Contemporary East Asia and the Confucian Revival [1 ed.] 1443881031, 9781443881036

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
List of Tables
Acknowledgements
Editorial: The Confucian Revival and “Different Models of Modernity” • Jana S. Rošker
Foreword: Confucianized Rationality: Some Reflections on East Asian, Wisdom,and Science • Bart Dessein
Confucian Concepts, Ideas And Ideologies
1 Kangaku, kogaku, kokugaku, rangaku: Reinterpretations of Confucianism in the Nation Building Process in Japan • Luka Culiberg
2 Zhang Taiyan and “National Studies” • Hans Kuehner
3 Xu Fuguan’s Comparison of the Concept you in Zhuangzi’s and Kongzi’s Aesthetics • Téa Sernelj
4 Mou Zongsan’s Negation of the Moral Self: A New Dialectical Model? • Jana S. Rošker
Confucius and the World
5 Carving Out a Role for a Confucian China on the World Stage • Jyrki Kallio
6 Peace as Evenness? Reflections on the Peaceful Development Doctrine and Their Classical References • Helena Motoh
7 Confucius in Brazil: An Epistemological (and Historical) Problem • André Bueno
8 Confucian Ideologies in the Modern Japanese State Formation • Nataša Visočnik
Confucianism in the People’s Republic of China
9 Weaving Confucianism into the Official Party Discourse: From Hu Jinatao’s “Harmonious Society”, to Xi Jinping’s Communist junzi • Mugur Zlotea
10 In Search of Numbers and Substance: On a Current Confucian Revival in the PRC • Ralph Weber
11 Contending for the Truth: Confucianism in the Contemporary PRC • Dessein Bart
Book Review
12 Antigas leituras. Visões da china antiga • Barbara Pihler Ciglič
Contributors
Index

Citation preview

Contemporary East Asia and the Confucian Revival

Contemporary East Asia and the Confucian Revival Edited by

Jana S. Rošker and Nataša Visočnik

Contemporary East Asia and the Confucian Revival Edited by Jana S. Rošker and Nataša Visočnik Specialized proofreading by Maja Veselič This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Jana S. Rošker, Nataša Visočnik and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8103-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8103-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgements .................................................................................... xi Editorial .................................................................................................... xiii The Confucian Revival and “Different Models of Modernity” Jana S. Rošker Foreword ................................................................................................. xxv Confucianized Rationality: Some Reflections on East Asian, Wisdom, and Science Bart Dessein Confucian Concepts, Ideas And Ideologies Chapter One ................................................................................................. 3 Kangaku, kogaku, kokugaku, rangaku: Reinterpretations of Confucianism in the Nation Building Process in Japan Luka Culiberg Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 23 Zhang Taiyan and “National Studies” Hans Kuehner Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 43 Xu Fuguan’s Comparison of the Concept you in Zhuangzi’s and Kongzi’s Aesthetics Téa Sernelj Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 59 Mou Zongsan’s Negation of the Moral Self: A New Dialectical Model? Jana S. Rošker

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Confucius and the World Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 75 Carving Out a Role for a Confucian China on the World Stage Jyrki Kallio Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 99 Peace as Evenness? Reflections on the Peaceful Development Doctrine and Their Classical References Helena Motoh Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 113 Confucius in Brazil: An Epistemological (and Historical) Problem André Bueno Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 129 Confucian Ideologies in the Modern Japanese State Formation Nataša Visoþnik Confucianism in the People’s Republic of China Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 149 Weaving Confucianism into the Official Party Discourse: From Hu Jinatao’s “Harmonious Society”, to Xi Jinping’s Communist junzi Mugur Zlotea Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 171 In Search of Numbers and Substance: On a Current Confucian Revival in the PRC Ralph Weber Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 191 Contending for the Truth: Confucianism in the Contemporary PRC Dessein Bart Book Review Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 215 Antigas leituras. Visões da china antiga Barbara Pihler Cigliþ

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Contributors ............................................................................................. 223 Index ........................................................................................................ 225

LIST OF TABLES

Table 11-1: Philosophical concepts and their political arrangements…202

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the Taiwanese Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange and the National Slovene Research Agency (ARRS) for their generous support during the research, proof reading and editorial work on this book. We would also like to thank our colleagues at the Department of Asian Studies at the Faculty of Art, University of Ljubljana, who provided the insight, expertise and understanding which proved to be of great assistance in our work. Last, but not least, we wish to thank all the authors in the present anthology, for it would be impossible to complete this publication without their cooperation. Jana S. Rošker and Nataša Visoþnik

EDITORIAL THE CONFUCIAN REVIVAL AND “DIFFERENT MODELS OF MODERNITY” JANA S. ROŠKER

The Confucian revival is a current East Asian phenomenon that is defined as the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional East Asian thought and is aimed at elaborating the system of ideas and values capable of resolving the social and political problems of modern globalized societies. In order to create a model of modernization that would not be confused or simply equated with “Westernization”, theoreticians and ideologists who belong to this stream of thought attempted (and continue to do so) to revive “traditional Confucian” values and reconcile them with the demands of the current era (see Tu 2014). Western modernization theories established an intellectual tradition that has explained the relation between tradition and modernity in a very specific way that has remained predominant to the present date. In spite of their diversity, they share the idea that “traditional” and “modern” societies constitute two systems of interrelated variables. In their frequent reformulations of the contrast between tradition and modernity, transition was conceived as a process that causes the first to decline and the latter to rise (Bendix 1967, 307–8). Within this framework these theories have typically operated with a “before and after” model (ibid., 309) of the society under consideration. In this model “traditional” and “modern” social structures were distinguished by two sets of dichotomous attributes, and individual societies were classified as more or less “modern” according to the degree to which they exhibited one set of attributes rather than another. Hence, in this framework, “tradition” and “modernity” are widely used as polar opposites in the linear theory of social change. However, as Gusfield (1967, 351) clearly showed, the relations between tradition and modernity do not necessarily involve conflict, exclusiveness,

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or displacement. In other words, the modern does not necessarily weaken the traditional. Both, tradition and modernity, form the grounds for movements and ideologies in which bipolar oppositions are converted into aspirations. However, as Gusfield (1967, 351) pointed out, traditional forms may supply support for, as well as against, change. Thus, the idea of change in contemporary new nations and economically growing societies in Eastern Asia has been seen as one that involves a linear movement from traditional past towards highly modernized future. An important supposition in this bipolar model of change is that the existing institutions and values that form the “content” of tradition, are impediments to changes and have thus to be understood as obstacles to modernization (ibid.). Following these ideas, most Western modernization theories have also assumed that Confucianism would have to be abandoned if East Asia wanted to develop a dynamic modern society. Marx and other classical theorists of modernity claimed that traditional Chinese culture was impervious or even inimical to modernization. Max Weber’s famous thesis that the Protestant ethic was an essential factor in the rise and spread of modernization represents a contrast to the notion that has gradually emerged over the last two decades in East Asia, and which argues that societies based upon the Confucian ethics may, in many ways, be superior to the West in achieving industrialization, affluence and modernization (Rošker 2013, 22). Weber wrote extensively on Asia, especially China and India, and in his writings he concluded that Asian cultural and philosophical or religious traditions were ill-suited to modernization (Makeham 2003, 33). In order to examine whether such a Eurocentric view of modernity is still suitable, the present book is based upon the presumption, according to which modernization represents a complex process of social transitions that include both universal and culturally conditioned elements. By providing new insights into the culturally conditioned structure of Asian societies, the book aims to contribute to the improvement of political, economic and cultural relations between “Western” and East Asian countries. In the twenty-first century East Asian societies have changed the map of progress: the balance of economic––and even political––power is shifting from the Euro-American to the Asian region. This shift leads to numerous issues connected to the transformations of material and ideological paradigms that do not merely define the development of Asian societies, but also have a strong influence on international relations. The strategic solutions to these problems need to

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consider the broader perspectives within the context of particular cultural backgrounds. They are not limited to economic and ecological issues, for they also include political and social roles of ideologies and culturally conditioned values, thus representing the axial epistemological and axiological grounds on which the most characteristic and enduring institutions of these societies rest. In Eastern Asia, Confucianism undoubtedly represents one of these foundations. The so-called Confucian revival which saw the light of day at the break of the previous century and which is manifested in the philosophical stream of Modern Confucianism1 is one of the most significant elements within the new Asian modernization ideologies (Li 1996, 544). The representatives of this stream of thought were (and still are) generally convinced that the successful development of modern East Asian societies was primarily due to the specific modernization model, known as “Confucian capitalism” (e.g. Kahn 1979; Vogel 1979). This model is characterized by a strong state leadership with a well-developed administrative structure, a hierarchical social structure with a well-developed network of social relations, and an emphasis on education. It also stresses virtues such as diligence, reliability and persistence together with cooperation, loyalty and a strong sense of affiliation with one’s community or organization (ibid.). In order to acquire a more coherent understanding of the East Asian Confucian revival, its social functions in the modernization process and its theories, the present anthology clearly refutes the idea that it represents a monolithic theoretical formation. On the contrary, the multifarious contributions in this book include a wide range of theoretical discourses based on a tradition that is already very complex and heterogeneous. This crucial idea has been elaborated already in Bart Dessein’s foreword to this publication. In this essay, the role of the “modernized” (i.e. rationalised) Confucian system of thought has been positioned into the broader context of reflections that are linked to its relation to two aspects of philosophy––wisdom and science. Within this context, the development of the East Asian traditions is placed in opposition with the development of the European philosophical and scientific traditions. The author shows how and why our interpretations of these developments are thoroughly and necessarily linked to something we have to be aware of, namely our 1

In international Asian studies, this line of thought is often translated with a number of other names, ranging from Neo-Confucianism or Contemporary or Modern NeoConfucianism, to New Confucianism and Modern or Contemporary Confucianism.

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attitude towards the relation between ourselves and the other. He emphasises that these interpretations should be the result of a rational inquiry, argumentation and dialogue and points out that such approaches are necessarily imbued with self-doubt in the sense of a permanent questioning of the prevailing interpretations of one’s tradition. In order to provide a broader picture of the Confucian revival, the present anthology not only examines the main philosophical approaches, ideas and methods, but also explores its political, social and ideological backgrounds and its connections to the ideological foundations of East Asian modernity. The geopolitical aspect is equally important. Hence one needs to take into account the economic and historical context when analysing a socially relevant idea. The Confucian revival is no exception; therefore we need to begin our examination of this philosophical line by recognizing that the trans-nationalization of capital also led to the universalization of capitalist production, which has thus become separated from its specifically European historical origins. The central part of this book is divided into three sections, which include chapters connected to theories, methodologies and ideologies linked to Confucian teachings, chapters that elaborate on the relations between Confucianism and the global discourses, and, last but not least, chapters dealing with the role and position of Confucianism in the contemporary People’s Republic of China. The first section, entitled Confucian Concepts, Ideas and Ideologies, consists of four chapters. The first two, written by Luka Culiberg and Hans Kuehner respectively, deal with the role of Confucian paradigms within the framework of the so-called “National Studies” or “National Learning” (guoxue in Chinese and kokugaku in Japanese) in the constitutional process of nation states in China and Japan respectively. In order to evaluate their possible impact upon the prevailing contemporary policies and ideologies, they analyze the central state building elements of Confucianism and interpret them within historical Chinese and Japanese socio-political contexts. In his essay, Luka Culiberg introduces the role of the modified NeoConfucian axiology in the formation process of the new Japanese nationstate during the final years of the Tokugawa regime. He shows that this pre-modern Confucian discourse was a complex network of philosophical currents. However, although the new Meiji state, which was born from this transitional process, was a modern, industrial and capitalist society, which ideologically refuted traditional teachings, it actually remained inherently

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Confucian. However, this type of inherent, almost “invisible” Confucianism was much more monolithic and formally orthodox than the previously predominant status-based, but also more flexible, contextual and situational system. This new, informal, yet more rigid network of values was perfectly capable of meeting the demands of Japanese modernity in which nationalism became the prevailing ideological narrative of the social reality. The second chapter, written by Hans Kuehner, investigates the sinicized evolution of the central term of this modernized Confucianism, which is manifested in the notion of “National Studies” introduced from Japan to China at the break of the previous century––along with similar new terms denoting ideas such as “national essence”, “nation” or “citizen”. He investigates the so-called guoxue (“National Studies”) movement, which was (and still is) promoted as a revival of China’s intellectual heritage, focusing on the work of Zhang Taiyan (also known as Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936), who is commonly seen as one of the pioneers of this line of thought. He was an anti-Manchu activist who played an important role in the consolidation of the intellectual foundation of the modern Chinese state. In this sense, the early guoxue movement was a Chinese response to the crisis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Kuehner introduces the historical background and the conceptual development of this project, but points out that the guoxue fever which can be witnessed in present day China has not got a lot in common with Zhang’s original version of this line of thought. The author shows how and why the contemporary revival of guoxue evolved into a comprehensive political and cultural project, while its original academic aims were pushed into the background. The second part of this theoretical scope is devoted to the philosophical foundations of the Confucian revival. In this context, Téa Sernelj and Jana S. Rošker focus on two particular theoretical questions in the works of two different representatives of the so-called second generation of Taiwanese Modern Confucian theoreticians, namely Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan. These theoreticians saw the modernization process as a kind of world rationalization. In search of a new philosophical basis, they concentrated on issues connected to ontology which they came to know within the framework of Western ideas and philosophical systems. Generally they followed the premise according to which the questions of the innermost reality of the universe, the substance of being and the Absolute represent the very questions that determine the meaning of human life. As such, these questions are essential for the establishment

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of a new, modern society, as well as for the preservation of an integrated, un-alienated cultural and personal identity of individuals in China. Within this context, Téa Sernelj examines the intellectual influence of Xu Fuguan (1902/1903–1982), an excellent essay writer, who also excelled with his broad knowledge on the development of ancient Chinese society, especially as concerns its political, spiritual, and cultural characteristics. Once she introduces the central concepts of his philosophy (youhuan yishi, concerned consciousness and tiren, bodily recognition), she focuses on their connections to his interpretation of the notion of you (wandering at ease) which can be found in Daoist (Zhuangzi), as well as Confucian (Kongzi) discourses. Through this analysis the author points out that Xu tried to establish a philosophical ground for a specific East Asian modernization. He ascertained that although Western modernism and postmodernism strived to liberalize the individual’s spirit, traditional philosophy and its aesthetic view of life and creativity provided a far more profound and sophisticated background for such freedom. Since he saw art as one of the fundamental pillars of society, he considered such aesthetic views to be more beneficial for the establishment of a harmonious modern society than creativity which is predominantly based upon the individual’s free will. In her contribution, Jana S. Rošker critically illuminates the new dialectical model proposed by Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), an innovative theoretician and one of the most important Confucian philosophers between 1980 and the time of his death. In Modern Confucian discourses the establishment of a free and autonomous subject seemed to represent a crucial precondition for modernization. Nevertheless, as Mou believed that Chinese modernization cannot be equated with Westernization, he wanted to establish a specifically Chinese form of an autonomous subject. In order to achieve this goal he proceeded from a dialectical self-negation of the traditional Confucian concept of moral self. Through a critical analysis of this model, the author points out its inconsistencies and proposes a methodological improvement which could be achieved by incorporating the classical Chinese principle of correlativity or complementarity, which could lead to a truly dynamic model, possibly surpassing the limitations of classical European dialectics. While the chapters in the first part are mainly linked to issues regarding the specific problems in East Asian modernization, the second part attempts to elaborate on its broader geopolitical context. Bearing in mind East Asia’s important role in this world, the book also aims to expose the function of its cultural heritages for the contemporary world.

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For, as Allan T. Wood (2010, 287) wrote, we are currently living in the dawn of a new world of challenges in human experience. In the past, whatever we did––good or bad, right or wrong––was confined within relatively narrow geographic limits. We could slaughter each other and poison our environment on a local scale without fear of global consequences. Because of the prodigious growth of our military and industrial technology, however, those days are rapidly coming to an end. Whether one talks about climate change, atmospheric pollution, nuclear proliferation, disease, crime, terrorism, biodiversity, energy and water shortages, poverty, human trafficking, or genetic manipulation, the problems we face as a human family cannot be addressed effectively within the borders of individual nations. The old atomistic, mechanistic, and analytic worldview, which portrayed the world in strictly nominalist terms as consisting of parts with few or no intrinsic connections to each other and which dominated modern life ever since the Scientific Revolution is no longer adequate. (ibid.)

Now the problems are systemic, intercultural, interdependent, interdisciplinary, and interconnected. Hence, the second part, entitled Confucius and the World explores the possibilities (and failures) of a “cosmopolitan” Confucianism, and its role on the global scale. This part also consists of four contributions, each of which sheds light upon a different aspect of the main topic. The first two contributions were written by Jyrki Kallio and Helena Motoh; the two authors address the different applications and (mis)uses of classical Confucian thought within the framework of the new liberal ideologies that have been constructed in contemporary China in order to fill up the prevailing “vacuum of values” in this complex society and enable it to assume its role within the network of contemporary international relations. The chapters investigate the modern reshaping of various central Confucian concepts such as he (harmony), ping (peace, balance), or tianxia (the world, all under heaven) from different angles; they analyze their original meanings and connotations and illuminate their semantic modifications which serve the ideological demands of the contemporary era in which China attempts to fulfil its role as one of the global superpowers. André Buenos’ essay also follows the presumption of the profound difference between the previously prevailing Marxist discourse and the contemporary social reality in the PR China. In order to paradigmatically illuminate the multifarious challenges of the relations between

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contemporary China and the world, the author introduces the historical development and crucial epistemological issues in the establishment and perception of Confucian studies in one of the most important Latin American countries, Brazil. He exposes several problems that are typical for the establishment of the new Sinologies in regions that have hitherto not been confronted with the urge to investigate China. As Confucius and the Confucian revival in Brazil remain reduced exclusively to the religious sphere, and the literary focus of the new Brazilian sinologists is restricted merely to the Annalects, they have not yet been able to create a more complete academic environment, in which it would be possible to philosophically analyze Confucianism. Similarly, there is no interest in translating other Confucian works, which indicates a serious limitation in the perspective. Due to this, the few Brazilian experts who are interested in China, generally prefer to study the current political model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Similar to numerous other new “China experts”, Brazilian intellectuals have a strong tendency to believe that it is possible to understand China without studying its historical past, which is, according to the author, a serious mistake. On the other hand, Nataša Visoþnik’s chapter investigates the relation between the Confucian thought heritage and the formation of Modern Japan. The author focuses on the period of transition between the textual and archaeological approach, at which she believes that the latter is of vital importance for the study of Japanese origins. The sense of national identity which started to appear during the Tokugawa era and that fully established itself in the Meiji period (1868–1912), was hence no longer limited to the elite. It was adopted by the leading ideologists and begun to function as the foundation stone for the modern national state. In this context, the author shows how the idea of the “family state” (kazoku kokka) came to life, and points out that this idea was based on the traditional concept of familism which was buttressed by Confucian ethics. In the period of modern state formation, the clan based family system that originally represented the foundation of social production and reproduction, was expanded to the nation as a whole. In this system, the imperial family was considered as the model for all Japanese families. The author concludes that in this way, the Japanese Confucian traditions of ancestor worship and the subordination of branch families to the main clan were integrated in order to achieve loyalty on a national scale. The last part of the book deals with Confucianism in the People’s Republic of China. This part is significant not only because Confucianism originated in China, but rather because, contrary to the predictions of its

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demise and the dismissals of its relevance to contemporary China, it is evident that––at least as an ideology––it still holds high socio-political importance. With the rapid development of the liberal economic policy and the openness that accompanied it, the Confucian revival also spread in the P.R. China over the last two decades. Hence, the third group of essays is devoted to the development of the Confucian legacy and the new Confucian ideologies in contemporary China. The chapters collected in this part mainly try to shed light upon the issues dealing with the reasons and consequences of the fact that these new ideologies were necessary in order to compensate for the loss of the normative authority of the Chinese Communist party, for from the mid-1980s onwards, these ideologies were utilized in order to fill the so-called “vacuum of values”, a function that had previously been entrusted to the orthodox socialist and communist value systems. In the first chapter within this part, Mugur Zlotea explores the Confucian revival in the context of political and ideological discourses of the leading Communist party. By analyzing the current Chinese political discourse, the chapter tries to identify to what extent had the Confucian thought permeated the discourse of legitimization and how is it used by the party. It focuses on the relation between Confucianism and Marxism in the post 2012 period, i.e. after the nomination of Xi Jinping as the General Secretary of CCP’s Central Committee. Through these analyses, the author identifies the new rhetoric devices that the CCP employs in an attempt to present itself to the Chinese citizens as the legitimate ruler of China. Due to the fact that the more “traditional” means of legitimization are no longer sufficient in ensuring the country’s stability, the Chinese leaders had to come up with a new type of discourse that, besides the more “traditional” legitimising elements, appealed to traditional culture more than ever before. A critical approach to traditional culture and its integration into the “advanced socialist culture” is thus crucial to the existence of the Chinese Communist party. In the conclusion the author shows that even though classical Confucian concepts are still being used merely as ideological elements, which serve as propaganda tools for the party’s legitimization, the so-called “Confucianization of the party” might become reality in the long run. In the second chapter within this part, Ralph Weber critically explores the issue of the true “significance” of the Confucian revival in present-day China. He draws attention to the currently rather common tendencies of overemphasizing the political and social importance of this revival, since they can lead to severe misunderstandings of China’s past and present. The

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author also points out that the revival of “substantial Confucianism”, i.e. Confucianism of a critical size which has a genuine impact on society and/or on the daily Chinese politics, turned out to be an imaginative instance, an invention of Confucian scholars and various ideologists. He draws attention to the fact that the so-called Confucian revival is––when liberated from its political and economic dimensions––in fact a general revival of tradition and religion as such. In addition, he shows that the nowadays predominant tendencies to misuse Chinese intellectual tradition (which can certainly not be reduced to Confucianism as such) can be politically dangerous, since they can serve as tools for achieving certain agendas linked to vested interests and utilitarian power politics. In the final chapter, Bart Dessein argues that (against the background of faltering Marxism-Leninism) socialist and Confucian values are increasingly contending for the position of the leading genuine ideal (i.e. the “Truth”) in the prevailing rhetoric of the Chinese Communist party. In his view, the gradually disappearing socialist system that was once supposed to replace Confucian values forever has now created the ideological context that allows the Chinese Communist party to promote randomly selected “useful” Confucian values which are seen as having the ability to enhance the unified cohesion of the modern Chinese nation-state. The author claims that following the decline of the previously omnipresent communist ideology and with the emergence of its ideological contest between remaining Confucian nostalgia, the widespread hopes for a fair society and the rising longing for mythological “golden times”, there is now space for a deliberate (and often false) use of past symbols that are presented as illustrations of the “Chinese revival”. Despite their heterogeneous variety, the common thread that links the chapters in the anthology in front of you is the presumption that in order to understand the relation between the Confucian heritage from the past and the current Confucian revival, we need to distinguish between original or classical Confucian thought and its ideological implications. This distinction is of utmost importance, as it indicates the type of differentiations that must be made in order to acquire a proper understanding of modern contemporary Confucianism and its theories and ideologies, while, as already pointed out, refuting the idea that it represents a monolithic theoretical formation. On the contrary, it includes a wide range of theoretical discourses based on a complex and heterogeneous tradition. The authors of the book are Western experts in East Asian studies. Hence, our task is to build bridges between East Asian and Euro-American

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regions. This task is not rooted merely in the recognition of a “different theoretical model”, but in the relativization of the value systems and perception structures. What does this mean? It does certainly not mean that all values are equally positive, necessary or applicable. The relativization of the value systems simply means that we distance ourselves from the notion of absolute values. Since the dominant discourses in Western philosophical theory are based on the concept of truth, the awareness that there are very few objective, universally valid values, is of utmost importance for those Western scholars who deal with Confucian thought. While the value-systems that shape modern Western societies are based upon concepts such as individualism and free will, a strong sense of familism and belonging to community prevailed (and, to a certain extent, still does) in East Asian societies. Such concepts and identification patterns represent the foundations of different value system(s), which should thus be seen as being relative. Thus, in spite of the fact that the so-called Confucian revival has often been (mis)used for various political and ideological purposes, the present anthology attempts to follow the notion that the so-called “vacuum of values” is responsible for the alienation of modern post-capitalist societies in the global world and, on this ground, raise the question as to whether this East Asian model is capable of generating a non-individualistic version of modernity. Several analyzes, contained in particular chapters, point in this direction, thus indicating that the purported relation between modernity and individualism, which international modernization theories have always viewed as “inevitable” or “intrinsic”, might, in fact, be little more than an outcome of the Western historical paradigms. Hence, the book aims to show that learning from Confucius can be more than merely a mirror that reflects the past experience to those of us who live in the present. Irrespective of their inherent differences, the essays collected in this book clearly show that we can establish true dialogues and create a common, truly interconnected, yet pluralistic world only by accepting the fact that all of us dwell in different cultural universes.

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Bibliography Bendix, Reinhard. 1967. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 9 (3) (April): 292–346. Gusfield, Joseph R. 1967. “Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change.” American Journal of Sociology 72 (4) (January): 351–62. Kahn, Hermann. 1979. World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond. Boulder: Westview Press. Li, Jinquan ᵾ䥖‫ޘ‬, ed. 1996. Xiandai xin rujia xua’an ⨮ԓᯠ݂ᇦᆨṸ. Vol. 3. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she. Makeham, John, ed. 2003. New Confucianism. A Critical Examination. New York: Palgrave Maximilians. Rošker, Jana S. 2013. Subjektova nova oblaþila – idejne osnove modernizacije v delih druge generacije modernega konfucijanstva, (Razprave FF). Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete. Tu, Weiming. 2014. “Confucianism.” In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed March 13, 2014. http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/132104/Confucianism/25455/The-historical-context#ref1008344. Vogel, Ezra F. 1961. “The Democratization of Family Relations in Japanese Urban Society.” Asian Survey 1 (4): 18–24. Wood, Alan T. 2010. “Fire, Water, Earth and Sky: Global Systems History and the Human Prospect.” The Journal of The Historical Society 10 (3) (September): 287–318.

FOREWORD CONFUCIANIZED RATIONALITY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON EAST ASIA, WISDOM, AND SCIENCE1 BART DESSEIN

Introduction With the intriguing question “Is it a historic accident that humanity has reached its present state, characterized on the one hand by powers that were up to this moment unexpected, and on the other hand menaced by the very consequences of these powers?”, Johannes Bronkhorst (2001, 35) touched upon the famous period of the “Achsenzeit”––as coined by Karl Jaspers in 1949, and on the question of the origin of the Western philosophical and scientific tradition. The “historic accident” he referred to, addresses the following questions: (1) What are the necessary conditions for a rational inquiry to develop? (2) Is rational inquiry a necessary condition for mental activity to be called “philosophy”? (3) Has rational inquiry created modern sciences charged with––at this moment–– still unexpected possibilities? (4) Will this same rational inquiry be the instrument that will rationalize––that is, philosophize––the consequences of the age of global science––itself the result of this rational inquiry, so as to enable contemporary man to define himself in the very tradition that created the feeling of “Unbehagen” to start with, and that he may be trying to overcome? In the continuation, some reflections on these issues are made. In doing so, the development of the East Asian traditions will be

1

This paper is a modified version of my keynote speech “Engaging China and the World”, delivered at the inaugural session of the establishment of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy, Ljubljana, October 3, 2014.

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contrasted with the development of the European philosophical and scientific traditions.

The Origin of Traditions of Rational Inquiry The early Greek Pyrrhonists, founded in the first century BCE, are known for their refusal to give judgments about anything that lies beyond direct perception. In their opinion such judgments could neither be affirmed nor denied, and therefore judgment was to be suspended. Any judgment on the non-evident would be merely a misuse of language in an attempt to represent in words what cannot be represented (see Kuzminski 2008, 134). In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, George Berkeley, the eighteenth century Anglo-Irish Bishop of Cloyne, maintained that “esse” was equal to “percipi” (Berkeley 1964, 42). With this, he denied the difference between reality (esse) and appearance (percipi), a claim that renders all statements as regards what could be beyond the realm of appearance futile. These two examples may suffice to illustrate that the development of a tradition of rational inquiry is not self-evident. For a tradition of rational inquiry to develop, thinkers have to accept the legitimacy of questions and critique, even if these are directed against the convictions that are sanctioned by intuition, tradition, or revealed truth. Rather than accepting and supporting the “revealed truth”––a typical “theological attitude”––rational inquiry is aimed at “revealing the truth” (see Bronkhorst 2001, 34). Such “rational investigation” is an instrument of human activity in the search of wisdom (sophia). Of course, belonging to a tradition of rational investigation does not make people cleverer. It is––it has to be stressed––merely a difference in “attitude”, a different way of dealing with the world. Because rational inquiry goes beyond intuition, tradition, or revealed truth, the “systems of rational thinking” have the possibility to cross the borders of the biotope in which they developed. This is important with respect to the following: when philosophy is characterized by rational inquiry, and when rational inquiry is the prerequisite for the development of a scientific tradition, philosophy becomes a scientific discipline. The question how many philosophical traditions developed in the history of mankind as a “rational inquiry” is therefore also the question how many scientific traditions developed––in regards to our contemporary Unbehagen. Scholarly opinion differs on this question (see Dessein 2001, 97). Frits Staal (1993, 16) differentiated between three scientific traditions: the West-Eurasian tradition which includes the European and Islamic

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scientific traditions, with the Greek tradition that is indebted to the Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites and Phoenicians (see also Needham 1974, 55), the Indian tradition, and the Chinese tradition. Of these three traditions, according to Staal (1989, 308), the Indian and the Greek tradition are characterized by the accentuation of formal logic, a characteristic that would not apply to the Chinese tradition. Taking cultural (philosophical) borrowings in genuine developments into account, some scholars claimed that Greek philosophy is indebted to Indian philosophy (see Garbe 1987, 36–39; Conger 1952, 103, 105, 107, 109– 11). Richard Garbe (1987, 39–46), ascribes a definite Indian influence on Pythagoras (sixth century BCE), an influence that came through Persia.2 Jean Przyluski (1932, 286) laid emphasis on the Iranian borrowings in both the Greek and the Indian tradition. This would thus reduce the number of traditions of rational inquiry to merely the Indo-Iranian-Greek tradition. As we will discuss in the continuation, the Indian––i.e. Buddhist––tradition has been of major importance also for China and, by consequence, for the entire East Asia (see Zürcher 1972; Ch’en 1973; Frankenhauser 1996; Harbsmeier 1998). In a discussion on the origins of philosophical traditions, Christoph Harbsmeier (1998, 261) argued that rationality and argumentation “arise when a thinker seriously contemplates the pervasiveness of the possibility that he may be wrong, that he needs reasons and arguments to support the validity of his views”. This makes the question as regards the rise of “philosophy” a contextual one: when were the circumstances such that the “philosophers” were confronted with the possible fallibility of (their) traditional concepts, and / or with the need to convince others of the correctness of their views.3 In this respect Jana Rošker (2008, 2–3) has drawn attention to the striking similarity between the following statements by Socrates, Laozi and Zhuangzi: While Socrates stated: “I neither know nor think that I know”,4 hereby acknowledging, as he states, “the total depth of his ignorance while at the same time denying a priori the possibility of attaining any kind of ‘real’ recognition”, Laozi, in chapter 71, stated: ⸕н⸕к To know that you do not know is the best (Ershi’er zi 1988, 8b).

2

For Persia see also Conger (1952, 124). For the study of “context” see Scharfstein (1989). 4 The Apology of Socrates in Plato (2001, 7). 3

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while Zhuangzi was of the opinion that: ⸕→ަᡰн⸕㠣⸓ One who knows to stop at where he does not know has attained perfection (Ershi’er zi 1988, 18b).

It thus appears that Western and Chinese thinkers of the so-called Achsenzeit were concerned with questions related to the theory of knowledge. “Similar” conducive conditions for the development of “rational inquiry” are therefore likely to have existed in both the Western and Chinese cultural spheres5 (see also Dessein 2001, 98–103). Aristotle (384–322 BCE) defined “Sophia” as “theoria”. The concept of “theoretical knowledge” was hereby opposed to “practical knowledge”, i.e., knowledge relating to human (social) behaviour. Aristotle favoured theoretical knowledge, for theoretical knowledge is the most useful type of knowledge for practical aims, as this kind of knowledge requires an absolute abstraction of the practical aim (see Bowra 1958, 86). Greek “Sophia” thus finds its aim “in” the world. In Platonean (428–348 BCE) and Aristotelian philosophy, wisdom deals with the practical lives of humans in society6 (see Dessein 2001, 101–2). While discussing the Greek case, Geoffrey Lloyd (1979, 255) remarked that one may presume that in situations in which citizens can openly debate the way in which the state is to be governed, there are less inhibitions––at least within some circles of society––to defy the rooted assumptions and beliefs about natural phenomena, gods or the origin or order of things, and he continues that Greek antiquity was not only characterized by exceptional intellectual developments, but also by a unique political situation and that––it is important to note––these two appear to be connected7 (Lloyd 1979, 258). China witnessed major political developments at the beginning of the sixth century BCE. Without wanting to overstress the “institutional” aspect of the so-called Jixia (lit. near the Ji [Gate of the Capital of the Qi state]) Academy, founded by Duke Huan, ruler of the feudal state of Qi, in approximately 360 BCE,8 it is important to note that Duke Huan is known 5

On the notion of “similarity” see Scharfstein (1978, 28 ff). This contradicts Mou Zongsan’s (1963, 15) claim that Greek philosophy started as a concern for nature and not with the arrangement of human life. 7 The emphasis is mine (B.D.). 8 Lloyd and Sivin (2002, 30–35) remarked that modern philosophy historians have wishfully invented a Jixia Academy that would resemble a meeting place for intellectuals, comparable to a contemporary research center. However, they claim 6

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for having invited a variety of scholars––Confucian, Daoist and other––to his court to advise him on political matters. Similar as in ancient Greece, in China the circumstances that were essential for the development of a tradition of rational inquiry––i.e. free discussion that is not inhibited by all sorts of questions, even in domains that might infringe on other sources of authority––appear to have been present. However, Chinese thinkers from the “One Hundred Philosophical Schools” period differed from their Greek counterparts in the moral values with which their quest was laden.9 Although the political circumstances in Warring States China may have been similar to those in ancient Greece, the Chinese “attitude” was different. No matter how different in their approach to the contemporary situation the different Chinese “philosophies” that developed in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE were, they also shared the characteristic that they were oriented towards the past, rather than towards the future: Chinese “philosophers” primarily aimed to reconstruct a glorified historical period, predating the political and social turmoil of their time (Bauer 2006, 37). This determination explains why it was the sagely origin rather than the authority of demonstration that determined the statement’s authority (see Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 193). Various scholars have repeatedly claimed that the unification of the empire in the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) and the victory of Confucianism in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) had a devastating impact on the development of “rational inquiry” as defined here (see Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 27). In the Confucian Han dynasty, the development of philosophy in different directions that existed as a result of the numerous feudal states, each with their own ruler and his particular need for advice, came to a halt. Scholarship became highly institutionalized and bureaucratized, and the philosophical profession was organized in “schools” (jia ᇦ) of thought. Belonging to a “school of thought” is essentially a matter of transmitting knowledge. On this, the third century BCE Lüshi chunqiu ੲ∿᱕⿻ (Spring and Autumn of the Lü Clan) informs us as follows:

that the only evidence that could lead one to perceive that the Jixia Academy was such a center, is the title “Senior Grand Master”, a honorary title with no institutional status attached to it. For the interpretation of the Jixia Academy as a center of learning: see Makeham (1994). See also Sivin (1995, Chapter 4); Lee (2000, 44–46). 9 For more on this see Lloyd and Sivin (2002, 2). On the Chinese concept “school” see further.

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Foreword ࠑᆨᗵउ䙢ᾝᗳࡷ❑⠏⯮䄧䃖 (…) 㿰備᜹୿ᴨ᜿丶㙣ⴞн䘶ᘇ䘰ᙍ ឞ≲ᡰ䄲 In studying, one has to progress, so that there is no blindness in the mind. Recite (the texts) carefully. (...) Observe whether (the teacher) is happy, and (if so) ask him the meaning of the texts. Make your ears and eyes obedient, and do not contradict his intention. Retreat from him, and think about what he has said. (Ershi’er zi 1988, 640a)

That (1) transmitting knowledge was seen as a recitation of texts, and (2) was aimed at accepting the teacher’s interpretation by the disciple, is, of course, in line with the just mentioned authority attributed to the words of the wise sages of antiquity (see Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 46). In China, books developed as texts accepted by and commented upon by a particular “school” in accordance with that school’s interpretation of the words of old sages10 (see Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 73) and membership in the “school”, were the prerequisites to gaining knowledge and understanding this interpretation. Angus Graham (1989, 75) summarized this historical development as follows: In China rationality develops with the controversies of the schools, and dwindles as they fade after 200 BCE (…) During the fourth century BCE we meet for the first time thinkers who are fascinated by the mechanics of argumentation, delight in paradoxes, astonish their audiences by “making the inadmissible admissible”. When during the Han the philosophers were classed in the Six Schools these, and others with more practical interests in naming came to be known retrospectively as the School of Names. Earlier they were known simply as pien che “those who argue out”, sometimes translated “Dialecticians”. Confucians, Taoists and Legalists alike scorn them for wasting their time on abstractions such as “the similar and the different”, “the hard and white”, “the limitless” and “the dimensionless”.

Chinese philosophy is thus not characterized as a “search for truth”, (Bauer 2006, 17) as the truth of the words from antiquity stands beyond any doubt. Instead, Chinese philosophy is aimed at engaging with the world, the good order of which is dictated by the past, and consists in 10 Cheng (1997, 318, note 4): “As regards the notion of ‘school’ in Chinese antiquity”, Nathan Sivin (1992, 27) remarks that, “contrary to the Greek notion of schools that are formed of orators and polemicists in a public place, the notion rather corresponds to bibliographic categories than it corresponds to groups of people. In China, schools mutually differed with respect to which corpus of written texts they preserved and transmitted in a line of transmission that highly resembled an affiliation (whence the word jia which means ‘clan’)”.

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bringing a specific and transmitted interpretation of the words from the past into practice.11 In China, this orientation towards the glorified past and the trust in the “revealed truth” resulted in a poorly developed art of formal proof, while the rigid rationalism that demanded formal proof in formal contexts remained a marginal phenomenon (Harbsmeier 1998, 265; see also Bauer 2006, 17). As East Asia was influenced by Chinese Confucian culture this peculiarity shaped the intellectual and scientific traditions of this part of the world. Korean and Japanese institutions were profoundly influenced by the Chinese Confucian canon, and philosophy predominantly focused on the “practical” world (see Sansom 1978, 113– 14; Romberg 2003, 527–30).

The Buddho-Confucian Encounter That “philosophy” is about perceptions of the world and the concomitant ways of “engaging with the world” becomes obvious when different philosophical and scientific “worlds” meet. In the region of Magadha where the historical Buddha lived, the Jainas (and sometimes also the ƖjƯvakas) were important religious competitors to the Buddhists.12 This implies that the early Buddhists had to convince their opponents of their truth––one is not born a Buddhist. The territorial expansion during the AĞokan period not only added the Brahmans as major opponents of the Buddhists, (see Bronkhorst 2011, 8–11) but also enhanced the possibilities for adherents of all beliefs and faiths to freely travel the country (see Bronkhorst 2001, 2–4). It was during this period that Buddhists ventured to Sri Lanka and the region of GandhƗra. The region of GandhƗra became especially important for the development of the Buddhist scholastic tradition. The famous Milindapañha (Questions of King Milinda), the recording of an alleged debate between the Greek king Milinda / 11

In the words of Anne Cheng (1997, 34): “Rather than a ‘knowing what’ (that is, a propositional knowledge that would have the truth as ideal content), knowledge conceived as that which tends towards action without already being action, is above all a ‘knowing how’: how to make distinctions in order to direct one’s life and change social and cosmic place for the better. Not a knowledge that intelectually apprehends the meaning of a proposition is meant, but a knowledge that integrates the factuality of a thing or of a situation”. 12 For some reflections on the Buddhist-Jain encounter see Bronkhorst (2011, 130– 42). For the different religious groups that were active at the same time as the Buddha see Hirakawa (1990, 16–18).

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Menandros and the Buddhist monk NƗgasena, is an important witness of the confrontation between Buddhists and the members of the Hellenistic tradition that flourished in Central Asia around 185 BCE.13 It is highly probable that the encounter with the members of the Greek rational tradition inspired the Buddhists of GandhƗra to systematize the word of Buddha into a sound philosophical system. Creating their own particular system was most likely seen as the only way to defend their faith against the well-developed Greek tradition of rational debate. But, once more, the Chinese case was different. The extent of the impact the Confucian orthodoxy, although not a “theology” in the strict sense, had on the development of Chinese “philosophy” is evident from the Buddho-Chinese encounter. GandhƗran Buddhism that reached China at the beginning of the Common Era eventually became “Confucianized”, and the Buddhist rational inquiry as an independent tradition failed to survive the ninth century. Hubert Seiwert (1994, 532) described the ensuing situation as follows: Elite culture in pre-modern China did not only consist of Confucians, but also of Buddhists and Daoists. Orthodoxy, that is, elements that maintained social cohesion of the Chinese world view did not exclusively belong to one of these three traditions, but were shared by all of them––in any case in so far as they had become integrated in elite culture. (…) The ideological homogeneity of the world view of the elites was thus that they even were not aware of its limits (the emphasis is mine B.D.).

In Japan, Buddhism primarily focused on the Diesseits (Romberg 2003, 529).

The Chinese Encounter with the West One could argue that once the Greek tradition had been interrupted by the fundamental shift brought forth by Augustinus (354–430), a return to 13

In its Chinese rendering, this work belongs to the SarvƗstivƗda school of Buddhism and most likely originates from the beginning of the Common Era (see Willemen, Dessein and Cox 1998, 104–5). However, it should be remarked that no work of the Greek literary and philosophical tradition, although referring to the Indian tradition, refers to ‘Buddhists’ in direct terms. Personal communication with Baudoin Decharneux on 29 January 2015. Beckwith (2012, 24) remarked that “it is highly improbable that the Greeks and the early Buddhists had no influence at all on each other”.

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“antiquity” set in the middle of the fifteenth century. The shift from scholastic thought to Humanism and the Renaissance challenged the Augustinian view and paved the way for the thinking characteristic of the Enlightenment period, with a renewed emphasis on the physical and sensual world.14 One important consequence of this was that man was–– once again––seen as a creative actor in history. Personal freedom was understood as a universal value and a necessary prerequisite for man to act creatively (see Casirer 1927, 46). The age of European colonialism came along with the combined transfigurations of the Renaissance and the scientific revolution. In its confrontation with Europe, a new phase of “engaging the world” emerged amongst East Asian thinkers. The term “tetsugaku”, a translation of “philo-sophia”––love for wisdom––that Nishi Amane, an important figure of Japan’s Meiji restoration during which Japan’s shed off its Confucian past as a reaction to the nineteenth century new world order (see Cheng 2007, 162), used for the first time in 1784, was used in its Chinese rendering “zhexue” ଢᆨ for the first time by Huang Zunxian 哳䚥ᇚ (1848–1905) in 1897 in an account of the creation of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1877. This university comprised of three faculties: law, physics, and literature which included a philosophy department. It is more than noteworthy that the study of Buddhism was promoted in this department of philosophy, and that a synthesis between Buddha, Confucius, Socrates and Immanuel Kant was envisaged (Cheng 2007, 162–63). In 1900, the Tokyo based Endo Ryukichi (1874–1946) published a “history of Chinese philosophy” under the title Shina tetsugaku shi. Inspired by western philosophical history, the work divided the history of Chinese philosophy into three periods: the ancient period up to the third century BCE, the medieval period of Han to Tang, and the modern period of the Song, Yuan and Ming. The overview ended with Wang Yangming ⦻䲭᰾ (1472–1529) who was immensely influential in Japan (Cheng 2007, 165). In China, the study of Western philosophy and the reinterpretation of the Chinese tradition became instruments that were used to engage with the new nineteenth and early twentieth century world order. In China’s epoch of “Mister Democracy” and “Mister Science” (can we detect an appreciation for the Greeks here?), Wang Guowei ⦻഻㏝ (1877–1927), in his Zhexue bianhuo ଢᆨ䗟ᜁ (Philosophical Clarifications) from 1903, 14

For reflections on the relation between the physical and the divine in this early period of “scientific thinking” see Göller and Mittag (2008, 38).

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advocated “a profound comprehension of Western philosophy, with the aim to reorganize our Chinese philosophy” (Cheng 2007, 164). In other words, this was an appeal to no longer interpret Chinese philosophy as “wisdom”, but as “science”. In the “New Citizen” journal dated to 1903, Liang Qichao ằஏ䎵 (1873–1929) published an article entitled “The thinking of Kant, the greatest modern philosopher”, in which he qualified the thinking of Kant as “almost Buddhist”, equipped with epistemology, logic and concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, and with textual sources in Indo-European languages. With his claim that Buddhism was the only “oriental” tradition that deserved the label “philosophy”, Liang Qichao acknowledged the previously mentioned premature death of Buddhist logic in China on one hand, while on the other, he recognized that China possessed the fundaments for a “philosophy” (Cheng 2007, 164). Feng Youlan 俞৻㱝 (1895–1990), who studied under the American pragmatist John Dewey at Columbia University, published his monumental Zhongguo zhexue shi ѝ഻ଢᆨਢ in Shanghai between 1931 and 1934. Similar to the work of Endo Ryukichi, the first volume discusses the period up to the Han period, while the second volume covers the history of Chinese philosophy up to the end of the Qing period. The following statement made by Feng Youlan (1953b, 1–5) in his introduction to the second volume is illustrative of the intellectual climate of the time: Historians of Western philosophy usually divide their subject chronologically into the three periods of ancient, medieval, and modern. This is no mere arbitrary division, for the philosophies of these three periods have, in fact, each their own individual spirit and character. Chinese philosophy, similarly, if considered purely from the point of view of time, may be divided into the same three periods. (…) From another point of view, nevertheless, it may be said that China has actually had only an ancient and a medieval philosophy, but still lacks a modern one. (…) China, until very recent times, regardless of how we view it, has remained essentially medieval, with the result that in many respects it has failed to keep pace with the West. A modern age, indeed, has been lacking in Chinese history, and philosophy is but one particular aspect of this general situation.

However, influenced by Dewey’s pragmatism, he also stands up for the peculiarities of the Chinese tradition. In the introduction to the first volume of his history he states the following:

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Logic is a requirement for dialectic discussion, and hence since most schools of Chinese philosophy have not striven greatly to establish arguments to support their doctrines, there have been few men, aside from those of the School of Names,15 who have been interested in examining the processes and methods of thinking; and this school, unfortunately, had but a fleeting existence. Hence logic, like epistemology, has failed to be developed in China. (…) Is it true that Chinese philosophy lacks system? As far as the presentation of ideas is concerned, it is certainly true that there are comparatively few Chinese philosophical works that display unity and orderly sequence; therefore it is commonly said that Chinese philosophy lacks system. Nevertheless, what is called system may be divided into two categories, the formal and the real, which have no necessary connection with one another. It may be admitted that Chinese philosophy lacks formal system, but if one were to say that it therefore lacks any real system, meaning that there is no organic unity of ideas to be found in Chinese philosophy, it would be equivalent to saying that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy, and that China has no philosophy. (…) According to what has just been said, in order to be philosophy, philosophy must have a real system, and although Chinese philosophy, formally speaking, is less systematic than Western philosophy, it has just as much system as western philosophy in its actual content. This being so, the important duty of the historian of philosophy is to find the underlying real system within a philosophy that lacks a formal system (Fung 1953a, I, 3– 4).

Philosophy as Wisdom and Philosophy as Science This pragmatism resurfaced in the twenty-first century in which the world order was––once again––being reshaped with a profoundness that may be very similar to what happened in China during the Warring States period. China’s new ‘engagement with the new world’ can, for instance be seen in the thinking of Li Zehou ᵾ⌭৊ who, in opposition to the strict “philosophical” approach, advocates a historic and anthropological approach to Confucianism (see Thoraval 2007, 120–21). This strand of thought does not merely have a diachronic dimension, but also a synchronic one, as it is directed against the contemporary Confucian movement of those Chinese thinkers who have, in the post 1949 period, lived in exile, and who, according to Li Zehou and his followers, ignore the peculiarity of the mainland historical experience. In 1999 Wang Bo,

15

That is the bianzhe that Angus Graham also refers to.

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professor of philosophy at Beijing University, formulated the following thought: We are confronted with the following dilemma: what do we prefer? That the object of our study would be “Chinese”, or that it would be “philosophical”? (Wang 1999, 30)

The 2001 “Zhonghua wenhua fuxing xuanyan” ѝॾ᮷ॆ༽‫ޤ‬ᇓ䀰 (“Manifesto for the Revival of Chinese Culture”) reveals that, in the twenty-first century, not only do two Chinese worlds need to engage with each other, but a rediscovered and re-founded Chinese tradition is increasingly being presented as a viable alternative for the Western philosophical and scientific tradition that was, albeit with a different pace, accepted by the East Asian nations––off go the Greeks.

Conclusion In the beginning of the twenty-first century we are witnessing a shift of global power from the Euro-American to the East Asian area and the Western developmental model has started to show its limits. This had resulted in East Asian traditions no longer being merely a preoccupation of East Asian intellectuals, but also a matter of concern for Westerners who hope to find––in these traditions––a new way of “doing philosophy” (Cheng 2007, 184). This new Western attitude is far from François-Marie Arouet Voltaire’s naiveté, when he, in 1755, declared that the stony heart of Genghis Khan was softened by the moral purity of the gentle Chinese,16 and his statement from 1756 when he stated that the history of civilization begun with the Chinese state;17 it is also far from the eighteenth century French Jesuits’ opportunistic claim that the Chinese had once had a form of monotheism that was not overly different from the Jewish-Christian tradition (see Spence 1991, 132–33). The contemporary rapprochement of “Asian” and “Western” philosophy also illustrates the following observation by Chad Hansen (1993, 19): the fact that East Asian philosophy (Chad Hansen spoke of Chinese philosophy) is logical in an innate sense is not a discovery, but 16 Voltaire in Orphelin de la Chine. Tragédie en cinq actes et en vers (1755). Quoted from Spence (1990, 4). 17 Voltaire in Essais sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations (1756). Quoted from Spence (1990, 4).

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our decision. It is a decision to propose, critique and defend interpretations in a specific way. The way we deal with East Asian philosophy is our decision, just as much as the way East Asian thinkers deal with the Western philosophical tradition is their decision. However, the decision reaching process should be a result of rational inquiry, argumentation and dialogue. It goes without saying that this also includes self-doubting and questioning of one’s own tradition, regardless of whether it is European or East Asian. The question as to whether it is the same rational inquiry that created the feeling of “Unbehagen” with the consequences of the age of global science that could and should serve as an instrument of rationalising this “Unbehagen”, can only be answered in the affirmative. It is, it should be repeated, the “attitude” towards oneself and the other that will be decisive in this process.

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Dessein, Bart. 2001. “Climbing a Tree to Catch Fish: Some Reflections on Plato, Aristotle, and China.” In La Rationalité en Asie / Rationality in Asia, edited by Johannes Bronkhorst, 97–125. Lausanne: Etudes de Lettres. Ershi’er zi ҼॱҼᆀ. (1986) 1988. Shanghai: Changhai guji chubanshe. Frankenhauser, Uwe. 1996. “Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logic in China.” Opera Sinologica 1. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Fung, Yu-lan. 1953a. A History of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Period of the Philosophers (from the beginnings to circa 100 BCE). Princeton: Princeton University Press. —. 1953b. A History of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 2: The Period of Classical Learning (from the Second Century B.C. to the Twentieth Century A.D.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garbe, Richard. 1987. The Philosophy of Ancient India. Chicago: The Open Court. Göller, Thomas, and Achim Mittag. 2008. Geschichtsdenken in Europa und China. Selbstdeutung und Deutung des Fremden in historischen Kontexten. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Graham, Angus C. 1989. Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle: Open Court. Hansen, Chad. 1983. Language and Logic in Ancient China. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Harbsmeier, Christoph. 1998. Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 7: Pt. 1: Language and Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hirakawa, Akira. 1990. A History of Indian Buddhism. From ‫܉‬Ɨkyamuni to Early MahƗyƗna. Asian Studies at Hawaii 36. Translated and edited by Paul Groner. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Jaspers, Karl. 1949. Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Zürich: Artemis Verlag. Kuzminski, Adrian. 2008. Pyrrhonism. How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism. Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion. Lanham et al.: Lexington Books. Lee, Th. H. C. 2000. Education in Traditional China, a History. Handbuch der Orientalistik, Section 4, China. Vol.13. Leiden: Brill. Lloyd, Geoffrey E. R. 1979. Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lloyd, Geoffry E. R., and Nathan Sivin. 2002. The Way and the Word. Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

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Needham, Joseph. 1974. La tradition scientifique chinoise. Collection Savoir. Paris: Hermann. Mou, Zongsan ⢏ᇇй. 1963. Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi ѝ഻ଢᆨⲴ⢩䌚. Taipei: Student Book Company. Plato. 2001. The Apology, Phaedo and Crito of Plato. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Harvard Classics. Edited by Charles W. Eliot. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1909–14. Published by Bartleby.com. Przyluski, Jean. 1932. “L’influence iranienne en Grèce et dans l’Inde.” Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles 37: 283–94. Romberg, C. 2003. “Inleiding (Introduction).” In 25 Eeuwen Oosterse Filosofie. Teksten, Toelichtingen, edited by Jan Bor and Karel Van der Leeuw, 527–40. Amsterdam: Boom. Rošker, Jana S. 2008. Searching for the Way. Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Sansom, George Bailey. 1978. Japan. A Short Cultural History. Stanford: Stanford Univerrsity Press. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1978. Philosophy East / Philosophy West. A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic, and European Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1989. The Dilemma of Context. New York and London: New York University Press. Seiwert, Hubert. 1994. “Orthodoxie, Orthographie und Zivilreligion im vorneuzeitlichen China.” In Gnosisforschung und Religionsgeschichte. Festschrift für Kurt Rudolph zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Holger Preißler, Hubert Seiwert and Heinz Mürmel, 529–41. Marburg: Diagonal-Verlag. Sivin, Nathan. 1995. Medicine, Philosophy and Religion in Ancient China. Researches and Reflections. Variorum Collected Studies Series. Aldershot: Variorum. Spence, Jonathan. 1990. “Western Perceptions of China from the Late Sixteenth Century to the Present.” In Heritage of China. Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, edited by Paul S. Ropp, 1–14. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. —. 1991. Op zoek naar het Moderne China. Amsterdam: Agon. (Dutch translation of the original The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton & Company, 1990). Staal, Frits. 1989. “The Independence of Rationality from Literacy.” European Journal of Sociology 30: 301–10. —. 1993. Concepts of Science in Europe and Asia. Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies.

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Thoraval, Joël. 2007. “La tentation pragmatiste dans la Chine contemporaine.” In La pensée en Chine aujourd’hui, edited by Anne Cheng, 103–34. Paris: Gallimard. Wang, Bo. 1999. “What Did the Ancient Chinese Philosophers Discuss? Zhuangzi as an Example.” Contemporary Chinese Thought 30 (4): 28– 40. Willemen, Charles, Bart Dessein, and Collett Cox. 1998. SarvƗstivƗda Buddhist Scholasticism. Handbuch der Orientalistik 2. Abteilung. Indien. Leiden: Brill. Zürcher, Erik. (1959) 1972. The Buddhist Conquest of China. The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China. 2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

CONFUCIAN CONCEPTS, IDEAS AND IDEOLOGIES

CHAPTER ONE KANGAKU, KOGAKU, KOKUGAKU, RANGAKU: REINTERPRETATIONS OF CONFUCIANISM IN THE NATION BUILDING PROCESS IN JAPAN LUKA CULIBERG

Introduction From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards various Asian countries were experiencing a rapid social change that we would usually describe with terms such as modernization and development of national consciousness. By the term “modernization” I understand the process of integrating these countries into the capitalist world-economy system, a process that accompanied “nation-building”. In turn, nation-building can be described as a process of transforming societies along the lines of specific structural demands of the so-called modernization, giving birth to nation-specific forms of social organization based upon the modern bourgeois capitalist economic system. The “capitalist world economy” is a social system in which states represent key political units and which, according to the leading exponents of the “world-systems” theory, came into historical existence in Europe during the “long” sixteenth century, and has subsequently expanded so that it now includes all other geographical areas of the globe (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2012, 22): In the original loci of the capitalist world-economy, the birth of diplomacy, of so-called international law, and of state-building ideologies (such as absolutism) all coincide with the early functioning of the world-economy. Of course, these states rapidly found themselves in a hierarchical network of unequal strength. As new areas became incorporated into this capitalist world-economy, the existing political structures of such areas were commonly reshaped in quite fundamental ways (including even the

4

Chapter One definition of their territorial and “ethnic” or national boundaries) so that they could play their expected roles in the relational network of the interstate system. (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2012, 22)

Countries entered this new world playground on different terms and in various shapes. India was not in the same field as China, and China faced a different fate than Japan. While establishing the power relations, the newcomers had to be weak enough not to interfere with the flow of the production factors across their borders and thus peripheralise their production processes (ibid., 22–23). These changes thus reshaped the existing social structures, the outcome of which varied depending on the external relations as well as on the internal conditions; however, in each case the main formative force that shaped these structures was the power relation: The classes and the ethnic/national groups or groupings that began to crystallize were crystallized, so to speak, from three directions. They defined themselves primarily in relation to these state structures that commanded the largest amount of armed force and access to economic possibilities, either through the direct distribution of ever-increasing tax income or through the creation of structured possibilities of preferential access to the market (including training). They were defined by those in the centers of these structures (and in the centers of the world-system as a whole). And they were perceived by competitive groups in their regional setting. (ibid., 23)

In this sense modernization can be explained as a process of changing social structures in accordance with the new political and social realities, while the result depended a lot on the previous circumstances in the “modernizing” societies. In India, for example, the attempt to end colonial rule manifested itself in the form of a nationalist struggle, while in China, the struggles to end and reverse the humiliation and the “carving” by foreign powers obtained the form of republican and communist movements (Seth 2013, 273). Seth (2013) points out that we need to pay attention to the fact that these movements were closely allied to the struggle to become “modern” (ibid.): Indeed, the two goals were usually seen to be so closely related as to be indistinguishable: a people had to start becoming modern if they were ever to be free of foreign domination, and they had to gain sovereignty and state power in order to undertake the laborious but necessary task of building a strong, prosperous, and modern nation. Thus in India, as in China, political movements from the latter nineteenth century sought to find a sovereign

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nation free from domination by a Western power or powers, and also sought to make this putative nation and its people “modern”, both as a necessary means towards the nationalist end and as an end in itself. (Seth 2013, 273)

Japan, for example, learned a good lesson from the Indian and Chinese experiences. In the chaotic times of the final years of the Tokugawa regime, the fate of its gigantic neighbours must have been one of the major factors that lead them to choose the path of rapid industrialization once the feudal regime was finally overthrown in 1868. However, there was a fundamental paradox inherent in this choice of “modernity”. In order to liberate themselves of the colonial status or of the threat thereof, the people had to become “modern” and achieve national sovereignty. According to Seth (2013) this meant that it was necessary to acquire many of the coloniser’s qualities, for how else could he be made to leave, and how else could the independent nation that would replace him be able to take its rightful place amongst the powerful countries of the West (Seth 2013, 273). However, at the same time the ideological perception of these struggles was surely not articulated as the goal to become the same as the Westerners, for then there could be no rationale for the nationalist project (ibid.). The paradox that the Asian civilizations faced was thus an inherent part of the modernization project, which meant becoming like Western civilizations but at the same time remaining radically different. Seth (2013) quotes Sun Yat-sen who urged the Chinese to reform their ways not so that they would become English, but so that they would become more authentically Chinese (ibid.), whatever this meant. Similarly, the Indian nationalist and educationalist Lajpat Rai understood Indian nationalism not as a project of becoming English or German or American or Japanese; “… we want to be Indians, but modern, up-to-date, progressive Indians” (ibid., 273). The “modernization” ideology was a complex one. “Modernity” was a notion derived from the West and becoming “modern” meant becoming Western. The notion of nationality countered this idea. The nationalist ideology was the mechanism that enabled these people to become “modern”, while at the same time allowed them to remain different in the form of a specific national group with an identity and tradition. In order to become a modern Indian it was not enough to become modern, they also needed to become Indian. The ideological question of how to remain Chinese or Japanese actually represented a struggle to become Chinese or

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Japanese. Seth (2013, 237) indicated that nationalisms claimed they were underwritten by the existence of a national identity but in fact they were a project to forge such a nationality and identity.

Japanese Modernity Japan took its own course on the path to “modernization”. Realizing that the xenophobic call to “expel the barbarians” (jǀi ᭈཧ) was futile in face of the technological advancement of the said barbarians, the zealous revolutionaries were quick to adopt a new approach. In order to expel the Westerners, they had to catch up with their technological and institutional level of progress, in other words, they had to become like them, but in order not to become them the new notion of national identity had to be developed. Thus the cry to “expel the barbarians” was quickly replaced during the early years of the Meiji Period (1868–1912) with the project of enriching the country and developing a strong military force (fukoku kyǀhei ᇼഭᕧ‫)ޥ‬, the idea that became the core policy of the new Meiji elite. The idea behind the project of turning Japan “modern”, i.e. Western, yet at the same time different, was reflected in another famous slogan of that time, namely wakon yǀsai ઼兲⌻᡽ which translates as “Japanese spirit and Western knowledge”. The underlining idea behind this lies in the belief that notwithstanding the all-encompassing material change in society, Japan can still preserve its uniqueness on the symbolic level, as implied by the idea of this unclear ideological notion of the “Japanese spirit”. So, how did Japan reinvent itself as a “modern” country that adopted Western knowledge (yǀsai) while forming its national identity based on the belief in a particular “Japanese spirit” (wakon)? I argue that this process of reinvention was not characterized by “inventing” new traditions, but was in fact structured through the reinterpretation of the existing intellectual currents in Japan at the time, and that these currents were a result of the changing social circumstances over the centuries. The pillar of the intellectual structure of the Tokugawa society is supposed to lie in the Confucian thought, however, we must not neglect the fact that this Confucian thought was extremely diverse and that it incorporated intellectual currents which actually developed as a sort of reaction or criticism of the Tokugawa Confucian thought, such as the Ancient Learning or kogaku ਔᆖ, Native Learning or kokugaku ഭᆖ and the Dutch Learning or rangaku 㱝ᆖ.

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Kangaku ╒ᆖ (Chinese Learning) The Tokugawa society (1600–1868) was definitely not entirely a Sinified society, especially when compared to the Joseon ᵍ凞 dynasty (1392–1897) on the Korean peninsula, and the scholars have different views as to the extent of the Confucian influence on the Tokugawa society. However, in Najita Tetsuo’s words, there is little doubt as regards the depth of the Tokugawa intellectual engagement with Confucian thought and of the profound legacy of this engagement for the modern history of Japan (Najita 1975, 931). Regardless of the actual influence of Confucian thought on the society at large, its influence in transforming Japan’s political establishment into a bureaucratic apparatus and its use as an explanatory ideological system of that political reality can hardly be denied.1 In 1899 Paul Carus published a report of a lecture that was held in Paris before the International Congress of Orientalists by Inoue Tetsujirǀ (1855–1944), a professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo, in his capacity of the official delegate of the Japanese government. In his report on the lecture on the philosophical development in Japan which was published in The Monist under the title Philosophy in Japan, Carus begun by stating “the prevalent opinion” that there is no originality in Japanese philosophy while professor Inoue “insists on the fact that although the first impulse to philosophising came from abroad, being given by Confucianism and Buddhism, the treatment and further development of these great philosophical and religious movements were carried on in an independent way and produced original thinkers in Japan.” (Carus 1899, 273) 1

Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691), an early Tokugawa scholar who was a big promoter of introducing Confucianism to Japan, believed that everything Chinese had already made its way to Japan except “true morality and the Way of the Great Learning”, i.e. Confucianism. However, Kurozumi (1994) claims that he was only partly correct in his assessment of the position of Confucianism in Japanese history: “Indeed, by the sixteenth century, Confucianism as an intellectual craft had already spread to Buddhists, Shinto theologians, court scholars, and part of the cultural elite. As a general thought system, it had left traces in legislation, house rules, and literary works. However, in contrast to pre-Tokugawa Confucianism which did not have enough character of its own for Banzan to even take note of its existence, Tokugawa Confucianism, on the whole, was to spread widely, even beyond Banzan’s dreams. But the content of the ‘Way’ would be markedly different from what Banzan had envisioned.” (Ooms and Kurozumi 1994, 339)

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Inoue’s presentation of his understanding of the history of Japanese thought or philosophy in the Tokugawa Japan begins with Fujiwara Seika (1565–1619), who was the first thinker to introduce Zhu Xi’s school of thought, known in today’s general discourse as “Neo-Confucianism, to Japan.”2 His most famous disciple was Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) who applied the principles of Zhu Xi to the domain of instruction and succeeded in introducing them as education principles into government ran schools (Carus 1899, 274). Not long after Fujiwara Seika introduced the Neo-Confucian thought, a new and different line of thought was struck by Nakae Tǀju (1608–1648), a follower of Wang Yangming (1472–1529), a Ming dynasty Confucian who attempted to reconcile Buddhism with Confucianism. According to Inoue this new school of thought played an important part in Japan through its influence on the higher and better educated classes of Japanese society (ibid., 274–75). Another school of thought was initiated by Yamazaki Ansai (1619– 1682) who was educated in a Buddhist monastery and became the founder of a new school after he abandoned Buddhism and converted to Confucianism, which failed to satisfy him, and he thus started studying shintǀ ⾎䚃, Japanese animistic mythology, which he tried to explain through the prism of Zhu Xi’s philosophy (ibid., 276). Inoue briefly explained the thoughts of other seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers, such as Yamaga Sokǀ (1622–1685), Itǀ Jinsai (1627–1705) and Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714). Carus completed his report with the observation that Japanese philosophers such as Sokǀ, Jinsai, Ekken, Sorai or Oshio Chnjsai (1793–1837), regardless of their differences and departures from Zhu Xi’s conventions, did not dare to openly disavow Confucius himself; “all of them considered him to be a model of philosophy, and even when they disagreed with his doctrines they regarded themselves merely as expositors of his views.” (ibid., 280) Carus found little metaphysical speculation among these philosophers, describing them as practical thinkers who do not leave the solid ground of the realities of this life (ibid., 281). As the only true opposition to 2

However, Kurozumi points out that we need to keep in mind, that it is wrong to approach Tokugawa Confucian thought purely and simply as “Neo-Confucianism” or Zhu Xi Learning. Fujiwara Seika himself, who has the honor of being called the founding father of Tokugawa Confucianism, was very tolerant and open-minded as regards the various traditions of “Chinese Learning”. (Ooms and Kurozumi 1994, 343)

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Confucian thought in Tokugawa Japan, he mentioned “the Shintoists”, such as Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), who showed open hostility to foreign doctrines and endeavoured to establish an original Japanese philosophy. However, on the whole, Confucianism remained the creed of all philosophical schools (Carus 1899, 281). At the time the feudal Tokugawa regime fell in the late 1860s, the society’s intellectual stratum was dominated by Confucian thought, even though the majority of thinkers from the past two centuries had been diverging from this thought and criticizing it from various points of view in accordance with the ever changing social realities. Although the validity of Confucian ethics was not frontally challenged by Japanese philosophers as a conceptual apparatus with which one could analyze reality and acquire knowledge, Confucianism underwent considerable changes and reinterpretations. For example, by the midnineteenth century the fundamental principle of dual structure, the socalled idea of “essence-function” (ti yong 億⭘), the two categories of reality, which were traditionally conceived as distinguishable but interrelated entities, supposedly had a different conceptual meaning in Japan; “essence” was considered as particular and “function” as universal (Najita 1975, 932): (E)thics and history were particular, being either national or regional, but not universal; while Western science was not merely “function” or a pragmatic appendage to another more essential reality, but indeed a manifestation of universal “reason” itself and therefore applicable everywhere without regard to a particular cultural experience (Najita 1975, 932–33).

Although not challenged in its entirety as an ethical system, particular elements of Neo-Confucian thought, such as dual structure, were dismissed as a reliable epistemological tool, giving rise to a complex intellectual metamorphosis in Tokugawa Confucian thinking (ibid., 933). As an example, Najita presented the case of Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) who wrote a text entitled Taigiroku བྷ⯁䥢 (Record of Great Doubts) towards the end of his life. In this text, which is regarded as a key document in the history of Tokugawa Confucian thought (ibid.), he rejected the Neo-Confucian metaphysics. In this treatise Ekken sought a more empirical approach to the study of nature unfettered by the constrictions of metaphysical ethics; this mode of reasoning was shared, to a considerable degree, with the important school that criticised Neo-

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Chapter One

Confucianism, the so-called Ancient Learning (kogaku), generally associated with Ogynj Sorai (1666–1728) and one of his main disciples, Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) (Najita 1975, 933). The goal of this school was to reconcile what it believed were indigenous (Japanese) ethical convictions with rationally organized knowledge systems such as NeoConfucianism (ibid., 934). Filiality, loyalty, truthfulness, respect for the aged and for the natural order of things all existed in Japan as beliefs in the so-called “divine age” (jindai) prior to the introduction of Chinese culture. Japan might thus be properly called the “country of gods” (shinkoku) in contrast to China which was the “country of sages” (seikoku). There was, however, nothing irrational about Shinto spiritualism. Ancient Japanese mythologies such as the Kojiki were misleading and did not convey the true meaning of Shinto, which could actually be better understood by reading the Confucian Classics, and especially by studying Neo-Confucian thought. (ibid.)

The awareness as regards the conceptual break between the indigenous philosophical or spiritual tradition and the imported philosophical school was present from the very introduction of the Neo-Confucian doctrine in the beginning of the Tokugawa period. Confucians soon departed from the orthodox teaching of Zhu Xi in order to align their interpretations with the social reality of the Tokugawa society. Some of them tried to conceptually integrate Neo-Confucian teachings with what they believed was indigenous philosophical tradition, while others, for instance the proponents of Native Learning (kokugaku) or Western Learning (rangaku), criticized Confucianism on the whole. However, their criticism was deeply rooted in the Confucian understanding of what is “native learning” or what is “Western knowledge”. However, we should not view reinterpretations of Neo-Confucian doctrines solely through the prism of the contact with the Japanese “native” philosophical world and Western knowledge. Social changes that took place within the Tokugawa society and slowly transformed the feudal warrior society into a bureaucratic state with rapidly developing bourgeoisie, large merchant centres, money based economy with bank and loan systems etc., naturally called for new interpretations of the reality in which the members of the Tokugawa society found themselves in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In Kaibara Ekken’s epistemology the study of nature was disentangled from Neo-Confucian metaphysics and ethical scholarship, and history was separated from nature. The study of “things” was distinguished from the

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examination of the “facts” linked to human action, i.e. history (Najita 1975, 939). This can be seen as a similar process to the one that took place in European thought at roughly the same period, when Enlightenment scholars started creating a divide between metaphysics and physics, between “speculative philosophy” and “natural science”. In the same way as the prevailing Aristotelian paradigm was breaking down in Europe with the constitution and advance of separate spheres of knowledge, rifts have been constantly emerging within the Confucian paradigm, for instance in the case of Ekken, who by collapsing the entire range of dual categories into a monism, established sharp cognitive distinctions in various areas of knowledge, while still remaining deep within the general framework of the Neo-Confucian intellectual tradition by limiting the comprehensive claims of Neo-Confucian metaphysics from within that tradition (ibid.): In his critique, Kaibara treated Neo-Confucian dualism as an exclusively abstract set of assumptions that resembled, at times, a conceptual foil, unrelated to practical ethics, historical structures, or physical reality. He thus stripped these spheres of knowledge of metaphysical interconnection and fostered the study of nature for its own sake, which was in the final analysis his central intent. (ibid., 939–40)

Kaibara Ekken’s thinking produced a break in Neo-Confucian orthodoxy which allowed for Confucianism and what would become termed as “science” to exist on their own terms. However, as Najita pointed out, although this break limited the explanatory range of NeoConfucian metaphysics and established important distinctions in the analysis, it failed to offer the possibility for a dialectical critique against the historical present (ibid., 940). For Ekken this was merely an example of the general intellectual trend within Tokugawa Confucianism that tended to deny the validity of dual structure and metaphysical ethics. As we have seen, “orthodox” Neo-Confucian philosophy was never practiced in Japan and, according to Najita, it was already Hayashi Razan, the first director of the official Neo-Confucian school in Japan, who anticipated Ekken’s materialistic monism and went as far as accepting it in place of dualism (ibid.): Indeed, there is a continuous tradition in the eighteenth century that is strongly oriented to empiricism, and most of the key figures in this tradition are identified with Neo-Confucianism in the manner of Kaibara. Thinkers such as Nakai Riken, Asada Gorynj, Goi Ranshnj, Yamagata Bantǀ, and especially Miura Baien, are outstanding examples of this

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Chapter One general tradition. All of these men shared Kaibara’s rejection of the metaphysical dualism of Neo-Confucianism (Najita 1975, 941).

I wish to emphasize that during the Tokugawa period, when one could say that Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism was adopted as the official state doctrine with the establishment of the Confucian academy, one could witness the rejection of Confucianism in the form of Ancient Learning, Native Learning or Dutch Learning as well as critical reinterpretations and epistemological changes that were abundant within the Confucian doctrine itself. In fact, Najita claimed that Kaibara Ekken’s ideas significantly overlapped with concepts formulated in opposition to the Neo-Confucian school, with ideas of Ancient Learning as formulated by Ogynj Sorai (1666–1728) and his student Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) who both denounced Neo-Confucian metaphysics on the grounds that it obfuscated the relationship between ethics and nature (ibid.). Even though they looked differently on the various aspects of human knowledge, we should understand the crumbling structure of NeoConfucianism as a common point, marking the shift in social circumstances which brought about these conceptual changes. In Europe, for example, there was a rift between the so-called rationalists and empiricists; however, their common point could be found in the break with the former philosophical tradition. 3 Historical conditions brought about new conceptions of reality, but these new conceptions need not have been in agreement. For example, unlike Ekken, the proponents of Ancient Learning focused their attention on “ethics” rather than “nature”. To them, “ethics” was intelligible as a part of the inter-related world of time, history, language, and especially politics, while “nature”, on the other hand, was not within the grasp of human intelligence; while it could be observed, its ultimate principle could not be comprehended (Najita 1975, 941).4 3

When “natural philosophy” was separated from the unitary field of knowledge and––based on the Cartesian paradigm––became “natural science”, philosophy was left only with metaphysics and was losing its prestige in relation to the new “scientific method”. However, this did not mean the end of philosophy, but rather it attained a new role in which it had to “defend” its position in relation to “science” as the only true knowledge. This, amongst other things, gave birth to the so-called “social sciences”––the study of things human, but with the “scientific” method adopted from natural sciences. 4 This reminds us of the early eighteenth century philosopher Giambattista Vico who, liberating himself from the Cartesian influence, claimed that his scienza

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Ogynj Sorai stated that ethics and politics were created by men and were therefore distinguishable from the way of nature. This is why the true scholarship was history, not nature. On the other hand, Kaibara Ekken confirmed the Neo-Confucian premise that men can rationally and objectively observe things, and that we tend to believe that while nature was ultimately intelligible, innate ethical knowledge in men was probably not (Najita 1975, 941–42). As Najita pointed out, despite this important difference in intellectual objectives, the similarity in their method of analysis is impressive (ibid.). I am overemphasizing this internal disintegration of Neo-Confucian thought and the overlapping with schools of thought critical of NeoConfucianism, because one needs to understand the nature of Confucian thought and its relation to competing schools of thought during the Tokugawa period if one wishes to understand the framing of modern nation-based Japanese society in the Meiji period. It would be wrong to simply consider Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian philosophy as the official ideological narrative of the Tokugawa society that was challenged for the first time by the school of Ancient Learning, especially Ogynj Sorai, who undermined the constitutive thought patterns of Confucian ideology by separating natural and moral laws. Nevertheless, his criticism and that of other Ancient Learning scholars had a great influence on the later school of National Learning or kokugaku. In the introduction to the English translation of his essays entitled Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan even Maruyama Masao, who in his early writings actually proposed this kind of a developmental scheme, admitted that this scheme, according to which Neo-Confucianism achieved a general social ascendancy in the early Tokugawa period (while its acceptance began to crumble in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century when it was challenged by the rising school of Ancient Learning), was too mechanical a reflection of historical evolutionism and did not truly correspond to facts (Maruyama 1974, xxxiv). Maruyama wrote that it was true that the Tokugawa government and that of the fiefs realized the usefulness of Neo-Confucianism in their attempts to stabilize the turbulent social situation in Japan that was emerging from the feudal wars with the policy of “rule through the civil, nuova of historiography bears higher certitude than the science of nature, because the final truth of nature can be understood only by God, who created it, while history is created by men and can therefore be understood by men.

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rather than the military arts”, but it was not really until the late seventeenth century that the Confucian classics and the authoritative commentaries on them came to be printed and circulated, and the doctrines of Confucianism came to penetrate the society in general (Maruyama 1974, xxxiv). It was, for example, in 1655 that Yamazaki Ansai, who played a great part in creating the national vogue for Chu Hsi’s Neo-Confucianism, started to lecture on what he claimed to be the pure version of those doctrines in Kyoto. However, the publication of Yamaga Sokǀ’s Seikyǀ yǀroku (Essential Teachings of the Sages), the work which boldly challenged the entire Chu Hsi school, is dated to 1666, while Itǀ Jinsai completed the manuscript of his highly original Rongo kogi (Ancient Meanings of the Confucian Analects) and Mǀshi kogi (Ancient Meanings of Mencius) in 1663. In short, the diffusion of Neo-Confucianism as an ideology and the School of Ancient Learning’s challenge of it developed almost contemporaneously. (ibid., xxxiv–xxxv)

From Neo-Confucianism to Ancient Learning and Native Learning The Way, the fundamental notion in Confucian thought, was founded in Zhu Xi’s school upon the Principle of Heaven, Earth, and Nature. This Principle permeates heaven and man, it encompasses society and nature, it is a normative standard as well as a natural law (Maruyama 1974, 148). Maruyama wrote that in the works of thinkers such as Yamaga Sokǀ, Itǀ Jinsai and Kaibara Ekken different elements of this absolute, allembracing Zhu Xi’s Way gradually became independent; the Way of Man separated from the Way of Heaven, normative standards from human nature. However, for these thinkers the Way remained the transcendental Principle, not dependent upon the existence of man (ibid., 148–49). It was Ogynj Sorai, the famous proponent of the so-called Ancient Learning school of thought, critical of Zhu Xi’s Confucianism, who denied that the Way is the ultimate principle, by explaining it as a product of man; not any man, but of sages. Because these human beings were raised to an otherworldly level, the Way retained its absolute and universal validity, however, the break was made––its validity no longer lay in the fact that it conforms to the “true” principles of nature, nor in the fact that it is in itself the ultimate idea, but only in the fact that it was established by the sages: “What makes the Way the Way is not Principle, but authority” (ibid., 149). Ogynj understood the Way of the sages as the way of governing the realm and managing the state and not as an inherent property of human

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nature to be elicited through either introspective reflection or, as the NeoConfucians phrased it, “abiding in reverence and investigating principle” (kyokei kynjri ትᮜマ⨶) (Watanabe 2012, 163): What we call the Way is neither the principle of things nor the natural way of heaven and earth; it is the Way established by the sages for the purpose of governing the realm (ibid.).

In this intellectual break we can recognize the ideological shift as a consequence of the slow disintegration of traditional structures of “premodern society” and a gradual transition into a “modern” one, marked by developments such as the ideological break between the public and private sphere of social life. In pre-modern societies the political power and private economic relations were closely interconnected and did not form autonomous spheres. The formation of seemingly separate public and private areas lead to the establishment of the autonomous political sphere on one side and the liberation of the private sphere from political demands on the other, which represented a step in the formation of the so-called modern individual. Numerous factors contributed to the development of the so-called National Learning or kokugaku, but according to Maruyama, Sorai’s philosophy was one of the key factors, and although later on some of the proponents of kokugaku acknowledged this relationship, at a time when the rapidly ascending school of National Learning was trying to establish an opposition to Confucianism and its distinctive feature, its members adopted the attitude of denying any influence (Maruyama 1974, 144).5 However, the ideological break of Ogynj Sorai who replaced the transcendental truth with authority released the genie from the bottle by providing the ideological foundation upon which the kokugakusha ഭᆖ㘵 5

Maruyama pointed out that because the kokugaku scholars also referred to their school as the “school of Ancient Learning”, the Confucian scholars of the day believed that it originated in the Confucian school of Ancient Learning, and therefore the scholars of National Learning were sensitive about the issue. For example, in an essay entitled Aru hito no ieru koto (According to Some People), Motoori Norinaga wrote: “Some people say that the writings of the Confucian scholars who study ancient words and terms are responsible for the birth of Ancient Learning, but that is incorrect. Our school of Ancient Learning was founded by Keichnj. As for the origin of the Confucian school of Ancient Learning, Itǀ was active about the same time as Keichnj, but the latter preceded the former somewhat. Ogynj was active still later. How then could National Learning have been modeled on them?” (Maruyama 1974, 145)

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(“Native Learning scholars”) and especially Motoori Norinaga could begin to question Confucianism in general, even though this authority was the absolute authority of the sage-kings. Norinaga defined the sages simply as the men who won support of the people by their authority and the profundity of their wisdom, who conquered other people’s lands and planed to prevent others from conquering their own lands (Maruyama 1974, 150). So, similar to Sorai, he defined the sages in political terms, but contrary to Sorai, he reduced them from figures of otherworldly validity to political usurpers and understood the way as a product of the specific period, place and circumstances in ancient China: Like Sorai, he saw that the essence of the Way lay in its political purpose, but in content he turned Sorai’s theory upside down. In Sorai’s opinion, the fact that the Way was an invention (sakui) of the sages made it absolute, while Norinaga considered the same fact as the reason for rejecting it. Of course, the scholars of National Learning had begun to question the value of Confucianism before they were exposed to the Sorai school. Once Keichnj began to study Japanese classics, he had become increasingly aware of the dichotomy between Confucian morality and the ancient spirit of Japan. But it was undoubtedly the Sorai school that influenced the direction of his criticism of Confucianism. This was a negative relation between the Sorai school and National Learning. (ibid.)

Norinaga located the new, true Way, which was not the Confucian Way, in the native animistic beliefs called shintǀ or “the Way of the Gods”. From the beginning of the Tokugawa period, the perception of shintǀ relied heavily on Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism. As Maruyama wrote, when this Confucian mode of thought was established as the foundation of shintǀ, the latter acquired a more or less pantheistic, or rather panpsychic, structure, that explained the origin of the universe in terms of li, yin and yang, and the five elements (ibid., 154). However, Norinaga had different ideas. From his perspective of rejecting Confucianism, he had to deny every aspect of it in order to “liberate” the native philosophy from the “corrupt” Chinese influence. He therefore rejected any rational interpretation or ethical evaluation of the shintǀ gods and by doing so, he had to change the basis of the Ancient Way completely: for him the new Way was neither the natural way of heaven and earth, nor a way established by man, but a Way initiated by ancestral Gods, Izanagi-no-mikoto and Izanami-no-mikoto, in accordance with the wishes of Taka-mi-musubi, and was received, preserved, and

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transmitted by Amaterasu-O-mi-kami, which is why it is called shintǀ or the Way of the Gods (Maruyama 1974, 156). Again, I would like to emphasize that Motoori Norinaga, who not only completely rejected Confucianism, but also dismissed the Sorai’s critical school of Ancient Learning, nevertheless firmly remained within the Confucian ideological universe and even though he believed he had dismissed Confucianism entirely, he preserved the concept of the Way. In other words, the kokugaku school did not actually reject or discard Confucianism, but had only reinterpreted it in order for it to suit the new social conditions which eventually, after the collapse of the Tokugawa regime, transformed the society into a nationally structured collective. Norinaga thought that the ancient Way signified “the great and honourable customs of our august land” before they were polluted by the importation of teachings from the Asian continent (Watanabe 2012, 238): The Way comprised the entirety of the mentality, speech, and actions of the people in high antiquity––the age of the gods and the first legendary emperors of Japan. This is both the “Way of mankind” and the way in which the emperors ruled the realm. It is the model for the entire human race: “Extending over Heaven and Earth, the true Way is the same in every single country, but it has been transmitted correctly in our Imperial Land alone. In other countries, its transmission was lost already in ancient times.” (ibid., 238–39)

By defining the Way as the invention of the sages and moving it into the political sphere, Sorai made it possible for Norinaga to reject it exactly on these grounds. Norinaga defined the Way, established by the ancient sages in China, as no more than a means by which usurpers legitimated their crimes, devices used to seize someone else’s country, and schemes to protect it from being seized (ibid., 245). According to Norinaga, “The Will of Heaven is a contrived concept that the ancient sages of China thought up in order to justify their crime of overthrowing their lord and stealing his land.” (ibid.)

Neo-Confucianism and Western Learning The fate of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan was therefore not a simple narrative of its general implementation, criticism and complete disintegration, but rather, as I tried to illustrate with the cases of Kaibara Ekken, Ogynj Sorai and Motoori Norinaga, an intellectual change that stemmed from the continuous reinterpretation of Confucianism in line

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with the changing social realities which eventually allowed for its implementation in a completely new social reality––that of Japan as a nation state. By criticizing Zhu Xi’s dual structure, Kaibara Ekken believed that he had remained firmly within the Confucian intellectual universe when he attempted to redefine the spiritualism of shintǀ in terms of the universal principle identical to the essence of nature itself (Najita 1975, 943). Thus, contrary to Neo-Confucianism, his epistemological conclusion was that the spirit and thing, essence and function, were governed by the same principle of life and hence should not be divided into distinct categories of reality (ibid.). Based on the notion of the unifying principle of life, he believed that the study of things (butsuri no gaku ⢙⨶ȃᆖ) must be distinguished from other forms of knowledge, such as practical ethics and the development of political and social institutions through history (ibid.): In short, nature was single, but historical custom was not the same everywhere. This was a widely shared perception in eighteenth century Japan that allowed particular historical “ideology” and natural “science” to coexist without being potentially mutually toxic. (ibid.)

Ekken could thus not accept Zhu Xi’s dualism that sharply divided li ⨶ (“principle”) and qi ≇ (“life force”) and that gave priority to qi over li. Qi, the energy or material force in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, is changeable, while li is the logical and universal principle of all things. However, Ekken does not see a distinction between the universal form of human nature and its acquired form. As we have seen, the reinterpretation of the NeoConfucian concept of the universal “principle” allowed Ekken to use it in a specifically materialistic manner that undergirded his common sense view of ethics (ibid., 935). He reasoned that all human beings shared a common “principle of life” and were thus alike as children of nature, while human ethics, on the other hand, were not at all inherent to this principle of life, but only reflected the awareness of human beings of the common fate they shared as nature’s children (ibid.). Once he redefined shintǀ spiritualism in terms of the Neo-Confucian “principle”, Ekken proceeded by separating the natural “principle” from all ethical dimensions, thus stripping nature of all ethical content, which finally led him to an essentially materialistic vision of nature (ibid., 936– 36). This made it possible for him to establish a clear distinction between particular historicism and universal science, thus Confucian ethics and Western science could coexist peacefully from the early Tokugawa period

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onwards. Ekken studied Western science or rangaku in Nagasaki, and became a famed botanist. Ekken thus radically reinterpreted Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism and blended it with the study of Western natural sciences, but he still considered himself a follower of Zhu Xi’s school and was critical of the Ancient Learning school of Confucianism and its scholars such as Itǀ Jinsai and Ogynj Sorai. In Ekken’s interpretation Confucianism therefore readily accommodated the methodology of Western science which became a major part of the Japanese perception of the West. In his memoirs Rangaku kotohajime 㱝ᆖһ࿻ (The Beginning of Dutch Learning) Sugita Genpaku (1733–1817), one of the pioneering scholars in the rangaku tradition, recalled that there was a widespread interest in Dutch imported goods, including barometers, hygrometers, Leyden jars, magic lanterns, clocks, telescopes, and fine glasswork around the Meiwa era (1764–72) (Watanabe 2012, 318). These rangakusha 㱝 ᆖ 㘵 (“Western Learning scholars”) did not believe that the West was more advanced or that it represented the next stage in the civilization progress, for as Watanabe pointed out, such a historical view was still absent in those times (ibid., 321). For some reason, they believed that it was in the “national character” of the Western countries to assemble information, examine it in detail, investigate its underlying principles, and skilfully employ the gained knowledge (ibid.). However, as Watanabe showed, they understood this process with reference to the Confucian concept of kynjri マ ⨶ (“penetration of principle”) found in Shuogua zhuan 䃚খۣ (one of the commentaries to Yijing ᱃㏃) and further refined by Zhu Xi (ibid.). “Science” or “learning” was understood exclusively within the Confucian framework, no science existed outside of this intellectual universe, and the rangakusha, while retaining the Confucian sensibility, merely shifted the object of their study from China to the West (ibid.). This admiration of the Western “penetration of principle” eventually led to Japanese anxiety over Western military supremacy. Shocked by China’s defeat in the Opium War (1839–42), another famous NeoConfucian scholar and rangakusha, Sakuma Shǀzan (1811–1864) concluded that the West was engaging in the penetration of principle more correctly and effectively than the countries under the sway of Zhu Xi NeoConfucianism (ibid., 322).

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Conclusion If the kokugakusha such as Motoori Norinaga discovered the true Way in the native Way of the Gods or the shintǀ, the rangakusha and many others in Japan understood the prosperity of the Western nations as an indication that the Way was more effectively taught and correctly followed in the West (Watanabe 2012, 323). When they described the achievements of the Western civilization, they translated the word “civilization” with the Japanese term bunmei ᮷ ᰾ , which was originally a Confucian term (wenming) denoting the state in which the Way was properly practiced and culture flourished (ibid., 327). In short, the core of Zhu Xi’s philosophy was rooted in the belief in the a priori existence of the li principle, which was to be followed by human behaviour. He posited a kind of dual structure in which the positive law was formulated as an application of the natural law, while Sorai’s sages, in contrast, knew of no such transcendent norm as a model, but the positive law that they invented and established was the Way itself (ibid., 163–64). This transformation of the Neo-Confucian doctrine enabled Motoori Norinaga and his followers to take it one step further and completely renounce the Way of the sages, for they established that the true Way could be found in the “noble customs” of their land even before they were contaminated by Chinese learning. On the other hand, rangakusha recognized this true Way in the technologically advanced Western civilization, the Way that was lost in China and Japan. The Confucian notion of the Way thus remained the central concept in Japanese philosophy while it was undergoing major transformations and reinterpretations. The new nation-state which was born from the revolutionary events that took place during the final years of the Tokugawa regime, this new political and social formation from the Meiji period, was an ideological amalgam of the above discussed conceptual currents. It was conceived as a modern, industrially developed and technologically advanced state, which enthusiastically adopted the technological achievements of Western science as well as the modern institutions of the liberal bourgeois nation-state. At the same time this transformation was interpreted through the ideological prism of wakon yǀsai, the idea that this western knowledge can be compatible with the “Japanese spirit” as formulated within the kokugaku tradition. The rangaku based “Western knowledge” and kokugaku based “Japanese spirit” were successfully woven together by the still firm Confucian ideological structure, since neither rangaku nor kokugaku, no matter how

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opposed they were to Confucianism, managed to liberate themselves from under its sway. Even though the new Meiji State was a modern, industrial and capitalist country that was ideologically perceived as liberated from the Chinese influence and founded on indigenous shintǀ based nationalism, it in fact remained a Confucian society. Although many rejected Confucianism for ideological reasons, others openly tried to reinterpret its conceptual universe in line with new imported notions from the West. For example, Nakae Chǀmin (1847–1901), a Meiji liberal thinker and an ardent promoter of Rousseau’s ideas, firmly believed that the notion of rigi ⨶㗙 (reason and justice)6 which was defined by Mencius, Liu Zongyuan and others, was identical to the ideas described by the Westerners as “liberty”, “equality” and “democracy.” (Watanabe 1997, 195) The criticism of Zhu Xi’s philosophy by Confucian schools, the further critical shift in the form of the so-called Ancient Learning school, the denial of Confucianism in the form of Native Learning or the kokugaku school and the popularity of Western Learning or the so-called rangaku school did not represent a slow disintegration of Confucianism that was to be completely washed away with the social and political revolution during the Meiji coup, but rather represented a slow reinterpretation within the ever-changing social contexts. In a sense, the Confucianism adopted in the early Tokugawa Period was far from a monolithic and orthodox philosophical system that could be simply described with a single term such as “Neo-Confucianism”, but was rather a complex network of philosophical currents in dialogue with each other. If anything, it was the Confucianism of the Meiji era, i.e. the Confucianism that informed a capitalist nation-state rather than a previous status-based feudal regime that was more monolithic and orthodox in its form. Confucian thought in all its interpretive variations was therefore not only suitable as an ideological support of a feudal status-based society that 6

Nakae Chǀmin was extremely fond of the notion of rigi ⨶㗙 which includes the basic Confucian notion of ri ⨶ (li in Chinese) or “Principle”. He even translated the Western concept of “philosophy” as rigaku ⨶ᆖ. When Japanese thinkers were importing Western philosophical concepts in the late nineteenth century, they were translating them with the help of Confucian terminology and the concept of ri played a major role in this process. Thus many common words in use today, such as “theory” (riron ⨶䄆), “ideal” (risǀ ⨶ᜣ), “logic” (ronri 䄆⨶), “reason” (risei ⨶ ᙗ ), “truth” (shinri ⵏ ⨶ ), “idea” (rinen ⨶ ᘥ ), etc. were coined with the inclusion of the notion of ri.

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was bound to collapse under the new social context of the nation-state, but, as we have seen, was perfectly capable of readjusting to the situation in which nationalism became the predominant ideological explanation of social reality. The way in which Confucianism was integrated within the context of the modernizing late nineteenth century nation-states remains a topic for another occasion.

Bibliography Arrighi, Giovanni, Terrence Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein. 2012. Anti-Systemic Movements. London: Verso Books. Carus, Paul. 1899. “Philosophy in Japan.” Monist 9 (2): 273–81. Maruyama, Masao. 1974. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Najita, Tetsuo. 1975. “Intellectual Change in Early Eighteenth-Century Tokugawa Confucianism.” The Journal of Asian Studies 34 (4): 931– 44. Ooms, Herman, and Makoto Kurozumi. 1994. “Introduction to “The Nature of Early Tokugawa Confucianism” by Kurozumi Makoto’. Journal of Japanese Studies 20 (2): 331–35, 337–75. Seth, Sanjay. 2013. “Nationalism, Modernity, and the ‘Woman Question’ in India and China.” The Journal of Asian Studies 72 (2): 273–97. Watanabe, Hiroshi ⑑䗪⎙. 1997. Higashi Ajia No ƿken to Shisǀ ᶡȪɀ Ȫȃ⦻⁙ǽᙍᜣ. Tǀkyǀ: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. —. 2012. A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901. Tǀkyǀ: International House of Japan.

CHAPTER TWO ZHANG TAIYAN AND “NATIONAL STUDIES” HANS KUEHNER

Introduction Over the recent years, observers have seen signs of a “conservative turn” in mainland China’s intellectual sphere. Already during the 1990s, nationalist views and rhetoric have resurged both in official publications and the intellectual discourse. 1 Confucius and Confucian ideas, which have been attacked as “reactionary” and “feudal” since the “Movement for a New Culture” in the 1910s onwards (xin wenhua yundong ᯠ᮷ॆ䙻अ), and considered to be one of the major obstacles to China’s modernization, have experienced a reappraisal or even a renaissance. 2 Values seen as Confucian are promoted by educational and academic institutions and are even included in national laws.3 Acting in unison with the appeals of the authorities, the intellectuals and academics in mainland China appear to have turned inward and back to the Chinese intellectual heritage. We are thus witnessing a revival of the interest in “national studies” or “national learning” (as the Chinese term guoxue ഻ᆨ is usually translated), and its appeal for intellectuals is on the rise. Furthermore, it has also received the support of the Party and Government bodies, and university departments

1

From the numerous press reports and scholarly works on this topic, I would like to mention merely two examples: Gries 2004, and Zhao 1997. 2 On the Renaissance of Confucianism in mainland China see Makeham 2003; on the complex relationship between the revival of guoxue and Confucianism see Makeham 2011. 3 Clauses on “filial piety” were included in the revised marriage law and in the “Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly”. (see Weber 2011, 19–20)

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devoted to education and research in guoxue topics have been established.4 On the other hand, teachers and professors are warned not to discuss liberal Western thinkers or “Western” topics such as civil society, pluralistic political systems, human rights, and so on.5 When we see the revival of interest in guoxue within this context, it seems only natural to dismiss it as merely another instance of the conservative turn, and to see it as instrumental in strengthening and deepening the influence of nationalist ideas amongst the educated in mainland China. However, when discussing this topic one has to keep in mind that “there is obviously nothing wrong or automatically regressive in the appreciation of past legacies in China or elsewhere” (Dirlik 2011, 11). It could also be argued that, seen from the global perspective, the revival of interest and the reappraisal of China’s intellectual heritage represent a legitimate response to the hegemonic claims of an exclusively Western or Eurocentric modernization and the reassertion of indigenous traditions that are threatened by globalising trends. In the limited space of this paper, it will be impossible to provide a definite judgment on the present guoxue movement. This is also due to the fact that it is a rather new phenomenon and has many faces. It is still too early to predict which direction it will take, and its character is still unclear and contended. Thus, a renowned Chinese scholar has complained that “until today we still have not gained a clear understanding of what guoxue is about (…). Guoxue is a big basket, anything can be put in it” (“Zhongguoshehuikexueyuan …” 2006). I shall therefore restrict myself to a historical perspective and approach these questions by looking closely at the ideas of the scholars who were the first to formulate the “national studies” programme as a separate field of learning, and who are seen today as its ancestors. I will then confront their ideas with the re-designed version of guoxue as it is in use today. When trying to assess today’s revival of guoxue or, as some call it, “national studies fever” (guoxue re ഻ ᆨ⟡), we can expect to get some clues on its character, concerns and orientation by examining its intellectual genealogy. I will focus on Zhang Taiyan ㄐཚ⚾ and his concise introduction to guoxue that was first published in 1922 (reprinted in 1997). In present day mainland China, Zhang Taiyan’s writings (Taiyan was his literary name, 4

An excellent survey of these developments can be found in the special issue on “National Learning” in China Perspectives 1 (2011). 5 These restrictive measures were widely reported in the Western press, see, e.g., “Class struggle…” 2015.

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Binglin ⛣᷇ was his true name) serve as a reference and orientation in the guoxue movement. He is widely seen as one of the founding fathers of this trend, school or academic discipline––whatever we may call it. The popular website guoxue.com, which lists renowned scholars such as Ji Xianlin ᆓ㗘᷇, Yue Daiyun ′唋䴢, Pang Pu 嗀⁨, Lin Wenzhao ᷇᮷ ➗, Ren Jiyu ԫ㒬᜸, Tang Yijie ⒟аӻ and others as its advisors, recommends four books as introductions to the topic of guoxue, one of which is Zhang Taiyan’s Collected Essays on the History of Scholarship (Xueshushi lunji ᆨ㺃ਢ䄆䳶).6

Terminology The term guoxue with the meaning “national studies” was introduced to China in the first decade of the twentieth century. It came from Japan, along with other new terms such as guocui ഻㋩ (“national essence”), guomin ഻≁ (“citizen”) and minzu ≁᯿ (“nation, race, ethnic group”). National studies were promoted by scholars and anti-Manchu activists associated with the National Essence Group (guocuipai ഻㋩⍮) such as Deng Shi 䝗ሖ, Huang Jie 哳ㇰ, Liu Shipei ࢹᑛษ and Zhang Taiyan ㄐ ཚ⚾. 7 In ancient Chinese texts, the term guoxue was not used for a field of learning or a school of thought, for it was the name of an institution. It was mentioned for the first time in Zhouli ઘ⿞ (Rituals of the Zhou Dynasty) (Hanyu dacidian 3, 1995, 646). There, guoxue was the name for an educational institution managed by the feudal states. Guoxue/kokugaku was first used as a name for an intellectual school in early nineteenth century Japan. Japanese scholars associated with this school rejected all foreign intellectual influence, specifically the Neo-Confucian ideas that had come from China and had dominated intellectual life in Japan until 6

The other recommended introductions to guoxue are the following collections of essays: Liang Qichao ằஃ䎵, Guoxue jiangxuelu erzhong ഻ᆨ䅋ᆨ䤴Ҽぞ Two Lectures on National studies, Liu Shipei, Zhonggu wenxue lunji ѝਔ᮷ᆨ䄆䳶 Collected Essays on Ancient Literature, and Wang Guowei ⦻഻㏝, Wang Guowei lunji ⦻഻㏝䄆䳶 Collected Essays by Wang Guowei. (Beijing guoxue shidai) 7 For more on the National Essence Group and the roles and ideas of Deng Shi and Huang Jie see Hon 2003, Liu 1995, Zheng 1997, and Schneider 1976. Liu Shipei first devoted himself to traditional scholarship, then turned to anti-Manchu nationalism and anarchism. While exiled in Japan he became an informer for the imperial government and a self-avowed monarchist. His intellectual trajectory is described in Bernal 1976; Müller 2001, 169–90, and Chang 1987, 146–79.

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then. In orthodox Chinese thought, political rule was seen as legitimate only if the ruler acted morally and governed in the good interest of his subjects. In contrast to these ideas, Japanese thinkers stressed the essential difference and singularity of Japan as shinkoku ⾎ഭ, land of the gods. In their view, the legitimacy of the rule of the tennǀ ኳⓚ (“emperor”), an essential trait of Japanese tradition, was not dependent on moral qualities. According to Japanese kokugaku ᅜᏛ thinkers, the mandate to rule was conferred to the tennǀ by the goddess Amaterasu, and the ruler was seen as a divine representative and direct descendant of the goddess. Therefore the rule of the dynasty was eternal and unchangeable (Antoni 1987, 270–72). The term guoxue in its Japanese use and meaning was transferred and adapted to fit the Chinese intellectual world by Chinese students in Japan in the first decade of the twentieth century. There is a double irony in the adoption of this term by young Chinese nationalists. Firstly, in the Japanese context, it implied a rejection of all Chinese influences, and secondly, this term had, like many other “return graphic loans” (as they were called by Liu 1995),8 to be imported from Japan in order to be of use to Chinese nationalist thinkers.

The First and Second Generations of Guoxue Scholars As mentioned above, Zhang Taiyan is today widely seen as a pioneer and founding father of the new field of national studies. Others usually referred to as the ancestors of the new guoxue are the members of the Xueheng Group, a group of scholars allied with the journal ᆨ㺑 Xueheng (Critical Review). Mei Guangdi ẵ‫ݹ‬䘚 and Wu Mi ੤ᇃ, two of the leading members of the group, had studied with Irving Babbitt in the United States. Following their teacher, these scholars promoted a form of universal humanism in which the best of Chinese and European traditions were to be united (Hon 2003, 255–57). They argued against the materialistic and utilitarian aspects of modernity and “envisioned a universal humanistic civilization that was a combination of the European classical tradition of Greek philosophy, Indian Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism” (Schneider 2001, 135). The scholars in this group, who can be regarded as the second generation of the guoxue school, argued that 8

For a list of these terms see her Translingual Practice, 302–42. “Return Graphic Loans” are defined as “classical Chinese character compounds that were used by the Japanese to translate modern European words and were reintroduced into modern Chinese”. (Liu 1995, 302; see also Zheng 1997, 1–6)

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“the national essence of China could be found in classical literature, which had to be protected against modern materialism (...) and utilitarianism” (ibid.). In contrast to other conservatives from this period they did not see Confucianism as a remedy to these supposed ills of Western society, but rather “emphasized the basic similarity of Chinese and Western classical civilization” (ibid.).9 Liang Qichao, mentioned on the guoxue website as another pioneer, belongs to the older generation of scholars. He had started as a reformer and admirer of Western ideas and institutions, and it was only once he had seen the disastrous consequences of the First World War in Europe that he turned to Chinese tradition. Only then was it justified to regard him as a representative of guoxue––although he himself did not ally himself with any of the conservative groups.10 Obviously, today different personalities and groups are assembled under the heading “Master of National Studies” guoxue dashi ഻ᆨབྷᑛ. What they share is not an affirmative view of Chinese tradition in itself: Wang Guowei was a student of Western philosophy,11 Liang Qichao, as previously mentioned, had originally been a critic of Confucian orthodoxy and an admirer of Western political institutions, while the Xueheng Group followed Babbitt’s ideas of universal humanism. Liu Yizheng ḣ䂂ᗥ, also a historian and another so-called the “master of national studies” (see Xue ren bu…, 2015), insisted on the particularity of the Chinese spirit and culture and saw it as medicine for the ills associated with Westernization and modernization. Liu also contributed articles to Xueheng but had never studied abroad.12 Thus, the feature that unites all of these scholars is not their shared attitude to Chinese tradition, nor is it their rejection of 9 This attitude is further illustrated by the fact that portraits of Socrates and Confucius were reproduced on the first pages of Xueheng, No.1 (January 1922). 10 On Liang’s intellectual evolution and his role as a reformer and intellectual leader of the young generation, see Huang 1972. Liang’s “conservative turn” was described in Tang 1996, where it was discussed in the terms of a supposedly “postnationalist” view of culture (see Tang 1996, 234). 11 For the evolution of Wang Guowei’s thinking and the influence of European philosophy see Kogelschatz 1986. 12 Liu’s opus magnum is his Zhongguo wenhua shi ѝ ഻ ᮷ ॆ ਢ (History of Chinese Civilization), the first version of which was published in a series in the Xueheng magazine, starting in 1925, and then in the book form in 1926, 1928 and 1932. A revised edition appeared in 1947 and was reprinted in 1988 and once again in two volumes in the series Zhongguo xueshu congshu ѝ഻ᆨ㺃਒ᴨ (Collection of Works of Chinese Scholarship).

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Western learning; on the contrary, all of them had been under the influence of Western ideas and openly acknowledged their intellectual debt. The one intellectual trait that these thinkers shared appears to be their aversion to the ideas of the New Youth Group or “Movement for a New Culture” in general (personified by Chen Duxiu 䲣⦘⿰ and Hu Shi 㜑䚙) with its iconoclastic ideas and the aim of using colloquial Chinese as a literary language. Let me provide two examples of this position: Mei Guangdi used a very emotional and polemical tone when expressing the Critical Review Group’s opposition to the ideas of the New Youth Group in his programme article found in the first pages of the first number of Xueheng magazine (Mei 1922). Similarly, Zhang Taiyan did not mince his words when he denigrated the new style poetry: In his 1922 lectures, he said: The works of the poets of the late Qing cannot qualify as poetry. Poems in colloquial Chinese are not poetry. If we do not endeavour to develop to a higher level, we will descend into degeneration. Poetry in colloquial Chinese is what we call descent into degeneration. (Zhang 1997, 80)

Guoxue and the Rise of Nationalism Zhang Taiyan (1869–1935) was one of the leading scholars of his times in the field of classical learning. But it was his role as an antiManchu activist, revolutionary, and early member of the nationalist Tongmenghui ਼ⴏᴳ (Revolutionary Alliance) that made him a legendary hero of the revolutionary movement.13 Zhang was classically educated, but he did not pursue the conventional career of an official. Instead, he became one of the activists of the reform movement that formed around Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. When the reform movement failed in 1898, he––like many other reformers––had to go into exile to Japan. At that point he changed into an increasingly radical anti-Manchu revolutionary. Following his return to Shanghai, he wrote and published anti-Manchu pamphlets and articles, and was sentenced to life imprisonment (later converted to three years) in the famous Subao-case (Jiangsu News 㰷๡). His release from prison in 1906 was followed by another five years of

13

An excellent introduction to Zhang Taiyan’s intellectual development can be found in Chang (1987, 104–45). His career as an anti-Manchu revolutionary was described in Wong (1989) and Laitinen (1990).

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exile in Japan, where he continued with his revolutionary activities. 14 Following the success of the Republican Revolution in 1911, he returned to China, where he was revered and respected as one of the veterans of the revolution. In an essay written at Zhang’s death, Lu Xun wrote: Zhang’s “contribution to the (…) revolution is actually greater than that to (…) scholarship” (Lu 1987, 545). For Lu Xun, who otherwise had only contempt and scathing criticism for cultural conservatives, this represented a surprisingly mild and sympathetic assessment of Zhang’s contributions. During his revolutionary years, Zhang was a regular contributor to the journal Guocui xuebao ഻㋩ᆨ๡ (National Essence Journal). This journal was published by the “Society for the Preservation of National Studies” Guoxue baocunhui ഻ᆨ‫؍‬ᆈᴳ, founded by Liu Shipei, Deng Shi and Huang Jie in 1904 in Shanghai. The first issue of Guocui xuebao appeared in 1905 and evolved into one of the most influential journals in the nationalist circles at the time (it existed until 1912). The overall aim of both the Society and the journal was to return the supposedly pure Han ╒ (Chinese) race, who were originally “the true masters of China by virtue of being the descendants of the Yellow Emperor” (Huang Jie in his preface to his Yellow History Huang shi 哳ਢ, 1905), to their former dominant position in Chinese politics, society and civilization. They opposed the idea for China to be dominated by “foreign races”, especially the Manchu, and strove for the reestablishment of the supposedly pure cultural practices and ideas of the pre-Qin period. With their publications they endeavoured to win over the public’s support for a political revolution against the absolute monarchy of the Manchu dynasty. For this purpose, they mobilized the feelings of racial nationalism and tried to create a form of Han racial identity. The appeal to the remote legendary origins of the Han race was one of their central strategies within this project. In this way, they strove to revitalize China’s cultural heritage. While the pre-Qin 〖 period (the period before the reign of the first emperor Qin Shihuangdi 〖࿻ⲷᑍ, who reigned from 221 to 210 BCE) was seen by the National Essence Group as politically and culturally pluralistic, the later centralization of political power, the intensified ideological control and increasingly autocratic rule in the later dynasties were seen as “non-Chinese” (Hon 2003, 247). According to these scholars and activists, the new field of guoxue has to be seen in contrast to junxue ੋᆨ (the word and character jun ੋ should be understood in the sense of 14

For more on this phase of political activism in Zhang’s career see Wong (1989, 4–83). The Subao case was described in Rankin (1971, 69–88).

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“ruler” or “feudal lord”; it has no moral connotations here) practiced by the later dynasties. The polarity between guo and jun hints to the core of the concerns and intentions of these early guoxue promoters. For them, guoxue implied a kind of scholarship from the perspective and in the interest of the nation or country and its inhabitants, the people, while junxue implied the kind of scholarship that was useful for and in the interest of the autocratic rulers. This reminds one of the modern opposition between a historiography from above and a historiography from below which is supposed to uncover events, conflicts and desires that have gone unnoticed in mainstream historiography. It was argued that the junxue of the later dynasties had led to a situation in which there was “neither love of the nation nor learning to serve the nation” (Deng Shi, quoted in Hon 2003, 252), while guoxue was characterised by a critical view of the autocratic rule. Guoxue thinkers assumed that every individual national culture constituted a living organism that developed in accordance with the evolution of mankind. Thus, national cultures are also subjected to the Darwinian concept of the “struggle for survival”. Guoxue is seen as the original Chinese scholarship that had been perverted by the rule of imperial dynasties and foreign influences. It is, therefore, seen as the transmitter of the essence of national culture. In order to revitalize Chinese national culture and the “soul of the nation” (guohun ഭ兲),15 which is thought to be “housed” in guoxue, a revival of national scholarship is required (Zarrow 2007, 23 f.). The guoxue project was a response to the Chinese crisis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As a result of the intrusion of the Western powers and the defeat of the Chinese navy in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty and traditional identity were shattered. With the aim of strengthening the Han Chinese national or racial identity and establishing a strong Chinese nation and nation state, reformers and nationalists started to deal with issues such as the origin of the Chinese nation and the essence of Chinese culture. The establishment of national studies was an essential part of their project of creating (or inventing; cf. Harrison 2001) a Han nation. While pursuing this aim, they followed Western models that had been transmitted to China via Japan. Their efforts thus echoed European discourses on the origins and ancestors 15

This is another loanword from the Japanese, used to translate the idea of “Volksseele”, “Volksgeist” and “Nationalgeist” in German romanticism. For more on the evolution and meaning of this word in the thoughts of Justus Möser and Johann Gottfried Herder see Kohn (1962, 335, 353–58, 406–29).

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of modern nations, and closely resembled the nineteenth century European endeavours to write national histories and histories of national literatures. In nineteenth century Europe, historiography’s meaning lay primarily in its contribution to the formation of a unified nation. For example, it was important for German historians to trace the origins of the German nation in early antiquity, so that they could prove the alleged continuity of German tribes from the Roman times to contemporary Germans, and thus construct a genealogy of the nation. The foundation of the German Second Reich in 1871 could be seen as the realization of the meaning of historical evolution.16 At the time, German historians argued that their central task consisted in clarifying the origins of the Germans and the beginning of German history. In one author’s view the historical research on these topics profited from the results of the studies on historical linguistics, which have “established the origin of Germans, determined an infinitely extended prehistory of our people and proven that it is related to other European peoples …”. Thus, according to this author, a Deutsche Alterthumskunde could be established, and this presumably showed that “our people” were a branch of the great Indo-German or Aryan family of peoples, Aryans, as the primeval people had called themselves, i.e. the noble ones, or the masters, in contrast to the neighbouring barbarians speaking foreign tongues (Arnold 1879, 3).

Similarly, Chinese proponents of national studies such as Zhang Taiyan, Liu Shipei, Huang Jie, and others tried to establish a genealogy of the Han nation with the Yellow Emperor as its first ancestor, and wrote national histories modelled after European examples. It is equally significant that––similar to nineteenth century German historiography–– historical phonology played an essential role in Zhang Taiyan’s version of guoxue (see below). At about the same time and in the same intellectual and political context, the new discipline of Germanistik, the study of German literature and its history, was established. The intention of some of the pioneers of this new discipline resembled the intentions of the pioneers of Chinese national studies during the first decades of the twentieth century. In the 16

See Lutz 1987, 12; and Hobsbawm, who speaks of the necessity of “inventing traditions” and “historic continuity (…) by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity either by semi-fiction (…) or by forgery (…)” (Hobsbawm 1983, 7).

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eyes of one of its early representatives, the central task of Germanistik was to explain how did the German nation come into being and demonstrate the special characteristics and the singularity of the German spirit (des deutschen Geistes). Thus, German studies were supposed to be useful in establishing a system of national ethics (Greß 1971, 34, 42; Hermand 1994, 30–34). I will not go into greater detail at this point; in the context of our discussion of the ideas of guoxue pioneers from the early twentieth century, it is interesting to see that their concerns were similar to those of European scholars in the age of nationalism and nation building. 17

The “Master of National Studies” When released from prison in 1906, Zhang Taiyan went into his second exile in Japan. There, he joined the revolutionary Tongmenghui and became the editor-in-chief of its journal Minbao ≁ ๡ (People’s News). While in Japan, he not only contributed articles to the National Essence Group’s journal but also continued with his scholarly activities. He founded the Guoxue jiangxihui ഻ᆨ䅋㘂ᴳ (“National Studies Lecture Society”) where he gave lectures on the subject of guoxue. Once the Republic was established Zhang continued with his activities in this field and devoted the remaining years of his life to lecturing and publishing with the aim of reviving traditional Chinese scholarship. Thus, in a series of lectures in 1922, Zhang gave a systematic exposition of the topics and the methodology of guoxue. He specifically edited journals devoted to this and related subjects.18 Upon his return to Suzhou towards the end of his life, he revived the National Studies Lecture Society (Tang 1997, 3). It appears that Zhang Taiyan was the scholar who contributed the most to the development of this school or discipline during his lifetime. It is therefore right for Zhang to be seen as the ancestor of today’s new guoxue. By presenting and analyzing Zhang’s concise introduction to guoxue 17 Arif Dirlik pointed out certain more or less contemporary parallels: “Saxophile responses to nation-building in nineteenth century Russia, the re-writing of history in twentieth-century Turkey, the return to the pre-Ottoman past in Arab nationalist historiography, or the search in Indian history for an authoritative native past in the pre-Moghul times” (Dirlik 2011, 9). The trend of writing and publishing new comprehensive Histories of China from a nationalist perspective, popular in the last decade of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century, is described in Yü 1987 and Hon 2007. 18 Namely Huaguo 㨟഻ (China) (1923–1926), and the short-lived Zhiyan ࡦ䀰 (Careful Speech) (1935).

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which was first published in 1922 (and reprinted in 1997) I intend to convey the impression of his intellectual and rhetorical style as well as his intellectual legacy. This will provide a historical perspective on the concerns, themes and intentions of the current guoxue movement. In one of the early issues of Minbao, the organ of the revolutionary Tongmenghui, Zhang defined the task he envisioned for the new field of studies: What we are calling national studies is the original source which establishes and forms a nation. I have heard that in a world of competition it is certainly not sufficient to merely promote national studies in order to found the nation. I have, however, never heard that a nation could be founded without flourishing national studies. I have heard of cases in which a nation has vanished while its national studies have not vanished, but I have never heard of a case where its national studies have vanished while the nation is still in existence. (Zhang 1906, 124)

Zhang’s series of lectures in Shanghai (published in November 1922 as Guoxue gailun ഻ᆨᾲ䄆 Outline of National Studies, Zhang 1997) started on March 1 and ended on June 17. Each lecture was announced in Shanghai’s leading daily Shenbao ⭣ ๡ , which also carried extensive reports on the contents of each lecture. Over 600 people attended the first lecture, and as the lecture hall could only hold 350 people, they had to change to another venue. 400 people turned up for the second lecture, but by the final lectures, the number of listeners dwindled to 70 or 80 (Tang 1997, 4–6). In his lectures, Zhang divided guoxue into four branches: a) The study of history. This topic was not discussed in detail, because, as Zhang said, “history cannot be explained in lectures, (…) one has to make an effort to study the books by oneself.” (Zhang 1997, 6) b) The study of canonical texts and of the later schools associated with each of these texts and engaged in their exegesis. Zhang also touched upon the controversy between the so-called Old Text and New Text traditions, clearly showing his sympathy for the Old Text versions, while accusing the New Text tradition of religious tendencies. Thus, the New Text interpretation of the Hongfan ⍚ㇴ (“Great Plan”) is said to be “close to religion”, while the Gongyang ‫ ޜ‬㖺 commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals is “very far from the facts”, and its New Text exegesis is “extremely strange”; similarly, Dong Zhongshu’s 㪓Ԣ㡂 Chunqiu fanlu

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᱕⿻㑱䵢 (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals) has “many strange passages” (Zhang 1997, 20).19 As far as the methodology is concerned, Zhang stressed that the canonical texts have to be studied as historical documents and not as religious texts. They have to be analyzed in the perspective of textual and historical criticism. Zhang also provided critical comments on the misinterpretations of these texts by Zhu Xi ᵡ ⟩ and other Song ᆻ scholars (ibid., 26). Interestingly, he blamed the “environment, in which thought could not be freely developed” for the errors in the Song exegesis (ibid., 25). In opposition to the Song scholars, the achievements of the Qing textual criticism were praised. Thus, Zhang expressed his agreement with the textual criticism of Qing scholars such as Mao Qiling ∋ཷ喑, Hui Dong ᜐᶡ, Dai Zhen ᡤ䴷, Wang Niansun ⦻ᘥᆛ and others (ibid., 27 f.).20 c) The study of philosophy, zhexue ଢᆨ, which, he said, was mostly contained in the zibu ᆀ 䜘 (philosopher’s) section of the Imperial Catalogue siku quanshu ഋᓛ‫ޘ‬ᴨ (Zhang 1997, 30). Zhang addressed the respective merits and demerits of the Sayings (Lunyu 䄆䃎) of Confucius ᆄᆀ, Mengzi ᆏᆀ, Xunzi 㥰ᆀ, Laozi’s 㘱ᆀ Daodejing 䚃ᗧ㏃, and above all Zhuangzi 㦺ᆀ. The essence of Zhuangzi’s philosophy was seen in the terms of ziyou 㠚⭡ and pingdeng ᒣㅹ (“freedom” and “equality”– –these are the somewhat anachronistic terms used by Zhang himself). This “yearning for freedom and equality is common to all mankind”, he commented (ibid., 34). Zhang went to considerable lengths to demonstrate the closeness of Zhuangzi’s ideas to Buddhism. Despite his own Buddhist leanings and objections to Song philology and their exegesis of the classics, he admonished his audience not to engage in the study of Buddhist philosophy without previous intellectual preparation. Young people need a kind of intellectual immunization first, and only after having studied Confucianism or, as he calls it, Ruxue ݂ᆨ, should a student be exposed to Buddhist ideas. Texts by the Song Neo-Confucians are

19

For a study of the Old Text––New Text issue see van Ess 1993. The Hongfan is a chapter of the Shangshu ቊᴨ (Book of Documents). Zhang had been an adherent of the Old Text tradition of the classics, while Kang Youwei, whom Zhang had supported for some time, was a principal proponent of the New Text version. This disagreement probably represented the basic motive for the split between the two. (see Chang 1987, 107–8) 20 For a survey of this school and some of its representatives see Elman 1984.

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recommended as the best introduction to the study of Confucianism (Zhang 1997, 48). d) The fourth branch of guoxue is literature–wenxue ᮷ ᆨ . In the present context it is not possible to go into the details of Zhang’s explanation of traditional genres, individual poets, and prose writers. It is obvious that he followed the traditional categories and divisions into different genres of prose and lyrical writing. In line with traditional views, poetry obviously occupies the highest rank in literature. Zhang devoted the greatest part of his text to descriptions of traditional poetry from the Shijing 䂙㏃ (Book of Songs) prior to the late imperial times, while failing to mention the category xiaoshuo ሿ䃚 (fiction) or any of the great novels of the Ming and Qing periods. His conservative approach to the interpretation of classical literature is nicely illustrated by his comments on the views of the Song philologist Huang Chaoying 哳ᵍ㤡.21 Huang formulated an unorthodox view of the Book of Songs, a view that is shared by certain modern interpreters, but seen by Zhang Taiyan with disgust: “Mr. Huang … sees the (songs of the) Shijing as (texts where) males and females seduce each other. This is at least a thousand miles away from the original intention of the Shijing.” (Zhang 1997, 26)22 Zhang Taiyan’s introduction to guoxue is characterized by its stress on rationality, empirical facts and down-to-earth philological methods. Its catchphrases are: “The canonical texts dealing with history are not myths”; “the canonical texts dealing with philosophy are not religion”; “history is not fiction” (ibid., 1). As far as the methodology of guoxue is concerned, Zhang started off by demanding textual criticism which would establish a reliable textual basis; this should be followed by empirical studies in historical phonology, historical exegesis, and the etymology of characters; other indispensable disciplines for the study of guoxue are historical geography, and the study of the historical evolution of mentalities. However, his critical attitude does not go so far as to question the records of the legendary emperors in the Wudi benji ӄᑍᵜ㌰ (“Basic Annals of the Five Emperors”) of Sima Qian’s ਨ俜䚧 Shiji ਢ䁈 (Records of the

21

Hardly any biographical data on Huang can be found in the standard biographical reference works; the book mentioned by Zhang is listed with a short description in the Zibu section of the Imperial Catalogue Siku quanshu. (see Yong 1987, 1017 f) 22 For more on the somewhat “puritan” interpretation of the Shijing in the Song period see Mittag 1993.

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Grand Historian). 23 He believed beyond any doubt that the Yellow Emperor and his successors were historical figures (Zhang 1989, 3). As outlined in his lectures Zhang’s concept of guoxue represented an ambitious program with the aim of establishing a new field or academic discipline, but definitely not a program for a popular movement or a new ethics. When reading the lecture notes, one can easily understand why the number of people attending dwindled dramatically in the course of the lectures. Obviously, his audience at the time was hoping for some kind of moral orientation. They expected to hear clear messages related to their immediate concerns, and clear statements on the issues of the intellectual debates of the time. Instead, they were offered a sober plea for a serious historical study, philological analysis and textual criticism. None of the contemporary debates and themes were explicitly discussed, the political issues were not mentioned, and the much debated issue of Westernization vs. Chineseness was also not brought up.

Guoxue––Past and Present One cannot help but wonder why should Zhang Taiyan’s version of guoxue appeal to today’s readers and students. I doubt that today’s guoxue fever has a lot in common with Zhang’s original version of guoxue. Let me confront Zhang’s views with the views of Liu Dong ࡈь, one of the most prominent promoters of the new guoxue. In a recent article, Liu claimed that the guoxue renaissance in the 1990s was a popular movement, not initiated by any circles related to the ruling party or the government. I am in no position to assess the truth of this statement. However, in line with such mouthpieces of the CCP as Xinhua News, Liu Dong sees an affirmative attitude to Confucianism as essential for the survival of Chinese culture and even of the Chinese nation. In this article he states: I insist (...) that the continued destruction of tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition, will not help overcome China’s moral anomie. Without the constraint of Confucianism, Yang-Zhu egoist philosophy 24 23

For a translation see Nienhauser (1994). For more on the rediscovery of the “Yellow Emperor” and his role in the early nationalist discourse see Kühner (2006). 24 Liu Dong alluded to the teachings of the school of the philosopher Yang Zhu ὺ ᵡ who is believed to have lived between 440 and 360 BCE. No single work can be attributed to him with certainty; some of the sayings attributed to him were transmitted in the works of other thinkers; the book Liezi ࡇᆀ, probably dating

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could be re-activated by Western individualism and celebrated as “advanced theory” (xianjin xueshuo). For this reason, although the “guoxue fever” may not prevent profit-making activities in its current initial stage, I still have faith that the inherent value system of Chinese culture will remain the most vital and effective means of regulating the public moral life and enriching the Chinese historical experience. For this reason, I believe in the unique and positive impact of “guoxue fever” on China’s future. Based on this faith, I have no hesitation asserting that if Chinese civilization is to survive, Chinese tradition deserves to be popularized and traditional guoxue, especially Ruxue, must reach even greater constituencies. (Liu 2011, 46)

Liu’s statement shows that, compared to Zhang Taiyan’s intention and praxis, today’s guoxue has acquired a different status and serves a different purpose. Today, guoxue has become an official project, backed and promoted by both the CCP and the government. This is illustrated by the following item published by Xinhua News Agency in 2010: Beijing cultural festival promotes national learning In Beijing, the country’s first ever Guoxue Cultural Festival kicked off on Saturday night at Guozijian, China’s highest academic institution during the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. The festival opened with performances by Ha Hui, the image ambassador of Guoxue (sic!). Ha elaborately incorporated the essence of Li, an important part of traditional Chinese philosophy, into her recital and singing. Although Ha’s singing was backed by Chinese court music, her performance was refreshed b the rearrangement of ancient tunes with the help of modern musical instruments. (...) The open air performance Saturday night was held in front of the Biyong Hall of Guozijian, which is regarded as the highest institute of learning in China's traditional educational system. It houses the Confucian temple, in which emperors in imperial China regularly conducted ceremonies honouring Confucius, the all-time-greatest Chinese thinker (sic!) and social philosopher. (...) Over the recent years, there’s been nationwide enthusiasm for the study of Confucianism. And the study of Guoxue, meaning the study and appreciation of traditional Chinese history, culture, arts and literature, is also on the increase. from the third century, contains one chapter entitled Yang Zhu. However, its authenticity is disputed. The ideas expressed in this chapter are close to philosophical Daoism. According to his critic Mengzi ᆏᆀ, Yang Zhu’s ideas betray the state and argue for radical egoism. Mengzi also stated that Yang Zhu would not have sacrificed a single hair to save the world. (see Roetz 1992, 386–93)

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Obviously, the concerns and intentions of today’s guoxue promoters, both in academic circles and in politics, go beyond the concerns of its pioneers such as Zhang Taiyan. Today, general political and cultural themes are stressed, and the guoxue revival has evolved into a comprehensive political and cultural project, while the original academic aims were pushed into the background. While Zhang Taiyan had a skeptical outlook on Confucianism in its various historical forms and transformations, present-day promoters of national studies do not see only the essential trait of Chinese civilization in Confucianism, but also a remedy for the negative consequences of modernization. Another trait that was essential for the first generation of guoxue scholars is lost in the present version of guoxue. For nationalist scholars and activists such as Zhang Taiyan, Liu Shipei and others, guoxue was defined in opposition to junxue––studies in the interest of the ruling autocracy. These egalitarian and anti-autocratic features seem to be forgotten. On the other hand, when compared to the grand claims of today’s guoxue promoters, Zhang Taiyan’s project was (although ambitious as regards academic issues) much more modest in scope. He did not claim that guoxue would offer answers to the actual crisis and solve contemporary problems in his 1922 lectures. The lectures were an invitation and an exhortation to the young people of his times to read the classical texts with a critical spirit, and then acquire all the necessary methodological competence to perform empirical studies, textual criticism and exegesis. In present day China, guoxue is revived by intellectual circles and promoted by the authorities. However, this is taking place in a context that is fundamentally different from its historical and political aspects in China during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is therefore only logical that the current aims and features of national studies in China, backed, promoted and subsidised by state and party organs, differ from the guoxue of the late Qing and early Republican period. Due to the changed context, the revival of guoxue plays a new role and serves different needs. In the previously quoted article Liu Dong gives a few hints as regards the new tasks of national studies today. However, he does not present a comprehensive account of today’s guoxue movement, since he omits the aspect of its sponsorship by political authorities. Only some of the aspects

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of the change of function that guoxue is experiencing today were described in this paper. Additional studies will have to be made in order to arrive at a comprehensive picture of today’s guoxue and of the concerns and aims of its promoters within the civil society, party departments and government bodies.

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100. Todestages, edited by Horst Fuhrmann, 11–30. München: Stiftung Historisches Kolleg. Makeham, John, ed. 2003. New Confucianism: A Critical Examination. New York: Palgrave. —. 2011. “The Revival of Guoxue. Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Aspirations.” China Perspectives 1: 14–21. Accessed February 20, 2015. http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5372. Mei, Guangdi ẵ‫ݹ‬䘚. 1922. “Ping tichang xin wenhuazhe 䂅ᨀّᯠ᮷ॆ 㘵.” Xueheng ᆨ㺑 1: n.p. Mittag, Achim. 1993. “Change in Shijing Exegesis: Some Notes on the Rediscovery of the Musical Aspects of the ‘Odes’ in the Song Period.” T’oung Pao 1 (29): 197–224. Müller, Gotelind. 2001. China, Kropotkin und der Anarchismus. Eine Kulturbewegung im China des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts unter dem Einfluß des Westens und japanischer Vorbilder. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Nienhauser, William H., ed. 1994. The Grand Scribe’s Records, Vol 1. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Rankin, Mary Backus. 1971. Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Roetz, Heiner. 1992. Die chinesische Ethik der Achsenzeit. Eine Rekonstruktion unter dem Aspekt des Durchbruchs zu postkonventionellem Denken. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Schneider, Axel. 2001. “Bridging the Gap: Attempts at Constructing a ‘New’ Historical-Cultural Identity in the People’s Republic of China.” East Asian History 22: 129–44. Schneider, Laurence A. 1976. “National Essence and the New Intelligentsia.” In The Limits of Change. Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, 57–89. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Tang, Xiaobing. 1996. Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tang, Zhijun ⒟ᘇ䡎. 1997. “‘Guoxue gailun’ daodu ‘഻ᆨᾲ䄆’ ሾ䆰.” Zhang: 1–19. Weber, Ralph. 2011: “Konfuzianische Selbstkultivierung als Philosophem und Politikum.” Polylog 26: 19–42. Wong, Young-tsu. 1989. Search for Modern Nationalism. Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China 1869–1936. Hongkong: Oxford University Press.

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Xinhua News Agency. 2010. “Guoxue Cultural Festival Promotes National Learning.” Accessed February 20, 2015. http://china.org.cn/ learning_chinese/news/2010-08 /11/content_20684718.htm. Xue ren bu. Guoxue dashi. 2015. “Liu Yizheng”. Accessed February 20, 2015. http://www.guoxue.com/master/lyzh/lyzh.htm. Yong, Rong ≨⪒ et al. (1965) 1987. Siku quanshu zongmu ഋᓛ‫ޘ‬ᴨ㑭. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Yü, Ying-Shih. 1987. “Changing Conceptions of National History in Twentieth Century China.” In Conceptions of National History. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78, edited by Erik Lönnroth et al., 155–74. Berlin: De Gruyter. Zarrow, Peter. 2007. “The New Schools and National Identity: Chinese History Textbooks in the Late Qing.” In The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp, 21–54. Leiden: Brill. Zhang Taiyan ㄐཚ⚾ (penname: Guoxue jiangxihui faqiren ഻ᆨ䅋㘂ᴳ Ⲭ䎧Ӫ). 1906. “Guoxue jiangxihui xu ഻ᆨ䅋㘂ᴳᒿ.” Minbao ≁๡ 7: 124–30. —. (1922) 1997. Guoxue gailun ഻ ᆨ ᾲ 䄆 . Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe. Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. “Greatness and Nationalist Writing in the 1990s.” China Quarterly 152: 725–45. Zheng, Shiqu. 1997. Wan Qing guocuipai: Wenhua sixiang yanjiu. ᲊ␵഻ ㋩⍮˖᮷ॆᙍᜣ⹄ウ. Beijing: Beijing shida chubanshe. “Zhongguoshehuikexueyuan jiaoshou Yu Dunkang zuoke xinlang tan guoxue yuantou ѝ഻⽮ᴳ、ᆨ䲒ᮉᦸ։ᮖᓧ‫ڊ‬ᇒᯠ⎚䃷഻ᆨⓀ九.” 2006. Accessed February 15, 2015. http://blog.sina.com.cn/lm/8/2006/ 0825/5997.html.

CHAPTER THREE XU FUGUAN’S COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT YOU IN ZHUANGZI’S AND KONGZI’S AESTHETICS TÉA SERNELJ

Introduction Xu Fuguan (1903–1982) was a significant twentieth century Chinese philosopher whose theoretical contribution lies in the center of academic interests in China and Taiwan, but has not truly been explored by the Western academic world. Modern Confucianism, the line of thought to which this theoretician belongs, is a discourse within which the development guidelines of the rehabilitation of Chinese traditionalism were most clearly expressed. This fraction developed in the beginning of the twentieth century and was fully established in 1957. On the first day of 1958 a group of Taiwanese and Hong Kong philosophers published the famous Declaration for the Re-evaluation of the Chinese Culture as a World Heritage (Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shiji erenshi xuanyan ⛪ ѝ഻ ᮷ॆᮜ੺ц⭼Ӫ༛ᇓ). This document represents the fundamental manifest which specifies the goals and contents of Modern Confucianism (Sernelj 2013, 73). Besides Xu Fuguan the members of the group that published this declaration included Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang, 1887–1969), Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), and Tang Junyi (1909–1978). These Modern theoreticians are still believed to be the founders of Modern Confucianism as a system that aimed to provide a systematic reinterpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy (and thus, of Chinese culture in general) through the lens of a deeper and broader understanding of Western––in particular Plato’s, Kant’s, and Hegel’s––philosophy (Bresciani 2001, 27).

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These philosophers are generally referred to as the main representatives of the second generation of Modern Confucianism (Bresciani 2001, 27). In contrast to the pioneers of this movement who (at least until 1949, but most of them until their death) lived in mainland China, most of the second generation lived and worked in Taiwan, and some in Hong Kong. Most Modern Confucians saw the modernization process as a kind of world rationalization. In the search for a new philosophical basis, they mainly focused on the questions connected to ontology which they usually came to know in the framework of Western ideas and philosophical systems. Generally they followed the premise according to which the questions of the innermost reality of the universe, the substance of being and the Absolute, are the very questions that determine the meaning of human life (ibid.). As such, these questions are essential for the establishment of a new, modern society, as well as for the preservation of an integrated, un-alienated cultural and personal identity of Chinese individuals. The Modern Confucianist current emerged from the attempt to synthesize Western and Chinese traditional thought, whereas at their time, these attempts were defined with the crisis of both discourses (Rošker 2013, 75). The ideals of Modern Confucians were not limited to the striving for revitalization and rehabilitation of ideological traditions from which they arose; in this respect it was obvious that they could begin the intellectual process of modernizing Confucianism only on the basis of its synthesis with ideas “imported” from the Euro-American philosophy, because this philosophy represented the very cultural context from which modernization actually emerged. However, their efforts were not derived merely from the tendency to find a solution for their own tradition, but also from their attempts to rescue this foreign ideological tradition which was irrevocably trapped into its own philosophical straps. In general, the members of the “second generation” strove to revitalise their cultural identity in the sense of “transplanting the old roots” of their own tradition, because they considered this method to be the only possible way in which the cultural tradition from which they arose could survive. However, this renovation of the “roots” should not have merely served as a tool that would enable the survival of the Chinese tradition. The members of the second generation (including Xiong Shili) sincerely hoped that it could also provide new methods for the elaboration and further development of the general philosophy and ethics on the global level.

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They believed that if this renovation of traditional Chinese thought was carried out conscientiously and accurately, this could lead to the establishment of a new philosophical system of modernised Chinese thought that could become actively involved in international dialogues in modern societies. Xu Fuguan’s research fields mainly covered philosophy, sociology of culture and literary and art criticism. He is one of the first theoreticians of the specific Chinese aesthetics in Contemporary Chinese thought. Although Xu was primarily an excellent essay writer, he also excelled with his broad knowledge on the development of ancient Chinese society, especially concerning its political, spiritual, and cultural characteristics. Because of his special interests, he did not publish excessively profound philosophical discussions like most Modern Confucians. Nevertheless, his fundamental methodological approach that determined his specific vision of the conceptual development of traditional Chinese spiritual culture remains widely unknown, even though the results of his studies in this field are extremely interesting and could represent an important contribution to further research in comparative cultural studies.

Xu Fuguan’s Concept of Concerned Consciousness and Bodily Recognition Almost all Modern Confucians emphasized the importance of building the new ontology that could serve as the basis for the Confucian renewal. Xu Fuguan was practically the only representative of the second generation of Modern Confucians to consider that metaphysics and ontology were not appropriate instruments for understanding ancient Chinese thought, and even less so for the development of its interpretation, as, according to him, its pragmatic nucleus has never led to a composition or structured and coherent metaphysical system, as had been established, for instance, by the ancient Greek philosophers (Sernelj 2013, 80). Instead, ancient Chinese philosophers developed the idea of ethics based on the “divine or heavenly” essence of human beings directly from the “primitive” state of religious and mythological society. The traditional religious concepts which represented the central parts of the dominant beliefs during the early Zhou dynasty, dissolved almost completely once the new culture which implied both, agrarian as well as nomadic elements, was consolidated. This turning point was extremely important, for it indicated that the Chinese society had already entered the

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period which had been labelled as the “Axial period” by Karl Jaspers (Sernelj 2013, 98). Xu claimed that this transformation did not emerge because people recognized their own limitations and were therefore directed towards the search for some kind of transcendent and infinite existence which could lead to the establishment of a monotheistic religion; on the contrary: they recognized the limitations of deities, and thus focused upon the real world and the problems connected to human relations and the regulation of society. Thus this important shift in Chinese history did not manifest any kind of a “breakthrough towards transcendence”; instead, it marked a “breakthrough towards humanities” (ibid.). All of this indicates an important difference in the intellectual and spiritual development of Chinese and European cultures after the “axial period”. While the latter stepped on the path of “more developed” forms or stages of religion, the further ideal development of the Chinese society was not determined by any turn towards monotheism, but rather to the pragmatically defined search for an ideal social order. The reason for this orientation lies in the fact that a major religious crisis emerged in China before the onset of the axial age, in which Heaven as the supreme god and supreme moral instance lost its credibility. As this morally defined religion lost all of its moral glitter during the early western Zhou dynasty period, it would be difficult to overcome the doubt that already prevailed amongst the broadest strata of the population and reestablish the theological mindset that would enable the development of a monotheistic religion. Thus the supreme deity was replaced with the belief in the rational structure of the universe, while the concept tian ཙ, which previously denoted “Heaven” (in a spiritual sense), was simply turned into “nature”. (ibid., 99) Xu Fuguan (and some other representatives of the second generation, in particularly Mou Zongsan) followed the assumption that due to this social transformation, the idea of Heaven or nature transformed from an anthropomorphic force majeure into something that defines the inner reality of every human being. Xu Fuguan pointed out that original Confucianism tried to establish an ethical basis for the moral decisions within the idea of subjective justice, which should have replaced the previous fear of ghosts (or, in other words, the hope for heavenly salvation instead of suffering in hell) as a basic criterion. (ibid.) He pointed out that the reason for this transformation lied in the higher level of spiritual development, which contrasted the transformations that lead to monotheistic religions that were based upon the idea of an

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(external) God. In his opinion, this transformation led to humanism which is based on a rather high level of “self-awareness” (㠚㿪ᙗ). Xu believed that the basic characteristic of the Chinese philosophic tradition lied in its origin in the concerned consciousness (youhuan yishi ឲᛓ᜿䆈), which contrasted the beginning of the Western philosophic tradition, which was marked by the sense of curiosity as regards the human being and the natural world. According to Xu, Chinese traditional culture and philosophy are based on the sense of concerned consciousness which lead Chinese tradition towards the search for virtue and value rather than science and understanding, and towards moral practice rather than speculation. Xu believed that the “sense of concerned consciousness” results from man’s first awakening to his/her own responsibility to the world and will eventually solve the quandary because he/she is morally autonomous (Sernelj 2013, 91). The sense of concerned consciousness leads to the discovery, understanding and transformation of human beings. It is a psychological state in which one feels responsible to overcome difficulties by the virtue of one’s own efforts. It originated from a moral conscience, an anxiety over not having one’s moral quality cultivated and not having learned. It is a sense of responsibility, responsiveness, discernment and self-reflexivity (ibid.). In Xu’s opinion, the transformation of the ancient “external Deities” into the inner Moral Self represents an important, specifically Chinese contribution to the ethical heritage of humanity. Xu believed that the concept of concerned consciousness (youhuan yishi) was closely linked to the traditional Chinese belief, according to which body and mind are interconnected. Xu Fuguan repeatedly pointed out that the body is in the centre of the Confucian interest; most Confucian philosophers found their theoretical models upon the direct presence of the body and physical discipline, although they always ended up focusing on men’s social duties (ibid., 86). However, Xu Fuguan’s main interest focused on the relation between the concept qi ≓ in the sense of an organism (i.e. an organic body) and the concept xin ᗳ in the sense of a consciousness or human heart-mind. As already mentioned, Xu argued that we can’t find anything similar to the Western metaphysic tradition in Chinese philosophy; on the contrary, one of the basic characteristics of Chinese philosophy lies in its immanent transcendence which means that everything that appears in the abstract sphere, can exist––at least possibly––also on the physical level. He placed

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the binary category of the heart-mind on one side and the body on the other, at the centre of the two he paced human reasoning and the cosmos. He suggested that Chinese philosophy and the heart-mind culture should be considered as a mesophysics rather than metaphysics––not only because of the above mentioned characteristics of Chinese philosophy, but also because of the physiological basis and implications of the heart’s functions for value (and moral) judgments (Sernelj 2013, 86). According to Xu, bodily recognition or tiren 億䂽 is a retrospective and active process in which “the subject uncovers moral subjectivity from the pseudo-subjectivity of human desires and affirms it, develops it”. One reveals one’s own moral nature through “overcoming the self” and “reducing sensual desires.” By freeing oneself from these constraints, the subject lets the original mind emerge. The way to determine what desires and inclinations need to be overcome is the same as the way that reveals moral subjectivity: bringing whatever feelings and ideas one experiences before the light of moral subjectivity in one’s heart-mind, and seeing whether one can still take the feelings and ideas at ease. (Ni 2002, 289) Xu agrees with the Cheng brothers and Wang Yangming as regards the existence of the identity of the Heaven and the human heart-mind which can be directly experienced through bodily recognition. If this is the case, Heaven and its moral implications are not abstract to humans, but rather implemented in our physiological and psychological structure. Therefore, in order to achieve the unity of Heaven as the moral instance and human nature, we are able to reduce the sensations and feelings that do not follow the way of the heart-mind (ibid.). The method of achieving such unity is the learning for self (weiji zhi xue ⛪ᐡ㘵ᆨ), which is not learning merely to understand others, for it serves for discovering, opening, transforming and completing oneself through which one turns the biological self into a moral, rational and artistic self. The concepts of concerned consciousness and bodily recognition that were briefly described above were also tightly connected to Xu’s specific interpretation of the concept you––which is manifested as a state of (spiritual) wandering or searching delight––for they represented its methodological and theoretical basis.

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Xu Fuguan’s Comparison of the Concept you in the Aesthetics of Zhuangzi and Kongzi Xu Fuguan’s main motivation for writing The Spirit of Chinese Art (Zhongguo yishu jingshen ѝ഻㰍㺃㋮⾎) in 1966 was his reaction to the contemporary art deriving to Taiwan from the West. He criticized the unreflective and uncritical acquisition of Western modern and postmodern art and culture by young Taiwanese intellectuals and artists and strove for a deeper understanding and acknowledgement of their own cultural tradition. It is therefore understandable that this book contains a rather broad spectrum of Western philosophical categories, especially aesthetics and phenomenology, e.g. the works of Husserl, Lipps, Heidegger, etc., through which Xu tried to point out that the Chinese tradition, especially Zhuangzi’s and Kongzi’s thought, already contained concepts (questions and even answers) occupying Western contemporary philosophy which became popular in Taiwan at the time. He regarded modern Western art as a symbol of destruction because of its intellect oriented, materialistic and alienated worldview, in which science and capitalism destroyed the balance of virtue and gave rise to irrational, anti–humanistic modern Western ideas such as logical positivism, behaviourism and psycho–analysis (Lee 1998, 309). Xu believed that modern art was an expression of a turbulent, grotesque and dismal primitive life force that will lead human beings backwards, towards complete destruction (ibid.). Xu’s greatest critique of modernism and postmodernism was that they were ignorant of their social responsibility, values and cultural tradition, in which the human spirit should be liberated from its constraints. Xu argued that modernism and postmodernism criticized the existing social and political order, but didn’t manage to establish a new and better one. Furthermore, Xu tried to highlight that the postmodernist effort to liberate the human spirit was not exclusively reserved to Western thought, as it could also be found in Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Xu’s fear that young Taiwanese artists were eager to absorb such a Western worldview lay in the fact that they considered themselves not as a component of a specific society, but as members of the human race (ibid., 318). This fear was quite understandable in the light of the specific social, political and economic development of the Taiwanese society. Xu Fuguan’s evaluation of art was based on the Confucian idea of humanity which contained moral and cognitive faculties, with the implication that morality inhibits the drive of sensual desires, whereas

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cognitive faculties could be mastered. In respect to the basic characteristic of the sense of concerned consciousness, according to which everybody was equal in terms of the moral nature conferred by Heaven and as divine as Heaven, this postulation of immanence encouraged man’s sense of responsibility toward his/her behaviour and guaranteed the meaning of life in this world (Lee 1998, 325). This evaluation of art is based on the Traditional Chinese aesthetics which does not consider the problem of aesthetics to be a problem of knowledge and does not pursue the answer for the questions as to what beauty and aesthetics are (as pursued by western aesthetics), but is set in the background of humanity and the reflection of human life in which philosophy, aesthetics and life experience are integrated into a whole (Xu 2006, 216). It is almost needless to expose the axiology of aesthetics in Chinese Tradition. As it is written in Shuowen jiezi 䃚᮷䀓ᆇ, beauty and good are in fact synonyms (mei yu shan tongyi 㖾㠷ழ਼᜿). The actuality of this innate relation is most clearly expressed in Kongzi’s thought, however Xu believed that the aesthetic spirit of Chinese tradition in the sense of art of life is best seen in Zhuangzi’s philosophy of Xiaoyao you 䘽䚉䙺 or free and easy wandering. Xu recognized Zhuangzi’s thought as the best representative of the “Chinese aesthetic spirit”, because of its unity between life and art (Ni 2002, 299) in which Xu considered the “aestheticized outlook on life” to be an equalitarian view of the world (Lee 1998, 326). The traditional Chinese ideas of corresponding and interchanging between nature and man lead to an aesthetic attitude toward life. Hence, Xu Fuguan believed that the aesthetic spirit of the Chinese tradition developed from Zhuangzi’s and Kongzi’s philosophy. More precisely it changed from Kongzi’s to Zhuangzi’s aesthetics. Neither Laozi nor Zhuangzi formulated the aesthetic theory in their philosophy, but Xu argued that although the fulfilment of their Dao 䚃 did not necessarily involve the creation of any art work, Zhuangzi’s speculation on the “art of life” unwittingly created the highest aesthetic spirit that consequently made artistic activities possible (ibid., 326). Zhuangzi’s philosophy of wandering at ease or xiaoyao you 䘽䚉䙺 is comprised of gongfu ࣏ ཛ , the aesthetic perfection, freedom and liberalization of the human spirit to achieve unity with Dao. Wandering at ease is the state of being free from all attachments, expectations and any type of utilitarianism. It has no external aim, but is in harmony and unity

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with Dao. This unity represents the ultimate state of a liberated human spirit. According to Zhuangzi, the freedom of human spirit and the emancipation from secularity of human existence can be achieved in two ways. The first way is to achieve the liberation of the human spirit and unity with Dao by the methods of xinzhai ᗳ啻 or fasting of the human heartmind and zuowang ඀ᘈ or sitting in forgetfulness. The second option is, as we will see later on, through artistic creativity. In the xinzhai or fasting of the human heart-mind method, bodily and emotional desires and any kind of utilitarian purposes are dispelled and one is able to integrate him/herself with nature and discover (or grasp) its true essence or benti ᵜ億. In sitting in forgetfulness or zuowang, Zhuangzi transcended conceptual or analytical thinking and judgement making decisions gained through the process of socialization and moral cultivation, which is overwhelmed by anxieties, worries, desires, life and death, and tried to open up a way for dissolving the boundaries of interpersonal relations so that one could become one with nature (or Dao). Zhuangzi proposed that one should master or gongfu the methods of fasting of the heart-mind and sitting in forgetfulness, if he wishes to achieve a non-self or wuji ❑ᐡ state of mind, in which one is able to grasp the essence of human life, the universe and all phenomena, not on the basis of cognitive knowledge but on the basis of intuition. As we shall see in the following quotations, Zhuangzi proposed a direct experience of the world. Xu found such a direct experience of the world in the aesthetic view of human life. എᴠ˖ᮒ୿ᗳ啻DŽԢቬᴠ˖㤕аᘇˈᰐ㚭ѻԕ㙣㘼㚭ѻԕᗳˈᰐ㚭ѻ ԕᗳ㘼 㚭ѻԕ≓DŽ㚭→ᯬ㙣ˈᗳ→ᯬㅖDŽ≓ҏ㘵ˈ㲋㘼ᖵ⢙㘵ҏDŽ ୟ䚃䳶㲋DŽ㲋㘵ˈᗳ啻ҏDŽ(Zhuangzi 2015, Neipian: Ren shijie 2) Yan Hui asked: “May I ask about the fasting of the mind?” Confucius answered: “Maintain perfect unity in your will. Do not listen with your ears, but with your mind. Do not listen with your mind, but with qi. For hearing does not go farther than the ears, and the mind does not go farther than symbols. But qi is empty and responds to things. Dao condenses in emptiness. Emptiness is fasting of the mind.”

Perceiving the world and its phenomena with qi means to comprehend qi as a constant change of nature and human emotions. Only in the state of emptiness, in which bodily and emotional desires are dispelled, is one able

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to integrate him/herself with nature and discover its true essence. Therefore, qi is like a mirror that expects nothing and responds to everything. Emptiness is a state of being tranquil and it contains all possibilities (Xu 2006, 220). In such a state one is able to act without interfering (wuwei ❑⛪) with the natural course of Dao and can thus become an integrated part of nature (ibid.). 乿എᴠ˖എ⳺⸓DŽԢቬᴠ˖օ䄲ҏ˛ᴠ˖എᘈӱ㗙⸓DŽᴠ˖ਟ⸓ˈ⥦ ᵚҏDŽԆᰕᗙ㾻ˈᴠ˖എ⳺⸓DŽᴠ˖օ䄲ҏ˛ᴠ˖എᘈ⿞′⸓DŽᴠ˖ ਟ⸓ˈ⥦ᵚҏDŽԆᰕᗙ㾻ˈᴠ˖എ⳺⸓DŽᴠ˖օ䄲ҏ˛ᴠ˖എ඀ᘈ⸓DŽ Ԣቬ䒤❦ᴠ˖օ䄲඀ᘈ˛乿എᴠ˖ໞ㛒億ˈ唌㚠᰾ˈ䴒ᖒ৫⸕ˈ਼ᯬ བྷ䙊ˈ↔䄲඀ᘈDŽԢቬᴠ˖਼ࡷ❑ྭҏˈॆࡷ❑ᑨҏDŽ㘼᷌ަ䌒Ѿʽ шҏ䃻ᗎ㘼ᖼҏDŽ(Zhuangzi 2015, Nei pian, Da Zong shi 9) Yan Hui said: “I’m making progress!” Confucius responded: “How so?” “I’ve forgotten humaneness and righteousness!” “Good, but you still haven’t got it.” They saw each other on another day. Yan Hui said: “I’m making progress!” “How so?” “I’ve forgotten rites and music!” “Good, but you still haven’t got it.” On another day, they met again. Yan Hui said: “I’m making progress!” “How so?” “I sit and forget!” Confucius looked surprised and said: “What do you mean, you sit and forget?” Yan Hui replied: “I destroy my limbs and organs, expel wisdom and sagacity, do away with form, get rid of knowledge, and make myself one with the great thoroughfare. This is what I mean by sitting and forgetting.” Confucius replied: “Being one with it, you must have no likes. Having been transformed, you must have no constancy. So you are one of the worthies after all! I would like to become your disciple.”

Sitting in forgetfulness (zuowang ඀ᘈ) refers to a method that goes beyond the moral implications and the striving to liberalize the human spirit from the bonds of dichotomy between right and wrong. In the above quotation, we can see that Zhuangzi directly addresses Kongzi’s moral teachings that go through the learning of renyi ӱ㗙 and liji ⿞䁈 which enable the individual to realize moral subjectivity on the basis of selfcultivation. Zhuangzi does not consider that the self-cultivation and the realization of the moral self is a sufficient method with which one can accomplish the ultimate freedom of human spirit and unity with Dao. In order to achieve the freedom of the human spirit and become one with Dao, the human spirit should be liberated from the chains of moral restrictions such as e.g. shifei ᱟ䶎, the distinction between right and wrong.

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Zhuangzi’s xiaoyao you is the highest state of the human spirit, which can be achieved with the use of the xinzhai and zuowang methods. It is oneness with Dao. In the process of the fasting of the heart-mind and sitting in forgetfulness one can comprehend the greatest beauty of heaven and earth which doesn’t need to be spoken of. 1 The state of emptiness when facing reality is a form of primordial knowledge that is purely intuitional and that represents Zhuangzi’s perception of beauty (Bresciani, 346). In Zhuangzi’s philosophy unity or oneness with Dao can also be achieved through the process of artistic engagement which is inseparably linked to the previously mentioned methods. In Butcher Ding’s story2 of 1

ཙൠᴹབྷ㖾㘼н䀰 ᓆб⛪᮷ᜐੋ䀓⢋ˈ᡻ѻᡰ䀨ˈ㛙ѻᡰ‫ˈي‬䏣ѻᡰንˈ㟍ѻᡰ䑖ˈ⸹❦ೞ ❦ˈཿ࠰偎❦ˈ㧛нѝ丣DŽਸᯬljẁ᷇NJѻ㡎ˈѳѝlj㏃俆NJѻᴳDŽ᮷ᜐੋ ᴠ˖䅶ʽழૹʽᢰ㫻㠣↔Ѿ˛ᓆб䟻࠰ሽᴠ˖㠓ѻᡰྭ㘵䚃ҏˈ䙢Ѿᢰ⸓DŽ ࿻㠓ѻ䀓⢋ѻᱲˈᡰ㾻ᰐ䶎⢋㘵DŽйᒤѻᖼˈᵚే㾻‫ޘ‬⢋ҏDŽᯩӺѻᱲˈ㠓 ԕ⾎䙷ˈ㘼нԕⴞ㿆ˈᇈ⸕→㘼⾎Ⅲ㹼DŽ‫׍‬Ѿཙ⨶ˈᢩབྷ䜔ˈሾབྷヮˈഐަ പ❦DŽᢰ㏃㛟㏞ѻᵚేˈ㘼⋱བྷ䔡Ѿʽ㢟ᓆ↢ᴤ࠰ˈࢢҏ˗᯿ᓆᴸᴤ࠰ˈᣈ ҏDŽӺ㠓ѻ࠰ॱҍᒤ⸓ˈᡰ䀓ᮨॳ⢋⸓ˈ㘼࠰࠳㤕ᯠⲬᯬ⹾DŽᖬㇰ㘵ᴹ䯃ˈ 㘼࠰࠳㘵ᰐ৊ˈԕᰐ৊‫ޕ‬ᴹ䯃ˈᚒᚒѾަᯬ䙺࠳ᗵᴹ佈ൠ⸓ˈᱟԕॱҍᒤ㘼 ࠰࠳㤕ᯠⲬᯬ⹾DŽ䴆❦ˈ⇿㠣ᯬ᯿ˈ੮㾻ަ䴓⛪ˈᙥ❦⛪ᡂˈ㿆⛪→ˈ㹼⛪ 䚢DŽअ࠰⭊ᗞˈ䄻❦ᐢ䀓ˈྲ൏ငൠDŽᨀ࠰㘼・ˈ⛪ѻഋ亗ˈ⛪ѻ䒺䒷┯ᘇˈ ழ࠰㘼㯿ѻDŽ᮷ᜐੋᴠ˖ழૹʽ੮㚎ᓆбѻ䀰ˈᗇ伺⭏✹DŽ His cook was cutting up an ox for the ruler Wen Hui. Whenever he applied his hand, leaned forward with his shoulder, planted his foot, and employed the pressure of his knee, in the audible ripping off of the skin, and slicing operation of the knife, the sounds were all in regular cadence. Movements and sounds proceeded as in the dance of the “Mulberry Forest” and the blended notes of the King Shou. “The ruler said”, “Ah! Admirable! That your art should have become so perfect!” Having finished his operation, the cook laid down his knife, and replied to the remark, “What your servant loves is the method of the Dao, something in advance of any art. When I first began to cut up an ox, I saw nothing but the (entire) carcase. After three years I ceased to see it as a whole. Now I deal with it in a spirit-like manner, and do not look at it with my eyes. The use of my senses is discarded, and my spirit acts as it wills. Observing the natural lines, (my knife) slips through the great crevices and slides through the great cavities, taking advantage of the facilities thus presented. My art avoids the membranous ligatures, and much more the great bones. A good cook changes his knife every year; it may have been injured in cutting––an ordinary cook changes his every month––it may have been broken. Now my knife has been in use for nineteen years; it has cut up several thousand oxen, and yet its edge is as sharp as if it had newly come from the 2

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the Inner chapters, Zhuangzi emphasizes the importance of xuji 㲋 ᐡ (emptying the self) with the dissolving of the opposition between the subject and the object on one hand and the opposition between the subject and the technique or artistic skill on the other, both carried out with the goal of achieving enjoyment within the unity with Dao. Therefore, the material enjoyment brought by the skill is of no significance for Zhuangzi, what counts is the transformation of the cook’s spirit that achieved the embodiment of Dao (“What I like is the Dao which is prior to any skill”3). The story outlines the journey from learning the technique to the embodiment of Dao and describes the process from learning the technique to the realm of artistic creativity (Xu in Ni 2002, 299). The aesthetic spirit in Kongzi’s thought is the unification of ethics and art as seen in the quote in the Analects (䄆䃎 Lunyu): ᘇᯬ䚃ˈᬊᯬᗧˈ‫׍‬ᯬӱˈ⑨ᯬ㰍 Let the will be set on the path of duty. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. Let perfect virtue be accorded with. Let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the polite arts. (translated by James Legge for the Chinese Text Project)

Kongzi valued art highly for its contribution to human education and moral improvement. Kongzi’s “six arts” ( ‫ ޝ‬㰍 liuyi) were therefore educational tools for self-cultivation and as such held the function of moulding and balancing human emotions that enabled humans to discover moral subjectivity. Hence, in Xu’s opinion, artistic accomplishments were achieved only when a person turned inward and discovered one's moral

whetstone. There are the interstices of the joints, and the edge of the knife has no (appreciable) thickness; when that which is so thin enters where the interstice is, how easily it moves along! The blade has more than room enough. Nevertheless, whenever I come to a complicated joint, and see that there will be some difficulty, I proceed anxiously and with caution, not allowing my eyes to wander from the place, and moving my hand slowly. Then by a very slight movement of the knife, the part is quickly separated, and drops like a clod of earth to the ground. Then standing up with the knife in my hand, I look all round, and in a leisurely manner, with an air of satisfaction, wipe it clean, and put it in its sheath.” The ruler Wen Hui said, 'Excellent! I have heard the words of my cook, and learned from them the nourishment of our life. (Transl. by James Legge for the Chinese Text Project) 3 㠓ѻᡰྭ㘵䚃ҏˈ䙢Ѿᢰ⸓ “What your servant loves is the method of the Dao, something in advance of any art.” (Transl. by James Legge for the Chinese Text Project)

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self (Bresciani 2001, 344). In order to create works of art or become creative, a person had to embody the ethical values. Xu Fuguan argued that Kongzi paid great respect to art in general; his devotion to music in particular illustrated that virtue and art converged and reinforced each other (Lee 1998, 325). However, the method and process of moral cultivation differed quantitatively from art training (gongfu), xinzhai and zuowang. In contrast to the moral spirit which strongly required altruistic action, Zhuangzi’s aesthetic activity was devoid of all such interest and free from any utilitarian purpose. It was thus Xu’s opinion that the Confucians failed to recognize the autonomy of art (ibid.). On the other hand, Kongzi’s you (⑨) represents engagement in art through relaxation, moulding and contemplation of human emotions, as well as provides a deeper understanding of human nature in the context of self-cultivation (Li 2010, 77). Besides, Kongzi’s “wandering in arts” expresses the value of art in human life in respect to the unity of beauty and goodness which is directly connected to Confucian values. Therefore, Kongzi’s you in relation to art as such unity provides a condition for a more profound comprehension of the process of realising moral subjectivity (e.g. the highest realm of human spirit) as the highest goal in Confucian philosophy. In Kongzi’s philosophy, the liberalization of human spirit is possible only through the embodiment of values and through the realization of moral subjectivity. Only then can an individual reach Dao. Xu valued the Confucian unity of goodness and beauty in which art was worthwhile when it was beneficial to the moral purposes, thus he believed that only a virtuous individual could create beautiful or aesthetic works. Xu Fuguan’s effort to draw a parallel between Zhuangzi’s equalitarian state of mind and Confucian humanness and righteousness failed due to Zhuangzi’s equal confirmation of all values, pluralism and the identity of contraries and––last but not least––the understanding of the true as the beautiful. The Confucian shanmei ழ 㖾 (the good as the beautiful) prevailed in his confrontation with modern art (Lee 1998, 329).

Conclusion Xu Fuguan’s comparison between Kongzi’s and Zhuangzi’s understandings of the concept you illustrates significant differences in their perspective of the realization of the human spirit and its relation to

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art. Zhuangzi’s understands it as a state of liberated and free human spirit that is exempt of all individual desires, intentions, goals and utilitarian attitudes. Such spirit is in total unity with Dao and is therefore able to comprehend the world aesthetically, intuitively and creatively. In Zhuangzi’s philosophy you as a state of unity with Dao in everyday life and in everything a person is engaged in, is the highest state of human spirit. Therefore Xu Fuguan recognized Zhuangzi as the one who truly lived the aesthetic life. On the other hand, Kongzi’s you represents engagement in art with respect to relaxation and contemplation of human emotions as well as a deeper understanding of the human nature in the context of selfcultivation. Besides, when Kongzi talks about “wandering in arts”, he expresses a value of art in human life regarding the unity of beauty and goodness, which is directly connected to Confucian values. Therefore, Kongzi’s you in relation to art as such unity, provides the conditions for a more profound understanding of the process of realization of moral subjectivity as the highest goal in Kongzi’s philosophy. What Xu tried to point out is that although Western modernism and postmodernism were striving for the liberalization of the individual’s spirit, Zhuangzi’s philosophy, his aesthetic view of life and creativity provided a far more profound and sophisticated background for such freedom. However, in relation to art as one of the fundamental pillars of society, he considered Confucian shanmei (the good as the beautiful) to be more beneficial for the establishment of a harmonious society. At that time, his efforts to offer this insight to the young Taiwanese artists and intellectuals, had failed. However, now it is becoming the subject of growing interest not only among Chinese and Taiwanese artists and scholars, but also among Western sinologists.

Bibliography Bresciani, Umberto. 2001. Reinventing Confucianism – The New Confucian Movement. Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies. Lee, Su-San. 1998. Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949– 1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation. Rhode Island: Brown University. Li, Zehou. 2010. The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

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Ni, Peimin. 2002. “Practical Humanism of Xu Fuguan.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, 281–305. Oxford. Blackwell Publishing. Rošker, Jana S. 2013. Subjektova nova oblaþila. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete. Sernelj, Tea. 2013. “Xu Fuguan’s Concept of Anxiety and Its Connection to Religious Studies.” Asian Studies 1 (2): 71–87. —. 2014. “Unity of Body and Mind in Xu Fuguan’s Theory.” Asian Studies 2 (1): 83–95. Xu, Bihui. 2006. “The Rebirth of Traditional Chinese Aesthetics.” In Aesthetic and Culture, East and West, edited by Jianping Gao and Keping Wang. Anhui: Anhui chubanshe. Xu, Fuguan ᗀᗙ㿰. 2001. Zhongguo yishu jingshen ѝ഻㰍㺃㋮⾎ (The Spirit of Chinese Art). Beijing: Huadong shifan daxue chuban she. Zhuangzi 㦺ᆀ. 2015. “Zhuangzi 㦺.” In Chinese Text Project. Accessed January 20, 2015. http://ctext.org/zhuangzi? searchu=%E6%82%A 3&page=2. Wim, De Reu. 2010. “How to Throw a Pot: The Centrality of Potter’s Wheel in the Zhuangzi.” Asian Philosophy 20 (1): 43–66.

CHAPTER FOUR MOU ZONGSAN’S NEGATION OF THE MORAL SELF: A NEW DIALECTICAL MODEL? JANA S. ROŠKER

Mou, Kant and the Quest for Chinese Modernity Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) was one of the most important Chinese philosophers between 1980 and the time of his death. Most of his writings dealt with logic and metaphysics, but he occasionally delved into political theory. He was an open and radical opponent of Marxism and the Marxist theory and thus of the dominant ideology in the People’s Republic of China. An innovative theorist, he was the best-known second generation Modern Confucian. At this point we should mention that the categorization into “generations” follows a long tradition in Confucian scholarship, which is ultimately rooted in classical Confucianism and still applied by most scholars (i.e. Makeham 2003, 3). Although slightly different categorizations can be found in present-day China, I decided1 to use the following: First generation: Feng Youlan 俞৻㱝 (1859–1990), Xiong Shili ➺ॱ࣋ (1885–1968), Zhang Junmai ᕥੋड (1886–1969), Liang Shuming ằ╡Ⓩ (1893–1988) and He Lin 䋰哏 (1902–1992). Second generation: Fang Dongmei ᯩᶡ㖾 (1899–1977), Xu Fuguan ᗀᗙ 㿰 (1903–1982), Tang Junyi ୀੋ⇵ (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan ⢏ᇇ й (1909–1995).

1

The reasons behind this decision are multifaceted and too complex to be described in the limited space of this article.

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Chapter Four Third generation: Yu Ying-shih ։㤡ᱲ (1930), Liu Shu-hsien ࢹ䘠‫ݸ‬ (1934), Cheng Chung-ying ᡀ ѝ ᖡ (1935) and Tu Wei-ming ᶌ ㏝ ᰾ (1940).

In his early years, Mou Zongsan mainly wrote texts on logic and metaphysics, but he occasionally delved into political theory. He was an open and radical opponent of Marxism and the Marxist theory and thus of the dominant ideology in the P. R. China. Once he enrolled into Peking university, he not only studied traditional Chinese philosophy, especially Zhu Xi’s School of Structure (Li xue), but also various Western philosophical systems. Initially, he was attracted by thinkers such as Bergson, Dewey and Darwin, who were “fashionable” among young intellectuals at that time.2 None of these thinkers had a lasting influence upon him, although Mou stuck to their systematic and structured thought that he encountered while reading their texts. Somewhat later he became interested in the philosophy of Bertrand Russel, mathematical logic and neo-empiricism. During this period he studied the works of Whitehead and Wittgenstein, as well as the Book of Changes (Yi jing) (Mou 1989, 42). As a result of his studies linked to the Book of Changes, he published his first book entitled Research of the Metaphysical and Moral Philosophy of China from the Aspect of the Book of Changes (Cong Zhouyi fangmian yanjiu Zhongguo zhi xuanxue yu daode zhexue), which was published in Tianjin as early as 1935, soon after he completed his studies. His interest in the Book of Changes was induced by his research into Whitehead’s philosophy (Mou 1988, 4), during which he ascertained that his views differed greatly from the views of this modern British mathematical philosopher whose works were popular in China at the time. While Whitehead considered aesthetic perception and intuition to be two physical realities, autonomous and external of each other, Mou believed the opposite was true (Mou 1988, 4).

2

Given that the most influential discourses in the Chinese philosophical tradition are pragmatic, Chinese intellectuals found it easier to understand American pragmatism than the analytical and formal logical discourses found in the European tradition. The new philosophical currents were greatly influenced by social Darwinism, as its concept of the connection between nature and society was much closer to the traditional Chinese, holistic understanding of the world, than the theories based on a strict separation between the two. The idea of evolution (jinhua) was especially interesting to Chinese thinkers, for it included the concept of progress, which was never a part of the Chinese tradition.

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Despite these basic differences, in his early years Mou was arguably the only modern Confucian to approach the original teachings through logic. And although his unconditional enthusiasm for the logical method was limited to his early works and he later acknowledged the imperfections inherent in this method, he never truly stopped using it (Tang 2002, 328). In 1939, Mou met his most important teacher, Xiong Shili, with whom he would remain in contact for as long as the political situation permitted. Xiong left a permanent mark on the young philosopher. Many years later, Mou recollected their first encounter with the following words: This was my first opportunity to meet a truly perfected person (zhen ren). For the first time, I could sense the fragrance of scholarship linked to life itself.3 (Mou 1984, 134–5)

In his book, The Teaching of Life (Shengmingde xuewen), he cites the basic ideas that he was introduced to through Xiong. For Mou, these “teachings of life” were not based solely on a conceptual, but also on an “existential” understanding of life (ibid.). However, Mou did not follow his teacher Xiong Shili merely in these basic approaches, but also regarding some problems linked to the general methodology, for it was Xiong who turned his attention to the need of reevaluating the Chinese philosophical tradition through the perspective of Modern European philosophy, especially Kant. In 1971, he published Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue Ც Ⲵ ⴤ 㿪 㠷 ѝ ഻ ଢ ᆨ ), which is generally considered to be his most important work. In this book, he examined the specific Chinese understanding of the structure of existence. In this context, he drew certain parallels with Heidegger’s ontology and pointed out certain inconsistencies in Kant’s theories. Until the end of Mou’s philosophical career, Immanuel Kant was both a fundamental source of inspiration and the object of harsh criticism. Due to the existential significance Kant ascribed to morality,4 Mou considered him to be the pinnacle of European and Western philosophy.

3

࿻㾻Ҷа‫ⵏػ‬Ӫ, ࿻௵ࡠҶᆨ୿㠷⭏ભⲴ᜿ણDŽ As is well-known, Mou greatly admired Kant’s moral philosophy and argued that it was only with Kant that Western philosophy began showing a true understanding of the nature of morality. Kant was the first in the West to say that “being moral is determined by moral rule, and not by external objects”. However, he strongly

4

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However, at the same time he was convinced that Kant’s theoretical system was logically inconsistent and flawed. Indeed, one is sometimes left with the impression that Mou believed that Kant’s greatest failing was that he did not have a solid classical Confucian education, which could have helped him fill the gaps in his worldview. Hence, it is by no means coincidental that a lot of Mou’s work is dedicated to performing “upgrades” and “repairs” to Kant’s philosophy. Mou was convinced that he could build a valid moral metaphysics along this line of thought, even though Kant failed to do so (Mou 1975, 37). In Mou Zongsan’s opinion moral metaphysics’ refers to the existence of things with moral substance that are reflected by moral consciousness. Hence, he believes that this clear consciousness is the “moral and, at the same time, the ontological substance”5 (ibid., 40). On the other hand, we must not forget that through Kant, Mou Zongsan obtained an insight into the importance of the concept of the subject, which was of crucial importance for the establishment of theories and ideologies that underpinned the process of modernization. Similar to most Modern Confucian philosophers, Mou Zongsan was thoroughly confronted with various problems linked to the question of Chinese modernization. In this context, he firmly believed in the necessity of consolidating the subject, who has to be placed into the centre of a rational perception of reality and who is due to his/her autonomy endowed with the ability to actively and creatively generate and change reality. Mou Zongsan also agreed with scholars who claimed that Chinese culture has successfully developed morality and ethics, but failed in establishing democracy and science. Like other Modern Confucians, he did not believe that Chinese culture was incompatible with science and democracy, but that this failure was primarily due to the specific historical conditions that formed the development of Chinese history and culture. These conditions also naturally determined the specific features of traditional Chinese epistemology. He Xinquan (2000, 76–77) exposed that in this context, it was important that Mou Zongsan did not see the structure of traditional Chinese society as defined by class struggle; in philosophy, this resulted in the lack of individual self-awareness (ibid., 75–76). According to Mou, this also led to the development of universal

criticized Kant’s claim that the existence of God was a necessary precondition for the existence of an integral realm of morality and happiness (Mou 1985, 239–40). 5 ⸕億᰾㿪ᱟ䚃ᗧⲴሖ億, ਼ᱲӖণᱟᆈᴹٛⲴሖ億DŽ

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principles, but without establishing the principles of particularity.6 These specific characteristics also resulted in the integrity of all dual oppositions that define the traditional reasoning methods; in this sense, they failed to separate between subject and object: These two entities were not in mutual opposition: either the object was incorporated into my subject, or I was integrated into the object… In my inwardness, all objects were part of my heart-mind, and the heart-mind was part of the (external) objects. Both were actually one entity. If we want to establish some kind of relation between the subject and the object by forcibly dividing the two this will lead to sub-ordination. So too with the “transformation” of saints and sages. In such a wise government, the relationship between the ruler and his people was seen as a relation between parents and their children. In this view, children cannot be the enemies of their parents.7 (Mou 1989, 52)

However, the establishment of a free and autonomous subject seemed to represent a crucial precondition for modernization. Nevertheless, since Mou believed Chinese modernization cannot be equated with Westernization, he wanted to establish a specifically Chinese form of an autonomous subject. In order to achieve this goal, he proceeded from the concept of the subject that is rooted in the traditional Chinese concept of moral self.

The New Moral Self and Double Ontology This moral self manifests itself through the inborn moral substance (xingti ᙗ億) which unites everything that constitutes Kant’s concept of practical reason, including free will. This moral substance is grounded in the original heart-mind (ben xin ᵜ ᗳ ) which is manifested as the phenomenal form of the infinite heart-mind (wuxiande zhixin ❑䲀ⲴᲪᗳ) and represents an elaboration of the Neo-Confucian concept of inborn knowledge (liangzhi 㢟⸕). This elaboration represents the basis of the moral performance; it is transcendent and infinitely universal. As a form of the infinite heart-mind it appears as a precondition for the actual 6

⭡ᯬ⅐㕪‫ػ‬億㠚㿪, ᡰԕѝ഻㻋ᴹᲞ䙽ဃ৏ࡷ㘼❑‫ػ‬億ᙗ৏ࡷ (He 1996, 78)DŽ 䙉Ҽ㘵Ⲷ൘‫ݽ‬৫ሽ・˖ᆳᡆ㘵ᢺሽ䊑᭦䙢㠚ᐡⲴѫ億㼑䶒ֶˈᡆ㘵ᢺ㠚ᐡ ᣅࡠሽ䊑㼑䶒৫ĂĂ‫ޗ‬᭦ࡷ‫ޘ‬⢙൘ᗳˈཆᣅࡷ‫ޘ‬ᗳ൘⢙DŽަሖаҏDŽ䙉㼑䶒 㤕ᕧ࠶㜭ᡰ㘼䃚а‫ػ‬䰌‫ׯˈײ‬ᱟ‘䳨ኜ䰌‫( ’ײ‬Sub-Ordination)DŽ 㚆䌒ӪṬѻ‘ॆ ’ᱟྲ↔: 㚆ੋ䌒⴨Ⲵ᭯億ˈੋ⴨ሽӪ≁Ⲵ䰌‫ྲ⥦ײ‬⡦⇽ሽᯬᆀྣˈᆀྣнᱟ ⡦⇽Ⲵᮥ億, Ӗᱟྲ↔DŽ 7

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realization of the categorical imperative which, in itself, is also infinite. Mou Zongsan understood free will as a constitutive element of the moral subject. Such understanding is necessarily rooted in the viewpoint, according to which this will represent the basic reason for any action. In this aspect, the moral self is equal with the Divine consciousness and therefore absolute and infinite. The infinite mind is manifested in Mou’s concept of intuitive reason or intellectual intuition (zhide zhijue ᲪⲴⴤ㿪), which essentially differs from Kant’s concept. Mou believed that Kant’s demarcation between noumena and phenomena was necessary. In his view, however, the main inconsistency of Kant’s philosophy is manifested in the fact that this German philosopher attributed the possibility of intuitive reason which provides access to the noumenal sphere only to God and divine consciousness or divine recognition (shende zhixing ⾎Ⲵ⸕ᙗ, Mou 1971, 51) respectively. In his conceptualization of the moral self as the new, modern Chinese subject, Mou tried to surpass this “inconsistency” in the following way: the first step was derived from the Buddhist concept of the twofolded consciousness (yi xin er men аᗳҼ䮰). Based on this, Mou Zongsan established the thesis, according to which humans exist in a two tiered ontology, which implies that the two spheres are attached (zhide ว Ⲵ) and detached (wuzhide ❑วⲴ) worlds. As such, they are furnished with a two-tiered mind, the finite and infinite one. Therefore, according to him, human beings also possessed the intuitive reason (zhide zhijue ᲪⲴ ⴤ㿪) which provided them with the possibility of accessing “things in themselves”.8 This thesis is still compatible to Kant’s limitation of recognition to the level of phenomena, as Mou believes that the intuitive reason is not a type of cognition, but an understanding of values. According to Mou, the intuitive reason (or intellectual intuition) is crucial for the entire system, which was in contrast to Kant not merely a metaphysics of morality, but a system of moral metaphysics. Mou was convinced that he fixed a hole in Kant’s line of thought and that Kant’s philosophical system could find completion in Chinese philosophy. Mou asserted that he could build a valid moral metaphysics along this line of thought, which is what Kant failed to do. We will begin clarifying this model by taking a closer look at some of the most important implications of Mou’s dualistic view of reality. 8

One needs to keep in mind that this concept of human intellectual intuition refers predominantly to the transcendental sphere.

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In the framework of his “dual ontology”, Mou Zongsan (1975, 37–40) saw both types of self in a complementary relation. However, he believed that Confucianism (and Chinese culture in general) failed to develop the idea of the real, i.e. the concrete, individual self. One of the important effects of this failure was the absence of an epistemological foundation for the development of technology and scientific thought. Historically, Confucian theoretical works always treated intuition as a manifestation of the personality of a sage or a saint, i.e. in terms of the magical effects of wisdom. These effects were always posited within humanity (or mutuality, ren ӱ), and therefore could not be separated from it, not even temporarily in order to gain “pure recognition”. According to Mou, this is why logic and mathematics never developed in China9 (Mou in Han and Zhao 1994, 176). Therefore, Mou proposed an idea of a moral self, which is consciously able to negate itself. It can pass from the sphere of infinity to that of finiteness, and vice versa. In this, it resembles the transcendent dynamic of Hegel’s absolute spirit. However, as we shall see in the continuation, Mou’s dialectical model differs from the one developed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who stated: Instead of realizing itself in the relation of causality, the infinite has rather fallen apart in it. The infinitive is in itself the connection of the unconnected, it is the simple that becomes an other to itself, which in turn is the other of its self and thereby the first simple. (Hegel 1986, 68)

However, Mou’s model of self-negating the moral self corresponds to the main features of his “double ontology”. In this framework of dualistic demarcations within the subject, there are two kinds of truth––extensional and intentional. In Mou’s opinion, Western science generally developed the extensional, while Chinese thought predominantly focused on intentional truth. In the field of epistemology, there are two forms of reason that correspond to these two truths: the functional and the constructive. The former manifested itself in the scope of Chinese intellectual history which developed the moral (daode zhuti 䚃ᗧѫ億) and artistic (yishuxing zhuti 㰍㺃ᙗѫ億) subject. The latter can be found in Western science, which 9

൘ԕࡽⲴ݂ᇦᆨ㺃Ⲭኅѝˈ࿻㍲ᱟ‫ڌ‬൘㚆䌒ӪṬѝⲴⴤ㿪ᖒ᝻кˈ৺Ცភ 䕍࿉⭘Ⲵර᝻ĂĂᆳ㑭ᱟкኜ㘼⑮ॆᯬӱѝˈ㘼ᵚ᳛ᱲ㝛䴒બӱ㘼ᡀ⛪Ā㍄ ㋩Ⲵ⸕ᙗāDŽഐ↔ˈ䚿䕟ᮨᆨ䜭ࠪнֶDŽ

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established the concept of the cognitive subject (renshi zhuti, zhixing zhuti 䂽䆈ѫ億ˈ⸕ᙗѫ億). Mou concluded that a cultural spirit, which is rooted in functional truths, could not provide the foundation for the development of democracy and/or science. Therefore, in order to activate the empirical subject or the external self, China needed to develop the cognitive subject as a product of the constructive reason. Translated into traditional Chinese categories, it needed to develop a new, more active and more influential “external ruler”.

The Old Inner Sage, the New External Ruler and the SelfNegation of the Moral Self Traditional Confucians adopted the concept of the so-called “external ruler” from the Daoist classic Zhuangzi, where he was defined as a personality who, thanks to his union with his own “inner sage”, was able to establish the ideal human Way. 10 In Confucian discourses, this concerned the ideal of moral rulership. The first generation Modern Confucians had a similar view of this traditional ideal of the “external ruler”, however, they also stressed the importance of scientific knowledge. The members of the second generation concluded that such ideal moral rulership was unattainable in their social reality. Thus, their “new external ruler” was, to a great extent, predicated by Western science and democracy. In his theory of the self-negation of the moral self, in which this passes from the sphere of transcendent morality into the sphere of concrete (cognitive, political and social) performance, i.e. from the realm of the “inner sage” to the realm of the “external ruler”, Mou Zongsan attributed a corresponding representation of reason to both forms of self. The moral self, which is posited within “detached ontology” (wuzhide cunyoulun ❑ วⲴᆈᴹ䄆), thus corresponds to the functional representation of reason (lixingde yunyong biaoxian ⨶ ᙗ ѻ 䙻 ⭘ 㺘 ⨮ ); however, in its selfnegation (ziwo kanxian 㠚ᡁൾ䲧), which is manifested in the cognitive subject and is posited within “attached ontology” (zhide cunyoulun วⲴᆈ

10 ‫ޗ‬㚆ཆ⦻ѻ䚃 (Zhuangzi 2014, Tianxia 1). In this chapter, Zhuangzi warned that the Way could become hidden or blurred if one was unable to conform to the cosmic order of Dao. Here, “neisheng waiwang” serves as a metaphor for the refined person, seen as someone who cultivates their intimate spiritual self while being actively engaged in social matters at the same time.

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ᴹ䄆) it corresponds to the constructive representation of reason (lixingde jiagou biaoxian ⨶ᙗѻᷦΏ㺘⨮): The inner sage Detached ontology The moral self The functional representation of reason

The external ruler Attached ontology The empirical self The constructive representation of reason

Both phases are thus complementary and the phase in which the moral self passes (self-negation) into the empirical self is therefore merely temporary. Like other Modern Confucians, Mou Zongsan conceived the moral self (i.e. the “inner sage”) as the foundation (Lee 2001, 14) and necessary precondition for any kind of civilized society. At the same time his empirical self, which is endowed by the “constructive representation of reason”, does not contradict morality. The empirical self, which is manifested in the “new external ruler” and represents a necessary precondition for China’s modernization, is a-moral only in the sense of the lack of moral valuation of the natural world. This “new external ruler” is focused on “instrumental rationality” (mudi helixing ⴞⲴਸ⨶ᙗ) which, in the dialectical development of complementary relations between two phases, always returns to the basic realm of the moral self which acts within the framework of the “rationality of values” (jiazhi helixing ‫ܩ‬٬ਸ ⨶ ᙗ ). In this regard, Lee Ming-Huei (2001, 17) points out that in opposition to Mou’s complementary model, the problem with Weber’s concept of modern rationalization is that it remains trapped in the phase of targeted rationalization (Zweckrationalität), which should always remain rooted in the axiological choice of the main aims or goals that produced it. Thus, Weber’s model of rationality remains trapped in the static framework of an isolated and static moral subject: “Instrumental rationality” as found in the developmental processes of Western social technology, first arose from the “rationality of values” that underlie the choice of its aims (or goals). However, the exaggerated emphasis on “targeted rationality” gradually led to completely forgetting the reasons for which technology was originally developed.11

11

Ā൘㾯ᯩ⽮ᴳ、ᢰⲬኅⲴ䙾〻ѝˈþⴞⲴਸ⨶ᙗÿⲴअ࣋Ⓚ㌫⭡ⴞⲴ䚨᫷ ѝⲴþ‫ܩ‬٬઼⨶ᙗÿᡰᨀ‫ˈⲴ׋‬նᱟþⴞⲴਸ⨶ᙗÿ䙾ᓖ㟘㝩Ⲵ㎀᷌ফ֯ þ‫ܩ‬٬઼⨶ᙗÿᰕ⳺㨾㑞, ֯ӪᘈফҶ৏‫Ⲭݸ‬ኅ、ᢰⲴⴞⲴDŽā

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Due to his belief in the necessity of establishing an empirical, free subject, which could meet the requirements of Asian and Chinese modernization, Mou Zongsan tried to modify the traditional complementary unity in the relation between the inner sage and the external ruler (neisheng waiwang ‫ޗ‬㚆ཆ⦻). Through his acceptance of the Kantian dualistic framework, he tried to place it into a dualistic form defined by the demarcation line between the moral and the empirical subject. In this attempt, one can detect a parallel with his general belief in the necessity of Kantian separation between the things in themselves on one side and the human perception of them on the other. As we have seen, he tried to surpass this demarcation line with the help of his concept of unlimited heart-mind or intuitive reason. Similarly, he tried to surpass the dualistic demarcation, which defines the antipodes of the transcendent and empirical self. In order to incorporate the concept of the active cognitive subject, which was essential for both, the development of science as well as for the establishment of a democratic social system, the traditional concept of the moral self thus had to be transformed through the process of the abovementioned self-negation (ziwo kanxian). However, such selfnegation of the subject was seen merely as a temporary phase in the “dialectical process” (Mou 1995, 94), for if the static, primary position of morality precluded the recognition of the full plurality of knowledge, its total absence would have devastating consequences for society (ibid., 95). In the dialectical process that linked the possible acquisition of scientific knowledge with the axiological regulation (or moral guidance), the moral self was thus seen as a “bridge connecting Confucianism with modern democracy” (ibid., 97). Some scholars consider this to be Mou Zongsan’s main contribution to the Modern Confucian attempts to develop and modernize the seeds of democracy and science found within the Chinese intellectual tradition: When viewed in terms of developing democracy and science, the dialectical development of the moral Self is, of course, not the only possibility. But when viewed in terms of Confucianism, which has been the dominant factor in determining the value systems in Chinese culture, Mou Zongsan’s theoretical framework of incorporating democracy via the inner dialectical development of Confucianism appears to be significant for

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the preservation of China’s long-running national sovereignty.12 (He 1996, 97–98)

Mou and Hegel: Two Different Dialectical Models? As noted, Mou Zongsan was the only second generation theorist who tried to modify the traditional complementary unity in the inner sage/external ruler relation and formulate it in a dualistic form, defined by a distinction between the moral and empirical self. This approach was a result of his belief in the need to establish an empirical, free self that could meet the requirements of Asian and Chinese modernization, and that would be consistent with his general belief in the necessity of a Kantian separation between things in themselves and the human perception of them. As previously mentioned, he tried to transcend this limitation by introducing the concept of unlimited heart-mind or intellectual intuition. Similarly, he also tried to introduce the dynamic of complementarity into the dualistic relation, as this would define the antipodes of the transcendent and empirical self. However, this method raises the question of whether his concept of the self-negation of the subject is truly an elaboration of the traditional complementarity between the inner and outer self, or whether his model merely represents a more sophisticated and structured reproduction of traditional binary categories 13 as applied by other Modern Confucians.

12

⮦❦ˈቡ≁ѫ㠷、ᆨⲴⲬኅ㘼䄆ˈ↔а䚃ᗧ⨶ᙗ䗟䅹䮻ኅⲴ䙾〻ˈі䶎ୟ аѻ䙢䐟ĂĂн䙾ˈቡ݂ᆨ⛪ѝ഻᮷ॆ‫ܩ‬٬㌫㎡ѻѫ⍱ˈ⢏ᇇй䘿䙾݂ᆨ‫ޗ‬ ൘䗟䅹䮻ኅԕ㶽䙊⨮ԓ≁ѫⲴ⨶䄆ᔪΏˈቡѝ഻䮧ѵⲴ・഻ѻ䚃㘼䀰ˈ⻪ᴹ ަ䟽བྷⲴ᜿㗙DŽ 13 Binary categories (duili fanchou ሽ ・ ㇴ ⮷ ) are one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy. This duality seeks to attain the most real (possible) state of actuality through relativity, expressed in terms of the relation between two oppositional notions. Some well known binary categories are: yinyang 䲠 䲭 (sunny/shady), tiyong 億 ⭘ (substance/function), mingshi ਽ ሖ (name or concept/actuality), liqi ⨶ ≓ (structure/vital creativity), benmo ᵜᵛ (roots/crown). As Graham (1989, 286) pointed out, the distinctions were seen in binary terms, and primarily between pairs of opposites (with even figure and colour reduced to square/round and white/black). Having drawn them and recognizing a recurring or persisting pattern (e.g. white, large, square, hard or heavy), we can detach a stone from other things in the same way we cut out a piece of cloth or chop off a piece of meat. Things were not seen as isolated, each with its

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The self-negation of the moral self is seen by Mou as a part of the dialectical process that activates the extensional truth, the empirical self, the cognitive subject and the constructive reason. However, this “dialectic process” is controlled by free will and moral autonomy that serve as its counterpart and activate the intentional truth, the transcendental self, the moral/artistic subject as well as the functional reason. Within the framework of Hegelian dialectics, this process cannot be regarded as a classical form of dialectics, for it lacks the necessary tension between two equally important and mutually contradictory counterparts, represented by the thesis and its negation, i.e. the anti-thesis. Hence, Mou Zongsan’s model cannot produce any form of synthesis, since in Hegelian dialectics, synthesis can only be produced by the mutual sublation (Aufhebung) of both, the thesis and the anti-thesis. In Hegel’s dialectics, both anti-poles mutually exclude each other; the synthesis, forming the third stage of the dialectical process, represents a qualitatively different stage, in which the positive (progressive) parts of the two mutually contradictory anti-poles are preserved, whereas the negative ones are removed. However, Mou’s moral self is infinite, all-embracing and overall. It is integral or comprehensive and it implies the very essence of the goodness in a sense of an onto-hermeneutical (or ontoepistemological) value. Therefore, it cannot represent a thesis, which is to be negated; it can also not represent a “positive” or “progressive” part of a synthesis, in which certain elements would be removed and only the positive ones would remain. Thus, Mou’s concept of the moral self can obviously not be placed into the framework of Hegelian dialectics. Besides, in Hegel’s dialectics, the anti-thesis is a reaction to the thesis, which cannot be actively caused by the thesis itself. In Hegel’s model, the anti-thesis is an independent force or entity which represents an external reaction to the thesis. However, in Mou’s understanding, the thesis (i.e. the moral self) actively negates itself in order to promote the empirical self, which (as visible from the traditional Chinese complementary model of the inner sage and external ruler) forms a part of itself. In short, in the Hegelian model, the anti-thesis is separated from the thesis, which is not the case in Mou’s philosophy. The reason for the main inconsistencies in Mou Zongsan’s model of the new subjectivized moral self might lay in the fact that he went too far in accepting the deeper levels of Kant’s demarcation line between things own essential and accidental features; instead, distinguishing characteristics were mostly seen as relative.

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in themselves and things as perceived by people. By giving humans intuitive reason, as Mou’s theory suggests, and by allowing this to function as an axiological criteria that determines (and creates) existence, his theory does not solve Kant’s insufficiencies, nor does it provide for a coherent explanation of the “dialectical” process offered by the selfnegation of the moral self. We need a new referential framework if we wish to resolve the static nature on which this dialectical model rests and explore the further possibilities of creatively uniting the spiritual and physical existence, idea and matter, subject and object. We might wish to consider applying the classical Chinese principle of correlativity or complementarity, which could offer a truly dynamic model, possibly surpassing the limitations of classical dialectics. However, in his theory Mou did not apply a pure form of this traditional Chinese model, but has been claiming that his model of self-negation of the moral subject was an upgraded model of the Hegelian dialectics.

Bibliography Graham, A. C. 1989. Disputers of the Tao–Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. Chicago: Open Court Publishing. Han, Qiang 七ᕧ, and Guanghui Zhao 䏉‫ݹ‬䕍. 1994. Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing – Gang Tai xin rujia Tang Junyi yu Mou Zongsande wenhua zhexue ᮷ॆ᜿䆈㠷䚃ᗧ⨶ᙗ – ⑟ਠᯠ݂ᇦୀੋ⇵㠷⢏ᇇй Ⲵ᮷ॆଢᆨ. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chuban she. He, Xinquan օؑ‫ޘ‬. 1996. Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu – Dangdai xin rujia zhengzhizhexue yanjiu ݂ᆨ㠷⨮ԓ≁ѫ – ⮦ԓᯠ݂ᇦ᭯⋫ଢᆨ⹄ウ. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1986. The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Lee, Ming-Huei ᵾ᰾䕍. 2001. Dangdai ruxuede ziwo zhuanhua ⮦ԓ݂ ᆨⲴ㠚ᡁ䕹ॆ. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she. Makeham, John, ed. 2003. New Confucianism. A Critical Examination. New York: Palgrave Maximilians. Mou, Zongsan ⢏ᇇй. 1971. Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue ᲪⲴⴤ㿪 㠷ѝ഻ଢᆨ. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshu guan. —. 1975. Xianxiang yu wu zishen ⨮䊑㠷⢙㠚䓛. Taibei: Xuesheng shuju. —. 1984. Shengmingde zhexue ⭏ભⲴଢᆨ. Taibei: Sanmin shuju.

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—. 1985. Yuanshan lun ൃழ䄆 (On Summum Bonum). Taibei: Xuesheng shuju. —. 1988. Zhou yide ziran zhexue yu daode hanyi ઘ᱃Ⲵ㠚❦ଢᆨ㠷䚃ᗧ ⏥㗙. Taibei: Wenjin chuban she. —. 1989. Wushi zishu ӄॱ㠚䘠. Tabei: Penghu chuban she. —. 1995. “Zhengdao yu zhidao, di san zhang ᭯䚃㠷⋫䚃, ㅜйㄐ.” In Xiandai xin ruxue xue’an ⨮ԓᯠ݂ᇦᆨṸ, Vol. 3, edited by Keli Fang ᯩ‫ ・ݻ‬and Jinquan Li ᵾ䥖‫ޘ‬, 89–102. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she. Tang, Refeng. 2002. “Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by Cheng Chung-Ying in Nicholas Bunnin, 235–346. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Zhuangzi 㦺ᆀ. 2014. Accesible at: Chinese Text Project. Pre-Qin and Han. Accessed July 7, 2014. http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/ text.pl?node =3925&if=en.

CONFUCIUS AND THE WORLD

CHAPTER FIVE CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR A CONFUCIAN CHINA ON THE WORLD STAGE JYRKI KALLIO

Introduction China’s hard power is on the rise, and the Party-state is keen to construct a new narrative that would legitimise China’s position as the world leader also from the soft power perspective. The need for such a narrative has arisen from the realization that there is an ideological vacuum within China, as the ideals of communism have no relevance to the present society. What is more, the Party does not want to see people turn to foreign belief systems or embrace Western values. Therefore, the Party has launched a dedicated project with the goal of formulating a new set of values that would guide the people. Chinese traditional schools of thought provide a good foundation for this, and they also appeal to the people’s national pride. Among the traditional schools of thought, Confucianism is the one most oriented towards good governance, thus it became central to the Party’s project. Sunzi, the author of the Art of War, has enjoyed longstanding popularity in the West thanks to the popularized versions of his book, which transpose his martial ideas into the fields of leadership, management and even relationships. However, Sunzi is not the best figurehead for China’s peaceful rise. This shortcoming was realized by the authors of a fictional book written in 1997 (China is Number One in 2030), which describes China’s rise to the leading superpower by the year 2030. In the book, Chinese peacekeepers set out to restore order in the United States. When American refugees return home from China in July 2016, many of them take two books with them; not the Art of War, which had been so popular during the previous decades, but a Chinese cookbook and the Analects by Confucius (Song and Zhang et al. 1997, 62).

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If Confucius (ca. 552–479 BCE) is the new figurehead for China, then President Xi Jinping is the figurehead for the project to revive traditional schools of thought in China. The beginnings of the Party’s project were noticeable as far back as the 1980s, and it was during Hu Jintao’s era (2002–2012) that the “harmonious society” became the catchphrase for the Party’s goals. It can be said that harmony is a Confucian value. Xi Jinping has since widened the scope and has been talking about China’s desire to build a “harmonious world”. His speeches are abundant in classical references. He is said to be the best versed Chinese leader in classical literature since Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the founding father of the People’s Republic, and was apparently used to resorting to classical quotations long before he became leader at the national level (Ye 2014). The “Chinese Dream”, the catchphrase of Xi’s era, is said to stand for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Xi 2014, 37–38), and the revival and internationalization of traditional Chinese values is a part of this dream. Xi Jinping has also been compared to Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), the father of China’s reform policies that opened the country up (Zhuang 2014). Under Xi’s leadership, the role of market forces was strengthened, legal reforms were pledged, and the anti-corruption campaign he launched was favourably received by the general public (Economy 2014). The Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Xinhuawang 2014) brought together Xi’s reform policies and the project aimed at reviving tradition: “We … must persist in the integration of ruling the country according to the law (yi fa zhi guo ‫⋫⌅׍‬഻) and ruling the country by virtue (yi de zhi guo ԕᗧ⋫ ഻)….”1 The latter part of the phrase reeks of Confucian political ideals. It has even led some pundits to speculate whether Xi wants to be seen as leading by means of his own personal virtue. In a discussion on Xi Jinping’s “love affair with Confucius” Michael Schuman (2014) wrote for Time: Xi also apparently believes that Confucius can bolster his own standing in the country. Confucius’ ideal government was topped by a “sage-king”…. By combining one-man rule with the morality of Chinese antiquity, (Xi) appears to be painting himself up as some newfangled communist / Confucian sage-king—an all-commanding figure who will usher in a new epoch of prestige and prosperity. 1

All translations from the Chinese are by the author himself, unless indicated otherwise. In the official translation (China Copyright and Media 2014), “by virtue” reads “according to virtue”.

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It is nevertheless exaggerated to talk of a “love-affair”. So far, both Xi Jinping and the Communist Party in general have steered clear of openly endorsing Confucianism as such. This is because the communist revolution and its predecessors were strongly anti-Confucian. Confucianism was seen as the embodiment of everything that was rotten and reactionary in Chinese society. The Party is not yet ready to turn its coat, hence it is officially promoting “Traditional Learning” (guoxue ഻ᆨ; also translated as “national learning”) instead: an amalgamation of carefully selected values from several traditional schools of thought. It is clear that the Party is willing to endorse only those traditional values that it deems useful for its purposes. All communist leaders, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, have emphasized that one should “discard the dross and keep the essence” of traditional schools of thought. Parallel to the Party’s project, the traditional schools of thought have been enjoying a revival of sorts within the country for years. This has come about partly due to the Party’s project and partly as a reflection of the popular realization that societal values have been lost. Many people also started questioning the basis of their identity as Chinese citizens. As a consequence, there is an ongoing search for the “true” tradition even at a grass-roots level. The way in which the Party-affiliated scholars have been interpreting the core of Confucianism has not been greeted solely by applause (Kallio 2011). However, some people want to have faith in the true affinity between the Party and tradition. Professor Kang Xiaoguang from the Renmin University, a prominent representative of the so-called New Confucians, a diffuse group of intellectuals who want to recast Confucian teachings as applicable to modern society, believes that a fundamental cultural and systemic change, which he calls the “Grand Realignment” (Da zhuangui བྷ䕹䓼) is currently taking place in China. Kang envisages that the next track in China’s development will be “Confucian socialist constitutionalism”. This would unite Chinese cultural tradition, which has been long neglected, with the Western influences that have shaped China’s politoeconomic system over the last century. The political legitimacy of the new track would come from the government following the Confucian virtue ren ӱ, variously translated as “humanness” or “goodness”. The system would mature gradually, with the market economy forming the basis, and the cultural forces shaping the process (Kang 2014). Kang (2014) believes that the unique Confucian socialist constitutionalism would strengthen China’s soft power in an unprecedented manner, which would make China a globally dominant force. Paraphrasing the Confucian

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classic Great Learning (Daxue བྷᆨ), he wrote: “The way of the great power illustrates the illustrious virtue, renovating the people and resting only at the highest excellence”.2 He does not elaborate on what this kind of soft power would look like or how it would change the world. He seems to be content with showing implicit support for the national rejuvenation scheme led by Xi Jinping. While Kang’s vision might be far-fetched, the Party’s project to revive––or revise, depending on the viewpoint––tradition is likely to continue for quite some time. It may prove significant that the most important milestone in realizing the Chinese Dream, the centennial of the People’s Republic in 2049, is also the 2,600th anniversary of the birth of Confucius. One must believe that this sort of symbolism will be utilized to the full. Professor Liu Xiaoying (2012, 111) from the University of International Relations (Beijing) remarked that traditional culture, which has already played a great role in the rise of China, will remain the basis for China’s overall strengthening also in the future. Some Chinese researchers in the field of international relations have expressed the expectation that China’s growing importance in the global arena should bring about a “Chinese IR Theory” based on traditional, especially Confucian, values and ideals (see e.g. Yan 2011, 256). These are said to include, inter alia, decency, harmony, peace, and common prosperity. When expanded into the international arena, these values are said to promote behaviour characterized by conciliation, comity, reciprocity, justness, solidarity, and anti-hegemony (see e.g. Li 2011). It is often said that when imperial China was ruled in accordance with Confucian virtues, it did not engage in wars of aggression or the conquest of foreign territories. However, extrapolating such ideals into contemporary realities requires a significant leap of faith. The first question that springs to mind is whether the idea of “Confucian international relations” is based on a real historical precedent. Opinions among Chinese scholars vary. Some argue that the idealized system of vassals under the Zhou Kings, or the tributary system of the later imperial era, can serve as precedents. Others, most prominently Professor Yan Xuetong (2011) from the Tsinghua University, who is one of the leading figures in the debate on China’s international relations, look to the Warring States era (475–221 BCE) which, as the name implies, bears a 2

The quotation originates from the Book of Rites, Daxue 1. The translation is a modification of Legge (1972, 357). The numbering of the paragraphs in the classical texts here and elsewhere follows the Chinese Text Project.

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certain resemblance to classical Greece with its city-states. They believe that this was the only period in Chinese history during which “interstate relations” actually existed in China. If we are to have faith in the existence of a historical precedent, at least theoretically, we need to examine whether identifiable guiding principles can be found behind such a historical system, and if so, whether they are of relevance to the present world. Opinions also differ in regard to relevance. Some Western academics welcome China’s efforts to disseminate its soft power through its traditional culture. For example, the sinologist Roger Ames (2011, 4) stated that the rise of China is leading to “a creative fusion of Confucianism with other narratives”. In contrast, Dr Christopher Ford, who has made a long career in the US government, regards the emerging narrative which utilizes Confucianism for the legitimization of the Communist Party as fundamentally illiberal and argues that “harmony” fundamentally opposes Western political liberalism. He warns that “the monist, hierarchic, and self-consciously virtuocratic Confucian model of authority” is being made “a template for the entire international system” (Ford 2014). According to Professor Sungmoon Kim (2014, 10) from the City University of Hong Kong, the discord between the “East” and the “West” is not about the alleged incompatibility between liberalism and Confucianism but the fact that the liberal-democratic institutions imported from the West, are “not socially relevant in East Asian societies, where citizens are soaked in Confucian habits and mores…”. A similar sentiment is echoed by François Godement (2013), who noted that international law and international institutions are Western imports which have failed to take root in Asia. Kim (2014, 9, 18–19) believes that philosophical Confucianism is no longer relevant as the East Asian nations have already digested the Western rights-based and interest-oriented discourses. Nevertheless, he asserts that East Asian societies remain behaviourally Confucian, as their continuing Confucian habits and traits are immediately apparent to an outside observer. These traits include the patriarchal family system in South Korea as well as the hierarchical organizations in Japan. As similar habits and traits can be found in other East Asian societies, it is questionable whether their presence has anything to do with China’s foreign policy. If this was the case, one would expect the foreign policy of all East Asian nations to follow similar principles. And to a certain extent, they do. The maxim of “a wealthy state and a strong military” (ᇼ഻ᕧ‫)ޥ‬

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is known in China (fuguo qiangbing), Japan (fukoku kyǀhei) and Korea (bukuk gangbyung) alike. Nevertheless, this maxim can hardly be considered Confucian, as it originates from a text (Shangjun Shu, Yi yan 2) from the Legalist school. 3 The maxim talks of hard power, and the question is, where does this leave the softer Confucian values.

Rising above Confucian Hermeneutics A steady stream of articles discussing the possibility of a “Chinese IR Theory” and its nature can currently be found in Chinese academic publications as well as elsewhere. The applied approaches can loosely be divided into three categories. The first approach lists certain relevant key Confucian concepts and virtues and then discusses their applicability to international relations. The second approach looks at those Confucian texts that explicitly talk of state-to-state relations, and analyses the behavioural modes expressed in them. The third and final approach sketches the Chinese world view based on a variety of Confucian texts and then projects this idealised world view into the practicalities of the modern world. The first approach requires identifying and discussing the key concepts of Confucianism and their “true” character. This takes us into the realm of hermeneutics, and in the case of Confucian classics, even exegetics. It is important to understand that the central concepts and categories of Confucianism have undergone numerous semantic shifts. Furthermore, rival schools of rival philosophers have used the same concepts to advance very different ideas (Raphals 1992, 7). Any single concept, or Confucian virtue, can belong to several locutions. Additionally, the semantic uses are inconsistent over time and context (ibid., 231). The approach of using concepts from traditional schools of thought in order to explain the Chinese society––an approach that does not prevail merely in the field of international relations––has caused the writer and essayist Yu Qiuyu (2006) to remark in frustration:

3

Although Legalism is usually considered to be the opposite of Confucianism in the spectrum of Chinese traditional schools of thought, they share some common roots. For example, Han Fei, an important protagonist of Legalism, was deeply influenced by his teacher Xunzi, who was one of the best-known successors of Confucius. Later, in imperial China’s political system, Confucian and Legalist elements became intertwined.

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In recent years, many officials and literati have indulged more and more in spouting strings of idioms, ancient sayings, descriptive words, and parallel sentences to describe Chinese culture and the Chinese spirit, and the proper connotation and denotation of many of these are hard to understand when they are translated into a foreign language… (translated citation from Martinsen 2006).

There are plenty of examples to be found. It is common for Chinese authors to state in English: “China’s cultural tradition emphasizes he wei gui ઼⛪䋤, ‘priority for peace’” (see e.g. Liu 2008). Although in modern Chinese, he conveys both peace (heping ઼ᒣ) and concord (hemu ઼ⶖ), it cannot be translated as “peace” (i.e. the opposite of “war”) in the phrase he wei gui, at least according to its original appearance in the Analects (I.12), where it means “concord”, or according to Legge (1972, 143), “natural ease”. Zhongyong ѝᓨ is an ambiguous term which is usually translated as referring to moderation, equilibrium, or the golden mean. However, research has shown that the interpretations have varied from “using the centre” according to scholar Zheng Xuan (127–200) to “central and constant” according to Zhu Xi (Johnston and Wang 2012). Therefore, the real meaning of the concept––if such a thing can even be said to exist– –is far from clear. Values cannot be selected at will as if they were some sort of a smorgasbord. They are the product of a certain frame of reference and function only within its parameters. Therefore, it is meaningless to directly extrapolate ideals, such as harmony or zhongyong, into state-to-state relations. Thus the second approach may prove to be more fruitful in the quest of finding the roots of a Chinese IR theory. This means that one should limit oneself to those texts and excerpts that explicitly discuss state-to-state relations. Only then can it be discovered that Confucian texts advocate concordance among all peoples (Book of History, Yu Shu: Yao Dian 1), righteous war (Da Dai Liji, Yong bing 2), overlordship through non-military means (Xunzi IX.12), and benevolence instead of tyranny (Analects XVI.1 et al) (see Wang Y. 2011). As for Confucius himself, he stated that if a ruler was righteous, trustworthy and respected the rules of propriety, then even people from distant lands would flock to him (Analects, XIII.4). According to Zhongyong (21), Confucius advised the ruler to treat foreigners indulgently and to cherish the lesser princes under his command. These remarks speak of the ruler’s soft power, which emerges as a byproduct of his virtuousness towards his own subjects, the main tenet of Confucius’s teachings. To extrapolate those remarks which are predominantly

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related to the state’s internal affairs, such as calls for propriety and righteousness, into the realm of international relations, would be ahistorical. Nevertheless, this approach appears to be common (see e.g. Wang R. 2011, 47; Zhu 2013, 61). The proponents of the third approach to identifying a Chinese IR theory aim to overcome the obstacles described above and discover whether there is something permanent which they could all agree upon. And perhaps there is. The traditional Chinese world view is neatly encapsulated in the following paragraph of Daxue: The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue under Heaven, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. … Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, All-Under-Heaven became tranquil and happy. (Liji, Daxue 1, quoted in Legge 1972, 357–59)4

The central concept in this paragraph is Tianxia ཙл. It can be directly translated as All-Under-Heaven, and it was the word used in the world known to the Chinese. It happened to be a world in which China had no contenders as a civilization, and thus Tianxia, the world and China were effectively the same. The Emperor was the Son of Heaven, and “under the wide heaven, there was no land that was not the king’s” (Book of Poetry, Xiaoya: Beishan 2). Researcher Zhu Zhongbo (2013, 59–62) from the Chinese Institute of International Studies described how the “three guiding principles” (san gang й㏡5) listed in Daxue, i.e. cultivating one’s person, regulating one’s family, and ordering one’s state, embodied the ideal combination of “Inner Sageliness” (neisheng ‫ޗ‬㚆) and “Outer Kingliness” (waiwang ཆ⦻) in a way which made “all within the four seas lift up their heads, and looking at (the Sagely Ruler), wishing to have him for their sovereign” (Mengzi, Teng Wen Gong II.10, quoted in Legge 1972, 274).6 Neisheng refers to becoming sage-like in knowledge, wisdom and morals through selfcultivation, while waiwang refers to turning the enlightened state into

4

The translation was slightly modified by the author. Confusingly, san gang used in other contexts may also refer to the “Three Cardinal Leads” of filiality, i.e. ruler leads subject, father leads son, husband leads wife. 6 The translation was slightly modified. 5

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enlightened action in order to better the society like a sage king of yore. According to Zhu, in such a situation, the “barbarians” from the four compass points would submit themselves to the ruler “like the myriad of stars pay their respect to the Polestar” (Analects II.1).7 Zhu (2013, 62–64) further pointed out that both Confucius and Mencius promoted virtue over military skills as a means of overcoming one’s adversaries, which combined with the “three guiding principles”, formed a peaceful basis for China’s foreign policy tradition. However, Zhu also noted that this was not a pacifist tradition as righteous wars and violence aimed at ending chaos were considered acceptable. As Professor Li Cunshan (2012, 15) from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences remarked, late imperial era idealist thinkers (such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Tan Sitong (1865–1898)) tried to establish a synthesis of the Chinese ideal of All-Under-Heaven with the realities of nation states. Perhaps most remarkably, the father of the republic, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925; quoted in Li 2012, 15), said: We must strengthen harmonious and friendly relations with friendly nations, uphold pacifism, increase China’s weight in the international community and work towards gradually realizing a “Universal Commonwealth” (Datong བྷ਼) in the world.

Sun borrowed from Kang Youwei, who named his future utopia Datong, which he described as a time when national frontiers and classes will disappear and universal peace will prevail. Sun later explained that before moving towards internationalism, China should regain its position as a free and equal nation among nations (Li 2012, 16). This standpoint has since been subscribed to by all Chinese leaders. Sun’s contemporary, Cai Yuanpei, recognized Sun’s ideas, known as the “Three Principles of the People” (san min zhuyi, й≁ѫѹ), as the epitome of the ancient Confucian ideal of zhongyong, understood as the golden mean (ibid., 16). Most famously, Sun adopted the saying Tianxia wei gong ཙл⛪‫ޜ‬, which is today most often understood as “All under Heaven is one” or “We all share a common world” as his slogan. Taken literally, this slogan means that everything under Heaven belongs to all (or: belongs together).

7

The quotation from the Analects is probably not a reference to the “barbarian” tribes, but rather to individual people.

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Li Cunshan (2012) sees both Sun Yat-sen’s pacifism and the epitome of China’s modern foreign relations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (which include the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs), as parts in a continuum of the traditional Confucian principles. Similarly, the researcher Wang Hongxu (2011, 97) from the Central Party School noted that in 1955, the Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) said: There is an ancient saying in China (in the Analects, XII.2), “Do not do unto others what you do not wish to be done unto you”. We are opposed to outside interference, so why would we interfere in the internal politics of other countries? (quoted in Wang H. 2011, 97).8

Wang Hongxu (2011, 98–100) and others (e.g. Yang 2011) explained how the Five Principles were an example of the unbreakable tradition of the search for “harmony” (hehe ઼ਸ) in Chinese politics. Harmony is often construed through an ancient phrase (from the Analects XIII.23) which extols the virtue of harmony over conformity (he er bu tong ઼㘼н ਼). The Five Principles may be seen as an application of this phrase as they call for a peaceful coexistence and the recognition of the other countries’ right to retain their individual characteristics. Ideally, this in turn facilitates the potentially fruitful exchanges even between ideological combatants. While it is easy to translate Tianxia, it is harder to interpret it. As several Chinese scholars (see Peng 2013) were quick to point out, it is a common error to superimpose ancient ideals onto the modern world when talking about the concept of Tianxia, All-Under-Heaven. From today’s perspective, it is easily understood as “the world” and, as such, transnational in character. Therefore, it is often claimed that Confucianism promotes internationalism. However, in reality Tianxia originally referred to the Chinese empire, which was seen as equal to the Chinese cultural sphere. The “states” (guo ഻) in existence referred to the vassals, who were all governed by the Son of Heaven, the Emperor. It can be argued that the “all under Heaven is one” ideal could become compatible with the modern, Westphalian system only if one abandoned the principle of the Emperor at the centre. Some Chinese thinkers, for 8

However, it would be incorrect to claim that Confucianism is against all kinds of interference in other countries’ affairs. Professor Wang Zhongjiang from Peking University remarked that Mencius was in favour of humanitarian interventions (Peng 2013, 93).

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instance Yan Xuetong (2006; 2011, 39–64), have tried to overcome this by emphasising the differentiation between a “true”, benevolent king (or emperor) and a hegemonic king. In classical texts, the former are said to follow the “Kingly Way”, wangdao ⦻䚃, while the latter follow the “Hegemonic Way”, badao 䵨 䚃 . The ensuing logic is that a unified Tianxia system need not be a hegemonic one. In Chinese texts, the ideal and just rule, known as wangdao, is presented as the opposite of badao, which is often translated as “hegemony”, although it also carries the implications of tyranny. 9 Li Cunshan (2012, 13) remarked that the benevolence and morality of a “true king” was a kind of a soft power, at which he quoted the ancient thinker Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE): A (true) king exerts his caring even to the barbarians of the four compass points, whereas a (tyrannical) hegemon only exerts his caring to the vassal lords under him (Chunqiu Fanlu, Ren yi fa 1).

Li noted that Wang Chong, who lived more than a century after Dong, balanced soft and hard power by noting that morality was not enough to rule a country, just as strength was not enough to subjugate the enemy.10 However, although tyrants were condemned as hegemons, there was no thought of equal state-to-state relations. In the Tianxia system it is impossible to entirely abandon the need for a centre. Li Cunshan (2012, 14) reminded readers that historically, the system was supposed to consist of vassals under the suzerain. Under Heaven there could be but one ruler, albeit preferably a benevolent one. Even during the last imperial dynasty, the Qing, the nations beyond direct imperial control were still considered vassals or tributary states, if not outright barbarians. This system came to 9

Interestingly, the academic Fu Sinian (1896–1950) remarked that Confucius favoured hegemonism in international relations, whereas Mencius (fourth century BCE), one of the best-known successors of Confucius, stood for the Kingly Way (Wang R. 2011, 47). Fu seemingly based his assessment on a pair of verses in the Analects (XIV.16–17) in which Confucius expressed his appreciation for the unification policies of Duke Huan of Qi (ruled 685–643 BCE) and his Prime Minister, Guan Zhong. Duke Huan was known as one of the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Era (770–476 BCE), i.e. one of the rulers with sufficient power to act as a regent and protector of the Zhou King, thus manifesting the unity of the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1045–221 BCE), which had become merely symbolic with the strengthening of the feudal states. 10 The quote of Dong Zhongshu can be found in Chunqiu Fanlu, Ren yi fa 1. The quote of Wang Chong can be found in Lunheng, Fei Han 10.

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an end during the colonial era, when China woke up to the reality of multiple competing powers. Furthermore, as noted by numerous scholars, the Kingly Way is also a hegemony of sorts (see Peng 2013). How else would “those who are far off [become] attracted” (Analects XIII.16, quoted in Legge 1972, 269) and acknowledge the superiority of the benevolent king? It might not be hegemony through force, but rather akin to soft power, but it is hegemony nonetheless.

Xi Jinping’s “Rule by Virtue” Professor Ye Zicheng (2013) from the Peking University coined the term Huaxia zhuyi 㨟༿ѫ㗙 (“Chinese-ism”, Huaxia refers to the Chinese cultural sphere) which refers to a combination of traditional schools of thought which he believes should form the basis of government in China. He suggested that China should endorse the Taoist “natural” way of government, the Confucian “people-centred” government, and the Legalist “law-based” government. Furthermore, Ye (2014) believes that Xi Jinping is already putting such a combination into force. According to Ye Zicheng (2014), Xi Jinping applied his knowledge of the tradition to the five fields of governance. With regard to (1) “building an ecological civilization” Xi is relying on Taoist values, which–– according to Ye––promote sustainable development and harmony between nature and man. Xi also referred to Taoist texts when he talked about (2) the relationship between market forces and the government. Ye considered the Taoist principle of wuwei ❑⛪, letting things happen in an unforced way, as the core of Xi’s domestic economic policies. With regard to (3) the treatment of people, Xi has often quoted the Confucian principle of yi min wei ben ԕ≁⛪ᵜ, “making the people the basis” of all government policies. In light of the Party’s previously mentioned goal to rule the country by integrating law and virtue, the two remaining fields identified by Ye Zicheng warrant closer scrutiny. They are related to (4) China’s legal framework and (5) foreign relations. The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party stressed the need to develop fazhi ⌅⋫, which has been translated as “the rule of law” in the Chinese media. Fazhi is often used synonymously with yi fa zhi guo ‫⋫⌅׍‬഻–– the standard translation for the rule of law––which is misleading. In actual fact, fazhi is the opposite of renzhi Ӫ⋫, “the rule of man”. When writing on the Fourth Plenum the Global Times (2014b) wrote: “China was stubbornly influenced by thousands of years of ‘the rule of man’, and the

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remnants are still impacting modern ruling mechanisms”. Today, renzhi refers not only to the emperor’s rule in history, but also to the kind of unlimited power that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were still able to wield before the Party started promoting collective rule and inner-Party democracy. Furthermore, the Constitution of the People’s Republic (Article 1) stipulates that China “is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class”. This is something quite different from constitutionalism. In China, the rule of law (yi fa zhi guo) is always presented as “the socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics”: a system that does not rest on the same principles as the “Western” rule of law. 11 On the eve of the Fourth Plenum, the Global Times (2014a) declared that “China must chart its own course to the rule of law”. The Communiqué of the Plenum states: The leadership of the Party and the Socialist rule of law are identical, the Socialist rule of law must persist in the leadership of the Party, the leadership of the Party must rely on the Socialist rule of law (Xinhuawang 2014).

Therefore, when the Party says it wants to promote fazhi in China, it is simply referring to a collective government supported by a solid legal system.12 Xi Jinping’s personal take on governance supported by laws seems to be based on a Legalist School’s understanding of society. The Legalist School, which promoted punishments and rewards as the most effective way of keeping subjects in hand, was favoured by the founder of the Qin Dynasty, who found the ideas useful in forming the first unified empire in China in 221 BCE. Ye Zicheng (2014) noted that in 2006 Xi quoted Shang Yang, a Legalist scholar and statesman who lived a century before the Qin Dynasty: “All states have laws but there is no law that forces the people to

11

Yi fa zhi guo, literally “to rule the country according to law”, was previously written homonymically as ԕ⌅⋫഻, literally “utilising law to rule the country”, which is in reality a synonym for fazhi, rule by law. 12 Hongqi Wengao, a Party-run theoretical magazine, published an article in October, 2014 accusing the promoters of the constitutional rule of renouncing the class struggle. The article warned of replacing the people’s democratic dictatorship with the rule of law, stating that this would be falling into the trap of “universal values”, and would play into the hands of international capital but be detrimental to the Chinese people (QStheory.cn 2014).

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obey them”. This means that laws alone are not sufficient for they need to be guided by a higher principle or actor. As Shang Yang wrote, the disorder in a country is not the fault of the laws being in disorder, it is just that the laws are inadequate in general.13 In the imperial era that followed the Qin Dynasty, the harsh teachings of Legalism were abandoned in favour of the more humane Confucianism as the state ideology. However, due to their practical value rulers still relied on the principles of Legalism. Thus it has been said that the imperial rule was “Legalism under the guise of Confucianism”. Following a similar logic, Xi Jinping’s idea of fazhi could be dubbed “Legalism in the guise of the Rule of Law”. Xi’s foreign relations have recently been epitomized in the idea of “a correct handling of justice and interests”. In Chinese, “justice” and “interests” are yi 㗙 and li ࡙, respectively. Li can also be translated as “benefits” or “profit”. This idea has been put forward in many authoritative articles, as well as in a book published by the State Council Information Office in 2014 (Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi 2014). As early as 2006, Wang Shengcai from the State Administration of Religious Affairs discussed the difference between Western realism and Confucianism in international relations (from the viewpoint of these two traditional concepts). In line with Yan Xuetong, Wang stated that realism equals the Hegemonic Way, whereas Confucianism, which preaches the Kingly Way, has similarities with the idealistic school of International Relations. In Confucianism, justice, albeit remote, must come first and benefits, even if immediate, must take second place. One does not need to disregard one’s own interests, but one must not pursue them through unjust means (Wang 2006). Wang Shengcai (2006) further claimed that the Chinese foreign policy decision-making put equal emphasis on justice and interests, and emphasized justice more than other countries. China’s peaceful rise will only be possible if cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is established, which will only happen if other countries place justice and the common good before their own interests. He concluded by stating that tradition should not lead people astray: aiming for global justice must not lead to the neglect of one’s national interests. According to the Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s article in the aforementioned book by the State Council Information Office, achieving a proper balance between justice and interests has always been of key 13

The original text can be found in Shangjun shu, Huace 3.

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importance in the Chinese tradition (Wang 2014, 27). From the point of view of Confucianism, this is not exactly true. On the contrary, Confucianism has always stressed justice and disregarded one’s own interests or benefits. According to Confucius, when one is offered benefits, one must consider whether they are justified or not (Analects XIV.12). One must seek justice and reject material benefit or fame. Confucius also said: “Riches and honours are what men desire. If they cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held.” (Analects IV.5, quoted in Legge 1972, 166) This was the ideological reason for the Confucian disdain for trade and tradesmen, who were seen as aiming to maximise their own profit at the expense of others. In later Confucianism the stances softened somewhat. During the Ming Dynasty, attitudes towards tradesmen became more favourable among certain Confucian scholars, for instance Wang Yangming (1472–1528), who stated that scholars, farmers, craftsmen and tradesmen all contributed equally to the wellbeing of the state (Yu 1987, 525). Seeking benefits became acceptable as long as one prioritized justice. Ye Zicheng (2014) noted that Xunzi, one of the most influential followers of Confucius, remarked that men desire both benefits and justice. Xunzi concluded that those who allow their desire for justice to overcome their desire for benefits are fit to rule the empire, whereas those who are unable to restrain their desire for benefits through their sense of justice (yi yi zhi li ԕ㗙ࡦ ࡙) become subjects to be ruled (Xunzi, Dalüe 61, and Zhenglun 19).14 A few centuries later, Dong Zhongshu said that benefit is a form of material nourishment, while justice is a form of spiritual nourishment; thus both are necessary. But even he concluded that society could survive poverty, but not the lack of justice (Chunqiu Fanlu, Shen zhi yang zhong yu yi 1). It is hard to draw any other conclusion than to say that, ultimately, Confucianism stands against seeking personal benefits. For a Confucian, the justification for his actions derives from his righteousness. Therefore, according to the Confucian tradition, justice comes before benefits or one’s own interests. In this regard, Ye Zicheng’s (2014) claim as regards the key trend in Chinese tradition is untenable.

14

In many articles (see e.g. Chen 2013) yi yi zhi li is mistakenly represented as yi li zhi yi ԕ࡙ࡦ㗙, and interpreted as “using material means to promote justice”, apparently in an effort to prove that yi and li need not be opposites. This is probably a modern formulation and interpretation which seems to bear no relevance to ancient texts.

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Naturally, it is correct to argue, even in the light of Confucian classics, that pursuing one’s interests cannot be disregarded entirely, as improving material conditions is beneficial for societal justice. As a state actor, China also has its core interests (whatever they may be), and cannot sacrifice them for the sake of abstract justice. On the other hand, China wants to be seen as a country fighting for greater justice in the international arena. Benefits and justice have to be balanced in the contemporary world. It is understandable that Chinese tradition needs to be interpreted accordingly, as ahistorical as this may be. In regard to justice, one further observation is called for. The concept which I have translated above as justice, yi, originally covered a wide range of meanings. In ancient texts, yi is often explained through its homonym ᇌ, which refers to what is appropriate: when man does what he ought to do, that is right. This is reflected in Ye Zicheng’s (2014) argument that what is right for China is the appropriate and timely course of action in any given situation. Thus the balance between yi and li means that China should neither act blindly in accordance with some abstract principles, nor concentrate on its own profit or external fame. While Xi Jinping said that China had a duty of helping poorer countries, China will act in accordance with the circumstances and its own resources, and seek mutual benefit, concluded Ye. All in all, the correct handling of justice and benefits translates into a pragmatic, utilitarian foreign policy. From China’s traditional point of view, this could perhaps be dubbed as “opportunism under the guise of Confucianism”.

The Confucian Response In conclusion, outlining a Confucian narrative of international affairs with clearly identifiable variables and a consistent logic seems to be a futile task. Similarly, labelling certain ideas, concepts or categories as “Confucian” does not always withstand closer scrutiny. However, it would be hasty and unjust to infer that Confucianism has nothing to contribute to the global discourses. There is an element in Confucianism which encompasses the kind of relevance and originality which indeed has the potential to be conducive to improving our societies. This is the image of All-under-Heaven combined with the ideal of a decentralized rule. Similar to the prominent political theorist Wu Jiaxiang (2013), I argue that according to early Confucian thinkers Sun Yat-sen’s slogan, Tianxia wei gong, represented the ideal for society. We just need to read the slogan in its original meaning: “All under Heaven belongs to all” (in Legge’s

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translation, “a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky”; see CText.org, Liji, Liyun 1). This phrase originates from the text “Liyun” ⿞ 䙻 (“Conveying and Using the Rites”) in the ancient Book of Rites, where it is mentioned as a feature of the past golden age, Datong. This is where Kang Youwei got the name for his utopia. However, it is often overlooked that the original golden age of Datong was not the same as Kang Youwei’s future utopia. In “Liyun”, Datong is more precisely translated as “Perfect Communality” rather than “Universal Commonwealth”. According to “Liyun”, Tianxia wei gong was the opposite of everything belonging to the ruling families, including the right to succession. Wu wrote that the core of the ideal lies within the principle that the throne is not the monopoly of any given clan but should be bequeathed to the most able (Wu 2013, 112, 335). In his book that promotes “polycentric governance” in China, Wu Jiaxiang (2013, 1–164) argued that the Confucian project was to attempt to make room for the functions of the Tianxia wei gong ideal within a system that essentially operated under the premise that everything belongs to the ruling families. These functions would have included the idea of succession by the able as well as “divided enfeoffment” or decentralized rule (called fengjian ሱ ᔪ in Chinese and often translated as “feudal system” because the term referred to a system of semi-autonomous duchies under the overlordship of the Son of Heaven, forming a nominally unified empire). The idea of decentralized rule was further promoted and developed by later Confucian thinkers, such as Gu Yanwu (1613–1682). He was dissatisfied with the prevailing centralized rule system (junxian 䜑㑓), and asserted that “implanting” the idea of the fengjian system into the imperial system of government would help the empire to rid itself of the drawbacks and excesses of centralized power (Gu cited in Liu 2000, 24–25). He wrote: Today, the centralization of power has been taken to excess …. Therefore, the lives of people worsen by the day, the Central Kingdom weakens by the day, and general unrest ensues. Why has it come to this? The difficulty of the decentralized rule (fengjian) was in centralizing power down, and the difficulty of the centralized rule is in centralizing power up. The ancient Sagely Rulers took care of their people in a communal way and divided their land into fiefdoms. Today, the masters of men consider all land within the Four Seas as their own, and even that is not enough for them. They treat every man with suspicion and wish to regulate every

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Other late imperial-era thinkers, such as Huang Zongxi (1610–95) and Zeng Jing (1679–1736), shared Gu Yanwu’s views. Zeng Jing explained fengjian in a way that sounds similar to the subsidiarity principle in the European Union. His ideal had links to the equal field system “from the days when there was less central power …” (Spence 2001, 75). Gu wrote: The vastness of the world is such that one person’s eyes or mind cannot grasp it all … The sage presided over the worthies, as the most important matters took precedence over the lesser. Thus, a balance was reached: dayto-day business was managed by the worthies, but there was still one person who decided on overall policy. Such was the system of ‘divided enfeoffment’ (fengjian) set up by the rulers in ancient days. Though the Son of Heaven presided …, the job of nurturing the people and the responsibility for governing them devolved on the enfeoffed rulers of each smaller region (translated and quoted in Spence 2001, 166).

Several present-day scholars have compared the societal ideals of Confucianism to communitarianism (see e.g. Fox 1997). Communitarianism seeks to promote the needs of the community and places itself against the interest politics. Sungmoon Kim (2014, 5–6, 12–14) condemned the fact that the advocates of the “communitarian thesis” promoted replacing “Western” democracy based on individual rights by Confucian, roleethics-based democracy. While they believe that a Confucian social self is symbiotic with the community and that ritual aestheticism (“propriety”, li ⿞) can function as an alternative to the rule of law, they fail to answer the all-important question: who gets to judge what does harmony mean? Kim (2014, 8) claimed that the communitarians15 “leave out democracy in toto” when they failed to offer any viable alternatives to the Western model they criticize. I would argue that it would be more fruitful to compare Confucianism to communalism rather than communitarianism. As a theory of government, communalism refers to a federation of autonomous communes. It may also be seen as a call for a moral economy that would harmonise human communities with the natural world (Bookchin 2005, 85–87). Indeed, the previously outlined ancient Confucian ideal resembles today’s calls for decentralization, regional autonomy, and grass-roots 15 Kim (2014, 8 fn. 18) referred to sinologists David L. Hall and Roger Ames in particular.

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democracy, as well as those criticizing nepotism, corruption and plutocracy. Such calls can be heard from all parts of the world, China and Europe alike. Therefore, there is a niche for combining Confucianism with communalism. It has been said that since revolutions ended the position of Confucianism as China’s main ideology at the turn of the last century, it has been a wondering soul without a body (Yu 1998, 229). By joining hands with the communalist movements, the Confucian soul might find a new home. A form of “Confucian communalism” would not challenge the prevailing liberal world order, but would rather fill in some of its gaps. It could also become an example of a true amalgamation of elements from both Chinese and “Western” cultures. In China, it could make democracy a part of the Confucian narrative in a manner that would not constitute an immediate threat to the Party-state. In sum, this means that while Confucianism may not be of major relevance for international relations, it could, as a societal movement, play a significant role in the modern world.

Bibliography Ames, Roger T. 2011. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Bookchin, Murray. 2005. The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy. Oakland: AK Press. Chen, Xiuping 䱸⿰ᒣ. 2013. “Rujia de ‘yi-liguan’ jiqi dangdai jiazhi ݂ ᇦ Ⲵ ’ ѹ ࡙ 㿲 ’ ৺ ަ ᖃ ԓ ԧ ٬ .” Qiushi Lilun Wang November 8. Accessed December 10, 2014. http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/bkjx/ 201311 /t 20131108_ 288633.htm. China Copyright and Media. 2014. “Official Central Committee Communiqué On 4th Plenum”. Accessed October 24, 2014. http://china copyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/23/official.centralcommittee-communique-on-4th-plenum/. Chinese Text Project. Accessed October 24, 2014. www.ctext.org. Economy, Elizabeth C. 2014. “China’s Imperial President. Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip.” Foreign Affairs 93 (6) (November/December): 80– 91. Ford, Christopher A. 2014. “Confucian Rationalizations for One-Party Dictatorship”. Remarks on 9 May, 2014 at a conference on “Rethinking the Chinese World Order; Historical Perspectives on the Rise of China” at the University of Denver. Published by New

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Paradigms Forum. Accessed May 20, 2014. http://www.newparadigms forum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1835. Fox, Russell A. 1997. “Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy.” The Review of Politics 59 (3): 561–92. Global Times. 2014a. “China Must Chart Own Course to Rule of Law.” Global Times October21. Accessed October 21, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/887350.shtml. Global Times. 2014b. “‘Rule of Man’ Tradition Changed by New Law Blueprint.” Global Times October 30, 2014. Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/889069.shtml. Godement, François. 2013. Divided Asia: The Implications for Europe. Policy Brief of the European Council on Foreign Relations. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR91_DIVIDED_ASIA_AW.pdf. Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi ഭ࣑䲒ᯠ䰫࣎‫ޜ‬ᇔ, ed. 2014. Jiedu Zhongguo Waijiao Xin Lilun 䀓䈫ѝഭཆӔᯠ⨶ᘥ. Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe. Johnston, Ian and Ping Wang, transl. and ed. 2012. Daxue & Zhongyong. Bilingual Edition. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Kallio, Jyrki. 2011. Tradition in Chinese Politics. The Party-state’s reinvention of the past and the critical response from public intellectuals. FIIA Report 27. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Accessed March 2, 2014. http://www.fiia.fi /fi/publication/165/tradition_in_chinese_politics/. Kang, Xiaoguang ᓧ ᲃ ‫ ݹ‬. 2014. “Da zhuangui–quanqiuhua shidai de guojia zhuangui lilun ji Zhonghua minzu fuxing zhanlüe” བྷ䖜䖘—བྷ 䖜䖘—‫ॆ⨳ޘ‬ᰦԓⲴഭᇦ䖜䖘⨶䇪৺ѝॾ≁᯿༽‫ޤ‬ᡈ⮕. Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Feiyingli Zuzhi Yanjiusuo April 30, 2014. Accessed 16 October, 2014. http://npo.ruc.edu.cn/displaynews. php?id=464. Kim, Sungmoon. 2014. Confucian Democracy in East Asia, Theory and Practise. New York: Cambridge University Press. Li, Fawei ᵾਁՏ. 2011. “Rujia xin-xing lilun dui chuantong Zhongguo duiwai guanxi de yingxiang” ݂ᇦᗳᙗ⨶䇪ሩՐ㔏ѝഭሩཆ‫ޣ‬㌫Ⲵ ᖡ૽. Ningxia Shehui Kexue 3: 120–23. Li, Cunshan ᵾᆈኡ. 2012. “Zhong-shu zhi Dao yu Zhongguo jin-xiandai de duiwai guanxi ᘐᚅѻ䚃оѝഭ䘁⧠ԓⲴሩཆ‫ޣ‬㌫.” Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiushengyuan Xuebao 5 (191) (September): 11– 18. Liu, Guoli. 2008. “Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 1, 43 (5): 543–61.

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Liu, Jiuzhou ࢹҍ⍢, ed. 2000. Xin yi Gu Tinglin wenji ᯠ䆟亗ӝ᷇᮷䳶. Taibei: Sanmin Shuju. Liu, Xiaoying ࡈᲃ㤡. 2012. “Shiyong lixing: Yingxiang Zhongguo jueqi de neizai wenhua yinsu ᇎ⭘⨶ᙗ˖ᖡ૽ѝഭፋ䎧Ⲵ޵൘᮷ॆഐ.” Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Beijing) 3: 108–15. Martinsen, Joel. 2006. “Yu Qiuyu on cross-cultural communication”. Danwei.org October 28. Accessed March 31, 2013. http://www. danwei.org/china_and_foreign_relations/yu_qiuyu_on_crosscultural_c omm.php. Peng, Yongjie ᖝ≨ᦧ. 2013. “Wangdao zhengzhi yu Tianxia zhuyi ⦻䚃 ᭯⋫оཙлѫѹ.” Xiandai Zhexue 127 (2) (March): 90–102. QStheory.cn. 2014. “Yi fa zhi guo yu jianchi renmin minzhu zhuanzheng” ‫⋫⌅׍‬ഭоඊᤱӪ≁≁ѫу᭯.” QStheory.cn. October 1. Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/ 201410/11/c_1112780248.htm. Raphals, Lisa. 1992. Knowing Words, Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Schuman, Michael. 2014. “The Chinese President’s Love Affair with Confucius Could Backfire on Him.” Time.com October 30. Accessed November 19, 2014. http://time.com/3547467/china-beijing-xi-jinpingconfucius-communism/. Spence, Jonathan D. 2001. Treason by the Book. New York, NY: Penguin Books. Song, Qiang ᆻᕧ, Zhang Zangzang 䮧㯿㯿, and Qiao Bian ௜䚺. 1997. Erlingsanling Zhongguo diyi Ҽ 䴦 й 䴦 ѝ ഻ ㅜ а . Hong Kong: Mingbao Chubanshe. Wang, Hongxu ⦻㓒㔝. 2011. “Hexie shijie linian de Zhonghua chuantong wenhua jichu ઼䉀ц⭼⨶ᘥⲴѝॾՐ㔏᮷ॆส⹰.” Zhong-Gong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao 15 (1) (February): 96–100. Wang, Rihua ⦻ ᰕ ॾ . 2011. “Kongzi zhuyi guoji guanxi lilun yu Zhongguo waijiao ᆄᆀѫѹഭ䱵‫ޣ‬㌫⨶䇪оѝഭཆӔ.” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 5: 47–54. Wang, Shengcai ⦻⭏᡽. 2006. “Rujia yi-liguan de xiandai jiedu jiqi dui Zhongguo waijiao juece de yingxiang ݂ᇦѹ࡙㿲Ⲵ⧠ԓ䀓䈫৺ަሩ ѝഭཆӔߣㆆⲴᖡ૽.” Xibei Di’er Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao 2 (70): 24–28.

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Wang, Yi ⦻᱃. 2011. “Rujia guojia guanxi lilun sixiang de xiandai jiazhi yu lishi shiming ݂ᇦഭᇦ‫ޣ‬㌫Ֆ⨶ᙍᜣⲴ⧠ԓԧ٬оশਢ֯ભ.” Chuangxin 5 (31): 8–13. —. 2014. “Jianchi zhengque yi-liguan, jiji fahui fuzeren daguo zuoyong ඊ ᤱ↓⺞ѹ࡙㿲, 〟ᶱਁᥕ䍏䍓ԫབྷഭ֌⭘.” In Jiedu Zhongguo Waijiao Xin Lilun 䀓 䈫 ѝ ഭ ཆ Ӕ ᯠ ⨶ ᘥ , edited by Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi ഭ࣑䲒ᯠ䰫࣎‫ޜ‬ᇔ, 27–33. Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe. Wu, Jiaxiang ੤ぬ⾕. 2013. Gong Tianxia – Duo zhongxin zhili yu shuang zhuti faquan ‫ޜ‬ཙл—ཊѝᗳ⋫⨶оৼѫփ⌅ᵳ. Nanning: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe. Xi, Jinping. 2014. The Governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Xinhuawang ᯠॾ㖁. 2014. “Shouquan fabu: Zhongguo Gongchandang dishibajie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui disici quanti huiyi gongbao” ᦸᵳ ਁᐳ˖ѝഭ‫ޡ‬ӗ‫ފ‬ㅜॱ‫ޛ‬ቺѝཞငઈՊㅜഋ⅑‫ޘ‬փՊ䇞‫ޜ‬ᣕ October 23. Accessed October 24, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet .com/politics/2014-10/23/c_1112953884.htm. Yan, Xuetong. 2006. “The Rise of China and its Power Status.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 1: 5–33. —. 2011. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe; translated by Edmund Ryden. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Yang, Meng ᶘ㨼. 2011. “‘He er bu tong’ yu heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze ઼㘼н਼”о઼ᒣ‫ޡ‬༴ӄ亩৏ࡉ.” Hongqi Wengao 2: 34–35. Ye, Zicheng ਦ㠚ᡀ. 2013. “Huaxia zhuyi: Zhongguo de bentu renwen jingshen ॾ༿ѫѹ: ѝഭⲴᵜ൏Ӫ᮷㋮⾎.” Xueshu Qianyan 2: 64– 83. —. 2014. “Chuantong wenhua jinghua yu Xi Jinping zhiguo linian” Ր㔏 ᮷ॆ㋮ॾоҐ䘁ᒣ⋫ഭ⨶ᘥ.” Renmin Luntan February 7. Accessed December 9, 2014. http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0207/c11285124291830.html, Yu, Qiuyu ։⿻䴘. 2006. “Zhongguo chuyu ‘wenhua guli’ zhi zhong ma? ѝ ഭ ༴ Ҿ “ ᮷ ॆ ᆔ ・ ” ѻ ѝ ੇ ˛ .” Huanqiu Shibao October 9, reprinted at Renminwang October 11. Accessed March 31, 2013. http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/27296/4903226.html. Yu, Yingshi ։㤡ᰦ. 1987. Shi yu Zhongguo wenhua ༛оѝഭ᮷ॆ. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe.

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—. 1998. Xiandai ruxue de kunjing ⧠ԓ݂ᆖⲴഠຳ. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe. Zhu, Zhongbo ᵡѝঊ. 2013. “Rujia de da zhanlüe sixiang daoxiang jiqi liang mian ݂ᇦⲴབྷᡈ⮕ᙍᜣሬੁ৺ަє䶒.” Guoji Guancha 1: 59– 65. Zhuang, Pinghui. 2014. “Party Mouthpiece Compares Xi with Deng as the ‘New Architect of Reform’.” South China Morning Post November 14. Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ article/1639250/party-mouthpiece-compares-xi-deng-new-architectreform.

CHAPTER SIX PEACE AS EVENNESS? REFLECTIONS ON THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND THEIR CLASSICAL REFERENCES HELENA MOTOH

ѝॾ᮷ॆᱟа⿽઼ᒣⲴ᮷ॆDŽ1 Chinese culture is a culture of peace.

These bold words were one of the key points of the first important official statement that set out a new line in Chinese foreign policy, i.e. the “peaceful development” strategy. The first white paper on this topic, China’s Peaceful Development Road (Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ䚃䐟), released in December 2005, marked the beginning of a strategy that was aimed at pacifying any anxieties caused by China’s rapid economic rise. Almost six years later, in September 2011, the idea was reconfirmed by another white paper with an almost identical title–– China’s Peaceful Development (Zhongguo de heping fazhan ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣ ਁ ኅ ) 2 ––this time reflecting a significantly different political and economical situation for China. Interestingly, the second text, although similar to the first one in both structure and length, addressed the idea in a

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Quoted from the published version on the Xinhua Portal 2005; the official English translation is quoted from China through a Lens 2005. The same two sources were used for all further quotes from the 2005 text China’s Peaceful Development Road (ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ䚃䐟). 2 Quoted from the published version on Xinhua Portal 2011; the official English translation is quoted from: China’s Peaceful Development 2011. The same two sources were used for all further quotes from the 2011 text China’s Peaceful Development (ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ).

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much more assertive tone, thus coming closer to the original doctrine of peaceful China from a decade before. One could say that the key precursor of the peaceful development doctrine was a proclamation made in 2002 on China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi ઼ᒣፋ䎧), or with the whole expression: “the development road of China’s peaceful rise” (Zhongguo heping jueqi de fa zhan daolu ѝ ഭ઼ᒣፋ䎧Ⲵਁኅ䚃䐟). The author of the doctrine, Zheng Bijian 䜁ᗵ ඊ, soon gained president Hu Jintao’s support and after 2003 the doctrine was promoted on a large scale (cf. Glaser and Medeiros 2007, 294). According to Zheng’s understanding, heping jueqi was meant to be a uniquely Chinese development model that characterized the period from the reform and opening up in the late seventies to the middle of the twenty-first century. The goal of this program was to achieve a moderately well-off (xiao kang ሿᓧ) society and ensure the well-being of the Chinese people, while refraining from exercising hegemony in any regard (ibid.). The “peaceful” element of the peaceful rise strategy was explicitly formulated to contrast the model of the rise of colonial superpowers in the nineteenth and twentieth century and thus provided a new “post-colonial” model of economic rise without any aspirations for political or military power expansions. As the term “rise” was seen as controversial and potentially frightening for the international community,3 it was officially removed from use in 2004 (Guo 2006, 2) and replaced by a phrase that was simply an abbreviated version of Zheng’s slogan, namely “China’s peaceful development” (Zhongguo heping fazhan ѝഭ઼ᒣਁኅ). Written in an apologetic spirit, the first of the two white papers on peaceful development, the 2005 “China’s Peaceful Development Road”, represents an interesting text. Partially a strategy for the future development of China’s and partially a declaration of its new foreign policy, the white paper connects three important keywords used by the HuWen administration: “harmony” (hexie ઼䉀), “development” (fazhan ਁ ኅ) and “peace” (heping ઼ᒣ), as expressed in the first chapter of the text: ઼ᒣǃᔰ᭮ǃਸ֌ǃ઼䉀ǃ‫ޡ‬䎒ᱟᡁԜⲴѫᕐǃᡁԜⲴ⨶ᘥǃᡁԜⲴ ৏ࡉǃᡁԜⲴ䘭≲DŽ䎠઼ᒣਁኅ䚃䐟ˈቡᱟ㾱ᢺѝഭഭ޵ਁኅоሩཆ ᔰ᭮㔏а䎧ᶕˈᢺѝഭⲴਁኅ оц⭼Ⲵਁኅ㚄㌫䎧ᶕˈᢺѝഭӪ≁ 3

The term “China’s rise” was allegedly first used in the controversial book Evaluation of the International Environment for China’s Rise (1998, Zhongguo jueqi guoji huanjing pinggu ѝഭፋ䎧ഭ䱵⧟ຳ䇴ՠ), edited by Yan Xuetong. (Guo 2006, 1)

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Ⲵṩᵜ࡙⳺оц⭼Ӫ≁Ⲵ‫⳺਼࡙ޡ‬㔃ਸ䎧ᶕDŽѝഭሩ޵ඊᤱ઼䉀ਁኅ ˈሩཆඊᤱ઼ᒣਁኅˈ䘉єњᯩ䶒ᱟᇶ࠷㚄㌫ǃᴹᵪ㔏аⲴ ᮤփˈ 䜭ᴹ࡙Ҿᔪ䇮ањᤱѵ઼ᒣǃ‫਼ޡ‬㑱㦓Ⲵ઼䉀ц⭼DŽ Peace, opening-up, cooperation, harmony and win-win are our policy, our idea, our principle and our pursuit. To take the road of peaceful development is to unify domestic development with opening to the outside world, linking the development of China with that of the rest of the world, and combining the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples throughout the world. China persists in its pursuit of harmony and development internally while pursuing peace and development externally; the two aspects, closely linked and organically united, are an integrated whole, and will help to build a harmonious world of sustained peace and common prosperity. (The underlining is by the author.)

The underlined phrase emphasizes an important aspect of the heping fazhan theory that is often overlooked, partly due to translation issues. The “harmony and development” as an internal policy slogan (or “harmonious development”) and the “peace and development” (or “peaceful development”) as an external policy motto are linked by much more than the mere elegant parallelism of the official wording. What the harmony doctrine represents for the development within China is related to what peace represents for the development of China’s position and status within the international community. It should be noted that, due to translation issues, the relationship between the two concepts can be found in the semantic nuance that gets lost when heping is translated by the English “peace” or its European variants. An important element of the classical references to “harmony” that appeared in Hu-Wen’s “harmonious society” doctrine––which represents the basis for the quoted passage––is that harmony understood as balancing out the differences that occur after the initial sameness (tong ਼) has been lost (Motoh 2009, 143–44). Therefore the harmonization within China primarily addresses the need to even out the differences caused by the period of rapid economic growth that occurred during the last decade. A similar task is addressed by the use of “peace” for the inequalities in the international sphere. The term heping, although standardly translated as “peace”, is interestingly composed of the term “harmony”, joined by the word “ping”, usually translated as “equality” or “evenness”. It is obviously very different from the common understanding of peace in the European political theory, both by etymology and function.

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The minuscule issue of translating concepts might seem peripheral to such a grand and well established concept as “peaceful development”. Nevertheless, as an interesting author on these and similar topics, Thorsten J. Pattberg often emphasises (cf. Pattberg 2013 and 2014) that translating terminologies is of key importance in any intercultural dialogue, and that this is never a smooth and univocal process. Instead, as Pattberg formulates, “cultures compete for terminologies”, 4 they use them intentionally and strategically. It is never merely about language when such concepts are translated. The choice of translating the concepts or–– even more––not translating them5 is a political choice. It is in this light that the reflection on the particular choice of phrasing in the “peaceful development” slogan will be made. I will try to show that the combination of the Chinese term heping, itself a modern compound, and its translation “peace” has strategic connotations that differ in the two language variants. I suggest that a reflection is needed on the discrepancy between the concept of “heping fazhan” with its possible semantic functions within China and its translated counterpart “peaceful development” and its external semantic functioning. Of course, it would require a much more extensive research in we were to attempt to prove that what somebody with a native Chinese linguistic background understands by heping fazhan and that what an average native speaker of English understands by “peaceful development” are or are not the same thing. 6 Therefore, the present paper only provides an introductory reflection on the topic and hopes to open a debate on these issues. First it will look into the classical sources, so often referred to in the contemporary PRC’s political discourse, in order to assess the semantic aspects of the components of the modern term heping.

Tranquillity and Evenness in Classical Writings The two classical concepts that are usually understood to be semantically related to the modern heping and are translated by “peace” in European languages are most commonly an (ᆹ) and ping (ᒣ). Both 4

This was the title of Pattberg’s talk delivered at the Alzahra University, Tehran in 2012 (The East-West Dichotonomy). 5 Pattberg himself advocated for the “end of translation” as a linguistic counterpart in the fight against imperialism (cf. Pattberg, 2014). 6 Of course, an average native speaker is a dubious methodological category in its own right.

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terms, often paired with “harmony” he, also appear in modern compound words with related meanings, e.g. heping (઼ᒣ) and ping’an (ᒣᆹ), etc. However, the two terms have quite different connotations in the classical writings. The uses of an point to a range of meanings that revolve around the notion of tranquillity, peaceful stability, safety or the state of being at ease with something or while doing something. Such, for example, is the use in Mozi (Mozi, Gongmeng, 7)7 where guo an, a “peaceful” country is understood as a result of a proper government (“… and with a (proper) government the country is brought to peace”; ..., Shi yi zhengzhi er guo’an ye ᱟԕ᭯⋫㘼ഭᆹҏ). Other uses also link an to “safety” (e.g. Xunzi, Rong ru, 4), not worrying about something (Han shu, Shi huo zhi shang, 26), being well versed, “at home” in doing something (Zuo zhuan, Xi gong er shi san nian, 2), etc. More interestingly, it can be observed that the two words, an and ping, started to appear together already in early texts, in which each presented a different connotation of what could be translated as peace. The most interesting of these is a phrase in Xunzi (Xunzi, Yi bing, 27), that links the two terms: “If a government is even, then the people are at peace” (Zhengpiíng er min an ᭯ᒣ㘼≁ᆹ), at which ping is the attribute of (a good) government and an its result for the people. I do not wish to imply that the classical sources could be interpreted as a coherent source of meanings and that any number of identified usages necessarily represent a universally valid rule or anything like the “true” or “original” meaning of a term. On the contrary, the terms ping and an represent a good example of the fact that the classics are not a consistent body of texts and that no such thing as a single true original meaning of a term ever existed. Even more, the study of classical references shows that the uses of similar concepts always overlap to a certain degree, making it even harder to discern their possible intended meanings. Nevertheless, as far as an and ping are concerned, there is an identifiable trend in classical references that provides a link to the contemporary applications of this vocabulary, which are also primarily related to the Confucian tradition. This trend can also be identified in the quoted Xunzi phrase. Ping is linked to the method of government, and an is the state that the people end up in as a result of the governing process. If an could be interpreted as being

7

Unless stated otherwise, all classical Chinese sources are quoted from the online database of the Chinese Text Project. The English translations are also taken from the database whenever available, and are modified only when a more literal translation is needed for a clearer interpretation.

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undisturbed and at ease, at peace in one’s own state, what kind of government could bring this about? Like in the quoted phrase, the interpretations of ping are often linked to a political context, the people, the state, or even (and quite commonly) the world or “All-under-Heaven” (tian xia ཙл). In most classical sources the use of ping refers to some kind of evenness, being even or equal, making things even or flattening things out––literally or figuratively, as in flattening out soil to make fields, regulating waters or putting things or people in order. An example of evening out or making order in the land (pingdi ᒣൠ) is provided in Shu jing’s description of the deeds of the legendary Yu (Da Yu mo, 7). One of the most interesting metaphoric explications of ping can be found in the text accompanying the first Yi jing hexagram, where evenness is compared to the equal distribution of natural benefits. lj᱃·ҮখNJӁ㹼䴘ᯭˈཙлᒣҏDŽ The clouds move, and the rain is distributed; all under heaven get an equal share.

Although the ping used in this passage is usually translated as rest, repose, peace, etc., the commentary clearly indicates that we are dealing with an even distribution of heavenly benefit li ࡙. lj⮿NJ䀰ཙлᲞᗇަ࡙ˈ㘼൷ᒣˈн‫ٿ‬䱲DŽ Everything under heaven receives its benefit, even and equal, and there is no prejudice or unevenness.

It definitely describes a kind of peace, stillness, but above all it is a type of balanced peace that stems from the equal distribution of Heavenly benefits. In the explanation of the first hexagram, qian, Heaven is compared to the ruler and the sage, and these two should follow its example. It can thus be understood why in later texts, Mengzi for example, the connotation of tian xia ping ཙлᒣ is already getting very close to the replacement that we find expressed in the Song dynasty quote of the same Yijing phrase: Ӂ㹼䴘ᯭˈཙл⋫ҏDŽljཚᒣᗑ㿸NJ The clouds move, and the rain is distributed; all under heaven is (well) governed.

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The key reference point for the later understanding of tian xia ping, the two occurrences in Daxue 2 and 12, also relate the idea of evenness to the standard of good rule. The use of the phrase in DX 2 is one of the examples for which I think the understanding could benefit from the interpretation of ping as having the connotation of equality or evenness: ਔѻⅢ᰾᰾ᗧҾཙл㘵ˈ‫ަ⋫ݸ‬ഭ˗……⢙Ṭ㘼ਾ⸕㠣ˈ⸕㠣㘼ਾ᜿ 䈊ˈ᜿䈊㘼ਾᗳ↓ˈᗳ↓㘼ਾ䓛‫ˈ؞‬䓛‫؞‬㘼ਾᇦ喀ˈᇦ喀㘼ਾഭ⋫ˈ ഭ⋫㘼ਾཙлᒣDŽ The ancients, who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. (...) Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, there was evenness throughout the kingdom.

Ping, understood as a stable, ordered and peaceful state, is even further explained in the twelfth passage in Daxue: ᡰ䉃ᒣཙл൘⋫ަഭ㘵˖к㘱㘱㘼≁‫ޤ‬ᆍˈк䮯䮯㘼≁‫ޤ‬ᕏˈкᚔᆔ 㘼≁н‫ˈؽ‬ᱟԕੋᆀᴹ⌱⸙ѻ䚃ҏDŽ What is meant by “Making the whole kingdom even (ping) depends on the government of his state,” is the following: When the sovereign behaves to his aged, as the aged should be behaved to, the people become filial; when the sovereign behaves to his elders, as the elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly submission; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same. Thus the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct.

A principle that could (with a hint of historical irony) be called “each according to his social position” shows that ping in Confucian contexts was understood as another kind of evenness, different from the equal distribution of benefit––social equality––in Yi jing. Here evenness in the meaning of social stability or social peace is not understood as a principle of equal treatment, but as the desired end result of policies that might be unequal in absolute terms. “Each according to his social position” thus brings about overall social stability, and thus moves closer to the connotations of an, another vision of peace that was mentioned above.

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There is also a slight inconsistency in the wording of the two Da xue occurrences of the phrase. Da xue 2 addresses tian xia ping, the evenness of the kingdom, while Da xue 12 addresses “ᡰ䉃ᒣཙл (suowei ping tianxia)”, what is meant by making the kingdom even. However, an ostensibly minor difference functions as a point of differentiation between the two lines of political thought. Although not exclusively, a divergence can be noticed between Mengzi and Daoists who prefer to talk about the evenness of the tian xia as the desired condition on one hand and Xunzi, legalists and Huainanzi who opt for the evening out of the tianxia and focus on the governing policies that would even out the kingdom on the other. Unsurprisingly, the preferred methods of how ping can be achieved differ accordingly.

Tian xia between the Cultural and the Political Definition Whether it is the kingdom that needs to be evened out or the ruler gets advice on how the evenness could be achieved, the reference point of the ping doctrine is usually tian xia, the All-under-Heaven, an enigmatic term that is becoming increasingly relevant in the contemporary Chinese political discourse. In his paper “Changing views of tian xia in preimperial discourse” (Pines 2002) Yuri Pines juxtaposes an established interpretation of the term by Joseph Levenson with a nuanced range of Chinese understandings of the term. Levenson, who primarily worked on texts from the later imperial period (ibid., 101), claimed that tian xia represented a political unit above that of a country or a state, and identified this realm with the prevalence of Chinese culture within it. According to Levenson, tian xia therefore equals the sphere of Chinese cultural influence, logically extending beyond the political borders of the Chinese state. Such an understanding of tian xia is similar in principle (although not in the formulation) to the notorious idea of three symbolic universes of Du Weiming’s “Cultural China” (Du 1991, 12). Pines is less simplistic and, even more importantly––much less essentialist. Instead of providing a single true understanding of the term, he seeks to find what the transformations of its use tell us about the self-perception of the Chinese people and the Chinese state. Virtually absent in early Zhou sources and not present in bronze inscriptions, the compound tian xia makes its appearance slowly, first phrased as tian zhi xia (ཙѻл). Interestingly, the term becomes more common with the political disintegration of the Zhou realm and during the Spring-Autumn period it coincides with the territory of the former Zhou

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rule. As the political unity collapsed, the unity that was described by the term Under-Heaven became a cultural one, with the reflection of the cultural (and linguistic) identity still recognised by the elites in the new states. This cultural sense of unity and the cultural understanding of tian xia was replaced by a more political interpretation at the beginning of China’s reunification. In the Warring states period, when the peripheral states gradually took over the culturally homogenous centre which was experiencing a great social and cultural transformation, political unity prevailed over the shared cultural identity and the understanding of tian xia became primarily political––Pines (2002, 104–7) even linked it to imperialist connotations. Tian xia remained synonymous with the Chinese state even in Qin times, when it was linked to the imperial realm of the house of Qin, although––according to Pines (ibid., 111–3)––a certain degree of self exclusion from the newly unified realm could be noticed amongst the Qin elites. It is hard to find an interpretation that would support Levenson’s interpretation in the classical sources, and as Pines shows, the tian xia is commonly understood as either the scope of culturally homogenous China or––later on––the realm of the sovereign’s ruling power. The classical understanding of tian xia does not seem to extend beyond the scope of the ruler’s power. This connection between tian xia and political sovereignty can be found in various bai jia schools. Confucius, for example, used tian xia when he talked about the ruler who found it easy to rule the tian xia once he had reached an adequate understanding (zhi qi shuo zhe zhi yu tianxia ye, qi ru shi zhu si hu! ⸕ަ䈤㘵ѻҾཙлҏˈަྲ⽪䈨ᯟѾ!) while Zhuangzi used it when he mentioned that Yao resigned the rule of the tian xia to Xu You (yao rang tianxia yu xu you ቗䇙ཙлҾ䇨⭡). The only exception to this understanding can be found in Dao de jing, where tian xia seems to be occasionally used as a synonym to di, the Earth. Still, even this usage does not support Levenson’s sinocentric reading, as Laozi sees tian xia either as the ruler’s actual realm or in a strictly cosmological and not political way. ሶⅢਆཙл㘼Ѫѻˈ੮㿱ަнᗇᐢDŽཙл⾎ಘˈнਟѪҏˈѪ㘵䍕 ѻˈᢗ㘵ཡѻDŽ If any one should wish to get the kingdom for himself, and to effect this by what he does, I see that he will not succeed. The kingdom is a spirit-like thing, and cannot be got by active doing. He who would so win it destroys it; he who would hold it in his grasp loses it. (Dao de jing, 29) ཙлз⢙⭏Ҿᴹˈᴹ⭏ҾᰐDŽ

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Chapter Six All things under heaven sprang from it as existing; that existence sprang from it as non- existent. (ibid., 40)

Later interpretations, most notably Liang Qichao’s, are much closer to Levenson’s understanding of the term. In Liang, the notion of tian xia is understood as an emblem that separates China from the modern view of nation-states. Compared to nation, tian xia signifies a supra-national polity, even larger than the kingdom itself. It implies the unity of the empire, at which it identifies the outmost borders of the empire with the limits of the (known) Universe (cf. Wang 2012, 338). The modern term “world” (shijie ц⭼) was introduced to China only during the late Qing period and it took a while for it to take on a new, decentralized view of the world (ibid., 339–40). As a part of the contemporary revival of Confucianism it is thus not surprising that after a century of promoting the modern nation state and shijie as its international Westfalian context, the old concept of tian xia is also being revived. The most prominent example of this can be found in the work by Zhao Tingyang, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Zhao’s first work on this topic, his book The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution (2005, Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun ཙлփ㌫˖ц⭼ࡦᓖଢᆖሬ䇪) proposes no less than a new world vision that would be based on a reinterpreted traditional world view. Zhao sees the deficiencies of the Westphalian international system of individual nation states in the fact that it does not provide a superstructure that would not only enable separate nation states to solve their conflicts but also provide a shared identity and value that would provide a positive base for a new world order. He calls this new world vision the tian xia tixi (the Tianxia system) (cf. Zhao, 2011). Contrary to what the most common criticisms of his theory point out, Zhao’s version of the tian xia system is not sinocentric. On the contrary, the decentralization of the sinocentric world view is one of the main points of his political vision. Nevertheless, however cosmopolitan Zhao’s vision might seem, it is conceived from a distinctly Chinese point of view. Although the conceptualization is new and innovative, the view on the country’s position in the world system still largely corresponds to the official worldview that was already discussed in the first part of the paper. Zhao considered the mutual non-interference in the inner affairs of the nation states within the tian xia system to be one of the main preconditions for its operation. In this regard Zhao’s model represents a perfect match for one of the most important axioms of China’s foreign policy: the five

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principles of peaceful coexistence. Both white papers on the peaceful development strategy refer to this set of principles as one of the most important elements of international stability and––interestingly enough–– this topic is also where the two otherwise quite different documents show a perfect match. In the 2011 text we can read: ѝഭӪ≁ඊᤱ㠚ᐡ䘹ᤙⲴ⽮Պࡦᓖ઼ਁኅ䚃䐟ˈн‫ݱ‬䇨ཆ䜘࣯࣋ᒢ⎹ ѝഭ޵᭯DŽ The Chinese people adhere to the social system and path of development chosen by themselves and will never allow any external forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs.

Quite a strong tone is followed (also in the 2005 text) by a reference to the main principle of Chinese foreign relations: ඊᤱ൘઼ᒣ‫ޡ‬༴ӄ亩৏ࡉส⹰кˈ਼ᡰᴹഭᇦਁኅ৻ྭਸ֌DŽ China promotes friendly and cooperative relations with all the other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

The five principles of peaceful coexistence (heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze ઼ᒣ‫ޡ‬༴ӄ亩৏ࡉ) were formulated in 1954 as the first model of post-colonial relations between states (Prakash and Sondhi 2007, 45). As a heir to two unlikely sources, the five moral principles of Buddhism and Stalin’s concept of “peaceful coexistence” (Miškoviü et all. 2014, 115– 16), these five guidelines were placed in a preamble to a 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement on “trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India”. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were formulated as: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (huxiang zunzhong lingtu zhuquan ӂ⴨ሺ䟽亶൏ѫᵳ) (2) mutual non-aggression (hu bu qinfan ӂн‫ץ‬⣟) (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (hu bu ganshe neizheng ӂнᒢ⎹޵᭯) (4) equality and mutual benefit (pingdeng huhui ᒣㅹӂᜐ) (5) peaceful co-existence (heping gongchu ઼ᒣ‫ޡ‬༴)

It is known that the well-intended treaty did not bring the peace and mutual understanding it aspired to and that the Sino-Indian conflict eventually erupted into a war in 1962. Nevertheless, the principle of peaceful coexistence was accepted at the 1955 Bandung conference as the

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standard for international relations in a post-colonial world and later on it became the main principle of the Non-aligned movement. One semantic characteristic of the five principles is especially interesting for the topic discussed in this paper. Although the name of the set of principles implies that they are primarily aimed at peace in inter-state relations, actually only one of the five points refers to “peace”, or to what this term usually means in the common political discourse. The remaining four can be consequentially linked to peace, clearly with the rationale that they are necessary preconditions for it, or rather, that the failure to respect them can eventually lead to conflict and war. However, we shall venture to claim that the link between the five principles and the idea of peace, understood as it is, is much closer in the Chinese context than it seems to be in its English translation. The reason for this can be found in the particular connotation of the world heping in Chinese. As we have seen the compound he-ping consists of two classical notions: harmony and evenness/equality, which together carry a very different undertone to the »peace« they are translated with. The two words often appeared together from the classical times onwards, but as all compound words they only gradually started functioning as a disyllabic word. They often appear as a part of the phrase tian xia he ping (ཙл઼ᒣ), i.e. “peace and evenness under Heaven”, already in classical texts. This can explain why the vision of “peace” as heping also remains closely correlated to the notion of tian xia and the classical vision of evenness within the tian xia realm. It is not so much “peace” as stability or absence of war, but “evenness” that is to be established under Heaven that can thus be identified as the key motif of the new Chinese political thought and policies. It is easier to understand some of the Chinese connotations of the “peaceful development strategy” within this context. With this aspect in mind, the strategy of this policy proves to be even more brilliantly conceived in its bilingual formulation. It can even be said that it manages to fulfil two sets of expectations with a single phrase. For the English speaking world it provides a guarantee of “peaceful development”. With the keyword “peace” which carries the connotation of the absence of aggression, it thus emphasizes the non-violent aspect of China’s rise––its deliberation to become a major force while refraining from political or military hegemony. In this context peace is used to imply the absence of violent actions, war, hostility and the like. However, as the previous analysis has shown the standard translation of the term “heping” as “peace” is of course correct, but also somewhat semantically misleading. If we therefore read the Chinese version of the same program from the

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viewpoint of traditional connotations it presupposes, the emphasis can be heard in a slightly different way, i.e. it provides a guaranty for the Chinese reader that China will not surrender its demands for internal sovereignty, equal participation in international institutions and generally, evenness on the global level.

Bibliography China’s Peaceful Development. 2011. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-09/06/content_ 23362449.htm. China Through a Lens. 2005. China’s Peaceful Development Road. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/ Dec/152669.htm. Da xue བྷᆖ. 2015. Accessed February 26, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Dao de jing 䚃 ᗧ 㓿 . 2015. Accessed February 26, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Glaser, Bonnie S., and Evan S. Medeiros. 2007. “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’.” The China Quarterly 190 (June): 291–310. Guo, Sujian. 2006. China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions. London: Ashgate Publishing. Han shu ≹ Җ . Accessed February 26, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Miškoviü, Nataša, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska. 2014. The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade. New York: Routledge. Mozi ໘ ᆀ . Accessed February 26, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Motoh, Helena. 2009. “‘Olympic Spirit’: Chinese Policies and the Universality of Human Rights.” Synthesis philosophica 47 (1): 141–51. Pattberg, Thorsten. 2013. The East-West Dichotomy: The Conceptual Contrast between Eastern and Western Cultures. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. —. 2014/2015. Language Imperialism & The End of Translation New York: LoD Press. Pines, Yuri. 2002. “Changing Views of Tianxia in Pre-Imperial Discourse.” Oriens Extremus 43 (1–2): 101–16.

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Prakash, Nanda, and M. L. Sondhi, ed. 2007. Rising India: Friends and Foes. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers. Shu jing Җ 㓿 . Accessed February 28, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. “The East-West Dichotonomy.” 2012. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com/cultures-compete-forterminologies-alzahra-university-tehran/. Tu, Weiming. 1991. “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center.” Daedalus 1–32. Wang, Mingming. 2012. “All Under Heaven (tianxia) – Cosmological Perspectives and Political Ontologies in Premodern China.” HAU – Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 337–83. Xunzi 㥰 ᆀ . Accessed March 4, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Yi jing ᱃ 㓿 . Accessed February 28, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Zhao, Tingyang (2005) 2011. Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun ཙ л փ ㌫ ˖ ц ⭼ ࡦ ᓖ ଢ ᆖ ሬ 䇪 . Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe. Zhongguo de heping fazhan ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ. 2011. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-09/06/c_121982103 .htm. Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ䚃䐟. 2005. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-12/22/ content_ 3954937 .htm. Zhuangzi ᒴᆀ. Accessed March 4, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org. Zuo zhuan ᐖՐ. Accessed March 4, 2015. Text and translation at www.ctext.org.

CHAPTER SEVEN CONFUCIUS IN BRAZIL: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL (AND HISTORICAL) PROBLEM ANDRÉ BUENO

Introduction Contemporary China faces a challenge: What will your policy options for the future be? We monitored the economic evolution of the country, and noticed an increasing and profound difference between the traditional Marxist discourse and social reality. It is therefore possible that we are witnessing a change in China’s political context. This transformation might happen already during the first half of this century. Certain proposals have emerged: the New Confucianism (Xin Rujia ᯠ ݂ ᇦ ) movement has been attracting the society’s attention. Based on the new interpretation of the Confucian tradition, New Confucianism proposes a transition from the Communist government to a new kind of social and political order that would be based on legitimate Chinese traditions. New Confucianism is not a new movement. The first manifesto Manifesto of the Universality of Chinese Culture (Wei zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan Ѫѝഭ᮷ॆᮜ੺ц⭼Ӫ༛ᇓ䀰) was launched in 1958 by a group of authors from China and Taiwan. Over the last two decades, this movement has strengthened in mainland China, and the Chinese government has allowed it to act with significant freedom. Brazil should pay attention to these changes. Brazilians consider China to be an ideal future partner, however, Brazil has no significant sinological tradition. The majority of the Brazilian society prefers to ignore the culture and history of China. Some Brazilian Marxist intellectuals believe that the Chinese political and economic model should be copied in Brazil. But which model? This can be applied to the case of New Confucianism. Most

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Brazilians have no idea who Confucius ᆄཛᆀ was. The readers have great difficulties in understanding the question. These difficulties have a direct relation to how the character of Confucius was built in the Brazilian imaginary. Brazilian universities are not acquainted with the Chinese thought, however, in Brazil Confucius is known as a religious figure. This situation creates deep problems in the understanding of the work by the ancient Chinese sage. In this essay we will examine the history of Confucius in Brazil and see the distorted view of his doctrine that the Brazilians have. We will conclude with a discussion on the difficulties Brazilians have when attempting to understand the political transition in contemporary China and the consequences this could generate.

The Appearance of Confucius in the Brazilian Intellectual Context Amongst Brazilian intellectuals the name of Confucius first appeared in the nineteenth century, and when it did, it did so with great force. At the time Brazil was still an empire. In 1873, the city of Rio de Janeiro (the imperial capital at the time) founded a spiritualist centre called “Confucius Group” which claimed to have received guidance from the spirit of the ancient Chinese master. It might seem strange that this text begins with this information. However, we shall see that the establishment of this group shows a very strong aspect within the Brazilian mentality: religious interpretation. The “Confucius Group” met the capital’s intellectual elite, and worked intensely for three years. The first Portuguese translations of the works by the French author Allan Kardec, the founder of spiritualism, were published by this group (curious detail: no Confucius work’s was translated by the group). One should consider why they chose the name “Confucius”. In Spiritism, a soul can face a group under an invented name. At the time only a few people in Brazil were aware of Confucius. None of the Confucian books were translated into Portuguese. It is possible that some of the intellectuals involved in the “Confucius Group” read the few available translations of Confucius in Latin, French or English. We may wonder whether the name Confucius was a part of the Orientalist’s fascination in the nineteenth century. Orientalism was fashionable in Rio de Janeiro, where newly constructed buildings were inspired by “Oriental” models (Chinese, Indian and Arabic). Brazil’s Emperor Pedro II was an Orientalist as well as a versatile polyglot.

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However, Brazilian Catholicism was also an important element in this issue. Although the Spiritism of Allan Kardec proclaimed to represent a segment of Christianity, it was rejected by Catholics as dangerous heresy. At the time Brazil was already one of the largest Catholic countries in the world. It is possible that the Spiritualists sought a differential with the rest of the Brazilian Christians. As they used an “exotic figure” as the “spiritual master”, Catholic criticism could decrease. However, in 1876–– three years after its foundation––the group changed its name to “Society of Spiritist Studies: God, Christ, and Charity”, thus once again approaching Christianity. The spiritual figure of Confucius disappeared. The group abandoned the “different”, and became dedicated to proselytising “among equals”. The move attracted a lot of interest, and the group grew rapidly (see Ribeiro and Campos 1931). Two lessons can be drawn from this experience: firstly, that the reading of Brazilian intellectuals is contaminated by religious imaginary. Any figure outside Western history and philosophy was a priori considered to be a religious one. History and philosophy were considered as exclusively Western sciences, and could thus not exist in the “Orient”. This situation created a deep prejudice against thinkers from Asia and Africa. Since these individuals were treated as religious figures, the Brazilians, almost everyone a Christian, tended to repudiate them. At most, they were treated as a curiosity. The second lesson was the following: any of these Afro-Asian thinkers only arouse interest when debating––and serving––the Brazilian Catholic Christian thought. This second lesson was crucial to the diffusion of Confucian thought in Brazil. According to Raimon Panikkar (1996), the symbolic level on which one could construct representations allowed for the identification of common ideas across cultures. From this, one can construct equivalent concepts that meet the intellectual reading of the cultures in which they were developed and a common identity can be defined. According to Panikkar, these concepts address the need to create a specific plan upon which an intercultural dialogue can develop, thus allowing agents from the involved cultures to have a common point of support. However, an intellectual interpretation of these symbols is necessary. And, in the Brazilian case, the figure of Confucius was adapted as a religious icon––but in the service of Christianity.

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Confucius in Brazilian Literature There was a gap of almost fifty years between the activities of the “Confucius’ Group” and the recommencement of the interest in Confucius in China. Brazil had changed significantly: it has been a consolidated republic since 1889. During the First World War (1914–1918), the Brazilian government tried to appear on the international political scene with great intensity. The country’s diplomatic activities were resurrected. The Brazilian public started timidly to express interest in global geopolitics. During the Second World War, the Japanese invasion of China in 1936 aroused the curiosity of Brazilians. Seizing the opportunity, Brazilian publishers searched for publications that would provide an explanation of Chinese culture. Then came the first translations of fragments of works by Confucius. The first was A Philosophia de Confúcio (The Philosophy of Confucius), by Ignacio Raposo (1939), which was translated from the French original; O pensamento vivo de Confúcio (Living Thought of Confucius) by Alfred Doblin, was published the following year (1940), this time a translation from an English work. The two books share the same problems: they are merely fragments of texts by Confucius, and both stress the religious view of Confucius. This was most likely the reason why the editions achieved certain success with the Brazilian public. The main ideas of Confucianism were compared to Christianity in a positive way. Confucius was virtually treated like an Old Testament prophet, he knew about God, but did not know Jesus. This issue generated a mistaken view of Confucius. The Brazilian public was not yet acquainted with the Confucian philosophical project in an appropriate way, and the university showed no interest in a religious figure. Thus, in order to sell books, a prejudice was reinforced, and Confucius remained practically a stranger. This was probably the reason why a single academic study on Confucius was published: Apologia do Confucianismo (The Apology of Confucianism, 1939), written by the Orientalist Giuseppe Tucci. Translated from Italian, this small––but informative––introduction to Confucius and Confucianism failed to create an impact amongst the general public, and was thus forgotten.

Lin Yutang The study of China in Brazil saw an important contribution in 1945. Over a span of a decade most of the works by the Chinese writer Lin Yutang ᷇ 䃎 า were translated into Portuguese. These translations

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included important collections of Chinese texts, such as the Sabedoria de China e Índia (Wisdom of China and India), Sabedoria de Confúcio (Wisdom of Confucius) and A importância de compreender (The Importance of Understanding). The work by Lin Yutang was very well received by the public, but one needs to keep in mind that the author was a Christian. As we have already seen this was important in Brazilian mentality. For example: Brazilian translators had no problems translating the important Chinese concept of “Heaven” (Tian) as “God”. The Chinese appeared to be proto-Christians, which made the Brazilian public at ease. It was a matter of time before China became Christian. Once again, Confucius emerged as one of those unconscious propagators of God. A small detail should be added: Lin Yutang published several novels, and his sinological work was not taken seriously. The Brazilian public was not accustomed to scholars who were also writers. And as Chinese culture was still viewed superficially, the historical and philosophical books edited by Lin failed to receive academic consideration. His sinological works were treated as literary texts, and Chinese historical passages were often considered to be mythological passages, similar to Homer’s Iliad.

Friar João Batista Kao Se-Tsien In the same year that Lin Yutang was first published in Portuguese, Brazil was visited by a Chinese Catholic priest for the very first time. The priest’s name was Fr. João Batista (Jean Baptiste) Kao Se-tsien 儈ᑛ䅉 (Gao Shiqian).1 In 1945, the Chinese priest conducted a tour of several Latin American countries, including Brazil. He was on a complex mission: he was seeking support for Jiang Jieshi’s 㭓 ӻ ⸣ (Chiang Kai-shek) government who was fighting against the communist Mao Zedong ∋⌭ь revolutionaries. The task was arduous: priest Kao had to appeal to the western Christian, while at the same time convincing people that the Chinese were not from another planet. What strategy was the priest to adopt? Once again, the “Christian Confucius” seemed to be the right choice.2 The two books that he published in Brazil used the same speech. 1

Not to be confused with the priest Nicholas Kao Se Tsien (1897–2007), another important priest from Hong Kong with a similar name. 2 As confirmed by François Jullien, “each dialogue in its native language, but translated to another. Translation requires the reworking of other concepts within their own language, so that they can be reconsidered, made available for an alternate meaning.” (in Jullien 2010)

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In A filosofia política e social do Confucianismo (The Social and Political Philosophy of Confucianism, 1952), the priest presented an analysis of the cultural pillar of Chinese civilization, i.e. Confucianism, and established a philosophical and religious dialogue with Christianity. In the preface to the Brazilian edition, written by the Brazilian intellectual Alceu Amoroso Lima, the connection is clear: For what Confucius taught, as taught the son of God, is that only peace can bring happiness to men, and only the natural law, the nature of things, that both Confucianism and Christianity show us how the last reason may put a brake on the collective madness that gripped humanity. (Lima 1952, 17)

This short quote is extremely significant: Confucianism and Christianity join forces against the great enemy, the “collective madness” (Communism). Priest Kao published another book with similar contents: Confucionismo e Tridemismo (Confucianism and Tridemism, 1953). This book explained the relationship between Confucianism and the political theory of Sun Yatsen, the patron of the Chinese republic. We might ask: what is the difference between Lin Yutang and priest Kao for Brazilians? The answer is simple: Kao was a religious priest, which automatically meant that he was an authority recognized by the Catholic Church. In the Brazilian mentality, this made his warnings as regards communism a serious issue. Priest Kao could, therefore, become Confucius in a religious (Christian) and political (anti-communist) figure. This was the time of the Korean War (1950–1953), which involved communist China. Church services and cult rituals clamouring for the end of the war were held throughout Brazil. The Brazilian government considered assisting the UN by sending troops to Korea, but in the end decided to maintain its neutrality. By 1954, priest Kao’s project was practically buried. The communist government held power on the mainland. For most Brazilians this turned China into a terrifying country (atheist and communist) and Confucius into a failure as a religious and political figure.

1960–80s In the 1960s, Brazilians started to read Confucius once again. This was the time of the hippies (or the “Flower Power” movement), which mixed rock, freedom and Eastern religions. Once again, Confucius was resurrected as an Eastern mystic sage––but this time, he was no longer considered a Christian. His teachings were mixed with Laozi 㘱ᆀ and

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Indian mysticism, and he became a “New Age guru”. In the case of Brazil, these Asian authors were used as a reaction to the institutional domain of the Catholic Church. They generally searched for non-Western, mystical religious options, that would propose some sort of alternative individual freedom. Clearly, the path had not helped the development of a legitimate Brazilian Sinology. The same errors were repeated and once again Asian authors were considered to be purely religious, regardless of their history and philosophy. Disparaged as a finished religious form, the Confucianist doctrine did not arouse any serious academic interest. Brazilian intellectuals were not acquainted with the work of Asian and North American philosophical Confucianism. In fact, it seemed that betting on Confucianism was a useless eccentricity. A single book, Filosofia: Oriente, Ocidente (Philosophy: East and West, edited by Charles Moore), published in 1978, brought some essays on Asian philosophy. The book, albeit excellent, brought texts from a conference held in 1939! Still, it was one of the first serious efforts to introduce Asian philosophies. However, it would be soon eclipsed by the return of Asian knowledge in its esoteric sense. In the end Brazilian esotericism rescued Confucius, Buddha and other Asian thinkers. Embedded in the chaotic systemization of esoteric “universal wisdom”, “Eastern teachers” began to resurface at the desks in esoteric centres, sharing space with transcendental meditation, martial arts, astrology, runes, crystals and tarot. When read superficially, Asian thinkers were framed in a form of religious belief without contours, but with wisdom and an exotic role, arguing against what was seen as religious dogmatism (or, the “organized Christianity of the churches”). Capturing this trend, which would develop strongly over the following years, the publisher Cultrix-Pensamento (with publications specializing in the esoteric field) published the first edition of the Analects, translated by Múcio P. Ferreira in 1968. One could say that the first version of Lunyu 䄆 䃎 was published almost in its entirety (at the beginning of the text, the author admits to have omitted certain passages relating to the disciples of Confucius). However, almost one half of the book represents an excellent introduction to Confucius. This version reigned alone on the shelves of Brazilian bookstores, and was re-launched in 1986, obtaining a relative success. Maybe Múcio‘s translation should not have been categorised as “esoteric”, but this was a large consumer market, and the publisher decided to make the best of the readers’ interest. A relatively unknown effort was that of Ginés Gebran, who published a translation of Four books of Confucius (translated from French) in 1974,

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entitled A Doutrina de Confúcio, which also happened to be the first complete translation of Confucius in Brazil. Ginés also published Mencius in a separate volume. Although its production could be linked to the “esoteric” (due to its relations with the “Pythagorean Institute”), its translation (though indirect) was meticulously and carefully done, which gave it a special and usable character in the set of translations of works by Confucius. The insoluble problem of the academic departure from the “Ancient East” remained. In the 1970s, one author tried to fill this gap. In 1973 Murillo Nunes de Azevedo published the book O Olho do Furacão (The Eye of the Storm), in which he made a brief presentation of the main lines of Asian thought (Indian, Chinese and Japanese). Murillo was a Buddhist monk, university professor, and a member of the Theosophical Society. Obviously, his book preserved the religious tone with which he addressed the “Eastern” doctrines. The book was reissued in 1987 (this time entitled O Pensamento do extremo Oriente (The Thought of the Far East)), and continued to be one of the few introductions to Asians thinkers, including Confucius. On the other hand, a number of Brazilian intellectuals became interested in Chinese communism, and learned about Confucius in the worst possible way. A collection of essays entitled Crítica contra Lin Piao e Confúcio (On the Criticism against Lin Piao and Confucius, 1975, by Yang Rongguo ᶘ㦓ഭ) was translated into Portuguese, and distributed in Portugal and Brazil. These texts were written during a campaign promoted by Mao Zedong, and they explained that Confucianism was responsible for the historical backwardness of China (while at the same time slandering Lin Biao, who was accused of conspiring against Mao Zedong). The texts built a bad reputation for Confucius, and discouraged anyone who was interested in studying him.

Priest Joaquim Guerra In the 1980s, the Portuguese Jesuit Joaquim Guerra began translating all Confucius’ works into Portuguese––the five Chinese classics as well as the books by Confucius and Mencius––an unprecedented feat in this language.3 This was the first translation of Confucius’ texts made directly from the Chinese, and not from a translation. The works were printed in Macau, and would not have been included in our brief analysis of 3

Works are listed in the bibliography.

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Confucius in Brazil, if it was not for the dedication of a few individuals who endeavoured to bring copies of this work to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, some Jesuits were known to walk from one city centre bookseller to another with big bags full of books, selling them door to door. Unfortunately, the distribution was irregular, distant and difficult (remember, there was no internet). The distribution depended on catalogues or personal contacts; sometimes they were passed on annually, sometimes without prior announcement; the public was mainly ignorant, and the complicated (but brilliant) system of transliteration of Chinese names that the priest Guerra created and used tended to keep away new readers. In the best Jesuit tradition, priest Guerra hoped to include Confucius in the Christian tradition, inserting his ideas into the genealogy of the annunciation of God on Earth. However, the translations were excellent, and could have opened an interesting way to Confucian studies. But neither religious nor esoteric groups became interested in his work. Their introductions were made as controversial (although some were essentially proselytizing), but the coarse and simple volumes were not attractive. The public was definitely not prepared for these publications, which toured Brazil for almost a decade.

Diálogos de Confúcio, by Anne Cheng (1983) A special note should be given to the Diálogos de Confúcio (Dialogues of Confucius), published in 1983. This is a translation of the French version of Lunyu by Anne Cheng 〻㢮㱝, a Sino-French Sinologue, and a renowned expert on Han Confucianism. It is the first philosophical version of Lunyu presented to the Brazilian public, without the heavy religious burden that was imposed on the other versions. The Brazilian translation (though made from the French) managed to maintain the clarity and simplicity of the text, and establish secure connections with the Chinese text. This is a remarkable feat. However, similar to Cultrix-Pensamento, the publisher (Ibrasa), categorized this publication in the collection entitled “gnosis”, which includes titles that could be classified as “esoteric” or “occult”. However, it should be noted that both publishers were familiar with the book market in Brazil, and this was probably one of the few options to make this book salable in a country that ignored Confucius both, as an intellectual and philosopher.

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Confúcio em 90 minutos, by Paul Strathern After more than ten years ––during which the Brazilian audience had absorbed very little about Confucius––Confúcio em 90 minutos (Confucius in 90 minutes) by Paul Strathern (1998) was published. The aim of Strathern’s book was to create a comic presentation of various philosophers, using humorous and provocative settings. Individuals with prior knowledge of Confucius could laugh at certain jokes. The problem was that the Brazilian audience did not laugh at the jokes, because it did not understand. In fact, the situation was much worse, for by the time the collection was launched, many students took it seriously, using it in their academic papers. The low level of knowledge amidst the academic audience is alarming; even today (over a decade later) it is not uncommon to see students using the books from this collection as reliable sources, books such as Sophie’s World by J. Gaarder or The Da Vinci Code by Dan Brown. It is therefore necessary to analyse this book on Confucius, for it contains serious errors. The idea that Confucius came up with the notion that people should be sentenced to death because they were wearing wrong clothes, for example, is a heavy mistake, which induces the construction of a completely wrong picture about one of the greatest humanists that the world has ever known. The jokes are lost, they are no longer humorous placements. If our audience understood this, they might reject the book; but the series has good sales.

O Pensamento Chinês, by Marcel Granet Marcel Granet’s O Pensamento Chinês (La Pensée chinoise) was published in 1997. Granet was one of the best sinologists to ever live, and this work covers the founding period of the ancient Chinese philosophies. Granet’s thick and at times complicated book on Chinese cosmology, immanent thought, and the emergence of ethical schools, is extremely rewarding and instructive for those who want to seriously start studying sinology. Although the original was published in 1934, it is a book worth reading even today. The publication of Granet’s book can also be understood as a timid awakening of the public to the scientific and academic interest in China. The 2000s would change this picture drastically.

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2000s; New Perspectives In the first decade of the new millennia, the literary market slowly began presenting new works on Confucius. One of the newly published books was the astonishing version of the Analects (2000) by Simon Leys, one of the most critical and renowned sinologists today. The widely commented analytical introduction to Confucian aphorisms gives this translation its special sinological character. A broad picture of the thought of Confucius is drawn in this book. Two other versions of Lunyu followed soon: O Livro das perguntas e respostas em vinte capítulos (The Book of Answers and Explanations in Twenty Chapters, 2001) and Aforismos de Confúcio (Aphorisms by Confucius, 2003). Although neither presented any new aspects as regards the translation, both shared a different approach: popularity. Simple and inexpensive, they provided the first contact with the work of Confucius for a wider range of readers, who probably had no idea as to what they would find when they started reading the old Chinese master. However, there is a clear problem: there is a certain insistence, to only translate the Lunyu. The intensity has not yet been replaced by diversity, and many Confucian works remain unknown. Moreover, different versions of Lunyu can create a framework of options that allow for a graduate level of knowledge, i.e. with an ever greater interest, the available versions will be optimised. In 2008, the “Confucius Institute” ᆄᆀᆖ䲒 (“Kongzi Xueyuan”), the main Chinese agency for the dissemination of the language around the world settled in the state of São Paulo. This resulted in a new phase of Chinese studies in Brazil, building a secure foundation for the training of experts in Chinese language in regular and supervised courses. Perhaps due to this revived interest, O Autêntico Confúcio (The Authentic Confucius) by Annping Chin 䠁ᆹᒣ was published in 2008. This book is devoted entirely to the history and work of Confucius. As one of the few specialized works on Confucian thought available to the general public, it presents a set of references to the master that can safely be used in the academic environment. Additional value it given by the fact that it is a modern and up-to-date work. A continuation of this interest in China can be seen in the publication of the excellent manual História do Pensamento Chinês (History of Chinese Thought), written by the aforementioned Anne Cheng and published in 2009. The book covers the history of Chinese thought from antiquity to present day, and is thus indispensable on the shelf of any

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humanist. Cheng’s book has numerous outstanding qualities: it is fluently written, easy, affordable and well put together; the text is comprehensive without being superficial, and has been updated according to the newest Chinese archaeological and textual discoveries. Chronologically organized, it presents the different schools of Chinese thought, revealing their multiplicity. Finally, the book is an indispensable reference in Sinology. It is essential for any Brazilian who wishes to have a broader view of Confucius and Confucianism. For the very first time, the academic public has access to a well organized work on Chinese intellectual history. Other publishers also decided to start disseminating the thoughts of Confucius. D.C. Lau’s ࢹ⇯⡥ consecrated version of the Analects was published in 2009, translated from the English. Confucius’ “self-help” aspect was resumed with the publication of Aprendendo a viver com Confúcio (Basic Confucius, 2009) by Kuijie Zhou, a small book in which the author selected fragments from the master and gave them personal wisdom (or, “to live everyday life”). After all, Confucius is the largest supplier of sentences found in fortune cookies… In the same year, Introdução ao Pensamento Chinês (An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 2009) by Karyn Lai was published. This book represents a good source for understanding the origins of Chinese thought, competing directly with the Manuals of M. Granet and A. Cheng. The problem with Lai’s book is that it has some serious translation errors, which occasionally undermine the understanding of the text. A good revision would make it a safe and reliable source. Karyn Lai is a highly qualified specialist in Chinese thought, and her statements on Confucianism are valuable. One year later the book Confúcio com amor (Confucius with Love) by Yudan Ҿѩ (2010) was published. This book was a great success in mainland China, for it brought passages from Confucius and applied them to everyday life. Although it could be categorised as “esoteric”, this must be exercised with great caution: it was written by a Chinese in China, and its intent is to reread Confucianism through the light of modernity, preparing the ground for a new understanding. Thus, although the book may appear to be superficial, or to have a character of a “self-help” book, it represents the tip of a broader contemporary project aimed at reevaluating Confucianism in China (and perhaps globally). The original was published in 2006, but in Brazil it was published in the same year as the Chinese biography of Confucius was released in the cinema. It is important to understand how the Chinese have resumed their interest in Confucius and Confucianism as a moral and political doctrine, in a society

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in which the Maoist Communist speech has started to show signs of fatigue. In the wake of these publications, a “new Study” on Confucius was published. Introdução a Confúcio (Introduction to Confucius, 2012) is a combination of three different essays, all in the public domain, given their age. The first is a presentation of Confucius by Richard Wilhelm, a German sinologist well known for his excellent translation of the Yijing ᱃ ㏃. The text was written at the turn of the twentieth century. The second is a biography of Confucius written by Sima Qian ਨ俜䚧. The third is a poor translation of Zhongyong ѝᓨ by Ku Hung Ming 䗌卫䣈, which is full of mistakes. However, Ku’s text already had all of these problems, they are not a result of the Brazilian translation. The texts are uneven and old, and do not present any new information, when compared to the most recent publications. Perhaps the biography by Sima Qian is the most useful, since Lin Yutang’s version (found in the Wisdom of Confucius, 1958) is only rarely found in antique shops.

The Analects by Giorgio Sinedino In 2012, the University of São Paulo State (UNESP) published the first completely Brazilian version of Lunyu, translated by Giorgio Sinedino. This translation, made directly from the Chinese, is one of the first efforts to establish a serious and scientific sinological literature basis. The work relies on a careful translation of the aphorisms by Confucius, complemented by copious explanatory notes that will enrich one’s reading. Its scope makes it appealing to a more specialized and interested public and shows the possibility of establishing Brazilian Sinology, that would be disassociated from “translations of translations”. The work is a thorough academic study that escapes the religious interpretations that marked the two national translations. Finally, Sinedino’s version also accompanies the renewed attention that has been given to Confucianism in China today, and it should serve as a warning to Brazilian intellectuals.

Twenty Years Later ... The new wave of publications revealed certain important questions. First, Confucius is still being reduced to a religious individual, while the literary focus still remains only on Lunyu. As it is still impossible to create a more complete sinological environment, we are unaable to analyze Confucius philosophically. Similarly, no interest in translating other

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Confucian works has emerged, which adds a serious limitation to the perspective. Due to this, the few Brazilian experts who are interested in China generally prefer to study the current Chinese communist model. Brazilian intellectuals have a strong tendency to commit the serious mistake of believing that it is possible to understand China without studying its historical past. Mainly it is the researchers in the history of religions who are interested in studying Confucius. This line seeks to understand the phenomenon of Chinese religions and their fundamental characteristics. One could say that this line is divided into two versions. The first version understands Confucianism as a religious movement, seeking to understand its morphology and differences from Christianity (Boff 1978). The second version consists of fundamentalist Christians who want to convert the Chinese. They do not seek a dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity, on the contrary: they repudiate Confucius as a pagan sage.

The Future Given this situation, we can see the tremendous difficulty that the Brazilian public face when trying to understand Confucianism. Primarily this is an epistemological problem. Brazilians apply a strong religious charge when analyzing anything foreign to Brazilian culture. As we have seen in the specific case of Confucius, the religious influence was remarkable. Always associated with a form of foreign religion, Confucius was despised by the university as a “lesser object” of analysis, as eccentric and exotic. On the popular level, his figure was almost always related to Christianity, which possibly facilitated his acceptance, but diminished the people’s interest in a deeper reading of Confucianism. The first groups of experts in Chinese language are now emerging from the Confucius Institute, which shows just how amateurish, shy, small and new Brazilian Sinology is. Inevitably, the new Chinese reality is forcing Brazilians, once again, to climb out of their cocoon. This may be the opportunity for Brazilians to finally begin studying New Confucianism, and thus understand the possible changes in the Chinese future. However, in order to do this, they need to know more about Confucius; and unfortunately the Brazilian university is still quite unprepared to meet this challenge. We stand at a unique historical moment: “to know the future, we need to investigate the past”. It was Confucius who said this; and the Brazilians need to learn this lesson urgently.

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Bibliography Anping, Ching. 2008. Autêntico Confúcio. São Paulo: Jsn. Azevedo, Murillo Nunes de. 1973. O Olho do Furacão. São Paulo: Civilização Brasileira. —. 1987. O pensamento do Extremo Oriente: Pensamento. São Paulo: Civilização Brasileira. Batista, João Kao Se-tsien. 1952. A filosofia política e social do Confucianismo. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE. Boff, Leonardo, ed. 1978. China e Cristianismo. Petrópolis: Vozes. Cheng, Anna. 1983. Diálogos de Confúcio. São Paulo: Ibrasa. —. 2009. História do Pensamento Chinês. Petrópolis: Vozes. Confúcio. 1968. Analectos. Translated by Múcio P. Ferreira. São Paulo: Pensamento-Cultrix. —. 2000. O Livro das perguntas e respostas em vinte capítulos. São Paulo: Landy. —. 2003. Os aforismos de Confúcio. São Paulo: Madras. Doeblin, Alfred. 1940. O pensamento vivo de Confúcio. Rio de Janeiro: Martins. Gibran, Ginés. 1974. A doutrina de Confúcio. Paranguá: Câmara Municipal. —. 1974. Mêncio. Paranaguá: Câmara Municipal. Granet, Marcel. 1997. O pensamento chinês. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto. Guerra, Joaquim. 1979. Livro dos Cantares. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau (Shijing). —. 1980. Escrituras Selectas. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. (Shujing). —. 1981. Quadras de Lu e Relação Auxiliar. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. 5 vols. (Chunqiu). —. 1984. Livro das Mutações. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. (Yijing) —. 1984. Obras de Mâncio. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. (Mengzi). —. 1984. Quadrivolume de Confúcio. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. (Lunyu, Daxue, Zhongyong e Xiaojing). —. 1987. O Cerimonial. Macau: Jesuítas de Macau. (Liji). —. 1953. Confucianismo e Tridemismo. Rio de Janeiro: Franciscanos. Jullien, François. 2010. “Entrevista – François Jullien” in Revista Cult, N.141, Sao Paulo, Accessed September 14, 2014. http://revistacult.uol. com.br/home/2010/03/entrevista-francois-jullien/. Kuijie, Zhou. 2009. Aprendendo a viver com Confúcio. São Paulo: Agir. Lay, Karyn. 2009. Introdução ao pensamento chinês. São Paulo: Madras. Lau, Din Cheuk. 2009. Analectos. Porto Alegre: L&PM. Leys, Simon. 2000. Analetos. São Paulo: Martins Fontes.

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Lin, Yutang. 1945. Sabedoria de China e Índia. Rio de Janeiro: Pongeti. —. 1958. A sabedoria de Confúcio. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio. —. 1962. A importância de compreender. Porto Alegre: Globo. Moore, Charles, ed. 1978. Filosofia; Oriente, Ocidente. São Paulo: EDUSP-Cultrix. Raposo, Ignacio. 1939. Philosophia de Confúcio. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Brasil. Sinedino, Giorgio. 2012. Os Analectos. São Paulo: UNESP. Strathern, Paul. 1998. Confúcio em 90 minutos. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar. Tucci, Giuseppe. 1939. Apologia do Confucianismo. Rio de Janeiro: Athena. Wilhelm, Richard et al. 2010. Introdução a Confúcio. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto. Yang, Rongguo. 1975. A crítica contra Lin Piao e Confúcio. Lisboa: Moraes. Yu, Dan. 2010. Confúcio com Amor. São Paulo: Best Seller.

CHAPTER EIGHT CONFUCIAN IDEOLOGIES IN THE MODERN JAPANESE STATE FORMATION NATAŠA VISOýNIK

Identity Processes in Japan The idea of searching for an identity of people living in Japan (or any other country for the matter of fact) is a process of explaining who the people are and in what ways do they differ from their neighbours. Many new concepts were constructed within this process, such as for instance nation, ethnos, culture and identity. The research of the ethnogenesis on Japanese islands was under great influence of the nationalist discourses in Japanese culture and has triggered a number of diverse assumptions, which are still present today. The process of constructing identities, especially the Japanese national identity, was intense during the Meiji period, i.e. when Japan opened up to the world and tried to form a national state under external influence. This period is thus characterized by a new intensity in the discussion on Japanese origins and different ideologies, which has emerged as a consequence of the new areas of investigation in social sciences. During the Meiji period (1868–1912), politicians adopted the sense of national belongingness in order to function as the foundation stone for the modern national state. They formed the idea of a family state (kazoku kokka, ᇦ᯿ഭᇦ), which contained traditional familism buttressed by Confucian ethics. Familism, which included the extended family system, was expanded to cover the entire nation in a way that included the imperial family as the main family of all Japanese families. This means that the Japanese traditions of ancestor worship and subordination of branch families to the main family were integrated in order to achieve loyalty on a national scale. This research will thus try to answer how was Confucianism integrated within the Japanese context of the modernizing

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nation-states of the late nineteenth century and how it came to define one of the major if not even the dominant layer of the early-modern and modern worldviews. Since most identities are imaginary constructs, the formation of a “real” identity is hopeless from the start and often leads into inherited fantasies about the nature of racial, ethnic and cultural dispositions. By analysing texts on Japanese identity development and discourses on Japanese identity and nationalism (see Doak 2007; Craig 1968) we can discover that the concept of nationalism is a very delicate one in Japanese language as several words exist for nationalism, such as kokuminshugi (ഭ ≁ѫ㗙) and minzokushugi (≁᯿ѫ㗙) just as they have two distinct words for “nation”: kokumin and minzoku.1 Over the past few years, there has been an increasing tendency to use the English word “nationalism” in its phonetic form (nashonarizumu ɒȿɯɒɲɂɨ) (Doak 2007, 2) 2 . However, in her book Nikole L. Freiner (2012) points out that another nationalism has developed under the influence of Confucian ideology. So called “Confucian nationalism” is one of the key concepts that define Japanese national identity and it was the “consolidation of which was pivotal in structuring relationships between citizens and the Japanese state at its founding” (ibid., 1). Besides, the maintenance of Confucian nationalism in Japan continues to influence its social policy, political behaviour, and the landscape of political interactions that occur in Japan. The Confucian nationalism3 concept helps us understand specific policies and policymaking decisions, Japan’s relationships with its neighbouring states, and the motivations in foreign diplomacy. During the first decade of the Meiji period government leaders focused on centralizing and stabilizing their power and authority, not only in order to secure their personal positions, but also to prevent foreign intervention (Tipton 2002, 42). While domestic factors always played an extremely important role in policy-making, Japan no longer tried to operate as a 1

Another term, kokkashugi (ഭᇦѫ㗙), is often mis-translated into English as “nationalism”, but it really denotes what the French language captures as étatisme, or “statism”. Similarly, the root word kokka should be translated into English as “state” rather than “nation” (Doak 2007, 2). 2 This approach has had two effects on the Japanese discourse on nationalism: one, an increase in the theoretical ambiguity about what exactly is being addressed (i.e. “what is nationalism?”); and two, a tendency to exoticize nationalism as something that comes from, or is characteristic only of, the West (Doak 2007, 2). 3 Variations of Confucian nationalism can be found in other Asian states such as South Korea and Taiwan (Freiener 2012, 1).

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closed country, isolated from the Western influence. In 1868 the new government proclaimed, in the name of the emperor, its general principles for the future, as well as numerous new goals that highlighted the changed world view and nationalist motives of the Meiji leaders.

Confucianism in Japan during the Meiji Period The importance of Confucianism in Japanese history is undeniable, for it has influenced the formation of the dominant layer of the early-modern and modern worldviews. John Tucker (2013) stated “that the lexicographic legacy is omnipresent in the modern Japanese discourse, with Confucian terms playing new roles in discourses ranging from modern philosophy to science, religion, the humanities and social sciences”. Confucian texts came to Japan in the mid-sixth century through the Korean Paekche by scholars who came to Japan to teach Chinese language and the system, at which they also passed on Buddhism. The terms jugaku ݂ ᆖ and jukyǀ ݂ ᮉ 4 are the most commonly used references to Confucianism (traditional and modern) in Japanese history (Tucker 2013). Between the seventh and tenth century, Japan attempted to establish a centralized political system with the emperor at its head and a corps of Confucian mandarins or bureaucrats based on the model practiced by the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907). This political system, known as the ritusuryǀ ( ᖻ Ԕ ) system, sought to build a harmonious society of hierarchical social relations and obligations. It even attempted to enforce the Confucian handen-shnjju ( ⨝ ⭠ ৾ ਇ ࡦ ) system of equal land distribution and made some effort to impose Confucian family and kinship values and practices. It also established a government college for training future bureaucrats using Confucian classics as a basis. However, it never adopted the Chinese-styled civil service examination system based on merit. “Because government offices were meted out according to birth, rather than earned on merit, the centralized bureaucratic system failed to

4

In these, ju is the Japanese reading of the Chinese word ru, literally referring to “weaklings.” The latter was a reference to scholars who tended to work with their minds rather than their bodies and were, as a result, perceived as weak. The term was used by later scholars in explaining the teachings of Confucius (551–479 BCE). As Tucker (2013) continues “the acceptance of the term partly reflected Confucius’ distaste for coercive force as opposed to the softer power of ethical examples and the allegedly irresistible efficacy of the moral suasion”.

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work as efficiently as it did in Tang China and Yi Korea”, states Shin (2012, 32). The traditional Japanese value system prior to the Meiji Restoration requires detailed explanation (see Tucker 2013; Bellah 2003), but in brief– –transcendental values lacked in Chinese and Japanese societies just like in the Western tradition. Values were principally centred on the maintenance and furtherance of the group. However, there is a difference between Chinese and Japanese Confucian tradition within the same type of value orientation. In China, certain universalistic ideas such as that of tian (heaven) clearly exist, even though there is a lack of transcendental value. According to Ishida (1996, 4), when the Confucian classics were introduced to Japan, the idea of changing the mandate of heaven was carefully avoided, because the Japanese Imperial rule had no other source of legitimacy than the belief that it had existed from the very beginning of history. In this sense, the Chinese traditional value system was more universalistic and the Japanese one more particularistic, although they both existed within the same category of immanent value orientation.

Doh Chull Shin (2012, 33) states that instead of the Confucian doctrine as the main principle of government, laws and administrative methods were often favoured as the means to institute the rule of law. Beside that the Japanese system of social ethics did not emphasize the importance of the family and blood ties in establishing networks of kinship relations like it was the case in China. The Japanese ethical system was more group oriented than the Chinese system as such relations often extended beyond blood ties. Thus, “of the two Confucian virtues of loyalty and filial piety, the Japanese system placed greater emphasis on loyalty to rulers and the group than filial piety to parents”, adds Shin (2012, 34). One of the specialists in Chinese philosophy, Hattori Unokichi5 (1867– 1939), played an important role in constructing the image of Confucianism as the teaching of ethics. First, he distinguished Confucian teaching as ethics from Confucianism as religion. In Hattori’s view, Confucianism was originally a local ethic for Chinese people, but Confucius changed it into a universal doctrine spread throughout East Asian countries. (Nakajima 2014, 43) 5

He was one of the leading sinologists at Tokyo University, as well as one of the Japanese advisors in China during the two decades that followed the first SinoJapanese War.

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In the wake of the Meiji restoration in 1868, all schools were reorganized along Western lines, and the core of their curricula shifted from Confucian moral education to practical knowledge and skills, which could be useful in modernizing the country. However, the Meiji leaders used Confucianism to legitimize their rule and maintain order by forcing the Japanese people to passively accept their authority (Shin 2012, 34). In this period Confucian ideals became so deeply rooted in Japanese politics, that loyalty to the emperor was mandated by law. The authority of the rulers was dealt a serious blow when Japan was defeated in World War II, and Confucian ideals were less commonly used to legitimize governmental behavior and they also influenced on the formation of national state and Japanese identity.

Formation of the National State and Searching for the Identity In the process of forming a national state the Japanese had to discuss who they are and express the characteristics of their people and their ethnos; in this process they used certain concepts imported from the West. The term ethnicity was employed when dealing with ethnic identity that was continually being re-created through interactions within society. According to Simon Kaner (1996, 56) it “emphasizes the common past, language, religion, and material culture”. Ethnicities were therefore constituted in the sense of continuity (not necessarily with the actual genetic continuity), in the sense of collective memory and destiny. Namely, cultural comprehension is embodied in certain myths, memories, symbols and values, which are sustained by a certain cultural unit of population (see more in Visoþnik 2004). As Mark Hudson (1999) stated in his book, Japanese ethnogenesis researches started much earlier than the Meiji period. Hudson divided the researches into three periods, at which the first ranged from around sixteenth century to the emergence of scientific archaeology and was marked by the rise of national learning (kokugaku movement). If we are to understand the Japanese views as regards their origins, we need to take into account the knowledge of the philosophical school of Confucius and not only the kokugako movement. Confucius’ scholars focused on texts on Chinese historic writing, while the nationalistically oriented kokugaku tried to denigrate the Chinese influence on Japanese culture. Prior to archaeological and anthropological approaches the old Japanese and Chinese

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texts represented the main source of information as regards the origins of Japanese people (Hudson 1999, 24–25). The second period (1877–1935) was characterized by the new intensity in the discussion on Japanese origins, which emerged as a consequence of the new areas of investigation in archaeology and anthropology. This was a period of transition between the textual approach to the past and the proper archaeological one, and it was of vital importance for the study of Japanese origins. Japan became an industrialized nation and a national state with the beginning of the Meiji period (1868). The sense of national belongingness, which started to occur in the previous period, was no longer limited to the elite. Politicians adopted it in order to function as the foundation stone for the modern national state (ibid., 34). The characteristic of the third period lies in its distinct development of the concept of culture in Japanese archaeology. A turn from the past and simple ethnic interpretations occurred in the 1930s. The symbol of this shift can be seen in the 1936 Minerva Discussion, which strongly influenced the increasing power of the military and undemocratic forces in Japan. The war with China reached its peak in 1937, and the aggression continued until August 1945, when the war in the Pacific region ended. During this period Japan was a rigorously formed and systematically organized fascist state that was ruled by ultranationalist ideologies (ibid., 45–46). The search and discussion as regards their identity was not ended during that period and has still not come to an end. This topic still occupies numerous scholars in Japan as well as around the world (see Visoþnik 2011; Amino 1990). However, during the Meiji period Japan realized that it has to become a strong independent national state if it wishes to compete against foreign countries. Within this process it started to think about self and other, which lead to the establishment of a strong identity. The main task, mainly under the Western influence, was to take the “heterogeneous” population and provide a sense of homogeneity and community. The key terms from this period where kazoku kokka (Japan as a Family state with the emperor as the father), minzuko (the people, ethnicity, nation) and jinshu (race). Japan realized that it was merely a modern manifestation of a primordial community (we’ve always been like this, always the same), that only people who lived in Japan were Japanese, for they shared the Japanese culture and spoke Japanese, which meant that the Japanese state was synonymous with the Japanese nation (Visoþnik 2011). As regards their culture and genes they considered themselves to be totally different from

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the countries surrounding them, which implies the influence of the Western concepts of “scientific” racism and social Darwinism, suggesting that “self” are more civilized than “other”, i.e. the uncivilized minorities and outsiders. The discussion on identity focused on the concepts of nation and state, which are of primary concern to the study of politics and international relations. For most states it would be perfect if there would be only one nation and one state; the two pieces of the nation-state that create the ideal. In this characterization, the state is defined legally, dating from the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, in which sovereignty was established. However, the nation is an emotive concept that rests upon looser terminology: culture, language, ethnicity, religion, and all of the ties that bind people together (Freiener 2012, 1; see also Doak 2007). In Japan the term nation can be found in the concept of minzoku, meaning people as an ethnic (some argue “racial”) group and in kokumin, which is based on the principle of people organised in a political unit (which may, but need not, be ethnic). The word kokka refers to the “state”. Nationalist movements also used words such as “motherland”, or “mother tongue” to define themselves. However, Yoon Keun-Cha (in Doak 2007, 15) argued that in the first half of the Meiji period (i.e. until 1890), there was an absence of collective or group consciousness as a single ethnic nation. This means that “the ethnic nation” did not exist or at least was still not fully formed. Actually, it was hard to find any actual instances of the word minzoku at that time. Clearly the word (and with it, the concept) of minzoku grew increasingly prominent in nationalist discourse in post-constitutional 6 Meiji Japan (see also Oguma 2002). Nevertheless, there was no coherent nationalist movement in Japan, instead there were architects of the modern nation-state and many different forces of modernization. Especially the political leaders, the intellectual elite, and advocates created a coherent set of values related to Confucianism and especially Confucian nationalism. This imagery and

6

The Meiji constitution was proclaimed in 1889 and by 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyǀiku chokugo ᮉ㛢ࣵ䃎) was published (Akami 2005, 128). The Meiji Imperial Rescript on Education was an important document that made Confucian thought central to the moral education that was to guide the National Policy. It was a sacred guide, written by Japanese Confucianists that reinforced Confucian values and indigenous shintǀ myths of divine imperial origins to be revered as laying down the religious tenets of social purpose for all Japanese. (De Vos 1998, 114; see also Tipton 2002)

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vocabulary utilized the home and family to unify the Japanese nation-state (Freiner 2012, 14) while Japan’s social system emphasized the responsibility within relationships and the hierarchy. The idea to catch up and surpass the Western powers became the national goal during the Meiji period and this occupied a major role in the national value system (Ishida 1996, 5). This goal was considered so important that anything that could be used in order to achieve this goal was used without any hesitation. The lack of transcendental religion in Japan proved advantageous. There was no need for the secularization and Japan proved to be more flexible in accepting Western ideas than China. The Tokugawa bureaucrats, who were originally samurai, belived in both civil and military responsibility, whereas in China the authority over military matters were in the hands of the autonomous warlords (ibid., 6).

Family State Ideology and Confucianism With the swing towards conservatism and nationalism that occurred in the late-Meiji period, only a few intellectuals advocated a faithful return to Confucianism. One of these philosophical voices was that of Inoue Tetsujirǀ, 7 who led the way, even though highly nationalistic, in interpreting Confucian developments as movements in “philosophy”, using the newly coined Japanese word, tetsugaku (ଢᆖ). 8 He was also noteworthy for his kokumin dǀtoku (ഭ≁䚃ᗣ), or “national ethics”. This set of teachings was based largely on selective Confucian virtues such as loyalty and filial piety. Inoue also attempted to clarify the concept of the family-state (kazoku kokka). He drew an analogy between the family and the state and he used the two fundamental Confucian moral principles. He concluded that loyalty (chnj ᘐ) to the emperor (tennǀ ཙⲷ) was identical to filial piety 7

Inoue Tetsujirǀ, Ӆкଢ⅑䛾 (1855–1944) was one of the most eminent and influential faculty members at Tokyo Imperial University. As a metaphysician Inoue was a leading exponent of the “phenomena are reality” (genshǀ sunawachi jitsuzai ron ⨮ 䊑 ণ ᇏ ൘ 䄆 ) doctrine. However, he was most prolific as an historian of Japanese Confucian philosophy and as a kokumin dǀtoku or “national morality” theorist (Tucker 2014, 36). 8 The Japanese word tetsugaku as “philosophy” can be found in Chinese Book of History, a Confucian classic, in which tetsu (Chinese: zhi) refers to the “wisdom” manifested by the ancient sages of China. The literal meaning of tetsugaku is “study of wisdom”, and as such it was as much a suitable characterization of the Confucian project as it was one of the western field of philosophy. (Tucker 2013)

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(kǀ 㘳), as the emperor was the head of the state as well as family. He then “explained that there should be a single unification principle, because the state was an organism that consisted of individual families as its cells.” (in Yoshino 1995, 91) However, De Vos (1998, 114) pointed out that the Japanese did not experience any tension when regulated by Confucianist principles. Confucianism was seen to support the intellectual moral side of the continuing conflict between social obligation, or giri (㗙⨶), and the more spontaneous, emotional social feelings, ninjo (Ӫᛵ). Giri ritually adhere to the anticipated and expected, which means more formal adherence to moral expectations in opposition to the spontaneity of love and other human emotions. Ninjo feelings were more untutored and native. Confucianism is seen as more formal, “Chinese” in origin. Classical Confucians do not consider the family to be merely a natural and biological unit, for it constitutes the most fundamental and pervasive unit of social life. Shin (2012, 181) here continues: Three of the five cardinal human relationships––father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother––are encompassed in the family unit, and this serves as the environment in which human beings begin to learn how to behave as moral persons. As the most powerful and enduring influence on the proper development of future social relationships, the family represents the bedrock of all other interpersonal relationships.

In the Confucian tradition, virtues directing family life are considered to represent the foundation for all other virtues, including loyalty to the ruler. This can be seen, for example, when Confucius emphasized filial piety (xiao) as the highest virtue of them all. Shin (2012, 180) emphasized that in Confucianism the family constituted the foundation of all interpersonal relationships, including those between the ruled and the ruler. Confucianism’s influence is also seen in the fact that people trusted those inside family circles more than the people from outside, and that was supporting family-centred civic and political life. Because of that, family style ethics of Confucianism “have been considered incompatible with the egalitarian principles of modern civic and political life” (Shin 2012, 180) where people do not know one another. Nikole L. Freiner (2012, 5) argued that the Japanese social system reinforced relationships of dual obligation within hierarchies which is clearly evident in the hierarchy of the national state. The belief in collectivism means that the collective interest of the Japanese people as a whole is valued over the individual’s benefits. The notion of the free and

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autonomous individual defined by Western philosophies does not exist in Confucian philosophy. Instead, Confucian thought rests upon the role bearing relationship between human beings whose identities are created through their relationships with other, among which the family relationships are the most important. The group cohesiveness continued to remain the same after the Meiji Restoration, however the size of the group had changed. Ishida (1996, 4– 5) stated that under the Tokugawa shogunate the han (fief) was the major focus of loyalties. As the result of the Western impact the sense of nationality became stronger, and the focus of loyalties shifted towards the state after the reorganization under the new Meiji government. Of course this shift did not take place overnight. It is true that there had already been some potential for national consciousness before the restoration; under the Tokugawa regime there was a network of communication and transportation throughout the country. On the other hand, it took some time to establish a more solid politically effective sense of national identity even after the civil struggle connected with the restoration. The ideas of certain Confucianists could be traced to the Imperial Rescript on Education from 1890, which stated that the emperor was divine because of the unbroken imperial lineage from time immemorial (from the Sun Goddess). The emperor presided as the head of the main family, from which all Japanese families subsequently branched out (Yoshino 1995, 65). The foundation of the emperor system was firmly grounded in familism and supplemented by State Shintǀ.9 The state had firm control over moral education in schools. Both Chinese and Japanese societies associated their rulers with the divine. After opening its borders in 1853 Japan’s experience with the United States led to a swift regime change and the consolidation of the perception of a centralized authority. The role of the emperor was nominally strengthened, and his Restoration led to the unification of Japan and the pursuit of rapid economic development (Freiner 2012, 5). The idea of the family-state, formed during this period, historically contained two elements. The first was traditional familism supported by Confucian ethics. Familism, which included the extended family system, was expanded to cover the entire nation in a way that included the imperial 9

A clear distinction must be made between folk shintǀ, which was the indigenous animistic worship of one’s ancestors among common people, and State shintǀ, which was a modern and politicised nationalist ideology based on emperor worship (Yoshino 1995, 91).

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family as the main family of all Japanese families. Another element was the organic theory of the state 10 introduced from the West, particularly Germany. The organic theory of the state, which to a degree corresponded to the newly established bureaucratic system, was important in displacing the ideas of popular sovereignty and natural law advocated by the activists in “civil rights” movements during the late 1870s and the early 1880s. Takeshi Ishida (1996, xii) explaines the process of the formation of the family-state idea together with its ideological structure and its actual functioning in Japanese society. The familistic element in the family-state idea proved useful in mobilizing the personal sentiment found in the family relationship and applying it to the loyalty to the state. The organic theory of the state was also important for justifying the existing law and social order. Kawashima Takeyoshi (in Yoshino 1995, 65) argued that the ideology of the family-state was formulated through the combination of two types of familism (kazokushugi), namely, the Confucian ethics of familism confined to the samurai in the Tokugawa period and the before mentioned indigenous family institution prevalent among the common people. The samurai type was oriented primarily towards “normative consciousnesses” while the common people type was oriented towards “emotive reactions”. Inoue elevated the status of Confucian notions, not necessarily as Confucian notions in themselves, but as integral parts of a nationalistic, imperialistic, and militaristic blend that served the interests of Japanese militarists in the 1930s and 1940s.11

10 The Organic Theory of the State was explained by Baradat (in Ishida 1996), where he says that “it is a type of political collectivism that maintains that the state transcends individuals within the State in power, right, or priority. It is often traced to Hegel, although it has links to ancient thinkers such as Plato, and has been strongly influential in societies as diverse as Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Communist China, and the political thought of Woodrow Wilson and some thinkers involved in the American New Deal”. 11 After 1905 Inoue Tetsujirǀ proceeded from the philosophical history to the work that enveloped his life for the next four decades. He defined kokumin dǀtoku in terms simple enough to be understood by high school students, the educated public, as well as the members of the Imperial armed forces. Although Inoue never viewed himself as a proponent of nationalist, imperialistic, or militarist ideological constructs, Tucker (2014, 36) believes that it is difficult not to see his writings in such terms, especially for the post-war intellectual historiography. His student Watsuji Tetsurǀ was another intellectual and philosopher who was somehow involved in nationalistic propaganda during World War II (for more see Bellah 1965).

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The ideas similar to those of Inoue Tetsujirǀ were also ideas of Tanaka Yoshito, as the foundations for his interpretation included several primary points, starting with nationalism: “For the Japanese people, the state forms the foundation of their lives; it rests on the hegemony of the state over the member of society from the outset.” (in Isomae 2014, 7) Tanaka rejected individualism as “an ideology that creates conflict between the state and the individual.” (ibid.) Similar with his idea of a household resembling state (ie ᇦ), he thought of a household as the state on a small scale and the state as a household on a large scale. People are expected to view the emperor as the head of the household, and pledge loyalty and filial piety to the state. They are supposed to worship the ancestors, honour the household lineage, and ensure the continuity of its rites. Tanaka’s view resembled Inoue’s also in seeing the very core of the Rescript as lying in the idea of the preeminent state and the ethic of loyalty and filial piety, both based on the doctrine of the kokutai ( ഭ փ as “national body”, or “national polity” or “national essence”) that combines the idea of the state as a family with the theory of the state as an organic body. (in Isomae 2014, 242)

However, the novelty of Tanaka’s approach was to place shintǀ at the centre of the national morality doctrine as Isomae (2014, 242) states in his text. As mentioned before the Confucian ideologies influenced on the development of the so-called Confucian nationalism. Nikole L. Freiner (2012, 4) represents following characteristics of the Confucian ideologies: 1) It is a social system in which family and home serve as the model for teaching proper behaviour, the emphasis of which is on maintaining harmony through role relationships and responsibilities that are mutually reinforcing. 2) It uses state institutions and policies to consciously codify the Confucian principle. 3) It believes in the historical identification of the ruler or state with the divine; the ruler possesses divine characteristics or descent that links state subjects with heaven, thus emphasizing the cultural uniqueness. However, as it was used by certain nationalists and imperialists this Confucian nationalism influenced the ultra-nationalism that developed prior to World War II. All of these processes and ideologies were of great importance for the development of the national identity. Yoshino (1995, 160) stated that the Japanese uni-racial ideology was closely associated with the notion held before and during World War II in which Japan was seen as a familynation (or family-state) of divine origin. The members of the family nation

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were perceived to have a blood relation with each other and ultimately with the emperor as a mother figure (see Bellah 2003, 176).12 The familynation concept represents what Armstrong calls “the racialization of the imagined community”. (in Yoshino 1995, 161) Kinship, religion and race were fused with one another in order to produce an intensely felt collective sense of “oneness”. At this point an additional remark can be made on the notion of “race” as an element of national identity in Japan as people identified with each other as a big nation, a group of people connected with the “blood”.

Conclusions In the process of forming its identity Japan has gone through different levels of apprehending and interpreting itself and its environment. It developed its national identity and nationalism under the influence of Western theories and concepts. These processes were influenced by numerous different ideologies, amongst them an important role was played by Confucian thought. With the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of universal education based upon Confucian concepts and interpreted within a nationalist framework the Confucian concepts spread amongst the general population. The Meiji Imperial Rescript on Education was an important document that made Confucian thought central to the moral education that was to guide the National Policy. Confucianism had also a great influence on the development of a distinct form of nationalism, that is Confucian nationalism which has been created by the Japanese government, policymakers, and scholars. This kind of nationalism structures the relationship between citizens and the state. Freiner (2012, 156) argues that the presence of Confucian nationalism in Japan decribes the importance of the relationships between people, especially the family relationships. This is connected to the one of the key concepts of Confucianism, that is familism which emphasizes the importance of strong bonds and ties among family members, and sets forth specific modes of thinking and behaviour. In order to think in accordance with Confucian familism, one must have a family-centred ideology or

12 Bellah (2003, 177) points out that from ideological point of view there was “a picture of a strongly patriarchal, hierarchical, and authoritarian social structure in both family and state. This kind of ideology is seen also in feudal social organization, dǀzoku family system, and the bushi social ethos.”

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mindset. Different than the ideology of individualism that stresses the independence and self-reliance of the individual, Confucian familism supports the prevalence of the family group and its well-being over the interests and needs of its individual members. (Shin 2012, 182) The Japan government applied this kind of family-centred ideology to the whole state, where a family was a foundation of the state and they equated filial piety with the loyalty to the emperor. The emperor was a father of all Japanese subjects in the family-state. This all was possible as Japan preserved the emperor from the past, as well as a small number of values such as loyalty, filial piety, and harmony, and a cluster of slogans stressing wealth, strength, and unity, although strong impact of the foreign ideas. To modernize the country these concepts from the past were recombined in suitable patterns, which enabled the state to draw support from diverse segments of the traditional society. (Craig 1973, 144) Their goals were to modernise and secure national hegemony and they used the narrative of the “family-state” to consolidate its symbolic power, in which the family/household represented the base for the state with the help of Confucianism and the Imperial Rescript on Education. By 1890 the Rescript, where loyalty to the emperor as the living representative of the mythic forefathers of the Japanese was described as one’s “ancestral duty”, became compulsory daily recitation in the national public education system. In words of Iida Yumiko (2002, 18) the Rescript was “a paean to the Japanese nation as the extended family of the emperor”. However, certain critics (in Gluck 1985, 280–1) would say that the analogy between the household (ie) or family (kazoku) and the Japanese state (kokka) is insupportable. It is all good and well for families with ancient pedigrees to bask in the sense of identity they feel with the imperial house that can trace its lineage back “two thousand six hundred years”, but it is too much to think that the nameless, property-less masses were ever admitted into this “family-state”. At best eligibility was restricted to those who had a single family line, whether nobles, samurai, old landlord families, the wealthy, or men of influence and reputation. The rest were no more than victims of this illusion. The consequence of this “lineage view” is that powerful nationalism developed over the following decades and this resulted in an imperialistic war. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, Confucian notions came to be regarded negatively because of their unfortunate appropriation by Inoue and other philosopher-ideologists. They had manipulated the core ethics of Confucian philosophy into a teaching of loyalty to the imperial state and self-sacrifice for the sake of its glory. At one point the most enthusiastic

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Confucian philosophers argued in their multifaceted philosophical corpus, that Japan and not China, was the true Central Kingdom––and it was these philosophers who consequently suffered from significant neglect in the post-war period. (Tucker 2013) The story of Confucianism in modern Japan is an interesting one one. Overshadowed and partially mixed with a revived shintǀ before and immediately after the Restoration, then looked down as old-fashioned when the Western ideas got under way, it showed amazing resilience. Its revival was accelerated at the beginning of the twentieth century when it became obvious just how declining a virtue obedient loyalty was, and when the spoils of the authoritarian state came to be shared by a wider class of business men, conservative politicians, bureaucrats and military men (in Levi 2013, 10). Confucianism was incorporated into the Japanese “national policy”. It became an integral part of the national essence and a symbol of the national traditions which all nationalists sought to glorify. Today many historians say that the Meiji Restoration represents the key to the understanding of modern Japanese history, but certain policies or personal views might shape its interpretation too idealistically. Especially ideas such as the one that the Japanese were strongly aware of being one nation in a national state from the early stage of the Meiji period or even before are too idealistic, but they still exist is some intellectual circles, and even in politics. Any kind of analysis of the ideology requires caution.

Bibliography Akami, Tomoko. 2005. “Nation, State, Empire and War: Problems of Liberalism in Modern Japanese History and Beyond.” Japanese Studies 25 (2): 119–40. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/10371390500226043. Amino, Yoshino. 1990. Nihonron no shiza. Rettǀ no shakai to kokka Ҽᵜ 䄆ȃ㿆ᓗ. ࡇጦȃ⽮Պǽഭᇦ. Tǀkyǀ: Shǀgakukan. Bellah, Robert Neelly. 1965. “Japan’s Cultural Identity: Some Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsuro.” The Journal of Asian Studies 24 (4) (August): 573–94. —. 2003. Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Craig, Albert M. “Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundation of Meiji Nationalism.” In Political Deveoplment in Modern Japan:

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Studies in the Modernization of Japan, edited by Robert E. Ward, 99– 148. New Jersey: Princeton Legacy Library. De Vos, George A. 1998. “A Japanese Legacy of Confucian Thought.” In Confucianism and the family, edited by Walter H. Slote and George A. De Vos, 105–17. New York: State University of New York Press. Doak, Kevin M. 2007. A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan. Placing the People. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Freiner, Nikole L. 2012. The Social and Gender Politics of Confucian Nationalism: Women and the Japanese Nation-state. New York: Palgrave Macmillian. Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton: Prrinceton University Press. Hudson, Mark. 1999. Ruins of Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Japanese Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Iida, Yumiko. 2002. Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan. Nationalism as Aesthetics. London and New York: Routledge. Ishida Takeshi. 1996 (1989). Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Isomae, Jun’ichi. 2014. Religious Discourse in Modern Japan: Religion, State, and Shintǀ. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. Kaner, Simon. 1996. “Beyond Ethnicity and Emergence in Japanese Archaeology.” In Multicultural Japan: Paleolithic to Postmodern, edited by Denoon Donald et al., 46–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levi, Nicolas. 2013. “The Impact of Confucianism in South Korea and Japan.” Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia 26: 7–15. Nakajima, Takahiro. 2014. “The Restoration of Confucianism in China and Japan. A New Source of Morality and Religion.” Essays on Japanese Philosophy. Nagoya, Japan: Nanazan Institute for religion and Culture, 37–50. Accessed January 15, 2015. https://nirc.nanzanu.ac.jp/nfile/ 2100. Oguma, Eiji. 2002. A Genealogy of Japanese’ Self-images. Translated by David Askew. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Tucker, John. 2013. “Japanese Confucian Philosophy.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed September 20, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall 2013/entries/japanese-confucian. —. 2014. “Tokugawa Intellectual History and Prewar Ideology: The Case of Inoue Tetsujirǀ, Yamaga Sokǀ, and the Forty-Seven Rǀnin.” 35–70. Accessed January 24, 2015. http://chinajapan.org/articles/ 14/14.3570tucker.pdf.

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CONFUCIANISM IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

CHAPTER NINE WEAVING CONFUCIANISM INTO THE OFFICIAL PARTY DISCOURSE: FROM HU JINTAO’S “HARMONIOUS SOCIETY”, TO XI JINPING’S COMMUNIST JUNZI MUGUR ZLOTEA

There has been a lot of discussion regarding a possible Confucian revival in contemporary China and there is no denying that elements that can be associated with Confucianism are increasingly present, especially– –but not restricted to––in the Chinese cultural and academic markets (films, books, cultural events, conferences, etc.).1 Not even politics could escape the Confucian return and many, including the former Chinese president Hu Jintao 㜑䭖⏋ (2005), have pointed out that slogans such as “harmonious society” and “putting people first” are of Confucian origin. Chinese leaders quoting from Confucian books have become a common sight and, at least in Beijing, walls, fences and flyovers are covered with banners, drawings or posters with the twelve core values, some of which seem to be taken directly from the Confucian classics rather than the Marxist ones. In December 2014, the students who attended the joint exam on political theory and management studies, a part of the national MA program’s entrance exams, had to discuss the historical background and the similarities and dissimilarities between Confucianism and Marxism, starting from a fragment taken form Guo Moruo’s 1926 essay “Marx enters the Confucian Temple”. Can thus one talk of a possible Confucianization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? 1

For additional literature on the revival of Confucianism, in English, see Ai 2008; Ai 2009; Bell 2008; Billioud 2011; Billioud 2007; Billioud and Thoraval 2009; Billioud and Thoraval 2007; Chen 2011; Fan 2011; Han 2013; Kallio 2011; Makeham 2008; Qin 2014; Rošker 2014; Zhe 2008.

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The aim of the following paper is to explore the relation between Confucianism and Marxism as reflected in the Chinese political discourse, after the nomination of Xi Jinping as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP in 2012. It must be said that there is no unified view amongst the party members and Marxist scholars as regards the importance of Confucianism in present-day China and its influence upon Marxism, but there seem to be two elements that most of them would agree upon: the fact that Confucianism was the most important system of thought within the rich Chinese tradition and that it cannot replace Marxism. Numerous arguments speak against Confucianism replacing Marxism, some stating that Marxism has a scientific dimension that Confucianism lacks, or that the former has been modeled to fit the realities of modern society, whereas contemporary Confucian thinkers still need to find a way to adapt Confucianism to the present realities, etc. However, the most sincere argument seems to be that renouncing Marxism would mean the end of the Party as it is today (see, for example, Xu 2014). Xi Jinping’s ascension to power also brought with it a change in the political discourse. The people-centered slogans, highly present during Hu Jintao’s rule, faded in favor of the increasing Marxist rhetoric and strong warnings issued to the party cadres warning them not to cross the party’s line, or indulge in corruption and extravagance. In numerous instances Xi’s actions seem to be inspired by those of Mao. Xi’s fight against the “tigers” (high-ranking corrupt officials) and “flies” (low-level corrupt cadres) brought back memories from the 1950s. In January 1952, after the “three-anti campaigns” were launched, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to various institutions and departments, in which he wrote the following: (T)here are many corrupt people, and for sure, many big corrupt people (“big tigers”), in any system that uses large amounts of money, whether it is the Party, the government, the army, civilian offices or the education system. (…) Therefore, after launching the fierce battle of the “three-anti” in every department and district, I am asking each and every comrade to concentrate upon exposing the “big tigers”, to fulfill their task, ceaselessly and without sparing any efforts and without getting satisfied with what 2 they have already achieved.

2

Āࠑ኎བྷᢩൠ⭘䫡㇑⢙Ⲵᵪ‫ˈޣ‬н䇪ᱟ‫ފ‬᭯ߋ≁ᆖଚа㌫㔏ˈᗵᇊᴹབྷᢩⲴ 䍚⊑⣟ˈ㘼фᗵᇊᴹབྷ䍚⊑⣟˄"བྷ㘱㱾"˅DŽ[ĂĂ]ഐ↔ˈ䈧֐Ԝ⌘᜿ˈ൘ ⇿а䜘䰘ǃ⇿аൠ४"й৽"ᯇҹ◰⛸ኅᔰѻਾˈቡ㾱ሶ਼ᘇԜⲴ⌘᜿ ࣋ᕅੁ

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The “Report on the Current Situation in the Ideological Sphere”3, or the so-called “Document Number Nine”, of which only excerpts were made public and made headlines in the Western media for identifying several threats to the Party’s grip on power (among them, Western-style democracy, neo-liberalism and universal values), is also reminiscent of the rhetoric used during the first decades of the People’s Republic. (Buckley 2013) In October 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art, the full content of which has not been made public, until the time of writing this paper. However, in a summary published by the official Xinhua News Agency, Xi was quoted to say: Essentially speaking, socialist literature and art, is the people’s literature and art. Literature and art must reflect the good people’s aspirations; it must keep the fundamental orientation of serving people and socialism. (…) There are hundreds and thousands of ways of creating literature and art, but the most fundamental, the most crucial and the most reliable method is taking root amongst the people and in life. (…) Good work should always place social effects first, but it should also integrate social and economic effects. Literature and art cannot become slaves of the market; they should not be stained with the smell of money. Excellent works of literature and art can gain ideological and artistic success and be 4 welcomed by the market.

The resemblance between Xi’s speech and Mao’s 1942 “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” was not noticed merely by foreign observers, but also by the Chinese media. On October 16, one day after the Forum, the CCP’s news webpage published an article which began with a black and white group photograph of the 1942 meeting, followed by a

ᩌራ"བྷ㘱㱾"ˈェ䘭࣑㧧ˈн㾱‫ˈ⮉ڌ‬н㾱ᶮ࣢ˈн㾱┑䏣Ҿᐢᗇᡀ㔙DŽā (Mao 1952) 3 “Guanyu dangqian yishi xingtai lingyu qingkuangde tongbao ‫ޣ‬Ҿᖃࡽ᜿䇶ᖒᘱ 亶ฏᛵߥⲴ䙊ᣕ” 4 Ā⽮Պѫѹ᮷㢪ˈӾᵜ䍘к䇢ˈቡᱟӪ≁Ⲵ᮷㢪DŽ᮷㢪㾱৽᱐ྭӪ≁ᗳ༠ˈ ቡ㾱ඊᤱѪӪ≁ᴽ࣑ǃѪ⽮Պѫѹᴽ࣑䘉њṩᵜᯩੁDŽ[ĂĂ]᮷㢪ࡋ֌ᯩ⌅ ᴹаⲮᶑǃаॳᶑˈնᴰṩᵜǃᴰ‫ޣ‬䭞ǃᴰ⢒䶐Ⲵ࣎⌅ᱟ᡾ṩӪ≁ǃ᡾ṩ⭏ ⍫DŽ[ĂĂ]а䜘ྭⲴ֌૱ˈᓄ䈕ᱟᢺ⽮Պ᭸⳺᭮൘俆սˈ਼ᰦҏᓄ䈕ᱟ⽮Պ ᭸⳺઼㓿⍾᭸⳺⴨㔏аⲴ֌૱DŽ᮷㢪н㜭ᖃᐲ൪Ⲵྤ䳦ˈн㾱⋮┑Ҷ䬌㠝≄DŽ Ո⿰Ⲵ᮷㢪֌૱ˈᴰྭᱟᰒ㜭൘ᙍᜣкǃ㢪ᵟкਆᗇᡀ࣏ˈ৸㜭൘ᐲ൪кਇ ࡠ⅒䗾DŽā(Xinhua News Agency 2014)

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photograph of a relaxed discussion between Xi Jinping and the artists attending the forum (The News Webpage 2014). The fact that Xi Jinping’s style is quite different from that of his predecessors’ needs no additional proof, at least on the discursive level. However, has Confucius truly vanished from the picture? Not quite. In November 2013, while visiting Confucius’s hometown of Qufu, Xi Jinping acknowledged the importance of Confucianism as the main representative of the Chinese tradition and said that, besides its conservative and idealistic elements, Confucianism also contained the “essence of rational progress” 5 . He also stated that Confucianism was important to the world as well as for the sinization of Marxism, albeit he did not elaborate on this statement. The anti-traditional struggle during the Cultural Revolution and the overemphasis of material gains during the last three decades of economic reforms brought along moral decadence and lack of values. However, it was not all lost, because in spite of the efforts, tradition could not be wiped out and it was still present in the “spiritual genes of the Chinese people” 6 . And how should one approach Confucianism? By applying Marxist methods, of course. People should study the values of loyalty, filial piety, chastity and righteousness and reinterpret them in accordance with the Chinese realities. Xi Jinping went on to say that there were states which had ideological prejudices against China and still agreed to set up Confucian institutes (however, he did not elaborate on the relation between Confucianism and these institutes). This type of behaviour was possible because of the failure of the capitalist system and the socialist miracle. Having to face various crises, Western states started to compare themselves with China’s politics and economy. Xi even mentioned that in a dialogue with the Greek prime minister, he told the Greek official that “democracy was not a Chinese tradition”. His speech was not published by official Chinese media, but was published on various blogs, both in mainland China and Hong Kong. However, the official media mentioned that during his visit in the Shandong Province, Xi Jinping also visited a cemetery of revolutionary martyrs in Linyi, where people who died in the War of Resistance against Japan were buried (China Daily 2013)7.

5

“jinbu de heli de jinghua 䘋↕Ⲵਸ⨶㋮ॾ” “zhonghua minzu jingshen jiyin ѝॾ≁᯿㋮⾎สഐ” 7 For Xi Jinping’s speech at Qufu see Xi 2014a, and 2014b, or Hu 2014. 6

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Again, on the 24 of September 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a key-note speech at the international seminar marking the 2565th birthday of Confucius, at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing. The very location of the event and the high profile of the speaker show Confucius’s rising importance in present day China. However, Xi’s speech was carefully worded and it seemed that the speaker did his best to avoid any direct mentioning of Confucianism whenever possible. It was a speech in which Xi Jinping talked about the importance of traditional culture in general, at which he repeatedly stressed that Confucianism was one of the most important systems of thought in ancient China. During the Warring States, schools of thought such as Confucianism and Legalism, Daoism, Mohism, Agriculturalism, or the School of Military Strategy learned from each other, or attacked each other, forming the magnificent culture of a hundred schools of thought, enriching the spiritual world of the Chinese people. Even if Confucianism played the leading role 8 in Chinese culture for a long time, Chinese culture retained its diversity.

The signals are mixed. The party leaders avoid mentioning Confucianism whenever possible and, when there is no escape, they insist that Confucianism is but one element of the great Chinese tradition. On the other hand, the official discourse includes so many Confucian concepts, i.e. concepts that almost everyone recognizes as originating from Confucian thought, that it would be virtually impossible to totally omit any reference to Confucianism. Just like Hu Jintao a few years before him, Xi Jinping also mentioned that one of the goals of the “two ‘one-hundred years’” (liangge yi bai nian є њ а Ⲯ ᒤ ), i.e. that of a moderately prosperous society (xiaokang shehui ሿᓧ⽮Պ) originated in The Book of Rites. (Xinhua wang 2014) What is, then, the relation between the Party and Confucianism?

Confucianism and the Sinization of Marxism In his speech at Qufu, Xi Jinping stated that “Confucius had a great influence upon mankind’s progressive and civilized thinking and upon the

8

Ā᱕⿻ᡈഭᰦᵏˈ݂ᇦ઼⌅ᇦǃ䚃ᇦǃ໘ᇦǃߌᇦǃ‫ޥ‬ᇦㅹ਴њᙍᜣ⍱⍮ ⴨ӂ࠷⻻ǃ⴨ӂ◰㦑ˈᖒᡀҶⲮᇦҹ呓Ⲵ᮷ॆབྷ㿲ˈѠᇼҶᖃᰦѝഭӪⲴ㋮ ⾎ц⭼DŽ㲭❦ਾᶕ݂ᇦᙍᜣ൘ѝഭᙍᜣ᮷ॆ亶ฏ䮯ᵏਆᗇҶѫሬൠսˈնѝ ഭᙍᜣ᮷ॆ‫❦׍‬ᱟཊੁཊ‫ਁݳ‬ኅⲴDŽā(Xinhua wang 2014)

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sinization of Marxism”. However, Xi Jinping was not the first Chinese leader to have mentioned the contribution of Chinese traditional culture to the sinization of Marxism; starting with Mao Zedong, all Chinese leaders, without exception, listed traditional culture as an important factor in giving Marxism its Chinese characteristics. Marxist scholars quoted or paraphrased Mao Zedong’s 1938 speech “The Role of the Communist Party in the National War” in numerous writings on traditional culture. In this speech Mao stated that in order for Marxism to succeed it needed to integrate China’s historic inheritance. From the very beginning, the sinization of Marxism meant adapting it to Chinese realities and using it in accordance with Chinese needs. Since Confucianism had been the main system of thought for thousands of years and due to its revival in the cultural and academic circles during the relative freedom of the 1980s, it was just a matter of time when Marxism would confront Confucianism. The Party needs historical legitimation; we are often reminded that the Party is continuing with the struggle for a rich and powerful China that started at the beginning of the twentieth century and that it embodies the spirit of the May Fourth Movement, 1919. The beginning of the twentieth century was a particularly complex one in Chinese history, for this was when tradition clashed with Western learning and all sorts of foreign ideologies were being introduced to China, including Marxism. The reformist discourse was full of calls for democracy, freedom, political and civil rights, all of them of Western inspiration. Since the Party keeps emphasising that it will never allow China to follow the path of Western democracy, it also needs to carefully choose which tradition it will continue. Moreover, during the last three decades, there have been voices arguing that Marxism was not the right choice for China, as it was an imported ideology that should be ditched in favour of the centuries-old Confucianism. Under these circumstances, Marxism needs Chinese tradition. Most articles dealing with the sinization of Marxism deal with the relation between Marxism and the Chinese tradition in general, and avoid naming Confucianism per se. However, inevitably, many authors are forced to admit that Confucianism was the main force within the Chinese tradition. While agreeing that Marxism cannot turn its back on tradition, Marxist scholars look at the encounter from the perspective of Marxism as the “strong culture” (qiangshi wenhua ᕪ࣯᮷ॆ); this means that even if the dialogue between the two systems is necessary, tradition has to be critically approached if we are to avoid confusion. An uncritical approach and the simple incorporation of traditional elements into Marxism would

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lead people to believe that there are no differences between the two which would be highly detrimental to the former; on the other hand, the reinterpretation of tradition under Marxism and the assimilation of what is perceived as “quintessential” would legitimize Marxism. According to Cheng Weiping (2014), besides “transformation” (biange ਈ 䶙 ) and “assimilation” (ronghe 㶽 ਸ ), “conditioning” (zhiyue ࡦ 㓖 )––with its positive and negative implications––is another phenomenon that derives from the encounter of the two ideologies. Chen mentioned that when Marxism first arrived to China, it was understood from the perspective of the traditional system of thought that was dominant during that period and thus, inevitably, traditional elements infiltrated the new ideology. For example, the concept of “Great Unity” (datong བྷ਼) came to represent the ideals of socialism and communism and made it easier for the masses to grasp the concept of “the world belongs to all” (tianxia wei gong ཙл Ѫ‫)ޜ‬, but at the same time, it brought with it the idea that the evolution from socialism to communism was a continuous struggle against private property, ignoring the importance of the development of the production forces. Is a dialogue between Marxism and Confucianism possible, especially when Marxism is described as a progressive scientific theory, able to adapt to the realities of contemporary society, while Confucianism is still seen as a conservative ideology that has yet to prove it can adapt to the needs of a modern society? Most Marxist scholars come up with a positive reply to this question, however they seem to disagree as regards the level upon which this dialogue could take place. Xu Wen (2011) believes that the “cultural spirit” (wenhua jingshen ᮷ ॆ㋮⾎) brings Marxism and tradition together. Born from the experiences of two different cultural areas, Marxism and Chinese tradition could not share the same conceptions, contents or thesis. However, once it entered China at the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxism developed more or less along the same lines as the Chinese tradition. During the first decades of the last century people fought against feudalism and for national sovereignty; some used tradition, while other saw a better weapon in Marxism. But it was not until Marxism was transformed by absorbing traditional elements that it became the dominant ideology. Or, the assimilation of traditional elements was possible only because tradition and Marxism were both used as weapons in the struggle for Chinese modernization. Chen Weiping seemed to go along the same lines when he stated that both tradition and Marxism were trying to answer the same questions regarding the universe, society and human life, but they differ in

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the way they pose the questions, in the language they use, where they place the emphasis and the conclusions they reach. Wen Bo (2009) is of the opinion that it is the social ideal of “Great Unity”, the emphasis on practice and the human-centred philosophy that brings the two together. Similar to traditional thinking which puts people at the centre and makes them the basis of the nation, 9 Marxism also attaches great importance to the masses and the individual who, according to the theory of historical materialism, is the creator of history. In Marxism practice represents the basis of knowledge and a similar approach can be found in Chinese tradition, especially after the Song Dynasty, when Zhu Xi established that “action” (xing 㹼) should come before “knowledge” (zhi ⸕). Huang Kaifeng (2010) also found compatibilities on the level of the social ideal, the shared concept of “Great Unity”, and the humancentred philosophy. Besides these, the Marxist dialectics are similar to that of traditional Chinese philosophy, with Huang citing examples from The Book of Changes and the Daodejing. Even if authors predominantly base their arguments on quotations from Confucian classics, which suggests that the so-called dialogue between Marxism and tradition is in fact between Marxism and Confucianism, we are often warned against overestimating the role of Confucianism in the sinization of Marxism. While advocating dialogue, Fang Keli (1989) mentioned that there were many differences between the two ideologies, starting with the way they report themselves to historical tradition and Western culture, their reassessment of the past, etc., and that Confucianism could never be as important as Marxism. Fang (2009) believes that Marxism is the only ideology capable of transforming Chinese society and its relation with Confucianism is that between “mainstream ideology” (zhudao yishi ѫሬ ᜿䇶) and “supporting ideology” (zhihuan yishi ᭟㕃᜿䇶). He criticizes the so-called “Confucian socialism” (reflected in traditional concepts such as: “the great unity” and “the moderate prosperous society”), saying that it is no different from what Marx and Engels called “feudal socialism” in their Communist Manifesto, and he is opposed to calling socialism with Chinese characteristics “Confucian socialism” since that would reduce the entire Chinese tradition to Confucianism and would ignore all events from the May Fourth Movement onwards.

9 With the exception of a single example all Wen Bo quotes in his article come from the Confucian classics: The Book of Rites, The Analects, Mengzi, Xunzi, etc.

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Kou Qingjie (2012) also compared Confucian socialism to feudal socialism in the Communist Manifesto. He stated that while “Confucian socialism” was a utopian idea, socialism with Chinese characteristics was based on reality and was deeply rooted in Chinese contemporary scientific socialism. It is true that the traditional ideals of a “moderate prosperous society” and “great unity” were a source of inspiration for early Chinese Marxists, but they remained simple ideals of an old agrarian society. Wang Yanjun (2012) listed three reasons why one could not equal Confucian socialism to socialism with Chinese characteristics. First of all, they have different historic backgrounds and class nature. While Confucian socialism was born during the Warrior States Period and preserved the feudal way of thinking, Chinese socialism eliminated exploitation and brought common welfare. Secondly, Marxism, as the core ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics, is a scientific, universal and rational system of thought. Thirdly, Marxism can critically approach Confucianism, assimilate the latter’s ideals of equality, democracy and harmony, which it can also transform by retaining what is good and discarding what does not fit the present realities. It is obvious that the official dialogue between Marxism and Confucianism is not an easy one and it is always conducted with Marxism in the dominant position. However, there are also cases in which Confucianism seems to insinuate itself in the official discourse.

Use of Confucianism in the Official Discourse As I have already mentioned, Chinese leaders enjoy quoting from classical books and Xi Jinping is no exception. In an article published in 2014, Ye Zicheng mentioned that after Mao Zedong, Xi was the Chinese leader most familiar with the Chinese classics and most likely to use them. He also dedicated an entire section of his paper to listing various quotations, mainly from Confucian classics, that Xi Jinping used in his articles published by the Zhejiang Daily, between 2003 and 2007. 10 Xi Jinping fondness for tradition is undeniable, however one must note that, in many of his speeches, quotations from the classical Chinese tradition were interwoven with those originating from the Marxist tradition. A good example of this practice can be seen in the speech Xi Jinping delivered at the 80th Anniversary of the Central Party School, in March 2013 (Xi 10

The articles published by Xi Jinping in the Zhejiang Daily, between 2003 and 2007, have been collected in a book. (see Xi 2007)

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2013). 11 The speech was short and Xi Jinping, who had given up the position of the President of the Central Party School less than two months before, talked to the newly enrolled students about the importance of learning. Learning is a recurrent topic in China, regardless of the historical period; it was important to Confucians, just as it was important to the communists, both prior and after 1949. If there are two quotations that every student of Chinese came across, they have to be the opening line of the Analects “Is it not a pleasure to learn and to repeat or practice from time to time what has been learned?”12 and Mao’s “Study hard and make progress every day”13, although some might be unable to locate the exact source of these quotations. Learning is crucial for the party; every moment in the party’s history was marked by calls to further study in order to acquire the skills necessary to solve the newly arising contradictions. For this, party members have to be “good at learning and good at learning once more”14. From the very beginning of the speech, one could sense the mixture of the vocabulary deriving from the two different traditions: the party cadres need to solve “contradictions”, and the key to this can be found in learning and repeating, a piece of advice that makes one think of the previously quoted opening line of the Analects. It is true that the term “contradictions” appeared only once in the entire speech, as all others items that need to be solved were defined as “problems”, but it is also true that “contradictions” is related to the ideal of “revolution”, while “problems” are specific things that arise from the implementation of various policies. In order to solve problems, no matter whether they are old or new, the cadres need skills and skills come from learning and applying. Skills were also emphasised in the “Speech at the Meeting for Education Mobilization for the Active Cadres at Yan’an”, which was delivered by Mao Zedong in 1939. Without mentioning Mao’s name, Xi reminded his audience that one of the problems the party faced at Yan’an was the so-called “skill panic” (benling konghuang ᵜ亶 ᝼), after which he added a few lines from Mao’s speech. This is not the only place in the speech where one can find 11

All quotations in this section attributed to Xi Jinping come from this text, unless otherwise specified. 12 ᆨ㘼ᱲ㘂ѻˈнӖᚵѾ˄䇪䈝gᆖ㘼˅, translated in Wing-Tsit (1963, 18). 13 “haohao xuexi, tiantian xiang shang ྭྭᆖҐˈཙཙੁк” 14 “shanyu xuexi, shanyu chongxin xuexi ழҾᆖҐˈழҾ䟽ᯠᆖҐ”

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fragments taken from Mao’s speeches and the fact that they were not marked as quotations could be down to two reasons. Firstly, the audience consisted of party cadres who were supposed to be familiar with Mao’s works, especially since they remained at the base of sinicized Marxism. Secondly, Xi presented the “skill panic” the cadres suffered during the Yan’an period as a constant problem, one to which the party had paid close attention. It was true that Mao Zedong also addressed this problem and it was also true that Xi used the same words as Mao, but Xi did not quote Mao, for he, just as Mao before him, used the standard party language. It was as if both leaders spoke a “party dialect”. The “skill panic” undermined the efforts of the party to fulfil the two “one hundred” goals, as the lack of skills bring the party to a point where “(the cadres) do not know how to use the new methods, while the old ones are useless, and (they) do not dare to use strong methods, when the soft ones give no results”, as Xi put it. Continuous and comprehensive learning is the key to success. But what should one study? First of all, one should study the Marxist theory seriously, both the original Marxism-Leninism as well as the local Maoism, Deng Xiaoping theory. Only by following the Marxist principles can the Party lead the people in the right way.15 It was also here that Xi Jinping employed a marked quote from Mao’s “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War”: So far as shouldering the main responsibility of leadership is concerned, our Party’s fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished if there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism-Leninism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow. (Mao 1938)16

15

Xi Jinping’s remark that “only thus can lead the people the right way” (᡽㜭ᑖ 亶Ӫ≁䎠ሩ䐟) is reminiscent of Hu Jintao’s remark in his last Report at the 18th Party Congress that went as follows “by firmly upholding the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, will we neither follow the old path of closed door and ossified politics, nor will we take to the evil road of changing our flags and banners.” (ᡁԜඊᇊн〫儈Ѯѝഭ⢩㢢⽮ՊѫѹՏབྷᰇᑌˈᰒн䎠ሱ䰝‫Ⲵॆܥ‬ 㘱䐟ǃҏн䎠᭩ᰇ᱃ᑌⲴ䛚䐟) (Hu 2012). 16 Ā൘ᣵ䍏ѫ㾱亶ሬ䍓ԫⲴ㿲⛩к䈤ˈྲ᷌ᡁԜ‫ފ‬ᴹаⲮњ㠣ҼⲮњ㌫㔏ൠ 㘼нᱟ䴦⺾ൠǃᇎ䱵ൠ㘼нᱟオ⍎ൠᆖՊҶ傜‫ݻ‬ᙍࡇᆱѫѹⲴ਼ᘇˈቡՊབྷ བྷൠᨀ儈ᡁԜ‫Ⲵފ‬ᡈᯇ࣋䟿ˈᒦ࣐䙏ᡁԜᡈ㜌ᰕᵜᑍഭѫѹⲴᐕ֌DŽā(Mao 1938)

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Second in importance to the study of Marxist theory is the study of party policies and national laws because these set the standards that the cadres need to take into account in their work. This includes the study of history, both of the Party and the national history, because knowing one’s history is loving one’s Party and country. This is followed by the study of practical knowledge: economy, politics, history (once more), culture, science, diplomacy, etc., anything that could help with the individual’s line of work. This includes the “outstanding Chinese culture”, which is important for giving the cadres a correct view of the world, human life and the right value system. Besides Chinese culture, the cadre also needs to understand the history and culture of other nations, so that they can get the best out of them and use this in their work. A word of warning for the audience, though: learning is not without its perils. One must be vigilant and learn from the Marxist perspective, otherwise one can easily be mislead and become the prisoner of erroneous thinking. Finally, one must apply what one learns. Once again, Xi used the exact same words as Mao in 1938.17 Putting into practice what one learns from books is not only learning, but is even more important than reading. The cadres must learn from the people as well from practice and apply what they have learnt. There is an intimate relation between learning and applying: learning provides one with new solutions to the problems he or she faces, while the success in applying one’s knowledge stimulates the desire to learn even more. Reading the contents of the studies one can notice that there is not a great departure from Mao. In “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” as well as in “Reform Our Study”, Mao placed the Marxist theory first on the list of steps that a party member should take when studying, stressing that cadres should pay a lot of attention to this subject. Second to Marxism came the critical study of history and knowledge applicability. It was in his speech, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War”, that Mao made his famous statement “We should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Zhongshan and take over this valuable legacy.” which is nowadays used as proof that the Party had always paid attention to tradition. However, in “Reform Our Study”, Mao pointed out that many party members knew the historical development of other nations, but forgot about their own, including “the last hundred years”––the history of humiliation.

17

“䈫ҖᱟᆖҐˈ֯⭘ҏᱟᆖҐˈ㘼фᱟᴤ䟽㾱ⲴᆖҐDŽ”

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Both Mao’s speeches insisted that everything one learns needs to be put into practice and this is what represents the adaptation to China’s characteristics, including Marxism. Besides the “valuable legacy”, which covers politics, society, philosophy, culture, etc., the communist cadre must also learn to solve practical questions, as well as understand the laws that govern the revolutionary movement and the lines of the Party. The study contents and its goals remained almost the same from Mao to Xi, if one does not take into account the changes necessary to keep it up to date. (For example, the Marxist literature Mao was asking his comrades to read contained essays by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, while nowadays, the last two are barely mentioned, being replaced by party leaders from Mao to Xi.18 Also, at first Mao faced a war against Japan and after that, one against the Nationalist Party, while Xi needs to address the problems that have arisen from the fast development of the Chinese society.) The language used by Xi Jinping is reminiscent of that of Mao Zedong; there are fragments that seem to be taken directly from Mao’s speeches, but no source is indicated; Mao sometimes called “studying” “squeezing” (ji ᥔ) and so does Xi. This does not mean that there are no quotations in Xi Jinping’s speech. On numerous occasions Xi backs his arguments by quoting from Chinese classics. Although, generally, no source other than “the ancient” (guren ਔӪ) is given, the quotations are signalled in the text by the employment of quotation marks and the fact that they are in classical Chinese, therefore even orally identifiable. The quotations are Confucian in nature, coming from Mencius, “riches and honours cannot corrupt him; poverty and humbleness cannot shaken his determination; threats and arms cannot subdue him”19; Xun Zi, “the learned one is not necessary an official, but an official must be a learned one”20; The Records of the Three Kingdoms, “spare no efforts in your duty until your final 18 There is basically no direct reference to Marx and Engels in the current official discourse, with the exception of direct quotations. The two are generally included in the concept of Makesizhuyi 傜‫ݻ‬ᙍѫѹ which covers the non-Chinese Marxist classics, while Zhongguohua de Makesizhuyi ѝഭॆⲴ傜‫ݻ‬ᙍѫѹ is preferred in Chinese Marxism. There is hardly any reference to MaLiezhuyi 傜 ࡇ ѫ ѹ (Marxism-Leninism), while Stalin has vanished completely. However, the four still appear in academic writing related to Marxism. 19 “fugui bun eng yin, pinjian bun eng yi, weiwu bun eng qu ᇼ䍥н㜭␛ˈ䍛䍡н 㜭〫ˈေ↖н㜭ቸ” 20 “xuezhe fei bi wei shi, er shizhe bi wei xue ᆖ㘵䶎ᗵѪԅˈ㘼ԅ㘵ᗵѪᆖ”

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day”21; Lu You, “humble as I am, I dare not forget the worries of my country”22; Fan Zhongyan, “worry about the troubles across the land and only after enjoy the happiness in the world”23; Wen Tianxing, “everyone dies, but my loyal heart will remain in the pages of history”24); Gu Yanwu, “empty talk jeopardizes the country, real action rejuvenates the country”25; Lin Zexu, “serve the country with the cost of your life, regardless of the personal gains or losses” 26 . There is no clear reason as to why these quotations are used. It could be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgement of the Party that many people, cadres included, lost faith in the communist philosophy and therefore the Party uses elements that are much deeper rooted in the public consciousness, i.e. those of tradition. On the other hand, a more plausible explanation would be that the Party is attempting to actively include tradition in its discourse and use it as a back-up for its Marxist agenda. With this it might want to show the compatibility between the two and emphasize the role of Marxism as the continuator of the Chinese tradition. However, Confucianism is not reduced merely to a few quotations. The way Xi Jinping words the entire concept of learning is Confucian in nature. At the end of his speech, Xi instructs the audience on how they should approach the process of learning and the key word is “internalization”, not “duty”. Xi quotes the Confucian Analects who stated: “they who know the truth are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who delight in it”27 The party is keeping the Confucian tradition of learning alive at which it requires its cadres to “make studying an

21

“jugong jin cui, si er hou yi ䷐䓜ቭⰱˈ↫㘼ਾᐢ” “wei bei wei gan wang you guo սঁᵚᮒᘈᘗഭ” 23 “xian tianxia zhi you er you, hou tianxia zhi le er le ‫ݸ‬ཙлѻᘗ㘼ᘗˈਾཙл ѻҀ㘼Ҁ” 24 “rensheng zigu shei wu si, liuqu danxin zhao hanqing Ӫ⭏㠚ਔ䈱ᰐ↫ˈ⮉ਆ ѩᗳ➗⊇䶂” 25 “kongtan wu guo, shigan xing bang オ䈸䈟ഭˈᇎᒢ‫ޤ‬䛖” 26 “gou li guojia shengsi yi, qi yin huofu biqu zhi 㤏࡙ഭᇦ⭏↫ԕˈኲഐ⾨⾿䚯 䎻ѻ” 27 “zhizhizhe buru haozhizhe, haozhizhe buru lezhizhe ⸕ѻ㘵нྲྭѻ㘵ˈྭѻ 㘵нྲҀѻ㘵” Unless specified otherwise, the fragments from the Analects and The Doctrine of the Mean quoted here were translated by James Legge. The translation is available at http://ctext.org/pre-qin-and-han. The fragment from Mencius comes from Mencius (1999), translated into English by Zhao Zhentao. 22

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aspiration, a passion and a healthy lifestyle, love studying and take pleasure in it. The deep interest in studying can change “there is a need for me to study” into “I want to study”, and “study for a while” into “study for a lifetime”, as Xi puts it. Learning does not mean simple memorizing, but adjusting the knowledge and applying it to solve concrete problems, or as Confucius stated “learning without thought is labour lost; thought without learning is perilous”28. The Doctrine of the Mean is used to exemplify the way cadres should approach government and solve problems, as they should “study what is good extensively, inquire about it accurately, reflect on it carefully, discriminate it clearly and practice it earnestly” 29 . Xi criticizes the cadres who do not take learning seriously under the pretext that they are too busy working while they are in fact indulging in parties and formalism, by quoting Mencius: “nowadays men try to help others understand through their own hazy understanding”30. The image that Xi Jinping created is that of a Confucian junzi and this is how he wants the party cadres to behave. Confucius himself is perceived not only as a teacher, but as someone who learned all his life. Gao Xuezhi sees junzi as someone committed to serving “the state and society in the name of the common good” (2002, 55). The commitment comes from the fact that junzi is a highly moral person and the moral behaviour is the result of self-cultivation. Du Weiming (1993) states that morality and politics are inseparable in Chinese culture and therefore there is a direct correlation between the self-cultivation of those who rule and the act of ruling over the people. Du argues that calling self-cultivation “root” (ben ᵜ) and the regulation of the house, ruling of the kingdom and bringing peace to the world “branches” (mo ᵛ ) indicates that Confucians see political service as rooted in personal morality. Xi also addresses the problem of self-cultivation and sees it possible through learning (yi xue xiushen ԕᆖ‫؞‬䓛). He basically asks the party cadres to internalize the concepts and accept them as natural, the same way the Confucian junzi internalized Confucian values. It is only through internalization that one can understand the true value of Marxim and act accordingly; the cadre must assume the responsibility for changing the society into a harmonious one, it must perceive it as its natural role, it must come from within and not be imposed from the outside. Just like the junzi, the party cadre must 28

“xue er bu si ze wang, si er bu xue ze dai ᆖ㘼нᙍࡉ㖄ˈᙍ㘼нᆖࡉ↶” bo xue zhi, shen wen zhi, shen si zhi, ming bian zhi, du xing zhi ঊᆖѻˈᇑ䰞ѻˈ ᝾ᙍѻˈ᰾䗘ѻˈㄳ㹼ѻ” 30 “yi qi hunhun, shi ren zhaozhao ԕަ᰿᰿ˈ֯Ӫᱝᱝ” 29

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strive to attain “sageness within and kingliness on the outside”, it must continuously seek to develop its moral sense, while devoting its life to serving the people. The final remark rounds up the speech made by the Chinese president. If at the beginning, Xi’s emphasis on learning and repeating reminded his audience of Confucius, the final remark seems inspired by both Lenin and Mao: “(we) must insist on learning, learning and learning and must insist on applying, applying and applying”31

Conclusions Could the extensive use of Confucian elements in the official discourse mark a shift in Party politics? It is hard to tell. Although all Chinese leaders since 1949 quoted from Confucian classics, it would be hard to deny that Confucianism has been much more present in the official speech over the last two decades; it was present in Hu Jintao’s discourse and it is still there is Xi Jinping’s, in spite of his departure from his predecessor’s style. The question does not address the presence of Confucian elements in the official Party discourse, since they have always been there, but deals with what does the more or less overt reference to Confucianism mean? The increased presence of Confucian elements in the Party discourse is directly related to the increased importance that the Party attaches to the traditional Chinese culture. The success of the economic reform launched by Deng Xiaoping made many people believe that the communist ideals of equality and prosperity were nothing more than utopian thinking. It was not the first time that the Chinese were presented with an image of a perfect world where all people were equal and prosperous, with many Marxist scholars drawing comparisons between the communist ideals and the Confucian ideal of the “Great Unity”. After three decades of planned economy under Mao Zedong, the reforms proved that, so far, the only viable economic system is that of the capitalist market economy, no matter how one decides to call it. The economic success, and especially the way it was achieved, disenchanted people with Marxism. A survey conducted on 1559 university students in the Chongqing and Southwest universities in 2011, showed that, although the governance value ranked rather high (between 3 and 4 out of 5 points, where 1 meant “not satisfied” and 5 31

“jianchi xuexi, xuexi, zai xuexi, jianchi shijian, shijian, zai shijian ඊᤱᆖҐǃ ᆖҐǃ޽ᆖҐˈඊᤱᇎ䐥ǃᇎ䐥ǃ޽ᇎ䐥”

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meant “highly satisfied”), many of those interviewed admitted that the reason behind their willingness to join the Party was not their faith in the Marxist ideology, but the chance of getting a better job, with as many as 30% stating that they had never read a Marxist text (Jiang and Dai 2011). Another survey (2014) conducted on 1100 students from six universities from the same Chongqing area, showed that 44.6% of all participants believed in Marxism and although most participants declared that “faith”– –as a general concept––was important, 13.1% declared that they do not need to have faith in Marxism and 40.5% declared that faith in Marxism was important because it helped them join the Party and find better employment. The same survey revealed that faith in Marxism was rather low amongst the ethnic minorities, for whom religious faith was much more important (Zhang and Huang 2014). On the other hand, just as Kang Xiaoguang (2004) observed, economic reforms rearranged the revolutionary social order, putting peasants and workers, the strata upon which the communist revolution initially relied, back to the bottom of the pyramid of power. The economic success deepened the gap between urban and rural areas and increased land-related tensions. As shown by the growing discontent with environmental policies, the growing urban class, much better educated and with broader access to information, started asking for increased participation regarding the policies that had a direct affect on their lives. Under these circumstances, when ideological and economic legitimation are no longer sufficient, the Party needs to look for a new way of legitimizing its power and tradition might be the answer. The human-centred slogans bring forward the image of a Party for whom nothing is more important than the welfare of its people; the request by Xi Jinping that the party cadres should behave like junzi strengthens this perception and projects the image of the Party acting like the “benevolent ruler”. Also, it is tradition that helped the present leadership come up with the core value system which, if successfully implemented, would guarantee that the people will remain loyal to the Party. However, the fact that numerous Marxist scholars, while stressing the need for a dialogue between Marxism and Confucianism, go to great lengths trying to prove that although many of their concepts are of Confucian origin, their meanings differ from those of the original concepts, makes us believe that the Party’s approach to Confucianism is not entirely sincere. It might be the case that since Marxism is no longer the language many people would like to hear, the Party is trying to gain their support by addressing them in a language much more familiar, that of their ancestors. But as Fang Keli

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put it, sinicized Marxism remains the “grammar” while Confucianism is merely the “vocabulary” (Fang in Makeham 2008, 248). However, one cannot ignore the long time effect of using Confucian vocabulary. No matter how much Marxist scholars insist that their concepts differ from the traditional ones, a concept can never be totally free of its initial meaning. Moreover, some of the used concepts are immediately recognized by the public as Confucian (such as xiao ᆍ, filial piety; zhong ᘐ, loyalty; xin ؑ, trust), for they are a part of what Xi Jinping (in his speech at Qufu) called the “spiritual genes” of the Chinese. People decode these concepts based on their knowledge of tradition, not Marxism. It is therefore possible that Confucianism insinuates itself into Marxism, transforming it from the inside. The same thing could happen with the junzi-like cadres. They are party cadres at the current moment, but if they were required to alter their behaviour, i.e. to be closer to the Confucian ideal, they might, in time, become more Confucian than Marxist. In other words, one never knows whether the long-term use of Confucian vocabulary will not finish by altering the Marxist grammar. Can one talk of the Confucianization of the Communist Party? I believe that for the time being, Confucian concepts are the tools of propaganda and tradition is used as a means of legitimation in a moment of ideological crisis. However, in the long run, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the Party might become transformed by the Confucian concepts which it is currently trying to transform and incorporate.

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Ґ䘁ᒣ൘ѝཞ‫ފ‬ṑᔪṑ 80 ઘᒤᒶ⾍བྷՊ᳘ 2013 ᒤ᱕ᆓᆖᵏ 39 ᔰ ᆖި⽬кⲴ䇢.” Accessed January 25, 2015. http://cpc.people.com. cn/n/2013/0303/c64094-20656845.html. —. 2014a. “Xi Jinping Qufu jinghua (quanwen) Ґ䘁ᒣᴢ䱌䇢䈍˄‫ޘ‬ ᮷˅.” Accessed January 24, 2015. http://news.nanyangpost.com/2014/ 02/Xi-Jinping-Confucius.html. —. 2014b. “Xi Jinping Qufu jinghua (quanwen) Ґ䘁ᒣᴢ䱌䇢䈍˄‫ޘ‬ ᮷˅.” On Sun Honggang de bokeᆉ㲩䫒Ⲵঊᇒ. Accessed January 24, 2015. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49363f34 0102e53e.html. Xinhua News Agency ᯠॾ⽮. 2014. “Xi Jinping: Wenyi bu neng zai shichang jingji dachaozhong mishi fangxiang Ґ䘁ᒣ˖᮷㢪н㜭൘ᐲ ൪㓿⍾བྷ▞ѝ䘧ཡᯩੁ.” Accessed February 2, 2015. http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/15/c_1112840544.htm. Xinhua wang ᯠॾ㖁. 2014. “Xi Jinping: Zai jinian Kongzi danchen 2565 zhounian guoji xueshu yantaihuishangde jianghua Ґ䘁ᒣ˖൘㓚ᘥᆄ ᆀ䈎䗠 2565 ઘᒤഭ䱵ᆖᵟ⹄䇘ՊкⲴ䇢䈍.” Accessed January 10, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/24/c_1112612018. h tm. Xu, Quanxing 䇨 ‫ ޤ ޘ‬. 2014. “Makesizhuyi yu Zhongguo chuantong wenhua xiangjiehe er ti” 傜‫ݻ‬ᙍѫѹоѝഭՐ㔏᮷ॆ⴨㔃ਸҼ仈 Accessed January 25, 2015. http://www.ccps.gov.cn/theory/llyl/20140 7/ t20140716 _52279.html. Xu, Wen ᗀっ. 2011. “Chuantong wenhua xiandaihua yu Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua Ր㔏᮷ॆ⧠ԓॆо傜‫ݻ‬ᙍѫѹѝഭॆ.” Shandong shehui kexue ኡь⽮Պ、ᆖ 8: 171–73. Ye, Zicheng ਦ 㠚 ᡀ . 2014. “Yuandian zhi si: lishi, dianjizhong de zhizheng sixiang yuanquan. Chuantong wenhua jinghua yu Xi Jinping zhiguo linian ৏⛩”ѻᙍ˖শਢǃި㉽ѝⲴᢗ᭯ᙍᜣⓀ⋹DŽՐ㔏᮷ ॆ㋮ॾоҐ䘁ᒣ⋫ഭ⨶ᘥ.” Xueshu qianyan ᆖᵟࡽ⋯ 1: 48–58.

CHAPTER TEN IN SEARCH OF NUMBERS AND SUBSTANCE: ON THE CURRENT CONFUCIAN REVIVAL IN THE PRC RALPH WEBER

Introduction Over the past four decades a Confucian revival of sorts has been taking place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It seems that everybody agrees that this noticeable revival bears significance and deserves critical attention of scholars studying the present day East Asian region. However, it is harder to agree upon the exact meaning of “revival” and the “significance” attributed to it. Of course, in present day China, Confucianism comes in all shades and colours. It would be hopeless and probably ill-advised to look for a unitary Confucian actor. It would also prove unnecessary. The revival at hand might well be of Confucianism rather than by Confucianism. This does not preclude that there are actors readily identified or even self-identifying as “Confucians”, but it is unclear whether this should be understood as a cause or an effect of the claimed revival. It should be added that such self-identification acts can be frequently found in political contexts, e.g. seeking recognition over other actors, as was the case in the 2010 and 2011 controversy involving a Christian church in Qufu.1 1

The Chinese government revealed plans for a Gothic-style Christian church (of the officially sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches) to be built in Qufu, the hometown of Confucius. This was done in order to facilitate a dialogue between Confucianism and the country’s fastest growing religion. The project prompted innumerable nationalist online comments and a public letter of protest by ten self-identifying Confucian scholars (including Chen Ming, Guo Qiyong, Kang Xiaoguang, Jiang Qing, Lin Anwu, Yan Binggan, and Zhang

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Christianity has become a major societal if not even political issue in the PRC, however, in this case we are also dealing with an array of fast growing communities of cultural, merely practicing, proselytizing and political Christians (operating both on and off the official radar). Alongside we can also follow Buddhist and Daoist “revivals”. As these cases point towards a new significance of tradition and religion, it seems that any evaluation would have to pay great attention to the political realm that continues to be ideologically defined by (economically and politically) liberal, (liberal and socialist) egalitarian and (orthodox and neo-) Marxist contentions, all of which are frequently enriched by droplets of (conservative, revivalist and other) traditionalism. It is certainly no coincidence that tradition and religion are revived during a period in which the country has adopted capitalism and is generally said to be “on the rise”. It is unlikely that the Confucian and other revivals would have occurred in the way and to the extent they have without the placet of the foremost power in Chinese politics, i.e. the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The notion of “revival” is sometimes used in a proliferating manner. In the form of intellectual fashions, numerous “revivals” of books and authors (from Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss to Alexis de Tocqueville) are claimed to have occurred in the PRC. Sometimes the claim extends beyond the fads of intellectual circles to the very ideology that guides those vying for power. News on a Tocqueville-frenzy that raged among Chinese intellectuals circled in 2012 and 2013, indicating that they were interested in his L’ancien régime et la Révolution and his thesis that revolutions do not arise when the masses are downtrodden, but when they are on the rise, the relevance of which is blatantly obvious in view of the recent Chinese context. What is more, Tocqueville (similar to Confucius, which is an important fact in some versions of the putative Confucian revival) received the badge of honour from top Party leadership, as the

Xianglong). The letter asked what would happen if a huge Confucian temple was built in Jerusalem, Mecca or the Vatican, how would people feel about it, and whether this would be accepted by the government and the people? (ሶᗳ∄ᗳˈ ྲ㤕൘㙦䐟᫂ߧᡆ哖࣐ᡆụ㪲޸ˈᔪа䎵儈䎵བྷⲴᆄᓉˈ࣋঻ަᇇᮉᔪㆁⲴ ≄࣯ˈ⤜亶ަ෾ᐲᔪㆁⲴ仾僊ˈᴹ‫ޣ‬ᇇᮉؑՇ৸Պ֌օᝏᜣ઒˛ަഭᇦǃަ ᭯ᓌǃަ≁Շ㜭᧕ਇੇ˛) The Confucian temple in Qufu is thereby clearly positioned on par with the holy places of the Abrahamic religions and one wonders whether this is the image of Confucianism that these Confucian scholars would defend. For the letter, see Guo Ruxue Wang (2010); see also Weber (2013).

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politburo standing committee member Wang Qishan ⋤ ᒱ ᒣ recommended reading him, which apparently created a stir on Weibo. Journalist Elizabeth Pond worded this as follows: “First there was Confucius. Then there was Mao Zedong. And now Alexis de Tocqueville tops the must-read list for avid Chinese intellectuals” (Pond 2012). Obviously, if “revival” is to be used in such a loose sense, it might just be claimed for everything and therefore perhaps for nothing much at all. It is imperative to disentangle the various claims that “revival” may refer to and address the question separately for different domains. I believe that there are certain domains for which a revival can be rightfully claimed. In the very late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a Confucian revival took place within the academic world. This could be clearly seen in the re-introduction of classes on Confucianism at university level and the newly established conferences on Marxism, Confucianism and their compatibility (e.g. Makesizhuyi he ruxue xueshu yantaohui 俜‫ݻ‬ ᙍѫ㗙઼݂ᆨᆨ㺃⹄䀾ᴳ in 1995, jointly organized by the Central Party School, Zhongguo zhongyang dangxiao ѝ഻ѝཞ唘ṑ, and the China Confucius Foundation, Zhongguo Kongzi jijinhui ѝ഻ᆄᆀส䠁), as well as the new research on Confucianism which included figures from Taiwan and the United States (e.g. the two large-scale research projects on Modern Confucianism under the leadership of Fang Keli ᪉ඞ❧ in 1986–1990 and 1991–1995). It is important to highlight that the academic revival preceded all currently claimed revivals, which begun with a few schools and temples in the 1990s, but truly took off in the 2000s. With an increase in the number of journals, books and conferences, the activities in the academic domain have also been on the rise in the 2000s. For example, the website Confucius2000, established by a group of young intellectuals, can be found online since 2001. Still, the current debate on the Confucian revival cannot focus merely on the academic world. Since the academic revival stretches back to the late 1970s, this should hardly be news to anybody. It seems that in most cases the current Confucian revival refers to one of the two specific and seemingly very different domains, while academics tend to play an important but yet unspecified role in both. One domain covers the level of society and everyday life, while the other covers the level of government and CCP’s guiding ideology. In this chapter, I propose to take a step back and assess the significance of Confucianism and, perhaps by implication, the Confucians in present day PRC. The argument that I wish to put forth and examine in this chapter comprises of two points that challenge the conventional claim for a Confucian revival in PRC today. I hold that in view of its significance in

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Chinese society and politics, the Confucian revival has been greatly overestimated in the scholarly community with a professional interest in Confucianism, which, for one thing, failed to get the numbers right (if the numbers prove to be of any concern at all). An example of this is Fan Ruiping’s edited volume on The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China (2011, 1), which in its introduction boldly asserts that “China is in fact a country on its way to recapturing and rearticulating the Confucian moral and political commitments that lie at the foundations of Chinese culture and have a history reaching back even before Confucius (551–479 BCE) himself” and “will not be shaped in the image and likeness of the West”––as if there were only these two options on the table (somehow necessitating a radical choice of either one or the other) and no one else had any agenda of his own. I believe that such misjudgement is unfortunate at best and politically dangerous at worst, since it could play into the hands of those for whom Confucianism is a means for achieving various agendas tied to the vested interests and pragmatic power politics and can as such be readily dropped or substituted when no longer found useful.

Confucian Revival in Society and Everyday Life? On the level of society and everyday life, it is paramount to establish different thresholds for qualifying a practice or belief as Confucian, even when an agreement on what qualifies as a threshold and what qualifies as a Confucian practice or belief is not to be expected. In fact, I am not out to determine what is truly and essentially Confucian and what is not, which might indeed be a rather futile endeavour given the evolving nature of whatever has been considered “Confucian” in the past. For instance, is ancestor worship particularly “Confucian”? This is surely a widely practiced custom in the PRC. However, the practitioners themselves do usually not identify this practice as particularly “Confucian”, nor do they consider themselves Confucian, at least not based on their ancestor worship.

Temples The Confucian revival is often claimed with regard to temples. In her book Confucianism as a World Religion: Contested Histories and Contemporary Realities (2013) Anna Sun presents extensive fieldwork conducted between 2000 and 2011 and concludes that “ritual worship of

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Confucius is indeed undergoing a significant and diverse revival in temple settings in contemporary Mainland China” (Sun 2013, 153). However, her analysis also shows the diversity of what is actually performed in temples and how much it might or might not have to do with something specifically “Confucian”. Let’s start by getting the numbers right. Anna Sun reports that there are merely a few hundred Confucian temples left, with thirty-nine of them designated as “national cultural heritage sites”, which means that they are subject to “strict regulations” in terms of construction and renovation, but also that they thereby come to offer “more opportunities for local governments to promote tourism” (ibid., 156). Even without the “national cultural heritage” designation, Confucian temples represent a means for provincial governments to attract tourists and their efforts to renovate these sites are usually financially supported by the state. Sun highlights that since 2004 the “political goal of establishing Confucianism as the most visible Chinese cultural and social heritage” has been added to the economic purpose (ibid., 157). At least 90 Confucian temples are currently owned by the state and managed by the Chinese National Association for the Protection of Confucian Temples under the State Cultural Heritage Administration. Officially, these are not religious sites, and the State Administration of Religious Affairs has no say in them, which gives the temples some leeway in developing innovative ways of attracting visitors and additional income. The temples differ as they follow either the museum system or the entrepreneurial model, at which the latter actively promotes ritual practices such as incense burning and prayer cards (a recently introduced tradition as well as a variety of group ritual activities (ibid., 157ff). Unsurprisingly, the entrepreneurial temples have turned out to be much more vibrant sites for ritual practices, which should be noted, since these activities might otherwise be quickly and perhaps one-sidedly understood as a bottom-up manifestation of Confucian commitment. Not to be mistaken, such commitment is present with some of the visitors, and Anna Sun described practices of burning incense, praying to the tablet, the statue, or the portrait of Confucius as well as writing prayers on prayer cards. Some prayers can be reconstructed from the prayer cards, where one can read requests for blessings such as “Dear Confucius, help my child be successful in his/her college entrance examination” (ibid., 165). Anna Sun commented: Interestingly, according to my interviews, people who perform rituals and ask for blessings in Confucian temples do not in general consider

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This is a well-known categorization problem specific to Confucianism. On a more general level, it might also relate to the kind of multiple religious identity that is widely documented in China (whilst it may be pertinent also elsewhere, perhaps even globally), where many people do one thing today and another tomorrow. They pray to Buddha and Jesus in the morning, fish and attend a Party meeting in the afternoon, visit a Daoist temple in the evening and drop in on Confucius on the way back, just to criticise after dinner; all of this is performed without them ever becoming a Buddhist or a Christian, a fisherman, a Daoist or Confucian, or indeed a critic. This is surely a part of the reason why it is so hard to count Confucians.2 Returning to Confucian temples, I should mention that most visitors in Sun’s study turned out to be tourists who did not perform any rituals, or if they did, they indulged in the “longstanding Chinese tradition of performing ritual practices during travels” (ibid., 164), asking for general blessings that do not depend on Confucius. The fact that they were addressed to Confucius is puzzling and made Anna Sun think about issues such as “half-belief” (ibid., 167) and offer the interesting remark that with ritual practice “the matter generally is not ‘why’, but ‘why not’” (ibid., 169).

Schools Today’s temples also offer a wide range of social rituals stretching from tea ceremonies to the revival of traditional dresses, commercial soapstyle Confucian weddings, or passing on teachings from the classical Confucian canon or Confucian behaviour based on ancient or modern manuals for students of all age groups. Such and similar practices can also be found at the core of some other associations - closer to schools than temples - that have emerged during the last decade and that have been wonderfully documented by Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval (2014) in their case studies. In the text I focus on one of Billioud’s cases, the one of the Beijing-based Yidan Xuetang а㙭ᆖา (2010, 219–20; 2011), 2 Anna Sun (2013) dedicated a chapter to counting Confucians through Social Scientific Research.

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which he characterized as a “jiaohua organization” (founded by Pang Fei 䘴伎 in 2000) that aims to transform the self and others through teaching. In order to put things into perspective I should start off with some numbers: Pang Fei claims to have attracted an average of 50,000 participants per annum, while the Confucian temple in Beijing brought together a mere 18 participants at the 2003 ceremony, which Billioud referred to as one of their “larger ceremonies” (2011, 296). The association is spreading throughout the country and is relatively successful in installing public reading groups of what is generally considered to be Confucian literature (i.e. the Four Books, read without commentary or interpretation, or the Classics in Three Characters). However, in the end, we are dealing with an example of what are, when viewed more comprehensively, poorly organized and relatively small-scale initiatives. Billioud drew an interesting contrast: All these popular activities contrast strikingly with the large events organized nowadays by the authorities and in which economic and ideological concerns easily turn supposedly Confucian rites into massive spectacles devoid of any ritual dimensions (Billioud 2011, 296).

Let me add a word on what Pang Fei and his Yidan Xuetang do in terms of content. They are predominantly connected to the Confucian heritage, but they are open to participants who otherwise practice Christianity or Buddhism. The Yidan Xuetang members seek to advocate a more general, decidedly worldly, ethos built around a few basic principles that read like adages: “privilege action, silence is golden”, “less empty talk” or “learning from others” (ibid., 290). Billioud concluded that no “well-articulated doctrine” is on offer (ibid., 307). In a different text Billioud and Thoraval highlighted the almost anti-intellectual stance of these minjian-level Confucian social practices (2014). It should also be mentioned that the association “actively endorses the party line”, has its members’ code begin with the line “be patriotic and abide by the law”, and co-operates with the Party in numerous ways (Billioud 2011, 299–300)–– which, to be sure, might be no more than what an association aspiring to go beyond a certain number has to do. Of course, there are also some private schools that are committed to teaching Confucianism, but they are insignificant in terms of numbers. The best case might be made for primary and secondary schools, as well as middle schools, whose curricula include a Confucian component. In his article “The Revival of Confucianism in Chinese Schools” Yu Tianlong

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(2008) stated that this can be seen, for example, in the guise of education in Chinese traditional virtues, an outgrowth of the earlier “back to tradition” movement in Chinese education, which was a grassroots movement on the local level that was quickly absorbed by the state. Yu discussed the marriage of politics and pedagogy and the utilitarian understanding of Confucianism. Apparently a top official in the Ministry of Education stated that Confucianism needs to undergo a transformation “so as to be compatible with a socialist/communist economy and ideology and to serve both” (ibid., 124). In view of Confucianism, what made it into the textbooks was the teaching of the 12 virtues, “which are basically simplified moral rules and principles that emphasise values such as loyalty to one’s country, commitment to serving one’s people, social responsibility, respect for authority, and self-discipline” (ibid., 125). Again, it seems that in terms of content we are facing something that is only loosely related to Confucian teachings, and this is clearly understood by Confucian academics. At the meeting of the International Confucian Association in Beijing, which took place in September 2014, one speaker who summarised the discussions emphasised that they needed “a better curriculum and better textbooks” to help them work against the fact that the “masses are guided by economic values”. This clearly indicates that the curricula and textbooks do not appropriately convey what scholars believe Confucianism is.

*** Thus, it seems that whenever we could effectively claim large numbers––and keep in mind that large numbers such as 10 million schoolchildren reading the Analects, as estimated by Chen Lai, or even 40 million copies of the Guangdong version of the New Three Character Classic that are in circulation might not turn out to be so large when measured against the population of the country––we are actually facing a rather thinly spread Confucianism. Of course, similarly thin versions of many other phenomena are sometimes referred to in order to make a Confucian revival plausible, from Yu Dan’s (ன୹) self-help book (as Michael Nylan calls it, 2010, 219), to Hu Mei’s (⬌⋷) state-supported Hollywood-style epic movie, the Confucius Ballet performed for UNESCO, Zhang Huan’s ( ᙇ ὰ ) 2011 art installations of Confucius, comics and other iconic uses as with the Olympic games, the Confucius Institutes or the Confucius Peace Prize.

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All of this is of course fair enough, and I have no serious objection to any of it. Still, I want to put an observation up for discussion. It is this thin version of Confucianism that contemporary scholars often refer to when claiming a Confucian revival, which they themselves often complain about, for instance when they would beg to object to each and all of these practices as simply not “Confucian” enough. In their discourse they demand a more substantial Confucian commitment. Remember Zhang Xianglong’s call (2007) for cultural preservation zones for Confucians, or even Jiang Qing’s call for a Confucian state religion (2003). Confucian academics draw legitimization for their normative work and political visions from Confucian popular social practices that are a far cry from what these scholars wish to see and sell as Confucian. And the Party knows how to exploit this odd situation––which is why we will now turn to the Party.

Confucian Revival in the Party Leadership? There is much talk about CCP embracing Confucianism. However, I would characterise it as similarly thin in terms of specific commitment to Confucianism. On other occasions I have argued this in the context of filial piety used as a criterion for the promotion of officials on the county level (Weber 2011, 21–23), but any speech on the topic of harmony by a top Party leader would reveal the sort of “empty talk” that Pang Fei asks his students to avoid. Beyond the Confucian references in the official Party discourse, my short examination of the social practices suggests that what might - at first glance - be considered evident bottom-up manifestations of Confucianism, is quickly enmeshed in Party policies, and might, as Yu Tianlong wrote with regard to the “back to tradition” movement, undermine the original educational premises (2008, 127). Some other seemingly bottom-up phenomena involving the renovation of Confucian temples and the erection of thousands of statues of Confucius are not down to the Party but capital from Hong Kong, for instance the money from the CEO of the Sanhe group, a major player in energy technology, and Tang Enjia ‫‮‬ᜠె, a self-styled Confucian entrepreneur who made his wealth in industrial painting (see Billioud 2010, 207–9).

From Liu Shaoqi to Party Journals Today Nowadays articles in Party journals frequently treat Confucianism as compatible with Marxism, as if the fusion of the two is a matter of

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convention and does not need further comment or conceptual work. This was by no means always the case. In Yan’an lectures on How to Become a Good Communist (Lun gongchandangyuan de xiuyang ㄽඹ䓊㯼ဨⓗಟ 㣴, literally: On the Self-cultivation of Communist Party Members, 1939) Liu Shaoqi ࢹቁཷ (1898–1969), the ill-fated president of the PRC, sought to re-interpret the Confucian self-cultivation in Marxist-Leninist terms for the Party’s own ends. Liu’s text can serve to highlight a certain tension that can be difficult to assuage in any treatment of Confucianism from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Looking at how the current Party thinkers tackle the tension might throw some light on the depth of engagement with Confucianism as a potential Party ideology.3 Liu stated that a good communist should undergo self-cultivation (jinxing xiuyang 䙢㹼‫؞‬伺), which is more precisely identified in the lectures as a “Marxist-Leninist method of self-cultivation” 4 . He also mentioned that self-cultivation should be pursued with Proletarian consciousness (wuchanjieji yishi de xiuyang ❑⭒䲾㍊᜿䆈Ⲵ‫؞‬伺), in which one transforms oneself from an immature into a mature revolutionary. Every Party member uses Proletarian awareness to fight non-Proletarian ideas; in order to erase all remaining traces of the nonCommunist worldview he captures the mind with the Communist worldview, as well as deploys the principle of priority of the Proletariat, the People and the Party with which individualism is fent off. Liu’s text has been noted for the manner in which the argument for a Marxist-Leninist self-cultivation draws on a high number of explicit references to Confucian texts (Lunyu, Mengzi, Shijing, etc.) and its terminological and thematic borrowings from Wang Yangming ⦻䲭᰾ (e.g. the phrase zhi xing he yi ⸕㹼ਸа) and philologists from the Qing dynasty. Liu quoted the famous passage from Lunyu II: 4, in which Confucius was reported to have said: ੮ॱᴹӄ㘼ᘇҾᆨˈйॱ㘼・ˈഋॱ㘼нᜁˈӄॱ㘼⸕ཙભˈ‫ॱޝ‬㘼 㙣丶ˈгॱ㘼ᗎᗳᡰⅢˈн䑠⸙DŽ At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took a stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I followed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line.5 3

An early review of Liu’s text that presents the historical context and dissects it for its Confucian references can be found in Nivison (1956). 4 “Makesi Lieningzhuyi de xiuyang fangfa 俜‫ݻ‬ᙍࡇሗѫ㗙Ⲵ‫؞‬伺ᯩ⌅” 5 Translated by D.C. Lau.

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Liu commented that in this passage “the thinker of feudalism” (fengjian sixiangjia ᑒᘓᛮ᝿ᐙ) referred to his “own process of selfperfection” 6 and that he obviously did not perceive himself as a born “sage” (shengren 㚆 Ӫ ). This comment is a good illustration of the previously mentioned tension in the Marxist-Leninist perspective on Confucian texts. Not only did Liu Shaoqi frequently and prominently draw on Confucian texts, but he also had a positive reference throughout. Sometimes he seamlessly wove the references into his arguments for a Marxist-Leninist self-cultivation, while at other times he signalled that these references implied a rupture since they were taken from an unmistakably feudal context, which could, of course, not be endorsed. In some passages it is easy to spot Liu’s struggle against the tension, for instance when he approvingly quoted Mencius and then added that Communists were “all the more” (geng bixu ᴤᗵ丸) asked to engage in self-cultivation, given their historic mission to change the world. On a different occasion he followed a quote by Mencius by saying that “I believe this is not badly said”, with which he created a parallel between the legendary sage-kings Yao and Shun on the one hand and Marx and Lenin on the other hand. Liu Shaoqi was aware of the tension between the positive reference and the negative qualification and he addressed this explicitly when he rejected the earlier self-cultivation practices as “idealistic, formalistic, abstract and detached from social practice”7. Sure enough he did not give any reference for this qualification. As Nivison (1956, 60) observed, he also abstained from mentioning the Confucian loyalty to family, ancestral worship or the moral gap between a junzi and the people at large. At least since 1989, when Gu Mu 䉧 ⢗ (1914–2009) delivered a speech at the 2540th anniversary of Confucius’ birth in which he highlighted harmony (hexie ઼䉀), we can find references at the highest administrative and political levels in the PRC. Similarly, in his speech “Three Representatives” (san ge daibiao йњԓ㺘) that he delivered on May 14, 2000, Jiang Zemin ⊏◔≁ chose to quote the Tang-dynasty Confucian Han Yu 七᜸ (768–824). He quoted the passage that addresses the fact that the scholar-officials of old were strict to themselves but tolerant and generous to others. Jiang also made an implicit reference to 6

“ziji xiuyang de guocheng 㠚ᐡ‫؞‬伺Ⲵ䙾〻” “weixin de, xingshi de, chouxiang de, tuoli shehui shijiande ୟᗳⲴˈᖒᔿⲴˈ ᣭ䊑Ⲵˈ㝡⿫⽮Պᇎ䐥Ⲵ” 7

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Liu Shaoqi’s lectures and introduced a distinction between the internal and external dimension of cultivation (Jiang 2002, 33, 54). Of course, Confucian texts became common with the leadership of Hu Jintao 㜑䭖⏋ and Wen Jiabao ⓛᇦሦ who quoted (and occasionally misquoted) them, which is well-documented in literature, and in the continuation I will examine the current situation around Xi Jinping Ґ 䘁 ᒣ and his administration. Perhaps it was because the top leadership started to regularly quote these texts (of course, other reasons are also possible) that the debates on Confucianism started appearing in Party journals and online Party forums. There are two different types of articles in which Confucianism gained a voice in party media. The first were articles written by contemporary Confucians in which the Party ideology is not mentioned, but the articles were reprinted in Party journals or uploaded onto online Party forums. Guo Qiyong 䜝啺ࣷ, one of the ten Confucian letter signatories of the previously mentioned Qufu Christian church controversy, published an article on Confucian self-cultivation and the promotion of public morals in contemporary society. The article was first printed in the Guangming Ribao ‫ݹ‬᰾ᰕ๡ (July 17, 2011), but from there it found its way to numerous other places including the homepage of Qiushi ≲ሖ, the CCP’s monthly review. The article focuses on the historical review of Cai Yuanpei 㭑‫ݳ‬ษ (1868–1940) and only towards the end does it discuss the recent attempts to educate the citizens (gongmin jiaoyu ‫ ≁ ޜ‬ᮉ 㛢 ). Confucianism is portrayed as a source for life wisdom and a teaching that unlike Christianity does not draw its ethics from a transcendent being, but from the hearts and the nature of human beings, which is why Confucianism places a strong emphasis on self-cultivation (Guo 2011). Party issues are even less addressed in an earlier text entitled “The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of the Theory of Confucian SelfCultivation”, which was uploaded onto the same homepage on July 31 2009. The author of this article is Chen Ying 䲣⪋, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the president of the Chinese Association for Ethics. In the article, Chen discusses self-cultivation along with its indispensability, methods, aims and meaning. Self-cultivation is identified as a universal imperative, one that should be followed by all. The author quotes the passage in the Daxue that states that everyone from the son of heaven to the common people should conceive self-cultivation as the root of everything. The article ends emphatically by praising

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Confucian self-cultivation as an “important spiritual resource” 8 for patriotism, collectivism (qunti zhuyi 㗔億ѫ㗙) and socialism. The texts by Guo Qiyong and Chen Ying lack the usually important feudal qualification in the discussion of Confucianism in a Marxist context. The advocated standpoints are not designated as stemming from feudal thinkers. Also, no methodological effort was undertaken to distance the substance of what was advocated from the traditional advocators, for instance, along the lines of the established techniques of “accentuating the positive, eliminating the negative”, “abstract inheritance”, “critical inheritance and synthetic creation”, etc. (cf. Makeham 2008, 242–50). The second way in which Confucianism finds a voice in print and online media is through the texts in Party journals and online Party forums that are written by Party theoreticians in their official capacities, hence emanating from the Party institutional framework itself. The article by Wang Jie ⦻‫ ہ‬and Gu Jianjun 亗ᔪ䓽, both of whom work at the Party school of the CCP’s Central Committee, is a good example of this. In 2009 they published their text in the journal of their home institution and adopted the famous sequence laid out in the Daxue (xiu shen ‫؞‬䓛, qi jia 啺ᇦ, zhi guo ⋫഻, ping tian xia ᒣཙл) with which they established the structure of their discussion. In each section the authors argued that the Daxue basically discusses harmony as the Confucian central theme (they are apparently unimpressed by the fact that he ઼, which is commonly mentioned in the Liji, is not mentioned once in the Daxue). Again, characteristic of similar texts, it is only towards the end that we find the discussion on the views of top leadership (in the case at hand of Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao). The authors conclude with the following: ਟ㾻ˈ݂ᇦ‫؞‬啺⋫ᒣⲴ⋫഻⁑ᔿˈ䘭≲઼䄗Ⲵ↧ਢۣ㎡ሽᯬ⮦Ӻ઼䄗 ⽮ᴳˈ઼䄗ц⭼Ⲵᔪ䁝ˈӽާᴹ䟽㾱Ⲵُ䪂᜿㗙઼⨮ሖ‫ܩ‬٬DŽ One can see that the method to govern a country along the Confucian “selfcultivation, rectification of the family, ordering of the state and bringing peace to all under heaven” principle and the search for a harmonious historical tradition that would establish a contemporary harmonious society and world continues to have significance as an important reference and real value(Wang and Gu 2009, 22).

8

“jingshen de zhongyao ziyuan ㋮⾎Ⲵ䟽㾱䋷Ⓚ”

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It is conspicuous and interesting to note that Wang and Gu mention the feudal character of Confucianism, but abstain from any effort to ease the tension between the positive reference and the negative qualification. This is far from Liu Shaoqi and his intellectually upright conversation between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism. It seems that the feudal qualification has turned from a serious problem into a mere convention with no content. But what does this mean for Confucianism? Perhaps this discovery merely reveals that Marxism-Leninism started to serve as a cover behind which Confucianism is making headway towards being the new ideology that will guide the CCP. This would imply that a really significant Confucian revival is on its way and is just waiting for the time to be right for its final coming out. In my opinion, the ease with which Wang and Gu came to understand that the Daxue is all about harmony leads to a different conclusion. It is a rather odd coincidence that a serious and scholarly reading of the Daxue in 2009 fell elegantly in line with the guiding ideology of the top leadership. Hence, my hunch is that far from substantially engaging with either Confucianism or Marxism-Leninism (let alone with both) these texts draw on superficial accounts in order to please the leadership and advance the pragmatic interests of the Party. I am not saying that there is no substantial discussion on the ideology and the future of the Party and the PRC in Party journals. In fact, I believe the opposite to be true. However, these debates are often more subtle and harder to decode and––most importantly for the concerns of this chapter––rarely (if at all) found in texts focusing on Confucianism.

Xi Jinping, Confucianism and the Chinese Tradition Perhaps matters have changed recently with the rise of Xi Jinping, whose ideological agenda proved to be hard to discern. Basing their news on statements by “three independent sources with ties to the leadership” Reuters’ journalists Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard reported (September 29, 2013) that in his fight against corruption Xi Jinping, the new president, is willing to bestow a special moral role on “China’s ‘traditional cultures’ or faiths––Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism”. In the same report, the reporters also speculated that Xi and his family “have feelings for Buddhism”. This assessment is telling in numerous ways. If true, this speculation would show that the Communist cadre, even top cadre, privately hold beliefs that deviate from their official sceptical stance toward religious or other beliefs. In this perspective, it is interesting that the Party discourse has recently shifted towards a presentation of

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Marxism-Leninism in the vocabulary of faith (cf. Strafella 2015). However, Lim and Blanchard’s assessment is also telling in the instrumentalist use given to Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Their role is to help fight corruption, which has evidently turned out to be the top priority of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang ᵾ‫ݻ‬ᕪ. At the time being it remains unclear whether corruption is fought in order to get rid of an evil with grave social consequences (because of these social consequences or because of the destabilizing affects that challenge the rule of those at the top), or in order to get rid of the unpleasant contenders for the top. David Shambaugh stated: “Mr. Xi’s campaign is turning out to be as much a selective purge as an antigraft campaign” (2015). The instrumentalist character of the so-called embrace of Confucianism by the Party has been confirmed in research literature, particularly in literature written by researchers who study Chinese politics rather than Confucianism (cf. Noesselt 2015). Anne-Marie Brady (2011), for instance, clearly states that the “embrace” is aimed at the social compliance generation and is based on the pragmatic and selective use of certain putatively Confucian concepts (e.g. filial piety, virtue, honesty, trust, ritual) that are deployed in order to convey messages throughout the political system. It appears that the question is not whether we are facing instrumental use, but rather whether this is the entire story. Billioud issued a word of caution and rightly pointed out the fact that “people sympathetic with Confucianism at the Party school obviously do not see their endeavours to promote it as something simply instrumental” (2010, 205). But is there any further evidence for the instrumental use of Confucianism at the top level or should we remain cautious and entertain the possibility of true sympathy for Confucianism? Xi Jinping has been widely praised for his numerous classical references (the Renmin Ribao printed a nice selection in its May 8, 2014 issue), but I believe that by now the contours of Xi Jinping’s take on Confucianism have emerged more clearly, as the Party’s discourse has become dominated by anti-Western polemics (as in Document No. 9), the re-deployment of Marxism-Maoism and the conscious embrace of the Chinese tradition. Of course, in the widely noted speech delivered at the meeting of the International Confucian Association (printed in Renmin Ribao on September 25, 2014) during the celebration of the 2565th birthday of Confucius, Xi had to praise Confucianism, but the most prominent notion in his remarks clearly focused on “China’s traditional culture”9. The most interesting part of Xi’s 9

“Zhongguo chuantong wenhua ѝഭՐ㔏᮷ॆ”

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speech was his characterization of the members of the Communist Party of China as Marxists who are “neither historical nihilists, nor cultural nihilists”10. Even more to the point were Xi’s assertions of “contemporary China as the continuation and development of the China of the past”11, “the ideology and culture of contemporary China as the continuation and sublimation of traditional Chinese ideology and culture” 12 , “the central elements of Chinese ideology and culture having formed the fundamental cultural genes of the nation” 13 , “the Chinese communists as all along faithful inheritors and promoters of the country’s outstanding cultural traditions”14. In the presentation entitled “Weaving Confucianism into the CCP’s Political Discourse––Re-evaluation or Instrumental Use” delivered in October 2014 in Ljubljana, Mugur Zlotea15 from Bucharest University analyzed Xi Jinping’s speech and noted that the president avoided the name of Confucianism whenever he could and was quick to emphasize that Confucianism is but one of many Chinese traditions whenever he could not avoid mentioning it explicitly. Hence, even though newspaper reports presented Xi’s speech as a confirmation of the embrace of Confucianism (writing for example that “clearly, The Analects of Confucius is for Xi’s Chinese Renaissance what The Little Red Book was for Mao’s Cultural Revolution”, see Gardels 2014), a closer look at the speech does not corroborate this conclusion. This finding was also corroborated by Jyrki Kallio’s excellent study (2011) which understands tradition (and history) as a fundamental category used to analyse Chinese politics. Kallio explains the turn to tradition as the Communist Party’s effort “to anchor its right to rule to 10

“bu shi lishi xuwuzhuyi zhe, ye bu shi wenhua xuwuzhuyi zhe нᱟশਢ㲊ᰐѫ ѹ㘵ҏнᱟ᮷ॆ㲊ᰐѫѹ㘵” 11 “dangdai Zhongguo shi lishi Zhongguo de yanxu he fazhan ᖃԓѝഭᱟশਢѝ” ഭⲴᔦ㔝઼ਁኅ” 12 “dangdai Zhongguo sixiang wenhua ye shi Zhongguo chuantong sixiang wenhua de chuancheng he shenghua ᖃԓѝഭᙍᜣ᮷ॆҏᱟѝഭՐ㔏ᙍᜣ᮷ॆⲴՐ᢯ ઼ॷॾ” 13 “zhe xie sixiang wenhua... qizhong zui hexin de neirong yijing chengwei Zhonghua minzu zui jiben de wenhua jiyin 䘉Ӌᙍᜣ᮷ॆĂĂ ަѝᴰṨᗳⲴ޵ ᇩᐢ㓿ᡀѪѝॾ≁᯿ᴰสᵜⲴ᮷ॆสഐ” 14 “Zhongguo gongchandangren shizhong shi Zhongguo youxiu chuantong wenhua de zhongshi jicheng zhe he hongyang zhe ѝഭ‫ޡ‬ӗ‫ފ‬Ӫ࿻㓸ᱟѝഭՈ⿰Ր㔏᮷ ॆⲴᘐᇎ㔗᢯㘵઼ᕈᢜ㘵” 15 See also Chapter 9 in this volume by Mugur Zlotea.

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something more permanent than economic growth” (Kallio 2011, 7) and leaves no doubt as regards the effort being made in taking “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” towards a “Chinese tradition with socialist characteristics” (ibid., 8 and 125). The general thrust of Kallio’s study lies in the sustained argument that it is not guoxue ഻ᆨ (National Learning) that represents the main drive of the Confucian revival, for Confucianism is revived in an attempt to make guoxue and, even more pertinently, Chinese tradition serve an important function in legitimizing the Party’s right to rule (ibid., 125–29). Kallio’s study also features an interesting example for many actors (and agendas) involved in the politicization of the tradition in a section on the Guodian texts (a set of texts on bamboo discovered in 1993) and scholarly attempts to reset the focus from “studying the classics” to “political action”, as suggested by Liang Tao ằ ⏋ (ibid., 111). Whatever the merits of the arguments given by Liang and others, Kallio (2011) points out that the Guodian texts appear at least partly to be “coloured by political instrumentalization” and it is “no wonder, then, that interpreting the texts has become a politicized issue”.

Short Conclusion Sébastien Billioud was probably right when he stated that “this ‘Confucian revival’ is a complex phenomenon, not unrelated to political and economic interests, but not reducible to these dimensions either” (2011, 287). I would add that when you strip it of its political and economic dimensions, what remains is a revival of a tradition and religion as such (cf. Weber, Grano and Hetmanczyk 2015), not unlike what can be witnessed in Buddhism, Daoism or Christianity, but by all accounts on a much smaller comparative scale. Looking at the numbers of the alleged Confucians and at the substance of the purportedly advocated Confucianism is indeed a sobering experience. I believe that a substantial revival of Confucianism that would impact the societal or political realm is merely wishful thinking on behalf of the Confucian scholars and other actors (with or without a political agenda of their own) and non-Confucian scholars who study Confucian scholars and their invention.

Bibliography Billioud, Sébastien. 2010. “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses: The Challenge of Structuring the Confucian Revival in the People’s Republic of China.” Oriens Extremus 49: 201–24.

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—. 2011. “Confucian Revival and the Emergence of ‘Jiaohua Organizations’: A Case Study of the Yidan Xuetang.” Modern China 37 (3): 286–314. Billioud, Sébastien, and Joël Thoraval. 2014. Le Sage et le peuple: Le renouveau confucéen en Chine. Paris: CNRS. Brady, Anne-Marie. 2011. “State Confucianism, Chineseness, and Tradition in CCP Propaganda.” In China’s Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady, 57–75. Abingdon: Routledge. Chen, Ying 䲣⪋. 2009. “Rujia xiushen lilun de neihan yu dangdai yiyi ݂ ᇦ‫؞‬䓛⨶䄆Ⲵ‫⏥ޗ‬㠷⮦ԓ᜿㗙.” Accessed on March 15, 2015. http://www.qstheory.cn/wh/sxdl/200907/t20090731_8161.htm. Confucius 2000. Accessed on March 14, 2015. http://www.confucius2000. com/. Fan, Ruiping. 2011. “Introduction: The Rise of Authentic Confucianism.” In The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, edited by Fan Ruiping, 1–13. Dordrecht: Springer. Gardels, Nathan. 2014. “Xi Launches Cultural Counter-Revolution to Restore Confucianism as China’s Ideology.” The World Post (Huffington Post). Accessed on March 14, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/xi-jinpingconfucianism_b_5897680.html. Guo, Qiyong 䜝啺ࣷ. 2011. “Rujia xiushen cheng de zhi jiao yu dangdai shehui de gongde jianshe ᇦ‫؞‬䓛ᡀᗧѻᮉ㠷⮦ԓ⽮ᴳⲴ‫ޜ‬ᗧᔪ䁝.” Accessed on March 15, 2015. http://www.qstheory.cn/wz/jiangt/201107/ t20110726_97405.htm. Guo Ruxue Wang. 2010. “Zhunzhong Zhonhua wenhua shengdi, tingjian Qufu Yejiao jiatang – Guanyu Qufu jianzao Yejiao dajiaotang de yijian shu ሺ䟽ѝॾ᮷ॆ൓ൠˈ‫ڌ‬ᔪᴢ䱌㙦ᮉᮉา——‫ޣ‬Ҿᴢ䱌ᔪ䙐㙦 ᮉ བྷ ᮉ า Ⲵ ᜿ 㿱 Җ .” Accessed on March 14, 2015. http://www. confuchina.com/05%20zongjiao/qufu%20jidujiaotang%20yijianshu.htm. Jiang, Qing 㪻ᒶ. 2003. Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan ᭯ ⋫ ݂ ᆖ ˖ ᖃ ԓ ݂ ᆖ Ⲵ 䖜 ੁ ǃ ⢩ 䍘 о ਁ ኅ . Beijing: Sanlian. Jiang, Zemin. 2002. On the “Three Represents”. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Kallio, Jyrki. 2011. Tradition in Chinese Politics: The Party-State’s Reinvention of the Past and the Critical Response from Public Intellectuals. FIIA Report 27. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

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Lim, Benjamin Kang, and Ben Blanchard. 2013. “Xi Jinping Hopes Traditional Faiths Can Fill Moral Void in China: Sources.” Reuters Beijing. Accessed on March 15, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article /2013/09/29/us-china-politics-vacuum-idUSBRE98S0GS20130929. Makeham, John. 2008. Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Nivison, David S. 1956. “Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition.” The Journal of Asian Studies 16 (1): 51–74. Noesselt, Nele. 2015. “Relegitimizing the Chinese Party-State: ‘Old’ Sources of Modern Chinese Party Power.” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 69 (1): 213–33. Nylan, Michael. 2010. “A Confusion of Confuciuses: Invoking Kongzi in the Modern World.” In Lives of Confucius, edited by Michael Nylan and Thomas Wilson, 192–246. New York: Doubleday. Pond, Elizabeth. 2012. “Democracy in China: The Popularity of Alexis de Tocqueville in the Middle Kingdom.” Accessed on March 14, 2015. http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/10/12/democracy-chinapopularity-alexis-de-tocqueville-middle-kingdom. Shambaugh, David. 2015. “The Coming Chinese Crack-up.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed on March 15, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/ articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198. Strafella, Giorgio. 2015. “‘Marxism’ as Tradition in CCP Discourse.” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 69 (1): 235–53. Sun, Anna. 2013. Confucianism as a World Religion: Contested Histories and Contemporary Realities. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wang, Jie ⦻‫ہ‬, and Gu Jianjun 亗ᔪ䓽. 2009. “Rujia zhiguo fanglüe dui goujian hexie shehui de qishi ݂ᇦ⋫഻ᯩ⮕ሽΏᔪ઼䄗⽮ᴳⲴஏ⽪.” Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao ѝ‫ޡ‬ѝཞ唘ṑᆨ๡ 13 (2): 19–22. Weber, Ralph. 2011. “Konfuzianische Selbstkultivierung als Philosophem und Politikum.” Polylog: Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren 26: 19–42. —. 2013. “Politik, Konfuzianismus und konfuzianische politische Philosophie in der VR China heute.” Widerspruch – Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56, 61–72 Accessed on March 15 2015. http://warpweftandway.com/2013/01/25/weber-the-politics-ofconfucian-political-philosophy. Weber, Ralph, Simona Grano, and Philipp Hetmanczyk. 2015. “Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and the Politicization of Traditions.” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 69 (1): 157–64.

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Yu, Tianlong. 2008. “The Revival of Confucianism in Chinese Schools: A Historical-Political Review.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 28 (2): 113–29. Zhang, Xianglong ᕐ⾕嗉. 2007. Sixiang binan: quanqiuhua zhong de Zhongguo gudai zheli ᙍᜣ䚯䴓:‫ॆ⨳ޘ‬ѝⲴѝ഻ਔԓଢ⨶. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.

CHAPTER ELEVEN CONTENDING FOR THE TRUTH: CONFUCIANISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY PRC DESSEIN BART

Prelude In “We een Mee-AH-mee Now”, the prologue to his novel Back to Blood (2013), Tom Wolfe evokes how a certain lady called “Mac” drives in “her beloved and ludicrously cramped brand-new Mitsubishi Green Elf hybrid, a chic and morally enlightened vehicle” (Wolfe 2013, 3), to one of “this month’s Miami nightspot of the century, Balzac’s” (ibid., 4). As she drove the car closer to Balzac’s, you could see how ten feet above the restaurant’s entrance was a huge Lexan disc, six feet in diameter and eighteen inches thick, embedded with a bust of Honoré de Balzac “appropriated”––as the artists today call artistic theft––from the famous daguerreotype by the one-name photographer Nadar. Balzac’s eyes had been turned to look straight into the customer’s and his lips had been turned up at the corners to create a big smile, but the “appropriator” was a talented sculptor, and a light from within suffused the enormous slab of Lexan with a golden glow, and tout le monde loved it. (ibid., 4)

At the moment “Mac” wanted to park her car in an empty parking slot, “shock, bewilderment––and bango––their central nervous systems were flooded with … humiliation” (ibid., 16), as a Ferrari 403, with what was most likely a Cuban girl behind the steering wheel, squeezed into the very same parking slot. Once inside the restaurant, Mac started recounting the parking incident and out of nowhere a phrase popped up in Ed’s––her husband’s––head: Everybody…all of them…it’s back to blood! Religion is dying … but everybody still has to believe in something. It would be intolerable––you couldn’t stand it––to finally have to say to yourself, “Why keep

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Chapter Eleven pretending? I’m nothing but a random atom inside a supercollider known as the universe.” But believing in by definition means blindly, irrationally, doesn’t it? So, my people, that leaves only our blood, the bloodlines that course through our very bodies, to unite us. “La Raza!” as the Puerto Ricans cry out. “The Race!” cries the whole world. All people, all people everywhere, have but one last thing on their minds––“Back to blood” All people, everywhere, you have no choice but––Back to blood! (Wolfe 2013, 22)

Iconoclastic Nationalism and the Creation of a MarxistLeninist “All Under Heaven” It has been repeatedly stated that the decline of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) that became apparent in the second half of the nineteenth century was a unique experience in the sense that––contrary to other occurrences of Chinese dynastic decline––this occurred at the time Europeans became more present in Asia. It is generally accepted that this led to a profound self-doubting cultural criticism, (see, e.g., Jansen 2009, 402) and that with the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the perceived contrast between the stagnating Chinese culture and the advancing European culture set in the phase of “iconoclastic nationalism”, i.e., a type of political nationalism that “is galvanized by a drive for a strong, sovereign state, national salvation and modernity, capitalist or socialist, at the sacrifice of cultural traditions”1(Guo 2004, 17). The political nationalism herein differs fundamentally from the cultural nationalism that is identified by the “national spirit” or “national essence”2 that aims to maintain the nation in the cultural sense (see Hutchington 1987, 122–23). As China’s “national essence” was equated with Confucianism, political nationalists blamed Confucianism for everything that had gone wrong in the country since the May Fourth Movement onwards; they also saw Confucianism as a stumbling block on the path to establishing a modern nation-state. On the other hand, due to the fact that the traditional institutions to which the conservative Chinese intellectuals owed their position in society were on the verge of being overturned by the end of the Qing dynasty, these intellectuals faced a possible loss of the status they enjoyed as the incarnations of the political institutions and social organization ever since the Song dynasty and Zhang Zai ᕥ䔹 (1020–1077) (see de Bary 1975, 3). 1

The emphasis is that of the author (B.D.). The conviction that one belongs to a distinctive civilization which, in itself, is a unique historical and cultural product. (see Guo 2004, 18)

2

Contending for the Truth: Confucianism in the Contemporary PRC

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Such an imminent and fundamental rupture with tradition may help to explain why, as noted by Tze-ki Hon (2014, 31), this period is characterized by the existence of two parallel types of Confucianism: the so-called “state Confucianism” (guoxue ഻ᆨ) and “radical Confucianism” (junxue ੋᆨ), which at this instance appeared to be stronger than in other instants of dynastic decline throughout the imperial period. While “state Confucianism” is used by the government to legitimize its rule and perpetuate its domination, “radical Confucianism” is a moral teaching that is critical of political and social injustice. The analysis of the publications by these “radical Confucians” in the late Qing journal Guocui xuebao ഻ ㋩ᆨ๡ (Journal of National Essence) and the Minbao ≁๡ (The People’s Tribute) reveals a strong belief in a revolution in China that would take place through the return of what they considered to be the essence of Chinese civilization, rather than through overthrowing China’s cultural heritage. According to the radical Confucians China’s “renaissance” consists of the return to the pre-Qin times, which were characterized by the philosophical debate that was not controlled by the government and the dissemination of knowledge to all men of letters. If we were to draw parallels with European history, we could say that they saw the Zhou period as the golden age of Chinese history, and the period from the unification onwards (in the Qin period) as the “dark age”, essentially characterized by authoritarian government. They claimed that the authoritarianism and centralization of the imperial power accelerated due to the domination of foreign ethnic groups such as the Mongols and the Manchus. At the end of the Qing dynasty radical Confucians reinterpreted the ancient classics so that they challenged the legitimacy of the Manchu government and the monarchical system.3

3

This contempt for the non-Chinese rule is clear from the “Gujin zhengtong dalun” ਔӺ↓㎡བྷ䄆 (“Great Discussion on True Rulership from the Earliest Times to the Present”), an essay attributed to Zheng Sixiao 䝝ᙍ㛆 (1241–1318) and contained in the Xin shi ᗳਢ (History of the Heart) in which the author described the Mongolian rule over China. He claimed that the barbarians (i.e. Mongols) did not even belong to the human race (renlei Ӫ于) as they resemble dogs and sheep. According to the essay this was also the reason why they “were excluded from true rulership and, therefore, did not belong to the Middle Kingdom”. True leadership, according to Zhang Sixiao, only applies to the rule of the legendary Emperor Shun, the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties, or the Han and the Song dynasties. Zheng Sixiao believed that the Tang rule is “worthy of China”, as the Tang rulers descended from Chinese/Xianbei/Turkic aristocracy from

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After the imperial Confucian examination system had––in accordance with the stipulations of the 1901 “Boxer Protocol”––been suspended for five years (a measure of retaliation for the collaboration of the Chinese gentry in the Boxer Uprising, see Ebrey 2006, 230) its final abolition in 1905 resulted in both, the radical and state Confucians, losing an important instrument for developing and disseminating their ideas, and the course of history rendered their further efforts futile. Further developments in world history gave room to the more radical revolutionaries and the communist alternative that rose from within the May Fourth Movement. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that was established in Shanghai in 1921 complemented the political nationalists’ claim that in order for China to become a modern national state it was necessary to forget about the Confucian past and replace it with the Marxist-Leninist ideological alternative. With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, these radical revolutionaries came to power which led to two decades of “iconoclastic nationalism”, culminating in the Cultural Revolution.4 During the first decade of the PRC, mass campaigns replaced the concept of a unified Confucian state that existed on the territory of the former Qing dynasty with a unified Marxist-Leninist nation-state. As a result, the traditional Confucians no longer incarnated the Chinese “cultural nation”, for they were replaced by the CCP and its leaders as representatives of the Marxist-Leninist ideology who enforced the new Chinese “political nation”.5 Contrary to the generally accepted belief that the establishment of the PRC and the CCP government as the heir of imperial rulership represented a fundamental rupture with traditional Confucianism and a complete Northwest China. (see Göller and Mittag 2008, 78–84) For an overview of the appreciation of foreign rulership in China see Dessein (2015). 4 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was, among others, politically vented in the “Pi Lin, pi Kong” ᢩᢩ᷇ᆄ (Criticize Lin (Biao), criticize Confucius) campaign of 1971–1973. 5 At the Fourth Session of the First People’s Congress (26 June–15 July 1957) Zhou Enlai ઘᚙֶ (1898–1976) listed the five campaigns that helped establish communist power in China: the land reform campaign ended feudalism; the campaign “Resist America, Support Korea” (Kang Mei, yuan Chao ᣇ㖾ᨤᵍ) diminished Western influence in China; the campaign to repress contrarevolutionaries broke the opposition against the CCP; the campaign for thought reform won over the intellectuals for the CCP; and the “Five Anti” (Wu fan ӄ৽ ) campaign eliminated the bourgeoisie. (see Meissner 1990, 27)

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replacement of Confucian concepts with Marxist-Leninist concepts, it can equally be argued that the introduction of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy infused the traditional Confucian concept “All-Under-Heaven” (tianxia ཙ л ) with a new homeland and a new international meaning. For the homeland, the Marxist-Leninist “All-Under-Heaven” consisted of the unification of all Chinese citizens in a multi-ethnic classless nation-state through the class struggle, while the post World War II installation of Marxist-Leninist regimes in different countries also showed the international potential of this ideology––much in the same way that Confucianism determined the culture of other East and Southeast Asian countries. Just as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed that: Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.6 (Marx and Engels 2009, 17),

a statement that entails a classless world vision, in 1920 Chen Duxiu 䱸⤜⿰ (1880–1942), one of the founders of the CCP, stated that he recognized the existence of only two nations: that of the capitalists and that of the workers (...) At present, the “nation” of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union; everywhere else we have the “nation” of the capitalists. (Chen in Schwartz 1968, 28; see also Dessein 2012)

The conviction that class struggle was the instrument that should be used to unite the “All-Under-Heaven” homeland undoubtedly had its roots in the perceived failure of the Manchus to maintain the unity of their multi-ethnic empire. After the Manchus came to power, they gradually expanded the territory over which they held jurisdiction, and ended up ruling a country that included the domains of the former Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and a part of Muslim Central Asia. As the Manchu rulers could not claim hereditary descent from the Han culture,7 they therefore accentuated the Confucian concept “virtue” (de ᗧ) understood as the harmonious co-existence of different ethnic 6

Vladimir I. Lenin (1999, 19) also believed that “every revolution, through the destruction of the state apparatus, shows us the naked class struggle”. 7 This explains the activities of the anti-Manchu rebellious groups who claimed descent from the Ming Dynasty or even the earlier Song royal house.

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groups in their empire (see Harrison 2001, 36–38). In practice, this meant that they chose to rule the different ethnic domains of their empire through different native elites, i.e. by giving them a certain degree of autonomy and allowing them to uphold their different traditions. As the Manchus managed to successfully maintain harmony (hexie ઼䉀) during the larger part of the first centuries of the Qing dynasty, the original suspicion with which former Ming intellectuals regarded the Manchu government faded. However, with the nineteenth century the relative decline of Manchu power led to the disintegration of their “All-Under-Heaven”. Han intellectuals not only blamed this on their Manchu descent, but also on their (ethnically inspired) policies of ethnic diversity. As a result, not only Confucianism but also ethnic diversity became suspicious for the revolutionaries. This gave room for the CCP to bring in a new concept that would help create national harmony: class struggle.8 What is, with respect to the international dimension of the Confucian rule of even greater importance, is that as a result of the accentuation of Confucian values by the Manchu government the Qing dynasty Confucian scholars believed in the “universal potential” of Chinese Confucian culture. Their belief was additionally supported by statements such as the one by the Yongzheng ≨↓ Emperor (r. 1723–1736) on the twelfth day of the ninth month of 1729 when he stated that the fact that his empire surpassed all previous empires showed that the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming ཙભ) belongs to the one with the highest (Confucian) virtue (de), regardless of his ethnic descent.9 Under the Qianlong Ү䲶 Emperor (r. 1736–1796), the Yongzheng Emperor’s successor to the throne, the idea of the “universalizing” capacity of Confucian culture flourished. This is clearly visible from the following imperial edict, issued on the first day of the sixth month of 1751: After our dynasty united the empire, all non-Chinese peoples (miaoyi 㤇ཧ ) of all the regions of the world (quyu ४ᆷ) within and without (the national borders) proclaimed their connection (with our ruling house), and 8

For obvious reasons, some New Confucians see class struggle to be intrinsically incompatible with Confucian harmony. (see Guo 2004, 78) 9 The Yongzheng Emperor referred to Shun and King Wen of the Zhou dynasty who were also of non-Chinese descent. (see Göller and Mittag 2008, 98) During the Tang dynasty, Buddhists argued that according to the Shiji ਢ䁈 (Records of the Historian), the mythical cultural hero Fuxi had an animal body and a human head, and that the founders of the Xia and Zhou dynasties were born among the Qiang. (see Abramson 2008, 76–77)

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addressed themselves (to it), so as to become subjects to its transformative influence (shucheng xianghua 䗃䈊ੁॆ )10 (Göller and Mittag 2008, 100).

The conviction that the “transformative influence” of Confucian culture has the ability to “civilize” the barbarians and unify “All-UnderHeaven”, is also evident from the Qing scholar Zhang Xuecheng’s ㄐᆨ䃐 (1738–1801) Yuan Dao ৏ 䚃 (Original Dao). According to Zhang Xuecheng, all people have, at any moment, the possibility to “civilize” themselves, i.e. to become “Chinese”. He claimed that the Chinese/barbarian dichotomy that had been dominant in earlier political philosophy had therefore become obsolete (ibid., 105–11). The Huang-Qing zhigong tu ⲷ ␵㚧䋒െ (Pictures from the Office of Receiving Tribute under the Qing Dynasty), a work completed in 1757, suggested that even Europe could become a part of “All-Under-Heaven”, which clearly shows the extent of this “universalizing” interpretation of Confucianism. In the same way as the perceived unifying qualities of Confucianism were replaced by the perceived unifying qualities of Marxism-Leninism, at which the ethnic criterion was exchanged for the sociological criterion, the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism in the post-war world could be perceived as an intrinsic quality of this new ideology. This interpretation is clearly visible in Zhou Enlai’s ઘᚙֶ claim that “socialist patriotism is not narrow nationalism, but patriotism aimed at strengthening national pride under the guidance of internationalism” (Chen 2005, 41)––a claim reminiscent of the differentiation between “small nationalism” (xiao minzu zhuyi ሿ≁᯿ѫ㗙 ) and “large nationalism” (da minzu zhuyiབྷ≁᯿ѫ㗙) that was set by Liang Qichao ằஏ䎵 (1873–1929) in the beginning of the twentieth century, in his attempt to strive for “large nationalism”. In his theory “small nationalism” was represented by the sentiment of the Han people towards other ethnicities within the borders of the former Qing empire (guonei ഻‫)ޗ‬, while “large nationalism” referred to the sentiments of all people towards all people outside the borders of the former Qing empire (guowai ഻ཆ) (Liang 1983, 75; see also Schneider 2012, 66–67). In practical terms, the international dimension of the Marxist-Leninist “All-Under-Heaven” could be seen in the Chinese/Soviet Union rivalry for the leadership of the communist world.11 10

The emphasis is that of the author (B.D.). Mao Zedong’s ∋◔ᶡ (1893–1976) proposition to create a Chinese version of socialist internationalism once China broke away from the Soviet Union in 1959, as well as the country’s attempt to formulate its own “world policies” by

11

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Reviving Confucianism The endeavour to establish a modern nation-state on the territory of the former Qing dynasty, under nationalist and communist rule, has not only proven to be an arduous undertaking, but has also given the Chinese people lots of hardship. In the contemporary period, it has also bereft many Chinese of the feeling of security they had before the reforms took place. Capitalist economic developments of the post-Mao era have increased the wealth gap between various social groups in Chinese society and social protest is becoming increasingly vocal. 12 Moreover, ethnic tensions that have continued to determine China’s homeland policies have made it impossible for the Marxist class-struggle to unify all people living on the territory of the former Qing Empire into a single nation-state. As a result, the ruling CCP’s traditional nationalist and socialist legitimacy base is being increasingly challenged. It is in these circumstances––the question of the nature and the desirability of secularized modernity––that contemporary China witnesses the revival of Confucian thought. Indeed, as Catarina Kinvall (2004, 744) noticed, in times of insecurity “going back to an imagined past by using reconstructed symbols and cultural reference points” can be seen as a viable alternative, especially in societies that have become secularized. Such societies can become characterized by the search for ideologies that are linked to faiths that can help negotiate the world one lives in (Kinvall

establishing a united front of anti-imperialist powers (started in 1963) thus isolating both, the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies, is a clear indication that China regarded the Soviet Union as a competitor for the leadership of the communist “All-Under-Heaven”. (see Chen 2005, 43; see also Näth 1975, 259–68 for China’s attempts to question the Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and the international communist movement, and its attempts to isolate the Soviet Union wherever possible; and Näth (1975, 284) for Zhou Enlai’s focus on the conflict with the United States in the 1968–1971 period.) Chinese foreign policy was characterized by its fierce anti Soviet stance, which merely increased after Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. (see Näth 1975, 307) 12 In a recent analysis of letters and songs posted on blogs by migrant workers Florence (2013) remarked that their claims to enjoy basic rights are increasingly turning into demands aimed at the government to live up to its own legislation: to provide people with minimum social and economic wellbeing and not allow for them to be subjected to exploitative labor. These blogs also reveal an increasing willingness to join forces in order to get these basic rights respected.

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2004, 759). 13 Similar to the radical Confucians of the early twentieth century who acted against the state Confucians as well as against the Manchu government, some of the New Confucians of the contemporary era are trying to revive the “genuine” form of Confucianism as an alternative to the CCP rule. In the continuation, some attention will be devoted to the thoughts of Jiang Qing 㪻ᒶ (1953–) and Zhao Tingyang 䎥≰䱣 (1961–), two New Confucian thinkers who stood up for their homeland.

Jiang Qing’s Return to Cultural Essence Jiang Qing’s concept of “Constitutional Confucianism” is symptomatic of how the critique of secularized modernity enables and conditions the rise of New Confucianism. This term entails that Jiang Qing, an academic who left his post in order to establish his own academy based on Confucian academies in the Song and Ming dynasties, 14 (Weber 2013) does not criticize “the West” as such, for he accepts certain forms of “constitutionalism”, but merely criticizes certain aspects of (Western) “modernity”. 15 Illustrative of the fact that societies that have become secularized are more likely to return to traditional faiths as these can be seen as an alternative for the perceived moral degeneration, Jiang Qing presented Confucianism as the means to cure man from his loss of morality, which he claims is the natural outcome of the division of “church and state” in Western liberal democracies (Jiang 2013, 182–84, 187). This conviction explains why his “Constitutional Confucianism”, although an essentially secular term, actually provides the contemporary intellectual 13

As Tu Wei-ming (1994, 30) observed, traditional intellectuals who saw themselves as guardians of national traditions and transmitters of the national culture and who, through this, assumed the central role of defining the meaning of being Chinese, referred to symbolic resources. 14 See Note no.7. 15 New Confucianism is not merely an endeavor to revalue Confucianism in opposition to Western ideologies, or a (chrono)logical continuation of so-called Neo-Confucianism. Numerous New Confucian thinkers, as well as many interpreters of the New Confucian movement, both in China and the West, emphasized the continuity of New Confucianism and Song-Ming NeoConfucianism. However, because of its different, entirely modern context, New Confucianism, the beginnings of which can be traced back to the early Republican period, has already become a distinct phenomenon in China’s intellectual history and should therefore not be identified simply with earlier, pre-modern schools of thinking. (With thanks to Christian Uhl for this insight)

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debate with a profoundly “religious” interpretation of the traditional “AllUnder-Heaven” concept. 16 Jiang Qing does not attempt to defend a constitutional government, but believes that the rule should be implemented through the “kingly way” (wangdao ⦻䚃), a concept that David Elstein (2011, 396) argues is not necessarily related to a (constitutional) monarchy in the Western sense (see Jiang 2004, 162; Elstein 2011, 396).17 Jiang Qing considers the “kingly way” to be a form of government that accentuates “rule through virtue” (dezhi ᗧ⋫), a term reminiscent of the Qing dynasty’s claim of rule through virtue (de) that hints at the attempt to “modernize” Confucian imperial rule. It is therefore interesting that similar to the Confucian political reformer Kang Youwei ᓧᴹ⛪ (1858–1927), Jiang Qing also based his political theory on the New Text School (Xinwen jia ᯠ᮷ᇦ) Gongyang zhuan ‫ޜ‬㖺ۣ, which is not even close to the earliest formulation of the Confucian doctrine (Chan 2013, 107). Kang Youwei’s political vision was an attempt to bring the Confucian emperor into the constitutional system, a political reform that does not place him among the radical Confucians. Using the Gongyang zhuan also allows Jiang Qing to connect the “kingly way” of rulership with the traditional Confucian concept of unity of the three realms of Heaven, Man, and Earth (see Jiang 2004, 293). With this trinity, Jiang Qing establishes a three-fold legitimacy: that of sacred values, popular will, and historical-cultural tradition. In line with his conviction that the contemporary period is characterized by a moral decline, the choice of the Gongyang zhuan may have been further inspired by his need for a hierarchical system in which a “Transcendental Heaven” stands above the traditional Confucian trinity of Heaven, Earth and Man. The acceptance of a “Transcendental Heaven”, a concept that was undoubtedly taken from the Christian belief from which he drew inspiration at one point of his life, transforms Confucianism and his Constitutional Confucianism into a transcendental system (Jiang 2013, 3, 16

This religious interpretation of Confucianism can also be seen in his work Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi ⭏ભؑԠ㠷⦻䚃᭯⋫(Living Faith and the Kingly Way of Politics), published by Yangzhengtang wenhua, Taiwan, 2004 (see also Elstein 2011, 395). 17 This also explains why Jiang Qing praises his fellow New Confucians for trying to formulate an alternative for Western political theories and institutions, while at the same time criticizing them––and especially Mou Zongsan ⢏ᇇй––for not resolutely opting for the “kingly way”. As shown by Ady Van den Stock (2014, 154–64), Mou Zongsan’s critique of Chinese communism is a critique of modernity in general, as communism is in fact state capitalism.

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118–19, 122, 135). 18 This hierarchical structure which is dominated by “Transcendental Heaven” implies that man mirrors himself on a “sacred” institution, comparable to a “church”, and depends on this institution to guide his moral conduct.19 According to Jiang Qing this also explains why “values act as law”: the basic purpose of “Constitutional Confucianism” is not to protect rights, but to implement morality. In order to implement “Constitutional Confucianism”, three sine qua non conditions are formulated: 1) Confucianism should be restored in full in China; 2) Confucian scholars should be trained; and 3) Confucianism should be integrated into the Chinese constitution. In this respect we should point out that the “Confucian” Gongyang zhuan is not merely not the earliest formulation of the Confucian doctrine, but that it was also heavily influenced by non-Confucian ideas. The use of this text therefore provides the opportunity for Jiang Qing to introduce the concept of “moral change” (jiaohua ᮉॆ) as an attribute of the “kingly way” (ibid., 182–84, 187). It does not need to be stressed that this concept is reminiscent of the concept of the Confucian “transformative power” that developed during the late empire. In Jiang Qing’s “Constitutional Confucianism”, “Transcendental Heaven”, “Heaven”, “Man”, and “Earth” all represent “Symbolic Powers”. Each of these “Symbolic Powers” has a homologous political institution. In this sense “Constitutional Confucianism” has the potential to overcome the church-state division that characterizes liberal democracies. Faithful to his Confucian conviction, the secular “Academy” that is composed of Confucian scholars/officials who supervise all government bodies, organise Confucian examinations and ensure that all people in all state institutions have the basic qualifications for governing, train parliamentarians for the “House of Ru”, or the House of Confucian Tradition (tongru yuan 䙊݂䲒), etc., is presented as secular homologue to his “Transcendental Heaven”. 20 Another important task that the 18 As remarked by Li Chenyang (2013, 136), the idea that the concept of “Transcendental Heaven” was derived from Christian inspiration is additionally corroborated by the fact that the harmonious connection between Heaven, Earth, and Man does not imply that these three are on equal footing: there is an ascending hierarchical order, culminating in “Heaven”. For the Christian inspiration of Jiang Qing: see Jiang (2013, 3, 118–19, 122, 135). 19 This idea is similar to the concept of Confucianism as a “civil religion” as defined by Hubert Seiwert (1994). 20 The fact that the “House of Ru” was inspired by the Confucian scholars/officials of old, but––as stated by Ralph Weber (2013) who refers to Chen (2011, 208)––

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“Academy” has is to uphold religion, i.e., Confucianism as “the only term that can apply to the specificity of China’s civilization and culture” (Jiang 2013, 47). In short, the “Academy” is the secular incarnation of the “transcendental Confucian values” and the watchdog of Confucian morality. Philosophical Concepts

Political Arrangements

Symbolic Power

Hereditary king

Transcendental Heaven

Academy

Heaven

House of Ru

Man

House of the People

Earth

House of the Nation

Table 11-1: Philosophical concepts and their political arrangements. (Jiang 2013)

The other three elements of “Symbolic Power”, i.e. the elements of cultural essence, are Heaven, Man, and Earth. Homologous with these three, a tricameral system has been developed. The “House of Ru” represents the “Heaven” of the Confucian holistic world, the “House of the People” (shumin yuan ᓦ≁䲒) represents “Man”, and the “House of the Nation” or “House of National Essence” (guoti yuan ഻億䲒), represents “Earth”. The “House of the Nation” or “House of National Essence” further represents “cultural legitimization”, while the “House of the People” represents “legitimization by the people”. It is clear that with the “House of the Nation” the concept of China as a “cultural nation” as opposed to a modern “political nation” has been reintroduced, for cultural nationalism relies on the national essence (see Guo 2004, 17). In line with Han Confucianism, Jiang Qing accepts that it is the harmonious connection between Heaven, Earth, and Man that determines whether or not the people, represented by the “House of the People”, will obey the political authorities. As he sees the continuation of power as a product of

apparently also by “Islamic theocratic institutions in contemporary Iran” further adds to the religious dimension of Jiang Qing’s “Constitutional Confucianism”.

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popular approval, his vision does not differ from what had been previously claimed by Mencius. In Mengzi, book VII, part II, chapter 14, he wrote: The people are the most important element (in a nation); the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest. Therefore to gain the peasantry is the way to become sovereign; to gain the sovereign is the way to become a prince of a State; to gain the prince of a State is the way to become a great officer.21

Leadership of the “House of Ru” rests with a Confucian scholar, and membership is determined through recommendation and nomination by scholars who have been examined in the Four Books and the Five Classics (Si shu, Wu jing ഋ ᴨ ӄ ㏃ ). By applying Western style democratic methods membership in the “House of the People” is approved from within the group of candidates selected through hereditary criteria and assignment. The leader of the “House of the People” has to be a direct descendent of Confucius. The leader also selects the members of the “House of the Nation” from the descendants of rulers, famous people, patriots, professors of Chinese history, diplomats, judges, …, and representatives of Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, Islam, … The latter contains an obvious reintroduction of the “All-Under-Heaven” concept that unites “All-Under-Heaven” under one central, Confucian leadership. This is echoed in his opinion that “All-Under-Heaven” encompasses the Qing empire, but with Han culture, and, therefore, with Confucianism as the dominant ideology, (Jiang 2013, 222, note 9); a concept that he justifies with the claim that “all Chinese carry the blood of the Yellow Emperor” (ibid., 224, note 25). Finally, the top-down organization of the tricameral system is corroborated by the introduction of the “hereditary king” who is the incarnation of history and political authority, and who represents the “symbolic power”.22

21

Translation by Legge (1970, 483–84). In this respect Guo (2004, 18) remarks that “What is central to cultural nationalism is the creation of a mode of ‘national’ communication and socialization, in which ethnic values, myths and memories become the basis of the national community, and substantiate and crystallize the idea of an ethnic nation in the minds of the members of the community by ‘creating a widespread awareness of myths, history, and linguistic traditions of the community’.” (see also Smith 1991) 22

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Zhao Tingyang’s New Worldness In contradistinction to Jiang Qing, Zhao Tingyang provides a secularized interpretation of “tianxia”. The meaning of this for the Chinese homeland is evident from his claim that What is considered evidence in the Chinese way is not always based on statistics, a democratic election, but rather (…) on the obvious fact that people autonomously choose to follow and pledge their allegiance, instead of voting for one of several dubious politicians (Zhao 2006, 30).

He claims, that it is the unspoken theory (…) that most people do not really know what is best for them, but that the elite do, so the elite ought genuinely to decide for the people (ibid., 31).

Or, as he further claims, “modernization is exactly the China dream of democratic choice. It is a paradoxical dream of the revival of China by devaluation of China” (ibid., 3). We can see that Zhao Tingyang’s New Confucianism is characterized by the dilemma between a merely “spiritual” and practically weak, and a “political” but practically powerful Confucianism. Prasenjit Duara (1993, 787) described the “universalizing” character of Confucianism as the idea that Confucianism can transform “barbarians”, i.e. those who are “not yet” Chinese, into “Chinese” through a process of education and emulation, as a result of which they would become part of the cultured “All-Under-Heaven”. Furthermore, as Chinese “identity” can exist only in opposition to non-Chinese identities, the non-Chinese “other” naturally becomes the “supplement” to the self. 23 This implies that this “Chinese”––“not yet (fully) Chinese” dichotomy entails an expansionist claim within a Confucian world-view. Now that the Chinese economic and political successes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have boosted Chinese self-esteem, the revaluation of Confucianism has spilled over into the New Confucian thinking on China’s role in the world. This explains why the early twenty-first century has seen the creation of the “China model” (Zhongguo moshi ѝ ഻ ⁑ ᔿ ) and has, once again, projected China as a possible model to be emulated (see Ramo 2004). This

23 “The supplement embeds the paradox of being separate from, yet necessary to the completion of, a phenomenon” (Duara 1993, 788).

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aspect is echoed in the new interpretation of “All-Under-Heaven” as an alternative to the Westphalian world system (see Callahan 2008, 750, 752– 53, 759). That the concerns of the New Confucian intellectuals are not restricted merely to China, but also have global aspirations, can be clearly seen in the new interpretation of “All-Under-Heaven” proposed by Zhao Tingyang who, in contradistinction to Jiang Qing’s “national” interpretation of “tianxia”, provides us with an “international” interpretation of the same concept. Zhao Tingyang reformulates the political role model of China by stipulating that the “All-Under-Heaven” theory is the best philosophy for world governance as it contains the ideal of a perfect empire (Zhao 2006, 29). For this, he returns to the “All-Under-Heaven” concept as it was understood in Zhou times––i.e. prior to the unification of China under the Qin dynasty, a period eulogized by the early twentieth century radical Confucians. In contrast to the United Nations who have “taken Oneness as a mission of western modernity to be accomplished”, and who see “states” as subordinate units within this framework (ibid., 30; see also Zhao 2013, 2), Zhao Tingyang believes that the “modern” “tianxia” concept will not foster oneness, but diversity, i.e., it is not an international theory but a theory of worldness (Zhao 2006, 36–37; see also Zhao 2012, 52–53). In the same way as the chapter “Daxue” བྷᆨ (“The Great Learning”) in Liji ⿞䁈 saw the hierarchical order of the moral example starting with the cultivation of oneself, and extending across the family and the state to “All-Under-Heaven”, and the hierarchical political order in the reverse order, Zhao Tingyang believes that the governing of the global world should run so that the world’s effective political order must progress from All-Under-Heaven, to state, to families, so as to ensure universal consistency and transitivity in political life (…) while an ethical order progresses from families, to states, to All-Under-Heaven, so as to ensure ethical consistency and transitivity (Zhao 2006, 32).

Contending for the Truth The return to Confucian values has not been restricted to the academic milieu, but has also informed contemporary CCP rhetoric, as can be seen from President Xi Jinping’s speech, held at the Confucian Research Institute in Qufu in May 2014:

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That I came here, to Qufu, to the Confucian Research Institute, embodies the fact that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party enhances traditional culture (…) The Confucius Research Institute (…) embodies the devotion (zhongshi 䟽㿶) of the Party and the State. (…) Numerous Confucianist viewpoints represent a great contribution to the intellectual treasure house of mankind, for they offered many fundamental concepts of which some happen to be shared by the thoughts of other countries, while others––such as “humaneness” (ren ӱ) and “do not do to others what you do not wish others would do to you” (ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren ᐡᡰнⅢ ˈयᯭҾӪ) are unique. (…) We should not cut off history. We should summarize and take on the precious heritage from Confucius to Sun Zhongshan. (…) Comrade Mao Zedong used numerous quotations from Confucius and Confucian ideas in his speeches. (…) I also use a lot of ideas coined by Confucius in my speeches (…) Now we can see the value of Confucian thought much clearer. (…) In order to bring China’s case to a favourable end, it is necessary for us to be in accordance with the method of China’s national conditions (Zhongguo guoqing ѝഭ ഭᛵ).24 (Xi 2014)

History teaches us that Confucianism does not offer the instruments to alleviate the problems of farmers (and industrial workers). The return to Confucianism does not seem to be a viable solution for the growing middle class that is embraced by the CCP––as Timothy Beardson (2013, 260) stated: “Many Chinese respect the past but yearn for the modern.”––I would therefore claim that the use of Confucian rhetoric by the CCP is not a genuine Confucian revival, but a deliberate attempt by the government to fuse lingering popular sentiments and a longing for “golden pre-MarxistLeninist times” with its official nationalist and patriotic rhetoric (see also Chen 2005, 51). As stated by Ralph Weber: If the revival of Confucianism in the PRC were only about a sort of cultural renaissance, about finding an identity in an age of globalization, then there perhaps would not be a problem at all. But where there is culture and identity, there is often also culture politics and identity politics. And where these are, other Realpolitik is not far. And indeed, the Confucian revival, which can be traced back to the late 1970s, is about such politics, too. (Weber 2013)

Seen from this perspective, the faltering of the Marxist-Leninist system that was supposed to replace Confucian values once and for all, has created the ideological context that the CCP uses to promote randomly 24

Translated by the author.

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selected Confucian values that are thought to have the ability to enhance the cohesion of the nation-state––or, in contemporary terms, as Fu Ying, spokeswoman for the National People’s Congress, explained: “political reform is ‘the self-improvement and development of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics’. Or, to put it differently, it is about strengthening the party rule, not diluting it.” (Banyan 2013, 54) This also echoes the cultural nationalist tone of Kang Xiaoguang, once an advisor to former Premier Zhu Rongji, who stated: So in the next 20 to 50 years, Confucianism will fight a decisive battle with Western culture. This will be a life-and-death struggle since it concerns the future of the Chinese nation. And I firmly believe that democracy will doom China’s future while Confucianism or Confucianization best suits the interest of the Chinese nation. This is a basic view of mine. “…the hegemony of Confucian culture must first be established”, “One needs to realize that it will take long and arduous efforts for Confucianism to defeat the West.” (Kang 2006, 113–14)

Conclusion Mao Zedong claimed that after “the success of the Russian Revolution led the Chinese to find Marxism as the universal truth,” (Mao 1991, 1470) the faltering Marxist-Leninist ideology and the ensuing ideological contest between remaining Confucian sentiments, universal hopes for a fair society, and the growing longing for mythological “golden times”, are now giving room to a deliberate and orchestrated use of symbols from the past that are presented as illustrations of “Chinese revival”. Given that “by the natural workings of the law of inertia of great masses, the majority of the people will always take very good care of the traditional elements which are dear to them”, and that it is, “therefore, gratuitous and absolutely unnecessary that the thinkers and leaders of a nation should worry about traditional values being lost,” (Walker 1967, 138) Western liberal democracy should not form a threat to traditional Confucian values that are dear to the people. As the majority of people are, by definition, conservative and as Confucian values have never completely disappeared, the CCP’s deliberate use of Confucian symbols may lead to the competition between Marxist-Leninist and Confucian ideals for truth. In this sense, the CCP may prove itself to be the “chic and morally enlightened vehicle” that drives the Chinese people through (state) capitalist Miami, and races

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towards a demoralized Confucianism that, therefore, is like Balzac stripped of any literary and true cultural value and has lost its true purpose and meaning. Confucianism may thus squeeze itself into the depleted Marxist-Leninist parking slot.

Coda In January 2011, a ten meter bronze statue of Confucius was erected on Tian’anmen Square (Zhu 2011). In April 2011, it was removed again––as it was inappropriate (for the time being)––which revealed the government’s struggle with its cultural and political nationalist legacy. I would like to conclude with the final sentences of Tom Wolfe’s Back to Blood: “Well, I have some good news. The Chief gave me my badge and my revolver back. I’m reinstated; I’m a real cop again.” “Oh, my God, Nestor! That’s … so … wonderful!” said Ghislaine. (Wolfe 2013, 704)

It seems Back to Blood may have quite a lot to do with the topic of this paper.

Bibliography Abramson, Marc S. 2008. Ethnic Identity in Tang China. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Banyan. 2013. “The Old Regime and the Revolution. Why Some think China Is Approaching a Political Tipping Point.” The Economist March 16. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://www.economist. com/news/china/21573546-why-some-think-china-approachingpolitical-tipping-point-old-regime-and-revolution. Beardson, Timothy. 2013. Stumbling Giant. The Threats to China’s Future. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Callahan, Willliam A. 2008. “Chinese Visions of World Order: Posthegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review 10 (4): 749–61. Chan, Joseph. 2013. “On the Legitimacy of Confucian Constitutionalism.” In A Confucian Constitutional Order. How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, edited by Jiang, Qing with Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan, 99–112. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

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Chen, Albert H. C. 2011. “Three Political Confucianisms and Half a Century.” In The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, edited by Fan Ruiping, 205–24. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture 20. Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer Dordrecht. Chen, Zhimin. 2005. “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (42): 35–53. de Bary, Wm. Theodore et al. 1975. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Dessein, Bart. 2012. “Nieuw confucianisme en het ‘Mandaat van de Hemel’.” Mededelingen der Zittingen van de Koninklijke Aademie voor Overzeese Wetenschappen = Bulletin des Séances de l’Academie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-mer 58 (2–4): 261–78. —. 2015. “Historical Narrative, Remembrance, and the Ordering of the World: A Historical Assessment of China’s International Relations.” In China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order?, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick and JörnCarsten Gottwald, 22–37. New York: Routledge. Duara, Prasenjit. 1993. “Provincial Narratives of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in Republican China.” In Cultural Nationalism in East Asia – Representation and Identity, edited by Harumi Befu, 9–35. Research Papers and Policy Studies 39. Institute of East Asian Studies. Berkeley: University of California. Ebrey, Patricia B. 2006. China. A Cultural, Social, and Political History. Boston: Wadsworth. Elstein, David. 2011. “Review of Living Faith and the Kingly Way of Politics ⭏ભؑԠ㠷⦻䚃᭯⋫ by Jiang Qing 㭓ឦ.” Dao 10 (3): 395– 98. Florence, Eric. 2013. “Migrant Labour Culture in Post-Mao China”. Accessed March 14, 2013. http://www.booksandideas.net/. Göller, Thomas, and Achim Mittag. 2008. Geschichtsdenken in Europa und China. Selbstdeutung und Deutung des Fremden in historischen Kontexten. Sankt Augustin: Academia. Guo, Yingjie. 2004. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China. The Search for National Identity under Reform. RoutledgeCurzon Studies on China in Transition. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Harrison, Henrietta. 2001. China. Inventing the Nation. London: Arnold. Hon, Tze-ki. 2014. “Radical Confucianism: The Critique of Imperial Orthodoxy in Guocui xuebao (1905–1911).” In Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power. Nationalism and Historical

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Consciousness in World Politics, edited by Bart Dessein, 30–43. Politics and Development of Contemporary China. London: Palgrave. Hutchington, John. 1987. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism. London: Allen & Unwin. Jansen, Thomas. (2008) 2009. “New Tendencies, Religious and Philosophical, in the Chinese World of the Third through Sixth Centuries.” In Conceiving the Empire. China and Rome Compared, edited by Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, 397–419. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jiang, Qing 㪻ᒶ. 2004. Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi ⭏ભؑ Ԡ㠷⦻䚃᭯⋫. Taiwan: Yangzhengtang wenhua. —. 2013. A Confucian Constitutional Order. How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Kang, Xiaoguang. 2006. “Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition.” Social Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Sciences 73 (1): 112–4. Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25(5): 741–67. Legge, James. 1970. The Works of Mencius. Translated, with Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes. New York: Dover Publications. Lenin, Vladimir I. 1999. The State and Revolution. Resistance Marxist Library. Resistance Books: Chippendale NSW. Li, Chenyang. 2013. “Transcendent Heaven? A Critique of Jiang Qing’s Grounding of the Right to Rule.” In A Confucian Constitutional Order. How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan, translated by Edmund Ryden, 129–38. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Liang, Qichao ằஏ䎵. (1903) 1983. “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo.” Yinbingshi heji, Wenji 13: 67–89. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 2009. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Middlesex: The Echo Library. Mao, Zedong ∋⌭ь. 1991. “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng” 䇪Ӫ≁≁ ѫу᭯.” In Mao Zedong Xuanji, vol. 4. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Meissner, Werner. 1990. “La voie orthodoxe (1949–1955).” In La Chine au XXe siècle. De 1949 à aujourd’hui, edited by Marie-Claire Bergère, Lucien Bianco and Jürgen Domes, 10–33. Paris: Fayard.

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Näth, Marie-Luise. 1975. “Die Aussenpolitik der VR China: Talleyrand Redivivus? In China nach der Kulturrevolution, edited by Jürgen Domes, 259–331. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. The Beijing Concensus. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Schneider, Julia. 2012. “Ethnicity and Sinicization. The Theory of Assimilative Power in the Making of the Chinese Nation-State (1900s– 1920s).” Unpublished PhD dissertation. Gent/Göttingen. Schwartz, Benjamin. 1968. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row. Seiwert, Hubert. 1994. “Orthodoxie, Orthographie und Zivilreligion im vorneuzeitlichen China.” In Gnosisforschung und Religionsgeschichte. Festschrift für Kurt Rudolph zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Holger Preißler, Hubert Seiwert and Heinz Mürmel, 529–41. Marburg: Diagonal-Verlag. Smith, Anthony. 1991. National Identity. Reno, Las Vegas and London: University of Nevada Press. Tu, Wei-ming, ed. 1994. “Cultural China. The Periphery as the Center.” In The Living Tree. The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, 1– 34. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Van den Stock, Ady. 2014. “The Horizon of Modernity. Observations on New Confucian Philosophy in History and Thought.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ghent University. Walker, Richard L. (1956) 1967. China and the West: Cultural Collision. Selected Documents. Sinological Series 5. New Haven: Yale University Far Eastern Publications. Weber, Ralph. 2013. “The Politics of ‘Confucian Political Philosophy’.” Warp, Weft, and Way. Chinese and Comparative Philosophy. http://warpweftandway.com/weber-the-politics-of-confucian-politicalphilosophy. English version of “Politik, Konfuzianismus und konfuzianische politische Philosophie in der VR China heute”. In Widerspruch – Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56. Wolfe, Tom. 2013. Back to Blood. London: Vintage. “Xi Jinping zhuxi dao Qufu Kongzi ruxue yanjiuyuan canguan bing fabiao yanjiang” (Ґ䘁ᒣѫᑝࡠᴢ䱌 ᆄᆀ݂ᆖ⹄ウ䲒৲㿲ᒦ╄䇢), May 16, 2014. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://www.hytxe.com/info/361. html. Zhao, Tingyang 䎥 ≰ 䱣 . 2006. “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tianxia).” Social Identies 12 (1): 29–41. —. 2009. “Ontology of Coexistence: Relations and Hearts.” Yanjiu. Beijing Philosophical Research 9.

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—. 2012. “All-under-Heaven and Methodological Relationism.” In Contemporary Chinese Political Thought. Debates and Perspectives, edited by Fred Reinhard Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, 46–66. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. —. 2013. “The China Dream in Question.” Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series, 1–13. Zhu, Linyong. 2011. “Confucius Stands Tall Near Tian’anmen.” Renmin Ribao January 13. Accessed April 24, 2015. http//English.people daily. com.cn/90001 /90776/90882/7259160.html.

BOOK REVIEW

CHAPTER TWELVE BOOK REVIEW: ANTIGAS LEITURAS. VISÕES DA CHINA ANTIGA BARBARA PIHLER CIGLIý

Edited by André Bueno and José Maria Neto. União da Vitória: UNESPAR, 2014, pp. 315, e-book. The book Antigas leituras. Visões da China antiga (Ancient readings. Visions of Ancient China) presents a collection of essays on history, art, philosophy and literature of Ancient China written by scholars from Brazil, Portugal, Macau, China, Singapore, Israel and Slovenia. It is the second volume of the series Antigas leituras, founded and edited by José Maria Gomes de Souza Neto, professor of Ancient History at the University of Pernambuco (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco). The first volume, Antigas Leituras. Diálogos entre a história e a literatura (Ancient Readings. Dialogues between History and Literature), was published in 2012, while the third volume is scheduled to be published within this year (2015). As the title Antigas leituras indicates, the main objective of the series is to bring new perspectives on ancient literary sources, which opens new questions and, therefore, encourages new readings. The second volume of the series, which is the subject of this review, represents an important collaborative effort toward achieving the objective of the series. Its editors are, as already mentioned, José Maria Neto, who devotes himself above all to the study of the reception of antiquity in the contemporary world in general, and André Bueno, professor of History at the University of Paraná (Universidade Estadual do Paraná), who has been disseminating sinological studies in Brazil for more than two decades. As it is clearly expressed in the introductory chapter by José Maria Neto, one of the main goals is to show the importance of studying and

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researching Chinese Antiquity as well as the necessity of a world-wide approach to truly comprehend its relevance. The author shows us that questioning the importance of the studies of Antiquity is still very alive, as he reveals the specific situation in Brazil and its segregation of historiographical knowledge: the naion’s most important research centers (such as Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paolo) deal with national historiography and nationally relevant issues while secondary centers are left to deal mainly with regional history. But such segregation is not necessary, as the author stresses, because what really matters is that historiography sharpens the critical sense and enables dialogue with the present, and therefore, extends and improves the perception of the modern world. The importance of this book is multifaceted: it is the first publication on Ancient China published in Brazil and, more so, it is the result of the effort of two enthusiastic scholars, both vigorous researchers of Antiquity, who come from the University of Paraná and the University of Pernambuco, which demonstrates that internationally significant research projects do not necessarily originate in major research centers. Furthermore, the book succeeds to be consistent and coherent while connecting scholars from three different continents, many of which have had their works published in Portuguese for the first time. Among them there are also two eminent Slovene sinologists, Jana S. Rošker and Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik, both professors at the Faculty of Arts at the University of Ljubljana, which makes this book even more relevant for the development of Sinology in Slovenia and for the promotion of Slovene sinologists in Portuguese-speaking countries. Last but not least, this collection clearly shows that Ancient History is anything but old or outdated, since historical knowledge as a »field of disputes« represents an important constituent element of the present, being that thinking about Antiquity enables us to rethink our place in this rapidly transforming modern world. The author of the first chapter of the book Sobre o humanismo na China; ou, de como a poesia orientiou o Céu (On Humanism in China; or, How Poetry Guided Heaven) is Alicia Relinque Eleta, professor in the University of Granada and one of the greatest Spanish-speaking sinologists. In her contribution she stresses the necessity to amplify the concept of Humanism which we normally relate with the Italian Renaissance and, consequently, with the so called classical Greco-Roman antiquity. The author shows that its origins go back to the Zhou dynasty, thousands of years before our era, when the human being was thought of

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as a being endowed with certain qualities, but which must be transformed and educated to be able to govern others. In the second chapter titled O culto da mulher no neolítico chinês (The Cult of the Woman in the Chinese Neolithic), Ana Maria Amaro, founder and current president of the Portuguese Institute of Sinology and probably the greatest Portuguese sinologist still active, correlates the solidity of archaeological finds with the evanescent texture of myth and memory to understand the role of the woman in the early stages of Chinese civilization, the period still poorly studied as a result of lack of archaeological data. The author shows that in the times of archaic China it was the cult of the mother-earth and fertility that gave stability to the relationship mother/children which ensured the continuity of the group, to the detriment of relations between partners, and also the relationship father/children. The woman was the mother; more so, the Woman was elevated as creator of all men, as fruitful and good Mother Earth renewing the cycle of life every spring. André Bueno, the co-editor of this book, is also the author of two contributions. In the first, titled Sinologia e Confucionismo: a importância dos estudos confucionistas para a compreensão da civilização chinesa (Sinology and Confucianism: the Importance of Confucian Studies for the Comprehension of Chinese Civilization) he exposes the main theme of his research: the relevance of Chinese culture, its particularities, and the significance of Confucius as the centerpiece of this story, because, like the author says, it is practically impossible to understand the China of today without understanding its past. His second contribution, O pensamento chinês durante a Dinastia Han (Chinese Thought During the Han Dynasty), continues the journey observing how the most relevant Chinese philosophy evolves during the Han Dynasty, which consolidated the principal way to investigate the reality of Chinese civilization. Therefore, it is essential, according to the author, to consider this period as a historically significant phase, as this enables the understanding of the later development of Chinese thought. In the chapter titled Lao Zi e o Taoísmo (Lao Zi and Taoism) António Graça de Abreu, known as one of the best Portuguese sinologists, offers a detailed presentation of Taoist thought analyzing the ideograms, their influences and repercussions from philosophical and religious points of view. We examine a variety of authors, from the philosopher Zhuangzi, the historian Sima Quian, literates He Shanggong and Wang Bi, Flemish Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest, Reverends António Vieira and Joaquim de Jesus Guerra, to the French explorer and sinologist Paul Pelliot, with the

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final emphasis on Lao Zi and Confucius. The correlation established by the author of the paper, between Tao and the famous Spanish poet Antonio Machado, is compelling, since the Tao is “the way to the goal even when there is no goal and no pre-established way”, while the well-known verses of Machado are “Walker, your footsteps / are the road, and nothing more. / Walker, there is no road, / the road is made by walking.” (Machado 2003, 280) Bony Schachter, a doctoral student at the Fudan University of Shanghai, analyzes religion and sexuality in Ancient China in the contribution titled O ‘rito de passagem do escrito amarelo da Claridade Superior’: religião e sexualidade na China Antiga (The ‘Passage of the Yellow Writ of Highest Clarity: Religion and Sexuality in Ancient China). He describes the practice of ritual sex among Taoists as an aesthetization of the act in an environment where the use of the body and the mobilization of its erotic potential does not belong to the privacy of the individual, but to the general welfare of the community. Chenyang Li, the eminent Chinese philosopher, former president of the Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America and the founder of the Philosophy Programme in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, contributed the article on Zhuangzi and Aristotle which forms a part of his previous book The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy (1999). The chapter in the reviewed book is titled Zhuangzi e Aristoteles: sobre ser uma coisa (Zhuangzi and Aristotle: About Being a Thing) and it begins with our understanding of ‘being’, which has profound implications in the way we understand the world as a whole. In this sense, the Chinese Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi and Aristotle have quite different perspectives. The contribution presents an important comparative study of these two great thinkers helping us to understand some of the fundamental ontological differences. The author of the eighth chapter is Jana S. Rošker, the first Slovene sinologist and cofounder of the Department of Asian and African Studies at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana. Her main research fields are traditional Chinese logic, theory of knowledge and methodology for intercultural research. In her contribution titled A relação entre linguagem e pensamento na antiga Epistemologia chinesa (The Relation Between Language and Thought in Ancient Chinese Epistemology) she explores specific and detailed visions of language and their connections to perception and interpretation of the human world. The contribution provides a systematic overview of special features defining the classical Chinese epistemological discourses through tight connections between

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linguistic and cognitive structures. The author demonstrates that ancient Chinese philosophers have elaborated specific views on language and its connection to human perception dealing mostly with “the design, implementation, analysis, characterization, and classification of names (or concepts) and their relation to actualities”. This attention to the semantic content led to important peculiarities in the development of inferences which also had a great impact upon the development of classical Chinese logic. The author shows that origins of ancient Chinese focusing on contents rather than form can also be found in ancient Greek logic, especially in the works of Aristotle, although they would not be developed until the early twentieth century, with the emergance of new theories in the philosophy of language. The following chapter Reflexões genealógicas e circulares sobre a formaçao do pensamento chinês antiguo (Genealogical and Circular Reflections on the Formation of Ancient Chinese Thought), is written by Jesualdo Correia, Brazilian orientalist and independent researcher. It offers a historical and social contextualization of some of the fundamental aspects which constitute the foundations of ancient Chinese thought, stressing the localization of their changes and continuation in the course of its long history. Márcia Schmaltz, Brazilian interpreter and translator, investigates the physical presence of an animal and its meaning assumed in arts and literature in the chapter titled O cavalo an Antiguidade chinesa: entre o institucional e o natural (The Horse in Chinese Antiquity: Between the Institutional and the Natural). She presents the importance of the horse and its symbolic representation in Chinese culture from prehistory to the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE–24 CE), describing various aspects: the horse’s presence in the myths, the development of the horse as a military element, the term horse in the first written records and their symbolism, the status of the horse in orthodox Confucianism and the animal allegories in Taoism. Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik, the author of chapter twelve, is a Slovene expert in Chinese traditional art, Chinese grave art and Chinese cosmology, and professor at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. In her contribution Os Quatro Animais comológicos em túmulos Han com murais (The Four Cosmological Animals in Han Tombs with Murals) she focuses on Han tombs with murals of which excavations were carried out primarily in the latter half of the twentieth century and continue today as they brought to light a great quantity of very rich archaeological material. She analyzes the iconography of the Han tombs identifying the

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representations of the four mythological animals, which occupy determinant positions embodying the Four directions and Four seasons which also define the spatial and temporal structure of the tomb. As the Han people recreated the cosmic framework in the form of a round ceiling over the square form of the chamber, and represented the dynamics of the entire universe with the symbolic codes of the yin yang wuxing theory, they created the ideal context, in which, as the author indicates, the depiction of the Four Animals not only embodied time and space, but also situated the deceased in an eternal cosmic context as they were particularly suited to the role of guiding and protecting the soul. The author of the penultimate chapter is Wang Keping, professor of Philosophy at Beijing International Studies University and Director and Doctorial Supervisor of the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He is recognized as one of the greatest current Chinese experts on intercultural dialogues, philosophy and comparative aesthetics. His study A redescoberta da unidade Céu-Homem (The Rediscovery of the Unity of Heaven and Man) continues the ethicalecological thought as it focuses on the interaction between heaven (tian) and man (ren), and on the concept of harmonious unity between heaven and man (tian ren heyi) as the general ethos of Chinese philosophy. The author exposes that the polysemy of the concept is extended with the passage of time according to the socio-cultural context. Presently, the tendency to rediscover the relevance of this continuity between heaven and human world reflects in unifying new and modern signs with old conceptions. The author discusses the essential supports and pertinence of unity of heaven and man parting from three sub-themes: the triple meaning, the two-dimensional orientation and a pragmatic alternative. The last contribution in this book is written by Yuri Pines, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and reputable Sinology expert. The paper titled O messianismo do Primeiro Imperador (The Messianism of the First Emperor) deals with one of the most controversial figures of Chinese and world history, the imperator Qin Huangdi. The main objective of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of the role of monarchs in China’s imperial policy and the dialectical relations between the Qin Dynasty and Han successors. The author reminds us that generations of traditional and modern scholars tend to see him as an aberration: an “anti-Confucius”, an anti-traditionalist entity, who behaved violently and erratically, and was duly eliminated from Chinese history, while others, mostly notable scholars of the institutional history of China, tend to emphasize his role as an inseparable part of a historical continuum.

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The paper demonstrates that the vision of the government of the first emperor is rooted in monarchical discourse previous to the Warring States period, and that he had a lasting impact on his Han successors. At the same time the author argues that the presentation of the First Emperor of his government as “the end of history” critically distinguishes him from previous and later monarchs, and can provide an explanation for the notion of exceptionality of Qin in Chinese history. Having reviewed the complexity of all the fourteen contributions which compose this book, we can emphasize once again the remarkable importance of this publication for a better understanding of both, Ancient China and the modern Chinese culture. As sinologists frequently emphasize, China is the oldest continuous civilization in existence. Therefore, one of the most important keys to understand current China is the Ancient China and the traces which it has left. Being the first book of its kind in Brazil, it represents, without doubt, an important part in the development of Sinology in Portuguese-speaking countries and beyond, and it is of great relevance for Ancient Chinese thought, in general, having connected world-known scholars from three continents. And that these include two Slovene sinologists is of great importance for Slovene Sinology and for the recognition of Slovene intellectuals in the world. We believe that this book will unquestionably fulfill the expectations of the editors: to stimulate the intellectual debate and to instigate that more and more Portuguese-speaking scholars will fall in love with the Middle Kingdom and its history.

References Machado, Antonio. 2003. Border of a Dream. Selected Poems. Washington: Copper Canyon Press.

CONTRIBUTORS

André Bueno André Bueno is Professor of Oriental Ancient History at the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Brazil. He has experience in the area of History and Philosophy, with an emphasis on Intercultural Dialogue and Sinology. Luka Culiberg Luka Culiberg, PhD, holds a degree in sociology and Japanese studies and mainly researches history of modern Japanese national language and other aspects of Japanese modernity and nation building. He has spent several years studying in Japan at the University of Tsukuba and Hitotsubashi University. Currently he works at the Department of Asian and African studies at the University of Ljubljana Bart Dessein Bart Dessein is professor in the department of Chinese Language and Culture of Ghent University, Belgium and Member of the Belgian Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences. His research concerns the philosophical development of early Buddhism and the Chinese-Buddhist philosophical debate. Lately, he has also been working on New Confucianism. Jyrki Kallio Jyrki Kallio is Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, specializing in China’s political culture and foreign relations. He was awarded the J.A. Hollo Prize for an exceptionally highquality translation of a non-fiction book into Finnish for his translation of Confucius’s Analects, published in 2014. Hans Kuehner Hans Kühner is professor of Chinese Studies at Munich University. He has taught at East China Normal University, Beijing International Studies University, Humboldt University, Berlin etc. Past and present research: history of science in China, late Qing Confucian schools, genealogies and the evolution of Chinese nationalism, Shen Congwen, Chinese places of remembrance.

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Helena Motoh Helena Motoh is an associate professor and a senior research fellow at the Faculty for Humanities, University of Primorska, Koper, Slovenia. Barbara Pihler Cigliþ Barbara Pihler Cigliþ is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Romance Languages and Literature, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Jana S. Rošker Jana S. Rošker is professor of Chinese philosophy and intercultural methodology in the Department of Asian and African Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Téa Sernelj Téa Sernelj is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Asian and African Studies at the University of Ljubljana. Mugur Zlotea Mugur Zlotea is a Lecturer at Department of Oriental Languages and Literature, University of Bucharest, Romania. He research areas are conceptual history, political discourse analysis and translation studies. Nataša Visoþnik Nataša Visoþnik is assistant professor at the Department of Asian and African Studies, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Her research is focused on identity issues in Japan, including identity processes, minority questions, marginality; she is also dealing with the anthropology of body and space. Ralph Weber Ralph Weber is assistant professor in the Institute for European Global Studies at the University of Basel, Switzerland. His work focuses on methodological and conceptual aspects of translinguistic and transcultural research, comparative philosophy, Chinese political philosophy and Confucianism. He is the book review editor (Europe) for Philosophy East and West.

INDEX A All-under-Heaven (see also tianxia), 97, 204, 225 at ease, 52, 55, 109–10, 125 authoritarianism, 205 B bodily recognition, 52–3 Buddha, 127, 188 C cadre (Party), 171, 174, 197 Chen, Duxiu, 30, 165, 208, 210, 215, 219 China model (Zhongguo moshi), 218 Chinese Communist Party, 160, 170, 171, 184, 206, 219 Christianity, 123–4, 126–7, 134, 184, 189, 195, 200, 216 communalism, 99, 100 communitarianism, 99 concerned consciousness, 51, 53–4 Confucian philosophy, 13, 60, 147, 148, 153 Confucianism, 7–11, 14–18, 21, 22, 25, 29, 37, 39, 40–1, 47–8, 50, 63, 69, 73, 81, 83, 85–6, 90–1, 94–97, 99, 100, 114, 122, 124, 126–9, 132–5, 139, 141, 143, 146–8, 152, 153, 159, 160, 162, 163–5, 167–8, 173, 175–7, 183, 185–8, 190–2, 194–200, 203, 205, 207–8, 210–7, 219, 220–2 Modern Confucianism, 47 Neo-Confucianism, 8, 10, 12–5, 17–9, 22, 212 New Confucianism, 76, 121, 212 Radical Confucianism, 205 State Confucianism, 205

constitutionalism, 83–4, 93, 212 D Daoism, 39, 163, 200, 216 Datong, 89, 97 Dewey, John, 64 dialectics, 74–76, 166 dynastic decline, 204–5 E Engels, Friedrich, 167, 172, 207 epistemology, 11, 67, 70 evenness, 105, 108–12, 117 external ruler, 70–3, 75 F familism, 139, 149, 150, 152 family state, 139, 145–6 Feng, Youlan, 63 filial piety, 25, 142, 147–8, 150, 152, 162, 177, 191, 198 formal logic, 64 G Guocui xuebao (Journal of National Essence), 31, 205 guoxue, 25–9, 32–41, 83, 199, 205 H harmony, 55, 82, 84–5, 87, 90, 93, 99, 106–7, 109, 116, 151, 152, 168, 191, 194, 196, 208 Hattori, Unokichi, 143 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 70, 73, 149 heping, 87, 105–9, 116, 117 heping fazhan, 105–8 historiography, 13, 32, 34 Hu, Jintao, 82, 106, 159, 160, 164, 170, 175, 194, 196

226 Huang, Zunxian, 27, 29, 31, 34, 98, 209 Huaxia zhuyi, 92 humanism, 29–30, 51 I identity, 5, 6, 32–3, 48, 52, 60, 83, 113, 115, 123, 139, 140, 143–5, 149, 151–3, 188, 217, 220, 238 ideology, 5, 14, 19, 63–4, 94, 100, 140, 149–52, 154, 165–7, 176, 184–5, 192, 194, 198, 207, 210, 216, 220 Imperial Rescript on Education, 146, 149, 152–3 in arts, 59–60, 233 inner sage, 70–3, 75 Inoue, Tetsujirǀ, 7–8, 147, 150, 153 intuition, 56, 65, 68–9, 74 J Jiang, Qing, 183, 191, 212–8 junzi, 159, 174, 176–7, 194 K Kang, Xiaoguang, 83, 176, 183, 220 Kang, Youwei, 31, 36, 89, 97, 213 Kant, Immanuel, 63, 65–6, 69 Kingly Way (wangdao), 91–2, 95, 212–3, 223 kogaku, 7, 10 kokugaku, 7, 10, 14, 16–7, 21–2, 28 Kongzi, 53, 59–60 L Laozi, 55, 114, 127 legitimation, 164, 176–7 Liang, Qichao, 27, 29, 31, 114, 210 Liu, Shaoqi, 192–4, 196 logic, 22, 63–5, 69, 91, 94, 97 M Mao, Zedong, 82–3, 93, 125, 128, 160, 164, 168–9, 171–2, 175, 185, 210–1, 219–20 Marx, Karl, 159, 167, 172, 193, 207

Index May Fourth Movement, 164, 167, 204, 206 Meiji Period, 6, 141 Meiji Restoration, 142, 148, 152, 154 Mengzi (Mencius), 14, 22, 37, 39, 90–1, 111–2, 128, 129, 166, 172–4, 193, 216 modernity, 5, 29, 133, 204, 211–3, 218 Mou, Zongsan, 47, 50, 63–76, 213 N nation, 3–5, 13, 18, 21–2, 27, 32–5, 39, 82, 89, 114–5, 139–40, 144– 6, 149, 151, 153–4, 166, 199, 204, 207, 211, 215–7, 220–1 national essence, 29, 151, 154, 204, 215 national studies, 25–8, 30, 33–5, 41 National Studies, 25–9, 31, 33–6, 41 nationalism, 5, 22–3, 27, 32, 34, 140, 146, 150, 153, 204, 206, 210, 216 Confucian nationalism, 140, 146, 151–2 cultural nationalism, 204, 215 iconoclastic nationalism, 204 political nationalism, 204 New Text School (xinwen jia), 213 P patriotism, 195, 210 peace, 84, 87, 90, 105–10, 112, 116–7, 126, 174, 196 peaceful coexistence, 90, 115–6 peaceful development, 105–8, 115, 117 philology, 37 ping, 108–12, 116, 196 Plato, 149 principle of correlativity or complementarity, 76

Contemporary East Asia and the Confucian Revival Q Qing dynasty, 193, 204–5, 207–9, 211, 213 R rangaku, 7, 10, 19, 20–22 renaissance, 25, 39, 205, 220 rule of law, 93–4, 99, 142 S slogan, 6, 90, 97, 106–8 Socrates, 29 Soviet Union, 208, 210 Sun, Anna, 187–8 Sun, Zhongshan, 171, 219 T temples, 185, 187–8, 192 tennǀ, 28, 147 terminology, 22, 145 the Party, 26, 81–4, 93–4, 100, 160– 1, 164, 170–1, 173, 175–7, 190– 2, 195, 197–9, 219 The People’s Tribute (Minbao), 35, 205 The Self Negation of the Moral Self, 70 tianxia, 110–5, 117, 165, 173, 196, 207, 217–8 Tokugawa Period, 22 tradition, 5, 10–2, 20–1, 28–9, 36, 39, 48, 51–5, 63–5, 73, 82–4, 87, 89, 90, 93, 95–6, 110, 121, 129, 142, 148, 160, 162–8, 171, 173,

227

176–7, 184, 187–8, 190–1, 196, 198–9, 200, 205, 213 W wandering, 53–5, 59–60 wandering at ease, 55 wandering in arts, 59, 60 Wang, Guowei, 27, 29 Wang, Yangming, 8, 52, 96, 193 Warring States, 85, 163 Wu, Jiaxiang, 97–98 X Xi, Jinping, 82–4, 92–4, 97, 159–4, 168, 170, 172–4, 176–7, 194, 197–9 xinzhai, 55, 57, 59 Xu, Fuguan, 47, 49, 50–1, 53–5, 59– 60, 64 Y Yan, Xuetong, 85, 91, 95, 106 Ye, Zicheng, 92–4, 96–7, 168 Yidan, Xuetang, 189 Z Zhao, Tingyang, 114, 212, 217–8 Zhou, Enlai, 90, 207, 210 Zhu, Rongji, 220 Zhu, Xi, 8–10, 12–3, 15, 17–22, 37, 64, 87, 166 Zhuangzi, 37, 53, 55–8, 60, 70, 114 zuowang, 55, 57, 59