Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Assessing Domestic and International Strategies 9780228000600

Table of contents :
Cover
Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism
Title
Copyright
Contents
Figures and Table
Preface
Abbreviations
PART ONE | State of the Field
Introduction Violent Extremism: Countering the Threat at Home and Abroad
1 Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists: Distinguishing between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters
2 Can Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? Should Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism?
PART TWO | CVE in the Canadian Context
3 Anger in the Peaceable Kingdom: An Overview of Canada’s Violent Extremist History
4 An Analytic Survey of the Canadian Academic Literature on Religion, Radicalization, and Terrorism
5 Incorporating Community Perspectives in CVE and Community-based Policing Strategies
PART THREE | International Models and Lessons
6 The Nature and Extent of Countering Violent Extremism in the United Kingdom
7 The Danish Model to Countering Violent Extremism: A Critical Assessment of a “Soft” Model
8 The Challenges of Evaluating Attitudinal Change: A Case Study of the Effectiveness of International Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs
Conclusion: The Next Wave of Canadian CVE
Contributors
Index

Citation preview

Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies Series editors: Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger, Pierre Jolicoeur, and Stéfanie von Hlatky Books published in the Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies series offer fresh perspectives on foreign affairs and global governance. Titles in the series illuminate critical issues of global security in the twenty-first century and emphasize the human dimensions of war such as the health and well-being of soldiers, the factors that influence operational effectiveness, the civil-military relations and decisions on the use of force, as well as the ethical, moral, and legal ramifications of ongoing conflicts and wars. Foreign policy is also analyzed both in terms of its impact on human rights and the role the public plays in shaping policy directions. With a strong focus on definitions of security, the series encourages discussion of contemporary security challenges and welcomes works that focus on issues including human security, violent conflict, terrorism, military cooperation, and foreign and defence policy. This series is published in collaboration with Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada with the Centre for International and Defence Policy, the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, and the Centre for Security, Armed Forces, and Society. 1 Going to War? Trends in Military Interventions Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky and H. Christian Breede

6 Violence and Militants From Ottoman Rebellions to Jihadist Organizations Baris Cayli

2 Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians France’s Response to Terrorism Christophe Chowanietz

7 Frontline Justice The Evolution and Reform of Summary Trials in the Canadian Armed Forces Pascal Lévesque

3 War Memories Commemoration, Recollections, and Writings on War Edited by Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger and Renée Dickason 4 Disarmament under International Law John Kierulf 5 Contract Workers, Risk, and the War in Iraq Sierra Leonean Labor Migrants at US Military Bases Kevin J.A. Thomas

8 Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Assessing Domestic and International Strategies Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky

Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Assessing Domestic and International Strategies

Edited by

Stéfanie von Hlatky

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2019 isbn 978-0-7735-5935-6 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-5936-3 (paper) isbn 978-0-2280-0060-0 (epdf) isbn 978-0-2280-0061-7 (epub) Legal deposit first quarter 2020 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Countering violent extremism and terrorism : assessing domestic and international strategies / edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky. Names: Von Hlatky, Stéfanie, 1982- editor. Series: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 8. Description: Series statement: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 8 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20190199261 | Canadiana (ebook) 20190199288 | isbn 9780773559356 (cloth) | isbn 9780773559363 (paper) | isbn 9780228000600 (epdf) | isbn 9780228000617 (epub) Subjects: lcsh: Terrorism—Canada—Prevention. | lcsh: Radicalism— Canada—Prevention. | lcsh: National security—Canada. | lcsh: Security, International. Classification: lcc hv6433.c3 c68 2019 | ddc 363.325/170971—dc23

Contents

Figures and Table | vii Preface | ix Abbreviations | xi

PA RT O N E | State of the Field Introduction Violent Extremism: Countering the Threat at Home and Abroad | 3 Stéfanie von Hlatky 1 Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists: Distinguishing between

Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters | 18 Christian Leuprecht, David B. Skillicorn, and Clark McCauley 2 Can Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? Should

Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? | 47 David Eisenman, Steve Weine, and Myrna Lashley

PA RT T W O | CVE in the Canadian Context 3 Anger in the Peaceable Kingdom: An Overview of Canada’s

Violent Extremist History | 67 Robert Martyn

vi

Contents

4 An Analytic Survey of the Canadian Academic Literature

on Religion, Radicalization, and Terrorism | 91 Ali Dizboni 5 Incorporating Community Perspectives in CVE and

Community-based Policing Strategies | 107 Tabasum Akseer

PA RT TH R E E | International Models and Lessons 6 The Nature and Extent of Countering Violent Extremism

in the United Kingdom | 127 Tahir Abbas 7 The Danish Model to Countering Violent Extremism:

A Critical Assessment of a “Soft” Model | 142 Rolf Holmboe 8 The Challenges of Evaluating Attitudinal Change: A Case

Study of the Effectiveness of International Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs | 160 Patrick O’Halloran Conclusion: The Next Wave of Canadian CVE | 181 Nora Abdelrahman Ibrahim Contributors | 199 Index | 205

Figures and Table

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2

The opinion pyramid | 30 The action pyramid | 31 Possible distribution of acceptance | 36 Ensuring conditions for public health | 50 Four-tiered model for public health prevention of violent extremism | 55 3.1 Trajectory of radicalization | 69

Table 2.1 Public health prevention models for pve | 59

Preface

The concept for this book evolved as a lot of changes were happening in Canada and on the global stage. Internationally, the fight against terrorism was delivering decisive victories in Iraq and Syria, and, after peaking in 2014, terrorist attacks globally finally seemed to be declining. In Canada, the policy landscape was maturing, with the launch of the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. On the research front, the Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence made its Community Resilience Fund available to grow the evidence and partnership base for sound policymaking at all levels of governance. Still, the policy focus at home and the actions that Canada deploys abroad are related but distinct spheres of activity. They intersect on the issue of foreign fighters, for example, but in terms of expertise, there seems to be a divide between the home and away game. Through a series of workshops and meetings convened by the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, the goal was to bring academics and practitioners from both spheres to collaborate on a common research project. The participants collectively developed their research questions, assessed the available evidence, and then grappled with the difficulty of formulating clear policy recommendations given the many failures of past policy efforts, as well as the faulty assumptions that continue to plague debates about radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. When visiting the breakout rooms where our participants were tackling our agreed upon problem sets, it got loud sometimes. I was witnessing the positive, electric energy of experts from different fields and backgrounds who recognized a rare opportunity for joint problem solving.

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Preface

With participants from government (Global Affairs, Public Safety, and the Department of National Defence), law enforcement, the private sector, civil society organizations, and academia, it was a diverse group. The participation of junior scholars also much enhanced the experience. I have to acknowledge one of these rising stars right off the bat as Nora Ibrahim, who was instrumental during each phase as the coordinator for this project. She is also a contributor in this volume. I am also grateful for the participants who travelled from the United States, the UK, Europe, and Australia to participate in the main workshop, as Kingston is not always easy to get to, but the international case studies and best practices shared proved invaluable to our discussions and to this volume. I would also like to thank Maureen Bartram from the Centre for International and Defence Policy and to acknowledge the generous funding provided by the Community Resilience Fund, administered by Public Safety Canada. Brett Kubicek and Andrew Ashkewe offered useful guidance all along this journey. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council provided additional funding for this effort. Our team of researchers, including Tabasum Akseer (see chapter 5), Assim Chaudhary, Dantae Gagnier, Alex Green, Sanam Skinner, Dana O’Shea, Landon Wilcock, and James Anderson were remarkable in the insights they provided to this project. Special thanks to Alexander Mirza who provided additional advice from an industry perspective. As always, my family provided constant support and levity throughout this project, so I send my love to Phil, Ian, and Zac. Stéfanie von Hlatky Kingston, May 2019

Abbreviations

Canada Centre contest crv cse csis ct cve isis pve rcmp

Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence UK National Counterterrorism Strategy Countering Radicalization To Violence Communications Security Establishment Canadian Security Intelligence Service Counterterrorism Countering Violent Extremism Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Preventing Violent Extremism Royal Canadian Mounted Police

PA RT O N E

State of the Field

Introduction Violent Extremism: Countering the Threat at Home and Abroad stéfanie von hl atky

The threat of global terrorism has been a constant source of concern for Canada, especially after 9/11. In recent years, the threat has mutated in response to domestic and international developments: terrorist recruitment is now ubiquitous on social media, and states have had to grapple with foreign fighters (and their return), as they have confronted the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis).1 Yet Canada has either not been a major target for terrorism or has proven effective at preventing attacks on its soil, when compared with other Western countries. By contrast, there has been a substantial increase in terrorist incidents globally since 9/11, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, though deaths from terrorism peaked in 2014.2 Still, the Canadian government continues to invest stunning sums of money to counter radicalization to violence and terrorism.3 And, as Frank Harvey notes, the more the Canadian government spends on security, the more citizens have expectations of “perfect security.”4 For the Canadian public, perhaps the most visible response to terrorism, especially against well-known groups such as al-Qaeda or isis, has been a military one. Military intervention is part of the toolkit known as counterterrorism (ct), which is supported by multilateral diplomacy, sanctions, the targeting of terrorist financing, and global intelligence sharing. Domestically, countries like Canada and its closest allies have tried to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism to curb the recruitment of its citizens by extremist groups and has boosted security and intelligence assets to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring on its soil. Community

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resilience has also been a major focus. This multipronged strategy of radicalization prevention combined with an enhanced security infrastructure is what has emerged as the dominant approach to countering violent extremism (cve), which the Canadian government has redubbed countering radicalization to violence (crv). These domestic and international responses have evolved quite independently, largely due to how governments divide up the labour for those tasks. While some governments have designed coordinating bodies to better integrate domestic and international programs geared toward the threat of violent extremism, others have opted for a very decentralized model. What is common between most countries’ approaches, however, is that the management of cve and ct is a multilevel governance challenge with complex policy implications.

From Conceptual to Action-Oriented Research Beyond the above conceptual clarifications, the literature acknowledges that it is hard not to conflate violent extremism with terrorism.5 Hard because these terms are often used interchangeably and hard because of measurement issues. Crafting an appropriate response to violent extremism and terrorism, both at home and abroad, has proven elusive for governments and international organizations. Terrorism is but one manifestation of violent extremism and is linked to a presumed higher level of political agency and the intent to provoke mass anxiety amongst the targeted population. This is achieved through the means of violent acts, which undermine people’s confidence in the ability of their government to protect them. Violent extremism is thus the broader, more inclusive term. As Jason-Leigh Striegher notes, “An individual who justifies the use of violence in pursuit of ideological goals, typically does this once they have moved through a process of radicalization that leads to the adoption of [violent extremism] as an ideology; where terrorism is solely the act of violence carried out in pursuit of these goals.”6 One could argue that the distinction between the two terms, violent extremism and terrorism, becomes clearer when looking at the responses. Indeed, ct has become associated with more lethal or coercive approaches to tackling the threat of violent extremism, such as military intervention.

Introduction

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cve efforts, in contrast, emphasize prevention and resilience a lot more. This volume embraces the fuzziness of those boundaries in order to question the chasm that has emerged in government responses along the cve and ct continuum but also to survey international best practices, free of conceptual or programmatic confines. The purpose of this volume is to identify persistent challenges for cve and ct and to provide analysis from a variety of academic and professional perspectives. The goal is to bridge the gap between the global research community, which features extensive studies on cve and ct from a variety of angles (the nature of the threat, the responses, the societal effects, etc.), and practitioners, who are tasked with the everyday implementation and delivery of these programs. The book also addresses the persistent problem of program evaluation by looking into case studies and grappling with definitional and measurement issues, in order to inform the policy discussion on success metrics that can be used by current and future stakeholders of cve and ct initiatives. The introduction and the contributions included in this volume have focused on a number of key questions to build on the academic and policy debates that have emerged around the themes of cve and ct: What are the conceptual and practical links between radicalization and terrorism? More specifically, how do cve and ct fit into conceptions of national and international security? What kinds of relationships should be fostered between governments and various government and non-government stakeholders? Have government programs and other initiatives been successful? How can we evaluate the success of existing programs? Should models be borrowed from other fields, such as the public health model, and adapted to tackle violent extremism? In addition to government actors, who are the best partners for cve and ct? Is it possible to build multistakeholder programs, involving law enforcement, civil society, and communities? Is this model viable domestically and internationally? The research developed for and presented in this volume offers a unique perspective on the state of the field in cve and ct, drawing in both Canadian

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and international perspectives. Specifically, it provides key insights from a variety of government pilot programs to identify best practices and lessons learned, as well as highlight key areas of focus moving forward, in addition to formulating policy recommendations that can improve current cve and ct initiatives. This introduction is meant to frame the central contributions made by the authors in the following chapters. This volume aims to critically assess the current state of the cve and ct fields, while calling attention to challenges that continue to bedevil ongoing initiatives. The book also seeks to identify successful international cve and ct approaches to inform Canadian policies and programs. Indeed, the inclusion of case studies from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the United States offer some interesting avenues for innovation.

Research Strategy By way of background information, it is worth noting in this introductory chapter that the research strategy chosen by the contributors is articulated around a common theoretical approach and methodology, based on the concept of “communities of practice.”7 First coined by Wenger and applied to security studies by Adler, a community of practice is a “like-minded group of practitioners who are formally as well as contextually bound by a common interest in learning and applying a common practice.”8 What ties members together is not the pursuit of a common political or ideological goal, but rather a set of practices that provide, “socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.”9 Since the volume emerged as the culmination of a multistakeholder project, these common understandings were both confirmed and strengthened through workshops and meetings with participants from different professional backgrounds but still with a common knowledge base. Indeed, communities of practice take shape through common learning experiences that allow members to share knowledge and develop professional standards. Learning can be promoted in virtual contexts, facilitated by online collaborative tools, or in real-life contexts, such as fieldwork or

Introduction

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classrooms.10 In this case, the program objectives were codeveloped and refined through consultations and requests for feedback. Though this process was led by the academic participants, the exchanges with collaborators from civil society, government, the military, and law enforcement correspond to a robust common learning experience. The community of cve and ct practitioners has expanded substantially since 9/11, and there is an increasing willingness to reach across disciplinary and professional boundaries. As a result, the conversations were characteristically multidisciplinary in nature, and the chapters, taken as a whole, are an example of analytically eclectic research articulated around overlapping questions and methodological challenges.11 This interactive dimension to the project is consistent with the practice “turn” in security studies, whereby our research strategy is to analyze what practitioners do rather than what they think or what they ought to do. But we also adopt a proactive methodology, in that we seek to foster a community of shared practice on the basis of existing, but disparate and sometimes contradictory, security performances in and around the cve and ct fields. Part of the shared pool of knowledge includes observation and data collected through interviews and fieldwork, conducted by individual researchers and practitioners. This is an inductive approach to look at concrete actors and community-level stakeholders engaged in the implementation of cve or ct programs. Researchers use process tracing to capture these interactions as they unfold and try to objectify practices that result from patterns of interaction.12 The workshops and meetings which produced this edited collection correspond to a more objectified form of observation. That involves getting stakeholders together with scholars in order to share experiences and exchange knowledge about the concrete social interactions that they have had to face in the field. This step serves two purposes. First, we compare the findings from research conducted by scholars to identify patterns of action in the cve and ct space. Using a comparative approach, these patterns are then checked against geographical, political, and institutional settings and across multiple levels of governance. This allows us to test the external validity of the observations made by researchers. Second, through these repeated interactions, stakeholders and scholars are immersed in a common learning experience to situate the meanings and background knowledge

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upon which their work is based, share information about the practices they deploy, and ultimately develop professional standards. This feedback allows our research framework to adapt and evolve in sync with the feedback and “real-life” experiences of the practitioners who participated in our workshops and meetings.

Desecuritizing Program Delivery With the abovementioned strategy, there are noteworthy points of dissonance that emerged from bringing together this community of practice. Confronting scholarly knowledge to the world of practice yielded some important insights on securitization. The community of practice that emerged, for the most part, belonged to the category of “security experts.” They were security studies scholars, members of government from Public Safety, Global Affairs Canada, or the Department of National Defence, as well as law enforcement, with local, provincial, and federal police representatives. The participants coming to the table with a different lens were the communitylevel civil society stakeholders who challenged the others to rethink the security framework through which ct and cve initiatives are deployed. The common question that emerged was about how to avoid the perception of a “securitized” program both at home and abroad, which would undermine the trust and “buy in” incentive of communities, which is essential for successful program delivery. Indeed, this resonated with law enforcement practitioners, who experienced community-level backlash when rolling out programs that were deemed too securitized. This realization is echoed in Tabasum Akseer’s chapter which refers to a “chilling effect” among Muslim communities targeted by government and law enforcement programs that were intended to build trust but had counterproductive effects instead. Through discussions, there was a recognition that government and law enforcement actors were not always a credible voice to reach their intended audiences when implementing communitylevel programs to prevent radicalization and extremism. This is further reflected in the critical security studies literature, which has long problematized the securitization of government programs to counter violent extremism and terrorism.13 The media and politicians also participate in

Introduction

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the securitization of prevention efforts with “fear-mongering” rhetoric, though the discourse surrounding cve and ct efforts has noticeably improved over the years. With this observation in mind, an intuitive policy recommendation is to increase the involvement of civil society and community-based groups to help desecuritize programming surrounding ct and cve and help mediate concerns emerging from targeted communities. While some observers have called for greater involvement by civil society in the development of cve policy and programs, there are good reasons for why this has not happened systematically.14 First, many civil society organizations have hesitations about collaborating with government, law enforcement, or intelligence agencies. The trademark of many of these organizations is their perceived independence and ability to criticize government free of pressure. Collaborating directly with governments then poses a dilemma, as some organizations would see their independence compromised through direct collaboration with, or by receiving funding from, government. The participation of civil society organizations in cve could, however, bring more legitimacy to current approaches, not to mention improve responsiveness.15 In a similar vein, other experts have called for greater collaboration between the public and private sectors to desecuritize efforts to prevent and respond to violent extremism and terrorism. It is clear that the threat of violent extremism and terrorism has impacted businesses all over the world, which are very focused on being prepared to handle incidents, such as those that happened at the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai or the Charlie Hebdo offices and Bataclan concert hall in Paris. Quick recovery and resilience are other central concerns, as businesses are focused on shortening the disruptive impact of incidents on their activities.16 Company leaders have also expressed their apprehensions publicly, like the CEO of Siemens, Joe Kaeser, who said, “the biggest concern is the fallout from the geopolitics distress. And people who are not in a good mood are not going to invest. Because investing is about believing about looking forward about the future.”17 In the push for “soft power” approaches, some experts have suggested investing in resilience-building strategies. Different from preventive approaches, resilience models are about better preparing and equipping societies to recover more quickly when violent incidents do occur.18 There is an acknowledgement that violent extremism is unlikely to disappear as a social

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or security problem and that a fruitful approach is to better withstand those shocks, minimizing the impact factor of violent extremism. Resiliencefocused approaches are strongly reliant on government support for their execution but with the right partnerships could prove sustainable. In fact, this is another key lesson learned from the literature, namely that better engagement between policymakers, academics, and practitioners is needed to design and field test new models.19 Gathering the right evidence and evaluating programs more systematically is best done with a community of practice that can be responsive and provide meaningful feedback when new strategies are tabled. Strengthening resilience can be achieved by sharing some of the responsibility for emergency preparedness and risk management and creating, for example, partnerships with businesses and communities.20 While the few points of dissonance amongst participants were instructive, it is also worth highlighting the areas where there was a strong consensus. The group recognized that, though the world of policy and practice had focused a lot on addressing the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism to curb recruitment to extremist groups, this approach was becoming stale as the evidence accumulated over the years did not reveal clear linear pathways to radicalization, which is the focus of the next section.21 The other area of strong consensus related to measurement as formal program evaluation methodologies remains lacking, complicating the policymaking process in this area.22 Finally, in comparing cve and ct, what becomes apparent is that there has been a fragmentation between the home and away games, as hinted to before.23 One particular gap has been in the literature that bridges cve and ct, as well as global cve responses.24 Both cve and ct are areas where multinational cooperation is absolutely necessary for success, yet the mechanisms through which this takes place have not received as much scholarly attention as other areas of inquiry. This is no longer sustainable given the transnational and deterritorialized nature of terrorist organizations and other extremist groups.25 What emerges is a picture where the actors that are internationally focused – like Global Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Armed Forces – have little to do with the domestically focused agencies such as Public Safety, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

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Moving Away from the Causal Model As hinted to above, this section homes in on the question of measurement. One of the main findings from the literature on ct and global cve is the lack of evidence to show that international initiatives and interventions have been successful.26 As global trends show, terrorist incidents have been on the rise since 9/11, peaking in 2014 after a dramatic rise in attacks carried out by isis, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, among others. While military intervention and drone strikes can disrupt terrorist activities, these do nothing to address the root causes of terrorism, which have more to do with bad governance and lack of opportunities for youth.27 For example, the Global Coalition Against Daesh has been successful in destroying isis enclaves in Iraq and Syria, but what can prevent the resurgence of other terrorist groups once military victory is achieved?28 As retired General David Petraeus said when testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the fight against Daesh, “the reality is that the challenges in Iraq are neither purely political nor purely military. They are both … What is required therefore is an integrated civil–military plan in which diplomatic and military lines of effort are coordinated to reinforce each other.”29 Furthermore, extremist narratives, which incite violence, continue to proliferate online and terrorist organizations can continue to recruit and shift their tactics so as not to provoke military responses, prompting experts to refer to groups like isis as hybrid threats.30 The indicators of success for law enforcement, intelligence, and military responses to terrorism have been focused on the number of arrests, number of terrorists killed, or even dollars spent. This type of approach can be counterproductive, as the money spent can appear wasteful when concrete results continue to elude governments. Moreover, the civilian casualties and collateral damage that accompany targeted killings or airstrikes are used by extremists, who can leverage the outrage of local populations when recruiting for their cause.31 Identifying and measuring short- and long-term outcomes has proven decidedly more difficult. The concept of cve was meant to focus on the causes of violent extremism rather than its most visible manifestation – terrorist actions. By better understanding the process of radicalization, the promise of cve was to study

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underlying grievances and causal pathways or trends that might be identified from those studies. This phase of cve research led to the conclusion that such causal patterns do not exist.32 The radicalization process is simply not linear and, as the stories of jihadis returning home demonstrate, the individual triggers of violent extremism can be quite different from one case to the next.33 It is therefore not possible to suggest that certain individuals might be “prone” to radicalization. If the path to radicalization is unpredictable, then, how can governments and international organizations design policies and programs that are preventive? The first possible answer, based on the preceding discussion, is to avoid coercive or kinetic solutions, especially if the risk of collateral damage or civilian casualties is present (which is almost always for ct). War and targeted killings can trigger underlying grievances and create new ones – that much is intuitive but also made apparent in the propagandist materials of terrorist groups. While this logic is compelling, it is also difficult to achieve in practice as politicians are urged to “do something” when terrorist attacks occur. Therefore, in France just like in Egypt, governments have approved retaliatory strikes after terrorist attacks to abate public outcries or simply stave off perceptions of inaction or ineffectiveness.34 Other approaches have focused not on addressing the root causes but on prevention understood as the early identification of violent extremists. Is it possible to reliably identify “early warning indicators” of violent extremism or terrorism? In intelligence, this method is “intended to integrate information and analysis supplied by a multidisciplinary, interagency team to provide early warning of potential threats.”35 This body of work has focused on intelligence but also on community-based models of intervention that saw law enforcement and intelligence agencies cooperating to stop extremism in communities by gaining the trust of local stakeholders and urging them to speak out if they notice unusual behaviours. The problem with this approach has been the targeting of certain communities and not of others. In this phase of cve, certain communities were stigmatized, especially Muslim communities, who were targeted by community engagement programs, fostering unanticipated unease.36 The picture is not all grim, however. The case study chapters presented by Tahir Abbas and Rolf Holmboe, for example, show how programs have adapted to failure and how more recent policy innovation has yielded pos-

Introduction

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itive results. While it is always challenging to assess the significance of shortterm policy changes to outcomes that are sought over the long term, there is an emerging trend in mindset that is palpable in cve and ct communities of practice, namely that violent extremism is a social problem, not just a threat, and that much can be gained from taking an ideologically agnostic approach in government policies and responses.37

Conclusion In the academic community and in government, there is often a gap between those who study responses to terrorism internationally and those who study extremism and radicalization at the national level. While the two naturally intersect, and indeed many academics and practitioners are active in both spaces, there is an undeniable analytical and practical segmentation between cve and ct approaches. This volume focuses less on breaking down those boundaries than on ignoring them, bringing in scholars and experts from various professional backgrounds and levels of governance, from the grassroots level to civil servants involved in international program delivery. This volume also demonstrates that it is fruitful to compare national perspectives to understand differences and nuances when comparing cve and ct strategies and programs. While the contributors in this volume recognize that program evaluation has been elusive, a push toward more qualitative indicators and best practices is challenging the causal, quantitative models that were privileged in the past. Individual case studies, especially cases of success and failure, were particularly instructive. The volume has thus included international perspectives to inform future Canadian programming in the cve and ct space. Finally, the substantive contributions of this volume are manifold. The chapters offer balance when it comes to paying attention to different phases of the cve cycle. Intervention has received a lot of attention and increased prevention, resilience, and rehabilitation programming appears as a welcome shift in emphasis. The authors also point to the importance of training and education as a strategy to shape the cve environment across stakeholder groups. The public health model, discussed in chapter 9, is a case in point.

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The book is organized into three sections. The first section offers a state of the field, with chapters from Christian Leuprecht, David Skillicorn, and Clark McCauley, as well as David Eisenman, Steve Weine, and Myrna Lashley. The second section discusses the Canadian context, with chapters from Robert Martyn, Ali Dizboni, and Tabasum Akseer. The third and final section introduces international models and lessons learned, with chapters from Tahir Abbas, Rolf Holmboe, and Patrick O’Halloran. The strong message that emerges from our collection of chapters is that the stakes are high: the post-9/11 period has been characterized by policy approaches that rested on faulty assumptions, sometimes leading to counterproductive outcomes. With the knowledge- and experience-base of almost two decades of intense cve and ct activities, identifying where governments can do better is an urgent task.

n otes 1 Marry Anne Weaver, “Her Majesty’s Jihadists,” New York Times Magazine, 14 April 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-jihadists .html?_r=2. 2 “Global Terrorism Index,” Institute for Economics and Peace (2018), 15. 3 Public Safety Canada, 2019. 2019–2020 Report on Plans and Priorities. 4 Frank P. Harvey, “The Homeland Security Dilemma: Imagination, Failure and the Escalating Costs of Perfect Security,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (2007): 283–316; Frank P. Harvey, The Homeland Security Dilemma: Fear, Failure, and the Future of American Insecurity (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2008). 5 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Countering Violent Extremism: What Are the Key Challenges for un?” International Peace Institute, 5 November 2015, www. theglobalobservatory.org/2015/11/countering-violent-extremism-unitednations-ban-ki-moon/. 6 Jason-Leigh Striegher, “Violent-Extremism: An Examination of a Definitional Dilemma,” 2015, http://ro.ecu.edu.au/asi/47/, 75. 7 This research strategy was initially codeveloped and tested through another project with Frédéric Mérand. It was successfully replicated here, with a new set of policy challenges and stakeholders.

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8 Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Emmanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and nato’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230. 9 Emmanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds., International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 10 Wenger, Communities of Practice. 11 Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 411–31. 12 Vincent Pouliot, “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007): 359–84. 13 See chapter 5. 14 Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi, and Carmen Jacques, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism 10, no. 1 (2015): 3–13. 15 Ibid. 16 Andrew Walker, “Paris attacks: Assessing the economic impact,” bbc News, 2 December 2015, www.bbc.com/news/business-34965000. 17 Ibid. 18 The research on resilience is broader, including how communities respond to a range of traumatic events, from terrorism to mass disasters and epidemics. Sonny S. Patel et al., “What Do We Mean by ‘Community Resilience’? A Systematic Literature Review of How It Is Defined in the Literature,” plos Currents Disasters (February 2017). 19 Larry Brooks, Sara K. Thompson, and Daniel Hiebert, Policy Brief: On the Creation of the Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-radicalization Coordinator (tsas, 2016), www.tsas.bronze.it.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/02/PolicyPaper_CVE_Finalversion.pdf. 20 Tami Amanda Jacoby, “How the War Was ‘One’: Countering Violent Extremism and the Social Dimensions of Counter-Terrorism in Canada,” Journal for Deradicalization 6 (2016): 290–1. 21 Sara Zeiger and Anne Aly, eds., Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an Evidence-base for Policy and Practice (Perth: Curtin University, 2015).

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22 See chapter 7. See also: Caitlin Mastroe and Susan Szmania, “Surveying cve Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs,” Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security (College Park: start, 2016). 23 John Gearson and Hugo Rosemont, “contest as Strategy: Reassessing Britain’s Counterterrorism Approach,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 1 (2015): 1038–64. 24 Peter Romaniuk, “Does cve work? Lessons learned from the global effort to counter violent extremism,” Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015). 25 Zakeri Mahdokht, “De-territorialized Phenomenon: isis as a Hybrid Criminal Terrorist Organizations,” Hemispheres 31, no. 1 (2016): 38–45. 26 George Selim, “Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism at Home and Abroad,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no. 1 (2016): 94–101. 27 Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole of Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Journal of Security Studies 3, no. 3 (2014): 471–512. 28 Daesh is another name for isis. The Global Coalition against Daesh is the formal name of this US-led multinational coalition engaged in military operations against isis in Iraq and Syria. 29 Nancy Lindborg and David Rothkopf, “Four Lessons for Fighting ExtremistsWithout Guns,” Foreign Policy, 29 September 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2015/09/29/four-lessons-for-fighting-extremists-without-guns-obamaunited-nations-summit/. 30 Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland, “isis: An Adaptive Threat in Transition,” Small Wars Journal 12, no. 10 (2016): https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ isis-an-adaptive-hybrid-threat-in-transition/. Also see chapter 8. 31 Susannah George, “Mosul is a Graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians,” Associated Press, 21 December 2017. 32 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36. 33 Peter Neumann, Ryan Evans, and Raffello Pantucci, “Locating Al Qaeda’s Center of Gravity: The Role in Middle Managers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 11 (2011): 825–42. 34 Alissa J. Rubin and Anne Barnard, “France Strikes isis Targets in Syria in Retaliation for Attacks,” New York Times, 15 November 2015, https://www.

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nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html. “Egypt bombs IS in Libya after beheadings video”, bbc News, 16 February 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31483631. 35 John P. Sullivan, and James J. Wirtz “Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 1 (2008): 14. 36 Romaniuk, “Does cve Work,” chapter 4. 37 Ibid., chapters 9 and 10.

1 Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists Distinguishing between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters christian leuprecht, david b. skillicorn, and cl ark m c cauley

Who is likely to sympathize with, provide material support for, or actually engage in violent extremism, and why? These have become some of the more pressing security questions of our time. Pragmatically, the questions are made difficult by the small numbers who move to violence, contrasted with the much larger numbers of people in apparently comparable circumstances who exhibit a staunch resilience against radicalization. Simplistic, reductionist, monocausal explanations abound: ideology or religion, relative deprivation, political or social alienation, discrimination, or moral outrage. However, none of these explanations can withstand rigorous empirical scrutiny. Few Muslims actually engage in political violence – and many of those who claim to do so are mere nominal believers or converts; poverty abounds, but political violence does not; feelings of alienation, discrimination, or grievance are common, but political violence is rare. In most democracies, more people get hit by lightning than die of terrorism, and many more people die in car accidents than in terrorist incidents. Yet, security improvements in cars are incremental while the state is expected not just to mitigate but eliminate the risk of terrorism. This is a classic example of “risk society,” where the expectation of the state’s ability to manage risk exceeds its capacity to do so. As a result, security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies in democracies find themselves on a narrow path: if they are perceived as being too aggressive, they are accused of trampling civil

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liberties; if a terrorist attack happens, the same critics quickly accuse them of complacency and ask why more was not done to prevent the carnage. Part of the problem is an inchoate understanding of security in a democracy. Just about everyone has been to school or to a physician, so people have at least a simple experiential understanding of education and health care. Beyond the occasional speeding ticket or passport application, however, the vast majority of citizens have not had much interaction with security agencies. Instead, their perception is skewed by the “Hollywood effect”: crime shows feature police, security agencies, spies, and terrorists who grace “personal opinion with dramatic illustration and thereby giving that opinion apparent authority” – and the criminals are caught.1 Much of the population has a hard time realizing that these shows are fiction, not reality. We invite you to take a simple test: watch any crime show and start counting the legal and constitutional violations. If you know what to look for, you will count up dozens in a matter of minutes. Security forces are also constrained by resources. It takes tens of people to monitor an individual continuously; so, even the largest law enforcement agencies in the world can only monitor a few dozen people at a time. But there are thousands about which security intelligence and law enforcement are concerned: reportedly some 20,500 on France’s terrorism watchlist, the Fichiers de signalements pour la prévention et la radicalisation à caractère terroriste (fsprt) – twice as many now as in the aftermath of the Paris attacks of 2015 – of whom as many as half are cause for serious concern.2 The difficulty for security forces is finding the needle in the haystack: the one among thousands who will act. How, then, are security officials to optimize the allocation of resources in fighting both extremist ideas and extremist violence? Real or perceived terrorist attacks at home or abroad foster a public perception that the issue of radicalization is far more pervasive and threatening than it actually is. Political leaders and the media cycle seize on the more sensational cases, which by their nature have gone too far for intervention but provide an opportunity for a sound bite or media clip. In Western democracies violent extremism remains rare and should not be confounded with larger-scale radicalization of opinion. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and cyberattacks, radicalization to violence is not a major, let alone existential, threat in democratic countries and, statistically

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at least, ranks well below many more pressing issues for local authorities and community leaders. In the democratic West, recent jihadist (al-Qaeda and the more apocalyptic and caliphate-driven Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or isis) terrorism has largely been carried out by second- and third-generation citizens or permanent legal residents of immigrant origin who appear to become radicalized and form operational groups in a largely bottom-up fashion. Such homegrown (often “lone wolf ”) terrorism poses a more difficult security challenge than “conventional” Islamist terrorism. Since there is little that distinguishes homegrown terrorists from their surrounding community until an attack is imminent, the time between group coalescence and attacks has often been short, and lone wolves can act without any group interaction. Many drivers for such bottom-up radicalization have been posited:3 a sense of alienation in a non-Islamic society, grievance about Western foreign policies, economic marginalization, superficial knowledge of Islam, and even a desire for status and excitement in otherwise boring lives. Some common patterns have also been noted,4 such as the presence of a local, charismatic figure who acts as a mentor and travel to a region where Muslims are perceived to be threatened and victimized. Models based on these drivers have been used tactically by law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies to focus resources on the groups and individuals that present the greatest risk and by governments, in more abstract ways, in an effort to reduce the drivers that create radicalized individuals in the first place. The objective of this chapter is to clarify common misperceptions about terrorism and how to prevent it. Since 9/11, governments have become especially concerned about “radicalization”; so, the first section will demystify the common adulteration of this concept. The second section frames common research questions and problems. Short of understanding why people feel the way they do, the third section prods the reader to ask (1) whether there is a structure to the attitudes that “radicals” hold, (2) what is the relationship that emerges from that structure, and (3) what are its broader policy implications. To promote a better grasp of how to parse policy approaches to this subject, subsequent sections take up the problem of countering the narrative of global jihad by positing a pyramid model that distinguishes between action and opinion, and the implications that follow.

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Operationalizing the Concept of “Radicalization” With experience and research showing that radicalization of opinion seldom leads to violence and that there is no single path for radicalization to violence, framing the problem is a fundamental challenge. In the vernacular, the concept of “radicalization” has been reduced to a pejorative catchall that is equated with terrorism: all radicals are terrorists, and all terrorists are radicalized. This adulteration of the concept is empirically false: in fact, all terrorist are radical, but most radicals are not terrorists. Conceptual clarity matters. Radicalization is generally understood as a change in beliefs, feelings, and actions towards increased support for one side of an intergroup conflict. By this definition, for instance, women who pushed for the extension of the franchise were radicalized, so was the government of the United States after 9/11. Radicalization per se, then, is not necessarily problematic. Instead, this chapter is concerned with a particular kind of radicalization in which individuals sympathize with, justify, or participate in politically motivated violence against a state or its citizens. Activism – legal and nonviolent political action – differs from radicalism – illegal political action.5 Only some radical activity is violent and, of that, terrorism is the extreme radical activity that targets civilians. The relation between activism and radicalism is an issue of considerable practical importance for security forces. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest a “conveyor belt” from Muslim activism to jihadi radicalism, a metaphor suggesting that extreme opinions bring individuals to activism, and frustrated activism then leads inexorably to radicalism. This chapter rejects the conveyor belt metaphor and distinguishes among three levels of radicalization of individuals based on actions: They engage in politically motivated violence (“terrorists”); They engage in nonviolent but illegal political actions such as financial support for terrorists (“radicals”); or They engage in legal political actions such as protest meetings (“activists”).

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The boundaries between these categories of action are objective, since a given individual has or has not protested, engaged in illegal acts, or engaged in violence. The nuance is important because the number of terrorists, by this definition, is bound to be minuscule. On the surface, these three gradations of what are commonly lumped together as radicals cannot readily be distinguished from the much larger pool or community of those from whom the radicals are drawn but who have not become radicalized to any kind of action. Radicalization, then, is the process by which an individual, who is initially inert, ends up in one of these three categories of political action. A fourth category of radicalization consists of individuals who sympathize with radicals but who do not engage in any kind of political action. Such individuals confuse the narrative because their views may seem more extreme than any of the other categories – but these views are totally without political sequelae.6 They have been called “armchair jihadists.” Having spent decades studying the relation between beliefs and feelings (attitudes) and actions (behaviour), social psychologists have consistently shown that most behaviour is not well explained by attitudes. Under some circumstances, beliefs and feelings are good predictors of action (in a voting booth, for instance). In most circumstances, however, beliefs and feelings are weak predictors of action (when strong social norms run counter to an individual’s attitude, for instance). In short, radical opinions are cheap, but radicalized action is expensive. Radicals and terrorists expose themselves to possible incarceration and even death. There is no simple generalization to be made about the commitment to extremist violence: belief in and of itself is an unreliable predictor of an individual’s predisposition towards committing acts of terrorism.7 The number of people in each of the three categories of political action may be a function of the escalating costs associated with radical activity. Costs may explain why the number of terrorists is smaller than the number of radicals, which is smaller than the number of activists, and all combined are a small subset of the larger community of sympathizers from which they are drawn.8

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The Research Agenda These observations suggest a number of research questions about radicalization: How do individuals end up in one of the three radical action categories? Are there three different kinds of people who end up in these three different categories? What are the drivers of the transitions involved? What motivates an individual to cross boundaries, either passing from nonradical to radical or from radical to terrorist? What are the barriers to these transitions? Why do so few people become radicalized and is there anything special about these few? Do the categories of action and the transitions between different categories depend on the particular cause being espoused or do all movements and issues exhibit commonalities in the structure of radicalization? These questions are of theoretical and empirical interest (insofar as they can be subjected to scrutiny). As strategy turns from prosecution to interdiction and prevention,9 intelligence, counterterrorism, and law enforcement organizations are also wondering: Is it possible to tell which category of action an individual will move toward by examining an individual’s attitudes? More generally, can current attitudes predict the future political trajectory of an individual? For these timely and relevant questions, the evidence base is surprisingly scant because individuals who meet the scope conditions are extraordinarily difficult to study. Attempts to answer these questions have suffered from a number of weaknesses. One popular approach has been to interview radicals who have been found guilty of political violence or associated activity.10 This approach raises a litany of methodological problems, not the least of which is that it samples on the dependent variable by examining in detail the beliefs, attitudes, and life histories of those who have become radical without

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controlling for beliefs, attitudes, and life histories of the much larger pool of similar individuals who remain inert.11 Second, this approach is marred by selection bias and a small n. The pool of radicals, especially those willing to be interviewed by researchers, is small; consequently, the evidence gleaned is inevitably anecdotal.12 Hence the answers arrived at do not offer particularly compelling explanations of how radicals differ from nonradicals, especially for studies that rely heavily on the subject’s ex post facto reconstruction of events. Human memory can be all too creative, biased, and unreliable. A relatively small n may facilitate the generation of hypotheses but not their testing.13 In theory, the solution to this quandary would be large-n longitudinal analysis among at-risk communities, but longitudinal community surveys large enough to yield robust results would be prohibitively expensive. Third, humans and human communities are complex. This makes it unlikely that radicalization is a single process.14 A quantitative approach is better suited to multivariate research than the qualitative research that has been the hallmark of much of the literature thus far. Independent effects, feedback loops, and causal mechanism are hard to disentangle using a qualitative approach, especially when they are posited to include a complex interaction of structural and personal factors such as political background (for example, group relative deprivation), psychological makeup and personality characteristics (for example, trauma and psychopathology), and social circumstances of joining the jihad (for example, identity conflicts).15 These make it difficult to infer pathways, drivers, or barriers from qualitative work whose samples are small in size, selection-biased, and plagued by omitted variables.16

Models of Radicalization Theories of radicalization describe a process that takes place over time. Ergo, they necessarily imply certain expectations about attitudinal or behavioural patterns at various temporal stages.17 The connection between radical beliefs and attitudes, and radicalization to violent or illegal action, has been broadly understood in three ways. First, attitudes towards a con-

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flict may vary within a population but the relationship to violence is weak or indeterminate. Second, such attitudes may vary across a population, but violence is conditioned by perceptions of the cost of criminal action. Third, such attitudes may vary within a population, and the variation is correlated with likelihood of radical action. In the first model, conflict attitudes may vary within a population, but such variation is regarded as operationally useless – what matters is detecting when an individual crosses the line from radical views of any kind or intensity to planning and carrying out violent or illegal actions – a legalist view of radicalization. This viewpoint naturally leads to an emphasis on intelligence and law enforcement as a way to construct “tripwires” to detect when individuals move from ideas to action – for example, watching travel patterns, changes in behaviour, and so on. This approach allegedly characterizes the New York Police Department’s (nypd) Demographic Unit.18 This model of radicalization makes no particular predictions about attitudes of radicals in contrast to the community from which they come, so research cannot easily validate or falsify it. In the second model, conflict attitudes may vary across a population, but the difference between those who move to violence and those who do not is their individual perceptions of the strength of the inhibitors to violence, both external and personality-based – a psychological and economic view of radicalization.19 This viewpoint naturally leads to an emphasis on (a) understanding the incentive structure in the population and community, and (b) creating disincentives whenever possible to discourage the transition to violence. This model of radicalization predicts that attitudes to economic or psychological issues should show some variation between radicals and those who are not – perhaps related to differences in risk aversion, for example. This model also predicts that the distribution of individuals should show a pyramidal structure where, as opinions become more radical, the number of individuals who hold them decreases. In the third model, conflict attitudes vary within a population, and these attitudes affect individuals’ likelihood of engaging in radical action. This viewpoint naturally leads to a scan for, as it were, dangerous ideas, those attitudes that create a proclivity for violence.20 Some attitudes, beliefs, and feelings may be affected by changing external realities, so this approach is

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particularly fruitful in uncovering points of leverage accessible to governments and societies. Strategies for deradicalization only make sense from this point of view.21 This model of radicalization predicts that attitudes should cluster – that there should be measurable differences in attitudes between those who are radical and those who are not. Either the particular issues for which these differences occur are drivers of radicalization or they are consequences (sequelae) of radicalization, and – a key issue – it may be possible to infer which is which. According to this model, the distribution of individuals by conflict opinions is again anticipated to have a pyramidal structure but perhaps with an even more obvious “gap” between commonly held opinions and those associated with radicalization.22 A more diffuse model of radicalization that is implicit in many government programs posits intensity of dissatisfaction as inherently dangerous, to some extent regardless of the content of the dissatisfaction. Those who are political or religious activists are regarded with suspicion because of a belief that passion is a kind of slippery slope that leads from legitimate protest, to illegal activity, and finally to violence – a variant of the conveyor belt model. This model predicts that radicalization should be associated with political, social, religious, or moral intensity of dissatisfaction. A roughly pyramidal distribution of individuals by conflict attitudes is again expected in this model, as relatively few individuals can maintain a high level of passion about political issues. They might be associated with political, social, religious, or moral intensity of dissatisfaction. Notice that all of these models begin from recognition that conflictrelated attitudes vary within a population. This is indeed the pattern found in polls relating to jihadist, right-wing, and left-wing grievances. For instance, about half of US Muslims believe that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam, and half do not.23 The different models represent our current uncertainties about the relation between population attitudes and the likelihood of political violence by members of that population.

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Policy Issues A good deal of government policy makes implicit assumptions about causality: Muslims become radicals because they are unhappy. The rational policy maker’s utilitarian instincts presume that happier Muslims mean fewer radicals. Thus, the solution is a programmatic policy response focused on spending money in areas of social support, education, housing, and so on. Some research on individual attitudes, actions, and aggregate patterns of terrorism suggests that weak welfare policies may foment religious extremism, while other research suggests that robust social welfare policies reduce incidents of terrorism.24 A social welfare approach is also conveniently appealing to the egalitarian instincts of the electorate; it is in line with the welfare-state premise of nation-building using T.H. Marshall’s social conception of citizenship, and it shows the government to be “doing something” about the problem. Yet ties between economic status and extremism turn out to be weak at both the individual and aggregate levels.25 This was also the view that informed the White House’s 2002 National Security Strategy which goes out of its way to stress that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by middle-class, educated misanthropes led by a rich religious fanatic.26 Findings of a poll of Ottawa Muslims we conducted can inform this debate.27 Radical attitudes appear absent among Muslims with moral and/or social/political satisfaction. Moral dissatisfaction does appear to be associated with increased social dissatisfaction, and, for some, the combination is associated with some activities and attitudes that correspond to radicalization. On the one hand, these results do not support the assumption that improving individuals’ life satisfaction will decrease the prevalence of radical attitudes, let alone reduce the prevalence of radical action. The results suggest instead that government policy would have to increase moral/religious satisfaction rather than social/political satisfaction. Moral/religious satisfaction, though, appears to be largely beyond the reach of government policy. In short, as appealing as social welfare programs may be to politicians, policy makers, and electorates, the strategic payoffs against radicalization are not evident. On the other hand, there appears to be little indication that governments should take the blame for the alleged inflammatory effects of their policies

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and actions. The same poll of Ottawa Muslims found that approval of Western governments (including Canada, US, and Israel) was unrelated to approval of jihadist groups (including al-Qaeda and Hamas).28 The implication of this surprising result is that policies that help Muslims like Western governments more may do nothing to help Muslims like jihadists less.

The Metanarrative of Global Jihad In his celebrated 1993 paper, Samuel Huntington suggested that the world’s future conflicts were likely to occur around cultural fault lines in a “Clash of Civilizations.”29 In particular, Huntington predicted a growing conflict between Western and Islamic cultures that seemed to be confirmed by alQaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the US. Whatever the virtues or failings of the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, it has at least moved attention beyond the perpetrators of violence to concerns about the broader base of sympathizers and supporters of violence. Thus the “war on terrorism” declared by President George W. Bush included a “war of ideas” aimed at reaching out to a billion Muslims, worldwide, to discourage the kind of radical Islam that brings support and recruits to militant Muslim groups. Empirically, the war of ideas has led to a growing literature of polling studies designed to assess both Western and Muslim views of jihadist militants who challenge the West. In Muslimmajority countries, the war of ideas aims to lower the appeal of armed nonstate actors such as isis and al-Qaeda, and to raise approval of the US and other Western countries targeted by jihadists. Waging the war of ideas requires getting specific about the mobilization frame that supports and justifies jihadist violence. The metanarrative of global jihad has four basic components: (1) Islam is under attack by Western crusaders led by the United States; (2) jihadis, whom the West refers to as “terrorists,” are defending against this attack; (3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportional, just, and religiously sanctified; and, therefore (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.30 This metanarrative can be broken down further into four kinds of discourse. The political narrative is concerned with the evils of the West, including a neo-Marxist take on global inequities and distributive

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effects arising from Western hegemony and exploitation whose roots can be traced to Islam’s best-known cultural historian, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). The moral narrative focuses on the internal contradictions of liberal democracies, which profess freedom as their core value and equality and justice as their subsidiary values but where these ideals remain largely unrealized, and the associated hypocrisy drives Western moral decay. The religious narrative legitimises violent struggle to defend Islam against the crusader West and, in the case of isis, a claim to be the “true” heart of Islam and so at odds even with the rest of Islam, including al-Qaeda. The social-psychological narrative, finally, employs a solipsistic in-group–out-group strategy to brand as infidels those who do not subscribe to the jihadist narrative, while promoting the brotherhood of arms as a means of fulfilling a yearning for adventure and sacrifice that compels the “true believer.” McCauley and Moskalenko propose that the global jihad narrative is best analyzed in terms of a pyramid of radicalization31 whose base is composed of Muslims who currently do not accept any of the global jihad narrative (figure 1.1). A layer above the base are those who sympathise with the first step of the jihadist frame: that the West is waging a war on Islam (global jihad level 1, pyramid second level). Next higher in the pyramid are Muslims who believe that jihadis are acting in defence of Islam and that their actions are morally and religiously justified (global jihad levels 2 and 3, pyramid third level). Highest in the pyramid are Muslims who believe there is an individual duty to join in violence and participate in the defence of Islam (global jihad level 4, pyramid fourth level). There is some complexity here: Islam distinguishes between defence that must be mandated by legitimate authority, a group responsibility, and defence that is an individual obligation of every good Muslim. The battle cry of jihadis is that the current threat to Islam justifies an individual obligation not dependent on having state or religious authority behind it. We here identify belief in the individual obligation as the highest, most radicalized level of the narrative pyramid. The implication of a pyramid model of the global jihad narrative is that the lower levels represent more people, with lower levels of radicalization. The pyramid model of radicalization implies that different pieces of the global jihad narrative are held by Muslims in different layers of the pyramid. Not all who justify suicide bombing also see a war on Islam, but most

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Figure 1.1 The opinion pyramid

do. Similarly, not all who feel a personal moral obligation for jihad also defend suicide bombing, but many do. In short, those who accept more radical elements of the global jihad narrative are more likely – but not 100 percent likely – to accept less radical elements. Given that different subsets of Muslims accept different elements of the global jihad narrative, it seems likely that the origins or sources or predictors of acceptance differ for different elements. Polling data give us an idea of who is likely to be more (or less) prone to the narrative, but not knowing why the narrative has traction with any given individual makes it difficult to devise an effective counternarrative strategy.32

A Two-Pyramids Model of Radicalization For decades psychologists have studied the relation between beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude) and action (behaviour). When action consistent with beliefs and feelings is costly (such as committing oneself to a suicide bombing), the gap between belief and behaviour is likely to be large. This seems to be the situation for the global jihad narrative: the opportunity cost of believing in a war on Islam and feeling that suicide attacks are justified in defence of Islam is relatively low; action in defence of Islam is dis-

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Figure 1.2 The action pyramid

proportionately costly in time, energy, and, at least in Western countries, risk of incarceration or death. Almost half of US Muslims believe there is a war on Islam, while 10 percent justify suicide bombing in defense of Islam. Even that 10 percent corresponds to about 100,000 adult US Muslims, but only hundreds of US Muslims have been indicted or convicted of terrorist actions. As already noted, opinion is cheap, but action is costly. The gap between the global jihad narrative and global jihad violence, at least in Western countries, indicates the need for another pyramid model, a pyramid of action (figure 1.2). Here the base includes all Muslims who are politically inert, whatever their beliefs or feelings. The next higher level are activists, engaged in legal and nonviolent political action, although some may join in one or another part of the global jihad narrative. Hizb ut-Tahrir members, for instance, are legal activists in both the United Kingdom (UK) and in the US (Hizb had its first national meeting in the US in Chicago in July 2009), even though Hizb, like isis and al-Qaeda, is striving to reestablish a supranational caliphate. Higher yet are radicals, engaged in illegal political action that may include violence. Finally, at the apex of the action pyramid are the terrorists, radicals who target civilians with lethal violence. It is important to distinguish between nonviolent and violent political behaviour because, ultimately, the latter is of primary concern for the purposes of public security. The former is of interest only if there is evidence that it

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foreshadows the latter. For example, the movement for voting rights for women and the civil-rights movement militating for racial equality were both considered radical and engaged in some illegal political action. With the benefit of hindsight, however, would we judge them as a liability or as an asset to the body politic? The borders between the levels of the action pyramid represent the most important transition points of radicalization in action: from doing nothing to doing something, from legal political action to illegal political action, and from illegal political action to killing civilians. However, the action pyramid is neither a conveyor belt nor a stage theory in which an individual must progress through each succeeding level in a linear fashion to become a terrorist. It is not necessary to be an activist in order to become a radical nor is it necessary to be radical in order to become a terrorist. A particular challenge for understanding radicalization in the action pyramid are cases of lone wolf or lone actor terrorists. These are individuals who act without group or organizational support; they plan and carry out an attack on their own. In effect, these are individuals who move in an apparently single step (and often quickly) from politically inert (base of the action pyramid) to terrorist action (apex of the pyramid). How is this possible? How could Major Nidal Hasan move from US Army officer to killing thirteen and wounding more than thirty in a mass shooting at Ft Hood, Texas? The next section reviews mechanisms of radicalization seen in cases where individuals join a terrorist group, but these mechanisms do not seem adequate to explain how so few individuals move to attacking alone. McCauley and Moskalenko have suggested two possible profiles of these unusual individuals.33 Disconnected-disordered individuals are loners, often with some history of mental disorder; they have little to lose in trying to escape their painful lives to become terrorist heroes. The only support they need is the perception that many will see them as martyrs. By contrast, caring-compelled individuals have normal social connections, including work and family. They have no history of mental disorder. They seem to be moved to action by unusual sensitivity to the sufferings of others – an unusual capacity for sympathy and empathy that pushes them to do something to fight back against perceived injustice. Momin Khawaja is such a person: he is incarcerated in Canada in connection with a bomb plot, but his initial act of radicalization was his solo attempt to join the Taliban to fight US

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forces in Afghanistan.34 The two profiles may not be mutually exclusive. Major Hasan seems to have been caring-compelled as well as socially disconnected (but not disordered). Lone actor terrorists are rare. Research on more cases is necessary to test the usefulness of the two possible profiles, but it is already worth noticing that both profiles point to the power of emotional experience in moving individuals to terrorism. Emotional experience may also be important in the radicalization of the much larger number of terrorists who act as part of a group or organization.

Mechanisms of Radicalization Any attempt at formulating a stage theory of radicalization in action is contradicted by the multiple mechanisms of radicalization identified at individual, group, and mass levels. McCauley and Moskalenko have compiled a suggestive list of mechanisms of radicalization, mostly from case materials about terrorist groups and terrorist individuals.35

Individual Level 1. Personal grievance. An individual is angry and seeks revenge for government action seen as harming self or loved ones. Personal grievance usually does not lead to action unless interpreted as part of some larger group grievance. Chechen Black Widows revenging brothers and husbands killed by Russians are a commonly cited example. 2. Group grievance. Identification with a group perceived as victims can radicalize an individual who has not personally experienced any harm or hurt. This includes “lone wolf terrorism” and “sudden jihad syndrome,” with such examples as the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, as well as Mohammed Rea Taheri-azar and Momin Khawaja. 3. Self-persuasion in action – the slippery slope. This mechanism is rooted in the famous Milgram experiment and is consistent with the image of a “conveyor belt” where people are gradually radicalized in a step-by-step process. 4. Regard. Individuals can join a militant group because someone they

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regard or love – friend, romantic partner, family member – asks them or because they want to aid and protect a loved one. Sometimes a member of a radical group may cultivate a personal connection with a potential recruit. 5. Fear, escape. In a failed state, individuals can join a militant group because they feel safer with friends with guns than on the street alone. Examples are found among militants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (farc), sectarian groups such as Daesh in Iraq, and some ultra-nationalists on the right fringe of the political spectrum. Some join a militant group to escape loneliness, personal shame, or trouble with the police. 6. Thrill, Status, Money. This mechanism depends on individual preferences, usually those of young males. Examples include joining the US Marine Corps, setting Improvised Explosive Devices (ied) in Iraq or Afghanistan for money, or joining a street gang.

Small Group Level 7. Group polarization. Discussion among members of a like-minded group moves members further in the initially agreed upon direction. Two tendencies contribute: not wanting to fall behind in representing group-favoured values and hearing a preponderance of arguments in the group-favoured direction. 8. Group competition. Radicalization can occur when nonstate actors compete with a state, compete against nonstate groups (often in the form of “outbidding” other groups), and when factions of the same group compete with one another (such as multiple fissions within the Irish Republican Army). 9. Extreme cohesion under isolation/threat. This multiplier of group dynamics (mechanisms 7 and 8) occurs for underground groups, cults, and small groups in combat.

Mass Level Mass level mechanisms are mechanisms of opinion radicalization. 10. External threat. This mechanism is at work at both the group level (mechanism 8) and the mass level. External threats lead to increased group identification, magnified ethnic entrepreneurship and the power of leaders,

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sanctions for in-group deviates, and idealized in-group values. An example is the US reaction to 9/11 and the Somali diaspora’s reaction to Ethiopian (Christian) troops entering Somalia in 2006. 11. Hate. An essentialized and dehumanized view of the enemy facilitates killing by ethnic or religious category, including civilians as well as militants and military. 12. Martyrdom. Martyrs can radicalize a mass audience by their example of sacrifice. A classic example is the 1981 hunger strike in which ten Irish Republican Army (ira)/Irish National Liberation Army (inla) prisoners perished, but the Republican cause was resuscitated. Five of the six individual-level mechanisms – personal grievance, slippery slope, regard, fear, and thrill-seeking – do not depend on accepting new ideas from a radical ideology or narrative and can move individuals to radical action, including joining an existing militant group. In particular, these five mechanisms do not depend on the existence or acceptance of the narrative of global jihad. In many cases, a radical narrative or ideology is learned after an individual joins a radical group. In these cases, the narrative is less a cause than a rationalization of commitment to radical action. In rational-choice terms, we might say that the purpose of the narrative is to reduce transaction costs of group interaction by building and reinforcing group cohesion and group consensus about action. Narratives may thus be better understood as enablers rather than as drivers of radicalization. To the extent that narratives are developed out of action and small group commitments, the potential for blocking radicalization by counternarratives is limited.

Relating the Two Pyramids It should be clear from the preceding discussion that relating the two pyramids, the narrative pyramid and the action pyramid, is anything but straightforward. Figure 1.3 represents, for each action level, a possible distribution of acceptance of the four aspects of the global jihad narrative. In this representation, acceptance of narrative elements is correlated with levels of action, such that accepting a personal moral obligation for jihad – relative thickness of the black band within each action level – is most likely

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Figure 1.3 Possible distribution of acceptance

among the terrorists and least likely among the inert. Similarly, belief in none of the aspects of the global jihad narrative – relative thickness of the white band within each action level – is most likely among the inert and least likely among the terrorists. But the correlation is only probabilistic, not deterministic. Some jihadists may accept no part of the global jihad narrative – for instance, individuals who joined a terrorist group for the thrill of guns and fighting. And there may be a few politically inert individuals who construct a personal moral obligation for jihad – for instance, individuals who don’t want to hurt their parents by leaving for jihad. As already described, it is neither obvious nor known what parts of the global jihad narrative appear with what frequency in different levels of the action pyramid. Mechanisms of radicalization that do not depend on ideology or narrative imply that the global jihad narrative is not necessary for radicalization in action. It seems likely that participation in a radical jihadist group soon teaches most or all of the global jihad narrative, but the narrative is not necessary to initiate radical action. A better understanding of how individuals and groups shift between sympathy, justification, and support for illegal political activity36 and the way this

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shift relates to the “multiple economic, social, political, and organizational relations that span borders”37 is needed. Are there tipping points that put individuals “over the edge” into action? Does a critical mass of drivers need to be accumulated for individuals to cross thresholds? Are there quantum leaps from illegal political action such as banned marches and property damage to lethal violence against human targets? What precipitates such leaps?

Efficacy and Efficiency Issues The weak relation between narrative and action limits the efficacy of intelligence and law enforcement in countering radicalization. The mandate of security and intelligence agencies is not to control opinion radicalization but to protect against violent threats. A common presumption is that radical ideas translate into a violent threat. And not just any type of violence but terrorism: politically motivated violence that is directed at general populations, not so much for the purpose of maximizing casualties as for the purpose of maximising psychological impact to disrupt legitimate authority and the capacity to govern. Bravado about violence proliferates among radicals, but they are unlikely to act on it – those most likely to act tend not to engage in bravado.38 On the contrary, those prone to violence are fully aware of the costs associated with their activity and, as rational actors, will not draw attention to themselves. In other words, zeroing in on “narrative radicals” is likely to generate an ineffective diversion of resources from “action radicals,” as false positives proliferate. Together, the three pyramids indicate that the relationship between radical ideas and radical violence is variable and uncertain. Instead of conceiving the process of radicalization as a pathway,39 with a mechanistic understanding of individuals on a quasi-determinist trajectory, the evidence points, instead, to plural pathways with no profile trajectory. Models that treat radicalization as a single pathway that starts at political sympathy and ends in political violence, grossly oversimplify a heterogeneous process by making many of the variables that matter exogenous to the model.40 Some “self-radicalize,”41 others are specifically targeted by recruiters,42 others are recruited by family or friendship groups,43 yet others are radicalized through media, especially the Internet.44

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Human Rights Issues Democracies have an unfortunate history of labelling any serious challenge to the status quo as radicalism. While the history of the rise of the modern security and police state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries need not detain us here,45 states cannot be careful enough when endeavouring to control or censor thought and beliefs. Indeed, the rise of democratic pluralism can be read as the struggle against state control and censorship of views from the margins. Some secularists today would like to attribute many of the world’s ills to religion.46 Their inference is that any type of “extremist” religion ought to be marginalized or banned. The problem with this approach is that it misses the crux of the problem: only actual violence is the responsibility of security forces. Democracies are premised on the assumption that freedom of speech and thought should prevail, which is why speech is protected from arbitrary government interference. Only under very specific circumstances is an utterance in and of itself a crime. Rather, the criminal justice system in a democracy is generally structured to deal with acts of crime ex post facto. Intent and motivation are not normally punishable, although they may factor into the degree of punishment. In short, gauging threat by means of profiling characteristics such as religion, political opinion, or country of origin is not particularly effective, unnecessarily aggravates the security problem by alienating entire communities, and is usually difficult to reconcile with democratic constitutions. Since courts have been reticent to convict based on terrorist motivation and intent, and since political opinion does not necessarily translate into actual illegal action, focus on the global jihad narrative is not a fruitful avenue for intelligence and law enforcement to pursue. Rather the war of ideas that can be tracked in polls, focus groups, web sites, and video releases must be separated from the war on terrorism. The pyramid of narrative and the pyramid of action can together contribute to this kind of understanding and this kind of action. Another way to tackle counternarratives is to invert the problem. This chapter suggests that one way to think about global jihad is as a massive free-rider problem: While the grievances are widely shared, the call to arms is not. Moreover, those who share the call to arms may have motives other

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than grievances to join the fight. For a counternarrative strategy to be effective, then, it should (1) frustrate the violent extremists by exacerbating their free-rider problem and (2) target those individuals who sympathize with the metanarrative without the metanarrative having affected their actual behaviour. The evidence in this chapter suggests that the way to aggravate the freerider problem is to widen the gap between narrative and behaviour. That is best done by (1) raising the costs associated with acting on violent beliefs (which liberal democracies’ legislators and security forces have done quite successfully in recent years) and (2) mitigating the mechanisms of radicalization that can push some individuals to bear such costs nonetheless.

Conclusion The war of ideas against the global jihadist narrative must be distinguished from the war against active terrorists. Violent political action must be the focus of security forces, whereas the war of ideas is in the political realm of choosing and promoting political policies. Within the war of ideas, different parts of the global jihad narrative are held by different audiences, and each part and its audience must be separately targeted if counternarratives are to be effective.47 One approach to the war of ideas would give priority to top-down counternarratives that target (1) individuals who are higher up in the pyramid and (2) individuals who are particularly prone to an upward trajectory in the pyramid. The more radicalized individuals higher up the pyramid are, in one sense, an easier target because there are fewer of them. This makes the counternarrative easier to tailor but also makes it more difficult to communicate the message to the target audience. In addition, those individuals who are already more radicalized are likely to be resistant to even the most convincing counternarrative. The second set of individuals is even more complicated to address because, in each pyramid level – whether of the narrative pyramid or the action pyramid – few will move toward greater radicalization in any given period of time. And there are many mechanisms of radicalization and thus many

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combination-trajectories to radicalization. A “profile” of individuals likely to show increased radicalization is thus unlikely to be helpful; a triangulation of factors to gauge risk perhaps more so. In sum, the top-down approach is not promising. Radicals and terrorists are difficult to reach and difficult to move, and no profile exists for predicting those most susceptible to radicalization. A lesser but still significant problem is that focusing on the more radicalized presents a real predicament for research. The higher up in the radicalization pyramid people are – whether narrative or action pyramid – the less likely they are to collaborate with researchers for fear of alerting security forces. The war of ideas should thus give priority to a bottom-up focus on the lower levels of the two pyramids. We cannot count on turning Muslims against Islamic militants via counternarratives that help Muslims feel more positive toward the West. Similarly, perhaps we cannot count on making Muslims more positive toward the West by turning them against jihadist militants. Although it is easy to assume that Muslims must choose between jihadis and the West, our results suggest that the war of ideas against the global jihad narrative must have two separate and independent targets: moving Muslims against militants and moving Muslims toward the West. Finally, it is important to raise another kind of difficulty with counternarratives, no matter whether the target is top-down or bottom-up. The danger is that a message may be effective with the target audience but have unintended consequences for those not immediately targeted. In this, counternarratives are similar to more kinetic forms of counterinsurgency: both can have collateral damage that undermines political goals. For instance, a message arguing that Islam does not approve killing enemy civilians might combat acceptance of suicide bombing in defence of Islam but also, at the same time, reinforce, at least implicitly, that Western countries are enemies engaged in war against Islam. In the end, the danger with counternarratives is a “ready-fire-aim” problem: We think we know the source of the problem when, in fact, the issue is more complex and differentiated than it appears. Although a wellintentioned solution, counternarratives may either risk diffusing scarce resources without a measurable effect or spawning unintended consequences. The good news is that, in the marketplace of ideas, democracy’s

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social contract, premised on nonviolence to settle political disputes, appears to have the upper hand. The bad news is that democracies have not cornered the market.

n otes This chapter updates select material that has been published previously as David B. Skillicorn, Christian Leuprecht, and Conrad Winn, “Home-Grown Islamist Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (2012): 929–56; and as Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, “Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism 5, no.1 (April– May 2010), 42–57. Revised version reprinted as “Narratives And CounterNarratives For Global Jihad: Opinion Versus Action,” in Countering Violent Extremist Narratives, ed. E.J.A.M. Kessels (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism [nctb], 2010), 58–70. 1 David Canter and Donna Young, “Beyond ‘Offender Profiling’: The Need for an Investigative Psychology,” in Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, ed. David Carson and Ray Bull (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005), 171–205. 2 bfmtv, 12 December 2018, https://rmc.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/ trasbourg-sebastien-pietrasanta-il-y-a-aujourd-hui-20-500-fiches-fsprt-enfrance-1124653.html. 3 Brandan O’Duffy, “Radical atmosphere: Explaining jihadist radicalization in the UK,” PS: Politcal Science & Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 37–42; Jamie Bartlett et. al., The Edge of Violence: A radical approach to extremism (London: Demos, 2010), http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Viole nce_-_web.pdf?1271346195; Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell, “Radicalization among Muslims in the UK,” MICROCON Policy Working Paper 7 (2009), http://www.microconflict. eu/publications/PWP7_ RB_JB.pdf; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 4 (2006): 39–60. 4 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (New York: nypd, 2007); Alan Travis, “The Making of an Extremist,”

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The Guardian, 20 August 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/ uksecurity.terrorism. 5 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Conflict Radicalizes Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 6 Ibid. 7 Max Taylor, “Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?” Aggression and Violent Behaviour 15, no. 2 (2010): 121–9; Max Taylor and John Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of a Terrorist,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006): 585–601. 8 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 9 Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 no. 1 (2009): 1–17; Brian M. Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica ca: rand, OP-292-0C, 2010). 10 Eg. Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40 no. 3 (2017): 191–210. 11 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvaia Press, 2004); Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. 12 Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)making of Terrorists (New York: Harper Collins, 2010); Peter Waldmann, Ethnischer Radikalismus: Ursachen and Folgen gewaltsamer Minderheitenkonflikte (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989); J Bower Bell, The ira 1968–2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Christine C. Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 1 (2008): 49–65; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 4 (2006): 39–60; John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2005). 13 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and The Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–93. 14 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; Taylor and Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of a Terrorist”; Tomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization

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in Europe (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007); Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (New York: nypd, 2007); Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorist in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadist,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, ed. Rik Coolsaet. (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2008); Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe, Special Report (Washington dc: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), http://www.usip.org/ files/resources /SR262-Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf. 15 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; John Horgan, Divided We Stand: The Psychology and Strategy of Ireland’s Dissident Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorist in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadist”; Michael King and Devon M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of HomeGrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 602–22. 16 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism in the West: Al-Qaeda’s Role in Home-Grown Terror,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 13, no. 2 (2007): 91–9; Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 133–8. 17 Ibid. 18 Matthew Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “With cia Help, nypd Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas,” Associated Press, 23 August 2011, http://www.ap.org/Content/ AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in-Muslim-areas. 19 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2009). 20 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West; Tomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe. 21 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2009); Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Walking Away from Terrorism: Individual and Collective Disengagement (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2009); John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge, 2nd ed., ed. Rik Coolsaet (London: Ashgate, 2011). 22 Ibid. 23 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, US Muslims with Radical Opinions

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Feel More Alienated and Depressed (Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security, College Park, md: start, 2017), http://start.umd.edu/publication/us-muslimsradical-opinions-feel-more-alienated-and-depressed. 24 Eli Berman, “Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An economist’s view of ultraorthodox Jews,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 65, no. 3 (2000): 905–53; Quan Li, and Drew Schaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 230–58; Daniel L. Chen, “Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence From Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis,” Journal of Political Economy 118, no. 2 (2010): 300–54; Brian Burgoon, “On Welfare and Terrorism: Social Welfare Policies And Political-Economic Roots Of Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no.2 (2006): 176–203. 25 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no.4 (2004): 119–44. 26 US White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington dc: Government Printing Office, 2002). 27 Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn, “Home-Grown Islamist Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey.” 28 Clark McCauley et al., “Tracking the War of Ideas.” 29 Ibid. 30 David Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (2008): 520. 31 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model,” American Psychologist 72, no.3 (2017): 205–16. 32 Clark McCauley et al., “Measuring Political Mobilization,” 239–60. 33 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization.” 34 Clark McCauley, Thomas Quiggin, and Sophia Moskalenko, Momin Khawaja: Mechanisms of Radicalization (Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security, College Park, md: start, 2016), https://www.start.umd.edu/ pubs/START_CSTAB_2.5_MominKhawajaMechanismsofRadicalization_ Aug2016.pdf. 35 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.

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36 See for example Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. 37 Nina Glick Schiller et al., Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992); See also P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 38 Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, The Edge of Violence (London: Demos, 2012). 39 Shahid Bux, “Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalization: Addressing Some Myths,” The Police Journal 80, (2007): 267–78; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60; John Horgan, “From Profiles To Pathways And Roots To Routes: Perspectives From Psychology On Radicalization Into Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94; Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers As Self-Starters: A Case Study In Indigenous Radicalization And The Emergence Of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 415–28; Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown Terrorists: Theory And Cases In The War On Terror’s Newest Front,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 95–109; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism And Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009): 239–60. 40 See for example: Justin Magouirk et al., “Connecting Terrorist Networks,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 1–16; Bent L. Smith et al., American Terrorism Study: Patterns of Behavior, Investigation and Prosecution of American Terrorist, Final Report (Washington, dc: Department of Justice, 2002); and Mark S. Hamm, Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 2007). 41 Kirby, “The London Bombers As Self-Starters,” 415–28. 42 See Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60. This may also include charismatic leaders. See for example: S. O’Neill and D. McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (Harper Perennial: London, 2006). 43 Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60. 44 Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown Terrorists,” 95-109; Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2

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(2008): 215–33; Brynjar Lia, “Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 18, no. 1 (2006). 45 Donald E. Emerson, Metternich and the Political Police: Security and Subversion in the Hapsburg Monarchy (1815–1830) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968). 46 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Houghton Mifflin, 2006). 47 Christian Leuprecht et al., “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narrative Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 25–35.

2 Can Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? Should Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? dav id eisenman, steve weine, and my rna l ashley

CVE’s First Wave Stopping violent extremism continues to be a public safety priority in the United States, Canada, and Europe that is not limited to any one ideology or group. In recent years, the body of practice called “countering violent extremism” (cve) has arisen. cve refers to the “use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.”1 However, this phrase is frequently uttered in the same breath as national security. These different concepts and terms are often used interchangeably, whereas the fact is that “countering violent extremism” can be instituted before the individual crosses into the realm of committing an act of terrorism. In other words, extremist violence may be preventable, and prevention can begin before law enforcement and other agents of the criminal justice system become involved. In this regard, preventing violent extremism can be similar to public health programs involving multiple actors and agencies partnered in countering negative and undesirable individual-level behaviours that can have harmful health effects for society in general. For example, Barrett and Janopaul-Naylor employed a multiagency, collaborative approach comprised of health care providers, law enforcement, schools, department of human services, community agencies, and families to address the problems

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of at risk youth in Cambridge, Massachusetts.2 Results indicated that the number of police arrests for this group was reduced by 50 percent. Moreover, there was an increase in the identification and treatment of youth who required mental health interventions. Similarly, Harding et al. looked at strategies to combat underage drinking that included law enforcement, government policies, and public education as well as intervention and referral programs.3 The investigators concluded that these multilevel, comprehensive preventive strategies have the potential to continue the current progress toward the reduction of underage drinking rates.4 Programs such as these reduce the intrusion of law enforcement in the individual’s life and produce results not attainable by law enforcement alone.

Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) is a New Wave In previous papers we called for a new wave of programs to stop violent extremism informed by public health approaches.5 The first wave of cve programs was led primarily by law enforcement and consisted largely of engagement and partnership activities with Muslim communities, based in part upon community policing strategies. One shortcoming was that it did not develop, implement, or evaluate focused prevention programs.6 Another shortcoming was that the first wave focused largely on Muslim communities in the United States, Canada, and Europe despite ideologically motivated violence coming from other sources, including far rightwing ideologies. As Romaniuk has reported, poorly conceived and executed programs resulted in communities feeling stigmatized and alienated and may have been counterproductive.7 A new wave needs new terminology but not just as a semantic change. The term preventing violent extremism (pve) better aligns with the prevention mission of public health. It avoids the law enforcement terminology of “countering,” which does not align with public health’s mission. It brings the topic into public health’s field of violence prevention, with the potential for greater learning, leveraging of programs and resources, and access to public health funding streams. It is also important to state that although this chapter often focuses on violence inspired by radical Islam, suggestions apply to other groups and

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communities who view themselves as having vulnerable individuals in their midst, notably right-wing extremists. White supremacists have been the most violent domestic extremists in the US, and the number and influence of hate groups surged during and after the 2016 election. To productively bring public health together with other fields involved in preventing violent extremism raises challenges. In what follows, we will address four of those main challenges: (1) how is public health defined and what is its relationship to pve? (2) How can public health’s four-step process guide the second wave of pve? (3) How can public health’s model of primordial, primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention help to map out different strategies for violent extremism prevention? And (4) should public health professionals get involved in pve, specifically when pve is primarily focused on Muslim communities? By addressing these issues, we hope to provide diverse disciplines, communities, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations with a better understanding of how public health approaches can contribute to pve and the development of policy.

What Is Public Health and What Is its Relationship to PVE? Public health is concerned with protecting the health of populations as small as a local neighbourhood or as large as an entire country or region. Public health is not confined to any one agency; rather, as is shown in the following illustration, its proper implementation depends upon several agencies and sectors, which interact with and have an impact upon population health. In other words, it is multisectorial. The importance of these many agencies from diverse sectors joining forces is underscored by a report from the US National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which points out that while each of the entities has the ability to act individually to improve population health, when working together, they become a system moving towards a common goal.8 Thus, as indicated by the interconnections shown in figure 2.1, it is evident that working as a unit to achieve a specific, identified outcome, removes the need for each agency to develop its own singular program. Moreover, since each entity contributes to the whole by addressing aspects of the problem which falls under its purview, the systemic approach of public

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Figure 2.1 Ensuring conditions for public health

health allows for identifying the “true” problem and its elements, determining appropriate outcomes and the contributions of each discipline, and uncovering any existing gaps and what will be needed to address them. Thus, the composite unit (composed of the representatives of the multiple agencies) is well placed to deliver an appropriate program targeted to a specific issue. Furthermore, it obviates “reinventing the wheel.” For example, there are existing school programs (such as antibullying efforts); family-centered interventions of community organizations; corporations’ youth-focused sport programs; community outreach efforts by police; wellness programs provided by health authorities – all of which could be incorporated into a proposed strategy and policy. This does not mean that there will never be a necessity to create new interventions. For example, and in terms of pve, schools may have to adjust curricula to make sure that all students feel a sense of inclusion; police may have to improve their cultural competency skills as well as ascertain that their personnel are representative of the diversity of citizens; businesses may need

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to ascertain that their programs are respectful of cultural differences; media may have to become more careful of how they report incidents of extremism; and higher-educational institutions may have to focus their research skills on identifying more evidence-based pve interventions. These examples are not exhaustive nor does this mean that agencies will lose their autonomy; it merely means that they become part of a concerted, unified effort to address an identified problem, such as smoking cessation, school bullying, homelessness, or, as is being proposed, pve. The goal is to reduce risk factors and strengthen those of a protective nature. While we are not advocating for the medicalization of violent extremism, our contention is that the public health model should be considered when pve policies are being developed. Such policies should be multisectorial and created, as Eisenman points out, with input from appropriate agencies such as health care, nongovernmental organizations, schools, law enforcement, media, academia, employers, individuals, and, importantly, sociocultural communities.9 Indeed, this is the premise upon which the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (ccrs), a consultative Canadian body consisting of citizens, representatives of different ethnic communities, and professions, is based.10 The independence of the entities represented by the members is maintained, but each brings specific expertise to advise the government on aspects of its overall pve policy, which acts as the guiding principle for more localized interventions. ccrs also helps the government to understand how to view potential policies from the perspective of the many communities constituting the population, with the aim of being aware of and eliminating, alienation, and stigmatization. The importance of this body and its manner of functioning is also incorporated into the government of Canada’s national security policy. The following illustrates an application of this public health approach. Let us assume that a teacher identifies a student as making threats or otherwise behaving in a manner which she fears might result in violence. In order to assist the student, the teacher can make referrals to school resources (e.g., guidance counsellors, school psychologists, social workers). Through the involvement of parents and family, religious leaders may have insights to offer; community and cultural organizations may also be consulted; business leaders may be asked to provide suitable employment or mentoring for

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the individual; academics may be solicited for evidence-based interventions; and law enforcement services that provide school talks and demonstrations, may be asked to speak to the student body, without targeting the student specifically. Although different strategies will be employed, the efforts of all these agencies will be geared towards deterring the student from engaging in activities leading to extremist violence. The general population may benefit, as a violent incident may have been averted, and overall safety and well-being assured. Furthermore, while there is overlap, agency independence is maintained and the inclusion of the community helps to support and enhance its sense of empowerment and collective efficacy, as well as its genuine involvement in seeking solutions. The following section will build on the knowledge of public health by examining the ways in which a public health model may be implemented in the pve space.

How Can Public Health’s Four-Step Process Guide Second Wave PVE? The public health approach to prevention is a four-step process grounded in scientific methods. These steps are: 1. Defining and monitoring the problem, and tracking trends. 2. Identifying factors that increase risk (i.e., risk factors), factors that protect against or buffer risk (i.e., protective factors), and factors that promote positive behaviours (i.e., promotive factors). 3. Developing, implementing, and evaluating prevention policies, strategies, and programs that are intended to reduce risk factors and increase protective and promotive factors. 4. Broad dissemination and implementation of the prevention policies, strategies, and programs. This four-step process has been applied to violence reduction in general.11 Applying step one to pve raises challenges regarding how we should define violent extremists who, according to the US Department of Homeland

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Security, are “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.” Yet the 2016 mass murders in Orlando, Nice, and Munich, in which the perpetrators’ ideological beliefs appear secondary to sociopathy and personal anger that predated the attacks, muddies the waters between ideologically motivated and personally motivated mass murder. Thus, definitions based upon discrete motive-based categories may not fit with reality. Furthermore, public health should establish definitions that lend themselves to prevention programs with a clear connection to health and well-being. Some aspects of preventing violent extremism, such as “supporting” ideologically motivated violence, may not be examples of public health concerns. Indeed, an argument can be made that public health can help prevent the violence part of pve but not the extremism portion since public health should not be concerned with preventing ideologies.12 Identifying violent extremism’s risk and protective factors has proved elusive. The processes by which one becomes a violent extremist vary and research is moving from understanding it as a linear process to conceptualizing it as a nonlinear process with incremental changes.13 Scholars in the field distinguish between the attitudes and beliefs that support violent extremism and the behaviours that exhibit a determination to do so. Less clear is how the two are related. Many people condone or support violent extremism without ever committing a violent action. Moreover, factors that may promote attitudes and beliefs may be different from the ones leading to actions. For instance, the collective experiences that drive attitudes (socioeconomic inequality, repression, and injustice) may not be the primary risk factors driving individual behaviour (previous violent experiences, persuasion by a mentor, vengeance). The search for a fixed profile of risk may, therefore, be futile. Rather, violent extremism is composed of a complex of variables and circumstances, and we cannot predict who will become a violent extremist. Possibly, however, one can identify motivational factors that situate where individuals are in the process in order to develop appropriate prevention strategies and interventions. To this effect, Jensen has suggested that, based on an analysis of fifty-six radicalized individuals in the US, there are some characteristics shared by these individuals: viewing their communities as being targeted and victimized; radical shifting of the way their world is

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viewed – including how they perceive challenges to their views; experiencing emotional vulnerabilities, preceded by traumatic life events, leading to identity crises; and having a propensity towards “group-think” engendered by the social isolation of radical social networks.14 Although it is impossible for anyone to identify a singular reason for an individual’s radicalization towards violent extremism, characteristics such as those identified by Jensen may be useful in suggesting which strategies, agencies, and individuals should be involved in intervention. Importantly, strategies should not only assist individuals but should also help empower and strengthen communities. The question is, does lack of adequate knowledge about risk and protection mean that public health can do nothing about violent extremism now? We suggest that one strategy, embodied in the threat-assessment approach, is to focus on an individual’s recent patterns of observable communications and behaviours, which we discuss below. The third step in a public health approach is to develop and test interventions that are based on the results of the first two steps (in reality, these steps may occur simultaneously rather than sequentially). Moreover, only recently has the public health imperative to rigorously evaluate interventions been introduced to pve, with several evaluations currently underway.15 Given the challenges of resource allocation, potential for harm, and need for effective solutions, there is an imperative for public health evaluation. Regarding step four, public health comes with a rich tradition of community participation and collaboration and a whole field of “dissemination science” and best practices that are distinct from law enforcement or criminology practices. This calls for greater attention to the dissemination of best practices and also to figuring out when they don’t work and why.

How Can Public Health Prevention Models Advance Second Wave PVE? The public health prevention model lends itself to a four-tiered model for pve (figure 2.2). At the base is primordial prevention, which seeks to reduce future risks to health by preventing the penetration of risk factors into a population. Primordial prevention includes the “actions and measures that

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Figure 2.2 Four-tiered model for public health prevention of violent extremism

inhibit the emergence and establishment of environmental, economic, social and behavioural conditions, cultural patterns of living, and so on, that are known to increase the risk of disease.”16 An example are policies to prevent the penetration of tobacco sales into developing countries in order to reduce the introduction of smoking – a risk factor for many diseases. Primordial prevention in pve might entail consideration of the range of broad political, social, economic, and historical forces or grievances that may create the conditions for ideologically motivated violence (e.g., Western foreign policy, wars in the Middle East, the global distribution of wealth, or western cultural insensitivity). Primordial prevention puts public health in the position of challenging governments concerning their foreign and domestic policies. Primary prevention aims to protect against exposure to risk factors that lead to disease or injury, and increase resistance to disease or injury, should exposure occur. Examples include childhood vaccinations against infectious diseases and safety belt laws. A primary prevention approach sees violent extremism as a problem for all communities and views all communities as having opportunities for violence prevention. In the pve space, primary prevention involves targeting the vast majority of the population who do not exhibit problematic behaviour associated with violent extremism. Primary

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prevention strategies would target risk and protective factors that are empirically or theoretically associated with violent extremism. A broad range of activities from media campaigns; community and nongovernmental organization capacity-building; and community outreach and training may apply. Minneapolis-St Paul, Minnesota is fielding a primary prevention program in response to a wave of young Somali Minnesotans having been recruited to fight for isis. Community stakeholders and researchers identified the lack of access to social and mental health services, “community isolation,” and high unemployment as contributing to radicalization there.17 It is challenging to develop primary prevention programs when the understanding of who turns to violent extremism is so limited. Primary prevention of pve also runs up against the low base rate problem: given the low base rate of violent extremism and the poor predictive accuracy of risk factors, primary prevention may not be suitable as a means of specifically addressing violent extremism. It is also true that the causes of violence are multifactorial and issue from several levels of the social ecology including individual, family, community, and societal levels. Violence is the outcome of interdependent elements within a connected whole. Achieving a meaningful impact on complex multicausal problems requires more than monofocused interventions. A good example is the public health problem of obesity. Changes in patterns of obesity have been brought on by changes in food distribution, food types, how we transport ourselves, the kinds of jobs we have, economics, and other systems changes. Physicians understand the limited power of simply advising an obese patient to exercise and eat right, and community education of this sort is clearly not enough to reduce the prevalence of obesity in a population. To reduce population obesity we need to shift multiple factors that influence obesity. A serious public health approach to pve would similarly entail multiple interventions across a target population at multiple levels of the social ecology – some of which may have only small effects on individuals but might lead to large changes at the population level. A challenge with this approach will be evaluating the results, given the low prevalence of the problem. In the second wave of pve programming, public health approaches might include expanding local capacity and resources (antihate education programs, culturally tailored mental health, youth mentoring programs) to enhance the work already being done in a manner that leverages it to help address violent extremism, rather

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than creating a program dedicated to countering violent extremism. They can be pve-specific or they can be pve-relevant (non-pve programs that have theoretical pve benefits) which embed addressing violent extremism alongside other threats to community wellbeing such as violence, youth unemployment, the spread of online misinformation, and rising hate crimes. Secondary prevention focuses strategies to stop or slow the progression of disease or injury once exposure has occurred but while still in the earliest stage. Traditionally, this includes screening and detection for early diagnosis and treatment and examples include mammograms to detect early stage breast cancers that are “asymptomatic,” leading to treatments that are more effective before symptoms appear. If secondary prevention detects and treats the “preclinical” changes that occur before disease manifests, then its pve equivalent is detecting and addressing behaviours that occur before violence occurs. It targets a smaller group considered “at risk” for violent behaviours. For example, the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health has a school threat reduction program which responds to any violent action, including ideologically motivated violence. This secondary prevention program uses a threat assessment approach in which a person’s own threatening or concerning behaviours trigger an assessment and are the basis of determining whether a person poses a violent threat. This has the theoretical advantage of avoiding risk profiling in a field where risk factors are controversial. It will serve persons believed to be at risk of committing a violent act; identify persons with social or mental health problems; and facilitate access to a range of services and link to programs for persons who are heading towards criminality but have not yet committed a crime.18 Threat assessment is a promising practice in school safety.19 However, since threat assessment is useful only when individuals are identified as posing a threat, it is liable to miss cases. Tertiary prevention is directed at managing and rehabilitating persons with diagnosed health conditions to reduce complications, improve their quality of life, and extend their years of productivity. Its aim is to mitigate the impact of an illness or injury having lasting consequences. A relevant example is vocational rehabilitation to retrain workers for new jobs after they have recovered from an injury. In pve, tertiary prevention targets those already involved in violent extremism in order to reduce their continued predilection to violence. Some of these programs consequently work with

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persons who have already manifested criminal or violent extremist behaviours, thereby providing treatment for the perpetrators. These programs have been conducted in closed populations for which there is little evaluation data or consistent methods, practices, and outcomes.20

Should Public Health Professionals Be Involved in Preventing Violent Extremism? A question some public health practitioners will ask is, is violent extremism a significant threat to the health and safety of the public? Public health recognizes that terrorism has population-level effects and has duly recognized terrorism as a public health problem for our time.21 While the risk of death from a terrorist attack in the United States, Canada, or Europe is exceedingly small, jihadist terrorism in particular has an outsized effect on public health by energizing Islamophobia and isolating Muslim communities. Muslim community members in the United States, Canada, and Europe have suffered hate crimes, social exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatization after attacks linked to Islamic radicals occur.22 The adverse health consequences of systematic discrimination and stigmatization give public health reason to reduce the perceived threat of violence that itself threatens stigmatization of communities and individuals.23 Therefore, public health must actively oppose strategies that further stigmatize Muslims or endanger their civil rights. Public health should strongly repudiate programs that purport to use “public health approaches” while further stigmatizing a group or community. Lending the public health name to such programs also risks losing the trust of communities characterized this way. The public’s trust in public health is vital to its larger, overall mission. This trust is based on a perception that public health is invested in its fiduciary role to the public, will provide honest information, will treat all people equally, and limit its role as an agent of the state. Historically, trust in public health has been fractured when it was viewed as carrying out the mandates of the state over the rights of individuals. For example, in the US, before being struck down, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act restricted immigrants’ receipt of public health services and mandated reporting of undocumented immigrants. Though

pve-relevant

Domestic and foreign policies Community Youth Programs; that improve human rights, Counter-narrative campaigns reduce inequalities

Program types

Examples

pve-relevant or pve-specific

Reduce risk and increase protective factors leading to violent extremism

Address social determinants of risk before people are born into a community

Goals

Community, family, individual-levels signs,

Country-level, global

Primary prevention

Target population

Primordial prevention

Table 2.1. Public health prevention models for pve

Targeted violence threat assessment programs

pve-relevant or pve-specific

Services for persons in early stages, before they manifest violence

Individuals with early “pre-clinical”

Secondary prevention

Deradicalization programs

pve-specific

Rehabilitation for violent extremists

Perpetrators

Tertiary prevention

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not followed by health authorities, fear of deportation led immigrants to avoid care leading to upsurges in tuberculosis.24 The public health basis for engaging Muslims in the United States, Canada, and Europe must be broader than preventing extremist violence. Muslims in these countries already experience barriers to health care. As an example, Muslims in the US face mental health barriers such as few culturally aware providers and the stigma associated with mental health problems. pve proponents may argue that improving access and utilization of mental health programs does double-duty – providing a resource for communities and helping persons whose psychosocial experiences and situation contribute to their risk of perpetrating violence. Public health risks exacerbating such barriers if improving access to mental health services is identified with advancing pve, especially if fundamental disparities in the health of Muslims are not being addressed. At least in the United States, the public health field has devoted negligible time and resources to pve. Public health will likely remain absent as long as the violence itself remains infrequent, stigmatization leads to community pushback, and policy makers fail to address using pve funding to counter the rise of right-wing extremism and its violence.

Conclusion and Next Steps Sir Michael Marmot states, “If violence, if political or religious extremism, is having an adverse impact on the health of our populations, we have not just the right but a duty to make our voices heard. If extremism is damaging health then it’s our responsibility to say that, and it gives us a legitimate entry point.” 25 In the short term, public health is faced with balancing the need for evidence with the need for action. And if demagogic populism increases, public health must be a vocal critic of pve policies that fuel intolerance, increase hate, and further isolate Muslim communities. Indeed, public health should always be casting its gaze at the public policy decisions that governing authorities make and which produce the upstream, social determinants of violent extremism. Nonetheless, public health approaches can contribute by assembling and integrating the knowledge, experience, and participation of diverse scientific disciplines, communities, and organizations; encouraging

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and supporting evidence-based programs; and conducting and disseminating rigorous program evaluations. pve should nest more of its efforts within the broader field of violence prevention, thus connecting it to a field rich in research and programming. We have elaborated the case for pve as a problem of public health violence prevention already.26 This recommendation rests on the proposition that violent extremism is more similar to, than dissimilar from, more common forms of violence, a proposition that needs to be examined and tested. Nevertheless, we believe that this is a practical course for pve if it is going to withstand community challenges to its acceptability and possible declines in support by policy makers and communities. Public health has historically recognized health problems, their causes, and solutions without always undertaking primary responsibility for addressing them (e.g., sanitation and safe water). Public health professionals can similarly contribute to preventing violent extremism without bearing full responsibility for program leadership in the community. With challenges and opportunities ahead, it is important that public health understand the growing pve field and examine its stance or contributions to it.

n otes 1 Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention is Flawed,” Foreign Affairs, 18 February 2015, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-counteringextremism-fails. 2 James G. Barrett and Elizabeth Janopaul-Naylor, “Description of a Collaborative Community Approach to Impacting Juvenile Arrests,” Psychological Services 13, no. 2 (2016): 133–9. 3 Frances M. Harding et al., “Underage Drinking: a Review of Trends and Prevention Strategies,” American Journal of Preventative Medicine 4, no. 2 (2016): 148–57. 4 Ibid. 5 Kamaldeep S. Bhui et al., “A Public Health Approach to Understanding and Preventing Violent Radicalization,” bmc Medicine 10, no.16 (2012): 16; Stevan Weine et al., “Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 1 (2016): 1–14.

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6 Steve Weine, Chloe Polutnik, and Ahmed Younis, The Role of Community Policing in Countering Violent Extremism (College Park: start, 2015). 7 Peter Romaniuk, “Does cve Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism,” Global Centre on Cooperative Security (2015). 8 Institute of Medicine, The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century (Washington, dc: The National Academies Press, 2003), https://doi.org/10. 17226/10548. 9 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop (Washington, dc: The National Academies Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10. 17226/24638. 10 Public Safety Canada, “Connecting with Canadian Communities: CrossCultural Roundtable on Security” (2016). 11 Dawn McDaniel, J.E. Logan, and Janet Schneiderman, “Supporting Gang Violence Prevention Efforts: A Public Health Approach for Nurses.” The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 19, no.1 (2014): 3. 12 National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, “Countering Violent Extremism.” 13 John Horgan, “A Call to Arms: The Need for More Psychological Research on Terrorism,” Social Psychological Review 18, no. 2 (2016): 25–8. 14 National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, “Countering Violent Extremism.” 15 Ibid.; Stevan Weine et al., “Leveraging a Targeted Violence Prevention Program to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Formative Evaluation in Los Angeles” (Washington, dc: Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 1–34. 16 David A. Kindig, “Have You Heard of ‘Primordial Prevention’?” Improving Population Health, 31 May 2011, http://www.improvingpopulationhealth.org/ blog/2011/05/primordial_prevention.html. 17 Eroll Southers and Justin Heinz, “Foreign Fighters: Terrorist Recruitment and Countering Violent Extremism (cve) Programs in Minneapolis-St Paul,” Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, National Center of Excellence for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (create), University of Southern California, 2015. 18 National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, “Countering Violent Extremism.”

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19 Randy Borum et al., “What Can Be Done About School Shootings? A Review of the Evidence,” Sage 39, no. 1 (2010): 27–37. 20 Horgan, “A Call to Arms.” 21 Joseph A. Boscarino et al., “Fear of Terrorism and Preparedness in New York City 2 Years After the Attacks: Implications for Disaster Planning and Research,” Journal of Public Health Management & Practice 12, no. 6 (2006): 503–13; David Eisenman et al., “Terrorism Related Fear and Avoidance Behavior in a Multiethnic Urban Population,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no.1 (2009): 168–74. 22 G. Hussein Rassool, “Cultural Competence in Counseling the Muslim Patient; Implications for Mental Health,” Archives of Psychiatric Nursing, vol. 29, no. 5 (2015): 321–5. 23 Matthew Limb, “Doctors must speak out about adverse effects on health of austerity and extremism, conference hears,” bmj, retrieved 14 September 2015, from http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h1685. 24 Kimberly Johns and Christos Varkoutas, “The Tuberculosis Crisis: the Deadly Consequence of Immigration Policies and Welfare Reform,” Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 15, no.1 (1998): 101–30; J.T. Kullgren, “Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to Health Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform,” American Journal of Public Health 93 no.10 (2003): 1630–3. 25 Limb, “Doctors Must Speak Out.” 26 David Eisenman and Louise Flavahan, “Canaries in the Coal Mine: Interpersonal Violence, Gang Violence and Violent Extremism Through a Public Health Prevention Lens,” International Review of Psychiatry 29, vol. 4 (2017): 341–9, doi: 10.1080/09540261.2017.1343527. pmid: 28805121.

PA RT T W O

CVE in the Canadian Context

3 Anger in the Peaceable Kingdom An Overview of Canada’s Violent Extremist History robert mart yn

Canadians routinely tell ourselves that we are nice. Our comedians are unfailingly self-depreciating about our saying “sorry,” while politicians proclaim that the world needs more Canada. Yet Canada has a dark underside; hostility has been manifested in rebellion, terrorist attacks, and fomenting hate groups even before we became an independent nation. Recently, awareness of such violence has come into our homes due to terrorism’s growth through expanded transnational mobility, innovative ways to harm one another, and media advances enabling the dissemination of radicalizing narratives as readily as the instantaneous reporting of terrorist attacks. The spectre of contemporary violent extremism is therefore lurid in Canadians’ minds. This omnipresence can lead to a false belief that violent radicalization started with, and is limited to, Islamist violence. Yes, approximately one hundred Canadians have sought to join Islamist extremist groups, and a similar number who operated with terrorists overseas have returned to Canada, with more remaining abroad supporting terrorist groups.1 Yet responding to grievances with violence is neither the exclusive domain of religious groups nor is it a recent phenomenon. Attempting to address the various underlying issues from a skewed start-state is a recipe for failure. As such, rather than merely a historical chronology, this chapter aims to provide context to current efforts in the hope that previous detrimental strategies can be avoided, thus bolstering our first steps toward an effective comparative approach to addressing violent extremism and terrorism.

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A survey of more than a century-and-a-half of Canada’s legacy of addressing violent extremism and uprisings cannot help but appear a bit scattered. While linkages between group and individual motivations are critical for complete understanding, this chapter’s focus is on the larger causes and the government’s responses. Such violence has been cyclic, wherein groups readily copy tactics and procedures that have proven successful elsewhere and evolve when effective countermeasures appear.2 The grievances and the government responses to the 1869 Red River Rebellion were repeated, almost verbatim, fifteen years later during the North-West Rebellion. The rationale for the 1837 Lower Canada Rebellion was cited directly in the manifesto of the Front de libération du Québec (flq) in 1980. The popularity of hostage taking on airliners in the 1960s declined as security improved, prompting a change in tactics to attacking airports themselves, which eventually morphed into terrorists placing bombs on aircraft, as seen in the horrific 1985 Air India attack by Canadian-based Sikh nationalists.3 A difficulty in conducting such a broad survey is one of definitional precision, which is exacerbated by deliberating historical events using twentyfirst century sensibilities. Some actions now considered legitimate social activism were previously deemed illegal. Such terminology challenges are not unique, as attested to by the time-worn aphorism, “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter,” which is no simple theoretical conundrum as today’s legislators and the judiciary must wrestle with specific terminologies.4 It suffices for our purposes to simply view radicalization as a trajectory. Extreme views are not, of themselves, sinister; those disagreeing with the status quo often introduce useful changes. It becomes problematic when its adherents cross into the realm where violence against society is an acceptable recourse. Note that the “status quo/support change” division will vary by community and grievance and merely illustrates the violent extremist’s alienation from accepted views as radicalization increases. Social circles diminish to conspiratorially minded peers as militancy increases and previous associates who accept the status quo become disavowed. Regardless of their support or dissent on a particular aggrieved issue, the overwhelming majority of Canada’s population inhabits the socially acceptable side of the alienation threshold. Dissatisfaction may cause some to pay more attention to the issues and ponder options. While still behav-

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Figure 3.1 Trajectory of radicalization

ing legally, perceptions of unfairness or feelings of relative deprivation may evoke anger towards a labelled enemy, such as “the west” or a specific country: a Freudian concept called displacement of aggression. Although not actively engaged in dubious activities, they now provide tacit or moral support, while not actively dissuading radicalizing behaviours, which could aid in countering the violent extremism. As they cross the “alienation threshold,” ideas of radicalized violence become less abhorrent, and, while not conducting violent acts, they see dynamically supporting their cause through fundraising or proselytizing as acceptable activities. Such undertakings, if seen as actively supporting terrorism, may now be illegal given recent changes to Canada’s antiterrorism legislation. Finally, individuals or groups cross a violence threshold where they take up arms or otherwise conduct violent attacks against society. One of our earliest examples comes from thirty years before Confederation, when the government faced concurrent rebellions in both Upper and Lower Canada. This commenced a legacy of failing to preemptively address the underlying issues that cause the anger and radicalization, to which the government default was largely “send in the army.” Only recently, and at the left end of the radicalization scale, has Canada begun efforts attempting to stem violence through early and effective intervention.

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Nineteenth-century Extremism Quebec’s Lower Canada Rebellion/Ontario’s Upper Canada Rebellion (1837–38) Following the War of 1812, a growing political consciousness spread throughout British North America. In Lower Canada, the francophone-dominated Legislative Assembly demanded exclusive decisionmaking on revenue spending. This produced multiple conflicts, including but not limited to English merchant distrust of the Assembly’s wisdom; Roman Catholic Church demands to retain their monopoly on tithes and other revenues; and the governor and Legislative Council wanting no dissolution of their powers, including dominance of the judiciary and senior governmental bureaucracy. By autumn, many Quebec rural districts had established their own revolutionary governing bodies, constituting a clear challenge to British rule.5 In Upper Canada, political and economic discontent also focused against in-group politicians, as the lieutenant governor made a succession of political appointments of wealthy businessmen, attempting to mirror Britain’s governing aristocratic class. This scorned Protestants by granting lands to Anglican Church adherents and favoured British immigrants to the detriment of Loyalists who had moved north from the United States, producing similar grievances of elite privilege and unequal opportunities for advancement. In response, William Lyon Mackenzie proposed ousting the British and forming an American-style republic. Violence erupted in November 1837, and the government responded with its soon to be default of deploying the army. Loyalist forces in both campaigns were brutal.6 In Quebec, Napoleonic War veteran General Sir John Colborne led the campaign marked by widespread destruction and pillaging. Soldiers were tasked to visit every village and farmstead; whenever the male proprietor could not be found, he was assumed to be a rebel and his houses and barns were burned, leaving hundreds without shelter or food going into a Quebec winter.7 Despite a subsequent attempt by Americanbacked “Patriotes,” which met the same fate as the first endeavour, the uprising was viciously crushed within a month. “Watchers from Montreal could see pillars of smoke behind the advancing columns of British, volunteers, and Indians.”8 In Upper Canada, the result was less grisly as a motley

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government force confronted the equally inept rebels. Although several key military leaders on both sides were killed early on, an almost bloodless encounter outside of Toronto’s Montgomery Tavern saw the main rebel group flee. A second, London, Ontario, uprising attempt was even less organized and was quickly dispersed. Being further from the seat of government in York (Toronto), however, crown forces destroyed a significant amount of property belonging to suspected rebels in southwestern Ontario.9 Once the radicals were routed, makeshift prisons were filled with accused insurgents, with more than one hundred from Lower Canada eventually convicted; the harshest sentences were short-lived exile to Bermuda. Conversely, in Upper Canada where the fighting was less callous, military tribunals sentenced rebels to either hanging or distant penal colonies such as Australia.10 While some Lower Canada “Patriotes” were also sent to Australia, most were pardoned and returned to Canada. Eventually, more moderate reformers emerged, who proved to be influential when the British government sent Lord Durham to investigate the conflicts. While not resultant government policy per se, Durham turned out to be an ardent reformer who argued for responsible government within the colonies.11

Canada’s Prairies: Red River Rebellion (1869–70) and North-West Rebellion (1885) Natives and settlers had established the Red River Colony at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine rivers, where Winnipeg, Manitoba now stands. The Hudson’s Bay Company owned the land, and in preparation for selling off parcels of it, had begun laying out square townships with no regard for the already extant strip lots. Assuming that they were going to lose their homesteads and intending to preserve their assumed property rights, Louis Riel organized the Métis to confront the surveyors. In quick succession Riel’s people seized the garrison of Fort Garry for its munitions and established a provisional government to negotiate the Red River Settlement’s entry into Confederation as the province of Manitoba. Riel had the Canadian Party members arrested, given a lack of trust that the territorial governor would negotiate with Métis interests at heart. Politician Thomas Scott was amongst those arrested. His abuse of the Métis, physical attacks on his guards, and threats to Riel’s life prompted his being

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put on trial, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death. He was shot the following morning.12 Sir John A. Macdonald’s government eventually agreed to most of Riel’s terms and Manitoba entered Confederation 12 May 1870. The government subsequently resorted to the tried and true response – a military force was dispatched, officially to keep the peace until the transfer of power to a new provincial government could be made; unofficially, they were responding to calls for justice from Ontario regarding the uprising and the death of Scott. There being no means of rapid troop movement, the soldiers arrived two months later.13 Riel and several key supporters had by then escaped to the United States while numerous Métis fled west, establishing new settlements in what is now Saskatchewan. Fifteen years later, once again not having clear title to their prairie land, several families discovered that their property had been arbitrarily sold to outside investors. The Métis asked Riel to return from exile to appeal to the government on their behalf. Riel however, dismissed political efforts and turned directly to a military campaign, which united the rest of Canada against them: “English Canadians remembered Thomas Scott and 1870; French Canadians were appalled by Riel’s anti-Catholic apostasy and by the murder [at the beginning of this uprising] of two Catholic missionaries.”14 With the recent expansion of the transnational railway, the now-default government response of sending the army occurred much more rapidly. Riel had the initiative, winning some early battles, which inspired some others to join the uprising. In the end, the combined rebel force of approximately 500 Métis and Cree–Assiniboine natives proved no match for more than 1,000 soldiers with cannons plus the 500 newly established North-West Mounted Police. Riel was found guilty of treason and hanged, facts which continue to resonate today as history is reinterpreted. Native leaders Poundmaker and Big Bear were sentenced to prison, while eight others were hanged in the largest mass hanging in Canadian history. The government’s army response was therefore augmented, and ostensibly provided with additional legitimacy, by a large police contingent. The change to their previous responses occurred only after the rebellion had ended. The government attempted to alleviate Cree and Assiniboine hardship by providing them food and other supplies. The Métis were all provided with land grants and the government resurveyed river lots to provide more equitable water access.15

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In all, between Confederation and the start of the First World War, the Canadian Army deployed forty-eight times to aid the civil authorities.16 While most of the issues involved strikes or natural disasters, the nineteenthcentury rebellions were treated as full-scale military operations, with very little thought to addressing radicalizing issues such as property rights and political representation.

The FLQ: Quebec’s Second Lower Canada Rebellion The 1959 death of Quebec’s Premier Maurice Duplessis ushered in a new era. Jean Lesage’s “Quiet Revolution” stimulated secularism and economic growth, accompanied by an increasingly stark political division between federalist and sovereignty factions. Most Quebec independence supporters were content to advocate for new political groups like the “Rassemblement pour l’indépendence national” (rin), deface English-language street signs, and write reams of letters to editors denouncing Canada. rin provided legal cover for the nascent Front de libération du Québec (flq), which plotted “the violent overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of an independent socialist Québec state.”17 The Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the day saw their grievances couched in Cuban and Algerian national liberation terminology. Yet, they also harkened back to long-standing English–French animosity; the flq manifesto included the declaration that Quebecois must struggle, “until victory is ours, with every means at our disposal, like the ‘Patriotes’ of 1837–8.”18 Approaching the 1970 October Crisis, their alleged injustices were increasingly linked with labour issues, bolstering their support base by appealing to the historically militant Quebecois labour movement.19 Their tactics however became increasingly illegal and violent as the flq began striking, predominantly, symbols of government and English-language such as initially bombing postal mailboxes and militia armouries; their bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange at the height of the day’s trading, to strike a “telling blow at the heart of the capitalist system,” injured twenty-seven and caused $1 million damage.20 The first death from these attacks was hardly a symbolic victory – sixty-five-year-old William O’Neil, a night watchman at an army recruiting centre.21 Attacks grew more frequent, with the target set expanding

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to include not only “colonial” symbols but also nonsupportive Quebec citizens such as Montreal Mayor Drapeau. Tensions were heightened by growing international support such as De Gaulle’s “vive le Québec libre” proclamation during Expo ’67.22 British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte were kidnapped in October 1970 following pronouncements of “selective assassination” and heightened offensive operations.23 The government blamed “experienced agitators trained in Cuba, Algeria and elsewhere” and “serious unrest and tendency to [civil rights and anti-war] violence in US cities.”24 The government initially responded with increased federal spending in Québec and francophone affirmative action programs; these proved fruitless as international businesses departed the province in growing numbers. Only after receiving the communiqué that Laporte had been killed, were military troops requested. Against a backdrop of acrimonious debate regarding the War Measures Act’s virtually unfettered executive powers, while diminishing the authority of the legislative and judiciary, the army deployed the equivalent of two brigades of soldiers to provide security in Quebec and Ottawa.25 More than 450 people were detained under the War Measure’s Act, most of who were released without charges. While seemingly draconian and still not without controversy, a Gallup poll at the time revealed that 88 percent of all Canadians and 86 percent of Quebecers supported the government’s actions.26 Despite the era’s undercurrent of civil unrest, the bombings, kidnappings, and murders were simply too much for Canadian sensibilities. The combination of increased executive power and military security set the conditions for efficient police work, which located the key terrorists and freed James Cross, thus ending the crisis.27

Canada as a Safe Haven A long-standing anxiety with the antiterrorism community is that Canada not be seen as a safe haven – an exporter of terrorism. A former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (csis) noted that “with perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here than any other country in the world.”28 As noted previously, several Canadian-linked individuals were suspected of terrorism-related activities abroad.29 More remain within Canada, sup-

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porting their causes in various ways, such as training, fundraising, proselytizing. Notwithstanding the overwhelming attention drawn by jihadist extremism, to which we will turn momentarily, Canada has had a significant history of Sikh and Tamil extremism. Both diasporas actively support their homeland conflicts by taking active advantage of Canada’s liberal democratic environment.

The Canadian Face of Sikh Extremism Incited by the Indian Army’s attack on the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar – Sikhism’s holiest shrine – the June 1985 bombing of Air India 182 off the coast of Ireland brought violent Sikh extremism to home with shocking abruptness.30 The bomb blew a hole in the side of the Boeing 747, causing it to break apart and fall 31,000 feet to the Atlantic, killing all 392 people aboard. The subsequent review stated that the bombing resulted from “a conspiracy conceived, planned, and executed in Canada. Most of its victims were Canadians. This is a Canadian catastrophe, whose dimension and meaning must be understood by all Canadians.”31 The attack was the worst act of aviation, indeed travel, terrorism prior to the September 11th attacks. Sikh martial identity has been a dominant attribute, whether fighting stoically against the British during the nineteenth-century Anglo-Sikh wars or fighting as allies during the twentieth century’s wars.32 Slightly more than 36 percent of the globalized Sikh diaspora of 17 million reside in Canada.33 While the overwhelming majority are not a security concern, the dangerous minority are nonetheless cause for ongoing apprehension. The extremists’ long-simmering conflict is their fight for an independent Khalistan, driven by a fear of being absorbed by the majority Hindus.34 Successful Indian antiterror efforts have forced several groups to operate abroad. Three radical Sikh groups in particular operate in Canada: World Sikh Organization (wso), the International Sikh Youth Federation (isyf), and Babbar Khalsa International (bki), with the latter two included on the Public Safety Canada’s Listed Terrorist Entities.35 Domestic extremist violence has included attacks against the Indian consulates in Toronto and Vancouver and the 1986 assassination attempt against Punjab politician Malkiat Singh Sidhu while he was visiting Vancouver Island. However, it was the Air India bombings that brought Canadian radical Sikhs to international prominence. Fast forwarding to 2018, Canada revisited the 1986

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Sidhu assassination attempt when one of the convicted attempted murderers, isyf-member Jaspat Atwal, accompanied PM Trudeau on a state visit to India with the attendant international repercussions that entailed.36 This issue returned to the fore again in early 2019, when accusations of politicizing intelligence beleaguered the Public Safety minister for removing the term “Sikh” from the government’s 2018 annual terrorism report. The government response remains a sad testament. Most of the alleged Air India conspirators remained free for more than a decade before being arrested, then subsequently acquitted as the prosecution failed to make their cases. The result was described as a “cascading series of failures,” distributed across the agencies and institutions whose mandate is to protect Canadians’ safety and security.37 Specific failures are beyond the scope of this chapter, but they span destroyed evidence, in-fighting between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (rcmp) and csis, and embarrassingly poor investigative and intelligence tradecraft.

Tamil “Snow Tigers” Sri Lanka has been consumed by intermittent civil war for almost four decades; the island has never known a unified political identity, with this latest insurgency waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte, aka the Tamil Tigers) seeking an independent Tamil state. Although the Sri Lankan military claimed victory over the Tamil Tigers in 2009, this may be merely an operational pause. Not in dispute is that both sides resorted to extreme brutality. With up to 100,000 fatalities thus far, approximately one million Sri Lankan Tamils fled to escape the war, with most settling in Canada, the United Kingdom, or India.38 These émigrés tend to still have family members in Sri Lanka, with most having at least one family member killed, raped, or tortured in the war. Accordingly, there is a very strong hatred of the majoritySinhalese Colombo government.39 Conversely, ltte are guilty of heavyhanded terrorist fundraising practices such as extortion and kidnapping of their own people for ransom, with many Tamils lamenting their transformation from “potential saviour to a veritable oppressor.”40 Canada’s predominant response in combating the Tamil Tigers has been The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (fintrac). Canada’s “financial intelligence unit” is focused on curtailing money

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laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. fintrac reports that the ltte’s supposed military defeat notwithstanding, their international financial network persists, using Tamil charitable organizations as fronts to continue fundraising and procuring weapons.41 One other means of confronting violent extremism, deportation, has been less successful. Court battles to deport Manickavasagam Suresh, for example, confirmed that he should be deported “on the grounds he was a member of a terrorist organization and that he was complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity.”42 This case has dragged on for more than two decades; as of early 2019, he remains living in Ontario.

Contemporary Islamist Extremism There is no shortage of material covering modern jihadism and its various attributes. As with other ethnic/religious turmoil, interpretations of Islam provide some with diverse motivations for radicalization, wherein charismatic leadership plays a key role in convincing adherents to cross those “alienation” or “violence” thresholds. Evolving from the late nineteenth century’s Jamal al-Afghani to the more well-known bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, each compelling leader ushered in heightened ideological extremes to justify bloodshed.43 Their narrative is one of encirclement and oppression envisioning either violent mobilization or extinction. In one study of jihadist motivation, the overwhelming majority of respondents described a search for meaning in a foreign, secularized world; radical groups provided a clear sense of identity, purpose, and a sense of belonging.44 The uncertainty of these individuals is therefore transformed into grievances about social-identity marginalization and the difficulties of integrating culturally.45 Religious extremism in particular is noteworthy for its “moral reductionism, which ascribes simple causes, and their implicit remedies, to complex events.”46 For many, especially inherently frustrated and perplexed youth, simplistic imagery and emotions provide compelling appeal. Individuals can be radicalized through their attachment to family or friends, the latter of which may be long-term and preexisting, or it may be deliberately cultivated.47 Our most persuasive example would be Canada’s Khadr family. Similarly, we note a growing inclination for young women travelling

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to insurgent areas seeking romance and adventure. Their fantasy world however, in which the radicalized male insurrectionaries are perceived as “some sort of Robin Hood,” seldom has a romance novel ending.48 Increasingly we see online extremist sites facilitating such radicalization processes. Canada’s response to jihadist terror has included a wider range of options than with previous threats, which often tended to be a simplistic wielding of military, and to a lesser extent, judicial means. For example, Canada has recently used the criminal justice system much more frequently, as seen when “the Toronto 18” came to national prominence in 2006.49 This al-Qaedamotivated group plotted using vans filled with fertilizer bombs, small-arms fire, and videoed beheadings in targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Toronto csis headquarters, the Canadian Broadcasting Centre (cbc), and the parliament buildings. The mass carnage, which was to include beheading the prime minister, aimed to intimidate Canada into removing its troops from Afghanistan. Seven adults and one youth were found guilty. Sentences ranged from two-and-a-half years for the juvenile to seven years to life with citizenship revocation for the adults.50 Legislatively, Canada introduced new laws specifically in response to violent jihadist extremism. Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ata), was introduced within weeks of 9/11 and added new offenses to the Criminal Code of Canada relating not only to terrorist activity but also to the provision of money, property, and other forms of assistance to terrorist groups.51 Contentious issues remained however, due largely to the haste of its passage.52 The even more controversial Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015, was passed as a direct reaction to the attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa in 2014 – two unrelated incidents targeting military personnel, resulting in one death and one serious injury in the former and one soldier’s death in the latter. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 granted greater powers to law enforcement and csis to target terrorist activities. Many Canadians protested what they perceived to be the act’s overreaching powers, to an extent that put civil liberties at risk.53 Beyond judicial and legislative responses, Canada deployed military troops to Afghanistan, ostensibly to combat extremism – “to fight the forces of terror here [Afghanistan], and … to aid the Afghan forces in fighting it themselves.”54 Following the withdrawal of our main combat elements in 2011, training and a supportive security intelligence presence, predominantly

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Communications Security Establishment (cse) and Canadian Special Operations Forces, remained until 2014.55 Finally, Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (ctcbp) is operating or investing in thirty-nine countries globally. The program spans the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast and Southwest Asia, providing antiterrorism and counterterrorism training and equipment, as well as technical and legal assistance, to foreign states lacking these capabilities.56

Outliers Social Activists In Canada’s history of violence there are outliers that do not fit cleanly into other specific groupings, such as the more extreme social activists – people who become violently radicalized to support their cause, (animal rights or environmentalism for example). One such group was the 1980s “Direct Action” (aka “Squamish Five”), a small group of antiauthoritarian anarchists with a diverse range of grievances, who embraced and acted upon Mikhail Bakunin’s symbolic “Propaganda of the Deed.” In British Columbia, their attacks spanned vandalizing a mining company and the Environment Ministry for exemptions to environmental laws, bombing a Dunsmuir BC hydroelectric site, and committing arson at several Red-Hot Video pornography outlets. In Ontario, they injured numerous people in a vehicle bomb detonation outside of Litton Industries, which was producing components for the controversial American cruise missiles, then being tested over Canada. This string of high profile attacks and their crossing of interprovincial jurisdictions drew the attention of more than those they had hoped to motivate into committing similar acts of radical extremism; they were arrested by the rcmp in January 1983. The five members received sentences ranging from six years to life in prison.57

Right-wing Extremism Another outlier group of recently growing concern is right-wing extremism. Until recently, csis officials maintained that the radical right was not a

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significant a problem because its perpetrators were isolated and ineffective. This was despite several provincial security bodies, such as the Sûreté du Québec’s domestic terrorism division, noting that the majority of their active files dealt with the extreme right.58 Where csis admits to there being a problem, it is dismissed as a public order threat rather than being a national security issue. The year 2018, however, marked the first time that Public Safety Canada’s report on Canadian terrorism specifically mentioned right-wing extremism as a stand-alone category. In the previous year it had constituted much of the reporting data, police-reported hate crime increased by 47 percent between 2016 and 2017. While much of the data refers to haterelated property crime such as graffiti and vandalism, those conducting physical attacks have shown a propensity for increased violence.59 Today, there are approximately one hundred groups across Canada identified as right-wing extremist; up to one-quarter of them are established in Quebec, with Ontario close behind. This disparate group of extremists have no standardized grievances, beyond targeting “otherness.” A recent survey of target communities included aboriginals, Asians, blacks, Jewish, immigrants, Muslims, and lgbtqs.60 Significantly for our purposes, feelings of persecution are one of the recurring elements along the radicalization trajectory. Right-wing extremists will ostracize, physically and otherwise, minorities who are not like them, potentially contributing to additional radicalization in Canada. In concert with the increased extremism, is their efforts at rebranding their image, moderating hate symbol usage like the swastika, normalizing hate speech, and reducing attacks against nonwhites. The umbrella National Socialist Movement has openly stated that this public change is “a cosmetic overhaul only,” necessary to bring the group into public office.61 They are seeing some successes as a new generation emerges, capitalizing particularly on jihadist violence to justify a purist “European” identity and recruiting younger members through social media. A Calgary-based white supremacist group, Blood and Honour, stated that they targeting “13- and 14-year-old white kids who are looking for a cause to join,” while Montreal witnessed a protest by the neo-Nazi, anti-Islam group pegida, in which it was proclaimed to all Canadian Muslims that they are not welcome.62 Similar groups, such as the Soldiers of Odin, allege to be merely a nonprofit, charitable organization, interested in public safety while nonetheless conducting

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anti-immigrant vigilantism, which intimidates ethnic communities wherever this gang patrols the streets.63 More troubling than bullying hate crimes are the increasingly violent nature of physical attacks, such as Alexandre Bissonnette’s January 2017 mass shooting within a suburban Quebec City mosque, for which he was convicted of six counts each of first-degree murder and attempted murder. For motivation, it appears that he was bullied as a child and was recently self-radicalized with a newfound interest in far-right politics following French nationalist leader Marine Le Pen’s visit to Quebec City and the presidential election of Donald Trump.64 Government responses have proven controversial as observers feel that endeavours are either sadly muted or wild overreactions. For example, Bissonnette was charged with murder but, for reasons unknown, not under any of the recent terrorism legislation. A similar situation followed the 2014 killing of three rcmp officers by antigovernment ideologue Justin Bourque, police confusingly said that it was “terror but he’s not a terrorist.”65 Both responses created contentious claims of “white privilege.” Something as innocuous as parliament’s nonbinding bill M-103, a private member’s motion on systemic racism and discrimination against Islam in particular, became a lightning rod of wild accusations and political grand-standing.66 Many people, who had likely not read the M-103 text, irrationally claimed that it quashed freedom of speech for Canadians, despite the Canadian Civil Liberties Association rejecting the argument that freedom of speech was remotely impeded by this motion. Far right groups were well represented at the protests, ignoring the reality that private member’s motions merely highlight pertinent issues: they create no judicial precedent; they have no legal standing. Once again, the extremists’ protests targeted Islamic society. The protesters, by claiming that the authorities were not protecting them adequately, set the conditions for some to take matters unto themselves through vigilantism. The fear that this evokes in the targeted community thus creates a counterresponse of increasing radicalization. It is a vicious cycle.

Aboriginal Anger 2.0 The 1990s was a time of increased native unrest, based upon very disparate grievances, yet retaining underlying echoes of nineteenth-century

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aboriginal and Métis issues – namely, lack of political voice in decisions affecting their lives. While not as violent as other extremist movements, they warrant consideration as continued frustrations, plus the history of some of their members taking up arms against government authority, place them within the radicalization continuum. The 1960s civil rights movements, ranging from peaceful, legal protests to the Black Panthers, may provide some research insights into the potentially changing relationships between non-native Canadians and aboriginals. The seventy-eight-day Oka Crisis was sparked by the expansion of a golf course and condominium development by the Quebec town of Oka onto land claimed by the Kanesatake community, which included a Mohawk burial ground. The nearby Akwesasne territory continues ongoing disputes, often exacerbated by internal politics regarding gambling and claims of illegal smuggling. Tyendinaga has ongoing land claims, asserting that their territory was sold improperly. The Kettle and Stoney Point Bands seek recompense for the appropriation of their land for the Ipperwash military camp in 1942. While the list is lengthy, their tactics have some reoccurring consistency. For example, bridges have been blocked by Kanesatake and Akwesasne, and the Tyendinaga blocked the busiest rail corridor and national highway. Regrettably, armed protests escalated to include several deaths. A Sûreté du Québec officer was killed in a brief gun battle at Oka, and a Mohawk elder died on the Kanesatake blockade. Two people died in factional fighting over casinos at Akwesasne, causing a police “occupation” of the territory. Ipperwash protestor Anthony (Dudley) George was shot by the Ontario Provincial Police. Oka was the site of the most visible government response as local police claimed that they did not have the resources to handle an estimated 600 “insurgents” including approximately 10 percent hard-core Warrior Society radicals “equipped with some 500 weapons ranging from ak-47s and M-16s to .50 calibre sniper rifles and either rpg-7 or 66mm law anti-tank weapons.”67 The government returned to the default of sending in the army, with approximately 2,500 military personnel deployed. The army advanced, backed with armoured vehicles, shrinking the perimeter until the natives surrendered. Those arrested were held in military custody, fearing police retribution for the death of the constable killed in the standoff.

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So, What Does This Mean? As noted, this chapter provides only a cursory overview intended to provide context for current efforts rather than being a comprehensive inventory. A fuller picture is necessary, as designing countermeasures based upon incomplete or incorrect premises is a sure recipe for failure. We have seen that radicalized violence is neither new nor is it limited to the current spotlight on jihadism. The results of such a limited perspective play out daily before, for example, Canadians in Mali where radicalization is fomented by a broad spectrum of challenges – economically driven criminality, disaffected uneducated youth, climate-aggravated food and water shortages. Yet national and international leadership remains focused on the one-dimensional antijihad effort of hunting extremists, a la “wack-a-mole.”68 Rather, collective grievances have varied, with radicals embracing egalitarian, anarchist, secessionist, or many other concerns, yet we often see commonalities.69 Armenian attacks on Turkish targets within Ottawa in the 1980s are similar to Tamil and Sikh extremist actions. Some Islamist groups’ preferences for their own Sharia law echo Dukhobors eschewing Canadian law throughout the early twentieth century. Violent aboriginal land disputes have dragged on for more than 150 years.70 There is an underlying theme of frustrated lack of empowerment; people feeling that government is denying them an effective voice in how they believe society ought to run. Whether the issue is property rights, religious practices, or environmental concerns, the narratives are remarkably similar. There is also a recurring similarity to government responses. Canada’s reaction to radicalized violence falls into three broad categories: military, judicial, and legislative. Calling out the military was almost a default reaction for the government. Canada’s early police systems were often rudimentary English-style constabulary, unevenly distributed beyond major cities. The rcmp’s precursor, the North-West Mounted Police started as more of a militarized light cavalry than what we currently think of as a law enforcement force. From full-scale rebellion to raiding illegal prizefights, the highly militarized nwmp represented authority. Today the military is more properly the force of last resort rather than the first option. Historically, the judiciary has responded quite harshly to those who have disturbed our staid peace. It was not uncommon for radicals to be hanged

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or banished to the far side of the planet. Lower-tier followers faced lengthy prison terms and forfeiture of their property and possessions. The flq leaders who negotiated safe passage to Cuba preferred escaping the judiciary, however, rather than face legal punishment. Legislative responses to violent radicalization are relatively recent in Canadian history. Before its inclusion in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, Canada lacked a legal definition of terrorism for prosecution purposes.71 The government addressed this shortcoming, almost with a vengeance. Contemporary antiterrorism legislation is often tabled in response to freshly occurring violent deeds, occasionally linked to, at first glance, strange bedfellows such as antigang or money-laundering decrees. Perceptions of the legal responses inevitably fall between overreactions infringing unnecessarily upon our civil liberties and claims that these laws are “too little– too late.”72 One response that has been largely absent from Canada’s history is preemptively addressing the underlying issues that are cited within manifestos or conspiratorial talk intended to radicalize others. While some extremist demands can never be met, a majority of disgruntled individuals may be dissuaded from turning to violence through early and effective intervention. The remaining contributors to this book will endeavour to fill this gap in Canada’s legacy of violent extremism. As with health care, prevention is more cost-effective in many ways than the cure.

n otes 1 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Countering the Terrorist Treat in Canada: An Interim Report” (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2015), iii, 1. 2 Canada’s history appears to concur with the critiques of David Rapoport’s “wave theory” of terrorism, which posits discrete movements, rather than more virus-like “strains” with evolutionary learning of tactics, etc., such as envisaged by authors like Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Terrorism,” Theoretical Criminology 14, no. 2 (2010): 131–53. 3 David Charters, “The (Un)Peaceable Kingdom? Terrorism and Canada before 9/11,” irpp Policy Matters 9, no. 4 (2008): 12.

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4 Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), chapter 9. 5 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 73; Allan Greer, The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), chapter 8. 6 Allan Greer, “1837–38: Rebellion Reconsidered,” Canadian Historical Review 76, no. 1 (1995): 8. 7 Shaun J. McLaughlin, “The Patriot War: Attempts by Canadian Rebels and American Citizen Allies to Establish a Republic,” in “The 1837–38 Upper Canadian Rebellion,” special issue, Australasian Canadian Studies 29, no. 1–2 (2011): 27. 8 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 76. 9 Colin Read, The Rising in Western Upper Canada, 1837–1838: The Duncombe Revolt and After (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 84–5. 10 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 74. 11 John George Lambton, Earl of Durham, Report on the Affairs of British North America, 1839. York University Collection, https://archive.org/details/report onaffairso00durh. 12 Canada, Library and Archives Canada, “Louis Riel,” http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/ eng/discover/aboriginal-heritage/metis/Pages/louis-riel.aspx. 13 John Grodzinski, “A Modicum of Professionalism: The Canadian Militia in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, ed. B. Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 118–22. 14 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 99–101. 15 Joseph Boyden, Extraordinary Canadians: Louis Riel and Gabriel Dumont (Toronto: Hamish Hamilton, 2013), passim. Many Métis subsequently sold their properties to speculators, for resale to farmers, squandering the government’s efforts to reduce radicalizing factors. 16 Desmond Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867–1914,” Canadian Historical Review 51, no. 4 (1970): 407. 17 Sean Maloney, “A ‘Mere Rustle of Leaves’: Canadian Strategy and the 1970 flq Crisis,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 2 (2002): 72. 18 “Manifeste d’Octobre 1970,” Site historique, Front de Libération du Québec,. http://www.independance-quebec.com/flq/octobre/manifeste_manifeste70. html. Author translation.

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19 Anthony Kellett, Bruce Beanlands, and James Deacon, Terrorism in Canada 1960–1989 (Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1991), 17. 20 Ibid., 261. 21 Christopher Hewitt, “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: The Political Consequences of Separatist Violence in Quebec, 1963–70,” Journal of Conflict Studies (then titled Conflict Quarterly) 14, no. 1 (1994): 9–29; Michael McLoughlin, Last Stop, Paris: The Assassination of Mario Bachand and the Death of the flq (Toronto: Viking, 1998), 23–4. 22 Jeffrey Ian Ross, “The Rise and Fall of Québecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 4 (1995), 287–92. 23 Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the flq (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 26–8. 24 Canada, Privy Council Office, “Defence Policy Review (Feb 1969),” cited in Maloney, “A ‘Mere Rustle of Leaves’,” 75–6. 25 Craig Forcese, National Security Law: Canadian Practice in International Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), 167. See also “Letters from the Quebec Authorities requesting the Implementation of the War Measures Act (October 15–16, 1970),” http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/ october/index.htm. 26 Lee E. Dutter, “Why Don’t Dogs Bark (Or Bomb) in the Night? Explaining the Non-Development of Political Violence or Terrorism: The Case of Québec Separatism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 1 (2012): 62. 27 Loomis, Not Much Glory, 142–3. 28 Ward Elcock, 1998 csis director, in Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World, Revised Edition (Mississauga: Wiley, 2005), 3. 29 Canada, Public Safety Canada, 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (2014), 3, 7. Canada, Public Safety Canada, 2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (2016), 7. 30 Kellett et al., Terrorism in Canada 1960–1989, 66. Sikh revenge for the Amritsar attack also included the assassination of then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, for having ordered the attack. The killing of Ms Gandhi triggered the mass murder of nearly 3,000 Sikhs in Delhi.

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31 Canada, Air India Review Secretariat, “Lessons to be Learned: The Report of the Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, on Outstanding Questions with Respect to the Bombing of Air India Flight 182” (2005), 2, chapters 4–6, passim. Additionally, two airport baggage handlers in Japan were killed by a suitcase bomb destined for Air India 301 as part of the same plot. 32 A. Walter Dorn and Stephen Gucciardi, “The Sword and the Turban: Armed Force in Sikh Thought,” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 1 (2011): 52, 64. 33 C. Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no.1 (2005): 129; Canada, Statistics Canada, “2011 National Household Survey,” http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/130508/dq130508b-eng.htm. 34 Carl H. Yaeger, “Sikh Terrorism in the Struggle for Khalistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 14, no. 4 (1991): 222. 35 Maryam Razavy, “Sikh Militant Movements in Canada,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 80; Bell, Cold Terror, 17–18. Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/ cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#2018. 36 David Cochrane, “Trudeau’s India Visit Marred by Invite of BC Man Convicted of Attempted Murder,” cbc, 22 February 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/ news/politics/trudeau-india-atwal-controversy-1.4546502. Atwal was also associated with the 1985 assault of BC Premier Ujjal Dosanjh, who was attacked with a tire iron for speaking out against Sikh extremist violence. Dosanjh suffered a broken hand and received eighty stitches in his head. 37 Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, “Dossier 2: Terrorism, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement – Canada’s Response to Sikh Terrorism” (19 February 2007), 6, 11. Canada, Privy Council Office, “Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy. Volume One: The Overview” (17 June 2010), 83. 38 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1023 n3. 39 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement,” 139. 40 DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 1032. 41 Canada, fintrac, “Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity Financing Watch: July–September 2011,” (2011), 15.

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42 Stewart Bell, “Federal Court Upholds Deportation of Tamil Tigers Fundraiser Who Has Fought to Stay in Canada for 22 Years,” National Post, 16 January 2017, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/federal-court-upholdsdeportation-of-tamil-tigers-fundraiser. 43 Haroro J. Ingram, “Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy,” Flinders Journal of Law Reform (retitled The Flinders Law Journal in 2015) 10/3, (2007/8): 504–6. 44 Stijn Sieckelinck and Micha de Winter, eds., Formers & Families: Transitional Journeys in and out of Extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and The Netherlands (The Hague: National Coordinator Security and Counterterrorism, 2015), 13, 87–8. The author wishes to thank Dr Ghayda Hassan (uqam) for recommending this excellent study. 45 Christian Leuprecht et al, “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 30. 46 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 80. 47 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 53–4. 48 Mark Silinsky, Jihad and the West: Black Flag over Babylon, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 83–4. 49 The author is grateful to the rcmp inspector working in the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre for providing insights that changed my opinion of the seriousness of this group. 50 Isabel Teotonio “Toronto 18,” The Star. http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto 18/index.html. 51 Rosalind Warner, ed., Unsettled Balance: Ethics, Security, and Canada’s International Relations, (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2015), 110. As of 2015, twenty-six people have been charged under the Anti-Terrorism Act and fourteen have been convicted. Canada, Public Safety Canada, “The Government of Canada’s Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11,” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/ cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/sptmbr-11th/gvrnmnt-rspns-en.aspx. 52 Canada, Department of Justice, “Views of Canadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001),” http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/ antiter/rr05_1/toc-tdm.html. The author was fortunate to have participated in this review. 53 Jim Bronskill, “Bill C-51: 4 Former PMs Call for Better Intelligence Account-

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ability,” The Canadian Press, 19 February 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 2015/02/19/former-pms-call-for-bette_n_6713018.html. 54 Brian Laghi and Bill Curry, “PM Warns Afghans of Dissent in Canada,” Globe and Mail, 15 March 2006. 55 Canada, Communications Security Establishment, “Chief, cse Appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence,” 21 March 2016, https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/media/media-2016-03-22. 56 Public Safety Canada, 2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 22–3. 57 Ann Hansen, Direct Action: Memoirs of an Urban Guerilla. (Chico, ca: ak Press, 2002), passim. Author’s discussions with Ann Hansen and a friend who requested anonymity. The Dunsmuir hydroelectric bombing alone caused $5 million in damages. Upon the judge pronouncing key member Ann Hansen’s life sentence, she threw a tomato at him – rebellious to the end. 58 Donald Quan, “Right-wing Extremist Groups ‘Prevalent’ across Canada, Study Warns,” National Post, 10 February 2016, 2. 59 Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Domestic and Multi-Issue Extremism.” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-rprt-tr rrsm-thrt-cnd-2018; Canada, Public Safety, 2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (Ottawa, Public Safety, 2018); Statistics Canada, Policereported Hate Crime, 2017, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/ 181129/dq181129a-eng.htm. 60 Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, “Right Wing Extremism in Canada: An Environmental Scan (2015),” Ottawa: Kanishka Project, 2016, 13–14. Catherine Solyom, “The Trump Effect and the Normalization of Hate in Quebec,” citing an unnamed report by Perry and Scrivens (see previous citation), Montreal Gazette, 14 November 2016, http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/thetrump-effect-and-the-normalization-of-hate. 61 US, State of New Jersey, Department of Homeland Security and Preparedness, “The Face of White Supremacy in 2017 (Unclassified),” 12 June 2017. 62 Blood and Honour Movement, http://28canada.com/membership; Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, “Uneasy Alliances: A Look at the Right-Wing Extremist Movement in Canada,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39, no. 9, (2016): 820. pegida comes from the German acronym for the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West. 63 Daniel Gallant, Countering Right-Wing Extremist Radicalization Where to

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take our policy toolkits next (Ottawa, unesco, May 2017), 7–8; Stewart Bell, “Soldiers of Odin Splinter in Canada over ‘Racist Agenda’ of Far-right Group’s Leadership in Finland,” National Post, 1 May 2017, http://news.nationalpost. com/news/canada/soldiers-of-odin-splinter-in-canada-over-racist-agendaof-far-right-groups-leadership-in-finland. 64 Global News, multiple reports, http://globalnews.ca/tag/alexandre-bissonnette/. 65 Solyom, “The Trump Effect and the Normalization of Hate,” citing Dr Barbara Perry. 66 Monique Scotti, “What You Need to Know about the Anti-Islamophobia Motion Making Waves in Ottawa,” Global News, 17 February 2017, https:// globalnews.ca/news/3256675/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-anti-islamo phobia-motion-making-waves-in-ottawa. Andrew Kemle, “Wording of M103 Bill Vital to Its Meaning,” The Gauntlet, 21 March 2017, http://www.the gauntlet.ca/wording-of-m103-bill-vital-to-its-meaning. 67 Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Issue No. 55, March 19, 1991 (Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 84; J. A. Roy, “Operation salon,” Canadian Defence Quarterly (April 1991), 15–19. 68 Robert Martyn, “Radicalization in Mali: A Primer,” Policy Brief (Kingston: Queen’s University, Centre for International and Defence Policy, November 2018). Author’s discussions with senior minusma officers who must remain anonymous. 69 Bard O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed (Washington dc: Potomac Books, 2005), 20–8. 70 J.R. Miller, “Great White Father Knows Best: Oka and the Land Claims Process,” Native Studies Review 7, no. 1 (1991): 25. 71 Anti-Terrorism Act, Subsection 83.01(1), in Craig Forcese, National Security Law: Canadian Practice in International Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), 167. 72 Forcese and Roach, False Security, chapter 1.

4 An Analytic Survey of the Canadian Academic Literature on Religion, Radicalization, and Terrorism ali dizboni

Secular academic literature in Canada (in French and English languages), in social science and mainly political science, has resisted consideration of religion as a focal point of research. While concepts such as Islam and Muslims have gradually made headway in current Canadian scholarship on terrorism, radicalization, and counterterrorism, available data is not as abundant as in other major Western countries and even less so with regard to Islam as an analytical factor. Most Canadian writings focus on religion and the public sphere as they relate to Canadian debates on multiculturalism (or interculturalisme), integration, accommodement raisonnable rather than security matters per se. Despite the paucity of research on faith and terrorism in Canada, it is however essential to take stock of the current academic literature on such topics given its omnipresence in public discourse and commentary.1 Such a literature review is missing in Canada and the current survey chapter is a step toward filling the gap. Furthermore, countering violent extremism (cve) in Canada not only needs to be informed of the dynamics of radicalization but also about the consequences and implications of cve responses in broader society. Informed cve policy process and community responses and practices need to bridge with the academic scholarship in order to better grasp the causes of radicalization and to prevent it. When it comes to religion and extremism, this dialogue becomes more necessary to public framing and actions. Essentialism, culturalism, and populism are important threats to the success of cve policies.

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The terror attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing vicious cycle of invasions, wars, and religious radicalization pushed Canadians to reflect on the future of Islam in open societies, on its violent aspects, and its reconcilability with democracy in an age of ever more rapid globalization. For many, such developments underlined the validity of the popular thesis that international politics would increasingly be characterized by a clash of civilizations in which an embattled West would face a number of ever more assertive challenges from religious and cultural forces abroad. Critics of Canadian multiculturalism and proponents of assimilationist theory have in fact embraced variants of the “clash” theory and triggered heated controversies and backlashes as a result. Irshad Manji, a Canadian Muslim scholar and author of the nonapologist book The Trouble with Islam, was one of the first to break the taboo. Manji argues that the orthodox understanding of Islam is in fact incompatible with modernity and democracy and proposes a reinterpretation of the Quran to liberate Islam from the preachers of violence. Similarly, but using a political science approach, I suggest in the book Islam and War (2011) that classical Islam, including its largest component the sharia, is in a paradigm crisis and that its epistemological and methodological characteristics impede its internal dynamism for reform and for intersubjective, interhorizontal dialogue with broader aspects of human philosophy and science.2 To be sure, academic research on Islam, terrorism, and radicalization in Canada does have its challenges. Lorne Dawson argues that it is plagued by methodological limitations, most notably explanatory gaps, and primary data and heterogeneity problems.3 The explanation problem refers to establishing a specific type of explanatory correlation to account for why and how some, out of many n, walk the path of violent radicalization. The second problem refers not only to the fact that occurrences of radicalization are limited and, more importantly given legal and security measures, to gaining access to sources. As Dawson says, interviews, provided they can be conducted, have dubious credibility. Finally, the heterogeneity issue refers to the variety and diversity of types of discourses, actors, and processes of jihadism and radicalization. For example, determining how to distinguish between nonreligious and religious motivations and reasons for violence or between processes of homegrown radicalization and foreign-originated terrorism given visibly different experiences and paths.

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Mindful of these limitations, in the following literature survey, the Canadian social science research on Islam/Muslims, Canadian security, and radicalization can be categorized as dissociationist and associationist (or correlationist and noncorrelationist,4 i.e., with the role of Islam in radicalization and terrorism serving as the chief point of contention). The following literature review is by no means exhaustive but selects a number of peer-reviewed research in Canada which tackle the relationship between Islam in Canada and radicalization. They examine this relationship from different angles such as integration, securitization, radicalization, and terrorism. What unites these publications is their focus and interest in the relationship between Islam and radicalization in Canada. In other words, this chapter seeks to shed light on what we know about how Canadians radicalize. The survey did not limit itself to a specific field but covered a variety of Canadian French and English publications from different academic disciplines and approaches such as sociology, political science, religious studies, psychology, and anthropology. Empirical research on Islam and terrorism in Canada tends to focus more on the weight of the Muslim faith in the process of radicalization than on specific terror incidents. Few available works focus on the relationship between the integration of Muslims in Canadian society and its potential impact on extremism and radicalization. Peer reviewed literature is generally cautious and nuanced in establishing a causal relation between Islam and homegrown jihadism or Canadian foreign fighters. Again, the reason is either related to the three methodological pitfalls noted above or to general paradigm resistance of social scientist scholarship.5

Dissociationism Part of the surveyed literature can be categorized as dissociationist (i.e., rejecting a correlation between Islam and terrorism/radicalization) for lack of consistent proof. Here, Islam is viewed as neither a primary nor a secondary driver of radicalization.6

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Islam, Integration, and Radicalization in Canada A number of studies incorporate elaborate interview methodology to investigate Muslim attitudes in Canada and Muslim perceptions of their place and contribution to the larger society. Here, while the primary focus is on integration, scholars also discuss the relation between integration and the propensity for radicalization. Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking questioned the dominant thesis on Muslim un-integrability and the propensity of Canadian Muslim youth towards radicalization.7 The mainstream perception of supposed Muslim alienation and vulnerability to radicalization is even found in the highest security and political echelons in Canada. Bullock and NesbettLarking quote the following from Andrew Ellis, director general of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (csis) who, at a public speech in Toronto, noted that, “in interviews with young Canadian Muslims [he] is often told ‘I can’t participate in the political process because it’s against my religion.’”8 This semistructured in-depth interview with twenty young Muslims in the Greater Toronto Area (gta) and London, Ontario, sampled male and females from different socioeconomic and religious backgrounds, explored “these young citizens’ concepts of political participation; conceptions of the self as a political actor; formal, informal, and civic political involvement; and the relationship between their religious and Canadian identities.” Contrary to the dominant mainstream perception associating Muslims with extremism, the research concludes that these interviewees, while both acknowledging and feeling mainstream social perceptions towards young Muslims, show an impressively high degree of political participation and civic engagement. Furthermore, and possibly the most intriguing observation by these researchers is the following: “Some of the least vigilant in their daily prayers are also the least interested in politics. If associations are actively seeking to develop deep piety in their adherents as well as positive and deeply engaged citizens, these groups should not be targeted by the security forces.”9 This proactive, civic engagement of Muslims in Canadian public affairs and civil society is seen in similar research on Muslim integration in Canada. The following study inspired by critical social theory is but one of such examples. Kinvall and Nesbitt-Larking say:

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[T]hose who live within the cracks of the securitized order, who are designated other and outsider, or the enemy within, find themselves dislocated by the reconfigurations of borders that take place as regimes respond to uncertainty and threat. Through the agency of the dialogical self and profane acts of resistance, young Muslims demonstrate a capability to engage citizenship regimes in various ways, to adapt and to challenge through assertive remapping of social space.10 In a much broader sampling of Canadian Muslims using different longitudinal (2002, 2006, 2016) surveys on their integration in Canada, McCoy, Kirova, and Knight reach the same conclusions. Using the criteria of the sense of belonging, they found that the majority of surveyed Muslims show a strong sense of pride and belonging to Canada, despite the environment of securitization and suspicion.11 In French Canada, the research on Muslims in Quebec reaches similar conclusions. Garneau emphasizes the diversity of Moroccan migrants and their differences among each other and with Moroccans in Morocco.12 She warns against the culturalization approach towards social phenomena and suggests an inherent plurality in the immigration trajectories.13 Strategies of social actors are inherently a plural by-product of concrete political, cultural, social, and economic facts. Fortin, LeBlanc, and Le Gall also warn against the essentialist and use a much broader and diverse sample of Muslims in Montreal (i.e., Lebanese, West African, and Maghrebis-north Africans).14 These researchers reject the essentialization of Islam in the Montreal context and, much like the previous research, argue that the sociability of these communities and their identity strategies are the product of interaction between religion, ethnicity, and culture, rather than a simple function of religion.15 A stronger expression of dissociationist hypothesis can be found in those researches that attribute the radicalization to the consequences of counterterrorist measures. These scholars discuss the external impediments to integration, potentially driving Muslims towards marginalization and ultimately radicalization. Patti Lenard posits that multiculturalism in Canada is under significant stress and suggests that the Muslim minority, regardless of its diversity, is viewed with suspicion, “the failure of these newest migrants [Muslims] to integrate effectively, it is claimed, demonstrates that

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multiculturalism has failed.”16 As to the difficulties that Muslims in Canada face in the process of integration, she mentions external impediments to integration in Canada: First, Muslims are constantly asked to demonstrate loyalty to the countries in which they live. They are asked to denounce acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam, even when these acts are in no way connected to them (Van Den Brink, 2007). They are asked in other words to “take responsibility” for their “brethren” abroad, in spite of the fact that they often share very little (if anything) in common with them. The worry that Muslim migrants may not be democratic, and moreover that their loyalty is necessarily towards an illiberal, and global, Muslim community, is frequently expressed.17 This version of dissociationism is echoed in some of the Canadian researches on securitization. Jamil provides deeper and more encompassing social content to the external impediments and drivers that can block integration: “securitization affects more than the individuals and groups drawn to radicalization. Securitization is part of the contemporary socio-political context which shapes the way Muslim communities are perceived in society, particularly the way in which they are collectively identified as ‘guilty by association’ and viewed as potential threats, terrorists, fifth columnists, or a danger to national security.”18 In sum, these works on integration and its implications for radicalization pivot on a key hypothesis: more integration equals less radicalization or, put differently, radicalized persons demonstrate little or no integration. Current research on terrorism in Canada does not fully corroborate this “immigration integration hypothesis” and generally finds it reductionist: “the ‘immigration–integration hypothesis’ thus contributes to an understanding of predisposing risk, but does not by itself offer a compelling, comprehensive explanation of differential rates of terrorism. Rather, it seems that a number of factors have combined to afford Canada a degree of ‘protection.’”19 It is true that the relatively low degree of Muslim radicalization in Canada cannot entirely be related to the degree of their integration in the Canadian society. Research on British, French, and known Canadian cases show that

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some violent Muslim radicals have, in fact, been socio-economically integrated in their host societies.20

Islam and Terrorism in Canada Unlike the previous scholars, this group of dissociationist researchers focuses more directly on the linkages between Islam and political violence in Canada. The work of Peter Beyers is illustrative. Using different samples and methodology, Beyers’s à la Cavanaugh does not find enough evidence to establish causality or a significant correlation between Islamic faith and practice on one hand and a potential for violent radicalization on the other.21 In fact, much like the previous research on Muslim youth in the gta and London, he even suggests that Islam could be an immunizing factor against radicalization.22 Scott Flower and Deborah Birkett study the hypothesis of the relation between inherent radicalism in Islam regardless of its demographic and social components.23 Their work on conversion to Islam concludes that: [T]here is no evidence supporting a “conveyor belt” mechanism of radicalization from conversion to terrorism. It is important to emphasize that although conversion and radicalization might on the surface involve similar changes in beliefs, attitudes and behaviour, radicalization is functionally different because it is a process in which new beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours are deployed and heightened in preparation for, and [with a] commitment to intergroup conflict. This in and of itself means that conversion to Islam alone is not a valid or reliable predictive indicator of whether a person is likely to radicalize.24 This observation could be supported by the fact that radicalization is more complex than simple religious conversion.25

Associationism Yet, the majority of reviewed research on Islam and terrorism in Canada tend to be associationist to varying degrees. This research is not explicit or clear

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on the conception of religion in relation to terrorism and radicalization. Religion is variously referred to as jihadist ideology, violent discourses, belief system, and so on. It is easier to posit that correlationists do not rule out Islam from the complex explanation of terrorism but generally avoid efforts to measure the exact explanatory weight they assign to it. Notably, however, a survey of the literature fails to yield a single work that considers Islam as the sole or even the leading cause of terrorism. Associationist scholarship is examined below and is organized into thematic subsections.

Methodological Necessity (recognizing the legitimacy of the investigation of religion in research on security) As in the case of any other religion, Islam is considered as part of what humans do. As such, normal methodological practice would be to consider the weight of religion in political violence. Ian Reader acknowledges the significance of the correlation. Although admitting that violence is not the monopoly of a religion, ideology, or a state, Reader rejects Cavanaugh’s thesis on The Myth of Religious Violence and believes that removing the religious component from violence would be very misleading from both an academic and practitioners’ perspective.26 “Those who seek either to separate religion from violence on the grounds that religion is peaceful and ‘good’ or to deny that there can be a category of religious violence are evading the reality of religion as part of the human world and as potential factor in and qualifying agent of violence. Certainly ‘religion’ is not some fixed identifiable entity with a timeless nature; rather it is a conceptual category created by humans as a means of explaining or analysing the world.”27 Reader’s chapter is representative of that part of the academic tradition that views religion as a significant explanatory factor in understanding violent groups such as al-Qaeda, isis, Aum Shriynko, Zen monks, Christian medievalists, bible-reading British racists, and so on.28 This methodological precision is reflected more clearly in a recent research focusing on new ways of conceiving homegrown terrorists in Canada. Typical is the work of Zekulin, who suggests using the “Islamist inspired” epithet for homegrown jihadism. By doing this, he argues, the current literature gains clarity and the

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response to homegrown terrorism would be more focused and mindful of its transformations.29 Thinking on Islamist inspired homegrown terrorism will shift our focus from the “endgame” to its original inceptions and drivers – from prevention of actual violent acts to the detection of radicalization symptoms. It will also help to distinguish between homegrown extremists based on domestic issues (such as right-wing violence) from domestic terrorism that is directly inspired by an age-old international Islamist ideology. This ideology survives and transcends lone wolves, cells, and groups and inspires Islamists in different shapes and forms. Here, Zekulin calls for recognizing “that the primary driver behind this type of terrorism is the global jihadist narrative … Those traveling from Western countries to Syria and Iraq are predominantly doing so of their own volition. They are not necessarily in contact with leadership or recruiters from specific groups who assist them or facilitate their travel and assimilation.”30

Jihadist Ideology Another body of research focuses on motivational factors in the process of radicalization. Here, two important observations stand out. The first is not about Islam and faith but rather Islam as an ideology – a very modern phenomenon in its political aspirations and rhetoric. The distinction is largely used to separate motivations in the radicalization process (e.g., from political to religious to ideological). The latter may include both secular and religious terrorism. Al-Qaeda discourse could be interpreted as a religious ideology as it combines Islamic teachings with modern radical political discourse with the aim of destabilizing or capturing political power. In other words, and as Olivier Roy notes, al-Qaeda radicalizes Islam rather than the other way around. Second, this ideologization is highly political, simplified, and encapsulated or coined at times as “pop Islam.”31 The following quotation captures three layers of adherence to the jihadist ideology: It is generally possible to distinguish among a) individuals who show at least some evidence of adhering to jihadi ideology … b) those who appear to be particularly committed to the cause (“Hardcore”) as evidenced by such factors as sustained and varied activities in support

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of terrorism, often including first-hand experience of violence, and c) ideological outliers (individuals who appear to be involved for distinct reasons such as personal motives or financial gain) … Canadian jihadis, both before and after 9/11, appear to have been primarily ideologically motivated by a combination of anger at foreign policy, a religious sense of social identity along with religiously-framed justifications for violence, an altruistic desire to help fellow Muslims in conflict zones, and a desire for revenge against the perceived enemies of Islam. This motivational melting pot appears to have remained relatively stable over time, albeit with shifts in the specific locations of concern and the targets of anger.32 The key driver of Muslim radicals is not religious, i.e., spreading the message of Islam, proselytism, and the defense of Islamic preaching. Rather, such radicals use Islam for their primary ideological purposes, an anachronistic adaptation of a historical religion to the realities of twenty-first-century political struggle and frustrations.

Combinationists This group of associationists assign different measures of explanatory weight to the faith. Dawson’s research on the explanatory weight of Islam in inspiring or motivating the so-called Toronto 18 terrorist plot33 as well as Canadian foreign fighters34 is broadly used by this community of scholars. Although he is more cautious in establishing any explanatory linkage between Islamic faith and the Toronto 18 plot itself, Dawson proposes that religion per se was less a factor in inciting violence in and of itself.35 That said, its interaction with other factors such as identity and age created a more explosive cocktail. He concurs with current research on religion and radicalization: “given the age-old functional linkages between religion and identity … and the role of the transcendent in sacralising causes, it should come as no surprise that religious ideologies – no matter how unsavoury – can continue to play a role in the contention over ultimate ends in our cultures and lives.”36 The faith factor and the existential quest for meaning take primacy in a more recent research on foreign fighters by Dawson and Amarasingam. Contrary to the bulk of European research on Dutch and Belgian foreign

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fighters, which emphasize push factors i.e., socioeconomic grievances, they emphasize pull factors i.e., “the search for greater meaning as a motivation for their hijrah (religiously justified migration) to Iraq and Syria.”37 One can read this explanation as more constructivist in terms of cognitive meaning construction by the agents. The interviewees in this research assign strong moral and religious commitment to their decision to join their victim brethren in Iraq and Syria despite the general absence of push factors in Canada.38 Unlike previous researchers who focused on actual terrorist events and actors, another set of associationist (combinationist variant) quantitative and high-impact research by Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn examines the radicalization process among at risk communities. In general, radicalization is defined very broadly and can range from sympathizing to actual support and engagement.39 More specifically, such work notes that “radicalization per se … is not necessarily problematic” and adopts as its focus “a particular subset of radicals: people who sympathize with, justify or feel a personal obligation towards politically motivated violent extremism or associated illegal acts.”40 Surveying an at risk Muslim community in the nation’s capital (Ottawa), the research focuses on attitudinal variation towards issues (such US politics in Middle East, views on states such as Israel and Iran and/or groups such Hamas and Hezbollah) relevant to three following radicalization factors: “[First,] general social, financial and political satisfaction or dissatisfaction; a second related to moral and religious satisfaction or dissatisfaction, including dissatisfaction associated with political support for groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah; and a third [dependent variable] (among Muslims only) related to high levels of religious activity, small religious group participation and support for groups that break the law.”41 One study in this vein concludes that these dissatisfactions will likely create conditions for radicalization in at risk communities: As dissatisfaction with life increases across the social, financial and political dimensions, respondents become more active and involved with political groups. As dissatisfaction with the religious and moral world increase, respondents become more overtly religious and more positive towards terrorist groups. As dissatisfaction with both life and the religious and moral world increases, respondents become more overtly

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religious in ways that involve high-frequency and small-group religious activity, and they show a willingness to admit to supporting organizations that fight oppression even if they break the law.42 Simply put, a coexistence of life frustrations with the religious world aspirations significantly increases the possibility of at risk Muslim individuals engaging in violent radicalization. Like Dawson and Amarasigam, these researchers recognize the factor of the quest for meaning (pull factors) but give to it a weight equal to material frustrations (push factors).43

Conclusions The keynote speech for the John Porter Award at the 2016 annual Canadian Sociological Association (Congress of Humanities, Calgary) was on the book The Muslim Question in Canada.44 Coverage of the terrorist event in Quebec City (2017) by The Economist cast doubts on Canadian multiculturalism and raised questions on the place of Muslims in Canada, like other places in the West.45 Academic discussion on the relation between religion (here Islam) and radicalization in Canada has taken many forms and paths. One group addresses the issue of Muslim integration in Canadian society by exploring the internal and external impediments or drivers to radicalization. Their assumptions are first, that a greater dose of integration leads to a lower propensity to radicalization and second, that the Muslim faith per se is not an obstacle to Muslim self-definition as fully Canadian. Consequently, any lack of integration should be sought in other external factors such as securitization and issues related to social trust and public perception. This fundamental assumption is questioned by others who believe that integration is a polyformous concept and greater integration in Canada does not necessarily reduce grounds for radicalization. In fact, counterfactual cases such as that involving Martin Rouleau and/or other seemingly well-integrated extremist Muslims would undermine the integration thesis. Reviewed associationist research, in its most elaborate academic form, is combinationist. Islam, framed as a spiritual and moral vision of life and a quest for identity (who am I? and emptiness) would create more incentives for revisionism and radicalization when coupled with other factors such as

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deep frustrations and grievances at material levels. It should be underlined however that even the latest debates on the prominence of the religious factor – the existential quest for moral meaning and identity definition – is conjectural in its conceptual framework as well as limited in its methodology. As acknowledged by these scholars, more methodological refinement and empirical evidence is required to inform further research. The Canadian government cve framing of radicalization marks a clear shift from the previous administration whose conception had focused on Islamism as the highest threat to Canada. The liberal approach to cve in Canada is departing from the conservative government’s conception of counterterrorism. The liberal government discourse de-emphasizes religion as a key driver of violent radicalization and implements its preventive measures in a more comprehensive approach against violent secular and religious ideologies. For example, community-based cve is a cornerstone to the overall government cve measures. Partnership with private and nongovernmental actors seems necessary to both the design and the implementation of cve policies. This chapter can only hope to contribute to the cve debate by presenting a survey of Canadian peer reviewed academic publications on linkages between Islam as faith, practice, identity, and radicalization process and dynamics in Canada.

n otes 1 The significance of religious factors in security in Canadian public discourse and in government reports is discussed in Ali Dizboni and Christian Leuprecht “Framing, Brading and Explaining: A Survey of Perceptions of Islam in the Canadian Polls, Government and Academia” in Islam in the West: Perceptions and Reactions, ed. A. Ata and J. Ali (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018). This study demonstrates that religion remains a prominent concern in opinion surveys, think tank reports, and government public decision making. The academic research tries, increasingly so, to catch up and contribute more objectivity to the mainstream discourses. 2 The work focused on the case of war (jihad) to demonstrate the stagnant and ahistorical thinking of later generations of Muslim sharia jurists on jihad. Relying on the insights of the hermeneutic school and international relations field, the book suggests paradigmatic changes in Muslim thinking in the

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modern age in terms of a methodological shift towards the historical and empirical interpretation of foundational scriptures and events. The sharia doctrine on jihad, the research suggested, should dialogue with the modern tradition of “just war,” which evolved extensively from its early Christian and Roman foundations. 3 Lorne Dawson, “Trying to Make Sense of Home-Grown Terrorist Radicalization: The Case of Toronto 18,” in Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond, ed. P. Bramadat and L. Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 4 Here any reference to causality is deliberately avoided. The content of the available literature does not suggest such a positivistic inference and correlation. 5 This resistance brushes aside the faith as an ontologically independent variable or explanatory factor reducing it to its social effects and functions in a broader context and nexus of human and group motivations and interests. 6 For a discussion on categories of causation in this debate please see Amanda Monroe and Fathali Moghaddam, “Is Religious Extremism a Major Cause for Terrorism,” in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, ed. Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 107–34. 7 Katherine Bullock and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, “Becoming ‘Holistically Indigenous’: Young Muslims and Political Participation in Canada,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 185–207. 8 Ibid., 185. 9 Ibid., 201. 10 Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, “Securitising Citizenship: (B)ordering Practices and Strategies of Resistance,” Global Society 27, no. 3 (2013): 337–59. 11 John McCoy, Anna Kirova, and W. Andy Knight, “Gauging Social Interaction among Canadian Muslims: A Sense of Belonging in an Age of Anxiety” Canadian Ethnic Studies 48, no. 2 (2016): 21–52. 12 Stéphanie Garneau, “L’émigration marocaine au Canada : contextes de départ et diversité des parcours migratoires,” Diversité urbaine 8, no. 2 (2008): 163–90, 163. 13 Ibid. 14 Sylvie Fortin, Mari-Nathalie LeBlanc, and Josiane Le Gall, “Entre la oumma, l’ethnicité et la culture : le rapport à l’islam chez les musulmans francophones de Montréal,” Diversité urbaine 8, no. 2 (2008): 99, 99–134.

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15 Ibid. 16 Patti Lenard, “The Reports of Multiculturalism’s Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” Politics 32, no. 3 (2012): 186–96, 191. 17 Ibid. 18 Uzma Jamil, “The Impact of Securitization on South Asian Muslims in Montreal,” in Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond, ed. Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 146. See also chapter 3 in Baljit Nagra, Securitized Citizens: Canadian Muslims’ Experiences of Race Relations and Identity Formation Post -9/11 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2017); chapter 7 in John S. McCoy, Protecting Multiculturalism: Muslims, Security and Integration in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018). 19 Sam Mullins, “Global Jihad: The Canadian Experience,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, (2013): 734–76; 760. 20 Lorne Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 191–210. 21 Peter Beyer, “Securitization and Young Muslim Males: Is None too Many” in Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond, ed. Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 22 Ibid. 23 Scott Flower and Deborah Birkett, “(Mis)Understanding Muslim Converts in Canada: A Critical Discussion of Muslim Converts in the Contexts of Security and Society,” no. 14-06, 25 December 2018, http://www.tsas.ca/wp-content/ uploads/2018/03/TSASWP14-06_Flower-Birkett.pdf. 24 Ibid. 25 Research on converts’ radicalization in urban middle class France and their involvement in foreign fighting, demonstrates that conversion to Islam is not directly related to their conversion to violent extremism and is embedded in the complex dynamics of young social groupings. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation (Paris: Éditions de la maison des sciences de l’Homme, 2014). 26 Ian Reader, “Beating a Path to Salvation: Themes in the Reality of Religious Violence,” in Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond, ed. Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 27 Ibid., 57.

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28 Ibid., 58 29 Michael Zekulin, “Endgames: Improving Our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 1 (2015): 46–66. 30 Ibid. 31 Olivier Roy, L’Islam mondialisé (Paris: Seuil, 2002). 32 Mullins, “Global Jihad,” 748, 756. 33 Dawson, “Trying to Make Sense.” 34 Dawson and Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters.” 35 Dawson, “Trying to Make Sense.” 36 Ibid., 86. 37 Dawson and Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters,” 193. 38 Ibid. 39 David B. Skillicorn, Christian Leuprecht, and Conrad Winn, “Homegrown Islamist Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (2012): 929–56, http://post. queensu.ca/~leuprech/docs/articles/Skillicorn_Leuprecht_%20Winn_2012_ Homegrown%20Islamist%20Radicalization%20in%20Canada_Process%20 Insights%20from%20an%20Attitudinal%20Survey_Canadian%20Journal% 20of%20Political%20Science.pdf. 40 Ibid., 929. 41 Ibid., 930 42 Ibid., 951. 43 Ibid. 44 Abdolmohammad Kazemipur, The Muslim Question in Canada (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2014). 45 Not to mention the recent elections in Quebec where caq (Coalition Avenir Québec) came to power with strong views on Muslim immigration.

5 Incorporating Community Perspectives in CVE and Community-based Policing Strategies tabasum akseer

In recent years, a prominent and common challenge facing western democracies is the fight against terrorism and countering violent extremism (cve), including radicalization. There is an increasing impetus on governments and institutions to address the “root causes” or “drivers” of radicalization. Thus, a global response of programs and policies have been designed to help eliminate or mitigate these “drivers” as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism (ct) strategy. Such programs and policies are prevalent in countries including the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, and Canada and within international organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (unctitf), Hedayah, and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (gctf). A contentious term, cve has a variety of definitions. For the purposes of this chapter, cve refers to programs and policies for countering and preventing radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism as part of an overall counterterrorism strategy and framework. [cve is] inclusive of strategic, non-coercive counterterrorism programs and policies including those involving education and broad-based community engagement; more targeted narrative/messaging programs and counterrecruitment strategies; disengagement and targeted intervention programs for individuals engaging in radicalization; as well as deradicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programs for former violent extremist offenders.1

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Within the “softer” side of counterterrorism is the pertinent role of “non-traditional security actors such as teachers, social workers, community leaders, youth, and women in addition to the traditional ct actors such as policymakers, senior government officials, police officers and intelligence officials.” A softer cve approach involves coordination between government bodies that are not traditionally linked and an awareness of the potential side effects of the “cve” label in threatening the credibility or safety of nontraditional security actors working within communities.2 Community outreach has become a practical alternative to the “hard” counterterrorism tactics, particularly among Muslim communities, and particularly through policing, hailed as integral to cve initiatives. In fact, among national and institutional initiatives mentioned previously, a cornerstone identifies community policing “as a legitimate channel of any legal authority to reach communities at risk.”3 In the 2010 American National Security Strategy, “national security draws on the strength and resilience of our citizens, communities, and economy.”4 Further, in a speech to American Muslims, the deputy national security advisor to the American president, stated, “the best defense against terrorist ideologies is strong and resilient individuals and communities.”5 Community policy is a partnership between police and local community members, relying on a blend of reactive approaches to service and proactive approaches to problem solving.6 In the United States, local police departments have been applying community-policing strategies that were successful in reducing urban crime and gang violence to counterterrorism work in Muslim communities.7 Consequentially, the role of community policing has become more widespread among policy makers seeking preventative ct goals and Muslim community leaders concerned with protecting the civil liberties of their constituents.8 In the Canadian context, the 2013 official counterterrorism strategy Building Resilience against Terrorism contains some preventative elements focused on building partnerships between government agencies and local communities.9 Other Canadian initiatives include the Calgary Police Department’s ReDirect campaign, focused on countering the radicalisation of young people; the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence in Montreal; the Campaign Against Violent Extremism (a partnership between

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the British Columbia Muslim Association and the rcmp); and Voices Against Extremism, in British Columbia.10 There is an obvious tendency among various initiatives to focus on specific communities, in particular the Muslim communities.11 In addition to (in)directly promoting Islamophobia, American cve programs geared towards Islamic extremism involving and/or engaging only Muslim communities are perceived as veiled attempts to increase surveillance by law enforcement agencies.12 In fact such initiatives are scrutinized and met with suspicion from Muslim communities.13 In the American context, scholars argue such practices have increased tension between law enforcement and Muslim communities, where the latter feel obligated to monitor and report on one another within their community.14 To understand the unintended consequences of security measures, we draw from the field of surveillance studies, particularly David Lyon’s concept of “social sorting” which explains the processing of personal data by agencies to influence, direct, and manipulate behaviour in daily life; the unequal deployment and effects of surveillance systems15 where there is a tendency to operate as mechanisms for societal differentiation. The “unfair sorting of populations” creates unintended consequences that can lead to “chilling effects” which describes a context where “individuals seeking to engage in lawful activity are deterred from doing so by a governmental regulation not specifically directed at that activity.”16 As Lyon argues, there is little empirical research on the “unintended consequences” of security measures, particularly on the ways surveillance practices reinforce social division and feelings of exclusion in certain communities. Similarly, Sherene Razack argues that it is unknown to what degree these measures mark “insiders” from “outsiders.”17 Thus, this research addresses this gap by offering empirical evidence of how certain communities are marked as “outsiders” and the accompanying “unintended consequences.” Limited qualitative evidence exists on the “unintended consequences” of security and surveillance of Muslims, including radicalization and insecurity of the state. These consequences can contribute to a “culture of fear” among Muslims.18 In fact, anti-Muslim policies and sentiments lead to what Naber refers to as an “internment of the psyche” where Muslims internalize

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negative messaging, leading to Muslim men’s behavioural shifts and desire to be viewed as a “good Muslim.”19 In the Canadian context, less information is known about the “unintended consequences” of surveillance and security practices, particularly intelligence gathering practices, on Canadian Muslim communities. Drawing from doctoral research on the “chilling effects” of security and surveillance practices, the following chapter seeks to address this gap. Data from a survey (50n) of Muslim and non-Muslim Canadian men reveal the disproportionate effects of security and surveillance measures, with Muslim men experiencing consequences that are not shared by non-Muslim men. Further, findings from open-ended interviews with Muslim male participants (20n) reveal that policy, intelligence and policing practices, media, and political rhetoric have unintended consequences within the Muslim male community. These consequences impact participants’ sense of identity and belonging, and can contribute towards disenchantment with state, feelings of helplessness, increased insecurity of minority communities, and in some cases, even radicalization and extremism. First, this chapter draws out key concerns Muslim male participants share in regards to policing and intelligence gathering practices. Second, this chapter will highlight Muslim male participants’ suggestions for positive and meaningful approaches in which the state, including law enforcement and intelligence communities, media, and policy makers can work alongside Muslim communities to address violent extremism without undermining their sense of belonging, security, and dignity. Perspectives offered by participants fill a gap in our understanding about how current security policies and practices influence minority communities, and the endless potential of community-based dialogue. This paper concludes with insights on how these findings could be effectively employed in countering violent extremism and community-based policing/crime prevention strategies.

Method To further explore the Canadian Muslim communities’ perceptions of security and surveillance practices, including policing and intelligence gathering practices, and the consequences for security, Akseer20 employed mixed

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methods including a survey (50n) and interviews (20n). In the first phase of her study, Akseer focused on quantitative data gathered through a selfdeveloped cross-sectional survey design administered to Muslim (25n) and non-Muslim (25n) men. The survey aimed to assess if the introduction of laws and other security measures impact an individual’s knowledge/ awareness of surveillance and security measures; perception of surveillance and security measures; and the subsequent “chilling effect” of surveillance and security measures; and if they have resulted in any behavioural changes. While the second phase of the study – open-ended interviews with 20 Muslim men – does not claim to be an ethnographic study, techniques from ethnography were used to understand and explore the way of life from the perspective of participants.21 Given the dearth of research on the unintended consequences of ct and cve measures in the Canadian context, the openended interview data provides valuable insight into how these particular members of the male Muslim population perceive and respond to Canadian securitization efforts. Some limitations to this research study are evident. It is based on an empirically small sample size (n=50 survey, and n=20 open-ended interviews) and does not make any claims to represent all Muslim/Arab men in Canada. As this is not a randomly selected sample, it cannot be generalized to the wider Canadian population but rather it can be used to provider richer insight into the experiences of a marginalized group. Drawing on survey data (50n) of Muslim (25n) and non-Muslim Canadian (25n) men shows the disproportionate effects of security and surveillance measures. To further explore their experiences, open-ended interviews with Muslim male participants (20n) reveal that certain security and immigration policies, policing practices, media, and political rhetoric have unintended consequences within the Muslim male community.22 Results from the open-ended interviews are shared in this chapter where Muslim males share their experiences and concerns in regards to policing and intelligence gathering practices. Second, this chapter will highlight Muslim male participants’ suggestions for positive and meaningful approaches in which the state, including law enforcement and intelligence communities, media, and policy makers can work alongside Muslim communities to address violent extremism without undermining their sense of belonging, security, and dignity.

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Findings A part of a larger mixed-methods study, Akseer found the disproportionate impact of surveillance and security procedures on Muslim versus nonMuslim men, where the former experience negative unintended consequences. Muslim men identify the role of securitized speech and political rhetoric as creating Islamophobia and insecurity among their communities. This insecurity leads to fear, suspicion, and anxiety among Muslim communities. In other words, unlike non-Muslim men, Muslim men experience a chilling effect on their civil liberties including their mobility, speech, association, and freedom of thought. The chilling effect is more pronounced along lines of race, where Muslim men who are darker skinned are unable to “blend in” or “pass off as white,” unlike lighter skinned Muslim men involved in the study. Darker skinned Muslim men, particularly those residing in smaller, white-dominant cities (such as Kingston, Ontario) are more likely to suppress their identity and monitor their outward appearance through personal grooming (ie., avoiding facial hair) or dress (ie., avoiding wearing religious garments such as the thobe). Among all Muslim men, there is greater pressure for transparency, avoiding the “suspicious gaze” and “making sure you have nothing to hide.” Participants also highlighted the fact that the increased insecurity and Islamophobia can at times be counterproductive as it can lead to radicalization and extremism, particularly among youth who feel disenchanted with the state. Contributing to the disenchantment, fear, anxiety, and suspicion among Muslim men in the study, participants identified surveillance and policing/ intelligence collection practices as problematic and counterproductive. In particular, the presence of intelligence officers at mosques, in their homes, and places of work, along with the pressure to cooperate with intelligence officers left participants feeling uncomfortable and at times, violated.

Presence at Mosques during Prayer Times To begin, participants describe the presence of intelligence officers in mosques as being “nosy” and intrusive, and an infringement on a space that is meant for prayer and devotion. The feelings of helplessness and disenchantment with the state indeed increase with the presence of “nosy

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intelligence officers” and “informants” (Participant 017) within mosques and community organizations. “Being interrogated by random government agents for barely being related to specific religious groups … or for example in my case, simply being a Muslim” (Participant 017) exacerbates negative feelings towards the government. Other participants describe unexpected visits from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (rcmp) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (csis) to mosques as offensive and intrusive. Participant 042 complained, “when they [rcmp or csis] show up … they are not looking for help, they are looking for information so that they can point fingers and create tension … it is scary. I cannot think what new immigrants who are not use to police presence must feel when they see rcmp and csis snooping around and asking people questions at the mosque. It’s not effective at all. If you want information, ask respectfully.”

Unannounced Home Visits In addition to unannounced visits to mosques, participants found it intrusive and offensive when intelligence officers visited their homes. According to the same participant (017), in addition to visiting the mosque and “ask[ing] the Brothers what they know of me, they [csis] talk to my wife if I am not home. This is disrespectful … they basically asked me to cooperate, but why should I? So they can harass other innocent Muslims too?”

Unwanted Contact in Place of Employment and with Coworkers Participants also shared their frustration when coworkers and colleagues are approached for information. Participant 027 who is also frequented by csis, complains, “csis contacted a co-worker’s ex-husband to ask if he knew anything unusual about me [laughs]. I’ve only ever spoken to my coworker at work, and yet they think her ex-husband would know something about me? I have nothing to hide. The only reason they harass me is because I am a Muslim male.” Another common frustration among participants is a sense of obligation to cooperate with intelligence officers. This obligation extends to the pressure to cooperate and act as informants, while at the same time assuming transparency. Participant 048 contends it is such pressure that leads to resentment

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within the Muslim communities, “we purposely try really hard not to be perceived as if we are hiding something. There is more pressure to be open and transparent, especially with law enforcement. If rcmp asked a Muslim guy ‘Hi can we talk to you?’ He is going to say ‘Yes of course, I have nothing to hide, let’s talk’ but with a non-Muslim, they … would be more guarded and protect themselves from unwanted questioning.” An interesting issue raised here is the question of whether non-Muslims experience the same pressure to cooperate. The same participant explains further: “with the new laws that we are going to pass, a Muslim or Arab does not want to be charged with something crazy like ‘refusing to cooperate in an investigation’ [laughs] [Muslims] try harder to show that they can be trusted, they have nothing to hide, they haven’t done anything.” However, despite the discomfort and pressure to cooperate, participants practiced due diligence and assert their trust in the judiciary, rule of law, and respect for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They are reassured of their Canadian identity and that the actions of intelligence officers are understandable, however questionable and offensive. Despite the “distrust for the Harper government … there is also a deep trust and appreciation for the judiciary and the rule of law” (Participant 044). Participants maintain the Muslim community is made up of law-abiding citizens. Participants acknowledge they are important partners in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. However, it is simply the process of collecting intelligence from within the communities that should be addressed to ensure “mutual respect and understanding” (Participant 001) between the law enforcement and Muslim communities. In particular, participants highlight specific roles for both the government and Muslim communities in ct and cve initiatives.

Suggestions for Community Policing and Law Enforcement/Intelligence Gathering Practices Need for Softer Approaches Participants suggest alternative ways that governments can work with communities to counter violent extremism and discourage homegrown rad-

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icalization. A good place to start is by avoiding “criminaliz[ing] individuals because of immigration issues” (Participant 030). In fact, according to some participants, softer approaches are available to the government “[in] understanding the Muslim community … [particularly] the new immigrants” (Participant 033).

Avoid Preferential Treatment of Certain Muslim Communities over Others Participants advocate more respect and tolerance from law enforcement and a halt to the biased practice of “picking favourites among the Muslim communities … [such as the] Ahmadiyya and Ismaili communities … simply because [they are] better established … have more money, a louder voice” (Participant 034).

Need for Greater Transparency and Communication with Muslim Communities The theme of collaborative work between Muslim communities, law enforcement, and government agencies is prevalent. Participant 046 calls for more transparency and communication with Muslim communities, more effort in “building a pathway with the communities … through intermediaries between law enforcement and … ‘trusted individuals’ [within the Muslim communities].” Participant 030 rationalizes “a better tool to fight Islamophobia is to promote positive interaction. More openness and transparency towards faith and culture is the way to go.” The result can be fruitful for both sides, according to participants including Participant 034: “if they [government] just ask nicely, for whatever information they need, whatever support they need, whatever they want – just ask nicely and respectfully. You will get more help.” An increase in communication between communities and law enforcement is vital but cannot happen overnight. As Participant 009 explains “obviously it’s not something that happens overnight but over the long run, with the coming generations, [with] the kids growing up.” Participant 033 states, “if you are worried about some kids being radicalized, well then instead of blaming the Muslim community, why don’t you say ‘Hey let’s talk about

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what is going on. Let’s work together because this is a problem that affects your community and the country.’” Indeed, promises of “making inroads with the Muslim community … showing respect for all our beliefs, and our practices” (Participant 013) will certainly go a long way.

Acknowledgement of Muslims as also Victims of Terrorism and Islamophobia Another issue participants raised is that Muslims too have been victimised by acts of terrorism and Islamophobia. Law enforcement and government agencies need to acknowledge this. Participant 036 suggested, “Muslims feel misunderstood by the government … [and] want to understand this problem of terrorism and radicalization … Muslims are suffering [globally] by terrorist organizations like isis and the Taliban … And domestically, Muslims are suffering because of the negative stereotyping and the bias, so [they] have a lot to lose.” There is an awareness of the impact of negative and stereotypical rhetoric in media, policies, and policing practices. Participant 030 explains phrases like “Islamicism” and “mosques being breeding grounds for terrorism” will result in a “push back.” Therefore, the solution is to “stop singling out the Muslim community … If the government is serious about rooting out terrorism with genuine leaders in the community and not ‘self-proclaimed’ leaders who fuel Islamophobic claims, which will lead to more division and polarization. We need to organize all the communities together.”

Developing Trust and Mutual Respect Overall, participants agree that the best approach is for the government to “empower leaders, religious leaders, ethnic leaders within a community to let them take charge. And then to treat them with dignity and respect that they can call Canada home” (Participant 027). The benefits of treating Muslims with respect and understanding is evident in a statement by Participant 017 who declares: “Once I feel like I am being fairly treated by the government as the rest of its citizens I will do anything in my power to cooperate with the government agencies in fighting against terrorism.”

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Some Suggestions Offered for Mosques, Community Leaders and Members In addition to suggestions for law enforcement and government agencies, participants also offered ways in which the Muslim community can better position themselves in relation to the state.

Encouraging Strong Leaders and Unity Participants suggest that while the Muslim community does have some strong leaders, there should be more onus on them to “denounce activities that lead to terrorism” (Participant 013). For example, several participants refer to a prominent Toronto leader, Shaykh Yusuf Badat, who is active and vocal within the Muslim mosques. Participant 001 states, “Brother Badat23 always mentions in his khutba,24 we have to be part of this broader community, with this local politics, national politics, international politics, as a Muslim community. Then we can raise our voice … to be effective.” And, Participant 036 discusses the importance of community engagement as promoted by Shaykh Badat: “[he] is always talking about how as a community we need to voice our concerns with our local MPs, we need to be more involved in the discussion and overall narrative. [He] is a great leader who … promotes dialogue and understanding among Muslims and non-Muslims.” According to participants, religious leaders can promote the importance of a united community. Having a stronger voice can only happen if Muslims are united. Participant 048 states Muslims “are unrepresented in politics, but we can fix that by being a stronger more united group.” Others stressed the importance of unity and strengthening the Muslim voice at the provincial and federal levels. Participant 042 urges for “better representatives” of Islam who can use their platform to confidently say “No, that does not represent us; here is what our religion is all about.” Participants stress the importance of an alternative narrative, a united voice so that “if any of these terrorist threats do rise up, the community is going to protect itself together … the government won’t need to get involved at all, and the stronger the bond the community grows, the lesser the impact the terrorists will have in terrorizing the community” (Participant 023).

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Participant 030 suggests making positive changes “starts with thinking and one’s mentality to begin with. Especially our immigrant background … we need to start taking care of our surroundings and see it as home, rather than a pit stop.” Participant 009 suggests Muslims be more “more inviting towards non-Muslims” and Canadians need to “coexist.” Some participants highlight the importance of openness of Muslim communities in thwarting suspicion, and avoid forming “closed groups … something [that] might cause … suspicion” (Participant 019).

Fostering Civic Engagement The potential of civic engagement is also highlighted, particularly when some participants suggest engaging troubled youth in civic responsibility. Here the importance of promoting civic engagement (particularly with youth and those at risk) is highlighted by several participants who place the responsibility within Muslim communities. Participant 030 organizes frequent community-building initiatives with Muslim and non-Muslim youth, “civic engagement is not just about talking about being good Muslims, if we are unable to have an impact at the political level and contribute as active citizens, then we don’t have a strong claim to being more respected. It starts not just at politics, but in civic leadership too. We need strong public relations in community, a well-coordinated public relations with genuine municipal relationships.”

Increasing Awareness and Education In addition to the various ways in which Muslim/Arab communities can increase openness, transparency, and engagement, participants also recommended increasing awareness and promoting knowledge sharing within their communities. For example, one of the problems Participant 001 highlights is that “basically we [Muslim community] are not aware of these laws and orders, whatever is going through Ottawa … our understanding, whatever we get through this local media … and this could be one way or another [this could be true or false].” The lack of awareness and knowledge of the measures is seen as a limitation by Participant 002 who states, “if I know that hanging out with a group of guys late at night,

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and there’s four of us with beards, and that’s bad from the government side, then we shouldn’t be doing it. Even though we’re not doing anything bad, I don’t know how the government looks at stuff but whether it’s like phone calls or your airplane itinerary, your conversations online, we don’t know what kind of stuff gets tagged. But we should know that.” Participant 013 also agreed “… all that has to happen is a little bit of education.”

Using Media Awareness/Engaging with Media In previous sections, participants express criticism of the media for promoting Islamophobia, however, social media and the Internet are identified as possible avenues where Muslims can and do offer an alternative perspective. The Internet is a venue where “people are more aware of what’s going on than they used to be … It gives us a chance to portray ourselves.” Participants use the Internet “to facilitate a more positive understanding of Muslims” (Participant 034). Participants believe that since they have little control over television and print media, the Internet is a better alternative because “it’s [a] free … and effective way to present what our religion and culture is all about. We can start by making sure we create a positive image on our Facebook, Twitter, and other social media accounts. By acting like good role models, good citizens, people will know what our religion is all about” (Participant 034). Essentially the Internet can be used with an overall goal of countering terrorist claims and ideologies within troubled communities. The importance of the “online world” plays a significant role in providing counter-messages to youth in the real world. Participant 025 uses the Internet to suppress the voices of “some among Muslims, as I say there are some among other groups or other communities who have some ideas which can be related to terrorism … need to recognize that among us there are some people who have crazy ideas … we need to take responsibility as Muslims … to teach our true religion via forums, blogs, posts etc.” The importance of counternarratives is important. Some participants suggest using the same tactics used by terrorist groups online to create counternarratives and encourage youth to reject extremist messaging. Participant 036 suggests

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[T]he Internet should be used to create an alternative narrative so that youth who find certain terrorist ideology appealing, can rethink it by accessing more accurate information. There should be a discourse online that there isn’t a war against Muslims or Islam, because that is what isis is telling our youth to think, and unfortunately some youth do buy into it. So instead of being silenced online and letting the voices of isis or whatever terrorist group thrive, we need to be just as rigorous in creating those counternarratives and delivering them through Facebook or Twitter whatever mechanisms isis uses. One participant suggested the importance of promoting a stronger Canadian identity as an effective counter-messaging tool for radicalized youth: “instead of going down this path to radicalization, if there is counter messaging, they, you know, they can say to themselves ‘Hey listen, no, it’s not what you think it is. Canadians don’t hate us, Canada isn’t out to get Muslims … And so, we reject that type of messaging that you are trying to bring towards us’… the messaging from isis, or al Qaeda, or any other extremist organization … a tool, to reject extremism, is having that sense of [Canadian] identity” (Participant 046). Further, in addition to stressing the importance of civic engagement and being a part of the political process, participants encourage Muslims to vote, volunteer, and engage in charity such as “feeding the poor, caring for neighbours, that leads to better communities, and it’s mandated in the Quran … youth engagement are practical approaches to these issues” (Participant 030). Participants note Muslims have become more politically aware “in recent years.” There is an increase in “grassroots Muslim organizations that are encouraging Muslims to go out and vote” (Participant 044). Such changes are tremendous, as according to the same participant, while there may not be a “100% voter turnout in the Muslim community … it will be much higher than in previous years.” In sum, interviews with Muslim male participants offered insights on improving community policing and law enforcement/intelligence gathering practices. Suggestions include the need for softer approaches; avoiding preferential treatment of certain Muslim communities over others; need for greater transparency and communication with Muslim communities; acknowledgement of Muslims as also victims of terrorism and Islamophobia;

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and, developing trust and mutual respect with Muslim communities. Participants also offered advice on how the Muslim community can strengthen their relationship with one another and with the state, through encouraging strong leaders and unity; fostering civic engagement; increasing awareness and education; using media awareness/engaging with media. Perspectives offered by participants fill a gap in our understanding of how current security policies and practices impact Canadian Muslim communities, and the endless potential of community-based dialogue. Indeed, both Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies need to collaborate in a respectful and mutually beneficial approach. Best practices from existing partnerships already indicate the potential for success. For example, both the rcmp National Security Awareness and Community Outreach program and the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security have been noted, however more work needs to be done to improve trust and respect between communities and government.

Policy Recommendations This chapter concludes with insights on how these findings could be effectively employed in countering violent extremism and community-based policing/intelligence gathering practices. The recommendations below are focused at the level of federal policy making because security and surveillance measures, including policing and intelligence gathering approaches, trickle down from that level. Federal policy changes that take into account the civil liberties and dignity of individuals, regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or citizenship should be considered and policies that (in)directly target specific groups should be changed. For example, it is evident that some measures have a disproportionate impact on Muslims. Policies such as these will continue to divide neighbours and lead to further instability. Political rhetoric indeed contributes to anti-Muslim sentiment; speech acts are intrinsically linked to security.25 When political leaders use words like “Islamicism” or associate terrorism solely with Muslim communities, the ramifications of such comments can lead to further insecurity both within Muslim communities and for society in general. Political leaders (and

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their speechwriters) should be aware of the dangers, for themselves and for the Canadian population at large, Muslim or non-Muslim, of such labels. The promotion of civic engagement among Muslim communities is essential. The prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment has been linked to “years of political apathy” among the Muslim community. Where voter turnout is below the national average, politicians in a “disengaged electorate” can (and have) used Muslims “as fear bait for a political party to mobilize its base and consolidate power.”26 We do not know if the Muslim population in Canada is similarly disengaged, and the 2015 elections did witness a surge in Muslim voter turnout.27 However the momentum must be actively promoted within and beyond Muslim communities so that the next federal election sees stronger Muslim representation.28 Despite increased interest among politicians, law enforcement, and scholars in understanding and countering violent extremism in Muslim communities, some research studies tend to infer a link between radicalization and Muslim youth.29 Comprehensive work is necessary to first assess whether there is a correlation between security and surveillance measures, Muslim youth and radicalization. It should be noted that a correlation between these variables does not infer a causal relationship.

n otes 1 Sara Zeiger and Anne Aly, Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an Evidence Base for Policy and Practice (Abu Dhabi: Hedayah and Curtin University, 2016). 2 Sara Zeiger, Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism (Abu Dhabi: Hedayah and Curtin University, 2015). 3 M. Alper Sozer, Ali Seving, and Suleyman Ozeren, “Perception of Police Officers in Countering Violent Extremism: An Exploratory Study,” http://s3. amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/38727267/M.Alper_Sozer_Percep tion_of_PO_in_CVE.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Ex pires=1494011344&Signature=auLNxNPe9ifyMmaBuErJ4WQHpoQ%3D&re sponse-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DPerception_of_ Police_Officers_on_Communi.pdf. 4 The White House, National Security Strategy (The White House, 2010),

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security _strategy.pdf. 5 D. McDonough, “Remarks at the Adams Center. Sterling, Virginia. March 8th, 2011,” http://blog.dhs.gov/2011/03/video-deputy-national-securityadvisor.html. 6 M.R. Haberfeld, Joseph F. King, and Charles A. Lieberman, Terrorism Within Comparative International Context: The counter-terrorism response and preparedness (New York, ny: Springer Publishers, 2009). 7 Stevan Weine, “Building Resilience to Violent Extremism in Muslim Diaspora Communities in the United States,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 5, no.1 (2009): 60–73. 8 Sahar Aziz, “Policing terrorists in the community,” Harvard National Security Journal 5, (2014): 147. 9 Although scholars criticize the strategy’s approach as being more reactive rather than proactive and preventative, see for example T. Jacoby, “How the War Was ‘One’: Countering Violent Extremism and the Social Dimensions of Counter-terrorism in Canada,” Journal for Deradicalization 6, no.1 (2016): 272–304. 10 Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, “Voices Against Extremism: A Case Study of a Community-based cve Counter-narrative Campaign,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 10 (2017): 147–74. 11 Ibid. 12 John D. Cohen, “The Next Generation of Government cve Strategies at Home: Expanding Opportunities for Intervention,” The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no.1 (2016): 118–28; Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrell, and Andrew Zammit, “What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring cve Policy and Practice in Australia,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 8, no.1 (2015): 6–24; Suraj Lakhani, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities,” The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 51, no. 2 (2012): 190– 206. 13 Macnair and Frank, “Voices Against Extremism.” 14 Hedieh Mirahmadi, “Building Resilience against Violent Extremism: A Community-based Approach,” The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no. 1 (2016): 129–44; Basia Spalek, “Community Engagement for Counterterrorism in Britain: An Exploration of the Role of

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“Connectors” in Countering Takfiri Jihadist Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 10 (2014): 825–41; Basia Spalek, “Radicalisation, De-radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation in Relation to Families: Key Challenges for Research, Policy and Practice,” Security Journal 29, no. 1 (2016): 39–52. 15 David Lyon, Surveillance After September 11 (London: Polity, 2003). 16 Gayle Horn, “Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New fbi Guidelines,” New York University Annual Survey of American Law 60 (2005): 735–49. 17 Sherene Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 18 Nadine Naber, “The Rules of Forced Engagement: Race, Gender and the Culture of Fear among Arab Immigrants in San Francisco post 9/11,” Cultural Dynamics 18, no. 3 (2006): 235–67. 19 Tariq Ramadan, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim,” New Statesman 139 (2010): 22–5. 20 Tabasum Akseer, “Understanding the Impact of Surveillance and Security Measures on Canadian Muslim Men: a Mixed Methods Approach” (dissertation, Queens University, 2016). 21 Paul Atkinson et al., Handbook of Ethnography (SAGE Publications, 2001). 22 Akseer, “Understanding the Impact of Surveillance.” 23 See http://www.islamicfoundation.ca/ift/directory.aspx/full_time_school/ yusuf_badat for profile of Shaykh Badat. 24 Religious sermon delivered during weekly Friday afternoon prayers. 25 Thierry Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” International Studies Encyclopaedia (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010). 26 Aurangzeb Qureshi, “Stephen Harper’s Islamophobia is a Product of Canadian Muslim Apathy,” Huffington Post, 11 September 2015, http://www.huffington post.ca/aurangzeb-qureshi/stephen-harper-islamophobia_b_8120374.html. 27 Shanifa Nasser, “Muslim Canadian Federal Election Turnout Driven by Fact So Much Was at Stake,” cbc News, 20 November 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/ politics/muslim-voter-turnout-canada-election-1.3327060. 28 Qureshi, “Stephen Harper’s Islamophobia.” 29 See for example Macnair and Frank, “Voices against Extremism”; Zeiger, Expanding Research; and Orla Lynch, “British Muslim Youth: Radicalisation, Terrorism and the Construction of the ‘Ither,’” Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013): 241–61.

PA RT TH R E E

International Models and Lessons

6 The Nature and Extent of Countering Violent Extremism in the United Kingdom tahir abbas

Introduction Terrorism and political violence require interdependent research and policy solutions in order to generate effective measures. The events of 9/11 and subsequent instances of terrorism and violent extremism linked to global Islamic radicalism, however, have created new challenges without obvious solutions. Since the 2015 United Nations General Assembly (unga), numerous governments across the world have introduced the “countering violent extremism” (cve) paradigm as an attempt to prevent, disrupt, and generate a response. This includes a counternarrative to avert, intervene, or build community resilience against further instances of violent extremism. As the concept’s reach has grown exponentially, from Canberra to California, from Astana to Addis Ababa, London is the centre of the cve world. But not all is well in the UK context. In the UK, the closest equivalent to cve is the policy approach known as Prevent – a counter extremism instrument to protect against future “would-be terrorists” based on various assumptions about the sociological, psychological, or behavioural characteristics of “the radicalized.”1 Consequently, Prevent is not without its critics in academia or civil society2 – to the extent that many see it as potentially making matters worse for community relations, including in unwittingly providing support to far right extremist movements. The UK government, led by the Home Office and its various internal units, however, is unwavering in rolling out Prevent. The UK government introduced a statutory Prevent Duty in 2015 to cover

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a whole host of public sector organizations, especially in education and health. New procedures include a concern over returnee foreign fighters.3 It is now legally incumbent upon all public sector bodies to tackle the threat of violent extremism. This includes reporting on visible differences in appearance among young people, regarded as one indication of radicalization.4 The object of this essay is to explore the concept of cve in general and Prevent in particular, with the explicit aim to discuss the extent and reach of the paradigm’s impact in context. Between September 2016 and February 2017, a series of informal one-to-one conversations were carried out with Prevent officers and civil servants in government departments in London. In addition, further conversations were held with activists, think-tank experts, and influential community leaders across the UK. Approximately ten detailed informal conversations were held with respondents who were aware that I was aiming to write on Prevent and cve and that any remarks used would not identify respondents. The purpose was to gauge their perspectives on these issues and the repercussions they raise for state–community relations. Upon reflection and having underpinned my perspectives based on the comments of professionals working on Prevent, the only effective way of problematizing violent extremism and its solutions is to concentrate energies on localized interventions and engagements. Programmatic directives should not define the policy approach from above. Rather, the needs of communities and their active critical engagement in the wider fight against radicalization in specific localities ought to be the central focus. The problems are local and, therefore, so must be the solutions.

The UK Approach In the UK, the Home Office takes the lead on counterterrorism and deradicalization. As the main government department responsible for counterterrorism, it receives the bulk of funding in this area. Nevertheless, it encounters various levels of criticism from a variety of social and political actors arguing that the Prevent agenda is counterproductive and divisive.5 Concerns here rest on how Muslim communities were, until very recently, the only groups targeted. The lack of trust in the institutions operating the policy is not addressed either. In effect, the lens through which Muslim

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communities are viewed is entirely based on terrorism and extremism rather than the needs of communities beyond these matters. In 2011, the UK government reviewed contest (counterterrorism strategy), originally developed (officially) in 2006 after the events of 7/7 (July 2005), from which came the Prevent agenda. The 2011 review considered countering ideology as central in the battle against terrorism. While it was also clear that the legal remits of Prevent would not be altered in any way, it did emphasise the need to work alongside different agencies, including health, education, and social services. A youth element would also become a particular feature of the policy content.6 The review accurately identified a significant conflation between social cohesion and counterterrorism. The areas where communities need support and investment have to be distinguished from judgements clouded by any assessments of the threats of radicalization. The 2011 review raised three consequences for policy. First, the need to help build resilience and empower communities to challenge radical Islamist extremist narratives that might lead to violent extremism. Second, a specific policing, security, and intelligence mandate to engage in overt and covert counterterrorism measures. Third, the need to establish counternarrative schemes as part of the communication and information battle. The latter also includes the importance of building community trust with policing authorities charged with targeting areas of high Muslim residential concentration. Previously, measures associated with the risk of radicalization were crudely connected with an allocation model where funding was based on residential concentrations of British Muslims.7 The trouble with this “at risk” versus “risky” dichotomy, however, is the possibility of blurring the borderlines. Given the politicization of radicalization from above, placing too great an emphasis on “Muslimness”8 rather than the underlying structural determinants of radicalization9 is a concern. Governmentality, a process of altering the behaviour of citizens to conform to certain government policy, as defined by Michel Foucault, applies in the context of Prevent, which many see as more a form of social engineering10 than an explicit policy of preventative deradicalization. It results in widening existing polarizations that are subsequently instrumentalized by elites. In a paradoxical development, the removal of ethnic inequalities from the mainstream discourse of diversity and difference has seen ethnic and religious differences given

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full weight in the counterterrorism domain.11 In addition, despite attempts to clarify the separation between social cohesion and counterterrorism, due to various political developments within the coalition government from 2010 to 2015,12 the split vanished. Not only did confusion on the part of politicians and civil servants lead to political bickering, it created an atmosphere of alarmism around British Muslims. It fuelled the flames of far right sentiment based on antiimmigration, antireligion and antimulticulturalism conceptualizations promulgated by media and political (il)liberal elites. A hostile discourse systematically fashioned the conditions for deepening Islamophobia, leading to levels of violence against Muslims that spike after incidents of terrorism across the world. It is a time, when, according to some, Islamophobia has become an accepted norm.13 These recent developments confirm trends from the mid-2000s onwards. In a charged and toxic atmosphere, relations between the state and British Muslim communities have become increasingly restricted. It has been reduced to a top-down system of design and delivery seen by numerous academics and commentators as a form of governmentality.14 The use of social media and digital imagery tools by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis) advanced to sophisticated levels in recent periods. As a front-facing dynamic of a wider counterterrorism strategy, one of the main elements of Prevent is to sustain a counternarrative and countermessaging platform. The aim is to restrict the interests of young people looking online for answers to questions that challenge them the most.15 The other main concern with Prevent is the mentoring system known as Channel.16 It uses a one-to-one methodology with vulnerable young people in order to educate, motivate, and inspire them away from the paths leading to violent extremism.17 The UK government argues that this system stopped a number of people joining Islamic State as “foreign fighters.”18 The Channel model is also of interest to other counterterrorism agencies, including those in France and Germany, with Denmark promoting its own unique approach, known as the Aarhus model.19 The question remains, however. Is mentoring alone the dominating enabler? Due to data confidentiality, the UK government is unable to provide access to original case files or even anonymized data regarding particular communities. Thus, in a deflating volte-face, the UK government has moved back the compass of its counterterrorism strategy. It targets not simply terrorism, as such, but also ideology in acts of

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preparedness of terrorist crimes. In addition, resistance to the state among Muslim minority groups is partly delegitimized. Many of these concerns are based on genuine grievances but receive scant attention anywhere in society.20 A significant body of the left-leaning press has also taken a critical stance towards Prevent throughout the policy’s various phases of development. These community reactions and the associated media attention are combined with various political concerns across parliament. It transforms the Prevent agenda into a media, political, and intellectual tussle of immense proportions.

The Trouble with Prevent While ongoing concerns relate to cve impact and effectiveness, considerable disagreement over the efficacy of the Prevent policy agenda also materialises inside UK government. In these policymaking circles, a particular political predilection also wishes to promote integration containing a pro-Prevent message. The dominant hegemonic discourse in UK government policy thinking is always to centre on specific interventions regarding British Muslim communities, however. This involves both a direct and indirect approach, potentially alienating a significant body of British Muslims unable to engage with the political process. It raises all sorts of connotations around ideas of policed multiculturalism.21 With a persistent gaze on terrorism and radicalism, British Muslims feel beleaguered. Consequently, they are hesitant about government attempts to engage with them through the singular lens of deradicalization.22 Various other community and political forces compete in their resistance to the enlargement, impact, and effects of counterterrorism legislation. With different groups signalling their interests, the Prevent discourse is the centripetal force that brings together the various elements in shaping its direction, but with the least privileged groups bearing the greatest consequences. British Muslims, various civil society actors, academics, sections of the media, and aspects of the political classes are united in this. They share concerns about the effectiveness of the policy as well the negative impact it has on community relations. The UK government, charged with delivering Prevent, encounters opposition from many elements of society.

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It places strain on relations between different groups involved in shaping the discussion and the narrative on Prevent. For advocates of Prevent, including many of the civil servants involved in designing, delivering, and evaluating it, violent extremism relates to a small number of people (argued to be) carefully processed by a system with significant checks and balances. No blanket approach exists to ensure proportionality, however. For these respondents, their criticism is that Prevent is too big in its reach and capacity, as it implicates a wide segment of the population. For example, individuals associated with radical Islamism because of a general tendency of conservatism based on historical–cultural faith traditions are swept up by the policy. Alternatively, Prevent is too small because it is not focused enough on catching vulnerable people actively looking to become violent extremists. The rhetoric among senior parliamentarians, however, states that the Prevent policy is working sufficiently. In addition, levels of security and confidentiality associated with the work make it impossible to permit much of the data to enter the public domain. However, this creates an information-dissemination vacuum ultimately filled by critical voices in the mainstream as well as in social media. These interests are variously individually or collectively organized as part of efforts to debunk Prevent as mass state surveillance. In the vast number of cases, professionals and practitioners working in this area are getting on with the business of improving and delivering Prevent policy. In the absence of an alternative, “doing nothing at all is not an alternative,” argued the respondents. For proponents of Prevent, critics are said to be unable to demonstrate a substitute for what is evidently a pressing concern for national security. The irony is that by removing the opening formed by Prevent, greater securitization of Muslim communities is more likely, not less, they argue.23 A harder-edged counterterrorism framework will take over the gaps left, argued many respondents, as it limits the opportunities to pursue community-engaged processes. The Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government (mhclg) is no longer at the forefront of community engagement – nor is it a front-facing aspect of counterterrorism policy as it was as a part of UK government thinking and policy a decade or so ago. The Home Office, traditionally the home of policing and security, has taken over the agenda. With the removal of Prevent, the Home Office

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would dominate further, argued many. The space generated by Prevent is to work with the harder end of counterterrorism at one end of the spectrum. At the other end, it is to reach deep into communities in order to work directly with vulnerable individuals. The aim is to safeguard and protect them and society from the threats and realities of violent extremism, said many. Because of the limitations caused by austerity and the failure of such ideas as the “Big Society,” mhclg no longer has such a role to play. In this opening, Prevent is the only critical space for government and communities, respondents argued. In commenting on the twenty-two-plus indicators used by Prevent service providers, respondents noted that local adaptations take into consideration local population characteristics. Moreover, these twenty-two-plus indicators are not part of a system that wishes to categorise individuals as terrorists or would-be terrorists. Rather than some crude measure to identify individuals thought to be on the path to radicalization, the approach assesses people on various spectrums of vulnerability. Education and mental health professionals consider each case independently. However, when individuals with severe mental health problems are classified as vulnerable it does not make them any less capable, potentially shifting a health issue into a counterterrorism conundrum, stated one respondent. Critical academics point to the dominant hegemonic order as culpable in the manufacture and delivery of an intolerant, oppressive, and controlling state. This creates a pernicious environment that poisons the Prevent brand before it has an opportunity to speak for itself, said another respondent. In sum, the problem is that the perception is greater than the reality, argued by many inside government. With numerous critical voices in response to the government’s approach, the direction of policy in such a charged field is invariably skewed. Calls have appealed for the removal of the Prevent agenda from government policy on tackling extremism altogether. But Prevent has so profoundly permeated aspects of UK government policy, including in education and health, that its disappearance is unlikely – even though the Prevent brand is seen as toxic among numerous actors in society. In this milieu, there is an absence of an alternative message. Moreover, there is a limited response on the part of the government to defend Prevent’s apparent successes, although it is clear Prevent is not a singular concept. Different modes of

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engagement do exist, but the dominant perspective is that referrals to the Channel program occur most of the time. However, UK governments need to be sensitive about instrumentalising a strategy that wishes to counter violent extremism with every good intention. Without the resources needed to support communities, or in building the necessary trust and engagement in the process, success is limited. Neither is cve simply a matter of countering the narratives of Islamic State. In the immediate stages of recruiting a soldier to its cause, Islamic State does not use the language of religion or ideology. It plays on real and observable grievances experienced by Muslims in the West. Recent data on Islamic State recruits recovered by German intelligence services provided details on more than 20,000 foreign fighters joining Islamic State.24 The overall profile suggests that these predominantly young men have low education, a history of offences, and a record of violence. They experience racism, exclusion, and marginalization but, crucially, have little or no knowledge of Islam before joining Islamic State. Ultimately, ideology is the tipping point at the end of the radicalization process. It takes troubled young people and turns them to suicide, but it is through ideology that they need to be brought back from the brink of self-annihilation. However, this needs to be seen as separate from a focus on religiosity or the need to “reverse religiosity” in some way.25 This is what has tainted the Prevent brand the most.

The Research and Policy Challenges Ahead Due to various political developments concerning the cve strategy, differences of opinion occur between state actors and the targeted communities, especially in Western Europe. It leads to politicization and polarization, not prevention nor protection. That policymakers have been struggling to profile the “potential violent extremist” suggests that the direction of questions is perhaps wrong. The conveyor belt theory promotes the view that vulnerable young people are at risk of radicalization and then commit acts of violent extremism. It stigmatises entire groups. It also disregards genuine instances of political resistance. Opposition is transmuted into previolence, precrime extremist thought, which is then policed or securitized, including through the silencing of legitimate dissent or criticism.26 The discussion on

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what causes violent extremism has led to the strategy of cve, branded as a concept with tentacles in numerous countries across the world. However, a significant gap materialises between perceptions and experiences among communities in general and the positions taken by states concerning the policy framework in particular. For too long, policymakers have concentrated on religion and ideology as the main causes. Hence, the cve aspiration to solve what is regarded as problematic religiosity by replacing it with a moderate or a liberal Islam. It uses proxy actors, with connections to the communities at large, who now see the errors of their ways, often presented as liberated from the shackles once chaining them to regressive Islamism. As states do this, however, they ignore the grievances – the structural dynamics of racism, inequality, social division, with multiculturalism and diversity as an asset for citizenship. In effect, the tendency is to securitise differences in societies. The focus is on deradicalization of individuals thought to be on the move from low-level to extremist radicalism and, eventually, to violence and extremism.27 Radicalizers mobilize young people attracted to a unifying, ostensibly empowering, and holistically conceptualized vision. It is an attempt to address all their grievances that are without doubt real and have long histories to them. The more states ignore genuine structural grievances, the more organizations such as Islamic State can play on them. Extremism is a symptom. It is not the cause of instabilities, insecurities, and patterns of anomie experienced by various groups. Religion is merely a convenient umbrella, an instrument of mobilization, not the first point of departure in the causes of radicalization or violent extremism. A counter extremist strategy that debunks the narrative of the likes of Islamic State but does not deal with the structural is likely to fail. A policy attempt that focuses entirely on religion as the central mystery is likely to miss the mark, as is a policy that focuses on religion as the sole solution. That radicalization is always a security risk, or that it will always lead to violence or terrorism, also needs decoupling. The net result is a “disconnected citizenship” that further alienates Muslim groups facing the deleterious consequences of a ceaselessly hostile gaze upon them.28 In reality, greater threats transpire from polarization than from radicalization. It pits indigenous minority and majority groups against each other, leading to ideological, cultural, as well as political conflict rather than violent extremism or terrorism.29 Therefore, social research on the impact

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of cve and cve-related policy interventions ought to explore individuals in their social contexts. The transformation of risks and challenges into strengths and opportunities is the key here. There are many essential questions from the lacuna. What is the position of the family (without promoting the “suspect community” paradigm30), peers, schools, or work – what we might call the “ecological parameters” – in providing support? How is confidence and trust built between near-radicalized individuals differentiated by ethnicity, gender, or sexuality in order to deradicalize collectively [dialogue and intercultural exchange]? How can self-realization and selfactualization act as methods to empower young people at the margins of extremism [empowerment]? Radicalization is the reality of global issues with local impacts. Radicalizers, as part of their strategies of recruitment, fill a vacuum, as local leaders in the diaspora are unable to address the concerns of disaffected youth. It is a space in which much of radicalization reflects youth rebellion. One task, therefore, is to encourage angry youth to redirect their energies to socially solidaristic causes, where communities and families are focal points. Broad measures have a negative effect, raising the need to concentrate on the narrower spaces.31 All-embracing interventions add to existing levels of distrust. This disproportionality has negative consequences because of its universally directed heavy-handed approach that casts the net wide. Teenagers recognized today as radicalized or vulnerable to extremism were born after the onset of the global “war on terror.” Effective intervention needs to be sensitive to the background of every individual in order to understand when best to introduce it. The politicization of cve is another important dimension. That younger people are increasingly entering into the fray of violent extremism suggests that the question is all about the local. It concentrates attention on the social pressures at specific points in the lives of young people – paths that lead to alienation, isolation, and intergenerational disconnect. Heightened emotions create psychological problems that introduce vulnerabilities. Tensions between counterterrorism and cve thinking have muddied the waters in the recent past, for example, in the UK context when activism is conflated with extremism.32 It is simplistic, however, to reduce the dilemma of Prevent to a conflation between cohesion and counterterrorism, as cohesion is not without its own difficulties.33 Emerging as policy approach and a political

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discourse after the Northern Disturbances in 2001, “community cohesion” was flawed and unpopular. Its insistence on generating bridging social capital as a solution to what are profound patterns of social inequality and economic polarization was a diversion, argued many.34 Sharing the same social, educational, occupational, or cultural spaces or an outlook on accepting and valuing differences in society more generally is not the central problem. The reality in 2001 reflected failed multicultural, integration, and social mobility policy, resulting in a process of cultural withdrawal. A lack of cohesion is the result of wider societal processes not the foundations of radicalism and later terrorism. Counterterrorism and cve extremism are relatively successful endeavours in the UK compared with France, Belgium, or Germany, however, the lack of public engagement about Prevent on the part of the UK government creates distrust and disengagement. Far right groups are committing more acts of terrorism than their radical violent Islamist counterparts are, but this reality is less well known or understood.35 It adversely affects Muslim communities already shouldering acute challenges regarding their visibility and their negative representation in media and politics. The vacuum is filled by critical voices that have no opposition or direct engagement from government, academia, or mainstream media. In addition, while accounts of 150 individuals stopped from joining Islamic State are certainly deemed as successes by the government, more than 800 UK men, women, and children entered the Islamic State in the last few years while variations on the Prevent policy have been in operation since the mid-2000s. Radicalization is a generational challenge that has arisen because of past inadequacies in policy as well as due to ongoing global concerns. A wider geopolitical climate has seen the rise of populism, protectionism, anti-immigration, and antidiversity sentiment. All the while, social divisions widen and foreign policy towards the “Muslim world” continues to create consternation. The challenge, therefore, is to determine the effectiveness or otherwise of cve,36 especially when it veers into matters of social cohesion,37 followed by a systematic evaluation of specific cve policies. This will help to obtain generalizable understandings that both improve knowledge and increase the ability to deliver effective policy and practice.

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n otes 1 Vicki Coppock and Mark McGovern, “‘Dangerous Minds’? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the ‘Psychological Vulnerability’ of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain,” Children & Society 28, no. 3 (2014): 242–56. 2 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London and New York: Verso, 2014); Lauren Powell, “Counter-Productive Counter-Terrorism. How Is the Dysfunctional Discourse of ‘Prevent’ Failing to Restrain Radicalisation?” Journal for Deradicalisation 8 (2016): 46–99; Caitlin Mastroe, “Evaluating cve: Understanding the Recent Changes to the United Kingdom’s Implementation of ‘Prevent,’” Perspectives of Terrorism 10, no. 2 (2016): 50–60. 3 Jessie Blackbourn and Clive Walker, “Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015,” Modern Law Review 79, no. 5 (2016): 840–70. 4 hmso, Revised ‘Prevent’ Duty Guidance: for England and Wales (London: Crown Copyright, 2015). 5 Toby Archer, “Welcome to the Umma: The British State and its Muslim Citizens since 9/11,” Cooperation and Conflict 44, no. 3 (2009): 329–47. 6 hmso, ‘Prevent’ Strategy (London: Home Office, 2011). 7 Alex Murray, Katrin Mueller-Johnson, and Lawrence W Sherman, “EvidenceBased Policing of UK Muslim Communities: Linking Confidence in the Police With Area Vulnerability to Violent Extremism,” International Criminal Justice Review 25, no. 1 (2015): 64–79. 8 Charlotte Heath-Kelly, “Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK ‘prevent’ Strategy,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 3 (2012): 394–415. 9 Suraj Lakhani, “‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities,” The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 51, no. 2 (2011): 190–206; Thomas Martin, “Governing an Unknowable Future: The Politics of Britain’s ‘Prevent’ Policy,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 7, no. 1 (2014): 62–78. 10 Mohammed Elshimi, “De-radicalisation Interventions as Technologies of the Self: A Foucauldian Analysis,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2015): 110–29. 11 Hanna Lewis and Gary Craig, “Multiculturalism Is Never Talked About’:

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Community Cohesion and Local Policy Contradictions in England,” Policy and Politics 42, no. 1 (2014): 21–38. 12 Tariq Ali, The Extreme Centre: A Warning (London and New York: Verso, 2014). 13 Chris Allen, “Passing the Dinner Table Test Retrospective and Prospective Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia in Britain,” sage Open, (2013): 1–10. 14 Therese O’ Toole et al., “Governing through ‘Prevent’? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim Engagement,” Sociology 50, no. 1 (2016): 160–77; Paul Thomas, Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism: Failing to ‘Prevent’ (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). 15 Alex P. Schmid, Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State” (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015). 16 Asim Qureshi, “‘prevent’: Creating ‘Radicals’ to Strengthen Anti-Muslim Narratives,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2015): 181–91. 17 Samuel Tyler Powers, “Expanding the Paradigm: Countering Violent Extremism in Britain and the Need for a Youth Centric Community Based Approach,” Journal of Terrorism Research 6, no. 1 (2015), http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1074. 18 Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, “Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 837–57. 19 Preben Bertelsen, “Danish ‘Prevent’ive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model,” Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs 1 (2015): 241–53. 20 Anthony Richards, “From Terrorism to ‘Radicalization’ to ‘Extremism’: Counterterrorism Imperative or Loss of Focus?” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): 371–80. 21 Francesco Ragazzi, “Suspect Community or Suspect Category? The Impact of Counter-terrorism as ‘Policed Multiculturalism,’” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 5 (2016): 724–41. 22 Gabe Mythen, Sandra Walklate, and Fatima Khan, “‘Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?’: Counter-terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities,” Sociology 47, no. 2 (2012): 383–98. 23 James Fitzgerald, “Frontline Perspectives on ‘Prevent’ing Violent Extremism: An Interview with Alyas Karmani (street uk),” Critical Studies on Terrorism 9, no. 1 (2016): 139–49. 24 The Guardian, “Isis Document Leak Reportedly Reveals Identities of 22,000

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Recruits,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/isis-document leak-reportedly-reveals-identities-syria-22000-fighters. Accessed 10 February 2018. 25 Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2016): 191–210. 26 Aislinn O’Donnell, “Securitisation, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The Educational Implications of ‘Prevent,’” British Journal of Educational Studies 64, no. 1 (2016): 53–76. 27 Gabe Mythen, Sandra Walklate, and Elizabeth-Jane Peatfield, “Assembling and Deconstructing Radicalisation in ‘Prevent’: A Case of Policy-based Evidence Making?,” Critical Social Policy 37, no. 2 (2016): 180–201. 28 Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, “Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Anti-terrorism Policy on Citizenship in the UK,” Political Studies 61, no. 3 (2012): 656–75. 29 Vasco Lub, “Polarisation, Radicalisation and Social Policy: Evaluating the Theories of Change,” Evidence and Policy 9, no. 2 (2013): 165–83. 30 Basia Spalek, “Radicalisation, De-radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation in Relation to Families: Key Challenges for Research, Policy and Practice,” Security Journal 29, no. 1 (2016): 39–52. 31 Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, “What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring cve Policy and Practice in Australia,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 8, no. 1 (2016): 6–24. 32 David Lowe, “‘Prevent’ Strategies: The Problems Associated in Defining Extremism – The Case of the UK,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2016, 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1253941. 33 Paul Thomas, “‘Prevent’ and Community Cohesion in Britain – The Worst of All Possible Worlds?” in Counter Radicalisation – Critical Perspectives, ed. Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Lee Jarvis (Abingdon: Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies, 2014). 34 Tahir Abbas, “Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 28, no. 3 (2007): 287–300. 35 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: iep, 2018); Daniel Peddell,

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Marie Eyre, Michelle McManus, and Jim Bonworth, “Influences and Vulnerabilities in Radicalised Lone-actor Terrorists: UK Practitioner Perspectives,” International Journal of Police Science & Management 18, no. 12 (2016): 63–76. 36 Hedieh Mirahmadi, “Building Resilience against Violent Extremism: A Community-Based Approach,” annals, aapss 668 (2016): 129–44. 37 Sahar F. Aziz, “Policing Terrorists in the Community,” Harvard National Security Journal 5 (2014), 147–224.

7 The Danish Model to Countering Violent Extremism A Critical Assessment of a “Soft” Model rolf holmboe

International approaches to countering violent extremism (cve) vary from “hard” security-first approaches, which aim at deterrence but can lead to the societal exclusion of a wider group and a worsening of the problem, to “soft” approaches, which aim at prevention and reintegration but can potentially be circumvented by elements of the target group. The so-called “Danish Model” is an example of a soft approach, but it complements more traditional security and counter-terrorism efforts, and the balance between these efforts have changed over time. This article will first discuss the evolution and core elements of the Danish Model based on three government counterradicalization action plans as well as various evaluations and analyses in the Danish language normally not accessible to an international audience, and it will critically assess key enablers, successes, constraints, and criticisms. The article will then discuss aspects that should be taken into account in the further evolution of domestic cve models. The Danish Model is still politically debated, especially over whether there should be more emphasis on the harder, security-related or on the softer, preventive approach. There is still divergence of opinion about (1) the nature of the problem (what is radicalization and violent extremism), (2) what instruments should be used (eg., the role of religious groups or harsher sanctions), and (3) who should be the first movers (social workers or police officers or nonstate workers). The article will argue that counterradicalization models have to encompass both “soft” and “hard” instruments to deal individually with those who are willing to leave violent extremism and those

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who are not but that prevention, exit, and reintegration are the most sustainable solutions and should be the first choice of interventions as far as they may go. It will also argue for the need to nuance the understanding of radicalization and of motivations to avoid the danger of categorizing persons as violent extremists who really are not and through sanctions risk pushing them in that very direction. It will finally argue for stronger international cooperation against the globalization of extremist mobilization, not least for a stronger stance and sanctions against groups or countries aiding and abetting extremist circles.

The “Danish Model” to Countering Violent Extremism The Danish Model to counter radicalization and violent extremism took off after the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 bombings and gathered impetus after the so-called “Cartoon Crisis,” which affected Denmark in 2006–08.1 It evolved from an existing integrated cooperation between schools, social services, and the police (the ssp Cooperation) that was established around 1975 to prevent youth from drifting into gang-related crime. In 2005, an intraministerial working group on fighting terrorism led by the prime minister’s office released a report that included a chapter on enhanced dialogue and cooperation with Muslim communities and preventive activities in schools and clubs to stop the radicalization of young people.2 In 2008, Denmark became the EU’s lead nation on deradicalization and initiated a number of pilot projects to develop tools for targeted counterradicalization interventions focusing on mentoring, capacity development of frontline workers, and exit programs. In 2009, the Danish government significantly upgraded cve efforts with twenty-two initiatives spanning outreach, prevention, integration, social cohesion, and international cooperation in a first government action plan (centre-right government) for the Prevention of Extremist Views and Radicalization Among Youth.3 An external evaluation of the plan conducted in 2011 noted that the preventive effect was hard to measure and recommended quality improvements to prevention and a stronger focus on interventions, inter alia, by further developing the mentoring system.4 The plan was also criticized by leading Muslims for stigmatization by linking radicalization of the few to integration issues of the whole

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Muslim community,5 and an ensuing 2014 Government Action Plan on Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism (centre-left government) was more narrowly focused on strengthening and professionalizing prevention complemented by tougher security measures against entrenched extremists and travellers to armed conflicts.6 The latest 2016 Government Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalization (centre-right government) focuses on nine specific areas of improvement, including better coordination of prevention in the so-called “InfoHouses” (hubs), further frontline agent professionalization, and interagency compatibility and information sharing, a further shift to the decentral level for implementation combined with stronger supportive ties to centres of excellence within national integration and security agencies, tougher measures against “foreign fighters” travelling to Syria, targeted interventions against criminal groups as well as in prisons, improved engagement with local communities at risk, and strengthened international cooperation.7 A core element of the Danish Model is a highly flexible and adaptive bottom-up approach, decentralising interventions to the police district/ municipal level and bringing them as close to the communities at risk as possible. As there are obvious differences in capacity between larger and smaller municipalities, links to two centres of excellence at the national level (the Centre for Prevention at the Danish Security and Intelligence Service and the Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing) is crucial not only for strengthening decentralized implementation by capacity building and by partnering prevention and intervention processes but also for informing national-level development of guidelines and policy. Another core element is the evolving and increasingly integrated cooperation between relevant agencies, especially police and various municipal functions, organized in the InfoHouses at the municipal/police district level that coordinate general prevention directed at groups at risk and specific preemption directed at extremist groups or individuals, and that cooperate on targeted interventions directed at violent extremists.8 The first InfoHouse was established in Aarhus in 2010. The main channel into the InfoHouses is hotlines where frontline workers, the general public, as well as families and friends can report specific concerns. These concerns are individually assessed

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in an interagency working group within the InfoHouses to determine if there is a risk of radicalization and if so which strategy of intervention to employ. Activities are mainly carried out by interagency networks. The key network involves schools, social services, and police (ssp) that focus prevention and interventions at the general groups at risk. In Denmark’s second largest city, Aarhus, alone, this involves more than one hundred frontline workers. This has since been complemented by specialized networks to handle specific target groups, such as young people with mental problems (police, social services, and psychological health care – psp) and individuals with a criminal background or within the penal system (prisons and probation services, social services and police – ksp). The underlying logic of the whole model is that terrorism is implicitly understood as a crime that should be prevented, just as radicalization and extremism are treated more as risks to vulnerable young people than as threats to the state.9 The point of departure for Professor Preben Bertelsen, who was intimately involved in developing the precursor “Aarhus Model” to the Danish Model, is therefore “life psychological theory of approaching the targeted young people by basically regarding them as individuals striving for agency in their own and common life.”10 The essential intervention instrument is the mentoring system that focuses on personal development of a mentee away from radicalized influences and functions as a one-stop-shop of services to assist the mentee back into society. Extensive guidelines have been developed and are available for mentors and parental coaches based on the learning-by-doing experiences of mentoring since the program started.11 Mentoring is a highly individualized approach used with radicalized persons as well as in exit programs for returning “foreign fighters.” The central value of the system is that it debureaucratizes the relationship with the mentee and brings it into the personal sphere. The mentor’s first job is to establish a personal relationship with the mentee, through dialogue sow doubt about the justification of violent extremism, and bring the person to see the world in a broader perspective than the narrow and exclusive one often characterizing radicalized thought.12 The mentor will not necessarily challenge religious or political beliefs per se but will seek to pivot the mentee away from the willingness to condone or use violent and/or illegal means to achieve objectives. Secondly, the mentor will

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help the mentee onto a path of reinclusion into society with regard to family and peer relations, access to appropriate medical care, education, job, and housing and the management of social interaction and leisure time. And thirdly, the mentor will be available for discussing the everyday problems and concerns of the mentee – a key element in avoiding relapses. As such, the mentor amalgamates into one single holistic approach the role of friend, confidant, role model, and sparring partner with that of all the public services put together. Mentoring is the key personalized instrument to help the radicalized person back into society in a safe way, but it is a clear condition for success that entry is voluntary.

Assessment The frequency of action plans and the trial-and-error-based adjustments from the first to the third indicates that the system is adaptive towards the continuing sophistication of the institutional setup, nuancing of the approach and professionalization of the agencies involved. The first action plan spanned a broad panoply of initiatives but on the basis of frontline experiences that was narrowed down in the 2014 and 2016 action plans. The last two action plans build on what has proven to work and continues to strengthen the core elements in the system of prevention and intervention. At the same time, the later plans adjust to the evolution in challenges (they have for instance been expanded to tackle growing radicalization in prisons and online). There are no real data-based evaluations of the results of the Danish Model. Some outputs could be measured (for instance the number of hotline calls, number of mentoring processes, number of radicalized persons/ violent extremists successfully reintegrated into society, number of relapses to violent extremism after mentoring/exit programs, etc.) It is harder to measure preventive action, the success of which of course is what not happens, and it is harder to associate outputs to outcomes in the theory of change perspective (for instance, what actually lead to the reduction in the number of radicalized persons and foreign fighters from 2015). Frontline workers themselves highlight anecdotal successes.13 By 2015, the number of young

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persons travelling to fight in Syria had been significantly reduced compared to 2012–14. More than 145 persons are believed to have travelled from Denmark as foreign fighters, and roughly half have since returned.14 In the stated experience of the East Jutland Police (up until mid-2015), “nine in ten returning foreign fighters can be reintegrated.” Of the seventeen foreign fighters that had returned to Aarhus by 2015, most had become very disillusioned and none were assessed by police as posing a threat at that point in time.15 In 2014, Denmark’s two largest cities, Copenhagen and Aarhus, opened hotlines for reporting concerns of radicalization, and in 2016 this was complemented by a national hotline. The number of calls to the hotlines has been steadily increasing, but there has been a fall in cases of assessed danger of radicalization. In Copenhagen, the number of reports has grown from 60/2014, 100/2015, to 104/2016 on top of sixty-one calls to the national hotline in 2016.16 In 2016, eight of the Copenhagen reports were assessed to be cases of radicalization (compared to twenty-two cases in 2014 and eighteen in 2015), and mentor programs were initiated for six of those cases and parental coaches assigned to the last two cases. Calls to the hotline come from frontline workers (teachers, youth club workers, and social workers) but increasingly also from friends and families indicating that outreach to communities at risk has strengthened and that these communities themselves are becoming the first line of defence against radicalization. Arguably, a key success of the interagency approach is that it helps overcome bureaucratic between-chairs inaction (“this is not our responsibility”) by cutting red tape and deconflicting responsibilities. Another success is that interagency interventions tend to become more complex and tailored to the specific needs of the individual (gravitating towards a demand focus) rather than a more mechanical application of the limited instruments available to any single agency (gravitating towards a supply focus). The interagency approach therefore very much underpins the efficacy of the mentoring system. A third success is that legal and bureaucratic barriers to interagency information sharing are gradually being overcome, which is proving to be a key enabler for early detection, holistic “triage,” and effective concerted action. Enhanced and focused information sharing is increasingly being lodged into integrated computer systems producing interagency platforms for reporting concerns, recording observations, and managing interventions in

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both general prevention work and in the individual cases, and this is key to overcoming the information disconnect, overload, and confusion that so often hamper agencies. A number of primarily qualitative evaluations of the Danish counterradicalization highlight both successes and challenges. Some of these challenges are echoed by former radicalized persons, who highlight that frontline workers do not know what they are dealing with in the sense that they have little cultural understanding of Islam and Muslims, that the issue of radicalization is misunderstood since most Salafis are conservative but peaceful, and that the problem of violent extremism is numerically small and gets blown out of proportion, exacerbating the problem. In 2011, the independent firm cowi undertook a questionnaire/interviewbased evaluation of the 2009 government action plan to achieve the two overall objectives of “fighting extremism” and “building a democratic society.”17 The results at that time were mainly outputs, and it notes a substantial capacity development of frontline workers and awareness building among communities at risk and directly in youth groups at risk as well. However, in the self-evaluation of those in charge of the initiatives, they had so far not contributed in a substantial way to reaching either objective. There was a slightly more positive review of “building a democratic society,” as social workers reported that they tended to favour “positive” instruments furthering democratic society, active citizenship, and social inclusion rather than working directly on the “negative” problems of radicalization and extremism for fear of making the problem worse and because the problem in their view was overinflated in the media debate. In 2015, the Danish National Social Appeals Board conducted an independent evaluation of the handling of twenty select cases of young people believed to have travelled to Syria, constituting roughly 1/6 of all known cases of foreign fighters at that time.18 Even though the board specifically noted that the evaluation could not be said to be representative of the whole population of foreign fighters, it found that 75 percent of the persons suffered from emotional, social, behavioural, family-related, or learning challenges that led to varying degrees of social or societal isolation and rejection. Thirteen out of twenty had at some time been involved in criminal behaviour, but in a significant pattern break 25 percent of the young people had no particular challenges and came from well-functioning backgrounds.

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Roughly half of the cases (9/20) had been brought to the attention of the authorities for concerns over radicalization, of which six cases were referred to the Municipal Radicalization Prevention Unit. Overall, the board found that only about half of the twenty cases had been properly handled and concluded that there was need to ensure thorough multidisciplinary assessment and quick decision on interventions, close follow up on the part of the Municipal Radicalization Prevention Units and intervention with parents in the case of, for instance, low school attendance. Also in 2015, Danish scholar Lasse Lindekilde reviewed the effort through the first two government action plans (2009 and 2014).19 Lindekilde notes a learning-by-doing progression in professionalization and sophistication through (1) the capacity building of frontline workers (ie., teachers, social workers, ssp consultants, police officers, youth club employees, employment counsellors, etc.), (2) the further elaboration of the mentoring system, and (3) the development of exit programs for known radicalized persons or violent extremists, including foreign fighters. Lindekilde finds the 2014 action plan considerably more focused on recognized radicalization as it responds to criticisms of stigmatization by the conflagration of counterradicalization efforts with broader issues of integration. It opens up for a much broader cooperation with civil society actors, building on experiences in other parts of Europe, such as youth and sports clubs, religious groups, and parental networks, to offer alternative paths to persons at risk of radicalization. However, Lindekilde fears that the 2014 action plan may undermine trust and cooperation with the target communities, a mainstay of the whole “soft” model, as it broadens the focus from the “carrot” approach of prevention and reintegration by introducing a number of coercive measures effectively transforming it into a “sticks and carrots” model. Sanctions include travel bans and confiscation of passports, withdrawal of citizen rights and legal prosecution if travelling as a foreign fighter. A second concern is the continuing differences between various frontline workers on the nature of radicalization because it blurs both the identification of the “issue” and leads to varying views on the “remedies,” even if the 2014 plan does build on a more complex understanding of radicalization and extremism. A third concern follows from this lack of clarity about the “issue” to a lack of clarity about the end goal of interventions. Is the purpose of a mentoring process an ambitious deradicalization (from a particular strand of

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radical thought) or the narrower goal of disengagement from violent extremism? It highlights the question of whether the issue of ideology should be avoided and interventions pursue the perhaps more realistic goal of bringing persons away from willingness to use or condone violence rather than for instance challenging their conservative religious views and pitting these against liberal societal values as an either–or.

Perspectives for Further Model Development There is general consensus among frontline workers, national agencies, and external analysts that the system to a certain extent is managing the problem of radicalization and is particularly successful in bringing persons out of radicalization and violent extremism if these persons want this themselves. One indicator of this is the number of violent extremists and returning foreign fighters who have been successfully reintegrated into society. The problem is that there are no publicly available “hard” evaluations with concrete results measurement that can substantiate anecdotal stories of success, however numerous and consistent they are, and the internal and external evaluations and reviews point to both successes and challenges. There is general consensus that a key asset of the model is the integrated interagency cooperation in the InfoHouses between various municipal functions and police and between local implementing authorities and national centres of excellence. They point to the progressive professionalization of frontline workers, the developing sophistication of approach, and the imbedded learning process informing the frequent adjustments to the system. However, there is a need to deepen integration of efforts and develop a common outlook and approach between various types of frontline workers, overcoming the inevitable challenges to the fluid cooperation between separate agencies, and further breaking down bureaucratic barriers to effective integrated action, not least with regard to full interagency information sharing and joint information platforms. Capacity development should be both entrenched and deepened, especially in cultural awareness, and the systems of quick and holistic qualitative assessment of individual cases should be further developed to avoid cases being wrongly assessed (false negatives or false positives) or falling between chairs or below the radar.

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There is also general consensus that the mentoring system is the key instrument to bringing individual people out of radicalization and violent extremism, and that the effort is producing good results. The expansion and deepening of mentoring should continue, and a broader international learning process of different types of mentoring should be sought to avoid narrowing the scope of mentoring too much. But since mentoring cannot stand alone, the ability of the integrated interagency system to combine multiple actors into a joint approach should be even further strengthened – reinforcing the exit strategy in the mentee’s touch points with society (schools, youth clubs, family, social counselling, etc.) Another key element is the confidence of communities at risk with frontline workers and trust in the whole project of counterradicalization. Outreach and cooperation with community groups, including not least parental networks as well as religious and citizen groups, has produced good results, more early warning, and has increased community resilience. It is as such a central component in the effectiveness of prevention that should be entrenched and further expanded. The goal should be to turn communities at risk into the first line of defence against radicalization and violent extremism. Working with civil society is important not least for allowing communities themselves to create alternative paths to radicalization and counternarratives to radicalized Salafi groups that exploit a key weakness of family, society, and religious relations in the Muslim world: the ability to reach out to youth. The benefit of working with communities on concerns of mutual interest is not only more efficiency in the fight against violent extremism, it also strengthens ties between communities at risk and society in general, and it helps create bulwarks against the negative effects of an often uninformed and stigmatizing political and public debate. Just as the mentoring system takes relations from the bureaucratic to the personal level in the individual cases, outreach to communities at risk should follow that approach. Closer involvement of civil society groups could be a valuable asset, not least in creating alternatives to radicalization within communities at risk, albeit at the risk of compromising the professionalization of interventions and involving and legitimizing actors with ulterior motives.20 A key enabler for the rapid quality development of the system is the fact that the action plans emanate from the government directly and have been

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led by the prime minister’s office, giving the effort high political priority and ensuring an overarching interagency framework for both plan preparation and implementation. This overcomes, to a certain extent, the tendency in bureaucratic politics for plans negotiated directly between agencies to offer less efficient bureaucratic compromises and stovepiped solutions. However, in the future development of efforts to counter violent extremism some fundamental challenges should be considered. One of the main conflicts in designing models to counter domestic violent extremism is the balance between soft and hard instruments. The number of planned or actual terror attacks in the West has risen from one per month in the years 2011–14 to four in 2015 and approximately five in 2016,21 and this is clearly pushing political pressure for harder interventions against terrorism. This is, for instance, exemplified by the introduction of sanctions against foreign fighters in the Danish 2014 and 2016 action plans, as they are deemed potential security threats. Few disagree that there must be stronger sanctions against persons who are willing to use violence or condone the use of it for their purposes as well as stronger instruments to preempt terror planning and imminent terror attacks. But some fear that more emphasis on sanctions will exacerbate the marginalization of communities at risk and create a sense of persecution and humiliation with growing parts of these communities, turning them against counterradicalization efforts and furthering radicalization. More importantly, automatic prison sentences for returning foreign fighters may actually force some deeper into violent extremism who might otherwise have successfully gone through exit programs, risking transforming more radicalized persons into violent extremists. In light of the current situation, the question is not whether the model should be “soft” or “hard,” but rather how those instruments are handled in an individual way to reinforce the purposes of cve: to reduce the number of radicalized individuals and groups, to reduce the tolerance of violent extremism in communities at risk, and to reduce the number of persons who transgress from radicalization to violent extremism and further to become willing to carry out actual terror attacks. Prevention and reintegration obviously have limitations: some simply do not want to leave violent extremism. There are several examples of interventions with individuals who have since returned to violent extremism or have travelled as a foreign fighter. The “carrot” should always be the first option to keep the focus on exiting persons from radicalization

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and violent extremism, and there should always be “a way back” in order to avoid if possible the consequence of pushing radicalized persons deeper into extremism. This is by far the more sustainable solution and it reduces the number of persons that have to handled in a security-related way. But if that does not work, “sticks” have to be available to ultimately reduce the risk to society and citizens. And they have to follow how extremist groups adjust to countermeasures – moving underground to more secretive groups and in particular the tendency to globalize by preaching and recruiting online from safe havens abroad. Building international cooperation to deny extremist groups safe havens must be a priority, and international sanctions for individuals and countries aiding and abetting them has to be an instrument. There is a need for a clearer understanding of the issue of radicalization, especially how radicalizing influences from regions of origin inspire and mix with influences in Western societies, as well as of the end goal of cve: should interventions aim at deradicalization or disengagement from violent extremism?22 Many approaches to counterradicalization in the West tend to see radicalization as an individual anomaly that should be rectified. But a Western Muslim with origins in the Middle East and North Africa (mena) is torn between two realities: adherence to Salafism is seen as a deviant anomaly in the West but it is a “new normal” political reality in their regions of origin. The traditional opposition to the autocratic mena regimes used to be socialist and nationalist, but they lost ground after the fall of communism. The Muslim Brotherhoods then became the dominant opposition, championing a wave of religious conservatism in stark contrast to the secular but kleptocratic regimes impoverishing their societies. But the regimes successfully managed to thwart the Brotherhood’s political ambitions after the Arab Spring, leaving doubt in the minds of people if the Muslim Brothers would ever be allowed to govern. The rising third wave of opposition is therefore pivoting to the Salafist, rejecting the political system altogether. Political Salafism is very much a group phenomenon with the backing of as much as 25 percent of the population in many places, and this is the reality meeting any Muslim from a Western country visiting family in the region. In this light, the most clear and attainable goal is disengaging a radicalized person from violent extremism, and this should be the first priority, whereas deradicalization is a much more complex and diffuse objective that perhaps should be pursued as a longer-term goal in and by communities at risk themselves

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rather than through direct interventions. The most efficient public counternarrative would be a clear communication of the nonacceptance of violent extremism and of any violence or sanctioning of the use of violence because this would already have a strong resonance with most communities at risk. As part of this, counternarratives have to strongly oppose radical Salafi intolerance of other faiths, cultures, and people and its rejection of Western liberal society, just as there has to be “a parallel attempt to counter the toxic, anti-Western narrative that creates a culture of victimhood in the minds of members of the Muslim community.”23 The counternarrative directly against radical ideologies, such as for instance intolerant radical Salafi learnings, would have greater legitimacy and effect if they came from within the communities themselves. The politicized right-wing counternarratives in Western public discourse that target Islam and Muslims per se as the problem are obviously more likely to exacerbate the problem of radicalization. In the same vein, there is a need to nuance the understanding of a radicalized person’s willingness to act on beliefs. There is a difference between, for instance, joining isis as a “foreign fighter” and a willingness to engage in actual terror attacks, and this difference has implications for the choice and success of interventions. In many models, a person is either understood as “radicalized” (nonviolent) or as a “violent extremist” (willing to violence), and the tendency is to treat returning foreign fighters outright as in the last category. But a large number of foreign fighters are very young (teenagers). They do not fit easily into this dichotomy, and it is necessary to nuance the understanding of their motivations. The largest group of travellers from Western countries are arguably young idealists with a strong religious fervour who are willing to fight for the project of the caliphate. Many of them did not see a conflict of interest in joining and fighting for groups like Jabhet anNusrah and isis, as their own governments were just as opposed to the Assad regime. Another group can be categorized as opportunists, mostly recruits from the Islamic world or people with a criminal background seeking a little “Islamic legitimization.” They are in it for the power, the prestige, and the money it can afford them and they are far less ideologically driven. The third and arguably smallest group are the dedicated violent extremists who embody the extremist cause and fully accept all the extreme instruments they deem necessary. Arguably, exit programs and reintegration could be the most relevant instruments to deal with many in the first two categories, as

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idealists and opportunists would not necessarily be outright willing to engage in actual terrorism, with the strong caveat that a foreign fighter can be a very different person going out than when coming home. They would have been exposed to violence and psychological stress that could lower their threshold of willingness to use violence and open them to extreme forms of violence. But if all of them are treated as violent extremists of the third category, the risk is simply producing more of them! Therefore, there is a need to further develop psychological assessment of violent extremists to better understand if and under which circumstances they potentially could cross over to willingness to engage in actual terrorism.

Can This Model Be Replicated Elsewhere? The Danish Model builds on a particular mix of political decision making, institutional capacities, and bureaucratic culture as well on a particular relationship between authorities and populations at risk. All this is built over time and is of course unique to any country. So even if a number of countries have models that combine “soft” and “hard” elements, a simple replication may not be possible or indeed advisable. But lessons learnt can be considered when designing or further developing models in other countries such as, for instance, Canada. Some lessons to consider are perhaps the integrated system built around the InfoHouses and the joint and individualized responses built on an increasingly nuanced understanding of the problem and of the individuals and groups at risk. A key strength of the Danish Model are the integrated systems centered around the InfoHouses or hubs at the local level that bring together frontline agencies (police, schools, municipalities/social services, correctional and psychological health services, and to some extent civil society organizations) and links them to centers of excellence at the national level. This has been particularly successful in building a combined and increasingly professionalized and needs-based approach to individuals as well as communities at risk. A key lesson is that an integrated information sharing and case handling platform is crucial – it literally brings involved agents from various institutions on to the same page. Another key lesson is the need to continuously

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build the professionalization and cultural understanding of frontline workers, and the interaction in the InfoHouses as well as with communities at risk is crucial for this. A key success has been the individualized, rather that standardized, approach to deal with individual cases. This is anchored in the mentoring system that personalizes the relationship with the individual, serves as a onestop-shop to solve problems across the board, and also functions as an early warning mechanism if things are not moving in the right direction. Another key success is the building of cooperative relations with the communities and families at risk – in many cases it multiplies the opportunities for prevention and the chance of intervention success. A key weakness is the lack of a nuanced operational understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization and extremism. Often this is a prime driver of the political agendas. Who is (just) a radicalized person, who believes in the ideals of an extremist ideology, but otherwise does not act on it? Who is willing to act upon beliefs and under certain circumstances condone or be willing to use violence (as for instance join a militant group and fight in a war)? And who is willing to step over the threshold and condone, support, or participate in actual terrorism? And what brings a person from the one level of radicalization to the next? Such a nuanced understanding of the challenge is the only basis for defining appropriate strategies for dealing with it – especially the consideration of when to use “soft” or “hard” instruments to produce the desired results. Without a nuanced understanding and approach, we risk exacerbating the problem and driving some of the target group even further into extremism. A returning foreign fighter may not be a terrorist or even willing to engage in such, but being treated as one could, in the worst case, bring about just that result. This is just to mention some of the lessons discussed in this article; others could be just as relevant.

n otes The article includes developments up until 2017. 1 “The Cartoon Crisis” refers to the publishing of twelve caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2005 and that sparked widespread protests against Denmark in 2006 and again in 2008 all over the Muslim world.

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2 “Dialog med de muslimske samfund,” Det danske samfunds indsats og beredskab mod terror (Copenhagen: Prime Minister’s Office 2005), http://www.stm. dk/publikationer/terror/Kap1.htm. Accessed 1 April 2017. 3 “En fælles og tryg fremtid”: Handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikalisering blandt unge” (Copenhagen: Prime Minister’s Office, January 2009), http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/En_f_lles_og_tryg_ fremtid.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2017. 4 “Midtvejsevaluering af regeringens handlingsplan “En fælles og tryg fremtid” (Copenhagen: cowi, June 2011), http://uim.dk/publikationer/midtvejsevaluering-af-regeringens-handlingsplan/@@download/publication. Accessed 31 March 2017. 5 Lasse Lindekilde, “Dansk forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikalisering 2009– 14: udviklingstendenser og fremtidige udfordringer,” in Politica 47, no. 3 (2015): 424–44, http://politica.dk/fileadmin/politica/Dokumenter/politica_47_3/ lasse_lindekilde.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2017. 6 “Forebyggelse af radikalisering og ekstremisme” (Copenhagen: Prime Minister’s Office, September 2014), http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/Forebyggelse_ af_radikalisering_og_ekstremisme_-_Regeringens_handlingsplan.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2017. 7 “Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalization” (Copenhagen: Prime Minister’s Office, October 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_ network/docs/preventing_countering_extremism_radicalisation_en.pdf. Accessed 17 April 2017. 8 An example of an InfoHouse is found in this short English summary of the webpage for the InfoHouse in Aarhus, Denmark: https://www.aarhus.dk/ sitecore/content/Subsites/Antiradikaliseringsindsats/Home/Indsatser-forborgere.aspx?sc_lang=en. 9 Ann-Sophie Henningsen, The Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization (Copenhagen: diis – Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015), 18. 10 Preben Bertelsen, “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model,” Panorama (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 01/2015), 242, http://psy.au.dk/fileadmin/Psykologi/Forskning/Preben_Bertelsen/Avisartikler _radikalisering/Panorama.pdf. Accessed electronically 5 April 2017. “Life Psychology” is here understood as an interdisciplinary approach integrating

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personality psychology, social psychology, and societal psychology with social sciences (politics, sociology, jurisprudence) and humanities (culture, religion, ethics) in the understanding of radicalization processes, risk factors, and resilience. 11 Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, “Mentorindsats, forældrecoaching og forældrenetværk,” 2016, http://uim.dk/publikationer/ mentorindsats-foraeldrecoaching-og-parorendenetvaerk. See also this earlier version (2011) in English: https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/ details/id/74/preventing-extremism-a-danish-handbook-series-14-cases-onhandling-radicalisation. 12 Bertelsen, “Danish Preventive Measures,” 244. 13 For instance as input from municipal and police frontline workers from Aarhus, Denmark, at a conference in Beirut, March 2015. 14 “Vurdering af Terrortruslen mod Danmark,” Danish Security and Intelligence Agency (February 2017), https://www.pet.dk/Nyheder/2017/~/media/VTD% 202017/VTD2017DKpdf.ashx. Accessed 20 April 2017. 15 Steffen Hagemann, “radikalisering. Succes med antiradikalisering Syriensfarerne blev stoppet,” in Børn & Unge no. 5 (2015), http://www.bupl. dk/internet/boernogunge.nsf/0/86C6DE1A3A37BE42C1257E060048BAAF? opendocument. Accessed 5 April 2017. 16 Peter Burhøi, Flere ringer til hotlines imod radikalisering (Berlingske Tidende 17 February 2017), http://www.pressreader.com/denmark/berlingske-tidende/ 20170217/281543700682829. Accessed 1 April 2017. 17 “Midtvejsevaluering af regeringens handlingsplan” En fælles og tryg fremtid,” cowi (June 2011), http://uim.dk/publikationer/midtvejsevaluering-af-reger ingens-handlingsplan/@@download/publication. Accessed 5 April 2017. 18 “20 sager om unge formodet udrejst til væbnet konflikt,” Ankestyrelsen (July 2015), http://uim.dk/publikationer/20-sager-om-unge-formodet-udrejsttil-vaebnet-konflikt/@@download/publication. Accessed 20 April 2017. 19 Lindekilde, “Dansk forebyggelse,” 424–44. See also Lasse Lindekilde, “Refocusing Danish Counter-Radicalisation Efforts: An Analysis of the (problematic) Logic and Practice of Individual De-radicalisation,” in Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, ed. Christopher Baker-Beal, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 20 Henningsen, The Danish Approach, 44–5.

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21 “Vurdering af terrortruslen,” 2. 22 See Lindekilde, “Dansk forebyggelse,” 434–5; and Henningsen, The Danish Approach, 35–7. 23 Stewart Bell, quoting Ahmed Hussen, Canadian minister for integration, refugees and citizenship, “Canada Not Refuting Extremist Ideologies, US Committee Told,” National Post, 27 July 2011, http://news.nationalpost.com/ news/canada/somali-militants-recruiting-westerners-committee-chair. Accessed 15 April 2017.

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8 The Challenges of Evaluating Attitudinal Change A Case Study of the Effectiveness of International Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs patr ick o’halloran

There has been significant growth in multilevel and multisectoral countering violent extremism (cve) initiatives by international organizations, governments and their agencies, and civil society in the last ten years. Canadian programs are in most cases relatively new, have achieved some real successes, and their policy relevance is gaining more traction given tragic events internationally and nationally, with the 29 January 2017 mosque attack in Ste-Foy, Quebec, as the most recent in Canada. The degree of government support for these programs as a national security and public safety policy instrument hinges to a certain extent on their ability to demonstrate utility. Moreover, and as acknowledged by the un, “effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for these plans are essential to ensuring that policies are having the desired impact.”1 Despite the cognitive nature of both the threat and political aim of sociopolitical cohesion, evidence-based policy (ebp) making requires empirical evidence of the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of those initiatives. So far, however, indicators of success and measures of effectiveness remain elusive given both the latent and manifest nature of extremism. Programs tend to evaluate their processes through output analysis and often focus on behavioural change (acts of violence) as compared to attitudinal change (beliefs that lead to violence) because of the methodological complexities of measuring attitudes and the ambiguity of causal primacy between ideas and practice. This paper explores the issue of impact evaluation of cve programs by reviewing the models in Denmark, Norway, and the UK. It begins with a cursory survey of the state of cve program evaluation, including evaluations

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of the three case studies, then a presentation of the theory of change approach to impact analysis, a summary of findings of a theory-based analysis of the three case studies, and, finally, implications of this analysis for Canadian cve strategies. The purpose of the case study analysis is to evaluate the respective program contribution claims, identify missing or questionable links in the causal pathway, and to provide insights on measures of performance. The availability of open-source information, however, hampered its execution. The cases were selected from non-Islamic states based on program maturity, positive results, and data availability.

CVE Evaluation A significant body of literature, broad survey analyses, and case studies of cve programs and evaluations has been produced in the last five years. Some examples are works by or edited by Zeiger,2 Zeiger and Aly,3 Horgan and Braddock,4 Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat,5 Romaniuk and Fink,6 Romaniuk,7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark,8 Young et al.,9 Mastroe and Szmania,10 the Institute for Strategic Dialogue,11 Williams,12 and the series of four volumes edited by Neumann13 that include Boucek,14 Kruglanski et al.,15 and Ramakrishna.16 According to this collection of literature, cve programs tend to fall within three broad types: prevention programs, generally targeting an at risk segment of society; disengagement programs, designed to encourage individuals to leave violent groups; and deradicalization programs, designed to “alter extremist beliefs that an individual holds.”17 Mastroe and Szmania’s literature review on cve metrics sounds a common chord. They identified only fifteen countries that have provided empirical data of some sort, ranging from surveys of people having taken programs, recidivism rates, murder rates, completion rates, prison release rates, changes in behaviour, disengagement rates, and changes in attitudes.18 Key findings indicate that program evaluation data is limited (forty-three studies) and that there is “little consensus regarding the effectiveness of cve prevention programs or disengagement/deradicalization programs largely due to the lack of empirical data.”19 Similarly, Horgan and Braddock analysed program evaluation and found that there was a

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major concern that participants were insincere; “there is little expectation that internal evaluation would result in outcomes being made public” and that external evaluation bodies might not have access to information; programs have not identified “valid and reliable indicators of successful deradicalization or even disengagement”; official claims of low recidivism are not substantiated with proof; and that context matters so different countries have different approaches.20 The broader body of literature indicates some early success in cve but quite little in terms of performance measurement. Counterradicalization, deradicalization, and reintegration are evaluated, if at all, in terms of recidivism rates and violent acts despite treatment. Results are not empirically robust. This is essentially the same situation for Danish, Norwegian, and British prevention strategies. The Danish government tasked an independent body, cowi, with the evaluation of the program in 2011 and again in 2014. Lindekilde criticized the 2011 evaluation for not providing an evaluation on effectiveness or impact.21 The cowi 2011 evaluation stated that, “for many initiatives, it is still too early to assess the long-term effects.”22 Later, with respect to contributing to the goal fulfilment of the 2014 Action Plan,23 the cowi report summarized the stakeholder’s uncertainty regarding activity impact: “the data collection in connection with the mid term evaluation shows that the majority of those responsible for initiatives find that their initiatives currently have not contributed significantly to fulfilling the overall objectives of the Action Plan.”24 With respect to the much-referenced Aarhus program, results are often expressed in terms of output (people participated and treated), with very little information in terms of impact or the extent to which there has been a reduction in violent extremism cases committed by the program target audience. One often cited impact measurement is that in 2012 there were thirty-one known cases of people leaving Aarhus to fight in Syria, but only one Danish citizen left in 2014. Additionally, fifteen foreign fighters who returned were rehabilitated and reintegrated.25 The Norwegian Action Plan26 is praised as maintaining a very grounded perspective that appeals to nonextremist and extremist Norwegians alike.27 Much of the program is based on an anti-extremism program that took place in Norway in the 1980s and 1990s, credited for diminishing the neo-

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Nazi presence in Norway.28 Since many of the program activities are locally driven and rely on community implementation it is difficult to know the extent to which the program has been effective in all 432 municipalities of Norway.29 One element of the action plan, Empowerment Conversations, treated ten members of the Muslim community in one year according to the Oslo Police in 2012. Although the numbers were low, authorities considered that part of the program a success because all participants were guided back into mainstream society.30 The UK Prevent Strategy31 is a “workstream” of the UK contest Counterterrorism Strategy.32 Unlike the Pursue workstream of contest, where success can be measured to some degree by the number of arrests and convictions, Prevent is a less clearly defined area that deals with attitudes and community cohesion and so has difficulty in proving the value of its contribution. For example, Gardner cites the increase in the number of police cases involving radicalization as a sign of the ineffectiveness of Prevent.33 Early 2007 outreach efforts also took on a surveillance role that incited public outcry resulting in a temporary suspension of activities, an inquiry, and ultimately program reorganization in 2011.34 This suspension and a perceived stigmatization of Muslim communities35 were unintended consequences of information collection. This case demonstrates the balancing act required between the collection of police intelligence and program monitoring data. The Prevent strategy is self-critical of its ability to self-evaluate and acknowledged the lack of data from previous Prevent activities and the requirement to build the evidentiary baseline: “funding decisions must be made on the ability to deliver against Prevent objectives. The focus must be on impact and outcomes (attitudinal or behavioural change in a target audience) not on outputs (for example, a simple assessment of numbers reached by a particular project).”36 Channel is an element of Prevent that began as a pilot project in 2007 but was not fully implemented until 2012.37 Despite the fact that the contest strategy foresaw the requirement for the evaluation of Channel, the UK government has not released indicators.38 Open source evidence from the program continues to be very limited, if nonexistent, especially given the fact that many referrals are children. An access to information request

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to the National Police Chiefs’ Council cited that 3,955 persons were referred to the Channel program in 2015 alone, of which only 293 were identified as Muslim.39 The referral itself is an output, not an outcome, and information regarding the assessment and whether or not individuals were deradicalized is unavailable.

Theory of Change and Impact Evaluation Leeuw and Vaessen identify two broad methodological approaches to impact evaluation: “impact evaluations that rely on statistical design and/or multivariate analysis with statistical controls as a basis for attribution; and impact evaluations relying on systematic argumentation guided by some type of causal theory of change.”40 Nonquantitative techniques, such as John Mayne’s causal contribution analysis,41 generate evidence to validate the causal chain and are helpful in complex environments but are weaker in terms of addressing attribution. The attribution problem concerns the evaluation of the benefit of an intervention beyond the other environmental factors. It is the evaluation of a counterfactual: “The net impact is the difference between the target variable’s value after the intervention and the value the variable would have had in case the intervention had not taken place.”42 Mayne’s contribution analysis43 argues that if an evaluator can validate a theory of change with empirical evidence and account for major external influencing factors, then it is reasonable to conclude that the intervention has made a difference. The theory of change (ToC) provides the basis for arguing that the intervention is making a difference and identifies weaknesses in the argument thus identifying where evidence for strengthening such claims is most needed. A contribution claim is based on, and causality inferred from, the following evidence: first, the intervention is based on a reasoned theory of change (the results chain and the underlying assumptions of why the intervention is expected to work are sound, plausible, and agreed to by key players, and the activities of the intervention were implemented); second, the theory of change is verified by evidence (the chain of expected results occurred, the assumptions held, and the final outcomes were observed); and, third, external factors or the context influencing the

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intervention were assessed and shown not to have made a significant contribution, or if they did, their relative contribution was recognized. To summarize, a contribution claim is justified when the ToC is verified and other key influencing factors are accounted for. This paper draws upon Mayne’s contribution analysis to reinforce the Canadian Treasury Board Secretariat (tbs) program evaluation framework.44 This admittedly does not provide an empirically robust solution to the attribution issue, but it does permit a critique of the underlying logic that predicts the benefit of a cve intervention beyond other environmental factors. The tbs Directive on the Evaluation Function includes the requirement for departments, when developing programs, to create a program profile, a logic model and theory of change, an evaluation framework, and, ultimately, an evaluation of the program relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. The case studies that follow were explored using the ToC framework employed by tbs to evaluate the contribution claim, identify missing or questionable links in the causal pathway, and provide insights on measures of performance. If the ToC can be validated with empirical evidence and account for major external influencing factors, then it is reasonable to conclude that the intervention has made a difference.

Denmark: Aarhus Program Denmark became the European Union (EU) lead nation on deradicalization in 2008. It released multiple counterterrorism policies and action plans between 2002 and 2016. It had a higher threat level after the 2005 JyllandsPosten publication of the Muhammad cartoons but did not experience a terrorist attack on its soil until the 14–15 February 2015 shootings in Copenhagen. According to a 2015 report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (icsr),45 however, Denmark has been the second highest source of jihadists per capita. Twenty-seven Danish citizens per million joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis). This is in a political context of, since 2010, “growing anti-immigrant sentiment in Denmark that has resulted in an anti-immigrant party gaining influence over the government. As a result, the issue of religion in general and Islam in particular has become extremely politically charged.”46

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Denmark’s 2009 counterradicalization strategy, A Common and Safe Future,47 divided its approach into seven focus areas, split into general preventive activities and targeted interventions. The fourth focus area emphasized democratic cohesion and that “a strong, vibrant and inclusive, democratic culture … may also contribute to strengthening the resilience of young people towards the group belonging and explanations offered by extremism.”48 The first focus area, direct contact with young people, provided for targeted interventions and funding for three deradicalization pilot projects in Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Odense aimed at developing mentoring programs for individuals expressing signs of radicalization or seeking exit from a group.49 Program implementation was largely a municipal responsibility. Municipalities worked with the ssp in particular (social services, schools and police) to establish early warning systems and to train personnel. The Aarhus model includes counterradicalization, deradicalization, and reintegration strategies. The target populations for the program are returning fighters and older youth, particularly Somali, prone to radicalization. According to 2013 data collected by the Center for Terror Analysis, the majority of foreign fighters who originate from Denmark are of Sunni Muslim origin, male, and sixteen to twenty-five years old. The aim of the Aarhus program is to prevent the political and religious radicalization of youth and to support the rehabilitation of returning fighters. The main principles of the multiagency program are to work with minority communities to identify vulnerable people, provide advice and assistance to professionals and parents who may encounter these individuals, and to be voluntary. Aarhus cve activities prioritise the integration of immigrant communities and treat counterradicalization as crime prevention work.50 There are several assumptions associated with this approach. Firstly, Denmark assumes that immigrant groups are the main source of radicalized individuals, an assumption also present in Denmark’s exit program and Aarhus’s focus on engagement with the Somali community and mosques.51 The Danes believe that the desire to radicalize will be reduced by integrating these groups and assimilating them into Danish culture.52 The Danes assume that terrorists can be engaged, rehabilitated, and reintegrated. These assumptions ignore the contextual pull factor of why Islamist groups fight the West or why people seek an international caliphate.

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Specific activities of the program include an information house (infohouse), booklets, and mentorship. The outputs of these activities include workshops, children’s club events, parent networking, and mentorship of returning fighters. The workshops deliver antiradicalization material to students aged sixteen to twenty-five in their final years of high school or at post-secondary school, and to professionals and parents. The parent network group for the parents of radicalized youth meets monthly and encourages dialogue.53 The infohouse seeks to educate parents, teachers, and other professionals through training sessions, an infoline for people in contact with at risk youth, and “offers a range of local dialogue based and participatory workshops to educate professionals on the signs of radicalization.”54 The infoline is founded on a number of assumptions. First, this practice assumes parents are in contact with their children (sixteen to twenty-five) and will detect problems. However, people who have radicalized sometimes move away and favour a more radical support system. Second, this approach assumes that parents can influence their children’s social attitudes. This assumption is questionable because a social network is often the primary agent of socialization for teens. The program also assumes that radicalization starts at a mature age, with those under eighteen treated within existing crime prevention efforts. Third, is the assumption that teachers are able to identify youth who might be radicalized. However, youth prone to radicalization may not be close with their teachers or other professionals. The mentorship program is designed to treat returning fighters and individuals at risk of radicalization. Mentorship assumes that individuals at risk will be identified and that the counselling will convince them to change their attitudes. It assumes that the target population will be reached and the counselling will be of an adequate “dose” and content, and conducted by convincing mentors, so as to incite permanent attitudinal and behavioural change. The idea that these activities can lead to fewer youth leaving to fight overseas, a greater ability for foreign fighters to reintegrate, and a more tolerant society is somewhat plausible. However, while this idea might be appealing to stakeholders, it is supported by weak empirical evidence. The impact of the international context in which the program is running may have also influenced the results if the slow defeat of Daesh discouraged potential

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fighters, although this disincentive is counteracted by the European antiIslamic reaction to the migrant crisis. The Aarhus program includes elements of counterpolarization, counterradicalization, deradicalization, and disengagement or reintegration. Enduring effects and undesired effects have not been evaluated given the program’s age. Data on known returnees is available but less on numbers of those known to have departed. The change being sought is attitudinal and also behavioural. Contrastingly, Norway currently evaluates the outcomes of the various outputs and activities based on the number of known departing foreign fighters.

Norway Norway experienced its most violent episode since World War Two when an act of terrorism on 22 July 2011 killed seventy-seven people.55 This attack, however, was not the product of Islamic radicalization but the work of rightwing extremist Anders Behring Breivik. Apart from that incident, most attacks in Norway have been isolated cases involving black and immigrant individual victims. While there have been incidents of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism, few groups have been able to take hold in Norwegian communities.56 This is similarly the case for Islamist extremists. Norway has one of the lowest counts of foreign fighters per capita with an estimated twelve fighters per 1 million inhabitants and approximately sixty foreign fighters known to authorities.57 While there has been an absence of significant instances of extremism, however, Norwegian authorities have noted a range of lower-level support for terrorism including fundraising, protests, and death threats.58 The Norwegian 2014 Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism59 was preceded by community-based intervention and prevention programs related to right-wing extremism. The plan built upon existing knowledge and practices about push and pull drivers or explanations, social intervention with parent and civil society groups, policing, and the limitations of those programs.60 The aim of the action plan was to practice early prevention to reduce participation in violent extremism. The action plan identifies two dominant and opposing violent extremist groups in Norway:

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“Al-Qaeda-inspired extremists and right-wing extremists who are hostile to Islam.”61 Although both groups are mentioned, measures focus primarily on al-Qaeda-inspired extremists and Muslims. The action plan identifies thirty measures, requiring an interagency approach that builds on local crime prevention and cooperation between local police and municipal authorities. First, it includes institution-building measures to clarify responsibilities, develop knowledge, cooperate internationally, and to create cohesion and coordination between government and civil society stakeholders. This includes dialogue conferences for youth and teaching resources for secondary schools. Second, it includes measures to “prevent the growth of extremist groups and help promote reintegration” and to “prevent radicalisation and recruitment through the internet.”62 These measures include interfaith dialogue, mentoring and exit schemes, follow-up action for foreign fighters, and monitoring and reacting to online sources of radicalization. Similar to other cve programs, the rationale assumption is that general and individual education and dialogue can counteract the push and pull drivers of radicalization, including psychological susceptibilities, socioeconomic drivers, convincing enablers, and international political events. The outputs of these measures are quite diverse and include research findings and conferences, dialogue with youth (generally under eighteen but up to twenty-three) and between religious groups, teaching material and instruction on extremism, institutional coordination, guidance material for mentoring and exit schemes, mentoring sessions themselves, publications for parents, changes to Norwegian laws, information gathering on returnees, internet monitoring, and instruction on internet awareness. The assumption is that these activities are reaching the at risk audience and returning fighters. The quantity and quality, or dose rate, of the various measures are not included in the action plan. That information was not located in the research and it would appear still too early to critique the success of the measures. Without data on the actual output, one can only surmise whether an activity contributes to the desired outcomes. For example, measure 9 is the development of digital teaching resources by the Ministry of Education and Research for use in secondary schools. The quality of the information, its distribution, its teaching, time devoted to teaching, and the student audience are all factors that affect whether that measure contributes to the awareness

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and deradicalization outcomes. It is plausible that education improves awareness and tolerance, as is the case with some initiatives that address minority and women’s rights. So, education certainly could contribute but whether that education is offered in a sufficient dose is unsubstantiated. The same argument can be made for other measures, such as the guide for parents, interfaith dialogue, and municipal mentoring programs. The intervention is based on a reasoned theory of change in that the types and scope of activities and the actors involved (multiple levels of government, police and social services, civil society, parents, and youth themselves) is certainly plausible, and the context of the European migrant crisis and right-wing government in Norway since 2013 should have made the cases of extremism worse, but it has not to date. The lack of data on the actual output of the action plan, however, does not permit a contribution claim because the ToC is not verified by evidence. Similarly, since the causal pathway is relatively new and untried, despite leveraging previous right-wing extremism strategies, it is difficult and too early to critique the ToC on missing or questionable links in the causal pathway.

UK Prevent and Channel Programs The UK developed the contest 63 strategy in response to the London bombings of July 2005, attacks in Northern Ireland in 2010 and 2011, and overall growth in arrests for terrorism.64 contest seeks to protect the UK from a variety of actors. In 2011, it was believed that the most significant threat emanated from terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, and alQaeda associated groups.65 One of the failings of contest, and of Western nations in general, was not anticipating the rise of isis, its attraction, and its impact in creating more terrorists and foreign fighters. More specifically, the UK believed that the greatest threats would emerge from Yemen and Somalia.66 The contest program also acknowledges that the alternative right is also a threat but, like the Norwegian action plan, its primary focus is on the Islamic aspect. The aim of the Prevent workstream of contest was to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The 2011 Prevent strategy built upon prevention activities from 2007. The objectives of Prevent

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are to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.”67 Despite the implementation of the 2011 Prevent strategy, the threat level in the UK has remained at the severe level, with the recent March 2017 Westminster attack killing five and wounding forty (by a British Islam convert with a criminal record) as a stark reminder of that enduring threat. Objective two of the Prevent strategy is protecting vulnerable people, an objective that builds on Channel, the multiagency counterradicalization program created in 2007, but fully implemented in 2012, in England and Wales to support at risk individuals. Channel’s program is for all forms of radicalization and, like the Danish and Norwegian models, involves multiagency collaboration.68 The rationale assumption of Channel is that, “people being drawn into radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support” and that support will “dissuade them from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity.”69 The purpose of Channel is to create attitudinal (cognitive) and behavioural change by identifying at risk individuals and providing them with the support they require to avoid radicalization: “Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist activity.”70 Channel identifies police agencies and social services as the frontline staff for program implementation, so the program is largely a municipal responsibility. These groups are reasonably more likely to identify and refer at risk individuals. The Channel guidance is quite explicit in roles and processes, including types of support (from health, to skills, to anger management), sharing of funding responsibilities, principles of information sharing between partners and data collection, and a vulnerability assessment framework. Developing the assumptions of a ToC for the Channel model and evaluating a contribution claim faces the same issues as the Norwegian one – the absence of open source data on both outputs and outcomes, despite several years of operation, hinders evaluation. The Channel intervention is based

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on a reasoned theory of change, itself a subset of Prevent and contest. Open source evidence from the program is limited if nonexistent, especially given the fact that many referrals are children, and the referral itself is an output not an outcome. Similar to the Danish and Norwegian models, the international context characterized by the European antimigrant sentiment, laws banning Islamic clothing, and the ongoing war against isis only serve to fuel Islamophobia and would result in an increase in terrorism as compared to a false positive. The causal pathways are incomplete without more details on outputs and a breakdown of outcomes into immediate, medium term, and long term. For example, that almost 4,000 people were referred in 2015 does not necessarily contribute to prevention. It might, however, contribute to scaremongering from excess missed diagnosis and seeing radicalization where none is present, to communities feeling targeted, and to a sense of government interference in personal affairs.

Implications These case studies suggest a number of implications for Canada’s cve strategy. First, a Canadian strategy needs to begin with clear definitions of program terms that are fundamental to the development of objectives and outcomes, such as radicalization to violence, counterpolarization, counterradicalization, deradicalization, disengagement, reintegration, and recidivism. Second, the strategy should begin with a context-specific typology of at risk individuals, context-specific drivers of radicalization (push, pull, and enablers), and a theory of change with proven assumptions linking the elements of the causal chain and that recognizes the potential deleterious effects of the program. Additionally, the program strategies or types of programs required – prevention, disengagement, and/or deradicalization – must fit with program objectives and provide the necessary outputs to move along the causal chain. Objectives should be expressed as outcomes, with reduced aspirations (immediate, midterm, and long term) to permit the evaluation of contribution between steps. Moreover, since ToC is integral to the Canadian federal government’s policy on results and, therefore, departmental plans and results reports, then a national cve strategy should be developed using a ToC approach.

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None of the case studies provided insight on performance measurement. The three case studies reinforced conclusions drawn on similar studies in terms of the difficulty of identifying outcome indicators for the evaluation of program effectiveness. Success is generally based on recidivism rates for foreign fighters and ex-militants or on an attitudinal change in members of the mentorship programs. The cases did demonstrate the requirement for vertical and horizontal policy coherence, from national strategy through to the municipal level. The nature of cve intervention is such that it requires implementation at the local level but resources and oversight from higher levels. Since none of the three cases were for a federal government, but unitary states, a provincial level was not involved. This extra level of government is, however, particularly important for the Canadian case because police, schools, and social programs are within provincial and municipal jurisdiction. A Canadian strategy would need to incorporate the roles and responsibilities of the provincial and municipal governments and their agencies. With respect to the application of specific program activities to Canada, the Danish Aarhus activities for returning fighters are unlikely to be applicable to Canada given the dispersion of returnees in Canada, but best practices for engaging with Somali groups may be transferable. Given the comparability of the Norwegian and Canadian experience and context, the measures identified in the Norwegian action plan could likely be applied to Canada. Examples are tracking and information sharing on returning fighters, psychosocial treatment of returning fighters, and resources to be taught in schools and for parents including internet awareness of extremism and intolerance. The UK Prevent and Channel programs provide the basis for strategy frameworks for Canada, including roles and responsibilities, how to identify at risk individuals, the types of support available to at risk individuals, sharing of funding responsibilities, and principles of information sharing between partners and principles of data collection.

Conclusion This chapter explored the issue of impact evaluation of cve programs by reviewing the models in Denmark, Norway, and the UK using theory of change and contribution analysis. The analysis provided a number of implications

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for a Canadian prevention strategy, taking into consideration the differences in context. It identified only two metrics for success across the different cve initiatives provided in national strategies, and by doing so highlighted the lack of measurable outcomes, including any that evaluate cognitive effects (attitudes) and associated actions (behaviour). Undesired side effects, like communities feeling targeted or claims of invasion of privacy, were observed but not predicted by the program. The most flagrant was the case of the UK 2007–11 Prevent program that was suspended and revised significantly after public outcry of prevention really being about police intelligence gathering. The available open source information on outputs and outcomes was insufficient to lead to a positive contribution claim for the three programs, but that does not mean that the programs do not contribute to prevention, disengagement, or deradicalization. A contribution claim requires a reasoned theory of change, evidence that indicates that outputs and outcomes were achieved and assumptions held, and that results were not significantly affected by external factors. The programs of the case studies were developed based on generally accepted drivers, activity outputs were achieved to varying levels, both positive and undesired outcomes were observed, and there was discussion within relevant policy communities over the extent of the influence of external factors. The results, or perhaps the lack of results, underscore the utility of using a theory of change to build programs. In the absence of robust empirical data, theory of change models, such as contribution analysis, provide the means to analyze critically the program causal chains and serve to corroborate or at least substantiate the results. The minimum conditions for a cve impact evaluation to be possible are an accepted theory of change, measurable activity outputs and observable behavioural outcomes. The Canadian government can certainly learn from the program development experience of Norway, Denmark, and the UK but should improve upon those initiatives by first acknowledging an underpinning theory of change that informs target audience identification, scope (type, frequency rate, volume) of activities, types of outputs necessary for outcomes to be reached, and anticipated short-, intermediate-, and longterm behavioural and attitudinal outcomes that are measurable through surveys, interviews, or observation. Once this logical superstructure is developed it can be used to test theoretical assumptions and to make practical

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adjustments to Canadian cve policies and programs. Despite comments to the contrary, it is never too early to start evaluating performance in a program cycle.

n otes 1 United Nations, General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (24 December 2015), available from undocs.org/A/70/674. 2 Sarah Zeiger, ed., Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism: The outcome of the 2015 International Countering Violent Extremism Research Conference (Abu Dhabi, uae: Hedayah and Edith Cowan University, 2016). 3 Sara Zeiger and Anne Aly, eds., Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an Evidence-Base for Policy and Practice (Hedayah Center/Curtin University: 2015). 4 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 267–91. 5 Naureen Chowdury Fink, Peter Romaniuk, and Rafia Barakat, Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Proactive and Progress (Centre on Global Counterterrorism and Cooperation, June 2013). 6 Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdury Fink, From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012). 7 Peter Romaniuk, Does cve Work? Lessons Learned From the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2015). 8 Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, Lessons Learned from Danish and Other International Efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (cve) in Development Contexts (danida, 2015). 9 Holly Young, Magda Rooze, Jonathan Russell, Julia Ebner, and Norah Schulten, “Evidence-based Policy Advice, Final Report, July 2016,” TerRa: Terrorism and Radicalisation, http://www.terra-net.eu/files/resources/evidence-based-policyadvice/evidence-based-policy-advice-terra_english.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 10 Caitlin Mastroe and Susan Szmania, “Surveying cve Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs,” Report to the Office of

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University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security (College Park, Maryland: start, 2016). 11 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, ppn Working Paper: Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalisation (June 2010). ppn countries are the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Canada, and Norway. 12 Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan ,and William P. Evans, “Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led cve Program,” National Criminal Justice Reference System (2016); Michael J. Williams and Steven M. Kleinman, “A Utilization-Focused Guide for Conducting Terrorism Risk Reduction Program Evaluations,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 6, no. 2 (2014): 102–46. 13 Peter R. Neumann, ed., Radicalization (New York: Routledge, 2015). 14 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Disengagment in Saudi Arabia: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare,” in Neumann, Radicalization. 15 Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “De-Radicalising the Liberation Tigers Radicalization of Tamil Eelam (ltte),” in Neumann, Radicalization. 16 Kuam Ramakrishna, “The “Three Rings” of Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Ideological Work in Singapore,” in Neumann, Radicalization. 17 Mastroe and Szmania, “Surveying cve,” 3. 18 Ibid., 18–20. 19 Ibid., 12. 20 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?,” 281, 268, and 268, respectively. 21 Lasse Lindekilde, “Value for Money? Problems of Impact Assessment of Counter-Radicalisation Policies on End Target Groups: The case of Denmark,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 18, no. 4 (2012): 395. ssp stands for social services, schools, and police. 22 cowi, Summary of the Mid Term Evaluation of the Action Plan “A Common and Safe Future” (June 2011), 3, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/index. cfm?action=media.download&uuid=FBC310B9-FB85-7C31-946D632BC120 D3B7. Accessed 28 April 2017. 23 Denmark. Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism: Action Plan (September 2014), http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemed delelser/pdf/2015/SJ20150422125507430%20%5BDOR1545530%5D.PDF. 24 cowi, Summary of the Mid Term Evaluation Plan, 3.

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25 Counter Extremism Project, “Denmark: Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” n.d., https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/denmark. Accessed 28 April 2017. 26 Norway, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Action plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2014), https://www.regjeringen.no/con tentassets/6d84d5d6c6df47b38f5e2b989347fc49/action-plan-against-radicalisa tion-and-violent-extremism_2014.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 27 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe (International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence: 2012), 66, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Counter ing-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 28 Yngve Carlsson, “Violent Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Community Based Prevention and Intervention,” in Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism in European Perspective, ed. Peter Rieker, Michael Glaser, and Silke Schuster (The Center for the Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia, 2006), 14, http://www.dji.de/fileadmin/user_up load/bibs/96_6736_Prevention_of_Right_Wing_Extremism.pdf. Accessed 27 April 2017. 29 Carlsson, “Violent Right-Wing,” 12. 30 Vidino and Brandon, Countering Radicalization, 66. 31 United Kingdom, Prevent Strategy (June 2011), https://www.gov.uk/govern ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 32 United Kingdom, contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 33 Frank Gardner, “Prevent strategy: Is it failing to stop radicalisation?,” bbc News, 6 March 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31756755. Accessed 28 April 2017. 34 Paul Thomas, “Britain’s Prevent Programme: An End in Sight?,” Critical Perspectives on Counter Terrorism, Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), 169–86, http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/22105/3/ThomasBritain.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 35 Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, “Social Cohesion and Counter Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction?” Politics & Policy 41, no. 4 (August 2013): 619–23. 10.1111/polp.12026

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36 UK, Prevent, 37. 37 United Kingdom, Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism, Statuatory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels. (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_ April_2015.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 38 UK, contest, 15. 39 National Police Chiefs’ Council. 07/03/2016 freedom of information request reference number: 000026/16. Retrieved from http://www.npcc. police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/02616ChannelReferrals.pdf. 40 Frans Leeuw and Jos Vaessen, “Impact Evaluations and Development: nonie Guidance on Impact Evaluation” (Washington, dc: Network of Networks for Impact Evaluation, World Bank, 2009), 330. 41 John Mayne, “Useful Theories of Change Models,” Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation / La Revue canadienne d’évaluation de programme 30, no. 2 (2015): 119–42, doi: 10.3138/cjpe.230. 42 Leeuw and Vaessen, “Impact Evaluations and Development,” xiii. 43 Mayne, “Useful theories.” 44 Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, “Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practice,” www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services /audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-evaluation/theory-based-approachesevaluation-concepts-practices.html. Accessed 1 March 2017. 45 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, http://icsr.info/about-us-2/. Accessed 28 April 2017. 46 Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Chrisopher Boucek, “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists” (rand Corporation, 2010), 155, http:// www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a534160.pdf. 47 Denmark, A Common and Safe Future: Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation among Young People (January 2009). 48 Denmark, A Common and Safe Future. 49 Denmark, Denmark’s Deradicalization efforts, Fact Sheet by the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (May 2010). 50 Toke Agerschou, “Preventing Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 1 (2014), 5–22. 51 Agerschou, “Preventing Radicalisation.”

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52 Colin M. Tansey, “Anti-radicalization Efforts within the European Union: Spain and Denmark” (Doctoral dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 53 Agerschou, “Preventing Radicalization.” 54 Holly Young, Magda Rooze, Jonathan Russell, Julia Ebner, and Norah Schulten. “Evidence-based Policy Advice, Final Report” (TerRa: Terrorism and Radicalisation, July 2016), 24, http://www.terra-net.eu/files/resources/evidence-basedpolicy-advice/evidence-based-policy-advice-terra_english.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 55 Norway, Action Plan, 7. 56 Carlsson in Rieker, Glaser, and Schuster, Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, 13. 57 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s” (London: icsr, 26 January 2015). 58 Vidino and Brandon, Countering Radicalization, 60. 59 Norway, Action Plan. 60 Carlsson, in Rieker, Glasner and Schuster, Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism. 61 Norway, Action Plan, 10. 62 Ibid, 16. 63 United Kingdom, Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (July 2011). 64 Thomas, “Britain’s Prevent Programme ” 65 United Kingdom, contest, 3. 66 Ibid., 5. 67 United Kingdom, Prevent Strategy (June 2011), 7. 68 Ibid., 55. 69 Ibid., 56. 70 United Kingdom, Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism, Statuatory Guidance for Channel Panel Members and Partners of Local Panels (2015), 5, https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_ Guidance_April_2015.pd. Accessed 28 April 2017.

Conclusion The Next Wave of Canadian CVE nora abdelrahman ibrahim

Counterterrorism (ct) has long been a national security priority for Canada, brought to particular prominence after the Air India Flight 182 terrorist attacks in 1985.1 This attack highlighted Canada’s vulnerability to violent extremism, which has persisted into the twenty-first century. In fact, violent extremism has become a permanent fixture in Canadian national security agendas, as the reverberations of the 11 September 2001 attacks escalated movements of homegrown terrorism, both in Canada and around the world.2 Beyond the handful of high profile terrorist attacks that have shaken the nation since the turn of the century, the Canadian government has also paid close attention to the invisible yet extensive networks of terrorist financing that connect Canadian funds and resources to violent extremist organizations abroad.3 Even more disturbing are recently emerging trends, whereby an increasing number of Canadians are travelling overseas to join violent extremist groups, particularly in conflict zones like Iraq and Syria.4 The persistence and rapid evolution of violent extremism continue to outpace the policy responses that have been developed to confront it, both in Canada and internationally. This has prompted an international recognition that not only are traditional ct strategies insufficient to adequately address violent extremism, but also that these very strategies have, in many cases, exacerbated the problem altogether and proved downright counterproductive.5 In 2015, The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (cve) highlighted the need to incorporate more communitybased strategies, to advance the engagement of civil society, and to amplify

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“credible and authentic religious voices” in the fight against violent extremism.6 Consequently, the cve agenda gained momentum as a significant breakthrough within counterterrorism around the world for its emphasis on the local, its goals of countering drivers to radicalization to prevent violence, and its proposition to partner with civil society in order to build resilience to violent extremism at a grassroots level.7 Although cve has been in practice internationally for some time, Canada’s experience with cve is still relatively new. Recent years have seen the establishment of a few initiatives around the country, with law enforcement leading programs in cities like Toronto, Ontario, and Calgary, Alberta, and a provincial deradicalization centre in Montreal, Quebec. Another meaningful step has been the creation of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre). Tasked with developing a robust, coherent national strategy to counter violent extremism, the Canada Centre is in the early stages of research and gathering input from relevant stakeholders in preparation for policy generation to come. This volume, then, is a timely contribution, where the potential for policy impact is great. To this end, this concluding chapter will amalgamate the common themes and ideas of the various contributions in this volume to inform a collection of policy recommendations that are critical to creating a more innovative and effective strategy to counter violent extremism in the future.

Overview of Chapters The volume is divided into three thematic sections, beginning with an overview of the state of the cve field by way of presenting recent developments in both research and cve practice. It moves on to an exploration of violent extremism within the Canadian context, for although Canada is widely regarded as a peaceful and stable nation, it has never been immune to the influences of radicalization and violent extremism.8 The third section broadens the focus beyond Canadian borders to survey international cve initiatives in an effort to tease out best practices and lessons learned. The introductory chapter, written by Stéfanie von Hlatky, sets the stage by outlining some recent trends in the literature, for example, the rejection

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of causal models to understand radicalization and violent extremism. It also sets forth a common research strategy for the volume, which is based on multistakeholder collaboration. Indeed, the foundational concept of the book was meant to draw from both academia and professionals from government and nongovernmental sectors to establish a community of practice whose work is articulated around a common problem set: preventing and responding to violent extremism. In chapter 1, Christian Leuprecht and his collaborators move onto a more practical discussion by demystifying persistent myths about radicalization and jihadist terrorism and introduce an important distinction between radicalization of thought and radicalization of action.9 As it relates to the crafting of policy responses, the distinction between action and opinion is critical to counter-messaging efforts that combat the global jihadist narrative.10 With the baseline recognition that not all Muslims are terrorists and not all radicals engage in violence, the authors propose a strategy of segmenting the radical Muslim population into distinct categories based on the type of activity they are engaged in. They conceptualize this strategy by outlining a pyramid model that displays three categories of followers and sympathizers. At the bottom are the activists (encompassing most of the population), defined as those who “support individuals or groups who engage in politically motivated violence or other illegal acts.”11 One tier above are the radicals, defined as those who “engage in nonviolent but illegal acts.”12 At the top are the terrorists (with the fewest numbers), those who “engage in politically motivated violence.”13 With these distinctions in mind, the authors suggest a multilayered approach to countermessaging, one that would target differentiated messages to each group. Moreover, they contend that it would be more realistic to focus the efforts of a countermessaging campaign on preventing the upward mobility of the two lower categories by pursuing the following strategies: (1) moving Muslims against militants; and (2) moving Muslims towards the West. While Leuprecht’s recommendations stay close to more traditional confines of ct and cve practice so far, others would suggest a more radical deviation from these frameworks. While cve has featured prominently in political discourse over the last few years, its efforts are not necessarily new nor are they novel. Indeed, many of the goals that fall under cve, such as encouraging social cohesion and addressing some of the grievances that

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motivate radicalization leading to violence, are common social goals among other fields as well. The idea that we may borrow strategies and lessons learned from other, more experienced fields, is gaining traction amongst academia, policy makers, and practitioners. This line of thinking has prompted researchers to look beyond the rather securitized approach that has characterized ct and cve so far, in order to explore potential overlap and applicable lessons from the field of public health. In suggesting a way to work within a public health framework, David Eisenman, Steve Weine, and Myrna Lashley begin by stressing the importance of definitional clarity and appropriate terminology.14 They propose rebranding countering violent extremism to preventing violent extremism (pve). This would imply that extremist violence is preventable in the precriminal space and that there is a context more appropriate for public health professionals to operate – before law enforcement and other agents of the justice system become involved. Furthermore, the preventative emphasis allows for a clearer connection to public health and well being, where the “goal is to reduce risk factors and strengthen those of a protective nature.”15 Eisenman, Weine, and Lashley further explain the application and implementation of a four-tiered public health model to pve practice. The first tier is primordial prevention, where the focus is on reducing “future risks to health by preventing the penetration of risk factors into a population.”16 Addressing the political, social, economic, and historical influences that may create the conditions for radicalization and the emergence of violent extremism would occur under this mandate. The second tier is primary prevention, which aims to protect against exposure to risk factors that lead to violent extremism, should exposure occur. Given some limitations to this tier, the authors suggest that it be a complementary aspect to efforts elsewhere, as opposed to having a specific standalone program with a tier two mandate. The third tier is secondary prevention, which involves detecting and addressing behaviours that predate the use of violence amongst identified “at risk” individuals. Finally, tertiary prevention would target individuals or groups that have become involved in violent extremism in order to deter them from resorting to the use of violence. In chapter 3, Robert Martyn brings the focus to the Canadian context by exploring the patterns and manifestations of Canadian violent extremism, looking at its evolution across both time and the political spectrum, and

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using a flexible lens that accounts for changes in conceptualizations, attitudes, and classifications of terrorist acts overtime.17 His narrative demonstrates that although these manifestations have differed from era to era, group to group, there is a recurring theme that persists throughout: perpetrators of violent extremism are united by their “unaddressed [personal and political] grievances that influence their decision to use violence to further political objectives.”18 Furthermore, Martyn suggests that in many cases, the response of the Canadian government is often inadequate or misguided, contributing in part to the persistence of radicalization and violent extremism today. In the next chapter, Ali Dizboni focuses on Islamic-inspired terrorism to investigate the relationship (or lack thereof) between religion and the use of violence.19 He delves into this puzzle by presenting a review of Canadian academic literature to understand how Canadians radicalize, examining the role of religion as a driver of radicalization and a justification for the use of violence. In this literature, two main camps emerge. The associationist camp encompasses much of this scholarship and argues that Islam does play a role in terrorism and radicalization, although the degree of this is debated. In contrast, the disassociationist literature rejects any correlation between religion and terrorism or radicalization for lack of reliable evidence. Rather, this camp questions other factors that may be drivers of radicalization, such as Muslim integration (or lack thereof) into Canadian society. Dizboni acknowledges that overall, research on religion and violence is limited by several methodological challenges, including explanatory gaps, primary data, heterogeneity problems, and limited empirical evidence. The preoccupation with religion and violent extremism in academia is reflective of a similar paranoia in the national security realm, where concerns around radicalization and violent extremism have dramatically heightened. With increasing instances of violent extremist acts worldwide, governments around the world are facing mounting pressure to manage and combat this phenomenon, and Canada is no exception. Recent efforts have shifted towards the implementation of policies and practices under the umbrella term countering violent extremism (cve), which focus on soft power applications to counter radicalization and curb recruitment to extremist groups. So far, cve practice has fallen on the shoulders of law enforcement and security intelligence agencies.20 However, and as noted in

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von Hlatky’s introductory chapter, engaging with communities under a securitized mandate has been difficult. Furthermore, the strategies employed by these agencies have resulted in a number of unintended consequences that have proven problematic and counterproductive, as Tabasum Akseer argues in chapter 5. In her study investigating the effects of surveillance, security, and intelligence gathering practices on Canadian Muslim communities, Akseer exposes the counterproductive nature of cve and community policing programs, including stigmatization and feelings of frustration, violation, and discomfort among Canadian Muslim men in particular.21 Her findings reveal that participants feel that current government practices are uncomfortably intrusive and often conducted with a lack of consideration for the dignity and civil liberties of Muslim citizens and individuals. With Muslims facing an intense pressure to cooperate in order to avoid the perception of having something to hide, these practices solidify feelings of resentment, isolation, and distrust of the government. Despite these negative feelings, Muslim participants in Akseer’s study acknowledge their role in the fight against violent extremism, and offer several suggestions to improve the process of intelligence gathering such that mutual trust is strengthened, civil rights and individual dignity preserved, and community engagement positively encouraged. Suggestions such as widening the focus beyond Muslims as the targets of cve programs, strengthening a unified Canadian identity, and addressing harmful political rhetoric and rising public Islamophobia are identified as essential steps to the improvement of these programs, as well as state–minority relations more broadly. The challenges outlined in Akseer’s chapter are not new nor are they unique to Canada. Stigmatization, consequential political rhetoric, rising Islamophobia, and a lack of trust between governments and communities are common challenges faced elsewhere. The third section of this volume surveyed international experiences and perspectives, where similar sentiments were echoed. These cases, which are interesting in their own right, were included to inform the development of international best practices, with the caveat that best practices should be tailored to specific national contexts. In chapter 6, Tahir Abbas discusses the British experience with cve. Officially introduced in 2007 as part of the broader contest (counterterrorism) strategy, the UK’s “Prevent” strategy is the centerpiece of cve policy

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and has been controversial at best.22 Prevent’s aim to build resilience to violent extremism is articulated around several objectives: (1) a focus on community engagement and empowerment to challenge extremist radical narratives; (2) a policing, security, and intelligence mandate to support “overt and covert counterterrorism measures”; (3) building a strong counternarrative and countermessaging platform that is critical to the information and communication battle; and (4) targeting vulnerable youth through a one-on-one mentoring program known as Channel, meant to “educate, motivate and inspire them away” from violent extremism.23 Despite its intentions, Abbas’s criticisms of Prevent parallel those presented by Akseer. Prevent is criticized for its heavy focus on Muslims as the primary target of its programs, overstretching itself to include segments of the Muslim population that do not pose a real threat. Moreover, the program’s emphasis on the role of religion and ideology in driving violent extremism far outweighs its efforts to adequately address other structural grievances that British Muslims experience. The societal implications of this have been quite negative: ethnicities and diversity have been securitized, a notion of “policed multiculturalism” has emerged, coupled with rising Islamophobia and far-right sentiments. With these attitudes underlining public and political attitudes, engaging with Muslim communities has been tainted with high levels of mistrust and wariness. Finally, the lack of adequate funding and supporting resources due to recent austerity cuts greatly reduces the impact that Prevent activities aim to have. As a consequence of these challenges, there is a general lack of confidence in the efficiency and efficacy of Prevent. In contrast to the UK experience, Rolf Holmboe’s review of the Danish Aarhus model in chapter 7 highlights more successful practices that could inform model replication elsewhere.24 Central to the Aarhus model is its streamlined interagency cooperation, both vertically among different levels of governance and government agencies, as well as horizontally among different community actors involved. At the municipal level, the use of “InfoHouses” has been successful in creating a multisectoral network of actors that contribute to the design of general prevention programs as well as targeted individual interventions. Individual-level interventions are carried out through the program’s one-on-one mentoring system, where the goal is to guide the reintegration and reinclusion of an individual back into

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society. In contrast to Prevent’s heavy focus on ideology, Holmboe asserts that the goal of the mentoring system in the Danish context is not to directly oppose the ideological or religious beliefs held by a mentee; rather, the focus is on a pivot away from an inclination to use violence. Although these tools have put Denmark in the lead for positive cve efforts, Holmboe suggests avenues for further improvement. While the Aarhus model has become well established over time, regular evaluation still remains an underdeveloped aspect of the programs in place. Anecdotal success is plentiful, but there remains a need for more concrete measures that can reliably grow the evidence base of good practices. Another area of improvement concerns the dilemma presented by returned foreign fighters. Similar to other models, the question of how to treat foreign fighters upon their return has been difficult to manage; on this, Holmboe suggests a more balanced combination of soft and hard power instruments to provide a chance at rehabilitation, as opposed to resorting to immediate prosecution. In the next chapter, O’Halloran addresses the challenges of program evaluation in more detail, providing a critical assessment of the evaluation strategies of three well-established cve programs in Denmark, Norway, Scotland, and the UK.25 Currently, much of the evaluation methodologies across these programs rely on quantitative data that measures and tracks changes in output – for example, the number of referrals to a cve program or recidivism rates for foreign fighters. However, this data is limited in its ability to provide any useful insight on the impact that a program is actually having on the attitudes and behaviours of radicalized or vulnerable individuals. To build this much-needed evidence base, O’Halloran proposes applying a theory of change and contribution analysis to impact evaluation methodologies. This framework involves three important considerations. First, a theory of change, tailored to the specific context of an intervention, would provide the reasoning for why an intervention is expected to work. Once the activities of the intervention are implemented, empirical evidence would be gathered to support the theory of change. In addition, the context of the intervention should be assessed so that external influences are accounted for, thereby isolating the effect of the intervention activity in question. A contribution claim can then be made about an intervention activity if the applied theory of change is justified and other external factors accounted for.

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Although formal evaluation metrics remain limited, there has been a concerted effort by scholars and practitioners to understand the impacts of the programs and strategies in place, and to tease out lessons learned and best practices to be incorporated into the next wave of cve policies and programs. The final section of this volume drew on some of this research and forward-looking suggestions to address some of the identified gaps in knowledge and practice.

Lessons Learned and Policy Implications Despite the harsh criticism leveraged against Canada’s earlier cve posture, recent policy developments have signalled a shift away from those approaches, as evident in recent announcements and revisions to the national strategy to counter radicalization leading to violence. The Canada Centre has been a concrete step in this direction, as it has prioritized community engagement to inform the entirety of its work, positioned itself to support and fund local programming through its Community Resilience Fund, as well as coordinate and fund action-oriented research that can be applied to improve work at the frontlines.26 More recently, the Canada Centre has partnered with the UK firm Moonshot cve to disrupt violent extremist narratives, particularly in online spaces.27 Other positive developments include the progression of initial programs in Toronto, Calgary, and Montreal into increasingly multidisciplinary initiatives, incorporating valuable partnerships between academia and practitioners.28 Although these are positive trends, there are still areas of improvement for Canada. In particular, youth engagement and youth-led initiatives are lacking. There is also a slight imbalance in the overall cycle of cve, where the focus on prevention and intervention efforts significantly outweighs rehabilitation.29 More broadly, the contributions of this volume have highlighted thematic challenges that are important for Canada’s consideration as it develops a new national strategy. Despite research and policy advances over the last few years, definitional clarity and precision with respect to several aspects of cve continues to elude researchers and policy makers alike. When it comes to defining the problem, there remains a lack of consensus on what, and who, falls under the umbrella of violent extremism.30 This has led to

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the perpetuation of misconceptions, inconsistent labelling of violent extremist acts, and the unfair targeting of particular groups for their perceived association with violent extremism. Considering the disagreement in outlining the problem, it is no surprise that the crafting of effective policy responses mirrors some of these uncertainties. Given the complexities of violent extremism and the diversity of stakeholders concerned, contestation over which actors are best equipped to respond persists. Moreover, the lack of a robust, empirically validated evidence base of good practices makes it difficult to determine what strategies should be used and how to anticipate and minimize unintended consequences and by-products. Policy missteps as a result of these challenges have a direct impact on the receptiveness of the public to these programs and serious implications for the levels of trust between governments and populations targeted. Finally, there remains an ambiguity around the end goal of countering violent extremism. Holmboe’s distinction between disengagement and deradicalization is key to this debate. Is it the goal of these programs to pursue disengagement from violence without necessarily challenging political, ideological, or religious beliefs held by an individual?31 Or are we pursuing deradicalization, which involves the complete separation of an individual from a particular strand of thought?32 We have seen that in contexts like the UK, and to a lesser extent in Canada, the heavy emphasis on countering ideology and religion (under an implied deradicalization mandate) have fed into an “us and them” dichotomy that has not only been especially problematic and alienating when it comes to community engagement but also diminishes our ability to claim definitive success. This is further complicated by unchecked public expectations around countering violent extremism, which are exacerbated by an inflated perception of the threat in the public’s eyes. These questions are perplexing, yet critical to our way forward. While there is a need for further rigorous inquiry into the ambiguities and uncertainties that continue to challenge the cve field, some small concrete steps can be taken to move Canada in the right direction.

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Rebranding and Reconceptualizing CVE The criticisms of singling out one particular group as the main perpetrator of violent extremist acts alludes to or is getting at what has been a hard lesson learned across many of the initiatives surveyed in this volume.33 Given the heightened focus on Islamic-inspired radicalization and violent extremism since 9/11, counterterrorism (ct) and cve practices have contributed to the securitization of ethnicities and diversity,34 the deepening of societal cleavages, and have allowed for the amplification of divisive rhetoric such as Islamophobia and xenophobic sentiments. Overall, this branding of violent extremism has severely undermined some of the efforts geared toward eradicating this threat and has allowed other forms of violent extremism from across the political and ideological spectrum to go unnoticed and unaddressed. In light of these consequences, the need to take an ideologically agnostic approach to countering violent extremism cannot be more pronounced. In an effort to rebrand and reconceptualize the way we think about violent extremism, we may consider analyzing it as a spectrum of activities, ranging from hate speech to physical terrorist attacks.35 This approach broadens the scope of violent extremism to include manifestations from across the political and ideological spectrum.36 Furthermore, it will encourage the classification of individuals or groups based on their rhetoric and actions, rather than any other denominational identifier.37 We may also consider disentangling the conception of violent extremism from its close association with national security. While there are undeniable implications for public safety and security in the event of a physical terrorist attack, much of the radicalization process and the adoption of extremist views actually occur in the precriminal space – before violence is used to further these inclinations. The preventative aspect of addressing violent extremism calls for specific tools, methods, and a multitude of agencies and actors that are better equipped to operate in the precriminal space. Unfortunately, the national security mandate that has heavily shrouded ct and cve efforts to date has alienated parts of civil society that could have a considerable impact on an individual’s path to (or rather, away from) violence and criminality, thereby muddying existing preventative efforts.

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An agnostic approach to addressing violent extremism would also be instrumental to building trust and confidence where it has been previously elusive or broken, not only within state–community relations but also among diverse groups in society as a whole. Indeed, an interesting idea that emerged from Akseer’s study is a recommendation to strengthen a collective Canadian identity so that minorities can feel secure, even when governments must enter their communities to investigate real threats of radicalization and/or violent extremism.38 With its underlying sentiment of inclusivity, security, and confidence in a common Canadian identity can also provide a safeguard in the face of divisive, bigoted, and hateful rhetoric – for both Muslim and non-Muslim groups.

Improving Political and Public Discourse Reconceptualizing violent extremism calls for the improvement of political and public discourses. Prevailing narratives surrounding violent extremism have been influenced by security-charged political rhetoric, harmful and/or divisive language in the political and public spheres, and continuous sensationalist media coverage of terrorist incidents worldwide. The effect has been heightened public anxiety, where threat perceptions far exceed the reality. Moreover, the grave suspicion that underpins these discussions has choked the expression of legitimate concerns and grievances related to ct and cve practices. The onus falls on government and media outlets to improve these narratives, as they are often the “first responders” when it comes to framing acts of violent extremism.39 Governments and political leaders should be more cognizant of the effect of the security charged language and rhetoric used because these messages influence both state–minority and intercultural relations at play within societies. Governments must also work with media outlets to encourage more responsible coverage and discussion of terrorist incidents in order to avoid perpetuating misconceptions and fuelling hostile attitudes among different groups.40 Finally, more constructive dialogue should incorporate a greater awareness of how international events resonate within local communities in order to better understand radicalization and recruitment patterns in localized contexts.

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Tapping into Other Fields: The Utility of Public Health Models To facilitate the move away from a highly securitized approach to countering violent extremism, the applicability of public health models and strategies should be considered. In the past, public health campaigns have been successful in sensitizing the general public to threats to the population such as smoking and drunk driving.41 These successful practices can be exported to help frame the challenge of violent extremism as a societal one rather than strictly a security threat, thereby encouraging a whole of society response.42 In addition, public awareness campaigns that emphasize the value of diversity and highlight the positive contributions of immigrants and refugees can help address harmful effects such as societal fractures, stigmatization, alienation, and the unfair targeting of particular groups.43 This will also complement efforts to improve public discourse by encouraging the questioning of stereotypes and promoting positive intercultural understanding.44 Within this space, public–private partnerships should be developed and strengthened.45 Largely an untapped resource, the private sector has an advantage in reaching a wide audience through marketing and advertising and can channel this skillset into promoting narratives of diversity and tolerance.46 Pursuing partnerships with underutilized parts of civil society more broadly can be streamlined within the context of a public health model. The need to improve multistakeholder efforts and strengthen community engagement was clearly articulated in several chapters of this volume.47 Within the public health domain, multistakeholder networks are an integral part of successful models, relying on a mosaic of different actors to each carry out a specific function in the pursuit of a broader common goal. Applied to the context of violent extremism, this blueprint would export stronger foundations of trust, cohesion, and cooperation. Moreover, efforts to desecuritize the brand of violent extremism would support the expansion of this network to further engage community organizations that take on meaningful, relevant social work aligning with cve, which would otherwise be compromised by a security mandate.

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Program Evaluation Finally, the lack of program evaluation methodologies remains a glaring gap when it comes to cve practice. One of the most significant but inescapable challenges stems from the fact that evaluating a successful intervention activity involves measuring a nonevent – that is, an intervention is considered successful with the absence of a violent extremist act. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to measure abstract changes, such as changes in one’s beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours. These challenges are further complicated by the mounting pressure that governments around the world are facing to produce rapid results on the progress of eradicating violent extremism. The problem is that both disengagement and deradicalization are long-term processes and cannot be fully assessed in the short term. To develop a more nuanced understanding of what works and what does not, evaluation guidelines can be improved in three ways. First, program evaluation strategies would benefit from more comprehensive layers of evaluation. One set of metrics should focus on process evaluation, allowing us to compare the efficacy of different models at the aggregate level.48 A second layer would incorporate more context-specific impact indicators that are qualitative in nature.49 O’Halloran’s theory of change model could be utilized here. Second, that cve programs are multisectoral necessitates multiple levels of analysis, in consideration of the fact that diverse stakeholders look for different kinds of data and information more suited to their specific purposes.50 Finally, evaluations must be regularly enforced over time and incorporate a balance between short- and long-term evaluations, as each has different uses.51 Short-term evaluations can help governments and practitioners keep up with the rapid evolution of trends in violent extremism, while long-term evaluations are telling of the real, long lasting patterns of success and can inform sustainable model replication in the future.52

Concluding Thoughts Terrorism and violent extremism have become some of the most pressing security challenges in the twenty-first century. The 9/11 attacks sparked the

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mobilization of vast resources, new and existing government agencies, and even entire militaries, to combat terrorism at the local, national, and international levels; it has pushed the ct and, later, cve agendas to the forefront of security discussions and efforts worldwide for nearly two decades. And yet, violent extremism still persists. Indeed, its evolution has outpaced the policy responses that have tried to address it. Moreover, the policy making process in this area has been complicated by the lack of a robust, empirically validated evidence base of best practices. As a result, governments and practitioners have resorted to approaches of “trying by doing” when it comes to designing and implementing ct and cve programs. Unfortunately, many of the tools and strategies used to date have proven ineffective or resulted in negative unintended consequences. The implication for future initiatives, then, is that the focus must not only be on tackling the threat of violent extremism in novel and innovative ways but also to undo some of the damage that has resulted from preceding efforts. This volume has contributed to the proliferating literature on cve and ct practices. It surveyed both Canadian and international initiatives in an effort to flesh out successful and effective practices, while identifying problematic aspects that should be avoided. Furthermore, it expanded the analysis of violent extremism beyond its instinctive security framework, recognizing the multidisciplinary nature of the issue and encouraging partnerships with other sectors and fields that can complement cve efforts more broadly. Ultimately, these contributions are vital to our collective commitment to tackling violent extremism and improving policy and practice moving forward.

n otes 1 Canada, the Government of Canada, “Remembering Air India Flight 182,” Public Safety Canada, 9 February 2018, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/r-nd-flght-182/index-en.aspx. 2 John McCoy and W. Andy Knight, “Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 1 (2015): 253–74; Michael Zekulin, “Terrorism in Canada,” Journal in Military & Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (2011): 1–19.

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3 Canada, the Government of Canada, “What is Terrorist Financing,” Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, 9 February 2018, http://fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/fintrac-canafe/definitions/terrorist-terroristeeng.asp. 4 Canada, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Countering the Terrorist Threat in Canada: An Interim Report” (2015), 1–26. 5 Peter Romaniuk, “Does cve Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism,” Global Centre on Cooperative Security (2015), 1–40. 6 Ibid., 1 7 Ibid. 8 See chapter 3: Robert Martyn, “Anger in the Peaceable Kingdom: An Overview of Canada’s Violent Extremist History.” 9 See chapter 1: Christian Leuprecht, David B. Skillicorn, and Clark McCauley, “Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists: Distinguishing between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters.” 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 See chapter 2: David Eisenman, Steve Weine, and Myrna Lashley, “Can Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? Should Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism?” 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Chapter 4: Ali Dizboni, “An Analytic Survey of the Canadian Academic Literature on Religion, Radicalization, and Terrorism.” 20 Chapter 1: Leuprecht et al., “Terrorist, Radicals, and Activists.” 21 See chapter 5: Tabasum Akseer, “Incorporating Community Perspectives in cve and Community-based Policing Strategies.” 22 See chapter 6: Tahir Abbas, “The Nature and Extent of Countering Violent Extremism in the United Kingdom.” 23 Ibid.

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24 Chapter 7: Rolf Holmboe, “The Danish Model to Countering Violent Extremism: A Critical Assessment of a “Soft” Model.” 25 See chapter 8: Patrick O’Halloran, “The Challenges of Evaluating Attitudinal Change: A Case Study of the Effectiveness of International Countering Violent Extremism (cve) Programs.” 26 Public Safety Canada, “Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence: Priorities and Activities,” 7 September 2017, https://www. publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/cccepv-wwd-en.aspx. 27 Michelle Zilio, “Ottawa Launches $1.5 Million Project That Will Use Online Ads to Try to Prevent Radicalization,” Globe and Mail, 6 November 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-launches-15-millionproject-that-will-use-online-ads-to-try/. Accessed 11 December 2018. 28 Centre for International and Defence Policy, “Countering Violent Extremism Scoping Study” (2017). 29 Ibid. 30 Holmboe, “The Danish Model.” 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Abbas, “The Nature of Countering Violent Extremism”; Akseer, “Incorporating Community Perspectives.” 34 Abbas, “The Nature of Countering Violent Extremism.” 35 Stéfanie von Hlatky and Nora Abdelrahman Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada and Abroad,” Special Policy Report, Centre for International and Defence Policy (2017), 1–4. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Akseer, “Incorporating Community Perspectives.” 39 von Hlatky and Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada.” 40 Ibid. 41 von Hlatky and Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada”; Stevan Weine et al., “Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (2016): 1–14. 42 Weine et al., “Addressing Violent Extremism.” 43 von Hlatky and Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada.” 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

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46 von Hlatky and Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada.” 47 Abbas, “The Nature of Countering Violent Extremism”; Akseer, “Incorporating Community Perspectives”; Holmboe, “The Danish Model.” 48 von Hlatky and Ibrahim, “Violent Extremism in Canada” 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid.

Contributors

tahir abbas is associate professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University in The Hague. He was a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, UK, a professor of sociology at Faith University in Istanbul, a reader in sociology at Birmingham University, and a senior research officer at the Home Office and Ministry of Justice in London. His recent books are Islamophobia and Radicalisation (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2019), Contemporary Turkey in Conflict (Edinburgh and Oxford University Press, 2016), and Muslim Diasporas in the West (Routledge, 2017, 4 vols, edited). He is also the associate editor of the quarterly journal Critical Muslim, published by Hurst and Oxford University Press. tabasum akse er is director of the Policy and Research Department at the Asia Foundation’s Afghanistan office. She provides overall strategic planning, management, and guidance related to the department’s research projects aimed at informing timely policy and decision making, and apprising Afghan governmental officials and international agencies on the public’s perceptions of a broad range of themes. Tabasum leads on all planning, writing, and analysis of research projects, in addition to leading a training program that provides research and data analysis training classes (both basic and advanced) to Afghan government officials. Prior to her work at the Asia Foundation, Tabasum was a postdoctoral research fellow and consultant at the Center for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University in Canada.

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ali dizboni is associate professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is current collaborator and coapplicant to sshrc and Public Safety grants. He has published numerous book chapters and articles in the fields of Middle East and international politics. Some of his works include the section on Afghanistan in the Encyclopedia of the World Legal Systems (abcclio, 2002) and “Une Deuxième revolution? La réforme iranienne et la revolution du paradigm de l’islam politique,” in Mouvenements sociaux et changements institutionnels (puq, 2005). Recent publications include, in collaboration, “Instruments and Arrangements against Online Terrorism Relation to International Cooperation,” in Online Terrorist Propaganda, Recruitment, and Radicalization, ed. John R. Vacca (crc Press, 2019); and, in collaboration, “Framing, Branding and Explaining: A Survey of Perceptions of Islam and Muslims in the Canadian Polls, Government and Academia,” in Muslims and Mainstream Societies in the West, ed. Jan Ali and Abe Ata (Oxford University Press, 2018). His current research focuses on area studies (democratization in the Middle East and the Canadian experience) and global politics (globalization, religion, and terrorism). dav id eisenman is a professor at the David Geffen School of Medicine and the Fielding School of Public Health at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is director of the Centre for Public Health and Disasters. The ucla Centre for Public Health and Disasters is home to the National Education Safety and Security Institute (nessi), which he also codirects. In 2012, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health appointed Dr Eisenman as the preparedness science officer for the Emergency Preparedness and Response Program. Dr Eisenman is also an associate natural scientist at rand. He holds a board certification in internal medicine and he cares for patients at the University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Centre. His recent publications include “Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice” (2017), in Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression; and “Ideologically Motivated Violence: A Public Health Approach to Prevention” (2017), in the American Journal of Public Health. rolf holmb o e currently serves as ambassador of Denmark to Pakistan, and he is a research fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute since

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2015. He served as ambassador of Denmark to Lebanon (2013–15), and to Syria and Jordan (2012–15). Previously, he was director of Strategy and Policy Planning and head of Department for Stabilization at the Danish mfa. He has served as Denmark’s representative to the Palestinian Authority responsible for political relations and development interventions in the West Bank and Gaza (2005–09). As a military reserve officer, he has served in a number of conflict zones. As an external lecturer, he has taught conflict studies in fragile states at Copenhagen University. n or a a b de l r a h m a n i br a h i m was the Countering Violent Extremism (cve) project coordinator at the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (cidp). A Queen’s graduate, her research interests include countering violent extremism, radicalization, terrorism, counterterrorism, the security–business nexus, and un peacekeeping. my r na l a s h l ey holds a PhD in counselling psychology from McGill University. She was associate dean at the John Abbot College and is assistant professor in the Department of Psychiatry at McGill University, as well as a researcher and project leader at the Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research at the Jewish General Hospital. Currently, she is the chair of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, as well as vice-chair of the board of the École Nationale de Police du Québec. In addition to conducting research on police matters, she has also been appointed to the Comité expert en matière de profilage racial of the Service de police de la ville de Montréal. She has authored two training manuals on intercultural issues in the workplace and coauthored a chapter in the book Encountering the Other. Her current research focuses on the intersections of culture, terrorism, and national security. She is also Barbados’s honorary consul to Montreal. chr istian leuprecht (PhD, Queen’s) is class of 1965 professor in leadership at the Royal Military College of Canada, cross-appointed to Queen’s University, adjunct research professor at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University, Eisenhower Fellow at the nato Defence College, and Munk senior fellow at the Macdonald Laurier Institute. He is a recipient of rmc’s Cowan Prize for Excellence in Research and an elected member of the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society

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of Canada. He also holds a governor-in-council appointment to the Police Services Board of the City of Kingston and is immediate past-president of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee 01: Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. An expert on comparative security and defence, he is regularly called as an expert witness to testify before committees of parliament. rob ert mart yn is affiliated with both the Centre for International and Defence Policy and the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research. Following degrees at the University of Manitoba and the Royal Military College, he earned his PhD in military history from Queen’s University. This was followed up by postdoctoral research on terrorism at the College of William & Mary and intelligence at Carleton University’s Norman Patterson School of International Affairs. His previous military experience includes serving in combat arms prior to being commissioned as an intelligence officer. His subsequent operational deployments include a year on un duty in Cyprus, two nato missions – Bosnia and Kosovo – and ten months in Afghanistan with multinational Special Operations forces. He completed his military career as a reserve infantry officer. c l a r k m c c au l ey is research professor of psychology at Bryn Mawr College. His research interests include stereotypes, group dynamics, and the psychological foundations of ethnic conflict and genocide. He is coauthor of Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder (2006), coauthor of Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (2011, second edition 2017), and founding editor emeritus of the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide. He is a lead investigator with the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (start) for research supported by the US Department of Homeland Security. pat r ick o’hal lor an, Lieutenant-Colonel (retired), cd, PhD (York), is adjunct professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. He has published on issues related to international security, terrorism, and un cve programs, and researched on cve policy integration.

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david b. skillicorn is professor in the School of Computing at Queen’s University and adjunct professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. He has published extensively in the area of adversarial data analytics and has also been involved in interdisciplinary research on radicalization, terrorism, fraud, and human trafficking. He consults for the intelligence and security parts of government in several countries and appears frequently in the media to comment on cybersecurity and terrorism. His undergraduate degree is from the University of Sydney and his PhD is from the University of Manitoba. s t é fa n i e vo n h l at k y is associate professor of political studies at Queen’s University and former director of the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (cidp). She is also the founder of Women in International Security – Canada and served as chair of the board until 2018. She has published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, International Journal, European Security, Asian Security, as well as the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and has a book with Oxford University Press entitled American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (2013). She has also published three co-edited volumes: The Future of US Extended Deterrence (Georgetown University Press, 2015), Going to War? Trends in Military Interventions (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), and Transhumanizing War: Performance Enhancement and the Implications for Policy, Society, and the Soldier (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020). steve weine, md, is professor of psychiatry at the University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine, where he is also the director of the International Centre on Responses to Catastrophes and the director of Global Health Research Training at the Centre for Global Health. Over the past twenty-five years, he has been conducting research with both refugees and migrants in the US and in postconflict countries, focusing on mental health, health, and countering violent extremism. He leads an active, externally funded research program, which has been supported by multiple federal, state, university, and foundation grants, from 1998 to the present, all with collaboration from community partners. His research mission is to

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develop, implement, and evaluate psychological interventions that are feasible, acceptable, and effective with respect to the complex real-life contexts where migrants and refugees live. He is the author of more than one hundred publications and two books: When History Is a Nightmare: Lives and Memories of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rutgers, 1999) and Testimony and Catastrophe: Narrating the Traumas of Political Violence (Northwestern, 2006).

Index

Figures and tables indicated by page numbers in italics Aarhus Model. See Danish Model aboriginal peoples, 81–2 action (behaviour), and beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude), 22, 24–6, 30, 53, 174 activism, 21, 136 Adler, Emmanuel, 6 Afghanistan, 78–9 aggression, displacement of, 69 Air India bombings, 68, 75–6, 86n31, 181 al-Qaeda, 20, 28–9, 99, 168, 170 Aly, Anne, 161 Amarasingam, Amarnath, 100–1 Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36; 2001), 78, 84, 88n51 Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-51; 2015), 78 armchair jihadists, 22 at-risk communities: “at risk” vs. “risky” dichotomy, 129; Channel program, 171; Danish Model, 144–5; engagement with counterradicalization strategy, 151; mentorship programs for, 167; preventative approach for, 47–8, 173; radicalization within, 101–2 attitude and cognition (feelings and belief), and action (behaviour), 22, 24–6, 30, 53, 174 Atwal, Jaspat, 76, 87n36

Babbar Khalsa International (bki), 75 Badat, Yusuf, 117 Bakunin, Mikhail: “Propaganda of the Deed,” 79 Barakat, Rafia, 161 Barrett, James G., 47 beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude), and action (behaviour), 22, 24–6, 30, 53, 174 belonging, sense of, 95. See also identity, Canadian Bertelsen, Preben, 145 Beyers, Peter, 97 Birkett, Deborah, 97 Bissonnette, Alexandre, 81 Blood and Honour (white supremacist group), 80 Boucek, Christopher, 161 Bourque, Justin, 81 Braddock, Kurt, 161–2 Breivik, Anders Behring, 168 Building Resilience Against Terrorism (Canada), 108, 123n9 Bullock, Katherine, 94 Bush, George W., 28 Calgary Police Department: ReDirect campaign, 108 Campaign Against Violent Extremism, 108–9 Canada: collective Canadian identity, 95,

206

120, 192; community policing in, 108–9; countering violent extremism in, 103, 160, 182, 189; counterterrorism priority, 3, 181; foreign fighters from, 181 Canada, violent extremism in: introduction and conclusion, 67–8, 83–4, 184–5; aboriginal peoples, 81–2; Front de libération du Québec (flq), 68, 73–4, 84; from frustrated lack of empowerment, 83; government responses, 83–4; Islamist extremism, 67, 77–9; legislative responses, 78, 84, 88n51; Lower Canada Rebellion and Upper Canada Rebellion (1837–38), 68, 70–1; North-West Rebellion (1885), 68, 72–3, 85n15; preventive responses, 84; radicalization trajectory, 68–9, 69; Red River Rebellion (1869–70), 68, 71–2, 73; right-wing extremism, 79– 81; safe haven for terrorism concerns, 74–5; Sikh extremism, 75–6, 86n30, 87n36; social activists, 79, 89n57; Tamil Tigers, 76–7 Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 182, 189 Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 81 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (csis), 76, 78–80, 113 caring-compelled individuals, 32–3 Cartoon Crisis (Denmark), 143, 156n1, 165 causality, 11–13, 18, 27 Cavanaugh, William T., 97–8 Center for Terror Analysis, 166 Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 108 change, theory of, 146, 164–5, 170, 172, 174, 188, 194 Channel mentorship program (UK), 130, 134, 163–4, 171–3, 187 Chechen Black Widows, 33 civic engagement, 94, 118, 120, 122 civil rights movements, 32, 82 civil society, 8–9, 151 Clash of Civilizations thesis, 28, 92 Coalition Avenir Québec (caq), 106n45 cohesion: critique of as strategy, 136–7;

Index

under isolation/threat, as radicalization mechanism, 34 Colborne, John, 70 communities of practice, 6–7, 10 community policing: introduction and conclusion, 110, 120–1, 186; acknowledging Muslims as also victims, 116; as alternative to hard counterterrorism strategies, 108; awareness and education initiatives, 118–19; in Canada, 108–9; chilling effect of, 112; civic engagement, 118, 120, 122; collective Canadian identity and, 120, 192; contact at employment and with coworkers, 113–14; encouraging strong leaders and unity, 117–18; home visits, 113; intelligence officers at mosques, 112–13; Muslim focus, 109; policy recommendations, 121–2; political rhetoric and, 121–2; preferential treatment issues, 115; radicalization and Muslim youth, 122; social media engagement, 119–20; softer approaches needed, 114–15; study findings, 112–14; study methodology, 110–11; suggestions for community policing, 114–16; suggestions for Muslim community, 117– 20; transparency and communication, 115–16; trust and mutual respect, 116; trust in judicial process, 114; unintended consequences, 109–10, 121; in US, 108 community resilience, 3–4, 9–10, 15n18, 151 Community Resilience Fund, 189 contest (UK National Counterterrorism Strategy), 129, 163, 170. See also Prevent Strategy (UK) contribution analysis, 164–5, 174, 188 conversion, religious, 97, 105n25 conveyor belt model, 21, 26, 33, 97, 134 countering radicalization to violence (crv), 4. See also countering violent extremism (cve) countering violent extremism (cve): introduction and conclusion, 5–6, 13–14, 182–3, 194–5; borrowing from other fields, 183–4; in Canada, 103, 160, 182,

Index

189; definition, 47, 107; disengagement vs. deradicalization, 149–50, 153–4, 190; early warning indicators, 12; first wave shortcomings, 48; fragmentation between domestic and international focuses, 10; global development of, 127, 181–2; improving political and public discourse, 192; literature on, 161; move away from causal model, 11–13; national security and, 47, 191; politicization and polarization, 134–6; purpose of, 11–12; radicalization focus, 10; rebranding and reconceptualizing, 191–2; research strategy, 6–8, 14n7; resilience-building strategies, 3–4, 9–10, 15n18, 151; securitization and community engagement, 8– 9, 185–6; softer approach of, 108; variety of approaches, 3–4, 142, 161. See also community policing; Danish Model; evaluation, of countering violent extremism (cve) programs; Islam and extremism, Canadian literature review; preventing violent extremism (pve); public health; radicalization; violent extremism counternarratives, 28, 35, 38–9, 119–20, 127, 129–30, 154, 183. See also jihadist narratives counterterrorism (ct): introduction and conclusion, 5–6, 13–14, 194–5; as Canadian priority, 3, 181; collateral damage and civilian casualties, 12; components of, 3; early warning indicators, 12; evaluation challenges, 10–11; focus on root causes and drivers, 107; fragmentation between domestic and international focuses, 10; move away from causal model, 11–13; radicalization focus, 10; radicalization from, 95; securitization and community engagement, 8–9. See also countering violent extremism (cve); terrorism Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (ctcbp), 79 critical security studies, 8 critical social theory, 94–5

207

Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (ccrs), 51, 121 csis (Canadian Security Intelligence Service), 76, 78–80, 113 culturalization, 95 Daesh. See Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis) dangerous ideas, 25–6 Danish Model: introduction and conclusion, 142–3, 187–8; anecdotal successes, 146–7; applicability for Canada, 173; assessment challenges, 146, 150; assumptions underlying, 166; background, 143–4, 165; balance between soft and hard instruments, 149, 152–3; bottom-up approach, 144; community relations, 149, 151, 156; evaluation of, 146–50, 162, 165–8; focus areas and purpose, 166–7; further development possibilities, 150–5; infoline, 167; integrated cooperation between agencies, 144–5, 147–8, 150, 155–6; leadership in, 151–2; mentorship system, 130, 145–6, 149–51, 156, 167; nuanced understanding needed for radicalization, 153–6; qualitative evaluations, 148–50; replication of, 155–6. See also Denmark Dawson, Lorne, 92, 100–1 democracies, 38, 40–1 Denmark: Cartoon Crisis, 143, 156n1, 165; foreign fighters from, 145–50, 165–6. See also Danish Model Department of Homeland Security, 52–3 deradicalization: vs. disengagement, 149–50, 153–4, 190; program evaluation, 161–2 dialogue, 167, 169, 192 Direct Action (Squamish Five), 79, 89n57 disconnected-disordered individuals, 32–3 disengagement: vs. deradicalization, 149–50, 153–4, 190; program evaluation, 161–2 displacement of aggression, 69 dissemination science, 54 Dizboni, Ali: Islam and War, 92, 103n2 Dosanjh, Ujjal, 87n36

208

Duplessis, Maurice, 73 Durham, Lord, 71 early warning indicators, 12 education, 118–19, 169–70 Eisenman, David, 51 Ellis, Andrew, 94 emotional experience, 33 escape, desire for, 34 evaluation, of countering violent extremism (cve) programs: introduction and conclusion, 160–1, 173–5, 188–9; Channel program (UK), 163–4, 171–3; contribution analysis and, 164–5, 174, 188; Danish Model, 146–50, 162, 165–8; implications for Canada, 172–5; improvements needed, 10–11, 194; literature on, 161–2; Norwegian Action Plan, 162–3, 168–70, 173; Prevent Strategy (UK), 163, 170–1; theory of change and, 164–5, 174, 188, 194 external threats, 34–5 far right. See right-wing extremism fear, 34–5 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (fintrac), 76–7 Fink, Naureen Chowdury, 161 Flower, Scott, 97 foreign fighters: from Canada, 67, 181; from Denmark, 145–50, 165–6; from Norway, 168; nuance needed for understanding, 154–6; Prevent Strategy (UK) and, 128, 130, 137; profile of, 134; pull factors, 100–1 Fortin, Sylvie, 95 Foucault, Michel, 129 France, 12, 19 freedom of speech, 38, 81 free-rider problem, 38–9 Front de libération du Québec (flq), 68, 73–4, 84 Gandhi, Indira, 86n30 Gardner, Frank, 163 Garneau, Stéphanie, 95

Index

Global Coalition Against Daesh, 11, 16n28 Global Counter Terrorism Forum (gctf), 107 global jihad. See jihadist terrorism Government Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalization (Denmark), 144 Government Action Plan on Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism (Denmark), 144 governmentality, 129–30 government policy, and radicalization, 27–8 grievances: group grievances, 33; personal grievances, 33, 35; structural grievances, 135, 137 group competition, 34 group grievances, 33 group polarization, 34 Hamas, 28 Hansen, Ann, 89n57 Harding, Frances M., 48 Harvey, Frank, 3 Hasan, Nidal, 32–3 hate, 35 Hedayah, 107 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 31 homegrown terrorism, 20, 98–9, 181. See also lone wolf terrorism Horgan, John, 161–2 human rights, 38 Huntington, Samuel, 28 Ibn Khaldun, 29 identity, Canadian, 95, 120, 192 ideology, jihadist, 99–100, 134–5 indigenous peoples, 81–2 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 161 integration, and radicalization, 94–7, 102 International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (icsr), 165 International Sikh Youth Federation (isyf), 75 internet, 119–20. See also social media

Index

Irish Republican Army, 34–5 isis. See Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Islam and extremism, Canadian literature review: introduction and conclusion, 91–3, 102–3, 104n4–5, 185; associationist approaches, 97–102; Clash of Civilizations thesis, 92; combinationist approaches, 100–2; critiques of, 92; dissociationist approaches, 93–7; on integration and radicalization, 94–7, 102; on jihadist ideology, 99–100; on lack of link between Islam and terrorism, 97, 105n25; on methodological necessity of including religion, 98–9; religion in public and government discourse, 91, 103n1 Islamic extremism. See jihadist terrorism Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis): failure to anticipate, 170; foreign fighters and, 3, 134, 137, 165; name of, 16n28; religious narrative of, 29; responses to, 3, 11; social media by, 130 Islamophobia, 58, 112, 115–16, 130, 172 Jamil, Uzma, 96 Janopaul-Naylor, Elizabeth, 47 jihad, and just war, 103n2 jihadist narratives: assumptions about, 37; counternarratives against, 28, 38–9, 119– 20, 127, 129, 130, 154, 183; metanarrative of, 28–9; proliferation of, 11; role in radicalization, 35–7 jihadist terrorism: action pyramid of radicalization, 30–2, 31; in Canada, 67, 77–9; homegrown and lone wolf terrorism, 20, 32–3, 98–9, 181; ideology of, 99–100, 134–5; metanarrative of, 28–9; motivation for, 77; opinion pyramid of radicalization, 29–30, 30; relationship between action and opinion pyramid models, 35–6, 36; women in, 77–8. See also jihadist narratives; radicalization just war, 103n2 Kaczynski, Ted (Unabomber), 33 Kaeser, Joe, 9

209

Khadr family, 77 Khawaja, Momin, 32–3 Kinnvall, Catarina, 94–5 Kirova, Anna, 95 Knight, W. Andy, 95 Kruglanski, Arie W., 161 LeBlanc, Mari-Nathalie, 95 Leeuw, Frans, 164 Le Gall, Josiane, 95 Lenard, Patti, 95–6 Le Pen, Marine, 81 Lesage, Jean, 73 Leuprecht, Christian, 101–2 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte), 76–7 life psychology, 145, 157n10 Lindekilde, Lasse, 149, 162 literature review. See Islam and extremism, Canadian literature review lone wolf terrorism, 20, 32–3. See also homegrown terrorism Los Angeles County: Department of Mental Health, 57 low base rate problem, 56 Lower Canada Rebellion (1837–38), 68, 70–1 Lyon, David, 109 M-103 (bill), 81 Macdonald, John A., 72 Mackenzie, William Lyon, 70 Manji, Irshad: The Trouble with Islam, 92 Marmot, Michael, 60 Marshall, T.H., 27 martyrdom, 35 Mastroe, Caitlin, 161 Mayne, John, 164–5 McCauley, Clark, 29, 32–3 McCoy, John, 95 media, 119, 192 mentorship programs: Channel program (UK), 130, 134, 163–4, 171–3, 187; Danish Model, 130, 145–6, 149–51, 156, 167 Mérand, Frédéric, 14n7 Métis, 71–2, 85n15

210

Milgram experiment, 33 military intervention, 3, 4, 11 Minneapolis-St Paul (mn), 56 money, desire for, 34 Moonshot cve, 189 moral narrative, 29 Moskalenko, Sophia, 29, 32–3 mosques, intelligence officers at, 112–13 multiculturalism: concerns about, 95–6, 102; policed multiculturalism, 131, 187 Muslim Brotherhood, 153 Naber, Nadine, 109–10 narratives. See jihadist narratives National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 49 national security, 47, 191 National Security Strategy (White House, 2002), 27 National Security Strategy (White House, 2010), 108 National Socialist Movement, 80 Nesbitt-Larking, Paul, 94–5 Neumann, Peter R., 161 New York Police Department (nypd): Demographic Unit, 25 9/11 attacks, 27, 35, 194–5 North-West Mounted Police (nwmp), 72, 83 North-West Rebellion (1885), 68, 72–3, 85n15 Norwegian Action Plan Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism, 162–3, 168–70, 173 obesity, 56 Oka Crisis, 82 Ontario: right-wing extremism in, 80; Upper Canada Rebellion (1837–38), 70–1 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), 107 pegida (neo-Nazi group), 80, 89n62 personal grievances, 33, 35 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (US), 58, 60

Index

Petraeus, David, 11 polarization, 34, 134–6 police. See community policing policed multiculturalism, 131, 187 political behaviour, nonviolent vs. violent, 31–2 political discourse, 121–2, 192 political narrative, 28–9 politicization, 136 preventing violent extremism (pve): introduction and conclusion, 48–9, 184; comparison to public health programs, 47–8; evaluation of programs, 161–2; lack of in Canada, 84; as new wave, 48; primary prevention, 55–7, 184; primordial prevention, 55, 184; public health approach to, 51–2, 193; public health four-step prevention process for, 52–4; public health four-tiered prevention model for, 54–8, 55, 59; public health next steps for, 60–1; reasons for public health involvement, 58, 60; secondary prevention, 57, 184; tertiary prevention, 57–8, 184. See also countering violent extremism (cve) Prevention of Extremist Views and Radicalization Among Youth (Denmark), 143–4 Prevent Strategy (UK): introduction and conclusion, 127–8, 137, 186–7; applicability for Canada, 173; background and strategies, 129–31; Channel mentorship program, 130, 134, 163–4, 171–3, 187; community cohesion and, 136–7; concerns of perception as greater than reality, 133; evaluation of, 163, 170–2; governmentality concerns, 129–30; and ideology vs. religion in radicalization, 134; intelligence gathering complaint, 174; lack of alternatives to, 132–3; lack of public engagement, 133–4, 137; policed multiculturalism and, 131, 187; public concerns, 128–9, 131–2; scope concerns, 132 primary prevention, 55–7, 184 primordial prevention, 54–5, 184 private sector, 9, 193

Index

process tracing, 7 psychology, life, 145, 157n10 public discourse, 91, 103n1, 192 public health: introduction and conclusion, 48–9, 184; applicability for preventing violent extremism (pve), 51–2, 193; four-step prevention process applied to pve, 52–4; four-tiered prevention model applied to pve, 54–8, 55, 59; multisectoral nature of, 49–51, 50, 193; next steps for pve involvement, 60–1; preventive approach of, 47–8; reasons for PVE involvement, 58, 60 Quebec: Coalition Avenir Québec (caq), 106n45; Front de libération du Québec (flq), 68, 73–4, 84; Lower Canada Rebellion (1837–38), 68, 70–1; Quiet Revolution, 73; right-wing extremism in, 80 radicalization: introduction and conclusion, 20, 39–41, 183; action pyramid model, 30–2, 31; in at-risk communities, 101–2; comparison to activism, 21; conversion to Islam and, 97, 105n25; conveyor belt model, 21, 26, 33, 97, 134; counternarratives against, 28, 35, 38–40, 119–20, 127, 129–30, 154, 183; from counterterrorism, 95; definition and categories, 21–2; disengagement vs. deradicalization, 149–50, 153–4, 190; from emotional experience, 33; future research areas, 36–7; government policy and, 27–8; human rights and, 38; ideology and, 134; individual level mechanisms, 33–4; integration and, 94–7, 102; lone wolf profiles, 32–3; mass level mechanisms, 34–5; mechanisms of, 33–5; models of, 24–6; move away from causal model, 10, 12; Muslim youth and, 122; nuance needed for understanding, 153– 5, 156; opinion pyramid model, 29–30, 30; radical narratives and, 35–7; relationship between action and opinion pyramid models, 35–6, 36; research agenda, 23–4; small group level mechanisms, 34;

211

structural grievances and, 135, 137; trajectory of, 68–9, 69 Ramakrishna, Kuam, 161 Rapoport, David, 84n2 Razack, Sherene, 109 Reader, Ian, 98 ReDirect campaign (Calgary Police Department), 108 Red River Rebellion (1869–70), 68, 71–3 regard, 33–5 religion, 77, 91, 98, 103n1, 135, 185. See also ideology, jihadist; Islam and extremism, Canadian literature review religious narrative, 29 resilience, community, 3–4, 9–10, 15n18, 151 Riel, Louis, 71–2 right-wing extremism, 49, 60, 79–81, 137, 168, 170 risk society, 18–19 Romaniuk, Peter, 48, 161 Rouleau, Martin, 102 Roy, Olivier, 99 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (rcmp), 76, 113, 121 Salafism, 148, 153 Scott, Thomas, 71–2 secondary prevention, 57, 184 securitization, 8–9, 96, 132–3, 185–6, 191 security, 19 self-persuasion, 33 Sikh extremism, 75–6, 86n30, 87n36. See also Air India bombings Skillicorn, David B., 101–2 slippery slope, 33, 35 smoking, 55 social activists, 79, 89n57 social media, 3, 119–20, 130 social-psychological narrative, 29 social sorting, 109 social welfare, 27 Soldiers of Odin, 80–1 Somali diaspora, 35, 56, 166 speech, freedom of, 38, 81 Squamish Five (Direct Action), 79, 89n57 Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers, 76–7

212

status-seeking, 34 Striegher, Jason-Leigh, 4 structural grievances, 135, 137 sudden jihad syndrome, 33 Suresh, Manickavasagam, 77 surveillance studies, 109 Szmania, Susan, 161 Taher-azar, Mohammed Rea, 33 Tamil Tigers, 76–7 terrorism: assumptions about radical ideas and, 37; comparison to violent extremism, 4–5; homegrown and lone wolf terrorism, 20, 32–3, 98–9, 181; increase in, 3, 11; public health consequences, 58; risk society and, 18–19; wave theory of, 84n2. See also counterterrorism (ct); jihadist terrorism; radicalization tertiary prevention, 57–8, 184 theory of change, 146, 164–5, 170, 172, 174, 188, 194 thrill-seeking, 34–5 Toronto 18 (jihadist group), 78, 100 Treasury Board Secretariat (tbs), 165 Trudeau, Justin, 76 Trump, Donald, 81 Unabomber (Ted Kaczynski), 33 United Kingdom: contest (counterterrorism strategy), 129, 163, 170; Home Office responsibility for countering violent extremism, 128, 132–3. See also Prevent Strategy (UK) United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (unctitf), 107 United States of America: community policing in, 108–9; National Security Strategy (2002), 27; National Security Strategy (2010), 108; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 58, 60; White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, 181–2 Upper Canada Rebellion (1837–38), 70–1

Index

Vaessen, Jos, 164 violent extremism: association with religion, 185; comparison to terrorism, 4–5; lack of clarity on, 52–3, 189–90; multifactoral nature of violence, 56; rarity of, 18–20; risk society and, 18–19. See also Canada, violent extremism in; countering violent extremism (cve); Islam and extremism, Canadian literature review; preventing violent extremism (pve); radicalization Voices Against Extremism, 109 War Measures Act, 74 war of ideas, 28, 38–40. See also jihadist narratives war on terrorism, 26, 28 wave theory, 84n2 Wenger, Etienne, 6 white supremacists, 49. See also rightwing extremism Williams, Michael J., 161 Winn, Conrad, 101–2 women, jihadist, 77–8 World Sikh Organization (wso), 75 Young, Holly, 161 youth, 122, 189 Zeiger, Sara, 161 Zekulin, Michael, 98–9