Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)
 0253336066, 9780253336064

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Martin Heidegger Studies in Continental Thought



Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)

Robert Bemasconi Rudolf Bemet John D. Caputo David C a n

William L. McBride J. N. Mohanty Mary Rawlinson Tom Rockmore Edward S. Casey Calvin 0.Schrag Hubert L. Dreyfus tReines Schiirmann Don thde Charla E. Scott David Farrell KrelI Tharnas Sheehan Lenore Langsdorf Robert Sokolowski Alphonso Lingis Bruce W.Wilshire David Wood

Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly

Indiana University Press Bloomington 6 Indianapolis

Contents Publication of this work was supported by funding from Inter Nationes, Ronn.

Translators' Foreword ~cknowledgments



I. Preview The Public 'lStle: Contributions to Philomphy and the Essential Heading:

This book is a publication of Indiana University Press 601 North Morton Street Bloomington, Indiana 47404-3797 USA

From Enaoning I. Cmfributionsto Philosophy Enact the Questioning Along a Pathway . . . 2. Saying from Enowning as the First Response to the Question of

Tdephonc orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders by c-mail [email protected] Published in German as %Wage mr Philosqhie (Vmn HreignisJ edited by FriedrichWilhelm von Hemnann O 1989 by Virtorio Klostermann, Frankfun am Main English translation O 1999 by Indiana University Ress All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical. including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system. without permission in writing from the publisher. The Assodation of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

The paper used In this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence 01 Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI 239.48-1984.

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-In-PubllrratfonData Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. [Beitriige zur Philosophie. English] Contributions to philosophy : from enowning I Martin Heidegger : translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. p. cm. - (Studies in Continental thought) Includm bibliographical references. ISBN 0-253-33606-6 (cloth :atk, paper) 1 . Philosophy. I. l7tle. R. Series. B3279.HMB44513 1999



Being 3. From Enowning 4. From Enowning 5. For the Few and the Rare 6. The Grounding-Attunement 7. From Enowning 8. From Enowning 9. A Glance 10. From Enowning I 1. Enowning Dasein Man I Z. Enowning and History 13. Reservedness 14. Philosophy and Worldview 15. Philosophy as "Philosophy of a People" 16. Philosophy 17. The Necessity of Philosophy 18. The PowerIessness of Thinking 19. Phikosophy (On the Question: Who Are We?) 20. The Beginning and InceptuaI Thinking 2 I. Inceptual Thinking (Projecting-Open) 22. Inceptual Thinking 23. InceptuaE Thinking:Why Thinking from within the Beginning? 24. The Wayward Claim on Inceptual Thinking 25. Historicity and Being 26. Philosophy as Knowing Awareness 27. Inceptual Thinking (Concept) 28. The Immeasurability of Inceptual Thinking as Finite Thinking 29. lnceptual Thinking (The Question of What Is Ownmosr) 30. Incepaual Thinking (As Mindfulness)





31. The Style of Inceptual Thinking 32. Enowning. A Decisive Glance after the Enactment of Echo and PEaying-Forth 33. The Question of Be-ing 34. Enowning and the Question of Being 35. Enowning 36. Enthinking Be-ing and Language 37. Be-ing and Reticence in Silence (The Sigetic) 38. Reticence in Silence 39. Enowning 40. The Work of Thinking in the Epoch of the Crossing 41. Every Saying of Be-ing Is Kept in Words and Namings 42. From 'Being and Time" to "Enowning" 43. Be-ing and Decision 44. The *Decisionsa 45. The 'Decision" 46. Decision (Fore-Grasping) 47. What Is Ownmost to Decision: Being and Not-Being 48. In What Sense Decision Belongs to Be-ing Itself 49. Why Must Decisions Be Made?

11. Echo

Contents 65. What Is Not Ownmast to Be-ing 66. Machination and Lived-Experience 67. Machination and Lived-Experience 68. Machination and Lived-Experience 69. Lived-Experience and "Anthropology" 70. m e Gigantic 7 1. The Gigantic 72. Nihilism 73. Abandonment of Being and *Sciencew 74. ' n t a l Mobilization" as Consequence of Originary Abandonment of Being 75. On Being Mindful of Science 36. Propositions about 'Science" 77. ~xperiri-Expdmha-wmmhlm-"Experimentu-&-faExpm'en~-Probe

78. Expmiri (kplmpfa)-'BxperiwrciFIgg 79. Exact Sdence and Experiment 80. Expmmri-Exper'tntia-Expenmmentum- "Experiment"

vii 91

91 92 93 93 94

96 96

98 100

100 100 110

1x1 114 114

m.Playing-Forth 8 1 . Playing-Forth


82. Playing-Forth


50. Echo

83. The View of All Metaphysics on

51. Echo 52. Abandonment of Being 53. Distress 54. Abandonment of Being 55. Echo 56. The Lingering of the Abandonment of Being in the ConceaIed Manner of Forgottenness of Being 57. History of Be-ing and Abandonment of Being 58. What the Three ConceaIments of the Abandonment of Being Are and How They Show Themselves 59. The Epoch of TotaI Lack of Questioning and Enchantment 60. Whence the Lack of Distress as Utmost Distress? 8 1 . Machination 62. Self-Dissembling of the Abandonment of Being by Machination and "Lived-Experience" 63. Live-Experience 64. Machination

84. A Being 85. The Originary Coming-into-Its-Own of the Pisst Beginning Means Gaining a Foothold in the Other Beginning





86. What the History of Metaphysics Keeps Ready and Thus "Plays

87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

Forth" as Still Unyielded and UmemgnizabIe by This History History of the First Beginning (History of Metaphysics) The 'Historical" Lectures Belong to the Sphere of This Task Crossing to the Other Beginning From the Fist to the Other Beginning: Negation From the First to the Other Beginning Setting into Perspective the First and the Other Beginning

93. The Great Philosophies


123 123

124 125 125 130


94. Setting Apan the Other Beginning



The First Beginning 96. The Inceptual Interpretation nf Being as @lo15


97. -5 (~xw) 98. Projecting Beingness Open unto Constant Presence


133 134




99. "Being" and "Becoming" in Inceptual Thinking

100. The First Beginning 101. Prom Early on Musr, Clearly, and in a Secure Light. .

132. Be-ing and a Being 133. The EssentiaI Sway of Be-ing


134. The Relation of Da-sein and Be-ing I 35. The Essential Swaying of Be-ing as Enowning (The Relation of Da-sein and Be-ing)

102. Thinking:The Guiding-Thread of the GuidineQuestion of Western Philosophy 103. On the Notion of German Idealism

136. Be-ing

104. German Idealism 105. Hiilderlin-KEerkegaard-

137. Be-ing 138. fluth of Be-ing and U~derstandingof Being


106. The Decision about AII Ontology in Enactment: Contention

139. The Essential Swaying of Be-ing: l h t h and lime-Space

between the First and the Other Beginning 107. Responding to the Guiding-Questionand the Form of Tkaditional Metaphysics 108. The Basic Metaphysical Positions within the History of the Guiding-Question and the Interpretation of Time-Space That BeIongs to Each of Them


The Essential Swaying of Be-ing

141. The Essential Sway of Be-ing 142.

The Essential Sway of Be-ing

143. Be-ing 144.

[email protected] 1 10. Wa,Platonism, and Idealism



Be-ing and the Originary Strife (Be-ing o r Not-Be-ing in the Essential Sway of Be-ing Itself) Be-ing and Nothing Be-ing and Not-Be-ing The Essential Swaying of Be-ing (IEFinitude) A Being Is Beingness of Beings Differentiated According to t[ k m v and

I l l . The "[email protected]


112. The "Aprion" 113, m a a n d o 4 d a 1 1 4 . On Nietzsche's Basic Metaphysical Position


IV.Leap I 1 5. The Guiding-Attunement of the Leap

150. The Origin of Differentiation of the What and the That of a

116. Being-History

15 1. Being and a Being



671E m v Being

117. Leap

152. The Stages of Be-ing

1 18. Leap

153. Life

1 1 9 . The Leap into Preparation by Asking the Grounding-Question 120. Leap

1 55. Nature and Eanh

121. Be-ing and Beings 122. Leap (The Thrown Projecting-Open) 123. Be-ing 124. Leap 125. Be-ing and Time 126. Be-ing and a Being and Gods 127. Cleavage 128. Be-ing and Man 129. The Nothing 130. The 'Essential Sway" of Be-ing 131. The Overflow in the Essential Sway of Be-ing (Self-Sheltering)

154. *Life"


156. Cleavage 157. Cleavage and 'Modalities" 158. Cleavage and 'Modalities"

1 59. Cleavage 160.

Being-toward-Death and Being

16 1. Being-toward-Death 162. Be-ing-toward-Death

163. Being-toward-Death and Being

The Essential Swaying et Re-ing 165. Essential Sway as Essential Swaying 166. EssentiaI Swaying and Essential Sway 164.

t ' *Y

.';LL' r

167. Advancing into Essential Swaying

. (r

i >


21 1. Emanation &kflha:The 11s History in Plato and Aristotle, the last andCrisis TotaIofCollapse


178. "Da-sein Exists for the Sake of Itself"

186. Da-sein


201. Da-sein and Being-Away



177. Being-Away










i7 *'



236. Truth 237. Faith and Truth

266. Be-ing and *Ontological Difference"

J,sq d) Time-Space as ~ b - & u n d

238. The-Space 239. nme-Space (Preparatory Consideration) 240. Time and Space: Their "Actuality" and 'Source" 241. Space and Time-Time-Space

242. Time-Space as Ab-ground

243. 244.

245. 246.


e) The Essential Swaying of Truth as Sheltering Sheltering Truth and Sheltering Truth and Sheltering Sheltering of Truth in What Is 'Ihre Grounding Da-sein and 'Ttajeaories of Sheltehg Truth

W.The Ones to Come 248. The Ones to Came

249. The Grounding-Attuneemnn of the Ones to Come 250. The Ones to Come 25 1. What Is Ownmost to a PeopIe and to Da-sein 252. Da-sein and the Ones to Come Who Belong to the Last God

VII. The Last God 253. TheLasz 254. Refusal 255. Turning in Enowning

256. The Last God

257. Be-ing 258. Philosophy

259. Philosophy 260. The Gigantic 261. The Opinion about Be-ing 262. "Projecting-Open" Be-in$ and Be-ing as Projecting-Open 263. Every Projecting-Open 1s a Thrown One 264. F'rojeding Be-ing Open and Understanding of Being 265. En-thinking of Be-ing

"Differentiation" 267. 268. 269. 270. 271.

Be-jng (Enowning) Be-ing (Differentiation) Be-ing The Essential Sway of Be-ing (The Essential Swaying)


272. Man

History A Being and Calculation A Being Be-ing and Language "Metaphysics" and the Origin of the Work of Art Origin of the Work of Art What about Gods? The Question of Crossing 281. Language (Its Origin)

273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280.

Editor's EpiIague


with this publication of CmlTibutiomto Philosophy (From E n m i n g ) , Martin ~eidegger'ssecond major work, Ba'triige mr Philosophie (Kom Ereignis), kmmes available for the first time in English. Known in phiIosophica1cirdes as Beifrage, this work had been awaited with great expectation long before its publication on the centennial of Heidegger's birth in 1989. &itrage mr Plrilmophie ,+'om Eseignis) opens the third division of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, which is devoted to the publication of book-length manuscripts and treatises. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enavning) was written almost a decade after Being and Time. Like Being and I'?me, it is a treatise that was not originaIly presented as a university lecture course. But unlike Being and Time, It is the first treatise whose maturation and unfolding are not reflected in any of the lecture courses of the years 19 19 to 1937. Even the university Iecture text Basic Qr.festions of Philosophy: Selected "FrobI m " of "Logic," though it was written at the same time as Contributions, involves some of the same language, and also deals with the question of truth, still does not reveal anything of the maturation and unfolding of Conrrib~tions.Thm, as far as the interrelation of Heidegges's treatises and university lecture texts is concerned, Contributions to Philasuphy (From Enowning) stands alone. Perhaps the "prolonged hesitation" spoken of in the e p i ~ a mto Contributions reflects the inaccessibility to any form of publicness-and not only the pubIicness of the university lecture course setting. That is, perhaps the thinking that goes on in this work could not find a proper hearing anywhere-until now. The singular importance of Contributions to Philosophy(From Enawning) consists in its being Heidegger's first fundamental work in which so-called *being-historical thinking" is enacted. In six "joinings" -not to be mistaken for "chapters"-called "Echo," "Playing-Forth," "Leap," "Grounding,"'The Ones to Come," and "TheZast God," Beidegger enacts "being-historical thinking" as a thinking that is enowned by being in its historical unfolding. Whether we consider the echo of being, the way in which the first Greek beginning of thinking plays forth into the other beginning, the manner in which thinking leaps into the essential swaying of being, or how this thinking is engaged in the grounding of this swaying as the ones to come who receive the hints of the last god-in any case we witness the gradual, systematic, cohesive, and closely interrelated unfolding of a thinking that presents ConFributionc as a

Translators' Foreword

Translators' Foreword

work which -as no other work of Heidegger's- shows the active character of "being-historica1 thinking." If we fail to consider this active character and if we do not question the traditional pattern that structures a philosophical work (a presupposed thesis, its development and demonstration), we may be misled into assuming that Contributions to Philosophy{From Enowning) is a collection of "aphorisms" or that it presents Heidegger's "working notes." Both assumptions are wrong. The appearance in the text of Contributions of a number of sentences that, seen from the outside, look like "notes" should not mislead us into believing that Heidegger is making certain notes to himself. The sentences in Contributions that look like "notes" are virtually all formal indicators of the paths to be taken or paths that have already been taken in the course of "being-historical thinking." When, for example, close to the end of Contributions, and after a focused discussion and analysis of the work of art, Heidegger lays out a series of questions and issues and addresses the views of the Berlin architect K.F. Schinkel-questions and issues that at firstglance look like "notesm-he shows in a formal-indicative manner that each and every word used by Schinkel is open to a "being-historical" interpretation. Moreover, Heidegger's own understanding of and relation to Contributions is such as to leave no doubt that he did not consider this work to be a collection of "aphorisms" or "notes." Indicating that "be-ing and only be-ing is and that a being is nat,"%eidegger makes cleat that statements made on behalf of "being-historical thinking" are not to be confused with assertion as "a subsequent expression in the language of a re-pre~entation."~ Rather, these statements emerge from and return to what shows and manifests itself, i.e., [email protected] of be-ing. Thus, Heidegger's own understanding of this work comes from the non-representational apophantic origin of 'being- historical thinking." A characterization of Contributions as a coIlection of "aphorisms" or as "working notes" is only possible when we ignore what defines this work and structures it, namely be-ing's self-showing and manifesting. Heidegger's concern with the cohesive character of Conh-ibutions is clearly manifest in the close attention that he paid to the process of the typing of the manuscript, in his checking the typed copy against the handwritten original, and, equally imponantly, in the rneticuIous cross-references throughout the Contributio~s.~ When carefully followed through, these cross-references show the path that thinking has traversed or is about to traverse. Cross-references are given in order to facilitate the engagement of thinking in what is formally indicated: They are not there for demonstrating what a preceding stage of discussion has already established. As translators of this work, we had to face the necessity of reflecting its singularity. We aIso had to he constantly aware of its unusual syntax,

remaining always fully aware of the source from which this transIation receives guidance and directive.



In our attempt to Iet the singularity of Corrrributions be reflected in its ~ n g l i s htranslation, we tried to keep in mind that "being-MstoricaI thinking" is not a thinking about being. For being is not an object and cannot be treated as a delimitable and objectifiable topic. For us as translators this meant that we could not use an objectifying approach to the language and word-structure of this work. Throughout Contributions to Philosophy (From En~wning)-in the course of a "preview," six "joinings," and a concluding section entitled *Be-ing" Heidegger takes a new approach to the question of being by enacting a thinking that is "enowned by being." The singularity of this work comes through in translation when translation mirrors 'being-historical thinking" as a thinking that is "enownedby being." It has been one of our goals ta let this happen throughout the transIation. It is the enactment of this thinking that molds the unusual syntax of Conrn'bufions.'Ikanslating this work into English, we faced the necessity of corning to terns with this syntax, since we realized that it is only by understanding and interpreting this syntax that the singularity of this work can come through in translation. We were thus called upon to characterize and appraise this syntax. A careful reading of the Contributions shows that its unusual syntax is neither extraneous to the work nor an insurmountable obstacle. Thus the unusual syntax cannot be set aside as having no impact on translation. The unusual character of this syntax shows itself in two ways: in the incompleteness of some sentences and in an occasionaI ambiguity with respect to German grammar. We found that both must be accounted for in our translation. We came to terms with the unusual syntax of the work by making minor additions to the text (they appear within square brackets [ I). These additions are meant to enhance the readability of the text. What we have added to the text within square brackets is in each case either an interpretation of a certain punctuation mark or derived from the immediate context. This device leaves the reader free either to use or to ignore the additions. The reader who opts for the latter needs only to overlook what stands between the square brackets. We decided to implement this device in spite of the fact that HeidegRer opted fox leaving the syntax of the Contritt~fionsintact. Indeed. the enactment of a new approach to the question of being, which is what Conh.ibutions is all about, does not depend on a detailed unfolding of its syntax. In a note written at the same time as Contributions, Heidegger points out:


In its new approach this Contributiom to Philosophy should render manifest the range of the question of being. A detailed unfolding here is not. necessary,