Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces [1 ed.] 9781617282102, 9781607417637

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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGY SERIES

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COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE ARMED FORCES

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central, contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in

DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGY SERIES Military Satellites: Issues, Goals and Challenges Abel Chirila (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-238-0 Evaluating Military Compensation Jaime G. Duenas (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-476-6 The Army's Future Combat System Program Christian N. Feliciano (Editor) 2009. ISBN 978-1-60741-262-5

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Strategizing Resilience and Reducing Vulnerability Peter R. J. Trim and Jack Caravelli (Editors) 2009. ISBN 978-1-60741-693-7 Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces Laure Paquette 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-763-7

Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGY SERIES

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE ARMED FORCES

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

LAURE PAQUETTE

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Counterinsurgency and the armed forces / Laure Paquette, editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN H%RRN 1. Counterinsurgency. 2. Armed Forces. 3. Multinational armed forces. 4. Strategic planning. 5. Military planning. I. Paquette, Laure. U241.C694 2009 355.02'18--dc22 2009031999 Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.    New York

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DEDICATION

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For the Canadians who served in Croatia and Afghanistan; bearing wounds that can be seen – and wounds that can’t.

Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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CONTENTS Preface

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Chapter 1

ix Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counter - terrorism

1

Chapter 2

Basics of Underdog Strategic Thinking

13

Chapter 3

How to Defeat Underdog Thinking

23

Chapter 4

Case Studies and Solutions

47

Chapter 5

Conclusion

89

About the Author

93

Bibliography

95

Index

101

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PREFACE Chapter 1. Irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency are now the foremost challenges facing conventional armed forces. There is no shortage of terminology to describe these challenges. Anyone who has read about counterinsurgency in recent years will have noticed: urban war, irregular war, fourth generation war, asymmetrical war, long war. There is no consensus about which word actually describes the broadest reality. However, for my purposes here, I will use asymmetric war as the broadest term, encompassing all the others, as have Drew and Snow.1 Along with all this, there is a lot of advice for armed forces charged with these tasks. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air force have recently updated their manuals for irregular war and counterinsurgency, of which Irregular Warfare/Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 and Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24 are only two.2 Chapter 2. This chapter discusses the basics of underdog thinking. It starts by listing its characteristics, and then its typical mistakes. It also gives examples of both. Finally, this chapter looks at what proposals have been made to exploit any weaknesses in underdog strategy. Chapter 3. To defeat underdogs, you must understand underdogs. This chapter explains how to analyse their strategy and tactics. This analysis relies on the characteristics of their strategic thinking outlined in the previous chapter. It also relies on the repeated differentiation of significant events, actions, actors, or 1

Dennis M. Drew And Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy/An Introduction to Modern NationalSecurity Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2006), p. 61-62. 2 Irregular Warfare/Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 (Washington: Department of the Air Force, August 2007), Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24 (Washington: Department of the Army, December 2006).

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resources used by any of them, from insignificant ones. Someone trying to defeat underdog thinking for the first time can learn the steps of analysis by using the worksheet system discussed below. Chapter 4. As explained in the first chapter, the first component of the knowledge transfer system was the exposition of theory as provided in Chapters 1 and 2. The second component of the knowledge-transfer system was the group of worksheets introduced in Chapter 3. The third component of the knowledgetransfer system is the case studies to be analyzed by readers or participants in a study group. These case studies chosen for the variety of levels of analysis that they require can be analyzed using the worksheets. Case studies I, II and III have solutions and completed worksheets. The rest have solutions only. Finally, the remaining case studies are provided for independent study. Chapter – 5. The knowledge transfer system based on worksheets, when joined to an u-nderstanding of underdog strategic thinking, has a large number of applications in irregular warfare. It can be used to analyze a single hostile actor’s actions. It can be used to develop a proposal to promote greater safety for a single country. It can be used to analyze and improve the effectiveness of cooperation between two states, if that is one of the states' objectives, in combating terrorism. It can be used to examine the pattern of insurgency or terrorism and design a response to it. It can be used to train analysts, gatherers of intelligence, or officers and personnel of combat units. It can be used by any kind of individual or group, civilian or military. It can analyze the possible action of non-state actors, which may assist or hinder the design of counter tactics. It can also analyze the domestic politics of a state, or to the relations of non-governmental actors, or the relations of non-government groups to their own (or other) governments. It can be used for willing or sane or unwilling or insane actors. The foregoing chapters, therefore, are only an introduction to underdog strategic thinking.

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Chapter 1

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IRREGULAR WARFARE, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTER - TERRORISM Irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency are now the foremost challenges facing conventional armed forces. There is no shortage of terminology to describe these challenges. Anyone who has read about counterinsurgency in recent years will have noticed: urban war, irregular war, fourth generation war, asymmetrical war, long war. There is no consensus about which word actually describes the broadest reality. However, for my purposes here, I will use asymmetric war as the broadest term, encompassing all the others, as have Drew and Snow.1 Along with all this, there is a lot of advice for armed forces charged with these tasks. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air force have recently updated their manuals for irregular war and counterinsurgency, of which Irregular Warfare/Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 and Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24 are only two.2 Fortunately, the problem with asymmetric war is the same for a three-block war, for a network-centric war, an urban war, or a small war: the soldier is suddenly required to think globally and act locally, and the outcome of entire campaigns may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders at the lowest level. 1

Dennis M. Drew And Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy/An Introduction to Modern NationalSecurity Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press,2006), p. 61-62. 2 Irregular Warfare/Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 (Washington: Department of the Air Force, August 2007), Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24 (Washington: Department of the Army, December 2006).

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Specifically, this decision-making requires the ability to enlarge or reduce easily the scope of facts to be taken into account in making decisions, i.e. to shift the focus from the big picture to the small picture and back again. It also requires a high degree of flexibility, the ability to make decisions in conditions of high uncertainty, the ability to think outside the box, and it requires the ability to forecast situations repeatedly as new information comes to light. The new threats of asymmetric war involve irregular operations which bypass the superior military power of states, and attacks on “vulnerable political, economic, population, and symbolic targets, thus demoralizing both government and its populace.”3 Guerrilla war, insurgency. and terrorism are all highly irregular, unconventional, and decentralized. Deception, denial, and stealth hide its operations. Combatants wear no uniforms and blend into the populations they attack. Combatants communicate with cell phones, fax machines, e-mail, and websites. There are no fronts, no laws, no conventions of war, no ethical constraints, no humanitarian concern, no distinction between civilian and military, and no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. “Examples of asymmetric threats might include the following:

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•

• •

•

• • •

Computer hackers use e-mail viruses to destroy U.S. military personnel records and the software used to process them, thereby seeking to delay U.S. force deployments and mobilization. Terrorists explode bombs against civilian targets in New York City. Adversary special forces fire handheld surface-to-air missiles (e.g., SA16s) against U.S. cargo aircraft, tankers, and commandcontrol aircraft taking off from theater airfields. Operating from fishing ships, Iraqi special forces spray [biological weapons] upwind of U.S. Navy ships in the port of Jabal Ali in the United Arab Emirates. (Jabal Ali is the largest port in the Persian Gulf.) Seeking to split the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, Saddam Hussein claims that U.S.-sponsored sanctions are starving Muslims in Iraq. North Korea uses chemical weapons against the Republic of Korea. China threatens a nuclear attack on U.S. cities if the United States interferes in its actions against Taiwan.”4

3

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in alQai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8:2 (June 2004) 4 Bruce W. Bennett Johnson, “Responding To Asymmetric Threats ,” in Stuart Johnson (Ed.), New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), 33.

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Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

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The age of honour among soldiers from all sides, launched by Jomini and celebrated in countless military traditions, is over. Instead, there is inventiveness, apparent immorality, and unpredictability.5 Targeted populations live in fear and animosity, and their resolve may verge on bigotry. Those charged with defending them face the classic challenge and conundrum of the strategist: playing by rules is a disadvantage when the opponent does not. So the assault is on the political institutions of liberal democracies as well as on the values which those institutions embody. Present-day war machines usually expect the hostile actors to think like they do themselves.6 The terrorist, insurgent, irregular, or asymmetric combatants, called here hostile actors, try to manoeuvre so that their advantages will be decisive, but they avoid decisive engagements. Hostile actors attack at the enemy’s weak point, not at the strong one. Hostile actors are worthy adversaries, and armed forces need to adapt now that they are in some ways the weaker side.7 The contribution of underdog strategic thinking, described below, is therefore twofold: it helps understand a seemingly unpredictable enemy, and it helps armed forces deal with the reversal in status. Underdog strategy is the ancient ‘way of thinking of women and the vanquished,’ the form of strategy which was excluded by Aristotle from philosophical discourse, but did not disappear from practice.8 The word ‘strategy’ has become something of a rubber band, stretched to fit whatever meaning is necessary. For my purposes, however, strategy is an idea that orchestrates actions to achieve a goal. Almost all strategic thinking today is strong-side strategy, and that is what is usually applied by business and military. Underdog strategy is a more flexible, holistic form of strategy that can be employed outside of the military or business to any interaction between individuals, groups, or governments. Underdog strategy answers the question “What is the best thing you can do, when the odds are against you?” That answer often includes analogical reasoning, because underdogs must make decisions in conditions of high uncertainty and change. Underdog strategy provides a framework that is composed of a description of the main characteristics of underdog strategy, a list of the mistakes they most commonly make, an analytical method that can analyze and predict what underdogs using strategy actually do, and a distinct general theory of strategy. It is 5

William S. Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Military Gazette, October 1989. 6 Scott L. Wheeler, "Terrorist Tactics for War With the West," Insight on the News, January 6, 2003. 7 William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Military Review (Sep-Oct 2004), 12-16. 8 Marcel Detienne, Les Ruses de l’intelligence (Paris: Grasset, 1956).

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also possible to use underdog strategy in practical situations by using analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning is a mental short-cut for making decisions, large and small, and we all use them in every day life. Using analogical reasoning simply means that if we ask whether we have ever before encountered this situation, and that we also try the solution that worked before. Analogical reasoning, in particular using structurally analogous thinking, builds on this common sense. Called mètis by the ancient Greeks, it disappeared from philosophical discourse at the time of Aristotle, but it survived in practice.9 It is possible to learn underdog strategic thinking, and it is more easily learned if it is broken down in steps and applied to practical situations. Whether non-conventional ways of warfare are new or not, they require significant revitalization of strategic thinking. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the high-level or macroscopic operational planning which occurs in armed forces. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science of planning and conducting operations, campaigns or a war. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science of projecting campaigns and directing military movements. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science which makes war “…strategy, on any level of command…”, questions about what I am willing to do, whom or what do I have to kill, destroy, besiege, intimidate, or constrain?10 By strategic thinking, I mean the sort of thinking that makes any corporal a strategic corporal.11 This sort of strategic thinking is appropriate for action of any scope by any military involved in irregular warfare. And this sort of strategic thinking is a key to combating irregular warfare, terrorism and insurgency. Whether non-conventional ways of warfare are new or not, they require significant revitalization of strategic thinking. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the high-level or macroscopic operational planning which occurs in armed forces. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science of planning and conducting operations, campaigns or a war. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science of projecting campaigns and directing military movements. By strategic thinking, I do not only mean the science which makes war “…strategy, on any level of command…”, questions about what I am willing to do, whom or what do I have to kill, destroy, besiege, intimidate, or constrain.12 This sort of strategic thinking is appropriate for action of any scope by 9

Marcel Detienne, Les ruses de l’intelligence (Paris: Flammarion, 1993). Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War/Ends and Means (Washington: Potomac, 2006), p. 92. 11 “Finding the Strategic Corporal in a Crowd,” NATO Challenges and Commitments (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, January 2007). 12 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War/Ends and Means (Washington: Potomac, 2006), p. 92. 10

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any military involved in irregular warfare. The present book provides an introduction to that key way of thinking is what the present book proposes to do. Before underdog strategic thinking can start to take hold, however, the successful armed force has to accept that the ideal of a decisive engagement or a decisive victory may not ever be possible. In most cases, the only real solution is to de-escalate contact with the hostile actors, teach the soldiers not to react, and train them to distinguish between the significant and the insignificant occurrence, without regard to pain inflicted. Officers must prepare for some militarily meaningless losses, suffer them, and give them a meaning other than the cost of a decisive engagement. Strategic thinking must, like underdog thinking, be practiced by everyone involved, from soldier to general. Everyone must learn with every contact with the culture, and adapt. Everyone needs to be flexible and everyone needs to decentralize decision-making as much as possible. I can now turn to the role of analogical reasoning. There has been an increase in the use of analogical reasoning in recent years. The process described below ends with an application of structurally analogous thinking. There has been an increase in the use of analogous thinking in recent years, among scientists with some surprising collaborators. “In one of the more unlikely collaborations of modern medicine, Britain’s largest children’s hospital has revamped its patient hand-off techniques by copying the choreographed pit stops of Italy’s Formula One Ferrari racing team. The hospital project has been in place for two years and has already helped reduce the number of mishaps.”13 Physicians in the U.S. have also sought out unusual collaborators: “A growing number of health care providers are trying to learn form aviation accidents and, more specifically, from what the airlines have done to prevent them. In the last five years, several major hospitals have hired professional pilots to train their critical-care staff members on how to apply aviation safety principles to their work…it is well established that, like airplane crashes, the majority of adverse events in health care are the result of human error, particularly failures in communication, leadership and decisionmaking.”14 There is also structurally analogous thinking in other areas of science. For example, “In a trial for a company with a high speed robotic assembly line, it took the algorithm for the waggle dance of bees identifying nectar location” (developed by Cardiff University’s Manufacturing Engineering Centre) just a few days to identify the most efficient way to run the machines, much faster than a 13

Gautam Naik “Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop,” Wall Street Journal Nov 14 2006 p.1 14 Kate Murphy, “What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety,” New York Times, October 31, 2006, 1.

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more conventional program.15 But there have been structurally analogous thinking in the military sphere, going back to the Duke of Wellington’s using “A mosquito attack, not a cannon attack.”16 And the study of emergency responders using intuitive methods of decision-making, including military people, is also established.17 I have used the capacity for analogical reasoning as a diagnostic test in assessing potential for effective counterinsurgency training in the Canadian Forces reserves. The use of checklists is common in a number of fields, including medicine.18 And there have also been advocacy for cognitive development of troops: To improve cognitive capabilities to understand, shape, and operate, a number of investments must be made: Cognitive profiles for COIN personnel should be developed. The government should gear up to compete vigorously with the private sector to attract people matching these profiles. Personnel policies should be tailored to stress COIN cognitive abilities in recruitment, performance evaluation, promotion, assignment, and retention. Professional education should address the sorts of problems and choices that arise in COIN analysis, strategy, and operations. Curricula for military, police, and intelligence education should stress analysis and questioning, not rote and groupthink. COIN training should be expanded and improved. It should include techniques that integrate intuition with reasoning and foster rapid-adaptive decisionmaking under the stress and uncertainty of COIN conditions. COIN training and education should include the study of the process by which ordinary Muslims travel the path to becoming suicide terrorists, including Islamic attitudes, ideals, and grievances, as well as consequences of the use of force. …The need to understand the cognitive strengths and strategies of insurgencies, and to invest in cognitive effectiveness for COIN, did not appear suddenly with global jihad. This aspect of COIN has rarely received sufficient attention, which helps to explain the unimpressive success rate.19 Underdog strategy presents several advantages. First, successful use of any strategy in asymmetric warfare will always be constrained by limited time, by 15

“The Waggle Dance” New Scientist, 25 Nov 2006, 56. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987). 17 Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998). 18 Atul Gawande, “The Checklist,” New Yorker Dec 10, 2007, 86-95, 92. 19 David C. Gompert, “Heads We Win : The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN),” RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 1.(Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), p. 13. 16

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limited means available, by international and domestic legal frameworks, by geography, culture, and religion, and by media scrutiny. Underdog strategy is better than regular strategy for dealing with heavily constrained situations. Second, underdog thinking can help long-standing armed forces cope better with a much greater proportion of unknowns (known and unknown) that regular warfare. Experienced, well-trained soldiers are used to operating where the rules are known, whether the environment allows them to plan and attack, where their greater knowledge, better training, larger numbers, and better technology give them an edge, and where there is a safe and orderly base to which they can return. Higher unknowns strip away their rest and their sense of security without reducing the boredom or the frustrations of military service. Underdog thinking promotes analogical reasoning that copes well with the lack of information, and with the much higher number of variables. Given that the media operate outside the control of government and give quick, partial information to civilians with no stomach for casualties and no understanding of the mission, that politicians may refuse the military what it needs out of fear of public opinion is understandable, and becomes a new challenge for a professional soldier. Third, underdog strategic thinking can be taught relatively quickly, given how hard it is to change a mindset, and that training can help soldiers cope with a large number of the new challenges they face. Fourth, underdog thinking can also help operations. Underdog thinking is highly flexible and quick to learn from every contact. Since the actions of a single soldier or fire team can have broad implications, operations may require military units to conduct non-traditional military activities. Underdog thinking always considers not just what has to be gained, but also what might be lost. Each mission will have its own unique political, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. Success requires decision-making guided by unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Military personnel at all levels need to understand not just the objectives of the operation, but also the impact of inappropriate military actions. Commanders must repeatedly adjust the operation as the situation changes. There could be mission creep because of the uncertainty, the shifting political objectives and the dynamics of the nongovernmental and international organizations involved. Tactical commanders must remain focused on the mission, but also protecting its legitimacy. Fifth, underdog thinking will help soldiers find the advantage in the requirements of international cooperation and show where to focus the efforts to promote cooperation. Military and civilian institutions, non-governmental and international organizations, and foreign governments must cooperate because command and control arrangements might include unilateral national operations,

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multinational operation with a lead nation, a standing alliance, parallel command arrangement, or operational command provided to another nation’s commander. Commanders may have to integrate civilians quite low in the chain of command, to the company level for combat units and to the individual military member for support units. Sixth, underdog thinking helps soldiers realize the costliness of mistakes that would be minor in other circumstances, and helps them be much more cautious. Armed forces can benefit from this. It is a given of military operations that force protection needs to be in proportion with the security risks. Restraint is essential in weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence, but that is even truer in irregular warfare, where the objectives are primarily political or psychological. There must be clear rules of engagement. Troops at all levels must show impartiality in the local feuds or politics, so that they can manage the population’s consent as the scarce resource it is. This consent may be endangered by the actions of a few. The mission, its intentions, and its methods must be clear to the local population: failure to communicate fosters suspicion. At the same time, commanders must balance transparency with operational security. Of course, much has already been written about all of this. The classic of the field, by David Galula, addresses the fortunate situation of a patterned, structured insurgency.20 It discusses the issue of the cause in support of which there is an insurgency, the ideal terrain, population dispersal and economy; the main patterns (orthodox or communist, unorthodox or bourgeois-nationalist). Its most useful section is the one on laws of counterinsurgency: the support of the population is critical; support is gained through an active minority; support from the population is conditional; intensity of efforts and vastness of means is essential; and, most revealingly, “Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right one in counterinsurgency situations.”21 Leroy Thompson’s classic Counterinsurgency Manual provides a large amount of tactical advice, but fails to address the vital issue of the soldier’s mindset.22 John Nagl presents an argument regarding mindset in his Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, namely that the U.S. army is not a learning organization whereas the British army is: but what is necessary is increasing strategic thinking at all levels, as Charles Krulak has

20

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare/ Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964). David Galula, id. 95. 22 Leroy Thompson, Counterinsurgency Manual (London: Greenhill, 2002). 21

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argued.23 So far, only pre-emption or a three-pronged approach has been advanced as the solution to this dilemma, and it may not in fact be correct.24 “Insurgents wage revolutionary warfare and, for the most part, insurgencies have been revolutions—attempts to overthrow and replace governments. Revolutionary insurgent warfare has played an important role in the military history of the twentieth century, particularly in the so-called Third World, and it continues to be important in this century.”25 Doctrine and strategy documents published by the U.S. military in the last few years all refer to the importance of the mindset in achieving victory, and the changes necessary to it.26 “Successfully combating non-state actors will likely require different training, tactics, doctrine, political strategies, and potentially rules of engagement, than are optimal for conventional military warfare. Collectively, these changes may combine to require a different politico-military mindset for senior decision makers.”27 Matarrazzo talks about how irregular or unconventional warfare is a much more intellectual undertaking than conventional warfare.28 The same is echoed in a number of publications. This book proposes revitalized strategic thinking, using the way the underdog thinks, and suggests how to make that knowledge available to the military. Whatever the solution is, it must “ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize[s] with our overall objectives and do[es] not undermine the public support needed…”29 Since the traditional form of strategy practiced by the 23

John A Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife/Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Charles Krulak, “Strategic Corporal”, Marines Magazine, January 1999 (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal htm) 24 Richard Schultz and Adreas Vogt, “It’s War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15:1 (Spr 2003), 1-30. Steven Metz, “New Challeneges and Old Concepts: Understand 21st Century Insurgency,” Parameters ,Winter 2007-08, 20-32, 31. 25 Dennis M. Drew And Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy/An Introduction to Modern NationalSecurity Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press,2006), p. 132. 26 Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency,” CRS Report for Congress, Jan 2006; draft counterinsurgency manual, USMC; and most likely in the upcoming irregular warfare document for the US Air Force. 27 Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency,” CRS Report for Congress, Jan 2006, 3-4. 28 David P. Matarazzo, “Far More Intellectual than a Bayonet Charge: /the Need for Joint Unconventional Warfare Doctrine,” Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004. 29 http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/boyd_grand_strategy.htm

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Western military cannot alone be the answer, since it must take on the flexibility of hostile actors’ thinking, the answer must come from the strategic thinking of the underdog. Not all underdogs have the talent for strategic thinking, and even then underdogs only resort to strategic thinking when their survival is at stake, because it is hard to do. However, underdogs become proficient in strategic thinking in a short amount of time. When they do, they are actors who can spar very effectively with conventional armed forces. Armed forces have always had to change to face new threats, but for the last five hundred years those changes have been primarily technological. This time is different. There is an obstacle to the acceptance of underdog strategic thinking: habitus. Habitus is the system of durable, transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of existence.30 Military personnel of all levels are likely to have a strong habitus. But habitus could, like the tacit dimension postulated by psychologists, be one of the forces that strategy can tap. Habitus can be founded in intuition, and intuition is important to underdog strategic thinking.31 But if habitus is neither conscious not explicit, it is not possible to use what is useful and set aside what is restrictive. The way out is through the use of thin-slicing, or the ability of the unconscious to find patterns in situations and behaviour based on very narrow slices of experience.32 That is one of the foundations of the knowledge transfer systems proposed here. “Expert analysts and scholars have identified some of the more important decision-making proclivities that have been related to political or military leaders’ faulty assessments or mistaken assumptions about their opponents. …Wishful thinking is less frequently a cause of faulty analysis or decision than are embedded expectations, hopeful or not.”33 The adaptive unconscious (not to be confused with the Freudian concept of the unconscious) is thought of as a giant data processing plant that quickly and quietly processes a lot of the data we need in order to keep functioning. There are times, particularly in times of stress, where the adaptive unconscious is critical. The adaptive unconscious is certainly fallible, but it can also be trained, “not only new approaches but also a new mentality.”34 30

Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88. Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris: Anthropos, 1974). 32 Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998). 33 Stephen J. Cimbala, Through a Glass Darkly : Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management & Termination (Westport: Greenwood, 2001), p. 164. 34 Gary Hart, Fourth Power : A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 12. 31

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Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

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Otherwise, they will be once again “too busy assiduously applying the past as a key to unlock the future to bother too much about the present.”35 The proposed step-by-step analysis will address that. This book provides not only the more common exposition of information in order to transfer knowledge, as is usual in most academic books, but a multi-pronged approach to that transfer. The first component of the knowledge transfer system was the exposition of theory as provided in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 2 discusses the main points of underdog strategic thinking. The second component of the knowledge-transfer system was the group of worksheets introduced in Chapter 3, which introduces the process of analysis, broken down into small steps. This process, presented through the worksheet system, is a series of forms to be completed until personnel become proficient in this new kind of strategic thinking. The third component in the knowledge-transfer system, i.e. the case studies to be analyzed by readers or participants in a study group. Chapter 4 presents case studies that illustrate the analysis based on underdog strategic thinking, but can also be used for self-study or training exercises. The next chapter proposes case studies and a study program to help the military develop underdog thinking. This will help meet the demands and challenges already mentioned .

35

John Gooch, "Clio and Mars: The Use and Abuse of History" in Perlmutter, Amos (Ed.), Strategy and the Social Sciences : Issues in Defense Policy (London: Cass, 1981), 21.

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Chapter 2

BASICS OF UNDERDOG STRATEGIC THINKING This chapter discusses the basics of underdog thinking. It starts by listing its characteristics, and then its typical mistakes. It also gives examples of both. Finally, this chapter looks at what proposals have been made to exploit any weaknesses in underdog strategy.

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS Underdog strategy can be identified by several characteristics. Underdogs are always thinking about what the strong might do, simply because their lives depend on it. Underdogs are always adapting because they have to, in order to survive. Underdogs play a waiting game, because they have no choice: the odds are against them, so they wait for any advantage. Underdogs are creative: their means are dramatically less than their enemies. They see the big picture; they are used to living and acting in a hostile and unpredictable environment. They usually see the context beyond their immediate circumstances. Underdogs have an unusually high level of situational awareness. They are constantly scanning the environment for possible threats and for possible opportunities. Underdogs specifically design each action to suit their strategy. They see the impact of every action, every tactics, on the whole picture, and take all the potential consequences into account when they design his/her tactics or actions. Underdogs are constantly forecasting for all possible events and for the actions of any actor who might be involved. They invest in the development of even unlikely scenarios. Underdogs assume they will lose any direct confrontation. Underdogs will break even their own rules of behaviour in order to achieve their goal. Their passions or passionate

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feelings are engaged. And an underdog strategist is always an underdog strategist -- not just occur when there is a crisis, but operating like this all the time. When it comes to irregular warfare, underdogs operate in an atmosphere of fear.

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COMMON MISTAKES UNDERDOGS MAKE Just as underdogs can be identified by some of the characteristics of their thinking, they also make the same sorts of mistakes. First, underdog strategists may not keep things simple. An underdog strategist is always tempted to make things complicated, but that is a mistake that is easy to exploit. Second, underdog strategists try to fight, instead of going with, the flow of events. It would be much better at most to try to divert the flow of events to their advantage than to try and swim upstream. But inexperienced underdog thinkers have trouble judging the direction of the flow of events is. Their judgment improves with experience. Some underdogs may ignore the need to wait and rush headlong into action. This is even more dangerous since they are by definition at a disadvantage, and it is doubly true if reaching their goal is very important, but not urgent or time-sensitive. Smart underdogs will be patient. Underdogs may ignore the unintended consequences of their actions. When the underdog acts to achieve his goal, he also affects a range of other situations. These unintended consequences have to be managed, just like a liberal democratic government has to manage public opinion. Underdogs may be working on the wrong problem, from the standpoint of a legitimate government or the regular armed forces. When underdogs are looking for a particular outcome, they may have misidentified the cause of the problem. That means the outcome will be different from what they expect. This gap will accelerate as the strategy goes on. Underdogs may not set objectives that are specific enough. It is normal to refine the objectives as the strategy is developed and implemented, but an unfocused, unspecific goal is going to lead to an unfocused, unspecific strategy. An unfocused strategy is much harder to implement, and much easier to fight. Underdogs may not develop enough alternatives: when they are considering various strategies, they need to have a broad enough range of possibilities to make a good decision. But that is not always the case. Underdogs may not give adequate thought to tradeoffs. To achieve their goal, underdogs have to set aside other desirable outcomes or actions. They need to weigh these carefully – it can be very difficult to judge which situation has the best outcome. Underdogs disregard uncertainty. They should always expect the unexpected and always pay attention

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Basics of Underdog Strategic Thinking

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to events outpacing them or blind-siding them. They should always expect their information to be faulty or incomplete. The essence of strategy is how to deal flexibly and creatively with new developments, not in nailing down the perfect plan on paper. Not all underdogs do all of this. Underdogs may fail to account for risk tolerance. No one is ever the perfect strategist, with great foresight, reliable information, fabulous intuition, and nerves of steel: underdogs need to be aware of how much risk they and their collaborators are willing to take, and stay within those boundaries. Extremists do not tend to take this into account. Underdogs may fail to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time. It is very easy to forget that events are inter-related and that there can be a domino effect. Underdogs may not trust their intuition. It is common for underdogs to deal with so many unknowns that they cannot work purely on a rational basis. That is where the intuition comes in, but some are unsure of themselves. Not all underdogs think in the way described here, but most of the ones that survive to fight another day probably do. In other words, the foregoing points describe the strategic thinking of the smart underdog, not the dumb one. You can remember most of these differences in the way underdogs think, by using the core idea. The core idea forces the use of more than the rational way most of us are taught in school. It calls on experience, judgment, intuition and everything else that has been learned in the past. It is described in more detail in Chapter 3. We can now turn to the tactics that hostile actors use and what is available to counter them.

IRREGULAR TACTICS Hostile actors in irregular warfare use a variety of tactics. On the offensive, they will use either local mobilization or armed action. In mass mobilization, hostile actors use terror and guerrilla action to eliminate resistance. In armed action, hostile actors try to inflict such a level of casualties and destruction that the force is unwilling to continue operations, but it does so in a much more decentralized way. Hostile units are small and specialized. Leaders themselves recruit, indoctrinate, and use the people necessary to carry out their actions. Units are mobile and lightly armed, and use ambushes and small-scale engagements rather than seizing and holding positions. Some hostile actors have collective leadership, which helps them to recover when they lose people. Others have a single charismatic personality more vulnerable to disruption. Leaders want

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popular support for the cause, but they will also terrify or terrorize people if necessary. Their aim is political power: their tactical objectives are only stepping stones, and usually includes destroying the armed forces’ legitimacy. Their political alternative to the existing situation is the liberation from occupying forces. Hostile actions have three steps: the strategic defensive, using terror methods for example; the stalemate, and the offensive, using mobile warfare. Hostile actors use the most advanced technology that can be purchased alongside crude weapons. Forcing engagements when and where it is best for them, using religious, cultural or urban sanctuaries, or the local population to protect themselves are also common tactics. They hug securing forces to avoid high-firepower weapon systems, to increase the chances of casualties through friendly fire, and to degrade their common operational picture. Hostile actors may try to hinder incoming forces by creating a quick tempo to counter their weakness in power projection. They may do the same in pre-conflict preparations to prolong the engagements. They might fight for key sites and infrastructure, forcing securing forces to operate in less favourable terrain. They may try to slow operations by forcing multiple fronts, making incoming forces consume resources supplied from outside the theatre, and delaying the overall operations. Hostile actors will try to deny incoming or securing forces any sort of safe haven: military buildings, facilities, and installations in urban areas are particularly vulnerable to large explosions, where the close-in environment, large populations, and high volume of traffic produce casualties. Dispersed and decentralized operations are typical, capitalizing on agility, flexibility, and manoeuvrability in a well-known environment. Their fluidity and seemingly disjointed appearance challenges securing forces, with air and ground ambushes used to deny ground and air reconnaissance. Hostile actors may be guided only by a common purpose and intent handed to them from above. Hostile actors, like all underdogs, understand the value of intangible resources. They may attack national will to force the armed forces to establish more restrictive rules of engagement. For example, herding refugees into friendlycontrolled areas may make them a burden on logistic and security resources. Hostile actors break rules, for example, taking prisoners only when they can be ransomed or exchanged, or executing prisoners in front of the media. Hostile actors use the local population for intelligence and logistical support. They might manipulate locals serving among securing forces as translators or with base operations. Refugees moving in controlled sectors may provide information on dispositions, readiness, and intent. Even supportive locals may unwittingly become informants. Of course, hostile actors might also turn the local population against them if they are too cruel, abusive, or repressive. Attacks on sewage

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treatment plants, flood control machinery, or electricity generators can be used to make areas uninhabitable. Any hostile actor will always have the advantage of a thorough knowledge of the country and its inhabitants. He will also be able to withstand the natural obstacles of climate and disease. His audacity will be brought on by fanaticism or desperation. It is possible to illustrate these points, and how it is possible to analyze a hostile actor by looking the Taliban insurgents during and after the U.S. invasion in 2001.

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A CASE STUDY: THE TALIBAN AFTER 2001 The Taliban regime in place in Afghanistan until late 2001 can certainly be considered an underdog for military reasons. At the time of the U.S. invasion, the Taliban controlled perhaps 90% of the territory and was opposed only by an alliance of minority factions in the north. Although their version of Islam had attracted widespread criticism, the U.S. invaded only after the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden. The air war against the Taliban began in October 2001. The U.S. enjoyed immediate air supremacy, losing no aircraft to enemy fire since the Taliban relied mostly on left-over arms and weapons from the Soviet invasion, and operated almost without opposition throughout the country. Cruise missile strikes initially focused on the area in and around the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Within a few days, most al-Qaeda training sites had been severely damaged, so the campaign then focused on command, control and communications. Thousands of Pashtun militia from Pakistan poured into the country, reinforcing the Taliban, but to no avail. The Taliban support structure began to erode under the pressure of the air-strikes. The ground war began with Special Forces launching a raid deep into Kandahar, even striking one of Mullah Omar's compounds. Poor Taliban tactics magnified the effects of U.S. attacks, for example standing on top of bare ridgelines, where they made easy targets. By November 2, Taliban forces were so weak that foreign fighters from al-Qaeda took over security in the Afghan cities. On November 9, the U.S. bombed Mazari Sharif, allowing the Northern Alliance forces to seize the city’s military base and airport, and triggering a complete collapse of Taliban positions. On November 12, Taliban forces fled Kabul, and within 24 hours, all of the Afghan provinces along the Iranian border had fallen. The last Taliban stronghold, Kandahar, fell by the end of November, and the

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Taliban regrouped in the wilds of Tora Bora, on the Pakistan border. There was only a week-long revolt by Taliban prisoners to mark the end of combat. The calm was not destined to last, however: with a year, the Islamic radicals had shifted to a new mode of operation. In this new mode of operation, it is possible to illustrate some of the characteristics and some of the mistakes, as previously discussed, that underdog strategists make. Characteristic #1. Underdog strategists are always aware of what the stronger groups or governments may do. The Taliban was clearly observing what the Afghan and foreign police were doing – they move some of the Helmand opium trade to Nimroz when they realized it was more weakly policed, in spring 2005.1 Characteristic #2. Underdog strategists are always adapting. The Taliban changed its methods repeatedly after the initial US-led invasion, after its defeat, and after the arrival of the NATO troops. These methods included: {

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{ { { {

Assassinations: Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir in July 2002; attempts on President Hamid Karzai in September 2002, the former governor of Badakhshan in October 2007, a vice-presidential candidate in 2004; Kidnappings: groups of foreigners in both July 2007 and October 2007; Insurgency tactics: recruitment and training on the Pakistan border, ambushes of soldiers; Suicide bombings: 64 between January 2005 and August 2006; and Improvised explosive devices.2

They quickly developed a symbiotic relationship with the opium traders to finance their operations.3 Characteristic #3. Underdog strategists almost always play a waiting game. After its defeat by the U.S. in 2001, for example, the Taliban took ten to twelve months to regroup and start recruiting. The violence fell to zero during that period, before increasing again later. 1 2

Andrew North, “Losing the war on Afghan drugs,” BBC News, 12 April 2005. Scott Baldauf and Faye Bowers, “Afghan Riddled with Drug Ties,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2005.

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Characteristic #4. Underdogs are creative, because their means are so limited. The Taliban imported the use of improvised explosive devices from the Iraq insurgency. It showed creativity in the adoption of the opium trade to finance itself.4 The Taliban-based opium trade also showed creativity in its exploitation of Afghanistan’s harsh terrain, the easy corruption of some of its officials, and the insecurity of the population.5

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Characteristic #5. Underdog strategists are more holistic. The Taliban is not longer looking for a military victory over ISAF or the US-led forces. Instead, it targets the unwillingness of NATO’s domestic populations to take casualties, as well as exploiting certain tactics to which the U.S. or NATO troops cannot respond for legal or ethical reasons. Exploiting such opportunities would be impossible without a holistic perspective. Characteristic #6. Underdog strategists constantly scan the environment for possible threats and opportunities. The Taliban are quick to spot their opportunities, something that is made more obvious by their ruthlessness. They quickly identified the poverty of farmers as a possibly way to exert power over them, by offering them money, getting into an extortion racket, or promoting the opium trade. Since farm prices for poppy have declined as production has increased, many farmers are falling into debt, and therefore are vulnerable to Taliban blackmail.6 Poverty also makes exploitation easy: the Taliban can recruit for as little as $20 a day.7 Unemployed men may be inferior to ISAF troops, but they can easily be used to arrange roadside bombs or harvest opium.8 Characteristic #7. Underdogs specifically design each action to suit their strategy. There is no evidence in open sources regarding the Taliban’s design.

3

Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). 4 Anthony Cordesman, “Testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee,” January 2007. 5 Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). 6 Gregg Zoroya and Donna Leinwand, “Rise of drug trade threat to Afghanistan's security,” USA Today, May 13, 2005. 7 Senlis Group, Afghanistan, Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies (London: MF Publishing, 2007). 8 Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007).

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Characteristic #8. Underdogs forecast each tactic and each scenario, however unlikely. There is no evidence from open sources about the Taliban forecasting. Characteristic #9. Underdog strategists assume they will lose any direct confrontation. The Taliban as a government may have been attacked directly by the U.S., but once defeated and reduced to the status of an insurgent political group with no place in the political system, it avoided any direct military or political confrontation. The Taliban did not participate in the Afghanistan elections.

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Characteristic #10. If the situation gets bad enough, underdog strategists will break even their own rules of behaviour. When the Taliban were in power, as late as 2000 they banned opium production. As insurgents, however, they have quickly come to rely on the opium trade in order to finance their operations.9 Similarly, Afghanistan warlords operate outside the law, maintaining private armies and jails and threatening people who speak out against them in the Loya Jirga.10 Nonetheless, the Karzai government, which has been trying to introduce the rule of law and encourage freedom of speech, has been forced to bargain with them. Characteristic #11. Underdog strategists are passionately committed. Despite long-standing adverse circumstances, Taliban supporters are willing to fight on despite facing a militarily much more powerful enemy. To summarize, the mistakes underdogs make are: not keeping things simple; going against the flow of events, ignoring the need to wait or rushing into action; ignoring unintended consequences, working on the wrong problem; not specifying objectives enough, not developing enough alternatives, not taking into account tradeoffs, disregarding uncertainty, failing to take into account risk tolerance; not trusting to non-rational processes in decision-making; and failing to plan ahead. The Taliban insurgents present evidence for all of the underdog strategy characteristics, as shown in Table 1: Evidence of Characteristics of Underdog Strategy. However, there is evidence of only one of the mistakes they would typically make. This suggests that the problem is information, i.e. that open 9

Unofficial comments by international staff working in the region, April 2007, cited in Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). 10 Kennet Katzman, “Afghanistan: government Formation and Performance,” CRS Report for Congress, June 2007, 3.

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sources are not sufficient for studying them. There is probably not enough open information about the inner workings of the Taliban to make a determination at this point. Table 1. Evidence of Characteristics of Underdog Strategy. Characteristic They are always thinking about what the strong are about to do They are always adapting.

They play a waiting game. They are creative.

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They are holistic.

They are always scanning their environment They specifically design each action to suit their strategy They are always forecasting for all events They are convinced they will lose a direct confrontation. They will break their own rules. Their commitment is complete.

Taliban Insurgents Opium traders moved to Nimroz from Helmand because it was more weakly policed Changed from regular warfare to assassinations and kidnappings, insurgency, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, financing by opium trade. Took time to regroup after losing control of country Adopted the method of roadside bombs, imported from the Iraq insurgency; opium traders exploit harsh terrain, easy corruption of officials, poverty of the population Abandoned goal of military victory over ISAF; now targeting unwillingness of domestic NATO populations, using unanswerable methods Quickly identified the poverty of farmers as a possible way to exert power over them

Gave up regular warfare; did not compete in elections

Banned opium when in power, relied on opium trade as insurgents Willing to fight on despite facing a much more powerful enemy

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The next chapter proposes case studies and a study program to help the military develop their understanding and exploitation of underdog thinking.

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Chapter 3

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HOW TO DEFEAT UNDERDOG THINKING

To defeat underdogs, you must understand underdogs. This chapter explains how to analyse their strategy and tactics. This analysis relies on the characteristics of their strategic thinking outlined in the previous chapter. It also relies on the repeated differentiation of significant events, actions, actors, or resources used by any of them, from insignificant ones. Someone trying to defeat underdog thinking for the first time can learn the steps of analysis by using the worksheet system discussed below. The use of forms and checklists is common in a number of fields, including medicine.1 The worksheets presented here are basically forms you use to answer specific questions that will walk you through your strategic and tactical analysis in a step-by-step, structured way. Each worksheet represents one step in the process of analyzing underdog strategy and tactics, with each box representing a further breaking down in the analysis. (As you get more proficient, it is possible to use the same worksheets to design strategies or tactics that will defeat underdogs). Although the structure and wording of most worksheets is simple, some thinking, or sometimes thought experiments, may be required to answer each question. If a group is analyzing a problem, then discussion may be necessary to fill out each worksheet – the aim is to reach consensus in the responses, which leads to consensus on the overall approach. There is no right or wrong answers in any situation, nor is there on any worksheet: the process is what is important. Taken

1

Atul Gawande, “The Checklist,” New Yorker Dec 10, 2007, 86-95, 92.

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together, the worksheets form a system that breaks down the analysis of underdog strategy, and helps design actions to defeat it. The goal of the worksheets is not to provide an exhaustive set of minutely described steps to reach a single correct conclusion. The intent is support the art of analyzing or designing underdog strategy. Most people become more comfortable using these worksheets after using them six or seven times. Once you are proficient, however, worksheets can still be used anytime a problem needs to be solved, or as long as is necessary for the strategy or strategic analysis to be completed. What follow are descriptions, instructions and examples of nine core worksheets that can be used to develop or analyze strategy in all its applications. The example chosen to illustrate them is deliberately simple, so it illustrates how to use the worksheets clearly. The worksheets themselves vary in complexity. For each, there is (1) an explanation of its purpose, (2) a blank worksheet, (3) a set of instructions on how to fill it out, and (4) an example of a completed worksheet. These last sample worksheets cover the same hypothetical situation: soldiers on patrol in hostile territory captured a prisoner and now returning to base camp over a two-day period. The nine worksheets are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Strategy Key Actors An Actor’s Actions or Tactics Resources A Strategy Can Draw On Rules of the Game All Other Factors Steps and Nodes Tactics and Counter Tactics Core Idea

WORKSHEET 1: STRATEGY In this worksheet, you are expected to identify the components of a strategy to deal with a particular challenge. You should use point form to fill this out, and restrict yourself to no more than a single page to complete the worksheet. This will force you to be specific and focused, and to choose among competing

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priorities. The effort to be concise hones your judgment and your capacity to think using strategy. The problem at hand is described in Line 1, “Issue.” The best solution that problem is described in Line 2, “Goal.” If you can identify the core idea, list it in Line 3. The steps that will have to be taken to reach the goal, or the method to be used, are listed in Line 4, “Tactics.” Worksheet 1. Strategy

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Issue Goal Core Idea Tactics

1 2 3 4

Although strategy can be used in any sort of situation, because it is intellectually demanding to develop and implement, it is usually only used in difficult circumstances: high uncertainty, lots of actors, emergency situations. For this worksheet, you must be detailed, specific and succinct. You should also be careful to work always at the same scope and level. Most strategies are like nesting bowls, so it is easy to expand or shrinking the scope.

Sample Worksheet 1. Strategy Issue

Tired troops in a hostile environment

Goal

Provide secure, safe and restful environment for troops for one night

Core Idea Tactics

“Let’s circle around the queen bee” (principle behind all-round defence) 1

Identify most defensible location within accessible range

2

Assign guard duty

3

Assign tasks re: setting up camp

4

Other

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WORKSHEET 2: KEY ACTORS In any strategy, there are a number of possible actors. Those actors can be individuals, groups, governments or even groups of governments. The actors can be involved in the planning of a strategy, or be on the outside. They may be friendly, neutral, or hostile. They may be aware of the strategy or actions, or not. But most importantly, they may have an impact either on the tactics or the strategy itself you are analyzing or designing or carrying out. The goal of this worksheet is to identify which ones may have an impact, so that you can set the others aside and concentrate your energies on the actors who matter.

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Worksheet 2. Key Actors Your Goal Your Latest Tactic Latest Action or Event, if different from above Your Possible Tactic A Your Possible Tactic B Your Possible Tactic C Your Possible Tactic D All Can this actor Actors affect your achieving the goal? (Yes or No)

Can this actor affect your achieving the goal? (Yes or No)

Can this actor affect any of your possible tactics?

Tactic A

Tactic B

Tactic C

Line 1: State the goal of the strategy.

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Tactic D

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Line 2: State your own last action relevant to your strategy. Line 3: State the last action or event, yours or not, relevant to the strategy. This action or event can come from anywhere, but it has to have happened after the last tactic. Line 4-7: List the actions under consideration with respect to the strategy. Up to four may be considered. Column 1: All Actors. Here, make a comprehensive list of actors. Various headings, such as civilian, military, domestic, foreign, army, navy, air force, etc. might be useful. Do not be concerned about putting people or groups in the right categories: the headings just help to ensure every individual and/or group possible is listed. Ask whether the groups listed ought to be broken down further into smaller groups – for example, should a foreign national government be listed as such, or should it be broken down into ministry of the interior, ministry of defence, legislators, executive council or cabinet, local government, etc. Once the list of actors is complete, the next column helps differentiate between significant and insignificant actors. Since the ongoing analysis is similarly and repeatedly reductionist. Column 2: A significant actor is one without whom it is impossible for the tactic cannot succeed. To be more specific, a significant actor can affect whether or not the tactic required can move the strategy toward the achievement of the goal. Is there anyone without whom a particular tactic is guaranteed to fail? Whose cooperation and support is essential to the success of the tactic? Which actor or actors have the power to affect the outcome? Who, on the other hand, is irrelevant? Are there actors whom you know stand no chance of affecting the outcome? Can they be spoilers? Are there other individuals or groups for which the same can be said? Are there any groups or individuals who can affect the outcome? Are there any actors that present a picture of disproportionate influence or power on the outcome? Place the checkmarks as you go along, and then select for further analysis only those actors who are significant.

WORKSHEET 3: AN ACTOR’S ACTIONS AND TACTICS The next step in the tactical analysis of a situation focuses on the tactics, and differentiates between significant and insignificant actions. There are a number of actions on the part of each significant actor. Those actions may be tactics, i.e. relevant to the strategy, or they may not. In order to be tactics, they must directly or indirectly move the situation towards the goal being achieved. Tactics

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themselves may prevent the goal from being achieved or the strategy from being successful, i.e. they can be key tactics. Which of these actions are relevant to the achievement of the goal? In what situations is that unclear? If it is possible that the tactic is relevant to the goal, include it. Better to include too many than to miss some critical aspect of the strategy, which will come back later to haunt you. If you are pressed for time, list the tactics of which you are unsure, but just analyze the tactics that you are certain are relevant. If your analysis later turns out to be incomplete, you will be able to start again from this point.

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Sample Worksheet 2. Key Actors Your Goal Your Latest Tactic Latest Action or Event, if different from above Your Possible Tactic A Your Possible Tactic B Your Possible Tactic C Your Possible Tactic D All Can this actor Can this actor Actors affect your affect your achieving the achieving the goal? (Yes or goal? (Yes or No) No)

Squad Leader Soldier 1 Soldier 2 Soldier 3 Soldier 4 Soldier 5 Prisoner 1 Nearby civilian 1 Nearby civilian 2 Nearby civilian 3

Getting prisoner back to camp Setting up camp for the night Night is falling Order black out Allow lights to be used Allow minimal lights to be used Can this actor affect any of your possible tactics?

Yes

Yes

Tactic A Yes

Tactic B Yes

Tactic C Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

No No No No No No No

No No No No No No No

No No No No No No No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

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Tactic D

29

How to Defeat Underdog Thinking Nearby civilian 4 Nearby civilian 5 Possible enemy fighter 1 Possible enemy fighter 2 Possible enemy fighter 3 Possible enemy fighter 4 Possible enemy fighter 5 Local authorities

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

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Worksheet 3. An Actor’s Actions and Tactics Actor:

Individual

Time/Date

Group Action

Detailed Description

Is this a tactic?

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Is a response necessary?

30

Laure Paquette Sample Worksheet 3. An Actor’s Actions and Tactics

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Actor: Prisoner _X_ Individual __Group Time/Date Action Detailed Description 1st day of capture, 6 pm

Smokes

1st day of capture, 3 pm

Drinks water

1st day of capture, 6:30 pm

Eats dinner

1st day of capture, on and off

Observes his captors

1st day of capture, 6 pm

Observes the soldiers assigned specifically to guard him Tries to cut his hand restraints

1st day of capture, 8 pm

Asks for a cigarette, is given a cigarette by a soldier, has cigarette lit, squats down, smokes cigarette Tries to drink water from a stream, is stopped by soldier, asks for water, is given a bottle of water, unscrews the cap, drinks entire contents, screws cap back on, returns bottle to soldier Is given vegetarian rations and plastic fork, unwraps rations, opens plastic box, uses fork to taste food, grimaces and complains, eats remainder, gives back fork and food wraps to soldier Squats down and watches soldiers go about the task of setting up camp and other duties Squats down and watches the soldier specifically guarding him

While soldier guarding him turns away for a moment, tries to cut the plastic restraints on his hands on a sharp rock; stops when soldier turns back towards him

Is this a tactic? No

Is a response necessary?

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

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Column 1: Give the date and time of the action you are analyzing. During the first draft, you can list actions as you remember them, but in later draft it is helpful to list them chronologically. Only if more than one action takes place on a particular day do you need to list the time. Column 2: Give a title to the action you are analyzing. Column 3: Give a detailed description of the action you are describing. Use point form rather than full sentences: this will help focus on the most important features of the action. Column 4: An action is a tactic if it is relevant to the achievement of the goal identified in the strategy. If the answer to the question: “Does this affect reaching my goal in any way?” is yes, than the action is a tactic. Only if the answer is “yes” do you proceed to Column 5. Column 5: If the action is a tactic, i.e. if it is relevant to the strategy, then it may or may not require a response. In other words, did the tactic have an effect that was bad for your chances of achieving your strategy? If so, a response is necessary and the answer is ‘yes.’ If the tactic may have had an effect that was bad for your chances of achieving your strategy, then a response is necessary and the answer is ‘yes.’

WORKSHEET 4: RESOURCES FOR A STRATEGY The next step is the identification of resources, using Worksheet 4: Resources for a Strategy. Put at its broadest, resources which make tactics possible are generated by “the symbolic experiences, mythic lore, and ritual practices of a group or society [that] create moods and motivations, ways of organizing experience and evaluating reality, modes of regulating conduct, and way of forming social bonds”.2 Conventional wisdom usually finds that money is the most important resource, and it can certainly be a severely limiting factor. Much more scarce, and much easier to waste, is the attention and good will of people with power. The four general types of resources discussed below are: the right equipment, the right people, time, and information. There are two categories of equipment: equipment you have, in which case the issue is deciding how to use it; and equipment you do not have, in which case the issue is finding it and justifying it. First, you need to decide how much and what kind of equipment you actually need. There are three types of equipment or 2

Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51:2 (April 1986), 273-286.

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Laure Paquette

materiel that you may need: those that are essential to success, those that would make a significant difference to success, and those that would be nice, but are not sure to make a significant difference to success. There are also things that affect politicians, who control the purse strings of the overall operations, which you may include here. You have to be pragmatic: some equipment may not be as important as you think. Although more ink is spilled and meetings held on money and money-related issues than anything else, the most important resource is human: skills, energy, and numbers. The first step is to establish what skills are useful, and then scan for them among the significant actors. Among the non-technical skills that may be needed are: command, writing, speaking, planning, research, tactical analysis, strategic analysis, forecasting, calm under pressure, good judgment, integrity, courage. Resources can be finite or limitless; helpful or neutral; and essential or not. Worksheet 4: Resources for a Strategy should be filled out listing as many of the resources as possible. Worksheet 4. Resources for a Strategy

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Resource

Effect on tactic

Limited?

Helpful?

Essential?

Column 1: List here all the materials, services, people (beyond the people who are carrying out the strategy with your), information, and funds that you need to achieve your goal. The list should be comprehensive, i.e. it should include absolutely everything you will need. In order to increase the chances of writing a comprehensive list, it is helpful to look at categories of resources, so that you are less likely to forget anything. You may use as categories materials, services, people, information and funds. You may also develop categories that are specific to your situation, as has been done in Sample Worksheet 4.

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How to Defeat Underdog Thinking

Column 2: here, describe the effect that a particular resource has on the tactic you are considering applying next. For example, if the squad leader in the example given already is considering whether to use lights or not, he needs to think about the power source for those lights and whether it is renewable or if there is enough non-renewable power source for his light. The next three columns are answered ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Column 3: Is the resource being analyzed in this line limited or not? Is there a specific amount of it available, or is there plenty of it around? For example, if the squad leader needs water for soldiers to wash some equipment, and the camp is near a river, then that water resource is not limited. If, on the other hand, the squad leader is considering whether to allow lights, and the lamps are all kerosene, the amount of kerosene he has with him is limited. He may have enough for his foreseeable needs, or even more than his foreseeable needs, but it is still a specific amount available. Whether the resource is limited or not is an important point for carrying out the strategy. The strategist needs to take into account the limited resources as the strategy unfolds. Sample Worksheet 4. Resources a Strategy Can Draw On

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Resource Water for equipment Fuel for lamps Food Drinking water Ammunition Fuel for vehicles Spare parts for vehicles Change of clothes Medication for cuts Medication for illness Bandages Spare parts for weapons

Effect on tactic N Y N N N N N N N N N N

Limited?

Helpful?

Essential?

N Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

N N Y Y Y N N

Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y

N N N N Y

Column 4: Is the resource being analyzed helpful to the goal being reached? Is it something that will move the strategy forward? If so, the answer is yes. For example, having fuel for vehicles will definitely move the squad leader’s strategy

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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

of bringing his prisoner back to the military base forward. The same can be true of a number of resources. Whether soldiers have recreational reading with them does not directly move the strategy about the prisoner forward. The answer then would be no. Only if there is a "Yes" in this column should the resources be analyzed more. Column 5: If the answer in the previous column is yes, then it is necessary to analyze the resource further. Here, ask yourself whether the resource being analyzed is absolutely necessary for reaching the goal, whether if there is none of this particular resource left you could still achieve the goal. If so, then you may write ‘yes’ in this column. If the squad leader runs out of fuel for his vehicles, he can still walk to base and reach his mission. There would be considerably more danger involved, but it would still be possible. So the answer here would be no. However, if the squad leader were to run out of ammunition and continued to encounter enemy fighters, then it would become impossible to carry out the strategy because the enemy fighters would kill everyone in the squad. Whether the resource is limited or not is an important point for carrying out the strategy, but if it is an essential resource, then the strategist has to put it at the highest priority. The list below is an illustration of the type of analysis that needs to be done; it is not a complete list of resources necessary.

WORKSHEET 5: RULES OF THE GAME The fifth step in the tactical analysis requires an examination of the rules involved. Taken together, rules may form a system. A system is a coherent whole of processes or practices that are organized or institutionalized; it sometimes takes the form of a combination of rules that produce a predictable effect on the outcome. The role of a system is to ensure a defined function or role, or guarantee the production of a particular result. Such systems can be helpful or essential (or not), to the outcome of the strategy. They are particularly critical when it comes to irregular warfare. In this type of warfare, soldiers are operating in a heavily constrained environment, and not all the rules are known. Systems can be either formal or informal, and they may be incomplete; if you are dealing with hostile actors, these rules may not be obvious although yours will be to them. Systems are enforced through sanctions, so one way to spot informal systems is to watch for behaviour changes among the hostile actors, and then look for the factors that led to the modification. If there were sanctions, then you are on the right track. Sanctions tend to be obvious, even if the system leading to them is not.

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Systems can affect actions, be they tactics, the management of resources, or strategies. Systems can also affect the significance of actions. In addition to the considerable formal rules, which are easy to identify, at least, there can be informal rules to consider, governing ethics or choices of allocation of scarce resources. There could be local cultural practices which may have to be taken into consideration. Column 1: List here all the formal and informal rules about materials, services, people (beyond the people who are carrying out the strategy with your), information, and funds that you need to achieve your goal. The list should be comprehensive, i.e. it should include absolutely everything you will need. In order to increase the chances of writing a comprehensive list, it is helpful to look at categories of rules, listed above, so that you are less likely to forget anything. You may use as categories materials, services, people, information and funds. You may also develop categories that are specific to your situation, as has been done in Sample Worksheet 5. Column 2: here, describe the effect that a particular rule has on the tactic you are considering applying next. Rules constrain behaviour, but it is important to be aware of how and why each rule constrains which behaviour or action. For example, if the squad leader in the example is thinking about withholding medical care from a prisoner, he needs to think about the rules governing prisoners of war and enemy fighters. The squad leader also needs to consider whether his conscience or culture provides him with rules in this situation. The next three columns are answered ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Column 3: Is the rule being analyzed in this line formal or not? Would infringing this rule have consequences in the near- or long-term? For example, if the squad leader has more need of medical care than he has resources to meet that need, is he within his rights to withhold medical care from the prisoner? Or does that prisoner come first? Or should he make his decision, as best he can, on the basis of medical need? What are his orders in this regard? What are the general orders on this matter? Do the Geneva conventions on treatment of prisoners of war apply? Do any other international conventions apply? To make this decision and so many others, the squad leader needs to understand the rules applying to his situation. The strategist needs to take into account the rules as the strategy unfolds. Column 4: Is the rule being analyzed helpful to the goal being reached? Is it something that will move the strategy forward? If so, the answer is yes. For example, there may be standing orders not to execute prisoners on the spot, but to return them to camp. If the squad leader’s strategy is to bring the prisoner back for interrogation, then the order or rule is helpful. Some rules may simply be

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Laure Paquette

irrelevant: for example, there may be rules regarding environmental protection and the river nearby, but if there are no fuel spills during the encampment, then the rules about how to deal with that do not apply. The same can be true of a number of rules. For example, there may be standing orders regarding the use of personal laptops. But if no soldiers are carrying them during the patrol, those rules are simply irrelevant. The answer then would be no. Only those resources with the answer ‘yes’ need to be analyzed further. Worksheet 5. Rules of the Game Rule

Description

Formal (yes/no)?

Helpful (yes/no)?

Actions

People

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Resources

Time management

Cultural etc. factors

Intelligence

Attitude towards casualties

Other rules

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Essential (yes/no)?

37

How to Defeat Underdog Thinking Sample Worksheet 5: Rules of the Game Rule

Description

Geneva conventions

International treaty regarding the treatment of civilians in war and prisoners of war How to conduct a patrol in unknown and possibly hostile territory Objectives for that specific patrol, such as traveling in a particular area, watching for particular activities, etc. Procedures regarding how to restrain, guard, interrogate, and generally treat prisoners Procedures and regulations about how to deal with the spill of various types of fuel in to various types of bodies of water Expectations, values, and principles about humanity instilled by culture and association

Procedures regarding patrol Specific orders regarding patrol

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Standing orders regarding prisoners Standing orders regarding fuel spills contaminating water Moral imperatives regarding treatment of another human being Procedures regarding allocation of medical care

Guidance for behaviour in making decisions about who gets what kind of medical care when, including various types of individuals who may be in the charge of a squad leader

Formal (yes/no)? Y

Helpful (yes/no)? Y

Essential (yes/no)? Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Column 5: If the answer in the previous column is yes, then it is necessary to analyze the rule further. Here, ask yourself whether the rule being analyzed is

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absolutely necessary for reaching the goal, whether if this rule is broken or ignored, whether you could still achieve the goal. If so, then you may write ‘yes’ in this column. For example, if the squad leader ignores a fuel spill because his patrol comes under enemy fire, he can still get his patrol and his prisoner back to the base. There could be consequences for that squad leader, but reaching the goal is still possible. So the answer would be no. However, if the squad leader was to deny medical care to the prisoner and the prisoner were to die from it, the goal would not be achieved and the consequences for the squad leader would still occur. For those rules, then the strategist has to put it at the highest priority. The list below is an illustration of the type of analysis that needs to be done; it is not a complete list of rules necessary.

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WORKSHEET 6: ALL OTHER FACTORS At this stage in the analysis, it becomes necessary to analyze what factors favour or work against your tactical or strategic goal. Among these factors are forces, trends, or events that affect the outcome, which you can list in Worksheet 6: All Other Factors. Factors may not be in anyone’s control or necessarily predictable: there could be a sudden storm, a stock market could crash and destabilize the economy, a new virus could emerge, someone important might suddenly die or become disabled, a fanatic might call on the population to rise. The only way to identify these factors is to scan the environment in which your tactic will take place. To avoid missing any factors, it is better to divide the relevant environment spatially, temporally or functionally into different sectors and then scan each sector. The environment could be divided up spatially, temporally, or functionally. It is also possible to divide up the environment according the major players involved in the strategy or tactic. The desired strategic outcome is the goal listed in the strategy. These may include goals drawn from a variety of categories, or can be very simple. Among the categories from which goals may be drawn are: complete elimination of hostile actors, complete elimination of fatalities of civilians, complete elimination of fatalities of military, complete elimination of fatalities of civilians and military, complete elimination of casualties of civilians, complete elimination of casualties of civilians, elimination of both civilian and military casualties, instauration of rule of law everywhere, instauration of rule of law in rural areas, instauration of rule of law in cities, instauration rule of law in some sectors, instauration of rule democratic institutions everywhere, instauration of democratic institutions in rural

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How to Defeat Underdog Thinking

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areas, instauration of democratic institutions in cities, instauration of democratic institutions in some sectors, and others. In the case of our ongoing example, the squad leader’s goal is simply to return to base or base camp with the prisoner. Worksheet 6. All Other Factors

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Desired Strategic Outcome: Driving Factors → → → → → → → → → → → → →

Restraining Factors ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ←

Driving factors may include public anxiety, political pressure, or threats in other locations. In the case of our ongoing example, the squad leader would have no control over the weather. Certain types of weather could be favourable, such as preventing attacks from the air, or other types of weather might make the patrol’s work more difficult, such as rain so intense it washes out roads and turns creeks that could be crossed into torrents that could not be crossed. Restraining factors in a broader military situation may include budget constraints, lack of information, few effective measures, lack of guides, lack of guidelines, and lack of experience. Sample Worksheet 6. All Other Factors Desired Strategic Outcome: returning to camp with prisoner alive Driving Factors Restraining Factors Favourable weather → ← Lack of experience Popular expectations → ← Lack of information Threats in other locations → ← Lack of applicable procedures, orders

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WORKSHEET 7: STRATEGIC PATHWAY The strategic pathway is the succession of steps which are likeliest to lead to the achievement of the goal, for a particular tactic. It can be identified using a three-part process: first, all possible steps to the goal are identified; second, the significant steps out of all the possible ones are identified; third, the critical steps are identified. The strategic pathway is made up of the critical steps, i.e. strategic nodes. Worksheet 7 asks the questions relevant to the first part. What are the steps to achieving the goal? For each step, what are the alternative steps that can also lead to goal? What are the scenarios you can think of that will achieve the goal? Who decides? Who has the power to make the changes? What are the other possibilities? Are any of the alternatives more effective? Is this economical, not just in terms of money, but also in terms of other resources? Is this likely to succeed? What arguments are convincing to those who decide? What factors affect the decisions of those who decide? If you were to work backwards, how would you set the steps? Worksheet 7 also assists in identifying the strategic nodes. Among the questions are: What are the critical actors, actions, resources, rules? Where are they situated on in relationship to another? Draw a picture of the relationships and locations. For every critical location, draw a big red circle. That is a strategic node. Then compare to your tactical plan. Are you focused on those nodes? Are you concentrating your efforts there? How does this change your own planning to reach your goals? The strategic goal is the goal that is given in the strategy from Worksheet 1. Worksheet 7. Stategic Pathway

Pathway 1 ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

Strategic Goal: Alternative 1 ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

Alternative 2 ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

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CIRCLE NODES ON EACH PATHWAY

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Sample Worksheet 7. Stategic Pathway Strategic Goal: getting prisoner back to camp Pathway 1 Alternative 1 Assign guards to prisoner▼ Travel 20 km on first Travel 12 km on first day day▼ ▼ Set up camp for Vehicle gets flat tire night▼ ▼ Travel 20 km on Set up camp for day/night second day▼ ▼ Set up camp for Repair flat second night ▼ ▼ Travel 10 km to base Travel 20 km on second camp▼ day ▼ Set up camp for second ▼ night▼ Travel 18 km to base ▼ camp ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

▼

▼

▼

▼

▼

▼

▼

Alternative 2

Travel 5 km on second day▼ Come under enemy fire ▼ Radio for air support ▼ Return fire ▼ Travel 10 km more ▼ Set up camp for second night▼ Travel 20 km on third day ▼ Set up camp for third night▼ Travel 15 km to base camp▼

In the first column, write out each of the steps necessary to reach the goal, in sequence. This first column is for reaching the goal with no surprises or problems. You must fill in the steps until you reach your goal. Each step should represent a single tactic or action contributing to your goal. You need to list all the steps necessary to reach your goal. Next, you need to identify which steps are absolutely essential to your reaching your goal. Consider each step in turn, and

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ask yourself whether it would still be possible to reach the goal if you failed at this step. If the answer is ‘yes’, then you can circle that step. That is a strategic node, and you need to develop alternatives to make sure that you get beyond that step. In the middle column, write alternative steps to reach the goal for each of the problems you can anticipate at a strategic node. If at any point your pathway starts to be the same as in column 1, then just draw an arrow returning to that step. Next, you need to identify which steps are absolutely essential to your reaching your goal. Consider each step in turn, and ask yourself whether it would still be possible to reach the goal if you failed at this step. If the answer is ‘yes’, then you can circle that step. That is again a strategic node, and you need to develop an alternative to make sure you get past it. In the right-hand column, fill in the steps to reach your goal if another set of problems occurs after what you have predicted in the middle column. Again, fill in the steps until you reach the goal, and if at any point your pathway starts to be the same as in the middle or left-hand column, then just draw an arrow returning to that step. You may use more than one copy of the worksheet if necessary. Remember to number the worksheets sequentially if you do that. In the example given, the patrol struggle to get the prisoner back to base camp. On the way back, one of the vehicles gets a flat tire, and then the patrol comes under enemy fire. The squad leader deals with each situation, and adapts the pathway to return to base camp with his prisoner.

CIRCLE NODES ON EACH PATHWAY WORKSHEET 8. TACTICS AND COUNTER TACTICS In designing a response to a tactic, retrace the steps of tactical analysis, using the same sequence of worksheets and instructions as above. Countervailing tactics designed within the framework of a broader strategy are called strategic intervention, and some general rules apply: • Choose the tactics to which you must respond. • Choose the earliest possible moment in the decision making process. • Choose only key actors. • Brainstorm the possible actions without prejudging your own or others’ ideas, but then assess them as carefully as if they were other actor’s.

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How to Defeat Underdog Thinking •

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At the start, choose only four possible actions, and assess their cost and benefits.

Once the analysis is complete, choose tactics for their economy and maximum benefit. If that is not apparent, it is possible to develop multiple scenarios for outcomes, depending on how favourable various factors are to the tactic, using Worksheet 8: Tactics and Counter Tactics. Questions to ask in terms of this latest worksheet include: Who decides? Who has the power to make the changes? What are the other possibilities? Are any of the alternatives more effective? Are they economical in terms of personnel, equipment, casualties? Who is likely to succeed? What arguments are convincing to those who decide? What factors affect the decisions of those who decide? If you were to work backwards, how would you set the steps? For the next phase, start with steps, then actors, then factors, then resources, then actions/tactics, then at last rules for system analysis? Worksheet 8. Tactics and Counter Tactics

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Issue: Goal: Tactics → → → → → → → → → → → → → → → →

Goal: Countervailing Tactics ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ←

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The issue listed at the top of the worksheet is the issue identified in the first worksheet, the problem on which you are working. The two columns represent the tactics of two actors. On the left is one actor, which can be you, and on the right is another actor who does not share the same strategic goal. For each actor, the strategic goal is identified in the first worksheet. The goals need not be contradictory: they need only not be identical. Under the heading Tactics, on the left, list all the actions that move that actor towards the strategic goal chosen. Under the heading Countervailing Tactics, on the right, list all the actions that move that actor towards the other strategic goal chosen. The tactics and counter tactics do not have to match up, although many of them will. The list on each side needs to be complete, so that it may be useful to use categories of tactics to make sure you are not missing any.

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Sample Worksheet 8. Tactics and Counter Tactics Issue: returning prisoner to base camp Goal: returning to base camp Tactics Assigns guard → Ties up prisoner’s hands → Gives prisoner medical care → Gives prisoner food and water →

Goal: prisoner seeks to escape Countervailing Tactics ← Observes guard ← Tries to free hands ← Observes all soldiers ← Eats, drinks to keep up strength

WORKSHEET 9. CORE IDEA Because coming up with a core idea is often the most difficult part of the exercise, there is a short worksheet that can be completed quickly that will stimulate the thinking of the participants. This worksheet is designed to force the participant to start thinking beyond the rational, linear model that has served him/her so far so well. The goal of the worksheet is to get the process of thinking metaphorically established, and then to give the participant some practice. It is deliberately simple to foster and focus thinking with strategy. The sample worksheet is being completed with the same task as set out above, setting up camp for the night. Not all the metaphors are actually practical or helpful. The point is to produce a number of them so that the participant can then develop the capacity to judge which are better or more practical.

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How to Defeat Underdog Thinking Worksheet 9. Core Idea Category

Suggested Metaphors, Images, Analogies, Role Models

Military

Machine gun, rifle, tank

Geographical

River, waterfall, creek

Plant

Tree, fern, Venus flytrap

Transportation

Bus, golf cart, car

Sports

Caddy, gymnastics, football

Mechanical

Wrench, Allen key, ratchet

Insects

Mosquito, ant, butterfly

Animals

Cougar, puma rhinoceros

Role models

Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi Your own metaphors:

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Your own Category:

Your Metaphors, Images, Role Models, Analogies

Core Idea

In the third column, list the metaphors, images, role models or images that come to your mind that fit the same category. In the fourth column, chose one image or metaphor and work it into a slogan that captures how you want to achieve your goal. Repeat these steps for the other categories. At the bottom of the page is a blank space for you to write in a category of images and metaphors that come to mind during this phase of your thinking. Then list the images or metaphors that come to mind, and then develop a slogan using that metaphor or image. When the worksheet is completed, you will then have several possible core ideas to choose from for your strategy. So this chapter had you plan a simple operation as if you were an underdog. Because the example was simple, it is possible that you do not detect any of the differences between your present way of thinking and a hostile actor’s. The next chapter will help you do that with real-life case studies.

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Sample Worksheet 9. Core Idea Category

Suggested Metaphors, Images, Analogies, Role Models

Military

Machine gun, rifle, tank

Geographical

River, waterfall, creek

Plant

Tree, fern, Venus flytrap

Transportation

Bus, golf cart, car

Truck, walking, running, bicycle

Sports

Caddy, gymnastics, football Wrench, Allen key, ratchet Mosquito, ant, butterfly

Soccer, tennis, ping pong Silicone gun, screwdriver Bee, wasp, slug

Cougar, puma rhinoceros Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi

Tiger, lion, gazelle, turtle Mother Theresa, Montgomery of Alamein

Mechanical Insects

Animals Role models

Your own Category:

Your Metaphors, Images, Role Models, Analogies Battalion, submarine, armoured personnel carrier Mountain, plateau, desert Flower, tomato, potato

Core Idea

Work together like a c-3 gun and a shell A 24-hour oasis Let’s close up camp like one of those evening prayer plants Let’s make our break like a cruise ship for the night

Let’s circle around the queen bee

Your own metaphors:

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Chapter 4

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CASE STUDIES AND SOLUTIONS

As explained in the first chapter, the first component of the knowledge transfer system was the exposition of theory as provided in Chapters 1 and 2. The second component of the knowledge-transfer system was the group of worksheets introduced in Chapter 3. The third component of the knowledge-transfer system is the case studies to be analyzed by readers or participants in a study group. These case studies chosen for the variety of levels of analysis that they require can be analyzed using the worksheets. Case studies I, II and III have solutions and completed worksheets. The rest have solutions only. Finally, the remaining case studies are provided for independent study. There is no right or wrong answer for the worksheets. Solutions are limited only by your imagination and the resources available, and even with limited resources there are an infinite number of possibilities. The goal of the worksheet system is to break down the steps of the analysis into components that can be handled one at a time with relative ease, and to support the process of developing a strategy until such time as it can occur easily and without conscious exercise. It is normal to use this process in its entirety at the start, but gradually only to use certain worksheets which are still necessary. However, when an application of a particular strategy runs into problems, it is useful to return to the worksheets. There, step by step, more options can be developed. The reader is expected to tackle repeatedly problems just beyond his or her level of skill – learning is greater when there is at least some challenge.

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CASE STUDY I: MILITARY FORCES PREPARE FOR A NEW KIND OF WARFARE Let us assume that the hostile actor can be an armed militiaman, a wellhidden sniper, or even a 12-year-old armed with an AK-47. Let us also assume that there are increasing numbers of increasingly worrying incidents. A 23-yearold army sergeant at a traffic checkpoint is shot dead after two people in a vehicle stopped and asked for medical help, then opened fire. As he walks guard patrol in an Iraqi town, a 19-year-old soldier from California dies when a grenade thrown over a nearby wall explodes. An Army patrol of two tanks and two armoured personnel carriers comes under fire in an ambush attack in an Iraqi town. Although no one was injured, soldiers saw an Iraqi girl only twelve years old, armed with an AK-47. Withdrawal is not an option, nor is alienating the general Iraqi population so much that it undermines the occupation or helps guerrillas recruit. Occupying forces must not lose control of the countryside, which could destabilize the entire occupation. Occupying forces must be able to project force anywhere, despite guerrilla operations. Finally, the occupation must not last long enough for the public back home to decide that it is no longer worth it to occupy the country at all.1 Conditions of engagement are poor: hostile actors are widely dispersed in formations that are undefined, the conflict is nonlinear in its development, it is without definable battlefields or fronts, and it no longer distinguishes clearly civilians from military or combatants from non-combatants. So a simple mission can quickly become very dangerous. In theatre, several major trends in violence can be identified: a strong Baathist remnant attacks the new security forces and assassinates government officials; hostile actors use suicide bombs and hostage-taking to force nations to withdraw from Iraq; an Iraqi nationalist campaign of young Sunnis and puritanical vigilantes attacks U.S. forces; major players in Al Qaeda are captured or killed.2 At the same time, Iraqis continue to step forward in large numbers to serve their country. Mass Iraqi defections are possible. Cities are prepared for urban combat. Heavy equipment is in poor repair. Urban combat weapons like shoulder-launched SAMs, anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades,

1 2

George Friedman, Stratfor, June 18, 2004. Benjamin C. Works: Iraq, Al Qaeda and Fourth Generation Warfare, August 4, 2004

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mortars, explosives, and mines are plentiful. The U.S. kills 5 to 20 Iraqis for every U.S. casualty. Some guerrilla command and control targets could survive attacks. Let us assume that Iraqi special troops (Fedayeen) use guerrilla warfare tactics that have been developed by Al Qaeda and other radical Muslim militants in a number of countries, including "stay-behind" irregular troops, dressed in civilian clothes and using unconventional and illegal tactics to attack U.S. and coalition forces.3 Assume also that Al Qaeda’s world view is that Islam in mortal danger from the West, that jihad is a duty, that the U.S. support local tyrants. The strategic characteristics of hostile actors include: difficult terrain, uncertain allies, problematic differentiation of friend and foe, and experienced underground fighters.4 Units are acting on mission-type orders; with a decreased dependence on logistics support, more emphasis on manoeuvre; and psychological rather than physical goals. The target is the hostile actor’s will to fight.5 Psychological operations and propaganda programs regarding the good will of the population will have increasing impact.6 In urban areas, hostile actors work to disrupt industry and public services by strikes and sabotage. They generate widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force. They create incidents or massing crowds to lure the opposition force into a trap. They provoke the opposing force into overreacting, as well as provoking inter-factional strife. They snipe at roadblocks, outposts, sentries, and individuals. They attack vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars. They plant explosive devices, either against specific targets or at random, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale. They ambush patrols and firing on helicopters. Let us also assume that the hostile actors themselves have the following characteristics: 1. They use standard military small unit tactics with assault, security, and support elements. 2. They coordinate and communicate via hand-held FM radios. 3. They use pick-up trucks to conduct raids/ assassinations, for example with shooters concealed in the bed of the truck. 3

Declaration of Jihad, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm; Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm; Sanders, K. "Iraqis deceive Marines at Nasiriyah," http://www.msnbc.com/news/890065.asp. 4 id. 5 G. Wilcox and G. I. Wilson, Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan,: http://www.attack.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm 6 C. L. Erri, Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Attack and National Security Forces, http://www.attack.com/asymetrc.htm.

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4. The security elements use motorcycles, not just assailants for drive by shootings and assassinations. 5. They use explosives as they withdraw. 6. They use vehicle horns to initiate explosives or to signal withdrawal. 7. They plan and rehearse all actions in detail. 8. They use procedures for prisoner handling from initial contact, to search and control, to execution. 9. The use multiple man room entries, typically one or two 2-man teams in back to back position near the center of the room. 10. They use distraction devices before room entry, such as lit fuses or improvised devices. 11. The use multiple breach points into structures or individual rooms. 12. They use paper targets and role players in rehearsals. 13. They show good muzzle awareness and control. On the side of the armed forces, certain tactical principles have proven useful. Rigorous communications security is essential. Night operations are especially difficult. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support. Trained snipers are very cost effective but in short supply. Patrolling is different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated. Fratricide is a serious problem because it is harder to identify friend from foe. Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are especially useful to urban defenders. Direct-fire artillery and anti-aircraft artillery can be valuable, provided one does not care about collateral damage. Collateral damage is used in propaganda. Small unit leadership is critical to tactical success. Recovering damaged armoured vehicles is more difficult. Intelligence, especially from human sources, is absolutely critical. Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favourite tactic. Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where there is likely to be large amounts of rubble in the streets. Otherwise wheeled armoured vehicles are preferable. Helicopters have extreme difficulties operating in an urban combat environment, but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations. Soldiers’ equipment load must be dramatically reduced, but with emphasis on ammunition loads, medical supplies, and water. Small arms play a disproportionately significant role. Individual flak jackets significantly reduce casualties. Smoke enhances survivability, but at a significant operational cost – it impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, and slows the overall rate of advance. Mortars are highly regarded but may be less effective. Machine-guns may be more valuable than

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51

assault rifles. Air defence guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets. Heavy machine-guns offer good defence against close air attack, especially helicopters. Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent, extensively used, and very effective. Armoured vehicles require more protection and that protection needs to be distributed differently. Remotely piloted vehicles can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have problems interpreting it. The hostile actor often uses home-made weapons, including chemical weapons. Lightly protected armoured vehicles are of limited value in heavy urban terrain. Combat engineering equipment, especially armoured bulldozers, are critical assets. Cluster munitions are very effective, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage. Artillery-fired precision-guided munitions were seldom used. Bunker busting weapons can be invaluable. Raids by hostile actors followed a standard pattern: they use covert entry and movement; the shoot any resisters or suspicious individuals immediately; they segregate prisoners into manageable groups; they use selected prisoners in their posturing and statements for press; and they plan to execute prisoners and then die themselves in place. They spend a lot of time training to carry out attacks with small groups of dedicated personnel equipped with little more than small arms. They have used the following four scenarios. (1) Targeting law enforcement officers in ambush / assassinations. In this scenario, faked disabled vehicle conceal shooters in the trunk of a car or the bed of a truck. When the officer stops his vehicle behind the disabled vehicle the driver blows the horn, initiating terrorist rifle fire from vehicle. Then the criminals deliver the final blow at close range. As they withdraw, they throw an explosive device into the law enforcement vehicle. Sometimes there is an over-watch element which fires on responding law enforcement officers. (2) Residential assassination. An innocuous-looking person with a concealed weapon knocks on the door of someone’s house. S/he stands in view of the peephole and answers questions from the resident through a closed door. When the resident opens the door the hostile actor draws and fires. (3) Golf course assassination. While the victim is on the green, the hostile actor fires a rocket propelled grenade at a vehicle adjacent to the green, then fires on victim with a rifle. (4) Compound kidnapping. The raid on the compound starts with a rocket propelled grenade attack on the guard shack, then on the primary building. Hostile actors then enter the building through multiple breach points through windows or after blowing up walls. After kidnapping the victim, they leave by truck, as motorcycle security element cover their withdrawal. Other scenarios include kidnapping someone off the street, using tunnels, storm drains, or sewers for attacking and withdrawing, rappelling from roofs to enter upper floors, and shots fired or grenades thrown from moving motorcycles.

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Problem: Your job is to recommend a change of strategy. The questions you ask yourself are: What is the present strategy? What can be forecast as actions by insurgents? What is an appropriate response? How should units be prepared for this kind of hostile environment? Solution: To identify strategy, you must start by identifying significant components on each side: actors, tactics, resources, etc. You must also identify factors outside anyone’s control. Formulate one new tactic you consider likely for hostile actors, and four new tactics for the occupying forces. Then identify key actors, tactics of particular actors, resources of particular actors, factors affecting outcome (Worksheets 2 through 5) for each side. Identify strategy for actors (Worksheet 1). Worksheet 2. Key Actors

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Your Goal Your Latest Tactic Latest Action or Event, if different from above Your Possible Tactic A Your Possible Tactic B Your Possible Tactic C Your Possible Tactic D All Actors

Can this actor affect your achieving the goal? (Yes or No)

23-yr-old female sergeant from Virginia 2 hostile people in vehicle

Can this actor affect your achieving the tactic? (Yes or No)

Propose a change of strategy n/a Ambush/Assassination of Coalition or collaborating authority figure Decrease exposure of coalition authority figure Decrease exposure of collaborating authority figure Train coalition troops further in guerrilla tactics Train coalition troops in flexible strategic thinking Can this actor affect any of your possible tactics?

N

N

Tactic A N

N

Y

N

Tactic B N

Tactic C N

Tactic D N

N

N

N

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Case Studies and Solutions 19 year old soldier from California Unknown thrower of grenade General Iraqi population Baathist remnant which assassinates new politicians International al Qaeda Iraqi nationalist campaign Young Sunnis seeking prestige Puritanical vigilantes Major Al Qaeda leaders/players Sunni clerics Shiite clerics Iraqi army/police volunteers Iraqi special troops (Fedayeen) Trained Us/Coalition snipers Small unit leaders/US troops Helicopter personnel Law enforcement officers

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y Y Y

Y Y Y

N N Y

N N Y

N N Y

N N Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

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Worksheet 3. An Actor’s Actions and Tactics Actor: Hostile Actor / psychological collapse of opponent X Individual __ Group Time/Date Action Detailed Is this Is a Description a response tactic? necessary? ? Kill U.S. soldier 2 people in vehicle Y N shoot sergeant at check point, after asking for help ? Grenade thrown At patrol, over a Y N wall ? Use child soldiers 12 year old seen Y N carrying AK-47 ? Dispersal Of various fighters, Y N to avoid being readily identified ? Suicide Bombs Indiscriminate Y N attack on population ? Hostages Kidnapping or Y N killing, to demoralize coalition ? Attack U.S. forces To gain prestige, to Y Y fight ‘corrupting forces ? Leave behind Y N irregular troops ? Spiritual revival Y N ? Low logistical needs Y N ? Small units Y N ? Communications Hand-held FM Y N radios ? Use of pick trucks For raids Y N ? Use of motorcycles For drive by shoot Y N ups, security ? Explosives set on Y Y withdrawal Y Y ? Use of Car horns To signal withdrawal, to initiate explosives ? Preparation Detailed planning, Y N

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Case Studies and Solutions

?

live fire rehearsals Multiple man entries for rooms or buildings

Entries

Y

Y

Worksheet 4. Resources a Strategy Can Draw On

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Resource Sunni clerics Shiite clerics Corrupted members of Iraqi police Corrupted members of civilian authorities – executive branch Corrupted members of civilian authorities – legislative branch Corrupted members of Iraqi army Iraqi nationalist campaign Disenchanted members of general Iraqi population Baathist remnants International Al Qaeda State sponsors of terrorism Mobilized elements of general population Corrupted government officials Other guerrillas Members of coalition forces Members of other units of U.S. forces

Effect on tactic N N N

Limited?

Helpful?

Essential?

Y Y Y

N N N

N N N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N N N

Y Y Y

N N N

N N N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N Y

Y Y

N N

N N

Y

Y

Y

N

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Worksheet 6. All Other Factors Desired Strategic Outcome: survival of assassination target Driving Factors Restraining Factors Public anxiety → ← Budget constraints Political pressure → ← Lack of information Threats in other locations → ← Few effective measures Poverty → ← No guides, guidelines Public lack of confidence → ← No experience, examples Loss of morale → ← Hostile actors blend in with general population Cultural differences → ← Importance of assassination target Reliability of civilian → ← Experience/wariness of target’s authorities bodyguards Fears of general population → ← Assassination target’s movements and precautions Perception of general → ← population Political will backing → ← occupying forces Low military capability of → ← hostile actors Low technology of hostile → ← actors

Worksheet 1. Strategy Issue Goal Core Idea

Improve armed forces response to raids Fewer or fewer successful raids by insurgents Kill a few, scare a lot

Tactics

1

Targeting law enforcement officers in ambush / assassinations

2

Residential assassination

3

Golf course assassination

4

Compound kidnapping

5

Kidnapping someone off the street

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Case Studies and Solutions Resources

57

Small groups, small arms Hand-held FM radios. Pick-up trucks with shooters concealed in the bed Motorcycles Explosives Vehicle horns to initiate explosives or to signal withdrawal. Live-fire rehearsals Distraction devices i.e. lit fuses or improvised devices

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CASE STUDY II: A BROADER WAR ON ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST HOSTILE ACTORS Let us assume that Al Qaeda has developed into the non-state equivalent of the counterintelligence state, using counterintelligence principles and practices in its strategy, and to organize, deploy, and fight.7 Let us also assume that Al Qaeda is operationally distinctive in the following ways. First, it is obsessed with the elimination of real or presumed threats, which generates unprecedented security and intelligence organizations. It is not concerned with the preservation of the lives of its members, only in its continued existence. Second, it has a millenarian ideology preaching fundamental change through the destruction of all existing evils and pursuing a totally new way of life. Third, it does not recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence. Let us also assume that the war at this time has three fronts. On the first front, in Algeria, a terrorist leader who allied himself with Al Qaeda has been killed in a military sweep in mid-June. Nabil Sahraoui, head of the armed Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat whose decade-long aim has been to overthrow the Algerian government. The Salafist has waged a vicious terror campaign inside Algeria throughout the last 14 years, killing thousands. It is thought to have about 5,000 loyalists. Then, in early July, Libya found a Salafist camp in its southern desert and eradicated it. In northern Chad, Sahraoui's successor, Amari Saifi was attacked, escaping the U.S. led efforts only to be captured by Chadian rebels who control a patch of territory close to the Libyan border. The second front at this point is Afghanistan and Pakistan. There, the Tanzanian Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who coordinated the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was captured. Ghailani's laptop and

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cell phone generated leads for the capture by Pakistan’s military intelligence of other Al Qaeda suspects of importance. That laptop also contained the files on proposed attacks on the New York Stock Exchange, and the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Pakistani government revived the model of "Collective Responsibility" to motivate Pashtun tribal leaders into turning in Al Qaeda members. An important Pashtun member of Al Qaeda, was killed in a government drive in late June. Most of the action is taking place in Waziristan, where there are successful operations against a radical Sunni Cleric. Across the border, a Marine expeditionary unit conducted a successful sweep of a province which has been a major Taliban stronghold. Saif Al-Adel, a military planner for Al-Qaeda, reportedly trained terrorist recruits in handling explosives, and he helped train tribal fighters to attack the United Nations peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1993. A high-ranking member of the al-Qaeda network, he is believed to have taken over as military commander of the organization. Battle planning information from Chechnya, Somalia and the West Bank is now being shared across the network.8 The third front is in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. There, the Crown Prince announced a thirty day amnesty for soft members to turn themselves in. Number 19 on a list of twenty-six wanted fugitives published by the Saudi government gave himself up, while another leader was killed himself after killing an American hostage. However, more than eighty-five police and civilians have died in Saudi in thirteen months of violence. Jordan, Yemen, and other countries are reported progress and significant arrests, but hostile actors continue to move around the region, in Europe and in the US. Problem: Determine whether the terrorist movement is operating as a single unit with a single strategy, or whether there are three movements operating independently on three fronts. Determine whether the terrorist movements are operating on a strategic or a tactical level. Design a response at the correct level. Evaluate own design.

7

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8:2 (June 2004) 8 Ib Faurby The Battle(s) of Grozny, Royal Danish Defence College, http://www.caucasus. dk/publication1.htm. A. Cordesman, The Second Intifada and the Lessons of Jenin Dealing with the Grim Realities of Urban Warfare, http://www.csis.org/features/second_jenin.pdf; F. Akers, Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare, http://www.at.y12.doe.gov/ranger.pdf.

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Case Studies and Solutions Worksheet 2. Key Actors Your Goal

Identify whether there is any strategy, and if so, how many, using analysis Determine whether is there any strategy by Salafists at all Whether there is one or more strategies in play Trend analysis Scenario forecasting Statistical analysis

Your Latest Tactic

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Latest Action or Event, if different from above Your Possible Tactic A Your Possible Tactic B Your Possible Tactic C Your Possible Tactic D All Can this actor affect Actors your achieving the goal? (Yes or No)

Al Qaeda Nabhil Sahraoui Algerian Salafist group Algerian gov’t Libyan gov’t Chad gov’t Libyan Salafist group Chad Salafist group Amari Saifi US gov’t US special/covert forces

Can this actor affect your achieving the tactic’s goal? (Yes or No)

Can this actor affect any of your possible tactics?

N N

N N

Tactic A N N

Tactic B N N

Tactic C N N

Tactic D n/a n/a

N

N

N

N

N

n/a

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

n/a

Y Y N

Y Y N

Y Y N

Y Y N

Y Y N

n/a n/a n/a

N

N

N

N

N

n/a

N Y Y

N Y Y

N Y Y

N Y Y

N Y Y

n/a n/a n/a

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Laure Paquette Solution: Step 1:

identify key actors, tactics of particular actors, resources of particular actors, factors affecting outcome (Worksheets 2 through 5). Step 2: based on information still necessary to complete analysis, develop list of research questions. Step 3: complete analysis by identifying strategies (Worksheet 1). Sample worksheets for Algerian front only are given. Alternatives, Step 4: design strategy in response for one operation on three fronts (Worksheet 1); design strategy in response for three operations operating independently (Worksheet 8 times three, one for each front; sample worksheets given only for Algerian front); design tactics in response for one operation on three fronts (Worksheet 8); design tactics in response for each operation (Worksheet 8, sample given for Algerian front only).

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Worksheet 3. An Actor’s Actions and Tactics Actor: Salafist Group in Algeria x Individual Q Group Time/Date Action Detailed Is this a Description tactic? Unknown

Leadership

Unknown

Leadership

Unknown

Leadership

Last 14 years

Terror campaign

Chose Sahraoui as leader Sahraoui killed by U.S. action Chose successor to Sahraoui Campaign killing thousands, recruited 5 000

Y

Is a response necessary? Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

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Case Studies and Solutions Worksheet 4. Resources a Strategy Can Draw On

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Resource People Community leaders, Algeria Clerics, Algeria Community leaders, Chad Clerics, Chad Algerian gov’t Libyan gov’t US gov’t Chad gov’t Community leaders, Libya Clerics, Libya Intelligence people, Algeria Intelligence people, Chad Intelligence people, Libya Intelligence people, US Law enforcement, Algeria Law enforcement, Chad Law Enforcement, Libya Military, US Military, Chad Military, Libya Military, Algeria funds Algerian gov’t Libyan gov’t US gov’t Chad gov’t Law enforcement, Chad

Effect on tactic

Limited?

Helpful?

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

N Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

N N Y N N

Y

Y

Essential?

N N N N Y Y Y Y N

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Y

Y

Y

Y

62

Laure Paquette Worksheet 4. (Continued)

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Resource Law Enforcement, Libya Law enforcement, Algeria Military, US Military, Chad Military, Libya Military, Algeria Information Algerian gov’t Libyan gov’t US gov’t Chad gov’t Intelligence people, Algeria Intelligence people, Chad Intelligence people, Libya Intelligence people, US Law enforcement, Algeria Law enforcement, Chad Law Enforcement, Libya Military, US Military, Chad Military, Libya Military, Algeria

Effect on tactic N N

Limited?

Helpful?

Essential?

Y N N N

Y

Y

Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y

Y

Worksheet 6. All Other Factors Desired Strategic Outcome: establishing whether strategy is being used and if so, how many Driving Factors Restraining Factors Public anxiety → ← Budget constraints Political pressure → ← Lack of information

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Case Studies and Solutions Threats in other locations Algerian desire to solve situation Libyan desire to please US Chad’s desire to please US

→ →

← ←

→ →

← ←

Few effective measures No guides, guidelines

No experience, examples Reluctance of Chad to share information Desired Strategic Outcome: establishing whether strategy is being used and if so, how many Driving Factors Restraining Factors → ← Reluctance of Libya to share information → ← Reluctance of Algeria to share information → ← Limited number of foreign language speakers in intelligence community → ← Reluctance of Algerians to cooperate with own authorities

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Worksheet 1. Strategy – Algeria Issue Goal Core Idea

Political leadership Overthrow of government Wear down the population; in the alternative, kill and recruit

Tactics

1 2 3 4

Resources

Terror campaign Camps in surrounding countries Thousands of casualties 5000 adherents. Salafist extremism

Worksheet 1. Strategy – Integrated Front (Algeria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Libya, Pakistan) Issue Goal Core Idea Tactics

Political extremism Overthrow of national governments Slay the hydra 1 2 3 4

Fourteen-year terror campaign in Algeria Sharing of battle information across the network Establishment of camps in one country for action in another Expendable leadership

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64

Laure Paquette Worksheet 8. Tactics and Counter Tactics, Algeria Issue: whether strategy is being used Goal: identify if strategy is used Tactics Cooperate with foreign gov’ts → Use best methods of analysis Collect as much information as possible Kill or capture terrorists Deter recruitment Win over domestic population Decrease chance of terror events

→ →

Goal: keep strategy to itself Countervailing Tactics ← Commit suicide rather than be captured ← Keep collaborators in the dark ←

→ → → →

← ← ← ←

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Worksheet 8. Tactics and Counter Tactics –Integrated Front Issue: whether strategy is being used Goal: identify if strategy is used Tactics Cooperate with foreign gov’ts → Use best methods of analysis Collect as much information as possible Kill or capture terrorists Deter recruitment Win over domestic population Decrease chance of terror events

→ →

Goal: keep strategy to itself Countervailing Tactics ← Commit suicide rather than be captured ← Keep collaborators in the dark ←

→ → → →

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CASE STUDY III: USING THE U.S. MILITARY BUDGET BETTER TO FIGHT TERRORISM Assume the following global trends: regional instability; weapons proliferation, including weapons of mass destruction; transnational ethnic and/or economic

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dangers; dangers to democratic and reform movements; defence budget pressures and/or reductions; force structure changes; and quickly changing military requirements. Also assume that military forces increasingly conduct a wide range of activities other than large-scale combat operations, and that politics may override military necessity in those activities. These activities may include support to U.S. civil authorities, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, arms control, recovery operations, show of force, enforcement of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, protection of shipping, strikes and raids, combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, ensuring freedom of navigation, non-combatant evacuation operations, and peace operations. The typical components of this type of military activity are as follows: development or maintenance of unit integrity, intelligence gathering, assessment of multinational considerations, coordination of civilian and military actions, command and control, resolution of unique challenges, and logistics. Worksheet 5. Rules of the Game Rule

Description

Formal (yes/no)?

Helpful (yes/no)?

Essential (yes/no)?

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

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Actions US federal government regulations, policies on conduct by military People How to interact with legislators How to interact with public servants/officials Resources n/a Time management Deadlines of federal government budgetary process

Let us also assume that, as per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2003 the United States spent approximately 47%, of the world's total military spending of $956,000,000,000 US. The US is required, with these funds,

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to accomplish the following two objectives. 1. To be able to project power globally, not just maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and sufficient force to repel an attack on the U.S. homeland, dealing with unexpected events, and fighting multiple wars at the same time. 2. To minimize possible casualties and the overall size of the military, to focus on improvements in technology, and to maintain a research program. Problem: Design the work of a committee whose job it is to review the latest budget figures and recommend changes to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Solution: Develop a strategy for the committee (Worksheet 7, then Worksheet 1). Analyze which rules which may apply to budget issues (Worksheet 6).

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Worksheet 5. (Continued) US gov’t regulations and laws re: money US armed forces regulations and laws re: money Intelligence

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

US government regulations and laws re: information Rule

Y

Y

Y

Formal (yes/no)? Y

Helpful (yes/no)? Y

Essential (yes/no)? Y

Y

Y

N

US armed forces regulations and laws re: information Other rules Conventions about lobbying and advocacy for military people

Description

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Worksheet 7. Stategic Pathway

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Strategic Goal: get funding for US armed forces for coming fiscal year Pathway 1

Alternative 1

Alternative 2

Internal process, US Army or Navy or Air Force ▼

Bureaucratic infighting within service

▼

Internal process, US armed forces ▼

Modification of US Army request ▼

▼

Internal process, US federal gov’t ▼

Internal process, US armed forces ▼

Bureaucratic infighting among services ▼

House of Representatives ▼

Internal process, US federal gov’t ▼

Modification of US Navy request ▼

Senate ▼

House of Representatives ▼ Senate ▼

Modification of US armed forces request ▼ Internal process, US federal gov’t ▼ House of Representatives ▼ Senate ▼ Budget obtained

Budget obtained

▼

Budget obtained

The remaining case studies are proposed for the analyst’s independent study. Case studies VI and VII were based on studies conducted by the US Department of the Army, as well as events in the public domain.

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CIRCLE NODES ON EACH PATHWAY Worksheet 1. Strategy Issue Goal Core Idea Tactics

Funding for armed forces Increase funding for armed forces Keep moving forward 1

Follow government process

2

Resolve internal conflicts

3

Lobby House

4

Lobby Senate

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CASE STUDY IV: AL QAEDA’S MODUS OPERANDI AND AN INFANTRY SQUAD’S TRAINING Let us assume that your assignment is to design changes to your squad’s way of thinking about strategy and tactics, given Al Qaeda’s know modes of operation. Assume that you are leading an infantry unit. Also assume that the mission of the infantry is to close with the hostile actor by means of fire and manoeuvre to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. In the fight against Al Qaeda, let us assume that infantry is being used for one of the following reasons: • • • • • • • •

To take difficult terrain prior to occupation by mechanized or armoured forces. To retain existing obstacles and difficult terrain for later operations. To act as a tactical manoeuvre pivot point. To seize or control forested or built up areas. To follow and support exploiting heavy forces when augmented with transportation. To conduct rear area operations, capitalizing on air mobility. Because it is capable of operating primarily at night. Because there is natural or induced limited visibility.

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Your squad may use four types of tactics: combat power, manoeuvre, firepower, protection, and leadership. For the purposes of this case study, assume manoeuvre is the movement of forces supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of hostile actors. Also assume that firepower is the capacity of a unit to deliver effective fires on a target, and that protection is the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. The first consideration is the maintenance of the squad as an effective fighting force. Secondary considerations include security, dispersion, cover, camouflage, deception, and suppression of hostile actor weapons. Assume your squad may use three types of strategies: movement, offence and defence. The key to moving successfully involves selecting the best combination of formations and movement techniques in each situation. Formations are arrangements of units and of soldiers in relation to each other. They are used for control, security, and flexibility. For control, each soldier has a standard position. Soldiers can see their team leaders. Fire team leaders can see their squad leader. Leaders control their units using arm and hand signals. For security, formations provide 360 degree security and allow units to give the weight of their firepower to the flanks or front in anticipation of hostile actor contact. The use of formations allows soldiers to execute battle drills more quickly and gives them the assurance that their leaders and team members that they are in their expected positions and performing the right tasks. Movement techniques describe the position of squads and fire teams in relation to each other during movement. Squads use three movement techniques: traveling, traveling over-watch, and bounding over-watch. Squad action should destroy the hostile actor and his will to fight; learn hostile actor strength and disposition; or deceive, divert, or fix the hostile actor. Its actions should be characterized by: flexibility, surprise, concentration, speed, and audacity. Offensive operations include: movements to contact, attacks, raids, reconnaissance and security operations, and ambushes. Movements to contact are used to gain or regain contact with the hostile actor, with a unit moving to contact usually lacks detailed information about the hostile actor. A platoon conducts movement to contact as part of a company. Squad leaders should strive to make contact with the smallest element possible, to prevent detection of elements not in contact until they are in the assault, to maintain 360 degree security at all times, to report information quickly and accurately, to maintain contact once it is gained, to generate combat power rapidly once contact is made, and to fight through at the lowest level possible. An attack is an offensive action characterized by movement supported by fire. There are two types of attacks: hasty, using forces immediately available to maintain

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momentum or take advantage of the hostile actor situation; and deliberate, which is carefully planned and coordinated. This last type is generally conducted against a well-organized defence. They are distinguished chiefly by the time available for preparation. Steps in the attack include: planning and preparation; finding the hostile actor; avoiding detection; fixing the hostile actor; finding or creating a weakness; manoeuvring to exploit a weakness; consolidating and reorganizing. Other, special-purpose attacks include raids, i.e. swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the hostile actor, or destroy his installations; and ambush, a surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted hostile actor unit. The squad should assume that hostile actors have the characteristics already described in case study I. The squad should also assume that Al Qaeda sees the "perfect day" as combining attacks designed to produce the maximum number of casualties with attacks that would give them the opportunity to get them coverage on the news channels to deliver their rhetoric. For maximum effect these attacks would take place nearly simultaneously at multiple geographically separate locations. The best time to act is most likely to be at the initiation of the attack. Once the hostile actors are consolidated on the objective it will be very difficult to take effective action. However, there are many opportunities to interrupt their cycle by detecting their pre-mission activities. Problem: The squad needs to address, in training and in personal preparation, the differences between a typical criminal victimization and a terrorist incident in terms of early recognition and appropriate response, i.e. the typical bank robbery vs. finding yourself in the middle of a terrorist attack on a financial institution. In the latter case, there will not be time for the SWAT team to intervene on your behalf. Compliance will buy only a very little time. If you survive, you can expect to be physically restrained and controlled through threats to others. If you are identified as a potential problem to the hostile actors you will be shot. You must plan on providing effective resistance at the first opportunity. You are instructed to shoot, move and communicate; seek cover, use your weapon as required; attempt to acquire a better weapons system at the first opportunity. Then develop a strategy and implement it. Solution: Step 1: analyze the actors (Worksheet 2). Step 2: Analyze your resources and factors affecting outcome (Worksheets 3, 4). Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Step 3: Analyze tactics and counter tactics (Worksheet 8). Step 4: Write a strategy for your squad (Worksheet 1).

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CASE STUDY V: FINDING AND EXPLOITING AL QAEDA'S WEAKNESSES Assume that what has been said about Al Qaeda in previous case studies continues to be true. Assume that members of Al Qaeda share the following world view: they had a common multinational experience in Afghanistan; they have a unifying vision; they are committed to spectacular violence without limits; they see themselves as having a vast reservoir of potential recruits; their safe havens and accessible training camps are now more dispersed than, say, three years ago; and they now have enough, as opposed to ample, cash. In addition, they feel that Muslims are guilty of substandard zealotry and must be aroused to action, they know that some of their top planners have been killed or captured, and that their skills will be hard to replace. Al Qaeda members are aware that hostile or dangerous non-Muslims are present in large numbers in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar and Oman, that Syria is at risk, and that hostile governments in Jordan, Pakistan, and in Southeast Asia assist the hostile non-Muslims. Apart from the Palestinians, there have been no uprisings. Their communications have been disrupted, and they have been forced to decentralize their operations and must beware of fragmentation and loss of unity. On the other hand, they have survived, recruits continue to join, and the U.S.’s arrogance has put off many of its traditional allies. The pace of operations has accelerated in the past 30 months. The Iraq invasion has created some advantages for Al Qaeda. The US is estranged from some of its allies. The quick military victory has put Coalition soldiers where they are vulnerable to the kind of warfare Al Qaeda can wage. The occupation provides a new radicalizing and bonding experience for recruits. Their strategic goals include: reconfiguring itself to operate in more hostile environments; protecting its surviving top leadership; finding a secure base; developing a functioning command and control capability able to operate clandestinely; continuing to communicate with operatives, recruiters, volunteers, and constituents; collecting and distributing funds; inspiring followers and continuing to recruit. Also assume that Al Qaeda has some problems. It has a dedicated core sufficient for present operations, but it needs another extraordinary success like

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the attacks of September 11th. The best planners are hard to recruit, and when they are it is hard for them to supervise operations. Local planners are comparatively less effective. Local operations cannot sustain a surge – they can only hit and hide. However, Al Qaeda is also facing some significant opportunities. Afghanistan is slipping back into chaos; Pakistan may overthrow or lose its leader; U.S. troops are bogged down Iraq; Saudi Arabia is less stable. A restructured Al Qaeda would continue to have Osama bin Laden remain as an inspirational figure and architect. The command would be leaner, and in a safe location. There would be less international travel, more clandestine operations, and fewer true sleepers in future. The reduced cash flow would now move through informal networks. Communications are now indirect and encoded, mainly via Internet. Time horizons are now shorter, and locals are used more. A decentralized al Qaeda would have Osama bin Laden exhorting rather than directing operations, with central operational planners largely dispensed with; local training and planning of recruits would follow largely local operations. Al Qaeda might also move towards leaderless resistance. Recruits would seek action, but Al Qaeda would not have a central voice or source of money. Problem: Conduct a strategic and a tactical analysis of Al Qaeda. Identify strategic and tactical weaknesses. Analyze civilian and military capacities to exploit those weaknesses. Forecast various scenarios for future Al Qaeda actions. Identify strategic nodes for those possible actions. Design strategic interventions for each node.

CASE STUDY VI. MOGADISHU, SOMALIA After decades of political unrest, the dictator Siad Barre fell, and civil war followed. Alliances among the fourteen clans vying for power were weak, not enough to unite the country. A drought led to famine and made ethnic and political tensions worse. This led to a phased US involvement, whose political objectives which changed over time. The United Nations (UN) initially asked international relief organizations for help. There was widespread looting, fighting between gangs, and lawlessness so that only 20 percent of the food entering the country reached the people who needed it. About twenty-five percent of Somalia’s six million people died of starvation or disease. In April 1992, the UN Security Council authorized fifty unarmed observers, but it had the action little effect. It then authorized 500 armed

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peacekeepers to protect humanitarian workers. UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) safeguarded the unloading of ships and the convoys into the affected areas. When, in July 1992, the UN requested an increased airlift of supplies, US quickly responded. US Central Command (CENTCOM) activated the joint task force (JTF) Operation Provide Relief. CENTCOM limited the JTF’s actions to assessing relief requirements, providing emergency airlift of supplies, and daily relief sorties into Somalia, in daylight hours and safe locations. In September, an offshore amphibious ready group provided security for U.S. airlift operations. By November 1992, the magnitude of the task, UN organizational deficiencies and a continued lack of security precluded delivery of sufficient supplies. A relief ship came under fire, and a Pakistani peacekeeper was shot when his car was hijacked. In December 1992, the UN authorized all necessary means to establish a secure environment and required Somali factions to cease hostilities. There was no exit strategy. Mogadishu was the entry point for the multinational force (UNITAF) and the key logistic hub for all operations in Somalia. UNITAF gained control over relief supplies and stabilized the conflict among the clans. UNITAF forces expanded control over additional ports and interior airfields, and secured additional distribution sites in other key urban areas. In March 1993, the UN established a permanent peacekeeping force, UNOSOM II, delaying the take-over so that US forces could disarm bandits and rival clan factions in Somalia. Somali clan leaders rejected the shift from a peacekeeping operation to a peace enforcement operation. A more powerful clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aideed, began a radio campaign characterizing UN soldiers as an occupation force trying to re-colonize. In June 1993, Aideed supporters killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers and wounded fifty-seven in an ambush while the soldiers were conducting a short-warning inspection of one of Aideed’s arsenals. In October 1993, elements of Task Force Ranger raided some of Aideed’s closest supporters. Although tactically successful, two helicopters were shot down, seventy-five soldiers were wounded, and eighteen killed. The U.S. deaths and vivid scenes of mutilation to soldiers increased calls for withdrawal. The President then ordered reinforcements to protect U.S. forces (USFORSOM) as they began a phased withdrawal with a March 31st deadline. U.S. forces failed to adequately assess the urban environment, especially the society. Somali culture stresses the unity of the clan and alliances are made with other clans only when necessary to elicit some gain. Weapons, overt aggressiveness, and an unusual willingness to accept casualties were intrinsic parts of the Somali culture. Women and children were part of the clan’s order of

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battle. On the other hand, there was limited transportation and distribution infrastructure in Mogadishu, especially the poor airport and harbour facilities. A naval construction battalion made major improvements in roads, warehouses, and other facilities that allowed more personnel, supplies, and equipment to join the relief effort faster. Operation Restore Hope worked with various clan leaders as the only recognized leadership left in the country. UNITAF forces also tried to re-establish elements of the Somali National Police—one of the last respected institutions in the country that was not clan-based. Because of this engagement strategy, UNITAF succeeded in stabilizing the security situation and facilitating humanitarian relief. During Operation Continued Hope, the UN Special Representative (Jonathon Howe) and the UNOSOM II commander (General Cevik Bir) tried to marginalize and isolate the clan leaders instead of engaging them. However, disregarding the long-established order in the interest of creating a representative, democratic Somali government ultimately set the stage for strategic failure. The UN came to see Aideed’s influence as a decisive obstacle to long-term conflict resolution. Aideed, for his part, tried to consolidate control of the nation under his leadership. He identified a potential American vulnerability: the inability to accept casualties for anything other than national interest. Enough casualties would convince the American public that troops should withdraw, and the UN would leave soon after. U.S. forces failed to anticipate that Aideed would adopt this approach. Aideed drew US forces into Mogadishu, where he could use guerrilla insurgency tactics in an urban area, and where the technological superiority was less important. Aideed could inflict heavy casualties and degrade US public support. If the US inflicted civilian casualties, these had propaganda value. Aideed’s forces had the potential to use women and children as cover and concealment. The U.S. should have avoided densely populated market districts with restrictive rules of engagement. The U.S. also failed to recognize their helicopters’ vulnerability to massed rocket-propelled grenade fires. More manoeuvrable aircraft could have provided the necessary fire support. Planning should also have included a ready ground reaction force for a downed helicopter contingency. US forces did little to protect essential sources of friendly information. Aideed’s followers used their clear view of the base, the Somali contractors with ready access, and gossip about missions. On October 3rd, 1993, for example, Aideed’s followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken off and, based on their pattern analysis of previous raids, rocket teams rushed to the rooftops along the flight paths of the task force’s Blackhawks. US forces largely discounted essential elements of friendly information and did not establish significant public

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affairs and psychological operations. They failed to shape the civilian perceptions, increasingly used lethal force, and let Aideed to create a sense of legitimacy and popular support. An understanding with UNITAF’s director of operations eventually led to a mutual lowering of the rhetoric. Later in the operations, the US segment became increasingly aggressive under the UN mandate. The increased use of force resulted in increased civilian casualties in turn reduced the Somalis’ perception of US legitimacy. Most moderate Somalis began to side with the Aideed and his supporters. Urban operations require unity of command to be effective; complex command and control relationships only add to the complexity and inhibit a commander. Stability and support operations required commanders to dominate throughout, albeit with restraint. During Operation Restore Hope, these challenges were met by the creation of civil-military operations center, the division of the country into nine humanitarian relief sectors that facilitated relief and military operations, and the establishment of a reasonable span of control for nations that provided less than platoon-sized contingents. On the other hand, the command and control relationships made unity of command nearly impossible. The operational commanders did not properly link US strategic objectives and concerns to the tactical plan. They failed to assess the lack of strategic groundwork, the threat’s intent and capabilities, and the overall impact of the urban environment, to include the terrain and society, on the operation. Problem: Develop a scheme by which the operational successes also result in strategic success. First, develop research questions for further necessary information for this analysis. Second, develop and implement a strategy for that research. Third, use worksheets to conduct a strategic analysis of all the players know to be involved. Fourth, analyze individual sectors of responsibility for strategy and tactics by each sector. Fifth, develop a strategy and tactics for success. Solution: Step 1 Analyze Al Qaeda’s strategy (Worksheet 1). Step 2 List Al Qaeda’s actions (Worksheet 2). Step 3 Identify the way in which Al Qaeda will reach its goal (Worksheet 7). Step 4 Develop counter tactics (Worksheet 8). Step 5 Identify Al Qaeda’s resources, rules, and the factors affecting the outcome (Worksheets 2, 3, and 4). Step 6 Identify strategic nodes for those possible actions (Worksheet 7).

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CASE STUDY VII: SIEGE OF BEIRUT In 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee. Its goal was to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in southern Lebanon. The initial massive assault across the border into southern Lebanon focused on the PLO, but the operations quickly involved major ground and air combat between Israel and Syrian forces. In the first few weeks, Israeli forces quickly pushed back both the Syrians and the PLO. However, most of the PLO fell back into Beirut. By 30 June, Israeli forces had reached the outskirts of southern Beirut, occupied East Beirut, isolated the city from Syria and the rest of Lebanon, and blockaded the sea approaches to the city. With most of the PLO intact inside and with significant military and political capability, the Israelis had yet to achieve their objectives, and faced three options: (1) permit the PLO to operate in Beirut; (2) execute a potentially costly assault of the PLO in the city; or (3) besiege to the city in order to achieve the objective. The Israelis chose to lay siege. The Israelis occupied high ground to the south and west of Beirut, controlling the water, fuel, and food sources. Their naval forces controlled the seaward approaches. They were capable of defeating any attempt to break out of or into the city from northern Lebanon or Syria. The air force had total and complete air superiority. The challenges faced by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) included the combat power of the PLO, Syria, and other threats in Beirut, and the fact that their doctrine and training did not emphasize urban operations. The Israeli army was not optimized to fight in urban terrain. Armour and self-propelled artillery formations dominated, and most infantry were mechanized, with only a few elite formations of traditional dismounted infantry. They also wanted to limit collateral damage and friendly and non-combatant casualties. The PLO was surrounded and cut off from support, but retained several advantages above and beyond the urban characteristics. It had spent months preparing bunkers, obstacles, and a defence plan. There were about 14,000 Arab combatants integrated with friendly civilians and ready for a siege on the advice of experienced Soviets, Syrians, and east Europeans. There was a six-month stockpile of essential supplies. The combatants knew the terrain and were experienced urban fighters after years in conflict with Syrian conventional forces and Christian militias. Finally, the combatants were organized in small teams of fighters armed with machine-guns and antitank weapons, and trained in insurgent, hit-and-run tactics. West Beirut’s civilian population, estimated to be between 350 000 and 500 000, was heavily Palestinian and Lebanese. The Palestinians supported the PLO,

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while the Lebanese were unhappy under Palestinian dominance, but still not willing to actively support Israel. These civilians were a constraint for the PLO, but were an even larger constraint on the Israeli, limiting how they could use firepower. Meanwhile, refugee camps in West Beirut were both civilian centers and military bases. The initial Israeli actions secured the city’s essential infrastructure, i.e. water, power, and food supplies. The Israelis also dominated Beirut’s international airport, closed all the sea access, and controlled all routes into and out of the city. The Israeli army took extraordinary steps to limit collateral damage and preserve critical infrastructure. The IDF put stringent rules of engagement in place, although they conflicted with the mandate to minimize their own casualties and adhere to a fast-paced timetable. They avoided randomly using grenades in house clearing, limited the use of massed artillery fires, and maximized the use of precision weapons. The environment made fighting slow. The concern for civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure declined as IDF casualties rose. The brought in more field artillery and increasingly employed close air support. This delicate balance between minimizing collateral damage and protecting infrastructure while accomplishing the military objective with the least expenditure of resources is something armed forces commanders will continue to face. The Israelis had a noteworthy if flawed ability to understand the human dimension, because they were familiar with the PLO after decades of conflict, and because they had close cooperation with Lebanese militia. The Israeli constraints on artillery and other systems against these parts of the city were much less than in other parts of West Beirut where the population was mostly Lebanese and where fewer key military targets existed. The PLO knew of the Israeli aversion to causing civil casualties and located key military centers, troop concentrations, and logistics and weapons systems in and amongst the population on purpose. It specifically chose the refugee Palestinian population in the southern part of West Beirut for the interest it would generate in the media. Tactically, they used the civilians to hide their forces and infiltrate Israeli positions. The friendly Palestinian population provided intelligence to the PLO while the friendly Lebanese population provided intelligence for the IDF. Throughout the siege, the IDF maintained a policy of free passage out of Beirut for all civilians. This policy was strictly enforced and permitted no weapons to leave the city. As many as 100,000 refugees took advantage of this policy. The siege of Beirut involved information operations to influence the media. The PLO tried to control the media and the international perception of the situation by carefully cultivating a select group of pro-PLO media over the years. Once hostilities started, only these media were allowed to report from the

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besieged portions of the city, and even then they were only shown actions that portrayed the IDF negatively. The PLO’s carefully orchestrated misinformation and control of the media manipulated international sentiment, grossly but successfully doubling the claims of civilian casualties, damage, and number of refugee civilians. The IDF actually contributed to the PLO plant by limiting media access to their activities. The IDF failed to present a believable and accurate account of operations, so that the international community was constantly pressuring the Israeli government to break off the siege. The government in turn put pressure on the IDF to conduct operations rapidly and to limit firepower and casualties. In psychological operations, however, the IDF successfully attacked Palestinian morale, passive measures, such as leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts, and naval bombardment to emphasize the totality of Beirut’s isolation. The IDF also used naval, air, and artillery bombardment and sonic booms to maintain high levels of stress, to deny sleep, and to emphasize their combat powers. Separating combatants from non-combatants was a difficult but important aspect of the Beirut operation. The Israelis made every effort. They permitted the passage of all civilians out of the city through Israeli lines. The cease-fires and open lanes need for this slowed operation down, and the IDF was wrong to assume that civilians would abandon combat areas. Civilians tried to stay in their homes, leaving only after the battle had begun. The PLO meanwhile tied their military operations closely to the civilian community to make targeting difficult, and did not wear uniforms. Once the IDF did convince civilians to leave, they were unable early one to provide food, water, clothing, shelter, and sanitation for them, and IDF commanders made things worse by interfering with relief efforts by outside agencies for fear that the PLO would benefit. Returning civilians then complicated IDF manoeuvre and targeting. Since essential services were under Israeli command, and had been since the beginning of the siege, the Israelis had the ability to easily restore these resources to West Beirut as soon as they adopted the cease-fire. In the rear areas, the Israeli army immediately handed over civic and police responsibility to civil authorities, believing that efficient administration of local government and police and resulting good will made up for the slightly increased force protection issues and the increased risk of PLO infiltration. On cease-fire, Israeli forces withdrew to predetermined positions and international forces under UN control supervised the evacuation of the PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut. The siege of Beirut began on July 1st. By July 4th, Israeli forces occupied East Beirut and the Green Line separating East and West Beirut, and dominated positions south of the airport. IDF naval forces also controlled the sea west and

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north of Beirut. On July 3rd and 4th, IDF artillery and naval fire began firing on military targets throughout West Beirut. On July 4th, the IDF cut power and water to the city. From July 5th to July 13th, the Israeli continued to pound PLO targets in West Beirut. The PLO gave only one significant response, firing on an Israeli position south of the city and causing several casualties. On July 7th, reacting to international pressure, the IDF returned power and water to West Beirut’s civilian population. On July 11th, the IDF launched its first attack, probing the southern portion of the airport with an armoured task force. The PLO repulsed this attack and destroyed several IDF armoured vehicles. On July 13th, both sides entered into a cease-fire that lasted until July 21st. The international community then mediated negotiations to end the siege. The PLO used this period to improve Beirut’s fortifications. The Israelis used the time to train their infantry and other arms in urban small unit tactics in Damour, a town the Israeli paratroopers had captured. The cease-fire ended July 21st when PLO forces attacked the IDF areas. The Israeli’s even more vigorous response was to bomb PLO positions using artillery, and naval and air forces, and there was no respite before July 30th. In addition, the IDF renewed its ground attacks around the airport on July 28th. This time IDF forces established a toehold by methodically advancing and capturing a few hundred meters of ground. The Israelis stopped their bombing on July 31st, but launched its first major ground attack on August 1st, seizing Beirut airport. Israeli armoured forces massed along the green line until August 2nd, while continuing to attack Palestinian positions at Ouzai from the South. On August 3rd, the Israeli forces kept reinforcing both their attack forces to the south and along the green line, in preparation for future offensive operations. On August 4th, the IDF launched the four-front major offensive, disrupting any coherent PLO defence. The southern attack was the most successful: it pushed PLO forces back to their camps of Sabra and Shatila and threatened to overrun PLO headquarters. The IDF crossed the green line at three points. All three attacks made modest gains against stiff resistance. For this offensive, the Israelis suffered nineteen killed and eighty-four wounded, the highest single ay total of the siege, bringing the total to 318 killed. Following the major attacks on August 4th, Israeli forces paused and, for four days, consolidated their gains and prepared to renew the offensive. Skirmishes and sniping continued, but without significant offensive action. On August 9th, the IDF attacked again by air and artillery, an attack which lasted four days. It peaked on August 12th with a massive aerial attack that killed over a hundred and wounded over 400—mostly civilians. A cease-fire started the next day and lasted until the PLO evacuated Beirut on August 22nd.

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The siege was both a military and a political victory, but the political outcome was in doubt until the last week of the siege. The Israeli government faced international and domestic opposition. For their part, the PLO might not have lasted militarily until a favourable political end could be negotiated. In the end, the PLO’s military situation became untenable before the Israeli political situation did, but the success came from the balance struck between the military force and political negotiation. The Israelis also struck a balance in the tactics against the domestic aversion to major friendly casualties on the one hand, and international concern with collateral damage on the other. The Israeli tactical plan was sound. They attacked from multiple directions, segmented West Beirut into pieces, and then destroyed each individually. The plan’s success strongly influenced the PLO willingness to negotiate. Tactical patience based on steady if slow progress toward decisive points limited friendly and non-combatant casualties. The willingness to execute close combat, especially on August 4th, was decisive. Decisive ground combat was used sparingly, was aimed at decisive points, and was timed carefully to impact on political negotiations. The Israelis avoided using attrition. Instead, they focused their attacks on decisive objects that would have an impact: PLO headquarters and refugee centers. Even the significant Syrian forces in West Beirut were not the focus, though they had significant combat power. The PLO had hoped that their preparations would have deterred Israeli assaults. But the successful urban attacks by the IDF convinced the PLO that the destruction of their forces was inevitable, and so they negotiated a cease-fire and a withdrawal. The Israeli siege of West Beirut was successful because the Israelis clearly understood their strategic objectives and closely coordinated diplomatic efforts with urban military operations. The IDF also understood that they would be more successful if they left an escape option to the PLO, i.e. their supervised evacuation without arms to different host countries after the siege, which shattered the PLO’s military capability. The physical destruction of the PLO in Beirut might have failed because politicians were unwilling to stomach the casualties, collateral damage, and international censure. Problem: Design a strategic intervention that would end the siege decisively earlier. Design a strategy for a Palestinian victory. Specify the strategic and tactical lessons learned, and apply them to the siege of Mogadishu. Solution: Step 1 develops research questions for further necessary information for this analysis (no worksheet).

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Step 2 develop and implement a strategy for that research (Worksheet 1). Step 3 conduct strategic and tactical analyses of all the players know to be involved (for each player, Worksheets 2, 3, 4, and 6). Step 4 analyzes individual sectors of responsibility for strategy and tactics by each sector (Worksheets 1 and 2). Step 5 develops a strategy and tactics for success (Worksheet 1).

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CASE STUDY VIII: A TERRORIST EXPLOSION IN A SMALL PACIFIC ISLAND STATE OCCUPIED BY A MULTINATIONAL FORCE Let us assume that the attacks might have been caused by foreign terrorists, domestic radical groups, state-sponsored adversaries, or disgruntled employees. Le us also assume that response capabilities and resources have not been fully tested or response plans developed. The multinational force responding may have to provide capacity lacking locally at any time. The attack is consistent with suspected and/or known terrorist capabilities, but that knowledge is not complete. There are two explosions, one nuclear and one conventional, which requires the coordination and cooperation of the multinational force as well as existing multiple regional, state, and local jurisdictions are operating. The country attacked, Fredonia, is composed of an archipelago, the Fredonian Islands, in the Pacific Ocean. Its 2000 census had a population of 1,225,000 people, with about 75 000 tourists at any given time. Fredolu, the city attacked, is both the largest city in the country and its capital, and it is located on the archipelago’s largest island on the southeast coast. It is ethnically and religiously diverse. Its landmass continues to grow due to active lava flows. Ecologically and agriculturally, it is the endangered species capital of the world, having surpassed Hawaii for the title in 2005. Nineteen islands and atolls extending across a distance of 2,400 km comprise the Fredonian Archipelago. The main islands are the eight high islands at the south-eastern end of the chain. All the islands were formed by volcanoes arising from the sea floor through a vent described in geological theory as a hotspot. As the tectonic plate beneath much the Pacific Ocean moves in a north-westerly direction, the hot spot remains stationary, slowly creating new volcanoes. Fredolu’s island is the least volcanically active. Fredonia’s isolation in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and the wide range of environments to be found on high islands located in and near the tropics has resulted in a vast array of endemic flora and fauna. The volcanic activity and

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subsequent erosion created impressive geological features. Fredonia has English at its official language, with a wide range of other native languages spoken on the islands. Fredonia’s history is one of a succession of dominating industries: sandalwood, whaling, sugarcane, pineapple, and now tourism. In recent years, new efforts were created to diversify the economy. Gross National Product for 2003 was $US 47 million, with per capita income at $US 18 341. Industrial exports include food processing and apparel. The main agricultural exports are nursery stock and flowers, coffee, macadamia nuts, pineapple, livestock, and sugar cane. Agricultural sales for 2002 were $US 370.9 million from diversified agriculture, $US 100.6 million from pineapple, and $US 64.3 million from sugarcane. Fredonia is known for its relatively high per capita tax burden, although millions of tourists pay the general excise tax and the hotel room tax. The 2004 census gave Fredolu a population of 390 000 and 140 000 households, with the rest of the island coming in at 900 000, about 950 square kilometres. The temperature and humidity are moderated by the mid-ocean location -- the average daily low and high temperature in January is 65/80 °F (18/27 °C) and in July is 74/88°F (23/31°C). Most of the city's commercial and industrial developments are located on a narrow but relatively flat coastal plain, while numerous ridges and valleys located inland of the coastal plain divide its residential areas into distinct neighbourhoods: some spread along valley floors and others climbing the interfluvial ridges. Within Fredolu proper can be found a number of volcanic cones. Downtown Fredolu is the financial, commercial and governmental center. On the eastern side of downtown is the historic center of government: the State Diet, Fredonia Palace, and numerous government buildings. Residential neighbourhoods located in adjacent valleys just inland of the downtown areas. In general, light industrial areas alternate with impoverished neighbourhoods outside the affluent core. The population density was 1,674.4/km² (4,336.6/mi²). Twenty-three percent of households have children under the age of 18, with an average household size was 2.57. In Fredolu, 19% of the population is under the age of 18, 8.9% is aged between 18 and 24, 29.9% between 25 and 44, 24.1% between 45 and 64, and 17.8% over the age of 65, with a median age of 40. The median income per household in the city proper was $US 45,112 in 2004, with 12% of the population below the poverty line. The airport is at the western end of the city, and two freeways serve the city proper: the A-1, which, coming into the city from the west, passes the international airport, runs just north of downtown and continues eastward, and the A-2, which the National Stadium the westward side of the city. The metropolitan area experiences heavy traffic congestion during rush hours, especially to and

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from the western suburbs; land for expanding road capacity is at a premium. The public transit system is excellent, with 93 routes and a fleet of 525 buses. The effects of an attachk on national, state, and local transportation, communication, medical, and utility infrastructure will in turn affect response strategies. These networks need to be properly coordinated between civilian and military to ensure as much continuity as possible. The magnitude of the attack may affect the economic sustainability of communities, and economic recovery is probably the most serious issue facing most communities. Environmental recovery is uncertain: decontamination, if necessary, may be well established in some situations, and only moderately effective in others. Technology may only be effective on small sites, or it may be difficult and expensive. Evacuation, relocation, and restoration can lead to local and regional economic downturn, and adversely affect agricultural or industrial production. Among the international aspects to be considered are: cross-border trade; transit; law enforcement coordination; treaty connections such as NATO; the potential involvement of the UN; and humanitarian assistance and relief. The foreign ministries of the member nations may offer assistance in the recovery efforts, but also in the investigations and apprehension of suspects outside the country. Within Fredonia, informing and protecting citizens is critical, and in many cases the media are the only source of information in the early stages of an event. Good working relations will provide the multinational force with opportunities to advise the public and correct the inevitable misinformation, which is essential in reducing the probability of injury and/or illness, and for managing public anxiety. Government essential operations must continue, even if primary staff and facilities are unavailable. Response organizations need to move quickly and in a coordinated way, mass casualties must be treated, and large numbers of people must be temporarily housed and fed. Infected animals might need to be treated, computer systems reconfigured, etc. Insurgents put together a gun-type nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium bought on the black market in the former Soviet Union and then smuggled into the country. It is assembled near Fredolu and brought to the central business district in a delivery van. The attack itself consists of the simultaneous detonation of a ten kiloton improvised nuclear device, and two conventional devices. At the nuclear explosion, there is infrastructure damage within a radius of half to one and a half kilometres. Most buildings within 1,000 meters are severely damaged. Injuries from flying debris may occur up to six kilometres away. An electromagnetic pulse damages much electronics within about five kilometres. The mushroom cloud rises above the city and drifts east-northeast. The incident happened on the coast, and the islands of a neighbouring country were slightly

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affected. The fallout plume was carried out primarily over the water, reducing casualties. However, the coast limits zones suitable for evacuation. Bridges and tunnels limit evacuation, causing delays and increasing the dose of radiation that evacuees receive. A decision to shelter-in-place rather than or evacuate-in-stages may have to be made. Insurgents also improvise conventional bombs to detonate in the city’s largest open markets, at peak shopping time, use suicide bombers in public transportation hubs, and then detonate another bomb in the parking lot of a hospital emergency room. The event is primarily designed for an urban environment, but could be adapted for more rural area events such as county fairs and other large gatherings. There are at least 450 000 displaced persons, and contamination has occurred over 3 000 km2. There, the recovery will take years. At two other sites, there are bombings using conventional improvised devices. There are 100 fatalities and 450 hospitalizations. The structures are affected by blast and fire. There are few displaced persons and no contamination. The recovery there will take weeks or months. Initially, in the area of the nuclear bomb, only survivors in the immediate area conducted rescue and lifesaving activities. Minutes later, rescue teams began to arrive and provide assistance. Many civilian responders get large, possibly incapacitating or fatal, doses of radiation. Various command posts are set up over hours or days to coordinate the response. On the nuclear site, the actual occurrence of injuries does not stop when the immediate blast effects have subsided. The most effective lifesaving activities are those that address the evacuation or sheltering-in-place decisions for the potential victims in the immediate fallout path, the effective communication of instructions to the affected population, and the efficient decontamination of the evacuated population. With the conventional explosions, the detonation occurs about an hour and fifteen minutes after the peak shopping and traffic period starts, in the afternoon at the start of the week-end. The explosion at the hospital is timed for maximum effect, and was coordinated via communication among the hostile actors. It occurs at the arrival of casualties from the open air markets. The explosion produces casualties due to collapse of poorly built structures, fire spreading through the market, secondary and tertiary blast effects, and crowd surge. The nuclear detonation causes many secondary hazards. The intense heat of the nuclear explosion produces many fires in the immediate blast zone. Damaged buildings, downed power and phone lines, leaking gas lines, broken water mains, and weakened bridges and tunnels need to be assessed. Hazardous materials might be released from industrial storage facilities and factories. The electromagnetic pulse from the intense radiation is a sharp, high-voltage spike radiating out from the site of the explosion. It can disrupt communications and other electronic

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equipment in a range of about 5 km. Public transportation infrastructure is significantly damaged, and their effects may be cascading. Structures used for essential services, like hospitals, may be damaged. The conventional explosions might lead to the disruption of electric power, natural gas lines, and water mains. There could also be undermined streets and flooded underground subways. Since one of the bombs was disguised as an emergency response vehicle, other legitimate vehicles may be impeded in their response to the scene and hospitals. The blasts throw both human bodies and objects, which in turn create other fatalities or injuries. The nuclear detonation produces heat that causes burns to exposed skin and eyes. The first, so-called prompt, radiation is of most concern. The first minute after explosion exposes people to extremely large gamma ray or neutron doses over a radius of a few kilometres. There is also the contaminated fallout cloud that settles over a period of minutes to weeks. The most dangerous fallout is deposited near the explosion within the first couple of hours. The radioactive fallout decays exponentially with time, but still exposes many people and contaminates large areas of land. More than 20 km away from ground zero, acute radiation exposure decreases, and there the major issues become the lowering of contamination, evacuation, and sheltering. More than 250 km away from ground zero, acute health concerns are no longer an immediate or significant issue, although there will be health and environmental concerns for years to come, given increased probabilities of cancers. The initial blast and fires destroy all buildings in the area. Decontamination requires all affected material to be removed, so buildings in the fallout path have to be destroyed. As the distance from the detonation site increases, the buildings do not have to be destroyed but do have to be fully decontaminated, at a cost greater than reconstruction. Service disruption is extensive in the area near ground zero and in the fallout path for several miles downwind. Services in these areas will not be restored for years because the land affected will not be returned to use until the decontamination is completed. Service disruption will be much less dramatic in areas that are less severely contaminated. The electrical power grid is damaged by transients produced by the destruction of substations, as well as other power production and distribution installations, and perhaps by the electromagnetic pulse of the detonation. It may cause power outages over wide areas, perhaps over several islands, but these outages should be repaired within several days to a couple of weeks. The communication systems in the area suffer similar damage and will likely be repaired within similar timeframes. City water mains survive without major damage. The city water supply is not substantially contaminated with radiation via water main breaks, but some small amount of radioactive and non-radioactive contamination may enter the lines. The national economy is significantly impacted.

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Decontamination, disposal, and replacement of lost infrastructure costs many billions of dollars. Replacement of lost private property and goods adds billions more. An overall national economic downturn is likely in the wake of the attack. Mission Areas Mission Area Prevention/ Deterrence/ Protection

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Emergency Assessmen t/Diagnosis

Emergency Manageme nt/ Response

Incident/ Hazard

Nuclear

Conventional

Law enforcement prevents development and detonation of the device. Site boundaries are protected and surveyed after blast. Response to any additional threats or looting/theft issues. Blast easily recognized as nuclear. Actions include dispatching response units; making incident scene reports; detecting and identifying the source; establishing a perimeter; collecting information; making hazard assessments and predictions; coordinating hospital and urgent care facilities; coordinating county and state response requests; and coordinating monitoring, surveying, and sampling operations. Evacuation/shelter-in-place decisions made immediately. Required actions include alerting the public, providing traffic and access control, protecting atrisk and special populations, supporting requests for assistance, directing and controlling critical infrastructure assets, and directing pubic information activities. Location and removal of injured and disabled people a significant undertaking greatly complicated by the need to keep the radiation dose of workers as low as possible. Initial emergency workers will likely receive high doses -- must be trained on how to avoid as much as possible. Short term self-evacuation. Quick appropriate decisions, suitable

Because execution requires only crude planning, higher potential for pre-blast detection. Fire after blast is first recognizable indication. Actions required include dispatch; agent detection; and hazard assessment, prediction, monitoring, and sampling.

Actions required include search and rescue, alerts, activation and notification, traffic and access control, protection of special populations, resource support, requests for assistance, and public information, establishment of a joint operations center.

Primary hazards include fire; toxic atmosphere/

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Case Studies and Solutions Mitigation

dissemination of information (e.g., evacuation/shelter-in-place instructions) will reduce effects of blast on population. Evacuees must be promptly decontaminated.

Public Protection

Actions include: making and communicating protective action decisions, monitoring and decontaminating evacuees, administering prophylaxis to the affected populations, protecting special populations, protecting schools and day care facilities, and providing shelter/reception facilities. Nuclear

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Mission Area Victim Care

Investigati on/Apprehe nsion

Recovery/ Remediatio n

Tens of thousands will require decontamination, short-term treatment, and long-term treatment. Due to large casualties, level of care significantly lower than normally expected. Triage of casualties: the earlier the onset of symptom, the larger the dose received, the less likely the survival. even with medical intervention. Attribution activities at the blast site relying on largely on scientific forensic techniques, provided by specialized teams. Actions of blast-site personnel include site control and criminal investigation. National/military forces seek apprehension of hostile actors. Radiation levels limit the total time workers can spend in the blast area. Shortage of willing, qualified, and trained workers. Volume of contaminated material overwhelms hazardous waste transportation and disposal facilities.

smoke; un-detonated explosives; unstable structures; electrical hazards; and low visibility. Vehicles at hospitals must be searched. Evacuation, additional threat assessment. The area must be cordoned.

Conventional Injuries from “walking wounded” to multiple systems trauma, burns, and obvious fatalities. Disabled hospital forces re-routing of casualties.

Investigation begins during rescue with photo documentation of scene, victim locations, and injury patterns. Coordination of federal, state, local, and military investigative resources begins early. Decontamination for blood-borne pathogens. Evidence search and recovery, then debris removal. Year-long restoration of damaged public spaces.

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Casualties from the conventional bomb include civilians, emergency personnel, and the suicide bombers at all sites. Property damage includes severe fire and blast damage to the open air market, blast damage to buildings across from the entertainment venue, moderate damage to the transportation center, severe damage to vehicles and nearby buildings at the parking facility, and severe damage to the hospital emergency room. Service disruption is severe in the impacted city and includes traffic, public transportation, emergency services, and hospitals. Major health issues include severe burn treatment and therapy for the victims; permanent hearing loss; long-term tinnitus; vertigo for some exposed to the blast; and post-traumatic stress for victims, first responders, and nearby residents. Problem: Design a strategy for overall recovery period. Design strategy for each mission area. Identify strategic nodes. Develop counter tactics for each node.

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Solution: For designing a strategy for the overall recovery period: Worksheet 1. For designing a strategy for each mission area: Worksheet 1. For identifying strategic nodes: Worksheet 7. For developing counter tactics for each node: Worksheet 8.

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Chapter 5

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CONCLUSION

The knowledge transfer system based on worksheets, when joined to an understanding of underdog strategic thinking, has a large number of applications in irregular warfare. It can be used to analyze a single hostile actor’s actions. It can be used to develop a proposal to promote greater safety for a single country. It can be used to analyze and improve the effectiveness of cooperation between two states, if that is one of the states' objectives, in combating terrorism. It can be used to examine the pattern of insurgency or terrorism and design a response to it. It can be used to train analysts, gatherers of intelligence, or officers and personnel of combat units. It can be used by any kind of individual or group, civilian or military. It can analyze the possible action of non-state actors, which may assist or hinder the design of counter tactics. It can also analyze the domestic politics of a state, or to the relations of non-governmental actors, or the relations of nongovernment groups to their own (or other) governments. It can be used for willing or sane or unwilling or insane actors. The foregoing chapters, therefore, are only an introduction to underdog strategic thinking. Underdog strategy comes with its own rules, and it is important to judge the proposal made within these pages by criteria which are valid for this type of enterprise.1 ‰ How much knowledge is retained by the analyst who has worked through the case studies? 1

Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, part I, section 2, heading 3, article 169, pp. 7273.

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Laure Paquette ‰ Can analysts demonstrate the skills they have acquired through this book? ‰ Do analysts have the ability to apply, in practical situations, the knowledge and skills that have been acquired?

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Any assessment should include categories that relate to the content, should be reliable, should identify clearly the degree of difficulty of the skills being acquired, should discriminate different levels of skills having been acquired, should be free of bias and should provide direction in the case of different standards between raters, should provide feedback to participants, and should be credible and functional. I propose the following levels of assessment of individuals or units having acquired skills: Level 1 correctly applying knowledge: demonstrates adequate knowledge of the tasks at hand; demonstrates ability to utilize new knowledge and experience Level 2 demonstrates by actions mastery of knowledge acquired; applies theory to specific situations or problems; does not make the same mistakes repeatedly; reorganizes approach or plan when needed Level 3 prepares realistic plans; can be used by a team, not just by individuals; stands up to the reasoning of others Level 4 plans with flexibility, adjusting actions to the situation; reflects on most effective use of particular skills of group members, learns from mistakes or changes in the situation Level 5 anticipates events and problems, and need resources; monitors events and anticipates changes to tactics or strategy. One could also consider, as I have elsewhere, that underdog strategy is the justifiable foundation for a new general theory of strategy. The general theory of strategy on which this book is based has theoretical and practical significance. At its broadest, it has the potential to change the way anyone understands power, analyzes the world, and acts. At its narrowest, it can help the single individual make a difference in his or her life. This book’s specific application is for combating insurgency. In addition to its numerous practical applications, the new general theory of strategy which underpins the present text also spawns a complex research agenda: research on phenomena, infra-national groups, supra-national groups, and systemic applications will require several sets of case studies. If they are all successful, it will be possible to propose an integrated theory of the use of power

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in society. The more applied strand of research represents detailed instructions for the application of the theory in a variety of situations. At the time of this writing, for example, a book on the uses of strategy in research itself has been drafted. The first category of case studies looks at how various actors can use strategy to deal with phenomena, the onset of the threat of bioterrorism for example. Among the other possible phenomena that could be studied are: the Internet, the rise of mass investment, the greening of politics, the marketization of the world, or the advent of the single European currency. Such studies must encompass the study of individuals, infra-national groups, supra-national groups, states and groups of states. A study of the Internet, for example, should encompass the following case studies: a study of either a security expert or a hacker, like the infamous Kevin Mitnick; the use of the Internet by a particular sub-national company, such as Barnes and Noble; the policies regarding the internet of a particular multinational corporation, like Microsoft; the policies regarding the internet of a government like the U.S. or Canada; and the way in which an international organization of states like the United Nations or the European Community dealt with the Internet. Among the cases of infra-national groups using strategy, whether in a systemic context or not, would be political parties, social movements, national or sub-national non-governmental organizations, companies or pressure groups. A book might, for example, study women’s groups in the U.S. and how they related to women’s groups in Canada, to the international women’s movement, to the US government or the United Nations. At the time of this writing, a book examining the actions of various infra-national groups operating within the Canadian health system has been drafted. Strategy can also be used to analyze or to assist supra- or transnational groups in dealing with other transnational groups, governments and groups of governments: the International Red Cross, Oxfam, development or aid groups; at the other end of the spectrum, multinational corporations like IBM, Nestlé, or Archer Daniels Midland; transnational movements such as those seeking to protect the environment, the women’s movement; and even transnational political parties like the Green Party or the former Communist and Socialist parties. Another set of case studies could examine how non-governmental organizations’ relations with each other, such as Green peace or Amnesty International, or with multinational corporations. It could also look at how groups deal with governments at various levels, or with groups of states like the Islamic League, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity or its successor organization, the African Union, among others. Again, the studies can

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be in a systemic or a less structured context. At the time of this writing, a book examining the Roman Catholic Church is in preparation. Among the practical strand of research, it is possible to anticipate the development of applications specific to systemic situations: in particular, the development of a method to promote the management and control of change of health services has been published. It is also possible to conceive of a method, suitable for the layperson, for the management and control of international economic or market change. My original intent, in developing a general theory of strategy and a new concept of strategy, was to work towards a more just society, and to allow the poor and the powerless to take their place in that society. I did not realize until I started using this general theory in the classroom and the training seminar that I had not discovered a new form of strategy, but merely recognized it. As far as military applications are concerned, my hope is to save even one life, prevent even one injury. Nonetheless, it is impossible for me to ignore that it could be used by a terrorist group to become more effective. There are also implications for citizens in general that are impossible to ignore. Traditionally, academics have declined to take responsibility for the consequences of their research being abused, and I find myself unable to do otherwise. But I wish to acknowledge here that strategy is and always has been ethically neutral. Its application and results depend entirely on how, and for what purpose, it is used.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Laure Paquette‚ Ph.D., a professor from the Department of Political Science at Lakehead University, has adapted the military conceptions of strategy for use in a number of much broader applications. Her series of tools and workshops developing strategic thinking have been developed with the support of NATO‚ the Department of National Defence of Canada, the Japan Foundation‚ the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation, the Canadian Warfare Services Research Foundation Taiwan‚ and the Canadian Institutes of Warfare Research, among many other sources. Prof. Paquette has visited over twenty-five countries to conduct research or to speak‚ and has addressed audiences in her speeches and workshops ranging from Chinese military to Fortune 500 executives to high school teachers. She has been visiting professor at Rutgers‚ the State University of New Jersey‚ the Sorbonne‚ and the National Institute of Defence Studies of Japan‚ among others. She is the author of several books and numerous articles on strategy.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY ———. “A Conceptual Foundation for Strategy, “ Washington Quarterly 13 (Winter 1990), 43-59. ———. “Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 57:5 (Summer 1979), 975-986. ———. “Perception and Information in Strategic Thinking.” Journal of Peace Research, 3 (1966), 257-276. ———. “Relevance of Traditional Strategy. “ Foreign Affairs, 51:12 (Jan 1973), 253-266. ———. “Scientific Strategists.” Chapter in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds. Scientists and National Policy-Making. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. ———. “Strategic Thinking Since 1945.” Chapter in New Directions in Strategic Thinking, Robert O’Neill and D. M. Horner, eds. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981. Ailleret, Charles. “Strategy,” Military Review (Nov. 1965), 75-80. Ansoff, H. (1987). Igor. “Emerging Paradigm of Strategic Behaviour.” Strategic Management Journal, 8, 501-515. Archibald, Kathleen, ed. Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966. Ascher, William and William H. Overholt. Strategic Planning and Forecasting, Political Risk and Economic Opportunity. New York: Wiley, 1983. Asplund, Göran. Strategy Formulation: An Intervention Study of a Complex Group Decision Process. Stockholm: Economic Research Institute at Stockholm School of Economics, 1975. Atkinson, Alexander. “Social Order and Strategic Theory.” chapter in Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

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INDEX

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A academics, 92 achievement, 27, 28, 31, 40 activation, 86 adverse event, 5 advocacy, 6, 66 Afghanistan, v, 17, 19, 20, 49, 57, 63, 71, 72 afternoon, 84 aggressiveness, 73 agricultural exports, 82 agriculture, 82 Air Force, ix, 1, 9, 67, 99 Al Qaeda, 48, 49, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75 Algeria, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 algorithm, 5 alternative, 16, 40, 42, 63 alternatives, 14, 20, 40, 42, 43 animals, 83 anxiety, 39, 56, 62, 83 apparel, 82 argument, 8 armed forces, ix, 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 14, 16, 50, 56, 66, 67, 68, 77 arms control, 65 assassination, 51, 56 assault, 3, 49, 51, 68, 69, 76 assessment, 65, 86, 87, 90

assets, 51, 86 assignment, 6, 68 assumptions, 10 attacks, 2, 17, 39, 48, 51, 58, 69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 81 attitudes, 6 authority, 52 aversion, 77, 80 awareness, 13, 50

B Bahrain, 71 banks, 50 Beijing, 98 bias, 90 biological weapons, 2 black market, 83 bonding, 71 bonds, 31 boredom, 7

C campaigns, 1, 4 Canada, 91, 93 carrier, 46

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102 case study, 69, 70 cash flow, 72 Catholic Church, 92 Chad, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63 chain of command, 8 channels, 70 chaos, 72 children, 73, 74, 82 China, 2 cognitive abilities, 6 cognitive development, 6 collateral, 50, 51, 76, 77, 80 collateral damage, 50, 51, 76, 77, 80 communication, 5, 83, 84, 85 communication systems, 85 community, 63, 78, 79 complexity, 24, 75 components, 24, 47, 52, 65 compounds, 17 computer systems, 83 concentration, 69 conditioning, 10 conflict, 16, 48, 73, 74, 76, 77 conflict resolution, 74 confrontation, 13, 20, 21 confusion, 49 Congress, 9, 20, 100 consensus, ix, 1, 23 consent, 8 conservation, 69 construction, 74 contamination, 84, 85 contingency, 74 continuity, 83 control, 7, 17, 21, 32, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50, 52, 57, 65, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 86, 87, 92 corporations, 91 corruption, 19, 21 counterterrorism, ix, 1 creativity, 19 criminals, 51 critical infrastructure, 77, 86 criticism, 17 cultural practices, 35

Index culture, 5, 7, 35, 37, 73 currency, 91

D danger, 34, 49 data processing, 10 deaths, 73 debt, 19 decision makers, 9 decision making, 42 decisions, 1, 3, 4, 8, 15, 37, 40, 43, 84, 86, 87 defence, 25, 27, 51, 65, 69, 70, 76, 79 definition, 14 delivery, 73, 83 denial, 2 destruction, 15, 49, 57, 69, 80, 85 detection, 69, 86 detonation, 83, 84, 85, 86 differentiation, ix, 23, 49 discourse, 3, 4 dispersion, 69 displaced persons, 84 disposition, 69 distribution, 73, 74, 85 division, 75 dominance, 77 draft, 9, 31 drought, 72 drugs, 18 duties, 30

E electricity, 17 electromagnetic, 83, 84, 85 e-mail, 2 emergency response, 85 employees, 81 engagement, 5, 8, 9, 16, 48, 74, 77 environment, 7, 13, 16, 19, 21, 25, 34, 38, 50, 52, 73, 75, 77, 84, 91 environmental protection, 36 erosion, 82

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103

Index ethics, 35 Europe, 58 European Community, 91 evacuation, 65, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86 evening, 46 exclusion, 65 execution, 50, 86 exercise, 44, 47 exploitation, 19, 22 explosives, 49, 50, 54, 57, 58, 86 exports, 82 exposure, 52, 85

geography, 7 goals, 38, 40, 44, 49, 71 gossip, 74 government, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 14, 18, 20, 26, 27, 48, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71, 74, 78, 80, 82, 89, 91 government budget, 65 groups, x, 3, 18, 26, 27, 50, 51, 57, 81, 89, 90, 91 groupthink, 6 guidelines, 39, 56, 63 guilty, 71 gymnastics, 45, 46

F

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H failure, 8, 74 famine, 72 fanaticism, 17 farmers, 19, 21 fear, 3, 7, 14, 78 feedback, 90 finance, 18, 19, 20 financing, 21 fires, 51, 69, 74, 77, 78, 84, 85 first responders, 88 fishing, 2 flexibility, 2, 10, 16, 69, 90 flight, 74 flood, 17 flora and fauna, 81 food, 30, 44, 72, 76, 77, 78, 82 football, 45, 46 forecasting, 13, 20, 21, 32, 59 foreign language, 63 France, 97 freedom, 20, 65 fuel, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 76 funding, 67, 68 funds, 32, 35, 61, 65, 71

G gangs, 72 generation, ix, 1, 99

Hawaii, 81 hazards, 84, 86 health, 5, 85, 88, 91, 92 health care, 5 health services, 92 hearing loss, 88 high school, 93 hospitals, 5, 50, 85, 86, 88 host, 80 hostilities, 73, 77 households, 82 humidity, 82

I identification, 31 ideology, 57 images, 45 imagination, 47 income, 82 indication, 86 industry, 49 infinite, 47 infrastructure, 16, 74, 77, 83, 86 initiation, 70 injuries, 84, 85 insecurity, 19 instability, 64

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104

Index

institutions, 3, 7, 38, 74 integrity, 32, 65 intelligence, x, 6, 16, 51, 57, 58, 63, 65, 77, 89 intelligence gathering, 65 intentions, 8 interaction, 3 International Monetary Fund, 58 internet, 91 intervention, 42, 80, 87 intuition, 6, 10, 15 inventiveness, 3 investment, 91 Iraq, 2, 19, 21, 48, 71, 72, 98 Islam, 17, 49 isolation, 78, 81 Israel, 76, 77

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J Japan, 93 jihad, 6, 49 Jirga, 20 Jordan, 58, 71 judgment, 14, 15, 25, 32 just society, 92

K Kenya, 57 kerosene, 33 kidnapping, 51, 56 killing, 54, 57, 58, 60 Korea, 2 Kuwait, 71

L lack of confidence, 56 land, 83, 85 language, 82 laptop, 57 law enforcement, 51, 56, 83 laws, 2, 8, 66

leadership, 5, 15, 50, 63, 69, 71, 74 learning, 8, 47 Lebanon, 76 liberation, 16 linear model, 44 livestock, 82 lobbying, 66 local government, 27, 78 logistics, 49, 65, 77

M machinery, 17 management, 35, 36, 65, 92 Marine Corps, 97 market, 38, 74, 84, 88, 92 markets, 84 mastery, 90 measures, 39, 56, 63, 78 media, 7, 16, 77, 83 median, 82 medical care, 35, 37, 38, 44 men, 19 metaphor, 45 Middle East, 2, 58 military, x, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 34, 38, 39, 48, 49, 56, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 87, 89, 92, 93 military spending, 65 militias, 76 minority, 8, 17 missions, 74 mobility, 68 models, 45, 46 momentum, 70 money, 19, 31, 32, 40, 66, 72 monopoly, 57 morale, 49, 56, 78 movement, 51, 58, 69, 91 multinational corporations, 91 Muslims, 2, 6, 71

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105

Index

N nation, 8, 65, 74 NATO, 4, 18, 19, 21, 83, 93 natural gas, 85 negotiation, 80 network, 1, 58, 63 New York Stock Exchange, 58 nodes, 40, 68, 72, 75, 88 North Korea, 2

O open markets, 84 Organization of American States, 91

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P Pacific, 81 pain, 5 Pakistan, 17, 18, 57, 63, 71, 72 Pashtun, 17, 58 passive, 78 pathogens, 87 peacekeeping, 58, 73 per capita income, 82 perceptions, 75 permit, 76 perseverance, 7 Persian Gulf, 2 personality, 15 planning, 4, 26, 32, 40, 54, 58, 70, 72, 86 plants, 17, 46 police, 6, 18, 53, 55, 58, 78 political parties, 91 political power, 16 politics, x, 8, 65, 89, 91 poor, 48, 74, 92 population, 2, 8, 16, 19, 21, 38, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63, 64, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86 population density, 82 ports, 73 potato, 46

poverty, 19, 21, 82 poverty line, 82 power, 2, 16, 19, 20, 21, 27, 31, 33, 40, 43, 66, 69, 72, 76, 77, 79, 80, 84, 85, 90 praxis, 97 prayer, 46 prediction, 86 pressure, 17, 32, 39, 56, 62, 78, 79, 91 pressure groups, 91 prestige, 53, 54 prices, 19 prisoners, 16, 18, 35, 37, 51 prisoners of war, 35, 37 private sector, 6 probability, 83 production, 10, 19, 20, 34, 83, 85 program, 6, 11, 22, 66 proliferation, 64 propaganda, 49, 50, 74 prophylaxis, 87 public affairs, 75 public domain, 67 public opinion, 7, 14 public service, 49 public support, 9, 74 pulse, 83, 84, 85

Q questioning, 6

R radiation, 84, 85, 86, 87 radio, 73 radioactive contamination, 85 radius, 83, 85 rain, 39 range, 14, 25, 51, 65, 81, 85 reading, 34 reality, ix, 1, 31 reasoning, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 90 reception, 87 recognition, 70

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106

Index

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reconstruction, 85 recovery, 65, 83, 84, 87, 88 recruiting, 18 refugee camps, 77 refugees, 16, 77 regulations, 37, 65, 66 relationship, 18, 40 relationships, 40, 75 religion, 7 repair, 48 reserves, 6 resistance, 15, 70, 72, 79 resolution, 65 resources, x, 16, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 43, 47, 49, 52, 60, 70, 75, 77, 78, 81, 87, 90 retention, 6 rhetoric, 70, 75 risk, 15, 20, 71, 78, 86 routing, 87 rubber, 3 rule of law, 20, 38 rural areas, 38

S sabotage, 49 Saddam Hussein, 2 safety, x, 5, 89 sales, 82 sample, 24, 44, 60 sampling, 86 sanctions, 2, 34, 65 sanctuaries, 16 Saudi Arabia, 58, 63, 71, 72 scarce resources, 35 school, 15, 87 search, 50, 86, 87 security, 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 57, 69, 73, 74, 91 Senate, 67, 68 September 11, 72 sewage, 16 shelter, 78, 84, 86, 87 shoot, 51, 54, 70 short supply, 50

signals, 69 skills, 32, 50, 71, 90 skin, 85 smoke, 86 social movements, 91 software, 2 Somalia, 58, 72, 73 Southeast Asia, 71 Soviet Union, 83 span of control, 75 species, 81 spectrum, 91 speech, 20 speed, 5, 69 stages, 83, 84 standards, 90 starvation, 72 steel, 15 stock, 38, 82 stomach, 7, 80 storage, 84 strategies, 6, 9, 14, 23, 25, 35, 59, 60, 69, 83 strength, 44, 69 stress, 6, 10, 49, 78, 88 success rate, 6 sugar, 82 sugarcane, 82 suicide, 6, 21, 48, 64, 84, 88 suicide bombers, 84, 88 Sunnis, 48, 53 superiority, 74, 76 supply, 85 suppression, 69 surprise, 69, 70 survivability, 50 survival, 10, 56, 87 survivors, 84 suspects, 58, 83 sustainability, 83 symptom, 87 Syria, 71, 76 system analysis, 43

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107

Index

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T tactics, ix, x, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, 35, 42, 43, 44, 49, 52, 59, 60, 68, 69, 71, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 88, 89, 90 Taiwan, 2, 93 talent, 10 Taliban, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 58 tanks, 48 Tanzania, 57 targets, 2, 17, 19, 49, 50, 51, 77, 79 teachers, 93 team members, 69 temperature, 82 territory, 17, 24, 37, 57, 70 terrorism, vii, x, 1, 2, 4, 55, 65, 89 theft, 86 therapy, 88 thinking, ix, x, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 35, 44, 45, 52, 68, 89, 93 Third World, 9 threat, 19, 87, 91 threats, 2, 10, 13, 19, 39, 57, 70, 76, 86 tinnitus, 88 tourism, 82 trade, 18, 19, 20, 21, 83 traffic, 16, 48, 82, 84, 86, 88 training, 6, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, 51, 70, 71, 72, 76, 92 transparency, 8 transportation, 68, 74, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88 transportation infrastructure, 85 trauma, 87

U UN, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 83 uncertainty, 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 20, 25 United Nations, 58, 72, 91 United States, 2, 9, 10, 65, 97, 99 uranium, 83 urban areas, 16, 49, 73

V values, 3, 37 variables, 7 vehicles, 33, 34, 42, 49, 50, 51, 79, 85, 88 venue, 88 Venus, 45, 46 vertigo, 88 victimization, 70 victims, 84, 88 Vietnam, 9 violence, 8, 18, 48, 57, 58, 71 viruses, 2 vision, 71 voice, 72 vulnerability, 74

W walking, 46, 87 war, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 18, 37, 57 warlords, 20 watches, 30 Waziristan, 58 weakness, 16, 70 weapons, 2, 16, 17, 33, 48, 51, 64, 69, 70, 76, 77 weapons of mass destruction, 64 wear, 2, 78 websites, 2 windows, 51 withdrawal, 50, 51, 54, 57, 73, 80 women, 3, 74 women’s groups, 91 workers, 73, 86, 87 World Bank, 58 writing, 32, 35, 91, 92

Y Yemen, 58

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