Contemporary Issues in Africa's Development : Whither the African Renaissance? [1 ed.] 9781527509528, 9781527503632

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Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Development

Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Development: Whither the African Renaissance? Edited by

Richard A. Olaniyan and Ehimika A. Ifidon

Contemporary Issues in Africa's Development: Whither the African Renaissance? Edited by Richard A. Olaniyan and Ehimika A. Ifidon This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 by Richard A. Olaniyan, Ehimika A. Ifidon and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0363-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0363-2

CONTENTS

List of Tables ............................................................................................ viii List of Figures............................................................................................. ix Preface ......................................................................................................... x Part I: Introduction Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 Africa and the Challenges of Development in the 21st Century Richard A. Olaniyan Part II: The Social Dimension Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 24 University Education and the Challenge of Functionality Adebayo A. Lawal Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 43 Persistent Malaria in Africa and the Poverty of Continental Response Olukoya Ogen and Adeyemi Balogun Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 66 Re-Encountering the Slave Trade? The Dimensions of Human Trafficking O. Oko Elechi Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 84 Addressing Gender Issues in Africa: Rhetoric or Reality? Anyango E. Reggy and Lonzen W. Rugira Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 108 Feeding the Millions: Understanding Africa’s Food Security Problem Olutayo C. Adesina

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Contents

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 128 Social and Political Responses to Environmental Problems Olukoya Ogen Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 152 The Problem of Energy Security in Africa: Prospects and Challenges Lawrence I.N. Ezemonye, Emmanuel T. Ogbomida and Mike U. Ajieh Part III: The Political Dimension Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 174 Civil Society, Democratization and Development Kehinde O. Olayode Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 195 Sit-Tight Syndrome and Tenure Elongation in African Politics Ayodeji Olukoju Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 213 ‘FrancAfrican’ Politics and Dictatorships in Francophone Africa Jeremie K. Dagnini Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 231 The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Contemporary Africa Emmanuel Onyeozili and O. Oko Elechi Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 250 Of Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Wars: The Domestic and International Dimensions of Insecurity Kathleen O’Halleran Part IV: The International Dimension Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 280 The OAU, AU and the Response to Conflict: De-Linking Domestic Jurisdiction and the Capacity to Intervene Ehimika A. Ifidon Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 298 Colonialism, the Post-Colonial State, and the Challenge of (Dis)Integration in Africa W. Alade Fawole

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Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 320 Africa and the International Politics of HIV/AIDS Olufunke Adeboye Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 345 Sino-African Relations in the Age of Chinese Capitalism Terhemba Wuam Chapter Eighteen ..................................................................................... 366 Africa and its External Debt Problem Adetunji O. Ogunyemi Contributors ............................................................................................. 393 Name Index ............................................................................................. 395

LIST OF TABLES

Table 7-1: Highlights of Some Critical Environmental Issues in African Countries Table 8-1: Energy Consumption by Type in Africa (%), 2001 Table 8-2: Energy Access Targets agreed by African Ministers for 2015 (%) Table 8-3: Electricity Generation in Africa, 1997 Table 8-4: Regional Fossil Fuel Reserves (January 1999) Table 18-1: Nigeria’s Public Debt, 1923-1951 (£) Table 18-2: Africa’s International Market Loss (-)/Gain (+) Table 18-3: Growth in Expenditure of Selected African States, 1950-58 Table 18-4: Nigeria: Revenue and Expenditure Balance Table 18-5: Debt owed by Less Developed Countries ($ Billions) Table 18-6: Emerging and Developing Countries External Debt, 19912000 ($ Billions) Table 18-7: Emerging and Developing Countries External Debt, 20012010 Table 18-8: Ratio of External Debt to GDP (in % of GDP) Table 18-9: Ratio of Debt to GDP in Emerging and Developing Countries, 2001-2010

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 8-1: Relationship between Energy and the Achievement of MDGs Figure 8-2: Africa’s Oil and Gas Reserves

PREFACE

The inspiration to embark on the writing of this book came from a course, IS 390: International Studies, co-taught by the late Professor Lillian Trager of the University of Wisconsin-Parkside and Professor Richard Olaniyan of the Obafemi Awolowo University in the Spring Semester of 2006. Using an innovative method which provided a ‘virtual exchange’ experience in which UW-Parkside students were linked with students at OAU in Nigeria in a weekly on-line discussion via the internet, the course explored a wide range of contemporary issues and problems in Africa and sought to understand them in their social, political, cultural and historical contexts. Those issues are not dissimilar from the ones represented in the following chapters. There is no doubt that Africa has been quite a dynamic continent. Unlike other continents where changes have occurred within a specific and anticipated range, and, therefore been controllable, Africa has suffered severe returns necessitating new beginnings. Nothing would seem to have escaped this law-like and seemingly cyclical pattern of development: its economies have oscillated between forms of state control and free-fall models; its politics between militarization and democratization; and its cultural life hanging somewhere between the African and conceptions of the Western. The African condition is characterized by two distinct features: economic crisis in an era of globalization; and political weakness caused by centuries of oppression, exploitation, bad governance, and marginalization. Africa is in a state of crisis, and diverse manifestations of Africa’s destitution in critical areas demonstrate this. Consider the following data: • although endowed with abundant human and natural resources, Africa remains the least developed and most indebted continent; • more than thirty of the forty-seven countries considered least developed are in black Africa, and 50% of the population living in the region are considered among the world’s poorest, earning less than a dollar a day; • the continent suffers from infrastructural deficit: poor road network, poor communication facilities; and poor access to electricity and potable water;

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• Africa has the highest incidence of malaria and HIV/AIDS; • the continent is the most conflict-ridden, war-torn, and politically • • • •

unstable, and suffers from problems of refugees and internally displaced people; Africa depends heavily on food import, and her peoples’ calorie intake is below the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization; educationally backward, technologically unprepared, and with a low level of industrialization, Africa remains an exporter of primary commodities and natural resources; even though the continent constitutes 12% of the global population, it contributes less than 1% of the world’s trade and services; and Africa suffers from deplorable environmental disasters consequences of oil and mineral exploration, exploitation and spillage and deforestation that destroy the ecosystem.

It is no wonder that only four African countries: Mauritius, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, fell within the 1-100 range in the Human Development Index ranking for 2011 and 2015, while the seventeen bottommost countries in the 2015 ranking are from Africa.1 What seems obvious is the fact that the issues thrown up by the African situation have been recurrent: absence of good governance whether democracy exists or not, political corruption, personalization of state power, widespread diseases, persistent policy failure in education, economy and infrastructural development and dependence on Western (and now, Asian) expertise. Yet, the current form of these issues cannot be said to be the same as they were some decades ago. Intervening factors in the domestic and international environment, and in the intellectual and policy environment, have caused mutations and transformations of a qualitative character. What are the contemporary forms of these problems? This is the central question that this collection of essays has responded to. The making of this volume, in a sense, was not a guided process. There was no seminar or workshop to identify or determine the focus, approach, perspective or even documentation system that contributors should adopt beyond advertising the general theme: Contemporary Issues in Africa. What is clear from the contributions is the dismalness of the African situation. Is this apparently “realistic, hard-headed analysis of African

1

UNDP, Human Development Report, 2011 (New York: UNDP, 2011), 126; and Human Development Report, 2015 (New York: UNDP, 2015), 208-211.

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conditions”2 not another exercise in Afro-pessimism? But is any other analytical outcome possible? Morgan Tsvangirai (Zimbabwe’s prime minister between 2009 and 2013) described the African condition as “a phase that Africa should accept - mistaken policies, mistaken positions - but it’s a phase all the same.”3 The view that the dismal African condition is a stage in the historical development of the continent is an aspect of the now clearly fictive African Renaissance, at least in its most recent and peculiarly South African conceptualization. But what should have been attached as a preface is a description of Africa’s golden age that has motivated a rebirth. Has African existence in the past 200 years been anything but dismal? Where is evidence of the African Renaissance? To claim, as Gilley has done, that the African Renaissance is now over, and that across subSaharan Africa since the early 2000s “tyranny, stagnation, and conflict are on the rise again”4 is to suggest that the 1990s of civil wars, genocide, economic decline and political instability represented the period of the African Renaissance. Or is such an interpretation of Africa “based on Western imagination rather than on objective facts about the African condition”?5 The conceptualization of the African Renaissance is idealistic, elitist and built on mere hope, and has come to constitute a ‘cargo cult mentality’. Why is it that this hope of African resurgence is not shared by the masses of Africa, but rather situated “along the corridors of power in the richest countries, and among the university elites”?6 Advertising the African Renaissance without pin-pointing its manifestations, or proclaiming hope of African resurgence amidst much suffering, poverty and insecurity, has become an instrument of political legitimization and ideological correctness for Africa’s elite. The state that is the source of the African crisis is unfortunately the hope for a true African renaissance. But as van de Walle has rightly observed,

2

Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, “Vision, politics, and Structure: AfroOptimism, Afro-Pessimism or Realism?”, in Hemmed In: Responses to Africa’s Economic Decline, ed., Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 2. 3 TIME, November 28, 2011, 108. 4 Bruce Gilley, “The End of the African Renaissance,” The Washington Quarterly, 33(4), 2010, 87. 5 Mabogo P. More, “African Renaissance: The Politics of Return,” African Journal of Political Science, 7(2), 2002, 71. 6 Ama Mazama, “The African Century”, in Africa in the 21st century: Toward a New Future, ed., Ama Mazama (New York: Routledge, 2007), xiii.

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With a handful of exceptions, the postcolonial state in Africa has been largely antidevelopmental. Parasitic, rent-seeking, and inept, it has been simultaneously very coercive and extremely weak, forced to prey on the economy and civil society - with devastating effect - just to survive. The bureaucracy’s effectiveness has typically been undermined by a patrimonial logic, in which state assets are routinely plundered for the political advantage of the regime, and state-society relations have been characterized by clientelism rather than citizenship. The state, powerless to elicit respect or loyalty from the populace, has typically used threats and coercion to achieve minimal - usually passive - acquiescence.7

But this is not a new condition. What the colonial state was, the postcolonial state became. The recurrence of the African condition in its varied forms in almost cyclical movements has become persistent. To “understand a slow-moving society, trapped for centuries in a cycle of poverty and tradition and disease and ignorance,” Mills has argued, “requires that we study the historical ground, and the persistent historical mechanisms of its terrible entrapment in its own history.”8 To therefore speak of the logic of return within a cyclical framework is not a return informed by knowledge of the past, but by a lack of it. “Those who cannot remember the past,” Santayana’s warning rings true, “are condemned to repeat it.”9 Whither the African Renaissance? We must here express our deep appreciation of the unflinching support and forbearance of the contributors. The publication of this book has taken a much longer time than we ever anticipated. The delay was due, in part, to inevitable changes we had to make at different times on the list of contributors. Now, we are happy to share in their pride and joy that the book is finally out.

7

Nicolas van de Walle, “Crisis and Opportunity in Africa,” Journal of Democracy, 6(2), 1995, 132-133. 8 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959), 155. 9 George Santayana, The Life of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner, 1906), 284.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE AFRICA AND THE CHALLENGES ST OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21 CENTURY RICHARD A. OLANIYAN

The Past in the Present Some four decades ago, the prolific scholar of African history, consummate journalist and current affairs commentator, Basil Davidson, asked the intriguing question, Can Africa survive? It was the title of his contentious book with the sub-title, Arguments against growth without development.1 Today, the question and the sub-title are still relevant and topical. But the thrust of the contemporary discourse is not whether Africa can survive, that has never been an issue, for Africa can and will survive, as Basil Davidson himself unequivocally admitted. The pertinent question is: What are the prospects for growth and development in Africa in this century? It is the issue of growth and development that has now engaged the attention of the community of leading lights in the academic and policy-making circles. Over the years, the concept of development has undergone several transformations from its simple definition in the early 1960s to its present broader, all-inclusive, comprehensive meaning involving all aspects of human preoccupation capable of or requiring improvement and transformation. Development was first conceived as the process of emerging from the state of underdevelopment to one of development as typified by the states of Europe and North America. Later, the concept of development was considered from the comparative point of view as between the developed, industrialized societies, with their moral and material superiority, as against the backward and ‘underdeveloped’ societies mainly found in essentially non-Western societies of Asia and Africa. It has also been posited by the dependency theorists that the syndrome of growth without development persists when feudal interaction structures, consisting of asymmetrical relations of highly unequal exchanges

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and differential beneficial spin-offs dating back to the colonial era, exist in commodity and trade concentration which ties African states (periphery/satellite) in relations of dependence to the developed former colonial centres (metropolis) in particular and the world capitalist system in general. The upshot of this relationship is that the periphery, producers and exporters of primary goods and consumers of manufactured goods from the metropolis, will continue to wallow in underdevelopment, while the metropolitan countries will continue to reap the benefits and enhance their development. Today, with the emphasis on market value and correct pricing, the consensus of opinion is that development is “a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investment, the orientation of technological development and institutional change, are all in harmony, and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.” In its more comprehensive and explicit definition, it is seen as combining “sustainable growth, poverty reduction, human development, environmental protection, institutional transformation, gender equity, and human rights protection.” There is now a decided emphasis on antipoverty strategies fashioned to empower the poor. The post-colonial discourse on development, especially in the Third World countries, has been essentially a story of backwardness, poverty, disease, declining quality of education, political instability, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, insecurity of lives and property, debt crises, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, human rights abuse, infrastructural deficit, social disintegration, corruption, burgeoning terrorist incidents, failed states, sittight syndrome, ineffective and uninspiring leadership, neo-colonialism, marginalization and exploitation. Africa has for long been a victim of all these and more.2 To fully understand and appreciate the contemporary predicament of African development, the prevailing global ethos of globalization must be examined from the African perspective in a world of competing national interests defined in political, economic and strategic terms. The result of the competition has produced a troubled international environment engaged in the scramble for global resources, making the world more and more unstable, insecure and inequitable. Globalization can be simply defined as the global structure and processes which increase and deepen interconnectedness, interdependence, and active interaction among global actors at virtually every level of their engagement. The impact, as can be deduced from what it encompasses, is not just economic, it implicates politics, governance, environment, technology, culture, information; it permeates virtually every facet of international contacts, but perhaps more

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profoundly the economic sphere where the capacity for trade and investment constitutes the sinews of economic growth and development, and therefore the well-being of nations. The open secret therefore is that to reap maximally the benefits of contemporary globalized economic order, it is imperative that a country possesses the institutional capacity in the areas of trade and investment, and technological and financial innovations that can accommodate and appropriate the dynamic opportunities and challenges of the globalized market.3 In this respect, Africa’s capacity has been greatly vitiated by her history of dependency, backwardness, technological unpreparedness or inadequacies, weak financial and investment portfolio, neo-colonial arrangements, and general lack of or low savvy in global enterprise. As a result, African countries face an arduous task competing with the more advanced industrialized economies of the North and even the emerging Asian global actors.4 Admittedly, globalization carries with it certain advantages for the developing economies; for example, it has opened up wider markets and made cheaper sources of finance accessible; it has put in the global pool new products, new technologies and new ideas; it has created a higher degree of specialization, efficiency, and better quality products; it has caused greater competitiveness and increased productivity. It has, nevertheless, contributed to the widening of the gap between the industrialized countries of the North and the developing countries of the South. Thus, while the countries of the North with greater economic capacity reap the benefits of globalization, the poor countries of the South, the Third World, especially in Africa with low trade and investment portfolios, stand at the marginal end. Consequently, the gap between the rich and the poor people and between the rich and the poor nations continues to widen. The developing countries are prone to catching cold when the developed countries sneeze because of the interlocking global financial flows, weak opportunities for trade and investment and declining economic competence which are crucial for wealth creation and development. In its operation, globalization calls for a diminished role of the state in the economy and increased private participation, good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights. It calls for downsizing of the public service, and puts a noose on public finances; and privatization of public companies, deregulation of social welfare services, and introduction of austerity measures to curtail government spending. These are key aspects of the new economic order promoted by globalization. The impact of this policy of less government on the society would include higher unemployment as a result of the required retrenchment in the public

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service; reduction in social welfare programmes; inevitable increase in the cost of public utilities; and decline in the standard of living generally and pauperization of the masses. Another dimension of the African predicament is the heavy external debt burden which has put a damper on development processes in many countries. Indeed, Africa is the “most externally indebted and aiddependent continent.” For example, twenty-eight of the thirty-four countries classified in 2000 as chronically indebted by the World Bank were in Africa. This, again, is a consequence of a combination of developments relating to the nature and operation of the international markets: skewed balance of trade, unequal exchange, collapse of commodity exports, fall in the demand for primary products, marginalization and decidedly neocolonial relationship with the leading trading partners and the global financial and development organizations, brazen corruption, poor leadership, and gross economic indiscipline of the African ruling elite. The imposition of oppressive reform and debt-servicing policies of the World Bank, the IMF and WTO made matters worse for the development aspirations of the developing countries. The politics and diplomacy of the African development environment in international politics is complex; only a determined, altruistic, focussed, nationalistic and purpose-driven national commitment can pull a nation out of its vortex. The Asian development miracles can attest to this. Over the years, global institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have, at different junctures, decreed policy interventions such as the Import Substitution Industrialization Programme, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the Trade Liberalization policy, ostensibly meant to reform and restructure the economy and, by so doing, arrest the declining development efforts in Africa. It is patently clear that SAP, for example, yielded no good fruit considering the deleterious impact on the populace. It caused devaluation of the national currency and brought untold social and economic hardship and pain to many in those countries where it was implemented. Indeed, globalization and the world financial institutions which serve to police its implementation have come under close scrutiny and heavy criticism. According to Sam Aluko, a leading Nigerian economist, globalization has increased the competence gap and reduced the “propensity to perform and innovate on the part of the African stragglers.” Furthermore, “the continent continues to be marginalized or peripheralized as it continues to succumb to the dictates of the IMF and the World Bank, which are controlled and manipulated from the Triad axes,” thereby turning the African countries into “mere appendages and

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outposts of the more developed economies” of the Euro-American-Asian axes.5 In a similar vein, Bade Onimode believes that “globalization, liberalization and deregulation under the banners of SAP and WTO, are unrelenting in their pursuit of unequal exchange, debt peonage and the thwarting of development in African countries.” The challenge before Africa in this century, as he perceives it, therefore is “how to curtail unequal exchange and its debilitating effects, restore development to the top priority of public policy and regain regional autonomy or control over recovery and development policies.”6 The extent of the infringement on the sovereign rights of the receiving developing countries is another issue entirely in the litany of adverse effects of globalization. More recently, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in a lecture titled “Neither the Washington nor Beijing Consensus: Developmental Models that fit African Realities and Cultures” at The Royal School of Medicine, London, contended that the defective economic ideologies prescribed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization contributed to the “development gaps in African economies” in that in spite of the faithful implementation of the policies they prescribed, Africa’s share in the global trade remained unimpressive for years. Over the last quarter of a century, Africa has been at the receiving end of liberal orthodoxy from these institutions that have persistently advocated, among other things, privatization of state-owned enterprises, free trade, intellectual property rights protection and deregulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) as requirements for developing countries to grow and develop.

He stressed that the neo-liberal ideology of the three international financial and development institutions is reflected in the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions which are encapsulated in the ‘Washington Consensus.’ Sanusi averred that the Washington Consensus has attracted severe criticism because the developing countries that had adopted its doctrine, especially in Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet countries, showed that “it had failed to deliver sustained growth as promised by its promoters.” He concluded that the fact that China’s spectacular growth has been achieved outside the framework of the Washington Consensus has raised “further doubt on the unassailability of its capabilities.” He therefore called for a paradigm shift advocating a timely “radical refocusing on development strategies for African countries to be relevant in the global economy.”7

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Windows of Opportunity The lot of Africa has been tortuous, complex and variegated. She was in the nineteenth century, and simultaneously too, a region of European scramble, imperialism, vassalage, colonial market and investment. Before that and in the four centuries preceding the nineteenth, she was a territory of slaves, European mercantile trade, geographical exploration, internecine wars and environmental purity. Post-colonial Africa has been burdened by vulnerable aid and export-dependent economies which have not lifted her out of underdevelopment; and the current international economic order based on globalization has not brought uhuru anywhere closer; if anything, the search for sustainable development remains tantalizing. The challenge now is for Africa to devise new approaches and strategies that can redeem her from crippling underdevelopment. What has become of Africa today has, however, been shown in two sharply divided schools of thought. One of the schools, the pessimist, believes that Africa is today a region that has not significantly changed in its position of underdevelopment and, as such, she is bedevilled by poverty, malnourishment and utter deficit in leadership. Two decades ago, for example, this unflattering picture of the continent was painted: The social and economic situation in Africa has been deteriorating since the late 1960s. The number and intensity of distressing economic features have perpetually increased. Poverty and destitution have become almost endemic. The tempo of increasing mass unemployment and underdevelopment on the continent has also been accentuated by the rapidly growing population. By the 1980s, Africa had a staggering number of people living in absolute poverty, malnourished and underfed, and with limited access to basic necessities of life: potable water, shelter, health and education.8

But the second school, the optimist, however presents a promising picture of Africa. It sees her as, in the words of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, a “rising star” but which would nonetheless need a huge dose of private sector investment to sustain the growth trends it has continued to record since 2001.9 Judging by the indices of food availability and good nourishment defined in terms of access to affordable food and drinking water, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria, a pessimist, has no soft words for the African condition. To him, Africa is way off the mark of development. Chief Obasanjo has predicated his dismissal of any attempt to show optimism in the trajectory of Africa’s development on the 2012 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. The report,

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released in May 2012 and titled Towards a Food Secure Future, reveals that 218 million Africans (about 25% of the people in the continent) are undernourished,10 meaning that one in four Africans go to bed every night hungry. It also means that, whereas in other parts of the world, the question of access to good and affordable food had been solved by the 20th century, Africa is still unable to feed its people by the second decade of the 21st century. Chief Obasanjo, who found this condition indefensible and unpardonable, blamed Africa’s leadership for the food crisis in the continent. He believed that the basic irreducible standard by which development could be measured in any civilized society should primarily be access to affordable food and nourishment. Hence to him the report is a damning condemnation of governance in Africa. It tells us what we know that the poverty of Africa is the making of African leaders over the years. African leaders have taken us together along the route of this shame. It is an indictment of African leadership particularly in the area of food production. Africa has the knowledge, technology and means to end undernourishment and food insecurity.11

However, early in May 2012, the World Economic Forum on Africa, whose theme was “Shaping Africa’s Transformation,” expressed great optimism in what it regarded as the renaissance of Africa, the birth of a new trajectory of development and growth on the continent. After a survey of Africa’s contribution to world trade, commerce, and development, the Forum concluded very emphatically that: No doubt, Africa is on the brink of a major transformation – the continent is home to seven of the world’s 10 fastest growing economies with a projected growth rate of 6% in 2012. While the rest of the world, particularly developed regions, grapple with embedded financial crisis and uncertainty, Africa is ballasted by macroeconomic and political stability, rich natural resources, a growing consumer base, strong retail markets and a young population. Around the globe, companies and countries are turning to Africa’s promise.12

Obviously, the Forum predicated its perception of renascent Africa on the fact that at least in the last ten years, extensive warfare and large-scale human displacement had begun to cease or slow down in traditional wartorn areas like the Sudan, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Chad, etc. It did not, like Chief Obasanjo, factor into its calculus the quality of the human person in Africa as defined by calorie intake or availability of drinking water, which obviously are the basic irreducible

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minimum of human development. But there is no denying the fact that Africa has still continued to contend with the challenges of persistent political instability such as we have had in Libya, Guinea Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and so forth. Extreme poverty, inequality and social discrimination against women, environmental degradation, infrastructure deficits (especially in roads, water supply and electricity) as well as corruption, disease and low-intensity violence, such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.13 There is hardly any sub-region in Africa today that does not have the persistent problem of political instability, poverty of leadership and ethnic tensions, all of which are very destructive of economic progress and peace. Added to the renewed optimism in the capacity of Africa to confront the underdevelopment which had been her unfortunate lot in the last century is the fairly positive report of economic growth shown by both the World Bank and the IMF on the state of economic performance by the continent. The IMF, for instance, predicted an average growth rate of 6% for 2012,14 an increase from 4.7% in 2011. The Fund also predicted a 5.3% growth for 2013. This is in spite of the continued negative effects of the global financial crises which began in 2008 in the US and which has continued to affect adversely Africa’s trading partners in the eurozone and in the Americas.15 The adverse effect on Europe has come in the form of reduction in foreign direct investment and, even in some dire cases, capital flight from Africa.16 But the argument on the extent of the impact which the global financial crisis has on Africa should not detain us here. Rather, what is noteworthy is that at least for the first time the IMF has something positive to say about Africa, namely, that the continent is growing economically. This contrasts sharply with the Fund’s traditional vilification of the continent as a region of acute economic inefficiency, underdevelopment and war. At least, the report is a big relief from the usual refrain of external debt, currency devaluation, structural adjustment, retrenchment of workers in the public services and trade liberalization, all of which are the IMF’s traditionally recommended antidote to Africa’s perceived economic problems which have hardly worked anywhere in the continent.17 The Fund’s projected growth rate for 2013 is only slightly lower than the African Development Bank’s figure of 5.4%. ADB’s apparent cautious optimism is a result of the increasing strong demand for raw materials, including oil and copper, from emerging markets. For example, a lot of Zambia’s copper is bought by Chinese state-owned companies and Beijing’s driving force is a well-articulated policy to gain access to Africa’s natural resources and energy. According to the Bank’s president,

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Donald Kaberuka, about 30% of the recent dynamic performance of subSaharan African economies can be attributed to commodity exports; the remaining 70% is due to two key factors, namely, a). the cumulative effects of economic reforms, which have improved the investment climate, risk profile and resilience; and b). the impact of demographic dynamics, urbanisation and the leapfrogging afforded by factors such as mobile telephony on the cost of doing business, markets efficiency, and service delivery. It must be noted that the growth figure would be as high as 6.6% if South Africa, which is 30% of sub-Saharan Africa’s economy, is excluded; if included, the growth figure drops to 5.4%.18 However, the positive report from the IMF and the World Bank cannot be equated with the abolition of the huge problems of poverty, disease and maladministration which continue to plague Africa. In fact, the World Bank in its report released in June 2012 - Global Economic Prospects warned that Africa would still need to strengthen its Domestic Fundamentals, that is, good governance, infrastructure, balanced budget, inflation, food production, etc., to be able to stay afloat on the sea of abject poverty.19 In fact, the Bank warned that the projected growth for the continent, gladdening as it might be, would not be sufficient to reduce poverty in the continent. Marcelo Giugale, the Bank’s Director of Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Programmes for Africa, was even more poignant and less optimistic about Africa’s capacity to sustain the growth trajectory she now has when he said: The growth rate is not enough to redefine poverty, not enough. We have specific targets that are in reach. Child mortality has fallen fast in many countries. But at the same time, poverty is going down very slowly. You certainly need much more than the GDP number going up. The transition from growth to employment is complex. It depends on labour market, skills, infrastructure, the quality of the business environment. Growth can be very fast and you still don’t see poverty reduction.20

Yet, it is important to show that a new dimension has emerged in the history of contemporary Africa within the last three decades. Whereas The Economist had sounded the death knell of Africa in the year 2000, dismissing the region as a “hopeless continent,” the combination of increased global competition for natural resources and the emergence of China as a world economic power and challenger to the hegemony of the United States have suddenly propelled Africa onto the centre-stage of

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world economic relevance.21 The competition for Africa’s gas, oil, diamond, gold, timber, and so on, has produced in the continent what E. Cheng calls the “new imperialism.”22 Corroborating Cheng’s prediction, N. Ferguson,23 C.K. Lee,24 S. Marks,25 and Van der Walt and Schimdt26 have also predicted a new found relevance for Africa in the World Economic Order. In that order, they contend, Africa stands to gain from the competition between the entrenched interests of the Western countries, which they believe are fast diminishing, and the new investment and partnership drive from the East and South. In the last twenty years, huge foreign investments have continued to pour chiefly from China, India, and Indonesia into Africa. This explains why Niall Ferguson, the British historian, also predicted that the age of American informal empire was coming to an end.27 In the place of that vanishing empire is what Ferguson believed would stand China, and possibly, India, Indonesia and Malaysia, thus provoking a new scramble for Africa’s resources by these Asian or eastern countries in the contemporary world. The ‘new scramble’ for Africa has thus begun. The scramble is today propelled not from Berlin but now from Beijing. This explains why Melber and Southall28 insist that the scramble is “primarily about investment and business” and that this has the tendency to replace and is very similar to the historical epoch instigated by the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885. The decision of the conference to partition Africa among European states, it should be emphasized, was responsible for much of the imperialistic design in Africa leading to almost one hundred years of colonisation.29 Chinese financial aid and investment appear to show the direction for Africa’s trade and commercial orientation in the decades ahead. Asked whether he considered China to be the new imperial power in Africa, Morgan Tsvangirai, as Zimbabwe’s prime minister said: “No, I don’t think so. But they are not missionaries, all the same. They are after business interests. China knows that there is going to be a scramble for resources.”30 In addition, scholars have been particular about the extent to which Chinese investment capital can alter the direction of Africa’s history from pro-Western to pro-China profile. For example, V. Satgar,31 S. Naidu32 and J. Honke33 have shown that Chinese, Indian and Brazilian aid and the extension of Chinese influence and investment capital in the areas of basic social infrastructure have the tendency of shifting African attention from the traditional Western spheres of influence to these eastern and southern countries. These are the countries that are fast becoming world economic powers.

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Thus, such a new imperialism and investment, M. Lee34 and H. Broadman35 contend, can even be beneficial to African labour and the middle class, regardless of their original bourgeois content. This is because observers believe that more capital investment was flowing into Africa at least from the 1990s up to the time of the world global financial crises in 2008 than at any period before the 1970s. Much of this investment, even the World Bank believes, has originated in China and India either directly as official foreign direct investment or as aid in the areas of critical infrastructure. Some of the investments have also come indirectly from Chinese and Indian private investors in electronics and pharmaceutical goods and services in African countries.36 Furthermore, Chinese consumer goods have continued to enjoy wide acceptability and patronage in Africa. This is in spite of the hue and cry about the inferior products being dumped in Africa. There has been a stupendous increase in demand by China, for example, for African oil, gas, copper, coal, and cashew nuts from Nigeria, Angola, DRC, Zambia, to name a few.37 Chinese private companies have increasingly in the last twenty years been winning construction contracts in railway, transport, electricity and infrastructure as well as in the construction of public buildings in Nigeria, South Africa and Angola.38 Chinese enterprises have certainly made some positive impact in Zambia and Ethiopia in the area of job creation; this is one area where most African countries are faced with the danger of social eruption by millions of unemployed angry youth. Beijing would therefore add greater value to her relationship with Africa if, in addition to her heavy concentration on importation of natural resources, she increases her investment in the jobcreating sectors of the African economy. This, if factored in, will inevitably lead to industrial training and skill acquisition by the work-force in the host communities. The standard practice of importing Chinese labour and equipment to execute major infrastructural projects in Africa cannot be considered mutually beneficial economically. Nor will the proliferation of Chinese arms and ammunition across the continent help reduce the incidence of armed conflicts, terrorism and political instability. Without wanting to sound the alarmist gong, one is constrained to ask, could this be the early chapters of a parody of Walter Rodney’s How China Underdeveloped Africa? The long-term effect of this partnership can at this time only be imagined; for example, what impact will the Chinese presence and products have on the African agenda to revitalize the industries? Would there be any strong incentive left to revive the industries? It can also be argued that African countries themselves are poor gatekeepers. It would be fair to expect that in any partnership with

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China, African countries should insist that where there is the requisite labour force in the host country, importing Chinese workers would not be allowed. That should be a necessary clause. In any event, it is hard to deny that the emergence of the Asian superpower in the African development journey has had patently salutary impact on African economic growth and a positive leap in the provision of the much-needed critical infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa.39 Such is the new turn of development possibilities and trade patterns in the African continent in the second decade of the twenty-first century. There is no doubt that the continent is on the swing and if she can play her cards well, the momentum may not be short-lived. What we have begun to see is that the era of aid-dependency and paternalism is giving way to emerging mutually beneficial partnerships; the private sector is beginning to wake up and responding more confidently and creatively to the burgeoning competition aroused by the wind of change blowing from the East. But we must not be lulled into thinking that all is well now that a new suitor has warmed his way into Africa. It is still far from being a ‘new heaven’ or a ‘new earth’. Until Africa can match, or, at least, adequately stand up to the Euro-American and Asian challenges in the key sectors of the global economy, the continent would find her development agenda and aspirations vitiated, and will remain the victim of the dynamic vagaries of the global markets whose terms are dictated and manipulated by the industrialized countries.

The Continuing Challenge The golden jubilee celebration of the founding of the continental organization – the Organization of African Unity (now the AU) – is an auspicious time to ask: What are Africa’s future prospects? What should Africa do to survive? The battle for African development in the 21st century, a complex process indeed, will have to be fought on multiple fronts. The battle calls for a clear understanding of the intricacies of globalization, why some countries derive huge benefits from it while others are beggarly disadvantaged. The prospect for Africa’s development in an era of globalization will depend largely on the prevailing global circumstances, internal economic, political and cultural dynamics, as well as leadership matched with effective plans and strategies. We must also bear in mind that Africa is a continent made up of over fifty countries which are at different levels of development and varying degrees of national cohesion and integration. An estimated 60% of the global Arab

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population inhabits the northern part of the continent. Essentially, therefore, our present focus must be on sub-Sahara Africa. We must be realistic: self-interest or national interest is a major motivating factor in international relations. It is therefore unrealistic to expect, in a system characterized by global inequality and competition for resources, that an industrialized power will choose the path of altruism. Consequently, it is important to emphasize that in the final analysis, it is the Africans themselves who have to decide by their action or inaction the substance, the content, the nature, the quality and the level of the growth and development they envisage or wish to realize in the 21st century. The need to have a development plan in which the state spells out her vision and mobilizes the resources and the strategies for realizing it is fundamental. One thing is certain: it would be neglectful for any country to put all her trust in external bodies and externally generated economic and development policies to solve her problem.40 As our starting point, let us recall what Adebayo Adedeji, the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, said almost two decades ago: The ECA’s alternative framework, in emphasizing the imperative of internalizing the development process, identifies the specific objectives that should be pursued across the continent. These include enhanced production and more efficient use of resources; greater and more efficient resource mobilization; improving human resources capability; strengthening science and technology; achieving vertical and horizontal diversification; establishing a pragmatic balance between private and public sectors; shifting resources from non-productive to highly productive activities and sectors; improving the pattern of income distribution among households and different socioeconomic groups; attaining food self-sufficiency; and realigning consumption patterns with production patterns.41

These objectives represent almost the full gamut of options open to Africa if she must survive; they are heavily loaded to satisfy the economic well-being of the African peoples. They are important and they are critical objectives for economic development which, if properly coordinated and implemented, can have positive consequences on the other sectors. For example, it is impossible to alleviate poverty, fund health care or education adequately without economic growth. But if the purpose of development, according to Ohiorhenuan, is to “enlarge people’s choices: economic, social, cultural and political,” it must then follow logically that “human choices extend far beyond economic well-being, encompassing among other things, knowledge, health, a clean physical environment, political freedom, and gender equality;”42 and indeed, the ability to access

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“resources needed for a decent standard of living.”43 It is also important to emphasize that good governance, accountability, effective legal structures, leadership and affordable health care are crucial to development. African development has for long suffered from the ravages of such diseases as malaria and HIV/AIDS. For sustainable development to be meaningful, therefore, it has to incorporate the vital elements that can make it possible for human life to be lived to the fullest. In this context, development, when conceived as a process, has to put on the toga of removing all likely obstacles on the way to full human actualization. The conceptualization of development, in other words, must be holistic to enhance the quality of life in the African society. By now, we are familiar with the horrendous accounts of Africa’s woes – historical, cultural, economic, political, institutional, etc. These are the challenges that the continent must continue to confront even as the promising new development trajectory takes its course. In offering policy advice, one is mindful of the various earlier inspirations that have responded to the African situation. It is difficult to find fault with the passion, intellectual rigour and objectivity, the cogency, realism and nationalist sensitivity that they engender.44 The large body of works on the issue of the possible futures of Africa agree on the need for Africa to look inwards, generate her own strategy of development to confront the future. Africa must have the conviction, the political will to go on a limb, as it were, and liberate herself from the cobwebs of her history. Being involved in an unequal competition with other actors in the global market, she must devise her own development agenda free from the stultifying colonial mentality or spirit that has plagued post-colonial African development objectives and strategies; striving to be Westernized can hardly work. As long as that kind of mindset persists, so long will the African mind, vision, initiatives and confidence remain inured to the development path of the developed North. This makes that kind of development not to be deeply rooted in the African environment. The times call for a paradigm shift! It is quite instructive that Orhiorhenuan has identified four essential determinants of development which he has labelled “messages”. They are: x First, development can only be what society considers it to be. It is fundamentally an endogenous process generated and sustained by the energy of the society and its ability to learn creatively from its own and others’ history. x Second, … the society must be willing to take ownership of its own development problem. … the responsibility of a people to articulate

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the nature of its problem, define its own vision and seek solutions, cannot be ceded to any external agent, however sympathetic. x Third, the ownership by, and empowerment of people, can only come from their full involvement in social and economic processes. The importance of inclusiveness derives not so much from its instrumental value, as from its affirmation of “self-in-society”. x Fourth, path dependence highlights the importance of learning innovativeness and flexibility. The outcome has always depended on the capacity of society and its leadership to generate extraordinary performance from an apparently ordinary combination of circumstances.45 A careful reading of these “messages” will reveal that the author, like Adebayo Adedeji, is emphasizing the need for Africa to embrace an alternative development framework, looking inward rather than depending on policy frameworks foisted on her by external institutions. It is now widely accepted, contrary to the conceptions of a minimalist state envisaged in the 1980s by the World Bank and the IMF, that the sort of massive transformation in all sectors of the economy that most developing countries desire can hardly be achieved without the active role of an enterprising and dynamic state. It is the responsibility of the state to launch a development policy and provide the necessary enabling investment-friendly environment including security of life and property, laws and regulations, as well as requisite infrastructure that can stimulate effective industrialization. The provision of good transportation networks, water, electricity, healthcare and telecommunications facilities, and the urgent task of expanding the frontiers of literacy and drastically reducing corruption are daunting enough challenges that cannot be effectively carried out in a developing economy without government intervention and sustained public support. These should be the primary duties of the state. One of the critical conditions for growing the African economies is diversification. African countries were, in the closing years of the last century, reported to be dependent on primary commodity exports (agricultural raw materials, food, fuel, metals, ores, and so on) and many were mono-cultural. Relying on only one product, petroleum, for example, because it is a lucrative foreign exchange earner and the main source of a country’s wealth, puts the nation’s economy at the risk of unpredictable adverse developments in the international market. An unexpected fluctuation in commodity price can cause untoward dislocation in the economy of such a country. Another disadvantage of over-dependence on petroleum alone for growth and development is that other sectors will

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suffer from neglect. The experience of Nigeria is a good example, where oil accounts for 72% of export earnings. As a result of Nigeria’s inordinate concentration on oil, agriculture has suffered a drastic decline in importance. Consequently, Nigeria has to spend huge amounts on food importation. Investment in agriculture should free the country from dependence on food imports. The money saved can be invested in subregional trade or other national priorities. Agriculture must be revitalized and should be seen as being of strategic importance for several reasons: as a guarantor of food security; its products can earn foreign exchange through exports; and the inter-connectedness of education, health and agriculture has been recognized as being capable of promoting human security and peace, as well as alleviating poverty in Africa. Agriculture is pivotal to the sustainability of the development process in Africa. It is therefore necessary for African governments to encourage farmers through incentives, subsidies and policies that would promote agricultural research and the adaptation of foreign best practices in agricultural enterprises to boost production and ensure food security.46 There is urgent need for Africa to promote, more vigorously and purposefully, a policy of economic integration in the sub-regions by providing critical infrastructure such as transport, electricity, water, and telecommunications. The provision of electricity is a prerequisite for industrialization; without it no meaningful modernization can be recorded. Economic and monetary integration is imperative because it will enhance trade, mobility of people, goods and services across borders; integration at the sub-regional level, for example, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South African Development Community (SADC) as models, and at the continental level, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Union (AU), serving to promote and deepen intra-African commercial relations thereby expanding the commercial space. Only recently have African countries begun to realize the importance of reaching out to markets in, and establishing formal commercial linkages with Latin America and the Caribbean where Brazil and Mexico stand out as prominent centres in the South-South regional axis. The search should be extended to the Asian countries where bilateral understanding is most likely to bear fruits. There is much that Africans can learn from the Asian experience and achievements. They can draw inspiration from the commonality of their current interests and lessons from the parallels and commonalities of their colonial experiences. It must be emphasized that if Africa must survive, Africa must not wait for technology to be transferred from either the West or the East; that strategy is as impractical as it is banal. The solution should be the

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adaptation of relevant technology that may prove useful in the technologically weak Third World environment, particularly in the area of agriculture. As much as possible, African indigenous resources and innovation must be maximally exploited along with ingenious adaptations in order to properly situate and enhance the development process in the African environment. As part of Africa’s strategy for survival and global relevance, she must invest massively in quality technical, vocational, entrepreneurial, and tertiary education. Technical and vocational education is particularly crucial to equipping the middle level manpower that is essential for an industrial economy. The ‘take-off’ and the sustenance of African development cannot be realized when the educational base is abjectly weak. The sector requires mass mobilization for educational empowerment of the populace. Furthermore, the present level of illiteracy on the continent is a cog in the wheel of development, and it has been observed as “impacting negatively on quality of life and catalysing youth unemployment and restiveness, which in turn stimulate human insecurity.”47 Africa cannot afford to lag behind for too long in this age of ideas and technology. In this regard, special emphasis must be laid on science and technology and the acquisition of competence in the use and application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). No educational curriculum should be considered complete at any level without it. African leaders must realize that no investor would consider it sane to put his or her resources in a country that cannot guarantee the safety of life and property within its borders. Meaningful development can hardly be expected to take place in a war-torn, insecure, unstable, conflict-ridden society. This is why it is necessary for African leaders to address the issues of governance, national integration, political stability, the rule of law, social justice, human capital development, the strengthening of institutions that enhance transparency and accountability, and devising workable strategies for resolving conflicts. They must confront the hydra-headed monster of corruption which, if uncontained, may render even the most ambitious development programme effete. They will need to build a new participatory, inclusive, democratic political structure to accommodate all hues of the demographic presence, including women, workers and the rural populace. These will constitute the building blocks and effective pathways for the rejuvenation of a continent that has once been ‘lost’ but is now ‘found’, a continent that is in the process of being effectively equipped for the challenges of a new millennium. As Basil Davidson maintains, “While despair is all very well for those who can afford it, despair comes too dear for those who can’t. For those who can’t, a ground

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for hope is a necessity.”48 All things considered, it would seem that there are now palpable indicators emerging on the horizon pointing to the fact that the cloud of pessimism about Africa’s growth and development is slowly giving way to some cautious optimism as the century advances.

Notes and References 1. Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive: Arguments Against Growth Without Development (New York: Little, Brown, 1974). 2. John F.E. Ohiorhenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” in Abdul-Ganiyu Garba (ed.), Development Thought, Policy Advice and Economic Development in Africa in the 20th Century: Lessons for the 21st Century (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 2003), pp. 14, 18. Walter Rodney defines development as an “overall social process which is dependent upon the outcome of man’s effort to deal with his natural environment.” Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982), p. 6. Bruce J. Berman, “Clientelism and Neocolonialism: Center-Periphery Relations and Political Development in African States,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. IX (Summer) 1974, No. 2, pp. 4-5; Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh, Jr., The New Partnership for African Development and the African Crisis: The Myths, Realities and Possibilities (Markudi: Aboki, 2005), Monograph Series, no. 1; Adelaja Odutola Odukoya, “Crisis of Development in Africa: Reflections on the Political Economy of the Culture of Accumulation,” in Akin Alao (ed.), Politics, Culture and Development in Nigeria (Lagos: CBAAC, 2011, p. 323; Mike I. Obadan, “Globalization and Economic Management in Africa,” in Nigerian Economic Society, Globalization and Africa’s Economic Development: Selected Papers for the 2003 Annual Conference (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 2004), pp. 3-6. 3. Obadan, “Globalization and Economic Management in Africa,” pp. 20-21; Sam Aluko defines globalization as “the growing interactions in world trade, national and foreign investments, capital markets and the ascribed role of governments in national economies.” Sam Aluko, “Background to Globalization and Africa’s Economic Development,” in ibid., p. 36. 4. Aluko, “Background to Globalization,” pp. 46-47; V.T. Jike, “Globalization and the Crises of African Development,” in ibid. p. 166. 5. Aluko, “Background to Globalization., pp. 46-47, 59-63. 6. Bade Onimode, “Unequal Exchange, External Debt and Capacity for Development-Oriented Policies in African Countries,” in Abdul-Ganiyu Garba (ed.), Development Thought, Policy Advice and Economic Development in Africa in the 20th Century: Lessons for the 21st Century, pp. 39-40; see the example of the Asian miracle in Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000). 7. The Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, quoted in “IMF, World Bank responsible for Africa’s woes,” The Nation (Lagos), Tuesday, April 10, 2012, p. 55. Actually, Sanusi’s position is not as radical as it may appear.

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As far back as 1999, Joseph Stiglitz, World Bank’s Senior Vice-President and Nobel Laureate in Economics, had expressed the view that privatization and trade liberalization, contrary to the tenets of the Washington Consensus, should be taken only as “means to more sustainable, equitable, and democratic growth,” and not as “ends in themselves.” He went on to point out that the WC failed in Eastern Europe and that the ‘Asian Tigers’ actually succeeded outside its restrictions. Cited in John F.E. Ohiohrenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” in Abdul Ganiyu-Garba (ed.), Development Thought, Policy Advice and Economic Development in Africa, p. 14. 8. Adebayo Adedeji, Owodunni Teriba and Patrick Bugembe (eds.), The Challenge of African Economic Recovery and Development (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 1. 9. Prime Minister Melles Zenawi had opined very instructively at the World Economic Forum on Africa in May 2012 that “without the private sector there is no development. Our policy is to have fast and equitable growth, but you cannot have that without a clear division of labour in partnership with the public and private sectors.” See World Economic Forum on Africa, Shaping Africa’s Transformation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9-11 May 2012, pp. 4-5. 10. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Africa Human Development Report 2012: Towards a Food Secure Future, pp. 33-34. 11. Olusegun Obasanjo, “Why Africa is Poor,” The Nation (Lagos), 27 May 2012, p. 3. 12. World Economic Forum on Africa, Shaping Africa’s Transformation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9-11 May 2012, p.4. 13. UNDP, Africa Human Development Report 2012, pp. 22-48. 14. See The Express Tribune, “Africa Growth Not Enough to Reduce Poverty: World Bank,” http://tribune.com.pk/story/287304/africa-growth-not-enough-toreduce-poverty-world-bank/ (accessed 17 June 2012). 15. W.J. McKibbin and A. Stoeckel, The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (Adelaide: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009). 16. C.C. Soludo, “Global Financial and Economic Crisis: How Vulnerable is Nigeria?” Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria Working Paper, 2009. 17. Bade Onimode and Ben Turok (eds.) The IMF and the World Bank in Africa (London: IFRAA, 1988); Adebayo Olukoshi (ed.), Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990). 18. The Guardian (Lagos), Sunday, February 10, 2013, “Economic Integration Could Shape Africa in Next 50 Years: AfDB Boss Foresees More Prosperous Africa,” pp. 44-45. 19. World Bank, Global Economy Prospects (Washington, DC: IBRD, 2012). 20. See The Express Tribune, “Africa Growth Not Enough to Reduce Poverty: World Bank.” (See note 13 above). 21. The Economist, 13 May 2000. 22. E. Cheng, “Is China Africa’s New Imperialist Power?” Green Left Weekly, 4 March, http://www.greenleft.org.org.au/2007/701/36384. 23. N. Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2004).

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24. C.K. Lee, “Casualisation and Precariousness of Labour in Africa,” Paper presented to Sociology of Work Unit, University of the Witwatersrand, 2 September 2008. 25. S. Marks, “China in Africa: The New Imperialism? Pambuzuka News, 2 March 2011, http://www.pambuzuka.org/en/category/features/32132. 26. L. Van der Walt and M. Schmidt, “Is China Africa’s New Imperialist Power?” Power to the People, 11 November, http://power-2-people.blogspot.com/2007/11is-china-africa’s-new-imperialist-power. 27. Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. 28. H. Melber and R. Southall, “Introduction: A Scramble for Africa?” in Roger Southall and Henning Melber (eds.), A New Scramble for Africa? (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), pp. xix-xxvii. 29. J.C. Anene, Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1966). 30. TIME, November 28, 2011, p. 108; Fareed Zakaria, “How to be a Real Superpower,” ibid., p. 22. 31. Vishuawas Satgar, “Global Capitalism and the Neo-Liberalisation of Africa,” in Roger Southall and Henning Melber (eds.), A New Scramble for Africa?” pp. 35-55. 32. Sanusha Naidu, “India’s Engagements in Africa: Self-Interest or Mutual Partnership?” in Roger Southall and Henning Melber (eds.), A New Scramble for Africa?, pp. 111-138. 33. Jana Honke, “Extractive Orders: Transnational Mining Companies in the Nineteenth and Twenty-First Centuries in the Central Africa Copper Belt,” in Roger Southall and Henning Melber (eds.), A New Scramble for Africa?, pp. 274298. 34. M. Lee, “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 303-330. 35. H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007). 36. Ibid. 37. Honke, “Extractive Orders,” pp. 274-298. 38. I. Mann, “Rise and Rise of Africa,” Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1 March 2009. 39. Morgan Tsvangirai’s frank assessment that the Chinese are not in Africa as missionaries is quite apropos when we consider their lack of ‘morality’ in their support of Khartoum or indifference to Sudanese criminality in Darfur. 40. Ohiorhenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” p. 30. 41. Adebayo Adedeji, “An Alternative for Africa,” Journal of Democracy, October 1994, Volume 5, (4), p. 130. Economic Commission for Africa, Beyond Recovery: ECA’s Revised Perspectives of Africa’s Development, 1990-2008 (Addis Ababa: ECA, 1989); Ojetunji Aboyade, Issues in the Development of Africa (Ibadan: University Press, 1976). 42. Ohiorhenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” p. 21, citing Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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43. Ibid.; UNDP, Human Development Report 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Kola Daisi, “Globalization and Sustainable Human Development,” Vanguard (Lagos), May 24, 2002. 44. See, for example, Garba, “The Past, Present and Possible Futures of Africa,” pp. XXXIX-LIII; Ohiorhenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” pp. 23-31; Onimode, “Unequal Exchange, External Debt and Capacity for Development,” pp. 51-55; Obadan, “Globalization and Economic Management in Africa,” pp. 20-30; Aluko, “Background to Globalization and Africa’s Economic Development,” pp. 63-66; Adedeji, “An Alternative for Africa,” pp. 130-132; Oby Ezekwesili, “Why African Economies are not Growing as Expected,” The Guardian (Lagos), Sunday, September 18, 2011, p. 54. 45. Ohiorhenuan, “Evolution of Development Thought,” p. 31. 46. Centre for Human Security, “First Biennial Conference and Award of Prizes for Africa Regional Essay Competition,” Conference Centre, Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library Complex, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria, March 5-6, 2009, p. 4. The role of the state or government participation in promoting industrial enterprises in the era of globalization is not altogether a ‘forbidden fruit’; it is necessary. It is a call against the untrammelled free-wheeling market orthodoxy. It is instructive to note that even Paul Krugman did not consider government intervention anathema. See his “Toward a Counter-Counterrevolution in Development Theory,” Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992), p. 32. It is important to note that only a negligible number of African countries produce petroleum, namely: Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, Congo-Brazzaville, and now Ghana – out of 54 countries. 47. Centre for Human Security, “First Biennial Conference,” p. 4. 48. Basil Davidson, The Blackman’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 320-321.

PART II: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

CHAPTER TWO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF FUNCTIONALITY ADEBAYO A. LAWAL

Introduction The functionality of education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels poses serious challenges to African countries today. However the gravity of the challenges varies from one country to another in relation to demography, level of economic growth and development, governance, foreign assistance, political stability, transparency and accountability. On the basis of these conditions, it is difficult to generalize on the degree of functionality or otherwise of education in Africa. Perhaps, what should be asked is: which type of education is functional and which type is not? And what do we mean by functionality? Whichever way we argue, we must bear in mind a number of factors which must have promoted or aggravated functionality at one time or the other; hence we must be careful in making sweeping generalizations. Education is the process of acquiring knowledge of reality in order to bring about improvement in people that they may live a responsible and good life. The school is primarily concerned with education. It is where the teacher of a particular subject imparts knowledge to a learner for moral, mental, spiritual and social transformation. Education, therefore, involves the development of knowledge and understanding. It also involves the concept of learning, teaching and ‘indoctrinating’.1 However, there is a distinction between ‘education’ and ‘training’. Education pertains to work and labour; hence education is allied to values of production. Through training, some specialized skills are acquired. Then there are noninstrumental features of the development of knowledge and understanding. Some African countries implement an educational policy by which primary and secondary school leavers will be permanently numerate and

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literate and have some skills. If they aspire to proceed to the tertiary level, then they further their education. We can then reflect on the relevance of education in Africa with regards to popular demand. Obviously, education is the signpost for manpower development, for economic growth and development. It should be funded for research in science and technology and for administrative and managerial expertise. The relevance of education is naturally tied to the content of education, its depth or breadth in schools and universities. In these institutions, the development of knowledge and understanding is effected through some structures. These organize the sequence of learning experiences known as the curriculum with its particular priorities that relate to depth of knowledge, epistemological distinctions of subjects or interdisciplinarity.2 Another dimension is the quality of education, which is relative to the quality of learning and teaching. The quality has to do with the standard of the school, the teacher and the ability of the learner to cope. Maintaining a high standard is a cherished tradition with discipline, hard work and serious commitment. High standard is a common characteristic of some missionary and private schools, colleges and universities whose educational services are expensive. It means that a high price is paid for a high standard and good quality education. At the university level, emphasis is on specialization in specific disciplines and in developing creative and analytical imagination which is the hallmark of quality in education. This differentiation of knowledge into distinct disciplines does not preclude the need for integration of other subjects to serve other purposes. Hence the necessity for interdisciplinary education which may compel curriculum integration, restructuring, retraining of the teaching staff and acquiring new books and teaching equipment.3 At what level do we regard someone as educated? It is when a person is stimulated by the teaching of others and is transformed by education. In the process, he acquires some skills, adopts some attitudes and develops some rational modes of thinking, and an analytical mind which guide his behaviour in any context. In this way, education is purpose-driven and result-oriented. Many scholars agree that the goal of education is to ‘reform’ or ‘transform’ a learner through his serious engagement in learning and the concentration of his teacher. Thus, a well-educated person, through the process of some structured activities and interactions in a particular direction, becomes better and has an outlook and form of life that is desirable.4 We may teach science, mathematics and engineering for educational reasons and the objective of increasing productivity. The learners are

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expected to live a worthwhile life and show clear evidence of being educated through an ‘integrated curriculum’ which is inclusive of basic education; otherwise he is merely a product of a purely vocational training. Schools and colleges are used for basic education and training. By training, we mean acquiring skills in pottery, drama, manufacturing, textile, carpentry, shoe-making, tailoring, and sports. Such skills are acquired in technical colleges and polytechnics. Can we say that the graduates of these institutions are not educated? All depends on their curricula and their teachers. While these skills are needed in the society for economic production, those who have them must “be committed to worthwhile activities in pursuit of truth for its own sake” through continuous development of knowledge and understanding. They must develop some kind of conceptual scheme to leverage their understanding “above the level of a collection of disjointed facts”.5 They must know how to apply some principles for organizing some facts, for interpretation in some contexts and be able to attempt some deductive and inductive reasoning on issues and reach some logical conclusions. Apart from specializing in a discipline, they must acquire a general working knowledge of some other cognate subjects to live a coherent pattern of life. In other words, school curricula must be designed to avoid narrow specialism. And graduates must pursue further studies, update their knowledge and be relevant to their society by contributing to nation building, developing insight and foresight for decision making, policy formulation, effective management and leadership.

On the Concept of Functionality To critically examine the question of the functionality of education in Africa and make some recommendations for correcting any noticeable deficiencies, it is appropriate to start with the functionalist theory. Functionalism is particular about how the several parts of an organ, system, institution or society interact, cooperate and function to achieve a common goal. All the various parts, being in cordial working relationship, are organized into a system, which must produce the desired result and reproduce.6 In relation to a society, members can be regarded as cells, and its institutions as organs. All are to function to sustain the life of the collective entity regardless of internal social conflicts, the death of some members and the birth of new babies. Functionalism applies also to social institutions like family, religion and education.

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These institutions perform specific functions to satisfy specific social needs which may vary from one society to another according to sociocultural values and historical experiences. The social institutions are to be developed to meet culturally derived and instrumental needs which include economic production, inter-group relations, social control, education and political organization. Each institution has personnel, a constitution, a set of norms or rules, activities, material apparatus (technology) and a function.7 Functionalism also draws attention to the social structure (structural functionalism) in terms of a system of social relationships (interdependency) in which members interact and engage in complementary functions to achieve a common goal. Hence the claim that institutions are an orderly set of relationships whose function is to maintain the society as a whole. Thus in an educational institution, the government, family, school heads, personnel, teachers and students must comply with the rules and regulations and cooperate to achieve a common goal.8 Structural functionalism calls attention to the correlation between the functions or dysfunction of an institution and its structure.9 In other words, there must be room for restructuring an institution in response to changes in society or in other parts of the world, as exemplified by the current information age and knowledge society. Thus the indispensable reorganization may entail retraining of personnel (administrative and academic), disposing of the redundant staff, recruiting new personnel with the requisite qualifications and skills, erecting new structures and acquiring new books, information technologies and pedagogical materials. Functionalism also clarifies the concept of function by differentiating the latent from the manifest functions. While the former are the objective consequences of social institutions (like a school in the society) which are neither intended nor recognized by the members of a society, the latter are those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the educational system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system through examinations, and feedbacks from the graduates already employed, doing very well and winning prizes for excellence and leadership roles.10 The manifest functions also pertain to the public recognition of particular educational institutions as centres of excellence that attract increased public and private funding and patronage.

Colonial Education in Africa Although the schools, colleges and tertiary institutions under colonial rule were modeled on European institutions in the metropoles, their

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curricula were limited. Yet the standard of education at any level was high. Indeed, the poor who could not travel overseas for higher education enrolled for long-distance learning and privately studied their modules for examinations in law, survey, and the humanities. Many of them passed in flying colours and constituted the vanguard of the nationalist movement and anti-colonial press. The most popular tertiary institutions included Achimota College (Accra), Fourah Bay College (Freetown), Yaba College of Technology (Lagos), the University College, Ibadan, Makerere University, Kampala and the University of Legon (Accra).11 The first generation of African graduates of these institutions had functional education and made fabulous contributions to their respective countries after independence.

Post-Colonial Education in Africa The achievement of independence has enabled various African states to decolonize the existing structures of education, the syllabi and the philosophy of education. The teaching personnel could not be disposed of, but various programmes were introduced locally to train teachers for the emerging primary and secondary schools and the production of textbooks on the basis of the new curricula. States that had the wherewithal sponsored overseas training of their resourceful citizens. Hence the decolonization of higher education was very gradual as the lecturers who administered the newly created universities were Europeans who trained Africans for a number of years.12 In line with the new educational philosophy and policy, new and relevant subjects were introduced for training Africans for administrative and managerial services. Courses like engineering, law, medicine, and the sciences were also introduced so that African graduates could fill the positions in the various fields and services to be vacated by Europeans.13 Such positions were in the civil service, teaching, judiciary, hospital, agriculture, transport, mining, communication, finance, banking, electricity and industry. The introduction of courses relating to these offices and services precipitated the need for the expansion of university education. This policy implied the establishment of various universities in different locations.14 There was an urgent need also for the development of the required middle-level manpower; hence the establishment of technical colleges, colleges of education and the polytechnics. Later, the universities of agriculture, science and technology were to follow in double quick time to join the rest of the world in the rat race for technological development and industrialization.

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These ambitious programmes were predicated on technical and financial assistance from some advanced countries. To promise is easier than fulfilling it. Thus, many donor countries and organizations reneged on their pledges, and neither were the expatriates forthcoming in transferring technology to African trainees. Only a few countries were able to adopt the policy of self-reliance by harnessing their limited resources to finance higher education for economic development. Those that were less endowed continued to rely on foreign assistance which was tied to specific conditionalities and subjected to international interests, without any guarantee of economic development. Some scholars have argued that although the universities have provided high level manpower for both the public and private sectors, one can hardly pinpoint evidence for their leading role in the development of the economies where they are located.15 The universities of agriculture, science and technology are vilified for their failure to make visible impact on the economy. However, we must not overlook the need for adequate funding of research programmes, discoveries and invention of mechanical gadgets by scientists. An example is the Federal Institute of Industrial Research (FIIRO), Oshodi, Lagos, which, over three decades, has accumulated innumerable inventions, designs and research reports from Nigerian universities but which have not been translated into consumer or industrial products for sale and for use in the Nigerian economy. The institute has been incapacitated by poor funding, the politics of revenue allocation and bureaucratic orthodoxy. A scholar at the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) once invented a yam pounding machine and submitted it to FIIRO for assessment and production. Official nonchalance and politics compelled him to withdraw his report and prototype invention for sale to a Japanese industrialist with the copyright. A few months later, yam pounding devices were imported from Japan into the Nigerian market.16

The Era of Military Administrations and Civil Wars, 1960s–1990s The initial fast rate of educational development in the 1960s was scuttled by sporadic military seizure of political power and civil wars. There was violence in one-party, monarchical and military states on account of rampant legitimacy crises: in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, Zambia, Malawi, Guinea, Chad, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Liberia, Eritrea, Sudan, Namibia, Angola,

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Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Uganda, Congo, Brazaville, Republic of Congo (Zaire), Central African Republic, Somalia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique and South Africa.17 Thus, civil wars, political instability, famine and displacement of persons paralyzed educational activities. The universities could not implement their programmes to a logical conclusion because the various regimes mobilized available resources for winning the wars and maintaining peace. The trend continued till the 1990s when the collapsing educational system was in need of rehabilitation. It was during the long period of military rule and wars that the universities, schools and colleges suffered almost total neglect. They could not attract much allocation from African governments during the post-war reconstruction programmes, hence the protests by students and the public that were violently suppressed. Many students and lecturers who opposed the governments were arrested and incarcerated. Journalists, who sympathized with the plight of victims of military dictatorships, were witch-hunted and shut up in military and police cells.18 As the university administration came under military control and direction, many lecturers began to migrate to Europe and North America in droves. Some radical expatriates who condemned military dictators were summarily deported for “teaching topics outside the syllabus”. Indeed, the university campuses were frequented by the personnel of state intelligence services to arrest the already marked opponents of the rulers.19 Many academics, however, compromised their integrity by becoming friends of the military and, in the process, were appointed as commissioners, vice-chancellors, ambassadors, advisers and directors of parastatals. Only a few of them returned to their respective universities at the end of their tenure. Those who stayed away became rich business tycoons having acquired much landed property in several parts of their countries. In the process, other academics began to jostle for political appointments which have now become more lucrative. They thereby became sycophants and errand boys of the military to whom they gave their curriculum vitae during unsolicited nocturnal visits.20 The universities were characterized by malpractices that included award of undeserved Ph.Ds and honorary degrees, admission rackets, graduation of unqualified students, doctoring of curriculum vitae by academics, sexual harassment, prostitution, cultism among male and female students, financial mismanagement by university administrators and students’ unions, examination malpractice, certificate racketeering, cyber theft, fraud and armed robbery by students, incessant strikes and student protests leading to frequent closure of universities, government

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imposition of less qualified academics and vice-chancellors and the promotion of others to professorships without due process and requisite academic requirements.21 Poor salaries and prolonged closures compelled academics to resort to moonlighting to cater for their families. Decline in morale and loss of interest in research inevitably and naturally led to poor quality of teaching and academic standard. Even many academics used the same lecture notes for twenty-five years because of absence of current journals and books in the libraries. Some academics resorted to selling handouts to students instead of publishing books. It took the authorities some years before the practice was abolished. On account of poor funding, academics could not attend international and local conferences except those sponsored by foreign organizers.22 It goes without saying that the worsening economic recession and the debt overhang confronting all African countries since the 1980s also aggravated the decline in the education sector: progressive decline in budgetary provision for higher education caused a destabilization of social structures and inability to pay monthly salaries regularly. In the process, African governments were compelled to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Among other things, they withdrew subsidies from social and economic services, adopted privatization, devaluation of national currencies and adopted the free market economy model. Investment in primary and secondary education was preferred to higher education on the ground that graduates were jobless. Various university programmes were closed down with the result that there was a drop in enrolment.23 Education thereby became more expensive. Poor parents and students struggled hard to bear the high cost of accommodation, meals, transport, books, handouts and photocopying of scarce texts. Nevertheless, the hard times failed to undermine the aspirations of applicants for university education as an upsurge in students’ enrolment shocked the IMF and the World Bank. The duo, rather than accept failure and defeat, reacted by ordering a change in the content of the university curriculum, known as the “University System Innovation Project (USIP), to re-tool African academics in the Social Sciences and Liberal Arts by using books and materials selected by World Bank experts from American universities.”24 These books, which were distributed to African universities, were purchased from a standby World Bank loan to African governments. This policy, which was interpreted by faculty unions as an attempt by the United States to recolonise African higher education, was vehemently opposed on various campuses with the support of the students.

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Still undaunted, the World Bank then compelled the university authorities to proscribe all faculty unions. This policy was also vigorously resisted despite the persistent assault on union leaders and their followers, whose salaries were withheld. The foregoing shows how complete the subversion of university autonomy was. As these policies and SAP were religiously implemented, many expatriates, African scholars, medical doctors and nurses emigrated from Africa to Europe, North America, and the Middle East in their thousands in the 1980s and 1990s.25 In Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, prolonged strikes paralysed academic activities despite repeated threats of firing union leaders and members. Throughout 1994, the academics in Kenya were on strike and, like in Nigeria and Ghana, their posts were declared vacant by their respective military dictators. Indeed, these posts were advertised by the local and foreign media but without any positive results. Pressure by parents, the local press and the civil society on African states to resolve the impasse compelled a rethink of the IMF policies.26 Questions have been asked about the motivation of the World Bank and its African collaborators for destroying higher education. It was unfortunate that the vice-chancellors, university commissions and the ministers of education, some of whom were professors, easily succumbed to the scripts prepared by the IMF and the World Bank for implementation. One would have expected them to advise their civilian and military rulers against the implementation of the policies that were contrary to African aspirations for rapid development. It was then unimaginable that various university administrations were converted to active accomplices in the subversion of university autonomy. While America, Britain, Germany and Japan historically upheld higher education as their route to the future, African rulers endorsed a Western conspiracy to destroy higher education in Africa’.27 By 2002, when negative reports on SAP in Africa were collated, the World Bank surprisingly presented an agenda for tertiary education in Africa as a precondition for rapid development, thereby vindicating the standpoint of the faculty unions.28

Higher Education and the Challenge of Functionality The foregoing is a catalogue of damaging developments, problems and challenges in education that could not be quantified. Since it is easier to destroy than to build, it will take a long time before the damage could be rectified. The problems include rapid expansion in students’ enrolment and the dwindling financial allocation; funding of education; the critical question of brain drain; university autonomy; the emerging knowledge

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economy; gender imbalance in enrolment; the quality of higher education and its relevance; and graduate unemployment. Since certain strategies to be adopted to meet these challenges have been elaborated on elsewhere, only a thumb nail sketch will be attempted here.29 The number of public and private universities has increased to tackle the problem of rapid expansion in student enrolment. Long distance learning, the Open University system and evening programmes have been introduced. Yet there are still thousands of candidates who are denied admission on account of limited spaces, especially in Nigeria with over 100 universities. Large numbers of students migrate from Africa to Europe, North America, India and Australia for further studies. Private universities are springing up everywhere.30 The problem of funding has been addressed by raising endowment funds, donation of chairs in some faculties, contributions of the alumni associations and the internally generated revenue through consultancy services, commercial undertakings, rents on use of auditoria, halls, guest houses, bookshops, pharmacies, zoos and tourism. Faculty unions often ask the government to uphold an allocation of 26% of its annual budget to higher education. Instead, about 4 to 12% was allocated in a decade. This was inadequate for laboratory equipment, library, information technology, and maintenance of other infrastructure in public institutions. Private universities that have these equipment and adequate teaching materials charge higher school fees, hence the general complaint by parents that they are expensive. Attempts to increase school fees by public universities and polytechnics have been greeted with condemnation, protests and demonstrations. One cannot generalize about this situation as some institutions perform better than others.31 The issue of brain drain was vigorously addressed in the 1980s and 1990s by both the faculty unions and university administrations. The consensus was that there should be improvement in the conditions of service, increase in salaries and funding and the sanctity of autonomy to stem the tide of emigration of scholars. By 2000, the rate of emigration had reduced on account of the relative improvement in university funding. The trend still continues, but private universities that offer fantastic salaries and housing attract potential emigrants from their public counterparts. Since 2000, the question of autonomy has been a topical subject of conferences, public lectures and workshops and publications.32 Autonomy means ‘the ability to act and make decision independently’. An autonomous university can then operate without external control or interference by the government and its agencies. The administrative, academic and financial aspects of autonomy need some analysis. By administrative autonomy,

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universities will be free from government administrative control to define their own structure and exercise full powers to appoint and discipline all erring staff. The relevant structures, like the governing councils, will perform the oversight responsibilities, appoint or remove vice-chancellors and determine the salary scales of all categories of workers after due consultation with the unions. Thus, the institutions will no longer be part of the public service.33 Academic autonomy, which was subverted during the period of military dictatorship and led to the exodus of the best scholars who could not enjoy and exercise their freedom to conduct research, teach and publish without any hindrance, is to be restored and enhanced. The envisaged policy will enable the university senate to determine the content and details of curricula in consonance with the government philosophy and policy on higher education. The institutions will be at liberty to decide on academic expansion or contraction, and determine the teaching methodology, and the mode of admission of students in accordance with approved minimum academic standards.34 The fear of public universities, which was predicated on a general misconception of financial autonomy as government abdication of the responsibility to fund universities, has been allayed. Indeed, government funding will increase while the institutions explore more opportunities for increased internally generated revenue for their services, and work towards making academic activities internationally competitive. Various consultations with government agencies, the private sector and other stakeholders have resulted in agreements on modalities for increased allocations for capital and recurrent expenditure. There has been a progressive expansion of hostel accommodation, classrooms and science laboratories. A popular source of revenue that is always exploited is the fee payable by the students. School fees and charges are raised usually after some necessary consultations with the faculty and students’ unions, parents, representatives of the private sector and the government. While this is done to avoid protests and strikes, it is also argued that parents’ salaries must be improved to pay increased fees and charges and that scholarship and students’ loan schemes must be introduced.35 African universities are confronted with the challenge of globalization which operates on the combined engines of a knowledge society and knowledge economy. In other words, we are in a new global age marked by change in three technological waves, namely, information technology, biotechnology and material science. The most dominant aspect of this trend is information technology. Fear of being isolated or left behind has prompted African universities to acquire the necessary information

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infrastructure on their various campuses. While some institutions are at par with their overseas counterparts, others are at the elementary stage of establishing an internet communication system, e-library, e-learning and websites. While the University of Cape Town is known for its virtual library with its high capital investment, similar systems are being contemplated in other parts of Africa.36 However, most campuses have computer centres for teaching various programmes while many offices of the faculty are connected to both local area network, wireless internet and the dial-up system for e-conferencing, e-marketing, e-catalogue and multidisciplinary research. University campuses are now awash with private cyber-cafes where students browse, chat, read mails and procure relevant data for class assignments at stipulated prices per page. In a few years’ time, the majority of them will be computer literate and possess personal laptops.

The Challenge of Functionality and Unemployment As stated earlier, the aim of functional education is to prepare teachers and learners to acquire knowledge, skills and capacities for proffering solutions to the challenges facing the individual, the wider society, the nation and the international community. Thus, through higher education, university teachers through training acquire the capability and knowledge to teach, conduct research and render community service. Ideally, all graduates of higher institutions are expected to play similar roles to justify their university education.37 Functional education also has to do with character training, which is a major concern of missionary and private schools, colleges and universities. Unfortunately, this important aspect of training is generally de-emphasised in the public schools and universities, hence the moral decadence and immoral practices that are prevalent on the various campuses in the name of modernism and fundamental human rights! Any form of education at any level without good morals, work ethic, discipline and self-control is dysfunctional. While combining education with character building, emphasis should be on the consistent inculcation of positive habits, values and attitudes. In the words of John Ruskin, “education is the leading of human souls to what is best, and making what is best out of them; and these two objects are always attainable together, and by the same means; the training which makes men happiest in themselves also makes them most serviceable to others.”39 Prior to and shortly after the flag independence of African states, Africans’ functional education impacted on their societies and governments positively. Reading the books and articles in the newspapers

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of these days, one will conclude that they were the quintessential persons of science and among the most versatile, extraordinary and incredibly brilliant minds with vast knowledge and clear grasp of issues. Their discourses transcended disciplinary boundaries in matters of sociopolitical transformation. Their qualitative and functional education had freed their minds from intellectual servitude because they rejected the platform of untested and unquestioned foreign theories and concepts by which unscrupulous scholars experience foreign domination.40 We still have many living legends today in Africa who have been influenced by their African forerunners in their conscious efforts at liberating our collective imagination from imitating the West by conducting cutting edge research into our culture, history and technology with scientific rigour, awesome objectivity and originality. In lectures and publications, the first and second generations of graduates of early higher institutions in Africa have demonstrated a good mastery of a second language and written in good style, with thorough-going analyses of contemporary issues and thereby confirmed their sure-footedness in scholarship. They are still respected in the international community for their thoughtful insights, caustic criticism and objectivity in different contexts.41 In recent times the rot in primary, secondary and higher education has dominated newspaper headlines and has been the theme of public lectures, symposia and workshops. Indeed, government functionaries, international organizations and key players in the private sector and concerned parents have decried the falling standard. Hence many so-called graduates are not employable because in the perception of employers they are half-baked and their knowledge and skills are irrelevant.42 Recently, the University Commissions Committees of Vice-Chancellors and Association of African Vice-Chancellors brainstormed on the issue and recommended the introduction of entrepreneurship studies as a compulsory course for all students so that after graduation they could establish their own businesses and employ some hands. A diagnosis of the fall in standard reveals an interdependent relationship of a number of factors in time and space as regards availability, quality, operation and adequacy. These factors are curriculum, teachers, students and physical resources.43 In the same vein, some quality-enhancing factors include improvement in salaries, increased recurrent funding (200%), tightening of quality assurance mechanism by the relevant university commission and the establishment of a department of quality assurance, ranking of African universities, Education Trust Fund (2% of gross profit), national digital

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library project, university autonomy, more private universities and a national open university to enhance access to university education.44 Like in the more developed countries, a faculty of career guidance and counselling should be established in each African university, whether private or public. Indeed the same structure will be useful in the schools and colleges. The main function of this establishment is to prepare undergraduates for their future careers by identifying their individual abilities, interests and skills. The career counselors in collaboration with entrepreneurs in the private sector will organize regular workshops, interviews, seminars and lectures for the students for rewarding interactions. In the process, students and their lecturers will know what the business world and labour market want from the students and higher institutions so as to redesign their curricula.45 Students will also learn about the practical application of theories; how to design or compose resume and curriculum vitae; and how to conduct job search, write job applications and prepare for job interviews with particular emphasis on appearance, composure, discipline and ability to communicate effectively and confidently, demonstrating a working knowledge of other relevant subjects to one’s professional training. The library should be stocked with books and journals on career opportunities according to disciplines and business houses for students’ perusal. It is indisputable that higher education is at present market-driven and is therefore very expensive. All the stakeholders must borrow a leaf from the advanced countries and learn from the experience of China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia to find ways of ensuring the relevance of education to the challenges of the global market economy. Relevance is essential in the current realities of globalization, democracy and current market-driven economies. Higher educational institutions must be conscious of the need to compete with the rest of the world that is characterized by rapid change, and must be relevant to the community in which they are located.46

Conclusion Since ‘Rome was not built in a day’ and, according to the Chinese, ‘a journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step’, African states cannot be lukewarm to the problems of education and its crucial role in nation-building, economic growth and economic development. We need to adopt a radical approach to revamping the educational system. In Nigeria, a repeated call has been made on the federal government to declare a state of emergency in the education sector. It should not be business as usual.

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The radical change requires the collaborative efforts of the Association of African Universities, Association of West African Universities, Southern African Regional Association of Universities, the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Association for the Development of Education in Africa, UNESCO, ministries of education, national university commissions and trust foundations. According to Winston Churchill, “the future of the world [and of Africa] belongs to the educated race”;47 the educated youths of today are leaders of tomorrow in Africa. It is through education that developing countries “can be developed and be free from foreign exploitation and economic dependence, subjection and neo-colonialism” regardless of political independence and sovereignty.48 Thus, education is the channel to technical, managerial and administrative competence, capital investment, and the much-expected industrial development. Knowledge is like a garden, if it is not cultivated it will not be harvested. Our higher institutions should reconceptualise and reformulate their visions and mission statements to incorporate the cultivation “of spiritual sensibilities and imaginative faculties, as well as ethical insight and critical thought; foster the integration of theoretical and practical knowledge and liberate persons to participate responsibly in and contribute to life in a global community”.49 Our general studies must be redesigned to have a global perspective so that students will gain an integrated understanding of how to live a meaningful and successful life in a rapidly shrinking global community, especially as careers increasingly demand that people understand diverse cultures and international issues. Students should be thoroughly taught to develop communicative skill and competency in a second language and an understanding of different cultures. Their studies in the sciences, the humanities, and the fine arts should enable them to develop critical thinking, writing, creativity, ethical analysis and problem-solving skills.50

Having been well grounded in the sciences and the humanities, they have a solid foundation for examining the challenges and opportunities of the future in terms of policy formulation and implementation. There is no doubt that at present Africa is lagging behind while the developed world continues to devise and employ new and sophisticated technologies in the management and delivery of educational services. In other words, they do the business of education, training and life-long learning through sophisticated technologies. African states must therefore

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invest heavily in the world education market to catch up with the developed world to be relevant in the emerging trend in global education. Thus, higher institutions must acquire and use television, multi-media technology, computer and the internet at the various levels of education such as basic and vocational education, training, long-distance learning and life-long education. There is no doubt that a few higher institutions in sub-Saharan Africa are well-established forerunners in the use of sophisticated technologies in teaching, research and publication. They include CODESRIA, the University of South Africa and TECHNICON in South Africa.51 They will be willing to assist other institutions in this regard so that, before long, some African higher institutions will be among the first 100 best universities in the world.

Notes 1. Peters, R.S., Woods, J. and Dray, W.H. (1980). “Aims of Education: A Conceptual Inquiry”, in Peters, R. S. ed. (1980). The Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.3. Also Mazrui, Ali A. (1978). Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa. London: Heinemann, pp.235-251. 2. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, pp.202, 216, 248, 302-6; Peters, Woods and Dray, “Aims of Education”, p.5. 3. Zeleza, P.T. (1997). Manufacturing African Studies and Crises. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp.70-86. 4. Peters, Woods and Dray, “Aims of Education”, p.15; Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, pp.1-20; Ayandele, E. A. (1979). The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, pp.4-5. 5. Peters, Woods and Dray, “Aims of Education”, pp.18-19. 6. Jarvie, I.C. (1973). Functionalism. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company. 7. Goldschmidt, Walter (1996). “Functionalism”, in Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology, Vol.2. David Levinson and Melvin Ember, EDA. New York: Harry Holt, p.510. 8. Seymour–Smith, Charlotte (1986). Dictionary of Anthropology. Boston: Gold, Hall, p.165. 9. Kaplan, David and Robert A. Manners (1972). Cultural Theory. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, p.58. 10. Turner, Jonathan H. and Alexandra Maryanski (1991). “Functionalism”, in Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol.2. Edgar F. Borgatta, ed. New York: Macmillan. Winthrop, Robert H. (1991), “Functionalism”, in Dictionary of Concepts in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Greenwood Press, p.130. 11. Ayandele, The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, pp.16, 77,190; Mazrui, Political Values, pp.287, 289, 290, 291-2; Coleman, J.S. (1986) Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Benin City: Broburg & Winstrom, pp.122-125.

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12. Coleman, J.S. (1986). Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp.154-159, 312314: Crowder, M. (1973). West Africa under Colonial Rule. London: Hutchinson, pp.150-162. 13. Fafunwa, A.B. (2002). History of Education in Nigeria. Ibadan: NPS Educational Publishers, pp.150-162. 14. Takyiwaa, Manub (2002). “Higher Education, Condition of Scholars and the Future of Development in Africa”. CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue, Nos. 3&4, p.43. 15. Eshiwani, G.S. (2002). “Higher Education in Africa: The Challenges and Strategies for 21st Century”. A Keynote Address at an International Conference of CODESRIA, Dakar, April 25, p.4. 16. The development dominated newspaper headlines in Nigeria in the late 1970s. 17. For details see Kennedy, G. (1974). The Military in the Third World. London: Duckworth, pp.23-54, 69-88. 18. Amobi, F.A. (2007). “Tribute to the Apogee of Nigerian Higher Education: Reflections of a Scholar in Diaspora”, in Afolayan, M.O., ed., Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa: Paradigms of Development, Decline and Dilemma. Frenton NJ: Africa World Press, p.345; Times International, Vol.6. No.44, August 5, 1985, pp.6-9; “Academic Freedom Programme in Africa 1994”, CODESRIA Bulletin, No.1, 1995, pp.5-8. 19. Anyang Nyong’o, P. (1991). “Democratization Process in Africa”, CODESRIA Bulletin, No.2, 1991, pp.2-3, 15. About thirty-one African academics were in detention in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). 20. Times International (1985) Vol.6. No.44, p.7; Lawal, A. A. (2007). “Adding a Historical Dimension to the Dilemmas of Higher Education”, in Afolayan, M.O., ed., Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, pp.67-69. 21. Lawal (2007). “Adding a Historical Dimension”, pp.63-65. African Concord, (1988, 10 May) Vol.2, No.6, pp.32-38. See also Ajayi, J. F. Ade, Lameck, K. H. Goma and G. Ampich Johnson (1995). The African Experience with Higher Education. Accra: The Association of African Universities. 22. The problem of handouts led to a face-off between a vice-chancellor and the faculty union of a university in southwestern Nigeria. To sue for peace, the state government ordered the vice-chancellor to proceed on compulsory leave, a euphemism for his removal. 23. Ifeanyi Onyeonoru (2004). “Industrial Conflict in Nigerian Universities: The Presence of the Past and the Thrust of the Future”, The National Scholar (A Publication of Academic Staff Union of Universities), Vol.4, No.5, pp.2, 5. 24. Iyayi, Festus, (2002). “University Autonomy and its Enemies in Nigeria”. An address at a Public Lecture organized by the Lagos State Chapter of the Alumni Association of the University of Ilorin at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of Lagos, Akoka, July 30, p.14. 25. Caffentizis, G. (2000). “The World Bank and Education in Africa”, in Federici, S. Gaffentzis, G. and Alidon, O., eds., A Thousand Flowers. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp.3-18; Afolayan, M.O. (2007). “Higher Education in Africa and the

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Critical Question of Brain Drain: The Case of Nigerian Americans”, in Afolayan, M.O., ed., Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, pp.327-341. 26. “Excerpts from the case studies and briefings on academic freedom in Africa 1994”, CODESRIA Bulletin (1995), No.1, pp.5-8. The countries covered were Nigeria, Zaire and Kenya. 27. Awolowo, Obafemi. (1981). Voice of Courage. Akure: Fagbamigbe Publishers, pp.70-71. 28. World Bank (2002). “Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education”. A World Bank Report, Education Group. Human Development Network. 29. Eshiwani (2002). “Higher Education in Africa”, p.7. 30. Eshiwani (2002). “Higher Education in Africa”, p.8. 31. Sawyer Akilagpa (1998). “Does Africa Really Need Her Universities”. CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos.3 and 4, p.22. 32. For a list of publications by Nigerian academics and faculty unions, see The National Scholar, 2004, Vol.4, Number 5. 33. Ade Ajayi, J.F. (2001). “Paths to the Sustainability of Higher Education in Nigeria”, Newsletter of the Social Science Academy of Nigeria, Vol.4, No.2, p.9. 34. “Programme on Academic Freedom and Human Rights in Africa” CODESRIA Bulletin (1997), No.4, pp.23-28; see also CODESRIA Bulletin (1991), No.1, pp.57. 35. Ade Ajayi (2001). “Paths to the Sustainability of Higher Education”, p.6. COPADNU Bulletin, Vol.1, Nos. 1& 2, October 2005, pp.11 & 12. COPADNU is Committee of Directors of Academic Planning of Nigerian Universities. 36. Eshiwani (2002). “Higher Education in Africa”, p.13; Omolewa, M. (2008). “Most African Universities are in Deplorable State”, The Nigerian Education Times, No.20, July – August, p.17. Audu, M.S. (2008). “State of ICT Application in Higher Institutions”, The Punch, September 30, 2008, p.39. 37. “The Social Responsibility of Intellectuals” (1991). CODESRIA Bulletin, No.1, p.6; Obafemi Awolowo (1981). Voice of Wisdom. Akure: Fagbamigbe Publishers, pp.107-109. 38. Omolewa (2008). “Most African Universities are in Deplorable State,” p.18. 39. Kem Ambroise (2005). “Redesigning the African University emerging from Subalternity”. CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos. 1 and 2, pp.4-7. 40. Omolewa, (2008). “Most African Universities are in Deplorable State”, pp.1718, 24. 41. “Varsities employ half-baked dons”, The Punch, September 23, 2008, p.7; “‘Graduates’ short on skills”, The Punch, September 23, 2008, p.56. 42. CODAPNU Bulletin, Vol.1, Nos. 1&2, October 2005, p.9. 43. Ibid. 44. This was the writer’s experience in the United States in the 1990s. 45. Ibidapo-Obe, O. (2007). “Innovative Paradigm for Nigerian University System”, Unilag News, May, pp.17-19; Adalemo, I.A. (2001). “Higher Institutions in Nigeria: Institutional Inadequacies, System Performance and Sustainability”, News Letter of the Social Science Academy of Nigeria, Vol.4, No.2, p.26. 46. Awolowo (1981). Voice of Wisdom, p.109.

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47. Awolowo, Obafemi. (1981). Voice of Courage. Akure: Fagbamigbe Publishers, p.54. 48. The Mission of Drury University, USA. http://www.drury.edu/multnl/story. cfm, March 7, 2005. 49. The Mission of Drury University. http://www.drury.edu/multinl/story.cfm, March 7, 2005. 50. “The World Education Market”, The Guardian, June 7, 2001, p.52.

CHAPTER THREE PERSISTENT MALARIA IN AFRICA AND THE POVERTY OF CONTINENTAL RESPONSE OLUKOYA OGEN AND ADEYEMI BALOGUN

Introduction One African child dies every 30 seconds from malaria. In fact, the malaria death toll in Africa is akin to one Boeing 747 full of people crashing every three hours – killing everyone on board – without this making a murmur in the news.1

This chapter re-appraises the problem of malaria in Africa, its effects on human lives, the attitude and response systems of many communities to malaria and the reasons why the epidemic persists in Africa. This attempt is based on some African countries’ reports and the available scholarly literature on malaria. Specifically, the work seeks to find out why malaria is still a problem in many rural communities through a qualitative field survey of fifty persons in Ile-Ife and Ikire, both in Osun State, Nigeria. It also employs archival data to interrogate the colonial and immediate postcolonial malaria control programmes of some African countries. From this perspective, it identifies the inability of African governments to sustain the anti-malaria policies of the colonial era as one of the most significant factors responsible for the recurring incidence of the epidemic in Africa. The work further highlights the lessons that could be learnt from the attitudes and experiences of people affected by malaria and the traditional methods that have been used, and which are still being used, in the fight against the epidemic. The work, in its conclusion, posits that part of the current global efforts needed to control the malaria epidemic in Africa should be situated within the socio-cultural context of the peoples of Africa with African governments playing a leading role. There is no denying the observation that malaria is a burden in Africa. Available evidence shows that the global incidence of malaria infection

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and its debilitating effects on human life are high in Africa.2 About 90 per cent of the world’s malaria deaths occur in Africa, and the most affected persons are children below the age of five, pregnant women, migrant population and people living with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus as well as the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).3 In spite of the huge global effort aimed at controlling the disease, several factors continue to militate against its eradication in Africa. For the most part, the tropical environment of Africa, which provides suitable breeding ground for the parasite responsible for transmitting malaria disease, is a major challenge. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps it is plausible to suggest that the sincerity of some of the efforts to fight the epidemic by donor countries, agencies and international organizations are not only suspicious but also face some dilemma. This is mostly the case in the use of Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) which has been used in developed countries but was later banned due to criticisms by environmentalists who warned against its damaging effects on the ecosystem. The study further argues that adequate attention has not been given to the control of malaria by African states. Again, this is because many of them have not been able to sustain and support the global interventions against malaria due to lack of trained experts in malaria control, technical difficulties and defective national malaria control programmes.

Africa and the Scourge of Parasite Malaria, according to Nchinda, ranks third among major infectious disease threats in Africa, coming after pneumococcal acute respiratory infections (3.5%) and tuberculosis (2.8%).4 Another estimate from the World Health Organisation (WHO) ranks the disease second to HIV/AIDS (16.6%), accounting for 10.6% of the disease burden in the continent.5 Others are diarrhoeal diseases (7.5%), acute respiratory infections (7.7%), measles (5.3%) and tuberculosis (1.7%). “The problem with malaria,” as observed by Munthali, “is that it can develop from mild illness to serious illness and death within 48 hours.”6 Malaria disease is said to be transmitted through a cycle. It is transferred into the human body through the bite of an infected female Anopheles mosquito. The Anopheles itself becomes infected by taking in parasite after feeding on infected human blood. The parasite then develops inside the mosquito and, about a week later, can be transferred to a new host when the mosquito feeds again.7 The parasite which infects the human blood is called plasmodium (p). There are five species of this

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plasmodium which are: p. falciparum, p. vivax, p. malariae, p. knowlesi, and p. ovale.8 The p. falciparum is reported to be the most threatening and it is responsible for the highest number of illness and death in Africa. It is said to account for about 93-98 per cent of malaria cases in Africa.9 When p. falciparum is injected into the human body, it lives in the liver for between two weeks and several months and later multiplies in the red blood cells where it bursts out showing the first symptoms of malaria.10 Anopheles gambiae, also referred to as the African Malaria Mosquito, is the major vector or organism that carries p. falciparum. This vector is considered to be the most effective in the transmission of malaria in the world and is widely distributed throughout the tropical belt of Africa.11 Another dangerous vector in tropical Africa is Anopheles funestes, which is said to be capable of producing very high inoculation rates in wide ecological, geographical, and seasonal conditions.12 It has been proven that this vector can transmit the malaria parasite in both rural and urban areas. There is also the Anopheles pharoensis, which is said to transmit malaria in the absence of the main malaria vectors.13 Apart from humans, the Anopheles mosquito also feeds on animals such as cattle. It is very active at dusk or dawn and at night. Once it feeds on its host’s blood, it could rest inside or outside the house. This however depends on the local vector type, the chromosomal makeup and the climatic condition.14 The epidemiological situation of the malaria disease is determined by the ecosystem, climate, and species of mosquitoes and parasites. The epidemiological situation is also encouraged by the interactions between malaria epidemics and development activities such “as irrigated agriculture, the damming of rivers, waste-water treatment facilities, intrarural as well as rural-urban population movements, and population displacements as a result of civil conflict or natural disasters.”15 Because of its climatic tolerance, the transmission of malaria in Africa is highly efficient such that even a small vector population can sustain a spread accounting for a substantial morbidity annually.

The Debilitating Effects of Malaria on Human Communities in Africa The endemic manifestations of malaria infection are many and severe. The commonest symptoms of the disease are frequent fever, chills, headaches, muscle aches, nausea and vomiting. These are however benign cases. The most complicated cases are characterised by serious organ failures or abnormalities in the patient’s blood or metabolism.16 Severe malaria could result in kidney and other organ dysfunction such as

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respiratory distress syndrome. It could also cause cerebral malaria, extreme weakness, oedema, septicaemia and coma. In one of the medical centres visited at Ikire, twenty-five, i.e., 83.3% of the thirty patients who come for treatment in one month are said to be malaria patients.17 The report of another major hospital shows that 60 per cent of patients who come for treatment suffer from the malaria disease.18 These figures corroborate the estimate of the Malaria Foundation which indicates that up to 60 per cent of hospital admissions in Africa may be for malaria.19 It is also estimated that about one-fifth of patients who made it to the hospital for treatment die of severe malaria infection.20 A report by the World Health Organization (WHO) also affirms that pregnant women constitute one of the most vulnerable groups to the malaria disease.21 Most of them are more likely to be infected and die from malaria than other adults, and this is said to be due “to the typical immuno-suppression associated with pregnancy and increased levels of the hormones cortisol and oestrogen.”22 As a result of this, they face the severe “risk of maternal anaemia, stillbirth, spontaneous abortion, low birth-weight and neonatal death.”23 It is estimated that 400,000 cases of severe anaemia and 200,000 newborn deaths every year in Africa are caused by malaria.24 The other group is made up of children under the age of five. Normally, children are said to acquire immunity against malaria from their mothers at birth.25 They however become vulnerable to the disease when they are almost three months of age, when their immunity begins to decrease. Children’s deaths due to malaria in Africa have therefore been excruciatingly high. Globally, WHO report shows that there are about 3.3 billion people – half of the world's population – at risk of malaria.26 In 2010 alone, the report shows that about 216 million malaria cases (with an uncertainty range of 149 million to 274 million) and an estimated 655,000 malaria deaths (with an uncertainty range of 537,000 to 907,000) were recorded. Children are said to account for about 90 per cent of all malaria deaths.27 Put differently, the disease is said to be responsible for one in five cases of childhood death in Africa. No wonder Kelvin Kemm suggests that one African child dies every thirty seconds from malaria.28 Although there are children who survive the disease, millions of African children usually cope with its consequences, such as epilepsy and neurological problems, which are not quickly recognized or adequately managed, and which further compounds their health and development into adulthood.29 Victims of HIV/AIDs constitute another group mostly susceptible to malaria. As pointed out by WHO, “co-infection and interaction between the two diseases have major public health implications.”30 Non-immune

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travellers, especially people coming from areas where malaria has mostly been eradicated, are also at risk of the disease. Some other high risk groups are refugees, displaced persons or migrant workers entering into malaria-endemic regions.31 Nchinda has noted that persons who are repeatedly exposed to malaria tend to acquire some measure of clinical immunity which, though is unstable, disappears after they move away from the disease environment.32 Their immunity however reappears once they return to a disease environment. Malaria was once thought to affect mainly the rural areas where there are suitable vector breeding sites. Scientists have discovered that transmission of malaria now occurs in urban areas in spite of the fact that breeding spaces for the Anopheles mosquito tend to decrease in these areas.33 High cases of malaria have been confirmed in large cities such as Lagos, Dakar, Brazzaville, Cotonou, Kumasi, Dar es Salam, and Abidjan, where there are over one million inhabitants each.34 Indeed, Donnelly et al. have pointed out that the urban poor are at risk of malaria than previously acknowledged.35 Apart from compromising the health of its victims, malaria is also a constraint on the social development of the people of Africa. Indirectly, malaria affects the quality of life of the infected, especially people who have several attacks per year. It affects the performance of children in school and also retards their development. Leighton and Foster’s findings36 on the impact of malaria on school children show that a primary school student in Kenya misses an estimated twenty school days per year, which is 10.8 per cent of the country’s 186-day school year. A secondary school child misses eight days, 4.3 per cent of a school year. In Nigeria, primary and secondary school students miss an estimated three to twelve school days per year, which is 2 to 6 per cent of the school year. Losses to students, which are not included in these estimates, could also occur due to days teachers miss school due to malaria. Economically, Ajani and Ashagidigbi have pointed out that “malaria has a direct impact on households’ incomes, wealth, labour productivity and labour market participation of both the sick and the care givers.”37 It is estimated that principal child-carers and employed persons could “lose up to 10 productive days for each time when they themselves or their children contract malaria.”38 Every workday lost to malaria is assumed to be equal to the loss of an average day’s worth of production.39 Therefore, while malaria limits the productive capacity of the infected, substantial wealth, time and efforts are also expended on prevention and control of mosquitoes.40 In their survey of the effect of malaria on rural farmers’ incomes in Oyo State, Nigeria, Ajani and Ashagidigbi discovered that

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Chapter Three as income increases, income lost due to malaria also increases. This is true because high income earning farmers tend to lose more of their income due to better treatment they seek which attracts high cost, and also because of income lost during the period of incapacitation which tends to be more compared to the low income earning farmers.41

In direct cost, individuals, households and governments bear the burden of malaria.42 A lot of money is expended by individuals, institutions and government on fumigation and malaria prevention and/or treatment. It is estimated that “20 to 40 percent of outpatients’ care, costing approximately USD 1 per consultation, and 10% - 15% of hospital admissions in Africa at USD 35 per admission in hospitals, is due to malaria.”43 In Chad, the cost of treatment is estimated to be between US$9.7 and US$82; US$5.73 and US$6.87 in Ghana; US$2.8 and US$18.7 in Rwanda; US$1 and US$5.73 in Uganda; and US$1.2 to US$8 in Nigeria. The direct cost of treatment in Mali is US$4.7.44 Variations in the cost of treatment are due to the rate of resistance of mosquitoes to a number of drugs and tools meant to fight them. Ajani and Ashagidigbi’s report also suggests that while a large amount of a household’s expenditure is used in treating malaria, there are many poor and malnourished people who could not afford the treatment.45 The disease is therefore more threatening to this group than many others. The negative impact of malaria on macro-economic development of African countries is also huge. The African Development Bank (ADB) reported that “macroeconomic impacts of malaria (calculated by including malaria related factors in economic growth models) suggest that countries with a substantial amount of malaria grew at 1.3% less per person per year (controlling for other influences on growth), and that a 10% reduction in malaria was associated with 0.3% higher growth rate per year.”46 Okorosobo et al.’s recent report suggests that malaria is a significant variable in the national incomes of Chad, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda.47 The report points out that the incidence of malaria had a negative impact on aggregate national output, with the loss in growth of the economy or the ‘malaria penalty’ ranging from 0.41% in Ghana to as high as 3.8% and 8.9% in Nigeria and Chad respectively. The loss in economic growth in Rwanda is much smaller at 0.08%. The studies reveal that the impact of malaria on the growth in real gross domestic product is negative and decreases for every increase in malaria morbidity rates.48

As noted in the Islamic Development Bank report,49 malaria is mostly a worry to Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote

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d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Uganda. The low burden countries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. As many people are concerned about the threat of the disease to their livelihoods; the international community is also deeply worried about the epidemic. These concerns have therefore been responsible for an increase in scientific tools, local and international initiatives aimed at taming the epidemic. These initiatives will be examined in the next section.

The Fight against Malaria in Africa: Tools and Measures Preventive and curative (case management) measures which employ a variety of chemical, physical and pharmacological techniques are being used to fight malaria around the world.50 The preventive measures are aimed at controlling the vector, putting a barrier to transmission and increasing human resistance to the parasite. This involves the use of DDT which has proved effective in many industrialised countries of Europe and North America. Environmentalists have however campaigned against its continuous use because of its damaging effects on the ecosystem and human life. Even though the claims by the environmentalists have been discredited by many scientific researches, the opposition to DDT led to a campaign by the industrialised world for a ban on its use for the control of malaria across the world.51 It is however recommended for use in certain quantities provided some guidelines are met.52 Another preventive measure is the Indoor Residual Spraying (IRS) of insecticides to the inner surfaces of dwelling, where many mosquitoes usually rest after feeding on their hosts. The IRS is said to be effective in controlling malaria transmission if the host shelters in target communities are treated.53 It is estimated that the IRS programmes have been used to cover more than ten million people at risk in Africa in 2005 to seventy-three million people in 2009.54 This is a small number compared to other countries outside the continent. Another available option for the prevention of malaria is the use of Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LLINs) or the Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs) which are regarded as the two most powerful vector control tools.55 WHO recommends that LLINs should be given free of charge or highly subsidized to all persons, especially pregnant women and children who are at great risk of malaria. Manufacturers of ITNs were said to have delivered up to 5.6 million nets in 2004, and 88.5 million nets in 2009 to Africa. Also, in the first three quarters of 2010, about 106 million nets

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were delivered. These nets are said to be “enough to cover 66% of the 765 million persons at risk (assuming 2 people sleeping under each ITN).”56 It is particularly significant to note that over 50 per cent of ITNs delivered between 2008 and 2010 went to seven countries: Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, which represent 56 per cent of the population at risk in sub-Saharan Africa.57 Curative measures that are used to control the malaria parasite within the body are contained in the treatment policy of WHO. The aims of these measures are to: (i) reduce morbidity and mortality by ensuring rapid, complete cure of the infection and thus preventing the progression of uncomplicated malaria to severe potentially fatal disease, and preventing chronic infection that leads to malaria-related anaemia; (ii) to reduce the frequency and duration of malaria infection during pregnancy and its negative impact on the foetus; and (iii) to curtail the transmission of malaria by reducing the human parasite reservoir of infection and infectivity.58 A plant-based extract, quinine, is used in many countries in Africa to treat uncomplicated and severe cases of malaria, and it requires a sevenday treatment period. The drug, however, has some side-effects and its use as a single course of treatment has come under serious debate, especially with the rate of resistance of malaria parasites.59 As a result of this, a suitable combination of substances has been advocated in the treatment of the disease. The most effective combination today is the Artemisininbased Combination Therapy (ACT), which is an extract from the Artemisia annua plant.60 WHO has recommended five ACTs which are artemether plus lumefantrine, artesunate plus amodiaquine, artesunate plus mefloquine, artesunate plus sulfadoxine pyrimethamine, and dihydroartemisinin plus piperaquine for the treatment of malaria, ranging from the uncomplicated to the most severe cases. It also specifies that “the choice of the ACT should be based on the efficacy of the combination in the country or area of intended use.”61 Apart from these measures, the efforts by people in the fight against malaria are also important factors in containing the disease. These efforts can be examined from the perspectives of individuals, the state, governmental and non-governmental organizations and the scientists. For many people, self-medication, which includes the use of local herbs or the orthodox anti-malaria medicine, is the first line of treatment for malaria. In severe cases, patients go to hospitals where they are admitted for several

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days of medical care and examination. Responses by governments are mostly in terms of making health facilities accessible and affordable for malaria patients. This may include the provision of medical centres, inexpensive drugs and awareness creation against malaria infection in communities. Heads of state of African countries have also been involved in several collaborative efforts with global governmental and nongovernmental organizations aimed at combating the epidemic. In 1998, African governments approached the international community to assist the continent in the fight against malaria through the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) programme. Through partnership with UN agencies, the private sector, development banks, research centres, NGOs, among others, the RBM targeted 50 per cent reduction in malaria mortality by 2010.62 This commitment was followed up at Abuja in 2000 with a landmark signing of the Abuja Declaration on Roll Back Malaria in Africa. In addition to these efforts, greater commitments have also been coming from NGOs, UN agencies, rich countries, among other individual and corporate aids donors. Global commitments are often in terms of strategic plans, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which aim to reduce or eradicate eight human and environmental threats against human development, including malaria, by 2015. Global commitment also involves financial grants and aids. Between 1997 and 2007, international donors increased their funding from US$50 million to US$800 million.63 The increase led to the establishment of three new initiatives which include The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Global Fund is said to have provided “two-thirds of all global malaria funding, supporting 78 countries around the world with grants totalling nearly US$6.6 billion since 2002”64 when it was established. The second initiative is the World Bank Malaria Booster Programme which has invested almost US$500 million in twenty countries in Africa to reduce the malaria epidemic by 2015. The third is the United States President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) which aims to reduce the high rate of malaria illness and deaths by half in fifteen African countries by 2010. From 2005, when it was established, the PMI has provided almost US$500 million to the battle against malaria. Apart from these initiatives, funding for malaria has also been promoted through investments in research and development by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The Foundation is about the largest private grant-making institution with over US$1.2 billion investment between 1998 and 2007 on the development of effective drugs and vaccines against malaria.65 Scientists and researchers are also involved in the global efforts to reduce the malaria epidemic in Africa. Researchers have been able to

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provide useful characterisations of the malaria parasite and are largely responsible for the development of tools such as the LLINs, insecticides, anti-malaria drugs, among other measures needed to prevent and control the epidemic. The global campaigns by NGOs, multinational corporations, individuals, among several organizations, have also been used to create awareness on the dangers of malaria and the need to prevent and control its continuous spread. Among these are the Africa Fighting Malaria, Malaria Consortium, and European Alliance against Malaria. Given these various efforts, WHO, in its 2011 World Malaria Report, pointed out that the global fight against malaria is yielding some positive results. The Director-General of the organisation, Margaret Chan, explained that coverage of population at risk with malaria prevention and control measures increased in 2010, thereby leading to a decline in estimated malaria cases and deaths. The 2011 document notes specifically that “the estimated incidence of malaria globally has reduced by 17% since 2000 and malaria-specific mortality rates by 26%.”66 The reduction is however a mean achievement as the rate of decline is lower than the internationally agreed targets for 2010 in many regions, especially Africa.67 The 2011 report is therefore an indication that the battle against malaria has not been won in spite of various efforts and tools deployed against it. This raises the question of why the epidemic has remained difficult to control in many communities in Africa.

The Problem of Malaria Control in Africa: The State and the People There is a sense in which it could be said that the international campaign against the malaria disease in Africa is mostly hampered by the uninspiring support of African states. This is based on the observation that many of these countries have been unable to sustain the anti-malaria campaign on their own without external intervention, and this has been responsible for discontinuities in the malaria control programmes in Africa. In this regard, it is possible to cite the example of the environmental management initiatives of colonial and the immediate post-colonial periods in some African countries. Although it may be argued that most of these environmental initiatives were undertaken in the areas where the colonial administrators were resident,68 the important question to ask is whether these anti-malaria campaigns were expanded to other areas after the collapse of colonialism. This does not seem to be the case. In colonial Nigeria, there were several attempts to contain the malaria disease through the reclamation of creeks, lagoons and swampy areas that

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provided breeding space for malaria-bearing mosquitoes. The 1929 AntiMalaria Report of Lagos shows that land reclamation was carried out in such areas as Yaba, Ebute Metta, Apapa, Iddo, Lagos Island, Ikoyi, Badagry and Victoria Island in Lagos.69 Further attempts were made to cut drainage ditches and oil them to prevent the breeding of mosquitoes in the reclaimed areas.70 By 1950, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Cook, could claim before the House of Commons that “four thousand two hundred acres have been reclaimed and the channels dug have extended to 130 miles”71 in the Lagos area. Apart from land reclamation, sanitary inspectors and attendants (wole wole in Yoruba, nwaole-ala in Igbo and duba gari in Hausa) were trained to promote preventive health services in different parts of the country.72 Sanitary officers were mostly responsible for routine inspection of houses, markets, schools and communities; waste disposal and environmental sanitation, pollution and industrial sanitation; water sampling and sanitation; control of communicable diseases; port health duties; vector and pest control; disposal of corpses; meat and food inspection; prosecution of public health offenders; vaccination and inoculation of school children and adults, among others. The sanitary workers played active roles in the eradication of the bubonic plague in Lagos in the 1920s, yaws in the 1940s and smallpox in the early 1970s.73 The establishment of WHO encouraged many of them to acquire higher qualification, thereby enhancing the professionalism of their work. They were later addressed as Environmental Health Officers (EHO) in Nigeria. To sustain the campaign against malaria, the colonial government charged the Lagos Town Council with the responsibility of taking appropriate measures to promote public health in the Lagos area.74 The Council was mandated to provide and maintain streets, open spaces and the drainage system. A Mosquito Control Committee was also set up in the Council with representatives from the Town Council, Sanitary Services, Medical Office of Health, Port Health Office, Public Works, the Railway and Marine Departments. One of the duties of the Committee was to receive reports on investigation, statistics and progress made towards the anti-mosquito campaign. It was also responsible for promoting education and propaganda necessary to assist the campaign. The anti-malaria campaign was also geared towards the use of antimosquito or larvicidal fishes such as the Tilapia (Hausa Gargasa), Top Minnows (Aplocheilichathys), Flotris species, Kusukusu (Electronis lebretoni), and Orombo (Electris africana).75 There were attempts to use a species of electric fish (Eja Ojiji in Yoruba) to control aedes - a genus of mosquito - in large water pots. This practice was said to have been

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observed in several houses in Yoruba and Igbirra lands where water pots were sunk in the floor.76 Although the use of fish had some challenges,77 the correspondence between the Director of Medical Services in Lagos and some colonial offices (including Sanitary Department, Agriculture Research Centre, Ibadan and research institutes in other African countries) shows that many of them were successfully used to contain the reproduction of mosquito larvae before their maturation.78 Among several other places, the suitability of larvicidal fishes for the control of mosquito was tested at Iju Waterworks in Lagos79 and the West African Fisheries Research Institute, Birnin Kebbi, Sokoto Province.80 Part of the measures taken against the malaria disease in the colonial period included ensuring strict regulation and distribution of anti-malaria drugs, mostly quinine. Available evidence from colonial Nigeria shows that adequate records of anti-malarial drugs that were imported into the country and distributed to pharmacy shops and hospitals were kept with the Director of Medical Services in Lagos.81 The Director also received information from pharmacy shops and hospitals on the number of antimalarial drugs in reserves and the quantity needed to restock their stores.82 The anti-malaria programme also included the Customs Office which allowed passengers leaving the country to avail themselves of taking Tabloid Quinine without the necessity of getting a permit from the Director of Medical Services.83 Apart from Nigeria, the anti-malaria campaign was undertaken in other colonial territories in Africa. Castro et al. have noted that between 1902 and 1918, the German colonial government embarked on environmental control of mosquitoes84 through the maintenance of drainages and soil modification in Tanzania. The government enacted ordinances for the prevention of mosquito breeding sites and proscription of urban agriculture, which were mostly the “potatoes and other ridge-and-furrow type cultivation.”85 Drainage works and stronger legal measures were also pursued under the British colonial government when it took over the administration of the territory. In Uganda, residual spraying of mosquito areas was carried out under the direction of the Colonial Insecticides Committee, which led to a reduction of malaria by fifty per cent.86 Freetown, Nairobi and Bathurst in the Gambia were other colonial territories where reclamation of swampy mosquito lands and residual spraying were carried out by the British colonial government.87 Obviously, most of the colonial anti-malaria legacies have not been sustained or improved upon by post-colonial African states. It is hard to imagine that post-colonial African states have discontinued the land reclamation programme, construction and oiling of drainages in many

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localities. Except for the monthly environmental sanitation in Nigeria, for instance, no stringent environmental control of disease is in place. Largely, the role of EHO has been rendered useless, as they are not always available to inspect the sanitary condition of various communities and industrial establishments. According to Garba, their work has also “been hijacked by medical health practitioners (most especially medical doctors)”, whose professional orientation centre primarily on curative health.88 This might be the reason why many health institutions have no EHO in their employment.89 In the same vein, while preventive and curative anti-malaria tools have been discovered and developed outside Africa, many African states have not given adequate attention to finding alternative tools from the resources that abound in the continent. As noted earlier, Eja Ojiji has been used by many Yoruba and Igbirra communities to prevent the breeding of mosquitoes in their houses. The burning of palm kernel shells and dried lime peels are also used by many people to keep their environment free from mosquitoes.90 These initiatives thus suggest that it is possible to improve upon the tools and methods that are used by traditional African societies in preventing the spread of mosquitoes in their environments. It is apparent that many African states do not have the resources to embark on an ambitious anti-malaria campaign on their own because of dwindling economic resources, poverty, and corruption, among other socio-economic and political crises. But beyond these challenges, their commitment to the eradication of malaria has not been impressive. To this extent, it is possible to emphasize that many countries are yet to improve upon the problems that were identified in the 1960s as hindering the antimalaria campaigns in Africa. The pre-eradication programme launched by WHO in the 1960s was said to be seriously affected by technical and operational challenges, especially the problem of infrastructure and improper planning of streets in Africa.91 For many years, researchers have been disturbed by the need to obtain reliable data in the rural communities, as accurate data, and capturing and monitoring of implementation programmes are weighed down by technical difficulties. Observations from Ikire and Ile-Ife communities still show that many houses and streets do not have identifiable names or numbers. Because of this, many residents continue to locate their houses through popular roads, schools or markets around them. Also, many African states do not have effective structures and policy that could facilitate proper implementation of antimalaria programmes. The example of the distribution of anti-malaria drugs can be cited here. As observed in the survey communities, the distribution of drugs does not seem to be adequately monitored. There are many

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unregistered shops on the streets that still sell and recommend drugs to patients. For the most part, it is not always easy to know how these shops get their supplies. This is one of the reasons why it has remained difficult to determine the progress being made in the management of malaria cases in many communities. The problem of technicalities and operation is the reason why virtually all the anti-malaria intervention reports in Africa continue to be filled with ‘estimated figures’ and uncertainties about progress made in the eradication of malaria. This also becomes a problem for many donor agencies which want to be sure about the impact of their investment in the anti-malaria campaign. As the World Bank explains, Although nearly all World Bank project design documents assert that the project will improve [health] outcomes, system performance, or health service access for the poor, few Implementation Completion Reports provide evidence that these development objectives were actually achieved. Not only do we know little about what the Bank has ‘bought’ with its investments, but when progress toward objectives is not measured, they are less likely to be achieved.92

Apart from the national governments, the attitude and experiences of the malaria communities of Africa present some challenges for sustaining the anti-malaria campaign. Field reports from Ikire and Ile-Ife, for instance, show that many people are aware that the condition of their environment is largely responsible for the high rate of mosquito presence and malaria infection. Many of them particularly point to their bushy surroundings, stagnant water and dirt as major factors responsible for the breeding of mosquitoes in their communities.93 In spite of this, the attention they paid to their environment is not enough to prevent the multiplication of malaria-borne mosquitoes. Many of these communities do not have proper sewage systems for used water from their homes or proper disposal systems for their waste. Because of this, stagnant water and dirt are usually left close to their houses. In places where there are sewage systems, they often look unkempt and conduce to the production of mosquitoes. The socio-cultural beliefs regarding the causes and management of diseases could also affect the response system in the control and treatment of malaria in many communities in Africa. As observed from our field surveys, some people do not believe that malaria is a problem of the rural poor.94 While poverty may be identified as a constraining factor in seeking medical attention, many people still consider going to hospitals as the practice of the rich urban class.95 Many of those who have been affected or have had an encounter with affected persons believe that the disease is a

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natural phenomenon which cannot be eradicated.96 Similarly, while there is awareness that children are mostly affected by the disease, many adults also believe they are immune to it because God has been merciful to them through His protection from all sorts of ailments.97 Many respondents particularly point out the fact that they usually drink well water that is considered dirty by the urban rich, yet they have remained hale and hearty for many years.98 The implication of this thinking is the tendency to pay scant regard to the urgency of malaria prevention in their communities. It is interesting to note that many of the interviewees do not consider the use of ITNs as the proper tool to prevent mosquito bite. The belief of many people is that the ITNs are designed for children, and that sleeping under the net is like putting oneself in unnecessary bondage.99 Many people also consider the net as capable of causing more heat when they sleep.100 In the same vein, many people do not believe that the use of orthodox anti-malaria drugs constitutes the most effective tool against malaria. The assumption is that since these drugs have not been able to prevent them from having malaria every year, then their efficacy can be questioned.101 Also, in the surveyed communities, and as observed in many urban areas where access to quality health care is better off, the decision to seek Western medical intervention for illness often comes as a last resort. Many people believe more in the efficacy of herbal medicine than what they referred to as ‘injections’ and ‘chalks’ usually administered in hospitals. This belief is often enhanced by the perception that some ailments cannot be medically diagnosed and treated by Western methods.102 Many of the interviewees confirmed that they had not been to any hospital for several years due to malaria or any other diseases because they were able to take care of themselves with some herbal mixtures.103 Many of the children interviewed also noted that they often took some herbal mixtures administered by their parents in the morning to keep them safe from diseases and other harmful infections.104 Therefore, while the idea of consulting Western medical personnel may not be the first option for many people in the treatment of malaria, herbal medicine also appears to be the preferred means of preventing other health-related problems in several rural and urban communities. It is however significant to note that many people often face the dangerous effects of misdiagnosis and wrong treatment characterised by more severe malaria, loss of faith in the health services, more ill health, increased malaria resistance and detrimental health-seeking behaviour, in spite of their faith in traditional medicine.105 During our field survey, medical personnel pointed out that many of the complicated cases of

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malaria that they treat in hospitals are effects of wrong diagnosis and treatment, resulting most times from treatment administered by herbalists and families of the patients.106 Wrong treatment of malaria could also result from the use of leftover medicine from previous incompletely treated malaria. Similarly, while the recommended and most effective medicine for the treatment of malaria in recent times is the ACT, many respondents are not aware of this. Instead they prefer to treat the common observable symptoms of malaria with pain-relieving medicines such as paracetamol and other drug combinations administered by local pharmaceutical shops. Medical doctors might also be guilty of misdiagnosis. This is usually the case when doctors administer drugs on the basis of enquiries on how patients feel about their health without going for proper laboratory tests. Many interviewees explained that this is the norm when they go to the hospital for treatment.107 Consequently, patients who are not satisfied with this behaviour tend to lose faith in seeking medical care in hospitals. Similarly, this behaviour tends to raise the conviction of many patients that they could actually treat malaria on their own since they know what the doctors might recommend for treatment in the hospital. The problems of wrong diagnosis and treatment also heighten the feeling that the management of malaria in many communities in Africa is being “managed by paediatricians, ophthalmologists and other physicians who know little about the mosquitoes in their areas and even less about vector control.”108 This is the reason why many disarticulations exist in malaria intervention programmes in many communities affected by the disease.109 Indeed, more worrisome is the prevalence of quacks that prescribe and administer various forms of ‘malaria drugs’. This position was emphasised by one of the medical officers interviewed who also noted that there is a need to encourage vector control officers in the fight against parasites and vectors causing diseases in many communities.110 Observations from the field also show that some medical doctors have a challenge in the administration of certain medicines for the treatment of malaria. One of the doctors interviewed during the field survey explained that many doctors are always reluctant to administer malaria medicine that are to be taken for more than a few days because of complaints from patients.111 Another medical officer confirmed that the treatment of malaria could be compounded by the complaints of some mothers over the large dosage of medicine administered to their children.112 The two concerns are therefore indicative of certain problems which doctors encounter in the treatment of malaria patients. One is that many patients usually fail to observe the instruction regarding the course of treatment as

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at when due. Second is that the use of medicine might be abandoned halfway, especially if some signs of relief are observed in the patients. In either case, the disease might not be properly treated. The observation that lessons learnt from the malaria case of one patient or country might not be useful for others113 is another challenge facing the control and management of malaria in Africa. The presence of malaria vectors and parasites vary from one region to another, so also does the rate of transmission and infection. Revelations from the field survey demonstrates that the experiences of malaria patients differ from one another. Some respondents claimed that they often experience the symptoms of malaria from about the month of July to August, the peak period of the rainy season.114 At a Writing Workshop held at the College of Humanities and Culture, Osun State University, Ikire Campus, on the 4th of October, 2012, Professor Adeboye lamented that the disease usually affect his entire family members during the month of October every year. Many interviewees on the field have also claimed that mere drinking of refrigerated water or eating roasted corn for more than three days could provoke malaria fever.115 The implication of these experiences is seemingly problematic. Indeed, while it raises the question of the actual symptoms of the malaria disease, it also points to a possible link between the disease and other health problems. This position has been emphasized by Nchinda who noted that there is a need to understand the relationship between the various malaria symptoms, its clinical patterns in different locations and the causes of deaths that are due to malaria.116

Conclusion In spite of the fact that malaria is a threat to Africa, the effort to eradicate the disease by African states has largely remained lacklustre. It is therefore important to mention that urgent measures are needed to control the debilitating effects of the epidemic in Africa. A lesson learnt from the colonial experience of many countries in Africa is that the government was able to sustain the campaign against the malaria disease through various methods. African governments also have a responsibility to deploy various tools in the battle against the epidemic. Most importantly, there is a need to encourage EHOs in the control of the breeding space of the parasites and vectors responsible for transmitting malaria in the environment. Furthermore, this chapter supports and confirms the view that people’s response system to malaria and their experiences with the disease present some challenges for the global and national control efforts. Whereas the

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limited availability of anti-malaria drugs and tools like ITNs have been identified in many studies as some of the challenges affecting the fight against malaria in Africa, the stark reality is that many people actually have a problem with the use of these tools. Again, the chapter observes that while the use of herbal medicine is not always recommended by orthodox medical practitioners, its efficacy is confirmed by the people that have been taking them for several years with little or no case of proven malaria infection. African governments are therefore strongly encouraged to actively support research into the efficacy, development and deployment of traditional methods of treating malaria. Also, due to the number of symptoms associated with malaria, the effect of malaria and its treatment differ from person to person, thereby making it difficult to transfer lessons learnt from one patient to another. Thus, as the attitudes and experiences of many people have shown in the surveyed communities, there is the need to explore the possibility of controlling malaria in a way that accommodates the socio-cultural practices of the people of Africa and the use of resources that are peculiar to their environment. This is based on the assumption that traditional methods of treatment still receive more patronage among Africans.

Notes 1

Kemm, Kelvin, “DDT the Primary Answer to Africa’s Malaria Problem.” Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012 from http://www.engineering news.co.za. 2 Gallup, John Luke and Sachs, D. Jeferry, “The Economic Burden of Malaria,” in Breman, J.G, et al (eds.), The Intolerable Burden of Malaria: A New Look at the Numbers, Supplement to Volume 64 (1), 2001 of the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 3 “High Risk Groups”, World Health Organization. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.who.int/entity/malaria/high_risk_groups/en/ 4 Nchinda, C. Thomas, “Malaria: A Re-emerging Disease in Africa”, Emerging Infectious Disease, Special Issue, Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998 5 The World Health Report: Making a Difference (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1999). 6 Munthali, C. Alister, “Managing Malaria in Under-Five Children in a Rural Malawian Village,” Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14(2): (2005), 127. 7 “The Disease,” Malaria Consortium. Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012 from http:www//malariaconsortium.org/pages/about_malaria.html. 8 Ibid.; also Nchinda, “Malaria: A Re-emerging Disease in Africa”. 9 Korenromp, E.L., “Malaria Monitoring and Evaluation Reference Group & MERG Task Force on Malaria Morbidity. Malaria Incidence Estimates at Country

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Level for the year 2004 – Proposed Estimates and Draft Report”, Geneva, World Health Organization, March 2005. (http://mosquito.who.int/docs/incidence_estimations2.pdf). 10 “The Disease,” Malaria Consortium. 11 Boissière, A., Tchioffo, M.T., Bachar, D., Abate, L., Marie, A., et al., “Midgut Microbiota of the Malaria Mosquito Vector Anopheles gambiae and Interactions with Plasmodium falciparum Infection”, PLoS Pathog, 8(5), 2012. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi% 2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1002742. 12 “Malaria and Development in Africa: A Cross-Sectoral Approach,” AAAS International Africa. Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012: http://www//aaas.org/ international/Africa/malaria91/background.html. 13 Ibid. 14 “Anopheles Mosquito”, Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/about/biology/ mosquitoes/. 15 African Development Bank, “Bank Group Malaria Control Strategy, 3. 16 “The Disease,” Malaria Consortium. 17 This is based on the report of the Chief Nursing Officer, Akinboye O. O., of the Medical Centre, Alaafiawunmi, Oke-Irorun, Molarere Road, Ikire (6-10-12). 18 This is based on the report of Dr. Odumuyiwa of St Jude Hospital, Ikire (6-1012). 19 “What is Malaria”, Malaria Foundation. Retrieved online Sept. 7 from http://www,malaria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task+section.. 20 “The Disease,” Malaria Consortium. 21 “High Risk Groups”, WHO. 22 “The Challenges,” Malaria Consortium, Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012 from http:www//.malariaconsortium.org/pages/malaria_challenges.html. 23 “High Risk Groups”, WHO. 24 “The Challenges,” Malaria Consortium. 25 Ibid. 26 “Ten Facts on Malaria,” WHO. Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012 from http://www.who.int/mala/.html. 27 Ibid. 28 Kemm, Kelvin, “DDT the Primary Answer to Africa’s Malaria Problem.” Retrieved on Sept. 7, 2012 from http://www.engineeringnews.co.za. 29 “The EU must Tackle Malaria to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals,” Africa Fighting Malaria, Press Release, June 21, 2008. 30 “High Risk Groups”, WHO. 31 “What is Malaria”, Malaria Foundation. 32 Nchinda, “Malaria: A Re-emerging Disease in Africa”, 398. 33 Coene, J., “Malaria in Urban and Rural Kinshasa: The Entomological Input”, cited in Donnelly, J. Martin, et al., “Malaria and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa”, Malaria Journal, 4:12 (2005). Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.malariajournal.com/content/4/1/12. 34 Donnelly, J Martin, et al., “Malaria and Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Malaria Journal, 2.

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Ibid. Leighton, Charlotte and Foster, Rebecca, “Economic Impact of Malaria in Kenya and Nigeria,” Major Applied Research, Paper No. 6 (1993), xiii. 37 Ajani, O.I.Y. and Ashagidigbi, W.M, “Effect of Malaria on Rural Households’ Farm Income in Oyo State, Nigeria,” African Journal of Biomedical Research, Vol. 11 (2008), 260. 38 African Development Bank, “Bank Group Malaria Control Strategy,” Jan. 2002, i. 39 Leighton and Foster, “Economic Impact of Malaria in Kenya and Nigeria,” ix. 40 Coluzzi, M., “The Clay feet of the Malaria Giant and its African Roots: Hypotheses and Inferences about Origin, Spread and Control of plasmodium falciparum”, cited in Ajani, O.I.Y. and Ashagidigbi, W.M, “Effect of Malaria on Rural Households’ Farm Income in Oyo State, Nigeria,” 260. 41 Ajani and Ashagidigbi, “Effect of Malaria on Rural Households’ Farm Income in Oyo State, Nigeria,” 264. 42 African Development Bank, “Bank Group Malaria Control Strategy”, 4. 43 Ibid., 4. 44 Okorosobo, Tuoyo, et al., “Economic Burden of Malaria in Six Countries of Africa,” European Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 3, No.6, 2011, 5152. 45 Ajani and Ashagidigbi, “Effect of Malaria on Rural Households’ Farm Income in Oyo State, Nigeria,” 260. 46 African Development Bank, “Bank Group Malaria Control Strategy, 4. 47 Okorosobo, Tuoyo, et al., “Economic Burden of Malaria in Six Countries of Africa,” 43. 48 Ibid. 49 Talisuna, O. Ambrose, “Eradicating Malaria in IDB Member Countries,” Islamic Development Bank (May 2008), xvii. 50 Dalrymple G. Dana, “Artemisia annua, Artemisinin, ACTs and Malaria Control in Africa: The Interplay of Tradition, Science and Public Policy,” Working Paper, Sept. 20, 2010, 8. 51 Urbach, Jasson and Tren, Richard, “Green Groups continue to Oppose Malaria Control Strategies” and Kemm, Kelvin, “DDT the Primary Answer to Africa’s Malaria Problem,” Africa Fighting Malaria, May 24, 2012. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.africafightingmalaria.org/pressreleases.aspx/. 52 “World Malaria Report: 2010,” World Health Organization (Geneva: WHO, 2010), 4. 53 Ibid., 4. 54 Ibid., 24. 55 “World Malaria Report 2011,” World Health Organization (Geneva: WHO, 2011), 4. 56 Ibid., 17. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 5. 59 Ibid. 60 Dana, “Artemisia annua, Artemisinin, ACTs and Malaria Control in Africa: The Interplay of Tradition, Science and Public Policy,” 9. 36

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“World Malaria Report: 2010,” World Health Organization, 5. Talisuna, O. Ambrose, “Eradicating Malaria in IDB Member Countries,” 12. 63 “Progress Against Malaria,” The Living Proof Project (Sept., 2009). Retrieved online Sept. 7, 2012 from http://www.livingproofproject.org. 64 Ibid. See some of the beneficiaries of the fund in “Catholic Relief Services to Lead Malaria Fight in Benin,” Africa Fighting Malaria, June 27, 2008 (Press Release) and “Global Fund Grants Nigeria US$225 Million to Fight Malaria,” African Fighting Malaria, Aug. 25, 2012. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.fightingmalaria.org/news.aspx?id=1845. 65 D. McCoy, et al., “The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Grant-Making Programme for Global Health,” cited in ibid. 66 “World Malaria Report 2011,” World Health Organization, v. 67 Ibid., ix and 51-59. 68 Stock, Robert, “Environmental Sanitation in Nigeria: Colonial and Contemporary,” Review of African Political Economy, (1974-2010). www.roape.org. 69 N.A.I., C.S.O.15120/26/2, “Report on Anti-Malaria Campaign, Lagos.” (Dec. 1929). 70 N.A.I., C.S.O.15120/26 Vol. II, “Anti-Malaria Campaign in Lagos and Apapa, Memorandum.” (Aug. 30th, 1927). 71 HC Deb, 11 July 1950 vol 477 cc1316-24, Malaria Control, Africa. Retrieved online Oct. 31, 2012 from http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ commons/ 1950/jul/11/malaria-control-africa. 72 Garba, Sani, “Environmental Health in Nigeria , Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, Retrieved online Oct. 31, 2012 from http://www.gamji.com/ article3000/NEWS3730.htm 73 Ibid. 74 N.A.I., C.S.O.15120/26/2, “Report on Anti-Malaria Campaign, Lagos.” 75 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed)1/1, 3711. “Anti-Mosquito Fish”; and “Larvicidal Fish in Malaria Control”, (Apr. 10th, 1943), 25. 76 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed)1/1, 3711. “Aedes: Domestic Foci Control by Stocking of Water Pots with Eja Ojiji,” (Mar. 9th, 1943), 23. 77 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed)1/1, 3711. “Larvicidal Fish in Malaria Control”; and “Burrow Pits and Mosquito Control” (Apr. 4th, 1948), 32. 78 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed) 1/1, 3711. “The Control of Mosquito Larvae Living in Deep Wells”; “Anti-Mosquito Fish,” (Jan. 27th, 1955), 37; and “Mosquito Control,” (Aug. 11th, 1939), 8. 79 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed) 1/1, 3711, Iju Waterworks, 36. 80 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed) 1/1, 3711. “The Control of Mosquito Larvae Living in Deep Wells.” 81 N.A.I., M.H. (Fed) 1/1, 3920. “Quinine Annual Import.” 82 Ibid., 72, 73. 83 Ibid., “Quinine- Import of” (Aug. 22, 1941), 24. 84 Castro, C. Marcia et al., “Community-based Environmental Management for Malaria Control: Evidence from a Small-Scale Intervention in Dar es Salaam, 62

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Tanzania,” Malaria Journal (2009), 8:57. Retrieved online Sept. 9, 2012 from http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/57. 85 Caldas de Castro, Marcia, et al, “Integrated urban malaria control: a case study in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania”, Retrieved online Sept. 9, 2012 from http://www.pum. princeton.edu/muhconference/presentations/Singer.pdf. 86 HC Deb, 11 July 1950 vol 477 cc1316-24, Malaria Control, Africa. 87 Ibid. 88 Garba, “Environmental Health in Nigeria”; and Lluberas, F. Manuel, “Malaria: a Full-Time Problem Addressed on a Part-Time Basis by Amateur Entomologists,” Malaria World, July 12, 2012. Retrieved online Sept. 8, 2012 from http://www.malariaworld.org/blog/malaria-full-time-approach-address. 89 Garba, Sani, “Environmental Health in Nigeria, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”. 90 Evidence based on direct observation by Olukoya Ogen in some remote villages in Ikaleland, Ondo State of Nigeria in the early 1980s. 91 WHO, Third African Malaria Conference, Corrigendum (Geneva: 1963), 4-14; and Attaran, Amir, “Promises Once, Promises Twice: a View on the Abuja Declaration and a New Opportunity for African Malaria Control”. 92 Cited in Attaran, Amir, “Promises Once, Promises Twice: a View on the Abuja Declaration and a New Opportunity for African Malaria Control”, 4. 93 Interviews with Mallam Odetunde (60+) and Mr Shittu Olanrewaju (60+) Molarere Road, Ikire (6-10-12). 94 Interviews with Mr Kunle (20+), Mr Tunde (20+), Mr Kozeem Alao (20+) and Mr Mathew (20+), Laakosin Street, Fatima Area, Ikire (6-10-12). 95 Interviews with Mr Akeem (40+), Amuku Road, and Akin Odebowale (20+), Jubril Adeola (20+) Adebayo Abiodun (20+), Molarere Road, Ikire. (6-10-12). 96 Interview with Mr Adebowale (70+), Molarre Road, Ikire (6-10-12). 97 Interviews with Mr Adebowale and Mr Akeem. 98 Ibid. 99 Interviews with Akin Odebowale, Mr Tunde and Mr Kozeem Alao. 100 Interviews with Mr Kunle and Mr Adebowale. 101 Interview with Mr Babatunde (50+), Odeyinka Road, Ikire (6-10-12). 102 Interviews with Akin Odebowale and Mr Akeem. 103 Interviews with Mr Raifu Isiaka (35+), Mr Opeyemi Adebayo (30+) and Saheed Adebayo (30+), Fatima Area, Ikire (6-10-12). 104 Interviews with Miss Noimat (15+), Nofisat (14+) and Rofiat (14+), Molarere Road, and Yisa Oladejo (12) and Ibrahim Olatunji (16+), Odeyinka Road, Ikire (610-12). 105 Donnelly, J Martin, et al., “Malaria and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa”, Malaria Journal, 2. 106 Dr. Odumuyiwa of St Jude Hospital, Ikire and Mrs Akinboye O. O., Alaafiawunmi, Oke-Irorun, Molarere Road, Ikire. 107 Interviews with Mr Kayode Odubote (30+) and Opeyemi Talabi (25+), Enuwa Street, Ile-Ife, (5-10-12). 108 Lluberas, F. Manuel, “Malaria: a Full-Time Problem Addressed on a Part-Time Basis by Amateur Entomologists.”

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Ibid. Interview with Mrs Akinboye O.O., Chief Nursing Officer, Alaafiawunmi, Oke-Irorun, Molarere Road, Ikire. 111 Interview with Dr. Odumuyiwa of St Judes Hospital, Ikire. 112 Interview with Mrs Akinboye O.O., Chief Nursing Officer Alaafiawunmi, OkeIrorun, Molarere Road, Ikire. 113 “Malaria Strategy Overview,” Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: Global Health Program, Apr. 2011. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2012 from www.gatesfoundation. org, 5. 114 Interviews with Miss Tayo Ojewale (27+), Odeyinka Road, Ikire, (6-10-12). 115 Interviews with Mr Yemi Akintunde (30+) and Mr Chidi Agu (40+), Enuwa Street, Ile-Ife, (5-10-12). 116 Nchinda, C. Thomas, “Malaria: A Re-emerging Disease in Africa”, 399. 110

CHAPTER FOUR RE-ENCOUNTERING THE SLAVE TRADE? THE DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING O. OKO ELECHI

Introduction Human trafficking is one of the fastest growing and serious forms of transnational crime in the world today. It is estimated that between 800,000 and four million people, mostly women and children, are trafficked across international borders annually. However, recent indicators show that the trafficking of adult males is underreported and that there has been an increase in the trafficking of adult males for forced labour. One major problem of human trafficking is that it constitutes a gross violation of human rights. Some of the victims of human trafficking are used as unwilling sex workers, for domestic labour, forced labour or debt bondage; hence many view trafficking in persons as another form of slavery, albeit a modern variety. As Adepoju (2005:76) put it, the “exploitative nature of the treatment of the victims of trafficking often amounts to new forms of slavery”. Most victims of human trafficking are recruited from the developing countries. It is widespread in countries undergoing civil war, or afflicted by political or economic instability. The popular destinations of most victims of human trafficking are the rich countries of Western Europe and North America. Asia is both a destination and source of victims of human trafficking. Human trafficking is a very lucrative business. The annual revenue from human trafficking is estimated to be between $9 billion and $32 billion (Bales 2004; Craig, et al. 2007). It is believed that the volume of human trafficking is likely to surpass that of drug and arms trafficking within the next ten years unless something is urgently done to arrest the situation. Many people, including world leaders, increasingly perceive transnational criminal activity as a major threat to global peace and security, and one that is capable of undermining the economic, social,

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political and cultural development of the international community. Kofi Annan, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, observed that we are all vulnerable to transnational crimes. According to him, No nation can defend itself against these threats entirely on its own. Dealing with today’s challenges – from ensuring that deadly weapons do not fall into dangerous hands to combating global climate change, from preventing the trafficking of sex slaves by organized criminal gangs to holding war criminals to account before competent courts – requires broad, deep, and sustained global cooperation. States working together can achieve things that are beyond what even the most powerful state can accomplish by itself. (Annan 2005:2)

The re-emergence of the slave trade that was officially banned in the early 19th century is bothersome, and is viewed as one of the major challenges confronting many governments in the 21st century. Other types of transnational crime include drug trafficking, trafficking in firearms, trafficking in stolen vehicles, trafficking in human body parts, smuggling of migrants, kidnapping for purposes of extortion and a variety of crimes against the environment, cyber-crimes, money-laundering and terrorism. The enormous profits these criminal acts generate constitute the main motive for engaging in them. Human trafficking alone generates more than $32 billion annually (Wheaton, et al. 2010:124). Most transnational crimes are carried out by organized criminal groups. The transnational criminals take advantage of the expansion of global trade, and improved communication and transportation technology to carry out their nefarious businesses. Most organized criminal groups operate in poor countries with little or no economic opportunities. They also find fertile grounds in countries with weak and corrupt governments where the rule of law is lacking, and usually going through war or experiencing other social and political conflicts. There is a strong relationship between organized crime and political corruption. According to the 2005 Thailand Country Report, “evidence shows that human smuggling and trafficking are closely linked to other criminal networks, be they illicit drug trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, document forging, or bribing of government officials” (2005:101). Other major characteristics of organized criminal groups are their extensive use of violence, employment of bribery and corruption of government officials, especially the law enforcement agents and judicial officials, in their operations. Again, many organized criminal entities are able to penetrate and corrupt legitimate businesses. Public outcry against transnational crime spurred the United Nations to create the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in September

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2003. The goal of this instrument is to empower nations and enhance international collaboration in dealing with transnational crimes. It is also working to raise global awareness and develop preventive measures against human trafficking and other transnational organized crimes. This chapter reviews these issues and presents the different dimensions of human trafficking in the world today.

Defining the Problem Lee (2007) has argued that ‘human trafficking’ is not a precise term. This definitional imprecision has been one of the challenges besetting the enforcement of human trafficking laws and related policies (Aromaa 2007:13-26). The acts that constitute human trafficking are said to include putting an individual in the black labour market, causing migration for the purpose of female and child prostitution, and adopting the under-aged for the purpose of organ removal. These acts are however not essentially different since they reduce “human beings to forms of property over which an unlimited of [sic] power is exercised by another human being” (Pocar 2007:8). Aradau (2008:3) draws attention to the social and political contexts of “illegal migration, organized crime, prostitution and human rights abuses” that make human trafficking possible. The structural perspective that this typifies presents the trafficked human as an individual that leaves her country willingly, but who becomes an illegal alien in the destination country. This condition provides the context for exploitation (Aronowitz 2001:163-195). The adoption by the United Nations in 2000 of a definition has focused attention on the criminal content of human trafficking, and facilitated the adoption of a common meaning for human trafficking. As Aronowitz (2009:1) has argued, since the “ratification of the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, there is almost universal agreement on the definition of human trafficking”. According to this definition, human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (United Nations 2001)

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This definition has been however criticised for not differentiating between “those who knowingly (consume) ‘give payment’ for forced services and those who unknowingly purchase these”, and between “the crimes of human trafficking and pedophilia” (Morehouse 2009:258). While admitting the general soundness of the definition in the UN Protocol, Laczko (2005:10) claims that it “has not resolved the problem of what precisely is meant by the term ‘trafficking’”. In any case, the dynamic character of its practice, responding as it were to new societal demands and strategies designed to evade detection and enforcement of anti-trafficking legislations, would require that it be always redefined. Notwithstanding this definitional difficulty, there is no doubt that human trafficking is a modern practice of slavery. Human trafficking is slavery because it describes the situation where one individual exploits the labour of another individual without her explicit consent. Unlike the classical form of slavery where one individual owned the other, today’s slave owners do not have legal ownership rights over their slaves. However, they are able to control and determine the fate literally of their slaves. People in a slave-like situation “cannot walk away, cannot make any choices about anything in their lives, because they are held under complete control that is backed by violence,” note Bales and Cornell (2008:8). They define slavery as a “social and economic relationship in which a person is controlled through violence or the threat of violence, is paid nothing, and is economically exploited,” for people held as slaves lose their ability to exercise their free will (2008:9). Based on the foregoing, there are essentially three aspects of modern slavery: economic exploitation, “absence of any framework of human rights”, and the “maintenance of control of one person over another by the prospect or reality of violence” (Craig, et al., 2007:12). Craig, et al. (2007) also argue that physical violence does not necessarily have to be present for it to constitute slavery. It is the nature of the relationship that determines whether it is slavery or not. Where the housing or working condition for the victims of human trafficking is deplorable and not fit for a human being, for example, then it is a slavelike condition. It also constitutes modern slavery when the liberty and movement of the individuals are overly restricted through either the withholding or confiscation of travel documents, such as passports or other identity documents. Intimidation, deceit or other forms of abuse of power could be employed to control the individuals. To avoid the confusion associated with the definition of modern slavery, the International Labour Organization has listed six conditions that define forced labour:

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1. “threat or actual physical harm to the worker; 2. restriction of movement and confinement, to the workplace or to a limited area”; 3. debt bondage, where the worker works to pay off a debt or loan, and is not paid for his or her services. The employer may provide food and accommodation at such inflated prices that the worker cannot escape debt; 4. withholding of wages or excessive wage reductions that violate previously made agreements; 5. retention of identity documents, so that the worker cannot leave, or prove his/her identity and status; and 6. threat of denunciation to the authorities, where the worker has an irregular immigration status” (see Craig, et al. 2007:18). Modern day slavery differs remarkably from ancient slavery in several ways, according to Bales and Cornell (2008). One way contemporary slavery differs from ancient slavery is that it costs much less to acquire slaves today. Some slaves, according to Bales and Cornell, can be purchased for as little as ten US dollars. Secondly, slaves today are not owned for life like in the past. Slaves are owned for a limited duration, some lasting for a few years or even months. However, this puts the slave in a more precarious situation because the slave owner has no incentive to look after the slave and prolong his or her life and well-being, and to keep him or her productive for a longer period of time. Again, with slaves being inexpensive, those causing expense are discarded and replaced. The third major difference between today’s slavery and ancient slavery is that modern slavery is globalized. This is because the roles slaves play and their contribution to the local economy are increasingly similar. Bales (2000:15) lists the major differences between old slavery and new slavery as follows: Old Slavery Legal ownership asserted High purchase cost Low profits Shortage of potential slaves Long-term relationship Slaves maintained Ethnic differences important

New Slavery Legal ownership avoided Very low purchase cost Very high profits Surplus of potential slaves Short term relationship Slaves disposable Ethnic differences not important

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Bales and Cornell (2008) argue that the transformation from the slavery that existed in the past to the slavery that is taking place now could be traced to the changes in the world economy after the Second World War. To appreciate these differences, one has to examine the economic agents determining economic choices in the global market, such as migrants, traffickers, employers and users of slave-produced products or services (Wheaton, et al. 2010). Human traffickers, according to them, enjoy a certain level of monopoly in an otherwise very competitive industry. Traffickers act as intermediaries between migrants and employers of labour in the trafficking market. The products traffickers supply are human beings, while the consumers of these products are the employers of labour. There is also the problem of differentiating between smuggling and trafficking. To bring clarity to the situation, the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air has provided a usable definition. Human smuggling, according to the UN definition, is “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (United Nations 2001). Smuggling apparently involves the active collaboration and consent of the smuggled person. The smuggling contract basically ends when the individual arrives at the destination. On the other hand, the relationship between the trafficked person and the trafficker is prolonged. It is often an exploitative relationship. It is carried out through some form of coercion or deception. In addition, trafficking can always be undertaken within the country. There is, however, a great overlap between smuggling and trafficking, even if sometimes the difference between the two may be a bit blurred.

Factors that Foster Modern Slavery There are many factors that have contributed to the growth of modern slavery. One factor, according to Bales and Cornell (2008), is the rapid increase in world population after the Second World War. This population increase occurred mostly in the developing nations. With the massive population explosion, the already fragile economy and infrastructure in the poorer countries were further stretched. The ensuing economic and social condition rendered many people vulnerable to trafficking. This explains why modern slavery is more prevalent in the developing countries.

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Records show that most of the victims of human trafficking are from Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. In addition to the population explosion, another factor that has contributed to the growth of modern slavery is the rapid change in the global economy. The transatlantic slave trade took a massive toll on the economy of sub-Saharan Africa. The slave trade carted away the ablebodied men and women, and those who were in a position to contribute to the economic and political growth of the continent. Besides, the fact that the slave trade pitted ethnic groups against one another tilted the focus of the people from economic activities and nation building to unnecessary war efforts. Colonialism further destabilized the economy by changing the focus of economic activity from food for sustenance to agricultural products for export to meet the needs of the industries in the metropoles. Further hampering the economies of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and South America were the wars of independence from colonial rule. Colonialism precipitated other internal conflicts that took a major toll on the economic and political development of the colonized countries. The new economic order introduced by the colonial regime changed land ownership patterns and displaced many people from the rural areas to urban areas. High unemployment in the cities rendered many citizens of the developing countries vulnerable to trafficking. Again, the national economic policies of the developed countries put the economies of the developing countries at a disadvantage. For example, the economic principle that promotes the free exchange of goods but limits the free movement of labour works against the economic interests of the developing world. Again, the subsidies the farmers in the developed countries receive from their governments put them at a more competitive position than their counterparts from the developing countries. Bales and Cornell (2008:13) illustrate this economic relationship between the developing countries and the developed countries thus: The United States government pays $19 billion a year to subsidize American farmers. For example, the US gives $4 billion a year to cotton farmers to help them grow a crop that is valued at only $3 billion. The cotton farmers in India, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso and Togo (all countries with high levels of slavery) cannot compete with this subsidy. Though they actually raise cotton at a lower cost than American farmers, the American farmers can beat them in the marketplace because they receive money from both the sale of the crop and from the US government.

Again, while the developed countries profess and promote free trade, they have adamantly refused to allow for the free movement of labour as a

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necessary follow up to the free economy ideology. Free trade makes it possible for the developing countries to export the raw materials the industrialized countries need, but does not afford them the opportunity to export their surplus labour too. The inefficient economy created by the foregoing conditions breeds corruption in the governments of the developing countries. Corruption undermines government policies and, above all, affects the morale of the people because it contributes to the widening of the gap between rich and poor. Democracy and the rule of law are also not compatible with massive poverty, illiteracy, and general discontent. To maintain order, the elite that dominates the government uses the control of the instrument of violence to maintain a self-interested order. As Bales and Cornell (2008:14) note, “slavery grows quickly when the rule of law breaks down. Conflict and disaster open the door to criminals who use violence and trickery to enslave people.” The global economic inequality further raises the stakes for people from the developing world who are made to believe that their chances of economic survival are higher in the developed economies of America and Europe. Furthermore, colonialism imposed foreign languages, religion, law, values, educational and political systems on the colonized countries. This has further added to the trauma and challenges of development and administration of these countries. Equally important is the fact that as colonialism was autocratic, so have those who inherited power from the colonial authorities.

The Scope of the Problem There are no reliable data on the extent of human trafficking anywhere in the world. One reason for the lack of reliable data on human trafficking is the hidden nature of the crime, being part of the underground economy. Again, the victims of human trafficking are often reluctant to report their victimization or cooperate with the law enforcement agents investigating the crime for a myriad of reasons. In addition, some of the victims of human trafficking do not know that they are protected by the local laws of the land. Furthermore, as Bales (2004) has pointed out, there is little or no cooperation between governments and the international anti-human trafficking agencies. Laczko (2005) has also observed that one of the most challenging problems facing researchers is the fact that most of the populations relevant to the study of human trafficking, such as victims/survivors of trafficking for sexual exploitation, traffickers, or illegal migrants are part of a ‘hidden population’, i.e. it is almost

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There are about 12.3 million people who are enslaved today, according to the International Labour Organization (see Craig, et al. 2007:20). Out of this number, notes the ILO, more than 360,000 are enslaved in the industrialized countries, with about 270,000 of them engaged in forced labour. In West and Central Africa, more than 200,000, according to UNICEF, are trafficked into slavery (Siasoco 2001). Most victims of human trafficking are women and children. However, some records have it that the incidence of adult male victims of human trafficking is much higher than earlier reported and this is on the increase. Carroll (2009:1) notes that “according to the latest U.S. State Department report on human trafficking, some 45 percent of the 286 certified adult victims in fiscal year 2008 were male, a significant increase from the 6 percent certified in 2006.” The report states that most of the adult male victims of human trafficking are forced to work on construction sites or farms. The majority of the male victims of human trafficking in the U.S. are from Central and South America. One reason provided in the report for under-reporting of male victims of human trafficking is that men are unlikely to report their victimization because of fear of the stigma that it might attract. Some of the victims of transnational trafficking are forced into prostitution. Others are coerced into working in sweatshops, domestic labour, farming and even child armies. There is high demand for cheap labour in these industries. In support, Gilmore (2004:1) notes that “forced labour occurs in poorly regulated industries with a high demand for cheap labour – sweatshops, restaurants and hotels, in addition to agriculture and domestic work.” Gilmore further argues that one reason why these industries are conducive for human traffickers is the little or no government oversight in these industries. As such, organized criminal groups and unscrupulous employers are able to exploit the labour of human trafficking victims without official detection. Craig, et al. (2007:20) state that of those trafficked into forced labour, approximately 43% are trafficked into sexual exploitation, approximately 32% into labour exploitation and about 25% are exploited for a mix of sexual and labour reasons. The ILO estimates that the worldwide traffic in human beings is worth at least US$32 billion annually, with just under half of that (about US$15.5 billion) obtained from the traffic to industrialized countries.

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Most “victims of forced labour are trafficked into the United States from at least 38 different countries, with China, Mexico and Vietnam topping the list. Some are born in the United States and later held captive,” notes Gilmore (2004:1). In addition, Wukman (2009:4) states that about ninety-six per cent of victims of human trafficking are women and female children, while three per cent are boys. More than seventy per cent of the female victims of human trafficking are coerced into the commercial sex industry. Adult males are also trafficked, including both educated and illiterate. Anyone can be a victim of human trafficking, including citizens of developed or developing countries. As Bales (2004) has rightly observed, it is no longer the case, as it was in the past, that slavery was justified on the grounds that the enslaved belonged to a different race, ethnic or religious group from those profiting from the trafficking. The justification sometimes given that it was in the best interest of the enslaved or that the enslaved was not fully human is no longer tenable. Human trafficking is a major threat to the global economic and political order. It is capable of destroying the already fragile economies and governments of the poorer countries of Asia and Africa. Many countries in Asia and Africa are major sources, destination and transit for trafficked persons. To illustrate how diverse the human trafficking problem is, the chapter surveys the situation in the United States, especially Houston, Texas and then in the regions of Africa. According to one estimate, more than 18,000 people of foreign origin are trafficked into the United States each year (TAASA 2009). It is important to reiterate that the recruiting, enslavement and movement of persons also occur within a country’s borders. As such, domestic trafficking and child prostitution remain major problems in the United States. Citing the Polaris Project, Washington, DC, TAASA says that more than 200,000 children are trafficked into the sex industry in the United States each year. According to ICE Operation Predator records, notes TAASA, about one in five girls, and about one in ten boys in the United States are sexually exploited before they reach adulthood. Child trafficking and child pornography, according to TAASA (2009), generate several billion dollars for the international sex tourism industry worldwide. Wukman (2009:3), citing a report by the National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Throwaway Children (NISMART), notes that one out of every three teenagers who runs away from home will be recruited into the sex industry within forty-eight hours. The average age of children recruited into prostitution or pornography is twelve years. Shared Hope International, a Vancouver-based anti-human traffic nonprofit organization, reported in 2008 that 75 per cent of the minors involved in prostitution have pimps. The magnitude of the problem is

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apparent if “6,000 children in the state of Texas run away every month,” according to Pat Fransen, an FBI agent (see Wukman 2009:3). Texas, because of its location as a border state, is a major point of illegal entry into the United States. Other points through which people are smuggled into the United States include Southern California, Tucson, Arizona and New Mexico. In addition, some human smugglers operate through the ports in Atlanta, Orlando and Washington, DC, notes TAASA (2009). Houston is a popular entry point for human smugglers for many reasons, including the fact that it is a big city close to a border town. Again, it has a significant population of Latinos and has a high need for immigrant labour, both legal and illegal. The illegal immigrants easily find jobs in the many industries of Texas, such as textiles, agriculture, restaurants, construction and in domestic work. As Gilmore (2004:1) has observed, “while forced labour exists across the United States, reported cases are concentrated in states with large immigrant communities, including California, Florida, New York and Texas.” The large geographical area of Texas also makes it conducive for immigrants, as well as Houston’s proximity and easy access to the towns which border Mexico. In support, Wukman (2009:3), citing a biannual report titled “Growing Up in Houston 2008-2010” put out by the Children at Risk, observes that “Houston has been identified as one of the main hubs and destinations for human traffickers and the I-10 highway, which runs between El Paso and Houston, has been found to be the main human trafficking route in the United States.” Another major indicator that human trafficking is a major problem in Texas in general, and in Houston in particular, is that, according to available records in 2006 from the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Rescue and Restore Campaign Results (April 2004 through 2006), 25% of certified victims of human trafficking were in Texas. Majority of these victims of human trafficking were in the Houston area, according to TAASA (2009). Furthermore, “of the three social service agencies in Houston serving human trafficking victims, YMCA Intl. Houston, has served over 105 victims, two of whom were under age minors,” states the YMCA Intl., 2007 as cited in TAASA (2009). For Africa’s regions, North Africa would seem to be the least burdened by human trafficking. But this is only relatively speaking for, in spite of the massive Sahara desert, humans have been trafficked into North Africa from West and Central Africa, either across the desert, or along the West African coast. The region has been both a destination and a transit point into Europe and the Middle East for trafficked persons. East Africa has experienced both intra-regional and transnational trafficking in humans.

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The victims of internal trafficking are mainly women and children, the latter, largely HIV orphans, eventually end up as commercial sex workers or domestic servants (Aronowitz 2009:81-82). In sub-Saharan Africa generally, trafficking has been in children destined for farms and homes as domestic labourers, both intra-regional and transnational; in women primarily exported for sexual exploitation; and in women imported into the region, particularly into South Africa, as sex workers (Adepoju 2005:76). South Africa, largely because of its relatively higher level of affluence, has become an attractive destination for trafficked persons. It has been claimed that South Africa “serves as a destination for children and women trafficked from more than 10 countries in Africa, predominantly from Eastern and Southern Africa” (Aronowitz 2009:81-82). Driven by unceasing armed conflicts, political instability, hunger and the absence of employment opportunities, waves of migration of trafficked individuals pour into South Africa. Within South Africa, crime syndicates and illegal labour suppliers “exploit this vulnerable population for the sex industry, agricultural and industrial labour and organ harvesting” (UNESCO 2007:8). It is estimated that 247,000 children, for the UNESCO report year of 2007, worked in the exploitative labour (including prostitution) industry, while 30,000 were child prostitutes (UNESCO 2007:11). West Africa also presents a complex picture. Just as so much export of humans to North and Southern Africa, and to Europe, Asia and the Middle East takes place, West Africa is also a large market for internally trafficked persons. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have been classified as “source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children”. Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo and Ghana have been identified as countries from which young children from rural areas are trafficked to Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial farms; and “from and through eastern Nigeria to Gabon” (Adepoju 2005:77). Aronowitz (2009:79) estimates between 200,000 and 300,000 as the number of trafficked children in West and Central Africa. Nigeria is a major source, destination and transit for the victims of human trafficking. The destinations of the Nigerian women and children victims of human trafficking are Europe, mostly Italy, the Middle East and North America, and for the purposes of adoption, domestic and agricultural labour, and for the sale of their human body parts. The destinations of the majority of the children victims of human trafficking from Nigeria are Nigeria and other African countries. It has long been recognized that trafficking in women and children for the purposes of economic and sexual exploitation is a serious transnational crime, which is akin to the classical slave trade.

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The Nigerian government is not oblivious of the problem and recognizes that the crime of trafficking in persons poses a major threat to Nigeria’s development and stability, and to its values and national economy. As an indication of the seriousness Nigeria attaches to the problem, it has created an agency to deal with the human trafficking problem. Known as the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons (NAPTIP), this agency came into existence through Act No. 24 of 2003. This Act makes it a crime and prescribes punishment for any individual or groups of individuals involved in the trafficking of persons, particularly women and children, and other related offences. The agency established under this Act has the authority and responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of offenders. It is also the responsibility of the agency to counsel and rehabilitate persons who are victims of trafficking. The agency is also mandated to provide protection for trafficked persons, informants and other information as may be necessary during the course of any investigation relating to the trafficking of persons. In addition, the Nigerian government has signed and ratified several international treaties directed at combating the trafficking in persons There are no reliable data on the extent of trafficking in persons in Nigeria. However, an insight into the extent and seriousness of the problem can be gleaned from the number of Nigerians deported from Italy and other European countries. For example, data from the Nigeria Police indicate that between 1999 and 2001, about 8,633 persons were deported to Nigeria from Europe. Specifically, it was estimated in 2001 that there were about 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes in Italy. This figure, according to the Nigerian Embassy report in Italy, does not include the 800 Nigerian prostitutes in Italy who were deported to Nigeria between 1999 and 2000 (see Loconto 2001; Okojie, et al. 2003). The Nigerian Tide newspaper of July 10, 2007 cited the NAPTIP report that the agency has within the last four years rescued 779 victims of human trafficking. The ages of these victims of human trafficking ranged from thirteen to twenty-two years, and the gender ratio was one male to four females. According to the report, the destinations of some of the victims of human trafficking from Nigeria are Spain, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Ireland and the Netherlands. The European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex Workers (TAMPEP), a non-governmental organization, reports that about 60 per cent of street girls in Italy are Nigerians. The report also mentions that about 13,000 Nigerian victims of human trafficking were stranded in Libya. Cameroon, Benin, Gabon and Niger are used as transit points for Nigerians trafficked to foreign countries. NAPTIP received report of more

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than 10,000 cases of trafficking of persons and had by 2007, according to its report, successfully prosecuted and convicted twelve barons, noting specifically that most of the criminal barons are women. What is not clear, however, is whether these women were acting as fronts for other politically connected and powerful men or on their own, considering that women are otherwise marginalized in the economic and political life of Nigeria due to the prevailing patriarchal values and structures.

Conclusion The transatlantic slave trade in which many European countries participated in the transportation of Africans to Latin America, the Caribbean and the United States to work in plantations without pay was officially abolished by the government of the United Kingdom in 1807. Many other countries, following the United Kingdom’s legislation abolishing slave trade, also adopted similar laws making the selling and buying of human beings illegal. Despite all these proclamations by the various countries of the world, slavery has remained with us. Slavery exists in several forms, including the ‘descent slavery’ practiced in some African countries such as Mali and Mauritania. Slavery has endured despite its abhorrence by civilized societies because of the critical role of labour as a factor of production. Some governments have either actively or tacitly participated in the exploitation of the labour of other people or even of their citizens for economic benefits. As Citizens for Community Values (2009) rightly put it, “it all boils down to profit! A girl who is forced into prostitution in Asia or Africa brings in about $10,000 a year. If that same victim is trafficked into an industrialized country, that profit increases to $67,200.” One of the most popular forms of modern slavery is human trafficking. It is estimated that more than twenty-seven million people are victims of human trafficking. And there are about 800,000 people trafficked worldwide annually. Human trafficking is a very lucrative business with a market value of more than $32 billion annually, and it is likely to surpass dealing in drug and arms in the near future if the trend continues. A review of the human trafficking literature shows that everybody is at risk of being trafficked, including men, women and children. Citizens of both developed and developing countries, whether educated or not, are at risk of being trafficked. However, it is pertinent to point out that the poorer countries of the world are a major source of victims of human trafficking while the rich countries are more often the destination of human trafficking victims. Human trafficking is carried out by organized criminal groups. It is noted

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that sometimes families and friends, either out of ignorance or desperation for economic survival, participate in the trafficking of their own people. Many businesses, both big and small, also benefit from the labour of trafficked persons. According to Citizens for Community Values (2009), there are several media through which people are recruited into sexual and labour bondage. Some victims of human trafficking are abducted, while some respond to newspaper advertisements by fake employment agencies. There are some human trafficking victims who are recruited through word of mouth by friends, family members or acquaintances. Citizens for Community Values (2009) further notes that some of the victims of human trafficking are coerced into prostitution, engaged in other adult oriented businesses such as agriculture, childcare/domestic work and restaurant services. Modern slavery constitutes a gross violation of human rights. It is also considered a major threat to global economic and political development, democracy and peace. Some of the factors that foster human trafficking and other transnational crimes are poverty and global inequality. Poor people and citizens of developing countries are most vulnerable to trafficking. Sawadogo (2012:97) has pointed out that beside poverty, “West African cultural patterns fertilize the expansion of human smuggling” by placing children “outside their biologic family with the objective of securing better education and working opportunities.” Most of the victims of human trafficking are from the developing countries, especially those going through ethnic conflict, economic and political instability. Endemic political corruption by government officials, principally by law enforcement agents and the judiciary, can also foster criminal activities. In addition to corruption, the law enforcement agents of many poor countries are ill-equipped and understaffed and so ineffective in responding to transnational crimes. Human trafficking can be eradicated if the governments of the world can make concerted efforts to end “world poverty, eradicating corruption, decreasing greed, slowing the population explosion, halting environmental destruction and armed conflicts, canceling international debts, and getting governments to keep the promises they make every time they pass a law” (Wheaton, et al. 2008:28). Craig, et al. (2007) have also recommended the strengthening of international laws against human trafficking. The United Nations and other human rights groups and governments should also join forces to raise the awareness of the world through education and information about the dangers of modern slavery.

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Lee, M. (2007). “Understanding Human Trafficking.” In Human Trafficking, Maggy Lee (ed.). Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing. Loconto, A. (2002). “The Trafficking of Nigerian Women into Italy”. TED Case Studies, 656. Retrieved from http://www.american.edu/TED/ italian-trafficking. htm. Morehouse, Christal (2009). Combating Human Trafficking: Policy Gaps and Hidden Political Agendas in the USA and Germany. Weisbaden: VS Verlag. Okojie, C.E.E., Okojie, O., Eghafona, K., Vincent-Osaghae, G. and Kalu, V. (2003). Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy: Report of field survey in Edo State, Nigeria. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/wwd/ trafficking/nigeria/ docs/rr_okojie.ng.pdf on July 27, 2006. Pocar, Fausto (2007). “Human Trafficking: A Crime against Humanity”. In Measuring Human trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls. Edited by Ernesto U. Savona and Sonia Stefanizzi. New York: Springer. Sawadogo, Wilfried R. (2012). “The Challenges of Transnational Human trafficking in West Africa”. African Studies Quarterly. Vol.13, Nos. 1&2. Siasoco, R.V. (2001). “Modern Slavery: Human bondage in Africa, Asia, and the Dominican Republic”. www.infoplease.com/spot/slavery1.html (accessed on 12/5/2008). Texas Association Against Sexual Assault (TAASA). (2009). “Ending Sexual Slavery”. www.taasa.org/trafficking/default.php (accessed on 04/01/09). Thailand Country Report (2005). Report presented at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 18 – 25 April 2005, Bangkok. The Nigerian Tide. (Retrieved from http:www.thetidenews.com/article. aspx) – July 10, 2007. UNESCO (2007). Human Trafficking in South Africa: Root Causes and Recommendations. Policy Paper, Poverty Series, No.14.5 (E). Paris: UNESCO Project to Fight Human Trafficking in Africa. United Nations (2001). “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”; and “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”. UN GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. 49, UN Doc. A/RES/55/25. Wheaton, E.M., Schauer, E.J. and Galli, T.V. (2010). “Economics of Human Trafficking.” International Migration, Vol.48, No.4.

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Wukman, A. (2009). “Human Trafficking Conference Highlights Major Problem for Texas” in Houston Community Newspapers published 02/23/09 – retrieved on 4/1/09 from http://www.hcnonline.com/ articles/2009/02/25/eastex_advocate/News/0909human_trafficking…

CHAPTER FIVE ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN AFRICA: RHETORIC OR REALITY? ANYANGO E. REGGY AND LONZEN W. RUGIRA

Introduction The old debate about Afro-pessimism and Afro-optimism is back. It is reflected in the question whether Africa is rising or whether this rising is nothing but a slogan.1 Afro-optimists point to the sustained economic growth that, in some instances, has outpaced growth in most of the world to label Africa as an emerging continent with tremendous promise ready to demand for a place on the table in world affairs. Afro-pessimists are keen to remind that Africa remains the continent of despair and possibly disrepair: a continent whose population is most impoverished (disease,2 poverty,3 illiteracy, for instance), more armed conflicts than any other part of the world, altogether views that are underscored by the Liberian activist, Ezekiel Pajibo, when he observes that “Africans eat less, live shorter lives and contend with misery more than any other inhabitants of planet earth.”4 In any case, Africa is still faced with stiff challenges that affect its capacity to compete and achieve optimal gains from global economic, political, social, and cultural developments brought forth by globalization. So far, ordinary Africans, particularly women, bear the brunt of the social and economic burdens of the continent. African society, through the prevailing cultural, economic, social and political norms and practices, continues to marginalize women. Women, for instance, work longer hours than men, have less access to the means of production, and have unequal access to education and other social services. Additionally, women are under-represented in both the political and economic spheres of society.5

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In countries ridden with armed conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, women are poorer and more vulnerable than anywhere else on the continent. Women’s “bodies are used as battlefields”6 to control and humiliate their families and communities. An Amnesty International (2007) report estimates that during the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone, 250,000 women and girls (33% of the female population of Sierra Leone) were subjected to some form of sexually related violence, including rape, sexual slavery, and assault.7 Moreover, in post-conflict situations, women lose many of the new and expanded roles previously gained during the transition period. In Liberated, but Not Free: Women in Post-War Eritrea, Hale (2002) states eloquently that “although Eritrean women fighters were indeed icons of liberated women, the pressure on former fighters to revert to traditional norms at the end of the war threatened to undo many of their gains.”8 Broadly, the recent wave of quasi-democratic regimes in many African countries continues to marginalize women. An example emerges from the Mugabe administration in Zimbabwe where Betty Makoni of The Girl Child Network noted at a press conference: “Rape is being used as a weapon of political intimidation to instill fear in us, our families and communities.”9 Paradoxically, victimization and humiliation have not always been the fate of African women. Historically, women in Africa held significant social and political positions within their various societies. Scholars, such as Filomina Chioma Steady and Nadaria Surkasa, observe that in pre-colonial Africa, while sexual division of labor existed, it was along parallel not hierarchical lines.10 During this era, Surkasa argues that African women were “conspicuous in high places.”11 Women served as queen mothers, for instance among the Swazi and Ashanti; they were queen sisters, paramount chiefs, warriors, and moral and religious authorities within their communities.12 Furthermore, Surkasa maintains that African women were “conspicuous in the economic life of their societies”13 with their active involvement in agriculture, trade, and craft production. Moreover, religious philosopher John Mbiti notes that in precolonial Africa, women used religion to negotiate their place in society.14 In other words, women were active participants in social change. Likewise, an examination of Africa’s oral traditions such as poetry, proverbs, and myths, demonstrates that women were held in high esteem; for instance, there is a saying among the Ashanti of Ghana, who trace their lineage through the blood lines of their maternal ancestors, that a “human being is formed from the blood of the mother and the spirit of the father.”15 Through Mbiti’s works, we learn that in pre-colonial Africa women were held in high esteem such that “Not only do they bear life, but

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they nurse, they cherish, they give warmth, they care for life since all human life passes through their own bodies.”16 Finally, there is a common saying among various African societies that “A woman must not be killed.”17 It is important to note, however, that pre-colonial African societies were not monolithic. That is, in some societies, women played “separate and complementary”18 roles, which gave them considerable levels of independence and power. For instance, women had access to land, even though it was communally owned. In other societies, however, there is evidence of sexism within some of the pre-colonial institutions and cultural practices, where the majority of women had little or no decisionmaking power. Indeed, a woman’s worth was based primarily on how well she took care of her husband and children, and, for all of her life, she was in the custody of either her father or her husband. Furthermore, Mbiti reveals that “The woman who is not married has practically no role in society, in African traditional world-view. It is expected that all women get married.”19 Paradoxically then, while some proverbs demonstrate the value of the African woman, others disclose the biases that society had towards her. For example, a proverb by the Tsonga-Shangana ethnic group of Southern Africa says “This woman is a deceitful and ferocious crocodile.” Another by the Gikuyu of Kenya states that “Women, like the weather, are unpredictable.” There are other African proverbs that contend that “Women have no secure gourds, but only leaking upside down ones,” or “Woman, remember that the mouth is sometimes covered with a branch,” which reinforces the stereotype that women talk too much and therefore are unable to be trusted with secrets.20 Furthermore, various myths hold women responsible for the death and destruction that entered into the world a long time ago. For instance, among the Pygmy (Bambuti), a popular myth goes as follows: God gave the first people one rule: they could eat the fruits of all the trees, except from one tree. The people observed this rule, until a pregnant woman was overcome by desire and persistently urged her husband to get the forbidden fruit for her. Finally he crept secretly into the forest, plucked the fruit and brought it to her. However, the moon was watching all this and went and reported it to God. God became so angry that He sent death to the people as punishment.21

While the authors of this study acknowledge that patriarchy did exist before slavery and colonisation, they maintain that it was European invasion that weakened the position of women by re-organizing society in a manner that took from them the freedoms that they had previously

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enjoyed. This is in line with Steady’s argument that colonialism introduced into the continent an exploitative model of development which continues to marginalize women in spaces where they previously had a presence, for instance, in their political and social leadership and advisory roles. Moreover, April Gordon (1996) observes that Europeans brought with them Western patriarchies with their Victorian ideologies of women and the sexual division of labor which, combined with the existing African patriarchy, was severely detrimental to women and African society as a whole. Likewise, James (1999) argues that colonialism restructured the African family through the introduction of forced, hard, seasonal, and sometimes unpaid labor. These authors give examples of the Igbo society where, as a direct result of colonization, women lost their political and social power within the society. Furthermore, colonial preference for educating boys over girls compounded the problem. The few women who did receive Western education were trained to be housewives, cooks, nurses, and cleaners.22 Clearly, education in colonial Africa was never intended to empower women; instead it served to reinforce the idea that women were secondclass citizens, or minors with few rights and privileges. Regrettably, in contemporary Africa, some of these outdated ideas continue to persist.

African Women’s Persistent Struggle for Liberation Decades after much of Africa gained political independence from colonial rule, women continue to struggle for liberation from inequality, sexism, and misogyny. This dynamics persists in many parts of the continent. Steady captures the phenomenon thus: “Independence did not bring about significant changes in the social, sexual, and racial inequalities perpetuated by colonialism mainly because many of the economic structures of colonialism remained intact and, in some cases, became even more exploitative.”23 Post-colonial African leadership developed amnesia when it came to the gender question. Historical analysis reminds us that the struggle for the woman’s place in society is not new to the African continent. This has been eloquently ascertained by Iris Berger (2005) in her study of precolonial African religions and cultures and their relation to gender issues in the quest for equality, relative to power.24 This male-dominated leadership advances the argument that the demand for gender equality by African women is a Western phenomenon, an importation of Western culture – with little or no reference to the historical accounts of women’s active contribution to politics.

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The exclusion of women by the African political leadership is compounded by a similar attitude from the religious leadership. Instead of acting as a liberating force, the religious leadership exacerbates the plight of African women by claiming that societal gender roles and the sexual division of labor are preordained phenomena. Here, Victoria Bernal’s study (2005) on how religion, Islam in particular, has been manipulated and transformed by Sudanese Imams to further their stranglehold on women and the larger society can be cited.25 The Imams, like the African political leadership, further the claim that women’s demands are modern impositions and an alien intrusion into African societies.

Ethnic, Religious and Women Movements as Sectarian Pursuits Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere were some of the preeminent African leaders who discouraged any form of sectarian divisions, especially those based on ethnicity and religion.26 They believed that any form of mobilization based on these divisions would expose newly independent states to external manipulation and predispose them to recolonization. Nkrumah and Nyerere, however, proved opportunistic in that they neglected the potential for positive mobilization that could come from religion, ethnicity and other forms of the so-called ‘sectarianism’. The claims of the ‘visionary’ nationalists of African independence were, however, contrary to historical records, as discussed earlier. Religion, especially in pre-colonial Africa, was used as a source of social cohesion. In East Africa, for instance, traditional religion was used as a way to include groups that were not at the center of power relations, such as women and the poor.27 In other societies, religion was part and parcel of the whole institution of governance; it played a vital role in the separation of powers that provide for checks and balances in state governance.28 Similarly, post-independence African society suffered from this same amnesia when the African leadership insisted that women return to their ‘traditional roles’ despite their equally significant contribution to the liberation of the continent from the yoke of colonialism. Like the men, women played an important role in the decolonization process: women were involved in campaigns, boycotts and strikes, and in the circulation of nationalist propaganda; they were also responsible for assuming leadership in the absence of their male colleagues who were frequently jailed for their political activities. In the aftermath of colonialism, however, women did not receive the recognition and rewards that they had fought for and therefore deserved.

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While men were celebrated as war heroes, women were labeled as murderers and prostitutes by the very societies they had fought to defend. Over time, these injustices have become institutionalized. According to Hale, “In most societies, men position women within the culture to serve male-dominated institutions.”29 Likewise, Jain (2005) documents the sixty-year struggle for women to free themselves from this domination. Jain captures the reasons for the decline in the status of women: “the roots lay in development policymakers’ poor understanding of women’s roles in their societies and the low priority they gave to women.”30 In the 1990s, the economic and political situation on the African continent seemed to have changed. After many years of turmoil, there was a ‘period of promise’.31 Africa experienced its highest economic growth rate in twenty years. There was a wave of democratization in Africa which began in Benin with the peaceful transformation of that country’s government. Additionally, peace was achieved between Ethiopia and Eritrea; there were positive changes in Southern Africa, such as the fall of apartheid with the historic election of Nelson Mandela, the country’s first black leader; four new-breed African leaders came to power: Uganda’s Museveni, Rwanda’s Kagame, Ethiopia’s Meles, and Eritrea’s Isaias to restore order to the chaos in their countries. Moving towards the twentyfirst century, Thabo Mbeki referred to this period as the ‘African Renaissance’. It was predicted as a time of “dignity, peace, stability and prosperity.”32 It was also in this decade that we began to witness a political and social reawakening of women’s collective action. There was a drastic increase in the number of women’s organizations and associations, which “set in motion important and unprecedented social transformation.”33 Women’s groups vigorously and clearly began voicing their concerns on issues such as land, inheritance, and autonomy. Political Scientist Aili Mari Tripp further notes that in this decade the women’s movement in many parts of Africa was “challenging laws and constitutions that do not uphold gender equality”34 in new and innovative ways. A number of factors significantly impacted the women’s movement in Africa in the 1990s. Perhaps the most noteworthy were the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolized a new era in global politics. On the African continent, a new euphoria for democratic governance emerged. The international community demanded political and economic reforms. A decade earlier, international economic institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, had required major restructuring in return for access to loans – the economic conditionality.

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The post-Cold War era, however, transcended the economic arena and, for the first time, external agents demanded political reforms in the form of political pluralism and the opening up of the political space as symbolized by the advent of multiparty politics on the continent. In this era of democratization, financial aid to African countries began to be tied to reforms that included integration of hitherto marginalized groups such as women in the political process. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in addition to the pressure placed at both the local and global levels for African leadership to open up the political space, there was also a rapid increase in globalization. This brought along with it new forms of communication technology, such as the internet and the cellular phone, enabling women to network faster and more extensively and efficiently. Women also used the media to “verbalize and demonstrate their vision of women’s role for the future.”35 Furthermore, this was the decade in which the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China in 1995 took place. Lisa Schirch and Manjrika Sewak describe the positive results of the conference on the individuals who participated: “Women who attended the conference returned home with a new sense of empowerment and began to articulate the challenges women around the world faced and to work toward articulating women’s rights in global and national policies and legislation.”36 Consequently, women’s movements in many countries, such as Rwanda and Uganda, were able to take full advantage of the opportunities created for them to strategize and pronounce an agenda for women within their various communities. Additionally, there was a push for governments around the world to make their politics more inclusive. To this end, steps have been taken across Africa to ensure that more women are represented in all branches of local and national government. In countries such as Uganda, Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe became vice-president; and in Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana became prime minister. Furthermore, the constitutions of some African countries, such as South Africa, Uganda, and Rwanda, provide for a quota system that requires at least 30% of parliamentarians to be women. Rwanda, the model of gender equality in Africa, has a constitution that requires that women occupy at least 30% of all public positions – from the national to the grassroots levels.37 This is a drastic shift from the pre-genocide era in which women made up only 12% of parliamentarians.38

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Cosmetic or Substantive Change? On the surface, there has been significant change in the status of women in post-Cold War Africa. A closer look, however, indicates only a marginal shift. It is unarguable that the reform process of the early 1990s and its call for broader participation increased women’s participation in the public sphere. Beyond these positive developments, however, are the critical concerns on what this increase in women’s representation means for the rest of the society in search of political and economic development. Questions remain whether these changes have permeated the rest of the society so as to affect gender roles. In other words, has a psychological shift in the society taken place to enable women to fully participate as equal partners in development with their male counterparts? Such are the substantive questions that transcend the numerical concerns represented in the quota system. These issues have not been adequately dealt with because the discourse has continued to frame gender issues in terms of increasing women’s representation as an end in itself; gender representation should be seen, not as an end, but as a tool towards gender equality. Representation as an end fails to capture gender equality as a sine qua non for political and economic development. This approach leads to the co-optation of women into patriarchal institutions instead of transforming those institutions to become less hostile to women’s emancipation. It seeks to advance the view that only women are the intended beneficiaries of gender equality and constructs men in oppositional terms. Instead, a more useful discourse would focus on the partnership between men and women in the construction of gender equality and consequently in development. The authors of this study argue that unless the discourse on African progress goes beyond this superficial framing, development will continue to elude the continent. As such, both men and women should treat gender equality as a mutually beneficial effort. Part of the struggle for women is not only to have a voice, but to be able to articulate their concerns as women autonomous of government. Failure to challenge and question patriarchal framing of gender equality will result in the status quo where women’s representation simply means co-optation into the patriarchal institutions, and this will have far less significance for the society at large; it will also maintain women in positions of subordination at every level of social interaction despite what their official titles might indicate.

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Taking Stock of the Reform Process In the light of the above discussion, the reform process in Africa has failed to adequately address the needs of women. It has been unable to ascertain the role that gender plays in development processes, nor destroy the structures that perpetuate women as second class citizens. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite their contributions to development, for example in agriculture as ‘key to the solution of the food crisis’, women’s concerns continue to be neglected and their (social status and space in the society) concerns for equal rights not seen as being of ‘high priority’.39 The assumption, according to Umerah-Udezulu, is that development is gender-neutral.40 This failure by policymakers to see the importance of gender balance in development processes means the continued marginalization of half of the continent’s population. This part of the thinking that fails to see gender as “central to development processes” is “centered on androcentric economic and social establishments.”41 Accordingly, feminist scholar Devaki Jaine has argued that the root cause of the continued decline in the status of women is “policymakers’ poor understanding of women’s roles in their societies and the low priority they gave to women.”42 James contends that the thinking that devalues women’s contributions can be traced to both colonial and African traditions where colonialism “created state structures that hindered women’s progress, and some traditional customs made it difficult for women to be completely equal with men. For example, in many parts of Africa, women do not have complete land-use rights; inheritance of property goes to male children, and women’s share of capital resources is limited”. As a result, “women’s weak social, political, and economic positions lead them to being the least skilled, and least-educated majority with the worst-paid jobs”.43 Ojaide agrees that the structure of colonialism entrenched public policies that favored males over females.44 Like James, scholar Mario Azevedo posits that colonialism created a sexual division of labor in its provision of men with jobs in cash crop and plantation farms, the civil service, and in the mines. In addition, the colonial market economy and modern technology have, to a large extent, been in the hands of men, contributing to the general problems of “technological and institutional constraints.”45 As such, women’s social status in Africa does not reflect their contribution to society: “informal market sectors in many African countries have disproportionately large numbers of women, and women are known to be at the center of food production, processing, and distribution on the continent.”46 The failure to integrate women in the

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development process hinders both men and women. Despite the structural limitations, Jain has pointed out that women have continued to demand equality and full participation in economic and political arenas.47 Development planning has tended to be the domain of males, facilitating the perpetuation of the existing conditions of underdevelopment and unequal social relations. The involvement of women must permeate all state structures including the political, social, economic and cultural institutions, while at the same time reorganizing societal gender roles. Additionally, Gordon advances the view that presently in Africa there exists a battle of supremacy between patriarchy and capitalism. She argues that Western capitalism is breaking down African patriarchy. In fact, according to Gordon, Africa’s development crisis can be explained in terms of its failure to fully embrace capitalist ideals. The present condition of underdevelopment in Africa is a result of the resilience of the African mode of production that has continued to hinder the full acceptance of Western capitalism, and women by extension.48 It is envisaged that Western capitalism would free African women from the African patriarchal arrangements, and the attendant social status of inferiority. Patriarchy, then, ensures that women are unable to fully participate in the capitalist economy which is non-discriminatory, given the ‘invisible hand’ and its ‘efficient’ allocation of resources according to market forces of supply and demand. The free market does not care whether one is a woman, it is only concerned with the most efficient labor.49 However, the experience with Structural Adjustment Programs and the monopoly of males in development planning are prime examples that the ‘invisible hand’ is indeed invisible to gender and other biases. Thus, there is a need for government intervention to correct these market distortions.

An African Model for Gender Relations? The Case of Rwanda Studies point to Rwanda as a success story in the effort to reorient development processes to include women in governance in the political, cultural, and economic arenas. The 2007 Social Watch Report placed Rwanda (tied with Finland) in second position, only behind Sweden on the Gender Equity Index. This index is compiled by over 400 social organizations that deal with issues of “social, economic, and gender justice”.50 This ranking puts Rwanda at the apex of gender progress in Africa. It is, however, important to state that on the whole the report on global gender relations showed that “the overall trend is either very slow

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or [shows] no progress at all towards equality between men and women.”51 The progress made in Rwanda is partly a result of the provisions of the constitution which provide for affirmative action of at least 30% representation of women in all government institutions.52 In addition, in 2008, Rwanda boasted of the highest percentage of female representation in the world at almost 56%; the cabinet consisted of 33% women. The gains in political positions for women in Rwanda have been a result of both appointments and elections.53 This progress also marks the success of the women’s movement in Rwanda in the post-genocide period which has worked to articulate the challenges faced by women in a male-dominated society. Prior to the genocide, women in Rwanda were severely marginalized. Governments in the 1960s through the 1980s were run by men who did little to incorporate women into the political sphere. By the 1980s, women made up only 12% of parliamentarians, and 2% of the diplomatic service;54 they had limited control of resources; no access to land and credit; no right to belong to an organization aimed at profit-making; no right to inherit property; and were even denied the right to open a bank account without the permission of their husbands.55 Educated women were systematically targeted because they were a threat to the patriarchal arrangements. An educated Tutsi was particularly targeted because she represented a double threat of class and ethnicity. Violence and propaganda were used to instill fear and discredit women who were able to climb the social ladder. For instance, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a Hutu woman, was one of the first people to be killed during the 1994 genocide. Initially, the women’s movement that arose in Rwanda in the early 1990s, as a result of international factors set in motion by the end of the Cold War, was apolitical, focusing on issues of family, family planning, and settling marital disputes; women were still skeptical about challenging male dominance, and men were resistant to any initiatives that could potentially challenge their privileges. However, a more politically assertive and ideologically grounded women’s movement emerged after the genocide in 1994.

Genocide as a Watershed Moment Rwanda is a patriarchal and post-genocide society.56 In reality, this implies that society must deal with the traditional or ‘normal’ forces of patriarchy, as well as those that are borne out of the experience of genocide. Indeed, a closer examination of the relationship between these

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phenomena reveals that for women, genocide served to compound their already precarious situation. Despite this condition of double jeopardy, a wave of progressive politics emerged in the post-genocide period and was able to shape an era committed to elevating the status of women in the country, and to removing all barriers to their enjoyment of rights and opportunities. Accordingly, in post-genocide Rwanda, there emerged a political commitment to counter the social subordination of women as second-class citizens. As a systematic response, institutional and policy interventions were established in the decade and a half that followed the genocide. These measures came to address structural impediments and to catalyse a process of shifting mindsets about the status and place of women in Rwanda. As a result, legal reforms were adopted to engender a more just relationship between men and women. Further, gender-focused institutions were created to propose new policy directions, to monitor progress, and to advocate for a more equitable society for men and women.

The Gender Dimension of Genocide Rwanda’s tragic experience reveals one of those circumstances where sexual violence is used as a strategy to humiliate, dehumanise, and force the physical and psychological surrender of a group, with the strategy of rape targeting the most vulnerable, such as “grandmothers and young toddlers” in order to “terrify individuals and destroy societies.”57 The genocide against the Tutsi had a specific gender dimension, with sexual and gender-based violence used as a strategy in its commission. The United Nations estimates that “between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide.”58 Further, a study by the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the predecessor to UN Women, noted savage acts committed against women such as the penetration of sexual organs using sharp objects, sticks and guns; indeed, others were sexually mutilated or enslaved.59 In its aftermath were gender-specific consequences. First, the genocide orphaned many children. As a result, many found themselves as household heads and therefore susceptible to all kinds of abuse, let alone the burden of having to provide for younger siblings, at times separated by only a few years. Thus, the exposure to potential physical abuse and psychological strains were often too overwhelming for many young girls and boys. Second, the genocide left behind hundreds of thousands of widows. Even worse, among these were pregnant widows who were carrying the babies of the persons who had raped them. Soon after, these women had to

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provide care for the children born out of rape, and both to share and live with that outcome of rape. Therefore, for women and girls, the genocide represented a double jeopardy and created specific challenges that many continue to live with. Consequently, perhaps nowhere in the world, taking into account the challenging initial circumstances of a social milieu of genocide, has the status of women shifted so dramatically in a relatively short period of time as has been the case in post-genocide Rwanda. To understand the effort expended on the fight against gender-based violence in Rwanda is to grasp the manner in which the women’s movement swept across the country in the aftermath of genocide and the advances in the empowerment of women that have been registered as a result.

Women’s Empowerment The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi had a drastic impact on gender relations in Rwanda. Close to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were violently murdered. After the genocide, women constituted over 70% of Rwanda’s population.60 As noted above, women formed the largest number of refugees and internally displaced people; they were raped, tortured, and left with the physical, psychological, and economic burdens of the genocide, including the largest number of female-headed households on the African continent.61 All of these factors helped to create new spaces and ultimately contributed to the restructuring of gender relations as a result of women occupying previously male-dominated positions. The rupture of the nation’s social fabric due to genocide meant that it was no longer tenable for society to return to the traditional gender roles. With a significant portion of the male population either dead or having fled, for one reason or another, women shifted, of necessity, into responsibilities that had hitherto been understood as the preserve of men. Their role in post-genocide reconstruction signalled a key entry point into the public space that would facilitate and catalyse the re-conceptualisation of society’s gender boundaries, creating new spaces for women and informing new realities around their boundless role as agents of socioeconomic transformation. More specifically, post-genocide reconstruction served as the impetus for women to seek equality and empowerment, sustainable avenues for raising their status and perceptions in the society. However, such a quest would not come unchallenged. It is a movement that was mounted against entrenched biases and resistance, themselves informed by historical circumstances. Rwanda’s society was, and still is

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patriarchal in nature. This counter-dynamics did, and continues to take a destructive toll on the lives of women and girls in Rwanda. These entrenched interests represent a threat to the human rights of women and girls; they also wreak havoc on the country’s development potential. As elsewhere still, Rwanda’s socio-cultural factors have, through time and space, colluded to inform an undercurrent of pernicious practices that undermine efforts geared towards effective reform. As a result, resistance has contributed to circumventing legislative and policy measures, the intention of which is to uproot, or to lessen the undue burden carried by women. Such measures are designed to restore their humanity as members of the society with equal rights, dignity, and opportunities similar to those enjoyed by their male compatriots.

Post-Genocide Reform: The Quest for a Mindset Shift The progressive post-genocide leadership understood that confronting practices that condone the abuse of women was necessarily tied to the degree of their disempowerment and denial of a role as active social agents. Such demeaning conditions of life relegated them to permanent victimisation, an existence that was largely at the mercy of the superordinate group, itself consisting of beneficiaries of male-privilege in all its expressions. One of these expressions is in the control of women’s livelihoods, the control of economic resources. With a vast majority historically eking a living from subsistence farming on family-owned land, a woman’s livelihood was greatly tied to ownership of such a key resource. Indeed, with tradition depriving women from owning or inheriting land, their existence would necessarily be dependent, regardless of circumstances. In other words, women were alienated from the main source of their survival by laws and practices which effectively reduced their status to that of squatters, if not worse. As a result of this economic marginalisation, women were necessarily made dependent upon men for their very survival, which predisposed them to conditions of abuse due to the constraints that arise from the absence (or strangulation) of choice. Accordingly, the post-genocide leadership recognised as crucial the expansion of opportunities by removing barriers to the control of economic resources as a necessary first step in the effort to elevate them from their dependent status. Similarly important, however, was the ability of the women’s movement to take full advantage of the socio-political environment. This has made it difficult to separate the women’s movement from the post-

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genocide political philosophy of governance, and the vision that the leadership that emerged had for the society in general and for women in particular, one that continues to inform policy choices. This suggests a deliberate strategic approach that has the intention of restoring the inherent dignity of women, and also an approach for inclusive development and socio-economic transformation. In other words, whereas the post-genocide social environment necessitated the entry of women into hitherto maledominated spaces, the emergence of an assertive women’s movement, coupled with the requisite political will, helped to align these interests with a radically different vision for the country.62 In practice, the decade that started in 2000 saw efforts being made in establishing a legal framework to close some of the gaps that had facilitated the marginalisation and abuse of women and girls. This served as the foundation upon which economic and political rights would be erected and consolidated in the decade that would follow.

Institutional, Legal and Policy Framework The 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda was unequivocal in its vision of the place of the woman in the ‘New Rwanda.’ A number of provisions establishes the contours of this paradigm shift, as well as sets the stage for the legal and policy interventions intended to activate the various elements of this constitutional vision. As broad principles of the Constitution, Articles 11 and 33 provide for, respectively, the affirmation that all citizens of Rwanda are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties, and that discrimination based on gender is illegal and punishable by law. More specifically on the subject of women, the Preamble to the Constitution reiterates commitment to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, and commits to ensuring equal rights among Rwandans in general and, more specifically, between women and men “without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and complementarity in national development.” The vision sought to affirm the dignity of women in both public and private spaces. In Article 26 of the Constitution, the woman’s rights in marriage are asserted, “Monogamous civil marriage between a man and a woman is recognized.” The rights of women in marriage are further elaborated in the civic and penal codes. For instance, Law N° 22/99 of 12/11/1999 on matrimonial regimes, liberties and successions guarantees the rights of women in marriage, divorce, and on the death of the husband. Moreover, this legal guarantee is a response to situations in which women

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were at the mercy of their husbands in marriage or of their in-laws in the unfortunate circumstance of widowhood.63 The law, therefore, ensures some degree of security, at least with respect to dependency. In a similar vein, the rights that came as a result of the 2005 Land Law (N°08/2005) had the intention of decreasing the degree of dependence by ensuring equal access to land for both men and women. Indeed, prior to this legal intervention, a woman often found herself tilling land that belonged to the husband, land she could not inherit on the death of the husband. The significance of the 2005 law, therefore, is in its extension of the right to joint ownership of land between the husband and the wife, and in equal rights to its inheritance. Further still, women’s human rights are also affirmed by the 2009 Labour Law. The law, among other stipulations, makes illegal gender-based discrimination in all its forms, and guarantees paid maternity leave and time off work for nursing mothers. Finally, women who are breastfeeding or those who are pregnant are also protected from activities that may harm them or their baby.64 Moreover, a year earlier in 2008, the parliament passed a law (N°59/2008) criminalising violence against women and making it punishable with, among other penalties, time in jail.

Political Participation Rwanda is globally recognised as a leader in the inclusion of women in political processes. Indeed, it is well known that Rwanda leads globally when it comes to women’s political representation with the highest proportion of women in parliament in the world. The political will to include women is a component of the ruling ideology that has expanded spaces for women with the affirmative action that reserves one-third of positions in the public sector for women. However, women’s inclusion in political processes is also constitutionally protected. The fourth point of the Fundamental Principles commits to building a state governed by the rule of law, pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and men, reflected in the grant to women of at least 30% of posts in decision-making organs. Similarly, Article 76 of the Constitution guarantees twenty-four positions out of the eighty-member Chamber of Deputies to women. Likewise, Article 82 reserves eight positions out of the twenty-six-member Senate to women. Indeed, both these provisions conform to the 30% requirement in decision making organs stipulated in the Fundamental Principles. In practice, this provision has given rise to a situation where women’s share of the membership of the Chamber of Deputies is 66%,65

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of the Senate 35%, of the judiciary 50%,66 of ministerial appointees 38%, and ministers of state 40%.67 However, two points are worth underscoring. First, the admission that patriarchal cultural norms in Rwanda help to undermine women’s authority in public spaces and affect their representation in elective politics points to the importance of affirmative action as a measure of redress. On the other hand, the success of such policies must also be measured against a reality where affirmative action would not be required for women to enjoy their full rights. In other words, this suggests that the society is yet to fully acquire the mindset shift that entrenched gender-based prejudices. Indeed, affirmative action is a tacit recognition of the fact that, as much as progress has been registered, much work needs to be undertaken structurally.

Consolidating Gains: Policy and Institutional Framework In any case, framers of the Constitution (2003) must have envisaged resistance due to socio-cultural factors. As a result, measures that sought to sustain the outcomes of the policy and legal provisions mentioned above were provided for by establishing institutions, through Articles 185 and 187. The latter establishes the National Council for Women and the former creates the Gender Monitoring Office to: x Monitor and supervise on a permanent basis compliance with gender provisions of the programme for ensuring gender equality and complementarity in the context of the vision of sustainable development; and to serve as a reference point on matters relating to gender equality and non-discrimination for equal opportunity and fairness; x Submit to various organs recommendations relating to the programme for the promotion of gender equality and complementarity for national development. Taken together, therefore, a series of legal measures seeking to tackle some of the key areas of women’s marginalisation and victimisation were progressively promulgated. Policies and laws were introduced to remove structural impediments in the quest for gender equality and women’s empowerment, as well as in the quest to dismantle the socio-cultural structure that condones practices that condemn women to a subordinate existence or servile dependence.

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Women have worked hard to overcome severe cultural and historical barriers, for instance, through the revision of laws, such as the inheritance laws, which give males and females equal access to land. Also, President Paul Kagame, and many within his administration, must be credited for the priority that they have placed on women’s issues. For instance, Rwanda was able to achieve Millennium Development Goals on maternal mortality and on education enrolment parity for boys and girls. However, much as progress has been registered in women empowerment in Rwanda, much more needs to be done to ensure that the benefits of the women’s movement trickle down to the majority of ordinary women which can only result from structural changes in gender relations. This point was underscored by a gender activist thus: “while women have benefited from the improvements in post-genocide Rwandan society, the lives of the majority of women have not changed significantly.68 Indeed, men still have about 67% of formal employment in urban areas.69 Moreover, despite successful poverty alleviation programmes that have seen a record number of Rwandans rise from debilitating poverty, a large proportion of the population remains poor; more women than men live below the poverty line and are more illiterate. In other words, poverty continues to affect men and women differently; its impact on women and girls exposes and binds them to conditions of abuse. This weakens their already precarious situation as social subordinates and ties their very survival to men as dependent subjects.

Conclusion The authors have argued that for gender relations to change as a matter of conscience, societies must be able to transform cultural values and norms in what would amount to a collective psychological shift. This exercise would require time and commitment – akin to a generational cultural shift. Further, they contend that while positive change is taking place in the discourse on gender in Africa, as evidenced in the increased representation of women in leadership positions, these changes have had limited impact on the holistic discourse of dismantling traditional gender roles that impede political and economic progress in African societies. The failure of the dominant approach that concentrates its efforts on the cooptation of women in patriarchal structures implies a reform process that fails to permeate society; the implications are clear: half the population continues to be neglected in development processes and consequently overall development is affected and suboptimal. Due to the fear of change and the need to maintain political, economic,

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and social control, the cultural and religious practices that oppress women have often been invoked. Indeed, the continued invocation of archaic cultural practices that maintain women in positions of subjugation must be exorcised. Religious and cultural practices that oppress women must be replaced by those that uplift women’s potential and encourage their empowerment. Furthermore, the African liberation movements and the heirs of those movements have largely paid lip service to the empowerment of women. A practice persists where women movements continue to subordinate (unquestioned, unexamined loyalty) themselves to these regimes, following the old pattern that co-opted some women into leadership positions without delivering an agenda that empowers women at all levels of the society. Finally, the education system that was supposed to deliver women from the status of second class citizens has had limited success. The increased girl-child – again emphasis on the numbers – education means that after her graduation she must join the society whose patriarchal gender roles have not been altered both at home and within the workplace. These limitations notwithstanding, the movement towards addressing the gender question is gaining strength. In the Great Lakes region, an amalgamation of groups is underway to address issues of gender equality. The number of women’s organizations and associations in the postgenocide era has risen drastically; however, their content and quality in terms of the substantive aspects of responding to issues facing the majority of women, especially those of class and opportunity, remain open to examination. Also, men’s organizations have emerged with the objective of gender equality. Groups70 from Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Sierra Leone met in Kenya a few years ago for a conference71 against gender violence. These groups, men being the major perpetrators of such violence, should be educated on the consequences of their actions towards women and the need to respect their rights as enshrined in international and national legal documents, such as the 1967 UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.72 However, the authors also point out that much as structural change is likely to take a while to materialize in the lives of ordinary women, gradual progress in gender relations in places like Rwanda has been achieved through the introduction and enforcement of policy and legal frameworks that protect women from abuse. An in-depth analysis of Rwanda would arrive at the conclusion that, undeniably, the country is on

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the right path in terms of gender relations. However, contrary to several reports on the status of women, the goal of gender parity has not yet been achieved. Important political, social, legal, and economic steps have been taken to build the structure needed for equitable gender relations, but the country is at its initial stages with several gaps that should be filled. Aloysia Inyumba underscored to one of the authors during a conversation, when she was a Senator, that the first fourteen years of post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda were the infrastructure-building stage, the focus of the next phase is implementation which entails strengthening Rwanda’s political, social, and economic institutions, and empowering women to take ownership of the policies and practices that are currently in place.73

The Way Forward The authors hope that this chapter has made a contribution to the discourse on development and social change in Africa. It is clear that African development has to overcome both external and internal obstacles in order to deliver on the promise of development to the masses of the continent. In contemporary Africa, the situation of poverty and violence against women is exacerbated by the deep-rooted cultural and institutional constraints that result from patriarchy. While the authors advocate the complete liberation of women marked by, among other things, their inclusion in politics at all levels, the authors caution against essentialist approaches to gender inclusion which assume that women are innately more prone to equality, peace, and social justice and that their increased involvement will automatically mean a change in governance and development in Africa. It is important to note that women are not a homogenous group. African women have historically represented different class, ethnic, and political interests, and that there are many women who benefit from and resist any attempts to change the status quo. Instead, what is needed is a holistic approach to empowerment of women which connects political power with increased access to social services such as health, education, electricity, and water, among others. Furthermore, both men and women need to work together to confront and eventually dismantle patriarchy through the re-socialization of all members of the society using the educational system, community groups, religious institutions, and the media. The important lesson to take from here is that powerful movements have been able to create space on the edges of orthodoxy, however limited, to challenge the status quo and demand change. Indeed, it may take some time, but change appears to be on the way. The question is about its pace.

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Notes 1

See, for example, Mahajan, V. (2009). “Africa Rising: How 900 Million African Consumers Offer more than you think.” New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing. 2 BBC, Racism ‘helping spread of Aids’, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa 1527599.stm (accessed September 13, 2008). 3 At least 50% of the population lives below the international poverty line. African Revolution, African Poverty - a Common Challenge, www.africangreerevolution. com/en/green_revolution/.../poverty/index.html (accessed September 13, 2008). 4 Ezekiel Pajibo, Talking Points on U.S. Engagement with Africa (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2001), 3. 5 Roel Van de Veen, What Went Wrong with Africa (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2004), 275-276. 6 Patricia H. Hynes, “On the Battlefield of Women’s Bodies: An Overview of the Harm of War to Women,” Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 27 (2004): 431– 445. 7 Amnesty International, Sierra Leone Getting Reparations Right for Survivors of Sexual Violence, www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGAFR5100 52007 (accessed September 1, 2008). 8 Sondra Hale, “‘Liberated, But Not Free’: Women in Post-War Eritrea,” in Aftermath: Women in Post-War Reconstruction, Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay and Meredith Turshen, eds. (New York: Zed Press, 2002), 122-141. 9 Lawrence Altman, AIDS Group Cites Rapes in Zimbabwe as Terror Tool, www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/08/africa/08aids.php (accessed August 8, 2008). 10 Filomina Chioma Steady, “African Feminism: A Worldwide Perspective,” in Women in Africa and the African Diaspora, Rosalyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea B. Rushing, eds. (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1997), 5. 11 Niara Sudarkasa, “The ‘Status of Women’ in Indigenous African Society,” in Women in Africa and the African Diaspora, Rosalyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea B. Rushing, eds., 73. 12 Ibid. Also see, Steady, “African Feminism”; and John Mbiti, The Role of Women in African Traditional Religion, www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/atr-women.htm (accessed August 27, 2008). 13 Sudarkasa, “The ‘Status of Women’ in Indigenous African Society,” 73. 14 Mbiti, The Role of Women in African Traditional Religion. 15 Peter Herndon, Family Life Among the Ashanti of West Africa,www.yale.edu/ ynhti/curriculum/units/1991/2/91.02.04.x.html (accessed on Sept. 07, 2008). 16 Mbiti, The Role of Women in African Traditional Religion. 17 Ibid. 18 Sudarkasa, Women in Africa and the African Diaspora, 73. 19 Mbiti, The Role of Women in African Traditional Religion. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Mario Azevedo. “European Exploration and Conquest of Africa.” In Africana Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora, Mario Azevedo, ed. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005).

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Steady, Women in Africa and the African Diaspora, 10. Iris Berger, “Rebels or Status Seekers? Women as Spirit Mediums in East Africa,” in Readings in Gender in Africa, Andrea Cornwall, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 25 Victoria Bernal, “‘Gender, Culture and Capitalism: Women and the Remaking of Islamic ‘Tradition’ in a Sudanese Village'," in Readings in Gender in Africa, Andrea Cornwall, ed., 164-177. 26 Luis Serapiao, "The Contemporary African World," in Africana Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora, Mario Azevedo, ed., 193. 27 Berger, Readings in Gender in Africa, 148-156. 28 Using the example of Rwanda see Mahmood Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Princeton University Press, 2001), 64; also see Gerald Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 15. 29 Hale, “Women in Post-War Eritrea,” 139. 30 Devaki Jain, Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 82. 31 Van de Veen, What Went Wrong with Africa, 109-134. 32 Ibid., 123. 33 Aili Mari Tripp, "Women in Movement: Transformations in African Political Landscapes," in Readings in Gender in Africa Andrea Cornwall, ed., 234-243. 34 Ibid., 234. 35 Gwendolyn Mikell, "Introduction," in African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gwendolyn Mikell, ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 2. 36 Lisa Schirch and Manjrika Sewak, “The Role of Women in Peacebuilding”, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Issue Paper, 2005), 1. 37 Interview, October 19, 2005, Washington D.C. 38 Rakiya Omaar and Rachel Ibreck, Women Taking a Lead: Toward Empowerment and Gender Equality in Rwanda (Washington, DC: Women for Women International, 2004), 8. 39 Jain, Women, Development, and the UN, 86. 40 Ifeyinwa Umerah-Udezulu, “The State and Feminization of Development Processes in West Africa,” in The Feminization of Development Processes in Africa, Valentine U. James and James S. Etim, eds. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 69. 41 Ibid., 69. 42 Jain, Women, Development, and the UN, 82. 43 Valentine U. James, “Trends and Conundrums in the Feminization of Development Processes in Africa”, in The Feminization of Development Processes in Africa, Valentine U. James and James Etim, eds., 8. 44 Tanure Ojaide, “Literature in Africa and the Caribbean,” in Africana Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora, Mario Azevedo, ed., 331. 45 Mario Azevedo, “European Exploration and Conquest of Africa," in Africana Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora, Mario Azevedo, ed., 116. 46 James, “Trends and Conundrums in the Feminization of Development Processes 24

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in Africa”, 5. Jain, Women, Development, and the UN, 106. 48 April Gordon, Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 135. 49 Ibid., 135. 50 Gasheegu Muramila, Rwanda is Africa's Best on Gender Equity, www. newtimes.co.rw (accessed November 3, 2007). 51 Ibid. 52 Elizabeth Powley, Rwanda: Women Hold Up Half the Parliament, www. idea.int/publications/wip2/upload/Rwanda.pdf (accessed October 10, 2007), 156. 53 Powley, “Rwanda: Women Hold Up Half the Parliament,”156. 54 Rakiya Omaar and Rachel Ibreck Omar, Women Taking a Lead: Toward Empowerment and Gender Equality in Rwanda, 8. 55 Interview, October 19, 2005, Washington D.C. 56 The Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, “National Gender Policy” July, 2010. 57 http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/situation.shtml (accessed July 2015). 58 Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 59 UNIFEM and Moser, "Case Studies of Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Rwanda and Timor Leste," 2009. 60 Today the female population (initially 70%) has evened out to the current rate of about 54%. This is probably as a result of the number of men who were living in exile during the war and since then have returned. For more on this see, Adam Jones, “Gender and Genocide in Rwanda,” in Gendercide and Genocide, Adam Jones, ed. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004), 111. 61 Interview, October 19, 2005, Washington D.C. 62 This position is implied in, Moser, "Case Studies of Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Rwanda and Timor Leste." 63 See, the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, “National Gender Policy,” July 2010. 64 12 weeks maternity leave: six weeks paid and six weeks at 20% of full pay; and one hour a day for breastfeeding up to 12 months. 65 Rwanda is the first country in the world to have women as the majority in parliament; its Speaker is also a woman. 66 The Chief Justice preceding the present is a woman. 67 See Institute of Policy Analyse and Research – Rwanda “Women’s Economic Empowerment in Rwanda: A Situational Analysis,” 2012. 68 Interview, October 31, 2008, Kigali. 69 Interview, October 20, 2007, Washington, D.C.; interview, January 24, 2008, Kigali; interview, March 9, 2008, Kigali; interview, February 6, 2008, Kigali; interview, October 31, 2008, Kigali. 70 Some of these groups are Men to Men Initiative and Men for Gender Equality. 71 The recommendations that were reached following this conference included: (a) government should start grassroots awareness in local languages; (b) NGOs and civil society organizations should promote, train, and build networks with the 47

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men's groups; (c) women activists should revisit their approaches towards men; and (d) Use of schools to form boys clubs for gender equality. 72 Levis Onegi, Involve Men in Struggles for Gender Equality, 2007, www. newvision.co.ug (accessed October 18, 2007). 73 Interview, February 5, 2008, Kigali.

CHAPTER SIX FEEDING THE MILLIONS: UNDERSTANDING AFRICA’S FOOD SECURITY PROBLEM OLUTAYO C. ADESINA

Introduction At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Africa, the world’s second largest and the second most populous continent, has remained as chronically food insecure as it was for most of the second-half of the twentieth century. A sizeable percentage of its population of about one billion people, like several others spread over the developing world, rarely gets enough to eat for a productive and healthy life (Tweeten and McClelland, 1997:ix). Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, the production of feed grains and wheat in the world doubled as improved seeds, machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides were used to increase production and new land was brought under cultivation. With this, food production began to increase slightly faster than population growth (Insel, 1985:893). Hunger-related deaths then began to decrease substantially. However, unlike other parts of the world, Africa experienced a decline of over 10% in per capita food output in the 1960s and 1970s due to poor performance in agriculture and very rapid population growth (Seitz, 1988: 47; Eckholm, 1982:21-22). Since the decade of independence in the 1960s therefore, when the optimism of the nations and their peoples were very high, the capacity of these African nations to feed their people had been on the decline. By the 1970s, for instance, it was generally agreed and widely reported that Nigerian agriculture was in crisis; food prices rose much more rapidly than other prices as urban employment drew young men out of the villages (Williams, 1980:158). Africa remains the only continent that is unable to feed itself. In the twenty-first century, it has become a net importer of food and a vast

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consumer of food aid, in spite of the fact that it is rich in natural resources and has a largely agrarian population. Large amounts of cultivable farmland exist in Africa. But despite millions of hectares of unused cultivable land, the continent spends $20bn each year buying food, a situation that is not sustainable economically and politically (Annan, 2010). Economic indicators in this regard have gone from bad to worse with no sign of improvement. Africans have therefore continued to wallow in the throes of extreme hunger and underdevelopment, in spite of the continent’s rich natural endowments. In several cases, the poor have been unable to purchase the food they need, whatever its price.

The Vulnerable Regions of Africa Physical conditions, as weather and climate over which the farmer has no control, affect the level of yield of farm crops (Oluwasanmi, 1966:1). The Sahelian region of Africa has been one of the most problematic areas of the continent. A considerable portion of the land in the Sahel - a vast area south of the Sahara desert - was hit by famine in the early 1970s. The region went through a very difficult time. Six years of drought, rapid population growth, and misuse of the land led to widespread crop failures and loss of livestock. It was estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 people had died of starvation before international aid arrived (Seitz, 1988:49; The New York Times, 1983:1). By 1984 the food crisis on the continent had reached unimaginable proportions. The famine in Ethiopia and in other sub-Saharan African countries followed on the heels of serious drought. In the Sahelian region, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad were badly affected and there were reports of starvation and of markets where thorns were the only food available. According to a special report by Africa Now (1984:12-18), “there are reports of markets where thorns are the only food available; of mothers who boil toxic seeds to make a drink which ‘knocks out’ their starving children. In the Sudan, over a quarter of a million have migrated from the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan. The situation is equally critical in the north of Somalia, the eastern highlands of Kenya and the whole of the semi-desert that stretches round to Karamoja in Uganda.” The situation was even more precarious in Ethiopia. In that country, a combination of the failure of successive rainy seasons, civil war, continued bad land use and increased human and stock population brought disaster and economic and social dislocation. Under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia’s peasant farmers were increasingly burdened by a semi-feudal system which forced more and more people to

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live on less and less land. Once fertile areas such as the central highlands became drastically over-cultivated, over-grazed and deforested to such an extent that where 40% of the country was once forested this dropped to about 4%. Significantly also, about one billion tonnes of topsoil per year were lost to erosion (Africa Now, 1984:12). Television pictures of starving Ethiopians in the mid-1980s led to a massive international effort to provide food aid. It is, however, important to point out that, in addition to drought, the extensive poverty in the region was caused by worldwide recession which hampered the efficiency of export-oriented economies, political instability, and governmental developmental programmes that placed a low priority on agriculture (Seitz, 1988:49). By 2003, close to thirty million people faced hunger and starvation in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. In Southern Africa, the severe drought, coupled with the devastating socio-economic impact of AIDS, caused drastic food shortages. In the Horn of Africa, close to fifteen million people were at risk of starvation due to prolonged drought that seriously affected agricultural and livestock production. In both regions, crops dried up in the fields and desperate families began to sell valuables to buy food. The agricultural disaster affected more than 14.6 million people in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The problem was compounded by the devastating floods in Malawi in March 2001. In the Horn of Africa where drought is a continual problem, poor harvests in Ethiopia and Eritrea put about 14.3 million people at risk of starvation on a magnitude similar to the 1984 famine in the region (American Red Cross, 2003). In recent times, more than ten million people across West Africa have become vulnerable to severe hunger and malnutrition arising from drought, poor harvests and rising food prices. The international aid agency, Oxfam, in June 2010 launched a £7 million emergency appeal to help more than 800,000 of the most vulnerable people. Worsening conditions in the Sahel region of West Africa, a semi-arid belt which stretches across the southern Sahara, have seen malnutrition rates soar as families struggle to find enough food to eat (The Guardian, 22 June 2010:88). Niger, the world’s least developed country, became the centre of the recent hunger crisis with more than seven million people - almost half of the population - facing food insecurity; 3.3 million, approaching a quarter of the population, are severely food insecure. Another two million people in Chad, more than 600,000 in Mali and more than 300,000 in Mauritania are at risk. Parts of Burkina Faso and the extreme north of Nigeria have also been affected (The Guardian, 22 June, 2010:88). To stave off

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imminent disaster, Oxfam commenced the expenditure of £3 million from its reserves to start emergency work in the most affected areas. The seriousness of the situation was underscored by Mamadou Biteye, head of Oxfam’s work in West Africa in June 2010: “The next harvests are several months away and people are already desperate. People are eating leaves and drinking dirty water. Unless we can raise money for this we will be forced to turn our backs on those most in need.” According to the agency, in parts of Niger and Chad, people are eating wild fruits, leaves and maize meant for feeding poultry. In Chad, women are digging anthills to eat the grains and seeds the ants have stored. In addition, large numbers of children were pulled out of school as families moved to urban areas in search of food and work, and women beg for alms in towns. Also, many animals belonging to the cattle rearing families have died in Chad, Mali and Niger forcing several families to cross borders in search of sustenance (The Guardian, 22 June, 2010: 88).

Food Security in Africa: Old Problems and New Challenges A number of challenges have continued to threaten the sustainability of food security on the continent. The concern about agricultural development and food security can be ascribed to a number of immediate and remote causes. First, Africa’s food security has been sacrificed on the altar of overdependence on the exploitation of natural resources. This phenomenon is known as the ‘Dutch Disease’. The ‘Dutch Disease’ is the apparent relationship between the increase in the exploitation of natural resources by naturally endowed countries and a decline in the manufacturing (or agricultural) sector. Such countries witness a large inflow of foreign currency from natural resource exploitation (the booming sector) and decreasing revenue from other sectors (the lagging sector). This has been the bane of Africa’s agricultural sector. This has become one of the greatest problems confronting several African countries. Nigeria typifies the countries whose economies had become skewed in favour of natural resources to the detriment of agricultural development. According to Oluwasanmi (1966:109), a critical analysis of Nigeria’s agricultural resources showed that in most parts of the country, land and labour resources were adequate for the requirements of efficient agricultural production. The soils were reasonably fertile, and, throughout the forest region, rainfall was well enough distributed to permit farmers to grow in one season two successive crops on the same plot of land. The

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effects of these were clear. Helleiner (1966:29) attested to the versatility of the sector and its gradual deterioration: “Agricultural exports provided the main dynamic for growth in the Nigerian economy in the 1950s and early 1960s. The volume of agricultural exports rose at an annual compound rate of more than 5 per cent from 1950 to 1963.” Local food production inevitably grew at more than 2 per cent a year and agricultural exports were the principal sources of foreign exchange. Thus, until 1966 when political disruption began to distort the economy, food-price inflation had been steady at relatively low levels. However, in 1966, there was a surge of food-price inflation to 20.5 per cent. Shortly thereafter, oil began to make an important contribution to government revenue and export earnings (Forrest, 1995:33). The collapse of Nigeria’s agriculture from the 1970s as a result of neglect due to increased earnings from oil, and the country’s extreme dependence on imported staples such as rice, wheat and sugar have made it vulnerable to external shocks. In the aftermath of the nation’s continued reliance on crude oil as the major means of sustenance in the face of increasing population growth, domestic food production has failed to cope with increases in demand (Olayide, 1982:15). The food crisis has further compounded the intractable existentialist problems facing Nigerians, most especially the poorest layers of the Nigerian populace (Adesina, 2008:59). By the 1970s, the oil and gas sector became the driving force of Nigeria’s economy. Reference to oil price in the international market became the tool for maintaining fiscal balance and budget assumptions. Thus, when oil revenue targets are not met, they bring distortions not only to the budget process but to the entire economy. It is however clear, as advised by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, that the Nigerian government needs to ensure that “there is a payoff in terms of faster non-oil growth and future taxes as well as improvement in human capital”(The Nation, April 9, 2010:1). The low agricultural output of the continent can also be attributed to low levels of technology and farming techniques in use. Traditional farming systems account for a substantial percentage of agricultural output. The level of investment and lack of innovation have remained major disincentives. Primitive farming techniques do have adverse effects on yield no matter how favourable are the physical conditions of production (Oluwasanmi, 1966:1). The traditional cultural practices of cultivation, land management, cropping patterns, and storage also have marked influences on the decisions of farmers concerning different aspects of agricultural production. It is generally agreed, for instance, that the dependence of Nigerian farmers on the use of the cutlass and the hoe has a

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serious limiting effect on the size of the plots they can operate (Agboola, 1979:26). In the twentieth century, Nigeria adopted a multiplicity of approaches, ranging from the popular farm settlement scheme to the regime-specific and ad-hoc National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP) set up in 1973, the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) launched in 1976, the Green Revolution (GR), and the Agricultural Development Projects and the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI). The ADPs were launched under the auspices of the World Bank (Dibua, 2006:186). The perceived shortcomings of previous agricultural transformation programmes provided the rationale for the creation of DFRRI (Dibua, 2006:189). The strategies for promoting self-reliance and self-sufficiency in food production proved horribly deficient (Agboola, 1979:184). Farm settlements were first established in the Western Region in 1959. This trend, which continued throughout the 1960s, was not an official acceptance of the failure of plantations, the expansion of which went on simultaneously, but rather emphasized the need to seek solutions to other social and economic problems. Accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the farm settlement scheme was to test and later demonstrate carefully planned farming systems designed to induce young educated people to take up farming as a satisfying and lucrative means of earning a living (Roider, 1971). Several of the plantations established either failed to secure cheap labour or operated unprofitably. Most government programmes designed to impose improved farming methods on settlement schemes or through extension activities ultimately hindered agricultural production. Irrigation schemes collapsed and credit programmes never amounted to more than an expensive way of giving money to favoured clients (Williams, 1980:160). Civil wars have been a major obstacle to African agricultural development. In Angola and Mozambique, several hectares of land have remained largely uncultivable because of the presence of land mines planted during their protracted civil wars. In Southern Sudan, the fight between tribes, with increasingly high fatality since January 2009, began as competition for scarce water and pasturage. The clashes intensified and went beyond cattle raids to include attacks on women and children. The fighting disrupted agricultural production and raised the prospect of a food crisis (The Guardian, July 9, 2009). In 2005, drought and famine stalked Africa, as rains and nutrientdepleted soils conspired to deny millions of farm households a crop yield sufficient just to ensure survival (Sachs, 2005:xvi). Millions of smallholder farmers have tried to raise productivity in the face of

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seemingly endless odds. The worst of the food shortages have hit the poor in regions hit by drought and famine. In several African countries, the situation has been compounded by poor farming practices, soil fertility and climate change. In Zimbabwe, agricultural land became caught up in politics. In 2000, Robert Mugabe and the pro-Mugabe War Veterans Association began the forceful seizure of white-owned lands. This was a more combative continuation of his land reform policy. Although the extent to which the expropriation of commercial farms belonging to white farmers has contributed to food insecurity in Zimbabwe has remained contentious, there is no doubt that the major hiccup noticed in the agricultural sector in the country in recent times is traceable to this problem. The negative impact of the government land reforms on food insecurity has become readily noticeable. According to Richardson (2007: 691-696), a rather large trend that happened in the wake of the land reforms - a 50 per cent average drop in total maize production! Since 2001, Zimbabwe has faced severe and persistent food shortages for six consecutive years, something that never happened before in its history. In many years through the 1990s, Zimbabwe exported grain when it had surpluses. Yet total maize output in 2006/7 was only a scant 500,000 tonnes, far short of the 1.5 million tonnes typically produced (and consumed) by Zimbabwe before 2000. Between 2002 and 2007, total maize production has averaged only 827,000 tonnes, in contrast to the 1, 590,000 tonnes it averaged between 1998 and 2001.

In Zimbabwe, there has been an ongoing food crisis since 2001 which coincided with the period when a majority of the white-owned farms were expropriated and distributed to former freedom fighters and party loyalists. In South Africa, since the start of the presidency of Jacob Zuma, land has also gradually become a political issue. What the implications of this for South Africa will be is difficult to predict, but for Bennie van Zyl, a member of the 6,000 strong Transvaal Agriculture Union (TAU), a small union representing white commercial farmers in the Afrikaner heartland of South Africa, “Zuma is under pressure from the left-wing of government alliance … He is allowing land to become a political issue, like Mugabe. But farming is about food security, not politics…” (Smith, 2010:2). The prospect of seizing lands in South Africa may compound the food crisis on the continent. As the world also grew more complex, other challenges to feeding humans also became multiplied. The problem of climate change and the emission of poisonous substances have deep implications for Africa. The increasing level of carbon dioxide in the air has now been said to pose a

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danger to some staples, like cassava, on which millions of people in Africa depend. Recent studies by Australian scientists have shown that the crops become more toxic and produce smaller yields in environments with higher carbon dioxide levels and more droughts. The findings, presented by Ros Gleadow of the Monash University in Melbourne at a conference in Glasgow in June 2009, underscored the need to develop climatechange-resistant cultivars to feed rapidly growing human populations. The team had tested cassava and sorghum under a series of climate change scenarios, with particular focus on different CO2 levels, to study the effect on plant nutritional quality and yield (The Guardian, June 30, 2009). In recent times, land-grabbing has become one of the worst abuses of capitalism in Africa. This will no doubt have dire implications for food security on the continent. According to an analysis by Aryeetey (2010), the Director of Africa Growth Initiative, The subject of transnational land acquisitions, infamously referred to as land grabbing, has increasingly become an important policy concern in Africa as acquisitions have grown in scale and number. The practice involves the purchase or lease of large tracts of land by foreign nations, companies or individuals for agricultural production. These land acquisitions differ from most foreign agricultural investment of the past because, as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) also notes, the investors are resource seeking instead of market seeking. Therefore, they are effectively using the land or water of a country solely for agricultural repatriation and not for commercial export. The scale of such land acquisitions has increased greatly. From 2004 to early 2009, at least 2.5 million hectares were transferred in five African countries alone. Recent estimates point to land acquisitions that each encompass millions of hectares of land. Of concern is that the land leased by African governments to foreign interests was previously occupied by poor local and indigenous populations who have little control over such land transfers.

Several countries are involved in these land transactions. They include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and some East Asian countries that by the end of 2008 jointly controlled over 7.6 million hectares of land. Multinational corporations such as Daewoo of South Korea, Morgan Stanley and other Wall Street firms in the U.S., Dominion Farms based in Guthrie, Oklahoma, are also known to be involved. About twenty African countries are part of the transnational land transactions. These include Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, Madagascar and Zambia. In these countries, foreign investors often arrange long-term land lease agreements, which predominantly involve government allocated land leases or land-use rights. Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and Mali have all

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taken part in land leases that are fifty years or more in duration. African countries are specifically targeted in these transactions because of the perception that large amounts of land are available, along with desirable climates and inexpensive labour (Aryeetey, 2010). It is significant to note that some of the countries involved in these land transactions are some of the most food-insecure countries on the continent. Already, some of these transactions have started to assume deeply political dimensions, such as in Madagascar where Daewoo’s transactions have sparked political concerns as a result of the large population living in poverty, and the state of food insecurity in the Indian Ocean country. In Kenya, foreign land investors have also stirred resentment. Subsistence farmers and cattle herders complained that they were displaced without compensation. In the Siaya District of southwest Kenya, families insisted that Dominion Farms had not offered as many jobs as it claimed in its six years of operation in the region. Villagers also accused it of polluting water and sickening farm animals (Silver-Greenberg, 2009).

The Global Food Crisis The very complex global economy has ultimately affected the Third World in very serious ways. One of the ways in which this affected the Third World is through the food crisis. The demand for food had been compounded by the onset of the world food crisis in late 2007 and reached its peak by July 2008. Severe food shortages arose as a result of this phenomenon in which the index of food prices rose by 78 per cent. A more difficult period began with the global financial meltdown that commenced in the U.S. in the last quarter of 2008. Also directly related to this crisis is the intention of advanced countries and energy-hungry China to promote ethanol and other bio-fuels as an alternative to petrol. In Nigeria, where Cassava, a major local staple, is consumed by over 70 per cent of the population as eba, amala and fufu, a major disequilibrium was injected into the economy with the industrial use and exportation of the product. The use of cassava as a major industrial resource such as starch pallets, chips, and as the source of ethanol and glucose syrup locally, as well as its massive export to China annually, has mopped up much of the produce, leaving little for home consumption. The global recession has pushed more people into extreme poverty as the economic crisis bites harder and rich countries also roll back assistance. The U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon (2009), in his foreword to the U.N.’s annual progress report launched in Geneva, said impoverished people have already suffered most from the economic crisis.

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According to him, “The numbers of people going hungry and living in extreme poverty are much larger than they would have been had progress continued uninterrupted”. In 2009, more people struggled more than ever to eat a decent meal. In the first half of 2009, according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, another 105 million people were pushed by high food prices into hunger, raising the total worldwide to over one billion. This was up from an estimated total of 963 million. The World Food Programme said it had to cut food aid rations and shut down some operations in eastern Africa and North Korea because of the credit crunch occasioned by the global meltdown.1

Africa and Biotechnology: Food or Health First? One of the most important ways of rolling back food insecurity in the world is through the application of biotechnology to food production. Genetic engineering in food plants has become a reality. The possibility of increasing food and food calories became enhanced significantly with biotechnology in the twenty-first century. But the long-term prospect of this effort has been questioned in some parts of Africa. Zambia was a country dependent on Western food aid. Nearly 30% of the country’s 10.2 million people faced acute starvation with the drought that hit the country. Yet, in the early decades of the twenty-first century, Zambia refused to allow genetically modified food to enter the country despite food shortages. This was based on the assumption that biotech foods were not yet scientifically proven to be suitable for human consumption. The Zambian president, Levy Mwanawasa, had vowed that until he had sufficient evidence to the contrary, he would not risk feeding Zambians a “poison” that could have long-term effects. The country then found itself in a dilemma of choosing between starvation for its citizens or giving them genetically modified food aid many believed may be harmful to health (Manda, 2003:5) The United Nation’s World Food Programme (WFP) had provided the cash-strapped country with thousands of tonnes of emergency food aid to help combat severe famine conditions. The food aid had been sourced from donor countries, such as the United States, which produce large quantities of genetically modified (GM) maize and other grains. The Zambian government placed the consignment already in the country under lock and key, banned its distribution and then prevented another 40,000 tonnes from being shipped in. Many Zambians believed that GM foods cause resistance to antibiotics, thereby cutting immunity to diseases that may then lead to the emergence of new toxins or allergies. Like Zambia,

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Zimbabwe too rejected the food grain. The country, also citing health and environmental concerns, blocked the GM food aid from entering the country (Manda, 2003:5). However, the WFP, Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization issued a joint statement in August 2002 stating that the GM foods were not likely to present health risk. However, apart from health concerns, other agitators expressed the fear that GM seeds may lead to ‘outcrossing’, that is, affect or alter local biodiversity or contaminate local varieties. Such contamination in turn could affect exports to the European Union, which “strictly controls GM experimentation and generally prohibits importation of such organisms” (Manda, 2003:5). In response to all these, however, Lesotho and Mozambique began to mill the GM grain so that no seeds will escape into the local farming system. According to Manda (2003:5), “as a result of such initiatives, Zimbabwe relaxed its earlier position by allowing in GM grain, provided it is milled upon entry. But Zambia did not.” The rejection of GM foods ultimately widened the circle of the fooddeficient population on the continent both on the short-term and the longterm. The sustainable management of food security on the continent therefore remains a major issue. This becomes more evident when considered against the view that “the new highly inbred seeds are often less resistant to diseases than are some of the traditional seeds” (Seitz, 1988:63).

Food Security: African Strategies for the 21st Century African governments have intervened in their agricultural sectors in a variety of ways (Lofchie, 2001:61; Bates, 1981:29). As African states consider the issue of food security on the continent, it is obvious that the leaders would, in this new century, take difficult decisions that would ensure a vibrant food security approach and strategy. In response to the lingering crisis in the agricultural sector, characterized by increasing importation and existence of large food gaps, the continent has been very active in creating structures to roll back food insecurity. In 2006, more than forty African nations met in Nigeria and agreed to lift all cross-border taxes and tariffs on fertilizers needed to replenish the continent’s severely degraded soils. Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria committed $10m to a fund to finance wider use of fertilizers. Three quarters of Africa’s farmland is severely drained of basic nutrients needed to grow crops (Armstrong, 2006). This alarming statistics no doubt encouraged a more proactive

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engagement with the agricultural sector. But there were other profound strategies. A more global approach to food insecurity came on the heels of the Millennium Development Goals. The objective of the Millennium Development Goal-1 (MDG-1) is to reduce extreme poverty and hunger by half by 2015. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are targets set by the United Nations that countries need to achieve to attain a certain level of development. Towards achieving sustainable growth in the agricultural sector and with the MDGs in mind, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative of the African Union (AU) thereafter created the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). It is the highest policy level framework for agricultural development and was established in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003 by AU heads of state and government. CAADP’s main objective is to help Africa achieve economic progress through agricultureled development. The CAADP compacts, among other areas, committed African governments to allocating 10% of their national budgets to agriculture and attain at least 6% sectoral growth per annum to create the wealth needed for rural communities and households in Africa to prosper. It was also seen as the action plan that guarantees a bright future for Africa, especially within the context of the achievement of the MDGs (Daily Sun, July 15, 2010: 6). Since its adoption in 2003, CAADP has established a reputation as a framework of support for sustainable agricultural development in different countries and regions of the continent. In July 2010, the CAADP Day, which was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, ended with a call by Laurent Sedogo, the agriculture minister of Burkina Faso, to review the Maputo declaration on budgetary commitments to agriculture by including a date by which countries should have allocated at least 10% of their national budgets to agriculture. The CAADP Day with the theme: ‘PostCompact CAADP Implementation: the African Private Sector and Investments in Agriculture’ was aimed at expanding the political space and investment climate for CAADP intervention in agriculture by paying particular attention to the role of the private sector. This call was adumbrated by the head of CAADP, Martin Bwalya, when he affirmed: “African countries should build new bridges and explore new sources of private capital flows into agriculture” (CAADP e-Alert, 7 May 2010). Several countries have begun to take steps to make the agricultural sector more vibrant. This may, in fact, represent a shift away from what Hayami and Ruttan (1985:11) described as an earlier “industrial fundamentalism” “to an emphasis on the significance of growth in

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agricultural production and productivity for the total development process.” The Burkinabe minister revealed that Burkina Faso had already committed 15% of its annual budget to agriculture, a move which allowed the country to increase production of its crops, such as rice in 2009, to more than 50% of the 2008 figures. In Sierra Leone, the government instituted tax holidays for the private sector involved in the agricultural sector, while in Burkina Faso, private banks such as Ecobank are financing the agricultural sector, mainly in the cotton industry. In Kenya, Equity Bank has commenced financial literacy programmes among farmers thereby bringing them into the banking sector and enabling them to develop through small loans (CAADP e-Alert, 22 July 2010). In Zimbabwe, the government has completed documentation of key areas needed to enhance agriculture. This included the development of irrigation to combat changing weather conditions, infrastructure development relating to markets for commodities and roads in the rural areas (The Herald, 2010). On July 29 and 30, 2009, Togo completed the signing of the CAADP country compact, becoming the first West African country to do so (ReSAKSS, 2009). Other countries have similarly taken steps to key into the CAADP strategy. Based on the financing gap for Nigeria’s National Agricultural Investment Plan, the country in 2010 began to seek financial assistance to the tune of $2.12billion or N302.3 billion for a three-year period, 2010-2012 (The Sun, July 15, 2010:6). In order to achieve rapid development in the agricultural sector, the AU in 2009 also convened a summit on Agriculture and Food Security. The sense of urgency to implement this goal resulted in the AU setting up more structures that would facilitate the development of agriculture on the continent. Agricultural investment schemes and policies have also become central to the strategies of feeding millions of Africans in the twenty-first century. While these strategies differed from country to country, others were created as joint policy thrusts and approaches. For many years, the urge to foster agricultural growth and development, among other things, has often compelled governments to intervene in the economy. For instance, “the concern for agricultural credit manifests itself in the set of policies and institutions put in place to promote it. The policies ranged from regulations and controls of formal financial institutions to the provision of incentives and establishment of specialized lending agencies” (Balogun and Otu, 1991:139). The incentives and strategies pursued in different African countries became vital instruments for agricultural development and the enthronement of food security. In 2003, the Ethiopian food crisis became very bad. However, a reaction to that was the development of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, the brain child of the

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World Bank Senior Economist, Eleni Gabre-Madhin. The Commodity Exchange began trading in 2008. It was designed to make a difference in the lives of the farmers. The exchange, owned by the Ethiopian government and supported by the World Bank, trades in six commodities including coffee, produced by around twelve million small-scale farmers in Ethiopia. Cutting edge technologies ensures that all transactions are logged on computers within four seconds, with prices transmitted across the country by radio and around the world via the internet. The farmers benefit by being guaranteed a good international market price, preventing exploitation by middlemen and being get paid within twenty-four hours (BBC News, 29 May, 2010). In response to the lingering crisis in the agricultural sector, characterized by increasing importation and existence of large food gaps, Nigeria in 2002 launched the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) to ensure food security. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) keyed into this programme to ensure food security for the region. The desire to assist the federal government to develop the agricultural sector was re-affirmed by the ECOWAS Commissioner on Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources, Ousseini Salifou, at the Abuja stakeholders’ workshop on the implementation of NAIP on June 10, 2010. According to him, “The ECOWAS commission over the last two years had supported Nigeria technically and financially in the preparation of NAIP, the roundtable for the adoption of the compact and the formulation of her investment plan for 2010-2015” (Leadership (Abuja) 11 June 2010). The plan, according to Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Sheik Ahmed Abdullah, among other things, was aimed at bringing development to the sector, reduce poverty and contribute to the achievement of the MDG-1 in the country. Other strategies have also come into play. In Nigeria, one of the 7points agenda of President Umaru Musa Yar’adua was food security and agriculture.2 At the U.N. General Assembly, African leaders on September 25, 2008 repudiated food aid as part of the reforms needed to face the challenges of the twenty-first century, requesting for a carefully designed investment in agriculture for which the continent is richly endowed. They also restated their opposition to the duplicitous insistence of the developed world that Africa should not emulate Europe and America by subsidizing agriculture.3 Thus, because three-fourths of the people in poor developing countries are employed in agriculture, the road to development begins with increasing agricultural productivity (Tweeten and McClelland, 1997:ix). There is no way out of the problem except there is recourse to full resultoriented agricultural programmes to put food on the tables of the people.

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Several of the strategies to ensure food security have either become successful or recorded mishaps. Ethiopia, a country that has experienced intermittent famine, had a programme to divert some of the headwaters of the Nile for irrigation purposes, but this has run into turbulent waters with Egypt, the main user of the Nile. However, the global financial crisis has put several African countries into recession, sending signals that donors might cut back funds for research. But one of the donor countries that had been supporting the Nigeria-based International Institute for Tropical agriculture (IITA) in the fight against hunger and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, Switzerland, had assured, after its ambassador held talks with top officials of the IITA, that “There is global crisis, but that does not mean cutting funds to support IITA. We will continue to support agricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa” (Nigerian Tribune, 26 June, 2009). The development of viable alternatives to well-known staples is also being tried out. This saves people from less nutritious and/or very monotonous diets. It has been discovered that local products, properly harnessed, can help improve the nutritional value of meals particularly during the dry season. At the local level, indigenous plants belonging to the divergent flora, such as sesame, tamarind and certain leaves, have become vital in the fight against malnutrition. In northern Burkina Faso, health workers have been showing villagers at Dori how to incorporate locally available ingredients into meals. According to the news report disseminated by IRIN, the humanitarian news and analysis (a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), “Health workers train local women in making porridge fortified with foods including tamarind, soumbala (a local bean), fish and baobab fruit … the women in turn teach fellow villagers” (IRIN “a”). According to the IRIN News (a), Eau Vive, a non-governmental organization, also shows people how to get the most nutritional value out of milk from the livestock. It affirmed: A lot of milk is produced in the Sahel region [where most families raise animals] from July to September,” Eau Vive country director Juste Hermann Nansi told IRIN. “But most people discard any surplus for lack of a way to conserve it.” The NGO - as part of a three-year “sustainable food security” project funded by the European Union - is teaching villagers to make a cheese that keeps longer than milk and provides nutritious supplements to meals.

Ultimately, the use of local food products and materials, rather than the imported varieties, may hold some answers to Africa’s food crisis.

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Conclusion Towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, close to 80 per cent of the African population remains largely dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and survival (CAADP e-Alert, 28 June, 2010). The continent also possesses 60% of arable land (CAADP e-Alert, 22 July, 2010). Within the framework of CAADP and other local, national and international mechanisms, key developmental issues and priorities are being addressed to give teeth to policy, implementation and advocacy matters. These are critical in addressing the African food security and poverty alleviation programmes. On April 23 and 24, 2010, 200 delegates attended the 6th CAADP Partnership Platform meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa. Delegates came from the AU Commission, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, Regional Economic Communities, farmer’s organizations, civil society organizations, and eight representatives of eight development partner agencies. The wide spectrum of attendance represented the importance attached to creating the necessary framework for a viable agricultural sector. In spite of this, however, the promise held by the African engagement with the agricultural sector has remained worrisome. The following reveals what presently confronts Africa, the continent that has more than fifty sovereign states: In reviewing progress towards ensuring food security and reducing poverty on the continent, recent trends across regions and individual countries showed that 10 countries had met 6% agricultural growth rate in 2008, while 13 countries were making progress towards the hunger or poverty targets but only Ghana was on track to achieve both targets by 2015. Estimates of the Global Hunger Index of The International Food Policy Research Institute showed that the majority of countries had managed to reduce hunger and poverty but Africa, as a whole, was not on track to achieve the primary Millennium Development Goal. This added to the sense of urgency for speedy and effective implementation of CAADP. Ten countries had met the target of allocating 10% of their national budgets to agriculture and several others had made some progress, with at least nine countries showing budget allocations in the 5-10% range … Whereas growth that had taken place in most countries should have led to greater reduction in poverty level, this has not happened. (CAADP e-Alert, May 7, 2010)

There is no doubt that Africa has the resources not only to take agriculture to the next level but also to end food insecurity on the continent. There is therefore the need to design, develop and sustain

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comprehensive investments and programmes in agriculture with the objective of raising productivity to sustain agriculture and food security. The real problem, however, is how to get African governments and peoples to attain best practices in the agricultural sector. It should however be noted that the problem of Africa in the past was not the absence of agricultural plans and strategies but on the viability, suitability or sustenance of such strategies. Only time will tell about the feasibility of the new approaches in a continent commentators have often cynically referred to as the graveyard of ideas.

Notes 1

Reuters Africa, “UN warns of Catastrophe as hungry people top 1bn”. Available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE55B0MZ20090612. Accessed June 13, 2009. At the end of the three-day G8 summit in July 2009 in L’Aquila, Italy, a greater hope for African agriculture was kindled. World leaders committed themselves to a $15 billion initiative to help farmers in poor countries boost production. Planned to be distributed over a three year period, the initiative would significantly change the global approach to hunger. “Obama set for emotional visits to Vatican, Ghana” http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/ 20090710/ap_on_go_pr_wh/ obama downloaded 10/7/09. 2 The others are power and energy, wealth creation and employment, mass transportation, land reform, security, qualitative and functional education. 3 “Africa rejects food aid, wants agric investment”. Nigerian Compass (Isheri), September 26, 2008, pp.1 and 4.

References Adesina, Olutayo. 2008. “Nigeria: peu d’action collective, beacoup de violence” Alternatives Sud. Etat de resistances dans le Sud-2009: Face a la crise alimentaire. 15:4. Africa Now. 1984. Agboola, S. A. 1979. An Agricultural Atlas of Nigeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. American Red Cross. 2003. “Food Crisis in Africa.” Available at http:www.crossnet.org/article/. Armstrong, Matt. 2006. Quoting the New York Times, http://mounainrunner.us/ africa/nigeria/17 June. Accessed 28/6/09. Annan, Kofi. 2010. “The Green Revolution- helping Africa to feed itself”, Kampala Daily Monitor, 23 March. See also CAADP Newsletter (Issue 02) English Edition, Thursday, 15 April 2010.

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Aryeetey, Ernest. 2010. “African Land Grabbing: Whose Interests are Served? The Brookings Institution. Available at http://www.brookings. edu/articles/2010/ 0625_africa_land_ aryeetey. aspx?p=1. Balogun, E.D. and M.F. Otu. 1991. “Credit Policies and Agricultural Development in Nigeria”. Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 29. No.2. Bates, Robert. 1981. “Markets and States”. In The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Los Angeles: University of California Press. BBC News, 29 May, 2010. “Brain Gain: African migrants returning home.” Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10173682. CAADP e-Alert. 2010. “Africa needs speedy and effective measures to eradicate poverty and hunger.” 7 May. Also available at http://www.caadp.net/blog/. —. 2010. “Key role of African fisheries and aquaculture in agricultural development and economic growth.” 28 June. Also available at http://www. caadp.net/blog/. —. 2010. “CAADP takes place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso” Issue 02, 22 July. Also available at http://www.caadp.net/blog/. Daily Sun (Lagos), July 15, 2010. Dibua, Jeremiah. I. 2006. Modernization and the Crisis of Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience. Aldershot: Ashgate. Eckholm, E.P. 1982. Down to Earth: Environment and Human Needs. New York: W.W. Norton. Forrest, Tom. 1995. Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hayami, Y. and Vernon W. Ruttan. 1985. Agricultural Development. An International Perspective. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Helleiner, G.K. 1966. Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria. Homewood, IL: Irwin. Insel, Barbara. 1985. “A World Awash in Grain,” Foreign Affairs, 63 (Spring). IRIN (a) n.d. “BURKINA FASO: Vital role for local food.” Available at http://www.irinnews.org/. Ki-Moon, Ban. 2009. “Recession pushed 90 million into extreme povertyU.N”. Available at http:in.news.yahoo.com/137/20090706/362/twlrecession-pushed-90-million-into-ext.html. Accessed July 7, 2009. Leadership newspaper (Abuja). 2000. “West Africa: ECOWAS Partners Govt on Agric Reforms”. 11 June. Also available at http://allafrica. com/stories/ 201006110751.html.

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Lofchie, Michael. 2001. “The Decline of African Agriculture: An Internalist Perspective”. In Robert O. Collins ed. Problems in the History of Modern Africa, Princeton: Markus Wiener. Manda, Olga. 2003. “Controversy rages over ‘GM’ food aid. Zambia, citing health concerns, bars genetically modified grain’, Africa Renewal, Vol. 14. No.4. Also available at http://www.un.org/ ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no4/ 164food2.htm. Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), 26 June, 2009) “Amb. Andreas Baum: “We won’t cut support to agric research in sub-Saharan Africa - Swiss govt”, 26/6/2009 http://www.tribune.com.ng/29062009/tue/agric2. html. Accessed 29/6/09. Olayide, S.O. 1982. Food and Nutrition Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press. Oluwasanmi, H.A. 1966. Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development. Ibadan: Oxford University Press. ReSAKSS Newsletter. 2009. “Togo Signs CAADP Compact”. Also available at http://resakss.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/togo-signs-caadp -compact/. Roider, W. 1971. Farm Settlements for Socio-Economic Development: The Western Nigerian Case. Munchen: Weltforum Verlag. Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty. Economic Possibilities of Our Time. New York: Penguin Books. Seitz, J.L. 1988. The Politics of Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Silver-Greenberg, Jessica. 2009. “Land Rush in Africa.” Business Week. November 25. Also available at http://www.businessweek.com/ magazine/content/09_49/b4158038757158.htm Accessed 21/12/2009. Smith, Alex Duval, “After Eugen Terre ‘Blanche’s Murder, the Boers prepare for war once more.’ The Observer on Sunday (London), April 11, 2010. Also available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ apr/11/eugene-terreblanche-boer-south-africa/print (Retrieved April 11, 2010). The Guardian (Lagos), June 30, 2009. “Food crisis looms as climate change threatens cassava, others”, Tuesday, June 30, 2009 The Guardian, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article04//indexn2 _html?pdate=300609&ptitle=Food%20crisis%looms’. Accessed 30 June 2009. —. July 9, 2009. Also available at “South Sudan fighting targets women, children, says UN”, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/africa/article02 //indexn2_html. —. 22 June 2010.

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The Herald (Harare). 2010. “Zimbabwe: Fight Against Hunger Progressive”. July 1. Also available at http://allafrica.com/stories/. The Nation (Lagos), April 9, 2010:1. The New York Times. 1983 (June 7). The Sun. July 15, 2010. Tweeten, Luther G. and Donald G. McClelland. 1997. Promoting ThirdWorld Development and Food Security. Westport, CT: Praeger. Williams, Gavin. 1980. State and Society in Nigeria. Idanre: Afrografika Publishers.

CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OLUKOYA OGEN

Introduction Throughout the world, environmental problems have emerged as some of the major challenges of the twenty-first century. Interestingly, with the increasing awareness of the global character of the environmental question, historical research has been focusing on the implications of the great processes of economic and social transformation affecting the modern and contemporary world. It has also been analysing the transnational aspects of the material and scientific construction of environmental situations. This branch of historical investigation, otherwise known as environmental history, encompasses both the natural history of humans and that of society (Corona, 2008:229; Castro, 2008:230). By its very nature, environmental history is a branch of history that casts a new universal gaze on reality (Bevilacqua, 2008:234). Interestingly, Worster (2008:233) emphasises the need to study environmental history thematically and globally because the planet should be seen as a single environmental system that has been radically reorganised by a single, integrated economy and technology. This line of thinking implies that environmental historians need to transcend national boundaries or local concerns in order to grasp the linkages that today bind all peoples and all ecosystems together, and to understand how that happened and what the consequences have been. Thus, modern environmental history cannot be studied within the theoretical and methodological framework developed for the history of the nation state. This is primarily because it deals with the environmental consequences of global interdependence (Corona, 2008:234-5). Invariably, environmental history has a lot to offer in terms of multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary scientific approaches to contemporary global issues because it

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has the propensity to serve as a bridge between historical studies and the natural sciences. It is also capable of providing the much needed long-term perspective on environmental change. Concepts such as sustainability, biodiversity and climate change are devoid of meaning if they are not viewed in their proper historical and cultural contexts (Pisani, 2008:243). The chapter is primarily aimed at yielding a rich harvest of reflections on African environmental history that could serve as additional social and intellectual stimuli for proactive actions aimed at checking the unprecedented and alarming rate at which the African environment is currently being despoiled and degraded. Indeed, Africa is the world's environmental nightmare. The study, therefore, concentrates on identifying some of the emerging environmental issues by critically examining Africa’s environmental problems and the social and political responses to those problems. The chapter also provides an understanding of how conditions at the local level are influenced and constrained by global economic and technological conditions thereby placing human beings at the heart of the environmental protection process. In the last two decades, a rich literature dealing with African environmental issues has gradually evolved (UNEP, 2008; Carruthers, 2005; Clay, 1994; Mabogunje, 1995; Gyasi, 1997; Benneh, 1996). Essentially, this development is primarily inspired by the growth of environmentalism as an international political movement. However, much of the current perspective on Africa’s environmental issues configures environmentalism in colonial and neo-colonial terms, thereby interpreting the historical roots of globalisation and their repercussions on the African environment. The emphasis has been on colonial and neo-colonial environmental irresponsibility that is actively supported by an African collaborative elite (Korvenoja 1993:140; Anderson and Grove, 1987:2). Thus, the consensus would seem to be that African environmental history cannot be completely divorced from the broader North-South debate. Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of these colonial and neocolonial configurations, the present study also acknowledges the fact that Africa is geologically old and the continent has been occupied by human beings much longer than other continents. Human activities in obtaining food, fuel and shelter have, therefore, significantly altered the environment. Equally important is the fact that Africa’s very high annual population growth of 2.36 per cent, which is nearly double the global rate of 1.33 per cent (Singh, et al., 1999:5), as well as the general level of poverty pose veritable threats to the African environment and threaten the ability to deal decisively with environmental problems.

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It is also apposite to declare here that the regional focus of this study is not fortuitous; it is in a way predicated on the 1993 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which emphasises the recognition of the impact of human activities on the environment on a regional scale rather than focusing on site-specific issues. This is simply because a broader geographic perspective of the environment is deemed necessary in revealing changes and connections. In addition, the 1997 Nairobi Declaration concerning the role and mandate of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) also placed emphasis on the analysis of global and regional environmental trends. Consequently, this chapter finds the 1999 UNEP report on the significant emerging environmental problems confronting the continent of Africa immensely useful in its analysis. An important feature of UNEP’s report is the use of globally-consistent and comprehensive geospatial data sets developed by UNEP and its collaborating agencies using remote sensing and other sources which have made it possible to identify and quantify selected emerging environmental issues requiring national and international attention (Singh, et al., 1999:25). Such analyses provide a basis for scientifically credible environmental assessments covering large areas. Moreover, the study also draws on data from a seminal book by UNEP entitled Africa: Atlas of Our Changing Environment. The book is the first publication to use satellite images to depict environmental change in each and every African country during the last thirty years. It also examines geographic and ecological issues of relevance in each African country by presenting each country’s unique features and highlighting some of the major environmental trends and challenges of each country (UNEP, 2008). Nevertheless, this study focuses on Africa, the world’s second largest continent. The analysis presented here, however, is not unique to Africa and could be extended to other developing regions of the world.

An Overview of the African Environmental Condition In the last four decades, Africa’s terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments have declined in virtually all respects. Indeed, the forces of overpopulation, urbanisation and globalisation continue to wreak havoc on the environment. Some of the environmental problems currently plaguing Africa include soil degradation caused by erosion, deforestation and desertification, water and air pollution, loss of soil fertility, and loss of biodiversity. For the purpose of clarity, a description of the nature of each of these environmental problems is presented below.

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Soil Degradation: Soil degradation is a major threat in Africa. Deforestation exposes the soil to high temperatures which break down the organic matter. It also increases evaporation and makes the soils vulnerable to erosion. Over thirty-seven million hectares of forest and woodlands in Africa are said to be disappearing each year. More serious still is the gradual removal of trees, which are crucial for protecting productive land from erosion in farmlands and pastures. In aggregate, Africa has the second largest area of tropical rainforests in the world, totaling over 520 million hectares. These forests cover 18 per cent of the African continent (FAO, 1995) and are generally considered to be ‘hot spots’ for biodiversity and endemic species. However, deforestation in Africa accounts for over 60 per cent of global deforestation. The annual rate of deforestation in Africa between 1990 and 1995 was 3.7 million hectares, or 0.7 per cent of the forested area (FAO, 1995). For example, Uganda reported a forest and woodland cover of about 45 per cent in 1900, surprisingly only 7.7 per cent was reported in 1995 (Republic of Uganda, 1995; Singh, et al., 1999:9). Indeed, many sub-Saharan countries have had over three quarters of their forest cover depleted. Deforestation also has negative consequences such as increased erosion and loss of biodiversity. In the East African highlands, soil erosion has resulted in productivity losses of about 2–3 per cent a year, in addition to creating offsite effects such as the siltation of reservoirs (World Bank, 2008:35). It has been estimated that small-scale farming by peasant farmers produces 70% of Africa's food. Ironically, it has also cleared about 70% of the continent's closed-canopy forests and 60% of its savanna woodlands. For instance, the massive rate of deforestation in Cote d’Ivoire is the highest in the world. Farmers of coffee, cocoa and other products are quickly clearing the tropical forests of Ivory Coast to feed the world market (Clay, 1994:1022). In addition to expanding farmlands, the intense gathering of firewood is another major cause of deforestation. Few rural Africans have access to modern fuel sources. Thus, forests and woodlands are disappearing quickly as growing communities seek wood to cook food and heat homes. Desertification has hit Africa harder than any other continent in the world. The term desertification not only describes the encroachment of desert conditions on forest zones, but also the loss of soil fertility and structure to the extent that its ability to support plant life is severely compromised. The main causes of desertification are human activities and changes in climate. In the last fifty years, over 270,000 miles of farming and grazing lands have been turned into desert in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this desertification has been caused by climatic fluctuations,

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overgrazing, woodcutting, soil exhaustion and misuse of land (DeBlij, Murphy and Fouberg, 2007:20). Overgrazing by cattle and goats has also helped expand the desert. For example, nomadic pastoralists, who must often confine their herds because of encroaching agriculture and restricted borders, are watching once fertile grasslands turn to desert. This is the legacy of excessive cultivation and grazing. Thus, available evidence suggests that soil degradation caused by erosion, desertification, deforestation, and poor agricultural practices is undermining the resources on which African farmers and their families depend for their very survival. In many areas of Africa, the manifestations of this calamity include the creation of deep gullies, of crusts that water cannot penetrate, rock-hard layers, laterite that hand-tools and plant roots cannot pierce and shifting sand dunes that swamp villages and fields. UNEP has estimated that more than a quarter of the African continent is at present in the process of becoming useless for cultivation due to degradation. Nearly four million hectares of Africa’s forests and woodlands are now being deforested or degraded annually, largely in humid and sub-humid West Africa. The rate of destruction is alarmingly high in Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria. The cause of deforestation is mainly clearing for agriculture, but uncontrolled logging, gathering of fuel wood, fire and overgrazing are also taking their toll. In most parts of Africa, the current trend cannot be continued indefinitely: in some places, deforestation rates exceed planting rates by a ratio of 30:1 (FAO, 1995). In a bid to increase agricultural production, many African farmers, through the active encouragement of their governments, have greatly increased their use of chemical-based pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides. UNEP reports that with the use of these chemicals more than eleven million acute pesticide poisonings, including those with only minor effects, occur annually in Africa, making them a major public health problem. In the Sudan, for example, 384,000 agricultural workers, or 80% of the labour force, were poisoned by pesticides (Clay, 1994:1022). Since the African peasant population is largely agrarian, increases in population directly lead to increased pressures on their land resources. It has also been reported that soil erosion, salinisation and acidification are seriously threatening the land on which Africans depend. Invariably, if the deterioration of agricultural lands continues at current rates, experts predict that crop production will be severely cut and the result will be catastrophic (Scotney and Van der Merwe, 1991; Singh, et al., 1999:9). Air and Water Pollution: Africans are increasingly being exposed to indoor and outdoor air pollution that can cause many different health

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problems. Over 70% of Africa’s households rely on coal and biomass fuels for cooking, heating, and lighting. These simple devices emit carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, formaldehyde, benzene, and other simple and complex organic compounds, including polyaromatic hydrocarbons. When children are regularly exposed to these environmental hazards they often develop acute respiratory infections (ARIs) which often lead to death (Clay, 1994:1022). Closely related to the above is the fact that access to clean water is a major problem throughout Africa. Water is polluted mostly by human and industrial wastes. Diseases like typhoid, cholera, and diarrhea come from contaminated water. Water pollution is the reason for high infant mortality rates and health problems for people of all ages (Mabogunje, 1995:4-11). Moreover, most automobiles still use leaded fuel and, because car inspection can be rare and inadequate, the air in major cities throughout sub-Saharan Africa contains high concentrations of lead. In addition, clusters of factories are often built in or near residential areas because of poor environmental regulations. The effluents from these industries are very toxic (Clay, 1994:1022). The 1991 global greenhouse emissions of South Africa, Zaire, and Nigeria ranked them among the top fifty countries (Mabogunje, 1995). Intensive Agriculture and Loss of Biodiversity: Biodiversity is ‘the total variety of plant and animal species in a particular place’ (DeBlij, Murphy, and Fouberg, 2007). It has been estimated that African forest reserves which hitherto contained over 700 different types of tropical trees as well as thirty-four plants, thirteen mammals, twenty-three butterflies, and eight birds have been seriously depleted and many of the species are now endangered (Boateng, 2006). Ghana is one of the few sub-Saharan African countries to register a sustained positive growth in per capita food production and declining food prices since 1990. But there is evidence of environmental degradation and unsustainable natural resource use (World Bank, 2008:47). For instance, in 1957, Ghana had about 8.3 million hectares of forestland, but only 1.2 million are left today (Boateng, 2006). The loss of forestland has reduced the level of biodiversity in Ghana. Even with agreements like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES), the hunting of elephants, rhinoceroses, and alligators is still a key dilemma in some African countries (Mabogunje, 1995:4-11). The problem can also be found in water sources. Because of the use of toxic chemicals by several mining companies, the bodies of water that provide millions of Africans with drinking water are being destroyed. The

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release of toxic materials into water bodies and the environment from mining and oil exploration activities is leading to the extermination of some species of plants and animals. Plant life is destroyed, streams are polluted with hazardous chemicals and marine resources become endangered. The most serious of all is the loss of bird biodiversity because pollution is destroying their habitats (Boateng, 2006). Furthermore, demand for water for both agricultural and nonagricultural uses is rising, and water scarcity is becoming acute in Africa. This scenario has limited the future expansion of irrigation. New sources of water are expensive to develop and building new dams often imposes high environmental and human resettlement costs. Poor water management is also leading to land degradation in irrigated areas through salinization and waterlogging. Waterlogging usually occurs in humid environments or irrigated areas with excessive irrigation and insufficient drainage. Salinization is a larger problem in arid and semiarid areas (World Bank, 2008:84, 55, 203). Intensive livestock farming, an integral part of the continuing livestock revolution, also presents environmental and health problems. High concentrations of livestock in or near urban areas produce waste and can spread animal diseases, such as tuberculosis, avian bird flu and the swine flu with their attendant high risks for human health. As a matter of fact, reports have shown that Africa is not immune to the ravages of the current global livestock revolution. Recently, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported some 3,872 laboratory-confirmed human cases of the pandemic (H1N1) swine flu virus, including eleven deaths in twenty-one African countries. The breakdown of confirmed cases and deaths showed that South Africa topped the chart with 3,485, followed by Kenya, eightyfive; Mauritius, sixty-nine; Tanzania, fifty-three; Cape Verde, thirty-seven; Namibia, thirty-four; and Algeria, thirty-three. Ghana with eight cases and Cameroon with four cases are the only countries in West Africa with reported cases. Nigeria is yet to report any case officially. According to Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General, ‘This virus travels at an unbelievable, almost unheard-of speed. In six weeks, it travels the same distance that other viruses take six months to cover’ (Ukwoma, 2009). Other major environmental threats are the pollution of water and soil with animal wastes, and highly toxic heavy metals such as cadmium, copper, and zinc. Dense livestock populations also add significantly to the risks of spreading animal diseases and high economic losses. Some of these diseases also constitute veritable threats to human beings, especially where dense populations of animals and humans come in close contact. Strategies to manage the environmental and health problems of intensive

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livestock systems need to alter this pattern of urban concentration (World Bank, 2008:200, 209). Dumping of Toxic Wastes: Developed countries also ship their most dangerous wastes to Africa, because their own stringent environmental laws and high costs of disposal make it difficult and expensive to dispose them at home. Unfortunately, the dumping of toxic waste in Africa is rarely accompanied by concern about the health of Africans living around the dump sites (Clay, 1994:1018). For instance, the Ikeja Computer Village in Lagos (Nigeria) serves as a hub for the advancement of information technology. But according to the Computer and Allied Products Dealers Association of Nigeria, about 75% of the electronics there are irreparable and, therefore, stylish junk. They subsequently end up in landfills and makeshift dumps without proper disposal, since Nigeria lacks the capacity to effectively handle electronic waste (e-waste). Ewastes are usually loaded with toxic metals and substances like lead, mercury, cadmium, arsenic, antimony trioxide, polybrominated flame retardants, selenium, chromium, and cobalt. When burned, especially those encased in plastic, they emit harmful gases like carcinogenic dioxins and polyaromatic hydrocarbons as well as leach chemicals such as barium into the soil. The Ikeja e-waste problem is not limited to Nigeria alone; several African countries have become dumping grounds for outdated electronic equipment (The Africa Society, 2008). Oil Exploration and the Environment: In countries such as Nigeria and Angola, where the principal source of revenue is oil, environmental problems associated with oil-related activities are numerous. For example, Nigeria has seen its environment degraded as a result of intense exploration by national and multinational petroleum companies. Oil spills have so polluted fishing areas in the Niger Delta that virtually the entire marine life in the Niger Delta is gravely endangered (Clay, 1994:1023). The release of oil into the water system through spillage, oil bunkering, militant group activities and ship leakage has catastrophic effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Similarly, the flaring of natural gas in Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, and Gabon has proven to be a significant source of carbon emission in sub-Saharan Africa and a significant contributor to global warming. In the process of oil production, natural gas is released. Because gas infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa is extremely limited, this "associated" gas is often burned off, or "flared," rather than captured for use. Not only does this waste a potentially valuable energy source, but it releases carbon dioxide directly into the atmosphere (Clay, 1994:1023).

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Table 7-1: Highlights of Some Critical Environmental Issues in African Countries S/N

Country

Nature of Environmental Problems

1.

Algeria

2.

Angola

3.

Benin

4.

Botswana

5.

Burkina Faso

6.

Burundi

7.

Cameroon

8. 9.

Cape Verde Central African Republic

10.

Chad

11.

Comoros

12. 13.

Congo Congo Democratic Republic

14.

Cote d’Ivoire

15.

Djibouti

16.

Egypt

17.

Equatorial Guinea

18.

Eritrea

19.

Ethiopia

20.

Gabon

Desertification, water scarcity and pollution Threats to biodiversity, access to portable water, coastal degradation Deforestation, desertification and threats to biodiversity Overgrazing, desertification, water scarcity, urbanisation, wildlife of the Okavango Delta Water scarcity, land degradation, desertification and deforestation Land scarcity and degradation, deforestation, depletion of Lake Tanganyika resources Land degradation and deforestation, overharvesting of biological resources, degradation of coastal and marine ecosystems Soil erosion and land degradation, threats to biodiversity Wildlife poaching, deforestation and land degradation, diamond mining and pollution Drought, desertification and land degradation, access to water and sanitation Deforestation and soil erosion, threats to coastal ecosystems Wildlife poaching, threats to coastal ecosystems and inland wetlands, deforestation Wildlife poaching, deforestation, mining and ecosystem degradation Deforestation, threats to biodiversity and threats to coastal ecosystems Water scarcity, land availability and desertification, marine resources and pollution Urbanisation and pollution, soil erosion and land degradation, threats to biodiversity Oil production and coastal degradation, deforestation, game and hunting on Bioko Island Water stress, land availability and degradation, deforestation and threats to biodiversity Water scarcity, livestock, soil erosion and land degradation, threats to biodiversity and endemism Threats to biodiversity, coastal degradation and industrial pollution, lack of sanitation

Social and Political Responses to Environmental Problems

21.

Gambia

22.

Ghana

23.

Guinea

24.

Guinea-Bissau

25.

Kenya

26.

Lesotho

27. 28.

Liberia Libya

29.

Madagascar

30.

Malawi

31.

Mali

32. 33.

Mauritania Mauritius

34.

Morocco

35.

Mozambique

36.

Namibia

37.

Niger

38.

Nigeria

39. 40.

Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe

41.

Senegal

137

Drought, threats to forest and wetland ecosystems, overfishing and coastal erosion Deforestation, land degradation and coastal erosion, overfishing and reduced water volume in Lake Volta Deforestation, overfishing and destruction of mangrove forests, land degradation Deforestation, soil erosion, threats to the Bijagos Biosphere Reserve Water scarcity and pollution, desertification and deforestation, degradation of freshwater ecosystems Degradation of Rangelands, threats to biodiversity in the Lesotho Highlands, water resource management and pollution Deforestation, threats to biodiversity and water pollution Water scarcity and desertification, oil pollution Soil erosion, endemism and threats to biodiversity and deforestation Land scarcity and soil erosion, deforestation, water pollution and aquatic biodiversity Desertification and drought, water pollution and threats to biodiversity Desertification and deforestation, iron mining, threats to fisheries and coastal ecosystems Coastal water pollution, threats to biodiversity Drought and desertification, water scarcity and pollution Water scarcity and natural disasters, land use, depletion of wildlife and forests Land degradation and desertification, aridity and water scarcity, threats to biodiversity Desertification and deforestation, threats to wildlife, and environmental consequences of mining Desertification, deforestation and threats to biodiversity, oil pollution Population pressure on land, soil erosion and sedimentation, deforestation and threats to biodiversity Degradation of forest ecosystems, threats to biodiversity Urban pollution, deforestation, coastal wetlands and depletion of marine resources

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Severe weather and coastal erosion, loss of mangrove forests and coral reefs Deforestation, land degradation and overfishing Threats to biodiversity, desertification, overgrazing and deforestation, water scarcity and 44. Somalia drought Water scarcity, land degradation, threats to 45. South Africa biodiversity Soil erosion and land degradation, poaching and 46. Sudan the depletion of forest and fisheries Population encroachment and land degradation, irrigation and soil degradation, threats to 47. Swaziland biodiversity Water pollution, land degradation and deforestation, threats to biodiversity and 48. Tanzania ecosystems Land degradation and deforestation, threats to 49. Togo aquatic ecosystems, threats to biodiversity Land degradation and desertification, water 50. Tunisia scarcity, air and water pollution Land degradation and deforestation, habitat degradation and threats to biodiversity, water 51. Uganda scarcity and pollution Land degradation, depletion of water resources 52. Western Sahara and marine fisheries Environmental consequences of copper mining, water and air pollution, deforestation and 53. Zambia wildlife depletion Land degradation and deforestation, water 54. Zimbabwe scarcity, drought and wildlife poaching Source: Compiled from UNEP (2008). Africa: Atlas of our Changing Environment. Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Programme, pp. xiv-xv. 42. 43.

Seychelles Sierra Leone

Major Causes of Africa’s Environmental Challenges Many of the current environmental changes in Africa are triggered by human activities, and the magnitude of these human-induced changes continues to soar to new heights. Nevertheless, natural causes, such as active volcanoes found to the extreme east of the Rift Valley, erosion, drought, and water shortages resulting from the dry season cannot be ignored. There is a wide consensus among historians that Western hegemony over the last two centuries has been mainly founded on the appropriation of the natural resources of colonised countries (Corona, 2008:237). The astonishing rapidity of economic growth in the developed

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world inevitably brought environmental repercussions. Paralleling the U.S. and Britain of a century ago, China’s rapid industrial growth has lately come to mean that China generates environmental turbulence for other parts of the world, as does Japan and, on a smaller scale, South Korea because of the massive importation of grain, oil, timber, mineral ores and other primary products from Africa and other parts of the developing world (Mcneill, 2005:3). It is also important to appraise the role of the internal political and social structures of African countries in relation to their environmental problems. The basis for this viewpoint is the assumption that regardless of the biophysical nature of the environmental problems, their causes are often social. Korvenoja (1993:140) explains some of the political and economic linkages of Africa’s environmental challenges by concentrating on the role of the African elite. The economic policies of the African governments have often been described as having an urban bias. This means that the state allocates resources in favour of the urban centres at the expense of small peasants. But because urban populations are growing quickly, and most heavy industries are located in or around major cities, increasing numbers of sub-Saharan Africans are now exposed to hazardous and toxic wastes (Diamond 1987:587). Anderson and Grove (1987:2) argue that the development programmes pursued by the colonial rulers and the immediate post-colonial governments were not only in many ways economically unsuccessful, they often also had serious environmental impact. In fact, this is best exemplified in the agricultural and forestry policies pursued by African governments. The local ruling class has often, like the colonialists, looked down on African agricultural traditions. However, the adoption of full-scale mechanisation, irrigation, chemical fertilizers and mono-cropping has produced results that have not necessarily been ecologically sustainable. In their forestry policies too, African governments have assumed the infrastructure and attitudes of the colonial regimes. Though, in principle, the importance of forest reserves has been widely acknowledged, at the same time Africa’s forest resources continue to be put to maximum use. Atampugre (1991:5) cites the example of Tanzania where the payment ordered in the Forest Rules of Government for each tree felled is not up to the value of a tree, nor the costs required for its replanting. The conclusion is that the Tanzanian government's policy would seem to support the consumption of timber rather than its conservation (Korvenoja, 1993:145). Wars and civil strife are also major causes of environmental degradation in Africa. For instance, until its deadly 1994 conflict, Rwanda was the most densely populated country in Africa and had the highest

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fertility rate. While the war has claimed millions of lives, the chaos also destroyed the infrastructure that once provided food, housing, and public services to the population. Among other calamities, many refugees have died from cholera due to poor water and improper food preparation in the camps. In the 1980s, agrarian communities in Ethiopia were nearly destroyed when all the farmers went off to fight its civil war. Today, the country still depends on foreign food imports for its survival (Clay, 1994:1018). Similar scenarios could be observed in war-torn Sudan, Chad, Liberia, and Somalia. Environmental problems in Africa are therefore partly human-induced and partly natural. The socio-economic impact of environmental deterioration on Africa continues to pose major problems to development, stability, and daily living. In an attempt to confront Africa’s gargantuan economic problems, well-intentioned but short-sighted policies were developed by foreign agencies and followed “blindly” by African governments. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are often singled out for criticism because their lending policies encouraged rapid economic development. Once they had borrowed huge amounts of money, poor African countries were then forced to rapidly exploit their natural resources to pay the loans back. For example, large-scale mining, irrigation, hydroelectric and industrial projects were often developed without consideration for the environment. For example, irrigation programmes help create new breeding grounds for mosquitoes and account in part for the spread of malaria into new areas, as in the cotton farms of the Sudan. According to a 1990 WHO report, malaria is responsible for most of the estimated one to two million annual worldwide deaths in subSaharan Africa. Malaria thrives where stagnant pools of water provide breeding grounds for the anopheles mosquito. Apart from premature death, malaria is also the major culprit for low productivity in Africa (Clay, 1994:1018-19). Thus, environmental-related diseases such as malaria compromise the continent's productivity, which in turn makes it more difficult to generate revenue to combat the continent’s underdevelopment.

Social and Political Responses to Africa’s Environmental Problems Public awareness and concern for the environment is becoming an increasingly important factor among decision-makers in sub-Saharan Africa as they seek to expand the development of their economies. Increased environmental awareness among Africans and a desire to boost Africa’s tourism potentials appear to be the real motivators for

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environmental action. A significant amount of international attention also has been focused on the environmental problems which sub-Saharan Africa now faces. This is directly responsible for a large number of policy and awareness initiatives. For example, there are well over a hundred nongovernmental organisations active in the preservation of the region's environment. This upsurge has placed enormous responsibility on African governments to adjust their policies to environmentally sound practices. Although the efforts of African countries in developing environmental administration, programmes and legislation are acknowledged, African governments have been criticised for spending actually more time in talking than in concrete action (Korvenoja, 1993:146). In August 2002, South Africa hosted the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), a follow-up conference to the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The agenda of the conference was organised around five issues, commonly referred to as the WEHAB initiative. These are water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity. The fact that the WSSD was held in South Africa ensured that many of the environmental and developmental issues faced by Africans received more attention than in past international environmental summits. As a result, many developed countries, including the United States, promised funds to Africa to address developmental and environmental challenges. The United States pledged $4.5 billion during the summit to combat HIV/AIDS and improve access to safe water. Additional projects included a United States project in the Congo River Basin to promote forest conservation, and a project sponsored by the European Union to improve water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa (Sandon, 2006).. Another major effect of the WSSD was the phenomenal increase in environmental awareness throughout Africa. The increase in awareness was not just noticeable among NGOs, but also within governments and among the general population. As people learnt more about environmental degradation, they began to demand that their governments address the issues more forcefully. However, while it is possible that this increase in awareness could lead to strong, enforceable environmental legislations in African countries, most countries in Africa still face significant problems of poverty that will have to be addressed before significant environmental action is feasible (Sandon, 2006). According to the World Bank, Africa’s intensive farming has resulted in declining productivity and loss of agricultural land. Better water and farm management, such as fieldleveling and drainage, can rectify these problems, but this often requires substantial public investments in off-farm infrastructure, strong water

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management institutions, collective action, and a good understanding of hydrology (World Bank, 2008:16). The alarming rate of deforestation and desertification in Africa in recent years has forced African governments to address the problems. Indeed, several countries in the region have implemented highly innovative community-based approaches to improve the management of their natural resource base and to extend the economic benefits to lower income households. Success stories include land revitalisation in Niger, the expansion of wetlands resulting from a restoration project to control flooding in Mauritania, and protection from grazing in the Sidi Toui National Park in southeastern Tunisia, which produced a dramatic rebound in the natural ecosystem. Others include a new management plan for the Itezhi-tezhi Dam in Zambia, which helped to restore the natural seasonal flooding of the Kafue Flats, and the release of massive volumes of water through Lake Nasser’s spillway, which prevented flooding damage along the Nile Valley (UNEP, 2008:xii-xv). Moreover, the Nigerian government is planting trees and preserving vegetation that is natural to the terrestrial environment. Various arms of the government are involved in this national tree-planting campaign. It has been estimated that over three million hectares have already been restored from land that was severely degraded in previous years. In Niger, surveyors found between ten and twenty per cent more trees in 2005 than were seen thirty years earlier in the same area (Niamey, 2006). In Burkina Faso, villagers were trained to improve on the local technique of building small dams called digguettes. Egypt has also been establishing shelter belts to protect reclaimed sandy soils on the fringe of the western desert. In Ethiopia, the amount of human labour that has been mobilised for soil conservation practices is unrivalled in Africa. The Ethiopian programme combines forestry, soil conservation and water resource development (FAO, 1995). In Ghana, a group of non-governmental organisations - SEND-Ghana, Christian Aid, CARE International, and Kasa - are facilitating a series of events titled ‘Voice and Vision on Climate Change’ to educate the government, civil society and Ghanaians on climate change and its development implications for Ghana. Historical data and available statistics show that in the last thirty years Ghana has seen an increase in average temperature of approximately 1 ºC, decrease in rainfall by 20% and runoff water by 30%. According to this group, the future looks seemingly alarming because such changes are posing an increasing threat to natural resource management, energy sufficiency, agriculture, food security, incomes and livelihoods (Sherwood, 2009). All these confirm

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Africa’s ability to protect against, and even reverse environmental degradation. Meanwhile, with regard to gas flaring, Nigeria is working on developing a gas-to-liquids industry and expanding its liquefied natural gas trade. The government has set a deadline for the termination of all gas flaring, with heavy fines for companies that do not comply The international community has also been in the forefront of environmental campaign in Africa. A recent example of growing global awareness of the impact on the environment of oil exploration and development was the controversy surrounding the World Bank's approval of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project in June 2000. The $3.7 billion project, led by ExxonMobil Corporation, is one of the largest construction ventures in sub-Saharan Africa ever and is expected to bring Chad $80$100 million a year (about half of Chad's budget) and Cameroon $20 million a year. Plans for the Chad-Cameroon project include development of Chad's Doba oil fields, construction of a 673-mile pipeline from the Doba oil fields to Cameroon's Atlantic coast at Kribi, installation of an offshore floating storage and off-loading vessel, and a submarine pipeline from the Atlantic coast to the vessel. Construction of the pipeline began in 2000 and the first barrels of oil were pumped through in July 2003. Despite its recent success, the project has been the target of vehement protests from environmental and human rights groups, which argue that the project would harm wildlife (black rhinos, chimpanzees, gorillas and elephants) in the rain forests which the pipeline would pass through, dislocate inhabitants along the pipeline route, and further increase civil strife through profiteering by local officials (Environmental Defense, 2001). Similarly, as far as e-waste is concerned, the Basel Action Network (BAN), a Seattle-based environmental group, has paid close attention to the e-waste export to Nigeria and, in an October 2005 report, cited the manner in which such waste is used to fill up swamps. As the piles rise, they are periodically burned, spewing toxic fumes. This is in addition to the fact that people, mostly children, scavenge through the waste, sometimes on their bare feet, while goats and chickens that later end up in meals also roam through the heaps. But BAN estimates that 25-75 per cent of the shipped electronics are worthless. Just as there is yet to be an effective method of checking the export of electronic junk to Africa, there is no trusted data on sources and exporting agents. In effect, exporters and importers are taking full advantage, reaping huge profits at the expense of environmental sanitation. While countries like Nigeria are in dire need of an electronic recovery industry and effective waste disposal systems, BAN continues to mount pressure on the United States to ratify the 1989 Basel

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Convention, an international treaty designed to regulate waste in all its forms and prevent hazardous waste from being dumped in the developing world (The Africa Society, 2008). At the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development, the United States joined forces with the governments of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo, along with multilateral donors, to promote economic development in the Congo River basin through natural resource conservation programmes. The programme created a network of parks and protected areas, well-managed forestry concessions, and assistance to communities which depend upon the conservation of the forest and wildlife resources in the Congo River basin. The United States planned to invest $53 million through 2005 on this project, and additional government, intergovernmental, and non-governmental partners were also expected to contribute funds (Sandon, 2006). The formation of the Division of Early Warning Assessment-Africa (DEWA-Africa), an organ of UNEP, is aimed at improving access to meaningful environmental data and information, and increasing Africa’s capacity to use environmental information for decision-making and action. DEWA-Africa also works with partners at different levels to make the Africa Environment Outlook (AEO) and Africa Environment Information Network (AEIN) processes more effective in terms of delivery to different target groups (UNEP, 2009). The efforts of the United States, under the auspices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in arresting and reversing Africa’s environmental degradation deserve closer scrutiny. USAID environmental programmes across Africa are demonstrating the sector’s ability to be a robust vehicle for rural economic growth, stronger local governance, more effective conflict mitigation, as well as reduced degradation. This section will therefore devote attention to the efforts of USAID in combating Africa’s environmental degradation. In Guinea, for instance, USAID is making significant input in the area of environmental protection. In this respect, 115,000 hectares of forests and tree plantations have been placed under sustainable management, and the government of Guinea has turned over the management of seven classified forests to local communities. Such co-management plans empower local communities to share management responsibility and benefits with the government. As part of the devolution process, a USAID natural resource management programme has provided a dozen forestry service agents with professional forest management training that allows them to transform themselves from policemen to development partners. At

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the village level, the men and women in democratically run management committees are empowered with the authority to make and enforce management laws. Some committees have exercised these rights by successfully challenging traditionally powerful logging and mining interests that transgressed the laws. Furthermore, USAID has also assisted more than 37,000 farmers to improve agricultural production through environmentally sustainable management practices and has helped establish over 2,800 new businesses (USAID, 2007). USAID’s programme in Kenya is aimed at improving communitybased wildlife management, strengthening forestry and environmental management, and enhancing integrated coastal zone management. Through this process, 770,000 hectares of land have been put under improved management. The sum of $652,000 has also been generated as revenues from nature-based enterprises, and 1,200 new jobs have been created. In addition, the Kenyan parliament is acting on a land policy review process and a forestry and wildlife bill, and has already enacted an environmental bill. In Uganda, USAID works to identify threats to biodiversity in the Albertine Rift by working with local communities. It also promotes income-generating activities involving the sustainable use of natural resources, especially tourism, agriculture and forestry-related enterprises (USAID, 2007). Illegal logging activities and over-dependence on the world’s second largest rain forest could be blamed for Central African Republic’s current environmental degradation. Through the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, USAID and its development partners are helping the people to manage their natural resources sustainably. Under the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE), USAID has agreed to contribute approximately $48 million to special projects that would support a network of effectively managed protected areas. The goal is to improve forest governance, develop sustainable means of livelihood, reduce the rate of forest degradation and loss of biodiversity, improve logging policies and achieve sustainable forest use by local inhabitants (USAID, 2007). In Tanzania, USAID is trying to address the links between the environment and rural poverty alleviation. In this respect, USAID is helping to improve rural livelihoods while conserving biodiversity by enhancing the capacity of local communities to participate in sustainable management of wildlife-protected areas. USAID also supports local action in the Pangani, Bagamoyo, and Mkuranga districts that promote sustainable coastal and marine resources management through co-management for nearshore fishery areas, small-scale enterprise development, marine culture

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and coastal tourism. USAID has also supported the placement of an additional 620,000 hectares of land under conservation management. This is a clear demonstration of the commitment of local communities to participate fully in community-based conservation (USAID, 2007). Apart from supporting the coordination and integration of national policies and laws governing natural resources in Namibia, USAID, under its Living in a Finite Environment Programme, has helped form fifteen protected areas known as conservancies. This involved almost 40,000 community members. An additional thirty-three conservancies are also being developed. The conservancies have created 3,500 jobs, and financial benefits to participants have increased to approximately $2.25 million. At the same time, wildlife numbers have increased, reversing a disturbing trend. Thus, through the conservancies, USAID has been working with Namibians to develop business plans that generate income while conserving wildlife and resources (USAID, 2007). African environmental challenges are also being addressed under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through its action plan on the environment. Similarly, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), which is the apex body on the environment, is responsible for, inter alia, guiding regional institutions and member states in implementing NEPAD’s action plan. It is also responsible for creating an enabling environment for cooperation in cross-border natural resource management and sharing best practices among African countries (UNEP, 2008:ii-iv). African leaders, under the auspices of the African Union, demanded for the sum of $67 billion annually from highly industrialised nations to stem the impact of global warming on the continent. The bone of contention is that Africa contributes less than one per cent to carbon dioxide emissions but bears nine-tenth of the adverse effects of global warming and climate change (The Guardian, 2009:1, 4). However, major challenges remain; the region contains 45 per cent of global biodiversity, yet it has the highest rate of deforestation in the world. Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation also create new environmental challenges. The top-down approach to natural resource management in many countries has resulted in inefficient exploitation and contributed to degradation, while inequitable access to natural resources is often a root cause of social instability. There is therefore no gainsaying the need for the United States, the global community, and African countries to redouble all efforts aimed at overcoming severe ecological challenges in order to ensure that the environment serves as a gateway to economic growth and a source of security.

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Conclusion The last century was an era of unusual environmental turbulence. Human practices, such as forest clearing, the use of forest resources for fire and fuel, fishing, farming, industrialisation, and use of advanced technology, have altered things in the twentieth century. Many of the present environmental problems were triggered by human activities. The grand quest for a legitimate use of nature has now become the concern of historians as well as other scholars (Chakrabarti, 2008:231). This chapter has shown that while chronic poverty, frequent civil wars and the deadly toll of HIV/AIDS in Africa continue to capture global headlines, wars, poverty and the killer virus are not the continent's only lethal threats (Clay, 1994:1018). Ineffective management of the environment has enormous economic and social consequences. There is no doubt that the future of Africa’s agricultural development is intrinsically tied to better stewardship of natural resources. The intricate links between agriculture and environmental sustainability require an integrated policy approach. With development and environmental protection inextricably linked, production, incentives and technologies need to be aligned with better natural resource management. According to the World Bank, strategies for implementing the agriculture-fordevelopment agenda require more than better governance and donor coordination. Given the pervasive nature of the forces of globalisation, action at the global level is essential for countries’ agendas to succeed in a dynamic global environment (World Bank, 2008:229, 278). Today, there is a global emphasis on sustainable development, not just development that serves a short-term economic or political goal but a strategy that considers all the ramifications, including environmental considerations. A basic component of sustainable development is environmental risk assessment, which may predict the likely environmental impact of a proposed project, such as a hydroelectric plant or new mining operations. However, such assessments are still new in Africa and rarely conducted. Educating the present as well as the next generation of Africans seems essential to improving Africa's fragile environmental health. Indeed, Africa needs to repair its damaged environment and preserve it for future generations (Clay, 1994:1023). The threat to the maintenance of the well-being of human populations will remain as long as scientifically sound methods to preserve environmental quality and, indeed, the entire ecosystem are not in place. This study is of the view that Africa’s environmental problems need to be addressed with a sense of urgency, as does the need to develop suitable long-term strategies

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and stimulate international cooperation to conserve biodiversity and freshwater resources (UNEP, 1999). Since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, it is generally accepted that the agriculture and environment agendas are inseparable. Degradation of natural resources undermines the basis for agricultural production and increases vulnerability to risk, imposing high economic losses from unsustainable use of natural resources. The agriculture-for-development agenda will not succeed without more sustainable use of natural resources, such as water, forests, soil conservation, genetically diverse crops and animal varieties, and other ecosystem services. At the same time, agriculture is often the main entry point for interventions aimed at environmental protection. It is the main user of land and water, a major source of greenhouse gas emissions, and the main cause of conversion of natural ecosystems and loss of biodiversity (World Bank, 2008:219). Historical evidence has shown that it is extremely difficult for any country to industrialise and develop economically without a reasonably healthy agricultural base. Africa seems to be caught in a trap; industrialisation could solve her food problems, but with agriculture stagnant, the chances of industrialisation are not bright. If the present trend of stagnating or declining agricultural productivity found over much of Africa is to be reversed, land degradation will have to be halted. As a matter of fact, the bottom line is that the natural resource base of Africa is being degraded and destroyed at a rate which will soon make food and agricultural production unsustainable. Therefore, this chapter supports the view of the World Commission on Environment that economic development need not be environmentally degrading and that growth should in fact create the capacity to solve environmental problems (FAO, 1995). With rising resource scarcity and mounting externalities, agricultural development and environmental protection have become closely intertwined. Agriculture’s negative environmental impact can be reduced, farming systems made less vulnerable to climate change, and agriculture harnessed to deliver more sustainable development. The solution is not to slow down agricultural development but to seek more sustainable production systems. Managing the connections among agriculture, natural resource conservation, and the environment must be an integral part of using agriculture for development. A good starting point would be the removal or proper management of subsidies that encourage the degradation of natural resources (World Bank, 2008:22, 24, 257). The environmental cost of pollution by fertilizers and pesticides can be reduced if these inputs are properly managed without sacrificing yields. Integrated pest management that combines agro-ecological principles with

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judicious use of pesticides can increase yields and reduce environmental damage (World Bank, 2008:22). Indeed, deliberate attempts at reducing the environmental impact of intensive agricultural systems, especially agro-chemical and animal waste pollution, have become critically important for both improved environmental and human health, and also to reduce the drag on productivity growth from land and water degradation.

References Anderson, David and Grove, Richard (1987). ‘The Scramble for Eden: Past, Present and Future in African Conservation.’ In Anderson, David and Grove, Richard (eds.), Conservation in Africa. People, Policies and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Atampugre, Nicholas (1991). ‘The Search for New Perspectives.’ In Hisham, Ahmed Mohamed, Sharma, Jan, Ngaiza, Anthony and Atampugre, Nicholas, Whose Trees? A People's View of Forestry Aid. London: The Panos Institute. Benneh, George. (1996). Sustaining the Future: Economic, Social and Environmental Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Tokyo: United Nations University. Bevilacqua, Piero (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment: A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2. Boateng, Clement (2006). Ghana: Mining Takes Heavier Toll on Ghana's Biodiversity. http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200609270627.html. (Accessed July 15, 2009). Carruthers, Jane (2006). ‘Africa’s Environmental History’ Newsletter of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, No. 2, 2005. Castro, Guillermo (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment. A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2. Chakrabarti, Ranjan (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment. A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2. Clay, Rebecca (1994). ‘A Continent in Chaos: Africa's Environmental Issues’. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 102, No. 12 (Dec., 1994). Cleaver, Kevin M. (1997). Rural Development Strategies for Poverty Reduction and Environmental Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

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Corona, Gabriella (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment. A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2. DeBlij, H.J., Murphy, Alexander B., and Fouberg, Erin H. (2007). Human Geography: People, Place, and Culture. 8th Ed. New Jersey: John Wiley. Diamond, Larry (1987). ‘Class Formation in the Swollen African State.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies. 25 (4). Environmental Defense (2001). ‘Africa’s Chad-Cameroon Oil and Gas Pipeline Project.’ http://www.edf.org/documents/2449_casestudy_ chadcameroon.pdf (Accessed 12 August 2009). FAO (1995). ‘Land and Environmental Degradation and Desertification in Africa.’ http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5318e/x5318e02.htm. (Accessed 16 September 2009). Gyasi, Edwin A. (1997). Environment, Biodiversity and Agricultural Change in West Africa: Perspectives from Ghana. Tokyo: United Nations University. Korvenoja, Tita (1993). ‘The Environmental Problems and Politics of Power: Review on the African Elite.’ Nordic Journal of African Studies. 2(1). Mabogunje, Akin L. (1995). ‘The Environmental Challenges in SubSaharan Africa.’ Environment, 37 (4). Mcneill, John (2005) ‘Modern Global Environmental History: A Turbulent and Dramatic Scenario’ Newsletter of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change. No.2. Niamey (2006). Niger: Tide Turning on Desertification. http://www.allafrica.com/ stories/200610110683.html (Accessed July 15, 2009). Pisani, John (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment. A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2. Republic of Uganda (1995). The National Environmental Action Plan for Uganda. Kampala: NEAP Secretariat, Ministry of Natural Resources. Sandon, A (2006). ‘Environmental Problems in Africa.’ Online: http://www.articlesbase.com/authors/andrew-sandon/8922.htm. (Accessed 12 August 2009). Scotney, D. M., and Van der Merwe, A. J., (1991). Irrigation: Long-term Viability of Soil and Water Resources in South Africa. Pretoria: Soil and Irrigation Research Institute. Sherwood, M. (2009). ‘Climate Change Action in Ghana’ Online: http://hnet.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-west-africa&month=

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0909&week=b&msg=8B3zGgqKYL99hw5InHgTVg&user=&pw= (Accessed 09 Sept. 2009). Singh, A., Dieye, A., Finco, M., Chenoweth, M.S., Fosnight, E.A., and Allotey, A. (1999). ‘Early Warning of Selected Emerging Environmental Issues in Africa: Change and Correlation from a Geographic Perspective.’ Nairobi: UNEP. The Africa Society (2008). ‘Addressing Environmental Problems in Africa.’ http://www.africasummit.org/publications/Environment.pdf. (Accessed 23 July 2009). The Guardian, 25 August 2009. Ukwuoma, B. (2009). ‘Swine Flu Spreads to 21 African Nations.’ The Guardian, August 31. UNEP (2009). ‘UNEP Division of Early Warning Assessment-Africa.’ Online: http://www.unep.org/dewa/Africa/. (Accessed 16 September 2009). —. (2008). Africa: Atlas of our Changing Environment. Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Programme. USAID (2007). ‘Sub-Saharan Africa.’ Online: http://www.usaid.gov/ locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/env/ (Accessed 15 August 2009). World Bank (2008). World Development Report: Agriculture for Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Worster, Donald (2008). ‘What is Global Environmental History?’ Global Environment. A Journal of History and Natural and Social Sciences. Nr. 2.

CHAPTER EIGHT THE PROBLEM OF ENERGY SECURITY IN AFRICA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES LAWRENCE I.N. EZEMONYE, EMMANUEL T. OGBOMIDA AND MIKE U. AJIEH

Introduction Energy is one of the essential inputs for socio-economic development (Johansson and Goldemberg, 2002; Davidson and Sokona, 2002). This is true at the regional, national and local levels. Small, medium and large enterprises all have critical need for reliable energy supply, and it is practically impossible in the world today to conceive of a successful commercial venture or modern human activity that does not require a dependable supply of energy in one form or another. Every advanced economy has required secure access to modern sources of energy to drive its development and growing prosperity. While many developed countries may be focused on domestic energy security or decarbonizing their energy mix, many other countries are still seeking to secure enough energy to meet basic human needs. In developing countries, access to affordable and reliable energy is fundamental to reducing poverty and improving health, increasing productivity, enhancing competitiveness and promoting economic growth. Despite the importance of these concerns, billions of people continue to be without basic modern energy services, and lack reliable access to either electricity or clean cooking facilities (OECD/IEA, 2011). As such, the development of sustainable and long-term solutions to meet these growing, diverse and urgent energy challenges assumes special significance for developing countries in general and countries in Africa in

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particular. African countries face many challenges in their quest to improve the welfare of their populations, one of which is the lack of access to affordable and reliable modern energy. The lack of access to modern energy services severely impedes social and economic development. It is critical and urgent to address the continent’s energy needs in order to unlock its development potential. Africa’s energy resources are more than adequate to meet its short- and medium-term requirements, taking into account the main drivers such as population growth and economic development (WEC, 2005). Despite a fairly adequate endowment with abundant energy resources, in the form of fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal), hydropower, nuclear, biomass and other renewable energy sources (solar, wind, geothermal power, etc.) that could be harnessed to provide various modern energy services, Africa lags behind when compared to developed countries in terms of access to reliable and affordable commercial energy supplies. Yet, these energy resources can play an essential role in the effort of African governments to alleviate poverty throughout the continent, thereby helping to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Africa has so far failed to mobilize the required resources for the development of its commercial energy resources. For example, only 7 per cent of Africa’s hydropower potential is currently being used, contributing to some 8 per cent of the total amount of electricity produced. Large amounts of natural gas associated with oil production operations are being wasted through flaring and venting instead of being valuably used for power generation and industrial processes. Africa could greatly benefit from the development of its hydropower and natural gas resources for producing commercial energy supplies required for its social and economic development in an environmentally sound manner and for fostering regional energy cooperation and integration. African petroleum producers without refining capability, which have been more concerned with meeting demand for crude oil in the international market, should strive to provide reliable and affordable supplies of petroleum products to their populations through negotiating processing contracts with, and paying processing fees to refineries with a regional scope. Harnessing available energy resources to ensure the provision of commercial energy supplies necessary for fuelling economic growth and poverty reduction should rank high on the policy agenda of African leaders. An important step in the right direction has already been taken by the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which includes a well-articulated energy programme. The NEPAD Energy

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Programme seeks to (i) significantly increase access to commercial energy supply for Africa’s population; (ii) improve the reliability and lower the cost of energy supply to productive activities in order to enable economic growth of 6 per cent per annum; and (iii) integrate transmission grids and gas pipelines so as to facilitate cross border energy flows. Africa’s energy sector is best understood as constituting three distinct regions (WEC, 2003) – North Africa, South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa is heavily dependent on oil and gas, followed by South Africa which depends on coal, and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is largely dependent on traditional biomass (which is termed combustible renewables and wastes). Table 8-1 shows the type and pattern of energy consumption in 2001 according to region. Table 8-1: Energy Consumption by Type in Africa (%), 2001

Region/ Country

North Africa SubSaharan Africa South Africa

Combustible Renewables and Waste (CRW)

Petroleum Products

Electricity

Gas

Coal

Crude Oil

4.06

61.51

15.08

18.01

1.31

0.03

81.18

14.51

2.87

0.99

0.45

0.00

16.46

29.28

25.90

1.59

26.79

0.00

Source: IEA, 2003; EIU, 2003.

What Is Energy Security? Energy security is commonly defined as reliable and adequate supply of energy at affordable prices (Constantini, et al., 2007; IEA, 2001). Under the strictest terms, energy security is defined as the availability of reliable and affordable energy supplies in adequate quantities to satisfy demand and maintain economic growth (Refaat, 2009). More comprehensively, it also includes notions of geopolitics, sustainability, and social acceptability. The meaning of ‘reliable’ and ‘adequate supply’ is rather straightforward: ‘reliable’ simply means uninterrupted supply that fully meets the needs of the global economy. The interpretation of ‘affordable prices’ is somewhat less clear as it changes over time and is perceived differently by energy producers and consumers. In general, however, it means that prices are cost-based and determined by the market, based on supply/demand

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balances. Based on this definition, energy policies are normally established to achieve goals in a two-fold manner: to increase the diversification of energy supply and to reduce the economic impact of energy supply instabilities. Energy security, therefore, may be defined as “a country’s ability to expand and optimize its energy resource portfolio and achieve a level of services that will sustain economic growth and poverty reduction” (RIVM, 2004). The IEA defines energy supply to be “secure” if it is adequate, affordable and reliable (IEA, 2007a). From the different definitions of energy security, two broad dimensions may be distinguished: a physical/quantity dimension - risks related to physical supply, shortfalls occurring between production and consumption due to infrastructural failure; and an economic/price dimension - the risks of price distortions caused by fluctuations in the price of energy products on the world market. Essentially, energy security rests on two principles: using less energy to provide energy services (i.e., improving energy efficiency), and having access to technologies (and fuels) that provide these energy services in a sustainable manner. Energy security encompasses supply side and demand side options. Both principles are typically not well met in Africa. From an African perspective, energy security requires a broader definition than just the availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable price. Energy security is a complex issue with linkages to numerous other sustainable development objectives. Because of this strong nexus between energy production/use and human development (UNDP, 2000, 2007b, 2007c, 2007e; FEMA, 2006), and also because there are no energy-specific MDGs, energy security must, therefore, be integrated into energy policies alongside other policy objectives, such as developmental and environmental goals. The issues of access to energy services and affordability assume special significance in facilitating achievement of the MDGs. An efficient and effective energy infrastructure is a precondition for economic development in general, and for industrial development (as measured in increases in productivity and competitiveness) and diversification in particular. Yet most forms of energy infrastructure are very capitalintensive and often require large-scale investment, which many African governments find almost impossible to finance (UNCTAD, 2007c). Figure 8-1 shows the links between energy use and the MDGs.

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p between Energy and the Acchievement of MDGs Figure 8-11: Relationship

Source: UNE ECA (2006b).

There arre initiatives to t address theese issues in Africa. To acchieve its objectives aand the MDG Gs, the Foru um of Energyy Ministers of o Africa (FEMA) prooposed to fulffill the follow wing energy reelated targets by 2015: doubling thee consumptionn of modern energy e servic es; 50% of in nhabitants in rural areaas should usee modern fuells for cookingg; 75% of thee poor in urban and peri-urban areaas should have access to m modern energy services; 75% of schhools, clinics and commun nity centres sshould have access to electricity, aas this would enhance e their competitivenness; mechaniccal power should be aavailable to rural r areas. African A minissters convenin ng under FEMA met in Maputo inn March 2007 7 where theyy adopted the “Maputo Declaration on Energy Security in Africa”. Table S and Sustainability S T 8-2 provides an overview of energy e targets agreed to by African minissters. In the N NEPAD Fram mework Docum ment, governm ments adopted several energy-relatted targets, including i targ gets to increease African peoples’ access to reeliable and afffordable com mmercial energgy from 10 to o 35% or more withinn twenty yearrs; improve th he reliability and lower th he cost of energy suppplies to produuctive activitiees in order too enable a 6% % growth; rationalize tthe territorial distribution of existing bbut unevenly allocated energy resouurces; reverse environmentaal degradationn associated with w the

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Table 8-2: E Energy Accesss Targets agreeed by African M Ministers for 2015 2 (%)

use of tradittional fuels inn rural areas; exploit e and deevelop the hyd dropower potential for the river basins b of Afriica; integrate power grids and gas pipelines too facilitate crooss-border en nergy flows; aand reform petroleum p regulation annd legislationn. Whereas alm most all of theese targets imm mediately relate to thee issue of access to energy y services, theey can be con nsidered a quantificatioon of African energy security and reliabillity objectivess.

Problems of Energy Security in n Africa The issuue of energy security for the African continent inv volves (i) availability oof quality eneergy in sufficieent volume foor all users, paarticularly industries; ((ii) access too modern en nergy for thee majority off African populations;; and (iii) secuurity of supply y of energy pproducts, especcially oil. Electricity ssupply in thee African continent is geenerally inadeequate in relation to nneeds. A highh percentage of o the continen ent’s populatio on has no access to ellectricity, witth sub-Saharaan Africa accoounting for over o 70% (African Unnion, 2007). Electricity E pro oduction infraastructure is relatively underdevelooped and the continent’s c tottal installed caapacity is only y 103,000 MW, the N North and Souuthern African n regions beiing the most endowed with 33% annd 51% of thhe production facilities, resppectively, as shown in Table 8-3 (A AU, 2007). Thhe reason for this resides inn the fact that there has not been anny significant investment in n energy prodduction in sub b-Saharan Africa in thee past ten yearrs.

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Table 8-3: Electricity E Gen neration in Afrrica, 1997

Source: USDOE (2000).

Electricity installationns are generallly obsolete inn many counttries, and this impact negatively onn the quality of o the servicee on offer (po ower cuts, huge losses, etc.). Electrric network interconnectioons are yet to o attain a significant llevel of devellopment. As a matter of fa fact, fourteen countries (excluding the island coountries) are yet to be int nterconnected with the others - a situation that has h translated into i a seriouss handicap (AU U, 2007). Consequentlly, the challennges to be add dressed in thiss sector are mu ultiple. In the first plaace, the high dependence on biomass aas source of domestic energy for over 90% of o the Africaan populationn is characteerised by inefficient aand irrational use of resou urces and by considerable negative impact on huuman health and a the enviro onment (AU, 22007). On the other hand, the recent hikes in thee price of oiil in the international market havve made thee cost of suppply of these energy resources unnbearable forr the balance of payment of African countries, c inevitably caalling for meaasures to be in nstituted to divversify the sou urces and forms of eenergy for alll the countriies that are highly depen ndent on petroleum products to meet their energy neeeds. With reespect to hydrocarbonns, the oil-im mporting cou untries, partiicularly poor African countries, arre faced withh acute energy y security prooblems. As for African oil-producinng countries, as shown in Table 8-4, thhe problem of o energy security is vviewed in term ms of depletion n of resources in a more or less short time frame ((AU, 2007). Consequently, C , the continennt needs to add dress two major conceerns: 1. for ooil-producing countries, thee concern is how to guaraantee and ensurre the securityy of oil and gas g productionn and export, and face up too the problem of eventual deepletion of theese resources; 2. and for importinng countries, the concernn is how to o ensure availability of petrroleum produccts at affordabble cost, and reduce the

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negattive effects of o petroleum shocks arisinng from the spiralling pricee of oil and gas. T Table 8-4: Regional Fossil Fueel Reserves (Jaanuary 1999)

Source: USDOE (2000).

Operrationalizin ng the Concept of Eneergy Securiity Fundameentally, sustainable nation nal economic developmentt depends on the stabillity of nationaal energy secu urity. Since theese balances can c swing in either diirection, securrity concerns may equallyy relate to in nadequate supply or deemand. To asssist in explain ning some of tthe concepts associated a with energyy security, thhis chapter in ntroduces the "four 'R's of o energy security" whhich are: reviiew (understaanding the prroblem), reducce (using less energy), replace (shiffting to securee sources), andd restrict (limiting new demand to ssecure sourcess), according to Hughes (20009 and 2007). (a) Revview (understtanding the problem): Energy ssecurity is dettermined by itts supply, the infrastructuree required for produciing, distributiing, and possibly storing the energy, and the associated ccost to the coonsumer. Thee first ‘R’ off energy secu urity is a review of thhe following: i.

ii.

Existting sources, suppliers, an nd supplies oof energy. Th his part of the reeview examinnes the state off the energy soources. Energy sources are raanked in term ms of how seccure they are ddeemed to bee (Hughes and S Sheth, 2008). Existting infrastru ucture, energ gy services, an nd energy in ntensities. The review should be done by y sector as ddeeply as possible; for exam mple, rather than t simply ‘residential ddemand’, thee sector’s energgy services, such s as heatin ng, cooling, hhot water, ap ppliances, and llighting, shoulld be considerred individuallly (Hughes, 2007).

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Potential secure energy supplies. The final part of the review examines the various secure energy supplies that are available, and presents an analysis of the infrastructure needed to support these energy supplies, and the cost of embracing them (Hughes, 2007).

The relationship between supply and infrastructure leads to two corollaries: first, the lack of infrastructure will exclude the consumer from accessing those forms of energy that rely on it and, second, the absence of affordable supply, regardless of the availability of infrastructure, will mean the consumer is unable to benefit from that energy source. (b) Reduce (using less energy) Actions that lead to a reduction in energy demand can have an impact on energy security. Energy reduction, the second ‘R’ of energy security, can be accomplished through energy conservation or energy efficiency, or both. In energy conservation, less energy is available for a particular energy service, meaning that the same service is not performed to its previous levels, whereas energy efficiency allows the same level of service to be achieved with less energy (Hughes, 2007). Of the two approaches to reduction, conservation measures can be introduced rapidly and, typically, with little cost: for example, lowering room temperatures, reducing roadway speeds, and turning off unnecessary lighting. However, because of reduced levels of service and potential changes to lifestyle, conservation has the undeserved reputation of being a virtuous rather than a practical activity (Kettle, et al., 2001). Energy reduction through energy efficiency measures generally takes more time and money to implement than does conservation; however, it can offer greater reduction potential. Examples of this approach include insulating a building to reduce heat loss, purchasing a vehicle with an improved fuel economy, and replacing incandescent bulbs with lower wattage compact fluorescent bulbs or light emitting diodes (Hughes, 2007). The benefits of energy efficiency are often overstated by their proponents (Gottron, 2001); and there is evidence of consumers parlaying savings into other energy-intensive activities, offsetting some of the expected benefits, and resulting in the rebound effect (Sorrell 2007). Rising energy prices may induce energy reduction, as individuals and organizations look for ways to reduce their energy costs. Reduction can be allowed to occur through market forces resulting in demand destruction (Gue, 2008), or it can be addressed through government policies that encourage reduction

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before rising energy prices make a serious impact on the society (Hughes, 2007). There is a number of ways in which reduction can be measured, perhaps the most common being energy-intensity or the amount of energy consumed per activity (USDOE, 2008). Lowering energy-intensity does not necessarily lead to an overall reduction in physical consumption, as increasing the level of activity (population growth, house size, distances travelled) can result in an increase in consumption despite a decrease in intensity. Reducing energy consumption does not automatically mean an improvement in energy security. If the reduction measures target secure sources, there may be an overall reduction in energy consumption, but the reliance on insecure sources may remain unchanged (Hughes, 2007). (c) Replace (shifting to secure sources) Although reduction is an important component in any energy security policy, its impact is limited by the fact that any system (be it household, industry, or country) requires a minimum level of energy to function (Hughes, 2007). Therefore, in addition to reducing demand, improving energy security also requires the replacement of insecure energy supplies with secure ones - the different energy sources and their related services can be identified during the review process. In general, replacement, the third ‘R’ of energy security, is achieved by either diversifying energy supplies or changing infrastructure to allow alternative energy sources (Hughes, 2007). In diversification, the same form of energy is used to meet the demands of the energy service, but the supplier changes, ideally, from less secure to more secure sources. A more recent example of diversification was caused by the oil embargo of the 1970s, after which the United States replaced much of its Middle Eastern oil imports with supplies from Canada, Venezuela, Mexico, and Nigeria (EIA, 2008). Alternative energy sources differ from the existing energy source but perform the same or similar task, often using different infrastructure. One such example is the worldwide switch from oil to coal and nuclear fission for electricity generation in the late 1970s due to rising oil costs, driven in part by the first oil shock in the 1970s (Gue 2008). The move from coal to natural gas and nuclear fission in the UK for electricity generation is another, driven largely by the coal miners’ strike which threatened supply in the early 1980s (Parker and Surrey, 1995). Iceland’s plans for a hydrogen economy would enable it to abandon imported oil (Blanchette, 2008). Given the energy requirements of the transportation sector, significant replacement programmes have been established in most major economies. The EU’s biodiesel programme (EU, 2006) and the US

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renewable fuels programme (Energy Independence and Security Act, 2007) are examples of replacement policies intended, in part, to improve energy security. (d) Restrict (limiting new demand to secure sources) African countries, such as those that are undergoing industrialization, economic growth, or increasing affluence, will often experience an increased demand for new supplies of energy. Since replacement refers to existing demand, a fourth ‘R’, restriction, is introduced with the intention to limit new demand to secure sources (Hughes, 2007). Restricting energy sources to the ones that are secure may be easier said than done as countries may not have sufficient secure energy sources or infrastructure, or both, to meet the new demand. Short of curtailing growth, in these cases, the best available option is to have the countries maximize their use of secure sources, leaving the remainder in an insecure state (Hughes, 2007).

Energy Challenges in Africa As already indicated, Africa’s energy sector is best understood through the lens of three distinct regions (WEC, 2005): North Africa, South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). North Africa is heavily reliant on oil and gas, wind and solar energy resources. Universal access to electricity (generated mostly by oil or gas thermal plants) is close to being attained. The five countries in the region are directing their efforts towards two main objectives: improving rural access to modern energy services, and strengthening interconnection of power grids and building capability for efficient power trading. South Africa, despite having the largest energy system in Africa, is grappling with ensuring an adequate energy supply, especially electricity. Sub-Saharan Africa’s major challenges include a very high dependence on traditional biomass, very low access levels to modern energy, electricity-supply shortfalls and rapid urbanization. Traditional biomass, despite the environmental, social and health problems associated with it, still remains the main source of energy for the majority of the poor. In several countries of sub-Saharan Africa, biomass energy accounts for 70-90% of primary energy supply. In Nigeria, biomass energy contributes as much as 97% of the total energy supply. Unless significant measures are taken, the status quo is not likely to change. Current projections show that the absolute number of people relying on biomass energy in Africa is expected to increase from 583 million in 2000 to 823 million in 2030, an increase of about 27% (IEA, 2002). This high

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degree of intra-African variability requires differentiated approaches to tackle the issues related to the continent’s energy security. In addition, as outlined below, island states and landlocked countries face specific challenges. Island states’ reliance on imported oil is a major challenge that leads to a high cost of energy supply. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Mauritius, via the use of local renewable resources (in this case, biomass), island states can greatly reduce their dependence on imported energy. Landlocked countries have delays in imported energy (especially oil and gas) and inadequate strategic reserves. Not having access to energy services is an obvious case of energy insecurity. Compared with developed countries, energy deprivation, that is, the lack of access to energy, is by far most prevalent in Africa. Over the last four decades, the gap between energy supply and demand in Africa has been (and is expected to continue) growing (UN-Energy, 2007). Since access to affordable energy services is a key determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction efforts, the high level of poverty in Africa is partly due to a lack of access to modern energy services. Africa has the lowest electrification rate of all regions (26% of households); as many as 547 million people do not have access to electricity (World Bank, 2009). Africa continues to face critical challenges related to its energy sector. These challenges include the use of renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, the diversification of energy supply, development of energy infrastructure, promotion of new (energy) technologies by exploiting innovative models of technology transfer, energy trade and regional integration, reform of the continent’s electricity industries, and the economic vulnerability of African countries to oil price fluctuations. In rural Africa, agricultural production and productivity are constrained by limited access to modern energy services to power water for irrigation, agricultural mechanization, and post-harvest storage and processing. This in turn depresses crop yields, added value and farmers’ incomes, thus aggravating food-security problems. In poor urban areas, the inability to afford electricity services constrains the range and profitability of incomegenerating activities for the poor. It also constrains the creation of microand small enterprises, an important source of employment. In order to sustainably eradicate poverty, a rapid energy transition must be operated in rural and peri-urban areas to promote access to modern energy services and the development of productive applications. Although energy is not one of the eight MDGs, it is obvious that access to modern energy is a prerequisite to achieving these goals. Energy supports the provision of basic needs (cooking, heating, lighting, access to clean water, transport, and social services), creates productive activities

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(manufacturing, industry, commerce, and agriculture) and stimulates employment creation. High levels of poverty partly explain the heavy reliance on traditional biofuels as an energy source for cooking and heating. According to the International Energy Agency, approximately 73% of the population in Africa use biomass energy (often in inefficient and unhealthy forms), compared with 52% in the developing world as a whole (IEA, 2006). Reliance on traditional biomass (especially charcoal) also encourages deforestation and land degradation. In some areas, especially around major cities such as Lusaka, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, charcoal demand contributes to the degradation of the surrounding woodlands and forests. Lack of access to reliable, affordable and modern energy services impedes economic growth and constrains key aspects of human welfare. There is therefore an urgent need to accelerate progress towards access to energy in order to unlock development opportunities and foster inclusive growth. Modern energy services are not affordable for the poor segments of the population. The two main determining factors of affordability of energy services are the cost of services and household income. Therefore, increasing access to modern energy services in Africa requires raising the supply of low-cost energy and facilitating affordability, including through targeted subsidies for energy services. The costs of energy services are generally high in Africa and investments in energy generation and transmission are inadequate, and regional cooperation to boost energy supply is moving slowly. Moreover, the small scale of most national power systems and the reliance on expensive, oil-based generation raise the cost of electricity generation in Africa: at 0.18 USD/Kwh (World Bank, 2009), it is two to three times higher than the global average. Unreliability of energy services in Africa is a significant obstacle to economic growth and competitiveness. At 39 MW per million inhabitants, power generation capacity in Africa is about one-tenth of that in other lowincome regions. More than thirty African countries experience recurrent outages and load shedding, with opportunity costs amounting to as much as 2% of GDP (World Bank, 2009). The key factors include recurrent shocks in oil and gas markets, inefficient supply and consumption practices, growing demand, unstable rainfall patterns as well as technical, managerial and financial weaknesses. In addition to low levels of access to electricity throughout the region, the sector is dogged by erratic and intermittent supply, low capacity utilization and availability, deficient maintenance and high transmission and distribution losses ranging from 15 to 45% of electricity distributed (AU, 2007). Most power utilities in Africa are not commercially viable as

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they charge tariffs that are below costs to promote access to energy by the poor majority. As a result, the utilities are not able to mobilize external capital for maintenance and expansion projects. Notwithstanding, some countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya in the region are making efforts to address this dilemma through innovative cross-subsidies and other similar measures with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, reforms in the power sector, which began in the late 1990s, have not yet yielded the expected results. Dominance of private sector involvement has been identified as the principal cause of the poor results due to prioritizing of profit while neglecting the need to electrify rural areas and poorer urban neighborhoods (African Ministerial Meeting on Energy, 2004). Weak governance and regulatory frameworks at the national and subregional levels impede performance in the energy sector. Effective governance and regulatory frameworks are crucial for promoting sound management practices, increasing competition and attracting private investments in the energy sector in an equitable, responsive and accountable fashion. By setting up the rules in the sector, regulation increases comfort for the private sector to invest and imposes on utilities cost discipline and quality standards for enhanced efficiency. Regulation also helps maintain a balance between the interests of service providers and the needs of consumers in terms of quality of service, profits and reasonable tariffs. For a long time, the energy sector in Africa (especially the power subsector) was under state ownership and control. Poor management led to a deterioration of facilities due to inadequate maintenance, poor performance of utilities and low-quality service. The reasons for poor performance include (i) a reliance on government funding, which proved inadequate to meet the financing needs; (ii) monopoly privileges enjoyed by public utilities, which shielded them from market competition; and (iii) political interference requiring utilities to play a difficult dual role as commercial entities and implementers of government social objectives. Confused governance roles (e.g., the government may have a political, shareholder’s and regulator’s role) created a challenge because they contradict the goals of providing affordable services while ensuring an adequate return on assets. Public utilities’ lack of autonomy made it hard to hold them accountable for weak performance. In response to these inefficiencies, many African countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda initiated reforms to boost performance and energy supply by setting up new institutional arrangements. Overall performance in the sector remains weak, however, and few countries have been able to take the required actions to create sound and efficient

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governance and regulatory frameworks. Emphasis should therefore be placed on improving governance and regulation at the national and sector levels to accelerate progress towards universal access to modern energy services. Energy resources in Africa are unevenly distributed. For instance, over 80% of the oil resources in Africa are located in four countries, i.e., Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Angola, as shown in Figure 8-2. This in itself is not necessarily a problem, but there is minimal interstate energy trade. About thirty-nine countries in Africa are net oil importers, including some oil producing countries. North Africa and South Africa account for 30% and 45%, respectively, of the total electricity generated in Africa. This leaves sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa with about 25% of the total electricity generated.

Africa Energy Prospects Africa is endowed with vast and diverse energy potentials; its oil and gas reserves are estimated at 60 billion barrels and 11.4 trillion cubic meters, respectively, mainly concentrated in the northern and western regions of the continent (see Figure 8-2). These represent approximately 5% and 6% of the total world reserves, respectively. The southern regions host the bulk of the continent’s coal reserves estimated at over 55,000 million tons. Africa's uranium deposits estimated at over 600 kilotons are one of the largest in the world, with South Africa, Namibia and Niger currently ranked among the ten leading global producers of uranium. Africa is also well endowed with geothermal energy, especially in the Great Rift Valley. The region has the potential to generate 20,000 MW of electrical energy (Mwangi, 2010) from hot water/steam-based sources. To date, however, only 150 MW has been exploited in Kenya (Kenya Electricity Generating Company 5KenGen, 2010) and only 7.3 MW in Ethiopia (Gizaw, 2008). The limited exploitation of the resource is partially due to the significant up-front cost and specialized expertise required. There is an important exploitable hydropower capacity in Africa, but only 7% of it has been harnessed. Hydropower energy resources are estimated to be more than 3,909TWh of theoretically potential hydropower (WEC, 2010). Eastern, southern, central and parts of western Africa have many permanent rivers providing excellent opportunities for hydropower development. In its western, central and eastern regions, Africa has 1,750TWh potential of hydropower and hosts some of the largest river courses of the world – the Nile, Congo, Niger, Volta and the Zambezi river systems. This makes Africa's hydroelectric potentials most attractive,

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especially as a renewable energy source. The hydroelectric potentials of the Democratic Republic of Congo alone are estimated to be sufficient for over 300% of Africa’s current energy consumption. Figure 8-2: Africa’s Oil and Gas Reserves

Oil Reserves (112.233 billion barrels)

Natural Gas Reserves (498.86Tcf)

Source: EIA, 2005.

Africa has significant potential in renewable energy which, if properly harnessed, could help meet a significant proportion of the energy demand. The continent receives abundant solar radiation throughout the year. Many African countries have daily solar radiation ranging between 5 and 6kWh/m2. But solar energy use is still dominated by traditional applications of direct solar energy to dry crops. Some encouraging results with photovoltaic (PV) systems have been registered, but these largely serve high-income rural households. In spite of the abundant potential, the use of solar water heaters in households and institutions is still limited (Mbuthi and Yuko, 2005). It is worth noting that hybrid supply technologies exist and can compensate for possible shortfalls during lowsunlight periods. Recent studies have confirmed the availability of abundant wind energy resources along some of the coastal and specific inland areas of Africa. Despite concerns about liquid biofuels, Africa has a great potential for their development. Liquid biofuels can be an alternative to meet the growing needs of the transport sector. Several countries, including Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, plan to expand domestic biofuel production in the coming years (IEA, 2011). With respect to non-

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renewable energy, coal resources are available in abundance in South Africa and in other countries (not yet quantified) within the region. The bulk of the electricity produced in Africa is from thermal stations (82%), because of the large coal plants in South Africa and oil- and gas-fired generation units mainly in Nigeria and North Africa. In spite of the massive exploitable hydropower capacity in Africa, its contribution to power generation is relatively low: 15%, compared with 42% from coal and 28% from gas; oil contributes 12% (IEA, 2010). At the end of 2007, the continent had over 117 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and over 14.6 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves. However, these energy endowments remain largely underutilized. For instance, only 5% of the continent’s potential of hydropower has been exploited in Africa (IEA, 2010a; OECD, 2003/2004), while the same figure for geothermal is 0.6% (United Nations, 2003). In 2007, the continent contributed 12.5% of global oil production but only consumed 3.5% of the oil consumed globally (United Nations, 2003) thereby making Africa a net exporter of oil. The resulting energy poverty remains a serious impediment to economic and human development in most parts of the continent. Despite all these impressive resources, Africa as a region continues to face critical challenges related to its energy sector, which is characterized by lack of access to modern energy services (especially in rural areas), poor infrastructure, low purchasing power, low investments and overdependence on traditional biomass to meet basic energy needs. Out of the 900 million people that reside in Africa, fewer than 25% have access to electricity. Furthermore, energy use across the different sectors remains quite inefficient, with the continent still having the highest energy intensity per unit of GDP.

Conclusion Energy production and use are strongly linked to the economic dimension of sustainable development, which is economic growth. Energy is essential for creating jobs, developing industries, enhancing value-added economic activities and supporting income-generating activities. Fuels are essential for heat-using processes, transportation and many industrial activities. Energy security is an essential input into modern productive activities as well as communication and service industries. Energy must be available at all times, in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices, to support the goals of sustainable development.

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Interruptions of energy supply can cause serious financial, economic and social losses. Due to deferred investments in power generation projects, many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are faced with power rationing and frequent shedding, leading many industries and businesses to lose their competitiveness through purchasing and operating private generators. High-energy import bills are currently one of the largest sources of foreign debt and balance-of-payments deficits for many of the poorest countries. In addition, investments made in high-cost centralized conventional energy systems have contributed to the growth of foreign debt of many developing countries. Attention to energy security is critical because of the uneven distribution of both fossil fuel resources and the capacity to develop other energy resources. Development of indigenous energy resources and diversification of energy supply (energy supply mix) can reduce long term dependence on imported oil and can lower national debts, thereby improving economic conditions and benefiting the poor. Regional networks are even more significant for Africa, given the relatively small national markets and the need for regional cooperation to ensure energy security and to attract needed investment. Moreover, the fact that there are more than twelve land-locked countries in Africa strengthens the necessity for cooperation and integration of energy projects with neighboring countries and/or for access to nearby ports, in order to develop better energy transport networks and to guarantee security of energy supply.

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Constantini, Valeria et al. 2007. Security of energy supply: comparing scenarios from a European perspective. Energy Policy 35:210–226. Davidson, O and Sokona, Y. 2002. A new sustainable energy path for African development: Think bigger act faster. Energy and Development Research Centre (EDRC) - Cape Town and Environmental Development Action in the Third World - Dakar. EIA (US Energy Information Administration). 2005. BP Statistical Review, Year-End 2004 and US Energy Information Administration. —. 2005. SODIGAZ, January 1, 2005 and USDOE – Energy Information Administration EIA: www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis _publications. —. 2008. "How dependent are we on foreign oil?" Energy Information Agency. EIU. 2003. Uganda Country Profile, 2003. London, United Kingdom: Economist Intelligence Unit. Energy Independence and Security Act. 2007 "Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007" Public Law 121:110-140. EU. 2006. An EU Strategy for Biofuels. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. FEMA. 2006. Energy and the Millennium Development Goals in Africa The Forum of Energy Ministers of Africa. Gizaw, B. 2008. Geothermal Exploration and Development in Ethiopia. Geological Survey of Ethiopia: 30th Anniversary Workshop 26-27 August 2008. Addis Ababa. Gottron, F. 2001. Energy Efficiency and the Rebound Effect: Does Increasing Efficiency Decrease Demand? Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Gue, E. 2008. "Defining Demand Destruction." The Energy Letter. Hughes, L and Sheth, N. 2008. A graphical technique for explaining the relationship between energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Energy Research Group, Dalhousie University. Hughes, L. 2007. Energy Security in Nova Scotia. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. —. 2009. The four ‘R’s of energy security. Energy Research Group, Electrical and Computer Engineering Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. IEA. 2001. Toward a Sustainable Energy Future. OECD/IEA, Paris. —. 2002. World Energy Outlook: Energy and Poverty Special Issue. Paris: International Energy Agency. —. 2003. Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, 2000-2001. Paris: International Energy Agency (IEA).

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—. 2006. World Energy Outlook. Paris: International Energy Agency. —. 2007a. Energy Security and Climate Change: assessing interactions. International Energy Agency. Paris. —. 2010. Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries. Paris: International Energy Agency. —. 2011. Technology roadmap: biofuels for transport, OECD/IEA 2011. Paris: International Energy Agency. Johansson, T. B and Goldemberg, J. (Eds.). 2002. Energy for Sustainable Development – A Policy Agenda. International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics (IIIEE) - Sweden, International Energy Initiative (IEI) – South Africa and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Kenya Electricity Generating Company (5KenGen). 2010. Annual Report and Financial Statements: Financial year ended 30 June 2010. Kettle, M., Paul, B, and Mark M. 2001. "Going Backwards - Cheney Promises Big US Nuclear Power Expansion." Common Dreams.org News Center. Mbuthi, P. and Yuko, D. 2005. Potential Renewable Energy Technologies in Kenya’s Electricity Supply – A Review of Geothermal and Cogeneration Technologies. AFREPREN/FWD Occasional Paper No. 26. AFREPREN/ FWD, Nairobi, Kenya. Mwangi, M.N. 2010. The African Rift Geothermal Facility (ARGEO) – Status. Presented at Short Course V on Exploration for Geothermal Resources, organized by UNU-GTP, GDC and KenGen, at Lake Bogoria and Lake Naivasha, Kenya, 29 Oct – 19 Nov. 2010. http://www.os.is/gogn/unu-gtp-sc/UNU-GTP-SC-11-48.pdf. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2004), Biomass and Agriculture: Sustainability, Markets and Policies, OECD, Paris. —. 2003/2004 African Economic Outlook, www.oecd.org. OECD/IEA. 2011. Technology roadmap: biofuels for transport, OECD/IEA 2011, Paris. Parker, M, and Surrey, J. 1995 "Contrasting British policies for coal and nuclear power, 1979–1992." Energy Policy 23(9): 821-850. Refaat, A.A. 2009. The Imperative Need for an Integrated Energy and Climate Policy for Africa. International Journal of Energy and Environment 1(3):29-42. RIVM. 2004. Conference Paper. Energy for Development. Sorrell, S. 2007. The Rebound Effect: an assessment of the evidence for economy- wide energy savings from improved energy efficiency. UK Energy Research Centre.

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UNCTAD. 2007c. Trade and Development Report 2007 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, UNCTAD/ TDR/2007. UNDP. 2000. World Energy Assessment: Overview – Energy and the challenge of sustainability United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, UNDESA, World Energy Council, New York. —. 2007b. Energizing Poverty Reduction. A Review of Energy-Poverty Nexus in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. United Nations Development Programme, New York. —. 2007c. Energizing the Least Developed Countries to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals: The Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization United Nations Ministerial Conference of the Least Developed Countries, Istanbul. —. 2007e. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. United Nations Development Programme. UNECA (2006b) Sustainable Energy. A Framework for New and Renewable Energy in Southern Africa United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ECA/SA/TPUB/2005/6. UN-Energy. 2007. Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa. UN-ENERGY/Africa. United Nations, 2003, Renewable Energy in Africa: Prospects and Limits, www.un.org. USDOE (Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration) 2000. Energy in Africa. —. 2008. Efficiency versus Intensity. Energy Intensity Indicators in the US. World Bank. 2009. World Bank Report, G8 Energy ministers meeting. Rome, 24-25 May. World Energy Council (WEC). 2005. Regional Energy Integration in Africa. London: World Energy Council. —. 2003. The Potential for Regionally Integrated Energy Development in Africa. London: World Energy Council. —. 2005. Regional Energy Integration in Africa. London: World Energy Council. —. 2010. Survey of Energy Resources. London: World Energy Council.

PART III: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

CHAPTER NINE CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT KEHINDE O. OLAYODE

Introduction The global wave of democratisation that swept through most parts of Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s revived the intellectual debate on the relative significance of civil society in the process of political reforms and economic development. Against the background of the failure of centralised states in the developmental project, civil society was gradually conceived of as the ‘alternative’ deliverer of social services and welfare, thus providing a solution to the incapacities of the state as well as the inequalities of capitalist development (Olowu and Wunsch, 1990). African policy makers, scholars and, indeed, more generally, ordinary Africans themselves recognised that the dramatic political shifts in the continent at the beginning of the 1990s could only be sustained by vigorous civil societies. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expresses this view thus: “the components of civil society, the broad-based groups, the network and communication among these groups, are at the heart of what USAID and many development agencies are trying to achieve” (USAID, 1994:11). Also, Beckman (1993:8) opines that “the liberation of civil society from the suffocating grip of the state has become the hegemonic ideological project of our time”. A remarkable agreement on the importance of democracy and development, central to the institutions and values of civil society, thus emerged in Africa. In this context, ‘civil society’ seems to mean the emergence of a situation where societal groups assert their autonomy from the post-colonial authoritarian state in Africa and challenge its political hegemony. A democratic society rests upon an underpinning of citizen-based associations, voluntarily established to pursue their interests, relying upon a government that implements policies relatively equitably and reasonably

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responds to pressure from below. Democratisation builds upon the belief that civil society requires a government that is committed to freedom of association, competitive elections, independent courts and media, and other civil and political rights. Therefore, a democratic state and civil society are two sides of the same coin. When a link is made between democratisation and development, many observers assume that the former reinforces the latter. Others go further by asserting that successive economic growth requires simultaneous economic and political liberalisation. These assumptions have reinforced the preeminence given to democratisation and efforts to strengthen civil society (Ake, 1996; Leftwich, 1996). It thus became increasingly clear that the failure of the state necessitated moving to a new paradigm. A shift in emphasis to the ‘grassroots’, rather than the ‘elites’ of the ‘states’, has thus become the focus of policy and scholarly attention. The demands of democratisation, development, human rights and the like require a different approach, not confined to the chief cities and their political/military elites, but more widely focused on people or groups throughout the country. The enthusiasm for civil society has been so great that the literature on civil society deals almost exclusively with its positive consequences, especially in the realm of political development. The evidence for these positive links is largely logical. The empirical evidence provided is often impressionistic rather than systematic. Nevertheless, a plausible logical connection has been drawn between the strength of civil society and the character of state-society relations. A strong civil society provides support for the rule of law and observance of human rights. It helps to make the government accountable to the public. It educates the public and state actors about issues. It can provide expertise to complement or challenge the legitimacy of the state. While civil society organizations sometimes can be surprisingly active and effective under authoritarian regimes, a strong civil society ultimately is a force for democratization and a powerful supporting institution for democratic institutions when they come into existence (Otobo, 2002:160). A stronger civil society also increases the capacity of the state to develop and implement policies, and thereby can contribute to economic and social development (Carroll and Carroll, 1999). This chapter attempts to provide a better understanding of the linkages between civil society, democratization and development from an Africanist perspective, with a view to generating some inferences that may lead to a better appreciation of associational life, ethnic organisations, nongovernmental organisations and informal institutions in the African developmental project. It equally seeks to explore ways of engaging civil

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society organisations positively in the twin project of democratisation and sustainable development.

Theoretical Perspectives Civil Society: At its most basic, the liberal conception holds civil society to be the process or realm in which society forges the normative basis for its collective political existence. Some theorists in this tradition – Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, for example – have emphasised civil society’s role in the formation of the social contract; others, notably Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, have pointed to the importance of civil society in checking the power of the liberal state. For many late twentieth-century analysts, Habermas’ conception of the pluralist potential of ‘communicative action’ in the ‘public sphere’ has revitalised the relevance of the liberal conception of civil society as “the social arena through which governments are rendered accountable to, and consonant with, the values of the people they represent” (Cohen and Arato, 1992). In recent attempts to theorise the emergence of what is often termed ‘global civil society’, the liberal vision has increasingly been applied to the planetary stage.1 Like civil society, articulated against the formal structures of the state and economy, global civil society has largely been conceived of as a sphere of non-state, non-economic global practices and institutions that provide a counterbalance to the increasingly integrated power of a world system ruled by nation states and transnational capital. The worldwide burgeoning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) features prominently in nearly all such discussions. Civil society is often understood as the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating and self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a set of shared rules. More simply, Bratton defines civil society as “public political activity that occurs in the realm between the state and the family” (Bratton, 1994:56). For Barkan, civil society is “the area of organised human activity concerned with the exercise of state authority, which functions in the space between the state and the family” (Barkan, 2003:87-116) There is general agreement in the literature that civil society is an area of social life bounded on one side by the state and on the other by family and kinship networks (Kasfir, 1998). However, that consensus quickly yields ambiguities, differences of emphasis, and areas of disagreement. Scholars who write about civil society differ immensely about what they wish to include within the concept, and what they wish to exclude. As Fierlbeck (1998) has demonstrated, some authors emphasize associational

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life, and others formal organizations. Some authors wish to exclude organizations that participate in the economy or the market, while others would include at least some such bodies. No author appears to have developed a usable operational definition of civil society, and it seems unlikely that any operational definition can be developed that would incorporate more than a very narrow sub-set of the activities generally considered to be part of civil society. Although it is sometimes difficult to make sense of the ways in which the notion of civil society has been utilized, the most common view is that civil society refers to those intermediate associations which are capable both of representing the continent’s various groups and of countering the state’s hegemonic ambitions. As a result, it is commonly assumed that the political reforms of the continent may depend on the extent to which civil society is able to counter the choking weight of the oppressive state. This experience makes the concept of civil society seem relevant to contemporary Africa as well. What is common to the various contexts in which civil society has re-emerged is the sense of an overpowered and excessively penetrative state, and the felt need for a countervailing revival of non-state social capacities for organisation and action. Scholars of post-colonial African politics have also experienced disillusionment with the centralized state form and a renewed hope for the resurgence of non-state forces (Bratton, 1989:407-430). Democratisation and Development: For the purpose of this study, democratisation is broadly conceived as a multi-faceted process that leads to the construction of a stable democratic system of governance, incorporating such elements as political participation, economic and social justice, good governance, free and fair elections. The process of democratisation begins with political challenges to authoritarian regimes, advances through the political struggles for liberation, and requires the installation of a freely elected government. It concludes only when democratic rule becomes firmly institutionalised as well as valued by political actors at large. In other words, democratisation is a protracted process, which could unfold over several generations. Democratisation is a process which involves experimentation over time, a period of trial and error, and reversals and setbacks. It is therefore wrong to assume that the experiment could not take place until all the necessary ingredients for its success are present. These factors can be created or developed in the course of the democratic experiment. The collapse of Communism has introduced a renewed interest in a paradigm which emphasises the development of economic liberalisation

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and democratisation. The new discourse centres on whether democracy is the cause and major facilitator of economic development. That is, is democracy to be construed as a means to an end or an end in itself? The new discourse privileges democracy and politics as the necessary precursor of economic development. It centres on what Leftwich (2000) describes as the “developmental efficacy of democracy”. The debate also repudiates the theoretical prejudice that democracy is an outcome of a particular economic system and stage of development which can be found in some societies and not in others. For example, in the Marxist and neoMarxist conception, liberal democracy is the limited form of democracy possible under industrial capitalism, while ‘backward and agrarian societies’ do not have the prerequisites for democratic practices. Modernisation theory also contends that democracy corresponds with the industrial phase of capitalist development. According to this view, capitalist development promotes features like structural differentiation, secularism, bureaucratisation, urbanisation, and individualism, all of which engender a new logic of power and ‘ethics of governance’, of liberal democratic politics (Adejumobi, 2000). There appears to be a consensus that democratisation, through multiparty politics and regular ‘free and fair elections’, was a pre-condition for ‘sustainable development’, a new concept that began to be increasingly deployed by the international donor community in the 1990s. This ‘new language’ of democratisation and development gained primacy in a global environment in which socialism had received enormous setbacks, leaving the ideological high ground mainly to neo-liberal perspectives of the market and governance. A linkage was drawn between good governance and economic development as well as access to loans and aid. Countries which demonstrated some progress on the path of democracy would be rewarded, while those that showed none were penalised in terms of granting of aid and lending. It was not, therefore, surprising that most countries expected the ‘democracy dividends’ to usher in significant economic assistance, lending, debt-relief and investment. Thus, democracy has become the independent variable, and economic development, dependent. The political import is that democracy can now be accepted, tolerated and promoted for all societies. Given the above context, what is the correlation between democracy and socio-economic development? How can democracy be constituted to aid the developmental process? Can democracy be sustained in a deteriorating economic environment? The argument that links democracy to economic development seeks to build the case for prima-facie

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plausibility on the fact that most of the wealthiest countries of the world are democracies. As observed by Ake (2000), the earliest instance of this position was propagated by Adam Smith who, in the Wealth of Nations, strongly argued for political liberalism as the necessary condition for effective operation of the market, which he considered the engine of economic growth. However, Lipset (1959) presented the most sustained argument regarding the correlation between democracy and economic development. After studying sample countries from different regions, he established that for each region set there was a correspondence between democracy and higher levels of economic development. Lipset’s argument was that economic development is associated with more education, assertiveness, and a push for participation and that it tempered the tone of politics and created crosscutting interests and multiple affiliations which facilitated democratic consensus-building and political stability. Also, economic development was associated with growth and vitality in associational life and civil society. The study concluded that the chances of democratic consolidation improve with economic development. There appeared to be strong positive relationship between education, literacy rate and democracy. What is undeniable is that fledgling democracies require sustained economic growth whatever the level of economic development from which they started. This position is broadly supported by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, which have sought to link progress on the democratic front to support for economic reform programmes. From this argument, the issue of compatibility of the two processes does not arise. The correlation is an imperative. Liberal democracy provides the basic foundation for economic development. Liberal values like freedom of speech and association, the rule of law, multi-party politics, and elections, the protection of human rights and separation of powers create the institutional context and process for economic development. Democracy facilitates economic empowerment, provides a stable investment climate, and ensures rapid mobilisation of national energies and resources for economic development. In addition, a democratic polity embodies the compromises and commitments that are needed by government and opposition alike for consensus on a market–oriented framework. Authoritarian systems lack the ability or even the inclination to establish consensus, and they are more prone than open democracies to corruption and financial mismanagement. In Africa, those who share this view point to the fast and stable economic growth rate of countries like Botswana and Mauritius, two countries that established stable liberal democratic governments. Between

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1965 and 1990, the rates of growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita for Botswana and Mauritius were 8.4% and 3.2%, respectively. These figures are contrasted with those of non-democratic polities like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, which recorded growth rates of –2.2% and 0.1%, respectively (Adejumobi, 2000:5). However, this approach tends to overlook a whole range of specific cultural, social, and economic considerations.2 The assumption is that there already exists a ‘paradigm’ which Africa should adopt: pluralist democracy and market economy along the Western experience with minor modifications. Also, this assumption has been used to prescribe economic structural adjustment that has been implemented in most African countries with limited success. Indeed, there has been a reversal of earlier gains in certain sectors, such as education, transport and health, with government drastically reducing spending on these key sectors. Increasingly, conditionality has been tied to funding for economic reform programmes thereby constraining the room for government intervention. The tensions between these austerity measures and popular material expectations have sometimes broken into ‘food riots’ and harsh authoritarian responses by beleaguered ‘democratic regimes’. Adverse consequences of economic reforms have deepened social polarisation in fragile states, raised the stakes of repression and thrown the future of democratisation into doubt. There is, therefore, nothing ‘automatic’ about economic reforms acting as an “incubator of sustainable democracy” (Lloyd, 2002:12). Against the liberal school, the ‘Washington Consensus’ argues for an authoritarian developmental regime as the more effective institution under which rapid economic development can be organised in the contemporary world.3 According to this argument, strong government, that is, a centralised administration with coercive capabilities, is desirable for economic development because political participation needs to be limited, albeit temporarily, in order to speed up development. Marx Gasiorowski (2000) indeed argues that political democracy may have a negative impact on macro-economic performance especially in developing countries. He asserts that democracy engenders high inflation rate and slower economic growth in poor countries as a result of unrestrained competition for resources and pressures for fiscal deficits. For him, the exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which is inimical to development. Gasiorowski, therefore, concludes that democracy and sustainable development are not compatible nor can they be pursued simultaneously with success. Concerning this argument, there is evidence of authoritarian regimes that have shown remarkable resilience for economic discipline and

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structural reforms, and thereby engineered tremendous economic growth in their countries. The ‘developmental authoritarian’ regimes in East Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s are instructive in this regard. However, the financial crises of the Asian Tigers after the phenomenal growth have since become the most compelling examples used to demonstrate the need for transparency and accountability of democratic governance which, in turn, could enhance sustainable economic growth. The argument that gives more primacy to development than democracy is unsustainable with regard to the African experience. Most countries that have been under the sway of authoritarian regimes in Africa have experienced economic decline rather than sustainable development. As Ake (2000) argued: With minor exceptions, Africa is still struggling to overcome a legacy of political authoritarianism, a legacy that has been associated with growing poverty and immiseration. In these circumstances, debating the merits of authoritarianism for development and whatever value does not arise. It does not arise, not only because authoritarianism has been catastrophic politically and economically, but also because Africa is now racing to achieve a democratic political renewal in order to avoid compounding its economic marginality in an outmoded political tradition.

Authoritarianism in Africa has not been associated, as in East Asia, with a vigorous accumulation programme which led to rapid economic development and high levels of education, health services, employment, rising incomes and equity. The African experience in authoritarianism tended to be characterised by neo-patrimonialism as well as selfaggrandisement by the leadership. This was typified by the excessive personal accumulation of wealth by some leaders such as Sani Abacha and Mobutu Sese-Seko of Nigeria and Zaire, respectively.4 Also, unlike the West and East Asia, Africa does not have the historical convenience of choosing how to sequence its democratisation and developmental processes. The internal demands for material development, political freedom and participation continue to rise while the external demands of globalisation exert enormous pressure on national economies and cultures. Admittedly, electoral democracy does not constitute a magical wand for economic progress and social transformation; it is the content of democracy with the way it is constituted that has some implications for the developmental project. The nature and constitution of democracy determines the extent to which the people participate concretely in decision-making beyond elections, and how their collective efforts

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influence their life chances. Democracy, in its constituted elements, must give practical expression to an organised and predictable life for the people, engender equity and fairness, both in power and resource distribution, and facilitate the empowerment of the people. It is through this that democracy can provide a base for socio-economic development. Democracy itself stands a better chance of consolidation where there is satisfactory human development. It is not possible to attain high levels of participation and empowerment in the development and political processes where illiteracy and unemployment are high, where education is lacking, and gender inequalities are glaring. The consolidation of democracy and good governance should simultaneously contribute to stronger foundations for sustainable development. From this perspective, the issue of imperative linkage and mutual interdependence between the two processes renders redundant the question of compatibility. Without democratisation, development will not be sustainable. At the same time, without progress in human development and economic growth, democratisation will rest on very fragile foundations. The path towards simultaneous sustainable development and democratisation is therefore to “collapse both processes into one by making development itself a process of democratization” (Ake, 2000:11).

Democratisation and Economic Development in Africa In spite of the euphoria of the third wave of democratisation, economic conditions in Africa look grim. Africa’s traditional importance as a supplier of raw materials has diminished with competition from synthetic substitutes and suppliers in Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet republics. Also, in the current wave of massive capital movement to the ‘emerging markets’, Africa remains marginal. For example, Africa’s share of the world’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decreased from 2.5% in 2002 to 1.8% in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2005). In contrast with other regions, Africa has remained aid-dependent, with FDI generally lagging behind official development assistance. In the words of Adebayo Adedeji, former Secretary-General of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), “Africa has moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy” (see Hopwood, 1998:249). Africa is also unique in that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) currently designates thirteen out of the sixteen West African countries as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). According to the World Bank's Doing Business in 2006, West African countries impose the most regulatory obstacles on entrepreneurs and are

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slower than any other region in implementing reforms to ease constraints on doing business. Private investment in the region averaged below 14% of GDP in the six-year period from 1998 to 2004 while foreign direct investment averaged 2.8% of GDP during the same period (Sesay and Olayode, 2006). It is also noteworthy that the informal sector accounted for 72% of trade in the ECOWAS countries (World Bank, 2005). The value of West Africa’s export trade between 2000 and 2004 was approximately 1.5% of total world exports, whereas the value of Asia’s exports (excluding China) within the same period was 29% (UNCTAD, 2005). Data in World Development Indicators 2006 show a remarkable growth in some West African states since 2000. The recent surge in oil exports and the boom in the price of oil have pushed up the growth rate in Nigeria. However, in spite of the recent recovery in some countries, the region's poverty rate remains the world's highest. About 44% of the total population lives on less than $1 a day. This is in sharp contrast to East Asia where the number of extremely poor people fell by 580 million to 12% of the total population. Current projections are that in 2015, West Africa's poverty rate will remain at over 48%, far above the 22.3% target set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (World Bank, 2006). Another major threat to the economic survival of most African countries, apart from their increasing marginalisation in the global economy, is the issue of excruciating external debt. Africa’s debt is greater than total economic output. According to the World Bank, whereas in 1980 the total debt stock of the Highly Indebtedness Poor Countries (HIPC), majority of which are in Africa, stood at about $59 billion, by 1997 it had increased to $201billion (World Bank, 1999). In the same period, annual debt servicing had similarly increased from about $5.9 billion to $8.7 billion. In addition, the Report noted that in the period 1992-1997, the official development assistance specifically to the HIPC declined from about $13 billion annually to $7 billion. The Report concluded that while most of the world’s economies expanded in the 1990s, people in fifty-four developing countries, with the largest number in Africa, had become poorer. Furthermore, the UNDP in a recent report painted a sombre picture of a ‘development crisis’ in which sub-Saharan Africa was left behind the rest of the world, including other poverty-ridden regions such as South Asia. The 2003 Human Development Report warned that at current rates, sub-Saharan Africa would take another one hundred and fifty years to reach some of the Millennium Development Goals agreed to by UN members for 2015:

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The UNDP challenges rich countries to improve assistance and open their markets to developing nations, urging that there was “an urgent need to change course”. Rich countries “have enormous scope” to expand marketaccess and promote imports by reducing tariffs, it added. The UNDP report echoes the submission of UNCTAD in its LDCs reports for 2000. Pointing to steadily worsening poverty in most of the world’s forty-eight poorest countries, thirty-three of which are in Africa, UNCTAD’s Secretary-General, Rubens Ricupero, called for “a fundamental change in current economic policies” (UNCTAD, 2000). For him, what the world’s poorest countries need most is not simply debt relief, but a “new deal” in international trade and development. The most immediate threat to democratic consolidation in Africa is likely to be the disastrous economic situation that already contributed to the delegitimisation of previous governments. New democratic regimes are thus faced with the daunting tasks of consolidating democratic institutions and undertaking urgent economic reforms simultaneously. The immediate economic agenda is stabilisation to reduce massive deficits, mobilisation of aid, including debt rescheduling, and initial steps to counter deteriorating living standards and physical infrastructure. Africa’s economic crisis renders democratisation difficult to sustain. The vast majority of African states currently undergoing democratisation face severe economic and social problems. Precisely because of these adverse economic circumstances, the masses of Africa are not concerned, nor can they expect to be, with democratic rights and freedoms, but only with survival needs. Julius Nyerere (1970:30), former Tanzanian president, expressed the problem thus: What freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the soil provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, medical care, or even good feeding. Certainly, he has freedom to vote and to speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to him than his freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom and rights become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity.

As economic recovery will take time, improving basic service delivery (affordable health care, access to good water, job creation, and qualitative education) can clearly demonstrate the increased responsiveness and

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effectiveness of government. Without showing some progress, new democracies are unlikely to consolidate power for long, possibly opening the way for renewed authoritarian rule or even state collapse. In order to avoid such a scenario, the democratisation process needs patience, understanding and tolerance in seeking compromises with government. Its priority should be to obtain the relaxation of austerity measures and the provision of more economic assistance. It is not enough to include respect for human rights and the establishment of multi-party democracy as new political conditionality in international and bilateral relations. There is a need also to support them with economic measures to consolidate democratic gains. The failure of the state to deliver the expected ‘democracy dividends’ brings about social unease and political disenchantment and may ultimately weaken government’s legitimacy.

The Role of Civil Society in Democratisation and Development With the collapse of communist regimes, there has been a renewed interest in the paradigm which emphasises economic liberalisation and democratisation. The apparent triumph of liberalism after the Cold War has placed a new emphasis on the putative significance of civil society which has led in turn to a shift of resources towards local NGOs – conceived by Western donors as the ‘representative’ bodies of that ‘civil society’. This has resulted in massive proliferation of NGOs in Africa. In democratic theory, civil society is expected to play a major representative role in the process of the transition to democracy (Olayode, 2008). Within established democracies, civil society also performs representative functions. A rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, and increases the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens. Thus, the development of pluralist systems of rule is expected to entail the emergence of a multitude of groups with the capacity (based on their experience in associational life) to exert influence on government (Olayode, 2004). Africa’s democratic transitions have confirmed these theoretical assumptions, as civil society associations were arguably instrumental in the process of democratisation. For example, the independent press continued to be the main critical voice against government corruption, human rights abuses and other malpractices. Likewise, a great number of NGOs, focussing on human rights, electoral monitoring issues and gender, emerged during this period.

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A thriving civil society can widen democracy by promoting pluralism, and it can also deepen democracy by embedding the values and institutions of liberal democracy within the society at large. White (1997:185-189) suggests four main arenas of civil society involvement in the democratisation project: “altering the balance of power between state and society; improving the accountability of both politicians and administrators; acting as an intermediary between state and society; and legitimating the political systems by promoting the values of liberal democracy”. The relationship between civil society and the state in the course of democratic consolidation is also relevant to this study. Civil society groups that emerged following a democratic transition continue to exist independently of the new political structures with its own aspirations and expectations from the new government. Cohen and Arato (1992:14) emphasise that civil society is based on non-class form of collective action, oriented towards and linked to the legal, associational, and public institutions of society. Its action is self-limiting in that it does not seek to usurp state power, but rather to open it up to outside influences. This may imply that the aftermath of political transition would involve the ‘domestication, demobilisation, and atomisation’ of the forces that were active in the struggle for democracy. It may also involve further attempt at democratisation or democratic institution building within civil society, the state, and political and economic society. Civil society forces should play a role in encouraging debate, promoting values of tolerance and pluralism, and contributing to the sense of civility and shared citizenship. Once formal democracy has been established, civil society forces should seek to reshape the relations of individuals to the public and the political sphere of the society and state. Successful democratisation does not imply that the state should retain exclusive control over the public– political sphere. Rather, it means that members and organisations would continue to debate issues of common concern, assert new rights, and influence political and economic policy. Policy intervention on the part of civil society can be accomplished through the implementation of decentralised and autonomous programmes to supplement the role of the welfare state, and through the design of non-bureaucratic forms of regulations to prevent the private sector from subordinating the economy to its interests. Furthermore, in a country with weak political parties, civil society organisations can influence national policies and condition the quality of public life. For example, professional groups and unions would prefer defending the interests of segments of the population rather than general principles of national governance. They may also be less involved in .

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national politics after the transition as they act only on behalf of their members; labour unions in particular have greater mobilisation capacity than other groups, and are likely to be feared most by the government. Therefore, the reinvigoration of civil society as a force for democratic governance is a major task on the agenda for consolidation in view of the demobilising effects of the conclusion of a political transition on civil society. The sustenance of democracy in any society is dependent more on the active participation of civil society through independent courses of action. Through its resilient struggles and holding leaders accountable, civil society can determine democratic possibilities in any society, thus giving credence to the submission that “democracy will only be sustainable if it is home grown, if it is the product of domestic social struggles which then leads to democratic denouements” (Nyongo, 1991:3). The argument is that it is not of enduring consequence for the state or any external force to impose democracy on any society. The most reliable way to make democracy enduring is for the people to successfully demand it through societal struggles carried out on the basis of the internal dynamics and potentialities of the civil society (Olayode, 2008:43-44). Apart from performing major roles in the process of regime transition and consolidation, civil society equally supports economic reforms. Rooy and Robinson (1998) have pointed out that international civil society assistance can be “a way to disguise free-marketeering”. Also, Hall and Young (1997:227), commenting about donors’ programmes in Mozambique, observed that aid is being deliberately directed to assist in the construction of new social groups committed to the market economy. In terms of economic reforms, donors support civil society for two reasons. First, liberal democracy is perceived to foster economic liberalism more effectively in the long run than an authoritarian regime is able to do. An important aspect of this is that a formal democracy imbues the reform process with greater legitimacy. According to liberal theory, civil society is a crucial element in remoulding authoritarianism towards liberal democracy. Thus, donors support civil society because it is a core element of democratic consolidation, which in turn provides the enabling environment for economic liberalism. This marks a considerable turnaround in the discussion of the politics of adjustment, the earlier literature of which stressed the extent to which societal groupings could derail adjustment, whilst donors tried to shield a government from the society in order for it to implement unpopular economic policies. Another reason for donors’ concern with support for civil society is that it is seen as potentially playing a key role in fostering societal consensus around what

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is otherwise a divisive reform process. This led donors to apply new forms of political conditionality to loans and technical assistance aimed at improving the democratic governance of developing countries. While taking on board the reformist critique of giving SAP a ‘human face’, international financial institutions embarked on bringing the representatives of civil society into the economic policy-making process in an attempt to widen support for it. It is an interesting observation that donors have calculated that bringing civil society into the economic reform process will not undermine it but strengthen it. Apparently, donors started seeing civil society not as the opposition, but as a potential ally and partner in the doctrine of free market economy. Various visions for Africa’s development have been proposed by scholars using informal institutions and structures as the foundation to build the future, and integrating certain aspects of traditional institutions of governance within structures of the modern nation state (Callaghy, 1994; Chazan, 1993). Putting people at the centre of development and seeking their collective well-being would promote shared material and nonmaterial well-being, trust within society, citizen participation in decisionmaking processes, and the accountability of state/government officials to the general public (Olayode, 2006). The ‘communitarian nature’ of the African way of life would be compatible with any concept of development that shifts emphasis from the individual to the community. Indeed, the core values of African society, including the extended family system, and shared concern for the vulnerable, have sustained Africa through decades of crisis, and could serve as the cultural foundation for future development. Some critics have perceived the extended family system as a burden on the more ambitious and hard-working individuals who are pressured to support their unachieving relatives. But Africa’s social structures such as families, lineages, clans or even ethnicities, remain strong social units, and compensate for the absence of organised social welfare schemes. If such structures are carefully managed they could play a key role in seeking the collective well-being, as these have done for South East Asians and Indians (Olayode, 2006).

Civil Society and the Challenges of Democratisation and Development For many scholars and donors, civil society is the most important instrument that will make African states more democratic, more transparent and more accountable. Proponents of this view are explicit on

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the point that the existence of an active civil society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy; and the nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated abuse of state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens, and establishing democratic governance. However, one of the most critical issues in the discourse of the role of civil society in democracy and development is whether civil society organisations in Africa are adequately equipped and strong enough to fill the vacuum created by the ‘collapsing state’. The conventional view of civil society, democratisation and development idealises the Western concept of state-civil society relations and overlooks the defects in this pluralist argument. Its proponents urge on Africa, particularly its inequalities of access, difficulties in responding to problems of collective action and lack of independent source of finance. Also, because of the paradoxical position of the state in civil society, the problem of creating civil society organisations that are powerful enough to force the state into democratic reforms might also weaken it severely. Furthermore, the ubiquity and importance of patronage for maintaining African governments raises serious questions about the ability of civil society organisations to maintain their autonomy from the state. The absence of a vigorous private economic sector makes it impossible for civil society organisations to match the resources the state can offer them, unless foreign donors fund them. This makes it difficult to make a case for autonomy. In many cases, with respect to patronage, ‘activists’ institutions were excluded from state patronage while the ‘loyalists’ were more or less explicitly included in order to polarise the activities of the opposition. A closer look at many civil society groups reveals serious deficiencies that will sap their effectiveness as key agents in the long and difficult process of democratisation and development. Trade unions and student organizations, which tend the most toward activism or even militancy, are highly vulnerable to repression and co-optation by the state. Dependent (directly or indirectly) on government for much of their funding, and with members recruited mostly from the public sector, African trade unions cannot prolong anti-government protest or pro-democratic activism. Most of Africa’s institutions of higher learning and their students are in a similar relationship with the state, and are subject to the same strategies of governmental control. In extreme instances, governments have dealt with recalcitrant unions by simply banning them. While middle-class professional bodies, such as bar associations, medical, and university staff unions, tend to practice a fair degree of internal democracy, and evince a strong commitment to liberal democracy,

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yet the protracted economic and political crises that have afflicted many African countries since the late 1970s have hit the middle classes and their organisations hard. In many countries, these organisations have lost or are losing most of their membership to retrenchment, thereby weakening their organisational capabilities. In addition, many non-governmental organisations, and especially the civic sub-species that is most likely to be involved in democratic activism, suffer from low levels of institutional development. Many have sprung up only in the period of ‘democratic struggle’. In many instances, they have withered or changed character as key leaders have taken posts in the new post-authoritarian governments or plunged into party politics. Indeed, many of Africa’s new democratic-specific civil associations have turned out to be nothing more than ‘political-action committees’ or proto-parties that have more in common with ‘political’ than ‘civil’ society. In much of Africa, a fundamental transformation of the relationship between the state and civil society is needed if democracies are to endure and if good governance is to prevail. Unfortunately, some leaders see civil society organizations as political competitors that need to be controlled rather than fostered. What civil organizations want, however, is legitimization, recognition, policy dialogues, political room in which to develop, and collaboration in implementing development in appropriate sectors.

Conclusion The revival of civil society by the combined and contradictory forces of globalisation, structural adjustment and democratisation underlay the political turbulence across Africa in the last decade of the twentieth century, as various groups struggled to survive economic hardship and diminishing resources, to assert their rights and resist authoritarian regimes, and to demand democratic reforms. It was in these struggles that fledgling civil society coalitions blossomed, thereby strengthening civil society’s efficacy to participate in democracy and development. The study has examined the relevance of the conventional argument of the relationships that exist among civil society, democratisation and development to the contemporary African experience. It has argued that civil society is a concept that raises serious questions about the nature and extent of state authority, and the boundary that can be sought between state and non-state spheres of activity. In other words, the concept of civil society can help to question and understand not only the political structure of a given society, but also the sphere of economic and social life of that

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society. Civil society is a vital concept in the study of African societies because it explicitly puts emphasis on the role of organized individuals in the life of their society, outside the pre-determined official norms which at times can be abusive or tyrannical in character, affecting negatively a normal course of development. The character of civil society in Africa shifted significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. Many organisations have severed their ties with the state and are seeking greater autonomy. Contemporary movements are shrugging off state patronage in order to reconstruct the substance and direction of local-level development. In some cases, their independence has put them on a collision course with the government. This new trend is a remarkable departure from the ‘welfare and leisure’ preoccupations characteristic of the colonial and immediate post-colonial ‘clubs’ or ‘organisations’. Apart from changes in the content of associations, the new trend is a manifestation of the consolidation of an autonomous sociopolitical space between the state and family structures within which cultures, traditions, politics, and interest articulation prevail. There are obvious challenges to overcome for civil society to participate effectively in democratisation and development. As revealed in this study, African civil associations are striving to enhance their capacity for greater autonomy from the state. They are also addressing issues of emancipation, empowerment, social justice, human rights, democracy and development. The level of political awareness, global goodwill, international networks and the capacity to engage actively with the state on developmental issues are grounds of optimism for democratic consolidation and sustainable development in Africa.

Notes 1

For a discussion of this term, see Korten (1990). For example, in the case of Botswana, diamond mining has fuelled much of the expansion and currently accounts for more than one-third of GDP and for ninetenths of export earnings; and culturally, the ‘Kgotla’, a traditional village consultative forum has evolved into part of the consultative machinery through which government policies are explained to the populace. Also the Tswana that constitutes about 70% of Botswana population are pastoralists with a long tradition of storage and frugality. This has translated into strong fiscal discipline and sound management of economy. 3 The 'Washington Consensus' is a phrase coined in the early 1990s by John Williamson of the Institute of International Economics to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989. 2

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4

Sani Abacha, former Nigeria military dictator between 1993 and 1998, was estimated to have amassed a personal fortune of over £5 billion, largely stashed in foreign accounts.

References Adejumobi, S. (2000). ‘Between Democracy and Development in Africa: What are the missing Links?’ Paper presented to the World Bank Conference on ‘Development Thinking in the Next Millennium’, Paris, June 26–28, 2000. Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and Development (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). —. (2000). The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa (Dakar: CODESRIA). Barkan, J.D. (2003). ‘Restructuring Modernisation Theory and the Emergence of Civil Society in Kenya and Nigeria’. In Apter, D.E. and Rosberg C.G. (Eds.), Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia). Bratton, M. (1989). ‘Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa’, World Politics, 41 (3). —. (1994). ‘Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa’. In Harbeson, J., Rothschild, D., and Chazan, N. (Eds.), Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Rienner). Beckman, B. (1993). ‘The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal ideology and Political Theory’, Review of African Political Economy, 58 (20). Callaghy, T.M. (1994). ‘Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies’. In Harbeson, John W., Rothschild Donald, and Chazan Naomi (eds.), Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Carroll, B. and Carroll, T. (1999). ‘Civic Networks, Legitimacy and the Policy Process’, International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(1). Chazan, N. (1993). ‘Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy’. In Diamond, Larry (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Cohen, J. and Arato, A. (1992). Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press). Fierlbeck, K. (1998). Globalizing Democracy: Power, Legitimacy and the Interpretation of Democratic Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

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Gasiorowski, M.J. (2000). ‘Democracy and Macro economic Performance in Under-Developed Countries: An Empirical Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, 33 (3). Hopwood, G.I. (1998). ‘Africa: Crisis and Challenge’. In Booth, K. (ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hall, M. and Young, T. (1997). Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence (London: Hurst). Kasfir, N. (1998). ‘The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 36 (2). Korten, D.C. (1990). Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (West Hartford: Kumarian). Leftwich, A. (1996). Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Polity Press). —. (2000). States of Development – On the Primacy of Politics in Development(Cambridge: Polity Press). Lipset, S.M. (1959). ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, 53 (4). Lloyd, S. (2002). ‘Democracy, Sustainable Development and Poverty: Are they Compatible’, Occasional Paper, No 2, DPM, Addis Ababa. Nyongo, A. (1991). ‘Development and Democracy: The Debate Continues’, CODESRIA Bulletin, No 2. Olayode, K.O. (2004). ‘Civil Society and Democratisation: The Nigerian Experience, 1990-2002’ (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis: University of Cambridge). —. (2006). ‘Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Nigeria: Reengaging the Informal Institutions’. Revised Paper for the 2006 CODESRIA Social Science Campus: Dakar, Senegal. —. (2008). ‘Civil Society and the Challenges of Good Governance in Africa’, Ife Journal of History, 4 (3). Olowu, D. and Wunsch, J. (1990). The Failure of the Centralised State. Boulder, CO: Westview. Otobo, E. E. (2002). ‘Policy Process in a Democratic Context: A Glimpse at Nigeria’s Privatization Program’. In Olowu, D. and Sako, S. (Eds.), Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building for Democratic Renewal in Africa (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian). Rooy, A. and Robinson, M. (1998). ‘Out of the Ivory Tower: Civil Society and the Aid System’. In Rooy, A. (Ed.), Civil Society and the Aid Industry (London: Earthscan).

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Sesay A. and Olayode, K. (2006). ‘A Force for Integration or Marginalisation: A Perspective from West Africa’. In Bowles, P, Veltmeyer, H., Cornelissen, S., Invernizzi, N. and Tang, K. (Eds.), Regional Perspectives on Globalisation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). UNCTAD (2005). The Handbook of Statistics (Geneva: UNCTAD). —. (2000). Least Developed Countries Reports, 2000 (Geneva: UNCTAD). UNDP (2003). Human Development Report (New York: UNDP). USAID (1994). Civil Society, Democracy and Development in Africa. Proceedings of a Workshop for Development Practitioners (Washington, DC: USAID). White, G. (2000). ‘Civil Society, Democratisation and Development’. In Luckham, R. and White, G. (Eds.) Democratisation in the South: The Jagged Wave (Manchester: Manchester University Press). World Bank (1999). World Development Report 1999/2000 (Washington, DC: The World Bank). —. (2005). World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank). —. (2006). World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank).

CHAPTER TEN SIT-TIGHT SYNDROME AND TENURE ELONGATION IN AFRICAN POLITICS* AYODEJI OLUKOJU

Introduction A striking feature of the post-independence politics of African countries is the sit-tight mentality of most African heads of state and government regardless of the manner of their accession. On the one hand, those who were elected into office on the strength of the Westminster or French parliamentary system of liberal democracy from the era of transfer of power to the immediate post-independence period (roughly the late-1950s to the early 1960s) have tended to remain in office, even in the face of tenure limits, poor performance, alternative leadership material or advancing age and failing health; on the other hand, many of those who seized power through coups d’état remain in office indefinitely through various means (suppression of opposition, suspension of the constitution, transmutation to ‘civilian’ life-presidents and manipulated ‘elections’). This chapter tackles this recurring and seemingly intractable or endemic problem in post-independence African politics by examining its general and specific causes, features and consequences. Building upon extant relevant literature (e.g., Willets, 1975; Kirk-Greene, 1991; Osaghae, 1999; Van de Walle, 2002; Krieger, 2003), it presents “fresh empirical reflections rather than major new theoretical constructs” (Kirk-Greene, 1991:163) on the sit-tight syndrome and tenure elongation as two strands of the subversion of the constitution and the political process. The chapter concludes with suggestions for transcending this major challenge to the political and economic development of Africa.

* A slightly modified version of this paper appeared in Lagos Historical Review, 14. 2014, 117-134.

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Variants of Sit-Tight Political Leadership in Africa With the exception of Liberia, it can be asserted that there was no problem of sit-tight syndrome in Africa of the mid- to late 1950s, when only a handful of African countries were either independent or well on their way to full independence. It is safe, therefore, to adopt the year 1960, when many African countries attained formal independence from their European colonial rulers, as the baseline for measuring the phenomenon. That said, in virtually all the independent African countries, with the exception of Togo (the site of a military coup in 1963), those in power at independence survived the first four or five years of their rule, which amounted to a legal first term in office. To be sure, most of the immediate post-independence rulers (such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah) have also been leaders of government business in the pre-independence decade of ‘responsible government.’ Hence by 1965 they had been in power for an average of between eight and ten years, which amounted to two terms in office. However, even counting from 1960, most of the post-independence rulers (Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, Diori Hamani of Niger, Dauda Jawara of The Gambia, Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon and Ghana’s Nkrumah) had stayed so long in power that they became synonymous with their countries (see Appendix for a list of Africa’s longest-ruling heads of state).1 Kirk-Greene (1991:168) notes how most people within and outside the respective countries equated Kenya with Kenyatta, Cote d’Ivoire with Houphouet-Boigny, Ghana with Nkrumah, Zambia with Kaunda, Tanzania with Nyerere and Guinea with Toure. Later leaders, too, such as Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria)2 and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) at one time or the other personified their countries. Transmutation and life-presidencies by military messiahs constitute a second variant of sit-tight leadership in Africa. A rash of military coups from the early 1960s rapidly decimated the ranks of democratically elected governments in post-independence Africa. Togo led the way in West Africa with a bloody coup in 1963, an example followed by neighbouring countries of Dahomey, Ghana and Nigeria. In other parts of Africa (Congo-Kinshasa, 1965; Libya, 1969; Uganda, 1971; Ethiopia, 1974; Liberia, 1980), soldiers seized power to terminate monarchical or nominally parliamentary governments, which had become unbearably inefficient, oppressive or corrupt. Indeed, in Libya, Liberia and The Gambia, the military adventurers were initially hailed as liberators from

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corrupt and oppressive feudal or oligarchic rule. But the true intentions of the adventurers unraveled as they dug in and became intolerant of any form of dissent. Drawing on their military and primordial sources of support, these life-presidents simply replicated and compounded the situation they claimed to have sought to correct by seizing power. However, while several of them succeeded, others, such as Nigeria’s Gowon (1966-75), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Sani Abacha (199398), were stopped by a military coup, a looming uprising and possible collapse of the country, and death, respectively. The third category of subversion, most popular in supposedly democratic countries, is the amendment of the constitution to expunge term limits in favour of incumbent heads of state. It is encapsulated in the Hausa expression – tazarce – which means ‘continuity.’ This was first used to describe the still-born gambit of Abacha, who was ultimately stopped by his unexpected death on June 8, 1998. Tenure elongation has been practised by both elected civilian presidents and ‘reformed’ ex-soldier elected presidents. The most notorious examples have been Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Mammadou Tandja (Niger). However, their gambits generated great controversy and attracted local and international opposition and opprobrium, with different outcomes. In the Nigerian case, Obasanjo (who had been a military head of state and, subsequently, a trenchant critic of the tenure elongation bids of Babangida and Abacha) was defeated through the concerted opposition of his estranged vice-president, Atiku Abubakar, a faction of the federal legislature led by the senate president, Ken Nnamani, and various elements of the civil society, led by distinguished personalities, such as Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, and human rights organizations. The attempt to make tenure elongation one of numerous constitutional amendment proposals was frustrated by the National Assembly, which voted to abandon the entire exercise. In Niger, on the other hand, Tandja conducted a referendum which allegedly endorsed tenure elongation and was poised to conduct an election, which he was bound to win by any means before the regional body woke up to the need to restrain him.

Explanations for Sit-Tightism and Tenure Elongation in African Politics To be sure, the phenomena of sit-tightism and tenure elongation are not peculiar to Africa3 though attempts have been made to ascribe them to the supposed anti-democratic tendencies in African political systems and

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cultural practices. It is suggested that African political leaders have tended to imagine themselves as traditional rulers with lifetime tenures, and who, naturally, should brook no opposition. Indeed, in that context, opposition amounts to treason. As Ayo-Vaughan (2008) observes, “Sit-tight leaders … [believe] that their country’s rulership is their birthright. They continue to suppress opposition and amend their constitution to remain in power.” It may be noted in passing that rulers of countries without strong monarchical traditions have demonstrated a comparable level of authoritarianism as their counterparts in those dominated by pre-colonial African empires and chiefdoms. Indeed, with the exception of the likes of Houphouet-Boigny, pioneer president of Cote d’Ivoire, Goukouni Oueddeye of Chad and Ahmadu Bello, premier of Nigeria’s Northern Region (1960-66), African ‘maximum’ rulers have generally been of humble (at least, non-royal) origins.4 Yet, it is difficult to ignore the growing incidence of patent dynastic succession which has taken place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Togo and Gabon. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila took over upon the assassination of his father, Laurent Kabila. Faure and Ali, sons of presidents Gnassingbe Eyadema and Omar Bongo, respectively, supposedly won elections conducted by the ruling junta upon the demise of their respective fathers. Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt equally positioned their sons for succession. The issue, of course, is not merely that of filial succession, but that it is taking place without reference to the constitution and the popular will in supposedly democratic states, at least with regard to Senegal and Egypt. Another argument has been the legacy of military involvement in the governments of both the pre-colonial and post-independence African states. The suggestion is that soldiers find it difficult to disengage from political life and that the continuity of their command-style dictatorial rule after their transmutation to ‘civilian’ presidents has left a permanent imprint on the psyche of African leaders, who are loathe to concede electoral defeat or vacate office. An alternative set of explanations may be advanced for the sit-tight syndrome in African politics. First, on the part of the political leaders, the creation of personality cult (Kirk-Greene, 1991:177-181) and a messianic complex, especially as founding presidents of their countries, deluded them into a feeling of indispensability. To be sure, these leaders had enjoyed acclaim as leaders of independence and liberation movements (Habib Bourguiba, Kenneth Kaunda, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Omar Bongo, Jomo Kenyatta, Siaka Stevens, Kwame Nkrumah, Robert Mugabe,

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Milton Obote, Ahmadu Ahidjo, Sekou Toure, etc.), civil war heroes and nation-builders (Yakubu Gowon) or liberators from feudalism and misrule (Muammar Ghaddafi, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Yoweri Museveni, Meles Zenawi Asres). They (except the last-named, who died in office in 2012) died in office (of old age or assassination), were defeated in elections or exiled after a violent overthrow. Second, the manner of their accession makes it mandatory for them to want to remain in office or to retain power by other means. In other words, sit-tightism is a consequence of personal, clan, ethnic or regime insecurity. It is driven by fear of life at the receiving end of reprisals from hostile successors who might be eager to even scores for past wrongs. While this fear is real in most cases, it degenerates to paranoia, which fuels the persecution of actual or perceived opponents of the regime, who are too often identified (and persecuted) with their regions or ethnic groups. In Samuel Doe’s Liberia, his Krahn ethnic group became privileged by his accession and endangered at his exit. The ethnic groups of his adversaries – the Gio and Mano in particular – likewise experienced a reversal of fortunes at the rise and fall of Doe. For Doe, Abacha and Charles Taylor, perpetuation in office was an insurance against just retribution for the war crimes, looting of the treasury and crimes against humanity committed by them or on their behalf. Such crimes included wartime or combat atrocities against non-combatants (especially the amputation of non-combatant women and children, rape and other violations of the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war) and the plunder of mineral and natural resources. Third, a desire on the part of the sit-tight leaders to maintain the opulent lifestyle typical of most African leaders, unfettered access to state resources, privileges and opportunities for accumulation is often too strong to ignore. Having developed a taste for conspicuous consumption that only the resources of the state can support, they find it impossible to survive outside the presidential palace. In the same vein, a life-presidency guaranteed the security of ill-gotten wealth and immunity from prosecution for economic crimes against their people. Fourth, the role of political sycophants and hangers-on, whose livelihood is tied to the tenure of a particular ruler, needs to be acknowledged. Abubakar Aliyu Gure, National Publicity Secretary of Mammadou Tandja’s ruling party in Niger, justified the tenure elongation scheme as follows: “The president has been able to bring changes never seen before in several sectors and it is these changes that people feel he should be allowed to continue so that these wonderful things he started will not be left for some politicians who will only come to enrich themselves.” The ruling party’s Secretary-General, Sale Habi, also argued that the economic

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transformation of the country, which Tandja reportedly accomplished, “must … not be left in the hands of someone who could not handle it” (Karofi and Ibrahim, 2008). Similar sentiments were expressed in Nigeria in the heady days of Abacha’s still-born plans to transmute to a civilian president. In the face of Abacha’s unspoken but ferocious determination to hang on to illegitimate power – as demonstrated by the harassment, detention without trial, trial of key opposition figures, including former military head of state, Obasanjo, and his deputy, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (who died in jail under suspicious circumstances) on trumped-up charges of coup-plotting, assassination and exile of key opposition figures - otherwise respectable leaders suddenly reached a consensus (an anomaly in Nigerian politics) that Abacha was the only Nigerian capable of ensuring the survival of the country! They then made him the sole candidate on the platform of each of the five registered political parties, another absurdity even in the Nigerian political context. Tony Anenih, who later became the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, had declared at the time (1998) that if Abacha did not continue in office as president, the country “stood the risk of imminent collapse” (Chukwu, 2005). These compromised ‘politicians’ were merely repaying their benefactor for the undeserved preferment that he had doled out to them as largesse. The same set of ‘politicians’ changed their tune when Abacha succumbed to death in June 1998, and went on without any remorse or scruples to serve in the next civilian administration of a country that they claimed could not survive without Abacha.5 Related to this is the pressure mounted on spineless but self-serving rulers by members of their ethnic groups, who consider the accession of their kinsman as their own chance to ‘eat the national cake.’ Obasanjo enjoyed the support of a minority of his fellow Yoruba, who masqueraded as the Yoruba Council of Elders, a group that he created (in opposition to Afenifere, the mainstream group) to win support in his home region where he was vastly unpopular. Fifth, sit-tight tendencies have also been fostered by developments in the local and global political economy. There are strong indications that Niger’s Tandja was encouraged to embark on tenure elongation when he discovered that the French were delaying the exploitation of oil reserves in his country for their own ends. He, therefore, approached the Chinese, who produced evidence that oil deposits existed in commercial quantities in the country.6 This made him decide to stay beyond 2009 since commercial production would begin in 2011. To this end, he had commissioned a refinery in 2009 strategically located in the stronghold of the opposition (Karofi and Hassan, 2008). It has also been noted that

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Tandja’s gambit was influenced by two other considerations. First, the desire to stay on to complete and commission the Kandadji Dam, a US$700m project that he commenced in August 2008. The landmark project, funded by the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Development Fund, the Saudi, Kuwaiti and other governments, originally due for completion in 2013, is expected to end Niger’s dependence on its southern neighbour, Nigeria, for power supply. Second, he would want to be credited with achieving lasting peace in Niger and resolving decades of Tuareg rebellion in the north. This would parallel his Nigerian counterpart’s seeming resolution of a similar insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta (Muhammad, 2009).

The Means and Process of Tenure Elongation While scholars will continue to debate reasons for tenure elongation, they will also have to contend with the equally important issue of why most of these schemes succeeded or why they were conceived in the first instance. First, the social, political and economic characteristics of the individual countries should be considered. Second, the strength or absence of pro-democratic institutions and the relative balance of power in the nation-states are also important. Regarding the peculiar make-up or history of the affected states, a number of propositions can be advanced. First, countries that operate de jure or de facto single-party systems of government are more prone to manipulation by rulers bent on perpetuating themselves in power. The examples of Uganda under Milton Obote (and, later, Yoweri Museveni) and Malawi under Hastings Banda are most revealing (Willets, 1975; Kirk-Greene, 1991). Such leaders routinely organize and ‘win’ sham elections where they are either the sole (consensus) candidate or where they run against straw candidates of weakened opposition parties. Indeed, the ‘opposition’ parties might be a decoy for the ruling party. However, the political leader does not take chances and, so, ensures that the constitution is amended to create a one-party state or to ensure that opposition parties operate under difficult, sometimes impossible, conditions. The examples of Yahya Jammeh’s Gambia, Blaise Campaore’s Burkina Faso, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and Gnassingbe Eyadema’s Togo illustrate this trend. Second, it can be stated that sit-tightism is more likely where the country is sharply divided by religion and ethnicity, which creates room for the manipulation of sentiments by opportunistic politicians or soldiers to stay in power. In this connection, Abacha was more likely to transmute

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to a civilian president and even abolish tenure limits than could an Obasanjo because of the lopsided regional imbalance in Nigeria. The overwhelming advantages of Northern Nigeria in the military, population, land size and political representation could be exploited by a soldier or civilian leader from that part of the country as Gowon, Babangida and Abacha almost did. An additional edge for the latter two was the religion of Islam which provided a formidable advantage in the regional and national contexts. Third, the level of poverty, political education and literacy in particular countries is also critical to the campaign for or against tenure extension. Indeed, it can be posited that the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and early 1990s amounted to the deliberate pauperization of the people, which made them vulnerable to manipulation. Hence, the ambitious rulers and their cohorts could mobilize support for tenure elongation by exploiting the people’s ignorance, poverty or sense of insecurity. This appears to have been the case in Niger where Mammadou Tandja successfully conducted a referendum to validate his quest for tenure elongation. Fourth, indeed, a ruler, such as Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, could achieve tenure elongation by default by playing the ethnic or jingoist card, exaggerating the threat of meddlesome external powers to rally nationalist support. In his case, he tied his political ambitions (sit-tightism) to the manipulation of populist causes (expropriation of land from British settlers and land redistribution to Africans) and the memory and rhetoric of the bitter liberation struggle to promote false consciousness while entrenching himself in a post that he had lost through a popular election conducted by his own government. Fifth, the failure or success of tenure elongation schemes may also be determined by the strength of countervailing forces and institutions – independent legislature, judiciary, armed forces, police and paramilitary services, the press and a strong civil society. The absence or weakness (sometimes, weakening or suborning) of countervailing institutions makes life-presidencies and tenure elongation easier than it should have been. Where the judiciary is emasculated, the press cowed, the military and paramilitary forces compromised and incorporated, and where civil liberties are curtailed (as in the Gambia of Yahya Jammeh), the farce of democratic multi-partyism can be maintained as a facade for a draconian, de facto life-presidency. In such countries, leaders and members of the opposition are arrested, tortured and detained without trial on trumped-up charges under state security laws. When they are finally arraigned, they are sentenced to jail terms or driven into exile with the aim of crushing the

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opposition. The unfortunate ones are simply assassinated by local or foreign operatives. Sham elections and manipulated referenda are then used to impose a life-presidency that often has to be terminated by a military coup d'état. In addition to the domestic configuration of a country’s political economy, the international context might also work in favour or against tenure extension. This depends on how strategic the country is, the effectiveness of the local and international lobby against the tenure extension scheme, and the rating of its problems on the agenda of the global powers. If the United States, for example, is contending with more serious issues, such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even the global threat of terrorism, it might not be able to pay much attention to the domestic issue of political succession in a country that it does not consider vital to its interests. However, if that country has strategic minerals that are critical to the military build-up of any of the global powers, especially the US, or if its domestic crisis could snowball into a regional conflagration with wider implications, or if there are strong indications of security threats to the world powers, it would attract more than a passing interest. Lest it is assumed that foreign intervention necessarily bolsters local opposition to tenure elongation, there are cases in which the former colonial power and its allies deliberately foster life-presidencies to protect their national economic interests in the affected countries. French and American support has been critical to the survival of many African dictators, including Bongo, Ahidjo, Paul Biya, and oil-rich Equatorial Guinea’s Nguema, whose country has since the 1990s become the Kuwait of Africa.

The Consequences of Sit-Tightism and Tenure Elongation Perpetuation in office by the subversion of the constitution through coups d’état, rigged elections, manipulated referenda and suppression of opposition has grave consequences for African countries. It is arguable that prolonged rule has brought stability to some countries, such as Cote d’Ivoire under Houphouet-Boigny, Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) under Mobutu Sese Seko, Guinea under Toure and Cameroon under Ahidjo and Biya, and some measure of development, as in Ghadafi’s Libya. But these ‘positive’ effects of personal rule are dubious since the affected countries have paid a high price for such ‘benefits’ in abridged human rights and descent into crises, or another ordeal of selfperpetuation upon the exit of the ‘strongman.’

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There have been less debatable negative consequences. First, it is the most important cause of the continent’s political instability and economic underdevelopment. These self-perpetuating rulers have perfected the art of plundering their countries and committing valuable resources to unproductive conspicuous consumption. This explains the vast sums of money stolen by these rulers and kept in foreign bank accounts to the detriment of their national economies. Second, these rulers, given the state of insecurity engendered by their unconstitutional rule, have also committed much human and material resource to developing the apparatus of state terror. It can be claimed that most African countries are saddled with the heavy burden of overdeveloped security apparatuses. The paradox is that it is for regime security, rather than that of the populace, that so much that could be better employed in productive sectors has been invested. Another paradox is that these security apparatuses are then deployed to repress the people or any potential source of threat to the ruling junta. As former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, remarked, “About half of the world’s armed conflicts and some three quarters of the UN’s peacekeepers are in Africa. This is because millions of Africans are still at the mercy of brutal regimes … showing no respect for human rights, or even human life” (Independent Online, 2005). Yet another paradox is that the supposedly secure ruler (such as Amin, Museveni, Taylor) soon becomes a source of insecurity to his neighbours, as he needs to create a diversion from the internal contradictions in his own country by sponsoring insurgency or precipitating unnecessary border disputes. Third, the ruler’s preoccupation with his personal and regime security influences his allocation of resources to competing national projects. Accordingly, he devotes a preponderant proportion of state resources to the upkeep of his security apparatus at the expense of developmental projects in public health, physical infrastructure, economic development, social welfare and education. Much of the outlay goes into funding a disproportionately large military and paramilitary (including intelligence or espionage) services, as he needs to keep the soldiers happy. The latter become part of a tiny and privileged elite, sustained at the expense of the vast majority – until an ambitious officer too decides to seize power for himself. A direct consequence of the ruler’s skewed allocation of resources is the imbalance in appointments into key positions and recruitment into the military and paramilitary services. The increasingly paranoid ruler invariably relies upon his core loyalists, who more often than not are his clan or ethnic kinsmen and women.

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Fourth, consequently, tenure elongation leads to the bastardization of values and increasing polarization of the polity between self-serving defenders of the emergent order and its brutalized opponents. The latter are treated as enemies of the state and labelled as ‘security threats’ that do not deserve the minimal protection of the state and the enjoyment of fundamental rights, including the right to life. Many of them are killed through a flawed judicial process while the more fortunate ones escape with their dear lives into exile. Fifth, the sheer waste of valuable human and natural resources, typified by the shackling of the country’s vibrant productive energy and the dissipation of effort and material on trivial matters, constitutes a negative impact of perpetual and personal rule in Africa. Accordingly, a nation like Nigeria is now represented in many Western countries by a large émigré population of economic refugees, asylum seekers, drug traffickers, prostitutes and economic criminals - credit card scammers, who are engaged in advanced fee fraud, popularly known as ‘419.’ Sixth, as typified by Abacha’s Nigeria and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, the country’s international profile and the economic fortunes of the people suffer a decline as the ruler becomes a recluse and turns his country to a pariah in the comity of nations. The ruler simply reduces a once great nation of proud, dignified people to his puny stature. Such was the case when Abacha refused to permit Nigeria, the defending champions, to defend their African Nations Cup title in post-apartheid South Africa, presumably because of a personal slight. Seventh, personal rule is characterized by excesses – human rights abuses, abridgment of citizenship rights and unbridled corruption. “Under President Biya,” a commentator wrote, “corruption has become endemic and pervasive playing a big role in crippling the buoyancy of one of the most prosperous and promising economies in Africa at the time he took over” (Ajong, 2009). The ruler who has compromised the constitution, himself and others can no longer enjoy the moral high ground but watch helplessly as his minions unleash a reign of terror on his fellow citizens with impunity. Indeed, many atrocities are committed in his name, often without his knowledge, and he becomes a veritable captive of a cabal that increasingly becomes a state within a state. Kinsmen of Eyadema and Doe exemplified this tendency. Eighth, the period after the death or exit of a maximum ruler has almost always thrown the affected country into a fresh round of crisis. In Cote d’Ivoire, Zaire (DRC), and Somalia, the existence of the country was called into question, with Somalia now officially declared a failed state without a central government since the exit of Siad Barre. Cote d’Ivoire

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and DRC are still on tenterhooks. The recourse to dynastic succession in Togo, Gabon and DRC does not appear to be a sustainable solution. At best, it only postpones the evil day. Finally, the perpetuation of personal rule by African heads of government reinforces the stereotype of the incapability of African and Black peoples to govern themselves or anything else for that matter. If such regimes last long, they also have the effect of instituting and entrenching an undemocratic culture in their own countries, making an absurdity the norm, while also encouraging similar bad behaviour in other African leaders. This is why most of the continent’s rulers are authoritarian, corrupt and inept to the point that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation could not make its coveted leadership award to any African head of state in 2009.

Conclusion This chapter has examined various dimensions of the perpetuation of personal rule by African heads of state and government. It is clear that the sit-tight syndrome and its variants are sad expressions of the deep-rooted problem of governance in post-independence Africa. Consequently, it is necessary to conclude the discussion with suggestions for tackling, ameliorating or preventing its recurrence. For countries such as Togo, Gambia, Gabon, Libya, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Burkina Faso, the prospects for real democratization appear bleak in the short run. But with increasing awareness by the populace and sustained political education, helped by the tides of global developments, the mass of the people would be roused from their inertia to rid themselves of their home-grown oppressors. Yet, there is no room for illusion that this would be easy or that the privileged would give up without a fight, especially as power is being retained in a dynastic fashion. Practical steps have to be taken to eliminate the tradition of personal rule in Africa. First, there must be a new brand and style of leadership in Africa – one that “encourages mentoring and succession” (The Guardian, 2005). A trans-generational succession plan that grooms a pool of potential leaders imbued with the ethos of democracy will have to replace the capricious system that is prevalent in most African countries. But nothing can replace the attitudinal re-orientation or “institutional learning” (Van de Walle, 2002:74) that current and potential rulers must undergo if the continent will not continue to be a laughing stock in the comity of nations. This means that, using credible democratic elections as a barometer of democratic consolidation, the higher the number of elections, no matter how imperfect, the greater the possibility of a genuine democracy.

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Second, while the economic prosperity of a country does not predispose its leaders to democratic practice, as in the case of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola, it has been shown to ensure democratic consolidation in Mauritius and Botswana. What this implies is that a bigger and more assertive middle class - in an improving socio-economic setting - in African countries will nurture and defend democratic rule. Third, the ability of the emergent democratic government to actually govern and ‘deliver the goods’ also helps to consolidate democracy. Paradoxically, the central governments of most African states have been pre-occupied with regime security rather than the social and economic security of their citizens. Accordingly, ‘overdeveloped’ central governments, as in Nigeria, are bogged down by heavy recurrent expenditure arising from the huge emoluments of ministers, technocrats, legislators and bureaucrats, and a culture of primitive accumulation. This calls for leaner and efficient central governments with a developmental (people-centred) orientation. Fourth, the threat of the dominant, hegemonic party and its subversion of the democratic process should also be tackled. In the infamous examples of Nigeria’s National Party of Nigeria and Peoples Democratic Party of Nigeria, the ruling party proceeded to decimate the opposition through rigged elections and induced defections to provide a platform for the perpetual rule of a person, party and region in a complex polity. This tendency demands comprehensive electoral reforms designed, among others, to outlaw induced defections, ensure internal democracy in political parties, establish truly independent electoral bodies at national and regional/state levels and make votes count. In this way, a viable opposition can survive to provide a credible alternative to the ruling party, as recently happened in Ghana. Van de Walle (2002:68, 78) notes that “The president’s party benefits from egregious gerrymandering, the manipulation of voter registration and a monopoly of television and radio coverage,” and concludes that “the quality of political competition and the power of the opposition in part determine the quality of the democracy that emerges.” Fifth, the strengthening of bulwarks against autocracy is a democratic imperative. An independent press, judiciary and police are critical to the working of genuine democracy. Such elements must be nurtured to check the prevailing tradition of “executive dominance” (Van de Walle, 2002: 74), the bane of separation of powers in Africa. The “fate of democracy,” it has been argued, “may hinge on whether civil society groups, opposition parties, and ordinary citizens can match wits and strength with resourceful rulers who aim to keep power and are not all that particular about how

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they do so” (Van de Walle 2002:79). It was such determined opposition by civil society elements that killed tenure elongation schemes by Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, Bakili Muluzi in Malawi and Obasanjo in Nigeria. Sixth, as it is clear that the longer a ruler stays in power the greater the erosion of democratic practice, term limits must be enshrined in all constitutions as an article of African Charter of Democratic Governance. No country will be allowed to operate without term limits and presidents must not “‘grandfather’ themselves in by having their time in power [prior to this constitutional change] … left out of the counting” (Van de Walle, 2002:77). This will obviate tenure elongation by sleight. Indeed, a singlesix or seven-year term, and the exile of the immediate past president on an ambassadorial posting on the Mexican model, constitute a bulwark against the Putin-style reincarnation as prime minister in the successor government! The approach to resolving this monumental problem of our time - the creation and sustenance of democratic institutions and practices in African countries - will involve the collaboration of domestic (national, regional and continental) and foreign (multilateral organizations, such as the UN and EU, national governments, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups) forces. However, it is the internal dynamics that will lead the way and drive the process. The people must take charge of their collective destiny; but this requires an enlightened leadership, especially in the opposition movements. African politicians must outgrow the tendency to flinch from paying a price for their principles. Hence those in opposition must resist the temptation to give in and give up by compromising with the ruling cabal in forming a farcical ‘government of national unity’ in the ‘national interest,’ a convenient excuse to sacrifice principles for expediency. Raila Odinga of Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe fell for the bait of ‘a government of national unity’ and thus traded off their electoral victory. These examples illustrate how compromise amounts to capitulation and why half-measures cannot yield an enduring solution to the problem. In the same vein, opportunistic clamour or support for military coups will neither help the opposition’s quest for justice after a rigged election nor the nation’s search for political stability. The examples of Mali (Moussa Traore), Guinea (Lansana Conte), Gambia (Yahya Jammeh), Ethiopia (Mengistu Haile Mariam), Uganda (Idi Amin and Museveni), Liberia (Samuel Doe) and Nigeria (Yakubu Gowon, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha) confirm that military messiahs are always ambitious, self-serving despots solely determined to inflict their own brand of incompetent, oppressive and corrupt personal rule on their traumatized people.

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Consequently, everyone must be willing to nurse the seedling of democracy till it matures to bear fruit that all can benefit from – political and electoral plurality, free and fair elections, stable governments and societal development. This will, hopefully, eradicate vote-rigging, manipulation of voters’ registers, suborning of electoral officials and security personnel, declaration of fake election results and violent suppression of the people’s choice. Not only must African leaders be made to subscribe to a code of democratic conduct, an example should be made of bad leaders through sanctions (as ECOWAS imposed on Tandja’s Niger) as a collective effort rather than the sporadic and uncoordinated efforts of a few. The international community7 too, especially the UN and EU, must give support to the entrenchment of democracy in Africa in their own interests, for the effects of misrule are always felt beyond national borders. To illustrate, the generation and flow of refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers not only demonstrate the interconnectedness of the regions and peoples of the world, but also show how African domestic problems, induced by misrule, can directly affect the West. As the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is also doing, more credible corporate bodies should reward exemplary leadership and role modelling by African leaders. This must begin by bridging the widening gap between the leaders and the people, thereby eradicating a historical disconnect that is traceable to the legacy of colonialism, the historical “disjuncture between the political elites and the state on the one hand, and society and ordinary people, the masses on the other …. [which manifests in] the alienation, disempowerment and low sense of ownership of the state experienced by the masses” (Osaghae, 1999:20). After all is said and done, it must be conceded that democratization is a process and not an event. It goes beyond mere voting or ballot-counting, periodic elections and power-sharing (Van de Walle, 2002). Its ultimate goal is the entrenchment of democratic behaviour – rule of law, institutionbuilding, separation of powers, accountability, respect for opposing and contrasting views, acknowledgement of political and social pluralism and a developmental ideology that focuses on the needs and yearnings of the majority as opposed to the indulgence of a tiny clique (cf. Osaghae, 1999:21). Though transmutation from military to civilian dictatorship has further compounded the problem and the pace of democratization is slow, there are hopes that Africa will fully join the democratic world in a matter of decades rather than centuries.

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Appendix Check List of Africa’s Longest-Ruling Heads of State Country Tunisia Guinea Cote d’Ivoire Senegal Cameroon Malawi Mauretania Zambia Tanzania Zaire (DRC) Lesotho Central African Republic Gabon Togo Sierra Leone Mali Gambia Libya Somalia Sudan

President/Head of State/ Prime Minister Habib Bourguiba Sekou Toure Felix Houphouet-Boigny Leopold Sedar Senghor Ahmadu Ahidjo Hastings Kamuzu Banda Moktar Ould Daddah Kenneth Kaunda Julius Nyerere Joseph Mobutu/Mobutu Sese Seko Joseph Leabua Jonathan Jean-Bedel Bokassa Omar Bongo Gnassingbe Eyadema Siaka Stevens Moussa Traore Dauda Jawara Muammar Ghaddafi Mohamed Siad Barre Muhammad Jaafar El Nimeiri

Benin Cape Verde Kenya Angola Republic of Congo Equatorial Guinea Zimbabwe Egypt Cameroon Guinea Uganda Burkina Faso Tunisia Burundi

Mathieu Kerekou Pedro de Verona Rodriguez Pires Daniel arap Moi Jose Eduardo dos Santos Dennis Sassou-Nguessou Teodoro Obiang Nguema Robert Mugabe Hosni Mubarak Paul Biya Lansana Conte Yoweri Museveni Blaise Campaore Zine El Abidine Pierre Buyoya

Sudan

Omar al-Bashir

Tenure in Office 1957-87+ 1958-84*** 1960-93*** 1960-81* 1960-82** 1961-94 1961-78 1964-91 1964-85* 1965-97 1965-86 1966-79 1967-2009*** 1967-2007*** 1967-85* 1968-91 1968-94 1969-2011 1969-91 1969-85 1972-91, 19962006 1975-2011 1978-2002 1979-2017 1979-1992, 1997197919801981-2011 19821984-2009*** 19861987-2014 1987-2011 1987-93, 19962003 1989-

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Chad Idris Derby 1991Ethiopia Meles Zenawi 1991-2012*** Eritrea Isaias Afewerki 1993Gambia Yahya Jammeh 1996-2017 Notes: * Retired voluntarily from office ** Retired on (wrong) medical advice *** Died in office + Deposed on grounds of senility Source: Adapted from The Guardian, 2005; Icheoku, 2009, author’s internet searches.

Notes 1

Kirk-Greene, 1991: 167-169 explores this concept of “national synonymity” in his masterful treatment of personal rule in Africa. 2 The slogan ‘Go on with One Nigeria!’ was coined during Nigeria’s civil war (1967-70) from Gowon’s name as a national rallying code. 3 The saga of Honduras’ ousted President Zelaya shows that Latin America too continues to grapple with the challenge of tenure elongation and self-perpetuation in office. Relevant lessons on the roles and limits of internal and external pressure will be learnt from the ultimate resolution of the lingering crisis. 4 In a bizarre twist, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, an ex-French army sergeant-turnedpresident of the extremely poor Central Africa Republic crowned himself ‘Emperor’ as a form of self-perpetuation in office in an atavistic parody of African ‘traditional government.’ 5 In another irony, they were also identified as being behind Obasanjo’s failed tenure elongation scheme (Chukwu, 2005). 6 The French allegedly got back at Tandja by instigating a rebellion in Agades. The former colonial masters were “not happy that the country invited China to reap where [it] … did not sow.” (Karofi and Ibrahim, 2008). The increasing influence of China in Africa, coupled with its uncritical support for undemocratic rulers, as in Sudan and Zimbabwe, gives cause for concern and compounds the African crisis. 7 We need to acknowledge, as Icheoku, 2009 has argued, that the ‘international community,’ too often driven by self-interest, tends to adopt double standards on the issue of undemocratic rule by African leaders. But this does not negate its continuing relevance in the search for a solution to this intractable problem.

References Ajong, Mbandah L. 2009. “Paul Biya: Anatomy of a Rare Brand of Leadership in Africa,” accessed on 4 May 2009 at http://www. groundreport.com/article.php?article... Ayo-Vaughan, Sola. 2008. “Africa: Insincerity of African Leaders,” ThisDay (Lagos), 21 September.

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Chukwu, Clinton. 2005. “Self-Succession: The Lessons of History,” 25 April, accessed on 30 April 2009 at http://www.dawodu.com/chukwu1 .htm. Icheoku, 2009. “The Zimbabwe Debate: Mugabe and Western Hypocrisy,” accessed on 30 April 2009 at http://www.africanexecutive.com/ modules/ magazine/article_print.php?article=3903. Independent Online (IOL). 2005. “Annan Slams Africa’s ‘Sit-Tight Leaders,” accessed on 30 April 2009 at http://www.iol.co.za/general/ news/newsprint.php?art... Karofi, Hassan and Lawal Ibrahim. 2008. “Oil Discovery Ignites Tenure Elongation Debate in Niger Republic,” Daily Trust, 15 November. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. 1991. “His Eternity, His Eccentricity, or His Exemplarity? A Further Contribution to the Study of H.E. the African Head of State,” African Affairs, 90, 163-187. Krieger, Norma J. 2003. “Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no.2, 307-313. Muhammad, Bala. 2009. “Re: Tandja’s ‘Tazarce’ Gamble in Niger Republic,” accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.weekly. dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49. Osaghae, E. 1999. “Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering Prospects, New Hopes,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 17, no.1, 5-28. The Guardian, Editorial. 2005. “Africa at Large: Africa’s Sit-Tight Leaders,” The Guardian (Lagos), 12 June. Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: Africa’s Range of Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, 66-80. Willets, Peter. 1975. “The Politics of Uganda as a One-Party State, 19691970,” African Affairs, vol. 74, no. 296, 278-299.

CHAPTER ELEVEN ‘FRANCAFRICAN’ POLITICS AND DICTATORSHIPS IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA JEREMIE K. DAGNINI

Introduction Félix Houphouët-Boigny, nicknamed le Sage, the ‘Wise Man’, was the very first president of Cote d’Ivoire (he ruled from 1960 to 1993). Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma had ruled the Republic of Togo with an authoritarian hand for thirty-eight years, from 1967 (after a military coup) until his death in 2005. Jean Bédel Bokassa was president, then self-proclaimed emperor under the name of Bokassa I of the Central African Republic from 1966 (after a coup d’etat) to 1979. Denis Sassou-Nguesso was president of Congo from 1979 to 1992 before coming back to power in 1997 after a coup d’état. Today, he is still at the head of the country and he has become the father-in-law of Omar Bongo, president of Gabon since 1967 (died in office in 2009). Idriss Déby has ruled Chad since 1990 (after a coup d’état); Paul Biya has been president of Cameroon since 1982; and Blaise Compaoré was the president of Burkina Faso – formerly Upper Volta – from 1987 (after a military coup) to 2014. What common point do these African dictators share? They were/are all ‘France’s friends,’ and economically, financially, politically and militarily supported by successive French presidents from Charles de Gaulle to Nicolas Sarkozy. They constitute the direct outcome of France’s ‘FrancAfrican’ politics over the last fifty years. The setting up and maintenance of dictatorships in its former African colonies since the era of decolonization have enabled France to keep a colonial exploitation and domination system in these countries while giving the impression that they are truly independent since they are indeed governed by local figures. Thus, this chapter examines France’s ‘FrancAfrican’ politics and its support of dictatorships in its former African colonies since decolonization.

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The Decolonization Background In the very first French anti-colonialist documentary, Afrique 50,1 the director and scriptwriter, René Vautier, reveals the huge amounts of money made by big French companies in Africa during the period of colonization. Among other things, he mentions the 650 million francs profit made by the Société commerciale de l’ouest africain (SCOA) in 1949, the 365 million francs profit made by the Compagnie française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) in 1949, the 180 million francs profit made by DAVUM, and the 11 billion 500 million francs profit accumulated by the Africaine française, Compagnie du Niger français (CNF), Compagnie française de Côte d’Ivoire (CFCI), and UNILEVER in 1949. Indeed, Africa was a source of massive profit for colonial companies exploiting wood, hevea, bananas, coffee or cocoa. The African continent also gave France access to strategic raw materials such as gold, uranium, and oil. Thus, considering the high profit generated by colonization, it seems obvious that France was not in favour of decolonization of its colonial empire; France was forced to abandon it. Indeed, being considerably weakened by the Second World War, being in a difficult position in IndoChina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962), and facing the desire for emancipation and the rise of anti-colonialist and nationalist movements (such as the Mouvement démocratique de la renovation malgache (MDRM) in Madagascar and the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) in Cameroon)2 in most of its colonies, France was compelled to negotiate the independence of almost all its African colonies in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This difficult task was handled by de Gaulle, whom, besides the reasons mentioned previously, had two more reasons for being against decolonization. First, from a political point of view, right in the middle of the Cold War, he wanted to avoid the spread of communism in French colonies. Second, there was also a “shameful reason: the financing of its political party was based on the misappropriation of African public revenues” (author’s translation),3 a practice which, in subsequent years, would spread to the other French political parties. Therefore, in 1958, de Gaulle devised a strategy the official aim of which was the gradual emancipation of French colonies in Africa, though the unofficial goal was their maintenance under French political, economic and military trusteeship. To do so, he proposed that France’s African colonies should belong to a structure named La Communauté, which allowed them to be autonomous internally but dependent upon France externally, especially in the fields of defence, diplomacy, currency and international trade. Except Sekou Touré’s Guinea which opted for prompt

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and total independence (on 2 October 1958) and decided to break off its relationships with France, eleven colonies in Francophone Africa as well as Madagascar agreed to be part of the Community, and then becoming autonomous republics. In 1960, de Gaulle finally decided to give these autonomous republics full independence: on 1 January 1960, Cameroon became independent headed by Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982); Togo on 27 April 1960, headed by Sylvanus Olympio (1961-1963); Madagascar on 26 June 1960, headed by Philibert Tsiranana (1960-1972); Upper Volta on 5 August 1960, headed by Maurice Yaméogo (1960-1966); Cote d’Ivoire on 7 August 1960, headed by Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993); Chad on 11 August 1960, headed by François Tombalbaye (1962-1975); Central African Republic on 13 August 1960, headed by David Dacko (19601965); Congo on 15 August 1960, headed by Fulbert Youlou (1960-1963); Gabon on 17 August 1960, headed by Léon M’ba (1961-1967), among others. As he proclaimed the independence of these states, de Gaulle, who did not want to lose his African pré carré, imposed cooperation agreements on them which enabled France to remain very influential in Francophone Africa. In the meantime, he gave Jacques Foccart,4 also known as ‘Mr Africa,’ the responsibility of maintaining Francophone African countries under the French yoke via a whole combination of illegal and secret means. Broadly speaking, Foccart’s role consisted in putting and keeping dictators that favoured French politics in Africa in power through electoral fraud and physical elimination of independentminded leaders and movements. The era of decolonization (1958-1960) is seen as the genesis of what François-Xavier Verschave,5 co-founder of Survie,6 called Françafrique (‘FrancAfrica’), a term that ironically refers to the expression used in 1955 by Felix Houphouët-Boigny to describe the ‘good’ relations between France and Africa. Françafrique is A secret criminal club composed of economic, political and military actors, operating both in France and Africa, organized in lobbies and networks, and centred on the misappropriation of two revenues: raw materials and the “Public Aid for Development” (APD). … This system is naturally hostile to democracy. The term also refers to confusion, a domestic familiarity looking towards liberties: presidents’ offspring, ministers and generals all take part in trafficking [author’s translation].7

The expression Françafrique also means ‘France à fric,’8 according to François-Xavier Verschave who emphasized that

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Chapter Eleven Over the course of four decades, hundreds of billions of euros misappropriated from debt, aid, oil, cocoa … or drained through French importing monopolies have financed French political-business networks – all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network – shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions [author’s translation].9

The ‘FrancAfrican’ Cooperation Agreements Here are some examples of agreements signed in the 1960s and the following decades between France and these African countries officially decolonized. The Military Agreements: The defence agreements signed at the time of decolonization defined the scope of military cooperation between France and the African countries. Among other things, they mandated the setting up of permanent French military bases on the African continent. There are currently five French military bases in Africa: in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire (3,000 soldiers); in Dakar, Senegal (1,100 soldiers); in Ndjamena, Chad (1,000 soldiers); in Libreville, Gabon (800 soldiers); and in Djibouti (2,800 soldiers). Why French military bases in Africa? Because these agreements made provision for, often indirectly, the organization, supervision and training of the local armed forces, although the countries are said to be independent. They also made provision for French military intervention in case of external threat. In return, French soldiers freely move around the countries in which they are stationed, and use the local infrastructure as well. Most of these agreements include so-called ‘special’ or ‘secret’ clauses which are not published in the French official bulletin that give details of laws and official announcements. For instance, the official bulletin of the 21 November 1960 points out that “the Gabonese Republic is responsible for its home defence, but Gabon can ask France for assistance with respect to the conditions defined by the special agreements [author’s translation]”.10 Thus, the clauses which enable France to participate in the maintenance of law and order in some African countries remain secret. It is precisely because of such clandestine clauses that France regularly intervenes militarily in Francophone Africa under the pretext of protecting its own citizens; the real goal of such operations, as will be seen in section 3, is to support dictatorial regimes or to overthrow unwanted African leaders. These defence agreements very often include appendices of an economic nature. For example, Appendix 2 of the defence agreement signed on 24 April 1961 between France on the one hand, and Cote

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d’Ivoire, Dahomey, and Niger on the other, deals with “raw materials and strategic products” – hydrocarbons, uranium, lithium, etc. It states that the aforementioned countries, “because of defence needs, [must] reserve first and foremost their sales for the French Republic once their own needs are satisfied, [must] get supplies first and foremost from France” and “[must restrict or stop their exportation to other countries] when defence interests are required” (author’s translation).11 As a result, these military cooperation agreements are much more important than mere military assistance. They go hand in hand with a certain harmonization of diplomatic and economic relations. To be more explicit, they allow France to control politically, militarily and economically its former African colonies. Indeed, the aforesaid Appendix 2 clearly shows that France has a stranglehold on Cote d’Ivoire’s mineral resources. The Economic Agreements: France’s political and military domination of its former colonies is accompanied by an economic domination which occurs mainly through the exploitation of African natural resources. But other strategies are used by the former colonial master so as to have power over its former colonies, among which is the use of the CFA franc which is controlled by the Bank of France. Initially created in 1939, the franc of French colonies in Africa was renamed the franc of the Communauté financière africaine for West African countries – Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger and Senegal, and the franc of the Coopération financière en Afrique centrale for countries in Central Africa – Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad.12 Until 1993, the CFA franc was directly convertible into French franc, which had facilitated the flight of capital.13 In January 1994, it was suddenly devalued officially by 50% which has brought a knock-on effect on both the economy and populations in Francophone African countries. In January 2008, economist, tax expert and Speaker of the Ivorian National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, virulently denounced the CFA franc in an interview conducted by New African’s Ruth Tete and Soh Taadhieu: The CFA franc region represents a state-controlled zone of cooperation with, interestingly, the levers of control based in Paris, from where the priority is the interests of France. The principles of monetary cooperation between France and the member states of the CFA zone were formulated in the 1960’s in a colonial pact which was reviewed in the monetary cooperation convention of 23 November 1972 between the member states

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Chapter Eleven of the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) (Bank of Central African States) and the French Republic on one hand, as well as in the cooperation agreement of 4 December 1973 between the member states of the Union Monetaire Ouest-Africaine (UMOA) (or the Monetary Union of West African States) and the French Republic on the other hand. Just before France conceded to African demands for independence in the 1960’s, it carefully organised its former colonies in a system of compulsory solidarity which consisted of obliging the African states to put 65% of their foreign currency reserves into the French Treasury, based on the convertibility, at a rigid exchange rate of the CFA – a currency France had created for them. Although the administration of the CFA currency was entrusted to a common central bank (comprising BCEAO and BEAC), these so-called African banks were only African in name. The reality is that they have no clout and are nothing more than huge bureaucratic institutions which have no monetary policies of their own. They exist to give the CFA countries the impression that they too are masters of their own monetary destiny, which in reality is not the case. In a general sense, what we should not forget, as we go along, are the privilege relations between France and the CFA countries which have conferred on France huge advantages in terms of market outlets for its goods and services. To begin with, the CFA franc is financially repressive, unfair, and morally indefensible. It has created a zone of state corruption. During elections in France the CFA zone countries are constantly solicited to provide private funding to French politicians, an obligation that has no justification whatsoever. This has always been a requirement from successive French presidents. The fact that the CFA countries provide their French counterparts with bags loaded with money at every election has been a source of numerous conflicts and provides room for other forms of corruption. It is these connections that continue to perpetuate French monopoly in the CFA countries, despite the globalisation of the market. Under the pretext of assisting poor countries with French tax-payers’ money, it is in fact the political class of France and Africa who enrich themselves in an illicit manner and this alone is justification enough to break up and reject the CFA zone system. In the 1990’s, France ordered the devaluation of the CFA franc. Before the devaluation, 1 French franc was equivalent to 50 CFA francs. In 1994, after devaluation, 1 French franc was equivalent to 100 CFA francs. Despite that fact, French authorities have managed to make people believe that the devaluation rate was 50% which in reality was not the case. Actually, we have been subjected to a 100% devaluation.14

In the meantime, the concept of ‘development’ appeared, Western countries being encouraged to help their former colonies, now renamed ‘under-developed countries.’ Thus, France created numerous programmes and organizations specialized in the management of development aid in these countries. The development expenditure was labelled aide publique

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au développement (APD). France devotes to it about “40 billion French francs” per year.15 However, instead of serving Africa’s development, the APD is used to financially support the political regimes that are friends of France; “help big French companies to sign contracts with African states – with huge profits, part of them being reallocated to the French political class; [and] maintain and if possible spread France’s influence in Africa. It is also used in addition for the misappropriation of African resources. … The rest of the APD serves France’s marketing image, the defence of Francophony, … and France’s prestige” (author’s translation and emphasis).16 Finally, part of the Public Aid for Development is used as grants for expatriates’ children, or to defray the cost of detention centres and illegal immigrants’ repatriation. Therefore, in total, only a small percentage of it is really used to reduce poverty in Africa. According to François-Xavier Verschave, “it is assumed that between 30 and 40% of the APD is totally embezzled, and less than 4% serve actions against poverty” (author’s translation).17 In the previous paragraph, two crucial points were emphasized. The first one deals with the French multinational companies. France’s stranglehold on the African economy, via big French industries such as ELF,18 Bouygues19 (active in the public buildings and works sector, water, and electricity), Bolloré (rail and sea transportation), France Telecom (telecommunications), and Air France (air transport), to name just a few, is also part of the economic domination strategy worked out by de Gaulle and his successors. It should be noted that these multinationals have always traditionally secured their African markets without making a tender. Indeed, markets are offered to them by African ‘friends.’ Among numerous examples, the water and electricity market in Cote d’Ivoire was offered to Bouygues by Alassane Ouattara when he was prime minister under Houphouët-Boigny’s regime. Today, France’s stranglehold on Africa remains obvious. For instance, it is estimated that French companies own 40% of Ivorian wealth. Furthermore, it is important to stress that these post-colonial multinationals, actors of Françafrique par excellence, have built some “capacités d’influence”20 in relation to African leaders. How? Primarily in financing electoral campaigns in Africa, the corruption of African leaders, the corruption of the French political class, the organization of rigged elections in Africa, the financing of militia and mercenaries, and the organization of coups d'état. In return, they have the capacity to influence decisions at the top of the political ladder. “It is this system that the government of Mr. Laurent Gbagbo has perturbed having recourse to international invitations to tender, thus challenging the exorbitant profits made by multinationals” (author’s translation).21 For

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example, as regards the building of the third bridge in Abidjan as well as the building of the San Pedro airport, the invitation to tender challenged Bouygues’ financial interests in Cote d’Ivoire in favour of a Chinese company and South African corporations; it is said that Bouygues’ proposition was three times higher than that of the Chinese firm.22 Consequently, it is legitimate to question the 2002 coup d’état attempt in Cote d’Ivoire which resulted in a civil war situation. Was it really orchestrated by Ivorian citizens, as the French government claimed, or by foreign countries – including France – as many people in Cote d’Ivoire think? It is to be noted that the coup attempt happened right at the time the Ivorian government was announcing its new resolution to invite tenders. The second point which is emphasized is the cultural promotion of France. Indeed, it is important to understand that the cultural cooperation boosted by de Gaulle and the succeeding French presidents, Francophony, FranceAfrica summits,23 has also enabled France to continue, indirectly, to play a major role in Africa. It is pointless arguing that France cannot exert its ‘FrancAfrican’ policy without the consent of African dictator heads of state. Actually, just after the so-called decolonization, de Gaulle master-minded, either by the organization of rigged elections or, even worse, by force, the enthronement of dictators in favour of Françafrique, with the help of his main spin doctor, Jacques Foccart, then director of the unofficial African cell of the Élysée palace, ensuring that France continued to exert its colonial exploitation system in its former African colonies. Georges Pompidou carried on where de Gaulle left off, and all his successors, from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to Jacques Chirac, had recourse to unofficial networks – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s sons’ and nephews’ networks, Charles Pasqua’s and his son’s (Pierre) networks, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand’s networks, among others. Hence the characterization of Françafrique put forward at the end of the first part of this chapter: a “confusion, a domestic familiarity looking towards liberties: presidents’ offspring, ministers and generals all take part in trafficking”. What about Nicolas Sarkozy? It would seem that he does not go against the established order and that he carries on with this ancient colonial French tradition.

Some Dictatorships in Francophone Africa Since the early 1960s, the French government, through its ‘FrancAfrican’ networks, has been involved in a great number of political, financial and military plots resulting in the setting up of dictatorships in Francophone Africa. Following is a discussion of some of the most illustrious dictators

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that favoured the neo-colonial exploitation of their countries by France, and who in return received considerable amounts of money to the detriment of their populations. Cote d’Ivoire: The Houphouët-Boigny Era: One great French fiction has been to portray the Ivorian leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, as a model of a democrat. Indeed, from de Gaulle to Sarkozy, all have praised the Houphouët-Boigny era paying tribute to the political and economic stability of Cote d’Ivoire, considered one of the most prosperous and dynamic countries in sub-Saharan Africa until the beginning of the crisis in 2002. Moreover, since the crisis broke out, some French media and politicians have kept asking the same question: How has Cote d’Ivoire changed from the ‘Ivorian miracle’ under Houphouët-Boigny to civil war under Laurent Gbagbo? They have kept comparing the two men, depicting the first one a “wise man,”24 a political genius and a symbol of peace,25 and describing the second one as an election cheat (even though he was legally elected president in 2000), a genocidal person26 and the kind of man you just do not associate with.27 But some truths should be told. First, the friendship between Jacques Foccart and Houphouët-Boigny. Indeed, Houphouët-Boigny was an old friend of Jacques Foccart, who organised his political advancement from the late 1950s onwards. Houphouët-Boigny officially became the leader of the Ivorian government in May 1959, then becoming the first president of independent Cote d’Ivoire in August 1960. Being in favour of a French Cote d’Ivoire, he reluctantly proclaimed the independence of the country on 7 August 1960. Houphouët-Boigny was ordered to regulate, in the whole Francophone Africa, the Mafia-like system set up by de Gaulle through Jacques Foccart and his networks of influence. In return, France assured him a peaceful reign for life. Houphouët-Boigny was extremely respected not only in Francophone Africa but in the entire African continent, silencing his opponents at home and keeping a watchful eye on his African counterparts who had to let him exert his supremacy for fear of being troubled. For example, his historical opponent, Laurent Gbagbo, was jailed from 1971 to 1973, before being forced into exile for many years. His wife and son were jailed too. Amongst all his misfortunes, Gbagbo and his family were luckier than Kragbé Gnagbé, originating from Gagnoa and leader of the Parti nationaliste africain (PANA), who campaigned for the creation of an opposition party in accordance with Article 7 of the Ivorian constitution. Kragbé Gnagbé was assassinated in 1970. Houphouët-Boigny did not content himself with eliminating his potential rival, but he organized a real genocide in Kragbé Gnagbé’s village which

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resulted in the death of thousands of people. The physical elimination of his opponents was one of his methods of governing. In other respects, he is recognized as having directly participated in the launching of war in Biafra (1967-1970), in Liberia (1989-2003) and in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) with the help of France. He was also fingered in the assassination of Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso in 1987. During the thirty-three years of his reign, Houphouët-Boigny enabled France to exploit and plunder the mineral resources of his country (coffee, cocoa, hevea, banana, cotton, among others) without any disturbance. In return, de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing and Francois Mitterrand turned a blind eye to the fortunes he had amassed to the detriment of the Ivorian people. It is estimated that his personal wealth was about 60 billion French francs, namely more than the Ivorian GNP in 1994 of about 8 billion dollars.28 Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaoré and the Assassination of Thomas Sankara: One of the great operations coordinated by France in Burkina Faso remains the assassination of Thomas Sankara on 15 October 1987. A soldier, pan-African politician, supporter of the Third World, he was influenced by Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah. Thomas Sankara led a revolution in Burkina Faso from August 1983 until his death. His communist government set up a series of measures aimed at fighting against corruption and improving education, farming and the lot of women. His political agenda, which he defined as being anti-imperialist, and his numerous speeches in which he denounced France’s post-colonial politics, French collusion with African dictators and French exploitation of African mineral resources, among other things, positioned Sankara as the sworn enemy of Paris. He was murdered on 15 October 1987 in a coup d’état organized by the one he saw as his brother, Blaise Compaoré, under the patronage of Houphouët-Boigny and Foccart. Compaoré immediately took over power, and under him Burkina Faso followed the usual trajectory of a ‘FrancAfrican’ country: corruption; plunder of mineral resources (cotton in particular); political murders (like the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo in December 1998); and nepotism. Compaoré, who is very close to Paris, his main sponsor, has been implicated in many coups d’état or coup attempts, including in Sierra Leone, in Niger, in Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire.29 Togo: Eyadéma and the Assassination of Sylvanus Olympio: On 13 January 1963, Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated by Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who claimed responsibility for the murder in the local press. At

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that time, he was a member of a contingent of half-pay soldiers demobilized from the French colonial army at the end of the Algerian and Indo-China wars. It was the first coup d’état in the history of sub-Saharan Africa after decolonization, a putsch orchestrated by Jacques Foccart. For the Gaullist government, which was determined to preserve French interests in Togo, it was a way to prevent Togo from becoming economically independent. Indeed, Olympio was about to create a national currency, which would have had serious repercussions in the other former colonies. Nicolas Grunitzky, born of a German father originating from Poland and a Togolese mother, became the new president and Sergeant Eyadéma was promoted in return as chief of staff. In January 1967, it was Nicolas Grunitzky’s turn to be overthrown by Eyadéma, who took over power and became the third president of Togo. On 15 April 1967, Étienne Eyadéma officially became president of the Republic of Togo, remaining at his post until his death in February 2005. During Eyadéma’s rule, wealthy Togo entered the club of the poorest countries of the world. In the meantime, Eyadéma became extremely rich, thanks to corruption, the misappropriation of international aid and money made from the phosphates trade. It is thought that his personal fortune was about 4.5 billion dollars, three times more than Togo’s foreign debt (1.8 billion in 2007). Dictator Eyadéma was very close to French presidents, especially Jacques Chirac, who never forgot to applaud electoral farce, including the one of April 2005 when Faure Gnassingbé Eyadéma took over from his late father as president. This rigged election resulted in the slaughter of about one thousand protesters.30 The Central African Republic: Emperor Bokassa I: Jean Bédel Bokassa took over power on 1 January 1966, after a New Year’s Eve coup d'état orchestrated by Foccart. He remained at his post until December 1979. Nicknamed the Soudard (rough-necked soldier) by de Gaulle, Bokassa proclaimed himself president for life in 1972, Marshal in 1974, Muslim in 1976 (in order to please Kadhafi) and Emperor of Central African Republic in 1977, becoming Bokassa I. Five thousand guests were invited to the enthronement ceremony which cost 7 billion CFA francs, including French Minister of Cooperation, Robert Galley. The latter was sent as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s emissary who offered the megalomaniac president a ceremonial sabre. During the first years of his reign, although his regime was depicted as a sanguinary one, it was supported by France which saw it as favouring its interests in the area. Under Bokassa’s presidency, France looted gold, ivory and diamonds, among other things. But things changed in 1976 when Bokassa started to get closer to

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Kadhafi’s Libya, which resulted in the deterioration of relations between France and the Central African Republic. On 21 September 1979, as he was in Libya, Bokassa I was overthrown during operation ‘Barracuda’ ordered by d’Estaing. During this operation, France sent paratroopers to Bangui’s airport to prevent him from going back to his country. Aboard the military aircraft there was also David Dacko, his predecessor and successor. At the same time, the ‘diamonds affair’ was published in the Parisian press. This affair referred to diamonds which were assumed to have been offered to d’Estaing by Bokassa himself. This issue contributed to Giscard d’Estaing’s electoral defeat in 1981.31 Congo-Brazzaville: ELF and Denis Sassou-Nguesso: In 1979, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, supported by ELF, took over power in CongoBrazzaville. Under his first dictatorship (from February 1979 to August 1992), France and ELF were very glad about their privileged oil exploitation conditions. Indeed, the Congolese president asked ELF to pay his country only 17% of declared oil production taxes and turned a blind eye to the undeclared production. Thus, he spent more money than he earned, which contributed considerably to the increase in the debt of Congo-Brazzaville. Today, Congo is one of the biggest debtor countries by population in the world with a foreign debt amounting to 9.2 billion dollars for a country of just over three million inhabitants. Furthermore, he operated a reign of terror, killing more than 3,000 people. Not surprisingly, he lost the 1992 election, handing over power to Pascal Lissouba. The latter increased the oil tax from 17% to 33% and made an agreement with the American company, Occidental Petroleum. In other words, Pascal Lissouba did not hesitate to put an end to ELF’s privileges. Consequently, ELF launched a civil war from the summer of 1997 to 1998/1999, so as to bring Denis Sassou-Nguesso back to power. During this petroleum war set up and financed by ELF and several French banks, Sassou-Nguesso’s Cobra militia slaughtered and/or raped thousands of men, women and children. The number of people killed is estimated at 100,000. It is to be noted that the Congolese dictator was helped by the Angolan and Chadian armies, as well as a troop of mercenaries formed and trained by Paul Barril.32 Denis Sassou-Nguesso went back to power in October 1997 and he has been at his post ever since. As for Pascal Lissouba, he has been living in exile between the UK and France. Dictator Sassou-Nguesso is Jacques Chirac’s personal friend and is Omar Bongo’s father-in-law – he got married to his elder daughter in August 1990.33

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Gabon: El Hadj Omar Bongo, the Oldest Dictator of Françafrique: Omar Bongo reigned over Gabon for forty-two years. In 1967, he succeeded Léon M’ba (first president of Gabon). Like his predecessor, who was not in favour of decolonization, Omar Bongo was set up as the leader of Gabon by Jacques Foccart with the consent of de Gaulle. Since his enthronement, he had always been re-elected through rigged elections supported by France, resorting to political assassination when it was necessary (like Germain M’ba who was assassinated by Bob Denard on 18 September 1971).34 Omar Bongo was a typical product of French neocolonialism in Africa, allowing France, through companies like Total, ELF, Pechiney, and individuals like Jacques Foccart, Bob Denard and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, among others, to plunder Gabon’s exceptional mineral resources: oil, uranium, wood, manganese and lithium. It is important to stress that for decades, Bongo had an impact on French politics, putting up money for most of the French political parties, including the National Front, through ELF Gabon, which has created a sort of reversed colonialism. For example, in January 2008, Jean-Marie Bockel, then Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophony, announced to the media his intention to put an end to Françafrique. Bongo, displeased by such statements, immediately ordered his removal from the French government. Two months later, in March 2008, Bockel resigned from his post. Since then, his political duties consisted in helping war veterans. This anecdote enables an understanding of the nature of the influence exerted by Bongo on French politics. It also provides information about Sarkozy’s African politics. It seems that he did not distinguish himself from his predecessors. Moreover, it must be emphasized that in May 2007, Bongo was the first foreign president to be welcomed at the Élysée palace just after Sarkozy took office.35 Chad: Idriss Déby Case: Chad was created by France after a real military conquest: “Ndjamena has been chosen as an air base because of the efficiency of the location from a military point of view and because of the support we give to President Déby” (author’s translation), pointed out Defence Minister, Alain Richard, in July 1997.36 Idriss Déby has been head of state of Chad since 1 December 1990 when he overthrew his former brother-in-arms, Hissène Habré,37 with the help of France, its army and secret service. France’s interest in Chad is mainly in oil. Since Déby took over power, he has always been re-elected (in 1996, 2001 and 2006), thanks to ballot rigging. In 2006, he was able to run for election after revising the constitution. In 2004, while visiting in Chad, French Minister Delegate for Cooperation, Development and Francophony, Xavier Darcos,

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said “France supports President Déby who has been democratically elected and it happened two times successively. France also applauds the fact that the National Assembly … has approved the revision of the constitution.”38 Déby is responsible for numerous crimes: first, as chief of staff under Hissène Habré, and subsequently as president from 1990, about 40,000 people were tortured and/or killed. Déby, trained at the École de guerre de Paris, has contributed to the way in which terror, torture, rape and ethnic cleansing have become features of everyday life in Chad as well as in the neighbouring countries of Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Niger and the Central African Republic. He has also contributed to the further pauperization of Chadians despite Chad’s huge petroleum resources. Since 2005-2006, guerrilla movements led by Déby’s own nephews, Timane and Tom Erdimi, have kept trying to overthrow his regime which has been scrupulously defended by France. In February 2008, the French Defence Minister, Hervé Morin, went to Ndjamena to give Déby France’s support. According to the minister, Nicolas Sarkozy’s support “has been permanent.” He added that the French president “has called his Chad counterpart many times, even at the worst time.”39 Cameroon: the Paul Biya Case: According to the former ELF chief executive officer, Loïk Le Floch-Prigent (from 1989 to 1993), Paul Biya was set up as the leader of Cameroon by ELF.40 He succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo (who was set up as the leader of Cameroon by Foccart) as president in 1982. Since then, Biya, like his African counterparts, has always been re-elected, thanks to ballot rigging. Despite the fact that his regime is strongly associated with repression, especially towards journalists and his political opponents, and corruption, Biya has been supported by France for more than twenty-five years. Indeed, his country allows France to make huge profits through companies like ELF, Rougier (wood) and Bolloré (oil, port gates, mining sector among others).41

Conclusion This list of dictators and ‘FrancAfrican’ plots is not exhaustive. France’s support for the dictatorship of Philibert Tsiranana (1960-1972) and Didier Ratsiraka (1975-1993 and 1997-2002) in Madagascar, as well as that of Sese Seko Mobutu’s ‘FrancAfrican’ regime in Zaire (1965-1997) and the many coup attempts orchestrated by France in Sekou Touré’s Guinea qualify as case studies of ‘FrancAfrican’ politics. The setting up and support of dictatorships by France in Francophone Africa since decolonization have allowed France to maintain an exploitative and

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hegemonic neo-colonial system while giving the impression that these countries are truly independent, since they are indeed governed by local individuals who are in reality puppet presidents in the pay of the French state. It should be emphasized that this strategy has enabled France to keep its leading position in international institutions like the UN as these officially independent African countries usually conform to France’s political choices. To conclude, Françafrique is a neo-colonial system, extremely wellorganized and whose main objective is to maintain Francophone African countries under the political, economic, military and diplomatic subjugation of France through, among other things, the setting up of coups d’état, the support given to dictatorships and the misappropriation of the wealth from African mineral resources. Thus, Africans are probably partly responsible for the numerous misfortunes which have been connected with Africa since the era of decolonization. What is certain is that France, through its ‘FrancAfrican’ politics, has hugely contributed to the increase of Africa’s debacles which already are numerous and multifaceted.

Notes 1

Afrique 50, dir. René Vautier, 1950, 20’. This film was directed for the League of Teaching in 1949-1950. Its primary aim ought to have been to increase the prestige of French educative mission in Africa. But once there, René Vautier decided to show another reality: namely, the massacre and looting of African populations by French settlers. Afrique 50, which was banned for more than forty years, caused René Vautier thirteen charges and a one-year prison sentence. 2 MDRM and UPC were violently repressed by the French colonial power. In 1947, French military repression towards MDRM resulted in the death of 89,000 people, which is the figure put forward by the French military at the time. But living witnesses sincerely think that the true figure is between 100,000 and 200,000 people killed. See Jacques Tronchon, L’insurrection malgache de 1947 (Paris: Karthala, 1986), 72-73. In May 1955, in Cameroon, the French colonial government also killed a great number of UPC activists, and on 13 July 1955, a special decree was promulgated outlawing the UPC: Jean-Martin Tchaptchet, Quand les jeunes africains créaient l’histoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006) 234. Also see Richard Joseph, Le mouvement nationaliste au Cameroun: les origines sociales de l’UPC (1946-1958) (Paris : Karthala, 2000). 3 François-Xavier Verschave, France-Afrique : le crime continue (Lyon : éditions tahin party, 2000), 13. 4 Jacques Foccart was de Gaulle’s and then Georges Pompidou’s spin doctor for African and Madagascan policy between 1960 and 1974. See Jacques Foccart and Philippe Gaillard, Foccart parle, entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, tome 2 (Paris: Fayard/ Jeune Afrique, 1997); Jacques Foccart and Philippe Gaillard, Foccart

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parle, entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, tome 1 (Paris: Fayard/ Jeune Afrique, 1995) and Pierre Péan, L’homme de l’ombre (Paris: Fayard, 1990). 5 François-Xavier Verschave had a passion for the study of the Africa-France relationship. He is considered an authority on Françafrique and ‘FrancAfrican’ politics. See François-Xavier Verschave and Philippe Hauser, Au mépris des peuples. Le néocolonialisme franco-africain (Paris : La Fabrique éditions, 2004) ; François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République (Paris : Stock, 2003) ; François-Xavier Verschave, Noir Chirac (Paris : Éditions les Arènes, 2002) ; François-Xavier Verschave, France-Afrique: le crime continue ; and François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique? (Paris : Éditions les Arènes, 2000). 6 Survie is a non-profit organization whose main goal is to inform the citizens and their elected representatives about the evils of Françafrique. Survie also campaigns for a reform of French politics in Africa. Among other things, the organization publishes the Billets d’Afrique and Les Dossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France. See . 7 Agir ici/ Survie, Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France n°7. FranceCameroun, Croisement dangereux ! (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1996), 8-9. 8 Fric is a French slang for cash. Boubacar Boris Diop, Odile Tobner and FrançoisXavier Verschave, Négrophobie (Paris : Éditions les Arènes, 2005), 106. 9 Ibid., 106-107. 10 “Présence militaire française en Afrique : dérives …,” in Agir ici/ Survie, Dossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France n° 1 à 5 (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1996), 215. 11 “Accords de défense,” Mouvement Ivoirien pour la défense des Institutions de la République de Côte d’Ivoire, 2004-2007, http://www.midici.com/midi/?midi= detailart&idart=1204, (accessed on 9 June 2008). 12 Pierre Mouandjo B. Lewis, L’économie politique de l’Afrique au XXIe siècle (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2002), 296. 13 For example, “‘bags loaded with bank notes’ going out of Cameroon represent about 20 billion French francs in 11 years (1983-1993)”: Agir ici/ Survie, Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France n°7. France-Cameroun, Croisement dangereux !, 9. 14 Mamadou Koulibaly in Ruth Tete and Soh Taadhieu, “How France lives off Francophone Africa via the CFA franc,” New African, 1 January 2008. 15 Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Violence politique et conflits en Afrique : le cas du Tchad (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2006), 267. 16 François-Xavier Verschave, France-Afrique : le crime continue, op. cit., 27-28. 17 Ibid., 27. 18 ELF was created in 1967 by Pierre Guillaumat, former French soldier and secret agent. 19 Africa is the very first foreign continent on which the company set up branches in the 1960s. 20 Yves Ekoué Amaïzo, “Crises et rébellions dans le ‘pré carré’ français. Ce qui paralyse le pouvoir ivoirien,” Le Monde diplomatique (Paris : January 2003), 2021.

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Ibid. Ibid. 23 The first France-Africa summit was held on 13 November 1973 in Paris during Georges Pompidou’s presidency. 24 See Jean-Marc Kalflèche, “Houphouët-Boigny tel qu’on le voyait en 1985. Le sage de l’Afrique”, L’Express.fr, http://www.lexpress.fr/info/monde/dossier/ cotedivoire/dossier.asp?ida=418739&p=1 (accessed on 11 June 2008). 25 In 1989, the Félix Houphouët-Boigny Prize was created in the search for peace under the patronage of UNESCO. 26 See “Certains socialistes français soutiennent l’aspirant génocidaire Gbagbo,” Le Monde, 8 November 2004 in Minorités.org, 13 novembre 2004, http://www. minorites.org/article.php?IDA=4426 (accessed on 11 June 2008). 27 In October 2004, the first secretary of the French socialist party, François Hollande, declared “Gbagbo est infréquentable,” “Méfiance, vous avez dit méfiance?”, Jeune afrique.com, 11 février 2007, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ pays/cote_ivoire/article_jeune_afrique.asp?art_cle=LIN11027mfianecnaif0 (accessed on 11 June 2008). 28 See François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit. ; Pierre Nandjui, Houphouët-Boigny : l’homme de la France en Afrique (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2000), and Samba Diarra, Les faux complots d’Houphouët-Boigny (Paris : Karthala, 1997). 29 See Bruno Jaffré, Biographie de Thomas Sankara : la patrie ou la mort (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2007), and Frédéric Lejeal, “Sankara et la France : secrets de famille,” Jeune afrique.com, 22 octobre 2007, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ jeune_afrique/article_jeune_afrique.asp?art_cle=LIN22107sankaellima0 (accessed on 11 June 2008). 30 See Jean-François Juliard, “Eyadéma, l’encombrant ‘ami personnel’ de Chirac,” Le Canard enchaîné (Paris: 9 February 2005) 4; Monique Mas, “De la présidence Eyadéma à la dynastie Gnassingbé,” RFI, 7 February 2005, http://www.rfi.fr/ actufr/articles/062/article_33840.asp (accessed on 12 June 2008), and FrançoisXavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit. 31 Emmanuel Germain, La Centrafrique et Bokassa 1965-1979 – Force et déclin d’un pouvoir personnel (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2001) ; François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique ?; and Géraldine Faes and Stephen Smith, Bokassa Ier un empereur français (Paris : Grasset, 2000). Also see the following documentary: Lionel Chomarat and Jean-Claude Chuzeville, Bokassa: l’entrevue interdite, 2001, 53. 32 Paul Barril, former officer of the French national Gendarmerie and notorious mercenary in the pay of France, participated in the creation of the Élysée antiterrorist unit under François Mitterrand’s presidency. Besides his involvement in Congo, Barril is also known to have played an active role in Cote d’Ivoire and Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s. 33 Read : François-Xavier Verschave, Noir Chirac, op. cit. and François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique ? 22

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34 Pierre Péan, Affaires Africaines (Paris: Fayard, 1983) 13. Bob Denard, deceased in 2007 in Paris, was a notorious mercenary who was involved in numerous postcolonial conflicts, in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Benin, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Comoro Islands and Gabon, where moreover he was an instructor of the presidential guard. 35 “Quand Omar Bongo se réjouit du remaniement ministériel français,” Libération.fr, 20 March 2008, http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde /316795. FR.php?rss=true&xtor=RSS-450 (accessed on 21 June 2008) ; François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit. ; François-Xavier Verschave, Noir Chirac; Omar Bongo and Airy Routier, Blanc comme nègre : entretiens avec Airy Routier (Paris : Grasset, 2001) ; and Pierre Péan, Affaires Africaines. 36 Alain Richard (30 July 1997) in François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique ?, 167. 37 Hissène Habré was himself imposed upon the Chadian people by France. 38 Agence France-Presse, Friday 28 May 2004, 06.36 pm, in The African Independent, 2003, http://www.africaindependent.com/chad-chirac-soutien-deby. html (accessed on 14 July 2008). 39 Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Violence politique et conflits en Afrique : le cas du Tchad; Ngarlegy Yorongar, Tchad : le procès d’Idriss Déby (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2003); François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique ? and Agir ici/ Survie, Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France n°13. Projet pétrolier Tchad-Cameroun : Dés pipés sur le pipe-line (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1999). 40 Survie, Billets d’Afrique, June 2003, http://survie-france.org/IMG/doc/NUM 115.doc (accessed on 14 July 2008). 41 Agir ici/Survie, Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France n°7. FranceCameroun, Croisement dangereux !

CHAPTER TWELVE THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA EMMANUEL ONYEOZILI AND O. OKO ELECHI

Introduction The concept of human rights is not alien to Africa. The principles and values of equality, individual rights, autonomy and freedom are consistent with African cultural values. African communities respect and protect the rights of their people. Traditional African societies were in the main egalitarian, and practiced participatory democracy. All adults in the community had equal access to the political and judicial institutions of the society and therefore were able to participate in the decision making process. It is, however, important to point out that the patriarchal values of African society interfered with the full enjoyment of some of these rights by women. The challenges to women’s full participation in political and social activities in Africa are some of the issues addressed in this chapter. Out of space constraints, we are limiting our discussion of contentious human rights issues in contemporary Africa to mostly gender issues. The issues selected for discussion in this chapter are also issues that can be generalized for many African societies. Further constraints to the respect and promotion of human rights in Africa include the imposition of a hierarchical and undemocratic political system by colonialism. Other impediments to the full enjoyment of human rights in Africa include poverty, underdevelopment, dehumanizing traditions, corruption, among others. It is pertinent also to point out that the principles of human rights are not set in a vacuum. They reflect the socio-economic and political conditions of the time and are constantly evolving. The definition of human rights and their implementation are continuously negotiated between the political authorities and the people. As such, it is the political framework of the society that is crucial to whether the human rights of the people are respected and promoted. This

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chapter examines the state of human rights in contemporary Africa. It reviews the efforts put in place by African governments to protect and promote the human rights of African peoples.

The Concept of Human Rights The idea of human rights is based on the assumption that as human beings there are certain rights which we are entitled to regardless of our station in life, for which governments are obliged to protect and promote. Governments are also expected to refrain from certain acts that jeopardize the rights of their people. Human rights, therefore, constitute the basis of political morality. Underpinning this principle is the rule of law doctrine that all human beings are equal before the law, and should be so protected by the law. The social contract theory espoused by the Enlightenment philosophers is relevant to the understanding of human rights. It states that citizens entered into agreement with one another to form a society, government, law and order. Believing that individual rights and needs are better protected when they act as a unified force, they formed a government and made laws. The people as a result gave their mandate to the government to look after them and in return will be accountable to them. Above all, the acts of governmental agencies are defined and circumscribed by law. Human rights as a value-loaded concept emanate from two major sources – religious and secular. Advocates of the religious origin of rights, according to Ishay (1997), claim that God is the source of the “universal principles of morality and duties guiding all human interactions” (p.xiii). The sources of these ideas and values are located in their various scriptures which were divinely revealed. Those who subscribe to the secular origin of rights are by no means unanimous. Liberals, for example, observes Ishay (1997:xiii), “place great emphasis on private property, equality before the law, and political liberty. Socialists (or progressive thinkers) stress economic equality as a precondition for political freedom and legal equity.” Ishay further notes that these rights positions are still not inclusive enough, as groups representing the interests of women, gays, and ethnic minorities insist these rights advocates have excluded them. For scholarly discourse, Ishay, citing the prominent French jurist, Karel Vasek, acknowledged three normative human rights traditions. They include the first generation of rights associated with the Enlightenment philosophers. These philosophers challenged the prevailing notion at the time that the monarch’s source of political authority was divine and, therefore, he was only accountable to God for his actions. Their insistence that the king’s mandate to rule was

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from the people and that he was thereby accountable to the people was the precursor of the liberal and civil rights tradition. The second generation of rights, according to this perspective, was developed during the nineteenth century by the Marxian school of thought which championed the social and economic rights of the people. The third generation of rights, notes Ishay, is often associated with the demands of post-colonial African, South American and Asian countries for their right to development and self-determination. Other commentators have further classified human rights into two broad conceptions, namely, negative and positive rights. It has been argued that the goal of negative rights proclamation is the protection of the individual from the oppression of the state and also from other individuals that may be so inclined to trample upon other citizens’ rights (see Elechi, 2004). The protection of these categories of rights is the target of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution, observes Weisheit and Morn (2004). Generally known as personal rights, they include such rights as the inviolability of the individual’s mind and body, and the right of the individual to exercise her conscience as she is free to think and express freely her opinions. The right of the individual to privacy and to exercise sovereignty over one’s body is included in these categories of rights. The goal of the positive rights doctrine, they note, recognizes that individuals have “rights to food, clothing, medical care, education, and housing” (p.31). The assumption is that it is only when these basic rights are met that individuals are able to actively and meaningfully participate in the political and social affairs of their community. The snag, however, according to Weisheit and Morn (2004), is that these rights are not actionable, as they represent statements of entitlement rather than protection.

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights The impetus for the internationalization of human rights could be attributed to the action of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president of the United States. In 1941, in his letter to the United States Congress, as part of his State of the Union address, President Roosevelt identified what he considered to be the four basic freedoms that every human being should be entitled to: “freedom of speech and expression; freedom of every person to worship God; freedom from want; and freedom from fear” (see Ishay 1997:xxxvi). The protection and promotion of human rights in a free world was the rationale for America’s intervention on behalf of the coalition forces against Hitler during the Second World War. The freedom principles and the trauma of the war on the world facilitated the formation

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of the United Nations and its Declaration of the Universal Human Rights on December 10, 1948. The objective of the declaration of human rights by the United Nations was for the principles contained in the declaration to act “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples” (see Alderson 1984:9). The UN Charter further reaffirmed the “dignity and worth of the human person” and the “equality of rights of men and women” (see Ishay 1997:xxxvii). The ideological divide entailed by the Cold War made it difficult for the world leaders at the time to reach agreement on the basic human rights standards. The Western countries were interested in the protection and promotion of civil and political rights, while countries in the Eastern Bloc were more interested in the protection and promotion of social and economic rights. As Ishay (1997:xxxvii) has rightly observed, “the rights ratified in the Declaration were supposed to gradually become a legally binding treaty, supervised by institutions and mechanisms of enforcement. Yet a dispute arose among the members of the Commission on Human Rights regarding the link between civil and political rights, on one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other hand.” Elechi (2004) identified the rights protected under the civil and political rights, popularly referred to as the first generation rights, namely, the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, the right to liberty and security; equality before the law; and freedom of thought. The second generation rights, known as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are geared towards the protection of such rights as the right to work, the right to favorable conditions of work, the right to social security, the right to education, and the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. The ultimate goal of the human rights declarations, despite the differences in approach as reflected by the first and second generations of rights, is the recognition that as human beings we are endowed with inalienable rights, integrity and dignity. Mahmoud (1993:487) succinctly captures the letter and spirit of the Declaration thus: Because there is but a single definition of man, so there can be but a single measure of man … Its dimensions are the fixed drives of human nature and all the elemental pleasures and pains of the flesh; the human spirit, with all its intuitions, feelings, fantasies and impulses, which seek the good, the true and the beautiful; and the power of the human mind, which is the basis of man’s claim to dignity and worth, to freedom and justice.

Human rights, as Elechi (2004) has observed, emanate from a negotiated Bill of Rights between the people and their political authorities.

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Human rights constitute a framework that defines and delineates the rights and duties of the people and the authority and powers of the political leadership. The framework raises questions about the legitimacy of the political leadership and the basis for demanding accountability from the political authorities. Pena (see Elechi 2004) describes human rights as “protections against arbitrary deprivations of life and liberty; it, therefore, includes notions of due process (i.e., fair trial, right to confront witnesses and present evidence, appeal, etc.).” In the same vein, Lauren (1998:11) insists that “the issue of human rights addresses age-old and universal questions about the relationship between individuals and their larger society, and thus is one that has been raised across time and across cultures.” Article II of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen by the French National Assembly of August 27, 1789 captures the values and principles of human rights with the following statement: The end in view of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man” (as cited in Waldron (1984:1). Waldron’s provided explanation of the essence of human rights is that “government must be set up and constitutions structured in such a way that it becomes impossible for individual rights to be pushed aside for the sake of the private interests of those in power or even in pursuit of other social goals and aspirations. (ibid)

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Human rights activists, both within and outside Africa, concerned with the state of human rights in post-colonial Africa persuaded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish a mechanism for the protection and promotion of human rights in the continent. Consequent upon this, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberated and passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary General of the Organization to constitute a committee of experts to draft an “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which among other things to provide a mechanism to promote and protect the rights of the African people” (African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies). The mission of the Centre is the implementation of Article 25 of the African Charter “which requires States Parties to promote and ensure, through teaching, education and publication, respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights, as well as corresponding obligations are understood” (ibid.). Upon ratification

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by a simple majority of OAU membership, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights came into force in Banjul on October 21, 1986. Elechi (2004:6) notes that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights underscores the cultural dimension of human rights. As a regional initiative it is geared towards the promotion of human rights that are relevant to African peoples at this stage of their economic and technological development. Ideologically speaking, the Charter reflects their “world-outlook, legal philosophy, collective developmental needs and peculiar circumstances and autonomy.” Popularly known as the third generation rights, the African Charter, in line with African communitarian values, seeks the protection of national interests and rights, rather than the individual rights per se. Included in these rights, therefore, are the rights to self-determination, liberation, and equality of all peoples and states; the right to international peace and security; the right to use one’s resources; the right to development; the right to satisfactory environment and the right of national minorities. The rationale for the focus on national rather than individual rights, and to development, according to Robertson (1982), is because The economic development of underdeveloped countries is necessary for their social well-being and political stability, without which they cannot ensure effectively the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights announced in the major international texts and that therefore the ‘right to development’ is a human right. (Mahmoud 1993:488)

Believing that the Charter will remain a paper tiger and ineffective in protecting the rights of human rights victims without an independent African human rights court, the African Union (the successor to the OAU) established the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This court was established on January 25, 2004 and located in Arusha, Tanzania. This court mediates on African states’ compliance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. To further support the human rights efforts of African governments, non-governmental organizations through the support of their governments and other international organizations have also emerged and organized to pressure their governments to respect and put in place mechanisms for the promotion of human rights in their countries.

The Human Rights Situation in Contemporary Africa In contemporary Africa, as in other parts of the world, reconciliation of good government with human rights issues continues to dominate national

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and local debates. The question that confronts governments is whether they can stand up and defend the violation of any, or part of these rights they have universally agreed to protect, especially the treatment of women. The failure of states to preserve the human rights of their citizens has been attributed to situations and circumstances that confront the African society. These situations are exacerbated by both natural and man-made circumstances. Among these circumstances is the nature of the African indigenous culture which extends into the contemporary society. Detestable cultural and harmful traditional practices which implicate human rights include the bail system, inheritance laws, early marriage or betrothal system, widowhood, infanticide and female genital mutilation. Nigeria, as an example, is a society governed by three main legal frameworks: the common law, the customary law and the Sharia law. The religion and culture of the people involved, and the area of jurisdiction where a case originates govern the application of the legal frameworks. The custom and tradition of the people influence the customary law, while the Sharia law is influenced by the Islamic religion. The English law, on the other hand, influences the common law. There are those who argue that this system of legal frameworks is complicated and confusing because of the difficulty involved in determining who is using what law, when, and how this law is being applied, especially as it affects women (Akumadu, 1998). However, the prevailing common opinion is that the customary law is practiced mostly in the Christian-dominated parts of Southern Nigeria, while the Sharia law is practiced mostly in the Islamic north of the country. The common law on its own is applicable in all parts of the country. Of these three types of law, women are most discriminated against under the customary law. As defined by the Evidence Act (Cap 112, Section 1, Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990), the customary law is “a rule which in a particular district has from long usage, obtained the force of law.” Viewed from this perspective, it is a system of law established to serve the peculiar needs of the local people, and obtains legitimacy from long usage. There is a variety of customary laws applicable to different ethnic groupings based on the custom and religion of the particular community group. In an attempt to determine the factors that influence the application of this law, Oli (1985) stated that the customary law that govern a community is closely linked and, in fact, inseparable from the tradition and religion of that particular community. This is only rational because different ethnic groupings have different cultural traits, some of which are similar, while others differ significantly.

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Functionally, it was created as a means of controlling behavior and ensuring compliance with the law and customs of the people. It is therefore a mechanism that provides a social control function for the traditional society. Jeffery (1990) echoed this social control function when he stated that “primitive tribes are governed by customs, tradition, magic and witchcraft” (p.49) which form the law of the society. Malinowski (1926) presented it better when he argued that “primitive social systems are governed by customs, which is enforced by reciprocity or a body of binding obligations … kept in force by specific mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society” (p.58). Hoebel (1954), on the other hand, views customary law as a form of law highly influenced by social norm. He recognizes the legality of the institution when he stated that “a social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met by the application of physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting” (p.28). Patriarchal ideologies influence women’s position in marital relationships in much of pre-colonial Africa (particularly Nigeria), and are legitimized in the laws governing them. This gender imbalance is most manifest in the customary laws governing widowhood practices, inheritance laws, child custody, divorce, bride price and polygamy. From a gender perspective, the customary laws constitute a social control mechanism that regulates gender relations and govern the rights and privileges of men and women. It was created by men to inferiorize women and subjugate them to discriminatory practices under the banner of custom and tradition. This inferiorization process may be what Akumadu (1998) had in mind when she stated that “customary laws are subjected to the 1979 constitution as amended. However, instead of statutes over-riding customary laws where the latter are found to be obnoxious, they have been used to entrench objectionable customary laws,” (p.14) especially where women are concerned.

Culture and Customary/Sharia Law In most African countries, the treatment of women is shaped by cultural practices of subordination and devaluation. Using the Nigerian example, the authors argue as human rights violation the ‘second class position’ imposed on Nigerian women by the customary law provisions and the role of antiquated ‘sacred’ customs and traditions in upholding and sustaining this injustice. We further highlight the difficulty in the modification of these practices, considering the ‘royal’ legitimizing sanctity used to clothe them by colonial codification and enforcement by

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the judiciary, including the 1979 constitution as amended. Some subject areas such as polygamy laws, widowhood practices, inheritance laws, child custody, divorce, bride price, and female genital mutilation are discussed. Polygamy: Polygamy is one of the two forms of marriages recognized in Nigeria. It is a marriage relationship which empowers a man to simultaneously marry two or more women, or the voluntary union of one man with two or more women. A key characteristic of this union is that it allows a man to marry as many wives as he can afford and legitimately refer to them as his wives. The only requirement is the payment of bride price to the girl’s parents and the acceptance of such by the parents of the proposed bride. The monogamous marriage, on the other hand, is one that does not recognize multiplicity of wives. It is based on the principle of one man, one wife to the exclusion of others. It is also a facet of the Christian faith. Legislatively, it has found acceptance under most of the common law practices in the country, and is governed by the Marriage Act and the Matrimonial Causes Decree of 1970. Although this form of marriage guarantees more legal equality to women in marital relationships, in practice it is the customary law practice which prevails. The institutionalization of polygamy finds expression in the customary law. This law which governs polygamy is a codification of the native law and custom of a particular group of people as it governs gender relationship in marriage. However, the institution of polygamy may be viewed as a violation of the human rights and privileges of women which are detrimental to the health and general well-being of women and children of the marriage. It generates intrigue, conflict, competition, suspicion and sometimes physical aggression among the wives in their quest for the love and attention of the common husband. This breeds unfriendliness which promotes stress in the home and on the individuals, including children of the family. The culture of primogeniture, whereby inheritance is handed down to the male children through the first son, further intensifies the stress for the wives in each woman’s quest for male children to inherit the common husband’s property. This promotes male child preference and infanticide through abortion to terminate female fetus in the bid for more male children. It also promotes excessively large families as the women compete to have more male children for the man and in the process breed more children than otherwise. Both polygamy and male child preference

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show inadequate regards for women and relegate them to second class citizenship. Bride price: The bride price is the cash payment made by the groom and his family to the bride’s parents and relations before he finally takes his bride home as his wife. It is a traditional requirement which legitimizes marriage and gives recognition to a man as the husband of a girl. The payment of the bride price is the most important requirement for marriage to take place among most African cultural groups, and is recognized by the customary law system as evidence of a traditional marriage. The amount of money paid to the bride’s parents depends on her level of education, beauty, and the wealth of her suitor. The higher the price, the more proud the parents of the bride become. Normally, the bride price is negotiated between both families, and has been interpreted in some quarters as the root cause of women powerlessness in marital relationships. Those who criticize it feel that it reduces women to the level of a commodity to be bought, used and discarded as it assigns monetary value to a girl based on her perceived worth. It also puts women in bondage without giving them much choice to get out of a bad marriage. The payment of bride price symbolizes that women have been purchased and, until they return the man’s bride price, they continue to be the man’s personal property, even when they no longer live together. According to Akumadu (1998), The bride price symbolizes a man’s payment to purchase a wife. Upon the dissolution of the marriage in the event that the man is not satisfied with the purchased ‘item’, either for misconduct or inability to produce male children or any other reasons for that matter, the woman continues to be his property until the bride price is returned to him.

In practice, therefore, these women being aware of the price paid for them in marriage try their best to endure oppression in their homes and work extra hard to make their marriage work, albeit enduring at their own cost. Atsenuwa (1993) views the bride price as a dehumanizing cultural practice and a violation of women’s right. It is of interest to note that since the bride price is not paid to the woman sought in marriage but to her guardian or parent and since receipt or acceptance of the same validly seals the marriage agreement, the consent of the woman sought in marriage may be disregarded. It is in this area that the woman’s right to be treated with dignity as any other human being is much abused.

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Some argue that bride price was traditionally instituted to symbolize respect and value attached to womanhood. Recently, however, especially since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program by the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s, and the harsh economic situation that followed, there has been tremendous increase in the amount of bride price demanded by parents of would-be brides. This has had a most devastating effect on the lives of women and girls and has added to their woes and devaluation. Most of the girls are left unmarried because prospective suitors could not find enough money to pay the bride price (to ‘buy’ them). In some cultures, like in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the bride price is paid in ‘heads’ of cattle. The end result is the noticeable increase in the number of girl prostitutes, and for the young men increased frustration. In discussing the increase in bride price, Akumadu (1998) argued that it creates tension and frustration for the man especially when it results to a “situation where prospective suitors have to hand over all their savings to pay the bride price at the time of marriage”. Furthermore, in assessing the implication of this practice in the lives of women in marital relationships, she states that Having purchased her, it is a matter of what is contingent for the man to do with his item and many women find that they have neither love nor respect in their husbands’ home. She is expected to do his bidding. This not only robs the woman of prestige and dignity but also ensures that she is not taken into account in decision-making in her home and is completely treated as a non-entity by her husband and his people.

The customary court recognizes a marriage only when the bride price is paid and divorce only when the bride price has been returned to the man’s family. Without this refund the customary court considers the marriage as still valid. Divorce: Divorce can be obtained under the customary, statutory and Islamic laws. Under the statutory law, Section 15 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) provides for dissolution of a marriage on several grounds. These include adultery, desertion, separation, and behavioral conducts which the petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to endure. Such conducts include attempt to murder or inflict grievous bodily harm on the petitioner. Other grounds for granting divorce under statutory law include refusal to consummate marriage, three years separation, respondents consent to the divorce, presumption of death, and failure to

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comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. The man or the woman can initiate the divorce. Compared to statutory law, divorce under customary law is less favorable to women. The statutory law provisions give women more right than the customary provisions. Under customary law, divorce is permitted and either of the two parties can initiate it. However, there are no standard grounds for the dissolution as is obtained under the statutory law. Cultural and traditional influences on customary law practices often provide other non-judicial ways of divorce, most often to the detriment of women. The position of women under the Islamic law is the worst of the three. Under this law, women are stripped of all rights to institute a divorce. Islamic law allows only a husband to divorce his wife and by simply pronouncing ‘I divorce you’ three times in a row. Child Custody: Under customary law, the father has exclusive right to the custody of the children of the marriage. This provision probably has its root in patriarchy, and the bride price factor which commodifies women as articles to be purchased and owned. It is a common occurrence to hear that a woman has children for a man but never for herself. When a husband dies, the custody of the children belongs to the family of the man. The woman only has temporary custody when she is still nursing the child and the family of the man finds her worthy to take this responsibility. There are variations to this practice; for instance, the customary law of the Igbira community in Nigeria requires that all children must have a woman’s care until they reach the age of seven. It is therefore worthy to note that a woman’s care in this case is not necessarily that of the mother of the child. A husband or his relatives (if he is dead) may appoint any woman other than the mother as the custodian of the child. In some cases where divorce is involved, the husband takes custody and transfers the mothering of the child to his new or other wives. Some scholars believe that of all Nigerian customary law practices, women are most disadvantaged in the area of child custody (Akumadu, 1998; Henderson, 1972). This is because patriarchal customary law practices recognize children as belonging only to the father. In exceptional cases where custody is given to the mother, she is made to understand that she is keeping the child only temporarily, and in trust for the husband. The low economic status of women adds to reinforce this imbalance as most women find it difficult to adequately cater for the upkeep of their children. Olokodana, a grade ‘A’ customary court president, in his paper “Giving a Human Face to Adjudication of Cases of Wife Battering” (1998), noted this problem when he stated that women are reluctant to allow the court to

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jail their offending husbands because they have no means of livelihood besides the husbands. The statutory law practices are more favorable to women than the customary law in case of child custody. The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, gave the mother equal right with the father in child custody cases. The overriding factor in deciding who keeps the child is hinged on the interest of the child, as determined by the presiding judge. The factors taken into consideration in making this decision include conduct of the parties, arrangements for their accommodation, education and welfare. Other factors considered are the ability of each parent to give the child good parental upbringing, the ages and sex of the children and his/her expressed wish on whom he/she desires to live with, if necessary. Widowhood Practices: When a woman’s husband dies, the widow is subjected to certain oppressive and dehumanizing treatments. These treatments are often governed by the cultural and societal conduct codes of the particular ethnic group, and vary between cultures. They range from seclusion and isolation to being put on public display. The widow may be required to sleep on bare floor, eat from broken dishes, and sometimes assume certain sitting posture that discomforts the woman. They may also be required to neglect personal appearance and body hygiene. In some African cultures, the widow is forced to drink water that has been used to wash her husband’s body and/or may be required to take an oath to prove her innocence or otherwise in the death of her husband. Additionally, the widow may, during the period of mourning, be forced to shave her hair and to demonstrate an exaggerated show of grief by screaming and wailing uncontrollably for days on end. Widow inheritance is one of the widowhood practices that directly violates a widow’s marital, procreative and sexual choices. It is a practice that requires that the brothers of the deceased husband inherit the widow. Functionally, it serves to promote the notion of women as property to be inherited and as invalids to be protected and guarded by a man. Where the widow is young and the man’s family is not considered complete, a family ‘caretaker’ may be appointed to procreate, and manage the deceased man’s estate and to help provide for the widow and her children. Widow inheritance within the culture falls under the principle of kin identification with one another and as a means of reproducing structural relations within the family circle. There are indications, however, that widow inheritance is optional rather than mandatory. It may also be the case that a widow with a grown son would not enter into such a relationship. With an adult male heir, such a woman would not be under

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pressure to be inherited to procure more children for the dead husband. Rather she would depend on her grown up sons to continue the procreation for the family and provide her with necessary financial assistance. In such cases and others where the widow’s sexual right is recognized, she is allowed to take a lover of her own choice. If the widow decides to remarry, however, she loses the custody of her children, although she may be allowed to visit them occasionally. Widow inheritance is an extension of the patrilineal tendencies inherent in the bride price marriage arrangement and the resultant transfer of a woman’s reproductive right to her husband. She is a property paid for which can only be inherited and not to inherit. This is because a property cannot inherit another property. The payment of the bride price validates this transfer of right. The philosophy and ideology of the bride price have implications for the reproductive and human rights of women in Nigeria. It strips them of their rights to their deceased husband’s property, the custody of the children of the marriage, their conjugal and affinal rights in marriage relationships and the option of divorce and remarriage, if conducted under the customary court system. Presently, there are no laws against widow inheritance and widowhood practices. What semblance of law that exists are the customary court legal provisions which promote and reinforce the existing injustice under the cover of culture and at the expense of women. The most disheartening of this denial of rights is the denial of a widow’s right to inherit her husband’s property. This economic loss is often aggravated by further financial loss through prolonged funeral rites and money paid to female inlaws by the widow during the funeral rites. Succession Rights: Under the customary law system, a widow has no right to her husband’s property. When a man dies without a son, his brother and relatives take over his property in what may be termed looting, without regard to the widow’s joint or individual contribution. Among some ethnic groups, for instance the Igbos, only the male children can inherit their father’s property. For the Yoruba ethnic group, the law is more flexible for the female offspring. The application of the Yoruba law of succession provides that when a man dies leaving a large estate his daughter may choose to remain unmarried in her father’s house and raise up children in her father’s name while administering his estate. If, however, she dies without any child, the patrilineal law of succession is applied. If she has a male son, he will take over the succession, and if there is more than one son, the eldest son will inherit the property. Where they are only daughters, one of them may decide to stay unmarried and raise

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her children at home while administering the family’s estate just like her mother did. Although the statutory law practice provides more protection to widows than the customary law, in practice however, it is the customary law that applies. Simply put, the system which allows a man and his relatives to switch from one legal provision to another encourages the family member of the deceased man to enforce the rights conferred by the customary law in challenge of the statutory law provisions. Reproductive/Health Issues (Female Genital Mutilation): It has been indicated that a lot of unequal practices abound in Africa with regard to differential treatment of women in a custom-driven male-dominated culture. Furthermore, the unfair and unequal treatment, e.g., female genital mutilation (FGM), is sanctioned or condoned by the social and legal system. Most critically, research evidence (Religious Tolerance.org, 2008) shows that the findings correspond with other UN-funded studies elsewhere. For example, in addition to other social conditions, it has become clearer that FGM is practiced in more than thirty countries of the world, including the West (WHO Report, 1995). Female genital cutting (FGC), also known as female genital mutilation or female circumcision, refers to "all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs whether for cultural, religious or other non-therapeutic reasons (Wikipedia). The procedures were once commonly referred to as female circumcision (FC), but the terms female genital mutilation and female genital cutting are now dominant throughout the international community. The term is used to describe traditional, cultural, and religious procedures that parents endorse for the cutting of their children. It does not include procedures generally done with self-consent (such as labiaplasty and vaginoplasty, or procedures used in gender reassignment surgery, and the genital modification of intersexuals). Following its human rights violation implications, the term female genital mutilation was adopted in 1990 at the third conference of the InterAfrican Committee on Traditional Practices affecting the Health of Women and Children (IAC) in Addis Ababa. In 1991, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended that the UN adopt this terminology, and subsequently it has been widely used in UN documents Amnesty International estimates that over 130 million women worldwide have been affected by some form of FGC, with over two million procedures being performed every year especially in Africa. Highest prevalence rates (98%) are reported for Somalia (3,773,000) and

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Djibouti (196,000). Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Eritrea have high prevalence rates, with Uganda and Zaire having the lowest rates. The WHO classifies FGM into four major types, namely: Type I (Sunna) FGM is the partial or total removal of the clitoris (clitoridectomy) and/or the prepuce (clitoral hood). This is found most commonly in West African countries like Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Type II FGM is partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision). It is most commonly found in Burkina Faso and Sudan. Type III (Pharaonic circumcision or infibulation) FGM is followed by sewing up of the vulva narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and repositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris. It is most commonly practiced in Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. Type IV FGM which may not involve tissue removal includes “all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example, pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization. This includes a diverse range of practices, such as pricking the clitoris with needles, burning or scarring the genitals as well as ripping or tearing of the vagina” (Wikipedia).

Frequency of abuse in Africa varies from country to country, and different African countries have introduced laws to eradicate FGM in the face of stiff resistance by some custom-entrenched old local women groups who still practice mutilation in secrecy. Estimated frequencies of practice in some identified African countries are: Burkina Faso (43.4% prevalence, Type I and II); Côte d'Ivoire (44.5% prevalence, Type II) ; Djibouti (90-98% prevalence, Type II); Egypt (78-97% prevalence, Type I, II and III); Eritrea (90-95% prevalence, Type I, II and III); Ghana (915% prevalence, Type I,II and III); Guinea (98.6% prevalence, Type I, II and III); Nigeria (25.1% prevalence, Type I, II and III); Senegal (5-20% prevalence, Type II and III); Sudan (91% prevalence, Type I, II and III); Tanzania (17.6% prevalence, Type II and III); Togo (12% prevalence, Type II); Uganda (. 29 Claude Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, ed., 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 64. 30 Paul Orogun, “‘Blood Diamonds’ and Africa’s Armed Conflicts in the Post Cold-War Era,” World Affairs, 133, no. 3 (2004), 151-161. 31 William Blum, Peter Scott, and Larry Bleidner, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995), 2. 32 Ibid. 33 John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: 1950-1962 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 229-230. 34 Khapoya, The African Experience, 252. 35 Ibid., 201. 12

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Edie, Politics in Africa, 122. Ibid., 122-123. 38 Schraeder, African Politics and Society, 227. 39 Roger Southhall, Democracy in Africa: Moving beyond a Difficult Legacy (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2003), 1. 40 R. Sandbrook, The Politics of Basic Needs (London: Heinemann, 1982); L. Nathan, Crisis Resolution and Conflict Management in Africa (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2003). 41 John Burton, Violence Experienced: The Source of Conflict Violence and Crime and their Prevention (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997). 42 Tom Ogwang, “The Root Causes of Conflict in Ivory Coast”, Africa Portal Backgrounder No. 5, April 2011), 2. Retrieved May 20, 2012 from URL: . 43 Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku, “The Relationship between Poverty, Conflict and Development, Journal of Sustainable Development, 2, no. 1, (2009), 21. 44 Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General, Speech before United Nations Security Council (Geneva: United Nations Security Council, July 26, 2000), 1. Retrieved August 18, 2012 from URL: < http://cyberschoolbus.un.org/briefing /soldiers/soldiers.pdf>. 45 Ibid., 1. 46 Ibid., 2. 47 “Internal Displacement in Africa” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2012), para.3. Retrieved June 12, 2012 from URL: . 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Justin Pini, “Political Violence and the African Refugee Experience”, International Affairs Review, 2012, par. 2. Retrieved June 12, 2012 from URL: . 51 Sixty Years and Counting: UNHCR Global Trends 2010 (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011), 6. 52 Ibid. 53 Pini, “Political Violence and the African Refugee Experience”, par. 2. 54 Ibid., par. 17. 55 Ibid., par. 5. 56 Ibid., par. 8. 57 Ernest Harsch, “Arab Spring Stirs African Hopes and Anxieties”, African Renewal, August 2011, 12. Retrieved August 16, 2012 from URL: . 58 Ibid. 59 Adam Nossiter, “Algerians Belittle Elections, but Not Enough to Protest”, New York Times, May 19, 2012. Retrieved May 26 from URL: . 37

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Harsch, “Arab Spring Stirs African Hopes and Anxieties”, 12. Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Education for Reconciliation, 2012. Retrieved May 13, 2012 from URL: < http://ijr.org.za/edu_rec.php>. 64 Mammo Muchie, “A Theory of Africa as a Unification Nation: A Re-thinking of the Structural Transformation of Africa”, African Sociological Review, 8, no. 2 (2004), 137. 65 Tosin Sulaiman, “Foreign Direct Investment into Africa to Double by 2014: UN”, Reuters Africa, July 6, 2012, par.4-5. Retrieved August 17, 2012 from URL: . 61

PART IV: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE OAU, AU AND THE RESPONSE TO CONFLICT: DE-LINKING DOMESTIC JURISDICTION AND THE CAPACITY TO INTERVENE EHIMIKA A. IFIDON

Africa is the most violent continent in the world.1 In spite of any accomplishment in other areas of cooperation, the success of modern international organizations … is most often judged on the basis of their handling of disputes and their utility in avoiding war. This is the case because of the destructiveness of modern warfare and because of the central role assigned to peace maintenance in establishing these organizations.2

Introduction Africa has no idea of its progress outside the framework of modernization. The idea of development, of African development, is equated with modernization; and modernization with Europeanization, Westernization, globalization. The attempt by Himmelstrand to enunciate an African or structural (or scientific) perspective by de-Europeanizing the concept of development and returning to what is “elementary and fundamental”3 is, in the end, futile. Although he proposes to define development primarily in terms of qualitative structures conceived with due consideration for what was possible at a particular historical juncture, and then to suggest that an assessment of levels of development could be pursued given such structures of development or underdevelopment,4

his four criteria of development – basic self-sufficiency, the existence of a national bourgeoisie, a “reasonably balanced” international trade and a

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liberal democratic culture5 are embellishments of modernization theory,6 abstractions from the history of Euro-American states. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that a developed society is one that satisfies these criteria, and an underdeveloped society presumably the opposite.7 If there is an African perspective on development, it is that African societies want to be like Western societies; the latter, ever advancing, constitute the shifting goal of African development. This, however, must be qualified. Even though Africa’s dominant elites express their wish for development and aspire to acquire the artifacts of Western material development, they do not wish to recreate in Africa the conditions that made such development possible, at least to the extent that their dominance is not threatened. Whenever the banner of African peculiarity (and the need to defend it) is hoisted, it does not really signify an attempt to define an autonomous scheme of African progress, but rather to protest and rally public opinion against Western pressure to implement measures that are believed would consolidate democracy and good governance, or rational economic planning. Generally, therefore, the African idea of progress is characterized by the dualisms of tradition/modernity, developing (under-developed)/developed, African/Western, the one, however, never passing into the other. The situation is best captured by the image of a Western head on an African body. This absence of a distinct form of the idea of progress, a consequence of Africa’s lack of consciousness of its past, is the source of the logic of return in African existence, and borrowing Mill’s phrase, the “terrible entrapment in its own history”.8 There is a virtual disjunction and discontinuity between the current policies and practices of its states and their individual and collective experiences. The only reminders that Africa indeed has a recent past, it would seem, are the scars of human suffering, civil wars, genocide, state privatization and political arrogance that pervade the continent. African existence is not autonomous. This is not to suggest that Africans can live in isolation of other peoples; it means that the most determinative influences on its affairs are external. These external influences and their historical milieux have been substituted for the African past as the source of policy and its reform. No wonder the quite high incidence of policy failure and the persistence of an apparently cyclical pattern of development.9 Such a cyclical pattern has in fact been discerned in Africa’s conflicts. Africa, it has been observed, “has experienced a violent cycle of warfare” for over a century.10 The reference to the cyclical nature of warfare in Africa should not be taken merely as a statement about its persistence, or about the likelihood of recurrence in countries where it has erupted and

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capped.11 That Africa is a hotbed of conflicts is not a profound observation. Neither is the assessment (made in 1992) concerning the apparency of the “potential for massive conflict on the African continent”, a consequence of the end of the Cold War;12 or that “Africa has been the most likely location for the requirement for armed humanitarian intervention over the past ten years”.13 It is most importantly a statement about the non-existence or failure of the mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution, about Africa’s response (capacity, process and outcome) to these conflicts within the framework of a continent-wide organization. If, as it has been argued, a significant raison d’être of the African Union (AU) is the “management of endemic armed conflicts”, a cause for which the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was adjudged incompetent,14 the claim, supportive of the theory of the external motivation of social change in Africa, that it is “modelled largely after the European Union”,15 and as Buyoya put it, “closely guided by the model of the European Union”,16 contradicts and defeats its avowed purpose. The claim implies that the AU has not benefited from the experience of the OAU at conflict prevention and resolution (since its identity is anchored on the history of the European Union), that it cannot be relevant to the prevention and resolution of conflict in Africa, and that it cannot therefore surpass the OAU in those areas. Just as Africa was described as a hotbed of conflicts during the period of the OAU, it has been no less so under the AU regime; the likelihood and persistence of conflict have been no less intense. But, from the perspective of capacity to respond to conflict, is the AU different from or superior to the OAU?

The OAU and the Response to Conflict: Assessing the Narrative of Failure As far as the response to conflict is concerned, the OAU ranks with the League of Nations as the most vilified international organization. For the League, what can be described as the narrative of failure is anchored on the fact that it was a security organization based on the idea of collective security.17 To this extent, therefore, it is possible to measure performance by matching outcome with objectives. When the League’s involvement in conflict situations was said to have had “rather patchy results”,18 it was because of the perceived dissociation between objective and process, or outcome. The narrative of failure in respect of the OAU’s involvement in conflict situations, on the other hand, has not been as systematic. The attempt to explain incapacity and structural inadequacy has been altogether legalistic and unhistorical. If there is any pattern, it is that the

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OAU has been more effective in handling inter-state disputes than internal conflicts, and its incapacity in relation to the latter is attributed to the constraining force of Article III (2 and 3) of its Charter. Akuchu’s claim that the “ineffective performance” of the OAU “in the peaceful settlement of African conflicts is not a subject of debate” because of perceived consensus among scholars19 ends up being less of a consensus when placed side by side with Tekle’s observation to the effect that the record of conflicts that have been settled by the OAU, either directly or indirectly through the efforts of African leaders acting on behalf of the Organization, is far greater than the OAU is credited for.20

And against Uwechue’s claim that the OAU was “relatively ineffectual in the resolution of inter-state conflicts in Africa”,21 there would seem to be a general agreement that the OAU performed creditably in handling interstate conflicts. The OAU’s involvement in the Algeria-Morocco border dispute in 1963,22 the first inter-state dispute that the OAU responded to, has generally been considered successful.23 Harshe would seem to have no problem with this verdict, even though he hastens to add that the dispute was resolved through the mediatory effort of Modibo Keita and Haile Selassie. The import of the reminder is to emphasize the fact that the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration that was set up in 1964 “had no mandatory jurisdiction”. Therefore, he concludes, “the OAU generally has been a poor instrument of resolving the inter-state disputes”.24 The implication of this analysis is that unless the conflict resolution mechanism of the OAU successfully settled an inter-state conflict, no successful settlement, even by the use of the good offices of member-states, could be credited to the OAU. This is the basis for Cervenka’s critique of the conflict resolution credentials of the OAU: A rather striking feature of the OAU’s handling of disputes is that not one has even been dealt with by the organ created specifically for that purpose, The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.25

Thus, the success of the OAU in the disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya was “achieved by the collective authority of Africa’s foreign ministers”; between Ghana and Guinea, by the ad hoc committee of Selassie, Tubman, Keita, Nyerere and Nasser; and between Senegal and Guinea, it was the ad hoc Special Mediation Commission of the OAU that was instrumental in bringing about

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reconciliation.26 The recourse to such ad hoc arrangements by the OAU was “not only precarious, but inconsistent and unreliable”.27 But were the successes of the ad hoc committees of the OAU not also the successes of the OAU? The apparent explanation for the successes of the OAU in intervening in inter-state conflicts is the fact that the Charter provided the legal basis for such intervention. Article III (4) declares, as one of the principles of the OAU, the “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration”,28 a principle described by Elias, one of the drafters of the Charter, as “probably the most fundamental of all the seven principles enshrined in Article 3”.29 This principle applied to memberstates, not to groups to an intra-state conflict, as Article XIX makes quite clear. While the OAU thus was legally empowered to intervene in inter-state conflicts and did deploy its resources (even though not the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration) to achieve peaceful settlement of disputes, it was “weakest and at its most disappointing when it comes to dealing with serious internal problems of its member-states”.30 But the OAU has also been credited with a “firm handling and resolution of intrastate disputes”, and “has arrested the process of disintegration of African states” by insisting on maintaining the status quo with regard to frontiers and incumbent political authority.31 However, this should be taken as referring to the perceived ‘do-nothing’ or reluctant disposition of the OAU to intervene in internal conflicts. The more widely held view is that the OAU had a “relatively weak score in its management of various threats to intra-African security”.32 Thus, when Legum wrote in 1975, the “inability to make a positive contribution during the nightmare years of civil war in Nigeria” was considered as the OAU’s “greatest failure”;33 the OAU’s intervention and peacekeeping attempt in Chad, it has been claimed, “resulted in abject failure”;34 and on the Eritrean secession crisis, Selassie in 1988 concluded that the OAU “has done nothing, taken no initiative of any significance to bring the tragic war to an end”.35 The conclusion would thus appear valid that the OAU “has never mediated the complete resolution of any civil war in Africa since its formation in 1963”.36 But the OAU has been credited with the role of preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict in pre-genocide Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros, and therefore hailed as “the most successful of African organizations in the area of conflict prevention”.37 To thus describe the OAU, and this is much clearer in Levitt’s assessment, as “the most active African regional actor in the area of conflict prevention”,38 is only to

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ascribe to it relative or comparative success, and, considering the standing of the other regional organizations, this is not saying much. It has been contended that the real source of the OAU’s failure to meaningfully intervene in intra-state conflicts is the Charter itself, specifically the so-called domestic jurisdiction clause. According to the logic of this argument, Article III (2), with the supportive III (3), by prescribing “non-interference in the internal affairs of states”, a presumably peculiar principle inserted into the Charter by sovereigntyconscious conservative African leaders, barred the OAU from interfering in the internal affairs of member-states: “The ground was thus set for the OAU to concern itself minimally with what it considers to be the internal affairs of its members”;39 and in intra-state conflict: “As a result, internal conflict, which would prove to be the most prevalent and deadly form in Africa … was entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the OAU”.40 If the OAU was barred from involvement in the internal affairs of memberstates, why then did it concern itself with the Nigerian civil war and the Chadian crisis, both of them internal conflicts? According to Rechner, the OAU’s involvement in the Nigerian civil war merely “seemed to demonstrate a wavering from the strict principle of non-interference in internal state affairs that its Charter advocated”; and in the Chadian conflict, OAU involvement was prompted by “Libyan military intervention”.41 Could the OAU have violated its own Charter? The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not peculiar to the OAU Charter. It follows logically from the foundational principle of ‘sovereign equality of states’: if states are equal by virtue of being sovereign, then one should not interfere in the internal affairs of the other. While the Charter of the United Nations also stresses the sovereign equality of its member-states, but contrary to the opinion of Elias that Article 2(7) of the Charter is relevant in appreciating the principle of noninterference by states in the internal affairs of other states,42 that Charter does not in fact contain any such principle. Equally incorrect and misleading is Rechner’s claim that “while both the U.N. and OAU Charters explicitly call for the organizations to avoid involving themselves in the internal affairs of their members, only the OAU would ultimately adopt a rigid adherence to this doctrine”.43 In the first place, the OAU Charter was clear and unambiguous about the entities to be affected by the principle. In the preamble to Article III, it states: “The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles”, one of which is that of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. This cannot be read to mean protection of the “autonomy of member states

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from interference or coercion by other members or by the organization as a whole”.44 The OAU Charter did not bar the OAU from interfering in the internal affairs of its members.45 For the UN Charter, the principle of noninterference of states in the affairs of other states was not given special mention because it was thought to be implied by the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states. The expression ‘sovereign equality’ was understood to mean that states are juridically equal and that they enjoy the rights inherent in their full sovereignty. It was further understood that this principle involves respect for the personality of a state and for its territorial integrity and political independence, an interpretation which is strengthened by the fourth principle [that is, member-states refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state].46

What Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has clearly done is to bar the United Nations and not its member-states from interfering in the internal affairs of its members: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, and this is without prejudice to enforcement measures by the UN Security Council. To understand the character of the OAU’s response to conflict, whether inter- or intra-state, it is necessary to appreciate the circumstances of its birth. The point is hardly missed in studies of the OAU that in the beginning, there were two antagonistic ideological blocs, Casablanca and Monrovia, the former radical and the latter conservative, each regarding the other “with deep suspicion if not outright hatred”.47 The usual conclusion is that since the OAU came to house the members of these antagonistic blocs, the Charter of the OAU can only be a compromise document,48 and according to Selassie, “much of its weakness is a reflection of this fact”.49 In spite of this tendency to see the OAU as a child of conflict, the environment of the OAU was not conflictual: African states were not at war and the OAU was not established as an organization to prevent future wars. Therefore, the OAU, unlike the United Nations, was not a security organization whose raison d’être was the maintenance of peace and security. Contrary to the assertion by Amoo, the OAU was not “a collective security body”;50 neither its Charter nor practices portrayed it as a security organization. If anything, the OAU was “a collegially governed, intergovernmental organization whose essential task has been to encourage, coordinate, and harmonize voluntary cooperation and compliance among its members”.51 It lacked the capacity, structure and institutions of a security organization and was therefore unable to

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appropriately respond to conflict. Yet, it could not fold its hands and watch as African states rolled from one conflict into another. So sometimes, it succeeded in preventing or retarding conflicts, at other times, it did not. Yet, while old conflicts persisted, new ones broke out. Meanwhile, Africa faced a future of marginalization with the end of the Cold War and delionization of the continent. It was to respond to the banality of conflict that the OAU attempted to reform the structure and processes of its response to conflict. The outcome of this exercise was the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in June 1993.52 The idea was to generate a new institutional framework for responding to conflict, considering the “many prolonged and destructive conflicts in our continent and our limited success at finding lasting solution to them”.53 However, the Mechanism did not break new grounds, whether by way of objectives or institution, or go beyond what the OAU had been doing. The OAU was not transformed into a security organization because of the crafting of the Mechanism. Its primary objective was the “anticipation and prevention of conflicts”, and then “to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions” where conflicts had broken out.54 Even the claim that the Mechanism “successfully challenged the principle of non interference, which too often became the last refuge for repressive systems”55 and, presumably, would have become more interventionist, is certainly exaggerated. The Mechanism was going to be guided by the principles of the OAU Charter amongst which is that of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.56

The African Union Security Framework: From Non-Interference to Interventionism? When an organization is born, either anew or in a transformed capacity, two circumstances may be pertinent to the definition of its identity: the character of its environment (internal and external), and, in the case of a transformed organization, the experience of the earlier organization. For the African Union (AU), it has not been this simple to determine the motivation for its establishment. The African Union, considered, for example, as “the brainchild of … Qaddafi, and modeled on the European Union, is the culmination of the OAU’s piecemeal process of political cooperation and economic integration”57 already has three motivational sources: Qaddafi, the European Union and the OAU. But it has also been insisted that the AU is neither new nor transformed, but rather a “rechristening” of the OAU, and its goals “no more than a rhetorical refurbishing of the essential aims of the OAU”.58

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However, the most widely advertised motivation for the establishment of the AU is the inutility and non-responsiveness of the OAU to problems, particularly the persistence and outbreak of conflicts in Africa. The idea that the OAU was an outdated organization that was in need of transformation is not recent. Uwechue summarized this position when he remarked in 1977 that “the OAU should not remain riveted to a Charter drafted fourteen years ago under circumstances profoundly different from those of today”.59 And it was not only in relation to the “current context” that it “performs poorly or disastrously”, but was also “poorly adjusted to the foreseeable future context”.60 But it was in the area of conflict resolution, “its limited capacity to deal effectively with the problems of conflicts and political instability, bad governance and the rule of law”,61 that the OAU’s failure was thought to be most visible and telling. The tradition of analysis of the OAU’s response to conflict, or of the explanation for the OAU’s failure to resolve conflicts, has been to focus on the perceived negative implications of the foundational principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. Thus, while the OAU’s Mechanism was thought to have “built up a solid experience of urgent intercessions in situations of concern” that the AU could fall back on,62 assuring significant continuity between the security architectures and processes of the two organizations,63 the domestic jurisdiction clause in the Charter “constrained efforts and the intervention of the organization” not just in internal conflicts, but more importantly “when some African leaders embarked on repressive measures against their compatriots and indulged in arbitrary violation of human rights of these people”.64 It is therefore understandable why there was much unqualified optimism about the capacity of the AU to respond since it is believed that the Constitutive Act has finally overridden the domestic jurisdiction clause. The analysis of this transformation has been couched in climactic and revolutionary terms. Where the OAU Charter, it has been pointed out, insists on the sovereign equality of states, the Constitutive Act on interdependence among states; and where the former declares noninterference in the internal affairs of states, the latter has “explicitly been granted authority to intervene in internal affairs of its members under certain circumstances”.65 This transformation has been adjudged “fundamental and qualitative”.66 The underlying conception, structure and process of the African Union reflects a strategic shift from a monocentric to a polycentric notion of state sovereignty, from emphasis on the indivisibility of state sovereignty, to an acceptance of a limited and carefully guided derogation from that sovereignty within a larger supra-national arrangement.67

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The intervention expected from the AU will even “address the vast injustices being perpetrated by some of the member nations against their own citizens”.68 There is no better way to cap this narrative of the AU’s potential success than to recall Tieku’s rather finalizing statement: “Unlike the OAU, the AU has real powers”.69 How great is the difference, from the perspective of operating principles, between the OAU and the AU? It has been demonstrated that the domestic jurisdiction clause of the OAU Charter was directed at member-states, as repeated in Article 4(g) of the Constitutive Act, and not the OAU. Even if governments made the claim of non-interference against the OAU, it does not mean that the Charter was supportive of such a claim. The OAU did intervene in some domestic conflicts, as in Nigeria and Chad. Like the OAU Charter, the AU Act also adopted the principle of the sovereign equality of states, the addition of interdependence among states is cosmetic; sovereign equality does not in any way imply a denial of interdependence. Article 4(b) on the principle of respect of borders existing on independence, repeats the addition made to the original principles in Cairo during the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly in July 1964.70 The two differentiating principles are 4(h), empowering the AU to intervene in a state, on the authority of the Assembly, in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, expanded in the amendment to Article 4 to cover serious threats to legitimate order; and 4(j), making it possible for states to request intervention to restore peace. The point has been made that since intervention is consequent upon a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, there is the “risk of inaction”.71 More fundamental, however, is the fact that the Constitutive Act technically recognizes a more limited range of internal conflicts: genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to the legitimate order. Legitimate order here implies a properly constituted democratic political order and precludes authoritarian systems, challenge to which may not attract the attention of the AU. Although the OAU Charter did not explicitly state the right to intervene in the internal affairs of states, neither did it disavow that right. This means that the OAU did not limit itself to intervention in any particular species of conflicts, and it did intervene, even though not too successfully, in all manner of conflicts. Even though 4(j) is potentially anti-people, since it also stands against popular insurgencies, there is nothing in the OAU Charter that prevented a government from asking for assistance to restore domestic peace and order. There would not appear to be a fundamental difference, from the perspective of operating principles, between the OAU and the AU. Considering the apparent preoccupation with conflicts and condemnation

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of the response of the OAU, African leaders had the opportunity of redressing the situation by properly structuring the objectives, principles, and institutions of the AU to deal with the scourge of conflicts. The originating environment of the OAU was not conflict-ridden, explaining why the OAU was more a forum for the exchange of pleasantries by Africa’s leaders. But the AU had a different originating environment. Yet, its response fell far short of what the circumstances required. Any appropriate response, that is, if the experience of the OAU was a motivating factor for its emergence, would have been the structuring of the AU as a security organization, its main objective being the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Instead, it brought under its wings matters that ought to have been left to national governments, and ended up being far less realistic than the OAU. The AU, amongst other principles, also hopes to promote self-reliance, gender equality and social justice. By spreading itself very thin, the AU set the stage for another narrative of failure.

The African Union and the Response to Conflict: Whither Interventionism? Even though the African Union is not a security organization, like the League of Nations or the United Nations, and even though the Constitutive Act in the statement of objectives did not give prominence to the problems of conflict and conflict resolution, it is curiously believed that a significant motivation for the establishment of the AU is the need to more adequately respond to Africa’s conflicts.72 The OAU’s inability to prevent and stop Africa’s civil wars, avert the genocide in Rwanda and stop the state in Somalia from collapsing, it has been claimed, made Africa’s leaders to decide to “dissolve the OAU and reconstitute it as a new organization that will address the problems of the continent”.73 It is no wonder then that Rechner asserts that the “most drastic differences between the Constitutive Act and the OAU Charter are with regard to intervention”.74 How then has the AU fared at intervening in the internal conflicts of African states? A critical stage in the ten-year Burundian crisis was the ceasefire agreement reached between the government and rebel groups at Pretoria on 27 January 2003, and after a problematic implementation, reaffirmed in March.75 To ensure that the ceasefire held, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was mandated in early April to supervise, observe, monitor and verify its implementation,76 as a prelude to the deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (the UNMIB was finally deployed in 2004). AMIB has been adjudged the AU’s “most successful peace

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support operation”,77 presumably for facilitating the deployment of UNMIB forces. It has been remarked that, like the OAU before it, the African Union effort was hindered by “lack of funding and a consequent breakdown of logistics”.78 The Darfur crisis that broke out in 2003 was greatly influenced by the course of the north-south impasse, and the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army since it held out the possibility of also forcing change in the region’s social and political order.79 It was again a government-versus-rebels (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement) conflict that generated a substantial humanitarian crisis.80 In July 2004, the African Union deployed an observer mission, the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), and a protection force, primarily to protect the civilian population. It has been noted that AMIS succeeded in protecting AU military observers, but not the civilian population in Darfur. AMIS personnel were ill-trained and grossly under-equipped.81 Above all, even though the conditions prevailing in Darfur qualified for the activation of the intervention clause, “the AU showed no inclination to actually invoke this article”,82 just as it did not in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Somalia.83 And in the Mwai Kibaki-Raila Odinga face-off in Kenya, the AU’s attempt to broker an agreement in early 2008 failed because Odinga’s movement was unprepared to negotiate,84 while the Laurent Gbagbo-Alassane Ouattara problem in Cote d’Ivoire from December 2010 was sorted out not by the AU but by the assault on Gbagbo by UN and French forces. It would appear that the AU can only intervene if it is invited.85 To what end then is the purported right of the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member states?

Conclusion What is the relationship between the domestic jurisdiction clause in the OAU Charter and arguably its absence in the AU Act and their capacity to respond to the internal conflicts of their member-states? The pattern of response to this question has been unnecessarily legalistic, even though, as the foregoing has shown, the interpretation of the operational principle has been faulty. There is a tendency to confuse the authority to intervene with the capacity to intervene. The OAU did not refuse to intervene or fail at intervention in the internal affairs of its member-states because of the perceived constraint of the domestic jurisdiction clause; neither has the AU succeeded in intervening in the internal affairs of its member-states just because of the belief that the ban on intervention has been lifted.

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It has long been an intellectual habit to consider the OAU and its Charter as constituting a compromise between pro-sovereignty forces (represented by the Monrovia bloc) and the proponents of union government (the Casablanca bloc). This, the argument usually insists, determined the identity of the OAU. But the AU too has been conceived of as a compromise between “the conflicting pulls of sovereignty and supranationalism”.86 It is very unlikely that the proponents of African Union interventionism will agree with the notion of a shared identity between the OAU and AU. But how could they be different when the character of the component states has not changed. Hence the conclusion that like the OAU, “the AU is to a large extent a reflection of the nature of its members – poorly governed, weak and heavily dependent on external support to survive”.87 The AU too has become afflicted by these same maladies. These are the sources of the AU’s incapacity, irrespective of the prescription of its Act. There is however another perspective on the question of shared identity. For this, the AU is not like the OAU; it is neither its continuation nor a transformation. The OAU had a definite identity; its Charter was a realist document. The AU Act, on the other hand, is chimerical; it is a curious mix of realist and idealist elements. The AU aspires to the status of a quasi-security organization, an economic organization, a social and even an ethical organization. In spite of the claim of current relevance to the African situation, the AU does not appear to be in tune with African problems and realities. It is not therefore surprising that regional organizations in Africa and non-African international organizations are stealing the initiative as far as involvement in conflicts is concerned “with the AU playing a more limited role, or in some cases no role at all”.88

Notes 1.

Rasheed Draman, “Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Reality, Empty Dream or Just Difficult?”, Civil Wars, 4, no. 2 (2001): 21. 2. A. Leroy Bennet and James K. Oliver, International Organizations: Principles and Issues (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2002), 38. 3. Ulf Himmelstrand, “Perspectives, Controversies and Dilemmas in the Study of African Development”, in African Perspectives on Development: Controversies, Dilemmas and Openings, edited by U. Himmelstrand, K. Kinyanjui and E. Mburugu (London: James Currey, 1994), 17. 4. Ibid., 21-22. 5. Ibid., 19-20. 6. See S. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Richard A. Higgott, Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London: Routledge, 1989).

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Himmelstrand, “Perspectives, Controversies and Dilemmas in the Study of African Development”, 19. 8. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 155. 9. African countries are always in the process of dying and being reborn: redemocratization and remilitarization; reliberalization and recentralization, restatization and state reprivatization. Niccolo Machiavelli may have been addressing the African situation when he wrote that since the study of the past is either neglected or understood, or “not applied in practice by those who rule, the consequence is that similar troubles occur at all times”: The Discourses, edited by B. Crick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 1.39. 10. Jon Woronoff, Editor’s Foreword in Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa, 2nd Edition (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2008), vii. 11. This cyclical nature is not vitiated even if the anti-colonial and intra-nationalist wars are factored out. There have been no fewer than twelve full-blown civil wars in post-colonial Africa and numerous less intense conflicts. See Karl DeRouen, Jr. and Uk Heo, ed., Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War I, vols. 1 and 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2007). 12. Jeffrey Herbst, “The Potential for Conflict in Africa”, Africa Insight, 22, no. 2 (1992): 108. 13. Mike Denning, “A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force”, Parameters, 34, no. 4 (2004-05): 103. 14. C. Nna-Emeka Okereke, “African Union (AU) and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Africa: Reflections on Cote d’Ivoire”, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 33, no. 1 (2007): 83. 15. James Cockayne and David Malone, “United Nations Peace Operation Then and Now”, in International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Vol. 9, edited by H. Langholitz, B. Kondoch and A. Wells (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 16. Apparently in a bid to draw attention to the European Union experience of differential accession to full membership, the New Nigerian (July 23, 2002) Editorial extends the logic of the external motivation of change in Africa: “After all, the AU is modeled after the EU and it took the Europeans over 40 years to get to where they are today”. But it has also been argued that the impetus for the emergence of the OAU, being racial African-American panAfricanism (rather than continental pan-Africanism), is located outside Africa. See a discussion of this question in Ehimika A. Ifidon, “Did Pan-Africanism beget Nationalism? Race and Territory in the Discourse on Pan-Africanism”, Lagos Historical Review, 8 (2008): 113-131. 16. Pierre Buyoya, “Toward a Stronger African Union”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 12, no. 2 (2006): 171. 17. See J. P. Dunbabin, “The League of Nations’ Place in the International System”. History, 78, no. 254 (1993): 421-442; and F. H. Hinsely, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 309-322. 18. Michael Smith, “The League of Nations and International Politics”, British Journal of International Studies, 2, no. 3 (1976): 319.

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Gemuh E. Akuchu, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Unsolved Problem for the OAU (A Case Study of the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict)”, Africa Today, 24, no. 4 (1977): 39. 20. Amare Tekle, “The Organization of African Unity at Twenty Five Years: Retrospect and Prospect”, Africa Today, 35(3/4), 1988, 13. 21. Raph Uwechue, “The OAU – Time for a Change”, in Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (London: Africa Books, 1977), xi. 22. See details of the dispute in Patricia B. Wild, “The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African Peoples”, International Organization, 20, no. 1 (1966): 18-36. 23. See, for example, Jonathan D. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or just a Name Change?”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 39, no. 2 (2006): 549. 24. Rajen Harshe, “Reflections on Organisation of African Unity”, Economic and Political Weekly, 23, no. 8 (1988): 375. 25. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity, 64. 26. Ibid., 67-68. 27. T. A. Imobighe, The OAU, African Defence and Security (Benin City: Adena, 1989), 40. 28. “African States Charter of the Organisation or African Unity”, The American Journal of International Law, 58, no. 3 (1964). 29. T. O. Elias, “The Charter of the Organization of African Unity”, The American Journal of International Law, 59, no. 2 (1965): 249. 30. Colin Legum, “The Organisation of African Unity – Success or Failure”, International Affairs, 51, no. 2 (1975): 212. 31. Harshe, “Reflections on Organisation of African Unity”, 375. 32. Imobighe, The OAU, African Defence and Security, 40. 33. Legum, “Organisation of African Unity – Success or Failure”, 213. 34. G. J. Naldi, “Peace-Keeping attempts by the Organisation of African Unity”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 34, no. 3 (1985): 595. For the circumstances under which the peacekeeping force operated in Chad, see Thomas A. Imobighe, “The Analysis of Political Issues raised by OAU peacekeeping in Chad”, in Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, Vol. 1, edited by M. A. Vogt and L. S. Aminu (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1996), 241-259; and G. O. Ejiga, “Analysis of the Operational Aspects of the OAU Peace-Keeping in Chad”, in Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, Vol. 2, edited by M. A. Vogt and L. S. Aminu (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1996), 367-386. 35. Bereket H. Selassie, “The OAU and Regional Conflicts: Focus on the Eritrean War”, Africa Today, 35, no. 3/4 (1988): 65; see also Leenco Lata, “The EthiopiaEritrea War”, in Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, edited by Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 167-172.

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Bukar Bukarambe, “Regional Order and Local Disorder: The OAU and Civil Wars in Africa”, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 14, no. 1 (1988): 95. 37. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU”, 553. 38. Jeremy Levitt, “Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Africa – Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD”, Journal of Conflict Prevention in Africa, 11, no. 1 (2001): 55. 39. U. O. Umozurike, “The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter”, Africa Affairs, 78, no. 311 (1979): 198. 40. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU”, 544. 41. Ibid., 550. 42. Elias, “Charter of the Organization of African Unity”, 248. 43. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU”, 548. 44. William Foltz, “The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa’s Conflicts”, in Conflict Resolution in Africa, edited by Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 349. 45. Akuchu also so contends: “There is no Charter provision that stipulates that the principle applies to the OAU itself. In other words, there is nothing in the OAU Charter that clearly forbids it from intervening in African conflicts”: “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, 56. 46. Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), 3940. 47. Imobighe, The OAU, African Defence and Security, 29. 48. This conclusion is not sustainable. See Ehimika A. Ifidon, “Unity without Unification: The Development of Nigeria’s ‘Inside-Out’ Approach to African Political Integration, 1937-1963”, International Social Science Review, 83, nos. 1&2 (2007): 40; and Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110-111. 49. Selassie, “OAU and Regional Conflicts”, 62. 50. Samuel G. Amoo, The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives, Working Paper 5 (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 1992), 9. 51. B. David Meyers, “Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity”, International Organization, 28, no. 3 (1974): 350. 52. See details of the circumstances of its establishment and assessment of its provisions and activities in Cedric de Coning and Hussein Solomon, “Enhancing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, Politeia, 19, no. 1 (2000): 13-30; and Monde Muyangwa and Margaret Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000 (New York: International Peace Academy, 2000). 53. Declaration of the Assembly by Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, AHG/DECL. 3 (XXIX), par.11. 54. Ibid., par.15.

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de Coning and Solomon, “Enhancing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention”, 16. 56. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, par.14. 57. Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, “The African Union: A New Dawn for Africa?”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51, no. 2 (2002): 415. 58. The Guardian (Lagos), Editorial, May 18, 2001. 59. Uwechue, “OAU - Time for a Change”, xii. 60. Benoit Ndi-Zambo, “African Unity: Looking Back, Looking Forward, and a Recipe for Failure”, in A United States for Africa?, edited by Eddy Maloka (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001), 36. 61. Lawrence, O. C. Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU: The Challenges of African Unity and Development in the Twenty-First Century, NIIA Lecture Series, No. 83 (Lagos: NIIA, 2004), 26. 62. B. G. Ramcharan, “The Continental Early Warning System of the African Union”, in Conflict Prevention in Practice: Essays in Honour of James Sutterlin, edited by B. Ramcharan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 71. 63. The OAU’s Mechanism formed the basis of the AU’s Peace and Security Council. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, ASS/AU/4/(1). 64. Bolaji Omitola and Peace Jiboku, “Regional Integration: Challenges and Prospects of African Union”, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 35, no. 2 (2009): 59. 65. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU”, 562-563. 66. Omitola and Jiboku, “Challenges and Prospects of African Union”, 71. 67. Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU, 17. 68. Robert L. Feldman, “Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces”, Defense and Security Analysis, 24, no. 3 (2008): 267-268. 69. Thomas K. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union”, African Affairs, 103, no. 411 (2004): 250. 70. “Border Disputes among African States”, AHG/Res. 16(1), Organization of African Unity, Resolutions adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964. 71. Corinne A. A. Packer and Donald Rukare, “The New African Union and its Constitutive Act”, The American Journal of International Law, 96, no. 2 (2002): 373. 72. This would not appear to be the case. See ‘Sirte Declaration’, EAHG/Decl. (iv), Rev.1, Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Sirte, Libya, 8-9 September 1999. 73. Paul G. Adogamhe, “Pan-Africanism Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development”, African Review of Integration, 2, no. 2 (2008): 13-14. 74. Rechner, “From OAU to AU”, 563. 75. See details of the Conflict and negotiation of the ceasefire agreement in Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2005).

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Henri Boshoff and Dara Francis, “The AU Mission in Burundi: Technical and Operational Dimensions”, African Security Review, 12, no. 3 (2003): 41. See details of the AU’s involvement in the conflict in Burundi in Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, ISS Monograph Series, No. 119, May 2005, 36-41. 77. Wafula Okumu, “The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa”, Journal of International Affairs, 62, no. 2 (2009): 97. 78. Rechner, “From the OAU to AU”, 568. 79. Paul D. Williams, “Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan”. International Peacekeeping, 13, no. 2 (2006): 174-175. 80. Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa, 138-140. 81. Williams, “African Union Mission in Sudan”, 178-179. 82. Ibid., 180. 83. Okumu, “The African Union”, 102. 84. Kieran E. Uchehara, “Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in Africa: The Case of the African Union and Conflict Management in Kenya”, Gazi Journal of Academic View, 1, no. 2 (2008): 31-32. 85. In spite of the absoluteness claimed for the domestic jurisdiction clause of the OAU Charter, it has also been claimed that “member states could only intervene on the invitation of a member state”: Sharkdam Wapmuk, “In search of Greater Unity: African States and the search for an African Union Government”, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 1, no. 3 (2009): 653. There is, of course, no support for this claim in the OAU Charter. 86. Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU, 33. 87. Okumu, “The African Union”, 97. 88. Jane Boulden, “Conclusions”, in Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, edited by Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 310.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN COLONIALISM, THE POST-COLONIAL STATE, AND THE CHALLENGE OF (DIS)INTEGRATION IN AFRICA W. ALADE FAWOLE

Introduction Since Ghana became independent in 1957, the dream of continental integration through creating a ‘United States of Africa’ from the multiplicity of largely unviable post-colonial states has been on the front burner of the discourse on African unity. As a result of Kwame Nkrumah’s relentless efforts to bring this dream to reality, Ghana organized and hosted a series of conferences in Accra in 1958, the first of such meetings that brought together the heads of the then independent African countries to map out the strategies and tactics for the evolution of a continental state. The aftermath of these serial efforts was the establishment in Addis Ababa of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963 after a series of factional conferences held by different groupings of African states in Casablanca, Monrovia, and Lagos. The resultant continental organization had to be a compromise between the divergent positions of Nkrumah and the radical Casablanca Group, on the one hand, and the more conservative and gradualist proponents such as Nigeria which preferred to hold on to newly won sovereignty, on the other. In reality, though, it would seem that the formation of the OAU signified the definitive triumph of the conservative ideologues over their more radical opponents. Even though the project of total political integration of all the countries into a single continental state, just like the United States of America, was rested at the time, the notion of eventual integration at some future date continued to resonate among Africans. For the conservative states such as Nigeria, whose position seemed to have triumphed in the formation of the OAU, the regional integration agenda could still be pursued through

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economic and functional integration at sub-regional levels. This led to the establishment of such regional economic groupings as the East African Community in 1967 and Economic Community of West African States later in 1975. The notion was that the anticipated success of such experiments at sub-regional levels would undoubtedly facilitate and smoothen overall continental political and economic integration. This was perhaps the sentiment behind the 1992 Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community. The central objective of this chapter is to critically interrogate the role and impact of the colonial state formation and its post-colonial manifestation on Africa’s serial attempts at achieving economic and political integration at the continental level. The chapter argues that the colonial enterprise, which callously balkanized the continent into largely unviable and often unstable states and allowed them to ossify, is chiefly responsible for the sluggish pace of integration, even though the perceived necessity is undoubtedly accepted by all. The chapter argues further that the perceived desirability of a United States of Africa notwithstanding, the post-colonial ‘state in Africa’ or the ‘African state’, as the case may be, remains the most relentless and unyielding hindrance to its realization. This is not unconnected with the inescapable reality that the ‘state’, in the real sense of the term, is essentially, though not exclusively, a capitalist instrument,1 and therefore its use to describe the territorial entities in Africa is not particularly helpful.2 While the chapter does not attribute all the blame for Africa’s lack of unity and its underdevelopment solely to colonialism, it however argues that Africa’s myriad problems of disunity and contemporary backwardness cannot be wholly resolved unless and until the root causes have been identified and isolated for proper scholarly interrogation.3 Therefore, attempts to blame African leaders alone as the sole source of continental underdevelopment is reductionist, as these amount to pretending that Africa’s problems are wholly endogenous. Barack Obama’s exhortation that Africans should look inwards for solutions to their problems, and stop blaming colonial rule and foreign powers, does grave injustice to the continent; it pretends that durable solutions can be arrived at without a proper understanding of the root causes. Prescribing medication for an ailment that was not properly diagnosed, as Obama attempted to do on his visit to Ghana, is patently bad practice. As appealing as his line of reasoning may seem, coming as it is from a highly respected and cerebral American president of African extraction, it is unfortunately short-sighted and glosses over the roots of the African problem of disunity and underdevelopment, and pretends that a panacea

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can be found to the ailment independently of a critical diagnosis.4 The Western predilection to blame Africans for their own woes sends a wrong signal to the rest of the world that continental Africans are congenitally incapable of development, a wrong impression which must not be allowed to gain firm roots. In accomplishing the main objective set out here, the chapter attempts a detailed interrogation of the logic of colonial state formation, its impact on the ossification of this colonial artefact after the grant of political independence, the deliberate creation of a local political elite amenable to neo-colonial control,5 and state resistance to all contemporary attempts to transcend the cynical balkanization of the continent into largely unviable states. It argues that the apparent failure of all the efforts in the direction of complete regional integration since 1958 is directly traceable to the predatory character and functioning of the post-colonial state. The chapter employs a historical and descriptive method of analysis which allows for a deep insight into the history, trajectory, mutations and development of the idea of a ‘United States of Africa’ and the progress and challenges of its implementation thus far. The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections: The next section interrogates the origin, nature and character as well as the original mission of the colonial state. This is done with a view to laying a strong foundation for the subsequent examination and understanding of the state in its postcolonial manifestation. The second section builds on that foundation and examines the post-colonial incarnation of the state that colonialism created. It attempts to situate the difficulties and failures of state-building in Africa within the logic of the colonial enterprise. The section after that analyzes why the post-colonial state remains a critical stumbling block to the evolution of a continental United States of Africa. The conclusion and recommendations constitute the final section.

The Political Architecture of Colonial Rule in Africa This section examines the origin, nature, historical mission and role, as well as the actual character of the state system, in other words the entire political architecture that colonial rule created and eventually bequeathed to Africa at independence. The origin of the colonial state is not shrouded in any mystery; it is boldly located in the historical mission and the essential logic of capitalist imperialism which bred the colonial enterprise. Once the major European nations abolished the trans-Atlantic slave trade, their attention and energies were shifted to devising other means of continuing the criminal exploitation and cornering the rich labour and

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natural resources of the African continent for their own selfish ends. The powerful metropolitan states of the time thereafter began the scramble for territories and resources in Africa, a scramble which was eventually legitimized through the instrumentality of the Berlin Conference of 18841885. It was at this conference that the continent of Africa was arbitrarily and cynically carved up into territorial possessions of the different European states. The major contenders for colonies in Africa were, in the main, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal, and the essence of the Berlin Conference was to mutually divide the continent into colonies and avoid the destructiveness of bloody clashes. Having thus subverted and subdued the subsisting African states and kingdoms, sometimes by ruthless armed force and sometimes by bribery and subterfuge, the metropolitan powers proceeded to impose alien rule on the peoples of these territories. These new but foreign regimes were often forcibly and violently resisted by the local peoples who had been robbed of their sovereignty, forcing the colonial authorities to rely mostly on coercion to exact compliance to alien law and governance. In the process, a European-type state structure also had to be created and imposed to facilitate resource exploitation and evacuation to Europe. Consequently, the colonizers had to make sure that the state system that they had created in each colony for the purpose of fulfilling the cardinal objectives of the colonial enterprise was particularly imbued with a certain nature, and this nature was equally determined by the logic and objectives of colonialism only. Even though the different foreign powers predicated their colonial policies and practices on separate ideologies and justifications (British indirect rule and French assimilation), the fundamental objective was the same: merciless resource exploitation for the benefit of the individual European states. The resultant colonial state was highly centralized, bureaucratic, predatory and violent; it severely excluded the colonial peoples from participation in governance and had no corresponding responsibilities towards them beyond what was necessary to facilitate resource exploitation. Divide-and-rule was quite pervasive in all the colonies, for this ably facilitated domination and plunder. In British colonies, the logic of divide-and-rule served as a disincentive to the unity of the disparate ethno-national groups that colonial rule had brought together. In very insidious cases, such as Nigeria with over two hundred ethnic groups, British policy was to deliberately create gulfs and divisions between the various groups, such that it was difficult to form a single nationalist opposition to foreign rule.6 The same policy was even more ruthlessly implemented in the settler-colony of Kenya.7 France’s policies in its

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African colonies were not any different. The negative impacts of French divide-and-rule policy are more visible especially in Chad and Senegal. Chad has remained largely disunited ever since the French deliberately carved out the country into two, namely, the ‘useless north,’ which resisted foreign imposition, and ‘useful south,’ where colonial rule penetrated much faster. Senegal is still battling with the inherited problem of separatism in its Casamance region, a crisis arising from deliberate French colonial divide-and-rule policy. In terms of the historical mission and role definition for the colonial state, the impression must not be created that colonial rule was the same in all the African colonies under the different metropolitan powers. However, the subtle differences in style of governance reflecting the basic philosophy and orientation of each colonial power notwithstanding, the underlying logic of colonialism remained exactly the same everywhere on the continent. Adejumobi has made this position very clearly. According to him, Colonialism, though primarily an economic project meant to facilitate the brutal exploitation of labour and natural resources in the colonies, evolved a political infrastructure that fostered relations of domination and control, which were a prerequisite for the colonial enterprise. Although methods of colonial governance differed slightly among the colonial powers, for example between the British ‘indirect rule’ policy and the French policy of ‘assimilation’, the logic and dynamics of these regimes, and the institutional structure and process of state formation which they set in motion, were basically the same.8

Arguing in the same vein, Bathily asserted that any distinction between British ‘indirect rule’ and French ‘assimilation’ policies is at best dubious.9 At the height of the colonial adventure, the African continent was callously balkanized into several colonies of different European powers, with mostly artificially drawn boundaries that refused to recognize subsisting historical realities and ethnic relations. The resultant colonial states, as they later turned out to be, and seemingly patterned after the Westphalian tradition of the European state system, have inevitably ossified into modern independent states and have consequently become huge stumbling blocks to every effort to unite and ultimately unify the continent. From Nkrumah’s efforts, which began immediately after Ghana’s independence in the late 1950s, through the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 to its eventual transformation into the African Union in 2002, the hope of African unity remains almost a forlorn hope, an enterprise to which successive African rulers since the

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early 1960s have merely been paying lip-service. Even though Muammar Gaddafi, when he was AU chairperson, appeared poised to fast-track the evolution of a United States of Africa, his effort was greeted with cold reception by some of the major countries such as Nigeria, whose predilection for the gradualist approach has remained unchanged since the early 1960s. The influence and impact of the colonial enterprise on state formation in post-colonial Africa have remained relentless, pervasive and sinister, inexorably vitiating Nkrumah’s sublime vision for a united African continent, a huge continent not of independent states anymore but of diverse peoples united under a single political authority. This was the vision he powerfully articulated in his seminal work, Africa Must Unite, published in 1963. The core of the philosophy of pan-Africanism was predicated on the essential oneness of African peoples in the continent and in the Diaspora, a unity that is at once physical and spiritual, the unity of a continent whose march of civilization and progress had previously been cruelly interrupted, first by the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and thereafter by merciless plunder and deliberate underdevelopment during centuries of European colonialism. Some proponents regard this as the unity of the entire Black race or the Negro race in Africa, America, the Caribbean and Latin America, and the movement began in the Diaspora, driven by such men as W.E.B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey, before it came to the continent. Nkrumah’s apt description of colonial rule, a product both of deep intellectual reflection and personal experience as newly independent Ghana’s first leader, remains perhaps the most poignant and unassailable testimony to the character of the colonial state.10 Other perceptive scholars, like Davidson and Ake, have provided deep analytical insights into the character and mission of colonial rule in Africa. As Ake has also aptly noted, the colonial state was distinguished by its absolutism and arbitrariness of its power over the subjects.11 In fact, this absolutist and arbitrary power of the colonial state allowed its rulers to readily criminalize any form of political opposition and dissent, a notable characteristic which the early post-colonial ruling elites used effectively to immobilize opposition parties and politicians, and to put many of them securely locked up in jail. Surprisingly, even Nkrumah, the foremost apostle of African unity and development, employed the same authoritarian and repressive strategy of the colonial state to put his political rivals, especially J.B. Danquah, permanently out of circulation. In the course of the early nationalist struggles in the various colonies, the local African elites were more concerned with being included and

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integrated into the colonial governance system than with reforming the unjust and defective system of foreign domination. Williams, while discussing what he regards as the fiction of post-colonial nationhood in Africa, also came to the conclusion that the leaders of independence movements in Africa, even of the most radical persuasion and revolutionary temperament, preferred to struggle within the problematic of the colonial nation. None ever questioned its inherent absurdity. This is perhaps the origin of the myth of the inviolability of colonial boundaries.12

One would not have difficulty concluding that the fundamental logic of the nationalist struggle, except in a few cases of revolutionary uprising, was actually to secure power and its other attendant benefits for the emerging middle class after the departure of the colonial rulers. No wonder then that the African middle class simply replaced the foreigners without questioning the character of the state or reforming the inherent contradictions of the colonial state.13

Decolonization, the Post-Colonial State and Neo-Colonial Dependency After several decades of foreign domination, the political architecture that the colonialists had created and eventually bequeathed to Africans upon their departure “was actually constructed on authoritarian and antidemocratic foundations for which the emergent African nationalists could not be held responsible.”14 In reality, therefore, the post-colonial state which the succeeding local elites inherited was the quintessential colonial state in its pristine and unrefined form and character. Having little patience or tolerance for dissent and opposition, which they saw as needless luxury for newly independent states, the new post-colonial ruling elites inescapably fell back on using exactly the same coercive methods of governance (use of military, civil police and other security outfits) that had served the colonialists so well. In many cases, opposition parties were deliberately enfeebled, subverted, or even outlawed, while opposition politicians were swiftly imprisoned on trumped-up charges of sedition and even treason. This was the beginning of Africa’s gradual descent into one-party dictatorship and the era of presidents-for-life. From what we have seen thus far, the territorial state that colonial rule had created inexorably ossified into the post-colonial nation-state the moment the emergent African ruling elites simply and naively took over its reins from the departed overlords instead of dismantling, redefining and

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restructuring it outright. Adherence to the international law doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of independent states became the defining characteristic of the newly independent African states in the early 1960s. The protection of individual state’s sovereignty, another international law principle, also became an overriding desideratum of African foreign policies. These two doctrines were boldly enshrined in the Charter of the OAU in 1963, while the acceptance of the sanctity of territorial states and their boundaries inherited from colonialism became a fait accompli as the basis for subsequent African unity and mutual cooperation. The survival of the artificial territorial states that were bequeathed by the departed metropolitan rulers, and the survival of the new regimes, became issues that took pre-eminence over other considerations, such as African unity, progress, and the development of the entire continent. In the final analysis, the creation of the OAU in 1963 was to undermine the fundamental essence of African unity and integration in favour of the continued existence of the territorial states.15 In essence, the state that colonial rule brought into existence has become, in the view of Basil Davidson, not merely a burden but actually a curse to Africans.16 But having inherited the colonial state in its pristine form, the African ruling elites were remiss in not attempting to structurally redefine the states to belong to the people. What they did instead was to promptly step into the shoes of their former masters, move into the various state houses and systematically instrumentalize the newly independent states for hegemonic control and primitive wealth accumulation by them and their cronies. Even though the necessity for ‘structural transformation’ was both logical and indisputable, since the colonial state had only subjects and not citizens, the new African rulers, who should have indigenized the state and given real sovereignty back to the people, preferred instead to preserve the predatory state as they had inherited it. This had to be so, as Ake argues further, because “the coming of political independence … [only] changed the composition of the managers of the state but not the character of the state, which remained much as it was during the colonial era.”17 Since the emergent African ruling elites, often carefully handpicked by the departed colonial officials from the ranks of their local collaborators, had decided on privatizing the colonial state structure, its institutions and processes to serve their selfish hegemonic interests, instinctive reliance on coercion to obtain compliance from the ‘citizens’ became indispensable to governance. Williams argues further that the first generation of politicians, rather than reform the paternalistic and authoritarian colonial state, actually saw it as a legitimate weapon in the struggle for hegemony. The urge to control the centre and the enormous

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This apparent lack of strategic vision cannot be solely blamed on the African rulers alone. We must acknowledge, first, the fact that the postcolonial state was not amenable to reform because of its class character, and, second, the invisible but potent stranglehold of the metropolitan patrons in the affairs of the new states. In the first instance, it would have been preposterous to expect that the new local elites would reform the state that they inherited, since it was their own instrument of hegemonic control over the resources of the country. To attempt to deconstruct and reform the state and imbue it with a new character would have amounted to committing class suicide on their part. We must remember that the fundamental essence of agitation against colonial rule was, ab initio, for the inclusion of the new bilingual local middle class elites in colonial governance rather than for redefining the essence and mission of the state. Indeed, what changed at independence was not the character of the state but those running it; in short, the passing of the baton of power from the agents of the metropolitan states to the natives of the former colonies. Second, the pervasive influence of metropolitan capitalism was not limited to economic matters alone but, as Ake would have it, much more prominent in the political field. Coming into the world system in the heydays of the Cold War, African states subsequently became veritable pawns in the hands of the great powers. Great power rivalry for ideological supremacy, economic and military domination played itself out prominently in the continent when many states became proxies of foreign interests. Internal crises and conflicts within and between African states became unduly externalized and complicated when the interests of external powers were involved, as in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict of the late 1970s;19 African governments survived in office or were removed depending on their disposition to the various foreign powers,20 and full-blown dictatorship along the lines of colonial authoritarianism was encouraged and facilitated from the outside. Even though flag independence was granted to a large number of the colonies in the 1960s, the reality was that they were neo-colonial appendages of the former colonial powers. The new rulers of Africa’s supposedly independent states were no more than local servants of foreign interests. This had to be so because the nationalist struggle in many of the colonies was mainly to ensure the inclusion of the new bilingual African middle class elites into the colonial government. Having thus been gradually integrated into the colonial state system and governance with all

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its privileges and appurtenances, the new middle class found it convenient to simply step into the shoes of their departed masters, a strategic move that guaranteed them easy access to national resources for private wealth accumulation. The emergent elites, with the assistance of their metropolitan patrons, promptly converted their newly independent countries into prebends21 for the accumulation of inordinate private wealth, thus making the states pawns in the hands of metropolitan neo-colonialists. In countries like Nigeria, Zaire, Angola and others with rich natural resource endowments, outright state robbery became the main logic of governance.22 This pattern of statecraft is replicated in most African countries, allowing the ruling elites to hang on to power and thereby frustrate those who are outside the ruling cliques. Claude Ake puts the issue more graphically thus: To become wealthy without the patronage of the state was likely to invite unpleasant attention of those in control of state power. Political power was everything; it was not only the access to wealth but also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being. For anyone outside the hegemonic faction of the political elite, it was generally futile to harbour any illusions of becoming wealthy by entrepreneurial activity or to even take personal safety for granted. For anyone who was part of the ruling faction, entrepreneurial activity was unnecessary, for one could appropriate surplus with less risk and less trouble by means of state power.23

Kwame Nkrumah captures the situation of neo-colonial dependence so aptly when he famously observed that neo-colonialism created “client states, independent in name but in point of fact pawns of the very colonial power which is supposed to have given them independence.”24 He asserts further that even though independent in the technical and theoretical sense, the subtle face of neo-colonialism was such that “these countries continue the classical relationship of a colonial economy to its metropolitan patron, i.e., providers of primary products and exclusive markets for the latter’s goods.”25 It must be stated that the metropolitan powers were not merely content with pulling the economic levers of control26 alone but also used the direct approach of concluding varieties of military and defence agreements with the newly independent states to tie them more securely to the control of outside powers. France concluded agreements with all its former colonies and for many years stationed its troops on African soil27 to monitor, manipulate and control their governments.28 Britain initially attempted a similar line of control, although with less success than the French. Its neo-colonial defence pact with Nigeria, which would have allowed the creation of British military bases and stationing of troops in

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the country, came under intense domestic opposition and had to be swiftly abrogated in January 1962.29 Until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967, Nigeria doggedly followed the British and would not do anything that would jeopardise British political and economic interests in Nigeria and Africa. Nigeria, for instance, shied away from a diplomatic showdown with Britain over the question of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. While the Cold War lasted, Africa was a victim of suffocating extraAfrican influence, manipulation and control. The end of the Cold War, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and eventual disappearance of Communism as a rival system on the world stage brought with them new challenges for Africa. The post-Cold War era is witnessing the ruthless universalization of Western liberal values and unleashing fresh political and economic conditionalities which are being imposed on African states. Africans are now experiencing a wave of externally induced political liberalization, inexorably compelling several autocratic regimes on the continent to experiment with a variety of deceitful political reforms and pseudo-democratization processes. Rather than escape from external dictation, new mechanisms of neo-colonial control have emerged, with the result that the countries and their governments are still clients of powerful foreign economic and political interests. For example, the United States government at the end of the Cold War in 1990 made it known that all its aid to Africa would henceforth be tied securely to evidence of democratization, emphasizing, according to Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, that “those countries which fail to respond to, or worse, suppress popular demands for democratization will find themselves in an ever more disadvantageous position in the competition for US assistance and private investment.”30 In the same vein, the European Union, as far back as the late 1980s, adopted political conditionality as a requirement for the grant of aid and direct foreign investment.31 What greater evidence of blatant external manipulation does one require to conclude that Africa’s position as clients of neo-colonial forces has not changed even in the post-Cold War era? Emblematic of the precarious condition of Africa after the Cold War is the resurgence of internal conflicts in many countries, with the collapse of DR Congo being the most problematic.32 These are manifestations of latent internal fissures and divisions that colonial rule purposely created and nurtured in the states. Since divide-and-rule, as observed earlier, was the main plank on which control in each of the colonies rested, the problem of ethnic particularism and disunity that the colonial rulers deliberately encouraged and emphasized among the disparate ethnic

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groups, have remained resistant to solution even five decades after independence. It must be remembered that in most cases, consideration of which ethnic group the colonial rulers were comfortable with was the main deciding factor as to who would be allowed to inherit the mantle of power.33 The French imposed their own chosen rulers on their colonies as they departed, with Guinea under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Toure being the only exception. In only a few cases, such as Ghana, were the British officers unable to impose their own quiescent lackeys as successors. DR Congo originally imploded shortly after independence in 1960,34 and again after the Cold War in the 1990s when the United States no longer needed Mobutu as an anti-communist bulwark. This could happen only because the US conveniently looked the other way as Laurent Kabila’s insurrection chased him out after thirty-two years of corrupt dictatorship.35 The great powers had by the early 1990s diverted attention to what they regarded as far more important and pressing engagement in the Balkans, even while the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe death squads brutally slaughtered almost a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994. What the preceding analysis seeks to establish is the fact that what Africans inherited as states were not the typical Westphalian variety but lawless, authoritarian, violent and predatory leviathans; and this may explain the unending controversy as to whether they are states in the real sense or a peculiarly African contraption. In discussing the controversy surrounding the ‘state in Africa’ versus the ‘African state’, Williams identifies the basic characteristics of the Westphalian state to include (a) being “the arbiter and custodian of the legitimate means of violence in the polity,” (b) possessing the capacity “to employ non-coercive means for the greatest good of the greatest number of the people,” (c) the “ability of the state to sublimate and transcend patrimonialism” by operationally differentiating the public and private domains, and (d) ability “to put in place adequate mechanisms for regulating and controlling inevitable conflict among the elite.”36 African states have undoubtedly not been able to conform to this accepted notion of the state. Instead, what Africa inherited from colonial rule were mere caricatures of the Westphalian state which its creators did not intend to survive beyond a few years.37 Other earlier scholars of the African experience have come to a similar conclusion. While interrogating the crisis faced by the immediate postcolonial state on the continent, O’Connell pungently observed that the colonial state was created by brute force, bringing together a multiplicity of often disparate ethnic formations, and whose mode of operation cynically “combined executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the

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hands of a single foreign caste and permitted only a minimum separation of those powers.”38 He also argues that when colonial rule was being dismantled, the local political elites who envied the excessive powers of the colonial overlords resented any suggestions that such powers might be whittled down through written constitutions which the departing metropolitan powers sought to impose on them. No wonder therefore that many African countries resorted to the authoritarian traditions of colonial rule, in effect becoming one-party states with presidents-for-life firmly in control. What can be learnt from this is that the state that colonial rule created, and which the post-colonial rulers inherited and sustained, is totalitarian and absolutist, making no room for popular participation. This very character of the original colonial state system in Africa has changed very little, if at all, in the post-colonial era. It is only more recently, and possibly with external assistance, that many states began to witness the rise of civil society which, at best, is only able to penetrate governance and public affairs very slowly in many countries. In a large number of the states, civil society is hampered, the press as society’s watchdog is deliberately hamstrung; opposition political parties are enfeebled and, where they are allowed to exist at all, remain as mere cosmetic adornments in the so-called democratic systems. The state largely monopolizes the instruments of violence and other security paraphernalia purely for internal pacification rather than for the timehonoured defence of the territory from external attacks and internal subversion. States are unable to guarantee protection of lives and property. In reality, therefore, the newly independent states in Africa were illequipped to transcend both the patrimonialism and authoritarianism of the colonial state, hence the serial political instabilities, armed insurgencies and uprisings, state failures and collapse that have become the lot of the continent in the post-Cold War era. These critical challenges to the state have always been there, even in the 1960s and 1970s, but were readily quelled by the authorities with assistance from their metropolitan godfathers.39 Apart from these cases of failure and collapse, the postcolonial state in general has been unable to live up to the dictates of the modern state system in that it lacks the basic wherewithal to be the sole custodian of the means of violence,40 to employ non-coercive resources to provide adequately for the benefit of the majority of the population,41 and to mediate conflict. The state is unable to transcend patrimonialism and authoritarianism, as many inevitably became the private fiefs of powerful authoritarian rulers and their cronies. The challenge to the legitimacy and survival of the state has become more prominent with the collapse of the

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Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War rivalries which had helped to sustain many ruthless despots in power for decades.

Globalization, the State, and Prospects for Regional Integration The rationale for economic and political integration of Africa was powerfully articulated by Kwame Nkrumah. According to him, the continental union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum. Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to the leaders of Africa. It is for us to grasp what is a golden opportunity to prove that the genius of African people can surmount the separatist tendencies in sovereign nationhood by coming together speedily for the sake of Africa’s greater glory and infinite well-being, into a Union of African states.42

Whilst the basic arguments in favour of integration remain sacrosanct, disagreement however subsists over the means and methods, as well as the date for accomplishing it. Globalization and its attendant characteristics have made integration no longer a luxury but a pressing necessity, especially considering that unviable African states are mere peripheral players on the global economic and political stage, and would remain so if they fail to come together. Globalization is ruthless and relentless, and no nation or region is immune to its rampaging impact. Even though globalization is not a new phenomenon, Africa, since its incorporation into the global economy, has always been only a minor and peripheral player, a producer of raw materials and consumer of finished products from the industrialized states. The rulers of the various African states accept this contemporary reality of Africa’s marginality on the global economic platform and also accept, if in principle, the necessity for integration for continental development, but have chosen to hide under the figment of individual state’s sovereignty since they loath giving away the enormous powers and resources that they control and enjoy. From Nkrumah’s efforts at creating a continental platform for eventual integration in the late 1950s, through the formation of the OAU in 1963, to its eventual transformation into the AU in 2002, the hope of African integration and unity have remained almost forlorn, an enterprise to which successive African rulers since the early 1960s have merely paid lip-service. Even though Gaddafi, once an AU chairperson, was poised to fast-track the evolution of a United States of Africa, his effort was given cold shoulders by some of the major countries (such as Nigeria) whose predilection for the gradualist approach

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has remained unchanged since the early 1960s. At the Grand Debate in Accra in 2006, Nigeria reaffirmed its commitment to gradualism, and only sent its vice-president, Goodluck Jonathan, to the 2009 AU summit in Libya, perhaps to signal its lack of enthusiasm for Gaddafi’s fast-track method. Having existed and functioned for four decades, the OAU was no longer able to respond to the unique and increasingly complex challenges of the post-Cold War international politico-economic and social order. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the vanquishing of Communism as a political system had created in their wake new global realities, challenges and infinitely more complex emergencies which the OAU was decidedly ill-equipped to address. Perhaps, we can best put the matter in its proper perspective by quoting the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who observed that “in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no state can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable.”43 The establishment of the AU as a successor to the OAU would therefore seem to have signalled Africa’s sensitivity to these new realities. But how far have the African continent and its new organization been able to respond to these new global challenges, and with what success? Since outright political fusion was initially rejected, integration at the sub-regional level was to be the precursor to continental integration. Even this has not progressed as steadily as was originally anticipated for a variety of political and technical reasons which need not delay us here. One of the major stumbling blocks to the continental effort is the purposeful establishment of a plethora of regional economic communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS, SADC, East African Community, and the Arab Maghreb Union, across the continent. These RECs, often with overlapping functions, invariably share the same economic space, and compete more than they cooperate. Their existence constitutes a serious disincentive to the progress of overall continental integration because of overlapping institutions and functions, needless duplication of efforts, spreading the meagre resources too thinly, and becoming too firmly rooted. In the West African sub-region, for example, ECOWAS cohabits, and possibly competes, with other organizations such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), Mano River Union (MRU), and now Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). In the Central African sub-region also, there are three regional economic groupings, namely, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and

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Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). Similarly, the Southern African sub-region parades the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), as well as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).44 This is in addition to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which its member states expect to be a northern arm of the COMESA in East Africa, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which brings together the states of North Africa, except Egypt. However, behind the snail speed of integration is the lack of the requisite strong political will and firm commitment on the part of contemporary African leaders to take the bull by the horns and move more swiftly towards achieving the goal of integration. Regardless of public affirmations of the necessity for integration at the annual summits of the AU, political commitment to the project remains very weak. This weakness may not be unconnected with the slim and often contested political legitimacy that most of the leaders enjoy in their countries, which therefore makes regime survival their main preoccupation and, of course, to the detriment of every other developmental issues.45 An inescapable if unspoken reality is that most African rulers are actually little more than puny clients of powerful foreign patrons who secretly control the levers of power in the continent. It is indisputable that many of them owe their rise to power and survival to foreign backers whose bidding they have to do once in power. Added to this endemic problem of contested domestic political legitimacy is the reluctance of the plenipotentiaries to advance even the existing RECs and similar organizations towards the supranational status envisaged in the 1992 Abuja Treaty that established the African Economic Community. More often than not, these RECs are becoming a hindrance to accelerating continental political integration because it satisfies the selfish interests of countries that would rather play big fish in a small pond than operate in a much larger continental pool. This then raises the critical question of whether Africa’s subsisting political architecture of multiple territorial states and the mindset spawned by inherited political practices and attitudes are actually conducive to continental political integration.

Political Instability and State Collapse as Impediments The incidence of failed and collapsed states which has dogged the continent since the end of the Cold War constitutes a major hindrance to integration. The failures and collapse have come about as a result of the

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peculiar internal political dynamics inherited from colonial rule. Several countries (Liberia, Somalia, DR Congo, and Sierra Leone) imploded in quick succession shortly after the Cold War, while others, such as Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Algeria, and Zimbabwe, have experienced serious internal turmoil and insurrection. A failed coup attempt in Cote d’Ivoire in 2002 led inexorably to the division of that once peaceful country along its natural north/south ethno-cultural and regional fault-lines and into a civil war that raged intractably for more than half a decade.46 These negative developments, which are merely intrinsic to the character of the inherited colonial state but which were suppressed for long by authoritarian rule, began to manifest more powerfully after the Cold War when foreign patrons no longer had any use for their local clients. This negative development has underscored the contemporary difficulties of economic and political integration in an underdeveloped and politically unstable continent.

Economic Partnership Agreements and the Problem of Integration The subtle and invisible foreign control, especially of the economic decision making structures of these states, remains quite virulent. There is the existence of a number of bilateral economic agreements and other pacts of a non-economic nature between specific African countries and extra-African powers which are capable of vitiating rapid and effective regional integration. Some of these agreements, especially between several West African states and former colonial powers, Britain and France, predated the formation of ECOWAS, and this fact is acknowledged in the ECOWAS Treaty. This is in addition to a series of new but often sinister economic partnership agreements being forced on several African states. Vulnerability to external dictation and manipulation remains a serious albatross since a number of African states have to rely on the developed states of the Western hemisphere for the capital and technology required for development, as well as for the guarantee of regime survival. Over the decades since independence, post-colonial ties and allegiances have hindered collective efforts, as the case of the Francophone gang-up against the formation of ECOWAS in the early 1970s poignantly demonstrated. Such sentiments and attachments have, without doubt, continued to frustrate sub-regional and regional cooperation.

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Concluding Remarks The foregoing analysis has sought to establish the culpability of the colonial state-building project in the intractable crisis of the post-colonial state and its inability to transcend the narrow confines of individual territorial sovereignty in order to embrace the inescapable reality of continental political and economic integration. Every attempt since Nkrumah’s valiant efforts to bring this to fruition has recorded unimpressive success, due largely to the inherent character of the state that colonial rule bequeathed to Africans, the predatory mentality of the continent’s own political elites, and the invisible vice-grip of powerful foreign interests on African affairs. African leaders can be said to have made at best very feeble moves towards realizing the goal of continental integration. Since the Sirte declaration of September 1999, they have sought to propel the continent towards the realization of Nkrumah’s dream of establishing a United States of Africa. It was partly in this direction that the OAU was transformed into the AU, with brand new structures, institutions and processes. Gaddafi then appeared to be the arrowhead and principal driving force behind the establishment of a continental state with a single central political authority. Perhaps in response to his efforts, the AU held a summit meeting in Accra in 2007, termed the “Grand Debate of the African Union”, a move apparently engineered by Gaddafi to fast-track the establishment of the United States of Africa. His efforts to move expeditiously towards the realization of the ultimate goal were not enthusiastically received by other leaders. But very little beyond mere rhetorical commitment to the ideal of the United States of Africa would seem to have been accomplished thus far. Undoubtedly, Gaddafi’s frenetic pace did not sit well with certain conservative elements within the AU who are not yet totally sold on the idea of a United States of Africa. Prominent in this group are the African leaders whose basic instinct is strictly for the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of individual states, leaders who are afraid of surrendering their states to a supranational body. Many of them, while persuaded of the desirability of the project as a sine qua non for Africa’s progress and relevance in the world of the twenty-first century, were incredibly suspicious of Gaddafi’s personal motives and motivation for the project. In fact, Nigeria’s lukewarm attitude revolves around the notion that African leaders are not empowered to trade away state sovereignty which ordinarily resides in the people themselves. This is not different

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from the views of a number of states whose leaders remain unwilling to forgo individual state sovereignty for the sake of the continent. The critical question in Africa today is not whether the idea of a continental state is desirable and feasible; it is whether the reluctant conservative states can be persuaded to facilitate its realization. In other words, is there any hope that the project would ever be brought to fruition? Besides, would other AU chairpersons be committed to the expeditious realization of the project as Gaddafi was? Will such leaders have the requisite moral and political gravitas to bring other reluctant states like Nigeria on board the ‘United States of Africa’ train? Will the dream not suffer a fatal damage should Nigeria, with one-fifth of Africa’s population, remain unyielding in its predilection for gradualism? How long and what efforts will be required to realize the objective of a continental African state? These are undoubtedly some of the critical questions whose answers are germane to our understanding of contemporary developments within the African continent. But even with the best of intentions, African integration may be a mere aspiration for as long as many regimes on the continent enjoy slim and contested legitimacy and remain clients of metropolitan powers and interests. Most so-called leaders are unable to wriggle out of the vice-grip of the series of subsisting military and defence pacts with foreign powers, as well as economic partnership agreements which they have entered into.

Notes 1

Claude Ake, “The State in Contemporary Africa,” in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Government and Politics in Africa: A Reader, Harare: AAPS Books, 2000, p. 57. 2 Ibid, p. 60. 3 Another prominent scholar shares the view that an understanding of Africa’s role in the world today is contingent upon a proper reading of the continent’s history, especially its colonization. See Dani Wadada Nabudere, “African Unity in Historical Perspective,” in Eddy Maloka (ed.), A United Statesof Africa? Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001, p. 9. 4 More perceptive Western scholars do not agree with this callous tendency of blaming the African victims of Western oppression for their own plight. See, amongst others, Ankie Hoogvelt, “Globalization, Imperialism and Exclusion: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Tunde Zack-Williams, Diane Frost and Alex Thomson (eds.), Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities, London: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 15 – 28. 5 These include the leaders of independent Nigeria for whom elections were deliberately rigged by the departing British colonial officials. External support from the metropolitan countries also propped up murderous rulers like Gnassingbe Eyadema, Mobutu Sese Seko, Omar Bongo, etc., while those other leaders who

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were not amenable to foreign manipulation and control were swiftly overthrown or murdered, such as Patrice Lumumba. 6 For a detailed examination of the rise and promotion of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness in Nigeria during colonial rule, see, amongst others, James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley and New York: University of California Press, 1958; Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978; W. A. Fawole, “Colonial History and the Search for Democratic Nationhood: The Case of Anglophone West Africa,” in W. A. Fawole and Charles Ukeje, (eds.), The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005, pp. 61-62. 7 For a thorough analysis of British policies in Kenya from the perspective of an insider and victim, see, Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: An Autobiography, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1967. 8 Said Adejumobi, “Identity, Citizenship and Conflict: The African Experience,” in W. A. Fawole and C. Ukeje (eds), The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005, p. 25. 9 Abdoulaye Bathily, “The West African State in Historical Perspective,” in Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), Government and Politics in Africa, p. 38. 10 For a graphic depiction of colonial rule, see Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf Books, 1963; Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, New York: Times Books, 1992. 11 Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan: Spectrum Books., 1996, p. 2-3. 12 Adebayo Williams, “Closed States and Open Borders: Interrogating the Fictions of Post-Colonial Nationhood in Africa,” Black Renaissance, p. 124. 13 Nabudere, “African Unity in Historical Perspective”, pp. 14, 19. 14 Fawole, “Colonial History and the Search for Democratic Nationhood”, p. 59. 15 Benoit Ndi-Zambo, “African Unity: Looking Back, Looking Forward, and a Recipe for Failure,” in Maloka (ed.), A United States of Africa?, p. 29. 16 See Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State, 1992. 17 Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA, 2000, p. 36. 18 Adebayo Williams, “Democracy in Nigeria: Retrospect and Prospect,” text of seminar paper delivered at the Afrika Studie Centrum, Leiden, February 11, 1999, p. 7. 19 The Congo crisis of the early 1960s and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in the late 1970s are prominent cases where extra-continental interests played prominent roles. 20 France entered into a series of military and defence agreements with virtually all its former colonies and established military bases on their soil. This was used to monitor and guarantee the survival of friendly regimes and for the removal of unwanted ones, such as the deployment of French troops that restored Gabonese president Leon Mba to power after a military coup in 1964, and the swift removal

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of self-styled emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa from power in Central African Republic in 1979. 21 For a conceptual elaboration and analysis, see Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991. 22 See W. A. Fawole, “A Critical Interrogation of the Historical-Political Genesis of ‘State Robbery’ in Nigeria,” text of Faculty seminar paper presented at the Faculty of Administration, 2009, Seminar Series, OAU, Ile-Ife, May 5, 2009. 23 Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, p. 7. 24 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf Books, 1963, p. 174. 25 Ibid, p. 176. 26 France demonstrated its intention to maintain an economic stranglehold on its former colonies when it inserted clauses in the 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community that would allow goods from those states to enjoy preferential treatment. 27 French troops were stationed in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Djibouti, among others. 28 France employed its troops to support favoured regimes and to remove unwanted ones. The cases of Leon Mba in Gabon in 1964 and Jean Bedell Bokassa in Central African Republic respectively are instructive. 29 The ill-fated Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, negotiated and concluded between emerging sovereign Nigeria and the British overlords was stiffly resisted by Nigerians immediately after independence and thus had to be swiftly abrogated in January 1962. 30 Herman Cohen, “Democratic Change in Africa,” Address to the AfricanAmerican Institute, 8 November, 1990. 31 Hoogvelt, “Globalisation, Imperialism and Exclusion: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa,” pp. 22-26. 32 Many countries, most significantly the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire have suffered critical internal crises leading to outright state collapse in a few cases. 33 The British ensured that elections were manipulated in favour of a certain section of Nigeria; the French deliberately divided Chad into ‘useful south’ and ‘useless north’, while Algeria was distinguished between the ‘French Algerians’ who accepted French citizenship and ‘Muslim Algerians’ who stiffly resisted foreign rule. 34 The major Western countries were uncomfortable with the radical posturing of its first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and thus fomented domestic upheavals that eventually led to his murder and the ensuing political instability which allowed Joseph Mobutu, a notable stooge of Western powers, to seize power and impose military rule. 35 Samuel Doe suffered the same fate in Liberia when the US refused to come to his aid after Charles Taylor launched an insurrection against his regime in December 1989. 36 Williams, “Towards a Typology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa: Elite Reorientation in the Era of Globalisation,” pp. 7-8.

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37 This argument has been made elsewhere. See W. Alade Fawole, “A Continent in Crisis: Internal Conflicts and External Interventions in Africa,” African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 411, pp. 297 – 304. See also a seminal analysis by James O’Connell, “The Inevitability of Instability,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, 2, (1967), pp. 181-191. 38 O’Connell, “The Inevitability of Instability, p. 183. 39 The serial Shaba uprisings against Mobutu which were usually put down with military and logistic assistance from the United States and Morocco can still be vividly recalled. In the post-cold war era, however, internal insurgents no longer require external support for their operations. The examples of Jonas Savimbi in Angola, Charles Taylor in Liberia and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone who seized control of their countries’ national resources to prosecute their domestic insurgencies remain instructive. 40 Non-state armed groups have posed severe threats to the authority and legitimacy of the state, invariably threatening both political survival and the sanctity of territorial boundaries. The cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, may be some of the most prominent across the continent. Nigeria has been battling with militant armed groups in its oil-rich Niger Delta for over a decade. 41 Failure or inability to employ non-coercive mechanisms to provide the basic social and physical infrastructures that would positively benefit the wellbeing and welfare of the vast majority of the people have caused social and political chaos and upheavals in several countries, and threatening the very survival of the inherited post-colonial state. The state remains largely a mere colonial artefact in the minds of most people since they neither own nor are able to control it for their benefit. 42 Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 221. 43 “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” Report of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” December 2, 2004, p. 15. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/secureworld. 44 Kwasi Asante, The Proliferation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa: The Imperative for Rationalization, (unpublished M.A. dissertation, LECIA, University of Ghana, August 2007, p. 2. 45 See Mae C. King, “The State, Foreign Policy and Conflict in Africa,” in Olayiwola Abegunrin and Olusoji Akomolafe (eds.), Nigeria in Global Politics: Twentieth Century and Beyond - Essays in Honor of Professor Olajide Aluko, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006, pp. 213-224. 46 See amongst others, W. A. Fawole, “ECOWAS and the Cote d’Ivoire Crisis: The Politics and Problems of Regional Peace Making,” Democracy and Development: Journal of West African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), pp. 11 - 30.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF HIV/AIDS OLUFUNKE ADEBOYE

Introduction In June 2011, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) marked thirty years of the epidemic with the publication of a 139-page document titled AIDS at 30: Nations at the Crossroads in which it outlined the strategies utilized to fight the epidemic, the progress made so far, and the challenges faced by the body. What comes out of every page of the document is the message that HIV/AIDS is a global challenge which requires an equally global and collaborative response. International response to the epidemic has been politicised right from the beginning. International response was grafted on existing power relations between the developed and developing worlds. Africa, as the continent most affected by the epidemic, became the focus of various antiAIDS plans and strategies designed by the international community. The slow response of most African leaders to the HIV/AIDS challenge, their lack of political will and reluctance to commit their meagre national resources to fight the epidemic made the continent vulnerable not only to the ravages of the epidemic but also to the manoeuvres of the Western countries which projected their own economic and political agenda under the guise of combating global HIV/AIDS. Western powers, through their bilateral and multilateral relationships with African states, played very important roles in the management of the epidemic. They identified and defined the epidemic, framed the limits of its discourse in official circles, mapped out strategies for combating it, patented the drugs to be purchased by Africa and even determined how donor funds given to fight AIDS were to be locally expended. African leaders thus found themselves responding to many of these developments in various ways. Given this tight situation, how much wiggle-room did

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African leaders have? How resourceful were they in identifying and utilizing positive opportunities embedded in the global politicisation of HIV/AIDS? How genuine were the interests of Western powers in the African HIV/AIDS situation? After thirty years of the epidemic, how much relief has international aid afforded the African continent, given the disconnect between international intervention programmes and the reality of the daily lives of people battling with the disease? This chapter argues that the HIV/AIDS challenge, among other things, underscores the dependent power relations between Africa and the Western powers who were the financiers of major global initiatives on the epidemic. Even when the ‘strings’ attached to foreign aid were sometimes detestable and counter-productive many African nations could not reject them because of their feeble economies. However, it would be misleading to see African leaders as passive agents in this encounter. They also exploited the HIV/AIDS situation to their own benefit. The epidemic thus remains a tool in the hands of astute players within and outside Africa. The following discussion is divided into four main sections. The first situates HIV/AIDS within the globalization discourse, while the second section provides an overview of the history of the epidemic in Africa. The next section discusses the controversies surrounding the intellectual property claims of Western multinational pharmaceuticals and their impact on Africa, while the last section examines some intricacies in the politics of foreign aid.

HIV/AIDS and Globalization In order to understand the various moves and countermoves in the international politics of HIV/AIDS, we need to examine the connection between the globalization discourse and HIV/AIDS, and how this affects Africa. Globalization, generally, has to do with the flow of ideas, technology, capital and human beings across various national boundaries. It reflects the growing “interconnectedness of individuals, groups, companies and countries.1 As Green and Griffith have noted, this has been going on for several centuries, but in the past three decades it has increased in intensity, scope, and visibility as a public issue.2 This is largely due to its negative impact, which scholars and activists all over the globe have had to criticize. But before examining this negative impact, it is important to note that globalization has diverse components and has therefore been presented and theorized in various ways by scholars. Patricia Alvarez sees it as the ‘recent’ expansion of free market and democratic institutions around the world.3 Obi also underscores the free

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flow of capital, trade and ideas, which he claims facilitated the integration of the global economy.4 However, Kellner, in a more nuanced analysis, sees the creation of a new globalized and interconnected world as a function of the “transmutations of technology and capital”.5 In other words, he identifies a close connection between scientific and technological revolutions and the global restructuring of the imperatives and institutions of capitalism. Globalization to him is not just the triumph of the hegemony of market capitalism, but rather a “conflictual and contradictory” phenomenon that unleashes conflicts between capitalism and democracy and which, in its “restructuring processes, creates new opening for struggle, resistance and democratic transformation”.6 Kellner proposes two perspectives for comprehending globalization, namely, “globalization from above” and “globalization from below”. The former has to do with the supremacy of corporate capitalism and the activities of capitalist states, while the latter has to do with the empowerment of hitherto marginalized groups and individuals (called civil society) who have now come out to demand social justice and resist the oppressive aspects of globalisation.7 Both perspectives are relevant to the issues discussed in this chapter. Perhaps, some of these oppressive aspects of ‘globalization from above’, which have been severely criticised by scholars, NGOs and popular movements, should be highlighted. In the words of Obi, “multinational corporations have exploited the expansionist, integrative and capitalist market logic of globalization to reinforce their position as dominant economic forces on a global scale. Essentially, multinationals operate as monopolies, dominating and dividing the world market among themselves, and manipulating prices to maximise profits”.8 The situation becomes critical when pharmaceutical multinationals are the ones insisting on protecting their monopoly rights over HIV/AIDS drugs. This has fatal implications. By making the drugs very expensive, access to them is restricted and, because these are lifesaving medications which the majority of infected people in Africa cannot afford, more deaths ensue. Closely related to this is the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). One of the rules of the WTO is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) invoked to protect drug patents by multinational pharmaceutical companies in the developed world. This is used to prevent the manufacture and distribution of cheaper, generic brands of the HIV/AIDS drugs in Africa and elsewhere. The unfortunate HIV/AIDS situation in Africa is thus ‘exploited’ by global capitalism. The question is how long can the rationale for maximization of profits and protection of patents by Western pharmaceutical multinationals

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withstand the cry for life by the sick and dying AIDS victims in urgent need of treatment in Africa? This is the conflict between profits and ethics. The response of the various parties involved, the politics, negotiations and criticisms are all discussed in this chapter. Other aspects of the connection between globalization and HIV/AIDS include the transfer of donor funds and ideas from the West to Africa; the issue of external debts; and the depredations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank ‘conditionalities’. The latter have been espoused through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that further weakened African economies and diminished their capacity to fight the epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s when it could easily have been curtailed.9 SAP required governments to devalue their currencies, reduce public spending, privatise industries, improve infrastructure and orient national economies towards international markets. According to Stephen Lewis, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, the result of this external imposition on Africa was to compromise the social sectors, especially health and education. In addition, “the rigid, fundamentalist policies of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) did extraordinary damage to African economies from which they are yet to recover”.10 Thus, in the face of HIV/AIDS, countries implementing SAPs lacked the capacity to fight the epidemic. The social impact of these oppressive economic regimes on African states is enormous. Women were worse affected. Where families could not afford to pay school fees for all their children, girls were usually kept at home. Moreover, women had fewer employment opportunities, received lower wages, and had limited access to land and agricultural resources.11 Closely related to this is the issue of national debt, which constituted a great burden on African states. By the time HIV/AIDS surfaced in Africa in the mid-eighties, twenty-two countries in sub-Saharan Africa had accumulated increased external debt.12 With huge portions of their national budgets allocated to debt servicing, many of these nations lacked the resources to intervene adequately in the HIV/AIDS situation. Between 1970 and 2002, Africa acquired a debt of $294 billion (largely taken by military dictators). Over the same period, it paid back $260 billion mostly as interest. At the end, Africa still owed more than $230 billion in debt.13 What Africa needed, which various groups have been calling for, is debt forgiveness. Indeed, some of Africa’s debts have been written off, but this has not produced any transformation in local economies. The funds freed up have not all been redirected to the anti-HIV/AIDS campaign.

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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community set eight specific development targets to be reached by 2015. These are the popular Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). One of them is to halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria. It is, however, becoming clear in Africa that without first conquering HIV/AIDS, none of the other seven goals would be realized due to the far-reaching impact of the epidemic. The fight against the epidemic must remain a global one in which both local and international resources are to be continually deployed.

History of AIDS in Africa HIV/AIDS was ‘discovered’ in 1981 in the United States among homosexual men. It was also found to be widespread among drug users who shared needles, and among sex workers. By 1984/85, the virus responsible for the infection had been identified and the main methods of transmission also indicated, namely, sexual contact, blood contact and mother to child transmission. African cases were identified as from 1983, first among African patients hospitalized in Belgium; in Kigali, Rwanda; Kinshasa, Zaire and later in Uganda.14 But it was soon discovered that the virus had existed in central Africa from the late 1950s. This was confirmed by tests carried out on conserved blood samples from Kinshasha.15 The disease had probably been spreading unnoticed since that time and the diffusion only became accelerated with increasing mobility of people (due to improvements in transportation), increasing poverty and other social conditions that enhanced it. Iliffe has argued that Africa later developed the worst AIDS epidemic in the world because it had the first epidemic.16 The disease had been spreading for several decades on the continent before it was eventually discovered. It has had time to establish itself, having spread silently for many years before anyone recognised its existence. It was indeed “a catastrophe in slow motion”.17 It is this slow development, coupled with the globalization of the fight against it, that has distinguished AIDS from previous epidemics.18 It was soon discovered that the most common form of exposure to HIV in sub-Saharan Africa was through sexual contact. Infections from blood contact and mother to child transmissions, though significant were not as widespread. National prevalence figures show the spread of the infection over time. The worst hit areas were the countries of Southern Africa, globally dubbed the ‘epicentre’ of the HIV/AIDS epidemic despite the fact that Central African capital cities initially had very high prevalence rates.19 In 1990, HIV/AIDS prevalence in South Africa and Lesotho was less than one per

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cent. But by 2000, South Africa had 16.1 per cent prevalence and Lesotho 24.5 per cent. Botswana, which had 3.5 per cent prevalence in 1990, had 26 per cent in 2000. In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Togo, the prevalence rates exceeded 5 per cent in 2000, far lower than in Southern Africa but much higher than the rate in the same region in 1990. By 2001, out of a total of forty million people living with HIV/AIDS globally, sub-Saharan Africa had twenty-eight million. This is a region with less than 8 per cent of the world’s population having over two-thirds of global AIDS cases. By 2011, out of a total of 34 million people with HIV/AIDS worldwide, Africa had 22.5 million, 60 per cent of them women.20 There is also an estimated 14.9 million children on the continent who had lost either or both parents to the epidemic. Figures from UNAIDS thus show that on the average, the number of people becoming infected is decreasing. But there are local spots where the infection rates are actually on the rise despite various preventive interventions. In other areas, the infection has simply stabilized. The number of people receiving treatment globally has been put at 6.6 million, while 9 million people are yet to be treated.21 A major area in the development of AIDS in Africa that has generated considerable controversy due to its political overtones is the area of research and interpretation of AIDS. Research on AIDS, especially during the first two decades of the spread of the epidemic, was dominated by biomedical paradigms. This could be attributed to funding priorities which privileged biomedical research. The need for social science perspectives soon became apparent. The tension arose over how to combine the two perspectives to generate a more nuanced understanding of the epidemic. The social context within which AIDS developed particularly had to be studied. After all, these societies had for generations been marked by “gender questions, political relations, class conflicts and sometimes, racial tensions”, all of which determine in varying proportions, or “at the very least explain the particular paths which the epidemic follows”.22 Since the mid-1990s, there has thus been a growth in anthropological, sociological, geographical, economic and political science studies of AIDS in Africa. Historians have also not been left out. Two major attempts to reconstruct the history of the epidemic are Philippe Denis and Charles Becker’s edited collection titled The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa in a Historical Perspective and John Iliffe’s A History of the African AIDS Epidemic.23 In addition, various research networks were established in Africa to generate up to date knowledge of the epidemic and harmonise efforts at fighting it. An example of such is the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS Research Alliance (SAHARA), established in 2001 by the

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Human Research Council of South Africa.24 SAHARA conducts multi-site, multi-country research projects that are cross-sectional, and interventionbased. It works with NEPAD (African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development) to ensure that continental approaches or strategies to address the epidemic are informed by evidence-based research. It has key multilateral partners like UNAIDS and regularly convenes conferences on HIV/AIDS research. It also publishes the Journal of the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS.25 Another source of tension in AIDS research is the fact that the resulting representation of AIDS in Africa carries a bias of ethnocentrism. This is largely due to the fact that the Western experts behind many of these publications describe AIDS in Africa in terms that call to mind the prejudice of colonial historiography on the continent. The language of AIDS discourse especially exposes these prejudices. But as African scholars and activists reacted to such value-laden language, several revisions have been made. Initial AIDS specialist literature talked about the ‘risk behaviour’ of Africans which connoted irrationality, lack of prudence, irresponsibility, and ‘African sexual promiscuity’. Later, the emphasis shifted to the negative impact of ‘dangerous environments’. But now, the value-neutral term used for groups hitherto described as ‘high risk’ groups is ‘key populations’. Apart from the above politics of AIDS diction is the issue of international stigmatization of Africa in the early scientific debate surrounding the epidemic. The point made then was that Africans infected the world with AIDS. This had various repercussions. Many countries initially contemplated immigration rules that limited the movement of infected individuals. Closely related to this is the initial reluctance of African leaders to admit the existence and extent of the epidemic in their nations for fear of being discriminated against. AIDS was now clearly a political and cultural issue. Another interpretation of AIDS was provided by Thambo Mbeki of South Africa, who ignored biomedical wisdom and portrayed it as a disease of poverty. Mbeki was eventually prevailed upon by local and international pressure to introduce antiretroviral (ARV) treatment. But the significance of his view lies not only in the fact that it captured the social perspective on the AIDS discourse, it also reflects his impatience with Western representations of AIDS in Africa which were devoid of any genuine engagement with local susceptibilities. This is not surprising given the South African past of apartheid and racial tensions. Perhaps, one should attempt, at this juncture, a periodisation of the epidemic in order to appreciate the major shifts in emphasis and reactions

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to the epidemic. This general periodisation is not a rigid exercise as each locality equally had its highlights. This periodisation looks first at the first two decades of the epidemic, and later at the last decade of the epidemic. The first twenty years could further be divided into three phases.26 The first phase (1984-1988) witnessed the initial denial by African governments of the epidemic. This largely had to do with the fear of international stigmatisation discussed above and their uncertainty about the ramifications of AIDS. The second phase (1989-1994) saw belated global response to the epidemic. This response was minimal as the fight against AIDS was delegated to national ministries of health in various African nations. This approach failed woefully in nations where public health infrastructure had already deteriorated. The third phase (1995-2000) witnessed broader global response. This was the time the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS was established to coordinate this response. Meanwhile, several lessons were learnt during this twenty-year period. One was the role of leadership in the fight against AIDS. Uganda and Senegal are two examples of the positive changes that could be effected by committed leaders in arresting and reversing the spread of AIDS. The power of advocacy groups and NGOs was also demonstrated during this period. The last decade of the epidemic (2001-2011) was characterized by increased global commitment to the AIDS cause. The year 2001 was particularly important as the international community now classified AIDS as a global security threat. A special session of the UN was convened on the issue of AIDS. There was also an African Union (AU) session in Abuja in the same year. At both sessions, world leaders committed themselves afresh to the anti-AIDS fight. African states now set up national commissions saddled with the responsibility of coordinating the fight against AIDS, instead of the ministries of health. The decade also witnessed a lot of debate and activities on ARVs. The World Health Organisation (WHO) set a ‘3 by 5’ target of giving ARV treatment to 3 million people by 2005. By that date only 1.3 million people had access to ARV. This was also the period of the tensions caused by the World Trade Organisation TRIPS agreement as low income countries that needed ARVs could not afford them while pharmaceutical multinationals guarded their patents jealously, invoking their intellectual property rights. In 2003, the American president set up the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). There was also the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. However, the recent global economic meltdown is already affecting the AIDS cause as external funding is beginning to dry up. This is at a time

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when AIDS has gradually been reduced to a chronic illness in the West instead of a death sentence. To maintain this new profile of AIDS in Africa, universal access to drugs has to be achieved throughout the entire continent.

Multinational Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property Issues At the heart of the global debate on the role of multinational pharmaceuticals in Africa and other parts of the developing world is the issue of unrestricted access to drugs for those who need them. Since ARVs were discovered in the late 1990s and used to treat those infected with HIV/AIDS in the Western world, it became evident that even though those drugs lacked curative properties, they reduced the viral load in the patient, improving his life and generally reducing AIDS mortality rate. There was thus the need to extend this treatment to Africa, where two-thirds of global HIV/AIDS patients reside. The basic question was how to get these lifesaving drugs from Western pharmaceutical companies to the sick in Africa. However, this basic question has been framed in various ways by scholars and activists to ventilate a host of other contingent concerns. First is the issue of the global political economy, the global capitalist system and the position of Africa and other low-income nations within it.27 There is also the ethical perspective to the development – should Western pharmaceutical multinationals continue to protect patent rights at the expense of the lives of poor Africans denied access to life-saving medication?28 Besides, this debate underscores the unpleasant aspects of globalization noted earlier. All these perspectives show that the question is beyond a mere ‘tug-of-war’ between patriotic African leaders and ‘greedy’ pharmaceutical multinationals. Perhaps, the question of patents and associated intellectual property rights should be examined more closely. The legal instrument that underpins this is the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement packaged by the WTO in 1995. It has been suggested that the agreement was instigated by giant multinational corporations which were apprehensive about the fate of their newly developed products in the world market. They anticipated that such products stood the risk of being stifled by the practices of “mercenary Southerners unwilling to engage in fair business deals”. It was this fear that made them promote an internationalization of Western standards of patent protection.29

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The TRIPS agreement introduced high levels of patent protection and expanded the scope of patentable products. Among other things, it granted a twenty-year protection to pharmaceutical products. This gives manufacturers monopoly rights over the production and distribution of such drugs. With this, they can prevent cheap versions of their patented drugs from being produced and distributed at will by others. Developing nations, as members of the WTO, signed this agreement but later discovered it was not in their interest. The TRIPS agreement appears oblivious of the development problems in many of these countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Within the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic where it became pertinent that cheap ARVs be made available to all those who needed them, the patenting of such drugs made them not only unaffordable but ultimately unavailable. They could not be produced locally. Patent protection enhanced monopoly rights, which in turn priced the drugs out of the reach of those who needed them most. Developing nations have therefore been turned into mere ‘toll collectors’ for the West, while their citizens succumb to high AIDS mortality. This has raised serious ethical questions on the attitude of the multinational pharmaceuticals. The issues here are particularly complicated given the fact that the clinical trials of some of these AIDS drugs were carried out on African subjects on the continent.30 It is necessary at this juncture to further elaborate on the high cost of AIDS drugs. The companies involved in the manufacture of such drugs include Glaxo SmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck & Co. Inc., Boehringer Ingelheim, Abbot Laboratories and F. Hoffman-La Roche. In the late 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century, the cost of a year’s treatment of antiretroviral (without any discount) was put at almost $10,000 per person.31 Yet, per capita income in Africa was as low as $300 within the same period. Glaxo SmithKline in 1999 was said to have made a profit of $589 million on a single AIDS drug.32 The justification by pharmaceutical companies for such high profit was that they needed to recoup the huge sums of money pumped into research and development (R&D) and advertising. In fact, pharmaceutical companies estimate over $800 million R&D investments per new drug.33 The same Glaxo by 2001 employed 16,000 researchers and 40,000 salesmen.34 Meanwhile, it has been argued by critics of pharmaceutical capitalism that the profits necessary to fund research and development have never been made in developing countries.35 The huge profits have always come from Western nations simply because the vast majority of patients in developing nations have never been able to afford the

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medications. Therefore, the need to sustain investments in R&D should not be used as an excuse to overprice AIDS drugs in Africa. Meanwhile, the continued implementation of the TRIPS patent regime has exposed a host of other problems identified as drawbacks to the system. These include a tendency among pharmaceuticals to concentrate on the production of drugs that address diseases in the more affluent nations and neglect those among the poor; focus on drugs that relieve symptoms rather than cure and prevent diseases, because the former are the most profitable – demand for them is guaranteed as patients could be on them for life; and wastefulness.36 The wastefulness of resources arises from excessive litigation costs to protect patents and the cost of filing for patents in multiple national jurisdictions. There is also the threat of the production of counterfeit drugs (as opposed to high-quality generics or original brands) which endanger the lives of patients and reduce the profits of the original manufacturers.37 All these drawbacks have necessitated the call for a reform of the patent regime. However, there is an emergency provision in the TRIPS agreement that is rarely invoked by developing nations. This allows developing countries to issue compulsory licences for the local production of generic drugs in cases of emergency. According to Article 31(b) of the agreement, Such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a member in the case of a national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.38

Under the stated conditions, compulsory licences may thus be issued without the authorization of the patent holders. With this provision, drugs could be produced “far more cheaply and sold at a fraction of the price demanded by the patenting pharmaceutical, thus allowing governments to purchase higher quantities for their populations in need”.39 This would immediately lead to the prevention of avoidable deaths and lower AIDS mortality rates in the affected countries. Besides, this licensing of generics would make the AIDS drugs market more competitive and boost the confidence of developing states in the international arena. Paradoxically, despite all these potentials, African states rarely utilised the TRIPS emergency provision. This is due to a couple of reasons. First, many African nations do not have the technical wherewithal to manufacture these AIDS generic drugs. The African pharmaceutical

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industry is still teething as many nations cannot afford the huge investments required in the industry. This leaves them with the option of importing pharmaceutical products at very high costs. Meanwhile, parallel importation of low-cost generics from other developing nations, such as India and Brazil, is frowned at by the patent owners. Udo Schuklenk and Richard Ashcroft cite the case of Glaxo SmithKline, which protested the importation of the generic version of its drug, Combivir, by Ghana from Cipla Limited of Bombay, India in 2000. Cipla is a well-known producer of high quality generic drugs. Under immense pressure from Glaxo, Cipla had to stop the sale of the drugs to Ghana.40 As to the reasons why African nations are reluctant to issue compulsory licences, the fear of retaliation from pharmaceutical companies and the US government stands out as the most important. Multinational pharmaceuticals, despite the TRIPS emergency provision, instituted legal action against countries that issued such licences and even threatened to close down their operations in such places. African countries with poor economies and high unemployment rates could not take such threats of job losses lightly. Besides, the US government, acting in the interest of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, also threatened trade sanctions against developing nations that issue such licences. Implementing either or both of compulsory licensing and parallel importation thus became fraught with various frustrations. The best African example with which to illustrate this is the case of South Africa. In November 1997, the South African government passed a new law called the Medicines and Related Substances (Amendment) Act. This was to allow the health minister to use compulsory licensing to legally manufacture generic ARVs. It also permits the parallel importation of generics from other countries. According to Article 15 (c) of the law, The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may (a) not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to act in respect of such medicine which has been put on to the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent.41

Glaxo SmithKline and the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (a coalition of thirty-nine firms) took court action against the South African government to prevent the implementation of the law. This attracted both local and international criticism. The pharmaceutical multinationals were derided and castigated for placing ‘patents over

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patients’ in a nation that had about 4.7 million people infected with the AIDS virus.42 Eventually the case was dropped in April 2001. Meanwhile, the US government, in a bid to safeguard the business interests of its multinational pharmaceutical companies, threatened trade sanctions against South Africa by blacklisting it under the US Special 301 Watchlist of countries suspected of breaching TRIPS. Again, international criticism of the US for this move during a presidential election year caused a reversal of the policy. South Africa was consequently removed from the watchlist. It is clear from this South African example that international public opinion played a decisive role in forcing the hands of both the US government and the pharmaceutical companies. However, it would be an oversimplification to aggregate the international response to the issue of the monopoly of pharmaceutical multinationals into one homogeneous mould. The broader debate on general access to treatment for the sick in developing nations attracted several shades of opinion from the international community: some criticised, others supported and justified the actions of the pharmaceutical companies, while a third reaction was clearly equivocal. At the forefront of the critics were treatment activists and NGOs. For instance, the most vocal of these groups in South Africa and elsewhere were the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the AIDS Coalition to Unleash the Power (ACT-UP).43 Next to the activists were the scholars. These again could be divided into two groups. There were those who denounced in strong terms the activities of the pharmaceuticals and the entire global capitalist system.44 The other group comprised those who were sympathetic with the pharmaceutical need to protect patents and further invest in drug innovations, even though such scholars also disapprove of the lack of access of poor Africans to essential life-saving drugs. What this second group of scholars has done is to propose a reform of the prevailing patent regime in a way that would facilitate access of the sick to the drugs that they need and at the same time ensure that pharmaceuticals are rewarded for their innovation and investment. Examples of these are Thomas Pogge, who proposed the Health Impact Fund, and Poku Adusei, who proposed “regulatory diversity” as a solution to the problems created by the TRIPS agreement.45 A particularly striking example of scholars suggesting a road map for resolving the drugs issue is the Harvard group which issued in April 2001 the Harvard Consensus Statement on Antiretroviral Treatment for AIDS in Poor Countries. This statement was signed by 148 academics from Harvard, and, among other things, it suggested “parameters for making

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anti-retroviral therapy immediately available to poor countries”; and “provided a detailed cost estimate for delivery” of the drugs and further suggested “how the treatment could be financed by resource-rich nations”.46 This statement was issued during the heat of the South African case earlier discussed. The Harvard intervention, therefore, “indicated solidarity with the Treatment Action Campaign while providing scientific and moral justification for further action”.47 The US government under Bill Clinton initially supported the pharmaceutical corporations and would not tolerate any attempt to infringe on their patent rights. It was also sceptical about extending treatment to Africa because it felt African nations lacked the required health infrastructure within which to administer treatment. The US position, however, changed during the George W. Bush administration, as AIDS was then conceived not just as a problem of the developing world but as a global security issue. It was Bush that in 2003 launched PEPFAR into which several billion dollars of American funds were committed. Moreover, a major test of the US government’s defence of patent laws came in the wake of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre when the anthrax scare hit the country. It was then alleged that the Bush administration began negotiations with Ranbaxy Laboratories of India to supply generic version of a drug originally patented by Bayer pharmaceuticals to fight the anthrax virus.48 While the Bush administration defined the anthrax scare as a national emergency, critics saw it as demonstrating a double standard given the way the Clinton administration had previously handled the South African case. On the equivocal channel were multilateral organisations like UNAIDS. These are bodies that bemoan the lack of access of Africans to ARVs, but are unwilling to challenge the pharmaceutical patents. Peter Piot, the pioneer executive director of UNAIDS, no doubt pointed out at various times that the application of strict patent laws and intellectual property rights in developing nations was not in the interest of those nations due to high AIDS mortality rates and the urgency of the situation.49 This amounted to mere rhetoric as nothing was done to directly confront the pharmaceuticals on their patents or encourage African governments to issue compulsory licences. What UNAIDS did within its first decade was to assist developing nations to negotiate discounts through bulk purchase of drugs from the multinational pharmaceuticals. The pilot programme on this scheme involved Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda and Vietnam. This deal, however, did not produce any appreciable reduction in the price of the drugs.50 Despite this disappointing outcome, multilateral organisations continued to broker such joint deals.

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In 2000, a joint initiative called the Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI) was organized by UNAIDS, WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank in which five multinational pharmaceuticals were to supply drugs at discounted rates to developing countries. The pharmaceutical companies involved in this deal were Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Glaxo SmithKline, Merck & Co., Inc. and F. Hoffman-La Roche. Two more companies later joined the deal: Abott Laboratories in 2001 and Gilead Sciences in 200451. The absurdity of these bulk purchase schemes vis-à-vis the issue of drug patent has been noted by scholars: The organisations’ strategy clearly is not to question the industry’s patents and to use the market mechanism to achieve the desirable lower prices. Yet the role of patents is precisely to prevent the market mechanism from operating to reduce prices in the short run, and it is not clear why this strategy is supposed to work.52

However, a lot has changed in the attitude of these multilateral bodies in particular and the international community in general to the issue of access to vital AIDS drugs in the last several years. It appears these organisations are now beginning to mount direct pressure on multinational pharmaceuticals. The failure of WHO’s target to put three million people under ARV treatment by 2005 underscored the need to reform and scale up such treatment schemes. Added to this is increasing international pressure from activists and NGOs in the face of continuing AIDS mortality. According to Michel Sidibe, the current UNAIDS executive director, about nine million people globally, majority of whom are in Africa, are yet to receive ARVs.53 Key actors on the international scene are now promoting the use of generic drugs. According to Bill Clinton, the Clinton Health Access Initiative in 2011 assisted the South African government to negotiate cheap generic drugs, with projected savings of USD 680 million.54 Again, in March 2011, the UNAIDS, WHO and UNDP issued a policy brief calling on all countries to use TRIPs flexibilities to lower costs and improve access to HIV treatment.55 This is an indirect way of encouraging developing nations to issue compulsory licences. While this is a welcome development, it ought to have been initiated much earlier when South African authorities tested the practicability of the so-called ‘TRIPs flexibilities’. This would have averted a lot of avoidable deaths. Multinational pharmaceuticals have not been completely insensitive to international pressure and criticism of their activities. Apart from giving controversial discounts, they have also responded by donating drugs to needy African nations. Donation of drugs as an act of charity only

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addresses the problem in the short term and offers no lasting solution. Moreover, the donations are tied to drug purchase and not released to the recipients to deploy as they deem fit. The logic of such donations is therefore not to make money available for other aspects of the battle against AIDS - prevention, testing, counselling, mitigation of AIDS effects and care of orphans and vulnerable children - but for treatment alone. The problem with the discount based-approach is, as in the case of donations, that such offers are fraught with conditions, time and quantitybased limitations and a continuing dependence of developing country’s healthcare planning on the goodwill of commercial organizations.56

When the slow rate at which the deals are negotiated, the logistic problem of distribution to remote areas and ensuring long-term adherence, and the fact that prices of drugs still remain unaffordable to a large majority of African people are added to this, then one would see that the impact of the pharmaceutical benevolence has been negligible on the African AIDS situation. It is necessary, before ending this segment, to examine the case of Brazil, a developing country that issued compulsory licences for the local manufacture of ARVs much to the consternation of the multinational pharmaceuticals and Western governments. In 1996, Brazil adopted a policy of universalising access to ARVs and began dispensing them free to all registered cases of HIV/AIDS. The high cost of patented drugs made Brazil to issue compulsory licences for local production. By 2011, ten out of the twenty ARV drugs used in the country were produced locally.57 The Brazilian policy of free access “not only created a market for generic drug components locally, it also raised international competition that led to an overall decrease in ARV prices”. In other words, the country uses the threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate better prices with the multinational pharmaceuticals. For example, in 2002, “the government obtained 40-60 per cent cost reductions on purchases from Merck and Roche of patented components essential to the production of the AIDS cocktail”.58 And where pharmaceuticals declined suggested price reductions, compulsory licences were issued. In 2007, the production of Efavirenz was compulsorily licensed.59 The impact of all these on the country’s AIDS profile is remarkable. Between 1996 and 2002, the AIDS mortality rate dropped by over 70 per cent while the number of reported cases fell by two-thirds.60 By 2011, only 600,000 Brazilians were HIV positive, which brought the prevalence rate to less than 1 per cent.61 The early success of the free-access-to-treatment policy made Brazilian authorities stick to it despite the fact that the

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country was then put on the violator’s list by the US government. Brazil currently plays a major role in the South-South cooperation on HIV/AIDS. It has been involved in transferring technology to Mozambique and assisting it to set up manufacturing plants with which to produce generic AIDS drugs. Brazil also donates more than 7,000 ARV treatments a year to nine countries.62 Africa has a lot to learn from Brazil, particularly in the area of political will and commitment of the leadership to the treatment campaign.

The Politics of Foreign Aid The need to universalize access to AIDS treatment and effectively contain the epidemic, as discussed in the previous section, has made many states in sub-Saharan Africa to increasingly depend on foreign aid. According to UNAIDS estimates, up to 70 per cent of AIDS resources in some states come from external donors.63 The fragile nature of some of the local economies also necessitated this. However, it is not enough to only survey the areas in which poor African states require assistance; the other side of the coin is to ask how much Western donors can give? Are they required to meet all the needs of African states, especially with regards to the fight against HIV/AIDS? It is generally understood among developed nations that the benchmark for Official Development Assistance (ODA) is 0.7 per cent of their GNP. But most of them have fallen below this mark. Moreover, South-South cooperation, though vital, has not delivered much gain to Africa. Despite these drawbacks, the flow of foreign aid to battle AIDS in Africa increased at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The impetus for this renewed commitment came from the securitization of the AIDS epidemic by the global community.64 This shows that the major discourse within which the AIDS question is articulated has changed over the years. It was first located in a biomedical discourse, later it became a development issue, and towards the end of the 1990s it began to be framed as a threat to global security. In January 2000, the UN Security Council deliberated on the security impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa. The Abuja Declaration of 2001, issued at the OAU meeting of heads of state, and the Declaration of Commitment, issued at the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001, both placed the epidemic firmly on the international security agenda. Thereafter, the seriousness of the African AIDS situation and prescriptions on how to address it were widely propagated by UNAIDS, the US government and a host of transnational NGOs concerned with the epidemic. All these constituted the background to the establishment of the

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Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003. The Global Fund started as a joint initiative of the G8 nations and was overseen by the UN. It has been described as the “global war cashbox” against the three identified killer diseases.65 The US government became the highest donor to the Fund. Between 2001 and 2008, it gave $2.5 billion, which was about 30 per cent of the total funds pledged by all the other donor states.66 PEPFAR, on the other hand, was a unilateral scheme of the US government through which $15 billion was committed over a period of five years (2003-2008) to the cause of fighting the AIDS epidemic. This has been the largest global intervention of a single state to fight HIV/AIDS. Both the Global Fund and PEPFAR served as conduits for foreign aid specifically targeted at HIV/AIDS to flow into Africa from the West.67 Of particular importance, however, are the politicization of such aid to Africa, and the ubiquitous role of the US government through PEPFAR and the Global Fund. Commenting on the intricacies of foreign aid, Stephen Lewis agrees with ActionAid, a British NGO, that over 60 per cent of ODA is “phantom aid” which is never really available for the stated purposes. A large chunk of the funds goes to “technical assistance” (over-priced consultants), “tied aid” (purchase of goods and services from firms in the donor country) and “administrative costs” (inflated overheads).68 Perhaps these should be illustrated with examples from PEPFAR and the Global Fund. Helen Epstein, an American journalist, writes of her experience in Uganda in the early 1990s at the peak of the country’s HIV infection: People used to joke that there are two types of AIDS in Uganda: ‘Slim AIDS’ and ‘Fat AIDS’. Those with ‘Slim AIDS’ grow thinner and thinner until they finally disappear. ‘Fat AIDS’ afflicts development agency bureaucrats, foreign consultants and medical experts, who attend lavish conferences and workshops in exotic places, earn large salaries and get fatter and fatter.69

This may appear overstated, but it does underscore the contradictions in aid administration. Or, how else does one explain (taking another example) a situation in which Family Health International “proposed to hand over $1 million of a $3 million PEPFAR grant to Northrop Grumman, a military contractor, … to conduct ‘monitoring and evaluation’ of Family Health’s orphan programs. Under the terms of the original contract, which was fortunately changed, Family Health International and Northrop Grumman would each receive more than twice as much money as all the orphans combined”.70

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The issue of “tied aid” is also widely practiced by PEPFAR and the Global Fund. At the beginning of PEPFAR funding for ARV treatment, the purchase of generic drugs was not allowed. Only patented brands by American pharmaceutical companies were allowed even though cheaper versions were available in India and Brazil. Eventually, by 2004 when PEPFAR agreed to fund generics (due to popular pressure), approval of such drugs by the American Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) was made compulsory. But the approval process was excruciatingly slow. By January 2005, no generic drug approval had completed the process. It was only at the end of 2005 that the first approvals were granted. By 2007, only thirty-four generics had been approved by the FDA and only 27 per cent of PEPFAR funds was expended on the purchase of generics in 2006.71 All these occurred during the administration of George W. Bush, believed to have had a particularly warm relationship with pharmaceutical corporations, as evidenced by the appointment of Randall Tobias, former Chairman of Eli Lilly & Co. as the US Global AIDS Coordinator. This appointment was particularly controversial as Tobias had no specific experience in AIDS matters or in African politics.72 When one adds to this the fact that, but for popular pressure, only patented drugs from North America were to be purchased by PEPFAR funds, the questioning by some sections of the American public of the motives of the US government in setting up PEPFAR becomes understandable. Even within the Global Fund, the Bush administration insisted that all AIDS generics had to be cleared by the FDA before the US would pay for them. Furthermore, much of foreign aid comes with ‘strings’ attached to it. Again, this could be illustrated by the debates and controversies generated by PEPFAR’s ‘conditionalities’. First was the prohibition of funding for programmes that had no explicit written policy opposing prostitution and sex work trafficking. US NGOs challenged this stipulation in court and the Brazilian government refused $40 million of US aid because of it.73 However, because most African countries could not afford to reject such aid, they were constrained to comply with US demands and de-emphasise such ‘offensive’ programmes. Secondly, from 2006, PEPFAR insisted that 33 per cent of its prevention funds should be directed at abstinence and fidelity programmes. Even its condom distribution scheme targeted only ‘high risk’ population and neglected other sexually active groups. The 33 per cent rule has been heavily criticised because it makes it difficult for recipient nations to tailor their intervention programmes to suit local circumstances. Again, the funds allocated to abstinence programmes “crowds out funding for other programs”. On the whole, it has been

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observed that the “exact impact of PEPFAR choices on abstinence, condoms, faith-based agencies (with which it partners) and other issues is difficult to measure, but shaping programs to hit funding targets and ideological goals is not a recipe for maximal medical success”.74 All these are related to the more fundamental question of how much control should be exercised by donor bodies in the affairs of recipient nations. This issue has been played out in various areas. One is in deciding healthcare priorities as the above PEPFAR example has shown. The experience in Africa with regards to HIV/AIDS management is that priority is given to the views and preferences of international donors over those of local health officials. Another instance of this is in the decisionmaking machinery of the Global Fund. Although the formal apparatus of the Fund appears democratic, in practice the few members representing developing nations on the board of the Fund are marginalised. It is the voice of the representatives of donor countries that predominates. This shows that despite attempts made to encourage multi-sectoral participation across all levels in the Fund, the current system of global governance remains unrepresentative of the needs of those most affected by global priorities.75 Finally, in evaluating the performance of aid programmes, emphasis has always been more on innovation and increase in the scale of intervention from ‘above’ rather than the impact of such schemes on the lives of Africans ‘below’. The changes celebrated and publicised are those on the attitude and behaviour of international and domestic policy-makers, donors and implementers of policies. Meanwhile, the general trend of expansion of the epidemic and the experiences of many people at the grassroots show that the everyday lives of infected and affected people remain largely unchanged given the uncertainty arising from doubts on policy sustainability.76 People are still being infected and dying in large numbers despite UNAIDS claims of declining infection rates in some areas; stigma is still persistent despite public information and NGO campaigns; the situation of orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) remain pathetic, while general behavioural change is still very low despite all the sensitisation campaigns.77 All these point to the fact that previous interventions prescribed and funded by foreign donors and mediated by agencies like UNAIDS addressed only one side of a multidimensional problem. The social context within which these interventions are implemented remains to be addressed, especially with regards to the issue of poverty, gender practices and related local conditions that enhance the spread of the AIDS epidemic. In addition to ARVs, it appears Africans also need a ‘social pill’.

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Conclusion It is clear, from the foregoing discussion, that HIV/AIDS is not just a public health issue but also deeply political, generating economic as well as ethical considerations. It has been constituted as a platform on which various issues converged and on which international and local actors interacted. The disconnect between international prescriptions for interventions implemented with foreign aid and the reality of the daily experience of people infected and affected by the disease underscores the need to make future interventions more sensitive to local conditions for them to have maximum impact. The poverty of African states and their dependence on foreign aid to battle AIDS have also been analysed, highlighting their inability (unlike the case of Brazil) to reject aids coated with undesirable Western ‘conditionality’. But it would be wrong to conclude that the African political leadership was completely helpless in the face of the international politicisation of HIV/AIDS. African states responded differently to these external stimuli based on their past history, prevailing socio-political contexts and predisposition of their ruling elite. Thambo Mbeki of South Africa kicked against the foreign understanding of AIDS promoted by the international community, insisting that it was a poverty-induced disease and consequently refused ARVs. He later changed his stance due to public pressure. But it was Jacob Zuma, his successor, who championed widespread testing and treatment. The ruling elite in Mozambique, because of their past experience in “dependency politics”, skillfully manipulated the situation, exploiting the ideas and resources offered by external agents in what has been described as an “instrumental adherence” to international HIV/AIDS norms.78 Nevertheless, the limited progress made in arresting the spread of the epidemic in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and in putting some infected people on treatment was largely facilitated by foreign donor funds. The need for universal access to treatment and the tensions surrounding it have also been discussed. But does access to drugs resolve all issues associated with the African AIDS crisis? There is no doubt that access to ARV will reduce AIDS mortality rates in the short run, but since these are drugs that are to be taken for life in the absence of any vaccine or curative medicine, a greater concern is how to ensure continuous supply of the drugs. There is thus the need for continuing international aid in addition to the mobilization of local resources. There is also the need for increased state investment in the local pharmaceutical industry. Many African nations lack the technology with which to manufacture high

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quality generics. The anti-AIDS campaign should also not lose sight of the need to prevent infection. There is no sense in rolling out mass treatment for AIDS patients without simultaneously reducing infection rates. Besides, African nations need to construct sustainable health infrastructure within which diagnosis, treatment, care and evaluation can take place. This extensive clinical support is a function of continued investment in the health sector. In other words, what Africa needs is a balanced package of interventions that address all of the above issues and not just access to treatment. Finally, African leaders should be more prudent with public funds. The problem with a country like Nigeria is not that resources are locally unavailable, but they are consistently squandered by the leadership. That was why Western nations were reluctant to subsidize this oil-rich state in its fight against HIV/AIDS. If African leaders would mismanage their local resources rather than commit them to the battle against the deadly epidemic, why should external donors be expected to come to their aid? Perhaps, the recent global economic meltdown and gradual drying up of donor funds would encourage African leaders to commit more of their national funds to the internal fight against the vicious virus. Where HIV/AIDS is concerned in the international arena, the critical issues should not be seen in terms of a struggle between ‘patriotic Africans’ negotiating with ‘calculating Westerners’. All are implicated in one way or the other, and have contributed to the recalcitrance of HIV/AIDS in Africa in various ways. What is needed now is a productive collaboration that will ultimately tame the aggressive virus on the continent.

Notes 1. Duncan Green and Matthew Griffith, “Globalization and Its Discontents”, International Affairs, 78:1 (2002), 50. 2. Ibid. 3. Patricia A. Alvarez, “Understanding Globalization”, The History Teacher, 35:2 (2002), 261. 4. Cyril I. Obi, “Pay or Perish? Globalization, Pharmaceutical Multinationals and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Africa”, CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue 2, 3, 4 (2003), 71. 5. Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization”, Sociological Theory, 20:3 (2002), 287. 6. Ibid., 293. 7. Ibid. 8. Obi, “Pay or Perish”, 71. 9. Solomon Benatar, “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A Sign of Instability in a Complex Global System”, in Anton A. van Niekerk and Loretta M. Kopelman

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(eds.) Ethics and AIDS in Africa: The Challenge to Our Thinking (Claremont: David Philip, 2005), 76. 10. Stephen Lewis, Race against Time (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2005), 5. 11. Susan Craddock, “AIDS and Ethics: Clinical Trials, Pharmaceuticals, and Global Scientific Practice”, in Ezekiel Kalipeni, Susan Craddock, Joseph R. Oppong and Jayati Ghosh (eds.) HIV and AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 7. 12. Michel Carael, “Twenty Years of Intervention and Controversy” in Philippe Denis and Charles Becker (eds.), The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa in a Historical Perspective, Online edition, 2006, available at http://www.refer.sn /rds/article.php3?id_article=245. 13. Lewis, Race Against Time, 22. 14. Carael, “Twenty Years”, 30. 15. Ibid., 19 16. John Iliffe, The African AIDS Epidemic: A History (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 58. 17. S. Sontay, AIDS and Its Metaphors (reprinted, London, 1990), 89, quoted in Iliffe, African AIDS Epidemic, 58. 18. Howard Phillips, “AIDS in the Context of South Africa’s Epidemic History: Preliminary Historical Thoughts”, South African Historical Journal, 45 (2001), 21. 19. Carael, “Twenty Years”, 30. 20. UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty: Nations at the Crossroads (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2011), 77. 21. Ibid., 74. 22. Philippe Denis, “Towards a Social History of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in Denis and Becker, The HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 16. 23. Iliffe, African AIDS Epidemic; Denis and Becker, HIV/AIDS Epidemic. 24. Olive Shisana, “Overview” in Bridgette Prince, Julia Louw, Kristin Roe and Rehaaz Adams (eds.) Exploring the Challenges of HIV/AIDS (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007), viii. 25. Gail Andrews, “Putting Research into Policy and Practice through Partnership Building, Networking and Information Dissemination: The Role of the Sahara Network”, in Prince et al, Exploring the Challenges, 2. 26. Carael, “Twenty Years”. 27. Obi, “Pay or Perish”, 70-73. 28. Udo Schuklenk and Richard Ashcroft “Affordable Access to Essential Medication in Developing Countries: Conflicts between Ethical and Economic Imperatives”, in van Niekerk and Kopelman, Ethics and AIDS in Africa, 127-140; Craddock, “AIDS and Ethnics”, 240-351. 29. Poku Adusei, “Regulatory Diversity as Key to the ‘Myth’ of Drug Patenting in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Law, 54:1(2010), 26-50. 30. Craddock, “AIDS and Ethics”, 240-251. 31. Adusei, “Regulatory Diversity”, 33. 32. Obi, “Pay or Perish”, 72. 33. John Abraham, “Global Health Challenges in the Pharmaceutical World”, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 4 (2009), 119.

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34. Jean-Christophe Boungou Bazika, “Production and International Marketing of Generic Drugs and the Fight against AIDS in Africa”, CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue 2, 3 & 4 (2003), 79. 35. Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Access”, 136. 36. Thomas Pogge, “The Health Impact Fund: Boosting Pharmaceutical Innovation without Obstructing Access”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 18 (2009), 81. 37. Ibid. 38. TRIPS Article 31(b) cited in Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Access”, 129. 39. Craddock, “AIDS and Ethnics”, 246. 40. Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Access”, 130. 41. Ibid. 42. Craddock, “AIDS and Ethnics”, 246. 43. Caroline G. Redding, “Anti-AIDS Drugs in South Africa: An Argument for Global Community”, CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue 2, 3 &4 (2003), 75. 44. Obi, “Pay or Perish”, 70–73. 45. Pogge, “Health Impact Fund”, 78–86; Adusei, “Regulatory Diversity”, 26-50. 46. Hakan Seckinelgin, International Politics of HIV/AID: Global Disease, Local Pain (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 28. 47. Ibid. 48. Redding, “Anti-AIDS Drugs”, 75. 49. Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Access”, 131. 50. Ibid., 135; Redding, “Anti AIDS Drugs”, 74. 51. Seckinelgin, International Politics, 28. 52. Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Prices”, 135. 53. UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty, 44. 54. Bill Clinton, “Smart Response is a Sound Investment”, in UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty, 35. 55. UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty, 44. 56. Schuklenk and Ashcroft, “Affordable Prices”, 134. 57. Lula da Silva, “Sharing Knowledge for the Profit of All”, in UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty, 29. 58. Abraham, “Global Health Challenges”, 123. 59. da Silva, “Sharing Knowledge”, 29. 60. Bazika, “Production and International Marketing”, 79. 61. da Silva, “Sharing Knowledge”, 29. 62. Ibid. 63. UNAIDS, AIDS at Thirty, 30. 64. Marco Antonio Vieira, “Southern Africa’s Response(s) to International HIV/AIDS Norms: The Politics of Assimilation”, Review of International Studies, 37 (2011), 3– 28. 65. Ibid., 7. 66. Ibid., 11. 67. See details of the activities of the two schemes in John W. Dietrich, “The Politics of PEPFAR: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief”, Ethics

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and International Affairs, 21:3 (2007), 277-292; Garreth Wallace Brown, “Safeguarding Deliberative Global Governance: The Case of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria”, Review of International Studies, 36 (2010), 511-530. 68. Lewis, Race Against Time, 30. 69. Helen Epstein, “The Lost Children of AIDS”, The New York Review of Books, 52:17 (2005) available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18399 Accessed on 27 February 2006. 70. Ibid. 71. Dietrich, “Politics of PEPFAR”, 286. 72. Vieira, “Southern Africa’s Response(s)”, 12; Dietrich, “Politics of PEPFAR”, 285. 73. Da Silva, “Sharing Knowledge”, 29. 74. Dietrich, “Politics of PEPFAR”, 290. 75. Brown, “Safeguarding Deliberative Global Governance”, 522-525. 76. Seckinelgin, International Politics, 96-125. 77. Ibid. 78. Vieira, “Southern Africa’s Response(s)”, 23.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF CHINESE CAPITALISM TERHEMBA WUAM

Introduction The past five decades constitute a period of enormous social, economic as well as political transformation for African countries and China. In contemporary times, spanning just two generations, African states have witnessed phenomenal growth in all aspects of human endeavour than had hitherto been witnessed in the last five hundred years. The aim of this chapter is to show what is new in the new emerging relationship between African states and China as opposed to what obtained in the relationship between Africa and the West in the twentieth and preceding centuries. It also makes suggestions on how this new relationship can be made more beneficial to both Africa and China.

The State of Africa after 1980 By 1980, many African countries had been independent for about twenty years, which was barely two years after the adoption of a market economy strategy by the Chinese Communist Party. By 1980, China was entering its third decade under Communist Party rule. Apart from this close comparison between the age of Communist China and independent Africa, much else between African states and China was different. African states at independence were grossly deficient in not having in sufficient mass an educated and enlightened citizenry, unlike Communist China that had inherited a bureaucracy and state system that went back for centuries, and which possessed a much larger number of skilled manpower. China also had the benefit of greater infrastructure and was located in a high growth area of the globe with rising economies like Japan, Taiwan,

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Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, among others, from which she could learn. When scholars and academics look at Africa and consider the continent as under-achieving, or apportion a greater blame for the African situation to the elite because of a perceived elite agenda that was inherently antiprogressive or anti-development, they miss what should have been obvious to any perceptive observer. The elites were overwhelmed by the new responsibilities they had won for themselves; they were too small in size relative to the size of the countries they had taken over, thereby causing the masses, especially their ethnicities, to worship them as tin-gods; and the most significant point that has been missed is that they were not capable administrators as the colonialists they had displaced. The African elites at independence and in the decades that followed were lacking in requisite experience and critical mass, and lacked the intellectual resources to effectively engage their country men, who did not know any better, in the daunting and challenging task of human and material development along the lines that the rest of the world had already been engaged in the course of the past two hundred years. China was not isolated from the development processes of Europeans in the nineteenth century. Reform movements initiated in the nineteenth century were what contributed to the downfall of the Qing dynasty as a result of the Republican Revolution in China in 1911, when the last emperor of China, Xuantong, also known as Henry Pu Yi, was deposed.1 In the early days of independent nationhood, the African elites behaved like their precursors elsewhere in Europe and Asia who, in the preceding centuries, kept their fellow citizens under servitude, and exploited and controlled the resources of their countries exclusively for the nobility. In much of Europe, the nobility, a tiny minority before the dawn of the modern era, owned upwards of 80 per cent of the land and utilized the free labour of serfs and peasants. And in nineteenth-century Europe, industrialisation created a situation where “A few are very rich, some well off, the majority in poverty, and a vast number in misery”.2 In the context of the Europe of these past periods, education was neither universal nor was it available to all, political and economic rights were restricted to a few and often denied to women, workers and the poor toiling masses. It took centuries of reforms, drawn from the ideas of leading thinkers through the ages and agitations for change by workers and the toiling masses, before reforms were gradually introduced to create the type of societies that now exist in the West.3 Africa, by the benefit of the historical experiences of these more advanced countries, is likely to have a faster

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process of universal development as evidenced by progress on all fronts within the last half century. Africa, by the turn of the 1980s, looked at the from the perspective of what the situation was like in the 1960s, was a continent that was doing a number of things right and positioning herself for future growth. With a relatively later take-off period than the rest of the world, Africa’s catch-up attempts have been salutary. While it could be argued that corruption, mismanagement of resources, wars and disturbances, diseases, and low infrastructural base, among others, that exist in African states tend to vitiate this thesis, it is however proper to state that it is within this complex mix that the positive changes have been occurring. Indeed, the modern state in Africa, a relatively new thing, younger than its operating counterparts elsewhere, was expected to do things that the precursor modern nation-state of Europe could not do for hundreds of years of their existence. For much of the period that modern nation-states have existed in Europe and elsewhere, much of what they could do was to levy their citizens for the purpose of making war. Mass education and the provision of health services or infrastructure were areas that the state did not get involved in for centuries. This is unlike the African situation where, illprepared as African nation-states were, the masses expected the continent’s political elites to deliver on many fronts. These expectations, however, could not be met by the inexperienced operators of the new countries, most of whom were out of their depths with their newly minted titles and job descriptions.4 Between the 1980s and 2010, when China was opening up its economy to capitalist influences, a policy that enabled her transformation in the past thirty years, Africa was undergoing its quiet transformation. During this period, Africa had undertaken structural adjustment, reformed its economies, and expanded infrastructure, education and health services, and also seen the rise of thousands of towns and cities across the continent. The impact of these changes has been the rise in population, with the continent having the fastest growth rate in the world, and, more importantly, the quality of human resources has grown exponentially. Of all the changes that have occurred, the rise in the literate population is the one that matters the most. Limited in absolute numbers when compared to China and other parts of the world, it is still better than it has been at whatever point in Africa’s historical past.5 And it is this increased human capacity that places contemporary African states in a position to harness and utilize its relationship with China better than they did in their relationship with past international actors.

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The preceding point is important because in the past, when the continent related with the West and the Arab world, it had no ready educated elite with which to engage the West; and neither did it possess the media to promote positive deals and highlight wrongs. Consequently, it was only when well-meaning Europeans chose to highlight wrongs and call for action that redress could be attempted on the continent. This redress sometimes occurred in manners that often did not satisfy the grievances for which remedies were sought. Today, a vibrant African media stands ready to highlight the nature of the ongoing Sino-African relations in a more assertive manner. This is unlike the period of the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885 when there was no African media organization or viable nation-states articulating African positions and perspectives. This is no longer the case in the Sino-African era of sustained engagement.6 Though in the contemporary era, African states, viewed through the prism of state capability as of states in Western Europe, the United States, Australia, and Canada, among others, may be weak, this apparent weakness masks the reality of the tremendous capability that many of the African states have been developing since they were configured by European powers or when they became independent. The right context to analyse state evolution in Africa is that in the 1880s through the 1920s, when Europe configured the states of Africa, state capability was almost non-existent in the Weberian sense. In the twenty-first century, however, though African states may be weak in comparison with states elsewhere, they actually have stronger capability than at any point in their preceding history. The bureaucracies are staffed by their well-educated citizens and the political class is beginning to understand what it takes to run a modern government. Literacy rate is also above 50 per cent in most of Africa and an emergent middle class is beginning to sprout. It is, therefore, valid to contend that in the prevailing conditions, the relationship of these various states with China may prove more beneficial than Africa’s past engagements, and actually make them stronger as the collaboration between the two parties mature.7 This positive outlook is premised on the reality that most African countries now possess skills and competences that were totally absent in the indigenous population just two generations ago. So as countries’ abilities improve in Africa, such skills will enhance the quality of the state and contribute positively to better and good governance, and more proactive international relations.

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The Development Implications of China’s Involvement with Africa The focus of this chapter is on the ramifications of the evolving SinoAfrican relations of the last four decades, which have accelerated in the last decade; it also considers their implications for the present and future structure of the Sino-African alliance. As it is, it should be noted that China in the unfolding world of the twenty-first century is becoming increasingly involved with several countries of the world, not least the United States of America and Africa’s former European colonial powers, and China’s immediate neighbours in South-East Asia. The implications of China’s rise in her capitalist age in Africa have been well treated by several publications, such as The Economist, Times, Newsweek, New Africa, The Guardian, and scholars such as Ian Taylor.8 Usually, these analyses are couched in terms of lose-win or win-win, or even lose-lose relations. The arguments tend to turn towards either China alone or both parties having the benefits. The driving rationale for China’s relations with Africa has largely been influenced by economic considerations as Africa, with a population of over one billion people, constitutes a large consumer base, making African markets a target of Chinese exports. Also, the need for African minerals by China calls for closer ties between the two parties. These factors - African markets for Chinese goods and investments, and African minerals for Chinese industries - as a result have drawn China and Africa closer. The emerging trend and impact of China’s evolving relations with Africa is better understood by looking at Chinese activities in individual African states. In general terms, however, salient issues to highlight include the fact that by 2011, China had risen to be Africa’s biggest lender, ahead of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. According to Nigeria’s leading newspaper, The Guardian, African countries secured up to $12.5 billion in loans from the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM) between 2001 and 2010, much of which went to Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Congo and the Sudan. In addition to the loans, China’s investment in the same period was $11 billion. This brings the approximate size of China’s financial outlay in sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade to $23.5 billion. This is apart from the assistance that about twenty-five African countries have benefitted from the China Development Bank Corporation, the Chinese state policy lender. The funds from the China Development Bank Corporation were used to fund projects and create jobs in Africa through small and medium-sized companies.9 Overall Chinese trade with the continent had also by 2011

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surpassed $127 billion.10 China’s engagement with individual countries on the continent is discussed below.

Nigeria Nigeria, which is Africa’s second largest economy, is also second in Africa in investment terms. The trade relationship between Nigeria and China has expanded, reaching $7.7 billion by 2010 and $10 billion in 2011. By 2010, there were over 500 solely funded Chinese companies with investments worth $8.3 billion operating in Nigeria. Apart from these investments, Chinese firms were also involved in engineering projects in Nigeria worth $28.1 billion.11 In addition, the Chinese are working on rehabilitating the railways, building roads, bridges, real estate and schools in Nigeria.12 The Chinese have, through the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), also secured oil deals in exchange for loans to Nigeria.13 The Nigerian engagement with the Chinese also has elements that transcend the basic formula of Sino-African economic relations – of, first, raw materials for Chinese cash and infrastructure, and, second, African cash for Chinese manufactured products, and the third component, of Chinese companies establishing in African markets. It also includes cooperation in technology and technical matters; an example is the cooperation in satellite and space technology, as evidenced by the manufacture of NigComSat-1 and NigComSat-2 for Nigeria.14 China’s interest in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, is therefore predicated on what the Chinese term ‘mutual development’. Accordingly, Guo Kun, the Chinese ambassador to Nigeria, in 2007 stated that Both China and Nigeria are developing countries, and facing many similar issues in economic development. China is the country with the largest population in the world; Nigeria is the country with the largest population in Africa. China would like to share its experiences with Nigeria in developing the economy. China’s economic development arises from insisting on making economic development as first priority, implementing reform and opening to the outside world. At the same time, we constantly improve our investment environment and infrastructure, so as to attract foreign investment. We hope Nigeria could realize prosperity through its economic reform, improvement of environment and attracting foreign investment.15

The two countries have maintained excellent bilateral relations made possible by the exchange of visits and trade agreements signed between them. Nigeria’s minister of trade and investment, Olusegun Aganga, saw

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the existing relations in positive terms by asserting that “Nigeria has the raw materials and the market needed for fruitful investments. Your country (China) has the capital and technology. An enhanced investment relationship will be a win-win situation for the two countries”.16 Aganga made this statement in his meeting with China’s deputy minister for commerce, Chen Jian in Beijing on 7 November 2011. The high level nature of the talks and the manner they were reported are emblematic of the new era of Africa’s relationship with foreign powers and actors. This is because in the past, colonial authorities solely determined whatever investments were to be made and articulated how the benefits were to be distributed. However, with African leadership and greater transparency on the continent, Africa’s media can report on such deals and interactions as they occur.17 The Western media, like The Economist, and nongovernmental organisations, like the Global Witness, are also equally keen to expose wrongdoings and shady deals on the continent by external agents, especially Chinese firms, which may help to restrain outright buccaneering by the Chinese state, its companies and independent Chinese firms. The damning exposé of the Chinese Queensway syndicate’s unsavoury activities in deals and “contracts worth billions of dollars for oil, minerals and diamonds from Africa” in The Economist is indicative of this.18

Zambia Another country with a high level of Chinese presence in Africa is Zambia. The country is a leading exporter of copper and this fact links China and Zambia together. China itself chronically lacks copper and has to import the commodity to drive forward its fast-growing economy; this makes Zambia a key source and economic partner.19 Chinese engagement with Zambia, however, goes back over four decades, and before the current era of Chinese interest in Africa was the most significant on the continent. Chinese projects in the country include the 1970s 1,100 kilometer railway that runs through Tanzania and Zambia, the Mulungushi Textile Mill, which was built in 1982 with Chinese aid and was the biggest textile mill in Zambia, and which ironically shut down in 2007 due to increasing competition from cheap Chinese textile imports.20 In addition to these investments, the Chinese opened a branch of the Bank of China in Zambia in 1997, and the city of Luzhou in China established sister-city relations with the city of Kabwe in Zambia. Also, about 300 Chinese enterprises operate in Zambia with investments of over $300 million and employ over 25,000 Zambians.21

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Chinese firms have invested heavily in the Zambian copper mines, and are also involved in building hotels, hospitals, schools and infrastructure. In addition, they have also opened shops in Lusaka’s Kamwala market which has irked local traders who insist that the Chinese, by bringing in cheaper goods themselves, are taking over their jobs and making them jobless. Zambians also decry Chinese firms, such as the state-owned China National Overseas Engineering Corporation, which bring in Chinese labour instead of using locals. The general manager of China National Overseas Engineering Corporation, Lui Ping, however, notes that for every Chinese labour import, fifteen Zambians are used. Lui Ping also insists that the Chinese are doing a lot of good for the Zambian economy and people, and that many of the complaints and call for the expulsion of the Chinese are by politicians who are out to make political capital, and that the reality of Chinese positive contributions will make them not to do it. Lui Ping’s position was vindicated by the Zambian president, Michael Sata, who assumed office in 2011 (died in October 2014). President Sata, who hitherto was a vociferous critic of China, had moderated his stance.22 In the 2006 elections, Sata had deplored the Chinese presence in Zambia, alleging that “In every part of Zambia, the Chinaman is there, packed eight to a room … What the Chinaman is doing, nobody knows”.23 In 2007, he equally said of the Chinese that We want the Chinese to leave and the old colonial rulers to return ... They exploited our natural resources too, but at least they took good care of us. They built schools, taught us their language and brought us British civilization … at least Western capitalism has a human face; the Chinese are only out to exploit us.24

As president in 2011, however, he changed his tune in realization of the contributions of the Chinese to the Zambian economy. In Zambia and elsewhere on the continent, China’s insatiable demand for copper and other commodities means that “copper mines may be built in parts of Africa, for example that might otherwise be problematic and take longer to get finance”.25 In this way, needed investment is channeled into productive ventures in Africa by Chinese firms backed by the home government.

South Africa With a 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head of $7,050, South Africa is richer than China, whose per head is $4,800.26 This fact is mentioned to enable an understanding that despite China having the world’s second strongest economy in 2010, valued at $6,450 billion,27 it is

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still overwhelmingly a poor country where “the vast majority of its people still live in Stone Age poverty”.28 The Chinese poverty statistics show that over 900 million Chinese are poor, 135 million people live on less than $1 and 500 million subsists on less than $2. This worries the Chinese government, which is committed to ending poverty for the Chinese people.29 The economic transactions of China in the world and in Africa are therefore designed to bring an end to the prevailing poverty the majority of China’s huge population lives in. In the light of this analysis, Africans will need to contextualize the nature of China’s engagement on the continent. The Chinese are not altruistic, they are in Africa for business, to secure their own prosperity, and, fortunately for both parties, China does not conceal its interest in Africa under an aid regime. China clearly articulates the economic and financial interests that it seeks to achieve adopting a co-prosperity strategy.30 China’s economic relations with South Africa may be the most beneficial and also the most tenuous. Unlike other African economies with undeveloped industrial sectors, where consumers simply benefit from cheap imports, such cheap imports adversely affect South Africa, which already has an industrial sector that cheap imports threaten alongside the indigenous textile industry.31 While in other African states, China dangles the infrastructure carrot, South Africa, with a highly developed infrastructure, is not wooed by this. Equally, it may also be that South Africa stands to benefit more from China than the rest of the continent given her high level of educational development and skills, and possession of world class companies, such as DeBeers and SABMiller, both of which are world leaders in their market sectors, and who are already investing in Chinese markets. This is unlike anywhere else on the continent where the corporate investment flows are from China and not the other way round. Strategically, too, South Africa appears to be one of the few African countries that has taken steps to study the likely impact and outcomes of a China that is dominant in the world economy and a rising political power.32

Zimbabwe When Muammar Gadhafi of Libya was killed in 2011, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe emerged as Africa’s longest-serving leader. While Mugabe, in the early days of his rule, had earned the West’s accolades for his rapprochement with white Zimbabwean farmers who owned much of the land after black-majority rule and independence in 1980, and who made the economy continue booming and Zimbabwe to

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remain a food basket, his land reform or land grab of the early 2000s and his brutal repression of his countrymen left him without many friends in the West and on the continent. Very little investment or assistance has therefore been coming into Zimbabwe, especially military assistance, as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West, and pressure on Mugabe to change his ways. In this atmosphere, it is China, with her no-questions asked approach, and de-emphasis of human rights, that has stepped in to work with Mugabe in circumventing the pressure for reform coming from other quarters.33 At the height of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, when it was alleged that Mugabe rigged the presidential elections, China was exporting weapons to Zimbabwe and these, when discovered at the ports in South Africa, were refused entry. In 2004, China had entered a $200 million deal to supply Zimbabwe with fighter jets and military hardware. In addition to the military assistance, China has propped up Mugabe through cash allowances in return for deals and access to the natural resources of Zimbabwe, especially to the Marange diamond fields, reported to be the biggest of such deposits in the world and worth £800 billion. Such arrangements effectively circumvent the Kimberly Process designed to restrict the circulation of blood diamonds as the Chinese-Zimbabwe government-to-government deal enables Beijing to supply weapon in order to mine the diamond fields.34Apart from minerals, China is also investing in agriculture and farmlands in Zimbabwe to enable it feed her population of 1.4 billion people. Another country in which China is investing in farmlands is Kenya and Uganda, among others.35

Engagement with Other African Countries Other African states with heavy Chinese presence include Angola, Gabon, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Angola: Riding on the wave of Chinese interest in the country, Angola’s economy for much of the first decade of the twenty-first century averaged over 6% annual growth rate, and was the fastest growing African economy in 2005 at 15.5%.36 Soaring oil prices that went up by 90% in the light of increasing demand by China and other Asian countries for the commodity meant that Angola, which was a major supplier, would reap the benefit of the windfall. In addition, Angola within this period was beginning to reap the peace dividend of ending its three-decade civil war. Angola has equally been the focus of major Chinese attention as the country, along with Saudi Arabia, is China’s major oil supplier.37

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Gabon: Gabon is another country in which China has made inroads in its desire for commodities. The difference between the Chinese approach and that of others is shown by the $3 billion deal with the government of Gabon to build an iron ore mine at Belinga, and to construct a 310-mile railway to link it to the coast. While other firms would have been deterred, given the need to have a railway link to the sea, Chinese firms stepped in due to the financial assistance they received from their home government. The deal offers benefits for both Gabon and China. Gabon attracts infrastructure and economic profits from the mines and China gets commodities that its economy needs to continue with its growth, and reduces the risk of uncertainty in the future supply of raw materials essential to her economic growth.38 Thus, what China is doing in Gabon is emblematic of its activities in other parts of the continent, coming in with long-term investment through partnership with the government and the private sector with the twin goals of advancing Chinese economic interests and empowering the host African state.39 Sudan: The Chinese have substantial investment in the Sudanese oil industry, now comprising the republics of Sudan and South Sudan. After the United States and European countries left the Sudan on account of its links with terrorism, its poor human rights record and alleged genocide in Sudan’s Darfur region, Chinese and Indian investors were keen to move in. The Chinese are however in the country because they “import oil from every source we can get oil from”.40 The West and international organisations have, as in the case of Zimbabwe and Angola, accused China of undermining policies and programmes designed to attain greater transparency in natural resource-rich countries, that is, the “extractive industries initiative”. This has given China what Peter Draper calls an “ethical advantage” over Western rivals.41 With more of the oil wells in the new Republic of South Sudan, which became independent in 2011, the Chinese had by the beginning of 2012 signed oil deals with the new state.42 Democratic Republic of Congo: In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese engagement with the country, which was a major centre in the African ‘world war’ of the 1990s, has been significant and has contributed to redefining the role of international monetary agencies operating in the region. In deals averaging about $9 billion, the Chinese are deeply involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at a period when investments from other parts of the world and loans from the IMF and World Bank were at their lowest or no longer forthcoming. The situation

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in the DRC was one of a palpable absence of infrastructure in the country. The Chinese deal was structured to address this in order for it to “build thousands of kilometres of roads and railways, thirty-two hospitals, 145 health centres and two universities, an investment of $6 billion in the kind of infrastructure Congo desperately needs”.43 The DRC was to pay for all these through concessions to mine copper and cobalt that China needs for her industries.44

Areas of Concern in Sino-African Relations In every relationship, areas of concern are bound to arise. This is equally true of the Sino-African engagement of the past three decades. In this emerging relationship issues of concern have included the following: Substandard but cheap goods and substandard construction work: This is an area in which the Chinese are receiving a lot of criticism. In all countries on the continent, African traders and consumers have issues with the quality of goods sold in their markets.45 The spectrum of products criticized ranges from substandard electronics and textile imports that displaced local producers. Many of these complaints about the quality of goods and commercial dealings of the Chinese appear justified. The issues are, however, ones that can be tackled and solved for the benefit of African consumers and traders, and Chinese companies and industries. This is because, if African consumers do not get value for their money, they may abandon Chinese products, and the labelling of China as a source of substandard and cheap products may in the end discredit China as a source of quality goods. Many African countries have institutions for controlling and regulating the quality of goods they produce and import; these organs should be made more functional and less corrupt. In essence, African governments should take responsibility for the quality of imported Chinese goods. The Chinese should also regulate their own industries, especially with regard to the goods meant for export, so that cheap goods shipped to Africa do not necessarily stand for substandard ones. Accordingly, the suggestion by Qui Jun, the representative of the Xinhua News Agency in Lagos, is that what African countries and China can do is to maintain strict control over the production and importation of low quality products because the low quality products are not good to both the buyers and producers. This is because the low quality products give us the Chinese bad name and in Nigeria, the consumers of the low quality products do not enjoy the products. For example, the low quality generators can catch fire and kill the buyer or it can damage the

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consumer’s property. So, there is need for the government to control the production and sale of these low quality products. Nigerian government can encourage Nigerians not only to care about the price of the product but also the quality of the products. If there is no demand for the low quality products from foreign business people, the Chinese producers will discontinue the production.46

Contract Underbidding due to state backing by Chinese companies: Another area of concern on how China does business in Africa has to do with the method used by Chinese construction companies on the continent to get much of the building and infrastructural development work. Because many of the Chinese construction companies are state-owned or backed by the state, they usually receive subsidies from their governments and varying degrees of support to enable them win competitive bids in Africa, not minding whether the projects they execute are profitable to the companies or not. This situation is reflected throughout the continent with examples in Nigeria, Zambia, Gabon, Guinea, the Sudan and Zimbabwe, among several other countries. In Rwanda, for instance, in 2011, the Chinese were working on over twenty projects and the Rwandan minister of infrastructure stated that “Tenders are not awarded based on bilateral relations, but Chinese companies provide better offers”.47 This structure of things works against established Western companies on the continent, as well as indigenous construction companies, which find it difficult to compete; and if African companies are not getting construction work, they may not get the experience, skill and capital needed to grow and expand. One way out of this is to insist that foreign companies, including those owned by the Chinese, that win contracts work with local construction companies on projects, just as the Chinese do back home. In China, foreign companies winning design and construction contracts are expected to work with local Chinese firms. This system should be adopted in Africa. New debt-burden on African states: Statistics reveal that China is now the number one lender to African countries. It has surpassed the IMF and the World Bank in making loans available to African countries during the last ten years, with a debt stock of over $12.5 billion. The worry is that the loans, though more readily available, usually carry stiffer terms than loans from other sources. The danger in this, therefore, is that Africa may be entering a new debt-burden era with China, with the attendant unknown ramifications of such a scenario. The inherent danger of borrowing from China and over-exposure to the resource-hungry dragon should actually give cause for concern. During Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s presidency,

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Nigeria had to withdraw from taking a loan from the Chinese Exim Bank that was to be made on a commercial rather than concessionary rate.48 The good thing about these debts is that the Chinese are not giving Africans the money to implement the projects or pay contractors themselves. This is because in most cases the debts are tied to projects that Chinese companies implement. In this wise, the needed infrastructure is provided and available for use, whereas in the past, corrupt politicians and leaders would have diverted the borrowed funds that still had to be paid by future governments. Low cost production and its effects on African industries: The Chinese are low-cost producers, though as the country is getting richer its cost is also rising and some companies are shifting base to neighbouring Asian countries, e.g., Vietnam. The implication of this for Africa is that though China can produce things cheaper than many African countries, this state of things may not remain so for ever. It is probable that Chinese costs will eventually rise, and the low-cost advantage may no longer become tenable. Africa too may need to find ways of emulating the Chinese low-cost strategy, trying to pay low wages for long hours of work so as to gain the same competitive advantage. Africans should learn this very important lesson from the Chinese: ‘exploit yourself for greater advantage down the line’.49 Also, Africans should adopt the Chinese work ethic. One reason why the Chinese import labour from the homeland, according to Lui Ping, the general manager of China National Overseas Engineering Corporation in Zambia, is that Chinese people can stand very hard work. This is a cultural difference. Chinese people work until they finish and then rest. Here [Africans] are like the British, they work according to plan. They have tea breaks and a lot of days off. For our construction company that means it costs a lot more.50

There is however every need for the Chinese to improve on their harsh labour policies in Africa, and have in place better welfare structures for African labour that are universally recognized. It should be observed that in the global society of today, competition in economic production is one that is going to persist and consumers, Africans or otherwise, will seek out products that are competitive on price, this being more so of Africans who are poorer and therefore more attracted to cheaper goods that meet their demands. Just like the textile industry in Italy is struggling to come to terms with the rise of textile production in China, African producers, even with government subsidies and restrictions

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on textile imports, are going to struggle unless they choose to innovate in ways that might match China on both price and quality. After all, with Africa as a poor continent, it should be able to produce goods more cheaply if the other inputs are also produced in Africa and producers go the extra length to become more competitive vis-à-vis the Chinese and other producers. Another approach may be for African textile producers to go into partnership with their Chinese competitors so that experiences, strategies and markets can be shared.51 Export of African raw materials without adding value: Many African states are following the same pattern of engagement that existed in the colonial era with China in which raw materials were extracted and taken to Europe without value addition. African states should insist that raw materials should be processed or semi-processed on the continent to add value before they are exported, so that the local communities will benefit more from the mining activities in particular. The weakness of Africa in this regard, e.g., in the Congo, is the apparent lack of local capacity, but elsewhere in states like Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria, the local capacity for adding value before export is now incubating. At present, South Africa is better organized than other African countries in terms of value-added exports. China is, however, listening to these criticisms as its logging industry in Central Africa has agreed to locally treat timber before exporting. Some aspects of the broader objectives of adding value can be discussed by African states under the aegis of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), where standards will be set for foreign companies operating in Africa to abide by, in addition to the national standards in individual African states. The danger of circumventing such policies is however real. In Mozambique, despite the Forestry and Wildlife Act of 2000, requiring all forestry products to be processed before exporting, the relevant “ministry under pressure from loggers and their Asian backers passed an internal decree reclassifying (tropical hardwoods) to permit their exports as logs” without any value addition.52

Platforms of African Assertiveness In the analysis of the Sino-African relationship, the point of a more assertive Africa than was hitherto possible in her relationship with Europe must be emphasized. The thrust of the argument that Africa may be able to have a win-win relationship with China is based on the existence of factors and platforms which can be utilized by either or both parties to drive the

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engagement in mutually beneficial ways. These platforms are examined in this section. Operational platforms: European powers created states in Africa and colonized same to enable them to achieve their social, economic and political objectives. In this new phase of greater Sino-African engagement, China is the one coming up with the institutions and facilitating their operationalization. The case in point is the establishment of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) by China, and the facilitating of bilateral trade agreements between African countries and China.53 The most recent of such developments or platforms designed to engage more fully with Africa is China’s invitation to South Africa to become a member of the BRICS bloc, which formerly as the BRICs was made up of Brazil, Russia, India and China. With the inclusion of South Africa, Africa is given a voice in a bloc that has the fastest growing economies and which is outside the core of the Western-dominated framework.54 While China cannot create states anew, it is creating frameworks and platforms with which it can operationalize its objectives and cooperation with African states. This, again, is a pointer to a relationship that is far different from that which obtained under the colonial regime. Then, even though states were created, Africa was not invited to sit at the table and make inputs. In the twenty-first century, however, China, in principle, upholds the equality of states and Africans, sitting in negotiation with China in economic, cultural, political and social matters, can make their point and expect its consideration. The political environment in contemporary Africa and its impact on future action on negative deals with China: Contemporary Africa is a lot more prepared to respond and benefit from her relationship with China. In cases where current governments enter into negative deals that overwhelmingly benefit China, or a tiny elite in an African state, these can be reviewed on their merits by subsequent governments. This is a likely and tenable scenario in an era where much of Africa is democratic, and changes in governments now occur much more frequently than in the past.55 China itself will therefore have to, in making deals on the continent, bear this fact in mind. In the case of countries like Zimbabwe, where the reign of Mugabe cannot last for another decade, much of what he has done will certainly be reviewed by a new government. This is unlike the colonial era when concessions given to European companies ran unchecked for generations, or during the era of sit-tight African dictators whose collaboration with unwholesome corporations and foreign powers

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enabled the continuous ripping-off of Africa for several decades without any hope of mitigation. Contemporary Africa, with regard to the political environment, is therefore certainly different. In democratic Nigeria, for instance, Yar’Adua, on the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, reviewed certain aspects of Chinese projects and financing in Nigeria that President Olusegun Obasanjo had negotiated.56 China is aware of these dangers and therefore attempts to consider the various political interests in each country, as it is trying to do in Zimbabwe by working with the Movement for Democratic Change, the leading opposition party, despite China’s strong alliance with Mugabe.57 Education and innovation and Africa’s role in the world in the twenty-first century: What has always mattered in how Africa relates with the rest of the world has been the level of the knowledge base on the continent. From an abysmally low point before the twentieth century, and a passable level during much of the twentieth century, in the twenty-first, Africa occupies a vastly improved position. If Africa is to forge ahead, it has to leverage on its much enhanced human capital in its relations with the rest of the world. Because it is knowledge that rules the world, Africa has to upgrade its knowledge base to benefit from her interaction with the rest of the world, including China and her old partners in the West. In this regard, contemporary Africa is not lagging behind in making efforts to bridge the knowledge gap. Countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among several others, are expanding their educational systems from the primary to the tertiary. In the mushrooming of tertiary institutions, especially in Nigeria, many may find arguments as to the quality of the emerging universities. But many of these institutions are only in their first decades and will likely mature into intellectual power houses in the coming decades and centuries.58 At the primary and secondary levels, though there is room for improvement, developments in these sectors on the continent have witnessed great advances than anywhere else in the world. This is because many societies on the continent by 1900 started at a zero base. Many of these societies a hundred years after have literacy rates of over 60%, and, with continued investments, should be able to take the literacy ratio to over 90% within the next three decades. These are pointers to the fact that Africa is a different continent from the one that engaged with Europe and the Arab world in the periods leading to the twenty-first century. Contemporary Africa is therefore better educated and aware of the challenges inherent in the ‘new’ world, and it is therefore a different Africa that is engaging with China and is poised to take such engagement

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further along lines that will prove much more beneficial than the past interactions with other powers allowed. Countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and Kenya have been developing their human resources at a fast pace and are reaching a point where the dividends accruing to the utilization of their skilled human resources will begin to be felt in the productive sectors of their economies and national life. Thus, growth in Africa over the past decade should not merely be looked at in terms of a high demand for raw materials, but considered alongside a high human resource capacity to utilize the accruing resources to the benefit of the national economies in the areas of banking, real estate, industry, education, infrastructure, and the distributive sectors.

Conclusion On balance, for contemporary Africa, the engagement with China has been positive. Africa’s rising economic growth rate, with GDP growth averaging above 5 per cent for much of the first decade of the twenty-first century, can be traced to soaring trade with China and Asia. The combination of a “commodities boom, relative political stability and progressive economic management”59 has contributed to faster and sustained economic growth on the continent. In the final analysis, if the relationship between African states and China is well-managed, as is the hope, and given the on-going trend, then it is a welcome development. The strength of the relationship as it has evolved, especially within the last two decades, shows that African states have succeeded in adding to their already existing partnership with the West the new one with China. The important thing in the new scenario is that it has occurred without the blood-letting environment of the Cold War, in which a choice of one super-power over the other attracted punitive sanctions and constrained Africa in her international and cooperative aspirations. In the new framework, China is only rising and is careful about her relations with Africa, and, most importantly, considers the interests of her partners. Equally, the military, political and strategic considerations that underpinned international relations during the Cold War have all but given way to more purely economic considerations. The period of the twenty-first century, therefore, is one in which Africans, more than any other time in the past five hundred years, appear to be in a position to ably direct the course of their destiny. With these considerations, Africans will certainly seek and obtain a win-win relationship with China in the coming decades. Alone, however, individual African states, because of their limited size and weight in international

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relations, may not have the requisite measure of impact with China, but operating under the framework of the African Union and its engagement mechanisms on China, their engagement with China will be better ordered.

Notes 1. Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy: The Individual and the State in Twentieth Century China (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), xi. 2. Peter Townsend, “Why Are the Many Poor?”, Fabian Tracts, No. 1/500, The Fabian Society, 1984, 1. 3. Robert Mandrou, Introduction to Modern France, 1500-1640: An Essay in Historical Psychology (New Yorker: Harper & Row, 1977). 4. See Terhemba Wuam, “African Leadership and the Development Challenge in the 1960s: Implications for Good Governance” in Tony Edoh and Terhemba Wuam, eds. Democracy, Leadership and Accountability in Post-Colonial Africa: Challenges and Possibilities – Essays in Honour of Professor Akase Paul Sorkaa (Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2009). 5. See Thomas Olusola Fasokun, “Education as a Potent Factor for Achieving Sustainable Development in Nigeria”, in Talla Ngarka, S.A.E. Apara, M.H. Mohammed and E.O. Ogungbe, eds., Education for Sustainable Development in Nigeria (Lapai: Faculty of Education and Arts, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University, 2010). 6. For more on the expansion of the African media, see Adewale Maja-Pearce, ed., Directory of African Media (Brussels: International Federation of Journalists, 1996). 7. Laza Kekic, “The State of the State”, in The World in 2011, The Economist, 94. 8. Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (London: Routledge, 2006). 9. The Guardian, “Nigeria, others secure more loans from China than World Bank”, December 29, 2011, 15. 10. “China-Africa Trade hits $127bn mark”,. 11. The Guardian, “China-Nigeria trade volume may hit $10b this year”, November 8, 2011, 15. See also Roseline Okere, “Chinese firms’ investments in Nigeria hit N48b”, The Guardian, November 10, 2011, 58. 12. The Guardian, “Editorial: To Restore the Railways”, June 8, 2008, 24. 13. Tim Webb and Nick Matiason, “China buys its Future from Africa”, The Observer (UK), February 10, 2008, 7. 14. Is’haq Modibbo Kawu, “A Search Party for NigComSat-1”, Daily Trust, November 20, 2008, 64. Also see Laide Akinboade, “How do NigComSat-2 and NigComSat-X benefit Nigeria?” . 15. Kayode Ogunbunmi, “Nigeria-China relationship is waxing stronger, says Ambassador Kun”, The Guardian (Nigeria), October 7, 2007, 47. 16. The Guardian, “China-Nigeria trade”, 15. 17. Ibid.

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18. The Economist, “The Queensway syndicate and the African trade”, August 13, 2011, 15-7. 19. See The Economist, “East Asian Trade: Everybody’s doing it”, February 28 2004, 59. 20. Chris McGreal, “Thanks China, now go home: buy-up of Zambia revives old colonial fears”, The Guardian (UK), February 5 2007, 21. 21. African Business, “Pros and cons of China-Zambia relations”, February 2008, 53. See too The Economist, “Chinese-African Attitudes: Not as bad as they say”, October 1, 2011, 38. 22. McGreal, “Thanks China”, 21. 23. Alex Perry, “China’s New Continent”, Time, July 5, 2010, 48. 24. The Economist, “Chinese-African Attitudes”, 38. 25. Webb and Matiason, “China buys its future from Africa”, 7. 26. The Economist, The World in 2011, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2010, 104, 109. At purchasing power parity (PPP), The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks South Africa GDP per head at $11,260 and that of China at $8,390. South Africa’s GDP is however, $346 billion and that of China is $6,460 billion. 27. See The Economist, The World in 2011, 104. 28. Max Hastings, “China: The Great Divide”, Daily Mail (UK), February 19, 2008, 39. 29. Ibid., 38. 30. Perry, “China’s New Continent”, 46. 31. Terhemba Wuam, “China in Africa: The African Response”, in Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., Terhemba Wuam and Jonathan M. Ayuba, eds., China and Africa: Threats and Opportunities (Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2009), 198. 32. Studies by the “China in Africa Programme” at the South African Institute of International Affairs are a reflection of this viewpoint especially works by Chris Alden, Director of the China in Africa Programme. See Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007). 33. Andrew Malone, “The biggest diamond raid in history”, Daily Mail (UK), September 18, 2010, 44-5. 34. Ibid. See also The Economist, “China’s business links with Africa: A new scramble”, November 27, 2004, 71. 35. Perry, “China’s New Continent”, 46. 36. The Economist, “Africa’s economy: A glimmer of light at last?”, June 24, 2006, 47-48. 37. The Economist, “The Queensway syndicate”, 15. 38. Webb and Matiason, “China buys its future from Africa”, 7. 39. Chidi Amuta, “Engagements: Nigeria and AFRICOM”, The Nation, October 11, 2008, 56. 40. The Economist, “China’s business links with Africa”, 71. 41. Ibid. 42. BBC Newscast, 14 January 2012. 43. Perry, “China’s New Continent”, 45. 44. Ibid., 46.

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45. Margaret C. Lee, “Uganda and China: Unleashing the Power of the Dragon” in Henning Melber, ed., China in Africa, Current African Issues No. 33, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2007, 26. 46. Godfrey Okpugie, “Nigerian businessmen exploit Chinese market segregation policy to rob consumers, says Chinese national”, The Guardian (Nigeria), July 6, 2008, 83. 47. Gertrude Majyambere, “Road works ahead: China to invest $532 million in Rwanda in 2011”, ChinAfrica, Vol. 3, April 2011, 27. 48. The Guardian, “Umaru Yar’Adua: President … on a mission incredible”, 15 April 2009. 49. Janice Ojeme, “China looks unstoppable – Adeniji”, The Nation, July 25, 2008, 29. 50. McGreal, “Thanks China”, 21. 51. The Economist, “Special Report: Italian Textiles and China”, February 25th 2006, 65-6. See also Jeff Israely, “Kick start: How a Chinese company rescued an ailing Italian motorcycle maker – and revved up its own competiveness”, Time, August 20, 2007, 35-7. 52. David Christianson, “Chinese Takeaway: How Chinese buyers are undermining Mozambique’s forest”, Business in Africa, May 2006, 51. 53. See Jonathan Mamu Ayuba, “Comrades or Capitalists: The Changing Nature of Sino-African Relations” in Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., Terhemba Wuam and Jonathan M. Ayuba, eds., China and Africa: Threats and Opportunities (Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2009). 54. China Daily, “South Africa’s role in BRICS” Friday, January 27, 2012 . 55. In Guinea a Chinese deal foundered upon the election of a new government – see The Economist, “The Queensway syndicate”, 16. 56. The Guardian, “Umaru Yar’Adua”. 57. Perry, “China’s New Continent”, 48. 58. Agnes Sellamatu Ojile, “Management of University Education in Nigeria: The Way Forward”, paper presented at the First International Conference on “Issues and Challenges in University Education in the Age of Globalisation”, organized by the Faculty of Education and Arts, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University, Lapai, Niger State, Nigeria, 4-8 December, 2011, 2. 59. Mike Hart, “Benefits of soaring Asian trade with Africa”, The Guardian (Nigeria), August 25, 2008, 26.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN AFRICA AND ITS EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEM ADETUNJI O. OGUNYEMI

Introduction In the majority of the states of the African continent, from about the mid1970s to the mid-1990s, apart from the problems associated with war and large-scale social dislocation that took the better part of the productive energies of the people, external debt was the most worrisome and debilitating to the task of freeing the states from under-development and poverty. In 1987, Jahangir Amuzegar had the task of working on the nature and burden of Africa’s external debt. His highly revealing and thought-provoking article, “Dealing with Debt”,1 shows that within a seven-year period, after 1981 when debt servicing obligations in Africa started to become an uphill task, Third World debt, of which Africa’s represented a large part, also began to increase significantly. It increased from a total of $729 billion in 1981 to $1 trillion by 1987.2 Africa was responsible for 16% of that amount in the latter year. The greater part of the Third World debt was owed foreign banks and states with fluctuating interest rates, often at the peril of the continent’s economies. By 1994, African states had a combined external indebtedness liability amounting to $312.2 billion.3 North Africa alone (made up of only seven countries and about one-sixth the continent’s population) owed $118.5 billion,4 or about 26.3% of the total indebtedness, while the rest was owed by the countries south of the Sahara, including South Africa. Although Africa’s debt, on a comparative level from 1987 to 2010, did not grow as fast as those of East Asia and the Pacific states (the combined annual growth rate from the late 1970s up to 2010 was 12%), the Middle East (1.5%) or South Asia (6.6%) or even Latin America and the Caribbean states (4.0%), still, in terms of per capita, and judging by the major debt indicators (like the ratio of debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), debt to export and debt in relation to the amount spent by national

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governments on basic infrastructure and poverty reduction), Africa’s external debt was the heaviest and the least serviceable.5 For example, North Africa’s debt to GDP ratio was 65.4% in 1994,6 a little lower than the 71.6% ratio for the whole of the continent in that year. The debt to GDP ratio of sub-Saharan Africa was even more excruciating than that of North Africa. As of 1994, it stood at a whopping 126%.7 The situation was so bad in 1998 that Africa’s external debt accounted for 243.6% of the continent’s total export of goods and services.8 Although by 2010, the debt burden eased out a little, still, the continent continued to labour under its yoke with very little hope of a total and secured escape.

Origin of Africa’s External Debt It is customary for writers, especially those in the social sciences,9 to trace the origin of Africa’s huge external indebtedness to no further back than the 1980s. They perceive that since the crises of Africa’s balance of payment and budget deficit financing heightened in that period, due to drastic decline in foreign receipts, then the continent’s lack of capacity to repay or service its debt should be traced to the same period. This study holds such a perception as mistaken. Africa’s external indebtedness and the burden it imposed on the peoples of the continent in the review period had a much deeper historical foundation than the problems of balance of payments and the collapse of commodity prices of the early 1980s, or even the so-called ‘oil-shock’10 of the early 1970s. The external debt problem of African states, the chapter contends, had its historical roots in the second half of the 19th century up to the first three decades of the 20th century. Three very good examples can be cited to buttress this point. These are the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Nigeria. Tunisia was plunged into external debts owed to European states, particularly Italy and France, during the reign of Muhammad Bey (185569), who was the sultan of Turkey appointed ruler of Tunisia. From 1863 to 1972, Tunisia sought and got from foreign banks different sums of money as loans for financing public works. The first of such loans of sixty-five million francs was got in 1863 under Muhammad Bey’s government.11 Although the loan brought some relief to the cash-strapped economy of Tunisia in that year, this was temporary. In fact, when different consultancy and up-front interest charges were deducted from the loan, Tunisia only received a net payment of 37,772,160 francs.12 No wonder Abun Nasir wrote that the overall effect of the loan was “the reduction in the loan’s real value by a quarter in one year. The bey had not

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only to abandon the public works ... but to borrow locally and abroad to meet the obligations of the first debt”.13 Tunisia’s external debt grew steadily from 1863 to 1870 without a corresponding growth in the income of the country. By 1870, the country’s external debt had risen to a whopping 125 million francs,14 about 265% of the value of its exports in that year. When Tunisia continued to demonstrate very little capacity in amortising or servicing the debt, her external creditors, made up of French and Italian banks, sought and got the support of their respective governments to set up a body in 1870, called ‘International Financial Commission’,15 to recover all the debts. The Commission was made up of representatives of all her European creditors and was vested with the mandate to seize control of the Tunisian economy, and to manage it in such a way that all her foreign creditors would be reimbursed all the sums owed them. The setting up of this Commission and the consequences of its operations laid the foundation for the eventual occupation of Tunisia by French forces and the eventual loss of her independence in 1881. The case of Egypt under external debt burden was not too different. Her external debt problem, just like those of her Maghreb neighbour, Tunisia, can be traced to the 1860s too. The Pasha of Egypt, Said (185463), who was successor to the legendary ‘moderniser’ of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-1849),16 had made very ambitious plans for the infrastructure development of Egypt. He decided on the construction of an artificial water-way that would link the Red Sea with the Nile, thus permitting ocean-going vessels to sail from the Mediterranean Sea through Egypt into the Indian Ocean. The water-way was called the Suez Canal. It was a huge engineering project described as the ‘greatest engineering feat’ of the 19th century.17 Said’s dream came to fruition but at great costs to Egypt. The project had, by the time of its commissioning in 1865, cost Egypt some £16 million in cash.18 This sum was not inclusive of the huge labour and environmental costs it imposed on the ordinary Egyptian, the fellahin, whose labour was always requisitioned by the state to support the French contractor, Franc de Lesseps, in meeting its construction target. It should be stated that much of the cash was borrowed from French and British banks. However, when in 1865 the American civil war, which had encouraged cotton export from Egypt and as such boosted Egyptian income, ended, public revenue declined sharply and Egypt’s capacity to repay or service the Suez Canal debt became seriously impaired. By the time the reign of Said ended (1862), Egyptian external debt had become so burdensome that it accounted for 45% of the total value of the

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country’s export and 55% of its revenue. But Said was a ruler that was clearly more concerned with infrastructure development and the modernisation of Egypt than with balancing his country’s budget. His zeal at turning Egypt into a modern state in the second half of the 19th century through infrastructure development, therefore, threw his country into huge debt. For example, apart from the Suez Canal, he borrowed heavily to finance the following projects: (i) construction of 1,797 kilometres of railroads, (ii) building of Port Said and another port in Suez, and (iii) construction of 9,500 miles of telegraph lines in Cairo and Alexandria,19 all at about the middle of the 19th century when even many parts of Europe had no such facilities. He was clearly a man in a hurry to develop his country, regardless of the cost implications. Yet, if Said was aggressive and hasty in his quest for modernising Egypt, his successor, Ismail, who assumed the more grandiose title, ‘Khedive’, was by far more daring in the same respect. Khedive Ismail’s very liberal attitude to public spending plunged Egypt even further into the abyss of foreign debt. Within ten years of his rule, he had borrowed £68.5 million from European financiers. Whereas the main purpose for borrowing under Said was the financing of infrastructure development, Ismail added extravagant life-style to it. For example, in order to impress the British monarch, who was invited to the opening ceremony of the Suez Canal in 1865, Ismail spent the sum of £1 million, which he borrowed from British banks, to entertain his guests.20 In 1875, he took a most scandalous financial decision by selling Egypt’s share in the Suez Canal (which had cost Egypt more than £16 million to build) to the British for a paltry £4 million21 in order to be able to repay a part of his country’s debt. But the decision failed to significantly address the huge debt which by then had piled up to £100 million.22 In that year, the same debt accounted for 70% of Egypt’s total revenue and 82% of the value of its exports. Again, just as in the case of Tunisia, the debt laid the basis for the takeover of Egypt by European financiers and later by the British government in order to recover the credit owed. However, in the case of Nigeria, public debt was never a reason for the colonisation of the country. This is because, throughout the course of her pre-colonial and colonial history, Nigeria’s external debts never grew as huge as to warrant any foreign aggression. But she too borrowed like Egypt and Tunisia from European financiers. For instance, in 1890, a loan of £792,500 was negotiated by the British imperial authorities on behalf of Nigeria for the construction of a rail line from Lagos to Ibadan.23 This was at a time when the total public revenue of the country was not even up to £1 million per annum. Between 1923 and 1951, when colonial rule had

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taken firm root in the country, Nigeria again secured foreign loans of varying amounts to finance the construction of ports and harbours in Lagos, and the extension of the railways from Jos to Bauchi and later to Maiduguri.24 However, from 1945 to 1951, the greater proportion of Nigeria’s borrowings was dominated by internally sourced loans secured via government bonds and other securities. Table 18-1 below shows the public debt profile of Nigeria in the colonial period. In 1923, the total amount owed was £5.7 million, but this declined steadily to £2.3 million in 1959. Save for 1951, when the debt jumped from £3 million recorded in 1949 to £6.8 million, Nigeria’s total public sector debt was generally manageable. This was a major point of departure from the situations in Tunisia and Egypt earlier shown. Table 18-1: Nigeria’s Public Debt, 1923-1951 (£) Year 1923 1946 1947 1949 1951 1959

Amount 5,700,000 300,000 1,250,000 3,000,000 6,800,000 2,300,000

Interest payments 228,000 9,750 31,250 90,000 268,000 627,000

Source: Report of the Accountant-General with Financial Statements for the Year Ended March, 1956. Lagos: Ministry of Finance, p.6.

In fact, structurally, only about 20% of Nigeria’s public debt before 1970 was owed to foreign creditors. That structure did not change until the military regimes of Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo, when more than 70% of the public debt stock of Nigeria became owed to external sources.25 However, before independence in 1960, Nigeria’s external debt was only about 11% of the country’s total value of exports.

The Beginning of the Rise in Africa’s Debt Profile The external debt picture of the three countries discussed above, and indeed the whole of Africa changed drastically after independence. External debt of African countries, and the problems occasioned by it, began to rise generally from around 1960 to 1975. The problem heightened in the 1980s. The continent’s total external debt in that period suddenly increased and became unsustainable. Although in the same period (1980s), total debt of the developing countries also increased,

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Africa’s debt was particularly more burdensome. For example, in 1980, the continent’s total external debt of $84.8 billion was, in fact, more than half of the value of its export of goods and services. This shows that the states within the continent could hardly earn enough from export to both repay their external debts and guarantee fiscal stability for their respective economies. As to the causes of the debt problem, many reasons can be adduced. The first is that in the decade preceding that period, and due to sharp increases in commodity prices, especially crude oil, at the world market, most of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) borrowed heavily to finance their imports, particularly petroleum imports. The countries that were worst hit were those of Latin America. But African countries, majority of which were not oil producers, also borrowed from Western banks and multilateral financial institutions to cover the gap in their balance of payments positions. The European and American banks, which were awash with money kept with them by the oil producers in the early 1970s due to increases in oil prices, sought avenues to place their excess funds in profitable loan agreements with the borrowers. As a result, they lowered their guards and gave out loans on extremely liberal conditions to the LDCs and, indeed, to many African states even when it was clear that the borrowers had very little capacity to repay. But by the early 1980s, the tea-party was over. Commodity and particularly oil prices collapsed and with them the capacity of lenders to continue to lend to the LDCs. The credit reserve of banks shrank considerably as a result of decline in oil producers’ deposits. The banks had no better option than to begin aggressive loan recovery programmes. These events put many African countries in a big balance of payments problem. Nigeria, for example, which was a major debtor in Africa and one of the beneficiaries of the increase in oil prices in the 1970s, also, surprisingly, borrowed heavily during the period to finance an aggressive programme of infrastructure development and the importation of consumer products. This happened under the administrations of Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Shagari. When oil prices declined in the early 1980s,26 the federal government of Nigeria began to cut public expenditure in order to reduce pressure on the balance of payments position. The government, for example, and in order to curtail imports due to refusal of creditors to open new lines of credit, resorted to taking “austerity measures” in 1982.27 The measures, which included deep cuts in recurrent expenditure and imposition of restrictions on the importation of finished domestic products

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among others, were the government’s contractionary fiscal policy responses to the decline in revenue. Shagari was in the saddle in Nigeria at the time these austerity measures were taken in 1982. The measures caused widespread shortages in essential household commodities, leading to huge social discontent. The discontent, coupled with the problems associated with the election malpractices of 1983, were used as the excuse by the military coupists of December 1983 to seize power, thus terminating Nigeria’s second republic abruptly. Nevertheless, the events of the 1970s showed that Nigeria and, indeed, many African countries, such as Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Zambia, Egypt and Burkina Faso, borrowed far in excess of their revenue capacities. Nigeria, for instance, moved from owing just $4 billion dollars in 1979 to owing $18 billion by 1983.28 That is, the country’s external debt increased by 350% within a period of just four years. Thus, by 1983, Nigeria’s external debt accounted for over 250% of the value of her exports. The debt steadily increased from that date to over $32 billion by 2006. Between 1986 and 2000, Nigeria’s external debt had become so burdensome on the finances of the country that she required more than a quarter of her total annual income to service it. However, it was in the year 2006, after a series of meetings and agreements reached some two years earlier with the Paris Club of creditors, that the country was able to repay the larger proportion of her external debt. A total of $28 billion or 87% of the debt was amortised as a result of the agreements. The successful negotiation which led to the repayment of the debt under some very rare concessionary terms was facilitated by Britain and made possible by the government of Olusegun Obasanjo. However, to make matters worse for the debtor African countries, for much of the period 1980-2000, interest rates charged on their debts rose very sharply. Worse still, the socio-economic projects to which they committed the money, by the time creditors were demanding repayment from the middle of the 1980s, had not been completed. In addition, creditors refused to advance new credits by which the projects could be completed during the same period. Most of the projects, therefore, became moribund. The uncompleted multi-million dollar Ajaokuta Steel Company on which Nigeria, between 1979 and 1996, spent over $15 billion was one of such moribund projects. Furthermore, in the oil-exporting African countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, Angola and Gabon, the collapse of oil prices at the world market led to huge current account deficits. The budgets of these countries, particularly the capital budgets, had to be reduced drastically to make up for the short-fall in revenue on the current account.

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Still, difficulties on the external front did not abate for African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Creditor banks began to pursue new lending terms for the most indebted countries, such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Togo and Mali. They also insisted on borrowers entering financial agreements with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) before new lines of credit could be opened to them. It was clear by 1985 that the heavily indebted African states were in very serious financial trouble. But a hostile international credit environment was what African states were least prepared for in the 1980s-90s. A sudden change of situation, from the milk of surplus credit in the 1970s to the shock of almost zero credit by the middle of 1980s, was what their infant economies could not absorb. The situation put the continent in dire financial straits. On a more global scale, there was even the fear of a massive debt default and repudiation by the LDCs, which was feared could provoke a total collapse of the world financial system in the late 1980s. Some leaders of Africa, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, actually advocated a total repudiation of Africa’s debts owed to Western financiers.29 It must be pointed out, however, that the capacity of an economy to adequately manage its deficits and pay its creditors is directly related to its capacity to broaden or diversify its revenue base, aggressively push for a favourable balance of trade position and keep budget deficits at a maximum of about 3% of the total national expenditure. But all these opportunities eluded the states of the African continent because public spending and deficit financing, in spite of the huge debt owed, increased right from the early 1980s to 1995. Large-scale social and infrastructural programmes, including huge defence spending, also largely characterised the expenditure of African states in the period. However, a particularly debilitating factor which made Africa’s external debt problem virtually intractable in the period under consideration was the unfavourable international trade system. The international trade mechanism was utterly at Africa’s disadvantage; but it has always been. The continent, from the time of the Atlantic slave trade to colonisation, had hardly ever fared better in terms of the comparable benefits derivable from international commercial relations. The continent, in these epochs, was only able to nibble at the large opportunities derivable from world trade. It could only have secured international recognition from other nations through commercial prosperity having almost lost the competitive edge in the area of science and technology. Without favourable international trade relations, there was hardly any

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other viable alternative route by which the continent could have repaid her huge external debt. Africa only managed to corner a pitiable 6.7% of world trade in the 1960s30 at a time when her post-colonial economy was just beginning to find its feet. The situation became worse in the 1980s. The continent’s share of world trade declined sharply to between 4-5%31 and, by 1994, it had further declined to an insignificant 3.2%.32 Compared with Portugal alone, one of the least industrialised countries in Western Europe whose contribution to world trade in the corresponding period (1994) was 3%, Africa was surely an insignificant actor in world commerce. Furthermore, whereas in the early 1970s, as shown in Table 18-2 below, 82% of the world cocoa supply, 28% of world coffee, 16% of cotton, 26% of copper and 13% of iron ore supplies came from Africa, by the 1990s, just two decades after, Africa’s share of these world commodities’ trade declined drastically to an all-time low. Thus, by early 1990s, only 61% of world cocoa export, 16% of coffee, 12% of cotton and a pitiable 6% of iron ore supplies originated in Africa.33 What this meant for Africa’s finances in the review period was that as the debt of the continent increased in those years, her balance of payments positions declined. Thus, her capacity to generate enough funds to either service or repay the external debts became endangered. Table 18-2: Africa’s International Market Loss (-)/Gain (+) Market share (%) Commodity

Cocoa Coffee Copper Cotton Petroleum Iron Ore Timber

1970-73 83.1 27.6 26.4 16.1 8.3 12.7 6.0

1980-83 78.9 20.8 19.5 10.3 9.0 7.2 4.8

1990-93 60.7 16.1 13.6 11.5 12.6 5.6 3.1

Loss/gain in market share (1973-1993) (%)

-22.4 -11.5 -12.8 -4.6 +4.3 -7.1 -2.5

Source: Compiled from UNCTAD, Commodity Year Book (various issues), and the United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (various issues).

The reasons for the decline in Africa’s share of world commodity trade from 1960 to 2010 are many. The most obvious are those connected with the abysmal level of technological support for the continent’s production efforts, and the emergence of new and better suppliers in Latin America and South-East Asia. These suppliers were much closer to the industrial

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machines of Europe than Africa, and their strategic production networks were such that they were better integrated into the world capitalist system of production than Africa. The outcome of these conditions on Africa’s financial situation was that the continent became barely able to meet her external financial commitments to her creditors and trading partners, which had serious implications for her credit worthiness and debtservicing capacity. It should be noted that since the early 1960s, the structure of Africa’s trade has not changed too significantly. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries of Europe and North America, apart from occasional variations, continued to supply over 70% of Africa’s imports, the prices of which the continent had no power to determine. In addition, 80% of the continent’s exports, the prices of which were subjected to the vagaries of the world commodity market, the indices of which were influenced and, at times, provoked by sheer speculation by the same developed countries, put the continent at the mercy of the OECD countries. It was not surprising, therefore, that the European Union (EU) countries, which are members of the OECD, were financially dominant in African states, and this dominance continued to receive expression in the conditionality imposed for the repayment of Africa’s debt by the creditor cartels, the ‘London Club’ and the ‘Paris Club’. Another reason for Africa’s huge external debt is the inability of the states in the continent to diversify their economies. The states were simply unable to overcome the heavy reliance on a single or few primary agricultural or mineral produce as their sole revenue earner. Since the independence of most of the states in the 1960s, Africa has continued to rely on a few primary commodities for the largest chunk of its export earnings. For example, from 1900 to the 1950s, Egypt’s export trade was dominated by cotton.34 In Tunisia, the virtual sole earner of external revenue from the 1880s to about 1960 was olive oil export.35 For Nigeria and Libya, since the early 1960s, it is petroleum export. In the case of Nigeria, revenue from petroleum export from 1973 to 2010 accounted for more than 80% of the country’s foreign receipts and about 70% of its total revenue.36 Oil export accounted for more than 90% of the same receipts for Libya and about 95% of its revenue in the corresponding period. However, by far the most obvious cause of Africa’s external debt is the spate of uncontrolled public expenditure profile of most of the states in the continent. In the first ten years of their independence to the middle of the 1980s, governments of virtually all African states embarked on indiscriminate and massive spending. Even when there was no rational economic reason for increasing expenditure, African leaders, for populist

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and political reasons, embarked on ambitious and extensive capital projects to please their hapless citizens. Evidence of this, though more profound in contemporary times, dates back to the period of decolonisation in the continent. Table 18-3 below shows the incidence of rising expenditure of selected African states between 1950 and 1958. In the table, it is evident that whereas Egypt spent £E163.8 million on public goods and services in 1950, by 1958 its total expenditure had climbed to Table 18-3: Growth in Expenditure of Selected African States, 1950-58

Algeria Morocco Nigeria S/Africa Tunisia Egypt

In Terms of National Currencies (millions) 1950 1958 89.2 220.8 60.2 165.0 29.4 95.4 222.2 378.0 40.4 65.9 163.8 309.9

Growth Rate (%) 1950-58 147.5 174.0 224.4 70.1 63.1 89.1

As % of Export Value 1950 50.3 90.5 32.6 99.3 102.0 93.4

1952 72.1 79.6 36.4 88.6 139.2 160.5

1957 118.5 99.5 52.6 87.1 95.7 206.1

1958 107.7 113.7 70.3 96.6 102.3 189.2

Sources: Computed from J.S. Uppal and Louis R. Salkever (eds.) Africa: Problems in Economic Development. New York: The Free Press, 1972, p. 265; and Economic Commission for Africa, Bulletin for Africa, Vol. 1 No. 2. New York: United Nations, June 1961, pp. 1-28.

£E309.9 million. This represented a percentage increase of 189.1% in just eight years. That rate of increase in public expenditure for an economy that grew at an average rate of less than 4% per year was clearly excessive. Still, if one had thought that the rise in expenditure in just over a period of eight years was rather phenomenal in Egyptian financial history, a cursory look at the impact of this on the value of export, expressed in terms of percentages, reveals a country on the path of financial trouble. In 1952, for instance, the percentage of expenditure in terms of the value of all Egyptian exports was a crippling 160.5%. In other words, total expenditure was in excess of export earnings by about one-and-a-half times. Save for a period of respite in 1950, when external debt accounted for 93.4% of the total value of exports, Egyptian government expenditure always over-shot its export revenues by no less than one-and-a-half times before 1960. For instance, in 1957, public expenditure as a percentage of

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export was 206.1%. In 1958, it stood at 189.2%, reflecting a situation of utter hopelessness in the attempt to secure fiscal or budgetary balance within the economy. Tunisia, too, was not spared the ugly incidence of rising public expenditure in the face of dwindling revenue before the 1960s. Though a relatively smaller economy in terms of population and strategic importance to Europe as a source of raw materials in the colonial and immediate post-independence period, Tunisia’s expenditure began to rise, especially with the attainment of independence in 1956. Her political leaders seemed to be in a hurry to develop the country, and with their haste came huge public spending on infrastructure and local industries. Hence public expenditure outshot the value of exports in 1950 by 2% and in 1952 by 39.2%. It was, therefore, not very surprising that most of the debt management techniques, such as imposition of restrictions on imports and devaluation of currency, which were embarked upon before the 1970s in both Egypt and Tunisia neither alleviated the balance of payment problems nor reduced the debt stock in these two North African countries. The growth of government expenditure in Africa did not abate in the 1980s. In fact, it escalated in virtually all the states of the continent. In Nigeria, for example, government expenditure shot up in 1957. Government expenditure under the British had consistently been kept below revenue, especially from 1945 to 1955.37 For example, and as shown in Table 18-4, government expenditure was below revenue by £1.312 million in 1944/45 fiscal year. Also, in 1949/50 and 1954/55, surpluses of £2.511 million and £1.812 million, respectively, were recorded. But gradually after the appointment of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister and F.S. Okotie-Eboh as minister of finance in September 1957, government expenditure began to exceed revenue. Deficit financing of government budget set in on the current account. After independence in 1960, the same expenditure was consistently in deficit. In fact, deficit financing with debilitating effect on fiscal stability in Nigeria actually began in 1959/60 fiscal year and continued from this date to the 1979/80 fiscal year. For instance, and as is further shown in Table18-4, deficits of £28.76 million, £204.66 million and a whopping N4,295 million were recorded in the fiscal years 1959/60, 1969/70, and 1979/80, respectively. All these figures show consistent but unsustainable growth path in Nigeria’s public expenditure profile from the decolonisation years to 1980. In fact, at no time from 1980 to 2000 was Nigeria’s government able to balance its budget, except for 1995 when the federal government recorded a surplus of N1,010 million. The 2010 budget of N4.6 trillion, for instance, had built into it a deficit of N1.6

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trillion, which was actually 5% of the country’s GDP and almost 40% of its income from the export of goods and services. Nigeria’s unbridled spending was particularly more pronounced under Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), who, in spite of his so-called structural adjustment programme launched in 1986, the philosophy of which was reduction in government spending through the diminution of capital expenditure, actually spent more money in excess of the revenue capacity of the country than any other administration in Nigeria’s financial history from 1960 to 2000. It was during his regime that the country’s external debt moved from $18 billion in 1985 to $32 billion in 1993,38 an increase Table 18-4: Nigeria: Revenue and Expenditure Balance Fiscal Year

Revenue (£/N m)

Expenditure (£/N m)

Expenditure growth (£/N m)

% Growth Rate

Deficit (-) /Surplus (+) (£/N m)

1944/45 11.444 10.132 +1.312 1949/50 30.764 28.253 18.121 178.8 +2.511 1954/55 62.480 60.668 32.415 114.7 +1.812 1959/60 88.824 117.579 56.911 93.8 -28.755 1964/65 149.566 191.970 74.391 63.2 -42.404 1969/70 127.000 331.660 139.690 72.7 -204.660 1974/75 2,171.4 2,213.4p 1,881.740p 567.3p -42.00 P 213.4p 4,295.0 1979/80* 8,919.0 13,214.0 9,450.520 1985* 10,000.0 13,040.0 -175.0 0 -3,040.0 1990* 38,150.0 60,260.26 47,220.26 78.3 -22,110.26 1995* 249,770.0 248,760.0 188,499.74 312.8 +1,010.0 2000* 597,282.1 701,059.4 452,299.00 181.8 -103,777.3 Source: Report of the Accountant General of the Federation with Financial Statements (various years). * figures in the fiscal year are presented in Naira. p to arrive at the difference in expenditure figures between those presented in the 1974/75 and 1980 fiscal years, which were denominated in Nigerian pounds and Naira respectively, the figures in the former fiscal year were multiplied by two, which was the prevalent exchange rate of the Naira to the pound during the period.

of about 78% over a period of eight years. The country expended more than 30% of its revenue on servicing debt in those years. The result was that little was left after deduction of recurrent expenditure (which always accounted for more than 60% of the revenue) for capital development. This explains why the regime was blamed, more than any other before and

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immediately after it, for being more responsible for the decrepit state of Nigeria’s social infrastructure and for inflicting the most pain on the ordinary Nigerian as a result of the failure of such infrastructure, especially electricity and roads.39 The picture painted above on the disproportionate growth in government expenditure over revenue in Nigeria was not limited to the country. It was indeed representative of what obtained in virtually all the states of the African continent. For example, in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Congo DR, Malawi, Kenya and Morocco, government expenditure grew by 215%, 216%, 462%, 125%, 314%, and 300%, respectively, between 1960 and 1980. Finally, corruption, both at the official and private levels, was partly responsible for the growth in Africa’s external debt and of the huge burden of debt management imposed on the continent. Virtually every part of Africa suffered from one form of official financial corruption or the other. It has been revealed that both “political and bureaucratic corruption have become firmly entrenched” in the continent.40 In 2002, Transparency International classified Nigeria as the second most corrupt country in the world.41 Other studies, Ruzindana’s,42 for example, have shown different forms of corruption in Africa which served as a debilitating factor in the task of developing the continent. Ruzindana’s study found that Bribery, extortion, illegal use of public assets for private gain, over and under-invoicing, payment of salaries and various benefits to non-existent (‘ghost’) workers and pensioners, payments for goods not supplied or services not rendered (‘air supply’), under-payment of taxes and duties on exports and imports through false invoicing or other declarations, purchase of goods at inflated prices, fraud and embezzlement, misappropriation of assets; court decisions awarding monetary damages well in excess of any injury suffered, removal of documents or even whole case files, and nepotism and patronage.43

Though Ruzindana’s observations relative to the origin of Africa’s external debt appear comparatively recent, they accurately express the sources of the economic and political turmoil that led to the growth of the indebtedness of Egypt and Tunisia between 1860 and 1960. The reign of Mohammed Ali’s successors was characterised by official corruption through badly and corruptly negotiated foreign loans, the granting of capitulatory rights to Europeans and the fixing of construction prices at an utterly higher rate than found in comparable situations elsewhere. The combined effect of corruption on Africa’s balance of payments situation and external debt portfolio has been aptly captured again by Ruzindana in his study:

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Corruption was largely responsible for the decreasing capacity of African states to service their debts. Corruption introduced distortions into the economic system by creating a huge reserve of unearned moneys and materials via corrupt dealings with the public treasury. Corruption had the unenviable character of removing resources from the productive sector for the servicing of ostentatious consumption and mismanagement. This situation created artificial resource scarcity in the productive sector and provoked a need for foreign assistance to compensate for the resource gap created by the same corruption and mismanagement. The reason for the entrenchment of corruption in the African bodypolitic is simply this: the whole gamut of Africa’s Integrity System, namely, offices of the Accountants-General, Attorneys-General, AuditorsGeneral, the Judiciary, the Police, Public Procurement Boards and Political Leadership has been almost irredeemably compromised. At the beginning of the decade, Uganda and Nigeria made some attempts at reducing the incidence of official corruption.45 But these attempts faced frustration from the system. The Police still carried on business as usual by refusing to apprehend corrupt individuals.

The Extent and Weight of the Debt Burden Africa’s debt grew gradually between the 1950s and the 1960s. But from the middle of the 1970s to 1994, its growth pattern became exponential. Between 1995 and 2010, it again slowed down. The debt did not just grow in size (amount) but also in the level of burden it imposed on the peoples of the continent. The burden can be calculated in terms of the ratio of debt to the value of export of all goods and services from the continent, and also in terms of the continent’s GDP. The debt burden is described under two sub-sections. The first highlights the trend of the debt in terms of its size in three different time periods. The first period covers the time from 1980 to 1990. The second shows and discusses the growth of the debt in the period between 1991 and 2000, while the third analyses the growth pattern of the debt in the decade 2001–2010. All these growth patterns are presented in table format for ease of analysis. The second subsection analyses the debt problems in terms of its effect on export of goods and services and the GDP.

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In 1980, out of a total of $702 billion external debt owed by all developing countries around the world, Africa owed a total of $84.8 billion (see Table 18-5). This latter amount accounted for 12.07% of the total LDCs’ debt. From 1981 to 1990, Africa’s debt increased steadily without respite, except for 1987. The debt grew during the period at an annual average rate of 11.9%. It was only in 1988 that Africa’s debt recorded a negative growth rate of -2.2%. In 1981, Africa’s total external debt liability was $109.8 billion. It increased in 1982, 1984, 1987 and 1990 to $122.4 billion, $132.1 billion, $218.3 billion and $235.2 billion, respectively. Total LDCs’ debts in the corresponding period were $831 billion, $1,958 billion, $1,190 billion and $1.539.3 billion (in that order). In other words, in quantitative terms, whereas LDCs’ external debt from 1980 to 1990 more than doubled within the eleven-year period, Africa’s external debt almost tripled within the Table 18-5: Debt owed by Less Developed Countries ($ Billions)

Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average

LDCs 702 755 831 894 1,958 1,038 1,120 1,190 1,245 1,284.6 1,539.3 1,141.5

Africa 84.8 109.8 122.4 129.7 132.1 145.6 197.1 218.3 213.5 221.0 235.2 164.5

Africa Debt as % of LDCs Debt 12.07 14.54 14.70 14.50 6.74 14.02 15.99 17.50 17.14 15.96 15.27 14.40

% Growth Rate (Africa) 29.4 20.3 5.7 1.8 10.2 23.0 21.8 -2.2 3.5 6.4 11.99

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 1990. Washington D.C.: IMF, 1990, p.36.

same period. This is the first phase in Africa’s contemporary external debt history. The second phase presents a mixed bag of growth and decline in the debt pattern. From 1991 to 2000, LDCs debt jumped from $1,626.7 billion to $2,201.9 billion (see Table 18-6). In other words, LDCs’ debt in the decade immediately after 1990 increased by over $660 billion, that is, an average increase of about $66 billion per year. In percentage terms,

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however, the debt increased at an average of 3.7%. For example, it increased by 5.67% in 1991 and 6.84% in 1993, and by 4.48% in 1996 and 8.41% in 1998. However, the debt decreased by 4.13% in 1995 and by 1.49% in 2000. This explains why in the latter year Africa’s external debt, which was $272.8 billion, accounted for only 12.38% of the LDCs’ total, down from 18.43% recorded in 1991 when the total amount owed by the continent was $299.9 billion. Table 18-6: Emerging and Developing Countries External Debt, 1991-2000 ($ billions)

Year

Total LDC

% Growth Rate (LDC)

Africa

% Growth Rate (Africa)

Africa’s Debt as % of LDCs 15.27 18.43 17.53 16.65 16.05 15.83 15.08 13.94 12.76 12.52 12.38

1990 1,539.3 235.2 1991 1,626.7 5.67 299.9 27.50 1992 1,695.7 4.24 297.3 -0.9% 1993 1,811.8 6.84 301.7 1.4 1994 1,944.6 7.32 312.2 3.4 1995 1,864.5 -4.13 295.3 -5.5 1996 1,948.2 4.48 293.8 -1.6 1997 2,030.4 4.21 283.1 -3.7 1998 2,201.2 8.41 281.0 -0.8 1999 2,235.3 1.54 280.0 -0.4 2000 2,201.9 -1.49 272.8 -2.6 Average 1,714.9 3.70 286.5 1.68 Source: Computed from the IMF, World Economic Outlook 2003. Washington DC: IMF, 2003, pp.36-38.

The gradual but significant reduction in Africa’s debt stock began to be visible from the mid-1990s. The period can be described as that of the thawing of the debt ice for Africa. The continent’s external debt, in proportional terms, did not only decline in relation to the LDCs’ total, but in addition recorded overall negative growth rates from 1995 to 2000. There was therefore significant relief for the indebted African states from 1995 to 2010. Several factors accounted for the general reduction in the debt profile of Africa beginning in 1995. The first was that the 1990s represented the period that the numerous austerity and contractionary fiscal policies that most of the states within the continent implemented, either on their own volition or at the instigation of the World Bank and the IMF, began to

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yield ‘positive’ macro-economic results. But the impact of the debt reduction strategy was felt principally in the area of reduction, both in government expenditure and borrowing from external sources, than in the transformation of African economies. As a result, it was mainly the external sector that benefitted from debt reduction strategies such as import restrictions, removal of government subsidies on utilities, devaluation of currencies and the imposition of moratorium on new borrowings. Whereas in 1991 Africa’s share of the LDCs’ debt of $1,626.7 was $299.9 billion (or 18.43%), the share declined marginally in 1992 by about $2 billion to stand at a total of $297.3 billion or 17.53% of LDCs’ debt. But in 1993, Africa’s debt increased significantly to $301.7 billion and even further to $312.2 billion the following year. In fact, even by 1993 when the continent’s total debt rose from about $297.3 billion to over $301 billion, the debt as a proportion of the LDCs’ declined from the previous 17.53% to 16.65%. This was the beginning of the decline in the proportion of debt owed by Africa vis-a-vis the LDCs’ in the review period. The 1990s represented the decade in which, as opposed to the 1980s, Africa witnessed an overall negative growth rate of 16.7% in its external debt portfolio. It was only in 1993 and 1994 that the quantum of the continent’s debt profile grew by 1.4% and 3.4%, respectively. In all other years in the decade 1990-2000, the debt recorded negative growth rates. For example, in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 1999, the negative growth rates were: -0.9%, -5.5%, -3.7% and -0.4% (in that order). In the year 2000, the growth rate was -2.6%. The reduction in Africa’s debt profile between 1995 and 2000 was discontinuous. The debt profile once again began to rise by returning to the very burdensome state that it was in the 1980s. For example, and as shown in Table 18-7, it was only in three of the nine years from 2002 to 2010 that negative growth rates were recorded in Africa’s debt profile. In the other years within the period, only positive growth rates ranging between 1.7% and 11.6% were recorded. Although on average, in the same period, Africa’s debt only marginally grew by about 1.3%, up from the 1.1% that was recorded in the 1990s, it is important to show, however, that the Emerging and Developing Countries’ (EDCs) debt grew by 7.9% on the average in the corresponding period.

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Table 18-7: Emerging and Developing Countries External Debt, 2001-2010 Year

Total EDC

Growth Rate (EDCs)

Africa

Growth Rate (Africa)

Africa’s Debt as % of EDCs’

2001 2,364.7 269.5 11.40 2002 2,421.0 2.3 274.3 1.7 11.33 2003 2,631.7 8.7 296.2 7.9 11.25 2004 2,876.5 9.3 311.2 5.0 10.81 2005 3,008.4 4.5 283.4 -9.0 9.42 2006 3,321.8 10.4 238.1 -16.0 7.16 2007 4,130.3 24.3 265.8 11.6 6.43 2008 4,472.3 8.2 268.0 0.8 5.99 2009 4,330.4 -0.8 297.2 10.8 6.24 2010 4,640.5 4.5 294.7 -1.0 6.35 Average 3,419.7 7.9 279.8 1.3 8.63 Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2010. Washington D.C.: IMF, 2010, pp.36-37.

Thus, measured in terms of quantum of debt owed, Africa’s external debt increased consistently from 2001 to 2004 (see Table 18-7). However, in 2005 and 2006, the quantum of the debt decreased significantly. In 2005, for instance, it was $283.4 billion, down from $311.2 billion recorded a year before. The debt further dipped in 2006 when it went down to $238.1 billion, i.e., a significant reduction by over $45 billion. However, in 2007, the debt suddenly jumped to $265.8 billion, breaking the tempo in the downward movement of the debt since 2005. The final debt position of Africa by 2010 was $294.7 billion. This represented a reduction by some $2.5 billion from what it was in 2009. In order words, Africa’s external debt in the decade 2001-2010 grew by only 1.3% compared to 1.68% recorded in the decade earlier.

Assessing the Burden of the Debt on Africa Debt to GDP: The problems which external debt liabilities imposed on the African continent in the review period are better appreciated when one considers the level of burden and fiscal limitations the continent had to contend with as a result. There was no part of the world in the review period that suffered from the debt burden as Africa. Measured both in terms of external and internal fiscal stability, Africa, as shown in Tables

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18-8 and 18-9 below, was worse off than her comparable counterparts in Developing Asia, the Middle East and the countries of the Western Hemisphere. On the two basic indices of External Debt to Export of Goods and Services (DT-EXT) and External Debt to Gross Domestic Product (DTGDP), Africa, even in the 1990s when the average rate of growth in its debt was very marginal (1.68%), suffered greater hardship than any other less developed parts of the world. This point is buttressed by the data presented in Table 18-8 below. The Table, for example, shows the adverse situation of Africa relative to Developing Asia and the Western Hemisphere in the 1990s in terms of debt to GDP. Table 18-8: Ratio of External Debt to GDP (in % of GDP) Year

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Average

ALL EDCs 41.5 39.4 98.7 43.5 44.7 40.5 41.3 AFRICA 72.1 67.7 63.5 65.9 65.5 63.0 66.2 SUBSAHARAN 72.1 68.7 64.2 67.6 68.2 67.0 67.9 AFRICA DEVELOPING 32.6 31.1 32.5 37.0 34.1 30.7 33.0 ASIA WESTERN 36.9 35.3 33.7 37.9 44.3 39.7 37.8 HEMISPHERE Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2010. Washington D.C.: IMF, 2010, p. 42.

Whereas in 1995, when the total external debt of the EDCs was $1,964.5 million, accounting for 41.5% of the GDP of all the countries in the group, Africa’s external debt of $295.8 billion accounted for a whopping 72.1% of the continent’s GDP in the same year. In other words, the debt liability of the continent was actually worth about three-quarters of the total value of goods and services produced by all of its peoples. It means that the continent’s debt had, by that year (1995), clearly become unsustainable. Again, and as Table 18-8 shows, there was no year, in spite of the significant reduction in the debt-GDP ratio from 1994 to 2000, that the same ratio did not account for more than 60% of the continent’s GDP. For example, in 1996, the debt-GDP ratio for Africa was 67.7% when the total for the EDCs was just 39.4%. In the years 1997, 1998 and 1999, the debtGDP ratios were 63.5%, 65.9% and 65.5%, respectively, for Africa. Although the average debt-GDP ratio from 1995 to 2000 for all EDCs was 41.3%, for Africa it was an excruciating 66.2%.

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The situation of sub-Saharan Africa was even worse on the debt-GDP ratio than the continent’s average. Whereas Africa’s average in the years indicated in Table 18-8 above was 66.2%, that of sub-Saharan Africa stood at 67.9%. In other words, the debt was more damaging for subSaharan Africa than the rest of the continent and, indeed, than all the EDCs. Furthermore, compared to other parts of the world, such as Developing Asia and the Western Hemisphere, Africa did not fare any better in the 1990s on the debt-GDP scale at all; from 1995 to 2000, the ratio was consistently above 60%. The highest recorded figure for Developing Asia in the corresponding period (recorded in 1998) was 37%. In 1995, when Africa’s debt-GDP ratio was 72.1%, that of Developing Asia was only 32.6%. Again, in 1996, 1997 and 1999, when debt-GDP ratios for Africa were 67.7%, 63.5% and 65.5%, respectively, for the Western Hemisphere they were 35.5%, 33.7% and 44.3%, respectively. At no time did the debt-GDP ratios for the states of the Western Hemisphere exceed 44.3% between 1995 and 2000. This confirms the thesis that Africa was worse off on the debt-GDP scale than any other parts of the developing world. However, beginning in 2001, the external debt burden began to ease off again, not only for Africa but generally also for the EDCs. This was the second time of respite enjoyed by Africa from the problem since the 1980s, the first being the period 1995-1998. Debt management measures, such as debt-equity swap, debt-buy-back and drastic cut in capital expenditure and the cessation of government subsidies on public goods and services, which were implemented by many states of Africa, began to have direct impact on their debt stock. Whereas Africa’s average debt to GDP ratio for the period 1995-2000 was 66.2%, in the decade 2001-2010 it declined significantly to 36.9%. The average for the EDCs also declined to 29.5% in the same period. Also, and as shown in Table 18-9 below, the average debt-GDP ratio for sub-Saharan Africa declined from 67.9% in the 1990s to 39.9% in the years 2000 to 2010. It should also be mentioned here that an additional reason for the easing off of the debt burden was the fact that Nigeria, a country whose external debt as at 2000 accounted for about one-tenth of Africa’s debt, was able to repay all of her Paris Club debt in 2006. The amount exited from Nigeria’s debt as a result of payments made to the Paris Club was $28 billion out of the county’s total indebtedness of $32 billion owed as at 2006. The settlement of this debt was a booster to Africa’s debt management initiatives and signalled one of the most outstanding successes of an African country in debt management. By the

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end of 2010, Nigeria owed no more than $4 billion to the London and other multilateral group of creditors. Table 18-9: Ratio of Debt to GDP in Emerging and Developing Countries, 2001-2010 Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average All EDCs 36.5 36.5 35.0 32.2 28.2 26.5 27.0 24.1 26.4 25.7 29.8 Africa 62.2 59.8 51.1 43.5 34.1 24.9 24.1 21.0 24.7 24.1 36.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 67.9 64.8 54.6 46.5 36.5 26.7 26.0 22.7 27.1 26.6

39.9

Developing Asia 27.8 25.7 23.7 22.3 20.4 19.1 17.4 15.6 16.1 16.2 20.4 Western Hemisphere 38.3 42.5 42.1 36.9 30.0 23.9 22.9 20.9 24.4 24.5 30.6 Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2010. Washington DC: IMF, 2010, p. 42.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that it was not Africa alone that got some relief from the debt burden in the decade 2000-2010. The countries of Asia and those of the Western Hemisphere also did. This fact confirms the effectiveness of their debt reduction strategies. For example, in the year 2001, the debt-GDP ratios for Developing Asia and the Western Hemisphere were 27.8% and 38.3%, respectively (see Table 189). Africa, in the corresponding period, had a debt-GDP ratio of 67.9%, i.e., more than twice the figure for Developing Asia. This fact is a further justification of the earlier proposition that Africa was more burdened by external debt in the period under review than Developing Asia. However, in the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the debt-GDP ratios for Africa were 24.1%, 21.0%, 24.7% and 24.1%, respectively; the ratios for Developing Asia were 17.4%, 15.6%, 16.1% and 16.2%, respectively. In short, what all the aforestated comparative scenarios show is that the burden of external debt was more pervasive in Africa and, therefore, more disruptive of its development and social welfare than in any other less developed parts of the world. Debt to Exports: Measured against the level of resources exported abroad, either to pay or service its debt, Africa’s external debt did great harm. The quantum of capital that left the continent, which, but for the unsustainable nature of the debt, should have been ploughed into infrastructure development was colossal. Measured in terms of export of goods and services, Africa’s debt in 1998 alone was almost two-and-a-half

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times the value of all her exports. In that year, Africa’s external debt was 243.6% of the total value of all her exports of goods and services. The same debt was 128.8% of the value of exports in Developing Asia in the same year. Africa’s external debt, measured as percentages of its export value in 2002, 2007 and 2010 accounted for 179.1%, 61.1% and 72.7%, respectively; in the corresponding period, the external debt of Developing Asia accounted for only 36.6%, 45.0% and 58.9%, respectively. This means that just as it has been shown on the debt-GDP scale, Africa was again worse off than her comparable counterparts in other parts of the world on the debt-export scale.46 Furthermore, Africa transferred a greater percentage of her resources abroad to service and repay her debts than her developing counterparts in other parts of the world. The continent’s interest payments in the years 1998 and 2002, calculated in terms of percentage of her exports, were 11.7% and 5.3%, respectively. In those years, the continent paid out 23.3% and 14.4% of the value of her exports to service her about $290 billion debt, whereas Developing Asia, in those two selected years, only paid out 18.1% and 14.1% of the same value in servicing its external debt of about $680 billion. The latter debt was, in fact, more than double that of Africa. Finally, it is important to stress that at all times from 2006 to 2010, Africa delivered to her external creditors greater percentages of the value of her exports than did Developing Asia for the service of external debt. For example, in 2006, 2008 and 2010, the continent paid out 18.2%, 5.2% and 7.1%, respectively, of the value of its total exports in servicing debt while Developing Asia only paid out 6.5%, 6.3% and 8.7%, respectively, for the same purpose in the same period.47

Conclusion A number of states in Africa have their debt histories dating back to the pre-colonial period, Egypt and Tunisia being good examples. However, the debt issue gradually became significant during colonial rule of the continent. Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, lost their national sovereignties to two European powers (Britain and France, respectively) mainly because of their inability to pay their European creditors. But it was after colonial rule, and particularly from about the 1960s to early 1970s, that the debt issue began to exceed the capacity of the states of Africa to either service or repay altogether. By 1980, Africa owed her external creditors the sum of $84.8 billion, which was 12.07% of the total sum owed by all the LDCs. From that time until 2004, the quantum of the debt vastly increased surpassing the combined value of exports of goods

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and services from the continent by more than 200%. In fact, by 1995, Africa’s external debt of $295.3 billion was actually 72.1% of the continent’s GDP. Three years after, in 1998, the debt required 243.6% of the total value of exports from the continent to repay. The decade 1980-1990 was the worst in the history of Africa’s external indebtedness because the continent moved from owing just a little more than $30 billion in the early 1960s to owing $84.8 billion, a growth rate of 180%. By 1990, Africa’s debt climbed to $235.2 billion, having grown by 177% from what it was in 1980. Again, by 1990, the debt was already 15.27% of the total debt of the LDCs. However, the debt began a downward movement from the middle of the 1990s to 1999, when it declined from $312.2 billion in 1994 to $280 billion in 1999. But that downward trend did not last because the debt began to rise again from 2007 up to 2010. By the latter year, Africa’s total external debt was $294.7 billion. However, in terms of the proportion of the debt of Africa to the LDCs’ debt, there were significant reductions from 2000 to 2010, for Africa’s debt declined from 12.38% in the former year to 6.35% of the LDCs’ in the latter year. Thus, in the review period, huge financial resources left the shores of Africa in the form of debt service charges and amortisation. The continent transferred more funds abroad than she ever received in the form of offical developemnt assistance and grants-in-aid. The effects of the debt burden were felt more in the areas of domestic social welfare and infrastructure than in the external sector. Governments of African states practically abandoned their social roles of financing education, primary healthcare and infrastructural developement as a result of the debt crisis. Creditor nations and their banks imposed excruciating conditions on the debtor states in order to recover their funds, including conditions such as those of structural adjustment programmes, devaluation of national currencies, liberalisation of trade and removal of subsidies on social goods. Surely, the period 1980-2010 was one of debt trap for the African continent.

Notes 1

Foreign Policy, No. 68, Fall, pp.141-148. Ibid., p.141. 3 International Monetary Fund, World Economict Outlook, 2009. Washington, DC: IMF, 2009, p.36. 4 Ibid. 5 For details on the problems of capacity in servicing Africa’s external debt see Adebayo Olukoshi, “Issues in Third World External Debt”. In: Adebayo O. 2

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Olukoshi (ed.), Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management. Lagos: Malthouse House Press, 1990, pp.3-19. 6 IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2009, p.36. 7 World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-94: External Debt of Developing Countries, Vol. 1: Analysis and Summary Tables. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994. 8 Ibid. 9 The list is endless, but see M.O. Ojo, “African Debt Burden in Historical Perspective” and J.C. Anyanwu, “An Analysis of the External Debt Burden of subSaharan Africa”. In: The Nigerian Economic Society, African Debt Burden and Economic Development. Ibadan: NES, 1994. See also Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 10 So called because when the prices of oil in the world market rose sharply because of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 a sudden and huge current account deficits occurred in non-oil producing states of Arica and Latin America. The shock was not overcome in Africa until the late 1990s. See Bade Onimode, The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt. 2 vols. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1989. 11 J. Abun Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.279. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p.280. 14 T. Zeleza, A Modern Economic History of Africa, Vol.1: The Nineteenth Century. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1993, p.361. 15 Ibid. 16 Mohammad Ali was actually not an Egyptian by origin but a native of Kavalla, an Albanian village which lay north of Greece. He came to Egypt as an Albanian army officer but rose through the ranks by sheer bravery and intrigues to become Pasha of Egypt. He established a dynasty that ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1952. All authors on the history of Egypt agree that he was in fact the ‘moderniser’ of Egypt because of his industrilisation programmes and the professionalisation of the Egyptian army. See C. Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982; I. Olomola, Main Trends in African History from Earliest Times to 1900. Ado Ekiti: Omolayo Press, 1969; and, P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966. 17 C. Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, p.46. 18 A.E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of Modern Egypt. London: Longman, 1938, p.40. 19 C. Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p.48. 20 E.A. Ayandele, “North Africa”. In: A.E. Afigbo, et al. (eds.), The Making of Modern Africa,Vol. 1: The Nineteenth Century. London: Longman, 1986, p.145. 21 Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, p.51.

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R. Owen, “Egypt and Europe: From French Expedition to British Occupation”. In R. Owen and B. Stutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. London: Longman, 1972, p.201. 23 Federal Ministry of Finance, Report of the Acountant-General with Financial Statements for the Year Ended, March, 1956. Lagos: Ministry of Finance, 1956, p.6. See also A.O. Olukoju, Infrastructure Development and Urban Facilities in Lagos, 1861-2000. Lagos: IFRA, 2003. 24 G.K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria.Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1966. 25 A.O. Ogunyemi, “Nigeria’s External Debt Management, 1970-1995: An Excursion into the Nature and Feasibility of the Conventional Methods”. University of Lagos, M.A. Thesis, 1997, p.25. 26 The price of crue oil declined from $40 in 1979 to less than $10 in 1986. See A. O. Olukoshi, “The Role of the International Monetary Fund and the World bank in the Mangement of Nigeria’s Foreign Debt”. In: A.O. Olukoshi (ed.), Nigerian External Debt Crisis, pp.81-103. 27 For full details of the measures, see Federal Ministry of Information, “Address by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President and Commnader in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the Occasion of the Presentation of the 1982 Budget Proposals to the Joint Session of the National Assembly on Wednesday, 16th December, 1981”. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information. 28 Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin, Vol 11, No.2. Lagos: CBN, 2000, p.101. 29 J.K. Nyerere, “Africa and the Debt Crisis”, African Affairs, Vol. 84, No.337, 1985, pp. 489-497. 30 See United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (various years) and UNCTAD Commodity Year Book (various Issues). 31 United Nations Conference on Trade and Developement (UNCTAD), Commodity Year Book, 1995. 32 IMF, World Developemnt Outlook, 2010. Washington, DC: IMF, Table B12, p.16. 33 Ibid. 34 C. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 35 D.L. Ling, Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 36 A.O. Ogunyemi, “Federal Budgets in Nigeria, 1954-1999: A History of the Processes, Policies and Problems”. University of Lagos, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2008, p.109. 37 Ibid., pp. 171-174. 38 Ibid. See also, CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 2000, p.101. 39 The most popular of such blames are those contained in the Pius Okigbo Panel Report of 1994. The Report is published in The News (Lagos), Vol.24, 23 May 2005, pp.33-40.

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40 S. Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Development” In: B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds.), Corruption: Catalyst and Constraints. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1997, pp. 35-57. 41 Business in Africa, November, 2001, pp. 42-43. 42 Augustin Ruzindana was a Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee in the Ugandan Parliament. See his ‘Comment on “What can be Done About Entrenched Corruption” by Michael Johnson’. In: B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds.), Corruption: Catalyst and Constraints, pp. 95-98. 43 Ibid., p. 96. 44 Ibid. 45 In Nigeria, for example, the Federal Government moved against official corruption in 2000 by enacting an anti-corruption law called the Independent Corrupt Practices (and other Related Offences) Act, 2000. See also A. Ruzindana, “Combating Corruption in Uganda”. In: P. Langseth, et al. (eds.), Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995, pp.13- 26. 46 See IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2010. Washington, DC: IMF, 2010, p.43. 47 Ibid.

CONTRIBUTORS

Olufunke Adeboye, Professor, Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. Olutayo C. Adesina, Professor, Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Mike U. Ajieh, Research Fellow, Biomass Unit, National Centre for Energy and Environment, Energy Commission of Nigeria, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. Adeyemi Balogun, Junior Fellow, Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany. Jeremie K. Dagnini, Research Associate, Center d’études politiques contemporaines, Université d’Orléans, Orléans, France. O. Oko Elechi, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Mississippi Valley State University, Mississippi, USA. Lawrence I.N. Ezemonye, Professor, Department of Animal and Environmental Biology, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. W. Alade Fawole, Professor, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Ehimika A. Ifidon, Professor, Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. Adebayo A. Lawal, Professor, Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. Emmanuel T. Ogbomida, Research Fellow, Ecotoxicology and Environmental Forensic Unit, National Centre for Energy and Environment, Energy Commission of Nigeria, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

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Olukoya Ogen, Professor, Department of History and International Studies, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria, and Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham. Adetunji O. Ogunyemi, Senior Lecturer, Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Kathleen O’Halleran, Retired Professor of Social Sciences (Northwestern Oklahoma State University), Social and Policy Analyst of International Affairs, Human and Development Security, San Antonio, Texas, USA. Richard A. Olaniyan, For many years Professor of History at Obafemi Awolowo University, he has also taught at Georgetown University, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, in USA; Adekunle Ajasin University, Niger Delta University, and Joseph Ayo Babalola University, in Nigeria. Kehinde O. Olayode, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Ayodeji Olukoju, Professor, Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos; former Vice-Chancellor, Caleb University, Lagos, Nigeria. Emmanuel Onyeozili, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Princess Anne, Maryland, USA. He is Managing Editor of African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies. Anyango E. Reggy, Professor, Leadership Studies Department, Beulah Heights University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. Lonzen W. Rugira, Associate Researcher, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research and Senior Researcher at the Policy Observatory, Rwanda. Terhemba Wuam, Associate Professor, Department of History, Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria.

NAME INDEX

A Abacha, Sani, 181, 192, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 205, 208, Abdullah, Sheik Ahmed, 121, Abubakar, Atiku, 197 Adedeji, Adebayo, 14, 16, 20, 182 Afwerki, Isaias, 89 Aganga, Olusegun, 350-351 Ahidjo, Ahmadou (also Ahmadu), 196, 199, 203, 210, 215, 226 Al-Bashir, Omar, 210 Amin, Idi, 204, 208 Annan, Kofi, 67, 204, 312 Anenih, Tony, 200 B Babangida, Ibrahim, 197, 202, 208, 378 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 377 Banda, Hastings Kamuzu, 196, 201, 210 Barre, Siad, 205, 210 Barril, Paul, 224, 229 Bello, Ahmadu, 198 Bey, Muhammed, 367 Biteye, Mamadou, 111 Biya, Paul, 203, 205, 210, 213, 226 Bockel, Jean-Marie, 225 Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 210, 211, 213, 223-224, 318 Bongo, Ali, 198 Bongo, Omar, 198, 203, 210, 213, 224, 225, 316 Bourguiba, Habib, 196, 198, 210 Bush, George W., 333, 338 Buyoya, Pierre, 210, 282 Bwalya, Martin, 119

C Campaore, Blaise, 201, 210, 213, 222 Chan, Margaret, 52, 134 Chiluba, Frederick, 208 Chirac, Jacques, 220, 223, 224 Churchill, Winston, 38 Clinton, Bill, 333, 334 Cohen, Herman, 308, 318 Conte, Lansana, 208, 210 D Dacko, David, 215, 224 Daddah, Moktar Ould, 210 Danquah, J.B., 303 Darcos, Xavier, 225 de Gaulle, Charles, 213, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 227 de Montesquieu, Baron (CharlesLouis de Secondat), 176 de Tocqueville, Alexander, 176 Deby, Idriss (also Idris, Derby), 211, 213, 225-226 Denard, Bob, 225, 230 d'Estaing, Valery Giscard, 220, 222, 223, 224 Doe, Samuel, 199, 205, 208, 318 dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 210 DuBois, W.E.B., 303 E El Nimeiri, Muhammed Jaafar, 210 El Abidine, Zine, 210 Erdimi, Timane, 226 Erdimi, Tom, 226 Eyadema, Etienne Gnassingbe, 198, 201, 205, 210, 213, 222-223, 316 Eyadema, Faure, 198, 223

396

Name Index

F Foccart, Jacques, 215, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227 G Gabre-Madhin, Eleni, 121 Galley, Robert , 223 Garvey, Marcus, 303 Gbagbo, Laurent, 219, 221, 264, 265, 291 Ghaddafi (also Gaddafi, Kadhafi, Qaddafi, Gadhafi), 198, 199, 210, 223, 224, 287, 303, 311, 312, 315, 316, 353 Giugale, Marcelo, 10 Gnagbe, Kragbe, 221 Gowon, Yakubu, 196, 197, 199, 202, 208, 211, 371 Grunitzky, Nicolas, 223 Gure, Abubakar Aliyu, 199 H Habermas, Jurgen 176 Habi, Sale 199 Habre, Hissene 225, 226, 230 Hamani, Diori 196 Hitler, Adolf 233 Hobbes, Thomas 176 Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 196, 198, 203, 210, 213, 215, 219, 221222, 229 I Inyumba, Aloysia, 103 J Jammeh, Yahya, 201, 202, 208, 211 Jawara, Dauda, 196, 210 Jonathan, Goodluck, 312 Jonathan, Joseph Leabua, 210 K Kaberuka, Donald, 10 Kabila, Joseph, 198 Kabila, Laurent, 198, 309 Kagame, Paul, 89, 101

Kaunda, Kenneth, 196, 198, 210 Kazibwe, Speciosa Wandira, 90 Keita, Modibo, 283 Kenyatta, Jomo, 196, 198 Kerekou, Marthieu, 210 Kibaki, Mwai, 291 Ki-Moon, Ban, 116, 125, 269 Kony, Joseph, 266 Koulibaly, Mamadou, 217, 228 L Le Floch-Prigent, Loik, 226 Lewis, Stephen, 323, 337 Lissouba, Pascal, 224 Locke, John, 176 Lumumba, Patrice, 222, 317, 318 M M’ba, Germain, 225 M’ba, Leon, 215, 225 Maathai, Wangari, 269, 271 Mandela, Nelson, 89, 260 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 199, 208 Marx, Karl, 262 Mbeki, Thabo, 89, 326, 340 Mitterrand, Francois, 222, 229 Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe, 220, 225 Mobutu, Sese Seko (also Joseph), 181, 203, 210, 226, 309, 316, 319 Moi, Daniel arap, 210 Morin, Herve, 226 Mubarak, Hosni, 198, 210 Mugabe, Robert, 85, 114, 196, 198, 201, 202, 205, 210, 353-354, 360, 361 Muhammed, Murtala, 370, 371 Muluzi, Bakiti, 208 Museveni, Yoweri, 89, 199, 201, 204, 208, 210 Mwanawasa, Levy, 117 N Nansi, Juste Hermann, 122 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 283

Contemporary Issues in Africa's Development Nguema, Theodoro Obiang, 203, 210 Nkrumah, Kwame, 88, 196, 198, 222, 298, 302, 303, 307, 311, 315 Nnamani, Ken, 197 Nyerere, Julius, 88, 184, 196, 210, 283, 373 O Obama, Barack, 299 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 7, 8, 118, 197, 200, 202, 208, 211, 361, 370, 371, 372 Obote, Milton, 199, 201 Odinga, Raila, 208, 291 Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi , 112 Okotie-Eboh, F.S., 377 Olaniyan, Richard, x Olympio, Sylvanus, 215, 222-223 Ouattara, Alassane, 219, 264, 265, 291 Oueddeye, Goukouni, 198 P Pasha, Muhammad (also Mohammad) Ali, 368, 390 Pasha, Ismail, 369 Pasha, Muhammad Said, 368-369 Pasqua, Charles, 220 Pasqua, Pierre, 220 Paul, Jean, 266 Piot, Peter, 333 Ping, Lui, 352, 358 Pires, Pedro de Verona Rodriguez, 210 Pompidou, Georges, 220, 222, 227, 229 R Ratsiraka, Didier, 226 Ricupero, Rubens, 184 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 233 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 176 Ruskin, John, 35

397

S Salifou, Ousseini, 121 Sankara, Thomas, 222 Sanusi, Sanusi Lamido, 16, 19 Sankoh, Foday, 319 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 213, 220, 221, 225, 226 Sassou-Nguesso, Denis, 210, 213, 224 Sata, Michael, 352 Savimbi, Jonas, 319 Sedogo, Laurent, 119 Selassie, Haile, 109, 283, 284 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 196, 210 Sidibe, Michael, 334 Shagari, Shehu, 371-372, 391 Smith, Adam, 179 Soyinka, Wole, 197 Stevens, Siaka, 196, 198, 210 Stiglitz, Joseph, 20 T Tandja, Mammadou, 197, 199-200, 201, 202, 209, 211 Taylor, Charles, 199, 204, 318, 319 Tobias, Randall, 338 Tombalbaye, Francois, 215 Toure, Ahmed Sekou, 196, 199, 203, 210, 214, 226, 309 Trager, Lilian, x Traore, Moussa, 208, 210 Tsiranana, Philibert, 215, 226 Tsvangirai, Morgan, xii, 11, 21, 208 Tubman, William, 283 U Uwilingiyimana, Agathe, 90, 94 V van Zyl, Bennie, 114 Vasek, Karel, 232 Vautier, Rene, 214, 227 Verschave, Francois-Xavier, 215, 219, 228

398 W Wade, Abdoulaye, 198 Y Yameogo, Maurice, 215 Yar’Adua, Shehu Musa, 121 Yar’Adua, Umar Musa, 200, 357, 361

Name Index Youlou, Fulbert, 215 Z Zenawi, Asres Meles, 7, 20, 69, 89, 199, 211 Zongo, Norbert, 222 Zuma, Jacob, 114, 340