Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum 9789048515370

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions
3. Shifting Railway Regime
4. European Integration, European Fragmentation
5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece
6. Uncovering Railway Europe
Bibliography
Summary
Curriculum Vitae
Appendix I. Timeline of Conferences and Conventions held in the early years after the war, concerning railways
Appendix II: Schedule of International Expresses in the 1930s
Appendix III: List of Illustrations

Citation preview

Acknowledgements 1

Constructing Iron Europe

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Constructing Iron Europe

Foundation for the History of Technology & Amsterdam University Press Technology and European History Series (TEHS) Ruth Oldenziel and Johan Schot (Eindhoven University of Technology) Series Editors The Technology and European History series seeks to present scholarship about the role of technology in European history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The series focuses on how technical communities, nation-states, businesses, social groups, and other actors have contested, projected, performed, and reproduced multiple representations of Europe while constructing and using a range of technologies. The series understands Europe both as an intellectual construct and material practice in relation to spaces inside as well as outside Europe. In particular, the series invites studies focusing on Europe’s (former) colonies and on the two new superpowers of the twentieth century: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Interdisciplinary work is welcomed. The series will offer a platform for scholarly works associated with the Tensions of Europe Network to find their way to a broader audience. For more information on the network and the series, see: www.tensionsofeurope.eu

Books in series

1. Judith Schueler, Materialising identity. The co-construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss national identity (Amsterdam, June 2008) 2. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks (Amsterdam, August 2008) 3. Frank Schipper, Driving Europe. Building Europe on roads in the twentieth century (Amsterdam, September 2008) 4. Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel (editors), Manufacturing Technology, Manufacturing Consumers. The Making of Dutch Consumer Society (Amsterdam, January, 2009) 5. Irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe. Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum. (Amsterdam, 2011).

Foundation for the History of Technology

The Foundation for the History of Technology (SHT) aims to develop and commu-

nicate knowledge that increases our understanding of the critical role of technology in the history of the Western world. Since 1988 the foundation has been supporting scholarly research in the history of technology. This has included large-scale national and international research programs and numerous individual projects, many in collaboration with Eindhoven University of Technology. The SHT also coordinates the international research network Tensions of Europe: Technology and the Making of Europe. For more information see: www.histech.nl

Constructing Iron Europe Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum Irene Anastasiadou

Amsterdam 2011

To my parents

The research has been made possible by: Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). This publication is made possible by: Eindhoven University of Technology and the Foundation for the History of Technology. ISBN 978 90 5260 392 6 e-isbn 978 90 4851 537 0 © 2011, Irene Anastasiadou No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Design and typesetting: Ellen Bouma, Alkmaar, the Netherlands Cover image: The Venice-Simplon Orient Express (Manchester Daily Express/ Science & Picture Library) Amsterdam University Press, Herengracht 221, NL-1016 BG Amsterdam www.aup.nl



Acknowledgements 5

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all those who helped me to write and publish this book, in particular my supervisors Johan Schot and Gijs Mom who patiently followed my progress and with whom I shared many ideas. Aristotle Tympas, under whose supervision I made my first steps into the field of history of technology. Together with him I developed many of the ideas on the Greek case discussed in the last chapter of this book. The other PhD students of the TIE group (Sorinela Ciobica, Vincent Lagendijk, Suzanne Lommers, Frank Schipper), with whom I shared many moments of anxiety and hard work as well as pleasant moments of laughs. The two post doc researchers that worked on the project Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe, Erik van der Vleuten and Alec Badenoch for their useful commentaries on many of my chapters. A special thanks to Alec Badenoch who patiently copy-edited this book, rendering it a more pleasant experience for the reader. The members of my doctorate committee Colin Dival, Eda Kranakis and Harry Lintsen who read an earlier version of this book and provided me with useful comments. Ruth Oldenziel who guided me through the publication process. Martijn van Sas who helped me to edit the illustrations in this book. Relatedly, I would also like to thank the Foundation for the History of Technology for financing the copy-editing. Μy brother in law Andrew Kerrigan who made some final adjustments to my English. Spending five years away from family and old friends has been a difficult and challenging experience. I may not have been able to go through these years without the help of a few people who happened to be in Eindhoven and who supported me and helped me go through this process. A special thanks therefore goes to Apostolos Doris, Efie Kesidou, Dick van den Brink, Joost Mangnus, Ariana Martinelli, Frank Schipper and Maria Vlasiou. Warm thanks to my mother and sister who, even though far away, closely shared my worries and concerns, difficulties and happy moments on this trajectory, providing an infinite source of support and encouragement. Eindhoven, December 25, 2010



Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 5 Abbreviations 9 1. Introduction Railways Across Borders and Historiography Technology, Infrastructures and European Integration Setting the Stage

11 13 19 23

2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions Central European Traffic Routes Allied Alternative Transport Routes Swiss Access to the Sea through France Inter Allied Railway Project International Reception Central Europe and the Inter Allied Railway Breaking the Spinal Cord of Germany: The Simplon Orient Express Railway Paris Dakar Europe, the Depression and Large Scale Technology Works A Pan-Europe Railway Proposal Conclusion

33 33 38 41 47 56 58 62 73 80 83 92

3. Shifting Railway Regime Germany and European Railways before 1914 Versailles and the Building of an Allied Railway Europe Central European Railways Attempts to Re-Establish a Railway Regime in Europe League of Nations and a Universal Approach to Railways, 1919-1939 France and the International Union of Railways, 1922-1939 Call for Regional Alliances Conclusion

97 97 102 110 113 120 138 141 150

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4. European Integration, European Fragmentation Railways as Carriers of Long Distance Traffic Further Fragmentation Conclusion

153 153 166 197

5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece Internationalism within Nation State Tensions between National and International, 1821–1914 Consolidating Rail Connection to Europe Conclusion

201 201 202 235 239

6. Uncovering Railway Europe Railway Internationalization Patterns A Look behind the Curtain In search of a European Approach to Railways Suggestions for Further Research

243 243 245 249 252

Bibliography 255 Summary 267 269 Curriculum Vitae Appendix I: Timeline of Conferences and Conventions held in the early years after the war, concerning railways: Appendix II: Schedule of International Expresses in the 1930s Appendix III: List of Illustrations

271 274 275



Abbreviations 9

Abbreviations

ΒΒΕ

Βιομηχανική και Βιοτεχνική Επιθεώρησις, εκδιδóμενη υπό του συνδέσμου των ελλήνων βιομηχάνων και βιοτεχνών (Industrial and manufacturing review) BCC Bureau central des compensations BUIC Bulletin de l’union internationale des chemins de fer Committee of Enquiry for European Union CEEC CEH Contemporary European History CIM Convention internationale marchandises CIT Comité international des transports par chemins de fer Wagons-Lits Compagnie internationale des wagons lits et grands express européens Central Office for International Rail Transport COTIF EWP European Table of Direct Vehicles ECEP Papers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe HoT History of Technology HSR Hellenic State Railways International Chamber of Commerce ICC ILO International Labor Office IRCA Congrès internationale des chemins de fer JT Journal des transports: Revue commerciale des chemins de fer et de la navigation Journal of Transport History JTH KKV Proposed railway line Kalabaka–Kozani–Veria LoNP League of Nations Papers The League The League of Nations Mitropa Mitteleuropäische Schlaf- und Speisewagengesellschaft Transit Organization Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. From 1938: Committee for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations Οργανισμός Σιδηροδρόμων Ελλάδος ΟΣΕ OTIF Intergovernmental Association for International Carriage by Rail PO Railway company Paris-Orléans Railway company Paris–Lyon-Mediterranean PLM RG The Railway Official Gazette (from 1882): The Railway Gazette (from July 21, 1905); The Railway Gazette and Railway News (from December 6, 1918); The Railway Gazette: a journal of Management, Engineering and Operation (from January 18, 1935). RGCF Revue générale des chemins de fer RIC Regolamento internazionale carrozze RIV Regolamento internazionale veicoli SCB Société commerciale de Belgique SE Simplon Express SOE Simplon Orient Express

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ΣΕ Σιδηροδρομική Επιθεώρησις TE Taurus–Express T&C Technology and Culture TIE Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe ΤΧ Τεχνικά Χρονικά UIC Union internationale des chemins de fer UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UT International Standards Conference / Unité technique des chemin de fer Verein Union of German Railway Administrations / Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn Verwaltungen; from 1932 Union of Administrations of Railways of Central Europe / Verein Mitteleuropäischer Eisenbahnverwaltungen



1. Introduction

1. Introduction

In 1910, an anonymous reporter described the experience of international railway travel, saying: ‘Indeed, the railway itself is an object lesson as to the futility of mere artificial restrictions on progress. The passenger boards his train at Calais and frontiers are wiped out between the English Channel and Bridinsi; or he sets out on his journey from St. Petersburg and his destination is the distant port of Vladivostok in the Far East. For him the artificial distinction that calls this “Europe” and that “Asia” is wiped out.’1 In interwar Europe, railways provided contemporaries with the experience of international travel. This fascination is underlined by the fact that quite a few novels were inspired by the international railway experience as well. The best known was Agatha Christie’s famous novel Murder on the Orient Express, written in 1932. The murder that detective Hercules Poirot, the main character in her novel, is called upon to solve takes place on board the Simplon Orient Express, which was one of the best known trains of the Compagnie internationale des wagons lits (henceforth Wagons-Lits). Detective Poirot began his journey in Syria with the destination of London, boarding the Taurus Express at Aleppo (Syria). The train, after crossing the Bosporus, then travelled on to Istanbul where there was a connection to the Simplon Orient Express that would run through Trieste and Calais to London.2 In the end, the train stopped unexpectedly somewhere in Yugoslavia due to heavy snow on the tracks, and the plot of the novel unravels. The international atmosphere runs through the novel. On the second day of the journey, Poirot is having his meal with his old friend and travelling companion, Bouc. The Belgian director of the Wagons-Lits, in the luncheon car of the train, Bouc, observing his surroundings notes: ‘Ah!’ he sighed. ‘If I had but the pen of a Balzac! I would depict this scene.’ He waved his hand. ‘It is an idea, that,’ said Poirot. ‘Ah, you agree? It has not been done, I think? And yet it lends itself to romance, my friend. All 1  2 

‘The International Railway Congress,’ RG 33 (1910): 70. Agatha Christie, Murder on the Orient Express (London: Pub. for the Crime Club, l.t.d.,1935), 11.

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around us are people, of all classes, of all nationalities, of all ages. For three days these people, these strangers to one another, are brought together. They sleep and eat under one roof; they cannot get away from each other. At the end of three days they part, they go their several ways, never, perhaps to see each other again.’3 The international travel of the Simplon Orient Express inspired many other authors. An Italian author Vittorio Carlo published a short novel also in 1932. In the opening paragraph of the novel, the author describes the setting of the first scene: ‘This, the most comfortable and certainly most aristocratic of the trains de luxe that cross small Europe, the pay toilet of people on the 1930 run from the coast of the Bosporus to the mists of Tamesi... The Simplon Orient Express is formed exclusively of clean and shiny wagons with beds and restaurant cars, clerks and chefs are international as well as the travelers and the cigarettes they are smoking.’4 Graham Greene’s novel Stamboul Train, a thriller that similarly takes place on an express train from Ostend to Constantinople, was also published in 1932.5 The international space of cross-border railway travel not only inspired many novelists in the 1930s, it also inspired visionaries of a new Europe. In the 1930s, when Europe was in economic crisis, the director of the International Labor Office (henceforth ILO) Albert Thomas submitted a memorandum to the newly created Committee of Enquiry for European Union of the League of Nations. In the committee’s work for unemployment relief, railways and Europe met. Thomas called on the committee to undertake public works of international importance. These would have a double role, serving both to relieve unemployment and help cultivate a spirit of solidarity among the European people. An Italian lawyer, Carlo Enrico Barduzzi, submitted a memorandum to the International Labor Office and the newly created Committee of Enquiry for Public Works and National Technical Equipment of the League of Nations, in which he argued that the political unification of Europe could be achieved through the construction of international railway arteries.6 It seems that international railway travel fascinated contemporaries. In articles in railway trade journals, such as this one from the Railway Gazette (RG), we read that:

3  4  5  6 

Ibid., 37-8. Vittorio Carlo Giannetti, Simplon Orient Express: Novelle (Napoli: 1932), 19. Graham Greene, Stamboul Train (London: Heinemann, 1932). For a better elaboration of the proposal see chapter 2.



1. Introduction

‘Both between the wars and before 1914 there was, as there is today, a spirit of enlightened co-operation amongst European railway-men, who have been among the first to realize the importance of demolishing international barriers.’7 Two main research questions underline this book: What were the factors and motivations that influenced international railway developments in interwar Europe? And: Was there a common shared European idea that influenced these developments? In the next two sections I position these questions within two sets of literature. The first is the literature on the history of railways in Europe and in particular the history of the internationalization of railways. The second is the newly emerging literature on international infrastructure development and its role in the history of European integration. Following this discussion of the relevant literature, I will introduce my research strategy and the outline of this book.

Railways Across Borders and Historiography This book addresses literature on the internationalization of railways, focusing on Europe. Traditionally, railway historiography has been national in focus. The national focus of political, economic and cultural history of Europe explains this national orientation of railway historiography.8 This is legitimate due to language barriers and the fact that most railways as systems were organized at a national level.9 In addition, many studies focus on the nineteenth century up to the year 1914 when the construction of the great mileage of railways took place in most countries of Western Europe.10 The main questions addressed in this literature concern 7  ‘International Railway Cooperation,’ RG 95 (1951): 199. 8  ‘National histories have been the predominant scholarly category since the study of history was established as a discipline in Europe in the nineteenth century, but historians are paying increasing attention to developments and themes that cut across national boundaries, in the process forcing a reevaluation of the concept not just of nation but also of history.’ Akira Iriye, ‘Transnational History,’ CEH 13, no. 2 (2004): 211-222. 9  A useful tool for looking at this literature is the book by Michèle Merger and Marie Noelle Polino, COST 340: Towards a European Intermodal Transport Network, Lessons from History, A Critical Bibliography (Paris: AHICF, 2004), 211. 10  For example the books by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Michael Robbins, The Railway Age (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998); Filippo Tajani, Storia delle ferrovie Italiane (Milano: Garzanti Editore, 1939). Tajani devotes a chapter to the interwar years, but the greatest part of his work is devoted to the years of the construction of the network in the nineteenth century. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1977); Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michèle Merger

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the role of the state in the construction of railways vis a vis private enterprise and the role of the railways in contributing to the modification of the political, economic, managerial and financial structures (for example the process of national unification, the construction of national markets, the process of industrialization and the rise of managerial capitalism) of the western world in the nineteenth century. The railway literature has already highlighted that technological networks are an important means for realizing socio-political goals and ideals. Historians have analyzed the way in which transport networks, and more specifically railways, were placed at the service of the political goals not only of nation-states, but also of empires. Historiography on railway developments in the colonies in the nineteenth century has shown how the European powers used railway construction overseas primarily as a means of fulfilling their imperial interests, extending control over territories outside Europe in order to increase their economic and military power.11 Construction of railways in the colonies was associated with ideological constructs such as the ‘civilizing mission’ in French West Africa.12 Studies of the interwar years and the years following WWI are scarcer.13 While railways were often presented as harbingers of peace, those who built them used them as often as not to pursue strategic national agendas and to prepare for war.14 British and American social and economic historians have written and Marie-Noelle Polino, Cost 340. Τhis bibliographical essay also notes scarcity of railway studies covering the interwar years. Comparative studies of the development of European railways also cover developments in the nineteenth century. See, for example, Rainer Fremdling, ‘European Railways, 1825–2001: An Overview,’ Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- Geschichte 1 (2003): 209–221; Patrick O’Brien, Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 1830-1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). On the role of railways in building nation-states see for example Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976). For accounts on railway developments in the 20th century look at E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the center for Russian and East European studies, 1995); Anthony Heywood, Modernising Lenin’s Russia: Economic Reconstruction, Foreign Trade and the Railways (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich: A History of the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Id., The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, 1933-1945: A History of the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 11  Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2001); Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn and Ronald Edward Robinson, Railway Imperialism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 12  Conklin, A Mission to Civilize, 38- 72. 13  Heywood, Modernising Lenin’s Russia; Mierzejewski, The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich; Mierzejewski, The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, 1933-1945; Jacob Meunier, On the Fast Track: French Railway Modernization and the Origins of the Tgv, 1944-1983 (Westport Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2002). 14  Logan Grant McPherson, Transportation in Europe (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1910), 43-44; Allan Mitchell, The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815-1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000); Mierzejewski, The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich; Idem., The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, 1933-1945.



1. Introduction

many studies discussing the impact of railroads on various aspects of society, such as the relationship between railroads and urbanization, medicine, psychology, architecture and language, literature.15 However, studies of how railways were placed into the service of political and economic agendas at an international level are scarcer. The few available comparative studies on the development of railways in different countries in Western Europe do not touch upon the issue of the internationalization of railways.16 Recent historiography has stressed the importance of looking at the role of international railway infrastructures within a transnational context (for definitions of ‘transnational’ vs. ‘international,’ see below).17 Colin Divall has criticized the national focus of railway historiography. The study of ‘imperial and postcolonial railways’ he observes, ’serves as a useful corrective to the assumption of most (European) transport historians that the ‘natural’ unit of railway development is the nation, and that any international dimension is chronologically and perhaps even ontologically a consequent.’18 Other authors have studied railway developments in Europe, adopting an international perspective. They speak about the internationalization of railways as having begun in the late nineteenth century as a result of two developments. The first is what Douglas Puffert names an ex ante standardization of the railway gauge.19 In particular, early on in the period of railway construction, most European countries adopted what later became the international standard railway gauge (1435 mm). As existing historiography documents, this was the result of the commercial success of the Liverpool and Manchester that had made it the model of modern railway technique for many of the early railways in Great Britain, North America, and continental Europe. Furthermore, the well known British mechanical engineer George Stephenson (1781-1848) himself built lines in several parts of Britain and much of Belgium during the mid-1830s, while other British engineers introduced his gauge to several parts of Germany and Italy by the early 1840s.20 15  For a selective presentation of recent literature on these topics see Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey. 16  Fremdling, ‘European Railways, 1825-2001,’ 209-221; O’Brien, Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe. 17  Colin Divall, ‘Railway Imperialisms, Railway Nationalisms,’ in Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn 1850-1970, ed. Monika Burri, Kilian T. Elsasser and David Gugerli (Zürich: Chronos, 2003), 195-209; Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, eds. Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000 (Sagamore Beach, Mass.: Science History Publications, 2006). 18  Divall, ‘Railway Imperialisms,’ 197. He has stressed the importance of looking at railway developments in connection with the establishment of supranational entities. By extending the logic of Anderson’s argument to the level of supra-national entities such as empires, he proposes to explore how railways helped to shape the ‘imagined communities of conquering and subjugated peoples alike.’ Ibid., 197. 19  Douglas J. Puffert, Tracks across Continents: Paths through History; The Economic Dynamics of Standardization in Railway Gauge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Idem., ‘The Technical Integration of the European Railway Network,’ in B8: European Networks, 129-140. 20  While the first line in Bavaria adopted Stephenson’s gauge because a British locomotive had been bought, the early French and Austrian railways adopted British practice for use by local engineers. These

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Second, the internationalization of the railways was a result of bilateral or multilateral agreements. In particular, as early as the nineteenth century the first international organizations to promote the interoperability of railways were being formed.21 Laurent Tissot has assessed the importance of the Berne Agreement on the Transport of Goods by Rail (Convention internationale concernant le transport des marchandises par chemins de fer, CIM, 1890) for the history of Europe.22 The Berne convention on the transport of goods by rail was signed in 1890, and established for the first time an international code of merchandise traffic between the participating countries.23 Tissot argues that the convention is of great importance for the history of railway internationalization. Firstly, it established for the first time in history an international code for the carriage of goods by rail. Furthermore, it established in 1893 a central body the Central Office for International Rail Transport (COTIF), under the supervision of the Swiss Federal Council, which would be responsible for the maintenance, implementation and renewal of the convention. This was the first intergovernmental organization concerned with issues of international railway traffic.24 Tissot argues that the establishment of the CIM convention and the creation of the central office for international transport by rail signaled the rise of a new international European order, as well as becoming an example for similar developments in other fields. Methodologically, Tissot points out the importance of studying the internationalization of railways as a system of a different order than the national systems. At an international level, railways constitute more than the sum of the national systems.25 In particular pioneering railways set the pattern for subsequent lines that branched out from them as compatible gauges were clearly adopted to facilitate through traffic. Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 132. 21  Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration’; Tissot, ‘Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire,’ in Les entreprises et leurs réseaux: Hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs, XIXe XXe siècle; Mélanges en l’honneur de François Caron, ed. Michèle Merger and Dominique Barjot (Paris: Presses de l’université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1998). 22  Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire’; Idem., ‘Les modèles ferroviaires nationaux et la création d’un système international de transports Européens, 1870-1912. Coordination, intégration ou unification,’ Relations internationales 95 (1998): 313-27; Idem., ‘The Internationality of the Railways. An Impossible Achievement?,’ in Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn, 259-272; Idem., ‘Développement touristique et développement ferroviaire. L’établissement d’une réseau transeuropéenne entre l’Angleterre et la Suisse, 1850-1914,’ in B8: European Networks, 141-154. 23  These were the governments of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland. Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire,’ 285. 24  G. Mutz, History of Cotif (OTIF: 2002): 2. The countries that participated in this conference were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Russia and Switzerland. On the 13th and 14th October 1890, the final conference took place, which adopted the first international rail freight convention (CIM). The CIM convention dealt with the commercial conditions for the acceptance and conveyance of passenger and goods traffic, defining the obligations and responsibilities of the various parties concerned. In 1985 the Intergovernmental Association for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) was created as a successor of COTIF. 25  Tissot, ‘Les modèles ferroviaires nationaux,’ 318. According to his analysis, the establishment of the Berne Convention signaled the rise of a new international order, and the establishment of a European



1. Introduction

Tissot argues that ‘the internationality of the railways has to be considered as an experience in itself, requiring specific tools in terms of infrastructure, rolling stock, management, commercial and industrial strategies, technical choices, accountancy and so on. This means that a new system of railway has to be created.’26 David Gugerli reinforces Tissot’s argument. In looking at the case of the 1950s Trans-Europe Express venture, he pleads for a cultural and technological approach to understanding international railway developments. Methodologically, he argues that the internationalization of railways should be approached analytically from two directions: from a bottom-up perspective, meaning from the perspective of national railways; and from a European top-down perspective, focusing on the international agreements that led to the establishment of international railway traffic. According to Gugerli, only a combination of both perspectives can provide interpretations for recent developments.27 The discussed literature seeks to interpret the internationalization of railways by analyzing developments that made the interoperability of railway networks in Europe possible. Other authors, however, have also pointed out the obstacles in this process. Puffert stresses the barriers to a technically integrated railway network in Europe, arguing that the decentralized development of railways within the nation-state hampered the rise of a technically integrated European railway network. He also underlines the role of international organizations as actors that promoted international railway traffic. In this sense, he agrees with Tissot and Gugerli that the internationalization of railways should be analyzed as a process separate from the development of national railway networks.28 However, Bryan Stone introduces a new problematic. He argues that interoperability of railways in Europe has not been achieved, and therefore there never was a European railway network. This was due to the fact that there was no common vision of what the European railways should look like. According to Stone, recent developments, railroad network due to the fact that it established for the first time an international law for railway commercial traffic that was to substitute with respect to certain provisions internal law. It provided a model for the establishment of similar provisions in other fields of legislation. So the case of the Berne Convention indicates, according to Tissot, how railways promoted the internationalization of society and the rise of a European society. 26  Tissot, ‘The Internationality of Railways,’ 264. 27  David Gugerli, ‘The Effective Fiction of Internationality. Analyzing the Emergence of a European Railroad System in the 1950s,’ in Preprints zur Kulturgeschichte der Technik, no. 17 (2003), 4. 28  Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 129-139. According to Puffert, railways in Europe developed diverse technical practices because network integration at a European level was less important to railway administrations than the integration of each local sub-network. The technical differences in national railways hampered the process of the interconnection of national networks and were the main obstacle in the process of emergence of a European railroad network. Technical coordination has so far been achieved through international agreements, often as a result of the activity of international organizations. Ibid., 129–139.

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and in particular, European Union legislation on the interoperability of railways, opens the way for the creation of a European railway network for the first time in history. Consequently, different authors have interpreted the internationalization of railways differently. The two positions present in the literature are exemplified by the work of Tissot and Stone. The former sees in the developments of the nineteenth century the rise of a new European order while the latter argues that the establishment of a European railway network has not yet been possible due to the lack of a single European vision.29 This divergence of opinion has broader implications. According to Tissot’s analysis, railway developments signaled a new phase in the history of Europe, preceding the formal process of political integration. In contrast, Puffert and Stone stress the difficulties in establishing an integrated network in Europe. According to them, the establishment of a European railroad network followed the establishment of political bodies aimed at bringing about a politically united Europe. Thus the implication of their conclusion is that railways, rather than facilitating the process of European integration, actually posed additional, mostly technical barriers to this process. Political and economic integration, in this case, were anterior to railroad integration. However, there seems to be unanimity on the prevalence of national versus international interests throughout these developments. Tissot discusses how national interests shaped the negotiations on the Bern Convention.30 He shows that the developments that made international railway traffic possible were more a result of aspirations to increase national power rather than efforts to promote a new international order. He argues that internationalization of railways in the nineteenth century was a process closely related to the aspirations of national states and their preoccupation with strengthening their national sovereignty rather than the expression of common visions of Europe and a new political order for the continent.31 Bryan Stone notes that national interests shaped railway developments not only in the nineteenth century, but also in the years following WWII. He points out ‘there was in fact no incentive until the latter part of the 20th century to think in European terms.’32 Puffert too seems to adopt the same thesis on the prevalence 29  Tissot, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 283-295; Bryan Stone, ‘Interoperability: How Railways Became European,’ in Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn 1850-1970, 236-243. 30  Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire,’ 289. 31  Ibid., 283-295. 32  This, according to Stone, led to the extension of barriers to interoperability as national railways and their suppliers sought their own solutions and new technologies in many areas. ‘The most radical step in recent years was to recognize that, in a single Europe, the European union should be empowered with legislative endorsement to address the revitalization of European rail. Interoperability is then a pre-condition to be put in place by legislators so that rail operators can exploit the new competitive freedoms which



1. Introduction

of national over international interests in Europe, arguing that European railways developed in very diverse technical ways. The development of new technologies, such as electrification, was done on a national basis. Puffert argues: ‘European railways developed diversity in their technical practices because network integration at the European level was less important to railway administrations than the integration of each local sub network. As a result, many practices had to be coordinated after networks had been established.’33 He names this process an ‘ex-post coordination’ that took place both through unilateral actions of local and national railway administrations, and through coordinated actions decided by international agreement.34 As part of my research on the factors and motivations that influenced international railway traffic in the interwar years I address issues posed by the historiography on the internationalization of railways. In particular, throughout my analysis I look at the tension between national and international considerations in discussions on the internationalization of railways in Europe. Furthermore, as I discussed above, I explore whether there was a shared European idea that influenced international railway developments.

Technology, Infrastructures and European Integration This book not only addresses railway history, but in a broader sense, also a newly emerging body of literature that aims at bridging European history and the history of technology, and in particular, the history of infrastructures. A first attempt towards this direction took place with the program entitled COST 340, Towards a European Intermodal Transport Network. Since 2000, this program has gathered many historians, geographers, economists and engineers, financed partly by the European Union and partly from funding by the participating states. Cost 340 aimed ‘to observe and present-independent of ideology and without theoretical preconceptions-the successive realities of the development of trans-European connections of an inter-modal transportation, two major factors in the integration of transportation networks within Europe.’35 Consequently, the aim of the project was to study the integration of transport networks within Europe. It focused on two aspects: the development of trans European connections and inter-modal ongoing rail liberalization gives them.’ Stone, ‘Interoperability,’ 243. 33  Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 138-139. 34  Ibid. 35  Merger and Polino, COST 340, xvi.

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transportation. Several scientific conferences were held within the framework of that program.36 The first published volume of this program provided a useful exploration of national transport historiographies, showing the national orientation of transport histories to the detriment of the international dimension.37 A first step to fill this gap in historiography was made by Albert Carreras, Andrea Giuntini and Michèle Merger with the publication of a second edited volume that comprises an anthology of essays where transnational network developments are analyzed.38 In the introduction of this volume, the editors note the difficulties of a transnational approach in studying technological networks and cite reasons for this ‘negligence’ in historiography.39 First, they point to the fact that transport networks have been perceived as political elements favoring national unity, one of their essential functions having been to reinforce territorial cohesion. Even works meant to analyze the role of the railways in economic integration are usually limited within a national context. The second reason is a historiographical omission from the field of study of international institutions that worked on transnational coordination of networks. Finally, a last problem concerned the diverse and diffuse sources for such a history. Certainly comparative studies between national experiences are numerous; but none look at the network from a transnational perspective.40 This initiative was followed and complemented by the Tensions of Europe research network. This is a network of historians of technology meeting periodically in annual conferences and workshops, aimed at addressing questions relating to broader European issues of integration. Within the context of the network, a separate research program was established at the Eindhoven University of Technology aiming at exploring the history of infrastructures and European Integration (Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe, TIE). This book is part of this project.41 Two products of the Tensions of Europe network and TIE, a special issue of the journal History of Technology and the book Networking Europe, are particularly relevant to this book. In the introduction to the special issue, Johan Schot 36  Ibid, xvi. 37  Ibid, xvi. 38  Albert Carreras, Andrea Giuntini and Michèle Merger, eds. B8: European Networks, 19th-20th Centuries: New Approaches to the Formation of a Transnational Transport and Communications System (Milan: Università Bocconi, 1994). 39  Ibid., 1-11. They speak about a transnational approach without clearly defining the notion of ‘transnational,’ European Networks. 40  Albert Carreras, Andrea Giuntini and Michèle Merger, ‘Introduction,’ in B8: European Networks, 1. 41  For more information on the project see http: //www.tie-project.nl/. Also outcomes of this project are the following: Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe; the Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008); Frank Schipper, Driving Europe, Building Europe on Roads in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008).



1. Introduction

and Tom Misa put forward the agenda of this research program. Technological developments, they argue, can be a promising research site for a closer understanding of European integration.42 So far, mainstream European integration history has looked upon European integration as a matter of international relations. European historians have assumed that ‘Europe’ as a political and cultural entity was achieved through the building of economic and political institutions. Authors of European integration studies identify the establishment of political bodies with transnational authority, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and later the European Economic Community (1957) as the beginning of this process.43 Criticizing this bias of historiography on European integration, Misa and Schot aim to set a future research agenda for the study of European integration that incorporates all processes of European integration involving a range of actors since the middle of the nineteenth century. In particular, they argue that these actors become visible when focusing on technical change including the construction and use of transnational infrastructures. While they plead in favor of looking into the technological integration of Europe as a process separate from the political integration of Europe, they argue that this process co-constructed political, economic and cultural integration processes.44 Articles included in this special issue provide both conceptual and empirical proposals for research as suggestions for how we might study the co-construction of Europe and technology.45 In particular, Vleuten and Kaijser show that the material linkage of nation-states through transport and communication infrastructures started much earlier than the official European integration process after WWII, and may have influenced the boundaries and internal shape of contemporary Europe.46 Schot and Misa have 42  Thomas J. Misa and Johan Schot, ‘Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe,’ in ‘Tensions of Europe: The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe,’ ed. Thomas J. Misa, Ruth Oldenziel and Johan Schot, special issue, History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-19. 43  Misa, and Schot, ‘Inventing Europe’; Martin J. Dedman, ed., The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-2008: A History of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2010), 7. 44  Johan Schot, Thomas J. Misa and Ruth Oldenziel eds. ‘Tensions of Europe: The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe,’ special issue, History and Technology 21, no. 1, (2005). 45  Schot, Misa and Oldenziel, ‘Tensions of Europe.’ For example Vleuten and Kaijser propose a research strategy of looking at the technical integration of Europe through the study of technological networks. Trischler and Weinberger propose looking at the transnational aspect of big engineering projects. David Arnold discusses the importance of understanding Europe and the process of European integration through its colonial relationships, and finally Ruth Oldenziel, Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Onno de Wit propose as a research strategy the study of consumption patterns, and more specifically, consumption of technologies. 46  Vleuten and Kaijser, ‘Networking Europe,’ 24. Vleuten and Kaijser argue that transnational linkages and networks have been priorities for centuries. Ever since the Enlightenment, politicians, philosophers and engineers have broadly discussed the potential of linking people and societies across natural or political borders by means of network technologies. Preceding the EU, political bodies such as the League of Nations and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe stressed the role of transnational

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introduced the term ‘hidden integration’ of Europe as a cornerstone of the new research agenda.47 With this notion they refer to integration processes outside the official political integration of Europe. More recently, Schot argues ‘The notion of ‘hidden integration’ is appropriate not so much because this vector of history has often been neglected in the European integration literature, but more importantly because the actors themselves, for example engineers, often intended to shield the process from the official political integration process.’48 Vleuten and Kaijser have since developed their article into the edited volume Networking Europe. In this anthology, authors investigate technological networks from an international angle. ‘Networking Europe,’ say the editors of the book in its introduction, ‘refers to processes of simultaneous transnational network and society building in Europe.’49 The studies in the book ‘focus particularly on transnational linking and de-linking processes, that is, network building in Europe that crossed national boundaries or had transnational meanings.’50 The book is rich in essays covering different geographical areas of Europe and different infrastructures and time periods.51 However the majority of the authors base their analysis on research in national archives focusing on national actors. Vleuten et al. adopt a different approach. They argue for the importance of looking at international organizations as a research site for transnational developments. Conceptually, they propose the concept of European system builder as a tool that would help capture the international aspect of these processes. Methodologically, they suggest the study of international developments through the archives of international organizations. Studying international organizations and their research agendas allow a less nationally biased interpretation of international developments.52 network building for creating a peaceful and prosperous Europe. 47  Johan Schot introduced the term ‘hidden integration,’ in Johan Schot, ‘Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe,’ TIE project (http://www.tie-project.nl), Working Document no 1, (2003): 1. See also Misa and Schot, ‘Inventing Europe,’ 1-3; Johan Schot, ‘Building Europe on Transnational Infrastructure,’ 169. 48  Johan Schot, Transnational Infrastructures and European Integration: A Historiographical and Empirical Exploration (paper presented at the second international TIE workshop, Eindhoven, April 2007), 3. 49  Vleuten and Kaijser, ‘Transnational Networks,’ in Networking Europe, 5. 50  Ibid. 4-5. 51  Schot, Misa and Oldenziel, ‘Tensions of Europe,’ 24. 52  The TIE project has resulted in several other publications. Problematizing Europe in relation to transnational transport developments was also the task that Badenoch, Shipper and Anastasiadou undertook on the special issue of the JTH under the title European Infrastructures. Irene Anastasiadou, ‘Networks of Powers: Railway Visions in Inter-War Europe,’ in ‘Mini Special Issue on European Infrastructures,’ ed. Gijs Mom, JTH 28, no. 2 (2007): 172-91; Alexander Badenoch, ‘Touring Between War and Peace: Imagining the ‘Transcontinental Motorway’ 1930-1950,’ in ‘Mini special issue on European Infrastructures,’ 192-210; Frank Schipper, ‘Changing the Face of Europe: European Road Mobility during the Marshall Plan Years,’ in ‘Mini special issue on European Infrastructures,’ 211-28. Following the methodological



1. Introduction

Consequently, this literature discusses some important issues relevant to this book. The main argument in this historiography is that technology in general, and technological networks more specifically, provide a suitable research site for exploring efforts towards society building in Europe.53 Furthermore, they represent fields of negotiation and contestation. Different scenarios for the political and economic development of Europe were negotiated when decisions on the development of the infrastructures were taken. This argument relates to the argument of this book in which I look at the factors, motivations and expectations that influenced the development of the international railways in the interwar years. Taking these factors into consideration on a transnational level has involved making several strategic choices in designing the research, and it is to a more detailed discussion of these choices that I now turn.

Setting the Stage This book covers the interwar years. The reasons for the choice of this time-period are various. Firstly, the complexity of the issues and the size of the geographical area that this study covers do not allow a thorough long-term study. International railway developments in the nineteenth century, as I described in the previous section, have already formed the subject of a number of studies while thus far nothing has been written on the interwar years. An interpretation of developments in the interwar years can provide the basis for a better understanding and interpretation of developments after WWII. The interwar years are also very interesting as the years in which, after the disaster of WWI, many actors came to appreciate international railway co-operation as important for maintaining peace in Europe. In particular, in those years, international co-operation was institutionalized with suggestion of Vleuten et al., they worked on analyzing archives of international organizations. As Schot notes in the introduction of this issue, these articles ‘open windows on this alternative history of European mobility.’ Johan Schot, ‘Building Europe on Transnational Infrastructure,’ in ‘Mini Special Issue on European Infrastructures,’ 169. This history can be analyzed as a process of hidden integration or fragmentation of Europe. The aim was to look at mobility as a category that contributed to the ‘hidden integration’ of Europe. Badenoch and Fickers (ed) also problemitize infrastructures and European Integration in their book Materializing Europe. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, ‘Europe Materializing? Toward a Transnational History of European Infrastructures,’ in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1-23; Johan Schot, ‘Transnational Infrastructure and the Origins of European Integration,’ in Materializing Europe, 82-109. In the introduction of their book, Badenoch and Fickers problematize the roles the have particular notions and spaces of Europe played in the construction, use and failure of the various infrastructures systems. Badenoch and Fickers, ‘Europe Materializing?’ 53  Vleuten and Kaijser, ‘Transnational Networks,’ 6.

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the creation of the League of Nations. For the first time, internationalization of railways became part of a discussion about the construction of an international society. Ideas for the political unification of Europe were put forward for the first time in the interwar years and acquired momentum. In my last chapter I take a somewhat longer perspective, and extend the overall time frame to include the nineteenth century. This will allow me to show the continuing importance of both national and international impulses for railway developments. Throughout my analysis, I use some conceptual tools that allow me to be more precise in the points that I am making. Since this book concerns railways, I need first to define what a ‘railway’ is. I find the concept of ‘railway’ that Michael Robbins adopts, drawing on Charles E. Lee, most appropriate for the purposes of this study. According to Lee, a modern railway comprises four main features: a specialized track, accommodation of public traffic, conveyance of passengers, and mechanical traction. To these four elements Robbins’ adds a fifth, namely ’some measure of public control.’ All five features have to be present together for something to be defined as a railway; when one or more are absent, then there is a tramway, or a light railway, or a private means of transport, or something else.54 This is a socio-technical definition of a railway, in keeping with the socio-technical approach that I am adopting in this book. Such a definition includes a mixture of technical, economic, and political elements, and draws on the conceptual tools from the discipline of history of technology. As a result I am looking at a railway as a ‘network.’55 In this I follow the methodological suggestion proposed in the seminal work of Thomas Hughes, who showed that in order to understand the development process and societal meaning of technology, historians should study an entire socio-technical configuration rather than individual artifacts. However, in contrast to Hughes, who focuses on the expansion of networks, I am extending the focus to include modifications to the existing networks, e.g. railway configurations, after they have reached a mature stage.56 The concepts of ‘hardware’ and ’software’ are used to help me distinguish between the technical and administrative or operational sides of the railway network. 54  Robbins, The Railway Age, 6. 55  I adopt the definition of the notion of a ‘network’ given by Vleuten and Kaijser. They argue that ‘we are interested here in human-made, materially integrated structures that cross national boundaries, perhaps best defined by examples like road, rail, telephone, or electricity supply networks.’ For a definition of a ‘network’ see Vleuten and Kaijser, Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000 (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2006), 6. 56  Tympas and Anastasiadou make this methodological suggestion. See Aristotle Tympas and Irene Anastasiadou ‘Constructing Balkan Europe: The Modern Greek Pursuit of an ‘Iron Egnatia,’’ in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2006), 26-7.



1. Introduction

As the title of this book reveals, I look here at railway developments in a context beyond the national. I use the notions of ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ throughout the analysis. It is useful to distinguish between these two notions, and in so doing I find Andrew Webster’s definition of those two concepts closest to my own thinking. According to Webster ‘whereas ‘international’ means ‘between nations’ and so reinforces the idea of dealings between states, ‘transnational’ means ‘extending beyond or across national boundaries’ and so represents a crossing of the boundaries that separate nations or states.’57 Or, as Schot defines the two concepts ‘while ‘international’ presumes that nation-states are the primary actors and fill the entire space of action beyond the level of the nation-state, ‘transnational’ suggests that international spaces involve processes where nation-states can be very active and even dominant but that other actors can have such role as well.’58 Often in my narrative I use the concept of ‘internationalization’ of railways. By such a term I refer to the achievement of interoperability across national borders. The concept concerns not only the standardization of the technical aspect, but also the homogenization of the operational and administrative aspects that allow rolling stock to cross borders and different railway networks to function as one system. Finally, I treat ‘Europe’ in my narrative as an actor-category. In this point I follow the methodological suggestion introduced by Misa and Schot, who, in their introductory article in the History of Technology mentioned above, do not consider ‘Europe’ to be a fixed geographic entity. Rather, they note, ‘Our focus is on how actors design and use technologies to constitute and enact European integration.’59 Studying an international subject presents many challenges, and historians can adopt different research strategies while approaching it. The decentralized way in which railway networks developed in Europe renders the work of the historian particularly challenging. Early on in my research, I decided to focus the greatest 57  ‘Whereas the term ‘international negotiation’ suggests a balancing of national interests between highlevel representatives of both sides, charged with getting the best possible for their own country at the least cost in concessions to the other side,’ the term ‘transnational’ is more appropriately used ‘for negotiation based on common interests among people on either side of the artificial line on the map.’ Andrew Webster, ‘The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations,’ in CEH 14, no. 4 (2005), 498. Also for an account on how to write history of technology from a transnational perspective see Erik Van der Vleuten, ‘Toward a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls,’ T&C 49, no. 4 (2008), 974-994. Additionally on the notion of transnationalism see Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism,’ CEH 14, no. 04 (2005): 421-39; Akira Iriye, ‘Transnational History,’ CEH 13, no. 02 (2004): 211-22. 58  Schot, ‘Transnational Infrastructures and European Integration,’ 12. 59  Using ‘Europe’ as an actor category is a broader historiographical line of the TIE project, see Johan Schot, ‘Imagining and Living Europe’ (working document no. 3, TIE project, http://www.tie-project.nl), 4; Misa and Schot, ‘Inventing Europe; Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe,’ 8-9.

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part of my analysis on material from archives of international organizations. In this point, I share the thesis of Vleuten et al., who argue that compared to national archives, international organizations and their archives constitute a research site better suited to bringing into view the overall picture of European infrastructure collaborations and those excluded from them. As Vleuten et al argue, ‘Since such organizations typically had little decision making power but rather functioned as arenas for co-coordinating and negotiating federalist, national and corporate interests, focusing on them should allow us to investigate the juxtaposition and relative weight of various interests in transnational infrastructure development.’60 However, in order to grasp more thoroughly the dynamics of railway integration in Europe, I complement this strategy with an analysis from the point of view of a single nation-state, Greece, using national sources. This case study should be considered as an exemplary case for the argument that the construction of a European system was a process negotiated not only at the international level but also within national borders. Furthermore, it shows how negotiations at the European level influenced national railway developments too. The selection of archives that I studied was ultimately the outcome of several considerations. First, I evaluated the importance and membership of the international bodies that were discussing issues relating to the achievement of the interoperability of railway traffic on a European scale. Second, the availability and accessibility of the archives of these organizations was an important practical consideration. The archive that provided me with the bulk of the material for the composition of my first three empirical chapters was the archive of the League of Nations. Additional material I collected from the archive of the International Labor Office. The archive of one of the most important international organizations in the interwar years, the International Union of Railways (UIC), was inaccessible, which forced me to follow its activity through its official published instrument, namely its monthly bulletin. In addition, I consulted the monthly bulletins of the International Railway Congress Association (IRCA), and the Central Office for International Transport by Rail (COTIF, 1893). Finally, I conducted complementary research in the national archives of Italy, and collected interesting original publications from different libraries, such as the French national François Mitterrand library, guided in each case by earlier findings in archives of the aforementioned international organizations. Furthermore, research in railway and engineering journals of national origin, 60  Erik van der Vleuten, Irene Anastasiadou, Frank Schipper and Vincent Lagendijk, ‘Europe’s System Builders; The Contested Shaping of Transnational Road, Electricity and Rail Networks,’ in CEH 16 (2007): 325.



1. Introduction

many of which claimed international status, at least in the titles, provided me with further useful contextual information on the most important national and international railway developments. Such sources also provided useful commentaries from a national perspective on international developments. Criteria that guided my selection of journals to be studied were primarily the diffusion and importance of each journal as evaluated in secondary and primary sources, as well as the subjects treated. Practical considerations such as language barriers and availability also played a role. I meticulously collected material from The Railway Gazette. Published in Great Britain, it was a mixed journal, established before WWI and incorporating older, more specialized British railway journals such as the Railway Magazine, the Railway News (founded in 1864), the Railway Times (1837) and Herapath’s Railway Journal.61 From the turn of the century onwards, the Railway Gazette paid increasing attention to engineering matters. The process of amalgamation, and with it the scope of the Railway Gazette, continued in the years before the outbreak of the war.62 By the end of the war, the editors of the journal argued that ‘a professional railway journal could be successful only by having the world for its sphere,’ and dealing with matters concerning management, engineering and operation as affecting overseas, as well as home railways. Consequently the Railway Gazette acquired a more international focus.63 A French commercial perspective is provided by the Journal des transports, revue commerciale des chemins de fer et de la navigation, published by the Chamber of Commerce of Paris (1878 to 1939). Finally, I collected additional information from the French journal Revue générale des chemins de fer, published by the French national railway network SNCF. For the fourth chapter, railway archives in Greece were unavailable, so I based my narrative partially on secondary literature and partially on my extensive research in Greek engineering journals. More specifically, historiography on the Greek railway network is limited. The most comprehensive study is the economic study of Leuteris Papagiannakis. This study is chronologically confined to developments from the formation of the Greek state up to WWI. These were the years when the 61  These were largely financial papers and derived most of their revenue from official notices and reports of the railway companies meetings, which were then held half yearly. The first purely technical modern railway periodical to make its appearance was the Railway Engineer (RE). The RE was considered a pioneer by virtue of its recognition of the importance of the engineering and manufacturing sides of railway activities, and ‘the value of progress that was to be secured by the accurate ventilation of both developments and problems.’ ‘One hundred Years of Railway Publishing,’ RG 62 (1935): 849-853. 62  On April 3, 1914, the Railway Gazette and the Railway Times were amalgamated, and almost simultaneously the then competitive Railway News completed its own series of absorptions by taking over The Railway Official Gazette. 63  By 1920s two more journals were amalgamated in the Railway Gazette, the Railway News and the Railway Engineer. ‘One hundred Years of Railway Publishing,’ RG 62 (1935): 849-853.

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Greek railway network was constructed. Furthermore his study is geographically limited to the pre-WWI borders of the Greek state with only some literature available on the history of the lines in Macedonia and Thrace that were to constitute part of Greece after the Balkan Wars and the WWI. Little, however, has been written on the development of the Greek railways in the interwar years, particularly with regard to the action undertaken by the Greek state in order to reshape the Greek railway network to meet what they saw as the needs imposed by the new socio-political conditions of the interwar years.64 I base my analysis of the interwar years on material from all the engineering and railways journals published in those years that are available in the public libraries of Athens.65 These were, Archimedes (1899-1923 & 1934-1938 & 1947), Erga (1925-1931), Technika Chronica (19321942 & 1945 up to today), Railway Review (1829, 1932), Promitheus (1890-92) and Industrial and manufacturing review (1914–1918).66 Archimedes was the first official journal of the Greek Polytechnic Association, established in 1899. It constituted a forum where engineers discussed issues relative to public works, infrastructures, industry, energy etc.67 The journal Technika Chronica was published by the Technical Chamber of Greece, starting in 1923.68 Industrial and manufacturing review was the journal of the Association of the Greek industrialists, manufacturers and tradesmen.69 In addition I complement my analysis with findings from the Railway Gazette and the Revue général des chemins de fer where relevant. While it must be acknowledged that my sources show some bias toward the Anglo-Saxon and French world, my aim here is not to exhaust the issue. Instead 64  The most comprehensive study of the history of the Greek railway network that of the Greek historian Leuteris Papagianakis, is focused on the formative years of the construction of the network, the years from 1869 up to 1914. Παπαγιαννάκης, Λευτέρης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι 1882-1910 [Greek railways, 1882-1910] (Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, 1990). Furthermore on different aspects of the development of the Greek railway network see Γιάννης Ζαρταλούδης et al., Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι: Η Διαδρομή τους από το 1869 εώς και Σήμερα [Greek railways from 1869 to our days] (Αθήνα, Μίλητος, 1996); Αντρέας Δεληγιάννης and Δ. Παπαδημητρίου, ‘Η Ιστορία των Σιδηροδρόμων στη Βόρεια Ελλάδα’ [A history of railways in northern Greece], in Ιστορία της Νεοελληνικής Τεχνολογίας [History of technology in Modern Greece] (Πάτρα: ΕΤΒΑ, 1988), 157 – 164; ‘Ολγα Τραγανού-Δεληγιάννη, ‘Οι Σιδηρόδρομοι και η Ιστορία τους. Έρευνες και Προσπάθειες Διάσωσης και Προστασίας’ [Railways and their history. Effforts for their maintenance and protection], in Ιστορία της Νεοελληνικής Τεχνολογίας, Τριήμερο Εργασίας, (Πάτρα: ΕΤΒΑ, 1988): 153-156; Πρόδρομος, Ματζαρίδης, Συνοπτικό Ιστορικό των Ελληνικών Σιδηροδρόμων [A brief history of the Greek railways] (ΟΣΕ, 1996); Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, ‘Phantom Rails and Roads: Land Transport Public Works in Greece During the 1920s,’ JTH 19, no. 1 (1998): 33-49. 65  In particular I conducted research of journals in the following libraries: library of the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), library of the Chamber of Commerce of Athens, library of the Parliament, library of the Hellenic State Railways (HST) and finally the National library of Greece. 66  From these journals I have looked at the available for consultation volumes. 67  Αντωνίου Γιάννης, Οι Έλληνες Μηχανικοί, Θεσμοί και Ιδέες [Greek engineers, their institutions and ideas], (Αθήνα: Βιβλιόραμα, 2006), 136, 140. 68  Ibid., 244. 69  Ibid., 258.



1. Introduction

I hope to open up a discussion on the developments and negotiations that took place at an international level concerning the shape of the European railway network. The material collected, presented and interpreted here is a sample providing an insight into the process of the constitution of a European railway network. It is as such that in putting together this book my aim has been to provide a rich analysis and a firm foundation for what I hope it will become an internationally scholarly dialogue. The book is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, I look at plans put forward during WWI for the construction of railway arteries. At a time when the future of Europe was being negotiated at a political level, scenarios for constructing alternative railroad networks in Europe reveal how international competition was reflected and embodied in such schemes. During the war, but also in the period of the Depression in the 1930s, engineers and politicians put forward plans to generate new flows of traffic and restructure the existing infrastructure to accommodate a new Europe. It seems that few of these plans managed to influence actual network building in the interwar years. Their study, however, is important for several reasons. Firstly, they provide an insight into the socio-political agendas of the allied powers in the interwar years. Secondly, they suggest that railroad technology was intimately intertwined with broader ideologies of interwar Europe, including nationalism and the nascent ideas of European union or federation. Thirdly, they point to the construction of transnational railway arteries as a means of strengthening the political and economic relations between European countries and as well as creating transnational alliances that embodied the political agenda of some circles during the interwar years. Finally, they give important insights into the development of railway technology and the expectations into the new role that it could attain within a globalized economy. In the second chapter, I examine the negotiations and actions undertaken by international bodies after the end of WWI to establish a new international railway regime that would allow easy cross-border traffic in Europe. A central theme in this chapter is an analysis of the work that the League of Nations undertook to establish a universal convention that would define the international railway regime. The work of the League is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it was the dominant transnational political alliance in the interwar years that encompassed Europe and issues of European co-operation. It worked throughout the interwar years to provide a forum in which diverse institutional and private actors addressed problems and issues of railway co-operation. It was also the first body in which general questions of international railway co-operation encompassing

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a large number of European countries were discussed.70 Many specialized governmental bodies had been created to deal with railway issues in Europe since the second half of the nineteenth century, but none adopted a comprehensive approach to the issue of railway transport. Instead, they examined and promoted standardization of specific aspects of railway operations. For example, the Central Office for International Transport was working on international legislation,71 the Technical Unity on Rail Transport on technical standardization,72 while the International Railway Congress Association discussed specific railway problems from an engineering perspective.73 In contrast, the Transit Organization of the League of Nations worked on any aspect of railways, necessary to ensure freedom of communications and transit.74 Until the establishment of the League there were no pan-European organizations for transport and communications. The League’s Transit Organization filled that role.75 Secondly, according to accounts of contemporaries, despite the global vision of the League, the influence of the Transit Organization, and more specifically its rail-subcommittee was greater in Europe than in any other part of the world.76 Finally, methodologically speaking, looking at the work of the League is consistent with the socio-technical approach that I adopt herein and focusing on the work of the League on railways allows me to discuss such aspects and contexts of network operation. In my third chapter, I explore the internationalization of railways in Europe and its limitations. In the first part of the chapter I look at how international railway 70  The German Verein can be considered as its predecessor. However, the Verein only encompassed railway administrations of Central Europe. Lochner, ‘The Influence of the German Railway “Verein”’; Philippe, M., ‘Notice sur l’union (Verein) des chemins de fer Allemands,’ RGCF 2, (1879): 241-251. 71  Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire’; Idem., ‘Modèles ferroviaires nationaux’; Idem., ‘The Internationality of Railways.’ 72  ‘Standardization on Continental Railways: L’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ RG 17 (1912): 569; ‘Standardization on Continental Railways, Continuous Brakes for Goods Trains-the Recent Trials at Vienna,’ RG 17 (1912): 597-99; ‘International Equipment,’ RG 29 (1918): 251; Unité technique des chemins de fer (Berne: L’Office Fédéral des Transports, 1982). 73  ‘The International Railway Congress,’ RG 33 (1910): 70; ‘The International Railway Congress; Report of the Berne Meetings,’ RG 33 (1910): 91-97; ‘The International Railway Congress,’ RG 13 (1910): 4-6; ‘The Work of the International Railway Congress,’ RG 14 (1911): 150; ‘The International Railway Congress; Report of the Berne Meetings,’ RG 33 (1910): 4-6; ‘The International Sleeping Car Company to-Day,’ RG 36 (1922): 478. 74  Harry Osborne Mance, ‘Convention et statut sur la liberté du transit,’ in L’ œuvre de Barcelona (Paris: Payot, 1922): 59. 75  In this book I use the word communication in its old meaning, including transport. As Hostie mentions in his manuscript ‘the word ‘communications’ has been used throughout as it was internationally understood during the period between the two World Wars.’ It is equivalent, therefore, to the present expression ‘transport and communications.’ Library of the UNECE, Jean François Hostie, The Organization of Transit and Communications of the League of Nations, Typewritten Manuscript, Geneva (n.d.), 1. 76  Harry Osborne Mance, Frontiers, Peace Treaties and International Organization (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 10; Ralph Lewis Wedgwood and J.E. Wheeler, International Rail Transport (London: Oxford University Press, 1946).



1. Introduction

passenger traffic developed in interwar Europe. Here, as appropriate I am making a distinction between passenger and freight traffic. Whereas the projects discussed in the second chapter of this book concerned both the running of passenger and freight traffic, here I am focusing on the development of international passenger traffic in the interwar years. The choice to focus my analysis on passenger traffic is due to the difficulty I encountered on locating sources on the development of international freight services during the interwar years. However, I argue here, the study of the development of international passenger traffic allows an estimate of the degree of internationalization in the interwar years. I base most of this account on a description of the services provided by the International Sleeping Car Company (henceforth Wagons-Lits). In the second part of the chapter, I look at the limitations of internationalization in the interwar years. I do this by looking at two issues: the agreement for the electrification of railway lines of international concern, and the implementation of automatic couplers for the railways of Europe. This provides an insight into the role of new bodies such as the International Labor Office (1919) in shaping railways in Europe. Discussions of both issues reveal the conflict of interests in the decision making process on the shape of the European railway network. The two issues are of particular interest because they concerned new technologies on which there was no previous agreement at an international level. Instead, different (national) railway networks were experimenting with different technologies. In the fourth and final chapter I change focus to look within a nation-state at the case of the development of the Greek railroad network. This chapter has a dual purpose. First it will show how the plans for the construction of transnational railway arteries discussed earlier in the book were received within the nation-state; second, it explores the influence of international developments on the national level. Assessing this influence forces me to extend my analysis deeper into the nineteenth century beyond the interwar framework of this book. Finally, I draw some conclusions from this broader analysis. I discuss the two distinct paradigms for the internationalization of railways put forward in the interwar years, by which I mean the two distinct methods of internationalizing railways. Furthermore, I summarize the factors and motivations that influenced international railway traffic, discussing the variety of actors, motivations and agendas that were engaged in discussions on the internationalization of railways in Europe. Finally, I explore these agendas to assess whether there was a common European idea during the process of internationalizing railways.

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2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Central European Traffic Routes Germany and Austria-Hungary played a prominent role in international railway traffic in Europe throughout the 19th century and until the outbreak of the war. Germany possessed a dense railway network in Europe in the years before WWI.1 This was a result of the rapid development of the German railway network after 1870. At an international level, the German Railway Union (1847) exercised great influence over the railway affairs of central and northern Europe, particularly in promoting co-operation among railway administrations of different nationalities.2 German railway policy expanded beyond the frontiers of German states as evidenced by the case of the financial contribution from Germany to the construction of the Gotthard tunnel (the construction of the tunnel started in 1872 and lasted until 1882).3 Both Germany and Italy had contributed two thirds of the necessary capital for the construction of the Gotthard railway. In return, they enjoyed preferential treatment in the matter of goods rates and were entitled to share the profit from the exploitation of the line when those profits were in excess of seven per cent dividend. When the Swiss government decided to nationalize the railways in the first decade of the 20th century, Germany claimed similar preference for its freight traffic on the whole of the Swiss Federal Railways, including all lines to be constructed in the future. It based this claim on the argument that since the Gotthard was part of the Federal Railways, any rights in connection with that line passed de facto to the whole.4 Italy, which saw itself as entitled to equal treatment with Germany, requested the same concessions.

1  There was a huge expansion in the track, doubling between 1880 and 1913, and in absolute terms the increase in rail kilometers exceeded that of France and Britain. Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and Transport, 1830-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 72. 2  Lochner,‘The Influence of the German Railway “Verein” on the Construction and Equipment of Railway Rolling-Stock,’ Zeitungs-des Vereins 61 (1896): 436-452. 3  For an account on the co-construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss national identity see Judith Schueler, Materialising Identity: The Co-Construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss National Identity (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008). 4  ‘The Gotthard Railway,’ RG 14 (1911): 276.

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The Swiss federal railways took over the ownership and operation of the Gotthard railway without waiting to conclude the negotiations with the shareholders and with the German and Italian governments. This gave rise to complications. After the Swiss railway nationalization scheme had been decided on, the acquisition of the Gotthard by the federal government was fixed to take place in 1909, and the line was formally taken over in this year. However, it was found impossible to conclude negotiations with the shareholders of the powers concerned by this date. It was therefore decided that the unfinished business should be circumscribed by special conventions on terms to be discussed with Italy and Germany. The main effect of these arrangements was that both countries were to be accorded preferential rates on the Gotthard, and special facilities in the event of certain other Alpine routes eventually being constructed. In turn for these concessions, both countries were willing to waive the repayment of the sums contributed by them towards the construction of the line. In 1911 the Railway Gazette reported: ‘The draft agreement has just been published, and has aroused a perfect storm of indignation in Switzerland. Germany demands not only the most-favored nation treatment on the Gotthard line, but also on all the other Swiss railways actually existing, in progress and yet to be built.’5 Consequently, the draft agreement provoked outrage in Switzerland and the French did not receive it favorably either, seeing it as an instrument through which Germany had economically enslaved Switzerland. According to the French, the Gotthard Convention was costing Switzerland its economic sovereignty by tying it to German merchandise.6 Similarly, the interests of the Austrian-Hungarian empire influenced railway developments outside their territory throughout much of the 19th century. Austrian railway policy before the war aimed at protecting its interests in the Balkans and mainly at assuring Austria-Hungary’s economic penetration into Turkey and Asia. According to the Convention of 9 May 1883 (‘Convention à quatre’) signed by Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria undertook the obligation of constructing certain railway lines in their territory through which the direct railway communication between Vienna-BelgradeNiš-Sofia-Constantinople and Niš-Skopje-Thessalonica would be re-established. Contemporaries observed that as a result of this convention the railways of the 5  ‘Gothard Railway Complications,’ RG 14 (1911): 3. 6  ‘Chemins de fer interalliés: conférence faite par M. Mange, directeur de la compagnie d’Orléans au groupe parlementaire du cercle républicain du commerce et de l’industrie le 24 Décembre 1918, JT 42 (1919): 1.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Balkan Peninsula, which before 1883 had been a series of scattered lines, developed into a network connecting the Balkan Peninsula to central Europe.7 Consequently, both as a result of their geographical position and their railway policies, AustriaHungary and Germany acquired a dominant position in Europe with respect to transit traffic of both goods and passengers to the East. As publications during WWI reveal, transit traffic from Western Europe to the East followed the German railways, which due to their better conditions provided the shortest route. By the end of the 19th century, German control of the railway routes to the East seemed to be strengthened through the concessions that the Germans gained from the Sultan of Turkey for the construction of the Baghdad railway.8 The importance of Germany and Austria-Hungary in international transit traffic becomes apparent in the case of the well-known Orient-Express train. The Belgian engineer George Nagelmackers introduced sleeping cars into Europe after seeing them used in the USA. Having gained the agreement of many European governments, he established the first company to run international passenger railway services in Europe, the Compagnie internationale des wagons-lits et des grands express européens (henceforth Wagons-Lits). The most famous of these trains was the Orient Express, which ran from Paris to Constantinople starting in 1883.9 The Orient Express was the only train carrying passengers and mail from Western Europe to the Orient in the 19th century and beyond until the outbreak of WWI. For a great part of its trajectory, it crossed areas of Germany and Austria-Hungary.10 Proposals for the establishment of different railway routes to the East were constantly put forward in the first decades of the 20th century, but were blocked by 7  Κορώνης, Ιστορικαί Σημειώσεις επί της Ελληνικής Σιδηροδρομικής Πολιτικής [Historical notes on Greek railway policy] (Αθήναι: Ξένος, 1934), 12-13. 8  In 27th of November 1899 and 16th January 1902 ‘His imperial majesty, the Sultan of Turkey and the German Company of the Anatolian Railways signed two conventions granting to the aforesaid company an extension of their railways from Konia to the Persian Gulf.’ Sarolea in his book in which he attempted to alert the British interest in these developments argued that, that convention marked a new era in the foreign policy of the German Empire. ‘By that convention Germany has secured by one stroke of the diplomatic pen what England and Russia have striven for generations to attain – and a great deal more!.’ Charles Sarolea, The Baghdad Railway and German Expansion as a Factor in European Politics (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1907), 4. For the history of railways in the Balkan peninsula see also Alexander Kostov, ‘Les Balkans et le réseau ferroviaire Européen avant 1914,’ in B8: European Networks, 19th-20th Centuries: New Approaches to the Formation of a Transnational Transport and Communications System, ed. Andrea Giuntini, Michèle Merger and Albert Carreras (Milano: Università Bocconi, 1994), 93-103; Frederic Barbier, ‘Entre les réseaux? La péninsule balkanique revisitée,’ in Les entreprises et leurs réseaux: Hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs, 19-20, ed. Michèle Merger and Dominique Barjot (Paris: Presses de l’université de Paris Sorbonne, 1998), 297-310. 9  George Behrend, The History of Wagons-Lits, 1875-1955 (Modern Transport Publ. Co. Ltd, 1959). 10  Shirley Sherwood, Venice Simplon Orient-Express: The Return of the World’s Most Celebrated Train (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), 27-8. For a description of the early trips of the Orient Express see George Behrend, Grand European Expresses: The Story of the Wagons-Lits (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 45-70.

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the opposition of the Austrians. Indeed, with the opening of the Simplon tunnel in 1906, the longest tunnel till then connecting Switzerland and Italy, the French saw possibilities of establishing new international flows of traffic. In particular, as a direct result of the Simplon, they saw an opportunity of attracting flows of traffic that previously had been following the railway routes passing through the Gotthard. When the Simplon tunnel opened to traffic in 1906, a new international train de-luxe was inaugurated, the Simplon Express, which ran from Paris with a sleeping car and a van from Calais through Lausanne, Brig (Switzerland) and the Simplon Tunnel to Milan.11 In 1907, it was extended to Venice and then, in 1912, to the Austrian port of Trieste making it the eastern terminus of the Simplon Express.12 During the timetable conference that was held in Bremen in 1906, the representatives of the French railway company Paris Lyon Mediterranean (henceforth PLM) promoted a scenario for establishing a new international railway service.13 After the opening of the Simplon tunnel, it was thought that a service semiparallel to the Orient Express could be arranged through the valleys of the Po and the Sava up to Belgrade. The establishment of the proposed service would connect Switzerland, Italy and the southern Slavic countries, via Belgrade, to the routes of London and Paris to Constantinople. This would also permit the construction of a new system of communications with the Greek peninsula. Consequently, the new service would ensure that the Orient Express no longer monopolized relations between Western Europe and the Balkan Peninsula.14 According to contemporary sources, Gustave Noblemair initially conceived the idea for such a service during his tenure as a director of the PLM Company. The representatives of this company tried in vain during the Bremen conference to break the monopoly held by the Orient Express, which, until 1914, passed through the Danube basin over routes to the East and the Balkan Peninsula. However, the new service was not established in view of the fact that the government of Austria-Hungary opposed allowing such a competitor to the Orient Express.15 After the opening of the Lötschberg tunnel, (1913, Switzerland) Italy again proposed an agreement to establish a connection between the express train connecting Paris to Milan, the Simplon Express, and the Orient Express in Budapest. However, Austria again refused to implement it.16 11  ‘The Simplon Route Approach Railways: the Texts of the Franco-Swiss Convention,’ RG 33 (1910): 52-54. 12  Behrend, Grand European Expresses, 70. 13  See C.M. Loiseau, ‘Le développement des services internationaux de Wagons-Lits depuis la guerre,’ RGCF 48 (1929): 220. 14  Ibid. 15  Ibid., 220-1. 16  C. Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo nel programma ferroviario dell’ intesa (Torino: Camera di commercio e industria di Torino, 1919), 11.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Establishing railway communications that would avoid the areas of Germany and Austria-Hungary was the main theme of a number of diverse proposals for the reconfiguration of railways in Europe after the outbreak of the WWI. Such proposals appeared mainly in France and Italy, but found also support after the end of the war in many of the newly created countries of Central Europe as well as in Spain and Greece. More generally, the main theme of this chapter concerns proposals for establishing transnational railway arteries in the interwar years. The notion of ‘transnational’ is appropriate here, since, as I will show throughout my narrative, such arteries would not merely satisfy national interests. National interests were indeed among the primary motives of the proponents of those plans. However, regional interests, and more specifically the desire to upgrade the economy of certain ports and sub national regions by incorporating them into the global movements of commercial traffic, and increasingly, tourist traffic, were among the main aims of those promoting those plans. This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I discuss plans for the construction of the grandiose trans-European arteries that were put forward during the WWI. In particular, I look at a plan to create a grandiose railway artery along the so-called line of the 45th parallel, which would connect Western Europe to the newly created countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the East whilst avoiding territories belonging to the central empires. Before I discuss this plan, which originated in France, I describe the general climate in France that was favorable to such an initiative. In particular, the call for such an artery was associated with local initiatives for improving railway communications in Western France. Subsequently, I describe the idea for the artery itself and its reception at an international level. As I show this idea, was related to the initiative of the allied governments after the war to establish a new international service, the Simplon Orient Express, which started running in the aftermath of the war. I also discuss a further and no less grandiose project to construct a railway artery that would complement the line of the 45th parallel by connecting France (Paris) as well as London to Spain and North-West Africa. Both projects were meant to increase the economic ‘radiance’ of France. Their proponents also argued their importance for the consolidation of the economic and political entente of the allied countries. In the second part of this chapter I look at similar initiatives in the 1930s, when Europe was in economic depression. Amidst the economic crisis that Europe was facing, plans for transnational railway arteries revived as part of more specific appeals for the construction of a European railway network. However, it seems that due to the economic situation in Europe, they found less support at an

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international level than the initiatives earlier discussed in this chapter. The rhetoric used in discussing the construction of transnational railway arteries is of great interest, however, and reveals the belief that the large-scale reorganization of the European railways could provide the means for the socio-political reorganization of the European continent during times of European crisis. Finally, in the conclusion of this chapter, I assess the success or failure of these plans.

Figure 2.1–Railways, Alpine Mountains and European Commerce Source: Édouard Herriot, ‘La ligne Suisse Océan,’ Je sais tout (1918): 156.

Allied Alternative Transport Routes After the outbreak of the war, the allies found themselves cut off from railway communications to the East, whereas the Central Empires were proceeding with what the allies saw as German plans for the ‘monopolization’ of the routes to the East. As an article in the Railway Gazette mentions: ‘The minds of all thoughtful Germans are full of the idea that Constantinople is the key to the Near East, including Mesopotamia with its boundless underdeveloped fertility... Moreover, not only does she hope to hold Constantinople the key to the Near East, but also to settle in Palestine and Syria and thus creep gradually towards Egypt.’17 In 1916, the Germans replaced the Orient Express with the Balkan Zug (Balkan Express).18 The Balkan Express ran from Hamburg to Istanbul over the territory 17  The New ‘Balkan Express,’ RG 24 (1916): 61-2; The ‘Balkan Train,’ RG 25 (1916): 251. 18  Discussing the establishment of the new train, the RG reports ‘the importance for Germany of having such a train service is too obvious to require explanation. Not only will she be able to transport troops



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

of the Central Empires. It consisted for the most part of rolling stock belonging formerly to the allied railway administrations, particularly Belgium, that the Germans had seized after the outbreak of the war. In order to achieve a direct railway communication to the East as far as Baghdad, the Germans seriously investigated the possibility of constructing a sub-marine railway tunnel under the straits of Bosporus.19 In addition, during the war the German government set up a new sleeping car company, the Mitteleuropäische Schlaf und Speisewagen Gesellschaft, abbreviated to Mitropa. The aim of this company was to compete with the WagonsLits, which had until then been the only company providing international sleeping car services in Europe.20 During the war years, allied trade journals discussed their dependency on the German and Austrian railway networks denouncing the pre-war dependency on the railway systems of the Central Empires.21 Both commerce and passenger transit traffic through the now-enemy countries had formed the shortest distance on different international routes such as from England to Denmark and the Scandinavian Kingdoms; from France to Russia, Greece, Turkey, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania; from Italy to Scandinavia and Russia; and from Scandinavia to the Balkans. Most importantly, the railways of Germany represented: ‘The bulk of the mileage of the only land route to Constantinople, the gateway to the Baghdad Railway, to Egypt, and thus, eventually, to the Cape–to-Cairo route.’22 and ammunition, but also the cereals – the Romanian wheat and maize- and the cotton from Asia Minor, which she so much needs, although the cereals at present are supposed to be coming by way of the Danube... Germany seems now not to be talking or even thinking much about Calais being the key to London, but on the other hand the minds of all thoughtful Germans are full of the idea that Constantinople is the key to the Near East, including Mesopotamia, with its boundless underdeveloped fertility. This is a fact which the ordinary Englishman does not seem to have grasped, but it is a point of the utmost importance, for the existence of our Empire and of our trade depends on our preventing Germany from getting hold of Constantinople and settling there so that she can never be dislodged again. Any patched up peace would simply mean that Germany has gained her end in this war. Already she has acquired such a hold on Turkey that she would be quite satisfied to conclude any kind of peace now, which would give her a free hand in the Near East. Moreover, not only does she hope to hold Constantinople, the key to the Near East, but also to settle in Palestine and Syria, and thus creep gradually towards Egypt.’ Ibid. 19  Michael Barsley, Orient Express: The Story of the World’s Most Fabulous Train (London: Macdonald and Co., 1966), 23; Charles Sarolea, The Bagdad Railway and German Expansion as a Factor in European Politics (Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1907), 23. 20  Géo Gérald, Mange, Benès, Jonesco, Cels, Atlantique-Mer Noire, ‘Bordeaux-Odessa,’ ou ligne dite du 45 parallèle, métropolitain de l’Europe, barrière antigermanique (Paris: Le courrier franco American, (n.d.)), 11. On the history of the establishment of the Wagons-Lits see chapter 4. 21  ‘Paris to Constantinople,’ RG 26 (1917): 509; ‘European Avoiding Lines,’ RG 26 (1917): 513; ‘InterAllied Railway Systems: a Vital Necessity in View of the Pre-War Dependence upon German-Austrian Railways for European International Traffic,’ RG 30 (1919): 995; ‘Improving International Routes,’ RG 33 (1920): 1-12; ‘Inter-Allied Railway Systems,’ RG 30 (1919): 995; G. Allix, ‘Voies d’ évitement Européennes,’ JT 40 (1917): 47; ‘Un réseau des chemins de fer interalliés,’ JT (1919): 91; ‘New International Routes,’ RG 30 (1919): 37. 22  ‘Inter-Allied Railway Systems: a Vital Necessity in View of the Pre-War dependence upon German-

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Engineers and politicians put forward proposals for the construction of new railway routes that would avoid the territories of the Central Empires. Such railway arteries would complement the sea routes and constitute an important economic and political instrument in the hands of the allies that would contribute to an increase in their economic and political power in the aftermath of the war. The Germans’ ‘monopolization’ of the railway routes to the East had contributed, according to the allies, to the increase in the economic importance of the German ports on the North Sea in the context of the overall commercial traffic in Europe. Before the war, German ports attracted transit traffic through Europe, but also traffic to and from neutral European countries such as Switzerland. As historiography documents, since 1870, French, Belgian and Dutch railway companies had rigorously competed to capture the streams of traffic from the big continental routes, as well as those used by England in its journeys to and from both its Empire and America.23 By the beginning of the 20th century, the ports of the North Sea seemed to have won. Statistics published in the Journal des transports reveal the dominant position of the North Sea ports with respect to the commercial movement to and from Europe. According to statistics published in a report of Antwerp’s Chamber of Commerce, the German ports on the North Sea and the ports of Belgium and the Netherlands handled the major part of commerce arriving at or departing from Europe in 1904. As far as the imports of goods was concerned (measured in tonnage) Antwerp was first in the list, followed by the Dutch ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the German ports of Bremen and Hamburg, the French ports of Bordeaux, Dunkerque, La Havre and Marseille, and finally the British ports of Liverpool and London. In exports, Rotterdam was followed by Hamburg, Antwerp (Belgium), Bremen, Marseille, Bordeaux, Amsterdam, Le Havre and Dunkerque. The report concluded that the most important competitors of Antwerp were Rotterdam and Hamburg, a situation that was similar to the year 1903.24 Clément Gondrand, one of the founders of the big transport company Gondrand Frères (48 branch offices in France, Italy and in other places) put forward an interesting idea, which is discussed in the Journal des transports. Gondrand pleaded in favor of the creation of a Latin union of the Mediterranean Sea. The object of the union would be to promote an alliance between the ship owners of France, Italy and Spain to benefit the three big ports of Marseille, Genoa and Barcelona and to ‘chase away’ the German and British fleet from the Austrian railways for European international traffic,’ RG 30 (1919): 995. 23  Laurent Bonnaud, ‘Le tunnel sous la Manche (1867 – 1993) ou le triomphe de l’Isthme court de l’objet technique a l’enjeu commercial,’ in B8, European Networks, 32-36. 24  ‘Les grands ports européens,’ JT 29 (1906): 319.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Mediterranean. ‘To the Latin people, the Southern Sea,’ he argued, ‘to the AngloSaxons, the North Sea.’25 The Journal des transports observed that if this idea were realized, the Mediterranean Sea would become a Latin lake and nobody would have the right of traffic, apart from French, Italian and Spanish ship owners.

Figure 2.2– Central European Traffic Routes Source: ‘Inter-Allied Railway Systems: a Vital Necessity in View of Pre-War Dependence upon German-Austrian Railways for European International Traffic,’ RG 30 (1919): 995.

Swiss Access to the Sea through France The allies and especially the French saw Switzerland as economically ‘enslaved’ to Germany. According to contemporary sources, the improvement of railway communications between Switzerland and the French seaports, which would create additional outlets to the sea for Switzerland, was already of concern to the French 25 

‘La méditerranée Franco italo-espagnole,’ JT 28 (1905): 70-71.

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government and parliament before the war. However it seems that no concrete action in this direction was undertaken before the outbreak of the war. Géo Gérald, a deputy of Charente (region in Western France), initiated one such action (1916).26 It is logical to assume that his motive was primarily regional, to improve the economy of his region by better incorporating regions of Western France into routes of commercial traffic. Indeed, in a speech that he gave at an inter parliamentary meeting (December 1918), which I discuss later in this chapter, noted that: 'A new unprecedented period of prosperity will begin for France, provided that all those who desire the reconstruction of our economic edifice would co-ordinate their efforts well... Several projects have appeared... Thus, in order to repair the enormous mistake in the route of our railways and in their timetables, that resulted in the traffic of all the departments being concentrated on Paris, it was proposed to create a line that would connect Switzerland to the sea. In order to attract towards France the traffic between the East and the two Americas, it was projected to design an immense line that would connect Bordeaux to Odessa through Lyon, Turin, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Belgrade and Bucharest...’27 After his failure to initiate concrete action on behalf of the government, Gérald took the initiative of constituting a provisional committee devoted to the issue, after ‘having explored the principal interests in France and Switzerland.’ This initiative was favorably received. Early on, representatives of many commercial and municipal councils from regions of Western France and Switzerland belonged to the provisional committee.28 In Switzerland, commercial and financial personalities as well as members of the administration of federal railways received the 26  The French government was already preoccupied before the outbreak of the war with the improvement of the lines of communications between Switzerland and the French seaports, however no concrete action was then undertaken. Gérald, describing the conditions that led to the establishment of the committee ‘Suisse Océan,’ noted that the critical situation (due to the outbreak of the war) for both Switzerland and France led to the revival of the idea of the Grand Central, which the French parliament had discussed four or five years earlier. Géo Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan (Paris: Ligue navale française, 1918), 26. 27  Géo Gérald et al., L’ Atlantique-Mer Noire, 7-8. In the years before the war, a network radiating from Paris and reaching the French frontiers was constructed. Kimon Apostolus Doukas, The French Railroads and the State (New York: Octagon, 1976), 17-48. In those years, when a railroad pattern evolved, it followed the established routes of travel. It retained for Paris its dominant position both as the political capital and the commercial centre of the nation. Each trunk was laid out to serve a distinct territory or region, radiating from Paris as the spoke of a wheel. Ibid, 270. 28  The following municipal councils participated in the provisional committee ‘Suisse Océan’: the municipal council of Lyon, Limoges, Angoulême, Confolens, Périgueux, Cognac, la Rochelle, Royan, Rochefort, Libourne, Bordeaux, Agen, Orthez, Arcachon, of the French and Swiss Chambers of Commerce of Geneva, of the Swiss Chamber of Commerce of Lausanne, of the Chambers of Commerce of Lyon, Angoulême, Cognac, Rochefort, la Rochelle, Périgueux, Bordeaux, as well as the general councils of the lines traversed opinions directed to the same aim. Gérald, La ligne Suisse-Océan, 27.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

project enthusiastically. Journals from Paris, the provinces and even foreign journals commented favorably on the establishment of the committee.29 The Committee ‘Suisse Océan’ was constituted in its definite form in France on the 21st of December 1916.30 The purpose of the committee, according to the first article of its constitution, was ‘the improvement of the economic relations between the two Americas, the Iberian Peninsula and the Western regions of France on the one hand and the Eastern regions of France, Switzerland, Italy and beyond on the other.’31 Gérald, apart from being one of the most active members of the committee, also served as its president throughout the years of WWI. On the 15th of September 1917 Gérald gave a speech to the French maritime association (Ligue navale française) in which he presented the history of the committee’s establishment, its considerations and its future goals. Germany, he argued, was preparing for a commercial and industrial battle in the aftermath of the war.32 In his talk he stressed the importance of re-orienting the economic policy of France so that it would be in a position to counterbalance Germany after the war.33 France, he argued, was an indispensable link between England and Italy, between the Atlantic Alliance and the Mediterranean or East and more generally as a link connecting the old to the new continent. Reports compiled by the committee showed that commercial exchanges between Switzerland and overseas countries passed exclusively through German territory in the years preceding the war. In particular, commerce and passengers from Switzerland were passing through the railways or waterways leading to Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp. For example, in 1913 the participation of France in the total commercial movement from and to Switzerland remained less than one third, and it hardly touched the ports of Marseille (200.000 tones) and Le Havre (50 000 tones). This was despite the fact that the distance to the main German ports from the principal ports of America was greater than to the French ports.34 Furthermore, this preference for routes to German ports was not a result of more favorable tariffs, since a comparison of the tariffs would be to the benefit of France.35 Instead the reason why passengers’ and goods’ traffic from Switzerland preferred German ports and railways was the poor state of the French railway lines leading to French ports. The constitution of the lines was such that they did not permit the circulation of traffic at high speeds and trains on bogies, 29  30  31  32  33  34  35 

Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 27. Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 3. Ibid., 3. Gérald, La linge Suisse Océan, 8. Ibid., 7. Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 31. Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 31.

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which were heavier but more comfortable for passenger traffic.36 During the war, exchanges between the port of Bordeaux and Switzerland increased significantly due to the blockage of ports on the North Sea.37 As Gérald argued, one of the primary considerations of the committee was to work to maintain and intensify those new streams of traffic immediately after the war. Gérald argued ‘we have to try to capture those new streams of traffic that were created to the detriment of the ports of the foreign countries.’ In order to achieve this goal, it was essential to open up new markets to the French ports by improving the communications that led to them. Fast and comfortable services should be provided.38 France being second only to England in the number and importance of its ports and size of its colonial empire should claim a larger share of traffic from and to Switzerland, extracting this important transit country from the influence of Germans.39 In order to achieve this, it had to improve its communications with the rest of the countries and especially Switzerland, a country that before the war had been enslaved economically by Germany through its dependence on the German transportation network.40 In this way, not only would Switzerland profit from acquiring an outlet to the sea through French ports, but the political bond also between the two countries would be enhanced.41 The French seaports would in effect become the maritime outlets of Switzerland. Consequently, one of the first steps towards realizing the committee’s goal was the improvement of the railway communication connecting Switzerland to the French seaports. In particular, the port of Bordeaux should acquire a new role in order to become the terminal port of a big international line that would connect it to Odessa.42 In his speech Gérald noted: 36  The decreased amount of traffic was a result of the insufficiency of railway lines that were of single way and of uneven profile. Ibid. 37  Ibid. 38  Ibid. 39  Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 1-3. 40  Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 23. 41  Ibid. 42  To achieve the goal of maintaining the streams of traffic, it was important to improve the speed of the voyage from Berne to Bordeaux (950 km). This took longer than the trip from Berne to Hamburg by approximately four hours (1001 km), despite the fact that this route was shorter by 51 km. For this reason, Gérald argued, it was important to place one powerful artery in the centre of France of double or triple track throughout its route, in inclinations less than ten millimeters, in curves of radius greater than five hundred m. In the network of Orléans, this existed in between Bordeaux and Saint-Sulpice-Laurière through Périgueux; from there onwards however the line had to be improved. Two proposals could give the desirable result. The first was to double the existing line from Saint-Sulpice-Laurière to Gannat or to Moulins and to straighten it by flattening the land or partial deviation of the line. The other option was to open an entirely new line that would be detached towards Limoge, and would reach the region of Moulins directly, passing in the south in Montlucon. The proposed project adopted the latter: a new line through Bourganeuf and Auzances, reaching towards Saint-Germain des-Fossés that would unite with the PLM



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

‘Why has Bordeaux, which used to be such a flourishing port, remained an almost exclusively French port, which, I would say, is of rather local importance... The war was necessary sirs, to make us finally see the deplorable conditions of our ports and the (communication) routes that are connected to them. And whereas such an admirable fresco as the Puvis de Chavannes projects Marseille as a port of the East, why is Bordeaux not what it is destined to be, a European window amply and powerfully open to the West Indies? And even more, it could serve as a link between the two Americas, particularly Central America, rich in prospects and in markets after the opening of the Panama Canal, and Central and Southern Europe freed from the Teutonic influence. How much more time will it take until the port of Bordeaux is properly utilized, and our communication to our African colonies finally exploited and made prosperous?’43 Throughout the years of the committee’s existence, Gérald had argued the importance of improving communications between Switzerland and the French seaports, evoking, as I discussed above, regional and national interests. However the completion of the line would also be of international importance. He argued that: ‘The “Suisse-Océan” [route] would constitute the first section of the [route] Bordeaux-Odessa; it will naturally be prolonged on land both via the “Trans Pyrenean” line and through the future line Bordeaux-TangierDakar, which would give our economic radiance an incalculable reach...’44 The committee had as members prominent personalities from the political and industrial world of France. The French ministers of foreign affairs, public works and of commerce and industry, as well as France’s ambassador to Switzerland served as honorary presidents of the committee.45 Furthermore, Edward Herriot served as a vice president of the committee during the early years of its establishment.46 Due to the action of Herriot, who was ‘long since dedicated to the “Suisse Océan’’’ the first step was undertaken for the realization of the goals of the committee.47 When he became minister of public works (1917), he invited the French railway companies Paris Orléans and PLM to submit proposals for the improvement of the railway communications of Western France.48 In the same year, the and reach Lyon through Roanne and Tarare. Gérald, ibid., 33-4. 43  Ibid., 13. 44  Ibid., 36-7. 45  Gérald et al, Atlantique Mer Noire, 3. 46  Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 28. 47  Ibid. 48  Ibid., 28 – 29. In 17 January 1917 the French minister of Public works assigned to the French railway

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Company Paris Orléans, after undertaking studies, proposed a plan for the route that would connect the PLM to the port of Bordeaux. In 1919, the same company, after conducting a new study, presented a new route that would run a bit further north (see Figure 2.3). At the same time, the minister of public works (service du contrôle des lignes nouvelles) had studied a third route, characterized by the concern of staying as close as possible to the route of 1917 to the western part. In its meeting of the fifth of July 1922, the superior council of railways expressed a favorable opinion for the construction of a new line between Jonchère (coastal city in Western France) and St-Germain des Fossés (city in central France), which it believed would exploit the advantages of both routes.49 During the French conference of public works in 1924, an engineer of the Railway Company Paris Orléans, Soustelle reported on the history of the lines and the different routes that were proposed. Soustelle, in his report to the commission of routes and railways of the fifth congress of national public works, argued once more on the regional, national and international importance of the project. The improvement of the railway communication from Switzerland to the French seaports, he argued, was very important from a touristic point of view. It would allow the inhabitants of Western and Southwestern France to visit the French Alps and Switzerland while allowing the inhabitants of Switzerland and the region of Lyon to easily reach the French Atlantic shores and Spain. From a national point of view, it would permit the development of traffic between the regions under consideration and consequently assure France a large part of the commercial movement that had bypassed it up to that point. Finally, the line was very important from an international point of view, since: ‘The “Suisse Océan” would constitute, as a matter of fact, a section of a great line of communications under the name of the 45th parallel. This would connect in a continuous chain France to Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Romania, and Southern Russia; it would place in the same route Odessa, Bucharest, Belgrade, Agram, Trieste, Venice and Milan. Through this line it will be possible to reach either Paris, England and Belgium through Switzerland, or Lyon and the French ports of both the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean, and in addition Spain, the Americas and the Western Coast of Africa. The new state of Czechoslovakia will also Company Paris Orléans to study the project of a railway line that would connect the network Paris-LyonMediterranean (PLM) to the port of Bordeaux. Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 15-6. 49  Soustelle, ‘Rapport sur le “Suisse-Océan”,’ in Congrès national des travaux publics français, [5o 1924, 8-10 Décembre, Paris], 5o Congrès, Paris 5-7., 3rd section; chemin de fer et routes [2] rapport sur le Suisse Océan, par Soustelle.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

be connected to this line. Consequently, communications between Paris, London, Brussels and Serbia, Romania, Southern Russia even Turkey would not be conducted through Hamburg and Austria, but through the new line. Through this line the communication between Switzerland to the Ocean would also be established.’50 Indeed, as WWI was breaking out, action was taken at an international level to realize this grandiose railway artery across Southern Europe. Before I discuss the action undertaken, however, it is important to look at the history of the idea of the line and its reception within political and commercial circles in France.

Figure 2.3– Proposals for Improvement of Communications Western France Source: Soustelle, ‘Rapport sur le “Suisse-Océan”,’ 9.

Inter Allied Railway Project As I also mentioned earlier in this chapter, the belief that the military battle would be continued on the field of economics after the war had been widespread in allied political and military circles since the outbreak of war. During a conference held 50 

Ibid., 1-3. Here citing from 3.

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in Paris in the early years of the war, the representatives of the allied governments observed that: ‘The empires of Central Europe are preparing together with their allies a battle in the economic field, a fight that will not only live on after the reestablishment of peace but that will gain at that moment its full magnitude and intensity.’51 Victor Boret (1872–1952), deputy of the French parliament, observed in his book La bataille économique de demain that the war was coming to an end, an allied victory. However the end of the military conflict, he observed, would not imply also the end of the war. Instead, ‘the work of the soldier should be complemented and perfected by the work of the merchant.’52 He goes on by observing that: ‘Some will think that perhaps it is wrong to speak of a liberating victory, because they estimate that it will be impossible to disarm Germany, even if it has won; in any case the battle, once stopped in the form of military conflict, will be continued as a rough economic battle where Englishmen, Latin and Slavs on the one hand and Germans on the other, will seek to dominate by exhausting the enemy.’53 In his book, Boret notes the importance of promoting France’s industrial development and improving the banking system, in particular with respect to the system of credit, appealing to the Parliament to take action in this direction. As the case of the establishment of the committee ‘Suisse Océan’ shows, more people shared his ideas, although they saw establishing better communications, in particular through the construction of railway arteries, as an important means for the ‘commercial defense’ of France. The French poet, economist and diplomat Paul Claudel was the first to put forward a comprehensive proposal for the establishment of an international railway artery that would place France at the center of global routes of commerce. He drafted the proposal in 1916 when serving as commercial representative of the French embassy in Rome, naming the line ‘the line of the 45th parallel’ because it was geographically situated throughout its route at an equal distance from the equator and the Pole.54 According to contemporary sources, Claudel was inspired by the discussions that were taking place during the European timetable conference at Bremen in 51  52  53  54 

Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 9. Ibid., 8; Victor Boret, La bataille économique de demain (Paris: Payot, 1918), 20. Ibid., 17-8. As an official of the French government Claudel served in China, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Rome.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

1906. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, during this conference, the French railway society PLM became the spokesperson for an important movement of public opinion in France, Italy and England that, as contemporary sources report, already then sought to diminish German dominance over communications to the East.55 The line that Claudel proposed would connect Eastern and Western Europe while avoiding the territory of the Central Powers.56 It would extend from the French port of Bordeaux through the French city of Lyon to Turin, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Fiume (today in Croatia), Agram (today Zagreb), reach the Danube close to Belgrade, go through Romania via Bucharest and finally reach Odessa.57 Such an undertaking did not require extensive construction work. In the greatest part of the route (2500 km), railway lines already existed, with the exception of a zone through Belgrade and Orsova (in Romanian and Serbian territory) where there was need to construct a line of 200 km. The line as a whole would constitute an innovation particularly with respect to the agreements that had to be drawn up among the interested countries regarding the administration of traffic, timetables and tariffs. However, in the long run it was necessary to upgrade the existing lines so that they would constitute sections of the larger international artery. France should complete an important section of the line between Bordeaux and Lyon and duplicate the line over its entire length, that is, run a parallel track.58 This project was a synthesis of earlier projects that had been presented in France and Italy for the construction of railway lines that would cross Europe in different directions. For example, in France regional initiatives had protested against the construction of a railway network that would centre on Paris. Improvements had been requested concerning the connections between the ports on the Atlantic and Lyon, Switzerland and Northern Italy. However, no substantial progress had been made in that direction. The European war stopped commerce from Hamburg and made Saint-Nazaire and Bordeaux American ports.59

55  Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 10. 56  G. Allix, ‘Voies d’évitement européennes,’ 21-23; G. Allix, ‘Voies d’évitement européennes,’ JT 40 (1917): 47. 57  Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 11. 58  Ibid., 12-3. 59  Lorin, ‘Un réseau ferre interallié,’ 418.

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Figure 2.4–The 45th Parallel Source: Giuseppe M. Sibille, La linea del 45 parallelo da Bordeaux ad Odessa attraverso il Monginevro dal 1857 ad oggi e nel suo imperioso avvenire, 1972, 230.

Claudel, as well as those who supported the project after him, argued that the line would have both economic and political advantages. Economically the line would claim traffic from the ‘Hamburg-Baghdad’ line while it would diminish the importance of the German northern ports. This was an issue of great importance owing to the German monopoly of the extensive terrestrial routes to Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Claudel argued that the line would unite territories of the allies that were complementary rather than competitors. In making such claims, Claudel expressed ideas that were put forward again in the 1930s, during the depression, by the French economist Francis Delaisi. The western part of Europe, observed Claudel, was overpopulated and suffered from chronic shortages of primary materials and foods. In contrast, the eastern part of Europe produced these primary materials and foods in excess but lacked manufactured goods. Claudel foresaw that after the war even the provisions from America would be insufficient to reconstitute the stocks of Western Europe. He estimated that the role that Eastern Europe would play in the provision of food supplies to Western Europe would significantly increase after the end of the war. Along the 45th parallel, equilibrium would be established between the American imports and imports from Eastern Europe. Politically, Claudel argued, the line of the 45th parallel



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

would connect France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Romania and Southern Russia in a continuous chain and thus would establish a closer bond between the allies and all those who had experienced the German menace, including America. The line would be the natural prolongation of the transversal line from San Francisco to New York. It would bring the Latin peoples and the people of the Entente closer together and thus contribute to the creation of new friendships while bringing the radiance of the ‘Latin civilization’ to the countries of the East. It would thus pull them away, Claudel argued, ‘from the influence and the unchallenged invasion of Germanism that has long weighed upon economically backward populations to their disadvantage, and with clearly egoistic aims.’ Finally, through the new line an autonomous connection between the allies and the new Russia could be established.60 In a meeting that was held on the fourth of October 1916, the board of the Association ‘France Russia,’ which was presided over by the French Minister of Public Education and Inventions Painlevé and by E. Herriot, was reportedly ‘overwhelmed’ by the project for the construction of the grand ‘Trans-European artery,’ the line of the 45th parallel, connecting Bordeaux to Odessa via Lyon, Turin, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Fiume, Agram, Belgrade, Bucharest, Bender. Spanning some 2.500 km in length, this line was to be the ‘metropolitan line of Europe,’ and an eminent engineer, Georges Hersent, presented a favorable report on the project on October 18 of that same year.61 According to contemporary accounts, Claudel communicated his plan to the minister of commerce, the most important French commercial groups and the press, all of who received it favorably.62 Important French personalities commented favorably on Claudel’s project, contributing significantly to its popularity. In an article dated first December 1917 published in the newly established journal Revue des nations latines, Henri Lorin, a professor of economic geography at the university of Bordeaux and member at the time of the International Economic Committee ‘Suisse Océan,’ discussed the importance of the construction of an inter allied railway network.63 He described the project of the line of the 45th parallel as a line that would constitute the axis of a powerful railway system containing connecting points and extensions so as to connect with the railway networks of the allied nations. Lorin observed in his article that in the aftermath of hostilities, in routes without 60  61  62  63 

Henri Lorin, ‘Un réseau ferre interallié,’ 421. Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 26-7. Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 22. Henri Lorin, ‘Un réseau ferrée interallié,’ Revue des nations latines (1917): 407-23.

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trans-shipment of more than 2-3000 km, the railways, if well administered, would constitute immediately the most practical means of transporting even heavy and low-value products across Europe. He argued that: ‘Here it is a progress that the Allies should pursue as soon as possible, it is a matter of mutual understanding of the essential needs of each one of them (referring to the allies) and of the common belief of the (importance of the) solidarity of all.’64 He consequently called for the concerted action of the allies in the field of transport. The German Verein, he argued, had been an important instrument in German hands for establishing a strong ‘Mittel-Europa’ in the years before the war. He called on the allies to constitute their own ‘internal’ railway organization that would facilitate international railway traffic among them.65 He proposed the construction of two railway axes that would divert commercial routes so as to only cross-territory of the allies. The line of the 45th parallel, which Claudel had conceived would cross Europe horizontally while a vertical railway axis, the line ‘London-Bridinsi’ would connect to this line at Milan. Lorin argued that the time was right for the project of the line of the 45th parallel.66 Discussing the section Bordeaux-Fiume, he argued that this would be one of the most precious instruments of the inter-allied economy after the war. He argued: ‘Before the war, the ports of Hamburg and Bremen had benefited from the combination of the German Verein and the navigable waterways that radiated throughout Southern Europe. The line from Bordeaux to Fiume would do the equivalent for the French and Italian docks, and together with its tributary lines, would replace German ports with Bordeaux, Marseille, Genoa, Venice, Trieste and Fiume and even Barcelona.’67 Lorin argued further that the project did not present any insurmountable difficulties. Railway lines already existed on the greater part of both routes; however, works were necessary to improve the capacity of the lines so that they could accommodate a considerable amount of traffic. In the case of Italy, in order to avoid danger from German submarines in the Mediterranean, the allies had developed their land communications across the Italian peninsula. These lines would 64  65  66  67 

Ibid., 412. Ibid., 407-8. Ibid., 418-9. Ibid., 419.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

constitute part of the railway axis ‘London-Bridinsi.'68 Departing from London, this railway artery would be directed through a tunnel to Calais, would continue on to Berne and Milan, and would reach the Italian port of the Southeast Bridinsi. From Bridinsi, or any other port of southern Italy, railway communications would continue to the west coast of the Balkan Peninsula. The Strait of Otranto could be crossed at its narrowest point (80 km), if not through a tunnel, then through ferryboats carrying trains. In the Balkans, the line would continue through the coast of Albania, where the lines already built by French and Italian engineers would have to be duplicated. The extension of this ‘European metropolitan line’ to the Balkans would follow the path of the ancient Roman road, extending from Dyrrachium (today Durres) to Thessalonica. Such a line would connect Western Europe to Athens Thessalonica and Constantinople, via a fast railway communication, bringing Greece, a ‘new friend of the Entente,’ into direct contact with the allies. Lorin called on the allied governments to convene a conference with the participation of delegates from Belgium, France and Italy so as to define an interallied transport policy. At a later stage, German presence would be indispensable.69 In February 1918, Edward Herriot, at the time mayor of Lyon and senator, published an article in which he called the governments to take action on the scheme that Lorin had proposed. Herriot agreed with Lorin that it was time that the allies establish a common railway program.70 ‘Italy is closed to us today; never before has our collaboration with her been closer or more fraternal. It would be convenient if she would help us to destroy the Gotthard Convention without damaging Switzerland. And for the rest, it is a policy of transport that the allies should establish, a policy that demands patient study. We should believe in this. Regarding railways, the task that it is imposed on us is not less formidable. This consists in utilizing what M. Lorin called in a striking expression the two inter allied transport axes that would be crossing each other in Milan.’71 With the support of the allies, in particular Great Britain and the United States, as well as more distant places such as Japan and Brazil, Herriot argued: ‘We could reorganize the world on an entirely new basis. We will be able not only to free ourselves, enrich our country, which is so much in need of new resources, but also liberate Italy over which [Germany] 68  69  70  71 

Ibid., 413-4. Ibid., 422-423. Herriot, ‘A propos de la ligne Suisse Océan,’ 158. Ibid., 159.

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exercises such strong control, and guarantee the economic independence of Switzerland.’72 According to Herriot, the line Bordeaux-Lyon-Turin-Milan-Trieste-BelgradeBucharest-Odessa would compete successfully with the line Paris-Berlin-WarsawMoscow-Petrograd, while opening up an invaluable passage between overpopulated Western Europe and resource-rich Eastern Europe.73 However, Herriot recognized that the political and military events during the year of the article’s publication (1918) did not allow the project to be realized. Austria still possessed Trieste while the Central powers held Belgrade and Bucharest and the political situation in Russia was unstable. One part of the project however could and had to be executed immediately. It was the one advocated by the authors of the project ‘Suisse Océan’ that would unite Bordeaux with Switzerland. He also argued for the continuance of the large line from the West to Turin and Milan to give a new importance to at least the first of these two cities that had previously been omitted from the main streams of circulation. Even so, Herriot stressed the importance of envisaging the more direct and faster connections between Bern and Bordeaux. Figure 2.5– Inter Allied Railway Source: Lorin, ‘Réseau ferrée interallié,’ 411.

Figure 2.6– Railway Line Bordeaux-Odessa 72  73 

Ibid., 162. Ibid.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Source: Édouard Herriot, ‘A propos de la ligne “Suisse-Océan”’ in Je sais tout: Magazine encyclopédique illustre, 1918, 15 Febr. 160-1. Figure 2.7– Bordeaux and Odessa, Head (s) of the Line of the 45th Parallel Source: Herriot ‘A propos de la ligne “Suisse-Océan”’ 162.

In his article, Herriot seems to become spokesman of the interests of SouthEastern France. The transalpine tunnels, he argued, had moved the traffic towards the East, causing significant economic damage to southern and eastern France. In his Tableau de la géographie de la France, Vidal (de la Blache) had shown that the commerce of Bordeaux had not yet received the important role that it deserved, as far as the economic life of France and its relations with the overseas territories was concerned. Bordeaux, Herriot argued in his article, offered great services and had undergone considerable progress during the war. Consequently: ‘It is neither imprudent nor pretentious to demand the important extension of a city that nature destined to become the window of all Southern Europe, a window open to the United States (the 45th parallel passes through Minneapolis and St. Paul), to Central Europe, to countries of a great future such as Brazil and Argentina. There is no sacrifice to which France should not consent in order to allow Bordeaux to be equipped in such a way that it corresponds to its magnificent destiny. At the other end of the projected line, Bern would also profit greatly, since it would be in a position to choose between at least two directions, and would no longer

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be forced to resort to German protection.’74 He closes his article expressing his opinion that an inter-allied Entente on the future transport regime as concerns both maritime and land transport would be an indispensable condition for a solid and reparatory peace.75

International Reception During a Conference of the Committee ‘Suisse Océan’ in Lyon in July 1918, the Italian deputy Theofilo Rossi, counselor of the chamber of commerce and industry of Turin, as well as president of the communications commission at the chamber of commerce of Turin, put forward for the first time the Italian interest. He argued that the new line to be constructed should serve the interests of the countries that had fought and won the war rather than the peaceful neutrals.76 As a result of the Italian intervention, a new association called ‘the league of the 45th parallel’ was established. The 45th Parallel League was alternatively also called the ‘Comité international du sud européen, Bordeaux Odessa, Atlantique Mer Noire ou ligne du 45e parallèle’. Its headquarters were in Paris.77 During the conference at which the 45th Parallel League was constituted, its program of action was decided. Membership was international and included representatives of various cities of Western France and Italy, such as the cities of Lyon, Bordeaux, Nantes and Turin. In addition, it included representatives from the industry of most of these cities, such as the chambers of commerce of Turin, Lyon, Limoges, Rochelle and the French chamber of commerce in Turin. Finally, a representative of the Italian minister of public works, delegates of the French societies PLM and Paris Orléans, and the president of the international economic committee ‘Suisse Océan’ were also members of the 45th Parallel League.78 Among the honorary presidents of the Committee were political personalities such as the French minister of public works, commerce and industry, the Italian minister of transport and commerce, and the president of the international commission of transit and communications. Similarly, among the members of the committee of patronage were personalities such as the president of the Romanian council of ministers J. 74  Herriot, ‘A propos de la ligne Suisse Océan,’ 159. 75  Ibid., 162. 76  Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 10. 77  The committee had as its goal the improvement of the economic relations of the French sea ports to Switzerland, Italy, the Balkan countries, Romania and beyond that through the improvement (strengthening) of the direct railways that connected these places, Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 5. 78  Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 16.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Bratiano, the president of the Greek council of ministers, Venizelos, the president of the administrative council of the French railway company PLM, Dervillé, the engineer G. Hersenti, the president of the chamber of commerce of Lyon, Coignet, the president of the chamber of commerce of Bordeaux, Dan Guestier, and a member of the Italian chamber of commerce of Turin.79 Géo Gérald was deputy and vice president of the council of foreign trade of France and served also as a president of the 45th Parallel League. The 45th Parallel League decreed that the line Turin-Lyon-Limoges-Bordeaux should be executed along the route proposed by the PLM and Paris Orléans railway companies. The line, they declared, would permit France to rapidly improve economic relationships with Italy and the two Americas (especially the United States and Brazil) through Turin, Milan and Venice in the case of the former and the line of the 45th parallel as regards the latter.80 The subsequent conferences, after the one that took place in Lyon on the seventh of July, were dedicated to consolidating the basic program that had been drafted at that time and to developing its role in intensifying French-Italian communications in general, and in connecting the projected line Bordeaux-LyonTurin to the line Milan-Trieste-Belgrade. A conference that was held on the 28th of August 1918 in the French chamber of commerce in Turin was surrounded in Italy by a wave of propaganda for the Bordeaux-Lyon-Turin-Milan line in order to profit from the contingencies of the time. The task of coordinating actions in Italy with those in France and presenting the Italian and French governments with the best route in harmony with the interests of the two nations was entrusted to the railway commission. This was composed of representatives of the community, the province and the chamber of commerce seated in Turin.81 The purpose of the committee was to study and report to the Italian government the best ways of protecting Italian interests and to push the government to act on the agreements that were concluded among the economic entities interested in the project as well as the more concrete decisions that were made during governmental conferences.82

79  Gérald, Atlantique Mer Noire, 5-6. 80  Dogliotti, La linea del 45 parallelo, 16-7. As contemporary sources report, in parallel to this conference, the international parliamentary conference of commerce was held in London. The object of the conference was to study the important economic questions of the years following the war. Two meetings in Paris and Rome had preceded it (1916 and 1917). Running into the question of the inter allied railways that was discussed at the conference in Lyon, the conference decided to submit the question to special commissions, and especially, to a French committee presided over by the deputy Carlo Chaumet for study. Ibid., 17. 81  Ibid., 17. 82  Ibid., 18.

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Central Europe and the Inter Allied Railway After the end of the war, an inter-parliamentary meeting was held on the 24th of December 1918 on the theme of the line of the 45th parallel. Representatives of both the committees ‘Suisse Océan’ and The 45th Parallel League participated. Géo Gérald, one of the first spokesmen of the conference, outlined the two important principles of action with respect to the inter-allied transport policy. He argued that: ‘The power of the German railways had been a great instrument of German expansion. If we intelligently employ the French railway along with the seaways and the waterways that complement it, if we employ it for the general interest, instead of the narrow local interests we have done so far, it could become an important means for the external economic renaissance of France of which we have dreamt and regarding which our Latin friends would like to see being strengthened.’83 He defined the policy required of the Allies as follows: ‘First, to assure the allied powers the penetration into the enemy countries that remain important markets, and second, and most important, to prevent the Germanic control of the inter-allied communications between western and southern Europe that (the allies) have tolerated for such a long time... and instead to create, at any cost and as soon as possible, an inter-allied network independent of (this) Germanic control; to establish a direct link between the allies; (such a network) would constitute a veritable anti-German barrier.’84 Mange, director of the French railway company Paris Orléans, stated in his speech that beyond doubt the effect of the allied victory over the central empires would be significantly weakened if the allies would not succeed in removing inter allied communications from the German influence.85 Later, the representatives of the newly created states of Central Europe spoke, with the Czech minister of foreign affairs I. Benès supporting the project and stressing that it would contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe. He too referred to the line of the 45th parallel as an ‘anti Germanic barrier,’ arguing that it was necessary to constitute a new 83  Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 11. 84  Ibid., 12. 85  ‘Chemins de fer interalliés: Conférence faite par M.Mange, directeur de la compagnie d‘Orléans au groupe parlementaire du cercle républicain du commerce et de l’industrie le 24 décembre 1918 ‘, JT 42 (1919): 1; Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 14.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

political block against German power. This political block would be composed of Czechoslovakia at the centre, Yugoslavia in the South, Romania at east coast, and finally Poland. Besides economic and political considerations, the transport question was a very important issue. The envisioned line would help Czechoslovakia to defend herself against the economic penetration of the Germans. He argued that the actual war had its roots in this peaceful economic penetration by Germany before the war. Consequently, Czechoslovakia aspired to become not only a political barrier, but also primarily an economic barrier from which not only central Europe but also France would profit. It was necessary for Czechoslovakia to connect to this new line, which would connect her both to France and to the sea.86 During the inter parliamentary conference Benès, the minister of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia expressed the desire of the Czechoslovakian people to intensify their commercial relations with France. He argued: ‘We would like, with the help of a skillful customs policy, to place a barrier to the external commerce of Germany, which has competed with England and France in the Balkans. This will be possible if we are connected to France, and if our external commerce, that to a great extent crossed Germany, in mainly with France.’87 In addition, he suggested that completing the line of the 45th parallel in central Europe would allow communications from Russia and Poland to France thus avoiding Germany. All the relations of Poland and of Russia towards France, he argued by way of an example, could pass through Prague, and Prague in turn could be directly connected to Strasbourg and thence to Paris. This line would not compete with the line of the 45th parallel; quite the contrary, it would complete the line. Consequently, he argued, it was possible to elaborate in central Europe an entire network of international railway lines, the centers of which would be connected to Czechoslovakia. This would be connected to Romania, to Yugoslavia and its ports, to Italy and to France. He argued: ‘We would like to collaborate with France on a durable peace regime in central Europe. We know that in order to achieve this we should be economically strong to preserve the politics of alliance that we have achieved during the war, and to always be in alliance with you. We could achieve this if our economic relations are reinforced and if we are connected, not only through our general ideas, but also through practical and economic 86  87 

Ibid., 19-20. Ibid., 20.

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interests. It is for this reason that we are accepting this idea of the internationalization of the railways, and it is for this reason that our government will do whatever is possible in order to attract the attention of important people to the importance of this idea.’88 Finally, Take Jonesco, previous vice president of the council of ministers in Romania, argued along the same lines, asserting that central Europe should be organized in such a way that Germany would not be able to begin a new war. This necessitated arranging the map in such a way that Germany would have the least contact possible with the rest of the world. He argued: 'We can reach this goal by arranging it so that the new States of the East are not political entities, but rather a political body ... It is necessary that those countries [referring to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland] constitute an alliance. That they will form together a powerful body, a body of considerable size that will constitute a barrier to Germany.’89 Czechoslovakia, he argued, was rather industrialized, while Romania was agricultural and Greece maritime. Those countries could constitute an ensemble that would be able to resist Germany and block its route to the East. However, he argued further, all the political unions of the world could not hold unless grounded in common economic interests. Consequently, it was necessary to form an economic union between these countries and France. He stressed the importance of the exchanges and the economic relations between these newly created countries and the West, ‘and it is you especially who for us represent the West.’ To this purpose, communications would have a very important role. He argued that Germany had exercised an important influence over Russia due to the fact that all the passengers to Russia going to the West had to pass through Germany.90 The meeting closed with the speech of Cels, the French sub-secretary of state, public works and transport. After thanking Géo Gérald for convoking the conference and the rest of the spokesmen, he closed the conference reassuring the 88  Ibid. 21. In April 1919, the JT reported that the Franco Czech Chamber of Commerce had studied the possibility of creating an inter allied railway network and establishing a transverse line from Poland to Bohemia and Yugoslavia, connecting at a certain point of its trajectory to the line Bordeaux-Lyon-Odessa. The creation of the projected line and the ramifications envisaged would offer great advantages for facilitating international transports and the development of commercial relations. ‘Un réseau des chemins de fer interalliés’, JT 42 (1919): 91. 89  Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire, 23. 90  Ibid., 22- 6.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

representatives of the allied countries that France would undertake action for the realization of the project that would ensure its direct communication to the rest of the allied countries.91 After the end of the war, interest in the project in Italy seems to have widened. In 1919 the chamber of commerce of Turin published a booklet on the history of the project, which presented the history of the line of the 45th parallel and the action that had been undertaken till then in Italy. The author, C. Dogliotti, reported that after the end of the war a national committee was constituted in Milan, composed of representatives of the municipalities, provinces, and chambers of commerce of Turin, Milan, Venice, and Trieste. The purpose of the committee was to study and report to the Italian government on the best means of protecting Italian interests, and to push the government to promote agreements among the interested economic entities. This publication was part of the effort to popularize the project in Italy. Dogliotti also stressed the project’s importance not only for Italian interests, but also for the more specific interests of the region of Turin. The president of the chamber of commerce of Turin, Ferdinando Bocca, mentioned in the foreword of this booklet that the publication was part of the propaganda that would help influence official representatives of the economic entities of the region to get interested in supervising the ultimate organization of the projected international line. This would make it possible to extract from it, in a short time, the maximum possible profit. The booklet’s author went on to state that from an international point of view, the line under discussion would appear as a symbol and sign of a railway policy based on larger international interests, and more specifically, of inter-allied interests. From a political point of view, it would constitute a powerful and solid bond of interests between the people that had suffered most from the German menace and had escaped it; besides, it would contribute to stabilizing the equilibrium in the relations between the West and the East that had been broken down under the influence of Germany. It would sustain the friendship of the allies and would radiate Latin civilization and thought into the Eastern countries.92 However, he argued, the advantages of this line were even more clearly visible in the economic field. The railways were powerful tools for the economic expansion of the nations that had them at their disposal and were able to regulate their tariffs. Doglioti reported that local conferences had been held in Marseille and Lyon, which were followed by agreements on segments of the projected line that would 91  92 

Ibid., 27. Ibid., 12.

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constitute important nodes for intensifying communications between France and Italy.93

Figure 2.8-2.9– The 45th Parallel as an Anti-Germanic Barrier. Source: Gérald et al., Atlantique Mer Noire.

Breaking the Spinal Cord of Germany: The Simplon Orient Express The allies regarded the line of the Orient Express, with its long extensions ViennaOdessa and Vienna-Bucharest-Constanta, as well as its connections to Berlin Petrograd and Moscow, as powerful means that allowed Germany the economic conquest of Eastern Europe. According to a report of the Turin’s chamber of commerce, in 1913, Russia had imported 642 million rubles of goods (mostly machines and wool) from Germany, while Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Greece and Montenegro were supplied almost exclusively from Germany. On the other hand, 93 

Ibid., 18-9.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Russia exported goods of value 452 million rubles to Germany in the same year. In contrast, it imported goods worth only 170 million from England (while exported to it goods of value of 266 million) fifty six million from France and sixteen million from Italy. Contemporary sources attribute these results to the German monopoly of the railway communications in Eastern Europe.94 During the meeting of the Commission of Railways, Ports and Waterways of the Peace Conference (March 1919), the issue of the line of the 45th parallel was put forward by the French and Italian delegations. As Claveille explained on behalf of the French delegation, there were projects for the discussion of two lines: the line of the 45th parallel and one from Paris to Belgrade via Switzerland. The line of the 45th parallel was the line Bordeaux-Belgrade-Odessa. Departing from Milan, the two lines would follow the same track.95 The conference decided to constitute a technical mission of the allies to discuss the issue, which held its first conference on the 18th of March. After discussions, the conference drafted an agreement for a new express train that would follow the line of the 45th parallel and would replace the Orient Express.96 Representatives of the governments signed the agreement on the 26th March 1919. The new train, designed to create direct connections between England, France, Italy and the Orient, would be called ‘the Simplon Orient Express.’97 As the JT reports, according to the convention, the international train de luxe would depart daily from Paris starting on the 15th of April, with connections to the East via Vallorbe, Lausanne, the Simplon, Milan and Venice. However, a sleeping car could not yet run beyond Trieste. The political situation in the Balkans was not yet settled and the frontiers were not decided. In addition, the situation beyond Trieste was still unknown with respect to the condition of the lines and whether they could carry heavy trains. Finally, the Wagons-Lits lacked the appropriate rolling material. Consequently, it was decided that beyond Trieste direct corresponding trains would complete the journey, one running to Bucharest and Odessa and the other to Belgrade and Constantinople. Finally, a third train would be separated from this line so as to reach Athens.98 Despite the fact that Italy was hoping for a line of the 45th parallel with Bordeaux as its departure point, it was decided that the service would start from Paris. From there it could be connected to London via Calais. In order to satisfy Italy, the mission decided to create a 94  Ibid., 13. 95  ‘Commission du régime international des ports, voies de eau et voies ferrées,’ in Conférence de la paix, recueil des actes de la conférence, Partie IV (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale), 32. 96  Ibid., 12. 97  Ibid., 159. 98  ‘Le Simplon-Orient Express,’ JT 42 (1919): 298.

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direct service Bordeaux-Gannat-Lyon-Mont Cenis-Turin that would join with the Simplon Orient Express in Milan.99 The JT observed that this new itinerary would define a line of great traffic that would without doubt be followed by a stream of goods and would establish direct relations between England, France, Italy and the East.100 The French journal Excelsior attributed global importance to the line. The new communication routes would serve not only to unite London and Bordeaux but also North America and Latin America to Asia, traversing only territory of the allies without allowing the enemy countries to profit from this transit traffic. These kinds of corridors would permit the allies to drain away all the commerce to their advantage and in particular would ensure their profit in the transport of cereals, petrol and other products from the Balkans and Southern Russia, which in turn would place Germany under the economic domination of the Entente.101 The new Orient Express was inaugurated in the fifteenth of April 1919.102 Half a year later, on the twenty second of August 1919, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia signed the new Simplon Orient Convention in Paris. The Convention determined the final regime of the Simplon Orient Express and the fact that the Wagons-Lits would run the service. According to article two of the Simplon Orient Convention, the governments that participated in the convention were obliged to refrain from participating in the formation of any other luxury train or sleeping car service that would compete with the Simplon Orient Express, especially any continuation beyond Vienna of such services to or from France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Any luxury train running through the central empires should reach no further than Vienna or Bucharest. Article four, paragraph three of the convention provided that ‘connections from London, Brussels and Bordeaux would be made by trains composed independently of the carriages of the Sleeping Car Company, first and second class coaches’.103 After a period of ten years, during which the 99  Ibid. 100  Ibid. 101  ‘Nouvelle voie de transit remplaçant l‘Orient Express,’ Excelsior, 10 année, no. 3045, 22 samedi Mars, 1919. 102  According to George Behrend the Simplon Orient Express inaugurated its trip on the 11th of April 1919. Behrend, Grand European Expresses, 70-71. Loiseau also notes the same date as the date of the inauguration of the Simplon Orient Express, ‘France, England, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece concluded a series of conventions with the Wagons-Lits company during the Peace Conference. The new train de luxe began running for the first time from the station of Paris P-L-M, on the 11th of April 1919,’ Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits depuis la guerre,’ 221. 103  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1093, Convention dealing with the inauguration of direct and rapid communication between England, France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the East, Article IV.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Convention would be valid, it could be extended with the consent of the participating countries for a period of five years.104 The convention of August twenty-two regulated the relationship between the networks and the Wagons-Lits, including the timetables and the composition of trains. This foresaw the delivery of direct tickets, as well as the direct registration of luggage, and obliged the governments to facilitate the passage at the frontiers. The company PLM was designated as director and administrator of the Simplon Orient Express. In fact, according to contemporary sources, the PLM played a primary role in the negotiations that led to the new convention. Under the title ‘Le transeuropéen,’ the JT reported on the new Simplon Orient Convention. The allies, it mentioned, were seriously preoccupied with ‘breaking the spinal cord of pan-Germanism, meaning the old Orient Express’. In May, the Belgians had requested that Belgium be attached to the Simplon Orient Express through a branch comprising Ostend, Brussels, Strasbourg, Basel, Gotthard and Milan. Consequently, Belgium and also Holland participated in the convention. ‘These two countries, competing for their relations with England united in order to be emancipated from the dependence of the Central Empires.’105 An important question that arose during the negotiations concerned the competition when the Orient Express revived. There was no question of depriving Central European countries of all connections to their neighbors; on the other hand, the Simplon Orient Express could not hope to supplant the Orient Express without blocking its re-establishment.

104  Article IX of the Convention concerning the duration of the agreement defined that ‘... the Convention shall have a duration of ten years. It shall be continued by tacit consent for periods of five years, with the power of withdrawal by any Government on condition that six months’ notice is given.’ Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1093, Convention dealing with the inauguration of direct and rapid communications, Article IX, 4. 105  G. Allix, ‘Le transeuropéen,’ JT 42 (1919): 430.

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Figure 2.10– New Railway Line would Replace the Orient Express. The title of the journal: ‘New line of transit would replace the Orient Express, this line will follow the line of the 45th parallel and would traverse only countries of the Entente.’ Box on the Right: ‘Thick line – New transit route will follow the 45th parallel from the Atlantic to the Black Sea without passing through areas of the allies. 80 km only needed of the route between Belgrade and Orsovo so that the line will be completed. Dotted line – Old Itinerary of the Orient Express and old project ‘Hamburg-Bagdad’ line that was blocked by the Allies. Dotted Area: Enemy countries avoided by the new project of the Orient Express.’ Source: Excelsior, ‘Nouvelle voie de transit remplaçant l‘Orient Express’ 22 March 1919, 10 Année, no 3.045.

Figure 2.11– Milan-Belgrade at the Intersection of Transit Routes under Modification. On the Left: ‘The old policy of Germany: A coalition to the central Empires, Bulgaria and Turkey resulted in the transformation of the train ‘Hamburg-Baghdad’ into the ‘OrientExpress,’ connecting Germany and Asia. The old ‘Orient Express’ would bring the passengers of the Entente to Belgrade following the route as before the war, from London, to Calais, Paris, Nancy, Strasbourg, Munich, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade. This resulted in the expansion of the German ports of the Baltic Sea which became the head of the big sea lines. On the Right: ‘New Policy of the allies: The project of the new trans-European line that will connect America and Southern and Western Europe with Eastern Europe. Because of this new train that will follow the 45 parallel, the Americans, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Swiss,



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Italians, will be able to communicate with Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakians, Romanians, Greeks, and Russians without passing through German, Austrian or Hungarian routes.’ Source: ‘Nouvelle voie de transit remplaçant l‘Orient Express,’ Excelsior, Vol. 10 Année, no. 3.045 (1919), 1.

Figure 2.12– Simplon Orient Express Map showing the itinerary that the new Orient Express would follow from fifteenth of April onwards and its timetable as established in the 25th of March 1919. Departing from Lyon it stopped in Trieste. From there a corresponding train would leave on the destination of Belgrade. Text Accompanying the figure: ‘the New Orient Express will be inaugurated in the 15th of April ‘(below) the timetable established during the meeting of the 25th of March, from the technical Inter allied Committee. Source: ‘Le nouvel Orient Express sera inaugure le 15 Avril,’ Excelsior, 10 April 1919, 2.

Consequently, article two of the convention was discussed in terms of what the participating governments could do to block any co-operation on services competing with the Simplon Orient Express. In virtue of this principle, the day on which the old Orient Express was re-established, it would stop in Vienna: no luxury train or service of direct sleeping vehicles coming from France, Belgium or the Low Countries could now be extended further, not even to nearby Budapest. At this point a lively debate arose. Before the war the luxury train Ostend-Vienna reached Budapest and many powers would have desired to see it re-established through its entire old itinerary. If the principle that was prevalent with the creation of the Simplon Orient Express triumphed, the JT reports, it was due to the support

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of the Netherlands, which came to support France, Switzerland, and Greece and brought Belgium and England around to the principle. The JT noted further that the new trans-European itinerary, besides its political and economic interest for the allied victors, presented travelers with a route far more economical in terms of its kilometric trajectory. The distance from Paris to Belgrade, which had been 2.032 km on the old Orient Express, was reduced to 1.092 through the Simplon Orient Express. Finally, the JT mentioned that: ‘Ιt remains to facilitate the voyage by establishing a more direct junction between Serbia and Romania and to complete the Simplon Orient Express by creating a new train de luxe Paris-Strasbourg-Prague and Warsaw, through which France will offer its hand to Czechoslovaks and Poles.’106

Figure 2.13– Simplon Orient Express from Paris to Athens Source: ‘L’Orient Express Paris-Athènes,’ Excelsior, 1920.

After June 1921 the Simplon Orient Express, which until then had been running three times per week, ran daily.107 In 1921 the Excelsior announced that the line would be soon complemented by another that joining at Lyon with the line of the 45th parallel, would subsequently reach Milan through the Simplon. Commenting on the opening of the line Thessalonica to Athens in 1917, which for the first time in history connected the Greek railway network to the networks of the Balkans and Central and Western Europe, and through which a branch of the Simplon Orient Express ran Excelsior commented that ‘it is a new zone of influence that opens up for our expansion, both intellectual and economical.’108

106  107  108 

Ibid. ‘Simplon Orient Express to Run Daily,’ RG 34 (1921): 822-23. ‘L’Orient Express Paris Athènes,’ Excelsior, (1920), 22, 1920.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

The change in the itinerary of the most prominent ‘train de luxe’ to date was accompanied by changes in the constitution of the administrative council of the Wagons-Lits. Before the war most of the leading European nations were represented on the council, with French interests being largely predominant. The absence of representatives from Germany, Austria and Hungary after the war led to the appointment of one English, one Spanish two additional French directors and three Italian directors.109 The action on behalf of the allied governments created apprehension in German commercial circles. Many international trains departing from Germany would lose their occupation as a result of the new express train. The situation is described in an article from the German correspondent to the RG: ‘Owing to the Orient Express, which runs to Constantinople and Athens, being arranged to travel in future via Venice, Trieste and Belgrade, thus avoiding Vienna and Budapest, which were formerly on the route, two celebrated connecting trains, the Hamburg-Berlin-Vienna and the BerlinOderberg [now Bohumín in the Czech Republic]-Budapest expresses, will find their occupation gone.’110 A few months after the Convention came into force, the delegations of Austria and Germany sent a letter to the president of the Peace Conference complaining about it.111 In his letter to the president of the Peace Conference, George Clemenceau (September 1919), H. Eichhoff, a member of the Austrian peace delegation, stated: ‘It is obvious that such a regime would forge new links in the chain of circumstances restricting and destroying the economic life of our republic.’112 Stressing the importance of the revival of international services through Austria for the economic, but also moral recovery of the Austrian republic, he requested that the Supreme Council intervene. On the 1st of September 1920, Layton sent a 109  ‘The International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 39 (1923): 326. 110  Other arrangements included changing the itinerary of the ‘Nord Express ‘to Russia and the Far East so that it would no longer run via Cologne and Berlin. This affected two other connecting trains, the Frankfurt-Berlin and Hamburg-Berlin Expresses. The German route to Copenhagen, which formerly offered the quickest service to and from London, lost its monopoly of speed, while the route between Switzerland, Cologne, and Frankfurt had already given way to the Franco-Belgian route via Brussels and Strasbourg, ‘Avoiding Prussian Railways,’ RG 31 (1919): 474. 111  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1090, Re-opening of Transcontinental Railway Routes, doc. no 1121. 112  Ibid.

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letter to the League of Nations complaining about the new convention that stood in the way of establishing fast through services from Ostend, Brussels, Cologne, Frankfurt, Nuremburg and Vienna to the Balkan States. He denounced the Simplon Orient convention making specific reference to article two as being contrary to article twenty three (e) of the Covenant of the League and requested its intervention.113 However, it seems that the appeals to the supreme council and to the League did not have any immediate effect. Five years later it is mentioned in the RG that in parallel to the running of the Simplon Orient Express, the Orient Express was running again through Germany. However, the train was running only as far as Bucharest and not to Istanbul as it had in the years before WW I. In 1932, the RG reports that the Orient Express had coaches running to the East for the first time since before the war.114 Soon after its creation, the service of through sleeping car carriages that would create the line of the 45th parallel by connecting the Simplon Orient Express to the port of Bordeaux was abandoned. Contemporary sources reveal that in June 1922, the Wagons-Lits had abandoned its line Bordeaux-Lyon-Milan, which ‘under the name of ‘line of the 45th parallel ‘was recommended as an organ of connection between America, Italy and the Orient.’115 There appeared to be little use for this service so the Wagons-Lits company re-established the sleeping vehicle for the itinerary Lyon-Milan, running in an ordinary train. It provided a service to Milan for passengers from central and western France who wished to use the Simplon Orient Express.116 Despite the fact that the trains were running, the important work of upgrading the existing lines throughout its course, thus rendering the line running along the 45th parallel a metropolitan line of Europe, never materialized. During the national congress of public works of France, in 1924 (third section on railways and roads) the engineer of the railway company Paris Orléans reported on the history of the project for the improvement of the railway communication of eastern France and argued its international importance for the completion of the 113  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1095, The Simplon-Orient Convention. 114  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 42 (1925): 798. Behrend, refers to the date of the running of the ‘Orient Express’ following its pre-war route from Paris (East) to Istanbul as being May 22, 1932. According to Behrend, ‘not until May 22, 1932 was it again possible to see a sleeping car labeled Orient Express, Paris (East)-Istanbul,’ Behrend, Grand European Expresses: The Story of the Wagons-Lits, 71. However, Wedgwood discussing the establishment of the Simplon Orient Express notes that in 1925 the monopoly of the Simplon Orient Express lapsed. Competing services were established, notably from Ostend via Vienna to Constantinople. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 71. This might be related to a conference that was held in 1925 between Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, the aim of which was to settle conditions for through service (passengers and luggage) between Germany and Constantinople. Ibid. 115  Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits depuis la guerre,’ 221. 116  Ibid.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

line of the 45th parallel.117 Later on in the interwar years, the line of the 45th parallel was one of the major, although uncompleted, railway arteries of southern Europe. Edward Herriot, at that time a minister of foreign affairs for France, enumerating the great railway routes of the world in his work the United States of Europe (1930), referred to it as the Meridian line of Europe and of the 45th degree, starting from Bordeaux and Nantes via Lyons and Milan to reach Odessa, and from thence to be completed by the trans-Caucasian.118 In this same work he described the railway network of Europe as admirable. Europe ought to use this valuable machinery, which, if properly utilized, had great potential to help her revive her lost glory. It was necessary, however, to achieve greater integration of the railway network: ‘If there were any need for further insistence on the necessity of uniting more and more our admirable network of railways, which is sufficient in itself to prove the development of our civilization, we could point to the fact that Europe possesses about 236,745 miles of rails, or 32 per cent of the world total, although her surface represents only eight per cent of the dry land of the world.’119 He further argued that integrating the existing railway systems of Europe would be important for its economic recovery and political unity.120 Later on, it seems that 117  Soustelle, ‘Rapport sur le “Suisse-Océan”.’ 118  Edward Herriot, The United States of Europe (London: George G. Harrao, 1930). 119  Enumerating the great railway routes of the world, he referred to ‘the line of the Northern Plain, uniting Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Leningrad and Moscow, and continuing in the trans-Siberian; and the Central European line, passing through Vienna, Budapest, Constantinople, and continuing by the TransAsiatic.’ Not surprisingly, he was an ardent supporter of the construction of the artery of the 45th parallel during the years of the war. Noting the ‘remarkable ‘efforts through which the Europeans succeeded in overcoming the obstacle of the mountain ranges of Europe-Pyrenees, Alps and in the Balkans- and to create the great Trans-Alpine lines, he comments that ‘The European will has been able to impress itself upon the old Alpine range, with the industrious and resolute populations living in its valleys. The French lines into Italy, with the Mont-Cenis tunnel, exploited as long ago as 1871; the Lausanne-Milan line with the Simplon Tunnel (1906); the Berne-Milan line, with the Lötschberg (1911); the Basle-Milan line with the St Gotthard (1883); the Basle-Vienna line, with the Arlberg (1884), the Munich-Rome line, running to Brenner; the Munich-Trieste line, with the Pyhrn tunnel (1907), the Vienna-Trieste line, with the Semmering and Tarvis passes (1879).’ He notes ‘these little fatherlands, sheltered in the Alpine valleys, have been united by civilization, human groups bound together to resist the violence of nature, to control the torrent or raise cattle in common. The carriage-route took the place of the mule-track, to be succeeded in its turn by the railroad.’ Finally, he refers to the trans-Pyrenean line, commencing at Bordeaux as destined one day to link up Europe with the African world. Ibid., 155-6. 120  Discussing the economic machinery of Europe, he stressed the need of greater integration of the network of railways of Europe. He notes however ‘for a Europe ready to unite such a network even in its present condition would represent an admirable instrument, opening up almost indefinite perspectives... Already from this summary examination we can see that if Europe intends to play her full part she must arrive at an understanding, in the fullest sense of the world. She cannot avoid relations with Moscow, with Constantinople, with Odessa, all of them connecting-links. Here as in the field we have been considering, the logic of geography and history points inevitably to union,’ ibid, 14, 156.

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these inter-allied railway schemes had an impact on different countries long after the end of the war. At the end of the 1920s, a Greek engineer Agapitos published in a Greek engineering journal a proposal for the construction of a railway line that he called ‘an Iron Egnatia Road’. The line would extend from Durres, through Thessalonica to Constantinople.121 In the following years, Greek engineers repeatedly put forward proposals for the construction of a Western railway axis in Greece that would answer both to local and international needs (see chapter 4).122 Similarly, in Italy, in November 1917, a commission was constituted under the name ‘Commission pour le trans-balkanique italien’. Its goal was to promote the connection of the Italian railways to the railways of the Balkan countries by means of a ferryboat service through the Strait of Otranto and the construction of the line Valona-Monastiri that would permit the railway continuity between Italy and Macedonia and consequently become the fastest communication between Italy and Constantinople.123 In 1972 the Italian lawyer and senator G.M. Sibille, in giving an account of the history of the line of the 45th parallel, pleaded in favor of its future realization for the economic prosperity of Southern Europe. The line, if completed, would increase the economic potential not only of the hinterland of Piedmont, but also for the entire traffic of the system of the ports of Liguria.124 He concluded his study on the history of the line of the 45th parallel writing that: ‘For us it remains only to renew the appeal of our fathers, which is still valid for all of Piedmont and the plain of Padana and the area that extends to the alpine arch, [and address it] to all the administrative, political and economic authorities of these areas so they will receive it and translate it into working reality at the service of Southern Europe because of the evident European function of the line of the 45th parallel from Bordeaux to Odessa.’125

121  Tympas and Anastasiadou, ‘Constructing Balkan Europe: The Modern Greek Pursuit of an ‘Iron Egnatia,’ ‘in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik van der Vleuten, and Arne Kaijser, (Sagamore Beach, Ma: Science History Publications, 2006), 25-49; Σπυρίδων Αγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδος-Ευρώπης, Η σιδηρά εγνατία οδός και η σύνδεσις Αθηνών Ρώμης,’ [The railway connection Greece to Europe, the iron Egnatia road and the connection Athens to Rome through railways], Έργα 4 (1928): 337-41. 122  Tympas and Anastasiadou, ‘Constructing Balkan Europe,’ 25-49. 123  ‘Le chemin de fer transbalkanique italien,’ JT 40 (1917): 263. 124  Giuseppe M. Sibille, La linea del 45 parallelo, 227. 125  Édouard Herriot, ‘A Propos de la ligne Suisse-Océan’; Sibille, La linea del 45 parallelo, 289.



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This appeal by the Italian lawyer 57 years after Claudel first put forward a proposal for the construction of a trans-European railway artery, points to the long period for which the proposal for the construction of a Southern European railway artery has been considered.

Railway Paris Dakar It seems that Géo Gérald’s appeal found support more broadly. Gérald noted in his speech in 1918 that the creation of the line of the 45th parallel, which would bring the economic radiance of France to Europe, could be complemented by a line that would connect the port of Bordeaux, and more particularly France, to Dakar through the Trans-Pyrenean railway. This would expand the economic radiance of France to Africa while at the same time would allow France to exploit the rich sources of its colonies. At the same year, Henri Bressler, a member of the French Society of Civil Engineers, proposed a project to the French Minister of Public Works and Foreign Affairs for the construction of a large-scale railway artery that would connect Paris to Dakar through Spain. Bressler’s rhetoric in describing the project allows the conclusion that Gérald influenced him. The proposed line, he argued, would expand the radiance of France to Africa while it would facilitate and speed up the communications to and from Latin America. Bressler proposed the construction of a railway line of an international gauge through Spain with technical features that would render it a line of high capacity. Spain, which until then was deprived of direct communications with Europe due to the different gauge of its railway network (5 ft 55⁄8), would have to construct a new electrified line (4 ft 8½) from the frontier of France to the city of Algeciras, a port city in Southern Spain. A tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar would allow the line to continue through Morocco to the port of Dakar on the west coast of Africa. Consequently, goods and passengers from Paris could be transported quickly and without transshipment to Dakar, which was under French colonial administration. Finally, the harbor in Dakar was to be re-constructed to accommodate the embarkation of large-scale traffic to Latin America. The aim of the project was to connect Europe to Latin America through the fastest means of transport. France would be the primary beneficiary of the project’s realization. In a memorandum addressed to the president of the French Republic, A. Millerand (1920), Bressler stressed the importance of the project for France:

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‘Today the combat is being pursued in a peaceful field, and in this great economic battle, it is your task, Mister President, to forge the instruments of peace that will lead France to the apogee of its magnitude and that will assure it the place it deserves in the world after its heroic and sublime sacrifices.’126 Bressler argued that through the construction of the proposed railway and the tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar, France would be in position to increase its exports considerably and intensify its production since it would be able to exploit the natural, agricultural and mineral sources of its vast African empire. It could provide the home country with primary material for its industry and other goods within 48 hours, without having to rely on foreign imports.127 In addition, it would strengthen its military power since it would be able to transport the troops of colonial military powers through the Gibraltar tunnel safely and speedily so as to defend its national interest.128

Figure 2.14– Railway Paris-Dakar Bressler argued that through the tunnel under the straits of Gibraltar, it would be possible to reach Senegal from Paris within 3 days and the Cape from London, through the Channel Tunnel, in 8 days. Source: ‘Un tunnel sous le détroit de Gibraltar,’ Excelsior 9 Année, no 2791, 1 Juillet 1918.

Bressler further argued that the project had international character as well. The proposed railway artery would benefit not only France, but also Spain and Great Britain. It would seal the economic alliance of the three countries once they found themselves bound by economic, commercial and social ties. Coupled with the construction of a railway tunnel under the English Channel, the projected railway 126  Bressler, ‘Paris Dakar en 3 jours,’ 9, 3. 127  Ibid. 128  Henri Bressler, ‘Le tunnel sous le détroit de Gibraltar,’ in Travaux préparatoires du congrès général du génie civil, session nationale (Paris: 1918), 9.



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line and the tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar would provide a direct railway link from European capitals such as Brussels, London, Paris and Madrid to their African colonies, while it would also intensify exchanges between them.129 The tunnels would be the best means for assuring peace in Europe, by permitting Spain, France and England to transport troops rapidly and without trans bordement and at the same time assuring the supply of goods to their home populations from Africa.130 Finally, it would open up a new route through which commerce and passengers could be transported from Asia, through the Trans-Siberian and Baghdad railways to Europe and Africa, and from there to Latin America. From Dakar, movement of commerce and passengers from Europe, Asia and Africa could continue to Latin America following the shortest route, the marine route to Pernambuco (Brazil). Large-scale railway construction in Latin America, could complement the project. Bressler suggested connecting the existing transAmerican railway, extending from Valparaiso (Chile) to Buenos-Aires (Argentina), to the railway network of Brazil in order to establish a new trans-American railway from Callao (Peru) to Pernambuco (Brazil).131 In this way, the line would attract the greatest volume of the traffic between Europe and Latin America.132

Figure 2.15– Global Traffic Routes in Bressler’s Project Source: Bressler, ‘Le tunnel sous le détroit de Gibraltar,’ 6-7.

Bressler’s proposal fits in the context of pre-war technological enthusiasm and imperialism in France that had carried over into the interwar years. The opening 129  130  131  132 

Bressler, ‘Paris Dakar en 3 jours,’ 11. Ibid., 4. Bressler, ‘Tunnel sous le détroit de Gibraltar,’ 9-11. Ibid. 5.

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of the Suez Canal (1869) by a French company and the completion of the Union Pacific Railway (1869), as well as the Tran Siberian railway a few decades later (1903), had triggered technological enthusiasm in French engineering circles in the last decades of the 19th century.133 Within the imperialistic climate of the French Third Republic, the first advocates of the construction of a Trans-Saharan railway appeared around the 1880s.134 Around the 1910s, proposals for the construction of a Trans-Saharan and a Trans-African railway proliferated and found ardent support in political and financial circles.135 Among other factors, the British plans for the construction of a Cape to Cairo railway triggered French interest in building railways in Africa. The Franco-Spanish rapprochement in Morocco a few years before the outbreak of WWI brought the French colonies in Africa closer to the French homeland. In particular, in 1912, France and Spain signed the Treaty of Fez that made Morocco a protectorate of France and made Spain the protecting power over the northern and southern Saharan zones. In 1913, the French and Spanish governments signed a treaty to construct a railway line from Tangiers to Fez (Morocco). Trade journals viewed this initiative as the first step towards the realization of an artery of international importance that would connect Europe to the North of Morocco (via Paris, Irun, Madrid, Algeciras, Tangiers, Fez).136 Economically, Bressler’s project responded to politico-economic worries that had troubled France since the outbreak of the war. As discussed in the previous section, during the war the allies felt that Germany was monopolizing the transport routes to the East. In July 1918 a conference of German merchants and industrialists in Hamburg decided to establish a major bank exclusively dedicated to the support of German export commerce, mainly to Southern and Central America, to the Antilles, the Far East and Australia. The Reichsbank would back up the new establishment while the capital would preferably come from small shareholders. This development created apprehension in French commercial and political circles and revived interest in various proposals for international railway arteries that would integrate France better within the worldwide commercial system, and ensure independence from Germany in its connections with other continents.137 In the aftermath of WWI, Frenchmen felt threatened by the 133  Daniel, R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 18501940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 200. 134  Monique Lakroum, ‘“Paris Dakar”...en chemin de fer!,’ L’Histoire 82 (1985): 68; Max LinigerGoumaz, ‘Éléments de bibliographie, Transsaharien et transafricain,’ in Genève Afrique: acta Africana 71 (1962), 70-71. 135  Lakroum,‘“Paris Dakar”...en chemin de fer!,’ 69; Liniger-Goumaz, ‘Éléments de bibliographie,’ 70-71. 136  ‘A Big International Railway,’ RG (1913): 116. 137  Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 20; Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1097, Projet de chemins de fer direct Paris Dakar.



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possibility of Germany’s economic expansion. On May 30, 1921, the French Petit journal observed: ‘The pan-Germanism that used to be militarist has become economic, that is the most noticeable change that has occurred in Germany since the war. We can say that Germans have changed their conquest strategy.’138 The project by Bressler found support in both France and Spain. On March 23, 1918, the congress of civil engineers of France adopted the project during its plenary session directed by the French minister of public works.139 In the same year, the Paris Orléans submitted to the minister of public works a demand for a concession that would enable it to exploit the railway system from Paris to Dakar, via Gibraltar.140 Technically the construction of a sub-marine tunnel under the strait of Gibraltar was regarded as feasible. In his reply to Bressler, Louis Gentil, professor of geology at the Sorbonne and scientific advisor of the protectorate of Morocco in January 1919 responded: ‘All that I can say in these few words, is that the question seems solvable to me... I feel that this grandiose project of which you have spoken to me, the national interest of which cannot escape one’s attention, should not be arrested due to the possible difficulties of the geological study in this extreme part of the Western Mediterranean.’141 Bressler estimated that such a tunnel could be constructed within five years, and that the gains from its construction and operation would parallel the gains from the opening of the Suez Canal.142 In 1919 the French government authorized the constitution of a study commission that would establish in detail the financial and technical conditions for the construction of a tunnel under the straits of Gibraltar.143 In April 1918 Bressler sent the report from the congress of civil engineers to the king of Spain and to the president of the republic.144 In April 1918, the latter nominated a commission with the task of examining the project, and in 1919 the Spanish parliament approved the construction of a double railway line of an 138  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1097, Projet de chemins de fer direct Paris Dakar. 139  Ibid. 140  E. Chabanier, ‘De Paris a Dakar en 3 jours, de Londres au Cap en 8 jours,’ Excelsior, no. 2791, 11 juillet 1918. 141  Henri Bressler, Paris Dakar en 3 jours (Paris: Tolra éditeur, 1920), 9. 142  Bressler, ‘Tunnel sous le détroit de Gibraltar,’ 10. 143  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1097, Projet de chemins de fer Paris Dakar direct. 144  Ibid.

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international gauge from the French frontier to Algeciras, which would constitute a part of the greater international artery. Subsequently, it authorized a financial society in Barcelona to begin preliminary works for the construction of the tunnel.145 The press both in France and abroad discussed the project favorably. The French daily journal Excelsior published an article by E. Chabanier in which he discussed the immediate advantages of the project’s realization for France. The construction of the Gibraltar tunnel would lead the commerce of France and its colonies to maximum prosperity after five years, he argued, while it would accelerate the economic union projected among the allies.146 The journal RG, discussing the bill by the Spanish Senate to construct a direct line of track from Dax (Southern France) to Algeciras, pointed to the international importance of such a line. It noted that the construction of a tunnel between Tarifa (Spain) and Tangier (Morocco) along with the proposed railway would enable the journey between Brussels and the French colony of Congo to be accomplished within five days, London to Transvaal (part of the British Empire) in seven days, and on to Cape Town in one day more.147 However, the political and economic climate seems to have changed somewhat only one and a half years later. In discussing the project and the issue of the building of a tunnel under the Straits of Gibraltar, the JT noted that the project presented very little interest as far as goods traffic was concerned since the transport of goods from Europe to America by sea was becoming constantly less expensive. The project did present interest as far as the transport of passengers was concerned, as it would diminish the fatigue of traversing the ocean by ship. For passage through the Gibraltar strait, it argued, the best solution economically and technically would be ferry services.148 Despite the initially enthusiastic reaction of the Spanish and French governments, works for the construction of this big international railway artery were not completed. The text of the project for a law relative to the construction of the railway line on behalf of the Spanish state was published in the Caseta de Madrid in 1919 (April). The project started with the following words: ‘The present circumstances render Spain a transit country of great 145  Ibid. 146  E. Chabanier, ‘De Paris a Dakar en 3 jours, de Londres au Cap en 8 jours,’ Excelsior 9, no. 2791 (1918), 2. The article by Chabanier was translated into English and published in a booklet that included important articles on the theme of the English Channel Tunnel. Arthur Fell Emile d’ Erlanger E. Chabanier, ‘From London to the Cape by Rail: Tunnel under Strait of Gibraltar. French and Spanish Scheme of Monsieur H. Bressler,’ 84. 147  ‘London to Cape via Spain,’ RG (1919): 353. 148  ‘Paris Dakar par voie ferrée,’ JT 43 (1920): 5-6.



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importance, thus it is important that the Spanish government seriously consider the appropriate means that would accelerate under the best possible conditions the passengers and the goods ‘traffic coming from France and from other parts of Europe with destination Morocco.’149 According to the last article of the decree, the construction of the line necessitated the establishment of an agreement between the French and Spanish government.150 During the fourteenth session of the Barcelona conference on Transit and Communications, the Spanish delegate Ortuno observed that the international line from the Pyrenees through Madrid to Algeciras was partially completed. ‘The scheme for the direct line Pyrenees-Madrid-Algeciras is completed as regards the section between the frontier and Madrid, and has reached the stage of a preliminary draft scheme for the section Madrid-ToledoSeville-Algeciras.’151 He referred to such an undertaking as one of the issues of international importance that had held the interest of Spanish public opinion since the end of the war and stressed the importance of such an undertaking for worldwide commerce: ‘You will see how much that means from the point of view of universal transit; hence forward Spain will become more and more the country through which transit must necessarily pass between Central and Western Europe and Africa and America.’152 Similarly, efforts to construct a tunnel under the strait of Gibraltar were undertaken throughout the interwar years. According to an article in the RG in 1936, on May 12 a film was shown at a leading Madrid cinema on the theme of the tunnel. The film demonstrated the work that had been carried out by the commission charged with the study of the scheme for the tunnel: ‘The geological history of the formation on each side and under the straits and the work of boring and exploring were clearly shown by the film, which purports to demonstrate the possibility of the tunnel and the great advantages to international transport and travel to be gained by its construction.’153 149  ‘Les chemins de fer d’Algesiras,’ JT 42 (1919): 90. 150  Ibid. 151  Barcelona Conference. Verbatim Records and Texts of the Recommendations Relative to the International Regime of Railways and of Recommendations Relative to Ports Placed under International Regime (Geneva: League of Nations, 1921), 17. 152  Ibid. 153  ‘Spain, the Gibraltar Tunnel,’ RG 64 (1936): 1031.

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We can only speculate about the reasons for the failure of the project, since the sources studied do not reveal them. One reason might have been the improvement of ship technologies in the years following the war, which may have reduced the competitive commercial advantage of land over sea transport. From a political perspective, a change in international relations in the mid-1920s can explain a decrease in the enthusiasm for the project among officials of the French government. The creation of an economically and militarily strong France was the line that shaped French politics in the years immediately after the war.154 It seems most probable that the improvement of the political relations with Germany after the signing of the Treaty of Locarno (1925), in combination with the high costs of such an undertaking, resulted in a reduction of interest in the project within the French government. Finally, French railway interests might have been satisfied with the realization of their ambitions to create the Simplon Orient Express.

Europe, the Depression and Large Scale Technology Works In the 1930s, the difficult socio-political situation that Europe was facing went hand-in-hand with a technological enthusiasm that was expressed both at an international and national level with proposals for the construction of large-scale engineering works. This provided the context in which the construction of international European railway arteries was discussed again. The rhetoric surrounding these discussions was different, however. The main aims that such undertakings would address involved fighting the economic depression of Europe through the execution of public works and the creation of a politically united Europe. Proposals for the execution of engineering works to combat the economic and political problems that Europe was facing in the 1930s provided the context in which the idea of a European network was again put forward. Atlantropa, for example, a large-scale project promoted by the Munich architect Herman Sörgel, attracted a lot of attention in the interwar years. From 1927 until his death 25 years later, Sörgel worked on plans for a gigantic energy project that included the construction of a dam in the Strait of Gibraltar and an electricity grid on a European scale. Sörgel believed his project would create interdependency between the countries of Europe, thus ensuring peace and solving the severe problem of unemployment and political instability in Europe.155 He emphasized the potential role of 154  Pierrepont B N, ‘Effects of French Policies on Present-Day European Situation,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 114 (1924): 26. 155  Alexander Gall, ‘Atlantropa, a Technological Vision of a United Europe,’ in Networking Europe, 99-28.



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large-scale technological works in solving the grave socio-economic problems that Europe was facing. Secondly, the discussions at the League and the International Labor Office of large-scale public works as an important means to combat socio-economic problems and promote social and political cohesion in Europe inspired individuals to propose plans for the construction of engineering projects on an international scale.156 In a memorandum to the committee of enquiry for European union in the beginning of the 1930s, the International Labor Office pointed to the creation of public works projects of an international scale as a means to combat unemployment in Europe and cultivate a spirit of solidarity among the people of the continent. More specifically, in its memorandum, ILO drew attention to ‘the possibility of Governments coming to an agreement, through the appropriate organs of the League, with a view to join in the execution of extensive public works of an international character.’157 Such work would be of direct use to the country in which it would be carried out, and of indirect, but no less vital importance to other countries, through the substantial improvements which are provided for all concerned and through the orders of material or equipment and the demand of labor to which it would give rise. In addition: ‘Such work would also present a psychological and moral advantage. It would interest all the countries of Europe in objects of a European character, and would thus develop that spirit of collaboration, that European spirit, which it is the object of the Commission of Enquiry of European Union to create.’158 Following the initiative by ILO and its director Albert Thomas, road planners organized two motor congresses where they discussed plans for the construction of large-scale trans-national motorways on a European scale.159 In 1930, while a subcommittee of the Transit Organization was undertaking the work of preparing a program of large-scale international public works, Albert Thomas proposed that the UIC should study the concept of a continental railway network as part 156  Cordier, ‘European Union and the League of Nations,’ in Geneva Special Studies 2, no. 6 (1931): 179. 157  LoNP, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Organization Sub-Committee: Report by M.Motta, doc. no. C.204. M.82.1931.VII [C.E.U.E./16], 2. 158  Ibid., 7-8. 159  On these projects see Erik van der Vleuten, Irene Anastasiadou, Frank Schipper and Vincent Lagendijk, ‘Europe’s System Builders,’ CEH 16 (2007): 328-334; Frank Schipper, Driving Europe (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 83-120; Id., ‘The Drive for Peace? Road Planning and the European Project during the Interbellum,’ Paper presented at the SHOT 2005 Conference, Minneapolis, USA, November 3-6 2005, www.tie-project.nl, Working Document no. 12, 6-12.

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of a number of projects aimed at reducing unemployment in Europe through the execution of public works of general interest. The International Railway Union responded that the issue was beyond its remit.160 After the rejection of such an undertaking on behalf of the Union, Albert Thomas sent a letter to the director of the French railway network Dautry. Referring to the refusal of the international railway union, he observed that:

‘I believe, as Mr Heinemann has strongly proven, that we cannot create a

new Europe in any way except with the systematic and rational development of all means of communications and economic equipment. Since those significant and qualified organizations are hesitant to undertake action, it is important to stimulate them, to animate them, to wake them up. I would like to stimulate their interest in the field of railways as in the case of other fields. But it is necessary to have the appropriate equipment. It is necessary that I have the support of the engineers. And since you are the only ones whom I can address in the railway world, I would like to ask you whether you have close to you some young engineer capable of being engaged in such an issue who could help us to launch the idea and to impose it.’161

The American engineer Dannie Heinemann had put forward the opinion of an engineer on the issue of European integration. Heinemann, to whom Thomas referred in his letter to Dautry, had given a serious of lectures in Europe expressing the opinion of an engineer on European unification. His book, Esquisse d’une Europe nouvelle, published in 1931 in Brussels, is a textbook example of the belief that technological integration should precede the political unification of Europe.162 Heinemann argued that infrastructures, in particular electricity but also the networks of communications, could result in the unification of the agricultural and the industrial parts of Europe. By helping in the transport of goods, they would result in the increase of exchanges between these two parts of the continent.163 He argued: ‘I am convinced, and I am sure that I can convince you too, that a happy 160  ‘Proposition de M. Albert Thomas, in question V, affaires diverses,’ Bulletin UIC 7, no. 11&12 (1931): 368. 161  Archive ILO, travaux publics, CAT 11, A 113, voies ferrées, extension de réseau, correspondance Dautry, Paris, lettré 15 Dec. 1931. 162  The book comprises of the talks that Dannie Heinemann gave in Cologne (28th November 1930) and in Barcelona (2 December 1930). 163  Dannie N. Heinemann, Esquisse d‘une Europe nouvelle: Conférence donnée le 28 Novembre 1930 a Cologne et le 2 Décembre 1930 a Barcelone (Bruxelles: 1931), 44.



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combination of the technology of electricity with the technology of roads and of transport and of the technology of credit could be sufficient to double in some years the well-being and the purchasing power of 140 millions peasants in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.’164

A Pan-Europe Railway Proposal Whereas, it seems that railway men were unwilling to respond positively to Thomas’ initiative an Italian advocate, Carlo Enrico Barduzzi (1884-1943), put forward a proposal for the construction of European railway arteries.165 Barduzzi argued that the political unification of Europe could be achieved through the construction of transnational railway arteries. A retired Italian diplomat, Barduzzi drafted a grandiose project for the construction of four major railway arteries traversing Europe from West to East and North to South and connecting Europe to Asia and Africa. He submitted different versions of his project for the realization of a Railway Pan-Europe to the directors of the ILO and the Transit Organization.166 As his correspondence with the Mussolini’s secretary, Alessandro Chiavolini, indicates, he spent the rest of his life promoting various large-scale undertakings by establishing contacts with governmental officials and industrialists.167 Barduzzi responded to the initiative of ILO for undertaking international works in order to combat unemployment. In his project, he proposed the construction of four railway arteries traversing Europe in a vertical and horizontal way to connect it to Asia and Africa.168 He pleaded for the realization of the European Union that 164  Ibid. 165  There is no letter of response at the archive of ILO. 166  Archive of the ILO, Carlo Enrico Barduzzi, Mémorandum réserve pour un projet ferroviaire intereuropéen asiatique présente à la commission des communications et de transit prés de la société des nations: abrège pour le bureau international du travail de Genève, Geneva, Maio 1931, 25 Mars 1931, file no. M7/5/34; Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 2566, Correspondence with E. Barduzzi, Carlo Enrico Barduzzi, Mémorandum riservato alla commissione del transito e delle comunicazioni presso la società delle nazioni, progetto di una paneuropa ferroviaria; Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 2566, Barduzzi, C.E., Projet pour une paneurope ferroviaire présenté à l’hon commission des communications; Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 2566, Artères Europo-Asiatiques. Carlo Enrico Barduzzi was born in Pisa in the 3rd of June 1884 and died in Rome in the 7th of June 1943. He began his carrier as a consulate in 10th May 1907. After serving in different cities such as Cairo, Alessandria, Rio de Janeiro, he was called to serve at the ministry in February 1912. On August 1915 he was retired with the degree of vice console of 1st class. Angeli Franco, La formazione della diplomazia nazionale 1861-1915 (Roma: Istituto poligrafico Zecca dello stato), 50. On the history of the establishment of the Transit Organization and its work in relation to railways in the interwar years see Chapter 3 of this book. 167  National Archive of Rome, segreteria particolare del duce, carteggio riservato: N.X.R., sottofascicolo n. 2. 168  Barduzzi, Artères européo asiatiques; Idem., Paneuropa ferroviaria.

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Count Richard Coudenhove Kalergi and Aristide Briand had proposed and envisioned its achievement through the construction of railways. In the introduction of his memoranda addressed to the directors of the Transit Organization and ILO, he mentioned the socio-technical character of his project explicitly: ‘Encouraged by the ideas that were expressed by M. Briand, in his memorandum for an economic and politic (Pan) Europe we propose a more immediate Europe, a Railway (Pan) Europe that will unite in a more balanced network West and East, as well as North and South Europe.’169 The point of departure for his argumentation was the economic depression and social problems that Europe encountered in the early 1930s. His argumentation presents a striking similarity to the argumentation of the French economist Francis Delaisi. Delaisi published a book in 1929 entitled The Two Europes in which he pleaded for the unification of Europe into an economically self-sufficient continent through the improvement of communications.170 Like Delaisi, Barduzzi described in his memorandum the division of the continent of Europe into two parts, the one consisting of the wealthy and industrialized countries in the West, and the other of the mainly agricultural countries in the East. A dense network of railways and roads covered the industrialized part of Europe and commercial exchanges as well as the circulation of products and people were thriving there. By contrast, in the agricultural part of Europe, peasants lived in isolation and networks of communication such as railways and roads were scarce, while production and commercial exchanges were underdeveloped. The cause of the economic depression of interwar years was that Western Europe had lost its markets in U.S.A., which had absorbed its industrial production before WWI. Like Delaisi, Barduzzi argued that the prosperity of the European continent depended on the connection of Europe’s two halves through economic co-operation and trade.171 Just as the American engineer Daniel Heinemann, Delaisi too argued that infrastructures were important conditions for the political and economic integration of Europe.172 According to Barduzzi, it was the construction of large-scale railway arteries that would consolidate the economic and political unity of the European continent.

169  Barduzzi, Artères européo asiatiques, 2. 170  Francis Delaisi, Les deux Europes (Paris: Payot, 1929). 171  Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 105; Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 2566, Correspondence with E. Barduzzi. 172  Heinemann, Esquisse d’une Europe nouvelle; Delaise, Les deux Europes.



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Figure 2.16– Railway Arteries in the Project of Barduzzi Source: Barduzzi, Memorandum riservato alla commissione del transito e delle comunicazioni presso la società delle nazioni.

The construction of four large-scale transnational railway arteries would have short-term and long-term benefits, according to Barduzzi. In the short term, they would provide employment to millions of workers, which would solve the severe problem of unemployment that Europe was facing. In the long term, the movement of commerce and passengers between the two parts of Europe would be intensified. Consequently, the four railway arteries would fuse the two parts of Europe economically through the development of better communications, thus providing a solution to the economic problems of Europe. In this way the railways would provide the means of unifying the two parts of Europe into a self-sufficient continent. Finally, improved communications between the two parts of Europe would contribute to the creation of a feeling of solidarity among European peoples. Each of the arteries would be of great political importance, and indeed crucial to the emergence of a politically peaceful and prosperous Europe. The first artery (A), which would be the ‘queen’ of the railway arteries, would constitute a trunk route connecting Europe to Indochina and America. It would extend from London through Paris, Geneva, Milan, Rome and Bari. From Bari, it would pass through a submarine tunnel under the Adriatic Sea and reach Valona (Albania). From there, it would continue to Thessalonica and Istanbul, and extend to Asia through Ankara and New Delhi to reach its final destination, the French colony of Saigon. This last section of the big artery, running in parallel to the Tran Siberian railway would allow industrial Europe to penetrate into East Asia. Consequently, according to Barduzzi, ‘Western Europe could prevent Western Asia from becoming a field of free penetration for Bolshevik propaganda.’ This artery was a modification and extension of proposals already made in the earlier decades.

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Figure 2.17− Europe A and B would be United Through Railways Source: Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 2566, Correspondence with Carlo Enrico Barduzzi.

The second artery (B) would cross Southern Europe horizontally. This would constitute the realization of the line of the 45th parallel. It would extend from Lisbon and cross via Bordeaux, Milan, Belgrade, and Bucharest to reach Odessa. Economically, the line was of great interest since it would connect the Atlantic to the Black Sea through Latin territory. Politically, by establishing a direct connection between Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Romania, it would contribute to the creation of a Latin Union by enhancing the feeling of solidarity among Latin people and by increasing their common economic interest.173 A third artery (C) would cross Europe from North to South. It would extend from Sofia, Bucharest, and Warsaw, to reach the Polish port of Gdynia on the Baltic Sea, and provide solutions to important political issues of the interwar years such as the Polish Corridor. In particular, if the section of the line from Warsaw to Gdynia was placed under international control, it was argued, it could provide an outlet for Poland to the Baltic Sea. Thus the disputed lands constituting the Polish Corridor could be returned to Germany. Furthermore, Germany would stop dominating in the commerce of the Baltic Sea as it had during the pre-war period since Gdynia would become the most important port in the Baltic Sea under Polish dominance. In the final version of his project, Barduzzi added a fourth railway artery (D) that would connect Antwerp, Brussels, Paris, Bordeaux, Madrid and Gibraltar. From Gibraltar, the railway of Europe would connect through a sub-marine tunnel to the Trans African Railway. The purpose of this artery would be to connect Belgium with the rest of the network, and to bring the traffic from Germany and the Netherlands to Africa through Belgium. 173 

Barduzzi, Paneuropa ferroviaria, 6, 48.



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Figure 2.18– Connection of Europe to Africa in Bressler’s Project Source: Archive League of Nations, Box R 2566, Correspondence with Carlo Enrico Barduzzi.

The construction of these arteries necessitated the execution of large-scale technical works, such as the construction of the channel tunnel, a tunnel under the Adriatic Sea and finally a sub-marine tunnel under the Bosporus. The establishment of large hydroelectric plants would provide for the electrification of substantial sections of these arteries. To realize the project, Barduzzi proposed the establishment of an international Europe-Asian society with a seat in Geneva. Representatives of the interested states as well as delegates of the banks that would help collect the capital would constitute the society. Subsequently, an international industrial metallurgic-siderurgicelectric consortium, also with a seat in Geneva would be created to provide all the material to execute the works. Barduzzi proposed his project as a means of consolidating the overall peace in Europe. His vision of Europe was of a Europe united under the economic and political dominance of the Latin countries. Through the construction of the principal

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railway arteries (A, B), the Latin ports and the ports of the Mediterranean Sea (such as Bordeaux, Trieste and Thessalonica) could claim the traffic heading toward the East from North and South America. This would strengthen the economic and political power of the Latin countries in Europe. Consequently, in Barduzzi’s proposal, the idea was to create a Europe where the Latin countries would dominate at the expense of the countries of central Europe, an idea that had proponents in Europe immediately after the war and was revived in the 1930s. Despite an emphasis on the economic complementarities of the two parts of Europe, imperialism is also apparent in the project. The four railway arteries extended to Asia and Africa, bringing the industrial products of Europe to the colonies. In the final version of his project, Barduzzi discussed the ‘civilizing ‘impact that the construction of the railways would have on the political systems of Africa and Asia. By establishing regular contacts between Europe, western Asia and equatorial and tropical Africa, they would completely modify the organization of the tribe and patriarchal system. These areas would become a real ‘political and economic laboratory ‘for experimentation with new social forms.174 It seems legitimate to suggest that what led Barduzzi to draft his proposal was national interest. In the introduction of his memorandum to the Transit Organization he states, ‘In our project we have considered in a particular way the interest of Italy so that it would become ever stronger and more productive.’175 Indeed, Italy has a central role as transit space in the project, being traversed by the two main arteries. The construction of the greatest work of the project, the tunnel under the Strait of Otranto, would revive the ancient glory of Rome. Discussing the feasibility of such a tunnel Barduzzi states: ‘Until yesterday we used to consider North America as the birthplace of every public work. Today and tomorrow all the scientists of the world will turn their eyes to Italy...’176 In the railway scheme that Barduzzi proposed, the ports of the Mediterranean Sea were better integrated into the global commercial avenues than their competitors in the north. Barduzzi’s plan, which was a synthesis of different plans already proposed and discussed earlier in the interwar years, eventually failed.177 The reasons for its failure are varied. First, the project did not find governmental support at a national level. Barduzzi appealed to the Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini. 174  Ibid. 175  Ibid. 176  Ibid., 17. 177  Dogliotti, La Linea del 45 parallelo nel programma ferroviario dell’intesa (Camera di commercio e industria di Torino); Lorin, ‘Un réseau ferrée interallié’; Gérald et al., [L’]Atlantique – Mer Noire.



2. Europe in Crisis and Railway Visions

Correspondence between Mussolini’s secretary and other Italian officials, based on a report by the Pubblica Sicurezza, presented Barduzzi as a person of ‘dubious fame.’ Mussolini’s secretary, who received the project, did not forward it to Mussolini.178 Consequently, Barduzzi’s failure to reach officials in Italy hampered the discussion of the project at an international level. On December 1932, the director of the Transit Organization Robert Haas responded to Barduzzi that the newly established Committee on Public Works and National Technical Equipment would examine only projects submitted to it by governments in accordance with the decision of the Council of the League. Secondly, Barduzzi failed to gain support of influential personalities at an international level, such as Albert Thomas. Thomas was the director of ILO and referred to Barduzzi’s work in a letter to the director of the railways of the French state that I mentioned earlier in this paragraph, Dautry on 15 December 1931, as: ‘... From certain aspects rather naïve, but showing at least some information and some systematic thought on the necessary work that would have to be done for the creation of a rail network sufficiently homogeneous and complete. I have told myself that such an individual work cannot have great value, but I decided to address myself to the International Union of Railways.’179 The nationally-oriented focus of the project coupled with the scale of international co-operation required for its realization, not to mention the scale of the works involved, might explain Thomas’ characterization of the project as ‘naïve.’ Economically, the project responded to the specific economic worries of the interwar years. Since the end of WWI, Germany and Austria had discussed the possibility of a customs union, a prospect that disturbed Italian interests.180 Italians estimated that such a customs union would be disadvantageous for the transit traffic of northern Italy and would consequently damage the ports of Trieste and Genoa significantly. In particular, it would result in lower transit tariffs for traffic from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria through Germany’s railway network. Consequently, traffic to and from America would prefer the ports of the North Sea, which were also better equipped technically in comparison to the ports of the Mediterranean. Consequently, international traffic, which had been passing 178  National Archive of Rome, segreteria particolare del duce, Carteggio riservato: N. X.R., sottofascicolo n. 2. 179  Archive ILO, travaux publics, CAT 11, A 113, voies ferrées, extension de réseau, correspondance Dautry, Paris, lettré 15 Déc. 1931. 180  Alberto Moscheni, L’unione dell’Austria alla Germania e la sua ripercussione sui traffici adriatici (Trieste: 1927).

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through Italy, would be redirected to North Sea ports such as Hamburg and Rotterdam. Throughout his correspondence to officials in Italy and abroad, Barduzzi presented the project to the directors of ILO and the Transit Organization as a result of the collective effort of a group of engineers. Of particular interest is a letter that he addressed to the director of the Transit Organization in which he discussed the advantages that a new system for joining rails, developed by an engineer belonging to this group (Spettoli), would bring to the economy of railway operation. He argued that the proposed artifact would bring economy to railway operation and consequently make the states interested to the venture willing to undertake the cost of construction.181 In his idea of creating a Latin Union he was also not alone. Many others had argued on the creation of a Latin Union during the years of WWI. The arguments in favor of the creation of a Federation of Latin Nations, either as a goal in it or as an offshoot of an eventual future European Federation, were developed first by Professor Bonfante in his article in the journal Scienza, and then in a few other articles in the same journal.182 The argument found public support. In 1917 Guglielmo Ferrero, Julien Luchaire and Maurice Wilmotte, editors of the newly established journal Rivista delle nazioni latine, surveyed politicians and authors from Italy and France on the desirability of the establishment of a Latin Union. The primary aim of such a union would be to counterbalance the power of the central empires.183 As the responses indicate, published under the title Pareri intorno ad una unione Latina, many important personalities were in favor of the creation of a Latin Union.184 Among them were Eugenio Rignano, director of the journal Scienza of Milan, and R. Callenga, deputy of the Italian parliament and member of the Italian delegation of the Inter-allied Parliament.185 Other personalities that 181  Archive League of Nations, Box R 2566, Correspondence with E. Barduzzi, 182  Pareri intorno ad una unione Latina (Firenze: De Marinis, 1917), 11. 183  Ibid. 3-4. Their argument can be summarized in three points. First, the Latin nations of Europe were the only races ‘among the great races of this part of the world’ divided into relatively small groups, none of which was over 40 million inhabitants. It was therefore logical, in order to better protect themselves from the power and the menace of the Germans, and in order to better cement their friendship with the allies, to consider the possibility of constituting a political and economic block, that would equal the power of the most powerful blocks. Secondly, the Latin nations, were among all the allied nations the only ones whose resemblance of language and temperament, as well as traditions permitted an ultimate union. Finally, according to the editors of the journal, political and economic needs necessitated the creation of a federation. In particular, the economic and political circumstances after the war necessitated the establishment of a union of primary size for the production, export but also action in a military and political level. In the case that union was not achieved, the Latin countries would ‘resign’ themselves into becoming satellites of the powerful countries or to live under the pressure of the constant menace of people who were stronger. Ibid. 184  Ibid., 6-7. 185  Ibid., 18-21. Eugenio Rignano, argued that among other important measures for the creation of a Latin Union, of importance would be the unification of tariffs and regulations in the field of railways, that



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expressed themselves in favor of such a solution were Lagour-Gayer and Victor Augagneur, deputy of the French parliament and former-minister.186 Another important Italian thinker that argued in favor of the creation of a Latin Union at the same years was the Italian economist and politician Luigi Einaudi. Einaudi viewed the creation of a European federation as hardly realistic; it seemed to him more prudent in a first phase to limit the scope to ‘imagining creations of Latin and Germanic States of higher order than the small European states, destined to become constellations of second or third degree.’187 Georges Ribeill writes in a recent article: ‘The railway has nourished the utopia of a continental supranational network that would bring civilizations and people closer from a political, economic and cultural point of view.’188 He refers to two French engineers that, 100 years apart from each other, envisioned railways as a means of establishing international communities.189 Chevalier (18061879) in the mid 19th century planned a network connected through the big sea would facilitate the exchanges between the two countries both of people and of commerce. He pointed out that although the federations of the two states required the general consensus of both populations, there was no unanimity or even semi-unanimity of the various political parties in either France or Italy. He pointed out that there were technical difficulties (including those of an economic order) for the establishment of such a federation. Such were the requirement for substantial and profound modifications within the institutions and state bodies and in many other aspect of social life. Such modifications would be necessary for the transformation of two or more independent states to an effective federation. These included the gradual reduction of the customs tariffs with the ultimate goal of their entire annihilation. In contrast, customs tariffs for German products needed to be increased so that the industries of Italy and France would be protected. At a juridical field the unification of civic and commercial law was required as one of the first steps for the establishment of a federation. He also referred to the need for the creation of a ‘Latin citizenship.’Further on he spoke of unification in social services, statistics, railways and postal services. Unione latina, ibid. 11-17. R. Callenga argued that the reciprocal sympathy that the Italian and French populations showed during the war should be transformed into a concrete and intimate alliance both in the political and economic fields. Ibid. 18. 186  Lagour-Gayet is introduced as member of the French Institute ( ‘dell’istituto di Francia’) and president of the ‘France-Romania’ (Presidente di ‘France-Roumanie’), Unione latina, 26-7. Victor Augagneur is introduced as deputy of the French Parliament, former-minister, ibid., 28-9. Others opposed the establishment of a Latin Union. Among them was Edouard Giretti, industrialist and deputy of the Italian parliament. He argued that an intermediary step towards the creation of the ‘United States of Europe’ was necessary, such as the provisional formation of unions or groups of States, more or less competitive. However, he argued in favor of creating a German-Austrian-Hungarian bloc on the one side and the countries of the Entente on the other, which would be transformed into an effective political and economic co-operation in the years of peace. Ibid., 8, 7-10. 187  Sergio Pistone, ‘Le critiche di Einaudi e di Agnelli e Cabiati alla società delle nazioni nel 1918,’ in L’idea dell’unificazione Europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale. Relazioni tenuti al convegno di studi svoltosi presso la fondazione Luigi Einaudi, ed. Sergio Pistone (Torino: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1975), 26. 188  George Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du réseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ Histoire & sociétés: Revue européenne d‘histoire sociale 21 (2003): 44-5. 189  Ibid., 44-5.

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routes and continental railway lines, designed from one end of the Mediterranean Sea to the other, that would be the ‘bridal bed of the East and the West.’ His Système de la méditerranée (1832) would constitute a ‘material link at the service of the continental brotherhood.’ Almost hundred years later, Louis Armand declared that: ‘If all the means of transport (should) compete for the construction of a united Europe ‘the place of the rail would be privileged because this is the only mode of transport that can ‘fulfill the obligations of a great public service.’190 C.E. Barduzzi in the interwar years placed railways into the service of his envisioned community of peaceful co-existence between the nation-states within Europe.

Conclusion The study of these projects allows us to make two conclusions. First, internationalism in these projects was in the interest of the nation state and the maintenance of the new socio-political order in Europe. During the war but also towards the end of it, the feeling was widespread among the allied nations that the military defeat of Germany would not permanently erase the German danger. Instead, it was thought that the military battle would be continued after the war in the economic sphere. Frenchmen regarded it as crucial for the survival of their country to promote the expansion of the economic radiance of France. This could be achieved through the improvement of France’s communications with the rest of the world. Railways were an important means to achieve this goal. The proponents of the line of the 45th parallel and Bressler’s project proposed that the increase in the economic but also political influence of the country would be achieved by establishing international railway arteries that would bring the newly created areas of the Balkans and the routes to the East into direct contact with France. In addition, the new arteries would also connect France to Africa, bringing it into more direct contact with this potential source of foods and primary materials and resulting in the better placement of France in the global commercial movement. Furthermore, the examination of these projects shows that internationalism was not only of national interest, but also of regional, sub-national interests. The most ardent supporters of the projects were people who lived in the areas that these projects would serve and that were interested in promoting the wellbeing and economic interests of these regions.

190 

Ibid.



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Secondly, railways were seen in these projects as a means of integrating larger regions of Europe. Railways were an instrument that would bring a constellation of European nation-states closer economically, politically and ideologically. They would help reinforce the entente of the allied countries and transform the military alliances that had been created during the war into powerful economic and political alliances. As the representatives of the newly established countries in Central Europe stated during the inter-parliamentary union that took place in December 1918, the proposed international railway arteries would be an indispensable means of forming the new nation-states into a solid political unit in them such that they would together constitute an economic and political block. The representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania supported the project, and also proposed the construction of additional inter-allied lines. Positioned in the centre of Europe, Czechoslovakians and Romanians argued that they could not defend themselves against the German menace. Instead, only by constituting a political alliance would they be strong enough to counterbalance the German danger. However, they argued that political alliances were weak without the development of common economic interests. The construction of international railway arteries that would bring those countries into direct communication and provide them with an outlet to the sea would constitute the fulcrum for the development of common economic interests. Consequently, the creation of a railway line of direct communication among these countries, but also between them and the Allies of Western Europe, would consolidate these alliances and would constitute an ‘anti-Germanic ‘barrier preventing any future German attempt to expand toward the East. Comparing the French visions to Barduzzi’s project, we see that their visions of a global community were different, as the geographical orientation of the two projects reveals. In the case of the French proponents of the ‘Suisse Océan,’ the 45th parallel and Bressler’s project, France, Europe and then Africa formed the centre of concentric circles in the envisioned global community, while the rest of the world belonged to the periphery. In the case of Barduzzi, the center was the Latin nations, then Western Europe while Eastern Europe and the rest of the world constituted the periphery. What it is important is that these projects were placing Europe in a global position and would favor specific nations and regions of Europe in the worldwide commercial movement. The story of the line of the 45th parallel can be regarded as a partial success since it led to the establishment of a new express train, the Simplon Orient Express. The Simplon Orient Express, however, seems to have run along the greatest part of its trajectory on existing infrastructure while no major works for the restructuring of the lines on which it ran seem to have been undertaken. Consequently, the idea of

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the realization of the line of the 45th parallel was not realized. The establishment of the Simplon Orient Express service is important since it shows how transnational alliances and international politics influenced the provision of railway services in Europe. However, the failure to construct the big international railway artery of the 45th parallel can be attributed to the failure to incorporate the plans for the renovation of the lines through which the line would pass to the national transport policies. Similarly, the railway arteries envisioned by Bressler and Barduzzi were not realized. Technical developments such as electrification permitted the realization of arteries that would carry the bulk of traffic at a high speed across great distances. In this respect, the projects do not seem technologically utopian. Rather, they were utopian in their belief that the socio-political circumstances would allow their realization. As existing historiography has suggested, large-scale technological works were realized in the interwar years within the context of nation states where there was strong centralized political authority and clearly defined political goals.191 A common factor that accounts for the failure of the projects discussed in this chapter is the lack of centralized political authority and action for their promotion. The establishment of transnational alliances was important for the realization of the plans. Only through such alliances could the geographical space and necessary material capital for the realization of the projects become available. The construction of trans-European railway arteries was put forward when Europe was in crisis. They were seen as a means for establishing a new social order. E. Herriot noted in a speech that he held in Geneva on the 5th of November 1916: ‘It is especially during periods of crisis that great projects are conceived, great thoughts; they are veritably and morally the traitors to their country who say, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, we will see later, let’s wait until the things have calmed down! It is not true; it is not calmness that favors the great thoughts, the great, the bravery, the big decision! ‘192 For almost 50 years after the Great War, very few new railway lines were constructed on the central landmass of Europe apart from the direttissima as the newly constructed, modernly equipped lines of the Italian railways in the 1930s were named, which due to their design characteristics, following the straightest possible trajectories with low gradients, allowed them higher than normal speeds 191  Gijs Mom, ‘Roads without Rails: European Highway-Network Building and the Desire for LongRange Motorized Mobility,’ T&C 46, no. 4 (2006): 770. 192  Gérald, La ligne Suisse Océan, 33.



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at the time.193 It was only in the second half of the 1970s that international bodies such as the UIC and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe started to discuss and to draft new plans for transnational railways in Europe that would form part of a European railway network. The plans discussed here can be seen as preludes to these post-war plans.

193 

‘UIC Drafts its Master Plan for Europe,’ RG 129 (1973): 429-31.

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3. Shifting Railway Regime

3. Shifting Railway Regime

Figure 3.1– New Political Order in the Aftermath of WWI Source: The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, I-II.

Germany and European Railways before 1914 Before the outbreak of WWI, Europe was covered by a dense railway network.1 As I discussed in the introduction, early in the 19th century, railway administrations and national governments took action to facilitate international railway traffic. As a result of this action a few international bodies engaged on issues of international railway traffic were established in the second half of the 19th century. Such bodies worked to establish regulations that would enable trains to run across national frontiers. As existing historiography has shown, Germany had an active and influential role in international railway developments, while France maintained a more conservative and introverted attitude.2 1  Norman J.G. Pounds, An Historical Geography of Europe, 1800-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1-36, 449-461. 2  Laurent Tissot, ‘Naissance d une Europe ferroviaire: la convention internationale de Berne (1890),’ in Les entreprises et leur réseaux: hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs XIXe XXe siècles mélanges en l’honneur de François Caron, ed. Michèle Merger and Dominique Barjot (Paris: Presses de l’université de Paris Sorbonne), 290-293. In this article Tissot discusses the initial conservative position of the French railway companies during the negotiations for the drafting of an international convention of the transport

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The union of Prussian railway administrations (Verein Preußischer Eisenbahn Verwaltungen) was formed in 1846. A year later it transformed itself into the union of German railway administrations (Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn Verwaltungen). This was the first private international body established in the geographical area of Europe with the object of creating uniform regulations for the carriage and exchange of traffic.3 It functioned as a democratic assembly; its decisions were made by majority rule and were imposed on all the members. Its field of activity covered legal, commercial and technical issues.4 Initially comprising only the Prussian State railways, it later expanded so as to include relations between the Prussian state railways and the neighboring German administrations. Later on it dealt with transport relations between Austria-Hungary, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Romania.5 In 1909 it covered 53 railway networks public and private.6 From 1850 onward, it also had an assembly of engineers that had the competence to set a number of technical conventions, including common specifications for construction and exploitation of rolling stock. This constituted a common regulation that facilitated the reciprocal exchange of vehicles among its members. Through these shared norms governing the form (gabari) and the technical interface of the material (coupling, brakes etc), the Prussians and the networks affiliated with the Verein developed an early practice of railway interoperability. Augustus Veenendaal in his study of the Dutch railways mentions that through its numerous publications and conferences it exercised a great influence in European railway technique and exploitation and attributed to it an important role in the unification of the European railway network.7 As Lochner, a private counselor to of goods by rail. Also see George Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du réseau ferroviaire Européen intègre,’ Histoire & sociétés: revue européenne d’histoire sociale 21 (2003): 46-50. 3  This union unified initially the regulation of exploitation of its adherents, while later on it established two conventions successively, one in 1856 relative to the construction and technical exploitation of railways, the other in 1868 concerning the reciprocal use of material. ‘Les accords internationaux pour l’échange du matériel de transport; Chapitre I − Les premiers accords d’échange,’ Bulletin UIC 3 (1927): 72. 4  When the Berne (CIM) convention came into force 1 January 1893, the Verein accepted the terms of the CIM and confined its activities to the provisions supplementary thereto. See Ralf Lewis Wedgwood and J.E. Wheeler, International Rail Transport (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946): 5; Douglas J. Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration of the European Railway Network,’ paper presented at the European Networks, 19th-20th centuries: New approaches to the formation of transnational transport and communications system. (Proceedings Eleventh International Economic History Congress, Milan, 1994),137. 5  Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 5. 6  The Eisenbahn-Direktion Berlin had been managing administration since 1884, 5. The importance of the work of the Verein for the standardization of the conditions of traffic in the railways of the member states and railway progress more general is also testified in the following articles: Lochner, ‘The Influence of the German Railway “Verein” on the Construction and Equipment of Railway Rolling-Stock,’ Zeitungsdes Vereins 61 (1896): 436-452, 436-452; M. Philippe, ‘Notice sur l’union (Verein) des chemins de fer allemands,’ RGCF 2 (1879): 241-51. 7  Augustus J. Veenendaal, Spoorwegen in Nederland: Van 1834 tot nu (Boom, 2004), 68. It published two periodicals: the Organ für die Fortschritte des Eisenbahnwesens, established in 1845 by a well-known Ger-



3. Shifting Railway Regime

the public works department and member of the royal railway directorate at Erfurt notes, as a result of its work, member networks were functioning as one network. In the second half of the 19th century when the Swiss government undertook the initiative for drafting international railway conventions that would include, besides Germany and Austria-Hungary, also France and Italy, Germany took on a dominant role in the negotiations in contrast to the French. In the case of the negotiation that led to the drafting of the Berne Agreement on the Transport of Goods by Rail (CIM, 1890) France was weakly represented in the first meetings due to the opposition of the French railway administrations. In contrast, Germany participated strongly presenting a draft proposal for an international convention that was based on the principles that were already in effect between the railway administrations in the Verein.8 In the first conference that met in Berne, from the 13th of May to the 4th of June 1878, France was represented with only two ‘modest’ civil servants, an inspector of the commercial exploitation of the railways and an auditor of the state council. According to Ribeill’s account, the Germans easily imposed on the discussion a project inspired by their own code of commerce and from the ‘règlement général d’exploitation,’ that was in power in all the lines of the Verein. They did not hide their political ambition to make their regulations relative to the railway transport the terrestrial equivalent of what English texts were in maritime law.9 As the JT observed, in France the German activism was evaluated as an attempt to ‘take in hand the continent’s international traffic and to expand the omnipotent organization of their Verein in all the represented states.”10 According to Tissot, the conferences that took place in Berne began a re-balancing between French and the German law.11 The Convention came into force in 1st January 1893.12 In the same decades in which the conferences on standard legislation for railways were taking place, the Swiss federal council called its neighboring countries to a conference on technical unity in railways that would ensure that rolling stock could circulate in their railway systems.13 After a series of conferences Austriaman railway engineer Edmund Hensiger von Waldegg; It was published from 1864 under the responsibility of the Verein and, according to Veenendaal, became the leading engineering weekly newspaper for the European railway world. The other, Die Zeitung des Vereins, was published two times per week since 1861. Ibid., 163, 170. 8  Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire,’ 290-295. 9  Ribeill, ‘Réseau ferroviaire Européen intègre,’ 47. 10  Tissot, ‘Europe ferroviaire,’ 294. 11 Ibid. 12  Ibid., 284. As a reaction to this action taken by governments, railway administrations established in 1902 an International Committee for railway transportation (Comite international des transports par chemins de fer, CIT) to deal with regulations supplementary to the CIM. 13  Unité technique des chemins de fer (Berne: L’office fédéral des transports, 1982), 26; ‘Les accords

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Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland signed in 1882 the protocol on the Technical Unity of Rail Transport (L’unité technique) that came into force first April 1887. It included provisions that secured uniformity in rolling-stock exchange on the continent.14 In this international conference for the technical unity on rail transport, each of the six governments that were represented (Prussia, Austria, Hungary, France, Switzerland, Italy) disposed a number of equal votes and it was applied the rule of the simple majority of votes. Discussing the French position at the conference, Ribeill argues that: ‘Once more, the French network was dragged along considering that the technical unity of rail transport in France had already been treated to a large extent, such that the rolling stock was mostly uniform and that small differences remaining were not of a nature that would endanger the security of the exploitation.’15 He notes that a number of the propositions adopted in the final protocol of the conference were in opposition of the voice of France.16 The standards adopted, Ribeill notes, reflected the numerous concessions that French had to make. While the German influence had been important within the context of the above-mentioned organizations, the Germans seem to have been unwilling to participate in another organization of worldwide scope, the International Railway Congress Association (IRCA). This was established on the initiative of the Belgian government and was an organization of an academic nature. During the meetings of the organization, representatives of railway administrations and governments gathered to discuss issues relating to the improvement of railway technique and practice. Germany only joined the organization in 1905 and only stayed a member until 1914. Discussing Germany’s attitude toward the association, the RGCF observes that Germany refused to participate in an association in which their hegemony would not be assured and that they considered as a rival to the German internationaux pour l’échangé du matériel de transport: Chapitre II − L’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ Bulletin UIC 4 (1928): 73-79. 14  Unité technique des chemins de fer, 4, 25; Puffert, ‘European Railway Network,’ 137. The European Conference of Ministers of Transport (Paris: ECMT, 1969), 11; Pierre Michelet, Les transports au sol et l’organisation de l’Europe: Chemins de fer, routes, voies d’eau, pipe-lines (Paris: Payot, 1962), 25. List of Permanent International Organizations, Digest 40 (Paris: International Chamber of Commerce): 1-12. On the history of the technical unit see also ‘Standardization on Continental Railways: L’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ RG 17 (1912): 569; ‘Standardization on Continental Railways, Continuous Brakes for Goods Trains-the Recent Trials at Vienna,’ RG 17 (1912): 597-99; ‘Standardization on Continental Railways: the Westinghouse Improved Brake for Goods Trains,’ RG 19 (1913): 557-62; ‘International Equipment,’ RG 29 (1918): 251. 15  Ribeill, ‘Réseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 48. 16 Ibid.



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Verein.17 According to Ribeill, the Prussians and their networks boycotted the congress and the new association in which they thought that French influence would be predominant, to the detriment of the favorable relations they had forced through in Berne.18 WWI, I argue here, put an end to this regime of communications. In the previous chapter, I discussed proposals for reconfiguring European railways by constructing international railway arteries and establishing new international services. In this chapter I look at the attempts by the allies to minimize German influence over international railway affairs by establishing a new regime of communications in Europe.19 Such efforts took place in the first years after WWI. The allies, I argue in this chapter, attempted in the aftermath of the war to create a new order in which Germany would not have a dominant role in the discussions concerning international railway traffic. In the first section, I discuss the articles of the Peace Treaties concerning railways. These aimed at the establishment of a new regime of communications in Europe, a regime that would be valid for a few years after the end of WWI. Subsequently I discuss the numerous conferences that continued or complemented the work of the Peace conference in re-establishing international railway traffic in Europe and the consolidation of the international railway regime envisioned by the authors of the Peace Treaties. Among the numerous organizations the activity of which revived in the years after WWI, I devote most attention to two newly established bodies: the Organization for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations (henceforth Transit Organization) and the International Union of Railways (UIC). Both resulted from the desire to establish a new international order in respect to international railway affairs. By the 1930s, I finally argue in this chapter, the regime of railway communications in Europe had started to change again. The role of Germany in international railway affairs became more prominent. This becomes apparent in the strengthening of the role of the German Verein and of the consolidation of the services of the Mitropa sleeping car company.

17  ‘La situation actuelle de l’association internationale des chemins de fer,’ RGCF 40 (1921): 117. 18  Ribeill, ‘Réseau ferroviaire Européen intègre,’ 50. 19  I am using the notion of regime here as used by Jan Hostie in his manuscript. In this he notes that ‘by international regime we mean the sum-total of the international duties of states with regard to a given system of communications, apart from those duties which arise out of provisions referring to international agencies, their establishment and the more formal of their functions.’ Library of the UNECE, Jean François Hostie, The Organization of Transit and Communications of the League of Nations, Typewritten Manuscript, Geneva (n.d.), 1-2.

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Versailles and the Building of an Allied Railway Europe At the Plenary Session of the 25th of January 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference decided to appoint a commission to inquire into the possibilities for the establishment of an International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.20 It was composed of nineteen members: ten belonging to the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan), each of which had two representatives, and one each from Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Czechoslovak Republic and Uruguay.21 The Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways, as it was called, began its work on the 3rd of February 1919 and worked on solving transport issues arising from the settlement of the new frontiers and drafting the articles of the Peace Treaties relating to transport. As the congress of Vienna had done a century before, it discussed issues of access to the sea (Vienna, 1811). The members of the Commission unanimously adopted the British delegation’s recommendation that before drawing up special conditions to which specified rivers, ports or railways should be submitted, it should lay down general principles relating to freedom of transit and rules for the general regulation of all international waterways, railways and free ports. Two sub-commissions were formed with the duty of drawing up a draft convention on freedom of transit and draft regulations regarding rivers, ports and railways. These sub-commissions performed their work simultaneously and presented drafts relating respectively to freedom of transit and to international rivers. After some weeks a change occurred in the original ideas. The members of the commission moved unanimously to modify the order in which they proceeded, owing in the first place to considerations brought out by the two drafts, and in the second place to an invitation addressed to the Commission to formulate proposals for clauses to be inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty as early as possible.22 The Commission did not have the time to complete its work on drafting international conventions. In its report 20  ‘Terms of Reference and Composition of the Commission,’ in Peace Congress, Paris, 1919; Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways; Reports submitted by the Commission to the Supreme Council of the allies; and Minutes (with Annexes) of the Meetings of the Commission and its Sub-Commissions; (1919), iv. 21  Ibid. The preliminary Peace Conference had decided to appoint a Commission composed of fifteen members, two of each of the Great Powers and five elected by all the Powers with special interests. At the meeting of the latter held on the 27th January 1919, Belgium, China, Greece, Serbia and Uruguay were chosen to nominate one representative each; and at a somewhat later stage it was decided to add delegates from Poland, Portugal, Romania and the Czechoslovak Republic to the membership of the Commission. Ibid. 22  ‘Report dated 7th April, 1919, presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission of the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways,’ Peace Congress, Paris, 1919; Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, vi.



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to the Preliminary Peace Conference of the 7th of April 1919, the commission stated that: ‘The Commission now offers for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty the clauses submitted herewith dealing with the general régime of transportation and particularly with certain ports, railway lines, and river systems of Central Europe. Efforts have been made to secure for the allied and associated powers, in a text as short as the complexity and the multiplicity of the technical problems permitted, the guarantees which in the judgment of the Commission are necessary for the free exercise of their rights of equal competition-rights which before the war were encroached upon and menaced by the constant practices of the enemy States.’23 Further on it stated: ‘Certain of these guarantees which, under the existing conditions, are indispensable to the economic security of the nations injured by the war, may cease to be necessary as those conditions change.’24 As contemporary sources reveal, the articles of the Treaty that are found in Part XII, represent essentially the clauses adopted and reported by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.25 In this section I examine the articles concerning communications in general and railways more specifically that were introduced in the Peace Treaties. Studying these articles reveals that the allies aimed to establish a new railway regime in Europe that would give the allied countries transit rights over the areas of the defeated countries. Through these provisions the allies sought to establish the free circulation of passengers, merchandise and information through the areas of the defeated countries. Discussing the articles of the Peace Treaties concerning railways and communications in general, the JT observed that through these articles ‘[the allies] wanted to reassure liberal access to the Baltic Sea and to prohibit it from becoming a German lake.’26 A closer examination of the railway provisions included in the Treaty of Versailles, and of their reception in contemporary journals gives an insight to the agenda of the allies.

23 Ibid. 24  ‘The Commission unanimously proposes therefore that the League of Nations shall have power to recommend the revision of these guarantees at any time, in accordance with the provision made in Article 61.’ Ibid. 25  David Hunter Miller, ‘The International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways,’ The American Journal of International Law 13, no. 4 (1919): 669. 26  G. Allix, ‘Les transports dans le traité de paix avec l’Allemagne,’ JT 42 (1919): 276.

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Chapter Seven of the Treaty of Versailles was devoted to issues of communications and transit. Part one included general dispositions. It posed the principle of absolute equality of treatment for the execution of international transport and forced Germany to prohibit any disposition that would favor any nation, port or type of good.27 Germany was bound to ensure freedom of transit through the area best-suited for international transit and to apply to all international transport the same conditions as its national transport received as far as taxes and others facilities were concerned.28 Part three of the seventh chapter of the Treaty of Versailles included railway provisions. These articles aimed at requiring Germany to allow goods and passengers of the allied and associated powers to pass through its railway networks under exactly the same conditions under which the German goods and passengers were transported. In particular, the Treaty included clauses on issues of tariffs, transit tickets and overall facilities that would ensure free access, circulation and equal treatment of passengers and goods to the railway networks of the defeated countries.29 If requested by the allies and associate powers, Germany would be bound to co-operate in establishing through-ticket services (for passengers and their luggage) so as to ensure their communication by rail with each other and with all other countries by transit across the territories of Germany.30 27  Ibid., 273; The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), 212-214. 28  Allix, ‘Les transports dans le traité de paix,’ 273. In particular article 321 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that Germany would grant freedom of transit through her territories on the routes most convenient for international traffic, either by rail, navigable waterway or canal... etc, The Treaties of Peace, 212214. According to Article 321, the German Government undertook to make no discrimination in charges on goods ‘based on whether any port through which the goods are imported or exported is a German port or a port belonging to any foreign country...’ Further, the seaports of the allied and associate Powers were ‘entitled to all reduced tariffs granted on German railways’ (Article 325). These obligations were to be binding for five years from coming into force of the Treaty, and were to lapse at the end of that period unless revised by agreement reached before the expiration of the five years (Article 378). The Treaty came into force in January 1920. Nevertheless, in 1924 the German railways made a series of sweeping reductions in the tariffs of certain goods exported through German ports, as well as for certain favored imports, the effect of which was practically to eliminate transit through Holland. The Belgian, French and Italian Governments protested through the Council of Ambassadors. When the conference ultimately moved in the matter (1925), it was found that the five years’ period had expired, and that Articles 323 and 325, not having been revised, had lapsed. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 57. 29  According to article 365, goods coming from the territories of the allied and associate powers with the destination of Germany or in transit through Germany from or to the territories of the allied and associated powers, should enjoy on the German railways the most favorable treatment applied to goods of any kind carried on any German line under similar conditions of transport. The Treaties of Peace, 230. 30  In particular, article 367 specified that ‘Germany shall accept trains and carriages coming from the territories of the allied and associate powers for this purpose and should forward them with a speed at least equal to that of her best long-distance trains on the same lines, in rates equal to the rates collected on German internal services for the same distance, under the same conditions for speed and comfort.’ Germany would also be obliged to co-operate in establishing through passenger services required by the allied and associate powers. Article 369, specified that the above measures should also be valid in the case of combined transport for the part of the route that was covered by railway journey. Article 368 of the



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Germany would be obliged to establish international tariffs in accordance with the rates provided for internal traffic in the case in which one of the allied and associate powers would require her to do so. Similarly, the Treaty defined that the Berne Convention dealing with the transportation of goods would be renewed and that Germany would be bound by any new Berne Convention to be concluded within five years of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles.31 Germany adhered to the Berne Convention in the years before the war. As sources from the post-war years report, since the war France, Italy and Serbia had denounced the Berne Convention.32 According to the RG, Germany had used railway tariffs in the years before the war as a means of competing for international traffic. In particular, the RG reports that before the war: ‘Germany had used her railways to serve political ends. From a railway man’s point of view, she had competed unfairly for international traffic, though not to the extent generally supposed and all the time in a secret and rather shameful manner. Those in power decided that provisions must be inserted in the peace treaties with a view to preventing this unfair treatment in the future.’33 In order to ensure their freedom of circulation through the German railway networks, the allies even introduced technical clauses to the Peace Treaties. With the article 370 of the Peace Treaties, the allies sought to settle a technical issue crucial for the establishment of international railway traffic. The issue of brakes was an important issue that had arisen and discussed in Europe in the years before the war. After tests made in Burlington in 1886 and 1887, an act was issued in the United States imposing upon the American Railways the obligation of equipping all vehicles with automatic coupling gear and automatic compressed air brakes. The importance of introducing automatic couplings in the rolling stock as a means Peace Treaties, specified that through emigrant traffic to or from associate and allied ports should not be impeded or delayed by any ‘technical, fiscal or administrative measures.’ See The Treaties of Peace, 231. 31  According to article 366: ‘From the coming into force of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall renew, insofar as concerns them and under the reserves indicated in the second paragraph of the present article, the conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on October 14, 1890, September 20, 1893, July 16, 1895, June 16, 1898, and September 19, 1906, regarding the transportation of goods by rail. If within five years from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty a new convention for the transportation of passengers, luggage and goods by rail shall have been concluded to replace the Berne Convention of October 14, 1890, and the subsequent additions referred to above, this new convention and the supplementary provisions for international transport by rail which may be based on it shall bind Germany, even if she shall have refused to take part in the preparation of the convention or to subscribe to it. Until a new convention shall have been concluded, Germany shall conform to the subsequent additions referred to above, and to the current supplementary provisions.’ The Treaties of Peace, 230-1. 32  ‘Transports internationaux,’ JT (1919): 452-53. 33  ‘Problems of European Transport,’ RG 37 (1922): 345.

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of increasing the efficiency of the railway network was proven. The introduction of automatic compressed air brakes made possible an increase in the capacity of goods trains and consequently an increase in their length.34 Contemporary journals report that authorities had been unanimous since then in admitting that this had contributed greatly to the development of rail traffic, making goods transport to the ports and in particular to New York possible in yearly-increasing quantities. In Europe the issue was discussed during the Berne Conference for the revision of the code on the Technical Unity of Rail Transport in 1907. The conference recognized the importance of the question and drew up a list of conditions that continuous brakes for goods trains should conform to before they would be admitted into international service. In addition the conference established an international commission that would discuss the brake problem and approve the types of brake to be accepted in international traffic. The parties taking part in this Conference, including Germany, undertook not to adopt any system without the approval of a commission composed of the delegates. As the RG reports, before the war two systems had successfully passed the inspection of the International Commission. The Clayton-Hardy quick acting vacuum brake that Austria submitted in 1911, and the Westinghouse compressed air double pipe brake that Hungary submitted in 1912. Discussing the proceedings and decisions of the conference, the JT observed that: ‘A careful observer would not fail to see that the course of the works of the conference were characterized by a Pan Germanic atmosphere that should concern those participant countries that haven’t yet been drawn into the German sphere of influence. In the very important question of continuous brakes, the Germans have directed their energy to the adoption of a continuous brake of the type that is used by the Austrians; regarding this point, one could wonder whether there is not an issue for standardization in the special interest of military mobilization.’35 Later on, as the RG reports, a third system, the Kunze Knorr proposed by Germany, should have been submitted to the Commission in 1914 but the war prevented an examination being made, and Germany, ignoring the undertaking it had given at Berne, adopted this brake and began construction at once.36 With the Treaties, 34  For this purpose it would not have been sufficient to construct engines increasing in power from year to year. It was also necessary to give considerable strength to couplings and to ensure the braking of freight cars at the end of a train, even when they were too far from the brakes man to be able to hear the engine driver’s order to put on the brakes. Netter J, ‘Continuous Brakes on Goods Trains in Europe,’ RG 46 (1927): 741-44. 35  ‘La conférence de Berne pour l’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ JT (1907): 267-69. 36  Netter, ‘Continuous Brakes on Goods Trains in Europe,’ 741-4.



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the allies attempted to solve the issue. Article 370 of the Peace Treaty stipulated that German freight cars should be fitted with apparatus allowing their inclusion in goods trains on the lines of the allied and associate powers that were parties to the Berne Convention of May 15, 1886, as modified on May 18, 1907, without hampering the action of the continuous brake which might be adopted in such countries within ten years of the Treaty of Versailles coming into force. In addition, Germany would be obliged to accept freight cars of these countries in all goods trains on German lines. Finally, the rolling stock of the allied and associate powers should enjoy the same treatment on German lines as German rolling stock as regards movement, upkeep and repairs.37 According to the RG, the reason for the incorporation of this particular clause was: ‘That our late enemy was anxious that a German brake should be adopted more generally on the Continent, and were this wish realized an already complex question would be further disturbed.’38 Subsequent articles concerning railways in the Peace Treaties, concerned provisions on the conditions of the railway lines that would be surrendered to the allied and associate powers and the operation and construction of certain railway lines crossing the territory of more than one state. In addition, through the Peace Treaty the allies sought to solve the Gotthard issue to their interest. According to article 375, Germany had to renounce the Gotthard Convention of 1909 within ten years, if requested to do so by the Swiss government in agreement with the Italian government. Finally, the Treaty contained provisions regulating the handing over of the railways and rolling stock that Germany was called on to surrender under the peace terms.39 Article 376 defined that disputes which might arise over the interpretation and application of the proceeding articles should be settled by the League. Finally of importance is article 378, which specified that the stipulations in proceeding articles 321, 330, 332, 365, 369, should be subject to revision by the Council of the League at any time after five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Failing such revision, after the expiration of the above period of five years, no allied or associated power could claim the benefit of any of the stipulations in the articles enumerated above on behalf of any portion of its territories without according reciprocity in respect of such stipulations. However, 37  It stipulated that German freight cars should be equipped so as to prevent ‘hampering the action of the continuous brake which might be adopted by the Allied and Associate powers within the next 10 years, and the freight cars of these countries should be accepted on the German railways. ‘The Peace Treaty, Clauses Relating to Railways and Transport,’ RG 31 (1919): 82. 38  ‘Continuous Brakes for Continental Goods Trains,’ RG 33 (1920): 690. 39  ‘Railways and the Peace Treaty,’ RG 31 (1919): 1-2.

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the Council of the League would have the power to prolong the period of five years during which reciprocity could not be demanded. Finally, according to article 379 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany undertook to adhere to any general convention regarding the international regime of transit, waterways, ports or railways in the case in which such a convention would be concluded by the allied and associate powers, with the approval of the League, within five years of the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.40 Consequently, the articles of the Peace Treaties would be valid for five years. Afterwards they were to be replaced by the general conventions on the freedom of transit, international regime of railways, navigable waterways and ports. After this period of time a general railway convention to be concluded within the context of the League would ensure freedom of transit throughout Europe. This meant that a general regime in international matters was contemplated. General conventions regarding transit, waterways, ports and railways were to be concluded within five years by the allied and associate powers with the approval of the League and Germany would adhere to them.41 Various committees took up this work in the early years following WWI. The war not only necessitated the establishment of a new regime. It was also necessary to undo the damage done to the railway by the war and its aftermath, e.g. Treaty of Versailles, which created many new countries.

New Political Order and the Delinking of Railways Communications and transport were among the most important issues that the allies and the newly created nation states had to settle after the war. Two categories of problems had to be settled. In the first category were problems that resulted from the war and the new configuration of borders. Such problems existed mainly in the areas of Central, Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In belligerent continental Europe, railway networks had suffered a lot of damage during the war. Apart from the destruction of much railway mileage during retreats, the absence of repairs and excessive use had resulted in tracks, locomotives, and rolling stock being worn out. The personnel had suffered heavy losses, while the price of coal had risen consid-

40  The Treaties of Peace, 230-237. Article 379 of the Treaty of Versailles defined that ‘without prejudice to the special obligations imposed on her by the present Treaty for the benefit of the allied and associated powers, Germany undertakes to adhere to any general conventions regarding the international regime of transit, waterways, ports or railways which may be concluded by the allied and associated powers, with the approval of the League of Nation, within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty.’ Similar provisions were included to the Treaties with Austria, Treaty of Sain-Germain-en-Laye, the treaty with Hungary, the Treaty with Bulgaria, treaty of Neuilly, and finally the Treaty with Turkey, see respectively, The Treaties of Peace, 439-446, 630-640, 771-775, 926-927. 41  Miller, ‘The International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways,’ 685.



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erably due to the reduction in production.42 Apart from problems concerning the material destruction of railway networks, problems also arose from the settlement of the new borders, the so-called ‘politico-railway’ problems.43 Such problems concerned mostly areas of Europe where political changes had occurred as a result of the war. These included problems of ownership and administration of railways such as those of Alsace Loraine and the Balkan States.44 The problems were more acute in Eastern Europe. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire posed problems of ownership of lines, while the existing systems and flows of traffic had to be modified to satisfy the needs of the newly created nation-states.45 As H.O. Mance wrote in his reports to the League: ‘Several of the important railway systems in Central Europe had been cut up by the new frontiers, thus necessitating a complete re-organization of the working of newly created systems, while wholesale changes were made in both the administrations and personnel with the result that certain lines were heavily overstaffed and other lines were denuded of a large proportion of their skilled personnel… On top to all of this, the new political situation tended to change the economic relations between different parts of Europe and to alter fundamentally the currents of traffic to which the existing railway systems had been adapted.’46 Secondly, there was the long-term issue of re-establishing an international regime of communications in Europe, a regime that would be in force also after the fiveyear period in which the articles of the Peace Treaties would be valid. As I discussed above, the Peace Treaty foresaw the creation and establishment of such a regime after the five-year period established in its articles expired. Next to these conventions, the Peace Treaties also foresaw the re-establishment of the Berne convention on the Transport of Goods by rail (CIM), which regulated international railway traffic before the war, and from which many countries abstained during the war. Further on, they also foresaw its extension to cover passengers and carriage, an extension that was envisaged for long before the outbreak of WWI.47 42  LoNP, Restoration of the Means of Communication in Europe, doc. no: A. 64. 1923. VIII, 6; LoNP, H.O. Mance, Report of the Transport Situation in Europe, doc. no: C.C.T. 130, 4. 43  ‘The Future of the Continental Railways,’ RG 30 (1919): 197. 44 Ibid. 45  Ivan Jakubec, ‘The Transport Problems of a new State Czechoslovak Railways and Rivers, 1918-1938,’ JTH 17, no 2 (1996): 116-131. 46  H.O. Mance was President of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council and vice president of the Provisional Communications and Transit Committee of the League of Nations. LoNP, Restoration of the Means of Communication in Europe, 6. 47  The Treaties of Peace, 230-1, Article 366.

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Central European Railways Immediately after the war, action was taken via a series of international conferences to settle the problems in both categories. The problem of distributing rolling stock among the successor states proved to be one of the most difficult problems. Since the dissolution of the old monarchy, the railway rolling stock of the old Austrian Hungarian Empire was considered as ‘common property’ of the successor States. The Communication Section of the Supreme Economic Council of the Allies was established in February 1919 with the aim of helping to restore communications in Europe. It consisted of representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium to which were attached representatives of the general of the French army Marshal Foch, the British Naval Section and the French Foreign Office. The Communications Section had no executive authority, its duty being to organize and co-ordinate action between the allies and the dispatch of the necessary technical commissions and the collection of information. An allied mission was sent to every country assisted, but in each case one of the allied powers was made responsible for local executive action.48 This section, with the help of the engineers that constituted the local missions, greatly facilitated the distribution and transfer of rolling material after the armistice as well as the arrangement of credits for the urgent purchase of material and equipment. It also served as an intermediary between the different administrations so that they could re-establish direct relations to the degree possible. In addition, a commission for the repartition of rolling stock in the old Austrian-Hungarian Empire began work at Vienna under Sir Francis Dent.49 Finally an International Wagon Exchange Committee (‘Commission de Circulation’) was set up at Vienna under an Allied president, Leverve, with participation of the countries belonging formerly in AustriaHungary for the purpose of facilitating interchange and checking of rolling stock.50 The labors of this Committee ultimately resulted in a conference convened at Porto 48  ‘Europe’s Need of Rolling Stock,’ RG 32 (1920): 613; ‘Les communications internationales aux conférences de Paris et de Barcelone,’ RGCF 40 (1921): 439. Discussing the character of the Supreme Economic Council, the League of Nations reports that ‘This body deals mainly with reconstruction in Central Europe in contrast to the above mentioned bodies [referring to the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways, the Committee of Enquiry on Transport and Communications and the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit], which are more immediately concerned with matters arising out of the Peace Treaty, and with future international relations regarding the communication and transit. ‘International Communications,’ RG 32 (1920): 587. 49  The peace treaties ordered a Commission composed by representatives of each of the States, under the presidency of one delegate of the allies, to distribute the rolling stock among the new States. This commission was constituted towards the end of 1919 under the presidency of Sir Francis Dent, director of the British network. Ibid. 50  ‘Europe’s Need of Rolling Stock,’ RG 32 (1920): 612-13.



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Rosa, as well as an arrangement to mark rolling stock previously belonging to the railways of Austria-Hungary provisionally, pending its permanent allocation, thus making international circulation possible in the interim.51 During the conference in Porto-Rosa (1921), the representatives of the seven successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Great Britain, the United States and France discussed measures for the economic restoration of these countries, to which, they believed, was tied the economic recovery of the rest of Europe.52 The main issue the conference had to deal with, concerned ways to make the railway rolling stock, which was standing still inside the newly drawn frontiers, start moving again across borders. In order to facilitate the international transport of passengers and their luggage, as well as goods, the member countries signed a convention in which they agreed to the following terms: to open as soon as possible for international traffic, and without distinction of the goods to be transported, all frontier stations of importance for this traffic; to concentrate traffic in common frontier stations; to establish good train connections for passenger and goods traffic; and, by lending each other every possible assistance, to co-operate in re-establishing international through passenger trains and in providing such new trains as might be necessary for the current volume of traffic. Finally, their railway administrations would make arrangements to organize long-distance through goods trains, and to accelerate certain classes of goods transported in complete wagonloads or in groups of freight cars, especially foodstuffs, cattle, fuel etc. Railway goods traffic between the contracting parties should be governed by the International Convention of October 14th, 1890 (CIM), with the amendments provided for in the additional Agreement of July 16th 1898 and September 19th 1906; through rates for the transportation of passengers and their luggage, and of goods between the territory of a third state passing through the territory of one of the contracting parties, should be fixed as soon as the circumstances permitted it.53 In addition, the Porto-Rosa Conference adopted a resolution according to which the countries participating in the conference recognized as highly desirable: ‘...In order to facilitate the establishment of international goods tariffs, and without in any way prejudicing sovereign rights as regards tariffs ... the establishment of a uniform nomenclature for goods to be carried in international traffic..., of a uniform system of classification of goods for the common international tariffs and of uniform general conditions for the 51  LoNP, Restoration of the Means of Communication in Europe, 7. 52  These were the states of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. ‘The Transport Commission at the Genoa Conference,’ Digest 21 (1922): 3. 53  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1121, The Porto Rosa Conference.

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application of international tariffs.’54 On the initiative of the Italian government the Conference issued a recommendation that a commission should be formed to study these questions, and a European Conference ought to be held for discussing them. The Conference further recognized that it was highly desirable that a single monetary unit for tariffs should be adopted for all international tariffs in Europe, and that the railway administrations of all states should be invited to adopt it in a uniform manner. This monetary unit for tariffs should be a unit that would approximate as far as possible to the gold parity. In addition, the Conference recognized as highly desirable the establishment of an international railway clearing office for all traffic subject to such international tariffs. Railway administrations would report to this office the reciprocal debts and credits in international transport accounts. The function of this office would be to liquidate these debts and credits as far as possible by clearing, and to determine the balance to be paid. Finally the conference recognized as highly desirable that if it would not be possible to give practical effect to the principle of a single monetary unit for tariffs, through rates affecting the railways of several states should, as far as possible be fixed in no more than two currencies. The Conference agreed that consideration of this question should be referred, under the same conditions, to the Commission mentioned above.55 The distribution of the material was only partially realized. This resulted in a delay to the needed repair of the material, since the respective countries didn’t want to undertake the cost of repair before knowing what part of the material would belong to them.56 As reported in contemporary sources, apart from relief trains formed of specially allocated rolling-stock whose return was guaranteed by the presence of an allied military guard, and certain large international contracts arranged and supervised with the assistance of the allied railway missions, the bulk of international goods traffic between most of the countries in Central Europe took place under the principle of wagon-by-wagon exchange at the frontiers.57 Indeed, as the report by Mance reveals, the problem of communications in Eastern Europe had still not been resolved by 1923. In his report he mentions that: ‘The recent re-organization of the Repartitions Committee into two separate committees for Austria and Hungary respectively, may not lead to any 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56  ‘Les difficultés des chemins de fer de l’Europe centrale,’ RGCF 41 (1922): 250. 57  An inter allied mission was instituted by the Supreme Council of the War in Paris, with the mandate to reorganize the transport of these countries, without taking into consideration the political frontiers, by using if necessary, the personnel and the diverse material of the networks, and by prioritizing the emergency transport and assistance. Ibid.



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more rapid solution of this urgent question. If I were permitted to offer a suggestion, I should advise that the quickest solution would be for all the parties, after reaching an agreement on as many questions as possible at the next meeting of the Commission in September, to agree to refer the whole of the outstanding matters to arbitration.’58 The Austrian delegation appealed to the Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, requesting the League to intervene to solve the problem. However, the Council of the League responded that the issue was not within the League’s remit. It suggested that an appeal should be directed to the Council of Ambassadors. Three years later, Walker H. Hines, late director general of railroads and arbitrator under the Peace Treaties wrote in an American academic journal that the problem of distributing the railroad rolling stock was one of immense difficulty. The problem was so enormously intricate that it would take years to work it out, and he stated that it would probably remain partially unsolved. One difficulty that arose in making the distribution was that the mechanisms for distribution, that is a commission with members from all the interested states, was not beyond the influence of politics. Inevitably, the work of the commission took on a political aspect that made it difficult to reach conclusions.59 Ralph Wedgwood gives additional information concerning further developments. In November 1925, he reports, the Conference of Ambassadors set up a Technical Committee of their own, composed of British, French and Italian members, whose function would be to arbitrate on questions not within the competence of the Distribution Commission. Further on he reports that the Distribution Commission was dissolved in August 1931. Until then all outstanding reparation questions having by that time being annulled.60

Attempts to Re-Establish a Railway Regime in Europe Meanwhile, governments and railway administrations of Western Europe undertook action to restore the regulations that would make possible the establishment of international communications in Europe. Governments undertook action within the context of the League in its early years to re-establish an international transport regime in Europe. In October 1920, a Conference on Passports, Customs 58  LoNP, Restorations of the Means of Communications in Europe. 59  Walker D. Hines, ‘International Transit Problems,’ in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 12, no. 1 (1926), 446. 60  Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 79.

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Formalities and Through Tickets was held under the auspices of the League. The 1920 Conference adopted a uniform model passport and recommended a large number of changes in the existing regime. Its overall aim was to diminish the inconveniences of the existing regime, by reducing the cost of passports and visas, prolonging their duration, and concluding agreements between countries to abolish entrance visas wherever possible. The Conference asked for the immediate abolition of exit visas.61 The Convention of Stresa generally assumed the resumption of international circulation of freight cars in Europe. The conventions signed at Stresa established two unions known as RIC (from its Italian name regolamento internazionale carrozze, in English International Carriages and Vans Union) and RIV (regolamento internazionale veicoli, in English International Wagons’ Union).62 These unions secured the adoption of a uniform system of freight cars and vehicle exchange on the continental standard gauge railways in Europe. In particular, before the war, the exchange of freight cars at the frontiers was arranged through exchange unions.63 After WWI, the Italian State Railways took the initiative and organized a conference in Stresa (1921) in which fifteen States participated.64 At this conference the ‘Union International des Wagons’ was formed. It drew up the ‘Règlement pour l’emploi réciproque des wagons en trafic international,’ that became known by its Italian name ‘Regolamento internazionale veicoli.’ The name of the document was also adopted as the name of the organization that was charged with the task of 61  LoNP, CEEU, Report by the Secretary-General on certain technical questions that have been dealt with by the League of Nations, doc no: C. 693. M 290. 1930. VII. 62 The RG reports that the union was based on the bilateral agreements that were already in existence between a number of neighbor countries up to 1914, in particular between the railways belonging to the German Verein. ‘International Railway Association-I: Some Notes on the Work and Scope of the Various Associations Concerned with International Traffic, Principally on the European Continent,’ RG 77 (1942): 549-50. 63  One such union was the ‘Union Internationale pour l’échange du matériel that came into existence on the 1st of January 1877. This resulted from a conference held in November 1876, the third in a row, convoked by the Belgian state. The two previous ones had been held in 1870 and 1874 in Brussels. Administrations of railways of Germany, the Netherlands and France that were bordering to Belgium participated in the conference. The Conference of 1876 had adopted the ‘Règlement technique pour l’admission réciproque du matériel et la responsabilité des avaries,’ while its date of application was fixed to the 1st January 1877. This included the regulation for the exchange of rolling stock and determined on the one hand the conditions that, if realized, would imply for the contractors the obligation to admit vehicles in exchange, or, on the other hand the deficiencies, that properly observed in vehicles, would permit them to refuse to participate in the exchange. ‘Les accords internationaux pour l’échangé du matériel de transport; Chapitre II-L’ unité technique des chemins de fer,’ 73-4. 64  These were the railway administrations of Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Low-Countries, Poland, Romania, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Sweden, Switzerland, Republic of Czechoslovakia, and Turkey. In one of its first meetings, the conference decided to limit its efforts to elaborate an international regulation applicable only to freight cars, the lease and the use of passengers’ vehicles, established through different principles, to be regulated by another convention. ‘Les accords internationaux pour l’échange du matériel de transport; Chapitre II,’ Bulletin UIC 3 (1927): 87.



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applying it and keeping it up to date.65 Discussing the convention, the RG mentions that this could be considered the operational counterpart to the International Standards Conference (UT).66 The International Carriages and Vans’ Union (RIC) was also established with the primary object of regulating the reciprocal use of vehicles. In addition, its duties were to compile annually the European table of direct vehicles67 and assure the application of the ‘règlement pour l’utilisation réciproque 65  The RIV established a clearing office and the ultimate settlement of balances were effected through the Bureau Central des Compensations (BCC). The RIV covered the following points: it defined that a fully loaded freight car would be allowed to continue its journey over the frontier to destination. The receiving administration would pay rent for the freight car to the owing administration. It defined this as a uniform rent. To prevent delay in the return of a freight car, it defined the rent on a sliding scale, reaching a maximum of fifteen days. Further on it defined that in order to save empty haulage, freight cars after unloading might under prescribed conditions be diverted to pick up a return load either for an internal or for an international journey. Repairs and technical treatments of freight cars were subject to the rules of the UT. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 18-9. In 1936 the Union comprised hundred three railway administrations of different countries dependent from twenty one countries. These represented the totality of the network of standard gauge, meaning that all the railways called to exchange freight cars of international traffic. The Union met every five years in a general assembly and its permanent organ constituted by a Committee. This was composed of six permanent members represented by one administration of each of the following countries: Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and by three temporary members representing three administrations designated by those railway administrations that exploited a network of at least 1000 km of lines and not belonging to the countries that selected the six permanent delegates (Czechoslovakia, Austria and Greece). Three revisions of the RIV took place in the interwar years, in 1924, 1929, 1934 and gave effect to the editions of ‘Perouse, Lucerne, Stockholm’. The last was put into effect in 1st January 1935. ‘Activité des principaux organismes internationaux de chemins de fer autres que l’UIC,’ Bulletin UIC 12 (1936): 207. 66  ‘International Railway Association-I: Some Notes on the Work and Scope of the Various Associations Concerned with International Traffic Principally in the European Continent,’ RG 77 (1942): 550. 67  The union was charged with the following functions: to pronounce the introduction of new members, to elect the directing administration, to order the modifications or additions to bring to the RIC, to establish at an annual basis the European Table of Direct Vehicles (EWP). This last work complemented the work of the Conférence européenne des horaires (European Timetable Conference) in two ways. Firstly by determining what material to provide to the trains, the formation or maintenance of which was decided. To organize connections with direct vehicles between big centers that were not connected through the itineraries decided by the timetable conference. For this reason, the two European conferences of timetables and of direct vehicles met every year at the same time and place. ‘Principaux organismes internationaux de chemins de fer autres que l’UIC,’ Bulletin UIC 12, 210. According to Wedgwood, it was in 1923 that the Union drew up a ‘Convention pour l’emploi réciproque des voitures et des fourgonnes.’ Apart from the formulation of the Convention, the RIC established periodical meetings, which came to be known as the European Through Carriage Conference, and later as the European Conference of Through Services. Beside the plenary meetings, group meetings were also held, and the groups themselves were split up into sections corresponding to the routes concerned. All the movements thus agreed composed the European Time Table or Through Carriage. Payments between the various administrations were based on a special unit, the axle-kilometer. And every endeavor was made to arrange the services so that the balances cancelled out. If there were any cash balances, they were transferred by the Swiss Federal Railways to the RIV account and settled through the BCC. The RIC dealt with the interchange of passenger vehicles generally, with accounts and clearing and also with technical rules governing (a) operation and (b) construction and maintenance. The rules governing construction and maintenance were based on the code on the UT, but supplemented it by additional rules dealing with continuous brakes, heating, lighting etc., which had no statutory force but constituted agreements between Railway Administrations. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 20.

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des voitures et fourgons.”68 The executive bodies of the union were the Conférence européenne des voitures directes (European Conference of Direct Vehicles) on the one hand, and the Director Administration appointed every five years on the other. The Swiss federal railways acted as director administration for both unions during the interwar years.69 The importance of restoring transport and communications, and most specifically railways, for the revival of European trade was stressed during the economic conference held at Genoa in 1922. In the preamble of the resolution concerning issues of transport, the conference recognized that: ‘Efficient transport is an essential requisite for the revival of European Trade and it is therefore desirable that the European States should continue to devote their unremitting efforts to the restoration of all means of transport at their disposal, and to the removal of every obstacle affecting international communications.’70 The Genoa Economic Conference included a transport committee and undertook resolutions concerning transport in general and railways in particular.71 Resolution number six of the conference recommended that the French railway administrations should convoke at the earliest possible moment a conference of technical representatives of all the railway administrations of Europe. The objects of this conference, which was to be held in Paris, would be, first, that these administrations should put into operation immediately all measures within their competence, calculated to restore international traffic to conditions at least as satisfactory as before the war; and second, that the representatives of the administrations should agree upon proposals to their respective governments for such further actions as may require governmental intervention. Furthermore, the resolution stated that this meeting of technical representatives should examine, among other questions, the question of a permanent conference of railway administrations for the assimilation and improvement of the equipment and operating methods of the railways, 68  This regulation together with the status of the union, and the règlement de la conférence européenne des voitures directes constituted a series of agreements, the totality of which, commonly designated as RIC dated since 1921,’ ‘Principaux organismes internationaux de chemins de fer,’ Bulletin UIC 12 (1936), 210. 69 Ibid. 70  Papers Relating to International Economic Conference, Genoa, April-May 1922 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922), 81; ‘La Commission des transports à la conférence de Genès,’ RGCF (1922), 483. 71  On April 1922 a Transport Commission was created by the International Economic Conference and entrusted with the task of examining questions relating to the restoration of means of communication. At a meeting held two days later, this Commission appointed three Sub-Commissions, the Organizing Sub-Commission, the Railway Sub-Commission and the Waterways Sub-commission. The Transport Commission concluded its task on April 26, 1922 and its proposals were adopted at a plenary session of the Conference on May 3. ‘The Transport Commission at the Genoa Conference,’ Digest 2, 3.



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with a view to international traffic.72 Carole Fink in his book European Diplomacy, 1921-1922, argues: ‘The transport Commission adopted Germany’s proposal to establish a unified administrative system for all European railways, such as that had existed informally under the Deutscher Verein prior to WWI. Germany’s purpose was to block the League from assuming control over railway traffic.’73 He argues that in order to ensure French sympathy, the British delegate proposed Paris as the administrative centre; since French railways were still privately owned, this also emphasized the ‘non-political nature’ of the decision. Paris, nonetheless considered this a victory that gave it a real economic and political advantage over Berlin.74 Meanwhile, the Swiss Federal Governor called a new Conference where the Berne Convention was discussed and was put into force again in 1924. More specifically, on the 23rd of October 1924, a diplomatic conference took place in Berne where twenty-four governments from Europe were represented. It undertook action to pass two international conventions that, as the bulletin of the UIC reports: ‘Provide decisive proof of the constant efforts of the railway industry to promote the development of relations and transactions between different countries and to assure safety.’75 One convention concerned goods traffic by rail, and was a revision of older convention of the 14th October 1890. The other was new, and provided long-contemplated conventions for the transport of passengers and luggage.76 In parallel, and independently of the above-mentioned activities, the Committee of Enquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit took up the work of the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways that met during the Peace Conference. More specifically, when the work of the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways was drawing to an end, the French government, ‘anxious 72  Ibid., 4. 73  Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921-1922 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993): 244. He refers to source: Stieler to German Foreign Ministry Archive, Genoa, 19 Apr., Germ. German Foreign Ministry Archive, T-120 3398/ 1734/ D738426-29. 74 Fink, The Genoa Conference, 244. He refers to source and documents on British Foreign policy (19191939), 19: 725; ‘Memorandum by British Representatives,’ 29 Apr., GB BT 90/18; Seydoux, Commissions Techniques, FMAE B 99. 75  ‘Les conventions internationales sur le transport des marchandises et des voyageurs par chemins de fer,’ Bulletin UIC 2 (1926): 30. 76 Ibid.

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to secure continuity of collaboration by experts who had acquired a special knowledge of international problems,’ invited the governments concerned to nominate these experts as their representatives to an International Commission of Enquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit on which certain neutral states-Argentina, Holland, Spain and Switzerland, in the first place as well as the allies, were already represented.77 The task of this body was to continue the work the Peace Conference had left uncompleted, and in particular, to undertake the task of compiling conventions that would ensure freedom of transit and a general railway convention. Consequently it worked on establishing draft general conventions on the freedom of transit, navigable waterways of international concern, ports and railways.78 This was the first body since the armistice that expanded the activity of establishing a new international regime of communications beyond the Allied and Associate powers to include neutral countries.79 It adopted the principle that technical problems ought to be studied by technical representatives from different countries, who should keep in close touch with each other in order to reconcile any differences between them by means of a verbal exchange of views, from which questions of international rivalry and of political preoccupation ought to be excluded.80 When dealing with railways, the Commission of Enquiry worked on the principle that in order to ensure freedom of transit, the articles of the Convention should be technical, specifying the conditions of working and utilization of railway lines.81 ‘Freedom of transit would be meaningless if, after having been afforded legal guarantees on those railways over which the various States exercise any degree of control or action, [freedom of transit] could not be effectively exercised owing to the general conditions of working and utilization of these lines.’82 This was in consonance with the works that had been done in the Peace Treaties, where technical clauses had been introduced with the aim of facilitating the free 77  ‘International Communications,’ RG 32 (1920), 587. 78 Ibid. 79  These were representatives from the Argentine Republic, Brazil, Spain and the Netherlands and Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. LoNP, First General Conference on Communications and Transit, Preparatory documents, doc no: 20/31/58, 13-5. 80  Ibid., 13. 81  ‘Report on the Draft Convention on the International Regime of Railways,’ in Barcelona Conference, Verbatim Records and Texts of the Recommendations relative to the International Regime of Railways and of the Recommendations relative to Ports under an International Regime (Geneva: League of Nations, 1921), 208. 82  ‘Report on the Draft Convention on the International Regime of Railways,’ 208.



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circulation of allied and associate powers’ freight cars through the railway networks of the ex-enemy countries. ‘Moreover, apart from the question of transit, the economic solidarity of nations, which to-day is more necessary than ever before, requires that every state should find on the railways of other States those facilities which are essential to its continued existence.’83 Consequently, it prepared a draft convention on railways that touched upon different issues of the construction and working of railways.84 The draft Convention included nineteen articles concerning issues such as the use of a single-way bill in international traffic of goods, the achievement of technical uniformity and the establishment of the principle of non-discrimination in setting tariffs for transit traffic. However, the new convention had to be approved by the European governments. It was discussed during the first conference on communications and transit of the League that took place in Barcelona (1921), which I discuss later in this chapter. In August 1923, Colonel Mance former president of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council as well as Vice president of the Provisional Communications and Transit Organization submitted a report on the situation in transport in Europe stating that: ‘As a wide generalization from all quarters the evidence is overwhelming that immense progress has been made... Generally speaking communications are far from being the limiting factor in the economic recovery of Europe and the progress made has in many directions practically reached the point where no further advance is possible until other questions, notably that of exchange, have been settled, and until the financial and economic policies of the various states have been clarified.’85 Further on he noted that those states that possessed the fewest resources for 83 Ibid. 84  The Provisional Committee of Transit and Communications of the League of Nations held a large number of meetings starting in October 1919, with the principal object of preparing draft conventions on freedom of transit, international rivers and railways, and a draft resolution regarding an international regime for certain ports. It also worked out the permanent organization of Communications and Transit of the League of Nations. The RG reports that practically the whole of the discussions were carried out at informal sittings without proceedings. It was agreed that a summary of these discussions would be presented in the form of a report explaining the reasons that had led the Committee to adopt the text of the draft Conventions. According to the RG this report was finally adopted at the formal meeting of the Committee on June 11. ‘Transit and Communications Committee under the League of Nations,’ RG 33 (1920), 24. 85  LoNP, Mance, Report on the Transport Situation, 10.

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dealing with a future economic recovery were the ones that had to deal with heavy traffic, in contrast to the general stagnation of goods traffic in Central Europe. Several vital links of immediate importance in joining up disconnected portions of the new systems had been completed or were approaching completion and others were in planning. 86

League of Nations and a Universal Approach to Railways, 1919-1939 The new Europe, as designed by the victors of the WWI, was a Europe organized politically according to the principle of national self-determination. The great empires Austria-Hungary, Germany and Ottoman Turkey – the latter of which was already in the process of disintegrating – were permanently dissolved. They were to be replaced by a constellation of new democratic nation states.87 However, the political re-organization of the world created new potential nuclei of conflicts in certain regions of Europe. The winners of the war had drawn the new map of Europe evoking the principle of national self-determination that they believed would legitimate the new configuration of borders.88 However, the existence of minorities in many of the newly created countries appeared as a new factor threatening the political stability in Europe.89 In order to safeguard the newly established political order, the victors established a political body that would be responsible for maintaining the peace in Europe and in mediating in any future disputes, the League of Nations. Triggered by the atrocities of the Great War, the idea for the League’s creation had its origins in the pacifist movements across the Atlantic.90 The president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, in his famous 14 points in January 1918 gave an outline of the peace that he had in mind. He made suggestions for the League particularly in point fourteen, according to which: ‘A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to small great and small States alike.’91 86 Ibid. 87  By the end of 1919 there were thirteen republics in Europe at the place of three of the years before the war. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: The Penguin Press, 1998), 3-4. 88  Ibid., 43. 89  Ibid., 13. 90  The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (Geneva: Information Section of the League of Nations, 1935), 18. 91 Ibid., 20.



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During the Peace Conference a special Commission worked to prepare the covenant of the League, which became the cornerstone of the new alliance. The covenant was the charter of the new international order that the League aspired to establish. Its authors were the allied powers, particularly the United States of America and Great Britain.92 As stated in the covenant, the aim of the alliance would be to achieve international peace and security but also to promote international co-operation.93 The main object of the League was to prevent war. All the powers that signed the covenant joined to use their military and economic forces against that one who would refuse to submit themselves to the peaceful preliminary procedures.94 However, the League acquired also a positive role, to promote international co-operation.95 The covenant of the League established a loose alliance. There was no supranational authority and any of the members could withdraw from the League with two years notice.96 The envisioned community of the authors of the covenant of the League was a community of peaceful co-existence of nation-states where human rights and more specifically labor issues would be respected. Free circulation of goods was to be achieved through the removal of economic barriers. In order to achieve its goals, it extended its activities not only to political issues but also to technical issues, including financial issues, issues of health, but also issues of communications and transit. The international society as envisioned by the authors of the covenant of the League would be a collectivity of sovereign states.97 Between 1920 and 1932, the great majority of neutrals and all the former enemies of the founder States became members of the League. Despite the fact that membership of the League was expanded to a large territory, the absence of important countries such as the United States that never signed the covenant, and temporary membership of others, such as the Soviet Union and Germany (became a member of the League in 1926 and withdrew on October 21st, 1935) weakened the alliance.98

92  Ibid., 18. 93  Ibid., 196. 94  Georges Scelle, Le pacte des nations et sa liaison avec le traité de Paix (Paris: L. Tenin, 1919). 95  The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935), 22. 96  The covenant of the League, article 1, paragraph 3, stipulated that ‘Any member of the League may, after two year’s notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.’ The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations, 197. 97  Bourquin, ‘L’organisation internationale des voies de communications,’ in Recueil des cours 5, 1924, 163. 98  The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations, 11.

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League’s Communications and Transit Organization The Peace Treaties had attributed important role to the League in issues of communications and transit. In particular article twenty-three (e) of the covenant of the League, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, stipulated that members of the League would ‘make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and transit.’99 As Jean François Hostie, a secretary of the Commission of Enquiry for Freedom of Communications and Transit observed, ‘strictly speaking, the words ‘and of transit’ are superfluous... It was in order to place the accent upon freedom of transit that the covenant made special mention thereof.’100 Various committees had worked since the armistice on issues of communications and transit. The council of the League at its meeting in February 18 1920 adopted a resolution on the initiative of the Spanish representative Senor Leon, inviting the Committee of Enquiry of Freedom of Communications and Transit to act in an advisory capacity to the League. In particular its task was to prepare drafts of Conventions regarding transit questions, and to frame the scheme of a permanent organization, which should eventually replace it, as an organ of the League. The Commission unanimously accepted this invitation and constituted a Provisional Committee on Communications and Transit of the League. During the first years of its activity, the former Minister of Public Works of France Claveille acted as a chairman of the Committee while the rest of the members were all public officials of high standing ministers, directors of waterways and of state railways, and legal and other experts.101 The plan for constituting a permanent committee was submitted and approved by the Barcelona Conference (1921) and the permanent committee of transit and communications came into existence (henceforth Transit Organization). The Transit Organization was composed of members appointed 99  Osborne Harry Mance, Frontiers, Peace Treaties and International Organization (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), x. ‘It is on the basis of that article of the general idea of freedom of communications and equitable opportunities in the field of communications that the work of the League has started and has developed.’ Robert Haas, ‘World Transit and Communications,’ in Problems of Peace: Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations (1927) (London: Institute of International Relations), 213. 100  More specifically according to Hostie, ’strictly speaking, the words ‘and of transit’ are superfluous, for in its general acceptation transit means a transport, both beginning and ending outside the territory of transit, and transit, therefore, is but a form of communications. Access to the sea of inland states, for instance, presupposes freedom of transit. The same is true of the utilization of Straits and maritime Canals.’ Jean François Hostie, ‘Transport and Communications: The First Ten Years at the League of Nations,’ World Trade 2 (1930): 366. 101  ‘International Communications,’ RG 32 (1920), 587. The official name of the committee was ‘Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit’ ; this was later altered into ‘Committee for Communications and Transit’ (1938). A comprehensive account of the work of this Committee was prepared by Jean Hostie. A copy of the work that was never published can be found in the library of the UNECE. Library of the UNECE, Jean François Hostie, The Organization of Transit and Communications of the League of Nations, Typewritten Manuscript, Geneva (n.d.).



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by the members of the League represented permanently on the Council, with one representative for each of those members, together with members to be appointed by the Conference as they deemed necessary, taking into account as much as possible technical interests and geographical representation. The total number of members of the Transit Organization would not exceed one third of the members of the League.102 The Transit Organization took over some of the activities of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council.103 Consequently both the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council and the Committee of Enquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit were incorporated to the Transit Organization. The authors of the Peace Treaties had already defined the line of action of the Transit Organization. It would serve the League in an advisory role, as well as assisting the Council and Assembly of the League in discharging the functions entrusted to the League by Article twenty-three (e) of the covenant and by Articles 342, 377 and 378 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the corresponding articles in the other Treaties.104 Furthermore, the Committee was responsible for arranging for any future conference and preparing its agenda. It was entrusted with investigating any disputes concerning issues of transport and communications (under Articles 336, 376 and 386 of the Treaty of Versailles) referred to the League, and acting, wherever possible, for conciliation between the parties. In 102  LoNP, Transit Organization, Minutes of the First Session held at Geneva, July 25-28th, 1921, doc no: C. 358. M. 254.1921. VIII 2. 103  The Supreme Economic Council was an inter allied body consisting of representatives from G. Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. The council consisted from the respective ministers of Finance, Commerce and Food. There were various subordinate bodies which continued to function after the last meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in February 6th, 1920. Such were the Permanent Committee, the Communication Section, the Consultative Food Committee and the Raw Materials and Statistical Committee. At its last meeting in Paris, the Council adopted a resolution enquiring what form of permanent organization it was proposed to establish under the League of Nations, offering to take part in drawing up plans for this purpose. In a report Loyd is writing that ‘no detailed plans have yet been drawn for the approval of the Council of the League as to a permanent economic organization, but the policy which at present holds the field is roughly as follows: ... (4) It has always been contemplated that the Communication Section of the Supreme Economic Council should become merged into the Permanent Transit Organization of the League of Nations. ... The Communication section as such would disappear when the Transit Office is able to take over such of its functions as are not purely inter-allied... In these circumstances I think that the question of the relations between the Communications Section and the Transit Office should be treated independently of the general question of the future Economic Organization and I agree with Mr Haas that this particular question that he desires to discuss with General Mance, should be treated independently of the wider problem.’ Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1091, Organisation du Transit. 104  According to the Resolution ‘The Conference shall likewise be invited to organize an Advisory and Technical Committee, the headquarters of which shall be at Geneva. This Committee shall be consultative and technical body to consider and propose measures calculated to ensure freedom of communications and transit at all times, and to assist the Council and Assembly of the League in discharging the functions entrusted to the League by Article 24 of the covenant and by Articles 342, 377 and 378 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the corresponding articles in the other Treaties.’

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the event of such disputes brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Committee could be called upon to assist the Court.

International Railway Regime Convention During the first years of its establishment it devoted most of its attention to placing railways into the service of realizing the new international universal community that the authors of the Peace Treaties envisioned. A glance at the rhetoric of some of the participants in the meetings of the committees and officials of the Transit Organization indicates that many of them envisioned the League as a context in which railways would be placed, for first time in history, at the service of realizing the ideal of ‘universalism.’ In an article in the International Chamber of Commerce’s journal World Trade, Hostie stated: ‘The Communications Organization realizes broadly the great ideal of universality.’105 Characteristic are also the words of Salvador de Madariaga, mining engineer and technical expert of the Spanish Delegation at the first transit and communications conference of the League: ‘Thus we have before us an admirable object lesson. The means of communications – railway, navigable waterways, even roads–appear to us not as mechanical installations to facilitate the transport of objects but as living organisms wrought by the political communities which inhabit and – so to speak–fashion the various countries. Their form and development are not solely the outcome of topographical and technical circumstances and of local economic conditions. They depend rather on the very mind of man... In short, transport systems form part of the body of nations. They are their arterial system... Just as the national and the continental spirit acting through the medium of the States endeavor to fashion local transportation in their image, so it is necessary that the universal spirit, acting through an organism also universal, be enabled to fashion in its image the world transportation.’106 Similarly, through their work on communications and transit, the participants to the Transit Organization believed that they contributed to creating the imagined community of the League. During the first conference on Communications and Transit, the president of the conference, Hanotaux, stated:

105  Hostie, ‘Transport and Communications,’ 371. 106  ‘Report by M. Salvador Madariaga,’ in Reports on the Condition of Communications and Transport after the War submitted to the Barcelona Conference (Geneva: League of Nations, 1922), 461-2.



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‘We are going to collaborate to the limits of our power in an effort for the indispensable improvement of the relations between people and consequently for the improvement of the present situation of humanity.’107 During the second general conference on communications and transit, the president, Crespi noted that: ‘... I hope with all my heart that this Second Conference on Freedom of Transit and Communications by completing the valuable work begun by the Barcelona Conference, especially as regards the General Convention on Freedom of Transit and the Regime of Navigable Waterways, will constitute a second and an important step towards embodying in legal form, that is to say towards legally guaranteeing the principles of solidarity and mutual assistance which ought to unite the nations at the present time.’108 Finally, the secretary of the League M. J. Avenol, observed in a speech in Paris, July 9th, 1937, that: ‘Ever since 1920, the League of Nations has been devoting itself to the organization of peace, endeavoring to bring peoples together and to remind them that, above differences of race, language and political and social system, the world is a community; and that not only in ideal, it is of necessity a physical community, from which the progress of communication makes it impossible to stand aloof.’109 The First General Conference on Communications and Transit took place in Barcelona in March 1921. Discussions were held between representatives of FortyFour States and as a result, conventions or recommendations were adopted on all the subjects on which the Commission had worked. Delegations of former enemy states that were not yet members of the League were invited to take part in the work of the Conference in a consultative capacity.110 Contemporaries recognized the establishment of the International Convention on Freedom of Transit as the most important achievement of the Barcelona Conference. General Mance in his report to the League observed that the establishment of a Convention on Freedom of Transit signaled important work in three directions: first, it constituted the establishment for first time ever of general principles to govern the relations between 107  LoNP, Transit Organization, First General Conference on Communications and Transit, Papers, doc no: CT 9, 2. 108 LoNP, Transit Organization, Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, Papers, 1923, doc. no. C.G.C.T. 1-36, The president’s opening speech, 2, 10. 109  Essential Facts about the League of Nations (Geneva: League of Nations’ Information Section, 1938), 9. 110  Hostie, ‘Transport and Communications,’ 369.

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states in matters of international transportation. Second, it gave jurisdiction to an international body for the interpretation of the principles laid down and for the prompt conciliation and settlement of any differences that might arise. Third, it created an organ charged with overseeing, coordinating and assisting the development of transportation relations between different countries and with facilitating international communications.111 In addition to this Convention on Freedom of Transit, the first general conference on communications and transit (Barcelona, 1921) discussed and approved draft conventions on the international regime of inland waterways and issued recommendations on the international status of maritime ports and railways. The Commission of Enquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit, as I discussed above had already prepared a draft railway convention. This was discussed in Barcelona, but ultimately, the Conference adopted only the recommendations on the International Regime of Railways. The failure of the Barcelona Conference to approve an international railway convention constituted a regression on the goals set by the Peace Conference.112 Looking closely at the proceedings of the conference, it appears that many factors contributed to the difficulty of establishing a railway convention of global scope. Railway networks were in different stages of development in different continents, following the different patterns of industrialization of the different parts of the world, while their technical features differed significantly according to socio-political conditions. In contrast to the majority of the countries of Western Europe, where railway networks were highly developed and international traffic had reached a significant state of development, in the more slowly industrializing countries of Latin America, railway technology was still in its infancy. As the delegate of Brazil during the fifteenth meeting of the Conference observed: ‘The situation of the countries of South America as regards railways, and particularly that of Brazil, is very different from the European situation or from that of North America... Brazil is still passing through a period of construction-a difficult period for us... it is true that we already possess nearly 30.000 kilometers of line in operation, and this undoubtedly marks considerable effort. But what is this figure compared with what must be attained in order to connect all the points in a vast territory of 8.500.000 square kilometers? You will understand then how difficult it 111  LoNP, Transit Organization, Restoration of the Means of Communication in Europe, doc no, A. 64. 1923. VIII., 5-36. 112  The vice president of the Conference was Sir Francis Dent, who had been chair of the Commission for the Repartition of the Rolling stock of the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy.



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would have been for us to agree to any Convention that is not restricted to generalities.’113 France, one of the countries that were mostly in favor of the establishment of a binding convention founded it difficult to agree on a convention of worldwide scope, since this would mean that it had to be obliged in respect to its railway policy to the colonies. The representative of France, Sibille, observed that: ‘As regards Europe I am quite prepared to agree to the prohibition of private agreements, but as regards railways situated outside Europe, I cannot do so. Those of our colleagues who represent countries outside Europe may tell you that it is impossible to build railways under the same conditions as in Europe... I will add that for my own part I cannot enter into the obligation to apply the Convention now before us from one day to another, not, be it noted to the railways of Continental France, but to French railways outside Europe.’114 Finally, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Lankas, argued that the global character of the convention resulted in weakening the power of its articles. He referred to the ‘liberal’ internationalism of some of the delegations of the Peace conference: ‘It will perhaps be necessary, particularly in the case of those States which did not collaborate in preparing the Convention in its present form, to remember that it is the result of a compromise, and that at first, as was proposed by certain delegations at the Peace Conference, it had a very much wider scope and was of much more importance. The intention at that time was to establish a kind of internationalization of railways similar to that of navigable waterways. It was considered that railway traffic was so important that private interests should bow before it. It was thought that certain lines were so important for international traffic that they ought to be reserved for it. Briefly the idea was to internationalize certain main lines. The last remains of this idea of internationalization, which consisted in obliging certain States to carry out certain work, even if not necessary for these States, have now been abandoned, and to-day we find a Convention which has an entirely general scope because it is to be applied all over the world.’115 113  Barcelona Conference, 15. 114  Ibid., 119. 115  Ibid., 22.

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The difficulty of drafting a convention was also a result of the path-dependency, or technological momentum in hughesian terms, of railway systems that had been constructed with the aim to satisfy national interests.116 Any change in the technical characteristics of the existing networks for the sake of internationalism was unprofitable from a national point of view. Characteristic is the objection of the delegates of Spain and Finland to article three of the draft convention as proposed by the Committee of Enquiry. According to this article: ‘The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize as highly desirable the adoption, on the railways placed under their sovereignty or authority, of all measures, including those of a technical nature, which will allow of and facilitate the reciprocal utilization and interchange of their rolling stock.’117 The Spanish, Finnish and Portuguese delegations objected to this article on the basis of the different gauge of their railways networks and the high cost that the modification of the gauge would entail, maintained a fragmentation that existed in Europe before the WWI.118 According to the Spanish representative, Ramon de Montagut: ‘The Spanish government cannot permit any compromise on this subject; the necessary reductions would evolve enormous expenses, and would occasion very great difficulties inherent in the work necessary to allow the circulation in Spain of foreign rolling-stock, with the exception of that of Portugal.’119 The representative of the British delegation also argued against such an article, evoking the diverse loading-gauge of British railways, while other delegations also cited various technical characteristics on which national railway networks differed, such as the weight of locomotives, the limit of load per axle, etc.120 They were unwilling to undertake the costs that a modification of all these technical components of the railway network would entail. Finally, as became particularly clear with regard to the establishment of common tariffs, countries were unwilling to surrender their sovereignty. They were unwilling to agree on the establishment of common tariffs since this would imply that they would lose the power of using 116  Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 117  Barcelona Conference, 43. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120  Ibid., 44.



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railway tariffs as a means of protecting their national industries. The Conference concluded with a series of recommendations of general measures to be undertaken by Governments that would facilitate international railway traffic and a call for a Convention to be completed within three years. Erik Drumond, in his report on the results of the Barcelona Conference, discusses the failure of the conference to compile a final convention. The Conference, he notes, refused to adopt a regular convention, since some countries considered that the Stipulations in the Draft Convention originally submitted were, after all, in the nature of simple recommendations and that the adoption of a convention in that form would impede the conclusion later of a binding and more effective instrument. ‘This was particularly felt – and naturally so – by countries such as France, which saw in the Convention under discussion the general Convention, which, under the Peace Treaty, was definitely to replace the rules imposed by the Treaty itself on the ex-enemy countries. For this reason the Railways Convention was transformed – and without any important change in its structure and stipulations – into a Recommendation.’121 A general recommendation was, however, unanimously voted, requesting the Council of the League to summon within two years a new conference for the purpose of concluding a regular convention.122 During the first years of the Transit Organization’s activity, a railway sub-committee constituted in July 1921 undertook to continue the work of the Committee of Enquiry in preparing a new draft of an international railway convention. It undertook an enquiry among European and non-European governments with the aim of collecting information on conventions and agreements in which these governments were already participating, as well as an enquiry into the issues treated already by existing conventions, and whether the countries surveyed regarded the preparation of a general railway Convention as useful. In their replies, many of the European and non-European governments disputed the value and feasibility of the sub-committee’s venture to compile a railway convention of a worldwide scope, while they pointed to the usefulness of drafting regional, European Conventions.123 Of particular interest for this narrative were the responses of 121  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1190, Report and Memorandum at the Results of the conference. 122 Ibid. 123  In its reply, the government of India stated that ‘it appears to be open to doubt whether there is any real need for an international convention in so far as extra European countries are concerned and especially in so far as India is concerned, the railways of which country do not link up with those of any other

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Romania and Czechoslovakia. In their responses the respective governments found the opportunity once more to stress the importance of uniform action with respect to railways in Europe. According to Czechoslovakia’s reply: ‘The problem of regulating the railway relations between the different states cannot be resolved unless it is done in connection with the totality of the railway politics of Europe. This regulation cannot be extended to railways situated outside Europe, the questions in this domain being very complicated, so that a uniform application could be applied in the framework of such a study.’124 Similarly the Romanian government stated in its reply: ‘A constant and invariable regime cannot be established for the long term unless it concerns the European railways. Especially as far as the European railways are concerned, it is necessary to centralize the conception and application of international regulation on the railway regime in the hands of a single organization; such regulations are destined to undergo continual modification according to the experience and to the evolution of the exploitation of railways in each country.’125 The railway sub-committee however, pursued its goal of drafting a railway convention of a worldwide scope. It collected information on the existing conventions and worked to extract the general principles underlying these conventions. It prepared and presented a new draft railway convention that the second general Conference on Communications and Transit discussed. The general convention would assume the form of a compendious international code of recognized international country.’ Archive of the League of Nations, Sub committee of Railway Transport, Box R 1122. Similarly, the government of South Africa in its reply suggested that ‘... in view of the many practical difficulties in the way of obtaining general agreement to a Railway Convention which could be uniformly applied, it might be worth considering whether more than one Convention, between different groups, might not be advisable as a means of overcoming some of the objections. ... A general Convention dealing with first principles, with subsidiary Conventions as need be, might meet the case. In regard to Communications our position in South Africa is somewhat unique, inasmuch as we are more or less a self-sufficient group ... Conditions which may be suitable for Europe might be inconvenient or unsuitable here.’ Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125  In its response the Romanian government continued by stating that such a body should be encharged with certain functions such as being an arbitrator in cases of conflicts arising from either the interpretation of regulations, or the settlement of accounts between administrations as well as the compilation of statistics, technical research, establishment of international tariffs, time-tables and many other functions that could be of interest to all administrations. ‘Such a body can only be created in the form of a general railway European association comprising as its members railway administrations exploiting a minimum of kilometers of railway line. The other administrations would be able to participate through the delegation of the intermediary members...’ Archive League of Nations, Box R 1123, International Convention on Railways, 1923.



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obligations with regard to transport by rail. Its application in detail would in most cases require the conclusion of conventions of execution between States or railway administrations, should conventions of this nature not already exist in conformity with the principles of the General Convention.126 In its report, the sub-Committee of experts that had worked in preparing the Convention noted its full awareness that this piece of work was wholly provisional and incomplete, and that this summary of a model of international regulations in no way excluded the possibility of regulations being drawn up on another model. Lastly, as it was chiefly based on the practices of the Continent of Europe, it would be required to be redrafted later, account being taken of other practices, the experience gained in which would be equally valuable.127 Describing their way of working, they noted that: ‘The experts first carried out the work in compiling and coordinating the mass of material contained in the various Conventions. It was then possible from this mass to obtain the essential basis for work. This was the task first of the Railway Sub-Committee and then of the Advisory Committee. Your Committee found itself in the fortunate position of being called upon to make a few slight alterations in drafting; it had no need to add anything or remove anything from the numerous articles which were submitted to it as an embodiment of the principles of existing international law.’128 As stated in the official documents of the Transit Organization: ‘The Committee was particularly desirous that the conclusion of the General Convention on the International Regime of Railways should in no way disturb the working of the numerous Conventions existing between states or between railway administrations in respect of railway traffic. These Conventions, indeed, are the elements of which its work has been mainly composed. The General Convention, in extracting those principles, enables the same principles to be more widely extended, and will doubtless in the future facilitate the conclusion of similar special Conventions between States or railway administrations, or in special fields where they do not already exist.’129 126  LoNP, Transit Organization, sub-committee on rail traffic. Papers, doc. no C.C.T./V.F., 4. 127  LoNP, Transit Organization, sub- committee on rail traffic. Papers, doc. no CCT/VF/30, 6. 128  ‘Report of the Railways Committee on the Statute on the International Regime of Railways,’ Records and Texts Relating to the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Railways, (Geneva, League of Nations, 1923), 80. 129  First Report of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit on the work of the Organization for Communications and Transit between the third and the fourth Assembly, presented to the Council to be submitted to the Assembly, doc. no: C. 488. M.204.1923. VIII, 3.

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The Second General Conference on Communications and Transit (Geneva, November 1923) discussed and approved the convention. Presenting its work to the General Conference on Communications and Transit of the League, the president of the sub-committee noted: ‘At the beginning of the work of the Advisory and Technical Committee, it appeared unwise to aim at establishing a Convention which was not purely European, and it was hoped that subsequently a certain number of principles might be evolved from such a Convention and embodied in a brief Statute applicable to all the nations members of the League. Owing to the fact that our work has been conducted on lines of constant simplification without abandoning the ample proportions of a universal scheme, it has been possible to submit to you today a single and worldwide Convention. To those who regret the present indefiniteness of our work and the elasticity of the obligations that it contains, I would reply that men who aim at hasty realization are also men of little faith. Rome was not built in a day. But its founders believed that they were laying the foundations of the Eternal City. The League of Nations gentlemen can also afford to wait.’130 The Statute included six sections, which concerned the interchange of international traffic by rail, the mutual use of rolling stock and technical uniformity, the relations between railways and persons who used them, tariffs, financial arrangements between railway administrations in the interest of international traffic and finally general regulations. It came into force on the 23rd of July 1925.131 As recognized by contemporaries, the new element that was introduced in the interwar years with the drafting of the new Convention of a world-wide scope consisted of the following points: first, in the introduction of a new principle of internationality with respect to international transport policy in general, and railway policy in particular. Until that time, the concession of facilities for international transit was regarded by the different states as appertaining to their exclusive sovereignty. In the words of the president of the second general conference on communications and transit:

130  ‘Annex 2 Report of the Railways Committee on the Statute on the International Regime of Railways,’ LoNP, Transit Organization, Second General Conference on Communications and Transit Geneva, November 15th – December 9th, Records and Texts Relating to the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Railways, doc. no: C.28. M.14.1924. VIII, Geneva: 1924, 84. 131  Amadeo Giannini, La convenzione di Ginevra sul regime internazionale delle ferrovie (Roma: Anonima Romana Editoriale, 1934), 16. Other sources state that the Convention came into force in 1928, after it was ratified by the countries that signed it. Hostie, The Organization of Transit and Communications, 84.



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‘The stability and continuity of the great international channels of communication depended upon the goodwill of the various governments, which could at their own pleasure suspend or obstruct traffic across their territories.’132 Second, it was officially recognized that the free access to the railway networks was of major importance for the maintenance of peace. The belief was expressed for the first time that international administration of the railways might be important for general well being.133 The history of the Railway Convention points to the difficulties that cooperation in the railway field posed to the realization of the League’s ideal of universality. As Wedgwood pointed out in his study on international railway developments until the outbreak of the WWII, in contrast to other means of communication such as aviation and shipping, railways were often developed as a regional means of transportation. They were shaped by the geographical conditions and the sociopolitical circumstances of different parts of the world. Salvador Madariaga, identified these characteristics as a key problem: ‘... Means of transportation-especially those that depend most directly on the conformation of the country, such as railways, canals and even small coastal traffic-are closely fashioned by national realities. They may be said to represent the type of international problem in which the importance of local factors is most deeply felt, and in which the negotiator runs the least risk of wandering into abstractions. In short, transport systems form part of the body of nations ... This gives rise to two tendencies to which attention must be particularly drawn. The first is a tendency towards regional groupings by zones, either local or sub-continental...’134 However, such considerations also showed the possibilities for the conclusion of convention of a more limited, European scope. The history of the convention on the international regime of railways showed the limitations of the movement towards internationalization in the interwar 132  LoNP, Transit Organization, Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, Closing Speech by the President, doc. no: C.G.C.T./ 35, 2. 133  The general O.H.Mance, technical counselor of the British representation at the Conference in Barcelona in his contemporary essay observed, ‘The special importance of the Conference in Barcelona resides in the formal recognition of the fundamental influence that the communications exercise in world peace.’ Mance, ‘Convention et statut sur la liberté du transit,’ in L’ oeuvre de Barcelona (Paris: Payot, 1922), 28. 134  ‘Report by M. Salvador Madariaga, Reports on the Condition of Communications and Transport after the War submitted to the Barcelona Conference (Geneva: League of Nations, 1922), 459-462, here quoting from 461-2.

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years in the field of railways.135 The League’s initial failure to draft an international railway convention and the conservatism of the final convention reveals the unwillingness of nation-states to compromise their national interests for the sake of internationalism. The history of the Convention indicates a progressive departure from a ‘liberal’ concept of internationalism as envisaged by some of the authors of the peace treaties to a ‘conservative’ internationalism of the pre-war years.136 General Jan Smuts put a ‘liberal’ internationalism forward for the first time. Smuts put forward the idea of the internationalization of railways in a rather vague way during the preparatory work of the ‘Commission on the Ports, Waterways and Railways’ ; In the article 14 (b) of his proposal on the role of the League in respect to communications stated that the League will ‘administer and supervise any property of an international character, such as the international waterways, rivers, straits, railways, fortifications, air stations etc.’137 Lankas from Czechoslovakia referred to this ideal of internationalism during the Barcelona conference, as I discussed above. On October 2nd, 1926, Henrich Bachmann, member of the German Imperial Railway Board (Reichseisenbahnverwaltung) communicated to the Chairman of the Transit Organization a memorandum on which he proposed ‘a more rational system of working railways in Europe.’ As he stated in the cover letter of this communication, Bachmann had received a prize two years before from an international competition for schemes promoting world peace held by the American philanthropist, Edward Filene. In his memorandum, Bachmann spoke about the internationalization of railways in Europe as a means to safeguard peace and to make railway transport more efficient and more profitable to the interests of European people. He noted that: ‘Among the numerous means of establishing peace in the world and preventing a recurrence of war, the internationalization of the railways which at present belongs to the State Members of the League appears to me not the least worthy of consideration. What I understand by internationalization is this: to entrust the administration and working of the railways to the League, with a view to establishing peace throughout the world, and to introduce a more rational system of working than prevails at present.’138

135  As Gianini mentions in his study ‘the convention expresses this that today could be reached, it poses the problem, it affirms it solemnly, in the context of the co-operation of the people and of the activity of the League of Nations,’ Giannini, Regime internazionale delle ferrovie, 22. 136  I call ‘conservative internationalism’ internationalism where the national interests remained unchallenged; ‘liberal internationalism’ by contrast, is that which did not take national interests into account. 137  J.C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (The Nation Press, 1919), 45. 138  Archive of the League of Nations, railway sub-committee, papers, doc no: C.C.T./V.F./83, 2.



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However, he did recognize the limitations of his times, acknowledging: ‘Internationalization of railways must at present remain a distant goal, though it may perhaps be attainable in ten or twenty years time. It should, however, be studied even now, so that the nations may become gradually reconciled to the idea and institutions for the promotion of general prosperity be established.’139

League of Nations and Railways after Geneva In the first years of its activity, the Transit Organization undertook some studies on the transport conditions in Europe and worldwide.140 Mance submitted a report to the League on the position in regard to transport by rail in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. On the basis of this report the Transit Organization adopted a resolution in August 1923, according to which the chief problems arising in connection with the restoration and improvement of transport by rail were not of technical nature but were financial problems connected with the stabilization of currencies and the granting of credit.141 Consequently, the League oriented its work toward solving these problems. Among the most important work that the League undertook in close collaboration with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the newly established International Union of Railways (UIC, 1922) was the compilation of a uniform nomenclature of goods for use in establishing international railway tariffs.142 In addition it also worked to simplify frontier formalities. Police and customs formalities had been very complicated during the war, and consequently their simplification presented, according to the Transit Organization, an interest of primary order. In 1927, in collaboration with the International Chamber of Commerce, it distributed a questionnaire to the governments inquiring about the conditions of passage at the frontiers. Despite the efforts of the League, the situation in the frontiers seems to have been difficult in the 1930s. An article in the RG reported that: ‘However efficient the physical connections especially in the form of railways may be, and generally are there remain the formalities in connection with passports, customs and the filling up of many forms-in a word the political barriers to the freedom of travel, which sometimes seem unnecessarily complicated and vexatious... To sweep away these barriers to travel 139 Ibid. 140  General Transport Situation in 1921 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1922), viii. 141  LoNP, CEEU, Rapport du secrétaire général sur certaines questions techniques qui ont été examinées par la Société des Nations, doc no: C.693. M. 290.1930. VII., 9. 142  I discuss the establishment and work of the UIC in greater detail below.

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is fit work to the Transit and Communications Committee of the League of Nations [Transit Organization], the International Chamber of Commerce and other bodies, and we recommend it to their best energies.’143 Insofar as the international sleeping car trains were concerned, according to contemporary sources, the conditions of crossing-borders for the international trains de luxe were improved in comparison to the years immediately after the war and in certain cases, even the years before it. However, these measures were varied regulations in each country and often in accordance to their interpretation during the passage of the frontier.144 Passengers on the international trains de luxe were freed from the obligation to present their passports and to assist in the inspection of their baggage in the rooms of the stations at the frontiers. From 1929 onwards passport verification and hand baggage inspection (and even registered baggage inspection, in some networks) usually took place inside the train, during a stop or en route. Discussing these developments, Loiseau observes that: ‘In other words, if it is perhaps a bit chimerical to envisage in the future a short of internationalization of the railways, similar to that of the ships, at least already, the control services are being displaced, instead of obliging the passengers to descent from the train... This is the progress so far achieved. It implies not only a concession appreciated by the travelers but an encouragement of travel, which we consider as a necessary condition of social and international life.’145 Overall, the rail sub-committee of the League discussed issues that were not dealt with by existing organizations or agreements but that could influence the efficiency of the European railway system as a whole. Those were issues, the solution of which required intergovernmental co-operation. Such issues included the influence of a system of uniform time for transportation by rail, the negotiability of railway transport documents and the unification of transport statistics. The League’s method of work was usually to undertake studies among governments and try to co-ordinate their actions in relation to specific issues. It did also undertake work on ‘mixed issues’ of importance to the working of the railways, such as the issue of passport regulation, the questions of a fixed Easter and of calendar reform. For example, it convoked a second passport conference in Geneva (May 1926). In this conference, the delegations of thirty-nine states met with the 143  ‘International Communications,’ RG 53 (1930): 767. 144  L.C. Loiseau, ‘Le développement des services internationaux de Wagons-Lits depuis la guerre,’ RGCF 48 (1929): 220, 228. 145 Ibid.



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representatives of great number of organizations that were pre-occupied with issues of international transport. It adopted a number of recommendations concerning the regime of passports, the adoption of a uniform passport established as the model of an ‘international type,’ the equalization of taxes, and the elimination of visas through the agreement of the states. Consequently, the Secretariat of the League conducted an inquiry to the governments in the subject of the application of the recommendations of the Conference of 1926. The responses of forty-one countries showed that there was no substantial difference between the existing regimes in these countries and the recommendations by the League. The elimination of visas following bilateral agreements became a frequent occurrence. However, the situation before the 1914, when one could travel without a passport was not re-established.146 Whenever issues of technical nature arose, the League addressed them to the UIC, which was responsible for conducting studies. Such was the case of the implementation of the automatic coupling in the railways of Europe, an issue that was brought forward by the International Labor Office (ILO).147 Finally, throughout the interwar years it acted as an arbitrator in disputes concerning international railway traffic that arose as a result of the new political situation. Such disputes arose often between the successor states of the AustroHungarian Empire and after the incidents on the Greco-Turkish frontiers. Failing agreement through the mediation of the League, either party had the right to bring the issue to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which through the conventions had a jointly recognized international code, which they merely had to interpret.148

146  According to the recommendations of the second passport conference (1926) the visas of entrance or of transit and the control of passports should in general be affected in the trains in course. In cases in which this was not possible, it would be assured that in the trains that stopped to one of the two frontier stations, the control would take place from the police of both states simultaneously. Finally, the conference recommended that agreements should be concluded so that the custom formalities would be put into effect in the same conditions, time and place. It also defined that all the possible facilities should be accorded for the passage of the emigrants in transit that were leaving Europe for the overseas countries. Harry Osborne Mance, ‘Recent Developments in International Railway Questions,’ in Proceedings of the Great Western Railway (London) Lecture and Debating Society, session 1929-1930, no. 236, (1929-30), 6; Les problèmes de transport résultant de la guerre de 1914-1918 et l’œuvre de reconstitution entreprise dans ce domaine par la Société des Nations (Genève: Série de publications de la Société des Nations, 1945), 38-9. 147  On the issue of the automatic coupling see Chapter 4. 148  Mance, ‘International Railway Questions,’ 7. The Permanent Committee for Transport by Rail met only once in the years 1931-1945 (in 1935). Hostie in his unpublished history of the Transit Organization reports that, ‘owing to the primarily regional character of railway problems and the dominating position of the Reichsbahn in Europe, Germany’s withdrawal from the Transit Organization was felt as a paralyzing factor both in the field of railways and in the case of navigable waterways’. Hostie, ‘The Organization of Transit and Communications,’ 255.

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France and the International Union of Railways, 1922-1939 In contrast to the ideal of universality as expressed by the League, regional alliances on European but also sub-European levels appeared, in the years following the war. As I discussed earlier, before the war, the Union of German Railway Administrations (Verein) had an important role in co-coordinating international railway traffic in a great part of central Europe. After the war the majority of the successor states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Italy, withdrew from this Union.149 The RG observed ‘it is they among others who desire to see a new body formed which shall not be so pronouncedly Prussian.’150 The issue of the creation of a union of railway administrations of Europe had already been put forward during the war. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Henri Lorin, a professor of economic geography at the University of Bordeaux and member at the time of the International Economic Committee ‘Suisse Océan’ called on the allies in December 1917 to take concerted action in the field of transport. He argued that the German Verein had been an important instrument on the hands of Germany for establishing a strong ‘Mittel-Europa’ in the years preceding the war. It was necessary, he argued, that the allies constitute their own ‘internal’ railway organization that would facilitate international railway traffic between them.151 The representatives of the successor states made an appeal for the creation of such a union during the Porto-Rosa (1921) conference. As a result, the conference issued a recommendation recognizing: ‘The desirability of regulating, by international conventions or by agreements between the European railway administrations, various questions of great importance and general concern, which have not yet been settled by conventions and agreements already existing or in course of preparation.’152 Such questions included the issues of the unification of railway tariffs and the adoption of a common monetary unit for international tariffs. The conference recommended that the governments should investigate these questions and should convene an international conference that would address these issues.153 The governments of the European states discussed the idea of the creation of a group of European Railways again during the International Economic Conference in Genoa (May 3, 1922). As a result, the conference recommended that the French Railway 149  Elemer Hantos, L’ Europe centrale: Une nouvelle organisation économique (Paris: 1932), 167. 150  ‘International Conference,’ RG 37 (1922): 445. 151  Henri Lorin, ‘Un réseau ferrée interallié,’ in Revue des nations latines (1917): 407-23. 152  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1121, The Porto Rosa Conference and Transit Questions. 153 Ibid.



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Administrations should convene at the earliest possible moment a conference of technical representatives of all the railway administrations of Europe to examine the creation of a permanent conference of railway administrations. This permanent conference would work to assimilate and improve equipment and operating methods of railways with a view to international traffic, as well as address the question of through tariffs and mitigate impediments to international transport occasioned by exchange fluctuations.154 The RG reported that much of the credit for the successful launching of the new union should be given to Sir Philip Lloyd Greame, the new president of the British board of Trade who, as a co-delegate with Sir Francis Dent and Sir William Clark at the Genoa conference, strongly urged the conference to establish a union to deal with international railway questions.155 The Committee of direction of the ‘Grands réseaux de chemins de fer français’ took the initiative of organizing the conference.156 The conference took place in 17th of October 1922. Technical representatives of all the railway administrations in Europe participated.157 The League sent its Secretary General, assisted by the Transit Organization and the reporters of its railway sub-committee. After having selected as its president Mange, director of the Railway Company Paris-Orléans, the Conference decided to constitute under the name ‘Union international des chemins de fer’ a permanent organization charged with assuring the collaboration among the different railway administrations desired by the Conference of Genoa. The Conference was opened at the Institute of Civil Engineers on Tuesday October 17, by L. Troequer, French Minister of Public Works, with Derville, president of the PLM company in the chair. The minister reminded his audience of the important role which transport occupied in the life of nations and pointed out that railways were not only national but international in the highest degree, inasmuch as the rails crossing the frontiers and multiplying the relations between the nations permitted people to enter into contact with one another. Eventually they would effect industrial and commercial agreements, which were the best forerunners of the political ‘entente.’ It was therefore to the development and improvement of international communications that he dedicated 154  Papers Relating to International Economic Conference, Genoa, April–May 1922 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922), 81-2. 155  ‘International Union of Railways,’ RG (1922): 499. 156  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1135, Conférence des administrations des chemins de fer, Paris, October 1922. 157  Union internationale des chemins de fer, Internationaler Eisenbahnverband, International Union of Railways, (Paris: UIC, 1982), 5-6, 8. The countries represented at the Conference were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Letonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saar Valley, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as the Oriental railways and the League of Nations. ‘The International Union of Railways,’ RG 37 (1922): 534.

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the UIC.158 Stieler, secretary of the state in the ministry of communications of the German Empire, declared that the railway administrations of Germany intended to support through all the possible means the creation of such a union that would contribute to all the efforts for the re-establishment and the revival of the commercial relations in Europe.159 The union was officially established on the 1st of December 1922. The president of the new union was French. Its headquarters were in France, with its seat in Paris. Throughout the interwar years, the UIC undertook studies with the aim of promoting international railway traffic. It included various sub-committees working on different fields of international railway traffic, such as a revision of the international regulations for the transport of goods, the promotion of similar regulations for traffic of passengers and luggage by rail, the revision of the technical conditions for international traffic, the clearing of the financial disputes between railway administrations of different nationalities, etc. From 1923 it published railway standards under the form of individual ‘Fiches UIC,’ the collection of which would form the ‘Code UIC.’ From 1924 it worked in co-operation with the TU on revising the code of technical standards laid down by the latter in 1907. As a result of this joint effort, they drafted a new code of standards, the final drafting of which was completed in 1935.160 It also participated in the four general conferences on Transport and Communications organized by the League and co-operated closely with it throughout the League’s existence. Important issues in which the UIC focused part of its efforts included the study of an air-compressed brake and the issue of automatic couplings with which it was engaged from 1926 onwards. The establishment of the new union under French presidency signaled a change in the international railway regime compared to the pre-war years. The French saw in the establishment of the union an increase of the French influence in international railway affairs. The RGCF, reporting on the history of the new association, commented: ‘It is certain that the new organization will bring about considerable advantages to the exploitation of railways with a view to the development of international relations, and that under the moral supervision of France, 158  Ibid., 550. 159  ‘Historique de la constitution de l’UIC et exposé de ses travaux jusqu’ en Octobre 1924,’ Bulletin UIC 1 (1924): 2. 160  The UIC acted as a technical research body for the TU. ECEP, Functions Means of Action and Interrelationships of International Railway Transport Bodies, Inland Transport Committee, Geneva, 1949, doc no: ECE, TRANS/SC. 2/7 Rev. 1. The new code came into force in 1938. The Governments of 18th standard gauge countries, constituting a solid block from the Pyrenees to the western frontiers of Russia and the Baltic States, accepted it.



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will be favorable to the French influence.’161 Later on, Charles Billy, narrating the history of its establishment in the official 50th anniversary booklet of the UIC, noted that ‘this (the establishment of the union) put a permanent end to the Verein ...’162 In his more recent article G. Ribeill also notes ‘the UIC was seen by the French as a new sort of Verein that they controlled. Under French leadership, the UIC appropriated rapidly the normative role that it borrowed from the Technical Unit of Berne.’163

Figure: 3.2– Membership of the International Railway Union. Source: L’évolution géographique de l’UIC, 27.

Call for Regional Alliances A tendency towards regional alliances of the railway administrations of central Europe outside the context of the UIC appeared shortly after the end of the war. Soon after the establishment of the UIC, at the suggestion of the Czech representative Lankas, the rail sub-committee of the League considered whether it would be desirable to convene a technical conference of government representatives to

161  L’union international des chemins de fer (UIC),’ RGCF (1922): 393-97. 162  Billy, ‘Naissance et vie d’ une union 1922 – 1972,’ 8-10. 163  Ribeill, ‘Réseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 57.

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investigate urgent measures to be taken for restoring traffic in Central Europe.164 The rail-Subcommittee of the League expressed the opinion that such a conference was doubtless an urgent issue and that the matter should have to be brought before the sub-committee, the plenary committee and the council of the League, after the meeting of the conference of railway administrations, which would perhaps allow the situation to be clearly defined. Lankas also proposed that such a conference could be merged with the select technical conference with a view to drawing up the general convention on the international regime of railways.165 However, the League did not take action in this direction. In 1926, a conference of Communications and Transport took place in Central Europe as a part of the Economic Conference of Central Europe. Participation in the Conference included representatives from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland, Hungary and Italy and a representative of the League was invited and participated ad audiendum. The participants discussed measures for closer integration of railway systems in central Europe. Resolution three of the conference stated that concerning railway transport that constituted the most important means of transport, it would be desirable to preserve and to develop at the greatest possible extend all the institutions that could contribute in achieving a technical uniformity of railways. Furthermore, it stated that it would be desirable to obtain the best facilities for the interchange of traffic of the countries of Central Europe. It defined that an international railway regime that would result from the unification of the freight law and the unification of the exploitation of the principal lines of Central Europe constituted one of the goals that would bring the economic rapprochement of central Europe. Finally it defined that it would be desirable that railway and the customs’ authorities would collaborate so that the formalities of the passage of frontiers would be simplified and accelerated.166 The ideal of the conference did not contradict the efforts of the League. According to resolution number nine: ‘The Congress of Communications and Transport is convinced that cooperation between the Technical and Consultative Committee of Communications and Transit of the League and the commissions of experts created by the Congress would be desirable.’167 Pelt, a member of the Secretariat of the League attended the conference on 164  LoNP, Rail sub-committee, memorandum, 6, doc. no. CT, C.C.T./ V.F./4, 165 Ibid. 166  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1172, Conférence de communications d’ Europe centrale. 167 Ibid.



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behalf of the League. The Traffic Congress of Central Europe (Mitteleuropaische Verkehrstagung), organized by the foundation of the same name, he observed in his note to the secretary of the Transit Organization Haas, was Austrian in origin and was a result of the general tendency in Vienna toward attempting to reconstruct wherever possible the economic relations between the different parts of the older double monarchy. Furthermore, in his note he observed: ‘We have to recognize that for some time various circles in Vienna have begun to organize such type of demonstrations in a clever way. A few years ago, they would have declared Vienna in a loud voice as the central point of this part of Europe. They would have complained bitterly that considerations of a political nature had deprived Vienna of its natural advantages. They would have declared blatantly the need to abolish the news frontiers, taking into account the sole interest of their capital. Today, they are making a serious effort, not to speak any more of Vienna but of Central Europe. They repeat at every opportunity their respect for the political sovereignty of the young successor states, and they speak about the need to reconstitute economically the territory of the old ancient monarchy, or of central Europe in general; they don’t evoke exclusively the Austrian interest, but on the contrary, the general interest of central Europe in its entirety. This attitude has started without doubt to have success, in the sense that it exercises a growing influence in certain economic circles of the successor states...’168 According to Pelt, the Mitteleuropaische Verkehrstagung had in its organization and its composition an Austrian character. ‘... I won’t engage with the details of all these conferences, but I would like to call your attention to the fact that in most of the speeches, the desire is expressed to regulate the problem of communications and transit in central Europe within a regional framework to the exclusion of the states of western Europe. This tendency was mostly demonstrated with regard to the domains of rivers, railways and post, and even though it was predictable in a conference of this type, its extent surprises me.’169 Pelt reports that when the conference was discussing railway affairs, this tendency resulted in a small fight between the supporters of the Verein and those of the UIC. 168 Ibid. 169  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1172, Conférence de communications d’Europe centrale, Vienna, 1926.

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The supporters of the UIC, remaining faithful to the organization, were pushing for the creation of a special section for Central Europe within the limits of the Union. Lankas, the representative of Czechoslovakia, mostly represented this tendency. The Germans were favorable to the Verein, while the Austrians, hesitated to take position. Finally, they came to an agreement on a resolution that nominated neither one nor the other of the two organizations, but that expressed clearly the desire to regulate the railway interests of central Europe through direct re-rapprochement of the administrations of the interested states. The conference created three permanent committees, one on railway questions, which would probably have its seat in Prague, for which Lankas would be responsible, a second for the questions of the Danube, with a seat probably in Bratislava, and a third one concerning questions of tourism, passports etc. that would have its seat probably in Vienna. The report of Pelt closes with the statement that this ’shows clearly the intention of the foreign members of the foundation to gradually ‘desaustrianise’ the entire organization of the ‘Mitteleuropaische Wirtschaftstagung.’’ According to Pelt, the representative of Hungary, Elemèr Hantos, a University professor at Budapest, was one of the driving forces of the Conference. Hantos argued that the new settlement of frontiers had broken down the natural whole that transportation in Central Europe formed. In an article published in 1930 he described the transport situation in central Europe as follows: ‘The draft of artificial new frontiers has dismembered the natural organism that formed, in the field of railway transport, central Europe... The shamble of the states and of their new frontiers provided for the parceling of the big lines that became unusable... the big arteries of international traffic are being hampered by the frontiers of the state.’170 Important railway lines of central Europe such as the line from Berlin to St. Petersburg and from Budapest to Czernowitz were deserted after WW I. Before the war, the first would cross only one frontier, the German-Russian frontier, after the war it was necessary to cross seven (Germany-Poland, Dazing, Lithuania, Poland, Lettonia, Russia). The second would cross six frontiers (Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Romania), whereas formerly, when the territory formed a customs union, there was no frontier for the traffic. He describes the big stations of international traffic of the pre-war years as resembling ‘cemeteries’ of traffic while the small internal stations, insignificant, were transformed into points of primary entry. Hungary was a characteristic case. Despite the fact that 170  Hantos, ‘Une nouvelle organisation des transports en Europe Central,’ 271-2.



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its territory had been significantly reduced, it possessed before the war six frontier stations in contrast to forty nine in the 1930s.171 The tendency towards regional alliances was most strongly pronounced by the end of the 1920s. In 1929 the Union of German Railway Administrations modified its statute in such a way that the membership to the union could be broadened. New provisions were included, which, as the bulletin of the UIC reports, aimed to unify the railway networks of Central and Northern Europe.172 The new statute simplified the conditions of admission so that next to the ordinary members of the union, extraordinary members could also be admitted. Consequently, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish state railways and Swiss railways joined the association as associate members but without voting rights. Following the modification of its statute the Verein changed in 1932 its name into Union of Administrations of Railways of Central Europe (Verein Mitteleuropäischer Eisenbahnverwaltungen, 1932).173 It was active in different fields of international railway traffic such as operation, track maintenance, rolling stock, disputes, finance and statistics. In those fields a whole series of regulations were drawn up.174 The railway administrations participating in the Verein remained members of the UIC. Meanwhile, inside the UIC and bound by its statute, a group was formed by the state railway administrations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, to regulate problems which concerned only those railways. This was the only group formed in accordance with the relevant provision of the UIC Statute.175 Political changes on the continent towards the end of the 1930s brought corresponding changes in the organization of the Central European Railway Association. In 1938, the RG reported that the representation of the Austrian Federal Railways, having disappeared as a separate administration and been absorbed in the Reichsbahn, had been continued in modified form, giving the new divisional managements an appropriate share in the committee work. At the congress held at Dresden from September 14 to 16 under the chairmanship of Dr. Marx, it was announced that negotiations were in progress with the Yugoslav and Italian state railways and that those lines were expected to become members before long. And it observes that ‘this cannot fail to add considerably to the prestige and influence of the 171 Ibid. 172  ‘L’union des administrations de chemins de fer de l’Europe centrale: ‘Verein mitteleuropäischer Eisenbahn Verwaltungen,’’ Bulletin UIC 9 (1933): 376. 173  It encompassed then the networks of Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Hungary, Luxembourg (Prince-Henri), Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the air company Deutsche Lufthansa. 174  Functions, Means of Action and Inter-Relationships of International Railway Transport Bodies, 1949, ECEP, TRANS/SC.2/7 Rev. 1., 27. 175  ‘International Railway Association-II,’ RG 77 (1942): 607.

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Verein, which, founded in 1847, has made notable contributions to railway progress in many directions.’176 Also in the field of long-distance international railway services a significant change in the existing regime occurred in the interwar years. There was only one company providing for international sleeping car services in continental Europe before the war, the Wagons-Lits. A Belgian engineer, named George Nagelmackers established this company as a Belgian company in 1872. The company had its registered office in Brussels, the head of its management in Paris and its principal shareholders in England, France, Belgium and Italy. Its object was to run vehicles similar to, but more luxurious than, the American sleeping cars on the European railways. It aimed particularly at long distance traffic covering the systems of several states. Up to 1914 it was the sole concessionaire of international sleeping-car services, and, with the exception of Prussia, ran the national services of most countries as well.177 In fact, there had never been any competition with the Wagons-Lits before the outbreak of WWI. At the instigation of the Russian Government, it instituted the Trans-Siberian express from Moscow to Vladivostok. The company also had agencies in the principal cities of Europe, not only for the reservation of sleeping berths, but also for the sale of railway and steamship tickets. Finally, it was responsible for carrying a considerable quantity of international mail, whilst special trains were run from the chief ports for the convenience of passengers alighting from ocean liners.178 With the outbreak of WWI the German government seized all the material of the Wagons-Lits. The German government established through the Deutsche Bank a new company of restaurant and sleeping cars on January 1, 1917, the Mitteleuropäische Schlaf- und Speisewagengesellschaft, which was abbreviated to Mitropa.179 This company ran the Balkan Express discussed in the previous chapter. During the years 1917-8, offices were opened in Budapest, Vienna and Warsaw and Mitropa cars operated throughout the area then in German occupation, and even ran as far afield in regular service as Constantinople. As a consequence, the

176 The RG reported that at the invitation of the Swedish State Railways, the next congress of the Verein would be held at Stockholm. It also reported that in addition to the German, Swiss, Dutch and Scandinavian railways, the German Lufthansa, the Mitropa, and the Central European Travel and Tourist Bureau were also connected with the association, and, for certain matters only, also the Greek, Polish and Czechoslovak railways and many light railways. See ‘Changes in the ‘Verein’,’ RG 69 (1938): 1129. 177  In Prussia, at the beginning of 1887, a company was founded for running sleeping and dining cars in that country, strictly limited, however, to the Prussian frontier. The other German States arranged with the Wagons-Lits to run their services. 178  ‘The International Sleeping Car Company to-Day,’ RG 39 (1923a): 340. 179  ‘Restaurant and Sleeping-Car Services in Central Europe,’ RG 49 (1928a): 119.



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Wagons-Lits had to face competition for the first time in Europe.180 Géo Gérald in his speech during the inter parliamentary conference noted: ‘... The Germans aided by the Hungarians got hold in Austria of the economic board of directors, banks, mines, terrestrial and fluvial transport. Romania is already for them a conquered country as well as Serbia. They extended their influence cynically also in Bulgaria and Turkey. They have already substituted the Wagons-Lits until now French-Belgian to a society purely German of vehicles lit and restaurants. The Mitropa has to impose herself through Central and Southern Europe and bring that way, shamelessly, the German influence. Their projects have died, they are sleeping at the moment; however, if the course of the events becomes more favorable they will be born again one day.’181 After the end of the war, the Wagons-Lits had to adjust to the new conditions. Its board of directors was modified. Before the war, most of the leading European nations were represented on its administrative council, with the French interests being largely predominant. After the war, one English, one Spanish, two additional French and three Italian directors were elected to fill the vacancies created by the absence of representatives from Germany, Austria and Hungary.182 For the first time, the Wagons-Lits had to share what had been its own sphere of action before the war. After the armistice its various contracts were again put in force and new ones made with the new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Estonia.183 The Peace Treaties included provisions for the through running of Allied trains of the allies through the networks of their former enemies. The Wagons-Lits, however, was unable to recover all its rolling stock from Germany and to get its original contracts re-established.184 In Germany it had to fight against Mitropa. Discussing the establishment of Mitropa, the RG reports that the German government attached considerable political importance to the running of sleeping and dining cars. For that reason it established Mitropa during the war, 180  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 36 (1922b): 581; ‘The International Sleeping Car Company To-Day,’ RG 39 (1923): 340. 181 Gérald, L’Atlantique Mer Noire, 11. 182  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 36 (1922): 581. ‘The International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 39 (1923): 326. 183  For a more detailed account and analysis of the modification of the services provided by the Wagons-Lits after the war see chapter 4. 184 The RG in 1922 reports that the restoration of the remainder of the rolling stock was taking place before the mixed German-Belgium Arbitral Tribunal. However, it was unable to get its original contract with the German Government recognized. ‘The International Sleeping Car Company To-Day,’ RG 39 (1923c): 340.

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which was intended to take the place of the Wagons-Lits as soon as the war ended. Mitropa was confined inside the Prussian frontier except with regard to Holland. From its establishment, the allies had seen the Mitropa as an instrument that the Germans used to expand their political influence. The RG reported that the new company was to be pan-Germanic in its aim and not international. In 1922, the RG reported that the Germans had established a new company, ‘La transcontinent’ to compete outside Germany.185 It was the promoters of the Mitropa that were attempting to get contracts outside Germany in neutral countries by means of the new company. This company, however, could not-in view of the existing contracts with the Wagons-Lits make many new contracts for some time. Moreover, the RG predicted that as this company would have to build rolling stock at the present price of construction, the commercial results were likely to be rather less successful than the political ones. The Wagons-Lits, which had some 1.700 vehicles built at pre-war prices was in a more advantageous position.186 The two companies reached an agreement in 1925. By this agreement the international spheres of action of both companies were strictly defined. The new agreement stipulated that the Wagons-Lits would continue to run to the Orient, Balkan and Paris-Berlin-Warsaw express routes, as well as the through services between Germany, Switzerland and Italy, France, Belgium and Germany; and Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. To Mitropa fell the through routes from Holland and Scandinavia (via Germany) to Switzerland, Austria (except those running via Czechoslovakia) and to the Bohemian Spas (Karlsbad, Marienbad, etc.).187 In spite of the new competitor, the services of the Wagons-Lits continued to proliferate. In 1926, the RG reported that the ordinary business of the company had shown a satisfactory expansion and the Pullman and second class car services were being developed. Contracts had been entered into assuring the restoration of the connections with the German railways and many new services were inaugurated in Italy and elsewhere.188 In parallel, the Mitropa also developed its services. By 1928 it was a well-established company in Central Europe. The RG refers to its 185  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 36 (1922a): 581. 186  In an article in 1923, it is mentioned ‘The extent to which the German Government is willing to help the ‘ Mitropa’ Company is clearly illustrated by the fact that for the running of 267 vehicles it paid to the imperial railways, for the year 1920, 184. 000 marks, while for the year 1921, on the other hand, the Wagons-Lits, in connection with the running of only 48 vehicles through Germany, had to pay nearly 11 million marks. Owing to the financial support of the Prussian railways, the ‘Mitropa’ Company has been able to cut its prices, which, of course, merely increases the deficit of the Prussian Railways’ . ‘The International Sleeping Car Company To-Day,’ RG 39 (1923): 340. 187  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 42 (1925): 798. 188  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 44 (1926): 714.



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establishment in a rather friendly tone. ‘The Mitropa,’ reports an article in 1928 ‘has earned during its ten years of operation a well-deserved reputation for efficiency and comfort. Over extensive areas of Central Europe it now provides facilities and renders services comparable to those of the world-famous Pullman cars in other lines.’189 The Mitropa Company also expanded its services. In 1928 the RG reported that since the year 1921 its development had been steady. Its share capital now amounted to 21.120.000 marks and the rolling stock comprised about 600 cars. The cars ran to Amsterdam, Vlissingen, Hook of Holland, Zurich, Lucerne, Chur, Lugano, Vienna, the Czech baths, and on many other routes, while various extensions were in view.190 Twenty-five branches in Germany and other European States supervised the general working and supply of the cars with provisions, lines, etc. However, as George Behrend notes in his account of the history of the WagonsLits, a decisive break in this state of peaceful co-existence between the two companies in Europe occurred once more in 1938. When the Anschluss occurred in Austria, the Reichsbahn took over the Austrian State Railways, broke all the contracts with the Wagons-Lits, and handed all internal and Austro-German services to Mitropa. The same occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1939, and in Holland, Poland, Belgium and parts of France after June 1940. However, during the winter of 1939, the Simplon Orient Express continued running from Paris to Istanbul and Athens, and included the Berlin sleepers south of Belgrade. Despite Mitropa’s ambitions, the Germans could not very well tamper with their ally’s property in Italy, and thus, the Wagons-Lits service was not eliminated within fortress Europe. Meanwhile in France, according to Behrend, the Wagons-Lits put up ’stubborn resistance’ to German pressure, while the staff remained extremely loyal and never abandoned their vehicles, though they were often cut off from their homes by bombing, derailments by the Maquis and finally the upsets of the invasion. Many of them used their facilities for providing berths, carrying messages and the like to help the allies. Some of the staff was arrested and deported, and seven were shot for these offences against the Germans.191 Consequently, in contrast to the universal approach of the League, a tendency appeared to address railway issues at a regional European, and even sub-European, scale already in the early years after the war. On the one hand, this tendency had its roots in the different kind of problems that railway administrations and 189  Archive of the League of Nations, Box R 1172; ‘Restaurant and Sleeping-Car Services in Central Europe,’ RG 49 (1928): 119. 190  ‘Restaurant and Sleeping-Car Services in Central Europe,’ RG 49, 119. 191  George Behrend, The History of Wagons-Lits, 1875-1955 (Modern Transport Publ. Co. Ltd, 1959), 18.

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governments had to solve due to different political situations in various regions of Europe. I spoke earlier in this chapter about the particular problems that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were facing due to political re-configuration of borders. On the other hand, such tendencies were an expression of the desire to subordinate railway issues to broader political issues and agendas. Again, railways constituted a field in which different transnational political alliances found an expression.

Conclusion As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, an international railway regime existed in Europe in the years before the outbreak of WWI. After the end of the war, with the conclusion of Peace, the allies sought to diminish the influence of Germany in international railway affairs. In the short term, Germany, Austria and Hungary had to adhere to the articles of the Peace Treaties. These articles ensured that the trains of the allied and associate powers would run unhampered through the railway networks of the former enemy countries. They also ensured that both passengers and commerce from the allied and associate states would enjoy the most favorable treatment on the railway networks of their former enemies. In the long term, the new conventions on the international regime of railways and on freedom of communications and transit would halt Germany from competing for railway traffic by providing preferential treatment and tariffs over its railway networks as it had done in the pre-war years, according to the allies. Equally important, the establishment of international conventions would prohibit the use of railways by European governments as a means of pursuing politics through, for example the regulation of freight tariffs. The equality in the access of the railway systems of all the European countries would constitute, in the long run, an important requirement for the maintenance of peace in Europe and consequently, the maintenance of the new political order. The case of the League shows that railways were seen as a means of integrating areas larger than the nation-state. The authors of the covenant of the League saw them as a means of realizing a global community. However, as the discussions for compiling a convention on the international regime of railways show, the step towards the universalization of railways proved to be too difficult. The negotiations on the convention on the international regime of railways indicated that an attempt to organize railways at a regional, European level might have been a more realistic goal. This could be a first step towards globalization. Furthermore,



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as the negotiations for the compilation of the convention on the international regime of railways show, the nation-states were not ready to surrender sovereignty. This limited the action of the nation-states and resulted in further fragmentation of the railway networks. The Transit Committee’s activities with respect to drafting a worldwide railway convention and ensuring its application failed. However, through this venture, the importance of concentrating the efforts towards regional, European collaboration in the field of railways became more strongly pronounced. As I discussed in this chapter, one of the constant issues coming up during the conference was the importance of drafting detail railway conventions of a regional scope. Furthermore, this chapter also illustrates another point. After the war, the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire led to the creation of many new political entities in central and Eastern Europe. However, the representatives of those states were among the most important proponents of the integration of the railway networks in Europe, on which, they believed, depended the economic reconstruction of their countries but also of Europe as a whole. For example, as I discussed above, the Porto-Rosa conference issued a recommendation calling for the unification of the railway tariffs at a European level and the establishment of a common monetary unit for the establishment of tariffs. This was an appeal for the integration of the railway networks in Europe in an era when many new nation-states were forming, and consequently the political fragmentation within Europe had increased. This appeal constituted also the route toward establishing a new body within the framework of which the railway norms could be decided. Consequently, as the deliberations and decisions of the conferences that followed WWI show, both in the case of the League and in the action outside its remit, the new European governments regarded integration of the railway networks at a transnational level as important for general wellbeing and for maintaining the new socio-political order in Europe. A consciousness developed after the war of the importance of railway integration in Europe as a condition for its economic recovery and development, which preceded historically any official attempts to achieve political integration in Europe. From this narrative, it appears that international railway traffic and in general international co-operation in the railway field was well developed from 1925 until the outbreak of WWI. R.J. Wedgwood, in his study International Rail Transport, drew the same conclusion. He observed that the strained political atmosphere and the growing feeling of instability made international negotiation, even in technical matters, much more delicate. At the same time, the railways found themselves used to an increasing extent as instruments of state policy, whether for developing

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national ports, for the shipment of international traffic, or more generally for strengthening the hold of the parent state in particular international fields of production or consumption. ‘Nevertheless, notable progress was made, and in some ways the railways came closer together than ever before. One factor in this development, at any rate after 1930, was the growing pressure of road competition. It may be said that the railways closed their ranks in the presence of a common enemy.’ He goes on to observe that ‘as a railway unit, Europe was functioning far better than as a political or an economic unit.’192

192  Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 8.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

Railways as Carriers of Long Distance Traffic In the previous chapter I discussed the establishment of an international railway regime after the war and the influence of political considerations in this regime. In this chapter, I look more closely at the working of the railway networks to explore the internationalization of railways in inter-war Europe. In particular, I focus on two aspects. First, I look at how international railway passenger services developed throughout the inter-war years. Stone has argued that by 1930 much freight rolling stock and a substantial fleet of passenger vehicles could run freely on large parts of the network.1 In this chapter, I examine the evolution of such international railway passenger traffic. More specifically, I look at the international passenger services provided by the Compagnie international des wagons-lits et grand express européennes (henceforth Wagons-Lits), examining not only the changing political situation in Europe, but also the changes in the field of transport that to some extent also resulted from the war. The choice to focus on railway passenger services instead of goods services was a result of the difficulty of collecting sources in the case of the latter. However, looking at how international passenger railway traffic developed in the inter-war years is an important indicator of the overall development of international railway traffic. Second I look at how the international railway regime responded to appeals for technical interoperability of networks in relation to the introduction of new technologies. In the previous chapters, I discussed an array of bodies that promoted the technical standardization of the railway networks in Europe, as well as research in specific fields. This was the case of the German Verein, to cite a key example, but also of the intergovernmental conference on the technical unity in rail transport. In this chapter, I look at the response of such bodies to appeals for the establishment of international agreements concerning new technologies that had started being introduced at a national level. 1  Bryan Stone, ‘Interoperability: How Railways Became European,’ in Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn, 1850-1970, ed. Burri Monica, Kilian T. Elsasser and David Gugerli (Zürich: Chronos, 2003), 240.

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I look at two cases: electrification and the introduction of automatic couplers in the railway networks of Europe. Historians have characterized the nineteenth century as the railway age.2 Next to canal transportation, railways became the most important carriers of both passenger and goods traffic.3 This situation changed in the inter-war years. Railways faced increased competition from other means of transport. The motor industry grew in many countries of Europe, and governments financed works for the improvement of the existing road infrastructure. Plans to develop automobile only roads began to materialize in Italy and Germany. However, this competition was mostly on smaller private lines and did not yet influence long distance land traffic. This becomes obvious in the discussions known as the ‘coordination debate’ that climaxed in the 1930s. By the end of the 1920s, the question of ‘competition’ between the two modes of transport and their ‘co-ordination’ was an important issue at both national and international level and became prominent in the agenda of the most important organizations dealing with international railway traffic such as the International Railway Congress Association (henceforth IRCA) and the League of Nations.4 As publications in the RG reveal, railway men perceived road services as threatening to rail transport, particularly with respect to short distance traffic. Before the war, the RG stated that: ‘No form of road traction, whether motor omnibus, or tramway, has ever been able to compete with the railway except over short distances, because for journeys of more than eight miles from the starting point, often less, the superior speed of the railways introduced a superiority which neither lower fares nor a more frequent service can counterbalance. So long as our present speed restrictions (which impose a maximum of only twelve miles an hour on heavy motor omnibuses in urban districts) endure, this advantage will remain with the railways.’5 Fifteen years later, road transport had significantly expanded. However in an article in the same journal published in 1927 we read that: ‘The great bulk of freight transportation in America, as in most other countries, takes the form of mass movement over long distances, and in

2  Michael Robbins, The Railway Age (London: Routledge & Paul, 1962). 3  Norman J.G. Pounds, An Historical Geography of Europe, 1800-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 449-461. 4  ‘Road and Rail Co-ordination,’ RG 47 (1927): 47; ‘Road and Rail Co-ordination,’ RG 48 (1928): 200-1. 5  ‘Roads and Railways,’ RG 19 (1913): 753.



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that field the railway is economically supreme.’6 For sure, railway networks in Europe faced difficult financial conditions in the inter-war years, and especially in the first half of the 1930s. According to a study of the IRCA on the financial situation of the railways of all members of the UIC, the economic depression was reflected in railway operating statistics.7 Goods traffic was the first to suffer from the crisis, with a downward trend becoming apparent from 1929. By contrast, passenger movement actually increased until 1930 in seven out of ten representative countries, and in the case of Denmark it did so until 1931. In several European countries, the crisis, at least as far as it affected railway traffic, appears to have reached its climax in 1932. Accounting for the poor financial situation of the railways in the inter-war years, the study’s reporters identified the industrialization of other continents that both limited the export trade of Europe and introduced a new element of competition in the home markets. They pointed further to changes in the economic structure of various countries and the increase in the number of strikes and wage costs as the growing trade union movement pressed for higher wages and shorter working hours. Finally, they cited competition from road transport.8 To respond to this situation railway networks adopted a range of technical measures. Electrification of the networks, which had already started before the war, was extended and more modern systems of signaling were adopted as well.9 Among the measures adopted by railways to 6  The author of the article suggests that ‘the course recommended is that of transport co-ordination between the railways and the roads, it being pointed out that in numerous cases traffic is now being conveyed on the railways by motor lorries which had themselves produce new producing territories so remote from the railway stations that the heretofore existing forms of transportation were prohibitive in cost.’ ‘Railways Versus Highways,’ RG 45 (1926): 750. Often railway administrations attempted to control the competition and to use rail traffic to their advantage by providing bus services complementary to the railway services. The Hungarian railways started a motor transport company, for both goods and passenger transport. In 1927 French railways ran a number of touring motor coach services, the PLM being in this field a pioneer, running 156 services. MAA Pourcel, ‘The Motor Vehicle as an Extension of the Railway,’ RG 48 (1928): 520-1. 7  E. la Valle and E. Mellini, ‘La crise mondiale et les chemins de fer,’ Bulletin IRCA 16 (1934): 827-833; A. Davies, ‘La crise mondiale et les chemins de fer,’ Bulletin IRCA 16 (1934): 835-854; Idem., ‘La crise mondiale et les chemins de fer,’ Bulletin IRCA 16 (1934): 693-731; C. and M. von Beck, ‘La crise mondiale et les chemins de fer,’ Bulletin IRCA 17 (1935): 1351-1417; Idem., ‘La crise mondiale et les chemins de fer,’ Bulletin IRCA 17 (1935): 1095-1138. 8  ‘The World Crisis and the Railways,’ RG 62 (1935): 157-158. The railway networks in Central Europe were affected by the depression. ‘Austrian Federal Railways in 1930,’ RG 55 (1931): 614-615; ‘Czecho-Slovakian State Railways,’ RG (1931): 615. 9  C.H. Palmer, ‘Railway Signaling in Belgium: An Account of the Signaling Practice of the Belgian Railways,’ RG 39 (1923): 811- 812; ‘Swiss Railway Electrification,’ RG 40 (1924): 401; ‘European Electrification Progress,’ RG 51 (1929): 280-1; ‘France: Extensive Program of New Automatic Signaling Installations,’ RG 62 (1935): 725; E.R. Kaan, ‘Electrification of the Tauern Section of the Austrian Federal Railways,’ RG 63 (1935): 166; ‘Centenary of the Belgian Railways,’ RG 62 (1935): 777-789; ‘Railway Developments in Norway,’ RG 63 (1935): 594-5; ‘Important French Electrification Opening,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to RG 62 (1935): 882-3; ‘Railway Electrification in Sweden,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to

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improve their economic situation, the introduction of electric traction in many railways held a unique position. Later on, many networks adopted diesel traction, similarly with an eye toward improving economic performance.10 Technical developments played a significant role in such developments. Since 1901, when it was first invented, it was apparent that the diesel locomotive could be several times more efficient in converting the energy in fuel to mechanical power. But it was not until the 1930s that the weight and bulk of the diesel engine began to be reduced to the point where it could compete with steam in anything other than low-speed switching service.11 Diesel engines were rarely designed solely for railway use until the 1930s when General Motors developed the ‘567’ engine.12 However, in the inter-war years the adoption of diesel traction was mainly in small private lines. Apart from the countries of Western Europe, in which the use of the diesel traction was expanding, countries taking up diesel traction for the first time in 1935 included Estonia, Bulgaria and Turkey. The RG reported a notable advance in Romania, and equal appreciation of the diesel on the Czechoslovak State Railways.13 Furthermore, new types of railway technology appeared, such as rail cars (also known as ‘automotrice’) that would provide more frequent and, in some cases faster services, while the use of bogie cars expanded.14 A new type of line, the diretissima, was constructed in Italy to improve the railway connection between big cities. These were the measures taken to improve the financial situation of railways. However, it seems that the difficult economic position of railways and the competition from road transport and aviation did not have a great influence on their RG 64 (1936): 683; E.R. Kaan, ‘Main-Line Electrification throughout the World,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to RG 64 (1936): 886-890; ‘European Development,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to RG 65 (1936): 1092-3; ‘Large-Scale Programs on the Continent,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to RG 68 (1938): 140-1. 10  As reported in contemporary press, the first reasons for electrification were internal considerations of railway companies, and the second, considerations concerning the requirements of the countries as a whole. ‘The Diesel Conquest of Europe,’ Diesel Railway Traction, Supplement to RG 63 (1935): 1124-7; ‘Diesel Traction Makes Big Forward Movement in Spain,’ RG 63 (1935): 1136-7; ‘Rapid Advance of Italian Diesels,’ Electric Railway Traction Supplement to RG 65 (1936): 1094. 11  The key developments leading to the eventual shift to diesel power for all railroad services were made in the 1920s. These were primarily in the area of reliable controls to match the load of the electrical generating and propulsion systems to the fuel input and power output of the diesel engine. John H. Armstrong and Marc Green, The Railroad, What it is, What it Does: The Introduction to Railroading (Omaha, NE: Simmons-Boardman Pub. Corp., 1978), 61-3. 12  R.L. Vickers, ‘The Beginnings of Diesel Electric Traction,’ The Newcomen Society for the Study of Engineering and Technology Transactions 71, no. 1 (2000): 115-27, 116. 13  ‘The Diesel Conquest of Europe,’ Diesel Railway Traction, Supplement to RG 63 (1935): 1125-7. 14  In 1935 over 750 railcars or rail motor trains were under construction or in order to 85 different designs. ‘International Railway Congress Association,’ RG 63 (1935): 416-7; ‘Small European Rail Cars,’ RG 63 (1935): 85.



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role as carriers of international traffic. As B. de Fontgalland and P. Ballet note in their article on the history of the UIC in the RGCF, the worsening internal situation of certain networks that faced rather strong competition from the road networks and the progressive nationalization of the private companies did not have any repercussion beyond their frontiers.15 Indeed, international railway services thrived in the inter-war years. The Wagons-Lits maintained a dense network of communications between diverse cities of Europe while it extended its services in Asia and Northern Africa. In fact many sources refer to the years from 1922 until 1939 as ‘the apogee of the grands express européens.’16 Railway administrations also provided many international services, as it is indicated in the case of the interEuropean timetable conference that was held annually in Europe. After the war and throughout the inter-war years, the Wagons-Lits expanded its range of services both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, it not only revived some of its pre-war services, but also created many new ones. In the aftermath of the war, the company faced the challenge of adjusting its services to the necessities of the new political geography by re-interpreting the new map of Europe. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the new Simplon Orient Express service was created after the war as a response to the changing political situation in Europe. This was only one of the many new services that were developed in response to the changing political situation. The newly created states requested that the Wagons-Lits provide them with connecting services so that they would improve the travelling conditions to and from their capitals after the war. By 1930, all of them were incorporated into the network of the Wagons-Lits.17 The WagonsLits provided services to most of the newly created states in Central Europe, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic States, either through one or more of the international trains, or through the incorporation of sleeping cars in regular trains.18 In fact, after the war, the running of trains composed entirely of sleeping 15  B. de Fontgalland and P. Ballet also come to this conclusion in their article, ‘Cinquante années de l’union internationale des chemins de fer,’ RGCF (1972): 336. 16  Referring to the inter-war years, Sherwood, the president of the Intercontainer group observed, ‘the twenties and early thirties were the heyday of luxury train travel. It was the grand way to travel across France and on to Istanbul, with superb service, elaborate meals and glamorous companions.’ Shirley Shirwood, Venice Simplon Orient-Express: The Return of the World’s Most Celebrated Train (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983): 21-2. 17  Czechoslovakia is a case in point. The Wagons-Lit services placed Prague directly in relation to Paris, Rome, Vienna, Warsaw, Bucharest, Istanbul and Athens. Similarly, the Simplon Orient Express ensured Yugoslavia’s rapid communications with all the countries of Western Europe and the East, Greece and Romania. The new Orient Express and Simplon Orient Express also supplied Romania with communications to Western Europe, while other services ensured the establishment of its connection to central and northern Europe. C.M. Loiseau, ‘Le développement des services internationaux de Wagons-lits depuis la guerre,’ RGCF 48 (1929): 220, 223. 18  Ibid. 223-224. In 1925 a contract was signed assuring the restoration of the connections with the

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car vehicles was an exception, while the establishment of new services with sleeping cars attached to ordinary trains became the rule.19 The services connecting Western to Eastern Europe and further east proliferated in the inter-war years. While in the pre-war years the Orient Express was the only train crossing the European continent from west to east, by the 1930s there were many different options connecting different regions of Europe to the East. The Simplon Orient Express ran throughout the inter-war years, establishing international connections between the capitals of the western, central and Eastern Europe via southern Europe.20 From 1919 onward, it provided a daily service between Calais and Istanbul.21 Different branches of the Simplon Orient Express were eventually created, and the network was constantly expanded.22 Gradually, it was transformed into a network of services connecting all the Balkan capitals, not only to Paris, London and Brussels, but also to Vienna, Budapest and again to Berlin. By 1929, as the RG reported, the trip from London to Istanbul could be undertaken every day of the week by the mere purchase of a ticket and a passport. This was a continuous run of 2,178½ miles from Calais in 74½ hours, the longest run in Europe without change of carriage. As the RG predicted the time, would be reduced to 64½ hours from May of the same year.23 In parallel to the Simplon Orient Express, the Orient Express started running again through its old itinerary in 1920s. The aim was to ensure communication with Central Europe. The Orient Express, however, now ran via Strasbourg, Munich, and Vienna to Bucharest, where it stopped instead of continuing its itinerary to Constanta and Istanbul as in the years before WWI.24 Its journey through Germany having been disrupted by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, the train was obliged to take the tunnel of Arlberg until November 1924, when the political situation became normal once more and it resumed its old itinerary through Strasbourg and Munich. However, at this point a new service was created, the Suisse Arlberg-Vienne-Express running three times per week between German railways. 19  Ibid., 223. 20  Lionel Wiener, ‘Note sur la vitesse des trains: Deuxième partie; Examen des vitesses et des services des trains dans les différents pays; La compagnie internationale des wagons-lits et des grands express européens,’ in Bulletin IRCA 16, no. 3 (1934), 244-5. 21  Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 221. 22  Only one branch was abandoned from June 1922 onwards. This was the branch Bordeaux-LionMilan that under the name of ‘line of the 45th parallel’ was recognized as an instrument of connection between America, Italy and beyond. Attendance on this section was nil, and consequently the wagon lit Lyon-Milan was re-established circulating in an ordinary train. This train corresponded with the Simplon Orient Express at Milan. Thus passengers from central and Western France could trans bord to the Simplon Orient Express. Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 221. 23  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 46 (1927): 764. 24  Wiener, ‘Note sur la vitesse des trains,’ 243; Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 222.



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France and Austria, via northern Switzerland. Later on, a vehicle that continued on to Bucharest via Budapest was added. Charles Loiseau, in his 1929 analysis of the European expresses, notes that this was added as an instrument of political relations between France, England and Romania.25 In 1932 the Orient Express ran through coaches from Paris (East) to Istanbul for the first time since 1914, whilst the Arlberg Express was extended to Athens and became known as Arlberg-Orient Express. There was also an Ostend–ViennaOrient Express that provided connecting services from Amsterdam and Brussels. All these services together made up a daily service from Vienna to Budapest and Bucharest and from Budapest to Belgrade. South of Belgrade, the Simplon Orient Express ran daily.26 Thus a dense network of services connected the capitals of Western, Eastern Europe and the Balkans to Istanbul. From there, the Wagons-Lits expanded its network into Asia Minor.

Figure 4.1– Simplon Orient Express and its Complementary Branches Source: Lionel Wiener, ‘La compagnie internationale des Wagons-Lits et des grands express européens,’ Bulletin IRCA 16 (1934): 245.

Figure 4.2– The ‘Orient’, the ‘Alberg – Orient Express,’ and their complementary branches. Source: Wiener, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ Bulletin IRCA 16 (1934): 242.

25  Loiseau seems to be the same person to which Michael Barsley refers in his study Orient Express, The Story of the World’s Most Fabulous Train (1966) as the former president of the Paris Chamber of Advocates, a man with considerable knowledge of the Balkan conditions. Together with Noblemaire, Director General of the PLM, were the men responsible, ‘... the human driving force which tuned a compulsory political move into a highly successful commercial proposition’ in the case of the Simplon Orient Express train. Michael Barsley, Orient Express: The Story of the World’s Most Fabulous Train. (London: Macdonald & Co., 1966), 61; Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 222. 26  It was composed of two fourgons, a dining-car four sleepers, and a diner for the Nis-Thassalonica service.

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The 1930s signaled the extension of services to the Orient. Michael Barsley writes in his account of the history of the routes to the Orient, the vanished German dream for the construction of a Baghdad railway had already been transformed into a British dream by 1918. Resisting pressure from the French Government, and even from an American financial group, Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) allowed a group of British bankers to buy the bankrupt stock of the Anatolian railway. According to Barsley, behind the operation was Lord Dalziel, who had become general director of the Wagons-Lits. His railway concept was not only a drive East to Baghdad but a link with the South, through Beirut (Lebanon), Haifa (North Israel) and Gaza (Palestine), all the way down to Cairo, where Wagons-Lits business flourished.27 Political developments later triggered interest in the route to the East. The change in the political regime in Turkey that took place in 1924 resulted in the transfer of the capital of the old Ottoman Empire from Constantinople-that now became Istanbul-to Ankara.28 Consequently it became doubtful whether this city should be the terminal point of the lines that converged towards Bosporus. In addition, Britain’s role as mandatory power extended its spheres of influence in Palestine and Mesopotamia, as was the case with France in Syria, while also attributing to these powers new responsibilities.29 During the European Timetable Conference, which took place in Baden-Baden in 1925, the delegates of the administrations with interests in the Simplon Orient Express included for the first time the representatives of the network Anatolia-Baghdad and of the French Society for the exploitation of the Railway Bozanti-Aleppo (Northern Syria)-Nissibine (Turkey).30 During this conference, it was unanimously decided to establish two services to the networks of Asia Minor that would complement the existing routes to the East. The first of these services would be the Anatolia Express. This would run three times per week between Haydarpassa (head of the network of Anatolia) and Ankara starting in the summer of 1927, in concurrence with the departures 27  Barsley, Orient Express, 69. 28  Jean Paul Caracalla, Le gout du voyage: de l’Orient Express au train a grande vitesse: Histoire de la compagnie des wagons-lits (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), 78. 29  The Covenant of the League of Nations defined the mandate system. This was designed to secure the well being and development of the peoples who inhabited the territories in question. The mandatory of Syria, Palestine and Iraq (Mesopotamia) were designated by the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 25th, 1920. France was entrusted with the administration of Syria, and the United Kingdom with that of Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq). The Covenant defined as follows the tasks of France and the United Kingdom as mandatory Powers: ‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.’ (Art. 22, Para. 4, Covenant), Essential Facts about the League of Nations, (Geneva: Information of the League of Nations, 1935): 192-196. 30  Loiseau, ‘Wagons-lits,’ 221.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

and arrivals of the Simplon Orient Express.31 The second train would run between Haydarpassa and Tripoli (Syria) through Eskisehir, Adana and Aleppo two times per week. This was called the Taurus Express. The Wagons-Lits would provide the material for these two services. In addition, it was decided that a special service of speedboats, functioning under the control of the Wagons-Lits, would assure the passage of the voyagers and their baggage between the stations of Istanbul and Haydarpassa so as to establish regular contact between the services of the Simplon Orient Express and the services that would carry on from Haydarpassa. Finally, the agencies and the principal stations situated throughout the route of the Simplon Orient Express would issue direct tickets and would accept the direct registration of baggage for the major stations in the network of Asia Minor. The Anatolia Express started running in the first of July 1927 while the Taurus Express started running in 1930. From 1927, the Wagons-Lits was also concerned with securing the junction between Tripoli and Cairo so as to offer their Europe-bound clientele a variant of the classic maritime route and also the attraction of a circular voyage. As the lines of standard gauge were not continued between Tripoli and Haifa, (the start of the Palestine railway network), it was necessary to create a service of automobiles in order to connect these two points. Between Haifa and Cairo, the continuity of the standard gauge network allowed a service of sleeping cars to be run twice per week, thus establishing the junction for the terrestrial route between London, Paris and the capital of Egypt. In 1930 the Taurus Express was established from Haydarpassa to Tripoli for Cairo, and Tel Kotchek (Turkey) for Baghdad.32 With the exception of the journey from Tripoli to Haifa, which had to be made by road, it then became possible to travel all the way to Cairo from Calais by Wagons-Lits.33 As Barsley observes, the Taurus Express, connecting with the Orient by specially timed ferries across the Bosporus, had made the Paris-Baghdad route a reality by 1930. The service became popular, and at one time the company possessed sixty Wagons-Lits and twenty dining cars, all on the Asian side.34 According to C. M. 31  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 46 (1927): 764. 32  At first the train avoided Ankara, but when the line from there to Adana was completed the route was altered from the old (shorter) line via Afyon (Turkey) to the capital. 33  Starting in the Simplon Orient Express the traveler was met at Istanbul by a special ferry that crossed the Bosporus to Haydarpasa where the Taurus stood waiting, two hours being allowed before its departure in case the Simplon Orient Express was late. Stepping out at Tripoli, a motor coach took the traveler to Haifa where another wagons-lit vehicle of the Cairo division took him on the Kantara East. Another ferry brought the passengers to Kantara West where they joined the Port Said-Cairo Pullman, arriving in Cairo exactly seven days after leaving London. 34  Barsley, Orient Express, 68. Barsley also observes that in the years immediately before WW II, the timetable and handbook for the Simplon Orient Express and Taurus Express, printed in French, English and Arabic (but not in modern Turkish), ‘Showed an impressive system on an almost Napoleonic scale,

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Loiseau, the year 1930 would mark the point of departure of a new regime of communications truly transcontinental.35 Behrend George described the three-weekly service provided by the Wagons-Lits as ‘an oasis of European luxury in the wild of the Taurus mountains.’36 Qualitatively, in order to handle the competition from air traffic and the economic depression of the 1930s, the Wagons-Lits adopted second and third class vehicles and thus extended its clientele. In order to attract a new clientele the company pursued a program of ‘democratization’ by increasing the number of second and third class sleeping vehicles and introducing buffet cars. It first brought third-class sleepers into use in 1925. At first they were used in Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia and Denmark but were later extended to Western Europe.37 Included in this program was the addition of second-class passengers to important international trains and to the greater number of the company’s ordinary services.38 By 1929 trains composed of only first class cars constituted a small exception rather than the rule.39 Through these innovations, the Wagons-Lits survived the crisis of the 1930s. In 1931 the RG reports that in spite of the world crisis necessitating the suppression or modification of certain services, the activities of the Wagons-Lits were still developing. The extension of sleeping car services in France had compensated to some extent for the diminution of traffic in other directions; the Taurus Express was bringing a new flow of traffic, and the success of the Riviera-Napoli Express had fulfilled expectations entirely. However, gross profits were diminished.40

involving the whole eastern European and middle-eastern complex, with the Dalziel extension through Palestine to Egypt and a shipping connection between Basra and Bombay.’ According to documents of the Wagons-Lits in 1939, the journey from Haydarpasa to Aleppo took only thirty-five hours, and Cairo could be reached in three and a half days. Paris to Beirut was reckoned as a four-day journey, and to Baghdad, six days. Ibid., 69. 35  Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 222. 36  George Behrend, The History of Wagons-Lits, 1875-1955 (Modern Transport Publ. Co. Ltd, 1959), 16. 37  Ibid. 38  ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 56 (1932): 862. 39  Loiseau, ‘Wagons-Lits,’ 226. 40  In 1932 the RG reports that the company felt the full effects of the financial crisis during 1931, and the gross profit amounted to only 102, 772, 323 francs as compared with 168, 887, 502 francs in 1930, while the net income was 103, 770, 521 francs against 179, 698, 215 francs in 1930. ‘... As in the previous years, the ordinary shares received no dividend. To meet the crisis, the strictest economy has been exercised compatible with efficiency, and certain services have been withdrawn or reduced where necessary.’ ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ RG 54 (1931): 917.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

Figure 4.3 – Map Published by the Wagons-Lits for the seasons 1930-1, showing the routes of the Simplon Orient Express and the Taurus Express. Source: Sherwood, Venice Simplon Orient-Express, 31.

Figure 4.4 – Itineraries of the ‘Great Expresses’ the Wagons-Lits run. Source: Wiener, ‘La compagnie internationale des Wagons-Lits,’ 236.

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As Wiener observed in 1934, the services provided by the Wagons-Lits company often had a pioneering role. Once an international train was placed into service, railway companies often established analogous services that were less rapid but also more popular. These were often followed in turn by non-stop trains for transport and goods.41 Besides the services provided by the Wagons-Lits, the general proliferation of international railway services in the 1930s becomes evident from the meetings of the international timetable conference. The history of the conference dates back to the nineteenth century. The first conference in which timetables were discussed between railway administrations of different nationalities took place in Munich in 1860. The Bavarian railways called the meeting in which the railways of Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Austria and France took part. From 1871 onwards these conferences were extended under the auspices of the Union of German Railway Administrations (Verein) and fixed to take place twice a year for winter and summer timetables. In 1891 they took the title of the European Timetable Conference. From then on, the Swiss Federal Railways took the role of the managing administration. During these conferences, delegates of railway administrations of Europe met and discussed the composition of the international trains in Europe, arranged timetables and the running of through carriages.42 In the inter-war years, as the RG reports, these conferences were attended by a number of the leading administrative officers of all the European railway administrations, the Wagons-Lits and Mitropa. During these conferences, any alterations that might be required in the international services were worked out in detail and agreed on for introduction in the following year’s service of through trains and carriages that ran throughout Europe. As the RG notes, this conference saved a great deal of correspondence and many separate meetings between different railways as the representatives of all the European railways were brought together for one week in the year and discussed any question regarding connecting services. As the RG mentioned, to make an alteration in one international express sometimes involved a number of different administrations. For example, to effect an alteration in the time of the Simplon Orient Express would involve alterations in the timetables of no fewer than ten railway administrations, whilst a change in the timing of the OstendVienna Orient Express might upset the train times of eleven other administrations and so on.43 In the 1930s the first international freight timetable conference was 41  Wiener, ‘Note sur le vitesse des trains,’ 235. 42  ‘European Time-Table Conference,’ RG 55 (1931): 450; ‘European Time-Table Conference,’ RG 51 (1929): 751; ‘European Timetable Conference,’ RG 67 (1937): 701. 43  ‘European Time-Table Conference,’ RG 55 (1931): 450.



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organized. Unlike passenger trains, up to then, freight train schedules were not discussed at meetings with any sort of comprehensive Europe-wide representation. The main function of this biannual conference was to arrange international freight transport connections to meet the needs of the countries represented and to accelerate freight cars transits, particularly at frontier stations.44 The case of the Wagons-Lits and of the international timetable conference show that international railway traffic was well developed in Europe in the inter-war years. As articles published in the RG reveal, amidst the economic depression, in the eyes of the international railway community, railways continued to be carriers of the ideal of internationalism. At the end of the 1920s the RG commented on the importance of international services for bringing nations together: ‘It will be admitted that rapid inter-communication between the great cities and business centre of Europe, such as London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Antwerp, Hamburg, Madrid, to name only a few, is not only desirable but necessary from any point of view-commercial, social, political. It is by travel that the opportunity of broadening one’s outlook on life is attained, thereby enabling people to appreciate the point of view of their neighbors, resulting, it is hoped, in better feeling between nation and nation.’45 Similarly, discussing the importance of the work of the European Timetable conference, the RG reported that: ‘It is this obscure but useful part of our complex international machinery, attracting and desiring none of the fierce light of publicity that beats upon Locarno meetings and Geneva assemblies, eschewing politics and soberly intent upon getting their difficult job well done, that probably does more to promote international amity and facilitate the daily work, at least of the European world, than any resounding political event. Their labors enable people to pass more quickly, freely and frequently between all the countries and capitals of Europe, both on business and on pleasure, thus promoting understanding and friendship between the nations.’46 44  The proceedings of the conference were private but the results were made known through an international freight train timetable compiled on behalf of the conference by the German Reichsbahn and published every spring in the French, German and Italian languages. The conference appointed a managing administration for its domestic affairs, such as the keeping of minutes and circulation of documents. The managing administration was the Czechoslovak State Railways, ‘International Freight Train Timetable Conference,’ RG 62 (1935): 762. 45  ‘Inter-European Timetable and through Carriage Conference,’ RG 51 (1929): 751. 46  ‘European Timetable Conference,’ RG 51 (1929): 741.

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Figure 4.5 – European International Expresses. Source: ‘Inter-European Timetable and Through Carriage Conference,’ RG 55 (1931): 494.

A glance at the maps showing international passenger connecting services in the years 1929 and 1930 reveal a dense network of intercommunications throughout Europe. The expansion of the Wagons-Lits and the provision of international services in the 1930s allow us to conclude that the economic difficulties and the political changes on the European continent did not influence personal travel. In fact, international railway traffic was not threatened at all. The meetings between the railway administrations and the arrangements of the sleeping car companies had actually created and expanded passenger traffic.

Further Fragmentation In the introduction to this book, I briefly discussed the processes that had already put technical standardization in place over a large part of Europe’s railway network in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to existing historiography, technical interoperability of the network was a result of two processes: what Puffert calls an ex ante standardization of the railway gauge and the establishment of agreements between governments and railway administrations. The most important of these agreements was the intergovernmental conference that



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established the protocol known as the Technical Unity on Rail Transport. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the Convention on the Technical Unity on Rail Transport (TU) had regulated issues relating to the interchange of railway rolling stock, such as the dimensions of the continental-loading gauge. As the RG reported in 1918: ‘It is this body which secures uniformity in all the rolling-stock exchange in the continent; determining the dimensions of the loading gauge, the maximum length of vehicles and the maximum axle load. It also fixes the position of couplings, continuous brakes and steam-heating pipes, of the connecting gangways of vestibule coaches etc.’47 In addition, other unions, such as the Verein, promoted the research and standardization of certain parts of the railway materials. In the inter-war years the Peace Treaties included provisions through which the technical unity came back into existence. Article 282 of the section four of the treaty of Versailles gave a list of the international conventions that were to remain in force, which included the convention on the technical uniformity on rail transport, while Article 370 compelled Germany also to adhere to it.48 Moreover, with the co-operation of the UIC, a new code of standards was signed in 1938. In this section I look at the action taken for the achievement of standardization concerning new technologies. Despite efforts to achieve technical standardization, in some cases, railway administrations introduced further diversity. In this second part of this chapter I examine two cases where all sides sought to establish international agreements for standardizing specific technologies, but where there was difficulty in reaching agreement. I look at two cases: electrification and automatic couplers.

Electrifying European Railways To this day, national railway networks in Europe employ a wide variety of electrical power distribution systems.49 European railway electrification began around 1900. At that time, different railway systems started experimenting with different 47  ‘International Equipment,’ RG (1918): 251. 48  From the coming into force of the present treaty and subject to the provisions thereof, the multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements of an economic or technical character enumerated below and in the subsequent articles shall alone be applied as between Germany and those of the Allied and Associated Powers party thereto: (4) Agreement of May 15, 1886, regarding the technical standardization of railways, The Treaties of Peace (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), art 282. 49  These are distinguished by the choice of direct or alternating current, frequency, voltage and the means by which locomotives collect electrical overhead wire or electrified third rail. Douglas J. Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ in B8: European Networks, 134.

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electrification systems and ultimately adopted different technical options.50 Puffert has argued: ‘The lack of a clearly optimal technique for electrical traction, at least until recent decades, has given rise to a wide variety of experiments. Diversity in electrical systems has remained because this diversity has not been as costly as gauge diversity. Although locomotives cannot cross breaks of electrical systems unless specially equipped to do so, freight cars and passenger coaches can, and railway administrations have usually preferred not to exchange locomotives anyway.’51 As he notes, it was in the inter-war years that a significant increase in electrification, measured in terms of km of railway lines electrified, occurred in Europe. As a matter of fact, the issue of an international agreement on some aspects of electrification was discussed during the first general conference on communications and transit in Barcelona (1921). A study of these discussions provides insight into the reason why railway administrations adopted diverse solutions for electric current and offers a better understanding of the difficulties in reaching an international agreement on electrification in the inter-war years.

The First Discussions During the discussions in Barcelona to establish an international railway regime, the Italian delegation proposed an article for the electrification of railways. According to the proposed article: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake, in connection with the construction or electrification of railways in the neighborhood of a frontier of interest to international traffic, to adopt as far as possible all measures which would allow of an improved operation of these lines. This should also include the possible concession of electric power from one country to another.’52 As the member of the Italian delegation, the engineer Paolo Bignami, observed during the opening discussion of the conference, the object of the proposal was to 50  Puffert gives an account of the different systems in use in different countries since the turn of the century. Ibid., 134-136. 51  Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 134. 52  ‘Second Meeting of the Committee on Railways; New Article Proposed by the Italian Delegation,’ in Barcelona Conference. Verbatim Records and Texts of the Recommendations Relative to the International Regime of Railways and of Recommendations Relative to Ports Placed under International Regime (Geneva: League of Nations, 1921): 47-8.



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bind any state which might decide to electrify a line on the frontier to assist as far as possible a neighboring state in doing the same, even if hampered by an insufficient supply of the necessary power.53 Consequently, the proposed article sought to facilitate agreements for the exchange of electric power between neighboring countries to electrify railways of international importance. This proposal presents interest since it was the first time when the issue of an international agreement for the electrification of railways of international concern was brought forward for discussion by international organizations. A committee was appointed to discuss the draft convention on the international regime of railways. During the meeting of the committee charged with preparing the final draft of the convention, the Italian delegate Girolamo Sinigalia, (in Bignami’s place) former inspector of the Italian State Railways and technical expert for Italy on railway matters, noted that what triggered the Italian delegation to put forward this proposal was the growing importance of electric traction and the advantages which it offered, especially in the case of mountain railways. For this reason, he argued, it had become a matter of international interest to further its development. If, therefore, in the case of two neighboring countries, one was rich in electric power and the other poor, it would be in the interest of international traffic if the former should supply electricity to the latter for the purposes of electric traction.54 A discussion opened up on the Italian delegation’s proposal. While the representatives of non-European countries, more specifically Paraguay and Brazil favored adopting the proposal; representatives of railway administrations from Europe expressed a strong opposition toward it.55 A major consideration for those who opposed it was that such an article would endanger the sovereignty of the nation state and its power to decide on how to dispose its reserves of power. The Belgian representative Hanrez argued that the issue of electrification of international lines was beyond the competence of the Barcelona conference. Even 53  Introducing the article to the discussions of the Barcelona conference, Bignami argued that ‘from the point of view of international communications, it would indeed be a great pity if the development of this new means of traction, the great usefulness of which is undeniable, were hindered through lack of electrical power, and especially so if this power could be granted to a poor country by a neighboring country which had an abundant supply of it. ‘Part 1, Statement by Sir Francis Dent (vice president of the conference) on the Question of Railways and General Discussion in Conference; Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference,’ Barcelona Conference, 11. 54  ‘Annex 7, Report by M. Bignami to the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit on the advisability of the League of Nation taking action for facilitating the Cession by one Country to another of Electric power for the Operation of Railways of International Concern’ in LoNP, Minutes of the Second Session, held at Geneva, March nineteenth – 31st 1922, 30. doc. no. G. 212. M. 116. 1922. VIII.’ 55  Barcelona Conference, 48-51. The representative of Paraguay requested the substitution of the word ‘undertake’ with the word ‘consider desirable.’ Ibid., 48.

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if the conference were to adopt such an article, he argued, it was highly probable that the military authorities in the various countries would oppose it on strategic grounds.56 The Dutch representative Kalff also stated that the Italian proposal was outside the scope of the convention under discussion. In his words: ‘we could not possibly accept it. We shall begin with conceding electricity and end up by conceding coal!’57 The Austrian delegate Reinhardt’s comments also show that the opposition was based on the desire of nation states to retain the right to decide how to dispose of their own reserves of power for their own economic and political goals. Austria was one of the nation states created as a result of the political re-organization that followed WWI. Political changes and the drafting of new borders had considerably affected the Austrian railway system. It was reduced to the one fourth of its pre-war length; however, the expenditure for its operation had been doubled. Whereas before the war Austria possessed coalmines that could provide motive power capable of satisfying the needs of the greatest part of her railway network, after the war she had to rely almost entirely on foreign sources. In addition, the depreciation of the Austrian currency had also resulted in the increase in expenditure for the purchase of fuel. Consequently, the issue of railway electrification constituted a question of major importance for Austria.58 However, the Austrian representative was against the proposal of the Italian representative. He stated: ‘The utilization of hydraulic power represents a problem so complex and of such wide bearing that it would be dangerous to endeavor to cope with it in a convention on the International Regime of Railways.’59

56  Ibid. 57  Ibid. 58  As Reinhardt noted, the railways of the Austrian Empire extended for a length of about 20.000 km before the war. The cost of the fuel necessary for traction over the system amounted to about 55 million crones. After the war, the length of the railways had been reduced to 4.500 km, a quarter of their former length and traction. In addition, expenditure was limited on account of the lack of coal and stock. Thus, on a railway system reduced to a quarter of its original extent, and in return for a very limited volume of traffic, Austria was spending forty times as much. The reason for the change was that before the war Austria possessed coalmines on which she drew to provide the traction on her railways to the extent of 84 % of the total needs. Whatever additional coal was necessary was imported from upper Silesia or from England. ‘To-day the mines which we possess are of minor importance, and are only capable of providing 12% of our total requirements in coal. We are obliged to rely on foreign sources for 88%. As we have to pay for coal in foreign currency, the loss sustained by us on the exchange, due to the depreciation of our own currency may be estimated at 1.850 million crones out of 2000 spent by us on fuel. This is a typical example and the committee will understand why the electrification of railways represents a question of vital interest for Austria; it is natural that the latter should wish to transform the method of traction on her railways by making a gradually increasing use of those of her waterways which are capable of supplying sufficient hydroelectric power.’ Ibid. 59  Ibid., 50.



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In addition he stated his conviction that there would be no difficulty, should the occasion arise, in carrying out the suggestion of the Italian delegation at some points along the Austro-Italian frontier. ‘But it appears to me out of the question to include in the convention on the international regime of railways-whether in connection with Article three or some other article-a clause dealing with the important question of the utilization of hydraulic power.’60 Sinigalia, in an attempt to mollify the opposition, stressed that the Italian proposal did not contain anything liable to interfere with the use of electrical power by the countries that possessed it. It would not constitute an absolute requirement but only a recommendation. It would be a friendly concession made subject to conditions to be laid down by the two countries concerned and only where there was surplus of electrical power and when all the requirements of the supplying country had been satisfied. Furthermore, he argued, fears related to the military interest of the country would apply not only to the question of electrical power but to any form of operation of the railway systems, whether steam traction or electric traction. Besides, the convention contained all desirable safeguards for national security.61 The delegate from Brazil, Barbaroza-Carneiro, proposed a slight addition to the text,62 but the Swiss representative repeated his opposition to the proposal.63 The committee eventually ruled against the new version proposed by the Brazilian delegation, and the article was rejected by 16 to 6 votes. During the general discussion of the conference, where the committee on railways presented a report of its work, Sinigalia referred again to the article proposed by the Italian delegation. The General Conference adopted a recommendation recognizing the importance of the issue to the interest of international communications and ordering its further examination.64 60  Ibid. 61  Ibid., 49. 62  He proposed the following text: ‘The high contracting parties consider desirable, in connection with the construction or electrification of railways in the neighborhood of a frontier of interest to international traffic, to adopt as far as possible, and without prejudice to the interests of industry and of internal traffic in the country in which the electrical power is produced, all measures which would allow of an improved operation of these lines, including the possible concession of electrical power by one country to another.’ Ibid. 63  Carlin, representative of Switzerland, stated that the question was outside the scope of the convention. ‘It appears to me that the circumstances are of such an exceptional nature that each case should only be dealt with by means of special agreements between the two or three countries concerned... I merely wish to draw the attention of the committee to the importance possessed by this article. Questions are involved which far exceed the scope of this convention, and it would therefore be better, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, to reject the article, altogether.’ Ibid., 50-1. 64  The text inserted in the final act reads as follows: ‘The conference, bearing in mind that it is desirable

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Electrification and Railways across Borders Paolo Bignami, after the request of the Organization for Communications and Transit (henceforth Transit Organization), prepared a report concerning the advisability of the League taking action to facilitate the cession by one country to the other of electric power for the operation of railways of international concern.65 In his report he referred to the considerations that had led the Italian delegation to propose this article. These were, firstly, the increased importance that electric traction had acquired after the war. Many countries had used electric power before the war. However, with the outbreak of the war, the use of electric power had expanded further. He predicted that, given the considerable advantages of electric traction, its use would expand considerably once the post-war economic crisis ended. Secondly, due to the nature of the advantages that its use presented over steam traction, electric traction presented the best advantages for use in railways carrying international traffic. Consequently, the establishment of international agreements for the electrification of such railways would be desirable, for the cases in which one country possessed a substantially larger store of electric power than a neighboring country. Therefore, he noted, that the Italian delegation was of the opinion that it would be a great advantage, with a view to the improvement of lines of communication, if the countries possessing such power, after having satisfied all their own requirements, consented to cede their surplus of electrical power to other countries lacking such resources. In this way these latter countries would be able to obtain power to electrify their frontier lines. Besides this, the case of the electric power exchange between France, Switzerland and Italy during a severe drought in Italy the preceding year had shown the considerable advantages that an international exchange of electric power presented. Consequently, the issue was clearly related to the much broader issue of the exploitation of hydraulic power near frontiers and the cession of electric power from one country to another. Bignami’s report is of great interest for several reasons. Bignami argued that railway lines that were carrying international traffic could best employ electricity as motive power. Electrification of railways presented great advantages, which explained the tendency of many countries to electrify railway lines, a tendency that was intensified during the years of the war.66 The lines where electric traction was with a view to the improvement of the ways of communication of international concern that States having an abundant supply of electric power should concede a part of it to States in want thereof, recommends that this question should be examined.’ Ibid., 147-148. 65  LoNP, Transit Organization, Minutes of the Second Session, Geneva, March 29th-31st, 1922, 29-41. 66  Bignami in his report referred to the various important advantages of the introduction of electric traction for the electrification of national railways. One such advantage was a significant saving in the amount of coal. Another considerable advantage was that it promoted the use of hydraulic power and the



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of the greatest use, Bignami argued, were steep-gradient mountain lines and lines over which there was heavy traffic, especially passenger traffic. As regards the former, the greater the traction power required, the greater the quantity of fuel saved was. Moreover, on those lines with many tunnels the absence of smoke was particularly important. On lines with heavy passenger traffic the marked advantages were the greater elasticity in the number of trains and greater commercial speed. Hence the large capital expenditure on the cost of plant would be more easily covered by an increase in passenger traffic. It was in the case of international railways that such characteristics applied. Such railways had often to cross high mountain ranges between two countries and almost invariably connected important cities of two or more countries. Consequently, railways of international importance were those on which the advantages of electric traction were most apparent and accordingly they were the first to figure on the program of electrification contemplated by various nations. Italy, for example, had undertaken its first electrification of the Mont Cenis railway towards France, and Switzerland the electrification of the St Gotthard railway towards Italy. Electrifying international lines, however, presented great complexity and difficulty for two reasons: first, because it was related to broader issues such as the exploitation of hydraulic power close to frontiers and the cession of electric power between neighboring countries.67 The settlement of these issues required extensive work. Second, it constituted an entirely new field of international action. The League of Nations, Bignami noted in his report, could undertake considerable action to facilitate the electrification of railways of international importance. First, it could contribute to the simplification of the complicated procedure necessary to establish an international agreement on the exploitation of hydraulic power near frontiers and the cession of electric power. The establishment of international provisions to promote the exploitation of waterways for motive power and facilitate transport and distribution of electric power and thus it often resulted in the industrialization of large areas. These advantages explained, according to Bignami, why certain countries, such as Italy, had decided to limit the exploitation of certain waterways, reserving their utilization for the railway administrations and to compel concessionaires of certain waterfalls to cede a fixed quantity of the power produced by them, at cost price, for use in electric railway traction. ‘Report By Mr. Bignami,’ 37-38. 67  Bignami noted in his report two instances in which it would be extremely difficult under existing legislation to electrify a railway of international character uniting two countries. Firstly in the case in which one of the countries desired to make use of power produced in the territory of the other or obtained from a water course which, due to the irregularities of the frontier, afterwards passed to the territory of another. Secondly, in the case in which power had to be transmitted to the section of a railway to be electrified by a transmission line which had to pass through a stretch of territory belonging to a neighboring country. Under the terms of existing legislation, he pointed out, it would be very difficult to apply in either of the two countries the necessary decrees of expropriation for either of the stretches of territory under consideration, ‘Report By Mr. Bignami,’ 40.

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the transmission and cession of electric power between countries could only be undertaken after a detailed study of the legislations of different countries. Such a study would aim at removing to the degree possible difficulties that held back the work required by modern installations for producing, transmitting and distributing electric power. It would also lead to the framing of a code of provisions, embodying the most valuable points of each legislation. Such provisions would aim at facilitating the establishment and work of modern installations for the production, transmission and distribution of electric power. However, Bignami predicted that it would be impossible to reach any definite conclusions acceptable to many nations.68 Second, the League could promote the establishment of an international agreement on how to use electric power situated on one side of a frontier for the electrification of a line crossing it. In many cases the frontiers between countries separated the points where it would be possible and convenient to use hydraulic power to power the international railways that should be electrified. While this, might occur on any continent, Bignami argued: ‘It is particularly marked in Europe, which is divided into about thirty states which are variously endowed by nature with hydraulic power and which are cut across in all directions by railways.’69 In such cases, Bignami argued, the establishment of international accords for the production and exchange of electricity crossing national frontiers would be important: ‘Such understandings would be extended to agreements either standardizing the system of traction (continuous current, mono-phasical current or tri-phasical current) on both sides of the frontier, or, in the case that this proved to be too difficult, arranging it so that the system of traction used by one of the two neighboring countries should continue to a point within the territory of the other country where the change of the system of traction would not be too inconvenient.’70

68  Bignami noted that the question of hydraulic exploitation touched upon so many interests that it was very difficult to control it adequately in any country. ‘It would therefore be almost useless to endeavor to arrive at an agreement based on a single code of legislative measures, especially in the view of the fact that legislative measures regarding waterways are bound up with general legislation, varying within each country, which control the rights of private persons to the ownership of real estate and the rights of public bodies over water supply.’ ‘Report By Mr. Bignami.’, 35. 69  Ibid., 38. 70  Ibid., 39.



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Bignami stressed that: ‘There can be no doubt of the great advantage of an obligation binding the various nations to admit the necessity of an international agreement in this connection since, in cases of diversity of opinion, recourse could be made to the decision of a body outside the interested parties, such as the League.’71 Finally Bignami considered the possibility of creating especially favorable conditions for the use of power for electric traction. He argued that considerable advantages would be obtained: ‘If states agreed to extend provisions similar to those designed to assist in national exploitation of hydraulic power to cover its production and transport to other countries or across their own territories for electric traction on international railways.’72 Such provisions would be incorporated into the legislation of the countries concerned.73 Bignami concluded his report summing up the fundamental ideas that he proposed as necessary to include in international agreements. These concerned firstly, recognizing that the electrification of a railway line crossing the frontiers of two neighboring countries was an issue of public interest. Secondly, the engagement of the states that would provide all necessary facilities for the electrification of a railway lines crossing their frontier insofar as they would not have to compromise their national sovereignty. Thirdly an obligation of two neighboring countries to co-operate for the use of hydroelectric power close to the frontier. Finally, in cases in which it would be difficult to establish a direct agreement, recourse could be made to the Transit Organization and the Permanent Court of International Justice, which would have an arbitrating role.74

71  Ibid. 72  Ibid., 40. 73  He argued that it would be extremely difficult under existing legislation to make the necessary arrangements, if it were necessary, for example, to electrify a railway between two countries using power produced by one of them, or obtained from a water-course that passed into the other, or transmitted by a line which had to pass through the neighboring country. These complications would be avoided if the two countries concerned had signed an international convention by which they were bound to afford each other reciprocal assistance to facilitate the electrification of railways of international character, both on their own territory and on the territory of neighboring countries, and if such transformations or new constructions were regarded as pre-eminently of public interest. Ibid., 40. 74  Ibid., 41.

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Cession of Electric Power Committee The subcommittee of transport by rail discussed Bignami’s report during its second session.75 During the second meeting of the committee, Robert Hérold (Switzerland) recognized the importance of the question for Switzerland, a country whose legislation on the subject, as he noted, was very liberal and whose actual export of electric power was already considerable. Until then the Federal Council had reserved the right to make a unilateral decision in each individual case; no foreign country had any recognized right to the electric power of Switzerland. He recognized that Bignami’s proposal intended to create a new principle that should be very carefully considered and was prepared to support the proposal to institute a special sub-committee to consider this question. Bignami responded that the experience of Italy and Switzerland had shown that there was no need for reservations concerning the proposal of the Italian delegation. The proposal’s aim was merely to encourage the use of electric traction for railways, which was often made difficult by frontier anomalies. However, he supported the idea of appointing a sub-committee to study this question and to submit to it its conclusions. Sinigalia supported Hérold’s proposal and ordered that a special sub-committee would be constituted to consider the problem thoroughly. In summing up the discussion, the chairman observed that he considered it indispensable, in order to arrive at a solution, to examine this question in detail. On the basis of Bignami’s report, he concluded that the role that the League would play concerning the issue under discussion would be that of a legislative rather than a judicial body, since there was no text to serve as a basis for the desired bilateral agreements. Consequently, he thought that it would be advisable to define more accurately beforehand what should be incorporated in such agreements and possibly to draw up a standard convention. To this effect, he also supported the proposal for the establishment of a special committee to further study the issue.76 After the chairman’s proposal the sub-committee appointed a consultative committee composed by Bignami, Chargueraud, Hérold (Switzerland, director of Railways of Toggenburg, Privat-Docent at the University of Zurich), HolckColding (Denmark, Chef de Bureau at the Ministry of Public Works) and E. Montarroyos (Brazil, engineer, former Staff Captain). As the matter under discussion was purely technical, the chairman proposed that each member of the committee should be authorized to secure the assistance of an expert whenever it was considered desirable. Each of these experts was to be considered as attached to the 75  LoNP, Transit Organization. Minutes of the Second Session, Geneva, March 29th-31,’ 1922, 6-7. 76  Ibid., 8.



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subcommittee.77 It was agreed that the sub-committee that would study the issue of the cession of electric power would meet on March 30th 1922.78 The issue of the electrification of international railways thus became a more specific question of the cession of electric power. The temporary subcommittee on hydroelectric questions presented its first findings in 1923. It drew up two conventions that laid out general principles. As in the case of the convention on the International Regime of Railways, it was expected that in practice, special agreements between states would be concluded. The first convention was the convention on the Transmission in Transit of Electric Power. The second convention related to the development of hydraulic power on watercourses forming part of a basin situated in the territory of several states. It aimed to arrange the construction of power plants in rivers or lakes with two or more riparian states.79 During the deliberations on the convention on the international regime of railways, the issue of the electrification of railway lines of an international concern was discussed once more. The new draft convention included an article concerning the desirability of the concession of electric power for electrification of lines of international concern. This article defined that special agreements may also provide for assistance in motive power and in case international traffic required so, also for assistance in fuel or electric current.80 Kejr (Czechoslovakia) proposed that a new paragraph should be added to this article defining that: ‘They (agreements) may also lay down conditions on which trains at frontier stations may be sent over the electrified system of the contiguous state in which a different method for the transmission of electric current is in use.’81 He noted that railways were being electrified in many countries, and it was clear that the question of sending electric trains over frontiers would acquire considerable importance, in view of the fact that each country would choose the electrical 77  Ibid., 9. 78  Ibid. 79  The convention specified that building hydroelectric plants and installations should follow technical considerations without looking at political borders. As Lagendijk observes in his book, the conventions had little practical value as the group of ratifying countries did not include neighboring States. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: the Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008): 65. 80  Article eleven of the draft statute, part two, mutual use of rolling stock and technical uniformity: ‘Special agreements may also provide for assistance in motive power and, should the international traffic concerned justify it, for assistance in fuel or electric current’, ‘Records and Texts Relating to the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Railways; League of Nations, Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, November 15th − December 9th 1923,’ (1924): 16. 81  Ibid., 16.

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system most appropriate to the electrical conditions within its borders. Therefore, if different electric systems were to be adopted, it would be necessary to have the mechanism essential for adapting electric locomotives at frontier stations. Such installations would cost money. Therefore he suggested that: ‘The general principle may perhaps be adopted, that the country on whose territory the frontier station was situated should be freed from the expense of such installation, and that the other country should bear the cost of any installation necessitated by a difference in the electric currents in use in the respective railway systems.’ Wolf (Germany) thought that if ‘M. Kejr’s very valuable suggestion’ was to be taken into account in the statute, it should be included under article two, which dealt with frontier stations. He thought, however, that the statute should rather be confined to general questions and should not enter into such detail. De Walter (Hungary) agreed with Wolf. Hungary had recently concluded a convention with Czechoslovakia concerning frontier stations, the text of which he would submit to the Committee. Henri Lorin (France), vice-chairman agreed with Wolf and de Walter that the general character of the statute should not be weakened by detailed provisions such as that suggested by L. Kejr. He nevertheless thought that Kejr’s suggestion should be recorded in the minutes, so that when special conventions relative to the general organization of common frontier stations were in preparation, it might clearly be shown that the railways committee of the conference had taken careful account of the question. Consequently, the committee adopted the article in the form in which it was proposed in the draft convention, which was then included in the final version approved by the second general Conference on Communications and Transit (Genoa, 1923). This account shows how complicated the issue of an international agreement on the electrification of international lines was. It was related to broader issues of the exploitation of hydroelectric power and nation-states’ freedom to decide on the best possible way to handle this in response to the local conditions and requirements, as well as strategic and economic purposes. However, this account also shows that in the years both when electric traction expanded on European railways and railway administrations were introducing further technical diversity by experimenting with and adopting different systems, the importance of international agreements for the use of electric power for international railway traffic was commonly recognized.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

Automatic Coupling and European Railways Even after years of kilometric expansion in railway networks, the railway systems were in constant flux.82 And while in the first years of their operation technical change in railway networks was oriented towards increasing network efficiency, later on, a variety of new factors influenced the direction of technical change. Among these factors were demands from customers for specialized services such as refrigerated vehicles, but also increased safety provisions for both workers and the travelling public.83 Often, though, technical change in this direction occurred on the initiative of governmental agencies and the increasing power of the labor movement. Mark Aldrich, for example, has discussed the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in implementing automatic signaling systems in the United States in the first decade of the 20th century.84 Usselman has also described the strong intervention of the government in promoting the implementation of safety appliances in the U.S. railways when railway administrations were more reluctant to install such costly technical devices in their networks.85 Here I discuss negotiations to establish an international agreement on the implementation of automatic couplers in the railways of Europe. The issue of automatic couplers is of interest for several reasons. In Europe, the issue of automatic couplers figured prominently in the agenda of many organizations since the second half of the nineteenth century. In particular, it appeared in the agenda of the International Railway Congress Association (1905), the conference of the technical unity in rail transport (1907) the International Labor Office (1923), the International Union of Railways (1926) and the Transit Organization (1924). The large-scale implementation of automatic couplers for both passenger and freight traffic occurred earlier in the USA than in any other country. Before the invention of the automatic coupler, railway vehicles were coupled together through human labor. The original couplers were eye bars or pieces of chain connecting the trains. Accidents that cost many lives gave rise to calls for legislation mandating the use of automatic brakes, couplers, and signals.86 The Master Car-Builders Association, 82  Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. 83  However, often, the actors that induced technical change were different. During the 1830s, in the USA, boiler explosions on steamboats had prompted some of the earliest state and federal legislation intended to remedy the negative consequences of the new technology. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 118. 84  Mark Aldrich, ‘Combating the Collision Horror: The Interstate Commerce Commission and Automatic Train Control, 1900-1939,’ T&C 34, no. 1 (1993): 49-77. 85  Usselman refers to the ’sluggish response to innovation in braking and signaling appeals,’ Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 273-4. 86  Ibid., 122.

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instituted in 1867 with a view to examining the question of automatic couplings, decided in 1887 in favor of adopting a system that after a series of trials had produced what they viewed as satisfactory results. Due to a delay in the application of this system, a movement started in favor of a Federal Act for the compulsory adoption of automatic couplings (Brake and Coupler Act). This made the use of automatic couplers compulsory from first January 1898.87 As was also the case with automatic brakes, in the USA most networks adopted automatic couplers on passenger trains only under intense pressure from customers and threats of legislation.88 By 1924 the system of automatic couplings was applied in all the railways in the USA, and the American appliance was also adopted by Canada and Mexico. In Europe, international bodies discussed the issue of the implementation of safe coupling systems in their railway networks before the outbreak of WWI. Realizing the immense importance of practical and safe coupling for traffic, the Verein had undertaken considerable work to improve coupling devices in the late nineteenth century for its member administrations.89 Railways adopted a pattern of central safety coupling, the application of which to all rolling stock was recommended by the Verein in 1882.90 At a national level, extensive experiments with automatic couplings began around the turn of the century. In Germany, for example, the system of automatic couplings was tried on about 800 freight cars on several lines in the North of the country, the majority of which were of narrow gauge in July 1913. In France, the first experiments took place in 1903. The French Government held a competition between various appliances in 1912. As a result of the experience gained with the successful coupling, the Chamber of Deputies voted for a loan of 8.000.000 francs to extend its application. The senate, however, did not pass this loan and it was consequently decided in the first half of 1914 that trials should be made to compare several types of coupling.91 While experimentation with automatic couplers had started early in the nineteenth century 87  ILO, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1924: 80.This period was extended on two occasions and eventually fixed at 1st January 1900. Ibid., 80. 88  Automatic air brakes and couplers which reduced dependence on brakemen in joining and stopping trains had become standard features in passenger service by the mid-1870s, while established suppliers stood ready and eager to see them placed upon freight equipment. Hand-operated brakes and couplers remained the norm in freight operations for more than another two decades until federal legislation mandated the change to automatic devices at the start of the twentieth century. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 273. 89  In 1874 the Verein appointed a special committee to consider alterations in couplings. The report of the labors of the special committee was published in 1877. 90  Lochner, ‘The Influence of the German Railway ‘Verein’ on the Construction and Equipment of Railway Rolling- Stock,’ Zeitungs- des Vereins 61 (1896): 437-440. 91  ILO, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Governing Body, 80.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

in different countries, it was widely recognized that synchronous implementation of automatic couplers by the railway administrations of different European networks was important so that the interoperability of the diverse railway networks would not be adversely affected. In 1905, the seventh session of the International Railway Congress Association (Washington) discussed the possibility of the extensive adoption of automatic couplings and in 1907 the issue appeared in the agenda of the third international conference for technical uniformity (Berne, 1907).92 Technically, during the years preceding the war, more than 2000 types of automatic couplings had been proposed.93 It was thought, however, that the tests made had not been sufficiently extensive and consequently it was considered that there was no automatic coupling then in use that met all the conditions necessary for large-scale application in the European railways. As a result, the conference decided to postpone a decision on the subject until one of the participating states was capable of presenting an advantageous coupling system.94

International Coordination After the war appeals from workers’ organizations proliferated for international regulation in Europe that would force the implementation of automatic couplers in the railways of all European countries.95 The railway workers argued that the implementation of coupling systems would significantly diminish the number of railway accidents.96 The system of coupling up vehicles employed on the railways, they argued, was a permanent danger to workmen, particularly in goods stations and sorting yards. Regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the shunter 92  Ibid., 82; ‘La conférence de Berne pour l’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ JT (1907): 268; ‘La conférence internationale pour l’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ JT 30 (1907): 590. 93  ILO, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Governing Body, 82. 94  The conference of the technical unity in Berne decided that the implementation of the automatic couplers that were used in the railway networks of the U.S.A. in the networks of Europe would present significant difficulties, regarding its application in the European chassis. ‘La conférence internationale pour l’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ JT 30, (1907): 590; ‘Standardisation on Continental Railways: l’unité technique des chemins de fer,’ RG 17, (1912): 596. 95  The Trade Union Conference at Berne (February 1919) discussing the demands of the workers to be submitted to the Peace Conference had requested that a common system of automatic coupling capable of being adapted to all railway freight cars would be introduced internationally in railway administrations within a period of five years. The issue was included in the agenda of other organizations, such as the IRCA (London, November 1920). In a debate in the course of which different systems of automatic coupling were examined, the IRCA adopted a resolution calling the attention of the different governments to the necessity of adopting all safety appliances in order to reduce the loss of life among railway employees. During the International Congress of Transport Workers, (Geneva, April 1921) a demonstration was given before the railway workers’ delegates at Geneva station of an appliance then being tied on the French State Railway System. As a result, the Congress unanimously passed a resolution calling for the general adoption of an appliance for automatic coupling on all railway systems. ILO, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Governing Body, 80. 96  Ibid., 79.

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frequently needed to pass between freight cars without waiting for them to come to rest, and once the coupling had been affected he had to pass under the buffers between the wheels, frequently when the freight cars were again in motion. In addition, the workers argued, the implementation of automatic couplers would have many other advantages that would result in the increased efficiency of the networks. With automatic coupling, a series of freight cars that till then were coupled one by one would be connected merely by the impact with one another. Rapid shunting would enable the time spent in clearing sorting yards to be shortened and this would bring a considerable saving of time. In addition, by avoiding delay in the delivery of goods, delay charges would be reduced. Further, the increase in the speed with which railway stock was moved about would bring a considerable improvement in the punctuality of trains, which would be an additional guarantee of safety for travelers. Finally a system of automatic coupling would allow rolling stock to be better utilized and facilities for the carriage of goods would be greatly augmented. The use of automatic couplings would also enable the frequent shocks which occurred with the current system to be lessened, and would largely reduce the damage caused to rolling stock and to goods, both of which generated heavy expense every year for the railway companies.97 Charles Schurch, the Swiss delegate put the matter forward during the fifth conference of the International Labor Office (1923). The ILO recognized that from an international point of view, it would be desirable for different countries or different systems to adopt the same type of automatic coupling especially in European countries where the transfer of rolling stock was already practiced on a large scale. The adoption of different types of automatic couplings would have a very adverse effect on the international use of rolling stock and to a certain extent would delay traffic. Even if different countries adopted a uniform type of coupling, if its adoption did not take place simultaneously, international railway traffic would be adversely affected until the rolling stock of the different countries was converted.98 Consequently, the fifth conference of the ILO requested that its governing body obtain information from governments and from international technical and industrial organizations on the question of automatic couplings in order to decide whether an international agreement on the matter was in the interest of the workers.99 At the same time, as a first step towards establishing an international agreement, it considered essential the centralization of statistics concerning accidents of which railway workers were the victims with a view to a 97  98  99 

Ibid. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 79.



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comparative study. It undertook a statistical survey on the accidents occurring in Europe in railways without automatic couplings. In this study ILO estimated that in the eleven European countries it dealt with in which automatic couplings were not in use, an average of 225 men were killed and between 4.500 and 9.000 men injured every year, 900 to 1.500 of whom very severely, in connection with coupling and uncoupling operations.100 In England where shunting risk was relatively small, the rate of fatal accidents nonetheless greatly surpassed that in mining, one of the most hazardous industrial occupations, while the rate of non-fatal accidents in shunting was equal to that in any other risky occupation except mining. In Germany the rate of accidents both fatal and non-fatal was by far greater than that among miners. Consequently, the study of the ILO concluded that the coupling operations were among the most dangerous of industrial occupations.101 In the meantime, ILO approached more specialized organizations to consider the issue from its practical and financial points of view. In 1924 the UIC placed the question on automatic couplings on the agenda of its Committee on Technical Questions (Florence, April 1924).102 The ILO estimated that international influence of the UIC could be exerted in two ways. First it could cause the adoption of direct agreements between systems or administrations in the different countries within the limits of competence of the administrations concerned. Second, members of the union could submit to their respective governments proposals drawn up by technical experts for measures that would require governmental action. A statistical report on the question was laid before the Committee on Technical Questions of the UIC at a meeting held at Munich in April and May 1925. The Committee did not however feel able to give a definite decision, but felt that the studies, which had been begun, should be continued. In the same year, the director of the ILO addressed a letter to the Transit Organization.103 It considered that should international government action prove to be practicable and necessary, it could only be effectively taken through the Transit Organization. The tenth session of the Transit Organization (1924) discussed the issue. The chairman of the committee, Sinigalia, pointed out that despite the 100  Ibid., 83. 101  ILO, Minutes of the 33rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva-October 1926, Automatic Couplings and the Safety of Railway Workers; Report on Statistics of Accidents due to Coupling and Uncoupling Operations, Geneva, 1924, 462-4. 102  The UIC undertook an enquiry among governments. With a view to preparing for the work of this Committee, it forwarded a questionnaire to the railway companies of all countries. ILO, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Governing Body, 82. 103  ‘Annex 2: Letter from the director of the ILO to the Secretary General of the League of Nations relating to the Automatic Coupling of Railways Rolling Stock, March 1924, 8’ in LoNP, Transit Organization, Minutes of the Sixth Session, held at Geneva on March 12th-14th, 1924. Doc No: C. 196. M 61. 1924 VIII.

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importance of the question, particularly from a humanitarian point of view, the technical studies had not yet proven what the most technical advantageous system was. He also stressed the great monetary expense that the adoption of such a system involved, and doubted its efficiency. He argued that even if automatic couplers were adopted in the railway networks of Europe all risk would not be eliminated for there would still be the question of connecting air brakes and heating-pipes. Schwob, the director-general of railways at the ministry of public works of France and member of the sub-committee of transport by rail of the Transit Organization, also pointed out that the experiments that were taking place in France were not yet completed. He also stressed that even if these experiments were successful, the financial difficulty would remain for the cost of installing an automatic coupling system was very high and complete agreement with neighboring states was an absolute necessity. Finally, while admitting that in the U.S. the establishment of an automatic coupling system had led to a decrease in the number of accidents, the chairman commented that the system previously in force in that country had not been perfect. He further drew the attention of the sub-committee to the fact, that during eight months of the year 1924, there had only been three fatal accidents in Italy resulting from manual coupling operations. It was finally decided that the question would be placed on the agenda of the railways sub-committee, and that in order to avoid any duplication of work during the period of technical investigation, the committee should maintain communication on this subject with the UIC.104 The Japanese representative, Mayeda, put forward the issue of automatic coupling once more during the 33rd session of the governing body of the ILO (1926). He requested that the question of automatic couplings be placed on the agenda of a future session of the ILO. In Japan automatic couplings had been installed on the entire state railways in 1925. Drawing on the experience of his country he argued that: ‘If we set aside the business aspect and consider the matter purely from the point of view of worker’s safety we can entertain no doubt as to the value of automatic couplings.’105 In Japan, after seven years of systematic preparation, he reported, automatic couplings had been installed on the entire state railways network all at one stroke in July 1925. The enterprise involved the expenditure of some 23.5 million yen. The 104  LoNP, Transit Organization, Minutes of the 10th Session, Geneva, 1927, off. no. C 242, M. 98, 1927, VIII, 9. 105  ILO, Minutes of the 33rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1926, 462.



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authorities, however, considered the investment a good one, for immediately after the installment of automatic couplings the number of accidents from coupling operations fell abruptly. He concluded: ‘The efficacy of automatic couplings for the safety of railway workers had been thus demonstrated conclusively through experiences in the various countries referred to.’106 Workers’ organizations also constantly directed appeals to the ILO to intervene to solve the issue. In January 1927 the International Transport Workers’ Federation adopted a resolution in which the Congress invited the competent authorities of the League to take the necessary steps for the protection of the railway workers. It urged affiliated organizations to take energetic action to secure the introduction of automatic coupling, to take the form, if necessary, of a joint action of an international character.107 Consequently, the ILO once more approached the UIC. The UIC, however, replied that the statistics relating to accidents with ordinary couplings and with automatic couplings respectively were not conclusive because they were not established on a strictly comparable basis. Before the question itself could be considered it was necessary to establish comparable statistics of the accidents occurring with the various methods of coupling. At that time, it was considering a draft indicating the basis on which statistics should be collected. However, it would have to be submitted to various committees of the union before being applied. Until the results of the statistics thus collected were known, the union would not feel itself able to consider the question of automatic couplings.108 Meanwhile, the director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, felt that no appreciable progress had been made in connection to the work of the UIC. ‘I fully realize the enormous obstacles which we have to overcome in order to arrive at an international accord in the matter of adopting automatic couplings in railways. It necessarily involves a large expenditure with no visible material return. From the point of view of business management the corresponding investment may very much more profitably be made 106  According to the report by Mayeda, the introduction of automatic couplings in the United States, decreased accidents during coupling operations between 70 to 60 per cent in the case of fatal accidents. In the case of non-fatal accidents, the figure was far greater than that among miners. A similar result was obtained through the adoption of automatic couplings in Canada. He concluded that coupling operations were thus among the most dangerous of industrial occupations. ILO, Minutes of the 33rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1926: 462-4. 107  ILO, Minutes of the 34th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1927, 76. The Third Congress of the International Federation of Christian Unions of Railwaymen also directed a similar resolution to the conference. Ibid., 77. 108  ILO, Minutes of the 33rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1926, 463-4.

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in other branches where the need for such an investment might be very urgently felt. Still, I am one of those who are convinced that the adoption of automatic couplings on an international scale will-to say nothing about its humanitarian value which is obvious- bring in the long run an ample reward for the initial expenditure it involves. This, however, is precisely the point which we shall have to examine when sufficient data has been collected.’109 He had requested the governing body of the ILO to authorize the office to make further inquiries into all phases of the question and to prepare and submit a report to the conference of the ILO in 1928. He further noted: ‘By so doing, I am sure, the governing body will help to throw light upon the immensely important question and afford the conference a real opportunity to examine and evaluate the importance of the problem thus presented.’110 After a decision of the governing body, the question of automatic coupling was placed on the agenda of the 1928 Conference. Before the conference, the Office once more requested that the UIC speed up its preliminary studies on the subject. On 15 November, the secretary general of the UIC, Leverve informed the Office that the Managing Committee had carefully considered the matter. It had been decided to set-up a sub-committee presided over by a representative of the German Railways, including also representatives from the Austrian, Belgian, French, Italian and Polish railways. This sub-committee would continue the study of accident statistics but would also consider the whole question of automatic coupling from the technical and financial point of view.111 The ILO conference in 1928 adopted a resolution requesting that the governing body appoint a joint committee of twenty-one persons representing the governments, employers and workers to study the issue using the information already obtained by the UIC. The conference also proposed that the UIC should be requested to pursue its inquiries and would communicate the results to the office as soon as possible, and in any case within the next two years.112 109  Ibid., 464. 110  ILO, Minutes of the 33rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva-October 1926, Note on Automatic Couplings, Submitted by Mr. Mayeda, 1926, 462-4. 111  ILO, Minutes of the 34th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva-January 1927, 104-5. 112  The International Transport Worker’s Federation and the director of the Swiss Federal Labor Office drew attention to the functions entrusted to the Swiss Federal Council in connection with the international consideration of technical questions relating to railways and requested the Governing body, in view of these functions to give Switzerland a seat of the future Committee.



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

Automatic Coupling Committee A fierce debate arose between the employers’ group and the workers’ group during the meeting of the governing body of the ILO in February 1928. The workers’ group insisted on the establishment of a committee at the earliest possible date. They argued that the work should be actively pursued so that a solution would be reached as soon as possible. Representatives of the workers expressed skepticism about the way the UIC was handling the issue. In the words of Jarrigion who represented the French Railwaymen’s Federation, the UIC did not seem to be in a great hurry to find a solution to the problem. They could not accept that the ILO would make its action dependent on the work of the UIC. Jouhaux stated that he was aware of the reasons that had so far prevented the UIC from arriving at a practical solution. ‘And there seemed to be no immediate prospect of these reasons ceasing to exist.’113 He urged that the committee proposed by the UIC should be set up as soon as possible’, so that progress should be made towards an international settlement of the question.’114 Schürch reminded the group of the constant efforts that had been made to speed up the work of the UIC on the question of automatic couplings. He noted that the workers group had protested at the conference against the ‘dilatory methods’ that some members had attempted to introduce into the discussion of the question. They had disputed the statement that several years would be needed to collect the necessary statistics. A new committee might well stimulate the UIC to greater effort while it could also exercise moral pressure on the UIC.115 Jouhaux commented on the numerous experiments that had been undertaken in many countries to perfect technical methods of automatic coupling. He pointed out that if each country settled the question nationally, it would no longer be possible to settle it internationally. Therefore it was important that the proposed committee be able to do useful work in the international sphere at once. The solution to the problem would have implications also with regard to transcontinental traffic. He called the attention to the fact that India was one of the countries considering the adoption of automatic couplings. Its railway system was probably the largest in the world after that of the United States. It was important that, before India came to a final decision, it should know of ILO’s decision and should have information on the systems in use in European countries. Sooner or later the railway systems of Asia would be linked up with those of Europe and the Asiatic countries therefore wanted to know what system of automatic coupling would be adopted in Europe. He accordingly asked the governing body to adopt the director’s suggestions and 113  114  115 

ILO, Minutes of the 34 2nd Session of the Governing Body, Warsaw, 1928, 499-500. Ibid. 499-500. Ibid., 501.

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establish a mixed committee as soon as possible.116 The employers’ group, on the other hand, argued that it would be premature to set up the committee at once. It argued for the importance of postponing the establishment of a committee until such time as the UIC had communicated the results of its study.117 In the words of Wolfe, ‘the safety of both passengers and employers was involved and important interests also had to be considered.’118 The UIC representative and chairman of the technical committee had said during the ILO conference that it would be some years before adequate statistics on the subject could be collected. In view of that statement, the committee had unanimously adopted the first two paragraphs of the resolution, which requested the UIC to carry on with its investigations as actively as possible and to communicate the results to the office within the next two years.119 Finally, the governing body instructed the director of the office to communicate to the UIC its decision to establish a mixed committee to study the question of the prevention of coupling accidents by the end of 1929, and to suggest that the Union should carry on its work as rapidly as possible so as to arrive at a definite solution.120 International associations of railway workers applauded this decision of the ILO. The Railway men’s section of the International Transport Workers’ Federation, representing over a million railway men, in a letter to the UIC (January 1929), declared itself in agreement with the decision of the ILO to constitute a committee to study the issue, noting that ’since the employers have already repeatedly shown their hostile attitude, the government delegates in the committee will have to act as arbitrators... as serious responsibility rests with the governments.’121 Similarly, the Swiss Federation of Railway workers sent a letter to the ILO expressing the desire of the railway workers to speed up the procedures to establish a committee for automatic couplers.122 In his reply, Leverve, the Secretary General 116  Ibid., 503-4. 117  Ibid., 499-500. 118  Ibid., 500. 119  Ibid. 120  Ibid., 21-28. 121  ‘ ... It has frequently happened in industrial history that Governments have had to overcome the employer’s resistance and adopt legislation to protect the working classes against occupational dangers that can be avoided. It is their duty to do this as regards automatic coupling.’ ILO, Minutes of the 43rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1929, Appendix XII, 154. 122  In their letter to the ILO they noted that in the past year there had been again a considerable number of fatal accidents in Switzerland due to the coupling and uncoupling of railway carriages. In its statement to the UIC, it was mentioned that ‘News was received yesterday of a further fatal accident in Basle due to the same cause. In view of these facts, we request you to inform the Governing Body of the ILO of the urgency which our Federation attributes that the Committee which the 11th session of the ILO decided in principle to set up to study the question of automatic coupling should be constituted without



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

of the Union (letter of 31st January 1929) informed the office that the UIC would not be called on to take any decision on the issue until the special committee set up to study the question of the introduction of automatic coupling had submitted proposals. In forwarding the letter to the governing body, the office informed it of the numerous urgent appeals which it had received from workers’ organizations asking that the setting up of the committee should be expedited. The director, Albert Thomas, pointed out that the attitude adopted by the UIC might cause considerable disappointment amongst the workers and therefore place the ILO in a somewhat embarrassing situation.123 Consequently, the governing body of the ILO, impatient with the way the UIC was handling the issue, proceeded to appoint the Committee on Automatic Coupling. The committee was a mixed body constituted by representatives of governments, workers and employees. Meanwhile, the Swiss government had called the directors’ attention to the fact that the Swiss federal council acted as an executive authority on all international agreements regarding railways reached by the various international conferences held between 1882 and 1912. It expressed the hope that the governing body would agree that the federal council should be represented on the joint committee. In addition, the Belgian, French and Japanese governments also informed the director that they were anxious to be represented on this committee.124 In the end, the governments of Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Poland, France Canada, Japan, and Switzerland were represented in the committee, along with nine members each from the employers’ group and the workers’ group.125 The committee on automatic couplings met for the first time in June 1930. It discussed the information that it had received from the UIC in the meantime. These were two documents drawn up by the union’s special committee at Locarno in October 1929, and approved by the managing committee. The first was a statement of provisional conditions that systems of automatic coupling should fulfill. Leverve stated in the UIC’s accompanying letter that in spite of the provisional character of these conditions, the committee thought them sufficient to allow administrations to judge whether coupling systems they intended to submit for examination were likely to be adopted by the UIC. The second laid out principles that automatic couplers should adhere to in order to be accepted for examination. delay (This does not make sense). The present system of coupling causes so many accidents every year that it is the moral duty of all those concerned to do everything in their power to put an end to the present state of affairs. We therefore hope and expect that the ILO will do its part in attaining the desired object by setting up the committee without delay. Ibid., 154. 123  ILO, Minutes of the 45th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1929, 339-40. 124  ILO, Minutes of the 46th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1929. 125  ILO, Minutes of the 49th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1930, 583

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These principles would enable the special committee of the UIC to establish a model scheme of tests and would allow administrations desiring to submit a coupling system to form an idea of the tests they should administer beforehand. However, Leverve further stated that: ‘In accordance with the decision of the Managing Committee, the UIC entirely reserved its opinion as regards the desirability of adopting automatic coupling until such time as the various aspects of the questions were fully studied, especially from the point of view of the safety of workers, the conditions of exploitation and the financial consequences.’126 Before deciding on the question, the mixed committee on automatic couplings decided to adjourn for six months to await the conclusions of the UIC’s statistical study on preventing coupling accidents.127 The second session of the committee was held in April 1931. The UIC was represented by its secretary general, Leverve, and by the chairman of its special committee on automatic coupling, Wiedemann (Germany). It submitted a note with eight appendices to the committee in which it presented the results of its statistical, technical and economic studies on the question of automatic coupling. According to the statistics of accidents compiled by the UIC for 1929, the proportion of employees killed varied quite considerably (from 0,045 to 2,28 per 10.000 employees) in the various countries. The number of fatal accidents per 10.000 employees for all European countries was 0,744 as compared with 0,62 in America. The latter figure approximately corresponded to the average for the European railways.128 The UIC concluded from this, first, that from the point of view of safety, the American system of automatic coupling was not markedly superior to the European system of screw coupling. Additionally, it was also concluded that the conditions under which the Japanese system worked were quite different, so that no reliable conclusions for European railways could be drawn from them. Secondly, simply from the point of view of accidents, it concluded that leaving aside the question of expense entirely, automatic coupling could not be contemplated unless an improved system was devised. Finally, it argued that the statistical investigations would have to be continued and enquiries should be made of the railway administrations that employed screw coupling in order to ascertain the causes of the great variations in the statistics of coupling accidents. It estimated that it would probably be possible to improve the situation considerably by developing the measures already taken 126  127  128 

ILO, Minutes of the 47th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1930, 257. ILO, Minutes of the 50th Session of the Governing Body, Brussels, 1930, 800. ILO, Minutes of the 52nd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1932, Appendix XIV, 404.



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by certain railway administrations in supervising and instructing employees. The workers’ group of the mixed committee criticized the conclusions of the UIC, both in the method employed in compiling the statistics and the way in which the UIC interpreted them. The Japanese government representative supplied information on railway operations in his country and argued that conditions on those railways did not differ essentially from those in Europe. The government and workers’ groups both asked Leverve and Wiedemann whether the UIC thought it would be possible to devise a more satisfactory system of automatic coupling than the American system and whether such a system, if introduced in Europe, would be of value from the point of view of safety. Both groups argued that the committee should state its opinion definitely on these two points. The UIC representatives replied that in their view, a system of automatic coupling fulfilling the conditions laid down by the UIC could be devised, and that railway workers could thus be protected against coupling and uncoupling accidents.129 The committee unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the adoption of a uniform and adequate system of automatic coupling in countries where screw coupling was in general use would contribute to the prevention of accidents and that it was technically feasible to devise such a coupling. It recommended that railway administrations construct new vehicles with a view to adapting them to automatic coupling as soon as the investigations of the UIC were sufficiently advanced. Finally, it was decided to set up a special sub-committee to closely follow the UIC’s further studies on the matter while requesting the UIC to continue its investigations and to keep this subcommittee and the representatives on the Conference on Technical Standards informed of the proposals made and allow them to be present at the tests.

International Fund The committee on automatic couplings had instructed the sub-committee to meet before the end of 1932 or as soon as the work of the UIC had reached a sufficiently advanced state.130 It met for the first time on February 1932. Two persons each from the government group, the employers’ group and the workers’ group constituted the sub-committee on automatic couplings. Both the UIC and the Transit Organization were represented in the sub-committee.131 When the sub-committee was appointed it had also been agreed that the ILO would ask the Conference 129  They further suggested that the UIC hoped in about a year’s time to be in a position to inform the railway administrations of the conditions as regards space etc. which should be provided on railway carriages in order to allow automatic coupling to be adopted later. Ibid., 405. 130  ILO, Minutes of the 57th Session of the Governing Body, Madrid, 1932, 404-405. 131  The UIC was represented by its secretary general Leverve (France) and the chairman of its special committee on automatic coupling, Wiedemann (Germany).

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Automatic Coupling ILO (1923)

UIC (1924)

Mixed-committee on automatic couplings (1929)

Committee on Automatic Couplings (1927) (France − president, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy)

(Governments of Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Poland, France Canada, Japan, Switzerland, 9 members of the employer’s group, 9 members of the worker’s group.) 1st meeting: June 1930 2nd meeting: April 1931 Sub-committee on automatic couplings (1931) Two persons for each group (governments’ group, employers’ group and workers’ group) 1st meeting: February 1932 (both the UIC and the OCT were represented) 2nd meeting: October 1932 3rd meeting: April 1936

on Technical Standardization to appoint two representatives; but, after negotiations with the Swiss Federal Council, which was the managing authority of the conference, the ILO found it ‘practically impossible’ to secure such appointments. The ILO instead accepted the proposal made by the Swiss Federal Railway department that the governments interested in the question should be given an opportunity to be present at the experiments made with automatic couplings. The UIC had in the meantime submitted a note, accompanied by seven appendices, to the sub-committee, describing the state of the studies that it had undertaken. This note stated that the number of vehicles to be equipped by administrations wishing to propose an automatic coupling had increased from about 180 in 1930 to 537. Further, it had decided that the special committee of the UIC would only examine



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

appliances that had already been tested by one of its member administrations and submitted by them, while no time limit was fixed for the submission of appliances. The workers’ group expressed the fear that the conditions fixed for the submission and testing of automatic couplings and ‘the economic and moral responsibilities involved’ might prevent the administrations from submitting and testing any appliance. They proposed that the UIC itself should make the practical tests with the best systems in use in order to be able to choose a standard appliance suitable for production in Europe as soon as possible. Furthermore, they put forward a new argument in favor of introducing the new coupling system. The introduction of automatic coupling would find work for a considerable number of unemployed, which militated in favor of the rapid application of the reform. In fact, the director of the ILO had already proposed undertaking large-scale international public works as a remedy for the unemployment problem in Europe in a memorandum to the newly established Committee of Enquiry for European Union. Among other works, he proposed: ‘The uniform and concerted substitution on all railways on the continent of Europe of a system of automatic coupling for the present system of screw coupling which still causes many fatal accidents every year. According to the calculations of experts, this undertaking, which is so desirable on humanitarian, economic, and even technical grounds would provide work for more than 600.000 men for five years.’132 The representatives of the UIC responded that the union was not in a position to undertake experiments on systems of automatic couplings since it possessed neither a railway system nor money for the purpose. Furthermore, it replied that in view of the technical and financial importance of the problem, the conditions set by the UIC could hardly be considered excessive. They recognized, however that practical tests would involve considerable expense. Consequently, the sub-committee found itself in a dilemma. To discharge its work and carry out experiments would require a sum between five and six million francs. The UIC was not able to supply this sum because it had no funds of its own. At this stage the director suggested the constitution of an international fund. The sub-committee considered then how the necessary money might be obtained. If progress were to be made, governments would need to contribute. If they refused, the proposed experiments could not be carried out. If it became necessary to apply to the railway authorities, the problem would become still more 132 

LoNP, CEEU, Unemployment, doc. no. C. 275. M. 127. 1931. VII, 2.

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complicated on account of the large number of these. Furthermore, many of them were in a very difficult financial situation. The sub-committee had decided that an appeal should be made to all European countries concerned.133 The experiments would be undertaken under the auspices of the UIC, with the participation of the members of the ILO sub-committee on automatic coupling and representatives of the governments interested in the question of technical standardization. Consequently, the sub-committee prepared a draft administrative agreement concerning the establishment and operation of an international fund for financing practical tests relating to automatic coupling. It proposed that the fund should be administered by a body of seven members, including three representatives of the governing body of the ILO, two representatives of the UIC, and two representatives of the governments that would contribute to the fund. The governing body was asked to approve the agreement. If approved by the governing body, the draft agreement would be submitted to the general assembly of the UIC, which would thus be able to take account of the fact that it had been approved in principle by the governing body. In addition, the sub-committee called on the UIC to study further an appliance described by the German employers’ representative, to look into the possibility of eliminating the transitional coupling, and to enquire of the member administrations of the Union whether they have undertaken or intend to undertake tests with coupling and the results of such tests.134 By 11 votes to 1, the governing body approved the conclusions of the report of the sub-committee. Jouhaux said that the sub-committee’s proposal on automatic coupling was worthy of consideration for two reasons: first of all because it was a reply to a demand of which the governing body had long being aware; and second, because if the experiments were conclusive, there would be an opportunity to carry out large-scale international public works which would help remedy unemployment. He added that when considering how to create a European economic system, it was certain that continuity in railway work would be one of the first conditions to be fulfilled. An important first step in this direction could be taken by the general adoption of automatic coupling on railways. The sub-committee on automatic coupling held its second meeting in October 1932. It discussed the final drafting of the draft administrative agreement on the creation and use of the international fund for financing practical experiments with systems of automatic coupling. The ILO had prepared the draft in accordance with the suggestion put forward by the sub-committee at its first meeting and approved by the governing body. Considering that states possessing an iron and 133  134 

ILO, Minutes of the 60th Session of the Governing Body, Madrid, 1932, 578. ILO, Minutes of the 57th Session of the Governing Body, Appendix XI, 170-1.



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steel industry would be more interested in the introduction of automatic coupling than other countries, the office in its draft suggested that only ten governments should be asked to assist in setting up the fund. The sub-committee decided that all European states should be asked to collaborate. The committee approved this decision and fixed the total amount of the fund at six million Swiss francs, which the governing body also approved.135 After the decision of the Committee on Automatic Coupling (October 1935), the sub-committee held its third session in April 1936 to examine the situation of the problem with a view to proposing means for carrying out practical tests of suitable coupling systems at the earliest possible date.136 The sub-committee considered the information collected by the ILO and produced a note providing a survey of the current state of the problem of automatic coupling. The note stated in the first place that the majority of the governments had refused to contribute towards an international fund for testing coupling systems. Only two governments had agreed to contribute to the fund. In the second place, it mentioned that tests had been begun in various countries on systems of automatic coupling that had already been put into operation on certain lines. Although there was a movement in favor of automatic coupling, no railway administration had so far submitted a type of coupling to the UIC, and therefore it had not yet been possible to carry out the tests provided for by the Union. The sub-committee accordingly suggested that the office should approach governments with a view to obtaining definite information concerning the appliances in use on the various lines and ascertaining whether these appliances would be submitted to the UIC. After a detailed discussion of the proposal and the method of collecting the information in question, the sub-committee decided that it would itself draw up the questionnaire to be sent to the governments concerned. Several speakers drew attention to the necessity of opposing the current tendency to adopt various systems of automatic coupling because it might impede the international settlement of the problem. Subsequently, the office asked the representatives of the large railway organizations to keep it informed about experiments with automatic coupling systems that were being carried out in certain countries. The information received, particularly from the UIC, showed that the information currently available was insufficient. 135  ILO, Minutes of the 60th Session of the Governing Body, Appendix XXV, 707-710. 136  Tzaut said that the agenda proposed for the meeting of the sub-committee was similar to that of the full committee at the meeting held in February 1931. The committee had at that time been unable to achieve positive results because comparative tests of coupling systems were necessary and this involved considerable expense. The sub-committee had drawn up a financial program involving contributions from states. Since October 1932, only one government, that of Italy, had agreed without reservation to contribute to the fund. ILO, Minutes of the 73rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1935, 393.

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The sub-committee therefore considered that it would be useless to continue its work if it was impossible to obtain exact information with regard to the present position. It was necessary to know what results had been obtained from the various automatic coupling systems which had been tried in different countries, and why these countries had not submitted the systems to the UIC for international testing. The sub-committee accordingly expressed the hope that the governing body would instruct the office to send a questionnaire to the various railway administrations asking for the necessary information. When this information had been received, the sub-committee would be able to meet again with the representatives of the UIC with a view to arriving at practical suggestions. The governing body approved the record of the meeting of the sub-committee on automatic coupling. During the discussions, however, Yoshisaka, representative of the Japanese Government, observed that according to a UIC note containing the results of statistical research carried out between 1929 and 1933, the American coupling system had not succeeded in preventing all accidents. Experiments carried out in Japan in this connection, however, had been entirely satisfactory. Before 1925 there had been an average of approximately 200 coupling accidents annually, but since the introduction of automatic coupling, this number had been reduced to only 13 accidents in 1932. Research was being continued with a view to improving the coupling system that was already in place. New apparatus had been adapted to new railway rolling stock, and very considerable improvements had been made in coupling all the connections for steam, electricity and compressed air. In addition, the UIC’s report stated that no railway company had so far submitted a satisfactory type of coupling system, and it had therefore not been possible to carry out the proposed experiments. Yoshisaka stated that the Japanese Government would be glad to welcome an expert from the Union who could see how the apparatus used in Japan worked and make experiments with it himself. It was agreed that the questionnaire attached to the record would be sent to the Governments of European countries as well as to the governments of non-European countries principally concerned.137 In 1938 the director suggested that the governing body should not reappoint the members of this committee, but should consider that it had ceased to exist. The governing body approved this proposal.138

137  138 

ILO, Minutes of the 76th Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 1936, 30-1. ILO, Minutes of the 85th Session of the Governing Body, London, 1938, 53.



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Conclusion Railway historiography has argued that achieving compatibility in the field of services and administration of railways has been historically less difficult than achieving technical standardization.139 This chapter shows indeed that international cooperation in the field of the software of railways was easier to achieve than in the field of hardware.140 Indeed, as the first part of this chapter shows, international railway traffic was well developed in the inter-war years. By contrast, railway administrations experimented with new technologies independently, which resulted in further diversity in technical parameters where international agreements had not yet been achieved. This was often the case with new technologies for which each railway network undertook research independently to address the requirements of national railway systems through the development and implementation of new technologies. In both the case of electricity and automatic couplers, the efforts to establish an international agreement show that early on, when the introduction of these relatively new technologies was taking place in the railways of Europe, different actors attempted to mobilize international organizations so that international understandings could be reached. In the case of electricity improving the network’s international efficiency was the basic argument for establishing an international agreement; in the case of the automatic couplers the basic consideration was the safety of workers. Neither of these efforts achieved its desired effect. In the case of electrification, the unwillingness of nation states to compromise their power to manage resources was one of the main reasons most of the delegates opposed the introduction of an article on the electrification of railways to the convention on the international regime of railways. Furthermore, the discussions at Barcelona and the report by Bignami show how complicated the establishment of an international agreement was. It touched upon the broader issue of the exploitation of hydraulic power near frontiers and the cession of electric power. As such it was closely related to national interests and the desire of governments to use electrification for their own economic purposes and foreign policy agendas. The establishment of a committee to study issues relating to the establishment of international 139  Puffert notes that ‘in general, it has been much more costly and difficult to standardize technical practices than to coordinate administrative practices. Technical practices are often embodied in durable hardware that can be converted only at a substantial cost. In several historical cases, such as that of Spain’s broad track gauge, countries have found the cost of conversion to be prohibitive Puffert, ‘The Technical Integration,’ 129. 140  By the term software, I refer to the regulation and administration of the railway network; by hardware, I refer to the technical aspects of standardizing the network.

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agreements for exploiting common resources and exchanging electric power point to the fact that the importance of establishing an international agreement on the issue was commonly recognized. It also indicates how the consideration of improving railway traffic opened up the field for cooperation in other fields. In the case of automatic couplers, however, the main argument in favor of establishing an international agreement was the improvement of workers’ safety. The establishment of an international agreement would prevent the implementation of different devices from adversely affecting the interoperability of the network. In both cases, individual railway administrations continued to experiment with different technologies, since, as Puffert has argued in the case of electricity, there was no commonly accepted optimal technique. Looking at the two cases, it appears that the lack of an optimal technique does not sufficiently explain the failure to come to an international agreement on the standardization of these technologies. The case of the automatic couplers shows that the group of workers and railway administrations valued the importance of the international agreement on the subject differently. Railway administrations disputed the efficacy of automatic couplers in reducing accidents and were unwilling to undertake the cost of implementing the new technology. In contrast, the workers insisted that implementing the new technology was important for increasing safety. Railway administrations argued that implementing automatic couplers was not a rational choice since the outcome was not proven and thus would not justify the expenditure concerned. Usselman has argued in his book Regulating Railway Innovation that technological innovation in the fields of railways always contained uncertainty. Looking at the implementation of new technologies in the railways of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, he argues that: ‘Efforts to channel technical change and reshape railroad innovation, while influenced always by various economic incentives, seldom boiled down simply to making rational choices grounded strictly in hard economic data. Innovation by its nature involves uncertainty... No one could say with absolute certainty that the selection of one technology over another or the decision to pursue some lines of innovation while neglecting others led to optimal or even preferred outcomes. This was especially true in railroading because the various components of the technical ensemble interacted to form an immensely complex system, one that included not only many coupled artifacts, but also numerous routines and bodies of



4. European Integration, European Fragmentation

acquired expertise. Changes in one area could easily wreak havoc in unanticipated places.’141 The negotiations reveal a much deeper dispute over the willingness of railway administrations to undertake costs and implement new technologies that would be directed not towards increasing the efficiency of the networks, as had normally been their main goal, but rather increasing the safety of the workers. In the United States, federal legislation had been crucial in providing an incentive for such improvements. In the case of the international agreement on the subject in Europe, when the two groups came to an agreement on establishing a committee to undertake studies on the most appropriate device, governments were unwilling to provide the necessary funds for testing technologies. Furthermore, as the first part of this chapter shows, international passenger traffic thrived in the inter-war years, so it seems legitimate to suggest that railway administrations were not willing to undertake more expenditure to implement new technologies that did not promise increase revenue or reduction of costs. They focused their efforts however on improving the operation of their networks at a local level, where they suffered most from competition from road traffic. Consequently, both cases show the limitations to the internationalization of railways in the inter-war years. Internationalization was not above the interests of the nation-state. Once more, as the case of the electricity shows, steps toward internationalization were not undertaken when they threatened national sovereignty. As the case of the automatic couplers shows, the economic interests of the nationstates and of individual railway administrations were always prevalent. However, both cases were successful in mobilizing international railway organizations to engage in discussions. In the case of electrification, the movement toward internationalization led to the establishment of a committee that would study for the first time how to reach an international agreement on the production and exchange of electric power. Furthermore, an article was introduced to the convention on the international regime of railways recognizing the importance of international cooperation in the exchange of electric power for the electrification of railways of international concern. In the case of the automatic couplers, the mobilization of international machinery and the constitution of an international committee that included representatives from governments, railway administrations and workers, shows the increased power of the ILO to participate in discussions about the 141  ‘Neither railroads nor their critics and overseers could escape that fundamental truth. Try as they might, they could not anticipate every eventuality and comprehend in advance the full effects of their choices regarding technologies,’ Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

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shape of European railways. As such, the case of automatic coupling shows how the range of actors discussing the shape of railways in Europe was broadened in the inter-war years.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

Internationalism within Nation State In this fifth chapter, I focus my analysis within a single nation-state. As I mentioned in the introduction, historiography on the internationalization of railways usually assumes that national considerations preceded international ones in the development of the railway networks. In this chapter, I investigate to what degree international considerations formed part of the negotiations on the shape of railways within a national context, and eventually influenced the shape of national railway networks. The consequence of such an argument is that the internationalization of railways actually often started within the nation state. Historiographically, I argue here that the study of the configuration and development of national railway networks within the context of general European developments does shed light on the role of railways as a means of integrating regions, nations and transnational alliances within Europe. National and international were not always two conflicting spheres of interest. Instead, looking at national developments allows us to observe that often the integrating role of railways in a national sphere was closely related to ideas and visions for integrating nations into broader transnational alliances. I have chosen to look at the case of Greece. The case of Greece is interesting for several reasons. First because Greece in the nineteenth century, due to its geographical position being geographically situated further away from the AustroHungarian Empire than the rest of the Balkan Countries provided a space where nascent nineteenth century transnational alliances competed in terms of their access to the East. After WWI, when the Greek territory expanded, many Greek engineers proposed plans for the completion of the Greek railroad network, attempting to position the country on the ‘proposed’ and internationally debated southern international railway artery. Consequently, the case of Greece allows us to see how the international projects earlier discussed in this book were received within the national context. Secondly, the case of Greece also allows us to examine how the construction of the modern nation state coincided with projects for the construction of railway arteries that not only would better integrate the different

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regions of the country, but also better integrate the country with international traffic of commerce. Consequently, in this chapter I am exploring the ‘tension’ between national and international considerations in a number of instances: firstly, when the early proposals for the construction of a Greek railway network were put forward; secondly, during the discussions on the choice of the gauge for the Greek railway network; thirdly, in the history of the line that was to form the railway axis of the country, the line that would connect the capital of Greece, Athens, to the northern borders. Finally, I am looking at interwar railway policy of Greece. Historiographically, I extend my analysis to study modifications in the existing railway configurations after the initial stage of expansion had been fulfilled, as well as railway visions shaped by diverse political and economic concerns.1

Tensions between National and International, 1821–1914 Two periods can be discerned in the history of the Greek railways. The first is from the formation of the Greek state (1821) up to the 1922. These were the years in which Greece was constantly fighting to expand its territory, which it regarded as crucial for its wellbeing and survival. Throughout the nineteenth century and up to the 1922 military fiasco in Asia Minor, the driving force of state policy was irredentism (namely the ambition of Greeks to rebuild the older Greek territories into a State).2 The Greek state was established as an independent state in 1829 with the treaty of Adrianopolis (Edirne). Motivated by an intellectual movement that is known as the ‘Greek Enlightenment,’ the Greek war for independence started in 1821 and lasted until 1827. With the treaty of Adrianopolis, signed by Turkey and Russia in 1829 (following Turkey’s defeat in the war between these two countries) Greece was recognized as an independent state. The modern Greek state was firmly established in 1830, when a protocol recognizing it as such was signed by the three major powers of the time − France, England, and Russia − in London. Going back to the first years of the war of independence the pursuit of ‘Greater Greece’ − meaning a Greece that would expand so as to include all the parts of 1  Tympas and Anastasiadou make this methodological suggestion in their article. See Aristotle Tympas and Irene Anastasiadou, ‘Constructing Balkan Europe: the Modern Greek Pursuit of an ‘Iron Egnatia,’’ in Networking Europe; Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, ed. Erik van de Vleuten, and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006), 26-7. 2  Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, ‘Phantom Rails and Roads: Land Transport Public Works in Greece during the 1920s,’ JTH 19, no. 1 (1998): 33-49, 35; Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 46-99.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

the Balkans and Asia Minor where Greek-speaking populations happened to live − became the defining ideology of the Greek ruling class, formed by ship owners and merchant capitalists. The ideology of ‘Greater Greece’ defined the political and economic endeavors of the new state for no less than a century (1821-1922). During this turbulent century, the Greek borders changed constantly, stabilizing only after 1922, when the Greek army was defeated in Asia Minor.3 In terms of railway developments, these were years of quantitative expansion in the Greek railway network. It was in these years that the majority of the railway network was built. The second period covers the years from the end of the Balkan Wars until the outbreak of WWII. In these years, the territory of Greece had expanded. The stabilization of the political borders that followed the Greco-Turkish war in Asia Minor (1922) was followed by massive exchanges of population. Approximately 1.100.000 Greeks moved to Greece as a consequence of the ‘catastrophe,’ as the Asia Minor disaster came to be known, and of the exchange of populations that followed it. Respectively, approximately 380.000 Muslims were transferred to Turkey. In addition, there were approximately 100.000 Greek refugees from revolutionary Russia and from Bulgaria.4 As a result of the large-scale exchanges of population, Greece became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the Balkans.5 In internal affairs, these were years of political instability. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s military and democratic governments rotated into power.6 As far as developments on the railway network are concerned, these were years of qualitative changes. Greek governments concentrated their efforts on upgrading the capacity of parts of the railway network while attempting to construct more lines that would better integrate the new provinces of Greece to the rest of the country, although this would eventually fail.

3  For overviews of the history of Modern Greece that are sensitive to economic phenomena, see Νίκος Γ. Σβορώνος, Επισκόπηση της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας [A review of modern Greek history] (Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο); Γιώργος, Μιλιός, Ο Ελληνικός Κοινωνικός Σχηματισμός [The Greek social formation], (Κριτική: Αθήνα, 2000). As these and other authors have shown, the record of industrialization after the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ is impressive. Between 1921 and 1931, industrial production was increased by 80%. Between 1920 and 1929 the number of industrial firms grew by 82%; between 1920 and 1940 by 25%. In addition, between 1928 and 1938, industrial production increased by 68%. Of particular note is that during this period, the Greek economy was second only to that of the Soviet Union (87%) and Japan (73%) in terms of rate of growth. Irene Anastasiadou and Aristotle Tympas, ‘On Studying the History of Greek Technological Networks’ (Paper presented at the ICOHTEC Conference, Granada, 2002), 1. 4 Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 101. 5  However, the issue of the small Muslim (predominately Turkish), Slav, Macedonian, Vlach and Albanian minorities was to remain sensitive. Ibid.,106. 6  Ibid., 101-143.

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Transport and the New Greek Nation State For most of the nineteenth century, inland transportation in Greece was limited. Before the construction of the first railroad line in 1869, the only means of overland transport was by pack animals and carriages.7 To a large extent, the naval transportation network satisfied transportation needs.8 It was not until the 1890s that an elementary network of roads was built. Funded by the state, work on the construction of roads started in the early 1880s and lasted until 1892. By 1893, the Greek state was bankrupt and work was limited to the maintenance of the network built up to that date.9 By then, the territory of the Greek state had already changed substantially. In the year 1864 the Ionian Islands were added, followed by Thessaly in 1881. Transportation by sea had been the dominant mode of transportation since the second half of the nineteenth century. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Greek vessels were used for most communication between the different parts of the country and with the rest of the world. The geography of the country, with natural ports available on many islands and other key coastal points on the mainland, favored the spontaneous development of a network of natural ports. In the early 1850s, some municipalities undertook work on the artificial improvement and enlargement of their ports. According to Maria Sinarelli, the port network became especially important after the 1880s, when there was a marked increase in internal trade.10 Railway Construction in the Balkans Before WWI the construction of the great railway axes in the Balkans was determined by the politics of the Great Powers, who aimed to connect Western and Central Europe to the Middle East by securing both the junction to the railways of Asiatic Turkey and the great Balkan ports situated in the Aegean, Adriatic, and Black seas. Such politics also sought to reinforce the economic and political domination of the big European states in the Balkans. Because of its double position as a great power and holder of territories in the region, the Austro-Hungarian Empire played the most important role. On their side, Balkan states wanted to construct their railways in response to their own economic needs and their national politics.11 7  Νίκος Σ. Κτενιάδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railways in Greece] (Η. Καλέργης, 1936), 4. 8  Μαρία Συναρέλλη, Δρόμοι και Λιμάνια στην Ελλάδα [Roads and ports in Greece] (Cultural Foundation of the Greek Bank of Industrial Development, 1989), 19-112. 9 Ibid. 10  Ibid., 113-201. 11  Discussing the formation of the Balkan railway network, Alexandre Kostov notes that before WWI, the construction of big axes in the Balkans was determined by the politics of the Great western powers. These had as their object to connect western and central Europe to the Middle East by securing the junc-



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

Since the signing of the treaty of commerce of 1862 between Prussia and Turkey, under the name of Zollverein, the German politics adhered to the constitution in southern-eastern Europe of a market for its products. In order to escape from the French-English competition, primarily active from the Mediterranean and Austrian ports (through the Danube), Germany tried to develop a railway system oriented from the north towards the south that she would control.12 Indeed, the German interest in the railways of the East, and more specifically of the Ottoman Empire, triggered reactions within Britain. Charles Sarollea (1870-1953) was a political writer and French scholar.13 In a booklet published at the beginning of the 20th century, he attempted to alert British interest to what he considered as the expansionist tendency of Germany in the Balkans and the Middle East. The interest of Germany in the railway affairs of European as well as Asiatic Turkey, Sarolea argued, related to the German Drang nach Osten, or aspiration for eastward expansion. Germany, he argued, aimed to attract the transit traffic of Europe: ‘Pangermanists have been looking towards every part of the horizon. They have first looked to the north and north-west, and reflected that the Rhine ought to belong to the Fatherland; that Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp are the natural outlets; that Denmark, Holland and Flemish Belgium are the outposts of Germany for the transit commerce of Europe, and that all these outposts ought to be included either in an economic ‘Zollverein’ or in a political confederation... Biding her time and following the line of least resistance, Germany for the last twenty years has therefore been growing more and more steadily towards the south and towards the east. Towards the south she sees two decaying empires, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which seem to be a natural prey for her commercial and political ambitions: two conglomerates of hostile races which are waiting for a master. Towards the east she sees a huge and rich territory that is the one great country still left unoccupied and undeveloped. On these three empires, Germany has set her heart, and with the spirit of method and tion to the railways of Asiatic Turkey and with the great Balkan ports situated in the three seas- Black, Aegean, and Adriatic. This politics had as a goal to secure the economic and political domination of the European states to the Balkans. Due to its double position as a great power and due to the area that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire possessed, it played a very important role in the development of the railway networks in the Balkans. On their side, the Balkan States wanted to construct their railways conforming to the needs of their own economy and their own national politics. Alexander Kostov, ‘Les Balkans et le réseau ferroviaire européen avant 1914,’ 96. Also Frederick Barbier, ‘Entre les réseaux? La péninsule Balkanique revisitée,’ in Les entreprises et leurs réseaux: Hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs, 19.-20, ed. Michèle Merger and Dominique Barjot (Paris: Presses Paris Sorbonne, 1998): 301-2. 12  Ibid., 302. 13  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, http: // www. oxforddnb.com/ index/ 101066974/.

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determination which characterizes her, she has set to work.'14 In the Balkans, the first railway lines were constructed in the decade of the 1860s, while the great kilometric expansion of the network took place in 1880.15

First Railways Projects, 1830-1869 In parallel to these developments in the Balkans, foreign capitalists and engineers put forward the first proposals for the construction of a railway network in Greece.16 After the Crimean war (1853-1856), numerous scenarios for constructing railways appeared. These were the years in which foreign experts and groups of capitalists, especially English and French bankers, began to expand their activities beyond the borders of their own countries in search of additional profit.17 Many of these early proposals included scenarios for railways that would connect Greece to the European railway network and thus situate the country within international flows of traffic. Here I discuss two such scenarios, both of which were regarded as holistic projects to create a national railway network. Both received favorable comments in the press and were discussed in the Greek parliament.18 However, in their positioning Greece in relation to different international transportation routes, these plans also hint at how the territory of Greece became an area where international interests competed for influence. 14  Charles Sarolea, The Baghdad Railway and German Expansion as a Factor in European Politics (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1907), 8, 9. 15  Barbier, ‘Entre les réseaux,’ 308; Kostov, ‘Les Balkans et le réseau ferroviaire européen avant 1914,’ in B8: European Networks, 19th-20th Centuries: New Approaches to the Formation of a Transnational Transport and Communications System, ed. Andrea Giuntini, Michèle Merger and Albert Carreras (Milano: Università Bocconi, 1994), 27. The first line was built in 1860. During the decade 1880-90 27.7 % of the total length of the network was constructed. During the following two decades the construction rate was decreased. Ibid., 27. 16  The discussions on the introduction of a railroad technology in the newly created Greek state began in 1835 when the Frenchman Franchiskos Feraldis proposed a railroad line that would connect Athens to Piraeus. Λευτέρης Παπαγιαννάκηs, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι, 1882-1910 [Greek railways] (Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, 1990), 47-52. 17  Such were Pereire, Rothschild, Mires, Brassey, Peto, Betts, Baring, Glyn, Devaux, Hirsh. Ibid., 52. 18  Feraldis submitted the first proposal for the construction of railways in Greece in 1835. Al. Ragkavi proposed another railway line in 1843. The state took interest in the railroad policy in 1855 after the submission of the first bill for the construction of railways from Athens to Piraeus at the time when Maurokordatos was in power. In 1859 the British Company Liders proposed the construction of the line Piraeus-Athens-Northern Borders. The proposed line would cross areas of the Ottoman Empire and reach Sofia. Greek populations living abroad developed a great interest in the establishment and development of the Greek railways. Πρόδρομος Ματζαρίδης, Συνοπτικό Ιστορικό των Eλληνικών Σιδηροδρόμων [A brief account of the history of Greek railways], 16- 17. In 1868 Louis de Normand proposed a plan on behalf of a group of capitalists for the construction of three lines, Sounio-Athens-northern borders, Laconic GulfTripoli-Corinth and a line that would extend from Amvrakikos Gulf and connect to the first line close to Lamia. The plan also included a maritime route to the Italian railways in Bridinsi. However, the returns that the group requested for the completion of the work within seven years were evaluated as unreasonable. Παπαγιαννάκης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι [Greek railways], 54.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

In July 1869, Philippe Vitali (1830-1910) submitted a proposal to the Greek parliament for a railway line that would cross Greece from east to west. Contemporary sources observed that of all the projects that were proposed in Greece up to 1872 for the construction of railways, the bizarre project of Vitali had attracted the greatest interest.19 Vitali was one of the most famous engineers at the time due to the construction of the Calabria-Sicily railway in Southern Italy.20 He was also engaged in projects for building railway lines in the Balkans. He submitted his project to the Greek parliament in August 1869 after conducting extensive local studies. He proposed a railway that would bring Athens into direct connection with Bridinsi (in 26 hours). Vitali argued that Bridinsi, at the time an abandoned port, used to be one of the most important ports of ancient Rome. It was the terminal port of the Roman Egnatia road that led from southern Italy to the east. The proposed railway line would connect the Greek railways to Italy through Bridinsi and from there to western Europe, constituting part of a larger route towards Asia and placing Athens at the centre of the route. Piraeus would become a significant port and industrial station of this route while Athens would be transformed into one of the most important points of commerce and civilization.21 The railway line that he proposed would follow a route of 305 km and would necessitate important technical works including the construction of four tunnels and the clearance of the grounds from which the line would pass.22 Apart from incorporating Greece into an international commercial route, Vitali argued that the development of agriculture and industry of Greece would also benefit greatly from this railway line.23 In addition, the ethos of the inhabitants would be tamed and the natural resources of the country would be transported easily and rapidly to be sold in Europe.24 The realization of the project would require a great deal of expenditure, however, due to the extensive engineering works that would be required. The project, nevertheless, was not realized, mainly due to 19 Κτενιάδης Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railways in Greece], 10. 20  Vitali was the founder of the Régie générale pour la construction et l´exploitation des chemins de fer serbes (1855). In 1855, the Régie obtained the concession of the Serbian railways, and later on, in 1892, of the line Thessalonica-Constantinople. This company constituted a great enterprise of public works that constructed numerous and important railway connections in Europe. Dominique Barjot, ‘La mise en place des infrastructures Européens de transport. Le rôle des entreprises françaises de travaux publics (18571914),’ in B8, European Networks, 15. 21 Κτενίάδης Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railways in Greece], 12. 22  Ibid., 12-3. 23  He argued that ‘if twenty years earlier Greece could have turned the money that she spent on the extinction of banditry toward the construction of railways, tightening her boundaries from East to West, the banditry would have been extinct from the country.’ Κτενίαδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι, [The first railways in Greece], 11, citing from M. Vitali, Préliminaires d’ un projet de chemin de fer d’ Athènes à Adriatique Mémoire (Paris, le 13 Aout 1869). 24 Κτενιάδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railways in Greece], 10-11.

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these costs.25 The contemporary press spoke favorably of the project. An Athenian journal commented that the importance of roads for developing the agriculture and industry of the country and improving safety, as well as the commercial and general interest of the country, necessitated the establishment of a railway connection to Western Europe via Bridinsi, as Vitali had suggested.26 While Vitali’s project was rejected, it attracted a great deal of attention and it became ‘the talk of the day.'27 Commenting on the project, an anonymous reporter of the Greek newspaper Aion noted: ‘Today Greece is isolated from the rest of Europe, from the perspective of fast, short and easy communication, and from the equally important perspective of common economic interests. With the construction of this new railway, Greece would constitute a part of Europe in reality and not only in name.'28

On the left Figure 5.1– Vitalis’ plan for the construction of the line Athens–Vonitsa. Source: Ν. Κτενιάδηςς, ‘Οι Πρώτοι Σιδηρόδρομοι εν Ελλάδι,’ ‘Εργα 5 (1932): 928. On the right Figure 5.2– political map of Europe in 1871. Source: Woodroffe, The New Penguin Atlas of Recent History, (London: Penguin, 2002), 37.

25  The government of Zaimi examined the project but decided that it would not be unfeasible to construct the proposed line as it would be impossible to find the necessary capital for its construction from within the country. On the other hand, it would be unprofitable to concede the right of the exploitation of the line to a foreign company since the expenditure for the construction of the line would be very high. Ν. Κτενιάδης, ‘Οι πρώτοι σιδηρόδρομοι εν Ελλάδι’ [The first railways in Greece], in ‘Εργα 5 (1932): 930. 26  Κτενιάδης, ‘Οι πρώτοι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδροµοι’ [The first railways in Greece], 14. 27 Ibid. 28  Αιών, no. 2484, year ΑΔ, 8 September 1869.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

In his book On the European Importance of the System of Austro-Hungarian railways (1868), Hahn, Austrian ambassador in Syros, proposed connecting Greece to the network of Western Europe through the Balkans as a more advantageous option.29 In one of his books, extracts of which appeared in most Athenian journals, he compared three scenarios for connecting Greece to Europe.30 Discussing the first scenario for creating a railway connection of Greece to Western Europe through Italy (through the port of Bridinsi, as Vitali had also suggested), Hahn argued that such a line, due to the extensive costs of construction and the necessary crossing of the Adriatic Sea, would have difficulty competing commercially with the land routes.31 Furthermore, he argued that the profit from this line would be insignificant, because the mountainous areas through which such a line would pass were sparsely populated and did not export any products. A second scenario included the connection of Piraeus to the railway network of central Europe through a line that would cross Albanian and Dalmatian territory. Comparing the routes from London to Piraeus through Vienna and from London to Piraeus through Trieste, he argued that the passage through Trieste would take significantly longer, particularly in the winter, because of its curvature in the Alps and the configuration of the ground through which the line would pass. The line through Trieste, however, did present significant advantages. Such a line would facilitate international commerce to the benefit of not only Trieste, the most important port of Austria-Hungary but also of the rest of the ports of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Also, from a military point of view, such a line would be of great importance since there was a railway on the neighboring coast of Italy. However, as far as the Austro-Hungarian railways were concerned, such a line would be peripheral since it would pass through neither Vienna nor Budapest. On the other hand, the profits of this line would be negligible, since it would cross-areas with no exports for the most part, and from Durres onwards, would face competition from sea traffic. Consequently, Hahn argued, such a railway would be important only as a fast commercial line. A third 29  Hahn had made a career in the judiciary of Greece during the first years of the reign of Othon. Later on he was employed at the service of the Austrian government. He served as an ambassador of Austria, first in Ioannina and afterwards in Syros. He had travelled around Greece and according to Kteniadis, was well aware of the transportation needs of the country. Κτενιάδης, ‘Οι πρώτοι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδροµοι,’ [The first railways in Greece], 21. 30  Some of the titles of his book were Αλβανικές μελέτες, περιοδεία από Βελιγραδείου εις Θεσσαλονίκη [Albanian studies, a tour from Belgrade to Thessalonica]. Κτενιάδης, ‘Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι’ [The first railways in Greece], 21. 31  Such a line from Bridinsi would cross the Adriatic Sea and follow the southern coast of Akarnania, the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf and through the valleys of Parnassos and Thebes would reach Piraeus.

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scenario included the construction of a line that would cross Macedonia and extend through Budapest and Vienna up to London. The construction of such a line, Hahn argued, presented significant advantages that rendered its construction more advantageous in comparison to the other two lines. First, the Hungarian section of the line was already finished and had reached the banks of the Danube.32 A second advantage of this northern line would be that its Serbian part, from the Austrian borders up to Nish (25 miles approximately), would constitute part of the line Vienna to Constantinople. Finally, this line would unite the Austrian-Hungarian railways with the port of Thessalonica, the most important port in the Aegean Sea. In addition, Hahn argued that considering the volume of the population living there and the geography of the countries that the line would be passing through, the profits from the line would be reasonable. Besides, when the line reached Thessalonica, it might be possible to compete with Bridinsi for the commerce of Alexandria since the maritime route from Alexandria to Thessalonica would be 150 miles shorter than the route from Bridinsi. However, as Hahn pointed out, Thessalonica was further away from London, the most important centre of global commerce. The real advantage of the Thessalonica to London line would be thus only 18 up to 24 miles, or 3 to 4 hours. Consequently, it was disputable whether commerce from London would abandon the line through Bridinsi to follow the route through Thessalonica. Such a shift in favor of the new line could be ensured, Hahn argued, only when the line reached the port of Piraeus. Hahn’s book was favorably received in Austria and this led to the increase of his status in Greece.33

32  Consequently, in the case of the northern line the contractors would have had to construct 40 miles less than in the case of the western line. 33  Κτενιάδης, ‘Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι’ [The first railways in Greece], 25.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

The Gauge War, 1881-1882

Figure 5.3– Political Map of Greece in the Second Half of the 19th Century Source: Mazower, The Balkans (New York, The Modern Library, 2002), xx.

As I discussed in earlier chapters, the gauge of the line was one of the technical parameters crucial for achieving technical interoperability of railway networks in Europe. According to railway historiography, most countries of Western and Eastern Europe adopted a common gauge as a result of a process of technological diffusion. In particular, Belgium, the first country to develop a national plan for state railways, adopted Stephenson’s practices as the ‘best practice’ in locomotive construction, civil engineering works and gauge of track. Thus the early continental railway projects relied heavily on British experience, often directly through the hiring of British engineers and/or purchase of British locomotives, though also through careful study of British practice.34 This early standardization of gauge rendered international railway traffic possible.35 In Greece, the debate on the issue of 34  Douglas J. Puffert, ‘The Economics of Spatial Network Externalities and the Dynamics of Railway Gauge Standardization,’ The Journal of Economic History 52, no. 02 (1992): 449-52, 306. 35  Ibid., 303-4. In contrast, for countries like Spain and Russia that had chosen a different gauge from the start, the establishment of international traffic was more challenging. Puffert argues that the most important factor governing the choice of gauge in continental Europe during the first two decades of railway development was the strong influence of contemporary British engineering practice. There is direct evidence that British engineers, he argues, British rolling stock, and the imitation of British practice were responsible for the separate introduction of the Stephenson gauge to Belgium, several German states, Austria and several Italian states between 1835 and the early 1840’s. France’s adoption of the same gauge was

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railway gauge concentrated on national versus international interests. Greece was a poor country; the geography of the country with its mountainous mainland rendered the construction of a network of what was to become standard gauge very expensive due to the costs of the necessary engineering works such as the construction of tunnels and bridges. However, the choice of gauge in Greece became a political discussion. The two major parties of this period disagreed on what would be the most appropriate means of constructing the network. As Greek historiography has noted, the railway issue, next to the fiscal and military issue, constituted the main axis of the political debate of the era.36 The Greek governments began to consider the issue seriously in 1880. As historiography has noted, the annexation of Thessaly to Greece (1880), which brought Greece closer to the Balkan Peninsula, and the Crimean war, which had proven the strategic importance of railways, triggered the Greek governments’ interest in constructing a railway network. In 1881, the then prime minister of Greece Koumoundouros, signed three contracts for the construction of railway lines, including one for the construction of a line of international gauge (1,43m) connecting Piraeus with Larissa and Patra.37 However, the company that undertook the concession declared that it was impossible for it to fulfill its obligations unless the terms of the contract were reconsidered. As a result, Charilaos Trikoupis, who was in power by then, cancelled the contract, signing instead the final contracts for the construction of three railway networks of total length 700 km in Thessaly, Peloponnese and Attica (Lavrio).38 This cancellation of Koumoundouros’s contract and the new basis of the contracts under Trikoupis created the conditions for the collision of the two parties.39 In May 1882 the Greek parliament discussed the bills for the construction of the railways of Volos, Larissa and Peloponnese. A fierce debate took place on the choice of the gauge for the railways of Greece the governing and opposition party disagreeing on which would be the most appropriate type of railways for the apparently also directly due to the British example. After the early 1840’s, the Stephenson gauge continued to be introduced to new regions, often by British engineers, but by that time the desire to adopt the gauge of the earlier lines was perhaps more important than the direct influence of British practice. 36 Παπαγιαννάκης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι [Greek railways], 91. 37  These were contracts for the construction of the lines Pirgos-Kalames (today Kalamata, Peloponnese), Piraeus-Larissa (Greek mainland) and Piraeus-Patras (Peloponnese), and Volos-Larissa (Greek mainland). For the construction of the line Athens to the northern borders, he signed the contract with L. Perdoux. The line would cost in total 108 million drachmas with a guarantee from the state for an annual profit of 5 % or 5,4 million drachmas. Finally, on 13.9.1881, Koumoundouros signed a contract with the engineer E. de Chirico – representative of the Constantinople banker Th. Maurokordatos – for the construction of the line Larissa-Volos. Ibid., 75-6. 38  Ibid., 73, 76. 39  Ibid., 77.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

country. Greece was a mountainous country with a dispersed population and a low level of agricultural, industrial and commercial development. Consequently Trikoupis argued that its railways should primarily satisfy the needs of local transportation.40 Lines of international gauge being faster and more comfortable would cost significantly more due to their technical characteristics (weight of the lines, length of wooden ties, greater curves and necessary tunnels especially on the mountainous terrain). Such an undertaking would exhaust the limited financial capacity of the state. Trikoupis argued in favor of constructing railways of narrow gauge. He believed that with the same amount of money that Koumoundouros was risking on only one line, it would be possible to construct within four to five years an entire network of local railways throughout the country.41 The only line of an international gauge to be constructed would be the line Athens to the northern borders. This line would be of an international character since it would one day connect to the European railway network. Trikoupis believed that the fast creation of a uniform internal railway network would be a convenient means of unifying the country politically, expanding the internal market and thus challenging foreign and Greek capital alike to develop economic and industrial activity beyond short-term speculation. The opposition party was in favor of constructing a dual system. This would be constituted on the one hand by railway arteries of wide gauge (1,43m) that would be immediately compatible with the European standard. It would be a system of international lines radiating from Athens. These would be supplemented, on the other hand, by local and very narrow gauge feeder lines.42 They expected that rapid economic growth would be the spontaneous result of extending the European network into Greek territory, as a network compatible with the European network would attract international traffic.43 The railway of wide gauge would also promote internal social and economic development. The state, consequently, according to Koumoundouros, had to undertake the additional costs to construct railway arteries of wide gauge.44 As he argued in parliament, the same reasons that made the choice of wide gauge on the line Athens to the northern borders legitimate (the probability of a railway connection to Thessalonica and from there to the European network), dictated the construction of a wide gauge line from Athens to Patras. This line would constitute part of an international artery to be 40  For the same reasons he preferred the kilometrical subsidy rather than the guarantee of minimal profit. Ibid., 51. 41  Ibid., 79-80. 42  Ibid., 85-6. 43  Ibid., 78-93. 44  Ibid., 87.

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completed in the future that would connect Patra to Arta, Aulon and henceforth to the Italian railways through Bridinsi.45 Consequently, Koumoundouros’s party believed that the choice of the gauge of the railroad network would determine the character of the railway network and through it its profitability and more generally the course of the Greek economy. He also believed that a railway network of international character would integrate Greece with international traffic flows. The economic development of Greece would be achieved through its integration with the international economy. Koumoundouros’s proposed international railway network, radiating from the capital to the ports of the country, was based on the belief that the development and wealth of the country would come from outside. They believed Greece could and should claim, at least partially, membership of the club of the European states united against the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. A natural bridge between the West and the East, it would function as an intermediary link for international commercial traffic. The commercial and railway connections would promote the economic and social development of the country.46 Koumoundouros felt both the lines Athens-Larissa, and the lines Athens-Patra should be of wide gauge, because they would become international routes. He hoped that its natural prolongation, the line Messologgi-Agrinio-Arta, would be prolonged to Aulon and Ioannina, so that it would connect both with Aulon, and from there via steam ship to Bridinsi and the Italian international line, and from Ioannina to the Dalmatic line.47 The controversy over the issue of the gauge of Greek railways shows how important were international considerations and visions of the integration of the country to international commercial routes when the shape of the Greek railway network was being decided. They support the argument that even in these 45  Trikoupis contested the international character of the railroad line Athens to Patras. According to him, the construction of a railroad line that would reach the port of Aulon (today Valona, Albanian Coast) was improbable in the near future while the two marine passages from Aulon to Italy (probably Brindisi) and from Rio to Antirio were cancelling the international character of this line. Κτενιάδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railway in Greece], 54-56. The line from Athens to Kalamata could be international on the assumption that it was the closest port to Egypt. However, Trikoupis argued that there was still no guarantee that merchandise or travelers would prefer Kalamata to any other port that would have other advantages. Λευτέρης Παπαγιαννάκης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι [Greek railways], 90. The different opinions of the political parties on the gauge of certain lines were also based on their different views on the potential role of certain ports of the Greek mainland in the international route of commerce (when connected to the European railroad network) and, consequently, their different beliefs on the route that international mail and commerce would follow. The senator of Kalavruta, Petimezas, observed that the railway to Patras should be international and of wide gauge. He expressed the belief that mail from India to Western Europe would follow the line from Thoriko to Rio and from there to Aulon. Through a sea passage it would be transferred to Bridinsi and henceforth to Europe. Κτενιάδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railway in Greece]. Ibid, 49-50, 52-56. 46  Ibid., 92. 47  Ibid., 83.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

formative years Greek politicians saw railways not only as a means of integrating Greece nationally, but also further afield with international commercial routes.

Failing Connection to Europe, 1890-1914 In this section I recount the history of the railway line that would connect Athens to the northern borders of Greece. Both military interests and the hope of eventually connecting the line to the European railways had led to the choice of 1.43 gauge for this line, the only line of the Greek network to be of European gauge. The construction of the line met with great difficulties and it was not completed until ten years after work began. Even when the line reached the Greek borders the actual connection to the railways of Europe could not be made due to political opposition from the Ottoman government. Consequently Greece remained a ‘missing link’ in the greater chain of the European railways throughout the nineteenth century and until the end of the Balkan Wars. This section shows how hostilities between different political regimes in Europe shaped railway developments. It gives an insight into political rivalries as a factor that hampered the integration of railways in Europe in the nineteenth century and the establishment of some international routes. Despite the controversy over the gauge of the railway lines that I discussed in the previous section, the leaders of the political parties of Greece agreed on the international character of the line that would connect Athens to the northern borders. The considerations that led to their agreement were both of a military nature but also because they regarded this line as an essential section of the railway axis that would eventually connect Greece to the European railways. As I mentioned above, in 1881 the then Prime Minister Koumoundouros signed a contract for the construction of the line. However, after the company that had undertaken the construction of the line asked to change the terms of the contract, the government of Trikoupis cancelled it. No further development took place until 1885. The mobilization of the army that year and the 1886 blockage of the Greek coastline by the major powers, who sent their fleet from Souda (Crete) to Piraeus and prohibited the expedition of ships to Volos, confirmed the military importance of the line.48 In March 1889 the Greek government discussed the bill for the construction of the railway line from Piraeus to Larissa. A debate took place in the Greek parliament. The government and the opposition party disagreed on the appropriate time for the construction of the line. The opposition party claimed that it would first be necessary to come to an agreement with the Ottoman government on the point of connection between the Greek railway networks and the Ottoman railways before the construction 48  Ibid., 127.

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could begin. In contrast, Trikoupis said the connection would bring a strategic advantage into the hands of the government. When the line reached the borders, Trikoupis argued, the Ottoman government, for military reasons, would seek to complete its own section of the line up to the Ottoman-Greek border. However, the Ottoman government would not be in a position to secure the necessary capital unless it agreed to connect the line to the Greek network. Thus the Ottoman government would find itself obliged to agree to the point of connection that Greeks had chosen. The parliament passed a bill to construct a railway line of an international gauge on behalf of the Greek state from Piraeus to the borders of Greece (with a branch line towards Chalkis).49 The British group of capitalists Eckersley Godfrey and Liddelow, represented by William Eckersley, signed a contract in 1889 to construct a line of width 1,43m and length 390km from Piraeus to the Greek-Ottoman border at Papapouli. However, the works for the construction of the line stopped in 1893 due to the financial problems of the company that had undertaken its construction. The Greek-Turkish war of 1897 contributed to an increase of interest in constructing the line.50 In March 1900, the Prime Minister G. Theotokis signed a contract to complete the construction of the line with Baron G. de Reuter, a representative of the Eastern Railway Construction Syndicate Ltd.51 In February 1902 the representative of the syndicate Baron G. de Reuter, J. Gouin and E. Erlanger constituted the Company of the Greek Railways. In March 1904, they opened the first 121km to traffic, adding a further 103 km by the end of the year. In June 1906 they signed an additional contract with the same company to construct the extension Demerli-Larissa to the northern borders. In addition, another contract declared that in the case that the connection to the Ottoman railways was not accomplished within two years from the completion of the works, the Company of the Greek Railways would construct a branch line that would connect the main line to the coast, if the government required them to do so.52 The company would ensure the communication between Platamon and Thessalonica by a daily steamship line on annual subsidy at the expense of the postal service.53 The line reached the borders in 1909.54 49  Πρόδρομος Ματζαρίδης, ‘Συνοπτικό ιστορικό των ελληνικών σιδηροδρόμων’ [A brief account of the history of the Greek railways], 93-4. 50  Ibid., 94-5. 51 Παπαγιαννάκης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι [Greek railways], 130. 52  The branch line would have a length of approximately 4,5 km and would be of the same gauge as the main line. Being detached from the main line close to the custom office (in Papapouli), it would be directed to the south in the coast of Platamonas and end up at a dock. ΓΡΚΔ’ (υπ’ αριθμόν 3124) in Αρχιμήδης, Νόμοι, 1906/ Εν Αθήναις, 1908, 6-7. 53 Ibid. 54  Ματζαρίδης, ‘Συνοπτικό ιστορικό των ελληνικών σιδηροδρόμων’ [Greek railways], 132.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

Consequently, more than ten years had passed from the day the construction of the line was decided up to its completion. However, its international character was now contested. In a series of articles published in the Greek engineering journal Archimedes, Greek engineers engaged in a debate on the technical characteristics of the line. K. Xidis strongly criticized the Greek governments of the years 1894-1901 for not requesting preliminary studies and therefore not selecting the most appropriate route that the line should follow in accordance with its international character, thus damaging the public interest. He argued that the intent of those who first ordered its construction was to construct an international line, so any argument on local considerations could not stand as an excuse for the significant disadvantages of the route chosen. As an international line, it ought to follow the shortest route with the fewest inclines.55 D. Diamantidis on the other hand argued that the line followed the most appropriate route, since its importance was local. He claimed that economic and local reasons weighed against international ones in choosing the route that the line would follow.56 The international importance of this line, as recognized in previous decades, was derived from two prospects: first, the belief that this line would be connected to the lines of Macedonia and thus to the rest of Europe; and second, the hope that after its connection to the European railroad network it would become a transit line through which the traffic from western and northern Europe would be directed to Egypt. However in 1911, after the latest decision of the Ottoman government to ‘concede’ the connection of the two networks through a route longer than the one the Greek government proposed, this advantage was lost. But even if the decision of the Ottoman government had not been unfavorable to fulfilling Greek expectations, the increased speed of the steamships rendered the route from Bridinsi more competitive in connection to the hybrid steamship-railway route through Piraeus. Therefore, the role of the route could not be transit. Consequently, both agreed that despite its international gauge, the rest of the line’s technical characteristics rendered it a line of local character.57 Indeed, even after the completion of the line, the connection to the Ottoman network, and through this to the network of the European railways, proved impossible. Starting in 1908 the Greek ambassador in Constantinople Gryparis negotiated with the Porte (the Ottoman government) over the connection of Greek railway networks with the European part of Turkey. The contemporary press reported that at 55  Κ. Ξύδης, ‘Ο σιδηρόδρομος Πειραιώς-Λαρίσσης: Υποδεικνυόμενα σφάλματα κατά την χάραξιν της γραμμής’ [The railway line Pireaus–Larissa], Αρχιμήδης 12 (1911): 37, 123. 56  Δ. Διαμαντίδης, ‘Ο σιδηρόδρομος Πειραιώς – Λαρίσσης, η επίκρισις της χαράξεως’ [The railway line Pireaus-Larissa], Αρχιμήδης 12 (1911): 7-8. 57  Engineers in the inter-war years also discussed the technical characteristics of the line as rendering it a line of local character. See next paragraph.

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that moment the situation seemed favorable and predicted that soon Athens would communicate with Europe through railways. The construction of a railway line from Larissa to Thessalonica formed part of the agenda of the minister of foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman government, however, refused to accept the construction of the line along the coast that was the shortest, which, according to the RGCF, was the most favorable route for international traffic. Greece, eager to achieve a connection, accepted the route Larissa-Elasson-Veria proposed by the Ottoman government for military reasons. However, the Porte continued the negotiations.58 The question was still open in October 1912, at the moment when war was declared. Reporting on the failure to achieve a connection to the rest of the network, the RG criticized the attitude of the Turkish government toward the connection. In an article entitled ‘The Turkish Opposition to the Completion of European Systems,’ an anonymous reporter blamed the Ottoman government for the failure to achieve the connection of the networks, which would be to the benefit not only of Greece but also of Turkey and Europe as a whole.59 He pointed out that Greece remained the only European country that was not connected to the continent of Europe by rail. This, he argued, was not only a ‘glaring’ anomaly but also a ‘great commercial drawback.’60 He referred to the long efforts to overcome this serious barrier to commercial communication that: ‘Would have been easily surmounted but for the fractious opposition evinced by the Turkish government, through whose territories a considerable portion of the connecting line would have to pass.’61 Both countries and the European commerce would gain significant advantages from the completion of the line.62 The surrounding agricultural districts would benefit 58  ‘The Graeco-Turkish Railway Scheme,’ RG 13 (1910): 497; ‘Les chemins de fer de la Grèce-Les lignes en exploitation – Les projets du gouvernement hellène dans les nouvelles provinces,’ RGCF 37 (1919): 1934. In 1910 the RG reported that the French engineers who had been surveying the route of the proposed railway in order to link up the Turkish and Greek railway networks, reported in favor of a junction at either Karaferia (Veria) or Tchais, the former being preferred. The journal announced that the negotiations for the undertaking of the work would shortly be begun between the French Government and the French syndicate desirous of building the line. ‘The Graeco-Turkish Railway Scheme,’ 497. 59  ‘Railways in Greece: The Turkish Opposition to Completion of European Systems,’ RG 16 (1912): 242. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62  It proposed as the most feasible project for linking up the two systems of railways the construction of a line that would follow the coastal route. This would connect Gida on the Monastiri Thessalonica (Ottoman) Railway and Karali Derveni (on the coast of Greece, close to the Greek-Ottoman frontier). This would necessitate the construction of approximately 100 km of track while there were no serious physical obstacles in this route. From a technical point of view, the RGCF noted that there would be no difficulty in constructing the line with the same curvature and the same gradients as adopted on both the Ottoman and the Greek railways. The configuration of the ground was such that it lent itself readily to the adoption of this course without any considerable expenditure. Finally, it concluded that in no case would the cost of construction exceed that of any other railway built in the Ottoman Empire. Ibid.



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especially, and the railways would also provide a favorable opportunity for exploiting the salt mines and forests of the areas through which it would pass. Apart from local interests, the author of the article spoke of great importance of the line as a means of linking up the ‘several systems of Europe.’ This line ‘would, in a word, complete the system of railways which has hitherto lacked a definite terminus in Southern Europe.’63 Until then Greece had only been able to maintain a connection to Europe by sea, but: ‘Once the railway is carried across the gap at present existing, it would be possible to reach Athens, without a change of carriage, from either Paris, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, or Constantinople, while the whole of Eastern and Western Europe would be brought within the network of railway.’64 The Ottoman railways would also benefit from such a connection. The amount of traffic that would probably leave the sea route for the railway through Greece would bring a run over 1.309 km to the Ottoman Empire lines. The sea route would still accommodate heavy and cumbersome freight. ‘But the mails, the great majority of passengers and the quick transit merchandises would undoubtedly take advantage of this easier and quicker mode of transportation, which would be available daily instead of weekly (or even less frequently), as in the case by sea, while weather conditions would have no place in their consideration.’65 Finally, the reporter criticized the Turkish position on the issue, observing that: ‘The economic development of their country is nothing to these patriots, who apparently love the sword much better than the ploughshare; who prefer to decimate and to destroy their fellow creatures rather than aid them to better their often miserable conditions of living. How long yet will the European powers consent to look on calmly at the arrest of civilization and the strangling of the economic development at the bidding of the Turk?’66 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65  ‘The number of passengers coming to Greece invariably complain of the long and some times tyring voyage by sea, and there can be no question that, were this drawback eliminated, their number would be enormously increased. There are also those ever increasing hordes of travelers who yearly wend their way to Egypt in order to pass the winter months, and who, were they enabled to reduced their sea journey of four days (between Marseille and Port Said), to one of about 30 hours (between Piraeus and Alexandria), would increase probably tenfold. Thus, there would not only be immediate traffic available, but the prospects of extension would be practically limitless. Of this valuable traffic no less than 1, 300 km of run would accrue to the Ottoman Railways.’ Ibid., 243. 66 Ibid.

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Consequently, in the years in which international railway traffic grew, Greece remained a railway island due to the existing political regime in the Southeastern part of the European continent.

Figure 5.4– Greek Railways in 1919 Source: ‘Les Chemins de Fer de la Grèce – les Lignes en Exploitation – Les projets du Gouvernement Hellène dans les Nouvelles Provinces,’ RGCF 37 (1919): 191.

Linking to European Railways After the end of the Balkan wars, the political situation in the Balkan Peninsula changed. In 1912 the Balkan countries that conquered lands in Macedonia replaced the Ottoman state as far as its rights and obligations in relation to the railways there were concerned.67 The areas of Thrace and Macedonia were conceded to Greece and the Greek state acquired the three railroad lines in Macedonia that traversed those areas. 67  Παδελόπουλος, ‘Η εξέλιξις των ΣΕΚ’ [The railways of the Greek state], 346. On the history of the construction of the lines in Macedonia that after the Balkan Wars were conceded to the Greek State see Δεληγιάννης, Παπαδημητρίου, ‘Η ιστορία των Σιδηροδρόμων στη Βόρεια Ελλάδα’ [History of railways in northern Greece], 157; Τραγανού-Δεληγιάννη, ‘Οι Σιδηρόδρομοι και η Ιστορία τους. Έρευνες και Προσπάθειες Διάσωσης και Προστασίας’ [The history of railways. Research and efforts for their maintenance and protection], 154.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

From 1913 the Greek government again took up the question of the connection to Europe. Teams of engineers were sent to the new provinces with the purpose of studying which connection best suited the interests of the country. Following these studies, four projects were presented to the government for approval, three of which recommended the connection through the interior of the country.68 The government decided to construct a line following the coastal route. According to contemporary sources, economic and military interests imposed this decision.69 Creating a connection across the coast necessitated the construction of a line of only 90km length while the works of putting it into operation would last only 20 months. The nature of the land would not require demanding technical works and the expenditure for the construction would not exceed two million francs.70 In fact, from the end of the Balkan wars, the Greek governments had planned to construct new lines that would better integrate the new provinces to ‘old Greece.’ In particularly, the RGCF reported that immediately after the war the Greek government had planned to construct four lines in Macedonia that would facilitate the communication to the new provinces. The first line would run from Elassona to Servia and Kozani. From there it would enter into Serbian territory and join the future line Monastiri-Veles through Sorovits and Florina. Another line would depart from Kalabaka, where it would join the railway lines of Thessaly, pass through Grevena and Kastoria, and enter into Serbian territory close to Florina. This line would serve from north to south, the eastern part of Macedonia and the territories bordering Epirus.71 Among the lines that the Greek government studied, one line was characterized in the RGCF as very important from a commercial and strategic point of view. This one would depart from Grevena, pass through Ioannina and reach Agioi Saranta. According to the RGCF, this line would be destined to bring the Adriatic Sea into contact with the Aegean Sea, by being extended through Kozani, Servia, up to Veria and from there to Thessalonica, crossing the entirety of Macedonia from West to East. The RGCF predicted that such a line would establish through Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia an intensive stream of traffic. It would improve the country’s communication with the rest of Europe, and would 68  These were the lines: Kalabaka-Kastoria-Monastiri, Larissa-Deskati-Veria, where the new line would connect to the line Thessalonica-Monastiri and the line Larissa-Deskati-Kozani-Florina-Monastiri. ‘Les chemins de fer de la Grèce,’ RGCF 37 (1919): 194. 69 The RGCF reports that the Greek government preferred the coastal route for economic reasons as well as the fact that the works for its construction could be realized faster. Ibid., 194. In the interwar years, Metaxas, a former minister of communications, noted that it was primarily military interest that had led the Greek government to opt for a coastal connection rather than an inland one. Ι. Μεταξά, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική πολιτική του ελληνικού κράτους’ [Railway policy of the Greek state], 422 70  ‘Les chemins de fer de la Grèce,’ RGCF 37 (1919): 194. 71 Ibid.

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facilitate commerce, opening up a new route of access to Greece. For example, the anonymous author in the RGCF argued that the trajectory from Paris to Piraeus via Bridinsi, Agioi Saranta-Ioannina-Kalabaka (2.425 km) could be accomplished within approximately fifty-five hours, faster than the trajectory through Vienna, and much faster than the trajectory Paris-Bridinsi-Patra-Athens.72 It would also increase the wealth of the country. ‘These lines would provide the populations of Epirus and Macedonia with the benefits of civilization of which they were deprived up to now.’73 Soon however, Greece was involved in WWI and consequently the plans for the construction of these lines were cancelled. Meanwhile, the contemporary press applauded the decision of the Greek government to connect the two parts of the network. The RGCF observed that the construction of this line would bring Athens in fast and daily communication with Europe. In the future Greece would be accessible by land. European commerce would also benefit from the construction of the line. Attica, Viotia, Thessaly, the most fertile valleys traversed by the line Piraeus-Athens-borders, would profit from the junction that would put them into contact with the European lines. It would allow them to develop their commerce, industry and agriculture.74 At the beginning of 1914, the Greek Government bought the Company of the Greek Railways. In 1915, the Greek state took over also the three lines that connected Thessalonica to the European railroad network through Serbia and Bulgaria.75 The construction of the section Papapouli-Platy that would connect the network of the old Greece to the lines of Macedonia was begun in 1914 and completed in 1916.76 For the first time, Athens was linked to the European system. The railways of Greece were the last of the railways of Europe to make a connection to the main continental system.77 The line opened to use in 1917.78 The Greek technical journal Industrial and manufacturing review (BBE) noted the significance of the construction of the section from Piraeus to Platy. It observed that this was an event of great importance for the industry of the country. Greece, while also communicating with the global market through the sea routes, would be in closer economic and political contact with the rest of the Balkan countries and the countries of central Europe, 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Κτενιάδης, Οι Πρώτοι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδροµοι [The first railways in Greece], 158-160. 76 Παπαγιαννάκης, Οι Ελληνικοί Σιδηρόδρομοι [Greek railways],133. 77  ‘The Hellenic State Railways; a Brief Description of the Railway System of the Greek Government,’ RG 56 (1932): 334. 78  A. Regnoul, ‘Οι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι και αι δυναταί βελτιώσεις αυτών’ [Possible improvements of the Greek railways], ΤΧ 2 (1932): 741.



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Austria-Hungary and Germany.79 In its May 1916 issue the BBE argued that an extension of the Greek rail network to the Ionian port of Epirus ‘must be among the first initiatives of the government after the war.’80 It noted that the railway communication of Greece did not serve in a sufficient way the development of the productive capacity of the country. The construction of new railway lines between Thessalonica and Ioannina (Epirus) through Kozani, between Kozani and Larissa, between Ioannina and Preveza should be one of the first concerns of the government after the end of the war.81 Koronis, the director of the Hellenic State Railways in the 1920s, noted the political importance of the establishment of a connection in his book Historical notes on railway politics. He argued that until then, the Greek railways satisfied only local interests, the significance of which did not go beyond the old borders of 1897. Communication with the rest of the continent was conducted exclusively by sea. After the Balkan wars, the Greek railways became part of the European railway network. This was an event of great political importance. Until 1912, he noted, Greece was not geographically a Balkan country, but only a Mediterranean country while afterward it became both. In the future, any development in the Balkan Peninsula would be of interest to Greece.82

Revising Modern Greece, Revising Railways, 1914-1939 After the end of WWI, the territory of Greece had significantly changed. Its area was now expanded. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, its railway network had also grown. The railways of Greece were now connected to the continental railways. The Balkan Wars and WWI had radically altered the political situation in the Balkan Peninsula. In the Balkan railway lines had been constructed with the intention of connecting to Central Europe and satisfying the military interests of the Ottoman Empire rather than improving the relations of the Balkan states among themselves.83 The need to complement the network so as to respond to the new political situation and political goals of the new political entities was consequently felt. Greece now shared land borders with the new Balkan states such as 79  I. B., ‘Η σιδηροδρομική συγκοινωνία εν Ελλάδι’ [Railway transport in Greece], ΒΒΕ 3, no. 1 (1916): 551. 80 Ibid. 81  Interestingly, in 1920 the RG reported that a Commission of Italian, French and Greek engineers was inquiring into the possibilities of a railway to complete communications between Athens and Rome. The line would pass through Patra, Arta and Ioannina and would be electrified. The terminus of the railway would be at Valona, the Otranto Canal being crossed by ferryboat. The waterfalls of Achelous, Agrafiotis, Louros and Arachtos would supply electric power. ‘Proposed Athens-Rome Railway,’ RG 33 (1920): 77. 82  Σπ. Κορώνη, Ιστορικαί Σημειώσεις επί της Ελληνικής Σιδηροδρομικής Πολιτικής [Historical notes on Greek railway policy] (Αθηναι: Γ. Π. Ξένου, 1934), 37. 83  Kostov, ‘Les Balkans.’

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Figure 5.5– Political borders in the Balkans,1930. Source: Mazower, The Balkans, xxi.

Albania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slavs (Yugoslavia after 1929), Bulgaria and Turkey. It was now connected to the railway network of Europe through Serbia (Belgrade). This was the only outlet to the European railway network.84 On the 1st of July 1920, the Simplon Orient Express ran for the first time from Paris to Athens.85 In addition, in 1920, as the RG reports, the Greek government con84  After Belgrade, the line followed the route Budapest-Vienna-Praga-Berlin and Trieste-MilanLausanne-Paris-London. Apart from this line that connected Greece to the railways of the European continent, there was also a connection to Constantinople through Thessalonica and Adrianople that now were within Greek territory. However, in the 1930s the Greek engineer Agapitos in a study of the international railway connection of Greece, characterized this line as of local importance since it did not connect Greece to the rest of Europe. Rather, it was interesting as it provided communications between Greece and Turkey. Σπ. Αγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας–Ευρώπης, η σιδηρά Εγνατία οδός και η σύνδεσις Αθηνών-Ρώμης’ [Proposal for a railway connection from Greece to Europe, the iron Egnatia road and the connection Athens-Rome], Έργα 4 (1928 – 1929): 337-8. 85 Ματζαρίδηs, Συνοπτικό Ιστορικό των Ελληνικών Σιδηροδρόμων [Brief account of the history of Greek



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sidered again the construction of new lines in the new provinces.86 However, due to the politically turbulent years that followed with the military expedition and eventual disaster in Asia Minor (1922) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), after which the Greek border was stabilized, no action was undertaken. From the end of WWI, significant changes also occurred in the organization of the Greek railways. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, already from 1914, the state, realizing the advantage of railways as a means of regulating its export policy (through the regulation of railway tariffs next to the customs tariffs), had exploited the line that connected Athens to Thessalonica as well as the lines of Macedonia (1917).87 These were the lines from Thessalonica to Monastiri, the Greek-Serbian borders close to Gevgeli and to Alexandroupolis (Dedeagats). However, until 1920 state administration of the lines was confined to the line of Larissa while the lines of Macedonia were under the administration of the allies. The Greek state got the use of the line back in 1920. The parliament then voted to construct the Hellenic State Railways (HSR). This new institution brought all the railway lines of standard gauge under public ownership.88 A French mission administered the network of Hellenic State Railways in the years 1920-1922. After 1922 the Greek state undertook the management of the network. As historiography partially documents, and the discussions on engineering journals of the inter-war years reveal, the Greek railway effort in the inter-war years was concentrated on two issues: re-constructing the line from Athens to the northern borders, which was in deplorable condition due to its extensive use and lack of maintenance during the war; and secondly, constructing an additional line in Western Macedonia to better integrate the new provinces into ‘old Greece.’ This was the line that would connect Kalabaka and Kozani to Veria (KKV). In this effort for the construction of the line KKV, the vision of recreating the Egnatia Road would be revived.

railways], 104. After the signature in Paris in August 1919 of the Simplon Orient Express agreement, the Simplon Orient Express was inaugurated and in 1920 provided a tri-weekly sleeping car service between Paris and Athens. ‘The Hellenic State Railways: A Brief Description of the Railway System of the Greek Government,’ RG 56 (1932): 335. 86 The RG reported that although it was not yet known when construction would commence, the following new lines had been sanctioned: Drama to Kavalla (42.500 km), Ioannina to Kalabaka (105.200 km). This would be an important strategic line, linking up Epirus and Macedonia. Larissa to Dimitsana (113.108 km), Kalabaka to Kozani (56.000 km), Kozani to Sorovits (56.000 km). Finally a line from Kozani to Veria (77.000 km). ‘The Railways of Greece,’ RG 33 (1920): 166. 87  Παδελόπουλος, ‘Η Εξέλιξις των ΣΕΚ’ [The evolution of the Greek State Railways], ΤΧ 1 (1932): 345. 88  Ibid.; A. Regnoul, ‘Οι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι και αι δυναταί βελτιώσεις αυτών’ [Possibilities for improvements of the Greek railways], ΤΧ 2 (1932): 741.

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Phantom Railway Plans Like many countries in the Balkans, e.g. Yugoslavia, the Greek state ordered the construction of new railway lines in the inter-war years to run through the areas of the new provinces.89 In fact, since the end of the Balkan wars, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, the Greek government had planned the construction of new lines that would better integrate the new provinces to ‘old Greece.'90 However, it seems that the outbreak of WWI did not allow the realization of these plans for Greece. The first contract for the construction of the new lines was signed in 1925 by the totalitarian government of Theodoros Pangalos and a Belgian Company, the Société Commerciale de Belgique (SCB). This contract defined the railway endeavor of the Greek state in the inter-war years. The contract included terms under which the SCB would construct lines of 350 km on a route that would be defined by the Greek government. Second, it would procure materials to renovate the lines Athens to the northern borders.91 After the fall of the dictatorship of Pangalos, the newly established coalition government discussed the validity of the Belgian contract and the importance of constructing the new lines. The National Assembly discussed the terms of the Belgian contract during its meetings in the years 1926 and 1927, deciding in favor of reconstructing the main railway axis, the section Athens to Larissa. However, the remaining money would only be sufficient for the construction of one new line between Thessaly and Macedonia, two provinces already connected through a coastal line. Consequently, the construction of another internal line would be sufficient for the internal communication of the country. Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the new lines, based on studies exchanged between the ministry of communications and the military, the new government agreed to the construction of a line that would connect Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria. It was calculated that the construction of this line would be possible with the remaining money from the Belgian group and that such a line would correspond to the economic and military needs of the country as they were forming then.92 As a result, on March 1927, 89  After the end of WWI, the newly created kingdom of Yugoslavia had to deal with a problem of great magnitude. The Serbian railway system had been destroyed in its totality and the rolling stock carried off by the enemy. As a consequence, the new kingdom found itself in possession of railways but no railway system. In 1927, the RG reports that since the foundation of Yugoslavia sixteen new lines had been constructed and all the railways existed before the war had been put in thorough repair. ‘A New Balkan Railway,’ RG 47 (1927): 2. 90  ‘Les chemins de fer de la Grèce,’ RGCF 37, 1919, 194. 91  For the history of the signature of the contract see also Ιoanna Pepelasis Minoglou, ‘Phantom Rails and Roads,’ 33-49. 92  Ι. Μεταξά, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική πολιτική του ελληνικού κράτους,’ [Railway policy of the Greek state], ΤΧ 1 (1932): 424.



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the minister of communications ordered works to cease on the line ThessalonicaAggista, the construction of which had already been ordered by the government of Pangalos, and urged the company to study the completion of the construction of the railway line Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria. The construction of the line begun in 1928. However, it was soon realized that its completion would be more costly than initially calculated.93 In 1930, works on the line stopped once more as new alternative routes for the northern terminus of the line were investigated. Meanwhile, as discussions in the engineering journals of those years reveal, engineers were strongly engaged in the issue. In those years, the poor financial situation that the Greek railways were suffering due to the general economic crisis and competition from the automobile caused many engineers to contest the need for constructing new railway lines in Greece.94 The increasing competition from automobiles led to a discussion on possible means of coordinating the two means of transport. The opinion was widespread that the role of the railway as a national means of transportation had changed due to competition from automobile technology.95 Most engineers agreed that only the construction of very important arterial lines should be contemplated, arteries that would connect the provinces to the capital of the country. Some even proposed the cancellation of railway lines of local importance. The railway network should constitute the spinal cord of the 93  When works for the construction of the line began (October 1927) it was estimated that it would cost 6.900.000 dollars. In spring 1930 it became obvious that the total expenditure for the construction of the line would be 18.000.000 dollars. Σπ. Κατσουλίδου, ‘Ο σιδηρόδρομος Καλαμπάκας-Βέρροιας: Mία σημαντική εθνική ζημιά’ [The railway Kalabaka-Veria: An important damage to the national interest], Έργα 6 (1931): 629-633. This caused discussions within the ministry of communications. It was proposed then that the line from Kozani to Sorovits instead of the line Kozani-Veria be constructed so that the available amount of money of 9 ½ million dollars would suffice. Ibid. 94  Β. Κορώνη, ‘Νέαι Σιδηροδρομικαί Γραμμαί’ [New railway lines], ΣΕ, 1929, no 8; Vougioukas argued that Greek engineers and the Greek government should by no means consider grandiose railway projects. Instead, they should understand that railways had acquired a new role in Greece after the appearance of the automobile. The competition from the automobile threatened the Greek railways due to the conditions under which road traffic was developing in Greece. Γεωργίου Βουγιούκα, ‘Η θέσις και η οικονομική κρίσις των σιδηροδρόμων της Ελλάδας’ [Conditions of the Greek railways and their financial crisis], Έργα 7 (1931): 291. 95  Vougioukas argues that roads were being constructed without appropriate studies being conducted. They were being built not in a way that they would complement the existing railway network, but in parallel to existing lines in a way that would take traffic away. Also, others argued that road traffic in Greece was entirely unregulated. Γεωργίου Βουγιούκα, Σπύρου Κορώνη, Γεωργίου Δούμα, Αθ Παδελόπουλου, Σπ. Αγαπητού, Ι. Πετρίδου, Α. Σταματιάδου and Γεωργ. Παπανικολάου, ‘Η θέσις και η οικονομική κρίσις των σιδηροδρόμων της Ελλάδας’ [The financial crisis of the Greek railways], Έργα 7 (1931): 289 – 299. Also Georgopoulos argues that due to the competition that the railways suffered from the automobile, the Greek state should not undertake the construction of new lines. He argued, though, that there was one route that was important from a commercial point of view, the construction of which the Greek state ought to undertake. This was a line that would connect the Greek railway network to the railways of Bulgaria and Sofia via the valley of Strumon. Ηλ. Γεωργοπούλου, ‘Εργα οδοποιϊας και έργα σιδηροδρομικά, σκοπιμότης και παραγωγικότης των έργων τούτων’ [Road and rail construction works], ΤΧ 1 (1932): 556.

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land transportation system of Greece.96 Despite this ‘conservatism’ over the need to construct new railway lines, most engineers agreed that it was important to complete the construction works of the line Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria. They had two main arguments: first, the Greek state had already spent a significant amount of money on studies and works. If the construction works were terminated, the Greek state would have lost a lot of money. Second, through a small modification of its route the line would constitute part of the much-needed international railway artery that would connect Greece to Western Europe through Italy. Almost a year after the construction of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line had been decided on, the Greek engineer S. Agapitos published an article in the Greek journal Eleuthero Vima in which he stressed the importance of the construction of railway lines that would provide an outlet to Europe through railways.97 It was of major importance, he argued, that Greece had more than one connecting line to the European railway network.98 Apart from the Serbian railways, Greece was also connected to the Ottoman railways in Constantinople. However, Agapitos argued, this connection should be regarded as local since it connected the Greek railway network to the Ottoman and not to the European network.99 In contrast, a connection that would require relatively few works was the connection to the European railway network through Bulgaria. The achievement of direct communication to Sofia necessitated the construction of only a short branch line of the existing line Thessalonica-Drama-Alexandroupolis. Bulgaria would profit a lot from the establishment of such a connection since it would have a direct connection to the ports of Thessalonica and Kavala. On the other hand, through the line Sofia-Bucharest Greece would be able to communicate to Europe through Budapest and Vienna.100 Other engineers also proposed the construction of this section of the line. Regnoul argued that the construction of the line would be very important from an economic point of view, much more than the construction of the Kalabaka-KozaniVeria line.101 96  Σπ. Αγαπητός, ‘Η θέσης και η οικονομική κρίσης των σιδηροδρόμων της Ελλάδος [ An acccount of the current condition of the Greek railways and their financial crisis], Έργα 7 (1931): 289. 97  Αγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας – Ευρώπης’ [The railway connection Greece to Europe], 337. 98  Bulgaria would profit a lot from the establishment of such a connection since it would have a direct communication to the ports of Thessalonica and Kavalla. On the other hand, Greece from the line SofiaBucharest would be able to communicate to Europe through Budapest and Vienna. 99  Αγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας-Ευρώπης’ [The railway connection Greece to Europe], 337-8. 100  Γεωργ. Βολ. Πόγγη, ‘Η πλουτοπαραγωγική σημασία μιας ελληνοβουλγαρικής σιδηροδρομικής συνδέσεως’ [The importance of a railway connection from Greece to Bulgaria], ΣΕ no. 9 (1929): 8-9. 101  Regnoul argued that the extension of the Bulgarian line to the Greek borders and the construction on a Greek territory of a section of approximately twenty kilometers connecting this line with the line



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Apart from this connection, Agapitos argued that a connection to Rome and thus to the western European network should be made. In his proposal the old project by Vitali for the construction of a railway line that would depart from the port of Bridinsi and reach Piraeus, thus placing Athens in a central position on the international traffic to the East revived once more. Plans for a line that would connect Adriatic to the Aegean Sea dated to the last decade of the nineteenth century.102 As Agapitos mentioned the Balkan International Syndicat Anglo Italian had already undertaken studies for the construction of a railway ‘Egnatia road’ that would reach Thessalonica and Constantinople through Albanian territory. Such a line would begin from Durres, pass through the Albanian capital Tirana, enter Serbian territory and finally connect to the Greek railway network. In Durres, it would connect to the Italian port of Bari through a steamship ferry. This was the line that also figured in the proposals on the construction of the line of the 45th parallel as they had been put forward during WWI.103 However, according to Agapitos, such a project was not in the best interests of Greece. By contrast, he argued that with a relatively short branch line to the existing and future railway network (the KKV line) they could achieve the dual goal of providing communications to the only province of Greece that was still cut off as well as establishing a shorter connection from Greece to the European railway network than currently existed. The construction of a new branch of the KKV line to Ioannina through Grevena and henceforth to Igoumenitsa would realize the much-needed communication of Epirus and Western Macedonia to Thessaly. In addition, the connection of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line to the railways of Thessaly would bring Epirus in direct communication to Athens when the short section from Kalabaka to Demerli was completed. Consequently, this line would complete the railway connection of all of Macedonia both to Thessalonica and to Athens. The line to be constructed, a branch line of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line already under from Thessalonica to Adrianople would bring into communication Sofia, Central and Northern Bulgaria, and the Danube with the Greek railway network and Thessalonica and would thus constitute an important railway artery. The Greek part of the line including the construction of a bridge on the river Strymon would cost approximately 50.000.000 drachmas. Such a line would play an important role in promoting exchanges between the two countries while it would also ensure Bulgaria an outlet to the port of Thessalonica. A. Regnoul, ‘Οι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι και αι δυναταί βελτιώσεις αυτών’ [The possibility of an improvement of the Greek railways], 739. 102  During the years 1892-1912, two big transversal lines with direction East-West were constructed in Bulgaria and in the Ottoman provinces. In 1894 and 1896, Thessalonica was connected to Constantinople (today Istanbul) through Dédéagach (Andrianoupolis) eastwards. Westwards it was connected to Monastiri (Vitola). The German society that had constructed the second line intended to extend it to Durres or Valona with the aim of connecting Constantinople to the Aegean Sea and the Adriatic. However, the prolongation of the line from Valona, Vitola to Durres was not established so this project was not realized. Kostov, ‘Les Balkans et le réseau ferroviaire Européen,’ 99-100. 103  See Chapter 1.

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construction, connecting the valley of Aliakmon to the valley of Kalama, would be a line of 130 km, vertically crossing the line from Athens to Gevgeli.104 These two lines, which would cross in Thessalonica, would constitute the iron frame of the country that would connect its entire body. He called the vertical line Igoumenitsa– Thessalonica- Alexandroupolis-borders (800 km length in Greek territory, of which 500 were already built) the ‘Iron Egnatia Road’ of Greece. Expanding by 200 km on Turkish territory, the line would connect the Adriatic to the Black Sea.105 The proposed Iron Egnatia Road could also provide an additional outlet to the railway network of Western Europe through Rome. However, as Agapitos argued, Igoumenitsa was not an appropriate port for the connection to Italy since the sea passage from Igoumenitsa to Bridinsi (the closest port on the Italian peninsula) was rather long. Instead, he proposed that either the port of Durres or Aulon in Albania should be the starting points of the artery. The choice of the port of Durres, Agapitos argued, served foreign interests, but not Greek interests, since it would cross close to the Albanian capital Tirana. In contrast, the port of Aulon, situated closer to the Italian shore (Bridinsi) was more appropriate as a staring point of the artery.106 Apart from the shorter maritime passage, the route Aulon–Kozani–Thessalonica would go through southern territory and consequently would traverse Greece more deeply, thus serving the interior of the country better.107 In addition, Greece would have to construct only thirty km of additional line since the line Grevena-Igoumenitsa should cross the valley of Aoos river not far away from the Albanian border. Agapitos finally argued that from the Greek perspective, the advantages of the route via Aulon were so important that it would be necessary for the Greek government to adopt the solution that he proposed and insist on its application.108 The Iron Egnatia Road, Agapitos argued, was of major importance for Greece. The connection to Western Europe would become shorter and at the same time Greece would be positioned within an international route to and from Asia.109 This would be particularly significant in cases where the two other routes through Bulgaria and Serbia were closed. 104  Aγαπητός., ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας – Ευρώπης’ [The railway connection Greece to Europe], 337-9. 105  Ibid., 340. 106  The route with its starting point at Aulon and following the valley of Aoos river would meet the line Igoumenitsa-Grevena-Kalabaka and would much better serve the Greek interest. The distance AulonOtranto was 50 miles instead of the 130 miles of the sea route Durres-Bari. Aγαπητός Σπ., ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας–Ευρώπης’ [The railway connection Greece to Europe], 340. 107 Ibid. 108  The line would cross Albania in 200 km, Greece in 700 km, and Turkey in 200 km, its total length being 1000 km. Ibid. 109  Agapitos estimated that the trip from Athens to Paris through the Simplon Orient Express that at that time lasted three days and nights would be shortened through the route Athens-Adriatic Sea-RomeParis to two days and nights. Ibid., 338, 337.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

Figure 5.6– Agapitos’ Proposed Line, 1930s Source: Αγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας – Ευρώπης’, 338.

On the left Figure 5.7– Positioning Greece to the Southern European Railway Artery. Source: Aγαπητός, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική σύνδεση Ελλάδας – Ευρώπης’, 339. On the right Figure 5.8– Political Map of Europe, 1930s Source: Woodroffe, The New Penguin Atlas of Recent History, 71.

The Greek engineering journal Erga republished the article by Agapitos and the response to it by N. Kogevinas, engineer and Member of Parliament. The latter noted that the establishment of a fast railway connection Athens-Rome was very important and that the construction of the line Grevena-Igoumenitsa was an urgent necessity. He stressed the importance of such a line in the event that the railway communication through Serbia and Bulgaria were closed. However, he argued that it would be very important that this third line did not cross-foreign territory.

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Consequently a ferryboat communication through Igoumenitsa-Corfu-Otranto should connect the line to the railways of Western Europe instead of constructing a branch line that would connect the line Grevena-Igoumenitsa to Aulon. By avoiding foreign territory, the possibility that the line would be closed would be diminished.110 In his discussion of the construction of trans-European railway arteries, the Italian advocate Carlo Enrico Barduzzi referred to Agapitos’s project. He put forward his own visions of an Iron Egnatia Road that would better serve Italian interests. Agapitos also seemed to have modified his project when he submitted it to the Balkan Conference. In a paper for the inter-Balkan conference, he now discussed the importance of the connection through Durres.111 More engineers shared Agapitos’ opinion. In 1930, when it was proven that the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line would cost much more than initially calculated, a discussion opened up again on the line’s usefulness, and many engineers proposed the modification of its route.112 The engineer Georgopoulos, in a discussion of the importance of new roads and railroads in Greece, stressed the importance of the completion of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line. He argued that the route of the line had been chosen for military reasons while commercially the line was of no importance. By changing the route of the line to Sorovits instead of Veria in the north and Demerli in the south, the line could be used in the future for connecting to the European railway network. Italy, he argued, in the distant future would pursue the construction of a railway line through Albania so as to promote faster communication to Thessalonica, Constantinople and finally to Asia Minor. Such a line could follow either the route through Durres and Tirana to Monastiri, or through Aulon, Koritsa and from there to Monastiri (through the Prespa lake) or Thessalonica (through Kastoria, Kozani, Veria). The route from southern Italy to Thessalonica and from there to Constantinople and Smyrna (Izmir) would be shortened in both cases to only fifteen hours, including the five-hour passage from Durres to Bridinsi by steamship, or from Aulon to Bridinsi. This would provide a great advantage over the seventy-six hours that the sea transit from Bridinsi through 110  Ν. Κογεβίνας, ‘Ενίσχυσις της προτάσεως του Σπ. Αγαπητού’ [In support of Agapitos’ proposal], Έργα 4th year, (1928-1929): 341. 111  Agapitos now published his article in the capacity of a member of the superior transportation council of Greece, former director of the Hellenic State Railways, former general director of the railways of Peloponnese, former director, chief engineer of the railways of Attica. ‘Εισήγησις εις την επί των συγκοινωνιών επιτροπήν της Β’ Βαλκανικής διασκέψεως επί του θέματος της σιδηροδρομικής σύνδέσεως των πρωτευουσών των Βαλκανικών κρατών. Αι Συνδέσεις των Βαλκανικών Σιδηροδρόμων’ [Proposal submitted to the transportation commission of the second Balcanic conference on the issue of the railway connections of the capitals of the Balkan states], Σιδηροδρομική Επιθεώρησις, 1931, 704-706. 112  Ηλ. Γεωργοπούλου, ‘Εργα οδοποιϊας και έργα σιδηροδρομικά’ [Road and rail constuction works], 552-563.



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Piraeus to Thessalonica by steamships (or forty-four hours by direct steamship) usually took. Besides, the transportation from Bridinsi to Thessalonica through Piraeus was not regular, but took place once or twice per week. In contrast, it would be easy to have daily marine transportation service from Bridinsi-Aulon or Bridinsi-Durres once the connection to Thessalonica was established. Consequently, the connection to Piraeus, he argued, would pass through Kozani and Kalabaka. For the line of Durres, the connection Kozani-Sorovits would be necessary.113 Such a connection would be of great importance for Greece. The route from Piraeus to Aulon would last a maximum of sixteen hours while to Durres would be a maximum of eighteen hours. As a consequence, the route to Europe (Milan-Paris-London) would be shortened by eleven hours.114 This would give the Greek railway network and the line Kalabaka-Kozani-Sorovits (instead of Veria) currently under construction a transit character. Passengers coming from Alexandria and Egypt or any place from Africa with destination Europe would probably prefer the transit through Piraeus up to Bridinsi, if a regular steamship communication could be established between Piraeus and Alexandria (he argued that such communication could be established within twenty-four hours). Epirus, either with the route Kalabaka-Ioannina or with the route Grevena-Ioannina, could also easily communicate with this railway line to Europe. Since a substantial part of the Baghdad railway still remained incomplete, he argued that the post and passengers to India that could not be transported by airplane would prefer the transit from Piraeus to Alexandria. It would thus be possible, he argued, to organize a daily communication between Alexandria and Piraeus with two steamships while the direct sea transit from Alexandria to Bridinsi or Marseille was harsh in the winter, lasted many days and was irregular.115 His arguments and expectations on the potential role of the country as a passage between East and West remind us of the expectations of Koumoundouros’ party in the Greek parliament during the discussions of 1882. The works for the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line were stopped. The news column of the railway journal Railway Review reported in 1932 that the workers in the construction of the line Kalabaka-Veria received a telegram from the company informing them that due to the company’s bad financial condition, the works for the construction of the line would be interrupted.116 113  The route Aulon-Piraeus via Koritsa-Kastoria-Pasa Gefuri-Kalabaka-Demerli was shorter than the route Durres-Monastiri-Sorovits-Kozani-Demerli-Piraeus by hundred km. Ηλ. Γεωργοπούλου, ‘Εργα οδοποιϊας και έργα σιδηροδρομικά’ [Road and rail construction works], 552-563. 114  He estimated that it would be possible to reach Milan from Piraeus within forty-one hours through Aulon and within forty-three through Durres. Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116  ‘Τα έργα Καλαμπάκας-Βέρροιας’ [Construction works Kalabaka-Veria], ΣΕ 6 (1932): 861.

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However, two years after the cancellation of the works, A. Xanthopoulos, a director of the state bureau controlling the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line, published a study in 1934 wherein he put forward many similar arguments to those cited above, stressing the importance of the completion of the existing sparse railway network in western Macedonia. He referred to the pre-war projects for the construction of lines in Macedonia such as the line from the Adriatic possibly from the port of Agioi Saranta through Ioannina and Grevena that would connect to the railway line Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria. In addition, he mentioned the line from the station Siatista on the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line through Kastoria up to Koritsa (Albania), the construction of which would one day constitute the connection of the Albanian railway network to the rest of the Balkan network. The KKV line, he pointed out, was important from both a military and economic point of view. Once again in the study of Xanthopoulos we read that: ‘The route from Poros up to Veria constitutes part of the grandiose plan for the railway connection of the Adriatic Sea to the Aegean Sea, connecting Epirus, which is totally deprived of any transportation network, to Thessalonica.’117 He noted that after the establishment of the connection of this line to the existing network to Constantinople, a trans-Balkan railway line would be created that would reach the Persian Gulf and would correspond to a new Iron Egnatia Road, expanding to the Middle East, the importance of which had also been recognized by the Romans.118 The line would be of both local and international importance. The connecting part (KKV) Poros-Grevena-Ioannina-Agioi Saranta (200 km approximately) would complete this plan. He noted ‘we think it will not stay incomplete for long, since its realization is of European interest.’ England, he added, was particularly interested in the project since a ferryboat service between Bridinsi and Agioi Saranta, similar to the communication of the English Channel Tunnel, would significantly shorten postal communications to India.119 Through the construction of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria railway, and its connection to both the network of Macedonia in Veria and the railways of Thessaly in Kalabaka, the transportation conditions necessary for that area’s development would be created, and communications with abandoned Western Macedonia would become 117  Αλ. Ξανθόπουλος, ‘Σκέψεις περί της εξελίξεως του σιδηροδρομικού δικτύου Δ. Μακεδονίας εν σχέσει με τον υπό κατασκευή Σιδηρόδρομον Καλαμπάκας-Κοζάνης-Βέρροιας (Κ.Κ.Β.),’ [Thoughts on the development of a railway network in Western Macedonia in relation to the railway under construction Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria], ΣΕ 7 (1934): 1224 – 1225. 118  Ibid, 1224-1225. 119  Ibid., 1225.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

possible. This area was particularly poor in roads, and consequently the railway under construction would favor its economic development.120 As in the case of the proposal of Vitali, so in the inter-war years the Iron Egnatia Road remained a ‘phantom’ railway line.121 The reasons of its failure were mainly economic. Albert Regnoul, technical representative of the French railways PLM, who was sent by the fiscal committee of the League of Nations to study and report the situation of the Greek railways, had stated in his report that even the thought of constructing new lines in the distant future was not permitted. Referring to the projects for constructing lines that would connect Epirus (through a territory that is mountainous and scarcely populated) with Ioannina and even further, after a suitable agreement, to Albania and up to Durres on the Adriatic coast, he commented: ‘On this however, not even a thought for the distant future. Besides, it is quite possible that the communication to Ioannina by automobiles over well-maintained roads would be permanently sufficient.’122

Consolidating Rail Connection to Europe The construction of the Kalabaka-Kozani-Veria line was one only of the terms of the Belgian contract. The other was the renovation of the line Athens to the northern borders. In fact, A. Matsas, a former director of the Hellenic State Railways and former minister of transport, discussing the Belgian contract noted that this originated from the need to reconstruct the Hellenic States’ Railways main artery Piraeus-Larissa-Old borders-Thessalonica. This had initially been constructed with a very weak infrastructure until the old borders of Greece. The circulation 120  Ibid. Other engineers also pleaded in favor of the completion of the line KKV to reach Sorovits (instead of Veria). 121  Τhe issue of the connection of an eastern European line was again discussed after WWII. Εustratiadis a director of the department responsible for construction works of the railways of Peloponnese proposed once more the establishment of a connection to the railways of continental Europe through Italy. In his study on the construction of a national railroad network (1954), Eustratiadis anticipated the construction of a railroad line in the northwest of the country from which traffic would be directed through a port in the Adriatic Sea to Italy. However, the examination of this project is beyond the time framework that this book covers. Δ. Γ. Ευστρατιάδου, Γενικό Σχέδιο Εθνικού Σιδηροδρομικού Δικτύου [A plan for a national railway network], Μέρος Πρώτον, Ανατύπωσις εκ του Περιοδικού ‘Συγκοινωνία’ Μάρτ.–Δεκέμβρ.1956, (Αθήναι 1959), one copy at the library of the chamber of commerce of Greece, doc no: 385 E. 122  A. Regnoul., ‘Οι Ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι και αι δυναταί βελτιώσεις αυτών [Possibilities for improvement of the Greek railways], 739.

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of international trains rendered this condition of the line a constant and serious danger so that its enhancement was regarded as extremely urgent.123 As I discussed in the previous section, the line from Athens to the northern borders, despite being the only line of ‘old Greece’ of international gauge, mostly had technical characteristics of a line of local character. In 1932, a director of the A district of the Hellenic State Railways by the name of Padelopoulos, discussed the financial exploitation of the line noting that: ‘Unfortunately, those responsible for constructing the line, without taking its future use into consideration, did not pay attention to the ground through which the line would pass. We inherited a feeble line with weak ground works which passes through infertile lands and unsound ground. For these reasons, the exploitation of the line requires great annual expenditure on strengthening the construction works and constructing additional protective works. Its coastal route means that the line has the steamships as its major competitors.’124 Padelopoulos argues that 1925-1926 were the years of many railway agreements for the procurement of new rolling stock. This rolling stock, because of its heavier load per axle, necessitated the strengthening of the line and construction works (e.g. bridges). Taking into consideration not only the needs of the use of the line but also military needs, additional rolling stock for the line were ordered.125 The Belgian contract also demanded additional material for the renovation of the line Athens to Larissa, twenty steam locomotives and 375 more freight cars.126 123  He mentioned that the line Athens to the northern borders had been constructed with very light iron bars and wooden sleepers placed at a distance to each other. The line was badly maintained during the war that for Greece lasted approximately ten years. Its superstructure and material were in a bad condition. The Belgian group seemed willing to lend to the Government twenty-one million drachmas asking only low interest. The government, wishing to minimize the dangers of the circulation of trains, established a contract according to which the Belgian group would lend Greece two parts of a loan amounting in total to twenty-one million dollars. The first part of the loan would be used for construction works and the government would need to pay it back within ten years. The second part of the loan would be used for the procurement of railway material and the government would have to pay it back within six years. The idea to construct new lines came up since, after the replacement of new bars and metal sleepers over a length of 350 km of railway line, the Greek government would have at its disposal 350 km of old ties that could be used elsewhere. Consequently, the government decided on the construction of new lines of 350 km where the old materials could be used. Ματσάς Αντ., ‘Η κατάστασις των σιδηροδρόμων εν Ελλάδι, τα ληπτέα μέτρα [Conditions of railways in Greece],’ ΤΧ 2 (1932) 807. 124  Παδελόπουλος, ‘Η εξέλιξις των ΣΕΚ’ [The railways of the Greek state], 345. 125  In particular ninety locomotives from the Steg and Scoda factories and 1300 freight cars from Ringhoffer had been ordered. Padelopoulos, ‘Η εξέλιξις των ΣΕΚ’ [The railways of the Greek state], 348. 126  A. Regnoul, ‘Οι Ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι και αι δυναταί βελτιώσεις αυτών’ [Possibilities for improvement of the Greek railways], 740; ‘Οι νέοι σιδηρόδρομοι Μακεδονίας’ [The new railways in Macedonia], ‘Εργα, 11/15, (1925), 270.



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Koronaios, engineer and director of public works in the ministry of aviation, notes in an article in the same year that: ‘The railway line is both before and particularly after the war in constant disorder: an effort had to be undertaken to transform the line from that of secondary to primary importance. A systematic activity of paving the line with cobbled-stones and replacing tracks and ties was undertaken. The line was renovated, the bridges were amplified, the stations were improved, and the tracks were substituted by new ones. The wooden ties were substituted from iron ones weighing eighty-five kilos each while the boxing was filled. As a consequence, the speed on the line was increased to seventy, seventy-five km.’127 As Maria Sinarelli observes, military interest was an important motivating factor behind this renovation. Indeed, the decisions to procure materials to renovate the line were taken on the twenty seventh August 1925 with the signing of the Belgian contract. The contract, as I mentioned above, was signed between the totalitarian government of Theodore Pangalos and the SCB. Pangalos disagreed with the status quo that had emerged after the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne. It was alleged that Pangalos nursed territorial desires on Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. In fact, during his dictatorship, the Greek army invaded Bulgaria.128 From the account of other engineers, it also appears that military interest was one of the many considerations that drove the large-scale renovation, also after the fall of the Pangalos dictatorship. According to Metaxas, who had served as a transport minister after the fall of Pangalos, the newly established coalition government, when discussing the validity of the Belgian contract, decided in favor of the reconstruction of the main railway axis in its section Athens to Larissa mainly for military reasons, the line as it was, being insufficient for bulk and military transportation. During the military expedition of the war of 1912 this line carried less than was expected when its construction had been decided.129 However, despite the apparent military motivation, international developments suggest that the changes undertaken might also have favored international railway 127  Παδελόπουλος, ‘Η εξέλιξις των ΣΕΚ’ [Railways of the Greek state], 341, 343. For a more detailed account of the changes in the technical constitution of the line Athens-Thessalonica in the interwar years see Γ. Π Βουγιούκα, ‘Μία επταετία των σιδηροδρόμων του ελληνικού κράτους’ [Seven years of the existence of the railways of the Greek state], Έργα 5 (1930): 537-545. 128 Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 108; Pepelasis Minoglou, ‘Phantom Rails and Roads,’ 33-49. 129  Μεταξά, ‘Η σιδηροδρομική πολιτική του ελληνικού κράτους’ [Railway politics of the Greek state], 424. This contract had been validated by the legislative decree of 1925. Consequently it was not possible to regard it as inept on the basis of the decision of the national assembly of the fifteenth of February 1927.

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traffic. In 1932, the RG reported that: ‘From May 22, the Simplon Orient Express will be accelerated and will reach Athens in time for passengers to catch the steamship to Egypt, which sails at 4.p.m., one hour and thirty five minutes before the train’s present time of arrival. Thus will be provided by way of Greece, the quickest route from Central Europe to Egypt... Not only is this route one of the most beautiful in Europe, but it is of particular interest in that a part of it traverses the area occupied by the allied troops during the war, and also that improvements undertaken during the past few years have been on a notable scale. The whole line from the Valley of Tempi right through to Athens, a distance of over 200 miles, has been completely re-laid with 89 lb. rails and steel sleepers, and all bridges have been strengthened to enable them to carry an axle load of 18 tons. Further, the line has been stone ballasted throughout. New and up-to-date rolling stock has been introduced and altogether the system brought up to first-class main line standards.’130 And whereas in the 1920s it took nearly five days on the journey, in 1930 the journey could be made within sixty-seven hours.131 Albert Regnoul, who was invited to study and report on the situation of the Greek railway network, observed that the line from north to south on the state network between Athens and Platy, where it meets the line Thessalonica-Florina, was equipped with new materials the firmness of which was disproportional to the corrosion that could be predicted for the future. The Belgian contract finally resulted in the state network procuring an excessive amount of steam locomotives and freight cars, exceeding to a great extent the needs of the network, including also the material from Kalabaka to Veria that remained unused.132

130  ‘The Railways of Greece,’ RG 56 (1932): 322. Also ‘The Hellenic State Railways; a brief description of the Railway System of the Greek Government,’ RG 56 (1932): 335. However, the RG reports, ‘The Simplon Orient Express arrives at Athens too late to connect with a steamer for Egypt... The Simplon Orient Express at present covers the 315 miles between Athens and Thessalonica in eleven hours twentyfive minutes. As a result of the increase in speed arranged at the recent time-table conference this will be rectified as from May 22, 1932, when the express will reach Athens at 1.10 p.m., allowing three hours and fifty minutes to catch the boat. The importance of this new service for travelers bound for Egypt will be realized when the following table giving the distances to Alexandria from the various ports of the Mediterranean is consulted: Piraeus to Alexandria 525 sea-miles, Bridinsi to Alexandria... 825 sea miles, Trieste to Alexandria .. 1,193 see miles, Genoa to Alexandria ...1,320 sea miles, Marseilles to Port Said ... 1.606 sea miles. Ibid., 334. 131  Ibid., 33. 132  Regnoul, ‘Οι ελληνικοί σιδηρόδρομοι’ [Greek railways], 740.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

Whatever the motives that led Greek governments to focus on improving the line from Athens to Larissa, the result of these efforts was that the hybridization of the railways of Greece increased. In 1940 the RG reported that the efforts to increase the capacity of the lines concentrated on the line Athens to the northern borders, whereas small-scale modifications occurred in the rest of the network. In June 1940 it was announced that the Hellenic State Railway had acquired the Piraeus-Athens-Peloponnese railway of 815 km (526 miles), the largest private railway company in Greece. This company had ceased to be profitable, owing to road competition and went into liquidation.133

Figure 5.9– The Technical Constitution of the Greek Railway, 1957. Source: Ευστρατιάδου, Γενικόν Σχέδιον Εθνικού Σιδηροδρομικού Δικτύου, 39.

Conclusion Griffiths has argued: ‘There are solid grounds for pointing out that integration is not a set of treaties or organizational frameworks but the degree to which policies, economies and societies of nation states were enmeshed, or integrated at a more fundamental level.'134 The case of Greece shows that the integration of the 133  ‘Hellenic State Railways,’ RG 73 (1940): 113. 134  Richard T. Griffiths, The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1957 (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1990), xi.

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railway network in some parts of Europe started within the nation-state. Scenarios for the connection to Europe were closely related to scenarios for promoting the economic development of the country and the need to upgrade the economic and industrial activity of certain regions of Greece. In this respect, the case of Greece supports the argument that the European and the national were co-constructed. In the Greek case, the prospect of a connection to the European railway network influenced the shape of the national railway network from its earliest formation. Embedded in the creation of a national railway network were concerns, prospects and visions for connecting to the European railways. The Greek railway network from the time of its conception was conceived as part and parcel of the emerging European traffic routes. Studying the case of Greece provides an insight to the importance of the developments within the national sphere, as far as the shape of the European railway network is concerned. Important decisions on the shape of the European railway network were taken within the national sphere. Transnational alliances, the tense relations with the Ottoman government for example, and the geographical configuration of the Balkans, were factors that influenced the shape of the Greek railways. The interplay between the national and the international was constantly an issue throughout the history of the Greek railways for the years studied in this chapter. The case of railway development of Greece also shows how European integration from a railway perspective concerned not only nation-states but also regions within nation-states. The engineers that argued for the importance of establishing a western connection to the European railway network noted that such a connection would not only provide an additional outlet of the Greek railway network to the broader European network, but also discussed the advantages of these railway lines for the development of the regions of Epirus and western Macedonia. Barbier looks at the way geographical and political factors influenced the shape of railway networks in the Balkans up to WWI. He notes that in certain cases, political difficulties led to the abandonment of certain itineraries: ‘As a consequence of the fact that the Macedonian question was resolved with the division between Albania (Turkey), Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, the old road Egnatia could not be constructed and the road stops, towards the east to Monastiri and Ohrid.’135 The study of the inter-war years leads to the same conclusion. The vision of creating an Iron Egnatia Road was put forward again from many sides. However, the 135  Barbier, ‘Entre les réseaux,’ 308.



5. Constructing the National, Constructing the European: Greece

political fragmentation in the Balkans seems to have made the realization of such an international project difficult. It seems that there were many competing visions of the route that the Iron Egnatia Road would follow, each of which would favor different states. Laurent Tissot has argued that European railways began as systems integrated at the national level. Railway administrations developed differing technical and administrative practices as they sought to optimize the performance of their local sub-networks rather than the performance of the European network as a whole.136 In Greece, this was true neither in the sphere of organization nor in the sphere of technical developments. Efforts to integrate with the railways of Europe and military interest resulted in networks that were unintegrated at a national level. Instead, a hybrid network emerged.

136  Tissot, ‘The Internationality of Railways,’ 302.

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6. Uncovering Railway Europe

6. Uncovering Railway Europe

Railway Internationalization Patterns The material discussed in this book provides an insight into two paradigms of internationalization that were expressed in the interwar years. The first paradigm involved constructing transnational railway arteries by reconfiguring the existing railway infrastructure and constructing new complementary lines. This paradigm also drew on technical developments, such as electrification and the construction of sub-marine tunnels. Construction of new lines did take place in the interwar years, but mainly within the nation state. As the chapter two indicates, proposals for establishing new international railway arteries were put forward during periods of international crisis. It was in these years that engineers and politicians put forward grandiose ideas for restructuring the railway infrastructure in Europe. This reveals that individuals looked at railways, transportation and infrastructures more generally as a means through which a new political order would be established. Those plans led to the establishment of the Simplon Orient Express, which provided a connection from western and central Europe to the East, avoiding territories of the central empires throughout the interwar years. Such projects could be seen as the voice of engineers proposing how to escape from international crisis, or as a criticism of the de-centralized and nationally focused way in which railway networks had developed till then. The words of Géo Gérald in his opening speech of the inter parliamentary union of December 1918 are characteristic of these ideas. In this he noted that ‘A new period of prosperity will open up for France, provided that all those who desire the reconstruction of our economic edifice co-ordinate their efforts... Thus, in order to repair the enormous mistake in the general route and timetables of our railways, which has resulted in the traffic of all the departments being concentrated on Paris, the creation of a line was proposed that would connect Switzerland to the Ocean. In order to attract traffic between the East and the two Americas to France, the design of

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an immense line was projected that would connect Bordeaux to Odessa through Lyon, Turin, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Belgrade and Bucharest...’1 However, these words have also broader implications for historiography on infrastructures and European integration. They show that communications, and railways more specifically, were seen and negotiated internationally as early as the first decades after WWI as a means of consolidating transnational alliances. They were part of thinking for the ‘simultaneous transnational network and society building’ that characterized the era.2 Such projects revived again in the years of the depression, as the seemingly individual effort of Barduzzi suggests. The rhetoric was now different, connected to projects for the political unification of Europe, and overcoming the economic crisis and unemployment that Europe was facing.3 In parallel to these appeals to reconfigure the railway network of Europe through new international arteries and services, national governments and railway administrations also operated within a second paradigm, which involved integration of national networks through the incremental standardization and the establishment of common regulations in both the field of legislation and administration. This was the pattern of the internationalization of the railways in the 19th century. International trains such as the Orient Express did run, but as interpreted currently in the literature, this was the result of a private initiative of an individual entrepreneur who pursued his commercial interest. In the years before WWI the Orient Express was running on infrastructure that had been designed to serve the interests of nation states. The construction of railways within the Balkan states did place railways into the imperialistic plans of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, these efforts were concentrated on gradually developing national railway networks and were shaped by the dependency of the Balkan countries and the Ottoman Empire on foreign capital, rather than common agreement on projects for constructing international railway arteries. Also in the interwar years, railway construction remained within the national sphere, while international organizations worked to ‘make the machine run’ in an efficient way rather than promoting

1  Géo Gérald et al., [L’] Atlantique Mer Noire, ‘Bordeaux-Odessa,’ ou ligne dite du 45 parallèle, Métropolitain de l’Europe, barrière antigermanique, (Paris: Le courrier franco American, (n.d.)): 7-8. 2  Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, ‘Networking Europe,’ History and Technology: Tensions of Europe, The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe 21 (2005): 25. 3  Such rhetoric was generated to other technological networks, such as roads and electricity. Aexander Gall, ‘Atlantropa, a Technological Vision of a United Europe,’ in Networking Europe, Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe 1850-2000, ed. Erik van de Vleuten, and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006); Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, ‘Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,’ Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 196-217.



6. Uncovering Railway Europe

the reconstruction of the network.4 It seems that such an approach resonated more strongly with the socio-political conditions of the period.

A Look behind the Curtain In this book I have shown that many actors participated in the negotiations on the shape of the railways of Europe in the interwar years. These actors promoted different scenarios for the internationalization of railways in interwar Europe. These scenarios, as I have shown here, were based on different ideas about the future development of Europe on the one hand, and on technical developments of the railway technology that altered their possibilities as means of transportation on the other hand. Such developments included the technologies for submarine tunnel construction; electrification, automatic couplers and more modern signaling systems that offered the opportunity to increase the capacity of the networks. Various proposals on how to reshape the European railways to accommodate the transition to a new socio-political order were put forward. Nation-state politics, and more specifically the competition for economic and political power in an international context were prevalent factors in the negotiations over the shape of European railways. Most nation-states attempted to gain economic and political power in an international context by creating arteries that would position their countries on international routes of passenger and commercial traffic. Furthermore they saw the establishment of international railway arteries as a means of integrating nation-states into broader transnational socio-political alliances. As historiography has documented, nation states competed for control of international overland traffic in the 19th century. In the 1840s, Belgium and the Netherlands were competing to connect their ports of Antwerp and Amsterdam through railways to the industrial Ruhr area of Germany.5 In central Europe Frenchmen were preoccupied with establishing a competitive alternative to the German transport system. In the 1830s Adolphe Thiers, one of the most influential politicians of the French July Monarchy envisioned a north-south rail axis from La Havre (France) to Algiers (Algeria) that would bring commercial and military advantages to France.6 The line would attract a big share of European 4  I am borrowing the term from Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 141. 5  Introduction, 10. 6  Adolphe Thiers was the French Minister of Commerce and Public Works at the period when the extent of the state’s role in railways first became a public issue. Allan Mitchell, The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815-1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000): 5.

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trade, thus ‘preventing this transit from falling into the hands of Germany and at the same time it would provide an avenue for French troop movement everywhere from the Belgian border to North Africa.’7 As the fifth chapter of this book shows, in south-eastern part of Europe the Greek state, facing the political obstacle of the Ottoman Empire, envisioned a connection to central and northern Europe through a railway artery that would cross western Greece, connect via ferry-boat to Italy, and cross the Italian peninsula vertically. While the European part of the Ottoman Empire had been connected to the railway network of Germany and Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the 20th century, the political rivalry with the Ottoman Empire prohibited the connection of the Greek railway network to Europe through the north. A connection through Italy seemed a politically feasible option. Early proposals for the construction of railway arteries that would connect the newly formed Greek state to the railway networks of Italy and consequently of France suggest that French and Italian interests sought to create new land routes that would bring them closer to Asia without having to pass through territories ‘controlled’ by Germany and Austria-Hungary.8 However geographical, economic and political factors prohibited the construction of such a line. As a consequence, the small Greek state at the edge of the Balkan Peninsula remained a ‘railway island’ until the end of WWI.9 In the second half of the 19th century, Germany and Austria-Hungary, due to their geographical position and their well-developed railway networks had gained a crucial role in accommodating an important part of the international flows of passengers and goods to the East.10 Indeed historiography has discussed the role of German and Austro-Hungarian interests in railway developments in the Balkan Peninsula and as part of their attempt to control the routes to the East.11 Particularly towards the turn of the century, Germany tried to expand its control of the routes to the east by undertaking the construction of the Baghdad railway.12 7  Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 5. 8  The connection of Vitali could not be established and remains a matter of speculation. 9  Aristotle Tympas and Irene Anastasiadou, ‘Constructing Balkan Europe: The Modern Greek Pursuit of an ‘Iron Egnatia,’’ in Networking Europe; Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, ed. Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006), 25-49. 10  Indicative is the case of the establishment of the Orient Express, the first international ‘train de luxe’ that run from Paris to Constantinople via Munich, Vienna, Budapest and Bucharest since 1883. George Behrend, The History of Wagons-Lits, 1875-1955 (Modern Transport Publ. Co. Ltd, 1959), 6-7. 11  Alexander Kostov, ‘Les Balkans et le réseau ferroviaire européen avant 1914,’ in B8: European Networks, 19th-20th Centuries: New Approaches to the Formation of a Transnational Transport and Communications System, ed. Andrea Giuntini, Albert Carreras and Michèle Merger (Milano: Università Bocconi, 1994), 93-103; Frederick Barbier, ‘Entre les réseaux? La péninsule balkanique revisitée,’ in Les Entreprises et leurs réseaux: Hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs, 19-20, ed. Michèle Merger and Dominique Barjot (Paris: Presses de l’université de Paris Sorbonne, 1998), 297-310. 12  McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway



6. Uncovering Railway Europe

As the material presented here shows, in the years following WWI other European powers attempted to counterbalance this influence and to create new land routes through Europe that would bring them closer to the Middle East and consequently to Asia and Eastern Africa. The major powers of the time were competing for control of the routes to the East, a competition that was also accompanied by the desire to increase their economic and political influence in the lands through which these railways would pass. This competition climaxed during WWI. After the outbreak of the war, representatives of regional, commercial and national political interests from the allied side put forward grandiose proposals for reconfiguring the European railways. These would bring the global traffic flows through Europe and European traffic flows through the areas of the allied and associated countries. This would improve the economy of certain regions and nations. In addition, as the proponents of these projects argued, they would bring the allied nations closer both economically and politically. In this way they would consolidate the military alliances created during the war and transform them into political and economic alliances. Such projects originated in France but found support also within commercial and engineering circles in Italy, Greece, Spain, Great Britain and the newly created countries of Central Europe. Another important point is that regional interest was also an important factor in pushing various actors to promote the internationalization of railways. As the analysis of the project of the 45th parallel shows, among the most ardent supporters of the construction of these lines were representatives of regional interests, such as the mayor of Lyon Edward Herriot, the professor of economic geography at Bordeaux Henri Lorin, and representatives of the commercial interests of these regions, such as the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux, Genoa and Turin were prominent in promoting the line at both a national and an international level. Competition between the major powers of the time was also expressed in specific technological choices. As I discussed in chapter three, the peace treaties included articles that concerned specific technological choices aiming at forcing Germany and the former enemy states to implement technologies preferred by the allies. Such was the case with specific types of brakes. Furthermore, the degree on which nation state politics influenced railway developments becomes apparent in the case of the establishment of the International Union of Railways (UIC). As I argued in chapter 2, this was a result of the desire of France and the newly created countries of central Europe to marginalize the influence of Germany in international railway affairs. While Germany had an important role into international (Westport Praeger, 2001).

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railway affairs before WWI, both through the Verein but also through its active role in the rest of the international bodies responsible for coordinating international railway traffic, the newly established UIC had its seat in Paris, a French president and its official language in the interwar years was French. Besides, as contemporary sources reveal, the convention on the international regime of railways was also partially a result of a French attempt to bind Germany to certain rules concerning international railway traffic. However, besides national political and commercial interests, more actors entered the debate on the shape of the railways of Europe in the interwar years. The newly created Transit Organization of the League of Nations promoted the principle of freedom of communications and transit established by the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It represented national governments of European but also extra-European countries. The UIC, by contrast, represented the interests of railway administrations mainly from Europe. It closely cooperated with national governments for the revision of the convention on the Technical Uniformity of Railways (1938). A new actor that promoted the interest of workers was the International Labor Office. As I discussed in the fourth chapter of this book, it undertook important action to promote the establishment of an international agreement on automatic couplers for the railways of Europe. The developments concerning the adoption of automatic couplers showed how different actors negotiated at an international scale the shape of the European railways. The issue was discussed by the ILO, which represented workers and concerns for their safety, the UIC, which represented the railway administrations and the Transit Organization, which represented governments. They exchanged studies and finally decided to establish an international committee to undertake common studies. Finally, as the fifth chapter shows, the shape of the European railways was negotiated within the nation state. The case of Greece shows that the connection to the European railways was negotiated in the Greek parliament. Different scenarios of how to connect to the European railway related to different scenarios on how the economic development of the Greek state could best be achieved. The case of Greece supports the argument that international considerations were in the interest of nation states in the interwar years. In the case of Greece, international railway building was a tool for nation state building. It is also significant to note that national interests did not contradict international interests. It is indeed the case that whenever international negotiations threatened national sovereignty, nation-states objected to surrendering their sovereignty. This becomes obvious in the discussions of the cession of electric power for the electrification of international railways but also during the negotiations for



6. Uncovering Railway Europe

a convention on the international regime of railways and the difficulty of establishing a binding convention of a specific character. Furthermore the case of Greece shows how the incorporation of the country to international flows of traffic was often seen as a part of strengthening the building of the nation state. This account has broader implications for the historiography on Europe and technological infrastructures. It shows that the development of railways in interwar Europe did not follow an internal logic of scale increase; instead railway choices at an international scale were negotiated among different actors representing many different interests. The shape of railroads in interwar Europe was the result of contextual factors such as political power games, events and aspirations, as well as expectations for the future of Europe.

In search of a European Approach to Railways Discussing the initiatives for the internationalization of railways, Tissot has argued that there was an established European railway network already in the 19th century.13 On the basis of the material presented in this book I argue that such a remark constitutes an anachronism. Initiatives for the internationalization of railways in Europe in the 19th century, but also in the interwar years, were not oriented towards a specific goal of creating a European network. On the contrary, as Tissot himself has argued for the case of the Berne convention, and as I have shown here in the negotiations for a convention on the international regime of railways, many of these initiatives were either taken in the interest of the nation-states, or at the service of different ideals, such as in the case of the League of Nations.14 Since the outbreak of WWI, as the material discussed here shows, plans to establish international railway arteries were related to rhetoric about transeuropean railway arteries and later in the 1930s, about creating a European railway network. However the 13  ‘Under the impulse of the small countries, the first to have this idea, a railway Europe was born initially from the needs of the traffic that remained the central point of any argumentation in favor of the composition of a new convention.’ Laurent Tissot, ‘Naissance d’ une Europe ferroviaire: La convention internationale de Berne (1890),’ in Les entreprises et leurs réseaux, 295. Tissot poses the following question: ‘Can we speak for a railway Europe in the years before the outbreak of WWI?’; Laurent Tissot, ‘Les modèles ferroviaires nationaux et la création d’ un système international de transports européens, 18701912. Coordination, intégration ou unification,’ Relations internationales 95 (1998): 313-27, 313. Finally, discussing the International Convention of Bern on railroad transport, he argues that, signed in 1890 by nine states, this marked the creation in commercial and administrative terms of a truly European railway. Laurent Tissot, ‘The Internationality of Railways: an Impossible Achievement,’ in Monica Burri Kilian T. Elsasser and David Gugerli, Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn, 1850-1970 (Zürich: Chronos, 2003), 265. 14  By the term ‘Europeanization’ I refer to concrete efforts of placing railways into the service of ideologies of European unification and the achievement of the political goal of integration at a European union.

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proponents of such plans were promoting regional and national interests. However, international organizations did not promote a specific European idea. Stone has argued that there was never a European railway network because there has never been a common vision of European railways. Indeed I agree with Stone that there was never a common vision of a European railway network. However, an ad hoc European railway network was created since the running of international traffic across borders was possible and was conducted in what is significant numbers. A more suitable research question for historical analysis is the role of railways in establishing transnational communities. This places the post-WWII efforts of the European Union to establish its envisioned community by constructing transnational railway arteries and improving the interoperability of the railways within a historical context in which railways were used historically as a means of attempting to create different transnational communities. Despite the fact that there was no shared European idea towards which the actors discussed here worked, interoperability of railways was created. Stone has pointed out the factors that have historically hampered the achievement of interoperability of railways in Europe.15 As the case of the automatic couplers reveals, there were certain technical parameters of the railway networks in Europe in which technical standardization proved difficult to achieve. Indeed, the case of the automatic couplers shows that the decentralized way of testing and implementing new technologies in the railway networks endangered the interoperability of railways in Europe. However, on the basis of the material presented here, it is legitimate to argue that a considerable degree of integration had been achieved as a result of the efforts already undertaken before the outbreak of the war, but also the action undertaken after it. The exchange of rolling stock at the frontiers in continental Europe was a common practice even before the outbreak of WWI.16 This becomes obvious also from the fact that the services of the Wagons-Lits Company proliferated in the interwar years, providing the opportunity for passengers and mail to cross borders without a change of carriage. Even in cases where the technical interoperability of the network was not ensured, or in itineraries where international trains services did not run, the work of the European timetable and through carriage conference ensured that passengers and commerce could travel across borders by spending the least amount of time necessary at the frontier. In fact, the European Timetable Conference seems to have been a remarkable instrument for centralizing administration of the European railways. Consequently I would 15  Bryan Stone, ‘Interoperability: How Railways Became European,’ in Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn, 237-243. 16  ‘European Wagon Exchange,’ RG 22 (1915): 245.



6. Uncovering Railway Europe

argue that a considerable degree of integration had been achieved in the railways of Europe in the interwar years. In this I agree with Wedgwood and Wheeler, who write that in the interwar years ‘Europe was functioning as a railway unit better than as a political or economic unit.’17 In addition, technical interoperability was not only achieved but also had some spillover effects. Historians have interpreted the field of railways as one of the primary fields where integration started. Tissot discussing developments in the nineteenth century has observed, ‘the internationalization of the railway could be viewed as the first step towards the internationalization of the society as a whole.’18 He goes on to add, ‘It is in the services of the communications and exchanges that the first elements of an international society emerged. Posts, telegraphs, railways, customs, have pushed towards establishing uniform legislation...’19 Such an argument seems to resonate with what in political theory is called a ‘functional spillover’ effect from the railway to the political and economic fields.20 As the introduction of numerous articles relating to railways into the Peace Treaties as well as the numerous conferences that were held in order to settle issues of international railway affairs, a considerable effort went into the standardizing railway traffic in the interwar years. As I discussed in chapter two, in the years when the political fragmentation of Europe increased, efforts to integrate the railway networks of central Europe increased. As the case of the negotiations in central Europe reveal, the re-establishment of international railway traffic was considered a necessary condition for the economic revival not only of the newly created countries of central Europe but also of Europe as a whole. In fact, here too a spillover effect is visible. As I discussed in chapter two of this book, the fluctuation of exchanges after WWI was recognized as one of the greatest barriers to re-establishing international 17  Ralph Lewis Wedgwood and J.E. Wheeler, International Rail Transport (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). 18  Tissot, ‘The Internationality of Railways,’ 271. 19  Tissot, ‘Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire,’ 295. 20  More specifically, the concept of a ‘functional spillover’ forms part of the neo-functionalist theory of European integration. A functional spillover consists of a process in which integration in one sector encourages other sectors to integrate as well. The main idea is that the introduction of integration in, for instance, the coal and steel industries will soon give rise to integration in the energy and transport sectors. Johan Schot, ‘Transnational Infrastructures and European Integration: A Historiographical and Empirical Exploration,’ 4. From the late 1950s up to the early ninety seventies neo-functionalist theory developed by political scientists dominated the historical understanding of European integration. Neo-functionalists derived their ideas about the importance of functional associations from an interwar functionalist set of theories. The idea is that the end of conflict and war can be engineered by creating international organizations that perform certain functions such as coal and steel production, transport, healthcare etc. These functions would create material interdependencies between governments and thus make conflict more difficult. In neo-functionalism, ‘functional spillover’ is only one part of three types of spillover: functional, political and cultural. Ibid.

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railway traffic in Europe, especially among the successor countries of the AustroHungarian Empire. In order to deal with such an important barrier to international railway traffic, the successor states proposed during the conference at Porto Rosa the establishment of a common monetary unit that would be used for international railway tariffs. The standardization of railway tariffs was one of the main preoccupations also of the Transit Organization. With this aim it worked to standardize the nomenclature of goods, which was a pre-condition for the establishment of international railway tariffs. The appeals for an article on electrification to be introduced to the convention on the international regime of railways, discussed in the third chapter of this thesis supports this argument. At last, many articles in the RG observed the political importance of establishing international railway services. As I mentioned in chapter three, the RG noted in discussing the European Time-table conference that this body was an important institution promoting international amity and facilitating the daily work of the European world. As such, its function was of great importance, as important as great political events, since through its work it promoted understanding and friendship between nations.’21

Suggestions for Further Research The research in this book does not by any means exhaust the issue. Instead additional research can complement the material presented here. Such may allow a reassessment of the conclusions of this book. Further research could be conducted in two directions: firstly an exploration of the questions and themes discussed in this book within the same time framework but focusing on material not yet explored in this book. Such can be a study of the use of railways in the interwar years. Information on this can allow revealing patterns of use at a transnational context both in the case of passenger and freight traffic. This can allow to better evaluate how railways and Europe were con-constructed, by favoring the integration of specific regions/and countries and amplifying the fragmentation of other. A study of the patterns of use of the railways in a transnational context in Europe will allow a better assessment of the amount of international railway traffic and thus allow a better interpretation of the emergence of an ‘ad hoc’ European railway. Further on, historians can look again at the history of the railway networks within nation states and study more thoroughly the degree in which international considerations shaped/ influenced the configuration of national railway networks. Two 21 

‘European Time-Table Conference,’ RG 51 (1929): 741.



6. Uncovering Railway Europe

methodological suggestions that might lead to different interpretations than the ones found in existing historiography are: first an appeal for studies that would not focus at the years of the construction and initial expansion of the railway networks (for most of the countries of Central and Western Europe, these were the years preceding the WWI); in contrast to study developments that followed this initial phase of expansion. Second, authors of such studies should look more closely at the technical configuration of the railway networks and debates within the nation state on the implementation of new technologies in lines where international railway traffic passed. Secondly, exploration of the years following the WWII. As I mentioned in the introduction of this book, the research presented here sets the stage for a better understanding and interpretations of the developments in the years after the WWII. The WWII disrupted the existing sociopolitical order and the existing regime of international railway communications of the interwar years. In the aftermath of it many actors attempted to rebuild Europe. However they planned a Europe significantly different from interwar Europe as far its political configuration was concerned. Not only the international railway regime but also the railway networks in Europe were to a large extent damaged during the years of WWII. An exploration of the role that contemporaries attributed to the re-construction of railways as a means for the (re-) construction of Europe, as well as a research of the (re-) shaping of national networks whenever this took place will allow to better estimate the role of railways in the (re)-construction of Europe. It will also shed light to competing visions of Europe in post WWII years. Furthermore it will provide an insight to the role of different groups, such as engineers and/or the labor movement in the construction of post war Europe. Consequently we will be able to investigate continuities and/or discontinuities in relation to transnational railway building in the interwar years. Overall, such research will allow to better assessing the role of railways in the construction of Europe in the twentieth century. It can consequently contribute to new interpretations of the history of European integration and consequently contribute to the emerging body of literature on infrastructures and European Integration.

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Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, from 1938 Committee for Communications and Transit, Minutes (1921-1931, 1934-1938) C.C.T./ P.V. Papers (1921-1943), C.C.T. 1- C.C.T. 731. Permanent Committee for Transport by Rail (before July 1926: subcommittee on Railway Traffic) Papers (1922-1937), C.C.T./ V.F.1- C.C.T./ V.F. 121. Verbatim Reports (1921), C.T./ V.F./ Compte Rendu 1–C.T./ V.F./ Compte Rendu 5. Papers, C.T.1–C.T. 28. Committee on Railways. Preparatory documents, 20/31/58 Barcelona Conference. Verbatim Records and Texts of the Recommendations Relative to the International Regime of Railways and of Recommendations Relative to Ports placed under International Regime. Geneva, League on Nations, 1921. Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Organization Sub-Committee: Report by M. Motta on the Constitution, Organization and Procedure of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Geneva: League of Nations, 1931, C.204. M.82.1931.VII [C.E.U.E./16] Report by the Secretary-General on Certain Technical Questions that have been dealt with by the League of Nations, C. 693. M 290. 1930. VII. Second General Conference on Communications and Transit. Papers, C.G.C.T.1– C.G.C.T. 36 Procès Verbal of the 1st Session held at Geneva, July 25-28,th C358. M. 254.1921. VIII. Railways Committee. Minutes, C.G.C.T./ V.F./ P.V. 1- C.G.C.T./ V.F/ P.V.10 Railways Committee. Papers, C.G.C.T./ V.F. 1- C.G.C.T./ V.F.3. Records and Texts Relating to the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Railways. C.28. M. 14.1924. VIII, Geneva, 1924. Mance, H.O., Report of the Transport Situation in Europe, C.C.T. 130. Restoration of the Means of Communication in Europe; Documents on the Application of the Transport Resolutions adopted by the Genoa Conference, A.64. 1923 VIII. Hostie, Jean François. The Organization of Transit and Communications of the League of Nations. Typewritten manuscript [a copy can be found at the library of the UNECE in Geneva] (n.d.).

International Labor Office

Automatic Couplings and the Safety of Railway Workers: Report on Statistics of Accidents due to Coupling and Uncoupling Operations. Geneva: ILO Studies and Reports, series F., second section, no. 1, 1924. Baduzzi, C.E., Mémorandum réserve pour un projet ferroviaire intereuropéen Asiatique ... Abrège pour le bureau international du travail (Maio 1931), M7/5/34. Minutes of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office, 21st session (GenevaJanuary 1924) to 85th Session (London 25-27 October 1938).

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

Functions, Means of Action and Inter-relationships of International Railway Transport Bodies, Inland Transport Committee. Geneva, 1949, ECE, TRANS/SC. 2/7, Rev.



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Summary

Most conventional histories that address the creation and development of railway networks start from national developments. Recent scholarship on this topic, however, has stressed the importance of formulating a transnational perspective on technological developments and infrastructural developments in particular. In this book I deal with railway developments in interwar Europe from a transnational perspective. My aim is to identify the actors that drove the internationalization of railways in interwar Europe and to examine their motivations. The materials used for writing this book were collected from archives of international organizations that played an important role in promoting international co-operation in railway affairs during the interwar years, as well as from railway journals of the period and secondary literature. In the first chapter I discuss the various proposals for the construction of transnational railway arteries in interwar Europe. As early as world war one, engineers and politicians began to formulate projects for the construction of Trans European railway arteries. Even if these projects were not realized, I argue here, they are highly important for understanding the historical and political dynamics of Europe. Among other things they show how in the interwar years railways were pushed to serve the goal of Europe’s socio-political reorganization and to consolidate transnational alliances. In the second chapter I consider the various trajectories of international cooperation involved. A number of international bodies were geared to promoting the integration of Europe’s railway network. They worked on establishing international regulation and international standards that would facilitate railway traffic across borders. After presenting the most important of these bodies I look more closely at two developments. First I concentrate on the attempt to establish a convention on the International Regime of Railways (1923) within the context of the newly created League of Nations, whereby I assess the historical importance of this League’s attempt to put railways at the service of realizing its envisioned, global community. Second, I discuss the attempts of the allied nations to counterbalance the German influence in international railway affairs in the years preceding World War One. A specific result of this effort was the establishment of the International Union of Railways (1922).

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The third chapter, which centres on the limitations of the effort towards the internationalization of railways in the interwar years, is divided into two parts. In the first part I discuss the development of the services of the international sleeping car company in interwar Europe (Wagons-Lits), which offers a general indication of Europe’s international railway passenger services and its level of internationalization during the interwar era. This chapter’s second part, by contrast, focuses on problems and challenges of railway internationalization at that time. More specifically I look at two failed efforts to establish international agreement on the standardization of technological features, the case of electrification and that of the automatic coupler. Chapter four provides a case study of railway development in one European nation state, Greece. My argument in this chapter starts from the assumption that the internationalization of European railways should also be looked at from a national perspective. The national context and the international context, after all, do not automatically constitute two conflicting spheres of interest. By zooming in on the case of Greece, I discuss how relevant developments at both the European level and the national level of Greece were co-constructed. Finally, in the concluding chapter I consider the two dominant paradigms of internationalization of railways in Europe during the interwar years. One paradigm concerned the construction of transnational railway arteries, while the other concerned the decentralized standardization of technical, legislative and administrative aspects of international railway traffic. As my argument in this book underscores, the second paradigm prevailed in the interwar years. Furthermore, the material presented in this book has broader implications for the historiography of both the internationalization of railways in Europe and European concerns in general. Although I conclude that an ad hoc European railway network was created in the interwar years, there was no shared European vision of railways. By contrast, the actors that promoted the internationalization of railways did so with having quite different transnational alliances in mind. This conclusion situates the recent European Union efforts to create trans European railway arteries in a broader historical context, one in which different actors have tried to put railways at the service of realizing political economic transnational alliances. As such the research presented in this book gives rise to new questions about the internationalization of railways and the shaping of contemporary Europe.



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Curriculum Vitae

Irene Anastasiadou (1977) holds a bachelor’s degree in history and philosophy of science from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (1995) and a master’s degree of the interdisciplinary program on history and philosophy of science and technology from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and the National Polytechnic University of Athens. She wrote her Master’s thesis on the co-construction of railways in modern-Greece and the emergence of a Greek engineering community. She was awarded a fellowship from the Greek Science Foundation for conducting her master study in Greece. In 2003 she was appointed a PhD student at the Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands in the context of the research project entitled Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe (TIE). Her PhD research concerned transnational railway developments in interwar Europe. In the context of her research she attended several international workshops and conferences. She participated in the meetings of the Networking Europe group of the Tensions of Europe program since 2002. In parallel she attended various workshops and conferences of the International Associations for Transport, Traffic and Mobility (T2M) and of the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT) where she presented papers relating to her research. Being a member of both associations she accepted with honor the award of international scholar of SHOT for the years 2005 to 2008. Next to her own PhD research she co-operated with other scholars in common publications and conference presentation. From September 2009 to August 2010, she worked as a post-doc researcher at the Eindhoven University of Technology. Her research was financed by the Eurocores, Inventing Europe, and the KSI research networks.

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Appendices 271

Appendix I Timeline of Conferences and Conventions held in the early years after the war, concerning railways:

Bodies concerned with issues arising out of the Peace Treaties and with future international relations regarding communications and transit. – 1919, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railway. Aim: to draft the articles concerning ports, waterways and railways to be introduced to the Peace Treaties. Membership: fifteen members two for each of the great powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and five elected by all the powers with special interests. → 1920, International Commission of Enquiry for Communications and Transit. Membership: representatives of several neutral countries in addition to representatives of most of the allied powers. Aim: to prepare draft conventions on freedom of transit, international rivers and waterways, and a draft resolution regarding an international regime for certain ports → 1920, February 18, Provisional Communications and Transit Committee of the League. Aim: to continue the work originally started by the Peace Conference of giving effect to Article 23 (e) of the Covenant of the League, by elaborating draft general Conventions or Recommendations of Freedom of Transit, the Right of landlocked states to a Maritime Flag, and on Waterways, Railways and Ports of International Concern, together with draft Statutes for the Permanent Communications and Transit Organization of the League → March 1921, 1st General Conference on Communications and Transit (League of Nations), participation of representatives of 44 states, Conventions or Recommendations were adopted on all the above subjects. Establishment of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. Reconstruction in Central Europe: – February 1919, Communication Section of the Supreme Economic council of the allies. Membership: consisted of representatives of America, Great

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Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, Marshal Foch, the British Naval Section and the French Foreign Office. Aim: to secure the necessary transport for the convenience of relief foodstuffs to Central Europe, to assist the different administrations in their first crisis of reconstruction and reorganization both by the collaboration of experts and by the supply of locomotives and rolling stock and of materials purchased out of relief credits, to promote international traffic until the administrations had established direct relations. Membership: representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium to which were attached representatives of Marshal Foch, the British Naval Section and the French Foreign Office. Early 1920: Committee of Circulation, Vienna. It brought into collective relations responsible representatives of the railway administrations of all the Succession states of Austria-Hungary. → November 1921, Porto Rosa Conference: an arrangement to mark provisionally the rolling-stock previously belonging to the railways of Austria-Hungary pending its permanent allocation, thus rendering possible free international circulation. Owing to the growing appreciation of the need for taking measures to improve communications between the Succession States of the Austria-Hungary and in order to facilitate the simultaneous and reciprocal application of the various measures agreed upon in principle. Re-Establishment of the pre-war regime of communications – October 1920, Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and Through Tickets (under the auspices of the League): as a result of this conference personal relations were re-established between experts of the different countries and important unanimous decisions taken which oriented the efforts of those countries in a common direction. – May 1921, Streza Convention, Regolamento Internazionale Veicoli (RIV), Regolamento Internazionale Carozze (RIC, 1921), came into force, January 1st 1922, formation of the International Wagons Union, “Union pour l’utilisation des voitures et fourgons en trafic internationale Aimed at: the resumption of the international circulation of wagons in Europe. This convention both simplified the pre-war arrangements and secured the adoption of a uniform system of wagon exchange on the Continental Standard Gauge Railways of Europe. – January 1922, Conference on Passport Formalities, Gratz, participation: representatives of the Succession States. – May 1922, Economic Conference Genoa, it adopted several resolutions on transport matters and requested the League to use its good offices to further their execution.



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– October 1922, Conference in Paris, creation of the International Union of Railways. – June 1923, Conference for the revision of the Berne Convention, revision of the Convention and its extension to cover passenger traffic and their luggage.

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Appendix II Schedule of International Expresses in the 1930s

Figure 4.7– The table is showing international expresses that were running in the year 1930. Source: Wiener, ‘Compagnie internationale des wagons-Lits et des grands express européens,’ 234. Figure 4.6– Many new international expresses were created in the decade 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. The table is showing the new Grand European Expresses of the Wagons-Lits since 1913. Source: Wiener, ‘La compagnie internationale des wagons-lits et des grands express européens,’ 234.



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Appendix III List of Illustrations

2.1. Railways, Alpine Mountains and European Commerce 2.2. Central European Traffic Routes 2.3. Proposals for Improvement of Communications Western France 2.4. The 45th Parallel 2.5. Inter-Allied Railway 2.6. Railway Line Bordeaux–Odessa 2.7. Bordeaux and Odessa, head (s) of the Line of the 45th Parallel 2.8. The 45th Parallel as an Anti-Germanic Barrier 2.9. The 45th Parallel as an Anti-Germanic Barrier 2.10. New Railway Artery would Replace Orient Express 2.11. Milan-Belgrade at the Intersection of Transit Routes under Modification. 2.12. Simplon Orient Express 2.13. Simplon Orient Express from Paris to Athens 2.14. Railway Paris Dakar 2.15. Global Traffic Routes in Bressler’s Project 2.16. Railway Arteries in the Project of Barduzzi 2.17. Europe A and B would be United through Railways 2.18. Connection of Europe to Africa in Bressler’s project 3.1. New Political Order in the Aftermath of WWI 3.2. Membership of the International Railway Union 4.1. Simplon Orient Express 4.2. The Orient Express, the Alberg–Orient Express, and their Complementary Branches. 4.3. The Simplon Orient Express and the Taurus Express 4.4. Itineraries of ‘Great Expresses’ of Wagons-Lits 4.5. European International Expresses 4.6. International Expresses in 1920s (Appendix ii) 4.7. International Expresses in 1930s (Appendix ii) 5.1. Vitali’s Construction Plan of Athens-Vonitsa Line 5.2. Political Map of Europe in 1871 5.3. Political Map of Greece in the Second Half of the 19th Century. 5.4. Greek Railways in 1919 5.5. Political Borders in the Balkans, 1930s 5.6. Agapitos’ Proposed Line 5.7. Positioning Greece to the Southern European Railway Artery 5.8. Political Map of Europe, 1930s 5.9. The Technical Constitution of the Greek Railway, 1957

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