Contesting Peace in the Postwar City: Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar 303028090X, 9783030280901, 9783030280918

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements......Page 7
Prologue......Page 9
Contents......Page 12
Abbreviations......Page 13
List of Figures......Page 15
Chapter 1: The Postwar City......Page 19
1.1 The Research Problem......Page 20
1.2 Research Contributions......Page 22
Opening Up Peace Research......Page 23
Critical Attentiveness Towards Different Forms of War and Peace......Page 24
Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 25
The Concepts Used......Page 26
1.5 A Note on Methods......Page 27
Participant Observations......Page 28
Unanticipated Conversations......Page 29
Selecting Interviewees, Sites, and Conversations......Page 30
References......Page 31
The Continuities of War in Peace......Page 36
War and Peace as Antitheses......Page 37
The Postwar as the Transition Between War and Peace......Page 38
The Contestation, Heterogeneity, and Subjectivity of Peace(s)......Page 40
Consequence 1: The Unavoidable Continuities of War in Peace(s)......Page 42
War = Peace?......Page 45
War ≠ Peace......Page 46
Peace as an Order of Things......Page 47
Consequence 3: The Postwar as the Conflict over Peace(s)......Page 48
2.2 Theorising the City as a Research Object......Page 49
The City’s Constitution......Page 50
The City’s Functioning......Page 51
The City as a Research Object......Page 53
The City’s Transcending Potential......Page 55
The Postwar City......Page 57
The Limits of the Postwar City......Page 58
The Distinctiveness of the Postwar City......Page 59
Studying the Postwar City Through Its Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 61
References......Page 63
Chapter 3: Three Approaches to Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 72
3.2 Entry Point 2: The Governed City......Page 73
3.3 Entry Point 3: The Spatial City......Page 74
3.4 The Complexities of the City......Page 75
3.5 Negotiating Agency......Page 77
The Subject’s Created, Multifaceted, and Fluid Set of Acts......Page 78
Coherence and Stability Is Both Possible and Necessary......Page 81
The Indeterminism of the World......Page 83
Agency as an Open-Ended and Constant Negotiation......Page 84
Studying Acts in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 86
Structuring the Field of Possible Acts......Page 87
Ways of Thinking......Page 90
Modes of Acting......Page 92
Governing in Governmentality......Page 93
Studying Governing Attempts in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 94
3.7 Relational Space......Page 95
The Production of Space......Page 96
Production Means Heterogeneity and Ever-becoming......Page 97
The Relationality Between Production of and by Space......Page 98
Studying Space in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 99
3.8 Three Different Ways to Study Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 100
How to Study Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 102
Choosing Cases from Multiple Postwar Cities......Page 103
Organising the Analyses......Page 104
Selecting Postwar Cities and Linking Them with Concepts......Page 105
Selecting the Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)......Page 107
References......Page 109
Chapter 4: Contesting Postwar Mostar......Page 115
4.1 Mostar......Page 117
4.2 Balancing Between Opposing Peace(s) in Obrana i zaštita......Page 121
The Ethnonationalist World of Mostar......Page 123
Slavko’s Coexisting Trajectory of Acting......Page 124
Contradicting Acts: Slavko Sneaks Around to Bury Đulaga......Page 125
4.3 Acting in Line with the Ethnonationalist Peace(s) to Stay Employed and Educated......Page 128
The Ethnonational World of Employing “Our People”......Page 129
Negotiation: People Doing What It Takes to Survive......Page 132
The World of Ethnonational Education......Page 137
Negotiation: Hard to Coexist in Segregated Schools......Page 139
When Ethnonationally Segregated Students Coexist......Page 141
The “Unified” Yet Ethnonational Old Gymnasium......Page 142
Students Wanting to Experiment Across Divisions......Page 145
The Negotiation of Contact, Friendship, and Love......Page 146
Abraševic:́ The Bridge over Dry Land......Page 149
Abraševic’́s Preferred Coexisting Trajectories of Acting......Page 150
The Ethnonational World That Hinders Coexistence......Page 151
Negotiating the Existence of Abrašević......Page 153
The Coexisting Effects of Abrašević......Page 154
References......Page 155
Online Sources, News Articles, Videos, and Datasets......Page 160
Chapter 5: Contesting Postwar Mitrovica......Page 161
5.1 Mitrovica......Page 164
5.2 Belgrade’s Parallel Governing......Page 169
Ways of Thinking: Keep Together and Stay Away from Them......Page 170
Modes of Acting: Preserving Parallel Institutions......Page 171
The Field of Possible Acts: You Are Free to do as We Tell You......Page 173
5.3 How Fear Governs......Page 177
Ways of Thinking: Mutual Fears Across Ibar......Page 178
The Southern View......Page 179
The Northern View......Page 180
Internal Pressure to Not Interact......Page 183
Keeping to Ourselves, Keeping Away from “Them”......Page 184
External Intimidation to Scare “Them” Away from “Us”......Page 185
People Not Really Daring to Interact......Page 187
Divided People Having Nowhere to Interact......Page 190
5.4 The External Inability to Govern......Page 191
Ways of Thinking: Coexistence Just is Better......Page 192
Governing Serbs Through Belgrade......Page 194
Governing Serbs Through Kosovar Institutions......Page 195
They Do What We Want, but Only If Belgrade Says So......Page 197
They Do the Opposite of What We Want......Page 199
References......Page 202
Online Sources, News Articles, Videos, and Datasets......Page 207
Chapter 6: Contesting Postwar Belfast......Page 208
6.1 Belfast......Page 211
6.2 The Production of Belfast’s Ethnonational Geography......Page 213
Belfast’s Ethnonational Peace(s)......Page 214
The Production of Material Spaces......Page 216
The Production of Perceived Spaces......Page 217
The Production of Lived Spaces......Page 219
Peace(s) in Belfast......Page 222
Transformation of Belfast’s Built Environment......Page 224
The Production of Peacewalls......Page 225
Middle Class Car-Centrism and Commercialism......Page 229
Housing Reconstruction in Working Class Areas......Page 234
Material Division: Disconnecting Working Class Areas......Page 239
Perceived Division: The Eradication of Shared Spaces......Page 246
Lived Division: Spatial Parallelism Vis-à-vis the City Centre......Page 247
Cemented Disconnection......Page 249
No Shared Spaces Means Nowhere to Meet......Page 252
Ethnonational and Socioeconomic Division......Page 254
References......Page 256
7.1 Attacking the Postwar City’s Transcending Potential......Page 260
7.2 Enhancing the Postwar City’s Destructive Potential......Page 263
7.3 The City Itself......Page 265
7.4 Two Additional Explanations......Page 267
7.5 The Other Side of the Postwar City......Page 269
No Default Trajectories and No Coherent Roles......Page 273
The Postwar City’s Transcending Potential......Page 274
There Are No Easy Solutions......Page 275
Peace Research and Urban Studies Must Cooperate......Page 276
References......Page 277
Online Sources, News Articles, Videos, and Datasets......Page 278
Books, Chapters, and Articles......Page 279
Online Sources, News Articles, Videos, and Datasets......Page 305
Index......Page 306

Citation preview

RETHINKING PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES SERIES EDITOR: OLIVER P. RICHMOND

Contesting Peace in the Postwar City Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar

Ivan Gusic

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series Editor Oliver P. Richmond University of Manchester Manchester, UK

This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing innovative new agendas for approaches to, and understandings of, peace and conflict studies and International Relations. Many of the critical volumes the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory, and hybrid forms of peace. New perspectives on peacemaking in practice and in theory, their implications for the international peace architecture, and different conflict-affected regions around the world, remain crucial. This series’ contributions offers both theoretical and empirical insights into many of the world’s most intractable conflicts and any subsequent attempts to build a new and more sustainable peace, responsive to the needs and norms of those who are its subjects. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14500

Ivan Gusic

Contesting Peace in the Postwar City Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar

Ivan Gusic Department of Political Science Lund University Lund, Sweden

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ISBN 978-3-030-28090-1    ISBN 978-3-030-28091-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28091-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover design © MC Richmond This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To those who shared & to Bea

Acknowledgements

The relationality of human existence means that everything we create “on our own” actually are collective endeavours. The words you are about to read are no different. While the mistakes of this book are mine alone, its potential merits stem almost exclusively from those around me. My deepest gratitude goes to those in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar who shared experiences and insights. Your words are the soul to this body of text. Thank you! Go raibh maith agaibh! Faleminderit! Хвала! Hvala! To transform these experiences and insights into text none have been more vital than Annika Björkdahl and Ted Svensson. Your uncompromising reading and brilliant input are surpassed only by your unwavering support and invaluable friendship. I neither could nor would have written this book without you. It is always hard to put feelings into words, but know that you both have a special place in my heart. Now and always. Countless others have also read, engaged, and/or helped me with this text. The greatest of thanks goes to Anders Uhlin, Björn Badersten, Elsa Hedling, Emma Elfversson, Jan Teorell, Klas Nilsson, Kristine Höglund, Linda Nyberg, Lisa Strömbom, Johanna Mannergren Selimovic, Maja Povrzanovic´ Frykman, Martin Hall, Niklas Altemark, Nina Wilén, Oliver Richmond, and Ulrika Waaranperä. The same gratitude also goes to the two anonymous reviewers, whose comments where invaluable and improved the book considerably. It also goes to Mark Hackett, who let me use his magnificent maps in the chapter on Belfast. I also had so much support in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. The loving hospitality of Frances Auld created a home away from home in Belfast. It was vii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

invaluable. The crowd at the number one hotel in Mitrovica created an inclusive and illuminating context for me, amidst jokes of me being their ‘dear spy that secretly records everything we say’. The help of so many in Mostar was vital in Mostar, but the help afar from Marinko and Slobodanka Komšic´ stands out. No proper academic text is done without money. I wish to thank the Crafoord Foundation, the Department of Political Science at Lund University, FORMAS, the Helge Ax:son Johnson Foundation, the Karl Staaff Foundation, the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science, and the Swedish Research Council for their generous support that allowed me to conduct this research. Nor is it done without books. I wish to thank the Library staff at Lund University—but especially Gabriella Johansson, Linda Leveau, and Ellen Fall—for the unique combination of professionalism and forgivingness. Oliver Richmond also deserves many thanks for encouragement and input towards the publication of this book in his series. The same applies to Sarah Roughley and Oliver Foster at Palgrave for patient and kind support along the way. Bits and pieces of this text also build an article in Political Geography1—thank you for letting me reuse it. Outside of academia an array of family and friends have helped me retain my sanity by refusing to let me forget that academia actually has an outside. Thank you all! Thanks also to my parents Davor and Marijana Gušic´ whose love, support, and courage (in war and in peace) has been the precondition for most things in my life. The last thanks goes to Bea Nordlöf, whose love is all I will ever need. I dedicate this book to you. Ivan Gusic

1  Gusic, Ivan. 2019. “The relational spatiality of the postwar condition: a study of the city of Mitrovica”. Political Geography 71: 47–55.

Prologue

It was the summer of 2014 and I had just arrived for my second prolonged stay in Mitrovica, a city that since the Kosovo war in 1999 has been divided by the Ibar River into the Albanian south and the Serb north. I soon reconnected with an interviewee I had met in 2011 and after initial greetings the conversation shifted—as it almost always does in Mitrovica—to the contested future of this city: They have gone down, the tensions, since the last time you were here. It is noticeable; indeed, it is more politically stable. But it is so today. There are no guarantees that what is the reality of today will be the reality of tomorrow. (interview with local community developer, 17 June 2014, around 2 pm in Mitrovica south of Ibar)

He was right that the tensions were down. The situation had become visibly calmer since the last time I was there. Back in 2011 the Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar had just erected barricades all over the city to block the Kosovo Police (KP) from advancing into areas controlled by Serbs. The goal was simple: keep Mitrovica north of Ibar and its surroundings at least de facto part of the Serbia. Now most barricades were dismantled while the remaining one on the Main Bridge—connecting the two Albanian and Serb city centres—was neither guarded nor upheld, making it more like an overgrown relic than an intimidating fortification. Yet the future of Mitrovica was still contested, just as it had been in 1999 and still is today. Albanians want the city in its entirety to be part of Kosovo whereas Serbs want its northern part to be part of Serbia as it had ix

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been before 1999. The external organisations still active in Kosovo just want Albanians and Serbs to get along so that the peace mission(s) can be deemed successful. This contestation was what my interviewee alluded to when claiming that there are no guarantees that today’s stability would survive the night. He was right about that—literally. On my way to visit him I had crossed Ibar and noticed an unusually high number of security forces on the Main Bridge. It is indeed always guarded by some Italian Carabinieri with light equipment—part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR)1—as well as some usually bored members of the KP. Yet now these usual suspects shared the bridge with heavily armed Swiss and Slovenian KFOR troops, a number of European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and United Nations (UN) marked cars, as well as dozens of KP forces. The interviewee, however, dismissed my worries as normal precautions due to some high-level UN visit, and I did not give it another thought. The morning after my social media feeds were filled with angry, worried, and shocked posts by Serbs I know. During the night, the barricade on the Main Bridge had been removed. The mood in Mitrovica north of Ibar was anxious; the talk at the diner where I am a regular was dominated by its removal. Who, why, when? What will happen now? Why didn’t anybody tell us? Is Serbia finally abandoning us? I went down to the bridge. It was being cleaned and soon traffic started to flow. People had gathered in masses. Some Albanians walked north and started taking pictures, something the Serbs perceived as an act of dominance. The talk in the north namely was—and still is—that the Albanians are just waiting to drive the Serbs out. When I returned a couple of hours later, the “Garden of Peace” was being constructed on the same place. I have not managed to confirm the exact decision-making behind these events, but the removal of the barricade was not accepted in Mitrovica north of Ibar. Due to the immediate tensions that followed, a new barricade was erected, but this time in the shape of a park. Five days later, Albanians gathered to protest against the reintroduction of hinders at the bridge, subsequently clashing with Kosovar as well as external security forces. I was on the scene. Cars were set on fire, hundreds of teargas grenades were thrown, and dozens of

 KFOR is an armed peace operation mandated by the UN and consisting mostly of soldiers from European countries. 1

 Prologue 

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shock bombs detonated. Numerous rioters and security personnel were hospitalised and many people were arrested.

Fig. 1  The riot on the Main Bridge. As observed from the northern riverbank. (Picture taken by author in 2014)

These tensions illustrate the continuities of war in peace that still today plague Mitrovica—two decades after the war ended, eleven years after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and six years after the Brussels Agreement and its (intended) “normalisation” of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Yet these tensions also pinpoint the contradiction that constitutes the principal research problem of this book. The city is namely often theorised as well as historically proved to have great potential to transcend societal divides, bridge communities, and foster heterogeneous coexistence. The postwar city, however, fulfils little to none of this potential as it tends to reinforce its continuities of war in peace. This book will explore why this is the case.

Contents

1 The Postwar City  1 2 Studying the Postwar City Through Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) 19 3 Three Approaches to Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) 55 4 Contesting Postwar Mostar 99 5 Contesting Postwar Mitrovica145 6 Contesting Postwar Belfast193 7 Conclusions245 References

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Index293

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Abbreviations

ABIH BA/GFA CBM CRC DDR DPA DSDNI DUP EU EULEX FBiH HDZ BiH HVO IBM ICG ICO IDP IRA KFOR KP NATO NGO NIHE OHR OSCE PIC QUB

Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Belfast Agreement/Good Friday Agreement Community Building Mitrovica Community Relations Council Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Dayton Peace Agreement Department of Social Development Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party European Union European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatian Defence Council Integrated Border Management International Crisis Group International Civilian Office Internally Displaced Person Irish Republican Army Kosovo Force Kosovo Police North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-governmental Organisation Northern Ireland Housing Executive Office of the High Representative Organization for Security and Co-operation Peace Implementation Council Queen’s University of Belfast xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

RS SCR SDA SFRJ SSR UÇK UDA UDU UK UN UNDP UNMIK UWCiM

Republika Srpska Security Council Resolution Party of Democratic Action Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Security Sector Reform Kosovo Liberation Army Ulster Defence Association Ulster Defence Union United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United World College in Mostar

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3

Fig. 5.1

A linear understanding of the postwar. The postwar as the linear transition from war to peace during which overlaps between the two antitheses is possible but temporary 22 Multiple peace(s). The multiple peace(s) that the transition from war can lead to if peace is understood as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective 26 A non-linear understanding of the postwar. The postwar as the socio-political reconfiguration of society during which war transits to one peace at the expense of other peace(s) 31 The city of Mostar. Except in the city centre—where division goes along the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard [Bulevar on the map]—the Neretva river divides the city into its Bosniak east and Croat west. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map)102 The result of protesting. An official building attacked during the protests. (Picture taken by author in 2014) 119 A section of the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard. There are still some bombed-out buildings, but the street is like any other. No walls, no barbwire, no people observing who is crossing or not. (Picture taken by author in 2014) 132 The map of Mitrovica. The river Ibar divides the city into its Albanian south and Serb north. While the northern part is smaller it is more densely populated. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map) 149

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List of Figures

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6 Fig. 5.7 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5

The southern riverbank at night. The Main Bridge is seen to the left. The 2015 “Peace Park” (mentioned in the prologue) is seen on the bridge as are some of the police cars stationed there 24/7 to make sure nothing happens. (Picture taken by author in 2015) The northern riverbank at night. The road in the middle comes from the Main Bridge. People have parked cars at the end of the bridge—both for convenience and in order to keep the bridge barricaded. The blue 4×4s are armoured EULEX cars. (Picture taken by author in 2015) People and KFOR soldiers at the Main Bridge. The view from the south. While some people do cross, most depicted here are on their way to the southern riverbank (to the left in the picture) where restaurants, cafés, and playgrounds are located. (Picture taken by author in 2014) The “Peace Park”. The park was built hours after the 2011–14 barricade on the Main Bridge was taken down—the sole purpose was to hinder access from the south by car. Since the bridge leads directly into the centre of Mitrovica north of Ibar, people fear that opening it to traffic might expose them to attacks. (Picture taken by author in 2015) Vandalism in Mitrovica. A vandalised cross on the Christian cemetery in Mitrovica south of Ibar. Almost no graves have been spared. (Picture taken by author in 2011) The barricade on the Main Bridge. As seen from the southern riverbank. (Picture taken by author in 2011) A map of Belfast. It is a spread out harbour city with most people living in houses rather than apartments. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map) One side of the peacewall. The peacewalls often have gates, but they are usually far away from each other and open only at certain times (if at all). (Picture taken by author in 2014) Another side of the peacewall. This is the other side of the peacewall above. (Picture taken by author in 2015) A derailed area near a peacewalls. These kind of areas often complement the peacewalls. (Picture taken by author in 2015) The city centre. It is marked in yellow. Surrounding it are roads and car infrastructure such as parking lots (black and grey). This shows the dominance of roads inaccessible to pedestrians. The Westlink—to be elaborated upon shortly— goes in a loop from north of the city centre and around on its western side. (The map was created by Mark Hackett © and is reproduced with permission)

151

152

162

165 166 170 197 210 211 213

215

  List of Figures 

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 6.7 Fig. 6.8

Fig. 6.9

Fig. 6.10

Fig. 6.11 Fig. 6.12 Fig. 6.13

Fig. 6.14

Fig. 6.15

An ordinary road. It is built straight through housing complexes. Despite the narrow pavements and high-speed traffic, the walkability of this street is quite high compared to other parts of the city. (Picture taken by author in 2015) The Westlink. It runs through several residential estates. Apart from the few pedestrian crossings, it is virtually impassable by foot. (Picture taken by author in 2019) Defensive architecture in the city centre. All around it there are walls, fences, and gates built without any motivation from or connection to “the Troubles” (conversation with NGO official 2015). (Picture taken by author in 2015) Transformed housing. The map to the right illustrates rows of outward-looking houses placed in grid-plan street networks before the reconstruction. The map on the left illustrates the spatial incoherence brought by the transformation to lower density cul-de-sac housing “connected” through random streets. (The maps were created by Mark Hackett © and are reproduced with permission) Belfast streets. The map to the left illustrates the grid-planned street network in north Belfast before the reconstruction. The map to the right illustrates the same area, but now with a more random, broken, and almost Kafkaesque street network. (The maps were created by Mark Hackett © and are reproduced with permission) A typical cul-de-sac. It has low-density housing, seemingly random streets, and only one way in and out. (Picture taken by author in 2016) A typical sight in cul-de-sacs. One tries to walk through, but almost inevitably ends up at a dead-end that forces one to turn around. (Picture (and dead-end stroll) taken by author in 2016) “The other side” as seen through a locked gate. This is one of the gates allowing passage—albeit obviously not this day— through the more than three kilometre-long peacewall separating Falls and Shankill. (Picture taken by author in 2016) An open gate. Yet it often closes by night and therefore functions like a curfew—if you miss closing time, you need to go to the city centre or Black Mountain (where the wall ends) in order to get home. (Picture taken by author in 2015) The dead-end of a cul-de-sac. After walking in zigzag from the Falls Road, I was met with the end of the street, a peacewall, numerous fences, and houses. This left me no other option than to walk back. (Picture taken by author in 2016)

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216 217

219

221

222 223 224

226

227

228

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List of Figures

Fig. 6.16

Fig. 6.17

Somewhere quite close to the city centre. I was on my way to an interview from Stranmillis (south) to Black Mountain (north-west). The difficulty to walk is quite poignant. Google Maps had told me it would take around an hour. I left two hours before the interview but I still had to take a taxi to get on time. (Picture taken by author in 2015) One relatively permeable part of the peacewall on Cupar Way. Houses on the right, a football pitch on the left, and a dead-end that could possibly be opened if the peacewall came down. On the other side of the peacewall, however, several houses would impede attempts to reconnect these areas. (Picture taken by author in 2016)

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CHAPTER 1

The Postwar City

Postwar cities, where war is over yet the socio-political ordering of society remains contested, tend to be one of the most entrenched and volatile flashpoints in war-to-peace transitions.1 More often than not it is in postwar cities where the starkest continuities of war in peace are located and where the primary fault lines of wider conflicts are found (Bollens 2018; Pullan and Baillie 2013).2 Neighbours in postwar cities are often ‘intimate enemies’ with little interaction as non-­contact is encouraged and enforced while mixing is discouraged and punished (Bollens 1999, 8). City institutions in turn are paralysed or divided, socio-political existence rendered in zero-sum “us and them” terms, and ethnonational3 belonging key for accessing jobs and services (Gusic 2015; Moore 2013). Streets of postwar cities also tend to be frequent sites of violence whereas cityscapes are securitised and carved up into “ours” and “theirs” (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; Calame and Charlesworth 2009). Thus rather than moving from war to peace, postwar cities tend to be

1  Cities become postwar when they no longer experience systematic use of armed force by groups with political and/or territorial ambitions and cease being postwar when an uncontested order of things has been established. This is elaborated in Chap. 2. 2  Continuities of war in peace refer to the violence, repression, and disorder of war that lingers on in peace. 3  Ethnonationalist groups are here understood as ethnic groups striving for political autonomy and/or sovereignty (see Connor 1994).

© The Author(s) 2020 I. Gusic, Contesting Peace in the Postwar City, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28091-8_1

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I. GUSIC

stuck in postwar status quos—where war might be over yet the socio-­ political ordering of society remains contested. Postwar cities thereby epitomise the continuities rather than discontinuities of war in peace, which has consequences in, for, and beyond these cities. Continuities of war in peace force people in postwar cities into divided and politicised lives where they are exposed to violence, have rights denied, and are unable to access all city parts (Gusic 2015; Moore 2013; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). Postwar cities themselves are not spared either as continuities of war in peace paralyse and make them dysfunctional, undermine citywide reintegration efforts, and make contestation their modus operandi (Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015; Bollens 2012). Postwar cities also impact their wider socio-political contexts as continuities of war in peace often make them Gordian knots of peace processes, entrenched frontiers of wider conflicts, and tinderboxes of violence (Beall et al. 2013; Esser 2004; Sampaio 2016). This is evident also in the postwar cities engaged in this book. Belfast is both the major location and disproportionately affected target of postwar violence between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011); the local north-south division of Mitrovica is the central frontier in the Albanian-Serb conflict over Kosovo (Gusic 2019); and the deadlock in Mostar damages relations between Bosniaks and Croats across Bosnia-Herzegovina (Moore 2013).

1.1   The Research Problem The continuities of war in peace found in postwar cities thus have alarming consequences. Yet they also form this book’s principal research problem. “The city” is namely often theorised and historically proven to have great potential to transcend societal divides, bridge communities, and foster coexistence (Brenner 2014; Sassen 2013; Sennett 2008).4 Postwar cities, however, fulfil little to none of this potential. Instead of bringing people together and spearheading wider war-to-peace transitions—as they have the potential to do—postwar cities reinforce and cement continuities of war in peace in as well as beyond themselves (Pullan and Baillie 2013). This unfulfilled potential constitutes my principal research problem as I ask: Why are the continuities of war in peace reinforced rather than transcended in the postwar city? 4  The city has the potential to do the opposite as well—i.e. create societal divides, separate communities, and undermine coexistence. In this sense it is Janus-faced. Yet while the city’s destructive potential is quite present in the postwar city, its transcending one is not.

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To engage this principal problem, I will split it into three foci. I will consequently theorise the postwar city to enable its study, explore what about the postwar city makes it reinforce its continuities of war in peace, as well as explore the continuities of war in peace found in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar.5 These foci boil down to the following research questions: 1. What constitutes the postwar city? 2. What accounts for the postwar city reinforcing rather than transcending its continuities of war in peace? 3. How are the continuities from war to peace reinforced—and possibly transcended—in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar? Yet this research problem is not only theoretically intriguing, it is also motivated by a research gap on the postwar city. Despite the problems that postwar cities both face and cause—and despite the parallel urbanization of war and violence (Graham 2010; Moser and Mcilwaine 2015; Muggah and Savage 2012)—there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical knowledge on why continuities of war in peace are reinforced rather than transcended in the postwar city. The reason is that the academic focus on postwar cities has been limited—with some notable exceptions (e.g. Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015; Bollens 2012; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Elfversson et al. 2019; Pullan and Baillie 2013). The subsequent lack of knowledge is found in both fields of particular relevance to this book: peace research and urban studies. Peace research has in recent years studied postwar settings extensively (Bara 2017; Jabri 2007; Mac Ginty 2006; Richmond 2016; Wallensteen 2015). This growing attention has resulted in more nuanced understandings of war-to-peace transitions that include previously excluded aspects and resonate more clearly with everyday experiences of those affected (Pouligny 2006; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015; Sylvester 2013). Yet peace research has generally not engaged with and thereby expanded our knowledge on postwar cities. While postwar cities hardly are categorically excluded, the few studies that do explore them are usually studies in rather than of postwar cities (e.g. Bieber 2005; Moore 2013; Pickering 2007). When postwar cities figure in peace research, they are thus levels of analysis for general foci rather than research objects with distinct postwar problems (cf. Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015 with Bollens 2012). 5

 The selection of these postwar cities is addressed in Chap. 3.

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This is hardly the problem in urban studies where cities are the research object (Brenner 2014). Urban studies have also devoted more attention to postwar cities than peace research has, meaning that most studies of postwar cities come either from urban studies or closely related fields (e.g. Bollens 2012; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Pullan and Baillie 2013).6 The problem, however, is that this research tends to not take on-board recent insights on postwar settings found within peace research. The result is that crucial advances such as the contentedness and non-linearity of war-­ to-­peace transitions or the necessity to include everyday experience usually are not fully and explicitly appreciated in urban studies (cf. Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015 with Bollens 2018; Calame and Charlesworth 2009).7 This dual problem—where peace research neglects the city as a research object while urban studies do not take on-board recent insights on postwar settings—has created a research gap that this book will address by linking these two largely disconnected fields.

1.2   Research Contributions This book thereby makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Its principal theoretical contribution is that it pushes the research front on the postwar city forward by generating knowledge on why its continuities of war in peace are reinforced rather than transcended. Its grounding in both peace research and urban studies makes sure that these findings resonate with the unique setting that the postwar city constitutes. Through this interdisciplinary endeavour I also hope to contribute in revitalising the much needed debate between these two academic fields. The principal empirical contributions are novel insights on Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. Although research undoubtedly has focused on these postwar cities, it has tended to suffer from the same problems 6  Important to note is that these studies often employ the label “divided” rather than “postwar” cities. This divergence is theoretical and semantic. “Postwar” only encompasses the narrow category of cities that have suffered from war and now experience contestation over their socio-political ordering. “Divided” is in contrast less precise as most—if not all— cities experience divisions (see Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Rokem and Boano 2017). This makes “postwar” much more apt when depicting cities such as Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. Yet as many “divided cities” studies focus on cities I define as postwar, these studies are nevertheless compatible with this book as the same category of cities are studied. 7  The example of Belfast is illustrative when comparing Mitchell (2011) with Bollens (1999; 2018).

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described above—i.e. peace scholars rarely studied them as cities while urban scholars have rarely taken on-board recent insights on postwar settings (cf. Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015 with Bollens 2012). The result is that existing empirical insights on Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar often neglect either their postwar or city-specific dynamics—something this book contributes in overcoming. In addition to making theoretical and empirical contributions to the research front on the postwar city, this book also contributes to wider theoretical discussions in peace research. This includes adding “the city” as a research object in this field, a novel take on the postwar—as constituted by conflicts over peace(s)—that produces more realistic views on why war-to-peace transitions are so difficult to achieve, as well as a conceptualization of peace as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective. The book also contributes to wider theoretical discussions in urban studies. While the postwar city has problems specifically tied to its postwar status, it also shares problems—e.g. segregation, violence, and corruption—with cities uneffaced by war. Insights on these problems from the postwar city can therefore also be significant to research on cities per se.

1.3   Situating the Book While I draw on both peace research and urban studies, it is primarily peace research that I speak to and from. This book is thus more about understanding the city in peace research than understanding the postwar in urban studies even if I combine the two fields. What follows below is an overview, from the viewpoint of this book, of recent advances in peace research and the subsequent situating of this book. Opening Up Peace Research Peace scholars have in recent decades critiqued the longstanding modus operandi in peace research. This critical turn is multifaceted. Critique is aimed at how the messiness of war and peace often is reduced to states, formal ceasefires, and direct violence between “relevant actors” (Firchow and Mac Ginty 2016; Richmond 2016; Sending 2011; Sylvester 2013). This results in everyday aspects of war and peace being systematically ­overlooked at best and silenced at worse (Firchow 2018; Mac Ginty 2013; Meyer 2008). The critique is thus that peace research often ends up being little else than ‘[r]e-search, which repeats and tests the narrow parameters

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of reductionist and parsimonious orthodoxies […] [rather than] exploring new areas of understanding not determined by pre-existing conventions’ (Richmond 2008, 134). Examples of unaddressed but vital everyday aspects of war and peace include civilian deaths, starvation, lack of medicine, orphaned children, soldier families, mass rape, and PTSDs (Enloe 2000; Jutila et al. 2008; Pankhurst 2008; Sjoberg 2013). Critique is also aimed at the sparse attention given to underlying dynamics of war and peace such as hypermasculinity, inequality, prejudices, group clustering, divisive education systems, and emotions such as hate or fear (Richmond et al. 2016; Sjoberg 2012; Zalewski 2013). The Western bias in thinking about war and peace is also critiqued for hiding the implicit colonialism of external (“peace”) interventions—by presenting external solutions as superior, ignoring local alternatives, and either vilifying or romanticising targeted societies (Duffield and Hewitt 2013; Firchow 2018; Richmond 2012; Sabaratnam 2011a). These eclectic examples represent only a fraction of critiques, but they all illustrate the core argument of the critical turn: that the myopic foci dominating peace research exclude many everyday aspects of war and peace while failing to properly understand the complexities of aspects that are studied. Critical Attentiveness Towards Different Forms of War and Peace The results of this critical turn are inestimable in terms of generated knowledge and changes to doing peace research. Yet two insights stand out from the perspective of this book. One is that many vital aspects of war and peace are hidden or neglected—with the examples of mass rape, dehumanisation efforts, or inequality merely scratching the surface (Berents 2015; Diehl 2016; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). The conclusion I subsequently draw is that war and peace need to be studied critically to be properly understood—i.e. we need to study not only that which is vocal and visible but also that which is silent and hidden. I will consequently engage the postwar city with critical attentiveness in order to explore as many of its nuances as possible. The other insight is that war and peace are much more complex and messy than has been previously acknowledged and will therefore manifest themselves differently across time and space—as everything from urban warfare and rape camps to divided education systems and postwar cities (Graham 2004; Hromadžicˊ 2015; Richmond 2016; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). The conclusion I subsequently draw is that it is necessary to study

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different forms of war and peace. This conclusion is motivated by two arguments. One is that everyday aspects of war and peace are not understood by studying armies on battlegrounds, politicians in parliaments, or power balances between states; they are understood by exploring the forms of war and peace in which they are located (Firchow 2018; Paffenholz 2015; Pouligny 2006; Randazzo 2016; Saulich and Werthes 2018; Väyrynen 2019). The other argument is that war and peace are neither unbound by context nor identical across time and space, meaning that different battlegrounds and power balances constitute different forms of war and peace (Firchow 2018; Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Richmond et al. 2016). Not studying different forms of war and peace thus not only excludes neglected and hidden everyday aspects of war and peace, but also risks misunderstanding aspects—such as states, armies, and power balances—considered relevant by most (Diehl 2016; Firchow 2018; Hameiri 2011; Sabaratnam 2011b; Sending 2011). It is precisely here that this book aims its contribution at. The research agenda in peace research has been opened up to different forms of war and peace (Paffenholz 2015; Randazzo 2016; Richmond 2016). I argue that by studying the postwar city I will explore a rarely addressed and sparsely understood form of war and peace.

1.4   Structuring the Book This book is structured as follows. I firstly theorise the postwar city by exploring “the postwar” and “the city”. The subsequent conclusion is that the postwar city no longer experiences war yet has its socio-political ordering contested through urban conflicts over peace(s). I secondly theorise negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space as concepts through which the acts, governing attempts, and spaces of these urban conflicts over peace(s) can be studied. I thirdly apply these concepts on urban conflicts over peace(s) in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. I finally answer the principal research question and draw wider conclusions. Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) I theorise the postwar—using peace research—as permeated by conflicts over peace(s) that are about imposing different orders of things. This argument is based on a reconceptualization of peace as inherently contested, heterogeneous, and subjective, thus making it not the virtuous antithesis to war but rather merely an order of things concerned with the

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socio-political ordering of society. The postwar thereby ceases to be the given and linear transition from war to “peace” (in some given, universal, and objective sense), but rather emerges as the non-linear contestation between heterogeneous and subjective peace(s) that envision competing ways to socio-politically order society. The city is then—using urban studies—theorised as a research object and subsequently argued to affect the nature of whatever research foci might be of interest. Some things (in this case: the postwar) thus manifest themselves somewhat differently in the city, because of the city. This argument is based on both the city’s constitution (heterogeneity, density, openness and permeability, and centrality within its wider socio-political context) and functioning (mixing, conflict, accommodation, creativity, and fragmentation). These aspects make up a unique combination that affects how any given research problem plays out. I thus end up arguing that the postwar city is a city where war might be over yet the socio-­ political ordering of society remains contested through urban conflicts over peace(s). The Concepts Used The principal research problem will thus be engaged by studying urban conflicts over peace(s). The focus of these analyses will shift between the acts, governing attempts, or spaces of urban conflicts over peace(s), foci that are motivated through arguments in urban studies that interchangeably elevate one of these three dimensions as central to the city. In each of the three analytical chapters—focusing sequentially on urban conflicts over peace(s) in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar—one of these dimensions are highlighted. The concepts used to analyse these dimensions are negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space. Negotiating agency is based on the notion that acts are the result of open-ended and constantly on-going negotiations between the subject and the world in which it exists. The key to understanding acts therefore lies neither in the subject (that acts) nor the world (in which the act happens), but in the negotiation between the two underpinning the act itself. This makes negotiating agency able to account for how acts in urban conflicts over peace(s) come about across time, space, and context. Governmentality understands governing as about structuring the field of possible acts for collectives, effectively

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­ eaning that anything making collectives choose A instead of B is considm ered governing. Governmentality is thus able to account for how different governing attempts structure the field of possible acts for collectives in urban conflicts over peace(s). Relational space builds on the notion that space is neither given nor passive to but rather both produced by and productive of society, effectively making it able to account for the complexities of space and its role in urban conflicts over peace(s). Insights from Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar The subsequent analyses explore how and why continuities of war in peace are perpetuated in the postwar city—with examples including how educational segregation disables students from meeting, how employment opportunities are linked with non-contact with “the other”, and how the postwar city is divided through built environment and fear. Yet these analyses also reveal how and why critical voices are able to (in bits and pieces) transcend these same continuities of war and peace—with examples including how people meet “the other” in secrecy, how everyday survival demands economic cooperation with “the other”, and how city areas are opened up. The postwar city thus emerges as inherently Janus-­faced in the sense that it neither has a default trajectory nor necessarily plays a coherent role in war-to-peace transitions. It rather has potential to both transcend and reinforce continuities of war in peace. What the outcome of this Janus-faced potential will be—i.e. what trajectory is followed and what role is played by the postwar city—in the end therefore depends on the postwar city itself. These insights are in the last chapter used to answer the principal research question and draw wider conclusions.

1.5   A Note on Methods To answer my principal research question I needed to explore the everyday realities of urban conflicts over peace(s) in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. This effectively meant that I needed to get away from my books and instead explore how people act, what governing attempts target them, and in which spaces they live (Firchow 2018; Millar 2018; Richmond 2016). To this end I used the following methods: (i) interviews, (ii) participant observations, and (iii) conversations.

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Semi-structured Interviews with Open-Ended Questions If wanting to understand everyday realities across diverse empirical contexts, interviews are quite potent. The reason is that interviews provide balance between in-depth understanding and width across diverse empirical contexts (Bryman 2008, 436–57; D’Costa 2006; Jacoby 2006). The form of interviews I employed were semi-structured with open-ended questions. Semi-structured implies that the interview has no predestined path yet still pursues certain foci while open-ended questions imply that there are no predetermined answers to what is asked. This interview form has multiple benefits. Open-ended questions enable interviewees to use their own words to provide rich and grounded insights about their everyday realities in the postwar city (D’Costa 2006, 132; Jacoby 2006, 161–4). The lack of fixed structure in turn makes it possible to explore what is unexpected, unknown, and/or neglected since interviewees can refocus the discussion towards what they think is important (Bryman 2008, 437; O’Reilly 2004, 114; Tickner 2006, 25). The dialogical nature of interviews also enables interviewees to engage the research process itself by challenging, refocusing, and/or affirming the researcher’s questions (D’Costa 2006; Stern 2006). Together these features make interviews an efficient tool to ‘deepen and sharpen our understanding of the complexities’ in as well as across different postwar cities (Brounéus 2011, 130). Participant Observations Yet interviews are always limited to excerpts—however insightful—of whatever everyday reality is of interest. Important aspects of people’s everyday might namely be unknown to the researcher yet taken for granted by the interviewee and therefore not brought up (Ackerly and True 2010, 200–3). Other everyday experiences take time for the interviewee to remember or render important (Nordstrom 1997). Some interviewees may also intentionally withhold insights because of fear, shame, or distrust (Bryman 2008, 400–9). There might also be discrepancies—unaware or not—between interview statements and what actually happens (O’Reilly 2004). Here participant observation comes in. This method enables the researcher to take part in the everyday realities in focus (O’Reilly 2004). While notes are taken and questions asked, the emphasis of participant

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observation is to experience that which eludes the interview setting (Ackerly and True 2010, 200–3). Participant observation thus complements interviews quite neatly. Everyday proximity means that taken-for-­ granted, hidden, or infrequent aspects can be captured (Bryman 2008, 403–7; O’Reilly 2004). Prolonged interaction with people may furthermore develop into a trusting relationship, thus increasing the possibility to gain insights that would never have been shared to outsiders (Nordstrom 1997).8 Experiences also means that insights are gained first-hand rather than through others. Participant observation is thus quite useful in exploring the fine-grained details of urban conflicts over peace(s). Yet as my theoretical ambitions demand empirical variation—i.e. multiple urban conflicts over peace(s) from different postwar cities—participant observation emerged as impractical to use across the board since it is timeconsuming and therefore unable to cover many different empirical contexts (Bryman 2008, 400–3; O’Reilly 2004). The insights used in this book were thus not primarily acquired through participant observation, which was mostly employed when practical. Unanticipated Conversations The last method—unanticipated conversations—was not an initial methodological choice, but rather arose over time. Unanticipated conversations are essentially when people start talking to the researcher about the given research problem. Such interactions can happen while using public transportation, at cafés, and in streets. It might seem that this “method” is covered by either interviews or participant observations, but unanticipated conversations are a method unto themselves. Interviews are namely actively pursued while everyday chatting in participant observation always occurs in explicit research contexts (Bryman 2008; D’Costa 2006; O’Reilly 2004). Unanticipated conversations, however, lack both the intentionality of the interview and the explicit research focus of the participant observation. In my case these unanticipated conversations happened quite often. When I did things unrelated to research, people would start talking to me and the subsequent conversations often ended up being both about my 8  I made many interviews in Mitrovica before someone admitted that young people are sometimes paid to stir up tensions ‘when needed’. Yet this revelation came from people I know would never let me interview them, but who over the years started trusting me enough to share previously inaccessible details.

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research foci and generative of quite remarkable insights. Yet as these insights did not fit into my other two methods, I was unsure what to do with them. The solution was to think of these unanticipated conversations as a method onto themselves (see Nordstrom 1997). Selecting Interviewees, Sites, and Conversations My interviewee selection was guided by theoretical sampling in order to get a wide range of insights (Brounéus 2011, 130). This implied interviewing people with quite multifaceted insights on the same urban conflict over peace(s) until novel insights became gradually infrequent (Bryman 2008, 458; Cohn 2006). I initially went through existing contacts, emailed potential interviewees, but also bumped into people I ended up interviewing. I then started asking each interviewee to recommend someone else to interview (see Bryman 2008; Cohn 2006). This strategy was quite efficient as the interviews I conducted are quite multifaceted. During about six months spent in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar—between 2011 and 2016 and across ten trips—my theoretical sampling led to 109 distinct interviews with 103 different interviewees.9 The two other methods did not have any sampling strategies. Since the time-consuming nature of participant observation made it quite hard to use across different urban conflicts over peace(s), I did not actively try to get into certain settings. Instead I took opportunities when they arose. During my visits in Belfast I took part in events organised by an activist and anarcho-punk music club. I also stayed with a friend and saw how she and her friends dealt with the everyday of this postwar city. In Mitrovica I participated in and observed everyday life at a central restaurant—befriending both staff and owner—where local high-profile individuals, various external officials, as well as common people go to get things “sorted”. I also spent quite a lot of time with four police officers and observed how they kept the Main Bridge safe and how they interacted with each other (the unit consisted of both Albanians and Serbs). In Mostar I observed ethnonationalist political rallies but also spent quite a lot of time socialising with and observing people in different NGOs.

9  Twelve of the interviewees were interviewed twice and three were interviewed thrice. Of those I interviewed only once I had follow-up contact with many. I also had interviews where I interviewed multiple people.

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The same lack of an active sampling strategy by definition applies to unanticipated conversations—i.e. I talked with different people when opportunities arose. With students outside of schools, with taxi drivers and bus passengers, or with secretaries of high-profile people I had interviewed. I met people at concerts, talked with protesters, or was just approached by people who fancied a talk. This informal approach—in both participant observations and unanticipated conversations—might sound naïve. Yet interaction with people is often about chance, especially when it comes to postwar settings (Cohn 2006; Millar 2018; Nordstrom 1997; Zalewski 2006).

1.6   Outline of Chapters This book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presented the research problem, provided an overview of the book, and gave some notes on methods. Chapter 2 theorises the postwar as constituted by conflicts over peace(s) and the city as a research object before arguing that the postwar city should be studied through its urban conflicts over peace(s). Chapter 3 argues that these urban conflicts over peace(s) should be studied through the acts, governing attempts, and spaces underpinning them; elaborates on the concepts subsequently used to do so; as well as provides some notes on my research design. The three subsequent chapters then analyse acts, governing attempts, or spaces in urban conflicts over peace(s) in one of the postwar cities. Negotiating agency is employed in Chap. 4 to understand acts in Mostar; governmentality in Chap. 5 to understand governing attempts in Mitrovica, and relational space in Chap. 6 to understand spaces in Belfast. Chapter 7 then answers the principal research question and elaborates on the wider conclusions.

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Saulich, Christina and Sascha Werthes. 2018. “Exploring potentials for peace: strategies to sustain peace in times of war”. Peacebuilding. https://doi.org/10. 1080/21647259.2018.1517965. Sending, Ole Jacob. 2011. “Why peacebuilding is toothless: sovereignty, patrimonialism and power”. In A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding, eds. Susanna Campbell, David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam. Zed Books. Sennett, Richard. 2008. The uses of disorder: personal identity and city life. Yale University Press. Sjoberg, Laura. 2012. “Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn’t see”. International Theory 4(1): 1–38. ———. 2013. Gendering global conflict: toward a feminist theory of war. Columbia University Press. Sjoberg, Laura and Caron E.  Gentry. 2007. Mothers, monsters, whores: women’s violence in global politics. Zed Books. Stern, Maria. 2006. “Racism, sexism, classism, and much more: reading security-­ identity in marginalized sites”. In Feminist methodologies for international relations, eds. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True. Cambridge University Press. Sylvester, Christine. 2013. War as experience: contributions from international relations and feminist analysis. Routledge. Tickner, Ann J. 2006. “Feminism meets international relations: some methodological issues”. In Feminist methodologies for international relations, eds. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True. Cambridge University Press. Väyrynen, Tarja. 2019. Corporeal peacebuilding mundane bodies and temporal transitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Wallensteen, Peter. 2015. Quality Peace: peacebuilding, victory and world order. Oxford University Press. Zalewski, Marysia. 2006. “Distracted reflections on the production, narration and refusal of feminist knowledge in international relations”. In Feminist methodologies for international relations, eds. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True. Cambridge University Press. ———. 2013. Feminist international relations: “exquisite corpse”. Routledge.

CHAPTER 2

Studying the Postwar City Through Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)

This chapter theorises the postwar city in three sections. The postwar is initially theorised as permeated by conflicts over peace(s) that contest the socio-political ordering of society. The city is then theorised as a research object constituted by heterogeneity, density, openness and permeability, and centrality within its wider socio-political context while functioning through mixing, conflict, accommodation, creativity, and fragmentation. The chapter ends by theorising the postwar city as a city where war is over yet the socio-political ordering of society remains contested through urban conflicts over peace(s).

2.1   The Postwar as Conflicts over Peace(s) This section digs into and theorises the postwar extensively. The central argument is that the postwar is not the given and linear transition from war to a universal and objective peace—as it often is understood to be—but rather is permeated by conflicts over peace(s) in which heterogeneous and subjective peace(s) strive to socio-politically order society in diametrically different ways. The Continuities of War in Peace The postwar cannot be theorised without starting with war and peace. Yet these two concepts are not as unambiguous as might be expected, ­primarily because they often are considered so axiomatic that they need not to be © The Author(s) 2020 I. Gusic, Contesting Peace in the Postwar City, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28091-8_2

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discussed. The ensuing result is that war and peace remain under-theorised even in studies that explicitly focus on them (Davenport et al. 2018, 27–8; Jutila et al. 2008, 625; Lupovici 2013, 204). To theorise the postwar I will subsequently begin by sketching out how war and peace are commonly understood in peace research.  ar and Peace as Antitheses W What often emerges as central when war and peace are theorised is the stark juxtaposing between the two, where peace is defined by multiple virtues that make it the antithesis to war (Davenport et al. 2018; Goertz et al. 2016; Richmond 2008). Three common dichotomies illustrate this antithetical relation. War is often theorised as inherently violent, a human activity leading to mutilated bodies, traumatised psyches, destroyed houses, and obliterated communities (Barkawi 2011; Diehl 2016; Holmqvist 2013). Peace in turn is theorised as inherently non-violent, a human condition both defined by and recognised through its absence of violence (Galtung 1969; Kühn 2012; Lau and Seedat 2013). The difference between war and peace is thus a question that can ‘quickly be dispensed with: war is violent and peace is, well, peaceful […] peace is the antithesis to war’ (Keen 2007, 1). Yet war is not “only” about pure destruction through mutilated bodies and rape victims or destroyed houses and bombed bridges. It is also theorised as repressive and consequently about devastated lifeworlds and limited choices (Galtung 1969; Jabri 2007). Peace in turn is theorised as emancipatory. It is seen to lack the repression of war; instead creating lifeworlds and providing choices (Paris and Sisk 2009; Richmond 2016; Wallensteen 2015). War is also theorised as disordered, with its everyday rendered unpredictable and insecure since it functions according to the whims of the powerful and with little respect for justice, morality, or law (Keen 2007; Meyer 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009). Peace in turn is theorised as ordered, thus generating a predictable everyday that functions according to just laws that are either respected or hard to elude (Elshtain 1985; Lau and Seedat 2013; Wallensteen 2015). War and peace are thus in their entirety seen as antithetical and the transition between them ‘a move from madness to sanity, or from evil to good’ (Keen 2007, 9).

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 he Continuities of War in Peace T The above theorisation is initially axiomatic: peace is good and war is bad, create the former and avoid the latter (Meyer 2008, 555). Yet many critical scholars argue that the war-peace binary does not hold up empirically as peace often is permeated by the same violence, repression, and disorder found in war. Rather than mutual exclusion—the argument goes—there are continuities of war in peace (Davenport et  al. 2018; Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010; Mac Ginty 2006). Peace as inherently non-violent does not hold up for scrutiny since violence can be as prevalent in peace as it ever was in war. Peace is often plagued by gender-based violence, violent crime organised by war-­commanders-­turnedpoliticians, and low-intensive violence between splinter groups (Hume 2008; Lau and Seedat 2013; Pankhurst 2008; 2016). Human trafficking also often increases in peace, reprisal violence is frequently exercised, and rape continues to be widespread (Boyle 2010; 2014; Grady 2010; Manjoo and McRaith 2011). These are only some examples, but they all show that in: Seemingly “peaceful” post-war societies, […] the presence of the instruments of war, death and suffering may be at the same level or even higher than during the original war. (Themnér and Ohlson 2014, 67)

Peace is not inherently emancipatory either as it often is plagued by systematic discrimination and high levels of inequality (Howhart 2014; Richmond 2008; Sesay 2019). It can also contain attacks against minorities, denial of refugee returns, and exclusion from political participation (Berdal and Mousavizadeh 2010; Mitchell 2011; Tuathail and Dahlman 2011). Nor is peace spared the disorder of war. Peace is often permeated by corruption, opaque privatisation processes, and mishandling of aid—all generative of uncertainty and chaos (Duffield 2014; Howhart 2014; Orjuela et al. 2016). Armed groups turned political parties additionally often uphold arbitrary legal systems also in peace while new institutions intended to replace those shattered in war can seem disordered to people used to other realities (Mustapha and Bangura 2010; Pouligny 2006; Sesay 2019).  he Postwar as the Transition Between War and Peace T The violence, repression, and disorder of war thus seems to be prevalent in rather than antithetical to peace (Hume 2008, 321). This challenge to the war-peace binary has not been missed or ignored by its proponents (see Davenport et  al. 2018; Goertz et  al. 2016; Paris and Sisk 2009;

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Ricigliano 2012). Yet the responses have rarely questioned this binary; they have rather blamed the continuities of war in peace on time, inadequate implementation, resistance, and/or poorly chosen methods. The time argument implies that violent, repressive, and disordered war cannot become non-violent, emancipatory, and ordered peace overnight—such things take time (Bargués-Pedreny 2018; Paris 2004; United Nations and World Bank 2018). It is also argued that it is difficult to implement peace. Mistakes are unavoidable and unexpected difficulties will arise, meaning that peace will always experience inadequacies during its implementation (Davenport 2018; Paris and Sisk 2009; Ricigliano 2012). The focus on resistance suggests that since not everyone is sympathetic to peace, it will be resisted. War profiteers might want to keep making money, antagonists might remain distrustful of each other, and leaders might be reluctant to compromise (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010; Wade 2016). It is also argued that the methods through which peace is implemented need to be both locally grounded and carefully prepared—otherwise problems will arise (Firchow 2018; Ricigliano 2012; Wallensteen 2015). Thus while the continuities of war in peace undoubtedly are acknowledged they are at the same time rendered transitional—i.e. they will go away as time passes, implementation problems are addressed, spoilers are dealt with, and/or methods are improved (Davenport et al. 2018; Paris and Sisk 2009; Ricigliano 2012; Wallensteen 2015). War and peace are consequently seen as scalar endpoints on a linear trajectory, with the postwar emerging as an in-between period during which war transitions into peace (see Davenport et al. 2018; Goertz et al. 2016; Paris and Sisk 2009; Wallensteen 2015). The postwar thereby amounts to nothing more than a grey area during which overlap between two antitheses—i.e. continuities of war in peace—might occur momentarily:

POSTWAR

WAR

PEACE

Fig. 2.1  A linear understanding of the postwar. The postwar as the linear transition from war to peace during which overlaps between the two antitheses is possible but temporary

The continuities of violence, repression, and disorder in peace are thereby played down and not seen to challenge the war-peace binary that renders them antithetical (see Goertz et al. 2016; Paris and Sisk 2009; Ricigliano 2012).

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The Contestation, Heterogeneity, and Subjectivity of Peace(s) ‘Peace’ is an essentially contested concept [and] the choice of a certain understanding of peace affects the analysis made and polices chosen. (Jutila et al. 2008, 632)

The theorisation above is not wrong per se. The continuities of war in peace can be understood as transitional and due to peace being incomplete. Discrimination can be blamed on not yet overcome “us and them” thinking, gendered violence on inefficient rule of law or untreated PTSD, inequality on corruption, and non-participation on context-insensitive methods. Yet this line of argument only holds as long as peace is understood as given (Lupovici 2013; Kühn 2012; Richmond 2008). This is indeed how peace often is understood: [D]ebates often make the mistakes of assuming that the project of peace is so apparent as to not require further explanation. (Richmond 2008, 16) ‘Peace’ is a notion with a wide variety of meanings, while everyone acts as if its content is self-evident. (Pouligny 2006, 96)

The result of understanding peace as given is that it is rendered in universal and objective terms—a singular concept that is transferable and axiomatic across the world (cf. Bargués-Pedreny 2018; Melander 2018; Paris 2004; Ricigliano 2012; Wallensteen 2015). Peace is thus “peace”; no matter where, when, how, or to whom one poses the question of peace (Barkawi 2011; Lupovici 2013; Richmond 2008). Within such an understanding of peace, the argument that continuities of war in peace are transitional is self-evident. The problem is just that this understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. When engaged, it becomes apparent that peace is not the same to everyone or everywhere. Peace as given and therefore universal and objective has repeatedly been refuted by critical scholars, who instead argue that it is a ‘historical and constantly evolving concept’ (Kühn 2012, 397). As such peace is ‘not ontologically prior to experience or learning’; it does not exist “out there” as some given fact (Richmond 2008, 18). Peace is rather a constructed concept shaped by the context in which it exists, constantly fluctuating according to the grounds—e.g. norms, principles, or ideologies—on which it rests. What peace “is” therefore changes depending on where, when, how, or whom one asks about peace (Lupovici 2013, 204; Polat 2010, 330; Richmond 2008, 2–6, 17; Rigual 2018).

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This critique has vital implications for peace. If peace is not given but rather constructed, then it will be contested (Jabri 2007; Polat 2010; Richmond 2008, 121). Given the plurality of positions from which peace can be theorised, it is impossible that complete agreement will be reached over what peace is or should be: A single peace […] translatable across all […] groupings, interest and ideologies is unlikely to stand up to an inter-disciplinary investigation. (Richmond 2008, 160)

This inherent untranslatability means that any version of what peace “is” will be contested by those who think of peace differently (Keen 2007; Polat 2010; Shinko 2008). This contentedness in turn means that peace will always exist in heterogeneous and subjective forms (Jabri 2007; Kühn 2012; Richmond 2008, 2–3; 2016). If peace is constructed and if this construction is contested, then the question of what, how, why, and for whom peace is will always have multiple and contextually bound answers: The existence of peace begs a number of questions: whose peace are we talking about? Peace on what terms? Peace in whose interests? And peace negotiated by which individuals or groups? In one sense everybody wants peace; it is just that they want their own version of peace. (Keen 2007, 18)

Thus rather than being a given concept of universal and objective value, peace emerges as one that is contested, heterogeneous, and subjective (Polat 2010; Richmond 2008; Shinko 2008). There is thus not peace in the universal and objective sense but rather multiple constructions of peace that can be based on entirely different norms, principles, and ideologies (Meyer 2008, 571; Mirbagheri 2012; Rigual 2018; Shogimen and Spencer 2014). Peace can thereby take feminist, Confucian, liberal, realist, Christian, anarchist, Hindu, post-colonial, Islamic, or Marxist forms—all versions of peace and each merely one of many potential peace(s). Those often labelled as spoilers or war-mongers are therefore not necessarily “against peace”. They might just have a different understanding of what peace is or should be: It is not that they (the violators of peace) love peace less, but they love their kind of peace more. (Augustine quoted in Coker 2008, 428, italics in original)

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Peace as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective has three consequences. First, peace moves from being transitionally to unavoidably violent, repressive, and disordered. Second, peace is “degraded” from its utopian and axiomatic position to just an order of things1 according to which any given society is—or is envisioned to be—socio-politically ordered. Third, the postwar stops having a linear trajectory towards an axiomatic destination. It instead emerges as permeated by conflicts over peace(s) that have nonlinear trajectories, move towards competing and sometimes even diametrically different destinations, and eventually decide the socio-political ordering of society. Consequence 1: The Unavoidable Continuities of War in Peace(s) The theorising above means that the continuities of war in peace become unavoidable rather than transitional—i.e. the violence, repression, and disorder of war will not go away with peace. This argument follows directly from peace as heterogeneous and subjective. If there is not peace in the singular and transferable sense but peace(s) that are multiple and contextually bound, then some peace(s) are bound to be incongruent or even mutually excluding (Coker 2008; Peterson 2013; Polat 2010; Shinko 2008). While we all might want peace, this does not necessarily mean that we all want the same things: Of course, everyone wants justice, morality, ethics and peace, no one wants to do wrong; but the only interesting question in concreto is always who decides in each specific case what is right, what peace consists in, what the threat to peace or a breach of the peace is, how it is to be eliminated and when a situation is normal and ‘pacified’, etc. (Carl Schmitt quoted in Jabri 2007, 95, italics in original)

The transition from war to peace thus neither has a linear trajectory nor an axiomatic destination. Peace rather has multiple destinations with many ways of getting there:

1  ‘Order of things’ refers to the organisation and functioning—in the broadest sense of these words—of any given socio-political existence. It encompasses everything from jurisprudence and norms to security structures and the economy (Foucault 2008; 2009; see also Wallensteen 2015, 3).

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PEACE

PEACE

WAR

PEACE

PEACE Fig. 2.2  Multiple peace(s). The multiple peace(s) that the transition from war can lead to if peace is understood as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective

This means that acts towards one peace might be seen as acts against other peace(s). Or—to put it bluntly—peace for me might generate violence, repression, and disorder for you (Keen 2007, 9; Mitchell 2011, 1–7; Pouligny 2006, 186). There are many examples of this. The state is often presented as the prerequisite for peace (Chandler 2014). Yet the sole existence of states is defined by and dependent on monopoly of violence. States use violence or the threat of it to defend borders, incarcerate criminals, and collect taxes (Lau and Seedat 2013, 486; Luckham 2017; Polat 2010, 321–3). The same goes for repression. A peace based on ethnonational belonging often excludes smaller minorities. Yet a peace that in contrast limits the role of ethnonational belonging is often seen as repressive by those who equate postwar survival with extensive group rights (Donais 2017; Keen 2007, 10; Mitchell 2011). Disorder is also in the eye of the beholder. Many external interventions striving to order war-torn places often create disorder by destroying functioning political structures and imposing new ones that make little sense on the ground (Firchow 2018; Pouligny 2006; Roberts 2011). My argument thus boils down to this: my peace might be the continuation of war for you (see Richmond 2008, 51). This means that continuities of war in peace cannot be entirely transitional. They will not disappear once the transition is complete because the establishment of one peace is inherently dependent on going against other peace(s): [A] universal, single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive. (Richmond 2008, 16)

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Some continuities of war in peace will thus always be unavoidable. The state must be violent if it is to survive, the ethnonational peace cannot avoid repressing minorities, and order for some will always be understood as disorder by others (Lau and Seedat 2013, 486; Polat 2010, 321–3; Shinko 2008). Every peace will thus from some position be perceived as inherently rather than transitionally violent, repressive, and disordered— or: warlike. The realist and feminist peace(s) are illustrative since getting closer to one means getting farther away from the other. War in realism is when states engage in violence towards other states. Peace in turn is defined by absence of violence and understood as the period between wars—when there is ceasefire between formerly warring states, there is peace (Bull 2012; Morgenthau 1993; Waltz 2001). Feminism in contrast sees people as central (Holmqvist 2013; Sylvester 2013; Väyrynen 2019). War in feminism is therefore whenever people experience anything from murder and rape to untreated PTSDs, hypermasculine cultures of violence, or gendered world politics (Enloe 2010; Pankhurst 2016; Zalewski 2013). The “mere” absence of violence between states can subsequently never be peace in feminism; at best it is the first step out of many towards peace, which in feminism is seen to abolish domination and foster emancipation (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2014; Rigual 2018; Sylvester 2013). The differences between how realism and feminism theorise war and peace might seem to be about ambition—i.e. while realism sees peace as the absence of violence between states, feminism sees peace as something “more”. This is not the case. Realist and feminist peace(s) are not different stops on a linear trajectory towards some shared destination—they have vastly different trajectories towards mutually exclusive destinations. What peace is and how it is reached within realism goes against and ­undermines what peace is and how it is reached in feminism, and vice versa (cf. Waltz 2001 with Cockburn 2004; Rigual 2018). Peace in realism is about militarisation. It is about having the same number of soldiers, tanks, or jets as “the other” in order to maintain the war-preventing balance of power (Waltz 2001). Yet peace in feminism is about demilitarisation, compromises, and moving beyond “us and them” (Rigual 2018; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). Peace in realism is about strong states and secure borders that keep threats out while feminism sees states as repressive and securitisation of borders as violence towards refugees (cf. Morgenthau 1993 with Enloe 2000; Hansen 2000; Pankhurst 2016; Sjoberg 2013). Realism also equates ceasefires with peace. Yet ceasefires that do not deal with PTSDs,

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gendered violence, or repressive discrimination—which ceasefires seldom do—are in feminism seen as institutionalised wars (Rigual 2018; Whitworth 2004). The two peace(s) are thus mutually exclusive; effort towards one are efforts away from the other. Consequence 2: (Re)defining War and Peace The argument above destabilises attempts to theorise war and peace as distinct concepts. If my peace can be your war—and vice versa—then peace is potentially undistinguishable from war (Polat 2010). Some scholars have therefore collapsed the war-peace binary and placed an equals sign between the two (see Pasquino 1993; Polat 2010; Shinko 2008). In this part I refute such arguments as normatively problematic and analytically ineffective, instead arguing that the continuities of war in peace can be better addressed by removing peace from its pedestal and understanding it as an order of things.  ar = Peace? W The underlying logic for equating war with peace is that the heterogeneity and subjectivity of peace means that efforts towards each and every peace can always be understood as violent, repressive, and disordered by those who want another peace (Shinko 2008). Peace thereby emerges as not permeated by violence, repression, and disorder “by mistake”, but because any society having peace (according to its own definition) must wage what others perceive as war in order to establish, stabilise, and preserve this peace (Polat 2010).2 Peace is thus dependent on—rather than opposed to—violence, repression, and disorder: Peace, or what is referred to as peace, is rent with subordination, repression and domination, where the stronger marshal all of their force to institutionalise, legitimate, and instantiate a system of order that will maintain their strategic position of privilege. War takes up residence right in the hearth of the commonwealth and peace serves as its accomplice, war’s silent, calm and imperturbable façade. (Shinko 2008, 488)

2  Locking criminals up to protect other citizens, militarising borders to keep the state safe, or redistributing wealth are all activities that can be deemed as building peace as well as being violent, repressive, and disordered.

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This makes peace ‘an uninterrupted combat [and any] civil order fundamentally a battle-order’ that survives only as long as it wages war against those that oppose it (Michel Foucault as cited in Shinko 2008, 488). Or to put it differently, this makes war ‘the first, founding principle, the arché, behind peace’ (Polat 2010, 335, italics in original). The war-peace binary thus collapses. War and peace become indistinguishable: War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or another. (Michel Foucault as quoted in Polat 2010, 332)

Peace is thus little less than the unrestricted and uninterrupted continuation of war, ‘a variety of war […] set off from conventional war only for […] not us[ing] conventional threats’ (Polat 2010, 332). War ≠ Peace This argument is compelling, especially since it is motivated by the desire to ‘[draw] our attention to the ways in which social domination, differentiation, and hierarchisation all ultimately derive from war’ (Shinko 2008, 488). Yet its effectiveness is overshadowed by its shortcomings. Equating war and peace namely relativizes war. Discrimination, police brutality, or PTSD in “peace” is horrific. Poverty and patriarchy are as well. These conditions need exposure, but equating them with war conceals the fact that the violence, repression, or disorder in war is so vastly different in scale and brutality that it makes war ontologically different from any peace. Bombs falling from the sky killing thousands or snipers terrorising an entire city are not the same as unfair trials or poverty. While it can be argued that there is a difference between actually living and merely being alive—thus acknowledging the perils of discrimination or poverty—I argue that there is also difference between being “merely” alive in peace and constantly risking death in war. Collapsing the war-peace binary also weakens any analysis. If everything is made into war, then it is impossible to make distinctions between conditions that are different (Davenport et  al. 2018). Mostar was the flashpoint in the 1993–94 “war within the war” between Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its centrality has not changed since. Yet

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while thousands of people died and many more were forced out of their homes during the war, virtually no one has died or lost their home since. Violence, repression, and disorder still permeate Mostar while Bosniaks and Croats remain antagonistic (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016). Yet the city’s contemporary problems are not comparable to its wartime bombs and prison camps; Mostar then and Mostar now are two different cities. Equating war and peace thus also undermines the analytical edge of any study. While there are continuities of war in peace, it does not mean that better analyses are produced by removing distinctions between the two.  eace as an Order of Things P Theorising peace as heterogeneous and subjective indeed ‘blurs the boundary between […] war and peace, the battlefield and the social realm’ (Jabri 2007, 55). Yet the continuous presence of violence, repression, and disorder in peace can be acknowledged without equating everything with war. The solution I choose to retain this separation is to define war narrowly and peace widely but without its “axiomatic” virtues. I subsequently define war as the systematic use of armed force by groups with political and/or territorial ambitions. This includes bombings and shootings, rape camps and torture, expulsion and destruction of property but not discrimination and denial of rights, criminal violence and non-­ systematic rape, segregation and poverty. With this definition neither patriarchy nor capitalism are understood to be wars—even if both are based on violence against, repression of, and disorder for women and workers. To recognise as well as make possible the analyses of human suffering outside of war I define peace as an order of things that encompasses nothing more than how society is socio-politically ordered or what kind of socio-political ordering is aspired for (see Jutila et al. 2008, 633). The underpinning reasoning is that if peace is contested, heterogeneous, and subjective then it will never be anything else than a (potentially) violent, repressive, and disordered ‘regime of inclusion and exclusion’ (Polat 2010, 319). This theorisation undoes some of the knots depicted earlier. It escapes normative relativism by defining war narrowly; it retains an analytical edge by refusing to equate war and peace; it acknowledges the contentedness, heterogeneity, and subjectivity of peace; and it becomes abler to expose human suffering outside of war since peace is rendered inherently rather than transitionally violent, repressive, or disordered.

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Consequence 3: The Postwar as the Conflict over Peace(s) The time has finally come to deal with the postwar and my short definition of it is the following: the postwar is the period between the systematic use of armed force by groups with political and/or territorial ambitions and the completed establishment of an unchallenged order of things. The postwar thus begins after war, consists of different peace(s) that engage each other in order to shape the socio-political ordering of society, and lasts until these heterogeneous and subjective peace(s) have boiled down to one peace whose order of things dominates the targeted society and excludes all competitors (Pouligny 2006; Sabaratnam 2011a, 22; Sending 2011). This definition might sound counterintuitive given that I have theorised peace as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective. Yet no society can in the long run be socio-politically ordered according to conflicting peace(s). Laws cannot be mutually excluding, political institutions cannot be based on incompatible ideologies, and everyday life cannot be indefinitely up in the air. The transition from war to peace must end in some stability, meaning that there is “peace” when one peace has asserted its order of things so thoroughly that there are no opposing peace(s) left to challenge it. The postwar subsequently emerges as the socio-political reconfiguration of society that brings it from war to peace:

= POSTWAR

PEACE

PEACE

WAR

PEACE

PEACE Fig. 2.3  A non-linear understanding of the postwar. The postwar as the socio-political reconfiguration of society during which war transits to one peace at the expense of other peace(s)

Yet this reconfiguration will be inherently conflictual. Understanding peace as heterogeneous and subjective orders of things—of which some will be mutually exclusive—means that the transition from war to peace cannot occur solely through negotiations or compromises (Jabri 2007;

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Polat 2010; Shinko 2008). Some peace(s) overlap and therefore also hold possibilities of reaching common ground (Mac Ginty 2011a; 2011b; Peterson 2013; Richmond 2008). Yet the postwar will also always consist of fundamentally incompatible peace(s) where peace at one end is interpreted as war at the other (Sabaratnam 2011b, 260). These peace(s) will never be able to reach common ground or coexist because there is nothing that binds them (Shinko 2008).3 The transition from several peace(s) in the postwar to an unchallenged order of things will therefore by necessity be conflictual. It will always consist of mutually excluding peace(s) that want to drive the socio-political ordering of society in incompatible directions. This means that if any peace is to assert its order of things in the long run, it must defeat and discard the peace(s) that it cannot compromise or coexist with (Polat 2010). The postwar is in this book therefore understood as permeated by conflicts over peace(s) in which different heterogeneous and subjective peace(s) engage each other until only one of them remains to decide the socio-political ordering of society. To study the postwar is thus to study conflicts over peace(s) and the ‘ways in which these conflicts shape the nature of political rule’ (Hameiri 2011, 202).

2.2   Theorising the City as a Research Object The city is the second concept that needs elaboration. Yet despite extensive theorisation since ancient times, the theoretical definition of the city is hardly unambiguous. This section therefore begins by theorising the city, moves on to argue that it constitutes a research object that affects the nature of any given research foci, and lastly explores the city’s potential to both transcend and reinforce continuities of war in peace.4

3  Real examples include the incompatible peace(s) of Hamas and the Israeli ultra-right, Albanian and Serb hard-core ethnonationalists, or ISIS and its enemies. 4  I do consequently not abide by the common distinction in urban studies between “the city” and “the urban”, in which the city is the constitution of cities and the urban is how cities function. The reason is that I understand the two as mutually constitutive, meaning that it makes little sense to accentuate the division between them if the research is not focused on this distinction per se—especially in research outside of urban studies, where the cityurban distinction hardly is axiomatic. “The city” is in this book consequently expanded to encapsulate the constitution and functioning of cities while “the urban” is reduced to signify that something is of the city—e.g. urban heterogeneity or urban violence.

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What Is the City? This part merges different strands of urban studies into one theorisation of the city. I elaborate on how the city is constituted and how it functions before arguing that these two aspects make the city a research object rather than an analytical level.  he City’s Constitution T The city’s constitution is theorised differently depending on whom one asks in urban studies, but four theoretical building blocks are nevertheless prevalent: (i) heterogeneity, (ii) density, (iii) openness and permeability, and (iv) centrality within its wider socio-political context. The city is initially heterogeneous across the socio-political spectrum (Lefebvre 1996; Mumford 1938; Wirth 1964). This implies heterogeneity of people as it consists of immigrants, LGBTQ persons, workers and unemployed, men and women, rich and homeless (Brenner 2014; Fuccaro 2016). It implies heterogeneity of attempts at governing the city by everyone from politicians, police, and religious institutions to criminal gangs and regular citizens (Jacobs 1994; Magnusson 2011). It also implies heterogeneity of spaces as the city consists of multifaceted and fluid spaces that are used differently depending on context, time of day, or user (Jacobs 1994; Sennett 1991). The city’s heterogeneity also stretches to ways of life, goods and services, norms and ideologies, cultural and artistic expressions, opportunities and risks (Mumford 1938; Sennett 2008). It is thus a mosaic of overlapping and diverse elements (Jacobs 1994, 148; Wirth 1964, 74). It contains and ‘has […] always contained elements from the most varied of situations’ (Martindale 1966, 92). The city is also dense in the sense that its heterogeneous elements are concentrated (Lefebvre 1996, 103; Wirth 1964, 73–5). Artists and workers live close to one another; attempts at governing the city by planners, police, and parents are proximate or overlapping; and homeless shelters, religious institutions, and music clubs are located in adjacent or even the same spaces (Jacobs 1994; Magnusson 2011; Mumford 1938). This density means that everything from homelessness and schools to drug dealers and incompatible ways of life can be found on the same street or in the same building. The city is also open and permeable in the sense that it has multiple contact points between which there are possibilities of moving (Hall 1999; Jacobs 1994; Lefebvre 1996). The result is that heterogeneous and densely

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located elements are able to find and connect with each other across the city (Amin and Thrift 2002, 7; Hall 1999, 299; Mumford 1938, 215). Protesters, criminals, or friends in the city thus have somewhere to meet and function (squares, parks, cafés) as well as ways of getting there (streets to walk, metros to ride, roads to drive) rather quickly (Jacobs 1994; Sennett 2008, 53). The city is finally central within its wider socio-political context (Brenner 2011, 161). It is vital to politics, constitutes an economic hub, and is generative of new relationships (Hall 1999; Sassen 2002). It is where people go to find work, educate themselves, or get advanced medical treatment (Wirth 1964, 314). It is also where political parties are based, capital is invested, enterprises are founded, religious or historical monuments are preserved, and cultural activities are concentrated (Hepburn 2004, 224; Lefebvre 1996; Sassen 2002).  he City’s Functioning T How the city functions also fluctuates depending on whom one asks in urban studies. Yet it is often theorised as functioning through: (i) mixing, (ii) conflict, (iii) accommodation, (iv) creativity, and (v) fragmentation. The city initially functions through constant mixing. It brings heterogeneous elements together and makes them engage each other (Hall 1999; Mumford 1938). Artists meet workers and students, police meet criminals, and spaces of consumption and provocative art meet spaces of homelessness and religion (Pullan and Baillie 2013b, 4–6). This mixing makes the city a mediation point within as well as beyond itself (Amin and Thrift 2002, 40; Lefebvre 1996, 101). Yet it is important to stress that these are not potential but ultimately unavoidable meetings. The density of the city combined with its openness and permeability denies its heterogeneous elements isolation from mixing (Mumford 1938, 482; Sennett 2008, 171). People in the city can neither fully nor permanently avoid meeting each other, ideologies cannot exist without challengers, and spaces cannot be kept isolated. The city forces these elements to engage, thus creating rather than merely enabling mixing (Hall 1999, 277; Sennett 2008, 90). This inevitable mixing leads to conflicts within the city. Conflict is thus another way through which the city functions (Hall 1999, 17). When heterogeneous elements are densely packed in an open and permeable setting, conflict is bound to emerge between them. There is conflict between homeless citizens and the high-end shops in front of which they beg,

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between drug dealers and police, between public and commercial spaces, between pedestrians and traffic, and between protesters from different ideological camps (Harvey 2014; Hills 2010; Lefebvre 1996). There is also conflict over the city itself, involving everything from urban planning and tax levels to service provisions and ‘the right to the city’ (Amin and Thrift 2002, 24; Harvey 2006, 103). Yet not everything can be disputed all the time. The city’s heterogeneous elements are at times forced to acknowledge each other and make mutual adjustments so that coexistence is made possible (Lefebvre 1996, 76–101; Sennett 2008, 147, 181). Although the city is conflictual, it thus also functions through accommodation of differences between heterogeneous and densely located elements (Magnusson 2011, 7, 23–7; Sennett 1991, 89). Conservative religious leaders and LGBTQ people find ways to coexist in the city. Just as working and middle class people do. Different attempts at governing accommodate each other through cooperation, compromise, and/or division of the city across time (e.g. day and night) or space (e.g. different neighbourhoods). Streets in turn accommodate a rainbow of people while squares and other public venues often are shared (Wirth 1964, 74–5). Heterogeneous elements that find themselves in dense as well as open and permeable cities, however, are not billiard balls that either clash in conflict or accommodate each other without change. These encounters also create new things that amount to sums greater than the constitutive parts (Mumford 1938, 3). The city thus also functions through creativity. When heterogeneous elements are forced to encounter each other, there is a cross-fertilization between them (Hall 1999, 277). Dense demands and heterogeneous workforces generate start-up enterprises that create novel technologies, goods, and services (Jacobs 1994). When people that otherwise would have not met encounter each other, ‘new kinds of social relationships’ are formed and alternative ways of living are generated (Hall 1999, 281; see also Mumford 1938). In the encounter between different food cultures, music styles, or norms, hybridity ensues. The same goes for ideologies, attempts at governing, or spaces. As human existence is about encounters between heterogeneous elements, the constitution of the city makes it: The uncontested home […] of progress; [where] ideas, fashions, customs, new needs are elaborated and then spread […] No ground is more favourable to evolutions of all sorts. (Émile Durkheim as cited in Coward 2004, 165)

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Its inherent creativity thus renders the city a generator of new things (Amin and Thrift 2002, 155; Jacobs 1994, 145). The city finally functions through fragmentation. The heterogeneity of the city means that most aspects of life—family life, work, or activism—are separated into disconnected social worlds that seldom overlap with each other (Sennett 1991). Thus instead of living in one holistic context, people in the city move constantly and abruptly between different contexts in which they interact with other people in isolated segments (Wirth 1964, 74).5 Fragmentation is evident also when it comes to attempts at governing the city. The city is namely characterised by a ‘multiplicity of divergent and discontinuous’ attempts at governing that have ‘their own spaces and times’ (Amin and Thrift 2002, 28). The police might successfully establish daytime order in the streets but lose it at night (when criminals take over) or in private homes (where family rules apply). Mixing might be propagated at schools but lamented in religious venues. Some city districts might provide homeless people with shelter while other ­districts might chase them away (Lefebvre 1996). The heterogeneity of attempts at governing the city thus means that the city is governed in fragments rather than univocally (Sennett 2008). The city does not function as one coherent space either, but is fragmented into public squares and private shopping centres, into safe and dangerous neighbourhoods, and into school buildings and homes (Sennett 1991, 27). Although most of these spaces are connected through streets, public transport, or passages, they are nevertheless rather secluded form each other. The result is that the city functions quite differently across its fragmented spaces (Sennett 2008, 90). The City as a Research Object The theorisations above lead me to define the city as follows: 1. The city is constituted by heterogeneity, density, openness and permeability, and centrality in its wider socio-political context. 2. The city functions through mixing, conflict, accommodation, creativity, and fragmentation. 5  The result is that people are able to escape norms, hide from oppressors, and lead rather anonymous lives (Martindale 1966, 36–9; Sennett 2008, 152). Teenagers can smoke marijuana without their parents finding out while people in intimate relationships across ethnic, religious, or class divides can hide from unaccepting communities (Sennett 1991).

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The argument that I make following this definition is that this combination of constitutive and functioning aspects cannot be found anywhere else than in the city (Hall 1999, 315). It is undoubtedly true that each aspect by which I define the city can be found in contrastable political entities—such as the rural/state/suburb. Yet it is equally true that it is only the city that can parade the entire spectrum of aspects theorised above (Brenner 2014; Jacobs 1994; Sennett 1991).6 The subsequent conclusion that I make from this unique combination is—in line with multiple urban scholars (e.g. Brenner 2014; Fuccaro 2016; Hall 1999; Lefebvre 1996; Magnusson 2011; Weber 1966)—that the city is so different from contrastable political entities that it should be approached not as an analytical level7 but as a research object that affects the nature of whatever phenomena might be of interest. This concretely means that different research foci—like economic development (Jacobs 1994), intergroup relations (Wirth 1964), or violence (Fuccaro 2016)—will have city-specific particularities when manifested in the city. This applies also to the city in the context of war and peace. It has been demonstrated multiple times that the city’s heterogeneity and density makes it much harder to distinguish between urban civilians and combatants (Archer and Dodman 2017; Lucchi 2010; Sampaio 2016). The city’s constant mixing in turn makes it much harder to avoid “the [enemy] other” and/or establish stable demarcation lines in the city than elsewhere (Bollens 2012; Ristic 2014; Pullan 2011). Research also shows that because the city is central within its wider socio-political context, events such as protests or terror attacks taking place there are more likely to spread and result in regime changes, wider tensions, and/or war (Elfversson et al. 2019; Graham 2010). Yet it is important to thoroughly explore rather than prematurely assert how the city affects any given phenomena. The reason is that by predefining 6  The rural is neither homogenous, disconnected, nor devote of creativity. Yet it lacks the density of the city, does not enforce mixing, and is not fragmented enough to allow anonymity (Lefebvre 1996, 69; Mumford 1938; Wirth 1964, 78). The state is as heterogeneous and central as the city. Yet it is does not enforce mixing, everyday conflict, or creativity upon society as the city does (Hall 1999, 962; Jacobs 1994; Magnusson 2011). The suburb is dense and can be both open and permeable. Yet it lacks the heterogeneity of the city, does not enforce mixing, and undermines creativity (Lefebvre 1996, 76; Mumford 1938, 215–17; Sennett 2008, 70, 138). 7  Like peace research often tends to approach it (see Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015; Moore 2013; Pickering 2007).

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the city’s role, there is a risk of including irrelevant and/or neglecting relevant foci that will dilute the subsequent theorisation and analysis (Allegra et al. 2012; Amin and Thrift 2002; Jacobs 1994). How the city affects the nature of research foci is therefore something that must come from rather than before the actual research endeavour. This pertains especially to this book, which in many ways is about the interplay between the city and the postwar. Sufficient to say now is that existing research makes a convincing argument that the postwar will manifest itself differently in the city than elsewhere. The City’s Transcending Potential The principal research problem addressed in this book is why the postwar city does not transcend—like it has the potential to do—but rather reinforces its continuities of war in peace. What follows from this way of posing the problem is the question of what the city’s postulated transcending potential might look like. The answers—in exemplifying rather than exhaustive terms—are the following. The constitution and functioning of the city means that it consists of heterogeneous people that are densely located, have openness and permeability between them, and inevitably will mix with each other (Mumford 1938; Sassen 2013; Sennett 2008). This mixing can transcend societal divides, bridge communities, and generate coexistence—through creativity and accommodation but also through fragmentation (Amin and Thrift 2002; Büscher and Vlassenroot 2010). When people are both able and forced to meet “the other” it can create new relationships that render old divisions obsolete as well as bring communities together since people might realise that accommodating each other is key to everyday stability (Jacobs 1994; O’Dowd and McKnight 2013; Sennett 2008). The city can also foster heterogeneous coexistence by locating antipodes—e.g. religious fanatics and LGBTQ persons—into its fragmented parts and thereby make them irrelevant to each other in everyday life (Lefebvre 1996; Sennett 1991). The constitution and functioning of the city also means that it has multiple almost indivisible assets as well as shared problems—e.g. water supplies, sewer systems, or public transport—that are best addressed through cooperation. This need for cooperation can lead to common and mutually accepted socio-political rule that in effect lowers tensions between those involved (Amin and Thrift 2002; Magnusson 2011). The centrality of the city can lastly demonstrate beyond the city itself both that people can coexist with “the other” and that common and mutually accepted socio-political rule is

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possible. This can in turn lead to spill-over effects to its wider socio-political context (Brenner 2014; Sassen 2013). Due to how the city is constituted and functions it thus has the potential to transcend divisions between people, across the city itself, and within its wider socio-political context—a potential that is seemingly unfulfilled in the postwar city and therefore is in focus throughout this book. Yet while the accentuation of its transcending potential is crucial to my principal research problem, it is paramount to note that this is neither the full nor only picture of the city. It namely also holds a destructive potential, largely due to the same constitution and functioning that gives it transcending potential. The unavoidable mixing of heterogeneous and densely located people might create new relationships as well as make antagonistic groups accommodate “the other”. Yet it can just as easily lead to elevated tensions as people are denied seclusion from and instead forced to engage “the other” over and over again (Muggah 2014; Pullan and Baillie 2013a). Fragmentation might lead antipodes to find ways to coexist in the same city. Yet it is equally possible that fragmentation will lead to entrenched divides that split the city into disconnected parts (Cauter 2004; Harris 2013). The indivisibility of vital assets or the existence of shared problems might lead to common and mutually acceptable socio-­political rule. Yet it can just as easily transform everyday conflicts inherent to the city—over employment, service provision, or planning—into principled and toxic “us and them” conflicts that cannot be compromised over (Kaker 2014; McMichael 2016). Common life as well as mutually acceptable sociopolitical rule in the city might spread to it wider socio-political context. Yet it can just as well attract those eager to not “surrender” the city to “the other” (Beall et al. 2013; Muggah 2014). In this sense the city is neither univocally transcending nor destructive but rather emerges as inherently Janus-faced. It does have the potential to transcend societal divides, bridge communities, and foster heterogeneous coexistence but it holds the potential to do the exact opposite as well (Muggah and Savage 2012; Rokem and Boano 2017; Sassen 2013). The city is thus ‘as much a place of progress and inclusion as of regression and exclusion’ (Pedrazzini et  al. 2014, 397). Contrary to how the principal research problem of this book might be interpreted at the outset, my theorisation of the city is thus not idealistic and univocal. The city is not some cosmopolitan antipode to divisions or a vanguard against inequality. I rather see in astute terms and theorise it as holding the potential to transcend and amplify societal divides, bridge and split communities, stimulate and undermine coexistence. This expectation is grounded in how the

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city is theorised in urban studies as well as reflective of what has been empirically observed in cities (Alawadi 2014; Davis 2014; Harvey 2003; Rodgers 2009; Sassen 2013). The city is namely both an engine of economic growth and a generator of inequality (Sassen 2002; Harvey 2006). People in the city escape but also face repression and marginalisation, find but are also excluded from opportunities, mix with but also segregate from “the other”, find seclusion but also become invisible (Kihato 2013; Lefebvre 1996). Cities lead the charge against climate change yet are great polluters, propagate sustainable living yet have destructive consumption patterns. It is in cities where anti-war movements are strongest and pockets of coexistence emerge in the postwar but also where many wars begin and conflicts linger on (Graham 2010; Moser and Mcilwaine 2015; Pullan and Baillie 2013a). The effects of understanding the city as Janus-faced is that the principal research problem of this book becomes more nuanced—i.e. if the city holds both transcending and destructive potential, then it might transcend and reinforce its continuities of war in peace. Neither of these outcomes are thus unexpected from or antipodal to the city. Against this background my principal research problem becomes less about why—in categorical terms—the postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace and more about why these continuities are transcended so little and reinforced so much.

2.3   The Postwar City as Permeated by Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) This concluding section theorises the postwar city across three parts. The first theorises and defines the postwar city as a city where war is over yet the socio-political ordering of society remains contested. The second theorises the limits as well as distinctiveness of the postwar city. The third argues that the postwar city should be studied through its urban conflicts over peace(s). The Postwar City Since the postwar city entails “the postwar” and “the city” it was essential to theorise these building blocks before moving on to the postwar city itself. The postwar was theorised as the period from war to peace in which the socio-political ordering of society is contested through conflicts over

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peace(s) while the city was theorised as a research object set apart by its constitution and functioning. Based on these two definitions, I define postwar city as: 1. A city in the sense theorised here—i.e. a research object set apart from other research objects by its constitution and functioning. 2. A city where war is over yet the socio-political ordering of society remains contested through conflicts over peace(s). This definition makes the postwar city a category of “the city”, set apart from other theoretical categories as well as empirical manifestations of cities by its experience of war and its on-going transition to peace through conflicts over peace(s) that contest its socio-political ordering. Important to note is that the postwar city is not some deviation of the city because of its continueties of war in peace. The city as theorised here is namely not some overarching model or epitome ideal vis-à-vis which ­theoretical categories or empirical manifestations of the city are contrasted with and/or deviate from (Amin and Thrift 2002; Brenner 2014; Wirth 1964). The theoretical conditions of the city rather constitute the lowest common denominator, effectively meaning that there are no “lesser” or “incomplete” cities (Lefebvre 1996; Hall 1999; Mumford 1938). All cities thus belong to some theoretical category that sets them apart from each other—with cities defined as everything from violent, besieged, and vulnerable to ancient, postcolonial, and developing (Alawadi 2014; Hall 1999; Nogueira 2017; Rokem and Boano 2017). The Limits and Distinctiveness of the Postwar City While this definition of the postwar city is quite clear-cut, it nevertheless generates questions regarding the limits of the postwar city as well as its distinctiveness vis-à-vis cities not deemed postwar. These two aspects are dealt with below.  he Limits of the Postwar City T Since the contestation of its socio-political ordering constitutes the definitional core of the postwar city—rather than the end of clashes, signing of peace agreements, or restoration of political institutions—it subsequently also decides when the postwar city begins/ends. Its limits are thus the following: the postwar city begins when it no longer experiences systematic

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use of armed force by groups with political and/or territorial ambitions; lasts as long as its socio-political ordering is contested through conflicts over peace(s); and ends when an uncontested order of things has been established. This quite open definition effectively means that the empirical manifestations I include into the theoretical category of the postwar city are potentially quite diverse and can differ in terms of geopolitical, historical, and economic contexts; roles in and effects of war; current conflict dynamics; and extent of external involvement (cf. Beall et  al. 2013; Björkdahl and Strömbom 2015; Bollens 2012; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Harris 2013). They can also be split between different states like Nicosia or have shared political institutions like Belfast (Bollens 2018; Vogel 2018); experience repeated violence like Beirut or be highly securitised like Mitrovica (Gusic 2015; Larkin 2010); and consist of symmetric (like Mostar) or asymmetric (like Jerusalem) conflict parties (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Rokem et al. 2018). The question that arises from this diversity is whether these cities can be included into the same theoretical category (see Allegra et al. 2012). I argue that they can. The empirical manifestations of the postwar city can differ in many ways, but what nevertheless binds these cities together is that they all are in a postwar period where war might be over yet the socio-political ordering of society remains contested.  he Distinctiveness of the Postwar City T How the postwar city differs from cities not deemed as postwar is a relevant question since many phenomena—like everyday violence, no rule of law, segregation, discrimination, or parallel socio-political existences— found as well as rendered problematic in the postwar city are prevalent also in many other cities. The violence epidemic in Caracas or Ciudad Juarez (Lucchi 2010; Maclean 2014; Miklos and Paoliello 2017), segregation in Johannesburg or Detroit (Brand and Fregonese 2013; Kihato 2013), and unequal “right to the city” in Riyadh or Nairobi (Elfversson and Höglund 2018; Rodgers and O’Neill 2012) all come to mind when the supposed distinctiveness of the postwar city is scrutinized. I argue that the postwar city and its empirical manifestations—despite both the openness of my definition and the clear parallels with other cities—nevertheless stand out in two fundamental ways. One is that none of the just mentioned cities have recently experienced war, effectively meaning that they do not have

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to deal with issues such as Security Sector Reform (SSR); Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) of former fighters; crimes against humanity; PTSD epidemics; completely destroyed social fabrics; warlords-turned-politicians as ruling elites; or severely damaged infrastructure (cf. Bollens 2018; Calame and Charlesworth 2009 with Rokem and Boano 2017; Gualini et al. 2015). The postwar city is thus exposed to phenomena that other cities are not—at least nowhere near as much. The other way in which the postwar city stands out from other cities is that its socio-political ordering is contested through conflicts over peace(s).8 The weight given to this distinction might seem exaggerated or even counterproductive given that it separates the postwar city from other categories of the city that it might have parallels with (Allegra et al. 2012). Yet it is neither. The contentedness of the socio-political ordering of ­society is namely not one problem out of many—it is the problem that needs to be settled if postwar societies are to reach peace (Davenport et al. 2018; Foucault 2003, 2008; Wallensteen 2015). The postwar city is thus set apart from just about any other city because its socio-political ordering is so up in the air that it lacks the fundamental stability upon which coexistence can be based or from where societal problems can be tackled (Bollens 2018; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011). Yet parallels nevertheless exist between the postwar city and other categories of cities. The postwar city is namely—as has been demonstrated primarily by urban scholars (Bollens 2012; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Hepburn 2004) but also will become clear throughout this book—confronted with many problems that are intrinsic to all cities such as socioeconomic segregation (cf. Murtagh and Shirlow 2006 with Sennett 1991); corruption on all societal levels (cf. Bieber 2005 with Winton 2004); inconsiderate and/or discriminatory urban planning (cf. Larkin 2010 with Pedrazzini et al. 2014); unequal access to services, employment, and public spaces (cf. Pullan and Baillie 2013a with Harvey 2006); organised criminal networks (cf. Moore 2013 with Patel and Burkle 2012); and patron-client relations (cf. Hromadžicˊ 2015 with Davis 2014).

8  This distinction is principal in nature, meaning that it does not matter if a city is more segregated than Belfast, more violent than Kirkuk, or more unequal than Jerusalem; if its socio-political ordering is not contested then it is not deemed a postwar city.

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These parallels shed light on two important nuances to the postwar city. One is that not all of its problems are explained by or connected to its postwar condition. The contentedness of its socio-political ordering means that the postwar city will confront problems not found in other cities. Peacewalls in Belfast, KFOR troops in Mitrovica, and segregated education in Mostar would clearly not exist had these cities not been postwar cities (Gusic 2015; Moore 2013; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). Yet not all problems found in the postwar city are idiosyncratic to it. Inexplicable planning decisions, unequal distribution of resources, and severe corruption found in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar are namely not dependent on them being postwar cities. These are more general problems found in all cities.9 The subsequent conclusion is that not everything that I will find, explore, analyse, and theorise in Belfast, Mitrovica, or Mostar is necessarily connected to them being postwar cities. The other important nuance is that it can be limiting to study the postwar city in isolation and without contrasts vis-à-vis cities not deemed as postwar. The potential problem with creating categories of cities between which some incommensurability is assumed is namely that it prevents insightful comparisons of cities that have parallel dynamics yet are placed in different categories (Allegra et al. 2012). The subsequent conclusion, however, is not that the postwar city needs to be studied together with cities not deemed postwar. The postwar city—with its experience of war and the contestation of its socio-political ordering—is namely so qualitatively distinct that it is motivated to understand it as set apart from other cities.10 Yet this does not necessitate constant isolation. This means that while the chapters on Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar will focus on the postwar city only, the concluding chapter will contrast it with cities not deemed as postwar. Studying the Postwar City Through Its Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) It might seem that based on how I define the postwar city, it should be studied through the contestation of its socio-political ordering (in some city-wide sense). Yet such an endeavour would be simplistic. The city is 9  Yet its contested socio-political ordering undoubtedly exaggerates these problems in the postwar city (Bollens 2018; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011). 10  Given that this book is primarily written from and to peace research, such an isolated focus becomes even more valid.

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namely inherently complex and unruly. It consists of countless acts, attempts at governing, and spaces that are heterogeneous and operate on different and fragmented levels and scales. These elements can overlap and intersect, but might just as well be fragmented and operate isolated from each other (Lefebvre 1996; Magnusson 2011; Mumford 1938). The city’s constitution and functioning mean that phenomena will not manifest themselves monolithically or equally across it. The city is thus like a chameleon or an anamorphic sculpture—it unescapably changes depending on who, where, when, why, and how you are in it (Lefebvre 1996; Sennett 2008). The result is that the city always has many diverse manifestations of any phenomena of interest. In my case this means that the postwar city will experience multiple conflicts over peace(s). This line of argument has important implications for the research focus of this book and therefore needs to be stated explicitly. What I argue is this: if the postwar city consists of multiple and diverse conflicts over peace(s), then it cannot be studied as one conflict over peace(s) that is monolithic and/or played out equally across the city. Neither the postwar city nor its empirical manifestations—in my case: Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar—are therefore the primary cases of analysis in this book.11 The primary cases of analysis are instead different conflicts over peace(s) that each postwar city always will have multiple and diverse manifestations of. Yet as these conflicts over peace(s) manifest themselves in the postwar city, they will take distinctively urban forms that make them different from conflicts over peace(s) manifested in other political entities. In order to signify that these conflicts over peace(s) are of and in the postwar city, my primary cases of analysis are subsequently termed urban conflicts over peace(s) and defined as: 1. Happening in the postwar city. 2. Involving at least two different peace(s) that contest the socio-political ordering of society. 3. Focusing on some (or several) contested issue(s). This definition might seem too analytically imprecise (cf. Allegra et  al. 2012 with Amin and Thrift 2002; Mumford 1938). Yet I argue that it is quite sensible since openness enables critical exploration. Too inflexible 11  Even if the research problem itself will remain focused on why the postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace.

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definitions of what constitutes the case of analysis leaves research endeavours much less able to capture hidden, neglected, and/or unanticipated aspects of whatever phenomena might be of interest (Ackerly and True 2010; Gingrich and Fox 2002; Lykke 2010, 139). This certainly applies to this book. It is the openness regarding what constitutes an urban conflict over peace(s) that allowed me to discover radically different ones. A less open definition would in undoubtedly have left the analysis more myopic and some hidden urban conflicts over peace(s) undiscovered.

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CHAPTER 3

Three Approaches to Urban Conflicts over Peace(s)

Any given problem has multiple dimensions to it and the postwar city is hardly an exception. The contestation of its socio-political ordering means that the postwar city is inherently complex and ‘does not lend itself to tidy research’ (Pullan and Baillie 2013, 4). What dimensions to focus on when studying its urban conflicts over peace(s)—and how to do so—are consequently open questions without definitive answers. The multifacetedness of any problem, however, does not only imply the possibility to study its different dimensions; it also makes a diverse study crucial. The reason is that while each dimension: [O]ffers a unique vantage point […] none […] holds the key to ultimate insights. Indeed, every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. This is to say that by opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. (Bleiker 2003, 44, emphasis added)

Since no dimension ever provides exhaustive answers, I argue that any problem is better understood the more of its dimensions are studied. I will therefore study urban conflicts over peace(s) through the following three1 dimensions: (i) acts (ii) governing, and (iii) spaces. These foci are 1  Why not five, seven, or “all”? Because every study has limitations. In my case I decided that three dimensions was manageable and therefore chose the three I found most relevant.

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derived from different strands in urban studies but also resonate with central aspects of the war-peace nexus. This chapter begins by elaborating on the three dimensions—acts, governing, and spaces—that constitute the theoretical entry points into my analysis of urban conflicts over peace(s). It then moves on to theorise negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space as apt concepts for analysing these dimensions. It ends with some notes on research design.

3.1   Entry Point 1: The Acted City The first dimension I will address is how acts by subjects2 come about in urban conflicts over peace(s). This focus is motivated by arguments in urban studies that the city is practiced (Harvey 2014, 88; Lefebvre 1996, 106; Martindale 1966, 10). The city is thus not “just there” as some static endpoint, but rather comes into being through acts and remains only as long as it is practiced (Angelo and Wachsmuth 2014, 354; Sennett 1991, 217). This view fits neatly with how I theorise the city. Mixing, accommodation, or creativity are not boxes to be ticked but rather acts that need constant reiteration—we mix at bus stops, accommodate each other in streets, and create relationships in schools. Again and again (Lefebvre 1996, 106–10). The same applies to urban conflicts over peace(s). Divisions in the postwar city are not “completed” and then moved on from to the next thing on the list; they need to be continuously practiced through acts of avoidance, threat, or violence. The city thus exists ‘by the virtue of action’ (Amin and Thrift 2002, 50). Analysing how acts come about in urban conflicts over peace(s) can thus help me understand the postwar city better. The focus on acts resonates also with the war-peace nexus. War is based on soldiers shooting or raping and on leaders ordering advancements or retreats. Peace in turn is based on soldiers disarming and disbanding, leaders signing peace agreements, neighbours reconciling, and infrastructure being rebuilt.

3.2   Entry Point 2: The Governed City The second dimension I will address is how urban conflicts over peace(s) attempt to govern collective life. This focus is motivated by the argument in urban studies that the city is a collective endeavour (Harvey 2003, 33). This 2  The subject is equivalent to agent, actor, or person (see Butler 1990; Foucault 1982; McNay 2000).

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resonates with my theorisation of the city as most of its defining aspects are collective. We live and work, mix and create, cooperate and fight together. We make cities heterogeneous, densely populated, and central entities by living there together. This makes the city a drama whose existence depends on collective life being governed (Mumford 1938, 481; see Hall 1999; Martindale 1966). The same applies to urban conflicts over peace(s). Both non-contact between ethnonational groups and integration of divided postwar institutions are dependent on collective life being governed. For the city to come into being and then continue existing, collective life needs to be governed. Analysing how urban conflicts over peace(s) attempt to govern collective life might thus make me understand the postwar city better. The focus on governing resonates also with the war-peace nexus. War and peace are essentially collective phenomena. War requires armed groups, functioning supply structures, and supportive citizens while peace is about creating stable political structures, punishing perpetrators, and overcoming prejudices.

3.3   Entry Point 3: The Spatial City The third dimension that I will address is how urban conflicts over peace(s) shape as well as are shaped by space. This is motivated by the argument in urban studies that the city is fundamentally spatial (Amin and Thrift 2002; Harvey 2000; Lefebvre 1991). One part of this argument is based on the fact that the functioning of the city always is grounded in space. Meetings happen on streets, at bus stops, in libraries. Conflict is expressed through protests in public spaces, occupation of buildings, or denial of entry into neighbourhoods. Accommodation is made by opening up space for marginalised people or accepting new residents (Harvey 2000). The other—and more central—part of the argument is that the city itself is fundamentally spatial (Soja 1989, 6–7). This spatiality is twofold. Things of the city shape the spaces in which they happen. Political protests and criminal activities affect the safety of streets and the willingness of people to frequent them. Increased mixing in a neighbourhood can attract more people, exclude poor inhabitants, and jam up the public transportation (Harvey 2006; Jacobs 1994; Lefebvre 1991). Yet things of the city are also shaped by the spaces in which they happen. The possibility to protest correlates with the amount of public space available (de Certeau 1984;

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Harvey 2006; Solnit 2014). Mixing is also affected by space as people mix easier in densely populated and permeable cities than in cities that are spread out and crosscut with highways and defensive architecture (Harvey 2000; Jacobs 1994). Analysing how urban conflicts over peace(s) shape as well as are shaped by space is thus another way to understand the postwar city. The spatiality of the city resonates also with the war-peace nexus (Hirst 2005). Wars are fought over territory, use imaginaries of space to legitimise territorial claims, and are shaped by topographical as well as geostrategic realities. Peace in turn needs secure spaces to emerge, often involves land swaps or granted territorial autonomy, and has its reconciliation efforts conditioned by the availability of shared space (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016; Flint 2005; Gusic 2019). These three dimensions are quite eclectic and neither give the “complete” picture of the postwar city nor combine into some unitary approach. Yet the focus on acts, governing, and space is both motivated through urban studies and reflective of different foci found in peace research. I argue that this dual resonance suggests that my approach captures three dimensions central to urban conflicts over peace(s). The diversity of the approach also means that it will generate insights that can complement each other and ultimately lead to more in-depth knowledge than would have been the case with a less eclectic approach.

3.4   The Complexities of the City These three dimensions constitute the theoretical entry points to urban conflicts over peace(s). The next issue is what concepts are suitable for studying the acts, governing, and spaces found in urban conflicts over peace(s). This exploration ties back to the city itself. It should be apparent from its theorisation that the city is inherently complex (Amin and Thrift 2002; Mumford 1938, 482; Sennett 2008, xiii). What the city “is” depends on how it is understood and how it is analysed—on whom one asks, what street or area is emphasised, what time of day (or night) is of interest, or what dimension is in focus. There is never one answer to the question of the city: Cities cannot be reduced to one. They are truly multiple. They exceed, always exceed. Cities are the machines of consumption? Yes, but never just that. Cities are artefacts of the state? Yes, but never just that. Cities are generators of patriarchy? Yes, but never just that. (Amin and Thrift 2002, 30)

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The city escapes monoism and holism. It is irreducible to and can never be one thing (Kihato 2013). It is thus more like an eccentric orchestra rather than a coherent solo artist (Mumford 1938, 4; Sennett 2008, 90). The city’s irreducibility has critical implications for this book since every dimension of the postwar city will be multifaceted—including the acts, governing, and spaces in different urban conflicts over peace(s). In terms of acts, the city is a mosaic of different worlds that subjects travel quickly and abruptly between (Martindale 1966, 36; Wirth 1964, 74). City life is thus about ‘differential participation […] in a great variety of conflicting, competing, and intersecting groups’ (Wirth 1964, 225). Every day people in the city move in and out of closed family circles, school/work, streets, public transport systems, and social events. Each of these constitutes their own world that subjects need to relate to and act differently in (Mumford 1938; Wirth 1964). This means that as subjects move across the city their acts will change across diverse and possibly contradicting spectra (Sennett 1991, 123, 152). Such fluctuations are evident also in the postwar city. Students in Belfast have different spatial patterns depending on whether they wear school uniforms—and are identifiable as “the other”—or regular clothes (Leonard 2010); people in Mitrovica behave differently depending on what side of the city they are on (Gusic 2015); while contact with “the other” in Mostar often correlates with its public observability (Hromadžicˊ 2015a). The city is hardly less complex when it comes to governing. Its complexity means that the city always has times and spaces in which governing is eluded or disabled. Governing of collective life in the city is thus inherently incomplete and more than anything else an attempt at governing (Amin and Thrift 2002; Jacobs 1994; Magnusson 2011). This means that ‘the city must be conceived as a social order of parts [rather than] a coherent, controllable whole’ (Sennett 2008, 141, emphasis added). The city’s complexity also means that it will always hold multiple attempts at governing collective life that contradict, compete, and/or overlap with each other (Amin and Thrift 2002, 29, 128; Lefebvre 1996, 85; Magnusson 2011, 7–27). These attempts can encompass everything from police enforcement and legal measures to planning regimes, social norms, and attentive parents (Amin and Thrift 2002; Jacobs 1994; Weber 1966). The city’s complexity lastly means that these multiple attempts at governing will need to be quite heterogeneous since what amounts to effective governing in the city changes. Sometimes brute force or defensive architecture are key while other times changed norms or watchful eyes of strangers

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are more efficient (Amin and Thrift 2002, 129–30; Magnusson 2011, 36). Governing of collective life is no less cacophonous in the postwar city. Fear of and hate towards “the other” in Belfast are just as effective in keeping people apart as still active paramilitary groups (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006); Mitrovica holds multiple governing attempts that compete and struggle with each other in order to impose their own peace (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013); and there are small NGOs in Mostar that manage to resist the dominance of ethnonational governing (Forde 2016; 2019). Space demonstrates the same level of complexity. City space is fundamentally multiple and ambiguous as the same spaces can shape in many directions, be shaped into many forms, and be many things (Sennett 1991, 101; West 2009, 244). This complexity is also found in the postwar city. Different neighbourhoods in Belfast create comfort and anxiety depending on whether one is Catholic or Protestant (Shirlow 2003); the different sides in Mitrovica actively and relentlessly try to make the city either Albanian, Serb, or shared (Gusic 2019); while the ownership of Mostar depends on whom one asks—with answers ranging from indisputably Bosniak/Croat to everyone’s (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016). The same spaces can thus be and do so many things in the city, making it inherently ambiguous, multifaceted, and fluid (Gaffikin et al. 2010, 498). To capture the complexities inherent to the postwar city’s different dimensions, I have chosen three concepts through which urban conflicts over peace(s) will be analysed: (i) negotiating agency, (ii) governmentality, and (iii) relational space. Below I theorise each of them.

3.5   Negotiating Agency Attempts to understand how acts come about are as old as political thinking itself. More often than not this ternate phenomenon—involving the subject that acts, the act itself, and the world in which the act happens— has been theorised as agency (Butler 1990; Foucault 2011; Giddens 1984; Lundquist 1993; McNay 2000). I follow this conceptual vocabulary. Given the ambitions and foci of this book, agency needs to be theorised so that it can capture and account for how the complex acts within urban conflicts over peace(s) come about. I argue that negotiating agency addresses this need. Central within negotiating agency is that acts are understood to be the result of open-ended and constantly on-going negotiations between the subject and the world (Braidotti 1994; Butler 1990; McNay 2000). The principal answer to how acts come about therefore lies

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neither in the subject (that acts) nor the world (in which the act happens), but in the negotiation underpinning each and every act. This section begins by arguing that while it is the subject that acts, it can always act in multiple and contradicting ways. It then turns to argue that while the world indeed conditions the subject in its acting, the subject can always act against it. I subsequently conclude that while both the subject and the world are central in the agency equation, neither of the two can in themselves account for how acts come about. Instead—I argue— the focus should be on the open-ended and constantly on-going negotiation between the subject and the world that underpins each and every act. The section is concluded by an operationalisation of negotiating agency. The Subject’s Created, Multifaceted, and Fluid Set of Acts [The] “I” cannot be considered as a rational and fixed entity; it is pervaded by different, and sometimes contradictory, desires and interests. (Lykke 2010, 114)

If wanting to understand how acts come about—e.g. how neighbours come to turn on each other or how former enemies come to reconcile—then turning to the subject for answers seems logical; it is after all the subject that acts. Yet understanding acts through the subject only is a dead end. The reason is that the set of acts each and every subject wants to pursue is partly created as well as multifaceted and fluid (Butler 2005; Foucault 1977; 2000b). In this context, a singular act can be everything from voting and practicing religion to drinking beer or taking a walk (McNay 2000). A set of acts is then the assemble of singular acts that the subject—at any given point—wants to pursue. The reasons behind why the subject wants to pursue certain acts stretch from the tangible and consciously decided to the intangible and subconsciously desired. It also involves everything from biology and ideology to norms, ascribed identity, and life goals (Braidotti 1994; Butler 1990; Foucault 2000a; Maleševicˊ 2010; 2017; McNay 2000). Yet from the perspective of this book there is no need to delve upon these underpinning reasons. It is enough to conclude that each and every subject has a set of acts that it wants to pursue within the world in which it exists and that this set of acts is partly created, multifaceted, and fluid (Lykke 2010; McNay 2000). These three aspects to the set of acts effectively mean that although the subject is an important part of the equation, it alone cannot be used to understand how acts come about.

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The set of acts the subject wants to pursue comes partly from chemical reactions in the brain, genetic heritages, and subconscious desires (Braidotti 1994; Maleševicˊ 2010; 2017; McNay 2000). Yet part of it is also created since we are not born with norms, identities, and/or life goals; we create them (Braidotti 1994; Butler 1990; Foucault 2000b). Take ethnonational identity as one created aspect that makes the subject want to pursue certain acts. The subject that lives in postwar Mostar, perceives itself as Croat, and believes in ethnonationalism wants—in all probability—to live in the western part of the city, marry other Croats only, and vote for explicitly Croat parties. This trajectory of acting3 corresponds to what being Croat means in Mostar (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Hromadžicˊ 2015b). Yet the acts that make up this trajectory of acting do not emanate from some essentialist core that predestines Croat subjects to pursue them; they are fundamentally created (Braidotti 1994; Foucault 2000b; Haraway 1991). Deviations between trajectories of acting pursed by people who identify as Croats demonstrates this well. There are many in Mostar who identify as Croat and subsequently prefer avoiding “the other”, support in-group cohesion, and want political unity in the ethnonational sense (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Carabelli 2018). Yet there are also those who identify as Croats but—in stark contrast—prefer acts of contact, are indifferent to ethnonational belonging, and vote civically. Not because they are “fake” or “disloyal” Croats, but because being Croat entails something else for them (Hromadžicˊ 2015a; Palmberger 2010). These deviations demonstrate that the set of acts pursed by the subject is partly created; had it emanated from some essentialist (in this case: “Croat”) core, then all Croats would have wanted to pursue identical trajectories of acting (Braidotti 1994; Butler 1993; McNay 2000). The same goes for deviations across time and space. Serbs are today demonized by many Croats, meaning that the “Croat” trajectory of acting involves avoidance from and/or aggression towards Serbs. Yet much of Yugoslavism—the idea that southern Slavs4 belong together in the same state—was created during the nineteenth century by the Croat intelligentsia (in the Austro-Hungarian Empire), whose “Croat” trajectory of acting 3  A trajectory of acting is the sum of singular acts (from the set of acts) that follow and correspond with each other. In this case, the singular acts of staying in western Mostar, marrying within the group, and voting for monoethnic parties constitute the “[ethnonational] Croat” trajectory of acting. 4  As jug (Yugoslavia is natively spelled Jugoslavija) means south, Yugoslavia was literality the state of southern Slavs—e.g. Croats, Macedonians, Serbs.

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involved strengthening bonds with Serbs and other southern Slavs (Lampe 2000). These temporal deviations also have spatial equivalents. While Serbs are the principal “other” in contemporary Croatia, Croats in BosniaHerzegovina often render Bosniaks the principal “other”—meaning that the “Croat” trajectory of acting in Bosnia-Herzegovina deviates from the one in Croatia. These temporal and spatial deviations thus also demonstrate that the set of acts subjects want to pursue often is ‘in process, a becoming, a construction that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end’ rather than emanating from some essentialist core (Butler 1990, 33; see also Braidotti 1994, 98; Foucault 2008). The set of acts pursued by the subject, however, is not only partly created. It is also inherently multifaceted as we always have multiple trajectories of acting within our set of acts (Lykke 2010; Mouffe 1993). People are complex. We can identify along ethnonationalist lines, be parents, work as soldiers, lean politically left, pray to God, worry about the environment, and support closed borders—to name some complex combinations (McNay 2000). All these potential nuances generate trajectories of acting that are contradicting but nevertheless belong to the same sets of acts. As Rosi Braidotti notes about human complexity: ‘[W]ere I to write an autobiography, it would be a selfportrait of a collectivity’ (1994, 14). The underlying argument is that the subject never wants to pursue only one trajectory of acting but many. The set of acts that the subject wants to pursue is finally fluid and thus unable to be permanently stabilised across time and space (Barad 2012, 43; Butler 1990). Perceptions of self, life goals, norms, or political affiliations—but also chemical reactions in the brain and subconscious desires— all change during a lifetime. The effect is that the set of acts that the subject wants to pursue changes as well (Butler 2005; Lykke 2010). This fluidity makes it ‘[i]mpossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogenous entity’ (Mouffe 1993, 77). The set of acts that the subject wants to pursue instead emerges as constituted by ‘fractured and ambivalent subjectivities that move back and forth between such terrains of identity as class, race, gender, nationality, language and sexual preference’ (Bleiker 2003, 33). Thus rather than being stable across time and space, the set of acts pursued by the subject is an open-ended and fluid project (Braidotti 1994, 111; Foucault 1978, 46). What follows from this threefold argument is that how acts come about cannot be understood through the subject only. Since the subject wants to pursue a set of acts that is partly created as well as inherently multifaceted and fluid, there will always be ‘a multitude of possible directions’ for how

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the subject might act (Braidotti 1994, 20). This multitude of possible directions—which are created and fluid—in effect means that the subject emerges as unable to ‘confer a homogenous meaning to the total field of her conduct by being the source of her action’ (Mouffe 1993, 75, emphasis added). That is, the subject itself does not provide enough ground to understand how its acts come about. Many times the different trajectories of acting within the set of acts the subject wants to pursue are combinable or can easily be shifted between—as when the soldier who is also a parent acts shifts between shooting people and changing diapers (Nordstrom 1997). Yet at other times trajectories of acting within the same set of acts will be incompatible. Take the subject identifying along ethnonationalist lines while striving to be a good parent. When it comes to the subject’s child enlisting in the ethnonational paramilitaries to protect the group, the set of acts pursued by the subject consists of two incompatible trajectories of acting. Ethnonationalism renders group survival central. Yet in parenthood, the wellbeing of the child overrides everything else. The result is that the subject will struggle with these two trajectories of acting before eventually choosing to either encourage or discourage its child to enlist (McNay 2000). Yet forecasting or (in retrospect) understanding how these acts come about cannot be done by looking at the subject and its sets of acts alone. The reason is that the partly created and inherently multifaceted and fluid set of acts the subject wants to pursue enables it to pursue different trajectories of acting across time and space. Coherence and Stability Is Both Possible and Necessary The set of acts the subject wants to pursue thus holds multiple trajectories of acting that it can both change and switch between across time and space (Braidotti 1994; McNay 2000; Mouffe 1993). This is what enables someone involved in war to become engaged in peace or allows balance between loving one’s child and hating “the other”. Yet the multifacetedness and fluidity of the set of acts pursued by the subject does not mean that the subject’s acting is utterly incoherent and unstable (McNay 2000, 18). While my theorisation of the subject means that ‘multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory’ trajectories of acting can be pursued across time and space, it does not foreclose coherence and stability (Braidotti 1994, 4). The idea of the partly created and inherently multifaceted and fluid set of acts the subject wants to pursue:

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[D]oes not involve the coexistence of a plurality […] but rather the constant subversion and over-determination of one by the others […] within a field characterized by open and indeterminate frontiers. (Mouffe 1993, 77, italics in original)

Thus while the subject has no entirely pregiven, uniform, or permanently stable set of acts, it is able to attain coherent and stable trajectories of acting in given times and spaces (McNay 2000, 78). We can stabilise our trajectories of acting so that we consistently act like women or men (or neither), sleep with one gender only, and abide by our ethnonational identities. The multifacetedness and fluidity of the set of acts is thus not antithetical to having coherent or stable trajectories of acting; it only suggests that no trajectories of acting are given, unavoidable, or permanently stable (Foucault 2003). Yet coherence and stability in what trajectories of acting are chosen is not only possible; it is also necessary. A subject without some coherent and stable trajectories of acting (in the sense that not every act is constantly up in the air) cannot really exist in the world: The “I” is a […] necessity, a theoretical fiction that holds together the collection of differing layers, the integrated fragments of the ever-receding horizon of one’s identity. (Braidotti 1994, 161)

As every subject can pursue multiple and often incompatible trajectories of acting, coherence and stability at given times and spaces is actually what enables the subject to function in the world (McNay 2000, 75). The ethnonationalist parent is yet again illustrative. This subject has in its set of acts trajectories of acting that are focused on both supporting the group and protecting the child. Yet since these two can be fundamentally incompatible, they cannot always be acted upon simultaneously. This means that if the ethnonational parent is to act, coherence and stability has to be established; the ethnonational parent must thus choose one trajectory of acting (McNay 2000, 75). This coherence and stability, however, will nevertheless be inherently dynamic and fluid across time and space. A ‘coherent and stable’ trajectory of acting is thus not the same as an essentialist one, but rather ‘the result of an active process of configuration whereby individuals attempt to make sense of […] existence’ (McNay 2000, 27). As Rosi Braidotti points out, the understanding of the set of acts as fluid does not imply ‘fluidity without borders but rather an acute awareness of the nonfixity of boundaries’ (1994, 36).

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The Indeterminism of the World Studying the world5 is another way of trying to understand how acts come about. It is after all in the world that all acts happen. Yet while the world undoubtedly conditions acts, it does not determine them. Subjects always seem able to resist and counteract whatever demands on acting is thrown at them in and by the world (Foucault 2000b). This means that the world alone cannot account for how acts come about either. The world conditions how we act in two ways. As just argued, we are only able to act within the world if we acquire some coherence and stability—as anything from Bosniaks/Croats to politically left/right (McNay 2000). Yet the ‘terms by which […] we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are not of our making’ (Butler 2005, 21). What this means is that while the subject chooses its trajectories of acting, it does so from a set of acts whose existence to a great extent is already conditioned by the world (Braidotti 1994, 14). The choice to pursue acts corresponding to Bosniak/Croat or politically left/right is namely not conceivable outside of the context in which these trajectories of acting already exist. How do we become Croats or lean politically left if these things do not exist? In most case the answer is: we do not. Many acts within our sets of acts are thus not of our own making but that of the world: When the “I” seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities of narration. (Butler 2005, 7–8)

The world in which the subject is born into thus conditions its set of acts and the possible trajectories of acting therein. The subject also always acts in the world. This means that the political, economic, and social context of the world in which the subject finds itself will affect how it chooses between different trajectories of acting (Foucault 1978; 1982). Thus even if a subject acquires internal coherence and stability—implying that there is no doubt regarding what trajectory of acting it prefers—the world in which it lives conditions what acts are actually viable (Butler 1990, 115). Take the subject that wants to pursue a non-­ ethnonationalist trajectory of acting yet lives in a world where employment 5  The world alludes to the overall society, thus encompassing different orders of things, other subjects, governing attempts, and spaces. It is essentially the material and immaterial sphere that any given subject needs to relate to when acting.

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and safety are tied to ethnonational loyalty. No matter how internally coherent and stable this subject is, the world in which it lives conditions its ability to pursue a non-ethnonationalist trajectory of acting. If this subject wants to work and stay safe, it needs to conform to ethnonationalism (Butler 2005; Foucault 1982; Mouffe 1993, 73). Yet this conditioning of acts does not mean that subjects who live in it have no choices. While the world does condition both the existence of the sets of acts subjects want to pursue and the choices subjects makes between different trajectories of acting, the world determines neither. Although it constitutes ‘a relative closure’, the world does not preclude choice as such (McNay 2000, 43; see also Butler 1997, 139; Lloyd 1999, 202). The soldier ordered to shoot the unarmed civilian can always refuse to do so. Not following orders will have consequences, perhaps severe or even deadly ones. But the choice is nevertheless always there and it is always made by the subject—i.e. the civilian is not shot until the soldier chooses to pull the trigger. This necessity of choice effectively illustrates that the world is ‘a generative rather than determining structure which establishes an active and creative relation […] between the subject and the world’ (McNay 2000, 39). Thus while the world does condition acts, this conditioning is always followed by ‘a more active process of self-interpretation on part of the subject’ (McNay 2000, 76; see also Bleiker 2003, 29; Foucault 1978, 95; 2000a, 449). This makes also the world unable to on its own account for how acts come about. Agency as an Open-Ended and Constant Negotiation These inabilities of the subject and the world to account for how acts come about suggest that the answer lies primarily in the act itself. If the set of acts that the subject wants to pursue is partly created as well as multifaceted and fluid while the world is unable to determine how the subject acts, then each and every act can always deviate from the act immediately before or after it (Barad 2003, 827; Butler 2004, 32; Foucault 1978). Take the soldier ordered to shoot unarmed civilians. He or she can act differently— e.g. by killing at one point and not at another—across time and space. The subject and the set of acts it wants to pursue can be the same. So can the world in which the order is given. Yet the act can nevertheless always differ between each instance the same order is given to the same subject in the same world. The soldier can shoot unarmed civilian A and then in the next second not shoot unarmed civilian B while everything else remains the

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same. This is because the choice to shoot or not has to be made anew at each instance, effectively implying that the act itself—rather than the subject or the world—is central to understanding how acts come about (Butler 1990; Foucault 1978; 2000a; 2003; McNay 2000). Yet this does not mean that only the act is important. The act namely comes about through the subject and in the world (Foucault 1982). As it is the subject that acts and the world that conditions the act, no act ever happens in nihilum but always through the existing set of acts that the subject wants to pursue and within the conditions put in place by the world (Butler 2005; Foucault 2009; McNay 2000). The soldier ordered to shoot unarmed civilians must take departure from (and is limited to) the set of acts that he or she wants to pursue—e.g. doing the right thing or obeying orders—as well as take into account the different carrots and sticks of the world that follow both compliance and noncompliance with the order. This brings both the subject and the world back into the agency equation, with the act ‘neither fully determined [by] nor radically free [from]’ the subject and the world (Butler 2005, 19; see also McNay 2000, 39). This theorisation may seem to take us either back to the very beginning or to a dead-end that provides no answers; but it does not. I namely draw the following conclusion from the line of reasoning above: the key to understanding how acts come about lies in the open-ended and constantly on-going negotiation between the subject and the world that results in the act (Butler 1990; 1993; 2005). I reason as follows: if acts are dependent on both the subject and the world but never determined by either of them, then each and every act will be underpinned by a negotiation6 between the subject and the world that can result in completely different acts. It is this negotiation that I argue should be the analytical focus when trying to understand how acts come about (Barad 2003, 827; Butler 2004, 32; Foucault 1978). As Karen Barad asserts: ‘[t]his dynamism is agency’—an open-ended and constantly on-going negotiation between the subject and the world regarding what acts are to be chosen at any given time and space (2003, 818, italics in original). The result is that if we want to understand the shooting or not of unarmed civilian A by soldier B, we need to focus on that very act.7 I call this thinking about how acts come about negotiating agency. 6  Negotiation is the process through which the subject chooses how to act in an interplay between the set of acts it wants to pursue and the conditions the world puts on it. 7  Or, if wanting to understand some long-term acting (like avoiding “the other”), we need to focus on that very trajectory of acting.

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Studying Acts in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) This open and flexible theorisation of how acts come about makes negotiating agency able to explore and understand how complex acts in urban conflicts over peace(s) come about across time, space, and context. In order to be able to do so more easily, I have chosen to operationalise negotiating agency into the following analytical steps. I will begin by exploring what trajectories of acting any given subject has made coherent and stable from its set of acts. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means examining what kind of peace the subject prefers and what trajectory of acting this peace entails. I will then explore what kind of world the subject exists in and how this world conditions the acts of that subject. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means what kind of peace(s) are imposed by the world, which acts these peace(s) entail, and what kind of consequences the subject faces if acting with or against these peace(s). I will then explore how the subject acts, if these acts overlap with its preferred trajectory of acting, and if these acts change according to time, space, and context. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means according to what peace the subject acts, if this is the peace preferred by the subject, and if the subject changes its acts across to time, space, and context. I will finally explore the underpinning negotiation between the subject and the world when it comes to how the subject acts. This is the trickiest part as it is both theoretically multifaceted and empirically ambiguous. There are ideal-typically three possible outcomes in this negotiation: the subject acts according to its preferred trajectory of acting in a world supporting these acts; the subject acts according to its preferred trajectory of acting in a world opposing these acts; and the subject acts against its preferred trajectory of acting in a world opposing these acts.8 This setup will help me explore and understand why the subject acts in certain ways and not others as well as how these acts are related to different urban conflicts over peace(s).

8  The latter two will be in focus in this book. Exploring and understanding the negotiation between the subject whose preferred trajectory of acting is largely supported by the world in which it exists is neither difficult nor interesting.

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3.6   Governmentality When trying to understand the complexities inherent to governing collective life in the postwar city, governmentality emerges as quite suitable. This section begins theorising this concept by arguing that governing collective life is about structuring the field of possible acts available to collectives of subjects. I then move on to argue that this structuring is done through the interplay between ways of thinking and modes of acting. The section ends with an operationalisation of governmentality. Structuring the Field of Possible Acts There are multiple ways to explain how governing is theorised within governmentality, but an illuminating one is to think of governing as about structuring the field of possible acts available to collectives9 of subjects (Dean 1996; Foucault 1982; McNay 2000; Rose and Miller 1992). The etymology of governmentality is perhaps the best starting point to elaborate on what this “structuring” as well as “the field of possible acts” imply more concretely. Governmentality is made up of the Latin words gubernāre (to pilot, steer [a ship], govern, or manage) and mente (mind). While this combination could be misread to equate governing with “mind control”, these etymological roots in fact pinpoint quite neatly how governing is understood (Foucault 2008). Governmentality namely sees collective life as inherently uncontrollable, thus making governing less about control and more about making people choose to act in certain ways themselves. Two dimensions underpin this thinking: the complexity of the world and the constancy of choice. The complexity of the world is about the world being multiple and diverse rather than uniform. The globe consists of many states rather than one; cities are “shared” (or: divided) between political institutions, police forces, and criminal enterprises rather than controlled by one faction; and democracies are permeated by multiple ideologies rather than dominated by one (Bleiker 2003; Foucault 2003; Soja 1989, 247). This complexity means that collective life will never be governed in some insulated vacuum or pushed into the same direction. Collective life will rather be governed through conflict and pulled towards many different and incompatible endpoints (Foucault 2008; Magnusson 2011). 9  Collectives are here understood as multiple subjects bound by some encapsulating notion (e.g. gender or ethnonational belonging) that is ascribed to and/or by them.

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The constancy of choice begins with the argument that collective life— rather than forming a singular whole—essentially consist of subjects (Braidotti 1994; Foucault 2003; McNay 2000). While this statement in many ways is axiomatic its impact is fundamental. If collective life consists of subjects, then governing comes down to governing collectives of subjects rather than collective life per se. This thinking both links governing of collective life back to agency as negotiated and—in doing so—brings up the importance of choice. A central argument in negotiated agency is that if acts are constantly negotiated between the subject and the world, then choice—while always limited—will never be foreclosed (Barad 2012; McNay 2000; Foucault 2000a). For governing this means that full control of collectives can never be asserted. If choice is constant then it is always possible to resist every form of governing; we can thus at every point choose to act in line with Y rather than the prescribed X (Foucault 2000a, 167). Not even in North Korea is full control or blind obedience conceivable. North Koreans are undeniably punished when not acting like the regime prescribes. Yet being punished (or living in fear of punishment) is not the same thing as being controlled. It is not the same as having choice removed from the equation or being unable to act differently.10 At the end of the day the North Korean order of things also hinges on people themselves acting in line with prescribed acts—of choosing to do so. Some acts indeed come with costs and others lead to benefits, but the choice to act in line with X or Y and thereby accept costs or secure benefits will nevertheless always remain up to the subject (Butler 1990; 1993; Li 2007; McNay 2000). Against the background of these two arguments, the governing of collective life emerges as an inherently incomplete and uncertain endeavour that is merely an attempt out of many to make collectives of subjects choose X rather than Y (Dean 1996; Foucault 2000a; 2000b; Rose and Miller 2008, 8). Governing is thus about making people make certain choices themselves through governing attempts. The analogy of steering a ship in open waters illustrates this thinking well.11 In this endeavour the capabilities of the crew are fundamental. Yet steering a ship is never only in the hands of 10  This argument sounds tone deaf and uncompassionate, at best. The claim, however, is purely theoretical and made to explain governmentality. I do not believe that North Koreans have actual choices. 11  To make it straightforward from the beginning: steering symbolises governing, the crew those that attempt to govern, the ship any given collective, and open waters everything that cannot be controlled (e.g. competing governing attempts, choice, or miscalculations).

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the crew since uncontrollable elements always are involved—e.g. weather conditions, bathymetry, suddenly failing equipment, or inadequate nautical charts. No matter how capable the crew is, the voyage from A to B is never certain because hidden rocks, devious storms, and broken radars always can prevent its completion. This is exactly how governing of collective life is understood within governmentality (Rose and Miller 1992). Just as steering a ship is an attempt to get from A to B in uncontrollable open waters so is governing merely an attempt out of many to make collectives of subjects choose to act in line with X rather than Y (Foucault 2008). To actually govern then emerges as not about asserting control— as this cannot be done—but about changing the conditions in which collectives of subjects choose how to act: [Governing] incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; [yet] it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects. (Foucault 1982, 789)

The structuring of the field of possible acts reflects the reasoning that ­governing is about making collectives make some choices rather than others. The field of possible acts depicts the totality of acts any given collective can choose from (e.g. X, Y, or Z) as well as the potential consequences that follow these acts or the lack of them. The structuring of this field in turn encompasses everything that asserts or alters these potential consequences and—in extension—the cost-benefit calculation any collectives make when considering to act in line with X, Y, or Z (Dean 1996). I thus theorise governing as about structuring the field of possible acts any given collective of subjects can choose from (Rose and Miller 2008, 8–15; see also Foucault 2000b; Li 2007). This structuring of the field of possible acts is within governmentality often nuanced as consisting of ways of thinking and modes of acting. Ways of thinking allude to how the world as well as X and Y are understood while ways of acting depict the methods by which the field of possible acts is structured so that collectives of subjects choose to act in line with X rather than Y (Rose and Miller 2008, 15). These two terms as well as the interplay between is elaborated below.

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Ways of Thinking Governing collective life is in governmentality largely about knowledge. The underpinning argument is that no collective can be governed without knowledge about the collective itself, the world in which it exits, or the acts it is envisioned to choose. Just like sailing involves having a ship, knowing the waters, and deciding the destination (Foucault 1977). Ways of thinking thus encapsulate all forms of knowledge any given governing attempt needs to structure the field of possible acts for its targeted collective. This includes both descriptions of reality and prescriptions for acting in this reality (Foucault 1978). Ethnic cleansing is illustrative of the fundamental link between knowledge and governing. The “endeavour” of ethnic cleansing is namely impossible without the concept of ethnonational groups and the subsequent knowledge of “who is who” (Wilmer 2004). Without describing reality in ethnonationalist terms subjects cannot be governed into ethnically cleansing each other. It is quite clear that if knowledge about Albanians, Croats, and Serbs as different ethnonational groups had not existed in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), the fields of possible acts of these collectives would have been impossible to structure towards ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. These collectives had to know themselves—as well as “the other”—in order to be governable (Wilmer 2004; Oberschall 2010). This inability of subjects to ethnically cleanse each other without knowing “us” and “them” illustrates how knowledge ‘effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist’ (Foucault 2008, 19).12 It also—and more importantly—illustrates how fundamental ways of thinking are to making collective life governable: By means of inscription reality is made stable, mobile, comparable, combinable. It is rendered in a form in which it can be debated and diagnosed. Information in this sense is not the outcome of a neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a way to devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention. (Rose and Miller 2008, 185)

The conclusion in governmentality is thus that collectives and the world in which they exist need to be known to be governable (Bacchi 1999, 226). 12  Knowledge is not always objective, neutral or “out there”. In addition to being of the world it can also be for the world (Li 2007, 199).

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This is what ways of thinking do: produce knowledge about reality so that collectives become governable (Foucault 1978, 33, 42–3). But it is not enough. When something is given ‘an analytical, visible, and permanent reality’ through knowledge, the structuring of its field of possible acts indeed becomes possible (Foucault 1978, 44). Yet governing not only entails knowledge of the world and the targeted collectives but also the acts they are subsequently envisioned to choose. This means that ways of thinking—in addition to describing reality—also need to produce visions about how targeted collectives are to act since something that is unknown cannot be chosen. Ways of thinking are thus not only descriptive but also prescriptive, focusing on ‘what is to be known’ but also ‘what is to be done’ regarding that what is known (Foucault 2000b, 225; see also Li 2007; Rose and Miller 2008). Let us continue with ethnic cleansing in SFRJ, which happened as planned massacres but also as spontaneous acts of killing between neighbours. Knowledge about the ethnonational groups in SFRJ was undoubtedly indispensable for the ethnic cleansing that took place there. Yet it was hardly a guarantee for it. Ethnonational groups were not only allowed in SFRJ—as long as they took nonviolent and inclusive forms—but also ­constituted the principal building blocks of the state itself (Lampe 2000; Rabrenovic 1997). Knowledge about Albanians, Croats, and Serbs was there the whole time yet—without painting too rosy a picture that excludes a repressive regime and sporadic outburst of unrest—ethnonationally motivated violence was missing between 1945 and 1991. Neighbours belonging to different ethnonational groups neither killed nor wanted to kill each other; they rather worked and socialised together, celebrated each other’s religious holidays, and intermarried (Wilmer 2004; Lampe 2000). This was largely because existing ways of thinking in SFRJ cherished diversity and subsequently prescribed acts of tolerance, trust, and coexistence between ethnonational groups. The role played by ethnonationalist ways of thinking in the ethnic cleansing was thus less about describing reality differently—i.e. producing ethnonational groups that already existed— and more about altering what was to be done regarding this reality (Oberschall 2010; Pavkovicˊ 1997; Wilmer 2004). To govern Albanians, Croats, and Serbs into ethnically cleansing each other, ethnonationalist ways of thinking needed to envision and prescribe new acts for these collectives to choose from. The ensuing result was that they started prescribing in-group cohesion, mistrust, and confrontation.

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Modes of Acting Ways of thinking thus produce knowledge both about what is to be known and what is to be done about that which is known. Yet if any governing attempt is to have an impact—i.e. if it is to structure the field of possible acts for targeted collectives—its ways of thinking need to be followed by modes of acting (Rose and Miller 2008). The world is real and governing attempts do not exist in sterilised laboratories where they target collectives without competition; they exist in an uncontrollable world together with other governing attempts with which they struggle to make collectives choose X instead of Y (Foucault 1977). This means that it is not enough to just describe the world or prescribe how to act in it. If any given governing attempt is to actually structure the field of possible acts, it needs to get its hands dirty and produces real effects—e.g. by making sure that choosing X leads to food and safety while choosing Y leads to hunger and death (Li 2007; Rose and Miller 1992). It is here that modes of acting come in as they are about changing the everyday realties in which targeted collectives exist so that the prescribed X emerges as the more beneficial and/or less costly choice compared to Y (Rose and Miller 2008, 8). Ethnic cleansing in SFRJ is once again illustrative as it did not happen because the idea of ethnonationalism is so convincing that it put people in some homicidal trance.13 It happened because different modes of acting made sure that not joining “the struggle(s)” like prescribed by ethnonationalist ways of thinking could mean no rations, exclusion, or death in contrast to food, social context, and protection (Lampe 2000; Simicˊ et  al. 2012; Wilmer 2004). These modes of acting were in no way uniform as they stretched from paramilitary groups forcing people into battle to societies treating fighters as heroes and non-fighters as traitors. Yet what they had in common was that they changed the conditions in which collectives chose between X (ethnic cleansing) or Y (coexistence). Modes of acting thus “translate” ways of thinking into reality by changing the conditions in which collectives choose between X and Y (Dean 1996, 49–51). As such the list of possible modes of acting is ‘heterogeneous 13  Nor did these previously warring ethnonational groups transform their hate into love upon hearing the ideas of “Brotherhood and Unity” (the principal parole of SFRJ) in 1945. They had after all fought each other right up until the very creation of SFRJ. While the new ways of thinking might have been attractive, the prescribed acts of tolerance, trust, and coexistence were backed up with modes of acting that repressed separatism, institutionalised cooperation, and linked high positions with support for Yugoslavism.

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and in principle unlimited’ (Rose and Miller 1992, 183). Modes of acting can be individual police officers arresting criminals in line with rule of law; the existence of passports and border controls that regulate freedom of movement; or signs that warn about land mines (Foucault 2011). Modes of acting are diffuse, ‘rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse […] [but] made up of bits and pieces [with] disparate set of tools or methods’ (Foucault 1977, 26). There is thus no standard modes of acting as anything that substantialises and translates into reality some form of knowledge is a mode of acting upon a way of thinking (Foucault 2009). Governing in Governmentality Ideas thus need to be turned into practices in order to have any impact on the conditions in which collectives choose to act between X and Y. For ethnic cleansing in SFRJ to become an actual choice—rather than remain at the idea stage—the act of ethnic cleansing (or the failure of it) needed to have practical consequence for the targeted collectives. Ways of thinking needed to be followed by modes of acting. Yet practices are inherently dependent on ideas for guidance. Without ethnonationalist ways of thinking—that included the idea of ethnonationalist belonging as well as the know-how to differentiate between “us” and “them”—the modes of acting that made people ethnically cleanse each other would not have been conceivable. We cannot kill each other on basis of something we have no knowledge of (cf. Wilmer 2004 with Foucault 2003). It was thus the combination of ethnonational ways of thinking and modes of acting that structured the field of possible acts available to collectives in SFRJ towards ethnic cleansing. This points to the interplay between the two in the sense that they are only able structure the field of possible acts for targeted collectives together (Dean 1996, 62; Foucault 1978). Ways of thinking thus describe the world and prescribe what how it is to be acted in. Modes of acting then change the everyday realties in which collectives exist so that the prescribed X is chosen instead of Y. It is this interplay that structures the field of possible acts and in governmentality constitutes governing (Foucault 1982). This understanding of governing has three analytical implications. The spectrum of what actually constitutes governing is initially quite wide (Foucault 2008). If governing entails the structuring of the field of possible acts, then much that is usually not granted an analytical role becomes governing—e.g. everything from hate and fear to employment security

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(Foucault 2003; 2009; Rose and Miller 2008).14 Governing can thus be overt and covert, ambiguous and clear, intended and unintended, planned and spontaneous. Governing of collective life also emerges as quite the elusive endeavour. Within governmentality the view is namely that ‘we do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the “will to govern”’ (Rose and Miller 1992, 191). This messiness does not mean that all governing attempts are inefficient or done in the dark; the world is full of calculated governing attempts that structure the field of possible acts for collectives with striking efficiency. Yet this messiness does mean that governing to some extent always is unpredictable and elusive (Rose and Miller 2008). Governing of collective life lastly emerges as inherently heterogeneous as it involves multiple and contradicting governing attempts that ‘overlap, lean one each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other’, effectively structuring the field of possible acts for collectives towards X and Y (Foucault 2008, 313; see also Foucault 2011; Li 2007; Rose and Miller 2008). Studying Governing Attempts in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) Governmentality is thus quite suitable when analysing the complexities inherent to urban conflicts over peace(s) found in the postwar city. Its openness and flexibility to what governing is means that governmentality can be used to capture and understand how streets are kept safe, how heterogeneity is accommodated or broken up, and how feelings such as fear or hate keep communities apart. In order to do so more easily, I have chosen to operationalise governmentality into the following analytical steps. I will begin by exploring what consequences acts in line with X and Y bring to any given collective and how its members understand these consequences. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means studying what outcomes different acts generate in the postwar city. I will then explore how and by which modes of acting the consequences for acts in line with X or Y are created. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means studying how the field of possible acts is structured for different collectives in the postwar city.

14  This does not mean that more “traditional” governing attempts (parliament, laws, or brute force) are ignored. Governmentality expands rather than shifts the scope of governing.

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I will lastly explore the ways of thinking that precede these modes of acting by identifying how the world is described and what acts are prescribed. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means studying how postwar realities are understood, what peace(s) are envisioned, and what is deemed necessary to impose these peace(s). The combined result is that I will be able to capture and understand how urban conflicts over peace(s) structure the field of possible acts for different collectives in the postwar city.

3.7   Relational Space Space is often understood in Euclidian terms that render it given and passive (Ide 2017; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005; Soja 1989). Given means that the existence of space is understood as presocial or “just there” ­without ever deviating from its original existence. (Massey 2005). Passive in turn means that space is understood as merely an arena in and over which societal interactions “play out”—i.e. space holds events, but plays no role in and is only a passive recipient to them (Featherstone and Painter 2013; Soja 1989; 2010). This understanding of space makes it unimportant and grants it almost no role in any analysis. At most space is the wooden stage and the painted props in the great drama that is society (Lefebvre 1991). The Euclidian understanding of space is clearly inept for analysing the role of space in urban conflicts over peace(s). It cannot help me understand how political protests and ethnonational tensions securitise space or what role walls and highways play in non-contact between antagonists. Yet this understanding has luckily not been unchallenged, meaning that there are scholars who instead theorise space as inherently produced and active (see Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1994; 2005; Soja 1989; 2010). In this section I build upon them and subsequently argue that the concept of relational space15 is suitable for understanding how space both shapes and is shaped by urban conflicts over peace(s) (Massey 2005, 6–12, 61). The reason for its suitability is that relational space builds on an understanding of space as both produced by and productive of society (Foucault 2009; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005, 6–12). This section begins by arguing that space is not given but rather produced by society, moves to argue that space is not 15  While ‘relational space’ per se is theorised by Massey (2005, 61), the other scholars used throughout this section also subscribe to its underpinning arguments (e.g. Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1989).

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passive either but actively produces society, and then merges these two arguments into the concept of relational space. I conclude the section by operationalising relational space. The Production of Space Space is in relational space not “just there” in some presocial way, but is rather theorised as produced by society through interactions between subjects, collectives, and political entities (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005; Radcliffe 1999). The principal point is that how society happens and exists has direct implications for space in the sense that war, injustice, and violence—or: peace, equality, and solidarity—always have spatial consequences. This means that rather than being given to society, space emerges as dependent on it (Soja 2010, 18). How society acts in space thus produces space, making the existence of space inseparable from what happens and exists in it (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005). To make this production more nuanced, I additionally theorise space as having material (e.g. walls, buildings, roads), perceived (e.g. dangerous or safe), and lived (e.g. segregated or mixed) dimensions (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 2010). That society produces space applies to all scales (Massey 2005). Increased neighbourhood crime often results in shattered local infrastructure, a worsened reputation for the affected area, and people getting hurt or moving away (Kaker 2014). The construction of defensive walls and barriers in postwar settings closes off roads and passages, makes people perceive areas as “ours/theirs”, and leads people to cluster along antagonistic dividing lines (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011). Unsustainable global living patterns in turn destroy ecosystems and raise sea levels, make us perceive areas as vulnerable to climate change, and depopulate villages while overcrowding cities (Holt 2011). Space “is” thus not because it always was, but becomes through how society acts in and upon it (Soja 2010, 18). This is a production that society can clash over, negotiate about, or agree on. Yet it is always a production in which society is central (Massey 1994, 5). We produce material space by negotiating where houses, highways, and parks are to be built (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012). We produce perceived space by clashing over whether certain areas are dangerous and deprived or safe and vibrant (Rokem and Boano 2017). We produce lived space by agreeing or refusing to live with numerous

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strangers in cities (Soja 2000). The examples are infinite but clearly illustrate the point: space is not given to society; it is produced by it.  roduction Means Heterogeneity and Ever-becoming P That space is produced by society rather than given to us generates substantial change in two other aspects of space. Implicit in space as given is namely that it is singular and static (Massey 2005; Soja 2010). Yet if space is produced by society then this production will be both heterogeneous and ever-becoming. The heterogeneity of space alludes to the fact that if space is produced then this production will always involve different constellations—of subjects, collectives, or political entities—that produce space into different directions (Lefebvre 1996; Massey 2005; Soja 2010). The result of these productions is that “space” actually consists of a ‘multiplicity of spaces, cross-cutting, intersecting, aligning with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or antagonism’ (Massey 2005, 3, emphasis added). As when the same alley means different things for the rape victim and the passer-by, when group belonging decides whether localities in war are perceived and lived as “safe/dangerous”, and when territorial ownership is claimed by different groups (Dulicˊ 2018; Massey 1994; Vogel 2018). Space as produced thus means that it is ambiguous and incoherent in its heterogeneity rather than unambiguous and coherent in its singularity (Massey 1994, 155; Pullan 2013, 129). It will thus always differ in how it is used and accessed, understood or portrayed, excluded from or included into (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1994, 155; 2005; Warf and Arias 2009).16 Space as produced rather than given also implies the ever-becoming of space. If space is produced by society, then it will never—just like society itself—be completed but will always remain in production (Boudreau 2007; Massey 2005, 3–9, 288; West 2009, 26, 162–3). As when people move in and out of residential areas, borders open up and close down, migration patterns shift, and territories are attacked or secured. These spaces are continuously produced, meaning that they are always becoming (Featherstone and Painter 2013; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Massey 2005). Theorising space as produced thus places it in a constant process of transformation that 16  This also effectively means that portrayals of space as given in the Euclidian sense are never reflections of how space “is” but rather attempts to impose certain spatial realities upon space—e.g. “this is our space” or “that street is dangerous” (Lefebvre 1996; Massey 2005; Soja 2010).

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is negotiated across society and through social interactions (Lefebvre 1991; Shlay and Rosen 2010). Space thereby emerges as not some timeless site that is fixated and dead but rather as an ever-­becoming event that constantly changes and whose future is never set but always unfinished (Massey 1994; Soja 1989). The Production by Space That space is produced, however, does not mean that it is some passive modelling clay (Massey 1994, 4). Space is in relational space namely also theorised as “talking back” to and actively producing the society that produces it (Soja 1989, 7). The principal point is that ‘where [societal] processes unfold is central to the nature and outcome of these processes’ (Agnew et  al. 2015, 7). The underpinning logic is that society is ­fundamentally spatial in the sense that everyday life, protests, violence, war, and peace all play out in space. The subsequent conclusion is therefore that what exists in space will affect how society plays out; that space—in its material, perceived, and lived dimensions—has direct implications for the existence of society (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1994; Warf and Arias 2009; Soja 1989). Thus rather than being passive vis-a-vis society, space ‘becomes a medium with its own consistency and its own agency’ (West 2009, 17). The examples of how space “talks back” are found on all scales. The topography of territories decides what military tactics are effective there while the possibility to protest correlates with the availability of public spaces (Gordillo 2018; Hirst 2005). How we perceive areas decides if we want travel there while the attributed value to cities decides how much resources are devoted to controlling them in both war and peace (Bollens 2012; Graham 2010). Demographics in turn decide how difficult it is to “hold on to” a given area during peace as well as whether minorities can be “tolerated” there during war (di Salvatore 2016; Dulicˊ 2018). Space thus produces society; it is as ‘a shaping force […] in social life’ (Soja 1989, 7). The Relationality Between Production of and by Space If this twofold argument is followed to the end, then space emerges as inherently relational (Gordillo 2018; Higate and Henry 2010; Massey 2005; Soja 1989). The principal point in relational space is therefore that neither space nor society hold primacy over or are reducible to the other

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but rather exist in a mutually constitutive ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ through which they produce each other (Soja 2010, 4). Space in relational space thus consists of ever-becoming series of heterogeneous spaces that through relationality emerge as both the products and producers of society (Massey 2005, 9). [S]pace is not the pre-existing stage upon which human life is played out. Rather, space is what is produced by the flow of human and non-human life […] we configure and create that world by the very act of living in it. The world creates us, as we create it, in relations of reciprocity. (West 2009, 242)

Borders are illustrative. Society produces borders by building fences and checkpoints, by conceiving territories as “ours”, and by regulating ­movement across these borders (Pullan 2013; Lemay-Hébert 2018). Yet these borders “talk back” to society. Fences and checkpoints can impede the mobility of migrants; demarcation of territories can provoke those being divided up; and the unequal treatment of people around borders can homogenise populations or erupt economic patterns (Dalby 2014; Ide 2017; Rokem et al. 2018). This production by space might then provoke societal responses—e.g. migrants forcing fences and checkpoints, provoked groups taking up arms and declaring a new state, and people smuggling products—that in turn produce space and so on in infinitum (Donaldson 2014; Pullan 2013). These are merely isolated examples rather than assertions of how the interplay between society and space will play out; each example has ambiguous trajectories and alternative outcomes. They nevertheless illustrate the argument: that there is relationality between society and space, that ‘space is shaped by social interaction and at the same time shapes these interactions’ (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016, 3). This mutually dependency between society and space is here theorised as ‘relational space’ (Massey 2005, 61). Studying Space in Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) Relational space is thus at its core about space as produced and active rather than pregiven and passive. This means that relational space shifts the analytical focus when studying space from ‘things in space to the actual

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production of space’17 (Lefebvre 1991, 37, italics in original). Relational space thus emerges as useful when analysing how space is shaped by as well as shapes urban conflicts over peace(s) (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Pullan 2013, 127). In order to make these analyses easier, I have chosen to operationalise relational space according to two different axes. The first axis is about direction. While relational space is about how society and space produce each other, it is quite hard to analyse this relationality without dividing it up. I will therefore study one direction of this production at a time—i.e. the production of space or the production by space. In terms of urban conflicts over peace(s), this means studying how different peace(s) produce space or how they have their existence conditioned by space. The second axis is about the spatial dimension. To make the analysis more nuanced I theorised space as having material, perceived, and lived dimensions (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 2010, 10–11). When studying either the production of or by space, the analysis will thus be further divided into these three dimensions. I will thus analyse space through combinations of productive direction and spatial dimension. This will allow me to explore and understand how urban conflicts over peace(s) both shape and are shaped by space.

3.8   Three Different Ways to Study Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) Negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space will in the coming chapters be used to analyse acts, governing attempts, and spaces in different urban conflicts over peace(s). The permeating ambition will be to generate principal insights on the continuities rather than discontinues of war in peace found in the postwar city. Since my concepts focus on the same research problem—albeit through different dimensions18—it might  While I talk about production of and by space, the differences to Lefebvre are more semantic than conceptual. Although only mentioning the ‘production of space’, the relationality of space in Lefebvre’s works is hard to miss (see Lefebvre 1991; 1996). 18  Yet dimensions that also interplay and overlap—e.g. the world with which the subject negotiates its acts is constituted by (among other things) governing attempts and spaces while acts are both part of governing attempts and shape spaces. 17

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seem logical to use them together. I will, however, use negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space separately and as standalone concepts—i.e. each analysis through any of the concepts will be made without direct input from the other two. There are multiple reasons for this setup. The conceptual “origins” of the dimensions for which these concepts (to be used separately) were chosen are one. Acts, governing attempts, and spaces were namely chosen because they are alternately emphasised across different strands in urban studies. This means that they were chosen not because they constitute some unitary whole, but because they have competing foci that might shed diverse lights on urban conflicts over peace(s). To then merge the concepts subsequently chosen to analyse these dimensions might generate analyses that are much less diverse than originally intended. Employing the concepts separately also generates more in-depth knowledge on each dimension. While focusing on all three dimensions of ­whatever urban conflict over peace(s) is analysed widens the scope of the generated insights, it also undermines its depth. Using the concepts separately in contrast enables me to focus the analysis on one dimension only, thus gaining deeper understanding and more lucid presentation of each dimension. Connected to this is also that by employing the concepts separately, it is less likely that I will miss important insights regarding each dimension. The potential risk to do so comes from the diverse foci found in the concepts. Even though they are ontologically and epistemologically compatible, are employed to analyse the same problem, as well as analyse interplaying dimensions, the concepts still have different emphasis on and create diverging hierarchies between acts, governing attempts, and space.19 Employing these concepts together and thereby combining their respective foci and emphases might delude the analysis and make me miss certain aspects that are more easily captured when the concepts are used separately and each dimension given full attention. These are the central arguments to why I will use negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space separately as standalone concepts in distinct analyses. The argument I made earlier that every problem is 19  Governmentality, for example, focuses on how collectives act vis-à-vis governing attempts but neglects the underlying negotiation of these acts. Negotiating agency in turn focuses on the impact governing attempts have on acts but neglects how these governing attempts function.

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multifaceted and therefore better understood from multiple angles might seem to contradict this setup. Yet my separation is temporary and happens in the analyses of distinct urban conflicts over peace(s) only. In the last chapter I will merge insights generated by distinct analyses to make nuanced and multifaceted conclusions about the postwar city. Added to this is also that while the concepts explicitly focus on acts, governing attempts, or spaces, each concept can when needed touch upon the other two dimensions as well. An illustrative example is the coming analysis of how high school students in Mostar, who want to interact across ethnonational dividing lines, negotiate their acts with a world in which teachers and peers punish them for mixing and in which there is nowhere to meet “the other”. Although this analysis employs negotiating agency and focuses on acts, the other two dimensions are nevertheless present in the analysis—the teachers and peers quite clearly form a governing attempt while the lack of somewhere to interact undoubtedly ties back to Mostar being dominated by ethnonational spaces. Each of the concepts can thus—while focusing on one dimension only—when needed also explore the interplay between acts, governing attempts, and spaces.

3.9   A Note on Research Design This section depicts how I will study urban conflicts over peace(s). It explains that the three standalone concepts are used on different urban conflicts over peace(s), that these are derived from multiple postwar cities, and that the subsequent analyses are grouped theoretically (according to concept) and empirically (according to city). The section then moves on to motivate the selection of Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar as the postwar cities I derived urban conflicts over peace(s) from; argues that Belfast should be linked with relational space, Mitrovica with governmentality, and Mostar with negotiating agency; and presents the selection process regarding what distinct urban conflicts over peace(s) to analyse. How to Study Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) I will in the next three chapters employ negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space on urban conflicts over peace(s). Given that these concepts are employed separately, there are three central questions to consider: whether each urban conflict over peace(s) should be analysed

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through only one of concepts or all three; whether the studied urban conflicts over peace(s) should come from multiple cities or only one; and how the subsequent analyses will be conducted.  rioritising More Cases P The first question concerns whether urban conflicts over peace(s) should be analysed through only one of the concepts or all three. I cannot do an infinite number of distinct analyses20 while I have chosen to employ the concepts separately. This means is that if I am able to do X distinct analyses, the choice is between studying X/3 urban conflicts over peace(s) through all three concepts or X urban conflicts over peace(s) through one concept only. The former approach gives more exhaustive understandings of fewer urban conflicts over peace(s) as each is analysed through negotiating agency, governmentality, and relational space. The latter approach gives more case variation but less exhaustive understandings of urban conflicts over peace(s) as each is analysed through negotiating agency, governmentality, or relational space. I choose the latter setup because I want to research as many urban conflicts over peace(s) as possible. The permeating research problem of this book is theoretical, meaning that I strive to draw principal conclusions about the postwar city. Yet this demands empirical variety because no single empirical manifestation of a theoretical problem can provide enough ground from which principal conclusions can be drawn (Gingrich and Fox 2002; Hannerz 1996; Marcus 1995). Against this background, I choose to prioritise higher case variation—by employing one concept only on more urban conflict over peace(s)—rather than more exhaustive understandings of fewer cases. The reason is that I want to base my principal conclusions on as many urban conflicts over peace(s) as possible.  hoosing Cases from Multiple Postwar Cities C The second question concerns whether to select these urban conflicts over peace(s) from multiple cities or only one. I chose to study urban conflicts over peace(s) from three postwar cities. This selection was likewise motivated by variation but also the need for contextuality. Variation is about wanting to study urban conflicts over peace(s) across a wide spectrum. Given that each postwar city always holds multiple urban conflicts over 20  A distinct analysis is the analysis of one urban conflict over peace(s) through one of the concepts.

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peace(s), each postwar city will always provide variation. Yet as urban conflicts over peace(s) from the same city still share empirical context, one postwar city will always provide less variation than multiple cities (Gingrich 2002; Hannerz 1996; Marcus 1995). To escape this potential limitation and broaden my variety, I chose to study multiple postwar cities. The need for contextualisation limited my selection to three postwar cities. I take to heart the argument that the many relevant insights of the postwar are located in its everyday (Pouligny 2006; Richmond 2016; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). Yet since the everyday often is hidden, neglected, or ambiguous its study hinges on contextual knowledge. To ask the other question one needs to know the typical one (Matsuda 1991). Searching for the unanticipated means knowing what the anticipated is (D’Costa 2006). Finding the silenced and hidden presupposes familiarity with the spoken and displayed (Jacoby 2006). The argument is thus that to explore everyday sites and experiences, one needs contextual ­knowledge of them (O’Reilly 2004; Richmond 2016). In my case this meant that I needed to have contextual knowledge about the postwar cities. Yet at the same time there was a limit to how many postwar cities I could acquire the necessary contextual knowledge of (Gingrich and Fox 2002, 21; Melhuus 2002; Peacock 2002). I concluded that three postwar cities would give enough variation of urban conflicts over peace(s) while being manageable in terms of contextual knowledge. Organising the Analyses The third question concerns the organisation of the analyses. The separate employment of three standalone concepts on distinct urban conflicts over peace(s) means that there will be three sets of analyses each focusing on acts, governing attempts, and spaces. In order to not confuse the reader by constantly switching analytical foci, I will sort the distinct analyses into chapters focusing on one of the three concept-dimension linkages—i.e. one chapter each covering acts, governing attempts, or spaces through the corresponding three concepts. This conceptual sorting provides clear insights into the role of acts, governing attempts, or spaces in urban conflicts over peace(s). Yet the focus on multiple postwar cities complicates matters. If the analysed urban conflicts over peace(s) come from different postwar cities while the distinct analyses are sorted into conceptually themed chapters, there is an additional choice to be made: to either use each concept on urban conflicts over peace(s) from Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar or only

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one of the three. I choose to link each concept with one of the postwar cites only due to the need for clarity. Having each chapter focus on urban conflicts over peace(s) from one postwar city only makes the analyses clearer and the contextualisation of each city thicker than if each chapter would focus on all three postwar cities. I recognise that this setup—while providing more clarity—lowers the variety of possible acts, governing attempts, and spaces because each dimension is analysed in one city only. Yet since the city is complex while the studied cases are urban conflicts over peace(s), each postwar city nevertheless has multiple urban conflicts over peace(s) that differ from each other and subsequently provide multifaceted insights (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Pullan 2013). The research design of this book thus organises the analytical chapters so that each chapter analyses urban conflicts over peace(s) from one city and through one concept only. The subsequent insights are then ­combined in the concluding chapter in order to make principal conclusions about why the continuities of war in peace are reinforced rather than transcended in the postwar city. Selecting What Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) to Study Having elaborated on how I will study urban conflicts over peace(s), this part moves on to the selection of the three postwar cities, what postwar city to link to what concept, and what urban conflicts over peace(s) to analyse in these postwar cities. S electing Postwar Cities and Linking Them with Concepts The number of postwar cities is quite limited. Many cities have quite recently experienced war and still suffer from its ramifications. Yet far fewer cities are permeated by urban conflicts over peace(s) that contest the socio-political ordering of society. Examples are Bagdad and Kirkuk (Iraq); Beirut and Tripoli (Lebanon); Belfast and Derry/Londonderry (Northern Ireland); Jerusalem (Israel-Palestine); Mitrovica (Kosovo); Mostar and Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina); and Nicosia (Cyprus). Most of these postwar cities are so different that nearly any combination of three provides enough variation of urban conflicts over peace(s). I therefore decided to let pragmatism as well the theoretical appeal of the postwar cities guide my selection. What pragmatism translates to is my

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ability to generate in-depth knowledge in any given postwar city, with language skills and contextual knowledge rendered central to this ability. Theoretical appeal in turn is about how interesting each postwar city is in terms of the acts, governing attempts, or spaces found in its urban conflicts over peace(s). The combination of pragmatism and theoretical appeal lead me to select Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. These three postwar cities are pragmatic choices since I speak English and Yugoslav while I was born in SFRJ and have lived in Belfast. Each of these three postwar cities are also more theoretically fascinating in one of the three dimensions—with Belfast standing out when it comes to space, Mitrovica when it comes to governing attempts, and Mostar when it comes to acts. Below the three are briefly presented as well as linked with the one of the concepts.

Location Languages Length of war Casualtiesa Role in war

Belfast

Mitrovica

Mostar

Northern Ireland English, Gaelic Late 1960s to 1998 ~3,500 Focal point

Kosovo Albanian, Yugoslav 1998–99

Bosnia-Herzegovina Yugoslav 1992–95

~10,000 Not focal point until the postwar period Three city councils (two in Kosovo’s system, one in Serbia’s) Highly disputed and highly topical

~100,000 Focal point between Bosniaks and Croats Six municipalities until 2004, now one city council in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Institutional setup

One city council within Northern Ireland

State contestation

Disputed and undecided but not highly topicalb ~286,000 Catholics and Protestants

Population Principal antagonistic groups

~80,000–100,000 Albanians and Serbs

Disputed and topical within externally enforced borders ~113,000 Bosniaks and Croats

For the entire war in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively. It is thus not a burning issue. The future status of Northern Ireland has yet to be solved, but it does not preoccupy people in Belfast to the same extent it preoccupies people in Mitrovica. This, however, is something that is changing with Brexit. a

b

Each of these three postwar cities could have provided urban conflicts over peace(s) that are intriguing to analyse through each concept. Yet each is also particularly interesting in one dimension. Belfast’s spatial division is

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fragmented down to streets and even corners. Peacewalls separate its different parts and some gardens have roofs to protect people from firebombs and stones when tending their flowers. Belfast is also built apart by defensive architecture, cul-de-sacs, and highways. While ethnonational belonging is central to its spatiality, there are many other aspects to it as well like class, education, and house ownership. Belfast will therefore be analysed through relational space. Mitrovica’s holds complex, overlapping, and diverse governing attempts— with examples including Serb as well as Kosovar institutions staffed by Serbs; Kosovar institutions staffed by Albanians; different criminal networks and radical groups; the governments in Belgrade and in Pristina; Serb military intelligence agents and undercover police officers from Serbia; Kosovar ­special police staffed by Albanians; Serb police officers from Kosovo (working in Serb and/or Kosovar police); and numerous external organisations. Added to these governing attempts is also hate and fear on all sides. Mitrovica will therefore be analysed through governmentality. Mostar’s ethnonational political parties cooperate to some extent while the city’s political institutions are shared. There are also no spatial hinders for people to cross to “the other side”. Yet most people in Mostar still act according to the ethnonational script. Students do not interact even if their schools are in the same building, mixed marriages are at an all-time low, voting patterns almost equate censuses, and “non-vital” contact is avoided. Mostar will therefore be analysed through negotiating agency. S electing the Urban Conflicts over Peace(s) It was argued above that the most important urban conflicts over peace(s) are to be found in the everyday (see also Bleiker 2011; Campbell et al. 2011; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). The subsequent question that emerges is how to find and select what urban conflicts over peace(s) to study. My short answer is: through dialogue with people who live, experience, and participate in these urban conflicts over peace(s). Many scholars engaging the everyday have often found that the initial approaches—in the eyes of those that live the researched everyday—make incorrect assumptions, ask irrelevant questions, and engage misplaced foci (D’Costa 2006; Jacoby 2006; Sylvester 2013). Dialogue with people has emerged as the lowest common denominator to deal with these problems (Cohn 2006; Kronsell 2006; O’Reilly 2004; Stern 2006). This is not dialogue in the sense of talking to people to gather empirical insights; it is an open and inclusive dialogue in which those that live the everyday of

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interest are invited to shape the entire research project so as to resonate with them more (see D’Costa 2006; Haraway 1991). This means that the urban conflicts over peace(s) to be analysed in the subsequent three chapters were selected in dialogue with people who stressed them as central. Yet not all urban conflicts over peace(s) that emerge through dialogue can be studied; there just are too many. To this end I added supplementary criteria. Variation was key. Since my principal research focus is theoretical it made sense to capture as many diverse urban conflict over peace(s) as possible (Ackerly and True 2010, 153–6). The case selection thus avoided selecting similar urban conflicts over peace(s) even if they were stressed as equally important. Other elements in the selection process were inability as well as lack of access. While these perhaps are not selection criteria per se it is still important to acknowledge that every researcher is bound to miss aspects as well as be excluded from certain contexts (Ackerly and True 2010; Bleiker 2003; Cohn 2006). Ethical considerations were also important. Some urban conflicts over peace(s)—e.g. involving people suffering from physical and/or mental trauma or victims fighting for recognition—were not studied; not because they are unimportant, but because their potential negative fallout (cf. D’Costa 2006).21 I will here not elaborate in detail on what urban conflicts over peace(s) were selected. Yet the broader empirical foci in the analytical chapters are the following. Dialogue with people in Mostar guided me to in Chap. 4 focus on how employment opportunities, educational segregation,  and social circles condition how people act in the everyday as well as how people resist and try to reshape the ethnonational world in which they live. Dialogue with people in Mitrovica guided me to in Chap. 5 analyse how the governing attempts of Belgrade, fear (as an emotion), as well as external organisations structure the field of possible acts for people in the city. Dialogue with people in Belfast lastly directed the analyses in Chap. 6 towards the production of ethnonational spaces as well as how the city’s built environment (e.g. walls, houses, and streets) constantly produces divided everyday realities. This selection was not exhaustive (it could never be), but it gave me enough insights to draw principal conclusions about why the postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace. 21  I hardly disapprove of this kind of research. I just believe that speaking with those who are traumatised and/or victims should be done with strict ethical considerations and by researchers who have the necessary training. Since I adhere to the former while lacking the latter I did not engage in this kind of research.

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CHAPTER 4

Contesting Postwar Mostar

We have a system that forces people to either behave or leave. (conversation with local Office of the High Representative (OHR) official 2015) Everything is divided […] and those that [work together across divides] are national traitors. This is not only rhetoric, but people really do think this. (interview with local academic 2014)

In the early 1990s SFRJ came tumbling down. The potential reasons are many. Tito’s death in 1980 created an unstable power vacuum leading to struggles between political elites (Jovic 2001; Vladisavljević 2011). The suppression of public debate over the 1941–45 atrocities that preceded SFRJ’s creation left a Pandora’s box of myths and traumas to be exploited by opportunistic leaders (Dulić 2011; Oberschall 2010). The downfall of the Soviet Union challenged SFRJ’s ideological foundations while the parallelly improving Cold War relations meant that its geostrategic importance diminished with financial support from both blocks drying up (Hupchick 2001; Sunic 1991). The underperforming economy in turn created grievances and blame games with socioeconomic solidarity gradually becoming tied to ethnonational belonging rather than citizenship (Lendvai and Parcell 1991; Nikolaidis 2015; Pavković 1997). These are some dynamics behind SFRJ’s violent breakdown. Hard questions rarely have easy answers. Yet the outcome was that Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia declared independence

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in 1991 with Bosnia-Herzegovina following in 1992. This left SFRJ with only two of its six constitutive republics—Montenegro and Serbia. What followed between those wanting independence and those determined to keep SFRJ together was war. But war followed unevenly. This unevenness was linked to SFRJ’s institutional setup and demographic distribution. While one state, it was organised around the six ethnonational groups rendered constitutive narodi since SFRJ was their “home”1 state (Wilmer 2004; Hromadžić 2015a). The result was that Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenians were given extensive group rights as well as quite self-governing “home republics” in which they constituted the majority (Lampe 2000).2 This meant that when the tensions escalated, each group (except Bosniaks) already controlled political entities with demarcated borders, working institutions, and ethnonational majorities. The infrastructure for breaking SFRJ up into seven states3 was thus a built-in feature of its institutional setup (Jovic 2001; Ramet 2004). SFRJ’s demographic distribution in turn meant that many found themselves exposed on the “wrong” side of the border when the collapse began. Even if almost all six republics had ethnonational majorities, mixing was prevalent and minorities existed everywhere (Lampe 2000; Djokić 2012). This “wrong-sidedness” combined with SFRJ’s ethnonational 1990s—where coexistence was targeted and homogeneity aspired for—meant that when war broke out, ethnonationally mixed areas became its focal points. Slovenia’s war was over in ten days as its small minorities could not establish viable opposition (Lampe 2000). Croatia, with a substantial Serb minority, had an entrenched war between 1991 and 1995 (Magaš and Žanić 2001). Macedonia, where almost a third of the population are Albanians, has been close to war several times and was politically deadlocked as late as 2018 (Danforth 1995; Koneska 2014). Kosovo, with its Albanian majority and Serb minority, was at war in the late 1990s and remains in entrenched political conflict with Serbia (Gusic 2015; King and Mason 2006). 1  If the largest fraction of an ethnonational group lived in SFRJ, it became constitutive. This meant that Montenegrins and Macedonians where narodi whilst Albanians—who outnumbered both but had Albania as “home”—only got the minority label narodnost. 2  The exception was Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in 1991 consisted of 43% Bosniaks, 31% Serbs, 17% Croats, and 6% Yugoslavs (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1992). Bosniaks were thus the only narod that did not have a republic in which they were the majority. 3  Montenegro became independent in 2006 with Serbia parallelly becoming its own state. Kosovo (an autonomous province of Serbia) declared independence in 2008.

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Needless to say, SFRJ’s most diverse republic experienced the worst violence. Bosnia-Herzegovina was ravaged by its 1992–95 war and virtually none of its four million citizens were unaffected. Around 100,000 were killed, 800,000 became refugees, and an additional 1.1 million became internally displaced. Sarajevo endured the longest urban siege in modern history, rape and torture camps were common, and ethnonational cleansing the modus operandi as the imagined postwar orders of things demanded “pure” territories (Mulaj 2005; Tuathail and Dahlman 2011; Wilmer 2004). Everything about the war is still contested as victims/perpetrators, underlying reasons, and blame shift depending on whom one asks. Yet what can be concluded is that when the war ended through the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995, few of the underpinning conflict lines were resolved. Bosnia-Herzegovina was instead socio-­politically ordered to accommodate the incompatible Bosniak, Croat, and Serb ethnonationalisms—leading to institutionalisation of war identities, territories, and politics (Bougarel et al. 2007; Chandler 2000).4 This accommodation of ethnonationalism was seen as unavoidable in the immediate postwar period, yet the assumption that time would result in reconciliation has been proven wrong (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Hromadžić 2015a). While progress has been made, more than 20 years of the DPA has not removed tensions or zero-sum calculations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs (Moore 2013; Merdzanovic 2017). The DPA thus ended the war, but it did not bring peace. Instead it built-in different conflicts over peace(s) into a Bosnia-Herzegovina where the postwar orders of things are as contested as ever.

4.1   Mostar Mostar hardly escaped these conflicts over peace(s). With its diverse history and multiethnic5 composition, it was one of the most progressive cities in SFRJ. Mixed marriages were common, many declared themselves as Yugoslavs, and the city was known for its vibrant economic and cultural life (Hromadžić 2015a; Palmberger 2010). 4  The DPA also stripped Bosnia-Herzegovina of its sovereignty as the OHR was mandated with full executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Overseen by the external Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the OHR is both undemocratically appointed and completely unaccountable to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chandler 2000; Donais 2017; Sebastian-Aparicio 2014). 5  In 1991 Mostar was populated by 43,856 Bosniaks, 43,037 Croats, 23,846 Serbs, 12,768 Yugoslavs, and 3,121 “Other” (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1992).

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Fig. 4.1  The city of Mostar. Except in the city centre—where division goes along the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard [Bulevar on the map]—the Neretva river divides the city into its Bosniak east and Croat west. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map)

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This coexistence unravelled when war broke out. Fighting initially erupted in 1992 between Bosniaks and Croats on one side and Serbs on the other.6 Yet after Serb forces (along with much of the civilian Serbs) were expelled, Bosniak and Croat forces turned on each other in 1993 (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; Burić 2015). The Austro-Hungarian Boulevard—which runs through the city centre—became the frontline and divided the city into a Bosniak east and a Croat west (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Jakiša 2015; Makaš 2012). Thousands of people were killed, many more were ethnically cleansed, and enormous destruction followed (especially to the militarily weaker Bosniak side). Mostar subsequently became the epicentre of the “war within the war” between Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reasons were multiple. Mostar had important weapons manufacturing as well as large concentration of armed forces. It was the fifth largest city in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the centre of Herzegovina.7 It also had stark political importance for Croats since it was both the city in Bosnia-Herzegovina with most Croats and the largest city which the Croat Defence Council (HVO) could hold.8 It therefore emerged as key for Croat survival in Bosnia-Herzegovina.9 Fighting between Bosniaks and Croats raged on until 1994 when a ceasefire was negotiated.10 Yet while the ceasefire ended the war it also marked the beginning of the urban conflicts over peace(s) between the Bosniak and Croat ethnonational peace(s)—the supporters of which have ever since tried to assert ownership over Mostar, create ethnonationally pure spheres, and keep the in-groups cohesive. The following year, the DPA worked in favour of these peace(s) when it inadvertently institutionalised Mostar’s wartime division into Bosniak and Croat halves (Aceska 6  This was part of the state-wide Serb effort to take as much of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible (Lampe 2000; Wilmer 2004; Woodward 1995). 7  Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of the historic regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the borders between them are not exact, Mostar is the centre of Herzegovina. 8  Sarajevo had almost as many Croats but it was five times larger, making Croats by far the smallest group. 9  While many Bosniaks also lived in Mostar, its importance for them was smaller since seven other cities had a larger Bosniak population than Mostar (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1992; see also Palmberger 2016). 10  This was the Washington Agreement, which ended the fighting between Bosniaks and Croats as well as laid the foundation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), the larger (with 51% of the area and almost 2/3 of the population) of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s two entities (Republika Srpska (RS) being the other one).

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2015; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; Yarwood 1999). The initial strategy to end the wartime division and unite the city was met with fierce resistance and ultimately proved unenforceable. Mostar was therefore divided into six decentralised municipalities and one shared city centre in an intricate attempt to “divide the division”. Yet also this strategy failed as it resulted in de facto unifications of the three Bosniak municipalities in the east and the three Croatian ones in the west—with each side continuing to operate parallel to the other. This went on until 2004 when OHR dissolved the parallel institutions and created one city council led by one mayor (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Moore 2013; Vetters 2007). This enforced unification, however, hardly changed things on the ground either and the urban conflicts over peace(s) continued liked they had since 1994. This situation has yet to change. Politics is still exclusively ethnonationalist, institutions still relatively parallel, and strives to dominate “the other” still routine (Carabelli 2018). As one citizen lamented: Everyone wants this to be one [united] city, but for it to be Croatian or Bosniak. They cannot understand that it cannot be like that. That such a possibility does not exist. You cannot move people from here or there. (interview with Abrašević leader 2014)

Thus even if many things have improved on the surface—with rebuilt buildings, vibrant nightlife, and tourism—the socio-political ordering of Mostar continues to be contested between the Bosniak and Croat ethnonational peace(s). Mostar’s current and almost complete political deadlock illustrates this continued contestation. The Mostar City Statute was declared unconstitutional in 2010 and the city banned from having local elections until it was amended. But as consensus across ethnonational divides is needed for any changes—which there never is—nothing has happened for years (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Moore 2013). Citizens have subsequently not elected new representatives since 2008, the mayor operates on a ‘technical mandate’ whose legality is uncertain, and ethnonational elites continue to run everything (interview with local OHR official 2014). Although the city is formally united, it is thus still permeated by urban conflicts over peace(s). Croats control the western part and Bosniaks control the eastern part of the city—just like during the war—with the former frontline serving as the de facto dividing line between two quite parallel systems where Bosniaks and Croats live side-by-side rather than together (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Moore 2013).

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Yet this does not mean that contact is nowhere to be found. There are also those who move across the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard, hang out in mixed crowds, and refuse to lead ethnonationally confined lives—primarily because they support the coexisting peace (Laketa 2016; Moore 2013). This chapter employs negotiating agency in three different lines of analyses to understand how both ethnonational and coexisting acts come about in Mostar’s urban conflicts over peace(s). The first line of analysis uses a feature film to explore the negotiation between Slavko, who wants to act in line with the coexisting peace, and a world that enforces the ethnonational peace(s). The subsequent insights on how difficult it to pursue a coexisting trajectory of acting in an ethnonationalist world are then contextualised in Mostar’s non-fictional everyday realities where two lines of analysis emerge: compliance with as well as resistance towards the ethnonational peace(s) by people supporting the coexisting peace.

4.2   Balancing Between Opposing Peace(s) in Obrana i zaštita There is no way around the reality that postwar Mostar is permeated by urban conflicts over peace(s) that have ordered the city into two parallel socio-political spheres (Laketa 2018; Palmberger 2013a). This tension is neither unique to Mostar nor completely prevailing, but it is there: There is a divide in Mostar, quite huge. […] I see the divides, but I choose to ignore them. To me the city is not divided, I live equally on both sides, but the sole fact that I need to say “on both sides” tells you that the city is divided, because the city where I was born and raised did not have “this” and “that” side. There was only Mostar. We never looked at west and east as something with meaning. […] For me it has always been one city. But realistically […] there are these two parallel systems. You have to be totally ignorant […] not to see that. (interview with school official 2011)

The ethnonational divides that emerged in the war are still predominant in Mostar (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Moore 2013). This does not mean that all people support them. Many people feel alien to and lost in postwar Mostar (Carabelli 2018; Hromadžić 2012). They want to coexist with their neighbours as they once did, but they find themselves in an ethnonational world that makes coexistence difficult and renders it threatening:

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People like you and me are somewhere lost in all this [ethnonationalism], while people who are purely nationalistic and religious, they bloom. (interview with local OHR official 2011)

Obrana i Zaštita is a feature film depicting the urban conflicts over peace(s) between the ethnonational peace(s) and the coexisting one. Taking place in contemporary Mostar, it follows Slavko (a Croat) and his struggles to navigate in the city, particularly his agony over whether to attend his best friend Đulaga’s (a Bosniak) funeral or not. The love for his friend compels Slavko to go, but doing so and crossing Mostar’s ethnonational divisions might give him problems. Slavko is already accused of being more ‘on their side than on our side’ and in his current economic hardship it is important to not jeopardize vital relations. Slavko’s main worry is the powerful Dragan (a character never seen) finding out that Slavko went to Đulaga’s funeral and therefore refusing to help him: Slavko and his wife Milena are sitting in their kitchen. Slavko: When is the funeral? Milena: At three. Slavko: I have to go and see Dragan. He is not picking up my calls. Maybe he is crossed with me? Maybe someone told him something about me? I do not know. We will see about the funeral, we will talk. […] Slavko: Who is going to the funeral? We should see who goes by car, it is far to walk. I do not know, I will see what I will do. Dragan is not picking up my calls, why is he not picking up my calls?

This tension about whether “to go or not to go” captures the urban conflict over peace(s) of Mostar. While his preferred trajectory of acting is in line with the coexisting peace, Slavko exists within the ethnonationalist world of Mostar that imposes in-group cohesion and parallelism (Jakiša 2015). This conundrum is summarized in the film synopsis: When his old friend […] Đulaga dies, Slavko is aware that he should attend the funeral. However, if his neighbours see how he is being friendly with “the other side” he might get into trouble. On the other hand, his wife firmly believes that he has to do the right thing—and he knows this in his heart. If he does not go to pay his respects, he will fail as a friend, husband, and human being. (Obrana i Zaštita 2013, my translation)

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What follows from this tension are contradicting trajectories of acting as Slavko acts in line with both the Croat ethnonationalist peace and the coexisting one. Below I analyse the negotiations between Slavko and the ethnonationalist world of Mostar that underpin these acts. The Ethnonationalist World of Mostar The world in which Slavko exists is dominated by the Croat11 ethnonationalist peace, whose supporters see continued existence of Croats in BosniaHerzegovina as dependent on in-group cohesion and self-­ governance (interview with Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) official 2009). This is because coexistence is equated with minority exposure to majority domination—locally termed as majorizacija. Peace is subsequently seen as contingent on ethnonational groups existing in parallel ethnocratic political systems away from “the other” (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016). The supporters of the Croat ethnonationalist peace therefore also see a third Croat political entity as imperative (Subotic 2016; Moore 2013).12 This peace takes an interesting turn in Mostar. Immediately after the 1994 ceasefire, Croat parties (mainly HDZ BiH) wanted to maintain the war divisions whereas Bosniak parties (mainly SDA)13 wanted to reunite the city. This tension was about demographics. Early on Croats feared that they would be outnumbered by Bosniaks and therefore wanted minority protection, through Mostar’s division, in place (interview with local OHR official 2011). Today these positions—in tandem with demographics— have shifted. Now HDZ BiH wants to unite Mostar and have no power-­ sharing mechanisms in the city, whilst SDA are against it and demand minority protection (Tuathail 2015; Zdeb 2017). Paradoxically, these Mostarian positions are diametrically opposed to state-level positions: In various forms, SDA more or less strives for a civic state with as few mechanisms as possible, but when they negotiate in Mostar, they demand ethnic quotas and protective mechanisms. Similarly, on higher levels HDZ BiH 11  Although the ethnonationalist Bosniak peace is not addressed in this section, it is almost identical to the Croat one. 12  From a Croat perspective, the Serbs have “their” (i.e. RS) and the Bosniaks have “their” (i.e. FBiH, where they are about 80% majority) entity to protect them while Croats lack anything similar (Moore 2013; Tuathail 2015). 13  HDZ BiH and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the two main Croat and Bosniak parties during the war, have remained dominant (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).

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demands balance, parity, but are against it in Mostar. (Mirsad Behram as quoted in Božović 2015, my translation)

The line of argument is nevertheless clear: coexistence is impossible and Croats need to govern themselves to survive. The film subsequently depicts Slavko in the ethnonational world of Mostar where in-group belonging and loyalty with ethnonational parties often trumps everything else (Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Moore 2013; Mujkić 2007). A world in which employment, economic favours, or welfare rights often are inaccessible if one does not pursue the ethnonationalist trajectories of acting (interview with OHR official 2011). This clearly plays into Slavko’s hesitance about going to the funeral. Slavko is in a dire economic situation and his plans to get out of it seem entirely dependent on his štela14 with Dragan, whose helpfulness in turn presumes that Slavko acts in line with the Croat ethnonationalist peace (Jakiša 2015).15 Other things in this ethnonationalist world discourage Slavko as well. Some ordinary Croats disapprove of contact with “that side” (conversation with citizen 2011). Slavko therefore fears that if his contacts across the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard stretch beyond what is considered acceptable, he might be ostracised or labelled a traitor. Personal security also plays a role. Just like some Croats disapprove of contact with “the other”, some Bosniaks do as well. If people like Slavko have the misfortune to be identified by the wrong people as a Croat in eastern Mostar or a Bosniak in western Mostar, they could get in trouble (conversation with local OHR official 2011).16 The fictional world in which Slavko lives in thus effectively reflects the world of non-fictional Mostar. Slavko’s Coexisting Trajectory of Acting Slavko’s preferred trajectory of acting, however, is in line with the coexisting peace—the supporters of which envision a Mostar where diversity is valued, real-life issues (e.g. employment, education, and healthcare) are 14  Local expression meaning “under the table” relations with people in a position to help with something one needs—e.g. getting a doctor’s appointment expediently or being hired instead of more qualified applicants. 15  While never disclosed, it is clear that Dragan is a high-ranking member of HDZ BiH. 16  Mostar is very safe (interview with Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) activist focusing on transparency 2014). The ethnonational tensions, however, mean that radicals might pose a threat. Even those not agreeing with ethnonationalism use caution when moving around in some parts of the city or at night (interview with local OHR official 2011).

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prioritised, and ethnonational identities are downplayed for more inclusive ones. Those supporting this peace argue that coexistence was successful during SFRJ, is successful in other parts of the world, and is possible in postwar Mostar as well (Kappler 2014; Moore 2013). Slavko consequently sees coexistence as something to cherish. This is evident in certain scenes of the film. When Đulaga’s coffin is carried, Slavko is struck by sorrow. His sadness is poignant and his eyes are filled with tears. His sense of loss is exposed even more after the funeral when Slavko walks through the cemetery, visibly devastated. This slow walk alludes to trajectory of acting he prefers. In a different world, he would without hesitation have stood by his friend’s family throughout their shared mourning (Jakiša 2015). Contradicting Acts: Slavko Sneaks Around to Bury Đulaga Slavko is thus torn between two peace(s) that involve two incompatible trajectories of acting. While the world of Mostar is mostly ethnonationalist, Slavko’s is not. This effectively means that he needs to constantly negotiate between the ethnonationalist world and his preferred coexisting trajectory of acting. No one is guarding the Austrian-Hungarian Boulevard to stop Slavko from crossing and no one is forcing him to go at gunpoint either (Jakiša 2015; Hromadžić 2013; 2015a). Slavko is free to choose any trajectory of acting. Yet all choices are followed by consequences. It is exactly this kind of tension that negotiating agency is useful for: understanding the constrained yet undetermined negotiation that underpins everyday acts in the postwar city. When employing negotiating agency, it becomes clear that Slavko’s agony is not between going and not going to the funeral. Slavko wants to go. The ethnonational peace(s) permeating the world of Mostar undeniably constrain Slavko’s everyday life, but he seems largely unconcerned with the ideas of Croat unity and survival. Instead he seems lost in an ethnonational world that is not his, a world that does not let him coexist like he once did. In a fight with Milena, he reveals how hard he finds it to navigate postwar Mostar: ‘I no longer know who or where I am [in this postwar setting]’. The agony is subsequently about being seen attending the funeral rather than if it is right or not. The negotiation underpinning his acts revolves around: ‘what kind of trouble can I get into if I am seen burying my friend?’. To a friend, he reveals that he is afraid Dragan will think badly of him if he is seen with Bosniaks:

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Slavko: I am afraid to call him all the time, of him thinking I am bothering him. Because he told me that he would call me. Friend: I totally understand you. Slavko: So I do not know what to do. Friend: But maybe he is busy? Slavko: Listen, you know what scares me the most? Friend: What? Slavko: I am afraid that someone has told him something about me. That someone has talked against me to him. Friend: Who? Slavko: Who. Friend: Srećko? Slavko: Let us say Srećko. Friend: What would Srećko say? Slavko: Do you know what Srećko told me the other day? Friend: What? Slavko: You, Slavko, are more on their side than on our side. That is what he told me.

The same fear is expressed in a discussion with Milena about going to the funeral: Milena: What does it matter, let us walk. It is not far. Slavko: Listen, in this situation that I am in at the moment, I do not know if it is clever to go to the funeral. Until I settle this thing with Dragan, you understand?

In the end, Slavko’s love for his friend outweighs eventual risks. So he buries Đulaga and returns home. Slavko thus acts in line with the coexisting peace. But as the agony was about being seen doing so, he acts in line with the ethnonationalist peace(s) as well. Before, during, and after the funeral Slavko consistently takes the ethnonationalist world of Mostar into consideration. He takes detours into alleys to not be detected when going east and he tries avoiding Đulaga’s family home after the ceremony to minimise his exposure. He also refuses being driven home by Đulaga’s daughter, Zehra. As Slavko and Milena are old, Zehra sees it as her obligation to take them home. But for Slavko this makes a bad situation worse: instead of risking being seen on “that side”, he suddenly risks being seen with a Bosniak on “that side”. An unsettling scene follows where Slavko makes up reasons for why Zehra cannot drive them home. He states that they do not want to trouble her, that the doctor told him to walk more, and that she is needed at home today. As Slavko had previously complained about

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the long walk to the funeral, it is obvious that it is not the ride but about being seen with Zehra that is the problem. Milena’s interpretation of his behaviour supports the analysis that Slavko is affected by the ethnonationalist world, making him act in line with both peace(s): At home after the funeral. Slavko: You are crossed with me about something, right? Milena: I? Slavko: Yes, you. Milena: What would I be crossed with you about? Slavko: If it is because of the funeral, just tell me. Milena: I am not crossed with you at all. Slavko: No? Milena: No. Slavko: Did I perhaps not behave myself properly there? Milena: You behaved properly. Slavko: I behaved properly? Milena: Yes. Slavko: I was a little tense. Do you know what was spinning around in my head? You know how much I cherish that family. How much…but if you are crossed with me, just tell me. Milena: It is all fine. Milena leaves the room. Slavko goes after her, talks to her. She keeps quiet during the entire conversation, visibly upset. Slavko: I will go and visit them. How does that sound? To me Đulaga was… [he smiles]. Mura [Đulaga’s wife] as well. How cute isn’t Zehra? I will go. I have no problem with that. Ah, the weather. Is it raining? Time passes. Milena keeps ignoring the circling Slavko. Slavko (screaming): Do you hear what I’m asking you?! Milena: Of course, I’m not deaf. Slavko: All I do to…do you know all that I have on my mind?! I no longer know who or where I am! Milena: They are like family to me! Slavko: Did I say that they are not like family?! Why are you making things up?! Milena: You behaved like they have scabies! Slavko: I went there, sat down, talked to people! They were glad I was there!

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Milena: How did you sit? Slavko: How I sat? Like I’m sitting now! Milena: You sat like on needles! Slavko: Why do you think I sat on needles? Milena: When my dad died they were here first. Slavko: Who is talking about that now? I did it for you! Because I love you! Milena: Shame on you. Slavko: Thank you! Shame on you! Milena: You know what I am going to say to you? You got scared that Dragan would find out that you were at the funeral. That is that.

Slavko thus acts in contradicting ways. He acts in line with the coexisting peace, which is about resisting the ethnonational world in which he lives. He maintains friendships, goes to Đulaga’s funeral, and dreams of a past where his preferred lifestyle was norm and not exception. Yet he also stands on the frontlines of the ethnonationalist peace(s). It might be a fight he is disgusted by and reluctant to take part in, but he takes part nonetheless. He is secretive with his friendships, hides at the funeral, and bribes Dragan with whiskey. Slavko’s acts thus change according to circumstances. He rejects ethnonationalism yet seeks its help, privately desires coexistence yet publicly does little to advance it, breaks as well as reinforces the socio-political division of the city. This is nothing strange but follows from constantly having to relate to the ethnonationalist world of Mostar. His seemingly incoherent acts are the result of constantly ongoing negotiations through which he tries to live his life as best he can in a city where urban conflicts over peace(s) rage on.

4.3   Acting in Line with the Ethnonationalist Peace(s) to Stay Employed and Educated Obrana i Zaštita might be a film, yet it reflects everyday life in Mostar. I have been told the same story many times. People in Mostar with who prefer coexisting trajectories of acting are forced to negotiate their acts with an ethnonationalist world—much like Slavko. [The film] very well describes the [real] situation in Mostar, and also actors from both sides of the city act in it. […] It very well paints the picture in the city […] in the sense that people constantly feel that someone is there, that they have to ask someone, to wait for someone. (interview with local Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) official 2014)

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There is nothing that forces people to act in certain ways. Yet the ethnonational world of Mostar skews the constant negotiations subjects have to undertake towards trajectories of acting in line with the Bosniak and Croat ethnonational peace(s). In dialogue with people, two aspects of the ethnonational world of Mostar emerged as highly crucial in this process: the ethnonational grip on employment and the segregated education system. Economic Shackles: Only Party Members Employed The issue to most of us is being able to put a roof over our heads and food on our tables. Yet in postwar settings these things are not easy to obtain, effectively making socioeconomic survival key to understanding how everyday acts come about (Addison and Brück 2009; Berdal and Wennmann 2010; Pickering 2007). This is evident in Mostar, where the ethnonational grip on employment—and thus people’s socioeconomic realities—skews also people who prefer the coexisting peace towards acts in line with the ethnonational peace(s).  he Ethnonational World of Employing “Our People” T The economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina has yet to recover. In the immediate postwar years, external aid and high public spending—which runs on chronic deficits—managed to restore some of its prewar economic standard (Mujkić 2007; Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2014). Yet external aid and internal deficits were unable make the economy self-sufficient, as became clear as the latest economic crisis reached Bosnia-­Herzegovina when external funds had dried up and public spending needed reduction. The current economic situation for the average citizen is dire with staggering unemployment and failing public institutions (Horvat and Štiks 2015; Palmberger 2010). While attracting tourists and having some well-functioning companies, Mostar has hardly been spared these economic hardships. The first time I visited Mostar I was told that ‘the economic situation is very hard and people are barely surviving’ (interview with school official 2011). When I met up with the same person three years later, little had changed: The economic situation has not been worse in a long time. Work for young people is non-existent. A lot of people are leaving just for economic reasons. They cannot find any work. I have the feeling that my generation is the last one that got educated, got a job, and went about our lives. That it was possible. But now these youngsters have nothing. (interview with former school official 2014)

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Mostarians are thus increasingly desperate for employment and stable incomes (interview with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014). This effectively means that those in control of whatever jobs do exist can exert great influence (Donais 2003; Mujkić 2007; Pugh 2016). In Mostar this control is largely in the hands of ethnonational political parties, who dominate the employment market through official bodies (e.g. schools, hospitals, and city institutions), public companies, as well as “ties”17 between politicians and private employers (interview with OHR official 2011; see also Divjak and Pugh 2008; Kurtović and Hromadžić 2017). This control—combined with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s corrupt institutions and almost non-existent separation of powers—means that the ethnonational political parties can distribute jobs according to will (interviews with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014; local OHR official 2014; politician 2011; see also Arsenijević 2014; Mujanović 2018). The subsequent result is that most available jobs in Mostar are gained through contacts that presuppose loyalty to the ethnonational peace(s): You cannot get a job in any other way anymore. You cannot. Not in any opening. If you do not have contacts that get things done for you, you cannot get employed. (interview with local academic 2014)

This does not apply only for highly qualified jobs. Even ‘to become a cleaner you need to have someone pushing you through. You need štela for everything. Every single job’ (conversation with teacher 2015). It is practically impossible to find a job if one lacks connections in ethnonational political parties and/or deviates from the ethnonational peace(s). It is all filled, and if there exists [jobs], it is absolutely only distributed to party members […] if you are not a member of a party, you cannot get a job. (interview with local OSCE official 2014)

This means that those who prefer the coexisting peace and despise the ethnonational ones often are left with the crude choice of pursuing coexisting trajectories of acting or securing employment (interview with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014). Having lost her job and being 17  The dominance of ethnonationalism means that private companies often are either owned by, affiliated with, or dependent on those in political positions (interviews with city official 2014; NGO activist focusing on development 2014). Štela with the political parties can thus result in employment with private companies as well (see Brković 2017).

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unable to find another, one interviewee told me how she reluctantly agreed to have something arranged by a relative, who went through high-­profile ethnonational contacts and quickly got her a new position. Every person at this state institution had found their job through ethnonational contacts, something they spoke openly about. She lamented that people at her new job were not doing anything, had bought their diplomas, and/or were unqualified. But as ‘nothing other than štela matters’, these things were irrelevant for employment. Instead positions in the hierarchy correlate not with the competences of workers but with their contacts—i.e. better contacts equal better positions (conversation with state official 2015).18 Two statements about on this employment-corruption-­ethnonationalism nexus are worth quoting at length: All political parties that prefer the national have very strong influences in employment, in placing certain directors, who in turn reproduce certain structures […] Look, we had these floods, a pure catastrophe for those people. Now enormous amounts of resources will be put in some funds, and there is already some fighting over who will become directors over these funds. Why? It is a hard job. An ungrateful job. I also work a similar job. It is hard when you have to help people and are forced to pick out of two that are very bad off, which one of them is worse off [because you do not have recourses to help both]. But wherever there is big money, people fight over the positions. Why? Because some of these funds will disappear […]. It does not even have to be illegally, but in certain commissions that will visit these places: ‘I can put my people there, and they will in turn make decisions that will preference my people, who in turn will vote for me’, and so on. (interview with City Council official 2014) They [the ethnonational elites] are in power for such a long time that they can make conditions that people will not get jobs or money if they are against the party. They can deny people jobs because they are not members of the party. They are so deep into vital infrastructural and societal companies 18  I have heard the exact same story from so many people. From external officials (interview with OHR official 2011), NGO activists focusing on transparency (interview 2014), people who have found their job through contacts (conversation with state official 2015), city administrators (interview with City Council official 2014), local staff in external missions (conversation with local OSCE official 2015), and opposition politicians (interview 2011). There are exceptions but in general ethnonational corruption is systematic (Arsenijević 2014; Belloni and Strazzari 2014; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; Brković 2017; Divjak and Pugh 2008; Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2014; Kurtović 2016; Pugh 2016).

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and institutions. Knowledge and hard work is not valued, [what matters is] more if you are or are not a member of “my” or “their” party, and then people do not have any strength to resist this. (interview with local academic 2011)

Mostarians thus depend on ethnonational parties for their socioeconomic survival (Brković 2017; Mujkić 2007; Tuathail 2015). This dependency creates strong patronage links in which acts in line with the ethnonational peace(s) are “qualifications” for employment (interview with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014).  egotiation: People Doing What It Takes to Survive N The ethnonational dominance over employment clearly influences how acts come about. Employment is no marginal thing; it is how people survive. When negotiating their acts with the ethnonationalist world of Mostar, people who prefer coexisting trajectories of acting therefore calculate with the risk of becoming unemployed—or not getting employed to begin with—if not following the ethnonationalist peace(s) (interviews with local OHR official 2014; NGO activist focusing on development 2014). Many want to act differently, yet they know that such acts will happen in an ethnonationalist world where non-compliance might lead to unemployment (Brković 2017; Donais 2003; Kostovicova and Bojicic-­ Dzelilovic 2014). Some of the encounters below illustrate how these tensions are negotiated. One interviewee working on integrating education in segregated schools described the problem his NGO faces: Everything in the city has politics behind it and every head [of a company or institution] is indebted to their party for their position. Through this domination of the city, they [the ethnonational elites] reach every sphere of people’s everyday life. A head of school will, for instance, discriminate in favour of teachers belonging to their party. Even if we find a teacher that is willing to participate in certain interethnic initiatives, they are scared off and threatened by their co-workers and bosses, making them fear to lose their job, which would mean an empty fridge at home and risking one’s whole existence. (interview with NGO activist focusing on educational integration 2011)

When this NGO finds teachers willing to work towards integrated ­education—which it rarely does because schools mostly employ teachers supporting segregation—the recruited teachers are forced to negotiate

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their potential coexisting trajectories of acting with an ethnonationalist world that disapproves of such acts. The result is that they rarely act in line with the coexisting peace (interview with NGO activist focusing on educational integration 2011). One local academic added to this analysis, claiming that coexisting acts are hard to muster as most people depend on the “goodwill” of their ethnonationally aligned employers. People feel forced to act in line with the ethnonationalist peace(s) to not risk unemployment: People accept this because they are forced to do so. They are forced, because otherwise you have nothing else to live off. And now you are supposed to speak against this ruling structure, which has employed at least one person in your family? Like that, fear slowly emerges. People are in debt, salaries are not given regularly, they are low, and life is rather expensive in relation to people’s salaries. And then a big psychosis emerges, no one dares to talk, and you have this notion: ‘be silent’. Just like Dubioza [Collective] sings: ‘keep quiet and endure’. (interview with local academic 2014)

This local academic listed numerous examples in the “Croat” university19 in which people who had pursued coexisting trajectories of acting had been disciplined. One colleague “discovered” as Serb lost his job within a week. Another whose teaching on the war deviated from the ethnonational version got a pay cut. A professor who had spoken out against HDZ BiH leader Dragan Č ović was beaten up in his office and received no faculty support. She told me these things in complete disgust. Yet when negotiating with the ethnonational world in which she inescapably lives, the result is that she also ‘keeps quiet and endures’. Speaking up might get her fired and there are no other alternatives in her line of work (interview 2014; conversation 2011; 2014). Another interviewee who prefers the coexisting peace was utterly grateful for being employed out of reach for the ethnonationalist peace(s) as otherwise he too would be forced to pursue a trajectory of acting he does not support: I […] have avoided being dragged into all these political games. Very few people can avoid that. Many owe their job and life standard to political parties. There is a lot of nepotism and corruption. […] I have friends that had to become members of parties they do not agree with ideologically only to get a job, which is very sad, but in the fight for sole survival one has to understand this, and people are prepared to abandon their ideals. People  Mostar unsurprisingly has one “Bosniak” and one “Croat” university.

19

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that are not satisfied are simply quiet, because speaking out might cost them [their jobs]. The general political passivity here [in Mostar] is explained by this, people just live their lives and try not to meddle or get involved. (interview with teacher at an integrated school 2011)

The interviewee whose relative got her employed also told me that her new colleagues feared that deviation from the ethnonational peace(s) might get them fired, a fear that she now also shared. She had previously been employed where support for the coexisting peace was presupposed. Yet now—when her job situation was the complete opposite—she too felt the need to constrain herself and not speak against ethnonationalism at work, a self-censorship that did not come easy yet had to be done. She felt that she had no choice but to confine her coexisting acts to private spheres outside of the ethnonationalist gaze (conversation 2015). The perhaps starkest example of how dominant the ethnonational peace(s) are can be found in the protests that shook Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 2014. They began when citizens in the city of Tuzla took to the streets to demand compensation for unpaid salaries as well as protest against stagnant corruption, flawed privatisation processes, high unemployment, and a rundown economy. Although starting non-violently, police and protesters soon clashed resulting in injured people and property damage (Arsenijević 2014; Kurtović 2015; Mujkić 2015). Even if these were local events, the expressed discontent in Tuzla hardly is. It is rather omnipresent across Bosnia-Herzegovina (Horvat and Štiks 2015; Mujanović 2018). The protests therefore quickly spread to other cities. This included Mostar, where the protests emerged as urban conflicts over peace(s) between the ethnonationalist and coexisting peace(s). The protests took a violent turn also in Mostar. Several public buildings as well as the headquarters of both HDZ BiH and SDA were attacked. Police cars were destroyed, protesters and police officers hurt, and many were arrested. These protests largely resonated with the coexisting peace as protesters lamented ethnonational politics as benefiting the corrupt elites while dividing the poverty-struck citizenry (Arsenijević 2014; Hasić and Karabegović 2018). It was argued that the only way forward is to work together for the benefit of all (interviews with local academic 2014; local OHR official 2014; NGO activist focusing on culture 2014; see also Kurtović and Hromadžić 2017; Lai 2016). Protesters in Mostar thus took to the streets together to demand better socioeconomic conditions and protest against the prevalent ethnonational mismanagement of Mostar:

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I do not know what happened [in other places]. You cannot trust the media here. If you did not see it with your own eyes, it is hard to give an opinion. But in Mostar, it was a classical social unrest. I was here, watching at the face of the scene the burnings and the people who participated. It was a classical social unrest. The fact that 52 Bosniaks and 38 Croats were arrested tells you that it was not scripted. I saw it, my neighbour, the woman from the bank office, the woman from the mall, a couple of students. You saw people you might bump into in town every day. People that came, pensioners with bloody eyes, hungry. (interview with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014)

Fig. 4.2  The result of protesting. An official building attacked during the protests. (Picture taken by author in 2014)

This does not mean that the protesters abandoned ethnonational identities or forgot grievances regarding the war (Kurtović 2015; Horvat and Štiks 2015). Yet ethnonational belonging was not emphasised as ‘the whole city was there [to protest]’ (interview with local OSCE official 2014). The protesters instead blamed the ethnonational peace(s) for many

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of their experienced hardships (interview with local OHR official 2014). The focus on everyday issues and needs that connect people across ethnonational divides—like employment, welfare, and corruption—effectively resonated with the coexisting peace (interview with NGO activist focusing on culture 2014). It was thus not “Bosniaks against Croats”, but disadvantaged and frustrated citizens against corrupt elites: They [the protesters] were claimed to be people from the outside who were paid to bring mayhem to Mostar—no, they were not. I was there. These are people, women and men, who came out protesting spontaneously. (interview with local academic 2014)

These protests did not go unchallenged for long. Perceiving them as an existential threat, the ethnonational elites soon acted to change the world with which the suddenly protesting Mostarians negotiated their coexisting acts. The grip on people’s survival through the employment market soon emerged as central to this endeavour. People were photographed or identified by street level affiliates and then threatened with unemployment (interview with local OSCE official 2014; NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014). The result was that many started fearing that they might lose their jobs if continuing to protest: Most people are paralysed, scared, blackmailed to not do that kind of work. After the protests in February, it was crystal clear that those in power are prepared to use everything in their power to remain. […] In that moment when their positions are threatened, they will do everything […] You know how? Well, someone in your family works, it is an old story how people are bought. If someone in your family works for some state institutions, then people defend that system because it works for them. And then, people that were on these protests, that participated in rioting, people that made themselves heard, they simply called them over the phone, sent them text messages and so on: ‘Watch what you are doing’ [or] ‘Where do you think you are?’ (interview with NGO activist focusing on development 2014)

One protester described how people were scared by the ethnonational peace(s); how also she feared being identified and subsequently losing her job: [People] came out protesting spontaneously. But fear was forced into their bones…they jailed them, beat them, fined them. Anyone they saw. I had to hide, I was shaking like this [shows trembling hands]. (interview 2014)

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This is the modus operandi of employment in Mostar. People know that acting in line with the coexisting peace might bring unemployment in a legal system where socioeconomically disadvantaged people have few actual rights (interview with OSCE official 2011; see also Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2014; Mujanović 2018; Pugh 2016). Those who prefer coexistence therefore largely assess their situation as: “either I act in line with the ethnonational peace(s), or else I might not have bread on my table”. In the subsequent negotiation between pursuing a coexisting trajectory of acting and putting food on their table, most people u ­ nsurprisingly choose to ‘keep quiet and endure’ (interview with local academic 2014). Enforcing Educational Segregation Apart from employment there was one other thing people kept bringing up: education. If they were concerned with the ethnonationalist status quo in Mostar, the education system was lamented. This is hardly surprising since education is central in shaping society and therefore holds significant potency to nurture or dismiss ideas of ethnonationalism and coexistence (Hromadžić 2008; Pantić 2015). This importance is illustrated by changes to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s educational system between 1992 and 1995: During the war […] the educational system became fragmented along ethnonational lines. Almost immediately, education was turned into a tool for the nationalist political control and advancement of nationalist ideologies. Children began to be educated according to […] the ethnicity to which they belonged. (Hromadžić 2008, 544)

Education remains contested to this day. Mostar is no exception, where the education system is central to its urban conflicts over peace(s) and effectively skews everyday acts of students, parents, and teachers towards the ethnonational peace(s) by eliminating coexisting alternatives.  he World of Ethnonational Education T The ethnonational logic of the DPA hardly spared the education system (Palmberger 2010; Wimmen 2004). Schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina are today ethnonationally divided with little to no contact between either teachers or students. The curricula are also explicitly Bosniak/Croat/Serb,

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are taught in different “languages”20 in “regular” subjects (e.g. math, physics, or biology), and teach mutually excluding versions in “national”21 subjects (Palmberger 2010; Torsti and Ahonen 2009; Vojvoda 2015). This means that three incompatible and non-scientific versions of the war(s) are being taught to largely monoethnic groups of students who hear only one side of the story: Our schools really avoid presenting a proper picture, a normal and balanced one. There is no universal concept [of the war], everybody can choose what to bring up, which basically means that there is propaganda in the schools. (interview with teacher at an integrated school 2011)

Thus while the DPA ‘brought an end to the shelling of school buildings […] it also reinforced the fragmentation […] in education created during the war’ (Hromadžić 2013, 111). This segregation effectively resonates with ethnonational peace(s), in which segregated schools are envisioned to preserve in-group cohesion while integrated schools are feared to erode it (interview with HDZ BiH politician 2009; see also Hromadžić 2008). Mostar is no exception as its ethnonationally segregated schools teach different curricula to almost completely segregated student bodies in schools that reside either ‘in the west or the east’ (interview with Mostar educational officer 2011).22 The segregation is not entirely complete. There are a few schools that have ‘two schools under one roof ’—one for Bosniak students and one for Croat students. These schools have completely different teaching staffs, curricula, and student bodies but are housed in one building where students either have different classrooms or use the same classrooms at different times. There is also the ‘one school two [ethnonational] curricula’ model practised in the Old Gymnasium that has some integration as well as the English-based United World College in Mostar (UWCiM). Yet these are outliers in an otherwise completely segregated education system where ‘schools [are]  These “languages” (Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian) are at most different dialects whose speakers understand each other perfectly—despite the postwar politicisation of language. I choose to call them Yugoslav languages. 21  These are subjects with ethnonational incompatibilities, such as history or religion. 22  Those that live on “the other side”—e.g. Bosniaks in the west—often send their children to an ethnonationally corresponding school (interview with Mostar educational officer 2011). 20

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imagined as primary sites in which ideas about (ethno)national loyalties are disseminated’ (Hromadžić 2015c, 431).23  egotiation: Hard to Coexist in Segregated Schools N This educational setup emerges as problematic for those in Mostar wanting an integrated education that cherishes diversity, teaches without biases, and builds an open and diverse society (interviews with head of school 2011; Mostar education officer 2011; teacher at an integrated school 2011). Through negotiating agency it becomes apparent that it is almost impossible to act in line with the coexisting peace in Mostar. Educational division is namely not something that can be transgressed in the same way one drinks coffee on “that side” or maintains prewar Bosniak/Croat friends (interview with OHR official 2011; see Hromadžić 2008; Pantić 2015). Education is organised around large collectives, regulated by law, and expensive to operate. It needs student bodies to teach, verifications to be accepted, and money to pay for school buildings, teachers, and equipment (Hromadžić 2015a; Pantić 2015). If there is no institutional support for integrated education—which there is not—students, parents, and teachers are left with whatever choices the world provides (interviews with head of school 2011; Old Gymnasium teacher 2011; parent 2011). This means that the vast majority of those preferring coexisting trajectories of acting lack practical educational options through which they might resist the ethnonational peace(s). There are next to no integrated schools that offer unbiased education and where students not only can but are encouraged to meet “the other”: The education system makes it impossible for students to get to know one another […] for fifteen years we educate divided kids in an atmosphere that after the war does not have any understanding and tolerance for others that are different. Especially for those in the same city, which are as invisible enemies. How these generations are to behave in the future is unclear. The city as a city is sick, it is a sick city. A city connects people, economy, culture, but here you do not have that. You have two cities. (interview with head of school 2011) 23  There is also exclusion. Minorities in Mostar—e.g. Serbs or Jews—have to choose between attending Bosniak or Croatian schools. The postwar education system has thus ‘left pan-, non-, and trans-ethnic forms of peoplehood and mixing politically unrecognized and socially discouraged’ (Hromadžić 2015b, 887).

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Instead people in Mostar can only choose which ethnonational (Bosniak/ Croat) curriculum they want to follow, teach, or enrol one’s children in (Björkdahl 2015; Hromadžić 2015c; Pantić 2015). One outburst illustrates the practical difficulties to avoid acting in line with the ethnonational peace(s). I was drinking coffee when a person sitting just behind me started telling his out-of-town visitors about the situation in Mostar. He initially lashed out at the corruption and the ‘fucked up situation in this fucking country’, but soon turned to education: They have created a fucked-up system. My kid went to a school on the [Bosniak] side, and one day he came home and told me he was going to Srebrenica […]. I said: ‘you are doing what? Oh no, you are not!’. Don’t take me wrong, I believe in God and believe like it says in the Bible that the murder of one single person is genocide on all of us. But he was in the third grade of primary school. Should he be fucking traumatised at that age? I believe they should go to Srebrenica, but in secondary school. So […] I took my kid out of that school and put him in a Croat school […]. On the fifth day, he came home and wanted some help with a math assignment. I was like, ‘sure’. But then I looked at it and I could not understand what it was about!24 Those fucking idiots are making sure that the kids won’t be able to understand each other. Look at us, you are from Split [in Croatia], we have no problems communicating. But these kids are 100 meters away from each other, and they sometimes have difficulties understanding one another […] they have made it so fucking hard to live normally. (overheard conversation 2015)25

This quotation captures the everyday reality of many Mostarians preferring the coexisting peace. Frustrated with one ethnonational (Bosniak) school, the father above only had another (Croat) ethnonational alternative. This binary choice has led many to fear that the education system will irreversibly normalise division and indoctrinate future generations into hating each other (conversation with local OHR official 2015). As one local OSCE official put it: 24  Since Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian are more or less the same language, the modus operandi within the ethnonational peace(s) has become to revitalise historic words as well as make new ones up in order to make “us” different from “them” (Vojvoda 2015). The effect is that students are taught diverging words as well as given lower grades for using other “languages”—e.g. using avijon instead of zrakoplov (both meaning airplane). 25  I was working at the moment and, for better or worse, eavesdropped and wrote everything down as they spoke.

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I very well know that these “other people” do not have tails or horns, they are no threat. But today in schools, especially where ethnic cleansing [has] been present, as in Mostar, people grow up in monoethnic communities. These generations do not know each other. They do not visit the places of “others”. They have more knowledge of Spain and Greece than the rest of their own country. “The others” are seen as enemies, because the whole society makes them believe that. There is no getting to know each other. (interview 2011)

For people who prefer the coexisting peace all preferable options have thus been eliminated (interviews with former school official 2014; head of school 2011; teacher at an integrated school 2011). Even those who completely disregard ethnonationalism and have no problems being ­ exposed as “traitors” simply have no other choice other than ethnonational schools (Hromadžić 2011; Laketa 2018; Pantić 2015). They are forced to participate in an educational system that reproduces division: In every sphere there is a wish to divide, from kindergartens, schools, everything, the kids are brought up to be divided. […] In 20–30 years when we are dead, then there will be no people left who know what it is, this common united life. (interview with local OHR official 2011)

4.4   Coexisting Acts in Education and Culture This above picture emerges as quite bleak, at least from the perspective of the coexisting peace. The urban conflict over peace(s) in Mostar seem to be almost settled in favour of—although not between—the Bosniak and Croat ethnonationalist peace(s). This, however, does not mean that no one pursues coexisting trajectories of acting. The ethnonational world has multiple pockets in which the coexisting peace is supported and the ethnonationalist peace(s) are resisted. This section explores how high-school students at the Old Gymnasium as well as activists running the cultural centre Abrašević negotiate their coexisting acts. When Ethnonationally Segregated Students Coexist In 2004 the eastern Bosniak and western Croat gymnasiums26 in Mostar were “unified” under shared management and relocated into the previously bombed out and newly renovated Old Gymnasium27 at the Austro-­  Gymnasium is an “elite” secondary school form.  Where the Mostarian gymnasium had been located before the war.

26 27

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Hungarian Boulevard (Björkdahl 2015; Wimmen 2004). This turned the Old Gymnasium into one of the most integrated schools in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. Yet this speaks more to the extent of educational segregation in Bosnia-Herzegovina than to the level of integration at the Old Gymnasium, which operates according to its ‘one school, two [ethnonational] programs’ concept (conversation with Old Gymnasium teacher 2015). “Unification” did thus not make the school some coexisting pocket where students were encouraged to reconnect across ethnonational divides (Hromadžić 2008, 542; Pantić 2015). It rather scaled down the urban conflict over peace(s) in Mostar to the Old Gymnasium itself: The school embodies the paradoxical spirit of the Dayton Peace Agreement, where simultaneous segregation (in the name of ethnic groups’ survival) and unification (in the name of democratization, reconciliation, and the common national identity) of citizens take place. New forms of schools and youth—not fully integrated but not segregated either—emerge from the collision. (Hromadžić 2008, 560)

In this continued contestation, the coexisting peace effectively comes out short vis-à-vis the ethnonational ones. While its “unification” (into one shared building under a common management) has brought students and teachers somewhat closer, the Old Gymnasium still operates according to the ethnonational peace(s), retains segregated student bodies who are taught ethnonational curricula by Bosniak or Croat teachers, and hardly is welcoming to acts in line with the coexisting peace (Björkdahl 2015; Hromadžić 2008, 542; Laketa 2015). Yet there still are students that manage to negotiate coexisting trajectories of acting in this ethnonational world.  he “Unified” Yet Ethnonational Old Gymnasium T The continued dominance of the ethnonational peace(s) permeating the Old Gymnasium has multiple nuances. Two stand out: social pressure and the setup of the school itself. Students in Mostar are often pressured to not interact across ethnonational divisions. Many parents either discourage contact per se or at least draw the line at intimate relationships (interviews with teacher at integrated school 2011; conversation with former student 2015; see also Laketa 2018; Palmberger 2016). The following examples are illustrative:

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I had a 2.5 year-long [interethnic] relationship, but our families did not know, and their finding out was the only reason why we broke up. (student28 in Perspektiva29 2015: episode 4) Parents constantly enforce the idea that it is not good to hang around with those on “that side” because they are not the same nation, religion, or even colour of skin. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 1) Most of those who would dare to do that [date across ethnic divides] would be killed by their parents. Unfortunately, that is not part of the mental make-up of most people here. (student quoted in Hromadžić 2013, 118)

This pressure comes also from teachers, who at the Old Gymnasium are more integrated than students and coexist quite well with cooperation across curricula and socialising in the teacher’s room (conversation with Old Gymnasium teacher 2015). Yet this does not mean that they all support interethnic contact for students (interview with former Old Gymnasium teacher 2011; conversation with former student 2015; see Hromadžić 2015b, 891, 900). Instead some of them to also enforce ethnonationalism: Regardless of all the similarities in the mentality of the people, in their way of life, but…they [mixed marriages] are not a solution. They are more of a problem, both for the married couple and for their children. It is even a bigger problem for their children because of the reactions of the surroundings in which they live. (teacher quoted in Hromadžić 2015b, 892) Our teacher Džemila told us: ‘We do not want to make peace, we just want our building back.’ Imagine when a teacher says that in front of 40 children… How can I believe that they want us to reconcile, when we and they [Croat students] get together in the hallways in front of the classrooms and they [teachers] force us back into the classrooms? (student quoted in Hromadžić 2008, 552)

28  All student quotations come from secondary sources. I am not particularly good with young people—making it unethical for me to talk to them. Yet given the importance people gave education, I thought that my limitations should not stop me from writing about it. 29  Perspektiva is a television program that followed students across Mostar for four episodes.

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Social pressure also comes from within the divided Bosniak or Croat classes (conversation with former student 2015). Students across the city are namely discouraged from coexisting acts and pressured into ethnonational cohesion by peers: I have two girls in my class that go to that side and even have boyfriends of different religion. That does not suit us in our class. We are used to things like they are, and they [the girls] are often excluded, not from my part but from most of us. There have been problems in front of the school when one of the boyfriends comes to pick one of them up. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 2) Because I hung out with Muslims [outside of class], I was harassed by Croats [in the class]. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 3)

The Old Gymnasium itself is also—despite its “unification”—ordered to minimise space and time for coexistence (Hromadžić 2015b; Palmberger 2010; Pilić and Bošnjak 2011). The school building might be integrated but its classrooms are Bosniak or Croat while the shared library sorts its books according to the two curricula (observation 2015). Its integrated areas (e.g. hallways or stairs) are also hard to coexist in since they are filled with teachers and peers disapproving of contact across ethnonational divides (interview with former Old Gymnasium teacher 2011; see also Hromadžić 2011, 274). The time students are able to spend with “the other” is likewise limited (conversation with student 2015). Education across Bosnia-Herzegovina is organised around tight shifts (morning/ afternoon) that have no lunches and only minimal breaks between classes. Together with the spatial segregation—meaning that students can only coexist outside of class—this temporal limitation means that the Old Gymnasium only allows students to engage “the other” for mere minutes each day (Hromadžić 2011; Laketa 2015). Yet despite this ethnonational dominance, the Old Gymnasium is neither entirely permeated by nor ordered only according to ethnonationalism. The students go to school during the same hours as the shifts are divided according to years rather than curricula (conversation with teacher 2015). The library is shared (even if the shelves are not), the American embassy sponsors an “American corner”, and some bilingual teaching (in French) is offered through outside support. There are also shared areas—like the bathrooms— where contact can be made (Björkdahl 2015; Hromadžić 2011, 275–9).

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While not offering many chances for coexistence, these limited spatial and temporal overlaps still constitute a radically change for most students at the Old Gymnasium, which breaks formerly monoethnic routines and makes them bump into each other at a scale usually not present in Mostar. People from other schools simply do not have enough chances to get to know students from other nationalities and other parts of Mostar. That has either forced them or made them create prejudices. I think that is a big difference [compared to the Old Gymnasium]. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 2)30

The Old Gymnasium is not completely ethnonationally dominated in substance either as it offers integrated activities where the students actually are expected to work together. Examples include a common student council, mixed IT classes in the first year, and the religion teachers doing guest lectures in each other’s classes (interview with Old Gymnasium teacher 2011). The importance of these integrative steps should not be exaggerated, but they still constitute cracks in the façade of the ethnonationalist peace(s) (Björkdahl 2015; Hromadžić 2009). S tudents Wanting to Experiment Across Divisions Within these largely ethnonational premises, there are students who desire to experiment, test limits, or cross “forbidden” (ethnonational) lines (interview with school official 2011; conversation with former student 2015; see also Hromadžić 2008). Often these students are encouraged to do so by their parents: I am a kid from a mixed marriage. […] I know how to celebrate Bajram [Eid al-Fitr] and how to celebrate Božić [Christmas]. I think that is the strength of differences of this city. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 1) “Our faith and their faith”, I mean, the kids from those mixed marriages should be proud because they know the culture of both sides. They are better people because they respect all around them, because they are both. My parents are Christians […] but they taught me human values, not who “they” and “they” are. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 1)

 Since the vast majority of students go to schools that are either on “that side” or “this side”, they have no routine contact with “the other” whatsoever. 30

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My parents went through the war but still taught all of us that there are differences, that there have to be differences, and that this world would not be normal if we were all the same. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 1)

Others have come to prefer coexisting trajectories of acting despite (and sometimes in resistance to) their immediate social circles: Hate is imposed upon us. The city is divided into two sides by our parents. We did not experience the war and we did not have camps, we did not survive the killings, nor did any […] of my generation kill anyone […]. I think that we should not hate each other and I think we should hang out more. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 2) My friends didn’t allow me to go on the other side. Because… you know… the other side is “fuj” [yuck]. But for me, if somebody forbids me something, I want to go there on purpose! (student in Laketa 2016, 673) One Croat student […] was curious about the other side, so one day he crossed with a group of friends to the east side. On the way back from his first trip to the east […] his parents drove by him, and saw him standing on the east side of the street. ‘They were shocked. They kept turning back and looking at me, their eyes wide-open. When I got home, I said to them that one of my Croat friends from school moved back into his apartment on the East side so I went to visit with him after school. You know, my parents are really nationalistic. I, myself, could not care less’. (Hromadžić 2008, 548)

What unites these students is that they experience the ethnonational division of Mostar as sad, unnecessary, and essentially disabling Mostar from moving forward (conversation with former student 2015; see also Hromadžić 2013; Laketa 2016).  he Negotiation of Contact, Friendship, and Love T While they undoubtedly live in a world ordered according to the ethnonational peace(s), some of these students still manage to act in line with the coexisting peace—mainly through two strategies. One is secrecy. Students are aware that contact with “the other” can get them in trouble (Laketa 2016). They therefore try to escape into “hidden” spaces at the school (conversation with former student 2015). In the constant negotiation between these students and the ethnonational world in which they live, the school bathrooms have become central. Located at the ‘fringes of the

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spatially regulated school’, the bathrooms not only allow illicit smoking but also let students escape the ethnonational peace(s), which opens up space for ‘experimentation and playfulness’ with and across divides (Hromadžić 2011, 277). Students preferring coexisting trajectories of acting thus use the bathrooms as somewhere to smoke, hang out, and interact across divisions that within the ethnonational peace(s) are seen as essential to uphold (conversations with former student 2014; teacher 2015). There they engage in everyday discussions about ‘classroom work, fashion, music, and dating’, but also in more intimate acts such as flirting, hugging, and kissing (Hromadžić 2011, 279). When negotiating their acts, these students manage to locate cracks in the ethnonational world where they can act in line with the coexisting peace (conversation with former student 2014; Hromadžić 2008, 279; Laketa 2015). These are indeed uneasy negotiations that presuppose secrecy, but they do allow the students to escape the ethnonationalist peace(s). The problem, however, is that these escapes are quite limited. The ethnonational peace(s) that still permeate the Old Gymnasium namely makes sure that students do not have the time or space to form deeper relationships: Mixing [in the bathroom] is not enough, because…it would take time [to build friendship], but we will be around the school only for a bit more, and then we go to our side and they go to theirs. (student quoted in Hromadžić 2008, 278) The gymnasium has succeeded, in some ways at least, to unite the two sides of Mostar, but still it is not enough. On the Bosnian program all are Bosniaks, on the Croat program all are Croat, so unification is not that successful. For instance, at the IT class in the first year we are mixed, so we get to know some friends from the Croat program but we do not remain friends but acquaintances […] That is all we manage. (student in Perspektiva 2015, episode 1)

It is here that the other strategy of relocating coexisting acts comes in. Mostar is undoubtedly divided across the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard. Many never cross to “the other side” and those that do often take precautions (Aceska 2015; Laketa 2018). Yet there still are mixed bars and cafés while the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard—if one is unaware of its politics, history, and symbolism—is nothing more than a busy street (Carabelli 2015; Moore 2013).

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Fig. 4.3  A section of the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard. There are still some bombed-out buildings, but the street is like any other. No walls, no barbwire, no people observing who is crossing or not. (Picture taken by author in 2014)

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Students at the Old Gymnasium have subsequently started exploiting these dual cracks in the ethnonationalist façade—i.e. that they have some overlaps at school and some freedom outside of school—in order to negotiate coexisting acts. They initially establish contact with each other in secrecy in bathrooms, in IT classes, or around the library shelves (conversation with former student 2014; see also Hromadžić 2009; Laketa 2016). Then, as the ethnonational setup of the school undermines any deeper relationships, they take these initiated contacts outside of school where the ethnonational infrastructure is less rigorous—e.g. in mixed bars and cafés—to develop them into deeper relationships (interviews with NGO activist focusing on culture 2014; teacher at an integrated school 2011; conversation with Old Gymnasium teacher 2015). Despite the ethnonational labyrinth in which these students live, they thus manage to act in line with the coexisting peace: At the beginning I had no friends and would not cross, but the more and more I met people the more I started hanging out…after some time I had a boyfriend. (student in Perspektiva 2015: episode 3)

This means that radical and experimental acts are negotiated in and around the Old Gymnasium. Students start to chat in corridors or bathrooms, and then continue to hang out, drink, hug, kiss, date, have sex, and form long-­ term relationships—effectively doing most things prohibited in the ethnonational peace(s) and encouraged in the coexisting one (interview with NGO activist focusing on culture 2014). This demonstrates the irreducibility of choice. The world might be limiting, yet it is never without its fair share of cracks. As one Old Gymnasium student claimed: ‘if we really want things to happen, nobody can stop us’ (statement in Perspektiva 2015: episode 4). Abraševic:́ The Bridge over Dry Land In opposition to the ethnonational world of Mostar, several cultural venues have emerged with explicitly stated goals to counteract the ethnonationalist peace(s) and instead promote the coexisting one. I here zoom in on the people behind Abrašević, a culture centre striving to reconnect young people. Abrašević is housed in a formerly bombed-out building at the old frontline and was established in 2003 when some old friends—longing for the coexisting lives they once had—decided to act

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out against ethnonationalism and for coexistence (interview with Abrašević founder 2014). Abraševic’́s Preferred Coexisting Trajectories of Acting The people behind Abrašević are firmly grounded in ideas that resonate with the coexisting peace. To many of them, the postwar divisions and hatred stemming from ethnonationalism are completely alien (interview with Abrašević staffer 2011). They grew up together and many come from family backgrounds in which coexistence is indisputable (conversation with Abrašević leader 2011). The postwar Mostar of “this side” and “that side”, educational segregation, and ethnonational dominance are therefore seen as disastrous (conversation with Abrašević volunteer 2014). The subsequent division, animosities, and non-contact among youth are seen as particularly worrying: [The lack of interethnic contact] is to me one of the biggest problems, because my generation is the last one that went to school before the war and has some living memories of interethnic contact, while those today do not. Those born in and after the war do not know any other reality, to them this is normal life, life as it should be. The opportunity to interact has been deprived these younger generations. (interview with Abrašević leader 2011)

The people behind Abrašević thus utterly lament the ethnonational modus operandi of Mostar (interview with Abrašević staffer 2011). They also have serious fears that if people continue to live in the same city without doing so together, war will always be around the corner. As one Abrašević founder proclaimed: ‘We cannot live one next to one another. Living next to one another means that there always is a risk for conflict’ (interview 2014). Coexistence is therefore seen as crucial for peace and the future of postwar Mostar as hinged on young people getting to know each other (Carabelli 2015; Kappler 2014; Palmberger 2013b). Abrašević emerged as an attempt to overcome these ethnonational divisions and bring people together into an integrated and coexisting everyday (interview with Abrašević leader 2011). This ideological ground is clearly indicated in their statute: OKC Abrašević emerged from the need to […] offer citizens, and especially young ones, the possibility for work and creative expression, cultural education, broad societal discussion, analysis, and critique of contemporary

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Bosnian-Herzegovinian and global society. […] Our goal is the search for alternative visions and models for organising the world and society. We will continue to search for alternative solutions to the current political, economic, and cultural reality that often contradicts human rights, divides human relations, and tears down social cohesion. (Abrašević statute 2016)

 he Ethnonational World That Hinders Coexistence T Yet implementing Abrašević’s vision is difficult in the ethnonational world of Mostar. Two main hinders are lamented: ethnonationalist animosities and spatial division. The problem with ethnonational animosities is that youngsters in Mostar are taught—e.g. by parents, peers, schools, politicians, and media—to dislike and not interact with “the other” (Moore 2013; Palmberger 2013a). “We” are presented as good and “they” as bad: We live in the same city, but we do not know each other, we have even lost the wish and the curiosity to know how the other thinks, because someone over there is telling people: ‘listen, they eat small children’. Like they were talking about Jews. That they eat children in their basements, that they kill them and drink their blood. It is nothing new, it is nothing new. People are being demonised by all sides: ‘they are fascist’, ‘they are lazy’, ‘we are clean, they are dirty’, ‘we build, they consume’. (interview with Abrašević leader 2014)

For the people behind Abrašević, this means that their intended target group exists in an antagonistic environment that enforces ethnonational cohesion and discourages coexistence. Even if young people support the coexisting peace (which they rarely do), the ethnonational world of Mostar constrains them from acting in line with the coexisting peace: The most curious people are generally young people, who wish to try, experiment, taste, see, but they are killed by this very upbringing, which from the very start tells them who is bad and who is good. From the start they are told where they can go, how they can go. […] Maybe someone succeeds in being curious, but they are usually the black sheep, stigmatised […]. No one wants to be the black sheep. It is an extremely heavy responsibility and burden to be the black sheep. […] It is a parallel to gay people coming out, but it is like that. [Contact with “the other”] is like coming out, taking a stance. (interview with Abrašević leader 2014)

The problems with the spatial division are twofold. Spatial division has in Mostar created ethnonationally coded parallelism in the sense that “this

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side” and “that side” have almost become like two cities—one Bosniak and one Croat (interview with local academic 2011). Mostar has parallel power suppliers, postal companies, and bus stations (Bieber 2005; Laketa 2018). These are all explicitly Bosniak or Croat and dominated by one of the ethnonational groups (interview with local academic 2011). Each side also has its own stadium, its own cultural centre, and its own theatre. This parallelism is also accompanied by ethnonational markers—e.g. flags (Croatian or Bosnian-Herzegovian), rebranding of streets and public spaces, and excessive construction of religious venues (i.e. churches or mosques). Restaurants, bars, clubs, and cafés are also “Bosniak” or “Croat”, revealing which through the type of beer they serve (Bosnian-­ Herzegovinian or Croatian) or how they spell coffee (kafa or kava). There are also two rock climbing clubs, two Taekwondo clubs, and two football clubs whose supporters regularly fight (Mills 2010; Moore 2013, 2–5). Other things are not explicitly part of “this” or “that” side, but still function parallelly (Bieber 2005; Tuathail 2015). Many public companies are formally united, yet separately run. The standard setup is that if a public company manager is Croat, his/her deputy is a Bosniak (and vice versa). But rather than working together for the benefit of Mostar, each would often manage the “Croat” or “Bosniak” part of the company and serve only “their” part of the city (interviews with NGO activist focusing on transparency 2014; OHR official 2011; OSCE official 2011).31 This division is undeniable: We insist that it [Mostar] is not divided, that it is one city, but the reality is that the city is deeply divided, and with tendencies to uphold status the quo, not to integrate. (interview with Abrašević leader 2011)

The spatial parallelism effectively means that spontaneous contact is minimized in Mostar because unless one really wants to cross the Austro-­ Hungarian Boulevard there is no need as almost all everyday needs can be covered on one side (interview with local OSCE official 2011). This parallelism has particular impact on young people who have grown up in postwar Mostar and therefore ‘do not know anything else than the division’ (interview with Abrašević artist 2011). Neither having friends across the divide like prewar generations nor routines in which they could meet any 31  This applies to waste management, infrastructure, and maintenance (Charlesworth 2006; Moore 2013).

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friends, young people usually lack everyday contact with “the other” (interview with Abrašević leader 2011). Yet the spatial division also means that even if a young person would like to transgress the divide, there are almost no shared spaces where such interactions could happen (Carabelli 2014; Laketa 2018; Palmberger 2013b). From the Abrašević perspective, the ethnonationalist peace(s) have not only divided the city into parallel halves and made certain that most people do not share everyday realities; they have also eliminated spaces where this parallelism might be transgressed: Abrašević is the only—the best—structure and organization that works with young people and offers neutral space for interaction, not stained by ethnic labels. Everything else in the city, from sports clubs and cafes to post offices and telecoms is divided. (interview with Abrašević leader 2011)

 egotiating the Existence of Abraševic ́ N The coexisting acts that the people behind Abrašević envision are thus inherently difficult to negotiate in the ethnonational world of Mostar. The ethnonational peace(s) not only generate hate and prejudices but also organise the city so that the spontaneous contact through which hate and prejudices could be overturned are minimized (Forde 2019). In order to connect anyone—including themselves—the people behind Abrašević realised that they had to begin by carving out spaces in which the envisioned coexisting acts could be located in (conversation with Abrašević volunteer 2014). Yet in war-torn Mostar, creating such spaces was extremely difficult—especially since accessibility from both sides meant localisation at the completely devastated but still contested old frontline. They nevertheless managed to restore a completely bombed-out building right on the old frontline where the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and HVO had stood metres between each other, separated only by house walls (interview with former soldier 2014). The traces of war were everywhere. Thousands and thousands of bullet holes, exploded walls, and no roof (interview with Abrašević founder 2014). With little to no recourses and support they took this completely unusable building, restored it, and turned it into a cultural venue accessible to and from both sides (interviews with Abrašević artist 2011; Abrašević staffer 2011). Faced with a lack of shared places to gather in a city spatially divided into parallel ethnonational spheres, they thus took matters into their own hands (interview with Abrašević leader 2014).

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To address the hate and prejudices, but also avoid being targeted too much as “the enemy” of the ethnonationalist peace(s), they set out create their cultural centre as not something primarily intended to bring ‘Bosniaks and Croats together’ but as something with substantive content and stand-alone value (interview with Abrašević leader 2011). This was motivated by the conviction that it is harder to attack or be against ­something that organises things of “universal” value such as concerts, art exhibitions, or theatre plays rather than something that is explicitly against the ethnonational peace(s). Yet it was also motivated by the reluctance to even remotely accept the premises of Mostar being organised around ethnonationalism: Abrašević has chosen a different way, taking departure from the space, and not from gatherings. We do not want to force this upon people, to seek them out, rather we want to have a space that they will come to, that when they wonder what to do a Friday night, they think of us. We believe that if people come because of the content, and not because they are told to interact because it is good to interact, then we reach a bigger success. We do not want to see people as Croats or Bosniaks. [Like] ‘come and interact because you are Croats and Bosniaks’, but rather to come because our content is interesting and then you might by chance start to talk to somebody else. The interaction is hence not in first place, the content is, the result is better if the interaction is not imposed. This place, due to its lack of ethnic names and its place on the frontline, it can become neutral, helping people to overcome barriers. (interview with Abrašević leader 2011)

 he Coexisting Effects of Abraševic ́ T Despite the difficulties of acting in line with the coexisting peace, the people behind Abrašević manage to do it. They tear the ethnonational world of Mostar and manage to place Abrašević into its holes. Its walls have been filled, its roof replaced, its inside fully equipped. Abrašević serves as a café by day and bar by night. It is a place where people can attend concerts, theatre plays, exhibitions, poetry readings, art workshops, seminars, stand-up comedy, and various clubs (conversation with Abrašević volunteer 2016). It also has an open use policy in which anyone in need of a venue can use it. Workers plan their strikes there, women’s groups have meetings, workshops of all kinds are organised, and kids practice and perform plays. It is thus an inclusive and shared venue in which ethnonationalism can be both countered and escaped, a place in where young people can come and just hang out (interview with Abrašević staffer 2011; see also Carabelli 2014; Forde 2019). The

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whole existence of Abrašević is thus a collective trajectory of acting in which its leaders, volunteers, and visitors constantly act in line with the coexisting peace while rejecting the ethnonational peace(s). Abrašević is today part of the Mostarian cityscape, frequented by people across the whole city, a venue where ethnonational divisions can be transcended (interviews with Abrašević leader 2014; local OHR official 2011; OSCE official 2011). This makes them—in their own words—a ‘bridge over dry land’ (interview with Abrašević founder 2014).

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CHAPTER 5

Contesting Postwar Mitrovica

There is an imaginary peace here. The problem is that the war never ended. […] This here is neither war nor peace. […] You do not know if something tomorrow will lead to people taking up arms [and] you have people on both sides who cannot wait to take up arms. (interview with politician 2015)

Rising tensions in the early 1980s between Kosovo’s Albanian majority1 and its Serb minority marked the start of what would become the 1998– 99 war (King and Mason 2006; Lampe 2000). The Albanian majority lamented its status in SFRJ. Although outnumbering Macedonians and Montenegrins and almost matching Slovenes—all constitutive narodi— Albanians were only granted minority narodnost status (Glenny 1999; Waller et al. 2001).2 Albanians were likewise denied a home republic as Kosovo only was an autonomous province of Serbia (Pavković 1997; Ramet 1999). To make matters worse, Kosovo was also the most socioeconomically deprived part of SFRJ (Glenny 1999; Vickers 1998). The result was that Albanians saw themselves as second-class citizens and therefore started calling for change in the 1980s: to make Albanians a

 77% of Kosovo’s population described themselves as Albanians in the 1981 census (Lampe 2000). 2  SFRJ had 1.73 million Albanians at the time, compared to 0.57 million Montenegrins, 1.34 million Macedonians, and 1.75 million Slovenes (Lampe 2000). 1

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narod, to grant Kosovo republic status, and to invest more in Albanian communities (Bieber 2015; King and Mason 2006; Vickers 1998). This standpoint was hardly shared by the Serb minority, who instead warned about emerging Albanian dominance in Kosovo and stressed how the Serb population was declining rapidly because of systematic discrimination (King and Mason 2006; Waller et al. 2001). Albanians were also accused of increasingly deviating from SFRJ’s coexisting modus operandi, thereby not only making Serbs second-class citizens in Kosovo but also risking the existence of SFRJ itself (Pavković 2000; Ramet 1999). The historical role of Kosovo further added to the sense of crisis, with claims that the cradle of Serb civilisation would soon be empty of Serbs (Lampe 2000; King and Mason 2006). What emerged was calls for increased minority protection and greater centralisation to counter the local dominance of Albanians (Ramet 1999; Waller et al. 2001). These opposing standpoints sparked the Albanian-Serb tensions that have been active ever since (King and Mason 2006; Visoka 2016). In the 1980s Albanian endeavours for more self-governance repeatedly clashed with Serb-dominated security forces determined to suppress any opposition (Bieber 2002; Pešić 1996). This went on until the Milošević regime in Belgrade completely abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in 1990, “secured” the province, and turned its attention to the rest of the gradually dissolving SFRJ (Bataković 2012; Pavković 2000). But while resistance in Kosovo was suppressed, it was not eliminated. The Milošević regime’s oppression was throughout the 1990s met with boycott of Serbdominated institutions and the creation of underground Albanian ones.3 This resulted in two parallel ethnonational spheres that still characterise Kosovo (Gusic 2015; Pula 2004). This non-violent resistance, however, was internally criticised for being ineffective and eventually led to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) in 1995. The ensuing clashes between Serb security forces and UÇK incrementally evolved into outright war that led to Albanian refugee streams and attracted external attempts to end the conflict (Beha and Vukpalaj 2018; King and Mason 2006). The violence nevertheless escalated and eventually led the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to in 1999 start air bomb-

3  Encompassing everything from healthcare and education—being run from the houses and basements of doctors and teachers—to Kosovo-wide presidential elections (Devic 2006).

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ing the Milošević regime to oust it from Kosovo (Dietrich 2010; Hehir 2010). During the three months long campaign, Serb forces (unable to match NATO’s military capabilities) ethnically cleansed most4 Albanians from the territory before Kosovo was taken by NATO ground forces ­(Ker-­Lindsay 2012; King and Mason 2006; Visoka 2016). Serbia subsequently lost all formal control of Kosovo as it was made into an UN protectorate, with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) taking complete legislative, executive, and judiciary control while KFOR was charged with internal and external security (King and Mason 2006; Knoll 2005). This led both to the return of Albanian refugees and wide-spread reprisal violence that made many Serbs leave Kosovo (Bataković 2004; Boyle 2010; 2014). Those that stayed either resettled to the four northern Serb-dominated municipalities5 bordering Serbia or clustered into a few isolated enclaves across Kosovo. In these parts, Serb institutions—schools, healthcare, and police—remained and created a parallel Serb existence in the now otherwise Albanian-dominated Kosovo (Bloom et al. 2006; Gusic 2015; van der Borgh 2012). The roles in Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs were thus completely reversed in just a few months of 1999. The tension lines, however, remained the same. The status of Kosovo is still disputed (Serbia has not recognised Kosovo’s declaration of independence), victim/perpetrator roles remain black and white, and Albanian-­Serb relations are antagonistic (King and Mason 2006; Knaus 2005; Visoka 2016). This continuity means that postwar Kosovo is permeated by conflicts over peace(s) between the ethnonational Albanian and Serb peace(s)—both of which stress historic and legal rights to Kosovo, portray “the other” as dangerous, and envision ethnonational dominance (Gusic 2015; Mehmeti and Radeljić 2018; Visoka and Richmond 2016). Yet the reality on the ground has led them into completely different endgames. The declining Serb minority has formulated continued division as fundamental for peace, meaning parallel existence in the north or in enclaves, no influence from Kosovar institutions, and 4  Around 1.1 million Albanians were made refugees. The total population of Kosovo was at that time around 2 million. 5  Mitrovica/Mitrovicë north of Ibar, Zvečan/Zveçan, Leposavić/Leposaviq and Zubin Potok/Potoku.

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Belgrade-financed healthcare, education, and police (Gusic 2015). The Albanian majority has in turn formulated integration within Kosovo as fundamental for peace, meaning Pristina rule over Serb-dominated areas, no influence from Serbia over internal Kosovar matters, and only Kosovar institutions (Beha 2015; Martino 2014; Visoka and Doyle 2016). This tension between division and integration has been central since 1999. Albanian political elites continuously try to establish Pristina rule across all of Kosovo while the Serbs living in the targeted areas resist (Gusic 2019; Visoka 2016). These conflicts over peace(s) permeate Kosovo. The situation of peace here is like when a colour-blind person discusses colours with someone that sees colours. You say red and the colour-blind person says green. […] Pristina has one vision of this peace, and Belgrade has another, and these are two different visions, and an agreement can come only if it turns out to be like Belgrade wants it, or like Pristina wants it. (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014)

5.1   Mitrovica These conflicts over peace(s) are nowhere more entrenched than in Mitrovica, which has become the undisputed epicentre of Kosovo’s postwar tensions. These tensions are relatively new. Mitrovica—the second largest city in Kosovo—was before the war an industrialised city that enjoyed relative prosperity due to its Trepča/Trepçës mining complex. Its population was ethnonationally mixed, its cultural scene vibrant, and its citizens coexisting. While the city never was as “Yugoslav” as other cities in SFRJ—mixed marriages were quite low and students went to segregated classes6—the present north-south divide did not exist.7

6  This was mainly due Albanian and Serbian having no commonalities. Yet students did learn both languages and those that went to school before the war usually can communicate with “the other”. 7  As illustrated by the fact that the Christian cemetery (used by Serbs) is in the south while the Muslim cemetery (used by Albanians) is in the north.

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Fig. 5.1  The map of Mitrovica. The river Ibar divides the city into its Albanian south and Serb north. While the northern part is smaller it is more densely populated. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map)

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This coexistence changed in 1999. Although Mitrovica did not have a prominent role before or during the war, it became the postwar flashpoint as it was in Mitrovica that NATO troops built checkpoints along Ibar to stem Serb refugees fleeing reprisal violence (Bataković 2004; Luković 2007; Pinos 2016). While this security parameter was intended to save Kosovo’s multiethnic character, it initiated a north-south division of Mitrovica along Ibar that today completely permeates the city (King and Mason 2006; Krasniqi 2013). Everything south of the river is currently considered Albanian, with an extremely limited amount of non-Albanians living there. The north is in turn considered Serb (although it is more multiethnic8 than the south). This divide is remarkably thorough. In Mitrovica south of Ibar, UNMIK built new institutions (everything from healthcare and education to municipal structures and police forces) with the intention of handing them over to Kosovars. These institutions, staffed mainly by Albanians, today constitute the foundations of post-independence Kosovo (Nagy 2014; Pinos 2016). This statebuilding process never took place in Mitrovica north of the Ibar. Not for lack of trying but because any attempts to replace the Belgrade-financed prewar institutions have been fiercely resisted (Gusic 2015; Franks and Richmond 2008). This tension has defined Albanian-Serb relations ever since. Kosovo repeatedly tries to incorporate Mitrovica north of Ibar into its political structures while the Serbs there resist these advancements (Gusic 2015; van der Borgh 2012). These urban conflicts over peace(s) have resulted in almost complete institutional and infrastructural division across the Ibar (Gusic 2019). Everything from education, healthcare, and social services to street cleaning, electricity supply, and water distribution is today provided in parallel (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2011; Krampe 2016; Nagy 2014).

8  There are small Albanian neighbourhoods in the north that border the river as well as the multiethnic Bosniak Mahalla where mixed trading can be found (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; Pinos 2016).

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Fig. 5.2  The southern riverbank at night. The Main Bridge is seen to the left. The 2015 “Peace Park” (mentioned in the prologue) is seen on the bridge as are some of the police cars stationed there 24/7 to make sure nothing happens. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

The divide is mirrored in everyday life as well. Mitrovica is demarcated as Albanian or Serb (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; Pinos 2016). North of the Ibar, Serbian is spoken, the Cyrillic alphabet is used, and Dinars are the currency (although Euros are taken at many places and withdrawn in ATMs), while the south speaks Albanian, uses the Latin alphabet, and pays with Euros. Products in stores differ, flags mark territories, and offensive graffiti is everywhere (Clark 2014; Gusic 2019). If wanting to take a taxi over Ibar, one needs to take a taxi with Serb (or no) license plates to Bosniak Mahalla and there switch to a taxi with Kosovar license plates— and vice versa—as most taxi drivers will not drive on “the other side” (conversations with numerous taxi drivers 2011, 2014, 2015).

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Fig. 5.3  The northern riverbank at night. The road in the middle comes from the Main Bridge. People have parked cars at the end of the bridge—both for convenience and in order to keep the bridge barricaded. The blue 4×4s are armoured EULEX cars. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

Contact across Ibar thus resembles contact across state borders rather than within cities. Many people have not crossed Ibar since 1999, friendships are rare, and the postwar generations do not know each other’s ­languages (Pinos 2016). For many in Mitrovica, each part of the city ends at the banks of the Ibar: [People] have forgotten that there is bridge, that there is a divided city. [Mitrovica] ends at the bridge. Sixteen years of division, of these kinds of politics have cemented this. (interview with municipal official 2015)

The urban conflicts over peace(s) in Mitrovica have thus divided the city into two parts—or rather: two cities. There have indeed been some concessions suggesting rapprochement is underway. Those supporting the Albanian ethnonational peace now want to incorporate the on-paper-only m ­ unicipality of

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North Mitrovica into the Kosovar state rather than unify the city completely. Those supporting the Serb ethnonational peace in turn accept some Kosovar institutions as long as Serbs rather than Albanians staff them (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; ICG 2011). Yet these changes are due to necessity and external pressure rather than reconciliatory intentions. While the realities on the ground might have shifted, the urban conflicts over peace(s) in Mitrovica are still about whether Mitrovica north of the Ibar will ‘function as a southern Serb city or [together with its southern part] as a northern Kosovar city’ (interview with EULEX official based in Pristina 2014). The people of Mitrovica are therefore consistently targeted by governing attempts imposing different peace(s). Governmentality will here be used to understand how these governing attempts structure the field of possible acts for collectives in Mitrovica so that they make certain choices instead of others. In dialogue with people, three governing attempts emerged as crucial: how Belgrade governs Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar through parallel institutions; how fear governs people into ethnonational division; and how the external governing attempts towards coexistence fall short.9

5.2   Belgrade’s Parallel Governing The urban conflict over peace(s) in Mitrovica between Albanians and Serbs is highly entrenched with mutually excluding ethnonational peace(s). The Serbs understand their long-term survival as based on their ability to govern themselves with as little influence from the rest of Kosovo as possible. Peace for them implies ethnonational division of Mitrovica. Albanians south of Ibar in contrast equate peace with the integration of Mitrovica north of Ibar into Kosovar institutions (“where it belongs”), return of Albanian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) north of Ibar, and an end to Serbia’s influence in Kosovo through Mitrovica (interview with political analyst based in Pristina 2015; see Gusic 2015). In this urban conflict over peace(s), Belgrade10 has emerged as a key player in upholding divisions and resisting integration. 9  The enhanced focus on Mitrovica north of Ibar has a simple reason: it is where the urban conflicts over peace(s) mainly play out. The question is not if Albanians or Serbs will dominate Mitrovica, but whether the northern part of the city will come under Kosovar influence or not. 10  “Belgrade” refers to the institutions financed by the government of Serbia, actors whose direct or indirect chain of command stems from Belgrade, and acts of the government in

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The background to Belgrade’s crucial role is that while Kosovo is widely opposed by Serbs north of Ibar, this part of the city is not exactly self-­ sufficient. The economic base is weak, unemployment is high, and people dependent on money from Serbia’s budget. Mitrovica north of Ibar is also stuck in a legal and political limbo that deters investments while generating crime and corruption. The ability of this part of the city to on its own sustain the infrastructure (employment, healthcare, education, social services) needed to resist integration into Kosovo is thus marginal. It is in this conundrum that Belgrade becomes central. Its continued presence namely structures the field of possible acts for Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar so that they are enabled and encouraged—but also pressured—to resist integration into Kosovo (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; van der Borgh and Lasance 2013). Ways of Thinking: Keep Together and Stay Away from Them Kosovo is our Jerusalem. (Serbia’s former foreign minister Vuk Jeremić as cited in B92, 31 May 2010)

Belgrade’s governing attempt holds several ways of thinking that stress Serb historic right to Kosovo, the illegality of the NATO invasion, and the impossibility of Albanian-Serb coexistence. Historic right is based on the notion that Kosovo was the birthplace of medieval Serbia, has multiple old Serb churches and monasteries, and is where the most mythologised event in Serb history—The Battle of Kosovo in 1389—took place (Judah 2008; King and Mason 2006). Kosovo is subsequently portrayed as fundamentally Serb, Albanians as intruders, and the remaining Serbs as front troops (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015). Added to historic rights are legal arguments. While Kosovo in the aftermath of war was put under UN mandate through Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244, the NATO campaign that facilitated this was unsanctioned by the UN and thus illegal according to international law (Bieber and Daskalovski 2004; Cocozelli 2009; Hehir 2009; King and Mason 2006; van der Borgh 2012). Belgrade has ever since argued that something that emerged illegally cannot later become legal. External presence11 and Kosovar institutions staffed by Albanians are therefore Belgrade. These are usually portrayed as one entity in the urban conflicts over peace(s) in Mitrovica, both by those in favour of and opposition to “Belgrade”. 11  Initially UNMIK and KFOR, but later also OSCE, EULEX, the International Civilian Office (ICO), and the European Union Special Representative (EUSR).

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­ ortrayed as anti-Serb aggressions that violate the territorial integrity of p Serbia through ‘the so-called independent Republic of Kosovo’12 (King and Mason 2006; Zaum 2009). It is finally argued that Albanian-Serb coexistence is impossible, something that is exclusively blamed on “anti-Serb” Albanians that want to “Albanize” Kosovo and ethnically cleanse all Serbs (interviews with EULEX official 2011; local historian 2014). That some Serbs still live in Kosovo is therefore only attributed to Albanian lip-service to multiethnicity and the sturdiness of Serbs (interview with NGO activist focusing on media 2011; see also Björkdahl and Gusic 2015). Any longterm coexistence where the Serb minority is exposed to the Albanian majority is deemed impossible (interview with UNMIK official 2015; see also Bataković 2004; Krasniqi 2012; Stegherr 2011).13 In combination, these ways of thinking produce the parole: “Косово је Србија!” [Kosovo is Serbia!], a claim that dreams of the pre-1999 arrangements in which Belgrade ruled Kosovo (Gow 2009; Narten 2009). Due to the situation on the ground, however, the realistic outcome in Mitrovica has become division of the city along Ibar so that integration into Kosovar institutions is evaded there (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; Visoka 2016). The subsequent prescriptions are segregation and non-contact with parts of Kosovo dominated by Albanians as well as refusal to retreat any further than Ibar (interviews with local EUSR official 2011; UNMIK official 2015). Modes of Acting: Preserving Parallel Institutions The modes of acting upon these ways of thinking is that Belgrade continues to fund the parallel14 institutions in Mitrovica north of Ibar that enable Serbs to live in Kosovo but outside of Kosovar institutions (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik 2012). These parallel institutions are intertwined but can be divided into three types. The first encompasses vital institutions that provide services such as healthcare, education, and social welfare—including all primary and secondary schools in 12  This phrase is used by Serbs to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence while emphasising that they do not recognise it. 13  This feared ethnic cleansing is strengthened by actual violations of Serb, Roma, Gorani, Ashkali, and other minority rights in Kosovo since 1999 (Deda and Kursani 2012; Fort 2018; ICG 2002; 2010; 2011; Sigona et al. 2009). 14  While Albanians label these institutions as parallel and illegal, Serbs see them as the only legitimate ones whilst claiming that Kosovar institutions are either non-existent or inferior (interviews with local EUSR official 2014; politician 2011).

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Mitrovica north of Ibar, the regional hospital that provides healthcare for Serbs across Kosovo, the “exiled” University of Pristina, and welfare benefits to the elderly, sick, and unemployed (Bloom et al. 2006; Deda and Kursani 2012; Pinos 2016). These institutions are completely disconnected from Kosovar equivalents and operate just like they would do in Serbia— handing out Serb diplomas, referring seriously ill patients to Belgrade, and financing benefits from Serbia’s budget (Bloom et al. 2006; Pinos 2016). These vital institutions both employ many people in Mitrovica north of Ibar and provide services that outmatch Kosovar equivalents. Yet they are not enough. The economy in Mitrovica north of Ibar is weak while not everyone can be employed in schools, the hospital, or different municipal departments (Clark 2014; Nešović and Celeghini 2015). The second type of parallel institutions are therefore “empty” in the sense that they employ people so that they will not leave Kosovo. While this is costly and lacks efficient output—as people are either given meaningless jobs or employed where no more workers are needed—these institutions are rationalised by the idea that local Serbs are the front troops of state sovereignty (interview with local analyst 2011; see also Deda and Kursani 2012; ICG 2011; Orosz 2016b; van der Borgh 2012). The third type of parallel institutions are informal security structures. Despite the official retreat in 1999 of its police and military forces, Belgrade has consistently maintained an informal security presence in Mitrovica north of Ibar15 (Gray and Strasheim 2016; ICG 2011; Kursani 2014). This informal security presence consists of plain-clothed police officers, undercover intelligence agents, and former police officers that now work for the KP but have connections with and are loyal to Belgrade (interviews with EULEX police officer 2015; NATO official 2011, UNMIK official in 2011).16 Belgrade also finances radical and sometimes violent groups. These groups initially became known as “Bridge Watchers” who sat on rooftops and in cafés near the river bank, observed the bridges, and “discouraged” Albanians and Serbs from crossing (Bjeloš 2016; Clark 2014; Zupančič 2019). While 15  KFOR and EULEX are aware of this continued presence (interview with EULEX police officer 2015; NATO analyst 2011; UNMIK official 2011). Yet they are unable and/or unwilling to do something about it. 16  The integrated police officers still coordinate with local Belgrade representatives and sometimes refuse to obey commands from Pristina (interviews with EULEX official based in Pristina 2015; EULEX police officer 2015; UNMIK official 2015).

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not as overt anymore they still organise violent protests when needed, intimidate NGOs with bombs, build barricades, monitor the city through CCTV, keep files17 on people, and maintain social cohesion through threats (interviews with EULEX police officer 2015; UNMIK official 2015; conversations with local police chief 2014; politician 2014). Through these parallel institutions, Belgrade attempts to make sure that local Serbs choose to resist integration and uphold the divisions inherent to the Serb ethnonational peace (Clark 2014; ICG 2011; van der Borgh 2012). The Field of Possible Acts: You Are Free to do as We Tell You Through governmentality it becomes clear that Belgrade indeed manages to structure the field of possible acts for Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar by enabling, encouraging, and pressuring them. Belgrade enables resistance and division by giving Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar alternatives. The absolute majority of local Serbs want to resist integration and uphold divisions towards Kosovo (Gusic 2015). Yet the long-term survival of any group hinges on access to employment, healthcare, education, and social services—the Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar are no exception. Without alternatives to Kosovo when it comes to these vital everyday components, they would either have to integrate or leave the city (Bloom et al. 2006; Knaus 2005; Orosz 2016b; van der Borgh 2012). It is here that Belgrade enters the picture. Its parallel institutions namely make sure that people can get Serb salaries, go to Serb hospitals, attend Serb schools, and get Serb benefits. The result is that Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar can choose to resist integration and uphold divides (interviews with local EULEX official 2011; political activist 2011; local United Nations Development Program (UNDP) official 2014). This is supported on the ground, as most people in Mitrovica north of Ibar believe that without the alternatives provided by Belgrade’s parallel institutions, resistance to and divisions from Kosovo would be impossible:

 An activist told me how these groups kept files on him for years as he was considered unreliable due to his engagement with NGOs. He was told this later on when his allegiance was not uncertain anymore (conversation 2015). 17

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Mitrovica as Mitrovica [i.e. north of Ibar] would have a difficult time without the support of Belgrade. It is what enables [us] to say no [to Kosovar institutions]. (interview with local EUSR official 2011)

Belgrade also encourages continued resistance towards and division from Kosovar institutions. The toxic Albanian-Serb conflict means that most— if not all—Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar prefer the parallel institutions over the Kosovar ones (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; van der Borgh 2012). Yet this is not merely an ideological or political preference. Since Serbia outperforms Kosovo economically, the parallel institutions are also more attractive in purely economic terms. Salaries are higher, benefits are more generous, and an “add-on” is given to public employees who work in Kosovo. The result is that some Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar are paid up to three times as much within the parallel institutions than they would for the same job within Kosovar institutions (conversation with doctor 2014).18 Thus even if Kosovar institutions would make life better in the long-­ run—which is uncertain—the ‘short-term economic loss makes people […] hold on to their comfort zone [that the parallel institutions constitute]’ (interview with EULEX official 2011). As it stands today the ‘Kosovo system means less’ for Serbs (interview with local lawyer 2015). The parallel institutions thus make sure that resisting integration and upholding division is not only about ideology or politics but also about choosing safer employments, higher wages, and better services (interview with local EULEX official 2015). As one interviewee asked me rhetorically: If we disregard ethnic belonging and pose it [integration] as a question rather than an answer, would you accept […] to be part of Estonia? A country that is much weaker economically than Sweden, that is weaker in social services, pensions, healthcare. Weaker in every aspect. Would you accept to say tomorrow: ‘I am a citizen of Estonia? I am glad that my salary is going to be 30–40% lower? I am glad that I have weaker healthcare and worse pensions?’. Those are the problems. Forget the ethnic parts and let’s take into consideration the things that are important in life […]. They insist on integration without understanding that there is an enormous barrier there. Serbia is not the “Promised Land” […] but generally Kosovo is on the level 18  This sum is actually so high that doctors and professors from Belgrade come to work in the city (conversations with doctor in 2011; professor 2011).

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of African countries. […] If I am forced to integrate for a salary that is 2/3 lower […] I will try to find another job and move from here. (interview with politician 2015)

Belgrade lastly pressures local Serbs to choose resistance and division. The parallel institutions are namely double-edged (Martino 2014; Mulaj 2011; van der Borgh 2012; Zupančič 2019). Those employed in the parallel institutions who do not support the Serb ethnonational peace or choose to integrate in some ways often risk salary deduction or losing their jobs (interviews with ICO official 2011; political activist 2011; UNMIK official 2011). The dependency most Serbs have on the parallel institutions thus structures their fields of possible acts—as well as that of those dependent on them such as children, parents, or unemployed spouses—so that challenging the Serb ethnonational peace never becomes an actual choice. One interviewee claimed to be unaffected because she works for an external organisation but insisted it would be different had she depended on the parallel institutions: If I worked in the schooling or healthcare system, I would be forced to take directives […]. It is a public secret that if there are unrest or blockades, everyone has to leave their workplaces and go to whatever event they were order to go to […] people have to go there even if they do not support what they were attending, only because they were sent there […]. People might say something, but will feel consequences on their back, be it something tied to employment or getting one’s car blown up, or whatever else […]. People [in charge of the institutions] work according to the idea ‘I do not care what you think, do as you are told’. (interview with local EULEX official 2014)

The parallel system and the overemployment therein—meaning that anyone is “disposable”—has made challenging Belgrade and the ethnonational peace something that most people cannot choose in the long run (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; King and Mason 2006; van der Borgh 2012; Zupančič 2019). This pressure was evident in the widespread public participation in the anti-Kosovo barricades in 2011–14, also by those who did not want to participate: 70 per cent of the people [in Mitrovica north of Ibar] work in the state institutions, they have a state salary, and have to be on the barricades since it is their job, their duty. Nowhere does it say that they have to do this, but

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nobody dares to speak up. Officially they will not say anything but unofficially you will lose your job… [the idea is that] you live in Serbia, you work for Serbia, you are paid by Serbia, and then you defend the interests of Serbia. (interview with citizen 2011) They say, ‘you must report there on Saturday, or Monday, or whenever, on this gathering for whatever purpose, and your attendance will be taken, and pay will be deducted if you do not show’. We have seen that over and over across the years. (interview with UNMIK official 2015)

Yet this is not the end of Belgrade’s pressure. Not only those working in the parallel institutions see integration as risky. Serbs who are non-­affiliated with the parallel institutions—by working for external organisations, running NGOs, or owning businesses—also have their field of possible acts structured by the parallel institutions, primarily through the informal security structures (Clark 2014; Milivojevic 2019). You have people who are involved in organised crime and other radical political elements who have been there for a long time […] they intimidate, they make their presence felt, when they feel that things are going too far they will engage in low-level violence, firebombs, breaking windows of properties and that sort of stuff. (interview with EULEX official 2014)

People in Mitrovica north of Ibar know that if they choose to challenge Belgrade, they can be verbally attacked and threatened. If these threats do not dissuade them, they could have a petrol bomb thrown through their window, their cars smashed, their property destroyed, or even their lives taken (interview with ICO official 2011; UNMIK official 2015; see also Borch 2017; ICG 2011; van der Borgh 2012; Zupančič 2019). The security structures thus: Maintain power by targeting business owners with grenades, [police] vehicles being targeted with gunfire, stations being grenaded, things like that. Intimidation by force to keep people down. (interview with EULEX police officer 2015)

The parallel institutions thus not only enable and encourage people to resist and remain divided from Kosovar institutions, they also make sure that interaction across Ibar is a choice people must carefully consider. This is how Belgrade governs people north of Ibar.

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5.3   How Fear Governs 24 November 2011 at about 9 pm; conversation19 outside of Café Charlie in Mitrovica south of Ibar after an interview with X: X: Where are you going? Want to walk together? Ivan: Sure, but I am going that way (points north). X: Where? Ivan: (names the place) X: Never heard of it. Ivan: It’s in the north. X: In the north? Are you serious? Are you going up there? Now? In the dark? Alone? Listen to me, be careful. Seriously, do not joke around, it is very dangerous up there. It’s lawless, no order, you can get attacked and no one will do anything about it. 10–15 minutes later at the place where I always stay, conversation with Y: Y: Working late? Ivan: Ha-ha, always. Y: Another interview? Ivan: Yes. Y: Where at this time of night? Ivan: Café Charlie. Y: Café what? Ivan: It’s in the south. Y: You went down there? At this time? And nothing happened to you? Ivan: No worries, it went fine. Y: But you spoke English, right? That would explain it. Ivan: No. He spoke Serbian, I spoke Yugoslav. Y: And nothing happened? You were quite lucky, you know that?

Fear is a powerful emotion. The conversations above depict two similar, quite common, yet completely opposite views of the security situation in Mitrovica. Albanians usually see Mitrovica north of Ibar as a lawless place, run by criminals, where hate for Albanians festers. Serbs in turn see Mitrovica south of Ibar as dominated by Albanians who discriminate Serbs and are only stopped from ethnically cleansing the north of Kosovo by the presence of UNMIK, EULEX, or KFOR.

19  I took notes afterwards and while the exact words are not depicted, I believe the sentiment is.

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Fig. 5.4  People and KFOR soldiers at the Main Bridge. The view from the south. While some people do cross, most depicted here are on their way to the southern riverbank (to the left in the picture) where restaurants, cafés, and playgrounds are located. (Picture taken by author in 2014)

The subsequent outcome from this widespread fear is that movement across Ibar and contact between Albanians and Serbs has been very low since 1999. This continued division is clearly in line with the Serb ethnonational peace. Yet it is also in line with the Albanian ethnonational peace. The Albanian ethnonational peace is ultimately about integrating Serb-­ dominated areas, but until such an integration is achieved, areas outside of Kosovar control are portrayed as dangerous and to be avoided. Through governmentality it becomes obvious that fear governs people on both sides of Ibar towards choosing ethnonational division and non-contact as implicit in the ethnonational peace(s). Ways of Thinking: Mutual Fears Across Ibar People are afraid that someone would come in a car, throw a bomb and then escape, which is really easy. There is a constant fear that something like this will happen. (interview with politician 2015)

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There is fear. Especially if you are from here, and they know you […]. Earlier it was that when you crossed people would wait for you, beat you, stab you, shoot you […] That is some general thinking from people here. (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015)

 he Southern View T There are two ways of thinking that underpin fear in the ethnonational Albanian peace. Fear is initially grounded in the almost univocal perception of Mitrovica north of Ibar as lawless and disordered (interviews with EULEX official 2011; local community developer 2015; see also Gusic 2015; UNDP 2011). The blame for this situation varies, but the diagnosis is usually the same: Mitrovica north of Ibar is ‘ruled by everybody and nobody’, it is a no-mans-land where no one ‘takes responsibility if someone is killed’ (interviews with Community Building Mitrovica (CBM) leader 2014; local ICO official 2011). The perception is that smugglers and criminals have replaced politicians and police and that anyone resisting them risk having their cars burned, families threatened, and lives taken (interviews with CBM leader 2011; 2014; local community developer 2014; 2015). Taking the banal example of having a car accident, one interviewee tried to illustrate the lack of ‘normality’ in the north: In the north people have no license plates, you do not know who hit you, who is responsible, you cannot report it to anybody, and if you do, nothing will be done about it. If I was a Serb, I would not want my kids to live there, it is a life without stability, future, or rule of law. (interview with local ICO official 2011)

Yet fear is also grounded in perceived anti-Albanian sentiments among Serbs (Clark 2014; King and Mason 2006). While lawlessness and disorder is seen to make life in Mitrovica north of Ibar dangerous for e­ verybody— including Serbs—hatred and prejudice is seen to make it even worse for Albanians (interview with NGO activist focusing on cross-­community relations 2011). Many see it as dangerous to even walk around there if one is Albanian (Joseph and Hoogenboom 2014; Strapacova 2016; UNDP 2011). These ways of thinking are often contrasted with the situation in the south. Contrary to the disorder and lawlessness of the north, Mitrovica south of Ibar is portrayed as somewhere where food inspections are made, rule of law upheld, and taxes paid (interview with local ICO official 2011). The intrinsic danger of being an Albanian north of Ibar is also contrasted with the ease in which Serbs can live south of Ibar:

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It is much harder to go north than it is to go south. You and I are in the south, we talk Slavic languages, and everyone here, everyone is Albanian, and they are okay with it [even if] it does not say that you are from Sweden or BosniaHerzegovina on your back [i.e. people do not know that I’m not a Serb]. In the north, it is totally different; go to the north and you will see. […] Maybe with the name Ivan you might not have too many problems, but with [my] name I will. (interview with NGO activist focusing on cross-­community relations 2011)

 he Northern View T The ways of thinking underpinning fear in the Serb ethnonational peace vis-àvis Mitrovica south of Ibar (and the rest of Kosovo) constitute almost the perfect mirror image (interview with EULEX official 2011). Serbs perceive Mitrovica south of Ibar as lawless and disordered with next to no dividing lines between elected officials and criminals (Clark 2014; Joseph and Hoogenboom 2014). It is claimed that UÇK military leaders (in the north seen as war criminals) hold high political positions and that Kosovo is a haven for organised crime involving arms and drug trade, organ harvesting, and human trafficking (interviews with local EUSR official 2011; 2014; local historian 2014; political activist 2011). Rule of law is rendered non-existent and ordinary people seen as victims of corruption, criminality, and poverty (Clark 2014; Joseph and Hoogenboom 2014; King and Mason 2006). Mitrovica south of Ibar is, besides its general criminality, also portrayed as especially dangerous for Serbs. Albanian hatred of Serbs is believed to be prevalent, including everything from institutionalised discrimination and denial of Serb minority rights to everyday violence towards Serbs (Bataković 2004; Joseph and Hoogenboom 2014; Strapacova 2016). The result is that people perceive in life in Kosovo as impossible. The words of one local IDP (driven out of his home in 1982, 1999, and 2004) sums up this widespread sentiment: Even if it at a formal level seems that Albanians are for an inclusive society and respect the rights of minorities […] in practice this does not exist. I cannot not get my rights […]. Having in mind some cultural and historical heritage, I cannot have faith or trust in an Albanian judge or police officer. […] The issue here was always who is strongest. Whoever was ruling tried to dominate the other […] that is why Serbs do not want to be part of the Kosovar system. […] We can have Kosovo passports, and Kosovo military and police to maintain security, but what will that security mean? Most probably what that same security means in Gračanica20: repression rather than security [….] Coexistence would be possible if I would be granted the same kind of rights as Albanians, to not feel political or any other insecurity vis-à-vis them. But it is not like that. (interview 2014)  Gračanica is one of the Serb enclaves south of Ibar, located around 10 km from Pristina.

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Fig. 5.5  The “Peace Park”. The park was built hours after the 2011–14 barricade on the Main Bridge was taken down—the sole purpose was to hinder access from the south by car. Since the bridge leads directly into the centre of Mitrovica north of Ibar, people fear that opening it to traffic might expose them to attacks. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

Many believe that crimes against Serbs are treated lightly or even sanctioned, stressing that keeping Mitrovica north of Ibar Serb is imperative for the continuation of Serb existence in Kosovo (Gusic 2015; Nešović and Celeghini 2015; Stegherr 2011). One interviewee described even being afraid to go to his mother’s grave: There are some serious problems going to south Mitrovica. My mother is there, and I have only visited her grave once; it is so terrible to see and feel how it is devastated, the cemetery […] in south of Mitrovica they dislike everything Slavic. They shot an American who had some Bulgarian roots, for only talking Bulgarian. They do not only dislike Serbs, they also dislike all Slavs. (interview with local politician 2011)

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Fig. 5.6  Vandalism in Mitrovica. A vandalised cross on the Christian cemetery in Mitrovica south of Ibar. Almost no graves have been spared. (Picture taken by author in 2011)

Another described how many Serbs fear the future when the external gaze ceases and Serbs are left to Kosovar structures: People are afraid of being suppressed, of being second-class citizens. As long as the international community is here, people have some safety and hope, but seeing that everything slowly leaves Kosovo, they fear that they will have incidents. […] We are afraid, of when there is no more EULEX, no more KFOR, when an Albanian will be the chief of police, when 80% of police officers in the north will be Albanians. People are afraid, there is mistrust, and people are afraid that it will be worse. (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015)

These ways of thinking are contrasted with the superior security in Mitrovica north of Ibar, which is portrayed as safe and remarkably well-­functioning given that it is under constant threat from Albanians, Kosovar institutions, and external organisations (interview with local EUSR official 2011; 2014).

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In contrast to the south where ‘not one Serb lives’, Mitrovica north of Ibar is portrayed as multiethnic and tolerant where the Serb majority coexists with Roma, Bosniak, and Albanian minorities—especially in Bosniak Mahalla (interview with local UNDP official 2014). The Albanian and Serb ethnonational peace(s) are thus quite similar when it comes to the perception of “the other side” as disordered, hateful, and threatening (Gusic 2015; Stegherr 2011; Visoka and Richmond 2016). What unsurprisingly follows is that the prescribed responses are similar as well. On both sides of Ibar peace is seen to require ethnonational division and non-contact (interviews with EULEX official 2011; local EUSR official 2011; 2014; NGO activist focusing on cross-community relations 2011; UNMIK official 2014). Within the Serb ethnonational peace, this division and non-contact is the standing parole, whereas division in the Albanian ethnonational peace is seen as needed only until Mitrovica north of Ibar is integrated into and secured by Kosovo (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; Krasniqi 2013). Modes of Acting: Pressure, Parallelism, Protection The spectrum is wide through which these ways of thinking are translated to reality. Yet three modes of acting emerged as central in dialogue with people in Mitrovica: internal pressure on “us”; the construction of parallel (Albanian/Serb) spheres; and external intimidation of “them”. The three are explored below. I nternal Pressure to Not Interact The first mode of acting is internal pressure on “us” to not interact with “them”. This pressure manifests itself in two ways: everyday peer-pressure and threats from radical groups. Everyday peer-pressure is about people on both sides urging each other to not interact across divides (interview with CBM leader 2014). This pressure is multifaceted in terms of both methods (e.g. threats or pleas) and reasons (e.g. safety concerns or in-­ group cohesion). Many warn and pressure each other to not interact due to genuine concern for their wellbeing—much like I was warned about going north/south (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015). People are afraid of what might happen to their family and friends if they cross Ibar. Some of these fears are grounded in prejudice and hate but others are based in actual events. The war and its ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs is not even a generation away. Nor are the Kosovo-wide attacks by Albanians against

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Serbs in 2004. Added to this is a constant stream of minor ethnonational clashes that since 1999 have stretched from violent protests and riots to stabbings, shootings, and bombings (see Bataković 2004; Fort 2018; Gusic 2015; King and Mason 2006; UNDP 2011; Zeqiri and Lazarevic 2014). The list of examples can go on but the essence is that ethnonationally coded and/or motivated crimes happen frequently enough for anyone to fear for the wellbeing of people close to them (interviews with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015; politician 2011). People are therefore often warned of “them” and urged not to cross into the dangerous north/south (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014). Yet everyday peer-pressure is not only about genuine concern. People are also pressured to avoid contact with “the other” because it is believed to undermine in-group cohesion and collective safety. Many who cross Ibar have therefore been vilified, excluded from social circles, and threatened (conversation with EULEX police officer 2015; see also Borch 2017; Clark 2014; Gusic 2015). But internal pressure to not interact with “the other” not only stems from spontaneous everyday peer-pressure; it is also exercised by organised radical groups who pressure those who “betray” the in-group by interacting with “them”. This pressure is manifested through everything from intimidation and name-calling of people that stray away from the ethnonational peace(s) to attacks (e.g. trashed cars, bombed houses, assaults) on those who actively work for coexistence and “betray” the in-group—like activists, politicians, or employees of external organisations (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015; conversation with women’s rights activist 2015; see also Milivojevic 2019).  eeping to Ourselves, Keeping Away from “Them” K The second mode of acting is segregation and isolation from “the other”. What this implies is that life in Mitrovica is continuously organised in parallel so that “the other” can be avoided (interviews with local EULEX official 2011; UNMIK official 2014). This parallelism manifests itself in division of everything from education and healthcare to electricity and political institutions but also through high levels of isolation when it comes to bars and restaurants, social events, and private lives (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; King and Mason 2006). While there are exceptions in which Albanian and Serb meet, these interactions are usually either economic or

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displaced to quite closed social circles. Everyday life in Mitrovica is otherwise organised into almost completely parallel existences that have few contact points: If you look at it, if you take a walk in the city, you will see that there are two systems, north and south, that are completely different. Culturally, the way they function, basically everything. I’m not saying that one is good and one is bad […] but everyone [when] they come here and when they cross the bridge they realise that there are two systems that function completely on their own […] After fourteen years, my personal experience is that I get to the bridge and after the bridge nothing exists. That is how it has been for fourteen years, you come to the bridge and then you turn around. (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014

 xternal Intimidation to Scare “Them” Away from “Us” E The third mode of acting is external intimidation. Whereas internal pressure is about in-group cohesiveness—thus targeting “us”—external intimidation is about keeping danger away by targeting “them” (interview with activist 2011). This intimidation stretches from organised and systematic setups designed to scare Albanians/Serbs from crossing Ibar to spontaneous clashes in the streets with those labelled as threats. In terms of organised intimidation, Mitrovica has had numerous examples over the years. The “Bridge Watchers” kept Mitrovica north of Ibar “safe” by assaulting people who used the bridges (Clark 2014; ICG 2009; 2010; 2011; Zupančič 2019). Different radical groups have over the years intimidated people who visit their empty apartments or still live on “the other side” (interviews with former CBM leader 2011; politician 2011). The barricades erected around Mitrovica (and the rest of the north) by Serbs in 2011 and maintained until 2014 were also external intimidation.21

21  These barricades were erected because Kosovo deployed special KP forces to seize the checkpoints between Kosovo and Serbia, which until then had been under Serb control and thus undermined the territorial integrity of Kosovo (Guzina and Marijan 2014; Visoka and Doyle 2016). This move raised Serb concerns that the divided status quo was under attack and led to barricades intended to block all security forces understood as anti-Serb (KP as well as EULEX and KFOR when they assisted KP). The barricades were guarded 24/7, alarms were installed to gather people for emergencies, and protests were regularly organised (interviews with EULEX official 2011; local ICO official 2011; local politician 2011).

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Fig. 5.7  The barricade on the Main Bridge. As seen from the southern riverbank. (Picture taken by author in 2011)

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Yet external intimidations can also take the form of spontaneous and scattered clashes. People in Mitrovica experience everything from verbal abuse to beatings when being identified as on “the wrong side” (Clark 2014; OSCE 2011; UNDP 2011). These violent acts do not occur every time people cross Ibar, but they happen often enough that people are careful (conversation with police officers 2015). The words by some Serbs towards Albanians crossing the Main Bridge when the barricade was removed in 2014 are illustrative: Get the fuck out of here. You are going to drink coffee here? Come here and take pictures? If I can’t walk down south, then you are not going to walk north. (overheard yelling by a Serb to some of the first Albanians to cross that morning)

Field of Possible Acts: Dare Not Interact, Have Nowhere to Meet The interplay between these ways of thinking and modes of acting effectively structure the field of possible acts for both Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica. Through governmentality it becomes evident that people either dare not to interact across the divide or have limited opportunities for meeting “the other” even when they dare to. Fear thus governs people in Mitrovica towards the division and non-contact found in both the Albanian and the Serb ethnonational peace(s).  eople Not Really Daring to Interact P Fear structures the field of possible acts for people in Mitrovica by making sure most dare not interact across ethnonational divides. Some are genuinely afraid. By portraying “the other” as hateful, people are made to associate contact with danger. This fear is partly based on prejudices that are being reproduced, but also on experiences that people either have or know about. It is harder to be Albanian than Serb north of Ibar—and vice versa (interviews with EULEX official based in Pristina 2015; NATO analyst 2011; see also Clark 2014; Fort 2018; ICG 2009; 2010; 2011; OSCE 2011). Kosovo is supposed to be a multiethnic society that coexists, but it is an environment where they [Albanians and Serbs] live next to one another [and] with a hostile attitude towards each other. (interview with UNMIK official 2014)

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Fear thus makes people on both sides of Ibar choose division and non-­ contact rather than interaction (Clark 2014; Gusic 2015; Krasniqi 2013; OSCE 2011; Nešović and Celeghini 2015). Many have not crossed Ibar for years because they are afraid to do so. One interviewee told me that he had not been ‘up there’ (in the north) for two years, that he had no reason to go, and that ‘fear [of getting injured, robbed, or killed] is the main reason why I have no reason’ (interview with local community developer 2015). Upon passing the Main Bridge during a walk, I asked another interviewee if he wanted to go and have a look at it. It was just days after the riots in June 2014 and the rubble had not yet been cleaned up. He replied, ‘I’m not going there, I’ll wait for you, but I’m not going there’ (conversation with local historian 2014). Later he told me that he had not crossed the bridge since 1999 because of fear. This division and non-­ contact permeates life on both sides of Ibar: [It is a] Berlin wall. […] Not only to me, but most people living here have the feeling that after the bridge, nothing exists […] It is [a Berlin wall] because the two communities have lived next to one another whilst trying to have as few connections as possible. Each community lived for itself […]. People here have the concept of coming to the bridge, and then from the bridge there is nothing, it is like coming to the abyss. (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015)

Yet these fears do not mean that no one chooses interaction across Mitrovica’s ethnonational divides. There are those who discard non-­ contact and division despite the predominance of fear in Mitrovica. Albanians living in the north cross Ibar on a daily basis, Serbs go south to get Kosovar IDs or collect pensions, and people on both sides visit former neighbours. Small-scale farmers and business people (as well as criminals) operate across Mitrovica in order to cope with the underperforming economy and/or take advantage of the institutional divisions (Björkdahl and Gusic 2013; Clark 2014; Krasniqi 2013). The economic imbalances across Ibar also mean that Albanian day labourers work in the north due to higher wages while Serbs shop in the south due to lower prices (interview with local ICO official 2011). But just because people interact does not mean that fear does not govern them as well. Those who cross namely often avoid unknown places, speak English, travel only during the day, and/or maintain a low profile to not be discover as “the other”. Even those who do choose interaction do not feel ‘free to move about as they would do normally [because of fear]’

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(interview with EULEX police officer 2015). One interviewee who works all over Kosovo explained that fear makes him think about safety all the time: Look, I have no problems going to the south side. I have travelled there for a long time, not only on the south side, but across Kosovo. But there is a feeling, a fact that all sorts of things can happen to me at some moment. (interview with local EUSR official 2011)

Yet this is not the end of how fear governs. There are indeed many who fear “the other” even if they do interact across ethnonational divides, but there are also those who believe these dangers to be exaggerated, politically motivated, or just wrong (interview with former CBM leader 2011). But fear structures their fields of possible acts as well. Not by making “the other” something to fear, but by making crossing something that one fears getting exposed of. As both sides of Ibar exercise internal pressure to keep the in-group cohesive and external intimidation to keep “the other” away, those who do not fear “the other” end up fearing possible reactions when crossing Ibar—e.g. a beating by “them” or ostracizing by “us” (Borch 2017; Clark 2014; Zupančič 2019). The quotation below is illustrative of how they are governed by the fear of being exposed: For the last fourteen years, I have not come across one case where people have met and started to hang around. There has been a lot of seminars or training sessions […] outside or inside Kosovo […] and when people go there, the atmosphere is fine, people drink, tease around, realise that they are normal people and they talk about normal things, about work or travel, about which school they finished. They even hook up […]. But when they come back here, because the pressure from the community is enormous, that dies. The moment they come back to Mitrovica it dies […]. Earlier it was enormous pressure […] people were killed, those scars are still fresh, there are people that lost entire families […]. And then we come to the question if you need or want to be a hero and risk, either getting beaten up or losing your job, to interact with someone publicly. (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014)

Through governmentality it becomes clear that fear structures the field of possible acts of people in Mitrovica so that interaction with “the other” rarely is a feasible choice (interview with local EUSR official 2011). Most people either fear interaction as such or fear repercussions if seen interacting. Either way, fear governs people towards the ethnonational peace(s) and effectively cements the ethnonational divisions across Ibar.

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Divided People Having Nowhere to Interact The city has been divided for such a long time that it has been normalized. […] I do not want claim that Mitrovica is a lost city as such, but there are very few things that bind people together; it is more a question about demarcation of the border. (interview with EULEX official 2011)

Fear also structures the field of possible acts so that it is difficult to engage “the other” even if one wants and dares to. This inability is twofold: people are stuck in parallel spheres with few everyday contact points whilst having next to no shared spaces where they can interact outside of the everyday. Segregation and isolation as modes of acting upon fear have effectively created parallel spheres with almost no overlap. The result of this parallelism is that people can only lead divided everyday lives—in the Albanian or Serb sphere—in which they almost never meet “the other” (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014; 2015). The reason is that there just are no contact points between the two spheres: It has been so many years that I think people […] generally they have their own routines, and they have very little contact […] there are no points of contact, you know, you need to have a common workplace […] you need common points of contact to make that interaction happen. People who had friends from different communities, who did not cut of these relationships, underneath the surface they still maintain some of those. But they did not have opportunities […] to create new relationships, new bonds, because the communities have been so separated from each other. […] It is difficult to make bonds when there is nothing that unites you […]. There are a lot of different projects, trying to bring people together [but] a lot of these attempts are not very sustainable in actually establishing these links between people […] you have few workshops, [a] retreat here or there, and then these people meet for a few hours or days, but that is that. If you want to have a dialogue, create relationships or establish bonds, you have to have a longterm setup, where people meet on a regular basis. (interview with OSCE official 2014) Fear thus governs Serbs and Albanians in Mitrovica into routine division from “the other”. People cannot meet at school, work, or restaurants. Not because they do not want to (although most still do not want to), but  because there are no shared schools, workplaces, and restaurants

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(Gusic  2019). Even those who are open to interaction are stuck in ­ethnonationally spheres—north or south of Ibar—that grants them no everyday contact where they can bump into “the other”. The possibility to choose everyday contact has thus been structured away to the point of elimination. It does not mean that interaction is impossible, but it does mean that such interactions will only happen outside of everyday life (interviews with EULEX official 2011; politician 2015). Yet even non-everyday interactions are difficult. Fear has divided Mitrovica into “safe/unsafe” and “Albanian/Serb” spaces. This means that even if people dare, want, and try to exit their parallel everyday lives in order to interact across Ibar, there are almost no shared (i.e. non-­ ethnonational) spaces where they can do so. People still can—and do— choose to interact with each other. Fear, however, has made this choice harder and less pleasant. Those who want to connect across Ibar have do so in ethnonational spaces (e.g. bars, streets, or parks) that are hostile to such contact, in confined spaces that are not accessible to all (e.g. the premises of NGOs), or within the four walls of one’s home (interview with local EULEX official 2014). The result is that most people in Mitrovica choose—willingly as well as reluctantly—the division inherent in the ethnonational peace(s).

5.4   The External Inability to Govern The picture of Mitrovica has so far been dominated by governing attempts that push people in Mitrovica towards the ethnonational peace(s). Yet Mitrovica also holds attempts at governing people towards the coexisting peace and thereby counter ethnonational divisions, (re)knit the social fabric of the city, and unite it under one political system (Gusic 2015; Krasniqi 2012; Bieber 2015). Through governmentality it become clear that the coexisting peace nevertheless leads a rather marginal existence because these—largely external22—governing attempts in line with the coexisting peace are quite inefficient in structuring the field of possible acts for Albanians and Serbs. 22  The term “external” is here used to capture everything from external organisations (e.g. EULEX, OSCE, UNMIK) and NGOs with staff in Mitrovica to those that in some way or another meddle in the city from the outside—e.g. foreign embassies and diplomats in Pristina, different organisations (e.g. World Bank or the European Commission) though field offices, or governments in Berlin, Paris, and Washington (see also Visoka 2016).

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Ways of Thinking: Coexistence Just is Better The governing attempts supporting the coexisting peace and envisioning a united Mitrovica—where Albanian, Serb, and other (e.g. Roma or Gorani) communities live together—are based on three ways of thinking. The first one sees coexistence as virtuous and morally superior vis-à-vis ethnonational divisions (interviews with CBM leader 2014; local EULEX official based in Pristina 2015; UNMIK official 2015). While this way of thinking is mainly promulgated by externals in Mitrovica, it also enjoys local support (Björkdahl and Gusic 2015; Fagan 2011). There are people in Mitrovica who—despite the dominant Albanian and Serb ethnonationalist peace(s)—strive for or want to go back to coexistence: For me, personally, I would want it to be like it was [when we were all living together]. (interview with citizen in Mitrovica north of Ibar 2015) I would like people not to think about this anymore: ‘are you an Albanian or a Serb?’, but have equal rights and feel so also and live in peace. (interview with citizen in Mitrovica south of Ibar 2014, italics in original)

The second way of thinking is more pragmatic. The idea is that Albanians and Serbs live next to one another and will continue to do so—regardless of Mitrovica’s future status (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; ICG 2011; Pond 2008). This inherently unavoidable contact is subsequently argued to have only one answer with long-term viability: coexistence with “the other”: Serbs and Albanians need to learn to be neighbours, because even if it would be a divide [of Mitrovica between Kosovo and Serbia], it would not be a wall, [we] would still need to interact. (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015)

Since the most likely outcome23 is that Mitrovica will remain within Kosovo while the city north of Ibar will keep its Serb majority, coexistence boils down to Albanians needing to accept diverging (Serb) voices and Serbs needing to accept Kosovar institutions:

23  This also goes for the rest of Kosovo, which probably will maintain its territorial sovereignty within the political lines it had in SFRJ while Serbs maintain self-governance vis-à-vis Pristina in municipalities where they are the majority. This future does not satisfy either side at the moment.

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[Albanians] need to understand that [Mitrovica north of Ibar] is Serb territory. Not Serbia’s but Serb […]. The sooner that happens, the better. (interview with local analyst based in Pristina 2011) Yes, Serbia is important, but it is in Pristina that things concerning us happen, and we need to be there, heard there, active there, seen there—for Albanians in [Kosovar] institutions to know the needs of people from the north. (interview with NGO activist focusing on rule of law 2015)

The third way of thinking is that people in Mitrovica have more in common than usually portrayed in the city’s toxic atmosphere (Arenliu et al. 2014; Bloom et al. 2006; Brand and Idrizi 2012). People on both sides namely lack stable employment, suffer from low quality education and healthcare, and feel uneasy about the political tensions (interviews with local community developer 2015; local ICO official 2011; NGO official 2014). These shared “real life” issues mean that people without stakes in corrupt structures just do not care about “[ethnonational] politics”; they just want to lead normal lives with stable incomes, good education, decent healthcare, and reliable social services in a secure environment where they are not marginalised (Joireman 2016; Lončar 2016; Pond 2008). If the situation in postwar Mitrovica would be normalised so that needs rather than ethnonational belonging decide everyday life, people would get along just fine. I said it in an interview ten years ago and they wanted to take my head off, but I’m saying it today as well: if people would lead normal lives here, if I had a passport, a salary, not millions, not yachts, but a job that can give me a summer and winter vacation, so that I do not have to tremble every time the electricity or water bills come, do you think that anyone would care at all what this country is called? […] If people would live normal lives, have normal life conditions […] then nobody would care what the country is called. My honest opinion is that I would not care. (interview with NGO activist focusing on community development 2014) [If] governments would invest and make [Mitrovica] a good place for people’s children to grow up, I am sure 100% would accept [coexistence]. In principle, if you offer people jobs and opportunities, they do not care about ethnicity. (interview with local analyst based in Pristina 2015)

These ways of thinking unambiguously prescribe coexistence through shared political institutions that generate welfare, security, and equality for everyone. The envisioned road there is quite straight-forward and mostly

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focused on integrating Serbs and Mitrovica north of Ibar into Kosovo. The reasoning is that since Kosovo is the likely endpoint for Mitrovica— and thus the locality of any future coexistence—the group and city part currently not in this entity (i.e. Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar) need to be integrated to enable coexistence (interviews with CBM leader; NGO official 2015; UNMIK official 2015; see also Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Yabanci 2016). Modes of Acting: Enforced Externally and Top-Down The coexisting peace is quite the same no matter if it is formulated by people in Mitrovica or external organisations active there: the city is envisioned as united and its citizens as living together. Yet these common ways of thinking have not resulted in common modes of acting. The governing attempts in line with the coexisting peace instead emerge as externally created and enforced (Bieber 2015; Fagan 2011; Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik 2012; Yabanci 2016). This does not mean that there are no local modes of acting in line with the coexisting peace, but it does mean that these are quite marginal. The coexisting peace instead emerges as primarily driven by Kosovo-only bodies like UNMIK, ICO, EULEX, or KFOR; by permanent envoys to Kosovo like EUSR or embassies of key states; and by global organisations with operations in Kosovo like OSCE or the World Bank. While there are several modes of acting in these governing attempts, two stand out: pressure on Belgrade as well as supervision and monitoring of Kosovar institutions.  overning Serbs Through Belgrade G The first mode of acting is about making Belgrade dismantle its parallel institutions, which are seen to both uphold the Serb ethnonational peace and undermine the coexisting one (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Ker-Lindsay 2012; Orosz 2016a). I have already demonstrated how these parallel institutions enable, encourage, and pressure Serbs into resisting integration into the Kosovar institutions. The underlying logic in this mode of acting is therefore that if Belgrade dismantles its parallel institutions, the Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar will be left with integration as their only viable choice (Bergmann and Niemann 2015; Ker-Lindsay 2012; Kostovicova 2014). To make Belgrade dismantle its parallel institutions, carrots and sticks are used. This mode of acting—to put it simply—links Belgrade’s broader

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political goals with the continued existence of the parallel institutions, with dismantlement rewarded and maintenance punished. There are numerous examples of this tit-for-tat, which lately pertains mostly to either financial aid or Serbia’s EU accession road. Loans and aid have been conditioned on Belgrade cutting its funding to the parallel institutions (Bieber 2015; Kostovicova 2014; Horvat and Štiks 2015). Serbia was denied EU candidacy status because its parallel institutions were central in erecting barricades in and around Mitrovica in 2011 (interview with EULEX official 2011; see also Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Guzina and Marijan 2014). Serbia was then granted this status when the Integrated Border Management (IBM)24 was established in late 2011 (Bieber 2015; Visoka and Doyle 2016). EU membership negotiations were then not opened until Belgrade agreed to dismantle and/or integrate into Kosovo some additional parallel security and municipal institutions (Bieber 2015; Bergmann and Niemann 2015; Guzina and Marijan 2014).25 Regardless of the carrots and sticks, the overarching goal of this mode of acting is to make Belgrade dismantle its parallel institutions to encourage Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar to choose integration.26  overning Serbs Through Kosovar Institutions G The second mode of acting is about making Kosovar institutions—and the Albanians that staff them—respect and guarantee the rights given to all Kosovar citizens on paper but not respected on the ground. The external organisations have since 1999 tried to create an institutional framework that guarantees equal rights for everyone in Kosovo (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Visoka and Doyle 2016). Having removed the ethnonationalist Serb institutions, the goal has been to avoid an ethnonationalist Albanian counterpart and instead build a coexisting Kosovo (Franks and 24  This led to the withdrawal of some parallel security structures, incremental integration of local Serb police into Kosovo, and many of the barricades being dismantled. 25  This was part of the more wide-ranging Brussels Agreement in 2013 in which the parallel institutions were the largest stumbling-block. A week later the thitherto blocked negotiations were opened (conversation with local UNDP official; see also Bieber 2015). 26  These are not controversial statements. The European Union (EU) refused to accept Serbia’s membership application for years, explicitly citing the lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The application was then promptly accepted when Mladić, Hodžić, and Karadžić were captured and transferred to ICTY (see Bergman and Niemann 2015; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; ObradovićWochnik and Wochnik 2012).

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Richmond 2008; King and Mason 2006). These efforts succeeded on paper. Kosovo’s legislative, executive, and judiciary branches are independent of each other. Democratic rights are guaranteed for every citizen and minority rights are extensive. The latter pertains especially to Serbs who enjoy self-governance (e.g. in education, healthcare, and police), have language rights guaranteed, and are ensured horizontal (in municipalities) and vertical (in parliament) political presence (King and Mason 2006; Perritt 2010; Pond 2008). On the ground, however, these efforts have largely failed. Rule of law remains weak, the power of corrupt and/or criminal leaders reaches across government branches, citizens struggle to attain rights, and minorities are discriminated.27 This status quo effectively governs Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar away from integration (interviews with local EULEX official 2011; 2014; 2015; local EUSR official 2014; local politician 2011). This is acknowledged by externals: [Serbs have] justified [fears of the Kosovo system]. If there was no […] international community protecting the Serb communities in Gračanica and the other Serb majority places, the exodus of Serbs would have been much bigger and stronger. There definitely need to be [external] measures to protect these groups. (interview with UNMIK official 2014)

The response has been to put pressure on these malfunctioning institutions in order to improve them. The underlying hope is that by making sure that Kosovar institutions respect and guarantee equal rights and opportunities for all its citizen as well as uphold minority rights, Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar will see the choice to integrate as viable (interviews with EULEX official based in Pristina 2015; ICO official 2011; UNMIK official 2014). Kosovar institutions are to this end continuously monitored and supervised by the same organisations that built them (Bieber 2015; Hamza 2015; Pond 2008; Visoka and Richmond 2016; Visoka 2016). The balance between monitoring and supervising has tilted over the years. In the immediate postwar period, externals ran Kosovo completely (Ker-Lindsay 2012; King and Mason 2006).28 Since the supervision of Kosovo’s independence has formally ended, most external organ27  These claims are supported by many sources (see Clark 2014; Deda and Kursani 2012; Ernst 2011; Fort 2018; ICG 2010; Joireman 2016; Krasniqi 2013; Lončar 2016; OSCE 2011; Narten 2009; Sigona et al. 2009; van der Borgh 2012; Zogiani and Bajrami 2014). 28  At least formally. The external mission did not arrive into a vacuum in 1999. Albanians had for years organised their lives parallel to the official Serb institutions and soon filled the

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isations today monitor rather than supervise Kosovo (Ernst 2011; Hamza 2015; Visoka 2016). Yet this does not mean that all external organisations have made this transition. EULEX monitors the rule of law in Kosovo but is also there in an executive and judiciary capacity. It supervises the KP from within while maintaining its own police force that mostly focuses on war crimes, grave corruption cases, and ethnonational tensions (interview with EULEX police officer 2015). EULEX is also involved in the prosecution and sentencing of sensitive and/or serious cases (Deda and Kursani 2012; Dijkstra 2011; Pond 2008). KFOR is also still present. Although it has been downsized considerably, it still consists of over 4000 troops who remain responsible for security in Kosovo and the safety of all citizens (interview with NATO analyst 2011). This combined monitoring and supervision is two-tiered. Monitoring is about exposing irregularities (e.g. denial of property rights for minorities) and pressuring Kosovar institutions to fix them by threatening to withhold aid, halt its EU path, or withdraw support for its consolidation in global fora. The supervision is more to the point and is exercised by prosecuting (or threatening to do so) those found to deny minorities their rights, enrichen themselves, or abuse power (Capusella 2015; Joireman 2016; Visoka and Richmond 2016; Visoka 2016; Yabanci 2016). The Field of Possible Acts: When We Govern It Is with the Help of Others The external governing attempts thus attempt to govern Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar by ousting the Serb and disciplining the Albanian e­ thnonationalist peace(s)—or: by governing those that govern them. This “governing by proxy” structures the field of possible acts for Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar in quite peculiar ways. Governing through Belgrade has shifting outcomes as it both pushes Serbs towards coexistence and completely fails to do so while governing through Kosovar institutions seems to be counterproductive as it governs Serbs away from coexistence even more.  hey Do What We Want, but Only If Belgrade Says So T The first mode of acting governs Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar towards integration—but only when Belgrade cooperates. When pressure on power vacuum that emerged when Serbia withdrew from Kosovo, thus immediately starting to compete with the external missions (Ernst 2011; Ker-Lindsay 2012; Peterson 2010).

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Belgrade leads it to dismantle some parallel institutions, Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar are indeed left with no other viable choices than to integrate (interviews with local EUSR official 2014; NGO activist focusing on community development 2015; UNMIK official 2015; see also Zupančič 2019). A prominent example is the integration of local Serb police officers into the KP. These police officers—often fiercely loyal to the Serb ethnonational peace—have been integral in keeping Kosovar institutions at bay and Mitrovica north of Ibar cohesively Serb (ICG 2011; Knaus 2005; van der Borgh 2012). Yet to resist integration these police officers were always dependent on having alternatives to KP in order to survive. These alternatives were provided by Belgrade. Through salaries, pensions, and benefits given by its parallel institutions, Belgrade made sure that these police officers could combine resisting integration with putting food on the table. This changed when Belgrade agreed to dismantle its parallel police forces in 2013 (Beha 2015; Bieber 2015; Kursani 2014; Zupančič 2019). What ensued was that all local Serb police officers were fired or retired from the parallel institutions and then offered equivalent positions within the KP ranks—even if this resulted in overstaffing in the KP (interviews with EULEX police officer 2015; OSCE official 2014; UNMIK official 2014; conversation with former police officers 2015). This move drastically restructured the field of possible acts for these police officers. Because the parallel salaries, pensions, and benefits disappeared, the choice to resist integration could no longer be combined with everyday survival. What followed was the complete and almost frictionless integration of these police officers into the ranks of the KP (interviews with EULEX official 2014; EULEX police officer 2015; conversation with former police officers 2015). Not because they suddenly embraced the still despised and feared Kosovar institutions, but because they ‘lost support from Belgrade. They lost their jobs and were forced to accept any job’ (interview with local UNDP official 2015). This is the situation for most Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar; when Belgrade dismantles its parallel presence most are forced to integrate. People are being forced to integrate into the Kosovar society even if 99%— and I repeat 99%—of the population in the north does not want this integration. [But] if alternatives or variants are being reduced, you simply do not have any choice [other] than to integrate. (interview with local UNDP official 2014)

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This reality was poignantly illustrated by the protests that followed the integration into KP. These protests were namely not organised by former police officers resisting integration, but by civilian police staff who also lost their jobs yet were excluded from the ensuing integration process. Their demands? To also join the KP (interview with UNMIK official 2015; conversation with protester 2014). By pressuring Belgrade to dismantle its parallel institutions in Mitrovica, the coexisting governing attempts are thus able to govern Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar towards the coexisting peace because they are left without other choices. Yet this impact is dependent on Belgrade actually complying. When Kosovar institutions have made advancements north of Ibar while the parallel options have remained, the Serbs living there have in contrast continued to resist integration. The example of the municipal institutions (i.e. city council and local administration) is illustrative. Belgrade pressured local Serbs to vote in the local Kosovar elections in 2013 whilst instructing its Mitrovica officials to participate in the formation of Kosovar institutions north of Ibar. Yet this encouragement to integrate was not accompanied with the dismantling of equivalent parallel institutions. This meant ‘continuity in everyday life. People have not been fired and they are [still] not dependent on Pristina in any way’ (interview with EULEX official based in Pristina 2015). The result is that people in these parallel institutions continue to resist integration (interview with UNMIK official 2015). The reason is that in the choice between ethnonationalist division through Belgrade’s parallel institutions and integration into Kosovar institutions, the vast majority of Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar will reject coexistence and instead uphold divisions (see Bieber 2015; Economides and KerLindsay 2015; Franks and Richmond 2008; Zupančič 2019).29 This effectively points to the limitations of the external governing attempts: they only manage to govern Serbs towards coexistence with Belgrade’s help. They Do the Opposite of What We Want Kosovo is ready to integrate Serbs on their conditions. That is politics. They have for long been prepared to integrate the north, but under their conditions. (interview with municipal worker 2015)

29  I have yet to encounter anyone preferring integration. There are those who see integration as inevitable but that is their analysis, not their desire.

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I think these fears are somehow based on rational thinking [of Serbs]. I do not see them as completely wrong […]. This government is not doing anything for me that is Albanian, so how do I expect them to do something for Serbs? (interview with local analyst based in Pristina 2015)

The other mode of acting is even less inefficient. The monitored and supervised Kosovar institutions namely continue to actively generate resistance towards integration as they neither are nor are perceived to be inclusive and tolerant towards minorities—despite the external governing attempts (Deda and Kursani 2012; Ernst 2011; Fort 2018; Jović and Nešović 2015; OSCE 2011). This does not mean that Kosovar institutions practice ‘soft apartheid’, ‘institutional genocide’, or ‘silent ethnic cleansing’ as is sometimes claimed by Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar (interviews with doctor 2015; local historian 2014; conversation with politician 2015). Yet it does mean that everyday life would be harder for Serbs within Kosovar institutions than it is today in the parallel institutions—all other things being equal (Krasniqi 2012; Mulaj 2011; Zogiani and Bajrami 2014). The quotes below point to the discrepancy between the external coexisting vision and the ethnonational reality in Kosovo: If Kosovo created incentives for them [Serbs] to participate, if Kosovo funded their inclusion in the state, then fine, that would be another story. But I do not think that any Kosovo government is going to do that. [Ivan: Why?] Because they do not like the Serbs, unfortunately, but there you go, the negative experiences from the war still persists. (interview with EULEX official based in Pristina 2014) Pristina has been very bad at connecting to the north. The Serbs ask what the south can offer them while the south sees the north as a territory that must go into Kosovo. [It is about] control [and] power. Nowhere do [Albanians] talk about what they can offer the north. And when [Serbs] look at the south from the north, they see […] that things are not functioning there, asking themselves why they should integrate. (interview with EULEX official 2014) Personally, I would not feel that it is so easy to be […] Serb south of Ibar. It is an illusion that Kosovo is a multiethnic society. It says so in the constitution and there are rights, but OSCE reports daily about situations where Serbs are denied their rights […] and there are no indications that Pristina has stretched a hand and said: ‘we want you to be part of the society we are building’. (interview with EULEX official 2011)

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The Kosovar institutions thus continue to govern Serbs away from ­integration and towards division. The reason is that Serbs in Mitrovica north of Ibar often just do not see integration as an actual choice; the perceived choice is rather between resisting Kosovo or leaving for Serbia. The resistance is longstanding and encompasses everything from barricades to quietly refusing to participate in Kosovar institutions and leading monoethnic lives (Bieber 2015; Clark 2014; Gusic 2019). Yet more recently, an increasing number of Serbs are preparing to leave. Belgrade’s support is becoming anything but certain while Kosovar institutions are slowly moving north. This reality has led some Serbs to look into choices outside of Kosovo (Joseph and Hoogenboom 2014). It is hard to assert the range of anything in Mitrovica, but I have encountered many people who are keeping their options open in terms of leaving. Many have “backup” houses in Serbia, are looking for jobs elsewhere, or keep bugout-bags packed (interview with politician 2011, 2015; conversation with citizen 2015; women’s activist 2015; see also Jović 2015). The vast majority of Serbs namely believe that life under Kosovar institutions is so untenable that even the possibility of integration makes them want to leave: The integration will mean that the Serb community will cease to exist. If the university is integrated, if the hospital, if education [are integrated, then] people will leave. (interview with politician 2015) What is being done is the integration of all Serb structures into the Kosovar system, which eventually will lead to the acceleration of Serb exodus from here. […] If it continues like this, people will move. Definitely, anyone who has any opportunity. I always take departure from my perspective [and I would move]. (interview with local UNDP official 2015) There are very few people who make any long-term plans to stay here […] everything is from today to tomorrow […]. The lack of support from my own government leads me to believe that I have nothing to strive for here. (interview with citizen 2014)

The external governing attempts thus only manage to structure the field of possible acts for local Serbs towards the coexisting peace through Belgrade. When going through Kosovar institutions or when Belgrade is unreceptive to sticks and carrots, these governing attempts lack impact.

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Visoka, Gëzim. 2016. Shaping peace in Kosovo: the politics of peacebuilding and statehood. Palgrave Macmillan. Visoka, Gëzim and John Doyle. 2016. “Neo-functional peace: the European Union way of resolving conflicts”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54(4): 862–877. Visoka, Gëzim and Oliver P. Richmond. 2016. “After liberal peace? from failed state-building to an emancipatory peace in Kosovo”. International Studies Perspectives 18(1): 110–129. Waller, Michael, Kyril Drezov and Bülent Gökay, eds. 2001. Kosovo: the politics of delusion. Frank Cass. Yabanci, Bilge. 2016. “The (il)legitimacy of EU state building: local support and contention in Kosovo”. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16(3): 1–29. Zaum, Dominik. 2009. “The norms and politics of exit: ending postconflict transitional administrations”. Ethics & International Affairs 23(2): 189–208. Zeqiri, Adrian and Sanja Lazarevic. 2014. “Bridging the divide: establishing a joint board for the city of Mitrovica”. European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo, Policy Brief 1(1): 1–6. Zogiani, Avni and Lorik Bajrami. 2014. “Culture of impunity in Kosovo”. Forum 2015 Policy Brief Series: What Went Wrong? 13(1): 1–34. Zupančič, Rok. 2019. “EU peace-building in the north of Kosovo and psychosocial implications for the locals: a bottom up perspective on normative power Europe”. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 21(5): 576–593.

Online Sources, News Articles, Videos, and Datasets B92. 2010. “Jeremić: Kosovo is Serbia’s Jerusalem”. B92. [b92.net/eng/news/ politics.php?yyyy=2010&mm=01&dd=17&nav_id=64534]. Accessed on 18 August 2017. Milivojevic, Andjela. 2019. “Bombs and bullets: fear and loathing in North Kosovo”. Balkan Insight. [https://balkaninsight.com/2019/01/16/bombsand-bullets-fear-and-loathing-in-north-kosovo-01-14-20191/]. Accessed on 13 May 2019.

CHAPTER 6

Contesting Postwar Belfast

Yes, we all want peace, who wants war? You’re a nutcase if you want to live in a war. But that can only happen if we have justice and we have freedom and we are treated as equals in our own country […] I will not feel peace until the British government has left Ireland and the Irish people are left to determine their own future. (interview with political former prisoner 2014) I believe [we] won the war because the war was about keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom [while] the IRA’s war was to bring about United Ireland. […]. We are still in the UK so we won the war, but I think very much Republicans are winning the peace. (interview with community worker 2014)

Northern Ireland plunged into war in the late 1960s when the mostly Catholic protests against discrimination within the Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland1 turned into violent clashes in the streets.2 Unexpected at the time, “the Troubles” (as this war was euphemistically called) would 1  Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). 2  The two main groups in Belfast are often labelled differently. One side is Catholic, Nationalist, or Republican while the other is Protestant, Unionist, or Loyalist. These labels shift from person and from intent. Catholic/Protestant ascribes group belonging. Nationalist/Unionist are more political as Nationalists want “Irish unity” and Unionist want to remain within “the Union” (i.e. the UK). Republican/Loyalist are used to depict those prepared to go to war to achieve these political goals—with Loyalists being loyal to the UK and Republicans wanting to join the Republic of Ireland. These labels, however, are protean

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last for decades and affect the lives of generations, leaving more than 3,500 people dead and many more wounded or displaced. Still today the reasons behind, length of, and conflict lines in this war are disputed and rendered as: the fight for equality—e.g in housing and employment—by the discriminated Catholic minority; the final standoff between British imperialism and its first and last colony; the struggle between Republicanism and Loyalism; terrorists trying to undermine the will of the majority in Northern Ireland; or the final act of the 800-year-old fight for Irish independence (Boal 1996; McGarry and O’Leary 1995; Walker 2012). These questions are beyond the scope of this book. Yet what can be said is that “the Troubles” became an ethnonationally coded war between Catholics and Protestants that to some extent was about Northern Ireland itself. This political entity had not existed until 1921 when the north-­ eastern and mostly Protestant part of Ireland3 was partitioned from the rest of the mostly Catholic island. The partition happened in the light of the accelerating struggle for Irish independence and subsequently meant that when Ireland became independent in 1922, it encompassed the rest of the island within the borders that today constitute the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland in turn remained part of the UK and under the rule of the Protestant majority, who then outnumbered Catholics two-to-­ one (McGarry and O’Leary 1995; Walker 2012). This secured the existence of Protestants on an otherwise Catholic island or continued the occupation of Ireland and ensured that the discrimination of the Catholic minority there was uninterrupted—all depending on whom one asks (Graham and Nash 2006; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Walker 2012). Yet despite continued tensions and political divisions, Northern Ireland did not experience renewed war until the late 1960s when the two sides clashed over the unequal political composition of Northern Ireland as well as its future status (within the Republic of Ireland or the UK). It is hard to depict “the Troubles” as its trajectory and intensity changed over the decades. Paramilitaries on both sides planted bombs, targeted different enemies, and hurt civilians (Bew and Gillespie 1993; Boal 1996). UK armed forces were early on deployed to contain the violence between the sides but ended up mostly targeting the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA in turn engaged in bombing campaigns that stretched from Belfast to London and often used interchangeably. I will for analytical clarity therefore use the labels Catholic/ Protestant throughout this book. 3  Then one political entity (like Scotland or England) within the UK encompassing the entire island.

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in an attempt to remove the armed forces—together with the entire UK state (English 2003; McGarry and O’Leary 1995). The violence escalated and de-escalated repeatedly while the military presence turned Northern Ireland into a low-intensive war zone (Bew and Gillespie 1993; Smyth 2017). The already existing ethnonational segregation also deepened as people clustered to areas where they felt safe (Boal 1996). This went on for decades until all sides slowly realised—or were forced to accept—that Northern Ireland would neither be “liberated” nor “secured” through war. These realisations eventually led to ceasefires and subsequent peace talks that produced the Belfast Agreement (BA) or the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)—the name is ironically contested—signed in 1998 by most conflict parties (McGarry 2001; Smyth 2017).4 The BA/GFA brought an end to violence by the major war parties, introduced ethnonational power-sharing with mandatory coalition governments, established minority rights protection, and tied the now cooperating UK and Irish governments into Northern Ireland’s future (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). Although the BA/GFA was not initially supported by everyone, the agreement is today ostensibly accepted by all major political parties in Northern Ireland and the tensions have gone down considerably. There is vast public support for political dialogue, the major paramilitaries are not engaging in violence (although some of them have dissidents that do), and the presence of armed forces has almost disappeared (Bollens 2018). Interaction between people across divides is rising while groups previously kept in the margins (like immigrants, women, and LGBTQ people) are speaking up. Yet this progress does not mean that the conflict lines from “the Troubles” have been transcended. The ethnonational balance is monitored, politics is seen in zero-sum terms, Catholics and Protestants are widely segregated, the defensive architecture is widespread, and the future status of Northern Ireland remains uncertain (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Smyth 2017). While things are better, it is still joked that Northern Irish politics can be put on the UNESCO World Heritage List because ‘they haven’t changed since the 17th century’ (interview with Belfast City Council planner 2015). This might be stretching things a little too far, but the sentiment is not wrong as the entire political system is dominated by its ethnonational fringes (Mitchell 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; O’Dowd 2014).5 There are, of course,  The currently largest party—the Democratic Unionist Part (DUP)—did not sign it.  The second largest party in Northern Ireland after DUP is Sinn Féin (the political wing of IRA). 4 5

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alternatives to this picture as some people have moved passed or never knew the war (O’Dowd and Komarova 2011; Shirlow and Coulter 2014). Yet the two ethnonational strands still dominate Northern Ireland. In the main Unionism and Nationalism are the two main identities […] I think that this stuff preoccupies people. […] We do not have any sense of collective citizenship here because there are two different directions where the two communities’ ultimate endpoint is. (interview with Good Relations Officer 2014)

The war has thus ended but Northern Ireland remains stuck in and permeated by conflicts over peace(s) that affect everything from high-politics to everyday life. Stormont (the regional parliament) is currently in deadlock, coalition talks have collapsed, and the threat of direct rule from London (as during “the Troubles”) is yet again immanent. The uncertainties brought by Brexit—including the risk of a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and the UK—are not exactly making things easier. Added to this is that educational and residential segregation is widespread, mixed marriages are low, and the absolute majority of people vote for explicitly ethnonational political parties (Boal 2002; Murtagh 2010; Neill 2004).

6.1   Belfast Belfast—the capital and largest city of Northern Ireland—hardly escaped “the Troubles”. The city had before the war not exactly been characterised by coexistence as Catholics and Protestants were clustered into divided neighbourhoods, worked at largely monoethnic workplaces, and attended segregated schools. The city was also politically and economically dominated by Protestants, just like the rest of Northern Ireland. Yet there was contact and friendships between Catholics and Protestants, Belfast’s ethnonationally segregated neighbourhoods were in close proximity to one another, and the city was quite open and permeable (Boal 1996; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). All this changed with “the Troubles”. Segregation and divisions skyrocketed, mixing and permeability all but ceased, and people became ‘intimate enemies’ (Bollens 1999, 8). Belfast’s symbolic status as the capital of Northern Ireland in turn made it the target for Catholics to attack and Protestants to protect (Boal 1996; 2002; Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). The city was additionally also the stronghold of both Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries and political parties (Boal 1996;

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Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). These factors effectively made Belfast the disproportionally affected epicentre of “the Troubles”—characterised by bloody clashes, intricate defensive architecture, and twice the average amount of war-related deaths per capita (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011).

Fig. 6.1  A map of Belfast. It is a spread out harbour city with most people living in houses rather than apartments. (Map generated by author using Open Street Map)

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Today, Belfast is calmer (Nolan 2013). Yet many problems remain and just like the city suffered disproportionally during “the Troubles”, it is today the focal point of the conflicts over peace(s) that followed the BA/ GPA (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Murtagh 2002; O’Dowd and Komarova 2011, 2013). Belfast is still severely segregated, contains most of Northern Ireland’s deprived areas, and regularly suffers from more tension and violence than the rest of Northern Ireland. Paramilitaries still control everyday life in certain areas and intergroup contact is low and often contentious (Graham and Nash 2006; Nolan 2012). More than twenty years after the BA/GFA, Belfast still suffers from urban conflicts over peace(s). These continued conflicts stand between those supporting the coexisting peace and envisioning people livening together across transcended divides, those supporting the normalising peace and wanting the city to put its violent past behind it by emulating “[economically] successful” cities around the world, and those supporting the ethnonational peace(s) and wanting to uphold segregation and division vis-à-vis “the other”. These urban conflict over peace(s) often circle around space—like “ownership” of Belfast’s residential areas, access to the city centre, and control over planning. Relational space will here be employed to analyse the role of space in these urban conflicts over peace(s). In dialogue with people, two lines of analysis emerged as crucial: how Belfast’s seemingly given ethnonational geography is not “just there” but is actively produced as well as how transformation of Belfast’s built environment—e.g. walls, houses, roads, and buildings—has long-term consequences and actively produces both ethnonational and socioeconomic division.

6.2   The Production of Belfast’s Ethnonational Geography The […] problem of Northern Ireland is not resolved at all. The sectarian division between communities is at least as bad as it was during the Troubles. (interview with journalist 2014) There isn’t in any sense a certainty that the conflict couldn’t restart. People like us […] would always be accused of crying wolf. And people would say: ‘do you think people would want to go back to that?’. Of course, nobody does, but they did not want to go into it in the first place either. I mean, nobody wanted it [“the Troubles”] but it happened and you can go back into it without people wanting it […]. So, if peace is the absence of war, yes it is peace. But if peace is

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a reconciled society where sectarianism and d ­ ivision is being progressively defeated, then we do not have it. (interview with human rights lawyer 2014) [Catholics and Protestants] are two enemies that have created the ability to maintain a certain level of peace, but we call it peaceful conflict. The peace is there; the conflict is there. […] The only difference […] is that the bombs and the guns have been taken out of it. (interview with community leader focusing on disadvantaged youth 2015)

The Northern Irish conflict is—just like many other conflicts—quite spatial. Most areas are conceptualised as “ours/theirs” while territorial consolidation is seen as key to both group survival and wider political goals (Murtagh 2004, 461). Since Belfast is both the focal point of and the central asset in this wider conflict, it has become dominated by an inherently ethnonational geography. Certain areas in Belfast just “are” the territory of one of the sides (Bollens 1999). Falls is Catholic and Shankill is Protestant (Boal 1996). The north part of the city is ‘a patchwork of sectarian geography’ completely rendered through Catholic/Protestant lenses (interview with activist 2015). The south is ‘mixed’ except for Protestant Sandy Row and the east is Protestant expect for Catholic Short Strand (interview with Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) official 2015). Even parks have “our/ their” sides (Leonard 2010). Much of the ethnonational geography is thus understood as given. Yet these “Catholic” and “Protestant” spaces are not there by themselves; they are constantly produced through urban conflicts over peace(s). This section employs relational space to explore this production through its material, perceived, and lived dimensions. Belfast’s Ethnonational Peace(s) Large parts of Belfast are permeated by urban conflicts over peace(s) between the antagonistic yet still quite similar Catholic and Protestant ethnonationalist peace(s). While these two peace(s) are multifaceted, two principal aspects stand out in both. One is the impossibility of coexistence in the sense that Catholics and Protestants cannot live together without constant violence and domination—an impossibility always blamed on “the [threatening, aggressive, and malicious] other” (interview with Community Relations Council (CRC) official 2015; see also Jarman 1997; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). The other principal aspect in both peace(s) is that they have two fully incompatible political trajectories for Northern Ireland, with the territory envisioned to either become part of the Republic

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of Ireland or remain part of the UK. This means that Northern Ireland— and Belfast as its centrepiece—constitutes the ‘territory of two dreams’ (Boal 2002, 691, emphasis added). The impossibility of coexistence and the incompatible territorial dreams have remained after the BA/GFA, which neither transcended ethnonational divisions nor settled the long-term status of Northern Ireland. Its “creative ambiguity”6 namely left the status question unresolved while its ethnonational power-sharing is ‘premised on the [ethnonational] divisions it aims to resolve’7 (Graham and Nash 2006; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Neill 2006). Neither Catholics nor Protestants are thus at ease with the BA/GFA, with long-term uncertainty prevailing and Belfast remaining a ‘disagreed place’ between two antagonistic groups who see coexistence as impossible (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 33; Shirlow and Coulter 2014, 713–15). People ‘just do not trust each other in terms of the long-term agenda’ and the urban conflicts over peace(s) reign on (interview with Good Relations Unit official 2015). As pessimistically put by a NIHE official focusing on community relations: No [there’s no peace]. No. I think there is a truce, which is different. I think it is a lull. It is a quiet time in-between. It is a truce. But I think my very pessimistic view is that both sides have a lot of stuff [i.e. weapons] ready to be brought out when peace breaks down. […] It is more peaceful than it was, but I don’t see it as a permanent peace. (interview 2015)

The responses to these insecurities have, from those supporting the ­ethnonational peace(s), often taken spatial forms. Territorial consolidation—i.e. ensuring that areas are indisputably “ours”—is namely seen as key in keeping “us” safe(er) from “them”, with the underlying logic on both sides being that homogenous spaces are easier to defend if Belfast slides back to war (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). The status question is also rendered as fundamentally spatial, with securitisation of space seen as crucial in uniting Ireland and staying in the 6  The BA/GFA enables Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland if the majority of people in both political entities agree. It thereby gives hope to the territorial dreams of both sides as it neither abolishes the UK continuity nor excludes the possibility of a united Ireland. 7  The power-sharing in Northern Ireland enforces mandatory coalitions between the largest ethnonationalist parties (MPs need to declare themselves Nationalist, Unionist, or Other). This means that political power is based on ethnonational belonging—especially since the four major parties in Stormont are either Nationalist or Unionist.

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UK. The subsequent modus operandi in both ethnonational peace(s) has therefore become ‘to hold the line’ (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). We still have the same sort of ‘that’s our space and we hold it’. There is a clear reluctance from either community to be seen to be giving any space whatsoever. (interview with NGO leader focusing on community relations 2015)

Control of space is thus as central in Belfast as it ever was, meaning that the urban conflicts over peace(s) between the Catholic and Protestant peace(s) have translated into ‘micro-territorial battles […] played out in a zero-sum game where even modest retrenchment [are] not countenanced’ (Murtagh 2004, 461). Yet these ethnonational spaces are not just there to “be held”. Through relational space it is clear that they are constantly produced as “ours/theirs”. The Production of Material Spaces Belfast’s ethnonational geography is materially produced through different objects that mark out spaces as “ours” (Graham and Nash 2006, 255). The most famous example are the murals, which basically are large artworks painted on walls or houses that have been around in Belfast since at least 1908 (Lisle 2006). Even if there is nothing innately ethnonational about colourful artwork on walls or houses, the murals in Belfast often take ethnonational forms and thereby signal that spaces are “ours”. Examples include murals that glorify fighters (often perceived as terrorists by “the other side”), remember victims killed by “them”, or tie “us” to the territory (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Nagle 2009b). Since Belfast holds two territorial dreams, also flags are important and excessive marking of space through flags common. By using the (Irish) Tricolour, the (UK) Union Flag, or the (Northern Irish) Ulster Banner8— but also proxy flags such as the Palestinian and Israeli ones9—spaces are 8  Ulster is one of the four historic regions of Ireland and compromises nine of the 32 counties of Ireland. As Northern Ireland consists of six of these nine, Ulster has become something that Protestants identify with. 9  Catholics and Protestants often support opposing sides in other conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, where Catholics identify with the “Palestinian freedom fight” and Protestants with “Israel’s right to defend itself from terrorists”.

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marked as belonging to “us” (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2006; O’Dowd 2014, 810). While bombings and shootings have almost disappeared in Belfast, the use of flags has increased. One interviewee jokingly lamented this by claiming that ‘if you stand still long enough in Belfast, it is quite possible that someone will attach a flag to you’ (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). Added to murals and flags is the painting of lampposts and curb stones as either “Catholic” (orange, white, and green) or “Protestant” (blue, white, red) to mark out whose any given area Belfast is (Boal 1996; Murtagh 2002). Offensive graffiti glorifying paramilitaries and demanding the death of “the other” is also common; when walking around the city one is bound to see graffiti in form of IRA or Ulster Defence Association (UDA) as well as ‘KAT/KAH [Kill all Taigs/Huns]’10 (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). The nature of objects is not always unequivocal and often lie in the eye of the beholder. Murals can be painted to intimidate outsiders, create in-­ group cohesion, or both (Lisle 2006). Flags can signal cultural and historical belonging as well as celebrate one’s identity (interview with community worker focusing on disadvantaged youth 2015). Yet flags can also mark territory, signal ownership, and deter “the other” (interview with geographer 2015). Given the conflictual context of Belfast, however, the depicted objects undoubtedly produce an ethnonational geography of “Catholic/ Protestant” spaces across many parts of Belfast by marking out “whose” part of the city one is in (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Nagle 2009a). Because of Belfast’s murals, flags, and painted curb stones: You know where you are. It does intimidate people. Again, it is people marking out their territory: ‘this is our area, stay out of it, we will do whatever we want in our area’. (interview with former police officer 2014)

This effectively illustrates that the material dimensions Belfast’s ethnonational geography is not “just there”; it is produced through murals, flags, memorials, graffiti, and painted curb stones. The Production of Perceived Spaces Material aspects of space, however, are not the only dimension of Belfast’s ethnonationalist geography. “Materially speaking” flags are nothing more than colourful pieces of cloth. Yet in Belfast flags mark territory, declare spaces  Which are derogatory terms for Catholics and Protestants.

10

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as safe/dangerous, and are inherently political. This is because flags—as well as murals and painted curb stones—interact with ethnonational perceptions of space that render them indicative of “our/their” spaces (Throgmorton 2004). These ethnonational perceptions, however, are not “just there” either; they too are produced by those supporting the ethnonationalist peace(s). Through locally grounded knowledge that is retold, through sharing of political beliefs, and through broader narratives most areas in Belfast are produced as “ours/theirs” (Boal 1996; Murtagh 2002). This production is so widespread and systematic that ‘people who live there [in Belfast] know this information to the square inch, while strangers know nothing of it’ (A. T. Q. Stewart quoted in Cunningham and Gregory 2014, 66). As elaborated by someone who grew up next to a peacewall11: If you were born in Belfast, you very very quickly learned the sectarian geography […] it is almost like it is an internal process that I know. (interview with former interface12 resident 2015)

The constant production of “our” space is tied to the notion that ‘control of space is [in Belfast] still regarded as being crucial to identity, power and politics’ (Graham and Nash 2006, 262). The tensions from “the Troubles” namely still dominate political calculations: Most things in Northern Ireland tend to be on the basis of zero-sum. So, if they win, we have lost. Particularly in places like Belfast. […] It is about [in a whispering voice]: ‘we need to be careful, if they get and we don’t’. And both sides play it. Both sides play it massively […]. It is all about bang the drum, bang the drum, ‘them and us’, ‘them and us’. (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015)

It is to this end fundamental to (continue to) produce certain spaces as “ours” to control, protect, and keep homogeneous so that the ethnonational group can be safe—something deemed impossible in heterogeneous spaces (Byrne and Gormley-Heenan 2014; Graham and Nash 2006). The reasoning is that as long as “our space” is just that, in-group cohesiveness can be maintained whilst our chances of survival in the case of renewed violence are enhanced (interview with NIHE official 2015). 11  “Peacewalls”—to be elaborated later in the chapter—are walls built to separate Catholic and Protestant communities in Belfast. 12  An interface is an area in Belfast that lies just next to a peacewall.

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The production of “their” space is in turn about “the other” in Belfast still being rendered as ‘menacing, repressive and unwelcoming’ (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 83). It is therefore crucial to produce certain spaces as “theirs” so that “we” can avoid them and the danger “they” pose (interviews Belfast City Council planner 2015; former police officer 2014; NGO leader focusing on community relations 2015). This combination of producing some spaces as “ours” to be protected and other spaces as “theirs” to be avoided means that people see almost every street in Belfast as safe or dangerous: You may pass through the different places, but almost hardwired within you is an idea that at certain times there are certain routes that you probably wouldn’t really go. You tend to navigate by where’s safe and where’s not, and where it sits comfortably and where it doesn’t. (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015)

The effect of this production is a ‘landscape of fear, prejudice, loathing’ that predominates Belfast and leads to segregation and avoidance (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 84). The logic is that ‘the other side is bad, you have to stick to your own’ (interview with politician 2014). This implies that perceptions of space as ethnonational are: Ingrained in people’s minds. Whether they can or cannot cross. If you look at some areas, you do not cross that line, you do not go beyond that. […] It is very much the knowledge that you cannot go down that street, or you cannot go into a particular area, even if you are travelling through. You just wouldn’t. (interview with Cohesion Unit official 2015)

Yet it also implies that the perceived safety of Falls and the perceived danger of Shankill for Catholics and vice versa for Protestants—to name some examples—is not “just there” either; it is constantly produced by rendering the ‘culturally opposed immediate community as a menacing spatial formation’ and the in-group as the spatial guarantee for safety and survival (Shirlow 2001, 68). The Production of Lived Spaces Material and perceived dimensions of space constitute the ground on Belfast’s ethnonational geography lays. Yet it is how these spaces are lived that complete the production of “our/their” spaces (Soja 2010). The notion of lived carries immense nuances beyond the scope of any text. Yet two dimensions of how lived ethnonationalist spaces in Belfast are produced stand out: clustering and paramilitary intimidation.

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The role of clustering in the production of lived ethnonationalist spaces is twofold. Clustering is partly about self-selecting residential ­segregation—i.e. people choosing to live in homogenous rather than heterogeneous neighbourhoods (interview with NIHE official 2015). The motivations range from actual danger of being attacked13 to just finding it the comfortable choice, but it nevertheless produces lived ethnonationalist spaces (interview with CRC official 2015; see Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Neill 2004). Yet clustering is also about actively avoiding the spaces of “the other”. People namely often refrain from using services or going places because it is on “the wrong side”. Some are just unwilling to engage “the other” (Boal 1996; Hughes et al. 2008; Lysaght and Basten 2002). Others are afraid and do not feel comfortable about going to “the other side”: ‘there is something in my head saying: no, not here’ (interview with former interface resident 2015). Many subsequently go out of their way to live on “the right side” rather than interact across ethnonational divides (Bairner and Shirlow 2010; Shirlow 2001, 71). In some neighbourhoods many have never met anyone from the adjacent street (Boal 1996). In others almost 75% avoid their nearest health centre because it is on “the wrong side” (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 85).14 Many even drive extra miles to shop: The nearest shop might be here, but they will drive five miles the other way to buy milk rather than going there […]. That’s mad. By any stretch of imagination, that’s mad. Why would you go miles and miles out of your way? Even in economic terms it is going to cost me a fortune to go that way. But people feel more contempt and that is part of that sectarian geography. (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory official 2015)

There are also those who see employment opportunities as inaccessible if they have to travel through or next to “their” territory (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 367).15 There are thus parts of Belfast that are lived in parallel to “the other”:

 The frequent exaggeration of danger does not mean that risks do not exist (interview with former police officer 2014). Many people in Belfast have had family members killed and/or have experienced violence themselves (see e.g. Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Shirlow 2003b). Many of my interviewees have also had negative experiences. 14  This is not isolated or anecdotal. It has been thoroughly mapped how many in Belfast have spatial patterns that both actively and subconsciously avoid “their” spaces (Boal 1996; Byrne 2012; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Hughes et al. 2008; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Shirlow 2003a). 15  There are Catholics from west Belfast more willing to work in London than in east Belfast (interviews with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). 13

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This is the way people live, this is the way people operate. Even busses taking young people to school would go certain ways to avoid certain areas where stones are thrown at the bus because it is either a Catholic or Protestant school bus. (interview with Good Relations Unit officer 2014)

In terms of intimidation by paramilitaries, the story is simple. Many paramilitaries are still active, in a ‘prepared for peace, ready for war’16 mode, and determined to keep their territories homogenous (interviews with former police officer 2014; NIHE official 2015). This is especially so in monoethnic neighbourhoods and/or social housing areas: The paramilitaries, although they are supposed to be disbanded, they are not really […]. They are still in charge in certain areas. […] It would be too dangerous for a Catholic to move into a Protestant area, or vice versa, in social housing estates. They would be intimidated out, and intimidation could be rocks thrown at them, or fire bombs, or just warnings: ‘you better get out or you could be shot at’. So, people would be intimated out if they are from a different community. (interview with NIHE official 2015)

The paramilitary intimidation reflects the importance of continued spatial control (Knox 2002, 166–7). During “the Troubles”, many neighbourhoods were out of reach for the security forces, so everyday policing largely was handled by paramilitaries—e.g. if you robbed someone, you got kneecapped by your local IRA or UDA cell (interviews former police officer 2014; former political prisoner 2014). In the BA/GFA era, this strive for spatial control amongst the paramilitaries has largely continued: ‘they still want to control everything that happens in the communities’ (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). The alleged reasons stretch from paramilitaries-turned-drug-lords wanting the police off their backs to seriously distrusting the peace process and wanting to preserve the option to fight back in case war erupts again. Irrespective of which, lived ethnonationalist spaces are produced by paramilitaries intimidating “others” out of ethnonational spaces (Graham and Nash 2006; Knox 2002; Shirlow and Coulter 2014). These are merely two examples. Yet they effectively illustrate that Belfast’s lived ethnonational geography is not “just there”; it is constantly produced through clustering and paramilitary intimidation (Lee 2013, 16  Common message on murals in Protestant areas, but also reflected in how certain Catholic dissidents view the postwar situation of Belfast (interview with former political prisoner 2014)

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524). For spaces to “be”—or rather: continuously become—ethnonational, they need to be lived as such. People need to cluster into ‘fortified residential camps’ and avoid each other while paramilitaries need to intimidate “the other” (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 83–4; Neill 2004, 189). Otherwise the ethnonational spaces would be ethnonational no more. Belfast’s ethnonational geography is thus not pregiven—even if it may seem to be due to the longevity of its existence. It is rather constantly produced through urban conflicts over peace(s) and in its material, perceived, and lived dimensions.

6.3   The Production by a Divided City Yet just as space is not pregiven it is not passive either. Urban conflicts over peace(s) not only produce but are also produced by space. Through dialogue with people, Belfast’s built environment (e.g. houses, roads, and walls) emerged as highly productive vis-à-vis its urban conflicts over peace(s). This section employs relational space to explore this production. It begins by depicting the different peace(s) that Belfast’s built environment impacts. It then moves on to a threefold analysis that sequentially explore how Belfast’s built environment changed during and after “the Troubles”, how this transformation divided Belfast, and how these divisions now play productive roles in Belfast’s urban conflicts over peace(s) so that the ethnonational and normalising peace(s) are supported while the coexisting one is undermined. Peace(s) in Belfast Everyone in Belfast seems to have their version of peace. Yet three peace(s) emerge as central. The coexisting peace is about moving beyond ethnonational divisions and transcending “us and them” dynamics. The goal is  an  inclusive Belfast that is safe for everyone across all divides (e.g. socioeconomic, ethnonational, or gender) and where no one is excluded or left behind (O’Dowd and Komarova 2013). The status of Northern Ireland or “our/their” space is subsequently not only seen as an unimportant but ultimately a detrimental focus. What is stressed instead are “real life” issues that affect everyone (interview with politician 2014). This makes the coexisting peace about shared education and healthcare, employment for and investment in deprived working class areas, and inclusive planning and reconstruction efforts (interviews with architect 2014; Belfast City Council planner 2015;

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NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). This peace is supported by taskforces within the City Council (e.g. the Good Relations Unit and the Cohesion Unit), various immigrant groups, LGBTQ activists, non-ethnonational parties, and many of Belfast’s grassroots movements. The normalising peace is about ‘reposition[ing] the city as a neutral, modernising place that has left its parochial sectarianism behind it’ (Murtagh 2010, 1119–20). The principal goal is to move Belfast into its ‘long awaited ‘normality” in line with other cities (unaffected by war) while ‘Falls and Shankill become mural galleries where tourists can walk through’ (Carden 2011, 8). The normalising and coexisting peace(s) thereby overlap when it comes to their antipathy of ethnonationalism (Morrow et  al. 2011). Yet they differ starkly in terms of how Belfast is envisioned to overcome its ethnonationalist divides. The coexisting peace is focused on including and empowering socioeconomically marginalised groups, reconnecting the city, and dealing with the legacy of war. The normalising peace—in contrast—is largely focused on “normalisation” through the market: Unspoken if implicit […] lies the assumption that consumerism and a buoyant economy would deconstruct sectarianism, racism and hate. (Graham and Nash 2006, 271–2)

What is envisioned is that competition, privatisation, deregulation, and non-intrusive policies and planning decisions will attract investors, ­generate economic growth, and ultimately allow the market to “solve” Belfast’s ethnonational problems (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 48; Neill 2004). The normalising peace is thus ultimately about—to use Sharon Zukin’s words—‘pacification by cappuccino’ (2010, 28).17 Neither the socioeconomically marginalised nor the conflict itself are thus actually present within this peace (interview with architect 2015). The effort to create a ‘sanitized, non-controversial revitalisation of Belfast’ is rather about ‘eschew[ing] to referenc[e] conflict at all costs’ (Nagle 2009a, 333). Belfast is thus “normalised”—and the legacy of “the Troubles” overcome—by pretending that ethnonational divisions no longer exist (Murtagh 2010, 1123–4; Rallings 2014). This peace is commonly supported by property developers, commercial companies, and many state agencies (O’Dowd 2014). It is also present in many official documents focusing on regenerating Belfast so that it becomes:  I wish to thank Brendan Murtagh for bringing this phrase to my attention.

17

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[C]onfigured as ‘normal’ capitalist space with ‘acceptable’ axes of differentiation such as class, income and lifestyle and a neo-liberal accent on personal choice for those possessing the resources to exercise their choice. (Graham and Nash 2006, 271–2)

The ethnonational Catholic and Protestant peace(s) in turn—as elaborated earlier—see coexistence as impossible while envisioning two incompatible political trajectories for Northern Ireland (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; O’Dowd and Komarova 2013). Both ethnonational peace(s) are consequently about maintaining segregation of everyday life, refusing to give up land, continuously marking territory, and blocking political initiatives deemed dangerous. These peace(s) are supported by (often dissident) paramilitaries, ethnonational parties, and people who do not believe that coexistence with the ethnonational “other” is possible (interviews with former community leader focusing on interethnic relations 2014; NGO activist in Shankill 2014; politician in ruling party 2014). Transformation of Belfast’s Built Environment Belfast was the epicentre of “the Troubles” (Gaffikin and Morrissey 2011, 203). Yet it was not evenly affected by war as the contestation was—and still is—concentrated to northern and western Belfast’s working class areas as well as its city centre. The west of Belfast holds the adjacent “heartlands”, separated by one of the largest peacewalls, of both Catholic (Falls) and Protestant (Shankill) ethnonational struggles (Boal 1996; 2002). In the north, deprived working class areas are mixed just like a ‘patchwork quilt’ where the ethnonational geography changes from street to street (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015). The symbolism of the city centre in turn made it a high-impact target throughout the war. Although not spared, the more middle class areas of east and south Belfast were—and still are—considerably less violent, contested, and overtly ethnonationalist (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006, 72–4). This section will therefore focus on how built environment in the west, north, and city centre of Belfast plays a productive role in the city’s urban conflicts over peace(s). Three forms emerged as central through dialogue with people: the peacewalls; the middle class biased car-centrism (across the city) and regeneration (of the city centre); and the remodelling of social housing into cul-de-sac estates.

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The Production of Peacewalls

Fig. 6.2  One side of the peacewall. The peacewalls often have gates, but they are usually far away from each other and open only at certain times (if at all). (Picture taken by author in 2014)

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The late 1960s in Belfast was a time of escalating violence and growing segregation between working class Catholics and Protestants (Boal 1996). Neither was new to Belfast as violence and segregation had been prominent for decades and even centuries (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Yet the intensity of the violence in the late 1960s led residents to build protective barriers vis-à-vis “the other side”—thus effectively reinforcing the existing segregation (Boal 1996; Murtagh 2002). When the UK government eventually deployed armed forces to address the escalating violence, these improvised barriers—consisting of cars and rubble—were fortified with concrete, steel gates, and barbwire (Byrne 2012).

Fig. 6.3  Another side of the peacewall. This is the other side of the peacewall above. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

These barriers were initially envisioned to be temporary—even by the armed forces who fortified them—and ‘gone by Christmas [of 1969]’ (interview with former political prisoner 2014). Yet as the violence escalated and war permeated Belfast, segregation through these soon-to-be

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infamous “peacewalls” became the standard protective measures across the city (Byrne and Gormley-Heenan 2014; Ravenscroft 2009). The peacewalls became higher and higher and where built in an increasing number of interfaces (Byrne 2012; Cunningham 2014). This expansion has not only continued but actually intensified in the period after the BA/GFA with peacewalls on an all-time high (Morrow et  al. 2011). Actual walls explicitly constructed to separate Catholics and Protestants amount to several dozens and vary from the infamous one on Cupar Way ­(separating Falls and Shankill)—which is 13 metres high and several kilometres long—to more “modest” ones separating smaller areas (Byrne 2012).

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Fig. 6.4  A derailed area near a peacewalls. These kind of areas often complement the peacewalls. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

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Yet other types of barriers are also used to separate Catholics and Protestants (conversation with community leaders 2015). Natural barriers like rivers or vegetation are worked into the ethnonational geography, building permits denied for derailed areas in interfaces, and abandoned houses used as buffers (Boal 1996; Byrne and Gormley-Heenan 2014; Cunningham 2014). If these are also counted, Belfast has more than 100 peacelines that separate very proximate neighbourhoods from each other and embed them in the city’s ethnonational geography (interview with CRC official 2015).  iddle Class Car-Centrism and Commercialism M The middle class agenda in Belfast is epitomised by car-centrism across Belfast and by a commercialist city centre regeneration. Car-centrism is both about the expansion of Belfast’s road system and how these roads were designed. During “the Troubles”, more and better—from the car perspective—roads were built (Cunningham 2014). This made the connection between middle class suburbs18 and the city centre quicker as well as expanded the cover surface of everyday commuting into surrounding rural areas (interviews with architect 2014; Belfast City Centre planner 2015).

18  Most people who could move from the violence-ridden inner-city areas during “the Troubles” did so.

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Fig. 6.5  The city centre. It is marked in yellow. Surrounding it are roads and car infrastructure such as parking lots (black and grey). This shows the dominance of roads inaccessible to pedestrians. The Westlink—to be elaborated upon shortly— goes in a loop from north of the city centre and around on its western side. (The map was created by Mark Hackett © and is reproduced with permission)

These roads were additionally “car-centrically” designed with little regard to pedestrians—i.e. high speed limits, narrow pavements, few crosswalks, and detachment from the immediate city infrastructure (Johnston 2014; Neill 2004). The map above clearly shows the dominance of roads (for cars) vis-à-vis streets (for mixed use) while the picture below shows how roads came to dissect the city.

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Fig. 6.6  An ordinary road. It is built straight through housing complexes. Despite the narrow pavements and high-speed traffic, the walkability of this street is quite high compared to other parts of the city. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

The Westlink Motorway epitomises this car-centrism. It both dominates the map above and is an almost extreme case of car-centrism in Belfast’s road design (Neill 2004, 188). The picture below depicts how it cuts through the city. While seemingly rather unwelcoming for anything but cars, it has actually been softened recently with more crossings added and some fences removed and it is this “softened” version that is depicted (interview with architect 2015).

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Fig. 6.7  The Westlink. It runs through several residential estates. Apart from the few pedestrian crossings, it is virtually impassable by foot. (Picture taken by author in 2019)

The commercialist regeneration pertains to the city centre becoming consumerist, insular, and car-adapted. The city centre was a politically and symbolically potent target for IRA bombings during the war (Morrow et al. 2011). Yet as it also was an administrative seat—which required people to move in and out of it—peacewalls were no remedy for its exposure. Security forces consequently set up a fortified steel gate perimeter in which everyone going into the city centre was thoroughly searched before being allowed to enter. This “Ring of Steel” made the city centre more secure but increasingly inaccessible, depopulated, and unfrequented (Morrow et al. 2011, 60; Neill 2004, 188). In effect it “died” as housing, shopping, and socialising were relocated either to homogenous inner-city working class areas or to middle class suburbs (interviews with Department of Social Development Northern Ireland (DSDNI) official 2015).

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In the final years of “the Troubles”, however, the city centre’s defensive architecture was dismantled and much needed regeneration efforts began. Yet these efforts were—and continue to be—almost exclusively commercial and focused on high-end entertainment, shopping, and corporations, and (Neill 2004; O’Dowd and Komarova 2013; Sterrett et al. 2012). The results are trendy neighbourhoods such as Titanic Quarters, Cathedral Quarters, and the Lagan Riverfront where a variety of bars, restaurants, and hotels now provide culinary experiences from around the world; the Victoria Square shopping centre and its surrounding commercial streets that now provide the same selection found in any European city; and the relocations of global corporations as well as the University of Ulster19 to office spaces in the city centre (Murtagh 2010; Neill 2004; O’Dowd and Komarova 2013). The non-commercial regeneration was parallelly neglected (Hickey 2014; Murtagh 2010). The results are that schools and healthcare centres, public parks, sport centres, and affordable housing were—and still are—largely missing from the city centre (interview with DSDNI official 2015). Yet besides what was built it is also important to stress how it was built. The regenerative efforts namely ‘turned their backs against the rest of the city’, especially the working class northern and western Belfast (interview with former planner 2015). This means that access to buildings—e.g. entrances, parking, or roads—is turned away from working class areas so to face the water or the middle class east and south of the city. It also means that walls and other defensive architecture measures were built towards working class areas so that easy access was undermined, effectively ‘isolating the city [centre]’ (interview with architect 2015).

19  The university’s car park was symptomatically built on a prime location intended for social housing.

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Fig. 6.8  Defensive architecture in the city centre. All around it there are walls, fences, and gates built without any motivation from or connection to “the Troubles” (conversation with NGO official 2015). (Picture taken by author in 2015)

The regeneration also focused heavily on accommodating cars in the new commercial districts (Neill 2004, 191; Sterrett et  al. 2012). The entire infrastructure of the city centre is in effect adapted so that one can easily drive into work or to shops, park cheaply in numerous and proximate parking spots and garages, and then drive back to the suburbs, making it a ‘commuter’s paradise’ (interview with architect 2014).  ousing Reconstruction in Working Class Areas H The last transformation of Belfast’s built environment to be mentioned is the reconstruction of social housing20 in working class areas from the 1950s and throughout “the Troubles”. The reconstruction changed the 20  In Northern Ireland, much of the housing is publicly owned, so apart from renting privately or buying accommodation, people can sign up for social housing.

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social housing quite substantially in three ways: their type, their layout, and their street networks (interviews with architect 2014; former planer 2015; NIHE official 2015). Most social houses were before the reconstruction both high-density with many people living on same piece of land21 and mixed-use in the sense that housing was mixed with businesses, restaurants, and bars (interview with architect 2014; see Jacobs 1994). The houses were additionally outward-facing in a grid-plan street network—i.e. they faced the street, laid in rows, and were connected through a network of straight and easily navigable streets (Boal 1996; Wiener 1976). In northern and western Belfast, this meant both that everyday life took place in rather dynamic streets and that Catholics and Protestants—while still segregated—had contact points in which to meet (interview with architect 2014). The fact that houses were outward-looking and located on straight streets namely meant that while one end of a street could be 100% Catholic and the other end 100% Protestant, people would nevertheless meet in the middle of it (interview with former political prisoner 2014). The reconstruction radically transformed social housing. The new houses were housing only—i.e. no businesses, restaurants, or bars—and built as cul-de-sacs, which (especially in its Belfast shape) are the exact opposite of a grid-plan with rows of houses.22 Cul-de-sacs namely place houses in isolated clusters with entrances facing inwards rather than the street, have non-systematic ‘dead-end and looped-back’ street networks, and often have only one road leading in and out of the individual clusters (Brand 2009; Morrow et al. 2011, 60; Sterrett et al. 2012, 52). The differences between the two systems are illustrated in the maps below.

21  High-density housing should not be confused with overcrowding. The latter is about too many people living in the same residential unit while the former is about types of houses that can absorb many people on the same piece of land (see Jacobs 1994) 22  The literal translation of the French word cul-de-sac means “in the bottom of a bag”, a translation that fairly well captures these types of houses.

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Fig. 6.9  Transformed housing. The map to the right illustrates rows of outward-looking houses placed in grid-plan street networks before the reconstruction. The map on the left illustrates the spatial incoherence brought by the transformation to lower density cul-de-sac housing “connected” through random streets. (The maps were created by Mark Hackett © and are reproduced with permission)

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Fig. 6.10  Belfast streets. The map to the left illustrates the grid-planned street network in north Belfast before the reconstruction. The map to the right illustrates the same area, but now with a more random, broken, and almost Kafkaesque street network. (The maps were created by Mark Hackett © and are reproduced with permission)

This transformation additionally meant that high-density housing became low-density, so that many former residents were forced out of the areas they were brought up in. One example is Lower Shankill, where

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almost 2000 homes became around 200 (interview with architect 2014). In a city already infused with territorial contestation and zero-sum ideas of space, this massive lowering of residential density was highly contentious in addition to its community-sundering effect (interview with planner 2015; see also Boal 1996; Wiener 1976).

Fig. 6.11  A typical cul-de-sac. It has low-density housing, seemingly random streets, and only one way in and out. (Picture taken by author in 2016)

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Fig. 6.12  A typical sight in cul-de-sacs. One tries to walk through, but almost inevitably ends up at a dead-end that forces one to turn around. (Picture (and dead-end stroll) taken by author in 2016)

How the Built Environment Divided Belfast The transformation of built environment effectively divided Belfast by materially disconnecting working class areas from each other as well as the rest of the city, by eradicating spaces perceived as shared, and by creating lived parallelism between the working and middle classes.  aterial Division: Disconnecting Working Class Areas M The transformation of built environment materially disconnected working class areas (Sack 1999, 254). This disconnection is both proximate and distant—i.e. it is about disconnection from neighbouring areas as well as from the city centre. The proximate disconnection clearly also stems from ethnonational violence, fear and mistrust, and in-group

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cohesion efforts (Boal 1996; Bollens 2000, 207; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). Yet the transformation of built environment hardly helped. Three examples make this clear: peacewalls, cul-de-sacs, and car-centric road networks. Peacewalls lowered—or at least “displaced”—the proximate violence between Catholics and Protestants (Cunningham 2014). Yet peacewalls also broke the existing permeability between adjacent neighbourhoods in areas where they were erected (interview with former political prisoner 2014). The result of this broken permeability was that working class areas in northern and western Belfast were materially ‘sectioned off in their own areas’ (interview with politician 2014). This is namely what peacewalls do: If you have a massive thirty or twenty foot wall between you and your neighbours, [then] that is just a physical impediment of actually being able to interact. (interview with politician 2014)

In some areas where peacewalls were erected, getting 50 metres from A to B can today imply several kilometres of transport—especially if your nearest gate is closed and you have to go around the entire wall (Bollens 2000, Shirlow 2003b, 81). Peacewalls thus materially ‘inhibit social mobility and interaction’ as neighbours are no longer left with the option they once had of connecting with each other on an everyday basis (interview with NGO activist focusing on community relations 2015).

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Fig. 6.13  “The other side” as seen through a locked gate. This is one of the gates allowing passage—albeit obviously not this day—through the more than three kilometre-long peacewall separating Falls and Shankill. (Picture taken by author in 2016)

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Fig. 6.14  An open gate. Yet it often closes by night and therefore functions like a curfew—if you miss closing time, you need to go to the city centre or Black Mountain (where the wall ends) in order to get home. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

Social housing reconstruction had similar results, albeit through slightly different dynamics. Whereas peacewalls break connections and literally seal off communities, cul-de-sacs are less straightforward yet still have a negative influence on permeability (interview with architect 2014). The reasons are that cul-de-sacs are confusing, unpredictable, and filled with dead-ends: Pre-Troubles, Belfast’s streets were a weft and warp of connectedness for citizens wishing to traverse the city. Neighbourhoods were distinct yet permeable. During the Troubles, however, this flow between neighbourhoods calcified. (Morrow et al. 2011, 60)

Moving through grid-planned rows of houses was earlier both possible and quite easy. The new and random street layout of cul-de-sacs, however, ­undermine this possibility. Many of Belfast’s social housing estates are

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today almost impossible for outsiders to navigate in and move through: ‘is a nightmare. If you know it [the cul-de-sac] it is fine, but if you do not, you get lost, wander around in circles’ (interview with former planner 2015). Even if some cul-­de-­sacs permit passage from A to B—which is not always the case as some only have one entrance—there is usually only one possible route, which often is hard for outsiders to locate. You thus have to know the cul-de-sac to travel through it, leading cul-de-sacs to seriously undermine Belfast’s permeability. Outsiders just feel like they are in ‘a labyrinth’ and therefore become unable and unwilling to venture into unknown parts of the city (interview with architect 2015).23

Fig. 6.15  The dead-end of a cul-de-sac. After walking in zigzag from the Falls Road, I was met with the end of the street, a peacewall, numerous fences, and houses. This left me no other option than to walk back. (Picture taken by author in 2016) 23  An added consequence of social housing reconstruction was that the vibrancy of and mixing in the streets was lost. The homogeneity of the new houses removed businesses, restaurants, and bars from the residential areas while the cul-­de-­sacs created small and isolated clusters, effectively leading people to lose any reason to venture into areas they do not live in (an interview with NIHE official 2015).

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The car-centric road network also has its problems. Like any city Belfast has arterial routes (i.e. major roads linking city areas) that connect it at the macro level. Yet since its road network is car-centric, arterial routes in Belfast are, while not impassable, difficult to cross and subsequently tend to disconnect adjacent neighbourhoods (through which they pass) at the micro level (Sterrett et al. 2012, 55–7). These arterial routes are additionally quite “tunnel-visioned” in the sense that there are few roads linking them with each other, the result of which is that while different areas of Belfast are connected to the city centre they are quite disconnected from each other (interview with Belfast City Council planner 2015). The public transport system epitomises this “tunnel-vision”; there are namely no busses going from Falls (in the west) to Stranmillis (in the south). The bus ride instead goes via one arterial route into the city centre and then via another out from the city centre—thereby multiplying both the distance covered and time devoted to getting from one area to the other (Murtagh 2010, 1132). Belfast’s road network thus effectively ‘prohibits easy interaction between different neighbourhoods and sectors of the city’ (interview with geographer 2015).

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Fig. 6.16  Somewhere quite close to the city centre. I was on my way to an interview from Stranmillis (south) to Black Mountain (north-west). The difficulty to walk is quite poignant. Google Maps had told me it would take around an hour. I left two hours before the interview but I still had to take a taxi to get on time. (Picture taken by author in 2015)

Yet this is not the end of material division. While creating insular neighbourhoods disconnected from each other, the transformation of built environment also cut these areas off from the rest of the city (Murtagh 2002; 2004). Primarily through gated neighbourhoods, defensive planning (e.g. barriers to prevent “anti-social behaviour”), and stark socioeconomic segregation (Boal 1996; Bollens 2000; Murtagh 2010). The Westlink is a case in point. Constructed during the war, this arterial road

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serves as a cordon sanitaire between the deprived working class areas in northern and western Belfast and the more affluent middle class areas in the rest of the city (Cunningham 2014; Neill 2004; Sterrett et al. 2012).24 It is namely very hard to move across the Westlink into the rest of the city without a car since the few existing junctions are ‘impassable spaces for most pedestrian and bicycle movement’ (Sterrett et al. 2011, 111). Car ownership in Belfast’s deprived working class areas is parallelly quite low compared to the rest of the city (Lysaght and Basten 2002; Murtagh 2002, 459). This combination means that the Westlink severely disconnects working class people in northern and western Belfast from the rest of the city because it is hard to walk across it while people in these areas often have no cars: There is nothing better to kill off whole sections of the city than putting it on the other side of a big road [….] this is exactly what the Westlink is, it is a brutal cut through of the city. (interview with architect 2014)

Belfast’s built environment thus confines working class people into small, impermeable, and segregated spaces that are disconnected from each other as well as from the rest of the city (interviews with Cohesion Unit officer 2015; former planner 2015; local geographer 2014).  erceived Division: The Eradication of Shared Spaces P The transformation of built environment also eradicated shared spaces serving as contact points Catholics and Protestants (Byrne 2012; Cunningham and Gregory 2014). Working class neighbourhoods in northern and western Belfast had hardly been shared before “the Troubles”; most spaces were also then perceived as “ours/theirs” down to street corners (Boal 1996). Yet some spaces at the intersection between “our” and “their” space were nevertheless perceived as shared and thus constituted contact points in which people could meet (interview with architect 2014). These shared spaces, however, were significantly reduced when the built environment changed (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). The example of Conway Street is symptomatic. This street—connecting Falls and Shankill—had been segregated since way before “the Troubles” with Catholics living in its southern part and Protestants in its northern part. 24  The intentionality behind the Westlink is disputed (cf. Murtagh 2002 with Cunningham 2014). Yet it nevertheless functions like a cordon sanitaire since it separates working class areas from more affluent ones—irrespective of the underlying intentions (or the lack thereof) regarding is construction.

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Yet since it was one street, people living in the middle of Conway Street— where it transitioned into “ours/theirs”—came to exist side-by-side with “the other”. The result was that ethnonational divisions were blurred and shared contact points emerged; the street just did not allow for a clear delineation between “ours” and “theirs” (Boal and Livingstone 1984). The erection of the peacewall on Cupar Way—which intersects Conway Street—effectively changed everything as it ‘separated and carved up that sectarian geography’, made people live on either side of the wall, and transformed contact points into defensive lines (interview with NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015; see also Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Neill 2004, 190). Cul-de-sacs produced similar changes. Whereas rows of houses have no obvious delineation, cul-de-sacs effectively create clusters (of about 20–25 houses) that face inwards and allow for no ambiguity regarding “whose” they are (interviews with architect 2015; Cohesion Unit officer 2015; community leader 2015). The contact points stimulated by the outward-­ looking houses in the grid-plan street network therefore effectively disappeared with construction of cul-de-sacs, which enforced binary spatial perceptions and eliminated the ambiguity needed for shared spaces to emerge (Cunningham 2014; Morrow et al. 2011). Both peacewalls and cul-de-sacs thus ‘contribute[d] to the freezing of the ethnic geography of the city’ and the elimination of spaces perceived as shared (Boal 2002, 693).  ived Division: Spatial Parallelism Vis-à-vis the City Centre L The transformation of built environment lastly created spatial parallelism between working and middle class people. Belfast’s city centre is today often described as having been transformed into a shared space accessible to everyone—thus putting it in stark contrast both to its own once heavy securitisation and to the ethnonational spaces that still today predominate other parts of the city (O’Dowd and Komarova 2013). Compared to the rest of Belfast, the city centre is almost an oasis of “normality” where people connect across ethnonational division in an otherwise still antagonistic city: If you go out to town on Thursday or Friday or Saturday night, there is as much peace as you want. (interview with former police officer 2014)

This view is in many ways accurate (interview with Good Relations Unit official 2014). Yet when taking a closer look, it becomes obvious that the transformation of Belfast’s built environment produced a city centre whose opportunities are unequally distributed according to socioeconomic

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background (Cunningham 2014, 456; O’Dowd and Komarova 2013; Sterrett et al. 2011, 110). This discrepancy has largely to do with access, which in the city centre is skewed towards the middle class and away from the working (and “non-working”) class. It is initially hard to get to the city centre.25 As most working class people do not own cars, they are forced to use public transportation or walk the heavily car-centric and ethnonational geography of Belfast (Murtagh 2004, 459; Neill 2004; Sterrett et al. 2012, 52). This vastly undermines working class people’s access to the city centre. Belfast’s public transportation system is not only poorly developed and inefficient but also quite unaffordable if one has little money (interview with architect 2015). Walking is equally problematic. The car-centric infrastructure impedes the possibilities of walking per se while the ethnonational geography makes walking intrinsically risky (interview with former planner 2015). Yet even if one gets to the city centre it is hard to live it. With very few exceptions, the city centre consists either of commercial spaces where one has to spend money (cafés, restaurants, shopping centres) or offices for well-educated employees (Leonard 2010; Murtagh and Keaveney 2006; Smyth and McKnight 2010). There are next to no free parks, squares, or other public spaces like skateparks, playgrounds, or outdoor gyms. It is even hard to find somewhere to sit down without having to make a purchase (Leonard 2010, 339). Since working class people per definition have less resources, the commercial composition of the city centre undermines their access to it (Smyth and McKnight 2010, 19). The academic underachievement in many poor inner-city areas additionally limits job opportunities in the city centre for working class people (Nolan 2013). This applies not only to jobs requiring higher education, but also to other jobs (interview with community leader 2015).26 As one working class community leader lamented, the access to the city centre is not an issue ‘if you are in a situation where you have had a good education, you have got a good disposable income, you have got a car’ (interview 2014). The way the city centre is built thus creates new divisions based on socioeconomic rather than ethnonational grounds (Nagle 2009a, 329). 25  Few people reside in the city centre (this applies both to working and middle class people), meaning that to “live” the city centre one must be able to get there (interview with NIHE official 2015). 26  There are jobs in shops, bars, cafés and restaurants, but they more often than not go to (middle class) students and youth rather than someone from working class areas such as Falls, Shankill, Short Strand, or Tiger’s Bay. The high unemployment numbers in these areas is indicative of this (see Nolan 2014).

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If you come back to it, it is the same as ever: the working class lost it. For them the peace is pretty meaningless. If you go around the housing estates in west Belfast and north Belfast, around the Shankill and the Falls, not much has changed there. The tourist busses are not stopping there and spending money. This part of the city [the centre], and the middle class, and the middle class youth, the educated, are the people that have benefited. (interview with local academic 2014)

Middle class people in turn face few of these problems. As they often own a car, the impediments of Belfast’s infrastructure do not prevent them from accessing the city centre (Neill 2004). They can avoid both the inefficient public transport and the risks of walking through the car-centric and ethnonational geography (Lysaght and Basten 2002). Once in the city centre, they are able to find good jobs, go to high-end restaurants, and enjoy Belfast’s emerging cappuccino culture (Murtagh 2010; Neill 2004; O’Dowd and Komarova 2013, 529). This generates lived spatial parallelism based on socioeconomic positions. Middle class people live the city centre—and the rest of the city—whereas working class people are confined to ethnonationalist areas. As a former planner described the situation: For many middle class people, their neighbourhood is the city, they go everywhere. Working class people go from this to that street. (interview 2015)

The Production by Material, Perceived, and Lived Division The two preceding parts explored how Belfast’s built environment transformed and then divided the city. This part now turns to analyse the productive role of this spatial division vis-a-vis Belfast’s urban conflicts over peace(s). What emerges is that the built environment supports the ethnonational and normalising peace(s) while undermining the coexisting one. Cemented Disconnection Many in Belfast are today trying to stitch the city back together by creating open public spaces, removing peacewalls, or building shared housing. Stormont has adopted an agenda to remove all peacewalls by 2023 while many public and private initiatives engage in reshaping schemes aimed at improving city-wide permeability and transcending divisions (O’Dowd and Komarova 2013). Belfast’s material disconnection, however, casts a long shadow that makes these aspiring efforts difficult, inefficient, and expensive. The material disconnection has almost taken a life of its own

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and today actively undermines efforts in line with the coexisting peace while enforcing the divisions that resonate with the ethnonational peace(s). The potential removal of peacewalls is illustrative. No matter how fast they were constructed, they could be bulldozed even quicker. Yet transcending divisions in these interface areas is not as easy as taking the peacewalls down because the disconnection once generated by them has spread and taken a life of its own. The peacewall on Cupar Way—which cuts through and disconnects Falls and Shankill—is a case in point. Even if this peacewall was to be removed, the two areas would remain materially disconnected and ethnonationally divided. The reason is that the peacewall split them so thoroughly that they ended up developing independently of each other for decades (interview with planner 2015; see also Sterrett et al. 2012, 61). Roads, houses, and parks were built as if there was nothing beyond the peacewall, which over time transformed the former contact points—along what now was the peacewall—into dead-ends that materially disconnect the two areas no matter if the peacewall exists or not (Bollens 2012). Certain parts of Falls and Shankill have due to their prolonged material disconnection thus become so spatially incompatible that the envisioned “panacea” of removing the peacewall would not reconnect them (interview with geographer 2015). Taking the example of reconnecting Bombay Street (in Falls) with Canmore Street (in Shankill), a former planner claimed it was almost too late: They […] built a roundabout at the end of the [Bombay] street with the intention that once the [peace]wall came down, you could just reconnect the neighbourhoods [like they once were connected]. But you cannot do that anymore, because on the other side, there is the wall itself, and fences, and a parallel road, and green spaces. To get through from Falls into Shankill, there are numerous things that have to be torn down [apart from the peacewall], and you probably need to knock down a couple of houses to make the connection. That means that the process since and the planning decisions since [the peacewall] have actually embedded disconnectedness. (interview 2015)

This means that although material disconnections ‘can be read as an outcome of the broader structuration of conflict’, they can also be understood to ‘produce a dynamic of their own which, in turn, feeds back into the wider reproduction of both spatial and social distance’ (Murtagh 2004, 461). The material disconnection of space once produced by the peacewalls has namely been so cemented that this disconnection now—in itself—actively undermines attempts to reconnect Belfast. It thereby supports the ethnonational peace(s) while undermining the coexisting one.

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Fig. 6.17  One relatively permeable part of the peacewall on Cupar Way. Houses on the right, a football pitch on the left, and a dead-end that could possibly be opened if the peacewall came down. On the other side of the peacewall, however, several houses would impede attempts to reconnect these areas. (Picture taken by author in 2016)

The same goes for the Westlink. The reasons for why it was constructed remain quite ambiguous, but its effects on space do not: the Westlink materially disconnects Belfast’s city centre from the working class north and west parts of the city (Johnston 2014; Sterrett et al. 2011). Connecting what has been disconnected by the Westlink—which is kilometres long and metres deep—by moving it underground or creating more pedestrian bridges would take enormous resources that postwar Belfast lacks. This highway therefore continues to produce division between working class areas and the rest of the city (Johnston 2014). Before the Westlink was built, it was predicted that it would ‘make changes that you will not be able to unmake for a century’ (interview with architect 2014). This proved correct as the Westlink illustrates that ‘roads and streets, and their urban patterning […] are not neutral entities in the city, but rather […] provide the structure around which the city is shaped’ (Sterrett et al. 2012, 50). The material disconnection of Belfast by the Westlink has thus gained a

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productive role of its own; because it cannot be removed it supports both the ethnonational and normalising peace(s) while undermining the coexisting one (Boal 1996; Johnston 2014; Sterrett et al. 2011; 2012).  o Shared Spaces Means Nowhere to Meet N Community workers often lament the prevailing non-contact in northern and western Belfast, where people live insularly and divided within distinctly ethnonational neighbourhoods: I know people in both communities who have never spoken to each other. And I know people who live less than 100 yards apart that have never even seen each other. […] They have their own friends and family around them, so why do they need to go into another community? The communities here become very polarized within themselves, simply because this is their area. Their comfort zone. Their ability to socialise and to live and to bring their children up is within this confinement. So why go out of it? Why go to another part of the city when there is really no need for it? That is the way life is. (interview with NGO activist focusing on disadvantaged youth 2015)

This is more the rule than the exception. I have been told by many who today interact across ethnonational divides that they once lived parallel lives (interviews with journalist 2014; LGBTQ activist 2015; student 2015). Much research also confirms this. Many in working class neighbourhoods live ethnonationally divided with minimum contact (Leonard 2008; Ravenscroft 2009; Shirlow 2003a). People neither meet “the other” around the corner nor leave their areas to do so: For some people, it is an explicit thought process, but for most people it is actually ingrained into their very being. That they wouldn’t go there. Your family never went there: ‘That’s the other. That’s the place of the other. That is a space that is not mine. This is a space that is mine’. (interview with Cohesion Unit officer 2015)

Many who support the coexisting peace see this non-contact as detrimental and therefore strive to improve mobility and connect working class areas by ‘humanising the other’ and promoting the belief that ‘we are not so different’ (interviews with Belfast Interface official 2015; CRC representative 2015; NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015).27 The reasoning is that people need to meet in order to transcend their differences. 27  This is a “generic” quote in the sense that all three interviewees use the same or similar words to express this quite shared sentiment.

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If people grow up in a segregated environment where they only meet people like themselves, where different people are seen as enemies, this [sectarianism] will happen […] The answer to sectarianism is to first create opportunism for people to meet as human beings on common issues […] It is about expanding people’s visions […] So opportunities need to be created. People need to go through the walls, talk to people on the other side, and develop partnerships. (interview with CRC official 2015)

Within the urban conflicts over peace(s) that permeate Belfast this endeavour is difficult. Transcending ethnonational divisions requires long-term commitment and incremental steps. Yet there is a much more basic problem. People in Belfast mistrust the space of “the other”, seeing it as dangerous and unwelcoming. Having shared spaces—i.e. which neither side sees as “ours/theirs”—where people can meet “the other” has subsequently emerged as crucial to attempts aimed at connecting people (Murtagh 2004, 458). Yet the almost complete demarcation of space in Belfast means that there usually are no shared spaces, which makes bringing people together much more difficult and in effect reproduces ethnonational divisions. The problems facing one unnamed (for safety issues) NGO in north-­ western Belfast are symptomatic. Placed within a patchwork of e­ thnonational spaces where the idea of ‘that’s our space and we hold it’ prevails, the activists of this cross-community NGO try their best to connect people (interview with NGO activist focusing on community relations 2015). They organise social events, run job-training workshops, and try to identify cross-community needs. Yet the entrenched divisions in their area means that ‘bringing people across the interfaces or going into each other’s neighbourhoods’ still is quite unattainable (interview with NGO leader focusing on community relations 2015). This NGO has therefore come to depend on shared spaces in its work towards advancing the coexisting peace and connecting people across ethnonational divides. It is exactly here that Belfast’s lack of shared spaces becomes productive of ethnonational divisions. Since there are very few shared spaces where this NGO operates, they have to devote considerable time and effort on the logistics of bringing people together: One thing we have to do. It sounds crazy, because some of the things we do are contrived to creating these opportunities for people to interact in normal ways. Running around renting neutral spaces. Does all this have to happen for a bunch of ten-year-olds to hang around? But yes, at this stage, it is what has to happen. (interview with NGO activist focusing on community relations 2015)

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These NGO representatives told me many stories about how their initiatives fell through, either because it took too much time and effort to find shared spaces or because the lack of shared spaces forced them to meet in “their/our” spaces instead—with the usual result being that one side hesitates and either shows up in fewer numbers or not at all (interview with NGO activist focusing on community relations 2015). This effectively illustrates how the lack of spaces perceived as shared—which were eradicated through the construction of cul-de-sacs, car-centric roads, and peacewalls—today produces ethnonational division and undermines coexistence on its own.  thnonational and Socioeconomic Division E Belfast’s ethnonational geography is hopefully clear by now. The city is materially cut into pieces, most spaces are perceived as “ours/theirs”, and many live in segregated neighbourhoods (Boal 1996; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). As locally put: 90% of all the areas around here would be politicised. […] If you go into south Belfast, west Belfast, north Belfast, east Belfast, you are talking about Protestant or Catholic communities, you see? […] There are very few grey areas. (interview with Good Relations Unit officer 2014) It is like parallel lives, separation. Separate but equal, that is the way it sort of operates. You have communities living in parallel lives, that are not really interested in engagement with each other. (interview with former political prisoner 2014)

This ethnonational geography is subsequently one of the greatest impediments to transcending ethnonational divisions in Belfast: ‘peace has improved, but it has not improved so much that people can feel safe in other areas’ (interview with NIHE official 2015). Transcending ethnonational divisions is therefore linked with the ability to partly exit Belfast’s ethnonational geography: The spatial aspect is a big part of it. If you grow up in east Belfast, go to school in east Belfast, and all your friends are in east Belfast [then] you almost need to break away from that to meet other people, or have another outlet to meet people who do not share the same identity as you […] I think that creates huge barriers and boundaries, not unlike what we see in relation to LGBTQ people…[but] when someone has a LGBTQ parent, cousin, friend, or relative, it humanizes those people and the issues they present and the issues people have

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with them […] I think the same exists within sectarian conflict. If people can’t humanise people from the other side, it is very difficult to move past what is often deeply engrained prejudice. (interview with LGBTQ activist 2015)

The city centre has in this context emerged as the space where this exit can happen, where ethnonational rules might be escaped and mixing with “the other” is possible (interviews with former police officer; journalist 2014; NGO activist focusing on disadvantaged youth 2015). Yet these are not only hopes or dreams—Belfast is experiencing radically improved mixing across ethnonational divides and most of it is happening in the city centre (Leonard 2010; Murtagh 2010; Rallings 2014; Smyth and McKnight 2010). As put by one community worker focusing on disadvantaged youth: There are a lot of unsafe areas. Probably the safest area today is Belfast city centre. It is that area where the unwritten law is that you are out on one night of enjoinment, so there are no issues over conflict, over territory, over space. That is the neutral area. (interview 2015)

The lived spatial parallelism produced by unequal access to the city centre, however, means that this ethnonational mixing mostly happens between middle class Catholics and Protestants (Leonard 2008; Murtagh 2010; Murtagh and Shirlow 2006). Middle class people namely have easy access to the city centre, where they can mix with “the other” on a routinized basis and subsequently avoid ‘the same level [as working class people] of isolation or invisibility of the other community, which then limits the divisions and makes people humanise the other’ (interview with LGBTQ activist 2015). This is hardly the case for working class Catholics and Protestants, whose inaccessibility to the city centre largely confines them to Belfast’s other—mostly segregated and ethnonational—areas and thereby denies them an everyday where mixing with “the other” can be continuously made: They don’t get to meet other people. People [were] being anti-Polish until the met Polish [people]. And it was no longer Poles, but Amrad, or whatever. They could see that actually they are OK so maybe some of the others are OK [as well]. That sort of engagement opens doors and changes attitudes. […] [The] problems are that [for] many communities the segregation limits the opportunities for that. (interview NGO activist focusing on space and territory 2015)

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The unsurprising result of the unequal access to the city centre—which is where mixing can happen—is that working class Catholics and Protestants also have relatively fewer contacts with “the other” than middle class Catholics and Protestants do (interviews with journalist 2014; local academic 2014; NGO activist in Shankill). What this suggests is that Belfast’s built environment has a productive role in the city’s urban conflicts over peace(s): it enforces both the ethnonational and normalising peace(s) while undermining the coexisting one. Since people connect far easier if they already frequent the same venues, the lived parallelism brought by the unequally accessible city centre produces ethnonational as well as socioeconomic divisions. This is not to say that that middle class people are past “the Troubles”. From the city centre they still go back to mostly segregated neighbourhoods (albeit less segregated than working class areas). They still send kids to segregated schools (less than 10% of all children attend integrated schools). They also still vote for ethnonational parties28 (Murtagh and Shirlow 2006; Nolan 2014). Nor is it to say that working class people do not use the city centre to transcend divisions; they certainly do. Yet what I am arguing—together with others (see Leonard 2008; Murtagh 2010; Sterrett et al. 2012)—is that there is an inherent skewedness in the socioeconomic background of those who are transcending ethnonational divisions in the city centre. The life paths of working class Catholics and Protestants overlap much less frequently than the life paths of middle class Catholics and Protestants (interview with journalist 2014). These differences mean that the city centre is “shared” mostly between middle class people while working class people are confined to the ethnonational geography that permeates the rest of Belfast (interviews with politician 2014; analyst 2014). Thus ‘when people talk about the city centre as successful shared space, it is only in a very narrow [socioeconomic] narrative’ (interview with architect 2014).

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Boal, Frederick W. 1996. “Integration and division: sharing and segregating in Belfast”. Planning Practice and Research 11(2): 151–158. ———. 2002. “Belfast: walls within”. Political Geography 21: 687–694. Boal, Frederick W. and David N.  Livingstone. 1984. “The frontier in the city: ethnonationalism in Belfast”. International Political Science Review 5(2): 161–179. Bollens, Scott A. 1999. Urban peace-building in divided societies: Belfast and Johannesburg. Westview Press. ———. 2000. On narrow ground: urban policy and ethnic conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. State University of New York Press. ———. 2012. City and soul in divided societies. Routledge. ———. 2018. Trajectories of conflict and peace: Jerusalem and Belfast since 1994. Routledge. Brand, Ralf. 2009. “Urban artefacts and social practices in a contested city”. Journal of Urban Technology 16(2–3): 35–60. Byrne, Jonny. 2012. “Belfast and beyond: local and international narratives of physical segregation?”. Shared Space 12: 5–20. Byrne, Jonny and Cathy Gormley-Heenan. 2014. “Beyond the walls: dismantling Belfast’s conflict architecture”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 18(4–5): 447–454. Carden, Siún. 2011. “Post-conflict Belfast ‘sliced and diced’: the case of the Gaeltacht Quarter”. Divided Cities/Contested States Working Paper 20: 1–19. Cunningham, Niall and Ian Gregory. 2014. “Hard to miss, easy to blame? Peacelines, interfaces and political deaths in Belfast during the troubles”. Political Geography 40: 64–78. Cunningham, Tim. 2014. “Changing direction: defensive planning in a post-­ conflict city”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 18(4–5): 455–462. English, Richard. 2003. Armed struggle: the history of IRA. Palgrave Macmillan. Gaffikin, Frank and Mike Morrissey. 2006. “Planning for peace in contested space”. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30(4): 873–893. ———. 2011. Planning in divided cities: collaborative shaping of contested space. Wiley-Blackwell. Graham, Brian and Catherine Nash. 2006. “A shared future: territoriality, pluralism and public policy in Northern Ireland”. Political Geography 25: 253–278. Hickey, Rosaleen. 2014. “The psychological dimensions of shared space in Belfast”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 18(4– 5): 440–446. Hughes, Joanne, Andrea Campbell, Miles Hewstone and Ed Cairns. 2008. “‘What’s there to fear?’: comparative study of responses to the out-group in mixed and segregated areas of Belfast”. Peace & Change 33(4): 522–548. Jacobs, Jane. 1994. The death and life of great American cities. Penguin. Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material conflicts. Parades and visual display in Northern Ireland. New York: Berg.

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Johnston, Wesley. 2014. The Belfast Urban motorway: engineering, ambition and social conflict. Colourpoint Books. Knox, Colin. 2002. “‘See no evil, hear no evil’: insidious paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland”. British Journal of Criminology 42: 164–185. Lee, Adele. 2013. “Post-conflict Belfast”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 17(4): 523–525. Leonard, Madeleine. 2008. “Building, bolstering and bridging boundaries: teenagers’ negotiations of interface areas in Belfast”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34(3): 471–489. ———. 2010. “Parochial geographies: growing up in divided Belfast”. Childhood 17(3): 329–342. Lisle, Debbie. 2006. “Local symbols, global networks: rereading the murals of Belfast”. Alternatives 31: 27–52. Lysaght, Karen and Anne Basten. 2002. “Violence, fear and ‘the everyday’: negotiating spatial practices in the city of Belfast”. In The meaning of violence, ed. Elizabeth Stanko. Routledge. McGarry, John, ed. 2001. Northern Ireland and the divided world: the Northern Ireland conflict and the Good Friday agreement in comparative perspective. Oxford University Press. McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary. 1995. Explaining Northern Ireland: broken images. Wiley-Blackwell. Mitchell, Audra. 2011. Lost in transformation: violent peace and peaceful conflict in Northern Ireland. Palgrave Macmillan. Morrow, Ruth, Ciaran Mackel and John Dickson Fitzgerald. 2011. “Beyond the shadow space: architecture as a professional and creative process; during and post-conflict”. The Journal of Architecture 16(1): 57–70. Murtagh, Brendan. 2002. The Politics of territory: policy and segregation in Northern Ireland. Palgrave. ———. 2004. “Collaboration, equality and land-use planning”. Planning Theory & Practice 5(4): 453–469. ———. 2010. “Desegregation and place restructuring in new Belfast”. Urban Studies 48(6): 1119–1135. Murtagh, Brendan and Karen Keaveney. 2006. “Policy and conflict transformation in the ethnocratic city”. Space and Polity 10(2): 187–202. Murtagh, Brendan and Peter Shirlow. 2006. Belfast: segregation, violence, and the city. Pluto Press. Nagle, John. 2009a. “Sites of social centrality and segregation: Lefebvre in Belfast, a ‘divided city’”. Antipode 41(2): 326–347. ———. 2009b. “The right to Belfast City Centre: from ethnocracy to liberal multiculturalism”. Political Geography 28: 132–141. Neill, William J. V. 2004. Urban planning and cultural identity. Routledge. ———. 2006. “Return to Titanic and lost in the maze: the search for representation of ‘post-conflict’ Belfast”. Space and Polity 10(2): 109–120.

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Nolan, Paul. 2012. Northern Ireland peace monitoring report: number one. Community Relations Council. ———. 2013. Northern Ireland peace monitoring report: number two. Community Relations Council. ———. 2014. Northern Ireland peace monitoring report: number three. Community Relations Council. O’Dowd, Liam. 2014. “Symmetrical solutions, asymmetrical realities: beyond the politics of paralysis”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37(9): 806–814. O’Dowd, Liam and Milena Komarova. 2011. “Contesting territorial fixity? a case study of regeneration in Belfast”. Urban Studies 48(10): 2013–3028. ———. 2013. “Three narrative in search of a city”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 17(4): 526–546. Rallings, Mary-Kathryn. 2014. “‘Shared space’ as symbolic capital: Belfast and the ‘right to the city’”. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 18(4–5): 432–439. Ravenscroft, Emily. 2009. “The meaning of the Peacelines of Belfast”. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 21: 213–221. Sack, Robert D. 1999. “A sketch of a geographic theory of morality”. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 89(1): 26–44. Shirlow, Peter. 2001. “Fear and ethnic division”. Peace Review 13(1): 67–74. ———. 2003a. “Ethnosectarianism and the reproduction of fear in Belfast”. Capital & Class 80: 77–94. ———. 2003b. “‘Who fears to speak’: fear, mobility, and ethno-sectarianism in the two ‘Ardoynes’”. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3(1): 76–91. Shirlow, Peter and Colin Coulter. 2014. “Northern Ireland: 20 years after the cease-fires”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37(9): 713–719. Smyth, Jim, ed. 2017. Remembering the troubles: contesting the recent past in Northern Ireland. University of Notre Dame Press. Smyth, Lisa and Martina McKnight. 2010. “The everyday dynamics of Belfast’s ‘Neutral’ city centre: maternal perspectives”. Divided Cities/Contested States Working Paper 15: 1–29. Soja, Edward W. 2010. Seeking spatial justice. University of Minnesota Press. Sterrett, Ken, Mark Hackett and Declan Hill. 2011. “Agitating for a design and regeneration agenda in a post-conflict city: the case of Belfast”. The Journal of Architecture 16(1): 99–119. ———. 2012. “The social consequences of broken urban structures: a case study of Belfast”. Journal of Transport Geography 21: 49–61. Throgmorton, James. 2004. “Where was the wall then? Where is it now?”. Planning Theory & Practice 5(3): 349–365. Walker, Brian M. 2012. A political history of the two Irelands. Palgrave Macmillan. Wiener, Ron. 1976. The rape & plunder of the Shankill: community action, the Belfast experience. Farset Co-operative Press. Zukin, Sharon. 2010. Naked city: the death and life of authentic urban places. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

The principal research problem of this book is why the postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace. When the analysed urban conflict over peace(s) are contextualised within the Janus-­ faced theorisation of the city—meaning that it has transcending and destructive potential—three different answers to this question crystallise. The postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war into peace because urban conflicts over peace(s): both attack its transcending potential and enhance its destructive potential as well as because the city itself—untouched by postwar contestation—is destructive towards war-­to-­peace transitions. This chapter primarily deals with these three answers.1 Yet it also focuses on complementary explanations, on the other side of the postwar city, and on wider conclusions.

7.1   Attacking the Postwar City’s Transcending Potential The first answer to why the postwar city reinforces its continuities of war in peace is that urban conflicts over peace(s) attack the constitutive and functioning aspects that give it transcending potential. Heterogeneity is an  The city’s complexity, the focus on multiple postwar cities, the diversity of analysed urban conflicts over peace(s), and the three different theoretical entry points make any exhaustive overview both overwhelming and repetitive. This last chapter should therefore be read as general theoretical claims underpinned by empirical illustrations. 1

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illuminating example. More than being just conducive for the postwar city’s transcending potential, heterogeneity is its prerequisite. “The other” has to be present in order for societal divisions to be transcended or coexistence stimulated. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, attack heterogeneity across the postwar city. While reasons may differ—involving everything from fear and prejudice to employment opportunities and educational segregation—the results are the same in all three analysed postwar cities: people have come to predominantly live in homogenous clusters.2 It must be acknowledged that Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar probably are the most heterogeneous political entities in their respective wider socio-­ political contexts. The problem, however, is that this heterogeneity mostly exists on an aggregated level or in isolated pockets. When the citywide surface is scratched, far different pictures emerge. The working class areas of Belfast—but also its middle class areas—constitute a “patchwork” of ethnonational clusters where Catholics or Protestants reside; Mitrovica consists of its southern part where only Albanians live and its northern part where mostly Serbs live; and Mostar is divided into its Bosniak east and its Croat west. The same applies to openness and permeability. An essential part of the postwar city’s transcending potential is its provision of easily accessible contact points where “the other” can be encountered. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, are detrimental towards both openness and permeability. Belfast is perhaps the starkest example of the latter. Its peacewalls force people to use gates and/or take kilometre-long detours just to visit the adjacent neighbourhood, fears and prejudices vis-à-vis “the other” make seemingly permeable parts of the city unimaginable to pass through, and paramilitaries hinder people from entering “our” areas. The permeability in Mitrovica and Mostar is not materially impeded to any great extent.3 Yet both fear and prejudice vis-à-vis “the other” and intimidation of those that cross Ibar or the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard still erode their permeability. Urban conflicts over peace(s) also close down the postwar city by removing contact points in which people can meet “the other”. All three analysed postwar cities have been divided into parts rendered “ours” or 2  This refers to homogeneity of groups important within any given urban conflict over peace(s)—i.e. “us” and “them” (whoever these are). In Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar the focus is primarily on ethnonational homogeneity. 3  The barricades, walls, and checkpoints along Ibar are quite symbolic while Mostar is easily zig-zagged both by foot and car.

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“theirs”, which leaves little ambiguity and fluidity in which ­contact points can emerge. The difficulties of NGOs in Belfast to find spaces where both sides feel safe to encounter each other, the view that Ibar constitutes a Berlin wall, and the need for students in Mostar to hide encounters with “the other” all speak to how urban conflicts over peace(s) attack openness in the postwar city. Mixing is also attacked by urban conflicts over peace(s). If heterogeneity or openness and permeability are prerequisites for transcending continuities of war in peace, then mixing is part and parcel of the processes through which this happens. It is through mixing that people meet and create new relationships that render old divisions obsolete, that new socio-­ political institutions are established, and that venues or hideouts where “the other” can be engaged emerge. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, impede mixing by making it not only highly avoidable but also something that it is important to refrain from. This is primarily achieved through two dynamics. One is indirect and has already been covered in part. Mixing depends on heterogeneity as well as openness and permeability—i.e. people need to exist together, have places where they can meet, as well as ways of getting there.4 Since urban conflicts over peace(s) undermine these aspects, they also make mixing more difficult. The other dynamic is more direct. When mixing is not disrupted by increased homogeneity or decreased openness and permeability, urban conflicts over peace(s) still attack mixing by making it something that is best avoided. The analyses from Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar make this clear. “The other” is constructed as hateful, dangerous, and undesirable in all three postwar cities, which makes mixing an almost enigmatic endeavour. There are also multiple carrots and sticks against mixing. Avoiding contact with “the other” can in all three postwar cities lead to employment, protection, and inclusion while mixing can result in unemployment, violence, and exclusion. Accommodation is also a victim of urban conflicts over peace(s). If mixing is what makes the city’s heterogeneous and densely located elements engage each other, accommodation is the process through which these elements come to acknowledge “the other” and make adjustments so that coexistence within the same city is made possible. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, attack accommodation of everything not in line with 4  While density also is central to mixing, I have not found any evidence that urban conflicts over peace(s) undermine density.

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the peace(s) being advanced whilst envisioning “the line to be held” in almost all spheres—just like in the preceding war. This effectively means that almost any accommodation is rendered unacceptable. The three analysed postwar cities illustrate this clearly. Moving into the “wrong” Belfast area can—in the rare cases it actually happens—lead to everything from insults and exclusion to threats from paramilitaries and firebombs through windows5; in Mitrovica the mere presence of “the other” on “our side” of Ibar is seen as threatening, aggressive, and to be prevented; while changes to Mostar’s education system—to accommodate students from all sides— are seen as fundamentally unacceptable and detrimental for group survival. What these observations thus point to is that urban conflicts over peace(s) attack the constitutive and functioning aspects that give the city its transcending potential. Heterogeneity, openness and permeability, mixing, and accommodation are key to the postwar city being able to transcend its continuities of war in peace. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, lead the postwar city to be less heterogeneous, to have fewer contact points and ways of getting to them, and to function more through non-contact and exclusion than through mixing and accommodation. The result is that the postwar city is much less able to transcend its continuities of war in peace.

7.2   Enhancing the Postwar City’s Destructive Potential Yet that is not the only side of the story. The second answer to why the postwar city reinforces its continuities of war in peace is that urban conflicts over peace(s) also enhance the constitutive and functioning aspects that give it destructive potential. The principal example is conflict, which is neither antithetical to the postwar city’s transcending potential nor increases its destructive potential by default. Conflict is rather integral to how the city functions—without it there would be no creativity, ­heterogeneity,  This lack of accommodation also makes Belfast’s housing market Kafkaesque. NIHE is namely struggling to find housing for people and tearing down houses just blocks away from those that need them. The demographic trajectories in Belfast (with the younger Catholic population accenting and the older Protestant population declining) mean that it is primarily Catholics who need housing whilst the majority of empty houses are in areas where Protestants live. Yet since the ethnonational geography means that Catholics are unwilling to move “there” while Protestants are equally reluctant to accommodate “them”, Belfast effectively has two housing markets—one where housing need prevails and one where houses are torn down because there is “no one” to live in them (interview with NIHE official 2015). 5

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or fragmentation in the city either (Amin and Thrift 2002; Jacobs 1994; Sennett 1991). Yet urban conflicts over peace(s) tend to enhance conflict in the postwar city so much that almost everything becomes about the warto-peace transition, thereby making impossible almost all negotiations or compromises with “the other” while rendering everything through the same lenses that dominated the preceding war. This was poignantly clear from the analysed urban conflicts over peace(s). Mitrovica’s different sides are today so alienated that they see everything through zero-sum lenses and from “worst-case-scenario” perspectives. The result is that seemingly conflict-unrelated events—from people just crossing Ibar to investments in social services—are seen as hidden attempts to dominate and get the upper hand “over us”. This omnipresence of conflict makes cooperation across Ibar highly controversial and often unattainable. The same goes for Belfast. The portrayal of everything as about “us and them” means that “the other” cannot live “here” while almost everything has to be provided in parallel in order to not disturb the balance. Mostar is no different, with the rendering of everything in zero-sum terms sometimes having tragicomical outcomes. Its location—near the tourist destinations Split and Dubrovnik, just beside the Međugorje pilgrimage, and far away from the winter fogs of Sarajevo— makes Mostar ideal to operate flights from. This was picked up by an airline, who started courting Mostar’s politicians about making the city airport fully operational, which would bring hundreds of jobs to the depleted economy. Yet these plans never materialised because of long delays caused by an entrenched conflict over the airport director position—important because the ethnonational belonging of that person would mean more jobs to members of that group. The airline eventually grew tired and established itself elsewhere (interview with OHR official 2011). The same enhancement is evident with fragmentation, which is central to transcend—or rather: neutralise—divisions because it allows antipodes (e.g. radical ethnonationalists and left-wing anarchists) to coexist in close proximity of each other. Yet fragmentation in the city is intrinsically linked with the possibility for smooth movement between different social worlds. Urban conflicts over peace(s), however, fragment the postwar city so much that that the possibility to move between its social worlds is almost abolished and instead replaced by isolation and inertia. Mitrovica is illustrative of this. Urban conflicts over peace(s) have fragmented life there into almost completely disconnected Albanian and Serb spheres. The result is that the possibilities of movement between these spheres—and thus engagement with “the other”—is heavily impeded. Equivalent dynamics exist in

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Belfast and Mostar. The ethnonational geography of Belfast ­combined with the unequal access to its city centre means that people are fragmented into both socioeconomically and ethnonationally closed spheres. People entering or exiting the Bosniak and Croat spheres in Mostar are in turn given labels such as “traitors” or “intruders”, leading many to stay on “our side”. What these observations thus point to is that urban conflicts over peace(s) also enhance the constitutive and functioning aspects that give the city its destructive potential. This should not be read that conflict and fragmentation are destructive by default. Yet the problem is that urban conflicts over peace(s) make everything in the postwar city so conflictual that no common ground is possible and so fragmented that people come to live almost completely parallel lives. The result is that the postwar city’s destructive potential is enhanced and its continuities of war in peace are reinforced.

7.3   The City Itself Yet everything is not down to urban conflicts over peace(s). The third answer to why the postwar city reinforces its continuities of war in peace is that the city can be destructive towards war-to-peace transitions. The city’s centrality within its wider socio-political context is illustrative. Postwar cities—due to everything from symbolism and political centrality to concentration of populations—often either become or remain the focal points of wider conflicts. The result is that conflicts over peace(s) become more important to win, less acceptable to lose, and in effect more entrenched in the postwar city than elsewhere. Mitrovica stands as a prominent example of this. Since it is the only Serb bastion left in Kosovo6 it has become highly central to Serbs across the territory. This centrality is partly symbolic, with Mitrovica north of Ibar seen to demonstrate both that there still are “Serb” cities in Kosovo and that the support from Belgrade deemed necessary to maintain such urban life continues. Yet its centrality is nonetheless primarily practical as Mitrovica hosts the only Serb (i.e. Belgrade-funded) advanced hospital and university in Kosovo.7 The city is also where most non-essential investments from Belgrade are 6  While most Serbs live south of Ibar, they do so in isolated enclaves scattered across the territory. Mitrovica in contrast has the largest concentration of Serbs in Kosovo. 7  While Serbs south of Ibar do have Belgrade-funded schools (primary and secondary), healthcare centres, and social benefits, everything “advanced” is located in Mitrovica.

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c­ oncentrated. This has effectively made Mitrovica north of Ibar central to Serbs as it is only there that they can access advanced healthcare, higher education, and increased employment opportunities in Kosovo but outside of Kosovar institutions. The city is also central to Albanians. Not so much for everyday needs8 but as both the symbolic and concrete example of Belgrade’s continued influence in Kosovo (through the Serbs there) and the subsequent inability of Pristina to assert sovereignty within its borders (due to the parallel institutions). The result of Mitrovica’s centrality is that conflicts over peace(s) are more entrenched in Mitrovica than anywhere else in Kosovo—with Albanians fearing that losing would facilitate territorial fragmentation of Kosovo and Serbs fearing that losing would doom all Serbs there. Mixing has the same impact. While urban conflicts over peace(s) undermine both the city’s heterogeneity and its openness and permeability— which impedes mixing—neither of these two constitutive aspects can be completely removed from the postwar city. The result is that mixing continues in the postwar city. The problem, however, is that within contested postwar settings, mixing does not necessarily transcend continuities of war in peace. It can just as well lead to perpetual clashes since it forces antagonistic groups to constantly encounter “the other”, with the urgency of urban conflicts over peace(s) being enhanced rather than eased as they come to permeate everyday life. The analyses from Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar make this evident. Neither of the three postwar cities are completely homogenous, closed down, or impermeable. This effectively means that all three experience mixing at certain times and spaces. Yet because this mixing happens in the context of urban conflicts over peace(s), it often reinforces rather than transcends tensions and divisions. The possibility to encounter “the other” in Belfast—especially around interface areas—leads to people routinely taking detours to avoid contact, taxi drivers refusing to enter certain areas, and school transports being planned according to the ethnonational geography to not “provoke” clashes. When teenagers in Mitrovica mix with “the other” the result is often violence and ensuing citywide tensions. Mostar is calmer when it comes to physical attacks, but people can still get into problems on “the other side” while the enforced unification in 2004 has stalemated its city council because political representatives refuse to compromise with “the other”. 8  For Albanians, higher education, advanced healthcare, and more employment is concentrated to the capital Pristina (42 kilometres south or about an hour bus ride away).

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What these observations thus point to is that the postwar city also r­einforces its continuities of war in peace because that the city itself—in how it is constituted and functions—reinforces urban conflicts over peace(s). The central position the city has within its wider socio-political context makes it more important to hold on to and less acceptable to lose while the mixing inherent to it forces antagonistic groups to constantly encounter “the other”.

7.4   Two Additional Explanations Yet also other explanations to the principal research problem have emerged throughout the book. I wish to stress two. One is of a more complementary nature vis-a-vis the three answers above. The postwar city is undoubtedly permeated by urban conflicts over peace(s)—as has been made clear throughout the book. Yet this does not mean that urban conflicts over peace(s) permeate every second of every day. People still go to work or the movies, police still address petty crime, residential areas are still built, new restaurants and bars still open, and spontaneous hangouts still emerge— i.e. everyday life goes on. Continuities of war in peace are nevertheless still reproduced throughout the postwar city, even in the parts of life that are peripheral to urban conflicts over peace(s). The analyses from Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar suggest that the routinisation of division is one central dynamic behind this. What seems to be the case is that urban conflicts over peace(s) divide everyday life in the postwar city so thoroughly that division becomes ‘the new normal’9 that is reproduced by routine— irrespective of whether the reasons for division still exist or not. Mostar is an illustrative case. Many undoubtedly still see non-contact as vital for ingroup survival and therefore actively uphold division. Yet part of the continued division can also be traced back to the parallel Bosniak/Croat existences since they mean that people can live in the same city without having to engage with “the other”. Here is where the routinisation of division comes in. Most people live their lives in ways requiring less hassle. If these lives happen to be displaced to parallel spheres with little to no overlap—which they often are in the postwar city—it is easy that divisions become routine:

9  Almost every person I spoke with (that resented division) claimed that division had become normal, something that one does not reflect upon.

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The everyday for a person is where their kid goes to school, where they work, and how they spend their free time. Most private firms are monoethnic. They spend their free time with the people whose kids go to the same kindergarten as their child, who live nearby, who they work with. These are [also] monoethnic. (interview with school official in Mostar 2011)

Division is thus not always reproduced with explicit intentionality; it is also reproduced because everyday routines are located in parallel city halves: Look at it: you are born on one side, and live there, and all around your life is taking shape. Routines. Places where you hang out. And you live in this circle, and you have no need—if you do not really wish to do so—to go to the other side. And when you do go, everyone will be strangers to you. Why would you go? And no one tries to connect you, no one makes a context where people would connect. (interview with NGO activist focusing on transparency in Mostar 2014)

The other explanation is of a more alternative nature and takes departure from the theorisation of peace as contested, heterogeneous, and subjective. The principal purpose of this theorisation was to enable the analysis of the postwar city—and Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar—through the lens of urban conflicts over peace(s). Yet this theorisation also made clear that some peace(s) will always be irreconcilable. Mitrovica provides a stark example. Its ethnonational Albanian and Serb peace(s) are so f­ undamentally antithetical that if Mitrovica north of Ibar would become fully integrated into Kosovo in line with the Albanian ethnonational peace—with no presence of Belgrade, dismantled parallel institutions, and complete subordination to Pristina—this socio-political ordering would undoubtedly be interpreted as anything but peace by the Serbs forced to live it. The opposite is also true. If Mitrovica north of Ibar would be granted some parallel existence within Kosovo in line with the Serb ethnonational peace—where Belgrade retains a heavy influence—this socio-­political ordering would be interpreted as the continuation of the decades-long war upon Kosovo by Serbia. The alternative (in part) answer is thus as follows: the postwar city reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace because it is unavoidable—i.e. what some see as movement towards peace others equate with the continuation of war.

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7.5   The Other Side of the Postwar City The postwar city thus reinforces rather than transcends its continuities of war in peace for multiple reasons—of which the principal ones were elaborated above. Yet it does not mean that it is all it does. Doreen Massey once eloquently noted that: ‘the beauty of empirical work is that you have no sooner reached such neat and satisfying conclusions than they start to exhibit cracks and queries’ (2005, 178). The postwar city epitomises this statement. The quite bleak picture just painted of the postwar city is undoubtedly prevailing. Yet while the postwar city predominantly reinforces its continuities of war in peace, it also has transcending moments. Two trajectories make this clear. One trajectory through which continuities of war in peace are transcended pertains to the postwar city itself. Its inherent complexity means that irrespective of how entrenched and permeating its urban conflicts over peace(s) are, its constitutive and functioning aspects with transcending potential are not obliterated. Take heterogeneity. It is almost impossible to organise the postwar city so that all its parts become completely homogenous. Unless homogenisation—through processes like clustering, securitisation of space, or ethnic cleansing—is downright systematic and unopposed (which it rarely is), the postwar city will always retain some heterogeneity. Despite years of entrenched urban conflicts over peace(s), none of the three analysed postwar cites are completely homogenous. Belfast’s city centre is—despite its socioeconomic inequality—quite mixed, its city administration is unified, and there are isolated cases where “the other” lives in Falls and Shankill. The Bosniak Mahalla in Mitrovica is comparatively heterogeneous with Albanians and Serbs living side-by-­side, trading with both sides of Ibar, and exploiting the gaps of institutional parallelism together. Mostar in turn has a (dysfunctional) city council that represents people from across the city, its Old Gymnasium consists of students from both sides, and there are quite many who live on “the other side”. The same goes for openness and permeability. While urban conflicts over peace(s) may remove many contact points, it is immensely difficult to completely close the postwar city down since contact can be made almost everywhere. Completely impeding open flows between the remaining contact points is almost as difficult since it would demand the postwar city to be hermetically sealed. Yet walls and barriers or guards and barbwire cannot be put at every street, alley, and park through which “the other”

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can be reached. Belfast might be securitised and permeated by an ethnonational geography but its city centre, the university area around Queen’s University of Belfast (QUB), and several NGO-facilitated venues nevertheless all constitute contact points where people can meet in an otherwise rather closed down city. Belfast is—despite its built environment, fears of “the other”, and paramilitary presence—not completely impermeable either. Its peacewalls have gates (albeit few and often closed), there are people who overcome fears and venture into ethnonationally coded areas, and the paramilitaries no longer have the same presence. The same goes for Mitrovica. The Bosniak Mahalla, the premises of NGOs operating across ethnonational divides, and certain markets and stores just of the banks of Ibar still allow people in Mitrovica to meet. The city is also quite permeable for those who do not fear “the other” as well as avoid getting noticed by ethnonational elements on either side. There are several bridges across Ibar—all of which are open to pedestrians—while the strong tradition of promenades in the region means that both city halves are built to be permeable. The same tendencies exist in Mostar. While the city is ethnonationally coded into east and west, there still are contact points around the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard—e.g. cafés and bars, Abrašević and other anti-ethnonational venues, and some public spaces. Those fearing neither “the other” nor exclusion by “us” in turn face a quite small city with wide pavements and multiple pedestrian streets. Mixing also continues in the postwar city. Urban conflicts over peace(s) were shown to undermine mixing through two dynamics. One was about undermining the aspects of the city upon which mixing depends. Yet as just elaborated, the postwar city always retains some heterogeneity while never becoming completely closed down or hermeneutically sealed. This subsequently means that people still end up mixing with “the other”—e.g. in the city centre in Belfast, the Main Bridge in Mitrovica, or the Spanish Square (on the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard) in Mostar. The other dynamic was about making mixing something that is best avoided. Yet negative portrayals of “the other” are never the only narrative nor are everyone susceptible to carrots and sticks. Belfast holds many groups who completely disregard antagonistic divides—like the feminist network around QUB, the anarcho-punk music club in the city centre, or the multinational companies that have recently moved to Belfast. The result is that mixing permeates these contexts. The anti-establishment protests of 2014 that shook Mostar in turn illustrate that economic and social carrots can never persuade everyone from mixing. These protests were namely filled

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with people that came together with “the other” despite being employed (in city institutions, hospitals, and schools) by those who see mixing as detrimental and non-contact as essential. The people in Mitrovica who work in NGOs trying to bridge the two city halves or regularly cross Ibar to meet up with friends and colleagues in turn illustrate that sticks cannot completely “dissuade” mixing either. There will always exist those who are prepared to take risks to engage “the other”—despite regular occurrence of threats, stones through windows, or car bombs. The other trajectory through which continuities of war in peace are transcended in the postwar city is that those who want to break postwar status quos utilise the postwar city’s continued heterogeneity, openness and permeability, and mixing. The result is that these aspects are reinforced in a positive feedback loop while conflict and fragmentation are undermined. Take the anonymised NGO operating in north Belfast. Urban conflicts over peace(s) have made this part of the city homogenous, closed down, and impermeable. Yet the different Catholic and Protestant areas are still densely aligned while the peacewalls do not constitute a hermetical seal. The NGO in question has utilised these two facts by creating contact points between adjacent areas in which people can engage “the other”. The result is that people have started mixing in these NGO-run spaces, thus both increasing heterogeneity and undermining conflict as they coalesce around common “real life” issues. They also undermine fragmentation because mixing in Belfast per definition means exiting social worlds where “the other” is not encountered. A similar dynamic is found in the city centre. Its relative openness and heterogeneity allows people to mix with “the other”, exit ethnonational social worlds, and create new relationships that transcend antagonistic worlds. The result is that the city centre has become even more heterogeneous while mixing has improved. Similar pictures emerge from Mitrovica. The integration of Serb police officers into KP—wanted by Pristina, demanded by external organisations, and implemented by Belgrade—utilised Mitrovica’s density as well as its citywide heterogeneity to create police units consisting of both Albanians and Serbs. The result of this integration is twofold. The fact that mixed police units now patrol both sides of Ibar means that heterogeneity and mixing have gone up—both between police officers (who now mix on a regular basis and are part of a more heterogeneous organisation) and between police officers and citizens. This new dynamic has also under-

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mined both conflict between police officers—who previously belonged to rival security structures but now are dependent on each other—and fragmentation since the presence of Albanian police officers in the north and Serb police officers in the south means that citizens now more regularly come in contact with “the other”. The same tendency is found in Bosniak Mahalla. Mitrovica’s density—combined with its relative openness and permeability—is utilised in Bosniak Mahalla for trading across the antagonistic divides. The result is this part of the city has become even more heterogeneous as well as the place where mixing in Mitrovica happens. Parallel to this development is also that conflict and fragmentation have gone down since trading is based both on cooperation and on people exiting ethnonational social worlds to meet “the other”. Abrašević in turn utilises Mostar’s continued density and permeability to create an open venue that is easily accessible from both sides. The multiple cultural and educational activities organised there attract people from across the city, meaning that heterogeneity and mixing has gone up both within Abrašević itself and across Mostar in its entirety since encounters with “the other” tend to make people curious of “the other side” as well. Fragmentation and conflict have parallelly gone done—at least between those visiting Abrašević. The situation in the Old Gymnasium goes along the same lines. Curious students have utilised the limited albeit existing heterogeneity and mixing within this building to form relationships with “the other” and transcend the antagonistic divides forced upon them. The result is that these students have begun to mix outside the Old Gymnasium and across the city as well—which in turn makes the city more heterogeneous and leads to even more mixing. Conflict and fragmentation between these students have at the same time gone down as they have become friends with “the other” and constantly move between ethnonational social worlds. The picture that emerges is thus that the postwar city not only reinforces but also transcends its conflicts over peace(s). This does not mean that there are no problems with the examples above. Mixing between people in north Belfast is increasing but from a low level, integration of police officers in Mitrovica is both enforced and still quite explosive, and the impact of Abrašević is limited to small pockets of Mostar. Yet these examples nevertheless show that the postwar city can play a transcending role as well.

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7.6   The Janus-Faced Postwar City With the principal research question answered, it is time for some concluding words on the postwar city in an ever-urbanizing world. Yet these words will be—much like the city itself—Janus-faced. I began this chapter by explaining how and why the postwar city reinforces its continuities of war in peace. I then presented an alternative picture of the postwar city explaining how and why it transcends the same continuities of war in peace. To add to this “confusion” I argued that some of the city’s aspects have both transcending and destructive potential—e.g. when mixing was shown to reinforce continuities of war in peace while fragmentation was argued as essential to transcend the same. While these somewhat ambiguous words may seem unsatisfactory, they point to several both illuminating and promising conclusions. No Default Trajectories and No Coherent Roles One important conclusion is that the postwar city neither has a default trajectory nor necessarily plays a coherent role in war-to-peace transitions. To contextualise this point, it is helpful to briefly remember the theorisation of the city as both Janus-faced and inherently complex. What this theorisation suggested was that the postwar city has the potential to transcend and reinforce its continuities of war in peace as well as that these potentials would rarely—if ever—be manifested monolithically or equally across the postwar city. The just elaborated conclusions suggest that this theorisation resonates with the everyday realities of the postwar city. This—I argue—means that the trajectories of and roles played by the postwar city in war-to-peace transitions ultimately depend on how its constitutive and functioning aspects are acted upon as well as what effects they have. Whether the postwar city transcends or reinforces its continuities of war in peace is thus dependent on—in exemplify terms—if heterogeneity is embraced or rejected, if the city is opened up or closed down, and if unavoidable everyday conflicts are made part of the wider conflict or employed to generate solutions to shared problems. It is also dependent on what the effects of homogenous clusters or shared housing are, how people react to enforced mixing, and whether paramilitaries accept or resist the accommodation of “the other” through unified city

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institutions or integrated education. The postwar city thus emerges as inherently Janus-faced. Which of its faces it will show the most in war-to-­ peace transitions in the end depends very much up to the postwar city itself. The Postwar City’s Transcending Potential Another conclusion is that the postwar city indeed does hold significant potential to transcend continuities of war in peace. This argument might be unexpected given the different urban conflicts over peace(s) analysed throughout the book. Yet if the focus is shifted from outcome to potential, it becomes clear that there are not many political entities where “the other” can be met with such ease, where people are as heterogeneous, and where cooperation is that common as in the postwar city. The three analysed postwar cities demonstrate this clearly. Belfast may be the invaluable asset that no party in Northern Ireland compromises over and where “the line is held” the most. Yet despite this centrality—or rather: because of it—Belfast is a magnet for people across Northern Ireland10 who go there to attend university, work in tech or start-up enterprises, or take part in its cultural life. Belfast thereby emerges as the place in Northern Ireland where heterogeneity, mixing, and accommodation—despite all urban conflicts over peace(s)—are most prevalent. Mitrovica in turn is undoubtedly the place in Kosovo where antagonistic clashes concentrate to as well as spread from. Yet its density—as well as its status as the frontier between two states that do not recognise each other and contest the same ­territory— means that there is no place in Kosovo in which people can and do engage “the other” as much. This has resulted in substantial economic cooperation across Ibar. It is true that this encompasses outright criminal activities (e.g. human trafficking, drug trading, protection rackets) exploiting the non-cooperation between rival security forces as well as “grey” activities (e.g. smuggling or tax evasion) exploiting both the weak rule of law and the relative institutional vacuum where the socio-political orders of Kosovo and Serbia meet. Yet this economic cooperation also encompasses entirely legal trading activities between partners across Ibar who partner up because it is mutually beneficial. Mostar may also seem as the entrenched “grad slučaj” [roughly: special case city] it often is portrayed to be. Yet just a glance at its demographics illustrates that there at the same time is no place in Bosnia-Herzegovina as heterogeneous as Mostar.  And—increasingly—for people from the Republic of Ireland, the UK, and beyond.

10

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Combined with its relative tranquillity and its quite open and permeable infrastructure, Mostar’s potential for mixing with “the other” supersedes anything that more “stable”—and more ethnonationally homogenous— cities of Banja Luka, Sarajevo, or Zenica can counter with.11 There Are No Easy Solutions Yet another important conclusions is that there are no straightforward or default solutions to the problems both caused and faced by the postwar city. This statement stems from the realisation that the postwar city is not only Janus-faced in its trajectory and role, but also in its constitutive and  functioning aspects. Heterogeneity, openness and permeability, and ­mixing were theorised as central to the postwar city’s transcending potential. The subsequent analyses in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar then confirmed that attacks against these constitutive and functioning aspects reinforce the postwar city’s continuities of war in peace. Yet this does not make these aspects transcending by default. Heterogeneity also means that “the [antagonistic] other” exists in the same everyday and is hard to avoid, openness and permeability can make people feel exposed and in need to defend themselves, and mixing may just as well result in clashes rather than in reconciliation. The opposite case can be made for conflict and fragmentation, both of which were theorised as central to the postwar city’s destructive potential and then shown to reinforce continuities of war in peace in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar. Yet conflict is parallelly also integral to the functioning of the city as well as the prerequisite for both democracy and continual progress of ideas, economies, and culture (see e.g. Jacobs 1994; Mouffe 1993; Sennett 2008). The same goes for fragmentation, which allows people to escape repressive worlds, alternative governing attempts to emerge, and spaces to be opened up. The postwar city’s constitutive and functioning aspects being Janus-­ faced thus means that the problem of the postwar city reinforcing rather than transcending continuities of war in peace is not “solved” by increas11  All four cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina larger than Mostar—Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica—are demographically monoethnic (of these, Tuzla is the most “multiethnic” one with its 72% Bosniaks). Mostar, however, has around 47,000 Bosniaks, 51,000 Croats, and 4500 Serbs. There are additionally around 3500 people that are undeclared or declared as “Other” (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 2016, 56–67).

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ing heterogeneity, tearing down defensive architecture, opening up ethnonational spaces, forcing people to mix, suppressing conflict, or abolishing fragmentation. While this might work, it may just as well be highly destabilising and dangerous—as unsuccessful attempts to integrate social housing in Belfast, remove barricades in Mitrovica, and unify the city council in Mostar illustrate. While this ambiguity may be disappointing or unsatisfying to some, I find it sobering and demanding of responsibility and carefulness when it comes to research on, policies for, or practices in the postwar city. To paraphrase Roger Mac Ginty, the transition from war to peace will never be made through one-size-fits-all peace packages from Ikea that have dummy-proof instructions (2008, 145). This book has made clear that the complexities of both the postwar city and its transition from war to peace cannot be overstated. The subsequent conclusion is that solutions to problems both faced and caused by the postwar city must be highly critical, attuned to its theoretical complexity, and sensitive of the empirical contexts in which different postwar cities find themselves. Peace Research and Urban Studies Must Cooperate This leads to the last conclusion, namely that peace research and urban studies need to cooperate in order to fully account for the postwar city’s problems. This argument may at first glance seem somewhat exaggerated since the problems depicted in Belfast, Mitrovica, and Mostar already are prevalent in and addressed by both fields. The problems of contested territoriality, continuation of violence, and fear of “the other” depicted throughout this book are prevalent in virtually every postwar setting. Peace research has therefore devoted extensive attention to and ­generated invaluable insights on these phenomena—and those concerned with postwar cities need to tap into this research. Yet the problem is that the postwar city’s constitutive and functioning aspects alter and/or exaggerate the nature of these phenomena. Belfast’s density has made its territorial struggles concentrate down to micro-scales—i.e. street corners, buildings, and metres—in a sense that is uncommon in other political entities (e.g. the state, rural, suburb) or elsewhere in Northern Ireland. Mitrovica’s centrality within its wider socio-political context also means that violent events happening there are much more likely have spill-over effects than violent events happening elsewhere in Kosovo. Mostar’s unavoidable mixing in turn means that fear is never far away since it is virtually impossible create an everyday in which “the [feared] other” is not

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encountered on a regular basis—unlike other parts in Bosnia-Herzegovina where such an ordering of everyday life is more common. The problems of bad planning, corruption, and segregation (residential, educational, social) depicted throughout this book are in turn found in virtually every city. The same goes for violence and intergroup tension. The result is that urban studies have devoted considerable time and effort at studying these phenomena—and those concerned with postwar cities need to tap into this research as well. Yet the postwar city’s transition from war to peace alters and/or exaggerates the nature of these phenomena. Belfast’s bad planning decisions—e.g. cul-de-sacs, defensive architecture, or the Westlink—are much harder to undo there than elsewhere since its postwar status means that all changes are analysed through zero-sum lenses and rendered as part of the wider conflict. The fact that Mitrovica’s corrupt socio-political orders(s) parallelly are understood as fundamental to Albanian and Serb security means that almost any anti-corruption efforts are rendered as existential threats and forcefully resisted, unlike in other cities. Mostar’s educational segregation—rendered central to in-­ group cohesion and survival—is in turn much harder to undo because the city has experienced war. The postwar city thus alters and/or exaggerates problems addressed in peace research as well as in urban studies. The fact that peace research tends to not engage the city as a research object while urban studies tend to not take on-board recent insights on postwar settings means that neither field is able to comprehensively deal with the postwar city. The ability to account for both its postwar and city-specific dynamics—I argue— depends on cooperation between these two fields.12 This book has taken some small steps towards that direction by exploring how and why the postwar city’s continuities of war in peace are reinforced. The next steps need to shift focus to how and why they can be transcended.

References Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift. 2002. Cities: reimagining the urban. Polity. Gusic, Ivan. 2019. “The relational spatiality of the postwar condition: a study of the city of Mitrovica”. Political Geography 71: 47–55. Jacobs, Jane. 1994. The death and life of great American cities. Penguin. 12  The postwar city’s significant potential to transcend continuities of war in peace additionally means that this need cannot be overstressed.

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Index1

A Abrašević, 104, 125, 133–139, 255, 257 The acted city, 61–64 Acts, 7, 23, 55, 105, 153, 194 Albanians, ix, x, 2, 12, 32n3, 60, 73, 74, 90, 100, 100n1, 145–148, 145n1, 145n2, 147n4, 148n6, 148n7, 150–156, 150n8, 153n9, 155n14, 161–164, 166–169, 171, 172, 174–177, 179, 180n28, 181, 184, 246, 249, 251, 251n8, 253, 254, 256, 257, 262 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH), 137 Austro-Hungarian Boulevard, 102, 103, 105, 108, 125–126, 131, 132, 136, 246, 255

B Barricades, ix, 157, 159, 169, 169n21, 179, 179n24, 185, 246n3, 261 Belfast, 2–5, 4n6, 4n7, 7–9, 12, 13, 42, 43n8, 44, 45, 59, 60, 85, 87–91, 193–241, 246–257, 246n2, 248n5, 259–262 Belfast Agreement/Good Friday Agreement (BA/GFA), 195, 198, 200, 200n6, 206, 212 Belfast City Centre, 214, 240 Belgrade, 90, 91, 146, 148, 153–160, 178–179, 181–183, 185, 250, 251, 253, 256 Bosnia, 103n7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2, 29, 63, 88, 89, 100, 100n2, 101, 101n4, 103, 103n6, 103n7, 103n10,

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 I. Gusic, Contesting Peace in the Postwar City, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28091-8

293

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INDEX

107, 113, 114, 118, 121, 126, 128, 164, 259, 260n11, 262 Bosniak Mahalla, 150n8, 151, 167, 254, 255, 257 Bosniaks, 2, 29, 30, 60, 63, 66, 100–104, 100n2, 101n5, 103n9, 103n10, 106–109, 107n11, 107n12, 107n13, 113, 117n19, 119–126, 122n20, 122n22, 123n23, 124n24, 128, 131, 136, 138, 167, 246, 250, 252, 260n11 Bridge Watchers, 156, 169 Brussels Agreement, xi, 179n25 Built environment, 9, 91, 198, 207, 209–234, 241, 255 C Car-centrism, 209, 214–219 Cathedral Quarters, 218 Catholics, 2, 60, 193–196, 193– 194n2, 199–202, 201n9, 202n10, 203n11, 204, 205n15, 206, 206n16, 209, 211, 212, 214, 220, 225, 231, 239–241, 246, 248n5, 256 City, 2, 29, 55, 101, 148, 245 City as research object, 4, 5, 8, 13, 19, 32–41, 262 The city’s constitution, 8, 33–34, 45 The city’s functioning, 32n4, 34–36, 38, 57, 260 Coexistence, xi, 2, 2n4, 35, 38–40, 43, 65, 74, 75, 75n13, 100, 103, 105, 107–109, 112, 121, 128, 129, 134–137, 150, 153–155, 164, 168, 176–178, 181, 183, 196, 199, 200, 209, 239, 246, 247 Coexisting peace, 105, 106, 108, 110, 112–114, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123–126, 130, 131, 133–135,

138, 139, 175, 176, 178, 183, 198, 207, 208, 235, 237, 238 Commercialism, 214–219 The complexities of the city, 61–64 Conflicts over peace(s), 5, 7, 13, 19–32, 40–43, 45, 101, 147, 148, 196, 198, 250, 251, 257 Constitutive and functioning aspects (of the city), 248, 250, 254, 258, 260, 261 Consumerism, 208 Continuities of war in peace, xi, 1–4, 1n2, 9, 19–23, 25–28, 30, 32, 38, 40, 45n11, 88, 91, 245, 247, 248, 250–254, 256, 258–260, 262, 262n12 Croatia, 63, 99, 100, 124 Croatian Defence Council (HVO), 103, 137 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH), 107, 107n13, 108n15, 117, 118, 122 Croats, 2, 29, 30, 60, 62, 62n3, 62n4, 63, 66, 73, 74, 100, 100n2, 101, 101n5, 103, 103n8, 103n10, 104, 106–109, 107n11, 107n12, 107n13, 113, 117, 117n19, 119–128, 130, 131, 136, 138, 246, 250, 252, 260n11 Cul-de-sacs, 90, 220, 223, 225, 227, 232, 239, 262 D Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 101, 101n4, 103, 121, 122, 126 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 195n4, 195n5 Destructive potential (of the city), 2n4, 39, 40, 245, 248–250, 258, 260 Disorder, 1n2, 21, 22, 25–30, 163

 INDEX 

Distinctiveness of the postwar city, 40–46 Divided cities, 4n6, 152 Division, 2, 4n6, 32n4, 35, 38, 39, 56, 89, 102–104, 106, 107, 112, 123–126, 129–131, 134–137, 139, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153, 155, 157–159, 162, 167, 168, 171–176, 183, 185, 194, 196, 198–200, 207, 208, 224–241, 246, 247, 249, 251–253, 252n9 E Educational segregation, 9, 91, 121–126, 134, 246, 262 Employment, 9, 39, 43, 66, 76, 87, 91, 108, 113–116, 114n17, 120, 121, 154, 157–159, 177, 194, 205, 207, 246, 247, 251, 251n8 Eradication of shared spaces, 231–232 Ethnonational belonging, 26, 62, 70n9, 90, 99, 119, 177, 200n7 Ethnonational education, 121–123 Ethnonational geography, 198–207, 209, 214, 233, 234, 239, 241, 248n5, 250, 251, 255 Ethnonationalism, 62, 64, 67, 75, 101, 106, 108n16, 112, 114n17, 115, 118, 121, 125, 127, 128, 134, 138, 208 Ethnonational peace, 27, 103–106, 109, 113, 114, 116, 118–124, 124n24, 126, 130, 131, 133, 137–139, 152, 153, 157, 159, 162, 164, 167, 168, 171, 173, 175, 178, 182, 198–201, 209, 235, 253 European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), x, 152, 153, 154n11, 155–161, 156n15, 156n16, 163, 164, 166–168, 169n21, 171, 173–176, 175n22, 178–184

295

European Union Special Representative (EUSR), 154n11, 155, 155n14, 158, 164, 166, 167, 173, 178, 180, 182 The everyday, 9, 10, 12, 75, 76, 87, 90, 91, 124, 174, 253, 258 F Falls, 199, 204, 208, 209, 212, 226, 228, 229, 231, 233n26, 234, 235, 254 Fear, 6, 9, 10, 60, 71, 76, 77, 90, 91, 108, 110, 116–118, 120, 124, 134, 153, 161–175, 180, 184, 204, 224, 246, 255, 261 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), 103n10, 107n12 Flags, 136, 151, 201–203 G The governed city, 61–64 Governing attempts, 7–9, 13, 60, 66n5, 71, 71n11, 73, 75, 77–78, 77n14, 83–85, 83n18, 84n19, 87–91, 153, 154, 175, 176, 178, 181, 183–185, 260 Governmentality, 7–9, 13, 56, 60, 70–78, 83–86, 84n19, 90, 153, 157, 162, 171, 173, 175 H Herzegovina, 103, 103n7 Housing reconstruction, 219–224, 227 I Ibar, x, 149–152, 155, 160, 162–169, 171–173, 175, 183, 184, 246–249, 246n3, 250n6, 250n7, 254–256, 259

296 

INDEX

Integrated Border Management (IBM), 179 Integrated education, 116, 123, 259 Integration, 57, 116, 117, 122, 126, 148, 153–155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 178–185, 179n24, 183n29, 256, 257 Internally Displaced Person (IDP), 153, 164 International Civilian Office (ICO), 154n11, 159, 160, 163, 169n21, 172, 177, 178, 180 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 193, 194, 195n5, 202, 206, 217 J Janus-faced city, 2n4, 9, 39, 40, 245, 258–262 K Kosovo, ix–xi, 2, 88–90, 100, 100n3, 145–148, 147n4, 150, 153–158, 155n12, 155n13, 161, 164–167, 169n21, 171, 173, 176, 176n23, 178–181, 179n24, 181n28, 183–185, 250, 250n6, 251, 253, 259, 261 Kosovo Force (KFOR), x, xn1, 44, 147, 154n11, 156n15, 161, 162, 166, 169n21, 178, 181 Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), 146, 164 Kosovo Police (KP), ix, x, 156, 169n21, 181–183, 256 Kosovo war, ix L Lagan Riverfront, 218 Limits of the postwar city, 41–42 Lived space, 79, 204–207 Loyalists, 193n2

M Macedonia, 62n4, 99, 100 Main Bridge, ix–xi, 12, 151, 152, 162, 165, 170–172, 255 Material disconnection, 234–236 Material space, 79, 201–202 Middle class areas, 209, 231, 246 Mitrovica, ix, xi, 2–5, 4n6, 7–9, 11n8, 12, 13, 42, 44, 45, 59, 60, 85, 87–91, 145–185, 246–257, 246n2, 250n6, 250n7, 259–262 Mitrovica north of Ibar, ix, x, 150, 151, 153–161, 153n9, 163, 165–167, 169, 176–178, 180–185, 250, 251, 253 Mitrovica south of Ibar, ix, 150, 153, 161, 163, 164, 166, 176 Modes of acting, 70, 72, 75–78, 75n13, 155–157, 167–171, 174, 178–181 Montenegro, 100, 100n3 Mostar, 2–5, 4n6, 7–9, 12, 13, 29, 30, 42, 44, 45, 59, 60, 62, 62n3, 85, 87–91, 99–139, 246–255, 246n2, 246n3, 257, 259–262, 260n11 Murals, 201–203, 206n16 N Nationalists, 121, 193n2, 200n7 Negotiating acts, 8, 69, 116, 131 Negotiating agency, 7, 8, 13, 56, 60–69, 83–86, 84n19, 90, 105, 109, 123 Non-contact, 1, 9, 57, 78, 134, 162, 167, 171, 172, 237, 248, 252, 256 Normalising peace, 198, 207, 208, 234, 237, 241 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 146, 147, 150, 154, 156, 156n15, 171, 181 Northern Ireland, 2, 88, 89, 193–196, 193n1, 195n5, 198–200, 200n6,

 INDEX 

200n7, 203, 207, 209, 219n20, 259, 261 O Obrana i Zaštita, 105–112 Office of the High Representative (OHR), 99, 101n4, 104, 106–108, 108n16, 114, 115n18, 116, 118, 120, 123–125, 136, 139, 249 Old Gymnasium, 122, 123, 125–129, 131, 133, 254, 257 Operationalisation, 61 Order of things, 1n1, 7, 25, 25n1, 28, 30–32, 42, 71 P Parallel institutions, 104, 153, 155–160, 178, 179, 179n25, 182–184, 251, 253 Participant observations, 9–13 Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 107, 107n13, 118 Peace, 1, 19, 55, 101, 145, 193, 245 Peace park, 151, 165 Peace research, 3–7, 20, 37n7, 44n10, 58, 261–262 Peacewalls, 44, 90, 203n11, 209–214, 217, 225, 227, 232, 234, 235, 239, 246, 255, 256 Perceived space, 79, 202–204 Postwar, 1–13, 19–46, 55–57, 62, 78, 79, 87, 99–139, 145–185, 193–241, 245–251, 254–262 Postwar cities/city, 1–13, 3n5, 4n6, 19–46, 55–60, 70, 77, 78, 83, 85–91, 245–262, 245n1 Pristina, 90, 148, 153, 156n16, 164n20, 171, 175n22, 176, 176n23, 177, 180, 183, 184, 251, 251n8, 253, 256

297

Production by space, 81–83 Production of space, 81, 83, 83n17 Protestants, 2, 60, 193–194n2, 194–196, 199–202, 201n9, 202n10, 203n11, 204, 206, 206n16, 209, 211, 212, 214, 220, 225, 231, 239–241, 246, 248n5, 256 Q Queens’ University of Belfast (QUB), 255 R Relational space, 7–9, 13, 56, 60, 78–86, 90, 198, 199, 207 Repression, 1n2, 20–22, 25, 26, 28–30, 40, 164 Republicans, 193, 193n2 Republic of Ireland, 193n2, 194, 196, 199–200, 200n6, 259n10 Republika Srpska (RS), 103n10, 107n12 Ring of Steel, 217 Routinisation of division, 252 S Sandy Row, 199 Segregation, 5, 30, 42, 43, 116, 122, 126, 128, 155, 168, 174, 195, 196, 198, 204, 205, 209, 211, 230, 240, 262 Semi-structured interviews, 10 Serbia, ix–xi, 90, 100, 100n3, 145, 147, 148, 153–156, 153n10, 158, 160, 169n21, 176, 177, 179, 179n26, 181n28, 185, 259 Serbs, ix, x, 12, 62, 62n4, 63, 73, 74, 90, 100, 100n2, 101, 101n5, 103, 107n12, 123n23, 146–148,

298 

INDEX

148n7, 150, 153–169, 153n9, 155n12, 155n14, 171, 172, 174–176, 176n23, 178–185, 246, 250, 250n6, 250n7, 251, 253, 254, 256, 260n11 Set of acts, 61–69, 68n6 Shankill, 199, 204, 208, 209, 212, 222, 226, 231, 233n26, 234, 235, 241, 254 Shared space, 58, 137, 174, 231–232, 237–239, 241 Short Strand, 199, 233n26 Sinn Fein, 195n5 Slovenia, 99, 100 Social housing, 206, 209, 218n19, 219, 219n20, 220, 227, 261 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), 73–76, 75n13, 89, 99–101, 100n1, 109, 145, 145n2, 146, 148, 176n23 Spaces, 6, 33, 55, 128, 175, 198, 247 The spatial city, 61–64 Spatial parallelism, 136, 232–234, 240 Štela, 108, 114, 114n17, 115 Structuring the field of possible acts, 8, 70–72, 77, 175 The subject, 8, 56n2, 60–69, 68n6, 69n8, 71, 83n18 T Third entity (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), 103n10, 107 Titanic Quarters, 218 Trajectory of acting, 62, 62n3, 63, 65–67, 69, 69n8, 105, 106, 108–109, 117, 121, 139 Transcending potential (of the city), 38–40, 245–248, 254, 259–260 Two schools under one roof, 122 U Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 202, 206

Unanticipated conversations, 11–13 Unionists, 193n2, 200n7 United Kingdom (UK), 193, 193n1 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 147, 150, 154n11, 155–157, 156n15, 156n16, 159–161, 167, 168, 171, 175n22, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183 University of Ulster, 218 Urban conflicts over peace(s), 7–9, 11–13, 19–46, 55–91, 103–106, 112, 118, 121, 150, 152, 153, 153n9, 154n10, 198–201, 207, 209, 234, 238, 241, 245–256, 245n1, 247n4, 259 Urban studies, 3–5, 8, 32n4, 33, 34, 40, 56–58, 84, 261–262 V Violence, 1–3, 1n2, 5, 20–23, 25–30, 32n4, 37, 42, 56, 74, 79, 81, 101, 146, 147, 150, 160, 164, 194, 195, 198, 199, 203, 205n13, 211, 224, 225, 247, 251, 261, 262 W War, 1, 19, 56, 99, 145, 193, 245 War-to-peace transitions, 1–5, 9, 249, 250, 258, 259 Washington Agreement, 103n10 Ways of thinking, 70, 72–76, 75n13, 78, 154–155, 162–167, 171, 176–178 Westlink, 215, 230, 231, 231n24, 236 Working class areas, 207, 209, 217–231, 231n24, 233n26 Y Yugoslavism, 62, 75n13