Corruption in the Public Sector: An International Perspective 9781839096433, 9781839096426, 9781839096440

Table of contents :
Corruption in the Public Sector: An International Perspective
Half Title Page
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
About the Editor
About the Authors
Chapter 1: Prologue: The Fight Against Corruption
References
Chapter 2: Best Practices for Combating Corruption: Learning from Singapore and Hong Kong
Introduction
Perceived Extent of Corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong
Singapore’s Success in Combating Corruption
Hong Kong’s Success in Combating Corruption
Best Practices for Combating Corruption
Strong Dose of Political Will Needed to Minimize Corruption
Address the Major Causes of Corruption
Don’t Rely on the Police to Curb Corruption to Avoid Conflict of Interest
Rely on an Independent and Well-resourced Type A ACA
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: India’s Continuing Fight Against Corruption: The Modi Regime’s First Five-Year Saga
Introduction
Efficacy of Extant Institutions to Fight Corruption
(i) Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
(ii) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
Lokpal, 1968–2019
Initial Challenges and Efforts of Modi Government
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Right to Information Act in India: An Effective Tool to Combat Corruption
The Genesis
RTI Act of 2002
Important Features of the RTI Act, 2005
An Assessment
The Flip Side of RTI
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Corruption and its Control: The Pursuit of Probity in Bangladesh
Introduction
The Bangladesh Corruption Syndrome
The Framework to Fight Corruption
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Corruption in Two Latin American Nations: The Experiences of Brazil and Chile in Comparative Analysis
Introduction
Comparative Levels of Corruption, Democracy, and the Rule of Law
Brazilian-based Corruption Scandals
Revisiting Populism Versus Good Government
Secrecy, Varying Perceptions, and Measures of Corruption
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Government Corruption in South Africa
Retrospect
The 1996 Constitution
Legislation
Endemic Corruption
Bureaucratic Failure
Failure of Leadership
Prospect
References
Chapter 8: Corruption in Public Procurement in Southeast Asian States
Introduction
Main Types of Corruption
Embezzlement
Favoritism
Fraud
Collusion
Measures to Curb Corruption in Procurement
Weaknesses in Implementing Measures to Combat Corruption in Procurement
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Ethical Privacy Policies for E-Government Websites
Ethical Considerations in e-Government
Privacy and Security
Prioritizing Privacy Policies
Big Data
Artificial Intelligence
Blockchain
Smart Technologies
Privacy and Security Protection
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Epilogue
References
Index

Citation preview

CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE Edited by Professor Evan Berman, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. This series brings together the best in international research on policy and governance issues. Authored and edited by experts in the field, these books present new and insightful research on a range of policy and governance issues across the globe. Topics covered include but are not limited to: policy analysis frameworks, healthcare policy, environmental/resource policy, local government policy, development policy, regional studies/policy, urban policy/planning, and social policy. Titles include: Corruption, Accountability and Discretion Nancy S. Lind and Cara Rabe-Hemp The Experience of Democracy and Bureaucracy in South Korea Tobin Im Governmental Financial Resilience: International Perspectives on how Local Governments Face Austerity Ileana Steccolini, Martin Jones, and Iris Saliterer The Global Educational Policy Environment in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Gated, Regulated and Governed Travis D. Jules Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow Jonathan Boston Asian Leadership in Policy and Governance Evan Berman and M. Shamsul Haque

Different Paths to Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore Jon S. T. Quah Institutional Reforms in the Public Sector: What Did We Learn? Mahabat Baimyrzaeva New Steering Concepts in Public Management Sandra Groeneveld and Steven Van de Walle Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? Jon S. T. Quah Public Policy and Governance Frontiers in New Zealand Evan Berman and Girol Karacaoglu

PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

EDITED BY

KRISHNA K. TUMMALA, PhD

United Kingdom – North America – Japan – India Malaysia – China

Emerald Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2021 Copyright © 2021 Emerald Publishing Limited Reprints and permissions service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-83909-643-3 (Print) ISBN: 978-1-83909-642-6 (Online) ISBN: 978-1-83909-644-0 (Epub) ISSN: 2053-7697 (Series)

To all those brave souls, who have been fighting corruption, against all odds

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CONTENTS About the Editor

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About the Authors

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Chapter 1  Prologue: The Fight Against Corruption Krishna K. Tummala

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Chapter 2  Best Practices for Combating Corruption: Learning from Singapore and Hong Kong Jon S. T. Quah

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Chapter 3  India’s Continuing Fight Against Corruption: The Modi Regime’s First Five-Year Saga Krishna K. Tummala

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Chapter 4  Right to Information Act in India: An Effective Tool to Combat Corruption K. Jhansi Rani

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Chapter 5  Corruption and its Control: The Pursuit of Probity in Bangladesh Habib Zafarullah and Ahmed Shafiqul Huque

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Chapter 6  Corruption in Two Latin American Nations: The Experiences of Brazil and Chile in Comparative Analysis Daniel Zirker

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Chapter 7  Government Corruption in South Africa Naas Ferreira

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Chapter 8  Corruption in Public Procurement in Southeast Asian States David S. Jones

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Chapter 9  Ethical Privacy Policies for E-Government Websites Aroon P. Manoharan and Tony Carrizales

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Chapter 10  Epilogue Krishna K. Tummala

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Index143

ABOUT THE EDITOR Krishna K. Tummala obtained two Master’s degree and taught College for eight years in India; domiciled in the United States, 1968; MPA, State University of New York, Albany; PhD, University of Missouri, Columbia. Taught at several places and retired as Professor Emeritus, Kansas State University after 25 years as Director of Public Administration Program. Directed over 125 Master’s theses and 7 PhDs. Published 10 books, over 75 refereed articles and about 65 op ed pieces in popular press. Served on the governing bodies of the two US national Associations in Public Administration – the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), and Chaired the National Honor Society for Public Administrators. Among the several prestigious awards are the Fred W. Riggs Life-time Achievement in Comparative Administration; Paul Appleby award for Services to Public Administration; Conferred the title Rashtriya Vikas Shiromani (Distinguished Development Administration Scholar), Delhi Telugu Academy; Don Stone Award, ASPA; Senior Fulbright Fellow; and Member on Fulbright Scholars.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Tony J. Carrizales is an Associate Professor of public administration at Marist College and Former Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Public Management and Social Policy. His research interests include diversity in the public sector, the digital divide, and e-governance. He received his PhD from the School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University-Newark. Naas Ferreira was born on 1942, June 29 in Pretoria. Obtained school leaving certificate in 1961. Employed by the South-African Railways as a goods clerk, then SASOL I, Department of Labor in East London and Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape. Then had a five year stint as regional representative of the Public Service Commission for Administration (now Public Service Commission). Then worked as a Deputy Director, Training at the Central Personnel Institution in Windhoek, Namibia, followed by three years at the Department of Education and Training as a Director of Personnel Administration. This was followed by a move to academia at various universities, until this day. Ahmed Shafiqul Huque’s research and teaching interests are in public administration and management, public policy, development, South Asian government and politics, and governance and climate change. He has published 13 books and numerous research articles in leading international journals, including Public Administration Review, Governance, Public Management Review, International Review of Administrative Sciences, International Journal of Public Administration, Journal of Comparative and Comparative Politics, and Pacific Affairs and Asian Survey. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Public Administration and Policy and Contributing Editor for Southeast Asia for the online Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Policy. David S. Jones was awarded a PhD at Queen’s University of Belfast. He is currently a Consultant in policy and management, having previously worked in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, in the School of Economics, Singapore Management University, and in the Faculty of Business, Economics and Policy Studies, University of Brunei. He has also been a Local Director in Singapore of the Master of Public Administration Program conducted by the Australian National University. His research specialisms include public and financial management, public procurement and land policy and administration. He has published widely in these areas. He has also conducted a wide range of consultancy projects in the areas of public management and public procurement and continues to undertake such projects.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Aroon P. Manoharan is an Associate Professor in the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. His research interests include e-governance, performance measurement, strategic planning, public management, and comparative public administration. His research employs an international comparative focus, and he was involved in e-government projects in Prague (Czech Republic), Sofia (Bulgaria), and Cape Town (South Africa). He holds an MPA from the Kansas State University and PhD from the School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers UniversityNewark. Jon S. T. Quah is a retired Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and an anti-corruption consultant based in Singapore. He has published extensively on corruption and governance in Asian countries. His recent books include: Combating Asian Corruption: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies (2017); The Role of the Public Bureaucracy in Policy Implementation in Five ASEAN Countries (2016); Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015) (2015); Different Paths to Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore (2013); Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (2011, 2013); and Public Administration Singapore-Style (2010). Guest-edited three Asian Education and Development Studies (AEDS) special issues on corruption and published many articles in the AEDS. Latest, editor Symposium on Corruption for Public Policy and Administration. K. Jhansi Rani graduated with MA in Public Administration, Andhra University, Waltair, AP, India. She Joined as an Assistant Professor, Durgabai Desmukh Women’s College of Arts and Science, Hyderabad, India. Obtained PhD in 2014 and promoted to Associate rank. Worked on several seminars, and invited several speakers to the campus to discuss topics of current topical interest in politics and public administration which was appeared in the local print media and radio. Habib Zafarullah obtained PhD in Public Administration from the University of Sydney. His areas of academic interest are: democratic governance, comparative bureaucracy, public policy and administration, and international development and has published extensively in these areas. Some of his recent books include: Colonial Bureaucracies (2014), Managing Development in a Globalized World (2012), and International Development Governance (2006) (the latter two with A. S. Huque). He has also published in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Public Organization Review, International Journal of Public Sector Management, International Journal of Public Administration, Government & Opposition, Journal of Asian Public Policy, International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, Human Rights Quarterly, Asian Studies Review, Gender Work and Organization, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Round Table, etc. He was the Editor of Politics, Administration and Change, an international social science journal, for 25 years.

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Daniel Zirker is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Waikato, New Zealand (since 2004). He obtained PhD (Political Science, University of Alberta) and was an Academic Dean (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato, 2004–2011; College of Arts and Sciences, Montana State University-Billings, 1998–2004), and Professor of Political Science (University of Idaho,1985–1998; Montana State University-Billings, 1998–2004; University of Waikato, 2004–present). A US Peace Corps Volunteer (Northeast Brazil, 1970– 1972) and Fulbright Senior Lecturer (University of Dar es Salaam, 1989–1990). He has been, and is currently (1999–2005; 2018–present), Chair/President of the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society of the Internat’l Pol. Science Assoc. He studies democracy, corruption, and civil–military relations in New Zealand, Brazil, Africa, and Eastern Europe. He holds dual US/New Zealand citizenship.

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CHAPTER 1 PROLOGUE: THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION Krishna K. Tummala

The study of corruption has rather very ancient beginnings, a muddled middle, and no end in sight into the near future. Kautilya, writing sometime during 321 and 296 bce, categorized as many as 44 types of “embezzlement” (did not use the expression “corruption”), and suggested how to deal with the transgressors (Shama Sastry, 1967, pp. 4–6). That he was in fact codifying extant texts in his time only adds to the interest in the subject even before his time to dates unknown. That we have been witnessing innumerable studies and various attempts by several nations on curbing corruption suggests that we continue to muddle along. Needless to say, we are yet to find the “silver bullet” to slay this monstrous scourge. A lot has been written so far what corruption is, and how to curb it, if not eradicate it altogether. A lot more would be written, certainly. Mathew C. Stephenson (2016) produced a bibliography on the subject running into 348 pages. During the last three or four years, a lot more was written. Ronald Kroeze, Andre Vitoria, and Guy Geltner (2018) produced a seminal volume dealing with a chronological comparative and international explanation of large scale corruption. Carole L. Jakiewicz (2020) edited a volume covering “Global Corruption…” I am only making here a humble addition in this regard. It is important to note that the very definition of “corruption” is fraught with difficulty. It defies a simple, universally accepted, definition (Rose, 2020, pp. 3–10; Tummala, 2020, pp. 174–181). Indeed the often cited World Bank’s elementary definition of corruption as using public power for private gain misses a lot. For that matter, any simple definition is of necessity tends to be simplistic. For corruption is ubiquitous. Pope Francis (2019) admitted as recently that there is corruption even in

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 1–5 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034002

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the Vatican! It is complex and endemic as each nation with its own unique culture not only has its own brand of corruption, but also a variety of ways of combating it. Transparency International (TI, 2017) made the profound statement in its 2016 Corruption Perception Index report of 176 nations it studied that “(N)o country gets close to a perfect score.” UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres (2018) observed that a total of $2.6 trillion, which amounts to about 5% of global GDP, is lost due to corruption. But worse is the TI’s (2019) ominous conclusion in its 2018 Report that “(C)orruption chips away at democracy to produce a vicious cycle, where corruption undermines democratic institutions and, in turn, weak institutions are less able to control corruption.” All this might lead one to despair, reminding Mark Twain’s famous expression about weather that everyone talks about, but not much can be done to change it. There, however, are some success stories – all small countries such as Norway, New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, and Hong Kong. And certainly there are lessons to learn. A couple of explanations are necessary. One, the various contributors here make no attempt to define precisely what corruption is. I advised them not to indulge in that effort, given the complexity, and the size of this volume. Moreover, as already noted, such an exercise might prove to be futile as a universally accepted definition is well-nigh impossible. Two, the title “International” could be understood as pretentious. After all, only a handful of countries are studied here. It is “international” in the sense it covers a variety of them, big and small, and not pertaining to a single entity. It also uniquely includes subjects that are not normally studied such as corruption in procurement where untold billions of dollars of tax payer’s money are contracted out. And there is the more nascent subject of use of information electronically, infringing upon individual privacy. As an introduction to the subject matter of this study in the ensuing pages, the following abstracts are provided. Before turning to gloom and doom, it is perhaps advisable to start with a few success stories. Quah who studied corruption for long, lists two such cases: Singapore and Hong Kong. Not only TI’s Corruption Perception Index but seven other indicators place these two nations that were very corrupt at one time, but high on fighting the scourge very successfully. Four best practices are shown as effective tools in this endeavor which might provide lessons for others. Indian writers’ preoccupation goes eons back. The East India Company, perhaps the first trading corporation (Darlymple, 2019), came to trade but soon began flying the British flag, and was known to be very corrupt. Edmund Burke’s long speech in the British Parliament impeaching Warren Hastings who served as Governor-General in India for his corruption stands out. Post-independent India, despite long rhetoric, had not fared any better. The Manmohan Singh led Congress Party governments, despite his own impeccable personal credentials, indulged in whole-sale corruption during their 10-year regime till 2014 (Rai, 2014). That led Narendra Modi of the Bhartiya Janata Party to excoriate that government for its failing while leading the general election campaign of the same year, and promising to clean it all up. Tummala (2020) shows, while indeed

Prologue

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there was some action in this regard, the outcomes during the first five years (2014–2019) of his rule were very mixed. The unsurpassed rhetoric fell short of the promise. Starting from the premise that decent information is a sine qua non of the corruption-fighting effort, Jhansi Rani shows the contribution of the Right to Information Act of 2005 which made it obligatory for all public agencies to provide any information (excluding that which compromises national security) in a timely fashion, the failure of which would invoke punishment. While this in itself is seen as a success, it also led to unintended consequences such as putting the lives of journalists, in particular who went aggressively after corruption stories, in jeopardy, as has been the case in many other countries. Zafarullah and Huque turn attention to Bangladesh. They show that successive governments failed to curb corruption to the extent it became ubiquitous, running through the entire social and political fabric. They analyze the underlying historical, social, cultural, political, economic, and administrative reasons for pervasive malfeasance in the public sector. Demonstrating such complexity, they mirror the difficulties faced by successive governments, and their failure to deal with corruption as all efforts have been politicized. Brazil and Chile have nearly similar recent political histories. Both emerged from military dictatorships into democracies, albeit with contrasting national emphases. But both countries went in separate directions, one succeeding better than the other. Zirker tries to uncover the key causal factors in such contrasting experiences. Naas Ferreira provides a retrospect and prospect in South Africa. A small White minority Afrikaners ruled a large native Black and Colored majority. Apartheid policies of the past, suppressed the majority of the nation. By 1994, Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress party took over. A new Constitution was accepted in 1996 which set mighty powerful precepts, followed by a plethora of laws, toward an ethical and efficient rule looking forward toward an equal society. But it did not take long after Mandela’s death for the country to fall into a morass of corruption. The succeeding President Jacob Zuma was embroiled in 783 corruption cases costing multi-millions of Rands (Hieberge, 2017). Private entities, led by one Gupta family, enabled the “state capture” for personal gain. This chapter shows the spectacular failure of that nation in its efforts at curbing corruption. All countries, in their development ventures, and efforts to provide national security, spend enormous amounts of tax-payers’ money. The less developed countries (LDCs) facing not only the necessity of providing for their citizens at least a minimally decent standard of life but also trying to catch up with the vanguard nations have a more onerous task on their hands. Procurement, thus, becomes common and complex. Outsourcing many governmental functions to the private sector with large amounts of money involved, results in lucrative sources for corruption. Jones, directs his attention toward the experience of Southeast Asian nations, and shows three different reasons for failure to curb corruption in contracting out.

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With the increasing public use of the Internet and social media, governments world-wide are adopting digital technologies to leverage big data analyses to improve their decision-making and organizational performance. More importantly disseminating information to the public accurately and quickly is seen as paramount. Manoharan and Carrizales look at the issues involved in this process which are seen as threatening privacy, and the governments’ need to restore confidence and trust of the public. Their primary focus is on local governments which seem to be widely using the emerging technologies, and their concomitant challenges. The epilogue hopes to show some lessons learnt in fighting corruption. In completing this volume, I stood on many a capable shoulder. My own interest in the subject goes back to the mid-1990s when Jon S.T. Quah, as editor of a new venture by Times Academic Press, Singapore, to publish a book on Public Administration in each of the Asian nations, asked me to do one on India where I was born, studied and taught, before taking domicile in the United States in 1968. As I sent my manuscript, Quah came back to me asking why I had nothing to say about corruption in India. That sent me back to the drawing board under the heading of “Ethos in Indian Administration.” Since then I am drawn into this subject deeper and deeper to the point of exasperation. My work has largely been confined to study India as I knew I can never do this kind of comparative work all by myself. Hence, my request, and invitation, to other cohorts to work with me. I am much obliged to each of the colleagues who readily accepted my invitation, and contributed generously, and all the anonymous reviewers of each of the contributions. In the event of publication of my own journal articles on the subject, very many anonymous reviewers enriched my thinking to whom I extend my appreciation. Similarly, my students in India, United States, South Africa, and England (on occasion in the latter two), and several participants in various national and international conferences of organizations such as the International Political Science Association (Brisbane, Australia, 2018), American Society for Public Administration (Denver, 2019), and Lein Conference (Singapore, 2019), challenged, corrected and taught me. I cannot thank them enough. My writings on India are richer because of my conversations with several cohorts. Prominent among them are (late) V. Bhaskara Rao, Ramesh K. Arora, Yarlagadda Pardhasaradhi, and N. Jayaprakash Narayan (of Loksatta). Nisar Fathima, Librarian, Loksatta, has been a great resource, who always promptly complied with my requests for information on India. I could always depend upon her, and am thankful as always for her help. Vriti Bansal, also of Loksatta, provided me with the copy of the “Pledge” developed by the Central Vigilance Commission in India, which she proudly took along with a few million other Indians. My sincere thanks to both. Evan Berman enthusiastically received this book proposal and shepherded it through the several hoops of Emerald publishers. Hazel Goodes, Anna Saife, and Carys Morley successively helped me at Emerald Publishers in seeing this volume through publication. My great appreciation and sincere thanks to each. In Particular, I express my great appreciation for S. Rajachitra for her meticulous final editing of the page proofs.

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REFERENCES Darlymple, W. (2019). The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate violence and the Pillage of an Empire. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing. Guterres, A. (2018, September). Retrieved from https://hotindiareport.com/world/corruption-costs2-6-trillion-or-5-of-global-gdp-says-un-chief/ Hieberge, T. (October 13, 2017). South African Supreme Court Upholds Reinstating 783 Corruption Charges Against Zuma. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com Jarkiewicz, C. L. (Ed.). (2020). Global corruption and ethics management. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kroeze, R, Vitoria, A., & Geltner, G. (2018). Histories of anticorruption and the myth of modernity: A review of anticorruption in history: From antiquity to the modern era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pope Frances (2019). OCCRP. The Pope Admits Corruption in Vatican, November 28. Rai, V. (2014). Not just an accountant: The diary of the nation’s conscience keeper. New Delhi: Rupa Publications Pvt. Ltd. Rose, J. (2020). The contested definition of corruption. In C. L. Jarkiewicz (Ed.), Global corruption and ethics management. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Shama Sastry, R. (Trans.). (1967). Kautily’a Arthsastra (8th ed.). Mysore: Mysore Publishing House. Stephenson, M. C. (2016). Bibliography on corruption and anti-corruption. Retrieved from http:// www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/2016PDFs/Stephenson%20Corruption%20 Bibliography%20March%2016,pdf2016 Transparency International. (2017, January 25). Corruption Perception Index 2016. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perception_index Transparency International. (2019, January 29). How corruption weakens democracy. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi_2018_global_analysis Tummala, K. K. (2020). Travails of studying corruption. In C. L. Jarkiewicz (Ed.), Global corruption and ethics management. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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CHAPTER 2 BEST PRACTICES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION: LEARNING FROM SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG Jon S. T. Quah

ABSTRACT Singapore and Hong Kong are the least corrupt Asian countries according to their rankings and scores on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018 and other indicators. This chapter explains why these two citystates have succeeded in minimizing corruption and identifies the four best practices which might serve as lessons for policy-makers in other countries. Keywords: Anti-corruption agencies; corruption; police; political will; Hong Kong; Singapore

INTRODUCTION Corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries judging from their performance on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2018. Table 1 confirms that only seven (25.9%) of the 27 Asian countries have scores above 50, the passing score, with Singapore having the top score of 85, followed by Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), which has a score of 76. By contrast, the remaining 20 countries have scores ranging from 14 for North Korea to 47 for Malaysia. It should be noted that 13 countries (48.1%) fall within the 30–39 category and North Korea and Afghanistan are the most corrupt Asian countries with their respective scores of 14 and 16.

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 7–22 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034003

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Table 1.  Performance of 27 Asian Countries by CPI Scores in 2018. CPI Score 80–100 70–79 60–69 50–59 40–49 30–39

20–29 0–19

Countries Singapore (85) Hong Kong SAR (76), Japan (73) Bhutan (68), Brunei Darussalam (63), Taiwan (63) South Korea (57) Malaysia (47), India (41) China (39), Indonesia (38), Sri Lanka (38), Mongolia (37), Philippines (36), Thailand (36), Timor-Leste (35), Pakistan (33), Vietnam (33), Maldives (31), Nepal (31), Lao PDR (29), Myanmar (29) Papua New Guinea (28), Bangladesh (26), Cambodia (20) Afghanistan (16), North Korea (14) Total

No. (%)   1 (3.7)   2 (7.4)   3 (11.1)   1 (3.7)   2 (7.4) 13 (48.1)

  3 (11.1)   2 (7.4) 27 (100)

Source: Compiled by the author from Transparency International (2019). The CPI score ranges from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (highly clean). To be included in the CPI, a country must have three independent surveys on its perceived extent of public sector corruption.

Why are Singapore and Hong Kong SAR the outliers among the Asian countries in their success in combating corruption? Can policy-makers in other countries with widespread corruption learn from the best practices from the success stories of Singapore and Hong Kong SAR? This chapter addresses these questions by explaining their success before identifying the four best practices for possible emulation by policy-makers in other countries.

PERCEIVED EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG As it is impossible to measure the actual extent of corruption in a country, scholars rely on surveys on citizen perceptions and attitudes toward corruption to assess their perceived extent of corruption in the country. As the CPI has several limitations (Ko & Samajdar, 2010), this section also relies on the World Bank’s control of corruption indicator in 2017 and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) annual corruption survey in 2018. Table 2 confirms that Singapore and Hong Kong have performed consistently well as the two least corrupt Asian countries across the three corruption indicators. Singapore is ranked first and Hong Kong is ranked fourth among the 16 countries included in PERC’s 2018 corruption survey. Singapore and Hong Kong have also performed well on the World Bank’s control of corruption indicator in 2017 with respective percentile ranks of 97.6 and 92.3. According to Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016), corruption flourishes in those “societies with low levels of trust” (p. 248) and “people are likely to distrust the government” if the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) and other anti-corruption policies are ineffective (pp. 256–257). As “corruption influences the level of trust” (p. 259), it is not surprising that the citizens of Singapore and Hong Kong have

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Best Practices for Combating Corruption

Table 2.  Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s Performance on Three Indicators, 2017–2018. Indicatora

Singapore

Hong Kong SAR

Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 Control of corruption 2017 PERC annual survey 2018

3rd (85) 2.1 (97.6) 1st (1.90)

14th (76) 1.6 (92.3) 4th (4.38)

Sources: Transparency International (2019), World Bank (2018a), and Asian Intelligence (2018, p. 1). a The CPI in 2018 covers 180 countries; the World Bank provides data on the control of corruption in 215 countries in 2017; and the PERC 2018 survey covers 16 countries.

a high level of trust in their politicians as reflected in Singapore’s top ranking and Hong Kong’s 18th position among the 137 countries surveyed on The Global Competiveness Report 2017–2018 indicator on public trust in politicians (Schwab, 2017, p.  263). However, the protests in Hong Kong arising from the government’s decision to pass the extradition bill in June 2019 and the selective law enforcement by the police have increased public mistrust of the government and the police (Burns, 2019).

SINGAPORE’S SUCCESS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION The British ruled Singapore for nearly 140 years from its founding by Stamford Raffles in January 1819 until the attainment of self-government in June 1959. Corruption was widespread during the British colonial period because the government’s weak political will to curb corruption was reflected in the adoption of ineffective anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2011, p. 216). Corruption was made illegal in 1871 with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang, and Singapore. The increase in the number of criminal cases and complaints against the Singapore Police Force (SPF) resulted in the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry by the government in 1879 to investigate the causes of the SPF’s inefficiency. The 1879 Commission found that corruption was prevalent among the European inspectors and the Malay and Indian junior officers (Quah, 1979, pp. 24–25). A second Commission appointed in April 1886 to investigate public gambling in the Straits Settlements concluded that there was systemic police corruption in both Singapore and Penang (Straits Settlements, 1887). The British colonial government’s lack of political will in combating corruption was reflected in the 66-year delay in passing the first anti-corruption law, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), in December 1937 after corruption was made an offense in 1871. Nothing was done by the British colonial government to curb police corruption in the Straits Settlements in spite of the convincing evidence of police corruption provided by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions. This was not surprising because the government employed the strategy of appointing

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commissions to “gain and bide time, to carry on the same exploitation with a promise of thorough investigation” (Krishna, 1939, pp. 307–309). More important than the inordinate delay in enacting the POCO, the British colonial government erred when it made the SPF’s Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) responsible for combating corruption in spite of widespread police corruption in Singapore. The ACB was ineffective in curbing corruption for three reasons. First, it was inadequately staffed with only 17 personnel to combat corruption in Singapore. As the CID was primarily concerned with the investigation and solution of serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, the function of combating corruption was given lower priority. Furthermore, the ACB had to compete with other branches of the CID for limited personnel and other resources (Quah, 2011, p. 217). Second, the ACB was ineffective because it was not a Type A ACA dedicated solely to the performance of anti-corruption functions but a Type B ACA performing both corruption and non-corruption-related functions (Quah, 2017, p. 7). Apart from combating corruption, the ACB was also responsible for many noncorruption-related functions, including secret societies, gambling promoters, commercial crime, anti-vice, pawnshops, second-hand dealers, narcotics and criminal records (Colony of Singapore, 1952, p. 31). Consequently, corruption control was neglected by the CID as police corruption was rampant. The third and most important reason for the ACB’s ineffectiveness was the prevalence of police corruption in Singapore. The Commissioner of Police, J.P. Pennefather-Evans, confirmed in 1950 the widespread police corruption revealed by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry and reported that corruption was rife in government departments. Police corruption was rampant because the local policemen were poorly paid and forced to accept bribes from the gambling house owners or to take on second jobs to supplement their low salaries even though they were forbidden to do so (Quah, 1979, pp. 28–29). The ACB’s Achilles’ heel was its inability to curb police corruption because it was part of the SPF. The British colonial government failed to observe the “golden rule” that “the police cannot and should not be responsible for investigating their deviance and crimes” (Punch, 2009, p. 245) when it made the ACB responsible for combating corruption even though there was rampant police corruption. The folly of this decision was exposed by the revelation of the Opium Hijacking scandal in October 1951 when a gang of robbers, which included three police detectives, had stolen 1,800 pounds of opium worth US $133,330 (Quah, 2011, p. 217). The ACB’s failure to curb corruption made the British colonial government realize its mistake and resulted in the establishment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) as a Type A ACA outside the SPF’s jurisdiction in September 1952 (Quah, 2011, p. 217). However, after replacing the ineffective ACB with the CPIB, the British colonial government’s second mistake was its failure to provide the CPIB with sufficient legal powers, budget and personnel during 1952–1959. The weak anticorruption laws did not provide the CPIB officers with sufficient enforcement powers and the CPIB’s reliance on 13 officers on short secondment from the SPF

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Best Practices for Combating Corruption

with “limited time and capacity to conduct thorough investigations” adversely affected its effectiveness (CPIB, 2012, p. 18). Singapore has succeeded in combating corruption not only because of the strong political will of the People’s Action Party (PAP) government but also because of its wisdom to learn from the two mistakes of the British colonial government. After assuming power in June 1959, the PAP government retained the CPIB as a Type A ACA and enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) on June 17, 1960 to strengthen the CPIB’s legal powers and rectify its limited budget and personnel during its first eight years. The POCA empowers the CPIB director and officers to arrest and search arrested persons, and to investigate their bank accounts, income tax returns and other documents. More importantly, CPIB officers investigating corruption cases are assisted by section 24, which compels accused persons to account for their “pecuniary resources or property” that are disproportionate to their known sources of income (Quah, 2011, p. 220). In addition to enacting the POCA, the PAP government has demonstrated its strong political will in combating corruption by providing the CPIB with the necessary budget and personnel to perform its functions effectively. Table 3 provides details of the growth in the CPIB’s budget and personnel from 2008 to 2015 and shows that its per capita expenditure has increased from US $2.32 to US $4.87 during the same period. Similarly, the CPIB’s staff-population ratio has also improved from 1:56,163 in 2008 to 1:23,858 in 2015. Unlike other ACAs, the CPIB has functioned effectively as an independent watchdog since 1960 for three reasons. The first and most important reason for the CPIB’s effectiveness is its operational autonomy even though it comes under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office and its director reports to the prime minister through the cabinet secretary. The CPIB’s investigative and preventive measures are reviewed since 1996 by the Anti-Corruption Review Committee and the Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee, both of which consist of senior civil servants, including the CPIB director and Head of the Singapore Civil Service, who chairs both committees (Quah, 2015, p. 90). The CPIB has maintained its independence because the Prime Minister and other political leaders have not interfered in its daily operations (Gregory, 2015, pp. 130–131). The CPIB’s independence is reflected in its investigation of five PAP leaders and eight senior civil servants without fear or favor from 1966 to 2014. In November 1986, the Minister for National Development, Teh Cheang Wan, Table 3.  CPIB’s Budget and Personnel, 2008–2015. CPIB Budget (in millions) Personnel Per capita expenditure Staff-population ratio

2008

2010

2012

2014

2015

US $11.2 86 US $2.32 1:56,163

US $14.7 90 US $2.90 1:56,408

US $20.3 138 US $3.82 1:38,496

US $29.3 205 US $5.36 1:26,682

US $26.8 232 US $4.87 1:23,858

Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the CPIB’s budget and personnel in Republic of Singapore (2008–2016).

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was accused of accepting S$1 million in bribes from two property developers. However, he committed suicide before he could be charged in court. On July 24, 2013, the CPIB assistant director, Edwin Yeo, was charged with misappropriating US $1.41 million from 2008 to 2012. He was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and for forgery and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on February 20, 2014 (Quah, 2015, pp. 80–81). No one is above the law in Singapore because with the creation of the elected presidency in 1991, the CPIB director can obtain the Elected President’s consent to investigate allegations of corruption against ministers, members of parliament and senior civil servants if the prime minister withholds his consent (Quah, 2011, p. 231). Singapore’s political leaders have “persistently and unequivocally supported and defended” the CPIB’s operational impartiality and their “political self-denial” has ensured its de facto independence, and sustained its reputation for impartiality and “its popular legitimacy” (Gregory, 2015, pp. 130-–131). In short, anyone found guilty of a corruption offense is punished in Singapore, regardless of his or her position, status, or political affiliation. Second, the CPIB is effective because it relies on a “total approach to enforcement” and deals with both major and minor cases of public and private sector corruption, regardless of the amount of bribe, rank or status of the persons being investigated. The same processes and procedures apply to everyone being investigated, including ministers and chief executive officers of major organizations. There is emphasis on both bribe-givers and bribe-takers as they are equally culpable according to the POCA (Soh, 2008, pp. 1–2). Furthermore, section 37 of the POCA states that Singapore citizens working for their government in embassies and agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt offenses committed in other countries and would be dealt with as if such offenses had occurred in Singapore (Quah, 2011, pp. 220–221). The CPIB also investigates anonymous corruption complaints if there is sufficient information to initiate an investigation. The third reason for the CPIB’s effectiveness is its continuous efforts to enhance the expertise and capabilities of its personnel by sending them for training programs on management and professional topics in Singapore and other countries. It has organized four Anti-Corruption Expertise (ACE) regional training workshops in Singapore on investigation, computer forensics, management of ACAs, and cross-border investigation and legal assistance for ACA officers in many Asian countries from 2006 to 2015. In July 2004, the CPIB established a Computer Forensics Unit to enhance the investigative and evidence-gathering skills of its officers by providing them with the knowledge of forensic accounting to enable them to trace ill-gotten assets and retrieve incriminating evidence from seized computers and mobile telephones. The CPIB has also conducted joint operations with the Commercial Affairs Department and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority to develop networks and partnerships with other public agencies in Singapore (Soh, 2008, pp. 3–4). The CPIB’s commitment to organizational excellence is reflected in the many awards it has won, beginning with its certification by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as an ISO 9000:2001, since 1997. The

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Best Practices for Combating Corruption

Table 4.  CPIB’s Cases Investigated, Clearance, and Conviction Rates, 2015–2018. Indicator

2015

2016

2017

2018

Cases investigated Clearance rate (%) Conviction rate (%)

132 86 97

118 80 100

103 84 99

107 80 98

Source: CPIB (2018, pp. 11–12, 2019, pp. 2, 8).

significance of this award is that the CPIB’s key processes are documented and followed by its officers, and there is also a “regular surveillance audit by the ISO inspectors and regular reviews” of these processes “to keep them up-to-date” (Soh, 2008, p. 4). In 1998, the CPIB was awarded the Singapore Quality Class, which certified the excellence of both public and private organizations in Singapore. The CPIB was the first public agency in Singapore to receive the People Excellence Award in 2003 and two years later, it was given the Distinguished Public Service Award for Organizational Excellence (CPIB, 2012, pp. 67, 84). In sum, the CPIB’s effectiveness in minimizing corruption is reflected in Singapore’s consistently good performance on the three indicators of the perceived extent of corruption in 2017–2018 in Table 2. The public perceptions surveys commissioned by the CPIB indicate that the proportion of respondents who have rated Singapore’s anti-corruption efforts positively has increased from 85% in 2010 to 89% in 2016 (CPIB, 2017, p. 9). Finally, the CPIB’s success in combating corruption is also confirmed in Table 4 by the declining number of cases registered for investigation from 2015 to 2018 and its high clearance and conviction rates for the same period.

HONG KONG’S SUCCESS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION Hong Kong was a British colony for about 156 years from its acquisition in 1841 until July 1, 1997 when it became a Special Administrative Region of China. Before 1898, bribery of civil servants in Hong Kong was a misdemeanor under Common Law, which was ineffective because corruption was widespread at all levels of the government during the first two decades of British rule (Lethbridge, 1974, p. 21). The June 1897 gambling house scandal, which involved the police, damaged the civil service’s reputation and resulted in the enactment of the Misdemeanors Punishment Ordinance in 1898, which increased the maximum penalty for corruption to two years’ imprisonment with or without hard labor and/or a fine not exceeding HK$500 (US $64) (Kuan, 1981, pp. 16–18). The police were the most corrupt government department in Hong Kong (Palmier, 1985, p. 123) because their “daily extensive contact with the public” provided policemen with ample opportunities to be involved in corrupt activities (de Speville, 1997, p. 14). Police corruption thrived in Hong Kong during the early years of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF) as the proliferation

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of gambling, prostitution and drugs provided the poorly paid police officers with additional income by accepting bribes from the owners of brothels and gambling dens and the government accorded lower priority to crime control by tolerating the alliance between the police and the triads (Jiao, 2007, p. 194). Nothing was done for the next 50 years until the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) was passed in 1948. The POCO raised the maximum penalty for corruption to five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of HK$10,000 (US $1,282) (Kuan, 1981, p. 23). Even though police corruption was widespread in Hong Kong, the government made the same mistake of establishing the AntiCorruption Branch (ACB) as a special unit within the RHKPF’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in 1948 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. The ACB was separated from the CID in 1952 but it retained its title and remained within the RHKPF (Lethbridge, 1985, p. 87). However, the increasing prevalence of corruption in Hong Kong resulted in the general public’s loss of confidence in the ACB and the government’s determination in combating corruption (Kuan, 1981, pp. 24–25). As part of the POCO’s review initiated by the government in 1968, a study team of government officials visited Singapore to examine how its anti-corruption laws worked in practice. They were impressed by Singapore’s success in combating corruption and attributed the CPIB’s effectiveness to its independence from the police (Wong, 1981, p. 47). However, the British colonial government in Hong Kong did not support the establishment of an independent ACA because of the adverse effects on police morale, the difficulties in recruiting and training independent investigators, and the need for coordination with other departments in the RHKPF related to anti-corruption investigations (Lethbridge, 1985, pp. 99–100). Not surprisingly, the RHKPF did not accept the study team’s recommendation of creating an independent ACA outside its jurisdiction and suggested instead the upgrading of the ACB into the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) with the enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) in May 1971 (Lethbridge, 1985, p. 98). The escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent of Police, Peter Godber, on June 8, 1973 to Britain angered the public in Hong Kong and undermined the ACO’s credibility. The government appointed a Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr to investigate the circumstances that enabled Godber to escape to Britain and to evaluate the POBO’s effectiveness (Quah, 2011, p. 252). The governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, accepted Sir Alastair’s advice of considering public opinion and established a new ACA that was independent of the RHKPF. Thus, the revelation of Godber’s corrupt activities and adverse publicity arising from his escape to Britain was the catalyst that made the governor to accept the risk of removing the RHKPF’s control of the investigation of corruption. MacLehose’s decision was path-breaking because his predecessors and previous committees had deferred to the police mainly because they feared a collapse of police morale if the control of corruption was transferred to an independent ACA (Quah, 2011, pp. 252–253). Consequently, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was formed on February 15, 1974 with the enactment of the ICAC Ordinance to

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Best Practices for Combating Corruption

Table 5.  ICAC’S Budget and Personnel, 2008–2015. ICAC Budget (in millions) Personnel Per capita expenditure Staff-population ratio

2008

2010

2012

2014

2015

US $97.7 1,263 US $13.40 1:5,780

US $104.65 1,321 US $14.89 1:5,317

US $112.96 1,282 US $15.78 1:5,581

US $120.14 1,358 US $16.59 1:5,333

US $126.01 1,351 US $17.24 1:5,408

Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ICAC budget and personnel provided in its annual reports and budgets from 2008 to 2015.

“root out corruption and to restore public confidence in the Government” (Wong, 1981, p. 45). Governor MacLehose demonstrated his political will in combating corruption by providing the ICAC with 369 personnel and a budget of HK$16.1 million (US $2.06 million) (Lethbridge, 1985, pp. 107, 231). As the longest serving governor of Hong Kong from 1971 to 1982, he continued to provide “unwavering budgetary support” to the ICAC until his retirement (Yep, 2013, p. 216). His successors continued to provide the ICAC with adequate budget and personnel as Table 5 shows that its per capita expenditure has increased from US $13.40 in 2008 to US $17.24 in 2015. The ICAC’s staff-population ratio has also improved from 1:5,780 to 1:5,408 during the same period. A former ICAC Commissioner, Fanny Law (2008, pp. 98–99) identifies these four strengths of Hong Kong’s “sound integrity system”: a strong political will to curb corruption; a common integrity framework for civil servants, politicians, judicial officers, and staff of the watchdog agencies; a vibrant civil society with independent media and non-government organizations; and an independent ICAC with a comprehensive anti-corruption program. Cheung (2008, p. 106) contends that the ICAC’s three-pronged strategy of investigation, prevention and education has contributed to its success in combating corruption in Hong Kong because it has (1) inculcated fear among corrupt offenders by enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially; (2) reduced the opportunities for corruption by streamlining procedures and management processes to prevent corruption; and (3) changed the population’s attitudes toward corruption through community education and publicity. Bertrand de Speville (1997, pp. 53–56), the ICAC Commissioner from 1992 to 1997, attributes the ICAC’s effectiveness in curbing corruption to five factors. The most important factor is the government’s recognition that corruption is a serious problem and its commitment to solve it by providing the ICAC with adequate budget and personnel. Second, to gain public confidence, the ICAC must be unimpeachable and its personnel “must have unblemished integrity” and be “dedicated and effective anti-graft fighters.” Third, the ICAC has implemented a carefully designed long-term three-pronged strategy, which focuses on investigation, prevention, and education. Fourth, the ICAC has gained public confidence by ensuring that all corruption complaints, no matter how small, are investigated. Finally, the ICAC is effective because of “a combination of factors that collectively produced an advantageous environment” for curbing corruption. Similarly, in their more recent study, Scott and Gong (2019, pp. 10–12) contend that the

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ICAC is successful not only because of the government’s political will and effective anti-corruption laws but also because of its independence, well-trained staff with high integrity, corruption-proof procedures, and public engagement.

BEST PRACTICES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION What can other countries learn from Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s success in combating corruption? There are four best practices which policy-makers elsewhere can emulate from analyzing their effective anti-corruption strategies. However, they must first recognize the significant contextual differences between Singapore and Hong Kong, which are affluent, politically stable city-states with small land areas and populations, and their own larger countries, with lower GDP per capita and huge populations. Furthermore, they must also realize that there is no “quick fix” to solve their corruption problem overnight by simply adopting a Singapore or Hong Kong-style anti-corruption strategy without considering the political will, preconditions for success and the high political and economic costs involved. Strong Dose of Political Will Needed to Minimize Corruption Political will is “the sustained commitment of political leaders to implement anticorruption policies and programs” (Quah, 2017, p. 64). Without political will, the anti-corruption measures adopted by governments will fail because they cannot enact comprehensive anti-corruption legislation, provide the ACAs with adequate personnel, budget and independence to perform effectively, or enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially without using the ACAs as attack dogs against political opponents. The disappointing performance of many Asian ACAs is the result of their governments’ weak political will as manifested in their weak legal powers, inadequate budgets, lack of trained personnel, and limited independence (Quah, 2017, p. 73). As combating corruption is expensive, ACAs require adequate budgets and personnel to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. All governments face budget constraints but their “allocation of limited resources for ACA activities” indicates their lack of “genuine commitment to the ACA’s mission” (Recanantini, 2011, p. 549). Using the two indicators of the ACA’s per capita expenditure and its staff-population ratio, Table 6 confirms that the strong political will of the governments of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore in combating corruption is manifested in the higher per capita expenditures and more favorable staff-­population ratios of the ICAC and CPIB, respectively. By contrast, the weak political will of the governments of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India is reflected in the lower per capita expenditures and unfavorable staff-population ratios of the Anti-Corruption Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), Agency Against Corruption (AAC), Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission), and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), respectively.

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Best Practices for Combating Corruption

Table 6.  Per Capita Expenditures and Staff–Population Ratios of Seven ACAS, 2014. ACA

Budget (in Millions)

Personnel

Per capita Expenditure

Staff–Population Ratio

ICAC (Type A) Singapore CPIB (Type A) Hong Kong SAR ACRC (Type B) South Korea AAC (Type A) Taiwan OMB (Type B) Philippines KPK (Type A) Indonesia CBI (Type B) India

US$120.14

1,358

US$16.59

1:5,333

US$29.30

205

US$5.36

1:26,682

US$58.30

465

US$1.15

1:108,430

US$13.70

200

US$0.59

1:117,150

US$38.80

1,214

US$0.39

1:81,631

US$50.17

1,102

US$0.19

1:230,943

US$65.50

5,676

US$0.05

1:228,206

Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the budgets and personnel provided in the annual reports of the ACAs. The AAC’s budget and personnel in 2014 are provided by courtesy of the Agency Against Corruption (AAC) Secretariat in Taipei, Taiwan.

Address the Major Causes of Corruption To combat corruption effectively, policy-makers must address the major causes of corruption in their countries. However, in spite of what is known about the causes of corruption (see Treisman, 2007), governments in many countries have failed to do so because it is easier to deal with the symptoms than to address the root causes of corruption. In his comparative study of anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong, India, and Indonesia, Palmier (1985, p. 271) identifies three important causes of corruption: low salaries of civil servants; ample opportunities for corruption provided by red tape; and the low probability of detecting and punishing corrupt offenders. He hypothesizes that “with few opportunities, good salaries, and effective policing,” corruption is minimal but “with many opportunities, poor salaries, and weak policing,” there will be considerable corruption (p. 272). Low salaries contribute to corruption because “when civil service pay is too low, civil servants may be obliged to use their positions to collect bribes as a way of making ends meet, particularly when the expected cost of being caught is low” (Mauro, 1997, p. 5). For example, civil servants in the Philippines receive “starvation wages,” and cannot “survive without accepting bribes” (Chua & Rimban, 1998, p. 154). Consequently, corruption becomes “a coping strategy to compensate for economic hardship” for poorly paid civil servants in many countries (Lindner, 2013, p. 2). Red tape provides civil servants with the excuse to extort bribes from those members of the public who are willing to pay “speed money” to “cut” red tape and reduce delay by expediting their applications for licenses or permits.

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Table 7.  Red Tape and Corruption in 10 Asian Countries, 2018. Dealing with Construction Permits Country Singapore Hong Kong Japan Bhutan Taiwan Lao PDR Papua NG Bangladesh Cambodia Afghanistan

Ease of Doing Business Rank

No. of Procedures

2/190 5/190 34/190 75/190 15/190 141/190 109/190 177/190 135/190 183/190

10 11 12 21 10 11 17 14.2 20 13

No. of Days 54 72 197 150 93 83 217 269 652 356

CPI 2018 Rank and Score 3rd (85) 14th (76) 18th (73) 25th (68) 31st (63) 132nd (29) 138th (28) 149th (26) 161st (20) 172nd (16)

Sources: World Bank (2018b) and Transparency International (2019).

The association between red tape and corruption in ten Asian countries in 2018 is demonstrated in Table 7 as it requires 10 procedures and 54 days to obtain a construction permit in Singapore, which is ranked second among 190 countries on the ease of doing business and has a high CPI score of 85. By contrast, Cambodia is ranked 135th for the ease of doing business because it requires 20 procedures and 652 days to get a construction permit and has a low CPI score of 20. To minimize corruption effectively in a country, those persons found guilty of corruption offenses should be punished according to the law. In reality, however, the probability of detection and punishment of corruption offenses varies in different countries. Corruption thrives in those countries where the public perceives it to be a “low risk, high reward” activity because corruption offenders are unlikely to be caught and punished. On the other hand, corruption is not a serious problem in those countries where corruption is perceived as a “high risk, low reward” activity because those committing corruption offenses are more likely to be caught and punished (Quah, 2011, p. 18). The low probability of detection and punishment in China is a major cause of corruption because, among the 115,143 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members disciplined during 1992–2006, 44,836 (38.9%) were warned, and 32,289 (28%) of them were given a serious warning. This means that two-thirds of those CCP members who were disciplined “got away with only a mild to serious warning that appeared to have no real punitive consequences” (Pei, 2008, pp. 230–232). Singapore and Hong Kong have reduced the incentives and opportunities for corruption by paying their civil servants competitive salaries, reducing red tape by streamlining administrative procedures and relying on e-governance, and enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially by punishing anyone found guilty of corruption, regardless of his or her position, status, or political affiliation. Policymakers in those countries concerned with minimizing corruption should follow their examples by addressing the problems of low salaries of their civil servants, red tape, and the low probability of detecting and punishing corruption offenders.

Best Practices for Combating Corruption

19

Don’t Rely on the Police to Curb Corruption to Avoid Conflict of Interest As explained above, the British colonial governments in Singapore and Hong Kong violated Professor Maurice Punch’s “golden rule” of not making the police responsible for investigating their own deviance and crimes when they relied on the corrupt police forces to curb corruption in both colonies. In Singapore, the ACB was the Type B ACA responsible for corruption control from 1937 until it was replaced by the CPIB, a Type A ACA, in September 1952. Similarly, in Hong Kong, the ACB (which was upgraded into the ACO in 1971) was established in 1948 to curb corruption until its replacement by the ICAC in February 1974. It has taken Singapore 15 years (1937–1952) and Hong Kong 26 years (1948–1974) to learn the important lesson of not relying on the police to curb corruption especially when police corruption was widespread in both territories during the colonial period. The Opium Hijacking scandal of October 1951 in Singapore and Peter Godber’s escape from Hong Kong to Britain in June 1973 were the triggering events that exposed the folly of using the corrupt police to control corruption and culminated in the establishment of the independent CPIB and ICAC, respectively. In short, Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s breakthrough in combating corruption is the result of their rejection of the British colonial government’s ineffective method of corruption control and their reliance instead on Type A ACAs like the CPIB and ICAC, respectively, which are outside the jurisdiction of the police. Apart from the inherent conflict of interest and violation of the “golden rule” mentioned earlier, the police should not investigate corruption cases when police corruption is rampant because this would be like giving candy to a child and expecting that he or she would not eat it. However, India, which is also a former British colony, has not learnt this important lesson yet because it continues to rely on the CBI, which was established in April 1963 as a Type B ACA. The CBI’s Achilles’ heel is that it is a police agency that derives its investigating powers from the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 (Quah, 2017, p. 51). This means that unlike the Governments of Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, the Government of India continues to rely on the CBI to curb corruption in India since 1963 even though this method is ineffective and the police are the second most corrupt institution in India after political parties in 2013 (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013, p. 36). India cannot improve its CPI score unless it replaces the CBI with a new Type A ACA that would be independent of the police (Quah, 2016, pp. 25–26). Rely on an Independent and Well-resourced Type A ACA Policy-makers and governments have three options to minimize corruption in their countries. The first option, which should be avoided, is the ineffective strategy adopted by Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam of relying on multiple ACAs. The experience of the Philippines is instructive as the proliferation of ACAs has resulted in “duplication, layering and turf wars” because these under-staffed and poorly funded ACAs compete for recognition, personnel, and resources (Quimson, 2006, p. 30).

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The second option relies on strengthening existing institutions like the Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the Auditor General’s Office, and the Serious Fraud Office to combat corruption without establishing an ACA. This option has worked for Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland, which are the top three countries on the CPI in 2018 with their high CPI scores of 88, 87, and 85, respectively. However, this option of combating corruption without relying on an ACA might not be suitable for those countries which lack other strong institutions to address their widespread corruption (Quah, 2017, p. 72). The third option of establishing an independent Type A ACA to curb corruption was initiated by the CPIB’s establishment in Singapore in September 1952 and emulated by the ICAC’s creation in Hong Kong in February 1974. The effectiveness of the CPIB and ICAC in combating corruption has led to the proliferation of many ACAs around the world (UNDP, 2011, p. 8). However, the disappointing performance of many ACAs in Asian countries is reflected in their low CPI scores in 2018, as only seven countries (25.9%) have scores between 57 and 85, with the other 20 countries having scores below 50 (see Table 1). As mentioned above, the major reason for these ineffective ACAs is their governments’ weak political will as manifested in their inadequate legal powers, limited budgets, lack of trained personnel, and political interference. Extrapolating from the CPIB’s and ICAC’s effectiveness, the fourth best practice for policy-makers concerned with minimizing corruption in their countries is to establish a Type A ACA and provide it with the necessary legal powers, budget, personnel, and operational autonomy to enable it to function effectively as an independent watchdog that investigates all corruption complaints impartially, regardless of the position, status, or political affiliation of those persons being investigated. The adoption of a Type A ACA by a government implies not only the rejection of a Type B ACA or multiple ACAs but also its avoidance of making the two common mistakes of using the ACA as an “attack dog” against its political opponents or creating the ACA as a “paper tiger” as a weak response to combating corruption.

CONCLUSION In the final analysis, the creation of a Type A ACA is not a panacea or magic bullet for curbing corruption in a country if the government lacks the strong political will to provide it with the required legal powers, human and financial resources, and operational autonomy to investigate all corruption cases impartially without political interference. Corruption is a serious problem in many countries around the world with adverse consequences, especially for the poor and marginalized in society. The two success stories of Singapore and Hong Kong give hope to policy-makers elsewhere that rampant corruption can be defeated if there is strong political will to ensure that well-resourced Type A ACAs like the CPIB and ICAC can perform as effective independent watchdogs against corruption in their countries. However, policy-makers in countries with less favorable policy contexts

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and circumstances than Singapore and Hong Kong would find it challenging to ­replicate their effective anti-corruption strategies.

REFERENCES Asian Intelligence. (2018). Regional overview. No. 992, Wednesday, 28 March, pp. 1–5. Burns, J. (2019). Hong Kong police breed mistrust and uncertainty with selective law enforcement. Hong Kong Free Press, July 26. Cheung, A. B. L. (2008). Evaluation of the Hong Kong integrity system. In L. Huberts, F. Anechiarico & F. Six (Eds.), Local integrity systems: World cities fighting corruption and safeguarding integrity (pp. 105–115). The Hague: Blu Legal Publishers. Chua, Y. T., & Rimban, L. (1998). Gatekeeper. In S. S. Coronel (Ed.), Pork and other perks: Corruption and governance in the Philippines (pp. 150–185). Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Colony of Singapore. (1952). Distribution of work 1st May, 1952. Singapore: Government Printing Office. Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). (2012). The journey: 60 Years of fighting corruption in Singapore. Singapore: CPIB. CPIB. (2017). Annual report 2016. Singapore: CPIB. CPIB. (2018). Annual report 2017. Singapore: CPIB. CPIB. (2019). Corruption statistics 2018. Singapore: CPIB Press Release, 25 April. de Speville, B. (1997). Hong Kong: Policy initiatives against corruption. Paris: Development Center of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Gregory, R. (2015). Political independence, operational impartiality, and the effectiveness of anti-­ corruption agencies. Asian Education & Development Studies, 4(1), 125–142. Hardoon, D., & Heinrich, F. (2013). Global corruption barometer 2013. Berlin: Transparency International. Jiao, A. Y. (2007). The police in Hong Kong: A contemporary view. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Ko, K., & Samajdar, A. (2010). Evaluation of international corruption indexes: Should we believe them or not? The Social Science Journal, 47(3), 508–540. Krishna, K. B. (1939). The problem of minorities or communal representation in India. London: George Allen & Unwin. Kuan, H. C. (1981). Anti-corruption legislation in Hong Kong: A history. In R. P. L. Lee (Ed.), Corruption and its control in Hong Kong: Situations up to the late seventies (pp. 15–43). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Law, F. (2008). The Hong Kong integrity system. In L. Huberts, F. Anechiarico, & F. Six (Eds.), Local integrity systems: World cities fighting corruption and safeguarding integrity (pp. 79–101). The Hague: Blu Legal Publishers. Lethbridge, H. J. (1974). The emergence of bureaucratic corruption as a social problem in Hong Kong. Journal of Oriental Studies, 12(1–2), 17–29. Lethbridge, H. J. (1985). Hard graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, corruption, the ICAC. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Lindner, S. (2013). Salary top-ups and their impact on corruption. U4 Expert Answer, No. 398, December 17, pp. 1–9. Mauro, P. (1997). Why worry about corruption? Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Palmier, L. (1985). The control of corruption: Case studies in Asia. New Delhi: Allied Publishers. Pei, M. (2008). Fighting corruption: A difficult challenge for Chinese leaders. In C. Li (Ed.), China’s changing political landscape: Prospects for democracy (pp. 229–250). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Punch, M. (2009). Police corruption: Deviance, accountability and reform in policing. London: Routledge. Quah, J. S. T. (1979). Police corruption in Singapore: An analysis of its forms, extent and causes. Singapore Police Journal 10(1), 7–43. Quah, J. S. T. (2011). Curbing corruption in Asian countries: An impossible dream? Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Quah, J. S. T. (2015). Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau: Four suggestions for enhancing its effectiveness. Asian Education & Development Studies, 4(1), 76–100.

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Quah, J. S. T. (2016). India’s anti-corruption agencies: Policy reforms for improving their effectiveness. Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal, 19(2), 10–30. Quah, J. S. T. (2017). Combating Asian corruption: Enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies. Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Maryland. Quimson, G. (2006). National integrity systems Transparency International country study report Philippines 2006. Berlin: Transparency International. Recanantini, F. (2011). Anti-corruption authorities: An effective tool to curb corruption? In S. RoseAckerman & T. Soreide (Eds.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (Vol. 2, pp. 528–569). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Republic of Singapore. (2008–2016). Singapore budget 2008–2016: Annex to the expenditure estimates. Singapore: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance. Rose-Ackerman, S., & Palifka, B. J. (2016). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Schwab, K. (2017). (Ed.). The global competitiveness report 2017–2018. Geneva: World Economic Forum. Scott, I., & Gong, T. (2019). Corruption prevention and governance in Hong Kong. London: Routledge. Soh, K. H. (2008). Corruption enforcement. Paper presented at the Second Seminar of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Associations, in Chongqing, China, May 17–18. Straits Settlements. (1887). Report of Commission appointed to enquire into the question of Public Gambling in the Straits Settlements. Singapore: Colonial Secretary’s Office. Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Berlin: Transparency International. Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of crossnational empirical research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211–244. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2011). Practitioners’ guide: Capacity assessment of anti-corruption agencies. New York, NY: UNDP. Wong, J. K. H. (1981). The ICAC and its anti-corruption measures. In R. P. L. Lee (Ed.), Corruption and its control in Hong Kong: Situations up to the late seventies (pp. 45–72). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. World Bank. (2018a). Worldwide governance indicators, 1996–2017. Retrieved from www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports World Bank. (2018b). Doing business 2018: Reforming to create jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yep, R. (2013). The crusade against corruption in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a zealous reformer or reluctant hero? China Information, 27(2), 197–221.

CHAPTER 3 INDIA’S CONTINUING FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION: THE MODI REGIME’S FIRST FIVE-YEAR SAGA Krishna K. Tummala

ABSTRACT Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party made fighting corruption as a major election plank, and won the 2014 elections, and formed the National Democratic Alliance government – a majority party government in India in nearly 30 years. Modi was re-elected in May 2019 with a bigger majority. As his government celebrates the second term, it is time to assess the last five years’ accomplishments in fighting corruption. This chapter deals with the subject under four major headings. The first examines the efficacy of existing anticorruption agencies. The second explains the office of Lokpal (Ombudsman). The third analyses the initial challenges and efforts of the Modi government. The fourth draws some conclusions. Keywords: CVC; CBI; ED; Ranjit Sinha; Hazare; Lokpal; Amartya Sen; Narendra Modi; “Black Money”; demonetizatoin; Sushma Swaraj; Vasundhara Raje; vyapam

INTRODUCTION India’s preoccupation with curbing corruption can be traced back to the fourth and the third centuries bce in Kautilya’s writings where he classified corruption and suggested ways to deal with it (Shama Sastry, 1967). Yet, corruption abounds even Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 23–42 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034004

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Table 1.  India’s Ranking on CPI by TI. Year

Number of Countries Surveyed

CPI Rank

1995a 2000 a 2010 a 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

 41  90 178 174 167 176 180 180

– 69 87 85 76 79 81 78

CPI Score 2.8 2.8 3.3 38 38 40 40 41

The score was on a 1–10 point scale (1 least corrupt). For 1995, the very first survey since TI was created in 1993, no ranking was computed. Since 2012, the score has been on 1–100 point scale (100 being the most corrupt). Compiled by this author from TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI) annual reports (www.transparency.org). a

today despite several reports, laws, and efforts to curb it, starting with Section 101, Indian Penal Code (1860) and the 1964 Santhanam Committee’s seminal report. In its Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Transparency International (2017), ranked India at 78 among the 180 countries it surveyed. Although that was an improvement by three levels from the previous year, the trend remains more or less consistent as shown in Table 1. The national conscience was aroused in 2010–2011 with the agitation for the creation of a new office of Lokpal (Ombudsman in vernacular) by social activist Anna Hazare consequent to a plethora of corruption cases involving several millions of dollars (Tummala, 2013, pp. 170–172). The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went to national polls in 2014 under the leadership of Narendra Modi who became the Prime Minister commanding an absolute majority (of 339 out of total strength of 541 in Lok Sabha – the lower House of Parliament) in over 30 years. The BJP alone garnered 282 seats. True to his campaign promise, Modi declared succinctly in Hindi: na khaaoonga, na khaanedoonga, literally translated as: “I will not eat; I will not let them eat” (Sharma, 2014). A caveat: This paper does not dwell on political corruption where the corporate sector and major industrial houses extend financial support to the party (parties) in power, intent on influencing public policies to their advantage. Vast and complex as this phenomenon is, it deserves a separate and serious study. Some other issues of the Modi second term since 2019 are studied elsewhere (2020).

EFFICACY OF EXTANT INSTITUTIONS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION The fight against corruption has two principal aspects: Investigation followed by prosecution, and punishment. At the Center (as is the federal government in India known), the primary responsibility to investigate cases of corruption rests with two commonly known institutions1 – the Central Vigilance Commission and

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the Central Bureau of Investigation. There is a third institution which is not wellknown, but with greater powers – the Enforcement Directorate (ED). According punishment is the domain of the courts. (Given the federal form of government, the State governments go their own separate ways, and are not included in this short chapter.) (i) Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Established in 1964, the CVC was strengthened in 2003 by an Act of Parliament subsequent to the Supreme Court judgment in the 1998 Vineet Narain case (Tummala, 2002, pp. 43–69). Under this Act, the CVC supervises the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE, which in fact is the Central Bureau of Investigation), and inquires into cases that fall under the ambit of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is deemed to be a civil court, and all matters before it are considered as judicial proceedings. Its ambit, however, is constrained in four ways. First, the very process of appointment of its head, the Commissioner, is opaque. The Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India (the country’s top-most civil servant), in consultation with other government Secretaries (also civil servants), develops a short list of candidates from within the civil service. After further scrutiny, five names out of the larger pool are forwarded to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. To date, all the recommended, and appointed, were former bureaucrats. No public announcement is made about the vacancy, and no outside inputs are sought. This process so annoyed the Supreme Court that it questioned its lack of transparency (The Hindu, 2015). Second, its jurisdiction is confined to the Center. Third, it deals with cases involving only the top civil servants whose number is miniscule (see below), and other public sector undertakings, but does not cover politicians, contractors, or any other lower level bureaucrats. Fourth, and more importantly, the CVC has no enforcement authority; it only advises the Government of India. Of late, it even indulged in symbolism when it urged both individuals and various companies to take a “pledge” that they would not be corrupt (see Appendix). (ii) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) As the primary investigative agency, the CBI demands an in-depth exploration into its organization and working, and the controversies regarding the appointment of its Directors. Created in 1941 (as DSPE), it was invested with expanded powers by a 1963 Act, dealing with cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Center. It cannot pursue any case out of a State unless it is requested, or permitted, by the concerned State. In November 2018, the government of Andhra Pradesh, later joined by West Bengal and other States, further restrained the CBI by refusing their “general consent” order, which meant the CBI cannot entertain any raid or investigation in these States, unless it is court-ordered or pertain to central government officials. The very organization of the CBI is an anathema as it is expected to serve multiple masters. The Ministry of Home Affairs has to clear the cadre of the Director. The Ministry of Personnel, Training and Public Grievances, to

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which it reports on its day-to-day working, funds it. The Union Public Service Commission’s approval is required when hiring all of its officers above the rank of Superintendent of Police. All corruption cases it pursues are under the supervision of the CVC. The Ministry of Law and Justice pays the salaries of prosecutors who argue cases of corruption for the CBI. The CBI is a police force whose investigative functions are not confined only to corruption cases; it investigates other serious crimes as well. Its working, however, has left much to be desired. In its Vineet Narain decision (1998), the Supreme Court observed: The Constitution and the working of the investigating agencies revealed the lacuna of its [sic.] inability to perform whenever powerful persons were involved. For this reason, a close examination of the constitution of these agencies and their control assumes significance. No doubt, the overall control of the agencies and responsibility for their functioning has to be in the executive, but then a scheme giving the needed insulation from extraneous influences even if the controlling executive is imperative. (Emphasis added.)

The Court further observed that “[i]nertia was the common rule whenever the alleged offender was a powerful person.” Consequently, it admonished that “none stands above the law so that an alleged offence by him is not required to be investigated.” The CBI has been criticized for being a political pawn serving the interests of the government of the day. No less a person than a former Director General of Police of Haryana, who served with the CBI, raised the not so a rhetorical question: “Who Owns the CBI?” (Lall, 2007). Subramanian (2014), a former Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India, had this to say about the relationship between CBI and the government of the day, worth quoting in extenso: The senior echelons of the Central government, in particular the Prime Minister and his office, and the party in power treat the CBI as (an) instrument of governance – to suspend a “Damocles sword” over persons who could be potential allies or enemies, and dangle it with appropriate finesse at the right time to meet short term and long-term needs; as also critically alter the pace, substance and direction of investigation into alleged wrong-doings by those in authority or opposed to it. If in the early stages of investigation critical documents are allowed to be destroyed, “disappeared” or handled strategically – these can impact the progress of the investigation in a definitive way. This can be used to “kill” a case or create suspicion where none is possible or open a case and keep it hanging to ensure continuing support. All these with finite variations are deadly games that are played all the time.

The Supreme Court itself called the CBI a “caged parrot” (Nayyar & Sriram, 2013, pp. 32–34; Tummala, 2013, p. 178), and demanded that it be insulated from political pressures. Further evidence to this effect came when Special Judge O. P. Saini, who on October 15, 2015 threw out charges against the former Telecom Secretary, Shyamal Ghosh, and three telecom companies in the 2G scam, as mala fide. The Judge used rather very harsh language accusing the CBI of malfeasance, and suggested that it behaved dishonestly and with malice (Shakil, 2015). A former Director of the CBI thought that “whether it was an action that reeked in mala fide or it was simply a gross mistake without any motive” is something that needs to be investigated (Raghavan, 2015).

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Trust in the CBI was further eroded of late. Its Director, Ranjit Sinha, was not only divested of responsibility of a major case (“coalgate”) that he was investigating, but was also removed from the office itself as he was alleged to have met at his home, in private, with the same persons he was investigating. On January 23, 2017, the Supreme Court, observing that they found a prima facie case of abuse of authority by Sinha, ordered that a Special Investigation Team (SIT) be appointed to investigate the case. (This was the first time a former CBI Director came to be investigated.) Ironically, the responsibility is given to the CBI itself, whose chief he was not too long ago. Another former Director, A. P. Singh, was booked by the CBI on February 20, 2017 for tax evasion, money laundering and on other corruption charges stemming out of his association with a Moin Qureshi, a meat exporter, and a Pradeep Koneru (The Times of India, 2017, pp. 1 and 10). Former ED Joint Director, J. P. Singh was arrested along with two of his former subordinates on charges of “extortion,” in regard to IPL cricket betting cases (The Hindu, 2017, p. 1). The CBI was also criticized for using the same witness over and over in many cases, who sometimes indulged in perjury. The Court emphasized as far back as in 1985 the need for the State to issue clear orders to the police department to “free the processes of investigation and prosecution from the contamination of concoction through the expediency of stockpiling of ‘stockwitnesses’” (The Daily Mail, 2017). Apart from its working and the government control over it, the CBI finds itself shortchanged both financially and personnel-wise as can be seen for FY 2015–2016. Its original estimated expenditure of J750 million was pared down to J667 million – a meager J0.66 per Indian that year. Yet, it was also noted that of the total amount allotted, nearly 30% (i.e. J200 million) was spent during the last six weeks of that fiscal year (Economic Times, 2017). That does not speak much in praise of the government’s support or for the management skills of CBI. Personnel-wise, in its annual report, the CBI (2014) reported that with an authorized total strength of 6,676 it had 1,000 vacant positions. The Directorate of Prosecution itself had 261 officers against an authorized strength of 314. Lack of resources leading to delayed prosecutions is reflected in as many as 9,243 pending trials CBI (2014). The very appointment of the CBI Director at times became a controversy. For example, Director Anil Sinha retired in December 2016. The senior most official, R.K. Dutta, who was in line to succeed, was moved out of CBI, and an Assistant, Rakesh Asthana, was placed in-charge. This led to two serious criticisms. First, it was a spoils appointment as Asthana belonged to Gujarat Cadre (Modi was the Chief Minister of that State before becoming the Prime Minister). Second, no new appointment would probably be made while Chief Justice T.S. Thakur (who was highly critical of Prime Minister Modi) was in office. (Note that the Chief Justice is a member of the Committee which appoints the Director.) Indeed, Justice Thakur retired in December, and with a new Chief Justice, the Selection Committee met and appointed on January 20, 2017 the Delhi Police Chief, Alok Verma, as Director for a two-year term (which is the tenure of that office under law).

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The Director’s position, however, became more complicated with the eventual loss of any veneer of respect for the CBI. Asthana and Verma accused each other of corruption. Just as Verma was about to arrest Asthana (whose appointment was opposed by Verma in the first place, but was overridden by the CVC) for allegedly taking a large bribe from the above-mentioned meat exporter, both were sent on leave in early October 2018 by the Modi government. Thirteen other senior officials of the CBI were also transferred. No reason was given justifying these transfers. Consequently, the government was roundly criticized as it is not empowered to do so. (Only the appointing Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition Party – LoP, has the power to remove him.) The Modi government, however, took umbrage under the argument that the CVC after all recommended such an action. Verma went to court claiming that the Director holds a two-year term appointment, and his own tenure was to end on January 31, 2019. The CVC recommendation itself was challenged as mala fide as it was based on a complaint against Verma made by someone who himself was being investigated by the CBI, and Verma was given no opportunity to defend himself. The CVC did not even copy the complaint to retired Justice A.K. Patnaik who was overseeing the inquiry into the conduct of Verma, prompting the Justice to observe that he was not a party to the CVC’s decision (Hindustan Times, 2018; Lawsisto, 2019). The Court in turn re-instated Verma on January 8. The very following day, the appointing committee met, and on a 2–1 decision reassigned him as Director General, Fire Services. Verma refused to take up the new position, again stating that his tenure as CBI Director is fixed; moreover, his own retirement from the police service in fact took place in 2017 itself, and so he was not going to take any other appointment (till his tenure as Director was complete). The government advised that disciplinary action would be taken against him. (No such thing happened to date.) In the meantime, the committee met, and appointed a Rishi Kumar Shukla as the new CBI Director on a 2–1 majority vote. Mallikarjuna Kharge, the LoP, dissented, suggesting that Kharge had no experience in dealing with corruption investigations of 100 months or more as required under DSPE rules (Langa, 2019). The cardinal question that arises is why the hurry to pack Verma out of the CBI when in fact he was to retire in three weeks anyway? It was speculated that Verma was thought to be a trouble-maker starting with the investigation of Asthana. Thus, the probity of the CVC, the government and the CBI is challenged. (The resulting several challenges and cases are moving through the courts.) (iii) Enforcement Directorate (ED) The less known, but of late more visible, agency is the one fighting economic offenses – the ED. Set up in 1957 within the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, it has three distinguishing features in contrast with the CBI. One, its jurisdiction covers all of India. Two, as it is within the Ministry of Finance, it is part of the executive branch. Three, stemming out of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999; Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002; and Fugitive Economic Offenders Act (FEOA), 2018, the ED has extensive powers such as starting criminal prosecution and attaching assets of the accused.

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What with the amendments added to PMLA in 2019, the ED can arrest without a First Information Report (FIR). All offenses are cognizable and non-bailable. FEOA allows it to irrevocably confiscate the properties of an offender. (Those proved innocent can recover their assets, but so far it had proved be a herculean task.) Of the 164 arrested during 2005–2019, only three got bail in less than 2 months. It can attach property of equivalent value in India if the accused shifted ill-gotten wealth out of the country. Unlike the CBI, the ED cannot lock up the accused within its own facilities, which it does not have; they are placed in the nearest police station. Deka (2019) showed that under the Modi regime so far 26 high-profile persons were charged – all from the opposition (none from BJP). During the Congress regime 9 were charged. Since 2005 over 2,500 cases were registered under PMLA, resulting in 164 arrests. Under FEMA over 16,000 cases were registered with 18 convictions. During the last five years (2014–2019), a total of J55 billion worth assets were attached. Given its reach and extensive powers, the ED might as well be surpassing the CBI as a “Weapon of Choice” (for the government), as India Today (2019) titled its cover story. (IV) The judiciary Punishment following an investigation and trial, is accorded by the courts who find themselves with two important limitations. The first is that the Indian courts in general operate notoriously slowly. It is estimated by no less a person than the past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, T.S. Thakur, that there are about 30 million pending cases, and at the present rate of disposal it would take about 300 years to clear such a backlog, assuming that no new cases are admitted (Sinha, 2016). On an average, a case takes about 15 years to be cleared by a court. Also, as T.S. Tulsi, a Supreme Court lawyer, showed that hardly 6% of cases result in conviction in the Indian courts (Vittal, 2012, pp. 52, 148, and 154). The second limitation is under-staffing with the result both the courts and the judges are overworked. As far back as in 1987, the Law Commission recommended the appointment of more judges so that there would be 50 judges per one million population (instead of the prevailing 10 judges). Commenting tearfully (literally) that nothing was done to alleviate the shortage, former Chief Justice Thakur, entreated Prime Minister Modi on April 25, 2016 to increase the number of judges from 21,000 to 40,000. Instead, Modi indulged in ridicule observing that judges take long summer vacations (Sinha, 2016). The following day, the Chief Justice paid back in kind stating that judges do not go to hill stations on vacation, but they do work there, and beseeched the Prime Minister “to rise to the occasion,” and appoint more judges (Sinha, 2016). There were only 23 Supreme Court Justices in 2015 out of the authorized strength of 31 (raised to 33 in July 2019). The Court takes up as many as 60,000 new cases each year, whereas the Supreme Court in the United States takes no more than 55–80 cases annually, and, in the United Kingdom, the number is about 110. The strength of High Court judges at States level and the lower courts is equally short in that of the authorized strength only 44% of judges at the former and 25% at the latter, are sitting (Datta, 2017, p. 41). Despite some important cases which contributed in pursuit of Rule of Law, the proliferation of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases using which anyone could drag anybody to the

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court on the flimsiest cause, or no cause at all – just being vindictive, or to settle past scores, or simply to cause nuisance, have been clogging the courts, thus, slowing down the already slow judicial process which led even the Supreme Court to asking for a re-think the utility of PIL (Choudary, 2017).

LOKPAL, 1968–2019 Given the troubling picture of corruption and the inept working of both CVC and CBI, as was seen above, it was felt that a new and more effective institution to curb corruption should be created – the Lokpal (Ombudsman in vernacular). The idea itself is not new. As far back as in 1968, the Lok Sabha passed a Bill to create such an office. But the Rajya Sabha adjourned before the Bill was taken up leading to its demise. The debate, however, never stopped and by 2010 it took centerstage. A humble former army bus driver, and a Gandhian – Anna Hazare, went on a fast-unto-death demanding the creation of a Lokpal. The entire nation seemed to have been transfixed with the Hazare movement (Denyer, 2011). The government did not fail to gauge the mood of the society, and a Bill was introduced by the UPA II government, which was passed by the Lok Sabha in December 2011. As it moved through the Rajya Sabha, the passage of the Bill looked uncertain what with as many as 200 amendments moved in that House. However, as general elections were looming on the horizon in 2104, the government managed to take it through Parliament. Thus, came finally the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Bill No. 134-C of 2011). The provisions of the Act briefly are, thus (Deepalakshmi, 2017; Annotation by Tummala): Incumbent Prime Minister was excluded from Lokpal jurisdiction as (s)he is responsible only to Parliament. (The final version did include the Prime Minister despite some resistance.) But all other Ministers are included despite the principle of “collective responsibility” (which implies that as the Prime Minister goes so does the rest of the Cabinet). Similarly, all former Prime Ministers are subjected to Lokpal jurisdiction. Members of Parliament would not come under the purview of Lokpal (as only the Speaker can control them.) Higher Judiciary is excluded (as they have the power of “judicial review,” which might include Lokpal’s activities; moreover, judges can only be impeached). Both the CBI and the CVC were left as they had been, and neither merged with, nor brought under control of, Lokpal. Only higher civil servants at Joint Secretary and above levels would come under the orbit which is only a miniscule of civil servants totaling just 589 – Joint Secretaries 391; Additional Secretaries 107; and Secretaries 91 – out of a total 3.3 million civil servants at all levels (Seventh Central Pay Commission (2015, pp. 23 and 183).2 The rationale argued was that the inclusion of all civil servants would only clog the work of Lokpal, and each Ministry and Department has its own mechanisms to deal with the lower rung, anyway. All non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are included under Lokpal’s orbit. Only the government can approach the Supreme Court against the Lokpal. The final Act, thus, came out rather tepid, and in variance with the demands of Hazare. Nonetheless, there was no Lokpal till 2019.

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To give Modi the benefit of the doubt, a procedural hurdle stood in his way of an earlier appointment. His unusual 2014 electoral success with 282 members of his party elected out of a total of 543, led to an unanticipated consequence. The Congress party with only 44 seats was the largest opposition party (oneindia.com, 2014), as a party to be recognized as the “Opposition Party” in the Lok Sabha needs 10% of the total members elected. But the Lokpal Act prescribed that the appointment of Lokpal must be made by a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Speaker of Lok Sabha, LoP, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (or his/her nominee), and an “eminent” jurist. In the absence of a recognized Opposition Party, as shown above, the Selection Committee, thus, fell short of one member, and could not function. By November 2016, the Supreme Court did not hide its annoyance noting that there has been no LoP for two-and-a-half years, and it is unlikely there would be one for the next two-and-a-half years (till the end of the then Lok Sabha term). It cautioned that the government should not allow the Lokpal Act “a dead letter.” In response, the then Attorney General, Mukul Rohatgi, submitted to the Court that an amendment to change the requirement of the LoP is pending before Parliament (First Post, 2016).

INITIAL CHALLENGES AND EFFORTS OF MODI GOVERNMENT Prime Minister Modi and the BJP always took the high road when it came to corruption. The BJP 2014 election manifesto read, thus: Corruption is a manifestation of poor Governance. Moreover, it reflects the bad intentions of those sitting in power. All pervasive corruption under the Congress-led UPA has become a “National Crisis.” We will establish a system, which eliminates the scope for corruption. We will do this through: Public awareness; Technology enabled e-Governance; Minimizing the discretion in the citizen-government interface; System based, policy-driven governance making it transparent; Rationalization and simplification of the tax regime which is currently repulsive for honest tax payers; Simplification of the processes and procedures at all levels; Bestowing faith in the citizens, institutions and establishments…. By minimizing the scope for corruption, we will ensure minimization of the generation of black money.

Modi himself, as stated above, declared his commitment to eradicate corruption. It should, however, be noted that his young government faced two major tests during the 2015 monsoon session of Parliament. The opposition parties raised two serious corruption issues, discussed below in detail. The first issue involved the External Affairs Minister in Modi’s Cabinet, Sushma Swaraj, and the BJP Chief Minister in the State of Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje. The second issue concerned Shivrajsingh Chouhan, the BJP Chief Minister of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The first issue pertained to a Lalit Modi (not related to the Prime Minister) who started the Indian Premier League (IPL) – a cricket outfit. But the way it

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was operated turned out to be far from “playing cricket” (commonly known as a gentlemen’s game). While he was being investigated on charges of violating Foreign Exchange Regulations, Lalit escaped to England. Swaraj sought the help of a Labor Party Member of the British Parliament to obtain British travel documents to Lalit to go abroad where his wife was being treated for cancer (indiatoday.in, 2015).3 Raje herself wrote on his behalf with a stipulation that her correspondence be kept secret, but was, however, leaked to the public. Also, her son, Dushyant Singh, a law-maker himself, was involved in financial deals with Lalit, and an investigation into the nature of these deals is on-going (Deshmane, 2015; Sharan, 2015). Seizing these two cases, the opposition parties shouted corruption at the highest levels, and demanded the resignation of both Swaraj and Raje. But the government simply brushed aside the criticism saying that help to Lalit was a “humanitarian” gesture, and declared that no one would resign! (First Post, 2015). Neither resigned. Yet another major scandal erupted in February 2018, involving another Modi – a Nirav Modi (again not related to the Prime Minister). He was accused of diverting funds from the Punjab National Bank totaling about $1.8 billion, and has been missing. How he succeeded in this large swindle in the first place despite early warnings as far back as on July 26, 2016, by a Hari Prasad S.V. from Benguluru is inexplicable. That it took the bank seven years to figure this one out in itself is a mystery. Nirav ran away taking a loan of about $20 million (Agarwal, 2018). If the bank were in the private sector, one need not worry as much. But the government had previously injected over $21 billion of tax payer’s money to keep public sector banks floating. Most of the banks lost a bundle due to bad loans, and non-performing assets. The government of India are negotiating with the British government for the extradition of the accused who are on the run (Press Trust of India – PTI, 2019). The second major case is known as “vyapam” (vyavahayik parikshna mandal), wherein several entrance examinations, alleged to be fraudulent, were conducted for admission into various schools, and for jobs in the State of Madhya Pradesh. (During 2007–2013, as many as 800,000 aspirants took these examinations.) But in 2009, one hundred medical students were dismissed for having taken these admission tests (Mahurkar, 2015, pp. 20–23). The Supreme Court canceled the admission of 634 other candidates, and ordered an inquiry (The Times of India, 2017, p. 1). But a SIT of the State cleared the State government of any wrong doing. Worse, the SIT declared that the suicide (out of shame or the fear she could be exposed) of one of the dismissed medical students was not a suicide at all. The opposition parties, both in Parliament and in the State, demanded an inquiry by the CBI. Chief Minister Chouhan first refused, but later relented in the face of mounting criticism. (The report of the inquiry is yet to come out.) The more critical part is as many as 42 persons connected with this scam, considered to be potential witnesses, died mysteriously. The State Governor’s own son, who was accused of extortion from prospective students and employees, committed suicide right in the government house. The demands for the dismissal of both the Governor (in India the Governor of a State is appointed by the Centre) and Chief Minister fell on deaf years. Both continued in office. It was only in late 2019 that 31

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involved in this case were convicted. Thirty of them are jailed for seven years, one for 10 years (All India Radio, 2019; The Hindu, 2019). Sadly, Modi had nothing to offer on either of these cases; he did not even appear on the floor of Parliament when the issues were raised. Neither had he made any mention of the above in his August 15, 2015 Independence Day address (which is generally read as the government’s future plans). Given that, the opposition parties stalled parliamentary proceedings instead of offering constructive opposition. In the process, Parliament basically was turned into what the then President of India called a “combative arena” (Tummala, 2015). However, it must be noted that preventing Parliament from functioning is not something that the current opposition parties invented. The BJP too did that when it was the Opposition during the previous Manmohan Singh’s UPA regime. Basically the shoe now was on the other foot. The Modi government, however, did not flinch from castigating the opposition parties for obstructing parliamentary proceedings. In the absence of any explanation from anyone, one can only speculate why the Prime Minister, himself a man of integrity, who proclaimed the eradication of corruption as one of his priorities, kept silent. It is quite possible that he and his party might have thought that if he were to succumb to the pressures of the opposition parties now, it could only mean that they would be emboldened, and a gridlock would be the order of business for the rest of his term in office. If this were true, Modi had undermined not only the parliamentary form of government but also gave short shrift to his own political scruples. Or, he could perhaps have been thinking that things would blow over, and for the present silence was the best option. In fact, he seems to have developed silence as a modus operandi in general, when bad news occur. In any case, politics triumphed, and his party’s best cultivated image of being totally against corruption, was sullied. On the flip side, the 16th Parliament elected in May 2014 showed that a total of 186 members reporting (as required in their disclosure statements while contesting) with criminal records. They ran across party lines (Alfred, 2014). As the trend is nothing new, it only confirmed the phenomenon of criminalization of politics and politicization of criminals which led the one time Chief Election Commissioner, G.V.G. Kishnamurty observe that “no law-breaker should become a law-maker” (quoting Times of India, 2002). The BJP seems to be no exception despite its protestations. At least 14 Ministers in the Modi Cabinet were said to have criminal cases against them. Among the many policies three major initiatives to fight corruption are chosen here, and credited to the Modi government: (a) get the Lokpal into operation (already discussed above); (b) unearth and control “black money,” stashed away externally, and hid internally; and (c) enable proper investigation, and accord swift and apt punishment to the corrupt. Demonetization policy: “Black money,” also known as “underground economy,” denotes unaccounted funds stashed away either in cash, or in what is known as benami (spuriously named) transactions, or deposited in foreign banks, or invested in gold and diamonds or real-estate, thus, avoiding paying taxes. The total is estimated to be nearly $640 billion, or about half of the national GDP

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(Tummala, 2013, p. 171). These are only “guestimates.” Arun Jaitley, Finance Minister in Modi Cabinet (now deceased), himself admitted that no official estimates were available (All India Radio, 2017). (The Minister of State for Finance, Anurag Singh Thapar repeated the statement on December 10, 2019 that no official estimate was available, even now.) Arguing that “black money” was contributing to greater corruption, and must be eradicated, Modi, in what the Nobel Economics laureate Amartya Sen (2017) later called the “Napoleon Moment,” announced on November 8, 2016 that all high denomination currency notes of J500 and J1,000, (roughly equivalent to $7.5 and $15, respectively) were demonetized forthwith with the promise new notes were coming. The assumption was that high denomination currency is a major method of stashing away “black money.” With that single stroke of pen 86% of all money in circulation in India was taken out (Tummala, 2013, p. 171). It immediately affected over 82% of daily or contract laborers toiling in the unorganized informal sector leading to their immense misery as they are normally paid in cash of J500 notes at the end of a working day. Most independent economists agreed that this decision led to a drop of one percent in GDP growth, resulting in a loss of 6 million jobs. The International Monetary Fund agreed, but added an afterthought that in the long run it should be alright. Moreover, there was nothing said as to how to prevent moving the high denomination J2,000 notes into black money. For that matter, it is not clearly explained why such high denomination notes are newly introduced while the other two higher denomination notes smaller in value than the new note were taken out of circulation. In the summer of 2017, an announcement was made that new J200 denomination notes would be coming out soon to ease the short supply of currency. It is estimated that the actual printing of the new J500 notes alone cost as much as J50 billion, thus, far (Business Standard, 2017). People in general were given a deadline to exchange old notes to newly introduced J100 and J2,000 notes at banks, and pay income tax (on all amounts exceeding certain ceiling) by explaining the source of those funds. But the sad story was that not enough new notes were printed, and available, to replace the old ones and meet new demands. As criticism of the measure was mounting, the official narrative kept changing from attacking “black money” to curb real-estate transactions (at least partly paid in cash under the table) to a cashless society with total digitization in bank transactions as people are required to open bank accounts in the name of transparency, to fight terrorism by denying them hidden funds, and finally to the closure of as many as 300,000 shell companies. Each one of these objectives was laudable in itself, but collectively, it was a formidable agenda. Yet, it would have been commendable if these objectives were all comprehensively stated as the demonetization policy was announced. It was the linear addition over time that led to the criticism that the goal-posts were being moved. When the common folks kept bitterly complaining, they were advised that pain is part of the patriotic equation! Nearly 80% of those polled showed their displeasure at demonetization (Mathew, 2017). Three years on, a survey showed (indiatoday.in, 2019) 66% of those polled thought demonetization has had a negative impact on the economy and labor employment, and 33% saw it as slowing down the economy with 28% believing it had no impact.

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Enhancement of punishment for corruption offences: The Cabinet, to its credit, approved in April 2015, and the Lok Sabha on July 23, 2018 passed, an amendment to the IPC that corruption cases be defined as “heinous crimes,” and would be brought speedily to trial, to be cleared within two years. Prison terms would cover both the bribe-taker and the bribe-giver. Punishment would be enhanced from a minimum of nine months to three years, and a maximum of five to seven years. Whereas the current law makes only individuals liable, the new law would make commercial entities also liable (The Hindu, 2015). Note that the Rajya Sabha too has to approve this measure before it becomes an Act. As the Modi government proposes an expenditure of $150 billion on weapons during the next 10–15 years, it is also reported that there would be revisions to its procurement policy, including possible blacklisting of foreign defense companies/ contractors involved in corruption (Raghuvanshi, 2016).

CONCLUSION To assess the five-year saga of the Modi government, two templates are used here: one provided by Jeremy Pope, and the other by Chrstine Lagarde. The late Jeremy Pope, a founder of TI and wrote much for it (since 2000), advocated that the fight against corruption should be multifaceted covering political parties, media, civil societies, and so on. He also developed a six point criteria to define a successful anti-corruption agency. (It is too soon to assess the working of the Lokpal, but Pope’s criteria can be applied to the rest.) The criteria he developed as applied here are: committed political backing at the highest levels of government (suspect in the past, but a committed Modi government despite failings in some sense shown above); adequate resources to undertake its mission (less than J0.66 per Indian per year budgeted for the CBI); political and operational independence to investigate even the highest levels of government (Lall, Who Owns CBI?); adequate powers to access documentation and for questioning witnesses (at the mercy of the assent of the agency concerned, per Section 197 Criminal Procedures Code, to prosecute an errant civil servant); user friendly laws, including criminalization of “illicit enrichment,” (uncertain); and leadership to be seen as of highest integrity (barring Prime Minister Modi, and questionable leadership of Ranjit Sinha and the current fiasco between the top two leaders of CBI, and other Cabinet and Parliament members). Lagarde, while serving as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, cautioned at the Anti-Corruption summit in London (2016, pp. 81–87), which is worth heeding. She said: Although active and sustained political leadership is critical to the success of any anticorruption campaign, it is important that reforms in this area are not hijacked to implement a political agenda. One way of assessing whether anti-corruption efforts are credible is to note whether enforcement is limited to the prosecution of political rivals, or instead also extends to the government’s political support.

Two examples can be cited in this regard. One, former Home Minister and Finance Minister in Manmohan Singh’s UPA I and II governments,

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P. Chidambaram, was taken into custody on charges of helping a company violated the foreign exchange regulations. It is noteworthy that Chidambaram, as Home Minister went after the current Home Minister in the Modi government, Amit Shah, who was implicated (later exonerated) in the Sohrabuddin encounter case and slapped with charges of murder, extortion, and kidnapping in Gujarat while he was Home Minister there. The Congress Party lost no time in castigating Chidambaram’s detention as a tit-for-tat affair. He was let out on bail (Ahmad, 2019; The Times of India, 2019). The second was the case of Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra who is the leader of the National Congress Party, too was charged by the ED just before the elections. And he offered that he would walk in directly and surrender. The offer was not taken, and he turned out to be the king-maker in forming a coalition government in Maharashtra headed by the Shiv Sena leader Udhav Thackery. It led to the comment that the ED happens be the new weapon now in the hands of the BJP (India Today, 2019, above cited). In any case, the optics were not good leading to the argument that the current government was on a sort of vendetta, trying to get former government leaders. Thus, at least for appearances sake, it is important to heed Lagarde’s admonition. Beyond the failings of political and administrative realms, there are some important cultural factors to contend with in fighting corruption in India (Tummala, 1994, pp. 13–14). The predominant Hindu tradition lays down four human pursuits (purushartha), as well as four different stages of life. Among the former is artha (acquisition of wealth) which is the duty of a householder (grihastha, the second stage of life). It is not, however, stated what strict norms, if any, must be observed in gaining wealth although piety is an important part of religion. Then there are the all-important traits of gift-giving, and tolerance. One cannot approach a superior (by age, profession, or whatever criterion) without some sort of a gift. And there is no stigma attached to a sinner once forgiveness is sought. Moreover, for a Hindu the current is only midhya or maya – an illusion. The more important goal is moksha – a higher abstraction after death. While indeed a causal relationship is established between deeds in the current and the state after death in that the former control the latter, absolution for bad deeds in current life is easily accorded. Thus, an escape mechanism from owning personal responsibility is easily available by seeking religious vindication. Nirad Chowdhury (1987, p. 787) put it succinctly, thus: “The unlimited capacity to be a villain of the worst kind with an unlimited capacity for self-abasement before virtue and nobility is one of the most disarming traits of the Indian character.” Further, there is the argumentative nature of Indians which is said to promote pluralism as it brings all shades of people into a dialogue – “a veritable feast of divergent viewpoints.” If one should be able to decipher India, one must understand this aspect of Indian culture, as argued by Sen (2005). There is also the Sanskritic tradition of saying “neti, neti, neti” (literally meaning “this is not, this is not, this is not”), thus, facilitating a continuous dialogue – a seemingly endless dialectic. Does all this mean the fight against corruption is a lost cause? Not necessarily. There are some reasons for optimism, albeit with some reservations (as each has

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its own flaws, too many and too complex to deal in detail here): Numerous media outlets indulging in aggressive investigative reportage; the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005; the new instrument called Public Interest Litigation (PIL); numerous NGOs such as the Hazare movement; an active judiciary; the disappearance of the mystique and awe of government, and so on. Perhaps a very noteworthy development is the rise of a new, group of civil servants, though small in number, who apparently tired of burgeoning corruption, are willing to speak out and expose the misdeeds of the higher-ups in their institutions regardless of reprisals and even at grave personal risk, and despite the fact that there has been little protection for “whistleblowers.” Identified as representing the “the singularity of hope in the age of conformity,” some personalities such as Ashok Khemka, Durga Shakti Nagpal, and Sanjiv Chaturvedi, among many others, turned out to be, if not household names, certainly as headline grabbing (Pradhan, 2015, pp. 10–17; Viswanathan, 2015, pp. 18–19).4 Of late, we hear the resignation of some from the coveted Indian Administrative Service, disgusted as they are with the current state of affairs in the country. In the final analysis, the need is to develop sound norms by changing the political and societal culture. It is also imperative to let the CVC and CBI function properly and enable their fight against corruption, and use the ED more judiciously. However, the CVC and CBI find their independence compromised, credibility challenged, and efficiency suspect. Some suggest that the CBI at least be freed from the control of the Ministry of Personnel (Rai, 2014, p. 78). Given that, and leaving the CVC and CBI intact, a new institution such as the Lokpal, with its ties to the government, could not be expected to do any better. If the former two institutions had not been allowed to work as they were intended to, yet another layer of bureaucracy is not going to be of much help as there is no guarantee that it would work any better than the other two. It is to be noted that none of the above mattered. The 2019 elections returned the BJP and Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a greater majority in the Parliament (with 303 members) than was the case in 2014 (282). Why so is a matter for separate discussion. But to set things right in the fight against corruption, a lot of premium is, thus, on the shoulders of Prime Minister Modi who enjoys great support in Parliament and in the nation. Whether, Modi would be magnanimous toward the scattered opposition, inconvenient administrators and none too flattering media, or become vindictive enough to treat all opposition as enemies to be vanquished is the stark choice. Thus, he carries a great burden and a greater responsibility. It is time to watch, and hope. As elections are fought in poetry and governance is in prose, it should not be difficult for Prime Minister Modi to extend some of that poetry into governance as well.

NOTES 1.  There in fact are five institutions of interest: the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the National Technical Research Organization, the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The first three are intelligence gathering institutions, not directly involved in fighting corruption though.

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2.  In 2018, the Modi government announced that they would add 10 lateral entrants at Joint Secretary level, bringing in candidates from the private, business, and academic sectors. It raised an immediate furor that it was an attempt at bringing in BJP sympathizers, while supporters lauded it as bringing in fresh outside outlook. 3. It is to be noted that Swaraj’s husband, Swaraj Kaushal, and daughter, Bansari, served as lawyers for Lalit Modi (Hindustan Times, 2015, June 16). 4.  Chaturvedi was quoted here (p. 13) saying that “Whistleblowers blow the whistle and run away. We’re here, out in the open, on the front lines.” The Whistleblowers Protection Act of 2014 had not been much use for several of these brave hearts. This Act has some interesting riders too such as punishment for frivolous complaints. The CVC may at its discretion disclose the name of the complainant to the head of the Department against which the whistle is being blown! The Act covers only the employees of the Central government, and not those of State governments. Given this inadequacy, a new private outfit, “Citizens Whistleblower Forum,” headed by retired Justice A. P. Shah, was created to provide an additional venue to whistleblowers (LiveLaw.in, February 23, 2017). Incidentally, Ashok Khemka had the dubious distinction of being transferred 53 times so far in his near 28 year career as of November 2019! But the cake belongs to one Pradeep Kasuri, who has been transferred 61 times in his career. Transfers usually are justified as normal, and not seen as punishment for those civil servants who do not bend to the political pressures, willy-nilly.

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India Today. (2019, October 14). Cover story, “Weapon of Choice”. Indian Penal Code (IPC). 1860: Section 161. indiatoday.in (2015, June 17). Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in indiatoday.in. (2019, 7 November). Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in Lagarde, C. (2016, May 12). Addressing corruption – Openly. Anti-Corruption Summit: A collection of essays. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/againstcorruption-acollection-of-essays Lall, B. R. (2007). Who owns the CBI? The naked truth. New Delhi: Manas. Langa, M. (2019, February 20). Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rihsi-kumarshukla-is-the-new-cbi-chief Lawsisto. (2019, January 13). Retrieved from https://lawsisto.com/legalnews.comMTY2Nw==JusticePtanaik-Goes-Against LiveLaw.in. (2017, February 23). https://www.livelaw.in/tags/Supreme-Court-of-India Mahurkar, U. (2015, October 5). A Bimaru State of Admissions. India Today, pp. 20–23. Mathew, A. (2017, November 7). National Herald. Retrieved from www.nationalheraldindia.com Nayyar, D., & Sriram, U. (2011, January 31). The Great Indian robbery. India Today. 11.13. Quoting from Global Financial Integrity. Drivers and dynamics of illicit financial flows from India: 1948–2008. oneindia.com. (2014, May 20). https://www.oneindia.com/topic/twitter Pope, J. (2000). Confronting corruption: The elements of a national integrity system. Berlin: Transparency International. Pradahan, Kunal. (2015, October 5). “New Freedom Fighters,” India Today. pp. 10–17. Press Trust of India (PTI). (2019, July 8). Government infused Rs. 3.15 lakh crore in public sector banks in last 11 years. Retrieved from https://www.bloombergquint.com/economy-finance/psubank-capitalization Raghavan, R. S. (2015, October 17). CBI caught on the wrong foot. The Hindu. Retrieved from www. thehindu.com Raghuvanshi, V. (2016, January 25). India plans procurement policy revisions. Defense News. Retrieved from www.defensenews.com Rai, V. (2014). Not just an accountant: The diary of the nation’s conscience keeper (p. 78). New Delhi: Rupa. Report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission. (2015). Santhanam, K. (1964). Report of the committee on prevention of corruption. New Delhi: Government of India Press. Sen, A. (2005). The argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian history, culture and identity. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Group. Sen, A. (2017, January 10). Retrieved from Indiatoday.indiatoday.in Sinha, Y. (2016, August 1). Chief Justice of India broke down. What’s going wrong. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/opinon Shakil, S. (2015, October 16). Retrieved from timesofindia.indiatimes.com Shama Sastry, R. (1967). Trans. Kautilya’s Arthsastra (8th ed., pp. 67–71). Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House. Sharan, A. (2015, June 23). Transactions between Raje’s son Dushyant and Lalit Modi under scanner. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/transactions-between-raje-s-son-dushyantand-lalit-modi-under-scanner/story-IrFapmIvMbBo1AGRpgmPiK.html Sharma, R. (2014, August 22). From CCTV to sudden calls: Modi keeps MPs on a tight leash. FirstPost. Retrieved from www.smachar.com Subramanian, T. S. R. (2014). India at turning point: The road to good governance. New Delhi: Rupa Publications. (Quoted by Deshmane, Akshay. February 2, 2018. “Probing Questions,” Frontline, p. 105). The Daily Mail. (2017, January 21). Retrieved from www.dailymail.co.uk The Hindu. (2015, April 19). Retrieved from www.thehindu.com. Accessed on September 18, 2015. The Hindu. (2017, February 22). The Hindu (2019, 21 November). The Indian Express. (2016, April 25). CJI takes a dig at PM Modi: We work during break, not just go to Manali.

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The Times of India. Retrieved from www.times_of_india..indiantimes.com The Times of India. (2002, July 13). Lawbreakers shouldn’t be lawmakers. The Times of India. (2017, February 21; 2019, October 17). Transparency International. (2017). Annual report. Retrieved from https://www/transparency. org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 Tummala, K. (1994). Public administration in India. Singapore: Times Academic Press. Tummala, K. (2002, December). Corruption in India: Control measures and consequences. Asian Journal of Political Science, 10(2), 43–69. Tummala, K. (2013). Can India combat corruption? In J. S. T. Quah (Ed.), Different paths to curbing corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore (pp. 167–187). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Tummala, K. (2015, July 9). India, one year after elections: An impasse in parliament. Retrieved from Governancejournal.wordpress.com Tummala, K. (2020, June). Constitutional corruption: Two Bharatiya Janata Party scandals in India. Public Administration and Policy, 23(1), 23–31. Viswanathan, S. (2015, October 5). The power of dissent. India Today. 18–19, and the preceding ‘Cover Story’ by Pradahan, Kunal “New Freedom Fighters,” pp. 10–17. Vineet Narain, et al v. Union of India, et al. (1998). AIR 1998 SC 889. Vittal, N. (2012). Ending corruption: How to clean up India? New Delhi: Penguin Books India.

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APPENDIX: INTEGRITY – A WAY OF LIFE (Vigilance Awareness Week, 2019)

On the occasion of the Vigilance Awareness Week 2019, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has launched the INGTEGRITY PLEDGE under the theme “Integrity – a Way of Life.” The underlying objective of the commission is to create awareness among the citizens and organizations of India to lead a life of integrity and dignity as well as encouraging their voluntary participation to eradicate corruption in their day to day lives. CVC also issues “Certificates of Commitment” to the individuals and organizations which impose a moral obligation on them to follow the rule of law in all walks of life and to never take bribe and report any form of corruption. The pledge can be taken in all the listed official Indian languages. 1. Steps to Take the Pledge

(i) To take the integrity e-pledge, one has to visit the income tax (www. incometaxindia.gov.in.) Or the CVC’s official website (pledge.cvc.nic. in); click on Take Pledge. (ii) Fill up the basic details (name, ID proof, date of birth, gender, city/state, pin code, e-mail, and phone number). (iii) Select the language of the pledge and proceed to read. (iv) After completion, the website shows the certificate of commitment with the name of the oath taker and options to download it. 2. Eligibility for Integrity E-pledge

i.

Individuals: Any citizen of India, Non-Resident Indian, Persons of Indian Origin, or any other individual possessing a valid Id proof like PAN card, voter Id, an Indian driving license, Aadhaar, etc., can take up the pledge.

ii. Organizations: Any organization having a PAN, TIN, etc. can take up the pledge through a representative authorized by the organization to take the pledge on behalf of it. 3. Contents of the E-pledge

i.

Pledge to be vigilant and committed to high standards of honesty and integrity at all times and support the fight against corruption.

ii. Pledge by citizens:

   

To follow probity and rule of law in all walks of life. To neither take nor offer bribe. To perform all tasks in an honest and transparent manner. To be accountable for one’s actions.

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To act in public interest. To lead by example exhibiting integrity in public behavior.  To report any incident of corruption to the appropriate agency.  

iii. Pledge by organizations:

Promote ethical business practices and foster a culture of honesty and integrity.  Commit to good corporate governance based on transparency, accountability, and fairness.   Adhere to all relevant laws, rules and compliance mechanism in conduct of business.  Shall not tolerate bribery of any form or engage in unethical business practices.  Shall adopt a code of ethics to ensure ethical behavior of all the employees and take appropriate action for the transgression of the code.   Shall sensitize all employees of laws, regulations, etc., relevant to their work for effective discharge of their duties.   Shall raise a proper grievance redressal mechanism to raise their grievances and report suspicious activities.  Shall aspire for excellence and protecting the rights and interests of all stakeholders and the society at large. 

4. Advantages of the Certificate of Commitment

 CVC issues “Certificates of Commitment” to the individuals and organizations which impose a moral obligation on them to follow the rule of law in all walks of life and to never take bribe and report any form of corruption.  There is a provision of OTP to the mobile no’s and emails which in the eyes of experts is a soft measure to involve people in tax and corruption related issues.

CHAPTER 4 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT IN INDIA: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COMBAT CORRUPTION K. Jhansi Rani

ABSTRACT Right to Information (RTI) is a formidable tool in the hands of responsible ­citizens to fight corruption and ensure transparency and accountability within a participatory democracy. The RTI Act was promulgated in India in October 2005, and has fundamentally changed the power equation between the government and citizens. T.his chapter examines the contribution of the Act, in particular playing a significant role by providing information necessary to combat corruption in India. It is also noted, however, that RTI is not an unmixed-blessing as it is seen how costly it has been for zealous investigative journalists. Keywords: Official Secrets Act; Freedom of Information Act; RTI; State of Rajasthan v. Raj Narain; Prabhu Dutt v. Union of India; Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan; Central Information Commission

“Fake news” (CBS, 2017), “alternative facts” (Conway, 2017), “truth is not truth” (Giuliani, 2018) – such is the new language stemming out of the White House since Donald Trump was elected President in the United States, and is now common jargon. An informed citizen being the bulwark in a democracy, it goes without saying that to winnow right actions of government from the wrong ones, one needs reliable and trustworthy information. Governments are not always known for dispensing such information. Right to Information (RTI) tries to offset this. Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 43–55 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034005

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In India, the largest working democracy in the world, corruption is deeprooted attracting a great deal of press and public concern. It is “at the cutting edge level of administration,” and indirectly affects the country‘s economy, and all types of developmental activity (Madhavi, 2016, pp. 13–14). In 1986, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reported that out of every Rupee earmarked for the benefit of the citizens, only R0.15 reached the beneficiaries (hinsdustantimes, 2017). A 2005 survey of 14,405 respondents found that citizens had paid bribes to the tune of R210 billion to avail public services (Transparency International India, 2005, p. 3). A later study in 2007–2008, focusing on 22,728 households living below poverty line, found that they paid about R9 billion in bribes to access need-based public services (Transparency International India – Centre for Media Studies India, 2008). The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India reported that out of several billion Rupees allocated to developmental schemes, a sum of R510 billion had not been accounted for (Hagde, 2011). Transparency International (TI) in its 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked India 81 among the 180 nations surveyed. Much has been written on corruption in India (among many, Quah 2017; Tummala, 2002, 2009, 2013), and much more would be written in future. This chapter deals but with one factor – and an important one, the RTI to combat corruption. The basic premise here is that to get to the bottom of this scourge, and make the government transparent and public officials accountable, it is reliable information that matters most. This chapter is organized under six sections.

THE GENESIS The first RTI law was enacted by Sweden in 1766, largely motivated by its Parliament to access information from the King. In 1966, the United States passed such an Act, followed by Norway in 1970. Further to the Watergate scandal which broke open in 1974, the United States passed a stronger Freedom of Information (FOI) Act in 1976. Several other western democracies followed with their own laws (France and Netherlands, 1978; Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 1982; Denmark, 1985; Greece, 1986; Austria, 1987; Italy, 1990). By 1990, the number of countries with FOI laws climbed to 13. A major step forward was the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, which included both freedom of expression and the right to access documents (Laskar, 2016, p. 21). By 2010, more than 85 countries have nationallevel RTI laws or regulations in force, including China and India. Of all these, Mexico has taken the lead with one of the best examples of a well-functioning FOIA in the world. The law passed in 2002 represents a vital element of Mexico’s democratic transition. A competent governmental body (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información) is entrusted with the responsibility of implementing and overseeing the law. Handling over 200,000 requests in its first five years, Mexico set a new international standard for transparency legislation (Briefing Paper, 2010). Article 19(1) (a) of independent India’s Constitution (1949) guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. But this right was overshadowed by the Official Secrets Act, 1923 – a legacy of the British Raj. However, the Supreme

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Court of India came to the rescue. In an effort to strengthen the spirit of democracy, the Court ruled in 1975 in State of Rajasthan v. Raj Narain that the RTI is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression. That decision was affirmed in numerous other cases, and the Court has even linked the RTI with the Right to Life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982) endorsed the view that under a democratic set up, citizens have the right to know about the functioning of their government. Among many other decisions, Prabhu Dutt v. Union of India (1982) held that the right to know information regarding administration of the government is included in the freedom of press (Laskar, 2016, p. 21). It is important to note that RTI is not necessarily a product of the benevolence of the Government of India. Grassroots struggles for transparency were perhaps the most critical component of the Indian journey toward operationalizing people’s RTI. In 1990, Aruna Roy, Shankar Singh, and Nikhil Dey, along with a number of peasants and workers from villages around Devdungri in Rajsamand District of Rajasthan, formed the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS). That organization raised the RTI issue in such a compelling manner that it changed the discourse on what had been seen for many years largely as an academic issue (Singh, 2007). This movement in Rajasthan joined with other activists and movements to form a national platform called the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) in 1996 to fight for the national RTI law (Agrawal, 2012, pp. 27–28). However, it was Sates that took the first step by enacting individual RTI laws (Roy, 2018): Tamil Nadu and Goa (1997), Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Karnataka (2000), Delhi (2001), Assam (2002), Madhya Pradesh (2003), and Jammu and Kashmir (2004). Thus came the national law out of States experience.

RTI ACT OF 2002 The national campaign for RTI received a major boost when the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s Common Minimum Program (CMP) promised that the RTI Act will be made more progressive, participatory and meaningful. The National Advisory Council (NAC), which was set up to oversee implementation of the CMP since its inception, took a close interest in RTI. The National Campaign for Peoples’ Right to Information (NCPRI) and the Press Council of India jointly formulated the initial draft (1997) of a nation-wide law, and presented it to the Government of India which set up another committee under the chairmanship of H.D. Shourie, which came up with a somewhat watered-down version of the Act. After some amendments, that draft was introduced as a FOI Bill in Parliament, and became an Act in December 2002, headed by the Prime Minister. Minimum exclusions, independent appeals, stringent penalties and universal accessibility are the four indicators of a strong transparency law (Jhansi Rani, 2014). The 2002 Act, however, failed on all these counts. The NCPRI, based on their extensive discussions with civil society groups formulated a set of amendments in August 2004 to the 2002 FOI Act in an effort at strengthen and make

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it more effective. The NAC was forwarded the suggested amendments, which endorsed most of them and forwarded them to the Prime Minister for further action. A revised RTI Bill was introduced in the Parliament by the Government of India on December 22, 2004. Although when compared to the 2002 Act, this RTI Bill was considerably stronger, some of the critical clauses recommended by the NCPRI, and endorsed by the NAC, had been amended or deleted. Most significantly, the 2004 Bill was applicable only to the federal government, not to the States (which had their own individual laws), and had almost no workable penalty provisions. As a result, civil society groups reacted sharply, and the government was forced to set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) to review these changes and refer the proposed Bill to a Standing Committee of the Parliament. Meanwhile, the NAC both personally and in writing expressed to the Prime Minister their unanimous support for its original recommendations. Consequently, the Committee and GoM recommended the restitution of most of the provisions that had been deleted. Parliament passed the refurbished RTI Act in May 2005, and the President gave his assent on June 15, 2005. The Act became operative on October 13, 2005 (Jhansi Rani, 2014).

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE RTI ACT, 2005 This law obliges all government entities to maintain records consistent with their operational needs. These records would have to be duly catalogued, indexed, and published at such intervals as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government or the competent authority (Pandey, 2009, p. 175). Important provisions of the Act (at http://rti.kerala.gov.in/highights_rtiact.pdf) are seen, thus,

• Every citizen has the Right to Information (RTI). • The term “information” includes any mode of information in any form of record, document, email, circular, press release, contract sample, electronic data, etc. • It covers inspection of work, document, record and its certified copy and information in any other electronic mode. • Applicant is entitled to obtain information within 30 days from the date of request in a normal case. • Information can be obtained within 48 hours from time of filing the request if it is a matter of life or liberty of a person. • Every public authority is under obligation to provide information on written request or request by electronic means. • Certain information can be restricted and denied for security reasons. • Penalty for not providing information is R250/per day with the total amount of penalty not to exceed R25,000. • Central Information Commission and State Information Commissions are to be constituted by the Central Government and respective State Governments. • Restrictions made for third party information Appeal against the decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission can be made to an officer who is of senior rank.

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• No Court can entertain any suit, application or other proceedings in respect of any order made under the Act.

AN ASSESSMENT RTI Act ensures two most important concepts – transparency and accountability, together for eradicating the evil of secrecy that becomes a hindrance to good governance. The Act envisages the harmonization of public interests with the RTI. However, there are some areas where public interest demands some element of secrecy which are kept outside the ambit of the RTI Act. Thus, a harmonious balance has been tried between the two competing interests – citizens’ need to know and secrecy of certain government decisions (Yadav, 2012, pp. 3–4). Social evils like corruption, nepotism, and suppression due to secretive acts of administration can be controlled only with the help of instruments like the RTI Act. Accordingly, due to the implementation of RTI a marked change in the administrative machinery has been observed. At least, officials in both governmental and non-governmental organizations have been made more alert and conscious of being transparent and accountable. Mass media are able to get more reliable sources of news, and, hence, they are able to create a sense of social awareness among the people up to a certain extent. Ever since the Act came into force, enlightened citizenry had started using it by making information requests. Social activist Aruna Roy (2018) has described India’s RTI Act “the most fundamental law this country has seen as it can be used from the local panchayat to parliament, from a non-descript village to posh Delhi, from a rationshop to the 2G Scam” (also, Madhavi, 2016, pp. 14–15; Shilpa, 2013, p. 50). Leena Mehendale in a paper titled “Role of PIOs and RTI activists in good governance” stated (The Times of India, January 2013) that the RTI Act is a very good tool to improve the functioning of the government. She felt RTI can facilitate people’s participation in development when in the past they had no role in government functioning. Starting from the premise that corruption is one of the biggest “obstacles in the efficient delivery of development resources to the poor in developing countries” (Otusanya, 2011) an empirical study conducted in 20 States over a span of three years found that the Act “reduces corruption in an average state by 18.5 per cent points” (Bhattacharyya & Jha, 2013). It concluded that RTI negatively impacted corruption, and its statistical impact on curbing corruption was quite significant. It also found that the Act “explains approximately 62 percent of the actual decline in corruption in Bihar over the period 2005 to 2008,” considering Bihar is considered as among one of the most corrupt States. The study concluded that the legislation makes significant contribution in controlling corruption, enhancing the quality of public goods and services, empowering citizens, and by breaking the informational monopoly of public officials (TI India: Centre for Media Studies, 2005, 2008). It (RTI) prevents corrupt public officials from misusing this information to advance their own interest. On the other hand, it provides the government with more power and public support for conducting top down audit of corrupt departments. (Bhattacharyya & Jha, 2013)

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It is known that RTI is being used to redress individual grievances, access entitlements such as ration cards and pensions, investigate government policies and decisions, and expose corruption and misuse of government resources. For example, in 2010, K. S. Sagaria, a resident of Kushmal village in rural Orissa, filed an RTI application seeking information on the number of ponds constructed in his village under the government’s national wage employment scheme. The information he received was revealing: No ponds were ever constructed even though the allocated money had been spent. Following complaints from villagers, the local administration was forced to take action and suspend the officials involved in this scam (Mandakini, 2011). An experiment conducted by two Yale University Ph.D. students, Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto (2010) found that India’s RTI Act can be as effective as bribery in helping the poor access their entitlements. As part of the experiment, slum dwellers in Delhi were divided into four groups and asked to submit applications for ration cards. While the first group submitted their application and did not follow up, the second group attached a recommendation letter from an NGO to their application, the third group paid a bribe, and the fourth group filed an RTI request to follow up on their application. While the group that paid a bribe was the most successful, those that filed RTI requests had their applications processed nearly as fast. According to these researchers, (A)ccess to information appears to empower the poor to the point where they receive almost the same treatment as middle-class individuals at the hands of civil servants. This is something that payment of a bribe cannot do. (Shilpa, 2013, p. 50)

THE FLIP SIDE OF RTI Several are singing well-deserved paeans to RTI, particularly conferring additional power to people in a democracy, as noted above. While indeed RTI so far has been doing well what it was supposed to – dissemination of information as sought by people, some serious pitfalls are also, however, noted. (a) How to cope with the flood of applications seeking information? Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, S.M. Bobde commented that government agencies experienced a “paralysis” what with the flood of RTI requests. The Central Information Commission reported (India Today, December 2019, p. 11) that from April 1, 2018 till March 31, 2019, a total of 1.37 million requests were made, of which 64,344 were rejected. It was also shown that while in 68,900 cases penalties should have been imposed (on government agencies for non-compliance) only 3% drew penalties. Noteworthy is the fact that on occasion asking for information was hazardous with 55 RTI activists killed since 2005. For comparison, for 2015–2016, there were a total of 977,000 applications at the federal level. In the same year, 64,666 applications were rejected against 60,127 in 2013–2014 (Deka, 2017, p. 11). The increasing number of applicants may be attributed to several reasons. It is quite possible that some may not be aware that the information they seek is readily available in the public domain, as most material of late is on the internet. Such information, however, may not necessarily be accessible

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insofar as not many, particularly in the rural areas, have access to the internet, or even capable of using it if they have access. No doubt there may be others who are lazy to search for the information but feel it is easy to file a request. All this is not to say that all information is readily available, and it may not be necessary to compel a government entity to come out clean. While admitting that the capacity of government entities is limited, and, thus, coping with the demand is a challenge, it must not be forgotten that it is a right the government must uphold. No doubt that the number of applicants is overwhelming which in fact is an affirmation of the intent of RTI. The Narendra Modi (BJP-NDA) government came up with several measures which were criticized as attempts to dilute RTI (Deshmane, 2017, 2018). For example, a suggestion which actually threatens the most radical provision of the Act (Section 6 [2]) laying down that the information seeker need not give any reason, or prove his/her locus standi. Further attempts to modify RTI were introduced, and passed, in the Lok Sabha, in the form of The RTI (Amendment) Bill, 2019 (Government of India Press release, 2019), which came under severe criticism (Dutta, 2019). (b) The Central Information Commission (CIC), a 10-memer quasi-­judicial body, is the top-most adjudicating authority for all RTI requests. And government officials are legally bound to follow directions of the CIC. Yet, while drafting 22 new rules, the government, however, did not consult with the Commission, despite the fact that the implementation of those rules is the domain of the CIC. (c) What should be done if the applicant dies before the application for information is finalized? Rule No. 12, of the 22 new rules, denotes the conditions under which an RTI request may be withdrawn by the requestor. While Section 1 of this Rule permits withdrawal of a request, Section 2 prescribes that the proceedings pending before the CIC “shall abate” if the requestor dies before a decision is given. In essence the application becomes moot when the applicant dies. Opponents of this Section claim that it would make it easier to silence those asking uncomfortable questions. “Silence” in this case could even go to the extent of killing (Deshmane, 2017, pp. 42–44). While killing an investigative journalist might sound preposterous, in fact it had occurred many a time. Venkatesh Nayak (2017) of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative observed: In 2017, there are more than 375 recorded instances of attacks on citizens who sought information to expose corruption and wrongdoing in various public authorities. Of these, 56 are murders, at least 157 are cases of physical assault and more than 160 are cases of harassment and threats, some of which have resulted in death by suicide …. By legally permitting withdrawal of appeals, vested interests will feel emboldened to pressure RTI users to withdraw their appeals before the CIC. If this proposed rule becomes law at the Centre, many States will make similar amendments, thereby unwittingly jeopardizing the life and safety of RTI users. (pp. 102–103)

Essentially, he thought that the proposed new rule is a bad idea. Minister of state for Home, Hansraj Ahir (2017), informed the Lok Sabha (lower House of the Indian Parliament) on December 18, 2017 that a total of 114 people were arrested in various parts of the country for attacks on media persons

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for which 189 FIRs were registered in different parts of the country in the last three years. (The numbers were further broken down, thus: 41 were arrested and 47 cases registered in 2016; 41 were arrested and 28 cases registered in 2015; and 32 were arrested and 114 cases registered in 2014.) It should also be noted that this trauma is not reserved only for journalists in India. Other writers who famously argued for rationalism and against Hindu fundamentalism met similar fate at the hands of otherwise fringe Hindu elements who came center-stage what with the advocacy of “Hindu nationalism,” since the election of the Modi government. Well-known writers such as Narendra Dhabolkar (August 2013), Govind Pansare (February 2015), M. M. Kalburgi (August 2015), and Gauri Lankesh (August 2017) were killed, and, as of 2017, no progress was made in their murder cases. (d) Some of the backlog in disposing of requests for information must be attributed to the vacancies, and delays in the appointment of Commissioners. In 2015 there were four vacancies of members, and the chief of the CIC itself. A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was preferred, and the Delhi High Court observed: Having regard to the undisputed fact that the non-appointment of the Chief Information Commissioner has virtually frustrated the very purpose of the RTI Act, 2005, we are of the view that it is necessary for this court to monitor the steps that are being taken for filling up the vacancies in question so as to ensure that all the vacancies are filled up within a time frame.

The case was disposed of in November 2015, and the following month the Chief was appointed (Deshmane, 2018, pp. 39–41). (e) Providing information is one thing, and whether that is correct or not is an altogether different issue. The National Campaign for Peoples’ Right to Information (NCPRI) reported that of the 4–6 million applications in all States, only 45% got satisfactory response (Deshmane, 2018, pp. 39–41). (f) The fourth estate in fact keeps governments honest. Yet, as it so happens that there are news outlets (be they electronic or print) which act like the handmaidens of the government. But those upright outlets suffer some possible threats. It is quite common for the government Ministers, or sundry legislators, to call up the correspondent who wrote a column that made them look bad, and demand a retraction. When that fails, the calls go higher up in the hierarchy to the Editor, or even the owner. The push at times is to at least downplay an event. There was in fact an attempt to control the oldest and reliable wire service – the Press Trust of India (PTI). The Wire reported that when PTI was looking for a successor to M.K. Razdan, the editor-in-chief and CEO, the BJP tried unsuccessfully to get someone of its choice into that place (Trivedi, 2018, pp. 107–110). If all else fails, the government has a potent weapon of withholding government advertisements, thus, causing a revenue choke-hold on the errant papers. In some extreme cases, the editors of well- known papers such as Ramnath Goenka (editor, Indian Express) and N. Ravi (editor, The Hindu) served time in prison. Second, contrarily, there are quite a few journalists who are readily available to be bought, and can be made to publish what came to be known infamously as “fake news.” Some of them even demand gratuity/gratification for writing favorable news (Mudgal, 2015; Sharma, n.d.).

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(g) Then there are “gag orders” imposed by courts, in the name of ensuring fairness toward the accused. These orders basically prohibit the media from reporting cases being adjudicated. Justice Mohite Dere (2018) in her order, quashing a lower court gag order in what came to be known as the Sohrabuddin case, cautioned that people at large have a right to know what is going on in courts. “The rights of the press are intrinsic with the constitutional right that guarantees freedom of expression. In reporting from an open trial, the press not only makes use of its own right, but serves the larger purpose of making such information available to the general public,” she said. She did add that if the prosecution felt that the identity of the witness needs to be protected then they can always ask the trial court to pass an order to that effect. However, she added that a fair trial is one which balances public interest with that of the interest of the witnesses. (h) Suffering of accredited and committed investigative journalists is not confined only to India. Der Spiegel in Germany on January 26, 2018 used the expression, “judicial hostagestagetaking” whereby journalists are imprisoned with no charges, for long. Turkey leads the world in this endeavor Deniz Yucel, a dual citizen of Germany and Turkey, is one example. He was behind bars in Turkey for nearly a year. Jason Rezain, a US–Iranian citizen, was in Iranian prison during 2014–2016. Perhaps the worst case that caught the attention of the democratic world is the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi Arabian Journalist. Having written critical articles against the Saudi royalty, he took shelter in the United States and served as a contributor to Washington Post, writing severely critical articles against the Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman. He went to the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul to get papers to marry a Turkish lady, and was murdered within the Consulate, and his body removed after dismemberment. Time (weekly, December 2018) appropriately called him and others as “Guardians of Truth,” and named them as “Persons of the Year.”

CONCLUSION It is gratifying to note that the RTI in India has been accepted as a Fundamental Right, and there is statutory backing. And it is also working, as seen from the numerous requests for information. It is shown (India Today, October 29, 2019, p. 6) that between 2005 and 2019 a total of 30 million requests were made for information, and as many as 23,541 complaints of (non-disclosure of information) were pending as of April 2018. It is also not clear what type of information, content-wise, and quality-wise has been sought, and was given, in general. Similarly it is not also clear how the information is being used by the applicants to hold the government accountable and governance transparent. Nonetheless, available data show that the intent in general of RTI is being carried out. Two developments in 2019 are to be noted in this context. One is the re-­ affirmation of the importance of RTI by the Supreme Court when it said that the BJP government cannot claim any “privilege” and deny information sought, even based on leaked documents, regarding the Rafale case (where a smaller number

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of jet fighters are bought from France at a higher cost than was being negotiated by the previous Congress-led UPA government) (Tummala in Chapter 3). “It is clear that under the Right to Information Act, a citizen can get a certified copy of a document … even if the matter pertains to security or relationship with a foreign nation, if a case is made out thereunder. If such a document is produced surely a claim for privilege could not lie,” Justice K.M. Joseph said in its judgment on Petition No. 46 of 2019, the Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, joining in the decision, quoted the precedent in Manohar Lal Sharma … V. Narendra Damodardas Modi & ors. (2018) [criminal] no.225. […] In long line of cases freedom of the press was recognized. Pentagon Papers case too emphasized the same. Documents in question were already published in The Hindu, and thus cannot be considered “Privilege” of the government. Hence they are public documents. The RTI’s objective and purpose was decided in Chief Information Commissioner v. State of Manipur … (T)he Act was enacted to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority in order to strengthen the core constitutional values of a democratic republic …. The Act is meant to harmonise the conflicting interests of Government to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information with the right of citizens to know the functioning of the governmental process in such a way as to preserve the paramountcy of the democratic ideal. (Emphasis in the original)

The second pertains to the amendments passed by Parliament on July 25, 2019 which conferred power to the central government to set service conditions such as salary, allowances, and tenure of office of the information commissioners. While the government claimed that these amendments were only trying to regularize the service conditions, critics (Bhardwaj & Johri, 2019) thought the effort was to extend government control over these supposedly independent Commissioners (on par with Supreme Court Justices). Several other problems are also seen which the government needs to address such as fully staffing the information offices, providing accurate information, and protecting the investigative journalists and the media in general. There are also at least two serious shortfalls in this law. One, no non-resident Indian (NRI) can seek information using RTI. Two, political parties, which not only indulge in corrupt practices, but in fact encourage corruption of the industrial and corporate giants who are their benefactors are exempted. In any case none of the major political parties complied with the requests for information so far (Press Trust of India, May 2018). Political parties in fact need not disclose the sources of contributions to their coffers of small sums running into a couple of thousand Rupees. This is something that need to be studied seriously. (That the Modi government instead developed what is called as “Electoral bonds” whereby individual contributors buy these bonds in banks, and designate the party as the beneficiary in the name of anonymity. This is a nascent phenomenon the outcomes of which are yet to be seen, deserving a separate study altogether.) Finally, as long as the media and the journalists themselves are not protected, RTI becomes meaningless. Although they are not an endangered species yet, they are surely a threatened lot, and certainly subjected to intimidation by even

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democratic governments and well-healed high political officials. To that extent it has a chilling effect, and needs to be remedied. On December 20, 2018 the Ministry of Home Affairs instead issued an order authorizing 10 Central agencies to intercept, monitor, and decrypt “any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer” (see Appendix). Government can claim that it is in a “surveillance” mode, adding insult to injury.

REFERENCES Agrawal, C. (2012, June). Right to information: A tool for combating corruption in India. Journal of Management & Public Policy, 3(2), 27–28. Ahir, H. (2017, December 19). The wire. https://www.google.com Bhardwaj, A., & Johri, A. (2019, August 2). India Today. Bhattacharyya, S., & Jha, R. (2009 June, 2013). Economic growth, law and corruption: Evidence from India. Comparative Economic Studies, 55(2), 287–313. Briefing Paper. (2010). Analyzing the Right to Information Act in India, CUTS International. CBS TV 26. (2017, March). ‘Fake News’. Trump used 176 times as of December 2017. CMS. (2017). CMS-India corruption study: Perception and experience with Public Services & Snapshot view for 2005–17. New Delhi: Saket Community Centre. Retrieved from http://cmsindia.org/ sites/default/files/Monograph_ICS_2017.pdf Conway, K. (2017, January 22). NBC TV, “Meet the Press”. Deka, K. (2017, December 25). What is your connection? India Today. Dere, M. (2018, January 24). India Today. Deshmane, A. (2017, October 13). Draft rules and dissent. Frontline, pp. 42–44. Deshmane, A. (2018, January 5). Threat from Within…. Frontline, pp. 39–41. Dutta, P. K. (2019, July 23). What makes RTI Amendment Bill so controversial? India Today. Gogoi, R. (2019, April 10). Manohar Lal Sharma …. V. Narendra Damodardas Modi & ors. (2018) [criminal] No. 225. Giuliani, R. (2018, August 14). Retrieved from www.theguardian>com>usnews>aug Government of India. (2019, July 19). Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Personnel, Pubic Grievances and Pension. Retrieved from https://pib..gov.in Hagde, N. S. (2011, May). Effect of Corruption on Good Governance. First CIPS Foundation Day Lecture. Retrieved from http://www.cips.org.in/public-sector-systemsgovernment-innovations/ documents/NS-Hegde_CIPSFDL_ed20May11.pdf; http://bharatilawreview.com/uploads/ 18_Sahina_mumtaz_laskar_216-229.pdf; http://www.cuts-international.org/cart/pdf/Analysing_ the_Right_to_Information_Act_in_India.pdf; http://www.nfici.org/attachments/article/163/IC-MALectureAtUNESCO-04122008.pdf; https://www.legalindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ RTI.pdf hinsdustantimes.com. (2017, June 11). Supreme Court of India (Writ Petitions 277 of 2017 and 304 of 2017), quoting Rajiv Gandhi in 1985. India Today. (2019a, October 28). India Today. (2019b, December 30). Jhansi Rani, K. (2014). Transparency and accountability in administration: A case study of Andhra Pradesh. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hyderabad, India. Joseph, K. (2019, April 10). Petition No, 46 of 2019. Laskar, S. M. (2016). Importance of Right to Information for good Governance in India. Bharati Law Review, October–December, 217–224. Madhavi, K. (2016, February). Right To Information Act: A tool to tackle corruption. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 21(2), Ver. VII, 13–15. Mandakini, D. S. (2011, 28 September). Right to Information in India: An effective tool to tackle corruption. Retrieved from htpps://asiafoundation.org Manohar Lal Sharma …. v. Narendra Damodardas Modi & ors. (2018). [criminal] no.225.

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Mudgal, V. (2015). News for sale: ‘Paid news’ media, ethics and India’s democratic public sphere. In S. Rao & H. Waserman (Eds.), Media ethics and justice in the age of globalization (pp. 100–120). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nayak, V. (2017, May 12). Quoted by Askhay Deshmane, “Diluting a right,” Frontline, pp. 102–103. Frontline. Otusanya, O. (2011, October). Corruption as an obstacle to development in developing countries: A review of literature. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 14(4), 387–422. Pandey, J. N. (2009). The constitutional law of India (46th ed., p. 175). Delhi: Central Law Agency. Peisakhin, L, & Pinto, P. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India. Retrieved from https://reseaercgate.net/publication/228162430 Prabhu Dutt v. Union of India. (1982 AIR 6). Press Trust of India (PTI). (2018, May 27). Quah, J. S. T. (2017, January–December). How India’s policy makers can win the war on corruption. Administrative Change, XLV, (1), 1–24. Right to Information Act. (2005). Retrieved from http://rti.kerala.gov.in/highlights_rtiact.pdf Roy, A. (2018). The RTI: Power to the people. New Delhi: Roli Books. S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982 AIR SC 149). Sharma, A. (n.d). In need of a Leveson? Journalism in India in times of paid news and ‘private treaties’. Retrieved from reutersinstitute.politics.oz.ac.uk Shilpa. (2013). Right to Information Act: A tool to strengthen good governance and tackling corruption. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 2(2), 46–50. Singh, S. (2007). India: Grassroots initiatives. In A. Florini (Ed.), The right to know: Transparency for an open world. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. State of Rajasthan v. Raj Narain (1975 AIR 865). Time. (2018, December 24–31). (Weekly) Times of India. (2013, January 20). RTI is a good tool to improve govt functioning. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/rti-is-a-good-tool-to-improve-govtfunctioning/ articleshow/18095731.cms Transparency International – Centre for Media Studies India. (2005). India corruption study 2005 to improve governance. New Delhi: Centre for Media Studies. Transparency International – Centre for Media Studies India. (2008). TII-CMS India Corruption Study 2007 with focus on BPL Households: National Report. Transparency International India. (2005). India corruption study 2005 (pp. 1–234). Trivedi, D. (2018, February 2). Devious designs. Frontline. Tummala, K. K. (2002, December). Corruption in India: Control measures and consequences. Asian Journal of Political Science, 10(2), 43–69. Tummala, K. K. (2009). Corruption in India: Can it be controlled? In L. Jones, B. Bowornawathana, & C. Wescott (Eds.), The many faces of public management reform in the Asia Pacific region research in public policy analysis and management (Vol. 18, pp. 45–72). Oxford: Emerald Press. Tummala, K. K. (2013). Can India combat corruption? In J. S. T. Quah (Ed.), Different paths to curbing corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore (pp. 167–187). Bingley: Emerald Publications. Yadav, A. S. (2012). Right to Information Act, 2005: An analysis (pp. 3–4). Allahabad: Central Law Publications.

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CHAPTER 5 CORRUPTION AND ITS CONTROL: THE PURSUIT OF PROBITY IN BANGLADESH Habib Zafarullah and Ahmed Shafiqul Huque

ABSTRACT Corruption is ubiquitous, deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s socio-political fabric. Over the past two decades, the phenomenon has reached to an extent that it is now inescapable and almost impossible to eradicate. Successive governments have tried several measures to combat corruption without much success. This chapter will probe into the nature and extent of corruption in Bangladesh from a wider perspective and consider some of the underlying historical, social, cultural, political, economic, and administrative reasons for the pervasive malfeasance in the public sector. It will evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption laws, and the strategies followed by institutions meant to fight corruption. Keywords: Regime changes; family ties; patronage; state capture; Anti-Corruption Commission; Bangladesh

INTRODUCTION Corruption has existed in numerous forms, in diverse styles, and at different levels in all societies since antiquity. In its simplest denotation, it is the abuse of public power for private gain or personal advantage or meeting “unofficial” goals (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackermann, 1999). It is behavioral deviance from ethical

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 57–77 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034006

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and moral principles which are developed for the common good of society. It is undesirable as it impairs integrity, tends to compromise righteousness, and desecrates the laws of just behavior. It leads to corrosion of civic virtues and upsets the trajectory of societal development. Decision-makers are led away from making sound policy choices impairing the quality and performance of state institutions (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004). It devalues trust in government, kindles public outrage (Treisman, 2000), and “challenges the popular legitimacy of democratic institutions [leading to] political instability” (Mulloy, 1999, quoted in Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2004, p. 440). However, while all these contrary phenomenon may not be completely eradicated, they certainly can be mitigated. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first will contextualize corruption in Bangladesh within the context of the historical, social-cultural, political, economic, and administrative reasons. The second will assess the framework to fight corruption, the nature, and strength of drivers and factors of unethical practices in both the public and private sectors, the mechanisms to counter them and the way anti-corruption enforcement is politicized. The third draws some conclusions.

THE BANGLADESH CORRUPTION SYNDROME According to the Transparency International (TI) 2018 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Bangladesh with a low score of 26 was ranked at 149 among 180 countries – a drop by 2 points in the CPI score and six rungs down in ranking from the previous year (TI, 2019a). From 2008 to 2017, the country had consistently been ranked in the lowest band. The low value – between −1.03 (lowest) and −0.89 (highest) – clearly indicates the poor state of governance in terms of corruption prevention compared to other lower ranking countries (Word Bank, 2019). Such a state of affairs is a product of several factors. As a nation, Bangladesh is small country, but overcrowded to the extreme with a population density of over 1,100 people per square kilometer. It also remained one of the poorest nations over several decades. Political turmoil and natural disasters exacerbated its economic backwardness. Pakistan, as part of India, was under British control for almost 200 years since 1757. When the sub-continent was divided into two separate nations – India and Pakistan, Pakistan itself was in two parts whose western part was divided by over 1,200 miles of Indian territory with Bangladesh in the east. Yet Bangladesh was virtually a colony of (west)Pakistan till after a war of independence in 1971 it became a separate nation. The colonial governing structure resulted in a bureaucracy-dependent administration that placed excessive power in the hands of civil servants who tended to be corrupt (Agrawal, 2007; Dwivedi & Bhargava, 1967). Colonial rulers (both from Britain and Pakistan) also preferred to maintain a distance from the indigenous public, and this opened opportunities for the local bureaucracies to exercise power disproportionate to their positions (Rahman, 2020). Several years of military rule under the Pakistani regime contributed to the entrenchment of a civil-military bureaucracy that had hardly any check on

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their activities, which in its turn aided corruption (Alavi, 1972; Huque, 2010; Zafarullah, 1987). During these years, the political pendulum in Bangladesh swung from being a parliamentary democracy to a one-party presidential system to military/ authoritarian rule to a multiparty parliamentary arrangement that soon muted into a civilian-authoritarian hybrid (Diamond, 2002). These reversals hamstrung initiatives to institutionalize the political process, and worked as deterrent toward the attainment of cherished democratic ideals. The turnabouts delayed the creation of a stable political order and a sound regulatory and legal framework to enforce social contracts in quest of the common good (Zafarullah, 1999). The return to civilian rule did not result in qualitative changes either. Control shifted from military to civilian leaders who behaved in much the same manner encouraging political party leaders and workers to adopt corrupt practices to gain from the illegal use of power. As recognition as a leader is primarily determined by the ability to contribute to the party coffers, acquiring wealth has become the primary objective of political persona (Huque, 2010). Also, contentious politics of the two major parties in pursuit of partisan ends, or for overpowering the opposition, undercut the establishment of sound governance systems (SGS) such as responsiveness, transparency, accountability, and ethics to drive away venality from public life and safeguard probity in government (Blair, 2010; Huque, 2016; Zafarullah, 2016). Thus, the Bangladeshi society has struggled with identity, ideological distinctions, institutional deficiencies, and organizational anomalies (Alam & Teicher, 2012; Guhathakurta & van Schendel, 2013, part vi; Huque, 2010). The combined consequences of the physical and emotional features of the nation have had substantial undesirable impacts on society. The culture of solid family ties have also resulted in the concentration of power in a few prominent families leading to extreme poverty and what Quah (2003, pp. 13, 183) calls a culture of “low risk, high reward,” which in turn helped entrench corruption. Also, poor economic management has created opportunities for the influential and partisan entrepreneurs to ruthlessly exploit the economy leaving ordinary citizens exposed to the vagaries of the manipulated market. A culture of defaulting on bank loans emerged as a serious threat to the economy. Businesses with connections to the ruling group tended to borrow massive amounts of money from the banks, and refuse to repay. As businesspeople got elected to Parliament and even inducted into the Cabinet in increasing numbers, there was an apparent reluctance of the banks to recover funds from them. And, governments ignored to identify and prosecute them. To gain and maintain bureaucratic support, successive governments at various times raised salaries of public sector employees. Consequently, the nation, and more importantly most private sector employees and small entrepreneurs, suffered from the resultant inflation. Many low-income earners succumbed to the temptation of corruption under conditions of inflation. The administrative apparatus and bureaucracy contributed their fair share to the incidence of corruption with flawed accountability mechanisms in place (Huque, 2011). Political considerations, irregular practices, and the craving for

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personal gain often influenced administrative decisions relating to staffing the civil service. All these features led to the lack of trust in government, thus, negating the major principle as stated by Holmes (2015, p. 62) that the “general public basically trusts the state and accords a regime a high level of legitimacy,” which needless to say is essential to fight corruption. The current government was returned to power in 2014, and again five years later, through a process whose credibility was highly suspect because of intense electoral engineering and widespread irregularities. Power has been captured by a highly partisan and socially infiltrating group that has little respect for democratic norms and disdainful of political opposition. It has unleashed a shameless picture of questionable accumulation of wealth of people in positions of power inconsistent with legitimate sources of income … [and] … indicators of kleptocratic state capture have taken deeper roots. (Iftekharuzzaman, 2014)

With an absolute majority in Parliament, the government has been capricious in governing the country with total control over state institutions, including the bureaucracy. In such a state, it can only be anticipated to “make small strides against corruption in the short-term” if it has the will but cannot do it “effectively in the long-term” due to “weak democratic institutions, laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms,” the absence of democratic checks and balances, and an independent judiciary (TI, 2019b). Privileged access to state resources by the ruling party enabled it to distribute patronage among its constituents and supporters through an array of rewards (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014). This “capture” of the state by political (and bureaucratic) elites and private interests has widened the scope for both petty and grand corruption as well as rent-seeking with the potential to curb productivity (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; World Bank, 2018). The garment industry, for instance, has secured its grip on state power with its leaders in Parliament and on high-level government committees deciding trade matters. It has successfully orchestrated moves to reap financial advantages and “obtain tax concessions, gain preferential access to infrastructure and avoid various government safety and security regulations through a complex nexus of private and political interests” (McDevitt, 2015, p. 5). Ostensibly, while such a connection may ensue within legal compass it creates opportunities for unethical behavior to flourish. Apart from all the above, a culture of extreme tolerance toward irregularities in every aspect of life by both the society and government have resulted in rapid spread of corruption in the country. An unaccountable elite has little respect for ethics and morality and, thus, has tilled and fructified the ground for corruption. Khan (2011, p. 115) argued that “political instability in Bangladesh was caused by the involvement of political elites in corruption and by the personalization of politics.” Indeed, democracy has been dysfunctional, and the instruments of governance are unstable providing a fertile ground for malpractice. The enduring confrontation between the two major political parties and high-intensity partisanism add to the problem. Industrial and business entrepreneurs who have little understanding or reverence for governance principles dominate the Parliament

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and, having expended vast sums of money to cover their electioneering costs, are intent on recouping them through rent-seeking (BTI, 2018). Loci and modes of corruption: Corruption in different domains takes different forms such as state capture, clientelism, collusion, profit shifting, bribery, conflict of interest, embezzlement, extortion, facilitation payments, fraud, lobbying, money laundering, nepotism, patronage, solicitation, transfer mispricing, and tax evasion. Each of these forms or their variants are evident in Bangladesh. In recent times with pervasive market activities in a globalized environment that enabled the broader participation of large corporation and businesses, corruption has found a new breeding ground in the private sector (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). The scope for unethical practices, such as distorting regulatory protocols and exploiting imprecise rules to make financial gains, circumventing taxes by local concerns to enhance business growth, transferring profits offshore by multinational companies to lessen their tax burden, money laundering by organized syndicates, surreptitious dealings, and exchanges to obtain or provide public procurement contracts, etc., have been on the rise in Bangladesh (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014; BRAC University, 2008). Some of these pursuits are seemingly lawful but unprincipled to the extreme, detrimental to ethical business practices, and impeding of national development (see Daily Star, December 22, 2017; Wise, Ali, & Wise, 2010). Multinational corporations (MNCs) in Bangladesh take advantage of tax administration inefficiencies and anomalous rules and engage in moving capital (earned from dividends, profits, and misinvoicing in transactions of goods and services) out of the country to their parent establishments elsewhere. The diminished national tax base engenders a loss of millions of dollars every year for the country (EquityBD, 2014; Oxfam, 2017). Corrupt businesspeople, bureaucrats, military personnel, and even politicians have been involved in “illicit financial flows” to transfer their ill-gotten wealth overseas in safe havens. The country ranks 26th among 149 countries in draining (on an average) more than $5.58 billion per annum, being the upshot of money laundering, drug trafficking, racketeering, and the like (Kar & Spanjers, 2015). A 2019 Global Financial Integrity report indicated that between 2006 and 2015, Bangladesh was on the list of developing countries with potential over- and under-invoicing in both its export and imports (GFI, 2019). The Panama Papers revealed a list of such individuals (The Independent, 2017), many among with political connections. Within the public sector itself, there has been a surge in venality. The reinstatement of democracy in 1991 ushered in “competitive clientelism” with the ruling party distributing patronage and rents among its constituents to make political capital. This is an ominous form of political corruption – “clientelism” produces its own spilling effect on the ground (Khan, 2011). In the bureaucracy, the ramifications of clientelism have been evident with successive governments dispensing patronage among partisan loyalists in exchange for their unqualified support for the government and its policies and actions (Sarker, 2008). Clientelism has also induced influential people (Ministers, Parliament members, civil servants) to exploit individuals reliant on them for services (Khan, 1989). Higher-ups in government have

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also been prone to abusing their authority by resorting to nepotism and favoritism to dole out special favors (jobs, contracts, and overseas postings) to family members, friends, or acquaintances (Kochanek, 2000; Zafarullah, 2003). Broad discretion of public officials, often with political blessing, to work out the modalities of public procurement contracts has opened windows of corruption in the public sector. Despite a well-grounded Public Procurement Act designed in line with global standards, later amendments have weakened and exposed it to abuse and external influences (Mahmood, 2010). In public–private interrelations, the common forms of corrupt practices, continue to be bribery, extortion, kickbacks, and payoffs. Depending upon the place of occurrence, actors involved, and the degree of intensity, corruption may be either “grand” or “petty.” Grand corruption pursued at the highest levels often at the behest or blessings of the powers-be, generally remains unchallenged and perpetrators often absolved. Typically, such corruption embracing collusion, conflict of interest, and money laundering may remain hidden from the eyes of the common people who do not perceive or experience its immediate impact, but their ramifications run through the body-politic (Kyriakos-Saad, Esposito, & Schwarz, 2012). These can work in isolation but may also complement one another. Grand corruption has policy-distorting effects that work for perpetrators’ financial or status-enhancing advantages to the detriment of citizen wellbeing (TI, 2009, p. 23). “Conflict of interest” is not uncommon in Bangladesh and often highlighted in the media. Ministers and Members of Parliament (MPs) often use their influence to extract financial gains from local and overseas sources, and interest groups relevant to their official concerns. One such example is a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works who also owns a real estate business, and is the President of an interest group dealing with housing matters (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, p. 48). Some high-profile scandals involving topmost politicians and bureaucrats and top international companies have desecrated Bangladesh’s governance environment. Here, “conflict of interest” becomes obvious. One of them was related to a Canadian energy firm, Niko Resources, that allegedly paid kickbacks (in cash and kind) to several top level politicians and bureaucrats under both regimes of Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party, to obtain a contract for a natural gas exploration project valued at $750 million (Montero, 2009a). The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute, an international arbitration court, found Niko guilty of being responsible for careless and inefficient drilling in the gas field that caused blowouts and ordered the company to pay compensation to the Bangladesh government (Dhaka Tribune, 4 May 2020; The Financial Express, 4 June 2020). Another was a German company, Siemen’s, bribing the Telecommunications Minister in 2004 to secure a mobile phone contract (Montero, 2009b). Infrastructure projects have often been the subject of grand corruption, and on one such noteworthy project the World Bank (2012) reported of credible evidence of “a high-level corruption conspiracy among Bangladeshi government officials, SNC-Lavalin executives, and private individuals in connection with the Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project.”

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As is known, “petty corruption,” on the other hand, happens lower down the bureaucratic hierarchy among public officials who directly interact with ordinary citizens accessing or availing basic public services of various kinds from a variety of providers. In Bangladesh, as elsewhere, these include bribery, extortion, embezzlement, fraud, and “speed money” (meant to hasten the process or to facilitate a service). When these become too routinized and predictable in an organization, corruption is bound to become institutionalized and their impact far-reaching. “Money laundering” has been quite rampant in recent years in Bangladesh amounting to nearly billions of dollars every year (Dhaka Tribune, 2019). Politicians, bureaucrats, police and retired military personnel, and business people are purportedly involved in amassing ill-gotten money from all sorts of unlawful practices, such as high-intensity bribery, extortion, fraud, abuse of dominant position, and also drug peddling, human trafficking, money smuggling, black marketeering, and so forth (Waris & Latif, 2013). The source, possession, and destination of such wealth are concealed but made to appear legitimately acquired and often moved offshore to evade taxes. These corrupt people also take advantage of government-created opportunities, such as amnesties to “cleanse” their immorally gathered fortune. The government’s unsound policy of indemnifying the money launderers and “encouraging” them to whiten black money breeds further corruption and serves as an incentive for prospective launderers. By granting unconventional privileges to certain sections of the community who are basically engaged in immoral acts contravene the United Nations’ Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2003, the country’s Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012, the Income Tax Ordinance of 1984, the AntiCorruption Act 2004 and even the constitutional principle of “equality before the law” that implies “non-discrimination” (Government of Bangladesh (GoB), 2010a: Art 27; Solaiman, 2018). The Destiny Group, a multilevel marketing concern in Bangladesh, presents a classic case of embezzlement and money laundering going hand in hand. The company, engaged in fraudulent pyramid schemes, swindled investors through several of its enterprises, and laundered nearly US $50 billion by depositing them in over 700 bank accounts (Financial Express, 2014, January 8, 14, and 16). Both public and private banks were indirectly (if not directly) involved in preserving the misappropriated money – a case of “collusion” (Nag, 2019; Rahman, 2019). The severe consequence of a bribery case related to the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in 2013 that killed 600 garment workers working under hazardous conditions. Public officials were heavily bribed to obtain building clearances even though the building did not comply with legal construction standards (Gomes, 2013). A 2017 TI survey reported the extent of corruption in different service sectors in Bangladesh with the law-enforcing agencies (police included) among the worst offenders (TIB, 2018). Citizen interaction with the police poses an elevated risk as they are forced to pay bribes most of the time they are in contact with them. They have a knack to cover up their misdeeds because of strong group solidarity, secure political connections, and a culture of impunity (TIB, 2018). Apparently, the internal control system has failed, and the prevalence of bribery and extortion

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has increased (Kashem, 2005; Rahman, 2019). The police in the rural areas (where the extent of extortion is greater) are significantly more corrupt than their urban counterparts (TIB, 2018). Victims were forced to pay bribes for lodging a complaint (74.7%), avoiding arrest (38.1%), lodging charge sheets (11.4%), and averting torture (11.1%) (TIB, 2010, p. 12). The regulatory agency on road transport surpasses the police as the worst performer vis-á-vis corruption with a bribery rate of 63.1%, while the passport issuing agency is also among the top offenders (59.3%) (TIB, 2018, p. 14). Land administration has one of the worst records in bribery relating to land registration, title transfers, property tax payments, and securing the lease of public lands (Daily Star, 2015, August 24). Here, the wealthy have been willingly engaging in bribing street-level officials to fast-track the processing of their applications or transactions to acquire or dispose of land (Islam & Lee, 2016). In the financial sector, loan defaulting has increased aggressively in the last decade leaving banks with liquidity crises and the country’s current account significant deficit. Most defaulters are said to be laundering money borrowed from banks with the help of unscrupulous politically appointed Directors on their Boards and top executives (Uddin, 2018). While Bangladesh has made steady progress in health and education, from the integrity perspective the situation is not so encouraging as the corruption syndrome does not spare these two sectors. Both sectors are vital for social development as a large number of people accessing these are directly affected by the quality of education and health care. In the education sector, corruption takes many forms, such as bribery in student admission process and stipend disbursement, cronyism and political patronage in teacher recruitment, dishonesty in procurement, teacher abuse of private tuition/coaching, exam paper leakage, selling of bogus certificates, manipulation of examination results, illegal payments to obtain school accreditation and allocation of subsidies, and sexual exploitation (Mulcahy, 2015). Similarly, in the health sector, a high percentage of users reported of bribery and illegal payments in accessing services (McDevitt, 2015). In both the lower and higher courts, “judges are given to doctoring their decisions in exchange for cash, land, and other benefits” (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, pp. 87–88). Here, collusion furthers corruption as judges and magistrates collaborate with other dishonest individuals in the judiciary while lower level court employees and solicitors are involved in extorting or soliciting money from litigants and sharing them with judges (Nawaz, 2012, p. 4). The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey in 2017 singled out corruption, as the leading deterrent toward building Bangladesh’s competitiveness in the world economy and in driving domestic growth (WEF, 2017). Similarly, another survey of private sector enterprise conducted by the World Bank identified corruption in government agencies, including regulatory ones, as one of the top impediments to doing business in Bangladesh. These enterprises listed demands by officials for gifts or payment when seeking to obtain import and operating licenses, construction permits and for securing government contracts. Such frequent and irksome behavior is an offshoot of inadequate or poorly enforced regulations relating to ethical practice by public agencies (World Bank, 2013).

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THE FRAMEWORK TO FIGHT CORRUPTION The fight against corruption is a matter of employing the right strategy to help coordinate anti-corruption action plans at the national and agency levels. With corruption gradually becoming dispersed and permeating the entire public and private spheres, a decentralized approach to anti-corruption at various levels (vertical and horizontal) is considered more productive. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is emphatic about the need for effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies affirming the rule of law in the form of a national strategy with prioritized objectives and a range of measures to deter corruption (UN, 2005). While successive governments in Bangladesh have gone for measures to combat corruption by framing policies, streamlining regulations and strengthening institutions for monitoring, oversight and enforcement, half-hearted commitment, apathetic execution, and perfunctory follow-up accompanied by the undue influence of the political leadership have undermined the effectiveness of these actions. The following assesses the several elements of the anti-corruption framework. Legal and institutional framework of anti-corruption: The Bangladeshi Constitution emphasizes probity by affirming that “The State shall endeavor to create conditions in which, as a general principle, persons shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes…” (GoB, 2010a, Article 20, p. 2). Similar conviction is reflected in the National Integrity Strategy (NIS), the overarching policy blueprint formulated in fulfillment of the constitutional requirement and, more importantly, UNCAC’s call “to safeguard integrity and to foster a culture of rejection of corruption” in society (UN, 2005, p. 6). In essence, NIS is an all-embracing set of goals, methods and action plans aiming to enhance performance in both State and non-State institutions by elevating the level of accountability, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness (GoB, 2008). It seeks to institutionalize and implement effective practices, legal instruments, and administrative actions in both public and private sector organizations with the support of the National Integrity Implementation Unit of the government (GoB, 2012a, 2013a). Consequently, there is an extensive corpus of laws, rules, procedures, and instruments that define the anti-corruption legal framework in Bangladesh. One of the earliest set of regulations framed in 1898 during the British colonial era – the Code of Criminal Procedure, continues to be in operation with minor adjustments. It provided for the appointment of executive and judicial Magistrates and constituted courts at various levels and defined their roles in deciding criminal offenses (GoB, 2010c). This Code has been synchronized with the time-honored colonial Penal Code, which is still used to discipline civil servants in the country. It focuses on corrupt practices that go against the public interest (GoB, 2010b, Secs 120B, 161, 162, 163, 165, 403). The Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 made immediately before the British left the Indian sub-continent still has relevance in present-day Bangladesh in the prevention of bribery and corruption in government. The list of misconduct by public servants was derived from the Penal Code and all offenses are punishable

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by imprisonment or pecuniary penalties (GoB, 2010d, section 5). Minor modifications came in 1992, but the main thrust of the law remained, as it has been with the Criminal Law Act 1958 (amended in 1978, 1987, and 2004) that had provided for “more” speedy trial and adequate punishment (GoB, 2010e). The Government Servants (Conducts) Rules, 1979 is more directly relevant to the bureaucracy. It articulates ethical principles by setting standards of behavior expected to check wrongdoings in the civil service. Officials are debarred from engaging in specific actions regarded unethical, such as participating in political activities, accepting gifts or awards for themselves or their family members that would oblige them to donors. They can neither indulge in parochialism, favoritism, victimization, and willful abuse of office nor enter into any relationship with anyone that would cause conflict between their personal interests and their public responsibilities. Resorting to any form of political influence to promote their career goals is forbidden. Civil servants are obliged to declare to the government their private property, liquid assets, and jewelry. But, in reality, they usually turn a blind eye to this requirement, and with no institutional mechanism in place to monitor compliance integrity is compromised (GoB, 1979). According to the Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985, public officials are also required to distance themselves from other forms of unethical practice. It is imperative upon them to adopt a professional and impartial approach to their tasks and responsibilities and refrain from lobbying parliamentarians or others outside government to intervene on their behalf concerning career matters. They are also prohibited from actively involving themselves in party politics. Those who contravene conduct rules or engage in unethical behavior are slapped with penalties ranging from an official censure to delayed promotion or even demotion, suspension or dismissal from service, following inquiries, appeals, and reviews (GoB, 1985, 1979). Another colonial instrument, the Manual for Office Procedure (Purchase) previously used for public sector procurement, was replaced by the Public Procurement Act 2006, which outlines the procedures to ensure transparency and accountability in procuring goods and services by government organizations or by any other entity using public money. The law covers the whole gamut of procurement and seeks to create an equitable space for healthy competition for providers to help prevent corruption, especially conflict of interest, fraud, and bribery in securing government contracts (GoB, 2013b). Toward this end, a set of guidelines are laid down to facilitate the procurement process in its various phases to ensure trustworthy conduct. Professional ethics are to be maintained, conflict of interest reported, and the influence of the tendering process forbidden. Procuring entities are to comply with the Act and shun all sorts of corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, or coercive practices by submitting to the highest standards of ethical behavior (GoB, 2007). The laws, rules, and method of blacklisting dubious companies may have given the public procurement system a facelift, but corrupt practices, nonetheless, persist as all these remain only on paper. Importantly, Bangladesh was the first South Asian country to enact a law in 2011 protecting whistleblowers from being harassed for revealing offenses or any unethical activities by public servants or organizations. It is recognized that

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whistleblowing encourages reporting of wrongdoings to help eradicate corruption from both the public and non-state sectors and to uphold the public interest. Whistleblowers are shielded from reprisals with their identities concealed; neither can they be presented as witnesses in courts (GoB, 2011). Yet, after this many years of the enactment of this law very few people are aware of it, and the AntiCorruption Commission (ACC) cannot make productive use of these provisions (TI, 2014). As an ancillary instrument to help prevent corruption, the Right to Information Act came into force in 2009. It incorporates some of the elements of the outdated Official Secrets Act 1923 and the Evidence Act 1872, and also draws from the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules. By enabling the free flow of information and providing citizens access to it, the law is believed to play a vital role in ensuring transparency and accountability in governmental and non-governmental settings that should help reduce corruption. Citizens have the right to know about the rationale of decisions that affect them and the manner of their execution, and if availed by them extensively this legislation is expected to make public organizations more attentive to and responsible for the tasks assigned to them. Discipline and integrity among officials is expected to follow (GoB, 2009). The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012 lists offenses punishable with fines and imprisonment such as consciously moving, converting, or smuggling illegally earned money out of the country; settling financial transactions often in collaboration with local or overseas accomplices in a manner to avoid reporting; and acquiring or possessing property in the country or elsewhere by using illicit funds obtained by engaging in “predicate offenses,” denoting money laundering or terrorist finance activity (GoB, 2012b). However, the government itself is responsible for encouraging money laundering enterprises by offering tax amnesties that provide them opportunities to whitewash their black money almost every year (Waris & Latif, 2013). Often, political partisans have benefited from the government’s selective application of the Act (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, p. 124). All these laws, rules, and regulations constitute the legal landscape of anticorruption, and specific institutions, and instruments operationalize them. The principal institutions in the national integrity system, inter alia, include State institutions – Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, Civil Service, Public Service Commission, ACC, and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Audit Office), while non-State entities are political society, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the media. These institutions have the wherewithal to combat corruption but, in reality, these often fail because of the hegemonic influence of politicians or flawed application of the rules. The Constitution has bestowed upon Parliament practically unlimited power over the Executive though the reality is different. With the ruling party enjoying absolute majority since 2001 and an irresponsible and ineffective Opposition, Parliament has been reduced to an invertebrate entity merely to validate the edicts of the Executive, rather than a serious deliberative body (Ahmed, 2014; Alamgir, Mahmud, & Iftekharuzzaman, 2006). With its declining credibility as a strong oversight institution, it has lost people’s trust. The committee system is overly

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dominated by Treasury Bench members that prevent Parliament from taking the Executive to task for accountability failures. Essentially, the Executive tended to keep the Committee system dysfunctional from preventing parliamentary oversight (Liton, 2013; Iftekharuzzaman, 2007; Zafarullah, 2003). Parliamentarians, considered as being the custodians of democratic practices, have themselves persisted in taking advantage of their position and resorting to unethical behavior (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, pp. 47–49). Thus, in the absence of robust legislative surveillance, the Executive has arrogated to itself unfettered power in making decisions for the Republic. The charter, known as the Rules of Business, gives the Cabinet the upper hand in overseeing governmental operations, but also important responsibility in curbing corruption with its leverage over institutions, especially those under its direct control. These include executive agencies responsible for maintaining probity and fidelity in public administration, the most relevant being the Ministries of Public Administration, Finance and Home Affairs. Yet, several dysfunctionalities are observed to the detriment of good governance. Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA) serves as the central personnel agency of the government and manages the civil service in all career-related matters and superintends all laws relevant to ensuring integrity in administration. The administration of the Public Service Act 2018 and other rules about bureaucratic conduct are MoPA’s obligation, and it ensures their realization. The law enforcement agencies, especially the police, are regulated by Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), which relies on several laws and regulations inherited from colonial times, albeit with marginal changes. These include the Police Act 1861, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Police Regulation of Bengal 1943, and other more recent ones framed for newer forces. Being one of the most corrupt institutions in the public sector, the application of codes of conduct and integrity are more germane in corrective administration. However, loopholes in the laws, being overly outdated and decontextualized, leave room for over-use of coercive powers and civil rights abuses and accountability deficit. This intensifies corruption (Shahjahan, 2006). Under the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the National Board of Revenue (NBR) is responsible for curbing tax avoidance and evasion by taxpayers, business people or organizations. The Intelligence Cell within NBR gathers information about taxpayers and detects tax evasions, concealments of income and other offenses (GoB, 1984, section 6 and chap. xxi). In collaboration with the Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit, NBR also checks on money laundering and reclaims from overseas money that was siphoned off (Financial Express, 2019, April 18). Several State and non-State organizations are by law required to report any unauthorized transactions and suspicious activities to NBR, and hefty penalties for non-compliance are provided (Bangladesh Bank, 2013). However, corruption by tax officials colluding with taxpayers has increased over the years, even though the Income Tax Ordinance delineates a range of measures against offenses and the sorts of punishment for non-compliance of the law. In recent years, there have been severe cases of tax evasion and money laundering demonstrating the pitiful lack of application of the rules and ineffective policing.

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Prudent use of public resources by public agencies applying the norms of accountability and transparency is the responsibility of the Audit Office, a Constitutional body with substantive autonomy. Apart from the Government Auditing Standards (GAS) and a Code of Ethics, two comprehensive codes (both framed in 1999) – the Account Code embodying accounting rules and regulations and their operative procedures (Audit Office, 1999a) and the Audit Code promoting transparency, accountability, and sound economic and financial management practices in government (Audit Office, 1999b). The GAS emphasizes professional competence, fairness, and completeness in reporting financial matters (Audit Office, 1999c), while the Ethics Code provides the foundation of fidelity in auditing as it seeks “to inculcate a consistently high degree of moral and ethical values on the part of the auditors in carrying out their activities … to foster confidence in the integrity, fairness and objectivity” of the audit institution (Audit Office, 1999d, p. 2). The Code highlights values, principles, professional obligations and ethical requirements of government auditors from the standpoint of integrity, independence, objectivity, impartiality, competence, efficiency and effectiveness, political neutrality, confidentiality, substantiation, public relations, personal conduct, and conflict of interest. Despite all these appealing values and norms, the Audit Office cannot break away from the corrupt and the highhanded interventions of the Executive (Daily Star, 2012, August 13; Dhaka Tribune, 2015, January 29). The Bangladesh chapter of Transparency International (TIB) reported the detrimental effects of legal and institutional constraints on the Audit Office due to officials’ recurrent resort to bribery and failure in recovering embezzled public money (TIB, 2015). The Central Procurement Technical Unit was established to implement the Procurement Act and monitor compliance with its technical requirements, but overall surveillance of the complaints and grievances process relating to procurement has not been delegated to any specialized agency. Thus, there is a missing link and accountability consequent to which integrity issues persist along with inconsistency in the application of the law (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, p. 121). However, the introduction and increasing use of e-procurement have, to some extent, enhanced accountability, increased competition among bidders, decreased collusive practices, and thus lowered the incidence of corruption (World Bank, 2015). The Right to Information Act paved the way for the creation of the Information Commission charged with the principal function of enabling citizens access to information relating to the operations of government agencies by preserving, managing, publishing, and disseminating information. This process is to ensure transparency and accountability and reduce corruption in the public sector (GoB, 2009). The Commission has the obligation to settle citizens’ complaints by applying the formal process guided by the law. However, it is yet to achieve its operational objectives and, as one study argues, it has lagged in proactively seeking information from the government and others on issues of national interest, processing appeals, coordinating RTI-related activities and identifying the challenges facing both the demand and supply sides of implementation of the RTI law. (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, p. 12)

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Many agencies concurrently work without coordination. And numerous issues on the exemptions list have somewhat diminished the strength of the law, while public bodies are often reluctant to back the Commission’s initiatives. This prevents the detection of wrongdoings in public agencies and dampens their accountability. Added to this is people’s diffidence in requesting information either being oblivious of the mechanism or fearing harassment. The media and NGOs lack enthusiasm in making use of the RTI law because of governmental deterrents with the result proactive disclosure of e\information is unsatisfactory (Bari & Naz, 2019; MRDI, 2013). Apart from the institutions mentioned above, two more prominent agencies must be reported. The ACC is the premier institution directly concerned with the prevention of corruption in all sectors. It is an independent body created by Parliament to enforce the Anti-Corruption Act 2004. It succeeded the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) established in 1957 in Pakistan (covering all Pakistan, i.e., including Bangladesh) to execute the Anti-Corruption Act 1957. Being an Executive agency, BAC had limited functions and, thus, could not independently intervene in corruption control, particularly when concerned about Executive agencies (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2001). The ACC envisions the development of a robust anti-corruption culture that would infuse the entire society. Its mission is to “relentlessly combat and prevent corruption” by attending to three strategic objectives: combating corruption through punitive actions; pre-empting corruption through system review; and using education and advocacy to avert corruption (ACC, 2014, pp. 19 and 21). The ACC Act entrusts the Commission, among other things, to identify sources of corruption, enquire and investigate offenses or allegations of corruption, and to build awareness regarding malpractices in society. Both punitive and preventive measures against corruption command equal priority (ACC, 2014, pp. 27 and 29). The ACC Act assigns the Commission the power to investigate a range of offenses listed in the Penal Code and other legislation. Money laundering; land revenue and lease; bribes (finance, assets, and services); illegal attainment of movable or immovable assets; corruption in construction works and communication sector; implementation of development projects and corruption in private organizations; duty and tax, revenue, businessmen/business organizations; public procurement, issuance of license; criminal breach of trust and misuse of power are among the offenses (TIB, 2016, p. 34). While the ACC has made significant inroads into the corruption syndrome, it also suffers from its own shortcomings and failures. Applying TI performance assessment criteria,1 ACC obtained a score that makes it a moderately strong agency. Being unable to effectively exercise its powers due to its compromised neutrality and politically one-sided approach, the ACC has jeopardized its operational autonomy. It has been partisan and selective in conducting corruption cases. Ineffective coordination with other governmental agencies and the absence of an external mechanism to scrutinize its activities are serious shortcomings. Overall, public perception of ACC is low, and a lack of trust is evident (TIB, 2016). One in-depth study bluntly labels the ACC as a “toothless tiger” because of structural and institutional inadequacies and the extent of political influence (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014, p. 11).

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Besides the formal procedures it follows, the ACC is mandated to create awareness in society about the pitfalls of corruption and ways of mitigating it at the microlevel. Awareness is created through public programs (rallies, marches, meetings, seminars, workshops, drama, and debate and essay competitions) and by using posters, leaflets, and phone SMS messages. It has constituted “corruption prevention committees” at the sub-national levels (sub-district, district, and metropolitan areas) and “integrity units” and “honesty stores” in secondary schools “to expedite a national social movement to prevent corruption with spontaneous participation of people from all walks of social life” (ACC, 2014, p. 75; Daily Star, 2012, April 5). The formal State initiatives against corruption are supplemented by social accountability mechanisms that emphasize citizen empowerment through participation and engagement. This can be useful within an expanded anticorruption regime. Such initiatives are not regulated by legislation or State directives but by the spontaneous campaigns of civil society organizations or citizen movements. Several organizations and the media have been crusading against corruption with programs and measures. TIB has been among the frontrunners, and has launched the Committee of Concerned Citizens for citizen mobilization against corruption, Youth Engagement and Support, and Young Professionals against Corruption for cultivating in themselves deep ethical values, Face-the-Public sessions providing citizens the opportunity to interact with people’s representatives and officials, and so on. Its Report Corruption drive enables wider people’s engagement in the anti-corruption movement. Broadcasts by community radio stations, research by think tank organizations, BRAC’s community forums among others have contributed to strengthening social accountability (Rahman, 2018; TIB, n.d.). Despite the above analysis, there is an overall dysfunctional dimension of fighting corruption which may be called “the politics of anti-corruption.” The political executive along with parliament, judiciary, and bureaucracy upon whom the people have bestowed their trust together are regarded as the guardians of the public interest (Caiden, 2006). They are supposed to be torchbearers of honesty, righteousness, and morality expected to work with sincerity in achieving the goals of anti-corruption strategies. However, if the government itself falters and abuses the principles of integrity or be selective in enforcing them to secure political advantage the essence of anti-corruption is undermined. Successive governments in Bangladesh have sporadically shown their enthusiasm in containing the malady and organized moves to that end, but the partisan approach in randomly applying anti-corruption laws and measures for offenses irrespective of the personal, social, or even political disposition of the offenders has been inimical to the real purpose of corruption control. Thus, many charged with confirmed corruption have been absolved because of their connection with the ruling party, while the disloyal have been punished for allegedly owing ostensible allegiance to the opposition. Massive public scams and gross abuse of power and authority are overlooked, and offenders exonerated, although those even with the slightest inclination toward the opposite political pole are harassed and victimized (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2001).

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Partisan influence, complemented by clientelist politics and political patronage, in almost every aspect of public life has challenged ethics and morality. Laws regulating the staffing process in the civil service (recruitment, promotion, transfers, and placements) are routinely violated by the “Establishment” to reward loyalty and punish perceived perfidy, regardless of the efficiency and performance of those concerned. Extreme forms of politicization have subverted the merit principle (in assessing relative ability), exploited the equity precept (in administering quotas), and abused capacity standards (in measuring performance). This perversion of civil service management has split the bureaucracy into two groups, one representing the ruling party and the other the Opposition. Using public agencies, such as MoPA and the Public Service Commission to aid in violating the rules, the political executive has been sponsoring corrupt practices within the bureaucracy. To further stifle ACC’s autonomy and make it subservient to the political executive, the government has amended the ACC Act that precludes the Commission from prosecuting judges and public servants without the government’s prior permission for any offense they would commit (GoB, 2018, section 41). By according public servants this special privilege, the constitutional provision of equality of all citizens before the law has been breached and the force of institutive action against corruption has been weakened. At another level, several corruption cases involving mega infrastructure projects, State-owned and private banks, the stock market, and private business groups patronizing pyramid schemes have been overruled on political considerations, the perpetrators acquitted or given lenient punishment. Intriguingly, political opponents of the ruling party are made scapegoats and given harsh punishments. Corruption in the tendering process in Bangladesh is well known, and, in this, the student wing of the ruling party plays the dominant role and wrongdoers are often relieved. In these crimes, the courts instead of being impartial have often been deferential to political interference giving their verdicts political overtones. As Freedom House (2019) notes: “Criminal cases against ruling party activists are regularly withdrawn on the grounds of ‘political consideration,’ undermining the judicial process and entrenching a culture of impunity.” Collusion between judges and the ruling party has been evident with court decisions invariably going against Opposition politicians. By unfairly appointing higher court Judges, some with questionable backgrounds, the executive has contributed to the politicization of the judiciary (Islam, 2019). Thus, corruption, partisanship, and political interference have stymied the independent working of the judiciary, and fair trials impeded (USDS, 2017). The most remarkable instance of gross politicking happened after the 2008 national elections with the Awami League regaining power. The party quashed corruption charges brought against its top leaders by the preceding militarybacked caretaker government (CG) but vigorously pursued the indictments against its political adversaries. The judiciary served as an accomplice in this project and the accused were all put behind bars, including the former Prime Minister, although the CG had also implicated the incumbent head of government. This was a clear example of “reversing the significant inroads

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the caretaker government had made in targeting official corruption in favor of political considerations” (Quaidir, 2011, p. 9). In securing political advantage, grand corruption became handy.

CONCLUSION Explaining corruption in the context of Bangladesh entails a comprehensive understanding of the social, economic, political, and administrative backgrounds. Successive governments all pledged to fight and eliminate corruption, but they stumbled. Thus, the problem of corruption remains one of the most formidable challenges for the country. The framework of the traditional social structure has eroded considerably, and new values are eclipsing the earlier beliefs and ethical standards that worked as checks against the spread of corruption. Even after gaining nationhood, the ghost of colonialism continues to haunt and remains a significant factor in the incidence of corruption. Key institutions of government remain influenced by the colonial mode of thinking in making decisions and following them up. Little was done to transform the major institutions into structures suited to the needs of an independent country and letting the specter of corruption to loom heavily over Bangladesh for years to come. This chapter has outlined several dimensions of social and political pathology that have emerged and consolidated over the years. The country has an elaborate framework of laws and regulations, as well as an extensive network of institutions and agencies for dealing with this problem. Ironically, the state that has constructed the framework failed to create the conditions that are necessary for making corruption control effective. State inability has contributed to the proliferation of corruption on two counts. First, it could not exercise effective control over inflation and prevent unbridled profiteering which forced a large number of citizens toward tacit approval of corrupt practices being the only option for survival in the face of steep price increase for goods and services. Second, the state could not implement laws and enforce rules. The Parliament and its Committees, the ACC, and law and order agencies have pitifully failed to play effective roles in formulating laws, enforcing them and detect and prosecuting offenders. After returning to power in December 2018, the current government declared a zero-tolerance policy against corruption (Daily Star, 2019, February 15). However, there is no sign of abatement in the various forms of crime and corruption outlined in this chapter. Judging by current trends, corruption appears to have attained political and social acceptance, and neither the government nor the public seem to care much about the malady, other than indulging in highprofile rhetoric. With a government that tacitly shelters corruption, the only agent for change could be social forces and movements. Unfortunately, widespread acceptance suggests that the citizens are resigned to the fact that corruption is entrenched and have resigned to live with it. More importantly, if a government keeps on settling political scores using corruption as a premise, corruption control will remain an exercise in futility.

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NOTE 1.  Anti-corruption agencies in Asia were assessed against seven criteria: legal independence and status; financial and human resources; detection and investigation; prevention, education and outreach; cooperation with other organizations; accountability and oversight; and public perception of effectiveness (TIB, 2016).

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Khan, M. H. (1989). Clientelism, corruption and capitalist development: An analysis of state intervention with special reference to Bangladesh. Ph.D. thesis, Kings College, London. Khan, M. H. (2011). The political settlement and its evolution in Bangladesh. School of Oriental Studies, University of London. Retrieved from https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/12845/ Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kochanek, S. A. (2000). Governance, patronage politics, and democratic transition in Bangladesh. Asian Survey, 40(3), 530–550. Kyriakos-Saad, N., Esposito, G., & Schwarz, N. (2012). The incestuous relationship between corruption and money laundering. Dans Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 83(1–2), 161–172. Liton, S. (2013, March 31). Our all-powerful PM. The Daily Star. Mahmood, S. A. (2010). Public procurement and corruption in Bangladesh: Confronting the challenges and opportunities. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, 2(6), 103–111. McDevitt, A. (2015). Bangladesh: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption with a focus on the health sector, U4 Expert Answer. No. 5. U4. Norway: Anti-Corruption Research Centre, CHR Michelsen Institute. Montero, D. (2009a). Bangladesh: The blowback of corruption. Front Line: Stories from a Small Planet, August 21. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/08/ bangladesh-a-dirty-deal-back-fires.html Motero, D. (2009b). Bangladesh: Where corruption flows. Front Line: Stories from a Small Planet, August 13. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/08/bangladesh-1.html MRDI. (2013). Citizens’ access to information in South Asia: Diagnostic analysis – Bangladesh Chapter. Dhaka: Management and Resources Development Initiative. Mulcahy, S. (2015). Corruption in the education sector in Bangladesh. Transparency International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/corruption_in_the_education_ sector_in_bangladesh Nag, N. C. (2019). Of scams, corruption and fortunes in banking. New Age, June 19. Nawaz, F. (2012). Overview of corruption within the justice sector and law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh, U4 Expert Answer, No. 316. U4. Norway: Anti-Corruption Research Centre, CHR Michelsen Institute. Oxfam (2017). Making Tax Vanish. Oxfam Briefing Paper. July. Oxford: Oxfam. Pellegrini, L., & Gerlagh, R. (2004). Corruption’s effect on growth and its transmission channels. Kyklos, 57(3), 429–456. Quaidir, F. (2011). Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Bangladesh. Freedom House. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/BANGLADESHFINAL.pdf Quah, J. S. T. (2003). Curbing corruption in Asia: A comparative study of six countries. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. Rahman, K. (2018). Social accountability initiatives and civil society contribution to anticorruption efforts in Bangladesh. U4 Brief, No. 4. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Rahman, K. (2019). Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bangladesh. U4 Brief, No. 6. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. Rahman, M. S. (2020). Politics, governance and development in Bangladesh. New York, NY: Routledge. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reforms. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2007). Measuring private sector corruption. U4Brief, No. 5. CHR Michelsen Institute, Bergen. Sarker, A. E. (2008). Patron-client politics and its implications for good governance in Bangladesh. International Journal of Public Administration, 31(12), 1416–1440. Shahjahan, A. S. M. (2006). Police reforms in Bangladesh. In Strengthening the criminal justice system (pp. 39–50). Manila: Asian Development Bank. Solaiman, S. M. (2018). Captured by evils – Combating black money, corruption and money laundering in Bangladesh: The dog must bark to keep predators away. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 21(3), 264–289. The Daily Star. (2012, April 5 and August 13; 2015, August 24; 2017, December 22; 2019, February 15). National English daily newspaper. The Dhaka Tribune. (2015, January 29; 2019, May 7; 2020, May 4). National English daily newspaper. The Financial Express. (2014, January 8, 14, and 16; 2019, April 18; 2020, June 4) National English daily newspaper.

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The Independent. (2017, November 19). National English daily newspaper. TIB. (2015). Corruption in the office of Comptroller and Auditor General. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh. TIB. (2016). Anti-corruption agency strengthening initiative assessment of the Bangladesh AntiCorruption Commission. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh. TIB. (2018). Corruption in Service Sectors: National Household Survey 2017. Dhaka: Transparency International. Retrieved from https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/2018/report/nhs/ NHS_2017_Ex_Sum_EN.pdf TIB. (2010). National household survey 2010 on corruption in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh. TIB. (n.d.). Bangladesh launches online “Report Corruption” Initiative. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh. Retrieved from tibangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/activities/4776ti-bangladesh-launches-online-report-corruption-initiative Transparency International (TI). (2009). The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide. Dhaka: TI. Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/the_anti_corruption_plain_ language_guide. Transparency International (TI). (2014). Fighting corruption in South Asia: Building accountability. Berlin. https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/fighting-corruption-in-south-asia-buildingaccountability Transparency International (TI). (2019a). Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2018. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. Accessed on February 3, 2019. Transparency International (TI). (2019b). Asia Pacific: Little to no progress on anti-corruption. https:// www.transparency.org/en/news/asia-pacific-makes-little-to-no-progress-on-anti-corruption Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399–457. Uddin, AKM Zamir. (2018, December 6). Default loans at all-time high. The Daily Star. p. 9 UN. (2005). United Nations convention against corruption. New York, NY: The United Nations. USDS. (2017). Human rights report: Bangladesh 2017. Washington, DC: Department of State. Waris, A., & Latif, A. L. (2013). Black Money Whitening Law: A study from Bangladesh. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Wise, V., Ali, M. M., & Wise, T. (2010). Ethical conduct in business: A case study analysis using Bangladesh experiences. Problems and Perspectives in Management, 8(4), 184–192. World Bank. (2012). World Bank statement on Padma Bridge. Washington, DC. The World Bank. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/06/29/world-bank-statement-padma-bridge World Bank. (2013). Enterprise surveys: Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2015). Wind of change: Digital procurement transforms Bangladesh. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2018). The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2018. Retrieved from info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xlsx World Bank. (2019). WGI Data Set, 2018. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ index.aspx?fileName=wgidataset.xlsx#home World Economic Forum (WEF). (2017). Global competitiveness report, 2017–2018. Cologny: WEF. Zafarullah, H. (1987). Public administration in the first decade of Bangladesh: Some observations on trends and development. Asian Survey, 27(4), 459–476. Zafarullah, H. (1999). Consolidating democratic governance: One step forward, two steps back. In M. Alauddin & S. Hasan (Eds.), Development, governance and the environment in South Asia (pp. 181–193). London: Macmillan. Zafarullah, H. (2003). Globalisation, state and politics in Bangladesh: Implications for democratic governance. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 26(3), 283–296. Zafarullah, H. (2016). Public Administration and Bureaucracy. In A. Riaz & S. Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh (pp. 94–108). London: Routledge. Zafarullah, H., & Siddiquee, N. A. (2001). Dissecting public sector corruption in Bangladesh: Issues and problems of control. Public Organization Review: A Global Journal, 1, 465–448.

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CHAPTER 6 CORRUPTION IN TWO LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS: THE EXPERIENCES OF BRAZIL AND CHILE IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Daniel Zirker

ABSTRACT Brazil and Chile have nearly similar recent political histories. Emerging from protracted military dictatorships at roughly the same time, both developed presidential and representative democratic processes, though with contrasting individual national emphases. Military dictatorships in both countries originated in anti-­corruption rationales, among others, and both have emphasized anticorruption practices since regime changes. Brazil impeached two presidents, ostensibly for corrupt practices. Yet, Chile has managed a corruption level, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, that is among the lowest in Latin America, while Brazil’s is among the highest. This study compares and contrasts the two nations’ experiences with a view to uncover key causal, or at least explanatory, variables in this striking contrast in levels of perceived corruption. Keywords: Brazil; Chile; corruption; need-based corruption; greed-based corruption; Odebrecht Scandal; intentional homicide data

INTRODUCTION Why do two politically and legally nearly similar democratizing nations in Latin America, Brazil and Chile, manifest such contrasting levels of corruption? Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 79–98 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034007

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Democratizing countries in Latin America have followed various contrasting forms of democracy, and have experienced contrasting levels of corruption. Widely varying levels of corruption in Brazil and Chile, the focus of this chapter, are noted. Specific contrasting political patterns, respective measures of the quality of democracy, and their contrasting tendencies regarding corrupt practices, are intriguing given the largely cultural and political similarities of the two countries (Foweraker, 2001; Hagopian, 2005; Posner, 2003). Chile and Brazil manifest many, at least nominally, political and legal similarities:

• Both succumbed to bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the 1960–1980s. • Both initiated democratization projects by the 1990s, with US-style government structures. • Both countries have experienced economic booms since the 1990s. • The military establishments in both countries nevertheless retained what • •

Alfred Stepan called military prerogatives. Both Chile and Brazil have had similar Latin American political cultures. Both had experimented with limited democracy in the first half of the twentieth century. Both have repeatedly elected presidents since their “civilianization” in the 1980s, from leftist and rightist candidates.

Two potentially significant measures on which Chile and Brazil vary markedly, however, are “intentional homicide” rates per 100,000 population (Chile: 4.40; Brazil: 27.38), which are thought by some observers accurately to correlate with less measurable crime statistics, such as corruption (Centers for Disease Control USA, n.d.; UNDP Human Development Reports, 2020), as well as estimates of civilian firearms per 100 persons in the two countries, also thought to relate in some way to overall crime rates (Karp, 2018; Small Arms Survey, n.d.). The comparative Chilean and Brazilian statistics on gun ownership are counter-intuitive, however, given Brazil’s high rate, and Chile’s low rate, of violent crime. Brazil’s homicide rate, discussed in detail below, is the highest in South America and among the highest in the world, while Chile’s figures are among the lowest (UNODC, 2019). Chile’s “Estimate of Civilian Firearms per 100 Persons,” on the other hand, at 12.1, is far higher than Brazil’s 8.3 (Karp, 2018; Small Arms Survey, n.d.). Political comparisons of the two countries after 1998 are perhaps best recounted by Frances Hagopian’s 2005 study, which noted that these two democratizing countries shared common institutional designs (e.g., strong presidencies, and a recent past of military dictatorship and human rights violations) as well as other Latin American political and cultural practices. Nevertheless, she observed that these two countries varied markedly in their respective levels of popular participation and representation, with the Chilean population much less participatory and less focused upon political representation than that of Brazil (p. 125), although much more concerned with protection of human rights, the Rule of Law and fairness than is Brazil. Hagopian associated less participatory and less representative democracies with lower levels of corruption, and predicted that Brazil, centrally concerned

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with participation and representation, would, therefore, continue to manifest higher levels of crime and corruption than would Chile. While her predictions were accurate, her causal explanations are now nearly 15 years out of date. Hagopian concluded that the “quality of democracy” in both countries, despite their dissimilar processes, was rising in 2005, and that “improvements in the quality of these two democracies may prefigure a more promising democratic future for Latin America than today’s reports of doom announce” (p. 126). The apparent stalling of the democratization process in Brazil over the past decade is striking, therefore, and out of step with Hagopian’s analysis. The inauguration of a right-leaning and exclusionary populist presidency of Jair Bolsonaro in January, 2019, was transformative. Two previous Presidents were indicted for corruption: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, in early 2018, the most popular presidential candidate (excluded from appearing on the October 2018 presidential ballot, since released on bail); and outgoing President Michel Temer, one of the chief architects of the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (Fernandes, 2019; Grellet, Macedo, Vassallo, & Merki II, 2019; Jansen, 2019). This represented a democratic nadir, rather than the predicted progress, particularly given that Brazil had been noted for its emphasis on political participation and representation. Bolsonaro, significantly a former military officer, was elected to the presidency having campaigned as an advocate of the violent application of military discipline to address the daily threats to personal security, human rights violations and corruption that had intensified markedly over the previous two decades. He vastly increased the presence at the highest levels of government of retired senior military officers (Cantanhêde, 2019; Londono & Andreoni, 2018), although he also elevated the public image, if not reality, of anti-corruption efforts. Transparency International (TI) has argued that the fight against corruption may in fact be necessary to save Brazil’s democracy (France & Martini, 2019). The Brazilian elections of 2018 were severely impacted by charges of corruption following two related networks of scandals, “Car Wash” (Lava Jato) and Odebrecht scandals, and their many tangents. Bolsonaro had highlighted anti-­ corruption efforts as one of his three election foci. However, his oft-quoted declaration that “Democracy [will] only exist if the Armed Forces wish it to do so” (Luna & Lindner, 2019; Weterman, 2019b), pointed to much more than the addressing of crime and corruption. The appointment as Minister of Justice of Sérgio Moro, the Judge and Chief Prosecutor of Lava Jato, who had earlier convicted and imprisoned Lula, was of concern. Moro declared after his appointment that the government’s top priority would remain the remediation of corruption (Fagundes & Osakabe, 2019). This was ameliorated to some extent by Moro’s 2020 unexpected departure from government and verbal attack on Bolsonaro. The prosecution of Bolsonaro’s son in a major corruption scandal (Darlington, 2019), said by Bolsonaro’s vice-president, General Hamilton Mourão, to be “a worry for Bolsonaro as a father, but not for the government” (Weterman, 2019a), ironically both underscored and undermined the sincerity of Bolsonaro’s anti-corruption campaign.

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COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW The widely contrasting propensities of Chile and Brazil to engage (or not) in corruption, phenomena that are regarded by many as the bane of democratization, are touched upon precisely as the result of more participatory democratization, a counter-intuitive conclusion that Hagopian has posited (Hagopian, 2005). She recognized that “Chile [was] easily the least corrupt country in Latin America” (p. 132), while Brazil, improving markedly after 2010 in its prosecution of high-level corruption, in 2005 manifested in dramatic numbers the ubiquitous presence of both petty and high-level corruption. While Brazil and Chile may be two bellwether countries (albeit, at opposite extremes) in Latin America as regards corruption and the fight against it in Latin America, Chile has nominally increased in perceptions of corruption in the country, including the corruption scandal involving the son of former president Michelle Bachelet, which triggered by itself a national anti-corruption drive (AQ, 2015). In 2005, the respective national scores in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) had Chile ranked at the 21st and Brazil at the 62nd of the 159 countries surveyed. By 2019, Chile had a CPI national ranking of 26th least corrupt country out of the 180 countries ranked, while Brazil was ranked at the 106th as one of the most corrupt countries in the region, if not in the world. Three causal factors, including Hagopian’s focus upon the active participation of citizens’ involvement in democracy, appear to explain the continuing and growing differences in perceived corruption levels: the specific natures of, differences between, and emerging outcomes of their respective democratization processes in the 1990s and after; significant and growing differences in political cultures; and the opportunistic presence of corrupt and corrupting private corporations, most notably the construction giant in Brazil, Odebrecht, a massive company that has “reached out” to infect bribery most of Brazil’s neighbors, including Chile (Reuters, 2017), and even two African countries (Faiola, 2018), dragging them all into a massive, and arguably Brazilian-based, web of bribery and kickbacks (Larmer, 2018). Odebrecht has been the focus of massive investigations and prosecutions (Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 2018). One important development in Brazil after 2010, the public investigation and prosecution of “greed corruption” (Bauhr, 2017; Fagundes & Osakabe, 2019), likely, but not necessarily, has attenuated the spread of high-level corruption. For some observers, however, the rapid adoption of widespread anti-corruption efforts has had a counter-productive effect (Castaneda, 2018). Specific elements of the democratization process, including the enhancement of the rule-of-law, personal security, and institutional accountability, appear to have been present in far greater measure in Chile in 2015, while Brazilian democratization seemed, at least before 2016 (and the impeachment of a sitting President on largely political, and significantly not on corruption, grounds), to have a greater degree of political participation, less political elitism, and more tangible political responsiveness. These last characteristics may be less important, however, in limiting corruption, as broader comparisons indicate at a first glance (Table 1).

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Table 1.  Brazil and Chile in Comparison. Population (2017, 2019) Population density Size Military force in numbers GDP estimate (total) GDP per capita Gini coefficient CPI National Ranking 2018 Irregular executive transfers (impeachments) since 1990

Chile

Brazil

17.6 million 24/K2 756,000 K2 83,000 active duty 62,000 reservists $305 billion $27,058 0.477 27th/180 0

210.147 million 25/K2 8.5 million K2 223,000 active duty 1.9 million reservists $1.93 trillion $9,159 0.513 105th/180 2

Sources: Based on data from Global Firepower: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-militarystrength-detail.asp?country_id=chile; https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail. asp?country_id=brazil; IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics). 2010 Census; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (October 2006) "Compendio estadístico 2006" [Chile].

Brazil

Chile

USA

Canada

Australia

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Rate per 100,000 in 2012

Rate per 100,000 in 2013

Rate per 100,000 in 2014

Rate per 100,000 in 2015

Rate per 100,000 in 2016

Fig. 1.  Intentional Homicide Victims Per 100,000 Population. Source: Author, based on data from UN Office on Drugs and Crime: https://dataunodc. un.org/crime/intentional-homicide-victims

Both Chile and Brazil experienced a very gradual decline in military influence after the respective “civilianization” processes that followed the voluntary ending of the two dictatorships (Brazil in 1985 and Chile in 1989), although Chile appears to have retained more social discipline from its dictatorial period than did Brazil (Madrid, Hunter, & Weyland, 2010). Political culture, in this instance, may have played an important role in limiting corruption. “Bottom-up” (or “need-based”) corruption, however, contrasts sharply with “top-down” (or “greed-based”) corruption, the form that has plagued Brazilian politics since the early 1990s (Bauhr, 2012, 2017). Another factor may be the overall predominance of criminality in an extreme form – the relative incidence of homicide that separate Brazil dramatically from Chile (Fig. 1).

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Successful versus unsuccessful governmental strategies in the fight against corruption represent separate potential causal factors, however. While both nations have been preoccupied with fighting corruption, Chile has approached anticorruption actions very differently from those promoted by Brazil. The recruitment of special prosecutors in Brazil contrasts sharply with a reliance upon the militarized police force, the Carabiñeros, in Chile. Significant differences in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator for “Control of Corruption” (Fig. 4), moreover, imply that the Brazilian government has been far less active in enacting measures to control corruption than has been the government of Chile. Nevertheless, the significant presence of “grand corruption,” and its increasing prosecution in Brazil, remains key in the comparison. The appointment of the effective anti-corruption prosecutor and judge, Sérgio Moro, as the Minister of Justice and Public Security in the Bolsonaro government in early 2019 suggested that the sweeping prosecutions of large-scale corruption would continue in Brazil even after Moro’s unceremonious departure. Nostalgia had been rapidly growing among voters for the “order and stability” of the 21-year military dictatorship (Lopes 2018a; May, 2018), although the military has by no means been exempt from corruption scandals over the past decade (Romero, 2015). The two countries have differed dramatically in respect to human rights (Hagopian, 2005, p. 127), as noted above, and have also varied in measures of individual well-being, per capita GDP, and overall quality of life. The 2015 UNDP Human Development Index ranked Chile as the 38th and Brazil as the 79th out of 188 countries (UNDP Human Development Reports (2020). Perhaps the most impressive variability in the socio-political data of the two countries involves their respective longitudinal rankings in TI’s CPI. Chile, remains “easily the least corrupt country in Latin America” (Glickhouse, 2015; Hagopian, 2005, p. 132), outpacing Brazil in the CPI by a wide margin. Freedom of press, widely regarded as key to a stable democracy, also tends to expose, and thereby limit, the institutionalization of corrupt practices. As Fig. 2 demonstrates, Brazil has had a constant and significantly lower ranking in the 2000 0

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

50 100 150 200 Chile

Brazil

Total # of Countries

Fig. 2.  Press Freedom Index Rankings and Total Ranked. Source: Press Freedom Index.

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Chile 2018

2016

2014

2012

Brazil 2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Fig. 3.  Press Freedom Index Ranking/Total Ranked. Source: Press Freedom Index.

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 –0.2 –0.4

–0.6

2010

2011

2012

2013 Brazil

2014

2015

2016

2017

Chile

Fig. 4.  Worldwide Governance Indicators: “Political Stability and Violence” (2.5=Weak; +2.5=Strong). Source: World Wide Governance Indicators.

Press Freedom Index, although both countries are well above the Latin American median. When the Press Freedom Index data are corrected by dividing the rankings into the total number of countries ranked, the significant difference between Brazil and Chile on press freedom becomes smooth and consistent (Fig. 3). The widespread presence of social violence and civil insecurity in Brazil, illustrated in comparison to Chile in the Worldwide Governance Indicators of Political Stability and Violence (Fig. 4), relates directly to Brazil’s relative inability to secure the rule-of-law as a national policy. Moreover, as Canache and Allison (2005) note, many, if not all of the Latin American national populations are painfully aware of the need to remediate corruption. In this context, Chile would appear to have been able to translate this popular sentiment more successfully into action, while Brazil has been far less successful.

BRAZILIAN-BASED CORRUPTION SCANDALS Brazil has experienced a multitude of corruption scandals over the past three decades, including most recently the huge Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) network of

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scandals, leading to the imprisonment and disqualification of the country’s most popular 2018 presidential candidate, former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, in 2018, and the indictment and prosecution of many members of the Brazilian Congress over the past three years. In 2019, the Acting President (a former VicePresident under Dilma Rousseff), Michel Temer, was arrested for obstruction of justice, racketeering, corruption, and money laundering (Alves, 2019; Fernandes, 2019; Jansen, 2019; Pupo, 2019). Although regarded as one of three Latin American countries spared the stigma of major corruption (Castaneda, 2018), Chile has investigated its own Odebrecht bribery scandals (Casey, 2017). It may be somewhat misleading to compare Chile and Brazil on the TI criterion of perceived corruption, however, given the international nature of corrupt practices in the contemporary global environment. The Panama Papers and Paradise Papers scandals, for example, had little to do with domestic politics except for their tax-avoidance focus. Nevertheless, rising above all other South American scandals is the significant influence of a single, massive, corruptionprone building contractor, headquartered in Brazil, Odebrecht. Odebrecht alone has been the progenitor of a vast network of bribery and “kickbacks” affecting at least 16 Latin American and African countries, including Chile (BBC, 2017). It has been called “the largest foreign bribery case in history” (Pressly, 2018). This network of scandals alone would seem to separate, although not explain, the variability in corruption levels between the cases of Brazil and Chile. As noted above, it has been responsible for the suicide of a previous Peruvian president, Alan Garcia (Zarate & Casey, 2019), and the resignation of one of his successors in that presidency (Faiola, 2018; Tegel, 2018). Odebrecht’s comprehensive bribery schemes have already led to criminal investigations and criminal prosecutions of senior officials in 16 countries (BBC, 2017), including, most prominently, Brazil, and Chile as well (Reuters, 2017). The British Broadcasting Corporation’s list of the amounts admitted to have been paid to senior officials in Latin American and African countries by Odebrecht is staggering:

• Brazil $349m • Venezuela $98m $92m • Dominican Republic Panama $59m • • Angola $50m • Argentina $35m • Ecuador $33.5m • Peru $29m • Guatemala $18m $11m (with a further $16m alleged) • Colombia Mexico $10m • • Mozambique $1m $10.5m (alleged) • Antigua

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• El Salvador • Chile

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Alleged

Source: BBC (2017, December 15).

The power exerted by this firm alone seems to have transformed Latin America’s record for adherence to corrupt practices. Mexico, for example, as of late 2018 was said to be “dragging its feet” as regards a firm reaction to its involvement in an Odebrecht scandal (Christofaro, Verza, & Associated Press, 2018), and Colombia’s involvement was said to be far larger than previously assumed (Fieser, 2016). Brazil and Chile experienced simultaneous corruption scandals in 2015, at a time when both were governed by women Presidents with declining popularity and their countries’ rising Gini Coefficients. The series of interlocking corruption scandals created the sense that the two Presidents, Michelle Bachelet and Dilma Rousseff, did not have the strength to counter them, and were opposed by very conservative Oppositions which have subsequently taken the presidencies. Bachelet was forced to respond to charges that her son was engaged in influence-peddling, which led to a plan that called for greater transparency in public official’s finances (Glickhouse, 2015), the requirements of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) that both Chile and Brazil had ratified, but that few countries had (or have to-date) fully implemented. Bachelet declared that all public sector officials will be required to annually submit a declaration of financial assets, with the first submission deadline set for April 30, 2015. Bachelet also plans to amend the constitution to mandate that former presidents continue to file the declaration of assets even after they have left office. Bachelet asserted that she will make the first move by declaring her own assets. (AQ, 2015)

In the same month, March 2015, Dilma Rousseff responded to the Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) scandal that ultimately led to, but was curiously not a formal charge in, her impeachment in 2016. The Lava Jato scandal was frequently referred to in the press by the name of one of its components, the Petrobrás Scandal (e.g., Glickhouse, 2015).

REVISITING POPULISM VERSUS GOOD GOVERNMENT Both Brazil and Chile have shared many populist and authoritarian political commonalities. Brazil was confronted with national-level populist politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, and Chile in the 1950s (Grugel, 1992). The Presidents of both countries, João Goulart in Brazil in 1964, and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, were overthrown in authoritarian and military-led coups, to be replaced by extended, non-charismatic institutional military interventions thereafter. Brazil’s military dictatorship lasted from 1964 to 1985, and Chile’s from 1973 to 1989.

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Latin American populism, long associated with transitions to authoritarianism, has resurfaced in Brazil (Londono & Andreoni, 2018; Lopes, 2018b; Lopes & Faiola, 2019). Brazil’s new president, Jair Bolsonaro, who promised in his campaign to end the remaining vestiges of civility, if not civil society (Reuters & Broadle, 2018), and to reaffirm ties with a more dictatorial set of military officers (Londono & Andreoni, 2018; Lopes, 2018a, 2018b), is in stark contrast to Chile’s recent Presidents, who have emphasized civil presidential electoral processes, on the one hand, while alternating between conservatives and more liberal social democrats. The World Bank’s measure of comparative political stability and the presence of violence in the two countries is noteworthy for its striking gap in the post-dictatorial periods, as Fig. 4 demonstrates. Authoritarianism during the military dictatorships in both countries was decidedly rightist and elite-centered, and the respective military regimes cooperated fully with each other in arresting and extraditing “subversives.” They also cooperated with other authoritarian regimes in the region (those of Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay) in Operation Condor, a joint military/police venture in arresting and “repatriating” leftists from-and-to participating countries. Brazil experienced a far less repressive and bloody dictatorship than was extant in Chile. An estimated 3,000 political detainees were executed summarily or “disappeared” in Chile, that is, murdered and concealed, without trial (The Associated Press, 2011). Comparable numbers for Brazil, with well over 10 times the population, were probably between 450 and 500 (Centers for Disease Control, n.d.; Hagopian, 2005). Both countries maintained murderous and torture-prone cadres throughout their dictatorial periods. Brazilian social repression, a longterm pattern related to social control of slums, furthered the practice well into this century. The civilianization of both regimes technically took place in the 1980s, although under the cover of “amnesty laws” designed to protect the military and police violators of human rights. Brazil’s 2018 populist presidential campaign significantly focused upon anti-corruption and pro-authoritarian sentiments. The economic elites, who appear to be the primary beneficiaries of this electoral swing, will likely vitiate reforms, however. Chile, on the other hand, has taken even relatively minor instances of corrupt practices very seriously (AQ, 2015), alternating between moderate left-of-center and right-of-center Presidents. Voters’ choices were apparently influenced by their strident reactions to relatively mild corruption scandals.

SECRECY, VARYING PERCEPTIONS, AND MEASURES OF CORRUPTION Corruption has long been thought to be “ever present where power is wielded” (Friedrich, 1972, p. 141). It is regarded, moreover, as a likely condition in most countries immersed in the global economy. Corruption in global, and certainly in Latin American, contexts is widely regarded as regressive vis-á-vis national development (Waisman, 2014), if not linked to political instability. While it is

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argued by some that it can at least occasionally serve a positive developmental role (Friedrich, 1972, p. 128), bribery, kickbacks, influence pedaling, nepotism, official fraud, and election tampering, the major categories of corruption in the global environment, lead to greater socio-economic inequality, and even “deindustrialization” (Waisman, 2014). The secretive nature of corruption vitiates most attempts accurately to measure it (Canache & Allison, 2005). Major analysis of the primary conceptual elements of corruption (Johnston, 2005; Klitgaard, 1991; Quah, 2014; Rose, 2018; RoseAckerman, 1999; Tummala, 2002) tend to agree that corruption is a complex and multivariate concept, and is profoundly difficult to measure; it is largely dependent upon political, cultural and economic contexts. Additionally, it is said effectively to erode trust in government (Lagard, 2018). Lambsdorff’s (1999) macroanalysis of the literature argues that corruption is best measured on a comparative basis, emphasizing perceptions of corruption, such as those afforded in TI’s CPI. Brazil, unlike Chile, experienced a virtual wave of national corruption scandals following the impeachment in 1992 of the second post-dictatorship civilian President, Fernando Collor de Mello, ostensibly for a widespread corruption scheme, although also, curiously, immediately after his highly publicized fallout with the military establishment over its dominance of intelligence. National corruption scandals have appeared to have infected popular consciousness, perhaps elevating such scandals beyond the realm of rational scrutiny and reasonable control. Jorge G. Castaneda (2018), a former Cabinet Minister of Mexico, has questioned the growing intensity of Latin America’s obsession with ending corruption: “(H)ave recent events against corruption [in Latin America] begun to threaten democracy and the rule of law, instead of strengthening them?,” he asked. A network of corruption scandals emanating from a major Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht, has led to bribery charges in more than a dozen Latin American and African countries (Casey, 2017; Larmer, 2018; Pressly, 2018; Reuters, 2017). But the suicide of a former Peruvian President, Alan García (Zarate & Casey 2019), and the resignation of another Peruvian President, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Tegel, 2018) has weakened simple comparisons of the two Latin American countries on levels of corruption. It is the remediation of corruption, and repeated failures thereof, which perhaps most clearly divides Brazil and Chile. Comparative levels of serious crime are particularly relevant in this regard. As noted above, Chile has had one of the lowest homicide rates as well as the lowest perceived levels of corruption in Latin America, while, on the other hand, Brazil has had among the highest of both. Their historical and cultural similarities, then, pale before this centrally determinant factor. Hagopian argued in 2005 that in Chile the democratic government has had to share de jure power with individuals and institutions with non-democratic bases, support for democracy is mediocre, political participation has declined dramatically, and responsiveness and accountability have diminished. (p. 125)

Brazil’s struggles regarding ensuring the rule-of-law and respect for human rights, on the other hand, have lagged far behind the efforts of Chile. The continuing and systematic use of torture and extra-judicial executions of criminals

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in Brazil have accompanied a system-wide breakdown of personal security. Thus, while most of the police in both countries are ultimately under, or potentially under, the command of the military, the military establishment in Brazil, unlike that in Chile, has seen prominent military officers convicted and imprisoned on corruption charges (Romero, 2015). There is evidence of gross malfeasance and even corrupt practices during the Chilean military dictatorship, although the scale and intensity of post-authoritarian cases are far less evident. Both countries elected women Presidents who succeeded to the presidency on their own records and abilities – Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, and Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Both were said to have suffered torture as captured activists during dictatorships. And while both countries have retreated to some extent from their amnesty laws (which guaranteed that guerrillas, as well as regime torturers and executioners during the dictatorships would not be prosecuted after democratization), both have established commissions to investigate human rights violations of the past. Neither have focused effectively on comprehensively punishing former torturers, however. The most that can be said regarding the punishment of blatant human rights violations during the dictatorships is that there have been occasional scandals and cover-ups related to the years of dictatorhsips. A retired Brazilian “hard-line” army general, Hamilton Mourão, is now Brazil’s Vice-President. His (as well as President Bolsonaro’s) open endorsement of military intervention and human rights violations, including endorsing torture as an acceptable practice (Genot, 2018), is striking. Coincidentally, both former Presidents, Michelle Bachelet of Chile and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil, signed anti-corruption measures into law during the same month, March, 2015 (Glickhouse, 2015). The differences in the CPI rankings of the two countries remain profound, however, as Table 2 illustrates. In graphic representation, the two countries’ CPI rankings have evinced a continuous disparity across decades, as demonstrated in Fig. 5.

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Chile

Brazil

Fig. 5.  CPI Rankings. Source: TI. n.d. for 2013.

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Table 2.  CPI Rankings of Brazil and Chile. Year of CPI Ranking 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 No data 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Chile CPI Ranking

Brazil CPI Ranking

Total # of Countries Ranked

Chile Ranking/ Total Countries Ranked

Brazil Ranking/ Total Countries Ranked

21 23 20 19 18 18 17 20 20 21 20 22 23 25 21 22 20

40 36 46 45 49 46 45 54 59 62 70 72 80 75 69 73 69

 54  52  85  99  90  91 102 133 145 158 163 179 180 180 178 182 174

0.39 0.44 0.24 0.19 0.2 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11

0.74 0.69 0.54 0.45 0.54 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.40

21 23 24 26 27

69 76 79 96 105

174 167 176 180 180

0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14

0.40 0.46 0.45 0.53

Source: Author, based on TI. N.D. for 2013.

Chile

Brazil

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Fig. 6.  CPI Rankings/Total Countries Ranked. Source: TI. n.d.

When those rankings are divided by the total number of countries ranked in each year, with a view to showing the global impact of this ordinal data more fairly, the disparity is further emphasized, as noted in Fig. 6. Evidence of corruption in Chile is rare, and tends to trigger an over-response by the government. In 2015, following the embarrassing revelation that her son

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2

1.5 1 0.5 0 –0.5 –1

2010

2011

2012

2013 Brazil

2014 Chile

2015

2016

2017

Fig. 7.  World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators – Control of Corruption (−2.5=Week; +2.5=Strong). Source: World Bank (n.d.).

had received preferential bank loans while serving as the socio-cultural director for the presidency, President Michelle Bachelet announced a sweeping anticorruption program for Chile (AQ, 2015; Glickhouse, 2015). The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and specifically the “Control of Corruption” measurement, likewise underscore this comparative disparity between Brazil and Chile in reaction to evidence of corruption, as noted in Fig. 7.

CONCLUSION As the growing number of “corruption scandals” in Brazil and, to a much lesser extent, Chile, have suggested, the impact of globalization and the question of domestic propensity for crime, which invariably includes corrupt practices, seem to be left out of the picture entirely. Elites who regard their class interests as national interests, for example, and “administration [as] their personal fortress from which they direct the political and economic life of the nation” (Friedrich, 1972, p. 145), to justify their intentions (e.g., survival of their political party) in their conduct of corrupt practices, appear often to be directed by greed clothed in neo-liberal ideology. The important distinction between “need” and “greed” corruption is likewise a confounding factor in the linking of the intentions of domestic elites to corrupt practices (Bauhr, 2012, 2017). In distinguishing between definitional and operational corruption, and its fundamental illegality (Tummala, 2002, p. 44), we are confronted with the argument for system maintenance – the “need” in poor countries to sustain a bureaucracy with informal “user fees.” This would seem at first glance to be less pernicious than “greed corruption.” As Monika Bauer notes: Citizens tend to mobilize, become engaged, and act against corruption if corruption is needed to gain access to public services or to avoid abuses by the police, or if corruption is necessary to secure a government contract even with the most competitive bid, as opposed to in the case that corruption grants special illicit advantages, such as cheaper services or winning a contract without offering the most competitive bid. In short, exposure to need corruption may give rise

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to citizens’ desire to impose sanctions, while greed corruption, instead, leads to concealment and disengagement, allowing institutions rife with venality to remain unchecked. (Bauer, 2017, pp. 561–562)

Bureaucrats in both Brazil and Chile tend to receive salaries well above subsistence levels, but in all cases well below the economic elite, whom they often aspire to join. Moreover, culture plays a subsidiary role in the emergence of greed corruption, and the social acceptability of present-giving and “tipping” as part of the problem. Present-giving, and gratuities, deeply woven into the fabric of Latin American cultures, can be said to open the door to greed-based corruption (Noonan, 1984, p. 687), usually at much greater levels, and almost always operationally (not simply technically) illegal. Noonan argues, perhaps overly harshly, that no gift is ever given without the expectation of reciprocity of some sort. However, the jump from gift-giving, or tipping, to bribery is, he argues, a short one indeed. A broader examination of comparative levels of corruption in Chile and Brazil has been plausibly linked to the literature of “good government” and the “quality of democracy.” In one of the most perspicacious comparisons of “good government in Chile and Brazil” (Hagopian, 2005), it is argued that corruption directly impinges upon good government, and, inversely, the quality of government impacts upon the level of corruption. This feedback, or “chicken-and-egg” problem, nevertheless offers us a range of insights into factors that may encourage, if not cause, variable levels of corruption in different countries, as is the case in Brazil and Chile. While the protection of basic freedoms and rights, the supremacy of the rule of law, and even basic equality are crucial to the achievement of good government and a decent society, a highquality democracy also requires a government that is accountable to other state agencies and responsive to citizens[…]. (Hagopian, 2005, pp. 124–125)

Hagopian (2005, pp. 125–126) observed, “the quality of democracy in both Chile and Brazil is rising,” although she clarified that Most Latin American countries at that time were viewed as “corrupt and unfair,” with Chile and Brazil seen as “among the most unequal countries in the world ….” Today, in view of their wide variability in a range of other factors, as noted above, the conclusion that democratic practices in both countries were improving is directly countered by basic data: growing inequality, the apparent breakdown of civility, and a striking rise in corruption scandals. Over the past five years, moreover, the quality of democracy in Brazil, at least, does not seem to be rising, and at least some of this change may relate directly to the widespread presence of corrupt practices. In a general sense, the quality of democracy and democratization are widely thought to have a determinant effect in lowering corruption levels, although Hagopian noted as regards democracy in a Latin American (and Chilean and Brazilian) context, “until now [2005] there has been no consensus on how the quality of democracy is to be defined, or once defined, how it can be operationalized” (p. 124). She added that high ratings in the quality of democratic government require, in addition to “the protection of basic freedoms and rights,

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the supremacy of the rule of law, and even basic equality,” should also include governmental accountability and responsiveness, as well as “meaningful competition for power, and satisfied citizens participating in political life” (pp. 124– 125). Christine Lagard (2018), former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has argued, perhaps ironically, given that she herself was convicted in 2016 of “negligence” as an arbitrator in a massive, government-ordered arbitration, that corrupt practices ultimately erode popular trust in government. Hence, Brazil’s higher rating by Hagopian in participatory democratic practices seems to be irrelevant in current politics. Adaptations and transformations of political culture in Chile and Brazil after 2010 have been heavily influenced by economic booms, busts, and even short bursts of “stagflation.” Brazil’s new lower middle class, largely the product of cash-transfer payments under the Lula and Dilma governments (thought to have raised 40 million people above the poverty line), represented a major new political dynamic that has subsequently been copied in a number of Latin American countries. With the economic downturn in 2012, a large segment of the population, this new lower middle class, was pushed toward a much more favorable view of populism, if not authoritarianism, a political dynamic long thought to be extant (Nun, 1970). Crime statistics rose markedly (Murray, Cerqueira, & Kahn, 2013). Bolsonaro, whose presidency began five years later, and in close collaboration with the military (Weterman, 2019c), proceeded apace in the months following his inauguration. Chile, on the other hand, reacted to its iteration of the global economic downturn with a much higher degree of discipline and adherence to democratic practices in 2019, having alternated between social democratic and moderate conservative presidencies and governments over the previous three decades. Hence, while Chile and Brazil continue to have extraordinarily high levels of socio-economic inequality, often linked to high crime rates, Brazil has been largely unable to protect civil rights, or impose the rule-of-law necessary to fight corruption formally and democratically (Hagopian, 2005, p. 125). On the other hand, since 2010 the prosecutions of major “greed corruption” (Bauhr, 2012, 2017) cases in Brazil have increased geometrically, and have included the indictment of nearly half of the Brazilian Congress. Chile has been more consistent in policing corrupt practices over the past three decades. While the quality of democracy was thought, in 2005 at least, to have been rising in both countries, Hagopian noted at the time that Chile had a democratic process that was “less violent, more effective, cleaner, and fairer” than in Brazil, although Chilean democracy was, in her analysis, “less responsive, less accountable, and less representative” than was democracy in Brazil (p. 126). How might we understand widely varying levels of corruption in these two largely similar democratizing systems? Do these remarkably varying levels of corruption simply underscore profound differences in democracy? Despite Chile’s relatively poorer record in political rights, including accountability for its dictatorial period, it is by all measures a significantly less corrupt country than is Brazil, and appears far less likely to evince corrupt practices in the future. Much of this may have to do with Chile’s significantly higher quality of democracy, on some measures,

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which may both “cause” lower levels of corruption, and, in turn, be “caused” by them. Brazil, on the other hand, had not prosecuted the vast majority of the dozens of major cases of high-level corruption until after 2008, and the conviction of financier Daniel Dantas (Prado & Carson, 2014; The Economist, 2008). It was also the headquarters of the wildly corrupt construction company, Construtora Norberto Odebrecht S.A., or Odebrecht. Certainly this one macrophenomenon, the Odebrecht network, has implicated Brazilian politicians in the nurturing of, if not directly benefitting from, massive international greed corruption. The quality of democracy, and the nature of national cultures, appear to be critical causal variables in this comparative analysis. As Hagopian had observed, Brazil’s failure to insure a stable and violence-free society, and a predictable and stable economy, and its struggles with national socioeconomic development, contrast sharply with the Chilean experience in most cases. As a result, Brazil’s democracy has accurately been described as deeply threatened (Weisbrot, 2018). Despite Chile’s historic struggles with inflation, in which foreign economists were brought in to consult as early as the late Nineteenth Century (Hirschman, 1963), and which parallel Brazil’s Twentieth Century economic struggles as regard the subject of high-level “greed corruption,” Chilean democracy remains largely healthy, and Brazil’s, deeply threatened (Weisbrot, 2018). Although Latin American countries have tended to act politically in waves, and to manifest at least a semblance of conformity (Nun, 1967), these two countries in 2019, culturally and historically similar in so many respects, could not be more different as regards their relative protection of human rights, their contrasting voluntary adherence to laws, their contrasting homicide rates, and, finally, their contrasting degrees of perceived corruption. They offer themselves, in effect, as striking examples of why culture and culture-facilitated democratic forms matter.

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Pupo, A. (2019, March 22). Preso na Lava Jato, Moreira Franco pede liberdade ao STF; Relator do habeas corpus é o ministro Marco Aurélio. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from https://politica. estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/preso-na-lava-jato-moreira-franco-pede-liberdade-ao-stf/ Quah, J. S. T. (2014). Curbing police corruption in Singapore: Lessons for other Asian countries. Asian Education and Development Studies, 3(3), 186–222. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-07-2014-0029 Reuters. (2017, March 2). Chilean police raid Odebrecht offices in Santiago. Retrieved from https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-chile/chilean-police-raid-odebrecht-offices-insantiago-idUSKBN1685S6 Reuters, & Broadle, A. (2018, August 3). Far-Right Presidential Bid Gets Less Play From Brazil Media. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2018/08/03/world/ americas/03reuters-brazil-politics-media-analysis.html Romero, S. (2015, July 28). Brazil arrests nuclear chief in widening of graft case. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/world/americas/brazil-arrests-nuclearchief-in-widening-of-graft-case.html Rose-Ackermann, S. (1991). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rose, J. (2018). The Meaning of Corruption: Testing the Coherence and Adequacy of Corruption Definitions. Public Integrity, 20(3), 220–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2017.1397999 Small Arms Survey. (n.d.). Small Arms Survey. Retrieved from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ Tegel, S. (2018, March 21). Peruvian President Kuczynski resigns amid corruption scandal. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/peruvian-­ president-kuczynski-resigns-amid-corruption-scandal/2018/03/21/07d37a2e-2d38-11e8-8dc93b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.f7cb18b88d06 The Associated Press. (2011). Chile dictatorship victim toll bumped to 40,018. CBC News, August 18. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/chile-dictatorship-victim-toll-bumpedto-40-018-1.998542. Accessed on June 4, 2020. The Economist. (2008, December 6). The Americas: Fall of an opportunist. Brazil. The Economist, 389(8609), 51. Tummala, K. K. (2002). Corruption in India: Control measures and consequences. Asian Journal of Political Science, 10(2), 43–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370208434210 UNDP Human Development Reports (2020). Statistical Data Tables. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ statistical-data-tables-7-1 UNODC. (2019). Intentional Homicide Victims. Retrieved from https://dataunodc.un.org/crime/­ intentional-homicide-victims Waisman, C. (2014). Reversal of development in Argentina: Postwar counterrevolutionary policies and their structural consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Weisbrot, M. (2018, January 23). Brazil’s democracy pushed into the Abyss, 2016–2018. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/opinion/brazil-lula-democracycorruption.html Weterman, D. (2019a, January 21). Caso de Flávio pode preocupar Bolsonaro como pai, mas não o governo, diz Mourão: Atual presidente em exercício reiterou que a polêmica não. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,caso-de-flavio-podepreocupar-bolsonaro-como-pai-mas-nao-o-governo-diz-mourao,70002688863 Weterman, D. (2019b, January 21). Mourão defende ampliação do tempo mínimo para aposentadoria de militares para 35 anos. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from https://economia.estadao. com.br/noticias/geral,mourao-defende-ampliacao-do-tempo-minimo-para-aposentadoria-demilitares,70002688138 Weterman, D. (2019c, January 22). Após recuos, communicação de Bolsonaro será coordenada por militares. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/ geral,apos-recuos-comunicacao-de-bolsonaro-sera-coordenada-por-militares,70002690403 Zarate, A., & Casey, N. (2019, April 17). Alan García, Ex-President of Peru, is dead after shooting himself during arrest. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/ world/americas/alan-garcia-dead.html?searchResultPosition=1

CHAPTER 7 GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA Naas Ferreira

ABSTRACT The 1994 elections had seen a near tectonic change in South Africa. The long run minority White regime was replaced by a majority Black government of the African National Congress headed by Nelson Mandela. He, along with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, did a magnificent job of avoiding a bloodbath and keeping peace between the races. A new Constitution was accepted by 1996 which subscribed to lofty ideals. Yet, they turned sour before long. Aspirations ran ahead of hard realities. Utopia seems to have morphed into dystopia. Greed, prompted by past deprivation, appears to have made opportunists of several while others became blind ideologues. In no time, the country turned to be totally corrupt. This spectacular failure of the system is explained in this chapter. Keywords: Jan van Riebeeck; slaves; Robben Island; British; Shepstone; apartheid; ANC; Nelson Mandela; 1996 Constitution; legislation; SOEs; bureaucratic failure; Guptas

RETROSPECT The Republic of South Africa won the 2019 Webb Ellis Rugby World Cup. Winning that cup in itself is not new, as they won it twice before. But they came a long way since the 1995 first win when there was just one Black player. This time there were 12, and the captain of the team himself, Siya Kolisi, is Black. The entire stadium crowd of all races and colors sang the National Anthem – multilingual

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 99–111 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034008

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that it is. Thus, one would expect the latest Rugby championship to serve as a metaphor as it showed in just 25 years the nation made long strides. But it was not. The rest of the story is not that rosy. Historians taught us that to understand the present and perhaps to foresee the future of a nation, studying its past is useful. As Gibson (2004, p. 1) pointed out “no country in history so directly and thoroughly confronted its past in an effort to shape its future as has South Africa.” Borrowing heavily (unless otherwise cited) from Tummala (2015, pp. 142–154), a brief history follows. Contrary to popular belief, with the assertion that South Africa’s history predates Vasco da Gama. By the end of the sixteenth century, merchant marines from several countries such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands, among others used the Cape of Good Hope as a place to rest and replenish their ships. In 1652, Dutchman Jan van Riebeeck occupied the Cape and the surrounding area, and established a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope and later expanded into the surrounding area. That saw the arrival of Whites with the Dutch officials, known as Free Burghers, occupying land. They later became Boers, but preferred to be known as Afrikaners, and enslaved Black children euphemistically calling them as “apprentices” (BBC, 2018). From 1658, several slaves were imported into the Cape from countries as far as Madagascar, Indonesia, India, and Ceylon (current day Sri Lanka). Although they initially enjoyed the same rights as Whites, official discrimination started by the 1760s. By the 1790s, they were required to carry “passes” to go out of town. Initial cordial relations between the Dutch and the native pastorals, called Hottentots (today known as the Khoi-San), gradually deteriorated, with the latter being branded and imprisoned in the infamous Robben Island. That prison later became (in)famous for having held the future first Black President of the nation – Nelson Mandela. In 1795, the British captured the Cape from the Dutch, imposed English language (as against Dutch Afrikaans), and limited land and labor the Dutch/Boers could possess. The latter moved on to form their own republics such as the Orange Free State (now, Free State) in 1854, and Transvaal in 1858. They also declared that there would be equality between them and the natives. Actual segregation, as an instrument of colonialism, however, started with the British Governor in Natal (1815–1893), Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who in 1854 divided Natal allotting urban areas to Whites and separate locations to Blacks. The Lieutenant Governor of Natal became the “supreme chief.” Thus, came three different peoples – two Whites (the British and the Dutch Afrikaner) and the native Blacks and Coloreds. With the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in the Northern Cape, several mining companies arrived. And the first diamond fields were annexed in 1871. Among the several European youth who worked there was one Cecil John Rhodes, who later became the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. Eventually the two Whites – the British and Afrikaners came into conflict what with the former being richer, and also claiming superiority. The former declared the Boer war. Led by leaders like Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, the Afrikaners began demanding their own rule. On September 20, 1909, the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act conceding self-rule, instead of yielding a united South Africa as demanded by Smuts. Botha became Prime Minister in 1910. It

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was only in 1961 that South Africa left the Commonwealth, and declared itself a Republic. But the lot of Black people had not improved in any sense; instead their conditions in the mines deteriorated. The Native Land Act of 1913 prohibited Black people from buying or leasing land. The creation of South African Native Trusts effectively reduced the natives to the status of tenants and wage earners. Apartheid, which was characterized by Gibson (2004, p. 32; Tummala, 2015, pp. 147–154) as “a conglomeration of legal and illegal means of separating blacks and whites” came into being. Apartheid in fact involved four distinct racial groups – the Whites, Coloreds, Indians, and Africans. But the smaller number of Whites prevailed over the rest of the large population. The White nationalist government as it came into power in 1948 formalized this separation and domination by the passage of several laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, Immorality Act, and Population Registration Act of 1950. It is the last Act that assigned racial categories to each person, and the Group Areas Act of 1950 promulgated the division of urban areas into separate and distinct zones meant for different races. Some of the missionary-educated Black people began organizing and expressing their resentment against White Rule. And, thus, the African National Congress (ANC) came into being in 1912 which eventually produced leaders such as Nelson Mandela. He was arrested on December 5, 1956 for “high treason,” but the case soon faltered, and he was released on March 29, 1961. However, he was re-arrested for sabotage on October 29, 1963, and was given a life sentence on June 12, 1964 and sent to the Robben Island prison at the age of 46. From there, he was moved to Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town in 1982, and to Victor Verster Prison in 1988. In the meanwhile, Botha suffered a stroke and FW de Klerk was elected President of the Republic of South Africa in 1989. He released Mandela from prison on February 10, 1990; he was 71 years of age by that time. In a referendum sought by de Klerk in 1992, a large majority voted for reforms. An interim Constitution was agreed upon in 1993 with agreement to draft a new Constitution by 1996. Elections were held during April 1994 where the ANC won 252 seats with the support of 62.7% of voters. Mandela became the President of the Republic of South Africa, with de Klerk as Deputy President. Under the leadership of Mandela, the new nation faced the formidable task of reconciling two starkly different sentiments. Unforgiving Blacks advocated retribution for the culprits of politically sanctioned racial segregation. Others believed that punishment for past wrongs would endanger the delicate balance struck under the universal franchise system. Yet others just wanted to overlook the past, and move on. Considering all the conflicting opinions, the government decided that a commission be set up to record what occurred during South Africa’s most grieved periods, and offer conditional acquittal to those individuals who admitted their complicity. Thus, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) came into existence under the appropriate title: The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995. It was empowered to hear cases, resolve questions, and settle on certain lawful choices. The arrangement of compromise encapsulated in the request was predicated on the key rule that “To forgive is not just to be altruistic, [but] it is the best form of self-interest” (https://www.sahistory.org.za). Leonard Thompson (2000, p. 299), citing The South African Reserve Bank’s survey for the years 1999–2000, showed the following unemployment percentage

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figures demonstrating the racial disparity in 1996: African 42.5; Colored 20.9; Indian 12.2; and Whites 4.5. These figures showed the dismal status of both the Africans (Blacks) and Colored, and the distance they needed to move to catch up.

THE 1996 CONSTITUTION The new Constitution proposed various codes of ethics to discourage corruption in the public services.

Section 96 of the SAC 1996 “(1) Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers must act in accordance with a code of ethics prescribed by national legislation.” Section 136 of the SAC 1996 “(1) Members of the Executive Council of a province must act in accordance with a code of ethics prescribed by national legislation.” Section 195 of the SAC 1996 “(1) Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles: (a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.” (See more on this below.) Section 196 of the SAC 1996 “(l) There is a single Public Service Commission for the Republic. (2) The Commission is independent and must be impartial, and must exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favor, or prejudice in the interest of the maintenance of effective and efficient public administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public service. The Commission must be regulated by national legislation.” The Constitution envisaged two other key national offices: The Public Protector and the Auditor-General (A-G). The Public Protector is in essence an Ombudsman. Section 182(1) of the country’s Constitution confers on the Public Protector the power to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, take appropriate remedial action. Section 188 of the Constitution provided for an A-G whose functions comprise auditing and reporting on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of all national and provincial state departments, municipalities, and any other institutions and/or accounting entities. In addition, the A-G audits and reports on the financial management structures of National Revenue Fund (NRF), the Provincial Revenue Fund (PRF) and municipalities and/or any other institutions that are being funded from the public purse (NRF). Perhaps uniquely, Chapter 10 of the Constitution (Section 195) focused on “Public Administration,” laying down “basic values and principles” to be followed. The most important and relevant of them for the discussion here are: “(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.” “(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.” “(f)

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Public administration must be accountable. (g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.” Laudable as these prescriptions are, what exactly are the “high standard of professional ethics” that must be followed is left undefined. Similarly, how to ensure accountability is also not specified. The implication of course is these would be defined in detail by law, and in practice. And indeed there is a plethora of laws.

LEGISLATION South Africa has a well-developed legal framework for curbing corruption. For example, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA) 12 of 2004 criminalizes corruption in public and private sectors and codifies specific offenses. It specifically criminalizes attempted corruption, extortion, active and passive bribery, bribing a foreign official, abuse of office and money laundering, and public officials are obliged to report corrupt activities. It is a criminal offence to provide any form of “gratification” to an official if it is not lawfully due, including gifts and facilitation payments. Whistle blowers are protected by a variety of laws, such as the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (dealing with unauthorized government expenditures). The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 provides for access to public information (though it has not been fully implemented). The 1998 Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members requires public officials to disclose gifts. Others include the following:

• Public Service Act 103 of 1994, Chapter 2, section 3(h) states: “The Minister • •

•

•

is responsible for establishing norms and standards relating to integrity, ethics, conduct and anti-corruption in the public service.” Section 2 – (training) of The Explanatory Manual on the Code of Conduct for Public Service prescribes: “In order to promote a high standard of professional ethics in the workplace, public servants should be encouraged to think and behave ethically.” The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 states: “This Act provides the legal definition of corruption and creates a range of offences. It also allows for people found guilty of certain offences (such as those related to tenders) to be ‘blacklisted’ and it requires senior officials to report corrupt activities.” The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 decrees: “This Act gives effect to Section 32 of the Constitution (Access to Information) by setting out how anyone can get access to information held by the state. By so doing, it promotes transparency and prevents government from operating in secret.” The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 states: “This Act gives effect to Section 33 of the Constitution (Just Administrative Action). It ensures that decisions that affect the public are taken in a way that is procedurally fair and it gives people the right to request written reasons for decisions they disagree with. In this way, it creates greater transparency – people may be

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less tempted to act corruptly if they know they will have to explain themselves to the public.” The Protected Disclosures Act (PDA), Act 26 of 2000 stipulates: “The PDA (often called the ‘Whistle blowers Act’) was passed to encourage employees to disclose information about unlawful and irregular behaviour in the workplace. It offers protection from victimization for ‘whistle blowers,’ as long as they meet the requirements and follow the procedure set out in the Act. This act was under revision at the time of the compilation of this booklet).” The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) Act 1 of 1999 and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) Act 56 of 2003 provided for sound treasury norms while the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) (No. 38 of 2001) created the Financial Intelligence Centre designed to combat money laundering.

Given such elaborate constitutional and statutory provisions, corruption abounds leading one to raise the question: Why so? What is wrong? Four answers are provided: The country’s tradition, opportunism, bureaucratic failure, and more importantly leadership (or the lack thereof).

ENDEMIC CORRUPTION It may not be an exaggeration to state that endemic corruption is no more than a continuing tradition. Corruption now is nothing new; it was quite prevalent even during the apartheid regime. A 103 page report released on 29 May 2006 by Hennie van Vuuren (2006) of the Institute of Security Studies demonstrates the situation during the apartheid regime, except it was hidden from the public eye. Leaders of the apartheid regime, including former President F.W. de Klerk, projected an image that led to the popular perception that the erstwhile regime may have been “brutal” in the way that it governed, but was “honest” in the way it managed its finances. E. Herbst (2016) lists a number of individuals who received heavy sentences for their part in corruption during the apartheid era. To give a few examples: Hennie van der Walt, Member of Parliament from Schweizer-Reineke, was sentenced in January 1988 to 10 years in prison (five years suspended) for 15 counts of theft of R800,000 in trust money while he was the deputy minister of the department of Co-operation and Development in the Nationalist government. Leon de Beer, former National Party MP for Hillbrow, Johannesburg, was jailed in 1989 for two years on 70 counts of electoral fraud. He served eight months before being released on good behavior. Peet de Pontes resigned as the MP for East London city in 1989, and was fined R35,000 in 1991 for fraud, theft, bribery, corruption, forgery and uttering (unlawfully and intentionally passing off a forged document to the actual or potential prejudice of another). He cheated a residence permit for controversial and alleged mafia financier Vito Palazzolo, bribed a public servant and stole a government file. Pietie du Plessis, a former Cabinet Minister, received a nine-year jail sentence in 1993 for 17 counts of fraud involving R30 million. He

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served two years and eight months, qualifying for early release because he was over 60 and ill. Since 1994, incidences of corruption only increased, with numerous politicians, high-ranking public servants and other prominent individuals becoming involved in corrupt activities (Scandals). Herbst also showed that the ANC government up to 2016 lost over R700 billion to corruption. That it was soft on corruption was evident as Tonty Yengeni and Maropeng, Deputy Speaker of the Province of Mpumalanga, who stole a R1 million, was sentenced in 2001 to seven years in jail after an investigation lasting little more than year. Crime and petty corruption in the police are significant. Nearly half of South Africans indicated that they perceive most or all police officers as corrupt (Global Competitiveness Report (GCB), 2015). Businesses report the police is unreliable (GCR, 2017–2018). Traffic fines are the single most common event in which bribes are requested in South Africa. According to Corruption Watch 2012, the police sometimes request bribes to protect businesses owned by foreigners against xenophobic violence. While the judiciary is widely recognized as independent, nonetheless private companies are not entirely confident in the independence of the judiciary (GCR, 2017–2018). Bribes and irregular payments in exchange for favorable judicial decisions are not uncommon (GCR, 2015–2016). For example, a magistrate named Kgomo in Randburg was sentenced to 15 years in jail for two corruption charges related to accepting a bribe to stop the extradition of Botswana fugitive Paul Mthabela (The Times Live, April 2018). Corruption and inefficiency are significant in public services. Irregular payments and bribes are common (GCR, 2015–2016). So are nepotism and cronyism. It is alleged that the Gupta family, a wealthy family with close ties to former President Jacob Zuma, carried influence to the extent that they were able to install Cabinet Ministers. A report by the previous Public Protector (2016) further shed light on the ties between the Guptas and Zuma and raised questions about several deals involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and possibly the effective “capture” of key individuals in the SA Revenue Service and National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) (The Guardian, 2016). These ties are under investigation as of mid-2018. Recently, prosecutors seized more than USD 21 million worth of assets from the Gupta family (Bloomberg, April 2018; Onishi & Gebrekidan, 2018). The post-apartheid era in its developmental efforts in fact provided several opportunities that allowed the unscrupulous to capture them for private gain. Three areas in particular are of interest in this regard: Public procurement, Power supply, and Mining. And one family stands out deserving mentioning here – the Guptas. (a) Public Procurement: Corruption in public procurement is high. Nearly two out of five companies indicated that they have experienced procurement fraud in the preceding two years (Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 2018). With the Local Procurement Accord (2011), the government is committed to increasing the procurement proportion of goods and services from South African suppliers to an “aspirational target” of 75%, which creates a potential disadvantage for foreign

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companies. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) strategy aims to increase the participation of Black citizens in the economy but has been criticized both for providing too much preferential treatment in the awarding of government contracts to wealthy black elites and for leading to increased corruption in public procurement (Wall Street Journal, 2014), due to a lack of monitoring and evaluation, mismanagement, difficulties in registering companies under BBBEE, and poor accountability (Anti-Corruption Report, 2016). Serious concerns have been raised about the governance of procurement processes executed by large parastatal companies, as well as the extent to which these companies have become vehicles for political patronage. A report by the previous Public Protector concerning state capture questioned a recent deal for Eskom, the country’s largest electricity company, which involved procuring coal from the politically well-connected Gupta family (Bertelsmann Stifftung, 2018) (see below) In addition to the above, the National Treasury declined to approve a refinancing proposal for South African Airways (SAA), which would have benefited another politically connected entity (BTI, 2018). South Africa’s Passenger Rail Agency (PRASA) entered into a multimillion rand order for Spanish locomotives, after a dubious procurement process, that were too large to fit through tunnels in South Africa and in respect of which the operational manuals were provided in Spanish, incomprehensible to the locomotive engineers and technicians (BTI, 2018). In another high-profile case, President Zuma is charged with receiving kickbacks from French arms company Thales in return for the procurement of their weapons systems; the charges against Zuma are repeatedly dropped and revived (News24, March 2016). As of March 2018, the National Prosecuting Authority has announced it will prosecute Zuma along with Thales’ local affiliate (News24, March 2018). (b) Power supply (ESKOM) (Khumalo, 2018). The embattled national power supplier, Eskom, released its 2017/2018 financial results on July 23, 2018, revealing billions Rands lost to corruption and nepotism. This company is reportedly in a dire financial situation, due to substantial debt, corruption allegations, and gross mismanagement. Financial malfeasances ascribed to Eskom include (Fin24, 2018):

• Approximately R30bn in derivative losses emanating from the Gupta capture • • • • •

of Eskom treasury. The approximately R50bn in contractors claims on capital build. Approximately R500bn in asset overvaluation directly attributable to the high tariff regime currently prevailing. Overvalued coal stocks and continuing corruption in coal procurement of around R8bn per annum. Overstaffing and capitalized salaries relating to the 30,000 overstaffed employees; thousands of employees suspected of being “ghost workers.” Eskom’s “phantom bonus scheme” which milks millions of Rands annually in favor of already over remunerated senior employees. Failing power infrastructure due to poor maintenance and poor quality coal.

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• Exaggerated coal costs resulting from road transport costs from Medupi power station. • Questionable contracts on renewables that force the utility to pay for electric-

ity at a higher rate than Eskom’s costs and which decimate Eskom’s sales and ability to service debt.

(c) Mining operations in South Africa are particularly vulnerable to corruption and illegal activities (Bloomberg, 2015). The scale of mining operations and the large sums of money involved – coupled with many interactions with government officials such as securing concessions, customs clearance and obtaining permits – increase corruption risks (Corruption Watch, July 2014). Illegal mining and money laundering are widespread in South Africa, costing the industry 5–10% of its annual production (Bloomberg, January 2015). Corruption risks are particularly high for the licensing process (National Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2017). The sector also suffers from politicization, resulting in the mining regulator being staffed with individuals who do not possess the relevant knowledge nor expertise needed to make decisions (Corruption Watch (CW), 2017). Corruption Watch found in a 2017 report that this politicization together with many other shortcomings in the governance of the sector poses significant corruption risks (CW, 2017).

BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE Aside all the evils attributed to bureaucracy everywhere, the South African bureaucratic system suffered from two major attributes, one from the apartheid era, and the other since independence. Dealing with the first, the concept of “Broederbond” is unique (Serfontein, 1978). While the phenomenon itself is not necessarily confined to South Africa, the extent and more importantly the institutionalizing of it is unique. The term Broederbond is literally translated into “brotherhood,” wherein the primary qualification to get into civil service often was whether one belonged to the Afrikaner society. Merit came later; belonging to the social group was primary. This was the basest from of nepotism. It was not simply a family affair, but a social constrict. The net result was that the bureaucracy was stacked with inefficient people guaranteed the continuance in the job regardless of performance, beyond discipline. It did not take long for President Mandela to realize the immense burden of the postapartheid system which was not delivering the services fairly and equally, if at all. As a remedy he offered a way out in the form of “golden parachutes” (also known as “handshakes”) in the presence of the inability of firing them en masse. The alternative that was believed to be effective to cull these out was to offer munificent pension packages to those who wished to leave. Thus, was offered a voluntary incentive for the so-called “deadwood” to go. But the best intentions went awry in that the best and those who are otherwise marketable grabbed the cash, left either into private sector jobs, which were emerging, or

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got to be entrepreneurs themselves, or even left the country altogether. And the deadwood remained. And the problem with inefficient bureaucracy susceptible to corruption continued. Nearly 800,000, about 18.2% of the total population of 4.4 million emigrated out of South Africa since 1995, as reported by Times (London, 2010). But filling those positions left vacant by those who left (approximately 600,000), became particularly difficult due to the lack of suitably qualified candidates due to lack of previous public policies of inadequate educational opportunities for the native Black people who turned out to be now eligible, and preferred under the new “equal employment opportunity” – a phrase preferred to “affirmative action.” That led to two different new phenomena. One, those few Black people who were educated and qualified enough found themselves very much sought after. Plenty of employment opportunities came their way, as the various employers, both in the public and private sectors went after these few to hire. Salable as they were, they kept moving from one job to the other well-paying, in quick succession. That led to what Loyiso Mbabane, Director of Equal Opportunity, in the Labor Department of South Africa stated as “Affirmative Action” actually turned out to be derogatorily known as “Affirmative Auction” (Tummala, 2015, p. 188). This emphasis on equal employment opportunity extended to “Blacks,” which included several other minorities such as Indians and other people of mixed races, to remedy past insidious discrimination in its turn caused a major heartburn among the left-over Whites who have come to feel that they are being left out of competition. Such feeling continues even to this day, after nearly a quarter of a century. This in itself presents a fascinating subject of study, not only administratively but also sociologically.

FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP It goes without saying that committed leadership is key variable in combating corruption. Just creating institutional edifices to deal with corruption in itself is not adequate. They need to be run efficiently and economically. Leaders holding positions at top echelons is imperative. Sadly it is here the country has suffered the most. While charges of corruption have been afflicting the ANC itself right from its beginning the phenomenon reached its apogee during the presidency of Jacob Zuma (May 2009–February 2018). For one, his own private life was contentious. He was charged of raping a house-guest. He did not deny it, but pleaded that it was part of his culture to satisfy the lady who presumably was seeking companionship. He was acquitted (Mail & Guardian, 2006). Zuma was also charged by the previous Public Prosecutor Thuli Madonsela of having spent 7.8 million Rands in improving his personal residence. Such expenditure using tax-payers money was justified in the name of safety of the President. There are actually as many as 783 corruption charges against the President starting with kickbacks from a French arms dealer when a large arms purchase deal was made (originally 30 billion Rand, estimated in 2018 to be 65 billion). It was alleged (Harin, 2019)

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that three banks, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and (India’s) Bank of Baroda helped Zuma in these endeavors. In addition the accounting firm, McKinsey, is also charged to be complicit. It is in this context that the Gupta family figures prominently. Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta immigrated to South Africa in the 1990s, with Ajay as the patriarch. This family is alleged to have bribed their way to establish a business empire. It is also stated that Zuma visited this family with names of who would be his Cabinet Ministers, leading to the allegation that the Guptas were so influential that they chose some of those characters leading to the expression “capture the state” (Sharife & Anderson, 2019). There is another aspect that is rankling the stability of the system. It largely comes out in the name of one of the opposition leaders, Julius Malema. An avowed Marxist, and a great admirer of the regime of Zimbabwe, he advocates the extreme form of expropriation of the riches of the Whites, who exploited the poor Blacks in the past. The attacks are largely directed at the White farmers, who successfully produced and provided ample food supplies. He does not seem to have taken notice that Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, attributing all the evils of that society to the Whites, reduced that “bread basket of Africa” into a dustbowl. It is reported by Times (London, 2010) that 87% of agricultural land was owned by White farmers, and of the 40,000 farmers more than 3,000 were killed by 2010 (since 1994). Malema has a large following, and his philosophy in itself does not simply cause, but abets, a great deal of social and economic turmoil (Times Live (South Africa), 2019). The Public Prosecutor is appointed for a seven-year non-renewable term, and can only be removed by the Parliament. While Madonsela relentlessly went after President Zuma, her successor in 2016 Mkhwebane turned out to be sympathetic to President Zuma. She even bailed out Bankorp by forcing the Absa Group Ltd which bought it in 1992 to repay 1.125 Billion Rand. Her actions forced the nation’s High Court to observe that Mkhwebane did not understand “her constitutional duty to be impartial,” as the Ombudsman (van Tilburg, 2019). Transparency International (2019) reported that Ramaphosa vowed to clean the ANC saying “whether some people like it or not.” The implied reference here is to Zuma. But what with the reputation of the office of Ombudsman sullied Ramaphosa, who was elected as President for a full-term who is trying hard to clean up the nation, seems to be stymied. In fact, in an interview with Aryn Baker (2019), the President admitted having made some mistakes and conceded: […]when we got into power, we had to deal with three things: inequality, poverty and unemployment. Poverty to a large extent has been reduced, we have reduced unemployment, we have almost more than doubled the size of the economy. But inequality has remained extremely stubborn. That [is because of] an economy that is not growing fast enough.

PROSPECT The above analysis demonstrates that in spite of great ideals in the Constitution and an elaborate legislative agenda, there is pervasive corruption and the efforts

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to curb the same appear to be futile. There is ample evidence to show that previous leadership had not been helpful, and in fact appear to be the perpetrators of corruption. Similarly, there is a spectacular failure of institutions such as the office of Public Prosecutor. For this state of affairs, in conclusion two more arguments are to be made. For one, there appears to be not much consternation about being rich, no matter how. President Zuma himself always lived beyond his means, but a large number of South Africans do admire him to this day. Most of these are recognized as Pentecostals, who advocates the “prosperity gospel,” although the mainline Christians were not all that comfortable (van Wyk & Posel, 2019). The second more potent reason is that of political realities. Ramaphosa was elected by a thin margin and needed the support of a David Mabuza, whom he appointed as Deputy President. Mabuza has long been accused of corruption, although not proven as of now. He hails from the small province of Mpmulanga which prospered under his tutelage. Data from the National Treasury and the A-G’s reports sustain this (Cowan, 2019). As of today unemployment in South Africa stands at over 27%. Unofficial figures place the figure at 38% (Unemployment, 2019). It means that about six million in a nation of 58 million population are with no jobs. While indeed, there is a substantial growth in Black middle-class, the nation remains notoriously unequal, with several Black people turning as rich as any in the nation with the majority left as they were. And President Ramaphosa seems to be unable to remedy the situation, although so far is in the short term. In any case, all the constitutional ideals and legislative mandates turned out to be aspirations. The chasm between rhetoric and reality is very wide, and even looks unable to be closed. Thus, the future is unpredictable.

REFERENCES BBC. (2018, April 4). “South Africa Profile: Timeline.” Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). (2018). Retrieved from https://www.bti-Project.org/en/ reports/country-reports/ Bloomberg. (2015). Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-the-year-in-money/ Business Anti-corruption Portal. (2018). Report. Retrieved from https://www.business-anti-corruption. com/country-profiles/south-africa/ Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members. (1998). Retrieved from https://www. right2info.org/resources/publications/asset-declarations/south-africa_code-of-conduct-forassembly-and-permanent-council-members Corruption Watch Report. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/sa-sees-saps-asmost-corrupt-within-the-state-survey/ Cowan, K. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/Analysis/the-pending-case-againstdeputy-president-david-mabuza-20190530 Fin 24. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskoms-skeletons-to-berevealed-10-things-to-look-out-in-the-financial-results-20180723-2 GCR. (2017–2018). Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitivenessreport-2017-2018 Gibson, J. L. (2004). Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile s divided nation? New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation. Global Economic and Crime Survey. (2018). Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC). Retrieved from https:// www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/global-economic-crime-survey.html

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Gous, N. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-08-08-briberytops-list-of-corrupt-activities-in-sa/ Gumede, W. Retrieved from https://democracyworks.org.za/policy-brief-12-combating-corruption-insouth-africa/ Hain, L. P. (2019, November 18). BBC. Herbst, E. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.fin24.com/BizNews/herbst-it-was-worse-under-apartheid-anc-soft-on-corruption-20160620. Another report provided more details of individuals who were found guilty of corruption during apartheid (https://www.timeslive.co.za/ideas/201107-25-national-party-leaders-convicted-of-fraud-theft-live/) Journal of Public Enquiry (2001, Fall/Winter). Khumalo, S. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskoms-dire-financialposition-likely-to-get-worse-before-it-improves-20180724-2 Mail & Guardian. (2006, March 21). Retrieved from https://mg.co.za/article/2006-03-21-timeline-ofthe-jacob-zuma-rape-trial/ NRGI. (2017). Retrieved from https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/2017resource-governance-index News 24. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/Tags/Places/south_africa Onishi, N., & Gebrekidan. (2018, December 22). In Gupta Brothers’ Rise and Fall, the Tale of a Sullied A.N.C. Retrieved from newyorktiems.com Public Prosecutor. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/16/southafrica-mcebisi-jonar-gupta-family-cabinet-jacob-zuma; https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/03/15/former-anc-mp-gutpas-offered-minister-role-exchange-saa-route-india Scandals. Retrieved from https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/99074/10-corruption-scandals-thatrocked-south-africa/ Serfontein, J. H. P. (1978). Brotherhood power. London: Rex Publishers. Sharife, K., & Anderson, M. (Quoted by Transparency International, on-line, 18 September 2019). Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project—OCCRP, report “Down the Gupta’s Financial Rabbit Hole.” Staff Writer. (2020). Business Tech. Retrieved from https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/394654/ south-africas-unemployment-rate-could-hit-50-report/ Statsa. (2019). Statistical Release P0211, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 2:2019, 30 July 2019. The Guardian. (2016, March 16). Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/16/ south-africa-mcebisi-jonar-gupta-family-cabinet-jacob-zuma Thompson, L. (2000). A history of South Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Times (London). (2010). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50463681 Times Live. (2019, November 13). Retrieved from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/201911-13-five-key-takeouts-from-julius-malemas-mugabe-motion-in-parliament/ Transparency International (2019). https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/south-africa Tummala, K. K. (2015). Politics of preference: India, United States, and South Africa. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group. Unemployment. (2019, August 5). Retrieved from https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-05-unemploymentin-south-africa-is-worse-than-you-think van Tilburg, L. (2019). Is it time to hang up your gloves Public Protector? Retrieved from https://www. biznews.com/undictated/2019/07/23/time-public-protector van Vuuren, H. (2006). Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/ApartheidGrandCorruption2006 van Wyk, I., & Posel, D. (2019, June 27). On News 24, quoting out of their edited book “Conspicuous Consumption in Africa.” Johannesburg: University of The Witwatersrand Press. Wall Street Journal. (2014). News Article Archive. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/public/page/ archive-2014-4-18.html

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CHAPTER 8 CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES David S. Jones

ABSTRACT This chapter examines the way corruption in the public procurement of goods, services, and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states over many years (with the exception of Singapore), and considers the measures taken to combat such practices. It also examines why so often those efforts have not been fully effective. Three reasons are given to explain these failings. These are the following: (a) elite capture of the procurement process by influential politicians, business leaders and senior bureaucrats; (b) the informal bureaucracy in the procuring agencies which allowed corrupt practices to be followed; and (c) lack of political will to enforce measures to combat ­corruption Keywords: Elite capture; E-procurement; embezzlement; fraud; collusion; favoritism

INTRODUCTION Public procurement of goods, services, and public works (including infrastructure projects) has long been susceptible to corruption in the countries of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore. This has been evident at different levels of procurement from day-to-day purchasing of small value goods and services

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 113–128 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034009

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to high-end infrastructure projects and defense contracts. The impact of such corruption has been far-reaching: excessive spending, sub-standard goods and services, non-completion of projects, and waste through under- or non-utilization of goods and facilities. The result is a needless drain on government finances and poor delivery of public and infrastructure services. As stated in a recent Transparency International(TI) report on regional integration in ASEAN (2015), corruption in government procurement – with the associated higher costs, lower quality and frequent delays – may also impede the development of the regional trading infrastructure (such as ports, rail, and road transport, telecommunications links, etc.).

Such corrupt practices have continued in spite of new or tougher anti-corruption and competition laws, strengthened anti-corruption programs, and reforms of procurement systems. This chapter will examine (1) the main types of corruption which have affected and undermined the system of procurement in different countries of Southeast Asia, with the exception Singapore; (2) the measures to deal with corruption in the procurement system; (3) the indications of and reasons for the difficulties in effectively implementing such measures; and (4) in conclusion the reasons for the lack of progress in combating procurement corruption in Southeast Asian countries.

MAIN TYPES OF CORRUPTION Bribery How bribery may occur in procurement? One of the most prevalent forms of corruption in procurement is bribery by which a business is awarded a procurement contract or a share of that contract, as a result of having provided or promised to provide special favors to politicians, senior officials, and officials in the procuring entity (the agency responsible for the procurement). Bribery may take several forms. Bribes may be paid to allow a particular company to pass an initial test to determine its suitability to bid (known as the pre-condition), and to alter the specifications of a product, service or works so that they favor a company. Bribes may be paid to bias the evaluation or guarantee the award decision in favor of a particular company, or to ensure the procurement method is not by competitive tendering but by single sourcing where one company is designated to undertake the procurement (often called procurement by direct appointment). Bribes may too be paid by a company in the post-contract phase, so as to obtain an increase in price, or to allow it to supply cheaper materials, use inferior designs and undertake sub-standard work, which may even contravene original specifications. Bribes are either offered by the business or solicited by government officials themselves (OECD, 2016; UNDP, 1997; Wiehen & Olaya, 2006). Extent of bribery in procurement: The extent of bribery in procurement in Southeast Asia can be gauged from two surveys. The first survey is taken from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report of 2017/2018. It is based on interviews of business executives and rates the extent of bribery on a scale of 1–7 within various countries (Table 1). The survey covers bribery in

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Table 1.  Rating of Frequency of Bribe Payments by Firms in Relation to Utility Connections, Imports/Exports, Tax Payments, and Public Contracts and Licenses, 2017/2018. Score From 1 (Common) to 7 (Never)

Global Rank Out of 137 Countries (1 Being the Highest Rank)

Singapore

6.7

3

Brunei

5.2

32

Malaysia

4.8

39

Laos

4.1

62

Thailand

3.8

72

Indonesia

3.8

72

Vietnam

3.1

109

Cambodia

3.0

113

Philippines

2.9

118

Source: Author, data taken from WEF (2018).

several areas of public administration and public services, including bribery in obtaining public contracts. A rating under 5 indicates that bribery exist to some degree while a rating under 4 indicates that it is serious and commonplace. In five out of the eight countries, the rating was under 4 with the worst performer being the Philippines (under 3). Singapore is by far the best performer with a rating near to the maximum of 7. The second survey refers to the expectancy of bribery to secure government contracts in seven Southeast Asian countries, and is drawn from the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank between 2014 and 2016, the survey year varying from country to country (Table 2). This measure refers to the percentage of firms surveyed in each country who indicated an expectancy to pay bribes. The average across the seven countries was 52% compared to an average in East Asia, and the Pacific of 45.6% and a global average of 28.8%. In no country did the expectancy fall below 20% of firms, and in five out of the seven countries it was above the average for East Asia and the Pacific. In four countries more than 50% of Table 2.  Expectation to Pay Bribes to Secure Government Contracts in Seven Countries of Southeast Asia, 2014–2016. % of Firms Expected to Pay Bribes

Number of Firms Surveyed

Philippines

20.5

1,335

Indonesia

33.0

1,320

Thailand

41.4

1,000

Malaysia

51.4

1,000

Vietnam

56.9

996

Laos

74.3

368

Cambodia

87.5

373

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2018).

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the businesses in the sample expected to pay bribes with the worst case being Cambodia (over 80% of businesses). The frequency of bribe payments did not vary much by size of the firm, nor did the value of the bribe. Firms employing 100 or more staff expected to pay bribes valued at 34% of the contract. The figure for smaller firms was 36%. Surprisingly, in this survey the Philippines is less prone to bribery in procurement than the other States covered, in contrast to the scores shown in Table 1. The polling organization Social Weather Stations (SWS) in the Philippines provides an in-depth assessment of corruption including bribery in procurement in that country. In its most recent survey conducted in 2016, a sample of 950 private sector managers and owners were interviewed (one third from “large” companies and the rest from “small and medium” enterprises). 42% of respondents stated that “almost all” or “most” companies in their sector of business paid bribes to secure a public sector contract. The median amount paid as a bribe was 20% of the contract value (SWS, 2016). Cambodia is little different. According to TI’s business brief on Cambodia in 2017, “kickbacks and gifts to procurement officers are particularly common in the Cambodian business environment” (TI Cambodia, 2017). Embezzlement Nature of embezzlement in public procurement: Embezzlement is another form of corruption that can occur in the procurement process. This in the main entails the siphoning off by politicians, officials, and business leaders of some or most of the funds allocated to a procurement project for their personal enrichment. It may as well involve diverting the goods purchased to politicians, officials, and business leaders to be used or sold by them for personal gain. The consequence may be to deny the user agency of some of the goods and services which it needs. In some cases, the quantity of goods specified is greater than needed by the user agency with the surplus acquired by politicians and officials for their private advantage (OECD, 2016). Extent and examples of embezzlement: The extent of embezzlement is illustrated in Table 3, showing the frequency of diversion of public funds for personal enrichment in Southeast Asian countries as indicated in the WEF’s Business Executive survey of 2016 based on a scale of 1–7 scale (referred to above). Public funds mentioned in the survey cover all government programs and services but a good proportion would have been earmarked for procurement. Nearly all the countries were rated below 5 which indicates a certain amount of embezzlement. Three have a rating below 3.5 which indicates widespread embezzlement, namely Thailand, Cambodia, and Philippines. Singapore was the country with by far the least embezzlement. An example of embezzlement in the Philippines uncovered in 2013 was the misappropriation of an estimated PHP10 billion (US$190 million) from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (Labog-Javellana, 2013; NGO Watchdog 2015; Punay, 2018). It involved 28 Senators and certain Members of the House of Representatives, prominent business people, and certain senior officials. The prosecution of those allegedly embezzling the funds is still on-going (Labog-Javellana, 2013; NGO Watchdog, 2015; Punay, 2018). Even in Singapore embezzlement has

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Table 3.  Rating of Frequency of the Illegal Diversion of Public Funds to Companies, Individuals, or Groups in 2016. Score From 1 (Very Common) to 7 (Never Occurs)

Global Rank Out of 137 Countries (1 Being the Highest Rank)

Singapore

6.2

4

Brunei

4.9

28

Malaysia

4.7

32

Indonesia

4.2

41

Laos

4.1

47

Vietnam

3.7

61

Thailand

3.3

80

Cambodia

3.2

88

Philippines

2.7

106

Source: Adapted from WEF (2018).

occurred though infrequent. For example, funds were embezzled ironically in its anti-corruption agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). In 2013, an Assistant Director of the CPIB was convicted of embezzling S$1.7 million (US $1.24 million) of funds to be used in procuring goods and services (Quah, 2015). Of course, embezzlement may involve paying bribes to others in authority to ignore the misappropriation. One recent example is the alleged embezzlement of funds earmarked for development projects to be carried out by the Sabah Water Department, Malaysia. This was accompanied by bribes to officials to overlook or facilitate the embezzlement. RM114.5 million (US$27.4 million) of embezzled money has been confiscated by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC). Combined with kickbacks to officials the embezzlement was worth 27–30% of the value of projects (Jones, 2018). Favoritism A good deal of corruption involves favoritism to one or other companies, usually stemming from personal interests in such companies on the part of politicians and officials, crony associations, family links, and political networks and party affiliations. As a result, contracts go to companies in which powerful political figures and senior bureaucrats, or their associates, friends and family members have a major ownership, or financial stake. Such companies often belong to a favored network of businesses dominated by the governing and business elites. In many cases, they may be well below the standard required to meet the needs of the procurement project. Favoritism may be shown through single sourcing, and in the case of tenders by altering specifications or by bid evaluation to suit a particular company (Wiehen & Olaya, 2006). Extent and examples of favoritism: The extent of favoritism in procurement in Southeast Asia can be gauged from the WEF’s Business Executive survey of

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Table 4.  Rating of Favoritism by Governments to Individuals and Companies in Deciding upon Policies and Contracts, in 2016. Score From 1 (Common) to 7 (Never)

Global Rank out of 137 Countries (1 Being the Highest Rank)

Singapore

5.9

1

Malaysia

4.4

22

Indonesia

4.0

32

Lao PDR

3.7

39

Brunei

3.7

40

Vietnam

3.3

56

Thailand

3.0

71

Cambodia

2.9

84

Philippines

2.5

105

Source: Based on data from WEF (2018).

2016. One of its measures rates on a scale of 1–7 the extent of favoritism in government policies and contracts (Table 4). In only one country (Singapore) was the rating above 5. In six countries the rating was between 3 and 5 which indicated a significant to moderate degree of favoritism. In two countries, the rating was below 3, namely Cambodia and the Philippines, indicating widespread favoritism. As an example, such practices have been entrenched in the Philippines as shown in Table 4 with companies earmarked for contracts often belonging to a network of well-connected business leaders and landowning families (Johnston, 2010; Jones, 2013). In the indictment of two senior officials in the Department of Transportation and Communications, the Ombudsman found that they “exhibited manifest partiality” in awarding a contract of switching gear worth US $560,000 (Office of the Ombudsman, Philippines (OMB), 2015). There was no competitive tender and the Bids and Awards Committee, which rightfully should have handled the procurement, was bypassed. There was suspicion that the guilty parties or their families had a stake in the company (OMB, 2015). A similar suspicion of nepotism in Thailand was the awards in 2015 and 2016 of the construction of large military buildings to Contemporary Construction Pub. Co. Ltd., partly owned by a son of the brother of the Thai junta leader and Prime Minister, and the award of a dyke project in Chang Mai to a company connected to the wife of the brother (Asian Correspondent, 2016). A common thread running through these and many other examples is the political aspect where partiality is shown to companies connected to political leaders, their close family relatives and cronies. To secure deals that specially favor companies connected to leading politicians and their networks, procurement is adopted based on single sourcing (i.e., direct appointment) instead of competitive tendering. In some cases, rules may allow for this in special or urgent circumstances, which, in the absence of clear definitions, are then invoked whatever the circumstances. GAN Integrity Solutions, which assesses corruption and anti-competitive practices in different countries,

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recently noted that in Malaysia, “the awarding of major infrastructure and public works contracts is often done without competitive bidding or open tenders” (GAN, 2018). The Malaysian Auditor-General’s (AGM) Reports in 2015 and 2016 indicated that in 17 of the 53 procurement programs/projects which were audited direct appointment was adopted. Where there was no compelling reason for direct appointment, suspicions arose that it was adopted to favor a particular company with high-level connections. The AGM in her 2016 activities report expressed the opinion that the practice of “direct negotiations without clear justification should cease immediately” (AGM, 2017; Jones, 2018). Fraud Fraud is another form of corruption affecting procurement in government agencies, involving submitting false or misleading information or acting dishonestly in any way which affects the award of a contract. An example is the submission by a firm of false or misleading information about its financial soundness, track record, and level of expertise, to secure registration for procurement purposes, or to pass a pre-qualification test. Other types of fraud include covertly using or supplying sub-standard materials and designs not specified in the contract, providing a service in a shorter period than stated in the contract, and falsifying purchase orders and payment receipts. Fraud in procurement often goes hand in glove with other forms of corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and collusion (CPO Rising, 2012). In Malaysia, between 2013 and 2017, 14 companies were penalized for failure to supply goods of the standard or quantity specified in the contract, and for providing a service for a shorter period than required. A further nine were penalized for false disclosures in the procurement process, including submitting false information in the pre-qualification and amending certificates to make them eligible to bid (Jones, 2018). There may have been many other instances of such fraud which were not detected. The PwC (2017) report on economic crime in Thailand in 2016 highlighted frequent fraud in both the public and private procurement processes. Collusion Companies may engage in corruption through collusion. A group of competing companies (the collusion ring) arrange among themselves to limit competition for a tender or to fix the price (sometimes referred to as the rigging of the tender). There are four types of collusion. One is for members of the collusion ring to segment the procurement market for a particular range of goods, and to allow each supplier exclusive access to a specific segment. The market could be segmented according to region within a country, with a designated supplier within the ring having sole access to a tender within each region. Equally the market could be segmented according to the particular goods to be supplied within a range of related goods (e.g. computer hardware accessories), with each supplier having the right to supply one type of good within the range (e.g., printers). A second type of collusion is rotational bidding for goods and services for which there are regular tenders. Suppliers in the collusion ring agree to take in turn to submit a bid for each of the tenders over a number of years, with the other suppliers at each tender

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withholding their bids. A third type of collusion occurs when one supplier bribes the others in the ring not to bid, to withdraw a bid, or to offer excessively high bids in a particular tender which would be rejected. In the second and third types of collusion, the company designated to tender or to win the tender may then undertake to share the profits of the contract with the other members of the ring or to sub-contract some of the work to them in the case of public works projects (OECD, 2010, 2011; TI, 2016). Over the last 15–20 years, different sources of evidence including country procurement assessment reports by the World Bank, project reviews by the Asian Development Bank, commentaries and papers by the OECD and the UNDP, as well as media reports, have consistently referred to the frequency of collusion in Southeast Asian states. One of the countries noted for collusion in public procurement is Indonesia (Jones, 2017). In 2017, Indonesia’s competition commission, Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU) received allegations or evidence of bid rigging in both public and private sector procurement in 130 cases. It was likely there were many more cases which were not reported or investigated (KPPU, 2018).

MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION IN PROCUREMENT In response to the history of corruption in procurement, most countries in Southeast Asia have introduced measures to curb it. These measures include introducing or toughening anti-corruption laws and operations, reforming the procurement system, restricting anti-competitive practices and cartels, and enhancing transparency in the procurement process through E-procurement. Procurement reforms: Reforms of the system of procurement, introduced over the past 10–20 years, are an important means to combat corruption. The reforms usually take the form of an umbrella sovereign law passed by the legislature rather than a presidential or government decree. The reforms may directly prohibit explicitly stated corrupt practices in the procurement process with express penalties for committing such offences and, in addition, may also stipulate requirements to be followed to prevent conflicts of interest. Indirectly, the procurement reforms seek to combat corruption by stipulating open competitive tendering for most types of procurement, laying down strict guidelines when competition should be waived in favor of alternatives such as limited tenders (only certain companies invited to tender) and direct appointment. The reforms may also discourage corruption by mandating transparency in the procurement process and by splitting the function of bid evaluation and bid selection, each to be undertaken by separate personnel. Several examples may be given. The major reform of procurement in Vietnam is the Law on Tendering, No. 61 of 2005, subsequently extended in 2013. The 2005 reform prohibits giving, accepting or requesting any object of value by an individual or organization involved in the process of selection of a contractor or of contractual performance, resulting in dishonest or partial behavior when deciding on the selection of a contractor or when signing and implementing the contract.

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It further prohibits “using personal influence to affect or to intervene in” the procurement process and bid selection (Jones, 2017). A similar reform has been promulgated in Cambodia with the enactment of the Law (Kram) on Public Procurement of 2012, building on the Sub-decree (Anukret) of 2006 (Public– Private–Partnership Legal Resource Center, World Bank, 2013). In the Philippines, the Government Procurement Reform Act, passed in 2003, subsequently amplified by Implementing Rules and Regulations and Procurement Manuals, lays down prohibitions on bribery, nepotism and collusion (Jones, 2013). A key law governing procurement in Thailand is the Act Concerning Offences Relating to the Submission of Bids to Government Agencies, 1999 which details various types of collusive practice and bribery (including bribery to alter product specifications to suit a company) as major offences. The Act also specifies the powers of investigation of the National Counter Corruption Commission in these cases and the penalties attaching to such offences (ThaiLaws.com, 2015). In contrast, the main procurement reform in Indonesia, the Presidential Decree (KEPPRES) No. 60 of 2003, refers to corrupt practices in much less detail. Such practices are referred to simply as “corruption, collusion and nepotism” and are accompanied by a broad prohibition on the involvement of procurement officials, procurement boards and tender participants in such practices. If this occurs, the tender is canceled and a new tender undertaken. The original procurement board or company committing the offence is replaced or debarred for the repeat tender. The penalties for corrupt offences against individuals, however, are only broadly referred to as “sanctions in accordance with the provisions of laws in force” although a company may face the additional penalty of being debarred for two years from public sector contracts (President of the Republic of Indonesia (PRI), 2003). Laws relating to collusion: Another legal instrument to combat corruption in procurement are the laws restricting monopolies and cartels and prohibiting unfair competition. These normally include provisions prohibiting actions to undermine competition in public procurement through collusion and bribery. For example, in Indonesia, the Anti-monopoly Law No. 5 of 1999 specifies that “Entrepreneurs are prohibited from conspiring with other parties to arrange and/or determine the winner of the tender thus causing unfair business competition”. This covers principally collusion among companies to fix the price but also includes the bribery of officials to ignore the collusion (Hadiputranto, 2013; PRI, 1999). In the same vein is the Philippine Competition Act, No. 10667, passed in 2015 and implemented through the newly created Philippine Competition Commission. Under Section 14, it prohibits agreements to restrict competition including the various forms of collusion in bidding mentioned above (Congress of the Philippines, 2015). Following the lead from the Philippines, Thailand in 2017 overhauled its competition law and the Thai Parliament passed the Trade Competition Act be 2560, which under Section 54 prohibits collusive or bid-rigging practices. The Law is implemented and enforced through a newly created autonomous body the Trade Competition Commission (Allen & Overy, 2017; Thanitcul, 2015). E-procurement: The procurement systems in Southeast Asia have been improved by the introduction of E-procurement in recent years, which has

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contributed to enhanced transparency and greater clarity in the procurement process. This has in theory made it difficult to disguise corrupt practices, and has arguably provided some safeguards against unchecked corruption. Singapore has led the way in establishing a comprehensive E-procurement system through its GeBiz portal set up in 1997 (Jones, 2007). It was followed by the Philippines when it created its PhilGEPS website in 2007. Other countries have initiated E-procurement and are in the process of making it more comprehensive though progress has varied a lot. For example, Vietnam which has already rolled out an E-procurement platform (now incorporating an e-bidding function), will only achieve a fully comprehensive E-procurement system in 2025 (VnExpress. net, 2016). PhilGEPS managed by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of the Philippines typifies the range of functions of a fully-fledged E-procurement system. The expressed aim is that it becomes “the primary source of information” for procurement, and creates “a more efficient, convenient, transparent, and open procurement process” (DBM, 2018). PhilGEPS publishes procurement laws, regulations, and bidding procedures, and enables the registration of companies for the purpose of public procurement. It announces procurement opportunities, known as bid notice abstracts, with a facility for downloading bid documents. Bid notice abstracts contain information on the types of goods, services, and infrastructure project to be procured, the approved budget ceiling for the contract, any pre-bid conference to be attended, and the method of procurement to be adopted. The portal now allows online submission of bids and price quotations from would-be suppliers and contractors. Following the evaluation of bids and quotations, the portal publicizes the name of the company awarded a contract, the reason for the award, and the contract sum. It also permits electronic payments for bid documents and to remunerate suppliers and contractors (DBM, 2018). Establishment of anti-corruption courts: To further aid the efforts to tackle corruption in general including procurement, in certain Southeast Asian countries, trials for corruption offences may be conducted before a special anti-corruption court. The most long-standing is the Sandiganbayan in the Philippines set up in 1979 (Stephenson, 2016). The Indonesian Court for Corruption Crimes, or Tipikor court, was created in 2002 (Schütte, 2016). The Corruption Session Courts in Malaysia was set up in 2011 (Chief Registrar of the Federal Court of Malaysia (CRFCM), 2018). The most recent example has been the Criminal Court for Corruption and Malfeasance Cases in Thailand established in 2016 (Isaac, 2016). The reasons for the Malaysian anti-corruption court, as well as the other anti-corruption courts, was “the fact that corruption cases are technical in nature and almost always require lengthy trials involving a significant number of witnesses and numerous documentary evidence” (CRFCM, 2018). No less is the need to employ judges with specialist knowledge of corruption issues (CRFCM, 2018). In Indonesia, the KPPU, may not only investigate anti-competitive practices, many of which involve collusion and bribery in public procurement, but also performs a quasi-judicial role of prosecution and conviction, imposing fines and other penalties on errant companies (KPPU, 2018).

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WEAKNESSES IN IMPLEMENTING MEASURES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION IN PROCUREMENT Despite the various measures and the agencies set up to implement them, referred to above, progress in reducing corruption in public procurement has been limited in many countries of Southeast Asia. Procurement officials and other senior figures and political leaders continue to accept or solicit bribes, award deals based on crony deals, family networks and political connections, ignore fraudulent submissions and collusive arrangements, and where opportunities arise engage in embezzlement. Typical is the Philippines, where some of the procurement officials continue to by-pass their legal obligations by not holding open competitive tenders, taking bribes and favoring certain companies (ADB, 2013; Jones, 2013). Furthermore, corrupt practices followed by companies in offering bribes, making false submissions, by-passing contractual obligations and engaging in collusive practices may be encouraged or ignored by the procuring entity (Jones, 2017). Various explanations may be given for these failings. Lack of capacity in procuring entities and watchdog and enforcement agencies: Procuring entities and committees have been limited by capacity constraints. Global Integrity (GI) reports covering three Southeast Asian countries since 2011 (Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cambodia) indicate the absence of comprehensive training of officials in procurement in these states, which denies them the opportunity to develop skills to detect bribery, collusive practices and fraudulent submissions, and in managing competitive tenders (GI, 2011, 2012, 2013). A report by TI highlighted the lack of training of officials at sub-national level, with particular reference to Indonesia, as an obstacle to controlling corruption in procurement (2014). Capacity constraints also hinder anti-corruption and other watchdog agencies in their efforts to combat corruption in procurement. A particular concern are the insufficient numbers of skilled staff they employ, given the labor intensive and specialized nature of investigative work in corruption cases relating to complex and high value procurements. Quah has pointed to low staffing and budgetary levels in the anti-corruption agencies of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (2017). This is no better illustrated than in the staffing constraints in the Office of the Ombudsman in the Philippines. In December 2016, it employed 1,239 persons consisting of 357 lawyers and 662 non-lawyers. This has given rise to a work load of 17 cases per employee, and a specific work load of 17 cases per lawyer employed by the Ombudsman, some of which were complex and time-consuming dealing with high value procurement offences (OMB, 2017). In addition, in 2107, over 50% of cases investigated by the Ombudsman were carried over from the year before. A further indication of staffing shortfalls is the number of vacancies in the Office of the Ombudsman, which were 76% of filled posts in 2017 (OMB, 2018). For lawyer posts, there were in fact more vacancies than filled posts. The shortfalls may have been due to the lack of suitable and qualified applicants or to budgetary restriction preventing recruitment (OMB, 2017, 2018). With its capacity constraints, the Office of the Ombudsman has been singled out as the “main culprit” in the slow progress of prosecutions of suspected corrupt officials and

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politicians in the Sandiganbayan (Stephenson, 2016). The Ombudsman’s lawyers are “frequently unprepared on hearing dates” and request “continuances, which the court feels that it must grant” (Stephenson, 2016). Competition agencies in Southeast Asia dealing with collusion may likewise be hindered by lack of necessary funding and insufficient staff complements to undertake their investigative and prosecutorial work. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BS) report on Indonesia in 2018, “equipped with a small budget, the KPPU (competition agency) can only handle a very limited number of cases each year” (BS, 2018). Lack of cooperation and fragmentation of agencies in combatting corruption: A further challenge to effectively combating corruption in procurement is the existence of more than one anti-corruption agency. Two of the most notable examples are the one-party States of Laos and Vietnam. In Vietnam the range of anti-corruption agencies include the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, the Government Inspectorate, the People’s Procuracy, and the State Audit of Vietnam. Further anti-corruption bodies exist under provincial authorities (BS, 2018; Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). In Laos, the anti-corruption agencies include the State Inspection Authority, Inspection Departments in each Ministry, and the Inspection Commission of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, as well as agencies at the provincial level (BS, 2018; Globalsecurity.org, 2013). Challenges arising from more than one anti-corruption agency include a spread of resources and expertise, and confusion about the precise functions of each agency. Furthermore, impediments may arise in the chain of investigation especially if the anti-corruption agencies at the provincial level impede the work of central government agencies. As the Bertelsmann Stiftung report on Vietnam in 2018 states, “A hierarchy of anti-corruption offices has been established since a decade ago under the prime minister and provincial chiefs. Yet corruption has not abated and actually increased” (BS, 2018, n.p.). Difficulties of enforcement through the judicial system: Implementation has also been affected by the inability of anti-corruption investigative and enforcement bodies to assemble evidence of corruption in procurement that would result in a prosecution, or to secure convictions in the courts. An example is the Competition Commission of Indonesia. Of 204 decisions made by the Commission to penalize anti-competitive practices between 2006 and 2012 (74% relating to bid rigging), 49 were overturned by either the District Courts or the Supreme Court (KPPU, 2014). The situation has been even worse in Thailand. Of only 93 claims brought before the Thai Competition Commission (22 for collusion) between 1999 and 2014, it has been unable or unwilling to gather the necessary evidence that could result in a prosecution, let alone a proven violation (Thanitcul, 2015). One reason for the difficulties arising in the judicial system is the complexity of legal procedures which provide loopholes allowing challenges to the indictment on technical and procedural grounds. A further problem is the reluctance of witnesses to testify against the accused parties, even with whistle-blower protection. The result is a failure to secure a conviction, or a lengthy delay in the prosecution process. Even special anti-corruption courts are no guarantee that judicial procedures will be any more straightforward and less protracted. With respect to the

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Sandiganbayan in the Philippines, it is reported: “estimates of average time from case filing to final disposition vary, but some put the figure at approximately seven years, with a few cases taking significantly longer” (Stephenson, 2016). Corruption in watchdog and enforcement agencies and judicial institutions: A key problem in implementation has been continuing corruption within the enforcement and judicial system itself including the police, public prosecutor’s office and the courts. The Bertelsmann Stiftung report on Indonesia in 2018 stated that bribes can influence judicial procedures at all levels, from police investigations to indictments by the Attorney General’s Office to court verdicts and appeals. Highranking judges continued to be arrested for corruption in the surveyed period, and the secretary-general of the Supreme Court had to resign after a raid on his house by the Anti-Corruption Agency (KPK) in April 2016 found hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash (BS, 2018). Most recently, the former Chief Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman in the Philippines, Enda Batacan, alleged that the institution was ridden with corruption, and even admitted herself to offering a bribe in her (unsuccessful) application to be appointed as the new Ombudsman in June 2018 (Buan, 2018). The allegation was denied by the present Ombudsman, and Batacan may be subject to charges for making the allegation (Buan, 2018). Interference by influential politicians: Another weakness in combatting corruption in procurement in Southeast Asia are the influences of leading politicians, members of the government, senior figures in the ruling party and prominent members of the legislature. They may exercise pressure on procurement boards to ensure contracts are awarded to businesses to which they are connected or their family members or cronies, and may accept bribes from a business to influence the procurement award in its favor. They may likewise engage in the embezzlement of funds earmarked for procurement projects. Given the influence of senior political figures, whether it be in democratic or one-party states, it is difficult for lower level officials to resist such pressure and exercise independence. Anti-corruption agencies in their reports and through their web sites have consistently referred to the top-down interference of politicians and senior officials in the procurement process for corrupt purposes. The many instances of the award of big procurement contracts to companies connected to political and party leaders at central and also local government levels, and to their families and cronies attest to this. Influence pedaling also applies to prominent representatives in the legislature. An example is Cambodia, where “Government contracts are awarded to private companies that have political relationships with high-ranking party members (the ruling Cambodia Peoples Party)” (BS, 2018). In Laos, “gross corruption has further concentrated wealth in the hands of a relatively small political elite” and has been increased by “foreign investors’ willingness to buy political support and pay off officials” (BTI, 2018). In the Philippines, the alleged embezzlement by several Congressmen from the Priority Development Assistance Fund, much of which was earmarked for procurement projects, as mentioned above, would if proven be an example of the involvement of political representatives in procurement corruption (Punay, 2018). Equally, political interference has undermined watchdog and enforcement bodies, resulting in delay or termination of investigations and prosecutions,

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redaction of incriminating reports, acquittals by the courts in corruption cases, or removal from office of investigative and enforcement staff, as shown in surveys by the Ombudsman, state audit authorities, and anti-corruption agencies in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (GI, 2011, 2012, 2013). While there has been some progress in dealing with corrupt practices in procurement by senior political figures in recent years, much more work remains to be done in rooting out such practices in many of the countries in the region. A key problem is that the influence of senior political figures over the watchdog, enforcement and judicial bodies leads them to the belief in being immune from ever being discovered or brought to justice.

CONCLUSION Despite the measures to improve the fight against corruption in procurement in Southeast Asia, corruption still remains pervasive in the procurement systems of most countries of the region. The GAN Anti-corruption Business Portal consistently reports that in the procurement systems of these countries (with the notable exception of Singapore), corruption remains “rampant” or that the risks of it are “high” (GAN, 2018). Three explanations may be offered for the lack of progress in combatting procurement corruption. One is elite capture. This is reflected in the way a close network of top business leaders, leading administrators, and influential politicians are able to influence procurement operations to suit their interests and are able to engage in corrupt practices to this end. Usually within this network, the politicians have interests in the business sector directly, or indirectly through their cronies and family members (Johnston, 2005). Second, in many Southeast Asian countries, there exists, alongside and contrary to the formal rules and procedures of the bureaucracy, an organizational culture in which informal rules and practices prevail – the so-called informal bureaucracy (Johnston, 2005). The political, administrative and business elites have been able to exploit the informal bureaucracy to pursue corrupt practices avoiding legal impediments and official procedures, with often little risk of being held to account. A third reason is the lack of will on the part of the political leadership in many Southeast Asian countries to root out corrupt practices in public procurement involving their family members, and political and business associates, despite clear commitments to do so in public speeches and policy statements.

REFERENCES ADB. (2013). Philippines Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) 2012. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Allen & Overy. (2017). New competition law in Thailand approved. Bangkok. Retrieved from http:// www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The_New_Competition_Law_in_Thailand_ Approved.pdf. Asian Correspondent. (2016). Thailand: PM’s brother accused of graft over contracts linked to son, wife. Kuala Lumpur, September 21. Retrieved from https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/09/ thailand-brother-accused-graft-contracts-son-wife/.

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Bertelsmann Stiftung (BS). (2018). Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI): Country reports. Gütersloh. Retrieved from https://www.bti-project.org/en/country-reports/. Buan, L. (2018). Ex-Arroyo lawyer Batacan faces charges for alleging corruption in Ombudsman. Rappler, November 21. Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/nation/217206-ex-arroyo-lawyer-faces-charges-alleging-corruption-ombudsman. CPO Rising. (2012). Examples of procurement fraud. Boston, MA. Retrieved from http://cporising. com/2012/08/03/examples-of-procurement-fraud/. Department of Budget and Management (DBM). (2018). Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS). Pasig City. Retrieved from https://www.philgeps.gov.ph/data. html. GAN Integrity Solutions (GAN). (2018). Business-anti-corruption portal: Country profiles. Copenhagen. Retrieved from http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/. Global Integrity (GI). (2011). Country reports, 2011: Vietnam – Scorecard. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.globalintegrity.org. Global Integrity (GI). (2012). Country reports, 2012: Cambodia – Scorecard. Washington, DC. Retrieved fromhttps://www.globalintegrity.org. Global Integrity (GI). (2013). Country reports, 2013: Indonesia – Scorecard. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.globalintegrity.org. Globalsecurity.org. (2013). Laos – Corruption. Retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/laos/corruption.htm. Hadiputranto, Hadinoto, & Partners. (2013). Guide to competition law in Indonesia. Jakarta. Retrieved from http://www.hhp.co.id/files/Uploads/Documents/Type%202/HHP/bk_hhp_competitionlawindonesia_2013.pdf. Isaac, T. (2016, October 4). Thailand opens specialized corruption court. Jurist. Retrieved from https:// www.jurist.org/news/2016/10/thailand-opens-specialized-corruption-court/ Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Johnston, M. (2010). Political and social foundations for reform: Anti-corruption strategies for the Philippines. Manila: Asian Institute of Management. Jones, D. S. (2007). The features and recent reforms of Government procurement in Singapore. In L. Knight, C. Harland, J. Telgen, G. Callender, K. Thai, & K. McKen (Eds.), Public procurement: International cases and commentary (pp. 117–137). Oxford: Routledge. Jones, D. S. (2013). Reforming public procurement in the Philippines: Progress and constraints. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 26(5), 375–400. Jones, D. S. (2017). Corruption and procurement in Asian states. In T. Gong & I. Scott (Eds.), Routledge handbook on corruption in Asia (pp. 113–128). Oxford: Routledge. Jones, D. S. (2018). Report of public procurement in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS). Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU). (2018). Annual report on competition policy developments in Indonesia. Paris: OECD. Labog-Javellana, J. (2013, August 20). Houses of corruption. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/467311/houses-of-corruption. NGO Watchdog. (2015). Priority Development Assistance Fund scam. Retrieved from https:// Ngowatchdog.Wordpress.Com/Author/Europenewscast/. Norton Rose Fulbright. (2017). Business ethics and anti-corruption laws, Vietnam. London. Retrieved from http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121088/business-ethics-andanti-corruption-laws-vietnam. OECD. (2010). Global Forum on Competition: Roundtable on collusion and corruption in public procurement. Paris. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/46235884.pdf. OECD. (2011). Competition and procurement. Paris. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/sectors/48315205.pdf. OECD. (2016). Preventing corruption in public procurement. Paris: OECD. Office of the Chief Registrar Federal Court of Malaysia (CRFCM). (2018). Corruption court in Malaysia. Putrajaya. Retrieved from https://cdn.sanity.io/files/1f1lcoov/production/ a89e2a517ce0a4d567df52d61e38118e6bb7a16.pdf. Office of the Ombudsman, Philippines (OMB). (2015). Annual Report, 2014. Quezon City: OMB. Office of the Ombudsman, Philippines (OMB). (2017). Annual Report, 2016. Quezon City: OMB.

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CHAPTER 9 ETHICAL PRIVACY POLICIES FOR E-GOVERNMENT WEBSITES Aroon P. Manoharan and Tony Carrizales

ABSTRACT With the increasing use of the Internet and social media, governments worldwide are adopting digital technologies and innovative strategies to communicate and engage with their citizens. Public sector agencies, especially at the local level, have been adopting emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things, artificial Intelligence, and blockchain and they are increasingly leveraging big data analytics to improve their decision-making and organizational performance. These rapid innovations pose important questions about, and concerns for, the privacy and security of the citizens accessing government information and services online. This chapter explores these issues, discusses the role of privacy policies in addressing such concerns, and highlights the need for ethical privacy policies to restore the trust and confidence of citizen users of government websites. Keywords: E-government; websites; ethics; privacy policy; security; technology

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN E-GOVERNMENT Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are shaping and influencing the social, political, economic, biological, physiological, and environmental context of human development. The beneficial outcomes of technological advancements are increasing the economic output and efficiency. In the process, however, they are also disrupting the traditional models and processes in several major

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sectors. The economic benefits present two significant ethical concerns: equity and privacy. As it stands now, society is growing increasingly interdependent with technology that is heavily concentrated in the hands of an elite few. Thus, decisions about technology have significant implications for future generations, requiring critical ethical discourse and decisions (Vallor, Green, & Raicu, 2018). This has caused public discussion and reflection. A recent report by Gartner, Inc. (2019) identified digital ethics and privacy as one of the top ten strategic technology trends for 2019, indicating the shift from “compliance-driven organizations” to “ethics-driven organizations.” These trends indicate that ethical considerations need to be an integral part of discussions in technological advancements, and ethical principles need to be addressed in the privacy policies of websites. The use of ICTs to develop e-government has been found to be effective as an anti-corruption tool (Gajendra, Xi, & Wang, 2012; Ionescu, 2013; Shim & Eom, 2008). Transparency underpins the advancement of ethical practices, and ICTs provide the medium for a more transparent government, which in turn provides safeguards against corruption in government. As Turilli and Floridi (2009) argue, transparency is not an ethical principle in itself but rather an ethical condition for promoting other ethical principles and practices. Shim and Eom (2008) have empirically shown how the transparency of e-government has helped reduce corruption throughout the world, specifically through the enhanced government– public relationships and control of employee behavior. One of the earliest adopters of a more transparent government was the City of Seoul, South Korea and their “Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications,” or “OPEN” system. This e-government initiative helped fight corruption in government, while also diffusing discriminatory practices and increasing citizen trust (Cho & Choi, 2004). As new and emerging technologies are adopted by government agencies, privacy and trust issues become paramount to enable more transparent and ethical government entities.

PRIVACY AND SECURITY Advances in technology have transformed how we interact and communicate today. However, the right to privacy is central to a democratic society (Bannister, 2005). A privacy policy communicates an organization’s privacy practices to users. In general terms, privacy refers to the individual’s ability to control the conditions under which his or her personal information is accessed (Westin, 1967). However, these definitions, and an individual’s right to privacy, vary depending upon the context and jurisdiction. For example, under US Federal Law, informational privacy or data privacy refers to an individual’s right of privacy over his or her personally identifiable information (PII) that is used to identify and distinguish the individual. The US Office of Management and Budget Memorandum (OMB, 2019, “Memo 7–16”) defines it as information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc., alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.

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The term “security” refers to the measures taken by an agency to secure such private data, and protect against breaches or unauthorized access. Accordingly, the memorandum defines “breach” as the loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where persons other than authorized users and for other than authorized purpose have access or potential access to personally identifiable information, whether physical or electronic. (OMB, 2019)

The OMB memorandum further explains that non-PII can be considered PII or personally identifiable when made publicly available. Agencies are required to establish breach notification policies based on the best judgment standards if such a disclosure occurs (OMB, 2019).

PRIORITIZING PRIVACY POLICIES The adoption and implementation of e-government services is contingent upon several factors such as budget resources, infrastructure, accessibility, affordability, and political support. Most cities began with a minimal web presence and limited pathways for online communication or transactions. Developing privacy and security policies for lightly trafficked websites was, understandably, not a priority for most. However, as many government websites now offer advanced functionalities and are transaction-oriented, many cities have been slow to craft adequate privacy policies A website privacy policy documents how an agency collects, uses, and disseminates data resulting from a user’s online communications and transactions. A 2016 e-government study of some of the world’s largest municipalities shows that cities have placed less emphasis on their websites’ privacy policies compared to other digital functionalities (Holzer & Manoharan, 2016). This study, as part of a longitudinal survey of municipal e-governments since 2003, evaluated cities’ official websites in five categories – privacy and security, usability, content, services, and citizen and social engagement. The average score in the category of privacy and security for those cities studied in 2016 was 5.55 out of a maximum of 20 points. This was only a minimal increase from 4.17 in 2005. Thus, the 2016 study’s findings indicate, governments online are not focused on developing strong privacy or security policies. Most notably, this study found that some cities have no privacy policy at all. This could become a major impediment for citizen use of digital government services. It is posited here that privacy and security policies, when clearly stated and accessible on government websites, can improve trust in government and increase trust in online transactions. To progress through the various phases of e-government development, websites need to communicate effective privacy policies to persuade wary citizens to transact business online and share sensitive information with government agencies (Belanger & Hiller, 2006; Manoharan, 2013). The public sector has considerably greater privacy and security obligations compared to the private sector. Citizens expect their government to work for their best interests, and as governments integrate smart technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and blockchain into

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their operations, they must also integrate ethical principles into their privacy policies. As Belanche-Gracia, Casaló-Ariño, and Pérez-Rueda (2015) found, citizens’ perceptions of privacy and security are evolving as they continue to depend on smart technologies. Importantly, they found that as citizens perceived a greater “ease-of-use” of technology, it positively affected their perception of privacy and security. The ethical implications become paramount when the perception of privacy can be improved by increasing the relative usefulness of a technology. Instead of focusing on perceptions, a technology provider should also prioritize privacy as it improves its users’ experiences. The following section identifies some of these technologies and discusses the implications regarding their ethical use.

BIG DATA As suggested by Richards and King (2014), the collection of citizen information, collectively identified as big data, will foster a transformational change in society equal to that of the Industrial Revolution. Social media and government agencies not only continually track and record the information submitted by citizen users but also their demographics, psychographics, health, location, devices, search, and purchasing histories. In reviewing the growing practice of data collection, Jurkiewicz (2018) outlined multiple areas of ethical concern. For example, collecting data about a user’s behaviors and practices for profit but publicly stating it as a benefit. Zwitter (2014) also noted the ethical implications of accessing big data for research purposes. Thus, presumptions of privacy and ownership built into the current model of data collection are being challenged.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AI represents an important area of ethical concern. AI can dehumanize individual choice, replacing an individual identity with a computerized model of a citizen. As AI becomes a more common tool of government agencies, ethical consideration must be given to the disproportionate impact its use will likely have on economically disadvantaged and marginalized populations. An unintended consequence of replacing unskilled jobs with AI tools is that the already unequal distribution of wealth will become even more unequal (Jurkiewicz, 2018). In addition, AI algorithms are expected to perform cognitive work with social dimensioncognitive functions (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014). These AI algorithms must, therefore, be made subject to transparency and accountability best practices that more accurately reflect the social dimensions they are meant to represent.

BLOCKCHAIN The increasing use of cryptocurrency and online transactions presents growing privacy concerns. Blockchain serves as a public, online transaction ledger, specifically centered on cryptocurrency expenditures. As Goldfeder, Kalodner, Reisman,

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and Narayanan (2018) point out, online trackers are able to see sensitive details such as the identities of purchasers and the prices of items; they are also able to retrieve information about purchases and link them to Bitcoin transactions. As found in their study, online transactions that embrace cryptocurrency and blockchain still have inherent privacy issues. These vulnerabilities arise especially in the use of third-party vendors that are not always apparent in website transactions.

SMART TECHNOLOGIES As government organizations continue to embrace smart technology for service delivery, the opportunity for data collection exponentially increases. Protection services use security cameras to build facial and community portfolios for their cities. Electronic parking meters collect information on individuals’ travel patterns. Sophisticated digital surveillance technologies including facial and voice recognition, are tracking behavior in both public and private spaces (Vallor et al., 2018). Even the privacy of a citizen walking or driving down a municipal street raises ethical questions. In short, there needs to be a greater public awareness on what data government and affiliated companies can collect and how they can use it.

PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROTECTION The expanding digitization of government has grown in tandem with an increasing uneasiness with the privacy and security offered by both public and private entities. The newly emerging technologies highlight the major ethical issues related to privacy and security. As governments embrace these technologies, it is imperative that their policies integrate ethical principles and standards, particularly due to the exponential generation of big data and the potential for data analytics. The years 2017 and 2018 witnessed increased levels of cybercrimes in the form of cryptojacking, spear phishing, malware implants, particularly in mobile phones, and a greater presence of targeted attack groups (Symantec, 2018). During the first half of 2019, state and local governments in the United States experienced 22 ransomware attacks that critically disabled basic online functions such as email, bill payments, and permit transactions (Freed, 2019). These cybercrimes and cyberattacks on government websites, and the recent controversies around data usage by social media companies have exacerbated citizens’ legitimate concerns about sharing private information online. Such concerns will likely influence their perception and trust of online government. As Lee, Zankl, and Chang (2016) outline, data privacy centers on access, use, and collection of data. Specifically, the components of data privacy are: freedom from unauthorized access to private data and inappropriate use of data; accuracy and completeness when collecting data about a person or persons by technology; availability of personal data and a person’s right to access it, i.e., ownership; and the rights to inspect, update, or correct these data. In 2018, along these same lines, the European Union (EU) adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), creating legal restrictions on how technology

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organizations collect and use personal data. The GDPR empowers EU citizens to better control data collected by technology companies. Citizens can request access to the data collected by the company, have it erased, or have errors corrected. Along with greater citizen control of personal data, the law also stipulates when and how citizens must be informed after a privacy breach. Many governments across the world have also implemented the Right to be Forgotten (RTBF) laws that require organizations to remove individual information upon request. The US federal government sought to protect the privacy and security of citizen records even before the large-scale adoption of e-government services during the 1990s. The Privacy Act of 1974 established the Code of Fair Information Practices for collecting, using, and disseminating personally identifiable information in the federal records systems. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the OMB to regulate the collection of information. OIRA is responsible for assisting federal agencies on privacy issues, developing federal privacy policies, and guiding the implementation of government policies relating to technology, information, and privacy (OMB, 2019). The Computer Security Act of 1987 focused on strengthening the privacy and security of sensitive information in federal computer systems, creating minimum security standards, and mandating training for the employees using these systems. Subsequent years have seen several legislative initiatives and memoranda to enhance the privacy and security standards of federal institutions, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002; Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Effectiveness Act (PRECISE) of 2011; National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014; and Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2016. Some recent OMB directives include the OMB Memorandum M-17-06, Policies for Federal Agency Public Websites and Digital Services (November 2016); OMB Circular A-108, Federal Agency Responsibilities for Review, Reporting, and Publication under the Privacy Act (December 2016); and the OMB Memorandum M-17-12, Preparing for and Responding to a Breach of Personally Identifiable Information (January 2017). During the Summer and Fall of 2018, as part of Congressional hearings into the 2016 presidential elections, representatives of social media companies, Facebook and Twitter, testified before Congress. The core of the questioning was what data was being collected and how it was being distributed to third parties. Whether these hearings will spur Congress to create new policies to protect the public in the near term remains unknown, but it is likely that discussions of transparency and privacy will be paramount in future cybersecurity legislation. However, as Vallor et al. (2018) point out, ethics is not legal compliance but rather an inherent object of respecting the dignity of others. The need for ethical practices becomes more apparent as we examine how emerging technologies impact citizens’ lives.

CONCLUSION The above discussion shows the importance and the need to protect private information. Thus, ethical privacy practices should be addressed through various

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approaches. As Lee et al. (2016) suggest, ethical practices in data privacy can be achieved through technical and social solutions. Social approaches require increased citizen awareness of how their personal data will be used. While technical and regulatory solutions can support awareness and transparency, other facets of ethical practices must also be present. These include organizational training and education, cultural competence, and advocacy for and compliance with, ethical privacy policies. The following recommendations should be considered when developing an organization’s privacy policy. 1. Comply with international proposed regulations: In developing privacy policy practices, local and federal policies should be the starting point. However, these should be considered a baseline minimum standard. An organization’s ultimate aim should be to expand how it protects citizens and consumers. For example, a US organization, not governed by the EU’s GDPR, should not preclude policy developers from implementing policies that would adhere to that law’s heightened level of privacy protection. As Lee et al. (2016) noted, the rapid development of technologies often outpaces policies and regulations. For that reason, ethical practices should be developed to comply with international proposed regulations that may be more protective than the legal standard within one’s jurisdiction. There should be more progressive action of exploring potential policies throughout the world, as ICTs are both rapid and worldwide mediums. 2. Create culturally competent policies: Cultural competence represents the most effective service delivery approach for organizations. Knowledge about this practice comes primarily from studies of health and human services (Carrizales, Zahradnik, & Silverio, 2016), and the cultural competence of private sector websites has been explored (Fletcher, 2006; Hiller, 2003; Sun, 2001). It also opens a new area of ethical issues when considering privacy policies. Specifically, language is a key component of cultural awareness when ICTs interact with consumers. The effectiveness of a privacy policy can be limited if consumers are unable to understand how and where their data are being used. To this end, privacy policies should aim to be culturally competent and provide multilingual options for any communications to its end-users. 3. Identify best practices in privacy policies: Rules and regulations must be complied with, but there are also best practices that should be explored when developing and improving privacy policies. Vallor et al. (2018) suggested adopting Tech Ethics: 16 best practices that go beyond current regulations making ethics a prominent aspect of technology rather than a compliance afterthought. Likewise, privacy and security should be a design issue, where “design” incorporates social and organizational design of groups, policies, procedures, incentives, resource allocations, and techniques. Exploring best practices should be integrated into training and policy, and ethics officers should become a functional part of an organization. Training of programming technicians, policy developers, and organizational staff should be continuous as best practices are continuously evolving.

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4. Transparency, accountability and accessibility: Privacy policies should be transparent, accountable, and accessible. These three principles represent the foundation of ethical privacy policies. Vaccaro (2006) proposes clear transparency for policies that affect the use of ICTs and the development of a participatory system in which all organizational actors are not only well-informed on ethical problems but can work toward addressing them. This participatory system lends itself to greater openness and transparency when developing and implementing ethical privacy policies; it can also adapt as technologies evolve. 5. Finally Simplicity and Clarity, a privacy policy must be simple, clear, and easily understood by users and easily identifiable as a link on the website homepage. It should also be readable, free of technical jargon, and complicated language. It needs to clearly state what data will be collected, how it will be used, and which agency or agencies are involved in the data collection. The policy should address any use of web features such as digital signatures, cookies, web beacons, and similar technologies, and there should be a contact email or phone number for any privacy or security related questions from users. It should clarify if third party agencies are involved and if they are regulated by the same privacy policy as the agency’s website. Most importantly, the website users should be given the option to decline disclosure of personal information to third parties, which may include other agencies, state and local government offices, or private sector businesses. Governments need to be proactive in informing and communicating their privacy policies, and any subsequent changes, to citizen users. In particular, the US federal government along with state governments should provide more direction and guidance for creating ethical privacy policies to local governments. Although some states and cities have taken steps to pass laws to protect their citizens’ privacy, most local governments lack the resources and technical guidance to implement robust privacy and security policies on their official websites. More recently, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has initiated an effort to enact a national privacy law to protect consumer privacy and coordinate cybersecurity efforts with State governments. The development of ethical privacy policies will require collective efforts for advancing this critical foundation for a better citizen–government technological relationship moving forward. While establishing ethical privacy policies and providing transparency as a useful tool to hold public agencies accountable, it is important to ensure that private information would not, and should not, be used for commercial purposes, and more importantly for partisan gain.

REFERENCES Bannister, F. (2005). The panoptic state: Privacy, surveillance and the balance of risk. Information Polity, 10(1, 2), 65–78. Belanche-Gracia, D., Casaló-Ariño, L. V., & Pérez-Rueda, A. (2015). Determinants of multi-service smartcard success for smart cities development: A study based on citizens’ privacy and security perceptions. Government Information Quarterly, 32(2), 154–163.

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Belanger, F., & Hiller, J. S. (2006). A framework for e-government: Privacy implications. Business Process Management Journal, 12(1), 48–60. Bostrom, N., & Yudkowsky, E. (2014). The ethics of artificial intelligence. The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, 316, 334. Carrizales, T., Zahradnik, A., & Silverio, M. (2016). Organizational advocacy of cultural competency initiatives: Lessons for public administration. Public Administration Quarterly, 40(1), 126. Cho, Y. H., & Choi, B. D. (2004). E-government to combat corruption: The case of Seoul metropolitan government. International Journal of Public Administration, 27(10), 719–735. Fletcher, R. (2006). The impact of culture on web site content, design, and structure: An international and a multicultural perspective. Journal of Communication Management, 10(3), 259–273. Freed, B. (2019). 2018 was ‘a bad year’ for ransomware, but so far 2019 is no better. Retrieved from https://statescoop.com/2018-was-a-bad-year-for-ransomware-but-so-far-2019-is-no-better/ Gajendra, S., Xi, B., & Wang, Q. (2012). E-government: Public participation and ethical issues. Journal of e-Governance, 35(4), 195–204. Gartner. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-10-strategictechnology-trends-for-2019/ Gartner, Inc. (2018, October 15). Top 10 Strategic Technology Trends for 2019. Goldfeder, S., Kalodner, H., Reisman, D., & Narayanan, A. (2018). When the cookie meets the blockchain: Privacy risks of web payments via cryptocurrencies. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2018(4), 179–199. Hiller, M. (2003). The role of cultural context in multilingual website usability. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2(1), 2–14. Holzer, M., & Manoharan, A. P. (2016). Digital governance in municipalities worldwide (2015–16). In Seventh global e-governance survey: A longitudinal assessment of municipal websites throughout the world. Newark, NJ: E-Governance Institute, NCPP. Ionescu, L. (2013). The positive effect of ICT infrastructure in reducing corruption and increasing transparency. Economics, Management, and Financial Markets, 8(2), 167–172. Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2018). Big data, big concerns: Ethics in the digital age. Public Integrity, 20, 1–14. Lee, W. W., Zankl, W., & Chang, H. (2016). An ethical approach to data privacy protection. Isaca Journal, 6. Manoharan, A. (2013). A three dimensional assessment of US county e-government. State and Local Government Review, 45(3), 153–162. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2007, May 22). Memorandum 07-16, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information. Retrieved from https:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-16.pdf Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2019, January 22). Privacy. Retrieved from https://www. whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/privacy/ Richards, N. M., & King, J. H. (2014). Big data ethics. Wake Forest Law Review, 49, 393. Shim, D. C., & Eom, T. H. (2008). E-government and anti-corruption: Empirical analysis of international data. International Journal of Public Administration, 31(3), 298–316. Sun, H. (2001, October). Building a culturally-competent corporate web site: An exploratory study of cultural markers in multilingual web design. In Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Computer documentation (pp. 95–102). London: ACM. Symantec Corporation. (2018). 2018 Internet Security Threat Report. Mountain View, CA: Symantec Corporation. Turilli, M., & Floridi, L. (2009). The ethics of information transparency. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(2), 105–112. Vaccaro, A. (2006). Privacy, security, and transparency: ICT-related ethical perspectives and contrasts in contemporary firms. In Social inclusion: Societal and organizational implications for information systems (pp. 245–258). Boston, MA: Springer. Vallor, S., Green, B., & Raicu, I. (2018, January 7). Ethics in technology practice. Retrieved from https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ Westin, A. F. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum. Zwitter, A. (2014). Big data ethics. Big Data & Society, 1(2), 1–6.

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CHAPTER 10 EPILOGUE Krishna K. Tummala

In closing… As Transparency International observed, there is no country which can claim that it is corruption free, including those small nations which are said to be the least corrupt. Even Singapore, which is clean in more ways than one, was found to have had corruption as Jones showed, quoting Quah. Paradoxically, it was seen in the agency meant to fight corruption – the CPIB. Even that holy place, Vatican, is no exception as the Pope himself admitted. Thus, corruption is everywhere; it is only a matter of degree, and even kind. It could be pervasive; it could be spotty. It could be large, or petty. Then what to do, and what is effective in terms of curbing corruption? Several lessons are drawn from this work as well as others (Tummala, 2020, pp. 179–180). What exactly is meant when it is said that a country is corrupt? What is the unit of measurement? And how could one actually and precisely measure corruption? Transparency International, whose annual ranking of corruption in nations, as measured by its “Corruption Perception Index” is no more than a study of “perception,” not “fact.” That too, the perceptions measured are those of a small group of business leaders, media and other prominent persons. The actual tax-payer – the bribe-giver, and the counterpart, the bribe-taker, are not part of the sample. Thus, the starting premise itself is that it is impossible to provide a precise, universally accepted definition of corruption, much less how to measure it. Moreover, definitions often times tend to be simple and simplistic, hiding a lot, or missing several nuances. For example, the more insidious forms of corruption – political and constitutional, are not commonly mentioned, much less studied, in corruption literature. The discerning reader would note that this work is no exception. Hence, no attempt has been made here in either defining, or explaining corruption in all its incarnations. Borrowing from Fred Riggs (1964; also Gaus,

Corruption in the Public Sector: An lnternational Perspective Public Policy and Governance, Volume 34, 139–142 Copyright © 2021 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2053-7697/doi:10.1108/S2053-769720210000034011

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1947; Plato 386 bce) who popularized the notion of “ecological study,” culture and context play a very important role in addressing corruption, and the ways to combat it. Given that, it is well-nigh impossible to develop a single, or even a set of strategies to combat corruption. There of course are only two reasons for corruption: need and greed. As to need, although it is not difficult to define what shall be the minimum pay, none can posit what exactly is the ceiling beyond which one ought not to be paid. It is recognized that at the minimum one should be paid a subsistence wage. For the temptation to take a bribe is greater for a lowly paid public servant. Thus, indeed better pay would work as an inhibitor, as is argued in the case of Singapore. An Indian police constable, who is paid a subsistence wage, or even less, is easily susceptible to a bribe. In fact, the propensity to demand a bribe is greater than otherwise. But higher pay does not guarantee probity and integrity. Moreover generous pay scales are a function of several variables such as the state of the economy, competition between the private and public sector for able and professional personnel, size of the population and the tax base, inequalities both social and economic among the populace, and so on. Moreover, better pay might meet the “need” part of corruption, but does not address the other part of equation – “greed.” To check greed, laws and institutions to fight corruption are essential. But just having them on the books is not enough as was seen in the cases of India, Bangladesh, or South Africa. They need to be implemented impartially. All these three States demonstrate the failure to do so. As is often argued, corruption should be made a “low reward, and high price” affair. It is not simply the force of law, nor the guarantee of swift, and commensurate punishment administered impartially that are enough. Social stigma matters most. A society that would not tolerate, either giving or taking a bribe, would do well in curbing corruption. Moreover, it is important to note the fight against corruption would not be successful if it is uni-dimensional. The effort must be multidimensional. It should involve several political and social institutions – all political parties, civil societies, media and so on. In the current day, when globalization has become the “new norm” (despite the new claims on “nationalism”), attempts to curb corruption locally or nationally alone would not do. For example, “odebrecht” is shown to have spread corruption in most of Latin America and even parts of Africa. More importantly institutions fighting corruption should not be burdened with fighting all sorts of crimes, but focused entirely on curbing corruption. Singapore and Hong Kong are shown to be prime examples. And such institutions ought not to be used for political purposes such as to neutralize opposition, or to advance ideological, political and personal or partisan gain, as argued by Lagarde. Pope, writing for Transparency International, provided a 6-point template to sustain a well-resourced, independent corruption fighting institution. The foremost variable is the political will to deal with corruption, in the first instance. Top leadership, as agreed by all, is fundamental to successfully fight corruption. But even there, some limitations are noted. For one, a Prime Minister or a President of a nation might be of great personal integrity and probity, but could be surrounded by a coterie of corrupt colleagues. Or even might become a captive of the system. Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi in India are

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good examples of leaders with integrity. And both are known to shout against corruption. Yet, corruption is ubiquitous in India. In South Africa, President Ramaphosa has to accommodate a corrupt leader as his Deputy. Frequent regime changes, or a single party dominated regime, may also be hurdles in curbing corruption as has been shown in case of Bangladesh and India. Not only strong and committed leadership, but political stability also are needed. There would also be some cultural and religious hurdles to contend with. President Zuma’s profligacy is justified in the name of the Pentecostal “Gospel of Wealth.” It is noteworthy that evangelical Christians (albeit with some cracks appearing of late in the form dissent, from a minority1) in the United States (where the “Establishment” clause does not recognize a state religion, but many claim that it is a Christian nation) suggest that President Donald Trump himself is God’s choice. That claim perhaps leads to the precept that the “King can do no wrong”; hence the President himself is above the law, and cannot be prosecuted for any reason during his tenure. So goes the perverse logic. In several cases pending before the courts, President Trump’s lawyers are actually using such argument (Finkelstein & Wagner, 2017). It would also be useful to realize that what succeeded in one country may not work in all others. A lot depends upon culture – socially and administratively – and the state of development. In some cultures, gift-giving is considered to be very important. But the distance between a gift and a bribe is not far off. Moreover, and more importantly, is corruption active in that it is demanded, or passive which is simply offered? Consider two examples. Not too long ago, in Singapore a Chinese worker who offered only a couple of dollars in bribe was arrested. Even when it is petty, a bribe is treated as serious. In Japan, two Cabinet Ministers resigned for having sent some gifts in kind to poor families, and at funerals. Indeed, the size of a nation also appears to be a determinant of the capacity of a nation to fight corruption. In a small country, such as the Nordic nations, where face-to-face relationships are the norm, or a Singapore, or Hong Kong, the stigma can easily be projected. In a large and very diverse country such as India, the very reach of law into the remote corners of the nation is suspect. Indeed, the development of transportation facilities and the ease of communication, what with new technologies, ease this burden to an extent. But issues of privacy and the evils of social media where rumors run rampant, particularly the negative ones spreading fast and far and furiously, for example, are the emerging issues just attracting attention. More importantly, how to protect citizen privacy? Corruption is no more restricted to bureaucracies; nor is it simply money changing hands. Now, multifarious participants such as politicians, private contractors, even non-government entities are involved. And corruption runs into sand and land what with construction becomes as an important consideration in the development of a nation. Procurement, that is, outsourcing (“contracting out”), is a great source of corruption. It is argued that e-governance and the right to information helped ease this trauma as transparency and accountability are maintained as Jones, and Manoharan and Carrizales show. But both come with their own problems. E-governance, with the attendant invasion of individual privacy, and governments use of emerging technologies to snoop over individuals,

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demand a different kind of focus in curbing corruption. Indeed, it is seen that corruption in procurement is curbed, and the interaction between governments and citizens is enhanced with the inauguration of e-governance. Similarly, the right to information too is fraught. Aggressive investigative journalists, and even zealous individual citizens, now face dire consequences even to the point of existential threats, and death. The above are not excuses for the inability to fight corruption, or worse the futility of efforts to curb it. The intent is to show that dealing with corruption is not an easy matter. Nor is it a one-time affair, or localized. The fight is unending. And indeed as despair might take hold, one can take heart that there are success stories. They seem to confine largely to smaller nations with stable polities, though. But then, the current experience in Hong Kong with the pro-democracy demonstrations vis-à-vis the Chinese response would test the stability hypothesis. In the ultimate analysis, not all rhetoric would cut corruption. It is action, sustained and meaningful, to find the reasons for corruption and then curb it that makes the difference. Fighting only symptoms of corruption, without understanding the very fundamental reasons for corruption could only be palliative in the short run. All this does should not be understood as an apologia for corruption, but only a reflection of the difficulties involved in the study and the efforts to curb it. Should the fight against corruption be considered a waste of effort? No. Not in the least. The search for a better understanding of the causes and consequences of corruption, and more effective ways of combating it, must, and will go on.

NOTE 1.  The departing editor-in-chief, Mark Galli of Christianity Today, a magazine started by evangelist Bill Graham, wrote in December: “The president of the United States attempted to use his political power to coerce a foreign leader to harass and discredit one of the president’s political opponents …. That is not only a violation of the Constitution; more importantly, it is profoundly immoral.” Hence, he (President Trump) must be impeached. The President in turn called the magazine “immoral,” and Billy Graham’s son, Franklin (a staunch supporter of President Trump), observed that his father would be embarrassed by the editorial. See, Elizabeth Dias (2019).

REFERENCES Dias, E. (2019). Evangelical Magazine Christianity today calls for Trump’s removal. New York Times, December 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/opinion/supreme-court-trump-executiveprivilege.html Finkelstein, C. O., & Wagner, R. (2020, May 8). Trump’s bid to stand above the law. New York Times. Gaus, J. M. (1947). Reflections on public administration. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama. Riggs, F. W. (1964). The theory of prismatic society. Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin. Tummala, K. K. (2020). Travails of studying corruption. In C. L. Jurkiewicz (Ed.), Global corruption and ethics management (pp. 174–180). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

INDEX Note: Page numbers followed by “n” indicate notes. Account Code, 69 Affirmative Auction, 108 African National Congress (ANC), 3, 101 Afrikaners, 100 Ahir, Hansraj, 49 American Society for Public Administration, 4 Amnesty laws, 88 Anti-corruption (see also Corruption) courts, 122 legal and institutional framework of, 65 policies, 8 Anti-Corruption Act (1957), 70 Anti-Corruption Act (2004), 63, 70 Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), 8, 16, 125 Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), 10, 14 Anti-Corruption Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), 16 Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), 67, 70 Anti-Corruption Expertise (ACE), 12 Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), 14 Apartheid, 101 Artificial intelligence (AI), 131–132 Audit Code, 69 Audit Office, 69 Auditor-General (A-G), 102 Authoritarianism, 88 Bangladesh Corruption Syndrome, 58–64 Benami, 33 Berman, Evan, 4 Bertelsmann Stiftung (BS), 124 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 2–3, 24

Big data, 132 Black money, 33–34 Blockchain, 132–133 Bottom-up corruption (see Need-based corruption) Brazilian-based corruption scandals, 85–87 Bribery, 114–116 British colonial government, 10 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment strategy (BBBEE strategy), 106 Broederbond, 107 Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC), 70 Bureaucratic failure, 107–108 Burke, Edmund, 2 Caretaker government (CG), 72 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 16, 25–28, 37n1 Central Information Commission (CIC), 49 Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB), 37n1 Central Procurement Technical Unit, 69 Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), 25, 37n1, 41 Certificates of Commitment, 42 Chief Registrar of the Federal Court of Malaysia (CRFCM), 122 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 18 Citizens Whistleblower Forum, 38n4 “Civilianization” processes, 83 Clientelism, 61 Code of Criminal Procedure (1898), 65, 68 Code of Ethics, 69 Collusion, 119–120 laws relating to, 121 143

144 INDEX

Common Law, 13 Common Minimum Program (CMP), 45 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 49 Compliance-driven organizations, 130 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), 44 Computer Security Act (1987), 134 Congress Party governments, 2 Constitution (1996), 102–103 Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), 10–11, 117 budget and personnel, 11 commitment to organizational excellence, 12 effectiveness, 14 Corruption, 1–2, 7, 23–24, 47, 57, 139, 141 (see also Government corruption in South Africa) best practices for combating, 16–20 causes, 17–18 conflict of interest, 19 control of, 92 efficacy of extant institutions to fighting, 24–30 framework to fight, 65–73 Hong Kong’s success in combating, 13–16 independent and well-resourced Type A ACA, 19–20 levels, 79–80, 82–85 loci and modes of, 61 perceived extent of corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong, 8–9 remediation of, 89 secrecy, varying perceptions, and measures of, 88–92 Singapore’s success in combating, 9–13 strong dose of political will needed to minimizing, 16 types, 114–120 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 7, 24, 44, 58, 82, 139 Corruption Watch (CW), 107

Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 10, 14 Criminal Law Act (1958), 66 Cryptocurrency, 132–133 Cybercrimes, 133 Data privacy, 133 Deadwood, 107 Decision-makers, 58 Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE), 25 Democracy, 82–85 Democratization process, 81–82 Demonetization policy, 33 Department of Budget and Management (DBM), 122 Der Spiegel, 51 Dere, Mohite, 51 Destiny Group, 63 Dhabolkar, Narendra, 50 Digital surveillance technologies, 133 E-governance, 141–142 E-government AI, 132 big data, 132 blockchain, 132–133 ethical considerations in, 129–130 prioritizing privacy policies, 131–132 privacy and security, 130–131 privacy and security protection, 133–134 smart technologies, 133 E-pledge, 41 E-procurement, 121–122 East India Company, 2 Ecological study, 140 Electronic parking meters, 133 Electoral bonds, 52 Elite capture, 126 Embezzlement, 116–117 Endemic corruption, 104–107 Enforcement Directorate (ED), 25, 28–29 Equal employment opportunity”, 108 Ethics, 130 ethics-driven organizations, 130

145

Index

Ethics Code, 69 Ethos in Indian Administration, 4 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, 44 European Union (EU), 133 Evidence Act (1872), 67 Facial recognition, 133 Family ties, 59 Fanny Law, 15 Favoritism, 117–119 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), 134 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), 104 First Information Report (FIR), 29 Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 28 Frances Hagopian’s 2005 study, 80 Francis, Pope, 1 Fraud, 119 Free Burghers, 100 Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act), 44 Fugitive Economic Offenders Act (FEOA), 28 Galli, Mark, 142n1 GAN Integrity Solutions, 118–119 Geltner, Guy, 1 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 133–134 Global Integrity (GI), 123 Golden parachutes, 107 Golden rule, 19 Good government, 87–88 Government Auditing Standards (GAS), 69 Government corruption in South Africa bureaucratic failure, 107–108 Constitution (1996), 102–103 endemic corruption, 104–107 leadership failure, 108–109 legislation, 103–104 prospect, 109–110

retrospect, 99–102 Government of Bangladesh (GoB), 63 Government Servants (Conducts) Rules (1979), 66–67 Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (1985), 66 Grand corruption, 62, 84 Greed-based corruption, 82–83, 140 Group Areas Act (1950), 101 Group of Ministers (GoM), 46 Handshakes (see Golden parachutes) Holmes, L., 60 Hong Kong, 7–8 perceived extent of corruption in, 8–9 success in combating corruption, 13–16 Hottentots, 100 Householder (grihastha), 36 Human pursuits (purushartha), 36 Immorality Act, 101 Income Tax Ordinance (1984), 63, 68 Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), 14–15 Indian Premier League (IPL), 31 Informal bureaucracy, 126 Information and communication technologies (ICTs), 129–130 Integrity, 41–42 International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 12 International Political Science Association, 4 Jakiewicz, Carole L., 1 Judicial system, 124 Judiciary, 29–30 Kalburgi, M. M., 50 Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), 16 Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU), 120 Kroeze, Ronald, 1

146 INDEX

Lagarde, Chrstine, 35 Lankesh, Gauri, 50 Latin American populism, 88 Lava Jato, 81, 85–87 Leader of Opposition Party (LoP), 31 Leadership failure, 108–109 Legislation, 103–104 Lein Conference, 4 Less developed countries (LDCs), 3 Lok Sabha, 24, 30 Lokpal, 24, 30–31, 33 Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), 117 Malaysian Auditor-General (AGM), 119 Manohar Lal Sharma … V. Narendra Damodardas Modi & ors, 52 Manual for Office Procedure, 66 Maya, 36 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), 45 Members of Parliament (MPs), 62 Midhya, 36 Mining operations, 107 Ministry of Finance (MoF), 68 Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), 68 Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA), 68 Misdemeanors Punishment Ordinance, 13 Modi government, initial challenges and efforts of, 31–35 Moksha, 36 Money laundering, 63 Money Laundering Prevention Act (2012), 63, 67 Multinational corporations (MNCs), 61 Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), 104 Napoleon Moment, 34 Narendra Modi, 37, 49 National Advisory Council (NAC), 45–46 National Board of Revenue (NBR), 68

National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), 45–46, 50 National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), 105 National Integrity Strategy (NIS), 65 National Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 107 National Revenue Fund (NRF), 102 National Technical Research Organization, 37n1 National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 136 Native Land Act (1913), 101 Need-based corruption, 83, 140 Nepotism, 47 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 30 Non-resident Indian (NRI), 52 Odebrecht scandals, 81–82 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 134 Office of Ombudsman (OMB), 16 Official Secrets Act (1923), 44, 67 Online procedures enhancement for civil applications system (OPEN system), 130 Operation Condor, 88 Orange Free State, 100 Pansare, Govind, 50 Paperwork Reduction Act (1980), 134 Parliamentarians, 68 Patronage, 60 Penal Code, 65, 70 Peisakhin, Leonid, 48 People’s Action Party government (PAP government), 11 Personally identifiable information (PII), 130 Petty corruption, 63 Phantom bonus scheme, 106 PhilGEPS, 122

147

Index

Philippine Competition Act, No. 10667, 121 Pinto, Paul, 48 Pledge, 41 Police, 9 Police Act (1861), 68 Police Regulation of Bengal (1943), 68 Political instability in Bangladesh, 60 interference, 125–126 will, 16 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), 8 Politics of anti-corruption, 71 Pope, Jeremy, 35, 140 Population Registration Act (1950), 101 Populism, 87–88 Power supply, 106–107 Prabhu Dutt v. Union of India (1982), 45 Press Freedom Index, 85 Press Trust of India (PTI), 50 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA), 103 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), 14 Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), 11–12, 65–66 Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), 9, 14 Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 28 Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 105 Prima facie case, 27 Privacy, 130–131 prioritizing privacy policies, 131–132 protection, 133–134 Privacy Act (1974), 134 Private entities, 3 Procurement Act, 69 Procurement reforms, 120 Professional ethics, 66 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), 101

Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Effectiveness Act (PRECISE), 134 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 (2000), 103 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 (2000), 103–104 Prosperity gospel, 110 Protected Disclosures Act (PDA), 104 Provincial Revenue Fund (PRF), 102 Public Administration, 102–103 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 104 Public Interest Litigation (PIL), 29–30, 37, 50 Public procurement, 105–106, 113–114 corruption types, 114–120 measures to curb corruption in procurement, 120–122 weaknesses in implementing measures to combat corruption in procurement, 123–126 Public Procurement Act (2006), 66 Public Protector, 102 Public Service Act (2018), 68 Public Service Act 103 (1994), 103 Quah, Jon S. T., 4 Quality of democracy, 81 Rajya Sabha, 30 Regime changes, 57 Republic of South Africa, 99 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), 37n1 Rigging of tender, 119 Right to be Forgotten laws (RTBF laws), 134 Right to Information Act (RTI Act), 37, 43–46, 67, 69 assessment, 47–48 features, 46–47 flip side, 48–51 genesis, 44–45

148 INDEX

Roy, Aruna, 47 Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF), 13 Rule of Law, 82–85, 89 Rules of Business, 68 S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982), 45 Sagaria, K. S., 48 Sastry, Shama, 23 Security, 130–131 protection, 133–134 Singapore, 7–8 perceived extent of corruption in, 8–9 success in combating corruption, 9–13 Singapore Police Force (SPF), 9 Singh, Dushyant, 32 Singh, Joginder, 26 Smart technologies, 133 Social evils, 47 Social democrats, 88 Social Weather Stations (SWS), 116 Sohrabuddin case, 51 Sound governance systems (SGS), 59 South Africa Act, 100 South Africa’s Passenger Rail Agency (PRASA), 106 South African Airways (SAA), 106 South African Native Trusts, 101 Special Administrative Region (SAR), 7 Special Investigation Team (SIT), 27 State capture, 60 State of Rajasthan v. Raj Narain (1975), 45

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 105 Stephenson, Mathew C., 1 Subramanian, T. S. R., 26 Suppression, 47 Technology, 130 Thompson, Leonard, 101 Top-down corruption (see Greedbased corruption) Transparency, 103, 130 Transparency International (TI), 2, 44, 58, 81, 114, 139–140 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 101 Type A ACA, 19–20 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCaC), 87 Underground economy (see Black money) United Nations’ Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), 63, 65 United Progressive Alliance (UPA), 45 Vineet Narain case, 25 Voice recognition, 133 “Vyapam” case, 32 Websites, 130 Whistle blowers Act, 104 Whistleblowers Protection Act (2014), 38n4 White Rule, 101 World Economic Forum (WEF), 64, 114