Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9780520331112

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CONTEMPORARY

YUGOSLAVIA

Contemporary

YUGOSLAVIA Socialist Experiment

EDITED BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH Jozo Tomasevich Woodford McClellan Phyllis Auty George Macesich M. George Zaninovich Joel M. Halpem

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES

»969

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright © 1969, by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-16512 Printed in the United States of America

The editor and the contributors dedicate this work to Harold H. Fisher, Director Emeritus of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and Professor Emeritus of History at Stanford University.

Preface ON DECEMBER 4 and 5, 1965, scholars from a number of American universities gathered at Stanford University for a conference on contemporary Yugoslavia. At the conference, which was sponsored by Stanford's Faculty Seminar on East European Studies, many important problems of postWorld War II Yugoslav history were subjected to close scrutiny. The present volume contains five of the papers prepared for the conference, and two commissioned papers—one on Yugoslav-Marxist thought, the other on social change in Yugoslavia. An introductory chapter provides a brief survey of the interwar period of Yugoslav history, with particular emphasis on those crucial problems which were responsible for internal instability and which, in one way or another, continue to exist today. Professor Jozo Tomasevich, who is presently putting the final touches on a comprehensive study of Yugoslavia in the Second World War, provides the finest short treatment of the enormously complicated Yugoslav war scene currently available. His essay is based on documentary materials in Serbo-Croatian and other languages, as well as a prodigious quantity of monographs and memoirs published in Yugoslavia and abroad. Professor Tomasevich shows how the foreign enemy partitioned Yugoslavia and took brutal measures in an effort to crush the Yugoslav peoples' will to resist. His analysis of the Communist Party's political organization and military activities, its relations with other Yugoslav political groups, its contacts with foreign powers, and its search for international recognition is clear and insightful. The Second World War had a profound impact on Yugoslavia's future development. As soon as the Axis powers overran the country, the middleclass parties and the so-called peasant parties disintegrated. Unable to rise above narrow national and confessional limitations, lacking unity of purpose and dedicated leadership, they proved less resilient to the pressure of foreign occupation than did the Communist Party. The nationalist forces, called Chetniks, were more concerned about the Communist threat than the enemy occupation, which they looked upon as a temporary phenomenon. Their aim of returning the government-in-exile to Yugoslavia clashed vii

viii

Preface

with the Communist determination to establish a "proletarian dictatorship." There thus ensued a civil war between the two resistance movements, the Chetniks fighting for legitimacy, the Communists for revolutionary change. Combining the struggle for national liberation with social revolution, the Communists perfected their organization, trained cadres of administrators and police, and captured the government of the liberated country. Tito's Communist forces overcame their adversaries. But it was one thing to vanquish the foe and quite another to build a state. Professor Woodford McClellan is the author of the chapter on Yugoslavia's postwar political evolution. As he shows, the transfer of power to the Communists was completed between 1945 and 1948. Political enemies were destroyed, the means of production were nationalized, and the Communist state system was established. In carrying out the transformations during those years, the Yugoslav Communist leaders sought to emulate the Soviet Union. A new chapter in its history was opened by Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948, a momentous event in the history of world Communism. The expulsion was followed by significant changes in Yugoslavia's political and economic systems, as the country's leaders abandoned rigid Stalinism and proceeded eventually to the introduction of a form of "national Communism." Although it may not have wished to break away, Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist bloc, by providing an example for resisting Soviet domination, initiated the disintegration of Communist unity and monolithic organization. The Yugoslav leaders' willingness to experiment with new economic and political ideas and institutions has set them apart from their counterparts in the East European Communist states. They were the first to depart from the Stalinist system and to develop "a variation on Marxist theory." Professor George Zaninovich's essay provides a penetrating interpretation of this complex of new departures which is often called Titoism. Professor Zaninovich points out that the Yugoslav Communists are not enslaved by Marxist, Leninist, or Stalinist teachings, and seem willing to adjust their theories to contemporary realities. Yugoslav theory, he holds, has developed out of a reaction against the overcentralizing tendencies of the Soviet model. It focuses, however, not only on the "ills of bureaucracy and state centralism, but also on what are considered viable alternatives to accepted Marxist institutional forms." In its twenty years of existence, Yugoslavia has adopted no fewer than three fundamental laws (written constitutions) and three economic reforms. And, if reports are accurate, the Yugoslavs are at present engaged in drafting a fourth postwar constitution. The main trends in Yugoslavia's political and economic affairs have been the devolution of political power,

Preface

ix

decentralization in economic management, and general liberalization. In the process, the Yugoslav leaders have found it expedient to graft certain capitalistic practices on socialistic foundations. With a planned economy and a policy of accelerated industrialization, the Communist government has transformed Yugoslavia from an agrarian to an industrial society. Professor George Macesich makes a judicious and succinct assessment of Yugoslavia's economic experimentation. He shows that Yugoslav economic development has been impressive, despite some costly errors in planning. In order to honor promises to workers and to stimulate production, the Communist government has decentralized economic management and has introduced workers' councils in economic enterprises. At the same time, Professor Macesich observes, the Communists, while preferring indirect methods of persuasion, do resort to more direct methods whenever worker-managers or an industrial party organization seem to ignore the official line or to take "the concept of worker management in a strict literal sense." Although economic productivity has risen rapidly, it has failed to keep up with the consumption demands of the people, and this has resulted in accumulating discontent and largescale migration of labor to Western Europe. As of this writing, the economic situation seems anything but stable, and the measures employed by the government to improve the economy appear more capitalistic than socialistic in nature. From the very beginning of its national history, Yugoslavia has been vexed by a seemingly insoluble nationality problem. Of an exceedingly complex nature, the problem involves the relations among national groups inside Yugoslavia and relations with foreign states which either have territorial claims against Yugoslavia or affect to speak on behalf of their conationals who constitute important minorities within the Yugoslav federation. Various solutions have been proposed and tried at various times, but all have failed to eliminate the problem. Communist federalism on the Soviet model was adopted as official policy during the war, and was subsequently implemented. But, as shown in Chapter Six, a federalism linking the separate republics through a common Communist ideology and central government has not eliminated the basic nationality problem. Both before and after the Second World War, there has been a tendency to blame one or another nationality for Yugoslavia's (usually interdependent) ethnic and confessional conflicts. In truth, all the Yugoslav peoples were responsible, because of the peculiar historical experiences which have imbued them with national and religious suspicion. There are, however, hopeful indications: it would appear that the idea of some form of Yugoslav unity is stronger today than the desire for national polarization and exclusiveness.

X

Preface

Few countries have climbed so rapidly to prominence in the international community as has Yugoslavia in the last twenty-five years. T h a t experience is the subject of an essay by Dr. Phyllis Auty, the well-known expert on Yugoslav affairs. Dr. Auty points out that several factors account for Yugoslavia's international importance: the country's strategic position in Southeastern Europe; the brilliant record of the Partisan resistance to the Axis; and the successful rejection of Stalinism and Soviet hegemony. But much of Yugoslavia's success can be attributed to the quality of leadership provided the country by President Josip Broz Tito. Assuming the role of a neutralist national leader, Marshal T i t o has been able to derive diplomatic and economic support from both the American and the Soviet worldpower blocs. Yugoslavia's future international standing, however, will depend, according to Dr. Auty, "not only on the question of leadership, but on internal unity." Noting the centrifugal tendencies in Yugoslavia, she concludes that the Yugoslav "nation" is not "sufficiently united." T h e Second World War served to scramble the Yugoslav population. A considerable two-way flow of population between countryside and city occurred; resistance fighters were shifted about the country as political and military needs required; hundreds of thousands of persons became prisoners of war, were transplanted from their homes by calculated policy or fled to escape destruction, or were sent to Germany as laborers and to the Eastern Front as combat troops. These wartime developments broke down the isolation of the peasant communities and brought other significant changes to the peasants' traditional ways of life. T h e peasants were introduced to an advanced military technology, to new dress and foods, and to new military, technical, and political language. T h e forces of social change unleashed by the war were subsequently accelerated by Communist policies. Professor Joel Halpern's essay on the social transformation of Yugoslavia since the war is an important study of the impact of modernism on a traditional social order. Among other things, Professor Halpern concludes that ethnic rivalries in Yugoslavia are likely to continue, but he believes that they will most probably develop in the direction of competing regional economic interest groups, as opposed to "specific socioeconomic groups having particular subcultural identities." As this is written, in 1968, Yugoslavia has by no means solved its political, economic, and nationality problems, although strenuous efforts are being made in dealing with them. Whether or not the country continues on the general course of liberalization and democratization will largely depend, of course, on those who head the government after President T i t o retires from the political stage. Among Yugoslavia's principal instruments of

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xi

power, the army is the least affected by nationalistic squabbles, and it may have a decisive voice in determining the country's direction of development The editor is most grateful to Stanford's Committee on International Studies for making possible the conference on contemporary Yugoslavia, and to his colleagues Professors Ivo J . Lederer and Terence Emmons for invaluable counsel concerning the organization of the conference and the preparation of the manuscript for publication. He is also indebted to the library staff of the Hoover Institution, to the secretarial staff of the Department of History at Stanford, to his students, Carl J . Di Fronzo, William M. Hatch, and Frank £. Wozniak, and to Mrs. Elise Johnson, for their generous assistance. W.S.V. Stanford, California December 1968

Contents 1. Interwar Yugoslavia

Wayne S. Vucinich

2. Yugoslavia During the Second World War 3. Postwar Political Evolution

Woodford

3 Jozo Tomasevich McClellan

4. Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945-1965)

59 119

Phyllis Auty

154

5. Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia George Macesich

203

6. Nationalism and Communism

Wayne S. Vucinich

7. T h e Yugoslav Variation on Marx

M. George Zaninovich

236 285

8. Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State Joel M. Halpern

316

NOTES

351

INDEX

4*5

xiii

CONTEMPORARY

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia

I

S

T

R

I

i)

SLOVENIA

A

H

U

N

G

Ljubljana

A

i

?

y

.(Autonomous)X d/ojvodinaS 7 \ N o v i \S a d

tontibe

(BOSNIA \

Belgrade

ANDÎi

HERZEGOVINA

.i iPristina Ì MONtENEGROr^\*v't,. ) V (Autonomous)*: / 'TitogradA ; < KOSSOVOyjf !§> * / 'vMETOHIJA f > ^ >7 l , BOUNDARIES International Autonomous region Republic

\

(' ; ) /

J

jp-yvTskopje^, 1

) nr/ \

¡ff M A C E D O N I A

)

1 Interwar Yugoslavia WAYNE S. VUCINICH

F R O M the date of its birth, December i, 1918, Yugoslavia was afflicted with problems of great magnitude that could be solved only with time. T h e interwar period was characterized by successive political and economic crises engendered by the difficult task of creating a state out of diverse peoples and regions never previously united. T h e fact that some 87 percent of the population was of South Slav background and only about 13 percent of other origins did not necessarily reduce ethnic friction, for each of the South Slav peoples guarded its own nationality, language, and culture jealously. T h e new country needed to devise a polity in which its three major and often clashing religious groups—Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim—could coexist. T h e Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and some minorities were members of the Orthodox Church; the Croats, Slovenes, and some other minorities were Catholics; and the Albanians, Turks, and Islamicized Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were Muslims. There were a few small Protestant communities (Lutheran, Seventh-Day Adventist, Evangelical) and a Jewish community. T h e Catholics, particularly the Croat Catholics, saw the Orthodox Church as an instrument of the Serbian-dominated government and suspected it of proselytism. In turn, the spokesmen of the Orthodox Church feared the international connections of the Catholic Church, saw in it the main force behind Croatian nationalism, and feared its proselytism. T h e Islamic community received full autonomy and the Muslims, for the most part, had no religious grievances. T h e Yugoslavs needed to unify such fairly advanced communities as Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina with such retarded societies as Montenegro and Macedonia with independent Serbia, a state whose level of development fell somewhere between the two extremes. T h e provinces constituting Yugoslavia had to be given uniform legal, judicial, economic, financial, educational, and political systems as well. For example, for months after the war, several currencies (dinar, perper, kruna, lev) circulated in

3

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Wayne S. Vucinich

Yugoslavia. Not until 1920 was the new dinar established as the sole national currency. Within its borders Yugoslavia had, in 1918, about two million minority citizens who were political instruments of inimical foreign states. Even had the Yugoslav government met all their demands, the minority citizens would have remained a disruptive force as long as their mother countries— the neighboring revisionist states—were unfriendly to Yugoslavia. Claiming to speak for the Macedonians, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was more interested in uniting Macedonia with Bulgaria than in a free Macedonia, and the Albanian minority, resisting the colonization of Serbs in the Kossovo-Metohija (Kosmet) region, wished to be united with Albania. The half-million Magyars, concentrated in the province of Vojvodina, were identified with Hungary's desire to restore St. Stephen's crown lands, while the German minority (Volksdeutsche) in the same province, which exceeded a half million in number in the thirties, became an arm of the German Reich. The very small Italian minority was awed by Mussolini's frequent demonstrations of power and stood ready to serve him. Only the Turkish and Romanian minorities posed no serious problem to the new state; their mother countries enjoyed friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and the Turkish minority had no hope of ever uniting with Turkey. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied a special place; they were an indigenous Slavic people and seemed relatively happy with their lot in the internar Yugoslavia in whose government they were often represented. The eighty thousand or so Jews had no ethnic or religious grievances against the Yugoslav regime. Yugoslavia suffered extensively thè ravages of the First World War. Railways, bridges, and roads had been destroyed, and locomotives, railway cars, and some industrial installations removed from the country. The fact that Serbia, which had lagged behind Slovenia and Croatia in industrial development, suffered far greater losses and damages than either Slovenia or Croatia did, contributed to the intensity of intra-Yugoslav ethnic antagonisms. Roads, railways, and communications, fairly well developed in northern Yugoslavia, were most inadequate in the central and southern portions of the country. The only important Yugoslav industries in 1918 were located in the north (Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina). The mineral resources in the central and eastern parts of the country (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia) were hardly tapped. In the north, agriculture had made moderate advances, but elsewhere in the country farming was still primitive.1 Although in Serbia and Montenegro nearly all cultivable land was held by

Interwar Yugoslavia

5

the small landholding peasantry, in other Yugoslav regions some of the land was still in the hands of the remnants of the feudal class. The glaring unevenness in economic development accounted for the sharp disparity in the economic and social standards of living among the different sections of the country and between the rural and urban population. In 1918 there was a serious shortage of elementary and secondary schools, hospitals, and persons with professional and technical skills. The country had only two universities, those of Zagreb and Belgrade, and university matriculation was extremely small. Illiteracy was very high in the central and southeastern parts of the country, low in some northern regions, and generally much higher among women than among men in all sections of the country. Most of the schools, hospitals, and doctors were located in the cities. Although the process of modernization had begun in the more prosperous northern regions and major urban centers much before 1918, the traditional way of life prevailed in most of the rest of the country. Yet linguistic and ethnic affinity, inextricably intertwined populations, and common foreign enemies favored the unification of the South Slavs; the centripetal forces exceeded the centrifugal. Only a form of government satisfactory to each constituent nation of the country needed to be devised. Unfortunately, however, those who accepted the union in 1918 could not agree on the constitutional organization of the state. The dominant Serbs favored a centralized state that would give them undisputed control, but the great majority of the Croats, the Slovenes, and most of the minorities hoped and fought for a federal state in which each ethnic group would be able to maintain its ethnic identity and to enjoy broad autonomy on its own historical territory. The latter would have made it necessary to delineate the territories each ethnic element considered to be its patrimony, a problem which was itself the root of the dispute between the Serbs and the Croats, since the leaders of each nation claimed the whole of ethnically mixed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The disagreement over state organization was further complicated by ideological conflicts between exponents of monarchism and republicanism, middle-class democracy, peasant democracy, and proletarian dictatorship.2 The pre-1914 governments of Serbia, plagued by many parliamentary crises, had been essentially democratic. Since the founding of the state in the early nineteenth century, the Serbs had gained parliamentary and administrative experience; by 1918 they possessed a number of able political leaders and organized political parties. The South Slavs in Austria-Hungary had not possessed their own independent state or states; they had instead gained valuable political experience through participation in the Hun-

6

Wayne S. Vucinich

garian and Austrian parliaments, their own provincial diets, and local administrations. They had a number of political parties, representing various shades of political opinion, and they also had some able and articulate political leaders. The political experience of the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary, however, differed from that of the Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, for the leaders of the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary had devoted most of their attention to opposing and criticizing the state, while the politicians of Serbia and Montenegro had striven to strengthen and expand their already existing states. The South Slav union, then, brought together political parties and political leaders of different experiences and backgrounds.8 Some of the political parties survived the union; some fused with others or simply disappeared. In the elections for the constituent assembly of November 28, 1920, no less than forty different political parties and groups participated. The personality of the party leader and his ethnic background were frequently more important than the program of the party. With the exception of the Communists and Socialists, all political parties spoke essentially for the middle classes, represented specific ethnic and confessional interests, and lacked reasonably consistent programs and disciplined membership. Even the Croatian People's Peasant Party (after December 7, 1920, called Croatian Republican Peasant Party, and after March 1925 Croatian Peasant Party) and the Agrarian Party, which claimed to speak for the peasants, were primarily middle-class parties. The early anticlerical position of the Croatian People's Peasant Party drove many Catholic clerics into extremist nationalist political movements, while the Slovene People's Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization were to a large extent confessional parties. The Yugoslav Socialist Party, attacked by both the middle-class parties and the Communists, never achieved political importance. No single political party ever was strong enough to form a government with a parliamentary majority. The result was government by coalitions bound together for the purpose of sharing the spoils of office. Interwar Yugoslavia did not produce a single new political leader of real stature. Most of the pre-1918 middleclass leaders clung to outdated philosophies and tactics and were unable to contend with new political challenges. The Formative Period and the Experiment in Parliamentary Democracy Immediately after the proclamation of unification on December 1, 1918, Stojan Prodi, well-known Serbian statesman, was asked to form the first government of the new country, and from December 20, 1918, to August

Interwar Yugoslavia

7

16, 1919, Protid served as prime minister. Prince Regent Alexander, who had since June 16, 1914, exercised the royal prerogatives for his aged father, King Peter, ordered the convocation of a "provisional parliament," Privremeno narodno predstavnStvo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, to enact a law for the election of the constituent assembly that would in turn adopt a constitution for the new state. A crisis was precipitated over the manner in which the deputies for the "provisional parliament" would be selected, the Serbian-dominated government endeavoring to assure itself of a parliamentary majority and insisting that the constituent assembly must a priori recognize the monarchy. Finally, under the auspices of a special ministry for the constituent assembly,4 the members of the provisional parliament were chosen by the Serbian skupitina (parliament), the National Council of Zagreb, and certain other provincial organizations in the "liberated territories." A National Council of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs had been established in Zagreb on the demise of Austria-Hungary. This National Council became the government of the South Slavs in what had been the Habsburg territories.5 In the temporary parliament it helped to choose, the number of representatives by provinces was Serbia, 84; Croatia (with Medjumurje and Fiume), 60; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 42; Slovenia, 32; Dalmatia, 12; Montenegro, 12; Istria, 4. The first meeting of the provisional parliament was held on March 16, 1919, to hear the Prince Regent's address from the throne outlining the regime's program. As in his unification proclamation of December 1, 1918, the Prince Regent made it clear that he conceived the South Slavs as one nation with "three names." On September 3, 1920, the provisional parliament adopted the law for the election of deputies for the constituent assembly. The law provided for universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage for males over the age of 21. Critics complained that the law denied suffrage to military personnel and that the electoral districts were based on the outdated 1910 census and were of very unequal size in terms of population. The provisional parliament spent a great deal of time discussing rules of procedure for the conduct of deliberations of the constituent assembly, but since it was unable to agree on such rules, they were issued by the government after the dissolution of the provisional parliament.6 The election for the constituent assembly was held on November 28, 1920. Forty different parties participated in the elections. The Democratic Party (92 seats), the Radical Party (91), the Communist Party (59), and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (50) elected the largest number of the total of 419 deputies. Other important parties were Agrarian Party (39), United Clericals [Slovene People's Party, 14, and Croatian People's Party with the Bunjevci-Sokci, 13] (27), Yugoslav Muslim Organization (»4),

8

Wayne S. Vucinich

Social Democratic Party (to), and National Turkish Organization [DZemijet] (8).T T h e supporters of federalism did well at the polls even though they lost the election. T h e Milenko Vesnii government8 resigned soon after the constituent assembly met on December is; and on January 1, 1921, Nikola Paiié formed the first of a number of governments he was to lead. Included in the cabinet were representatives of the Radical and Democratic parties. Fifty deputies of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party together with the two deputies representing the Croatian Pure Party of Rights (Frankovci, so called after the party's leader, Josip Frank) refused to take their seats in the constituent assembly, for their doing so would have been tantamount to acceptance of the centralized state and monarchical government. The rules of procedure which the government provided for the constituent assembly obligated the deputies first of all to swear their loyalty to the king. This made it clear that the constituent assembly possessed no right to change the monarchical government already recognized by the proclamation of December 1, 1918. The rules restricted the powers of the constituent assembly to adopt the kind of constitution it wished. T h e oath remained mandatory, and the decision-making area of the members of the constituent assembly was thereby limited. The Communist deputies, whose party had been responsible for much social strife in recent months, were among the loudest critics of the oath.9 At the opening of the constituent assembly, the Communists declared that the assembly was sovereign and that it could not be restricted in its deliberations by either king or cabinet; they threatened not to take the oath to the king because this would imply acceptance of monarchy before the constitution was agreed upon. But on January 28, 1921, the Communists decided to take the required oath and thereby to utilize the constituent assembly as a public platform from which to disseminate their revolutionary ideas. Though various constitutional drafts were discussed in the constituent assembly, the outcome was predictable. On February 25, 1921, Prime Minister Paîii submitted the government's draft of the constitution, which had the support of the two strongest Serbian parties, the National Radical Party and the Democratic Party, and after a great deal of passionate discussion it was adopted on June 28,1921, as the Vidovdan Constitution. The constitution provided for a centralized monarchical government with large powers reserved to the king. The constitution was never accepted by large segments of the population, for some of them advocated a strong and centralized Yugoslavia governed from Belgrade, while others demanded a weak and federalized gov-

Interwar Yugoslavia

9

ernment in which each ethnic group would possess autonomy. Stojan Protit? advocated provincial autonomies of a kind that would make the Yugoslav state organization a compromise between centralism and federalism. T h e Communists urged varying forms of soviet-type government (see Chapter Six). A group called the Yugoslav Club sought a federalized state of six confessional territories. Some wanted autonomies for the historical provinces, while others wanted autonomies for ethnic groups. Some regarded the South Slavs as separate people, while others saw them as branches of a single nation and urged creation of a unitary nation-state. Over the years the Slovene People's Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization vacillated from centralism to federalism, from viewing the South Slavs as one nation to viewing them as belonging to separate nations. 10 T h e Vidovdan Constitution remained a source of controversy until it was suspended by King Alexander in January 1929. From the very beginning, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, the Slovene People's Party, the Communist Party, and certain smaller groups opposed the constitution either by voting against it or by withdrawing from the constituent assembly. T h e Yugoslav Club, headed by Anton KoroSec and representing the Croatian People's Party, Slovene People's Party, and the Bunjevci-Sokci Party, also withdrew from the constituent assembly. 11 In favor of the constitution were parties representing the Serbs and the Muslims, and a Slovene splinter group. Of 419 members of the constituent assembly, only 258 were present for a vote on the constitution, 223 voting in favor of it and 35 against it. T o assure itself of a decisive majority in the constituent assembly, the government, in exchange for support, made special promises to the Slovene Peasant Party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and the Southern Muslim Organization (Dzemijet, the party of the Muslims of South Serbia and Macedonia). 12 Because little more than half of the assembly's members voted for the constitution, less than the two-thirds majority demanded by the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs and the Croatian Union, the critics declared the document illegal. T h e Communists and Social Democrats flatly rejected the constitution. 13 A t first vigorously protesting against the constitution, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Slovene People's Party eventually recognized it, although they continued to complain against state centralization and political and ethnic inequality. T h e Vidovdan Constitution proclaimed Yugoslavia a constitutional parliamentary monarchy and provided for a unicameral legislature (skupItina) and a high degree of democracy in matters regarding civil rights and parliamentary procedure. 14 Moreover, the constitution provided for ad-

10

Wayne S.

Vucinich

ministrative centralization and denied self-government to the ethnic territories and historical provinces. By a subsequent law for regional and district self-government (April 26, 1922), the country was divided into thirty-two regions (oblasti), which were subdivided into counties (okruzi), districts (srezovi), and communes (opstine). T h e regions were to be administered by grand prefects (veliki zupani) appointed by the king and responsible to him. In regard to the nationality question, the constitution represented a compromise. It recognized the existence of separate Serb, Croat, and Slovene nations united in a comon state to be called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Yet the unitary concept was implied in references to the "Serbo-Croat-Slovene nationality" and to the "SerboCroat and Slovene language." T h e heated debates and uncontrolled tempers evidenced in the constituent assembly were evil omens; they clearly showed that Yugoslav parliamentary life had a thorny road ahead. T h e bitter and vituperative miasma enveloping Yugoslav parliamentary life for the most part found its origin in the governmental discrimination against non-Serbs. In 1918 Serbia was in a dilemma—caught as she was between Yugoslav idealism and Serbian realism. She had sacrificed in human and material resources far more than any other South Slav nation. Her economy was a shambles. But her army, dynasty, and government, as a result of the victorious war, enjoyed unparalleled prestige. Uppermost in the minds of the Serbian statesmen was that their country by becoming a part of the new Yugoslav state did not lose its hard-won political independence and that it was not eclipsed economically and culturally by more advanced Yugoslav provinces. T h e Vidovdan Constitution amply protected the Serbian national interests. Only one interwar government was headed by a non-Serb prime minister, and for the most part only Serbs were given the key portfolios in the government (i.e., the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and army and navy). A l l seven prime ministers of the twenty-four cabinets holding office between December 1918 and January 1929, the period of parliamentary democracy, were Serbs. In the subsequent period, from January 1929 to March 1941, there were fifteen different cabinets of whose ministers three fifths (73) of the total of 121 were Serbs. T h e Slovene Anton Korosec was prime minister from July 27, 1928, until January 6, 1929. Only in the six cabinets immediately after the war (December 20, 1918, to January 1, 1921) did a nonSerb (Croat Ante Trumbid) hold the post of foreign minister. Korosec was the only non-Serb to hold the ministry of interior (on two occasions: July 27, 1928, to January 6, 1929; June 24, 1935, to December 21, 1938). In all thirty-nine cabinets, the minister of army and navy was always a Serb gen-

Interwar Yugoslavia

11

eral on the active list. Again, of the 165 generals in 1938 only two were Croats and two Slovenes; all others were Serbs. (Military representation is still a problem in Yugoslavia. In Communist Yugoslavia leading military positions are distributed in accordance with an "ethnic key," but the government has found it difficult to attract Croats and Slovenes to military service.) By control of patronage and by certain other procedures the government was able to designate Serbs to important banking, credit, and other institutions. 15 Political life was marred by extensive corruption in official circles and by the abuse of power. T o stay in power, the government employed strong methods against members of the political opposition, especially after 192g, and thereby succeeded in driving some of them into the ranks of the extremists. The period from 1919 to 1928 was marked by frequent parliamentary crises, bitter interparty conflicts, and continued war between the supporters of centralism and federalism. T h e principal opponents of the established political system were the Croatian Peasant Party and the outlawed Communist Party. Stjepan Radii, the most popular Croat leader, was a critic of the government from the very creation of the Yugoslav state. He demanded equality for the various nationalities and at first advocated a republican form of government. In 1904, he and his brother Antun had founded the Croatian People's Peasant Party, which did not gain real importance until after the First World War. In November 1918, at the meeting of the National Council, he had protested vehemently against the proposed centralistic form of Yugoslav unification and, unable to stop the tide toward unification in a manner that would assure primacy to the Serbs, in February 1919 he addressed a memorandum to the Peace Conference in Paris, asking that Croatia be given the right of self-determination and the freedom to negotiate its own entry into a federal community to include Serbia and Montenegro. 16 Because of his activity, the government on March 25, 1919, had Radié arrested. He remained in prison until February 17, 1920, was released, and then five days later was again incarcerated. Finally, he was amnestied on November 28, 1920, the day of the election for the constituent assembly. Radic's bitterness toward Belgrade was symbolized by the change on December 7, 1920, of the name of the Croatian Peasant People's Party to the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP). 17 In the years immediately following the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which was created in 1919 by consolidation of various South Slav Social Democratic parties, posed a real threat to the existing Yugoslav political system. The terrible economic and social conditions wrought by the war, dissatisfaction with the new state, and the apparent

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Wayne S. Vucinich

success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia inspired many to join the Communist ranks. A certain number of the Yugoslav prisoners of war in Russia had been subjected to Bolshevik propaganda and converted to Communism. They brought revolutionary ideas to the Yugoslav troops on the Salonika front and to the people at home. T h e Communist Party advocated revolution and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. Special efforts were made to attract the discontented elements of the population and national minorities; in fact, many of the disturbances in the country were Communist-inspired. T h e Communist Party showed real strength by winning municipal elections in Zagreb and Belgrade and in a number of other cities. O n April 12, 1920, the railway workers organized a strike which lasted for two weeks, and soon they were followed by the miners. T h e government was compelled to use force to put down the strikers.18 Nonetheless, the Communist influence grew. Of the sixteen parties that won seats in the 1920 constituent assembly, the Communist Party was the third largest, polling 198,463 votes and electing 59 deputies, 19 12 percent of the total vote and 13 percent of the deputies. In Macedonia and Montenegro, the Communists won almost two fifths of the votes cast. O n December 29, 1920, the Vesnic government had issued the so-called Obznana (Decree), which prohibited all Communist political organizations, confiscated Communist newspapers and publications, and provided stringent measures against Communist activity. Those suspected of Communist sympathies were to be weeded out of the government, and students affiliated with or sympathetic to Communism were denied stipends.20 In the constituent assembly, the Communists vigorously protested against the Obznana but most other representatives approved the government's measures. In the following months, conflicts between the government and Communist agitators increased. In March 1921, a group of party conspirators assassinated Milorad Draikovid, former minister of the interior, for issuing the Obznana. Among the plotters were Alija Alijagid and Rodoljub Colakovid. Alijagid was hanged for his part in the assassination, while Colakovid, later a leading T i t o partisan and prominent Communist writer, along with other conspirators, was given a long prison sentence. T h e government used the assassination as a pretext for the enactment of the "Law for the Defense of the Realm," on July 26, 1921, which provided severe penalties for Communist activities.21 Thenceforth, the Communist Party could not function openly and proceeded to found illegal organizations. As an underground movement, it ceased to be a major threat to the Yugoslav government. Having lost its fairly large following, the party was further weakened by dissension in

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the ranks over ideology and tactics; its only successful achievement was the firm establishment of a Communist youth organization. 11 Most of the members of the Central Council were imprisoned and the Substitute Central Committee chosen to take temporary charge of party activity proved to be unacceptable to the Comintern. Consequently, an Executive Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party more easily controlled by Moscow was established in Vienna under the leadership of Sima Markovié. A unified leadership for the C P Y was not established until the First Conference of the C P Y , held July 2 - 1 7 , 1922, when Markovid was chosen as leader. 13 From this time on, however, the main problem for the Yugoslav government was not Communism but the Croatian Question. In August i g 2 i , the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, the Croatian Union, and the Croatian Party of Rights founded the Croatian Bloc. Stjepan R a d i i became one of the three leaders of the Bloc. O n January 14, 1922, the Bloc issued a memorandum in which it referred to Croatia's historical past, reviewed the political situation since 1918, and demanded "a truly sovereign Croatia"— or "a Croatian state within the borders of the inter-national community of the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes." T h e Bloc asked for a new constitution which would provide for a federal organization of Yugoslavia. T h e Yugoslav Club, Slovene People's Party, and Yugoslav Muslim Organization also demanded revision of the constitution and a federal Yugoslavia. Revision of the constitution on the Serbian side was supported by Stojan Protié, 24 w h o advocated a type of decentralization. T h e government denounced the Bloc and took steps to weaken the Croatian opposition, including the prohibition of some Croatian newspapers. In the meantime, domestic political problems were overshadowed by the death of King Peter on August 16, 1921; because of his advanced age the king had long since withdrawn from active political life, the royal prerogatives being in the hands of his son Alexander. Prince Regent Alexander, who was "on cure" in France at the time of his father's death, was criticized for not having been present at the funeral. T h e Prince Regent returned to Belgrade on October 31, 1921, and on November 6 he took the oath before the skupïtina.a T h e national attention was now again focused on the Croatian question. T o make the Croatian case better known as well as to embarrass the government, the Croatian Bloc requested that the Yugoslav delegation to the 1922 Genoa Conference include a separate Croatian delegation. T h i s Prime Minister Païid could not allow. T h e Bloc in turn addressed itself directly to the Genoa Conference, calling to the attention of the representatives of foreign states the Croatian grievances against the Yugoslav government. 26

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On July 21, 1923, three days after the elections, in which his party did well. Radié left on a trip to London, Vienna, and Moscow. He was given a hearing everywhere, but his odyssey yielded no tangible advantages. His visit to the Soviet state came last. Soon after arriving there on June 3, 1924, he enrolled his Croatian Republican Peasant Party in the Communist Peasant International, an affiliate of the Comintern. 27 This was to pave the way for cooperation between the CRPP and the CPY. Many of Radic's conservative colleagues, the spokesmen of the Pasic-Pribiéevié government, Social Democrats, and certain others criticized Radie for his association with the Peasant International, but Radié, never a friend of the Bolsheviks, explained that his sole objective was to see the solution of Yugoslav internal problems.28 In addition to seeking foreign help, Radié tried to secure the backing of certain political groups at home. In ig22, he sought unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with the Democratic Party, then sharing the government with the Radical Party. Further negotiations were conducted in 1923 between Radié and the leaders of the Slovene People's Party (Anton KoroSec), the Yugoslav Muslim organization (Mehmed Spaho), and the Democratic Party (Ljubomir Davidovié), but nothing of consequence developed from these discussions. Radié was somewhat more successful in negotiating with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, the Montenegrin Federalists, the Albanian separatists led by Hasan-beg Pristina, and the Comintern-organized Balkan Communist Federation, all of which opposed the Yugoslav regime. He even negotiated with Nikola Pasié, prime minister and head of the powerful Radical Party. T h e two had actually reached an agreement in April 1923, but Palié failed to live up to it.29 Despite such failures, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party continued to enjoy popular support. From 1920 to 1925, it polled a steadily increasing number of votes.80 Its growing influence and its disruptive work with the Communist Party inspired counter movements. Ostensibly to protect Yugoslav unity and security, the Organization of the Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA) 3 1 was founded in Split in 1921. Its members were recruited primarily from the ranks of the Democratic Party. A t the same time the breaking down of the parliamentary system and rampant party conflict led to the creation of such other militant organizations as the Croatian National Youth (HANAO) and the Serbian National Youth (SRNAO). Throughout 1922-1924, the supporters of these organizations clashed with their opponents, one of the bloodiest encounters occurring on June 1, 1924, when O R J U N A members attacked Communistled workers at Trbovlje. 82 T h e nationalist activities of the Serbian Chetnik

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veterans, who had distinguished themselves in fighting for the cause of liberation, were also disturbing. Here it should be pointed out that the Communist Party, through its legal front, the Independent Workers Party, backed the nationalist movements in Croatia and Macedonia. O n instruction from Moscow, the C P Y helped organize the left wing of the I M R O into a new organization called the I M R O (United)—in Macedonian, Vnatresna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija (obedineta). Its program was acceptable to the Communists; it included the dominant pro-Bulgarian wing (led by Alexander Protogerov and Todor Alexandrov). T h e May 1924 Manifesto and the statute of the I M R O (United) set forth the purpose and objective of the Communist Party: a free and independent Macedonia to be an equal member in a future Balkan federation. 83 T h e Communist Party, as witnessed in its connection with the Croatian question and the Macedonian problem, had decided to take advantage of national movements with strong popular appeal and through them to work for the overthrow of the Yugoslav regime. T h e position of the Communist Party and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party was buttressed by the opposition parties (Democratic Party, Yugoslav Muslim Organization, Slovene People's Party, and Croatian Republican Peasant Party) in the skupitina which, on May 24, 1924, formed the Opposition Bloc and appealed for a democratic Yugoslavia that would assure the Slovenes and the Croats of their fair share in the government. T o undermine the collaboration between the C R P P and the CPY, the government on July 12, 1924, outlawed all front organizations of the C P Y (youth and workers' organizations), although the measure was not put into force immediately. T h e Pasié government also tried to weaken the parliamentary opposition by winning over Svetozar Pribiéevid and other members of the Democratic Party who opposed Radii's demands. In this effort, the prime minister was successful. T h e conflict between Ljubomir Davidovié and Svetozar Pribicevié, the leaders of the Democratic Party, became very serious at the beginning of 1924. T h e former advocated a policy of moderation and concession to the Croatians and the latter the policy of intransigence, for at the time Pribiíevié was a strong exponent of the principle of a unitary Yugoslavia. T h e result was the withdrawal of Pribiéevié and fourteen of his party's parliamentary deputies from the Democratic Party and the founding of the Independent Democratic Party (IDP), M which joined the Radical-led coalition government, sometimes called the "National Bloc" government, on March 27. T h e Pasié-Pribicevié coalition fell from power a few months later under heavy attack from the Opposition Bloc.

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On July 27, 1924, the formation of a government was entrusted to Ljubomir Davidovic, the head of the Democrats. This so-called "government of national understanding" was composed of the Opposition Bloc and made it possible for Stjepan Radié to return home on August 12. Davidovic promised strict parliamentary procedures, appeared willing to consider establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and suggested that the CRPP, if it chose to join the government, would be guaranteed a specified number of ministerial portfolios. But Radié chose to remain in opposition, accusing both the Democrats and the Radicals of being politically dishonest.35 T h e Croat leader's stand, and the king's interference with the work of the government, compelled Davidovic to tender his resignation on October 15, 1924. On November 6, Pasic, with the support of Pribicevié, was returned to office. First on the government's agenda were the dismissal of the skupstina and the scheduling of elections for February 8, 1925. T h e Pasic-Pribicevic government feared the collaboration of the C R P P and the CPY and was annoyed by university student demonstrations in December in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. Rather than wait for the outcome of the elections, the government decided to apply against the C R P P the Law for the Defense of the Realm, especially Article XVIII concerning the protection of public security and state order. T h e C R P P was dissolved on the ground that it had joined the Peasant International and thereby had become an integral part of the Comintern. Meetings and publications of the C R P P were prohibited, its archives were confiscated, and steps were taken for the prosecution of its leaders. Stjepan Radié, Vladko Macek, and others were arrested on January 5, 1925, and brought to trial. When the state prosecutor charged Radié with high treason, the opposition in the skupstina protested strongly.36 Despite government intimidation, the opposition parties ran strong in the election of February 8, 1925, but, as expected, the Radical Party won with 702,573 votes and 142 deputies elected to the skupstina. T h e C R P P received 545,466 votes and secured 67 deputies. T h e next largest party, the Yugoslav Democratic Party, got 279,686 votes and elected 36 deputies.37 Because the formerly legal Independent Workers Party had been outlawed, the Communists participated in the election through the Republican Workers-Peasants Bloc, whose platform conformed with the decisions of the Third Conference of the CPY (i.e., struggle against Great Serbian rule and militarism, solution of the national and agrarian questions, and recognition of the Soviet Union). T h e Republican Workers-Peasants Bloc polled a mere 16,330 votes and did not win a single seat in the skupstina.38 Shortly after the election, the opposition leaders, representing Slovene People's Party, Democratic Party, Croatian Republican Peasant Party, and

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Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and including Davidovié and Radié, the latter still in prison, formed the Bloc of National Understanding and Peasant Democracy. T h e group aske'd for full equality of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, accepted Yugoslavia as it was, and advocated "a parliamentary monarchy of the English type." 89 As a result of mounting tension, the government itself felt compelled to reach an agreement with the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, whose leaders languished in jail. Palié considered various means through which he could induce Radié to cooperate with the government and to break up the Bloc of National Understanding. He feared that continued prosecution would only serve to increase Radii's personal prestige.40 At the same time, Radié was pressured by leftist groups in his own party for a more energetic and "positive" program of action. Rightly or wrongly, Radié concluded that he would gain most by accepting the government's overtures. He had no desire to become a captive of the Communists, and so he instructed Pavle Radié, the vice president of the C R P P and a deputy in the skupltina, to declare in the skupitina on March 27, 1925, that the C R P P was ready to accept the constitution, monarchical government, and the indivisibility of the state, and that it would withdraw from the Peasant International. 41 In the opinion of his many critics, Radié simply capitulated to the Serbian "hegemonists." T h e C R P P even dropped the word "Republican" from its name. T h e outcome of three months of discussion was the release from prison, on July 2, 1925, of the Croatian Peasant Party (CPP) leaders. Realizing that Svetozar Pribiéevié's participation in the government did little to affect the position of Radié in Croatia, Pasié now abandoned the former. On July 18, a Paîié-Radié government was formed. 42 Pasié was prime minister, but Radié did not enter the government until November of that year, and even then only as minister of education. T h e CPP participated in the government, first under Palié's prime ministry and later under that of Nikola Uzunovié, until April 1926, when Radié was removed. T h e CPP did not participate either in the fourth Uzunovié cabinet (February x to April 17, 1927) or in any subsequent government until August 1939.43 T h e brief period of Radié's cooperation with the government proved a fiasco. Radié's dramatic political reversal, after having helped sabotage the moderate regime of Davidovié, cost him much popularity, even though he stressed repeatedly his unswerving loyalty to the Croatian cause. In the 1927 parliamentary elections, the CPP polled about 150,000 votes fewer than in the preceding election. 44 Perhaps for this reason, on November 10, 1927, Radié broke with the Radicals and once again went into opposition. T h i s time he reached an agreement with Svetozar Pribiéevié, the head of the Independent Democratic Party. As a result of the agreement, the C P P

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and the IDP formed the Peasant-Democratic Coalition. Pribicevié, a Serb from Croatia, who was from 1918 to 1925 one of the staunchest exponents of centralism and monarchism (though not of Great Serbianism), had switched his position to become one of the severest critics of the crown and the loudest exponents of federalism.45 It had taken him some time to learn that his and Paîié's views of Yugoslavia were at variance and irreconcilable. Pribicevié remained in opposition during the Uzunovic and Veljo Vukiéevié governments that followed, boasting that his was the only Yugoslav party because it contained the great majority of the Serbs from the former Austro-Hungarian provinces as well as some Croatian and Slovene intellectuals.48 T h e Radié-Pribiéevié cooperation proved lasting and the Peasant Democratic Coalition, in one way or another, survived until the establishment of Communist Yugoslavia in 1945. The Royal Dictatorship

1929-1934

T h e political passions engendered by the conflict between the centralists and federalists culminated in June 1928 in a shooting incident in the skupltina in which two Croatian deputies died and Stjepan Radié, the leader of the Croats, was mortally wounded. The assassin was Punila Racié, a Montenegrin Serb deputy and member of the Radical Party.47 The skupltina tragedy was followed by the suspension of the Vidovdan Constitution and the proclamation of a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929.48 With this began the second period in the postwar evolution of Yugoslavia. In his proclamation, King Alexander declared that it had become necessary to seek "new methods of work" and "new paths" for the solution of Yugoslavia's problems. Parliamentary procedures had failed, he claimed, and he had a sacred duty "to safeguard national unity and the state's integrity." The Charter of January 6, 1929, "On the Royal Power and the Supreme Administration of the State," concentrated executive and legislative powers in the hands of the monarch, giving him exclusive control over national life. On January 13, the government of General Petar Zivkovié announced that its purpose would be to establish order and discipline in the country's administration.49 T h e king suspended the parliament and abolished all political parties. Legislation was entrusted to the Supreme Legislative Council which was attached to the Ministry of Justice. Actually, the Council did no more than draft royal decrees and promulgate them. Yugoslavia became an antiparliamentary, totalitarian state. A new "Law for the Defense of State Security and Order" confirmed the provisions of the Law of August 2, 1921, and included provisions not only against the Communists but against any-

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one who worked against the existing order. Local governments lost their autonomy, mayors and prefects were now appointed, and local and regional governments were deprived of the right to elect their own councils. A centralized administrative system was organized, dividing Yugoslavia into nine banovine (headed by bans directly responsible to Belgrade).50 They were so gerrymandered that six of them had Serbian majorities. Stringent police and press laws were introduced. The country's name was changed from Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to Kingdom of Yugoslavia 51 to stress the ethnic oneness of the Yugoslav peoples. Only the Yugoslav state flag was permitted for public display. December 1, anniversary of the day in igi8 on which national unification was proclaimed, was declared a state holiday. Ethnic societies and organizations, as well as those opposed to the unitary state and integral Yugoslavism, were dissolved. A drive was initiated against the Communists and other enemies of the regime, many of whom were arrested. One of the numerous police victims was Djuro Djakovid, the secretary of the Communist Party. 52 The resentment against royal dictatorship was widespread not only in Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia but also in the areas inhabited by the Serbs. The attempts to suppress separate nationalisms by forging unitary Yugoslavia from above by force, instead of stifling opposition, actually intensified it, and the king was forced to make concessions. On September 3, 1931, he granted his people a constitution which provided for a quasi-parliamentary system of government. In a proclamation to the people, the ruler declared that the measures which he had introduced since 1929 had achieved their objectives and that he was now ready to adopt a broader base for conduct of national and local affairs. He insisted that his aim continued to be the same: to safeguard the national unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 53 T h e Constitution of 1931 remained in force until the collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941. A bicameral legislature, with a lower house elected by a narrowly restricted franchise system and public voting, and a partly appointed and partly elected senate, served as a rubber stamp for the government's actions. The parliament could propose legislation and disagree with the laws proposed by the government, but it could neither legislate nor invalidate laws. The ministerial council was responsible to both king and parliament, and the monarch appointed and dismissed the cabinet or individual ministers. The Constitution confirmed the existing laws concerning political parties and civil rights. While the Vidovdan Constitution had left some power to local government, the royal decree of January 6, 1929, and the Constitution of September 3, 1931, transformed the country into a highly centralized, authoritarian state.

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Vucinich

A new government formed by General Zivkovid was practically the same in membership as his January 6, 1929-September 3, 1931, cabinet. General 2ivkovid first took office as prime minister on January 6, 1929. O n September 3, 1931, he reshuffled his government, and again on January 5, 1932. T h e last of his three cabinets was of short duration. But as it turned out, the abridged parliamentary system that was introduced was merely a cloak for dictatorship. T h e persecution of so-called "antistate" elements continued. Only government-approved candidates were able to run for election. 5 4 According to the electoral law issued on September 10, 1931—the electoral system introduced by this law was modified somewhat by the law of March 24, 1933—a political party, in order to qualify, had to present a list of candidates in every district of the country, approved by two hundred registered voters of the district and by the head of the "country list of candidates." 55 T h i s was a major obstacle in a country divided by local animosities and national and religious disunity. District candidates had to make a declaration that they would stand for the integrity of the state, would work for national unity, and would not join any association based on religious, ethnic, or regional principles. 5 * T h e government-sponsored list of district candidates required only sixty signatures, which was no problem, since the government could always garner the votes of that many public servants and other officials in each district. T h e party gaining a plurality of votes in the elections was given two thirds of the seats in the parliament. Article X I I of the Law on Associations, Assemblies, and Agreements of September 18, 1931, prohibited political associations, societies, and parties which had religious, ethnic, or regional character, or aims which were against national unity, state integrity, and the existing social order. Only the single government party—the United Radical Peasant Democracywas officially recognized. Like the government, it stood for a unitary nationstate. T h e party also promised to improve the peasant's lot. I n 1933 the party's name was changed to the Yugoslav National Party. T h e elections held on November 8, 1931, were remarkable for their undemocratic character. Voting was open and by voice, and police intimidation was widespread. T h e election was boycotted by the United Serbian political opposition (led by Aca Stanojevid, Ljubomir Davidovid, Jovan Jovanovid), the Slovene People's Party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition, and the CPY. T h e official report claimed that 2,343,395 out of a total of 3,560,278 registered voters cast their ballots for the government and that the government won all 306 seats in the house of deputies. Only 65.29 percent of the electorate voted. There were protest demonstrations by university students in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Skopje. 57 T h e election of the senators (January 3, 1932) was carried out in a simi-

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larly tense atmosphere,M except that only 46 senators were elected while 26 were appointed by the king. In his first speech from the throne to the new parliament, the king spoke of the indivisibility of the Yugoslav Kingdom and reiterated the main points of his ig2g declaration; the parliamentary representatives endorsed the speech,59 thereby giving legal sanction to the royal dictatorship. But popular agitation against General Zivkovid prompted King Alexander to request his resignation, and on April 4, 1932, to ask Vojislav Marinkovic, a member of the cabinet and one-time prominent member of the Democratic Party, to form a government. This government, in power from April 4 to July 2, 1932, was confronted by a serious peasant problem, aggravated by depression, and by workers' and students' unrest. It issued a Law for the Protection of the Land Cultivators (April 19, 1932) which failed to eliminate the problem. T w o Croats resigned from the cabinet in protest over anti-Croat policy.80 Unable to cope with the country's problems, Marinkovid finally resigned. The new prime minister, Milan SrSkid, an important member of the Radical Party and later a member of the Yugoslav National Party, adopted firm measures against political unrest. (He was prime minister from July 2 to November 5, 1932, and from November 5, 1932, to January 27, 1934.) Outside the cabinet, court, and bogus parliament, the opposition continued to gain ground. 81 Although the restrictive laws were strictly enforced against opposition political parties, the latter were able to preserve their organization, especially at the leadership level. The Peasant-Democratic Coalition was particularly active in disseminating criticism of the government. On November 7, 1932, leaders of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition met in Zagreb and adopted a resolution containing policy positions, the so-called Punctations.82 They denounced Serbian hegemony and royal dictatorship, condemned the concept of the unitary nation-state, and argued that multinational federalism should be the basis for Yugoslav state organization.83 Government reprisal was quick. On January 31, 1933, Macek was arrested and on April 13 was sentenced to three years in prison.64 T h e prosecution of Macek inflamed Croat nationalism and inspired widespread antigovernment agitation. One of the consequences was the demise of the Srlkid government (January 27, 1934). T h e government was entrusted to Nikola Uzunovid, once a member of the Radical Party and later of the Yugoslav National Party, who stayed in power less than a year, from January 27 to April 18, 1934, April 18 to October 22,1934, and October 22 to December 20,1934. He promised much but accomplished little. During his administration, the Balkan Pact was signed, but this was the result of a policy initiated by others. T h e government suffered a heavy blow as a result of King Alexander's murder in

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Marseilles on October 9, 1934. The king's will,85 written on January 5, 1934, designated three men to constitute a regency during the minority of his son Peter. The regency marked the opening of the third stage in Yugoslavia's interwar history. The Regency After the king's murder, Uzunovic's cabinet resigned, but it was reconstituted and brought back to power for a brief time before disappearing from the political scene for good. Prince Paul, who as the first of the three regents assumed the principal role in the regency, called on Bogoljub Jevtic, a member of the Yugoslav National Party, to organize a cabinet. Jevtic was an experienced politician, having served as foreign minister in five preceding cabinets. He kept that portfolio for himself in his own government, which was in office from December 20, 1934, to June 24, 1935. One of Jevtic's first acts was to amnesty Vladko Macek from the Sremska Mitrovica prison, an occasion for large popular manifestations in various parts of Croatia. Another important act by Jevtic was to permit the middleclass parties to engage in political activity.68 But the new prime minister made it abundantly clear that he was determined to maintain the established order and Yugoslavia as a unitary nation-state. He repeated the errors of earlier governments and failed to deal adequately with the agrarian crisis. The use of the police and more subtle methods to put an end to student disorders and agitation fell short of their objectives. In international relations, Jevtic suffered a setback with the fall, on January 22, 1934, of Bulgaria's friendly Military League-Zveno government and the growing Franco-Italian rapprochement. Thinking that a decisive victory at the polls, of which he was certain, would strengthen his government, the prime minister scheduled elections for May 5, 1935. He counted on reaping advantage from the electoral law of March 24, 1933, which gave the winning party three fifths of the parliamentary representation plus a percentage of the remaining two fifths. The opposition, remembering the experience of 1931, joined a United Opposition, comprising the Peasant-Democratic Coalition, Yugoslav Muslim Organization, Davidovid's wing of the Democratic Party, and part of the Agrarian Party.87 A joint slate of candidates was headed by Vladko Macek. In turn, the government launched a campaign against its opponents, arresting some of them.88 Four groups participated in the election: Jevtic's government party (Yugoslav National Party), a group of Radicals led by Boza Maksimovic, the United Opposition led by Vladko Macek, and Zbor, the fascist group

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of Dimitrije Ljotic. Hodjera's Yugoslav Popular Party was denied permission to take part in the elections, and the outlawed Communist Party, which could have contrived a legal group to represent it, chose not to go to the polls. The election results were most revealing. Some 2,880,964 out of 3,908,313 registered voters cast their ballots.89 The government party polled 1,746,982 votes (60 percent), the United Opposition 1,076,345 (37.4 percent), the Ljotid group 35,549 (1.2 percent), and the Maksimovid group a mere 24,088 (0.8 percent). Considering the fact that the government tried to keep the opposition away from the polls, the latter's strong showing was impressive. Ljotid and Maksimovic did not elect a single deputy.70 Jevtic failed to obtain the overwhelming endorsement he had anticipated, and some members of his cabinet (General Petar Zivkovid and Milan Stojadinovid) wanted him to resign. The United Opposition insisted that they would have done even better at the polls had the elections been free and honest; they announced that their elected deputies would not take their seats in the skupitina and demanded new elections.71 Convinced that Jevtid could not manage the country's internal problems, Prince Paul turned to a new political leader, Milan Stojadinovid, who had been minister of finance and was a member of the Radical Party.72 Stojadinovid organized a government (June 24) composed of members of the Radical Party, the Slovene People's Party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and dissidents from the Croatian Peasant Party. He created from the parties represented in government a single political organization called the Yugoslav Radical Union. Besides serving as the prime minister, Stojadinovid also held the ministry of foreign affairs. Upon assuming power, Stojadinovid issued a declaration in which he promised to uphold the Constitution of 193173 and to safeguard state and national unity. At the same time, he spoke of a restoration of civil rights and alluded to the democratization of the country. In foreign relations, he promised to maintain close relations with France and the members of the Little Entente and Balkan Pact. At the congress of the Yugoslav Radical Union, Stojadinovid declared that his party stood for the unitary nation-state and a solution of the Croatian question. Stojadinovid's statements were contradictory. On the one hand, he promised to preserve the status quo; on the other, he promised to solve the Croatian question, which implied a constitutional change.74 Once he felt secure at the helm of the government, Stojadinovid betrayed a thirst for power and, instead of democratizing the government, he proceeded to make it more authoritarian. Censorship was tightened, the police and gendarmerie were expanded, an attempt was made to organize the workers into

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a loyal syndicate, and a number of nationalistic organizations were founded, some of them imitating fascist models.7* Stojadinovid's program not only failed to win over the opposition, but it lost the support of many conservatives. The rivalry between his party and the ideologically similar Yugoslav National Party became so intense that on one occasion a member of the latter party attempted to assassinate the prime minister.76 Croatian separatists gained a fresh impetus in their drive to detach Croatia from Yugoslavia. In June 1935, they formed the Legion of Work, an organization whose purpose was to promote Croat separatism. Although the group was suppressed, its supporters continued their subversive activities against the state. The government, however, did not interfere with the Croatian Civil Defense and Croatian Rural Defense guards, organized by Vladko Macek. The main function of these guards was to protect the meetings of the Croatian Peasant Party from attacks by political enemies, including the Serbian National Youth (SRNAO). 77 While Stojadinovid78 employed strong tactics against his domestic enemies, he flirted with fascist leaders abroad and appears to have wanted to build a fascist system at home. In this connection, it would be appropriate to comment briefly at this point on Yugoslav fascism. During the thirties, fascism was a greater threat to government than Communism. Fascism in Yugoslavia was not a monolithic movement; it was the ideology of a number of separate and sometimes even antagonistic political groups. None of these groups openly proclaimed adherence to fascism, but their programs, symbols, and supporters identified them with it. Apart from the I M R O and certain elements among the German and Albanian minorities, the principal fascist groups were the Ustashe and the Zbor. Throughout the twenties, bands organized and armed by IMRO, which had its origins in the 1890's, perpetrated acts of sabotage and terrorism in Yugoslavia. The Ustashe, organized soon after the proclamation of the royal dictatorship in 1929, operated from bases in Italy and Hungary and committed similar atrocities in the name of Croatian independence; they were led by Ante Pavelid and were passionately anti-Serb and anti-Semitic. Another fascist organization was the Zbor79 or Yugoslav National Movement, which came into existence in the 1930's. Led by Dimitrije Ljotid, it polled a mere 30,000 votes in the election of 1938. Zbor's program stressed xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and corporativism. It appealed to a few students and intellectuals and banded its young followers into an organization called the White Eagle (Beli orao). Unlike the Ustasha movement, Zbor did not seek to destroy Yugoslavia but to transform it into a centralized, corporate state. What is important is that none of the radical rightist movements were able to secure enough popular support to assume power. The

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fascists gained control of various parts of Yugoslavia only as puppet regimes of the Axis and with the aid of the invading foreign armies. A more serious threat to Yugoslavia came from those elements of the middle-class parties who sympathized with the fascist position on racism, religion, nationalism, and authoritarianism. Thus, for example, a number of leading Ustashe gained their political experience in the ranks of the Croatian Peasant Party. With the growing liberal-radical opposition at home, the parties that constituted the Yugoslav Radical Union and certain other conservative elements drifted in the direction of fascism. This is amply illustrated by the policies and activities of Stojadinovic, prime minister from 1936 to 1938. On the domestic front, Stojadinovic refused to democratize the state and to make meaningful concessions to the Croats, while in foreign affairs he increasingly relied on the friendship of the Axis powers. In the summer of 1937, a serious crisis resulted when Stojadinovic sought to have the Concordat with the Vatican, concluded in 1935, ratified by the parliament. He saw the Concordat as a means by which he could further strengthen relations with Italy and gain Croatian and Slovene support. The clerical Slovene People's Party was particularly anxious to have the legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia improved. The Orthodox churchmen and many Serbian nationalists reacted against concessions to the Catholic Church. They felt that the Concordat, which provided extensive concessions to the Catholic Church, including papal appointments of bishops and legal and military service immunities for the clergy, implied "special privileges" not accorded to other faiths. Many Serbian leaders had no objection to a concordat in principle—but could not support the present Concordat.80 Many other Serbs opposed the Concordat simply for reasons of nationalistic and religious prejudice. The progressives and the Communists opposed concessions to the Catholic Church because of their rejection of religion in general and because they considered the Church a vehicle of Italian Fascism. In the meantime, Belgrade became a scene of demonstrations against the Concordat and wild rumors spread that the government had poisoned the Orthodox Patriarch Varnava, who died in the midst of the crisis. The Patriarch's funeral procession was transformed into a political protest. Violence broke out and several people were wounded by the gendarmes. Nonetheless, the government submitted the Concordat to the lower house of the parliament, which ratified it on July 23, 1937, by a vote of 166 to 129.81 But it dared not submit the Concordat to the senate, whose ratification was required. Later Stojadinovid was obliged tb announce that the Concordat was indefinitely put aside. In the autumn of 1937, some of the leaders of the Agrarian and Demo-

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cratic parties initiated a move to reactivate the Opposition Bloc. They met with the Peasant-Democratic Coalition at Feketic on Ocober 8, 1937, and reached a National Understanding, which denounced the constitutions of 1921 and 1931 and appealed for a democratic regime in Yugoslavia. 82 T h e United Opposition demanded adoption of a democratic electoral law, election of a representative body under its provisions, and enactment of a new constitution by the representative body, to be approved by a majority of each of the three principal South Slav peoples. T h e United Opposition recognized Yugoslavia as a hereditary, constitutional, and parliamentary monarchy as well as agreeing to the temporary exercise of royal prerogatives by the regency. T h e Communists, not included in the United Opposition, hailed the National Understanding as a step in the right direction.83 Stojadinovic refused to consider either decentralization or democratization of the state. A t the beginning of 1937, he initiated discussions with Macek, but their positions were far apart and no agreement was possible. For the moment Stojadinovic felt secure as the head of the government. His government was backed by a large number of followers banded together in the Yugoslav Radical Union, and Stojadinovic was their accepted "leader" (vodja). T h e Axis powers likewise believed that Stojadinovic was strongly entrenched. Yet the crisis over the Concordat 84 and a budget dispute, which revealed that he could not even rely on his own followers, had indicated the contrary to be true. Discord within the Yugoslav Radical Union between the "old Radicals," the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and the Slovene People's Party led to the resignation of three ministers. Stojadinovic was outnumbered in the cabinet by those willing to seek a compromise with the Croats. Consequently, he reorganized his government in August 1938, and decided to strengthen his position by holding elections on December 11,1938. In the election campaign that ensued, the prime minister posed as the defender of the state and pictured his opponents as disloyal agitators. Three lists of candidates were submitted to the electors: those of the government (Yugoslav Radical Union), the United Opposition (led by Macek), and Zbor of Dimitrije Ljotic. T h e opposition was subjected to police intimidation and arrests, and the registers of voters were reportedly falsified. Of the 4,080,286 registered voters, 3,039,041 (74.4 percent) voted. T h e Stojadinovic list of candidates received 1,643,783 votes (54.09 percent), the United Opposition 1,364,524 (44.9 percent), and Ljotic 30,734 (1.01 percent). Having won a majority, Stojadinovic received 306 seats in the house of representatives and the United Opposition a mere 67. T h e Ljotic slate did not elect a single deputy. 85 It is of some significance that, despite the unfairness of the election, the opposition got more votes than it did in the 1935 election and that Stojadinovic did worse than Jevtic.

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27

Weakened by the election results and internal divisions, the Stojadinovic regime was now rejected by the regent himself. Prince Paul was critical of the government's policy toward the Croats and, like many others, he was alarmed over the open collaboration with Berlin and Rome. T h e Croats and Slovenes in the government insisted on a new Croatian policy. On February 3,1938, a group of ministers—including Dragisa Cvetkovic (Yugoslav Radical Union), Mehmed Spaho and Dzafer Kulenovic (Yugoslav Muslim Organization), and Franc Snoj and Miho Krek (Slovene People's Party)—addressed a letter to the prime minister urging understanding with the Croats; and when Stojadinovic refused to heed their appeals, they tendered their resignations, reportedly at the Prince Regent's suggestion. This strengthened the hand of Prince Paul, and he asked for Stojadinovic's resignation. Dragisa Cvetkovic, a member of the Yugoslav Radical Union and a member of the cabinet who had resigned, became the new prime minister. Before we discuss the successes and failures of the new government, we should comment briefly on the Yugoslav political parties in the 1930's. After their suppression in 1929, the political parties were forced to discontinue active politics and therefore could not offer effective resistance to the royal dictatorship. Individual party leaders openly opposed the successive dictatorial governments, while others participated in them. Thus, a number of prominent members of the Radical Party, which frequently held power between 1918 and 1929, actively participated in governments after 1929.86 T h e leadership core of both government parties (Yugoslav National Party, Yugoslav Radical Union) was made up of former Radicals. On April 4, 1932, the government organized the Yugoslav Peasant Radical Democratic Party and thereby gave the country a one-party system. In 1933, the name of the party was changed to Yugoslav National Party. T h e leading spirits of the party were General Petar Zivkovic and Bogoljub Jevtic. When Jevtic lost his prime ministry, the Yugoslav National Party continued to exist as an opposition party, and Milan Stojadinovic, his successor, founded the Yugoslav Radical Union, a government party under his control. Those leading Radicals who did not cast their lot with the dictatorship in 1937 joined the National Understanding bloc, headed by the Croatian Peasant Party. However, after the elections of November 1938, these Radicals left the bloc and subsequently opposed the sporazum (agreement) of August 1939 which gave the Croats an autonomous banovina. T h e Democratic Party leaders behaved much like those of the Radical Party, one group collaborating with and another opposing the government. In 1937, the former, led by Davidovic, participated in the National Understanding bloc and supported the national rights of the Croats, although they opposed creation of the Banovina of Croatia. 87 T h e Agrarian Union,

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like other middle-class parties, was also divided, but most of the leaders stayed in the opposition. T h e conflict between the radical and more conservative members led to a permanent break in the Agrarian Union and the emergence of a separate National Peasant Party in 1940 led by DragoIjub Jovanovic. Between 1929 and 1939, the most powerful opponent of the government was the Croatian Peasant Party. It led the United Opposition in 1935 and the bloc of National Understanding after 1937. But as a result of the agreement or sporazum of August 26, 1939, with the government, the Croatian Peasant Party abandoned opposition and entered the government for the first time in more than a decade.88 From then until the end of the Second World War, the Croatian Peasant Party was represented in all Yugoslav governments. Representing the Serbs of the territories that were once a part of AustriaHungary, the Independent Democratic Party (IDP) chose a policy of cooperation with the Croatian Peasant Party. Exiled in 1929, Svetozar Pribicevic, a bitter enemy of King Alexander, directed the party from abroad. Cooperation between the CPP and IDP continued until after the Second World War. The followers of Frank's Croatian Pure Party of Rights consistently rejected the Yugoslav state, as did the Ustashe and certain clerical elements in Croatia. The Slovene People's Party during the period of dictatorship for the most part pursued an opportunistic policy "wavering between the government and the opposition."89 Anton Korosec participated in Zivkovid's government, but later withdrew in protest. Afterward the Slovene People's Party again participated in various governments of the dictatorship period, Korosec himself serving as interior minister in the Stojadinovic cabinet. The Slovene People's Party was a member of the government's Yugoslav Radical Union and was represented in the Cvetkovic-Macek government o f 1 939 _ 1 94 1 Until 1937, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was undermined by personality and tactical disputes. It was no longer a serious threat to the regime, though still a considerable nuisance. In response to the decision of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which was held from July 25 to August 20, 1935, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY, like its counterparts in other countries, began to advocate a "Front of Popular Freedom" to include all "progressive forces" for a common stand against fascism. The party founded a legal United Workers Party to rally workers to its banner. Efforts to enlist the United Opposition in a popular front failed because the opposition parties feared that the Communists would outmaneuver and subvert them.90 Only a small group of Slovene Socialists

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joined the front. T h e head of the Yugoslav Socialist Party, Zivko Topalovid, and the leaders of the United Workers' Syndical Alliance and General Workers Alliance were willing to collaborate only on conditions which the Communists could not accept.91 T h e year 1937 was of great importance for the CPY. In July, Milan Gorkic was removed, and, in December, Josip Broz T i t o was appointed by the Comintern as Secretary General of the Central Committee. He obtained full powers to select a new interim Central Committee. T h e CPY was directed to intensify the ideological and political education of its members and to seek a coalition of all "progressive forces."92 In the meantime, the CPY adopted a new nationality policy, which called for a federalized Yugoslavia. This policy had already been initiated by the establishment of a Slovene Communist Party on April 17 and a Croatian Communist Party on August 1-2. In succeeding years, the CPY, utilizing the Popular Front as an instrument of its policies, was responsible for many demonstrations and labor strikes. On the occasion of Count Ciano's and Konstantin von Neurath's visits to Belgrade, large demonstrations were organized. T h e Communists claim responsibility for 282 strikes in 1937 and 345 in 1938.93 In Croatia the most outspoken pro-Yugoslav group was the Communist Party, which for its own special reasons opposed the pro-Axis leaning of some leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party and wished Yugoslavia preserved.94

The Cvetkovid-Macek

Understanding

T h e Munich capitulation which led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of "independent" Slovakia in March 1939 made a solution of the Croat problem imperative. T h e Croat separatists had seen in German-created Slovakia an answer to their own desires. On April 3-4, 1939, Cvetkovic initiated discussions with Vladko Macek,915 still president of both the Croatian Peasant Party and the Peasant-Democratic Coalition. T h e initial discussions did not go well. T h e province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, claimed by both the Serbs and the Croats as their patrimony, proved to be the main obstacle to a Cvetkovic-Macek agreement.96 Cvetkovic could not have conceded this to the Croats and the negotiations were momentarily suspended. Disillusioned, Macek appears to have explored the possibility of securing Italian financial and arms assistance for a rebellion against the Belgrade regime, but Macek has denied this to have been his purpose. He says instead that the Italians themselves had made overtures to him. 97 On the other hand, Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, notes in his Diary that the Italians had actually reached

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an agreement with Macek. T h e agreement is said to have provided for the personal union of Croatia and Italy through the Italian royal family. Under the pressure of both internal and external events, the agreement or sporazum between Cvetkovic and Macek was finally reached on August 26, 1939, marking the fourth stage in the historical development of interwar Yugoslavia. T h e Law Concerning the Banovina Croatia 98 established an autonomous territory, with Zagreb as its capital. T o create the Banovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina were partitioned." Procedure was established for the transfer of a certain amount of local authority to the Croatian government. T h e Law defined the rights and powers of the Banovina government, headed by a ban (banus) appointed by and responsible to the king.* Legislative power was shared by the king and the diet (sabor), which was chosen by free, general, indirect, and secret ballot. T h e central government retained under its control national finances, foreign policy, and defense. Nearly all other functions were transferred to the Croatian government. T h e ban was given considerable powers; he countersigned the royal decrees pertaining to Croatia. Except for the changes resulting from the establishment of the Banovina, the Constitution of 1931 remained in force. T h e Banovina administration was very quickly organized. T h e government was divided into eleven departments, each headed by an official responsible to the ban and the diet. Plans were under study to grant communal self-government, but this was not done. Various decrees and laws were issued concerning the organization of the Banovina government and the diet, and the establishment of the police system and the camps of detention as well as many other institutions and government agencies.100 Macek himself considered the sporazum a great success, even though he encountered difficulties in implementing it. He attended public festivities and meetings on a white horse, and his Civil and Rural Defense guards were made a paramilitary force.101 T h e Banovina government repressed its own critics, especially Communists, in the same manner that the Croats had previously been persecuted by the Belgrade government. Some Croatian Peasant leaders considered the sporazum only a beginning, insisting that their aim was the destruction of Yugoslavia. 102 By continued criticism of Belgrade's "hegemony" and the dictatorial rule, they hoped to force Prince Paul into making further concessions to Croatia. Instructions or okruznice were circulated urging the people to continue their struggle for an independent Croatia and to purge the Croatian language of Serbian words. It is quite possible that Macek had very little to do with this agitation. But the very existence of an autonomous Croatia intensified Croatian nationalism and gave impetus to the activities of Croatian ultranationalists, such * Ivan Subacid, strong supporter of Yugoslav unity, was designated the

ban.

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as the Ustashe and the "crusaders" (kriiari). In fact, the extremist groups became an embarrassment to the Croatian Peasant Party, and several Ustashe were imprisoned. It soon became obvious, however, that the Ustashe had infiltrated the Peasant Party itself and that there was little difference between the Ustashe and certain right-wing members of the CPP. In the meantime, the Serbian nationalists, the members of the "Srpski klub," and even some Serbian members in the government, including Cvetkovic, planned creation of a Serbian Banovina, or "the Serbian Lands" (srpske zemlje), comprising the existing provinces of Vrbas, Drina, Dunav, Morava, Zeta, and Vardar. T h e organization of the proposed Banovina of Serbia was to be similar to that of Croatia. 103 Plans were also afloat for a Slovene Banovina. (See Chapter Six.) On September 6, 1939, a few days after the war broke out, the government proclaimed its neutrality, issued orders for military preparedness, and proceeded to tighten its control of the citizenry. Changes in school curriculum were introduced and closer surveillance over university students was prescribed. T h e Communists condemned the government's "antinational policies" and incited the masses to rebellion; they organized demonstrations against war and the high costs of living, collected help for the Yugoslavs who fought in Spain, and campaigned for the release of Yugoslav volunteers in the Spanish Civil War interned in France. T h e year 1939 closed with Communist-inspired students' and workers' demonstrations. T h e demonstrators carried placards which called for "Peace, Bread, and Freedom!" and there were clashes with the police. T o cope with the situation, the government amended the Law for the Defense of the Realm by a decree on December 15, 1939, which authorized the establishment of internment camps for politically unreliable persons in Bileca, Lepoglava, and Krsko, and gave the police the right to ban citizens from their places of residence.104 Despite increased police pressure against them, the Communists scored a noticeable success in the two years preceding the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. Party membership grew in number and Communist influence greatly expanded. For these reasons, the CPY decided to hold its Fifth National Conference. Delegates were selected by a number of provincial conferences and a National Conference of the Communist youth. They met in Zagreb on October 19-23, i94o.10S A t the Conference, reports were read telling of the party's organizational accomplishments and progress in infiltrating peasant and student groups. Party membership by 1940, as a result of systematic recruitment, had risen to 6,445. I n a major policy speech, T i t o attributed the party's success to purges of "fractionalists and spies" from the ranks; a united leadership no

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Vucinich

longer beset by divisions; intensive work among the masses; the maintenance of close relations with progressive forces; and the party's decision, in the face of external threats, to defend the country and to wage the struggle against the "fifth column." 106 T h e resolution adopted at the Conference referred to the C v e t k o v i t Macek government as a regime of oppression and tyranny over the working class. It criticized the government's foreign policy, and considered the sporazum an agreement between the Serbian and Croatian ruling classes, and not between the Serbian and Croatian peoples. T h e Croatian peasants were again told that the Croatian Peasant Party promoted not their interests but those of the well-to-do landowners. T h e sporazum, it was pointed out, had only created two "privileged nations" and had not solved the national, the agrarian, or the social question. 107 Nothing was done to help the peasant pay his debts, to retain his land, or to stabilize the price of agricultural goods. Throughout 1940, the Communist Party attacked the government's foreign and domestic policies and alluded to growing fascism at home. Communist sources claim that it was under their pressure that the Yugoslav government finally decided to recognize the Soviet Union and to conclude a commercial treaty with her on June 24, 1940. On the arrival of the Soviet delegation to Belgrade, the party organized a large number of people to welcome it, and the police had difficulty in containing the jubilant demonstrators.108 Communist attempts to force the Belgrade regime to sign a nonaggression treaty with the Russians were less successful. T h e government in the meantime tried to curb Communist influence. O n December 24, the Communist-dominated United Workers Syndicate, 150,000 strong, was outlawed and many leading Communists were imprisoned. However, some of the party's "legal" newspapers109 continued to appear and were widely circulated. When, on March 24, 1941, Dragisa Cvetkovid left for Germany to sign the Tripartite Pact, the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party in Serbia appealed for popular protest against the Pact. Demonstrations followed in some Serbian cities and spread to Montenegro. A Communist-led rally in Belgrade, on March 26, forced the government to close all secondary schools. 110 Economy Compared to the countries of Western and Central Europe, interwar Yugoslavia was an economically underdeveloped country. T h e explanation lies in the special history of its provinces, the long period of foreign rule, and

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the late abolition of the feudal system. The varied historical experiences resulted in uneven development of various parts of the country and in three kinds of land tenure: in the areas (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) in which the Ottoman feudal system survived until 1918, in the areas (Slovenia, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, Dalmatia) in which to varying degrees feudal landownership had given way to small peasant ownership, and in the areas (Serbia, Montenegro) in which small peasant landholdings predominated. In his Manifesto to the People on January 6, 1919, Prince Regent Alexander promised that one of the first measures of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would be "a solution of the agrarian question" with "just compensation" to former landowners. The "Interim Decree" of February 15, 1919, contained the basic provisions of the agrarian reform. The last vestiges of serfdom were abolished and the large landed estates were expropriated. 111 The Interim Decree made the various kinds of dependent peasants the legal owners of the land they tilled. However, it left implementation of land reform to subsequent special legislation. In some instances, formal transfer of full ownership of the land to the peasant was delayed for as long as fifteen years. The Decree has been criticized for giving preferential treatment to war veterans and for failing to define the large estates, which was not done until 1931. Another weakness of the land reform was that peasants received land but not the necessary draft animals, tools, technical assistance, and credit. 112 Throughout the interwar period, land cultivation remained primitive and peasant farms small and fragmented into many parcels. Only an inconsequential fraction of cultivable land was irrigated and regularly fertilized. As a result of inheritance traditions and the rapid growth of population, peasant farms were steadily subdivided. Population increased more rapidly than the extension of crop lands and caused rural overcrowding and pauperization. The limited industry was unable to grow quickly enough to absorb the surplus rural population. Some colonization in Vojvodina, Macedonia, and Kosmet was likewise insufficient to alleviate the problem of overpopulation. The doors of America were nearly closed as a result of that country's new immigration policies. 113 Nor was royalist Yugoslavia, like her postwar successor, in a position to send hundreds of thousands of workers abroad to earn their wages. The declining grain prices on the international market had devastating effects on Yugoslav agriculture. Low prices of marketable agricultural products and high prices of consumer goods accounted for the mounting indebtedness of the peasant and his growing discontent with the government. The situation was worsened by the fact that economic grievances were often couched in nationalistic terms.

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O n April 15, 1930, Yugoslavia established a Chartered Company for the Export of Agricultural Products (PRIZAD), which had as one of its functions to purchase directly from the producers of wheat and maize. T h i s was intended to eliminate the middleman's profit and thereby to help the producers. 114 During the Great Depression, the government was compelled to introduce a number of measures to relieve the plight of the peasantry. In 1932, a moratorium was proclaimed on payment of peasant debts, and banks which got into difficulties because of this decree could also ask for a moratorium on their obligations. In 1936, a portion of peasant debt was canceled altogether. Although these measures improved conditions, they did little to solve agrarian problems. T h e slow development of the economy itself impeded the growth of agriculture. In 1918, Yugoslavia had few industries, and most of these were located in the northern parts of the country. T h e First World War caused heavy damage to the economy, especially to railroads, bridges, and industries in Serbia. In 1922, Yugoslavia had only 9,330 kilometers of railways, 2,294 locomotives, 4,381 passenger cars, and 48,828 freight cars. Connections between many parts of the country remained inadequate. Montenegro, for example, had a mere 12 kilometers of narrow-gauge railways and until the late thirties it had no railway connection with other Yugoslav provinces. A special weakness was the fact that the leading urban centers, such as Belgrade, had poor connections with the Adriatic seaports. In the northern parts of the country there was a fairly dense railway network, but in the coastal and central regions railways were very few. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 110 kilometers out of a total of 1,056 kilometers of railway were of normal gauge. By 1929, the railway network had been improved and extended to 10,500 kilometers, and from then until 1941 a small additional extension of railways was constructed annually. But, obviously, the railways failed to satisfy the needs of the country. After the First World War, it was necessary to create a common internal market and to develop industry. Serbia's protective tariff was extended, in 1919, to the entire country. Heavy taxes were imposed on foreign imports and special exemptions were granted to new industries that imported industrial installations. T h e greatest industrial growth occurred in the years immediately after the war (7.9 percent in 1921). Between 1919 and 1938, some 2,193 new factories were founded, employing about 145,000 workers. Increased mining productivity was also impressive. 115 But by 1941 only a few Yugoslav industries (e.g., timber and wood, flour milling, cement, chemicals, copper and lead concentrates) were large enough both to provide for domestic needs and to produce enough for export. Interwar Yugoslavia was encumbered with a variety of foreign debts.

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35

Yugoslavia agreed to pay a proportional share of the prewar national debt of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and agreed to pay for loans that it obtained immediately after the end of the war from the Allies, and for acquired public domain (railways, forests, mines, buildings, etc.). T h e government, furthermore, was obliged to contract large loans. T h e state debts were to some extent offset by reparations payments, which were of considerable help in the initial years after the war. The Reparations Commission had awarded Yugoslavia, on June 20,1921,5 percent of the German reparations and an average of 10 percent of the Bulgarian and AustroHungarian. 116 Austria paid no reparations because of her economic instability. While the reparations from Hungary and Bulgaria were beneficial to Yugoslavia, they were not of real consequence. On the other hand, the German payments between 1921 and 1931 were very important. T h e Germans delivered to Yugoslavia large quantities of railway equipment and materials as well as industrial installations. German reparations in 1921— 1924 amounted to 220,000,000 gold marks and in 1924—1931 to 275,200,000 Reichsmarks. 117 The fact that the reparations were received in the years of greatest need was of great importance for Yugoslav economy. Between 1919 and 1931, the reparations amounted to about 15 percent of the country's total tax receipts. Thus, Yugoslavia was seriously affected by the reduction and ultimate suspension of German reparations. 118 Unlike its Communist successor, the royalist government was able to obtain only moderate amounts of foreign loans for the development of its economy. The dearth of capital led the government to allow heavy foreign investment in Yugoslavia and to increase government participation in its economy. The principal foreign investors were France (25 percent), Great Britain (17.4 percent), United States (15 percent), Germany (11.1 percent), Italy (9.5 percent), Belgium (7.4 percent), and Switzerland (5.9 percent). 119 The Bor Copper Mines, one of the largest sources of copper in Europe, were exploited by French capital until 1941, when occupied France sold its interest to the Germans. The principal Yugoslav lead and zinc mines in the Trepca basin were owned by the Trepca Mines Ltd., a subsidiary of the British Selection Trust. Several other smaller mines of nonferrous metals were also foreign-controlled.120 State participation in the economy through outright ownership, regulatory measures, and price controls had become very extensive by 1939. Here it should be observed that many industries and economic enterprises in Yugoslavia have traditionally been state-owned. The Austro-Hungarian government invested heavily in Bosnia and Herzegovina in railways, timber, and tobacco. Many economic enterprises in remaining provinces of Austria-Hungary and in Serbia were also state-owned. These state-owned

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Vucinich

industries and enterprises passed over to the Yugoslav state, which further extended the state industrial sector. T h e government concentrated its investments in transportation and communication systems, schools, hospitals, cultural centers, banking, publishing houses, mining, timber, sugar factories, and certain defense industries. 121 Special government agencies in charge of food (September 1939), foreign trade (March 1940), and the "defense of economy" (May 1940) were founded and, in January 1941, a separate ministry of supply was established. T h e very considerable state participation in economy accelerated Yugoslavia's move toward economic etatism. Yugoslavia's exports comprised primarily agricultural and livestock products, which made up 46 to 49 percent of the total from 1926 to 1929. In the same period, timber represented 15 to 20 percent and minerals 7 to 15 percent of annual exports. Yugoslavia's principal customers were Italy, Austria, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. As a result of the sanctions applied against Italy during the Ethiopian war, exports to Italy dropped from 25.8 percent in 1931—1935 to 7.4 percent in 1936-1939. For this and other reasons, exports to Germany—10.4 percent of the total in 1926—1930 and 14.1 percent in 1931-1935—rose to 28.3 percent in 1936-1939. 122 A similar tendency was manifested in Yugoslav imports. In the 19261930 period, imports came mainly from Czechoslovakia (18.2 percent), Austria (18.2 percent), Germany (14.2 percent), and Italy (12.2 percent). During the following five-year period, 1931-1935, the same four countriesCzechoslovakia (14.3 percent), Austria (13.8 percent), Germany (16 percent), and Italy (12.9 percent)—remained the main exporters to Yugoslavia. T h i s began to change after the Ethiopian war. T h e German annexation of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia likewise influenced Yugoslav foreign trade; in 1936—1939, Yugoslavia imported 34.8 percent of its total imports from Germany. 123 It should be pointed out that import surpluses in trade with hard-currency and large export surpluses in trade with some clearing or soft-currency countries forced the government, in 1936, to decree that 35 percent of the total value of trade could not be imported from nonclearing countries except under special license. 124 Germany also acquired Austrian and Czechoslovak investments in Yugoslavia. But all the hasty and often poorly conceived economic measures proved unsuccessful or too late, as the country's economy continued to deteriorate. Hoarding became widespread and speculation rampant. T h e worsening of the international situation required greater military expenditures, while at the same time bilateralism in foreign trade led to large blocked balances abroad, particularly in Germany. Although by 1941 Yugoslavia had achieved a modest economic expansion

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in agriculture and industry, it still remained predominantly agrarian, exporting food products and raw materials and importing machinery and finished goods. T h e peasant problem remained acute. While in 1921, 131 peasants lived on 100 hectares of cultivable land, in 1938 as many as 144 lived on the same amount of land. 125 Had the world situation been more favorable and Yugoslavia freed of foreign pressures, she might have been able to exploit her resources more systematically and to solve some of her major economic problems. But such was not to be her fate. Foreign

Relations

Yugoslavia inherited many foreign problems from the Austro-Hungarian and Serbian monarchies; for example, the rivalry with Italy over the Adriatic Sea and Albania, the struggle with Bulgaria for Macedonia, and the question of a sea outlet through Salonika. T h e end of the First World War and the following peace settlements brought further problems, such as reparations, determination of frontiers, the restoration of the Habsburgs, and the question of minorities. But from the end of the war until the late thirties, the principal foreign problem of Yugoslavia was that of Italian imperialism. Italy, a former wartime ally, became a threat to Yugoslavia in her claims to territories heavily populated by Yugoslav peoples, in seeking to establish a protectorate over Albania, and in her determination to convert the Adriatic Sea into an Italian lake. Endless tension was caused by subjecting the Yugoslav minority in Italy to Italianization, and inciting Yugoslavia's neighbors against her. A t the end of the war, Italy had insisted on occupying Yugoslav territories beyond the zone of occupation and the provinces promised her in the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915). A t the Paris Peace Conference, Great Britain and France appeared willing to conciliate Italy, but President Wilson, who supported national self-determination, rejected Italian demands as unreasonable. Various proposals for the settlement of the YugoslavItalian dispute were rejected by Italy, rejections which nearly wrecked the conference. T h e lack of coordinated policy among the Allies allowed the Italians to pursue national rather than inter-Allied objectives. On November 19, 1918, the Italians occupied Fiume, which had not been promised to them in the Treaty of London. 128 Having failed to prevent the formation of Yugoslavia, the Italians tried to forestall its recognition and hoped by economic blockade to undermine the economy of the new state. In an attempt to divide the Yugoslavs, the Italians backed the claims of deposed King Nicholas of Montenegro, the Italian king's father-in-law. General Pietro Badoglio, deputy chief of staff

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of the Italian Army, drew up a plan to disrupt and break up Yugoslavia 127 and the plan seems to have been approved by the top leaders of Italy. On February 11, 1919, the Yugoslavs offered to accept President Wilson's arbitration of the Italo-Yugoslav dispute. 128 T h e Italians refused a plebiscite in the disputed territory, as well as the "Wilson Line" which actually gave Gorizia, Trieste, and Istria west of the river Rasa, excluding Fiume, to Italy. There were more Italians than Yugoslavs in Fiume, though not if the population of the city's environs was also counted. In the course of the year, other proposals and counterproposals were made to the Supreme Council, but all to no avail. T h e French proposal (Tardieu Plan) which would have created a buffer state of Fiume got nowhere. But while the peace conference discusssed the Italo-Yugoslav frontier question, chaos prevailed in Fiume as the Italian troops seemed unable to maintain order; finally, on September 12, 1919, the poet-condottiere, Gabriele D'Annunzio, seized Fiume and established a miniature fascist state.129 Neither the peace conference nor the Council of Five was able to solve the growing Italo-Yugoslav dispute. Finally, in desperation, the two nations were simply left to settle it themselves through direct negotiations. T h i s step was made possible when the more reasonable Giovanni Giolitti and Count Carlo Sforza became prime minister and foreign minister respectively of Italy. T h e talks, initiated in May ig20 while Premier Francesco Nitti was still in office, ended in the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo on November 12 of the same year. Rapallo was essentially a Yugoslav defeat. 130 Italy obtained most of Istria, several Dalmatian islands, and the city of Zara and its immediate environs. Fiume was to become a "free state." A number of other important provisions were contained in the treaty, all of them favoring Italy. In Yugoslavia, the Croats and the Slovenes condemned the treaty for its surrender of their conationals to Italy. D'Annunzio, also for reasons of his own, tried to prevent the implementation of the treaty, only to be forced by Italian armed forces to withdraw from Fiume in January 1921. T h e Treaty of Rapallo did not bring the expected improvement in Yugoslav-Italian relations. Mussolini's Fascist government soon rejected the treaty and demanded a new arrangement for Fiume. Yugoslavia was once again forced to yield to her stronger neighbor in the Treaty of Rome (January 27, 1924). This treaty recognized full Italian sovereignty over Fiume while Yugoslavia acquired only the possession of its suburb Susak. Certain guarantees were given to the Yugoslav minority in Fiume and on the same day an Italian-Yugoslav "pact of friendship" was signed which provided for cooperation in the preservation of peace and a policy of neu-

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trality in regard to Albania. T h e pact was to last for five years; it was not renewed. 1 3 1 Nearly three dozen conventions, concluded in 1924 and 1925, gave Italy special concessions in Yugoslavia in matters of trade, transportation, navigation, and several other areas. T h e r e was much opposition to these new concessions to Italy, especially given the ruthless Italian oppression of the Yugoslav minority. Consequently, the Yugoslav skupstina failed to ratify some of the conventions the government had concluded with Italy. T h e resulting Italian animosity, the steady encroachment of Italy on A l b a n i a , and the gradual forging of a chain of Italian alliances around Yugoslavia forced Yugoslavia to turn to France. In 1925-1926, the French were reluctant to help. France was appeasing Italy in an effort to use her as a check on a revived Germany. O n l y after the failure to reconcile Yugoslavia and Italy and to arrange with them a tripartite pact did France propose a treaty with the Yugoslavs similar to the one she had concluded with Czechoslovakia (without the inclusion of the military convention). T h e treaty, however, was not concluded until November 11, 1927. A basic cause of I talo-Yugoslav antagonism was the question of A l b a n i a . T h e First W o r l d W a r had left A l b a n i a in a state of internal disorder as various tribal and political groups competed with each other and w i t h the Italians for control of the country. T h e question of Italian domination of A l b a n i a was temporarily alleviated when, in 1920, political unrest at home caused the withdrawal of Italian forces from all but Valona. Italy's special interests in A l b a n i a were, however, recognized by the great powers. A d d i n g to the A l b a n i a n confusion was a border dispute between Albania and Yugoslavia, a dispute ultimately solved by leaving the shrine of St. N a u m to Yugoslavia. B u t with the conclusion of the T i r a n a pacts of May 12, 1925, and November 27, 1926, Italy began to renew her economic and political penetration of A l b a n i a and to promote A l b a n i a n nationalism against Yugoslavia, thereby aggravating the uneasy relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. T h e twenty-year treaty of defense, November 22, 1927, provided for close military cooperation between Italy and Albania. Another cause of friction between the two Balkan states was the large A l b a n i a n minority within Yugoslavia which was denied autonomy and political and ethnic rights. Demands for union with Albania, particularly strong in the Kosmet area, were silenced by force and the Yugoslavs proceeded to colonize the region with Serbian veterans. Fascist Italy gave its support to the A l b a n i a n irredentist movement and to anti-Yugoslav activities. In turn, the Yugoslavs supported A l b a n i a n groups and individuals w h o opposed the T i r a n a regime.

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Three other revisionist countries, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, also nurtured deep antipathy toward Yugoslavia. These countries had never been reconciled completely to the provisions of the peace treaties which compelled them to relinquish substantial territories to Yugoslavia, nor did they appreciate the reparations, restitutions, and military obligations to which they were subjected. T h e treaty of St. Germain (September 10, 1919) ended the hostilities between Austria and Yugoslavia. After armed frontier skirmishes,132 the two countries lived in relative friendship, though Austria's rapprochement with Italy, her periodic threats of Anschluss with Germany, and the emergence of a fascist regime in Austria were of serious concern to Yugoslavia. A t different times, Yugoslavia protested against what it called the "Germanization" of the Slovenes in Carinthia and against the agitation of the German Austrians to detach the Maribor area from Yugoslavia. T h e Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919) obligated Bulgaria to cede three districts (Strumica, Caribrod, Bosilgrad) to Yugoslavia, 133 but the Yugoslavs failed to obtain the Dragoman Pass and the city of Vidin which they claimed. These territorial cessions intensified the bad relations with Bulgaria, for that state also claimed Yugoslav Macedonia, insisting that this territory as well as newly lost districts were ethnically and historically hers. Bulgaria supported the armed bands of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which made repeated incursions into Yugoslavia and committed acts of terror and sabotage. T h e brief period of improving relations during Alexander Stamboliski's prime ministry (1919—1923) and subsequent aborted attempts at reconciliation failed to restore friendly relations between the two countries, for the I M R O and its backers in Bulgaria vigorously opposed reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Only the waning prestige of Italy and the ascendance of Hitler brought a change in Bulgarian policy. On May 18-19, 1934, a group called the Zveno and the Military League effected a coup d'etat and seized power in Bulgaria. T h e new government was the first seriously to challenge the IMRO. It suppressed the I M R O , recognized the Soviet Union, and inaugurated a policy of friendship with Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the latter policy suffered a setback as a result of the demise of the Zveno-Military League government in January 1935. Relations later improved, but in an entirely different setting, as both countries drifted into the Axis orbit. T h e Nazi Reich actually found it expedient to promote Yugoslav-Bulgarian amity. Hungary's adamant insistence on the unity of the lands of St. Stephen prevented good relations with Yugoslavia until 1923. By the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920), Hungary had ceded Vojvodina (parts of Baranja,

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Backa, and the Banat) to Yugoslavia. I n addition, Yugoslavia received M e d j u m u r j e and some small border areas. Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, all beneficiaries of T r i a n o n , feared Hungarian revisionism more than Bulgarian or Austrian, and this fear was the main reason for the formation of the Little Entente in the early twenties. Hungary did little to placate her neighbors. T h e counterfeiting of French francs, Czechoslovak crowns, and Yugoslav dinars by official circles in Hungary, as well as Hungarian revisionist activities, made normal relations with Hungary impossible. In A p r i l 1927, Hungary closed the door to Yugoslav friendship by concluding a treaty of perpetual peace and eternal amity with Italy. T h e common fear of a Habsburg restoration in Hungary forced Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania to stand together. O n March 1, 1920, the Hungarian parliament established a regency under Admiral Nicholas Horthy, w h o had been an aide-de-camp of Franz Josef. W h e n the Emperor Charles attempted, on March 27, 1921, to regain the Hungarian throne, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia protested strenuously and persuaded the Council of Ambassadors in Paris to force him to leave Hungary. A second adventure by Charles, on October 20,1921, was met by the threat of military intervention by the successor states. T h e Little Entente forced the Hungarian Constituent Assembly to pass a dethronement act deposing the Habsburgs. But Hungary continued to harbor resentments against the Yugoslav state and actively assisted the Croatian fascists (ustashe) whose major objective was to break u p Yugoslavia. Border incidents and Hungarian complaints about the treatment of their conationals in Yugoslavia agitated the two countries. T h e assassination of K i n g Alexander in October 1934 brought relations nearly to the breaking point when Yugoslavia accused Hungary of implication in the murder. O n August 14, 1920, Yugoslavia signed a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia and on June 7,1921, with Romania. Czechoslovakia and Romania concluded a comparable treaty on A p r i l 23, 1921. These bilateral agreements, subsequently known as the Little Entente, were not a complete system in that they did not offer comprehensive security to the signatories but were primarily concerned with Hungary. O n January 25, 1924, France and Czechoslovakia concluded a treaty of friendship and subsequently the other two Little Entente powers entered into agreements with France. T h u s the Little Entente became a part of the French international system of alliances. From the very beginning the members of the Little Entente were very active members of the League of Nations and participated in the numerous international conferences aimed at preservation of the peace settlements of 1919-1920. O n January 1,1928, an Austrian customs officer discovered at

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St. Gotthard five carloads of machine guns shipped from Italy and consigned to Hungary. T h e Little Entente powers at once sent notes to the Council of the League demanding the restoration of interallied disarmament controls in Hungary. On May 21, 1929, the Little Entente states signed a tripartite agreement which provided for economic and intellectual collaboration and the automatic renewal of alliance treaties every five years. They agreed to unite against outside intervention in their own domestic affairs and to oppose any large reductions in German reparations to the detriment of one another. They also signed a General Act of Arbitration and Conciliation. A t the beginning of the 1930's, in the time of the Great Depression, there was much talk in Europe about regional blocs and economic cooperation. Yugoslavia and her allies proposed various regional groupings along economic lines. Because of their differing economic needs, it was some time before the Entente powers were ready to discuss seriously a formula for a mutually beneficial pattern of economic relations. T h e Tardieu plan of 1932, which envisaged a Danubian federation built on preferential, reciprocal tariffs and mutually favorable quota allotments was, however, rejected.The proposal was opposed by the suspicious great powers, who saw the plan as an instrument of French foreign policy. In return, France and the Little Entente succeeded in preventing an Austro-German customs union in 1931. Attempts to deal with the international economic crisis were even less successful. A t the World Economic Conference in London in mid-June 1933, the Little Entente powers favored suspension of war debts, the removal of impediments to international trade, the introduction of preferential treatment for agricultural products, and the acceptance of international regulation of trade and of cereal prices. But nothing came of all this. It was not until the Bucharest meeting (April 30-May 9, 1934) that the Economic Council of the Entente (see below) was able to adopt a system of procedure and a basic plan for the study of ways and means of wider economic collaboration. In London, the representatives of the Little Entente signed a convention with the Soviet Union (July 4, 1933) which was in fact a regional nonaggression pact granting Soviet recognition of the Little Entente as a single international entity. However, unlike Czechoslovakia and Romania, Yugoslavia did not establish direct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1940. T h e failure of the Entente to cooperate fully on economic affairs was made more dangerous by the rise of Hitler in Germany in 1933 and the continued interference of Mussolini in Austria and the Balkans. Early in January 1933, a large number of rifles and machine guns, shipped from

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Italy, were discovered in an Austrian arms factory in Hirtenberg. T h e Western powers and the Little Entente demanded in vain that the weapons be returned to Italy. In an effort to strengthen their organization, the Little Entente states signed the Geneva agreement of February 14—15,1933, which made them "a virtual diplomatic federation" in order "to act as a unified international organ." 134 Accordingly, a Permanent Council, Economic Council, and Secretariat were established. The Little Entente usually supported French policies in matters of disarmament. At the Geneva Conference, which assembled on February 2, 1932, the French suggested the formation of an international army and a series of interlocking Locarno Pacts around the world. They had on previous occasions urged the extension of the Locarno Pact to Eastern Europe. Like the French, the Little Entente had a vested interest in the problem of reparations, the interallied debt, and related financial matters that stemmed from the peace treaties. This question, however, is so complex and so immersed in general European politics that we can do no more than mention it here. The Four-Power Pact (March 1933), signed by Italy, France, Great Britain, and Germany, which would have established a "four-power directorate" in place of the processes of the League of Nations, came as a shock to the Little Entente. At their meetings in Prague, May-June 1933, they refused to recognize territorial revisionism or the right of great powers to dispose of the territory of smaller states. The Rome Protocols between Italy, Hungary, and Austria (March 1934) were interpreted as evidence of further Italian penetration into the Danube Basin and the encirclement of Yugoslavia. Then Mussolini clashed with Hitler when in July 1934 the Nazis attempted a putsch in Austria and murdered Chancellor Dollfuss. Italy mobilized two divisions and sent them to the Brenner Pass; Yugoslavia countered by declaring that, if Italian troops entered Austria, she would follow suit. During those critical days, the French foreign minister, Jean Louis Barthou, toured the Entente countries and advocated the establishment of a "Grand Alliance" to include the East European states and the Soviet Union. It was in connection with this that King Alexander made his trip to France where, at Marseilles, he and Barthou were assassinated on October 9, 1934. T h e Permanent Council of the Little Entente, meeting at Belgrade on October 19, decided that the assassination was a part of a foreign plot and insisted that the criminals and their protectors be brought to trial. Italy and Hungary were heavily implicated in the murder because they had both trained and financed the I M R O and the Ustashe who had organized the assassination.

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T h e Yugoslav government charged Italy and Hungary before the Council of the League of Nations with complicity in the murder of King Alexander. 145 The debate which began in the Council on December 7, 1934, ended in a weak resolution three days later. T h e resolution was pushed through by Pierre Laval, the new French foreign minister, and the Yugoslav delegation was forced to accept it.18e T h e resolution reprimanded Hungary for harboring the Ustashe and for failing to suppress them, but Italy went uncensured. Yugoslavia was bitter over the Council's failure to punish those responsible for the murder and was particularly hurt by the manner in which Great Britain and France treated her. Because of the position taken by Laval, who did not wish to alienate Italy, Italy and Hungary escaped punishment after much discussion of the Yugoslav charge in the Council. With this, Barthou's East European Locarno came to naught. T h e Little Entente weathered the storm but thenceforth, without French support, rapidly declined in strength. T h e assassination of King Alexander and the Franco-Italian rapprochement led to a shift in Yugoslav foreign policy from reliance on France and the French system of alliances to a policy of neutrality. 187 After 1929, international uncertainty once again, as on many previous occasions, inspired some of the Balkan leaders to advocate a regional agreement. In the course of the next two or three years, the Balkan states concluded a number of bilateral agreements. But before a general Balkan agreement could be reached, Yugoslavia had to improve her relations with Bulgaria and Greece. In 1929, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria embarked on a policy of reconciliation. By the Agreement of Pirot (September 26, 1929) and subsequent protocols, much was done to alleviate disputes arising from frontier violations and double property ownership. Relations with Greece for a time after the war were not as cordial as they might have been. The agreement reached between Greece and Serbia in 1914 regarding the free Serbian zone in the port of Salonika never went into effect as a result of the interruption of the First World War. An agreement reached on May 10, 1923, gave Yugoslavia for a period of fifty years almost complete sovereignty over a small area in the port of Salonika. However, as a result of unstable political conditions in Greece and certain other reasons, the agreement was not fully implemented for some time. Finally, in Geneva on March 17, 1929, the Yugoslavs and Greeks signed protocols on transportation, the free zone, customs, railways, and communications. T e n days later, in Belgrade, a pact of friendship, arbitration, and conciliation was concluded, and on April 22 a trade treaty was signed. Nevertheless, irritations over various questions con-

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cerning the free zone in Salonika continued to harm relations between Yugoslavia and Greece.188 In the course of the Twenty-Seventh Universal Congress of Peace, held in Athens, October 6—10, 1929, a commission organized to investigate the question of the "federation of peoples" created a subcommission of representatives of the Balkan countries. As a result of preliminary work of the Balkan Commission, on May 12, 1930, academic, economic, and professional delegations from the individual Balkan countries were invited to a conference. Unofficial observers of the Balkan governments were also present at this First Balkan Conference, which met in Athens on October 5, 1930. 189 After that, Balkan conferences were held annually at different Balkan capitals and a whole range of subjects was discussed in connection with the establishment of closer political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Much, in fact, came from these periodical meetings. An organizational system and rules of procedure were established. Statutes for a Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a Balkan Postal Convention were adopted. Though Bulgaria and Albania, the revisionist states, were admitted to the conferences, they insisted primarily on solution of the sensitive minority questions and created other difficulties. Without Bulgaria adhering, the Balkan states agreed not to resort to war, to submit their disputes to peaceful settlement, to avail themselves when necessary of a permanent commission of conciliation (made up of representatives of the signatories), and, if this failed, to utilize the Permanent Court of International Justice. Signatories pledged assistance to a country against whom aggression was committed. The pact also provided for an Office of Minorities to be established by each contracting power, which would receive petitions and, on request, transmit them to the Balkan commission of minorities. All members were pledged to accept the unanimous decision of the commission. Yugoslavia and the other Balkan countries also participated in the Stresa Conference of 1932 for the economic improvement of Eastern Europe, which proposed the elimination of trade barriers, a policy of increasing grain prices, and the encouragement of a plan of public works. Though nothing came of those proposals, on September 11—13, 1933, the first meeting of the newly established Balkan Medical Union was held, and a Balkan Tobacco Office was founded. In the course of the year, various interBalkan bilateral agreements were signed, as well as a Yugoslav-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (November 27, 1933). In October 1933, King Alexander visited Bucharest, Varna, Istanbul, and Corfu and was everywhere received cordially.

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T h e Fourth Balkan Conference, in Salonika on November 5, 1933, adopted a plan for regional cooperation in trade and promotion of Balkan products in world markets. Mutual most-favored-nation treatment in the Balkans was agreed upon, and a Permanent Commission of International Commerce was established as well. A multilateral pact of Balkan countries was proposed. T h e foreign ministers of Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia met in Belgrade on February 2-4, 1934, and, after much deliberation as to whether Bulgaria and Albania should be admitted, agreed to sign the pact at Athens on February 9, 1934. T h e Balkan Pact had no time limitation and was defensive in character. T h e signatories were not to take political action against any other nonsignatory Balkan state without agreement of the signatories, and in a secret protocol defined an aggressor. As in the case of the Little Entente, the signatories did not incur any obligations against a great power. A t the Universal Congress of Peace, meeting in Locarno in September 1934, the Balkan Pact powers submitted a resolution couched in terms that would encourage Albania and Bulgaria to join the pact, but they never did. T h e members of the pact in the meantime worked on the problem of economic cooperation, conclusion of new commercial treaties, and collective resistance to economic penetration of the Balkans by foreign powers that might jeopardize their independence. They proceeded to develop an administrative mechanism headed by a permanent council and an advisory economic council. In September 1934, the Yugoslav royal family visited Sofia. During this period a number of congresses of Bulgarian and Yugoslav professional people were held and a Yugoslav-Bulgarian society was founded for the promotion of friendship and cooperation between the two states. After the assassination of King Alexander, the Balkan Entente stood by the Yugoslavs and supported their charges against the powers implicated in the assassination. During the Venizelist revolt in Greece in the spring of 1935, the Entente served as a "stabilizing influence." T h e Balkan Entente applied the sanctions voted by the League of Nations against Italy as a result of the Ethiopian war. It also supported Turkey at the Montreux Conference (June 22-July 20, 1936) in obtaining revision of the Lausanne Convention on the Straits. T h e Balkan Entente sponsored conventions on aviation and telegraph, planned to issue joint postage stamps, promoted mutual trade and tourism, and discussed the possibility of exchanging professors and intellectuals. In November 1936, Yugoslavia and Romania agreed on the construction of the Kladovo-Turnu-Severin bridge across the Danube, and in the same year a permanent Balkan maritime committee was established at Piraeus.

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T h e year 1936 was probably the high-water mark in the activities and hopes of the Balkan Entente. From then on international events in one way or another undermined it, tilting the scales in favor of the revisionist powers. By 1939, the Balkan dream of mutual cooperation and friendship had disappeared in the mire of national jealousies and the revisionists' dependence on Germany. Moreover, similarities of economies had hindered a movement toward Balkan cooperation. Until 1937, Italy was Yugoslavia's principal enemy. Efforts in 1931-1934 by K i n g Alexander to win Italian friendship by offering economic advantages to Italy, recognizing Italian ascendancy in Albania, and even holding out the possibility of an Italian naval base in Boka Kotorska were ignored. 140 Italy continued to oppress its Yugoslav minority and to finance and encourage the Croatian ustashe. Italy seems to have had an exaggerated notion of the power of Croatian separatism and mistakenly saw Yugoslavia as a state on the verge of collapse. In March 1934, Jean Louis Barthou hoped to include Italy in his G r a n d Alliance scheme. T o do so, he found it necessary to bring about reconciliation between Italy and Yugoslavia. T h e Yugoslavs were alarmed over France's seeming willingness to sacrifice Yugoslavia's friendship in order to secure an anti-German agreement with Italy. In fact, some Yugoslavs were inclined to see Germany itself as a power that might help contain Italian expansion in the Balkans. T h e G e r m a n occupation of the Rhineland and the successful Italian invasion of Ethiopia proved the ineffectiveness of the Western powers and convinced the Yugoslavs that they must seek new friends in order to insure national security. Yugoslavia had voted for and participated in the sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war. But discussions regarding military assistance by the Western powers if Italy should decide to attack Yugoslavia proved that the latter could not expect any tangible aid. 1 4 1 Furthermore, the Hoare-Laval plan for partitioning Ethiopia was seen in Yugoslavia as a proof of the bankruptcy of the League of Nations and the whole notion of collective security. N o sanctions were taken against Germany when she occupied the Rhineland, so why continue them against Italy? O n July 15, 1936, the sanctions against Italy were dropped. T h e sanctions had profoundly affected Yugoslavia's foreign trade, which was heavily dependent on Italy. W h i l e France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia had absorbed only 25 percent of the resulting slack, Germany took u p 60 percent. T h i s was an important element in Yugoslav reluctance to continue economic sanctions against Germany. 1 4 2 T h e failure of France to respond with determination against G e r m a n and Italian aggression and her inability to help Yugoslavia undermined French prestige in the Balkans and turned the Yugoslavs toward a G e r m a n

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orientation. In July 1936, Hjalmar Schacht, the German minister of economic affairs, visited Belgrade and offered, in exchange for Yugoslav economic concessions, the Reich's protection of Yugoslavia from Italy and Hungary. Later in the year, Hitler urged Mussolini to come to an agreement with Stojadinovid's regime in Yugoslavia and encouraged Hungary to direct her revisionist drive against Czechoslovakia instead of Yugoslavia. 148 When the French finally solicited a pact of mutual assistance, Yugoslavia showed little interest. Close economic ties and improved relations with the Rome-Berlin Axis appeared more durable than assistance from a weak and divided France.144 Prince Paul continued Alexander's policy of seeking a rapprochement with Italy. In September 1936, Yugoslavia concluded an economic agreement with Italy, which was interpreted as a move toward closer relations. 145 Germany had no objection to this but desired that Yugoslavia should seek agreement with both Rome and Berlin. Under German diplomatic pressure, Italy became anxious to remove obstacles to negotiations with Yugoslavia. She invited the Yugoslavs to send a delegation to Rome for discussions relating to Albania, the Yugoslav minorities, the ustashe, the Italian optants in Dalmatia, clarification of the St. Margherita and Nettuno conventions, compensation arising out of agrarian reform in Dalmatia, and the possibility of a political pact.148 With the Western democracies in retreat on the diplomatic front, Yugoslav leaders concluded that the security of their country was more important than loyalty to alliances of dubious value. Stojadinovid spoke of his dedication to the existing allies and treaties but proceeded gradually to draw the country away from France toward the fascist states, who saw in the Yugoslav prime minister a person who behaved and thought like a fascist and who would collaborate in building the "new order" in Europe. 147 At the time of the Spanish Civil War, the Yugoslav government shipped supplies to Franco's Spain and took special measures to prevent Yugoslav volunteers from going to Spain to join the Spanish Loyalists.148 When in 1937 France proposed to the Little Entente the conclusion of a military pact, Stojadinovil opposed it.148 Despite the resentment of Yugoslavia's neighbors, Stojadinovic and Prince Paul sought understandings with Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria. Not only would these give the country security from without, but it would also serve to undermine the separatist movements inside Yugoslavia. 150 In line with this thought came the pact of eternal friendship with Bulgaria, signed on January 24, 1937. But by making this agreement, Yugoslavia violated the Balkan Pact, according to which no signatory

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was allowed to enter into an agreement with another state without the concurrence of the other signatories.151 Especially important is the fact that the Balkan Pact itself was directed against Bulgaria. The frequent manifestations of Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement since 1936 had already alarmed the Greeks, always sensitive to any Slavic solidarity, as well as Romania. 182 Stojadinovid, who believed that his country should concentrate on Balkan affairs, sought the approval of the Balkan Pact powers for the treaty he had concluded with Bulgaria. 153 They gave it only reluctantly, Greece being the last to do so. Stojadinovid assured the member nations that the Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact did not endanger any of the signatories, that it was in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Balkan Pact. Stojadinovid failed to mention his promise to support the Bulgarian acquisition of Dedeagach (now Alexandroiipolis) in return for Kiosseivanov's support of Yugoslavia's claim on Salonika. 154 At the meeting of the Permanent Council in Athens, February 15-18, 1937, Stojadinovid was obliged to sign a statement declaring that obligations under the Balkan Pact would have priority over those contained in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty, if Bulgaria should attack one of the signatories. Needless to say, Stojadinovid weakened the Balkan Pact; the result was closer GrecoTurkish relations in answer to the Yugoslav-Bulgarian bloc. 155 At the same time, the negotiations in Rome between the Yugoslav and Italian plenipotentiaries made steady progress. An Italo-Yugoslav treaty was signed on March 25, 1937. Yugoslavia definitely turned her back on France with a promise not to enter into any new agreement with France. Just as the Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact undermined the Balkan Pact, the Yugoslav-Italian treaty did so to the Little Entente. According to the treaty, Italy was pledged to respect Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and to cease its support of Ustasha terrorist activity against Yugoslavia. T h e Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelid, was to be kept under close police surveillance. T h e two powers agreed to remain neutral should either of them be attacked by one or more powers. Italy recognized Yugoslavia's obligations to the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, and the League of Nations. A n economic accord bound Italy to import more Yugoslav goods and to grant Yugoslavia a most-favored-nation position in all commercial relations.154 T h e Yugoslav-Italian compact signified a definite shift in Yugoslavia's foreign policy away from reliance on France to a policy of "neutralism." In the opinion of some writers, Prime Minister Stojadinovid acted as a realist and did what he thought to be best for his country. T h e rapprochement with the Axis did not come suddenly and the French were warned in advance of the impending Yugoslav-Italian agreement.157

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T h e ease with which Germany annexed Austria and Germany's new position in Europe sent deep reverberations throughout Eastern Europe. T h e Balkan Entente countries, on July 31, 1938, reached an agreement with Bulgaria scrapping the military clauses imposed on that country by the Treaty of Neuilly. As a result of German and Hungarian pressure on Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia hastened to assure her that they would aid her if she were attacked by Hungary. These panicky negotiations were to be of little avail, however, for none of the Balkan states were willing or capable of challenging the real danger—Nazi Germany. Stojadinovic made few objections to Germany's annexation of Austria on March 13, 1938, and to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1938. The annexation of Austria gave Germany many strategic advantages in her dealings with Yugoslavia. T h e Reich inherited Austrian capital investments in Yugoslavia and Austria's share of Yugoslav trade, and secured a frontier with Yugoslavia. T h e dismemberment of Czechoslovakia gave Germany control over all the major land routes leading into the Balkans from the west. With the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente was reduced to impotence. In the Balkans, Mussolini occupied Albania in April 1939 and thus achieved a strong military position for his future operations against Greece and Yugoslavia, in addition to threatening Yugoslavia's access to the West by sea. Yet the Balkan Entente powers continued to function for a while longer. At the Permanent Council, on February 2—8, 1940, at Belgrade, the Entente spokesmen declared common interests in the maintenance of peace and order and security in southeastern Europe. They planned to meet again in February 1941, at Athens, but war conditions were to make this gathering impossible. The Stojadinovic regime did not demonstrate real opposition to the Italian rape of Albania. In fact, the Italians had discussed with Stojadinovic the possibility of a Yugoslav-Italian partition of that country. When Stojadinovic fell from office on February 4, 1939, the Italians decided not to share Albania with anyone.158 His friend Stojadinovic gone, Mussolini once again gave his full backing to the Albanian irredentist movement in Kosmet. The indigenous Albanians, according to one source, were both anti-Yugoslav and anti-Italian, but they considered the Italians a lesser evil and felt that through them they could at least attain their own country and schools.159 The Axis powers considered the overthrow of the compliant Stojadinovic as a real setback to their ambitions. Nonetheless, during 1939 relations with the Axis were expanded. Prince Paul visited Mussolini in May 1939 and Hitler in June, hoping to secure Axis support for the preservation of Yugoslavia. While some segments of the population openly expressed pro-

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A x i s sympathy, the majority continued to identify itself more actively with the cause of Great Britain and France. After the sporazum of August 26, 1939, the Cvetkovic-Macek government was very anxious to overcome Axis suspicions. A number of political and economic concessions were made and legislation was introduced to restrict Jewish educational opportunities. A t the same time, the two Axis powers undertook to bring Yugoslavia completely into their fold. T h e y tempted Yugoslavia with the bait of gaining Greek Salonika, under certain conditions. 160 O n several occasions the A x i s powers stressed their admiration and friendship for Yugoslavia. In the meantime, the political position of Yugoslavia in Europe, as well as in the Balkans, deteriorated. W h i l e revisionist Bulgaria and Hungary moved closer to the Axis, friendly Poland was destroyed in 1939. T h e NaziSoviet pact frightened many Yugoslavs and forced the Cvetkovic regime to recognize the Soviet U n i o n in July 1940. Romania, an old ally, was nearly dismembered by the Russian acquisition of Bessarabia (June 1940), the Vienna award of Northern Transylvania to Hungary (August 1940), and surrender of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria in the Treaty of Craiova in September. R o m a n i a was reduced to almost complete dependence on the Axis. For a time, in September 1940, Mussolini in fact had seemed ready for an invasion of Yugoslavia, but Hitler had deterred him from such action. 161 Both powers, however, increased their diplomatic pressure on Yugoslavia, conditionally promising her Salonika. A t the same time, the Axis incited fascist and separatist elements in Yugoslavia. As a result, the Yugoslav government made only meek protests when Italy attacked Greece in October 1940. W h i l e the Germans were preparing to rescue Italy from her fiasco in the Greek war (Operation Marita), they also bargained for Yugoslav membership in the A x i s alliance system so that the German armies sent to Greece would be protected on their right flank. Germany considered it extremely important to preserve Yugoslavia because of her economic importance. Yugoslav leaders since the summer of 1940 had made a number of trips to Germany for discussions with their German counterparts, but the more they conceded to the Nazis, the greater the Nazi demands. Consequently, the Yugoslavs continued to look for friends elsewhere as well, and on December 12, 1940, a pact of eternal friendship with Hungary was concluded. But except to moderate the demands of Hungarian revisionists this diplomatic act could not do much to improve the country's security. A t Berchtesgaden, on February 15, 1941, the prime minister and foreign minister of Yugoslavia were told that Hitler insisted that their country must join the Tripartite Pact. A f t e r March 1, 1941, when Bulgaria signed the Tripartite

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Pact and German troops poured into Bulgaria, Hitler refused to accept anything less than Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. A t the same time, British and American leaders were using their influence to keep Yugoslavia from committing itself fully. Both Washington and London sent plenipotentiaries to Belgrade to talk with the Yugoslav leaders. A belated attempt was made to assure the Yugoslavs of Western loyalty and support. But Yugoslav military experts and government leaders became increasingly convinced that for Yugoslavia if neutrality was not possible then adherence to the Tripartite Pact was a necessity. Certainly the country was not militarily prepared for war. It was believed that, by joining the Axis, Yugoslavia might escape war and even acquire Salonika as a result of it. 162 On March 4, Prince Regent Paul met Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the German Fiihrer's invitation. Upon his return to Belgrade, the Prince called a crown council meeting on March 6, and told those present that Hitler was planning to attack the Soviet Union and that Yugoslavia, therefore, in order to protect her own interests, should join the Axis. 163 Foreign Minister Cincar Markovié added that Hitler had promised to respect Yugoslav sovereignty and to spare her the rigors of war. T h e problem of Salonika was also discussed. Those present at the crown council meeting, including the war minister, the deputy prime minister, the Croat and Slovene leaders, all favored signing the Tripartite Pact. T h e prime minister, Cvetkovié, informed the German minister, von Heeren, of the crown council's favorable reaction and requested that Germany make a formal proposal "regarding the limitation of the pact." T h e Yugoslav decision has been interpreted variously. Most students believe that the Yugoslav leaders were sure that by signing the pact they could keep the country out of war. Others think that Prince Paul saw it simply as an opportunity to become king. T h e first explanation seems more likely. Because the government was uncertain of the course to follow or because it wished to deceive the opposition, an emissary was sent to Athens to discuss the possibility of military cooperation with British and Greek forces. A Yugoslav army officer conducted discussions with the British and Greek staffs on March 9 and March 12, 1941. If it became necessary for Yugoslav troops to withdraw into Greece, in accordance with pre-established plan, the Yugoslavs were assured that the British and Greeks would cover the Yugoslav withdrawal and Great Britain and the United States would supply war matériel to Yugoslavia. 1 * 4 Defense plans were also discussed, and a proposal was made for a Yugoslav attack on Italian troops in Albania. T h e details of these military talks are lacking and there is discrepancy

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in reports as to what was actually said in Athens. According to some, the British promised to provide Yugoslavia all the help they could, except for sending their fleet into the Adriatic. 165 Confident that Yugoslavia could still be kept from joining the Axis, Anthony Eden undertook to forge a joint Balkan defense. He spoke about this to both the Greek and Turkish governments. The most that he could get from the Turks was that they would defend themselves if attacked. The Balkan Entente, or what was left of it, had been reduced to a scrap of paper. Yugoslavia itself played a double game, negotiating with the Turks, the Greeks, and the Allies on the one hand, and the Axis on the other. Between March 9 and March 20, the details of a Yugoslav-German agreement were discussed and many points were ironed out. Yugoslavia wanted a clear declaration recognizing her "neutrality" but Hitler refused to allow this, since it would have an adverse effect on Germany's satellites. Finally, at the ministerial council meeting of March 20, the foreign minister once again discussed the difficult international position of Yugoslavia and urged that the Tripartite Pact be signed. Deputy Prime Minister Vladko Macek, the Croat leader, echoed his words. Three Serbian ministers resigned in protest. One of them later withdrew his resignation and others were found to fill the vacant seats left in the cabinet. T h e die was cast. Yet there were last-minute efforts from abroad and at home to discourage the Yugoslav government from signing the Tripartite Pact. Commander of the Air Force General DuSan Simovid visited Prince Paul twice to attempt to dissuade him from signing the pact, telling him of the anti-Axis feeling of the officers' corps. A telegram from Winston Churchill, on March 22, 166 failed to impress the Yugoslav leaders. In the meantime, at the crown council meeting of March 23-24, the foreign minister told those present that Germany was poised for an attack against Greece and urged that Yugoslavia at once regulate her relations with Germany, which had promised Salonika to Yugoslavia. On this occasion the crown council appears to have refused the offer of Salonika, but agreed that the prime minister and the foreign minister should go to Vienna to sign the pact.167 In Vienna, before they signed the pact, the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, handed the Yugoslav negotiators three notes. One of them declared that the German government would respect Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity; another stated that the Axis powers would not demand passage of Axis troops through Yugoslav territory; the third explained that the Axis powers would not request Yugoslav military assistance. In a separate note, the Italian government promised that, in the future frontier settlement, Yugoslavia's security interests and

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the possibility of an outlet to the Aegean Sea would be considered. Germany saw in Yugoslavia's adherence to the pact a victory over Great Britain, of great importance for pending military operations. Had Yugoslavia not joined the Axis, Germany's right flank would have been exposed in the Balkans to an Allied attack and Turkey might have become involved in the war in the Balkans.168 In Yugoslavia there was much popular opposition to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Pro-Western elements of the population, the officers' corps, students, Communists, and certain other antifascist groups combined to attack adherence to the pact. Most critical of the regime were certain circles of Serbian nationalists. In the evening of March 25, the day on which the pact was signed, there were demonstrations against the government in one or two provincial cities. T h e government was forewarned about the rising discontent and had planned measures to control it. Popular indignation and outbursts increased upon news that the pact was signed. Some time before the signing of the Tripartite Pact a group of air force officers, led by generals Dusan Simovic and Bora Mirkovic, had organized a conspiracy against the government and they had succeeded in enlisting the support of a few civilians. In the night of March 27, 1941, the officer-conspirators seized the government. Members of the cabinet, party leaders, and certain others were told by General Simovic that the seizure of power was necessary in order to preserve the country's freedom and independence. The formation of a new government proved a difficult task. It was some time before the Croatian leader, Vladko Macek, agreed to enter the government, though he had almost immediately accepted his party's participation in it. General Simovic became prime minister of the government, which included Croat and Slovene leaders who had endorsed the Tripartite Pact and a number of Serbian leaders who had opposed the signing of the pact. There were two deputy prime ministers, Vladko Macek, head of the Croatian Peasant Party, and Slobodan Jovanovic, a well-known Serbian historian and nationalist. King Peter II was declared of age and a royal proclamation written and ostensibly read by him (but actually by someone else) was released over the Belgrade radio in the morning of March 27.169 In the afternoon the king signed the order naming the new government. The regents resigned. The Belgrade "putsch" was bloodless. T h e people hailed it with enormous enthusiasm, at least on the streets of Belgrade. T h e demonstrators jubilantly shouted "Better grave than slave!" and "Better war than pactl" T h e Axis powers were shocked. Hitler, who counted on Yugoslavia and respected her military power and strategic importance,170 at once ordered his advisers to work out a plan for an attack on Yugoslavia. In a rage he

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told his advisers that he planned to be harsh, unmerciful, and to destroy Yugoslavia with lightning speed and in so doing to impress the Turks and Greeks. He no longer trusted the Yugoslavs' declarations of loyalty. T h e next few days were marked by German military preparations, discussions of strategy among the Axis powers and their satellites, the overtures by the representatives of the Simovic government to the Axis powers, promising to recognize the pact and to pursue neutrality, and the abortive Yugoslav negotiations with the Soviet Union for military assistance. T h e government's policy was to refrain from any action that might arouse Germany and precipitate war. Macek's uncertainty and the discussions with the Axis were ominous and resented in Belgrade. T h e Germans planned to pit the Croats against the Serbs by sparing Croatia the destruction of war and granting it autonomy. 171 On April 1, Macek was officially informed that Germany wanted an independent Croatia; after some deliberation he replied to the Germans that he had decided to join the Simovic government in order to prevent bloodshed between the Serbs and the Croats. Macek joined the government on three conditions: that the government initiate talks with the Germans, confirm the sporazum of 1939, and refrain from anything that might give the Axis justification for armed aggression. Macek did not wish to appear as though he backed Hitler's policies and he did not wish to range the Croats on the side of the Axis if war broke out. 172 On April 4, Macek arrived in Belgrade to accept his post as deputy prime minister. T h e last few days of peace were taken up by Allied attempts to detach Yugoslavia from the Axis and by Yugoslavia's failure to get Italy to intervene on her behalf with Hitler. 173 Most of the cabinet ministers were for peace with the Axis. In the meantime, Weisung 25 was drafted and Germany was ready to strike. Nazi propaganda singled out the Serbs as enemies, stressed German friendship for the Croats and Macedonians, and claimed that the Serbs were planning to sacrifice the interests of the non-Serbian peoples to England. Accompanying Directive 25 were preliminary instructions for the partitioning of Yugoslavia. 174 On April 6, 1941, the Axis launched its attack on Yugoslavia from several directions, and within a few days the country's armed forces were annihilated and its territories occupied. What General Simovic's government accomplished during its brief tenure and what it could have done but failed to do are questions still discussed by historians. Communist writers make much of the fact that Simovic's government made no eifort to resolve social and national problems.175 Many consider the coup d'etat of March 27 a momentous event in Yugo-

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slav history; certainly it is the subject of conflicting interpretations in Yugoslav historical and political circles at home and abroad. 178 Those who back the signers of the Tripartite Pact consider the coup a national calamity because it precipitated a war that cost the country staggering losses of life and enormous material sacrifices and saddled the Yugoslav peoples with a Communist regime. Viewing the situation in which the country found itself in March 1941, they insist that their policy was a realistic one, and they condemn those responsible for the coup as opportunists and paid foreign agents. T h e conspirators who accomplished the coup justify their action on the ground that the Yugoslav people, especially the Serbs, had opposed the government's collaboration with the Axis and that as patriots and democrats they felt duty-bound to do what they could to stop fascist aggression. They insist that the coup d'etat not only saved Yugoslavia's honor but that it had far-reaching political and military consequences. It forced the Nazis to revise their military plans against Greece and the Soviet Union and consequently it represented a major political setback for Hitler. It also caused a crucial delay in the German offensive against Russia. Communist historians consider the coup d'etat a logical consequence of capitalistic contradictions and failures. They say that the Communist Party considered the signing of the Tripartite Pact an act of national betrayal and that it incited popular opposition to the government. Stating that there was "a powerful revolutionary tension" within Yugoslavia, the Communists now claim to have directed the masses while Simovic and his group were mere executors of the popular will. 177 A balanced study of the March coup has not been possible until recently. T h e passage of time permits a more dispassionate interpretation of the large quantity of documentary evidence currently available. Conclusion Yugoslavia's interwar history is characterized by a succession of parliamentary crises, a political life largely inconsistent with democratic practices, and a failure to solve major constitutional, nationality, and economic questions. As a rule, historians have tended to stress the country's failures, ignoring the insurmountability of her domestic problems (i.e., diversity of peoples, cultures, economies, customs, etc.) and foreign problems (i.e., revisionism, collapse of the principle of international security, rise of Communism and Fascism, Great Depression, etc.). It seems doubtful that any government, however democratic, could have overcome the problems that beset the newly founded kingdom and could have satisfied the country's

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heterogeneous population. Moreover, it would be grossly unfair to adjudge interwar Yugoslavia a failure. For the first time, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, three kindred peoples, became a part of the same political community; and despite centrifugal tendencies, the unity of that community grew steadily stronger. Although some see "integral Yugoslavism" as an artificial concept and a cloak for "Great Serbianism," there were many in and outside the government who sincerely believed in a unitary Yugoslav nation. T h e government's promotion of Yugoslav unity was a sound policy. This was amply demonstrated by the events of the Second World War, which showed that, despite fratricidal warfare, Yugoslav solidarity was stronger than any separatist nationalism. By 1941, Yugoslavia had progressed in many directions. There were many more schools, four additional universities, and many new cultural centers. Illiteracy had dropped from 50.5 percent in 1921 to about 30 percent in 1941. 178 Hospitals, sanitariums, and clinics were built and the number of doctors, medical technicians, and nurses was much larger than it was in 1918. There were more extensive and better communication facilities. Despite protracted domestic and foreign crises, substantial gains were made in the national economy. By 1931, the last vestiges of feudal land tenure were gone and some improvements in agriculture were noted. On the eve of the Second World War, Yugoslavia could boast an industrial base suitable for rapid growth. There were more factories, banks, and credit institutions than there had been when the state was founded. Economic production had expanded noticeably and so had the volume of domestic and foreign trade. Modernity reached even the most isolated communities, and there was a more rapid shift of population from rural communities to cities.179 Perhaps the most impressive achievements of interwar Yugoslavia were in the field of culture and learning. 180 Many persons obtained university degrees in domestic and foreign universities, and the country within a few years produced a generation of educated men and women. In 1939, there were about 60,000 persons in the country with a university education as compared to 81,000 in 1953 and 132,000 in 1961. Yugoslavia began to attract international attention in the field of art and scholarship. Well-known sculptors Ivan Meltrovid and Toma Rosandid, such outstanding writers as Ivo Andrid and Miroslav Krleia, talented composers Josip Slavenski and Petar Konjovid, are essentially products of the interwar period. Yugoslavia produced a whole list of first-rate scientists, historians, literati, and artists whose works were recognized at home and abroad for their high quality. Unfortunately, not all of the educated were able to obtain positions in

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Yugoslav society commensurate with their training and often there were heard official complaints against the overproduction of intellectuals. Many embittered intellectuals and students turned to Communism or Fascism, both of which promised them a better future. But neither one nor the other ideology was a real threat to the country, and in time Yugoslavia might have solved some of her major domestic problems. However, the country was invaded and conquered by the overwhelming military force of the Axis powers, which adopted policies calculated to incite ethnic and confessional strife among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Considering Yugoslavia's ethnic, confessional, and cultural diversity, no other country in Europe faced the magnitude of Yugoslavia's problems and no other country was subjected to such treatment by an enemy.

2 Yugoslavia During the Second World War JOZO TOMASEVICH

T H E Yugoslav Communists acquired power essentially by their own efforts and by identifying their aims with those of a large part of the people of Yugoslavia, rather than as a consequence of the Red Army's control of Yugoslav territory. Considering the fact that in a country of close to 16,000,000 people in July 1941 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had only about 12,000 members and the United Communist Youth of Yugoslavia about 30,000 members, this ascendancy was an astonishing feat. T h e Communists provided excellent political and military leadership, and they put up an extremely hard and determined fight throughout the four years of war. In addition, they were helped by two important circumstances: (1) the many mistakes committed by the armies of occupation and the various groups of domestic collaborators, which made the Partisan program for postwar Yugoslavia the only acceptable course for great numbers of people of all the South Slav nations, and (2) the favorable international conditions, which the Communist leaders of the Partisans shrewdly used to promote their objectives of winning the war and launching a political and socioeconomic revolution. But if they had not been militarily successful and had not followed a policy appealing to large parts of the population T h e author is engaged in writing a comprehensive study of Yugoslavia during World War II. While this chapter uses parts of the materials to be presented in that study, it is in no way a sketch of the study in progress. Yugoslavia's situation during World War II was so complex that some of the important developments can only be intimated here and some have had to be left out entirely. Likewise, in this chapter it was possible to utilize only a small portion of the documentation the author has accumulated and worked through. Finally, it is to be clearly understood that some of the statements made and figures given in this text are tentative and will be revised in the larger study if further research should warrant.

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in all areas of the country, neither of these helpful circumstances could have been turned to their advantage. The rise, growth, and final victory of the Communist-led Partisans grew out of the situation in which Yugoslavia found itself in April 1941, when the Axis invasion brought about the collapse of the Yugoslav army and the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. If political and socioeconomic conditions in the country had been satisfactory to the majority of the people, Yugoslavia still would have been overrun by the Axis powers in April 1941, but it would not have suffered the total political disintegration that it did. Neither would have conditions existed for the creation of brutal quisling regimes and for the multifaceted and terribly bloody civil war that raged in Yugoslav territory during the Second World War. The fundamental political weakness of royal Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was the unsolved national question. As a multinational country consisting of five different nations living in historically well-defined areas, and all with varied historical background, Yugoslavia should have been organized in 1918 as a federal state, keeping for the central government such functions as foreign affairs, army, money and banking, and foreign trade, and leaving the highest degree of jurisdiction to the component national units so that they could freely develop their specific national goals within a higher Yugoslav synthesis. Instead, a rigid system of centralism was established under the Constitution of 1921, because only such a system made possible the hegemony of the Serbian ruling groups, who regarded Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia and all non-Serbian peoples of Yugoslavia more or less as second-class citizens. Under this system of centralism the local governments were only the organs of the central government and even the appointment of an elementary school teacher or gendarme was decided upon in Belgrade by the respective ministries. The Croats never accepted this constitutional situation as final, and the Croatian problem as the most important component of the unsolved national question became the country's fundamental political problem. In addition, there existed the Macedonian national question, for the ruling Serbian groups never acknowledged the Macedonians as a separate nation but considered all Christian Macedonians "Serbs" and called Macedonia "Southern Serbia." The Montenegrins also were considered simply "Serbs," although at least some Montenegrins claimed for the Montenegrins the status of a separate nation. Because of such a policy on the part of the Serbian political forces controlling the Yugoslav state during the interwar period, the Yugoslav idea—the political idea of unity among all South Slav nations which animated large portions of the Croatian and the Slovenian intelligentsia, as well as a small portion of the Serbian intelligentsia, and contributed

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materially to the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918—became totally discredited. T o pass the centralistic Constitution of 1921, against which stood the overwhelming bulk of Croatian and Slovene representatives as well as the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the third largest party in the Parliament at that time), it was necessary for the Serbian ruling parties to acquire votes from splinter groups and small parties by political bribery. And to run the state so organized it was necessary first to misuse and later totally to obliterate the democratic system of government and, in January 1929, to introduce a system of royal dictatorship. Under this system, the mass of ordinary citizens, the Serbs no less than the others, were deprived of democratic rights. As a consequence of this shortsighted and unenlightened policy of the Serbian ruling groups, the Yugoslav state of the interwar period never achieved political consolidation; it thus was never in a position in which the solution of fundamental social and economic problems facing the country could be attempted. T h e idea of Yugoslavia's general interest and destiny grew weaker and weaker, while separate nationalisms of the suppressed nations, as well as that of Serbia, grew stronger. A concession was eventually given to the Croats through the Cvetkovid-Macek agreement (Cvetkovid acting for Prince Regent Paul) in August 1939 in the form of autonomy for Croatia—eighteen months after Hitler, with the occupation of Austria, had started to redraw the map of Europe. 1 Prince Regent Paul 2 was forced to grant this by the foreign political situation of the country, and to increase internal cohesion in the face of probable military involvement in a general European war. Even so, large segments of the Serbian ruling groups regarded this grant of autonomy to Croatia as unreasonable and dangerous for the country's interests as they understood them. Of course, what was neglected during the years between 1918 and 1939 could not be built overnight, especially not in a period of tremendous foreign and domestic political pressures such as existed from August 1939, just before the war began, until April 1941, when eventually the country was invaded. Moreover, the other nationalities of Yugoslavia got no concessions at all. Not only were many of the Serbs opposed to Croatian autonomy, but also considerable numbers of the Croats themselves, especially those of extreme nationalist and fascist leanings, who wanted complete independence for Croatia and were against Yugoslavia as a state in any form. Religion under Balkan conditions was associated with the feeling of national belonging, and religious diversity deepened still further the cleavages within Yugoslavia. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as the national church of the dominant nation, had materially, if not formally, the role of a state

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church, which gave it a great advantage in comparison to other churches. Under the Stojadinovii cabinet in 1937, a Concordat with the Vatican that would have put the Catholic Church on formally equal footing with the Orthodox Church was presented to the Yugoslav Parliament for ratification; the opposition of the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy and of many Serbs forced its withdrawal.3 While it cannot be said that during the interwar period in Yugoslavia there existed any kind of persecution of the Catholics and their church, there is no doubt that some discrimination against them was present, which strengthened anti-Serb feeling.4 Furthermore, during the interwar period there were, according to Catholic sources, about 200,000 Catholics, mostly Croats, who became converts to Orthodoxy.5 Some of them, surely, converted in order to be able to get divorces and remarry, or under the influence of their spouses, but many probably were trying to avoid the effects of discrimination on their careers. In a religious frontier area—as much of Yugoslavia was from the point of view of the Roman Catholic Church—this loss of members was a hard blow. Thus, religious diversity and unequal treatment of non-Orthodox denominations—discrimination against Catholics being merely the most striking instance—injected into the body politic of the country additional reasons for the dissatisfaction of the non-Orthodox population. A third divisive factor was the uneven level of economic development among the South Slav nations and areas. This unevenness was partly due to the unequal endowment of the various regions with natural resources, partly a reflection of differing historical backgrounds, and partly an effect of the very uneven rates of population growth among the national groups. If the average per-capita income in Yugoslavia in 1953 is taken as 100, then the following index for various parts of the country is obtained: SR (Socialist Republic) Serbia 90, SR Croatia 113, SR Slovenia 188, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina 80, SR Macedonia 71, and SR Montenegro 6i. a The population increase from 1880 to 1957 related to the present territorial entities was as follows: Yugoslavia 2 times, Serbia 2.2 times, Croatia 1.6 times, Slovenia 1.4 times, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.5 times, Macedonia 2.3 times, and Montenegro 2.3 times.7 An extremely difficult problem of the Yugoslav state was the structurally depressed economic situation of the peasants. In 1941 about 73 percent of the total Yugoslav population depended upon agriculture for its livelihood. Agricultural overpopulation, low capital formation, and primitive production technology were responsible for the underdevelopment of Yugoslav agriculture, and for a vicious circle of low income, low saving, and low investment leading again to further low income and so on. About 80 people dependent on agriculture per 100 hectares (a hectare equals 2471

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acres) of cultivated land can be taken as a norm for securing a modest level of living such as would have been considered satisfactory at that time in Yugoslavia. T h e average density for the country as a whole was about 140 persons dependent on agriculture per 100 hectares of cultivated land. Since possibilities for emigration did not exist and the urban economy was growing at a slow rate, the excess peasant population was forced to stay in the villages and thus depress the already low level of rural living. Heavy tax burdens, unfavorable terms of trade with the urban economy, and high interest charges on credit worsened still further the position of the agricultural population, as through all of these contacts with nonagricultural sectors the real income of agriculture was reduced. As long as agriculture remained burdened with so many unemployable people little improvement could take place. Indeed, the solution of the agricultural problem did not lie in agriculture, but outside it. Massive industrialization over a period of several generations was the only way to create jobs that would absorb the surplus agricultural population. Since little was done in this direction during the interwar period, the prospect for the agricultural population, especially the young people on the land, was bleak. Rural and urban populations both suffered in Yugoslavia during the 1930's under the world economic depression; employment and prices declined, trade stagnated, and the credit system collapsed, while high taxes persisted. In its foreign economic relations Yugoslavia became increasingly dependent on Germany. T h e unconventional trading methods employed by the Nazis produced an increasing flow of trade whereas the Western democracies showed very little capability of ministering to the economic plight of southeastern Europe despite their considerable investment in Yugoslavia and in other countries of the area.8 As the influence of the Axis powers grew throughout the Danube Basin after 1933, the pressure upon Yugoslavia from Germany and Italy became stronger and this increased also the importance of the fascist-oriented forces inside the country. After leaving the French bloc, Yugoslavia followed first for some years a policy of neutrality between the Western democracies and the fascist bloc, and then during the second half of the Stojadinovid regime—from early 1937 to February 1939—it shifted perilously close to a pro-Axis orientation.9 After the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 the position of Yugoslavia in foreign relations— both politically and economically—became perilous as German pressure mounted. Internally, a certain political improvement was achieved through the Cvetkovid-Macek agreement of August 26, 1939, granting autonomy to Croatia. T h e domestic economy was put under a great variety of direct

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controls in order to cope with imbalances created by the effects of the war on imports and exports, by the inflationary psychosis in the economy, and by large new expenditures for strengthening the armed forces. The government tried frantically to increase its military power and readiness, at the same time being very careful not to undertake anything that could be interpreted by Hitler as an offense. Somewhat to counterbalance the German pressure, the government decided in June 1940 to recognize the Soviet Union, although in all its measures the basic objective was to ensure Yugoslavia's neutrality between the Axis and the Western powers. It is noteworthy, however, that all of Yugoslavia's military plans were developed on the assumption of war against the Axis and of collaboration with Greece and the Western powers, that the sympathies of the great majority of the people were with the West, and that sympathies for Russia—traditionally strong in Serbia and Montenegro—were growing. Leaning on Russia for support was conceived of as additional insurance against the Axis. As long as Hitler was busy in the West and Yugoslavia performed well as a supplier of strategic materials—especially nonferrous metals and food— the existing German-Yugoslav arrangement was workable because it was in the German interest. Thus, when in September 1940 Mussolini was ready to attack Yugoslavia, Hitler dissuaded him by insisting that he needed peace at his southern frontier.10 But Germany's relations with Yugoslavia changed rather soon because Hitler decided (1) to attack Greece to help his partner Mussolini and to prevent the British from establishing themselves in the southern Balkans, which could be damaging to his other plans, and (2) to attack Russia, which required complete security on his flanks in the south, including the protection of the Romanian oil fields, his chief source of petroleum, against bombing from the airfields in Greece. T o achieve these two aims, Hitler started systematically to adjust the political and military situation in southeastern Europe; economically, the whole area was already in his grip. Hungary and Romania were brought in November 1940 into the Tripartite Pact—the test for membership in or support of Hitler's "New Order in Europe" among the smaller southeastern European nations—and some German troops moved into these countries.11 Well-calculated pressure upon Yugoslavia to join the pact was started in November 1940 by summoning the foreign minister to Berchtesgaden. Yugoslavia insisted on its neutrality. Hitler was willing to guarantee neutrality, but his other moves were placing Yugoslavia in a position where it was less and less capable of resisting. Early in March 1941, when Hitler's troops moved into Bulgaria for the attack upon Greece and when his timetable for opening hostilities against Russia was already fixed, the Fiihrer presented Yugoslavia with an ultimatum to adhere to the Tripartite Pact

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within a fortnight. After obtaining two special guarantees—no participation in war against any country, and no movement of Axis troops through Yugoslavia—and after securing the promise of a favorable consideration in regard to Salonika in the postwar settlements (assuming Axis victory), Yugoslavia joined the Axis by signing a protocol in Vienna on March 25. 14 The decision was made by Prince Paul and the cabinet—which during the preceding few days had been reconstructed because of the resignation of several ministers who were against signing the Tripartite Pact—after consultation not only with the Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chief of General Staff, but also with the commanders of the armies in the field, all of whom were in favor of joining the Tripartite Pact. 13 However, the commander of the Air Force, General DuSan T . Simovid, was resolutely against joining the pact and expressed his opinion both to the Prince Regent and to the cabinet. Simovid indicated also that many younger generals and other officers shared his views.14 Great pressure against joining the pact was brought to bear by Great Britain, which at that time in addition to regular diplomatic personnel had in Belgrade a considerable number of intelligence personnel and some representatives of the S.O.E. (Special Operations Executive), and by the United States.15 But their efforts were in vain. The decision to join the Axis was made not out of sympathy with the Axis powers, but rather out of a feeling of utter military impotence in the face of German military might, then at its zenith. T h e paralyzing fear felt by the government and the military leaders as well as many people in all walks of life was understandable, considering the fact that all of Europe was dancing to Hitler's tune after the smashing victories the Germans had already achieved against the armies of Poland and France. There was no prospect for any speedy assistance from abroad; Britain was willing but weak, and America was far, far away. In such circumstances, war against the Axis powers amounted, in the short run, to state suicide. Maintenance of neutrality, if at all possible, was thought to be the preferable alternative. It was just possible that by joining the Axis after special guarantees were received the country might be able to remain neutral. Should conditions later change and the tide turn against Hitler, Yugoslavia could come into the struggle at a time of its own choosing in order to be on the winning side and to participate in the spoils of victory. In the meanwhile what was important was to avoid provoking Hitler into any precipitous action. As General Simovid had indicated, a number of senior officers and many younger ones were of his opinion. Some Serbian opposition politicians and Serb politicians from areas outside of Serbia were also against joining the Axis, as was the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Gavrilo. 16 All

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of them regarded it as a surrender and as a danger to national interests in the long run. T h e British exerted pressure upon these dissenters as well as upon Prince Regent Paul and his government, and were determined to help—or to use—them to prevent Yugoslavia from joining the pact. T h e landing of a sizable British expeditionary force in Greece early in March provided an additional argument and obviously emboldened the anti-Axis groups. Moreover, the temper of the people in Belgrade, and in Kragujevac, Split, Ljubljana, and other cities, manifested itself in mass demonstrations against the government and the Axis; obviously, in spite of the appalling prospects in the event of war, very many people were opposed to what they considered to be a surrender of the government to the Axis. In the spread of mass feeling against the Axis and in street demonstrations against both the government and the Axis, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia played an important part. 17 In other words, at this juncture the interests and actions of the pro-Western officers and politicians and of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia coincided and supported each other, although, naturally, without any concerted action or communication between them. Considering the libertarian traditions of the South Slav nations, especially the Serbs, their pro-Western orientation and sympathies, and the already mentioned prodding by the British and the Americans, it is easy to understand why the middle-class groups oriented toward the West should be willing to run the risk of provoking Hitler, whose domination of the country would mean loss of national independence and promoting the cause of Axis war aims. T h e position of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, however, was different and requires a different explanation. After all, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was a loyal member of the Comintern, and Stalin, the boss of the Comintern, had concluded a nonaggression agreement with Hitler in August 1939. Of course, Stalin was buying time for the better preparation of the Soviet Union, but in the meanwhile he was living up to the letter of the agreement in regard to the delivery of strategic materials to Germany. Naturally, the Russians were greatly upset over the progressive German takeover of southeastern Europe, but they could not do much to counteract it, except to force Romania in June 1940 to cede to them Bessarabia and part of Bukovina. 18 T h e war in Europe was interpreted by Communists everywhere as an imperialist war among the capitalist countries. But while Comintern discipline was requiring the Yugoslav Communists to accept all of Stalin's moves, it was clear to them that Yugoslavia was likely to be taken over by Hitler either by diplomatic or by military means—an eventuality that either way was unacceptable to them without a struggle, because it would have meant their end. Therefore, they had to be and they were against any concessions to Hitler in March 1941.19 Moreover, the Commu-

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nists were fundamentally interested in acquiring the image of a patriotic political force. Up to that time, they were considered to be simply an arm of international Communism, and Yugoslav national interests were thought to be only of secondary significance to them. For them a resolute struggle by means of a people's war offered the prospect of survival and—especially if other forces at home should make many mistakes in political strategy and under favorable international conditions such as coalition wars often present—could become, as Communist theory clearly states, a vehicle of revolution to put the Communists on the road to power. The Putsch of March 27,1941 The dissatisfaction of some officers and politicians with the pro-Axis course of the government, amply prodded by the British services, resulted in a successful putsch against Prince Regent Paul and the Cvetkovic-Macek government in the early hours of March 27, 1941.20 Prince Paul was exiled to Greece and Kenya, King Peter II (born in 1923) was proclaimed as being of age and put on the throne, former Prime Minister Cvetkovic and a few other politicians and generals were imprisoned, and the government was taken over by General Simovic as Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff. No opposition was met; only one life was lost, and that accidentally. The formal leader of the putsch was General Simovic, but actually the leadership was collective: Simovic, Brigadier General Bora Mirkovic of the Air Force, Major Zivan L. Kneievii of the Royal Guards, and a few other officers of middle rank from key units in Belgrade, and from the civilian side Radoje L. Knezevid (brother of Zivan), a member of the National Committee of the Democratic Party and a former teacher of the young king.21 A certain number of other civilians were probably informed of the coming putsch, like the president of the Serbian Cultural Club, Slobodan Jovanovic, and the president of the (essentially Serbian) patriotic organization Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), Ilija Trifunovic-Bircanin, along with possibly a few opposition politicians, but they were not among the organizers of the putsch. After the putsch succeeded these professional politicians sided with the putschists; some of the leading figures from the former opposition groups and some of the ministers (Croatian, Slovene, and Moslem) from the previous government were included in the new cabinet. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia had nothing to do with the putsch of March 27 as such. Mass street demonstrations in many cities (to which the CPY greatly contributed) and especially demonstrations in Belgrade showed the putschists that they had considerable popular support. However, the CPY interprets the action of March 27 and its immediate conse-

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quences as something that went far beyond what the pro-Western putschist officers intended to accomplish, and thus in fact as a victory for the CPY.22 The government formed by General Simovic consisted on the Serbian side of representatives of the parties earlier in opposition (or the parts of such parties that were earlier in opposition), of representatives of the Serbian parties from areas outside of Serbia, and of the same representatives of the Croatian and Slovenian parties that participated in the Cvetkovic-Macek government. Persuading Dr. Macek to come into the government took some doing, however, because he and the other leading members of his party were of the opinion that the putsch from the point of view of internal politics was directed against the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement of August 1939.23 After obtaining assurance that this agreement would be continued, he entered the government. Formally, this government had a broader popular base than any Yugoslav government during the interwar period. But no sooner did the new government and the putschist officers take office than all belligerence went out of them. The new government accepted all the obligations of the preceding one, including adherence to the Tripartite Pact; it tried by all means to inaugurate new talks with Hitler—even decided to ask Mussolini to be an intermediary; and, as far as military preparations were concerned, it was as anxious as the old one not to offend or provoke Hitler, and therefore proceeded slowly in improving the country's defenses.24 It did not order a general mobilization; rather, on March 30 it ordered a "general activation" of troops and made only some minor shifts of units. It also tried desperately to keep secret its contacts with British and Greek military leaders in Greece and with special British emissaries, such as the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, who came to Belgrade for talks regarding defense problems.25 In other words, the Simovic government reverted almost immediately to the Cvetkovic-Macek policies. There is little doubt that it was paralyzed by fear of Germany as much as the previous government had been, or more so as the invasion now became imminent. But the die was cast. Within hours of the putsch in Belgrade, Hitler, after a meeting with his military and political advisers, issued his Directive No. 25, the key paragraph of which said: The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has changed the political situation in the Balkans. Even if Yugoslavia at first should give declarations of loyalty, she must be considered as a foe and therefore must be destroyed as quickly as possible.26

Following the issue of this directive the German General Staff prepared the plan for an immediate attack upon Yugoslavia, which plan, as Operation 25, was signed by Hitler on March 29 and became operative. Parallel

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with this work, Hitler lined up his allies Italy and Hungary, to whom were assigned special duties in the attack upon Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was to come in only after the conquest, to take its share of the spoils. Its chief contribution was to let the German armies use its territory as a jumping-off base for operations against Yugoslav Macedonia and Greece. Meanwhile the Germans went systematically about undermining Yugoslavia from within. First, they tried to induce Dr. Macek and other Croatian Peasant Party leaders not to have anything to do with the Belgrade government and informed them that an independent Croatia was envisaged by the Germans as a part of the "New Order in Europe."27 Macek refused to be used as a German agent in this scheme of creating an independent Croatia, because this would have meant helping the Germans to wreck Yugoslavia from within. On the contrary, he decided to enter the Simovic government as vice premier and to work for the preservation of peace.28 Second, after Macek's position became clear, German agents in Zagreb began to plot with a group of Ustashe around Colonel Slavko Kvaternik and the members of the right wing of the Croatian Peasant Party in order both to destroy Macek's standing among the Croatian people—by presenting him as a traitor because of his cooperation with Belgrade—and somehow to use these people to proclaim a separate Croatian state. But this endeavor was also fruitless.29 It seems that in their consultations with Dr. Macek and in their plotting with this other group the Germans imagined that first a separate Croatian state would be proclaimed and then that their troops would be invited in to make the separation effective. At any rate, separation of Croatia would have induced the collapse of Yugoslavia. Finally, the Germans switched their support exclusively to the Croatian extremist group, the Ustashe, and their leader, Dr. Ante Pavelic, who was at that time in Italy and whom Mussolini was pushing for the position of head (Poglavnik) of the new puppet state.30 Thus, on April 10, with German troops already at the outskirts of Zagreb, German agents helped to arrange the proclamation of the "Independent State of Croatia." Yugoslav Defense Plans Naturally, as all armies do, the Yugoslav General Staff had been preparing for the occasion of an enemy attack. After the German absorption of Austria, it worked out the so-called War Plan S. In response to the Italian occupation of Albania in 1939, War Plan R-40 was developed and, when the Germans moved into Bulgaria early in March 1941, War Plan R-41.31 All these plans were committed to a cordon-type defense of the whole Yugoslav land border, extending in 1941 to more than 1,860 miles. All of them as-

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sumed that prolonged defense of the western and northern borders would be impossible and therefore foresaw withdrawal through the center of the country in a southeasterly direction toward Greece. Thus, the protection of Macedonia as the door for withdrawal to Greece played a basic role. Plan R-41 was communicated to the armies in the field only on March 31, 1941, so that Plan R-40 was for all practical purposes the operative plan in April. If Yugoslavia had been able to mobilize its whole army, it would have had under arms about 1,200,000 first-line troops and about 500,000 in reserve, as well as about goo,000 draft animals on which, along with the railroads, the army depended almost completely for transport. When the invasion came, however, there were only about 700,000 men under colors, of whom more than 400,000 were recent inductees.32 While some infantry and cavalry regiments were at the time of invasion in full complement, not a single division was fully prepared. In other words, Yugoslavia was less than half mobilized. With an underdeveloped, peasant economy, Yugoslavia was unable to provide its army with modern arms, although it was allotting, relatively speaking, a large proportion of its national income to military expenditures. Furthermore, a large part of its armament was obsolete, and its planned defense and war operations were prepared, basically, in accordance with principles developed during the First World War. Thus, in addition to its small size and its being surrounded on land (except toward Greece) by enemy countries or countries which allowed the enemy to use their territory, Yugoslavia had the disadvantage that its armament and the whole training and attitude of its military leadership were not at all suited for defense against Blitzkrieg. In addition to the lack of modern armaments and the fact that the army was not even half mobilized, its leadership was extremely poor, and the sense of unity of the people and fighting spirit were absent. T h e lack of a sense of unity was related to the whole history of the power structure and power relations in Yugoslavia during the interwar period, characterized on the one hand by Serbian hegemonism, and on the other by the widespread feeling among the non-Serbian peoples that Yugoslavia, as it existed, was their prison. Furthermore, the odds against Yugoslavia were such that both government and armed forces were paralyzed by fear of the German juggernaut. T h e Yugoslavs had only one potential military asset in April 1941—the rugged terrain of much of their country was well suited for guerrilla warfare. The use of this form of warfare, however, requires unorthodoxy, perseverance, and steady improvisation, which are seldom gifts of professional officers. Besides, successful guerrillas have to have wide popular support

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and a strong ideology to sustain them. Nothing of this did the Yugoslav Army have in April 1941. Axis Attack on

Yugoslavia

Thus a small, poorly armed and poorly led, only partly mobilized, politically disunited, psychologically paralyzed, and almost completely surrounded country was standing up to Hitler at the zenith of his power and against his several allies. Hitler struck on April 6 with a savage air attack on Belgrade and the main Yugoslav airfields, and with huge armored and motorized forces against Yugoslav Macedonia to the south. T h e ground attack issuing from his Bulgarian bases cut off, on the second day of the war, the possibility of Yugoslav retreat toward Greece (and it had the further purpose of securing additional terrain for an attack against Greek territory). With this successful move, Hitler at one stroke invalidated the chief premise of all Yugoslav defense plans, namely, withdrawal to Greece and joining up with Allied forces. On April 8, a part of the forces stationed in Bulgaria turned the blitz attack north toward Belgrade. On April 10, Hitler struck in great force from bases in Austria and western Hungary against Slovenia and Croatia, and with other forces from bases in Romania through the Banat toward Belgrade. The Italians joined the attack on April 11 with their land forces on their Albanian front and in the northwest, and the Hungarians on the same day moved against Vojvodina. In all, the Axis powers used 52 divisions against Yugoslavia; of these, 24 were German. About 1,500 German and 670 Italian aircraft participated, either in strategic bombing or tactical support operations. 33 Besides being less than half mobilized and having only some of their troops in assigned positions, the Yugoslavs had only n o light tanks of 5 and 10 tons, of which 60 were of First World War vintage, and about 600 aircraft, including about 150 naval airplanes, of which probably as many as half were obsolete. Because of the lack of radio equipment, communications between the Supreme Command and the main units in the field and among the units themselves were extremely poor and largely were severed on the first day of attack. Politically damaging but militarily of relatively little consequence, the German-sponsored, German-engineered proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia took place about two hours before the arrival of German tanks at Zagreb on April 10 and the installation there of the Ustasha puppet regime. By April 11 the German troops attacking Macedonia from Bulgaria had joined hands with the Italian troops from Albania. On April 12 Belgrade

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was taken without a shot by troops coming both from Romania and Bulgaria, and on the same day German troops coming via Zagreb were near Sarajevo, in whose neighborhood the Yugoslav Supreme Command was set up and was waiting to surrender. All Yugoslav armies and the state administration were collapsing or had already collapsed. On April 13 General Simovic transferred his function of Chief of Supreme Command to general Danilo Kalafatovic and ordered him to take all steps to secure as soon as possible aid in armaments and other materiel from the Allies which had been already asked, to undertake speedy action to organize suitable defense lines in the interior of the country, taking advantage of the mountainous terrain where communications were difficult, and, considering the "condition of the army after the first failures and especially considering the delicate situation of the army because of the happenings in Croatia and Dalmatia, . . . immediately to ask the enemy for an armistice in order to gain in time and to improve the situation of the army."34 Of course, the first two points of the order as well as the concluding phrase of the third point were totally illusory. The important and only realistic point was the grant of power to ask for an armistice. But the phrasing of the order was such that the Supreme Command formally found an excuse for the dismal failure of the army, namely, "happenings in Croatia and Dalmatia," meaning in fact the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia by the Ustashe on April 10. This formulation of the cause of the military collapse (which General Kalafatovic in his decision of April 14 on implementing the orders of the government rephrased: "Because of the failure on all fronts, because of the total disintegration of our army in Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia . . . and because it was concluded that all further military resistance was impossible . . . " ) was most probably intended to save face for the leaders of the Supreme Command and the Serbian ruling groups in general who had controlled and run Yugoslavia during the previous twenty-three years and obviously were responsible not for the speedy collapse as such, because it was inevitable, but for the way in which it had occurred, namely, by a total disintegration of the armed forces and of the state's fabric. The king and the government, together with all the chief actors in the putsch of March 27, left the country by air on April 14 and 15 for exile, going first to Greece, then to Palestine, and finally to England.35 The flight of the government was so precipitate that it even forgot or was unable to leave behind some trusted people for intelligence work and later contacts with the government-in-exile. An armistice was signed in Belgrade on April 17. Actually it was difficult to find suitable people to sign it and the choice fell upon General Jankovic, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, and Alexander Cincar-

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Markovic, formerly foreign minister in the Cvetkovic government who now had no official standing whatsoever. Some Yugoslav experts maintain that, legally, the armistice was not a valid document.36 In fact, the document provided for an unconditional surrender of the Yugoslav Army. Under the terms of the armistice, the Yugoslav Army had to surrender with all its armaments and stores; and with the exception of two divisions in Montenegro, which allowed some of the men to go home with their arms, all of the military did so surrender. Thus, although this was a coalition war and its outcome was definitely not settled in April 1941, the Yugoslav military commanders did not have either the presence of mind or the fortitude to allow their men, at least in the areas in which fifth-column activity was not in evidence, to disengage themselves and to save as much of their arms as possible in order to fight another day. They kept their troops on the main communication lines for surrender lock, stock, and barrel to the Germans, and to some extent to the Italians. Later, the officers and men were screened and only those from Serbia and a small proportion of those from other areas were taken as prisoners of war to Germany, and to a much smaller extent to Italy, while the bulk of officers and men coming from other areas were released to their homes.37 Those officers coming from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, if they were not Serbs, were mostly pressed into the military service of that "state." German losses were 151 killed, 392 wounded, and 15 missing in action.38 Yugoslav losses of military personnel are not known, but the bombing of Belgrade on April 6 caused in excess of 5,000 civilian deaths. Hitler used tremendous power to crush Yugoslavia for two main reasons: he expected a somewhat more determined defense, and he wanted a speedy result in order not to have to postpone his invasion of Russia still further. In addition, he wanted to frighten Turkey into staying neutral and to soften Greece for eventual attack. Thus, within less than a week the fate of the Yugoslav royal army was sealed, and only four or five additional days were necessary to mop it up and to obtain an unconditional surrender. Yet despite the fact that the April 1941 war was a dismal failure from the Yugoslav point of view, the putsch of March 27 and the German invasion that it made necessary had an important effect upon the overall struggle against Hitler. It delayed the German attack on the Soviet Union by six weeks.39 This fact—combined with an unusually severe winter in 1941-1942 and good Soviet intelligence in Japan which revealed that the Japanese intended to attack not the Soviet Union but rather the United States of America, allowing the transfer of some troops from the Far East to European Russia—made it possible for the Russians, thanks also to their great valor, to save Moscow. Hitler's failure to take Moscow in December 1941 is

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considered by some experts as the real turning point of the war, after which German victory in Russia became impossible.40 Yugoslavia's collapse in April 1941 is still a matter of controversy. But the controversy relates only to the manner in which it happened. Considering the adversaries involved and their respective economic and military power, the speedy and complete collapse of the Yugoslav forces was inevitable. This would have been the case even if the Yugoslav forces had been fully mobilized and well led, even if the country had been armed up to the limit of its economic potential, and even if the country had been so well governed during the preceding twenty-three years that full cohesion had prevailed among various nationalities, religions, and social strata of population and their fighting morale had been perfect. The only difference, then, would have been the manner of the collapse: it would have been a military defeat rather than the total disintegration of a ruling system, a disintegration after which it looked as if the Yugoslav state as a unified political entity would never recover. The chief factor in the way things collapsed was not the fifth column in Croatia or the fifth column in general, as many writers and defenders of the old regime would like us to believe, though fifth-column activity was extensive. Rather, it was the system of hegemonism by Serbian ruling groups characteristic of the state during the interwar period. This made of Yugoslavia a state ruled by few for the few, in which the non-Serbian nations and broad strata of population in general had no stake and for which they would not fight. With this factor eliminated and under a completely different leadership, armed resistance soon arose and was continued throughout the war. Dismemberment and Occupation of the Country Even before the invasion of Yugoslavia, Hitler had decided upon dismembering the country. On April 12 he issued the preliminary directive for this, which with some minor adjustments became the blueprint for the ensuing final partition.41 The partition as executed in 1941 is illustrated in the following map. From the prostrate country, Hitler annexed the greater part of Slovenia, excluding the city of Ljubljana. Similarly, Italy annexed the remainder of Slovenia and called it the Province of Ljubljana, but was greatly disappointed that Hitler took for Germany the parts of Slovenia containing the Ljubljana-Zagreb railroad and the Trbovlje (Trifail) coal mines. Italy also annexed part of the Croatian territory in the hinterland of Rijeka (Fiume); a large portion of Dalmatia, including most of the Adriatic islands, and the whole area of the Gulf of Kotor. Further,

Partition of 1941

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Wayne S. Vucinich

256

equality of all the peoples of Yugoslavia can be assured only by democratic economic and social relations, which require the workers to participate directly in the economy and government. The Communist program adopted by the Fifth Congress (1948) asks its members to do all they can to assure the equality of the Yugoslav people.85 (For figures on Yugoslav Communist membership by nationality, see Table 3.) Ten years later the program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) warns that the unity of the country is possible only if each nationality has equality and the right of free national development.86 The program asserts that there is no real "national question" in Yugoslavia because the existing political and social system precludes domination of one nation over others. It concedes, however, that conditions still exist that might negatively affect relations between peoples and that vestiges of bourgeois nationalism survive. The LCY program and the March 1959 decisions of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCY both demand equal treatment for all working people and the complete elimination of national discrimination. According to Tito, each national group is assured full rights and given the opportunity to realize them through "the system of self-management." The program of the LCY reiterates Communist determination to bring about brotherhood and unity among Yugoslavs and lists some principles and policies that should be pursued in order to achieve "socialist Yugoslavism."87 What is needed to achieve national harmony, it states, is "the unity of the socialist social-economic relations." TABLE 3

Communist Membership by Nationality Nationalities Serb Croat Slovene Macedonian Montenegrin "Muslim" Albanian Hungarian Others Total

Total Members

Per Cent of Per Cent of Membership T o t a l Population

541,526 189,605 70,516 67,603 65,986 37,433 31,780 12,683 28,886

51.77 18.13 6.74 6.46 6.31 3.58 3.04 1.21 2.76

42.08 23.15 8.57 5.64 2.77 5.24 4.93 2.72 4.90

1,046,018

100.00

100.00

Source: MiloS Nikolii (ed.). Savez komunista Jugoslavije u uslooima samoupravijanja (Belgrade, 1967), p. 785.

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257

The equality of the Yugoslav nationalities will be facilitated by their "equal participation" in the social management, the rightful share of the income accumulated from production and labor, and complete independence in determining their economic development within the context of the federal economic plan and the interests of the economy as a whole. The program88 takes note of the fact that the disparity in economic development among different Yugoslav regions will invariably lead to the development of particularism, bureaucratic centralism, and greater state hegemony. T o narrow or eliminate the economic disparity, special capital investment should be earmarked for underdeveloped republics. Measures must be taken to eliminate the tendencies toward "bourgeois nationalism" which would undermine the "democratic achievements" of the Yugoslav revolution, "deform" relations between nationalities, and open the doors to "nationalist hegemonistic tendencies." According to the program of the LCY, the unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia is a matter of concern to workingmen. It is in their common interest to work for "social unification" and develop "social cultural consciousness" and "socialist patriotism." The Yugoslav Communists wish to forge "socialist Yugoslavism" and not a "Yugoslav nation" made up of the countries of various peoples. T h e LCY program states that "socialist Yugoslavism" will foster the development of "national languages and cultures." Those who drafted the L C Y program see nationalism in Yugoslavia as "either a cloak concealing antisocialist tendencies and selfish and particularistic interests," or as a "product of uneven economic development" among different parts of the country. The Constitution of 1963s9 reiterates the nationality guarantees provided by the Constitution of 1946 and the Fundamental Law of 1953. It defines Yugoslavia as "a federal state of voluntarily united and equal peoples." The constitution declares Yugoslavia "a one-party state," confirms "the principles" of self-government, provides for decentralization of the country along federal lines, and promises [more] democracy "within the socialist system." Henceforth the "whole economy and society is to be based on workers' management." Article X L I guarantees to each citizen the freedom to declare or not to declare his nationality, the right to develop his own culture and to speak his language. The Constitution of 1963 provides economic and social aid to underdeveloped republics and credit under terms more favorable than those provided by the general credit system. Thus, the central government is obliged to subsidize the administration of schools, hospitals, and similar institutions of republics that are unable to maintain them at national standards, and to grant them favorable credit. Between the seventh and eighth congresses, there was much discussion

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about national relations in Yugoslavia, and different measures were taken to combat nationalism but without success. Consequently, nationalism was a major question discussed at the Eighth Congress of the LCY, held in Belgrade December 7-13, 1964. President T i t o spoke at length on the subject. He had often said that the Yugoslav national question had been solved in "the most democratic possible manner" 90 and claimed this as one of the Communist Party's great accomplishments during the Second World War. His speech at the Eighth Congress of the L C Y showed that he was seriously perturbed by recent manifestations of national antagonism in Yugoslavia. He surveyed the history of the national question in Yugoslavia since the early twenties, urged the Congress to give its full attention to the "relations among nationalities," and discussed the reasons for the recent outcroppings of nationalism. O n April 7, 1967, the parliament amended the Constitution of 1963. It reduced the powers of the central government in the sphere of legislation, investments, and state security and extended the rights of republics and autonomous provinces. T h e functions and rights of the Council of Nationalities were broadened to include participation in the discussion of social and economic plans, the federal budget, foreign policy, defense, and national security. Parliament also removed general investment funds from the control of federal bodies, whose competence it reduced to matters concerning the common socioeconomic and sociopolitical system and distribution of the gross national product. 91 According to Yugoslav theorists, the social and economic structure of Yugoslavia assures free national and cultural development of its peoples.92 T h i s assurance is founded "in the system of self-government of the working people under conditions of social ownership of the means of production," and in a state system in which the "stronger" constituent nations do not dominate the "weaker" ones. T h e Yugoslav system of government, they say, does not allow the exploitation "either of the individual citizens or of any nation" 93 and offers "greater guarantees" to the individual peoples than the federation of "the classical type." Moreover, the socialist system (i.e., social ownership of the means of production) provides the conditions for the creation of broader international communities without negating the national languages and cultures.94 T h e Yugoslav Criminal Code prohibits all actions that obstruct and prevent individual nations from exercising their rights. Propaganda or other activity that incites national, racial, or religious hate or dissension is a criminal offense (Article CXIX). T h e languages of the national minorities are recognized in the oral proceedings of all representative bodies. In autonomous regions the use of national minority languages in the enactment

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of legislation by government bodies is obligatory. T h e national minorities are entitled to use their own languages in government and court proceedings. Yet, according to Article C X X X I of the 1963 Constitution, " T h e federal laws and other general acts of the federal organs shall be made public in the official gazette . . . in Serbo-Croatian and Croato-Serbian, Slovene, and Macedonian." T h e constitution guarantees to national minorities the use of their languages in schools as well as schools for training their own teachers. 95 T h e minorities are assured all the rights and freedoms that the majorities enjoy, and they have the full right to preserve and to develop their own culture. 98 Every ninth Yugoslav is a member of a national minority group. T h e majority of these (70.3 percent) live in the Serbian People's R e p u b l i c and two thirds of them are Albanians and Magyars. T h e former are the largest minority (30.58 percent) in Serbia, about 700,000 inhabitants, and have their own administrative and political territory—the autonomous province of Kosmet. T h e Magyars, the second largest group, number about a half million and live in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. Another 20 percent of the minorities live in the Macedonian People's Republic. O n l y 9.7 percent of the minority population live in other Yugoslav republics. 97 T h e Constitution of 1963 provides that in the territories inhabited by a mixed population, all nationalities must be represented in the government at all levels and in the workers' councils of the economic enterprises in proportion to their size in the population. 9 8 T h e ethnic representation, therefore, is dictated by what is referred to as the "key" (kljuZ). Albanians, for example, constitute 65 percent of the population of the Kosmet. T h u s , the " k e y " requires that they make u p the majority in the people's committee (government) of the province and that the chairman of the committee be an Albanian; in governments on lower levels, the proportion of Albanians has remained below the standard due to the dearth of educated Albanians. In some instances in Kosmet and elsewhere in the country the "key"—the idea of representation regardless of competence—has been a source of national friction. T h e policy has a tendency to accentuate g r o u p separateness and to develop interest in the welfare of one's own g r o u p rather than in that of society as a whole. W h i l e distribution of diplomatic posts according to the "key" has posed no difficulty, the distribution of higher military ranks reportedly has been a problem because non-Serb elements are not attracted to the military as a career. 99 T h e minorities, located as they are on the borders of their mother countries, are quick to respond to any crisis in the relations between those countries and Yugoslavia. A f t e r Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Romania, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria tried to incite

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their compatriots in Yugoslavia against Tito's government. Although Yugoslavia took appropriate police measures to prevent subversion, it did not on the whole infringe upon the rights of the minorities. In more recent years, the tension on the borders of the non-Communist countries (Austria, Italy, Greece) has subsided and agreements have been made for the "unhindered circulation of men and goods" on both sides of the frontier. Attempts have been made to establish similar arrangements with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. However, the Greek coup d'etat in May 1967 has caused tension along the Yugoslav-Greek frontier and the laxity in that border region has had to be abandoned. Resiliency of

Nationalism

Yugoslav leaders, in general, admit that certain aspects of "the nationality question in the classical sense" continue to impede the development of socialism, socialist "consciousness," and socialistic "creativity" in their country, but they are optimistic about the future. It seems that the socialist system itself has kept the national question alive. T h e decentralization of economic management and the devolution of governmental power, together with the liberalization of the political system begun in 1953, have given the people, Communists and non-Communists, freedom to vent pentu p national feelings without fear of prosecution. Socialistic education and the extensive legislation against incitement of national hate have, apparently, fallen short of their objective. T h e country's leaders do not attribute the recent nationalistic bickering exclusively to the survivals of "classical bourgeois nationalism" but primarily to the uneven economic development among the various parts of Yugoslavia, to "big-state hegemony," and to "bureaucratic centralism." T h e y are confident that as "social democracy" evolves, it will eventually eradicate all "bourgeois nationalism" by bringing people of different nationalities closer together while at the same time allowing for the unfettered development of the individuality of each nation. 100 T h e Yugoslav government is determined to eliminate economic unevenness, and hopes to check "big state hegemonism" and "bureaucratic centralism" by decentralization of authority and expansion of self-government and the forces of production. 101 A t the Eighth Congress of the L C Y , T i t o complained about the Communists who had fallen under the spell of nationalism and reminded his listeners that "the bureaucratic-centralistic and bureaucratic-particularistic nationalism" is just as "dangerous and counterrevolutionary" as the " 'classical' bourgeois nationalism." 102 T h e Yugoslav leader attributed the existing "nationalistic deformations" to the statist-bureaucratism and to

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the tendency to shut oneself up "within one's own borders." 103 T h e existing contradictions in "socialist social relationships," he said, are characteristic of "a multinational state," and what is bad about it is that it makes it possible for the surviving "chauvinist" elements to disseminate their undesirable ideas. In fact, T i t o explained, nationalism inspired by bureaucracy tends to associate itself with bourgeois nationalism and to become the latter's "ideological arsenal." 104 He urged the Communists to work on strengthening the unity of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities and their "Yugoslav socialistic patriotism." 105 Other prominent Yugoslav Communist leaders agree that the sources of nationalism in Yugoslavia, in addition to economic disparity, are bureaucratism and statism. Veljko Vlahovid finds that bureaucrats think that a multinational community with self-government complicates their lives unnecessarily.106 T h e bureaucrats, he says, have lost their "proletarian and socialistic consciousness" and acquired that of a Communist provincial. They have come to believe that they can defend "national interests" with bureaucratic methods and become "national leaders." A t the May 1968 meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, two of the leading Serbian Communists, Jovan Marjanovil and Dobrica Cosid, brought into the open various nationality problems. Marjanovid cited many negative manifestations of nationalism in the country and especially in the province of Kosmet. He spoke of growing nationalistic activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its "open anti-Communist propaganda." 107 Cosid cited the persistence of "primitive Serbianism" (primitivno srpstvo) and strong anti-Serbian sentiment, especially in Croatia and Slovenia. He alluded to the camouflaged campaign against the Serbs, which accuses them of getting the largest piece of the "Yugoslav cake," and brands them as "Statists, unitarists, assimilators, centralists, conservatives, etc." This sort of anti-Serbianism, he said, has in turn inspired Serbian chauvinism. Like Marjanovid, Cosid noted the dangers implicit in the Albanian and Magyar nationalisms. Both critics were condemned by Communist leadership for being "nationalistic" and "opposed to self-government." 108 The Economics of Nationalism T h e Yugoslav leaders think that success in national relations among the Yugoslav peoples will depend on the country's economic development. 109 In other words, the national question will exist in Yugoslavia so long as there is economic disparity between different regions in the country. (See Chapter Five.) T h e Communists promised that once in power they would give full attention to the problems of the underdeveloped regions, at-

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tributing the misery and backwardness in them not only to long periods of foreign oppressive rule but particularly to negligence and exploitation by the bourgeois classes. T h e y provided investment funds and various kinds of grants to facilitate economic and social development in those republics. T h e objective was to narrow or eliminate the economic gap that existed between developed and underdeveloped regions. Each region was to enjoy the same social standard of life—public health, education, culture—and if it was unable to pay for necessary services the government was to extend it financial aid. A larger percentage of tax money collected in underdeveloped republics was left to them for this purpose. But financial aid to the less developed republics did not produce expected results. T h e r e are many reasons for this. A m o n g other things serious mistakes were made in that investments and grants to underdeveloped republics were made without due regard for their efficient use. In Tito's words, postwar programs were at first accompanied by "disproportions and complications in the economy," which led to "statism, bureaucracy, and subjectivism," and caused "nationalistic deformations," 110 and, this situation, among other things, necessitated the reduction of administrative interference in economic relations among the nationalities. By 1950, the federal government was convinced that the existing forms of financial assistance would not help the underdeveloped republics reach the desired level of economic development. T h e Seventh Congress of the L C Y , in 1958, announced a new policy: the contributions from the federal budget should be made to the underdeveloped regions primarily in order to develop their productive resources and when absolutely necessary for ensuring "a determinate uniform level of social services." But this policy was not adhered to strictly. Under political pressure and because of need, the underdeveloped republics continued to receive large grants. Prestige projects were built. T h e money was used for nonprofitable plants and wasted or used for purposes for which it was not intended. T h e question of how investment funds should be spent has been a delicate point in the relations between the republics. A t first—during the period of centralized planning and distribution—the funds were granted "administratively" through the federal budget, and the republics enjoyed very little autonomy in their utilization. After the policy of economic decentralization (since about 1953) was introduced, the republics were given more and more freedom in the disposal of the granted funds. A system of "directed investments" was introduced. These investments were financed from the general investment fund in the form of credits. T h e annuities due on these credits were left to the investment funds of the recipient republics, provinces, and communes.

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It is estimated that two fifths of the total capital investment in the underdeveloped regions comes from federal sources, a heavy drain on the country's finances, especially since investment in new industries does not yield early returns. 111 The more developed republics resent being penalized for success. They complain about the heavy taxes on their profitable industries, which are used to build projects of dubious economic value in underdeveloped regions. In 1958, for example, Slovenia, which has 8.6 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia, contributed 37.2 percent to the national budget. Between i960 and 1965, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Kosmet, representing together but 15 percent of the country's population, received 28 percent of the country's total capital investments. 112 The figures indicate that, as a result of these special investments, increase in industrial production has been most marked in the underdeveloped regions. In the Belgrade parliament, the representatives of the six republics compete for a greater share of capital investments. Naturally, some funds are allocated for political rather than economic reasons. The so-called political factories, which have been created without economic justification, often operate at a loss, and produce far below capacity. They are usually found in the underdeveloped regions, such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosmet, where skilled labor and raw materials are in short supply and transportation is inadequate. But some political factories, like the unprofitable fish canneries in Dalmatia, have also been built in more advanced republics. Ethnic jealousies sometimes underlie politico-economic competition. There is a widespread belief among the Croats, for example, that the Belgrade-to-the-sea railway is being built across the Sanjak and Montenegro to satisfy Serbian pride, and that economic considerations dictated a route through Croatian territory instead. Specifically, they see no reason for building a port on the Montenegrin coast. The defenders of the BelgradeBar railway reply that the line provides the shortest connection between the country's heavily industrialized capital and the Adriatic Sea, thereby reducing transportation costs, that it will increase tourist trade because it crosses a spectacular part of the country, and that it will ameliorate conditions in some of the most underdeveloped regions in the country. Begun in the fifties, construction of the Belgrade-Bar line was abandoned for a time because of lack of funds and the Croatian protests, but more recently construction has been resumed. Certain Croatian circles also complain that the government is investing too heavily in the industrial development of the Belgrade region and see in this a plan to direct the country's economy away from the Adriatic to the

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Danube Basin. T h e y are, therefore, urging the construction of additional roads and railways to link the interior with the Croatian coast and thereby strengthen the country's "Adriatic orientation." 113 For a time after 1948, because of fear of Soviet invasion, the economic development of eastern parts of Yugoslavia was given low priority. T h i s danger past, the economic planners compensated Serbia and eastern parts of the country by allocating them a disproportionately larger share of investments in the 1960-1965 Five-Year Plan. 114 T h e Croats insist that the "Serb-dominated" federal government made the 1965 economic reform unjustly favorable to Serbia by raising prices on Serbian raw materials to the detriment of the processing industries of Croatia, by rigging the new investment banking system to the advantage of Serbia. They point to such undertakings as the Belgrade-Bar railroad, the Iron Gate power dam, the Smederevo steelworks, and the Pancevo fertilizer plant, all of which benefited Serbia. 115 It was this sort of economic bickering that prompted President T i t o at the Eighth Congress to say that those who expressed anxiety over the supposed threat to their "national interests" saw only the negative side of the economic policy for their own region and only the positive side where other regions were concerned. T h e y had no wish to view the whole economic picture objectively but became self-styled "protectors" of their "national interests." According to Tito, the nationalism behind the mask of "protection of national interests" operates against social self-government because it considers the strong workers' management its biggest enemy. 116 Another Yugoslav leader, Dobrivoje Radosavljevié, also denounced bureaucrats who sought monopoly in defense of "national interests," interpreted economic questions in nationalistic terms, and spoke of "national honor" and "national equality." These people, he said, suffered from "investment megalomania," which gives everything a nationalist and political twist." 117 T h e y were, according to Cosié, under the influence of the pettybourgeois mentality; their words stemmed from their personal economic interests. Such individuals think of themselves as the "national elite" and claim special privileges. 118 They distort every form of "Yugoslavism" into one-nation "hegemonism," proclaim that they are being threatened with assimilation, and give the general impression that their nation is being exploited and threatened by others. More specifically, they have often maintained that the Serbian people ("Belgrade") seek a centralized state to secure economic domination over the rest of the country. Of course, Cosié continued, there are also Serb nationalists of the same type who complain endlessly that "everything is being removed from Serbia" (iz Srbije sve uzeie).

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T w o opposing camps may be discerned in this nationalistic bickering. T h e official line, supported by Serbia and the underdeveloped republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, favored further economic centralization; the opposition, consisting of the more advanced republics of Slovenia and Croatia, favored decentralization. Tito had urged that top priority be given to making the less-developed republics "economically independent." T h e economic resources of the advanced republics were to be utilized in the development of the retarded regions. In this way, it was hoped, the country as a whole could achieve an economy sufficiently balanced to provide "equal working conditions for all producers." 119 Policies for the developing regions must, however, take into consideration the "objective possibilities of the entire economy" 120 and conform to "the interests of Yugoslavia's economy as a whole." 121 In 1961 a special Federal Credit Fund was established to be used for the economic development of the underdeveloped republics and regions. This arrangement was confirmed by Article C X X I I I of the Constitution of 1963. The same article also provides for supplementary federal allocations to republics unable to finance their "social and other services." 122 The second Five-Year Plan (1960-1965) devoted an entire section to "the elimination of inequality in the economic development of the national republics." 123 It provided the following investment (in billions of dinars) by republics: Serbia 439, Croatia 466, Slovenia 368, Bosnia and Herzegovina 721, Macedonia 800, and Montenegro 755. T h e purpose of this investment was to expand the productive capacities of the underdeveloped republics and to increase their capital formation. 124 In the meantime aid became more difficult to obtain and finally in 1963 the general investment fund was abolished. T h e assistance to underdeveloped republics was sharply cut and federal aid was reserved primarily for projects in construction. The 1964 social plan warned the underdeveloped republics that they should concentrate on indispensable projects and think in terms of profitability of investment.125 The conflict between the advanced and less advanced republics, however, continued over the allocation of investment funds. T h e central government was accused of discriminating in favor of one or another republic. The advanced republics complained of unnecessary drain on their capital and less advanced republics spoke of being suppliers of raw materials under unfavorable terms of trade. The competition between republics for investment funds grew in intensity, which, needless to say, often resulted in duplicating productive facilities, in the impossibility of fully utilizing existing capacity, and therefore in high unit costs and losses. In his speech at the Eighth Congress in 1964, Kardelj echoed Tito's

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words. T o eliminate nationalistic prejudices and "great state" ideology, he said that each Yugoslav nation must build its own material base sufficient for the development of its own culture and civilization, but no nation may be allowed to achieve a privileged economic position. He recommended the increased transfer of investment funds 128 to local authorities, not only to assist in the economic development of backward regions, but also to increase local involvement in self-government. T h e latter would foster democratic relationships among individual peoples and strengthen their solidarity by inducing them to recognize and expand their common interests. For, in fact, Yugoslavia is united not from above, but rather by the common interests of the working people. A l l Yugoslavs should, therefore, exercise their mutual obligations and, in particular, strive to eliminate economic disparities by assisting the backward republics. In addition to the transfer of investment funds, such assistance might include lengthening the term of investments, some resort to additional foreign sources of investment, and subsidies or favorable taxes, or both, for the maintenance and improvement of social services.127 O n the other hand, economic planners must not permit stagnation in the advanced republics while the others are catching up. This would create discontent, which would retard progress and interfere with the country's "general social plan." 128 T h e Yugoslav theorists believed that "the development of the material base of socialism" should reduce the disparities existing in the economic development between individual national and other areas and "mitigate the contradictions that stem therefrom." 129 Finally, it was decided, after prolonged discussion, to issue a law in February 1965 establishing the Fund for Crediting the Economic Development of Economically Lesser Developed Republics and Regions. Through this fund, long-term programs of aid could be developed and credits could be given to enterprises under more favorable conditions than those provided by banks. T h e law also provided for technical assistance to underdeveloped republics and called for certain other measures. Thus, for example, industries in advanced areas were to be encouraged to cooperate with and help develop the industries in less-developed regions. In July 1965, the Federal Council introduced significant reforms in the country's economic policy, presaging radical improvement in relations among Yugoslav nationalities. 130 T h e reforms provided considerable autonomy for industrial enterprises, an almost freely convertible currency, and a competitive market. Quantitative restrictions in imports were largely removed and customs duties reduced. T h e initial supporters of the reform were the Slovenes and Croats, representing the developed republics; the opponents came from Serbia and the other republics. Yugoslavia planned

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to abandon autarky for a "policy of long-term structural integration of the Yugoslav economy into the world division of labor in place of merely short-term commercial operations." 131 It hoped to develop a system that could withstand competition from advanced countries "without the constant tutelage of government machinery," but rather through further "decentralization, destatization, depolitication, and democratization." After a meeting on February 25-26, 1966, the Central Committee of the L C Y reminded its members that it was their duty to see that the economic reforms were carried out and to wage an implacable struggle against every sign of nationalism and chauvinism. T h e L C Y promised to discover the sources of nationalism and to unmask those responsible for it; President T i t o warned that "there can be no place in the League of Communists for those who have degenerated to nationalist positions." 132 In response to the opposition of conservative and nationalist elements in the L C Y and of officials unwilling to give up traditional privileges, the leadership of the L C Y proclaimed its determination to enforce the country's economic reform, threatening to expel those who opposed it. 133 In spite of the good intentions and considerable efforts of the L C Y and the Yugoslav government to remove the economic disparities among various republics and regions, it seems to us that due to differing socioeconomic backgrounds, varied endowment of different regions with natural resources, and the very different rates of population growth, the disparity will continue to exist for a long time to come and continue to complicate the problem of national relations. Failures of Communist Policy: Ethnic and Linguistic

Boomerangs

Whatever the real objectives of the Communist agitators before the Second World War, their work strengthened among certain segments of the population an anti-Serbian feeling. T h e ruling Serbs were branded as cruel oppressors and Belgrade was made a symbol of reaction and oppression. Many persons were not able to understand the Communist dialectic and found it difficult to distinguish between the Serbian "bourgeoisie" and the Serbian "workers." T h e suspicion of the Serbs and of Belgrade survived the war and the rise of Communist political control in Yugoslavia. Today the Communist bureaucrats who are dissatisfied with their place in Yugoslav society often blame Belgrade for it and attempt to advance themselves by nationalistic appeals to local feelings. 184 T h e Communists' constant harping on federalism, national republics, and national cultures has not facilitated the integration of different peoples into a socialist community. Rather, it has separated them by keeping

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them aware of their ethnic differences. This national consciousness has caused problems in relations among the six republics, five of which are established along "ethnic" lines, and also within individual republics. Croatia must deal with a large minority of Serbian inhabitants, while Serbia's population comprises potentially troublesome Albanians and Magyars. A prominent Serbian Communist, Dobrica Cosi£, recently criticised Magyar "nationalism and segregationism" in Vojvodina and also the "bureaucratism" which seeks to broaden the autonomy of Vojvodina. 135 Even in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only one not associated with a particular nationality, there is a certain degree of friction among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims over economic and political benefits. Slovenia, on the other hand, has little internal difficulty with minorities, which consist primarily of the small number of Italians added to the population in 1945, when the republic acquired Venezia Ciulia, and an equally small number of non-Slovene Yugoslavs from other parts of the country. However, one does note a certain amount of Slovene impatience with the immigrant Serbs and other outsiders. The ethnic situation is somewhat special in the two remaining republics. T h e issue among the Montenegrins is whether to maintain any distinct national identity at all. T h e majority of them reject the concept of a separate Montenegrin nation and culture. After World War I, those who favored complete integration with the Serbs under the Karadjordjevi tA IH

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NOTES

NOTES ì. Internar Yugoslavia

1. On Yugoslavia's economy in the interwar period, see Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford, 1955); Stevan Kukoleca, Industrija Jugoslavije 1918-19)8 (Belgrade, 1941); Mijo Mirkovid, Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije 1918-1941 (Zagreb, 1952). 2. The most comprehensive history of interwar Yugoslavia is Ferdo Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, 2 vols. (Zagreb, 1961). 3. For short accounts of Yugoslav interwar political parties, see Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 258-297; and Jovan Marjanovid, "Politicke partije Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca," in Sergije Dimitrijevid (ed.), Iz istorije Jugoslavije 1918-1945. Zbornik predavanja (Belgrade, 1958), pp. 207-225. Hereafter cited as Iz istorije Jugoslavije. 4. Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 202-221. For details, see Stenografske beleske Privremenog narodnog predstavnistva Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, I (Zagreb, 1919). 5. See Bogdan Krizman, "Zapisnici srediSnjeg odbora 'Narodnog vijeda Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba' u Zagrebu," Starine, No. 48 (1958), pp. 344-350- By the same, "Osnivanje 'Narodnog vijeda Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba' u Zagrebu," Historijski zbornik, No. 1-4 (1954). PP- 23-32. 6. Ferdo SiSid, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Zagreb, 1920), pp. 282-283. Hereafter cited as Dokumenti. Dragoslav Jankovid and Borgdan Krizman, Gradja o stvaranju jugoslovenske driave (Belgrade, 1964). On the formation of Yugoslavia and its international implications, see Ivo J . Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference (New Haven, 1963). Sluibene novine, September 6, December 8, 1920. Culinovid, Driavnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX i XX vijeka (Zagreb, 1954), II, p. 231, 233. For detailed criticism of the electoral law, see Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 217-218. Stenografske belelke Privremenog narodnog predstvanistva (Zagreb, 1921), II, pp. 592 ff. 7. Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika (Belgrade, 1928), p. Ixi. 8. Preceding the Vesnid government, four different governments were in power: Stojan M. Protid (Radical), December 20, 1918-August 16, 1919; Ljubomir M. Davidovid (Democratic), August 16-October 18,1919, and again October 18,1919February 19, 1920; and Stojan M. Protid (Radical), February 19-May 17, 1920. Milenko Vesnid headed coalition governments from May 17 to August 18, 1920, and from August 18, 1920, to January 1, 1921. 9. Culinovid, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 218-221, 314. Stenografske beleske Ustavotvorne skupltine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Belgrade, 1921), I, p. 41.

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354

Notes to pages 9 - 1 3

10. Stojan Protid, Nekoliko misli o novom ustavu (Belgrade, igig). For different constitutional drafts (those proposed by Stojan Protid, Ante Trumbid, Josip Smodlaka, Agrarian Union, Social Democratic Party, Yugoslav Club, Croatian Republican Peasant Party, and Croatian Union), see Ferdo Culinovid, Driavnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX i XX vijeka, II, pp. 242-255. The Communists lacked a policy endorsed by the entire party membership. See Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 285, 329-333. Culinovid has written several works on the constitutional development of Yugoslavia, in addition to the one just cited. See also his Tri etape nacionalnog pitanja u jugoslavenskim zemljama (Zagreb, 1962); and Razvitak jugoslaverukog federalizma (Zagreb, 1952). 1 1 . See Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 342-348. 12. Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, V (Zagreb, 1962), p. 121. Only seven volumes have appeared thus far, beginning in 1955. On agreement with the Muslims, see Josip Horvat, Politic ka povijest Hrvatske, 1918-1929 (Zagreb, 1938), p. 255. Also see Culinovid, Razvitak jugoslavenskog federalizma, op. cit. 13. Hrvoje Matkovid, "Hrvatska zajednica," Istorija XX veka. Zbornik radova, V (Belgrade, 1963), pp. 5-136. Stenografske beleske Ustavotvorne skupstine, II, p. 2: Triia Kaclerovid's statement on the position of the Communist Party. 14. On the Vidovdan Constitution, see Culinovid, Driavnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja, II, pp. 257-286. Dragoslav Jankovid, "Vidovdanski ustav," in Iz istorije Jugoslavije 1918-1945, pp. 182-190. Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Belgrade, 1921). 15. Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change, pp. 241-242. For a full list of cabinets and their members from 1918 to 1941, see Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, II, Appendix. Rudolf Bidanid, Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja (2nd ed., Zagreb, 1938), p. 120. 16. Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda (Zagreb, 1962), VI, p. 3 1 1 . 17. Julijana Vrcinac, Naia najnovija istorija (Belgrade, 1967), p. 29. 18. Vrcinac, pp. 27-30. 19. Rodoljub Colakovid et al. (eds.), Pregled istorije Saveza Kommunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1963), p. 67. Hereafter Pregled istorije. 20. For text of Obznana, see Vrcinac, p. 31. Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 315-321. 21. Pregled istorije, pp. 77-78. Alijagid was a member of the terrorist organization Crvena pravda. See Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, I (1958), p. 66. Culinovid, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 364-368. 22. Slavoljub cvetkovid, "Prilog pitanju osnivanja saveza komunisticke omladine Jugoslavije," Istorija XX veka. Zbornik radova, VI (Belgrade, 1964), pp. 213-243. 23. T h e interwar history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is characterized by intraparty bickering and lack of discipline or a logical and well-conceived program. Attempts by contemporary Yugoslav official historians to dignify the party's interwar history have not been successful. T h e best history of the party is the above-cited Pregled istorije. 24. Culinovid, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 371-377. Vrcinac, pp. 47-48.

Notes to pages 1 3 - 1 8

355

«5. Culinovil, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 377-379. 26. Ibid., pp. 381-387. Horvat, Politicka povijest Hrvatske, 1918-1929, pp. 288-289. 27. Vrcinac, pp. 58-59, 61. 28. Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, p. 437. 29. Ibid., p. 403. Vrcinac, p. 58. 30. In the election held on March 18, 1923, out of 2,971,370 registered voters, the Radical Party polled 562,213 votes and elected 108 deputies; the Democratic Party polled 400,342 votes and elected 51 deputies; and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party polled 473,753 votes and elected 70 deputies. In 1925 the CRPP received more than half a million votes. Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika (Belgrade, 1924), Tables V and VI, pp. 34-36. 31. Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, III (1958), p. 291. Branislav Gligorijevii, "Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista (Orjuna)," Istorija XX veka. Zbornik radova, V (Belgrade, 1963), pp. 315-396. 32. Vrcinac, pp. 60-61. 33. Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia (London, 1950), pp. 45-77. The statute of the United IMRO, pp. 68-69. 34. Vrcinac, p. 59. 35. Culinovid, Jugoslav!ja izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 429-431. 36. Vrcinac, pp. 62-63. Culinovil, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, p. 446. 37. On the election returns, see Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika (Belgrade, 1926), Tables II and III, pp. 152-157. 38. Vrcinac, p. 64. 39. Culinovid, Jugoslavia izmedju dva rata, I, p. 459. Vrcinac, pp. 64-65. This program had been announced previously by both the Democratic Party (August 12, 1924) and the CRPP (September 24, 1924). 40. Lazar Markovil, Jugoslovenska driava i hrvatsko pitanje (1914-1929) (Belgrade, 1935), p. 253. 41. Stenografske beleske Narodne skupstine Kraljevine Srba, Hruata i Slovenaca. Vanredni saziv za 1925 (Belgrade, 1926), p. 222 S. 42. Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, VI (1965), p. 612. Culinovil, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, I, pp. 478-484. Four members of Radii's party were taken into the government; Radii himself stayed out. 43. See note 15. 44. In the election of 1927, the Radical Party polled 742,111 votes and won 112 seats; the Croatian Peasant Party polled 367,570 votes and won 61 seats; and the Democratic Party polled 381,784 votes and won 59 seats. See Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika (Belgrade, 1928), pp. 242-244. 45. Svetozar Pribidevid, Diktatura kralja Aleksandra (Belgrade, 1952). The translation of the French edition published in 1933. A passionate critic of King Alexander who alleges that on one occasion the king had suggested the "amputation" of Croatia from Yugoslavia. 46. Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, VI (1965), p. 612. 47. The assassination of Radii is a controversial question. Who was really

S56

Notes to pages 18-21

responsible for it? Enemies of the king have tried unsuccessfully to link him to the murder. Even the most recent study, by Zvonimir Kulundzi953). PP- 277-286. 84. New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953). 85. Josip Broz Tito, "Borba komunista Jugoslavije za socijalisticku demokratiju," in VI Kongres KPJ (Belgrade, 1952), pp. 1 - 1 7 , 79. 86. The Programme, pp. 195-204. 87. Osmi kongres, p. 35. 88. The Programme, pp. 197-204. 89. The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1963). Anton VratuSa, "Solutions of the National Question in Yugoslavia," in Information File and Clipping Service (Belgrade, May 1966), pp. 4-5. Law Prohibiting Incitement to National, Racial, and Religious Hatred and Discord (Belgrade, 1947). 90. Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 16 (1964), pp. 47-57. This issue of the journal contains the proceedings of the Eighth Congress. 91. Yugoslav News Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 398, April 17, 1967, p. 1. 92. New Fundamental Law, p. 25. 93. Vratuia, Multinationality, p. 4. 94. New Fundamental Law, p. 25. 95. Koca Joncié, Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 1962), pp. 21-22. Also see the same author's The National Minorities (Belgrade, i960), pp. 17-18, as well as his The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1967), pp. 58-64. Gabor JanoSi, Education and Culture of Nationalities in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1965). Some spokesmen contend that if every nationality used its own tongue at meetings, chaos would be created and not everyone would understand the proceedings. See Krste Crvenkovski, Medjunacionalni odnosi u samoupravnom drustvu (Belgrade, 1967), pp. 20-29. On the other hand, they insist that the aim should be neither to forge a single Yugoslav nationality nor a single Yugoslav language. Crvenkovski, p. 29. T h e languages existed before nations emerged and would

Notes to pages 259-264

397

continue to exist after nations as we know them are gone. Edvard Kardelj, Razvoj slovenachog nacionalnog pitanja. Translated by Zvonko Tkalec (Belgrade, 1960) p. 49. Others complain that in Kosmet, although Albanians may be overwhelmingly preponderant at meetings, the Serbo-Croatian is used as the language of business. See Veli Deva, "Afirmacije ideja o ravnopravnosti ljudi i naroda" in MiloS Nikolié (éd.), O nacionalnom pitanju (Belgrade, 1967), p. 371. Similarly, the Slovenes have been demanding greater use of their language in the conduct of federal affairs. See Vida TomJic, "Socijalizam se cuva na svim jezicima," ibid., P- 33°96. Joncié, Nacionalne manjine, pp. 26-50. 97. Ibid., pp. 1-5. According to one source, 74.5 percent of the total Yugoslav minorities live in Serbia. See Joncié, The Relations Between Nationalities, pp. 5-698. Vratuïa, Multinationality, p. 18. On ethnic representation in leading government and party posts in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the republics, see Shoup, Appendix D, pp. »74-279. 99. Kardelj, p. 38. VratuSa, "Solutions of the National Question," pp. 8-9. 100. VratuSa, Multinationality, pp. 6-7. Kardelj, pp. 38-44. 101. VratuJa, Multinationality, p. 7. 102. Osmi hongres, p. 44. 103. Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 16, pp. 48-50. 104. Ibid., p. 51. 105. Osmi hongres, p. 45. 106. Veljko Vlahovié, "Idejna kretanja na sadaînjem stepenu naJeg razvoja i dalji zadaci Saveza komunista Jugoslavije," in Osmi Kongres, pp. 165-167. 107. Borba, May 30, 1968. See Joca Marjanovié, "Odnos klasnog i nacionalnog," 14 sedmica CK SK Srbije (Belgrade, 1968), pp. 89-100. By the same, "Parafraza programa," ibid., pp. 226-231. Dobrica Cosié, "Potreba za kritickimrazmatranjima vladajvée ideoloike koncepcije u nacionalnog politici," ibid., pp. 110-116. 108. Borba, May 31, 1968. 109. Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 16, p. 54. 110. Ibid. 111. Vratuia, Multinationality, pp. 11-13. Joncié, The Relations Between Nationalities, p. 30. 112. VratuJa, Multinationality, p. 14. See tables in Joncié, The Relations Between Nationalities, pp. 31-32. 113. Rudolf Biéanié, "Jadranska koncepcija ekonomskog razvoja Jugoslavije," Pomorstvo, No. 9-10 (1964), pp. 37-40. 114. Vratuïa, Multinationality, p. 13. 115. David Binder, "Croatian Youths Revive Nationalism," New Yorh Times, February 20, 1966, p. 15. 116. Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 16, p. 51. 117. Borba, September 15, 1966. 118. Dobrica Cosié, "Zajedno ili drugacije ili o aktuelnostima naJe savremene kulture," Praxis, Nos. 4-5 (1965), pp. 524-527.

398

Notes to pages 265-269

119. VratuSa, Multinationality, pp. 7-8. n o . Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 16, p. 55. 1 2 1 . The Programme, p. 198. 122. Joncid, The Relations Between Nationalities, p. 30. For details on this topic, see B. Colanovid, The Development of Underdeveloped Regions in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1965). 123. Hasanagid, "O nacionalnom pitanju," pp. 238-240. 124. VratuSa, Multinationality, p. 10. 125. Sluibeni list SFRJ, No. 52 (1963), p. 953. See also Borislav Srebrid, "Problem metoda privrednog razvoja nerazvijenih krajeva Jugoslavije," Ekonomist, X V I I (1964), pp. 3 1 1 - 3 2 7 . See also Sluibeni list SFRJ, No. 31 (1964), pp. 605-617, and No. 35 (1965), p. 181. 126. Osmi Kongres, p. 100. 127. Ibid., p. 101-102. 128. VratuSa, Multinationality, pp. 1 0 - 1 1 . Idem., "Solutions of the Nationality Question," pp. 3-5. 129. Joncid, The Relations Between Nationalities, p. 75. 130. The Economic Reform of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1965). 1 3 1 . Rudolf Bidanid, "Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country," Foreign Affairs, July 1966, p. 643. 132. "Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on Further Implementation of Economic Reforms, held in Belgrade on February 26 and March 1 1 , 1966," Yugoslav Facts and Views, undated and unnumbered, p. 7. 133. New York Times, March 20, 1966. 134. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, " T h e Marshal and the Lecturer," Review, No. 6 (1967), p. 484. 135. Borba, May 30,1968. 136. Pregled istorije, p. 295. 137. Barker, pp. 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 . 138. Dimitar Vlahov, Kroz historiju makedonskog naroda (Zagreb, 1949), pp. 107-108. On Macedonian language, see Blaze Konski and Krum Toshev, Makedonski pravopis (Skopje, 1950). 139. Dimitar Mitrev, Pirinska Makedonija vo borba za nacionalno osloboduvanje (Skopje, 1950), pp. 325-361. 140. See New York Times, December 7, 1966. At the beginning of 1968 the Yugoslav government protested against the articles published in Sofia's Rabotnichesko delo praising the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) which had given Bulgaria what is today the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia. Petar Stambolid recently warned that the Yugoslavs "can not be indifferent to attempts to deny the existence of a Macedonian nation." See Politika, July 29,1968, pp. 5-6. See Gledista, No. 3 (1968), p. 405. Nova Makedonija, May 31 and July 6, 1968. Borba, June 14 and October 3, 1968. In 1958 Macedonians were granted autonomous ecclesiastical administration and in 1967 full administrative independence. T h e Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek churches have not yet recognized the "auto-

Notes to pages 270-274

399

cephalous" Macedonian church, backed by Macedonian Communists but not by Serbian. See also EJ, VI (1965), p. 595. Borba, April 26, 1968. 141. Borba, May 30, 1968. 142. David Binder, "Yugoslavs Spur Non-Reds' Role," New York Times, J u n e 12,1966. 143. Pravopis hrvatsko-srpskoga knjiieimoga jezika (Zagreb-Novi Sad, i960). 144. Borba, March 21, 1967. Telegram (Zagreb), March 17, 1967. 145. Yugoslav News Bulletin, V, No. 398, April 17, 1967, pp. 5-7. Borba, April 2, 1967, p. 5. 146. Yugoslav News Bulletin, V, No. 398, April 17, 1967, pp. 7-8. Not all Croats agreed with the "political implications" behind the Declaration. See, (or example, Ferdo £ulinovi*8, 325, 326; falls to Germans, 71-72, liberated by Yugoslav and Soviet forces, 106; conference of nonaligned nations (1961), 191-193, 388n., symbol of oppression, 267; industrial concentration, 318; growth, 319; population 326-327, 4130.; transformations in family relationships, 338; general transformation, 343 Belgrade-Bar railway, 263, 264 Belishova, Liri, 185 Berchtesgaden meeting with Hitler, 51, 5*« 64 Beria, Lavrenty D., 173 Bessarabia, 51, 66 Bihai, 99, 120, 250

Index Bjelaii (Montenegrin fusioniats), 268 Bled Agreement (1947). 162, 163 See also Bulgaria; Yugoslavia; Foreign relations Bleiburg: mass executions of ustashe and otheT non-Communists, 376n. Blitzkrieg, 70 Bloc of National Understanding and Peasant Democracy, 17 Blue Guards (Plava gar da), Sjn., 368 Bogdanov, Vaso, «79 Boka Kotorska, 47 Bolshevik Revolution, is, 85, . 44. 46. 5°. 5 ' . 77. 161; Military League, 40; Pirot Agreement, 44; friendship pact wih Yugoslavia (1937), 48-49, 162; Balkan Entente, 50;

419 Tripartite Pact, 51-52; Treaty of Craiova, 51; plans against Yugoslavia in 1941, 69: Axis base, 71-72; annexation of Yugoslav territory, 76; expels Yugoslav colonists, 77; Bulgarian occupation of Serbia, 79; Bulgarian forces in Yugoslavia, 106; reparations to Yugoslavia waived, 162; Macedonian question, 244, 252; War Office and Macedonia, 245; Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, 252; antiTitoism, 259-260; border relations, 260; rivalry with Yugoslavia over Macedonia, 269; Bulgarophiles in Yugoslavia, 280; zadruga, 330. See also Macedonia; Communist Party of Bulgaria, Bulgaria; Foreign affairs Bunjevci-Sokci Party, 9 Bureaucracy, 296-298, 407n. Cairo conference of nonaligned nations, 191-193, 388n. Caribrod, 40 Carinthia, 40, 169. See also Austria Catholic Church, 3, 25, 62, 120, 124, 125, 317; clericals, 28; clergy, 79; in the Second World War, 279; Croation and Slovene Catholics, 320-321. See also Religion Centralism, 8-9, 10-13, '8. 6°, 240, 247. See also Government Cepiika, Aleksej, 177 Cesarec, August, 242 Ceylon, 191 Chamber of Nationalities, 145, 147. See also Government; Constitution; Council of Nationalities Charles I, emperor of Austria-Hungary, 41 Chervenkov, Vulko, 177; South Slav Federation, 162 Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army (fietnidki odredi jugoslovenska vojske), 82. See also Chetniks Chetniks (Serbian veterans), 14-15, 96 Chetniks (Cetnici: followers of Mihailovich), 79, 81-83, 86, 87-97, 1I4> , , 7> IS0 > 124, 282, 287, 368n.; mistakes, 81; program, 82, 368n.; cooperate and break with partisans, 82, 92; ethnic complexion of movement, 83, 288; nationality policy, 87; elect Central National Committee, 87; relations with governmentin-exile, 90; defection in ranks, g2; cooperation with Germans, 93-94, 104, 37m.; organized into "Voluntary Anti-

420 Communist Militia," g3; Chetniks in Montenegro, 94; contrasted with Partisans, 95-96; refuse to attack Germans, 10s; relations with Great Britain strained, ios;withdrawaI with Germans, 107; appraisal, 107; under Jevdjevii and Djurié, 1 1 1 ; under Mihailovii, 1 1 1 ; under Lt. Col. DjuriJii 1 1 1 - 1 1 « ; returned to Yugoslavia, 113; destroyed by ustashe, 112; on Muslims, 276; collaboration with Italians, 37m.; defeated by Partisans, 373n. See also Jugoslovenska vojska u otadzbini; Mihailovich Children, 337, 338-340 China: relations with Yugoslavia, i8*-i88, 194-195; relations with Albania, 185; relations with United States, 186, 188. See also Foreign relations; Albania; Soviet Union Church. See Catholic Church; Serbian Orthodox Church; Macedonian Orthodox Church; Clergy; Muslims Churchill, Winston, prime minister, 53, 101; on spheres of influence, 107; recognizes Partisans, 122; meeting with Tito, 157. See also Great Britain; Foreign relations; Tito; Partisans Ciano, Galeazzo, count, 29, 77 Cincar Markovii, Alexander, foreign minister, 51; signs armistice, 72-73. See also Foreign relations; Coup d'état of March, 1941; Tripartite Pact Cities, 319-320 Ciîinski, Josip, head of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 246. See also Goric, Milan Clergy, 79, 133 Clodius Agreement, 77. See also Croatia; Germany Colankovié, Rodoljub, 12, 37gn. Cold war, 155, 170 Colonization, 33; in Kosmet, 39; in Vojvodian, 334 Cominform, 128, 130, 154-155, 158, 165166, 173, 187, 199, 290, 292; expels Yugoslavia, 130, 133-134, 156, 166-168, 171, 259, 268, 269-286; sympathizers of Cominform in Yugoslavia, 130-131, 168; Cominform accusations rejected, 131; attacks Yugoslavia, 131-133; economic dislocation and isolation, 132, 167, 39011.; headquarters in Belgrade, 165-166; details in dispute, 166; economic blockade of Yugoslavia, 168 Comintern, 13, 16, 28, 66, 83, 99, 160, 161,

Index 163, 238; purges of Yugoslav Communist leaders in Soviet Union, 85; congress (fourth, 1922), 241; (fifth, 1914), 244; (sixth, 1928), 247; (seventh, 1935), 83-84, 247; on Yugoslav nationality question, 240-243; proposes separation of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, 244, 251; on Macedonia and Thrace, 244, 251; favors Communist Party of Bulgaria, 244; urges overthrow of Yugoslav burgeois government, 244; overtures to Croatian Republican Peasant Party and IMRO, 244245; May manifesto, 245; pressure on CPY 245; commission to study Yugoslav nationality problem, 245; on peasant question 245-246; popular front, 247. See also Communist Party of Yugoslavia Common market, 188, 189 Commune, 136, 143, 144, 149, 231, 305; assembly communal), 144; functions, 146-147 Communism, 139, 143; world communism, 67, 181, 183, 186-187, 189-191; Communist states, 154-155; Communist revolutions, 155, 159; Yugoslav variety, 190; nonaligned nations, igi-194, in school books, 340. See also Communist Party of Yugoslavia; Communist bloc; nationalism Communist bloc, 168, 182, 187; economic blockade of Yugoslavia, 168; attitude towards Israel, 195 Communist Party Albania: 163, 164, 185. See also Hoxha; Albania Austria: 247 Bulgaria: favored by Comintern, 244; on Macedonian question, 251; rivalry with Yugoslavia over Macedonia, 251252. See also Bulgaria; Macedonia; Foreign relations China: 184-187. See also China Croatia: 29, 84, 248 Czechoslovakia: 125 Greece: 165, 252; Macedonian problem, 269 Hungary: 125. See also Hungary Italy: 247 Macedonia: 84 Serbia: 271-272 Slovenia: 29, 84, 248 Soviet Union: 178; twelfth congress (1956), 133, 156, 198; favors CP of Bulgaria on Macedonia, 244. See also So-

Index viet U n i o n ; Comintern; C o m i n f o r m ; Foreign relations Yugoslavia (CPY): 6 - 9 , 1 1 - 3 5 passim, 54-58 passim, 104, 1 1 1 , 114, 115, 1221*6, 133-137, 151-161 passim, 167, 170, 178, 199-202, 230-831, 23S-239, 2 8 7 289, 299-300, 306-308, 314; national conferences (first, 1922), 12, 241; (second, 1923), 241, 243; (third, 1923), 16, 243, 246; (fourth, 1934), 247; (fifth, 1940), 31, 85, 248; executive committee in V i e n n a , 12; in elections, 12-15; anti-Communist measures, 18, 31-32, 83, 246, 356n.; p o p u l a r front, 29, 84; nationality question, 29, 83-84, 87, 241, 243, 245-246, 247, 249, 250, 256, 2 6 1 267, 281-283; volunteers in Spain and internees in France, 31; membership, 31-32, 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 , 123, 129, 141, 146, 1 4 7 148; opposes T r i p a r t i t e Pact, 32, 66; strength 59-60; opposes constitution 1921), 61, 240; plans and preparations, 66-67, ^3; putsch of M a r c h 1941, 6 7 68; insurrection and call to resistance, 80, 250, 279-280; w a r tactics, 80-81, 280; program (1948), 83-84, 130; (1958), 142; organization and activities, 84, 247; central committee, 84-85, 8889, 126, 129-130, 139, 150, 156, 166; persecution by the Germans, 85; city committee in Zagreb, 85; purges by Stalin, 85; party purges, 85; local and provincial activity, 89; organizes National Liberation Movement, Front and A r m y , 96-109, 250; influence a m o n g w o m e n and y o u t h , 97; dominated unified government, 108; in Istria, 109; propaganda, 111; leadership and government, 114, 288, 318; revolution, 120; class enemy, 128; Stalinists, 130; agitprop, 131; expelled f r o m C o m i n f o r m , 132, 168; new role a n d theory, 133-134; p l e n u m of 1953, 141; subservience to Soviet U n i o n , 159; in power, 160; Stalin, 160, 245246; economic reform (1964), 219, 258; on state organization, 238, 246; on burgeois Yugoslavia, 239-240; Y u g o slavism, 240; Comintern directives on peasant a n d nationality problems, 241, »43« *45> left a n d right wings, 242, 246; on Yugoslav unification, 243; on Croatian question, 245; congresses (fourth, 1928), 246; (fifth, 1948), 130-

421 131, 158, 243, 256; (sixth, 1952), 147; (eighth, 1964), 3 8 m . ; o n M a c e d o n i a and Bulgaria, 246, 251, 268-269; Stalinization, 246; antistate activity, 247; abides by C o m i n t e r n directive, 247; accepts independent Slovenia, 247; opposes b r e a k u p of Yugoslavia, 247, 250; demands abolition of banovinas, 247; opposes Serbian colonists, 247; party organization in M a c e d o n i a a n d Herzegovina, 248; c o u p d'état of March 1941, 248-249; against fascism, 249; on Simovif government, 249; call for C o m m u n i s t Yugoslavia, 249; M a y consultations (1941), 250; demands Julian region for Yugoslavia, 250; Slavophilism, 250; G e r m a n invasion of Soviet Union, 250; Stolice decisions (1941), 250; armed uints, 250; Comintern and Macedonia, 251-252; regional committee of the C P Y for Macedonia, 251-252; T e m p o and Macedonia, 252; ethnic and linguistic questions, 267273; criticism of M i o d r a g Pavlovic, 269; in collapse of Yugoslavia, 279; infiltrations, 280; ethnic e l e m e n t in the C o m m u n i s t movement, 287; abandons Soviet model, 292; in historiography, 354n. See also Antifascist Women's Front; C o m i n f o r m ; C o m m u n i s t y o u t h ; L e a g u e of Communists of Yugoslavia; Partisans; Putsch Constitution of the People's R e p u b l i c of Croatia, 253 Constitutional court, 145 Constitutionality (ustavnost), 302 C o r f u , 164, 237-240 C o s i t , Dobrica, 261, 264, 268, 275-276, 278 Council of Ambassadors, 41 Council of Five, 38 Council of Ministers, 135. See also Federal Executive C o u n c i l Council of Nationalities, 135-136, 258. See also Government; Constitution Council of Producers, 136. See also G o v ernment; Constitution C o u p d'état of March 27, 1941, 32, 54-56, 395n. See also Putsch Craftsmen, 327 Craiova agreement (1944), 106 C r i m i n a l code, 133, 258. See also Police; OZNA, UDBA Croatia and Croats; nationalism a n d nationality question, 3-5, 11-31 passim, 38,

422 47, 48, 55, 60-61, 76, 77, 87, 99, l i i , 114, 136, 143, 236, 145-246, »49, 275-276, 279, 280, 321; Banovina, 30-32, 248; Croatian leaders, 52; on Tripartite Pact, 52; quest for autonomy and independence, 61; anti-Serbian sentiment, 62; German offer to Croats, 69; axis invasion and April war, 7 1 - 7 2 ; axis economic control, 77; Italian sphere, 77; Croatian coastland, 78; Quisling government, 78; armed forces, 78-80; 8g, 107, 108-109; King Timoslav II, 78; anti-Serbian policy, 82, 261; Croats in Chetnik ranks, 83; Croats in Italy, 105, 109-110, 251; Croatian government in flight, 1 1 2 ; Croatian armed forces surrender, 113; mass execution of Croat ustashe, 113; appeal for cultural autonomy, 143; nominal income of Croatia, 222, Croatia and Comintern, 245; murder in parliament, 246; drift toward fascism, 249; Provincial Antifascist Council of Croatia (ZAVNOH), 250-251; Plitvice resolution, 251; People's Republic, 253; oppose BelgradeBar railway, 263-264; economic grievances, 263-264; support economic reform, 266; Serbian minority in Croatia, 268; Croats in Bosnia and Herzogovina, 268; denounce Novi Sad language agreement, 270; Croatian language, 270; in the Second World War, 278-280; relations with Serbs; "betrayal", 279; Croatian bourgeoisie, 280; uprising in the Second World War, 280; home guard (Domobrans, Domobranstvo), 280; claim Bosnia and Herzogovina, 283; area and population, 320; Croatian geography, 320; above average in development, 322: national characteristics and historical traditions, 322; zadruga, 330; internal migration, 334; elementary education, 339-342. See also Clodius Agreement; Maiek; Pavelii; Ustasha Croatian bloc, 13 Croatian Civil Guard, 24, 30, 357n. Croatian National Youth (HANAO), 14 Croatian Orthodox Church, 79. See also Religion Croatian Party of Rights, 13 Croatian Peasant Defense, 357n. Croatian Peasant Party (CPP), 9, 1 1 , 17, 23-32 passim, 54, 69, 78, 123, 247; in April War, 279-280; anti-clericalism,

Index 5*5- 343: election results (1925), 5550.; criticized by CPY, 358n. Croatian People's Party, 9 Croatian People's Peasant Party, 6, 1 1 . See also Croatian Peasant Party Croatian Pure Party of Rights, 8, 28 Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP), 7 - 9 , 11, 1 3 - 1 7 , 244-245. See also Croatian Peasant Party Croatian Rural Defense Guards, 24, 30 Croatian Union, 9, 13 Croato-Serbian language, 270 Cuba, 187-188 Culture, 257, 267; socialist Yugoslavism, 257; Western tradition, 313; Turkish influence, 317; Kulturni, 340. See also Yugoslav culture Cvetkovii, DragiSa, prime minister, 27, 29, 31, 32, 52, 67, 248, 249 Cvetkovii-Mafek agreement, 28, 29, 32, 51, 61, 63, 67, 68, 248. See also Sporaium Cvijii, Djuro, 242 Cyrillic alphabet, 270, 321 Czechoslovakia, 2g. 50; economic relations with Yugoslavia, 36, 41, 47, 48; dismemberment, 36; treaty with Yugoslavia and with Romania, 41; Soviet invasion and Yugoslav reaction, 189, 200, 383». See also Foreign affairs; Munich crisis

Dalmatia, 38, 48, 76, 77, 78, 83, 92, 95, 104, 109; in April War, 72, 74; towns and tradition, 326 Damjanovil, Miodrag M., general, 111 D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 38 Danube, 76, 263-264 Davidovié, Ljubomir, M„ 1 4 - 1 7 , 20, 22, 27. 353 Deakin, F. W., captain, 101 Dedeagach (Alexandroupolis), 49 Democratic Party, 7-8, 14, 16, 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 5 26, 27, 67, 108, 123. See also Davidovié, Ljubomir Demography, 318-320 Demonstrations (March, 1941), 67 Dill, Sir John, 68 Dimitrov, Georgi, 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 , *45 Directive, 25, 55, 68. See also Weisung Djakovié, Djuro, 19 Djilas, Milovan, 85, 1 3 7 - 1 4 1 , 142, 163-164, 200, 338 Djurié, Chetnik leader, 1 1 1

Index DjuriSil, Pavle, Lt. col. and Chetnik leader, 94, 107, ì i i - i i z , 37211. Doboj, 81 Domobrans (Domobranstvo): in Slovenia, 83, 111; in Croatia, 89, >80 Dragojlov, Fedor, general, 367 Draäkovii, Milorad, 12 Drina, 104, 111, 112, 26g Drvar (German air attack), 104 DrZié, Marin, 272 Dubrovnik, 326; literature, 272 Dlemijet. See National Turkish Organization

Eastern Europe, 154, 155, 161; Communism, 125-126, 187; federation, 159; Yugoslav influence, 183; Soviet control, 189, 200-201 East Germany recognized by Yugoslavia (1957), 181 Economy (prewar) 3-5, 32, 37, 38, 42-57, 62, 353^; foreign trade, i6in„ 36411. (postwar) 115-116, 127, 148, 170; a decade of transformation, 141-147, 317; major trends in economy, 203-235; transition period, 205-207; general performance, 207-208; chief characteristics of economy, 314, 319 Agriculture, 208, 211-212, 224; producers' cooperatives, 211-212; tractors, 212; agriculture and state farms, 224, 228-229; private farming, 229; seljak, 229; output of milk, wood, eggs, and honey, 235t.; output of selected agricultural products, 234t. See also Agrarian reform laws; Agriculture Economic problems: uneven developement of country, 62, 149; unemployment, 149; Cominform blockade, 168205; housing, 209, 218; utilization of existing capacity, 211; labor export, 222; developed and underdeveloped regions, 257, 267, 322-323; economics and nationalism, 261-267; political factories, 263 Economic reforms, 213-225, 4o8n., 41m.; decentralization, 149, 218; selfmanagement, 218; changes in planning procedures, 220; greater freedom for enterprises, 223; free market forces,

423 225; competition between republics, 265 Economic and social results: modernization, 151, 316-348; population shift, 208; human agent, 208—209; housing, 209, 218, 221; consumers, 217-218; economic and social indicators, 3471. Economic system: workers' management councils, 133-134, 143, 211; nationalization and state paternalism, 148, 204; innovations 148; centralized planning and distribution, 203-205, 262, 265; failure of Soviet model, 204; the role of the communes, 206-207; administrative measures, 218 Finances, 115-116, 148; currency, 3; interwar national income, 364^; distribution of gross income, 206-207; foreign exchange, 213; defense expenditures, 213; devaluation of dinar, 213, 220; dinar-dollar exchange, 215; price system, 216; interests and taxes, 216, 220, 263; wages, 217-218; import duties, 221; personal incomes, 221; nominal incomes by republics, 222; national incomes, 222; banking system, 223224; Public Accounting Service, 223; national income, 232!.; national budget, 263; loans and credits to foreign countries, 388n. Foreign aid, 213; quest for Western aid, 168; United States aid, 227-228. See also Foreign affairs; United States Industry and mining: developement of "key" industries, 204; mining industry, 208; Magnohrom complex, 209; private handicraft, 210; industrial production, 213; selected industrial products, 1939, 1952, 1961, 1965, 2351.; industrialization, 275; industrial output, 318-319; aluminum industry, 39°nInternational participation: joins Coal and Steel Community of Europe, 168; asks U.N. Economic Commission for Europe for aid, 168; joins G A T T , 189, 232; relations with common market countries, 189; European Free Trade Association, 214 Investments, 208-209, 223; long term credits to underdeveloped Tegions, 226-227; investment and aid to underdeveloped republics, 262-263; capital

424 investments, 161-463; share of country's investments by republics, 263; Federal Credit Fund, 365; federal allocation Labor: wage earners, 217-218; labor export, 222; trade unions, » 4 Planning: five-year plans (1947-1951), 167, 255, 257; (1960-1965), 264-265; (1966-1970), 223; central planning body, 206; social plan 266. See also Economic system Prospects. 225-226 Trade, foreign, 212-213, 214-215, 231232; pattern of foreign trade, 213; exports to Asia, Africa, South America, 214; exports to Italy, 214-215; domestic trade, 214; export subsidies, 216; trade with the Soviet Union, 38711. Eden, Anthony, 53 Egypt, 100, 196 Eisenhower, Dwight, president, 183 Ekavski, 270 Elections (1920), 240; (1923), 355n., (1925), 16; (1927), 355n.; (1931), s 5 6n.; (1945), 123-125 Electoral law: (1920), 7; (1931, 1933), 20, 357 n Emigration, 33, 359^ Engels, Friedrich, 13g, 299, 309 England. See Great Britain Erfurt progTara, 238 Ethiopia: war with Italy, 36, 46-47; Yugoslav credits, 226 Ethnic problem, 267-273, 320. See also Nationalism; Nationality Executive Committee, 151 Executive Committee of the Antifascist Council, 103. See also Antifascist Council Family, 335-338 Fascism, 24-25, 32, 51, 56, 58, 80 Federal Assembly, 135. See also Government Federal Council, 135, 266 Federal Credit Fund, 265 Federal Executive Council, 135. See also Government Federalism, 8-9, 11, 13, 18, 21, 601 83-84, 86, 116, 240, 246-247, 248, 251, 267, 40411. See also Government Federalists (Montenegrin), 14, 280 Federal social plan (1961-1965), 322 Feketif meeting, 26

Index Feudalism, 33 Fifth column, 73-74 Filipovii, Filip, head of CPY, 240 Finland, 192-193 First international, 139 Fiume Rijeka), 37, 38 Five-year plan, 128, 167, 168, 274-265. See also Economy; Federal social plan Flag, 19 Foia decrees, 120 Foreign affairs, 4, 37, 56, 67, 105-106, 109111, 115, 154-202; border disputes, 37; Spanish Civil War, 48; neutralism, 49, 64-65; Allied spheres of influence, 107; nationalities as problem in foreign relations, 154; Yalta conference, 165; Macedonian problem in foreign relations, 165; nonalignment policy, 175, 182, 187, 189195; success in foreign affairs, 176; Vietnam and Israel-Arab wars, 189; Belgrade conference of nonaligned nations (1961), 191-193; Cairo conference of nonaligned nations (1964), 191-193; relations with Asian states, 191-193; relations with African states, 192-193; Vietnam policy, 194; relations with Arabs, 196; relations with Middle Eastern countries, 197, 201; general assessment of Yugoslavia's foreign relations, 197-202; long term credits to Algeria, 226; fascist threat, 248; crisis encourages separatism, 249 Albania: Albanian minority, 24, 39, 164; Yugoslav relations with, 37-40 passim, 46-47, 71, 161, 164, 167, 184-187, 259260; annexation of Kossovo and Metohija, 76; possible federation with Yugoslavia, 163; thirty-year economic agreement with Yugoslavia (1946), 164; Yugoslav-Albanian joint companies, 164; frontier incidents, 167. See also Albania; Albanians; Minority Austria: relations with, 36, 40, 41, 43, 260; effects of Anschluss, 36; Carinthia, question of, 40; Treaty of Trianon, 40-41; peace treaty (1955), 173 Axis: Tripartite Pact, 32, 51-52, 53-56, 249; policy toward Axis powers, 52; Yugoslavia joins Axis, 65, 68; Axis conquest, partition and plunder of Yugoslavia, 24g. See also Germany; Italy Bulgaria: relations with 44-46, 51, 162, 260; Pirot agreement, 44; agreement with Bulgaria, 106; treaty of friend-

Index ship with Bulgaria (1947), 162; pact of friendship (1946), 165; Macedonia in relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 3g8n. See also Bulgaria; Macedonia China: relations with, 175, 182-187, 194195; ideological challenge to China, 182; China condemns Yugoslavia, 386n. See also China Communist bloc: relations with, 161; impact of Titoism on Communist bloc, 176-177. See also Albania; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Poland; Romania Czechoslovakia: pact of friendship with Yugoslavia (1946), 165; Yugoslav attitude toward Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 189, 201-202, 383. See also Czechoslovakia France: French investments in Yugoslavia, 35; relations with, 38-39, 4 2 44> 50-51. 98; Tardieu Plan, 38; treaty with Yugoslavia, 3g. See also France Germany: relations with, 29, 32, 35, 5051, 175, 181; German investments, 3 5 36; economic relations with Germany, 36; recognition of East Germany, 181. See also Germany; Hitler Great Britain: British investments in Yugoslavia, 35; relations with Yugoslavia, 44, 51-52, 53-54. See also Great Britain, Western powers Greece: Yugoslav-Greek treaty, 41; relations with Yugoslavia, 44-45, 50-51, 53-54, 56, 195, 260; pact of friendship with Greece, 54; Yugoslavia helps Greek insurgents, 165; Balkan Pact (1954), 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 . See also Greece Hungary: relations with, 40, 43-44, 5051, 260; pact of eternal friendship with Hungary, 51; pact of friendship with Yugoslavia (1947), 165; Hungarian revolution and Yugoslav attitude, 178-179. See also Hungary Israel: relations with, 195-196. See also Israel Italy: relations with, 29-30, 37-38, 3941, 42, 44, 46, 51, 53, 55, 154; Italian investments, 35; economic relations with Italy, 36; pact of friendship with Italy, 38-39; Yugoslav territorial claims, 105, 124, 374n.; Yugoslavs in Italy, 110; population exchange, 1 t o i l 1; Trieste agreement (1954), 158, 172

425 Poland, pact of friendship with Yugoslavia (1946), 165 Romania: Romanian-Yugoslav treaty, 41; relations with Yugoslavia, 46, 51, 260; pact of friendship (1947), 165 Soviet Union: Yugoslav-Soviet agreement (1944), 106; twenty-year treaty with Soviet Union, 108; relations with Yugoslavia, 128, 135, 156-159, 160-161, 170, 178-179, 182-183, 187-189, 190192, 198-199; economic relations (trade, joint-companies, aid), 128; trade negotiations and ideological conflict, 129; treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, 172-180; impact of Titoism on Soviet Union and Communist bloc, 176-177; isolates Yugoslavia after Hungarian revolution, 180; ideological challenge to Soviet Union, 182; Yugoslav-Soviet communique, 188; Soviet economic aid, 189; reaction to Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 189, 3830., Communist summit meetings at Moscow and Bucharest, 197; Yugoslavia condemns Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 201-202. See also Soviet Union; Comintern; Cominform Trieste: Trieste agreement (1954), 158, 172. See also Italy Turkey: relations with, 53-54, 55; Balkan Pact (1954), 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 . See also Turkey United Nations, 175; elected to security council (1950), 169 United States: investments in Yugoslavia, 35; United States aid restored (1957), 181, 183; relations with Yugoslavia, 189, 192, 198-199; T i t o on United States aid, 3 8 7 ^ See also United States; Western powers Western powers: pro-Western sympathy, 54, 66; relations with Great Britain and United States, 132, 155, 157, 158, 160, 170; technical training in the West, 171. See also Great Britain; United States Foreign debts, 34-35 Foreign loans and credits, 170 Forum, 279 France: relations with Yugoslavia, 23, 36, 37-56, 62, 98, 104; aid to Yugoslavia after 1948, 132, 170; Fifth Republic, 145. See also Yugoslavia; Foreign relations

426 Frank, Josip, 8, >8 Frankovci, 39411. See also Croatian P u r e Party of Rights Fromm, Erich, 309 Front of Popular Freedom, 28 Frunze, 245 Fund for economic developement, «66 Fundamental Law (1953), 135 _ 1 3 6 . «53. 257. See also Constitution (1946 and 1963); Government G A T T , 189, 232 GavTila, Patriarch, 65 General Act of Arbitration and Conciliation, 42 Geneva Agreement (1918), 240 Geneva Conference (1932), 43 Genoa Conference (1922), 13 German-Italian understanding re-Yugoslavia, 77 German Social Democratic Party, 238 Germany and Germans, 4, 112, 114, 119, 191, 192, 291; minority in Yugoslavia, 24, 83, 115, 321, 334; relations with Yugoslavia, 29, 32, 35, 40, 47. 48, 50, 51, 53, 54; economic relations and investments in Yugoslavia, 35-36, 47-48, 50, 62, 64; Anschluss, 36, 42,50; break-up of Czechoslovakia, 36; pressures on Yugoslavia to join T r i p a r t i t e Pact, 52-53, 64-65; military preparations against Yugoslavia, 54-55, 68; overtures to Maiek and Croats, 55; invasion of Soviet Union, 56, 64, 251; psychological warfare against Yugoslavia, 60; economic control of southeastern Europe, 64; ultimatum to Yugoslavia, 64-65; move into Bulgaria, 64; military power, 65, 69; relations with ustashe, 69; plot to dismember Yugoslavia, 69; invasion of Yugoslavia, 69, 71; German troops enter Zagreb, 71; conquest of Yugoslavia, 73; Yugoslav putsch contributes to defeat of Germany, 73; confiscations and seizures in Yugoslavia, 76-77; replaces Italy in Croatia, 77; recruitment and deportation of workers, 77; army of occupation, 78, 80; economic exploitation of wartime Serbia, 79; attitude toward Nedii's regime, 79-80; military occupation and administration of Serbia, 81; Germans in Slovenia, 83; persecution of Communists in Yugoslavia, 85; German reprisals in Yugo-

Index slavia, 90-91; occupation regimes and policy, 90, 100; use of terror and drastic measures, 90; defeat Partisans, 92; cooperate with Chetniks, 93, 94; WaffenruheVertrage, 93; military operations against the Partisans, 100-101; sixth and seventh offensives against Partisans, 104; airborne attack on Drvar, 104; occupation forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 105-106; withdrawal from Greece, 106; retreat from Yugoslavia, 106-107, general retreat, 108-109, 1 1 S I offensive in Hungary, 109; collapse, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ; assistance to Chetniks and ustashe, 112; unconditional surrender, 1 1 3 ; persecution of Serbs, 120; control of Yugoslav industries d u r i n g the war, 125; Yugoslavia and the peace treaty, 188; militarism, 239; turns against Yugoslavia, 249; reception in Zagreb, 279; German minority leaves Yugoslavia, 334; Yugoslav prisoners of war and the fate of the Yugoslav army, 366n. See also Minorities; Volksdeutsche Gero, Erno, prime minister, 178-179 Ghana, 226 Giolitti, Giovanni, 38 Glediita, 278 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 178 Gorizia, 38 Gorki«?, Milan, 29. See also Ciiinski, Josip Gospodar, 330 Government Prewar, 83-84, 103-104; judicial, legal, political system, 3; proclamation of unification (1918), 6-7; government of December 20, 1918, 6-7; provisional parliament, 7; local government, 10, 19; regional government, 30-32; coup d'etat of 1941, 67-68; government-inexile, 72, 80-83, 90-91, 103, 105-108; significance of coup d'etat, 73-74. See also Constitution; (1921, 1946 and 1963); Fundamental law Postwar: federalism, 83-84, 86; unified government (1945). 86, 108; Quisling and satellite governments, 88; national liberation committees, 96, 99; people's government (narodna vlast), 99; National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, 103; Subacid agreements, 120-121; Communist government, 120-121; Provisional Government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, 122-

Index 125; decentralization, 133, 143, 171; social selfgovernment, 133, 146-147; socialist democracy, 133, 139, 141; reforms (1952-1953), i35-»37; president, 135; Presidium of the Federal Assembly, 135; parliamentary debates, 141; federal, republican, and communal government, 143, 146-147; people's committees (communal), 143; Federal Chamber, 144, 147; Federal Assembly, 144-145; republican assemblies, 144; Supreme Court, 145; Federal Executive Council, 145; rotation principle, 145; secret police, 150; people's democracy, 156; ethnic complexion of government, 240-241; Rankovii affair, 272-273; police law (1966), 273; governmental experimentation, 295-297, 315; federal and local government, 297; theoretical basis, 297. See also Federalism; OZNA; Politics; UDBA Grand Alliance, 43, 47 Great Britain, 47, 55, 72, 121; investments in Yugoslavia, 35; relations with Yugoslavia, 44, 51, 52, 53-54, 154, 159; pressure on Yugoslavia in 1941, 65-67; expeditionary force in Greece, 66; secret talks with Yugoslavia, 68; policy toward Yugoslav resistance movements, 91; liason with Partisans, 101-102, 157; jettison Mihailovii, 102; withdraws military mission from Mihailovii, 102; British destroyer returns Tito, 104; military mission to Partisans, 104, 106, 157, 373n.; British troops on Vis, 105; agreement with Soviet Union on spheres of influence, 107; relations with Tito's Yugoslavia deteriorate, 109; reject surrender of Croatian units, 112-113; aid to Yugoslavia, 132, 168, 170; economic agreements with Yugoslavia, 168 Great depression, 21, 34, 42 Great Serbia and Great Serbianism, 57, 82, 87, 245, 274, 278. See also Serbia and Serbs Greece, 98; relations with Yugoslavia, 44, 49-56 passim, 64, 76, 164-165, 169, 171; Venizclist revolt, 46; Italian invasion (1940), 51; German invasion, 53, 64, 69; military talks with British and Yugoslavs, 68; in Yugoslav military strategy, 70-72; Hitler plans, 73; German withdrawal from Greece, 106-107; Slav National Liberation Front (SNOF), 164-

427 165, 268; opposition to Tito's Macedonia solution, 165; Greek civil war (Stalin refugees), 165, 169; Tito cuts off aid to Greek insurgents, 169; military dictatorship, 195-196, 260; border cooperation with Yugoslavia, 260; Macedonian problem and Slav minority in Greece, 268-269 Grol, Milan, 108, 123-124, 158 Gubec, Matija, 292 Gypsies, 276, 316

Habsburgs, 37, 41, 236, 237 Halpern, M. Joel, x, 316 Hayduk, Veljko, 269 Health, 5 Hebrang, Andrija, 128, 130, 167 Heeren, Viktor, von, 52 Hegemonism, 264. See also Yugoslavia; Government; Great Serbia Herzegovina, 77, 80, 98, 101, 112, 114. See also Bosnia and Herzegovina Hirtenberg, 43 Historiography: historical problems and controversies, 271, 277, 281; discussed at the eighth congress of the LCY, 277; third congress of Yugoslav historians (1961), 278; History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, 280-281 Hitler, Adolf, 48, 66, 68, 77; relations with Yugoslavia, 42, 43, 50-56 passim; orders invasion of Yugoslavia, 54-55; offers guarantees, 64; victories in Europe, 65; reaction to Yugoslav coup d'état of March 1941, 69; plans against Yugoslavia, 69; stopped at Moscow and doomed, 73-74; conquers Yugoslavia, 73; plans against Turkey and Greece, 73; dismemberment of Yugoslavia, 74. See also Germany; Foreign affairs Hoare-Laval plan, 47 Hodjera, Svetislav, 23, J56n. Holidays (Communist), 340 Horthy, Nicholas, admiral, 41 Hospitals, 5. See also Health House of Commons, 122 Households: changes in average size from 1953 to 1961, 349t.; number of members,

35°t-

Housing: problems, style, conditions, 327328, 332-333; size of household, 319 Hoxha, Enver, 164; relations with Yugoslavia, 185; attacks Khrushchev, 186; See

428 also Albania; Yugoslavia; Foreign relations Hungary, 4, 35, 106, 109, 141; relations with Yugoslavia, 14, 40, 41, 41, 43-44, 48, 50, 51, 77; pact of eternal friendship, 51; plans against Yugoslavia, 6g; collaboration with Axis in Yugoslavia, 71; invades Bafka, 71; annexation of Ba£ka, Baranja, and Med jumurje, 76-77; expels Serbian colonists, 77; Hungarian revolution (1956), 178-179; Yugoslav policy, 178-179; Soviet intervention, 178-179; repercussions in Communist world, 179-181; border relations with Yugoslavia, 353; anti-Titoist, 259-260

Ijekavski, 270 Illiteracy, 5 Income: average per capita by ethnic groups and republics, 62; wage earners, 319; See also Economy Indépendant Democratic Party, 15, 17-18, 84. 93. i*S Indépendant State of Croatia (Neuwisna Drzava Hrvatska), 69-73, 7®< 78. 81, 82, 111, 112, 113, 249; Germans arrive in Zagreb, 71; Croatian army, 73; population in 1941, 76; treaties with Italy, 77; a joint Italo-German protectorate, 77; Muslims, 276; persecution of Serbs, 367n. See also Croatia; Croats; Pavelii; Ustasha Indépendant Workers Party of Yugoslavia, 15-16; legal arm of CPY, 241 Indonesia, 188 Industry, 125, 127, 128. See also Yugoslavia; Economy Inflation, 64. See also Yugoslavia; Economy Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, 3*8 Intelligentsia, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, 60-61, 117, 289 Interests, 63. See also Yugoslavia; Economy Interim Decree, 33 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), 4, 14, 15, 24, 40, 43, 247; Comintern position, 244-245; rapprochement with Croatian Republican Peasant Party, 244-245; I M R O (United), 245. See also Comintern; Communist Party of Bulgaria; Communist Party of

Index Yugoslavia; Foreign relations; Macedonia; Yugoslavia Internment camps, 31, J59n. Iraq, 196 Iron Gate Dam, 264 Islam, 3. See also Muslims; Religion Israel, 155, 189, 195, 196 Istria, 38, 105, 108-111, 115 Italy and Italians, 4, 24, 112; relations with Yugoslavia, 29, 30, 37-41, 42-44, 47, 51, 55, 62, 69, 71, 154, 172; economic relations with Yugoslavia, 35-36, 48-49; Italian imperialism, 37; Yugoslav minority in Italy, 37-39; pact of friendship with Yugoslavia, 38-39; relations with Albania, 38-39; pacts of Tirana with Albania (1925, 1926), 39, 105, 110, 251; League's sanctions against Yugoslavia, 46, 36m.; Italian minority in Yugoslavia, 48; Italo-Yugoslav treaty (1937), 49; pressure on Yugoslavia to join Tripartite Pact, 53; Italian troops in Albania, 71; invasion of Yugoslavia, 71; victory in Yugoslavia, 73; occupation and annexation of Yugoslav territories, 74, 76, 78; Rome treaties with Croatia, 77; army of occupation, 78, 92, 94; gains in Croatia, 78; occupation of Montenegro, 80; policy in occupied Slovenia, 83; requires Yugoslav resources, 88; Supersloda, 93; collapse, 94, 100, 104; occupation policy, 100; operations against Partisans, 100-101; alters policy towards Chetniks, 102; Croats and Slovenes in Italy, 105, 251; territorial claims by Yugoslavia, 105, 124; Istria, 105, 108-111; population exchange with Yugoslavia, 110-111, 172; Trieste problem settled, 172; seizes Yugoslav lands, 239; border cooperation, 260; attitude toward Montenegro, 268; Yugoslavia demands Istria, Slovene Littoral, Trieste, Rijeka (Fiume), 374n. See also Foreign affairs; Trieste; Minority

Jajce, 102, 104, 252 Jankovii, general, deputy chief of staff of the supreme command signs armistice, 72 Japan, 73 Jasenice, 318 Jevdjevii, Dobrosav, Chetnik leader, 111

Index Jevtii, Bogoljub, prime minister, 22-25, 26-27 Jews, 4; anti-Semitism, 24, 51; persecution in Croatia, 78-79 Johnson, Lyndon, president, 194 Jovanovif, Batril, 40«n. Jovanovié, Dragoljub, 28, 128-1(9 Jovanovié, Jean, 139 Jovanovié, Slobodan, prime minister, 54, 67 Jugoslavenska vojska u oladzbini (Yugoslav Army in Homeland), 82-94 Julian Alps, 320 Kaclerovié, TriSa, 242. See also Chetniks Kalafatovié, Danilo, general, 72 Kallay, Benjamin von, 276 Karadjorjevié dynasty, 237; relations with Montenegro, 268. See also Alexander, Peter I, Peter II, Paul Karadîié, Vuk Stefanovié, 340 Karageorge (Karadjordje), 326 Kardelj, Edvard, 85, 141, 144, 201; Stalinist period, 132; on communes, 136-137; socialist democracy, 142; economy 148; Soviet policy, 158; South Slav federation, 162; Balkan federation, 163; break with the Soviet Union, 166; his theories, 181182; nationality problem, 238-239; Yugoslavia, 239; South Slav unification, 240; sporazum, 248; coup d'état (1941), 88 Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 237, 239; proclamation of kingdom, (1918), 239-240; renamed Yugoslavia (1929), 246, 278. See also Yugoslavia Kinship, 334-335 Kioseivanov, Georgi, 49 Kladovo-Turnu-Severin bridge, 49

429 Kljul, .59 Knelevid, Radoje L., 67 Kneievii, Zivan L., major, 67 Koievje, 251 Kolarov, Vasil, 245 KolaJin, 251 Kolishevski, Lazar, 252 Konjovii, Petar, 57 Korea, 189 KoroSec, Anton, 9, 10, 14, 28 Kosmet (Kossovo and Metohija), 4, 33, 39, 50, 76, 143, 164, 240, 259, 320; under Italian occupation, 76; annexed to Albania, 76; constitutional status, 127, 253; economy, 149; ethnic representation in government, 259; nationalism, 261; share of country's investments, 263; Belgrade-Bar railroad, 263; Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosmet, 275-276; constitutional problems, 283; Kosmet, 322; character of population, 326; zadruga, 331; household, 333; education, 339. See also Government; Politics; Economy: Albania Kostov, Traicho, 162, 170, 177 Kotor, gulf of, 74 Kragujevac, 66; German murder of Serbs, 37on.

Krek, Miho, 27 Krestintern, 245; See also Communist Peasant International Kriiari, 31 Krlefa, Miroslav, 57 Kulenovii, Diafer, 27, 280 Kum, Kumovi, 334 Kvaternik, Slavko, colonel, 69, 78 Land, 4; land reform, 33; land tenure, 33 Language, problem of, 5, 57, 321-322; conflict, 269-270, 3g6n.; official languages (Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian), 271; language of military command, 322; first-grade primers, 339-340; literature, 341; in Kosmet, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Serbia, and Croatia, 341342. See also Education; Schools; Universities Laos, 188 Latin alphabet, 270, 321 Latin America, 191-193 Lausanne Convention on Straits, 46 Laval, Pierre, 44 Law on Associations, 20

430 L a w for the Defense of T h e Realm, is, 16, 31; L a w for the Defense of State Security and Order, 18 L a w for the Protection of the Land Cultivators, ( i League of Communists of Serbia. See Communist Party of Serbia League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), «93, 304-303, 306-307; nationality problem, 256; on national equality, selfmanagement, and socialist Yugoslavism, 256; seventh congress (1958), 262; eighth congress (1964), 265-266; economic reforms, 267; nationalism and economics, 267; on Croatian declaration denouncing N o v i Sad agreement, 271; Rankovid affair, 272; on Muslims, 277; third plenum, 312; on Praxis, 312; L C Y program, 407n., 4ogn. See also Communist Party of Yugoslavia League of Nations, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49 Legion of Work, 24 Lenin, 139, 148, 309, 315 L'Hunanite, 126 Liebknecht, Karl, 139 Lika, 77, 92, 95, 109; uprising in the Second W o r l d War, 280 Linguistic problem, 269-270; Croatian declaration denouncing Novi Sad agreement, 270-271; Latin and Cyrillic alphabets, 270; Serbian and Croatian claims, 272. See also Language Literature, problem of, 271-272; Dubrovnik literature, 272; Bosnian and Herzogovinian, and Partisan literature, 288 L i t t l e Entente, 23, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50; Economic Council, 42; Geneva agreem e n t (1933), 43 L j o t i l , Dimitrije, 23, 24, 26, 80, 111, 112; his armed followers returned to Yugoslavia, 113; armed followers, ison., 376 L j u b l j a n a , 66, 109; under Italian occupation, 74; Ljubljana-Zagreb Tailroad, 74; L j u b l j a n a gap, 111, 112; population, 322, 4i4n. Local government. See Commune; Government; Yugoslavia Locarno Pact, 43 L o h r , Alexander, colonel general, 376n. Loyalists (Spanish), 84 M a f e k , Vladko, 16, 24, 26, 29, 30, 78, 83, 367n.; arrest and imprisonment, 21-22;

Index T r i p a r t i t e Pact, 53-55; German overtures, 55; deputy prime minister, 55, 69; insists on sporazum, 69; rejects German offer and joins Simovii, 69; in the Second W o r l d W a r , 279; on April War, 280; discussions with Italians, 357n., 358n. See also Croatia; Croatian Peasant Party; Cvetkovif-Maiek agreement; sporazum Macedonia and Macedonians, 3, 4, 15, 19, 33. 4". 55. 6°. 69. " 5 . >43. , 6 2 - s o ' . MS244, 246, 280, 321; in Yugoslavia's defensive system, 70; battle zone, 71; partition in the Second World War, 76; Insurrection, 80; in South Slav federation, 162; Pirin and Greek Macedonia, 162; Macedonian Slav Partisans in Greece, 165; Greek and Vardar Macedonia, 165; nominal income, 222; proposed autonomy, 236; as South Serbia, 240; demand for national recognition, 240; population, 241; Comintern policy, 244; May Manifesto, 245; federalists, 245; separation, 246; self-determination, 248; turn against Yugoslavia, 249; Antifascist Council, ( A S N O M ) , 251; in Yugoslav federation, 251; Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, 251; Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 251-252; the general staff of the National Liberation A r m y , 252; on union with Yugoslavia, 252; A S N O M proclaims Macedonian People's Republic within Yugoslavia, 252-253; federation, 252; share of country's investments by republics, 263; favors economic centralization, 265; nationalism, problem of, 267, 276; rivalry over Macedonia between Communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 268; Macedonians in Greece, 268; Slav National Liberation Front (SNOF), 268; proclaimed national and a republic, 268-269; Bulgarian claims, 268; T s a r Samuel, 269; liberation from Axis rule, 269; Macedonian Orthodox Church, 269; area and population, 320; Albanian minority, 322; character of population, 326; household, 333; internal migration, 334; education, 339; Bulgarian claims and propaganda, 398n. McClellan, W o o d f o r d D., viii, 119 McDowell, Robert H., head of American mission to Chetniks, 374n. Macesii, George, ix, 203

Index MacLean, Fitzroy, heads British mission to Tito, 37jn. Maglaj, 3 1 6 - 3 x 5 passim Magnohrom industrial complex, 2 0 9 Magyars (Hungarians), 4 , « 5 3 , 2 5 9 ; nationalism, 2 6 1 , 2 6 8 ; discrimination against, 2 7 2 Maksimovil, Boia, 2 2 , 2 3 Maliiid-Martinovic, Jovan, head of CPY, 246 Mao-Tse-tung, 1 7 3 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 "March on the Drina," 269 Marcuse, Herbert, 3 0 9 Maribor, 4 0 Marinkovil, Vojislav, 2 1 Marita, operation of, 5 1 Marjanovii, Jovan, 2 6 1 , 274, 2 7 5 Markos, general, 169. See also Vaphiades Markovii, Siraa, 12, Communist Party leader, 240; on nationality question, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 ; criticized at First Party Conference, 2 4 1 ; on class struggle, 2 4 2 ; his views condemned by Comintern, 244 Marseilles, 2 2 , 4 3 Marshall Plan, 1 6 1 Martinovii, Jovan. See MaliSii-Martinovii, Jovan Marx and Marxism, 1 3 9 , 289, 290, 297, 299, 3 1 3 , 3 1 5 ; Marxism-Leninism, 1 1 7 ; Marxist socialism, 1 3 3 ; variation, 2 8 5 - 3 1 5 ; in Yugoslavia, 2 9 4 ; theory, 299, 3 0 0 - 3 0 2 , 3 0 6 - 3 0 8 , 3 1 5 ; Soviet theory, 307; young Marx, 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 , 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 ; humanism, 3 1 1 ; ideology, 313. See also bibliography (402) May Manifesto ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 1 5 Medjumurje (Medjimurje), 40, 7 6 Meitrovid, Ivan, 5 7 Mexico, 1 9 3 Middle classes. See Bourgeoisie Middle East crisis, 1 9 5 - 1 9 8 , 2 0 1 Migration, 3 2 7 - 3 2 8 ; internal, 3 3 4 Mihajlov, Mihajlo, 1 5 1 , 200, 2 7 5 Mihailovil, Draia, general, 8 1 , 83, 87, 9 0 9 1 , 1 0 2 , 1 0 3 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 1 , 1 2 0 , 1 7 8 , 287, 36811.; head of Chetniks, 8 2 , 1 1 1 ; minister of army, navy, and air force, 8 2 , 8 9 - 9 0 ; followers in Slovenia, 8 3 ; on German reprisals, 9 0 - 9 1 ; aims and objectives, 9 1 ; collaboration, 9 1 , 9a; contacts with Nedii, 9 1 ; attacks Partisans (November 1 9 4 1 ) , 9 1 ; transfers headquarters to Montenegro, 9 2 ; Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command (June 1 0 , 1942), 9 2 ; collaboration with Nedid, 9 2 ; Chetnilc

4SI organization and commands, 9 5 ; as a military leader, 96; relieved of command, 1 0 7 ; final months, 1 1 2 ; capture and execution, 1 1 2 ; trial 376n. See also Chetniks Mikoyan, Anastas, 1 7 0 , 1 7 8 Military League-Zveno, 2 2 Military zones of wartime occupation. See map, 5 0 Mills, C. Wright, 3 0 9 Mining and mineral resources, 3 5 , 76. See also Yugoslavia; Economy Minority, 4 , 3 7 , 8 3 , 259; German, 2 4 ; Yugoslav in Italy, 3 7 - 3 9 , 47; Croat in Italy, 1 0 5 , 2 5 1 ; Slovenes in Italy, 1 0 5 , 2 5 1 ; Italian, 268; Albanian, 268, 275; Magyar (Hungarian), 268, 2 7 2 ; Serb in Croatia, 268; Serb and Montenegrin in Kosmet, 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 ; Turkish, 2 7 6 ; Gypsy, 2 7 6 ; Slovak, Ukrainian, Romanian, Albanian, and Hungarian, 3 2 0 ; rights and schools, 3 2 1 . See also Jews; Nationality, Office of Minorities, Population Mirkovii, Bora, general, 54, 67 Modernization, 5 , 3 1 6 - 3 1 8 ; in OraSac, 3 3 2 ; in villages, 3 3 2 ; significance, 3 4 2 - 3 4 3 Molotov, Viacheslav M., 1 6 4 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 8 Monarchy, 1 2 1 . See also Karadjordevil; Government; Yugoslavia Monohrom complex, 209 Montenegro and Montenegrins, 3 , 6 , 1 1 , 1 8 , 6 0 , 7 7 , 80, 82, 87, 9 3 , 98, 1 0 1 , 1 0 6 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 , 236, 2 4 3 , 3 2 1 ; pro-Russian, 6 4 ; under Italian occupation, 7 6 , 80, 2 6 8 ; population in 1 9 4 1 , 7 6 ; uprising (July 1 3 , 1 9 4 1 ) , 8 0 ; Bjelaii (fusionists) and zelenaii (federalists), 80, 268, 280; Chetniks in Montenegro, 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ; Montenegrin anti-Partisan forces, 1 1 4 ; economy, 1 4 9 ; union with Serbia, 2 3 7 ; Montenegrin federalists, 2 4 7 ; selfdetermination, 248; Antifascist Council, 2 5 1 ; People's Republic, 2 5 3 , 268; share of country's investments, 263; BelgradeBar railway, 2 6 3 ; favors economic centralization, 265; Temporary Administrative Committee, 2 6 8 ; Congress of 1 9 4 1 , 268; Neiavisna Kraljevina Crnagora, 2 6 8 ; separate nation and culture, 268; in the First World War, 268; Montenegrins in Kosmet, 2 7 5 ; language, 279; uprising in the Second World War, 280; area and population, 3 2 0 ; geography, 3 2 0 ; national characteristics, 3 2 2 ; his-

4S2 torical traditions, 322; pastoral communities, 315; character of population, 3*6; 1adruga, 330; internal migration, 334; resistance movement, 40*n. Montreux Conference (1936), 46 Morafa, Petar, 278-279 Morgan, F. E„ general, 110 Morgan line, n o Moslems. See Muslims; Moslem Party Moslem Party, 1x3 Moscow, 117, i*8, 195, 196; in Second World War, 73-74; Moscow conference (1957), 182; Moscow meeting (i960), 186 Moskovljevii, MiloJ, «70 Mrkonjii grad, 151 Muhii, Fuad, 277 Munich crisis (1938), 29, 50 Muslims, 3,4,9,82,83,87,112,320; in Chetnik Tanks, 83; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 268, 276, 277; nationalism, 275-276; demand recognition of seperateness, 276, 277; politics, 276; Communism, 276; Gypsies, Turks, and Islamicized Slavs, 276, 321; literature and writers, 277; League of Communists of Serbia on Muslims, 277; in April War, 280; Turks and Albanian, 300-321; village life, 316; zadruga, 330; community constitution, 4oon., bibliography on Muslim demands, 4oon. Mussolini, 38, 42, 43, 48, 50, 51, 68; plans attack on Yugoslavia, 64; complains against Germany, 77. See also Italy National komitet oslobodjenja Jugoslavije (NKOJ), 121 Nagy, Imre, 179, 183 Narodna Odbrana (national defense), 67 Nasser, Gamal, 190, 191, 195 National Bloc, 15 National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOJ), 104, 121 See also Nacionalni komitet oslobodjenja Jugoslavije National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, (Narodno vijece Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba, 7, 9, 1 1 , 237 Nationalism, 29, 269, 281-282; nationalistic organizations, 24; nationalism and communism, 236-284; Tito's criticism, 260-261; discussion of the eighth congress, LCY, 260; Veljko Vlahovifs statement, 261; considered by the League of Communists of Serbia, 261;

Index Jovan Marjanovid and Dobrica £osii on nationalism, 261; Kosmet, 261; economics of nationalism, 261-267, 305; Slovene, Croat, Serbian, and Macedonian nationalisms, 276; nationalism in historical writings, 277-281; assessment of nationalism, 281-284. See also Minority; Nationality; Yugoslav idea; Yugoslavism; Yugoslav nation Nationality, 60-61, 86-88, 135, 155; nationality rights, 51, 57, 256-259; Yugoslav nationality and nation, 236, 257; Austro-Marxist conception, 236; nationality problem, 249, 252, 287; nationalities in Yugoslavia 2541., 2551., 256t.; federal organization of state, 253; social management, 257; bourgeois nationalism, 257; social unification and socialcultural consciousness, 257; national languages and cultures, 257; socialist Yugoslavism, 257; nationality question at the seventh and eighth congresses, LCY, 257-258; protected by law, 258259; right to use own language, 258-259; constitutional guarantees, 259; bibliography on nationality question, 391-394 National Liberation Army, 89, 96, 103104; Fourth Army, 109; occupies Serbia, 107. See also Partisans National Liberation Army supreme headquarters, 101-103, I 0 4 - I 0 5 National Liberation Committee, 96, 99, 251, 372n., 373n. National Liberation Front, 96, 97, 99, 123, 126, 250, 287; fifth offensive, 100-101; in Istria, 109 National Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, 88 National Peasant Party, 28 National Radical Party. See Radical Party National Turkish Organization, 8, 9 National Understanding Bloc, 26, 27-28 NATO, 191. 195 Natronka, 316 Navy, 340 Nazis, 51, 56, 113, 157; putsch in Austria, 43; propaganda, 55 Nazi-Soviet pact (>939), 66 Nedif, Milan, general and head of government of occupied Serbia, 79, 93, 1 1 1 ; cooperates with Mihailovii and Chetniks, 92-93 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 190, 193, 195 Neretva River, battle of, 100, 112

Index Nettuno Convention, 48 Neurath, Konstantin von, >9 New Order of Europe, 64, 69 Neiavisna Kraljevina Crnagora (Indépendant Kingdom of Montenegro), 268 Nicholas (Nikola), king of Montenegro, 37 Nikiié, 318 NiJ, s*7 Nitti, Francesco, 38 NjegoS (Petrovié, Petar), 340 Nkrumah, Kwame, 195 Nonaligned nations, 187, 189-195; Belgrade conference (1961) and Cairo conference (1964), 19t North Africa, 100 North Vietnam, 194 Novak, Grga, 283 Novak, Karlo, major, 83 Novi Sad agreement on Serbo-Croatian language, (1954), 270 Oblast, Oblasti (prefecture), 10, 240 Obzana (decree), 1 : , 192 Oil, 76. See also Economy Okrulnica, 30-31 Operation, 25, 68. See also Directive Operation Overlord, 104 Operation Schwarz, 101 Operation Weiss, I, II, III, 100 Opposition, 21 Opposition Bloc, 15, 16, 26 Opitina (pi. opftine), 10 OraSac, modernization, 332-333; household, 332-333 Organization of the Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA), 14 Orthodox Church (Serbian), 3, 25, 61-62, 269, 316-317, 320. See also Macedonian Orthodox Church Otoiac, 251 Ottoman rule: zadruga, 330; village institutions, 330; influence on Yugoslavs, 320-322 OZNA, 129. See also Police; UDBA Palestine, 72 Panievo, 264 Papuiar, 332 Paris Peace Conference, 37 Partisans, 79, 83-86, 88-97, 9 9 - , 0 0 > , 0 9> 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 139, 156, 157, 160, 276, 286, 287, 288-290, 302, 314; cooperation with Chetniks, 82; in Slovenia, 82, 83; supreme headquarters

43S of the Partisan forces, 88-89; Stollce decisions, 88; break with Chetniks, 92; defection in ranks, 92; expulsion from Serbia, 92, 98; contrasted with Chetniks, 95-96; military and political operations, 97-109; German offensives against them, 100-101; supreme headquarters of the National Liberation Army, 101, 103; strength, 101; Partisan headquarters in Croatia, 101; disarm Italians, 103; military strategy, 106; liquidation of opposition, 111-114; liberate Zagreb (May 8, 1945), 112; defeat Chetniks, 112; reasons for success, 1 1 6 - 1 1 8 ; wartime economic measures, 116; Partisan myth, 287; Yugoslav character, 288; ideology, 325; in school books and education, 339, 342; British Mission, 373n.; domination of movement, 403^, contribution to Allied cause, 403n. See also National Liberation Movement; National Liberation Army; National Liberation Partisan Detachments; Stolice People's Committee (communal), 143 People's democracy, 156 People's Front, 287 People's liberation councils, 120 People's Republic of China. See China Permanent Commission of International Commerce, 46 Permanent Court of International Justice, 45 Peter I, Karadjordjevii, king, 7; death of, »3 Peter II, Karadjordjevtf, king, 22, 54, 103, 105, 122; proclaimed of age, 67; in April War, 72; leaves country, 72; abandons Milhailovi£, 107; forbidden to return home, 121 Pijade, Moia, 135, 139, 163 Pirot Agreement (1929), 44. See also Bulgaria, Foreign relations, Yugoslavia Plekhanov, George, 139 Plemena, 236, 238, 241 Plenia, DuSan, 280, 402n. Plitvice Resolution, 251 Pobratimstvo, 331 Poglavnik (leader, head), 69 Poland, 51, 116 Police, 273. See also OZNA, UBDA Political parties, 6-8, 27-29, 68, 84, 1 1 9 120, 240, 353n. Politics, 120; situation on the eve of war, 51; government resignations over the

434 Tripartite Pact, 53, 56; general appraisal, 56-58; political opposition, 1 1 1 11*; socialization, 115; political evolution, 117-153; Stalinist period (19451948), 122-131; Soviet model, 1*7; reconstruction, 127; Soviet satellite, 128; authoritarian methods, 128; period of readjustment (1948-1952), 131-134; contradictions, 131; new policy, 133; theory, 134; a new system, 147; dictatorship, 246; Communist measures, 246; Macedonian problem and Bulgaria, 252; federalism or a unitary state, 252-253; multinational community, 253, 292; minorities, 259; linguistic conflict, 269-270; constitutionalism, 281-282; experiment in socialism, 286; Soviet model abandoned, 291; reply to Stalinism, 293; Karadjordjevii dynasty, 326; bibliography on internal politics, 353-363 Popovif, Koia, foreign minister, 187 Popular Front, 80-81, 84, 134, 135, 161; program, 125 Population, 3, 5, 123; surplus, 33; urban and rural, 62, 319; overpopulation, 62; partition map of Yugoslavia (1941), 75; population in 1941 by annexed provinces, 76; Serbian losses in two world wars, 90; orthodox population in Austria, 331; principal Yugoslav cities (1921-1961), 346t.; agricultural population in urban settlements (1953), 348; in 1939 by occupation, 36311. See also Colonization; Minority; Nationality Poznan riots, 178 Praxis, 151, 309-313, 315; on Yugoslav culture, 274-275; criticized by Tito, 278, 312; young Marx, 310; Marxism, 310; character of the periodical, 41m. Prekomurje, 76 Preieren, France, 340 President of the Republic, 135. See also Tito Presidium of the Federal Assembly, 135. See also Constitution; Government; Federal Executive Council Prespa, 252 Press, 19 Pribiievii, Svetozar, 14-18, 28; on King Alexander, 355n. "Prinz Eugen," Seventh SS Division, 113 Prisoners of war, 73, 77 PriStina, Hasan-beg, 14

Index Prizad (chartered company for the export of agricultural products), 34 Protestants, 3. See also Religion Protié, Stojan, prime minister, 6-7, 9, 13, 353 Protogerov, Alexander, 5 Province of Ljubljana, 74. See also Ljubljana Pula, n o Punctuations, 21, 356n. Purié, Boiidar, prime minister, 83, 102 Putsch of March 27, 1941, 54, 67-69; interpretations of, 55-56. See also Coup d'état of March 27, 1941 Quisling governments, 78-80, 83 Raiii, PuniSa, 18 Raéki, Franjo, historian, 283 Radii, Antun, 11 Radié, Pa vie, 17 Radié, Stjepan, 11, 13, 14, 17-18; capitulates, 17; relations with Comintern, 244-245; relations with IMRO, 244-245; joins Communist Peasant International (Krestintern), 245; murdered, 246; assassination in literature, 355n. Radical Party, 7-8, 14, 15-17, 18, 21-23, 27; old radicals, 26 Radio London, 107 Radniike novine, 238 Radosavljevié, Dobrivoje, 264 Railroads, 34. See also Economy; Yugoslavia Ràjk, Lâszlô, 170 Ràkosi, Mâtyâs, 177-179 Rankovié, Alexander, 85, 129, 143, 147, 201-202, 38on.; imprisons Cominform supporters, 130; on Party membership, 148; expulsion from Central Committee, LCY, 150-151; charges against him, 272; condemned by the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, LCY, 272«73Rapallo, Treaty of, 38 Ravna Gora, 81 Red Army, 125; makes Communist revolutions, 159. See also Soviet Union Reforms, 133-137 Regency, 22, 54, 363 Regional Committee of Cpy for Macedonia, 252 Regional government, 10, 19, 30-32. See also Government; Yugoslavia

Index Religion, 3, (5, 61-62, 282, 3x0-3*1, 3630., 36411.; anticlericalism, 325. See also Catholic Church; Macedonian Orthodox Church; Protestants; Jews Renner, Karl, 236 Reparations, 35, 37, 127, 162. See also Economy; Yugoslavia Republican Workers-Peasant Bloc, 16 Republic assemblies, 144 Resistance movement, 368n. See also Chetniks, Partisans Revisionism, 40, 47-48, 50-51 Rhineland, 47 Ribar, Ivan, 126 Ribbentrop, Joachim, 53 Rijeka (Fiume), 74 Roman Catholic Church, 78-79. See also Catholic Church Romania and Romanians, 4, 50, 106; relations with Yugoslavia, 41, 46, 49, 51; Treaty of Craiova, 51; loss of Bessarabia (1940), 51; oilfields, 64; a German military base, 71-72; on Israel, 195; antiTitoist, 259-260 Romanian-Czechoslovak treaty, 41 Romanian-Yugoslav treaty, 41 Rome-Berlin Axis, 48. See also Axis Powers Rome Protocols (1943), 43 Rome treaties (May 18, 1941), 77 Rosandif, Torna, 57 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 139 Royal dictatorship, 18, 356n. See also Government; Yugoslavia Royal Manifesto, January 6, 1919, 33 Royal power, 30 Rupnik, Leo, general, 83 Russia and Russians, 91, 98; civil war, 85; See also Soviet Union Sabor, 30; See also Banovia (Croatia) St. Gotthard, 42 St. Margherita Convention, 48 St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan), 130 Solonika, 37, 49, 51-53, 65; Serbian zone, 44-45; Yugoslav-Greek agreement (1923), 44; Geneva protocols (1929), 44; pact of friendship (1929), 44. See also Greece; Foreign relations; Yugoslavia "Salonika Ship A-sail," 269 Samuel, Tsar, 269 Sanjak of Novi Pazar, 92; Antifascist Council, 251 San Stefano, treaty of (1878), 269

435 Sarajevo, 72, 107 Satorov, Metodi, Sharlo, 88, 251. Satellites, 88. See also Quisling states; Second World War; Yugoslavia Sava River, 107, 109 Schacht, Hjalmar, 48 Schools, 5, 31, 32. See also Education Second International, 139, 237 Secret Police, 150; See also OZNA, UDBA Secret treaties, 110 Self-government, 146-147, 312 Seljak, 229 Senate, 20-21, 25. See also Constitution; Government Serbia and Serbs, 3-6, 9, 1 1 , 18, 29, 56, 7778, 82, 87, 91, 93-94, 104, 106-107, I l l > 120, 150, 287, 321 First World War, 85, 105, 124, 237, 326; fall of Serbia, 4; damages and losses, 34; economic situation and losses, 115-116; liberation in 1918, 237; union with Montenegro, 237; Serbianization, 243; status of Montenegro, 268; war songs, 269; Serbian army, 269; Salonika front, 269 Interwar: hegemony in Yugoslavia, 101 1 , 21, 30, 70, 82, 120, 126, 239, 241243, 247; Serbian leaders, 25; Serbs in Austria-Hungary, 28; nationalism, 31, 24g, 261, 275-276; proposed banovina and srpske zemlje, 31; nationalists oppose Tripartite Pact, 54, 65; singled by Germans as main enemy, 55; proRussian sentiment, 64; ruling group, 72, 74, 240-242, 272, 279; losses in two world wars, 90; dynasty, 126, 326; kingdom, 237; prewar Communist agitation, 267; reactionary rule, 267 Second World War: Bulgarian occupation, 76; occupation costs, 77; "Quisling" government, 78; Serbian minority in Croatia, 78; expulsion from Croatia, 78; under Commissariat, 79; German military government, 79; local armed forces, 80; volunteer corps, 80; insurrection, 80-81; under foreign occupation, 90; Axis offensive against Partisans in Serbia, 98; Serbia occupied by Partisans (1944), 107; "Quisling" forces, 1 1 1 , 114; Serbian Chetniks, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 , Ustashe murder of Serbs, 113, 367^; Supreme Council for National Liberation of Serbia, 251; People's Republic, 253; uprising in

436 1941, 280; forced conversion of Serbs in Croatia, 3670.; expulsion of Serbs from Croatia, 3&7n. Postwar: Soviet and Bulgarian troops in Serbia, 106; economy, 149, 316; nominal income, i n ; minorities in Serbia, (59, 268; League of Communists of Serbia, 261; Orthodox Church, 261; accused of domination, 263-364; support economic reform, 266; Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 268; activated Serbian nationalism, 269; Serbian language, 270; proposal for reflection on linguistic conflict with Croatians, 271; Serbian Writers' Assembly, 271; Rankovid affair, 272; Serbs in Kosmet, 275; Albanian minority, 275; Croat-Serbian relations in the Second World War, 278, 343; Serbo-Croatian animosity, 279, 283; claim on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 283; Turks, 292; area and population, 320; national characteristics, 322; historical tradition, 322; crafts and industry, 327; economic establishments, 327; zadruga, 330; household, 333; internal migration, 334; transformations in family relationships, 338; elementary education, 341; Albanian irredentism, 400n. See also Albanians; Communist Party of Serbia; Economy; Minority; Orthodox Church; Minority Serbian Agrarian Party, 128-129 Serbian National Youth (SRNAO), 14, 24 Serbian Orthodox Church, 79, 120, 261. See also Orthodox Church Serbian Social Democratic Party, 278 Serbo-Croatian language (agreement of 1850 and Novi Sad agreement of 1954), 270 Seventh Congress, LCY (1958), 141-142 Sex equality, 341 Sforza, Carlo, count, 38 Shatorov, Metodi Sharlo, 251 Shippee, John, 119 Simovii, DuSan, general, 53, 54, 65, 67, 68, 78, 249; overtures to Axis, 55; transfers command to general Kalafatovid, 72; heads government, 78, 249 Sisak, 318 Sixth Congress of CPY, 134, 141 Skopje (Skoplje); earthquake, 322; Turkish tradition, 322

Index Skupitina, 9, 18, 23, 240; murder in, 18. See also Parliamentary debate Slavenski, Josip, 57 Slav National Liberation Front, 268 Slavonia, 76, 330; zadruga, 330 Slavophilism, 250 Slovakia, 29 Slovene Liberation Front, 250 Slovene Peasant Party, 9 Slovene People's Party, 6, 9, 13-16, 20, 2628, 247; its armed followers, 83; opposes constitution (1921), 240 Slovene Socialists, 28-29 Slovenia and Slovenes, 3, 5, 18, 19m 25, 27, 38, 83, 87, 105, 109, 111, 112, 136, 143, 236, 246; proposed banovina, 31; Tripartite Pact, 52; Axis invasion, 71, April War, 72; German and Italian annexations, 74; population in 1941, 76; in Chetnik ranks, 83; resistance forces and police, 83; Slovenes in Italy, 105; Slovenes in Istria and Trieste, 109; Slovenes in Slovenian Littoral and Istria, 110; Domobrans ( Domobranstvo), 111-112, Domobrans returned to Yugoslavia, 113; anti-Partisan forces, 114; nominal income, 222; proposed independence, 247; Slovene People's Party, 247; sporaium, 248; Slovene Liberation Front, 250; Antifascist Council, 251; minority in Italy, 251; People's Republic, 253; antiSerbianism, 261; contribution to national budget, 263; relations with Croats, 263-264; economy, 264; Italian minority, 268; Serbian immigrants, 268; activated nationalism, 270; 1850 language agreement, 270; nationalism, 276; bourgeoisie, 280; Slovene geography, 320; national characteristics, 322, 326; historical traditions, 322; women, 322; most developed in Yugoslavia, 322; urbanism, 327; cultural patterns, 329; household, 333; internal migration, 334; education, 339-340; education in prewar Yugoslavia, 36on. See also Economy; Slovene People's Party; Yugoslavia Slovenian Domobrans, 83, 111-112. See also Domobrans, Domobranstvo Slovenian Littoral, 109-110 Smederevo Steelworks, 264 Snoj, Franc, 27 Sochi, 178-179 Social change, 323-329; modernization, 316-348, 342-344; city population, 318;

Index urbanization of village, peasantization of town and impact of modernization, 3*3; household, 338-333 Social Democratic Party, 6, 8-9, 1 1 ; Austrian socialists, 236-237; Yugoslav socialists, 236-238; social participation in National Council, 237; German socialists, 237; South Slav socialists in AustriaHungary, 238. See also Yugoslav Socialist Party Social Democratic Party of Serbia, 236; Tenth Congress (1914), 236; position on nationality question, 236, 238; advocates union of Serbia and Montenegro, 236; on Macedonian question, 236; in the First World War, 237; Serbian socialists on Yugoslav unification, 238; Vukovar Congress, 238 Socialism, 303; material base, 266; Yugoslav theory, 286, 298-299; experiment, 286; Yugoslav socialism, 290; socialist society, 300 Socialist Alliance of Working Peoples of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), 135, 142, 146, 147; Fourth Congress, 135; Sixth Congress, 270; on nationalism and language, 270 Socialist (Yugoslav) consciousness, 274-275 Socialist democracy, 133, 139, 142, 171, 182,

3°7

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Yugoslavia Socialist patriotism, 289, 305, 4 1 m . Socialist theory (Titoism), 182 Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia, >38 Socialist Yugoslavism, 256. See also Yugoslavism Social Plan, 266; on underdeveloped republics, 265 Social relationships, 329-335 Social self-government, 133 Socijalistilki savei radnog naroda Jugoslavije. See Socialist Alliance of Working Peoples of Yugoslavia South America, 192 Southern Dobrudja, 51 Southern Muslim Organization, 9. See also National Turkish Organization South Serbia, 60, 321. See also Macedonia South Slav Federation, 162, 245, 269 South Slavs, 5, 6, 7, 9, 66, 83, 86, 87, 114, 130, 240, 283; attitude toward Italy, 105; unification, 236-238; one nation idea, 241; unification or separation, 244; federation, 269

437 Soviet bloc, 130, 173 Soviet constitution, 126-127 Soviet Union, 76, 86, 91, 103, 110, 112, 115, 116, 124, 126, 127-129, 156, 289, 290, 291; recognition of Yugoslavia, 32, 40, 51; negotiation with Yugoslavia, 55; relations with Germany, 66; Soviet intelligence, 73; in the Second World War, 73; relations with Yugoslavia, 82, 160-161, 198-200, 274-275, 289-290; Red Army in Yugoslavia, 98, 157; Yugoslav Partisans and the Soviet Union, 104; military mission to Partisans, 104, 106, 373-374; Red Army enters Yugoslavia, 106-107; Soviet-Yugoslav agreement (1944), 106; Soviet command, 106; Red Army in Yugoslavia, 106; agreement with Great Britain (1944) on spheres of influence in eastern Europe, 107-108; twenty-year treaty with Yugoslavia, 108; military progress, 108; ambivalence toward Tito, 120; Yugoslavia copies Soviet model, 127; espionage in Yugoslavia, 128; infiltrates CPY, 128; Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations, 128-129, 135, 155-156, 157, 158, 172-180, 182-183, 190-191, 39on.; agreement with Yugoslavia (1944), 157; Soviet wartime mission, 157; concerning Triests, 158; Red Army makes revolutions, 159; Eastern European federation, 159; foreign policy, 160; Balkan federation, 163; Albanian question, 164; break with Yugoslavia, 166; economic aid to Yugoslavia, 167, 189; isolation of Yugoslavia, 168; economic warfare against Yugoslavia fails, 168-169; pressure on Yugoslavia and threats, 169; seeks reconciliation with Yugoslavia, 172-180; exchange of ambassadors, 173; trade agreements, 173; Hungarian revolution, 178-179; world communism, 181; Titoism, 181; relations with China, 184187; Soviet-Yugoslav communique, 188; invasion of Czechoslovakia, 189, 202; relations with Czechoslovakia, 200-202; German invasion, 250-252; Soviet threat forces Yugoslav unity, 284; Soviet system, 291, 296; Marxist theory, 300; relations with Yugoslavia in the Second World War, 37on. See also Cominform Soviet-Yugoslav agreement (1955), 174175. See also Soviet Union Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, 289, 290. See also Soviet Union

438 Spaho, Mehmed, 14, 27 Spanish Civil War, 48, 84, 161; royalists, 48; Yugoslav volunteers, 84, 96 Special Operations executive (S. O. E.), 65 Spiljak, Mika, 231 Split, 66 Sporazum (August 26, 1939), »7-28, 30, 3*, 51, 61, 63, 5' ' 7 . *°> *3> >6, 276 Yugoslav National Party, 20-22, 24, 27 Yugoslav Peasant Radical Democratic Party, 27 Yugoslav Popular Party, 23, 356n. Yugoslav Social Democratic Party, 11 Yugoslav Socialist Party, 29 Yugoslav-Turkish treaty of friendship (•933). 45 Yalta Conference (February 4 - 1 1 , 1945). 108, 122, 158, 159, 165 Zagreb, 78, 83, 84, 109, 1 1 1 , 112, 124, 326; G e r m a n troops enter city, 69, 71-72; City Committee of the CPY, 85; University of, 309; concentration of industry, 318; appearance, 322; transformation, 343; population, 4i4n. Zakonitost (lawfulness), 302 Zaninovich, M. George, viii, 285 Zara (Zadar), 38 Zbor, 22-23, *4> *6. See also Ljotil, Dimitrije Zelenaii (federalists), 268. See also Montenegro Zenica, 318 Zinoviev, Gregory, 245 iivkovii, Petar, general, 18, 20-21, 23, 2 7 28 2ujovi£, Sretan, 128, 130, 167 Zveno, 40. See also Military League