy issues (social policies vs. anticorruption); and political parties (governing without parties vs. governing in coalition with parties). Results suggested the existence of two main groups of right-wing respondents. One group is mostly based on conservative identity ties. This group is more organic and cohesive and tends to offer unconditional support to the government because the members believe in Bolsonaro’s political project and conservative values. In order to remain cohesive, offering safe social and political support, this group needs to be constantly fed with populist and identity-based polarizing signaling. We consider identitarians as those voters whose individual results in the conjoint analysis attribute higher salience to the “values” dimension. Pragmatic voters, on the other hand, attribute higher salience to the “economic policy” dimension. We then labelled respondents as such, according to the conjoint analysis results. The other group, which we call pragmatic, offers circumstantial political support to the government insofar as the President can provide what they were really interested in: liberal economic policies and avoiding the return of the Workers’ Party (PT) to power.

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While Bolsonaro expressed radical positions on issues related to the environment, gender, minorities, foreign policy, education, and culture, his voters were willing to continue supporting him, since they believed their individual short-term risks of loss were low. However, when the President took a stand against social distancing, respondents believed this position posed risks to their own lives and that of loved ones, generating real risks in the short term. The support for social distancing is stronger among pragmatic respondents than in identitarian respondents (b  =  −0.307, p  =  0.001). Differences in Bolsonaro’s approval between these two groups are also statistically significant (b  =  0.692, p = 0.000), suggesting that the identitarian respondents provide greater support to Bolsonaro than pragmatic respondents. We tested the predicted value with regard to Bolsonaro’s performance and regarding the support for social distance. The results confirm our expectation. That is, the predicted value of Bolsonaro’s approval between identitarian and pragmatic respondents (values  – EconPol) is 0.692, p = 0.000. Moreover, the predicted value of social distancing approval over these two profiles (values – EconPol) is −0.307, p = 0.001.3 The center-right and right-wing respondents who positively evaluated President Bolsonaro’s performance gave greater importance to conservative social values. This pillar seems to be the key component of the identity-based connection with Bolsonaro. In fact, these respondents want their candidate for the presidency in 2022 to govern mostly oriented toward actions grounded on conservative values, morals, and family principles. They also want the next president to govern with the state playing a smaller role in the economy in a market-oriented fashion, without political alliances or via formal coalitions with other parties, and prioritizing the fight against political corruption. On the other hand, those respondents who negatively evaluated the performance of Bolsonaro in office were less extreme in all of the analyzed conjoint dimensions. The only clear dimension that stands out in this pragmatic group of voters was the support for liberal economic policies (Fig. 10.3). In order to understand how strong these identities are in face of the danger posed by COVID-19, we proposed an econometric exercise. In both rounds of the survey, we collected data on the proportion of people who claimed to know someone infected with COVID-19. In the first round, this number was approximately 35% (17% developed mild COVID-19 and 18% severe cases, of which 7% died). In the second round, the proximity to COVID-19 cases rose to 71% (32% in the mild stage and 39% in the most severe stage, of which 20% died). To what extent does greater exposure to cases of COVID-19 with varying degrees of severity and conservative ties influence voting intentions of center-right and right-wing respondents in presidential elections? Offering definitive answers to this question still seems premature, since the presidential elections of 2022 are a long way off in terms of events that can sway voters. Many other aspects may interfere with this voting decision. However, a picture of what could happen today can offer plausible clues as to how people might react

 The tests related to the conjoint tests and analyses will be available upon request.

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Fig. 10.3  Bolsonaro’s performance and support for social distancing between right-wing identitarians and pragmatic respondents

electorally. This exercise sheds light on the profile of conservative voters and their electoral behavior. Figure 10.4 depicts a statistical exercise in which we estimate the likelihood of center-right and right-wing respondents’ voting for Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections. We have proximity to people infected by COVID-19 (our proxy for fear of death) as a predictor. We also included variables that estimate the level of preference for conservative, liberal, anti-party, and anti-corruption identity-based values. In addition, we tested the impact of the expected economic loss due to the pandemic. We also controlled for gender, education, and age. The results suggest that the “fear of death” and the expectation of economic loss significantly reduce the chances of these voters voting for Bolsonaro in 2022. On the other hand, the more conservative and anti-party these voters were, the greater the chances of voting for the President’s reelection. Although these variables have

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Fig. 10.4  Impact of COVID-19 on voting preference for the presidency in 2022. (N 1833, pseudo­R2: 0.29)

opposite effects, the substantive impact of being conservative is much greater than the fear of death. In other words, being close to someone who died due to COVID-19 reduces the chances by 20% of right-wing and center-right voters to vote for Bolsonaro. However, having a conservative identity with the President can guarantee almost 90% of those respondents’ support for Bolsonaro’s reelection. These results provide support for our claim that the identity connections that people develop with a particular group generate a sense of belonging, warmth, and security for the members of the group. For this reason, people tend to use their identities as protective shields that reduce the chances of the group’s values and beliefs being reassessed and updated. As already widely documented in the social psychology literature, strong identity-based ties activate equally strong psychological defense mechanisms, distorting, avoiding, and/or denying factual information that threatens the social identity of individuals, and in this case, voters.

10.4  Conclusions The empirical results of the two rounds of surveys revealed the existence of two competing forces. On the one hand, the fear of death is extremely relevant. People perceived COVID-19 as a strong shock, which caused high uncertainty about the risk of infection, with distinct levels of severity. This risk perception boosted support for (and the practice of) social distancing and led to a negative evaluation of President Bolsonaro’s performance. On the other hand, as people got used to the pandemic’s everyday effect, identity connections with Bolsonaro acted as a competing vector in the opposite direction to the fear of death, working as a shield against the pandemic’s external shock and maintaining the political support for Bolsonaro. It is the dream of most leaders to leave a historic legacy of facing crises such as wars or pandemics and uniting the country around their leadership to face the

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common enemy. However, Bolsonaro was unable to extricate from the bonds that he imposed on himself when he decided to govern aiming at his identitarian supporters. Instead of uniting the country to fight the mortal and invisible enemy, he worked to divide it. Despite waging a perpetual polarized campaign, President Bolsonaro was able to obtain political support from an important portion of the population. However, by emphasizing the negative impacts of social distancing on the economy and at the same time minimizing the risks of contagion and the severity of the pandemic, a significant portion of voters ideologically congruent with the government turned against it.

References Aguilar R, Cunow S, Desposato S, Barone LS (2015) Ballot structure, candidate race, and vote choice in Brazil. Lat Am Res Rev 50(3):175–202 Ajzenman N, Cavalcanti T, Da Mata D (2020) More than words: leaders’ speech and risky behavior during a pandemic. Available at SSRN 3582908 Bisgaard M (2015) Bias will find a way: economic perceptions, attributions of blame, and partisan-­ motivated reasoning during crisis. J Polit 77(3):849–860 Bolsen T, Druckman JN, Cook FL (2014) The influence of partisan motivated reasoning on public opinion. Polit Behav 36(2):235–262 Bos L, Schemer C, Corbu N, Hameleers M, Andreadis I, Schulz A, Fawzi N (2020) The effects of populism as a social identity frame on persuasion and mobilization: evidence from a 15-­country experiment. Eur J Polit Res 59(1):3–24 Brewer M (2001) The many faces of social identity: implications for political psychology. Polit Psychol 22(1):115–125 Druckman JN, Bolsen T (2011) Framing, motivated reasoning, and opinions about emergent technologies. J Commun 61(4):659–688 Franchino F, Zucchini F (2015) Voting in a multi-dimensional space: a conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. Polit Sci Res Methods 3(02):221–241 Hainmueller J, Hopkins DJ (2014) The hidden American immigration consensus: a conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants. Am J Polit Sci 58(4):835–856 Hainmueller J, Hopkins DJ, Yamamoto T (2014) Causal inference in conjoint analysis: understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. Polit Anal 22(1):1–30 Hameleers M, Bos L, de Vreese CH (2017) “They did it”: the effects of emotionalized blame attribution in populist communication. Commun Res 44(6):870–900 Hassel J (2020) Which countries have protected both heath and the economy in the pandemic? https://ourworldindata.org/covid-­health-­economy Hunter W, Power TJ (2019) Bolsonaro and brazil’s illiberal backlash. J Democr 30(1):68–82 Jorge MP (2020) Quarenta é coisa de rico?. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=KRcNNWHM2EY Kingstone P, Power T (2017) Democratic Brazil divided. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA Kovic, M., & Caspar, C. (2018). Motivated cognition, conspiratorial epistemology, and bullshit: A model of post-factual political discourse politics. In SocArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf. io/bnv2m Kunda Z (1990) The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol Bull 108(3):480–498 Le Roux, B., & Rouanet, H. (2010). Multiple correspondence analysis (Vol. 163). Sage Publications

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Leeper TJ, Slothuus R (2014) Political parties, motivated reasoning, and public opinion formation. Polit Psychol 35(S1):129–156 Mason L (2018) Uncivil agreement: how politics became our identity. Chicago University Press, Chicago Mazar N, Amir O, Ariely D (2008) The dishonesty of honest people: a theory of self-concept maintenance. J Mark Res 155(6):633–644 Mudde C (2004) The populist Zeitgeist. Gov Oppos 39(4):541–563 Mudde C, Rovira Kaltwasser C (2012) Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America. Gov Oppos 48(2):147–174 Ones D, Viswesvaran C (1999) Relative importance of personality dimensions for expatriate selection: a policy capturing study. Hum Perform 12:275–295. https://doi. org/10.1080/08959289909539872 Pereira C, Medeiros A, Bertholini F (2020) O medo da morte flexibiliza perdas e aproxima polos: consequências políticas da pandemia da COVID-19 no Brasil. Revista de Administração Pública 54(4):952–968 Raghavarao D, Wiley JB, Chitturi P (2010) Choice-based conjoint analysis: models and designs. CRC Press, Boca Raton Rao VR et al (2014) Applied conjoint analysis. Springer, Berlin Shin H (2012) A cautionary note on post-stratification adjustment. In: Section on survey research methods, joint statistical meeting (JSM), San Diego Tomassetti AJ, Dalal RS, Kaplan SA (2016) Is policy capturing really more resistant than traditional self-report techniques to socially desirable responding? Organ Res Methods 19:255–285. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428115627497 Wallander L (2009) 25 years of factorial surveys in sociology: a review. Soc Sci Res 38:505–520. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.03.004 Winship C, Radbill L (1994) Sampling weights and regression analysis. Sociol Methods Res 23(2):230–257. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124194023002004

Chapter 11

Between Pessimism and Mistrust: Ecuadorian Attitudes in the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic Angélica Abad Cisneros

11.1  Introduction Ecuador is one of the Latin American countries hardest hit by the pandemic. In February 2021, official data indicated a total of 281,169 cases and 15,669 deaths (COE 2021).1 However, excess death estimates suggest that the impact of COVID-19 is more significant than what the government informs: “Out of the total 80,108 deaths registered in 2020, 36,922 deaths (95% CI: 32,314–42,696) were estimated to be in excess of expected levels” (Cevallos-Valdiviezo et al. 2021). The speed and virulence with which the virus spread after detecting the first case on February 29, 2020, caused the collapse of the public health system and the funeral system, forcing the government to extend the confinement measures until September. During the pandemic’s first year, the number of cases and deaths were constantly increasing. The same occurred with the country’s social and economic problems, which worsened due to the social distancing measures. The 2021 general elections took place in this adverse context. From the official start of the process, on March 12, 2020, until the weeks following election day, held on February 7, 2021, the pandemic exposed the weaknesses and vices of the electoral system. On the one hand, the law allows various local organizations, known as “independent movements,” to compete in national constituencies. This disposition favors the proliferation of parties in electoral contests. On the other hand, the electoral regime limits the duration of campaigns to 45 days, making parties focus on promoting remembrance elements (such as the party brand) and personalization

1  The government divides the deaths between confirmed coronavirus deaths (10,929) and probable coronavirus deaths (4740).

A. Abad Cisneros () University of Cuenca, Cuenca, Ecuador © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_11

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(people before programs). Finally, the complaints about the National Electoral Council’s impartiality since the 2017 general elections, added to a series of inconveniences encountered to organize the polls during the pandemic, generated distrust in the process and its results. With this scenario, citizenry’s assessments of crisis and its management and their evaluation of the main political actors  – the government, the legislature, and the political parties – but also the degree of trust placed in the elections become more important. Unfortunately, there is no public opinion survey of free access and national scope in Ecuador that would allow for an in-depth study of the political culture. Generally, the academy’s opinion studies come mainly from two regional surveys, the Latino barometer and the LAPOP Americas Barometer. However, due to the pandemic, these surveys could not be conducted. Thus, the descriptive data presented below comes from information collected throughout the year by various surveys, with varying representativeness degrees. For this reason, the information depicted in this document should be understood as a partial and preliminary view of Ecuadorian public opinion. The chapter that follows is divided into four sections. The first seeks to establish a baseline with notes on the context and public opinion prior to the pandemic. The second describes the pandemic’s evolution in terms of its social impact and how this has affected citizens’ attitudes about their personal and future situation and their assessment of the country’s situation. The third section addresses the problems that the government and the legislature faced during the health crisis and the public’s opinion about the President and Assembly. The fourth briefly describes the campaign, the February election results, and citizens’ views about the electoral process.

11.2  B  efore the Pandemic: Political Ruptures, Economic Recession, and Social Unrest Moreno took office in May 2017 with 66% of approval (CEDATOS 2020a). As former Vice President, he was seen as an experienced leader who would continue Rafael Correa’s left-wing policies under the banner of la Revolución Ciudadana (the Citizens Revolution) and his party Alianza PAIS (Wolff 2018, p. 282). However, it was not long before the new government blamed Correa for the economy’s poor situation and accused the former Administration of leaving the country’s finances on the verge of bankruptcy (El Comercio 2017). Less than a year after Moreno’s election, the country witnessed the rupture between the former president Correa’s followers, which abandoned Alianza PAIS and took over the name “Citizens Revolution,” and those who supported the government kept within the official party (Wolff 2018). By the end of 2018, Moreno’s popularity dropped 20 points (CEDATOS 2020a). Along with acknowledging the problems that affected the economy and the national budget, the Odebrecht scandal gave way to a series of accusations and

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formal prosecutions for corruption that involved several high-rank officials. One of the most notorious was the prosecution of Vice President Jorge Glas, who also served as Correa’s Vice President between 2013 and 2017. Glas was found guilty of illicit association and condemned to 6 years of prison (Borja 2017). Another was the Comptroller General’s prosecution, Carlos Polit, who fled the country before being sentenced to 6 years in prison and to pay a fine of $40.4 million (El Universo 2018; La República 2017). The situation was so critical that President Moreno created an International Commission Against Corruption to investigate corruption cases within the public sector. Unfortunately, the Commission could never start working. By 2019, almost two of every three Ecuadorians thought that “more than half” if not “all” politicians were corrupted, and only 52.1% supported the political system (Moncagatta et al. 2020, pp. 114, 25). A year after the rupture with the correístas, in May 2019, the government bench formed a right-wing alliance with CREO, the second Legislative majority, and two other minority forces (El Telégrafo 2019). This alliance allowed the ruling party to form a new majority in the National Assembly. However, it implied a shift in public policy, which went from public spending to austerity and from an anti-imperialist discourse to the active search for financial aid from the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilateral agencies. As expected from an electorate that voted for the continuity of a progressist Administration, the announcement did not award public support: at that time, Moreno’s approval dropped another 20 points, reaching only 26.1% of the population (CEDATOS 2020a). In 2018, the Administration made little progress in the correction of public finances: “…expenditures remained higher than fiscal income and, thus, public debt has continued to increase” (Wolff 2018, p. 282). By the end of the year, public debt represented 41% of the GDP, and public deficit was 3.81% (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas del Ecuador 2020). Thus, in 2019, the government negotiated a $10.3 billion credit from the IMF and other multilateral agencies. For the first disbursement ($4.6 billion), the country had to enact a series of labor and taxation regime reforms and reduce public expenses (Coba 2019). The most controversial of these was the Executive Decree 883, issued on October 2, that eliminated gasoline subsidies to release around $1.3 billion. The measure was supported by experts and academics, who regarded it as necessary to reroute the course of the economy (Barragán Manjón et al. 2020). Contrary to the opinion of experts, the elimination of subsidies was met with massive rejection. Between October 2 and 12, the country was paralyzed. Protesters – led by the Indigenous Movement, transport unions, labor unions, and students  – blocked access to the cities, causing a severe shortage of gas and food supplies and impeding access to public services (Abad Cisneros and Barragán Manjón 2019). Demonstrations were characterized by unprecedented violence that came both from national security agencies’ excessive use of force and protesters’ criminal actions against the police and vandalization of public and private property (HRW 2020). The confrontation left 1,507 injured and 11 dead, at least 4 of them killed by police

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Government and Legislative Approval 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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1-Jul-18

1-May-18

1-Jan-18

1-Mar-18

1-Nov-17

1-Jul-17

1-Sep-17

1-May-17

0%

National Assembly

Fig. 11.1  Evolution of the President’s and the National Assembly’s approval Source: Author with CEDATOS data

forces. The situation forced Moreno to withdraw the measure.2 By November 2019, Ecuadorians’ opinion of the government had dropped to the lowest levels in 20 years: only 8% supported governmental actions (CEDATOS 2020a). Still, the President was not the only actor that lost citizen’s support in October 2019. During the fortnight of protests and riots, the National Assembly was mute. Instead of taking an active role to incorporate civil demands, present alternative measures, or merely acting as a mediator between the government and the Indigenous Movement, representatives chose to suspend legislative work (Barragán Manjón et al. 2020). Meanwhile, the opposition, especially correístas, called for impeachment and accused Moreno of selling the country to imperialism (Noboa 2019). By the end of that month, only 11.5% of the population approved the work of the National Assembly, and only 9.7% trusted the word of Legislators, i.e., 31 points below its initial levels of approval and 20 points less the initial levels of credibility registered in May 2017 (CEDATOS 2020a). Nevertheless, the attitude of the legislature during the protests does not entirely explain peoples’ disapproval. To understand the public’s negative attitude toward the National Assembly, one needs to recall that during the 10 years of Correa’s rule, the official bench held the majority in the Assembly, allowing the ruling party to pass the law without much interference. In the 2017–2021 scenario, however, the governing party lost the absolute majority and turned the parliament into “a central arena of the political struggle” (Wolff 2018, p.  294). Thus, as Fig.  11.1 shows, 2  On May 9, 2020, under the quarentine’s umbrella, the government announced the partial elimination of the gasoline and diesel subsides. The new system establishes a price fluctuation band. When the price surpasses the higher band, the subsidies activate for some sectors (El Comercio 2020a).

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public approval levels for the National Assembly and the President were descending at a considerable pace even before the pandemics.

11.3  T  he Effects of the Pandemic’s First Year. Ecuadorians’ Attitudes and Well-Being December 2020 was not met with the usual holiday spirit. A survey carried out by Know Report between November 15 and 23 showed that Ecuadorians living in Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Manta, and Portoviejo were struggling to balance their incomes and expenditures amidst a generalized feeling of distrust with the economy.3 At the face of one of the most important festivities of the year, 79.8% of the respondents said they would spend Christmas at home with their families and that they would reduce expenses by decreasing their presents and dinner budgets (48% and 61%, respectively) or by not giving any gifts (32.2%). At the same time, when asked about their Christmas wishes, 30.3% of respondents prayed for health and 24.3% for finding an accessible cure that ends COVID-19. Even though this survey does not represent the entire population, it reflects a national concern: the deterioration of the living conditions due to the economic contraction caused by social distance measures implemented to slow down coronavirus dissemination. According to official data, in 2020, the Ecuadorian economy contracted an 8.8%, while unemployment and informality rates escalated (BCE 2021). Between December 2019 and September 2020, unemployment went from 4.9% to 8.9%, and informality went from 17% to 23.4%. Moreover, only 39.3% of the economically active population was described as having “adequate employment,” i.e., having an income equal to or above the minimum wage ($400) and a full-time legal job (BCE 2021; Inec 2020). In August, a survey carried out by the Latin American Strategic Center for Geopolitics (CELAG 2020) showed that 37.2% of the population was uncertain, 23.9% was feeling anguished, and 17% felt anger with the nation’s current situation. At that time, 83.3% of respondents said their consumption capacity was affected by the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 emergency. The Ecuadorian chapter of the Gallup World Poll also shows that in 2020 employment-related issues affected most of the population. Whether it meant losing jobs permanently (39%) or temporarily (64%), seeing their monthly wages reduced due to salary cuts or sales decreases (63%), or the diminution of regular working hours (58%), most of the interviewees manifested that the pandemics affected their lives “a lot” (Ray 2021). Unfortunately, the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC, in its Spanish acronym) did not publish any poverty statistics 3  The survey calculated the Index of Consumer Sentiment employed by the University of Michigan. This index measures consumers’ confidence in the economy. It considers attitudes toward the economy based on the consumer’s finances, spending, and appreciations on the business climate (Lavrakas 2008).

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between December 2019 and February 2021, making it difficult to assess the pandemic’s depths. However, as Hurtado Caicedo and Velasco Abad (2020) point out, in a country where two out of ten people live in overcrowding conditions and lack access to tubed water inside their homes, the magnitude of COVID-19 can barely be grasped through these numbers. Along with the macroeconomic indicators, other structural issues related to inequality such as educational gaps, gendered violence, and unequal healthcare access had a significant effect on people’s well-being in 2020. The “new normality” imposed by the pandemic rests over the assumption that people are safer inside their homes and that those have certain comforts such as personal spaces, tubed water, and Internet access. However, the Ecuadorian social structure proves this reality only exists for a few. Only 37% of the population has permanent access to the Internet, meaning 70% of students have problems keeping up with their online education (Castro 2020; Constante 2020). According to the Education Ministry, 4% of students, mostly from vulnerable households and rural areas, ages 5–18, will drop out of school in the first semester of 2021 (Suárez 2020). Two studies by UNICEF published in October 2020 showed that 23% of the households with children and teenagers were not sending them to school, while 13% were working. Forty percent of these students were feeling anguish and tension (2020a, b.) Gender and domestic violence are other problems. Women are regular victims of chauvinism in Ecuador as 64.9% have suffered some violence, 42.8% of it inflicted by their partners (INEC 2019). Women’s vulnerability increases when considering that since they are also responsible for most household management and family care, their labor stability and financial independence are lower than men’s (Rodríguez 2020). Between March and November, one femicide was registered every 72  h, emergency lines registered 70,000 calls related to domestic violence, and 893 cases of sexual abuse were listed between March and June (El Telégrafo 2020; Puente 2020). According to Pulso Ciudadano (2020), during the total quarantine, 52.94% of women from the seven provinces with more records of domestic violence admitted feeling insecure inside their homes; 81.46% of them felt humiliated or devalued by their partners; 57.9% were blamed for not taking proper care of their families during the lockdown; and 37.2% felt that, at some point, their lives were at risk as a consequence of being physically abused by their mates. As for healthcare access, the Public Health System collapsed before the coronavirus’s arrival. In 2020, Ecuador counted as one of the five Latin American countries with the highest numbers of deaths caused by COVID-19, along with Honduras and Perú; the country’s total deaths in 2020 tripled when compared to 2019 (ECLAC 2021, p. 14, 17). According to the WIN global survey to measure the COVID-19 vaccine perceptions, and which was carried out in Ecuador by CEDATOS in Quito and Guayaquil, only 22% of the population from both cities considered that the attention capacity of the national health system was “good” (WIN and CEDATOS 2021). Alas, the facts presented above might help understand the pessimistic sentiment that Ecuadorians show about the future and their positive attitudes toward the vaccine. According to CEDATOS (2020a, b) monthly public opinion measurements,

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approximately 90% of Ecuadorians believed that the country was walking the wrong path during the pandemic the first year, and 80% felt pessimistic, concerned, uncertain, or upset about the nations’ future. At the same time, 80% of Quito and Guayaquil citizens have manifested their willingness to receive the vaccine as soon as it is available (Win and Cedatos 2021).

11.4  E  cuadorians’ Evaluation of the Government and the Legislature During the Pandemic As pessimistic as Ecuadorians’ views about the situation and the future can be, when asked about the country’s main problems, “corruption” and “coronavirus,” not “employment” or “economy,” are the most cited (CELAG 2020; Notimundo 2020). Corruption scandals have been a constant for the past 80 years. Nonetheless, during the sanitary emergency, news about government officers, legislators, local authorities, and other public servants involved with irregularities in public hospitals, overpricing sanitary supplies, and unlawful purchasing of COVID-19 tests have damaged individual’s opinions about political actors and politics in general. In June 2020, a corruption plot known as “the Distribution of Hospitals” was uncovered. It involved a dozen members of the National Assembly with public posts traffic in different health houses and the awarding of contracts for hospitals’ construction since 2017 (Celi 2020; España 2020). As a result of the prosecution’s investigation, one former Legislator is in prison, and another is fugitive (Noboa 2020). Just like that, December 2020 closed with 196 open cases for bribery, peculated, concussion, illicit enrichment, and organized crime (El Comercio 2020b). Among the closed cases, eight court rulings found former President Rafael Correa, former Vice President Jorge Glas, former Comptroller General Carlos Polit, and several other high-level officials guilty of a series of corruption-related charges, condemning them to 8 years in prison, to pay $145,4 million as reparation to the State and to give a public apology (El Universo 2020b). As one headline put it, “In Ecuador, corruption is more concerning than pandemic and unemployment” (El Expreso 2020). According to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, even though the country has improved since 2012, in 2020, it was ranked 92nd out of 180 nations evaluated and perceived as highly corrupt (TI 2020). Moreover, by November 2020, 82% of the population believed that corruption was not being fought, and 72% thought it would not be fought in the next 5 years (CEDATOS 2020b). In addition to the corruption scandals that transverse to the entire political system and its actors, the economic measures adopted over the past year, the management of the pandemic, and the Executive’s communication strategy harmed citizens’ perception of Lenin Moreno’s government. As a consequence of the economic difficulties that Ecuador was facing at the beginning of 2020 and the sanitary emergency declared to contain the coronavirus, governmental approval reached a meager 21.7% in early March (CEDATOS 2020a). On May 25, the government announced

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a new package of austerity measures that included reducing the university’s budget, public enterprises’ closure, discharges, and salary reductions of public servants. As a result, thousands of peoples violated the State of Emergency lockdown and went to the streets to protest (BBC Mundo 2020b). That month, President Moreno’s Administration approval fell to 16.1%, and by November, it barely reached 7.1% (CEDATOS 2020b). With regard to the pandemic management, less than a month after the State of Emergency was declared, President Moreno admitted: “We know that registers fell short on the number of contagions as well as on the number of deceased. Reality always outstrips the number of tests and the speed with which attention is given” (BBC Mundo 2020a). Since then, the growth of positive cases and overall mortality rates have been constant (Parra and Carrera 2021). December 2020 arrived with 212,512 confirmed cases; 14,034 deaths caused, or suspected to be caused, by the coronavirus (COE 2020); and an increase of 154.8% on the overall mortality rates. In August, 71.7% of the national population opined that the government could have avoided more deaths (CELAG 2020). At the end of the year, 70% of the population from Quito and Guayaquil believed that the pandemic’s management was “bad” or “very bad.” However, they also recognized that the system’s capacity was not satisfying: 78% thought the Sanitary System capacity was also “bad” or “very bad” (WIN and CEDATOS 2021). Communication was the Officialism’s main weakness during the pandemic’s first year. The government repeatedly changed spokespersons, how they communicated, and the channels used to deliver that information (Abad Cisneros and Calderón 2020). Also, it changed the way of recording positive cases and counting for coronavirus deaths, making it impossible to assess the reality of the situation (Hurtado Caicedo and Velasco Abad 2020). A critical moment occurred in April when media worldwide broadcasted images of dead bodies lying on the streets of Guayaquil. The first official reaction was to deny the situation, saying that the photos were fake, only to contradict themselves after a few days and publicly acknowledge the mistake.4 In the words of Sonnenholzner, the Vice President at that time: “this week, Ecuador has suffered a great deterioration of its international image, and we have seen images that should not have occurred and, for that, as a public servant I apologize” (El Universo 2020a). These errors, computable to a deficient communication strategy, add up to a series of other communication mishaps that ultimately show a lack of tact and a high disconnection with citizens’ emotions and demands. Four of these are worth mentioning since they help to explain Ecuadorians’ lack of trust in the government. The first was a picture of the former Ministry of Government, Maria Paula Romo, wearing a tee shirt that featured an image of a woman with a hole in place of her right eye on the cover of a magazine published on August 30. As Ministry of Government, Romo was ultimately responsible for suppressing the October 2019 riots. At that

4  For a detailed recount of the first month of the crisis after the arrival of COVID-19 to Ecuador, see https://www.lifegate.com/ecuador-coronavirus-guayaquil.

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time, many protesters lost their eyes due to police repression. Even though the image was a reproduction of artwork with feminist content, the association with the October 2019 repression was more potent, and public opinion was outraged. The second “mistake” occurred in November 2020 when the newly appointed vice president, María Alejandra Muñoz, traveled to Europe on a diplomatic mission. On this tour, the Vice President, known for being a devoted catholic, took along her family and visited the Vatican on accounts of negotiating humanitarian aid for children. When pictures of the family with the pope were made public, even though they supposedly paid for their trip, public opinion that was already criticizing the need for “diplomatic” travel amidst the delicate economic situation turned into indignation (Borja 2020). The third was the Ministry of Health’s public excuse in January 2021 when it was known that he had personally escorted medical personnel to vaccinate his mother in a private elderly home that was not part of the pilot vaccine plan. The Ministry justified his actions as being filial and stated: “if this was political recklessness on my part, I don’t know. I’m not a politician” (El Telégrafo 2021). Finally, the fourth was a tweet by President Moreno congratulating the winner of a reality show and saying that “it was a great deploy of talent” (Moreno 2021) the night before the brutal assassination of 79 high-security prisoners in Cuenca, Guayaquil, and Latacunga. An example of the adverse reaction caused by this tweet reflects on a vignette of a famous caricaturist Vilmatraca (Fig. 11.2).

Fig. 11.2  Vilmatraca’s vignette: Monster Chef. Source: Vargas (2021) reproduced with permission

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If communication errors and faults in crisis management have affected the government, the National Assembly has been criticized precisely for the opposite: its passive attitude in the health crisis’s conduction. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the legislature (in virtual sessions) has limited its actions to discuss and approve, with amendments, the proposals for a law sent from the Executive to deal with the pandemic (Abad Cisneros and Calderón 2020). While legislative work has increased relative to 2019, COVID-19-related actions were limited to State Ministries’ audit and control and two motions of censure against the Economic and Finances and Government Ministries (Abad Cisneros and Calderón 2020; El Universo 2020c). This behavior, along with the corruption scandals, has gravely affected the image of the Legislative body. At the beginning of the pandemic, approval rates for the National Assembly were at 10.6%. By November 2020, only 4.5% of the population approved the work of the Legislative. Moreover, in 2020, the Legislator’s credibility went from 29% in March to 2.5% in November (CEDATOS 2020b).

11.5  E  cuadorians’ Attitudes and Expectations for the 2021 General Elections Almost a year after COVID-19’s health, social, and economic emergency, Ecuador held general elections. The political contest took place in a significantly fragmented arena, with 16 presidential candidates and 87 organizations vying for 1 of the 137 seats in the National Assembly. The elections were held amidst a high level of uncertainty and distrust in the electoral process. According to one of the last polls of voting intentions carried out before the beginning of the electoral campaign, in November 2020, only 8% of Ecuadorians trusted the National Electoral Council, 66.4% said they were “not interested” in the elections, and 33.2% had not yet decided whom to vote for (CEDATOS 2020b). This disinterest and lack of confidence in the electoral process respond to a series of problematic actions on the National Electoral Council (CNE) part. On March 12, 2020, the CNE officially declared itself in the electoral period, and, since then, the divisions within the organization regarding how the elections should be carried out, the budget, and the campaign, set the tone (Abad Cisneros and Calderón 2020). As the elections approached, problems related to the accreditation of political parties, the registration of candidacies, and errors in the printing of ballots, continued to tarnish the institution (El Universo 2021b). The tensions between the CNE and the Contentious Electoral Tribunal (TCE) regarding the registration of the candidates of the Social Justice Movement caused the campaign to begin without the certainty of the number of presidential candidates that would finally compete in the election (García 2020). After the first round, the electoral authority could not escape conflict: the technical tie between presidential candidates Lasso (19.7%) and Pérez (19.4%)

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Table 11.1  February 2021 election results. Presidential percentage of the vote and share of acquired legislative seats

Political party Unión por la Esperanza (UNES) Creando Oportunidades (CREO) Pachakutik Izquierda Democrática (ID) Alianza PAIS Others

Presidential candidate Andrés Arauz

Presidential vote 32.7%

Legislative seats 2021–2025 36.5%

Legislative seats 2017–2021 0%

Guillermo Lasso

19.7%

8.8%

23.4%

Yaku Pérez Javier Hervas

19.4% 15.7%

19.0% 11.7%

2.9% 2.9%

Ximena Peña

15.4% 10.9%

0% 10.2%

54.0% NA

Source: Author with CNE data

raised suspicions and accusations of fraud, resulting in a formal impugn of results and demonstrations from indigenous communities all over the country (Primicias 2021). The electoral campaign began amid this context of distrust and uncertainty. Despite the prohibition of mass events and the current regulations on social distancing, the candidates toured the country’s main cities, preferring direct contact with their supporters even through online events (El Comercio 2021; El Universo 2021a). The study of the mobilization strategies employed during the electoral campaign shows that political parties organized their activities according to the region (coast and highlands), combining symbolic and programmatic elements to promote themselves as organizations at the service of popular interests (Geo-party-links in Ecuador 2021). The campaign proposals’ main content focused on education, employment, and health (Geo-party-links in Ecuador 2021).5 The elections results (summarized in Table  11.1) show an electorate that preferred proposals with an emphasis on social policy over those focused on economic reactivation as left-wing alternatives (UNES, Pachakutik, and ID) concentrated 67.2% of legislative seats. They also reflected a typical behavior before Correa came to power in 2009: the tendency to punish the governing party (Freidenberg 2009). As can be seen, Alianza PAIS obtained only 1.54% of the votes in the presidential elections and lost all its seats in the National Assembly, while CREO lost more than half. The results also show the strength and persistence of correismo, which entered the election under the name Union for Hope (UNES in its Spanish acronym).6

5  Data analyzed and developed by Angélica Abad Cisneros, Raúl Aldaz Peña, Diana Dávila Gordillo, and Sebastián Vallejo Vera under the project “Political Parties in Ecuador: The Use of Multiple Strategies to Mobilize Voters.” We thank the Universidad de las Américas for the support. 6  During the campaign Correa’s image was present in all canvassing activities, and Correa himself appeared on online events supporting Andrés Arauz.

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Vote orientation confirms the results of the survey conducted by CELAG in August 2020. This study showed a public opinion disenchanted with the functioning of the political system and calling for progressive policies: 58.2% of the respondents thought the only way to improve the situation was via a Constituent Assembly as the percentage of individuals with a “bad” image of the National Assembly and the Judiciary reached 80.1% and 84.5%, respectively. 49.6% agreed with the idea of “suspending payments and renegotiating the [external] debt,” 62.6% were favorable to the provision of “a minimum income for all Ecuadorians,” and 75.6% approved with the levying of extra taxes on large fortunes.

11.6  Conclusion The opinion polls and surveys presented above show a citizenry dissatisfied with institutions’ functioning and the actions of political actors. The climate of pessimism that prevailed during the pandemic’s first year has its roots in the precarious socioeconomic situation that has worsened as a result of the pandemic. However, the way in which the different political actors reacted to the sanitary emergency has also taken its toll on the public’s orientations: in the case of the government, the communication errors and the lack of tune with the citizens’ demands; in the case of the National Assembly, the conveniently passive attitude toward the crisis; in the case of the electoral authority and the political parties, the inability to give credibility to the democratic system and join efforts to reduce fragmentation. Both actions and omissions on the part of political actors have contributed to the fact that most Ecuadorians are incredulous about the prospect of a better future without first going through a change in the institutional design. Thus, the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on citizenry’s satisfaction with democracy and system-level support has yet to be evaluated.

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BBC Mundo (2020b) Coronavirus en Ecuador: las multitudinarias protestas por las drásticas medidas económicas y recortes de Lenín Moreno. BBC 0(0):1–6. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ noticias-­america-­latina-­52814371 Banco Central del Ecuador - BCE (2021) Estadísticas macroeconómicas presentación coyuntural. Report. Quito. https://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/Estadisticas/SectorReal/Previsiones/ IndCoyuntura/IndiceEMcoyuntural.html Borja MS (2017) Jorge Glas declarado culpable: así fue el juicio al Vicepresidente. GK. https:// gk.city/2017/12/13/jorge-­glas-­declarado-­culpable/ Borja MS (2020) Las prioridades que están detrás del viaje de la Vicepresidenta al Vaticano. GK. https://gk.city/2020/11/05/viaje-­vicepresidenta-­vaticano/ Castro AM (2020) En la Amazonía ecuatoriana la educación no se detiene por la falta de conectividad. UNICEF  – Ecuador. https://www.unicef.org/ecuador/historias/ en-­la-­amazonía-­ecuatoriana-­la-­educación-­no-­se-­detiene-­por-­la-­falta-­de-­conectividad CEDATOS (2020a) La población evalúa la gestión de los tres años de gobierno del presidente Lenin Moreno. CEDATOS. https://cedatos.com.ec/blog/2020/05/23/ la-­poblacion-­evalua-­la-­gestion-­de-­los-­tres-­anos-­de-­gobierno-­del-­presidente-­lenin-­moreno/ CEDATOS (2020b) Panorama Político y Electoral. CEDATOS. https://cedatos.com.ec/ blog/2020/12/07/cedatos-­panorama-­politico-­y-­electoral/ CELAG (2020) Panorama político y Social Ecuador Celi E (2020) El reparto de hospitales: el nuevo escándalo de la actual Asamblea. Primicias. https:// www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/reparto-­hospitales-­escandalo-­nuevo-­actual-­asamblea/ Cevallos-Valdiviezo H, Vergara-Montesdeoca A, Zambrano-Zambrano G (2021) Measuring the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak in Ecuador using preliminary estimates of excess mortality, march 17–October 22, 2020. Int J Infect Dis 104:297–299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijid.2020.12.045 Coba G (2019) Las reformas de Ecuador ante el FMI aún están pendientes. Primicias. https://www. primicias.ec/noticias/economia/ecuador-­desembolsos-­multilaterales-­fmi-­acuerdo/ COE, C. de O. de E.  N (2020) Informe de Situación COVID-19 Ecuador No067. https://www. gestionderiesgos.gob.ec/wp-­content/uploads/2020/04/Informe-­de-­Situación-­No031-­Casos-­ Coronavirus-­Ecuador-­09042020.pdf COE, C. de O. de E.  N (2021) Situción Nacional por COVID_19 Infografía No364. Inicio 29/02/2020- Corte 25/02/2021 Constante S (2020) Coronavirus: Ecuador: la educación online desde casa es imposible e injusta. El País. https://elpais.com/elpais/2020/06/12/planeta_futuro/1591955314_376413.html Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2021) Demographic observatory. COVID-19 mortality. Evidence and scenarios. https://doi.org/LC/PUB.2020/20-­P El Comercio (2017) Lenín Moreno: ‘Se podía haber sido un poquito más mesurado al momento de dejar cuentas en mejores condiciones.’ El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ leninmoreno-­mesaservida-­libertadexpresion-­crisiseconomica.html El Comercio (2020a) Gobierno implementará mecanismo de bandas de precios para subsidios. El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/gobierno-­mecanismo-­bandas-­precios-­ subsidios.html El Comercio (2020b) La corrupción sorprendió en la pandemia. El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/corrupcion-­sorprendio-­pandemia-­ecuador-­contratos.html El Comercio (2021) Los presidenciables hacen campaña en caravanas y en foros virtuales. El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/presidenciables-­campana-­caravanas-­ foros-­virtuales.html El Expreso (2020) En el Ecuador, la corrupción preocupa más que la pandemia y el desempleo. El Expreso. https://www.expreso.ec/actualidad/ecuador-­corrupcion-­preocupa-­pandemia-­ desempleo-­87299.html El Telégrafo (2019) Unión entre Alianza PAIS, CREO, BIN y BADI se consolida en la Asamblea. El Telégrafo. https://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/3/ union-­alianzapais-­creo-­bin-­badi-­asamblea

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El Telégrafo (Editorial) (2020) La violencia contra las mujeres es la otra pandemia en Ecuador. El Telégrafo. https://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/editoriales/1/ violencia-­contra-­mujeres-­pandemia-­ecuador-­femicidio El Telégrafo (2021) Ministro Zevallos: “Si esto fue una imprudencia política de mi parte, no lo sé, no soy político.” El Telégrafo. https://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/actualidad/44/ ministro-­juan-­carlos-­zevallos-­disculpas-­vacuna El Universo (2018) Carlos Pólit y su hijo John Pólit, condenados a seis y tres años de cárcel por concusión en caso Odebrecht. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/06/06/ nota/6796388/carlos-­polit-­su-­hijo-­john-­polit-­condenados-­seis-­tres-­anos-­carcel/ El Universo (2020a) Coronavirus: Otto Sonnenholzner pide disculpas y señala que los errores no se pueden volver a cometer. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2020/04/04/ nota/7805301/otto-­sonnenholzner-­pide-­disculpas-­senala-­que-­errores-­no-­se-­pueden/ El Universo (2020b) Ecuador empieza el largo proceso para recuperar $ 145,4 millones en ocho casos con sentencias en firme por delitos de corrupción. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2020/12/03/nota/8070913/ ecuador-­empieza-­largo-­proceso-­recuperar-­1044-­millones-­seis-­casos/ El Universo (2020c) Durante la pandemia, la Asamblea Nacional aprobó más leyes con relación al 2019. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2020/12/30/nota/9119584/ asamblea-­nacional-­ecuador-­aprobacion-­leyes-­durante-­2020/ El Universo (2021a) Candidatos presidenciales intensifican visitas y ofrecimientos en busca de votos en ciudades. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2021/01/23/ nota/9598012/elecciones-­presidenciales-­ecuador-­2021-­campana-­electoral-­recorridos/ El Universo (2021b) Marcado por tropiezos, el CNE enfrentará su segundo proceso electoral. El Universo. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2021/01/29/nota/9606679/ elecciones-­presidenciales-­ecuador-­2021-­consejo-­nacional-­electoral/ España S (2020) La corrupción penetra en la Asamblea de Ecuador y tensa la elección del cuarto vicepresidente de Lenín Moreno. El País. https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-­07-­18/la-­ corrupcion-­penetra-­en-­la-­asamblea-­de-­ecuador-­y-­tensa-­la-­eleccion-­del-­cuarto-­vicepresidente-­ de-­lenin-­moreno.html Freidenberg F (2009) Ecuador: las transformaciones de un sistema de partidos en treinta años de democracia (1978–2009). Observatorio de Instituciones Representativas (OIR). Instituto de Iberoamérica-Universidad de Salamanca García A (2020) CNE pedirá a la Corte Constitucional que dirima conflicto de competencias con el TCE, por sentencia de Justicia Social. El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ cne-­corte-­conflicto-­justicia-­social.html Geo-party-links in Ecuador (2021) The “Political parties in Ecuador: the use of multiple strategies to mobilize voters” Project. Quito: Universidad de las Americas. https://udla.edu.ec/ estrategias-movilizaci%c3%b3n/ HRW, H.  R. W (2020) Ecuador: lessons from the 2019 protests. https://www.hrw.org/ news/2020/04/06/ecuador-­lessons-­2019-­protests Hurtado Caicedo FX, Velasco Abad M (2020) La pandemia en Ecuador. Desigualdades, impactos y desafíos (Vol. 53, Issue 9). www.covid19ecuador.org INEC (2019) Encuesta nacional de relaciones familiares y violencia de genero contra las mujeres. https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/documentos/web-­inec/Estadisticas_Sociales/Violencia_ de_genero_2019/Principales resultadosENVIGMU 2019.pdf Inec (2020) Indicadores Laborales Septiembre 2020. In: Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo (ENEMDU). https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/documentos/web-­inec/ EMPLEO/2019/Junio/201906_Mercado_Laboral_final.pdf La República (2017) Contralor Carlos Pólit, en Miami. Su abogado dice que allanamiento es represalia del Fiscal. La República. https://www.larepublica.ec/blog/2017/06/02/ confirman-­que-­el-­contralor-­carlos-­polit-­salio-­del-­pais/ Lavrakas P (2008) Encyclopedia of survey research methods. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412963947NV-­0 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas del Ecuador (2020) Informe Anual de Ejecución. Presupuesto General del Estado. Enero-diciembre 2019. In: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas del Ecuador

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Moncagatta P, Moreno AM, Montalvo JD, Editor R, Zechmeister EJ (2020) The political culture of democracy in Ecuador and in the Americas, 2018/19: taking the pulse of democracy. Latin America Public Opinion Project. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ecuador/AB2018-19Ecuador-Country-Report-Eng-V2-W-200903.pdf Moreno L (2021) “¡Gran despliegue de talento en #MasterChefEcuadorEC! Felicitaciones a Roberto Ayala por esa creatividad y sazón para la cocina. Nos inspira a crecer, a sentir que si ponemos el corazón en lo que hacemos, el éxito será la recompensa.” Twitter. https://twitter.com/Lenin/status/1364064308985016338?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwe etembed%7Ctwterm%5E1364064308985016338%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_ url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ecuadorenvivo.com%2Fgente1%2Fgente%2F134762-roberto-­ ayala-gana-master-chef-ecuador-lenin-moreno-felicita-su-creatividad-y-sazon.html Noboa A (2019) El correísmo avivó las jornadas de manifestaciones en el país. Primicias. https:// www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/correismo-­jornadas-­manifestaciones/ Noboa A (2020) La futura Asamblea se enfrentará al reto de mejorar su imagen. Primicias. https:// www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/futura-­asamblea-­nacional-­reto-­mejorar-­imagen/ Notimundo (2020) Credibilidad: Moreno 13.2%, Sonnenholzner 42.3%, Asambleístas 4,50%, CNE 13%, según CEDATOS.  Notimundo.Com.Ec. https://notimundo.com.ec/ credibilidad-moreno-13-2-sonnenholzner-42-3-asambleistas-450-cne-13-segun-cedatos/ Parra M, Carrera E (2021) Evolution of COVID-19 in Ecuador. Revista Investigación y Desarrollo 13(1):28–42. https://doi.org/10.31243/ID.V13.2020.1002 Primicias (2021) El movimiento indígena arranca una nueva jornada de manifestaciones. Primicias. https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/movimiento-­indigena-­jornada-­manifestaciones/ Puente D (2020) Los reportes sobre delitos sexuales a escala nacional van en aumento. El Comercio. https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/reportes-­delitos-­sexuales-­aumento-­violencia.html Pulso Ciudadano (2020) Estudio de percepción. Violencia de género contra las mujeres durante el confinamiento por la COVID 19 Ray J (2021) Pandemic-battered voters in Ecuador seek stability. GALLUP. https://news.gallup. com/poll/329414/pandemic-­battered-­voters-­ecuador-­seek-­stability.aspx Rodríguez L (2020) La triple pandemia y sus efectos en la vida de las mujeres ecuatorianas. CEPAM, Centro Ecuatoriano Para La Promoción y Acción de La Mujer. https://www.cepam. org.ec/la-­triple-­pandemia-­y-­sus-­efectos-­en-­la-­vida-­de-­las-­mujeres-­ecuatorianas/ Suárez AM (2020) La educación durante la pandemia: Evitar la deserción escolar. El Telégrafo. https://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/sociedad/6/ la-­educacion-­durante-­la-­pandemia-­evitar-­la-­desercion-­escolar Transparency International (TI) (2020) Ecuador  – corruption perceptions index. Transparency International (TI). https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/ecuador UNICEF (2020a) El choque COVID-19 en la pobreza, desigualdad y clases sociales en el Ecuador. Quito: UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/ecuador/informes/ el-choque-covid-19-en-la-pobreza-desigualdad-y-clases-sociales-en-el-ecuador UNICEF (2020b) La salud mental es determinante para que niños, niñas, adolescentes, familias y comunidades puedan salir adelante. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/ecuador/comunicados-­prensa/ la-­salud-­mental-­es-­determinante-­para-­que-­niños-­niñas-­adolescentes-­familias-­y Vargas V (2021) Monster Chef [caricature]. https://twitter.com/vilmavargasva/statu s/1364580490527846405?s=20 WIN, CEDATOS (2021) Encuesta Mundial Covid-19 y la vacuna: Los ciudadanos del mundo frente al COVID.  CEDATOS. https://cedatos.com.ec/blog/2021/01/04/encuesta-­mundial-­ covid-­19-­y-­la-­vacuna-­los-­ciudadanos-­del-­mundo-­frente-­al-­covid-­win-­cedatos/ Wolff J (2018) Ecuador after Correa: the struggle over the “citizens” revolution. Rev Cienc Política (Santiago) 38(2):281–302. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-­090x2018000200281

Chapter 12

“For the Sake of All, the Poor First”: COVID-19, Mañaneras, and the Popularity of the Mexican President Alejandro Natal

12.1  Introduction This chapter discusses that despite the appalling way in which Mexican government dealt with the health crisis due to COVID-19, mortality escalated and voices against government policies multiplied. Lopez Obrador’s popularity levels were not shaken but rather maintained high. Firstly, we analyze the health crisis to show how hesitations and mistakes of the Mexican federal government, in the management of the pandemic, originated a tension between the need to prevent the overflow of health systems, on one hand, and minimize the economic cost of social distancing strategies, on the other. Secondly, we analyze how the health crisis derived in an economic crisis. Thirdly, we discuss about what we call the crisis of the public debate. Here we analyze the morning conferences and the framing of public debate showing that it has become extremely mediatized and oversimplified. We conclude with some brief final words.

12.2  The Health Crisis On February 28, the severe respiratory syndrome SARS-CoV-2 entered Mexico. Health protocols were presented, and different government actors begin to disseminate information on forms of contagion and the measures that would be taken. It was stated that the Mexican government will not carry out a massive application of tests, nor systematic contact tracing, but would follow a model called “Sentinel,” designed to estimate the evolution of other diseases such as seasonal influenza. This A. Natal () Autonomous Metropolitan University, Mexico City, Mexico

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_12

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model does not measure the real number of infections, but it is rather based on statistics of hospital admissions. After a couple of months, the government presented also an “epidemiological traffic lights” color code, based – again – on the availability of hospital beds. Though it was said, measurement would be transparent and objective, as Human Rights Watch showed,1 data were not accurate neither clear even for health authorities themselves.2 This measurement neither met the recommendations of the scientific community and the World Health Organization (WHO),3 since it did not account for the real situation or the risks to be expected.4 Nevertheless, in the morning presidential conferences, the severity of the pandemic was systematically minimized.5 President Lopez Obrador (better known by the acronym of his name, AMLO) pointed out that Mexico was not going to “be hit so hard by the pandemic” and that Mexicans should continue “ to hug each other.”6 He himself hugged followers in rallies7 and pointed out that the best prevention was “do not lie and do not steal”8 and bragged he wore an amulet to protect himself. On March 22, he declared “Do not stop going out…continue taking the family to restaurants and diners.” Four hours after, the Head of Mexico City Government declared the closure of all nonessential businesses.9 Along with the city, several states announced similar measures. The country had come to a standstill. As time went by, there were constant pronouncements from many productive sectors, which became more and more desperate and exerted pressure for a

1  HRW, (March 20,2020), Mexico: Mexicans Need Accurate COVID-19 Information. Human Rights Watch Bulletin. 2  See Kitroeff N., (December 21, 2020), México tergiversó los datos sobre la gravedad del coronavirus en la capital, New York Times. 3  OMS, (February 29, 2020). Recomendaciones actualizadas de la OMS para el tráfico internacional en relación con el brote de COVID-19. Organización Mundial de la Salud Bulletin 4  See Gilas K., (September 6, 2020), Mexico frente a las tres crisis de la pandemia, Agenda Publica 5  See (a) Manrique J., (March 12, 2020), “Hay que abrazarse, no pasa nada”: cómo ha reaccionado López Obrador ante el coronavirus, INFOBAE. (b) Redacción AN/GH, (March 17, 2020), ¿Qué no han resistido los mexicanos?: AMLO ante coronavirus, Aristegui Noticias; (c) Robinson A. (March 19, 2020), El Presidente de México minimiza la gravedad de la pandemia, La Vanguardia. 6  See INFOBAE (March 12, 2020), Hay que abrazarse, no pasa nada: cómo ha reaccionado López Obrador ante el coronavirus, INFOBAE. 7  See González M. (March 17, 2020), Coronavirus en México: las críticas a AMLO por seguir besando y abrazando a sus seguidores pese a las advertencias sanitarias frente al covid-19, BBC news. 8  See Cuando AMLO mostró el “detente” y dijo que contra el Covid ayuda mucho “no mentir y no robar”, El Universal, p.1. 9  See Ureste M. and Sandoval F. (March 24, 2020), Ni en días festivos hay tan poca gente: cierre de negocios por COVID-19 vacía las calles de CDMX, Animal Político.

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reopening, since their economy was collapsing.10 Most likely for these pressures, the ­government announced, on June 29, the change from “red” to “orange traffic light,” which meant hospitalization was below 65%. This implied that several nonessential businesses were allowed to reopen with strict sanitary measures.11 Although the government intensively campaigned asking population to stay at home,12 with the shift to orange, many loosen sanitary measures, and popularly, the joke was made that Mexico City had “an orange traffic light that should be red, but looked like green.” With the change to orange, the federal government did not make the use of face masks mandatory, which according AMLO should not “be by decree or order” since citizens are “of legal age and know how to take care of themselves.”13 AMLO himself did not wear face masks, saying that those who asked him to wear it, were trying to “shut him up” and that he would only start using it when “there is no more corruption.”14 When, public opinion pressured AMLO to wear a mask, Lopez Gatel, the Mexican czar in the fight against COVID, declared, “the President’s force is moral and not a force of contagion.”15 When in November, the head of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom, considered the pandemic in Mexico was worrisome and asked the leaders of this country to wear face masks and be examples, AMLO dismissed the recommendation.16 The same happened when Congressman Fernández Noroña refused to wear a mask. AMLO defended him saying that “the most important thing is freedom.”17 Finally, on January 24, 2021, AMLO announced he was infected with COVID-19.18 That day the number of people infected reached, 1,857,230 people.19

 See Arista L. (April 14, 2020), No le tememos al coronavirus, lo que nos mata es el hambre, Expansión Política. (b) Velasco J (March 25, 2020), Si no nos mata el virus, nos va a matar el hambre: Meseros, El Informador. 11  See Redacción Animal Político (June 26, 2020), Mexico cambia a semáforo naranja, Animal Politico. 12  See Con ayuda del pueblo, México superará COVID-19. Conferencia presidente AMLO, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=OoIQ39UQ6_I 13  See Luna F. (July 23, 2020), Ejercer poder mesiánico, la razón de AMLO para no usar cubrebocas: experto. FORBES 14  See Alemán R. (November 17, 2020), Los “pianistas” quieren demandar a AMLO por no usar el cubrebocas, La Otra Opinión. 15  Raphael R. (January 25, 2020), AMLO tiene Covid, Milenio. 16  See Redaccion (December 2, 2020), AMLO insiste en no usar cubrebocas pese a ‘regaño’ de la OMS y aumento del COVID, Expansión Politica. 17  See Lo más importante es la libertad dice AMLO (November 27, 2020). El Universal. p.1. 18  See Redacción AN/GH (January 24, 2021, AMLO), Da positivo a Covid-19, Aristegui Noticias. 19  See México reporta más de 158 mil muertes y un millón 857 mil 230 casos de Covid-19 ( January 30, 2021), El Universal. 10

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12.3  Chronicle of Announced Deaths At the end of May 2020, before the epidemiological traffic light changed, there were 9779 deaths.20 Three months later, in August, Mexico had already exceeded 60,000 deaths from Covid-19. Faced with these numbers, AMLO downplayed the problem and accused the “conservative media” of exaggerating21 and did the same, when the WHO warned that the underestimation of infections in Mexico could lead to a higher risk situation.22 Moreover, on the first day of December 2020, the Mexican federal government falsified the real number of occupied beds in hospitals, so the color code could allow commercial activities on Christmas time.23 But in December 4, it had to back down and shut all activities down again in the country’s capital, given the overflow of the hospital system, which reached record numbers since the pandemic had begun. By December 6, 85% of hospital beds were already occupied in the capital, and a black market for oxygen began to appear.24 Through social networks, doctors began to ask people to stay at home, since they had run out of medicines or beds. Since the beginning of the pandemic, doctors had been making demonstrations demanding protection equipment, which, according to them, had not been adequately provided.25 Though government refuted these claims,26 demonstrations repeated continuously throughout the country,27 at least until January 2021.28 Doctors were concerned, for a good reason, by December 2020, more than 1320 health workers had died and more than 100,000 were

 See Salmeron U. (May 30, 2020) Coronavirus en México: resumen, casos y muertes del 30 de mayo, Diario AS. 21  See AMLO defiende la estrategia contra el COVID y minimiza “escenario catastrófico”, (August 24, 2020) Expansión Política. 22  See EFE (August 21, 2020), La OMS alerta sobre la magnitud de la pandemia en México, Forbes. 23  See Kitroeff N. (December 21, 2020), Mexico Misled Citizens about the severity of Coronavirus, New York Times. 24  Arroyo L. (December 19, 2020), La ocupación hospitalaria de Ciudad de México alcanza ya el 85%, El País. 25  See Trabajadores de salud en México protestan por falta de equipamiento contra Covid-19, (March 23, 2020), El Universal. 26  See Personal médico del IMSS protesta por falta de insumos ante el COVID-19, (March 24, 2020), Expansion Politica. p. 1. 27  Among the main manifestations are those of Hospital de la Raza, General Hospital of Zone No. 27  in Tlatelolco, Regional Hospital No. 2 Guillermo Fajardo Ortiz, Regional Hospital No. 1 Gabriel Mancera, and Family Medicine Unit No. 15 in Iztapalapa. Saltillo, Coahuila (Clinic 89); Torreón, Coahuila (Clinic 16); Xalapa, Veracruz (General Hospital Zone No. 11 and Clinic 66); Puebla, Puebla (hospitals and clinics); León, Guanajuato (High Specialty Medical Unit T1 and Family Medicine Unit 58); and Villahermosa, Tabasco (Hospital Regional de Zona 46), among many others. 28  See La primera manifestación de personal medico del 2021 (January 1, 2021), INFOBAE, p.1 20

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infected,29 according to official data.30 This would place Mexico31 as the country with the most deaths in this sector in the world,32 cleaning workers being the most vulnerable.33 In December 2020, with overwhelmed hospitals, without drugs or oxygen,34 Mexico was the fourth country with the highest number of deaths and the worst percentage of positivity by tests according to the United Nations.35 Furthermore, according to a report by Bloomberg, out of 53 countries evaluated,36 Mexico was positioned as the worst place in the world to experience the pandemic.37 Starting 2021, according to the University of Oxford,38 Mexico had already passed to the third place in number of deaths,39 reaching in February 2021 166,731 accumulated deaths and almost 2 million people infected.40 But, perhaps the data that should have worried most Mexicans was the mortality rate of the infected that could not recover from the disease, which, according to John Hopkins University, ranked Mexico in first place in the world. Mortality rate oscillated between 10.8% and 8.6% from the second half of 2020 until February 2021 (according to data from the University of Oxford), in a brutal contrast to the rest of the world, where the average mortality was between 3% and 2%.41 Therefore, ruling out the possibility that Mexicans are more likely to die from coronavirus, or that for an inexplicable reason the virus in Mexico was three or four times more lethal, there is no other possibility but to recognize a failure in the health public policies to deal with the pandemic.  Esquivel J. (February 8, 2021), Mexico primer lugar mundial en porcentaje de muertos por covid 19, Proceso. 30  On August 25, Health Secretary reported 97,632 infected. 31  México, primer lugar mundial en personal de salud fallecido por COVID-19: Amnistía Internacional, (September 2, 2020) El Financiero, p.1. 32   See Reporte Amnistía Internacional, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ news/2020/09/amnesty-analysis-7000-health-workers-have-died-from-covid19/ 33   See Reporte Amnistía Internacional, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ news/2020/09/amnesty-analysis-7000-health-workers-have-died-from-covid19/ 34  See Redacción (January 22, 2021), Coronavirus en México, BBC News. 35  See Almaguer C. (December 29, 2020), Desde la Mano Izquierda, SemMéxico. 36  See Abundis F. (December 1, 2020), El presidente solo en su aprobación, Milenio. 37  See, La Redacción, Mexico se mantiene como el peor país de 53 (January 26, 2021), Proceso. 38  See Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data-explorer?yScale=log&zoo mToSelection=true&time=2020-03-14..latest&country=OWID_WRL~USA~ITA~BRA~ESP~S WE~DEU~IND~IRN~MEX®ion=World&casesMetric=true&interval=total&aligned=true&h ideControls=true&smoothing=0&pickerMetric=location&pickerSort=asc 39  See Barragán S. (January 29, 2021), México es tercer lugar mundial en número de muertes por Covid, Aristegui Noticias. 40  See México, primer lugar en letalidad por covid-19 (February 8, 2021), Milenio. p.1. 41  Data from: Our World in Data, Universidad de Oxford, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-­ data-­explorer?zoomToSelection=true&time=2020-03-14..latest&country=OWID_WRL~USA~IT A~BRA~ESP~SWE~DEU~IND~IRN~MEX®ion=World&cfrMetric=true&interval=total&al igned=true&hideControls=true&smoothing=0&pickerMetric=location&pickerSort=asc 29

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This failure was mainly a consequence of, first, official data not showing the real dimensions of the crisis. Independent analyses (Nexos y Punto Decimal, Taller de datos de Nexos y Mexicanos contra la Corrupción) indicate a difference between official data and the real number of around 75%–80%.42 According to this assessment, official data should be multiplied at least by three. If these studies are correct, Mexico would reach shocking figures in February, with half a million possible deaths and more than 6 million people infected. Second, compared to the world average, the rate of those who failed to recover from the disease (10.8 and 8.6%) shows the enormous inefficiency of the Mexican health system. Additionally, the 195,558 health personnel who were infected and the 2580 who died43 exhibit that a large part of the problem may be the lack of prevention gear and medicines, as doctors had claimed. Shortage of supplies may be the result of the new purchasing policy of the federal government, as reported by the Mexican Association Against Corruption.44

12.4  The Economic Crisis As for the economic crisis, the problem was not minor. In April, looking at the measures the government had implemented, Fitch downgraded Mexico, to BBB,45 and soon her predictions fell short. By May 2020, the Mitofsky Pools pointed out that 88.8% Mexicans felt their economy was severely affected.46 By the end of July, unemployment as a result of the pandemic had grown significantly, as 12 million people had lost their jobs (2 million formal jobs and around 10 million informal ones), with an impact in 30% of households. In parallel, more than 90% of the companies registered less income, and more than half of them were forced to close temporarily, while only 7.8% have received governmental economic support (INEGI and Encuesta sobre el Impacto Economic Generated by COVID-19 in Companies (ECOVID-IE) 2020). However, these numbers were only the beginning of the economic crisis. By November, the number of formal jobs lost reached 3,600,000.47 Similarly, in August, more than half a million companies48 would have already gone  Gilas K. (September 6, 2020) Mexico frente a las tres crisis de la pandemia, Agenda Publica.  Cruz A. (January 15, 2021), Enfermaron de Covid 195,558 trabajadores de salud en México, La Jornada. 44  Mexicanos contra la Corrupción, Mapa del Desabasto. Available at: https://contralacorrupcion. mx/mapa-desabasto-hospitales-mexico-covid-19/ 45  Fitch Downgrades Mexico to ‘BBB-’ (April 15, 2020), Available at: https://www.fitchratings. com/research/sovereigns/fitch-downgrades-mexico-to-bbb-outlook-stable-15-04-2020 46  See Ramos R. (May 12, 2020). Consulta Mitofsky, El Economista. 47  Expansión, 17 noviembre 2020, México suma 3.6 millones de desempleados en el tercer trimestre, https://expansion.mx/economia/2020/11/17/mexico-suma-3-6-millones-de-desempleados-en-eltercer-trimestre. 48  Saldaña I. (November 30, 2020). Persistirá la quiebra de empresas por Covid-19, El Universal. 42 43

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bankrupt, and by December, numbers would have doubled, to reach 1 million companies permanently closed.49 Faced with the terrible economic outlook, the federal government, in the voice of the president himself, repeatedly pointed out that there would be no fiscal or economic stimulus programs to support companies.50 This, despite the insistence of the business sector that called for a national plan to face the economic emergency, as other countries, had done.51 After much pressure, the government designed a devious and weak infrastructure investment program52 and a support fund for small businesses with meager loans (25,000 pesos), which would barely cover a month’s rental.53 Likewise, the government did not modify what they call “republican austerity” and maintained the 75% cuts in most public agencies, including the health sector. Nor did it modify its fiscal discipline strategy or propose any tax reduction or support plan for the most affected sectors by the crisis or for the unemployed (as did most governments), and neither the budget for large and most expensive projects (the New Santa Lucia Airport, the Dos Bocas Refinery, or the Mayan Train). This absence of effective economic policies to alleviate the crisis earned the Mexican government a rating of “0,” according to an analysis by the University of Oxford.54 Undoubtedly the ravages of the pandemic will increase precariousness by 2021, hinder access to basic resources, and significantly affect the less-favored sectors of the economy, mainly women and vulnerable groups.

12.5  AMLO Popularity However, despite this appalling handling of the pandemic, rising unemployment and the economy’s collapse,55 the president’s popularity registered little change. Apart from a decrease, registered at the beginning of the pandemic, in March 2020, probably due to the suspension of all economic activity, in April the popularity of AMLO improved. Most polling houses reported his popularity reached

 Forbes Staff (December 2, 2020), Más de 1 millón de micronegocios cierran definitivamente en México, Forbes. 50  See (a) Redacción (March 23, 2020), Ayuda pobres condonación empresas, Animal Político; (b) Lopez Obrador. Org, En crisis de COVID-19, el rescate será al pueblo de México: presidente AMLO, Abril 6, 2020 51  See Empresarios buscan con AMLO plan escalonado para salvar 1.1 millones de negocios, (April 2, 2020), Expansion p.1. 52  See Redacción (October 5, 2020), AMLO anuncia plan de inversión, El Economista. 53  See Redacción AN/AG (April 6, 2020), Se destinarán 25,000 millones de pesos a Pymes, Aristegui Noticias 54  See, too, Gilas, (September 6, 2020), México frente a las tres crisis de la pandemia. Agenda Pública. 55  Redacción (August 12, 2020), COVID-19 provoca caída histórica de empleo, Animal Político. 49

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Fig. 12.1  In general, do you approve or disapprove the way in which the president Andres Lopez Obrador is working? (Parametria) Source: Parametry. National Survey. https://www.parametria.com.mx/

between 60% (INFOBAE)56 and 68% (Financiero)57 of approval (see Figs.  12.1, 12.2, and 12.3). The situation did not change much in the months to follow. Although weaving finer, citizens were questioning the handling of the pandemic. For example, in May, those who believed AMLO “a lot” and “somewhat” decreased from 62.8 to 56.6%, and those who believed “little” or “nothing” increased from 36.3 to 42.7% (Mitofsky Consultation for El Economista, May 2020). By November, 22% believed the same strategy should be continued, 43% that it should be modified or 32% adjusted.58 Moreover, a decrease in the president’s “ability to give results” was reported, for the second successive occasion (37% in October 39%, 41% in September).59 Furthermore, by December 2020, only 28% believed that the country was doing well, a drop of 18 points compared to the 46% in November 2019 (see Alejandro Moreno January 4, 2021).

 See La popularidad de AMLO resiste (December 1, 2020), INFOBAE  Poll by El Financiero, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/amlo-cierra-el-2020-con-unaaprobacion-del-62 58  See (a) Zuckermann, L. (November 24, 2020) Juegos de poder, Excelsior; (b) La popularidad de AMLO resiste (December 1, 2020), Infobae. 59  https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/amlo-cierra-el-2020-con-una-aprobacion-del-62 56 57

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Fig. 12.2  In general, do you approve or disapprove the way in which the president Andres Lopez Obrador is working? (El Financiero) Source: National Survey of El Financiero (Methodology: National survey conducted by telephone to 820 adults from December 4–6 and 18–19, 2020. A probabilistic sampling of residential and cell phones was carried out in the 32 states. With a 95% confidence level, the margin of error for the estimates is +/− 3.4%. EL FINANCIERO. Realized byAlejandro Moreno). https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/amlo-­cierra-­el-­2020-­con-­una-­aprobacion-­del-­62

To this must be added the various social movements that were questioning the work of the federal government, such as the case of FRENAAA, the feminists and the medical demonstrations, in addition to a series of scandals, such as when AMLO greeted the mother of drug trafficker Chapo Guzmán,60 the release of his son Ovidio,61 and the corruption scandal of AMLO’s brother Pio López Obrador.62 Additionally, 2020 witnessed the formation of the Federalist Alliance, an open confrontation of governors with the presidential figure. 2020 was also reported as the most violent year in the history of Mexico, with 40,863 murders.63 In any other period, any of these elements individually would have had a significant impact in presidential popularity. However, in aggregated terms, AMLO’s  Redacción (March 29, 2020), En su visita a Badiraguato, AMLO saludó a la mamá del Chapo, Aristegui Noticias. 61  See (October 18, 2019), AMLO justifica la liberación de Ovidio Guzmán, La Izquierda Diario México, p.1. 62  See Fonseca D., La doble moral de nuestros gobiernos (September 3, 2020), New York Times. 63  Hernández S. (September 3, 2020) 2020 será el año más violento en la historia, El Sol de México. 60

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Fig. 12.3  I am going to read you some attributes people expect from a president. How would you evaluate Mr. Lopez Obrador in each of them? Source: National Survey of El Financiero (El Financiero, realizada en diciembre a 820 mexicanos adultos vía telefónica. Ver, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/amlo-­cierra-­el-­2020-­con-­ una-­aprobacion-­del-­62). https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/amlo-­cierra-­el-­2020-­con-­una­aprobacion-­del-­62

popularity was not seriously affected. Although it is true that his popularity reduced in February 2019, 83%, and its average for his first year, 71.09%, what is undeniable is that it changed little throughout the pandemic.64 By the beginning of 2020, it was around 65% (Infobae), and throughout the pandemic it has oscillated around 60–65%,65 reaching 2021 with ± 62%.66 Even the fact that a large majority of citizens were in favor of the mandatory wear of face masks (87%) did not affect AMLO’s image, who refused to wear it.67 This sustained popularity, positioned AMLO, according to Morning Consult Political Intelligence, as the second highest-­ rated leader.68

 La popularidad de AMLO Resiste (December 1, 2020), Infobae. p.1  Abundis F. (December 1, 2020), El presidente solo en su aprobación, Milenio. 66  Encuesta de Alejandro Moreno para El Financiero. Available at: https://www.elfinanciero.com. mx/nacional/amlo-cierra-el-2020-con-una-aprobacion-del-62 67  See Zuckermann L. (November 24, 2020, Juegos de poder, Excelsior. 68  Ni la pandemia ni FRENAAA lograron mermar la popularidad de AMLO (December 30, 2020), INFOBAE. p.1. 64 65

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12.6  Reasons Behind AMLO’s Popularity The impermeability of AMLO’s popularity may be a consequence of several nonexclusive factors. First, polls may reflect more an appreciation for AMLO as a person, rather than as the chief of the executive power. This may be due, among other things, to his speech always in popular language and his public image as a social, affable, and honest fighter. Another explanation is that perhaps Mexicans perceive COVID-19 as a crisis that comes from abroad, and therefore they do not attribute responsibilities to the federal administration. This effect also worked for former President Calderon during the influenza crisis.69 It is also likely that since Mexicans do not enjoy an efficient health system and are used to assume disease individually, they do not see the pandemic as a public policy problem. Another element to consider may be the effect of the various programs of the AMLO administration that distribute resources directly. These aids may be influencing public opinion and could explain the approval of AMLO as a leader and person, even if it is not believed that he can give results. Another likely explanation would be that AMLOs communication strategy, of assigning responsibilities to past governments, has turned out to be successful. Public opinion may have been permeated by the constantly repeated idea that COVID-19 and the economic crisis are a consequence of the previous governments’ neglect of health and corruption.70 The lack of a trustworthy opposition able to question the government is another explanatory factor. Finally, it is likely that the analytical capacity of the majority of Mexican public opinion does not question many of the AMLO government’s controversial decisions, because it does not comprehend them at level of complexity they entail.71 It is very likely that these reasons help to understand the great popularity that AMLO enjoys, but we propose an alternative though nonexclusive explanation in the following pages.

12.7  T  he Crisis of the Debate on Public Affairs: The Morning Conferences When AMLO was Mayor of Mexico City (2000–2005), he arrived at his office at 7 am. Reporters stationed at the entrance of the City Hall to address him on issues of the city but also to know his position on other matters. These brief morning statements allowed him to set agendas. Based on that experience, from day 1 as president, AMLO began with a daily morning conference. These conferences were presented as an accountability mechanism, an exercise called “circular dialogue,” a  See Abundis F. (December 1, 2020), El Presidente solo en su aprobación, Milenio  See Vázquez J. (August 28, 2020), Nostalgia del caviar, El Universal. 71  See Abundis F., (December 1, 2020), El Presidente solo en su aprobación, Milenio 69 70

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direct communication between “the people” and the president.72 Popularly, they are known as the mañaneras. In the beginning, these conferences seemed like an efficient and novel form communication. In a country where presidents did not speak to the media until the 1990s and after that they only answered few selected questions, this strategy was a breath of fresh air. Thus, many expected them to be an accountability mechanism as the president and cabinet members presented reports and exposed themselves to questions from journalists. Mañaneras did give the impression of transparency, since AMLO started to give ad hoc instructions to his officials to solve problems as they aroused73 and also gave the impression that the government worked quickly to face problems. However, from our point of view, these morning conferences soon ceased to be a real instrument of accountability for several reasons: (a) Impersonation. The weight of the presidential figure presenting himself all government engagements makes it seem that all decisions and actions are taking by he himself alone. This gives AMLO an omnipresent working aura but blurs other government actors and the state’s powers. By issuing instant solutions, AMLO also generates an image of immediate attention from the executive, which does not always translate into operational terms and which represents a challenge for the public servants, which have to be attentive to the broadcasting of mañaneras in the case they receive instructions. (b) Language. By speaking with popular sayings and expressions ordinary people use, AMLO transformed the political language and the uptight and parsimonious rituals that political power used in Mexico. Rather, in the mañaneras, AMLO adopts an attitude that he would have at a friend’s house, playing for his audience the role of an ordinary individual, a friend, who is mocking the “rich and corrupt.” This change is important, because the form in which statements are expressed define their real meaning. Thus, in the mañaneras, the information itself becomes secondary, and the message is the social relationship that AMLO symbolically establishes with his audience. Parallelly, the language AMLO uses in the mañaneras is directed to specific sectors of the population. He uses communication protocols, meanings, and cultural codes shared by those sectors. He also constructs arguments based on stereotypes shared by those sectors, and though stereotypes are speculative and lack accuracy and adaptability to complex and changing realities, their usefulness in sharing meanings is high. With all this, AMLO can charge communication with symbolic elements and therefore shape public opinion to maintain his popularity. (c) Opacity. If they were ever intended as such, mañaneras soon ceased to be a strategy for transparency. First, as never before, AMLO’s administration has hidden official information on relevant issues, and in the best case, the

72 73

 See Luna G., (October 22, 2019), López Obrador y 220 mañaneras después, Infobae.  Redacción (January 19, 2019), Explosión en ducto de Pemex en Hidalgo, BBC News.

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i­ nformation of different government agencies does not coincide.74 Second, government programs lack operating rules and examples abound of governmental contracts not made public but assigned directly. Third, in his barrage against autonomous institutions, the president threatened to end the National Institute for Access to Information.75 This, most probably, because his government accumulates more complaints in that organism than any other in the same period.76 Fourth, in general, in the mañaneras, AMLO excludes what it is not convenient for him to show,77 and when journalists corner him, he says he has “other data” and evades the answer.78 Furthermore, official data he presents lack of methodological transparency,79 and as pointed out by Verificado’s study 80 of 389 messages presented between December 2018 and September 2019, in many occasions, they are misleading (125) or false (94) (Verificado 2020).81 As a culmination, the question-and-answer part of the mañaneras, which should be the cornerstone of accountability, has been criticized by serious journalists, as a circus where those who ask are personnel paid by the presidency.82 (d) Backbiting the adversary. On many occasions, in the mañaneras, the president labels those who think differently, with nicknames such as “conservatives,” “corrupt,” or “fifís,” among others. In AMLO’s attacks, he generally accuses adversaries of being corrupt without any proof. Most generally, attacks are made personal, not addressing the public problem in question. Journalists have been a preferred target of these accusations.83 This burning-of-witches to those who do not agree with AMLO’s ideology represents an act of power, a veiled threat to this profession,84 and is problematic in terms of freedom of expression,

 See (a) AMLO y López Gatel se contradicen acerca del posible rebrote del Coronovirus, El Economista, https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/AMLO-y-Lopez-Gatell-se-contradicenacerca-de-posible-rebrote-de-Covid-19-20201020-0059.html; (b) Andrea Vega, 7 de agosto, 2019, Secretario de Salud contradice a AMLO sobre Fondo para servicios médicos https://www.animalpolitico.com/2019/08/salud-secretario-amlo-fondo-proteccion/; (c) Jannet López Ponce, 31.07.2019, Otra vez, AMLO contradice a Hacienda; son ahorros, no hay subejercicio, dice. https://www.milenio.com/politica/amlo-contradice-a-hacienda-no-hubo-subejercicio-sonahorros. 75  Galván M. (January 7, 2021), AMLO contra el INAI, Expansión. 76  Ortiz A. ( January 9, 2021) Gobierno de AMLO, el más reacio a abrir datos. El Universal. 77  Nácar J. (February 5, 2021), Los datos polemizan y desinforman, Eje Central. 78  See (a) Villa P. and Morales A. (December 2, 2020) Yo tengo otros datos, El Universal ; (b) Tengo otros datos (January 30, 2020), Milenio, p.1; (c) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0syDDMSP7w 79  See Morales G. ( January 16, 2021) Mañaneras de AMLO, El Universal. 80  Available at: https://verificado.com.mx/la-mananera/ 81  See (a) https://verificado.com.mx/verificado. See, too, https://www.ceonline.com.mx/ post/10-meses-de-las-ma%C3%B1aneras-de-amlo-56-es-falso-o-enga%C3%B1oso. 82  See Riva R. (March 6, 2020), El circo de la mañanera, El Financiero. 83  Periodistas recibieron 1,081 mdp con Peña (May 23, 2019), Expansion. 84  Barrera C. and Cattan N. (April 12, 2019) Twitter arde cuando los periodistas ‘desafían’ a AMLO, Bloomberg. 74

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as 650 intellectuals, journalists, and artists have stated.85 The problem becomes more serious given that Mexico is the most insecure country to practice journalism,86 a fact that governments, including AMLO’s, have ignored. Because of the reasons exposed above, even when we do recognize that though mañaneras are an excellent political communication tool, we believe they are not useful as an accountability mechanism.87 Rather, we believe that the president uttering dictations, stigmatizing those who question his government, or presenting misleading information seriously undermines democracy. It is our contend that mañaneras are a form of political propaganda and its real function is to control the public sphere88 by dictating the agenda of public debate. We now turn to this analysis. (e) Agenda framing The mañaneras are designed to define a framework for the agenda and to establish the limits of the debate. The agenda’s construction refers to a process in which, through the manipulation of different variables, public opinion is influenced at a given moment, to consider an issue most important than others (Rodelo and Muñiz 2017). This can be done by building a public issue or by framing one (Cobb and Elder 1971). AMLO uses framing, which consists of presenting the facts, placing them within a specific context or from a particular perspective or analytical angle, and involving determined actors in precise manners (see Sadaba 2001). By doing so, the problem is, reduced to the arena and debates the framer decides, and in which he/she has a comparative advantage and can treat information, often symbolically, to gain the favor of audiences (Sádaba and Rodríguez 2007). Framing allows AMLO to choose the angle from which a fact will be discussed and in what terms. Thus, he marks the line of what should and should not be debated. (1) He does this by bringing the information, to make some sense within the logic of the discursive axes of his government, i.e., the distancing of neoliberal measures to implement public policies, the poor first, and the fight against past corruption. Any problem, no matter how complex, is reduced to one of these axes. This oversimplification is only the first step, but it is very important because it allows audiences to perceive the fact or problem from the perspective that the president proposes. Once this is done, AMLO (2) brings in the actors. By making statements he impersonates saints and demons for his audience, positioning them either on the side of the fifís, conservatives, and corrupts or on those who are with him. Smeared actors are forced to react within the framed terms. Then, (3) he intensifies the tone

 See Redacción (September 17, 2020) Más de 650 científicos e intelectuales piden a AMLO frenar sus ataque, El Economista. 86  Gómez R. (December 29, 2020), México, el país más peligroso para los periodistas, El País. 87  Moreno D. (January 20, 2019), Derecho a saber, Reforma. 88  Luna G (October 22, 2019), Lopez Obrador y 220 mañaneras, INFOBAE. 85

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of the debate, either to minimize,89 scandalize,90 or ridicule the positions or reactions of the opposition91 or to exalt his. This process is what has been named mediatizacion (see Thompson 2000). Finally, (4) AMLO leads his audience to visualize the problem just as he wishes it to be analyzed. It does this by using a very useful tool of political communication, post-truth (Roberts 2010). Post-truth is a half-truth or a directed lie, which is aimed to influence the events of the political scene. It is characterized by the reconstruction of a political fact, through ideological elements adding context, references, or assumptions posing them as true (see Keyes 2004). This technique may profit from the use of vague concepts, such as “the people,” and uses colloquial expressions and stereotypes, loaded with symbolic elements and historical references (see Crouch 2004). Thus, it is easily internalized in the imagination or social representations of certain groups, sectors, or social classes and may be used to influence the behavior of rational individuals who may not be fully informed. In this way, AMLO creates political pseudo-­ facts and, by adding symbols, emotion and a few data it gives his speech an allure of truth. By doing this, AMLO also does a no less important thing. He adapts the format, content, and discourse of his messages to the narrative logic of the media, constructing the note in the same precise syntax as them. This allows his speeches to be prêt à manger, easily assimilated by the media, and therefore they quickly impact different areas of society. The power of this framing is such that even central issues such as health emergency, the economic, or the security crisis can be moved into the background and get lost within the smoke screens launched from the presidency, such as the raffle for the presidential plane. All this, of course, has been to the detriment of an analytical and critical discursive field that seriously reviews real problems and solution routes, a broad and democratic public space in which fundamental issues for the future of the country can be thoroughly debated. It is true that the possibilities of post-true arguments of impacting public opinion are directly proportional to the educational levels of audiences, the political culture, and the spaces for political socialization that a community has. But precisely due to the enormous educational gap and the low level of political culture that exists in Mexico, AMLO’s strategy can permeate society. AMLO’s oversimplified messages can permeate public opinion also because, in Mexico, there is very little investigative journalism that seeks evidence, empirical fact, verification of effects, analysis, and cause-effect relationships. Additionally, most Mexican media are spaces of exchange between the economic and the political elites (see Mellado Ruiz and Lagos Lira 2013) and economic enterprises, which do not necessarily seek the expansion of democracy (see Deutsch 1971; Herman and Chomsky 2002). And though Mexican media were having a spring, starting in the  See AMLO minimiza el sargazo y da a la Marina el control del problema (June 24, 2019, Expansion. 90  See Riva R., (March 6, 2020) El circo de la mañanera, El Financiero. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/opinion/raymundo-riva-palacio/el-circo-de-la-mananera 91  See Genera polémica caricatura de López-Dóriga (December 22, 2020), El Universal. p.1. 89

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1990s, with greater editorial freedom, a more critical press and a vigilant journalism, upon the arrival of the AMLO administration, many media, especially television journalism, even when ideologically distant from the new government, voluntarily bent to power because it suited its interests or those of their advertisers. Thus, today the two main TV networks, to which AMLO had called “the power mafia,” work hand in hand with him92 and have largely followed the way in which AMLO structures the debate rarely questioning presidential projects. This is important because, a large part of Mexicans inform themselves through television (around 59%93), and TV networks make extracts of the mañaneras to reach about half the population,94 with around 10 million viewers daily.95 These extracts are precisely the more “entertaining” parts of AMLO’s already mediatized messages. Thus, the information Mexican public opinion obtains is just a spectacle where AMLO mocks his adversaries or makes jokes deviating attention from the real public affairs problems. As for the most part, these extracts are broadcasted with practically no discussion; thus, TV news do not promote reflection on public affairs; neither are they critical mirrors of reality. Historically, TV networks in Mexico have given very little follow-up to the government’s corruption or illegalities and have become accomplices of the State, or even instruments of the political power to control the society. In Mexico, TV networks do not serve as watchdogs for political elites, neither as a counterweight to power. They rather do a disservice to society since they are empty boxes, mere repeaters of superficial entertainment schemes, which deviate attention to irrelevant issues, and by so doing, they have largely contributed to misinform and even demobilize Mexican citizens. Nevertheless, in order not to fall into manichaeisms, it must be emphasized that Mexican media are not monolithic structures, but complex organizations, sums of actors, wherein debates and differences take place. Thus, in the same media, there may be journalists who fold to power, while there will be others who are contributors to democracy. Hence, there are some very brave journalists, which with great dignity and respect for their profession, remain independent. These few, generally in the written press, unfortunately do not impact public opinion, since only 26% of Mexicans inform themselves through newspapers, including sports ones.96 Moreover, as nine of each ten Mexicans inform themselves about public affairs through the Internet,97 mostly through social networks98 (70%), chiefly Facebook, 92  https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/emilio-azcarraga-y-amlo-en-la-mananera-el-­ escandalo-­por-la-que-llamaba-la-mafia-del-poder-212915267.html 93  Díaz C. (October 13th, 2020) Estas son las redes que más se usan para ver noticias de México, Merca 2.0. 94  Luna G. (October 22nd, 2019). Lopez Obrador y 220 Mañaneras, INFOBAE. 95  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21amySXNjoc. 96  https://www.edelman.lat/estudios/informe-anual-de-noticias-digitales-2020-del-instituto-reuters 97  https://www.edelman.lat/estudios/informe-anual-de-noticias-digitales-2020-del-instituto-reuters 98  El Mirón (January 8, 2019, Las conferencias mañaneras de AMLO están superando en rating, El Regio.

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according to the University of Oxford and the Reuters Institute,99 the quality of the public debate depends of the oversimplified syntaxes of social networks. This demonstrates that AMLO’s mediatized mañaneras messages fall in a fertile field to impact a feeble and uncritical public opinion in his favor.

12.8  Conclusion The federal government in Mexico seems to coincide with Chantal Mouffe, regarding the idea that left-wing populism can be presented as a form of democratic renewal (2018) and a form of counter-hegemony (Lynn Marie 2016). This is a populism characterized by anti-elitism without xenophobia, where the struggle takes place in the symbolic, to build public opinion and social mobilization that generates alternatives for an ample democratization (Laclau 2017). This type of political program could justify the oversimplification of the political facts and would also explain the construction of saints and villains. A program like this could also explain AMLO’s objective of working with public opinion and his focus on communicating at the most elementary level possible, in order to politicize the popular sectors and make them participate in public life. It would also explain that through his populism AMLO seeks to lead his movement toward building an alternative, a new democratic transformation, or the fourth transformation of the life of Mexico, as he calls it. However, if a political project like this was taking place, after 2 years of administration, we should also be seeing an ambitious project of political culture education in parallel. We should also be observing the implementation of new and broader forms of popular participation, be it through new institutions, the ones currently available at the State, or, at least, through AMLO’s party. Similarly, Mexico should be experiencing some transit from representative democracy to a more participative one or at least, proposals for governance mechanisms to involve citizens in public affair debates and decision-making. However, in this sense, the only thing done so far was the revocation of the presidential mandate, which, given the way it has been carried out, seems to be more of a way to boost AMLO’s party in the 2021 elections. Nothing more substantial has been seen crafted or presented so far. Thus, evidence seems to point in a rather different direction, since AMLO’s denial of civil society participation is well known100. Similarly, his idea of the people seems to be an amorphous entity that manifests itself at the polls or demonstrations (as long as they are in favor of his project) but that does not have formal spaces  Díaz C. (October 13, 2020), Estas son las redes que más se usan para ver noticias de México, Merca 2.0. 100  See (a) Tren Maya: los indígenas critican que AMLO destruirá selvas (April 29, 2019). Reportur Mx; (b) Este año arranca construcción de Tren Maya, garantiza AMLO (June 22, 2019), Milenio (c) Jiménez, G. et  al. (March 7, 2019). Cede AMLO: habrá recursos para las ONG.  El Sol de México, p.6. 99

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for participation in decision-making on public affairs beyond the traditional instruments of representative democracy. Judging by the way in which AMLO has managed the demands of social movements, it seems that public affairs are reduced to what he considers important, and everything that breaks that framework, or the fragile finances of the presidential projects or assistance programs, or that do not report political benefits to the presidency, does not exist.101 Similarly, the evidence also indicates that many of the decisions made by AMLO’s government, including the management of the pandemic unleashed by COVID, have been the result of decisions based on popularity gain. Thus, AMLO’s government, preferred to partially comply with its obligation to contain the health crisis and privileged the minimization of the economic cost that would have translated, ultimately, into an enormous political-electoral cost in the 2021 intermediate elections, with Congress seats, mayoralties, and governorships at stake. The future is not promising for Mexico and less so if one belongs to the 52 million poor people, plus the 10 million new poor who joined as a result of the pandemic.102 In other words, more than half of the country will be below the poverty line in a hostile period in economic matters and with a government that refuses to develop economic instruments to address the harsh problems derived from the health crisis. The pandemic taught us, as recognized by specialists at the National Institute of Public Health,103 that the people with the highest risk of infection and death were those at the lowest socioeconomic level. This is not only because they live in crowded conditions and use public transportation but also because this group is mostly outside the coverage of the health system, and economic shortages made it difficult to access clinics and medicines. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico was marked by inequality, closure, and the concealment of relevant information, which made the worn-out slogan of AMLO’s administration “for the sake of all, the poor first,” acquire a most sinister sense, since the poor were indeed the first to be infected and die.

References Cobb RW, Elder C (1971) The politics of agenda-building: an alternative perspective for modern democratic theory. J Polit 33:892–915 Crouch C (2004) Post-democracy. Polity Press, London Deutsch KW (1971) Los nervios del gobierno. Modelos de comunicación y control políticos. Paidós, Buenos Aires Herman Edward S y Chomsky N (2002) Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media. Pantheon Books, North Charleston

 See,Guerrero J. (August 28, 2020) Nostalgia del caviar, El Economista.  Jauregui, D. (July 14, 2020), 10 millones más de pobres en México, Tercera Via. 103  Segundo Ciclo de Conferencias COVID, “Reinfección de COVID-19: ¿Qué sabes hasta ahora?”, 17, Diciembre 2020, Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, https://youtu.be/JPK4-6UgHkQ 101 102

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Inegi, Encuesta sobre el Impacto Económico Generado por COVID-19 en las Empresas (ECOVID-IE) (2020) Keyes R (2004) The post-truth era: dishonesty and deception in contemporary life (págs. 127–128). St. Martin’s Press, Nueva York Laclau E (2017) On populist reason. Verso, London Lynn Marie W (2016) Turning left: counter-hegemonic exhibition-making in the post-socialist era (1989–2014) A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Liverpool John Moores University for the degree Doctor of Philosophy. Liverpool John Moores University, UK, pp 460 Mellado Ruiz C y Lagos Lira C (2013) Redefining comparative analyses of media systems from the perspective of new democracies, Communication & Society, ISSN 0214–0039, ISSN-e 2174–0895, Vol. 26, N°. 4, 2013, págs. 1–24 Mouffe C (2018) For a left populism. Random House Publishing Group, London Roberts D, Post-truth politics, Apr 1, 2010. Grist. https://grist.org/ article/2010-­03-­30-­post-­truth-­politics/ Rodelo FV y Muñiz C (2017) La orientación política del periódico y su influencia en la presencia de encuadres y asuntos dentro de las noticias, Ediciones Complutense, Vol. 23 Núm. 1, Madrid, 2017 Sadaba Garraza MT (2001) Origen, aplicación y limites de la “teoría del encuadre” (framing) en comunicación. In: Comunicación y Sociedad Vol. XIV. Num. 2. Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona Sádaba T y Rodríguez J (2007) La construcción de la agenda de los medios. El debate del estatut en la prensa española, ÁMBITOS. N° 16 – Año 2007, pp 187–211 Thompson J (2000) Political scandal: power and visibility in the media age. Blackwell, New York Verificado-19 (2020) Disonancia: Voces en Disputa. Informe Anual de Verificado-19, Mexico

Chapter 13

Comparing Cases to Understand the Political Challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America Carlos Machado and Michelle Fernandez

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a scenario of relative political and social stability was observed in Latin America. However, the years leading up to the pandemic marked changes in the political orientation in many countries in the region, with emphasis on the strengthening of neoliberal policies. This change in direction in Latin America established, in the years before the pandemic’s outbreak, a period of intense pressure on the political systems of several countries. The political coordination capacity needed to react to the health, economic, and social crisis resulting from the rapid COVID-19 had been deteriorating in the years leading up to the pandemic. The frailty of infrastructure combined with the last trends of de-democratization has brought the Latin American societies to a twisted fate in the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the diversity of concrete situations of each country, this unfortunate picture must be added to any assessment of the political returns on the current dilemmas. However, conflicting political and social contexts had different presentations, intensities, and temporalities in the region. The rise of Andrés Lopes Obrador in Mexico will mark a political change, since he was originally identified with a leftist position. While in Colombia, the conservative government of Iván Duque’s victory, as opposed to the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, signals an inclination toward an extreme right agenda. In Brazil, political and economic crises have created a perfect storm scenario for the arrival of the pandemic. So, in this book, we tried to present different perspectives to analyze the political challenges of COVID-19 in Latin America. All chapters discuss, at some level, elements linked to the political situation in the region experienced in the last decade. Facing COVID-19 imposes challenges on organization and social cooperation that all the world’s population must struggle with at this moment. Although the C. Machado () · M. Fernandez University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil

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ethics of our times emphasizes the individual as a self-sufficient being, this crisis, as others surrounding us daily, such as the environmental crisis, which has a close relation to the actual pandemic, cannot be dealt with without collective cooperation. It is quite mesmerizing albeit all the accumulated knowledge on the dynamics of pandemics, there are still lone (or looney) defenders of practices that induce the spread of the disease. It is a disrespect to the lost lives of all our ancestors who did not have the slightest idea that a microorganism was the cause of their deaths, as it is with the ones whose lives are lost to this coronavirus. The solution for this crisis, as we have seen around the world in the successful countries to respond to the pandemic, will not occur on an individual level. It demands collective coordination, at the social and political levels. The political dynamics directly affects the conditions of the social pacts necessary to face the losses and suffering resulting from the pandemic. In the countries analyzed, we found different reactions and results, despite some dilemmas common to the entire territory. As shocking as it may seem, to deny the pandemic had positive implications to the leaders who adopted this strategy. Negationist reactions, regardless of position in the political field, emerged from populist leaderships who seek to sustain their positions based on the incessant mobilization of their support bases, resorting to intensive interaction strategies with their followers as a way of ensuring a popular support base to maintain their positions. However, the results observed in 2020 differ considerably between the countries that fit this scenario. In Nicaragua, the crisis was dealt as an opportunity to intensify restrictions on freedoms in a regime with evident autocratic dynamics. In Brazil, the denial of the pandemic’s danger to the Brazilian population has been activated as a way of retaining Bolsonaro’s government supporters. In Mexico, the lack of commitment from the Obrador presidency to prevent the crisis made it impossible for the health system to respond accordingly to the gravity of the situation. In all those countries where negationists came to surface, other political or social actors had to mobilize to react to the health crisis. In all of those, there was some difficulty put forward by the national government to hinder not only measures to prevent the spread of the virus but also in testing and especially in the registration of cases of infection and deaths by COVID-19. In Nicaragua, the mobilization of public health specialists was highlighted to provide a record of the number of cases, something that also occurred in Brazil. The confrontation with the crisis relied on the mobilization of civil society and the performance of several Brazilian governors and mayors, something that also occurred in seven Mexican states. In all these cases, the pandemic was treated by the respective central governments as a political dilemma, devaluing the importance of the government engaging in combating the pandemic. However, the recognition from the political leaders about the emergence of the crisis is not enough to deal with its dilemmas, taking into account the different capacities of Latin American states. The comparison between Colombia and Uruguay highlights this case, as both governments quickly recognized the exceptional character of the pandemic and implemented quarantine or isolation measures

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in March 2020. Both administrations sought to act promptly in both isolation and economic support measures. Nonetheless, the Colombian decentralized state structure brought a series of obstacles to implement the emergency policies to counter the effects of the pandemic. The inefficiency of the Colombian State confronting the pandemic led to the break of new demonstrations, which have been taking place since the end of 2019. The Ivan Duque government reacts with the concentration of powers in the Executive, taking to itself Legislative powers and reducing the civil liberties to protestors. These clashes generated several problems of definition as to which administrative level would be the jurisdiction over COVID-19’s confrontation measures, producing a scenario of low coordination capacity to offer responses to the crisis in the long term. In Uruguay, this could not be more different, as it is the only positive case assessed in this book. Although the newly installed president defends political reforms for state reduction, there was not only a massive public investment to deal with the crisis, for the strong structure of the national health system but also economic subsidies, both factors contributing to a low impact of COVID-19 in the country compared to its neighbors. As a result, the state’s organizational arrangement has crucial elements to understand its capacity to deal with emergency situations, such as the current pandemic. The political decision to engage in crisis control is crucial, but it is not enough to understand the success in dealing with the effects of the crisis. Adding to Colombia’s situation, social mobilizations in Chile also bring an emblematic case of the reactions to the actions of the states. In both countries the route of the protests, which were already mobilized in 2019, brought an additional dilemma to be faced by the governments of these countries. Despite the restrictive measures regarding agglomeration, in Chile, the number of protests intensified in 2020 when compared to the previous year, in addition to a change in the profile of the people present in the protests, who now have a profile of workers, especially those involved in the health sector, highlighting the dissatisfaction with the Chilean government’s handling of the crisis. Brazil, in turn, despite protests, within a context in which the federal government relies on negationist theses, a significant amount of the capacity to mobilize social movements will emerge from the articulation with activities of direct engagement in confronting pandemic effects on communities with less assistance. The solidarity networks that produced protests in Chile strengthened diverse actions despite the Chilean government’s guidelines (or absence of them). The political repercussions of all dimensions presented before are quite complex to consider. The impact of political support for the government has, in general, a negative bias, but with significant differences. In Argentina, despite the swift action of the presidency in taking travel restriction measures and negotiating the payment of the debt with external creditors in order to have the necessary resources to face the pandemic, the prolonged lockdown had a negative impact on the government’s assessment. In this case, we have one more component to the reaction of the pandemic; it is not enough to pay attention to the crisis and have the capacity to implement the measures, elements that have escaped the Colombian case. Despite the actions of the states, the current scenario is unlikely to have positive repercussions

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for governments that have not resorted to autocratic methods to ensure their control. In this sense, the context of the holding elections in Ecuador also follows the same path. In March 2020, the approval of Moreno’s management saw an improvement when it registered a raising up to 30%; despite being at significantly lower levels months before, in the subsequent months, the upward tendency was substituted for a downward trend on its popular support. The comparison with the Brazilian case also brings important dilemmas on this aspect. The support base for President Bolsonaro is maintained at the range of 30% approval, like the Ecuadorian case. However, as the pandemic situation evolved, there has been noted a change in the composition of Bolsonaro’s supporters from previous years. At this point, both the Brazilian and the Mexican cases meet again, despite being governments in opposite political positions. Both governments used communication tools to surpass the media and connect with their bases directly. Nevertheless, in the Mexican case, the utter gravity of the pandemic forced a change in Obrador’s discourse, which also had an impact on the direction of policies to deal with the pandemic. Even so, the Mexican president managed to remain with positive approval ratings throughout the period, despite his discursive change. The use of these communication tools is, therefore, crucial as a political strategy for affirming social mobilization and support for populist leaders. It is not by chance that the base of Bolsonaro’s supporters in Brazil will resonate with the president’s strategy of blaming governors for the negative results in tackling the pandemic. As a result, the Latin American dilemmas that bring these experiences together lie in the weaknesses of political and administrative coordination, despite relevant variations in the region. The importance of the head of government’s action draws attention, because if Brazil has a health system capable of facing a crisis of this magnitude, by not being given due importance and not being activated in a nationally coordinated way, the potential of the Brazilian health system was reduced, unlike the Uruguayan context, where the public health system was able to provide an effective response to the crisis, even with the prospect of State reform, which would affect the health system itself, as it is the agenda promoted by the current president. Therefore, it is not enough to have a structure capable of coping with the health crisis; it is also necessary to provide direction, leadership, and political action worthy of this challenge. At the same time, it is necessary to show that the use of the strategy to deny the health crisis did not have a negative impact on the image of the leaders who opted for this line, at least up to the end of 2020. The unraveling of the pandemic in 2021 already shows that we can perceive several defeats in the fight against the pandemic, in which case Brazil is evident for its outline of growth of deaths, a different posture from that adopted by Obrador, in Mexico, which retracted his initial perspective on the pandemic. The propensity of a state to cope with pandemic dilemmas suggests an idea of a​​ perfect reversed storm, considering the Latin American political trends in the last decade. To face this challenge, it is necessary to have a state structure capable of reacting to the dilemma, as well as national coordination to allow the direction of political action and a government whose population expresses confidence in its

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actions. This reversed storm occurred only in Uruguay. In the other countries, we have seen several disasters in the carrying of the crisis, and in one specific case, Brazil, there are clear contours, not only a storm, but of a flood. So, understanding the governments that denied the real danger of the pandemic, knowing the state actions in countries considered emblematic to face the COVID-19, analyzing the performance of social movements in some Latin American countries during this period of health emergency, and understanding the behavior of public opinion during the pandemic have allowed us to get into political issues that are crucial for the current crisis’ moments. This book is part of the effort to comprehend the region’s politics and its impact on the everyday life of its population. However, there is a lot to be done in terms of comparative politics, beyond the cases here presented. Considering cases beyond those presented here, it is necessary to assess the effect of the recent turmoils at Bolivian politics, and how this hindered the capacity to respond to the sanitary crisis. Another important case would be to analyze the response from El Salvador, an autocratic response, but without a denial face, like we could perceive in the case of Nicaragua. Besides adding cases, there is a lot to be done in the comparisons in the regions, including more dimensions than we were able to convey for now. For last, it must be stressed that these texts represent a photograph of what was going on during 2020. As we enter 2021, there’s new virus variants that reshape the scenery in Latin America. As Brazil becomes the epicenter of the pandemic, with more contagious variants of the coronavirus, all its neighbors felt the pressure in their respective health systems. Albeit the good management of the crisis by Uruguay during 2020, at the first months of 2021, it is notable the steep curve of infections and deaths, without certainty about the capacity to vaccinate enough of the population to impede this tendency, as the production and distribution of the vaccines throughout the world is marked by delays and concentration of doses at the wealthiest countries. Unfortunately, there is a lot to be learned from this emergency situation as it seems there is a lot delaying the vaccination in the region at the present. But this effort must be carried on, with a hope that we can learn from the mistakes made at this moment, as in the near future we may expect new epidemics and maybe pandemics to burst in the near horizon.

Index

A Accountability mechanism, 173 ACLD’s dataset, 4 ad hoc inspiration, 100 Aerolíneas Argentinas, 129 African Americans, 90 Agenda’s construction, 176 Agglomeration, 130 Aggressive media campaign, 64 Ambulance Medical Emergencies, 78 AMLO communication protocols, 174 AMLO popularity approval, 169 changes, 169 Federalist Alliance, 171 pandemic handling, 170 reasons, 173 social movements, 171 successive occasion, 170 AMLO’s Covid-19 response controversial statements, 24 cooperation, 31 Covid-19 management, 24 criticism, 31 downplayed, conservative media, 166 electoral opportunism, 30 health measures, 31 health workers death, 166 hospital system, 166 independent analyses, 168 inefficiency, 168 mask usages, 30 mortality rate, 166, 167 overwhelmed hospitals, 167

own government’s recommendation, 30 pandemic denier, 30 poor face masks usage, 165 public opinion, 165 public policies, 167 AMLO’s ideology, 175 AMLO’s mismanagement ranks, 29 Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), 23 civil society participation denial, 179 conference, 173, 174 economic instruments refusal, 180 format, content and discourse, 177 health crisis, 180 mediatized messages, 179 Mexican public opinion, 178 neoliberal measures, 176 objectives, 179 oversimplification, 176 oversimplified messages, 177 pandemic management (see AMLO's Covid-19 response) political pseudo-facts, 177 worn-out slogan, 180 Anti-elitism, 179 Antiviral drug distribution system, 26 Argentina’s pandemic management communication and public opinion, 124 debt crisis, 123 health crisis, 123 health vs. economy, 126–128 interministerial meetings, 123 irregular territorial distribution, 125, 126 Kirchner administration, 123 lockdowns, 123

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Fernandez, C. Machado (eds.), COVID-19’s political challenges in Latin America, Latin American Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2

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190 Argentina’s pandemic management (cont.) mandatory lockdown, 122 national government’s actions, 123 political costs, 124 political polarization, 123 president initiative, 124 vaccines, 128, 129 Argentine government, 4 Argentinian economy, 126 Argentinian government, 121 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 106, 109, 116 Articulation logic, 104 Authoritarian electoral regime, 35 Authoritarianism, 110 Autocratic governments, 2 Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA), 125, 126, 130 B Barros Luco Hospital workers, 111 Batllismo, 72 Biological warfare, 42 Bolivian politics, 187 Bolsonaristas, 19 Bolsonaro "The Negationist” Alckmin, 11 anti-corruption operation, 11 anti-PT position, 11 attitudinal posture, 13 Brazilian politics, 9 confrontation, 13 controversy, 11 corruption scandal, 11 COVID-19 pandemic, 12 economic downfall, 21 extreme positions, 19 governing coalition, 20 intolerant and antidemocratic positions, 10 juxtaposed measures, 12 military regime, 10 opposition, 9 pandemic denier, 12, 134 pandemic response, 9, 19 pandemic seriousness denial, 12 pandemic trajectory, 134 Poder360 poll aggregator, 10 polarization, 20 president elections, 10 radical defense, 13 radical positions, 141 spokesperson, 9 staunch defender, 10

Index systematic denial, 134 toxic rhetoric, 13 vocal critics, 9 Bolsonaro’s approval, 141 Bolsonaro’s government supporters, 184 Bolsonaro’s negationism, 16 Bolsonaro’s presidency, 14 Bolsonaro’s reelection, 143 Bolsonaro’s supporters, 186 Brazil Bolsonaro (see Bolsonaro “The Negationist”) campaign against hunger, 91 civil society, 100 Covid-19 deaths, 9 Covid-19 pandemic, 12 elections, 14 federal government, 14 federation, 13 fragmented party system, 14 health and education policies, 14 pandemic, 87 pandemic war surveys, 17 state governors, 14 substantial policy authority, 14 Brazil’s associational tissue, 100 Brazil’s federalism, 14 Brazilian Association of Intensive Medicine, 87 Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG), 94 Brazilian civil society, 4 Brazilian electoral competition, 20 Brazilian governors and mayors, 184 Brazilian health system, 186 Brazilian polarization, 5 Brazilian political spectrum, 20 Brazilian political system, 20 Brazilian politics, 2 Brazilian Public Health System (SUS), 17, 18 Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), 15 Bricolage, 90 Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, 4, 121 C CABA’s chief of government, 128 Cacerolazo, 61, 127 Centralizing/decentralizing powers, 18 Central-provincial government coordination, 130 Chauvinism, 152 Chilean labor movement, 109 Chilean movements, 104 Chilean Security Association, 111

Index Chilean society, 4, 104, 110 Choice-based CA task, 137 Choice-based situation, 137 Circular dialogue, 173 Citizen Observatory, 41 Citizen security, 70 Citizenry’s crisis assessments, 148 Citizens Revolution, 148 Civil society actors, 87, 88 Civil society initiatives, 91 Civil society mobilization, 100 Civil society organizations, 41 Coalición Multicolor, 70 Cognitive framework, 36 Collaborative Map, 94 Collective action dynamics, 110 Collective action frames, 88, 89 Collective action grievances, 105 Collective action in Chile Covid-19 pandemic, 103 demands, 103 pandemic and survival protests, 113–114 social movements, 110–113 soup kitchens, 115, 116 southern mobilizations, 114–115 transformative events (see Transformative events) Collective action repertoires Buddhist community radio program, 95 civil society organizations, 96 community radio programing, 97 definition, 89 digital inclusion, 96 digital platforms, 95 digitalization, 96, 97 emergency solidarity efforts, 95 foundations, 90 initiatives, 95 offline innovations, 97 online innovations, 97 organizational design, 89 pandemic improvisation, 97 Collective action routines, 88, 90 Collective emotions and grievances, 108 Colombia Covid-19 positive case, 49 economic-administrative measures, 50 Legislative Decrees, 64 pandemic management, 49 poor health crisis management, 63 Colombia National Government’s Covid-19 response administrative acts, 51, 52 constitutional and legal powers, 51

191 economic-administrative measures, 53–54 institutional political effects (see State of Emergency) measures, 50 sanitary measures, 51, 52 Colombian decentralized state structure, 185 Colombian political system, 56, 63 Colombian presidential regime power accumulation Congress regulations, 59 constitution and jurisprudence, 58 Constitutional Court, 59 convenience and timeliness, 59 Decrees 444 and 559 of 2020, 58 General Pension System, 58 health emergency, 57 institutional balance, 60 Latin America, 56 lockdowns and mobility restrictions, 56 mandatory public service, 58 military leadership, 57 national radio and television networks, 57 political control, 60 political sphere, 56 public opinion, 57 representatives and senators, 59 resources allocations, 58 vaccines, pharmaceutical companies, 57 Colombian society, 60 Comfort zones, 135 Communication, 95, 158, 186 Comparative politics, 187 Comprehensive Medical Care Program (PAMI), 129 Comptroller General’s prosecution, 149 Compulsory preventive isolation, 51 CONFECH, 112 Confrontation, 184 Congress Regulations, 59, 64 Conjoint analysis (CA), 136, 137 Conservatives, 175 Consolidated movements, 104 Constituent Assembly, 158 Constitutional amendment, 44 Constitutional Court, 64 Constitutional Exceptionality regime, 51 Contentious Electoral Tribunal (TCE), 156 Controlled health situation, 83 Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) in Argentina, 4, 5 in Chile, 105, 106 in Chile, 4 Colombia, 49, 50 Latin America, 1

192 Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) (cont.) in Mexico, 24, 163 mysterious disease, 133 Nicaragua, 35 socioeconomic effects, 3 Western pacific region, 1 Coronavirus Fund, 74, 75, 82 Coronavirus pandemic scales, Mexico, 29 Corruption scandals, 153 Costa Rica, 41, 42 Covid bonuses, 111 COVID communications, 5 Covid-19 generated resistance, 127 COVID-19 Task Force, 92 Creativity, 91, 100 Crisis management, 49, 57, 187 Crisis promotion, 12 Curfews, 64 D Decentralization, 64 Decentralized electoral institutions, 14 De-democratization process, 37 Demobilized student movement, 105 Democratic Center party, 65 Denial, 3 Digital gap, 96 Digital inclusion, 96 Dilma Rousseff’s administration, 10 Dire consequences, 49 Direct democracy mechanisms, 71 DISPO scheme, 125 Divided political right, 138 Division of Health Economics, 77 Domestic violence, 152 E Ecological emergency, 63 Economic-administrative issues, 63 Economic-administrative measures aid and support, 54 criticisms, 54 emergency declaration, 53 entities and appointments, 63–64 FOME, 53 FONPET, 54 mitigation of emergencies, 53 public health and public order, 53 Solidarity Income Program, 54 tax relief, 54 territorial entities, 64 Economic contraction, 151

Index Economic crisis, 2, 82 Economic liberalism, 11 Economic policy, 140 Economic threat, 113 Ecuador, 5 corruption, 153 Covid-19 pandemic, 152 Latin American country, 147 pessimistic sentiment, 152 WIN global survey, 152 Ecuadorian economy, 151 Ecuadorian pandemic response communication errors, 156 corruptions, 153 crisis management, 154 disconnection with citizens’ emotions and demands, 154 legislative credibility, 156 legislative work, 156 Ministry of Government, 154 Ministry of Health’s public excuse, 155 mortality rates, 154 official reaction, 154 pessimistic view, 153 public opinion, 155 tweets, 155 weak communication, 154 Ecuadorian public opinion, 148 Ecuadorians’ political attitudes Alianza PAIS, 157 approaches, 156 campaign proposals, 157 CNE, 156 elections results, 157 electoral campaign, 157 indigenous communities, 157 political contest, 156 TCE, 156 UNES, 157 Education, 81 Educational agenda and policies, 112 Educational Minister, 112 El Dorado International Airport, 50 Electoral campaign, 71 Emergency aid program, 98 Emergency declaration, 3 Emergency initiatives, 4 Emergency Mitigation Fund (FOME), 53, 58, 64 Employment-protection laws, 111 Executive Power, 71 Executive’s communication strategy, 153 Experimental conjoint analysis, 5

Index F FA governments, 71 Face-to-face classes, 105 Face-to-face school lessons, 125 Face-to-face to stage demonstrations, 112 Federal government, 15 Felipe Correa’s left-wing government, 2 Feminist mobilization, 110 Fernández’s government, 122 Fondos de Pensiones Territoriales (FONPET), 53 Food Acquisition Program (PAA), 98 Formal participatory institutions, 100 Frame bridging civil society initiatives, 99 connecting demands, 97 emergency solidarity action, 98 food security, 98 observatory, 99 programmatic agendas, 98 public health services, 98 solidarity efforts intensification, 99 solidarity initiatives, 98 Free public institution, 80 G GACH recommendations, 75 Gallup World Poll, 151 Gasoline subsidies, 149 Gender and domestic violence, 152 General Health Council (CSG), 28 General Pension System, 58 Gini index evolution, 72, 74 Global economic crisis, 40 Governance mechanisms, 179 Government-opposition political cooperation strategy, 130 Government's communication, 40 Governor Doria Bolsonaro’s loudest critic, 16 conflicts, 16 mayor, São Paulo City, 15 opposing Bolsonaro, 16 pandemic response, 16 presidential ambitions, 16 PSDB leader, 20 vaccination, 16, 17 Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), 125 Gross domestic product (GDP), 122 H Hate crimes, 44 Health authorities, 104

193 Healthcare, 87 Healthcare professionals, 40 Healthcare system, 41 Health crisis, 2 Health protocols, 163 Health Provider Entities, 52 Health reform, 76 Health security measures, 4 Health system, 126 High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet, 40 Homogenization, 134 Honorary Scientific Advisory Group (GACH), 75 House of Representatives, 59 Human rights violations and abuses, 35 Human Rights Watch, 164 Hypothetical presidential candidates, 139 I Identitarian supporters, 144 Identitarians, 140 Identity-based connection, 141 Identity-based groups, 135 Identity-based ideological connections, 5 Identity-based polarizing signaling, 140 Identity connections, 134, 135 Impeachment, 150 Imperialism, 150 Impersonation, 174 Incessant mobilization, 184 In-class teaching, 80 Independent analyses, 168 Independent movements, 147 Indigenous Movement, 149, 150 Indigenous organizations, 96 Inequality, 152 Informational updates, 135 Institutional complexity and ambiguity, 90 Institutional political power balances, 65 Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), 96 Integrated National Health System (SNIS), 76, 77 Intense uncertainty, 88 Intergovernmental conflict, 20 International Commission Against Corruption, 149 International financing, 126 International Health Regulations, 23 International isolation, 36 International media, 38 International politics approximation, 1 Internet, 95 Intervozes, 96 INVIMA, 52 Ivan Duque government, 185

194 L Lacalle Pou’s administration, 81 Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST), 92 Language, 174 LAPOP Americas Barometer, 148 Latin America AMLO, Mexico, 183 Brazil, political and economic crisis, 183 Chile crisis, 185 de-democratization, 183 dilemmas, 186 Ecuador crisis, 186 Nicaragua, political and economic crisis, 184 political and social stability, 183 political leaders, 184 political systems, 183 political trends, 186 Latin American Strategic Center for Geopolitics (CELAG), 151 Latino barometer, 148 Law of Urgent Consideration, 82 Left-wing populism, 179 Legislative branch, 14, 64 Legislative majority, 149 Lopez Obrador’s popularity, 163 M Macroeconomic indicators, 152 Management instruments, 77 Mañaneras agenda framing, 176 attitudes, 174 backbiting the adversary, 175 culmination, 175 definition, 174 impersonation, 174 opacity, 174 perspective/analytical angle, 176 political communication tool, 176 political propaganda, 176 social relationship, 174 transparency, 174 Manichaeisms, 178 Market-oriented fashion, 141 Mediatizacion, 177 Medical personnel training, 129 Methodological transparency, 175 Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (AMBA), 125, 130 Mexican administration, 29 Mexican federal administration, 32

Index Mexican federal government epidemiological traffic lights, 164 hospitalization, 165 pandemic management, 163 presidential conferences, 164 pronouncements, 164 Sentinel model, 163 Mexican government, 5 Mexican media, 177, 178 Mexican news portal El Hospital, 25 Mexicans economic crisis bankruptcy, 168 expensive projects, 169 predictions, 168 rating, 169 unemployment, 168 weak economic stimulus programs, 169 Mexico’s Covid-19 pandemic response airport control, 27 AMLO’s government, 26 closure of schools, 27 CSG, 28 detection and isolation tests, 27 health emergency, 27, 28 mathematical models, 28 measurement model, 28 new policies, 27 prevention measures, 27 sentinel surveillance model, 28 Mexico’s H1N1 flu pandemic response care protocols, 25 closure of public places, 25 comparison, 24 health protocols, 25 journals, 26 lockdowns, 25 pneumonia cases detection, 25 social and behavioral change, 26 strategic plans, 26 strengthening public health laboratories, 26 Ministry of Social Development (MIDES), 79, 81 Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron (ESMAD), 61 Mobilizations, 4, 61 Moral economy, 114 Moreno’s management, 186 Morning Consult Political Intelligence, 172 Movement tactics, 104, 106–108 Multilateral agencies, 149 Multilateral organization loan, 75 Multiparty coalition, 71 Multiple correspondence analysis, 139, 140 Mythification, 134

Index N Narrative structures, 135 National Assembly alliance, 149 criticism, 156 electoral authority, 158 Judiciary, 158 protests and riots, 150 public approval, 150, 151 public opinion, 158 public’s negative attitude, 150 National Board of Health, 77 National Electoral Council (CNE), 148, 156 National government, 64 National governors’ forum, 15 National Health Fund (FONASA), 76 National Health System, 77 National Healthy Distance Day, 27 National Institute for Access to Information, 175 National Institute of Health (INS), 50 National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC), 151 National Network of Social Mobilization (COEP), 94 National security agencies, 149 Negationist reactions, 184 Negotiation, 122, 126 Neighborhoods of favelas, 91 Neoliberal principles, 1 Network of Popular Collectives of Paulista (COPPA), 93 Network theorists, 90 Nicaragua government’s Covid-19 response accusation, 40 cognitive framework, 36 communications strategy, 37 community transmission, 39 crisis denial, 36 discreet epidemiological monitoring, 39 health crisis, 36 heterodox policies, 38 international healthcare guidelines, 37 MINSA protocol, 39 mismanagement, 40 narratives, 39 political crisis, 36 quarantine, 37, 39 spokespersons, 38 State-sponsored massive activities, 38 Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), 42

195 Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security (INSS), 35 Nicaraguan Medical Association, 40 Nicaraguan spring, 35 Noncontributory transfers, 80 Nongovernmental “Stay at home” campaign, 41 O Obligatory preventive social distancing (DISPO), 125 Obligatory preventive social isolation (ASPO), 125 Obrador’s discourse, 186 Odebrecht scandal, 148 Official immunization schedule, 21 Online environment, 112 Online strikes, 112 Organizational institutionalists, 90 Organizations’ real financial situation, 111 Organized informal survival networks, 116 Ortega family regime, 36 Ortega family’s political discourse, 37 Ortega government, 44 Ortega regime, 37 Out-of-pocket spending, 76 Oversimplification, 179 P Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 38, 76 Pandemic dilemmas, 186 Pandemic’s chronology, 23 Participatory budgeting program, 100 Pathogenic H5N1 viruses, 26 Performances, 90 Peronism, 122 Pessimism, 158 Pharmaceutical company AstraZéneca, 128 Plan Ceibal, 80 Polarization campaign, 134 Polarizing mobilization strategy, 21 Political actors, 158 Political analysis challenges, 2 Political and organizational circumstances, 105 Political and socioeconomic structure, 49 Political communication, 3 Political cooperation, 121, 129 Political coordination capacity, 1 Political creativity, 90, 91, 100

196 Political culture education, 179 Political decision, 185 Political discourses, 134 Political dynamics, 184 Political economy, 82 Political inefficiency, 23 Political leadership, 64 Political mismanagement, 113 Political opportunity theory, 108 Political polarization Argentina, 130 Brazil, 134 dynamics, 131 effects, 122 elites and society, 130 indication, 127 interaction barrier, 135 public opinion, 121, 124 ruling coalition, 122 Political preferences opposition, 135 Political repercussions, 185 Political-institutional effects, 64 Politicization, 36 Post-truth, 177 Pragmatist authors, 91 Preparedness and Response Plan, 23 President Bolsonaro’s performance, 143 President Iván Duque governance disease Prevention and Action program, 62 health crisis, 62 Health Emergency adoption measures, 62 image and career, 61 institutional political power balances, 62 measures and information, 62 necessary governance, 61 presidential program, 63 Upper/Lower Houses Representatives, 61 Venezuelan situation, 62 Presidential coalition, 83 Presidential economic orientation, 83 Presidential popularity, 123, 126, 130, 131 Primary-defense strategy, 135 Private and public education, 80 Programmatic agreement, 70 Progressist Administration, 149 Psychological defense mechanisms, 143 Public health system, 147 Public opinion campaign, 74 Public policies, 100 Public transportation system, 105 Punta Arenas rises, 114

Index Q Quantitative market research methods, 137 Quarantines, 64 Quick reaction, 23 Quito and Guayaquil citizens, 153 R Radical antisystem discourse, 11 Radical mobilization, 134 Rafael Correa’s left-wing policies, 148 Recentralization, 14 Repertoire, 89 Repository of Civil Society Initiatives Against the Pandemic, 88 Republican austerity, 169 Resource mobilization, 103 Responsible freedom, 68, 74–75 Right-wing coalition, 67, 81 Right-wing respondents, 141, 142 Risk communication, 26 Rival communities, 135 Round-the-flag rally effect, 123 Russian Direct Investment Fund, 128 S Salary Councils, 79 Salience, 110 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 42–44 Sandinista Popular Revolution, 41 Sanitary cords, 105 Sanitary emergency, 56, 153 Sanitary management, 76 Sanitary measures, 63 SARS-CoV-2, 3 See also Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) Scarcities, 4 Scientific and civil society organizations, 94 Self-care recommendations, 36 Self-sufficient being, 184 Semi-authoritarian regimes, 44 Senate of the Republic (Upper House), 55 Sentinel, 163 Sentinel surveillance model, 28 Small convenience analysis, 113 Social distancing, 13, 38, 87, 133 data variance, 139 identitarian respondents, 141 ideological orientation, 139 MCA model, 139

Index multiple correspondence analysis, 139 opinion, 139 political support, 138 respondents, 138 Social imaginary, 72 Social isolation, 18, 131 Social media, 12 Social mobility evolution, 69 Social mobilizations, 185 Social movements, 3 actors, 88, 89, 100 challenges and grievances, 110, 111 frames, 89, 90 improvisation, 90 Latin American countries, 187 mobilization, 185 national initiatives, 91 pandemic response, 88 performances, 90 pragmatist approach, 90 recombination, 91 repertoires, 89 students demobilization, 112, 113 Social movement repertoires, 4 Social movement theories, 103 Social networks, 166 Social protection, 3, 73 Social public spending, 82 Social safety nets, 100 Social security instruments, 81 Social spending, 81 Social uprising, 104 active group, 110 indigenous groups and women, 110 International Women’s Day, 106 mobilization levels, 110 mobilized society, 108 pandemic transformed collective action, 107 peaceful-violent balance, 107, 108 plebiscite, 106 pre-uprising period, 108, 109 protest intensity, 107 protest’s cyclical nature, 106, 107 quarantine and post-quarantine periods, 109 short-term legacy, 116 Socioeconomic indicators, 72 Sociopolitical force, 112 Soft coup, 36 Solid legislative shield, 21 Solidarity Income Program, 54 Solidarity initiatives, 4, 88 Soup kitchens, 115, 116

197 Southern Chilean mobilizations local authorities, 115 local economies, 114 quarantine, 114 self-employed workers, 114 social outburst, 115 Special Cybercrime Law, 44 State bureaucratic structure, 70 State Health Services Administration (ASSE), 76 State of Emergency abnormality, 55 Colombia, 55 Colombian presidential power accumulation, 56–60 Constitutional Court control, 55 COVID-19 public health crisis, 55 exceptional measure, 60 extensions, 55 force of law, 55 individual freedoms and human rights, 60–61 lockdown, 154 negative effect, national economy, 55 political/economic crisis, 56 president’s leadership, 61–63 public calamity, 54 State retrenchment, 81 State’s organizational arrangement, 185 States of Constitutional Exception, 54 Strategic Vaccination Command, 129 Stratified universalism, 73 Strikes, 112 Structuralism, 90 Struggle against hunger campaign, 93, 94 digital baskets, 91–92 distribution projects, 92 initiatives, 93, 94 intermediary programs, 92 logistical operations, 92 mapping project, 94 media activism, 93 nongovernmental organizations, 92 smartphone application, 93 solidarity and mutual aid, 91 Survival protests, 108 Syncretism, 91 T Tax relief, 54 Telecommunications, 79 Theatrical language, 90

Index

198 Theorists of agency, 90 Traditional “honeymoon” period, 71 Transformative events Chilean spring, 104 chronological periods, 106 collective action, 116 Covid-19 pandemic, 104 definition, 103 nature and composition, 106 origins, 104 participating groups, 109 political conflict, 104 political consequence, 104 protest trends, 106 social movements, 113–114 social uprising, 104, 106 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 153 Transportation mobility, 68 U Underfunded public education, 60 Unemployment, 21 UNICEF studies, 152 Unified Favela Central (CUFA), 91 Union for Hope (UNES), 157 Universal Health Coverage (UHC), 76 Unweighted OLS estimates, 136 Uruguay controlling health effects, 67 COVID-19, 81 education, 80–81 government’s political orientation, 82 Integrated National Health System, 67 pandemic evolution, 68, 69 post-pandemic scenario, 70–72 radical restrictive measures, 81 role in crisis, 67 social and economic matters, 67 socioeconomic context, 72 Uruguayan economy, 72 Uruguayan health system budget, 76 Covid-19 case detection, 77 FONASA, 76 healthcare services, 76 institutional capacities, 77 management instruments, 77 PAHO, 76 pandemic challenges, 77 public and private sectors, 76 public research institutions, 77 SNIS, 76

UHC, 76 vaccines acquisition, 78 Uruguayan social protection regime connectivity capabilities, 79 employment market structure, 78 employment situation, 78 noncontributory transfers, 80 palliative instrument, 79 public institution, 79 Salary Councils, 79 telework, 79 welfare systems, 78 Uruguayan union central PIT-CNT, 82 Uruguayan welfare regime, 67 Uruguayan welfare system, 73 UTIs Brasileiras, 87 V Vaccination, 131, 187 Vaccine suppliers, 129 Vandalization, 149 Vandals and coup plotters, 36 Venezuelan migrants regularization, 65 Verificado’s study, 175 Vice President Murillo summoned government sympathizers, 37 Virtual Congress, 59 Virtual universalization, 73 Vote orientation, 158 Vulnerable social and economic groups, 87 W Web-based opinion polls attributes, 137 CA, 136, 137 experimental data, 136 OLS estimates, 136 post-stratification, 136 respondents perception and behavior, 136 samples, 136 WhatsApp, 95 White paper (publication), 39 WHO recommendations, 2, 20, 43 Women’s movement revitalization, 110 Women’s vulnerability, 152 Worker’s Party (PT), 10, 11, 15 World Health Organization (WHO), 2 Z Zero Hunger Program, 99