Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies 9780773595415

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
PART TWO: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies
Consociational Democracy
A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon
The Principles of Majority and Proportionality
On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland
PART THREE: Applications and Illustrations: Europe
The Netherlands: The Influence of Denominationalism on Social Life and Organizational Patterns
The Netherlands: The Rules of the Game
Austria: The Three Lager and the First Republic
Austria: The Legitimizing Role of Political Parties
Belgium: Conflict and Compromise
Switzerland: Geography of the Swiss Party System
PART FOUR: Applications and Illustrations: Canada
Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System
Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism
The Province of Canada: The Emergence of Consociational Politics
The Federal Bargain: The Contractarian Basis of Confederation
Consociationalism at Provincial Level: The Erosion of Dualism in Manitoba 1870-1890
Epilogue
Select Biblography
Notes on Authors

Citation preview

Consociational Democracy Political A ccommodation in Segmented Societies

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Edited and with Original Essays by Kenneth D. M c R a e

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The Carleton Library No. 79

M cC lelland and Stew art L im ited

UQ

T H E C A R L E T O N LIB RA RY A series o f C an ad ian reprints and new collections o f source m aterial relating to C an ad a, issued un d er the editorial supervision o f the Institute o f C anadian Studies o f C arleton University, O ttaw a. D IR E C T O R O F T H E IN S T IT U T E

Davidson Dunton G E N E R A L E D IT O R

M ichael G narow ski E X E C U T IV E E D IT O R

Jam es H. M arsh E D IT O R IA L B O A R D

B. C arm an Bickerton I H istory) D ennis Forccse I Sociology I J. G eorge Neuspiel I L aw ) T hom as K. Rym es I Econom ics) Derek G . Sm ith (A nth ro p o lo g y) M ichael S. W hittington (P o liticalScience)

© M cC lelland a n d Stew a rt L im ited. 1974

A L L R IG H T S R E S E R V E D

0-7710-9779-4 The C anadian Publishers M cClelland and Stew art Limited 25 Hollinger Road. T o ro n to 374

Printed and bound in C anada

M IS ^ c.S

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CONTENTS P R E F A C E , vii PA R T ONE: IN T R O D U C T IO N I P A R T TW O : •^Theoretical and C om parative Perspectives, 29 , Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Dem ocracies Val R. Lorwin, 33 • 1 C onsociational Democracy Arend Lijphart, 70 M A N on-C om petitive Pattern of Conflict M anagem ent in Liberal Democracies: The Case o f Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon G erh ard Lehmbruch, 90 » The Principles o f M ajority and Proportionality Jiirg Steiner, 98 •j^ O n B uilding C o n so ciatio n al N atio n s: T he C ases o f the ^ N etherlands and Switzerland H ans D aalder, 107 PA RT THREE: A pplications and Illustrations: Europe, 125 The Netherlands: T he Influence o f D enom inationalism on Social Life and O rganizational Patterns J. P. Kruijt, 128 The N etherlands: The Rules of the G am e Arend Lijphart, 137 Austria: The Three Lager and the First Republic Alfred D iam ant, 150 Austria: The Legitimizing Role o f Political Parties Peter Pulzer. 157 Belgium: Conflict and C om prom ise Val R. Lorw in, 179 Switzerland: G eography o f the Swiss Party System Roger G irod, 207

PA RT FO U R : A pplications and Illustrations: C anada, 235 C onsociationalism and the C anadian Political System K . D. M cR ae, 238 Consociational D emocracy and C anadian Federalism S. J. R. N oel, 262 T he Province of C anada: T he Emergence of C onsociational Politics W illiam O rm sby, 269 T he Federal Bargain: T he C ontractarian Basis of C onfederation - G eorge F. G . Stanley, 275 C o n so ciatio n alism a t Provincial Level: T h e E rosion of Dualism in M anitoba, 1870-1890 Janice Staples, 288 E P IL O G U E , 300 S E L E C T B IB L IO G R A P H Y . 303 N O T E S O N A U T H O R S , 309

PREFA CE

This book represents a by-product o f a larger study o f linguistic pluralism in several societies that has been in progress for several years. If the present study has any precise inspiration it originates not so much from anything read in the literature as from living tem porarily in Belgium and Switzerland during 1969-70 and becoming modestly acquainted with the political process o f those two countries at first hand. F or a C anadian it was a novel experience to observe political systems that em phasize the contin­ uous adjustm ent o f sharply diversified and clearly articulated interests. If the results of this adjustm ent seem som ew hat nebu­ lous and inconclusive from a distance, what stands out on closer acquaintance is the relatively high level o f responsiveness o f the process itself. O ne soon senses that in these countries, as com ­ pared to the m ore fam iliar A nglo-A m erican model, the m ajor parties and interest groups are continuously and formally involved in policy discussion and decision-m aking. T he experience o f living in Belgium and Switzerland reinforced for me two personal convictions th at had been growing since the early 1960’s. The first is that the political traditions of Western democracies are highly diversified and the significance o f any particular country's political system is not a function o f its size or population. Those who set out in the 1970’s to refloct upon or borrow from the political traditions o f the West may well find that the experience o f som e o f the sm aller and lesser known dem ocracies is most worthy o f attention and most relevant to their situation. The second conviction is that C anadians, whatever their other advantages and providential blessings, do not possess, as they often assume, the best political system in the world. There is evidence that unquestioning acceptance o f A nglo-American norm s in the C anadian political system has not served C anada well, and that closer study m ight suggest m odifications that would m ake that system m ore responsive to C an ad a's diversified social structure. Many C anadians have envisioned a political system that w ould fashion a m ore integrated C anadian society: the real prob­ lem is to find one that will reflect and support its continuing diversity. In the 1960’s that problem becam e m ore urgent. M any C anadi­ ans, French-speaking and English-speaking alike, concluded that the C anadian federation was doom ed and that French and Eng­ lish C anadians would go their separate ways through the political independence o f Q uebec. I do not accept the need for such a

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solution. I do accept that it is im perative to explore, with urgency, im agination, and willingness to innovate, just how that federation may be continued and adapted so as to accom m odate and reconcile forces that are threatening to tear it apart. T he readings in this volum e have been chosen with several m odest but distinct objectives in view: to indicate how the suc­ cessful accom m odation of serious political cleavages in certain countries has given rise to the concept o f consociational dem oc­ racy in the recent literature of political science; to identify and analyze the main approaches to the consociational them e in its broader sense; to illustrate m ore fully the European settings in which consociational political systems have arisen; to consider how far the consociational model may be useful in understanding the C anadian political system; and to raise for further discussion the question of using the consociational model norm atively or prescriptively, in C anada and elsewhere, as a criterion for evaluat­ ing the past perform ance o f political systems and shaping their future developm ent. This book has no precise solutions for the present crisis in C anadian federalism. It offers, at the most, a first small guidepost for a journey that may prove long and arduous, a journey whose end lies far out o f sight. In preparing this volum e I have had encouragem ent and assist­ ance from many sources, and I should like to express my thanks in- som e small m easure here: to the C anada Council for a Leave Fellowship in 1969-70 and to C arleton University for the sabbati­ cal leave that gave m e a first-hand glimpse o f consociational politics; to the organizers o f the 1972 Q uebec Round Table on Multilingual Political Systems, jointly sponsored by the Interna­ tional Political Science Association and the International Centre for Research on Bilingualism, for the opportunity to explore the them e in detail; and to the Board o f D irectors o f the Interna­ tional C entre for Research on Bilingualism at Laval University for allowing republication in this collection o f my own two papers, which are to appear in the Round T able proceedings in slightly different form. The original drafts o f these tw o papers have been much im proved as a result of com m ents and friendly criticism by Val Lorwin, John Meisel, Jean Laponce, W illiam M ackey, and A lbert V erdoodt. I have also benefited from discus­ sions about consociationalism with tw o o f our doctoral candidates a t C a rle to n , Ilja Scholten and Jim M cA llister. In the m an y and diverse tasks o f preparing the volum e as a whole I have had generous assistance from my wife and from my secretary, Mrs. M aureen Sayers. A final note of thanks must go to the authors and original' publishers of the other contributions to the volume for their prom pt cooperation in meeting a tight publication deadline, and

PREFACE

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particularly to G erhard Lehm bruch and Val Lorwin for allowing papers already well known and widely cited to be printed for the first tim e in this collection. O ttaw a, August 1973.

PARTI INTRODUCTION K enneth D. M cR ae

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C O NSO CIATION A L DEM OCRACY

TH R EE

APPROACHES TO

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L

DEM OCRACY

In the 1950’s, when the study o f politics shifted from a traditional \ \ concern with formal institutions to an interest in the political process, the classification o f W estern-style dem ocratic regimes looked deceptively simple. The earliest typologies tended to con­ trast stable tw o-party systems based on alternating majority gov­ ernm ents with m ore volatile m ulti-party systems based on fluc­ tuating ministerial coalitions. M ost developed countries of the W est seem ed to fit one or other o f these categories. The first was exemplified in the U nited States, the U nited K ingdom , a n d with a few apparently negligible a b e rr a tio n s -th e countries o f the Old C om m onw ealth. The second category covered, broadly speaking, the countries o f C ontinental E urope France, Italy, G erm any, and the other European democracies. W hen it was noted that som e of the sm aller countries did not empirically bear out the apparent correlation between ministerial stability and the num ber o f significant parties in the legislature, there was a ten d ­ ency to dismiss these examples as deviant cases, o r as an interm e­ diate category com bining characteristics o f the other tw o .1 Besides, these smaller countries rem ained virtual lerrae incognitae to most political scientists and as such did not unduly disturb the sym m etry of theory. Finally, since the study o f politics in the developing world was just getting under way, there was more interest in testing theoretical m odels against the em ergent political systems o f the T hird W orld. T he I960's brought an increased sophistication in the develop­ m ent o f models and a wider range o f questions for analysis. The stability o f regimes was differentiated from ministerial stability. Political integration and nation building, questions of burning concern to developing countries, were studied in the older W est­ ern societies as well. T here was a growing realization that the m ajor powers o f the W est were not the only possible m odels for the developing world. The U nited States may have been the first new nation, but was its pattern o f social and political develop­ m ent the most relevant one for those em ancipated m ore recently? By this tim e the T hird World had been developing som e distinc­ tive political patterns o f its own, and this innovation in turn stim ulated a closer look at variations in the political experience of the W est. Spe^fically, the political processes of the long neglected smaller dem ocracies o f W estern Europe attracted a share o f this increased attention. By the late 1960’s the result was a rapidly grow ing literature on these countries which has im portant impli1 A well known exam ple is G . A. A lm ond. “ C om parative Political System s,” Jo urnal o f P olitics. Vol. 18 (1956), 391-409.

INTRODUCTION

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cations both for theory form ation and for possible application in other parts o f the world. My concern in this book is not with the sm aller European dem ocracies in general, but with certain patterns o f social struc­ ture and political behavior that have been exemplified most sharply in the N etherlands. Belgium, A ustria and Switzerland. All fou r o f these countries have been characterized by substantial I cleavages in social structure in addition to those arising from socio-econom ic dillerences, cleavages founded on broad_jdeok)gi- I cal o r ^religious foundations. In general their political parties and ^ voluntary associations and to a degree even their formal govern­ mental in s titu tio n s -h ave been structured so as to acknowledge and reinforce these cleavages. They have all tended tow ards multj-p a rty ■systems' in -w h lg h .Jio single p a r t y jcan d o m in a te the legislature. Nevertheless all four countries have been able to develop stable, effective governm ents com m anding the support of a broad sector o f the legislature. All four have successfully accom ­ m odated a degree o f social and ideological cleavage that else­ w here has reduced m u lti-p arty system s to paralysis and chronic instability. The apparent paradox o f strong social fragm entation com bined with political efficiency and stability has led a num ber o f w riters to consider these four countries— along with certain others that are som etim es linked with th em — as a separate cate­ gory in the typology o f democracies. Before proceeding further we should note that a rather varied terminology has been applied to these patterns and processes. Val Lorwin has used the term segm ented pluralism , and the term is also used by other w riters.2 T he term “segm ented” here is used to distinguish it from the m ore fam iliar pluralism of A m erican polit­ ical literature, founded on overlapping and cross-cutting m em ber­ ships; others have tried to m ake the sam e distinction by using the term vertical pluralism . ’ Perhaps m ore widely known is the expression consociational dem ocracy which A rend Lijphart has proppsed as a third alternative to the centripetal (hom ogeneous and stable) and the centrifugal (fragmented and unstable) types

V. R . Lorwin, "Segm ented Pluralism ,” C om parative Politics, Vol. 3 (1971), 141-175 [below, 33-69); G . Lehm bruch, “ Segm ented Plural­ ism an d P olitical S trateg ies in C o n tin e n ta l E u ro p e: In tern al and External C onditions o f ‘C o ncordant D em ocracy’” (P aper presented at the T orino R ound T able o f the International Political Science A ssociation. 1969). 3 See the special issue o f S o c ia l C o m pass on “ V ertical p lu ra lism ,” Vol. 9. Nos. 1-2(1962).

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developed by earlier theorists.4 G erh ard Lehm bruch uses the term "c o n c o rd a n t” d em o cra cy, o r K o n k o rd a n zd e m o k ra tie , w hich em phasizes how elite decisions are reached by mutual agreem ent rather than by m ajority rule.- Still another term is Proporzdemokra tie or “ proportional” dem ocracy, which, calls attention to the balanced distribution o f appointm ents and patronage am ongst the coalition partners.6 In turn, Proporz in the strict sense is a variable concept and must be distinguished from systems which lean tow ards a fixed equality (P aritdt). Some other term s are found in relation to specific countries. L ijphart’s longer study of the N etherlands is described as a politics o f accom m odation,1 and Bluhm refers to the reconstruction o f the A ustrian political system after the Second W orld W ar as a contractarian dem ocracy} W hile I propose to use consociational dem ocracy o r consociationalism as the most convenient generic term s for the p henom ­ ena that we shall exam ine, these variations in term inology are nevertheless im portant. Far from being simply exchangeable syn­ onyms, they have different overtones and resonances. They call attention to the fact that different analysts have emphasized dif­ ferent aspects o f the political systems of the countries concerned, and in this way they constitute a first step tow ards m ore system ­ atic distinctions. 4 A . L ijphart, “ Typologies o f D em ocratic System s", Com parative Pol­ itical Stu d ies, Vol. 1 (1968), 17-35, and “ C onsociational D em oc­ ra c y ” , W o rld P o litic s, V ol. 21 (1969), 2 07-225 [below , 70-89]; H . D aalder, “ O n Building C onsociational N ations: the C ases o f the N eth erlan d s an d S w itzerland,” International S o cia l Science Journal. Vol. 23 (1971), 355-370 [below, 107-124] and “ T h e C onsociational D em ocracy T hem e: a Review A rticle,” W orld Politics (forthcom ­ ing); R . P. Stiefbold, “ E lite-M ass O pinion S tructure and C om m uni­ cation Flow in a C onsociational D em ocracy (A ustria)” (P aper pre­ sented to the A nnual M eeting o f th e A m erican Political Science A ssociation, C hicago, 1968). 5 G . Lehm bruch, “ K onkordanzdem okratie im politischen System der Schweiz: Ein L iteraturbericht,” Politische V ierteljahresschrift, Vol. 9 (1968), 443-459, and also his “ Segm ented Pluralism an d Political Strategies in C ontinental E urope.” 6 G . Lehm bruch, P roporzdem okratie: P olitisches S y s te m und poli­ tische K u ltu r in d e r Sch w eiz und in O sterreich (Tubingen, 1967); J. Steiner, “ M ajorz und P ro p o rz", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 11 (1970), 139-146. 7 A . L ijphart, The P olitics o f A ccom m odation: Pluralism and D em oc­ racy in the N etherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968). * W . T . Bluhm . “ N ation-B uilding: T he C ase o f A u stria,” P olity, Vol. 1 (1968), 149-177, and also his “ Political Integration, C ultural Inte­ gration and Econom ic D evelopm ent” (P aper presented to the Eighth W orld Congress o f the International Political Science A ssociation, M unich, 1970).

IN TRO D U CTIO N

5

To state the central issue as briefly as possible, the existing literature suggests that consociationalism has been approached from three principal standpoints: H As a pattern o f social structure, em phasizing the degree of religious, ideological, cultural o r linguistic segm entation in the society itself; 2) As a pattern o f elite behavior and mass-elite relationships, em phasizing the processes o f decision-m aking and conflict regula­ tion; 3) As an underlying characteristic of the political culture aris­ ing from historical circumstances that may antedate the period o f mass politics. O f course in any given situation none o f these elem ents will be lound in total isolation. The com bination will vary from country ,to country, and in the literature to date the emphasis has also varied from one author to another. However it seems both possi­ ble and useful for analytical purposes to isolate the structural, the behavioral-attitudinal, and the historical-traditional com ponents o f consociationalism and to exam ine them separately. O ne can then assess the relative im portance of each com ponent in those countries that are generally considered to have consociational political systems. W hen this has been done it should be possible to identify and analyse aspects o f consociationalism in countries where it is only imperfectly realized and also to consider it in the context of other kinds o f social cleavage than the religiousideological dim ension that constitutes its usual setting in Europe. C o n sociationa lism as se g m e n te d so cia l stru c tu re . T h e first approach to consociationalism , which is perhaps best exemplified in the w ork o f L orw in, is to see it as a function o f the structure o f social cleavage. The m ore completely a society is segm ented around a single cleavage line, the m ore it is an appropriate site for the developm ent o f consociational politics. But this outcom e is not a certainty, only a possibility. The hallm ark o f this approach is to begin from institutionalized cleavage structures and then observe to what extent elem ents o f cohesion and cooperation actually emerge in the political system. As Lorwin has expressed it: L ijp h a rt’s d efin itio n is p ut in term s o f th e “ overarch in g cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim o f c o u n teractin g d isin teg ratin g ten d en cies in the sy stem ” (“ Typologies," p. 21). I should rather define the system in term s of the bases o f party form ation and voluntary associa­ tion and leave open the question o f elite cooperation and outcom es. N ot building effective elite cooperation into the definition m akes one m ore likely to exam ine the conditions

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C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

which induce, and those which inhibit or frustrate, such cooperation.9 In the four European cases that we shall exam ine, the prim ary cleavage is religious and ideological. The developm ent o f mass politics in the C atholic or partially C atholic dem ocracies o f W est­ ern Europe has led typically to a tripartite division o f social organization and a corresponding structure o f m ajor political p ar­ ties, comprising in general term s a R om an Catholic, a secular liberal and a socialist sector. These three categories apply fairly directly to A ustria and Belgium, and also with m inor variations to Switzerland (where the farm ers have a fourth significant party and corresponding interest groups) and to the N etherlands (where Calvinism has developed its own social sector and its own reli­ giously oriented parties). In o th er settings segm entation can run along other cleavage lines, such as language, race, caste, o r social class. But the requirem ent for segm ented pluralism would seem to be that the cleavage in question should be sufficiently intense and durable to give m em bers o f the respective groups a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation th at is different from that o f other sectors, a raison d 'etre for m aintaining organized segm entation. In som e countries the linguistic-cultural dim ension fulfils this condition. In two o f the countries being exam ined here, Switzerland and Belgium, linguistic-cultural cleavage is also im portant, but it rem ained secondary to religious-ideological cleavage during the form ative period o f political parties and inter­ est groups in the nineteenth century. In this view o f consociationalism , then, the respective segments each m aintain their own distinctive generalized view o f life, and this outlook serves as a rallying point for preserving segm entation in an organizational sense. Lorwin describes these cultural seg­ m ents in a broad general sense by the term s fa m ilie s spirituelles o r W elta n sch a u u n g sg ru p p en '0, a n d this is also th e term most frequently ap p lied in Belgium , b u t th ere a re local v a ria tio n s. In th e N e th erlan d s th e segm ents a re b e tte r k now n as zu ile n , or “ pillars,” and their study by sociologists antedates the literature focussing explicitly on consociational politics by at least a dec­ a d e ." The sociological process is verzuiling, or “ pillarization,” which has overtones o f both segm entation and integration, o f

9 “ Segm ented Pluralism ,” 144, note 5 (below, 36-37, note 5). 10 Ibid. , 141 [below, 33]. 11 J. P. K ru ijt, " T h e In flu ence o f D e n o m in atio n alism on Social Life an d O rganizational P atterns," A rchives de Sociologie des Religions. N o. 8 (1959), 105-11 [below, 128-136], an d cf. his Verzuiling (2nd ed., Z aandijk, 1959).

INTRODUCTION

7

both separation o f the colum ns and support for overarching struc­ tures at the top. From the N etherlands this concept has spread, with nuances, into Belgium and G erm any ( Versdulung). In A us­ tria the image changes sharply: the L ager o f the First Republic becam e arm ed camps in the literal sense, but they have succeeded in w orking out a politics o f accom m odation in the Second. N ev­ ertheless the term inology and to som e extent the imagery rem ain. T he extent to which segm entation can be carried in a consocia- . tional system can be quite startling to an observer raised in a m ore integrative setting. It is possible for a person to pass most o f his life am ong persons and associations o f his own persuasion from the m om ent o f his birth in a denom inational hospital to his burial in a denom inational cem etery. Along the way he may be educated in confessional schools, attend a denom inational univer­ sity, be hired by an em ployer o f his own persuasion, jo in a denom inational trade union, buy provisions at a denom inational cooperative, and patronize tradesm en of his own political persua­ sion only. His associational activities, w hether for music, sports, youth groups, charitable w orks, or whatever, may be similarly organized by his own segm ent, and his leisure tim e spent by preference with friends w ho share his beliefs. He will read denom inational books and a denom inational press;12 in extreme cases he may even watch only denom inationally produced televi­ sion program m es. A nd he will vote for a political party that m akes a strong case for segm ent solidarity as a defence against opposing philosophies. O f course in the real world no segm ented system is completely c o m p artm en talized . O n e p illar m ay be ideologically p u re r and structurally m ore complete than another. U nder conditions of increasing urbanization all pillars are likely to suffer som e attri­ tion as cross-pressures increase, and Dutch sociologists also speak o f the reverse process o f ontzuiling, or dism antling o f the pillars.13 In the 1960’s th e ideological foundations o f segm ented pluralism appeared to be weakening in all countries, but even w here this It seem s to be no coincidence th at in the N etherlands and Switzer­ land the opinion press has been m ore successful than elsewhere in resisting the advance o f the inform ation press, though even in these c o u n trie s it h as b een slow ly losing g ro u n d . C f. L. F. T ijm stra an d A. G asp art, “ La diffusion des opinions dans la presse: les exemples hollandais e t suisses,” G a zette, Vol. 4 ( 1958), 165-178. " J . P. K ruijt and W . G od d ijn , “ Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociolo­ g i s t p ro ces," in A .N .J. den H ollander et al, eds.. D rift en koers: Een halve eeuw sociale verandering in N ederland (3rd ed., Assen, 1968), 227-263, translated into French as “ C loisonnem ent et decloiso n n c m en t cu ltu rels co m m e processus so c io lo g iq u e s,” S o c ia l C om ­ p a ss, Vol. 9 (1 9 6 2 ), 63-107.

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CONSO CIATION AL DEMOCRACY

was most m arked there rem ained nevertheless a form idable resi­ due in the structure of parties and interest groups. These in turn are in the hands o f elites having a personal stake in the preserva­ tion o f these structures, and to the extent that ideological quiesc­ ence endangers their position they can in many instances remobilize their followers by an appeal to the dangers o f dism antling the barriers.14 .C onsociationalism as a pattern o f elite behavior. The second approach to consociationalism is perhaps most directly associated j with the work o f Lijphart, and som ew hat less directly with th at of Lehm bruch. T h e ‘most vital area o f concern here is the capacity and good will o f the elites. As Lijphart says, “ the essential characteristic o f consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangem ent as overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim o f counteracting disintegra­ tive tendencies in the system .” 15 The particular ways o f o peration­ alizing the cooperation are not o f great im portance, and will depend upon historical, geographical and o th er factors su rro u n d ­ ing the structure o f cleavages. In a later article Lijphart identified three o f the six possible outcom es o f conflict am ong subcultures as developed by Dahl - mutual veto, autonom y, or proportional repre­ sen tatio n - as jo in tly ch arac te riz in g so lu tio n s o f a co n so ciatio n al type while the others - repression, separation, and assimilation - do n o t.16 The concept of overarching cooperation for Lijphart has four requirem ents which must be fulfilled if consociational democracy is to be successful. The elites must first o f all be able to recognize the dangers of fragm entation; secondly, they must have some com m itm ent to m aintaining the system: thirdly, they must be able to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level to work with the elites of other subcultures; and lastly, they must have the ability to forge appropriate solutions that will accom m odate the divergent interests and dem ands o f the subcultures.17 According to this approach, much will clearly depend on the ability, mutual good will, and allegiance o f the elites; the role o f leadership is crucial. O n the other hand, the process of accom m odation may be facilitated, as Lehm bruch n o tes,18 by the fact that any legislature IJ Lchm bruch. “ Segm ented Pluralism and Political Strategies." 6-7. 15 “ Typologies o f D em ocratic System s." 21. % ,h A . L ijphart. "C u ltu ral Diversity and T heories o f Political Integra­ tio n ” , C anadian Journal o f P olitical Science. Vol. 4 (1971). 10. 17 "T ypologies o f D em ocratic System s, " 22-23: “ Consociational D em o­ cracy.” 216 [below, 79). IXG . Lehm bruch, "S tru k tu ren ideologischer Konflicte bei Partcienw cttbew erb". Politische V ierteljahresschrift, Vol. 10 (1969). 305.

INTRODUCTION

9

is itself a powerful agent for socializing its m em bers into a coop­ erative pattern, a “consensual subsystem ” with respect to one another, and the sam e argum ent can probably be m ade for other organs of institutionalized cooperation am ong the subcultures. Beyond these prerequisites, certain other factors may be observed to be conducive th o u g h n o t necessarily essential to the establishm ent or continuance o f consociational politics am ong the elites. Lijphart singles out the existence o f external threats, a balance o f power am ong the subcultures, and a relatively low total load on the system as a whole, as favorable conditions. He also m entions distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures and internal political cohesion o f the subcultures as im portant, while popular acceptance o f governm ent by elite cartel is also helpful.19 Lehm bruch develops a sim ilar but som ew hat m ore extended list, draw ing distinctions between internal and external conditions, as well as between generating and sustaining conditions.20 However most o f the factors listed by both authors seem to be not so much necessary conditions as empirically observed characteristics o f the countries concerned that have facilitated the developm ent of appropriate elite attitudes and behavior. Both m ention as im por­ tant the previous establishm ent of consociational patterns, but for Lijphart the tim e factor is im portant only in that after a certain p oint “ inter-elite cooperation becomes habitual” and “consocia­ tional norm s becom e m ore firmly established.” 21 T he first approach that we have exam ined, that is, consociationalism as segm ented social structure, is bound to the notion o f long-lasting subcultural cleavages by its very definition. In this second approach the existence o f significant subcultural fragm en­ tation is the main reason for establishing a consociational pattern o f elite behavior, but one may then question the necessity for the continuance of distinctive lines o f cleavage. Lijphart does not m ake the continuance of distinctive cleavage structures a formal requirem ent, but he considers th at it facilitates the w ork o f the elites by minimizing tensions am ong subcultures at the mass level, m aintaining the political cohesion of the subcultures and hence their support for agreem ents reached by their leadership, and also by articulating adequately the interests o f the subcultures.22 Lehm bruch, on the other hand, suggests that the concordant or consociational pattern of conflict m anagem ent “ may becom e so firmly established that it rem ains essentially the sam e even if the " T y p o lo g ie s o f D em o c ra tic S y ste m s," 25-30: “ C o n so ciatio n al D em ocracy," 2 17-222 (below. 80-85J. "S egm ented Pluralism an d Political Strategies," especially 3-7. ' “ C onsociational D em ocracy," 216-217 |below , 80). :: Ihid.. 219-22! jbelow. 82-85).

10

C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

m a t t e r o f c o n flic ts c h a n g e s ____I f o u r h y p o th e s is is c o r re c t th is w o u ld m e a n th a t c o n tin u e d e x is te n c e o f f u n d a m e n ta l c le a v a g e s is n o t a n a b s o lu te c o n d itio n o f th e p e rs is te n c e o f th is p a t t e r n .” 23 W e m a y te n ta tiv e ly c o n c lu d e th a t, in th is v iew o f c o n s o c ia tio n a lis m , a p o litic a l sy ste m w ill f u n c tio n b e s t w h e n th e r e is a c le a rly d e fin e d c le a v a g e s tr u c tu r e t o a r tic u la te s u b c u ltu r a l in te re s ts a n d p ro v id e c le a r c h a n n e ls fo r e lite -m a s s re la tio n s h ip s , b u t th is n e e d n o t be th e s a m e c le a v a g e s tr u c tu r e t h a t firs t g a v e r is e to th e n e e d fo r an a c c o m m o d a tiv e p a tte r n . O n c e th e c o n s o c ia tio n a l p a tte r n o f elite b e h a v io r is w ell e s ta b lis h e d , it m a y b e a d a p te d to a c c o m m o d a te n e w lin e s o f p e rs is te n t c le a v a g e a s w ell a s o t h e r a r e a s o f m o re tr a n s ie n t d is a g re e m e n t o v e r p q licy . W h a t s ta n d s o u t m o st s tro n g ly in th is s e c o n d a p p r o a c h to c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m - e s p e c i a l l y a s p r e s e n te d by L i j p h a r t - i s its e m p h a s is o n a p a tte r n o f le a r n e d b e h a v io r . T h e n e c e s sa ry c o n d i­ tio n s a r e few ; su c c e ss re sts b n th e le a rn in g c a p a c ity o f a re la tiv e ly s m a ll g r o u p o f le a d e rs . T h e h is to ric a l s e ttin g a n d g e o g ra p h ic a l e n v ir o n m e n t a r e re la tiv e ly u n i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e o f th e “ p o ss ib ility o f tr a n s n a tio n a l d iffu s io n o f k n o w l e d g e ." 24 O r , a s h e h a s sa id e a rlie r: D e e p , m u tu a lly re in fo rc in g so c ia l c le a v a g e s d o n o t fo rm an in s u p e ra b le o b s ta c le to v ia b le d e m o c r a c y . T h e c ru c ia l f a c to r in th e e s ta b lis h m e n t a n d p r e s e r v a tio n o f d e m o c r a tic n o r m s a n d d e m o c r a tic s ta b ility is t h e q u a lity o f le a d e r s h ip . T h e p o litic s o f a c c o m m o d a tio n o p e n s u p th e p o s s ib ility o f v ia b le d e m o c r a c y e v e n w h e re t h e so c ia l c o n d itio n s a p p e a r u n p r o m ­ isin g . F o r th o s e c o m m itte d to th e d e m o c r a tic c r e e d , th is is a n o p tim is tic a n d h a p p y c o n c lu s io n .25 T h e a ttr a c tiv e n e s s o f th is s e c o n d v iew o f c o n s o c ia tio n a lis m , so h e a v ily f o u n d e d o n th e r a tio n a l c a p a c ity o f t h e elite s, is t h a t it p r o m is e s to b e s o e asily e x p o r ta b le to o t h e r c o u n tr ie s . C o n s o c ia tio n a lis m a s a n u n d e r ly in g c h a r a c te r is tic o f th e p o litic a l tr a d itio n . A t h ir d a p p r o a c h to c o n s o c ia tio n a lis m , w h ic h is p e r ­ h a p s t h e m o s t e lu s iv e a n d d iffic u lt to d e f in e , is su g g e ste d in th e w o rk o f L e h m b ru c h a n d h a s b e e n r e s ta te d m o r e c o g e n tly by D a a id e r w ith re fe re n c e to th e c a s e s o f S w itz e rla n d a n d th e N e t h ­ e r la n d s . In th is v iew , it is th e e x is te n c e o f o ld e r p a tte r n s o f e lite G . Lehm bruch. “ A N on-C om petitive Pattern o f Conflict M anage­ m ent in Liberal D em ocracies: T h e C ase o f Sw itzerland. A ustria and L ebanon” (P ap er presented to the Seventh W orld Congress o f the International Political Science A ssociation. Brussels, 1967). 6 [below, 9 4 |. N "C u ltu ral D iversity." 13. -5 The Politics o j A ccom m odation. 2 1 1.

INTRODUCTION

I I

cooperation in the pre-m odern period that paves the way for a politics o f accom m odation in an ag e o f mass politics: “ In sum , ancient pluralism has facilitated the developm ent o f a stable, legitimate and consistently pluralist modern so ciety ."26 O r, as he has expressed it elsewhere: “ O lder elite styles eased the transition to mass politics and made for a tradition in which the principle o f proportionality led to a de-em phasis o f the majority principle in favor o f a pluralist autonom y o f all subgroups in the so ciety ."27 . T he crucial factor in this third view o f consociationalism is the pattern o f the historical political tradition. O n this point the four Countries that we are examining reveal certain variations which .can best be exam ined on an individual basis later on, but they jalso have one im portant com m on characteristic. All four lay at one period or another within the boundaries of the Holy Rom an Empire, and all four escaped in varying degrees the long, gradual centralization of authority that was characteristic o f France, Spain, England, Scotland and o th er national m onarchies from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. Further, all four felt to a greater o r lesser degree the impact o f the Thirty Y ears’ W ar and the religious settlem ent o f the T reaty o f W estphalia. Lehmbruch notes that the T reaty provided explicitly for resolving differences b etw eenithe Protestant and C atholic m em bers o f the Empire by m utual Agreement rather than by majority vote: s o la a m ic a b ilis e o m p o s itio tile s d ir im a i n o n a l t e n ia v o to r u m p lu r a lita te . 28

One o f the most interesting illustrations o f this Im perial heri­ tage may be seen and analyzed in a setting where it is no longer the undisputed political norm , contem porary W est G erm any. The early years o f the Federal Republic appeared to have established a com petitive party system, and public attitudes tow ards P ro p o rz d e m o k r a t i e on the A ustrian model seemed generally unfavorable. Yet the form ation o f a C hristian Democratic-Social D em ocratic coalition in 1966, Lehmbruch notes, was an occasion for calling attention to the fact that large sectors of the political system preserve traditions of proportional participation which date back to a situation when alternative governm ent was a notion alien to G erm an political thought. D aalder, " O n Building C onsociational N atio n s," 361 (below, 114).

-7 H . D aalder, “ C abinets and Party Systems in ten E uropean D em oc­ racies," A cta Politico, Vol. 6 (1971), 299-300. He explores the Ihem e m ore broadly in his “ Parties, Elites, and Political D evelop­ m ent in W estern E u ro p e," in J. La Palom bara and M . W einer, eds.. P olitical Parlies a n d P olitical D evelopm ent (Princeton, 1966), 43-77. P roporzdem okratie. 7-8.

12

CONSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

Pointing out that the concept o f Proporz is prom inent in local governm ent executives, federal parliam entary com m ittees, in the Federal C onstitutional C ourt, the supervisory boards o f the broadcasting m edia, and in other agencies, he goes on to suggest th at in West G erm any such institutional arrangem ents can be regarded as an older stratum o f political culture in which party co-operation is viewed as a condition of im par­ tial, hence just and rational decision-m aking, which has only recently been partially overlaid by a stratum constituted of the above m entioned trends tow ards alternative governm ent. O n the whole, the political system o f W est G erm any may be characterized as a mixed system which com bines elem ents of party com petition and m ajority rule with elem ents o f pro p o r­ tional division of influence and o f bargaining, and its Pro­ porz segm ents keep alive political attitudes which may regain preponderance on the level o f national policy-m aking to o .29 Since both th e second an d th ird ap p ro a c h e s to co n so ciatio n alism focus upon elite accom m odation, it becomes im portant to clarify the difference between them . In the second approach elite cooperation is seen as a pattern o f learned behavior, a deliberate response to the disintegrative perils o f segm entation: in the third approach elite cooperation is a longstanding characteristic of the political system, a factor which itself helps to m oderate tensions as mass party form ation develops along pluralist lines. The differ­ ence is ,not simply a m atter o f timing, but o f causal relationships. D aalder suggests that elite behavior should not be viewed solely as a dependent variable, but that “ the elite culture is in itself a most im portant independent variable which may go far to deter­ m ine how cleavages are handled in a political society . . . ” 30 T he distinction between these second and third approaches becomes of the utm ost significance when we consider how far the consociational model may be approp riate in other settings. Lijp­ h art argues that the behavior of elites can be restructured through im itation of foreign exam ples.31 D aalder insists on the long-run tradition of elite accom m odation - at least in the D utch and Swiss cases - as an independent com ponent o f political culture. N ever­ theless, he suggests that the consociational model may still be relevant for som e developing nations if they can recognize their older pluralist traditions as useful foundations to build upon

:“ G . Lehm bruch. “ T he A m biguous C oalition in West G erm an y ". G overnm ent a n d O pposition, Vol. 3 (1968). 181-204. 1,1 “ O n Building C onsociational N ations." 368 (below, 122]. “ C ultural D iversity.” 13-14.

INTRODUCTION

13

rath er than obstacles to be overcom e as nation building p ro ­ ceeds.32 But the question may then be posed as to w hether consociationalism has any place in societies w here older traditions o f pluralism and elite accom m odation are weak o r substantially absent, a question that becomes relevant when we consider the case o f C anada in Part IV below.

T H E O R E T IC A L A P P R O A C H E S A N D S P E C IF IC A P P L IC A T IO N S : TH E F O U R “ C L A S S IC " CASES. From the recent literature on com parative politics we have identi­ fied and outlined three distinct approaches to consociational dem ocracy. It is clear that different authors have approached the concept in different ways, but are they describing different phe­ nom ena in different countries? To explore this possibility we shall review very briefly the four “classic" cases o f consociationalism am ong developed Western dem ocracies, namely the N etherlands, A ustria, Belgium, and Switzerland, in order to estim ate how far each o f the three approaches applies in each specific case. T he object o f this exercise is both to understand m ore clearly how the political systems of these four countries have functioned during certain stages o f their developm ent and also to test certain theoretical propositions advanced in the consociational literature in a variety of actual political settings. In doing so we shall be doubly selective. In the first place certain other countries that have been identified by som e authors as consociational systems, such as L ebanon, Cyprus, Luxem bourg, C olom bia, U ruguay, and M alaysia, will not be exam ined here. Secondly, we shall be inter­ ested prim arily in those aspects o f theory that relate to the three m ajor approaches outlined above. As the readings and bibliogra­ phy later on will show, the literature on consociationalism , recent as it is, yields a variety o f further theoretical insights and hypotheses that cannot be followed up in detail within the limits of this book. The Netherlands. From the standpoint o f social segm entation, the phenom enon o f verzuiling has been exam ined in a num ber of studies.33 Historically, there have been three main zuilen or blocs in D utch society. Catholic. Calvinist, and secular. The secular zuil is further divided into socialist and liberal ideological groups, each with its own m ajor political party, and som e authors also treat fundam entalist and latitudinarian Calvinists and their respec-

“ O n Building Consociational N atio n s," 368. “ K ruijt, " T h e Influence o f D enom inationalism ” (see below. 128-136] a n d also his V erzu ilin g ; L ijp h art. T he P o litics o f A c c o m m o d a tio n : Lorwin. “ Segm ented P luralism ." [see below. 33-69],

14

C O N SO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

tive political parties, the A nti-R evolutionary Party and the Chris­ tian Historical U nion, as separate blocs. According to the criteria used, therefore, one can view D utch society in term s o f three, or four, or five main blocs.’4 Lorwin attem pts to estim ate the intens­ ity and completeness of religious-ideological segm entation among the blocs by establishing a table for som e 15 sectors o f social activ ity -e d u c a tio n , the mass m edia, socio-econom ic organiza­ tions, leisure, and the political re a lm - a n d for the N etherlands he finds high or at least medium levels of segm entation for all sectors exam ined.35 Even the electronic m edia show segm entation in that the broadcasting systems developed through a highly unusual system o f five private societies, each having its own ideological outlook, its own paid m em berships, and its own share o f pro­ gram m ing tim e.36 Various empirical studies show that the degree of segm entation is particularly high - in som e organizational sectors up to 90 per cent - in th e C a th o lic .a n d C alv in ist blocs w hile th e liberal and socialist segm ents of the secular bloc are som ew hat m ore open to cross-m em berships and cross-pressures. T here are strikingly high correlations between religious affiliation and party preference.'37 It is im portant to note, however, th at the three main Dutch zuilen (including both Socialists and Liberals for this purpose in one secular bloc) show sim ilar patterns of status and income distribu­ tion, so that class cleavage cross-cuts bloc or zuil cleavage almost perfectly and constitutes a factor reducing interbloc tensions.38 O ther cleavages have been negligible in recent decades; linguistic diversity (between Dutch and Frisian) has never become politi­ cized. On balance, then, until the force o f segm entation began to show signs of weakening in the later 1960’s, D utch society was highly segm ented along a single cleavage dim ension into three m ajor blocs of roughly com parable socio-econom ic status. ,J J. G o udsblom , D utch S o c ie ty (N ew Y ork. 1967). 31-32. 124-125. 15 “ Segm ented Pluralism .” 155 [below. 48]. Jh J . D e B oer an d P. C a m e ro n . “ D u tch R a d io : th e T h ird W ay ". J o u rn a lism Q u a r te rly , V ol. 32 (1955), 62-69; A . J. H eid en h eim er, “ E lite R e sp o n ses to O n tzu ilin g : R eels w ithin W heels in D utch Broadcasting Politics" (P a p er presented to the Eighth W orld C on­ gress o f th e International Political Science A ssociation. M unich. 1970). -,7 L ijphart. The Politics o f A ccom m odation, ch. 2: H. D aalder. "T he N etherlands: O pposition in a Segm ented Society." in R. A . Dahl, ed.. P olitical O ppositions in W estern D em ocracies (N ew Haven. 1966), 214-216. -,s L ijphart. The Politics o f A ccom m odation. 88-93. and see also his "C leavages in C onsociational D em ocracies: a four-country com pari­ so n " (P ap er presented at ihe Sym posium on C om parative Analysis o f Highly Industrialized Societies. Bellagio. 1971). 18-20.

INTRODUCTION

15

O ne can point to a pattern o f innovative elite responses to emerging political cleavage. T he 1870’s and 1880’s witnessed the beginnings of m odern mass parties am ong both Calvinists and Catholics as these groups began to challenge the suprem acy o f the m ore secular, higher-status, liberal-oriented ruling elite. There followed a series o f governm ental alternations between religious coalitions and Liberal ministries, with increasing polarization over the questions o f religious schools and the suffrage. In 1913 the M inistry o f C ort van der Linden undertook to resolve the issue by appointing two special parliam entary comm issions with equal representation from all seven o f the parliam entary political p ar­ ties. By 1917, against an international background o f extreme e x ternal d an g er, p arliam en t had accep ted th e co m m issio n s’ reco m m en d atio n s an d san ctio n ed co n stitu tio n a l changes th at becam e basic features of the D utch political system and models o f Proporzdem okratie: all schools, public and religious alike, were to receive state aid proportionate to enrolm ent, and the franchise question was resolved by adopting m anhood suffrage and p ro p o r­ tional representation. The Pacificatie o f 1917 did not resolve all inter-party issues, but it set a precedent for negotiated accom m o­ dation which tended in tim e to becom e the no rm .39 This pattern o f m odern parliam entary developm ent, however, should be set against the m ore distant background evoked by D aalder.40 Situated on the periphery o f the Em pire and at the delta o f the R hine, the Low C ountries developed vigorous trading patterns and wealthy m ercantile cities at an early date. N o single centre predom inated, and the political tradition becam e one o f p articu larism , c o rp o ra te lib ertie s, a n d a n o ta b le ab sen ce o f cen ­ tralized authority beyond a certain predom inance accorded to the siadholders and the Province o f Holland to represent the Dutch Republic on the international scene. T he nineteenth century brought greater adm inistrative centralization and a m ore con­ scious period of nation building, but this resulted in transferring differences am ong the emerging mass m ovem ents from the local to th e n atio n al political are n a . In th is settin g th e religious issue and particularly the role o f the churches and the state in educa­ tion dom inated all other cleavages during the formative period of mass political parties, and with the addition o f a socialist party in the 1890's the party structure reached the sam e general dim en­ sions that it m aintained into the I960’s. On balance, the case o f the N etherlands is inconclusive in that it clearly exemplifies all three aspects o f consociationalism . Per­ sistent segm entation along distinct cleavage lines and articulated w L ijphart. The Politics o f A ccom m odation. 104-112. “ O n Building Consociational N atio n s." [below. 107-124).

16

CONSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

in distinctive parties was strongly evident from the 1890’s to the 1960’s. The elites were able to m eet this challenge by accommodationist policies, particularly after the Pacification o f 1917. But could they have done so in the absence o f the extensive tradition o f pluralism in the Dutch Republic? This question rem ains hypo­ thetical and cannot be answered explicitly in the setting of the N etherlands alone. Austria. The First Republic of 1918 was born in traum a, a G erm an-speaking rem nant o f the shattered H absburg Empire, with no sense o f constituting a separate nation. Its principal political parties w ere inherited from the H absburg period, but this period had no experience of ministerial responsibility to Parlia­ m ent, and the rising ethnic aspirations th at ultimately led to breakdow n gave rise to a multiplicity o f parties with cleavages running along both ethnic and class lines. A fter the departure of the other ethnic groups the m ain political blocs rem aining in the truncated G erm an-A ustrian territory were the C atholic Conserva­ tives, th e Social D em o crats, and secu lar, m iddle-class liberal nationalists, the latter group being the weakest of the three after being cut off from its strongest base am ong the Sudeten G er­ m ans. These three blocs had becom e organized and institutional­ ized subcultures prior to the birth o f the Republic in 1918, and the First Republic (like the Second) was the product o f “ a contrat social, a state-founding treaty between the political parties representing the classes of the G erm an-A ustrian people.” 41 The existence of institutionalized segm entation am ong the three subcultures has been generally recognized in the literature. Diam ant, who describes the three Lager in som e detail, considers that o f the socialists to have been the most com plete and hom oge­ neous.42 Lorwin, analyzing by sectors o f activity, finds high to medium segm entation in all sectors and a total profile only slightly lower than that o f the N etherlands.43 But there are also som e interesting differences. In A ustria subcultural segm entation was reinforced by geographic re g io n s -a “ R ed " Vienna and a “ Black” h in te rla n d -a n d also by class and econom ic interests, with the result that interbloc rivalries tended to set industrial workers against farm interests, industrial centres against the coun­ tryside, socialists against bourgeois, as well as secularists against 41 O tto Bauer, q u oted in P. Pulzer, “ The Legitimizing R ole o f Politi­ cal Parties: th e Second A ustrian R epublic", G overnment a n d O ppo­ sitio n , Vol. 4 (1969), 332 [below, 165], 42 A . D iam ant, A ustrian Catholics and the First R epublic (P rinceton, 1960), 73-74 [below, 150-151). 41 “ Segm ented Pluralism .” 155 [below. 48).

INTRODUCTION

17

practising Catholics. Furtherm ore, the image o f contending L a g e r was no mere figure o f speech. A fter the breakdow n o f a short­ lived coalition between Catholics and Socialists in 1920 the politi­ cal atm osphere became one o f growing hostility and mistrust. Segm entation reached its logical conclusion in the form ation of private arm ies, and continuous param ilitary strife after 1927 between the socialist S c h u t z b u n d and the C atholic H e im w e h r paved the way for the overthrow o f the dem ocratic regim e in 1934 and annexation by Nazi G erm any in I938.44 The Second R epublic inherited the sam e three cleavage blocs, though the nationalist bloc had lost ground through its wartime connections with Nazism. W hile the pattern o f politics changed dram atically after 1945, organized segm entation has persisted. Engelm ann notes that while id e o lo g ic a l differences have subsided, p s y c h o lo g ic a l separation (in the form o f L a g e r m e n ta litd t) contin­ ues.45 In trying to analyse this phenom enon Stiefbold has found that polarization rem ains most pronounced am ong the middlelevel political elites, though his conclusions have been questioned by Bluhm .46 W hatever the variations in political and ideological climate, however, the broader conclusion must be that institu­ tional segm entation was high in the First Republic and has rem ained high in the early decades o f the Second. In term s o f deliberate elite adjustm ents to segm ented pluralism th e Second R epublic is a classic case. T h o se w ho revived the A ustrian political parties after 1945 inherited virtually the sam e cleavage structures that had destroyed the First Republic, and they faced the additional constraints of Allied occupation. N ever­ theless they succeeded in overcom ing a most unprom ising heri­ tage. T he essential feature o f their solution was a grand coalition o f Catholics and Socialists which lasted through six elections to 1966. This coalition rested upon a contractarian base, the term s o f which were established in 1947 and renegotiated after each election and even published on each occasion from 1956 onw ards. A system o f P r o p o r z in the distribution o f ministries and patro n ­ age w ent a long w ay tow ards co rrectin g th e u n d erre p rese n ta tio n o f the Socialists in the public sector. The function of opposition was preserved not only by the small parties outside the coalition 44 F . C . Engelm ann. “ Austria: the Pooling o f O p p o sitio n ," in R. A. D ahl, ed.. P olitical O ppositions in W estern D em ocracies (New H aven, 1966). 264-265. 45 Ibid.. 267-268. 46 Stiefbold, “ Elite-M ass O pinion S tructure” : Bluhm , “ Political Inte­ g ra tio n ," 38. F o r an em pirical study in one com m unity, see G . B. Powell, Jr., S o cia l Fragm entation and P olitical H ostility: A n A ustria n Case S tu d y (Stanford. 1970).

18

CONSOCIATIONAL. DEM OCRACY

but to som e extent also by a unique practice o f Bereichsopposilion in which each coalition partner acted as a critic o f the departm ents dom inated by the other. The details of the A ustrian coalition system are interesting, but they need not be elaborated here. The im portant thing to be stressed is th at the two coalition p a rtn e rs, each one hostile to the o th e r in ideology b u t yoked together by massive m istrust o f the o th er’s role in governing, succeeded through cooperation in developing a stable parliam en­ tary system that was not substantially w eakened when the grand coalition ended in 1966. F or the first tim e in A ustrian history the parliam entary regime itself was adequately legitimized. Finally, w hat is the role o f older elem ents o f the political culture in facilitating this successful cooperation? Im perial Austria had shared fully in the tradition of the Holy Rom an Em pire, and after 1867 it had developed its own institutions of Ausgleich and J u n k tim that enabled the highly fragmented society o f the Dual M onarchy to find a precarious and complex modus vivendi for half a century. Nevertheless one must conclude that these tradi­ tional elem ents w ere not decisive, for o th erw ise they w ould also have been significant, or at least visible, during the First R epub­ lic. Even if we grant that the political conditions were som ewhat m ore propitious for stability in 1945 than they were in 1918 owing to foreign military occupation and a dim inished allegiance to G erm any after the Nazi period, the A ustrian case is perhaps the clearest example o f consociationalism as an innovative pattern o f elite cooperation that develops in response to a m ajor chal­ lenge. Belgium. Religious-ideological segm entation is highly developed in Belgium; in term s o f organizational completeness, Lorwin finds more sectors highly segm ented in Belgium than in any o f the other countries he exam ines.47 At the sam e tim e this dim ension of segm entation is less com plicated than the case o f the N etherlands in having a classic tripartite C atholic-Liberal-Socialist base. The Catholic sector, as Lorwin notes, is the most highly and fully organized, the Liberal sector the least.48 T he central feature o f this structural cleavage is o f course the political parties themselves. The issue of church and state gave rise to the C atholic and Liberal p ar­ ties, and the emergence o f the Socialist party as a significant parlia­ m entary force in the 1890’s com pleted a pattern which has persisted strongly ever since. J' “ Segm ented Pluralism ," 155 [below, 48J. J' V. R. L o rw in . “ C o n flict a n d C o m p ro m ise in Belgian P o litic s” (P a p e r p re se n te d to th e A n n u al M eeting o f th e A m erican Political Science A ssociation, W ashington, 1965), 28-30 [cf. below, 202-203).

IN TRO DU CTION

19

The religious-ideological dim ension, however, is not the only m ajor line of cleavage in Belgian politics. For m ore than a century there has been a grow ing linguistic-cultural polarization around the struggle for equality between the country's two m ajor languages. Beginning predom inantly in the literary and cultural realm, the Flemish m ovem ent rem ained relatively little politicized until m ajor expansions o f the suffrage in 1893 and 1919 enfran­ chised the Flemish masses and called attention to the economic underdevelopm ent o f the Flemish provinces. T he first Flemish nationalist m em bers were elected to parliam ent in 1919, and the period since 1945 has seen the em ergence o f “ linguistic” splinter parties am ong both m ajor language groups, culm inating in the 1971 election when they won 45 o f the 212 seats in the lower house. T he emergence o f political parties appealing to one lin­ guistic group only has put som e severe strains on the traditional parties, whose linguistic wings find themselves under pressure to articulate linguistic and regional dem ands against the other wing o f their own party in order to avoid losing even a larger share o f the electorate. T here has been a corresponding growth in linguist­ ically based voluntary asso ciatio n s, especially ones o rien ted tow ards culture, leisure, or sports, and existing associations have been reorganized to provide increased autonom y for their linguis­ tic sections. The outlook for associational segm entation in Belgium is diffi­ cult to predict. Though the three traditional blocs have suffered from these linguistic cross-pressures, organizational persistence rem ains relatively strong. The developm ent o f new institutional channels for the expression o f regional cultural autonom y and econom ic decen tralizatio n has been to o recen t to assess its long-run impact on social segm entation and party alignment. For the future any one of the following seems possible: (1) linguistic segm entation might continue to develop until it becomes dom i­ nant, or (2) with linguistic pacification through new institutional arrangem ents the traditional religious-ideological cleavage might reassert itself with renewed force, o r (3) both the linguistic and the religious-ideological cleavagc dim en sio n s m ight c o n tin u e to co-exist and com pete with each other for a considerable period. In term s o f elite responses to the challenge o f segm entation, the Belgian experience seems to be one o f several evolutionary stages over a considerable tim e rather than a m ajor crisis followed by a far-reaching pacification. T here is an early precedent for a politics o f accom m odation at the dawn o f Belgian independence, when Catholics and Liberals joined to g e th e r in a “ union o f the opposi­ tions” in 1827 to resist the anti-C atholic and pro-N etherlandic poli­ cies o f K ing William I. The U nionist alliance not only achieved

20

C O NSO CIATION AL DEMOCRACY

independence but guided the young state through its early diplo­ m atic difficulties until 1847. T here followed a succession o f single­ party governm ents, but the advent o f a socialist m ovem ent and of organized mass parties late in the century was soon followed by pro­ p o rtio n al rep resen tatio n in P arliam en t. As L orw in no tes sig n ifi­ cantly: In conceding proportional representation, in 1899, the C ath­ olic governm ent preserved the unitary state, the national character o f the three parties, and the system o f segm ented pluralism. Thenceforth, in alm ost all phases o f public life at all levels, the proportional representation o f the three “ tradi­ tional parties” and o f all recognized interests tended to become the rule. F lem ish linguistic interests were not yet am ong those traditional interests; the system of segm ented pluralism did not recognize them .49 Similarly since 1919 all m inistries have been coalition ministries except during the C atholic party’s tem porary majority in rather special circum stances from 1950 to 1954. M ost coalitions have been tw o-party alliances, but tripartite m inistries have emerged at certain critical periods.50 If th e acco m m o d atio n ist style has d eveloped ra th e r grad u ally , certain episodes may nevertheless be singled out for m ention. In 1935 th e th re e m ajor p arties closed ran k s in th e V an Z eeland m inistry to carry out a program o f m ajor econom ic reform and also to m eet the challenge o f the rightist anti-dem ocratic Rexist m ovem ent, which captured 11 per cent o f the vote in the 1936 election. In 1958 they cam e to g e th e r again to n eg o tiate an end to the second guerre scolaire which raged in the 1950’s. T he text o f the Schools Pact, a formal agreem ent between the three parties signed by 13 party representatives, bears a striking resem blance to an international treaty.51 Finally the search for a solution to linguistic problem s in the later 1960’s was participated in by all six parliam entary parties, while the constitutional changes neces­ sary to give effect to the new regime o f cultural autonom y were assured o f the necessary tw o-thirds m ajority by the support of the three traditional parties. T here is, to be sure, a noticeable difference in tone between religious-ideological argum ent and linguistic argum ent in Belgium. 49 V. R. L orw in, “ Linguistic Pluralism and Political T ension in M od­ ern B elgium ", Canadian Jo urnal o f H isto ry, Vol. 5 (1970), 9.

50 J. M eynaud, J. L adrierc, and F. Perin. L a decision politique en Belgique: le pouvoir et les groupes (P aris, 1965), 66-67. s' Ibid., 170-176.

IN TR O D U C TIO N

21

Religious-ideological debate may be sharp, even hostile, but the d ifferences are long estab lish ed , u n d e rsto o d , accep ted , a n d to le r­ ated, if not always treated with respect. Linguistic differences are bitter, intolerant, and reveal little reciprocal understanding. A t the mass level, the feeling of being an endangered or a disadvantaged m inority is strong on both sides. These feelings, however, devel­ oped during a period when linguistic interests were very im per­ fectly articulated by the parliam entary parties, and they may dim inish if the new m achinery for institutional accom m odation o f cultural autonom y provides the needed outlet. O n balance, party elites in Belgium have striven in the 1960’s to accom m odate linguistic tensions deliberately as they did in earlier tim es to reconcile religious and ideological diversity, and if it is too soon to evaluate their success, there can be no question as to the effort that has been m ade. If the Belgian pattern of elite accom m odation has developed gradually, building upon the earlier collaboration th at won Belgian independence, how is this pattern related to the older political tradition of the Low C ountries? O n this point we encounter a complexity appropriate to Belgium’s position as a crossroads o f several cultures. T he territorial com ponents o f m odem Belgium all shared, in greater o r lesser degree, in the heritage o f the Holy R om an Em pire, but this tradition was interspersed and over­ laid with a series o f dynastic and imperialistic ventures, B urgundian, Spanish, A ustrian, French, and D utch, that left som ew hat conflict­ ing im prints of foreign rule and centralization. A t a tim e when the N o rth e rn N eth erlan d s was a d y n am ic com m ercial pow er on th e world stage, the Southern provinces were undergoing tw o centuries of econom ic and intellectual stagnation. W hile the Prince-Bishopric of Liege was echoing the Paris revolution o f 1789, the provinces u n d er A u strian rule w ere resistin g th e refo rm s o f Jo sep h II in defence o f ancient privileges. W hile an older conservative, pluralist tradition thus existed, the architects o f the independent Belgium o f 1830 turned away from it and built on different foundations. O n the whole, therefore, the older political tradition is am biguous, and its very diversity makes its influence on the m odem political culture dif­ ficult to assess. Switzerland. Lorwin estim ates Switzerland to be the least highly segm ented o f the countries that he exam ines,52 but the main point , to be underlined is that organized segm entation along any one cleavage line is low not because cleavages are w eak but because they are m ulti-dim ensional and cross-cutting.53 As in the other 5: “ Segm ented Pluralism ,” 155 [below, 48]. 5J L ijphart, “ Cleavages in C onsociational D em ocracies," 18-20.

22

C O N SO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

three countries the usual religious-ideological cleavage was histori­ cally the most im portant, and it became the basis for the form a­ tion o f the m ajor political parties. The ideological roots o f the split between Radicals and Catholics may be traced back to the R eform ation, and with the developm ent o f the Socialist Party and the Farm ers’ Party in the tw entieth century the roster o f m ajor parties became complete. --However this party structure is superim posed upon a political system which is also characterized by significant linguistic and regional cleavages. Linguistic diversity, which was characteristic particularly of the subject territories o f the Old C onfederation, assum ed greater im portance after the N apoleonic M ediation, and was effectively accom m odated in the federal C onstitution o f 1848. It has never been significantly politicized at the federal level, except for a brief period prior to and during the First World W ar. W hat we might call “ regional segm entation” arises from the intense geographic particularism o f Swiss society; the cantons and com m unes are vital elem ents o f the political system, and many issues are m ediated there which might be m ore intractable at the national level. As D aalder has noted, because o f multiple cleav­ ages “ accom m odationist practices fin Switzerland] are diffused am ong many m ore sites and arenas than in the N etherlands,” and conversely, “ partly due to the much greater role o f regional factors, Swiss political culture is m ore highly fragmented than D utch political culture.” 54 Some discussions of conflict resolution in Swiss politics rely heavily on structural factors to explain the success o f the Swiss in m ediating conflict. O ne of the best examples is that of M ayer, who suggests that the Swiss “ m iracle" o f unity in diversity rests upon a pecul­ iar equilibrium of cross-cutting cultural divisions which is historically unique and cannot be duplicated under different conditions. Interestingly, and largely unknow n to the outside world, Switzerland itself furnishes p ro o f that if the divisions between the linguistic and religious groups do not overlap but coincide the result is conflict instead o f harm ony.55 He then goes on to examine certain structural conditions which in m odern Swiss history have created overlapping loyalties and neu­ tralized cleavages: these include (1) the cross-cutting o f linguistic and religious boundaries; (2) the cross-cutting o f linguistic and M " O n Building C onsociational N atio n s," 366 [below, 120]. 55 K . B. M ayer. “ The Ju ra Problem: Ethnic Conflict in S w itzerland." S o cial R esearch. Vol. 35 (1968). 707.

INTRODUCTION

23

cantonal boundaries; (3) the cross-cutting o f econom ic differences and linguistic boundaries; (4) the relative dem ographic stability of the linguistic groups despite differences in fertility, m ortality and internal migration patterns. W here these conditions are lacking, as in the northern part o f the Bernese Jura, where religious and linguistic cleavages are mutually reinforcing within the sam e canton, conflict can occur even in the Swiss setting, and in historical perspective the French-speaking C atholic population of the Jura was caught up religiously in the K u llu rk a m p f in the 1870's and linguistically in the pan-G erm an m ovem ent prior to 1914. M ayer concludes that "even in Switzerland cultural coexistence requires specific struc­ tural underpinnings. W hen these are missing ethnic conflicts become as intractable there as elsewhere.” 56 M ayer’s emphasis on the structure o f cleavages is interesting because it suggests that to som e degree at least certain structural factors are a necessary condition o f consociational dem ocracy. By itself, however, this seems insufficient. It does not explain, for example, why the A ustro-H ungarian Em pire, with a similarly complex structure o f overlapping linguistic, religious, and class cleavages, was so unsuccessful. Besides, M ayer, whose prim ary concern is the linguistic and cultural dim ension, pays little atten ­ tion to religious-ideological differences as expressed in the party system and the political process, although in addition to structural factors he does note certain “ inform al practices” and attitudes in the political and bureaucratic realm tending tow ards a politics of linguistic Proporz,57 T he pattern o f elite accom m odation in Switzerland is probably well know n, at least in its general outlines. A t the executive level the Federal Council is com posed o f m em bers o f all four m ajor parties according to a fixed form ula which changes only at rather infrequent intervals. Since 1959 the proportion has been two Radicals, two Conservatives, tw o Socialists, and one m em ber from the Farm ers’ Party. But there are also firm conventions for regional representation (which must include Z urich, Bern and Vaud) and for linguistic representation (which calls for over­ representation o f the sm aller linguistic groups). Sim ilar conven­ tions apply to parliam entary com m ittees, the bureaucracy, and the Federal Tribunal. M oreover, as G irod has shown, the sam e pat­ terns o f m ulti-party executives may be found in virtually all o f the ■b Ibid.. 741. and see also K. B. M ayer, "M ig ratio n , C ultural T en ­ sions. and Foreign Relations: Sw itzerland". Journal o f C onflict R es­ olution. Vol. II (1967). 139-152. 57 " T h e Ju ra P ro b lem ," 720.

24

CONSOCIATION A L DEMOCRACY

cantons, including som e rural cantons with relatively hom ogene­ ous populations in which one party has a clear legislative m ajor­ ity.58 T here is, however, an im portant question o f tim ing to be noted. The pattern of elite accom m odation through m ulti-party executives did not develop in response to a specific integration crisis, but rather it was institutionalized gradually and com pleted rather recently. As G irod notes: Nearly half a century lapsed after the Sonderbund W ar before a m em ber o f the Catholic-C onservative party became a m em ber o f the Federal G overnm ent and 25 years passed between the Strike o f 1918 and the election o f the first Socialist federal co u n c illo r. . . M any other examples could be quoted to show that the “ all-parties governm ent” is not at-all inherent to the Swiss regime as such, but a construction o f ' the last period o f history.59 The pattern o f deliberate elite accom m odation of diversity is highly visible in contem porary Swiss politics, but to understand its developm ent we must begin considerably further back. T rad i­ tions o f com prom ise lie deep in Swiss history. Before the Refor­ m ation a dangerous gulf between rural and urban cantons had been resolved in 1481 through the m ediation o f Nicholas o f Flue, an enigm atic and symbolic figure whose role has been evoked many times in later crises. T he R eform ation and its afterm ath left the cantons sharply divided on religious lines; only gradually, and with periodic setbacks, did there emerge a principle o f parity of P ro testan t an d C ath o lic can to n s an alo g o u s to th a t o f the E m pire.60 W hen the C onfederation and som e individual cantons acquired various neighbouring territories by conquest or treaty from the sixteenth century onw ards, their own traditions o f local autonom y were extended to the newly acquired lands, and linguis­ tic and religious diversity were accom m odated to the point that when these territories were “ liberated” by the N apoleonic armies in 1798, most o f them chose to rem ain within the enlarged Confederation as full cantons. The liberal revolution of the 1830’s brought new strains whiph culm inated in the Sonderbund W ar of 1847. Yet such was the 58 R . G iro d , “ G eo g ra p h y o f th e Swiss P arty S y stem ", in E. A llardt and Y. L ittunen, eds.. Cleavages, Ideologies, and P arty System s (T ra n sa c tio n s o f the W esterm arck S ociety, 10. H elsin k i, 1964), 137-143 [below, 211-217). » Ibid., 146 [cf. below . 2 19). L eh m b ru ch . “ A N o n -C o m p e titiv e P a tte r n ." 5 [below , 93) and also his Pr'oporzdem okratie, 15-16.

INTRODUCTION

25

spirit o f accom m odation that after a brief but decisive campaign both sides sat down together to produce a new federal constitu­ tion which cam e into force less than a year after the outbreak o f hostilities. Perhaps the outlook o f this period is best expressed in the words o f N um a Droz: “ Presque toutes nos lois sont, plus que dans d ’autres pays, le resultat de transactions entre Ies partis, les regions, les races.” 61 The date here is significant, for D roz is speaking in 1885, before the age o f mass politics, at a tim e when the Radicals still m onopolized all seven seats on the Federal Council. W e may conclude that in Switzerland recent patterns o f elite behavior are subsum ed within a well established political tradi­ tion. The mechanisms o f accom m odation - m ulti-party executives, proportional representation, decentralization, over-representation of m in o ritie s-a re -se q u e ls and consequences o f political patterns developed in earlier times. U nlike the A ustrian case, the political tradition o f Switzerland is, as Lehm bruch notes, “ historically h o m o g en eo u s.” 62 U n lik e th e B elgian case, w h ere th e seco n d ary cleavage on linguistic lines was not recognized and accom m odated on account o f its relatively late arrival on the political stage, all m ajor social cleavages in Switzerland are o f relatively long stan d ­ ing and have been accom m odated m ore or less continuously as the political system developed. From this brief consideration o f the four “classic” cases of consociationalism we may now attem pt a limited cross-national assessment o f the three approaches outlined at the beginning. The problem is to assess the im portance o r significance of each o f the approaches in each o f the cases, and a first, rather tentative attem pt to scale these dim ensions is given in T able 1. T here seems to be no autom atic relationship between the first o f these dim ensions and the other two; extensive social segm entation may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for consociational politics, but it may well be a facilitating condition, for reasons that we have noted above.63 F urther, while the dim ension o f elite behavior is rated high in all four cases, this may be misleading w ithout som e qualification. In the D utch and Swiss cases these ratings may simply represent linkages with older traditions of pluralism, whereas the A ustrian case suggests significant innova­ tion and the Belgian example seems m ore am biguous. This rudi­ m entary cross-national com parison could o f course be carried much further. In particular one could explore the im plications of 61 Q u o ted in Lehm bruch, Proporzdem okratie, 19. 62 Ibid., 51. See above, p. 9-'

26

C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

the mutual cross-cutting o f various cleavages one against the o ther.64 To do this, however, would go som ew hat beyond the prim ary purpose of this book, which is concerned basically with those cleavages that have been comprehensively incorporated into social structures and reflected in the political process. These four “classic” cases o f consociational democracy are all examples of countries that have overcom e the divisive potentiali­ ties o f deep and lasting social segm entation through a politics o f accom m odation. D uring the period in question each has kept anti-system parties to low levels and each has attained a satisfac­ tory level o f regime stability. But in all four cases the prim ary dim ension o f cleavage, at least in the formal structural sense, has been religious and ideological, reflecting broad cleavage lines that are com m on to much o f W estern E urope. The question then arises as to w hether the concept o f consociationalism may be relevant for countries w here som e other prim ary axis o f cleavage has become politicized. Lorwin emphasizes the voluntary nature o f segm ented pluralism and suggests that “ the availability o f individual alternatives distin­ guishes the politics of segm ented pluralism from those based on th e cleavages o f caste, co m m u n alism , race, o r even lan g u ag e .” 65 But this view raises tw o questions. First, given the logic o f com prehensive segm entation with minimal cross-pressures in the consociational m odel, are voluntary interbloc transfers o f alle­ giance likely to take place as long as the level o f segm entation and even hostility rem ains high? Secondly, and m ore fundam en­ tally, is the principle o f individual freedom o f choice a necessary c o n d itio n - o r even a facilitating condition - for segm ented plural­ ism? If not, the apparent distinction betw een religious-ideological cleavage and other forms o f cleavage may be less fundam ental than Lorwin appears to suggest. This issue is an im portant one, for if the experience of the successful consociational democracies in mediating deep and lasting religious and ideological cleavages can be shown to be relevant to societies where divisions o f similar intensity run along ethnic or cultural o r linguistic lines, then that experience may be im portant for a very substantial part o f the contem porary world. 64 T he m easurem ent and com parison o f cross-cutting cleavages in the consociational dem ocracies is being currently (1973) investigated by L ijphart. See his "C leavages in C onsociational D em ocracies" and also his “ Linguistic F ragm entation and O ther D im ensions o f Cleav­ age: a C om parison o f Belgium. C anada, and Sw itzerland" (Paper presented at th e N inth W orld C ongress o f the International Political Science A ssociation. M ontreal. A ugust 1973). “ Segm ented P luralism ," 143 [below. 35).

Table I . Degree o f im portance o f three elem ents of consociationalism in four "classic” cases. Element

N etherlands

A ustria

1. O rganized segm entation in social structure (on religious-ideological dim ension)

High

High

H igh (but increasingly cross-cut by language)

M edium (extensively cross-cut by language and region)

2.

High (1913-1917)

High (p o st-1945)

High (1827-31 and m any tim es since)

High (1847-48 on religion; 1914-18 on language)

High

Low

M edium

High

D eliberate efforts by elites to m ediate cleavages (with crisis periods noted)

3. Strength o f pluralism in older political tradition.

Belgium

Switzerland

P A R T II THEORETICAL A N D COM PARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

30

C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

The fiv e articles in this section have been selected to illustrate the three approaches to consociationalism already discussed in Part I, but they also touch on other them es o f the consociational literature. Val Lorwin. whose article "S eg m en ted Pluralism " dates fr o m 1969 in its original version, concentrates upon the fra g m en ted social structures that fo r m a base f o r consociational politics in the fo u r European cases that we have exam ined. M ore im portant, he directs attention to the question o f m easuring and comparing the exten t and intensity o f segm entation, providing som e rough benchm arks which will be used later f o r comparisons with C a n a d a B e y o n d these central concerns he also traces the historical development o f segm entation in the political m obiliza­ tion o f the workers in the late nineteenth century and fin a lly touches on the dynam ics o f segm ented political system s by exa m ­ ining the interplay o f fa cto rs o f continuity and change. A rend L ijp h a rt’s "C onsociational D em ocracy" (1969) is a rew orking o f som e parts o f his earlier paper "T ypologies o f D em ocratic S ystem s", the original version o f which was pre­ sented at the Brussels Congress o f the International Political Science Association in 1967. Both articles draw attention to the inadequacy o f prevailing classifications o f political sy stem s and stress the existence o f a separate category o f dem ocracy that is b o th fr a g m e n te d and sta b le. M o re than a n y o th e r author. L ijp ­ hart has underlined the role o f political elites in counteracting the dangers o f social fragm enta tio n by deliberate negotiated accom ­ m odation o f divergent interests al the su m m it o f the political system . This centra! em phasis on elite behavior and its possibili­ ties o f em ulation in other settings, together with the simple clarity o f his model, have com bined to m a ke Lijphart's work perhaps the m ost widely know n am ong the consociational litera­ ture. Gerhard Lehm bruch's "A N on-C om petitive Pattern o f Conflict M anagem ent in Liberal D em ocracies" , like L ijphart's earlier paper, was written fo r the 1967 Brussels Congress o f the Interna­ tional Political Science Association. In it he also seeks to define a third category o f dem ocracies beyond the com petitive and the bureaucratic m odels that he fin d s exem plified by the AngloA m erican and Franco-German traditions respectively. L ik e Lijp­ h a rt, Lehm bruch also describes a p ro cess o f co n flict regulation that works by negotiated agreem ent and compromise, but while Lijphart stresses the conscious efforts o f the elites in m aking such a system work, Lehm bruch points to the im portance o f historical tradition in shaping the norms o f conflict regulation. In Austria, Sw itzerland, and Lebanon, specific historical circumSee below. 245-247.

T H EO R ET IC A L AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

31

stances gave rise to certain patterns o f elite behavior which were then tra n sm itte d as norm s through p o litic a l so cia liza tio n . A lthough som e o f Lehm bruch's later work fo cu ses on the specific internal and external conditions that generate and sustain conso­ ciational politics,2 the 1967 paper tends to explain modern p a t­ terns o f conflict regulation by tracing elite political culture to its historical antecedents. Jiirg Steiner's article " The Principles o f M ajo rity and Propor­ tio n a lity" fir s t appeared in German under the title " M ajorz und P roporz" in 1970. The version printed here is a translation, with slightly reduced fo otnotes, by G eoffrey H osking. From the stand­ point o f political decision-m aking, S tein er views the m ajority principle and the proportionality principle as opposite ends o f a continuum the profile o f which will em erge only a fter system atic study o f individual political system s. For this purpose he develops som e prelim inary hypotheses concerning the effect on the decision-m aking process o f the size o f p olity, the degree and dim en­ sions o f segm entation, and the fo r c e o f societal norm s, a n d also concerning the influence o f this decision-m aking process on other political variables. Though the starting point is his own work on Sw itzerland. S tein er’s aim is to develop som e o f the propositions in the early consociational literature to the point where they might be incorporated into em pirical political theory in a m ore general sense. H ans Daalder's "On Building C onsociational Nations: the Cases o f the N etherlands and S w itzerla n d ", fir s t published in 1971, was w ritten f o r the U N E S C O M eeting o f E xp erts on the Problem s o f S la te Form ation a n d N ation Building (A ugust 19701 and has also been published in the two-volume work that fo llo w ed fr o m th a t con ference. } It c o n stitu tes p erh a p s th e m o st ex p lic it argum ent to date o f the influence o f older political traditions upon modern patterns o f elite accom m odation a n d conflict regu­ lation. Where Lijphart stresses the conscious and deliberate efforts o f elites to overcome the effects o f fragm en ta tio n . Daalder strongly em phasizes the role o f older pluralist traditions in shap­ ing a political culture which prevents social fra g m en ta tio n fro m running to political extrem es. The chronology o f the articles in this section deserves special notice. A ll fiv e were written between 1967 and 1970; the two earliest were both presented at the Brussels Congress o f the International Political Science Association. Though m ost o f the : See the Select Bibliography below. ’ S. N . E isenstadt and S. R ok kan. eds.. Building S ta le s and Nations: M odels. A nalyses a n d D ata A cross Three W orlds (2 vols.. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1973).

32

CONSO CIATION A L DEM OCRACY

ingredients f o r consociationalism can be discerned in earlier liter­ ature. these ingredients do not seem to come together as an explicit insight into com parative politics theory until the later I960's. It is interesting that Lijphart and Lehm bruch. working sim ultaneously but prim arily on different countries (Lijphart on the Netherlands, Lehm bruch on A ustria and Sw itzerland) arrived a t models that have som e striking sim ilarities, in spite o f diverging views as to how political system s o f this type m ay arise. On the other hand, Lijphart and Daalder can look at the sam e political s y s te m a n d d iffe r su b sta n tia lly as to th e crucial variables and sequence o f development. In longer perspective the fiv e articles in this section m a y well be viewed as belonging to the fo rm a tive phase o f consociationa­ lism. The later 1960's gave rise to the consociational m odel as a distinct category o f dem ocracy which d iffered in im portant ways fr o m preceding classifications. This significant theoretical insight was accom panied by a considerable discussion o f the origins, lim iting conditions, political processes, and potential transferabil­ ity o f consociational politics, m uch o f which remains unresolved in 1973. It seem s likely that in the n ext stage these insights and propositions will give rise to m ore detailed em pirical research, a tendency already visible in som e o f the longer studies that have already appeared. 4 In the long run one m a y exp ect that these early hypotheses, tested and reform ulated in case studies, will be refined and developed m ore fu lly and integrated into the study o f comparative politics.

* See the Select Bibliography below, especially the full-length studies by L ijphart, Steiner, Powell, and Presthus.

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S E G M E N T E D P L U R A L IS M : ID E O L O G IC A L C L E A V A G E S A N D P O L IT IC A L C O H E S IO N IN T H E S M A L L E R E U R O P E A N D E M O C R A C IE S * Val R. Lorwin Source: V. R . Lorwin. “ Segm ented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political C ohesion in th e Sm aller E uropean D em ocracies.” Com parative P olitics, Vol. 3, N o. 2 (January 1971). 141-175. R e p rin te d by p erm issio n o f C o m p a ra tive P o litics an d th e a u th o r, who has reviewed and slightly revised the text for this volume.

In an era o f political and scholarly concern with national integra­ tion, segm ented pluralism serves as one historic model o f the attem pt to reconcile religious and ideological diversity with civic cohesion. Segmented pluralism is the organization o f social move­ ments, educational and com m unications systems, voluntary asso­ ciations, and political parties along the lines o f religious and ideological cleavages. It is pluralist in its recognition o f diversity o f religious, so cioeconom ic, and political a ffiliatio n s: it is “ seg­ m ented” in its institutionalization o f most other forms of associa­ tion along the lines o f politico-religious cleavages. A social or cultural organization is “ segm ented” if it is com ­ posed chiefly of, and directed by, m em bers o f one of several churches or W eltanschauungsgruppen (or fa m ilie s spiriiuelles). I distinguish segm ented organization from what I shall call func­ tional organization. In functional organizations people associate only in term s o f a specific econom ic o r social purpose. Thus, a trade union organized solely on lines o f skill o r industry o r em ployer unit is a functional o rg a n iz a tio n , w hile a C ath o lic o r P ro testa n t o r Socialist trade union is a segm ented organization. A Boy Scout or G irl Scout troop organized only by age or locality is functional: but a C atholic or Protestant or Socialist Scout troop is segmented. These term s are m eant to be neutral (and, of course, they are unrelated to debates about functional analysis). N either “ func­ * T his is an entirely revised version o f a paper originally presented at the International Political Science A ssociation R ound T able on C om para­ tive Politics at T u rin , Septem ber 9-14, 1969. F or generous support o f my research and th at o f m y colleagues on the international Study o f the Politics o f the Sm aller E uropean D em ocracies. I thank the Ford F oun­ datio n , th e Social Science Research C ouncil, the Jo h n Sim on G uggen­ heim M em orial F o u n d atio n , the Rockefeller C onstitutional D em oc­ racy Program , the G rad u ate School o f the University o f O regon, and the C enter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am deeply and happily indebted to m any individuals; I hope to thank them how­ ever inadequately in a forthcom ing book.

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tional” nor “ segm ented” implies any judgm ent as to the effective­ ness of an organization in relation to the needs or desires o f its constituency or of the society. A functional organization may evoke as much solidarity as a segm ented one: a segm ented organ­ ization may be as ready to com prom ise differences as a functional one. A political system is one o f segm ented pluralism when its cleavages have produced com peting netw orks o f schools, com m u­ nications m edia, interest groups, leisure tim e associations, and political parties along segm ented lines, o f both religious and antireligious nature. The phenom enon will be understood m ore clearly with the aid o f a m etaphor which I owe to those D utch sociologists w ho first analyzed th e p h en o m en o n o f segm ented p luralism , although contem porary observers had com m ented on it in Belgium and elsewhere for generations. T he D utch sociologists' greatest con­ tribution has been to identify and measure w hat they call verzuiling in their own country. T his neologism refers both to the historical process o f the developm ent o f segm ented organization and to the condition o f segm ented pluralism .1 A zuil is a pillar. In the D utch figure of speech, each o f the n ation's ideological groups is a “ pillar,” standing vertical and separate on its own base o f religious or secular ideology. Each has its own party, socio-econom ic associations, press, leisure tim e groups, radio and television broadcasting chain, and - in the case of Catholicism and tw o m ajor forms o f Calvinist Protestantism its churches, parish leagues, and schools. T he D utch first spoke o f verzuiling soon after W orld W ar II, using the word in a positive sense to refer to the integrating role o f the zuilen. They saw the pillars as sustaining an overarching unity above the diversity o f the n ation’s social and political struc­ ture. But many of them cam e increasingly to look upon the ideological blocs not only as sustaining pillars but also - to change 1 See, for exam ple, the witty volum e o f J. P. K ruijt an d others. Verzuiling, (2d ed., Z aandijk. 1959): J. P. K ruijt. "T h e Influence o f D enom inationalism on Social Life and O rganizational P atterns." A rchives d e sociologic des religions. Vol. 4. N o. 8 (July-D ecem ber 1959), 105-11: J. P. K ruijt and W. G o d d ijn . “ Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociologisch p ro ces," in A . N . J. Den H ollander et al., eds. D rijt en Koers: Een halve eeuw sociale verandering in N ederland (2d ed.. Assen. 1962). pp. 227-63: Jo h an G oudsblom . D utch S o ciety (N ew Y ork, 1967): H ans D aalder, “ T he N etherlands: O pposition in a Segm ented Society.” in R obert A . D ahl, ed.. P olitical Oppositions in W estern D em ocracies (N ew H aven, 1966). pp. 188-236: and A rend L ijphart. The P olitics o f A ccom m odation: Pluralism and D em ocracy in the N etherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1968).

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the m e ta p h o r- a s com partm ents separating groups o f people from each other except at levels o f elite relationships. M any, therefore, advocated ontzuiling o r the breaking down o f these institutional­ ized com partm ents; som e even described the onset o f a process o f ontzuiling. Belgians, especially those of Dutch (Flem ish) speech, took up the discussion in the light o f conditions in their own country.3 A m ong the ways in which societies have organized and divided themselves, segm ented pluralism approaches the lower limit of rigidity if we take the visibility o f group identification and the possibility of individual choice in m em bership and m arriage as indicators. At the upper limit of rigidity in the contem porary world are the ascriptive inequalities o f caste and o f polycom munalism; the stigm ata o f com m unal m em bership have high salience, and individual choice within the system is practically nil. In societies o f voluntary, rather than enforced, pluralism, language identifies and separates people and may limit occupational choice. In areas of language contacts, while individuals may move out of the language groups into which they were born, the costs of change are usually so high by the tim e people are old enough to exercise choice that what choices they m ake are likely to be for their children rather than for themselves. Segmented pluralism depends on self-definition, and the possi­ bility of individual choice was at the origin o f the system. In practice there may be high costs, in social pressure or individual traum a, of change; but in principle the individual can change at alm ost any time - definitively and entirely, or m om entarily and partially, by simply reading an opposition p ap er o r splitting his vote. The availability o f individual alternatives distinguishes the politics o f segmented pluralism from those based on the cleavages o f caste, com m unalism , race, o r even language. T he segm ented pluralism I am discussing is, o f course, not that o f the stratified plural societies o f Southeast Asia o r the C arib­ bean which John S. Furnivall, M. G . Smith, and others have analyzed. I refer to the voluntary groups which function at var­ ious levels between the individual or prim ary group and the state, 2 See especially K ruijt and G oddijn, and A rend L ijphart, "K en terin g in d e N ederlandse P olitick.” A d a Politico. Vol. 4. N o. 3 (April 1969), 231-47. C f Belgian discussion in B. J. De Clercq, K ritiek van d e Verzuiling (Lier, 1968). Jan D e M eyer, “ Verzuiling en d o o rb raak in d e hedendaagse politick" (A ddress delivered at E uro­ pean Study and Inform ation C enter, Brussels, 3 April 1967), num er­ o us articles in De X laand, and L. Huyse, Die N iet-A anw ezige Staatshurger (A ntw erp, 1969), and Passiviteit. P acijicatie en Verzuiling in de Belgische P olitick (A ntw erp, 1970).

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and to the solidarities and conflicts o f such groups in the national integration' of com paratively open W estern societies. Segmented pluralism has been prom inent in the social mobili­ zation and the structuring o f political conflict and com prom ise in the N etherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg. Switzerland, and A us­ tria,4 and it is w ith these five countries that this article will deal. In none o f these societies except A ustria has segm entation approached completeness. If it had. interest-group and political life might have become to o stifling, and perhaps even explosive. W e are dealing with relatively, not completely, segm ented polities. In other dem ocracies, notably France, Italy, and G erm any, there has been considerable segm entation, but that has not been the dom inant characteristic o f their political systems. In England and the U nited States, there has been much less, although there is a significant am ount of unavow ed religious segm entation in the U nited States. Paradoxically, just as segm ented pluralism has apparently passed its high point o f developm ent in several coun­ tries, it is beginning to receive attention in the literature of com parative politics.5 3 O n the concept o f national integration, see the nuanced and sensible introductory rem arks in A ristide R. Z olberg. "P attern s o f N ational In teg ratio n ." Journal o f M odern A frican Studies. Vol. 5. N o. 4 (1967), 449-52. 4 I am n o t discussing N o rth ern Ireland, which is neither state nor nation, and which has not created a system o f segm ented pluralism o u t o f its fierce religious loyalties an d hostilities. F or an excellent survey, see Richard Rose, Governing without Consensus: A n Irish P ersp ective (L o n d o n , 1971). As I am discussing only m o d ern an d dem ocratic states, I do not take up Lebanon. 5 A rend Lijphart has w ritten o f “ consociational dem ocracy" and G er­ hard Lehm bruch o f “ K o nkordanzdem okratie" and “ Proporzdem okratie." by which they have characterized systems an d arrangem ents based on w hat I have called segm ented pluralism : L ijphart. “ T ypolo­ gies o f D em ocratic System s," Com parative Political Studies. Vol. I. (April 1968), 3-44. and “ C onsociational D em ocracy." W orld Poli­ tics. Vol. 21, (January 1969), 207-25: G erhard Lehm bruch. Proporzd em okratie: Politische S y s te m und politische K ultur in der Schw eiz und in O esterreich (T uebingen. 1967). and "A N oncom petitive Pat­ tern o f Conflict M anagem ent in Liberal Dem ocracies: T he Case of Sw itzerland, A ustria, and L eb an o n " (P aper given at the Interna­ tional Political Science A ssociation’s Seventh W orld C ongress. Brus­ sels. 1967). L ijphart's definition is p ut in term s o f the “ overarching coopera­ tion at ihe elite level with the deliberate aim o f counteracting disinte­ grating tendencies in the system " (“ T ypologies." p. 21). I should rather define the system in term s o f the bases o f party form ation and voluntary association and leave open the question o f elite coopera-

TH EO R ET IC A L AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

37

“ H U N G E R IS N E IT H E R C A T H O L IC N O R P R O T E S T A N T " W hen, in the nineteenth century. European w orkers, peasants, and lower-middle-class elem ents began to organize for representa­ tion o f their group interests, they had the choice of three basic frameworks: that of an existing framework o f religious organiza­ tion, the “ functional” framework o f socioeconomic interests alone, or that offered by som e form o f the new doctrines and organization o f socialism. Politically, the most im portant organi­ zations were to be those o f peasants and of w orkers, the latter being the more im portant, because they were a growing class, m ore dynam ic and m ore open to conflicting appeals. “ The future belongs to the class which knows how to create its own institutions,” proclaim ed Emile Vandervelde, but he was a Socialist, writing in the springtim e o f the w orkers' aw akening to the struggle for social and political em ancipation. In Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, A ustria, and the N etherlands, workers created their own institutions as Socialists or Catholics or. in som e cases, as Protestants. The Socialists generally took the lead. C hristian unions, cooperatives, and friendly societies paid Social­ ist vice the tribute of virtuous im itation, and som e trade unions were even blessed with the characterization “ anti-Socialist” in their names. Among the peasants and lower middle class. C ath o ­ lics and Protestants were in the lead. The Socialists, to be sure, would have em braced all workers in their organizations. However, in the countries I am d isc u ssin g -a s distinct from Scandinavia and B rita in - th e Socialists’ antireligious tion an d outcom es. N ot building effective elite cooperation into the definition m akes o n e m ore likely to exam ine the conditions which induce, and those which inhibit o r frustrate, such cooperation. F or o th er suggestions o f som ew hat sim ilar term inology, see M ichael Fogarty on “ vertical o r ideological pluralism ." in Christian D em ocracy in Europe. 1820-1953 (L ondon, 1957), p. 42: Joseph G usfield. on "superim posed segregation." in "M ass Society and Extrem ist P olitics." A m erican Sociological Review, Vol. 27 (F e b ru ­ ary 1962). 29. and Juerg Steiner on "C onflict R esolution and D em ­ ocratic Stability in Subculturally Segm ented Political System s." R es P ublica, Vol. I I . N o. 4 (1969). 775-98. and his Gew ahlose P olitik u n d k u ltu re lle V ie lfa ll: H v p o th e se n e n tw ic k e lt a m B eisp iel d e r S ch w eiz (B ern, 1970). R alf D ah ren d o rf speaks o f " Versaeulung" in Gesellschaft und D em okratie in D eutschland (M unich. 1965). pp. 134-44. 302-4. and 436-38. but in a looser and b ro ad er sense than d o the D utch. His E nglish v ersio n . S o c ie ty a n d D em o cra cy in G erm a n y (New' Y o rk , 1967), p p . 116-18 an d 276. gives only a sm all p a rt o f the o rigin al discussion. He has kept the literal sense o f th e D utch verzuiling with "pillarizatio n ."

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tone tended to repel C hristian w orkers, and they ridiculed the idea o f political neutrality, as Swiss Socialists did that o f an A rbeiterbund “ whose head would be red while its tail was black.” 6 A ttem pts at political neutrality likewise incurred the suspicions o f ecclesiastical authorities. Clerical and anti-clerical intolerance fed on each other, but they also prom oted organiza­ tion and .counterorganization am ong workers. If the division of class forces weakened, the rivalry and em ulation o f traditional religion and the new secular religion o f socialism stim ulated organization. Even Vandervelde predicted, in his native Belgium as early as the year of R erum Novarum, th at “ the m ore rapid the progress o f socialism, the m ore im portance will the m ovem ent of C hristian Democracy take o n .” 7 In the countries of mixed religions, the C atholic-Protestant cleavage also shaped th e new social m o v em en ts.8 “ H u n g er is neither C atholic nor P rotestant,” indignantly declared a Swiss C atholic deputy.9 Nonetheless, Swiss and D utch churches long sought to ensure that the organization against hunger would be C atholic or Protestant. They discouraged their faithful, not only from joining Socialist or even functional organizations, but also from forming joint C atholic-Protestant organizations. A unidim ensional political cleavage on ideological grounds was possible only as long as a happy few had the political terrain to themselves. T hat model may be seen with classical clarity (even m ore sharply than in Britain) in Belgium's Liberal-C atholic twoparty system from the 1830s to the 1880s. But in the age o f mass politics class cleavages had to be expressed within or between parties. T hus, it was a com bination o f religious-ideological and class alignments that structured the political life and the voluntary associations o f the segm ented pluralist nations. Religious politics narrowly won out over class politics in the hierarchy o f cleavages in the N etherlands; m oreover, while the C atholic party cut across class lines, the tw o Calvinist parties represented differences not only in religious tem peram ent, but also between lower-class and bourgeois followings. In the overlapping between religious and social alignments during the era o f universal equal m anhood suffrage after World h R. Ruffieux. “ La S uisse." in S. H. Scholl, ed. 150 A n s de M ouvem ent Ouvrier Chretien en Europe de I'O uest. 1789-1939 (Brussels. 1966). 462. 7 Emile V andervelde. E nquete su r les A ssociations Professionnelles d 'artisans et ouvriers en Belgique. 2 vols. (Brussels. 1891). ii:54. KO n these and o th er cleavages, see Stein R okkan. C itizens. Elections. Parties (N ew York and O slo. 1970). 9 Q uoted by R. Ruffieux, “ La Suisse." p. 462.

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W ar I, am ong the five countries I have m entioned only interw ar A u stria experienced class conflict as intense as religiousideological conflict in determ ining the tone of politics. As Richard Rose and D erek Urwin have recently show n,10 there is not a single instance of a dem ocratic polity with a uni­ dim ensional party cleavage on class o r econom ic lines. The nine­ teenth century politico-religious ideological alignments segm ented later voluntary associations, the press, and, in som e countries, education. M odified but not displaced by class alignm ents, they occupied much o f the political space o f the countries I am dis­ cussing, making it difficult for new political form ations to enter the scene. Brevity makes it necessary for me to force the distinctions between religious-ideological and class alignm ents. Anticlericalism was a m ajor com ponent o f the new socialism, and the defense o f established class interests was a m ajor concern o f most leaders o f the confessional parties. The Liberals were generally allied with the latter in the defense o f property interests, while fighting them on the terrain o f the K u ltu rk a m p f The outspoken, very conserva­ tive lead e r o f th e Belgian C ath o lic p arty declared to his L iberal opponents in 1878, “ W e and you cannot adm it that there is a social question to be resolved, we cannot adm it the regulation of labor conditions, because then we should have no defense against the w orker asking us, in the nam e o f the suffering o f his family, for w ork and for b read.” 11 Despite the conservatism o f most C hristian party leaders and most prelates, the religiously oriented organizations helped to reconcile peasants’ and w orkers’ traditional loyalties with the new voluntary associations and political action o f an era o f social m obilization. A m ong workers and the lower middle classes, and especially am ong peasants, many were unwilling and often unable to organize unless they could do so within old fram ew orks. Seg­ mented organizations m ediated between religious hierarchies and the disadvantaged social groups, asserting new rights by new forms of collective action. Religiously oriented peasants’ leagues and labor organizations joined , at first in a subordinate capacity, in political action with the dom inant classes o f th eir coreligionists. In the multilingual states, the Socialist. Liberal, and C hristian 10 Richard Rose and D erek U rw in, “ Social C ohesion, Political Parties, and Strains in Regim es,” C om parative P olitical S tu d ies, Vol. 2 (April 1969), 7-67. 11 C harles W oeste. H ouse o f Representatives. 20 F ebruary 1878, A /m ales parlem entaires, p. 408. C ited by B. S. C hlepner. C ent ans d 'h isio ire sociale en Belgique (Brussels. 1956). 65.

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segm ented organizations united their m em bers across the frontiers of language. In the long run, the com bination o f confessional and anticon­ fessional organizations enabled the lower strata of the population to achieve a higher rate o f social and political organization than, say, the U nited States. (Scandinavia shows high rates o f organiza­ tion, too but in a religiously hom ogeneous society.) In the coun­ tries o f segm ented pluralism it is not true, as E. E. Schattschneider has said of the U nited States, that “ in the pluralist heaven, the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.” 12 The m oderation o f early C hristian social organizations helped to keep the dem ands o f newly mobilizing groups at levels easily m anag eab le - p erh ap s too m an ag eab le - for the system . O f course, all these states had political parties and adm inistrative institutions o f a sort which p u t them in a different category from the new states about whose prem ature social m obilization Samuel P. H untington has w arned.13 The caution o f many o f the early C hristian organizations, inspired by their own weakness, defer­ ence, and prelates’ restraints, was such th at it often sacrificed social justice for social peace. Some early jo in t ProtestantC atholic labor groups in the N etherlands and Switzerland were m ore m ilitant, but they were dissolved by their churches’ opposi­ tion. The specialization o f function achieved by Belgian Catholic, D utch Catholic, and D utch Protestant organizations gradually lent a greater realism to social and econom ic attitudes and pro­ gram s aggregated by their blocs. U ltim ately, the cohabitation o f clashing social movem ents within the C hristian blocs m ade their elites aware o f the utility, or at least o f the inevitability, o f the tensions of conflicting group interests. This heterogeneity gave those blocs a liveliness often lacking in the m ore socially hom oge­ neous Socialist bloc after its “ heroic p eriod.”

C O N D IT IO N S FO R T H E E M E R G E N C E O F S E G M E N T E D P L U R A L IS M Some of the conditions for the emergence o f segm ented organiza­ tions were am ong the m ore general conditions for the emergence o f political democracy. In addition, there had to be at least two Weltanschauungsgruppen o f relatively num erous followings, with som e geographical concentration o f each, and, in som e areas, 12 E. E. Schattschneider. The Sem i-sovereign People (N ew York. I960), 35. See also C harles Perrow , " T h e Sociological Perspective and Political Pluralism ," S o cia l R esearch, Vol. 31 (W inter 1964), 411-22. 13 S am uel P. H u n tin g to n . “ P olitical D ev elo p m en t an d Political D ecay," W orld Politics. Vol. 17 (April 1965), 386-430.

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Table / N ational Religions and Extent o f Segmented Pluralism ,’ W estern Democracies, about 1905-65 N ational Religions

Extent o f Segm ented Pluralism High

M edium

Catholic

A ustria France Belgium Italy Luxem bourg

Catholic and Protestant

N etherlands

Protestant

Low Irelan d t

G erm any G reat Britain Switzerland U nited States Denm ark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden

* S egm en ted plu ralism d efin ed , as in tex t, only in term s o f religiousideological cleavages an d organization. + Refers only to w hat is now the Irish R epublic.

contact with m em bers o f another group. As Table 1 shows, segm entation has been highest in several C atholic countries and in one o f mixed religion. In all the countries o f verzuiling, a n ational o r, as in S w itzerland, can to n a l C ath o lic o r P ro testan t church was challenged by oth er faiths and by anticonfessional Liberal and, later and m ore powerfully am ong the masses. Social­ ist groups. W ith in d u strializatio n , u rb a n iz atio n , an d g eo g rap h ic m o b il­ ity (in these small countries, som etim es only by daily o r weekly com m uting), the churches becam e concerned about risks to the faith o f the masses. If isolation could no longer protect the faithful from exposure to influences corrosive o f their faith, spe­ cial institutions had to encapsulate them . In areas relatively untouched by m igrations and changes in social structure, trad i­ tional hierarchies and values might rem ain unchallenged. N o seg­ m ented social organization was necessary in these places, and a single party could m onopolize political representation. A classic, case is the Swiss half-canton of Appenzell Inner R h o d en .14 In other, often less picturesque, rural areas and small towns o f 14 Roger G iro d , "G eo g rap h y o f the Swiss Party S ystem ," in E. Allardt an d Y. L ittunen, eds. Cleavages. Ideologies, and P arty S y ste m s (H el­ sinki. 1964), pp. 137-38. -

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traditional C atholic or Protestant life, sim ilar situations have endured. A nother condition of segm ented organization was that the elites from different social classes of the sam e faith have enough com m unication and mutual trust to encourage cooperation in a lasting political organization. (These were lacking most o f the tim e am ong French and Italian Catholics because o f social dis­ tance and because of disputes about the legitimacy of the regimes.) T he protection or advancem ent o f a church’s schools and, to a lesser extent, its welfare activities, produced enough long-term solidarity across class lines for political organization for a long time.

S M A L L N E S S O F S TA TE S Is another condition of segm ented pluralism the state’s smallness o f population and power? If so, what have been the intervening variables between smallness and viability o f such a system? Is the critical variable to be found in the international system? Is it the lack o f a foreign policy “ load” on the political systems of small states? U nder certain conditions, external dem ands in small or large nations m ake for solidarity against outside threats: in others they cause increased discord. The historic experience varies among nations, and from period to period and som etim es from issue to issue within the sam e nation; it depends som ew hat on whether external dem ands press along the lines o f existing cleavages within the state. In the 1830s and early 1840s, foreign threats to the very existence o f the new Belgian state united Liberals and Catholics in a period of “ unionism ” which consolidated the kingdom 's survival; but the threats were not along the lines o f internal cleavages. In A ustria the First Republic was torn apart by exter­ nal pressures following the fault lines o f the new state’s precarious political structure: however, the Second Republic found viability in surm ounting external dem ands, which no longer followed inter­ nal “ fault lines.” Switzerland has long been sensitive to threats of intervention from the big powers; the Nazi menace encouraged a lasting peace between labor and employer organizations, and the belated admission of the Socialist party to the federal executive. In Belgium, each world w ar deepened national integration above class lines, but exacerbated linguistic and regional conflict. G iven the character o f the international system in this century, and of the larger neighbors o f each o f the segm ented pluralist nations, the reduction of external dem ands (by all except interw ar A ustria) represents a considerable feat o f political m anagem ent. It would be unkind to the great powers to com pare the effectiveness

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43

o f their foreign policies with those of the sm aller dem ocratic states in the first half o f this century. Factors o f location aside, segm ented pluralism has not m ade these small European dem oc­ racies any m ore vulnerable to external threats, o r less capable of form ulating policies o f survival, than the unsegm ented small states. If World W ar 1 som ew hat divided the Swiss, it was along lines o f language, not ideology. The Nazi threat united them across lines of ideology, social class, and language. D espite all the professions o f socialist internationalism and the discipline of international C atholicism , international ties did not determ ine the relations of blocs to each other. We may see an exception in the international strength of corporatist currents which helped divide each o f the segm ented states, but also divided their C atholic com m unities. C atholic corporatism between the wars owed much to Pope Pius X I’s tolerance o f this reaction­ ary and gaseous doctrine expounded in Italy, and to his pleas to restructure modern society along the lines o f a “ mitigated corpo­ ratist state.” 15 But in the one state where corporatism seemed m om entarily to carry the day, its success was due to M ussolini’s meddling in A ustrian politics, and not to the P o n tiffs eloquence o r to international C atholic ties. Size has helped the segm ented pluralist (and other small) dem ocracies in one essential respect. N ot being possessed, in the age o f industrialism , o f the m eans o f international aggression, none o f them has cherished illusions about its international role. This sort o f realism has reduced the external dem ands on them . It has had the futher effect, in the segm ented pluralist states, of making the system m ore receptive to the admission o f Socialist and C atholic parties, which, in the larger states o f G erm any and France, offended the hypernationalism o f political leaders and powerful dom estic groups. Ceteris paribus, the sm aller the state, the easier it is to recognize solidarity in diversity. It is, o f course, possible to cherish a myth o f the mission o f a national state even in a country w ithout pretensions to interna­ tional grandeur. In not one of our five sm aller democracies does such a myth exist, however. The Swiss cantons ceased to be expansionist when, with the R eform ation, the existence o f reli­ gious differences was accepted. (The continued strength o f Swiss com m unal and cantonal political life continues to be a marvel of 15 T he phrase is th at o f the distinguished C atholic historian, M sgr. A. Sim on, in the course o f a sym pathetic appraisal o f the work o f Pope Pius X I. in “ Le V atican," in. S. H . Scholl, 150 Arts, p. 42. On C a th o lic c o rp o ra tis m , see also Paul V ignaux, T ra d itio n a lism e et syndicalism s: E ssa id 'h isto ire so c ia le (1884-1941) (N ew Y ork, 1943).

44

CONSOCIATION A L DEMOCRACY

the age o f the national state.) Even colonial pow er, though its sins were grievous, sinned abroad rather than at home. It did not create illusions o f state pow er, either within the N etherlands, whose old em pire gave it som e influence in extra-E uropean affairs, or within Belgium, which briefly held such vast dom ain.

Q U A L IT IE S O F S E G M E N T E D P L U R A L IS T S TA TE S The postw ar politics o f the five states show a num ber o f comm on characteristics. To be sure, many o f these qualities are not unique to them , but are com m on to other dem ocracies as well. In each o f the five states, as in any modern political entity o f any size, there is a un ique co n fig u ratio n o f q u a litie s, but o n e ca n n o t dw ell on these here. All the states except A ustria have long traditions o f municipal and provincial or cantonal liberties and initiatives. W hile provin­ cial autonom y disappeared in the Low C ountries with the French Revolution, neither the m odern N etherlands nor Belgium has becom e anything like a Jacobin state; in both, localism rem ains a significant dim ension of political life, despite the unitary state. (L u xem bourg, o f course, is only city -state size.) In all th e states u n d er discussion th ere are stro n g linkages betw een local and national politics. T here is, therefore, none o f the myth o f the state which has overshadowed diversity within m odern G erm any or - in a less virulent form - in France. Even though only Switzerland and A ustria have formal federal structures, in the 1960s Belgium moved tow ard a federalism in cultural, social, and party life, for which its political leaders are still seeking governm ental institutions. But federalism offers a different sort of pluralism than does verzuiling; it recognizes diversity in territorial space, although that diversity may corre­ spond as to a considerable extent in Switzerland - with religious and linguistic diversity. Segmented pluralism calls for representa­ tion of diversity within the sam e space, as well as for ties of voluntary association between m em bers o f com peting blocs across internal boundaries. Proportional representation is its logical pol­ itical counterpart. All the five countries have m ultiparty systems (with A ustria com ing nearest to a tw o-party system), and the proportional representation characteristic of continental dem ocra­ cies, which in the larger states has aroused the indignation o f so many English-language writers. W ith m ultiparty systems, coalition governm ent has, o f course, been the usual practice. The exception has been an occasional single-party m ajority governm ent in Belgium and A ustria; there has been no recourse to m inority governm ent (a la D enm ark) or to extraparliam entary cabinets. Coalitions have most often assem­

TH EO R ET IC A L AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

45

bled m ore than the minim um required parliam entary support, and the numerically strongest party has generally been a partner even in coalitions am ong three parties. The segm ented pluralist nations have com e to place greater weight on jo in t decision m aking and m utuality of rights and obligations than upon majority decisions and m ajority-m inority alternations o f pow er (which are, m ore­ over, often unattainable in m ultiparty systems). The principle o f amicabilis eompositio - in the suggestive formula o f the Peace o f W estphalia recalled by Juerg S te in e r-h a s com e to prevail in much o f political and socioeconom ic life. Switzerland has informally institutionalized unique systems of legislative-executive relations at cantonal and national levels. These include an executive K ollegialprinzip16 which goes far beyond norm al coalition practice in its inclusiveness, stability, and capacity for c o m p ro m ise-th o u g h not in its learning capacity, Steiner argues. The principles o f “ all-parties governm ent” (R oger G irod's term exaggerates only slightly) were first developed in a num ber of com m unes and cantons before becoming the unw ritten rule o f th e co n fed eratio n . N o c an to n w ith a four- o r five-party coalition has ever gone back to a tw o- or three-party coalition.17 A ustria, Switzerland, and Belgium have carried proportionality into the civil service and the staffing o f public corporations, as well as the agencies o f adm inistrative pluralism. The Swiss and Belgian systems naturally include recognition o f language and regional or cantonal diversity in addition to religious-ideological bloc representation. The A ustrian P r o p o r z is most clearly partydeterm ined: the Swiss practice is the least formal. The Belgian situation, aside from its very thorny linguistic conflict, w hich is at least reg u lated by law, req u ires th e m ost subtle adjustm ents between uncodified principles and uneasy prac­ tice. T he Belgian parties practice a sort of P roporz, which takes account not only o f the individual’s party or associated trade union affiliatio n , but also o f his id en tificatio n as a p ractising C atholic or freethinker. R itual calls for each new governm ent to proclaim its devotion to a merit system and its intent to do away with political appointm ents and (m ore im portant these days) pro­ 16 Erich G ru n er. Die P arieien in der Schw eiz (B ern. 1969). p. 24. 17 F o r S teiner's views. “ N onviolent Conflict R esolution in Dem ocratic Systems: Sw itzerland,” Journal o f C onflict R esolution, Vol. 13 (Sep­ tem ber 1969). 295-303. F or the “svstem e de gouvernem ent de tous les p artis." R. G iro d . "L e Systeme des partis en Suisse." Revue fra ttfa ise d e science politique. Vol. 14 (D ecem ber 1964). 1130. See also F rancois M asnata. L e p a rti socialiste et la tradition dem ocratique en Suisse (Paris. 1963) and C hristopher H ughes. The Parlia­ m ent o f S w itzerla n d (L o n d on. 1962).

46

C O NSO CIATION AL DEMOCRACY

m otions. But it insists that the balance within the public service reflect the divisions within public opinion. Therefore, each gov­ ernm ent moves first to reestablish a hypothetical equilibrium upset only by the regrettable partisanship o f its predecessors. An unavowed and constantly shifting Proporz in favor of the parties o f th e governing coalition prevails; b u t g o v ern m en ts a la recherche des equilibres perdus d o not dismiss people in order to restore balance, although they may sidetrack them from decision making.

E X T E N T O F S E G M E N T A T IO N T able 2 offers som e gross com parisons o f the degrees o f penetra­ tion into different social milieux by the various ideological blocs about 1950-1960, when the systems o f segm ented pluralism attained their highest developm ent. Table 3 offers som e equally gross com parisons o f the degrees of segm entation by spheres of politically relevant activity in the sam e period. As these tables indicate, segm entation has been m ore extensive in the lower social strata. W orkers and farmers have been much m ore inclined than employers and m em bers of the liberal professions to act through segm ented o rg an izatio n s. L iberal, C ath o lic , and P ro testan t employers have very largely surm ounted religious differences in order to work through neutral employer associations, leaving the C ath o lic o r P ro te stan t-o rie n ted asso ciatio n s to serve as study groups. The most im portant segm ented employer associations, those o f the N etherlands, cooperated earlier and at first more effectively with each other than did the segm ented labor unions.18 The fullest data on association m em berships by socioeconomic categories com e from the N etherlands. T here, as in the U nited States, association m em berships as a whole rise with advances in socioeconom ic status. However, the contrary holds true for m em bership in segm ented associations; it is high am ong workers and low am ong em ployers.19 1,1 John W indm uller. L abor R elations in the Netherlands (Ithaca. 1969). 19 N etherlands Central Statistical Bureau, Vrije-tijdsbesteding in Xederland. 1962-1963. Deel 7. Verenigingsleven. zom er 1963 (H ilversum , 1965), p. 47. F o r d ata in Tables 2 and 3, I have relied on the results o f elec­ tio n s to official o r sem iofficial re p re se n ta tiv e b o d ies (th e ch a m ­ bers o f labor, agriculture, and com m erce in A ustria: the elections to works councils and health and safety com m ittees in Belgium), the m em bership data o f various voluntary associations and som e survey research (notably in the N etherlands and A ustria), and on the research and scholarly “ guesstim ates” o f my colleagues in the Inter­ national Study o f th e Politics o f th e Sm aller European D em ocracies.

Table 2

E x te n t o f P e n e t r a t i o n b y Id e o lo g ic a l B locs in to O c c u p a t i o n a l M ilie u x , a b o u t 1 9 5 0 -1 9 6 0

Social Milieu__________________________________ A ustria

M anual W orkers W hite-collar Employees Farm ers Farm Laborers Small Business Employers Liberal Professions N o te:

________ Belgium

CA

SO

CO

LR

3 2 1 I 1 1 2

I 2 3 2 3 3 2

3 4

4 3 4

CA

3 3 2

2 2 1 1 1 1' 1

Ideological Bloc - C A = C ath o lic; SO = S ocialist; C O = C o m m u n ist; L R = L ib e ral-R ad ica l; PR = Protestant.

Strength o f bloc organization in milieu: I = m ajority support; 2 = exten siv e su p p o rt, betw een a b o u t 15 an d 49 p ercen t; 3 = sig n ifican t m in o rity , b etw een a b o u t 5 an d 14 p ercen t; 4 = som e support, but less than 5 percent. * Includes both Protestant blocs (H ervorm d and G ereform eerd). Sources: See note 19.

N etherlands

Switzerland

SO

CO

LR

CA

SO

CO

L R PR* CA

SO

CO

LR

PR

2 2

3 3

3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2

4

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 2

3

3 2 2

3 3 2

1 1 2

3 2 2

2 3 2

2 2 2

2 2 3 2

3 3 2 2 2 2

3

48

C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

Table 3 Extent o f Segmented Pluralism, by Sphere o f Activity, about 1950-1960 A ustria

Belgium

Education Prim ary Secondary Higher

M M

H H H

(D* (2)* (3)**

H H M

M M L

Mass M edia Press Electronic

H M

M

H

M H

M

H H

H

H H

H M

H L

H M

L

M H H

M H

H

M

M

H

M H

Socioeconom ic O rganization L abor H Farm ers H Small Business M M Employers Liberal Professions M M H ealth Care C onsum ers H Leisure Activities H Politics and G overnm ent Religion-Party H Tics Bureaucracy H

H H

L uxem bourgN etherlands Switzerland

H

H L

N ote: Degree o f segm ented pluralism H = High; M = M edium : L = Low. * 1 . 2 = State schools un d er clerical influence: **3 = N o university. Sources: See no te 19

Some o f these class differences in the degree o f segmented activity reflect the wider range of social and com m unications skills in the higher-status occupations and the wider networks o f p er­ sonal relationships m ade possible by education and economic means. They also reflect historic differences in approaches by religious authorities to the faithful of different classes as they sought to inoculate or encapsulate them against contam inating contacts. The poverty of social relations experienced by most

on w hich see Val R. L o rw in , “ H isto rian s an d O th e r Social S cien­ tists: T he C o m p a ra tiv e A nalysis o f N a tio n -B u ild in g in W estern Societies.” in Stein R okkan. ed. C om parative Research across Cul­ tures a n d N a tions (Paris. 1968). esp. pp. 111-14.

TH EO R ETIC AL A N D COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

49

peasants, workers, and lower middle-class elem ents m ade possible a concept o f “ to tal" organization for them which one can hardly im agine proposed to a m odern upper-class constituency. This is the concept stated in the 1950s by the chaplain o f the Belgian C atholic W orkers' M ovement: “ A triple idea governs the struc­ ture o f our great C hristian labor organization: that o f totality, o f complexity, and o f u n ity .. . . O ur m ovem ent must em brace the whole person o f the w orker, the whole o f the w orker’s life, the whole family o f the w orker, all w orkers' needs, and the whole working class. W e want the working man and w om an, youth and adult, in coming into our m ovem ent, to find everything th ere.” 20 Peasant leagues achieved as much for C atholic peasants. A b ra­ ham Kuvper, who organized in the N etherlands the mass m ove­ ment o f fundam entalist Calvinists against the bourgeois leaders of the latitudinarian Dutch Reform ed church, proclaim ed. “ T here is no sphere where Christ does not say. ‘M ine!’ ” 21 N o r was it only the religiously oriented leaders who tried to organize an all-em bracing framework for the lives o f workers. Lacking only the equivalents o f the parish and parochial schools, the Socialists sought sim ilar ends. The Belgian W orkers’ party proposed “ to take the whole m an at every age of his life and in all the manifestations of his existence.” 22 The greatest density and intensity o f such organization - and the greatest cultural em anci­ pation - were those achieved between the wars am ong the workers o f “ Red V ienna.” 23

R E L A T IO N S A M O N G T H E BLO C S In each country, each bloc eventually had to recognize that no one bloc or even coalition could have a tranquil or durable national (or, in Switzerland, cantonal) m ajority on any decision which threatened the raison d 'etre for another bloc’s political organization, notably, the relations between state and schools. Also, as in every political dem ocracy, the dom inant social and econom ic groups came to recognize the need for sharing pow er in the regulation o f the labor m arket and distribution o f the national product with the industrial and political representatives o f the working classes. In the segm ented pluralist polities, th at meant recognizing the legitimacy o f the com peting segm ented organiza­ tions o f workers rather than attem pting to play o ff one segm ented 20 M sgr. A Brys, C om m ent esi coneu et organise le M ouvem ent Ouvrier Chretien en Belgique (Brussels, n.d.). 10.

21 Q uoted in K ruijt. Verzuiling. 14. 22 Emile Vandervelde, La Cinquantenaire clu P arti Ouvrier Beige (Brussels, 1935), 324. 2J C harles A. G ulick. A u stria fr o m H absburg to H itler. 2 vols. (Berke­ ley and Los Angeles, 1948).

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CONSO CIATION AL DEMOCRACY

organization against another. Socialist organizations had to accept the legitimacy o f organizations formed on denom inational lines within the social class which the Socialists claimed for their own on grounds of ideology and o f historical prim acy in the field. W orking-class elites had to achieve enough unity in econom ic and political bargaining to prevent pluralism from keeping them too weak to represent their constituents adequately. T he full acceptance by contending blocs o f the legitimacy of their rivals at every level was slow in coming, and it has prevailed for only a short tim e. In Switzerland, with its curious m ixture of egalitarianism and stratification, traditionalism and capacity for com prom ise, the Socialist party got a seat on the federal executive only a generation ago, and it did not get tw o seats, in accordance with its share o f the national vote, until 1959. (It was possible for the Socialists to wait with som e confidence, since they had been sitting on com m unal and cantonal executives since the 1930s.) In every nation the m utual acceptance o f the legitimacy o f social, especially labor, organizations o f opposing ideologies dates chiefly from W orld W ar II. T here is a tension between the fixity o f segm entation and the options o f pluralism. Faithful clienteles and hereditary voters exist in an atm osphere o f voluntary associational and electoral com pe­ tition. A host of socializing agencies, beginning w ith th e family, and netw orks o f social services transm it bloc attitudes and attach­ m ents from generation to generation. But som e margin o f uncer­ tainty and fear o f com petition, which were at the base o f the system ’s establishm ent, rem ain necessary, in another day and another spirit, to m ake the system viable. Bloc m em bers can have the advantages o f pluralism only if they feel, and their elites know, that they may exercise som e freedom o f choice in associa­ tion m em bership and voting. Such possibilities help keep leaders responsible to the needs of their rank and file. O f course, too much uncertainty may lead to com petitive bidding and overbid­ ding by leaders o f mass organizations; nonetheless, segm ented labor organizations in the sm aller European democracies have shown m ore sense o f the public interest and m ore civic responsi­ bility since World W ar II than the functional organizations o f the U nited States o r Britain. C om parison o f the extent and effectiveness o f participation in segm ented and in functional organizations is one o f the many aspects of our problem which still calls for system atic research. The pluralism due to segm entation has. on the whole, m ade for more, rather than for less, participation in voluntary associations. All other things being equal, the m ore pluralism in an area of socioeconomic association, the larger the num ber o f posts to fill at all levels. Tw o building trades unions have twice as many

TH EO R ET IC A L A ND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

51

presidencies and secretaryships, and alm ost twice as many execu­ tive board positions, as a single building trades union for the sam e territo ry . T hey will furnish m ore union rep resen tativ es to public regulatory bodies and to collective bargaining commissions than a single union. Pluralism creates m ore pluralism. In what may be a wholesome form o f Parkinson’s law, com petition of organizations for places on the various elected bodies o f labor representation and protection creates a need for candidates, some o f whom are already activists; but thousands m ore become active only because of the contested elections. T he usual proportional representation gives even the organization of a foreordained m inority position the incentive to com pete in a unit where it does not hope to win. O n th e o th e r h an d , a high ra tio o f p a rticip atio n to m em b er­ ship am ong people low in organizational experience and formal training will, at least initially, lower the quality of representation. Responsibility may develop com petence, but only if the initial disparity between skills and responsibilities is not too great and not too suddenly manifest to participants and critical observers. D em ands far in excess o f com petence discourage participation and frustrate its aims. In all these countries, even little Luxem­ bourg, the workings o f segm ented pluralism in som e spheres have been so complicated as to give the masses the impression that the system could work only by a concentration o f decisions at top levels. Hence there arose a peculiar blend o f democracy and elite decision making shrouded in confidentiality, o f “ leadership and pas­ sivity.” 24 Benefits have their costs, and those o f segm ented pluralist diversity include waste and im m obilism e. The duplication o f facil­ ities and services is m ore uneconomical in small countries than in large, and less justified by a need to prevent organizational levi­ athans. O ne should rate diversity ahead o f efficiency where there is com petition o f ideals and opinions. C om petition in the age of the welfare state, however, is often based not on meaningful differentiation o f services but on the natural pursuit o f institu­ tional growth: for example, the com petition for students between public and C atholic school systems in Belgium, o r the com peti­ tion o f health care systems for num bers o f enrollees. M ore dam aging than waste is im m obilism e. V oluntary organi­ zations or the state may fail to tak e d esirab le actio n because of mutual veto powers held by the segm ented organizations, or because of lack of the public resources to accomplish in all o f the :j H ans D aalder. Leiding en L ijdelijkheid (Assen, 1964): also his essay in D ahl, Political Oppositions, and the work o f Lijphart. Juerg Steiner, and Huyse.

52

C O NSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

recognized institutions what there are resources to accomplish in only one of them . The block on innovation by mutual veto comes with greater force from segm ented organizations than in other forms o f pluralism, because the differentiation o f organization is tied to the values of religious and political choice.

A U S T R IA IN F E L IX If we do not restrict discussion to current regimes, we may exam ine the co n d itio n s u n d er w hich segm ented pluralism has failed and succeeded within the sam e country. With the same formal institutions between the wars and after World W ar II, A ustria is the best example o f discontinuities in the history o f segm ented pluralism. The First Republic presents a limiting case o f unm anageable conflict; the Second Republic presents a limiting case in conflict m anagem ent which goes to the point o f depriving politics o f much o f its meaning. The A ustrian state was a creation o f the victorious enemy; in 1919 the Allies were naturally unwilling to see G erm any aggran­ dized by the A nschluss supported by the A ustrian parties and people. The G erm an-speaking rem nant o f the Hapsburg Empire had little sense o f national identity or national goals and no accepted national symbols. Schoolbooks did not even perform their norm al socialization functions, but led youngsters to under­ stand that they w ere part o f an ideal G erm any.25 Loyalties ran to the ideological blocs and their parties, which had their own sym bols an d th e ir ow n arm ed forces. T h e b ittern ess o f party struggle weakened the state, whose weakness in turn gave m ore scope for party struggle. U nable to enforce law or order on the parties, A ustria was a state characterized by “ a strong tendency tow ard non-existence,” a S ta a l wider W illen.2b From the three "cam ps” o r Lager o f prew ar days, society and politics becam e polarized w hen th e sm allest an d least w idely organized o f the three, the G erm an N ationals, threw much o f their support to the “ Blacks” against the“ R eds.” Class and geo­ graphical alignments deepened those of religion and ideology: C atholic businessmen, artisans, and farmers versus Socialist w ork­ ers; rural areas versus industrial cities; the Black hinterland versus the R ed capital. The C atholic bloc lacked the sort o f labor or left wing that was giving such blocs som e balance and som e progres­ 25 I am indebted to K urt S teiner for this inform ation, which is based on research for his Politics in A ustria (B oston, 1972). 26 R. Lorenz. D er S ta a t wider W illen (V ienna, 1938), quoted by H. P. Sccher. “ C oalition G overnm ent: T he Case o f the Second A ustrian R epublic,” A m erican Political Science Review, Vol. 52. (Septem ber 1958). 791

TH EO R ETIC AL A ND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

53

sive impetus in other countries. Its elites, including the prelates, treated the workers as inferior and dependent and actually or potentially subversive. N ot even papal pronouncem ents were pro o f against this attitude: Quadragesitno A nno in 1931, despite its corporatist em phasis, was all but suppressed in A ustria.27 T he A ustrian Socialists were a classic case o f reformists whose revolutionary language confused their followers and alarm ed their antagonists. Suaviter in re, fo r iite r in m odo might have been the m otto o f the party. Com m itted to political dem ocracy, despite all the subtleties of “ A ustro-M arxism ,” the Socialists nevertheless em ployed a vocabulary o f class struggle - notably in the famous Linz program o f 1926- t o keep their left wing within the party. U nity was the opium of the party activists. “ It is a hundred times better to go the wrong way united,” argued O tto Bauer, “ for errors can be corrected, than to split in search o f the right w ay.” 28 But Socialist unity in the face o f potential Com m unist com peti­ tion o r left-wing dissatisfaction was bought at the expense of w hatever chances there were of a m inim um o f national unity. Foreign pressures accentuated internal divisions. M ussolini’s open and covert interventions encouraged the C atholic L ager in its m ortal com bat with the Socialist cam p. M uch feebler was the pressure o f international C om m unism , but its influence helped m ake the Socialists m ore revolutionary in rhetoric, and more reluctant to reach com prom ises. U nlike the other states o f seg­ m ented pluralism, A ustria had no tradition of smallness o f size a n d th e use o f balan ce-o f-p o w er co n sid e ra tio n s am ong pow erful states to preserve its own independence; to be sure, the shortsight­ edness o f the democracies gave it little opportunity in th at direc­ tion.

T H E S E C O N D A U S T R IA N R E P U B L IC : P L U R A L IS M A F F IR M E D The spirit of paradox bids us learn from history that people never learn from history. That is not so; som etim es they learn, and som etim es they learn too much. Leaders and masses o f the two A ustrian blocs learned many lessons in the late 1930s and the 1940s. T here was the lesson o f the civil war: politics must never come to that again. T here were the lessons of dictatorship: M us­ solini’s brutality and corruption, and the greater horrors o f H itler­ ism and Stalinism sensitized Catholics and Socialists against all Alfred D iam an t. A ustrian Catholics and the First R epublic (P rince­ ton. I960), ch. 5. P arteitag, 1927, p. 128, q uoted by G ulick. A ustria fr o m H absburg, I: 694. Cf. N orb ert Leser. "A u stro-M arxism : A R eappraisal," Jo urnal o f C o n tem p o ra ry H isto r y , Vol. I (1966), 117-33. an d his Z w isc h e n ReJ'ormismus und Bolschew ism us: D er A ustro-M ar.xism us als Theorie und P raxis (V ienna, 1968).

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dictatorship. T here was the lesson of the concentration camps: there many Catholics and Socialists learned to know and esteem each other as hum an beings and as political colleagues and to stress the values that united them , including even the national independence o f Austria. T he four-power occupation and the Soviet presence placed a prem ium on concerted efforts by the two parties to end the occupation and lessen the threat o f Soviet intervention. T he needs o f postw ar reconstruction directed energies tow ard concrete tasks bringing into play shared interests rather than incom patible ideo­ logies. In principle, the new structure of the C atholic party gave m anual workers and white-collar employees equality with busi­ nessmen and farmers. The Socialists no longer felt concern over possible C om m unist com petition on their left, as a result of collective m em ories o f the Soviet behavior on entering Vienna and o f the Soviet occupation of Eastern A ustria; the failure o f the Com m unists' Putsch in 1950 firmly sealed them o ff from power. Class and geographical polarization declined, with the nation's further industrialization and changes in social structure, and with the developm ent by both parties o f m ore diversified territorial and social constituencies. The Catholics gained strength am ong workers, notably in Vienna. The Socialists gained in other classes, and outside Vienna and the industrial cities. As W alter Simon found, “ it became m ore and m ore frequent that a peasant was a Socialist and a w orker an anti-Socialist.” 29 T he issues o f clericalism and anticlericalism subsided. The bish­ ops gave up endorsem ent of political candidates, and affirmed the ideal of “ a free church in a free society.” T he Socialists, like their G erm an brethren, moved beyond old antireligious positions. O ther old issues had lost their thrust and counterthrust. W ith the w idespread and w idely accep ted p o stw ar n atio n a liz a tio n o f A ustrian industry, further nationalizing ceased to be a vital issue. W ith the W estern orientation o f the big parties, international pressures now unified, rather than tore apart, the small state. W hen the Republic was reconstituted by Allied action, there was no koalitionsfaehig m inor party. Socialists and Catholics entered upon a “grand coalition” which was to last two decades. This extraordinary arrangem ent included the Propor: for the allocation of many o f the places in public services and in n ation­ alized enterprises.30 After the coalition broke up in 1966, its 29 Walter B. Simon. “ Politische Ethik und politische Struktur," Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologic, Vol 11, No. 3 (1959). 450. See also Kurt Shell. The Transformat ior o f Austrian Socialism (New York. 1962). 30 Frederick C. Engelmann. “Austria: The Pooling of Opposition." in Dahl. Political Oppositions, 260-83: Proporz is defined on pp. 265 and 274: Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parlia-

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successors - first a Catholic, then a Socialist, cabinet continued the Proporz. W as there any meaning left in the d ram a o f segm ented plural­ ism in the postw ar atm osphere of leadership accom m odation and mass passivity? T here was, even beyond the Bereichsopposiiion by which each coalition partner was free to criticize the m anagem ent o f the areas under its partner’s direction. The doctrines o f the two blocs had lost most o f their intensity and much o f their signifi­ cance to the actors, but attitudes o f identification with each bloc and negative associations with the other bloc lived on. Since the C atholic and Socialist cam ps had som ew hat diversified their social and geographic bases, the com petition within social groups and within geographic areas m ight eventually be keener. W ithin each cam p, m oreover, there rem ained a middle-level political elite, living much am ong its own people, and with an interest, as R odney Stiefbold has shown, in m aintaining the con­ sciousness o f political difference am idst the hom ogenizing effects o f the coalition and its afterm ath.31 Organized labor was united in ' a single trade union federation, but its Socialist m ajority perm it­ ted a unique recognition o f the international ties o f segm ented pluralism: the affiliation o f the C atholic m inority with the Inter­ national Confederation o f C hristian T rade U nions, and of the C o m m u n ist m inority w ith the W orld F ed eratio n o f T rad e U nions. M any o f the restraints on partisanship had been lifted with the conclusion o f com m on tasks, the end o f the occupation, and changes in the international environm ent. Tim e had removed many o f those who could recall the civil w ar o r the concentration camps. The tasks o f reconstruction had been concluded, to make way for A ustria’s own W irtschaftsw under. Cold w ar pressures for, unity had dwindled, despite the grim rem inders o f H ungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The partisanship that revived had neither the ideological char­ acter nor the virulence of the partisanship o f the 1920s and 1930s, and it accepted both state and regime. Its stakes were lower and the penalties for defeat were limited. In the W irtschaftswunder there was m ore for all groups, room for m ovem ent and accom ­ m odation, and toleration for what unkind observers called refined or less refined forms o f corruption. Issues were bargainable and

m entary R egim es,” S o cia l R esearch. Vol. 24 (Sum m er 1957). 127-56. reprinted in his P olitics. Law. and Social Change (New Y ork. 1969). 292-318. " Rodney Stiefbold, “ Elite-M ass O pinion S tructure and C om m unica­ tion Flow in a Consociational Dem ocracy: A u stria" (P a p er given at the A nnual M eeting o f the A m erican Political Science Association. S eptem ber 1968).

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apparently soluble, as they had not often been under the im pover­ ished First Republic. T he chief changes were in the nature o f the state, its international setting, and the collective actors, even after the individual actors who had learned so much had departed from the scene. The Socialist bloc o f the Second Republic is not the Socialist Lager of the First Republic; the People's party bloc o f today is not the C hristian Social L ager of a harsh and passionate yesterday.

T H E D E C L IN E O F S E G M E N T E D P L U R A L IS M The height and the decline o f institutions, as o f doctrines, often com e hard upon each other. F o r a tim e there is m ovem ent in both directions. Did Parliam ent’s repeal o f the Corn Laws in 1846 usher in the “ age of laissez-faire” in Britain? Perhaps, but the sam e Parliam ent, only a year later, carried state intervention a long step forward by the T en-H ours Act. The 1950s saw the apogee o f the system of segm ented plural­ ism. D uring those years, two events m arked turning points in two countries. O ne was the M andem ent (Pastoral Letter) o f 195432 in which the Dutch episcopate reiterated and amplified its old attem pts to safeguard Catholics from the corrosive effects of m odernization, liberalism, and socialism. Recalling the im pera­ tives o f unity and separateness in political and social action, the M andem ent threatened workers who joined the Socialist-led unions with denial of the sacram ents. Oddly enough, o f Catholics in the Labor party (successor to the prew ar Socialist party) it dem anded no m ore than an exam ination of conscience. Coming from the most conservative section o f the church, the M andem ent turned out to be a last look backw ard. M any Catholics, notably am ong the intellectuals, attacked its spirit of isolationism and defensiveness and narrow clericalism. C atholic and Socialist union leaders did not cease the cooperation which had made possible the n ation’s postw ar recovery. In 1965 the bishops formally retracted the ban on C atholic m em bership in the Socialist-led unions.33 The Belgian school pact o f 1958 was a very different sort of turning point. In it the leaders of the three traditional ideological parties com prom ised the outstanding issues o f the school fight that had em broiled them interm ittently for a century .34 Although D e K atholiek in hei openbare leven van deze tijd. Bisschopiijk M andem ent van 1954 (Zeist, 1954). 33 W indm uller, L abor R elations, pp. 121-26. 34 See “ Le Pacte scolaire." in Jean M eynaud, Jean L adriere, and Frangois Perin. eds. La Decision politique en Belgique (Paris. 1965). 150-76.

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the pact was negotiated only for a twelve-year period (and was still under renegotiation in 1970), its im plem entation quickly con­ vinced Belgians that its principles had become perm anent national policy. The pact ended the sharp conflict o f the 1950s over the levels and conditions o f state aid to the C atholic secondary s c h o o ls -a n aid already granted at prim ary school and university le v e ls -a n d established a general modus vivendi, with m utual rec­ ognition of the legitimacy o f both public and C atholic schools. T he pact im mediately reduced the church’s intervention in elec­ tions and the support by C atholic social organizations for the Christian Social party, for it rem oved the strongest argum ent for separate C atholic political action and for C atholic political unity. The m anagers o f the C hristian Social party could soon experience the pertinence of Oscar W ilde’s and Bernard Shaw’s principle that there are only two tragedies in li f e - n o t getting what you want, and getting what you want. The systems o f segm ented pluralism have reached, and begun to retreat from, their maximum developm ent. The structures and attitudes of segm ented pluralism will no doubt persist a long time, but the dynam ic has gone from the principle. Paradoxically, the system looks as if it may last longest w here it once had the worst results, i.e., in A ustria. W here it was first and most successful, the N etherlands - in part because o f its successes there - it has decom­ posed most. Why, beyond the obvious (but easily ignored) certainty that systems change, should we now see a weakening o f segmented pluralism? If the reasons vary from country to country, among ideological blocs, and am ong social organizations and parties within the blocs, we may nevertheless note som e general bases for ontzuiling. (To identify the disintegration o f systems o f segmented pluralism , I shall use the D utch ontzuiling, because there is no English word o r even phrase as crisp and, once defined - as it is on page 35 - as clear.) O ntzuiling is possible because the ideological blocs have suc­ ceeded in their defensive missions, while their offensive missions have ground to a halt. The denom inational blocs have won state support for their schools and welfare activities. They have not arrested the long-term trends o f secularization, but they have prevented the forcible secularizers from having their way. The Liberal and Socialist blocs, on the other hand, have prevented the churches from dom inating the state. They have not secularized all education, far from it, but they have affirm ed the state's role in education. W here once there rang the shouts o f “ Ecrasez I'infam e!” and the countershouts o f “ Deliver us, O Lord, from schools without G od and teachers w ithout faith,” there are not

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only truce here and peace there, but signs o f a tolerance which may lead to new forms of educational pluralism. The last clash o f offensive missions was probably the Belgian school fight of the 1950s. An age has passed since the Liberal and Socialist parties form ed, in 1954, a national governm ent coalition “ for a generation” to carry out an active public school policy that would perm anently reduce the recruitm ent of a C atholic electo­ rate out o f the C atholic secondary schools. T hat “generation” and that coalition lasted the four years o f a single legislature, at the end o f which (with elections unsuccessful for the coalition) the Liberals and Socialists joined the Catholics in writing the school pact. In different historical settings, different results flow from sim i­ lar actions. The Dutch Pacifica tie o f 1917, with its school pact, was followed by rapid developm ent o f the denom inational schools and bloc organizations, unions, and parties. The patterns o f edu­ cation and organization had been formed, but the C atholic and fundam entalist Calvinist and Socialist organizations had not yet carried the social em ancipation o f their followers as far as they could. T he Dutch social movem ents and political parties needed a generation to develop through segm ented structures before those structures would appear to many o f their elites as confining rather than liberating; so the D utch pact took four decades to begin to produce its consequences o f ontzuiling. The Belgian school pact cam e, in a later phase of social and political developm ent, near the height, rather than the beginning, o f mass m em bership. It took less than a decade to elicit com parable consequences. Changing technology has sharply cut the proportions of purely intra-bloc com m unications in several ways. In the first generations o f social m obilization, most forms o f com m unication were segre­ gated by origin and by self-selection o f audiences: religious ser­ vices or Socialist meetings, voluntary gatherings, dem onstrations and mass meetings, petitions and pam phlets, and the party press. But electronic media finally defied effective segm entation. At first, with radio, the D utch blocs found a way to practice a p a r t­ h e i d w ith eq u ality , under a u n iq u e g o v ern m en t schem e fo r the sharing out o f broadcasting tim e am ong the blocs. The Dutch carried this principle over into television, but here the medium was too potent for a p a r th e id to work, especially since the more expensive facilities were not available for com peting program s at the sam e hours. It was futile to expect most people not to watch program s indiscriminately. A lthgugh programs have occasionally shocked viewers o f other blocs', the general effect on the masses, who did not normally share social life with members o f other blocs, has been to weaken old stereotypes and enhance under­ standing o f other groups. Since television program s brought intra­

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bloc as well as interbloc conflicts into the living room s o f the ordinarily deferential Dutch citizens* they eroded som e o f the simplified self-images of the segm ented society.-15 In newspaper publishing, rising costs of production and distri­ bution have made it difficult for ideological blocs to com pete with neutral, or ostensibly neutral, publishers o f heavily capitalized, ideologically uninhibited papers. N o doubt many o f the seg­ m ented socioeconomic m ovem ents could assess themselves enough to support better papers, even though the parties themselves do not have the means. But the movem ents have not, for the most part, cared to risk the sums needed, and many party and bloc papers have declined in quality and appeal, som e to the point of disappearance or am algam ation. (This is not surprising in small countries, when even in Britain the L abour party has been incap­ able o f supporting a daily new spaper at all worthy o f its size or mission.) A m ong the elites of the four nations caught up in the war, contacts in exile helped to erode the sharpness of old antipathies while affirming the best o f traditional values. Postwar social and econom ic controls, the great extension o f collective bargaining, and the various forms o f partial national planning and interestgroup consultation have multiplied elite contacts with m em bers of rival bloc organizations, with m em bers o f governm ent, parlia­ m ent, and bureaucracy, and with econom ic bargaining partners. These contacts have, on the whole, tended to replace stereotypes of m em bers o f other blocs with m ore realistic and m ore differen­ tiated images, dim inishing political distance between elites and between parties. These changed perceptions am ong elites have been self-reinforcing. The most obvious consequences have been Socialist-Christian political coalitions and labor m ovem ent cooperation. W hile party coalitions have been dissolved and re-form ed, the labor union understandings have continued and deepened. The changing nature of the provision o f social insurance and welfare services has been anoth er element o f ontzuiling. The state has rendered general and obligatory the unem ploym ent com pen­ sation and health care insurance provided originally by trade unions and friendly societies. The segm ented organizations may still adm inister the benefits, but under legislation and regulation which m ake for a m ore or less uniform professionalization of personnel and bureaucratization o f services. With success, the business elem ent o f any social organization, functional or segm ented, grows at the expense o f the elem ent of '■ A rnold J. H eidenheim er, “ Elite .Responses to Ontzuiling: Reels within W heels in Dutch Broadcasting P olitics" (P aper delivered at the Eighth W orld C ongress o f Political Science. M unich. 1970).

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em ancipating m ovem ent. A m ong the segm ented organizations, this unavoidable asym m etry o f growth blurs the distinctions which were the reasons for creating separate organizations. T here is nothing so like a Socialist union’s unem ploym ent compensation office as a C atholic union’s unem ploym ent com pensation office. The labor organizations have difficulty finding issues that might differentiate those o f one bloc from those of a n o th er.36 The success which has built them into the structures o f the welfare state has cost them their original particularistic appeals. Youth had shown disaffection from the ideological blocs well before the turm oil of the late 1960s. Even am ong young people attracted by the heart of the Christian or liberal o r socialist message, many have tended to reject the structures to which the message has given rise. Y outh are easily put off by the complex and em otionally unsatisfying com prom ises o f the systems o f seg­ mented pluralism. D iscontent has ranged from that of unideological sports club m em bers (sports are the least segm ented field of voluntary association activity) to th at o f students with a thirst for the absolute - ecumenical, ideological, nationalist, or libertarian. Y oung Flemish Catholics led an antiepiscopal m ovem ent which successfully defied the Belgian bishops w ho had refused to turn the bilingual U niversity of Louvain into an exclusively Flemish institution. M any went on to question the necessity o f separate C atholic educational institutions. In the N etherlands, surveys show ed that, with religious practice held constant, younger voters gave less support to the confessional parties than did older voters, and that when students deviated from their fathers’ party choices, it was to turn away from the confessional p arties.37

T H E C H R IS T IA N BLO C S O ntzuiling in the C atholic blocs was under way long before the second Vatican Council. O ne trend has been th at o f the increas­ ing autonom y o f lay organization am ong the once most depend­ ent social categories: workers, farmers, w om en. The A ustrian C hristian W orkers’ movem ent could no longer be called “ the m ovem ent of the vicars.” 38 Yet until the late 1960s the Dutch 16 F o r exam ple. Pierre A ragno. " L a Division artificielle des salaries suisses," Revue syndicate suisse. Vol. 55 (Septem ber 1963). 241-48. 17 T he tw o D utch surveys are: ( I) A ttw ood Statistics, cited by A rend Lijphart in draft p ap er for forthcom ing volum e edited by Richard R o se. E lecto ral B ehavior: A C o m p a ra tiv e H a n d b o o k (N ew Y ork: F re e P ress, fo rth co m in g ), a n d (2) C . J . L am m ers. " D e c o n fe ssio n a lisering en radicalisering bij studenten?” A cta Politico. Vol. 3 (Jan u ­ ary 1968). 149-61. 3* L. R eichhold, “ A ustria,” in S. H . Scholl. 150 A ns, p. 111.

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bishops insisted on m aintaining diocesan w orkers’ leagues, under their own direction, to the confusion o f the m ore m odern, auto n ­ om ous organizations of the C atholic trade unions.39 T he lay organizations have been able to recruit their own leadership, thanks to the general rise in literacy, to preparation for public service in youth m ovem ents, w orkers’ education, and training institutes (Catholic or public), and to the accum ulation of experience in groups once dom inated by clerics or m em bers of the higher social strata. W ith increasing autonom y and lay leader­ ship, the C atholic organizations have shown an increasing willing­ ness to work with neutral or rival-bloc organizations. They have gained self-confidence in this work from the observation that neither Socialists nor. a fo r tio ri in these countries, C om m unists were likely to absorb o r displace the C hristian social organiza­ tions. The failure o f ecclesiastical organizations to C hristianize the governm ents or the peoples (or. in som e cases, the churches) has not discouraged lay initiatives in the social and political field: on the contrary, it has evoked m ore action by C atholic and Protes­ tant organizations and individuals. The individuals have shown an increasing readiness to work outside o f specifically C hristian m i­ lieux, and often in organizations with a historical background o f hostility to Christianity. An increasing num ber of people, notably elites, especially the young, show a desire to “ go o u t am ong the others, with the others.” rath er than to serve, or bear witness, or simply defend their group interests in specifically Christian organ­ izations. Those who have put the issue o f the appropriate milieu for Christian tem poral action on the simple level o f conversions have had to meet the argum ent put forward by a distinguished C atho­ lic scholar an d public serv an t, th a t “ to th e ex ten t th a t C ath o lic institutions realize their aim . they risk constructing around C ath o ­ lics a sort o f fortress which preserves them from dangers from w ithout and from dechristianization. But to that very extent, they isolate them from the nonbelievers and assure the latter against any possible risk o f C hristian co n tag io n ."40 Even where their' faith is nominally that o f the vast m ajority, som e thoughtful Catholics have not hesitated to speak o f a C atholic “g h etto " to describe the dangers of isolation from their fellow men by the pervasive complex of parish leagues, schools, myriad voluntary associations, and political party; for intensity o f com m unication W indm uller. L abor R elations, pp. 37. 59. 127-28. Ju A ndre M olitor. quoted in Inform ations CathoUques Internationales (I Ju n e 1958). p. 16.

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am o n g som e has been purchased a t th e price o f co m m u n icatio n with others. Critics o f segm ented pluralism argue that the complex o f con­ fessional social and political organizations tends to dim inish the sp iritu al c h aracter o f th e church and h am p er its tru e m ission. W hat once appeared to be the organizational m eans to a C hris­ tian life in society risk becoming ends in themselves. O verorgani­ zation m ay have g re a te r d a n g ers fo r religious life th an underorganization. A ssociations taking in every aspect o f social life but em ploym ent (and often that, too) envelop the masses in a "so cio ­ logical C hristianity” likely to foster a religious practice o f social con­ formity rather than personal devotion. At the expense o f the aim s of the lay apostolate, they risk inducing in the elites an excessive con­ cern with the organizational and instrum ental. “ Confessionally o ri­ ented structures and institutions have rendered and still render great services,” said A ndre M olitor, “ but their existence risks arousing in us a spirit o f pow er and of dom ination hardly in keeping with the message o f the B eatitudes.”41 T o the confessional party, such a com m ent applies with special force. As Dutch Catholics w ho could not accept their bishops’ antisocialist pastoral letter o f 1954 said, "Political power has been a wall between the church and the soul o f the people.” 42 The danger to religion (and to the church) was all the greater where Catholicism was the dom inant faith o f the land; for the church and the C atholic party were likely to identify with the interests of p ro p erty holders as well as w ith th e te m p ta tio n s o f political pow er.4-’ If, in partisan politics, the churches becam e less active, individ­ ual C hristians might be more active than ever. For at least am ong the elites, in a period when ecclesiastical and political party establishments were put in question, there was a deepening ap p re­ ciation o f the validity o f politics as an individual hum an concern. C atholic and Protestant churchm en and laymen reexam ined their relations to denom inational parties. M any Catholics had long anticipated the second Vatican C ouncil's abandonm ent o f the old com m andm ent o f the political separateness and political unity o f the faithful. N orth o f the Alps, at least, as a Jesuit sociologist has rem arked, "th e question of w hether parties should be form ed on a confessional basis o r on a purely socioeconom ic basis has lost 41 Ibid. 42 Q uoted in A . J. A rntz, "L e s C atholiques hollandais dans la n atio n ." Vic h u elleciu elle, Vol. 26 (O ctober 1955). 150. 4-’ See for exam ple Msgr. A. Sim on. L e Parti C atholique Beige. 1830-1945 (Brussels. 1958). esp. chs. 5 and 6.

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the character o f a question o f principle.” 44 Political action need not be taken through a confessional party; Catholics could legiti­ mately differ about the most appropriate form of political action. The lifting of constraints on the citizen may free the institution as well. T he C ath o lic h ierarch y ’s d isen tan g lem en t from its p a rti­ san role in national politics may turn out to be com parable to the loss o f the tem poral states o f the papacy a century ago. W hat the church then considered a catastrophe turned out to be an inestim­ able boon, since it freed the popes from the petty responsibilities o f rule over a small band o f Italian territory for the am pler perform ance o f a universal spiritual role. N ow most Catholics see the church’s change o f role in a happier light than that o f the papacy o f 1870. The A ustrian bishops put it in these term s in 1952, “ Today the church has no em peror and no governm ent, no party, no class, no cannon, and no capital behind h er___ And thus the church goes out from a dying age to meet a new epoch o f social developm ent.”45 The Socialist blocs show a profound aggiornam ento, too. The church and confessional organizations have ceased to be their chief negative reference groups; or, where they have retained that primacy, the intensity o f feeling has subsided am ong Socialist elites and masses. Some o f the reasons are com m on to the confes­ sional groups as well, notably contacts during the w ar under perils and for a cause which m ade for solidarity. An Italian Socialist, sheltered in the Vatican cellars while the departing Nazis searched above for him. is reported to have said to a C atholic and a Com m unist sharing his hiding place: “ Twenty years o f my life wasted in anticlerical activities!’’ The greater social and political progressivism of the C hristian blocs m ade it no longer possible to tag C hristian unions as “ yellow.” The postw ar emphasis on plan­ ning. rather than on nationalization o r the class struggle, called for extensive consultation and an “ ecum enical” approach to the representatives of all legitimate group interests, religiously ori­ ented or not. Pragmatism induces pragm atism . The dim inishing salience o f the confessional quality and o f the clerical presence in their rivals' organizations induced a “ de-confessionalization” of Socialist doctrine and rhetoric. As religion itself seem ed less rele­ vant to Christians, the attack on religion was less relevant - and JJ H. Hoefnagels. L'Eglise ei la societe prometheenne: problemes de sociologie religieuse (Paris. 1966). p. 85. 45 Quoted by William T. Bluhm. “ Political Integration. Cultural Inte­ gration. and Economic Development: Their Relationship in the Nation-Building Experience of Republican Austria" (Paper read at Eighth World Congress of Political Science. Munich. 1970). p. 20.

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politically less attractive to Socialist leaders, in term s o f either electoral appeal o r o f m em bership response in their own organiza­ tions. T here was a positive elem ent too, in a new conception o f the “ socialist m an” - o r rather, in the disappearance o f the old conception of hom o socialisticus, the man for whom socialism was an all-em bracing (and anticonfessional) vision o f life. “ T here is not, and cannot be, a Socialist credo," w rote the Swiss Socialist Jeanne Hersch. “ This absence o f credo is not an im poverishment o f man but an appeal to a liberty which transcends any political discipline; it im plies also th a t th e re is no socialist m ystiq u e . . . because socialism does not address itself to the whole m a n .. . . Hence, all incom patibility between socialism, on the one hand, and religions and churches on the other hand, disappears. N o socialist credo stands opposed to their credo.” 46 N or was hers merely the view o f an internationally-m inded philosopher. The Dutch Labor party, a new creation on a largely Socialist base, insisted that it was “ simply the meeting place o f those who agree on a progressive political program . The collaboration o f these people is valuable only if they have strong principles, rooted in a philosophy o f life which they must seek outside the labor move­ m ent. It is expected that each m em ber of the party will be a Catholic, a Protestant, or a ‘hum anist,’ and will behave and wish to be treated accordingly.” 47 In 1958, the A ustrian party, although affirming the rest o f its seventy-year socialist heritage, w ooed C hristians with these words: “ Socialism and C hristianity, the religion o f love o f one’s neighbor, are entirely com patible. There can be no conflict between a Socialism which is based on ethical convictions and the religious com m unities, so long as the latter avoid using the m achinery o f the state for the attainm ent of denom inational dem ands.’’48 The inability o f the political system to cope effectively with pressing problems is yet another cause for change. In only one country o f the five, however, has any issue becom e so compelling as to shake the parties o f segm ented pluralism: the language issue in Belgium.49 Once the school pact had removed an essential 46 Jeanne Hersch, Ideologies el realite (Paris, 1956). pp. 159-60. 47 Quoted in Fogarty. Christian D em ocracy, p. 384. 4K The New P rogram m e o f A ustrian Socialism , adopted at the C onfer­ ence o f the A ustrian Socialist P arty, 14 M a y 1958 (Vienna, 1958).

pp. 6-7. 49 “ La crise de I’unite beige.” in Jean Meynaud et al.. eds. La Deci­ sion, pp. 89-149: George A. Kelly. “ Belgium: New Nationalism in an Old World." C om parative Politics. Vol. 1 (April 1969), 343-65, and Val R. Lorwin, “ Linguistic Pluralism and Political Tensions in Modern Belgium," Canadian Journal o f H istory, Vol. 5 (March

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cem ent of the C hristian Social party’s national structure, the old Flem ish-French-speaking cleavage threatened that structure and the party's very existence. Sim ilar, but m ilder, trem ors shook the Socialist party and labor unions. The third of the traditional ideological parties, the Liberal party, reorganized itself in 1961, and ostentatiously renounced its century-old anticlericalism . Its initial success as a “catchall party” o f the center and center right increased pressures for “deconfessionalization” within the C hris­ tian Social and Socialist parties. Its success also showed how much ontzuiling depended not only on long-term social and polit­ ical trends, but on determ inations by party leaders th at ontzuiling would pay off. The segm ented pluralist systems have reached m aturity too recently for us to have much evidence yet for any theory of ontzuiling. But it seems that disarray within one ideological bloc tends, as one would expect, to encourage disarray within rival blocs. The hostility, or at least the perception o f hostility, o f other blocs is a source o f intrabloc solidarity: the decline o f another bloc dim inishes the perception of hostility and of threat. W ith a blurring of the image of unity o f the others comes a blurring of the self-image. At this period in the developm ent o f segm ented pluralism a sort o f “ dom ino effect” comes into play within a bloc. If bloc organization weakens in one area o f public life, it tends to weaken in other areas. As strength transm itted strength, weakness o r disaffection transm its weakness. If the schools do not need the party, their supporters are freer not to support the party. If trade unions, cooperatives, and friendly societies do not find the party necessary, they will pay fewer o f its bills and those o f the party press, and they will do less to recruit political personnel and voters for the party. If party and church-oriented student and oth er youth movem ents fall off, as they are doing,50 potential" leaders will be less likely to start out on a party-oriented cursus honorurn.

FA C TO R S O F C O N T IN U IT Y A fter looking at som e o f the factors o f change, one must return to the factors of continuity and adjustm ent within existing politi­ cal systems. If verzuiling originally was not inevitable, but rather 1970). 1-23. and an expanded and revised version thereof in Joshua Fishman, ed. Advances in the Sociology o f Language, vol. u (Paris and The Hague, 1972), pp. 386-412. 50 Frank A. Pinner. “Tradition and Transgression: Western European Students in the Postwar World," Daedalus (Winter 1968), 150.

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the result o f a series o f historical choices, so ontzuiling is not inevitable now. M odern social and political organizations have g reat powers o f survival with the help o f inertia. It took the com bined holocaust of the Nazi revolution and w ar to raze the segm ented structure o f G erm an trade unionism . O rganizations built on ideologies may endure long after the ideologies have lost most o f their dynamism . T he bloc organizations continue to perform functions to which the state and their m em bers and voters have become accustom ed, however much the distinctive­ ness o f the com peting organizations has faded. These organizations have been recognized and subsidized in the public or quasi-public authorities adm inistering education, com ­ m unications, social insurance and health care, and regulation of the labor m arket. Religious affiliations may even provide the basis for allocation to individuals o f desiderata in short supply, as with the Dutch governm ent's allocation o f land reclaimed from the Z uider Z e e .5' The Belgian school pact delegates the continu ing interpretation o f its term s to representatives of the three political parties which negotiated the pact. T he socioeconom ic and cultural organizations associated with the blocs carry on a great deal o f political socialization, som e in close relationship with prim ary groups. They play an im portant role in the recruitm ent o f political personnel: m oreover, by offer­ ing defeated candidates a relatively painless retreat back to spon­ soring organizations, they dim inish the risks o f political engage­ m ent for activists from the lower classes. U nion and friendly society pluralism offer som ething o f an option in societies in which, despite political democracy and consum er satisfactions, the elem ents o f choice for workers are very restricted; even the small C atholic and the small Protestant labor m ovem ents o f Switzerland offer elem ents o f such choice to som e Swiss w orkers. T o be sure, highly developed cooperation am ong segm ented organizations in many fields deprives them o f much o f the rationale for separate­ ness. At the sam e time, however, by dim inishing the frictions of com petition, it removes much o f the pressure that might com e for unification. A ttitudes, which persist after ideologies wane, are conditioned by milieux and traditions which are still largely separate and often uncom prehending o f each other. “ Political clienteles in Austria are still so strongly structured,” K laus Liepelt argues from a new com parative analysis o f survey d ata, “ that a significant upheaval 51 A. K. Constandse, “Acquaintanceships of Farmers in a Newly Colonized Area,” Social Compass. Vol. 6. No. 2 (1959). 69.

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in their behavior is practically im possible.” 52 Perceptions and' attitudes are based on issues form ulated to a large extent by the segm ented organizations and the messages which their elites and their Lum penelites emit to their own people, as well as to those o f other blocs. A left-wing C atholic writes in despair about the religious news in a Brussels Socialist daily, “ Reading Le Peuple, one never has the impression th at there may be Catholics who m ight also be Socialist. Every year I have to go to seek com fort from my friends in the D utch L abor party.” 53 But most people do not have friends in another bloc in another land. Interm arriage is one indicator o f bloc isolation or openness. In the N etherlands, where ontzuiling has been most conspicuous, we nevertheless find that interm arriages have declined, rather than increased. Between 1947 and I960, bloc interm arriage declined, and intram arriage increased, in each of the three m ajor religious groups, as well as am ong those categorized as o f “ o th er” religions o r no religion.54 A ttitudes born o f past conflicts may condition present conflicts that express themselves in oth er terms. In the multidim ensional pluralism of Switzerland, the limiting c a s e - th e only “separatist” m o v e m e n t-is that of the autonom ists in the Jura Bernois, in the C atholic uplands o f the French-speaking district o f the over­ whelmingly Protestant and G erm an-speaking canton o f Bern. The autonom ists pose their dem ands in term s o f linguistic rights; but mem ories of a bygone religious discrim ination are perhaps more im portant (if unconscious) sources o f resentm ent than the present (and apparently undisputed) rights o f the French language and culture in this northwest corner o f the C onfederation.55 Inertia and lags in perception pose the old questions of the relationships between belief-systems and institutions. The inher­ ited stru ctu res o f segm en tatio n are related to a religiousideological pluralism which nobody am ong elites o r masses, except a very small extreme left, would repudiate. “ But the diffi­ culty is,” as Jean Ladriere has said, “ that people cannot seriously 52 Klaus Liepell, “ Esquisse d’une typologie des electeurs allemands et autrichiens," R evue fra n ^a ise de sociologie , Vol. 9 (January-March 1968), 28-29. 53 “ La Chronique religieuse du Peuple-. II,” L a Releve , Vol. 21 (10 July 1965). 54 Lijphart, The Politics, pp. 189-91. 55 Kurt B. Mayer, “The Jura Problem: Ethnic Conflict in Switzer­ land.” Socia l R esearch. Vol. 35 (Winter 1968). 736-38. analyzes the voting in the 1959 popular initiative which provided a crucial test of autonomist sentiment.

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conceive o f such a philosophical pluralism w ithout a certain insti­ tutional base. If the present base does not seem capable of constituting a lasting level of stabilization, it will be necessary to find other institutional forms o f pluralism .” 56 These other forms will be related to the segm ented pluralism which their leaders and m em bers seek to transcend o r transform . I

People can usually learn m ore from the failures o f political sys­ tems than from their successes; the export o f political prescription has always been less effective than the im port o f political warning. T here are. however, both successes and failures in the experiences o f the segm ented pluralist nations which have interest for anyone concerned with the relationships between ideologies and organiza­ tions. between old loyalties and modern associational needs, and between cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages, in the processes o f national integration. As Sir A rthur Lewis has recently recalled, the Anglo-A m erican experience (real or fancied) does not afford appropriate models to the leaders o f plural societies o f the T hird W orld.57 F or such societies, th e “ segm ented in te g ra tio n ” 58 o f som e E u ro p ean dem ocracies is o f interest - an in terest q u ick en e d by th e ir being, like most African states, small in population and international power. In developed (sometimes quaintly called “ fully devel­ oped” ) societies, too, we may ponder the observation o f a Swiss political scientist that “ national unity must always be reconsti­ tu ted .” 59 Recalling that som e segm entation has characterized all dem ocratic polities, it is encouraging to know that scholars are contem plating and doing a great deal m ore than this modest interm ediate report has attem pted in the com parative study of structures and processes of group solidarity and hostility and their relations to “ national unity,” the protection o f diversity, and the m anagem ent o f political conflict in the countries I have discussed and in other countries.60 56 Jean Ladriere, in J. Mevnaud et a!., eds. L a Decision politique, p. 32. 57 VV. Arthur Lewis. Politics in W est A frica (London. 1965). ch. 3. ■KThe phrase is that of Goudsblom, D utch S o ciety, p. 124. 59 Erich Gruner, “ Le Fonctionnement du Systeme Representatif dans la Confederation Suisse" (Paper read at Seventh World Congress of Political Science, Brussels, 1967). u" It'or discussion of some types of needed studies, see. in ter alia. Sidney Verba. “Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," W orld Politics. Vol. 20 (October 1967): Peter H. Merkl. “ Political Cleav­ age and Party Systems." W orld Politics. Vol. 21 (April 1969), 476: Rokkan. C itiz e n s . pp. 42-43. 69-70. and 138-40: Liepell.

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F or a historic m om ent, the systems o f segm ented pluralism have em bodied a rem arkable equilibrium in a num ber o f small democracies. The num ber is not large, but then the num ber of dem ocracies is not very large. The equilibrium will not have lasted long, but th e n - d e s p ite w hat historians may s a y -h is to ry abhors an equilibrium .

"Esquisse." 32: and the articles by Joseph LaPalombara. Harold D. Lasswell, Guenter Lewy. Roy C. Macridis and Dankwart A. Rustow. in Comparative Politics. Vol. 1 (October 1968). For a system­ atic approach to some problems of definition, measurement, and formulation of theory: Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor. The Analysis o f Political Cleavages (New Haven. 1970).

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L D E M O C R A C Y *

Arend Lijphart Source: Arend Lijphart. "Consociational Democracy," World Poli­ tics, Vol. 21. No. 2 (copyright © 1969 by Princeton University Press): pp. 207-225. Reprinted by permission of Princeton Univer­ sity Press and the author.

T Y P E S O F W E S T E R N D E M O C R A T IC SYSTEM S In G abriel A. A lm ond's fam ous typology o f political systems, first expounded in 1956, he distinguishes three types o f Western dem ocratic systems: A nglo-A m erican political systems (exem pli­ fied by Britain and the U nited States), C ontinental European political systems (France, G erm any, and Italy), and a third cate­ gory consisting o f the Scandinavian and Low C ountries. The third type is not given a distinct label and is not described in detail; A lm ond merely states that the countries belonging to this type “ com bine som e of the features o f the C ontinental European and the A nglo-A m erican” political systems, and “stand som e­ w here in between the C ontinental pattern and the AngloA m erican.” 1 A lm ond’s threefold typology has been highly influen­ tial in the com parative analysis o f dem ocratic politics, although, like any provocative and insightful idea, it has also been criti­ cized. This research note will discuss the concept of "consocia­ tional dem ocracy” in a constructive attem pt to refine and elabo­ rate A lm ond’s typology of dem ocracies. T he typology derives its theoretical significance from the rela­ tionship it establishes between political culture and social struc­ ture on the one hand and political stability on the other hand. T he A nglo-A m erican systems have a “ hom ogeneous, secular pol­ itical culture” and a “ highly differentiated” role structure, in which governm ental agencies, parties, interest groups, and the com m unication media have specialized functions and are autono­ m ous, although interdependent. In contrast, the Continental European democracies are characterized by a “ fragm entation of * This note represents an intermediate stage of a research project con­ cerning political stability in democratic systems. An earlier and briefer discussion of the concept of consociational democracy, in the context of a critical analysis of the utility of typologies in comparative politics, appeared in the author's "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Com­ parative Political Studies. I (April 1968), 3-44. The author is indebted to the Institute of International Studies. Berkeley, for financial support. 1Gabriel A. Almond. "Comparative Political Systems." Journal o f Politics. Vol. 18 (August 1956). 392-93. 405.

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political culture” with separate “ political sub-cultures.” Their roles “ are em bedded in the sub-cultures and tend to constitute separate sub-systems o f roles.'” The term s “ A nglo-A m erican” and “ C o n tin en tal E u ro p e a n " a re used for con v en ien ce only and do not imply that geographical location is an additional criterion distinguishing the two types o f dem ocratic systems. This point deserves special emphasis, because som e o f A lm ond’s critics have m isinterpreted it. For instance, A rthur L. Kalleberg states that the tw o types “ are based on criteria o f geographic location and are a,” and that “ A lm ond does not com e o u t and specify that these are his criteria o f classification; we have to infer them from the titles and descriptions he gives o f each o f his groups of states.” 3 Actually, A lm ond does indicate clearly what his criteria are. and he also specifically rejects the criterion o f geography or region as irrelevant, because it is not based “ on the properties of the political systems.” 4 Political cu ltu re and social stru c tu re are em pirically related to political stability. The A nglo-A m erican dem ocracies display a high degree o f stability and effectiveness. The C ontinental E uro­ pean systems, on the other hand, tend to be unstable; they are characterized by political im mobilism, which is “ a consequence of the [fragmented] condition o f the political culture.” Furtherm ore, there is the “ ever-present threat o f what is often called the ‘Caesaristic’ breakthrough” and even the danger of a lapse into totalitarianism as a result o f this im m obilism .5 The theoretical basis o f A lm ond’s typology is the “ overlapping m em berships” proposition form ulated by the group theorists A rth ur F. Bentley and David B. T rum an and the very sim ilar "crosscutting cleavages” proposition o f Seym our M artin Lipset. These propositions state that the psychological cross-pressures resulting from m em bership in different groups with diverse inter­ I hid.. 398-99. 405-07 (italics omitted). 1 Kalleberg. “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems." World Politics, Vol. 19 (October 1966). 73-74. Hans Daalder's critical question "Why should France, Germany, and Italy be more ‘continental,’ than Hol­ land, or Switzerland, or more ‘European’ than Britain?” seems to be based on a similar erroneous interpretation: sec his “ Parlies. Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe." in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds.. Political Parties and Politi­ cal Development (Princeton. 1966). 43n. 4 Almond. 392. There is also no reason, therefore, to call the exclu­ sion of Scandinavia and the Low Countries from the “ Continental European" systems an "artificial qualifier." as Kalleberg does. 74. 4 Almond. 408.

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ests and outlooks lead to m oderate attitudes. These groups may be formally organized groups or merely unorganized, categoric, an d , in T ru m a n ’s term in o lo g y , “ p o te n tia l” g ro u p s. C ro ss­ pressures operate not only at the mass but also at the elite level: the leaders o f social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping m em berships will tend to find it necessary to adopt m oderate positions. W hen, on the other hand, a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no or very few overlapping m em berships and loyalties - in other words, when the political culture is deeply fragm ented - the pressures tow ard m oderate m iddle-of-the-road ’ attitudes are absent. Political stability depends on m oderation and. therefore, also on overlapping m em berships. T rum an states this proposition as follows: “ In the long run a complex society m ay experience rev o lu tio n , d eg e n eratio n , and decay. If it m ain ­ tains its stability, however, it may do so in large measure because o f the fact of multiple m em berships.” 1' Bentley calls com prom ise “the very process itself of the criss-cross groups in action.” 7 And Lipset argues th a t “ the ch an ces for stab le d em ocracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a num ber o f crosscu tting, politically relev an t a ffilia tio n s.” 8 Som etim es A lm ond him self explicitly adopts the terminology o f these pro p o ­ sitions: for instance, he describes the French Fourth R epublic as being divided into “ three main ideological families or subcul­ tures,” which m eans that the people o f France were “ exposed to few o f the kinds o f ‘cross-pressures’ that m oderate [their] rigid political attitudes," while, on the other hand, he characterizes the U nited States and Britain as having an “ overlapping p attern ” of m em bership.9 In his later writings, A lm ond m aintains both the threefold typology o f W estern dem ocracies and the criteria on which it is based, although the terms th at he uses vary considerably. In an article published in 1963, for instance, he distinguishes between “stable dem ocracies” and “ im mobilist dem ocracies.” The latter are characterized by “ fragm entation, both in a cultural and struc­ tural sense” and by the absence of “consensus on governm ental 6 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951), 508, 511. 7 Arthur F. Bentley. The Process o f Government: A Study o f Social Pressures, 4th ed. (Evanston. 1955). 208. KSeymour Martin Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics (Garden City, 1960). 88-89. 9 Almond and G. Bingham Powell. Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston. 1966), 122, 263: Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton. 1963). 134.

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structure and process" (i.e. the Continental European systems). The form er group is divided into two sub-classes: one includes G reat Britain, the U nited States, and the Old Com m onwealth d em ocracies (i.e. the A nglo-A m erican system s), and th e o th er “ the stable m ulti-party dem ocracies o f the European continent the Scandinavian and Low C ountries and Sw itzerland.” 10 A nd in Comparative Politics: A D evelopm ental A pproach. published in 1966, a distinction is draw n between m odern dem ocratic systems with “ high subsystem autonom y” (the A nglo-A m erican dem ocra­ cies) and those with “ limited subsystem autonom y” and fragm en­ tation of political culture (the C ontinental European dem ocra­ cies). The third type is not included in this classification." In what respects are Sw itzerland, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries “ in betw een” the A nglo-A m erican and C ontinental European democracies? Here, too, A lm ond consistently uses the two criteria of role structure and political culture. A differentiated role structure (or a high degree o f subsystem autonom y) is related to the perform ance o f the political aggregation function in a society. The best aggregators are parties in tw o-party systems like the A nglo-A m erican democracies, but the larger the num ber and the sm aller the size of the parties in a system, the less effectively th e aggregation function will be p erfo rm ed ; in th e C o n tin e n tal European m ulti-party systems only a m inim um of aggregation takes place. The “ working m ulti-party systems” o f the Scandina­ vian and Low C ountries differ from the French-Italian “ crisis” systems in that som e, though not all, of their parties are “ broadly aggregative.” A lm ond gives the Scandinavian Socialist parties and the Belgian C atholic and Socialist parties as exam ples.12 This criterion does not distinguish adequately between the tw o types of dem ocracies, however: if one calls the Belgian C atholic party broadly aggregative, the Italian C hristian D em ocrats surely also have to be regarded as such. O n the o th er hand, none o f the Dutch and Swiss parties can be called broadly aggregative. .....Political Systems and Political Change," A m erican Behavioral S ci­ entist, Vol. 6 (June 1963), 9-10. 11 Almond and Powell, 259 (italics omitted). 12 Almond, rapporteur, “A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process." A m erican Political Science Review. 52 (March 1958). 275-77: Almond. “ A Functional Approach to Com­ parative Politics." in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds.. The Politics o f the Developing A reas (Princeton. I960). 42-43. See also GOran G. Lindahl. “Gabriel A. Almond’s funktionella kategorier: En kritik.” Sta tsveten ska p lig T id skrift . No. 4 (1967). 263-72: and Constance E. van der Maesen and G. H. Scholten. “ De functioned benadering van G. A. Almond bij het vergelijken van politieke stelsels," A cta Politico. I (1965-66). 220-26.

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Instead of using the extent o f aggregation perform ed by politi­ cal parties as the operational indicator of the degree o f subsystem autonom y, it is m ore satisfactory to exam ine the system 's role structure directly. Like the A nglo-A m erican countries, the Scandi­ navian states have a high degree o f subsystem autonom y. But one finds a severely limited subsystem autonom y and considerable interpenetration of parties, interest groups, and the m edia of com m unication in the Low C ountries, Switzerland, and also in A ustria. In fact, subsystem autonom y is at least as limited in these countries as in the C ontinental European systems. A ccord­ ing to the criterion of role structure, therefore, one arrives at a dichotom ous rather than a threefold typology: the Scandinavian states must be grouped with the A nglo-A m erican svstems, and the other “ in-betw een” states with the C ontinental European systems. T he application o f the second criterion - political culture leads to a sim ilar result. Almond writes th at the political culture in the Scandinavian and Low C ountries is “ m ore hom ogeneous and fusional o f secular and tra d itio n a l ele m en ts” than th a t in the C ontinental European system s.1-' This is clearly true for the Scan­ dinavian countries, which are, in fact, quite hom ogeneous and do not differ significantly from the hom ogeneous Anglo-A m erican systems. But again, the other “ in-betw een” countries are at least as fragm ented into political s u b c u ltu re s -th e fa m ilie s spirituelles o f Belgium and Luxembourg, the zuilen o f the N etherlands, and the Lager of A u s tr ia - a s the C ontinental European states. T here­ fore, on the basis of the two criteria of political culture and role structure, the W estern dem ocracies can be satisfactorily classified into two broad but clearly bounded categories: (1) the AngloA m erican, Old Com m onw ealth, and Scandinavian states; (2) the other European dem ocracies, including France, Italy, W eim ar G erm any, the Low C ountries, A ustria, and Switzerland.

F R A G M E N T E D B U T S T A B L E D E M O C R A C IE S T he second category of the above twofold typology is too broad, however, because it includes both highly stable systems (e.g.. Switzerland and H olland) and highly unstable ones (e.g., W eim ar G erm any and the French Third and F ourth Republics). The political stability o f a system can apparently not be predicted solely on the basis o f the two variables o f political culture and role structure. A ccording to the theory o f crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low C ountries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great im mobilism and instability. But they IJ“ A Functional Approach." 42.

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do not. These deviant cases o f fragmented but stable democracies will be called “consociational dem ocracies."14 In general, deviant case analysis can lead to the discovery o f additional relevant variables, and in this particular instance, a third variable can account for the stability o f the consociational democracies: the behavior of the political elites. The leaders o f the rival subcultures may engage in com petitive behavior and thus further aggravate m utual tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the im m obilizing and unstabilizing effects o f cultural fragm entation. As a result o f such overarching cooperation at the elite level, a country can, as C laude A ke states, “ achieve a degree of political stability quite out o f proportion to its social hom ogeneity.” 15 T he clearest examples are the experiences o f dem ocratic A us­ tria after the First World W ar and o f pre-dem ocratic Belgium in the early nineteenth century. The fragm ented and unstable A ustrian First Republic of the interwar years was transform ed into the still fragmented but stable Second Republic after the Second World W ar by m eans o f a consociational solution. As Frederick C. Engelmann states, “ the central socio-political fact in the life of p o st-1918 A ustria [was that] the Republic had devel­ oped under conditions of cleavage so deep as to leave it with a high potential f o r - a n d a sporadic actuality o f - c iv il w ar.” The instability caused by the deep cleavage and antagonism between the Catholic and Socialist L ager (subcultures) spelled the end of dem ocracy and the establishm ent o f a dictatorship. The leaders of the rival subcultures were anxious not to repeat the sorry experi­ ence of the First Republic, and decided to join in a grand coalition after the Second W orld W ar. A ccording to Engelmann, “ critics and objective observers agree with A ustria’s leading poli­ ticians in the assessment that the coalition was a response to the civil-war tension o f the First R epublic.” 16 O tto K irchheim er also attributes the consociational pattern o f A ustria’s p o st-1945 poli­ 14 Cf. Johannes Althusius' concept of consociatio in his Politico M ethodice D igesta, and the term ‘'consociational" used by David E. Apter, The P olitical Kingdom in Uganda: A S tu d y in Bureaucratic N ationalism (Princeton, 1961), 24-25. '■ Claude Ake, A T heory o f P olitical Integration (Homewood. 1967), 113. This possibility exists not only in the fragmented democracies, but also in fragmented predemocralic or nondemocralic systems, of course. See also Arend Lijphart, The P olitics o f A ccom m odation: Pluralism an d D em ocracy in the N etherlands ( Berkeley, 1968), 1-15, 197-211. 16 Frederick C. Engelmann. "Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Rene­ gotiation of the Austrian Coalition. 1959." A m erican P olitical S ci­ ence Review. Vol. 56 (September 1962). 651-52.

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tics (until early 1966) to “ the republic’s historical record of politi­ cal frustration and abiding suspicion.” 17 Val R. Lorwin describes how the potential instability caused by subcultural cleavage was deliberately avoided at the tim e o f the birth o f independent Belgium: the C atholic and Liberal leaders had learned “ the great lesson of m utual tolerance from the catastrophic experience o f the B rabant Revolution o f 1789, when the civil strife o f their prede­ cessors had so soon laid the country open to easy Habsburg reconquest. It was a rem arkable and self-conscious 'union o f the oppositions' that made the revolution of 1830, w rote the C onsti­ tution o f 1831, and headed the governm ent in its critical years.” 18 The grand coalition cabinet is the most typical and obvious, but not the only possible, consociational solution for a fragmented system. The essential characteristic o f consociational dem ocracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangem ent as the delib­ erate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system. Instead of the term “grand coalition” with its rather narrow connotation, one could speak o f universal participation, or as R alf D ahrendorf does, o f a “ cartel o f elites.” 19 A grand co a litio n c a b in e t as in A ustria represents the most com prehensive form o f the cartel of elites, but one finds a variety o f other devices in the other W estern consociational d em o cracies an d , ou tsid e W estern Europe, in the consociational politics o f Lebanon, U ruguay (until early 1967), and Colom bia. Even in A ustria, not the cabinet itself but the small extra-constitutional “coalition com m ittee,” on which the top Socialist and C atholic leaders were equally repre­ sented, m ade the crucial decisions. In the Swiss system o f govern­ m ent, which is a hybrid o f the presidential and the parliam entary patterns, all four m ajor parties are represented on the m ulti­ m em ber executive. In U ruguay’s'{now defunct) governm ental sys­ tem , fashioned after the Swiss m odel, there was coparticipacion o f the tw o parties on the executive. > In the C olom bian and Lebanese presidential systems, such a sharing o f the top executive post is not possible because the presidency is held by one person. The alternative solution pro­ 17 Kirchheimer. “The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes.” So cial R esearch. Vol. 24 (Summer 1957), 137. ,s Lorwin. "Constitutionalism and Controlled Violence in the Modern State: The Case of Belgium” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, 1965), 4 (italics added). For a description of the establishment of consocia­ tional democracy in the Netherlands, see Lijphart. The Politics o f A ccom m odation . 103-12. 19 Dahrendorf. S o ciety a n d D em ocracy in G erm any (Garden City, 1967), 276.

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vided by the Lebanese N ational Pact of 1943 is that the President o f the Republic must be a M aronite and the President of the Council a Sunni, thus guaranteeing representation to the coun­ try’s tw o m ajor religious groups. In C olom bia, the Liberal and C onservative parties agreed in 1958 to join in a consociational arrangem ent in order to deliver the country from its recurrent civil wars and dictatorships. The agreem ent stipulated that the presidency would be alternated for four-year term s betw een the two parties and that there would be equal representation {paridad) on all lower levels o f governm ent. In the Low C ountries, the cabinets are usually broadly based coalitions, but not all major subcultures are perm anently represented. The typical consocia­ tional devices in these dem ocracies are the advisory councils and com m ittees, which, in spite of their very limited formal powers, often have decisive influence. These councils and com m ittees may be perm anent organs, such as the powerful Social and Economic Council o f the N e th e rla n d s -a perfect example o f a cartel of econom ic e li te s - o r ad hoc bodies, such as the cartels o f to p party leaders that negotiated the “school pacts” in Holland in 1917 and in Belgium in 1958. T he desire to avoid political com petition may be so strong that the cartel o f elites may decide to extend the consociational princi­ ple to the electoral level in ord er to prevent the passions aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possibly fragile, system o f cooperation. This may apply to a single election o r to a num ber of successive elections. The paridad and alterna­ tio n principles in C olom bia entail a controlled democracy for a period o f sixteen years, during which the efficacy o f the right to vote is severely restricted. A nother example is the Dutch parlia­ m entary election of 1917, in which all of the parties agreed not to contest the seats held by incum bents in order to safeguard the passage o f a set o f crucial constitutional am endm ents; these am endm ents, negotiated by cartels o f top party leaders, contained the term s o f the settlem ent o f the sensitive issues o f universal suffrage and state aid to church schools. A parallel agreem ent on the suffrage was adopted in Belgium in 1919 without holding the constitutionally prescribed election at all. Consociational democracy violates the principle o f majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from norm ative dem o­ cratic theory. M ost dem ocratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the norm al transaction o f business when the stakes are not too high, but extraordinary m ajorities o r several successive m ajorities for the most im portant decisions, such as changes in the constitution. In fragm ented systems, many other decisions in addition to constituent ones are perceived as involving high

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stakes, and therefore require m ore than simple majority rule. Similarly, majority rule does not suffice in times o f grave crisis in even the most hom ogeneous and consensual o f democracies. G reat Britain and Sweden, both highly hom ogeneous countries, resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the Second W orld W ar. Julius N yerere draws the correct lesson from the experience o f the W estern dem ocracies, in which, he observes, “ it is an accepted practice in times of emergency for opposition parties to sink their differences and join together in forming a national g overnm ent.'” 0 A nd just as the form ation o f a national unity governm ent is the appropriate response to an external emergency, so the form ation of a grand coalition cabinet o r an alternative form of elite cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis of fragm entation into hostile subcultures. Furtherm ore, the concept of consociational democracy is also in agreem ent with the empirical “ size principle," form ulated by W illiam H. R iker. This principle, based on gam e-theoretic assum ptions, states: “ In social situations sim ilar to //-person, zero-sum games with side-paym ents [private agreem ents about the division o f the payoff], participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure w inning and no larger.” T he tendency will be tow ard a “ minim um winning coalition,” which in a dem ocracy will be a coalition with bare majority support - but only under the conditions specified in the size principle. The most im portant condition is the zero-sum assum ption: “ only the direct conflicts am ong participants are included and com m on advantages are ignored.” 21 C om m on advantages will be completely ignored only in two diam etrically opposite kinds o f situations: (I) when the participants in the “gam e” do not perceive any comm on advantages, and when, consequently, they are likely to engage in unlimited warfare; and (2) when they are in such firm agreem ent on their com m on advantages th at they can take them for granted. In the latter case, politics literally becomes a gam e. In other w ords, the zero-sum condition and the size principle apply only to societies with completely hom ogeneous political cultures and to societies with completely fragm ented cultures. T o the extent that political cultures deviate from these two extrem e conditions, pres­ sures will exist to fashion coalitions and other forms o f coopera­ tion that are m ore inclusive than the bare “ minim um winning coalition” and that may be all-inclusive grand coalitions. 20 Nyerere, "One-Party Rule," in Paul E. Sigmund. Jr., ed.. The Ideologies o f the Developing Nations {New York. 1963). 199. ;i William H. Riker. The Theory o f Political Coalitions {New Haven. 1962). 29. 32-33.

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A lm ond aptly uses the m etaphor o f the gam e in characterizing the A nglo-A m erican systems: “ Because the political culture tends to be hom ogeneous and pragm atic, [the political process] takes on som e o f the atm osphere o f a gam e. A gam e is a good gam e when the outcom e is in doubt and when the stakes are not too high. W hen the stakes are too high, the tone changes from excitement to anxiety.” 22 Political contests in severely fragmented societies are indeed not likely to be “good gam es.” But the anxieties and hostilities attending the political process may be countered by rem oving its com petitive features as much as possible. In conso­ ciational dem ocracies, politics is treated not as a gam e but as a serious business.

EA C TO R S C O N D U C IV E T O C O N S O C IA T IO N A L D E M O C R A C Y Consociational democracy m eans governm ent by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragm ented political culture into a stable democracy. Efforts at consociationalism are not necessarily successful, of course: consociational designs failed in Cyprus and Nigeria, and U ruguay abandoned its Swiss-style consociational system. Successful consociational democracy requires: (1) T hat the elites have the ability to accom m odate the divergent interests and dem ands of the subcultures. (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to jo in in a com m on effort with the elites o f rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their com m itm ent to the m aintenance o f th e [system and to the im provem ent o f its cohesion and stability. ( 4 ) '■Finally, all o f the above requirem ents are based on the assum ption that the elites understand the perils o f political fragm entation. These four req u irem en ts are logically im plied by th e co n cep t o f consor ciational democracy as defined in this paper. U nder what condi­ tions are they likely to be fulfilled? An exam ination of the suc­ cessful consociational dem ocracies in the Low C ountries, Switzer­ land. A ustria, and Lebanon suggests a num ber o f conditions favorable to the establishment and the persistence o f this type of dem ocracy. These have to do with inter-subcultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, and elite-mass relations within each o f the subcultures.

R E L A T IO N S A M O N G T H E E L IT E S O F T H E S U B C U LTU R E S It is easier to assess the probability of continued success o f an already established consociational democracy than to predict the chance of success that a fragmented system would have if it were to a ttem p t consociationalism . In an existing co n so ciatio n al :: Almond, "Comparative Political Systems." 398-99.

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dem ocracy, an investigation of the institutional arrangem ents and the operational code o f inter-elite accom m odation can throw light on the question o f how thorough a com m itm ent to cooperation they represent and how effective they have been in solving the problem s caused by fragm entation. The length o f lim e a consocia­ tional dem ocracy has been in operation is also a factor o f im por­ tance. As inter-elite cooperation becomes habitual and does not represent a deliberate departure from com petitive responses to political challenges, consociational norm s becom e m ore firmly established. A nd, as G erhard Lehm bruch states, these norm s may becom e an im portant part o f "th e political socialization o f elites and thus acquire a strong degree o f persistence through tim e.” 23 T here are three factors that ap p ear to be strongly conducive to the establishm ent o r m aintenance o f cooperation am ong elites in a fragm ented system. The m ost strik ing o f these is the existence o f e xte rnal threats to thg cOuntrvT In all o f the consociational democracies, the cartel o f elites was either initiated o r greatly strengthened during periods o f international crisis, especially the First and Second World W ars. D uring the First W orld W ar, the com prehensive settlem ent o f the conflict am ong H olland’s politi­ cal subcultures firmly established the pattern o f consociational dem ocracy. “ U nionism ” - i.e., Catholic-Liberal grand co alitio n sbegan during Belgium’s struggle for independence in the early nineteenth century, but lapsed when the country appeared to be out o f danger. As a result of the First W orld W ar, unionism was resum ed and th e Socialist leaders were soon ad m itted to the governing cartel. T he Second W orld W ar m arked the beginning o f consociational democracy in Lebanon: the N ational P a c t- th e Islam o-Christian accord that provided the basis for consociational governm ent for the country was concluded in 1943. In Switzer­ land, consociational dem ocracy developed m ore gradually, but reached its culm ination with the admission o f the Socialists to the grand coalition o f the Federal Council, also in 1943. The A ustrian grand coalition was form ed soon after the Second World W ar, v.'hen the country was occupied by the allied forces. In all cases, the external threats impressed on the elites the need for in tern al unity and co o p e ra tio n . E x ternal th reats can also strengthen the ties am ong-the subcultures at the mass level and the ties between leaders and followers within the subcultures. 23 Lehmbruch. "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland. Austria and Leba­ non" (paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of the Inter­ national Political Science Association. Brussels. 1967). 6. See also Lehmbruch, P ro p o rzd e m o k ra tie : P o litisch es S y s te m u n d p o litisch e K u h u r in d er Sch w eiz u n d in Osterreich (Tubingen, 1967).

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A second factor favorable to consociational democracy, in the sense that it helps the elites to recognize the necessity o f coopera­ tion, is ax m ultiple balance o f pow er am ong the subcultures instead "of either a dual balance of power or a clear hegem ony by one ^subculture. W hen one group is in the m ajority, its leaders may attem pt to dom inate rath er than cooperate with the rival minority. Similarly, in a society with two evenly m atched subcul­ tures, the leaders of both may hope to achieve their aim s by dom ination rather than cooperation, if they expect to win a m ajority at the polls. R obert Dahl argues that for this reason it is doubtful that the consociational arrangem ent in C olom bia will last, because “ the tem ptation to shift from coalition to com peti­ tion is bound to be very great.” 24 W hen political parties in a fragmented society are the organized m anifestations o f political subcultures, a multiparty system is m ore conducive to consocia­ tional democracy and therefore to stability than a tw o-party sys­ tem . This proposition is at odds with the generally high esteem accorded to tw o-party systems. In an already hom ogeneous sys­ tem , tw o-party systems may be m ore effective, but a m oderate m ultiparty system, in which no party is close to a majority, appears preferable in a consociational dem ocracy. The N ether­ lands, Switzerland, and Lebanon have the advantage that their subcultures are all m inority groups. In the A ustrian two-party system, consociational politics did w ork, but with considerable strain. Lehmbruch states: “ A ustrian political parties are strongly integrated social com m unities . . . and the bipolar structure of the coalition reinforced their antagonism s.” 25 The internal balance of pow er in Belgium has complicated the country’s consociational politics in two ways. The Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal subcul­ tures are minorities, but the C atholics are close to majority status. The C atholic party actually won a legislative majority in 1950. and attem pted to settle the sensitive royal question by majority rule. This led to a short civil war. followed by a return to consociational governm ent. M oreover, the Belgian situation is complicated as a result o f the linguistic cleavage, which cuts across the three spiritual families. The linguistic balance o f power is a dual balance in which the W alloons fear the numerical m ajority o f the Flemings, while the Flem ings resent the econom ic and social superiority o f the W alloons. Consociational democracy presupposes not only a willingness on the part o f elites to cooperate but also a capability to solve the :4 Dahl. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1 9 6 6 ),

3 3 7 .

25 Lehmbruch. 8.

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political problem s o f their countries. Fragm ented societies have a tendency to immobilism. which consociational politics is designed to avoid. Nevertheless, decision-m aking that entails accom m oda­ tion am ong all subcultures is a difficult process, and consocia­ tional dem ocracies are always threatened by a degree of im m obil­ ism. C onsequently, a third favorable factor to inter-elite cooperaM ion is a relatively low total load on the decision-m aking appara­ tus. The stability o f Lebanon is partly due to its productive economy and the social equilibrium it has m aintained so far, but it may not be able to continue its successful consociational politics when the burdens on the system increase. Michael C. Hudson argues that the Lebanese political system is “ attuned to incessant adjustm ent am ong prim ordial groups rather than policy planning and execution.” As a result, its “ apparent stability . . . is decep­ tively precarious: social m obilization appears to be overloading the circuits o f the Lebanese political system .” ’6 In general, the size factor is im portant in this respect: the political burdens that large states have to shoulder tend to be disproportionately heavier than those o f small countries. Ernest S. G riffith argues that “ democracy is m ore likely to survive, other things being equal, in small states. Such states are m ore m an ag e ab le.. . . ” 27 In particu­ lar, small states are m ore likely to escape the onerous burdens entailed by an active foreign policy. Lehm bruch states that the Swiss, A ustrian, and Lebanese cases “show that the preservation o f the inner equilibrium presupposes a reduction o f external dem ands to the political system .” And he even goes so far as to conclude that the type o f politics found in these three countries “seems to work in small states only.” 28

IN T E R -S U B C U L T U R A L R E L A T IO N S A T T H E M ASS L E V E L The political cultures of the countries belonging to A lm ond's C ontinental European type and to the consociational type arc all fragmented, but the consociational countries have even clearer boundaries am ong their subcultures. Such "distinct lines o f cleav­ age appear to be conducive to consociational democracy and political stability. The explanation is that subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and interests may coexist w ithout necessarily being in conflict: conflict arises only when they are in contact with each other. As Quincy W right states: “ Ideologies accepted :6 Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevelopment." Journal o f Poli­ tics. Vol. 29 (November 1967), 836. -’ Griffith. “ Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracv,“ American Political Science Review. Vol. 50 (March 1956). 102. 28 Lehmbruch. 9.

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by different groups within a society may be inconsistent w ithout creating tension: but i f . . . the groups with inconsistent ideologies are in close c o n ta c t. . . the tension will be g reat.” 39 David Easton also endorses the thesis that good social fences may m ake good political n eighbors, w hen he suggests a k ind o f vo lu n tary a p a rt­ h e id policy as th e best so lu tio n fo r a d iv id ed society: “ G re a te r success may be attained through steps that conduce to the devel­ opm ent o f a deeper sense o f mutual awareness and responsiveness am ong encapsulated cultural u n its." This is “ the m ajor hope of avoiding stress.” 30 And Sidney Verba follows the sam e line of reasoning when he argues that political and econom ic m oderniza­ tion in Africa is bringing “differing subcultures into contact with each other and hence into conflict.” 31 This argum ent appears to be a direct refutation of the overlapping-m em berships proposition, but by adding two am endm ents to this proposition the discrepancy can be resolved. In the first place, the basic explanatory elem ent in the concept o f consocia­ tional dem ocracy is that political elites may take joint actions to counter the effects o f cultural fragm entation. This means th at the overlapping-m em berships propositions may become a self-denying hypothesis under certain conditions. Secondly, the view that any severe discontinuity in overlapping patterns o f m em bership and allegiance is a danger to political stability needs to be restated in m ore refined form. A distinction has to be m ade between essen­ tially hom ogeneous political cultures, where increased contacts are likely to lead to an increase in m utual understanding and further hom ogenization, and essentially heterogeneous cultures, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility. This is the distinction that W alker C onnor makes when he argues that “ increased contacts help to dissolve regional cultural distinctions within a state such as the U nited States. Yet, if one is dealing not with m inor variations o f the sam e culture, but with tw o quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures, are not increased contacts between the two apt to increase antagonism s?” 33 This proposition' can be refined further by stating both the degree of homogeneity 29 Wright. “The Nature of Conflict.” W estern P olitical Q uarterly, Vol. 4 (June 1951). 196. 30 Easton. -( S y ste m s A nalysis o j P olitical L ife (New York. 1965). 250-51 (italics added). See also G. H. Scholten. “ Het vergelijken van federaties met behulp van systeem-analyse,” A cta P olitico , Vol. 2 (1966-67), 51-68. 31 Verba, “Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research,” W orld Poli­ tics, Vol. 20 (October 1967), 126 (italics added). 32 Connor, “ Self-Determination: The New Phase,” W o rld P o litics, Vol. 20 (October 1967), 49-50.

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and the extent o f m utual contacts in term s o f continua rather than dichotom ies. In order to safeguard political stability, the volume and intensity o f contacts must not exceed the com m ensurate degree o f hom ogeneity. Karl W . Deutsch states that stability depends on a “ balance between transaction and integration' because “ the num ber of opportunities for possible violent conflict^ will increase with the volum e and range of mutual transactions.” 33 Hence, it may be desirable to keep transactions am ong antagonis­ tic subcultures in a divided society - or, similarly, am ong different nationalities in a m ultinational s t a t e - t o a m inim um .

E L IT E -M A S S R E L A T IO N S W IT H IN T H E S U B C U L T U R E S Distinct lines o f cleavage am ong the subcultures are also condu­ cive to consociational democracy because they are likely to be concom itant w ith a high degree of internal political cohesion o f the subcultures. This is vital to the success o f consociational dem ocracy. The elites have to cooperate and com prom ise with each oth er w ithout losing the allegiance and support o f their own rank and file. W hen the subcultures are cohesive political blocs, such support is m ore likely to be forthcom ing. As H ans D aalder states, what is im portant is not only “ the extent to which party leaders are m ore tolerant than their followers” but also the extent to which they “are yet able to carry them along.” 34 A second way in which distinct cleavages have a favorable effect on elite-mass relations in a consociational democracy is that they m ake it m ore likely th at the parties and interest groups will be the organized representatives o f the political subcultures. If this is the case, the political parties may not be the best aggregators, but there is at least an adequate articulation o f the interests o f the subcultures. Aggregation o f the clearly articulated interests can then be perform ed by the cartel o f elites. In Belgium, the three principal parties represent the Catholic, Socialist, and Lib­ eral spiritual families, but the linguistic cleavage does not coincide with the cleavages dividing the spiritual families, and all three parties have both Flemings and W alloons am ong their followers. Lorwin describes the situation as follows: “ The sentim ental and practical interests o f the two linguistic com m unities are not effec­ tively organized, and the geographical regions have no adm inis­ trative or formal political existence. T here are no recognized representatives qualified to form ulate dem ands, to negotiate, and to fulfill com m itm ents.” 35 The religious and class issues have been 1! Deutsch. Political Community at the International Level (Garden City. 1954), 39. J4 Daalder. 69. 35 Lorwin. “ Belgium: Religion. Class, and Language in National Poli-

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effectively articulated by the political parties and have by and large been resolved, but the linguistic issue has not been clearly articulated and rem ains intractable. In Switzerland, the parties also represent the religious-ideological groups rather than the linguistic com m unities, but much o f the country’s decentralized political life takes place at the cantonal level, and most o f the cantons are linguistically hom ogeneous. A final factor which favors consociational democracy is wide­ spread approval o f the principle o f governm ent by elite cartel. This is a very obvious factor, but it is o f considerable im portance and deserves to be m entioned briefly. For example, Switzerland has a long and strong tradition o f grand coalition executives, and this has im measurably strengthened Swiss consociational dem oc­ racy. O n the other hand, the grand coalition in A ustria was under constant attack by critics w ho alleged that the absence o f a British-style opposition m ade A ustrian politics “ undem ocratic.” This attests to the strength o f the British system as a norm ative m odel even in fragmented political systems, w here the model is inappropriate and underm ines the attem pt to achieve political stability by consociational means.

C E N T R IP E T A L A N D C E N T R IF U G A L D E M O C R A C IE S An exam ination of the other tw o types o f the threefold typology o f dem ocracies in the light o f the distinguishing characteristics of consociational democracy can contribute to the clarification and refinem ent of all three types and their prerequisites. In order to avoid any unintended geographical connotation, we shall refer to the hom ogeneous and stable dem ocracies as the centripetal (instead o f the A nglo-A m erican democracies), and to the fragm ented and unstable ones as the centrifugal (instead o f the C ontinental Euro­ pean) democracies. The centrifugal dem ocracies include the French T hird and Fourth Republics, Italy, W eim ar G erm any, the A ustrian First R epublic, and the short-lived Spanish Republic o f the early 1930’s. T he m ajo r exam ples o f cen trip etal d em ocracy are G reat Britain, the Old Com m onw ealth countries, the U nited States, Ire­ land, the Scandinavian states, and the postw ar Bonn Republic in G erm any. The French Fourth R epublic is often regarded as the outstand­ ing example of unstable, ineffective, and immobilist democracy, but the explanation of its political instability in term s o f cultural fragm entation has been criticized on two grounds. In the first place, Eric A. N ordlinger rejects the argum ent that the “ ideologitics." in Dahl. ed.. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. 174.

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cal inundation of French politics” and its “ fragm ented party system ” were responsible for its chronic instability; he states that this explanation conveniently overlooks “ the way in which the gam e o f politics is actually played in France. Although ideologism pervades the parties’ electoral and propaganda efforts, this public ideological posturing o f French politicians does not prevent them from playing out their gam e o f com prom ise in the Assembly and its couloirs. In fact, the political class thinks of com prom ise as a positive principle o f action, with parliam entary activity largely revolving around nonideological sq u a b b le s.. . . ” 36 T he elites of the center parties that supported the Republic fulfilled to som e extent all of the logical prerequisites for consociational democracy except the most im portant one: they lacked the ability to forge effective and lasting solutions to pressing political problem s. They indeed played a nonideological gam e, but, as N athan Leites observes, with a “well-developed capacity for avoiding their responsibility.” 37 In other words, they were nonideological, but not constructively pragm atic. T o turn a centrifugal into a conso­ ciational dem ocracy, true statesm anship is required. M oreover, it is incorrect to assume that, because the elites were not divided by irreconcilable ideological differences, mass politics was not ideo­ logically fragmented either.38 The second criticism o f the cultural fragm entation thesis alleges, on the basis o f independent evidence, that not only at the elite level but also at the mass level, ideology played a negligible role in France. Philip E. C onverse and G eorges Dupeux dem on­ strate that the French electorate was not highly politicized and felt little allegiance to the political p arties.39 But the lack o f stable partisan attachm ents does not necessarily indicate that the politi­ cal culture was not fragmented. D uncan M acR ae argues persua16 Nordlinger. “ Democratic Stability and Instability: The French Case.” W orld Politics. Vol. 18 (October 1965). 143. 17 Leites, On the G ame o f P olitics in France (Stanford. 1959). 2. -,s Nor does the reverse assumption hold true. Giovanni Sartori relates the instability of Italian democracy to “ poor leadership, both in the sense that the political elites lack the ability for problem-solving and that they do not provide a generalized leadership." This weakness of leadership, he continues, "is easily explained by the fragmentation of the party system and its ideological rigidity." (“ European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism." in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds.. Political Parlies and P olitical Developm ent. 163.) The example of the consociational democracies shows that this is not a sufficient explanation. 19 Converse and Dupeux. “ Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States." Public Opinion Q uarterly, Vol. 26 (Spring 1962). 1-23.

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sively that political divisions did extend to the electorate as a whole in spite o f the apparent “ lack o f involvement o f the aver­ age voter.” Even though political allegiances were diffuse, there were “ relatively fixed and non-overlapping social groupings” to which “ separate leaders and separate m edia o f com m unication had access."40 The com bination o f fragm entation into subcultures and low politicization can in turn be explained by the negative French attitude tow ard authority. Stanley Hoffm ann speaks of “ potential insurrection against authority,” and Michel Crozier observes that this attitude m akes it “ impossible for an individual o f the group to become its leader.” 41 Strong cohesion w ithin the subcultures was m entioned earlier as a factor conducive to conso­ ciational democracy; the lack o f it in France can explain both that the French people were fragm ented but at the sam e tim e not politically involved, and that the political elites did not have the advantage o f strong support from the rank and file for construc­ tive cooperation. On the other hand, the example of France also serves to make clear that the lack o f problem-solving ability as a cause o f politi­ cal instability must not be overstated. A fter all, as M aurice D uverger points out, in spite o f all o f the F ourth Republic’s flaws and weaknesses, it “would have continued to exist if it had not been for the Algerian w ar.” 42 The critical factor was the tooheavy burden of an essentially external problem on the political system. Similarly, the fragmented W eim ar Republic might have survived, too, if it had not been for the unusually difficult p ro b ­ lems it was faced with. G erm any’s experience with dem ocracy also appears to throw som e doubt on our threefold typology and the theory on which it is based. W eim ar G erm any was a centrifugal democracy but the Bonn Republic can be grouped with the centripetal democracies. In explaining this extraordinary shift, we have to keep in mind that cultural fragm entation must be m easured on a continuum rather than as a dichotom y, as we have done so far. The degree o f hom ogeneity of a political culture can change, although great changes at a rapid pace can normally not be expected. Three reasons can plausibly account for the change from the fragmented 40 MacRae. Parliam ent. Parlies, and S o ciety in France: 1946-1958 (New York. 1967). 333. 41 Hoffmann and others. In Search o f France (Cambridge, 1963). 8 (italics omitted): Crozier. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago. 1964). 220. 4: Duverger. “The Development of Democracy in France." in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed.. D em ocracy in a Changing S o ciety (New York. 1964). 77.

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political culture of the unstable W eim ar Republic to the much m ore hom ogeneous culture o f the Bonn Republic: (1) the trau ­ m atic experiences of totalitarianism , w ar, defeat, and occupation; (2) “ conscious m anipulative change o f fundam ental political a tti­ tudes,” which, as Verba states, added up to a “ rem aking of political culture” ;43 (3) the loss of the eastern territories, which m eant that, as Lipset argues, “ the greater hom ogeneity o f western G erm any now becam e a national hom ogeneity.” 44 The degree of com petitive or cooperative behavior by elites must also be seen as a continuum . A m ong the consociational dem ocracies, som e are m ore consociational than others; and many centripetal democracies have som e consociational features. The phenom enon o f w artim e grand coalition cabinets has already been m entioned. The tem porary C hristian D emocratic-Socialist grand coalition under C hancellor Kiesinger falls in the sam e category. In fact, the stability o f the centripetal dem ocracies depends not only on their essentially hom ogeneous political cultures but also on consociational devices, to the extent th at a certain degree of heterogeneity exists. The alternation o f English-speaking and French-speaking leaders o f the Liberal party in C anada may be com pared with the C olom bian device of alternation. In the U nited States, where, as Dahl states, “ the South has for nearly, tw o centuries formed a distinctive regional subculture,” 45 cultural fragm entation led to secession and civil war. A fter the Civil W ar, a consociational arrangem ent developed th at gave to the South a high degree of autonom y and to the Southern leaders - by such means as chairm anships of key Congressional com m ittees and the filib u s te r-a crucial position in federal decision-m aking. This example also shows that, while consociational solutions may increase political cohesion, they also have a definite tendency to lead to a certain degree of immobilism. Even in D enm ark, which is am ong the most hom ogeneous of the centripetal democracies, one finds considerable consociationa­ lism. This does not appear in grand coalition c a b in e ts - in fact, D enm ark is known for its long periods o f governm ent by m inor­ ity cabinets but in the far-reaching search for com prom ise in the legislature. The rule of the gam e prescribes that the top leaders of all four m ajor parties do their utm ost to reach a consensus. This 43 Verba, “Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Verba, eds.. Political Culture and Political Develop­ ment (Princeton, 1965), 133. 44 Lipset, The First New Nation: The United Slates in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York. 1963). 292. 45 Dahl. 358.

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is glidningspolitik, which G erald R. M cD aniel translates as the “ politics o f sm oothness” 46 - an apt characterization o f consocia­ tional politics.

46 M cD aniel. The Danish U nicam eral Parliam ent (unpubl. P h.D . diss.. University o f C alifornia. Berkeley, 1963). iv.

A N O N -C O M P E T IT IV E P A T T E R N O F C O N F L IC T M A N A G E M E N T IN L IB E R A L D E M O C R A C IE S : T H E C A SE O F S W IT Z E R L A N D , A U S T R IA A N D L E B A N O N 1 G erhard Lehmbruch Source: G erh ard Lehm bruch. “ A N on-com pelitive Pattern o f C on­ flict M anagem ent in Liberal Dem ocracies: the C ase o f Sw itzerland, A ustria and L ebanon” (P aper presented at the Seventh W orld C on­ gress o f the International Political Science A ssociation. Brussels, Septem ber 1967). Printed for the first tim e by perm ission o f the author.

In current political typologies the existence of a fundam ental and “ norm al” pattern o f conflict settlem ent in liberal democracies is often taken for granted, namely, deciding controversial political issues by alternating parliam entary m ajorities which result from the com petition o f political parties in periodic elections (com pare, for example, Schum peter’s still influential “ theory o f com petitive lead­ ership” in democracy). Such typologies often take the form of simple dichotom ies, such as democracy versus dictatorship, or they are variants consisting o f three m em bers (e.g., totalitarian versus authoritarian versus dem ocratic governm ent). Recently, “ developm ental” typologies have gained increasing favour in the field of com parative politics. In these the com petitive leadership model (often identified with Anglo-Saxon or, m ore precisely, the British two-party system) appears to be the final point of an ascending continuum o f political developm ent, whereas the m ul­ ti-party coalition systems o f continental E urope are viewed as an interm ediate stage on this continuum and hence as a som ehow imperfect type of liberal dem ocracy. In this line of thinking we may include the well-known proposals for a transform ation of those “ im perfect” dem ocracies into really com petitive systems by constitutional or legal devices, for example by a change o f the electoral system, or of the rules for selecting the head o f govern­ m ent (as has been suggested in France by the advocates o f a genuine presidential system). The validity o f such argum ents has repeatedly been questioned. It has been argued recently that “ it m ight be reasonable to consider m ultiparty systems as the natural way for governm ent and oppositions to m anage their conflicts in dem ocracies, while the tw o-party systems . . . are the deviant cases.” 2 Though we 1 T his paper sum m arizes and develops further som e hypotheses con­ tained in the a u th o r's P roporzdem okratie: politisches S y ste m und politische K u ltu r in der Schw eiz und in Osterreich (Tubingen: J. C. B. M ohr, 1967). ; R . A . D ahl. P olitical O ppositions in W estern D em ocracies (New Haven and L ondon. 1966). 335.

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doubt that it m akes sense to consider any particular type o f political system as a “ natu ral” one, or inversely as a “deviant case,” we think that the rath er unique character o f com petitive tw o-party systems is well emphasized here. C om parative political science thus seems to be on the point o f arriving at m ore appro­ priate schemes o f classification which are free o f hidden teleological im plications. This paper intends to contribute to such efforts by analyzing a type o f political systems that has hitherto been rather neglected in com parative research: we speak o f systems in which political groups like to settle their conflicts by negotiated agreem ents am ong all the relevant actors, the m ajority principle being applic­ able in fairly limited dom ains only. The most im portant cases are Switzerland (the C onfederation as well as the cantons), Austria (the central governm ent from 1945 to 1966, the L aender since 1918) and Lebanon. The most salient feature o f these political systems is the distribution o f public office am ong all im portant linguistic groups and regions (Switzerland), political parties (A us­ tria, Switzerland), or, as in Lebanon (and in the Swiss C onfedera­ tion until 1798), religious denom inations. A nother example is the Holy G erm an Empire from 1648 to 1806, in which conflicts am ong the religious groups had to be settled by am icabilis com ­ position and the majority principle was explicitly suspended for such m atters; this principle was further guaranteed by the consti­ tutional rule of “ parity” o f Protestants and Catholics in the distribution o f offices. It is tem pting to explain this pattern on the basis o f the peculiar social structure of the countries we are investigating. The political cleavages run along linguistic a n d /o r denom inational lines. T he strong ideological tensions between the conservative and the socialist “cam ps” in A ustria retain the im print o f quasi­ religious antagonism s dating back to the C ounter-reform ation. The numerical relations of rival groups are therefore rather inflex­ ible. This m eans that in a society thus divided along religious or ethnic boundaries a political strategy o f m axim ization o f v o te san essential feature o f com petitive political systems - cannot work. H ence if neither group has a clear numerical preponderance, negotiated agreem ent appears to be the only possible m eans by which civil peace can be preserved. Such agreem ents are to be distinguished from those reached by bargaining in a “ hom ogeneous” political culture. If actors agree on political ends and m eans their preferences tend to be generally com patible and transitive. Thus, if they differ on transitive prefer­ ences. they may agree on a com prom ise which constitutes an interm ediate point on a com m on preference scale. This is usually done by incremental concessions of the bargaining actors, and

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often it is assumed that the interm ediate solution is a “ju s t,” “ natural” or “ rational” one. Instead, in a society divided by religious or strong ideological differences, or am ong linguistic groups, som e (or the m ore im por­ tant) preferences of the actors are incom patible and intransitive. Hence, there exists no com m on preference scale on which an in te rm e d ia te solution may be fo u n d . In this case th e follow ing expedients may be used: either (1) the political system is divided into m ore o r less autonom ous spheres of influence in which the actors may be free to realize the preferences held by the respec­ tive groups; such spheres of influence may be on a regional basis (this is the Swiss solution o f linguistic conflicts) o r on a functional basis (this has resulted in A ustria from the allocation o f ministries am ong the political parties). O r (2) the actors may agree on large-scale barter sim ilar to package deals as they occur not infrequently in international negotiations; this procedure means that one o f the actors offers a concession he detests in exchange for a concession by his opponent that the latter detests equally strongly. This form ula, known in A ustria under the nam e of J u n k tim , am ounts to a partial realization o f the actors' incom pati­ ble and intransitive preferences in different dom ains; its signifi­ cant m ark is th a t o ften th ere exists no o bjective relatio n am ong the “junctim ized” (Junktim iert) m atters, and that the solution can be labeled neither “ interm ediate” nor “ju s t” nor “ natural” . Of course in all these countries there are issues which are character­ ized by com patibility and transitivity o f preferences, for example in econom ic and social m atters, but even these are often included in such exchange procedures. T hat the social structure of the countries concerned is an essen­ tial condition o f this pattern o f conflict m anagem ent, is quite obvious. But it offers no sufficient explanation. F o r it is equally obvious that there exist im portant countries with equally “ frag­ m ented” political cultures where conflicts are managed in a rather different fashion. T he case o f France, beginning with Jean Bodin's advocacy o f authoritarian arbitration o f religious conflicts by the sovereign pow er, may be an example in point. From this we conclude th at one must look for intervening variables which explain why a system o f am icabilis com positio and Proporz correlates in som e countries with a social structure in which the preferences o f rival groups appear to be largely incom patible. O ne of these variables is the interaction o f the conflicts within the political system and the conflicts in the sur­ rounding international system, particularly if the sam e cleavages divide the one as well as the other. This is true o f Lebanon and was true o f Switzerland too, as long as religious or ethnic antago­

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nisms played a m ajor role in European politics. The groups within the state then have to be balanced in order to m aintain the integrity o f the political system against pressures from outside, while on the other hand internal equilibrium might be a condition o f the equilibrium o f the surrounding international system. But the intervening variable most relevant to our topic seems to belong to the dom ain o f “ political culture” : this is the fact that peculiar norm s o f conflict m anagem ent develop under specific historical circumstances. Thus the most im portant historical roots o f the Swiss system of proportional representation o f all large groups in governm ent seem to be (1) the principle o f "p arity ” of Catholics and Protestants within the C onfederation which, in analogy to the Holy G erm an Em pire, developed during the 16th to 18th centuries, and (2) the tradition o f municipal governm ent in which all patrician or otherw ise privileged families used to be represented in the councils o f towns and cantons. Later the same form ulae were applied to the settlem ent o f ethnic, and finally of inter-party, conflicts. The Lebanese system goes back to the O tto­ man tradition o f autonom y o f the religious com m unities (millets) and to the cooperation of C hristian and D ruse millets in the Turkish province o f Lebanon since the treaties of 1861 and 1864 w hich established L ebanese a u to n o m y a n d p rovided for a m ulti-denom inational council o f notables to assist the governor. As for A ustria, political parties continue to m anage their con­ flicts according to those rules of the parliam entary gam e which (as for example the Ju n ktim ) were used in the H absburg Em pire to establish the fragile m odus vivendi o f the different nations o f the m onarchy, and the political usages o f the Republic still bear the im pact o f the politics o f Ausgleich, that is, the settlem ent of ethnic antagonism s by institutional devices such as patronage, com m ittees representing the different groups, dem arcation of a u to n o m o u s spheres o f influence, and so on. A n o th e r facto r o f im portance is the strong influence that corporate representation of interests exerts upon policy-m aking; this reinforces the strong inclination of A ustrian political leaders and legislators to m anage their conflicts by negotiated agreem ents (in the m anner of union-em ployer bargains) rather than by political com petition and the m ajority principle, which in the eyes o f the m inority often appears to be “ undem ocratic” . T he com m on essence of these developm ents is this: under certain (and quite different) historical circumstances “ fragm ented” political cultures generate m ethods o f conflict m anagem ent which perm it the survival and continued existence o f the political system and the retention at the sam e tim e o f a considerable m easure of group autonom y. These m ethods consist in transactions which

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differ markedly from bargains in a “ hom ogeneous” political cul­ ture and have much in com m on with agreem ents as they take place am ong nations. T hen they becom e norm s which are retrans­ mitted by the learning processes in the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree o f persistence through time. T he case of Switzerland dem onstrates th at this pattern of conflict m anagem ent may become so firmly established that it will rem ain essentially the same even if the issues change. Recent developm ents in that country as well as in A ustria seem to indicate an increasing tendency to settle social and econom ic affairs by agreem ents - often rath er highly formalized - am ong the large interest groups; this can be interpreted as an extension of the pattern to these dom ains too. If o u r hypothesis is correct, this would m ean that continued existence o f fundam ental cleavages is not an absolute condition for the persistence of this pattern. The point may com e where polarization o f the electorate is decreasing, as seems to be the case in present-day A ustria. But if the elites are strongly inte­ grated in parties o f rigid discipline, as in A ustria, their perception o f political conflicts may differ markedly from the m anner in which these are perceived by a majority o f voters. Policy disagree­ m ents which voters regard as being of rather limited im portance may then be interpreted by elites in term s o f fundam ental cleav­ ages. and in critical situations the polarization o f voters may even be reactivated by the elites. O n the other hand, if elites cease to perceive the society as divided by fundam entals, they may none­ theless continue to uphold the supposed virtues of the “ typical Austrian com prom ise” or “ typical Swiss com prom ise” (a charac­ teristic phrase quite current in both countries) and to prefer this pattern o f cartelized decision-m aking to political com petition o f the “ A nglo-Saxon” type. This hypothesis is supported by em piri­ cal evidence indicating that voters in different countries differ much less in their perception o f political conflicts than do the political elites. A n im portant example is the dem onstration by Converse and Dupeux that the polarization of French public opinion, as com pared with the less strong polarization in the U nited States, seem s to be largely an elite phenom enon. This aspect is often som ewhat neglected in the discussion on political culture and in voting research. The discussion on Proporz governm ent has concentrated on the efficiency of the system. U nfortunately, the problem o f efficiency has been disregarded in com parative research on political systems. O ne reason may be the difficulty in finding an operational definition o f such efficiency. We might define it as the capacity o f a political system to resolve, within a reasonable tim e, the problem s considered

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as vital o r im p o rtan t by su b stan tia l segm ents o f p ublic o p in io n , including those problem s that can be expected to gain such im por­ tance in the foreseeable future. But then we would be led to the con­ clusion that no political system at all is efficient, for it seems to be a structural fact o f m odern industrial society that the political system always lags behind the expectations placed upon it by som e im por­ tan t groups. It seems highly im probable th at any material definition o f goals would enable us to measure and to com pare the efficiency of political systems. Instead we may inquire into the degree to which certain essen­ tial functions are perform ed in a given system, considering them at first from the standpoint of the mechanisms o f conflict m anage­ m ent, and thereafter from the standpoint o f perform ance o f vital tasks by the political system. As to the first aspect, com parison of the Swiss and the A ustrian system is particularly instructive, for the m echanism s of conflict m anagem ent obviously w ork much m ore sm oothly in the Swiss system than they did in the A ustrian coalition. A ustrian political parties are strongly integrated social com m unities (“ pillarized,” in the sense o f the D utch verzuiling), and the bipolar structure of the coalition reinforced their antago­ nisms: m oreover the coalition w orked within the framework o f a rather centralized political and adm inistrative system. Although horizontal com m unication channels (for exam ple, on the unionem ployer level) facilitated the solution o f many problem s and thus relieved the load on the system, im portant agreem ents often had to be w orked out at the top by the leaders o f the coalition parties. Such a system may of course quickly be deadlocked, whereas in Switzerland several factors contribute to render the mechanisms much m ore flexible: there are m ore than tw o cooperating parties (Radicals, Catholics, Socialists, conservative “ Peasants and Bour­ geois” ) which are rather loosely integrated and little disciplined: their mutual relationships are characterized by multiple intersec­ tions o f cleavages (regional, linguistic, confessional, econom ic and social): and they work within the framework o f a strongly decentralized federal system. This means that in Switzerland, unlike A ustria, it remains possible to avoid deadlock by majority decisions. For m ajorities in the Swiss system are o f a rather tem p o rary and inconsistent c h a ra c te r and d o n o t in f r in g e - a s would the consistent m ajorities o f the A ustrian tw o-party antago­ n is m -u p o n the fundam ental principle o f transactional conflict m anagem ent and cooperation o f all relevant groups. Proporz systems, like federal states, can thus be said to work b etter if there exist several independent centers o f political power, because these can use the majority principle not as the fundam ental device o f conflict m anagem ent and the ultim ate source o f legitimacy, but

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as an auxiliary expedient to avoid deadlock, w hereas in a system consisting o f only two parties the majority principle is quite inapplicable. It is rather frequently assum ed that Proporz systems perform less well the vital tasks o f the com m onw ealth than do com petitive o r bureaucratic systems, especially because im portant constitu­ tional functions are neutralized and paralyzed by the cartelization o f groups and political parties. This criticism often overlooks the fact that, by a process o f functional substitution, these tasks may be perform ed by other elem ents o f the system than those to which the constitutional texts assign the respective tasks. C ontrol has been exercised, as the late O tto K irchheim er has underlined, by means o f mutual Bereichsopposition, or o f opposition restricted to certain dom ains, of the coalition partners. The sam e may be said o f innovation, although the A ustrian or the Swiss systems certainly include specific factors that may block innovative change as effec­ tively as does, for example, the structure o f British trade union­ ism. A dm ittedly, Lebanon offers num erous examples o f im pedi­ m ents to social change and innovation which arise if an elaborate equilibrium of groups has to be preserved, but there is no reason to believe that the political systems o f the A rab neighbour states are m ore efficient. Perhaps central coordination may be particu­ larly difficult in a Proporz system, but com petitive and bureau­ cratic systems have their own specific problem s in this regard. The present rather unsatisfactory state o f com parative research does not perm it us to m ake a definitive judgm ent, but it appears difficult to credit com petitive systems with a generally higher level o f efficiency than P roporz system s. W e can only specify w hich are the characteristic deficiencies and strong points o f either sys­ tem . In o n e d o m ain , it is tru e , P roporz system s seem to be less capable o f effective perform ance o f tasks, namely that o f foreign policy. Switzerland, A ustria and Lebanon show that the preserva­ tion of internal equilibrium presupposes a reduction of external dem ands on the political system. This may explain why, in a general fashion, Proporz seems to work in small states only. This is not to say that the topic o f this paper is o f only m arginal and limited relevance to com parative research. F o r it is evident th at the pattern o f conflict m anagem ent described as Proporz has much in com m on with the phenom enon o f “ organ­ ized pluralism ” .3 The most salient fact is that Proporz as well as “ organized pluralism ” are non-com petitive systems in which issues are settled by am icabilis com positio, that is, by negotiated agree­ m ent rather than by m ajority. N o doubt it is not by accident that the “ organized pluralism ” o f interest groups is m ore highly develJ D ahl, op. cit. 395.

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oped in A ustria and Switzerland than in most other industrialized countries. Thus o u r topic may lead us to reconsider critically current political typologies which disregard non-com petitive con­ flict m anagem ent in favour o f the com petitive pattern on the one hand and the centralized bureaucratic and authoritarian patterns on the other. This disregard, incidentally, may be due to the fact th at only the latter patterns have been accepted by constitutional theory; it thus reflects legalistic traditions of our discipline untouched by methodological progress. W e propose an alternative classification o f political systems of the liberal-dem ocratic type according to the predom inance o f one o f the following patterns: a) T he com petitive pattern o f conflict m anagem ent (the fun­ dam ental device o f which is the m ajority principle); b) the non-com petitive, “cartelized” pluralist pattern (which w orks by am icabilis com positio, “ amicable agreem ent” ); c) conflict m anagem ent by an interaction o f bureaucratic arbi­ tration (which works by hierarchy) and dem ocratic control. This third pattern seems to be characteristic o f som e larger countries o f continental E urope which we propose to label “ dem o-bureaucratic systems.” In these countries - especially in France, Italy and G e rm a n y -lib e ra l dem ocracy originated in par­ liam entary control o f the m onarchic-bureaucratic executive, and this distribution o f roles is still largely characteristic o f the struc­ ture o f parliam entary governm ent. Political parties are not really com petitive leadership parties, and control o f the executive pow er, instead o f taking over executive leadership, is a predom i­ nant elem ent in the role perceptions o f legislators. This is particu­ larly evident in the political culture of France and in French theories of parliam entary governm ent, but W est G erm an y ’s politi­ cal culture too is still largely m arked by the dem o-bureaucratic pattern and is not as fully com petitive as it m ight seem to the foreign observer. These patterns, which are transm itted in the socialization p ro ­ cesses o f political elites, may o f course interm ingle and supplant each other in the course o f historical developm ents. D evelopm ental typologies that tend to explain patterns o f con­ flict m anagem ent by socio-econom ic factors alone and that neglect intervening variables may lead to rather faulty projections of developm ent trends. Particularly if we want to predict the future evolution o f the “ developing countries” o r o f the “ socialist cam p” , we should consider that even an evolution tow ards a m ore “ pluralistic” system might not render this a really com peti­ tive one. Historical circum stances may instead favour the coming into existence o f norm s o f conflict m anagem ent which are o f the dem o-bureaucratic or o f the non-com petitive Proporz type.

T H E P R IN C IP L E S O F M A JO R IT Y A N D P R O P O R T IO N A L IT Y Jiirg Steiner Source: J. Steiner, " T h e Principles o f M ajority and P roportionality," British Journal o j P olitical Science, Vol. I (1970), 63-70, a translation by G eoffrey Hosking o f the original G erm an version published under the title “‘M ajorz und P roporz," Politische V iertetjahresschrijl. Vol. II (1970), 139-146. R eprinted by perm ission o f th e author.

It is only in connection with electoral law th at the term s 'm ajority principle’ and ‘proportionality’ are widely used. It seems to us meaningful to apply the tw o concepts also to the political decision-m aking process as a whole. In this broadened sense ‘m ajor­ ity principle’ and ‘proportionality’ denote certain models o f con­ flict regulation. The majority model then denotes the regulation o f conflict through majority decisions. T he proportional m odel is much m ore difficult to describe: its basic characteristic is that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength. Proportional conflict regulation is easiest to apply when a decision is concerned with several units, all o f which are per­ ceived as equivalent to one another. The classical case o f this is the parliam entary election, for the parliam entary seats are per­ ceived as equivalent to one another, so that by m eans of an appropriate electoral law they can relatively easily be distributed on a proportional basis am ong the different political groups. In Switzerland the election o f the governm ent by the parliam ent gives rise to an analogous situation, in th at the seven seats in the Bundesrat (Federal Council) are perceived as equivalent to one a n o th e r, so th a t they can likew ise be relatively easily d istrib u ted on a proportional basis. In most other political systems the appli­ cation o f the rules o f proportionality at the level o f the govern­ m ent would entail greater difficulties, since the individual govern­ m ental posts are perceived as being o f different value. The great­ est difficulty presents itself when only a single office is to be filled, for example that o f President. H ere the application of proportional rules is only possible if rotation o f office (i.e. pro­ portionality in the tem poral dim ension) is brought into the reck­ oning, or if the disadvantage im posed on one group can be com pensated by preference given to it in another decision. In policy decisions it is as a rule even m ore difficult to proceed by proportionality than in decisions regarding persons. Policy problem s are usually not structured in such a way that they can be reduced to a num ber o f units perceived as equivalent to one another. A roughly proportional distribution of influence in policy problem s can usually only be assured if the decision is bargained

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over with the participation o f all groups. W e may add that this bargaining process is also the most frequent indication o f conflict regulation on the proportional principle. G erhard Lehm bruch has revived for this bargaining process a concept originating from the Peace o f W estphalia, that o f the ‘am icabilis com positio'.1 In the Swiss discussion the concept o f ‘concordance dem ocracy’ has often been used in this context, and has recently also been taken up by L ehm bruch.2 The models o f conflict regulation on m ajority o r proportional principles, which we here describe, are scarcely ever met with in their pure form. They constitute the extrem es on a continuum which requires closer investigation. U nfortunately there do not as yet exist any studies which have undertaken to classify political systems according to the degree to which they settle political conflicts by majority o r proportional rules. This would o f course not simply be a m atter o f enum erating the electoral systems: rather, what requires investigation is the extent to which, in governm ents, in parliam ents, in political parties, etc., m ajority or proportional rules are applied. It should be the aim o f such investigations to compile for each political system a set o f indices perm itting a rank-ordering on the m ajority-proportionality contin­ uum . W e are conscious that the establishm ent o f such indices will involve great difficulties. The m ajor problem will be to determ ine what weight within the overall index should be attached to con­ flict resolution in the individual sub-systems. A provisional solu­ tion m ight be first o f all to establish separate indices for the individual sub-systems i.e. the parties, parliam ents, governm ents, etc. - and to seek an international com parison on this level. A classification o f political system s on a m ajo rity proportionality continuum would enable one to test hypotheses in which the m ethod o f conflict regulation could feature either as the dependent or as the independent variable. In what follows we will attem pt to form ulate som e hypotheses of this kind. These rest on a narrow empirical basis: on the one hand, a description o f the political system o f Sw itzerland,3 on the other, the secondary liter­ 1 G erh ard Lehm bruch, Proporzdem okratie: Politiscltes S y ste m und politische K u ltu r in d er Schw eiz und in Oesterreich (Tubingen, 1967). 2 G erh ard Lehm bruch, ‘K onkordanzdem okratie im politischen System d er Schweiz: Ein L ileralu rbericht', Politische V ierteljahresschrift, 9 (1968), 443-459. ' See my boo k : G ew a lt/o se P o litik u n d k u llu r e lle V ie lfa lt: H yp o th esen e n tw ic k e lt a m B eisp iel d e r S c h w e iz (B e rn -S tu tlg a rt: Paul H aupt, 1970). F o r a sum m ary o f this book see my article: ‘Nonvi­ olent Conflict R esolution in D em ocratic Systems: Sw itzerland’, The Journal o f C onflict R esolution, Vol. 13, (1969) pp. 295-304.

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ature on other political systems.4 Since it is our conception of science that any theory must result from a constant interplay of the form ulation and testing of hypotheses, it is quite natural that in the opening phase o f an investigation the hypotheses are still predom inantly speculative in nature. The present article has thus prim arily an innovatory function, in that hypotheses are to be form ulated which can later be tested systematically. First of all we consider the degree o f conflict-regulation on m ajority or proportional principles as a dependent variable. The first hypothesis takes the following form: H ypothesis I: The smaller political systems are, the greater their tendency to regulate conflicts on proportional principles. A first substantiation of this hypothesis may be seen in the fact that in sm aller states the political elite is, com pared to bigger states, relatively small. Hence the probability is greater th at the m em bers of the political elite will interact relatively frequently. But, as H om ans postulates, frequent interaction tends to increase m utual goodw ill.5 As a result o f this relatively high level of m utual goodwill, such groups generally prefer not to perceive politics as a zero-sum gam e, in which a strategy o f ‘all-or-nothing’ is applied. For the winners in such a gam e would forfeit the loser’s goodwill, and this would entail high costs relative to the rew ards to be gained. The costs o f a majority strategy in the sense o f ‘all-or-nothing’ are only low if the participants do not feel much goodwill tow ards one another, and hence risk no great loss in this respect. If on the other hand the level o f goodwill is relatively high, then the gains resulting from the balance between rew ards and costs can be maximized by applying som e kind of proportional rules in the reso lu tio n o f conflicts. O f course the rew ards to be gained are reduced, for it is no longer possible to achieve ‘all’ at the expense o f the opponent. But on the other hand the costs in term s o f goodwill are likely to be low, so that in the overall balance higher gains are much m ore likely to result than if majority rules had been followed.6 4 A particularly rich source in this respect was R obert A . D ahl, ed.. P olitical Oppositions in W estern D em ocracies (N ew H aven and London: Yale U niversity Press. 1966). 4 G eorge C asp ar H om ans, Social Behavior: Its E lem entary Forms (N ew York: H arcourt Brace and W orld, 1961). '' T h e h y p o th esis p u t fo rw ard h e re , th a t sm all g ro u p s ten d to avoid m ajority strategies, can also be found in W . H. Riker, The Theory o f P olitical C oalitions (N ew Haven: Yale University Press. 1962). p. 51: ‘Especially in small g r o u p s . . . considerations o f m aintaining the solidarity o f the g roup and the loyalty o f m em bers to it dom inate considerations o f m axim um victory on particular decisions.’

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A second reason why proportional rules are applied relatively frequently in small states is th at in such states the resources available as rew ards are by the nature o f things sm aller than in large states. Now if in small states high costs are incurred in distributing the modest rew ards, it can easily happen that the balance between rewards and costs turns out to be negative. But the costs are generally high if political conflicts are settled accord­ ing to m ajority rules, because in this mode o f conflict regulation the winners risk forfeiting the losers' goodwill. Such costs are only irrelevant where in any case no mutual goodwill exists. If, how­ ever, goodwill does reach a certain level, then it will presumably be preferable to distribute the available resources according to proportional rules. In this way costs can be kept to a m inim um , while the overall balance can show a gain, in spite o f the modest rew ards. We can form ulate the sam e idea in a slightly different way by saying that, in a gam e w here the rewards to be gained are meagre, one does not risk a large stake. It is evident that both the elucidations hitherto offered for hypothesis i have a cumulative effect. Because in small states the mutual goodwill within the political elite tends to be relatively great, the probability will increase that, with a m ajority strategy, in view o f the meagre resources available, the costs in term s o f goodwill will exceed the rewards. A third explanation o f hypothesis I can be seen in the fact that small states are m ore exposed to the pressure o f the international system than large ones. As small group research has dem on­ strated, the solidarity within a group increases under external pressure.7 If we apply this result to large groups such as s ta te s which is not unproblem atic, but surely not wholly misleading then we reach the conclusion th at the pressure o f the international system has a positive effect on the solidarity within small states. To be able to resist the pressure from outside it is perceived as essential to m aintain internally as high a degree o f solidarity as possible. But this solidarity could be reduced if in the regulation of internal conflicts a m ajority strategy in the sense o f ‘allor-nothing’ were mainly applied. In this connection it should be pointed out that in the Second W orld W ar G reat Britain, the m ajority democracy p ar excellence, when it was under strong external pressure, deviated considerably from the majority m odel, in particular by setting up an all-party governm ent. W hich point on the m ajority-proportionality continuum a polit­ ical system occupies will probably depend not only on its size but also on its segm entation. On this second aspect we form ulate the following hypothesis: 7 Cf. for exam ple H om ans. S o cia l Behavior.

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H ypothesis 2: The m ore political systems are segm ented, the greater their tendency to regulate conflicts on proportional princi­ ples. W e consider a political system segm ented when most m em bers o f the individual sub-systems have in com m on two or m ore social characteristics with political relevance. Such segm entation is pre­ sent, for example, when most m em bers o f a given sub-culture belong both to the sam e political party and to the sam e religious denom ination; for both party and confessional allegiance are, as a rule, politically relevant. The segm entation can be dom inated by a single characteristic, as for example in A ustria between the two world wars, w here tw o ‘cam ps’ (Lager) had been formed on a class-ideological dim ension.14 In such cases, we speak o f a one­ dim ensional segm entation. W e find a tw o-dim ensional segm enta­ tion in Belgium, where besides the religious/anti-religious dim en­ sion language is also a dom inant characteristic. From the com bi­ nation o f both these dim ensions there results, for example, inside the C hristian Socialist party a Flemish and a W alloon su b ­ culture.9 Finally, in Switzerland we have multi-dim ensional seg­ m entation, for here the segm entation is determ ined roughly equally by language, religion, m em bership o f social stratum and region. These dim ensions cut across one another, so that a rela­ tively large num ber o f sub-cultures exists.10 In segm ented political systems - w hatever the nature o f the segm entation - interests of the different segm ents are in many political questions perceived as incom patible. Hence the probabil­ ity is small that the application o f a majority strategy would lead to alternating m ajorities, for a segm ent which finds itself in a m inority has scarcely any chance o f winning over voters from the m ajority segment and thereby o f becoming itself a majority. But if a group o f the population rem ains constantly in a m inority, it will presum ably in tim e become so frustrated th at it will m ake efforts to opt out o f the system. The best way to prevent this kind of dissolution o f the system will, in case o f strong segm entation, probably be to apply som e kind of proportional rules in the resolution o f political conflicts. The application o f proportional rules appears as especially nec­ essary when the segm entation within a political system corre­ sponds to a segm entation o f the international system. In the event o f this kind o f congruence it is particularly probable that a frustrated segment within a national system will make efforts to * Lehm bruch, P ro p orzdem okratie. pp. 34 IT. 9 Val R. Lorwin. “ Belgium: R eligion. C lass, and L anguage in N ational Politics,” in D ahl. ed.. P olitical Oppositions. 10 F o r the concept o f segm entation, com pare Steiner. G ew altlose Politik.

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opt out of that system. Switzerland was long in a situation where internal religious and linguistic segm entation was also dom inated by the international system. We may suppose that Switzerland w ould have fallen ap art had sh e no t p a rtially satisfied all her segm ents by the application o f proportional rules." The third hypothesis we postulate is that the position o f a political system on the m ajority-proportionality continuum depends not only on its size and its segm entation, but also on its social norm s. H ypothesis 3: T he m ore weight the prevalent norm-system lays on amicable agreem ent, the m ore a political system tends to regulate conflicts on proportional principles. In Switzerland, it is com m on to speak o f a “ true Swiss com ­ prom ise” . By that is m eant th at a solution has been reached as a kind o f amicable agreem ent with the participation of all interested circles. The frequent use o f the concept of the “ true Swiss com ­ prom ise" shows that the norm o f amicable agreem ent possesses a high priority. T hat such a norm can emerge at all depends partly on its past application having been rew arded. This prerequisite is present in Switzerland, for in Sw itzerland's understanding o f itself th e view is w idely accepted th a t th e eco n o m ic p ro sp erity o f the country, its peaceful internal com m unity life, indeed its very existence, are largely derived from the fact that amicable agree­ m ent was always aim ed at as a means o f regulating conflict. It is also im portant for the generation o f a norm th at symbolic figures should exist which represent th at norm . This to o applies to Switz­ e rlan d , if we th ink for exam p le o f B ro th er K laus, w ho in the O rdinance of the Diet o f Stans (1481) indicated the path of negotiation in the spirit o f am icable agreem ent. F urtherm ore, the nam e of the Swiss C onfederation (Eidgenossenschaft) points sym ­ bolically to am icable understanding between com rades (Genossen). W hether the prevalent norm inclines m ore to com petition or to amicable agreem ent depends also on the nature of the sociali­ zation process in families, schools, play groups, workplaces, etc. T h e position o f a political system on th e m ajo rity proportionality continuum can also be treated as an independent variable, and as such be used to explain o th er variables. T he next hypothesis attem pts to show how the application of proportional models affects the channels o f com m unication for the articulation of dissent: " T h e first tw o hypotheses presented here can also be found, partly with sim ilar explanations, but limited to electoral law. in Stein R okkan. ‘T he Structuring o f M ass Politics in the Sm aller European Dem ocracies: A D evelopm ental Typology’. Com parative S tu d ies in S o ciety and H istory. 10 (1968). 189 ff.

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H ypothesis 4: The m ore conflicts in political systems are regu­ lated by proportionality, the greater the tendency for ordinary citizens to have no functional channels for the articulation of dissent at their disposal. T he explanation of this hypothesis is that, with a proportional strategy, the political elites form a relatively closed group, as results from the necessity ofureaching settlem ents by m utual b ar­ gaining. In the face of this relatively closed political elite the ordinary citizen is hardly in a position to discern who is responsi­ ble if his dem ands are not m et. N o r has he access to the inform a­ tion necessary to artic u la te his dissent in a w ell-directed and hence functional m anner. A diffuse protest against the dom inant political group as a whole, how ever, is usually dysfunctional, since in this way nothing is likely to be achieved. H ypothesis 5: T he m ore conflicts in a political system are regu­ lated by proportionality, the lower the learning capacity o f the system tends to be. By high learning capacity we understand with K arl W . Deutsch a com bination o f ‘a high degree o f richness and o rig in a lity -th a t is, im p ro b a b ility -o f new patterns, with a high degree o f speed in their selection, and with a high probability o f their relevance to the challenges offered to the organization by its environm ent’. 12 Because of the already m entioned relatively closed nature o f the political elite, it is probable th at the citizens' political interest will w ane as they see only limited opportunities for m aking their influence felt.13 But if the citizens behave politically relatively passively, then they com m unicate to the political elites corre­ spondingly little in fo rm atio n . T h en th e feed-back process w ithin the system does not work optim ally, since the political elites are in ad eq u ately inform ed ab o u t th e reactio n s th e ir decisions arouse from the ordinary citizens. T his must affect the learning capacity negatively, by reducing th e p ro b ab ility th a t so lu tio n s will be found which are relevant to the dem ands im posed on the system. T he learning capacity o f the system is also adversely affected by the fact that a com prom ise solution in the spirit o f amicable agreem ent can usually be reached only if the scope for innovation is very limited from the start. For if there is wide scope for innovation, then so many alternatives will present themselves that a decision can hardly be reached unless a good many alternatives are elim inated by the application o f m ajority rules. If the scope for innovation is small, on the other hand, it is m ore likely to be 12 Karl W. D eutsch, The N erves o f Government. M odels o f Political C om m unication a n d C ontrol (N ew York and London: F ree Press. 1966).

11 F or this point sec my B urger und P oliiik (M eisenheim : A nton H ain, 1969).

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possible through amicable agreem ent to reduce the viewpoints to a com m on denom inator. Small scope for innovation, however, also lessens the probability that very original solutions will be found, such as might be evolved in a system possessing high learning capacity. Even when the scope for innovation is kept small, the bargain­ ing for an agreed solution still takes a lot o f time. H ence the system has difficulty in reacting fast, which is likewise not condu­ cive to a high learning capacity. W hat connection exists betw een the position o f a political system on the m ajority-proportionality continuum and the consen­ sus within the system? On the basis o f Swiss experience one m ight assume that the frequent application o f proportional rules increases the consensus within the system, for various indicators, such as the low incidence of the use o f violence,14 suggest that the Swiss system enjoys strong consensus. As confirm ation one could point out that through the frequent application o f proportional rules the dem ands o f the various groups o f the population are satisfied m ore or less equitably, so th at now here can pronounced frustration arise. But then, what about the connection between hypotheses 4 and 5 and the degree o f consensus? D o dysfunctional com m unication channels for the articulation o f dissent and a low learning capacity not operate to reduce the degree o f consensus? W e assume it hypothetically, but must po in t out that in Switzerland special conditions pertain which restrict the effects of these factors. For one thing,the political system o f Switzerland has a relatively small input o f dem ands, and consequently the deficient learning capac­ ity o f the system does not make itself strongly felt. The relatively small input of dem ands is connected with various factors: neutral­ ity eases the burden of foreign affairs; by virtue o f the federal structure dem ands are split up am ong different political levels; because o f the small size of the state political problem s remain within certain limits o f complexity; and, finally, in Switzerland many problem s elsewhere consigned to the state are traditionally settled privately. A second consideration is th at the Swiss elector has in the referendum an in stru m en t at his disposal w hich c o n stitu tes c o n ­ siderable com pensation for the way in which the frequent applica­ tion of proportional rules renders other com m unication channels for the articulation o f dissent dysfunctional. However, even in Switzerland the input o f dem ands has increased considerably recently.15 Because o f this developm ent, 14 Steiner, Gewaltlose P olitik. 15 F o r this point cf. for exam ple: Schaizungen der E innahm en und A usgaben des Bundes 1966-74. Bericht der Eidgenossischen Exper-

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the deficient learning capacity o f the system is gradually beginning to have m ore noticeable effects. F u rth e rm o re -a s we have expounded in another place16 it appears that with a growing input o f dem ands the institution o f the referendum degrades the learning capacity of the system. As a result, the ever m ore appar­ ent deficiency in the learning capacity o f the system has already led to a certain uneasiness, vividly captured by Max Im boden in the concept o f the malaise helvetiqueJ 7 Even in the case of Switzerland it must thus in the long run be regarded as uncertain w hether a proportional strategy furthers consensus within a sys­ tem .18 So it would be at the very least hasty to want to transfer the Swiss proportional rules to other strongly segm ented political systems. O n the other hand it must not be forgotten as we have already pointed o u t— that it is no less problem atical for political systems with strong segm entation to apply majority rules. This problem indicates the dilem m a in which many developing coun­ tries find themselves, and also m odern industrial states like Bel­ gium and C anada. With the progress o f attem pts at integration, this dilem m a will also becom e ever m ore acute for supranational organizations. C onsiderable research endeavours will be needed so that it may gradually becom e clearer what connection exists under d ifferent system ic co n d itio n s betw een th e a p p licatio n o f majority and proportional strategies and the stability o f dem o­ cratic system s.19

tcnkom m ission zur B earbeitung dcr G rundlagen und M ethodcn einer langfristigen Finanzplanung im Bunde (Bern, 1966). 16 Steiner, “A spekte des R eferendum s', Sehw eizer M onalshefte, Vol. 48. N o. 12 (M arch, 1969). 17 M ax Im boden. H eh etisches M alaise (Zurich. 1964). 18 Cf. Steiner. Ge walllose Poliiik. 19 Cf. m y "C onflict R esolution and D em ocratic Stability in Subculturally Segm ented Political System s." R es Publica. R evue de 1‘Institut Beige de Science Politique. 11 (1969). 775-798. and also my A m ica­ ble A greem ent a n d M ajority Rule: C onflict R esolution in S w itzer­ land (Chapel Hill: University o f N orth C arolina Press, forthcom ing).

O N B U IL D IN G C O N S O C IA T IO N A L N A T IO N S : T H E C A SE S O F T H E N E T H E R L A N D S A N D S W IT Z E R L A N D H ans D aalder Source: H ans D aalder, " O n Building C onsociational N ations: the Cases o f the N etherlands and S w itzerland", International Social S cien ce Journal, Vol. 23, N o. 3. 1971, pp. 355-370. R eprinted by perm ission o f u n k s c o and the author.

Introduction. O f late, the term “consociational” has been increas­ ingly used to characterize a certain pattern o f political life in which the political elites of distinct social groups succeed in estab­ lishing a viable, pluralistic State by a process o f mutual forbear­ ance and accom m odation. In m odern social science, the w ord was first used by David A p ter.1 T he term was further elaborated into a general classificatory concept by A rend L ijphart.3 Independently o f him and som etimes under different term s like P roporzdem okratie o r K onkordanzdem okratie, G erhard L ehm bruch,3 Jiirg Stei­ ner.4 and Rodney Stiefbold5 have sought to analyse com parable types o f political experience. The w ord consociatio originated with Johannes A lthusius.6 It is significant that a term first adopted to analyse the developm ent of a new polity in the Low C ountries in the early seventeenth century, is now being revived in the study o f com parative political developm ent in the twentieth century. A process o f building up a new political society from below, to som e degree by the consent of participating com m unities, in which deliberate com prom ises by elites carefully circum scribe and limit the extent to which political 1 David A pter. The Political K ingdom in Uganda: a S tu d y in Bureau­ cratic N ationalism . (Princeton. 1961), pp. 24-5. 2 See his “ Typologies o f D em ocratic System s." Com parative Political Stu d ies. Vol. I (1968), p. 3-44; and “ C onsociational D em ocracy,” W orld P olitics, Vol. 21 (1968-69). p. 207-25. ’ See his P ro p o rz d e m o k r a tie (T u b in g e n . 1967); a n d " A N onC o m p e titiv e P attern o f C o nflict M an ag em en t in L iberal D e m o c ra ­ cies: the Cases o f Sw itzerland, A ustria and L ebanon,” paper pre­ sented to the Brussels Congress o f the International Political Science A ssociation. 1967. 4 Jiirg Steiner. Gewaltlose P o litik und Kulturelle V ielfalt: H ypothesen E n tw ickelt am B eispiel d er Schw eiz (Bern and S tuttgart. 1970). 5 Rodney Stiefbold, "E lite-M ass O pinion Structure and C om m unica­ tio n Flow in a C o n so ciatio n al D em ocracy ( A u s tr ia )," p a p e r p re ­ sented to the annual m eeting o f the A m erican Political Science A ssociation. W ashington, 1968. 6 F o r a useful short sum m ary see O tto G ierke, N atural L aw and the Theory o f S o ciety 1500 to 1800. ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker (B oston. 1957), pp . 70-9.

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pow er can be wielded by one political centre, may be a relatively rare political phenom enon. Yet it provides at least a significant footnote to the prevailing m ood in the study o f nation-building which so often proceeds from the assum ption that nationhood should be forged from above, by the deliberate im position o f a “ m odern" State on traditional society. T he term “ consociational dem ocracy" has been used by Lijphart to ch aracterize th e political life o f E u ro p ean c o u n tries (th e Low C ountries, A ustria, Switzerland) as well as countries on other continents (e.g. Israel, Lebanon, U ruguay. C olom bia). This arti­ cle will deal only in its conclusion with the general model of “ consociational dem ocracy." Its m ajor em phasis will be on a tw o-country com parison prom pted by the suggestion o f Stein R okkan that a treatm ent o f the Dutch and Swiss cases of nation-building might open “ fascinating possibilities of com para­ tive historical analysis.” 7 Inevitably, in the context o f a short article, the argum ent will proceed mainly in the form o f proposi­ tions which stand in need o f m ore detailed historical substantia­ tion. C om parison presupposes com m on as well as contrasting char­ acteristics. In the first section o f this article, com m on elem ents in the political developm ent o f the N etherlands and Switzerland will be traced. In the second part, the focus will shift to differences between the two countries. The paper will conclude with some rem arks on m ore theoretical questions which are prom pted by a com parison o f Dutch and Swiss experiences in nation-building with those o f other countries.

C O M M O N C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S O F S W IS S A N D D U T C H N A T IO N -B U IL D IN G PRO C ESSES Both the N etherlands and Switzerland provide examples o f States which attained international sovereignty w ith only minim al inter­ nal consolidation. Some violence did occur both in the processes o f external dem arcation and internal integration; but nationhood typically grew through extensive processes o f accom m odation and com prom ise. In the typology of European States,8 the tw o coun­ tries resemble the U nited Kingdom and Sweden in their centuries-old status as independent polities which show strong trad i­ 7 S tein R o k k a n , C itize n s. E le ctio n s. P a rlies A p p ro a ch es to the C o m p a ra tive S tu d y o f th e P rocesses o f D evelopm ent (O slo . 1970). p. I 18 'R o k k a n , op. c it.. P art I, especially C h a p te r 3; see also H ans D aalder, "P arties, Elites and Political D evelopm ents in W estern E urope.” in: Joseph L aP alom bara and M yron W einer (eds.). P oliti­ cal Parties a n d P olitical D evelopm ent (Princeton. 1966). pp. 44-52

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tions o f continuous representative organs and which grew slowly but w ithout reversals - into m odern dem ocratic societies. But unlike these two countries, nationhood was achieved without dynastic guidance or early central governm ent. Like Italy and G erm any, the m odern State developed through unification o f once highly dispersed political com m unities. But whereas conquest and forceful unification stood at the cradle o f Italian and G erm an sta te h o o d , Swiss an d D utch sta te h o o d as well as n atio n h o o d were formed on the whole by com pact and accom m odation. If one seeks to account for the D utch and Swiss developm ents, the following factors would seem to stand out. Geopolitical Factors. O tto Hintze long ago drew attention to the im portance for later developm ents o f the specific location o f certain countries at the periphery o f the Holy R om an E m pire.9 Due to the weakness o f central authority in the Em pire independ­ ent dukedom s, bishoprics, counties, cities, cantons and provinces m aintained themselves with a high degree o f political selfsufficiency and independence when in other countries like France, Spain, the U nited Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries dynastic rule resulted in centralized statehood. T he developm ent notably of the U nited Kingdom and France as strong pow er centres on the international scene, assisted the further develop­ m ent o f political independence o f Switzerland and the N ether­ lands: Swiss independence after the fifteenth century was strength­ ened by a special relationship with France, and Dutch nation­ hood was achieved not least because H ab sb u rg s, B o u rb o n s, and Stuarts were unwilling to see political control over the European Delta go to any one of them. A second com m on geopolitical factor between the N etherlands and Switzerland is their location at som e o f the most im portant trade routes o f Europe. This led to the early developm ent of m ercantile cities. Both in the N etherlands and in som e o f the m ore im portant Swiss cantons, cities thus gained a dom inant position which they also extended over the surrounding country­ side. But these cities rem ained at the sam e tim e highly particularist political com m unities. Both in the N etherlands and Switzer­ land a polycephalous city netw ork d eveloped in w hich no single city could become the “capital city” for the whole country. Switz­ erland as well as the N etherlands rem ained for long, much to the dislike o f nineteenth-century unifiers like Friedrich List, a Konglom erat von M unizipaliiaten.,0 M oreover, in both countries 9 O tto H intze. "T ypologie d er Stiindischen Verfassung des A bendlan d es," H istorisches Z e ilsc h rift, Vol. 141 (1930). p. 224-48. 10 Q uoted by Hans K ohn. N ationalism a n d L iberty: the Sw iss e x a m ­ ple. (L o n d on . 1956). p. 57.

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strong rural cantons and provinces retained an independent politi­ cal title beside the m ore prosperous city-dom inated polities. Thirdly, for geographic reasons, neither country saw the devel­ opm ent o f large land-ownership. C om m unal grazing practices in Switzerland, com m on needs for the protection of land against the ever-present threat o f the sea and rivers in the Lowlands, m ade for an early developm ent o f self-reliant peasant com m unities. If not always in practice, this provided at least in political theory for the idea o f self-governing com m unes adm inistered by com m oners. Later political developm ents could therefore be inspired by ancient traditions. The Peculiar Development o f 'Sovereignty'. Both in the N ether­ lands and in Switzerland, independent national existence was originally decided by the force o f arm s. Territorial consolidation was achieved only by extensive military battles against foreign claim ants and, to som e extent, at least in Switzerland, by a show o f strength against internal dissidents. Local military conflicts decided the course of later frontiers, and military alliances began the process o f later developm ent o f national identity. To state that nationhood emerged from the completely voluntary association of free com m unities, would therefore be an unw arranted simplifica­ tio n . In th e N eth erlan d s, th e seven U n ited Provinces co n q u ered Brabant and Lim burg in the 1620s and 1630s and ruled them as dependent territories for 150 years. Switzerland for long was a patchw ork o f U rkantone, associated cantons and a host of dependencies of which Tessin and Vaud were the most im portant. The essence o f Dutch and Swiss political life rem ained for very long a motley arrangem ent o f particularist com m unities, not national co-operation am ong equals. Yet this very particularism had im portant consequences for later developm ents. Interestingly, even the m ore im portant, poten­ tially m ore powerful provinces and cantons did not aspire to become central adm inistrative capitals. And even in dependent territories, local traditions and local governm ents were perm itted to persist. A measure o f traditionalist self-sufficiency could even­ tually substantiate later claims for a separate identity on a par with form er overlords. The very dispersed pow er structure gave am ple scope, moreover, for local elites to m aintain themselves, and for the confederation as a whole to continue irrespective of political changes within any o f the constituent political com m uni­ ties. If there was hardly any national political life, there were also no strong national cleavages o r conflicts. Both the N etherlands and Switzerland emerged therefore as independent political societies w ithout either a strong central gov­ ernm ent apparatus or an articulate national identity. C om m on

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affairs were decided ad hoc by political procedures th at resembled international conferences rather than legitimate national govern­ m ent. N either the U nited Provinces, nor the Swiss C onfederation knew a central arm y or a central bureaucracy. There were no organs o f State which could act directly on the individual and there was no concept o f com m on citizenship. Does this mean that one cannot speak o f a Dutch o r a Swiss nationality in this period? The answ er is som ew hat in the nature of a petitio principii. If one defines “ the central factor o f nation-building” as “ the orderly exercise o f a nation-w ide public authority,” 11 the answer must be negative as no such nation-wide public authority existed. If one speaks o f nations only when there has been a “ process whereby people transfer [my italics] their c o m m itm en t and loyalty from sm aller trib es, villages, o r petty principalities to the larger central political system ,” 12 the conclu­ sion must be equally negative. But one could also argue th at at least one condition o f n atio n ality -so v ereig n political existencehad been fulfilled. And if one defines nationality m ore in term s of at least som e consciousness o f togetherness rather than as an exclusivist transfer of loyalties to a new State, signs of an incipi­ ent nationhood could be found at least am ong the leading politi­ cal strata o f Swiss and Dutch society. The Persistence o f Pluralism in M odernization. The French rev­ olution, undoubtedly, had a m ajor effect on the developm ent of D utch and to a lesser extent on th at o f Swiss nationhood. In the N etherlands, French occupation brought a lasting unitary State, com m on citizenship, com m on laws and equal rights for the var­ ious religions. In Switzerland, the institutions o f the Helvetic Republic proved abortive, but old inequalities between the can ­ tons disappeared and virtually equal rights were secured for the main languages. Eventually, Switzerland too moved to m ore defi­ nite forms o f (federal) statehood in 1848. But the drive of radical forces for unification (as represented by the Dutch Patriottenbeweging or the Swiss Helvetic Society tow ards the end of the eighteenth century, or again by innovative radicals around 1848) never succeeded in achieving a sharp break with older pluralist traditions. If thinkers o f the French Enlight­ enm ent put the twin concepts o f absolutism and individualism against what they conceived as the dead weight o f privileged c o rp o ra te interests, D utch and Swiss tra d itio n s consistently 11 R e in h a rd B endix. S a tio n -b u ild in g a n d C itize n sh ip : S tu d ie s o f our Changing S o cial O rder (N ew Y ork. 1964). p. 18. G abriel A . A lm ond and G . Bingham Powell. J r.. Com parative Poli­ tics: a D evelopm ental A pproach (B oston, 1966), p. 36.

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regarded an entrenched pluralism as the safeguard o f liberties. A dm ittedly, these old liberties (in the plural) m ight frustrate individual equality and individual liberty (in the singular). Yet. corporate rights were regarded as im portant in themselves, as well as a protection against threatening claims on the p art o f an om nipotent new State. T he form ation of the D utch and Swiss nations could therefore becom e the result o f a slow process o f genuine national integra­ tion, rather than o f deliberate nation-building. It would be diffi­ cult to point to one social group, or one political centre, o r one legal institution which m ight be regarded as the chief nationbuilding force. D ata on elite-recruitm ent (w hether on D utch C abinet person­ nel13 or on Swiss m em bers o f P arliam entu ) show th at elite posi­ tions in the nineteenth century were shared widely by all the m ajor regions o f the country. N ational integration first evolved slowly on the level of accom m odating elites, to filter down later to the m ore parochial orders o f society. The slow developm ent of a stronger national sentim ent in the population at large was therefore in the m ain com plem entary to, rath er than destructive of, older local allegiances. In D utch and Swiss nineteenth-century history one also looks in vain for a salient role o f the usual agencies o f nation-building: the arm y, the bureaucracy, national schools. N ational arm ies appeared only relatively late on the D utch and Swiss scene. A lthough they may have played som e role in the political socialization of recruits into a developing national politi­ cal c u ltu r e - a role so often attributed to arm ies15- a definite sense o f national identity preceded the introduction o f compulsory military service. Especially in S w itzerland, th e n a tio n al b u reau cracy has rem ained o f relatively modest dim ensions, not least because the cantonal governm ents retained very m ajor political and adm inis­ trative functions in the federal structure. But also in the N ether­ lands which was a unitary State from 1795 onw ards, the central 13 A m achine-readable bibliographical file on all D utch cabinet m inis­ ters since 1848 is available in the Leiden D epartm ent o f Political Science, based on m aterial originally collected by M attei D ogan and M aria Scheffer-van der Veen. In the context o f a larger study o f the D utch Parliam ent, a sim ilar file is being prepared on all m em bers of the D utch P arliam ent from 1848 to the present. 14 F . G ru n e r an d K . F re i. S c h w e ize r isc h e B undesversanw ilung. 1848-1920 (Bern. 1966). 2 vols. See in particular Lucian W . Pye, A spects o j P olitical D evelopm ent. (Boston, 1965),ch ap ter 11.

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bureaucracy rem ained o f m odest size until the early tw entieth century. R ecruitm ent to higher civil service roles has retained many o f the features o f earlier particularist elite practices. T o this day , th e Swiss and th e D utch b u reau cracies rem ain in m any respects not only nationalizing agencies, but also points o f b roker­ age between highly differentiated subgroups o f society. Schools have undoubtedly played an im portant role in fostering the developm ent o f national sentim ent. But in Switzerland control over education has, in practice, rem ained a highly regionalized and localized affair. In the N etherlands, an attem pt on the part o f secular liberal elite gro u p s in th e second p art o f th e n in eteen th century to build up a centralized school system soon ran into strong opposition from Calvinists and Catholics who successfully fought for autonom y o f religious schools under their own con­ tro l.15 An inspection of the course content o f D utch and Swiss schools would probably reveal an insistence on both national and sub-national allegiances, typically regarded as fully com patible. Thus, older traditions o f elite accom m odation which had grown from the necessities o f the highly dispersed pow er structure o f the pre-1789 confederations could be carried over into the m oderniza­ tion process. O lder pluralist elite attitudes facilitated the gradual settlem ent o f participation dem ands from new social groupings in society. Both in Switzerland and in the N etherlands verbal ad h er­ ence to ancient ideals of accountable governm ent had gone together in practice with effective rule by relatively narrow - albeit also p lu ra list-e lite groups. But typically, these had enjoyed a high degree o f legitimacy. The franchise was extended only slowly, and older practices by which policies were preferably determ ined in negotiations and com prom ises outside the public m arket place, have retained a strong hold in the political culture. Both the N etherlands and Switzerland substantiate tw o o f Stein R o k k an’s hypotheses: (a) “ The stronger the inherited traditions of representative rule, w hether within estates, territorial assem­ blies or city councils, the greater the chances o f early legitimation of opposition” ; and (b) “the stronger the inherited traditions of representative rule, the slower, and the less likely to be reversed, the processes o f enfranchisem ent and equalization” .17 Finally, in the tw o countries a strong em phasis on the need to make sure that political pow er could not becom e concentrated in one political centre, has continued to form part o f the political culture. M ore so in Switzerland than in the N etherlands, this has 16 See H ans D aalder, “ T he N etherlands: O pposition in a Segm ented Society,” in R obert A. D ahl (ed.). P olitical Oppositions in W estern D em ocracies (New H aven, 1966), pp. 199ff. 17 R ok k an . op. cit.. pp. 82-3.

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been done by keeping local governm ents strong and relatively independent political sites.18 In both countries, central govern­ m ent institutions have been so arranged as to ensure a definite duality between the executive and the legislature. W ithin each, older pluralist traditions and m odern electoral devices have seen to it that political power has been divided over a variety of political parties: the distance which separates even the largest party from the majority point has been greater in Switzerland and the N etherlands than in practically any European cou n try .19 C oa­ lition governm ent is ingrained both within the official governm ent structures and in the decision-m aking processes o f the large num ­ ber o f interest groups. In sum, ancient pluralism has facilitated the developm ent of a stable, legitimate and consistently pluralist m odern society.20 Both the N etherlands and Switzerland are countries with strong subcul­ tural divisions. Yet, o f the six possible ways in which subcultural conflicts m ight be dealt with according to R obert A . D ahl,21 violence and repression as well as secession or separation have been rem arkably absent. Instead a respect for autonom y, a habit­ ual reference to proportional representation, and som etim es a willingness to abide by mutual veto rather than undiluted majority decisions22 have been characteristic features o f Dutch and Swiss 18 O n the concept o f political “ site” , see D ahl, op. cit., pp. 338IT. 19 See the classificatory table o f the Smaller E uropean Dem ocracies by th e L ikelihood o f Single-party M ajorities and the D istribution of M inority Party Strength, in R okkan, op. cit., p. 94. 20 T his article concentrates above all on the distinct properties in the national developm ent o f Switzerland and the N etherlands. These countries have, o f course, m any o ther features in com m on with European States. M ost o f the general indicators specified by R ok­ k an, op. cit., in his “ M ethods an d M odels in the C om parative Study o f N atio n -b u ild in g ," p. 65ff. would be highly relevant for a study of D utch an d Swiss experience. Swiss and D utch national developm ent might also be contrasted with that o f the U nited States. In fact, both countries often resem ble H untington's “ A m erican" pattern o f devel­ opm ent m ore than his “ E u ro p ean " type (w hether “ British” or “ C o n tin en tal"). See Samuel P. H untington, “ Political M oderniza­ tion: A m erica wr. E u rope". W orld Politics, Vol. 18 (1965-66). pp 378-414. :i T hese six possible ways o f solving subcultural conflicts are: (a) violence and repression: (b) secession o r separation: (c) m utual veto: (d) autonom y: (e) proportional representation: and (0 assim ilation see D ahl. op. cit., pp. 358-9. n Typically, the Swiss referendum has in practice becom e m uch m ore a w eapon wielded by m inorities who seek to resist m ajority decisions taken by the federal Parliam ent than an expression o f will by “ th e" sovereign Swiss people as a whole.

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political culture. And this instinctive respect for diversity has, paradoxically, eased m odern processes o f assimilation.

C O N T R A S T S B E T W E E N D U T C H A N D S W IS S N A T IO N -B U IL D IN G PRO C ESSES If “ the inevitability o f gradualness” in a consistently pluralist evolution is the most obvious com m on characteristic o f the two countries, certain differences between them should also be noted. G eo p olitical F actors. G e o g ra p h ic factors have d ifferen tiated Dutch and Swiss political developm ent on the following points. First, Dutch geography provided less durable barriers to pro­ cesses o f social mobility than the Swiss terrain. Particularism was therefore broken up m ore easily once the hom ogenizing process of political m odernization set in. The most conspicuous illustration of this process is the relatively unhindered developm ent o f one national language. T o this day Frisian rem ains a separate language spoken by a few hundred thousand persons; in addition there are num erous slowly disappearing Dutch dialects. But there was never any real issue about the acceptance of the original tongue o f the burghers of the cities of the N etherlands as the national language. This in turn, facilitated easy com m unication throughout the country, and paved the way for stronger assimilatory processes than could be found in Switzerland. Secondly, Switzerland is a land-locked country, the N etherlands very much a sea-faring nation. The latter country acquired a colonial empire, and developed also other strong overseas links. At the sam e time, the N etherlands psychologically stood for a long t i m e - t o use a h ab itu al D utch m e ta p h o r - with its back against th e E u ro pean C o n tin en t (strong tra d in g -lin k s w ith the hinterland notw ithstanding). The D utch self-image was therefore relatively little influenced by the country's precarious position as a small European State at the borders of larger European powers. Switzerland, on the other hand, was acutely conscious o f its larger neighbours. The very fact that Swiss citizens spoke the languages o f three larger neighbouring S ta te s -a n d that each o f these tended to define nationality in linguistic term s - m ade it im perative to separate the concept of nationhood from any possible link with seem ingly objective “ n a tio n a l” crite ria o f language, cu ltu re, or ethnic descent.23 O f the two countries, the N etherlands became 23 It has been argued that Switzerland owes its continued political independence to the very circum stance that it was not a G erm anspeaking S tate only, but a m ultilingual political com m unity. A ccord­ ing to the historian W illiam M artin, the conquest o f Frenchspeaking parts by the original Swiss C onfederation in 1536 deter­ m ined the very existence o f a Swiss Stale: “ On ne saurait exagerer

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the more hom ogeneous, unconsciously nationalized society; Switz­ erland the m ore heterogeneous, diversified State which embraced a self-conscious “ political” definition o f n ationhood.24 D ifferences in Political C entralization. Since 1795, the N ether­ lands has been the m ore centralized political com m unity. But even before, som e vestiges o f centralization could be found in the Low C ountries. The Dutch Republic, after all, developed when medieval traditions inspired particularist societies in the sixteenth century to revolt against the Burgundians w ho seem ed destined to becom e the most successful centralizing dynasty of E urope.25 If the D utch Revolt arrested this drive tow ards centralization, som e rem nants o f it could yet be found in som e o f the curious political organs of the D utch R epublic. N otably the office o f the stadtholder (literally, the Sovereign's rem plafant) retained vestiges o f earlier centralizing practices, and provided a political base for the O range dynasty which had no counterpart in Swiss history. Tech­ nically, the stadtholders were servants o f each o f the provinces, and for long periods the city aristocracies successfully kept the O range Princes from power. But the office carried the comm and of fleet and arm y, and eventually developed even before the arrival o f the unitary State into a unifying force, com plete with court and court circle. M uch m ore than the Swiss C onfederation, the D utch Republic I'im portance de cette conquete. Elle est com parable a celle du Tessin et la depasse d e beaucoup. C e fut p our la C onfederation une nouvelle naissance. Sans qu'il soit perm is de refaire l'histoire, on peut affirm er que si la Suisse etait reslee purem ent allem ande, elle n'aurait pas pu defendre son independance contre le m ouvem ent des nationaiites m odernes qui a tendu a la creation de grands E tats sur u n e base linguistique. Au m om ent ou les Bernois o nt conquis le Pays d e V aud. ils n 'o n t peut-etre pas saisi to u te la portee nationale d e leur acte, car la diversite des langues n ’etonnait alors aucun esprit. M ais la conquete n ’en a pas m oins regenere. et peut-etre sauve, la C o n fed eration.” W illiam M artin. H istoire de la Suisse: Essai su r la Formation d 'u n e C onfederation d 'F la ts, p. 112, Lau­ sanne. 1943. as quoted by H ans K ohn, op. cit.. pp. 19-20. footnote

1.

24 F o r a discussion on the definition o f “ n atio n ” and th e political overtones in the d ebate about defining “ n atio n h o o d " older studies like those o f C. A . M acartney. N ational S ta le s and N ational M inor­ itie s (L o n d o n , 1934): R oyal In stitu te o f In te rn a tio n a l A ffairs. N a tio n a lism (L o n d o n . 1939); E. H. C a rr, N a tio n a lism a n d A fte r (L ondon, 1945): and Alfred C obban, N ational Self-determ ination (O xford, 1945). rem ain highly relevant. 25 F or a very good analysis, see B. H. M. Vlekke, T he Evolution o f the D utch N a tion (N ew York. 1945).

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was for a tim e an active participant on the international scene. Some o f the O range P rin c e s -a s well as the G rand-P ensionary of H o lla n d -w e re actively involved in high diplom atic manoeuvres. The D utch fleet, and the Dutch colonies, also m ade for a stronger international presence. This m ore active international stance hardly contributed tow ards internal consolidation. In the seven­ teenth and eighteenth centuries, activist foreign policies were set­ tled in the most narrow circles, in which the otherwise highly particularist representatives o f the Province o f Holland had a decisive voice. Typically, activism in foreign policy was more characteristic o f the loosely structured Dutch Republic than o f the nineteenth-century centralized kingdom . But the role played by the Republic in international affairs created at least a selfconscious image o f the international im portance of the N ether­ lands which later nationalist historians could exploit on behalf of nationalist mythology. Both during the days o f French supremacy, and after the defeat o f N apoleon, there was a definite revulsion against centralized structures in both countries. But whereas Switzerland reverted alm ost completely to the old ord er in 1813, the N etherlands knew its period o f strongest autocratic rule after 1815. Fears o f the older diversity caused the new kings to obtain strong powers. C ontrol over local governm ents rem ained strongly centralized, and to this day the appointm ent o f provincial governors and local m ayors rests with the central governm ent.26 Decisive powers were explicitly vested in the national governm ent. Ever since 1813, D utch political life has tended to be national in scope: constitu­ tional conflicts centered on the national institutions, and political oppositions tended to develop as contestants in one national political arena. In contrast, nineteenth- and tw entieth-century developm ents in Switzerland have been far less centralistic in nature. N ot only after 1813, but also after the form ation o f a genuine political federation in 1848, Swiss politics has rem ained a very specific com prom ise between local, regional, and national forms o f gov­ ernm ent. The Swiss G emeinde has retained many characteristics o f autonom ous polities, including lifelong adm inistrative and sen­ tim ental ties with persons bom within its boundaries. The Swiss can to n s have rem ained pow erful bod ies, w ith g re a t diversities in stru c tu re and politics. A nd even in the n atio n al in stitu tio n s, regional interests hold an im p o rta n t place. T he Swiss U pper It is ag ain illu strativ e, h o w ever, o f th e forces o f p lu ralism in the N etherlands th at these central appointees nevertheless developed into highly independent m agistrates rath er than "p refects" on behalf o f the centre.

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House (like the A merican Senate) continues to give absolute parity to cantons, large or small; the D utch E erste K a m er is also elected by the provincial councils but only after a complex weight­ ing arrangem ent m akes the vote of each councillor proportional to population. T he Swiss Executive ( Bundesrat), com posed o f only seven m em bers, preserves a careful balance between linguis­ tic and regional interests, unlike the much larger Dutch Cabinets w hich are form ed alm ost exclusively w ith an eye to th e relative strength o f political parties. Also in the election of the Lower H o u s e - a s well as the day-to-day functioning o f political p a rtie sregional forces play a much greater role in Switzerland than in the N etherlands. Being m ore im portant than D utch local govern­ m ent posts, cantonal governm ent positions provide much greater sources o f leverage for local politicians within their national par­ ties than can be found in the N etherlands. D ifferences in the Cleavage Structure. The much greater, con­ tinuing influence o f regional factors in Swiss political life has a strong influence on the degree o f politicization o f various cleav­ ages. This factor may perhaps best be illustrated in the very different m anner in which religious factors have affected the grow th of national integration. Both the N etherlands and Switzerland belong to the mixed religious belt in E urope in w hich P ro testan ts and C ath o lics live side by side. In the U nited Provinces, Calvinism becam e the established church, even though Catholics never num bered less than a third o f the Dutch population. C atholics not only lived in the conquered provinces o f Brabant and Lim burg, but also form ed large m in o ritie s-a n d locally even m ajorities - in the west­ ern parts o f the country. Switzerland did not know a national established church; the effective independence of each o f the cantons made for the developm ent of specific C atholic and spe­ cific Protestant cantons (true to the old A ugsburg form ula of cuius regio eius religio). M uch m ore so than in the N etherlands, religion was therefore tied to specific regional positions. This had great effect on later developm ents. The localization of religion in Switzerland in particular cantons exacerbated regional strife. It polarized conflict to such an extent that religious conflict led to the regional Sonderbund war in 1847.27 In the N etherlands, on the o th er hand, national unification 27 It testifies to the lasting strength o f accom m odationist practices in Switzerland th at im m ediately after the civil w ar victors and van­ quished sat together in elaborating the Swiss C onstitution o f 1848 which retained m uch o f the older regional particularism and to a large degree depoliticized religious cleavages.

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after 1795 had ensured equal rights for all religious groups throughout the State. But both the secular claims of the new State - and the widespread processes of secularization in society at large -p ro v o k ed Calvinists and C atholics to dem and autonom y for their churches and denom inational control over education. This issue m ade religion the dom inant dividing line in the form ation of m odern political parties in the latter part of the nineteenth cen­ tury. Paradoxically, religion therefore became both an integrative and a divisive force. It split mixed religious local com m unities, and built strong organizational links am ong like-m inded believers across the nation. The strong institutional build-up of Calvinist and C atholic organizations led to a strong segm entation o f the Dutch nation in separate subcultural com m unities of Calvinists, C atholics and m ore secular groups. But this new division, while splitting the country along a new dim ension, integrated and nationalized political life. The subordination o f regional to religious cleavages can be best illustrated by the.exam ple of the D utch C atholics. A bout h alf the num ber of Dutch Catholics live in the two southern provinces of Brabant and Lim burg. These provinces shared a com m on history, sim ilar patterns o f speech, and religious outlook with neighbour­ ing Belgium. Belgian Catholicism exercised a strong influence on these southern provinces, not least because a C atholic hierarchy had disappeared in the north when Calvinists captured the leader­ ship o f the D utch Revolt at the end o f the sixteenth century. U ntil very late, only weak adm inistrative links and at most ten ­ uous integrationist contacts on the level o f a narrow political elite linked Brabant and Lim burg between 1650 and 1850 with the rem ainder o f the N etherlands. These circum stances would seem to m ake Brabant and Lim burg natural candidates for secessionist' stirrings. W hy then did these not materialize? ~ T he explanation probably lies in differences in the timing of political m obilization. Brabant and Lim burg rem ained for long the least developed, most traditional part o f the N etherlands. N orthern Catholics, on the other h a n d -liv in g as distinct m inority groups in a part o f the country which m odernized earliest developed a m ore definite political consciousness than their south­ ern brethren. Sensitive to the massive Protestantism which sur­ rounded them , these C atholic m inorities dem anded a return of the R om an C atholic hierarchy, so as to secure their identity with a definite organizational base. T he resurrection o f the C atholic hierarchy in 1853- a n d later join t political action for other C ath­ olic in terests-stren g th en ed organizational links between Catholics o f all parts o f the country. T he fight on behalf o f separate C atholic interests simultaneously prom oted the integration o f Bra­ bant and Lim burg in the D utch nation.

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In both the N etherlands and in Switzerland, then, religion was an im p o rta n t cleavage line. But th e m uch g re a te r political cen ­ tralization o f the Dutch State m ade religion less a regional than a national source o f political conflict. M uch m ore so than in Switz­ erland, regional factors were subordinated to national partisan alignm ents. If in Switzerland religion was one factor in a highly diversified society, in the N etherlands the contest between Calvin­ ists, Catholics and m ore secular elem ents o f the society becam e of overriding im portance; in this process a strongly integrated, but religiously segm ented political com m unity developed. O ne can m ake this statem ent m ore general. Partly due to the much greater role o f regional factors, Swiss political culture is m ore highly fragm ented28 than D utch political culture. Factors of class, religion, language and regionalism intersect one another at num erous points. N one o f these factors has assumed dom inant im portance, and in many cases the potential for politicization of any one cleavage line has been m inim ized by rival claims o f other possible divisions. Swiss politics, too, m ight be dubbed “ the politics o f accom m odation.” 29 But accom m odationist practices are diffused am ong many m ore sites and arenas than in the N ether­ lands, where religion (and to a lesser extent class) cam e to subor­ dinate other potential cleavages as the basis on which political organizations were formed and political decisions taken.

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L D E M O C R A C Y A N D D U T C H A N D S W IS S E X P E R IE N C E In this final section, we shall raise, on the basis o f Swiss and D utch experience, som e m ore general theoretical questions. These are im portant if one seeks to generalize from the experiences of these tw o countries to w ider issues of possible models o f nationbuilding. Tw o issues deserve special attention: (a) to w hat extent is “ consociationalism ” a m atter o f free choice for political elite groups?; and (b) is the model of “ consociationalism ” restricted to nations o f sm aller size? C onsociationalism as Free Choice? In the argum ent o f Arend L ijphart10 consociational dem ocracy should be seen above all as a See especially th e th eo retical stu d y on S w itzerland by Jiirg S tein er, op. cit. 29 T his is th e well-chosen title o f A rend L ijphart's im portant study. The P olitics o f A cco m m odation: P luralism and D em ocracy in the N etherlands (Berkeley, 1968). J0T he following quotes are all from A rend L ijphart, “ Consociational D e m o c ra c y ,” W o rld P o litics. V ol. 21 (I9 6 0 ), p. 212ff. [see ab o v e, p p . 75-79].

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result o f “ d elib era te e ffo r ts to co u n tera ct th e im m o b ilizin g and unstabilizing e ffe c ts o f cu ltu ra l fr a g m e n ta tio n ,” u n d e rta k en by leaders o f rival subcultures; L ijp h art d efin es “ co nso ciatio n al dem ocracy” as “governm ent by elite cartel designed to turn a dem ocracy with a fragm ented political culture into a stable dem ocracy.” Implicit in this reasoning is the statem ent that cer­ tain political societies develop such sharp cleavages, th at only the “ deliberate joint elTort by the elites [can] stabilize the system .” L ijphart’s argum ent is directed against the writings o f a genera­ tion o f scholars who have ascribed the stability of political sys­ tems to a com bination o f a hom ogeneous political culture and a group structure in which “ cross-cutting cleavages” m ake for over­ lapping m em berships and hence for political m oderation. He attributes a vital im portance to the stance o f political elites who may turn the expected dangers o f a fragm ented political culture into a “self-denying prophecy,” by counteracting the divisive effects through conscious policies of accom m odation. He m en­ tions certain conditions which should be fulfilled for a successful consociational democracy: “ ( 1 ) . . . that the elites have the ability to acco m m o d ate th e divergent in terests and d em an d s o f th e su b ­ cultures; ( 2 ) . . . that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a comm on effort with the elites o f rival subcultures; (3) [that they have] a com m itm ent to the m aintenance o f the system and to the im provem ent o f its cohesion and stability; (4) finally . . . that the elites understand the perils o f political fragm en­ tatio n .” These are dem anding conditions; but they rem ain largely on the level of free choice on the p art o f strategic elite groups. The m ajor them e o f the earlier part o f this article has been that, in the N etherlands and Switzerland, traditions o f pluralism and political accom m odation long preceded the processes o f political m oderni­ zation. A gainst L ijphart’s views o f consociational dem ocracy as the outcom e o f a desire on the part o f elites to counteract the potential threat o f political divisions, one m ight put the reverse thesis: earlier consociational practices facilitated the peaceful tran­ sition tow ards newer forms o f pluralist political organization in these two countries. C onsociationalism , in this view, is not a response to the perils o f subcultural splits, but the prior reason why subcultural divisions never did becom e perilous. W hereas our analysis starts from a developm ental perspective o f centuries, Lijphart gives a critical analysis o f certain general sociological models that have a som ew hat static character. In doing so, Lijphart rem ains, to som e extent, hostage to som e of the m echanistic fallacies which underlie the literature on political cleavages. This body of literature often assumes, w ithout adequate political analysis, that social divisions autom atically translate

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themselves into political conflicts. Hence the search for cross­ cutting cleavages, to dam pen the explosive potential o f polarized cleavage lines. Hence also L ijphart's quest for counteracting forces on the elite level when he finds societies in which cross­ cutting cleavages seem replaced by mutually reinforcing dividing lines. Both views tend to neglect the im portant question o f what forces m ake for the politicization, or non-politicization o f dividing lines. U nder general term s like “ subcultural splits,” “segm enta­ tio n ,” “ fragm entation,” "cleavages,” all m anner o f social divi­ sions are regarded as load ed w ith p o ten tial political c o n te n t. Rarely are different cleavage lines distinguished according to their potential for politicization. T oo little attention is paid to the issue o f w hether earlier politicization o f one cleav ag ejin e may prevent th e ex ploitation o f o th er possib le cleavages. E lite cu ltu res are regarded too much as a dependent variable only: L ijphart’s elites act to counteract the perils o f “ objective” cleavages. In our view, on the other hand, the elite culture is in itself a most im portant independent variable which may go far to determ ine how cleav­ ages are handled in a political society, to what extent they become loaded with political tension, and to what degree subcul­ tural divisions are solved in a spirit o f tolerance and accom m oda­ tion, or by violence and repression. »The im portance o f these theoretical m atters for the com parative study o f nation-building processes should be obvious. The view o f elite culture as an im portant independent variable forces one to take a long developm ental perspective. Differences between exist­ ing nation-States are seen to be to a considerable extent the product of earlier forms of State form ation.31 Similarly, the future o f nation-building efforts in the new States becomes highly dependent on prior elite experiences. Prevailing ideological o u t­ looks in the new States are not favourable for consociationalist choices. O lder pluralist traditions in the new States are strong. But they are regarded generally by present-day political elites as obstacles which should be cleared away, rather than as buildingstones from which a new, pluralist nation might be constructed. Later developm ents will depend to a very large extent on choices now taken. The im portance o f stressing the various alternative roads to m odern Statehood, including the consociational one, lies in the need to destroy the widespread assum ption that B lut und Eisen is the “ norm al” path to nation-building.:: Consociationalism - A L u xu ry o f S m a ll N ations? Both the N ether­ lands and Switzerland are smaller nations. It has often been argued See the article m entioned in note 8 above. j: See H ans D aalder. "G o v ern m en t and O pposition in the New S tates." Government and Opposition. Vol. I. (1966). pp. 205-26.

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that their specific political experiences are related to that fact. A standard argum ent holds that sm aller nations can practise a certain pattern o f political life that larger States could not endure, exactly because these latter States cannot escape the international responsi­ bilities which their size forces on th e m ." A ccording to this theory, larger States carry a greater political load. They must have certain in stitu tio n s w hich allow them to act w ith sufficient decisiveness. C onsiderations o f defence necessitate a larger arm y which in turn requires a strong bureaucracy. The need to act rules out the cum ber­ som e accom m odationist styles o f Swiss o r Dutch politics; for that reason electoral systems like proportional representation or accomm odationist coalition systems on the level o f the C abinet o r chief executive are im practicable. In the particular case o f Switzerland (or the N etherlands before 1940), their stance was m oreover facilitated by the fact that the surrounding powers liked to see neutral States in charge o f strategic locations. Even if this implied neutrality by impo­ sition, it gave these countries a licence for internal tolerance and cum bersom e pluralism that larger nations could not affo rd .:4 It is not easy to assess the justification o f this body o f reason­ ing. U ndoubtedly, countries like Switzerland and the N etherlands fared better in international politics than many o f the larger States, and to the extent to which small size assisted this develop­ m ent, it helped them to m aintain the accom m odationist practices o f older times. But should one grant the argum ent that larger States must carry the burden o f international politics as distinct from actually carrying, let alone preferring to carry it? Did not the once-subject inhabitants o f Tessin consciously prefer in 1798 to join the archaic Swiss Republic rather than an incipient national State in Italy, because they preferred internal freedoms to foreign grandeur? D id not in the early nineteenth century many K leinstaaller in G erm any foresee the dangers which the developm ent o f a large new G erm an State might spell both for internal freedoms and external aggressiveness? The statem ent that smaller States carry in fact a sm aller load in international politics rem ains debatable. H andling a foreign envi­ r o n m e n t-a n d the impact of foreign influences within their boundaries - pose large problem s for small States. N o t the least of these is survival itself. If both the N etherlands and Switzerland " These views are particularly evident in the writings o f F erdinand Hermens, Carl J. Friedrich and Barrington M oore. See on this sam e point L ijphart. "C onsociational D em ocracy," p. 217; Lehm bruch. Proporzdem okraiie.pci.isim , and R okkan, op. cit.. pp. 88ff. 14 In a sim ilar vein, the g reater freedom characteristic o f the U nited Kingdom and the U nited Stales is often explained by their ability to avoid entanglem ents in large-scale land wars.

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belonged to the surviving States o f Europe, this may possibly be due in som e m easure to their ability not only to handle internal diversity, but also foreign-imposed loads.

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The m aterial in this section has been chosen to illustrate the w orking o f the social and political system s o f the fo u r "classic" e x a m p le s o f conso ciation a l d em o cra cy in W estern Europe, nam ely the Netherlands, A ustria, Belgium, a n d Sw itzerland. M ost o f these selections were written prior to the theoretical articles in Part II, and this is an advantage in the sense that they are substantially independent o f the explicit consociational model. Yet the selection has been m ade so as to illustrate m ore com pre­ hensively the broad them es already developed above, that is. the im plications o f segm ented social structure, political accom m oda­ tion at elite level, and the cultural context in which such patterns occur. For the Netherlands, J. P. K ruijt's article "T h e Influence o f D enom inationalism on Social L ife and O rganizational P atterns" 11959) is one o f the earliest sta tem en ts in English to call atten ­ tion to cumulative religious-ideological segm entation as a phe­ nomenon deserving sociological study. W hile Kruijt poses the question in general term s the bulk o f his b rie f paper gives an overview o f the structure an d dynam ics o f verzuiling in the N eth­ erlands. The passage by A ren d Lijphart. on the other hand, is concerned with the context o f conflict resolution al elite level. In this chapter drawn fr o m The Politics o f A ccom m odation (1968) he describes certain inform al but well understood norm s o f par­ liam entary behavior that have enabled m em bers o f coalition m in­ istries in the N etherlands to reach agreem ent on issues that fin d their respective parlies sharply opposed to one another. For A u stria , A lfr e d D ia m a n t's p a g es on th e three L ager are drawn fr o m his A ustrian Catholics and the First Republic (I960), a full-length study o f Catholic political thought and action between the tw o W orld Wars. Even though his topic is the First A ustrian Republic, he is describing a pattern o f classically seg­ m ented social structure that re-em erged with little change in the Second Republic despite the upheavals o f A ustrian annexation to Germany and the Second W orld War. P eter Pulzer's article, "T h e Legitim izing Role o f Political Parties" (19691. is concerned with the party system and its long-term evolution fro m the Habs­ burg Em pire to the present. In particular, his them e is the successful legitim ization in the Second Republic o f a previously strife-ridden party structure and fa lterin g dem ocratic process in spite o f form idable obstacles and a relatively unchanging social and electoral base. While elem ents o f consociationalism are not specifically em phasized in this broad study, the central role o j coalition politics in the changed political clim ate o f the Second Republic em erges clearly. Val Lorwin"s paper "C onflict and Compromise in Belgian Pol­

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itic s" was presented to the A nnual M eeting o f the Am erican Political Science Association in 1965. A lthough som e aspects o f it have been developed in his later work, it has not been published previously in its original fo rm . In this paper Lorwin touches on three m ajor them es o f Belgian politics a n d society. First, he describes the organization and development o f segm ented social structures in term s o f the three traditional families spirituelles a n d the system o f political parties that resulted fr o m this segm en­ tation around the tw in issues o f confessionality and social class. Secondly, he shows how the three m ajor political parties devel­ oped a practice o f coalition m inistries based on a politics o f continuous accom m odation a n d adjustm ent am ong the coalition partners. Finally he exam ines in som e d etail the im pact on this system o f a m ajor and persistent issue that crosscuts the tradi­ tional alignm ents o f religious-ideological verzuiling. the increas­ ingly sensitive linguistic-cultural cleavage between D utch-speaking and French-speaking Belgians. R oger G irod's " Geography o f the Sw iss P arty S y s te m " (19641 deals with the structure o f parties in the Sw iss political system and particularly with interparty cooperation at executive level. W hile Girod is particularly concerned to identify variations in the system by region and level o f governm ent. the non-Sw iss observer m ay be m ore im pressed by the sim ilarities o f executive com posi­ tion and behavior am ong regions o f widely different social struc­ ture and political representation. This is especially noticeable concerning the norm s o f interparty representation a n d coopera­ tion on executive councils at all three levels o f government. The politics o f interparty " com prom ise on a perm anent basis" has spread even to cantons and com m unes where a single party dom inates the legislature. G irod m akes it d e a r that the m ulti­ p a rty executive is a relatively recent development in Sw itzerland, but it is now sufficiently widespread to be considered an integral part o f the political culture.

T H E N E T H E R L A N D S : T H E IN F L U E N C E O F D E N O M I N A T IO N A L IS M O N S O C IA L L IF E A N D O R G A N IZ A T IO N A L P A T T E R N S J. P. Kruijt Source: J. P. K ruijt, “ T he Influence o f D cnom inationalism on Social Life and O rganizational P atterns.” A rchives de Sociologie des R eligions (Paris: E ditions du C.N.R.S.), Vol. 4, no. 8 (1959). 105-111. R eprinted by perm ission o f the C entre N ational de la Recherche Scientifique an d the author.

In the W estern world there are many nations with tw o o r more C hristian denom inations, for exam ple the C atholic C hurch and som e Protestant denom inations (G erm any, Switzerland, England, Scotland, U .S .A ., the N etherlands, etc.). A variation, as in the case o f France, Italy, o r Belgium, is that o f a majority o f Rom an Catholics, only a small percentage o f Protestants, but with a great num ber o f persons w ho are only nom inal Catholics and in fact religiously indifferent o r even antagonistic to the R om an C atholic C hurch. In both categories we find varying degrees o f religious tension: between Rom an C atholics and Protestants, between m ore orthodox and m ore m odernistic Protestants, between High C h u rch and n o n -co n fo rm ists, betw een churches a n d sects, between C hristians and non-C hristians. N ow the general problem I address, and which I shall illumi­ nate for my own country, the N etherlands, is this: what are the influences o f those religious tensions on all the other areas of social life, especially on the cooperation o r non-cooperation of individuals and groups of different denom inations in economic, social, political, educational, cultural, scientific, and artistic organ­ izations o r activities, in fam ily life, cliques, n e ig h b o u rh o o d or clubs, in schools, factories, offices and the arm y, etc.? T heoretically there are two extrem e possibilities: 1) no co rrelatio n betw een church m em b ersh ip (o r n o n ­ m em bership) and the selection, in term s o f religion, of persons and groups with which one is participating o r cooperating in all the other a b o v e-m en tio n ed activities and o rg an iza tio n s. T his w ould m ean that each organization, if large enough, is a representative sam ple of the whole population, or of th at p art o f the population which may be expected to perform the particular activities of that organization o r to be interested in it. 2) a com plete correlation, which would mean that all activities are perform ed by (or all organizations have a m em bership consisting of) persons with the sam e denom ination or belonging to the sam e group o f congenial denom inations, having the sam e o r related religious (or non-religious) philosophies o r ideologies.

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These two extrem e possibilities have never been realized in our m odern Western world, and will probably never be realized, at least not on a national level. We might call them tw o extreme ideal types. However, between those two extrem es lies the possi­ bility o f —an d in fact exists —a w hole scale o f descending or ascending degrees o f correlations as stated above. Some countries in the W estern world have a situation not far from the first ideal type, others are not far from the second, and the rem aining countries lie m ore o r less midway between. It is not my intention to give a detailed international com pari­ son. however im portant this may be. Let me only give som e examples. In my opinion, the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries are not far from the first ideal type, th at is, w ith som e but not many correlations, though in recent times som e authors have seen several sym ptom s that in the U nited States the distance from that point o f com parison is increasing.1 On the other hand" my own country, the N etherlands, lies rather close to the second ideal type, or at least a t the shortest distance from this point as com pared with oth er W estern countries, with perhaps Belgium coming next after the N etherlands. I think this is a very im portant theological, ecclesiastical and political problem . H ere we are especially interested in the sociol­ ogical aspects. ,Now, in giving my survey o f the Dutch situation, I h ope to stim u late sim ilar sk etch es o f th e situ a tio n in o th e r countries in this respect and perhaps, to anim ate other sociolo­ gists (and theologians!) to do the sam e. Only then will it be possible to give a m ore exact com parison and - what is still m ore im portant - to try to find a socio-historical explanation o f why the W estern countries differ so much in this respect. First, som e rem arks about our term inology. W hat is the best nam e for this phenom enon in its different degrees? T he situation not far from the second ideal type might be typified as religiousideological segregation: there is a preference for participating in all activities with persons o f the sam e ideology, there is isolation from and discrim ination o f other persons and groups. T he conse­ quence is the developm ent within the sam e nation o f tw o or more complex sets o f organizations and activities, tw o or m ore com pet­ ing blocs, each based on and bound together by a particular philosophy. It is no accident that the only language which has a nam e for 1 D avid O . M oberg (Bethel College. St. Paul. M innesota), "R eligion an d society in the N etherlands an d in A m erica,” unpublished paper. 1959 [later published in A m erican Q uarterly, 13 (1961). 172-178. and reprinted in S o cial Com pass, 9 (1962). 11-19 ed.]: Will Herberg. P rotestant. Catholic. J e w (N ew Y ork, 1955).

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such a bloc is the Dutch language. In o u r country we call such a bloc a zuil. G erm an friends will understand the word: eine Sa u le, that is, a pillar, a colum n (in French: un p ilier, une eolonne).The word pillar is a rather apt m etaphor. A pillar o r colum n is a thing apart, resting on its own base (in our case a particular religious or non-religious faith) separated from other pillars, which are units sim ilar to the first; they are standing upright, perpendicular sets o f persons and groups separated from other sets. Perpendicular means that each pillar is cutting vertically th e h o rizo n tal so cio ­ econom ic strata which we call social classes. F o r a pillar is not a social class: it contains persons out o f every social class or stratifi­ cation. W e might say that the “ horizontal functional integration" is crossed by th e “ vertical ideological in te g ra tio n .” F u rth e r, a pillar is solid: the ideological pillars of the Dutch nation are indeed strong super-organizations, and the R om an C atholic pillar is the strongest, the most solid o f all. Finally, all the pillars together generally serve as a support to som ething resting on the top; in our case, th at som ething is the whole Dutch nation. At least, th at is what is signified by this w ord pillar. However, w hether the whole D utch nation is stronger through this “ pillarization” 2 than if it were sustained by one mighty pillar rem ains a problem which has to be resolved not by an architect, but by sociologists, psychologists, historians, political scientists and theologians. For those religious-ideological pillars are also pressure groups, and while pressure groups may be a necess­ ity in a modern pluralistic dem ocratic society, as such they may be m ore dysfunctional than eu fu n ctio n al for th e w hole n atio n . W e can now understand why Fogarty3 uses the term “ vertical pluralism ” for this Dutch phenom enon. But we know th at the presence of several ethnic groups besides the Yankees in the A m erican population is also a form o f vertical pluralism and therefore 1 m ake the term m ore specific by speaking of “ vertical ide­ ological pluralism .” A nd now we must give a m ore detailed and concrete sketch o f the D utch situation. Several authors say th at the roots go back to the R eform ation. Indeed, since that tim e we have had (somewhat simplified) two religious blocs: the Calvinist “ Reform ed C hurch,” a State C hurch, at least sustained and privileged by the State, and a rather num erous m inority o f barely tolerated Rom an Catholics. From the beginning the Protestant world had two wings, one m ore liberal-minded and undogm atic, the other the m ore aggres: T his word is from D avid M oberg (see note I). A French word m ight be colonnisation (with tw o n's\). •’ M ichael P. F ogarty. Christian D em ocracy in W estern Europe, 1820-1953 (L o n d o n , 1957).

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sive dogm atic Calvinists and am ong them many diehards. At the beginning of the 17th century cam e a schism; the less dogm atic ministers were driven out o f the State Church and formed a new nonconform ist church, still existing, the “ R em onstrants.” The 19th century brought a new separation: the most orthodox m em ­ bers o f the Dutch Reform ed C hurch - no longer a State Church but still the “ national church” - resigned their m em bership and form ed new gro u p s w hich later on w ere for th e g re a te r p art united by the fam ous Dr. A braham K uyper in a new and very active Neo-Calvinist Free C hurch, “ the Reform ed C hurches.” So the form er State Church lost many active m em bers on its right wing, m odernistic-m inded m em bers on its left wing, and m ore­ over, since the last decades of the 19th century, hundreds of thousands o f people who gradually went over to the unorganized arm y o f people w ithout any church. In the m eantim e the Rom an C atholic Church restored its hierarchy and began to grow in influence, and in our century also in m em bership through a h ig her b irth ra te . T he result was th a t, acco rd in g to th e census of 1947,4 the Rom an C atholic Church was, with m ore than 38 p ercen t o f the population, the largest church, the D utch Reform ed Church was still the largest Protestant C hurch but had only 31 per cent of the population, the N eo-Calvinist Free Church had, together with som e smaller related groups, ab o u t 10 per cent, a great num ber of sm aller churches and sects abo u t 4 per cent, while 17 per cent o f the population had no religious m em bership at all. We know that the religious situation in the U nited States is about the sam e, although with different percentages: a strong and grow ing m inority o f R om an Catholics, many Protestant Churches and sects with a whole scale o f theologies from fundam entalism to m odernism , and a num erous group o f unchurched. Hence it will be clear that this kind o f frequency distribution cannot by itself explain the high degree o f pillarization o f the D utch people. W ithout attem pting a total explanation I shall m ention here som e significant points: 1) The adherents of the N eo-C alvinist m ovem ent were in general “ little people” with a low social status. A m ong the R om an Catholics were som e well-do-do families, but the majority also had a low status. Both groups were second-class citizens and th e ir religious struggle was also a struggle for e m an c ip atio n , which gave a strong stim ulus for very close cooperation with people o f the sam e creed. ‘ |B y the 1971 census th e religious distribution was as follows: Rom an Catholics, 39.5 p er cent: D utch R eform ed. 23 per cent: Neo-Calvinists and related groups. 10 per cent: o ther sm aller churches and sects, 5 per cent: no religious m em bership, 22.5 per c en l.|

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2) In the first half of the 19th century o u r country had a public school system. The R om an Catholics as well as a p art of the orthodox Protestants w anted to have their own religious schools. C atholic schools or “ schools with the Bible" respectively. On the side o f the N eo-Calvinists this was prom oted by A braham K uyper’s theological doctrine of the so-called “sphere sover­ eignty” : family, state, church, school, and society each ought to have a certain autonom y, however all dom inated by G o d 's sover­ eignty. The R om an C atholic principle o f subsidiarity goes, m utatis m utandis, in a sim ilar direction. Therefore the controversy betw een the adherents o f the public school and those of the religious school became, in the second half o f the 19th century, one o f the principal and very em otional topics o f Dutch political life. 3) T o get m ore possibilities for their religious schools, the Neo-Calvinists and the R om an Catholics each founded a political party, the A nti-R evolutionary party and the R om an C atholic party. From 1888 till 1938 Protestant and R om an C atholic politi­ cal parties cooperated in a so-called “ C hristian" coalition and in most elections won a m ajority varying between 51 and 55 per cent o f the votes. For most o f these 50 years this “ C hristian coalition” had the political pow er in the national governm ent: the “ C hristian" or “ right” parties were in governm ent, the “ left” or “ non-C hristian” parties in the opposition. 4) Especially in the view o f the N eo-Calvinists, this was the principal line o f separation: the antithesis between the “ C hris­ tians” (i.e., adherents o f these “ C hristian" political parties) at the right, and the “ paganists," pagans, non-C hristians, at the left. As a m atter o f fact there were and are, am ong voters and representa­ tives of the left, many Christians, most m odernists, and increas­ ingly after the Second W orld W ar many orthodox Protestants and even som e R om an Catholics. This m eans th at the antithetical separation between right and left never coincided with the reli­ gious dividing line between C hristians and non-C hristians, and in recent times even less than before 1940. 5) T he em otional school struggle cam e to an end with a kind o f arm istice, the Pacification of 191^. This provided a way out w hich is really un iq u e in th e W estern w orld: a to ta l financial equality between public education and free (that is, mostly reli­ gious) education, since 1920 for the prim ary schools, and g rad­ ually in later years also for the secondary and higher schools, even for all kinds o f technical schools! A bout 62 per cent of the p aren ts are now sending th e ir child ren to the religious p rim ary school and only 38 per cent to the public prim ary school. In the elections o f 1959. 52 per cent voted for the Rom an C atholic

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Party and the four Protestant parties. That m eans that the degree of “ pillarization” for the prim ary school is higher than that for the political parties. 6) I called this pacification an “ arm istice.” In fact it was not a real peace. T h e g reat p u rp o se for the p a rtie s o f th e right was e q u alizatio n for th eir religious schools. T hey had a tta in e d this result in 1917 and we might expect a reduction o f the tension between right and left after 1917. However, even during the em otional school struggle before 1917, and with the background of belief in a total antithesis betw een right and left, the adherents of the right had already turned to other controversial topics and they continued this work after 1917. The result is that nowadays the num ber o f “confessional" (either R om an C atholic o r o rth o ­ dox P ro testan t) o rg an izatio n s, clubs, fo u n d atio n s, societies, unions, institutes, etc. is m ultitudinous. I shall now try to give you an idea o f the extent o f the Dutch pillarization. The two groups have not only their own schools, their own political parties, their own press, but also in general: - t h e ir own trade unions, farm ers' unions, em ployers’ unions, shopkeepers’ unions, co-operatives, agricultural loan banks; - t h e ir own institutes for social research and societies for physicians, for lawyers, for teachers, for social w orkers, for scientists, for employees, for artists, for musicians, for authors; - their own music bands, choral societies, sport clubs, theatre clubs, travellers’ clubs, dance clubs, clubs for adult educa­ tion, “ public” libraries, broadcasting: - t h e ir own youth organizations, w om en’s clubs, student clubs, fraternities, and sororities; - t h e i r own hospitals, sanatorium s, organizations for all kinds o f social work and charitable w ork, etc. I stop w ithout even trying to be com plete. In addition I have to m ention that the frequency o f religiously mixed m arriages is rath er low: 10 per cent for the R om an Catholics, 25 per cent for the Neo-Calvinists. And finally, in selecting employees (especially for sm aller enterprises) or in choosing a dealer, many people have a preference for persons o f their own pillar. So. from all those thousands o f organizations, clubs, etc. there are. for each activity, at least three associations: one Rom an C atholic organization; one Protestant organization (sometimes m ore than one: an orthodox and a m odernist Protestant organiza­ tion, or a Neo-Calvinist organization and one for m em bers of the D utch R eform ed C hurch); and th en , o f co u rse, o n e “ g e n e ra l"

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organization, that is, an organization which adm its members irrespective of their creed, but which in fact has only m em bers who oppose the principle o f total antithesis. Usually they are called neutral organizations, and in that sense they form together a third pillar, the neutral pillar. But these organizations them ­ selves say that they do not want to form a pillar, they are general, they are open to all people. W e may distinguish three kinds of such "general” organizations: a) those which have a majority of unchurched people and are in fact not neutral, e.g., they arrange meetings on Sunday morning; b) those which strive for a passive, negative neutrality, that is, they try to avoid all things which may offend religious feelings: c) those which strive for a positive attitude tow ards the religious pluralism, that is, they not only recognize the diversity o f creeds of their m em bers, but also stim ulate them to work in the organization and for the com m on purpose o f that organization on the foundation o f their own creed, and try therefore to form ulate the principles of the organization in accordance with that religious plural­ ism. W hereas before the Second W orld W ar the first two types were d om inant, after that w ar the third has been winning ground. This opens the possibility for a future de-pillarization. Meanwhile the whole structure is still strongly pillarized. This is prom oted by governm ent subsidies, just the sam e as in the case o f th e school system . Every tim e th a t an activ ity (social w ork, adult education, sport, libraries, youth w ork, etc.) is subsidized, the money is "honestly.” that is. proportionally, divided: so much for the Rom an Catholics, so much for the orthodox Protestants, and so much for the third pillar, the general o r “ n eutral" organi­ zations. If this system were com plete, and wholly closed, there would be three totally closed sub-cultures, sub-nations in the N etherlands. T herefore I must stress the fact that the system is not com plete, not wholly closed, that it is very complex and in continuous m ovem ent. The system has developed in a highly urbanized and industrialized society. Therefore som e villages, only recently taken up in m odern traffic, still have som e traits o f what a Dutch sociologist called the “ folk oecum ene,” that is, the territorial ties with neighbours are stronger than the religious differences. But even there the pillar integration grows to the sam e degree th at the territorial ties become looser. This explains why, during the last

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century, the whole pillar system became stronger and stronger. It was a kind o f counter-offensive o f som e churches to protect their mem bers against the secularizing effects o f modern society; it increased the social control o f church m em bers by prom oting group exclusiveness, exclusiveness o f the religious ingroup. O n the other hand it seems that the whole system, although structurally very strong, has already reached o r passed its culm i­ nating point. It still perform s favourable functions for the Rom an C atholic and N eo-Calvinist churches in term s o f enculturation, but for the whole nation it w orks rather dysfunctionally. In gen­ eral people belonging to different pillars do not really meet, and that m eans they do not really know each other. This is a situation in which very peculiar stereotypes about the persons in the other pillars may develop and spread. A nd even for the churches th em ­ selves the system may be dysfunctional. The material interests of a pillar may be identified with the spiritual interests o f the church. The R om an C atholic Church in particular, and the N eo-Calvinist Church too, are accustom ed, m ore than in other dem ocratic countries, not only to give advice on som e worldly affairs (elections, m em bership o f trade-unions), but even to impose sanctions in this respect. The most recent example is a Letter from the R om an C atholic Bishops in 1954, in which they declared: “ W e m aintain the rule th at the Holy Sacram ents must be r e f u s e d - a n d , in case o f d ea th w ith o u t c o n v ersio n , th e eccle­ siastical funeral a l s o - t o any C atholic who is known to be a m em ber o f a Socialist association, or w ho, w ithout being a mem­ ber, still regularly attends Socialist meetings, or is a regular reader o f Socialist periodicals or papers.” A nd this has been written in a country in which the Socialist Party shows perhaps the greatest distant e o f any in Europe from form er M arxian attitudes tow ards religio 1 and church. M em bership in the Socialist Party itself was strong y discouraged by the R om an C atholic C hurch, which how­ ever did not formally ban it. A few hundred R om an Catholics, mostly intellectuals, were m em bers o f this Party and rem ained in it after the publication o f the Letter. The public reaction was exceptionally strong. It was a declaration o f w ar from the Rom an C atholic Church against the idea o f breaking through the antith­ etical lines o f dem arcation set up by the Neo-Calvinists and their C atholic allies. The principal vehicles o f this “ break-through” idea are, on the theological and ecclesiastical side, the “ Dutch Reform ed C hurch,” the form er State C hurch, whose members are partly influenced by the doctrine o f Karl Barth, and, on the political side, the already m entioned socialist L abour Party. It is sym ptom atic that the Dutch Reform ed Church published a Pro­ testant Pastoral L etter in which this pressure on the consciences of the Episcopal Letter is rejected, but that the A nti-Revolutionary

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Party, the most m ilitant Protestant political party, heartily agreed with it. However, there are also other opinions am ong the NeoCalvinists; D r. Schippers, Professor at the N eo-C alvinist “ Free U niversity” in A m sterdam , declared that “ the way in which the Bishops direct the consciences o f their church m em bers is not acceptable to C hristians of the R eform ation". It is clear that the Dutch nation is now in a period o f heavy crisis in this respect. This period may last several years. The struggle goes on. In my opinion it is not probable that it will end in a com plete pillarization. M ore probable is a gradual depillarization, especially in those fields which are most rem ote from the essence o f religion (sport, recreation, econom ic life). But we know that R om an C atholic ideas ab o u t the separation between Church and State, and between Church and public life, are different from those o f Churches o f the R eform ation. A nd we have seen that in several aspects the N eo-Calvinists in the N etherlands cam e very near to R om an C atholic ideas. It is also sym ptom atic th at these N eo-Calvinistic Churches are not m em bers o f the W orld Council o f C hurches. The result o f the struggle will be very im portant for the D utch n a tio n - b u t also very interesting for other W estern countries which have hitherto had a sm aller degree o f pillarization and which may learn from the D utch example.

TH E N ETH ERLA N D S: TH E RULES O F TH E G A M E A rend Lijphart Source: A. L ijphart, T h e P o litics o f A ccom m odation: P luralism and D em o cra cy in th e N e th e rla n d s (B erkeley an d L os A n g eles, 1968), C h ap ter 7, “ T he Rules o f the G am e,” 122-138. Originally published by th e University o f C alifornia Press; reprinted by perm ission o f T he R egents o f the University o f C alifornia and the au th o r.

The politics o f accom m odation places heavy burdens on the polit­ ical leaders. Successful policym aking and settlem ent o f divisive issues under the adverse conditions o f a minimally consensual milieu requires a clear recognition o f the perennial disintegrative tendencies in the system and the capability to take either preven­ tive or remedial action. In the N etherlands, the process o f accom ­ m odation is greatly facilitated by the existence o f a num ber o f rules that govern the “gam e” o f accom m odation. These rules are not part o f a com prehensive national consensus; they apply mainly to the political elite. O r, to follow the terminology o f political culture analysis, the rules o f the gam e are a part o f the “ role culture” developed by and instilled, in the elite, and not o f the mass culture.1 F urtherm ore, they consist of a m ixture o f procedural rules and general orientations tow ard politics, and do not have much substantive content. It must be emphasized that the seven rules specified below are unw ritten, inform al, and implicit. N o convenient book o f rules exists; they have to be inferred from the actions o f the leaders especially under conditions of political tension.2

R U L E i: T H E B U SIN ESS O F P O L IT IC S The first and foremost rule o f the D utch political gam e is that politics should not be regarded as a gam e at all. It is, to borrow von Clausewitz’s phrase, “ a serious means to a serious en d .” Or, to put it even m ore succinctly, it is a business. This attitude is in accord with H olland’s long tradition as a m erchant nation and with the crucial political role the m erchant middle classes have played in Dutch history. This attitude tow ard politics has a 1 See G abriel A . A lm ond and Sidney V erba, T he Civic Culture: P olitical A ttitu d es a n d D em ocracy in Five N ations (Princeton: P rin­ ceton U niversity Press. 1963). pp. 29-31. T hese rules o f the gam e differ in the sam e way from what T rum an calls the "rules o f the g a m e " (i.e. th e “ general ideological consensus"): see A rend L ijphart. The Politics o f A ccom m odation, pp. 13-14. 2 H ans D aalder has d one the m ost significant pioneering w ork in calling attention to these rules. Sec especially his L ei ding en lijdelijkheid in d e N ederlandse p o litick (Assen: Van G orcum . 1964).

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pervasive and highly beneficial influence on dem ocratic stability. H ans D aalder calls it the “ businesslike determ ination that the jo b should not be allow ed to su ffer” ; an d A lan D . R obinson refers to the “ attitude that doctrinal disputes should not stand in the way o f getting the w ork d o n e .” ' The political elite is oriented tow ard results. In this respect. Dutch politics is sharply different from what N athan Leites has called the “gam e o f politics in F rance” with its tactics o f delay, equivocation, and avoidance of responsibility, regardless of the consequences for the nation.4 W ithout this result-oriented attitude, Dutch politics would look quite different. N either the great political settlem ent o f 1917 nor the continuing pattern o f accom m odation since then would have been possible w ithout it. It is the axiom underlying all other “ rules o f the political business.”

R U L E II: T H E A G R E E M E N T T O D IS A G R E E Probably the second most im portant rule th at governs the Dutch political business is the pragm atic acceptance o f the ideological differences as basic realities which cannot and should not be changed. The fundam ental convictions o f other blocs must be tolerated if not respected. Disagreem ents must not be allowed to turn into either mutual contem pt o r proselytizing zeal. In the policy-m aking process, a pure and consistent application o f this rule would lead to paralysis. Decisions on controversial m atters have to be m ade, and continuous inaction would have disastrous consequences. In its pure form, therefore, the rule is only applied to questions not requiring im m ediate answers. An excellent illustration is the cabinet crisis o f 1951. The four-party coalition cabinet, based on all m ajor parties except the AntiRevolutionaries, fell apart on the highly em otional issue o f colo­ nial policy. In the negotiations to end the crisis, it was clear that the realities of both the international situation and the dom estic constellation of opinion would not perm it any m ajor change of policy. The four parties were thus able to mend their differences by simply agreeing to disagree on the colonial question because it had no direct policy consequences. The new cabinet was a virtual carbon copy of its predecessor, and could be formed only because o f the conviction that the widely divergent and deeply felt dis3 H. D aalder, “ Parties and Politics in the N etherlands," Political Studies. Vol. 3, N o. I (F ebruary 1955), p. 16; Alan D. R obinson. D utch O rganised A griculture in International P olitics (T he H ague. Nijhoff. 1961), p. 37. See also D aalder, "P o litick in Nederlands k ad er.” in M ensen en m achten (U trecht: Spectrum . 1965). pp. 117-118. 4 N athan Leites, On the G am e o f Politics in France (Stanford: Stan­ ford U niversity Press. 1959). passim .

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agreem ents over colonial policy should not stand in the way of fruitful cooperation on m ore pressing questions. This policy, or ra th e r nonpolicy, was ap p ro p ria tely referred to as th e “ icebox policy.” 5 Here the agreem ent to disagree allowed a vexatious issue to be tem porarily frozen. Such perfect conditions for the pure and simple application o f the agreem ent-to-disagree rule are rare, o f course. M ost issues do require som e kind of substantive decision. A n attem pt is then m ade to involve all blocs in finding a fair com prom ise. O r, if a com prom ise acceptable to all blocs cannot be reached because o f ideological opposition by one o r m ore blocs, the o th er groups will go to great lengths in trying to avoid antagonizing their opp o ­ nents. Decisions are not m ade by a majority simply outvoting a m inority. F or instance, when a cabinet proposal to institute a football pool was debated in parliam ent in 1960 and again in 1964, th e C alvinists, and especially th e o rth o d o x A n tiR evolutionary party, were fundam entally opposed on religious grounds - not allowing any pragm atic com prom ise. On the other hand, a large majority were in favor and had the votes to pass the bill over Calvinist opposition. But this was not done. T he m ajor­ ity parties m ade a num ber o f c o n c e ssio n s-lik e limiting the am ount an individual could wager and instituting a relatively low m axim um for the highest prize to be won - not so much in order to fashion a majority to pass the bill, but mainly to placate the m inority. This also m ade it possible for the A nti-R evolutionaries to rem ain in the cabinet. In this form, the agreem ent-to-disagree rule comes close to C alhoun’s doctrine o f concurrent majority. On issues considered vital by any bloc, no decision can be m ade w ithout either their concurrence or at least substantial concessions to them . The veto pow er is not absolute. N o single group can block action com ­ pletely, but its wishes will be considered seriously and accom m o­ dated as much as possible by the others. In short, the rule is m ajoritarianism tem pered by the spirit o f concurrent majority.

RU LE

h i: s u m m it d ip l o m a c y

The politics o f accom m odation entails governm ent by the elite. The leaders o f the religious-ideological blocs have the duty to m ake the political decisions and to work o u t com prom ises. This pattern has become increasingly m ore institutionalized, as was discussed in the previous chapter.6 5 See A rend L ijphart, The Traum a o f D ecolonization: The D utch and W est N ew Guinea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 164-177. 6 The Politics o f A ccom m odation, pp. 112-115.

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T he m ore serious the political question that is at stake, the higher will be the elite level at which it will be resolved. This m eans that the crucial issues have to be handled at the sum m it. The problem s o f state aid to religious schools and o f extending the suffrage were solved by sum m it conferences of the to p leaders o f all m ajor parties. This culm inated in the peaceful settlem ent of 1917.7 Sum m it diplomacy was resorted to again in later crises. W hen the G erm ans occupied Holland in M ay 1940, the cabinet went into exile and parliam ent disbanded. But the political lead­ ers rem aining in the N etherlands decided immediately on the necessity o f close co o p e ra tio n . A n inform al su m m it conference was established which consisted o f twelve persons: the two highest leaders o f each o f the six m ajor parties (Catholics, Social D em o­ crats, A nti-R evolutionaries, C hristian Historical U nion, and the tw o Liberal parties in existence at that tim e). This im portant group, which eventually received the unpretentious nam e o f “ Pol­ itical C ouncil" (P olitiek Convent I, met for the first tim e on July 1, 1940, and continued to be active in one form o r another during the entire w ar period in spite o f growing Nazi persecu­ tio n .8 A nother example was the group referred to in popular parlance as th e “ Irene Q u a rte t.” Its task was to resolve th e crisis over Princess Irene’s conversion and m arriage in 1964. It consisted o f four cabinet ministers: Prime M inister V. G . M. M arijnen, his secon d -in -co m m an d B. W . B iesheuvel, M in ister o f Internal Affairs E. H. Toxopeus, and M inister of Justice Y. Scholten. These four were chosen ostensibly on the grounds that the issue involved their special jurisdictions as ministers. But it was no accident that they also belonged to the four different parties represented in the cabinet. T he only gap in this sum m it arrange­ m ent was the absence of a L abor party leader from the tem porary supercabinet. A Laborite was not included because the party was in the opposition from 1958 to 1965, but the Irene Q uartet was informally in close touch with the Labor party leadership, too. A som ew hat sim ilar arrangem ent is the so-called “ Seniors’ A ssem bly” (S en iorenco n ven t) in the Second C h am b er o f the S tates-G en eral. It is a five-m an co m m ittee m ade up o f th e p a r­ liam entary chairm en o f th e five m ajo r p artie s. It has no form al 1 Ibid.. pp. 109-112. * W . D rees. "1940-1945: Het Politiek C o n v e n t." in P. J. B oum an, et al., eds., 150 Ja a r K oninkrijk der Nederlanden (A m sterdam : De Bussy. 1963), pp . 232-239. See also W erner W arm brunn, The Dutch under Germ an Occupation: 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford U niver­ sity Press, 1963). pp . 216-218.

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status, and it operates only interm ittently.9 But it assumes great political significance at times o f actual or threatening crises and deadlocks in the cham ber.

R U L E iv: P R O P O R T IO N A L IT Y The rule o f proportionality is a simple procedural device capable o f solving a host o f troublesom e problem s. The most im portant of these is the allocation o f the necessarily scarce financial resources at the governm ent’s disposal. T he peaceful settlem ent o f the schools issue in 1917 set the pattern: all schools, private as well as public, w ould receive govern m en t funds in p ro p o rtio n to the num ber o f students enrolled. The sam e rule is applied in the allocation o f governm ental assistance to hospitals and other wel­ fare functions. It does not solve the problem o f deciding the kinds o f projects the governm ent should finance: for example, should m ore m oney be spent on seco n d ary ed u catio n o r on hospital expansion or on land reclam ation? But once this decision is m ade, it does solve the problem of allocation am ong the blocs, which is politically the most sensitive one. H ans D aalder puts it this way: “ the essence o f political action has shifted from strife to distribu­ tio n ” with the governm ent’s task limited to “ the allocation of subsidies according to objective criteria.” 10 Proportionality applies to other areas as well. N etw ork tim e on the state-ow ned radio and television stations is allocated to the bloc organizations that arrange virtually all program s, roughly in proportion to their m em berships. A ppointm ents to public office are on the basis o f a rough proportionality. The alm ost one th o u san d b urgom asters and th e eleven p ro v in cial g o v ern o rs are appointed with the idea of approxim ate proportionality in m ind. The com position o f the national civil service in The H ague is patterned after the relative strengths o f the blocs in the population as a whole, although the C atholics are still slightly underrepre­ sen ted ." It is significant, how ever, that the Catholics invariably base their protests against this bias on the grounds o f injustice defined as lack o f proportionality. Such an argum ent is most persu asive and is b o und to w in ev entually. In the local civil services, proportionality is also the rule. G adourek reports the E. van Raalte. H e t Nederlandse Parlem enr (T he Hague: S taatsdrukk erij-en U itgeverijbedrijf, 1958). p. 155. 10 D aalder, L eiding en lijd elijkheid in de N ederlandse poliiiek. p. 24 See also S. W . C ouw enberg, “ N ederland m eer een corporatieve dan parlem entaire d em o cratic." O o st-W est, Vol. 3., N o. 7 (O ctober 1964). p .228. 11 The Politics o f A ccom m odation, pp. 90-92.

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form ula, based on both the num ber of civil servants belonging to each bloc and their salaries, used by the town council in the small tow n o f Sassenheim: T he total am ount of money for the salaries o f the personnel is divided am ong them roughly in the sam e way as the electorate is divided into various political (virtually religious) factions. T hus, for instance, if about one half of the popula­ tion is R om an Catholic, the money which is paid to the R om an C atholic clerks at the village-hall will am ount to about one half o f th e total sum . Hirings are governed by the sam e rule. As there are no sudden changes in the political com position o f the electorate, elections do not disturb this system .12 T he rule o f proportionality is o f fundam ental im portance to the success o f the politics o f accom m odation in H olland. The estab­ lishment o f the accom m odation pattern o f politics by the peaceful settlem ent o f 1917 was intim ately related to this rule: both the suffrage and the schools questions were settled on the basis of proportionality. The rule has been faithfully adhered to ever since.

R U L E v: DE P O L IT IC IZ A T IO N Proportionality is one m ethod for the neutralization o f potentially divisive political disputes. But it can be applied only when there are valued items like appointm ents, subsidies, or broadcast hours to be d istrib u te d . A different m ethod o f n eu tralizin g sensitive issues and justifying com prom ises to the rank and file, especially in p o stw ar politics, has been th e use o f co m p licated econom ic argum ents and the juggling o f econom ic facts and figures incom ­ prehensible to most people. A nother frequent tool of depoliticization is the resort to legal and constitutional principles. T he handling o f the crisis over Princess Irene’s conversion and m arriage can again serve as an example. The issue was most embarrassing: should a C atholic be allow ed to ascend th e D utch th ro n e? A positive answ er would deeply offend especially the m ore orthodox Calvinists, and a negative answ er would be an insult to the Catholics. If the issue had been limited to Irene’s conversion to Catholicism, the agreem ent-to-disagree rule could have been followed: the governm ent could have argued that the constitution did not b ar Catholics from succession to the throne, but that Irene was not first in the I. G ad o u rek , A Dutch C om m unity: Social and Cultural Structure a n d Process in a Bulb-Growing Region in the N etherlands (2nd ed.. G roningen: W olters, 1961), p. 62.

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line o f succession and that hence th e issue was purely hypotheti­ cal. Thus the dilem m a could perhaps have been avoided alto ­ gether, and at least postponed. But the question was m ore diffi­ cult: a definite decision on Irene’s right o f succession was abso­ lutely necessary, because of the constitutional provision that royal m arriages require parliam entary approval. Irene was engaged to a Spanish noblem an. W ithout parliam entary approval, she and her descendants would be excluded from the right o f succession. Coincidentally, Irene’s fiance was involved in Spanish politics. T he possibility o f a future prince consort being em broiled in politics, and even m ore seriously, in the politics of a foreign country, definitely conflicted with an im portant unw ritten rule in the D utch constitution: the m onarch and the royal family must stay out o f politics. This was the main argum ent on which the cabinet based its decision not to propose parliam entary consent to the marriage. Thus the most troublesom e is su e -w h ic h concerned the m onarch's religion and which was therefore a potential strain on interbloc peaceful coexistence - could be avoided. If a decision on a C atholic princess’ right to become the D utch queen would have been inescapable, the governm ent and parliam ent would undoubtedly have supported this r i g h t- t h e Catholic, Socialist, a n d L iberal leaders w ho le-h earted ly , and th e leaders o f th e tw o main Protestant parties perhaps m ore reluctantly. But such a decision was not necessary, because the issue could be form ulated in less em barrassing and. therefore, politically m ore acceptable term s. It was deliberately neutralized by the skillful resort to a generally approved constitutional principle. RULE

V I:

SECRECY

Successful accom m odation by the bloc leaders requires a high' degree o f flexibility. They have to be able to m ake concessions and to arrive at pragm atic com prom ises even when religious or ideological values are at stake. T he process o f accom m odation must, therefore, be shielded from publicity. The leaders’ moves in negotiations am ong the blocs must be carefully insulated from the knowledge o f the rank and file. Because an “ inform ation g ap ” is desirable, secrecy is a most im portant rule. In this respect, the politics o f accom m odation again resembles international politics. W oodrow W ilson’s prescriptions o f “ open covenants o f peace, openly arrived a t” and a “ diplom acy [which] shall proceed always frankly and in the public view” 13 are obstacles to com prom ises betw een ideologically opposed rivals in the international as well as in dom estic systems. In H olland, covenants are usually, though 13 A lbert Bushnell H art, ed.. S elected A ddresses a n d Public Papers o f W oodrow WHson (N ew York: Boni and Liveright. 1918), p. 248.

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not always, open, but covenants openly arrived at are rare indeed. Democracy would suffocate under com plete secrecy, o f course. T he principal public forum for the discussion and disclosure of political facts and issues is the States-G eneral, and particularly the Second C ham ber. Here the parties confront each other and the cabinet in the presence o f the parliam entary reporters o f the m ajor newspapers and those citizens who are lucky enough to gain access to the tw o short rows o f seats a symbolically signifi­ cant lim ita tio n !- o f the public gallery.14 Parliam entary approval represents no m ore than the final stage o f the accom m odation process. U ntil recently, all meetings o f parliam entary comm ittees were closed to the public. W hat is held up for public view on the floor o f the cham bers is the result o f the interbloc negotiations which now merely requires ratification. C ovenants that were w orked out in secret, now becom e open. D aalder characterizes parliam entary debates as “ m ore elaborate than in fo rm ativ e. . . because policy has already been determ ined in another place and because a com prom ise itself looks much b etter in half-lights than in the glare o f a real parliam entary search-light.” 15 Clashes betw een the cham ber and the cabinet do occur, o f course; am end­ m ents are introduced and often passed; and adverse votes can topple cabinets. But the leaders usually do their utm ost to avoid it, and to safeguard at least the essence o f the fa i l accom pli. And when the parliam entary battle gets out o f control, they often resort to the device o f suspending the public debate and retiring to the proverbial “smoke-filled room s.” Parliam ent does have considerable constitutional powers to force the cabinet into a public disclosure o f facts: investigation, interpellation, and questions. T he most p otent o f these - parlia­ m entary in v estig atio n -h as been used only nine times since 1850, and mainly before 1887. From 1887 to 1947, no comm issions of investigation were set up. T he best-know n instance o f investiga­ tion since the Second W orld W ar is the nine-m em ber comm ission which labored for alm ost ten years on a thorough inquiry into the activities o f the w artim e governm ent-in-exile in L o n d o n -m o re a m atter o f historical interest than o f current political excitem ent: Interpellations are held m ore frequently: in the 1930’s about ten per year, but no m ore than four o r five per year in the postwar period. This is, therefore, not a strong weapon against elite secrecy either. Besides, secrecy is safeguarded by the custom that the interpellator subm its his questions in advance to the minister 14 H ow ever, in recent years a num ber o f im portant parliam entary debates have been televised. 15 H. D aalder. “ T he Relation Between C abinet and Parliam ent in the N eth erlan d s" (unpublished paper presented at th e R om e Congress o f the International Political Science A ssociation. 1958), p. 17.

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involved. The most innocuous parliam entary w eapon is the ques­ tion. H undreds o f questions are asked during each annual session, but the overwhelming majority deal with very m inor m atters and are w ritten. And ministers usually take th eir tim e to w rite the answers. Few questions entail a lively confrontation on the floor o f the cham bers.16 In short, parliam ent has the pow er to bridge the inform ation gap but does not take advantage of it. Its m em ­ bers, o r at least those belonging to the Big Five o f the parties, conscientiously participate in the conspiracy o f silence. The academ ic world also tends to protect this secrecy. G oudsblom , pointing out that the question o f social stratification in Holland has not been subjected to a thorough scholarly investiga­ tion and that “ least of all is know n about the elites,” speculates that one reason for this lack o f inform ation is the elite’s “ discre­ tion [which] has always been p art and parcel o f its self-assured dignity and authority; the m odern university graduates, ascended from lower levels o f society, have generally tended w ithout ques­ tioning to adopt this paternalistic a ttitu d e.” 17 T here are other conspirators, too, notably the press. Indeed the com m unications elite play the most vital role in preserving the secrecy o f the accom m odation process. M ost o f the national newspapers are closely linked to a particular bloc by organiza­ tional, ideological, or personal ties. Editors and journalists belong to the “ establishm ent” of the politics o f accom m odation. An independent paper like De T eleg ra a f is m ore adventurous and does not feel bound to guard all political secrets. But its access to such classified inform ation is severely limited, and it tends to be m ore noisy than knowledgeable. In a speech to the N ational N ew spaper Association in 1964, Prime M inister M arijnen cautioned the press to exercise selfcontrol in deciding what is and what is not fit to p rin t1* - a totally unnecessary rem inder to the highly self-disciplined D utch new spa­ perm an. In com m enting on the editorial speculation o f another paper, the N ieuwe Rotterdantse Couranl wrote: “ They give the im pression o f knowing m ore than they can tell at the m om ent (which is not abnorm al for newspapers: they are often like ice­ bergs).” 19 This would also be an apt description of the entire political process, o f which only a small part is visible and the rest is kept hidden under the dark and som etim es muddy water. 16 Van Raalte. pp. 207-217, 232-238. 17Johan G oudsblom , Dutch S o ciety (N ew York: R andom House, 1967), p. 70. 18 N ieuw e R o iierdam se Couranl (M ay 26. 1964). 19 Ibid. (F eb ru ary I. 1964), quoted in Dick Schaap and Bert Pasterkam p. De za a k Irene (A m sterdam : A B C -B oeken, 1964), p. 68.

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R U L E V II: T H E G O V E R N M E N T ’ S R IG H T T O G O V E R N All rules discussed so far are closely related to the first rule or axiom that politics is a serious business. T he seventh rule is a direct deduction from this axiom . W hat is im portant in both politics and business is to get the jo b done, and this applies first and foremost to the highest rulers: the cabinet. W hen the Dutch refer to the “governm ent" ( regering) they refer prim arily to the cabinet rather than all branches o f governm ent or the entire adm in­ istration. The governm ent o r cabinet must do the jo b o f governing. T he corollary to this is that others, specifically the parties in parlia­ m ent, must allow them to govern. T o be sure, the cabinet or individ­ ual ministers may be challenged and criticized but only with decent and polite restraint. The cabinet must not be harassed. Parliam ent, that is, the two cham bers o f the States-G eneral, is theoretically sovereign. The principle that the cabinet is entirely dependent on the confidence o f parliam ent was firmly established in the protracted battle between the Second C ham ber and the cabinet from 1866 to 1868. T he Second C ham ber repeatedly passed m otions o f censure against the cabinet and voted down the cabinet’s budget proposals. T he cabinet tried to m aintain itself in office by twice dissolving the cham ber, but the newly-elected cham bers still had strong m ajorities opposed to the cabinet. In the end, the cabinet resigned and was replaced by a new cabinet that had the cham ber’s confidence. Parliam entarism had trium phed. Furtherm ore, the constitutional provision that “ the laws are inviolable” means that the judiciary is not allowed to test the constitutionality o f laws passed by the States-G eneral. Judicial, review is unknow n.20 In this respect, too, parliam ent is fully sovereign. It is impossible, therefore, to apply the concept of separation of pow ers to the relationship betw een cabinet and parliam ent. Yet, in practice, the cabinet enjoys a large measure of independence, based on the attitude that it is the governm ent’s task to govern. This “sem i-separation of pow ers” is based not on constitutional provisions but on informal, but nonetheless deeply ingrained pol­ itical practice. The sem i-independent position o f the cabinet is reinforced by the prevalent concept that cabinets are K ing’s or Q ueen’s cabinets, although they are all, at least after 1868, parlia­ m entary cabinets, and by the strong tradition that m em bership in the cabinet is not com patible with m em bership in the States-

20 R. K ranenburg. H ei N ederlands staaisrechl (8th ed., Haarlem: T jeen k W illin k . 1958). p p . 1 18-120, 2 8 8-293. S ee also J . V. Rijpperda W ierdsm a, D uatism e in ons staatsbestel (Assen: Van G orcum , 1961).

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G eneral. M inisters have special reserved seats in the cham bers and they may speak there, but they are not m em bers and may not vote. Also, cabinet m em bers have traditionally been recruited primarily from outside the States-G eneral. O f the 334 ministers between 1848 and 1958, alm ost half never served in parliam ent and alm ost a fifth entered parliam entary service only after first having been on the cabinet; only slightly m ore than a third o f the m inisters had p rio r experience in p a rlia m e n t.21 T he sem i­ independence of the cabinets is further enhanced by the labels they frequently attach to themselves. Virtually all cabinets are based on a majority coalition in parliam ent, but many have described themselves as “ extraparliam entary cabinets,” “ business cabinets,” “ crisis cabinets,” and the like, thus em phasizing their autonom ous status. T he practice o f sem i-separation o f powers is eminently suited to the politics o f accom m odation. Dutch cabinets are egalitarian bodies. The prim e m inister stands out only slightly above his colleagues; the title prim e m inister (M in ister President) did not even exist officially until 1945. T he person charged with the form ation o f a new cabinet does not necessarily become its prim e m inister. In 1948, J. R. H. van Schaik formed the cabinet, but W . Drees became its prim e m inister and Van Schaik him self took the vice-prem iership and the less exalted official title o f minister w ithout portfolio. A gain, in 1951, Drees becam e the head o f a new cabinet formed by som eone else, C. P. M. R om m e, who did not enter the cabinet himself.22 The prim e m inister is undoubtedly prim us inter pares but without undue emphasis on prim us. The parties joining in a cabinet coalition do not have to be afraid, therefore, o f being dom inated by the strongm an o f a different party. F urtherm ore, cabinets have usually been based on broad m ajorities in the Second C ham ber, especially after 1946. The m ajor parties have am ple opportunities to participate in cabinets, and if they do participate, to occupy a num ber o f posts roughly proportional to their parliam entary strength. N ot all m ajor parties are perm anently in the cabinet, o f course. But being in opposition does not entail being excluded from the policy-m aking process. T here is no sharp line between governm ent and opposition p ar­ ties. M ajor pieces of legislation are often passed with the help of :i M attei D ogan and M aria Scheffer-Van dor Veen, “ Le personnel ministeriel h o llan d ais (1 8 4 8 -1 9 5 8 ),” L 'A n n e e S o cio lo g iq u e. 3rd series, 1957-58, p. 100. ” E. van Raalte, D e o n tw ikkelin g van-het m inister-presidentschap in Nederland. Belgie. F rankrijk. Engeland en enige andere landen (Leyden: U niversitaire Pers. 1954). pp. 24-26, 44-45.

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som e “ opposition” parties and with a “ governm ent” party voting against. The departm ental budgets are usually approved by all m ajor parties with only one or m ore o f the splinter groups in the opposition. T he cabinet’s sem i-independent status and its flexible partner­ ship with all m ajor p artie s-re p re se n tin g the four b lo c s - in the Second C ham ber, give it a dual function in the politics o f accom ­ m odation. Because of its broad com position, it is an o th er confed­ eral organ within which accom m odation takes place. At the same time, because o f its autonom ous position above parliam ent and the parties and its presumed im partiality, it acts collectively as a m ediator or balancer between the rival groups in the process o f accom m odation. In its first role, it resembles the Social and Economic Council, although its tasks are m ore com prehensive. Its second role is epitom ized by the fifteen cabinet-appointed neutral mem bers in the Social and Economic Council who hold the balance o f pow er that is divided proportionally am ong the blocs and equally between workers and employers. The rule o f the governm ent’s right to govern on which its special position in the politics o f accom m odation is based, is therefore o f great im por­ tance. These inform al, unwritten rules govern the political business in H olland. They may not always be scrupulously followed, and because they are stated in general term s, they may be subject to different interpretations, but they are sufficiently salient to be regarded as the rules o f the gam e. They contribute much to the success o f the elite’s efforts to govern the divided nation. A nother effect o f the rules is to m ake politics dull and to keep popular interest at low ebb. Especially the rules o f secrecy, pro­ portionality, and depoliticization keep much of the fire and excitement out o f politics. It would be wrong to assume, however, that the dullness of Dutch politics must be attributed to a lack of issues and tensions. The opposite is true: potentially divisive issues and disintegrative tendencies are ever present, but they are carefully controlled. T he lack o f excitement does not reflect a nearly perfect consensus, but rather the elite’s conscious and deliberate attem pts to cope with the system ’s fragility. Hence popular apathy and disinterest in politics and its apparent dullness have a positive value.

P O S T S C R IP T BY T H E A U T H O R , A U G U S T 1973 W hen I was w riting the final version o f the m anuscript o f my The Politics o f A ccom m odation in 1967, there were already clear signs that Dutch politics was changing in a num ber o f fundam ental respects. I therefore included a chapter on “ Dutch Politics in

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T ransition” in which 1 paid special attention to the fact that the religious and ideological cleavages had become less deep and less relevant to the political process during the late 1950's and the 1960’s. Therefore, 1 stated, “ the highly oligarchical and elitist patterns o f authority are not as necessary and consequently not as justifiable as before, and . . . a greater degree o f openness and popular participation can be allowed w ithout grave risks to the system's stability” (p. 193). In the years since 1967, strong pres­ sures have in fact been building up to change the rules o f the gam e in the direction that I indicated. O ne clear m anifestation of these pressures is the growing support for the proposal to intro­ duce a popularly elected prim e m inister (or, in a less far-reaching version o f the proposal, a directly elected cabinet fo rm a teu r) who would be much m ore than a prim us inter pares. A second im por­ tant innovation is the “ shadow cabinet” formed by the left-wing parties to challenge the incum bent cabinet in the parliam entary election cam paigns of the spring o f 1971 and the fall o f 1972. These developm ents entail a tendency to draw a sharper line between governm ent parties and opposition parties, to accentuate political differences rather than to depoliticize them and resolve them in secret negotiations, and to dow ngrade the principles of concurrent majority and proportional participation in decision­ making.

A U S T R IA : T H E T H R E E L A G E R A N D T H E F IR S T R E P U B L IC Alfred D iam ant Sourcc: “ A ustrian Society and the T hree L a g e r " in Alfred D ia­ m ant. A ustria n Catholics and the First Republic: D em ocracy. Capi­ talism . a n d the Socia l O rder 1918-1934 (copyright © I960 by P rin­ ceton University Press), pp. 73-80. R eprinted by perm ission o f Prin­ ceton University Press and the author.

T he political and social developm ent o f the A ustrian Republic was dom inated by the existence o f three m ajor groups which the A ustrian h isto ria n , A dam W an d ru szk a, had called L a g er. 1 Each Lager drew its support from specific social groups and each had a political organization which acted as the political representative of its interests. Each Lager also attem pted to develop a W eltan­ schauung. and to foster social and ideological homogeneity am ong its followers. Thus it hoped to establish “ totalitarian” control over its m em bers and shape their entire lives. These three Lager were the Socialist, the N ationalist, and the Christian-social con­ servative (christlichsozial-konservaiiv).2 T heir origin can be traced to the national, social, and religious struggles o f the Empire during the nineteenth century. The developm ent o f A ustrian poli­ tics since 1945 gives proof o f the persistence o f the Ihrce-Lager pattern. The grow th o f N ational Socialism and the question o f Anschluss upset the “ norm al” pattern in the early 1930’s, but when A ustrian politics returned to norm al in 1945 the three Lager re-em erged. The Socialist and Christian-social conservative cam ps again dom inate the scene while a small N ationalist move­ ment attem pts to play the role of a balancer. However, the determ ination o f the tw o large camps to avoid the m istakes o f the First Republic has so far prevented the N ationalists from exercis­ ing a decisive influence over the distribution o f political pow er as they had done between 1918 and 1934.

(a)

t h e s o c ia l is t l a g e r

O f the three, the Socialist Lager, the cam p o f the industrial w orkers, most nearly attained hom ogeneity. Its political represent­ ative was the Social D em ocratic party. In addition, the so-called Free T rade U nions were so closely allied with the Social D em o­ 1 A dam W andruszka. “ O sterreichs politische S truktur. Die Entwicklung d er Parteien und der politischen B ew egungen." Geschichte der R epublik O sterreich. Heinrich Benedikt. editor (V ienna: Verlag fiir G eschichte und Politik. 1954). pp. 289-485. 2 Ibid.. pp. 291-292.

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cratic party organization that they w ere considered an integral part o f the Socialist Lager. T hrough the Social D em ocratic party, the trade unions, and a host of other organizations the Socialist L ager had created a sep arate sp h ere o f life fo r its m em bers,-’ a separate universe in which the w orkers lived am ong fellow Social­ ists in municipal public housing units, read Socialist newspapers, and joined Socialist stam p collecting o r pigeon fancying clubs. They enrolled their children in the Socialist youth organization, hiked through the Vienna woods with com rades from the Social­ ist N aturfreunde, and stayed overnight in m ountain lodges m ain­ tained by Socialist A lpine Clubs. A t work they belonged to a trade union whose principal leaders sat in parliam ent as Social D em ocrats. A fter their death they were crem ated in a municipal crem atorium operated by a Socialist city adm inistration. T his last act o f their earthly career was also their ultim ate gesture of defiance against a clerical bourgeois world. T he C hristian Social G overnm ent, urged by the church, had tried to stop the construc­ tion and operation of the crem atorium ostensibly on technical, legal grounds. Actually, the Christian-social conservative cam p opposed crem ation on religious grounds and attem pted in this way to enforce its Weltanschauung on a resisting proletariat. The A ustrian w orker considered active m em bership in the Socialist Lager his way o f protesting against the privileged posi­ tion o f the old nobility, the clergy, and the industrialists. This protest also found expression in an extremely m ilitant ideology, A u stro -M arxism us,4 a term which becam e synonym ous in Europe 3 “ A fter 1918 the party had not only grow n to be a mass organization o f unique size an d vigor but a spiritual pow er w hose effects were lasting and p ro fo u n d----- F ar beyond the realm o f politics it shaped the lives and thoughts o f its active m em bers___ Its broad organiza­ tional structure had room for all trades and professions. It enabled all ages to organize their entertainm ent requirem ents, their educa­ tional plans, their purposes in life, their cultural desires, their h o b ­ bies. even their follies, and to fuse them ‘ideologically’ with the aims o f th e p arty in se rio u s a n d rid ic u lo u s fash io n . In th is m ass o f h u n d re d s o f th o u sa n d s, a n y o n e c a p ab le o f rising ab o v e th e m erely personal, found in the party a new m eaning to his life. T his fulfill­ m ent was as strong and as enduring as a religious tie.” Joseph Buttinger. In the Twilight o f Socialism . A H istory o f the Revolu­ tionary Socialists o f A u stria (N ew York: Frederick A . Praeger. 1953). pp. 20-22. Buttinger was one o f the principal figures in the illegal Socialist m ovem ent betw een 1934 and 1938. 4 In spile o f his pro-Socialist bias, G ulick's chapter on A ustroM arxism is an excellent summary' and critique. C harles A . G ulick. A u stria fr o m H absburg to H itler, vol. ii: F ascism 's Subversion o f D em ocracy (Berkeley: University o f California Press. 1948). ch. xx v ii, "T h eo ry an d Practice o f A ustro-M arxism .” pp. 1363-1400.

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with extrem e left-wing M arxism . This ideology was given an especially radical form ulation in the Social D em ocratic party’s L in z program o f 1926. T he em phasis on a violent class struggle and the determ ination to seize pow er by force contained in the L in z pro­ gram greatly exaggerated the doctrinaire M arxist tendencies o f the Socialist Lager. A ustrian Socialists never applied this doctrinaire M arxism ,5 but pursued instead a gradualist policy and were com m it­ ted to change by peaceful m eans. Nevertheless, A ustrian Catholics cam e to identify the Republic o f 1918 w ith the Socialist Lager and considered Social Democracy its principal enemy. T he Socialist Lager drew its principal strength from the indus­ trial w orkers in Vienna and the industrial centers in the prov­ inces.6 It also had a large following o f intellectuals, especially Jewish intellectuals who found in it career opportunities as organ­ izers, educators, and party theorists not open to Jewish intellec­ tuals elsewhere.7

Gulick show ed that in spite o f an appearance o f violent M arxism the theories o f A ustrian Socialism were “ dictated by their steadfast adherence to the principles o f dem ocracy and o f intellectual and spiritual freedom . . . an d by their deep sym pathy with those who suffer and need h elp " (p. 1400). 5 A nton Rintelen for m any years L and governor o f Styria an d one of th e m ore sinister figures in republican A ustria adm itted: “ It was a m iracle that M arxism did not sweep away all conservative obstacles in its m arch to total p o w e r .. . . C om m unism radicalized Social Dem ocracy but was unable to carry it along all the way. In fact, on crucial issues Social D em ocracy resisted, and even opposed C om ­ m unism actively.” R intelen, Erinnerungen an O sterreichs W eg. Versailles-B erchtesgaden-G rossdeulschland (M unich: Verlag F. Bruckm ann, 1941), p. 98. Rintelen was slated to be chancellor in the governm ent to be installed after the assassination o f Dollfuss in July 1934. T he book is largely anti-C hristian Social and anti-clerical and, therefore, m ore favorably disposed to anyone else w ho also might have been anti-clerical. Rintelen recalled th a t in 1919 at the height o f what he called C om m unist riots in G raz only the support given to the regular police forces by the Socialist A rbeiterhilfskorps saved the day an d b ro k e th e fury o f the riots. Ibid., p. 104. 6 R udolf Schlesinger, C entral E uropean D em ocracy and its B a ck­ ground: E conom ic and P olitical Group O rganization (L ondon: Routledge & K egan Paul. L im ited, 1953), pp. I /8 -1 /9 . 7 Buttinger estim ated that eighty percent o f the intellectuals who jo ined the Socialist m ovem ent were Jew ish and that there were secret arrangem ents by the p arty executive to insure an “ A ryan" m ajority in the p arty ’s top echelons: “ T he A ustrian w orker's aw e of m ental achievem ent gave to m any intellectual Jews the first and deepest happiness o f their lives. T his was their real escape from the loathsom e G h e t t o . . . ” op. c it., pp. 80-81. Even though Jewish

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(B ) T H E N A T IO N A L IS T LA G E R . During the first decade o f the R epublic the N ationalist L ager was the weakest of the three. It was com posed o f anti-clerical middle-class groups in urban as well as rural areas. U nder the influence of the social question and o f the nationality struggles the G erm an middle class o f the Em pire had split in two. Those who em phasized social and econom ic problem s followed Lueger into th e C h ristian -so cial co nservativ e L a g er. T h o se w ho were m ore concerned with threats to the national position o f the G erm ans within the Empire followed G eorg von Schonerer and his an ti­ clerical, Pan-G erm an program . These anti-clerical nationalist groups form ed the nucleus o f the N ationalist Lager in 1918. Two political parties represented the N ationalist L ager between 1918 and 1934. The Grossdeutsche Volkspartei drew its strength from urban middle-class groups, especially civil servants. In fact, defense o f the civil servants and lobbying for civil service legisla­ tion consum ed most o f the energies o f that party.8 The L andbund represented a group o f well-to-do anti-clerical peasants in C arinthia and Styria. In C arinthia the L andbund gained the support o f East Prussian Protestant peasants w ho had fled from the East Prussian territories ceded to Poland after the w ar, and had taken over land vacated by C arinthian Slovenes who had been forced to return to Yugoslavia in 1918.9 Both parties collaborated with the C hristian Socials until 1934. In fact, their votes in Parliam ent were indispensable for an anti-socialist majority. The rise o f the Nazi movem ent deprived these tw o parties o f all their followers. U ltim ately the Nazis drew a large num ber o f middle and lower middle-class supporters into the N ationalist Lager. intellectuals jo ined the Social D em ocratic party in large num bers, the Jew ish m em bers o f high finance, big business, an d industry did not share this radicalism and supported the H eim w ehr, in spite o f its open anti-Sem itism , because it “ protected” business and industry. Franz Borkenau, A u stria a n d A fte r (L ondon: F ab er and Faber. 1938), pp. 106-107. " G eorge M aria von Alexich, A S tu d y o f th e Political Parlies in A ustria. 1918-1938 (G eorgetow n University P h.D . dissertation. 1948). pp. 218-226. Alexich was a m em ber o f the A ustrian diplo­ m atic service until 1938. T he dissertation has an outspoken proC hristian Social bias. ''Ib id .. pp . 227-229. In Styria the L andbund was fairly strong and R intelen, who led the C hristian Socials in that L and, com plained that his party could fight the L andbund only w ith difficulty. The C hristian Socials could not entirely neglect cither rural-agricultural o r urban-industrial interests while th e Landbund. a purely agricul­ tural interest gro u p , could appeal to the peasants strictly on their ow n term s. R intelen, op. cit., p. 57.

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(C ) T H E C H R IS T IA N -S O C IA I. C O N S E R V A T IV E L A G E R . T he Christian-social conservative L ager centered around the church and those groups which accepted C atholic social theory: peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. It also received the support o f financial and industrial leaders who sought to fashion a political instrum ent with which to destroy the powerful position o f the workers. In this m anner the Christian-social conservative L ager becam e the focal point o f an anti-socialist alliance. T he lower middle class in the cities and on the farm comprised the principal support o f the Christian-social conservative Lager. A rtisans, shopkeepers, som e white-collar w orkers, and above all the peasants constituted the social base of that Lager. The Chris­ tian Social party and a m ultitude of C atholic organizations, most o f them closely supervised by the clergy, were the principal organ­ izational w eapons o f the Christian-social conservative L a g er.'0 Catholics considered this netw ork of organizations indispensable in their struggle against bourgeois-liberal as well as socialist influ­ ences in A ustrian life. They feared that the Socialists would be able to win over a majority o f A ustrians and establish a dictator­ ship of the proletariat on the Russian model - a fear which seem ed well-founded in view o f the extrem e doctrinaire M arxian program proclaim ed repeatedly by the Socialists. The Christiansocial cam p realized that it was engaged in a grim struggle: “ The fight must be conducted along two fronts: in parliam ent among deputies, and outside parliam ent am ong the A ustrian people. Therefore Catholicism must be prepared to do com bat on both fro n ts .. . . Because Socialists have focused their energies on the task o f obtaining a majority in the legislature. C atholic Action must do everything to create the sort of electorate which will choose a parliam ent where the Socialists' strength will be reduced and the enemies o f religion will not have a m ajority.’' 11 Aemilian Schopfer, a prelate o f the C atholic Church and a leader o f the C hristian Social party in the Tyrol, reflected in that statem ent the com m only accepted assum ption during the interw ar period that a political m ovem ent which would gain a clear majority in the legislature would im mediately proceed with a com plete reshaping o f the country’s social, econom ic, and political institutions, in line with that party’s Weltanschauung. To counter the Socialist network of trade unions, youth organi­ 10 A em ilian Schopfer, “ K atholizism us und P olitik," K atholizism us in O sterreich. pp. 448-449. However. Alexich was o f the opinion that the youth groups, for exam ple, which had a highly com plex organi­ zational structure in parishes an d dioceses, did not am ount to very m uch. op. cit., pp. 86-87. 11 Schopfer. op. cit., pp. 442-443.

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z a t i o n s , h i k i n g c lu b s , w e ig h t lif tin g a n d p ig e o n f a n c y in g s o c i e ­ tie s, C a th o lic s a tte m p te d to c r e a te a s im ila r n e tw o rk o f o r g a n iz a ­ tio n s in w h ic h t h e fa ith fu l w o u ld fo llo w a C a th o lic p a tte r n o f life a n d a C a th o lic W e lta n s c h a u u n g , j u s t a s th e S o c ia lis t L a g e r tr ie d t o c r e a te a S o c ia list w o rld fo r its o w n p e o p le . T h e C a th o lic c a m p c o u ld n o t m a tc h th e h o m o g e n e ity o f its S o c ia list riv a l. U n d e r th e in flu e n c e o f in d u s tr ia lis ts a n d la rg e la n d h o ld e r s w h o tr a d itio n a lly p la y a p r o m in e n t ro le in A u s tr ia n life, C h r is tia n S o cial g o v e r n m e n ts p u r s u e d p o lic ie s w h ic h d id n o t alw ay s f a v o r t h e sm a ll h o ld e r s a n d th e a r tis a n s , th e C h r is tia n S o c ia l ra n k -a n d -f ile . S o m e o f t h e p ro v in c ia l p o litic ia n s , lik e A n to n R in te le n , a n d C a th o lic tr a d e u n io n le a d e rs lik e L e o p o ld K u n s c h a k , c a s tig a te d t h e i r o w n p a r ty c h ie fta in s fo r th e ir p r o -b ig b u s in e s s b i a s .12

( d ) t h e t h r e e l a g e r a n d t h e f a il u r e O F CO NSENSUS. T h e f a ilu re o f th e m a jo r A u s tr ia n so c ial g r o u p s to e s ta b lis h a c o n s e n s u s o n fu n d a m e n ta ls o f p o litic a l a n d so c ia l o r g a n iz a tio n p e r p e tu a te d th e d iv isio n o f th e c o u n tr y in to th r e e L a g e r . T h e m a jo r o p p o n e n ts in th is s tru g g le w e re th e S o c ia list a n d th e C a th o ­ lic c a m p s , w ith th e N a tio n a lis ts jo in in g th e C a th o lic s in a b o u r ­ g e o is a n ti- S o c ia lis t a llia n c e . In s p ite o f th is p a r lia m e n ta r y a llia n c e b e tw e e n tw o o f th e L a g e r , th e th r e e w e re d iv id e d o n fu n d a m e n ta l issues in v o lv in g th e so c ia l q u e s tio n , c h u r c h - s ta te r e la tio n s h ip s , a n d G e r m a n n a tio n a lis m . A u s tr ia , th e r e f o r e , la c k e d w h a t P. T . L u x , a S w iss, lo n g -tim e re s id e n t o f A u s tr ia , h a s c a lle d a “ v ita l, u n ifie d , n a tio n a l id e a .” 13 C o n s e q u e n tly , e a c h L a g e r tr ie d to b e c o m e th e c e n tr e o f all lo y a ltie s o f its fo llo w e rs , a n d t h e s tru g g le fo r th e v o te s o f th e p e o p le tu r n e d in to a s tr u g g le fo r th e ir so u ls . A e m ilia n S c h o p f e r w as c o r re c t w h e n h e in sis te d t h a t “ . . . th e S o c ia list 12 Rintelen seem s to be very b itter about the policies which favored industry at the expense o f the peasants. O ne must rem em ber, though, that R intelen, in w riting his m em oirs, would tend to over­ em phasize the differences between him and the less nationalist and m ore strongly clerical views o f those in C hristian Social party h ead­ q u arters in Vienna, op. cit., pp. 48-51. Rintelen pointed o ut that before the First W orld W ar there had been no contact at all between the peasants, safely rooted in the Catholic conservative fold, and the nationalist bourgeoisie o f the small and m edium -sized tow ns of A ustria. M en like Rintelen were largely responsible for assum ing the leadership o f part o f the peasantry and also for alienating the peas­ ants from the clerical leadership. T hey thereby prepared the way for th e sweeping victories o f N ational Socialism especially in Styria and C arinthia. 13 P. T . Lux, Osterreich 19 18-1938. Eine D em okratie? (G raz: Leykam Verlag, G .m .b .H ., 1946), p. 76.

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youth organizations and the freethinker societies were non­ political m eans to a political end and had, therefore, trem endous political significance.” 14 They were p art o f the network o f organi­ zations with which the Socialists tried to spread their theology to win new followers and m aintain the loyalty o f the faithful. O tto Bauer, the Socialist, on the o th er hand, considered the C atholic C hurch not simply a religious institution bu t the propaganda arm o f the Socialists’ principal opponent: “ T he clergy fanned the flame o f peasant resentm ent against the w orkers___ They organ­ ized and strengthened the peasant m ovem ent as the most effective counterforce to the proletarian revolution. N ewspapers and ser­ mons rem inded the peasants . . . that the revolution would social­ ize th e ir p ro p erty and destro y th e C h u rc h .” 15 C . A. M acartney, whose The Social Revolution in A ustria is critical o f the Social D em ocrats, wrote: “ The C atholic C hurch o f A ustria is the real enemy o f Socialism. She is the living representative of the old o r d e r .. . . She is the upholder o f conservatism , loyalty, piety, respect and obedience___ U ntil her hold over the spirits o f the people has been w eakened, Socialism, the very reverse o f all this, cannot move. The C atholic C hurch, too, was and is an active political fo rc e .. . . Therefore we find th at even to this day the real b attle o f A u strian Socialism is d irected ag ain st the C h u r c h .. . . F or under these circumstances the Socialist maxim th at ‘religion is every m an’s private affair' is already a direct challenge, since Catholicism adm its no neutrality.” 16 Ever since the days o f the Josephinist reforms and o f Schonerer’s Los von R om cam paign, political struggles in A ustria have been religious rivalries, and religious rivalries have been turned into political controversies. U nder such conditions political parties become arm ed cam ps of religious crusaders, determ ined to drive the infidels from the field: “ Parties which serve as a shield for powerful private interests have a tendency to become totalitarian and to suppress all those who disagree with them . This was especially true in A ustria whose parties were extremely doctrinaire and com m itted to definite ideologies. This gave them the charac­ ter o f secular re lig io n s-a n d distinguished them sharply from most W estern parties which w ere held together not by an ideol­ ogy but by com m on traditions o r interests. As a result, all parties in A ustria tended to identify their own interest with that o f the entire country.” 17 14 Schopfer, op. cit., p. 441. 15 O tto Bauer, Die osterreichische Revolution (V ienna: W iener Volksbuchhandlung. 1934), p. 124. 16 C . A. M acartney. The S o cia l Revolution in A ustria (Cam bridge: U niversity Press. 1926). p. 54. 17 Lux. op. cit., p. 3.

A U S T R IA : T H E L E G IT IM IZ IN G R O L E O F P O L IT IC A L PA R T IE S Peter Pulzer Source: P. G . J . Pulzer, “ T he Legitimizing Role o f Political Parties: th e Second A ustrian R epublic,” G overnm ent and Opposition, Vol. 4, N o. 3 (1969), 324-344. R eprinted by perm ission o f the publisher, and with a 1973 postscript by the author.

C an parliam entary institutions thrive in countries with little or no tradition in the habits o f self-governm ent?1 Is m ulti-party com pe­ titio n viable in states w here co m p ro m ise is n o t accepted as a political virtue? T he questions are fam iliar and are asked w hen­ ever the advisability o f exporting the W estminister model (or the Capitol Hill or Palais Bourbon model) is raised. T he proposition to be exam ined is that a parliam entary and party system was transplanted into an initially unfavourable envi­ ronm ent and eventually acclimatized itself. The ecological difficul­ ties are familiar; indeed, they form the substance o f the debate about the export o f systems. In the T hird W orld, at the point of decolonization it involves the form er colonial pow er bequeathing liberal-dem ocratic institutions as a device for legitimizing the new native regim e.2 In Central and Eastern E urope it was native elites -g en e ra lly the intelligentsia, but som etim es enlightened nobles and b u re a u c ra ts-w h o sought to bring their societies into line with the archetypal nation-states o f the W est. O ne distinguished historian of Eastern Europe has outlined the process as follows: The ideas o f Voltaire, the rhetoric o f G ladstone, derived even if by tortuous ro u te s -f ro m the reality o f France or Britain. The Russian intellectual and the Russian peasant belonged to different cultures. The ideas o f the Russian intellectual did not derive from Russian conditions, but were im p o rted p refab ricated from ab ro ad . . . E astern E urope (including Russia) was the first part o f the world in which W estern ideas, im ported ready m ade, were used to remould societies neither economically nor culturally prepared for th em .3 It is, of course, the case, that the intelligentsia o f the Third World have also im bibed ideas w hich d eriv e m ore from th e experience 1 A version o f this paper was presented to the C om parative Politics Panel o f the Political Science A ssociation in Y ork. April 1969. : D. E. A pter. The P olitics o f M odernisation, p. 271. n. 4. 3 H. Seton-VVatson. “ Intellectuals and Revolution: Social Forces in Eastern E urope since 1848” in: R . Pares & A. J . P. T aylor (eds.). E ssays P resented to S ir Lew is N am ier, pp. 399. 428.

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o f advanced countries than o f their own, but these ideas have been largely concerned with national self-determ ination and industrialization, not with constitutional forms. In continental E urope it was the ideas o f the Enlightenm ent and the institutions o f liberalism which travelled southw ards and eastwards during the 19th and early 20th cen tu ries. W e m ay th ere fo re say th a t while parliam entary governm ent was exp o rted by de-colonizing powers to largely unappreciative o r uncom prehending elites outside Europe, it was im ported by enthusiastic though unreflecting elites in Europe outside the liberalized N orth-W est. The learned works on parliam entary procedure by 19th century G erm ans and Austrians, such as R obert von M ohl, R udolf von G neist and Josef Redlich, show the extent to which the W estm inister model was explicitly regarded as a n o rm .4 Given that Austria presents virtually the only example o f a European state in which an initially unsuccessful parliam entary system turned into a successful one, and in which constitutional and party-structural factors can be held constant over half a century (1919-1969), I propose to examine A ustrian political experience. I propose to treat it as a problem in political culture; m ore specifically as a problem in isolating the main determ inants o f such a culture and in distinguishing between the static and evolving elem ents in it.

P A R T Y F O R M A T IO N IN T H E E M P IR E T he principal com ponents o f the A ustrian political culture emerged in the final, constitutional era o f the H absburg em pire (1861-1918) and particularly between the two franchise reforms of 1882 and 1906. T he H absburg em pire differed from the post1918 republics not merely in area and social structure but in its m ulti-nationality. I intend to discuss the historical continuity only o f the G erm an-speaking parties, though bearing in mind that the em pire’s m ulti-nationality had a decisive im pact on the nature of these parties. A ustrian parliam entary institutions, as established by the ‘Feb­ ruary Patent’ o f 1861, gave little scope for popular participation and provided little need for elaborate party organization. Until 1872 the m em bers o f the Reichsrat were elected indirectly, by the diets o f the individual crow n-lands. W ithin these crow n-lands the franchise varied widely. W hen in 1872 direct elections were intro­ duced. the variations in the franchise rem ained. A further feature 4 T his point is discussed by G . Loew enberg. Parliament in the Ger­ man P olitical S y ste m , pp. 8-9. 14-15: and by R . J . L am er. Der englische P arlam entarism us in der deutschen politischen Theorie im Z e ita lte r B ism arcks (1857 bis 1890). H istorische S ch riften , 387.

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o f th e electoral system , carried o v e r from th a t prev ailin g in the crown-Iands, was representation by classes or curiae. In 1882 the franchise in the third and fourth curiae was standardized at an annual tax burden o f five florins bringing in one adult male in three. A fifth curia, to be elected by universal suffrage, was added in 1896.5 In 1906 universal m ale suffrage for all seats was intro­ duced. Party form ation in the 1860s reflected the inherited cleavages o f A ustrian public life: on the one hand, a C atholic C hurch, accustomed since the C ounter-R eform ation to a dom inant share in directing the state, allied with agriculture and the pow er o f the territorial aristocracy: on the other, a secularizing, centralizing, mainly G erm an-speaking urban middle class, the local representa­ tive o f the challenge expressed by the Enlightenm ent and the French R evolution. It also took the form characteristic o f early p arliam en tary system s w ith a restricted su ffrag e. It was in traparliam entary, and the parties so formed divided dichotom ously into groups supporting or opposing the governm ent o f the day. T here quickly emerged a Left (collectively known as Verfassungspartei or C onstitutional Party) and a Right, though neither was rigorously disciplined and both tended to fragm ent into su b ­ ordinate groupings known as Klubs. T here was virtually no con­ stituency organization and, until direct elections were introduced, no need for any. Partisanship was defined by intellectual affinity, not organization. The R ight/L eft duality did not arise in response to any dem ands which the new constitution m ade on parliam enta­ rians. N either the February Patent nor the 1867 C onstitutional Laws which am ended it provided for ministerial responsibility, and the governm ent retained considerable reserve powers o f legis­ lation by decree. It arose rather, as observers have noted for many states,6 because the m erits o f the representative institutions were themselves still in dispute; it arose, in other w ords, out o f a crisis o f legitim acy. The Left supported, in principle if not neces­ sarily in detail, the 1861-7 constitution: hence their nam e. The Right favoured the historic rights o f the individual crown-lands. Left and Right were therefore not rivals for ministerial office, otherwise prepared to observe the sam e rules. They were the heirs o f an ancient ideological dispute; their antagonism survived them, and was inherited by the newer parties which emerged in the 1880’s a n d 1890’s. 5 12 f l .= £ l. 6 F o r Sweden, see D . A . R ustow , The P olitics o f Com prom ise. A S tudy o f P arties a n d Cabinet G overnm ent in Sw eden, pp. 11-12, 26-34; for the U .S .A ., S. M . Lipset, The F irst N ew N ation, pp. 15-23. The evolu­ tion o f parties in Britain between 1679 and 1760, though not uniform ly interpreted, is no d o u b t the best-know n exam ple o f all.

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T he intra-parliam entary parties o f the 1860’s and 1870’s were unable to resolve the crisis o f legitimacy. In general such a crisis can be overcom e by parliam entary m eans only if the participants are able to concentrate on solving it to the exclusion o f other critical strains on the system (B ritain. Sweden, N etherlands). It is not too difficult for a system to carry one critical ‘load’ at a time. But it is a characteristic o f late-developing countries th at various loads are placed on the system at very short intervals o r even sim ultaneously. T hree oth er types o f historical crisis, in addition to that of legitimacy are most salient in the form ation o f parties: territorial incorporation, econom ic distribution and political par­ ticipation.7 T he crisis o f incorporation, involving the ability o f different ethnic com m unities to co-exist within the sam e state, may be said to date from 1848 in A ustrian politics, and was never solved. Indeed, their ability to co-exist declined between 1848 and 1918. T he reason for this is to be found in the forms th at the crises of distribution and participation took. T he crisis o f distribution was sparked off by the accelerating m odernization o f the A ustrian economy in the 1860’s and even m ore by the bank and stock exchange crash o f 1873. It affected first the lower middle class and peasantry and was able to influ­ ence party form ation thanks to the electoral reform o f 1882 which benefited principally these classes. Because this reform enfran­ chised proportionately m ore non-G erm ans than G erm ans, the division into Catholic, liberal-national, radical and agrarian parties took place am ong most nationalities - Czechs, Poles, R uthenes and Slovenes. By bringing about party divisions on ethnic lines it helped to perpetuate and exacerbate the crisis o f incorporation, and the electoral system, with its socially hom ogeneous curiae and consti­ tuencies, further encouraged the division on class lines. These dual divisions caused th e extrem e frag m en tatio n o f p artie s in th e last years o f the empire. The enfranchisem ent of the five-florin voters also led to the form ation o f the first extra-parliam entary parties. This move was sym ptom atic o f th e crisis o f p a rticip a tio n . Such a crisis m ay be o v e rc o m e -a s in B r ita in - if the politically dom inant groups accom m odate the claim ants to a share in pow er. The effect on the dom inant political parties o f such accom m odation is a slow evolu­ 7 M y d e fin itio n o f these " d e v e lo p m e n ta l c rise s " resem bles those o f Verba in Pye & V crba’s P olitical C ulture and Political D evelopm ent., pp. 557-9 and La Palom bara and W einer in their Political Parlies and P o litica l D evelo p m en t, p p . 14-19. I p refe r “ in c o rp o ra tio n " to th eir “ in tegration,” since integration already has an accepted m eaning in political sociology, not related to territorial problem s.

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tion from cad re to m ass-m em b ersh ip p artie s, as envisaged by John G orst and Joseph Cham berlain in the years after the 1867 Reform Act. In A ustria there was little accom m odation. Peasants and tradesm en in the G erm an-speaking areas rebelled against the political leadership o f aristocrats and grand bourgeois, and against the econom ic encroachm ents o f industrial and financial capitalists. Civil servants and professional men feared the growing com peti­ tion o f non-G erm ans, especially Czechs. All groups dem anded increasingly protectionist. G erm an-nationalist and anti-Sem itic policies.8 T he response from the established parties was in the m ain in h o sp itab le, forcing the new fo rm atio n s to seek an extraparliam entary base. G eorg von Schonerer’s P an-G erm an League (1882) was the first of several to seek the support o f the provin­ cial, anti-clerical middle class. C atholic social reform ers formed the C hristlich-Sozialer Verein (1887) which soon emerged as a fully fledged party. In the election o f 1901, the last to be fought under the curia system, the extraparliam entary parties gained 76 out o f the 118 seats with predom inantly G erm an electorates in the third and fourth curiae, and an anti-Sem itic electoral coalition under K arl Lueger gained control o f the m unicipality of Vienna in 1895. The refusal o f the dom inant classes to accom m odate the claims of the lower middle-class electorate helped to em phasize the differ­ ence betw een th e o ld er, in tra -p a rlia m e n ta ry p arties and the new er extra-parliam entary ones,9 and encouraged the newer p ar­ ties to see in the Reichsrai little m ore than a platform for sectional claims. Such parties naturally identify less closely with the conventions of parliam entary institutions, they radicalize the process o f electoral com petition and they tend as I shall amplify b e lo w - to rely on ‘totalistic’ program m es. T he final claim for participation cam e from the growing indus­ trial working class. In the 1870’s and 1880’s the spread o f anarchist ideas on the one hand, and governm ent repression on the o ther, had both inhibited the em ergence o f a working-class party. This, the Social D em ocratic Party, with a M arxist program m e, was born in 1889. It got its first electoral chance in 1897 after the creation o f the fifth curia in which it won 14 o f the 72 seats. A fter 1907 som e rationalization o f the party structure was necessary in response to the requirem ents o f the new political culture. The Conservatives, already driven into a corner under the 11 P. G . J. Pulzer, The Origins o f P olitical A n ti-S em itism in G erm any a n d A ustria, pp. 144-70. 9 F o r the im portance o f the distinction in organizational origin see, e.g. M . D uverger. Political P arties, pp. xxiv-xxxvii.

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old franchise, w ere absorbed into the C hristian-Social Party and the Liberals, similarly constricted, joined forces with the other G erm an nationalist parties to form a rather loosely integrated D euischer Naiionalverband. T he prim ary ideological cleavage of Austrian public life was thus perpetuated. The Social D em ocratic Party, which had initially prided itself on being a “ little Interna­ tional,” succum bed to nationalist pressures in 1910, thus leaving the official party overwhelmingly G erm an-speaking. T he new geography o f political fragm entation was further emphasized by the relationship between parties, classes and inter­ est groups. The patriarchal and paternalistic character o f state and society had inhibited the grow th of self-help associations. Interest groups grew up in the shadow of, and in subservience to, political parties. W orkers’ and peasants’ organizations, which were the most im portant, illustrate this. T rade unions and working m en’s associations were, from their beginnings, dom inated by socialists. In the 1860s this m eant Lassalleans;10 when trade unions revived in th e 1880s they were d o m in a te d by M arxists. In cou n try -w id e organization they lagged behind the Social D em ocratic Party: the provisorische Kom m ission der G ewerkschaften Osierreichs was not set up until 1892, three years after foundation o f the party; its first Congress declared th at “ in order to be able to carry on the struggle effectively on all fronts [trade unions] will not be able to neglect political means to this end and therefore take their stand unreservedly on the foundations and principles o f Social D em oc­ racy .” 11 T h e only rivals to the socialist tra d e u n io n s w ere also ideologically based, as m em bership for 1908 show s:12 Socialist (all nationalities) C hristian-Social G erm an N ationalist Czech N ationalist

513,769 94,011 37,446 16,141

Peasant associations were equally strongly tied to the Christian Social party. The most im portant of these, th at o f Lower A ustria, was at first politically neutral, but declared itself for the Christian-Socials in 1901, partly under the influence o f the village clergy who had been prom inent in building it up. W hen it was reconstituted in 1904 thirteen o f its eighteen executive members w ere political office holders. The sam e dom ination by politicians characterized the Tyrolean Bauernbund, founded in 1904, though 10 J. D eutsch, G eschichle d e r osierreichischen Gewerk.se/iafisbewegung, pp. 34-6. 11 Ibid.. p. 196. 12 Calculated by A . G . W hiteside. A ustrian N ational Socialism Before 1918. p. 33.

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the local clergy, who were mainly sym pathetic, were barred from supporting it.13 T hus, by 1914, the principal sub-cultures had become institu­ tionalized. Among the G erm an-speaking population these were (a) a p red o m in an tly C atholic-conservative on e, rep resen tin g largely pre-industrial strata ideologically continuous with the Old R ight, (b) a secular, lib era l-n a tio n a l on e, ideologically co n tin u ­ ous with the Old Left, and (c) a working-class, industrial one, ideologically dom inated by M arxism . In the last R eichsrat elec­ tion o f the old em pire the C hristian-Social party gained 36 per cent o f the G erm an vote, the parties o f the Nationalverband 32 per cent, the Social D em ocrats 31 per cent; in those crown-Iands that constituted the p o st-1918 A ustrian republic the percentages were 53, 18 and 29 respectively. G iven that the o th er nationalities had also by this tim e been drawn into participation and that their party structures showed sim ilar divisions along class and ideologi­ cal lines, the picture that the Reichsrat presented was a highly fragm ented one. T here was not a single one am ong its 28 parties that could claim to represent m ore than one nationality, class or Weltanschauung. All fragm entation m akes parliam entary institutions difficult to operate, but it is not the fragm entation as such which is the chief obstacle. Divergent influences in a society may be com pensated by countervailing, convergent factors, such as patriotism ; o r the practice o f pluralistic reconciliation may derive from the tradition­ ally dem ocratic structure of subordinate social units, such as the family, the Church o r the school. Merely to describe these centripetal forces is to em phasize their absence from A ustria. O ne reason for this was constitutional. In the absence of ministerial responsibility parties had no incentive to consider the consequences o f pressing their dem ands, and indeed no function beyond articulating the sectional interests o f their followers. The executive or the judiciary were not penetrated by new parties: this was not because the new parties were satis­ fied by the controls which parliam entary governm ent gave them , but because these institutions rem ained the m onopoly o f the older elites. Indeed, the constitutional structure o f the em pire illustrated the difficulty o f resolving the crises of legitimacy and participa­ tion. The rulers o f the em pire were convinced that the sole, reliable centripetal force in it was the dynasty, and the dynasty’s appeal to the loyalty o f its subjects could rest on only one o f n T . K raus, Die E ntstehung des niederdsterreichischen Bauernbundes, U n p u b lish e d d isse rta tio n , pp . 162,. 189-90; N . M ik o . D ie V ereinigung d er Konservaiiven in d er Christlich-sozialen Partei, U n p u b ­ lished dissertation, p. 52.

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W eber’s three authority types, the trad itio n al.14 O nce the trad i­ tional authority o f the dynasty was challenged, as it increasingly was from 1848 onw ards, entrusting its future to the mechanism o f popular consent was too risky. This constitutional deadlock had profound effects on the political culture and gave it the following characteristics: 1) G overnm ent was thought o f in adm inistrative, not parlia­ m entary, terms. 2) All parties were opposition parties, judging the govern­ m ent in the light o f its response to their sectional dem ands. 3) All p arties w ere identified w ith w ell-defined in terestgroups; they reflected the frag m en tatio n o f political life, but also encouraged it, since interest groups were seen as useful sources o f political m obilization. All parties aim ed, through a netw ork o f affiliated econom ic and cultural groups, at spiritual and organizational self-containm ent, as a defence against both the executive and other rivals. T he most effective agent o f such external isolation and internal coherence is ideology. T he Social D em ocrats were not only the most highly organized o f the three main party groups, they were also the most highly ideologized, but the difference between them and their rivals was one o f degree only. The liberal-national groups becam e increasingly affected by Pan-G erm an and racialist notions, the C hristian-conservative groups by various schools of C atholic social theory.15 Such was the internal coherence of each of these institutionalized sub-cultures, such the hostility with which it regarded its rivals, so strong the consciousness o f belonging to a m ovem ent, that historians have tended to refer to these embattled sub-cultures as Lager (encam pm ents).16 The em ergence of the L ager had a crucial effect on the way the crisis o f legitimacy unfolded under the im pact o f the First W orld W ar. The traditional authority which had com m anded the loyalty o f the em pire’s citizens in the early p art o f the w ar disintegrated in the face o f military defeat. 14 M . W eber, The T heory o f Social and E conom ic O rganization (ed. T. Parsons), pp. 328-9, 341-58. 15 P. M olisch, G eschichte der deuischnationalen B ewegung in O sterreich, pp . 140-51. 182-5, 215: A . D iam ant. A ustrian Catholics and the First Republic. D em ocracy. C apitalism and the Social Order. pp. 3-69. 16 A. W andruszka. “ O sterreichs politische S tru k tu r,” in: H. Benedikt (ed.) G eschichte d er R epublik O sterreich: A. D iam ant. “ T he G roup Basis o f A ustrian Politics." Journal o f C entral European A ffa irs. Vol. 18 (July 1958).

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THE FIRST REPUBLIC AND THE Lager

In O ctober 1918 the Reichsrat m em bers o f the three G erm an parties form ed themselves into a “ provisional national assem bly,” drew up a provisional constitution and called for the election o f a C onstituent Assembly. This, consisting o f the three parties which had called it into being, merely ratified the draft. T hat the draft had em anated from the parties which were, at the parliam entary and electoral level, the secular arm s o f herm etic, millenarian sub-cultures, was sufficient legitim ation for the new parliam entary republic. As O tto Bauer, the chief theoretician o f the Social Dem ocratic Party, put it, “ T he G erm an-A ustrian state had emerged from a control social, a state-founding treaty between the political parties representing the classes o f the G erm anAustrian people.” 17 A corollary o f this contract was that legitimacy could last only as long as the parties continued to collaborate. But the obstacles to such collaboration were too great. Just as under the em pire the crisis of legitimacy was perpetuated because the crisis o f participa­ tion rem ained unresolved, so now under the republic it was perpetuated by the unresolved crisis o f distribution. The peculiar difficulties surrounding the A ustrian distribution crisis can be traced to the political c u ltu re - a n d its chief com ponent, the Lager -w h ic h the republic, inherited from the em pire. The relative strengths o f the Lager did not shift dram atically com pared with pre-war. In the 1919 elections the Social D em ocrats gained 41 per cent o f the votes, the C hristian-Social Party 36 per cent, the liberal-national groups, which re-form ed themselves into two p ar­ ties, the Pan-G erm an People’s Party (Grossdeutsche Volks partei) and the Rural League (Landbund), 18 per cent. This party con­ stellation looked, on the surface, prom ising for a viable parlia­ m entary system: at no subsequent election did the tw o leading parties gain fewer than 75 per cent o f the total votes. In fact, after the collapse o f the C hristian-Social/Social-D em ocrat coali­ tion in 1920, the future o f the republic itself was in doubt. For though political life was dom inated by two m ajor parties their relationship was not, in S artori’s vocabulary “ bi-polar” - “ tending to converge to the centre and therefore centripetal” - but polar­ ized “ w here the spectrum o f political opinion is extrem ized.” 18 Though Sartori’s terminology is helpful in an analysis o f the A ustrian party system, his categories are not. He rightly urges us to abandon analysis o f party systems by reference to the num ber of com peting parties: instead we should adopt “ a m odel-oriented 17 O. Bauer. D ie osterreichische Revolution, p. 96. 18 G . S artori. “ E uropean Political Parties. The Case o f Polarised Plu­ ralism " in La Palom bara & W einer, op. cit., pp. 138-9.

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distinction between bi-polar and m ulti-polar systems w hich, first, accounts for the positioning and pattern o f interaction o f the parties (regardless o f their num ber) and, second, breaks down the undifferentiated category o f the m ulti-party system s.” In addition, what m atters is “ not only the num ber o f poles but the distance between th em ___ Finally we must take into account the drives of the polity [i.e., centripetal o r centrifugal].” C onsideration (a) of the num ber of the poles (b) o f the predom inating drive, enables him to arrive at three main tVDes o f party system: 1) “ simple pluralism ” : two poles, no polarity, hence an over­ whelmingly centripetal drive (e.g. G reat Britain); 2) “ m oderate pluralism ” : tw o poles, som e polarity, hence predom inantly centripetal drives (e.g. Scandinavia); 3) “ extreme pluralism” : many poles, overwhelming polarity, hence centrifugal drives (e.g. Italy). These types may be illustrated as follows: -

(2)

O---- ► 4— O

o----->

4-----O

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S artori’s typology, though in many ways original, shares the old-fashioned assum ption that polarization occurs only in com ­ pany with multi-polarity. W hat is missing is type (4):

4 two poles, extreme polarity, hence centrifugal drive. It is, o f course, arguable that such a system cannot survive: that where the only tw o im portant political forces are pulling in opposite direc­ tions, disintegration is the only possible outcom e. And it is true that in A ustria it survived for only fourteen years (1919-33), though this is no shorter a life than th at of the W eim ar Republic and the Fourth French Republic. W hat A ustria lacked was the characteristic which Sartori has located in the o th er two examples I have cited, as well as in post-w ar Italy: “ a large area which is unequivocally central despite its centre-left and centre-right shades and subtleties.” 19 Thus, though a m ulti-polar, polarized system may contain anti-system parties whose opposition is irresponsible, it can keep going provided that the m inisirable parties com m and a m ajority. It is this centre that was lacking in Austria: the A ustrian system could survive only on condition that the two poles had convergent drives. Between 1919 and 1933 these drives were divergent. The reasons for this are to be found-in the political culture that the republic inherited, one which in the extended territory o f the em pire had been genuinely m ulti-polar. The republic inherited a geographical fragment o f the imperial party system. M oreover the Lager mentality luxuriated as never before. Each o f the parties was able to engage not merely in intense political mobilization but, since it now held executive pow er (national o r local), to provide patronage as well. M em bership o f the Social Democratic Party rose from 92,000 in 1913 to 332,000 in 1919 and 718,000 in 1929.20 In 1930 three out o f five male socialist voters were party m em bers: in Vienna it was four out o f five.21 T he coalition governm ent which had, in 1918-19, legitimated the republican constitution broke up in 1920 in the face of increasingly bitter class conflicts: thereafter the Christian-Social Party ruled with the support o f the liberal-national groups. W hat compelled the Lager to co-exist was what O tto Bauer term ed the 19 Ibid.. p. 155. 20 Bauer, op. cil., p. 137. :i Sia tistisc h e N achrichten (Vienna: Bundesam t fur Statistik) Sonderheft: D ie N ationalratsw ahlen vont. 9 N ovem ber 1930. Tabclie 34.

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“ equilibrium o f class fo rces” (das G leichgew ichl der K lassenk r d f te ),:1 w hich prev ented eith er o f the p a rtn e rs from dealing a knock-out blow. The percentage o f votes polled by th e M arxist L ager (Social D em ocrats plus the very small Com m unist Party) was as follows: 1919 1923 1927 1930

41% 40% 43% 42%

Changes in list com binations m ake it difficult to com pare the shares of the tw o “ bourgeois” Lager, but the Christian-Social Party, fighting alone, never dropped below 35 per cent and the national-liberal groups never below 13 per cent. These figures are not very different from those o f 1907 and 191123 and illustrate the rigid delineations between the encam pm ents. M oreover, the term Lager was ceasing to be m etaphorical as each o f the m ajor parties formed its own private arm y. It would be tedious to go through all the parties’ program m es to count how frequently words like K a m p f and M achi are reiter­ ated. O f course all political parties, even the most liberal-m inded, are apt to use military m etaphors (cam paign, strategy, rankand-file) and Michels had pointed out long ago th at “ Socialist term inology . . . is largely borrow ed from military science.” 24 N ev­ ertheless there was an exceptional relish in the L ager's anticipa­ tion o f ideological A rm ageddon, and a calm certitude in the way in which the Social D em ocrats’ 1926 program m e equated interest and ideology: “ T he class struggle is not only a struggle between opposed class interests, it is at the sam e tim e a struggle between opposed class id e a ls.. . . ” 25 T hus the distribution crisis was dead­ locked: as long as it was deadlocked a state with low legitimacy survived, fa u te de m ieux. T he deadlock was broken in 1933-4 by C hancellor Dollfuss’s suspension o f parliam ent, the banning of the Social D em ocratic Party, the defeat o f its arm ed form ation, the Republikanischer Schutzbund, and the proclam ation o f an authoritarian-corporatist constitution in force until the Anschluss o f 1938. But the late-im perial political culture survived, intact, the dicta­ torship o f the 1930’s, incorporation into the T hird Reich and the ” Bauer, op. c/7., pp . 126, 196-213. See below, p. 169. 24 R. M ichels, P olitical Parlies. A Sociological S tu d y o f th e Oligarchi­ cal Tendencies o f M odern D em ocracy (introd. S. M . Lipset), p. 80. I am grateful to Professor David R apoport, o f u . C . l . a . , for his illum inating com m ents on this topic. 25 L. Berchtold. O sterreichische Parteiprogram m e. 1868-1966. p. 250.

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16 9

Second W orld W ar, and im printed itself on the second as on the first A ustrian Republic. The very m anner in which the republican constitution was reinstated in 1945 illustrates this continuity. As in 1918, it was the party leaders w ho took the in itia tiv e -th is tim e not in parliam ent (for there was none), but in their private residences and hiding places. On 27 April the m em bers o f the provisional governm ent acting as “ executives o f the political p ar­ ties o f A ustria” proclaim ed the “ restoration o f the dem ocratic republic o f A ustria” .26 O nce m ore a constitution was apparently accepted by the population because it was acceptable to the parties. T he first parliam entary election show ed that little had changed in the relative strengths o f the Lager, the People’s Party (ovp), broadly the successor o f the Christian-Socials. polled 50 per cent, the Socialists ( s p o ) 45 per cent and the C om m unists 5 per cent. T he Allied military authorities refused to license a party to represent the national-liberal L ager, and many o f its potential voters were am ong the 480,000 tem porarily disfranchised for their Nazi activities. W hen, in 1949, such a party was licensed and form er Nazis were again allowed to vote, it polled 12 per cent. N ot very much had shifted since 1911: Percentage Support f o r Lager 1911 -49 (post-1918 frontiers) 1911 M arxist L iberal-N ational C hristian-C onservative

29 18 53

1930

1949

42 16 42

44 12 44

One critical load o f which the A ustrian political system was relieved in 1945 was that of incorporation. The experience o f the Anschluss convinced most A ustrians that they wished to live in a sovereign state, bounded by the frontiers fixed at the Paris Peace Conference. For the first time since 1848 patriotism and the sense o f nationality could work tow ards the sam e goal. In every other respect the viability o f the system was still in question. As in 1918-19 its legitimacy depended on the com bined support o f the m ajor parties: if that support disappeared, so would the legitimacy. If the political parties concentrated their efforts on reconstructing and m aintaining their internal cohesion and ideological purity, then Lagerm entaliial would once m ore trium ph over com m on interest. All the initial evidence showed how tenacious were the habits o f life o f the sub-cultures. Party 26 A . Schiirf, D sterreichs W iederaufrichtung ini J ah re 1945. p. 74.

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en ro lm en t quickly rose to p re-w ar levels. T he s p o h ad over 600,000 m em bers by 1948; in the past twenty years between 36 and 38 per cent o f the p arty ’s electors have been paid-up mem­ bers, com pared with under 10 per cent in West G erm any. The effective m em bership of the o v p is about 515,000,27 representing som e 25-30 per cent o f its regular electorate - an extraordinarily high level for a European C hristian-D em ocratic party. Electoral participation exceeds 90 per cent in every one o f the nine prov­ inces, including those where voting is not compulsory. The ancillary organizations o f the political parties continued to flourish. T here are, according to the latest figures, 4,000 socialist philatelists, 11,000 socialist fishing enthusiasts and 85,000 socialist m otorists.38 T he parties’ rival athletic organizations vie in pro­ claiming their contributions to the country's Olympic medals. An elaborate multiple regression survey in 1965-6, using seven vari­ ables, cam e to the conclusion that three out o f five A ustrians are firmly integrated into either the working-class-socialist o r C atho­ lic-conservative sub-culture, and that the proportion o f persons susceptible to cross-pressures is exceptionally low .29

C O A L IT IO N IN T H E SEC O N D R E P U B L IC Although the extent of com m itm ent to the life o f the sub-cultures has not changed since the first republic, its intensity evidently has. The coalition governm ent which saw the second republic in lasted tw enty-one years, not a mere two. T he most pressing reason for continuing the coalition beyond the initial phase of political reconstruction was external. It was necessary to m aintain national unity in the face o f Allied military occupation which lasted until 1955. Even after the signature of the State Treaty there were diplom atic reasons for preserving the coalition, since a condition o f the treaty was “ perpetual neutral­ ity" on the part o f A u s tr ia - a condition which the Austrian public initially accepted only grudgingly, as the price to be paid for Soviet w ithdraw al, and which only later came to be seen as an ornam ent o f A ustrian sovereignty, rather than as a dim inution of it. The im portance o f the treaty for internal politics was that it enabled the coalition leaders to claim a patriotic achievement, unlike the political leaders o f the first republic, who had to bear :7 T h e difficulties o f assessing O V P m em bership are discussed in P. G . J. Pulzer. “ A u stria" in S. H enig & J . Pinder (eds.), European P olitical P arties, p. 295. 2HSozialistische Partei Osterreichs. B ericht an den P arteitag 1968. pp. 137, 130. 127. : i , K . Liepelt, “ Esquisse d 'u n e typologie des electeurs allem ands et autrich ien s," Revue frangaise de Sociologie, II (janvier-m ars 1968), pp . 16, 23.

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the odium o f having stabbed the em pire in the back. (The parallel with the fate o f the political parties o f West G erm any is strikingly suggestive.) These patriotic achievem ents, and their diplom atic co nsequences, q u ite a p a rt from th eir leg itim atin g effect, also ensured that there would be no revival o f the incorporation crisis. But there were also purely dom estic reasons which explain the slow solution o f the legitimacy crisis. I shall argue that the lon­ gevity o f the coalition; the m odes o f political collaboration devised within it; and the special relationship between the coali­ tion partners and the principal pressure groups have had a de-polarizing effect on the system. Ideology is not an end in A ustria. As the Liepelt survey has shown. Lager-based trad itio n ­ alism is widespread, but what was once a millenarian vision has become a set o f routinized dogm atic attitudes. T he L ager have not disintegrated. They have merely colluded in letting their am m unition rust. The character o f the parties has not changed beyond recognition. W hat has happened is that those wings o f the parties which favour peaceful co-existence have gained strength com pared with the inter-war period. Both before 1934 and since 1945 it was the party organizations o f the provinces which were m ore favourable to coalition than those o f V ienna,30 partly because the constitutions o f the eight non-m etropolitan provinces provide for coalition governm ent on the Swiss, collegial m odel. T he post-war shift o f econom ic and dem ographic preponderance from m etropolitan to provincial A us­ tria has had predictable political effects. The political dom inance o f m oderate men and the exigencies of foreign policy helped to m ake the coalition viable; but they would not have sufficed if the coalition had been unable to satisfy the aspirations of the country's m ajor organized interests. Polarity as it exists in A ustria can be explained in three ways. In the first place A ustria is unique am ong European polarized systems in having two overwhelmingly strong m ajor parties. In post-w ar elections they have totalled an average o f 87.4 p er cent o f the vote com pared with 88.7 p er cent in “ tw o-party” Britain. The reason for this, as I have suggested above, is th at the post1918 party alignm ent, like the p o st-1918 territory o f A ustria, was a fragm ent o f the m ulti-national, m ulti-party empire. T hen, the weakness of autonom ous pressure groups, and their dependence on political parties as patrons, m akes the articulation o f interests easier. W hen interest groups depend on the leadership o f ideological parties in m ulti-party systems, the result is fragm en­ tation o f interest representation - witness the rival trade unions and farm ers' organizations in Italy, France o r Belgium. In A us­ 30 A . W andruszka, op. cit., pp. 324. 344-5: 452, 455-6.

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tria there is no reason for this fragm entation. T he Liepelt survey dem onstrates what A ustrian political m anagers have for decades assum ed, that each m ajor interest group is alm ost exclusively integrated into one o f the Lager. O f the peasants 80 per cent are integrated into the C atholic sub-culture. Forty-nine per cent o f socialist support comes from industrial or white-collar workers who are classified as integrated and a further 24 per cent from industrial w orkers who are not fully integrated; the o v p draws only 5 per cent and 9 per cent respectively o f its support from these tw o groups.31 Finally, not only does each party effectively articulate one o f the m ajor interests in the country, it also aggregates them , as indeed it must in a tw o-party situation.

T he only group apparently cross-pressurized is that o f public sector employees (which includes a considerable proportion o f the country’s white-collar labour force). However, the conventions of party patronage elaborated under the coalition turned the “ red ” 31 A dapted from Liepelt, op. cit., pp. 18-19, p. 27. n. 8.

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and “ black” wings o f the public sector into virtually separate, non-com peting interests. The exceptionally clear-cut relationship between interest groups and parties contributed to the sm ooth functioning o f the coalition. Each party knew in which direction it had to look over its shoulder. The process was further facilitated by the corporatist traditions and sem i-corporatist institutions o f A ustrian econom ic life. Each m ajor econom ic interest is enrolled in a statutory representative organ known as a cham ber: the three most im por­ tant and politically significant o f these are the C ham ber o f C om ­ merce (H andelskam m er), the C ham ber o f A griculture (L andw irtschaftskam m er), and the C ham ber o f L abour (A rbeilskam m er), em bracing both industrial workers and clerical em ployees.32 Since’ elections to the executives o f these cham bers are by party list, the o v p perm anently dom inates the first two, the s p O the third. The sam e corporatist features are displayed by the internal constitu­ tion o f the People’s Party: m em bership is recruited through one o f three occupational “ leagues” - econom ic ( W irtschaftsbund), a g ricu ltu ral (B auernbund) an d w a g e -earn ers’ (A rb e ite r- und A ngestelltenbund). Leadership o f the cham bers, the leagues, and therefore also o f those ministries in the coalition which cam e under o v p patronage, overlapped heavily. The Socialist Party in contrast has a unitary structure, but there is a noticeable inter­ locking o f offices between its leaders, those o f the trade unions and those o f the C ham ber o f Labour. W hile the authority with which the party leaders acted owed much to the direct way in which they could speak for the m ajor interest organizations, it derived equally from the way in which the governm ental coalition functioned. The m odalities o f coalition politics recognized that it was the parties which, as in 1918, had “created” the organs o f state. T he character o f this control social (to repeat Bauer’s form ulation) was ratified by a series of coali­ tion pacts, first signed in 1947 and then repeated after every general election until 1962, which bound the signatories to an exclusive partnership, to be ended only by a dissolution of parlia­ m ent. At first these pacts were secret, but following a new spaper leak those o f 1956, 1959 and 1962 were published immediately on being signed. T he pacts provided for a coalition comm ission (K oalitionsausschuss) with pow er to decide any m atters o f inter­ pretation. Except for the two party leaders (who would be the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor o f the governm ent) the delegates to the comm ission were whips and party functionaries, not cabi•i: H. P. Secher, “ Representative Democracy or 'Chamber State': The Ambiguous Role of Inlerest Groups in Austrian Politics." Western Political Quarterly. Vol. 13 (December 1960) pp. 892-6.

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net m em bers. It is evident that in term s o f policy-m aking power the cabinet was subordinate to the com m ission, as parliam ent was subordinate to both, since it was the duty o f the parliam entary whips to ensure compliance with the decisions o f the comm ission. But even the comm ission was not completely m aster in its own house. The parties’ dom inance over the interest groups was strong, but not complete: “ business,” “ agriculture” and “ labour” do not, after all, constitute single, hom ogeneous lobbies, but are subject to intra-group rivalries. Especially in the period o f greatest econom ic stringency, from 1947 to 1952, the annual wage-price agreem ents, a national collective bargain in which the country’s leading politicians certainly participated but in which the cham ­ bers and trade unions cam e uniquely into their ow n, constituted “ the core o f political decision-m aking.” 33 T o that extent they presented fa ils accom plis to the bodies constitutionally designated for ratifying these agreements. The coalition’s style o f decision-m aking had its faults: it encouraged a corporatist im m obilism , protection for the least productive sectors, and inflation: it gave A ustria a p er capita income which is one-half that o f Switzerland. But it also created full employment and the beginnings o f consum er affluence, and both these m aterial satisfactions are a great im provem ent on the A ustrians’ previous experience. W hat the coalition did achieve, equally by its m ethods o f work and by the material im provem ents which took place under its aegis, was to defuse the crisis of distribution. Economic conflicts were no longer seen as driving inexorably tow ards civil w ar. The coalition equally helped to resolve the crisis o f participa­ tion. T he introduction o f universal suffrage in 1907, and o f full parliamentary' governm ent in 1918, had, o f course, gone a long way tow ards achieving this. N either o f these reforms, however, had given the non-official classes, represented by the extraparliam entary parties, full access to the adm inistration and the judiciary. Before 1918 both these branches had. at any rate in the higher ranks, been near-m onopolies o f the liberal bourgeoisie. T he academ ic requirem ents were stringent and m em bership o f the correct student corporation helped. A fter 1918, with governm ents dom inated by the C hristian-Social Party, the older elites had to share their privileges with nom inees o f the C artell-Verband, the Catholic academ ic corporation. But only in a limited num ber of municipalities, chiefly Vienna, was public service advancem ent open to persons o f working-class o r Jewish origin. This changed with the com ing o f the p o st-1945 coalition. U nder the term s o f the coalition pacts, each party gained partisan Ibid., p . m .

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I 75

patronage in the ministries and public corporations that it con­ trolled. T he right to nom inate rested on the P r o p o r z - the relative strengths o f the parties as revealed by the most recent election. The Proporz also applied to any new institutions that might be set up: the broadcasting services and the arm ed forces, as these were released from allied military control after 1955, or new universities and research institutes.34 Through the Proporz the socialists at last gained parity within the state, and it was one o f their main reasons for supporting the coalition. T he Proporz no doubt encouraged bureaucratization and car­ eerism in the spo, thereby offending som e rank-and-file mem bers. However, the num ber o f jobs at stake was large, partly as a result o f the nationalizations o f 1945-6. T he M inistry o f N ationalized Industries, headed from 1949 to 1956 by the chief sp o technocrat, Karl W aldbrunner, was the most im portant p art o f the socialist patronage machine, and one w hose partition the o v p achieved when they gained 8 seats in the 1956 election. W ith tw o of the heaviest critical loads shed, the chances that the crisis o f legitimacy might also be solved were im proved. There were still obstacles to this. M ost im portantly, the m achinery of econom ic consultation necessarily devalued the purely political institutions o f the c o u n try -p a rlia m e n t and the c a b in e t- a n d the purely political mechanism s, such as elections. Everybody knew that the real decisions were m ade by the cham bers, the caucuses and the coalition comm ission. In addition, a powerful factor in cem enting the coalition was precisely the mutual distrust which the two Lager had inherited as p art o f the com m on political culture. Only if shackled to each o th er by the coalition pact could they avert foul play. This explains why elections were only semicom petitive. Both the spo and the o v p pledged themselves in advance to continue the coalition after the election - this was true even in 1966 when the coalition was, in fact, not continued. N either o f the true opposition p a r tie s - th e com m unists on the Left and the revived liberal-national parties on the R ight35- h a d any prospect of sharing power. All that the election could decide was the exact proportions in which office was to be distributed within the next governm ent. G iven the rigidity o f voter loyalties the movem ents were necessarily m inute. Some aspects o f coalition governm ent suggested th at the coali­ tion was intended to be a perm anent feature o f the co untry’s 14 H. P. Secher, "Coalition Government: The Case of the Austrian Sec­ ond Republic,” American Political Science Review. Vol. 51 (Septem­ ber 1958). pp. 799-801.805-7. 35 League of Independents (vdu) until 1956, Freedom Party (fp6) thereafter.

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political life. T he Proporz was one sym ptom of this institutional­ ization. A nother was the convention o f “ departm ental opposi­ tio n ” S a 1940 (Uppsala, Almkvist and Wiksell, 1946).

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193

spread and perhaps excessive purge after the w ar struck Frenchspeaking Belgians as well as Flem ings.9 But, as after the First W orld W ar, the bitterest recollections o f the purge and the dem ands for an amnesty were those o f the Flemings. A fter the decim ation o f its leadership by the purge, Flemish nationalist action resumed slowly, at first under the cautious forms o f cultural and youth m ovem ents. In the 1950’s, the Volksunie could dem onstrate th at a Flemish federalist party had a perm anent, if m inor, place in regional and national politics. Between 1961 and 1965, it sharply increased its national represen­ tation, from five to 12 (out o f 212) H ouse m em bers, receiving in the 1965 election alm ost 12 percent o f the votes in the Flemish constituencies, and its potential appeal represented pressures upon the traditional political parties considerably greater than its own electoral showing. O utside o f Parliam ent, Flemish organizations were not above troubling the public order now and then. The Flemish Action C om m ittee for Brussels and the Language F rontier organized “ marches on Brussels'’ - the classic form o f Belgian protest - and other dem onstrations whose force impressed public opinion. For a tim e the Volksunie m aintained a param ilitary youth organiza­ tion. But, w hatever the latent threat to dem ocratic processes from som e “ hard” elements, up to 1965 they had done no m ore than interrupt services in several A ntw erp and G h en t churches that had French-language serm ons, deface French-language highway m arkers and business signs on Flem ish so il, a n d rough up bystanders in occasional “ border incidents” around Brussels. Economic developm ent, meanwhile, eliminated many Flemish disadvantages. An overwhelming percentage o f post-w ar invest­ ment, especially by foreign interests (notably A m erican), and most o f that in the new types o f industry, was in Flanders. While sub-m arginal old W alloon coal mines were being shut down, more productive new seam s were opened in Flanders. These changes would take tim e to produce their social and psychological and political consequences, even their clear eco­ nomic consequences. F or the tim e being, the W alloon provinces as a whole still had m ore o f the higher-w age industries and higher personal incomes than the Flemish provinces (with Brussels higher than either), but their lead was narrow ing. If the structural unem ploym ent which had so long plagued Flanders was finally on the way to being absorbed, in the 1950’s the Flemish provinces as a whole still showed alm ost 2 xh tim es as much unem ploym ent as ‘’ John Gilisscn, “ Etude statistique sur la repression de I’incivisme.” Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie, Vol. 31 (1950-51), pp. 513-628, especially the summary, pp. 624-626.

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the Walloon provinces.10 As one moved from secondary to university-level education, the ratio o f Flemish to French-language students was reversed, to the disadvantage o f the Flem ish. While the Dutch language was advancing. French still dom inated in the highest echelons o f the economy and adm in istratio n ."

TH E “ W A LLO O N PRO BLEM ” As long as W allonia had prospered and Francophones had run the nation, there had been no “ W alloon problem .” N o r was there a W alloon consciousness com parable to Flemish consciousness; people o f the southern provinces had long thought o f themselves m ore in local terms, as Liegois or men o f the Borinage, for example, than as W alloons. But increased regional consciousness was a byproduct o f econom ic distress and o f Flemish dem ands. By the 1950's, the shift in the relative econom ic position o f W allonia began to alarm a region once so confident o f its desti­ nies. To the continued experience o f dem ographic stagnation and decline in som e areas was joined the newer, m ore harrowing experience o f economic stagnation due to superannuated coal mines, old factories and equipm ent, and an industrial structure still reflecting the first Industrial Revolution. Frustrations and fears cam e to a head in a general strike o f 34 days’ duration in D ecem ber 1960 and January 1961. The strike began, over the opposition o f the national leaders o f the Socialist unions and party, as a protest against the PSC-Liberal govern­ m ent's om nibus economic retrenchm ent bill (the “ loi unique” ) after the loss o f the C ongo. Soon it turned in W allonia into a violent protest against governm ent and (incidentally) Socialist lead ers’ alleged neglect o f W alloon in terests. In th e h eat o f the strik e, as th eir im m ediate econom ic d em an d s w ere getting now here, left-Socialist trade union leaders o f the region switched to federalist dem ands. W hen they founded the W alloon People’s M ovem ent (M ouvem ent Populaire W allon, the m p w ), W alloon fed­ eralism for the first tim e had a mass organization. Flemish federalists proposed regional autonom y for its own sake or chiefly for cultural reasons. W alloon federalists proposed regional autonom y to im prove their region’s econom ic prospects and to carry out the socialist econom ic reforms they could not 10 L. Coetsier and A. Bonte. D oorstrom ing naar de universiteit (2 Vols.. Antwerp. Kulturraad voor Vlaanderen, 1963), Vol. II, p. 20. On student ratios, see Ibid. Vols. 1 and II. On ratios of higher civil servants, see E. Van Leuven, D e E vo ln tie van d e P ersoneelse ffe c tie v e n in O verh eid sd ien sl (Brussels (?), 1963?), pp. 25-27, offprint of two articles originally in the Tijdschrifl voor Besluurswetenschappen en p ubliek R echi (1962), nos. 4 and 5, pp. 230-237 and 304-319.

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win on a national basis. The m p w called itself a pressure group not afraid o f a term which alarm ed m any citizens but it led to a series o f independent political thrusts, mostly at the expense of the Belgian Socialist Party, eventuating in the Rassem blem ent W allon. W alloon Socialists very optimistically foresaw an absolute majority for themselves in their own region. But Flemish Social­ ists opposed a federalism which would leave them so clearly a minority in their region. The general strike and the form ation of the m p w exacerbated divisions betw een W alloons a n d Flem ings. Even m ore it exacerbated divisions between the right-wing majority and the small but significant left m inority which has been a perm a­ nent feature o f the Socialist trade unions and party.

T H E P R O B L E M O F B R U SSELS Brussels and its environs showed a special form o f the centerperiphery opposition to be seen in many nations. A pole for Flemish im m igration and the center of the n ation’s Frenchspeaking elites, Brussels becam e for Flemish leaders both a dom i­ nation to overcom e and a terra irredenta to recover. N ear the capital the old language frontier had shifted in the course o f a century o f national life, and the once quiet little Flemish city had become a French-speaking m etropolis. H ere not even D utch, let alone the Flemish dialects, could com pete with F re n c h - a n d most Flem ish spoke dialects rather than standard Dutch. F o r the culturally stronger language was also the language o f upw ard social and econom ic mobility. U ntil recently most Flemish im m igrants, or at least their children, w ere lost to Flem ­ ish culture. The 1932 laws to m ake Brussels bilingual in adm inis­ tration and education were honored in the breach by the au th o ri­ ties o f a num ber of predom inantly French-speaking com m unes of m etropolitan Brussels. Flemish citizens com plained that they did not feel at hom e in a national capital which looked dow n upon, and discrim inated against, their m other tongue. A nother dim ension o f the problem was that o f the migration o f Brussels families, mostly French-speaking, to the suburbs and rural com m unes o f surrounding Flemish Brabant. N aturally they w anted to use their own language and have their children taught in it. M ilitant Flem ings viewed this developm ent, not merely as a local m anifestation o f a universal urban-suburban m igration, but as a “ robbery o f Flemish soil.” F o r the proxim ity o f French speech would bring an increasing and intolerable com petition for Flemish. In other ways too, they saw an “ oil stain” spreading out from Brussels over the Flemish countryside. Some o f the new­ comers were indifferent Catholics, and som e freethinkers, and they disturbed the political balance in hitherto overwhelmingly

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Catholic Flemish com m unes. Even when the newcomers were indeed good Catholics, there were often conflicts with old settlers o f other traditional habits and outlook.

T H E L IN G U IS T IC L A W S O F T H E 1960’s In 1962 and 1963, the Catholic-Socialist governm ent managed, with the greatest difficulty, to put through a series o f laws, some giving greater force to old prescriptions and som e enacting new principles, in the hope o f taking language conflicts out o f national politics. The new principle was th at o f fixity o f the language frontier. O ne law 12 scrapped the 1932 principle o f adm inistrative conform ­ ity to language practices in com m unes along the language fron­ tier, as determ ined by a periodic language census. T he census had become m ore a referendum on preferences than a finding of facls about existing knowledge and use o f languages.13 The new law fixed the existing frontier14 and adm inistrative practices along it, in theory perm anently. Here was a long step tow ard an undeclared federalism .15 In behalf o f Flemish rights, another law sought to give more reality to official bilingualism in the m unicipal adm inistrations of the Brussels m etropolitan area, by creating sanctions and a mech­ anism for enforcem ent.16 In behalf o f the F rancophones, it rccog: nized som e o f the facts o f m igration out o f the capital to its outskirts by concessions in the language o f adm inistration in certain Flemish com m unes with large French-speaking minorities. A third in the triptych o f language laws confirmed the princi­ ple, accepted in the 1930’s, o f unilingualism in the schools o f Flanders and W allonia. But it aim ed to im prove the quality and augm ent the am ount o f instruction in the second language in each area. In m etropolitan Brussels it aim ed to provide m ore Flemish 12 Law of Nov. 8. 1962, M o n ite u r Beige (Nov. 22, 1962), pages 10315-10319. 13 Paul M. G. Levy, La Q uerelle du recensem eni (Brussels: Institut Beige de Science Politique, I960): Vlaams Aktiekomitee voor Brus­ sel en Taalgrens. Geen lalenielling (Brussels, 1959). 14 Some small shifts in administrative frontiers made eight of the nine provinces unilingual, four Flemish and four French in expression, with Brabant bilingual. The shift of some 4,500 inhabitants of a group of small towns (known in French as the Fourons) from Liege to Flemish-speaking Limburg province caused a wave of indignation in Wallonia. 15 On undeclared federalism in other forms, see the excellent article by Lode Claes, “ Het federaliseringsproces in Belgie,” Streven , April 1963 (English translation in Delta. Winter 1963-64, pp. 43-52). 16 Law of August 2, 1963, M oniteur Beige (Aug. 22, 1963), pp. 8217-8233.

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schools in francophone com m unes, while m aking it harder for Flemish parents to have their children educated in French schools.17 From Flemish m ovem ents and from Walloon and francophone circles alike cam e loud protests against the 1962-1963 legislation. In the painfully elaborated com prom ises between the two parties o f the majority and between their respective francophone and Flemish wings, ardent Flemings and Francophones alike saw only the concessions they had h ad to m ak e, and no t th e concessions m ade to them .

T H E IN T R A C T A B IL IT Y O F L IN G U IS T IC -R E G IO N A L O P P O S IT IO N S By the m id-1960's the linguistic-regional tensions appeared m ore intractable than those o f ideological difference o r social class. Why? 1. T he sentim ental and practical interests o f the linguistic com m unities were not effectively organized, and the geographical regions had no adm inistrative o r formal political existence as yet. T here were no recognized representatives qualified to form ulate dem ands, to negotiate, and to fulfill com m itm ents. T he 1962-1963 language laws were negotiated within and between the PSC and the PSB, the two governing parties. T his aggregation o f linguistic and regional claims by the governing parties was challenged, not only by the leading opposition party and by the regional and linguistic parties, but also by self-d esig n ated linguistic and regional spokesm en within the governing parties. 2. Inequality, the bane o f relations between man and m an, poisoned the relations o f the linguistic groups. Flem ings resented a continuing francophone snobbishness tow ard the Flemish lan­ guage, still touched with som e o f the old assum ptions of social superiority. French-speaking Belgians, always a numerical m inor­ ity, now feared to becom e a sociological minority. In addition to their numerical disadvantage, they lacked the feeling o f com m un­ ity (some said the “ national feeling” ) o f their Flem ish-speaking com patriots. Francophones had no concept a n d -sig n ifica n tly no phrase com parable to the powerful Flemish “ons volk.” And “ons volk" em braced the Flem ish-speaking people o f Brussels as well as Flanders; there was no such firm identification between W alloons and French-speaking Bruxellois. 3. F lem ings knew little o f W alloon th in k in g , an d W alloons even less o f Flemish thinking. O n any specific issue W alloons and even Flem ings were far from m onolithic, yet each group tended to see the other as a solid bloc opposing its vital interests.18 17 Law of July 30. 1963. Ibid., pp. 8210-8214. ,s Even the distinguished Catholic philosopher. Msgr. Jacques

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4. Many o f the Flem ish elite passed their days in a Brussels environm ent which kept linguistic sensitivities raw. If they worked in, or dealt w ith, national institutions in Brussels, they generally found French still the dom inant language. They m ight assert the rights of the D utch language to equality, at the cost o f frictions with Francophones who did not speak the second national lan­ guage. O r they might, as “good fellows," carry on in a language which many spoke fairly well, but few as they did their m other tongue, and at the cost o f frictions with m ore punctilious Flem ­ ings. 5. In the argum ents over the Brussels area, the thorniest complex o f linguistic opposition, Flemish and Francophones appealed past each other to different sets o f values. T he contrast was classic. In behalf o f the socially disadvantaged, the Flemish asserted the rights o f the collectivity; in behalf o f the socially dom inant, the Francophones asserted the rights o f the individual. The Flemish dem anded th at the State protect the continuity of their language com m unity, even against those of their own people who wished their children to be assimilated into the m ore presti­ gious language com m unity. T he Francophones defending Flemish individuals’ rights to choose the French language for their chil­ d ren ’s education, ignored the social and econom ic pressure, the “ silent intolerance,” 19 weighing upon hum bler Flemish in the Brussels milieu. 6. T here was an incongruity betw een many o f the basic p ro b ­ lems and the remedies sought. Legal equality for D utch could not alone m ake up for a lack o f precision, uniform ity, and style in m ost F lem in g s’ use o f th eir ow n language. N o official policy could preserve for th e W alloons an equal sh are o f responsible governm ent posts when their num bers were so much less than those o f the Flemish and when so few o f them m ade the effort to learn the oth er national language. 7. T he Flemish still saw themselves as oppressed, despite the political weight o f their num bers, the progress in use o f the Dutch language everywhere except in the Brussels area, and the recent econom ic growth in Flanders. W hat M ichael Balfour once called Leclercq. w ro te th at “ the Flem ish form a hom ogeneous com m un­ ity ."' L es C atholiques el la question wallonne (Liege: C om ite d 'etu d e p o u r une nouvelle action wallonne, 1963), p. 5. 19 T he phrase is that o f “ T elem achus" (cited above, note 6). p. 334. On the social bases o f the “ Flem ish problem ," see also “ O nze T a a lp o litie k c S p an n in g en en H un T o e k o m s t," D e M aand. Vol. 8 (1965), pp . 207-39, consisting o f a num ber o f critical com m ents by various au th o rs on my article, "F acto ren van conflict en factoren van sam en h o rig h eid ." in the sam e review, 7 (1964). pp. 596-604.

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“ the reflexes o f underdogs” 20 continued far beyond the conditions which had created them . The reflexes o f “ overdogs” o r form er overdogs were equally far from reality. T he W alloons looked backward too, recalling past security in the light o f their fears for the future. Brussels still determ ined and adm inistered much, too m uch, of the nation’s life, yet many Bruxellois felt threatened by Flemish aggressiveness and resentful o f W alloon indifference tow ard their special interests. In this unique national triangle of one oppressed majority and two oppressed m inorities, rational and tolerant discourse was not easy. 8. Local and regional leaders and interest groups com peted for public and private investm ent and for o th er advantages in public policy. Such norm al clashes o f local and regional economic interest were intensified because they were seen in the sentim ental light o f ethnic-linguistic conflict. 9. M oney had m et many o f the historic dem ands o f the working classes. G reatly enhanced public expenditures m ade the school pact acceptable to C atholic and to public institutions. M oney could meet regional econom ic dem ands. But money could do little to meet critical linguistic dem ands and counter-dem ands: it would not resolve to the satisfaction o f both parties the issue of w hether a child should be taught in D utch o r in French. 10. N ational sentim ent was m ilder in Belgium than in any other European nation except A ustria. Political socialization, especially in Flanders, emphasized th e regional rather than the national. Belgians knew a Flemish culture and a French culture (and in folklore a W alloon culture) - but hardly a Belgian culture. Except for the King, few national symbols had pow er to move or to hold. Even the m onarchy, although generally accepted, was far from universally p o p u lar. T h e arm y had little value as a symbol, because o f a realistic assessment o f its weakness in the nu­ clear age, and because o f the anti-m ilitarism traditional am ong the Flemish in general and am ong the Socialists in W allonia. The historic m em ories o f Flanders were regional rath er than national; the anniversary o f the Battle o f the G olden Spurs in 1302 evoked m ore enthusiasm than the national holiday com m em orating 1831, and the Flemish lion m ore enthusiasm than the national flag. In what other national capital o f a dem ocratic polity would federal­ ists have given the unfurling of the national colors as excuse for assault and battery?21 20 Michael J. L. G. Balfour. Stales and Mind (London: Cresset Press, 1953). p. 97. 21 In Wemmel. a Flemish suburb of Brussels, in June 1962. Flemish nationalist demonstrators assaulted some citizens from whose win­ dows flew the national colors. A Volksunie leader did not hesitate to

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In what other Western nation (except C anada) did informed citizens feel no taboo against public inquiry, not only as to w hether the national state would survive, but even as to whether it deserved to survive? “ W e are faced with this choice,” said the leading Flemish daily new spaper in its issue for the national holiday in 1964, “ either we reach an understanding as to how to continue to live together, or each o f us [each region or linguistic com m unity] goes its own way. Belgium is not condem ned, but it must prove its right to live.” 22 Discussion o f the survival o f Belgium added to the hazards of its continuance. T hat it continued despite the discussion was a tribute to the sang-froid o f the Belgians. It was also a reflection o f many factors o f sentim ent, o f institutions, and o f social and econom ic advantage w h ic h -a lo n g with in e rtia -c o n trib u te d to the national reality.

FA C TO R S O F U N IT Y 1. The C onstitution was, to be sure, no longer venerated as it had been. But, except for the federalist proposals, its institutions were accepted with little question. In the “ royal q uestion,” both sides had appealed to the C onstitution, while taking opposing views o f the constitutionality o f the K ing’s w artim e acts. In the long school conflict, neither side questioned th e constitutional provision for the freedom o f education while each asserted that only its own approach could realize that freedom in practice.23 2. The m onarchy, born with the nation, was a symbol o f its existence an d unity. E xcept for th e d ecad e o f th e 1940’s, the kings had been not only symbols, but m ediators. T he royal func­ tion had “ som e o f all three o f Max W eber’s ideal types o f power: the traditional, the charism atic, and the rational.” 24 3. C om m unal (m unicipal) politics, on the whole, served as a factor o f unity. The com m une was the norm al ladder to national political office, and a high percentage o f M .P .’s continued to hold com m unal office. With com m unal councils elected by p ro p o r­ tional representation, only a coalition could secure the needed m ajority in most o f the larger com m unes. M unicipal coalitions formed and fell apart with scant reference to ideology, and gener­ say, publicly and privately, that the (lags had been “ a provocation” to the dem onstrators. 22 M . Ruys, "B ouw en aan Belgie." De Sta n d a a rd (July 20-21). 1964, p. 1. :j On th e c o n s titu tio n , see th e excellent discussion in A n d re M ast, “ U n e C o n s titu tio n d u tem ps de L o u is -P h ilip p e ,” R evue de D roil Public e l de la Science P olitique (N ov.-D ec. 1957), pp. 987-1030. 24 “ La C o u ro n n e et Ic Pays,” Revue N ouvelle, 30 (July 15. 1959), p. 57.

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ally with little reference to national coalition patterns. Politicians thus were likely to have considerable experience o f alliance at one level o f governm ent with people they opposed at another level. On balance,25 this experience tended to dim inish hostilities am ong politicians by m aking the reasons for hostility seem relative rather than absolute. 4. Brussels had a “ national vocation.” Its very existence as a m etropolis depended upon the perform ance o f national political, adm inistrative, comm ercial, financial, and cultural services. O ut of interest and out o f sentim ent, Brussels needed the national fram e­ w ork; its new international “ vocation” did not obviate that necessity. Conversely, advocates o f regional separation o r federal­ ism a d eu x found Brussels the greatest stumbling-block. 5. Economic life reflected the national experience, and helped to shape it. M ost large industrial and financial enterprises were national. Exports and th e transit trade, upon which Belgium was so heavily dependent, called for national action. The highly struc­ tured system o f labor relations was largely on a national basis, and in no case on a regional basis. 6. M ost social and econom ic interests, except those o f a spe­ cifically local o r regional character, were organized nationally. N ational organizations preserved their unity by recognizing diver­ sity. Some differentiation between Flemish and French-speaking m em bers was im posed by lan g u ag e d ifferences. T h e form al or informal recognition o f tw o language com m unities or o f twoor-three regional interests perm itted national organizations to accom m odate differences in outlook and in style o f action am ong their W alloon, Flem ish, and Brussels m em berships. 7. If all the lines o f cleavage in Belgium had run in the same direction, the tensions might well have become unbearable. But each o f the other great factors o f division - religion, social class, and p a r ty - w a s also a factor o f national cohesion across regional and language lines. T he Church and the national labor and employer organizations were, at the the top, conscious of national responsibilities. In the political parties, although secondary leaders defended chiefly Flemish or W alloon o r francophone interests, the to p leaders assum ed an ex plicit role in th e ag g reg atio n of linguistic and regional claims.

T H E ID E O L O G IE S R E C E D E ; T H E P IL L A R S S T A N D By the school pact o f 1958, the p s c had consciously divested itself :5 “ On balance” only, since local frictions som etim es im pede national agreem ents and national frictions som etim es im pede o r disarrange local accords.

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o f the historic basis and the chief argum ent for C atholic political cohesion, as well as for the political intervention o f the hierarchy. T he school pact also took much o f w hat ideological starch there had been out o f the anti-clerical Socialist Party as well. The Liberals’ “ deconfessionalization” in 1961 was an appropriately timed bid to keep up with m ore pragm atic tim e s -m o r e prag­ m atic in reference to religious and political ideology, but not language. Floating voters had hitherto com e chiefly from the middle classes, less disciplined and less effectively organized by the ver­ zuiling system than workers and Flemish peasants. “ D o you know the Friendly Society, the U nion, the M ovem ent, the Party o f the Bourgeois?” ironically asked a C atholic em ployers’ jo u r­ nal.26 The 1965 elections showed that m ore working-class voters were moving into the floating-voter category. T o be sure, Belgian society was still rather highly stratified: there were sharp class differences in style o f life and in access to higher education, and workers felt the possibilities o f upw ard mobility to be very lim­ ited. But few workers concerned themselves with the structural reform s which would alter the locus o f econom ic pow er,37 while” most felt that w elfare-state benefits were assured under any con­ ceivable governm ent. T hus som e workers were moving into a m ore m odern age to vote, not along the lines o f econom ic group interest, but along those o f language. O r they might be protesting against the leadership o f parties and unions o f the system of verzuiling by voting along the linguistic or regional lines which escaped that system. T here were oth er signs o f dim inished verzuiling. T here were increasing contacts am ong the elites o f the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal worlds. The partial integration o f Socialist, Catholic, and L iberal friendly societies in to th e social in su ran ce system de-em phasized som ew hat the ideological-political bases o f their foundation. Yet if the ideologies of verzuiling receded, the pillars still stood. The thoughtful journal of a C atholic ginger group m ade light o f som e persons’ stress on the old philosophical and religious b ar­ riers “ . . . as if Belgium were peopled with philosophers and theo­ logians.” 28 But a year later the sam e jo urnal was com plaining -6 Jean N olet d e Brauwere. “ U n C oup d 'oeil sur les bourgeoisies." Bulletin Socia l des Industrie/s (April 1965). page 227. :7 See M arcel Bolle de Bal, "L es sociologues, la conscience de classe. et la g rande greve beige de I’hiver 196 0 -6 1." in Revue de I'ln s tilu t de Sociologie, (1961, no. 3), and M aurice C haum ont, “ G reves, syndicalism e et attitudes ouvrieres: les greves beiges de decem bre 1960-janvier 1961." R en te d e sociologie du travail. Vol. 4 (1962), pp. 142-158. 28 L a R eleve, M arch 7, 1964, p. 2. untitled article on G uy Cudell, unsigned (by F. Coupe).

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a b o u t t h e ex cess w e ig h t o f “ id e o lo g ic a l a - p r io r i ’s ” in p a r ty p r o ­ g r a m s .29 It w a s n o t th e p r o g ra m s o r e v e n th e id e o lo g ie s w h ic h c o n s ti­ tu te d th e c h ie f b a r r ie r s b e tw e e n p e o p le a n d p e o p le . B u t w h ile th e id e o lo g ie s b e c a m e P r iv a ts a c h e n , th e o r g a n iz a tio n s o rig in a lly b a s e d o n th e m h a d b e c o m e w ell e s ta b lis h e d in m o s t o f o r g a n iz e d so c ial life a n d in th e in n u m e r a b le a g e n c ie s o f a h ig h ly d e v e lo p e d a d m in ­ is tr a tiv e p lu r a lis m .30 In th e U n ite d S ta te s , m u ltip le m e m b e r s h ip s in v o lu n ta r y a s s o ­ c ia tio n s w e r e th o u g h t to d ilu te lo y a ltie s a n d lessen th e rig id ity o f in d iv id u a ls ’ a ttitu d e s . In B e lg iu m th e y re fle c te d a n d c o n f irm e d p r im a r y lo y a ltie s, s in c e th e in d iv id u a l’s m e m b e r s h ip s w e re o r d i ­ n a rily all w ith in o n e s p ir itu a l fa m ily a n d o n e la n g u a g e g r o u p . T h e S o c ia lists la c k e d t h e s c h o o ls a n d p a ris h o r g a n iz a tio n s , th e f a r m e r s ’ a n d m id d le -c la ss g r o u p s , o f t h e ir C a th o lic riv a ls. B u t th e y h a d o rg a n iz a tio n s o f m o s t o f th e o th e r c o n c e iv a b le s o c io ­ e c o n o m ic a n d c u ltu ra l in te re s ts , fro m p ig e o n fa n c ie rs to o ld -a g e p e n s io n e rs . T h e L ib e ra ls h a d a lm o s t a s m a n y , a lth o u g h g e n e ra lly less n u m e r o u s in m e m b e r s h ip . T h e r e w e re e v e n L ib e ra l tr a d e u n io n s , d iv id e d th o u g h th e y w e re , a n d a n o m a lo u s a s th e id e a w as to s o m e p l p le a d e rs. T h e la rg e s t c o m p le x o f v o lu n ta r y o rg a n iz a tio n s w a s th a t w h ic h a s s e rte d th e v a lu e s a n d in te re s ts o f C a th o lic is m . It w a s p o s s ib le to live o n e ’s life in a C a th o lic s u b - c u ltu r e : p a r is h , s c h o o l, y o u th m o v e m e n t, tr a d e u n io n o r f a r m e r s ’ le a g u e o r o t h e r o c c u p a tio n a l g r o u p , fa m ily a s s o c ia tio n , c o n s u m e r c o o p e r a tiv e , c r e d it u n io n , in s u r a n c e , frie n d ly so c ie ty , c lin ic a n d h o s p ita l, c u ltu r a l o r g a n iz a ­ tio n s , w o m e n ’s m o v e m e n t o r m e n ’s s tu d y g r o u p , a n d p e n s io n e rs ’ o r g a n iz a tio n . T h is w a s a so c io lo g ic a l o r “ p r o te c tiv e ” C h r is tia n ity , w h ic h to a n o ld e r C a th o lic m e n ta lity h a d th e v a lu e o f m in im iz in g th e “ d a n g e r o u s o u ts id e c o n ta c ts ” o f t h e fa ith fu l. T o m a n y e a r n e s t a n d th o u g h tfu l C a th o lic s a f te r th e w a r , h o w e v e r, it k e p t fello w C a th o lic s in a “ g h e t t o ” w h ic h w a s n o less c o n f i n i n g - a n d d is ­ c o u r a g in g to C h r is tia n w itn e s s - f o r b e in g th a t o f th e m o s t nu m er-^ o u s g r o u p in th e n a t i o n .31 T h e c o m p r e h e n s iv e n e s s o f C a th o lic s o c io -p o litic a l o r g a n iz a tio n o ffe re d its o w n c h a lle n g e h o w e v e r . T h e te n s io n s a m o n g th e so c ia lly d iv e rs e o r g a n iz a tio n s o f th e C a th o lic s u b - c u ltu r e w e re

29 "P ro g ram m es.” Ibid.. July 17, 1965. p. I. 30 See especially various num bers o f the Courrier H ebdom adaire o f the C en tre de Recherches et d 'ln fo rm atio n Socio-Politiques (c r is p ), 1959 - . 31 See the rem arkable sum m ary (unsigned) by Jules G erard-L ibois, “ D ebats actuels des C atholiques beiges,” Inform ations Catholiques Internationales (June 1, 1958), pp. 15-22. and a num ber o f Cour­ i e r s H ebdom adaires o f the CRISP.

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perhaps one o f the reasons for the greater recent vitality of C atholic labor organizations, as com pared to their Socialist rivals, who operated in a socially less heterogeneous sub-culture. Proportional representation for all recognized interests was enshrined in alm ost every aspect of life affected with a public interest. It ran from elected local and national political assem­ blies, the Central Economic Council and the jo in t collective bar­ gaining comm issions, to the three brass bands - Catholic, Social­ ist, and L ib e ra l-w h ic h sounded forth, with the aid o f subsidies, in any large city. The institutionalization o f the n atio n ’s particularism s in turn helped to m aintain the attitudes to which they had once given m ore m ilitant expression. T he attitudes rem ained after the ideolo­ gies had lost their thrust, as in A ustria under the continuing coalition and the “ proporz.” 32 In Belgium, in norm al tim es, these attitudes were pervasive rather than virulent, brooding rather than bellicose. If meaningful personal contacts with people o f other spiritual families were few, so were the occasions for personal hostility. F or m any, organizational m em bership was a dull gray rather than a m ilitant Red or a faithful Black. N orm al man would not be political man much o f the tim e. Even party m em bership - not to speak o f voting - might be, not an act o f com m itm ent o r even a prise de position, but only conform ism to a social milieu, a key to a housing project, o r an insurance policy for a career in a highly politicized civil service.33 Even the anti-heroes o f such behavior usually responded to dem ands for support on the set occasions o f political balloting or shop-or-office elections, or on the unpredictable occasions when a royal affair or a regional strike raised gusts o f old passions. As O tto K irchheim er dem onstrated in a now-classic essay, som e nineteenth-century forms o f opposition had indeed w aned.34 But that waning left the structure o f other old oppositions intact. Even 33 See the ch ap ter on A ustria by Frederick C . Engelmann in D ahl, (see above, note I). 33 See the adm irable essay by A ndre M olitor, “ L 'A dm inistration dans la societe beige,” in Institut Beige de Science Politique, A spects de la societe beige (B russels, 1958), p p . 113-134; J . V an d en d ries, “ L ’Influence d e la politique dans la vie de 1’adm inistration en Bel­ giq u e.” International Review o f A dm inistrative Sciences, Vol. 24 (1958). pp. 512-522; Victor C rabbe, “ Les Com m issions de reform e adm inistrative en Belgique.” Ibid., Vol. 20 (1954), pp. 869-903, and the reports o f the com m issions o f inquiry cited in that article; E. Van Leuven, cited in no te 11, above; also Val R . Lorwin. “ The Politicization o f the Bureaucracy in B elgium ," Stanford, C enter for A dvanced Study in th e Behavioral Sciences, 1962 (m im eographed). 34 O tto K irchheim er, “ T he W aning o f O pposition in Parliam entary

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if their ideological bases sank into the ground, the structures of verzuiling still conditioned the affinities and antipathies o f many people along old lines. How can one explain the contrast between the continuing pervasiveness o f verzuiling, on the one hand, a n d - o n the other hand - the recurrent eruptions o f disorder and the recent increase o f political action outside the system? At a fairly m odest level o f expectations, the system produced the services and the political representation satisfactory to an increasingly consum er-oriented society. But the decline o f ideolog­ ical com m itm ent on the part o f both organizations and masses opened the way to the unpredictable bursts o f individual indigna­ tion and collective protest against the bureaucratization and com ­ prom ise which were o f the very nature o f the successful operations o f verzuiling. People accepted, even took for granted, the services which they got from the verzuild social organizations integrated into the adm inistration of universalized welfare functions. But from time to unpredictable time, some o f them acted to kick over the traces o f affiliations which for their fathers and grandfathers had represented liberating movements. In all this Belgium was perhaps contributing only its own version o f apathy and alienation and the search for m ore m ean­ ingful forms o f political participation in a society whose com plex­ ity was so much greater than its size.35 Thus a pristine loyalty,' tied to the intimacies o f a once-scorned m other tongue or to the clouded destinies o f a once-proud region, moved som e people to action opposed to the com prom ises o f verzuiling. T o occasional outbursts and to continuing threats, the m anagers o f the system o f verzuiling responded by the tim e-honored policies o f concession and attem pted absorption. But the threats rem ained, and the pillars, still standing, w eakened.

P O S T S C R IP T BY T H E A U T H O R , J U L Y 1973 M ost o f my 1965 paper was already written before the Belgian national elections o f that year, which m arked a considerable rupture with the patterns of verzuiling politics; my paper took R egim es,” S o cia l Research. Vol. 24 (1957). reprinted in R. C. M acridis and B. E. Brown, eds.. C om parative P olitics (H om ew ood. III.: D orsey. 1961), pp. 216-227. C f. G abriel A. A lm ond, "A C o m ­ parative Study o f Interest G roups and the Political Process,” A m eri­ can P olitical Science Review , Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 270-282, and R obert A . D ahl, cited above, n o te I. 35 O n the basis o f her researches in Belgium. Renee C. Fox suggests wryly th at there m ay be an inverse relationship betw een the size o f a country and the com plexity o f its social system . “ Belgian M edical R esearch.” in Phillip E. H am m ond, ed.. Sociologists at W ork (N ew Y ork: Basic Books, 1964), p. 349.

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insufficient account of the changes which those elections indi­ cated. Since then the chief tendencies have been as follows: 1. A steady series o f gains for the linguistic and regional parties, in W allonia and even m ore in Brussels; least in Flanders, but significantly there too. T he most spectacular electoral achieve­ m ent o f these parties was the absolute majority o f the Front D em ocratique des Francophones in the elections for the assembly o f the newly created Brussels A gglom eration in late 1971. 2. The o b v e rs e -b o th cause and consequence o f the first phe­ nom enon - the steadily declining share o f total electoral o r affec­ tive support for the two m ajor national parties o f the verzuiling system, the Christian Socials and the Socialists. 3. The general decline o f the segm entation on religiousideological lines o f Belgian society and politics. This phenom enon o f “ ontzuiling" I have discussed in com parative perspective in “ Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohe­ sion in the Smaller European D em ocracies,” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, N o. 2 (January 1971), pp. 141-75 [cf. above, 33-69] 4. C ontinued moves tow ard federalism on language and regional lines in Belgian governm ent, politics, and society. C onsti­ tutional revision has produced som e Byzantine patterns o f institu­ tions, whose scope, functioning, and resource allocations are still (in m id -1973) very far from clear to most m em bers o f the politi­ cal class, let alone even the most conscientious o f average voters. 1 have discussed the background o f these changes in “ Linguistic Pluralism and Political Tension in M odern Belgium,” in J. A. Fishm an, ed.. Advances in the Sociology o f Language, (Paris and T he Hague: M outon, 1972), vol. II, pp. 386-412. 5. The m aintenance, nevertheless, o f most o f the structures o f segm ented pluralism or consociational democracy in Belgium.

S W IT Z E R L A N D : G E O G R A P H Y O F T H E SW ISS PA R T Y SY STE M Roger G irod Source: R. G iro d , “ G eography o f th e Swiss Party System ” , in E. A llardt and Y. L ittunen, eds., Cleavages. Ideologies and P arty S y s te m s, T ransactions o f th e W esterm arck Society. Vol 10 (H el­ sinki, 1964), 132-161. R eprinted by perm ission o f the editors and th e author.

The party system which operates in Switzerland today is w ithout doubt of a particular kind. All the parties, with the exception of certain marginal groups, cooperate on a perm anent basis within the executive councils. This overall alliance is not in any way disturbed by com petition in elections, which serve only to record the very small fluctuations in party popularity. Such com petition also enables rival forces within each party (right and left tenden­ cies, urban and rural factions, contesting leaders, etc.) to test their influence. This system applies m ore or less to the whole country. It presents itself according to regions as well as levels (federal, cantonal, com m unal) under varied aspects. This article will be devoted to examining in a very prelim inary way som e aspects of these variations. Chiefly, the article aims at classifying the differ­ ent forms o f the Swiss party system into several broad categories. A few rem arks will however be m ade on the question o f deter­ mining w hether each one of these categories corresponds to a definite type o f social organisation. The relationship of the parties on the federal level is fairly widely know n. Therefore this point will only be m entioned w ith­ out developm ent. A m ore detailed exam ination will be m ade of the system (num ber o f parties, relative im portance, style o f their relationship) found on the cantonal level. A com parative analysis of these systems may prove to be interesting, since as far as we know no such analysis has been m ade to date, although on the whole Swiss political life is mainly on a cantonal basis.1 1 W illiam R appard, The G overnm ent o f S w itzerla n d (New York, 1936). in p articular pp. 31 and 104-105. T his au th o r em phasizes the fact th at in Switzerland th e activity o f their cantonal grouping deter­ m ines the existence o f political parties. N ational com m ittees have but lim ited influence over these groups. "In fact it could not unreasonably be claim ed that, w ith the possible exception o f the socialist party, there w ere no autonom ous national parties in Sw itzerland, b ut only alliances for federal pur­ poses o f otherw ise com pletely independent cantonal organizations.” It m ay also be added th at the role o f national party “great leader”

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Inform ation on this point has mainly been draw n from the answers given by all the cantonal chancelleries to several question­ naires which we had sent them . W e would like to extend our thanks to the chancelleries for th at help.2 An outline o f the conditions to be found on the comm unal level will also be given, reference being m ade solely to the case of the Genevese elections. A few o f the lim itations to this work must be pointed out. The question o f the influence o f the electoral system on the party form ula will only be briefly touched on, not because the question is considered unim portant but rather because it was thought preferable not to enlarge upon an already broad subject. A part from a few historical rem inders, the period under consid­ eration in this article is that which stretches from 1945 till the 1960’s. Before that period the Swiss party system was rather differ­ ent. We leave aside the parties and miscellaneous groups (for the m ost part ephem eral and unim portant) which have taken part in the elections under consideration, but w ithout ever having a single candidate elected.

I. O N T H E F E D E R A L L E V E L T he C onfederation is governed by an executive collegiate body consisting o f seven m em bers (the Federal Council) elected by the federal assembly which is m ade up o f two cham bers, the N ational C ouncil and the Council o f States. T he m em bers o f the N ational Council are directly elected by the people, according to the sys­ tem o f proportional representation based on population. Each canton or half-canton3 constitutes an electoral district and elects at least one representative. T oday the council comprises 200 repre­ sentatives. The Council o f States consists o f 44 m em bers, two for each canton and one for each half-canton. T he sam e m ethod o f does n o t exist in Sw itzerland. On th e contrary, parties have cantonal leading figures w ho are generally unknow n to the average citizen in the rest o f th e country. N ot even the C om m unist party has a national figure-head, a kind o f Swiss T horez o r T oglialti, but has a leading team in every canton where it is represented. 2 W e also like to thank the D epartm ent o f H om e and A gricultural Affairs o f G eneva, to w hose rem arkably kept archives we were given access. M r. F irouz Tofigh and M r. Jean-C laude T hoenig proved to be w orthy collaborators during the preparation o f this study. ' The cantons o f Basle, Appenzell and U nterw alden are divided (Basle-City and B asle-Country, Appenzell A usser R hoden and Inner R hoden, O bw alden and N idw alden). Each o f these half-cantons is a sovereign state with its own governm ent, but elects only on e state representative to the Council o f S tates instead o f tw o.

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electing m em bers o f this Council does not prevail everywhere (17 cantons elect their m em bers by secret popular vote, 4 by the cantonal legislature, and 4 by the L andsgem einde which is an open-air gathering o f all citizens.) T he present-day balance o f pow er in these institutions is the result o f a slow political evolution. F o r nearly fifty years the Radical party4 dom inated federal politics. It was not until 1891 that a representative o f the Catholic-C onservative party5 became a m em ber o f the Federal Council. Since 1919 this last party has occupied two seats in the Federal Council. Since then, writes R appard, “ the Radicals and Conserv­ atives have, as a rule, supported together the com m on govern­ mental measures and have constantly voted for each o th er’s can ­ didates in all im portant elections.” 6 In 1929 the Bourgeois and Farm ers party, a regional group (see T able I) formed ten years earlier, representing a type o f radicalism broken away from its progressive tendencies, gained a seat in the Federal Council. T he admission o f a m em ber o f this party to the Federal governm ent was then considered useful by the governing forces for strengthening the ranks o f anti-Socialists. Since then the Bourgeois and Farm ers party has retained this seat. But the Socialists, w ho had become m ore and m ore m oderate in a rapidly changing world, gaining som e seats in the N ational Council, whilst the Radicals were experiencing a contrary move, managed to have a federal councillor elected in 1943 due to the closely knit political union of the time. Since 1959 they have held two seats. The com position o f the Federal Council today is the follow ing: tw o R adicals, tw o S ocialists, tw o C ath o licConservatives, and one Bourgeois and Farm ers. It corresponds m ore or less to the com position o f the N ational Council, whose figures are shown below for the years 1925, 1935, and 1963. 1 T he Radical party (which is nam ed differently according to cantons) exists in nearly all parts o f the country. N early all levels o f society are influenced by it. It can be seen in various forms: opposition in C atholic cantons, the traditional party in rural Protestant regions, the party o f the com m on m an in tow ns, in close relations also with big business. 5 T he o th er party active throughout nearly the w hole country. O pen to all C hristians, but in fact essentially C atholic. It is as varied in its com ponents as the Radical party. T he party has a Christian-social wing with progressive tendencies an d am ongst which certain m em ­ bers have clearly left tendencies. T he party will be called the C atholic-Conservative party in this study although the nam e m ay not be the sam e throughout the country. 6 Op. cit., p. 97.

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Seats

Party

C atholic-C onservative Radical Liberal Bourgeois and Farm ers Socialist Independent party Dem ocrats Com m unist O thers Total

1925

1935

19637

42 60 7 30 49 — 5 3 2 198

42 48 6 21 50 7 4 2 7 187

48 51 6 22 53 10 4 4 28 200

T his table shows not only the basic stability o f the political forces, but also clearly indicates that the lower house is dom i­ nated by three m ajor political parties, the Catholic, Socialist and Radical. A few m oderate regional groups may be added, amongst which the most im portant, the Bourgeois and Farm ers, is repre­ sented in the governm ent. The others (L iberal,9 D em ocrat,10 In d e p e n d e n t" ) have a g o v ern m en tal o rie n ta tio n in varying degrees. T he very small Com m unist party alone does not enter at all into the governm ental circle. Any Socialist penetration into the Council o f States is difficult. An appreciable num ber o f the m em bers o f this institution are elected by cantons in the m ountains regions, where the Socialist party plays only a small role. In the other cantons the middleclass parties represent the m ajority, and thus the chances o f Socialist candidates being elected are very small, except under certain circumstances. In N ovem ber 1963 the Council o f States was m ade up in the following m anner (in parentheses its com position in 1925): Catholic-Conservatives 18 (18); Radicals 13 (21); Socialists 3 (2); Bourgeois and Farm ers 4 (I)); Liberals 3 (1); D em ocrats and Evangelicals 3 (1). 7 A fter the elections o f 25-27 O ctober 1963. 8 T he Evangelical party o f Z urich. 9 T he Liberal p arty today is a regional group (see T able I) with right tendencies, draw n from Protestant circles mainly. T he "Jo u rn al de G en ev e " and the “ G azette de L ausanne” arc its m ain Frenchlanguage m outhpieces. 10 Regional party (See T able I). Placed generally in the category o f centre. 11 Regional p arty (See T ab le I). Pro-dynam ic econom y, guaranteeing satisfactory living conditions for the people.

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II. O N T H E C A N T O N A L L E V E L A unicam eral system is found in the cantons. The m em bers o f the “ G rand Conseil” (nam e given to the legislative body in Frenchspeaking cantons) are elected on the basis o f proportional repre­ sentation. with the exception o f som e cantons that have retained the majority vote system (see table I). Each canton is governed by a collegiate Executive Council. T his Executive Council is elected by popular vote, either by secret ballot as in 20 o f the cantons, or by a show o f hands in the Landsgem einde (O bwalden, Nidwalden, G la ris, A ppenzell A usser R h o d en , A ppenzell In n er Rhoden). T able I (which shows the party structure o f the G rand Conseil o f the different cantons just following the Second W orld W ar, and today) and Table II (showing the party structure o f the cantonal Executive Councils at approxim ately the same tim e) will enable us to distinguish the form s o f the party system in the different cantons. In order to define these forms, certain expres­ sions utilized by M aurice D uverger in his terminology, o r term s suggested by that term inology, will be used.12 T here should how ­ ever be no confusion in the reader’s mind: Duverger proposed his classification in order to distinguish between a series of com ­ pletely different systems, whereas in this case the classification is being used to distinguish the variations in one system. This system, as was explained at the beginning, is defined by a tend­ ency tow ards an overall perm anent alliance within the executive itself, o f all the parties having a m inim um o f im portance. F o r this reason, we shall speak here o f different “ form ulas” (the “ for­ m ula” o f the predom inant party, the “ form ula” o f multipartism , etc.) and not o f different systems. These “ form ulas” correspond to different ways of practising the system. T he cantons will be divided into tw o basic groups: those where the G rand Conseil and the Executive Council are dom inated by one party, and those which have a m ultiparty form ula. A subdivi­ sion will be m ade in each one o f these categories.

A ) F O R M U L A O F T H E D O M IN A N T P A R T Y In this group, a distinction is to be m ade between the formula o f the solitary party and the formula o f the predom inant party. /. Solitary Party. An extreme form o f the dom inant party for­ mula exists in one canton, Appenzell Inner R hoden. The som e­ what cheerless nam e o f solitary party may apply particularly well 12 M aurice D uverger, L es p artis politiques (4th ed., Paris, 1961), and the chapter on “ Sociologie des partis” prepared by th e sam e author for the T raite de Sociologie, published under the direction o f G eorges G urvitch, V olum e II, Paris, I960, pp. 22-45.

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in this case: in this canton, the Catholic-C onservative party finds itself w ithout any partner to play the gam e o f pluralism as this party does everywhere else in the country. All the m em bers o f the executive belong to this party, and there is no partisan opposition within the legislative assembly. O pposition, o f course, is always possible. All the different trends o f thought found throughout the country may be expressed freely w ithout hindrance. T his formula has therefore nothing in com m on with the authoritarian versions o f the one-party system. If a political m ovem ent succeeded in grouping together a certain num ber o f citizens outside the C atho­ lic-Conservative party, it may safely be said that this new move­ m ent would soon be represented in the executive, as for example, the Socialist m inority at Appenzell A usser R hoden, Zoug or Schwyz. F or that reason, the solitary party form ula belongs in essence to the above defined party system which tends tow ards an overall alliance o f all political forces. T his formula is but one incomplete (em bryonic or degenerate) variety o f that system. In the case o f Appenzell Inner R hoden, party pluralism seems to have become impossible for purely sociological reasons. It would be interesting to specify these reasons in greater detail. For the present, it can be m aintained that the solitary party formula o f this very old, small and m ountainous republic o f C atholic faith (with a total population o f 13,000, of whom nearly 5,000 inhabit the m ain town which is simply a large village) is the result o f its marked religious unity, o f the econom ic and social hom ogeneity o f its people, and o f the simplicity and cohesion o f its traditional hierarchic structure. In the state doctrine nothing prevents a mul­ tiparty form ula. The com m on practice o f all cantons strongly favours plurality. However, in Appenzell Inner R hoden, ap par­ ently because o f an insufficient social differentiation, an opposi­ tion party capable of lasting has not taken root. In fact, the Radical party ceased all activities twenty years ago. T his situation would only be o f folkloric interest, were it not a norm al case in traditionally rural com m unities not only in Switz­ erland but in other countries as well. It shows that even when the system applied by the rest o f the country is one o f strong plural­ ism, as it is in the case o f Switzerland, party plurality is not possible under a certain level o f evolution. T he solitary party in Appenzell Inner R hoden seems to corre­ spond approxim ately to these movem ents which form at election tim e in rural com m unes o f the traditional type with a political colour which is rather vague. T he Catholic-C onservative party in this canton appears to limit its activities to an annual assembly at which 3 0 - 4 0 citizens participate. It should be m entioned th at the idea o f a party is hardly more consistent in the other small and m ountainous cantons.

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In Appenzell A usser R hoden, as a footnote to Table II shows, a num ber o f m em bers o f the Executive Council have only a very loose connection with the predom inant party to which they are statistically assigned. In N idw alden the parties disappeared for several years one generation ago, and were replaced by two pressure groups, one supporting the building o f an electrical pow er plant, and the other opposing it. This situation has since changed and once again the party names are used to classify political leaders. T he federal statisticians, for instance, consider that the m em bers of the legislative councils o f the two Appenzells and O bwalden cannot be classified by party (see Table I). 2. The Predom inant Party. T his term is used here to describe one strong form o f the dom inant party form ula. The predom inant party enjoys a double advantage: its ideological inspiration is in close harm ony with the cultural and religious traditions o f the bulk o f the population; on the o th er hand, the party had in the past and continues to have the absolute m ajority o f the legislative body at its disposal. Even in that case, in present-day Switzer­ land, the m inority party (or parties) is represented in the execu­ tive, with the exception o f extremely small groups. T he cantons w here this formula is found are Appenzell Ausser Rhoden (P rotestant) and all the cantons which during the Civil W ar o f 1847 form ed the C atholic league called the Sonderbund (Lucerne, U ri, Schwyz, O bw alden, N idw alden, Zoug, Fribourg and Valais). The fact that these cantons even today form a singular group must indeed draw one’s attention to the astonishing perm anence o f certain fundam ental political characteristics. It is impossible to explain these essential characteristics simply by com parisons o f the present degree o f econom ic developm ent in the different cantons, in term s o f production, standards o f living, and so on. An adequate explanation cannot be found either in the language difference (Valais and Fribourg are mainly French-speaking) o r in the co n trastin g electoral system s. S om e o f th e can to n s in qu es­ tion elect their legislative council on a m ajoritarian basis (for the most part the smallest o f these cantons, and those where on the whole the Catholic-C onservative party is the m ore predom inant), but in the rem ainder o f this group o f cantons this election is organized according to the proportional system. T he Catholic-Conservative m ovem ent dom inates these Sonder­ bund cantons. In som e o f them the Social-Christian groups con­ stitute a special organization with a certain degree o f autonom y. T he C atholic forces have a special m argin o f safety in U ri, N idw alden and Obwalden, as well as in the Valais. These cantons form the most m ountainous regions o f C atholic Switzerland. The

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C atholic superiority is less overwhelm ing in Lucerne, Schwyz, Zoug and Fribourg. In the cantons o f the Sonderbund, the num ber o f parties is between two and five. In Obwalden the tw o local parties form the Executive Council. In Schwyz, where three parties are represented in the G rand Conseil, these three parties form the Executive C oun­ cil. However, in the latter canton, the Socialist party has only about 15 deputies out o f the total o f 105 in the cantonal legislature. In Nidw alden, the Radical party has representatives in the Executive Council but not the Socialists whose establishm ent is only recent and who have very few electors, and only one deputy in the legisla­ tive body. In U ri, Fribourg and the Valais, the Socialist m inority is not represented in the executive. T his m inority am ounts to between 5 and 9 per cent o f the representatives in the legislative body. How­ ever, in Lucerne and Zoug, where the Socialist party has roughly the sam e degree o f im portance (7.7 per cent o f the deputies in the for­ m er and 10.5 per cent in the latter) a place in the governm ent has been accorded to it. In the two latter cantons the Independent party, which is active but very small, is the only party rem aining outside the executive. In Appenzell Ausser R hoden, the Radical party traditionally holds six out o f the seven seats within the Executive Council, the last seat being held by the Socialist party. T he presence o f this Protestant canton within the category o f those which practise the predom inant party formula, would indicate that religion as such is not at the basis o f this solution. The reasons for the establishment o f this com bination of political forces may be sought rather in econom ic and social history. T he cantons w ith a solitary party o r a predom inant party form ula num ber ten in all. They are mainly sparsely populated regions with a total population o f approxim ately 690,000, which is 12.5 per cent o f the total population o f the country. In the Council o f States their influence is quite large (16 deputies out o f 44) but in the N ational Council they have only 33 deputies out o f

200 .

B) F O R M U L A O F M U L T I P A R T IS M In the majority of the States o f the C onfederation the political equilibrium is o f the m ultiparty type. N ot w ithout a minim um of discretion, two cases may be characterized: the three-party for­ mula and the pronounced m ultiparty formula. 1. The Three-Party Formula. In this case, three parties dom inate the political life o f the canton, none o f the three having a m ajor­ ity in the G ran d Conseil, all three (and only they) being repre­ sented regularly in the Executive Council. This is to be found in the cantons of Berne, Soleure, Schaffhouse, St-Gall and Ticino.

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The three dom inating parties in the cantons o f Berne and Schaffhouse are the Radicals, the Bourgeois a n d Farm ers, and the Socialists. In Ticino, St-Gall and Soleure, the three dom in at­ ing parties being Radical, C atholic-Conservative, and Socialist. Berne and Schaffhouse are cantons with a large Protestant majority w here the num ber o f C atholic electors is relatively small. Industry has brought about a Social D em ocrat tendency, m ore to the left than the Radicals. On the other hand, the Bourgeois and Farm ers party reacted by gaining im portance on the right wing. The political pow er is therefore mainly shared by these three political parties. In Ticino, a C atholic canton, one finds a situa­ tion com m on to a Latin milieu. The present day Radicals are the mild inheritors o f an anti-clerical tradition which had its period of virulence in the past. They have slightly m ore seats in the G rand Conseil than the Catholic-Conservatives. The Socialist party con­ stitutes a third fairly im portant group. In Soleure and St-Gall, which are mixed from a religious point o f view, the sam e three parties form the m ajor political forces. But here the political climate is o f a rather different kind. In Soleure the three-party form ula applies in its pure form, for only three parties have deputies in the G rand Conseil, and these three parties are represented in the executive. In Ticino there are four parties represented in the legislative assembly. The very weak C om m unist party is not included in the executive. In St-Gall the Independent party has a small num ber o f deputies, but no state councillors, and a fifth party, the “ Free Conservatives” has a single deputy in the G rand Conseil. In Berne there are seven parties and in Schaffhouse there are eight. T he four parties in Berne, which take no part in governm ental responsibilities, are small. The C atholic-Conservatives have eleven deputies ou t of 200, the Independent and P opular Evangelical parties have one each, and the “ Y outh of Berne” party has two. In Schaffhouse the situation is m ore or less similar. 2. Pronounced M ultiple P arly Formula. F our parties (possibly m ore) are represented in the Executive Council, and the num ber o f those who play a certain role in the G ran d Conseil may be higher. N one o f these parties has a m ajority in the G ran d C on­ seil. The form ula is the sam e on the federal level, as we have seen. In 1962, in the cantons which are being considered here, the Executive Council had the following characteristics: a) It was com posed o f representatives o f four parties. b) In none o f these cantons did any one o f these parties constitute the m ajority in the executive body. (T he parties with the greatest num ber o f representatives were the Rad-

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icals in the canton o f Vaud with 3 out o f the 7 seats, and the Socialists in Basle-City who also had 3 o u t o f the 7 seats.) c) In each o f these cantons the Radical and the Socialist parties belong to the governm ental team along with two m oderate parties. Consequently in every case the non­ socialist forces are dom inant. T he two m oderate parties whose representatives cooperate on a governm ental level with representatives o f the Socialist and R adi­ cal parties differ from canton to canton. In seven cantons, (Glaris, G risons, Basle-Country, Basle-City, Argovie, Thurgovie, G eneva) the Catholic-Conservative party is represented. T he second m od­ erate party is generally either the D em ocratic o r the Bourgeois and Farm ers in the G erm an-speaking p art o f Switzerland. In G eneva and Basle-City it is the Liberal party. In Z u rich ,13 Vaud and N euchatel the Catholic-C onservative party is not represented in the governm ent. In the form er o f these three cantons, both the Independent party and the Bourgeois and Farm ers are to be found in the executive. In N euchatel the N ational Progressive party (centre-right) works in conjunction with the Liberal, Social­ ist and Radical parties. In 1946 the Radical party still had a m ajority in the canton o f V aud’s Executive Council. A t the sam e tim e, the executive coun­ cillors o f Basle-City were taken from 5 parties (1 C om m unist in addition to the representatives o f the 4 other parties). In N eucha­ tel there w ere also representatives o f 5 parties in the executive (including 2 local parties). G laris has only four parties in the G rand Conseil and all are represented in the executive. F o r the other cases, rem arks con­ cerning the cantons with a three-party form ula may be repeated here. T hose parties which have no executive councillor according to table II carry negligible electoral weight except in two possible cases: that o f the Catholic-C onservative party in Zurich (this exception disappeared in 1963, see footnote 13) and the C om m unist party in G eneva.14 T he work o f electoral coalitions prevented this p arty from belonging to the executive after its p o st-w ar success 13 In A p ril 1963 (T a b le II en d s in 1962) a re p re se n ta tiv e o f the C a th o lic -C o n se rv a tiv e p arty b ecam e a m em b er o f th e E xecutive Council o f Z urich. T his council was subsequently m ade up o f repre­ sentatives o f 5 parties, and no longer four: 2 Bourgeois and Farm ers, 1 S o cialist, 2 R ad icals, I In d e p e n d e n t p a rty , 1 C a th o licConservative. 14 A nd also lately in th e cantons o f Vaud an d N euchatel, w here the C om m unist party has had a relatively im portant representation in th e legislative body.

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(except in Basle-City ju st after the war) and continues to have the sam e effect now that it is losing im portance. T he fact that this party has no representative in the cantonal executive does not prevent it from being active on the legislative level in cantons where it has som e influence on public opinion. In the sam e regions this party has also an appreciable critical action through its press (not mentioning the role it plays at the municipal level). F ear o f seeing the C om m un­ ists increase their influence has m ade the other parties feel more sharply the need for reform. This may be one o f the reasons for the d isp arity in m atters o f social legislation b etw een th e c an to n s of G eneva, V aud, and N euchatel on one side, and the majority o f other cantons during recent years. A ttention should also be draw n to the fact that those cantons in which there is a pronounced m ultipartism , do not have m ore parties than those with a three-party formula: 5 o r 6 in G eneva, N euchatel, Vaud and Thurgovie; 8 in Basle-City, Basle C ountry. Zurich and Argovie. The balance o f pow er between the parties is simply different. Because o f the particular state o f the social structures, a fourth group and som etim es a fifth has been able to gain sufficient support to have at least one executive councillor elected.

III. O N T H E C O M M U N A L L E V E L It is obvious that the political party formula in a canton does not necessarily apply to the com m unes. A few rem arks will be made to clarify this point, w ithout going into too much detail. Even in the very small region o f G eneva, there are very m arked political contrasts from the point o f view o f the relative influence of the different parties between tw o groups o f com ­ munes. These contrasts have very ancient historical origins, as the m ajor differences shown between the cantons had. T he first of these two groups o f com m unes is formed by those comm unes which were formerly possessions o f the old Protestant Republic, and the second by those C atholic com m unes ceded by F rance and Sardinia just after the N apoleonic wars. F or example, in the elections o f the G eneva G rand Conseil, the left parties obtain very few votes in the com m unes o f the first group (apart from som e which have becom e suburban constituen­ cies). The Catholic-C onservative party does not obtain any great num ber. This indicates that the Radical and Liberal parties are predom inant. These two parties alone get between 75 p er cent and 85 per cent o f the votes in the m ajority o f these com m unes, and between 60 per cent and 75 per cent in the others. In the most typical cases, the Radical party alone has the majority, getting approxim ately 55 per cent to 70 per cent o f the votes. However, in certain m ore residential com m unes the num ber of

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Liberal electors is usually greater than that o f the Radical elec­ to rs.15 In the majority o f the com m unes of the second type (excluding also those purely suburban) the situation tends to be reversed in favour o f the Catholic-C onservative party. But the m ajority is not generally overwhelming. T his applies only to cantonal elections w here the c a n to n consti­ tutes a single electoral district. Every party draws up a list of candidates, which are therefore the sam e in all the comm unes. M unicipal elections (com munal councils, m ayors and their depu­ ties) are obviously quite different. In the small com m unes (up to 800 inhabitants) the election of the municipal council (7-11 m em bers according to the num ber of inhabitants) is by the m ajority vote system. Q uite often the local political com m ittees (that is to say a few “ notables” ) agree am ongst each other on drawing up a single balanced list, to gain the satisfaction o f the main groups of electors, naturally starting with the traditionally predom inant categories. The num ber of candidates on the list is equal to the num ber o f seats to be filled. Form erly, election was understood (“ tacit” ) in such cases. Today the election takes place and for the candidates to be elected they must obtain at least one third o f the votes cast. In other small com m unes two or m ore lists oppose each other, with non-political labels (list of com m unal interests, com m unal defence, and so on). H owever, these lists are drawn up according to m ore o r less vague ideological affinities and to local interests. T hat may give them a certain political character. In comm unes o f m ore than 800 inhabitants, the m unicipal councillors (from 13 to 25 according to com m une, apart from the city o f G eneva which elects a council o f 80 m em bers) are elected according to the system o f proportional representation. In som e o f these com m unes, amongst the less urbanized, only non-political lists are presented. But in the others the parties draw up lists (only two o r three parties in the com ­ munes o f medium im portance, four o r five in the largest) which som etim es oppose candidates supported by m ore or less ephem ­ eral local groupings. Sim ilar rem arks could also be m ade about the mayoral elections. Throughout the country, the com m unes where there is a pre­ dom inant political group, solitary o r not, (either with Radical o r C atholic or other tendencies) are probably num erous. F urther research on the stru c tu re and clim ate o f com m u n al political life would be of interest. In som e m unicipalities the Socialists dom i­ 15 G en ev a cantonal archives. Percentages concern the last election of the G ran d Conseil (1961). In previous elections the situation was sim ilar.

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nate public life. In Bienne, for example, the municipal executive consists o f 5 Socialists and 4 Radicals. In the two w atch-m aking cities o f Le Locle and La C haux-de-Fonds the C om m unist party has one m em ber in the executive (in La C haux-de-Fonds the executive is m ade up o f 1 C om m unist, 3 Socialists and 1 Liberal). T h u s the form ulas practised on th e co m m u n al level are m ore varied th an on th e can to n a l level, w ith political pluralism in its developed form tending apparently to limit itself to the m ore urban­ ized regions.

IV . T H E S P IR IT O F T H E S Y S TE M The general m ode o f relationship between the parties in Switzer­ land seems to be midway between a struggle in which everyone is trying to elim inate the other in o rd er to rule alone, and federal co-operation in which each o f the partners recognizes the o th er’s right to retain his individuality, and any hostile action tow ards the other is mutually forbidden. This situation did not com e ab o u t im mediately. The main parties today, on the contrary, were formed during a period o f battles w ithout concessions, am ongst which the most im portant were the Liberal insurrection movem ents in the 1830’s, the Sonderbund W ar between Radical and C atholic Switzerland, the K u ltu rk a m p f, and the clash betw een th e arm y a n d the w orkers during the G eneral Strike o f 1918. Nearly half a century lapsed after the Sonderbund W ar before a m em b er o f th e C ath o lic-C o n serv ativ e p arty becam e a m em ber o f the Federal G overnm ent, and 25 years passed between the Strike of 1918 and the election o f the first Socialist federal councillor. In Soleure, all executive councillors were Radicals up to the end o f the 19th century. The first councillor o f the CatholicConservative party was elected in 1887, the first Socialist in 1917. In Fribourg, at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning o f the 20th century, the governm ent was on the contrary entirely C a th o lic-C o n serv ativ e. T he first S ocialist executive co u n cillo r o f Vaud was elected in 1946. M any other examples could be quoted to show that the “ all-parties governm ent” is not at all inherent in the Swiss regime as such, but a construction o f the latest period of history. Once in the governm ent, a party continues to oppose the other p arties by p ro p ag an d a, but gen erally in a m o d e ra te fash io n . In addition, at election tim e the contest between the parties is rela­ tively sh arp . T hese elections en ab le th e relativ e stren g th o f the parties to be estim ated, especially at the election of the cantonal legislative body and the N ational Council. But often enough agreem ents reduce stakes at election o f deputies to this federal

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organ. The most rem arkable case is perhaps that o f U ri, where for many years the Catholic-Conservatives, who have a large majority, reserve tw o seats to themselves in the federal Council of States, and in exchange do not oppose the election o f a Radical to the single seat o f the canton in the N ational Council. T here is usually little o r no struggle in the election o f the executive councillors in the cantons. It is the people, as was said before, who elect these councillors. T he voting is held on a m ajority basis except in tw o cantons w here the system o f propor­ tional representation is used in these elections (Ticino, Z oug). In these two cantons, the right o f m inority parties to assum e their role o f governm ental responsibility is thus constitutionally con­ firm ed.16 But although this is not a codified rule, in the othef cantons it is nonetheless alm ost fully applied. The ordinary explana­ tion given is that a party (or group o f parties having similar interests) which numerically has the m ajority o f the votes would act in contra­ diction with the rules protecting m inorities by electing only magis­ trates o f its own ranks. D ue to that present rule (ap art from som e exceptional restric­ tions such as those applied today to the C om m unists) every political group having even the minim um o f im portance in the legislature must be represented in the executive. This m eans that the parties must be considered rath er like natural political divisions o f the population. The guarantees which federalism gives to local political entities, to languages, cultures and religions, must be largely extended to them especially where they are in a minority. U nder these conditions the electoral agreem ents between par­ ties become all-im portant, and the popular vote less so, since often this vote serves to ratify the nom inations agreed upon by party leaders. Even m ore often it serves to prolong autom atically the m andate o f the governm ent in power. In order to clarify this point, a questionnaire relating to the elections of executive councillors was sent to the cantonal chancel­ leries. It would be interesting to undertake com parative studies of this kind on the subject o f o th er types o f election (especially of

16 It should b e noted that although not going as far as T icino and Z oug, several cantons explicitly recognise the right o f certain m inori­ ties to be represented in the governm ent. T h e constitution o f the can to n o f Berne specifies that the m inority in the Jura region, which is French-speaking, has tw o seats in the executive. The constitution o f A rgovie contains a sim ilar principle which applies to th e C atholic m inority. Valais specifies that each o f the m ajor geographical regions o f the canton (of which one is G erm an-speaking) shall elect at least one executive councillor.

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deputies to the Federal cham bers). T he questionnaire was along the following lines: 1) D uring the period from 1945 to A ugust 1963, did it at any time occur in your canton, that the num ber o f candi­ dates equalled the num ber o f seats available at the time o f the election o f one o r m ore executive councillors? 2) If so, did the election actually take place or was there merely a tacit agreem ent?17 According to the replies received, the cantons were classified as follows: A I A utom atic Renewal o f the Government's Term o f O ffice. At the expiration o f its term , the governm ent is re-elected as a whole w ithout opposition. Only supplem entary elections, for example for the replacem ent o f a deceased o r retired councillor, are occasion­ ally contested. The cantons o f G ro u p A are Berne, Lucerne, U ri, S t-G all, T h u rgovie. A m ongst these, tw o have a p re d o m in a n t party, tw o practise the three-party form ula, and one the m ulti­ party form ula. These distinctions thus do not explain the habits acquired by these cantons as regards the nom ination o f the execu­ tive. This rem ark also applies to groups B and C which will be dealt w ith later on. T here is an extract from the Thurgovie reply which is fairly typical o f the logic o f the autom atic renewal o f the governm ent: “ At the tim e o f the elections of cantonal governm ent every three years . . . the rule is that only the five magistrates in office shall be brought forward as candidates.” The general idea m otivating this practice is obviously that there is no valid reason for depriving men o f their office when they have proved their worth, and whose distribution according to parties corresponds to a lasting balance between the political powers in the canton. If an appreciable change in this bal­ ance would be noticed, partial elections would enable the structure o f the executive to be m odified. But this is quite unusual. Since 1945 Berne, U ri, and Thurgovie have witnessed on two or three occasions co n tested sup p lem en tary elec tio n s. T his has n o t tak en place in Lucerne or St-G all, w here for the appointm ent o f new magistrates the num ber has never exceeded the num ber o f seats to be filled d u r­ ing the period under consideration here. It should also be added that none o f the cantons o f G ro u p A allow a tacit agreem ent for the nom ination o f executive councillors. Even if not contested, these elections always take place. 17 T acit agreem ent: the authorities, noting that the num ber o f candi­ dates proposed in the prescribed tim e limit is not greater than the seats available, declares them elected w ithout any vote.

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B) Renewal Giving Rise to a R elatively C ontested Electoral Campaign. The cantons classed here are those in which since 1945 the candidates have always been m ore num erous than the num ber o f offices open at the tim e o f the renewal o f the term of office of the Executive Council. These cantons are Fribourg, Basle-Country, Ticino. N euchatel and G eneva. T he lim itations to electoral cam paigns which take place under these circumstances can clearly be seen from the following exam­ ples. In 1957 som e people m aintained that the elections o f the G en ev a executive co u n c illo rs18 w ere p articu larly c o n te ste d ,' because not all the bourgeois parties had agreed on retaining the com position o f the executive as it was at the tim e o f the preceding legislature (4 Radicals, 1 Liberal, 1 C atholic-Conservative, 1 Social­ ist). The C atholic-Conservatives were claiming one supplem entary seat for them . The electoral lists presented to the electorate were the following: 1) R adical register: four R adical c an d id a tes ( R l , R2, R3, R 4), 1 L iberal (L ), 1 S ocialist (S) and 1 C ath o licC onservative (C l) 2) Catholic-Conservative register: the sam e candidates except th e Socialist replaced by a second C ath o lic-C o n serv ativ e (C2) 3) Liberal register: the candidates R l, R2, R3, R4, C l and L o f the Radical register with the 7th line left empty. 4) Socialist register: R 1, R2, R3, R4 and S. Finally C2 was defeated and all the other candidates were elected. T he Com m unist party, isolated, put no candidates forward. In the following election (1961) an o th er contest, slightly different in d etail, to o k place. E xceptionally, tw o coun cillo rs in office were defeated. T he contest is usually still less sharp. In G eneva, in 1948, 1951, and 1954 only candidates brought forward by non-political provi­ sional groups w ithout the slightest chance o f being elected opposed the candidates o f governm ental parties. The num ber of candidates o f these governm ental parties was seven, corresponding to the num ber o f seats in the Executive Council. In the cantons o f G roup B, the supplem entary elections for the replacem ent o f state councillors are conducted m ore or less on the sam e lines as those for the periodic renewal o f the governm ent’s term. In G eneva, Basle-Country and Neuchatel, the election o f the executive councillors has never been tacit since 1945. In Fribourg a tw o-round election takes place, w here the second may be tacit. I!( T h eir term o f office is 4 years.

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In Ticino, too, this election may be tacit (as in 1943), but in general, this is not the case. Even in the cantons o f G ro u p B the councillors, once elected, generally remain in office as long as they do not choose to retire. T he limited electoral cam paigns brought about by the renewal o f their term o f office simply m eans that this rule is subject to certain exceptions. T herefore the average governm ental career o f the m em bers o f the executive is long in these cantons, in spite of the fact that they may appear to be rather “ unstable” to som e in com parison with the other states o f the C onfederation. In G eneva, which is probably the most “ unstable” o f these repub­ lics, a governm ental career lasting ten years is usually considered short and those lasting about tw enty years are not exceptional. C) O ccasionally C o n tested R enew als. C a n to n s w here the renewal o f the executive councillors’ m andate has given rise, since 1945, to elections which were som etim es contested and som etim es not: Z urich, Schwyz, Zoug, Soleure, Schaffhouse, Basle-City, A rgovie, G riso n s, V alais, and V aud. Som e o f these ca n to n s are very sim ilar to those o f G roup A because contested elections are exceptional (for example Zoug which will be discussed later on) and others are for the opposite reason close to those o f G ro u p B (for instance Vaud). In the canton o f Vaud, the election of state councillors (peri­ odic re-election or supplem entary election) may be tacit. BasleCity uses the system o f a tw o-round election for the sam e pur­ pose. with the second round possibly being tacit. Zoug would certainly be better placed in G ro u p A , for the election o f the Executive Council follows an alm ost unchanging p attern. Nevertheless this pattern was slightly disturbed in 1954. In this canton, where the councillors are elected proportionally, their distribution according to party has rem ained unchanged since 1918 (4 Catholic-Conservatives, 2 Radicals, and 1 Socialist). The parties represented in the governm ent always put forward seven candidates in all, which generally meet with no opposition. Exceptionally, in 1954 ten candidates were put forward, but none­ theless the structure o f the governing body did not change at all. In Zoug the periodic election for the governm ent’s m andate always takes place, but supplem entary elections are tacit if the n um ber o f candidates corresponds to the num ber o f officials to be elected. In practice this is what always happens. In the other cantons o f group C, the election o f executive councillors has always effectively taken place since 1945 up to the 1960’s, w hether contested o r not. D) Cantons Where the E xecutive Councillors A re E lected by the Landsgemeinde. These are O bw alden, N idw alden, G laris and the tw o Appenzells. In these cantons (the form o f the election aside)

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the appointm ent of the m em bers of the governm ent is sim ilar to those o f group A: that is to say that there is an autom atic renewal o f the m andates o f the magistrates in office, with the possibility o f a contested election if a seat is empty. But in this last case the party mechanism apparently plays but a small part and the per­ sonal prestige o f the candidates is the deciding factor. “ W hen it concerns the renewal o f the governm ent's m andate and there is no seat vacant, then no names are put forward in fact, apart from those of the councillors already in office. On the other hand if one or m ore new councillors have to be proposed, then it is not unusual th a t several n am es a re put fo rw ard for each p o sitio n " (extract from the reply from G laris). This is perhaps m ore unu­ sual in som e other o f these cantons. In N idw alden, for example, uncontested elections took place for the appointm ents o f the new councillors in 1945, 1946, 1952 and 1959. Because o f the electoral system, the election always takes place effectively. “ W hen only one candidate is proposed . . . the vote (by a show o f hands) takes place. T he Landam m ann then asks the assem­ bly o f the people if they do not wish to propose any o th er nam es. If this is not th e case, he th en declares th a t th e election has taken place,” (from O bw alden's reply). When several candidates are put forw ard they op p o se each o th e r face to face before th e ir fellowcitizens. Every citizen has the right to propose names, and from time to tim e this right is im plem ented. T he election o f the m em bers o f the Federal Council is made according to a scaled pattern o f distribution, which only changes at rather long intervals, by virtue o f the changes in the num ber of national councillors o f each party, and other considerations (the international situation, public opinion climate, the attitu d e o f the m ajor trade union movem ents and the directing bodies o f the econom y, and so on). Neglecting the details o f tactics, one may say that w henever such a change takes place, it is usually obtained w ithout spectacular electoral dispute. T he party which sees itself losing a seat does not put forward a candidate, at least not officially. In actual fact only representatives o f the “ moving up” party oppose each other, and the m em bers o f the Assembly choose between them. The situation corresponding to these practices is very different from th a t in co u n tries w h ere th e o p p o sitio n system atically opposes a governm ent party (or coalition) with the hopes of replacing it. T he collegiate governm ent as now seen in Switzer­ land forces the parties to reach a com prom ise on a perm anent basis. Obviously each one o f the parties tries to have its own ideas incorporated to the highest possible degree in this com pro­ mise. But the political conditions m ake it unrealistic for the

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m em bers o f a party to cherish the hope o f seeing their party program m e applied completely for a while. Therefore a perm a­ nent co-existence o f the parties is left which does not differ very much in essence from that federalistic equilibrium which regulates relationships between cantonal sovereign states, between linguistic or religious groups, etc., except that the balance o f pow er amongst the parties still fluctuates slightly instead o f being com ­ pletely stabilized.

F IN A L R E M A R K S T he contrast between the predom inant party cantons and the m ultiparty cantons would largely be explained by reference to their long-term historical evolution. On the whole, the main reason for the developm ent o f the system practised by the m ultiparty cantons is the form ation o f urban econom ic centres since the end of the M iddle Ages. The society which grew up within these centres soon gave birth to several different classes o f people, all with claims to a p art in the city’s governm ent, but with varied interests and concepts. T o this may be added the opposition betw een the sovereign cities and subjected rural regions. T he econom ic changes o f the 19th and 20th centuries added to this cleavage, especially by prom oting the working class move­ m ent and parties corresponding to it. It also stim ulated m igra­ tions which enabled C atholic-inspired parties to take root on Protestant soil and vice versa. However, even in the cantons with the most pronounced m ulti­ party form ula, the influential political forces are certainly very few outside the towns. The small and relatively hom ogeneous p opula­ tion o f their rural com m unes is not a ground where the m ulti­ party form ula may function. T he persistence o f the dom inant party formula in a series o f cantons is understandable along the sam e lines. These last cantons are predom inantly rural com m unities. The m ajority o f them have no urban concentration o f im portance. T heir greatest towns are Fribourg (32,500 inhabitants) and Lucerne (72,000). In addition, their population is com paratively hom ogeneous from the point o f view o f religious traditions. U nder these circumstances, the num ber o f organized political forces could hardly have been anything but restricted. Both groups o f cantons show now the sam e preference for the “ all-party governm ent,’’ in spite o f their structural differences. N o te by the a uthor. Ju n e 1973: T he system describ ed here is very stable. Since the tim e o f first publication o f the paper, no significant change has occurred.

1* 1’ M M 1* 1* 1* 1* 1> 1* M I*

Other T o ta l of Inde­ Commu­ parties. pendent nist W itho u t seats party party party ( 1 0 0 % )

ao ■ a3 X

Liberals

Method of V oting M

Bourgeois and Socialists Farmers

CatholicConserva­ tives

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

_

_

1945 1960

43.3 47.6

28.1 30.6

—

—

16.3 16.1

3.9 —

2.8 5.2

2.2 --

3.4 0.5 11

178 193

1945 1961

32.7 34.5

13.2 25.7

—

—

7.1 6.2

43.9 32.7

—

—

3.1 0.9 7

98 113

1945 1961

22.2 23.5

19.2 20.5

—

17.6 14.0

34.7 32.0

—

2.1 4.0

1.0 —

3.2 6.0 11

193 200

Thurgovie 1947 1962

23.0 25.6

48.4 13 46.4 1! —

—

24.6 21.6

0.8

—

0.7 —

3.3 5.6 3

122 125

1947 1959

36.9 35.4

41.6 44.6

—

4.6 3.1

13.8 15.4

—

—

3.1 1.5

—

65 65

1945 1962

3.0

46.5 39.1

16.1 20.8

3.7 7.6

12.0 23.4

—

—

19.4 5.1

Canton App. Inn. Rhod.6 1963 St-Gall

Orison*

Argovie

Ticino Vaud

Demo­ crats

2.3 1 .0 ’

60

217 197

p p p p p p

Valail

1945 1961

Neuchitel 1945 1961 Geneva

1945 1961

70.2 67.7

24.4 20.8

_

_

—

—

5.4 9.2

—

—

27.2 29.6

18.1 20.8

—

30.1 32.2

—

14.0 21.0

25.0 27.0

16.0 20.0

—

9.0 18.0

-

-

1.5“

131 130

-

13.6 S.2

10.7 12.2 '»

103 115

-

36.0 14.0

-

loo loo

0.8

1 According to the Swiss statistical year-book, und correspondence w ith cantonal chancelleries. P=proportional system. M —m ajority vote system. M -f P = in circles electing one deputy, m ajority vote system; otherwise, proportional system. * The Social-Christians form a separate movement, although joined w ith the Conservatives, in some cantons, in particular in Schywz, Obwald and Lucern. In the latter canton, for example, the two groups form a single party in the Crand Conseil, anil the Executive Council, but at election time, they present separate (and related) lists. * Popular Evangelical party. * Popular Evangelical party and "Youth of Bern*. s No indication, probably without party. * Distinction according to party can not be made. ’ W ithout party. * Popular Evangelical party and Independent Socialists. ' Evangelical-Democratic party. List for the two Rasies. 10 Popular Evangelical party and Liberal-Socialist party. 11 Free Conservatives. » 11 Popular Evangelical party, United movment for the compulsory vote, and list of dissident Catholic-Conservatives. 15 Including the Bourgeois and Farmers party, the lists being identical in some districts. 14 Farmers' social movement. '* National Progressive party (centre-right), Neuchatel movement of the new Socialist left.

Table

II

C o m p o sitio n o f t h e E x e c u tiv e C o u n c il o f e a c h c a n to n in 1946 a n d 19621

Canton ZUrich

Berne

Lucerne Uri

Schwya

Obwalden

1946 1962 1946 1962

CathnlicBourgeois Conser- Radicals Liberals and Socialists Fanners vatives

—

— — —

Demo­ crats

Inde­ pendent party

Other party

— 1

—

W ith o u t T otal of p arly seats

2 2

— —

2 2

2 2

1 —

2 2

—

4 4

3 3

—

—

—

--

—

—

—

—

—

9 9

1

—

— —

— —

— —

7 7

— —

— —

— —

— —

— —

.—

—

7 7

— —

1 1

— —

—

—

1

7 7

— —

—

— —

— —

— —

— —

7 7

1946 1962

5 4

2 2

— —

— —

1946 1962

4 5

3 2

— —

1946 1962

4 4

2 1

— —

1946 1962

6 5

1 2

—

—

7 7

—

—

—

N'idwnldrn 1946 1962

8 5

3 3

1946 1962

1 1

2 2

1946 1962

4 4

1946 1962

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

2 2

—

—

6 5

1 1

—

1

1946 1962

1 1

3 2

—

—

—

—

Basle-City 1946 1962

I 1

1 2

1 1

—

Basle-Country 1946 1962

1 1

1 1

—

1

Schaffhouse 1946 1962

— —

2 2

Glaris

Zoug

Fribourg

Soleure

—

—

_ --3 2

_ —

i

—

—

7 7

_

9

-

-•

—

—

7

__

__

..

_

7 7

—

—

’

•* r>

_

2 2

ii

—

i*

7 7

i

—

--

—

S

__

__ —

_

_

—

—

5

—

S

CatholicConser­ Radicals vatives App. A u m . Rhod. 1946 1962

— —

App. Inn. Rhod. 1946 1962

9 9

1946 1962

Liberals

Bourgeois Socialists and Farm ers

I*; 1

Dem o­ crats

Inde­ pendent p a rty

O ther p arty

— —

— —

— —

— —

7 7

— —

— —

—

— —

9 9

_

_

7 7

W ith o u t T o ta l of p arty seats

— —

— —

-—

— —

— —

— —

3 3

3 3

—

—

1 1

1946 1962

2 2

1 1

— —

— —

— 1

2 1

— —

— —

— —

5 5

1946 1962

1 1

1 2

— —

2 1

1 I

— —

— —

— —

— —

5 5

Thurgovie 1946 1962

1 1

2 2

— —

1 1

1 1

— —

— —

— —

— —

S 5

5t Call

Grisons

Argovie

62 6J

T icino 1946 1962

2 2

—

—

1

—

—

—

—

—

—

1

—

—

—

—

—

1 2

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

7 7 5

Vaud

1946 1962

_

4

2 1

—

3

1962

4 4

1 I

1946

—

1962

—

1 2

1 1

3 1

2

1

ValaU

1946

5 5

2 2

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1 1

—

—

2 *

—

—

—

1»

—

1

—

—

—

—

7

—

—

—

7

N euchatel — —

5 5

Geneva 1946 1962

1

2

2

— —

2

"

Total 1946 1962

64

60

51 49

6 5

11 13

23

29

7 3

—

1

3 1

.

—

2

1 According to inform ation kindly supplied by the Cantonal chancelleries in reply to u questionnaire. 1 Communist party. 5 The chancellery o f this canton specifies that some of the councillors counted here as Hadical, may not he party members at least formerly. * One National Progressive party, and one member o f another small local party. 5 National Progressive party.

165 163

P A R T IV APPLICATIONS A N D ILLUSTRATIONS CANADA

236

CONSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

The selections in Part iv are chosen to illustrate various aspects o f consociationalism in Canada, although as in the case o f Part m som e o f the m aterial cannot be lin ked explicitly to the concept as it has been developed in recent political literature. M y own paper on "C onsociationalism and the Canadian Political S y s­ te m ." like the introductory paper in Part I above, was prepared in its original fo r m in conjunction with the International R ound Table on M ultilingual Political S y stem s sponsored b y the International P o litica l Scien ce A sso cia tio n a n d the In te rn a tio n a l C en tre f o r Research on Bilingualism at Laval University in M arch 1972. In it I have a ttem p ted to assess the Canadian case fr o m the standpoint o f each o f the three approaches to the consociational them e that were exam ined in Part i: Probably the fir s t scholar to apply the consociational model explicitly to Canada was S. J. R. Noel, who did so in a paper to the Canadian Political Science Association at Winnipeg in 1970 and again in O ctober 1970 at a jo in t colloquium o f the Canadian Political Science Association a n d the S ociete canadienne de sci­ ence p o litiq u e a t Q uebec. It is the se co n d o f th ese papers, revised, condensed, and confined to the consociational model alone, that is reprinted here. N oel is prim arily influenced by Lijphart’s approach to consociationalism and thus em phasizes the capacity and willingness o f elites as a crucial fa c to r in m aking th e sy ste m w ork. B ut he also is im p ressed b y th e stre n g th o f regional id en tities and th e w o rkin g o f fe d era l-p ro v in c ia l m ech a ­ n ism s o f a ccom m odation to th e p o in t th a t he sees th e provinces themselves as the basic subcultures within the Canadian system . The n ext tw o selections are m ore historical. The pages fro m W illiam O rm sby's The Em ergence o f the Federal C oncept in C anada, 1839-1845 are a rem inder that fo r a quarter o f a cen­ tury follow ing the Rebellions o f 1837 Upper and Low er Canadi­ ans. E n g lish-speaking a n d F ren ch -sp ea kin g , P ro te sta n t and Rom an Catholic, lived under a unified political system in the Province o f Canada. A full-sca le system a tic study o f the political accom m odation o f religious, linguistic and regional cleavages dur­ ing the union p erio d has y e t to be a tte m p te d , but O rm sb y indi­ cates som e o f the them es to be explored in such a study. In particular he suggests how regional fa cto rs, fo rtifie d by the ear­ lier separation o f Upper and Low er Canada, pointed towards territorial federalism as the principal m echanism f o r the accom^ m o d a tio n o f pluralism. The view that Canadian Confederation rests upon a com pact or contract has been a ffir m e d a n d d en ied m a n y tim es a t b oth the political and the academ ic level. G. F. G. S ta n ley's " A c t or Pact: A nother Look at C onfederation," delivered as the Presidential Address to the Canadian H istorical Association in 1956, reconsi­

A PPLICA TIO NS A N D ILLUSTRATIONS: CANADA

237

ders the evidence f o r regarding the term s o f Confederation fro m the standpoint o f central Canada at least - as an interethnic entente that was later sanctioned by Im perial statute. The tex t reprinted here is considerably abridged, representing less than h a lf o f Sta n ley's original address. In particular tw o long sections, on French-English relations before the Confederation period and on judicial interpretation o f the British N orth A m erica A c t, have been reluctantly om itted as less directly relevant to the genera! them e o f this volume. Janice Staples's paper, "T h e Erosion o f D ualism in M a n i­ to b a ," is a rew ritten a n d cond en sed version o f a considerably longer sem inar paper on the sam e theme. While the institutions o f dualism in M anitoba proved fra g ile and short-lived, this essay is a rem inder that social segm entation and consociational politics can be fo u n d at the provincial level as welt as federa lly, and that fu r th e r provincial studies along the sam e lines m ight well be instructive. Consociationalism in M anitoba evolved gradually in the R ed River colony over h a lf a century and was destroyed in two decades a fter the province entered Confederation. The politi­ cal processes and underlying public attitudes in the M anitoba case and in sim ilar issues in o th er provinces deserve closer study than they have had hitherto, because whether religious and espe­ cially linguistic accom m odation is possible - or impossible at the provincial level has m ajor im plications f o r the fu tu re o f the Canadian federation as a whole.

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E C A N A D IA N P O L IT IC A L SY STEM K . D. M cR ae W hen we look at C anadian society from the standpoint o f consociational theory, we can use the three approaches to consociationalism described in Part I above as convenient categories for analysis and evaluation. Before doing so, however, we should recall that consociationalism is a classificatory device based on a num ber of complex political and social dim ensions including the structure o f political parties and voluntary associations, patterns o f social action, attitudes and behavior of political elites, and even general historical traditions o f accom m odation o f diversity. It is, therefore, prim arily a m atter o f degree; one could expect to find a t least som e aspects o f consociationalism in any dem ocratic society having significant social cleavages. The consociational model may therefore be useful as an ideal type against which to m easure societies that are consociational only to a limited extent. F urtherm ore, consociational patterns may increase or diminish dram atically over time, as the A ustrian case illustrates. M ore generally, the literature on consociationalism reveals a pro­ nounced tendency tow ards ontzuiling, or dism antling o f the pil­ lars, from the mid-1960’s onw ards in all o f the European coun­ tries w here segm ented pluralism has been strong. In looking at the C anadian case, then, we may examine how closely the C ana­ d ian experience has ap p ro ac h ed the co n so ciatio n al m odel a t any given point in tim e, and we may also consider w hether the consociational model suggests possible reforms for the existing C anadian system. S E G M E N T A T IO N IN C A N A D IA N S O C IA L S T R U C T U R E

In addition to the usual differences in socio-econom ic status it is fairly obvious that there are further social cleavages in C anada, but a closer look soon reveals difficulties in determ ining with any exactitude the segment boundaries or axes o f cleavage. U nlike the European cases that we have exam ined, the political party system in C anada does not offer clear guideposts to these boundaries. Somewhat paradoxically, the most fully institutionalized cleavage in term s o f segm ented social structures need not be the cleavage o f greatest salience or intensity, as we may recall from the exam ­ ple of Belgium in the 1960’s when language differences became m ore intense than traditional formally institutionalized religiousideological cleavages. In C anada the problem becomes m ore com ­ plex, in part because o f the federal system. W hile differences between linguistic com m unities may ap p ear at first glance to be

A PP LIC A TIO N S A ND ILL U STR A TIO N S: C ANADA

239

the overriding cleavage o f contem porary C anada in term s of intensity, the pattern o f institutionalization o f cleavages is not so simple, and we are faced with a num ber o f alternative hypotheses. In the most systematic attem pt to date to apply the Lijphart model to C anada, S. J. R. Noel recognizes the need to make “ certain adjustm ents" before applying it to C anada: The term “ subculture” could be interpreted in a num ber of w a y s - it could be taken, for example, to refer to English C anada and French C anada, o r to a num ber o f distinct regions such as the M aritim es, Q uebec, O ntario, and the W e s t- b u t most usefully perhaps as “ province.” 1 Lijphart him self appears to give this notion som e sanction when he suggests that “ if the subcultures are geographically concen­ trated, a federal pattern o f governm ent in which the internal political boundaries coincide with the subcultural cleavages can be an em inently suitable consociational device.” 2 On the other hand another recent article, which refers only briefly to the consocia­ tional m odel, implies that the basic cleavage is prim arily ethniclinguistic: I j j I

. . . we would suggest that C anadian C onfederation, and in particular French-English relations, can be viewed as a consociational democracy, which has been faltering for som e time, and which has since 1960 alm ost completely broken dow n.3

N one o f these articles, however, has examined systematically the structure o f social or political segm entation in C anady. T here are obvious institutional a rg u m e n ts-fo r interpreting L ijphart’s model in term s o f provinces. In the C anadian federal system the provinces provide a tangible institutional framework for articulating and aggregating local and regional interests which are then accom m odated at the federal level and through various m echanism s o f federal-provincial interaction. Much the same 1 S. J. R. N oel. “ C onsociational Dem ocracy and C anadian F ederal­ is m ." C anadian Jo u rn a l o f P o litic a l S c ien ce. Vol. 4 (1971). 16 [below, 265], : A Lijphart. "C u ltu ral Diversity and T heories o f Political Integra­ tio n ." Canadian Journal o f P olitical Science. Vol. 4 (1971). 10. The paragraph in question does not appear in the original m im eographed version o f the p aper, which was presented at a jo in t colloquium o f the C anadian Political Science A ssociation and the Societe canadienne de science politique at Q uebec in O ctober 1970. 3 C . W hite. J. M illar, and W . G agne, "P olitical Integration in Q uebec during the I9 6 0 's". C anadian E thnic S tu d ies, Vol. 3 (1971). 57-58.

240

CONSOCIATION A L DEMOCRACY

argum ent could be applied to any federal system, provided only th at the com ponent units o f the federation coincide sufficiently with subcultural boundaries. The case o f India suggests itself here, because there the state boundaries have been redrawn to coincide m ore closely with linguistic and cultural boundaries, and certain o f the Swiss cantons - those th at are small, intensely particularistic and hom ogeneous - afford a further example. In C anada, however, one should not assume an autom atic coincidence o f provincial and subcultural boundaries, and even the nature o f the cleavages themselves deserves closer analysis th an it has had up to now . B asically, to recall th e E u ro p ean examples, it is difficult to see the ten p ro v in c e s -o r even the four o r five regions o f C a n a d a - a s distinctive fa m ilie s spiriiuelles or Weltanschauungsgruppen analogous to the European zuilen or L ager, that is, as blocs em bodying distinctive, enduring, and possi­ bly clashing value system s. If we c o m p a re N ova S cotia w ith O ntario or British C olum bia in term s o f value systems, life styles, and general cultural patterns, it seems likely - though we lack sufficient evidence to argue m ore strongly - that we would find greater differences within provinces than between them , and that in terreg io n al v ariatio n s in C a n a d a w ould be found to be sig n ifi­ cantly lower by most criteria than in m any countries o f Europe. It w ould th erefo re seem m o re a p p ro p ria te , in th e fram ew o rk o f consociational theory, to begin by regarding the C anadian prov­ inces, like most Swiss cantons, not so much as independent subcultures in themselves but as additional sites for the accom m o­ dation of cleavages that do not necessarily coincide with provin­ cial boundaries. O f course to the extent th at subcultural bounda­ ries do* coincide with -p ro vincial boundaries, the federal system m ay itself becom e a deviceJor-accom m odating subcultural differ­ ences, but this is a point to be investigated empirically rath er than taken"For granted from the start. T here is, how ever, one im m ediate exception. N o very extensive investigation is needed to establish th at Q uebec is a province pas eom m e les autres. W hile all the other provinces are predom i­ nantly English-speaking, it is predom inantly French-speaking. W hile all the others are either predom inantly Protestant o r almost evenly balanced between Protestants and Catholics, it is predom i­ nantly R om an Catholic. We encounter here a situation o f overlap­ ping and reinforcing cleavages by which province, language and reli­ gion are linked and interrelated, as indicated in D iagram 1. In this perspective Quebec is indeed a subculture that departs significantly from all oth er provinces and from the C anadian averages. A nd if the# image o f a fa m ille spirituelle can no longer do justice to Quebec's* diversity, the image of a L ager, a defensive complex in a hostile environm ent, is not inappropriate. Nevertheless, as D iagram 1 indicates, the correlations between

A PP LIC A TIO N S A N D ILL U ST R A TIO N S: C ANADA

P e rc e n ta g e and

D IA G R A M 1 c o n c e n tr a t io n o f p re d o m in a n t

r e li g i o n ,

Canada

and

241

la n g u a g e

p r o v in c e s , 1971

P RO TESTA N T 100i

N ew f. O n t. F REN C H io o S P E A K IN G ‘

90

80

70

60

80 ®C a n a d a

90

$EI100 E N G L IS H S P E A K IN G

SN.B.

100 R O M A N C A T H O L IC

Sources: H om e language: S ta tistic s Canada D aily. Ju n e 6, 1973. Religion: calculated from S ta tistic s Canada D aily. July 3, 1973. N ote: In this table “ P rotestant" includes Anglican, Baptist, Jehovah's W it­ nesses, L utheran, M ennonite, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Salvation Arm y and U nited C hurch, b u t excludes sm aller P rotestant groups included in the residual category " O th e r" . F o r C anada as a whole both Protestants and R om an C atholics are below 50 per cent (43 and 46 per cent respectively), and this occurs also in Prince Edward Island. Language data are based on the language m ost often spoken at hom e, which was recorded for the first tim e at the 1971 census.

242

CONSOCIATION A L DEMOCRACY

religion, language and territory are far from perfect. Every prov­ ince has both religious and linguistic m inorities, though in every province except Q uebec th e religious m in o rities are larg er than the linguistic ones. W hile virtually all French speakers are Roman Catholics, English speakers are far from being uniformly Protes­ tant. This netw ork of religious and linguistic cleavages, substantially reinforced but also partially cross-cut by the territorial dim ension, gives rise to issues and tensions that cannot" be resolved by mechanisms o f decentralized federalism alone. ’“ Because this pattern o f cleavages is complex, it is im portant to observe carefully its institutionalization in historical context, for here, perhaps, lie clues to som e present am biguities. T he most visible cleavage in C anadian history had its origin in F rance’s double Cession to Britain o f Acadia in 1713 and New France in 1763. With the Cession o f N ew France Britain acquired for the first tim e a substantial colony whose population was alien in religion, legal system, language, and culture. For an imperial pow er whose own R om an C atholic population was still disfran­ chised and barred from any public office, the most im portant of these differences was religion, and with the influx of Englishspeaking settlem ent into Q uebec differences between “ new sub­ jects” and “ old subjects” tended to be institutionalized along religious lines. In 1774 the Q uebec Act confirm ed the position of the C atholic Church in the colony, and in 1791 the C onstitutional Act m ade R om an Catholics in the C anadas eligible to vote and hold public office, rights not available to their co-religionists in Britain until 1829. T he ine o f religious cleavage and ethnic-linguistic cleavage coincided well enough until the 1840’s, by which tim e extensive Irish im m igration was giving rise to a substantial population of English-speaking Catholics. Religious issues were intensified by the im portation into C anada o f hereditary quarrels between O rangem en and Irish Catholics, and by the C atholic C hurch’s c o u n terattack on liberalism d u rin g th e Papacy o f Pius ix . T hus the second half o f the nineteenth century witnessed a politics of significant religious co n fro n ta tio n , and a fte r C o n fed e ra tio n in 1867 this rem ained the most obvious line of cleavage at the federal level. As one pam phleteer rem arked while analysing the distribution o f appointm ents to the public service: I shall divide the whole population conform ably with its two great religious sections - C atholic and Protestant - for all other distinctions seem m inor perturbations, like the ripple on a wave, and merge in these. T he former I shall divide into English and French-speaking.4 4 J. L. P. O ’H anly, T he P olitical Standing o f Irish Catholics in Canada (O ttaw a, 1872), 10.

A PP LIC A TIO N S A ND ILL U STR A TIO N S: C ANADA

243

The im portant thing to note is that a good deal o f institutional segm entation took place during this period, and the C atholic population acquired not only publicly supported denom inational schools in most provinces but a whole netw ork o f colleges, news­ papers, hospitals and charitable and welfare institutions th at made a substantial part o f C atholic life a world ap art. Linguistic issues might arise from tim e to tim e within the C atholic com m unity, but the prim ary line o f cleavage was religious during this im portant form ative period. Since about 1960 the pattern o f institutional segm entation has a p p eared to be shifting slightly b u t p ercep tib ly from religion to language. T he evidence is found in many sectors. Schools are increasingly sharply segm ented on a linguistic basis. In O ntario the p riv ate F ren ch -sp eak in g C a th o lic high schools have en tered the public system as French-language public schools. D enom ina­ tional universities have been secularized under governm ental and financial pressure but separate linguistic stream ing is emphasized more strongly. Health care has become a public responsibility, and even C atholic hospitals are under pressure to establish ab o r­ tion com m ittees. T he electronic m edia, which are segm ented lin­ guistically, have grown vastly in im portance. A m ong the reasons for this changing pattern one could undoubtedly list a dim inished interest in organized religion, the climate o f ecumenism, and an increased salience o f linguistic issues in the working world as urbanization and industrialism have advanced. T he shifting o f patterns o f segm entation from a religious to a linguistic base has certain political consequences. W hile all prov­ inces except Q uebec have quite substantial religious m inorities (as defined by D iagram 1 above), the official-language linguistic m inorities are proportionally small and politically weak in all provinces except Q uebec and New Brunswick. As a consequence the French-speaking m inorities outside Quebec are w eaker and m ore vulnerable to majority pressures than were the politically significant R om an C atholic m inorities o f an earlier period, while within Q uebec the English-speaking sector as a whole (including English-speaking Catholics) is larger and m ore significant than the relatively small Protestant sector alone. T hus the effect o f a shifting pattern o f segm entation tow ards a linguistic base is to throw the C anadian political system o ff balance at the provincial level; while the bargaining pow er o f the m inority in Quebec remains strong and even increases, that o f the French-speaking linguistic m inorities in the other provinces becomes significantly w eaker and more precarious. Some o f the present strains in the political system may doubtless be traced to the fact th at it is badly structured for a situation in which linguistic and cultural issues are perceived to be m ore salient than religious ones. Beyond the analysis o f formal, institutionalized segm entation,

244

CONSOCIATION A L DEMOCRACY

however, certain troublesom e analytical questions persist. Despite form al institu tio n alizatio n alo n g religious b o u n d a rie s, there rem ains an alternative hypothesis that the most fundam ental, the most basic, and the most enduring of social cleavages in C anada has been the dim ension o f ethnic-linguistic diversity, and that in this respect o u r history has perhaps been m ore hom ogeneous than the pattern o f institutional segm entation suggests. W ere not the initial phases o f formal segm entation overly influenced by a Brit­ ish concern to integrate her Rom an C atholic “ new subjects” into the Im perial system, and was not the subsequent ProtestantC atholic rivalry in the nineteenth century in som e sense a distor­ tion o f our own dom estic tradition, an echo o f foreign battles being fought at the tim e in Ireland and on the C ontinent? Was not Lord D urham essentially correct in his description o f the Lower C anadian scene in 1838 as “ a struggle, not o f principles, but o f races”?5 A nd is not A rth u r Lower correct, a century later, in characterizing the “deep division between French and English” as the “ prim ary antithesis” o f C anadian history?6 It is never easy to com pare the salience o r intensity o f religious and ethnic-linguistic differences, and in the context o f C anadian history it is particularly difficult. In the first place the tw o cleav­ ages overlap substantially, but where they do not the patterns of interaction differ.T he history o f French-English relations has been characterized by relatively high geographical separation, and even w here there was physical proxim ity substantial occupational dif­ ferentiation tended to keep the groups apart. Further, as Louis H artz has argued from the standpoint o f com parative intellectual history, French C anada and English C anada arose from different phases of European ideological experience and constitute distinc­ tive fragments o f that experience, each with its own highly inter­ nalized value system and each insensitive to the values of the o th er.7 Because o f this ideological gulf, reinforced until recent decades by physical separation and occupational distance, the relationship o f French and English C anadians in historical perspective has been less a confrontation o f opposing forces than a coexistence o f tw o solitudes. G iven both physical and ideologi­ cal separation, it is scarcely surprising th at formal institutional seg m en tatio n on ethnic-lin g u istic lines was slow er to develop than religious segm entation. W ith little inter-ethnic contact, it was simply less called for. 5 The R eport o f the E arl o f D urham (new e d „ L ondon. 1902), 8. 6 A . R. M . Lower, "T w o W ays o f Life: T he Prim ary A ntithesis o f C anadian H isto ry ," C anadian H istorical Association R eport, 1943. R eprinted in C . Berger, ed.. Approaches to C anadian H istory (T oronto. 1967). 15-28. 7 L. H artz, el a l„ The Founding o f N e w Societies (N ew Y ork, 1964).

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T o som e degree the very attem pt to com pare the salience of religious and ethnic cleavage may be an unreal quest, because a significant proportion o f the population may not perceive the religious and the ethnic-linguistic dim ensions as analytically dis­ tinct. It is possible that the distinction is felt prim arily by the relatively small num bers who are cross-pressured, o f whom p er­ haps the most obvious group are English-speaking Catholics in linguistically mixed areas. A thorough exploration o f this ques­ tion, which seems im portant to an understanding o f C anadian society, would be too complex to pursue here. O u r m ore modest objective in this paper has been to identify patterns o f segm ented pluralism prim arily as they are manifested in the structure of formal institutions, but in a w ider theoretical sense the study of segm entation could and should be extended across the entire spectrum o f social action. These special difficulties o f the C anadian setting need not deter us from attem pting som e prelim inary cross-national com parisons o f areas an d degrees o f seg m e n ta tio n . W e have id en tified three possible axes o f segm entation for C a n a d a -p ro v in c e , religion, and language. O ne m ethod o f com parison is to assess the degree of organized segm entation along each axis by sphere of activity, using L orw in’s categories, in o rd er to com pare the three C an a­ dian axes with one another and also with Lorw in’s results for A ustria, Belgium, the N etherlands and Switzerland. T he results of such a com parison are shown in T able 2. in which I have added certain political subcategories for C anada which are not included in Lorw in’s original table.8 It must be emphasized at once that the ratings for C anada are both tentative and subjective. O ur concern in T able 2 is with the degree to which groups are organizationally distinct and au to n o ­ m ous, o r at least recognized and represented as distinct interest groups, with respect to the axis in question. A num ber of p ro b ­ lems arise in establishing even approxim ate ratings. First, in C anada as in E urope different groups reveal different degrees of segm entation. Catholics m ore than Protestants, French C anadians m ore than English C anadians, and Q uebec m ore than other prov­ inces. Second, there are tim e differentials between the European and C anadian indicators. Lorwin refers to E urope at the peak of segm entation in the 1950’s, while ours for C anada refer to about 1970: ratings for C anada in the 1950’s might well have scored a few sectors higher on the religious axis and lower on the linguistic one. T hird, since C anad a’s size and heterogeneity may give rise to different regional perspectives as to som e o f these ratings, I ' V. R . Lorw in, “ Segm ented Pluralism ” , Com parative Politics, Vol. 3 (1971), 155 [cf. above. 48],

Table 2.

D e g r e e o f S e g m e n t e d P lu r a l is m , b y S p h e r e o f A c t i v i t y .

__________________________________

A ustria______ Belgium

Education Primary Secondary H igher

M M

M ass M edia Press Electronic Socio-econom ic Organization Labor Farm ers Small Business Employers Liberal Professions H ealth Care Consum ers Leisure Activities Politics and G overnm ent R eligion-Party tics Party Platform s2 Party O rganization2 V ariations in voter support Bureaucracy N ote: D eg ree

of

S eg m en ted

N etherlands

Switzerland

Province1

C anada Religion

Language

H H H

H H M

M M L

H H H

H M or H M

H H H

H M

M

M H

M

L L

L L

H H

H H M M M M H H

H H H L M H H H

H H H M M H

H M

M

H L M

M (H ) M (H ) L L M M L L

M L L L L M L L

M L L L L L L Lor M

H

H

H

•M L M M

L L L M L

L M M L

L

'

H

H

P luralism :

H = H igh;

1 Ratings in parentheses in this colum n refer to Q uebec. Source: F o r E uropean countries, Lorwin (see above, p. 48).

H M = M edium ; L = Low.

2 Subcategories n ot included in L orw in’s table.

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247

should state that my own vantage point is th at o f central C anada. While I have tried to strike rough national averages, different provinces would probably yield som ew hat different profiles on all three axes. Finally, the ratings for the provincial colum n present a special problem . In a federal system som e sectors may go to the prov­ inces through the constitutional division o f powers, but not neces­ sarily because the provinces themselves represent divergent inter­ ests. In general a province may offer a base for mobilizing and expressing a particular regional interest in the wider political system, or else it may, as we have noted earlier, simply offer an alternative and possibly better site for the accom m odation o f divergent interests than the national level. Table 2 is not well adapted to bring out this distinction, especially as provinces may differ am ong themselves on this point. I have classified a sector as having medium or high segm entation on the provincial axis (1) where there is formal organizational autonom y (for example, in education), or (2) where associations in that sector are roughly as active at the provincial as at the federal level, or m ore so. In addition, since Q uebec does represent a distinctive value system to a greater extent than other provinces, I have added extra ratings in parentheses for Q uebec w here these seem different from the C anadian norms. In com paring the colum ns o f T able 2 it is obvious from the crude nature o f the data and the problem s o f establishing ratings that only very approxim ate com parisons should be attem pted. From the three C anadian colum ns one notes first that none o f the three axes reveals significantly stronger segm entation than the others. O nce again the relative salience of province, religion and language as alternative lines o f dem arcation in organized social structure rem ains as unsettled as before. But the m ore interesting and significant com parisons in the table are between C anada and Europe. U nlike the European social movements that sought to. em brace the “w hole m an” and to construct an organizational network encompassing all the social roles o f the individual, social m obilization in C anada has left the various econom ic roles rela­ tively unsegm ented. The prim e em phasis has been on education, with its large potential for structuring attitudes and values. - T here is another crucial dissim ilarity. In all four European cases the apex o f the organizational netw ork is a set o f political parties which both mobilize and reflect the values o f the subcul­ tural blocs. In C anada this high correlation between political parties and any o f the axes o f cleavage has been conspicuously absent. Though parties may from tim e to tim e alm ost monopolize the representation o f one province or region, they only rarely appeal to the electorate in specifically regional terms. Though

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parties may from time to tim e obtain disproportionate support from one religious or linguistic group, they alm ost invariably cam paign to maximize support from the electorate as a whole rather than from any specific religious o r ethnic segment as such.9Perhaps the chief obstacle to interpreting C anadian society in term s o f European-style segm ented pluralism is the low level o f consistent, identifiable segm entation w hether regional, or reli­ gious, or linguistic - in the functioning of political parties. One might m ake an exception for separatist and nationalist parties in Q uebec, but these have not been prom inent at the federal level. T he virtual absence o f parties which m ight explicitly form ulate and express segm ent interests has undoubtedly been a major obstacle to social m obilization along segment lines. T he causes and consequences o f this incom plete m obilization o f segment interests will be seen in the next section.

E L IT E C O O P E R A T IO N IN T H E C A N A D IA N P O L IT IC A L S Y S T E M . In order to apply the consociational model to the C anadian political system, one must first consider certain basic differences between the C anadian case and all the European examples considered elsewhere in this book. These differences include (1) political parties with rela­ tively low ideological profiles, (2) an electoral system that places a high prem ium on winning single-m em ber constituencies, and (3) a strong tendency tow ards single-party control o f the legislature and one-party ministries. These contrast with the European norm s of m ore consciously ideological parties, proportional representation, and coalition ministries. T he sam e contrasts exist at the provincial level; while the Swiss cantons tend strongly to proportional repre­ sen tatio n and coalition m in istries like th e Swiss federal p a tte rn , C anadian provinces tend equally strongly to single-m em ber consti­ tuencies and one-party ministries. It follows from these differences that patterns o f elite cooperation may have to take very different forms in C anada from those found in Europe. T o take the question o f party structures first, federal politics was characterized for half a century after C onfederation by a tw o-party system in which both Liberals and Conservatives sought to obtain as wide a spectrum o f support as possible. A lthough additional parties appeared in the 1920’s and becam e an enduring feature o f the politi­ cal scene, the norm o f a tw o-party system rem ained. As Denis Smith has pointed out: 9 T he 1971 O ntario provincial election, in which financial aid to R om an C atholic secondary schools becam e a m ajor inter-party issue, was rather exceptional from this standpoint. M ore typical is the case o f M a n ito b a , w h ere th e issue o f aid to p riv a te se ctarian schools has cross-cut political parties rath er sharply during the 1960's.

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249

T h e le a d e rs o f th e th r e e w e s te rn m o v e m e n ts o f p o litic a l p r o te s t, th e P ro g re s siv e s , th e c . c . f . , a n d S o c ia l C r e d it, in sis te d in t h e i r n a tio n a l c a m p a ig n s fro m 1921 to 1958 th a t th e ir p u r p o s e w a s n o t to c o m p lic a te th e C a n a d ia n p a rty s y s te m b y c r e a t i n g p e r m a n e n t m i n o r g r o u p s , b u t t o s i m ­ p lify it b y fo rc in g a re a lig n m e n t o f p o litic a l lo y a lty th r o u g h ­ o u t th e c o u n tr y . T h e p ro fe s s e d n a tio n a l a im o f e a c h p a r ty w as to c r e a te a n a tio n a l tw o - p a rty sy ste m d iv id e d o n lin e s o f p r i n c i p l e . . . 10 In o t h e r w o rd s e a c h o f th e m in o r p a r tie s s o u g h t to b e c o m e a m a jo r p a r ty , a n a lte r n a tiv e to t h e g o v e r n m e n t in p o w e r , a n d c a m p a ig n e d a c c o rd in g ly b e f o re th e e le c t o r a te .^ N o fe d e ra l party_^ h a s s o u g h t to b e c o m e id e n tifie d a s th e r e p re s e n ta tiv e p r im a rily o f a sp e c ific p r o v in c e , re g io n , re lig io u s d e n o m in a tio n , o r lin g u istic c u ltu ra l g ro u p ? E v e n th e N e w D e m o c r a tic P a rty a n d its p r e d e c e s ­ s o r th e c . c . f . , t h e m o s t id e o lo g ic a lly o r ie n te d o f C a n a d ia n p a r tie s in te r m s o f so c ial c la ss, h a v e in m o s t c a m p a ig n s m a d e a b r o a d a p p e a l f o r s y m p a th e tic m id d le -c la ss s u p p o r t w h ile s e e k in g to m a in ta in a s p e c ia l r e la tio n s h ip w ith o r g a n iz e d l a b o u r a n d fa rm e rs . A t th e fo rm a l level all fe d e ra l p o litic a l p a r tie s in C a n a d a h a v e stre s s e d th e a g g re g a tio n o f a m a x im u m ra n g e o f in te re s ts a s th e ir p r im a r y c a m p a ig n g o a l, a n d h e n c e in c o n tr a s t to th e E u r o p e a n cases n o n e o f t h e p o s s ib le a x e s o f s u b c u ltu r a l c le a v a g e th a t w e h a v e e x a m in e d h a s b e e n c o n s c io u s ly a n d d e lib e r a te ly e m b o d ie d in th e s tr u c tu r e o f p a r tie s . In p r a c tic e th e r e h a v e b e e n m o d e r a te ly s ig n if ic a n t v a r ia tio n s in v o te r s u p p o r t a lo n g th e s e s a m e c le a v a g e lin e s in r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s , " a n d a t m o r e in f o r m a l le v e ls p a r t i e s u n d o u b te d ly b u ild u p o n w h a te v e r s e g m e n t a d v a n ta g e s th e y h a v e . T h e r e is a n o b v io u s lin k b e tw e e n th e p a r ty s y s te m a n d th e e le c to ra l sy s te m . T h e fact th a t a p a r ty m u s t s u r p a s s all o th e r p a r tie s t o w in a s in g le - m e m b e r c o n s titu e n c y g iv e s a b o n u s to th e s tr o n g e r s u b c u ltu r e s in th e c o n s titu e n c y a n d d is c o u ra g e s th e full a r tic u la tio n o f in te re s ts o f m in o r ity g r o u p s . U n d e r th e s e c ir c u m ­ s ta n c e s t h e b e st e le c to ra l s tr a te g y is to e m p h a s iz e c o m m o n in te r ­ ests a s fu lly a s p o s s ib le w h ile m in im iz in g th e im p a c t o f d iv e r g e n t in te re s ts . In a n y g iv e n c o n s titu e n c y m in o rity in te r e s ts w ill h a v e n o e x p lic it p a r lia m e n ta r y r e p re s e n ta tio n . T h e s a m e m u ltip lie r effe ct in th e c o u n tr y a s a w h o le e n a b le s th e p a r ty w ith a s im p le p lu r a lity o f v o te s t o a s p ire to a c le a r m a jo r ity o f s e a ts a n d to fo rm a m in is tr y d e p e n d e n t o n n o o t h e r p a r lia m e n ta r y p a r ty > 'T h e sy ste m p r e s u p p o s e s a s a g e n e ra l r u le th e 10 "P ra irie Revolt, Federalism , an d the Party System ” , in H . G . T h o rb u rn , ed.. P a rty P olitics in Canada (T oronto, 1963), 126. 11 J. M eisel, W orking Papers on Canadian P olitics (M ontreal and L ondon, 1972), ch. I.

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hegemony o f one broadly based party in the legislature and the adequate representation within it o f all m ajor political interests, including reg io n al, religious a n d lin g u istic-cu ltu ral in terests. In practice, as Alan C airns dem onstrates in an im portant article, the electoral system has frequently produced a significant distortion between the parties’ shares o f the popular vote and the distribu­ tion o f seats won, a n d - m o r e im portant - each party’s distribu­ tion o f seats by region tends to be m ore distorted than one would expect from the distribution o f the popular vote by region.12 This is in sharp contrast not only with the European m ulti-party/f ' coalition model but even with those Scandinavian instances in which a single party having roughly com parable electoral support but only m inority representation in the legislature will form a single-party m inority ministry and rem ain in office for a consider­ able period through a politics o f com prom ise. All the norm s of the C anadian system favour one-party control of the legislature and a wide m andate to the majority party to rule as it sees fit. W hen an election does not produce this result, the m em bers o f a m inority m inistry, as Senator Forsey has pointed out, . . . face three deeply rooted popular n o tio n s.. . . T he first is that m inority governm ents are altogether exceptional, abnor­ mal, alm ost unheard of, except, of course, am ong benighted continental E u ro p ean s. . . .The second popular C anadian notion about minority governm ent is th at it is necessarily bad: incom petent, weak, indecisive, if not w o rse . . . .The third popular notion about m inority governm ent is that it cannot last.13 If we look for consociational politics in C anada, then, we must normally seek it not in com prom ises am ong parliam entary parties but in accom m odation within the party in pow er and in the mechanism s o f the federal system. 12 A . C . C airns, "T h e Electoral System and the Party System in C anada. 1921-1965", Canadian Journal o f P olitical Science, Vol. I (1968), especially pp. 58-63. an d sec also the further discussion by J. A . A . Lovink and C airns in the sam e journal. Vol. 3 (1970). 497-521. 13 E. A. Forsey. "T h e Problem o f ‘M inority’ G overnm ent in C an ad a". Canadian Journal o f E conom ics and P olitical Science. Vol. 30 (1964), 1-4. T hese "p o p u lar n o tio n s" m ay be m ost strongly held, however, by the party elites an d activists w ho expect to gain from them . T h at the public a t large m ay take a m ore pragm atic view is suggested by a M arch 1973 C 1 P O poll which show ed 54 per cent of the public expressing favorable attitudes to m inority governm ent against 27 p er cent who disapproved it (O ttaw a C itizen. April 25 and 28. 1973).

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25 I

T he focal point for accom m odation within the party in power is, o f course, the federal cabinet. Longstanding and firm trad i­ tions require the C abinet to be faithfully representative not only o f provinces but also o f religion and language, even to the extent o f som e sacrifice o f efficiency. A lexander M ackenzie in 1873 took pride in his delicately balanced cabinet o f “ five Catholics, three m em bers o f the Church of England, three Presbyterians, two M eth o d ists, one C ongregationalism and o n e B ap tist.” 14 M ore recent stu d ies by G ib so n an d V an L o o n 15 have focussed on the question o f linguistic representation; both give data on a q uanti­ tive basis, but they also rem ind us that beyond the simple a rith ­ metic o f representation lie m ore complex questions o f the im por­ tance o f portfolios held, the varying stature o f individual cabinet mem bers, and the influence that these exert on cabinet decisions. As Noel observes, the secrecy o f cabinet proceedings m akes it difficult to relate representational factors to decision-m aking in any direct w ay.16 - O ur concern here is not to trace the detailed history o f repre­ sentational patterns in the C anadian cabinet system but to assess the cabinet as a possible consociational m odel. Such a context suggests certain possible dangers. In the first place adequate rep­ resentation of subcultural interests, is heavily dependent on the ability o f the party in pow er to win significant support from all m ajor segments. T o illustrate in simple terms, this can be taken first and foremost to mean significant backing from both English and French C anada. C abinet representation draw n from the elites o f both sides must be sufficient in num bers and stature to press for and obtain decisions on national policy acceptable to the respective rank and file groups. If the inputs o f one side are incompletely formulated or insufficiently heeded, the outcom e will not be acceptable to the rank and file, which will then become less interested in, or even alienated from, federal politics. At this point the process tends to becom e circular, because alienation of the rank and file may produce less'ehte interest in federal politics and a correspondingly lower calibre o f federal representation, which will then win less respect from the other side, and so on.

14 R. M . Daw son. The G overnment o f Canada (2nd ed., T oronto, 1954). 215-216. 15 F. W . G ibson. Cabinet Form ation and Hicult lira I R elations (Studies o f th e Royal C om m ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism , 6. O ttaw a. 1970), and R. Van L oon. T he S tru c tu re a n d M em bership o f the Canadian Cabinet (m im eographed, O ttaw a, 1966). a study p repared for the Royal C om m ission on Bilingualism and Bicultural­ ism. ^ N oel, o/>. c/7., 17 [below, 265].

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Though the model is hypothetical, it is suggestive o f the recurring difficulties o f the Conservative Party in Q uebec ever since the conscription crisis of 1917. From 1918 to 1920 the U nionist G overnm ent had only one French-C anadian m inister in a cabinet o f 22, and in 1957 the first D iefenbaker ministry began with one French C anadian in a cabinet o f 17.17 Though the num ber of representatives gradually increased to five, French-C anadian influ­ ence in the C abinet rem ained relatively unim portant throughout the D iefenbaker period. These years o f C onservative rule in O ttaw a were parallelled by a rem arkable resurgence o f energy and talent in Q uebec provincial politics, and it is worth noting that a n um ber o f senior French-C anadian politicians and public servants moved from the federal to the Quebec provincial stage during these years. T here is a second danger to the process o f accom m odation am ong subcultures in the C anadian political system. G overning parties in federal politics have always been loose coalitions of many divergent interests, highly volatile in term s o f party loyalty. T he power o f party elites to control rank and file supporters is som ewhat tenuous at best. H ence agreem ents arrived a t by nego­ tiation between the subcultural elites within a party may not be enforceable upon the mass o f party supporters, particularly in English C anada where m ajoritarian values are prom inent in the political culture. If elite-m ass relatio n sh ip s a re no t cohesive, the whole process o f negotiation between the subcultures begins to lose meaning, and if accom m odation negotiated between the elites is rejected by the E nglish-speaking elec to rate, the F ren ch speaking electorate will lose confidence in its spokesm en at the federal level. This situation has perhaps been m ore typical o f the Liberal Party in recent years, because while Liberal ministries have had strong parliam entary representation from both linguistic sectors, they have had difficulty in persuading their Englishspeaking follow ers o f th e need for a re stru ctu rin g o f F renchEnglish relations.18 H owever, the problem is not confined to the Liberal Party. All parties supported the Official Languages Act o f 1969, but some Conservative backbenchers refused to follow the party leadership on this issue and it would a p p e a r'th a t a substantial portion o f the English-Canadian electorate o f all political persuasions does not yet accept the changes agreed to by all parties in Parliam ent. These weaknesses of the C anadian political system may be sum ­ 17 G ib so n , op. cit., 176-177. 18 T he above paragraphs w ere written p rio r to the federal election o f O cto b er 1972: the results o f this election appear to add em phasis to tendencies visible before.

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marized by borrowing the term inology o f L ijphart:19 adequate articulation o f the interests o f the subcultures is not guaranteed at cabinet level because o f uncertainty and distortion in the electoral system, and internal p o litical cohesion o f the subcultures is not strong enough to assure th at agreem ents reached in cabinet will be accepted by the electorate. W hile the cabinet is the main institution for elite accom m oda­ tion in federal politics, one could pursue the question further by examining the working o f o th er federal boards, departm ents, agencies and tribunals. In general we might expect to find pat­ terns o f accom m odation sim ilar to those pursued by the Cabinet, with the qualification however th at most o f these agencies are less sensitive than the C abinet to pressures from the electorate and therefore less likely to have policies o f intergroup com prom ise rendered unenforceable by reactions o f the rank and file on one side or the other. A m ore interesting question is the im pact o f the federal system itself upon patterns o f elite accom m odation. As in Switzerland, federalism in C anada can reduce levels o f tension by offering m ore sites for the resolution o f differences between subcultures. Its very flexibility m eans th at in cases o f malfunction at the federal level the provincial level offers a safety valve, a possible alternate staging point for the m obilization o f subcultural inter­ ests. The concentration o f French-C anadian interest on Q uebec during the 1960’s is an obvious example. T here are, however, som e limits to this alternative. First, if a subculture becomes thoroughly frustrated at O ttaw a its interest will dim inish to the point that L ijphart’s second prerequisite condition, a minimal level o f com m itm ent to m aintain the system, is no longer ful­ filled.20 Further, disagreem ents am ong the subcultures as to the appropriate degree o f decentralization may be particularly difficult to resolve. Finally, as we have noted earlier, provincial boundaries do not coincide fully with either religious o r linguistic cleavages. W hile the religious m inorities have been generally strong enough to fend for themselves at the provincial level, the French-speaking m inori­ ties in the English-speaking provinces are economically and politi­ cally w eak. T o move further tow ards the provincialization o f linguistic and cultural differences is therefore to abandon the linguistic m inorities and to force the subcultural boundaries to coincide with provincial boundaries. At the provincial level only 19 C o n so c ia tio n a l D em o cracy ” , W o rld P olitics. V ol. 21 (1969), 221, [above, 84 j. :o A . L ijphart. “ Typologies o f D em ocratic System s", C om para live Pol­ itica l S tu d ies. Vol. I (1968). 23.

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the English-speaking m inority in Q uebec, economically strong and reinforced by the cultural dom inance o f English in C anada and N orth A m erica, has been able to obtain a fully effective politics o f accom m odation, and even this group has felt increas­ ingly insecure in the face o f escalating Q uebec nationalism since 1960. T h e Royal C om m ission on B ilingualism recognized this dilem m a and proposed various federal initiatives to strengthen the position o f the minorities: “ W e take as a guiding principle the recognition o f both official languages, in law and in practice, wherever the m inority is num erous enough to be viable as a g roup.” 21 But while its linguistic recom m endations w ere largely em bodied in the federal Official Languages Act o f 1969, the Comm ission term inated its work w ithout producing a concluding volum e in which it had planned to deal with “ constitutional questions concerning the relations and the future o f the two societies” o f French and English C an ad a.22 Thus the present federal system and its shortcom ings from the standpoint o f lin­ guistic-cultural accom m odation remain an unresolved constitu­ tional problem . While the European m ultiparty systems run the obvious risk o f immobilism due to stalem ate am ong the parties, it is not so readily acknowledged that the C anadian system, through its inadequate representation o f segm ent interests at the federal level, may also run a sim ilar risk o f immobilism and stalem ate owing to subcultural disagreem ents over issues of decentralization and federal-provincial relations, and in this case the m achinery for dialogue and accom m odation is m ore cumbersome. T H E

IM P A C T

O F

O LD ER

P O L IT IC A L

T R A D IT IO N S .

T he political traditions o f C anada originated from the two Euro­ pean powers that colonized the area, France and Britain. Both were archetypal nation-states whose political traditions differed sharply from those of the Holy R om an Em pire and its successor states. Further, both colonial experiments represented a selective fragm entation from the parent society,23 and it can be argued that the net effect o f this filtering was to enhance centralizing tenden­ cies. N ew F ran ce was a p ro jectio n o f th e F ran ce o f L ouis X IV and Colbert, but it lacked the counterbalance o f older feudalism. British N orth A m erica after the loss o f the American colonies was dom inated by Imperial governors and British military garri­ sons, and until the 1840’s it lacked an effective political counter­ 21 Royal C om m ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. R eport. Book I (O ttaw a. 1967). 86. 22 Ibid.. I. xviii. 23 H artz. op. cit.

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force to this strong executive influence. W hen responsible govern­ m ent cam e in the 1840’s, it cam e in the form o f parliam entary suprem acy rather than of a balanced separation o f powers. On both sides the tendencies of older tradition were heavily weighted in favour o f the central authority; the accom m odation o f religious and cultural pluralism would clearly have to be learned in the New W orld. From one standpoint the political developm ent o f C anada since 1763 can be viewed as a series o f attem pts to find a satisfactory pattern of accom m odation within the limits imposed by these older political traditions. Two centuries later, that quest rem ains conspicuously unfinished. A fter American Loyalist im m igration in the 1780’s had intro­ duced a substantial English-speaking population, the first response to diversity, im plem ented by the C onstitutional Act o f 1791, was to divide the province into the separate colonies o f U pper and Lower C anada. In the latter French C anadians enjoyed a su b ­ stantial majority in the Legislative Assembly but found themselves blocked by a colonial executive responsible only to L ondon, an executive which increasingly cam e to reflect the outlook and aspirations o f the commercially oriented English-speaking m inor­ ity in the colony. W hen Lord D urham recom m ended colonial responsible governm ent in his celebrated R eport in 1839, this proposal was linked with a plan to reunite the tw o C anadas and to assimilate the French C anadians to the language and value structure o f the British settlers. C ontrary to D urham 's expectations, the French C anadians rem ained unassim ilated, and the U nion period produced perhaps the closest approach to an institutionalized politics o f accom m o­ dation to be found in C anadian history. A fter the w inning o f responsible governm ent in 1848 there developed a system of double prim e ministerships and tw inned ministerial portfolios in m inistries which were carefully balanced to give equal weight to the eastern and western sections o f the U nited Province. Despite the U nion, parallel departm ental establishm ents persisted and even the provincial capital rotated at intervals from one section to the o th er.24 Both sections developed a tw o-party system and each of the four parliam entary groups w orked prim arily in loose coali­ tion with its counterpart in the o th er section. Lower C anada Bleus with U pper C anada Conservatives, Lower C anada Rouges with U pper C anada Reform ers. But in successive elections these coalitions becam e increasingly evenly balanced and politically deadlocked, and although som e advocated a “ double-m ajority” 24 J . E. H o d g etts, P io n e er P ublic Service: an A d m in is tra tiv e H isto r y o f the U nited Canadas. 1841-1867 (T oronto, 1955), 55-62.

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principle whereby the dom inant group in each section should collaborate regardless o f party platform , the dom inant Bleus of C anada East could not work with the increasingly anti-C atholic Reform ers o f C anada W est. N o r could political stability be achieved through a grand coalition: the only example o f this type during the U nion period, the fi/^M-Conservative-Reform coalition o f 1864, was formed for the explicit purpose o f breaking the deadlock through radical constitutional reform .25 It is significant that the U nion period, the one notew orthy example o f FrenchEnglish political collaboration on approxim ately equal term s, is rem em bered today prim arily as a period of immobilism and dead­ lock. Confederation resolved the deadlock o f the Province o f C anada essentially by encapsulating the dom inant religious and linguistic groups of each territorial section into their own respective provin­ cial frameworks, subject only to certain m inority guarantees. A lthough the new provinces o f N ova Scotia and New Brunswick tilted the federal balance further in favour o f A nglophones and Protestants, the eventual uniqueness o f Q uebec within C onfedera­ tion was not a foregone conclusion at this point, for there still rem ained the question o f W estern C anada. Long before its incorporation into C anada, the tiny Red River colony had evolved an accom m odation am ong English and Scot­ tish personnel o f the H udson’s Bay C om pany, French-C anadian employees o f the M ontreal fur trade, Scottish agricultural settlers, and native Indians and half-breeds o r m etis. Following the Riel uprising in defence o f these local interests against C anadian annexationists, the new Province o f M anitoba entered C onfedera­ tion endowed with similarly consociational institutions, including an ethnically balanced upper house, equality o f the French and English languages in the legislature and courts, and a denom ina­ tional school system. F u rth er west, the N orthw est Territories, eventually to becom e the provinces o f Saskatchewan and Alberta, were also organized so as to extend the federal language guaran­ tees for French and English to the territorial legislature and courts in 1877 and later to establish a dual C atholic and Protes­ tant school system. Briefly, for two decades after Confederation there lingered the possibility o f a s e c o n d - a n d perhaps even a third province o f the C anadian federation which would incorpo­ rate in its institutions the principle o f cultural duality according to the model o f Q uebec. 25 P. G . C ornell, The A lignm ent 1841-1867 (T oronto, 1962), and Political G ro u p s in the U nited Canadian H istorical Review. Vol.

o f P olitical Groups in Canada. see also his “ T he A lignm ent of Province o f C anada. 1854-1864,” 30 (1949). 22-46.

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All o f these hopes were abruptly term inated in the 1890's in the w ake o f massive English-speaking migration to the W est. A M anitoba statute o f 1890 ended the equal status o f the French language and m ade English the sole official language: the Legisla­ tive Assembly o f the N orthw est Territories followed suit in 1892 as soon as it received from the federal governm ent the pow er to determ ine its own language policy. But m ore im portant was the M anitoba Public Schools Act o f 1890, which term inated public support for R om an C atholic schools and initiated a controversy that clouded federal politics for several years. The failure of federal intervention in 1896 served only to em phasize the inability o f the federal governm ent to protect religious or linguistic m inori­ ties and the political vulnerability o f the m inority constitutional guarantees o f 1867. By 1905, the W estern prairies, which had entered C anada with em bryonic political institutions reflecting the cultural pluralism o f their variegated populations, were refash­ ioned by increasingly powerful local elites into the A nglo-Saxon, Protestant image o f O n tario .26 Even at this date, however, an o th er approach lay open at the federal level. D uring the early 1900’s the influential FrenchC anadian nationalist H enri Bourassa was urging a pan-C anadian nationalism built on dualistic cultural foundations, in language that has strikingly contem porary consociational overtones: O ur nationalism is C anadian nationalism founded on the duality o f races and on the particular traditions which accom pany this duality. . . . T he fatherland, for us, is the whole o f C anada, that is to say a federation o f distinct races and autonom ous provinces. T he nation which we wish to see developed is the C anadian nation, com posed o f French C anadians and English C anadians, that is to say a nation of tw o elem ents separated by language and religion and by the legal arrangem ents necessary for the preservation o f their respective traditions, but united by a sentim ent o f brother­ hood in a com m on attachm ent to a com m on country.27 W ith respect to language, his advocacy as early as 1902 o f bilin­ gualism am ong the elites coupled with unilingualism -o f the French-speaking and English-speaking masses foreshadows alm ost exactly the federal language policy o f the later 1960’s and inciden­ tally provides an apt blueprint for the consociational accom m oda­ tion o f linguistic diversity: O n the question o f language, I do not believe that it is F or a closer study o f th e M anitoba case, see below, 288-299. 27 J. Levitt, ed.. H enri Bourassa on Im perialism a n d Bi-culluralism . / 900-1918 (T o ro n to . 1970). 107.

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possible o r desirable for the mass o f o u r people to learn and speak English. The com m on man can generally use only one language. T he diffusion o f the English language am ong the populace will take place at the expense o f the national idiom and will soon harm the inner fibres o f our ethnic tem pera­ m ent. This would be the surest road to the annihilation o f o u r nationality. The case is not the sam e for our elite, those w ho by their wealth, intellectual culture and political and social position, ought to lead our people and m aintain the union between ourselves and our neighbours. On them falls the duty o f learning English, o f draw ing close to the elite o f the English majority, o f thoroughly studying the tem pera­ m ent, aspirations and the traits o f English C anada. M ore­ over, the English elite have the sam e responsibility. If the most influential and most enlightened o f the tw o races tried to have m ore to do with each o th er and got to know each other better, our national future would not be so preca­ rious.28 Nevertheless in Bourassa’s thought the linguistic issue is ulti­ mately subordinate to the religious, a m eans to a m ore exalted end. for French C anadians must above all fulfil their providential mission as Catholics in the New W orld: “ Let us not strive solely to protect o u r language, nor to protect language and fa ith ; let us fight for the language in order the b etter to protect the fa ith ” .-9 Like many oth er political figures, Bourassa based his argu­ m ents for French-C anadian rights on the contractarian n ature of C onfederation, but Ramsay C ook has pointed out that Bourassa was perhaps the first to argue in term s o f a com pact o f cultures rath er than o f provinces, and this shift was clearly indicated after 1890 when questions arose o f defending religious and linguistic m inorities against provincial m ajorities. But to do so. C ook notes, he had to argue m ore in m oral than in legal term s, for constitu­ tional texts in support o f such a position were lacking. More im portant, however, was the fact th at the notion o f cultural com pact was taken up by no m ajor interest group, while the alternative theory o f C onfederation as a com pact o f provinces had already found powerful backing from several provincial govern­ m ents.30 In the circumstances, Bourassa’s views were not to pre­ 28 Ibid., 105. 29 H. Bourassa, La langue. gardienne d e la f o i . ([Montreal], [1918)), 51. 30 R. Cook, Provincial A u to n om y. M inority R ig h ts and the Compact Theory. 1867-1921 (Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingual­ ism and Biculturalism, 4, Ottawa. 1969). ch. 5. For a wider review of compact doctrines, see R. Ares. D ossier su r le pacle fe d e r a tif de 1867 (rev. ed.. Montreal. 1967).

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vail in his generation, and very few English C anadians heard and understood his message. In place o f bicultural accom m odation, the move to abolish French-language schools in O ntario in 1913 and the w artim e conscription policy o f 1917 led to further and sharper polarization. It is scarcely surprising that the period after the First World W ar saw a tendency for many French C anadians in Q uebec to show little interest in federal issues and m ore concern for their own province, the only arena in which their political influence could find full expression. G radually there emerged on both sides a tacit “ Q uebec reserve” theory, whereby French-C anadian lead­ ers played only m inor roles in broad federal issues while Q uebec politics rem ained a world apart. Such an accom m odation was possible as long as Q uebec life rem ained traditional and politically passive, but under the impact o f m odernization it pointed directly to a gradual separation o f the tw o political systems. W hen the federal governm ent in 1963 appointed a Royal Comm ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to examine the whole question of equal partnership between the linguistic com m unities, it was late, very late indeed, to develop an alternative strategy. T he Comm ission published its Final Report between 1967 and 1970, and governm ental im plem entation has been reflected in the Official Languages Act o f 1969 and other measures. In its barest essentials the policy o f the federal governm ent since 1969 has called for full legal equality o f French and English as official languages o f C anada, provision o f federal services to the public in both languages wherever there are significant concentrations of Francophones and A nglophones, and equal access to posts in the federal public service for speakers o f either language. Once again we are close to the vision o f pan-C anadian biculturalism envi­ sioned by Henri Bourassa tw o generations ago, but the question o f political accom m odation th at he raised still rem ains largely unexplored. In retrospect, the quest to accom m odate linguistic diversity in _anada may be viewed as a series o f lost opportunities. While religious diversity has been accom m odated with m oderate success in C anadian history, linguistic and cultural cleavages have given rise to a variety o f institutional arrangem ents and proposals none o f which has been conspicuously successful on a long-term basis. Even by the most charitable interpretation, the political system ’s capacity to learn and to adapt to linguistic-cultural diversity has not been high, and it seems likely that this low capacity o f the system to devise effective solutions' has helped to increase the intensity o f linguistic and cultural cleavage in recent decades.

S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S IO N . From several standpoints the C anadian political system defies

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simple classification, and in this respect it is o f course not unique. The clarity o f a model is seldom found in the real world. It is tem pting to apply the consociational model to the C anadian political system, but closer analysis has revealed a num ber of m ajor divergences from th e m odel and even from th e w orking consociational systems exam ined above. D espite these differences, how ever, th e use o f th e con so ciatio n al m odel helps to d iffe re n ­ tiate C anadian politics from its usual A nglo-A m erican context and perm its new insights at both the analytical and the norm ative levels. In the above pages I have tried to assess the C anadian political system in the light o f the three m ajor approaches to consociation­ alism that are represented earlier in this book, but since the question is a complex one the argum ent may perhaps be clarified by a sum m ary o f its essentials: 1. T he prim ary lines of segm entation in C anada are difficult to identify with precision on account of the reinforcing but not completely overlapping effects o f province, language and religion. Because provinces are partially autonom ous political units in the federal system, they offer a convenient but also a distorting forum for the expression o f segment interests. 2. Historically, the formal institutionalization o f cleavage has followed mainly religious rath er than linguistic lines. However this does not dem onstrate beyond dispute the greater salience of the religious issue because (a) formal institutionalization in the 18th and 19th centuries reflected norm s o f the Im perial authority as well as colonial values, (b) prior to 1840 the lines o f religious and ethnic cleavage coincided closely, and (c) even after 1840 the line o f linguistic-ethnic cleavage was characterized by high geo­ graphical and occupational separation, precluding any need for further institutional separation. 3. A rough attem pt to com pare the present extent o f organ­ ized segm entation in various spheres o f activity along the respec­ tive axes o f province, religion, and language is inconclusive, but by any of these criteria C anada must be ranked significantly lower than any o f the four “ classic" consociational countries. 4. Because o f the nature o f the party system and the electoral system, modern political parties in C anada have not divided along any o f the axes o f subcultural cleavage. Because ministries are generally composed o f a single party only, accom m odations between subcultures must take place within the governing party on the basis of w hatever pattern o f subcultural representation that party may currently possess. 5. The principal mechanism for the accom m odation o f sub­ cultural interests o f all types is the federal cabinet, but accom m o­ dation may be unsatisfactory (a) if the cabinet reflects inadequate

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representation o f any subculture, or (b) if decisions arrived at in cabinet are not acceptable to any m ajor subcultural segm ent of the governm ent’s followers. E ither situation may lead to the alien­ ation o f a m inority subculture from federal politics and in some circumstances to a transfer o f allegiance to the provincial arena. 6. W hile the classic cases o f consociationalism run a risk of stalem ate through deadlock am ong parties, the C anadian case seems to run a com parable risk o f immobilism in term s o f subcul­ tural disagreem ents over the federal-provincial division o f power. 7. The older political traditions o f both France and G reat Britain have been typical o f centralizing nation-states from an early date, and they offer little as foundations for pluralist accom ­ m odation in C anada. 8. In the C anadian setting a num ber o f approaches to accom ­ m odating F rench-E nglish lin g u istic-cu ltu ral cleavage have been attem pted o r proposed at different periods, b u t success has been rather limited and the learning capacity o f the political system in this respect must be rated as low. T he pattern of religious and ethnic cleavages has not so far provoked a m ajor catastrophe. C anadians have not been through the agonies o f a Bangladesh, a Biafra, or a Cyprus. They are not trapped in the situation o f a N orthern Ireland, though there were occasions in the nineteenth century when such a turn o f events seem ed entirely possible. They have not fought a Boer W ar. But neither have they profited intellectually and politically from the less intense ethnic and religious tensions that have been a con­ stant o f their history. It may well be that the absence o f more acute phases o f tension has dim inished the capacity o f the politi­ cal system to respond creatively to the problem s o f cultural diver­ sity. In a sense C anadians have occupied the rather colourless middle ground between rational problem-solving and ultim ate disaster. It would be unreasonable to assume that so precarious a balance can be m aintained indefinitely.

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L D E M O C R A C Y A N D C A N A D IA N F E D E R A L IS M S. J. R. Noel S o u rcc: S. J . R. N o el. “ C o n so c ia tio n a l D em ocracy an d C a n ad ian Federalism .” Canadian Jo urnal o f P olitical Science, Vol. 4 (1971), 15-18. R eprinted by perm ission o f the C anadian Political Science Association an d the author.

It is only natural that C anada should most frequently be com ­ pared with the U nited States, and th at m odels, m etaphors, and theories o f the political system th at are applicable to the one should be assumed to be applicable to the other. That there are certain close sim ilarities is obvious: both are federations, both span th e N o rth A m erican c o n tin e n t, b oth are afflu en t W estern dem ocracies, and both exist within the com m on econom ic fram e­ work o f modern capitalism. These and o th er similarities, how ­ ever, too often obscure the significance o f those differences which do exist, or cause similarities which exist with other countries to be neglected. T his is particularly true o f European countries, even though it would appear to be the case that C anadians, with their stro n g linguistic an d cu ltu ral d ifferences, have a good deal in com m on w ith at least som e E u ro p ean s. T h is is n o t to say th at C anada is m ore European than A m erican. It is merely to suggest that there may be som e advantages to be gained from occasion­ ally viewing C anadian politics from a European perspective. F irst, however, it is necessary to discuss briefly the political culture o f the C anadian federation. C anada, it is often said, is a country w ithout a strong national identity; indeed, as John Meisel has put it, C anada “ is alm ost totally lacking in a genuinely shared set o f .symbols, heroes, historical incidents, enemies, o r even am bitions.” 1 Implicit in such a view is a com parison with the U nited States: what is missing north o f the border is an equiva­ lent o f th e A m erican national m yth. Yet this com parison, while indisputable, can also be seriously misleading. F or, am ong the co u n tries o f th e w orld, C an ad a is by no m eans u n iq u e in its deviation from the A merican pattern and, m oreover, excessive attention to the question of national identity obscures the fact that within C anada there are a num ber o f strong regional and provincial identities, a recognition o f which is vital to a proper understanding o f the country’s nature. As the historian J. M. S. Careless has pointed out, what C anadians have “ sought, and to som e degree achieved, is not really unification o r consolidation, 1 “ C an ad ian Parties and Politics,” in R. H. Leach, ed.. C ontem porary Canada (D u rh am , 1968), 135.

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but the articulation o f regional patterns in one transcontinental state.” 2 By what means, therefore, has the C anadian federal system been able to achieve the m inim um level o f harm ony between its regional com ponents which, despite the lack o f a strong national identity, has allowed it to m aintain itself and function with rela­ tive effectiveness for m ore than a century? P erhaps th e com m onest respo n se o f political scientists to this question is to attribute to the national political parties in C anada the sam e role o f “consensus-building” as that perform ed by national parties in the U nited S ta te s-e v e n though in the case of C anada the content o f the alleged consensus cannot be empirically id e n tifie d .3 A non -A m erican bu t possibly m o re p ro m isin g ' approach is to enquire instead into the basis o f the political order in other economically advanced but culturally divided societies, particularly in W estern E urope, where a num ber o f countries resemble C anada in their lack o f an overriding national identity, yet possess distinct “ lim ite d ” id en tities o f region and cu ltu re . A theory which attem pts to explain their operation should therefore be o f considerable interest to the student o f C anadian politics. O ne such theory is that o f “consociational dem ocracy” advanced by A rend Lijphart.4 A merican pluralist theory, Lijphart points out, is unable to explain the politics o f “ fragm ented but stable dem ocracies” (such as The N etherlands, A ustria, Belgium, and Switzerland) other than by treating them as “ deviant” cases. In none o f these societies is there a situation o f “cross-cutting cleavages,” or national consensus, such as pluralist theory holds to be necessary for the successful functioning o f dem ocratic governm ent, yet each must be regarded as a functioning and relatively effective democ2 “ 'L im ited Identities' in C a n a d a ." Canadian H istorical Review, Vol. 50. no. I (M arch 1969), 9. A parallel view m ay be found in the field o f literary criticism : "W h en we speak o f a recognizably Canadian poet we usually m ean a regional poet w ho uses the distinctive objects an d actions o f his locality as poetic m aterials." M ilton W ilson. " O th e r C a n a d ia n s an d A f te r." T a m a ra c k R eview , Vol. 9 (1958-9) 89. •' F o r a m ore extended discussion o f consensus an d th e role o f parties, see m y paper “ Political Parties and Elite A ccom m odation: Interpretations o f C a n a d ia n F e d e ra lis m ," C a n a d ia n P olitical S cience A sso ciatio n , W innipeg, Ju n e 1970, printed in J. P. M eekison, ed., Canadian Feder­ a lism : M y th o r R e a lity ? (2nd ed ., T o ro n to , L o ndon e tc ., 1971), 121-140. 4 F o r a m ore extensive presentation of the theory, see his “ C onsocia­ tional D em ocracy.” W orld P olitics, Vol. 21, no. 2 (Jan. 1969). 207-25 (above. 70-89],

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racy. T h e e x p lan a tio n , he suggests, is to be found in th e role played by political elites in each o f these countries in deliberately overcom ing the effects of cultural fragm entation. Given the exist­ ence o f strong limited identities or subcultures, and the absence of a national consensus on symbols and goals, it becomes the task of the political leaders o f these separate subcultures to prartisp accom m odation a t the elite level in o rd er to m aintain the national, political system and m ake it w ork. In other w ords, bargains can be m ade and com prom ises reached am ong political leaders which would not be possible if they required popular ratification. This type o f governm ent Lijphart refers to as “ consociational democracy. ’ 5 F or it to function successfully, those who occupy positions of political leadership must understand the perils o f political fragm en­ tatio n an d be co m m itted to th e m ain te n a n ce o f th e n atio n al system; they must also be able, within their respective subcultures, to accom m odate divergent interests and dem ands. For the masses, on the other hand, all that is required is that they be com m itted to their own subcultures and th at they trust and support their respective elites. S ince th e m o re c o n tact and in teractio n th ere is between the masses of the subcultures the greater the likelihood o f friction between them , Lijphart suggests, “ it may be desirable to keep transactions am ong antagonistic subcultures in a divided society . . . to a m inim um .” 6 In theory there is no reason why a consociational democracy could not function satisfactorily even if am ong th e m asses o f the d ifferen t su b cu ltu res th ere was a b so ­ lutely no attachm ent to the national political system and no sense w hatever of a national identity. In actual systems, how ever, som e w degree o f popular national sentim ent is invariably present. The distinguishing feature o f a consociational political system is the $ elative weakness o f popular national sentim ent and the overcom ing o f this weakness through a process o f elite accom m odation. v Thus, not only does L ijphart’s model suggest parallels between C anada’s experience and the experience o f a num ber o f other countries, it also offers a possible explanation o f the way the C anadian political process operates. First, in broadest term s, it suggests that the lack o f a pan-C anadian identity com bined with strong regional subcultures is n o t necessarily a dysfunctional fea­ ture in term s o t the successiui operation o f a federal political system , as long as within each subculture dem ands are effectively articulated through its political elite. Secondly, it suggests that in h (s the relative absence o f a national mass consensus C anadian federf\*nO

5 T his usage follows David E. A pter. The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A S tu d y in B ureaucratic N ationalism (P rinceton, 1961). 6 “ C onsociational D em ocracy," 220-1.

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alism has been m aintained and m ade to w ork mainly through a process o f accom m odation at the elite level. It is necessary, how ever, to m ak e certain ad ju stm en ts in Lijph a rt’s con so ciatio n al m odel b efo re it can be applied to C an ad a . The term “subculture” could be interpreted in a num ber o f ways - it could be taken, for example, to refer to English C anada and French C anada, o r to a num ber o f distinct regions such as the M aritim es, Q uebec, O ntario, and the W est but most usefully perhaps as “ province.” M oreover, because o f the federal constitu­ tion o f C anada, a distinction should be m ade between federal and provincial political “ elites” (defined simply as the holders o f the m ost im p o rtan t offices in federal and p ro v in cial political in stitu ­ tions). Federal and provincial bureaucratic elites could be sim i­ larly identified. T o employ L ijphart’s term , elite accom m odation , in C anada could therefore be said to take place at several leveis? ip the num erous federal boards, com m issions, and councils which, through convention, have pj^3vmc[a^Representation as their basis o f m em bership: in the p a t t e r n s ^ com m unication and consulta­ tion which have developed am ong senior provincial civil servants; in the meetings o f such interprovincial bodies as the Council o f M inisters o f Education; in federal-provincial conferences; and, above all, in the federal cabinet. These are the institutions which are central to the day-to-day m aintenance and operation o f the C anadian federal system. T he representative character o f the cabinet, and particularly the em phasis placed on provincial representation, is well known. W hat is uncertain is the practical significance o f this fact in the functioning o f the political system. Since constitutional convention ensures that the proceedings o f cabinet are secret, it is possible only to surmise about provincial influences on decision-m aking. If, however, the cabinet is viewed in the broad fram ew ork of consociational theory, it can be seen as a mechanism o f elite accom m odation quite ap art from the specific decisions it makes. Its im portance, in other words, can be seen to lie m ore in its function o f bringing together political leaders from the provinces and m aintaining their continuous involvement in the decision­ m aking process than in th e actual o u tp u ts o f th a t process. A nd one o f the most im portant roles o f the prim e m inister is to m aintain am ong cabinet m em bers drawn from the various prov­ inces a degree o f com m itm ent to the national political system which does not exist to nearly the sam e extent at the popular or mass level within the provinces themselves; in other w ords, he m ust be able to m aintain and operate successfully a system o f elite accom m odation. C anadian political history contains am ple confirm ation o f such a view. Two cases may be briefly m entioned. .F irst, the inability

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o f the D iefenbaker governm ent to involve a Q uebec political elite rm a process o f accom m odation at the federal level was surely one o f the m ajor factors contributing to its downfall. Its policies and decisions w ere not an ti-Q u eb ec; its failure to a p p re cia te the im portance o f elite accom m odation w as.7 Secondly, as P. D. Stevens has shown in his study o f the collapse o f the Liberal party in O ntario in 1911, the failure o f Laurier was not so much a failure of policy as a failure to m aintain the involvement at the federal level o f an O ntario political elite. A fter Sir Oliver Mowa t’s resignation in 1897 the Laurier cabinet increasingly lacked effective representation from O ntario, a deficiency which co ntrib­ uted largely to its electoral defeat.8 Interprovincial conferences an d , since 1906, federal-provincial conferences have also p rovid ed an im p o rta n t in stitu tio n al fram e­ work for the process o f elite accom m odation. Even m ore than in the case o f the cabinet, their m ere existence is m ore im portant than the agreem ents which they produce. M oreover, they d ram at­ ically illustrate a prim e ministerial role o f considerable conse­ quence in the operation o f the federal system: the presenting o f a national viewpoint to provincial political leaders whose positions within the system are even m ore crucial than those o f federal cabinet ministers. A federal-provincial conference, therefore, has a dual sym bolic function: it symbolizes the vitality o f the provincial the personification o f inter-elite accom m odation. It is politics as theatre, highlighting for a brief m om ent the prim e m inister’s role in ex tracting the necessary n a tio n a l co m m itm en t from p rovincial elites (grudging and minim al though it may som etim es be) w ith­ out which the federal system could not work. Successful federal leadership in C anada requires an attention to provincial political elites which is m atched only by the need for sim ilar accom m odation in the consociational dem ocracies of W estern E urope. C an ad ian political histo ry reveals a p a tte rn of elite accom m odation which must be taken into account in any attem pt to explain the longevity o f the federation. From Joseph Howe, who moved from the leadership o f the N ova Scotia seces­ sionists to a seat in the federal cabinet, to D onald Jam ieson, the present m inister o f transport, w ho in 1948-9 was one o f the leading figures in the cam paign to keep N ewfoundland out of 7 F o r a glim pse into the origin o f this failure, see D alton C am p, Gentlem en, P lovers and Politicians (T oronto. M ontreal. 1970), 238-52. 8 S ee S tevens. “ L au rier. A ylesw orth, an d th e D eclin e o f th e L iberal Party in O n tario ,” H istorical P apers, C anadian H istorical Associa­ tio n , 1968. p p . 94-113.

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C onfederation,9 the pattern has been the sam e. Tim e after time, provincial politicians with no m ore attachm ent to the federal system than the mass o f their constituents become transform ed in O ttaw a into cabinet ministers intent on m aking the system work. T he two cases cited are but the extreme examples o f how the process o f elite accom m odation in C anada has provided a w orkable substitute for mass national integration. As A rend Lijphart rightly points out, his theory o f consocia­ tional democracy also contains certain norm ative im plications. Hence, if a consociational perspective is adopted tow ards some recent trends in C anadian politics, a num ber o f conclusions would appear to follow. First, a decline o f "elitism ” in C anada and its replacem ent by a general acceptance o f the Jacksonian myth o f p opular or “ participatory” dem ocracy may be detrim ental to the^-. . m aintenance o f C anadian federalism if it leads to a situation in V u jjC i which the mass o f the people are unwilling to accept the interelite accom m odations m ade by th eir political leaders. If inter-elite . ~ accom m oda tions m ust pe popuiariv ratified they mav he impossi- vA D ble_to achievq. Secondly, “ national” policies aim ed a t prom oting bilinguITism and bicnttw ahsm may be misguided in the sense that /--> they may jncrease friction between separate (- n m m n n i t j e s w h i r h previously had little direct contact with o n e another. It m ay be that a system oF~consociational~ Federalism works best when the “ tw o solitudes” are preserved. Thirdly, if there were to emerge within any one o f the provinces an elite who for nationalistic, economic, ideological, or any o th er reasons are unwilling to pro­ vide “overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim o f counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system ,” the system would become inoperable. It may be, therefore, th at the ultim ate precept of consociationalism as a norm ative theory is that new elites must either be accom m odated or suppressed. On the other hand, it must be noted th at consociationalism com bined with federalism creates at least the possibility o f a conflict between com peting federal and provincial elites within the same provincial subculture (as would presumably be the case if, for example, Quebec were to elect a Parti quebecois governm ent provincially yet continue to give a majority of its federal seats to the Liberal party). It would ap p ear that the duality o f political elites in a federal system m akes the outcom e o f subcultural con­ flict m ore uncertain than it would be in a unitary state. F or the student o f C anadian politics, however, the value of consociational theory lies less in its norm ative im plications than in its capacity to provide a framework for historical explanation. 9 S ee R ich a rd G w y n , S m a llw o o d : (T o ro n to . 1968). 102-3.

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W hat it offers is a way o f viewing the C anadian political process which accounts for its successful m aintenance yet requires no dubious assum ptions about the role o f political parties and posits no chimerical notion o f an “ underlying” national identity.

T H E P R O V IN C E O F C A N A D A : T H E E M E R G E N C E O F C O N S O C IA T IO N A L P O L IT IC S W illiam Ormsby Source: W illiam O rm sby, The E m ergence o f the Federal Concept in C anada. 1839-1845 (T o ro n to , 1969), p p . 3, 122-5. C o p y rig h t © University o f T o ro n to Press 1969. R eprinted by perm ission o f the publisher and the author.

It has become traditional to regard the 1840’s as the “ responsible governm ent” decade in C anadian history. W hile this em phasis on constitutional developm ent is no doubt w arranted, it has tended to obscure the fact that it was during these sam e years th at the federal im plications of the C anadian situation began to be recog­ nized. The continued existence o f tw o distinct cultures within the Province o f C anada dem anded the developm ent o f som e guaran­ tee for the peculiar interests and values o f each group. In short, the survival o f French C anada, despite the deliberate attem pt to overwhelm it in a union o f the two C anadas, dem anded the emergence o f a federal c o n c e p t___ The advent o f the U nited E m pire Loyalists created the ele­ ments o f a bi-cultural problem in the old province o f Q uebec, but it was alm ost seventy years before the full significance o f this, fact began to be recognized. In 1791, the division o f the province was an attem pt to find a solution for the problem o f two distinct cultures endeavouring to exist within a single geographic unit. But it was a solution which side-stepped the basic question o f whether French C anada was to be assimilated or the two cultures werd to continue to exist side by side. D uring the debate on the C onstitu­ tional Act, Charles Jam es Fox called for measures which would “ form the tw o descriptions o f people into one body, and endeav­ our to annihilate all national distinctions,” but William Pitt replied that any attem pt to implem ent such a policy would pro­ duce “ a perpetual scene o f factious altercation.” 1 N onetheless, Pitt sanguinely predicted that assim ilation would take place indi­ rectly through Lower C anada's em ulation o f U pper C anada. / Although the ensuing years revealed the fallacy o f Pitt's predic­ tion, they failed to produce any positive indication o f the British G o vernm ent’s ultim ate objective. Had the attem pted union of 1822 been carried through, it would have am ounted to a decision in favour o f assim ilation, but the rapidity with which it was dropped when opposition developed was indicative both o f the 1 The A n nual R egister or a View o f the H istory. Politics, and L itera­ ture f o r the y e a r 1791 (L o n don. 1795). pp. 110-1 I.

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G overnm ent’s reluctance to bring thorny colonial problem s before Parliam ent and o f the force o f ethnological and social opposition to the union. The French R evolution and the N apoleonic W ars, together with the growing reform m ovem ent in G reat Britain, left British statesm en with little leisure to contem plate C anadian problem s. T hose who did concern themselves with C anada were inclined to view the clash between the Executive and the Assem­ bly in Lower C anada as a constitutional question rather than as the struggle o f French C anada to survive as a separate entity. C onsequently, little thought was given to w hether assimilation was possible, or to the im plications o f the survival o f tw o cultures in C anada if it were not. Before the rebellions occurred, only Roebuck and G lenelg seem to have sensed the potentialities o f a federal solution. The rebellions focused attention on the C anadian problem and at the sam e tim e fostered the conviction th at the assimilation of French C anada was essential to the m aintenance of the British connection. A gainst such a background, it is not surprising that few men caught a glimpse o f the federal concept. O ne o f the few was Edward Ellice, who had learned a great deal from the unsuc­ cessful attem pt at union in 1822. In 1860, as dualism asserted itself ever m ore strongly in C anada, Ellice rem inded L aF ontaine o f his foresight: “ All that has since occurred in C anada, confirms the advice, I gave in vain to the G ovt, at the tim e o f the Union B ill. . . I saw the difficulty th at would sooner or later, arise, from the dissim ilarity in habits & institutions, o f the tw o Provinces, after th e feelings th a t had been called in to actio n , a t the crisis . . . ” A lthough L ord H ow ick and Jam es S tephen shared E llice’s preference for a federal union, they were unable to exert any significant influence on the G overnm ent. Lord D urham saw the national possibilities in a federal union o f British N orth A m erica, but when this proved to be beyond his grasp, he could not bring him self to recom m end a federal union o f the C anadas alone. He believed that responsible governm ent was the only solution for C anadian problem s, but that it could not be safely conceded, nor could it function properly, unless French C anada was assimilated in a com plete legislative union with U pper C anada. O f D u rham ’s several recom m endations, it is probable that the idea o f assimila­ tion was most in accord with the views o f M elbourne and R us­ sell. Som e m em bers of Parliam ent may have doubted that assimi­ lation could be achieved by m eans of the D urham form ula, but most adm itted th at, given the influence o f the U nited States in 2 L aF o n tain e Papers, vol. M arch 8, I860.

17, pp. 3016-17, Ellice to L aF ontaine,

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N orth America and the state o f public opinion in England, they could not suggest a better means. The assimilation o f French C anada would have been difficult, if not impossible, in 17 9 1 -f ifty years later it was an entirely unrealistic objective. Lord Sydenham was able to convey the im pression that the union had been successfully inaugurated and that French C anada had no alternative but to subm it to anglicization. U nder Bagot and Metcalfe, however, it became clear that C anada was likely to remain a bi-cultural province,* and the Imperial G overnm ent was forced, reluctantly, to abandon the union’s prim ary objective. Paradoxically, the union, which had been designed for precisely the opposite purpose, left considerable room for the developm ent o f federal characteristics. Once assim ilation was rejected, equal representation assumed the guise o f a political guarantee for the continued existence o f two distinct cultures. It was soon discov­ ered that the “ harm ony concept” could be subdivided to produce the fascinating, though im practical, theory o f double harm ony o r double majority. The existence o f duplicate law offices paved the way for the creation o f hyphenated ministries which symbolized the dual character o f the C anadian population. W ith the appoint­ m ent o f French C anadians to the Executive Council during Bago t’s adm inistration, the federal concept began to emerge and within a few years it gained wide recognition. The concept did not, however, become the all-pervading force within the union; there were som e aspects o f politics and many areas o f adm inistra­ tion which rem ained unaffected by the principle o f dualism . Even Baldwin and L aFontaine, who were deeply com m itted to the principle, exerted pressure to replace the tw o separate provincial secretaries with a single one in the interest o f economy. N onethe­ less, there is am ple evidence to support the claim that dualism did become a significant characteristic o f the union. W hen Lord Sydenham was m aking the adm inistrative arrange­ ments for the union, he was necessarily thinking in term s o f a province in which cultural differences would eventually disappear. Consequently the continuation o f separate adm inistrative estab­ lishm ents in each section o f the province for som e departm ents was dictated prim arily by the vast extent o f territory involved. Assimilation was only prospective, however, and he could not entirely ignore the fact that, initially at least, each section would differ from the other in language, religion, civil code, judicial system, and the form o f land tenure. These factors must have had som e influence on Sydenham 's decision that dual adm inistrative establishm ents should be m aintained by the law officers, the p rovincial secretaries, and th e c o m m issio n er o f C row n lands. In 1842, Bagot’s decision to appoint tw o deputy superintendents of

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education was based entirely on the religious differences between the tw o sections o f the province. A s the federal concept devel­ oped, this adm inistrative fram ew ork perm itted the m anifestation o f dualism in the public service. O ther departm ents m aintained a single establishm ent, but, as J. E. Hodgetts has noted, som e of these were “split right down the middle, starting at the to p with the political head and going dow n to the subdivisions o f the various branches.” 3 One o f the most striking applications o f the principle of dualism was the rotation o f the capital between T oronto and Q uebec in the years after 1849. If the D urham formula had functioned as its originator had anticipated, French C anadians would have joined the G overn­ m ent not to protect the particular interests o f their com patriots, but rather to assist in the process o f assim ilation. W hen the continued existence o f French C anada as a separate cultural entity was accepted as a recognized fact, however, FrenchC anadian politicians and public servants becam e the representa­ tives o f a separate unit o f the population with its own rights and interests. It was in this context th at dualism becam e a significant characteristic o f the U nited Province of C anada. W ithin the political arena, the union functioned well only when its federal aspects were dom inant. This fact was recognized by John A . M acdonald during the C onfederation debates: W e, in C anada, already know som ething o f the advantages and disadvantages of a Federal U nion. A lthough we have nominally a Legislative U nion in C a n a d a -a lth o u g h we sit in one Parliam ent, supposed constitutionally to represent the people w ithout regard to sections o r localities, yet we know, as a m atter o f fact, that since the union in 1841, we have had a Federal U nion; that in matters affecting U pper C an­ ada solely, m em bers from th at section claimed and generally exercised the right o f exclusive legislation, while m em bers from Lower C anada legislated in m atters affecting only their own section. We have had a Federal U nion in fact, though a Legislative Union in nam e.4 D espite M acdonald’s testim ony, there were occasions when mea­ sures affecting only one half o f the province were passed or rejected by a m inority from th at section with the aid o f a majority from the other section. Equal representation proved to be an insufficient guarantee for the protection o f sectional interests, and it was this fact which ultimately doom ed the union. F o r m ore 1J . E. H odgetts, Pioneer Public Service. (T oronto, 1955), p. 55. 4 P arliam entary D ebates on the Subject o f th e C onfederation o f the B ritish N orth A m erican Provinces (Q uebec, 1865), p. 30.

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than a quarter o f a century the union managed to function as a quasi-federal system, but eventually the forces o f dualism cam e into direct conflict with the unitary character o f the constitution. D uring the early years of the union, it was Lower C anada that com plained o f interference; the L aF o n tain e Papers contain a list o f seventeen votes taken during the years 1844 to 1846 in which Lower C anadian m atters were decided by a m ajority from the upper province. A m ong the subjects listed are dam ages caused by the construction o f the Beauharnois C anal, the M ontreal election o f 1844, the Lower C anada Election Bill, Lower C anadian rebel­ lion losses, am endm ents to the W inter R oads Bill, land titles o f naturalized persons, claims o f the Chambly Canal contractors, the Lower C anada School Bill, and the Jesuits’ estates.5 T he shoe began to pinch on the other foot in the 1850’s and the charge was m ade that U pper C anada was suffering from French-C anadian dom ination. The suspicion grew that the secularization o f the clergy reserves was being retarded by the influence o f FrenchC anadian m em bers of the G overnm ent. M ore pusitive evidence was presented when U pper C anadian school legislation was am ended, by a Lower C anadian m ajority, to extend the provision for separate schools. This situation, coupled with the fact th at U pper C anada now had the larger population, produced the C lear G rit dem and for representation by population which rapidly gained in popularity. G . F. G . Stanley has quite correctly observed that representation by population implied “ the collapse o f the federal concept.” 6 However, it should be recognized that from another point o f view, “ Rep. by Pop.” was a protest against the fact that the union could still assume a legislative character. On the other hand, “ Rep. by Pop.” could never be acceptable to Lower C anada for it was a direct threat to French-C anadian interests. The necessity o f finding som e alternative led to a renewed interest in the “ double m ajority” principle and the experim ent o f John Sandfield M acdonald from 1862 to 1864. The principle proved unacceptable in practice, however, because o f the difficulty in securing a double m ajority for any contentious mea­ sure. Even John Sandfield M acdonald, the professed cham pion of the principle, could not resist the tem ptation in 1863 to carry U pper C anadian separate schools legislation by means o f a Lower C anadian m ajority. With the failure o f the “ double m ajority” theory, the only alternative was a proper federal union and this was the solution adopted in 1867. 5 L aF o n tain e Papers, pp. 5241-42. 6 G . F. G . Stanley, “ Act o r Pact: A nother Look at C onfederation,’ Canadian H istorical Association R eport, 1956, p. 9.

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N um erous factors, lying beyond the scope o f this study, but fam iliar to every historian, determ ined that C onfederation should em brace Nova Scotia and N ew Brunswick as well as the C ana­ das. T here were also distinctive m aritim e factors which favoured a federal union, but the predom inant federal influence was the dual character o f the C anadas. C onfederation was an im possibil­ ity w ithout the concurrence o f French C anada and th at concurr­ ence was forthcom ing only when guarantees for its institutions, language, laws, and religion had been spelled out in the resolu­ tions that were to form the basis for the British N orth America Act. If the union o f 1841 had failed to fulfil the original expecta­ tions, it had, nonetheless, served as a useful experim ent in feder­ alism , and had produced both the concept and the experience upon which a larger and m ore satisfactory union could be built.

T H E F E D E R A L B A R G A IN : T H E C O N T R A C T A R IA N BASIS O F C O N F E D E R A T IO N G eorge F. G . Stanley Source: G. F. G. Stanley, “ Act or Pact: Another Look at Confed­ eration,” Canadian Historical Association Report, 1956, 1-25. The text given here is substantially abridged and is reprinted by permis­ sion of the author. The paper was originally presented, partly in English and partly in French, as the Presidential Address to the Canadian Historical Association at a joint meeting with the Cana­ dian Political Science Association in Montreal on June 7. 1956. T o my mind the principal f a c t o r - I do not suggest it as the sole factor but as one o f the most im p o rta n t-in determ ining the course o f C anadian constitutional developm ent, has been the existence, within C anada, o f tw o com peting ethnic, cultural groups. The Earl o f D urham , in his fam ous R eport, chose to refer to them as “ two nations w arring in the bosom o f a single s ta te .''1 W ere he writing in to d ay ’s idiom, he might have pre­ ferred to substitute the word “ co-existing” for “ w arring.” C er­ tainly “ w arring” is too strong and too inaccurate a w ord to describe what has been simply the political struggle on the part o f the English-speaking population for supremacy, and on the part o f the French-speaking population for survival. This struggle has dom inated the whole story o f C anadian politics. It probably accounts for the prepossession o f C anadian historians with politi­ cal and constitutional history. T he struggle is one which still continues, and the issues are still the same; supremacy as against survival, or to use the contem porary term s, centralization as against provincial autonom y. And yet, perhaps, if the w ord “ w arring” is unsuitable as a general description o f A nglo-French relations within the bosom of this country, C anada, at times it has not been w ithout som e aptness; for the bitterness and m isunderstandings which have frequently accom panied our relations have cut, on occasions, close to the bone. T hat civil strife in C anada has never degenerated into civil w ar has been due, in part at least, to the recognition by both peoples o f the necessity o f som e m odus vivendi and the recognition by each o f the rights o f the other. The recognition and definition o f these rights is the basis o f the entente, under­ standing, pact, com pact, call it what you will, which is the foun­ dation o f our political unity. W ithout such an entente there would have been, and would be no C anada as we know it today. M uch 1Sir Reginald Coupland, The Durham Report, an abridged version with an introduction and notes (Oxford, 1945), p. 15.

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has been written both in the French and English languages about this pact; som e o f it narrow and legalistic; m ore o f it unhistorical; much o f it purely polemical. If we attem pt to look upon this pact o r entente as a legal contract, freely entered into by tw o parties and intended by them to be legally enforceable in a court o f law, our vision will be so limited as to be distorted; for a pact or com pact is not a contract in the legal sense. It is a gentlem an’s agreem ent, an understanding based upon m utual consent, with a m oral rather than a juridical sanction. The A nglo-French under­ standing which alone has m ade governm ent possible within the boundaries of the larger C anada has become sanctified by time and continued acceptance, until today it is looked upon by many as a convention o f our constitution. It is my im m ediate purpose, this evening, to trace for you the origin and growth o f this convention, and to discuss som e o f its im plications in the devel­ opm ent o f o u r c o n stitu tio n .. . . T here is no need for me to discuss the various factors leading to C onfederation - the threat o f A m erican im perialism, the fear of the westward expansion o f the U nited States, the necessity for im proved railway com m unications, the political im passe in C an­ ada; all o f this is fam iliar ground to generations of C anadian students. N or is it necessary for m e to chronicle the erratic course o f the am bulatory conference o f 1864 or to follow its mem bers, bottle by bottle, as they travelled through the M aritim es and C anada, dispensing good will and self-congratulatory speeches to all who were prepared to listen to them . However, I do wish to direct your attention, for a m om ent, to the fundam ental problem which faced the delegates w ho met at C harlottetow n and at Q uebec, that o f reconciling the conflicting interests o f the two racial groups and o f the conflicting principles o f centralization and provincial autonom y. Broadly s p e a k in g -a n d there are, of course, exceptions to this general s ta te m e n t-th e English-speaking representatives, pragm atists, suspicious o f ideas and generaliza­ tions, preoccupied with econom ic and political interests and secure in their ever increasing m ajority over the French C anadi­ ans, were disposed to favour a strong central governm ent, if not actually a legislative union; th e French C anadians, empiricists, uneasy, apprehensive, and deeply concerned with the survival of their culture, were by religion and by history in favour o f a constitution which would, at the very least, secure them such guarantees as they had already extracted from the British govern­ m ent during the hundred years which had gone b efore.jiN o French C anadian, intent upon preserving his national identity or bettering his political future could ever agree to a legislative union. Only federalism would perm it the two, distinct, and sepa­ rate, 'cultures'"to co-exist side by side within the bosom o f a single

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sta te ^ F e d e ra lism , not a half-way, hesitant, ill-defined, semiunitary federalism like that which had evolved out o f the Act o f U nion, But an honest, w hole-hearted, clearly-stated, precise feder­ alism was the only solution acceptable to the French C anadian leaders. Thus, thtTone group was, at heart, for unity and fusion: the oth er for diversity and co-operation: the one was dom inated by econom ic fact and the other, philosophical principle. T he fundam ental opposition o f these tw o divergent points o f view does not, unfortunately, ap p ear in the docum entary frag­ m ents o f the conferences which we possess; it does, however, emerge clearly in a letter w ritten by Sir A rthur G o rd o n , Lieuten­ ant-G overnor of New Brunswick, following his visit to C harlotte­ town and his conversations with C artier, Brown and G alt. In a lengthy despatch to the Colonial Office outlining the details o f the union schem e as the C anadians had put it up to the M aritim ers, G o rdon wrote: W ith regard to the im portant question o f the attributes to be assigned to the respective Legislatures and G overnm ents, there was a very great divergence o f opinion. The aim of Lower C anada is a local independence as com plete as cir­ cumstances will perm it, and the peculiarities o f race, religion and habits which distinguish its people render their desire respectable and natural.2 It was at Q uebec that the new constitution took form and shape. T o the old capital o f New France cam e delegates from the six provinces, the four seaboard provinces o f N ova Scotia, N ew ­ foundland, Prince Edward Island and N ew Brunswick, and the two provinces o f C anada, which, if they did not have a juridical basis, had, at least, as I have pointed out, a factual foundation. This gathering at Q uebec was the first and only constituent body in the whole o f our constitutional history. All previous constitu­ tions had been drafted, considered, and passed, by an outside authority; in 1864 the thirty-three representatives o f the British N orth American provinces m et, with the blessing and approval of the British G overnm ent, to do what had hitherto always been done for them . The constitution which they adopted in the form of seventy-two 2 Public Archives of Canada, New Brunswick. C.O. 189. vol. 9: Gordon to Cardwell, confidential. Sept. 22, 1864. This letter is reproduced, in part, in W. F. O'Connor. Report pursuant to Resolu­ tion o f the Senate to the Honourable the Speaker by the Parliamen­ tary Counsel (Ottawa, 1939), Annex 2, pp. 84-6. Large sections of the original letter were, however, omitted in the printed version. The quotation given here is one of the omitted portions.

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Resolutions had already been prepared in draft form before the C anadian delegates had ever disem barked at C harlottetow n. In m any respects it bore a striking resemblance to an outline plan which had appeared over the nam e of Joseph Charles T ache in Le Courrier du Canada in 1857, and which had been published as a book in the following y ear.3 In sum m ary form, w hat the Q uebec C onference decided was that the new union should be federal in character; that its central parliam ent should comprise two houses, the upper based on representation by provinces, and the lower upon representation by population; jthat the powers of the central governm ent should be o f a general character and those o f the provincial legislatures o f a local nature^lThese pow ers were carefully enum erated, byt the legislative residuum was given to the central parliam ent.(T he French and English languages were to enjoy equal status in the central parliam ent and courts and in the legislature and courts o f the province o f Lower C anada. \ G eorges C artier, generally, was satisfied with w h S w iad been achieved. He felt that even though he had been obliged to yield much to the dem ands o f M acdonald and Brown and other advo­ cates o f a strong central governm ent, he had, nevertheless, suc­ ceeded in preserving the rights and privileges o f his own people and o f the province in which they lived.4 H e had, m oreover,' 3J. C. Tache, Des provinces de /'A merique du h'ord el dune union feder­ ate (Quebec, 1858). 4 "Objection had been taken to the scheme now under consideration, because of the words, ‘new nationality." Now. when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political national­ ity with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual would interfere. It was lamented by some that we had this diversity of races, and hopes were expressed that this distinctive feature would cease. The idea of unity of races was u topian-it was impossible.. . . We could not do away with the distinctions of race. We could not legislate for the disappearance of the French Canadi­ ans from American soil, but British and French Canadians alike could appreciate and understand their position relative to each other.” (Cartier. Feb. 7. 1865. Confederation Debates, p. 60). Subsequently, in answer to the criticisms of A. A. Dorion, Cartier said, "I have always had the interests of Lower Canada at heart, and have guarded them more sedulously than the hon. member for Hochelaga and his partisans have ever done." (Confederation Debates, p. 714). Hector Langevin, the Solicitor-General, took the same view. He said. “ We are considering the establishment of a Confederacy with a Central Parliament and local parliaments. The Central or Federal Parliament will have the control of all measures of a general charac­ ter . . . , but all matters of local interest, all that relates to the affairs' and rights of the different sections of the Confederacy, will be reserved for the control of the local parliaments.. . . It will be the

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succeeded in m aintaining the fundam ental principle o f the entente between the two racial groups in C anada, equality of race, equal­ ity o f religion, equality o f language, equality of laws. Even G eorge Brown, the old francophobe, had gone as far as to adm it to the C anadian legislature “ w hether we ask for parliam entary reform for C anada alone, o r in union with the M aritim e Prov­ inces, the French C anadians must have their views consulted as well as us (sic). This schem e can be carried and no schem e can be th at has not the support o f both sections o f the province.” 5 The new constitution might not be designed to be the most efficient, but it w ould, at least, be just. T he next step was as easy as it was logical. Since both races were equal, a decision taken, an agreem ent arrived at by the equal partners on the fundam ental character o f the new constitu­ tion, could not be changed w ithout the consent o f each. It was, in fact, a treaty, a com pact binding upon both parties. This was a view which scarcely roused a dissenting voice in the C anada o f 1865. N ot one o f the C anadians who fathered the resolutions at Q uebec failed to stress the unalterable character o f the agreem ent they had m ade. M acdonald said, “ these resolutions were in the nature o f a treaty, and if not adopted in their entirety, the proceedings would have to be com m enced de novo."6 M cG ee, in his high-pitched but not unmusical voice, cried: A nd that there may be no doubt ab o u t our position in regard to that docum ent, we say, question it you may, reject it you may, or accept it you may, but alter it you may not. (H ear, hear.) It is beyond your power, o r our power, to alter it. T here is not a se n te n c e -a y , o r even a w o rd -y o u can alter w ithout desiring to throw out the d ocum ent___ On this point, I repeat after all my hon. friends w ho have already spoken, for one party to alter a treaty is, o f course, to destroy it.7 Tache, C artier, M cD ougall, Brown, all o f them described the Q uebec Resolutions as a “ treaty” o r as a “ p act,” and argued for adoption w ithout am endm ent.8 duty of the Central Government to see that the country prospers, but it will not be its duty to attack our religion, our institutions, or our nationality, which . . . will be amply protected.” (Confederal ion Debates, pp. 367-8. See also pp. 373, 392.) ■Confederation Debales, p. 87. 6 Ibid., p. 16. Macdonald repeated this idea several times throughout his speech: see pp. 31-2. 7 Ibid., p. 136. s Ibid., pp. 83, 88, 714. 720. See also Chapter II in Sir George Ross.

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It is easy for the lawyer o r the political scientist, three genera­ tions later, to reply that in 1865 there was no treaty really made at all, that the C om prom ise o f Q uebec could not possess the attributes o f a treaty or o f a legal contract. N evertheless the historical fact rem ains that the men who used these term s were the men who drafted the Resolutions; they chose their w ords with deliberation; many o f them were lawyers, they knew what they were saying. They were not, every one o f them , trying to becloud the issue before the legislature or to confuse the legislators. I have found no evidence which would lead me to question their sincer­ ity or to believe that they disbelieved their own assertions. In strict law it is probably true th at the term s they used to describe the Q uebec Resolutions were not all that could be desired in the way o f legalistic exactitude; but to my m ind these terms adequately expressed the ideas which the Fathers of the C onfed­ erate Resolutions wished to convey to their listeners and to posterity, for they spoke to both. The idea o f a com pact between races was not a new one in 1865; it had already become a vital thing in our history. It influenced both the political thinking and the political vocabulary o f the day; and it was already on the way to becom e a tradition and a convention o f our constitution. T he idea o f a com pact as I have outlined it was essentially, in its o rig in , a racial concep t. But the m eeting o f th e m aritim e delegates with those o f C anada at C harlottetow n and at Quebec introduced a new interpretation which has had mighty impact upon the course o f our later history, namely, the idea o f a com pact between the politico-geographic areas which go to make up C anada. Even before the conferences it had become the com ­ mon practice to identify the racial groups with the areas from which they came. W hen thinking of French C anadians or of A nglo-C anadians, it was all to o simple to speak o f them in geographical term s, as Lower C anada and U pper C anada. It was a confusion o f mind and speech o f which we in our own day and generation are all too frequently guilty. Almost w ithout thought “ Q u e b e c ” and “ French C a n a d ia n s,” o r “ O n ta rio ” and “ A nglo-C anadians,” becom e synonym ous term s in the m ouths of C an ad ian s o f b o th tongues. It is, o f co u rse, a slipshod way of thinking as well as o f speaking, for there are French C anadians in O ntario and English C anadians in Quebec; and in many ways it has been unfortunate, for it has limited to Q uebec language rights which might, under happier circum stances, have been accorded French C anadians in other parts o f the country. That English did

The Senate o f Canada: its Constitution. Powers and Duties Histori­ cally Considered (Toronto, 1914).

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not suffer the sam e fate in Q uebec as did the French tongue in o ther provinces, was due in part to the effective role o f Englishspeaking Q uebeckers, like M cG ee and G alt, in the drafting o f the federative act, as well as to a greater appreciation on the part of French C anadians o f the need for toleration. However, the point which I really wish to m ake is this; once C anadians (as distinct from M aritim ers) began to identify provinces with specific linguis­ tic groups, the idea o f a pact between races was transform ed into the idea o f a pact between provinces. And the C om prom ise of Quebec becam e a com pact between the provinces which partici­ p ated in th e conference. 1 have no need to la b o u r this p o in t. It emerges in all clarity from a careful reading o f the speeches to be found in the C onfederation D ebates o f 1865. However, the com pact idea, was still, in 1865, peculiarly a C anadian one. It was not shared by the delegates o f the several M aritim e colonies who had journeyed to Q uebec. From what I have seen of the debates in the legislatures and the speeches reported in the press o f N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick, the words so familiar in C anada, words like “p act” , “treaty” or “ com pact” were rarely used in reference to w hat had been decided upon at C harlottetow n o r Q uebec. T here was never any idea in the m inds o f the M aritim e representatives th at the Seven­ ty-Two Resolutions were sacrosanct. Thus, when N ova Scotia and New Brunswick resolved in 1866 to renew the negotiations for a federal union with C anada, they sent th eir representatives to London with full authority to m ake any changes and to conclude any new arrangem ent they m ight see lit___ In the end, the term s o f the agreem ent drafted and adopted at the W estm in ster Palace H otel in L ondon in D ecem b er 1866 were substantially those which had previously been discussed and accepted at Q uebec. A great deal has, I know, been m ade o f the London Resolutions as a new departure and as an effective denial o f the idea o f a binding pact having been concluded at Quebec; but a detailed com parison o f the tw o sets o f resolutions reveals no really substantial points of difference. T he outline is similar; the w ording in many instances is unchanged. Such alterations as were m ade, appear to have been either o f a m inor nature intended to clarify an am biguity o r inserted to strengthen rath er than to w eaken the bi-racial, bi-cultural aspect o f the pact. Certainly the people o f the day who were most concerned viewed the revised resolutions after this fashion. O n January 5th, 1867, the editor of The M orning Freeman of St. John, N .B ., w rote, “ If the Q uebec Scheme has been modified in any im portant particulars they are profoundly ignorant of what the m odifications a re .” 9 Tw o m onths' 9 The Morning Freeman, Saint John. N.B., Jan. 5. 1867.

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later he w rote again while the British N drth A m erica Bill was before Parliament: W e ask any reasonable, intelligent man o f any party to take up that Bill, com pare it with the original Q uebec Scheme, and discover, if he can, anything that could possibly have occupied honest, earnest m en, for even a week, no m atter what the particular objections to the few changes th at have been m a d e .. . . Could not all these m atters have been settled as well and as much to the satisfaction o f the public by letter, at an expense o f a few shillings postage . . . as by this large and most costly delegation?10 T h e L ondon R esolutions o f 1866 w ere, in a w ord, little if an y ­ thing m ore than an edited version o f the Q uebec Resolutions of 1864; the contractual nature o f the pact rem ained unaffected. T he British seem ed to like the idea o f a provincial com pact. Both the Colonial Secretary, Lord C arnarvon, and his undersec­ retary, the H onourable Charles Adderley, accepted it as an accu­ rate description o f what was intended and what was achieved. M r. A dderley, w ho in tro d u ced th e Bill based on th e resolutions into the British House of C om m ons, urged upon the m em bers, in words which might have com e straight from the m outh o f M ac­ donald o r C artier, that no change o r alteration should be m ade in the term s o f the Bill: The House may ask w hat occasion there can be for our interfering in a question o f this description. It will, however, I think, be manifest, upon reflection, that, as the arrange­ m ent is a m atter of m utual concession on the part o f the Provinces, there must be som e external authority to give sanction to the com pact into which they have e n te re d .. . . If, again, federation has in this case specially been a m atter o f most delicate mutual treaty and com pact between the prov­ in c e s - if it has been a m atter o f m utual concession and com prom ise - it is clearly necessary th at there should be a third party ab extra to give sanction to the treaty made between them . Such seem s to m e to be the office we have to perform in regard to this Bill." Lord C arnarvon, in the H ouse o f Lords, said: the Quebec R esolutions, with som e slight changes, form the basis o f a measure that I have now the honour to subm it to Parliam ent. T o those resolutions all the British Provinces in N orth Am erica were, as I have said, consenting parties, and 10Ibid., March 7. 1867. 11 Quoted in O'Connor. Report, Annex 4. p. 149.

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the measure founded upon them must be accepted as a treaty o f u n io n .12. jllater in the sam e speech C arnarvon, after pointing out that a legislative union was “ im practicable,” because o f Lower C an ad a’s jealousy and pride in “ her ancestral customs and traditions” and her willingness to enter C onfederation “only upon the distinct understanding that she retains th em ,” stated em phatically that the term s o f the British N orth A m erica Bill were “ o f the nature o f a treaty o f union, [every single clause in which had been debated over and over' again, and had been subm itted to the closest scrutiny, and, in fact each o f them represented a com prom ise between the different interests involved.” “ T here might be altera­ tions w here they are not m aterial,” he continued, “ and do not go to the essence o f the m easu re.. . . But it will be my duty to resist th e a lteratio n o f anything w hich is in th e n a tu re o f a c o m p ro ­ mise between the Provinces, as an am endm ent o f that nature, if carried, would be fatal to the m easure.” 13 T he legalist will, o f course, reply that the intervention o f the C olonial Office and the passing o f the Bill as an Act o f the British Parliam ent in effect destroyed the com pactual - I prefer to avoid the w ord “contractual” with its juridical connotation basis o f the historical process of confederation. Perhaps it does; to the law yer. But to th e h isto rian th e sim ple fact rem ain s th a t the officers o f the Colonial Office accepted w ithout question the assessment o f the situation given them by the colonial delegates. T o them the Bill was in the nature of a colonial treaty, even if such a treaty were not to be found in the classifications usually given in the text books of international law. In consequence they w ere prepared to leave the colonial delegates alone, to let them m ake th e ir own arran g em en ts, th resh o u t th e ir own differences, draft their own agreem ent. N either Lord C arnarvon nor the m em bers o f his office entered the negotiations o r took part in them until the Q uebec Resolutions had undergone the revision or editing to which I have referred. W hen they did, it was at the specific request o f the delegates, with the object of acting in an advisory capacity only. Perhaps the British role is best expressed in the suggestion that the Colonial Secretary acted in the capacity o f a n o tary reducing to p ro p e r legal term s an u n d erstan d in g already arrived at by the parties concerned. T h at certainly was the role in which C arnarvon saw himself. The British N orth A m erica Act was, therefore, not the w ork o f the British authorities, nor the expression o f ideas o f the British Colonial Office; it was, in 12 Sir R. Herbert, Speeches on Canadian Affairs by Henry Howard Molyneux, fourth Earl o f Carnarvon (London. 1902) p. 92. 13 Ibid., pp. 110, 130.

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essence, simply the recognition in law o f the agreem ent arrived at originally in Q uebec and clarified later in L ondon, by the repre­ sentatives of the provinces o f N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, and C anada with its two divisions, C anada East and C anada W est. T he British N orth A m erica Act passed through its necessary readings in the H ouse o f C om m ons and in the House o f Lords w ithout change or alteration; on M arch 28, 1867, it received the Royal Assent. By royal proclam ation it cam e into effect on the first day of July following. T he new constitution was, without question, a statute o f the British Parliam ent, and as such pos­ sessed th e a ttrib u te s o f an o rd in a ry sta tu te . But it was a sta tu te distinctly unlike any other previously passed by the Parliam ent at W estm inster. The Q uebec Act of 1774, the C onstitutional Act of 1791, the Act o f Union o f 1840, all o f them had been devised, drafted, and enacted, w ithout reference to the people o f the provinces concerned. Individuals and groups o f individuals had been consulted, it is true; but the w ork was done and the respon­ sibility was taken by the Im perial authorities. T he British N orth Am erica Act, however, was, to all intents and purposes, the work o f the several self-governing, quasi-sovereign colonies themselves. The Colonial Office did no m ore than put the words into proper form and the British Parliam ent no m ore than give them legisla­ tive sanction. T he British N orth America Act was, therefore, to use the words o f an early C anadian jurist, “ a simple ratification by the M other C ountry o f the agreem ent entered into by the provinces, which in confirm ing its provisions rendered them obli­ gatory. by giving them the authority o f an Im perial A ct.” 14 r But the legal supplem enting o f the interprovincial pact, both by tne C anadian and British governm ents, did not mean that the problem s o f the coexistence o f the two contending races within the bosom o f a single state had been solved. A greem ent there could be on broad lines o f how to divide authority between the central and provincial governm ents, but disagreem ent on the details o f the division was inherent in the very nature o f a federal constitution, and particularly in C anada w here federal union in the m outh o f a Lower C anadian usually m eant "th e independence o f his Province from English and Protestant influences” 15 and in 14 Hon. Justice T. J. J. Loranger, Letters upon the Interpretation o f the Federal Constitution known as the British North America Act 1867 (Quebec, 1884), p. 63. 15 O'Connor. Report, Annex 2, p. 83: Gordon to Cardwell. Sep. 12. 1864. After visiting Charlottetown during the meeting of the provin­ cial delegates and receiving daily reports from the New Brunswick delegation, Lieutenant-Governor Gordon wrote to the Colonial Sec­ retary:

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that o f the U pper C anadian, a preference for a strong central governm ent.16 M inisters and Prim e M inisters might pay lip ser­ vice to the doctrine o f a Pact;17 they might honestly believe in its validity; they could shelve but could not shed their centralizing proclivities. T here was never any underhand conspiracy to destroy the A nglo-French entente: but there was an open-handed effort to add to the powers o f the central governm ent at the expense o f those o f the provinces. 1 need only mention the names of M ac­ donald, M ow at and M ercier to recall to m ind the early trials of strength o f the two opposing points o f view. Fortunately the arbiter was there, the courts: the controversies which opposing points o f view engendered were resolvable by due process o f law. The pow ers o f the federal parliam ent and those o f the provincial legislatures had, in 1867, been carefully tabulated. All th at was necessary was to apply the tabulation to each specific dispute___ But to return to the question o f the C onfederative pact. D espite the frequency with which C anadian political leaders have reiterated the existence of the pact, despite the legal support afforded the concept o f the pact by the highest court o f appeal as late as the 1930’s, the Privy Council referred to the British N orth A m erica Act as a “ contract,” a “ com pact” and a “ treaty” founded on the Q uebec and London R esolutions18 - the pact con­ cept was never universally understood o r wholly accepted by each and all o f the provinces of C anada. Indeed the popularity o f the pact idea seems to vary in som e provinces in inverse ratio to their fiscal need. T he concept of the pact was slow to be accepted in A "Federal Union” in the mouth of a Lower Canadian usually means the independence of his Province from English and Protes­ tant influences. In the mouth of an inhabitant of the Maritime Provinces it means the retention of the machinery of the existing local Executive Government, the expenditure within each Prov­ ince of the revenue raised from it, except a quota to be paid towards Federal expenses, and the preservation of the existing Legis­ latures in their integrity, with the somewhat cumbrous addition of a central Parliament to which the consideration of some few topics of general interest is to be confided under restraints prompted by a jeal­ ous care for the maintenance of Provincial independence. 16 Confederation Debates, p. 29. 17 See, for instance, statements by Sir Wilfrid Laurier (House o f Com­ mons Debates. Canada. Jan. 28. 1907, p. 2199): Robert Borden (Ibid., Jan. 28. 1907. p. 2199); Ernest Lapointe (Ibid., Feb. 18. 1925. pp. 297-300); Arthur Meighen (Ibid., Feb. 19, 1925. p. 335) and Richard B. Bennett (Ibid.. Feb. 24. 1930, p. 24). 18 Attorney-General fo r Australia v. Colonial Sugar Co. (1914) A. C.. p. 253; In re the Regulation and Control o f Aeronautics in Canada (1932) A.C., p. 70: Attorney-General fo r Canada v. AttorneyGeneral for Ontario and others (1937) A.C.. p. 351.

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the M aritim es. In the early years after C onfederation, there was still strong opposition to the very fact o f union, and the pact upon which it was based was never very popular. In 1869 the Saint John M orning Freeman criticized the idea o f a pact o f confederation, denying th at there was any continuity between the pre- and post-confederation provinces.19 From tim e to tim e, v a r ­ ious provinces have supported the doctrine o f the pact, including New Brunswick, A lberta and British C olum bia; but their support has not been m arked by unanim ity or consistency. Only in O ntario and Q uebec has the concept rem ained undim inished in strength and popularity, at least in political circles, if not always in legal and academ ic. The O ntario-Q uebec axis has transcended both tim e and political parties. The original alliance o f M owat and M ercier has carried on through that o f W hitney and G ouin, Ferguson and Taschereau, and Drew and Duplessis. It has always been the principal buttress o f provincial autonom y. T he explanation why the pact idea has rem ained most vigorous in the tw o central provinces is to be found in their history. We need only re c a ll. . . th a t th e pact w as, in its orig in , an en ten te betw een the tw o raciaT groups o f Old C anada, between the two provinces'w hich were each the focus o f a distinctive culture. Only in the two provinces o f Old C anada did the racial struggle play any real part in our history; only in the tw o provinces o f Old C anad a did thisTtrugjfle have any real m eaning. T he M aritimerso f 1864 were not concerned with racial problem s; their interest in federal union was largely fin an cial, in th e recovery o f a passing age o f sea-going prosperity. T he western provinces, with the exception o f British C olum bia which found its own version o f a com pact in the term s of union in 1871, w ere the offspring o f the federal loins; their interest in federal union was in their m ainte­ nance and subsistence. But in U pper and Lower C anada federa­ tion was the solution o f the politico-racial contest for supremacy and survival, which had m arked their jo in t history since the^day Vaudreuil and A m herst signed the C apitulation o f Montreal} The concept of a pact o f federation was thus peculiarly a C anadian one (I use C anadian in the sense in which it was used in 1864, and in which it is still used in som e parts o f the M aritimes today); it still rem ains peculiarly C anadian. Duality o f culture as the central feature o f the constitutional problem has a meaning and a reality to the people o f the two provinces of Old Canada which it cannot have to those o f the other provinces. T hat is why neither O ntario nor Q uebec has departed in its provincial policy from the strict interpretation o f the federal basis o f the constitu­ tion, o r from the concept o f a federative pact. jfh e identification 19 The Morning Freeman. Saint John. N.B., Nov. 25, 1869.

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o f the racial pact, which was a very real thing in the 1850’s and 1860’s, with the com prom ise arrived at by the several provinces in 1864 and 1866, has tended to obscure the racial aspect o f the bargain and to deprive it o f som e o f its strength. The C anadian delegates to Q uebec and London we$e thoroughly convinced that their bargain was a treaty or a pact; however, this conviction was always weaker am ong the M aritim ers than am ong the C anadians, and especially the French C anadians, whose principal concern as a vital m ino rity has been an d m ust be th e survival o f th e ir culture and the pact which is the constitutional assurance o f that survival. It is the racial aspect of the pact o f Confederation which gives the pact its historicity and confirm s its continued usage. If the population o f C anada were one in race, language, and religion, o u r federation would be m arked by flexibility; am endm ent would be a com paratively easy m atter w here there was agreem ent upon fundam ental issues. Since history had given us a dual culture, with its_diversities of race and language, we must m aintain a precarious balance between the tw o groups; and o u r constitution • is rigid and inflexible. That is what I m eant, when I said at the outset, thaflTTe'historic pact o f the U nion has becom e, by accept­ ance and usage, a necessary convention o f o u r constitution. It will continue to be such so long as the m inority group retains its num bers and its will to survive.

C O N S O C IA T IO N A L IS M A T P R O V IN C IA L LEVEL: T H E E R O S IO N O F D U A L IS M IN M A N IT O B A , 1870-1890 Janice Staples M anitoba was the first province to enter the C anadian C onfeder­ ation after its inception in 1867. Its entry in 1869 and 1870 provides an interesting example o f a federal bargain between a young, still fragile federation and a potential new m em ber. C an a­ d ia n s - a n d particularly U pper C a n a d ia n s - h a d been casting cov­ etous glances at the sparsely settled lands o f the N orthw est since the 1850’s, and w ith the annexation o f the vast H udson’s Bay C om pany territory to C anada in 1869 their goal seemed within reach. In the R ed River Settlem ent, however, w ith its distinctive c o m b in atio n o f F ren ch -sp eak in g and E nglish-speaking h alf breeds, o f Scottish Selkirk settlers and native Indians, insensitive C anadian expansionism had aroused a general distrust which quickly gave way to open resistance to C anadian rule and the form ation o f a Provisional G overnm ent under the M etis leader, Louis Riel, in D ecem ber 1869. There followed a period o f de fa c to control by the Provisional G overnm ent and negotiation with O ttaw a for several m onths with the aim of obtaining provincial status, m inority guarantees, and the settlem ent o f land claims in a society th at was in full transi­ tion from a sem i-nom adic hunting economy to prairie agriculture. T he m inority guarantees sought by the Red River representatives and incorporated in Riel’s fourth “ Bill o f R ights” included the continuation o f the existing confessional school system, official bilingualism, and a provincial second cham ber like th at of Q uebec. All o f these, together with the full provincial status, were conceded in the federal p arliam ent’s M anitoba Act o f 1870, though on their side the Red River negotiators had to make concessions on oth er points including restricted provincial bound­ aries and federal control o f C row n lands. The central point, how ever, is clear. T he Red River Settlem ent entered the C anadian federal system as a small but functioning consociational society, which after brief initial violence had been able to accom m odate its rem arkable cultural heterogeneity under the rule o f the H udson’s Bay C om pany. W ithin two decades after 1870 this special blend o f ethnic, religious, and cultural pluralism had been thrust aside by an emerging Anglo-Saxon Protestant hegemony. This paper examines the unfolding o f these changes.

T H E “ E X T E R N A L FA C TO R S ” H Y P O T H E S IS M ost historians who have studied the M anitoba school question

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have found the origins o f the dispute principally outside the province of M anitoba. The basic differences am ong them arise as to the emphasis to be placed on outside agitation. Several histori­ ans find the origins o f the agitation for a single public school system in O ntario, precipitated mainly by the issue o f the Quebec Jesuit Estates Act o f 1888 and by the action o f Dalton M cC arthy, an O ntario m em ber o f the H ouse o f C om m ons who acted as the leading spokesm an against this legislation. John D afoe notes that T he M anitoba school question descended upon the public of M anitoba in the late sum m er of 1889 out o f a clear sky. Indirectly, it may be said to have been derived from the controversy in the D om inion Parliam ent over the refusal of the D om inion G overnm ent to disallow the act passed by the Q uebec Legislature, m aking com pensation to the ecclesiasti­ cal authorities for the confiscation o f the Jesuits Estates act early in the nineteenth cen tu ry .1 O. D . Skelton also asserts th at “ the M anitoba school question was an echo o f the storm s which had raged over Riel and the Je s u its’ E states.” 2 Lovell C lark specifically focuses on th e p art played by D alton M cCarthy when he writes: . . . t h e controversy over schools in M anitoba in 1889 arose not from any necessities inherent in the local situation, but from the actions o f a dem agogue and bigot who succeeded in arousing the prejudices o f the A nglo-Saxon Protestants of M anitoba.3 C ontem porary com m ent for the most part reflected sim ilar opin­ ions. A M anitoba Free Press editorial o f August 19, 1889, noted that “ . . . M anitoba [was] being m ade the battleground o f O ntario fanatics who dare not propose the abolition o f separate schools in their own province” . J. S. Ewart com m ented on D al­ ton M cC arthy and the Jesuit Estates Act: W hat a magnificent record! From O ntario, the “sleepy Prot­ estants o f Q uebec” (as M r. M cC arthy called them ), on the one side, are stirred into sectarian strife, over an Act that passed the Legislature w ithout a dissenting Protestant vote; and the dull, good natured Protestants o f M anitoba, on the 1John Dafoe, Sir Clifford Sifion in Relation to his Times (Toronto: Macmillan, 1931), p. 36. 2 O. D. Skelton, The Life and Letters o f Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921), Vol. 1, p. 440. 3 Lovell Clark, The Manitoba School Question: Majority Rule or Minority Rights? (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968) p. 4.

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other side, are aroused into bitter attack upon a school system highly prized by their C atholic fellow-countrymen, and which in no way interfered with their own m ethods o f education,4 W. L. M orton is the only w riter, to my knowledge, who em pha­ sizes the internal conditions o f M anitoba at the tim e, the most im portant and basic o f those conditions being the overwhelming presence o f British and O ntario im m igrants. However even he finds the main im petus outside the province: “ T he tim e was ripe for the raising o f the School Question in M anitoba: yet the impulse to do so cam e not so much from within the province as from w ithout.” 5 1 have found it difficult to concur in these judgm ents. A review o f the prim ary sources suggests th at the changing internal condi­ tions in M anitoba from 1870 to 1890 m ade the raising o f both the school and language issues an inevitability by the late 1870’s. If this is so, it follows that outside factors contributed very little to the M anitoba school crisis, and the search for an explanation o f the causes must begin in M anitoba itself.

D E M O G R A P H IC C H A N G E S The im pact of im m igration on the population in M anitoba can be seen in Table I. At the provincial census o f 1870, the vast m ajority o f the population had been born in the N orthw est; from 1881 onw ards this elem ent represented only ab o u t one third of the total population. T here was considerable im migration from the British Isles, but settlers from O ntario form ed the largest g roup by a considerable margin. O f the original population enu­ m erated in 1870, approxim ately 82 per cent was o f M etis or mixed Indian-E uropean ancestry and only 14 per cent was recorded as white, the rest being recorded as Indian. The majority o f this M etis population was French-speaking and Catholic. The bulk o f the full-blooded Indian population does not seem to have been enum erated at this census. F urther evidence o f dem ographic change may be seen in the data on the origins o f the people, which in the C anadian census traces ancestry on the paternal side. Though com parable data are lacking for the provincial census o f 1870, by 1881 som e 59 per cent o f the population was o f British origin, 15 per cent of French origin, 13 per cent o f G erm an origin (including G erm an M ennonites bom in Russia and Poland) and 10 per cent of 4 Quoted in ibid., p. 5. 5 W. L. Morton. Manitoba: A History. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 240.

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Table I

Population o f M anitoba by Birthplace, 1870-1891. 1870

1881

1886

1891 N

%

34.644 31.9 51,433 5.976 5.5 7,555 34,121 31.4 46,620 2,201 2.0 2,354 19,925 18.3 28.014 2,322 2.1 3.063 9,451 8.7 13,467

33.7 4.9 30.6 1.5 18.4 2.0 8.8

12.228 100 65,954 100 108,640 100 152,506

100

N

%

N

%

Manitoba & North­ west Territories 11.298 92.4 24,442 37.0 119 1.0 4.085 6.2 Quebec 118 1.0 19,125 29.0 Ontario Maritimes n.a. — 1,315 2.0 British Isles 422 3.4 8,161 12.4 U.S.A. 172 1.4 1,752 2.6 Others & not stated 99 0.8 7,049 10.7 Total

291

N

%

Source: Calculated from Census of Canada, 1871, 1881, 1891, and Census of Manitoba, 1886, as reported in Statistical Abstracts, 1887. Indian extraction. The 1886 census o f M anitoba gives m ore pre­ cise inform ation as to the M etis population. By this tim e the population o f British extraction accounted for 67 per cent o f the total, and half breeds of British extraction counted for a further 3 per cent. The population o f French origin was approxim ately 6 per cent, while the French M e tis constituted a further 4 per cent. O ther groups included 10 per cent o f G erm an origin, 5 per cent o f Indian origin, and 2 per cent o f Icelandic origin, for a total population o f 108,640. T hus the population o f French and mixed French-Indian origin accounted for approxim ately 10 per cent of the total population in 1886, and in the absence o f figures by m other tongue during this period perhaps this is the most accu­ rate indicator o f linguistic-cultural affiliation. T he proportion o f Rom an C atholics and Protestants is shown in T able 2. In the 1870 census, the R om an Catholics were in a slight majority o f those whose affiliation was reported, though religious data are alm ost entirely lacking for one o f the five census districts. However, the m ore com plete prelim inary report subm itted by L ieutenant-G overnor Archibald on D ecem ber 26, 1870, reveals an alm ost exact balance between C atholics and Protestants.6 By 1881, the flow o f im m igration had created a" strong Protestant majority, which increased marginally in succeed6 Of the 6059 Catholics there were 5,568 French-speaking half breeds, 57 English-speaking half breeds and 360 whites. Of the 5,906 Protes­ tants there were 126 French-speaking half breeds, 4,019 Englishspeaking half breeds and 1,254 whites. See Canada. Sessional Papers, v (20), 1871, p. 94.

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CONSO CIATION A L DEMOCRACY

Table 2 Population of M anitoba by Religious D enom inations, 1870-1891 1870

1881

N

%

Roman Catholics 5.452 44.6 12.246 18.6 14.651 13.5 20,571 Protestants 4.841 39.6 49.091 74.4 87.655 80.7 125.940 2,290* 3.5 1.191 Others 718 0.7 Not given 2,327 3.5 1,935+ 15.8 5.616 5.2 4,824

13.5 82.6 0.8 3.2

N

Total

%

N

%

1891

1886 N

%

12.228 100 65.954 100 108.640 100 152.526

100

Source: Calculated from the Censuses of Canada. 1871. 1881, 1891. and the Census of Manitoba. 1886, as reported in Siatistical Abstracts, 1887. * includes 2,173 or 3.3 per cent listed as “pagans” , t The census return does not record religion satisfactorily, especially in the district of the boundary extension. However, the preliminary report lists 6,059 Catholics and 5,906 Protestants for a total of 11,965. See Canada, Sessional Papers, V (20), 1871. p. 94. ing censuses. A corresponding progression may be seen in statis­ tics on schools and pupils enrolled in the C atholic and Protestant school systems as can be seen in Table 3. D espite som e anom alies in the form o f reporting, enrolm ent statistics are available on a m ore or less continuous basis and thus reveal m ore closely, if indirectly, the dem ographic changes o f the 1870’s. As Table 3 shows, Protestant pupils outnum bered C atholic pupils by more than 2:1 in 1880, by 4:1 in 1882, and by alm ost 6:1 in 1890.

IN S T IT U T IO N A L A N D A T T IT U D IN A L C H A N G E S T he establishment o f new provincial institutions after 1870 involved a certain persistence o f conditions and attitudes th at had been prevalent in the Red River settlem ent. The educational system had already been organized along denom inational lines with schools being organized by R om an Catholics, Anglicans, and_ Presbyterians7 and education grants to the Protestant and C ath o ­ lic groups being apportioned equally. The old Council o f Assiniboia, which acted in an advisory capacity to the G overnor and which has been term ed “ fairly representative o f all interests in the colony . . . ,” 8 exemplified a linguistic and ethnic diversity which reappeared in the Executive Council, the Legislative Council and 7 The Presbyterians had organized only one school. KF. A. Milligan. "The Establishment of Manitoba's First Provincial Government." Historical and Scientific Society o f Manitoba. Series 3. no. 5, 1950. p. 7.

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Table 3 Schools and Pupils by School System, Selected Years, 1873-1889 Catholic Year 1873 1874 1876 1880 1882 1889

No. of Schools 18 20 22 27 34 73

Protestant Pupils N 824 945 1,134 1,658 1,684 3,236

% 45.8 48.2 41.5 31.4 19.5 15.0

Pupils

No. of Schools

N

17 18 30 99 182 545

977 1,014 1,600 3,614 6,972 18,358

% 54.2 51.8 58.5 68.6 80.5 85.0

Source: Reports of the Superintendent of Protestant Schools and Reports of the Superintendent of Education for Catholic Schools for the above years as found in the Appendixes of the Journals o f the Legislative Assembly. the Legislative Assembly after 1870. F urther examples o f earlier dualism include the appointm ent o f two land surveyors in 1856, one English-speaking and one French-speaking,and the sharing of custom s collection by four m en, two English-speaking and two French-speaking. F urther evidence could also be cited to show th at both language groups had been given recognition in the colony prior to C onfederation. T he first federally-appointed L ieutenant-G overnor after C on­ federation, the N ova Scotian A. G . A rchibald, seems to have been aw are o f these traditions while establishing em bryonic politi­ cal institutions for the new province.9 H is first appointed Execu-' tive and Legislative Councils deliberately balanced the M etis and the settlers o f both language groups. The first electoral districts for the Legislative Assembly were evenly divided along racial lines into twelve English-speaking and twelve French-speaking constituencies.10 The results o f the first election in 1871 revealed the success o f A rchibald's attem pt to m aintain a balanced repre­ sentation. A m ong the tw enty-four elected m em bers, there were twelve whites, twelve M etis. and within each group, half were C atholics and half P rotestants." Evolution o f political representation. The second provincial elec­ tion in 1874 produced an increase in English-speaking representa­ 9 Archibald was active in the Confederation movement and attended the Charlottetown. Quebec, and London Conferences. At Quebec he introduced a motion to give residual legislative powers to the prov­ inces. 10 Morton, op. cit.. p. 146. 11 Milligan, op. cit., p. 14 note 57.

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tion in the Assembly. O f 24 m em bers returned, five were natives o f the British Isles, two were from O ntario, one from the M ari­ tim es, seven from Q uebec (including one English-speaking C atho­ lic) and eight were natives o f M anitoba, seven being Englishspeaking and one a French-speaking M etis. French-speaking rep ­ resentation on the Executive Council decreased by o n e .12 The third Assembly returns in 1878 followed closely the pattern o f the changing population mosaic of M anitoba. Eight of the m em ­ bers were natives o f O ntario, three were from the British Isles and three from Q uebec. O f the seven native-born mem bers, five were English-speaking and tw o French-speaking. Only one m em ber was a M etis (of French origin). T he Executive Council of 1878, with two French-speaking m em bers out o f five, was m ore representative than the Assem bly.13 In the Assembly elected in 1883, the num ber o f French-speaking mem bers declined from 6 to 4, and for the first tim e two m em bers born in E urope of non-B ritish origin were elected. The linguistic constitution o f the Executive Council rem ained the sam e.14 A t the 1886 election, the num ber of O ntario and British-born mem bers increased further, while the Executive Council showed a decrease in French-speaking m em bership and also in the num ber of native M anitobans returned. By this tim e all but two o f the C ouncil­ lors originated from O ntario or B ritain.15 The election o f 1888 returned six French-speaking m em bers o f a total of 38 in the Assembly and only one French-speaking m em ber was appointed to the Executive C ouncil.16 This was the ministry which two years later was the pass legislation to abolish the dual school system and the official status o f the French language in M an ­ itoba. From this brief outline o f the patterns o f representation it is evident that as early as 1878 the influx o f British and O ntarioborn im m igrants had severely disturbed the linguistic and ethnic balance o f 1871. By 1888, the change in the legislative elite was com plete. As M orton has com m ented, “ This election o f m id-1888 m arked th e triu m p h o f O n ta rio over Q u eb ec in M a n ito b a .” 17 This trium ph, however, had been in the m aking over the five preceding elections. A nother manifestation of change is the gradual developm ent of party lines in M anitoba. Basically, there were three successive lines o f cleavages within the Legislature: in the early 1870’s, the 12 Parliamentary Companion, 1875, p. 589-610. 13 Ibid., 1879, pp. 360-373. 14 Ibid., 1885, pp. 313-338. "Ib id ., 1887. pp. 319-340. 16Ibid., 1889. pp. 330-349. 17 Morton, op. cit., p. 233.

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old versus the new settlers; from the m id-1870’s to the early 1880’s, the French-speaking versus the English-speaking population, and from the early 1880’s, the Liberals versus the Conservatives. With th e d ev elo p m en t o f parties co rresp o n d in g to th o se at th e federal level in this third phase, the M anitoba Assembly ceased to be an effective vehicle for th e expression o f F re n ch -sp eak in g political interests in the province. Legislative Changes, 1870-1890. The change in the com position o f the Legislative Assembly is not surprising since it corresponded roughly to ethnic changes in the population o f M anitoba. The im portant factor to be studied is how the emerging Englishspeaking majority exercised its political pow er. T hat this power was used from an early date to erode dualism and to lim it the political influence o f the French-speaking m inority may be seen in the bills introduced in the Assembly between 1871 and 1890. M any o f the pertinent bills were technical and only a close look at their effects will indicate how they dim inished the political position o f the French-speaking M anitobans. A few, however, were direct frontal assaults on linguistic and cultural dualism. O ne category o f legislation provided M anitoba with an institu­ tional framework shaped on British and O ntarian lines. It included three bills o f 1871, 1873, and 1877 that gradually intro­ duced a m unicipal system m odelled a fte r th a t o f O n ta rio . T his application o f the O ntario m unicipal system is extremely im por­ tan t when seen in conjunction w ith certain school am endm ents of the later 1870's, which provided increased jurisdiction for m unici­ p alities over school d istricts w ithin th e ir a re a . A s M o rto n rem arks, “ . . . the new municipal system was certain to assimilate to itself the district educational system o f denom inational schools and to raise religious and racial controversy in doing so.” 18 A nother category o f legislation that helped to decrease Franco-M anitoban political pow er was the periodic redistribution of electoral boundaries. R edistribution bills were passed in 1873, 1877, 1879, 1881, 1885 and 1888. T h eir co m b in ed effect w as a steady decrease in the num ber o f French-speaking electoral districts in M anitoba through the introduction o f the principle o f representa­ tion by population, as opposed to the original com m unal representa­ tion. It has been calculated th at by 1888, only one o f the original electoral districts of 1870 rem ained intact.19 The French-speaking d istricts had been divided so as to d ecrease th e influence o f the Franco-M anitoban vote. A nother detrim ental measure was the abolition of the Legislal!l Morton, op. cit., p. 189. ''•Ibid.. p. 232.

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tive Council, which was passed by both Houses in 1876 after being blocked by the upper house itself at the first attem pt in 1875. T he appointed Legislative Council, like its counterpart, the federal sen ate, had been co nceived as a device for g u aran teein g minority rights. T he first Council appointed by LieutenantG overnor Archibald consisted of one Scottish C atholic h alf breed, tw o French-speaking M etis, one Irish C atholic and three Protes­ tant English-speaking settlers.20 W hile Q uebec had a similar upper house, O ntario did not, and a num ber o f settlers from O ntario advocated its abolition. T he Davis ministry had prom ised abolition as early as 1874, and when the federal governm ent added its voice in the interest o f economy, the fate o f the Legislative C o u n ­ cil was sealed.21 Two further bills, both rejected at this period, are indicators o f changing public opinion in the later 1870’s and portents o f the final extinction o f dualism in 1890. T he first bill called for the abolition o f both the official status o f the French language and the dual school system but was twice defeated in the 1875 and 1876 parliam entary sessions. T he second, the Public Printing Bill o f 1879, provided for abolition o f the printing in French o f all public docum ents except provincial statutes. This m easure was passed by the Assembly but was reserved for federal decision by the L ieuten­ ant-G overnor, Joseph C auchon, a French C anadian. W hen, how ­ ever, a m ore drastic bill to m ake English the sole official language was passed by the Assembly in 1890, the L ieutenant-G overnor who gave assent to the bill was John C hristian Schultz, the man who as leader o f the C anadian party had led the opposition to Riel in 1869. The m em ber who introduced th e bills o f 1875 and 1876, W il­ liam Luxton, was also the editor o f the influential M anitoba Free P ress. M any o f th e ed ito rials o f this p erio d c o n tain ed p o in ted attacks on both the dual school system and the official status of the French language. The prem ier and his cabinet were accused of being tools for the French-speaking elem ent, and the official status o f the French language was attacked as an unnecessary burden on the M anitoba taxpayers.22 Legislation on Schools. A further indicator th at settler opinion was changing by the middle 1870’s was a resolution passed by the Protestant Section o f the Board o f Education in 1875, that called upon the M anitoba governm ent to enact new school legislation 20 Milligan, op. cit., p. 16. 21 The correspondence between the federal government and the prov­ ince concerning this issue can be found in the Appendix to the Journals o f the Legislative Assembly, 1875. 22 Sec, for example, the editorials of September 4, 7, 21, October 10 and 18, 1874, and March 11 and April 9, 1875.

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providing for a single non-sectarian school system.23 Though this was not acted upon, the various school am endm ents passed dur­ ing the tw enty-year period were frequent enough and o f sufficient im portance to be considered separately as further evidence o f the decline o f dualism. The constitutional guarantee for the dual educational system in Section 22 o f the M anitoba A ct protected the denom inational school system, as it existed prior to 1870, against provincial legislative encroachm ent and provided for appeal to the federal cabinet and rem edial legislation by the federal parliam ent if such infringem ents occurred. U nder the first Education Act of 1871, existing local schools were taken over, classified as C atholic o r Protestant, and placed u n d er th e su p erin ten d e n ce o f e ith e r th e P ro testa n t o r C ath o lic section o f th e Provincial B oard o f E d u ca tio n . T h e A ct also allowed for the establishm ent o f new schools on the sam e principle. The system soon underwent a series o f am endm ents. W here the Act o f 1871 provided that the educational grant was to be divided equally between the two sections,24 an am endm ent o f 1873 pro­ vided that the grant was to be divided in proportion to the yearly average attendance at all the schools under each section.25 The sam e Act also laid down conditions for the establishm ent of separate schools when requested by the religious m inority o f any C atholic or Protestant school district. A nother am endm ent of 1875, reorganized th e B oard o f E d u catio n so as to upset the numerical equality between the C atholic and Protestant sections, which had existed since its establishm ent in 1871. M em bership of the Board was increased from six Protestants and six C atholics to twelve Protestants and nine Catholics. O ther am endm ents in 1875 and 1876 had the effect o f making the tw o sections o f the Board m ore independent o f each other, but the respective powers o f the tw o sections were reduced to a certain extent by o th e r legislation th a t gave m unicipalities increased authority over the school districts within their area. The first Act o f this type granted virtual autonom y in educational m atters to the city o f W innipeg in 1876. T he main fear concern­ ing the increased power o f municipalities over the school districts involved the assum ption that most municipalities were Englishspeaking and Protestant while the separate schools within those 23 J. A. Jackson, The Centennial History o f Manitoba. (Winnipeg. McClelland and Stewart. 1970). p. 138. 24 Statutes o f Manitoba, 1871, “An Act to Establish a System of Educa­ tion”, cap. 12, section 18. 25 Statutes o f Manitoba. 1873, “ An Act to Amend the Act to Estab­ lish a System of Education in this Province," cap. 22. section 4.

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districts were French-speaking and Catholic. The municipalities w ielded p o ten tially pow erful in stru m en ts th ro u g h tax atio n , a p p o in tm e n t o f personnel, and insp ectio n , w hich could be em ployed to the disadvantage o f the French m inority. These am endm ents were o f m inor significance but they paved the way for the legislation o f 1890, which gave municipalities even m ore control over the educational system. The school acts o f 1890 are tw o in num ber. T he first, “ A n Act Respecting the D epartm ent o f E ducation” abolished the Board of Education and created a D epartm ent o f Education which was to consist o f a com m ittee o f the Executive Council and an Advisory Board o f seven m em bers, with powers to authorize texts and prescribe the form of religious exercises. The second, “ An Act Respecting Public Schools,” repealed all form er laws relating to e d u catio n and established a system o f n o n -d en o m in atio n al schools, instructing only in the religious exercises authorized by the Advisory Board. Any schools not adhering to the provisions o f the Act were to be refused a provincial educational grant and the right to receive any funds raised by m unicipal taxation. The various am endm ents o f the school system from 1873 onw ard had the effect of underm ining th e principle o f religious equality and breaking down linguistic and religious segm entation by providing for a closer linkage between the municipalities and the educational system. M ore generally, they eroded the structures o f religious, linguistic and cultural dualism which had existed in the M anitoba o f 1870. By 1890, the entrenchm ent o f O ntariobased political attitudes was com plete and the locus o f political pow er in th e province had sh ifted irrevocably. As M o rto n has noted o f the redistribution o f 1887: The old order, w hether the dual school system in language and schools with all it m eant to the French, or the influence the old settlers had exercised through their com m unal consti­ tuencies and their own representatives led by John N orquay, now existed only at the discretion o f the new majority, largely O ntario-bred and Protestant by creed.-’'’ And the new m ajority lost little tim e in exercising its political pow er to the detrim ent of the French-speaking minority.

C O N C L U S IO N T he later nings, for in federal minority,

phases o f the story are better know n than its begin­ after 1890 the schools question becam e a central issue politics. D espite num erous appeals by the Catholic the federal governm ent did not disallow the Public

26 Morton, op. cit., p. 232.

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Schools Act nor did it succeed in passing rem edial legislation. All attem pts at com prom ise failed until the Laurier-G reenw ay agree­ m ent o f N ovem ber 1896, which modified the public school sys­ tem so as to allow limited periods o f linguistic and religious teaching w here num bers w arranted.27 Nevertheless, this was a" political settlem ent, and one that left a lasting m ark on the nature o f C onfederation, for it had shown the forces o f provincial au to n ­ om y to be stronger than the claims o f religious o r ethnic m inori­ ties, stronger even than the rights incorporated and guaranteed constitutionally at M anitoba’s creation as a province. T he politicisation o f the M anitoba School Question has been linked by many writers to various issues outside the province: to the second Riel Rebellion and the sharp controversy over the fate o f th e M e tis lead er in 1885, to Q u eb e c’s Jesu it E states A ct of 1888 and the anti-C atholic extremism o f D alton M cC arthy and the incongruously misnam ed Equal Rights Association. But the seeds were sown within the province long before 1885 and had been germ inating since the middle I870’s. W hen M cC arthy m ounted the platform at Portage la Prairie on A ugust 5, 1889 to launch his attack on the French language and the C atholic schools, all the ingredients for a conflagration were at hand save for the final spark to set it ablaze. By the time th at the school question “ descended upon the public o f M anitoba in the late sum m er of 1889 o u t o f a clear sky,” as John Dafoe has rem arked, its outcom e was clearly prefigured by events already past. A t this point only decisive intervention from outside the province could have saved the dual regim e in M anitoba, and that intervention fell short both at the legal and political level.

27 The clauses of the settlement were very general. It allowed not only French-language instruction but also German in German-speaking Mennonite areas, and later on other languages as immigration increased. However, all instruction in languages other than English was banned in 1917.

/

E P IL O G U E

Most of this book so far has been concerned with descriptive and analytical approaches to consociationalism . In Part iv we have exam ined how far the consociational model can be used to explain the C anadian political system both now and in the past. C onsociational dem ocracy, how ever, may also be viewed prescriptively, as a norm ative m odel, a criterion for evaluating political systems and a guide to future policy and action. It is this n o rm a­ tive aspect o f consociationalism that gives great significance to the hitherto unresolved debate between Lijphart and D aalder:1 just how far consociational systems are the product o f earlier political tradition and how far they may be created through deliberate efforts by elites is crucial in d ecid in g w h eth er co n so ciatio n al patterns may be successfully transplanted to other settings. In the C anadian case, as my own paper has indicated, the existing political system falls sh o rt o f th e c o n so ciatio n al m odel and even of the other working consociational systems in several different ways.2 M oreover the provinces, with the exception of Q uebec, have functioned no better than the federal governm ent in this respect, though the M anitoba example is perhaps an extreme case and som e provinces have reflected a m ore accom m odative atm osphere since the mid-1960’s. Nevertheless the existing C ana­ dian political system, even at its best, must be viewed as a very imperfect example o f consociational democracy. I suggest that the ultim ate source of these shortcom ings lies not so much in any specific institutional arrangem ents as in attitudes rooted deeply in the C anadian political culture, attitudes that fail to com prehend the meaning o f a plural society. In the traditional political thought o f the English-speaking world, m inority status is a tem porary phenom enon, and today’s political m inority becomes a nucleus for building tom orrow ’s m ajority. In the politics of segm ented pluralism - w hether based on religion, language, or ra c e -m in o rity status is far m ore likely to be a perm anent fact of life, an ascribed characteristic, a burden to be carried perpetually by the smaller group or groups. In such a setting, appeals to the m ajority p rinciple can be highly d a n g ero u s, and special accom m odatory devices may be needed for resolving inter-group dif­ 1 See Daalder, above, 120-122; Lijphart, “ Cultural Diversity and Theo­ ries of Political Integration," Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 4 (1971), 13-14; and also Daalder, “ The Consociational Democracy Theme: a review article,” World Politics (forthcoming). : See especially the summary above, pp. 260-261.

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ferences. English C anadians collectively have never grasped this fun­ dam ental point, and because they have not done so French C anadi­ ans have reacted in the only effective w ay o p en to th em , by an in stinctive a ttem p t to build - e ith er by them selves o r in co n cert w ith o th e r s - s ta b le m ajorities o f th eir ow n. A s long as English C anadians rem ain m ajority-m inded, many French C anadians will find th e ir m ost effective resp o n se in an increasingly au to n o m o u s Q uebec. This m ajoritarian attitu d e on both sides, I suggest, is the Achilles heel o f the C anadian political system. It is the dam nosa hereditas o f A nglo-A m erican dem ocracy and Lockean political theory and liberal society, though in fairness one must note its all to o fre­ quent appearance in other political traditions also. The point is that any genuinely pluralist society must learn to do better, and the consociational model offers som e general guidelines as to how to do so. A t first glance C anada may appear to offer a distinctly unprom ising setting for a m ore explicitly consociational political system. The _older_poliUcaLheritage is vastly different, and m ajoritarian attitudes are firmly rooted. The main linguistic groups are not closely balanced and m ajorities face m inorities at both federal and provincial levels. T here is no major external threat (except, perhaps, o f an econom ic nature) to stim u­ late internal cooperation. H owever against these negative factors one must balance a very limited range o f alternatives. T he present political system is under considerable strain, and m ore integrative solutions appear to be ruled out for the foreseeable future. The one significant alternative is the separation o r quasi-separation of Q uebec. But this option, w hatever its other consequences, would still leave substantial linguistic m inorities in both Q uebec and the rest of C anada because provincial boundaries do not follow lin­ guistic ones. The paucity o f alternatives is perhaps the best reason for considering seriously w hether the C anadian system could not be im proved by modifying its formal institutions along more consociational lines. This is not the place to begin a com prehensive inventory of desirable or possible reforms. It is clear th at the question is com plex and that various approaches are possible. But am ong the m ore obvious topics for closer study one may readily select (1) the electoral system and its effects on the political representation o f subcultural interests at both federal and provincial levels, (2) the party system and the problem o f adequate articulation of subcultural interests within parties, and (3) the existing federal system and its overall im pact on linguistic and ethnic relations. W hat is needed is a willingness to examine with an open mind certain well-established institutions and practices that appear to have becom e increasingly disfunctional as linguistic issues have becom e m ore salient. The four European dem ocracies th at we

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have exam ined all found it necessary to m odify th eir political system s q u ite substantially in o rd e r to acco m m o d ate th e new social forces th a t gave rise to th e ir co n so ciatio n al system s, and Belgium has been doing so again since the early 1960’s in order to accom m odate linguistic diversity. It seems not impossible that C anada, through intensive discussion and negotiation am ong the subcultural elites, could do the sam e. The passing o f the federal Official Languages Act in 1969 m arked a significant step towards legal and adm inistrative accom m odation o f C an ad a’s linguistic and cultural diversity, but the accom m odation o f this diversity in the political process itself has lagged behind and must now be ranked high on any C anadian agenda for reform . But the problem s o f segm ented pluralism are by no means confined to C anada alone, and the consociational model may have som e relevance wherever sharp and lasting cleavages occur. The political scientist or statesm an would never build o r perpetu­ ate social segm entation unnecessarily, but he may be called upon, as A ristotle has observed, to do the best he can with the m aterials at h an d .3 W here segm entation is a given, the problem is to find the best political strategy for dealing with it. A t this stage we’ know relatively little about the limiting conditions for consocia­ tional democracy, or about the possibilities o f its successful adap­ tation to situations o f linguistic o r racial o r com m unal pluralism. Until we do know these limits m ore precisely, we may take it as a working rule that accom m odationist solutions are m ore civilized than forced integration, and th at the inefficiencies o f consocia­ tional politics are less costly than subcultural hostility and vio­ lence.

3 Politics, 1288b.

S E L E C T B IB L IO G R A P H Y

In addition to the studies printed or partially printed above, the following rather specialized bibliography may be helpful for those who wish to explore the consociational them e in greater detail. Section A contains mainly items o f a m ore theoretical o r analyti­ cal n ature and also those dealing with m ore than one country; the rest are grouped by individual countries though many o f these also have theoretical significance. Since explicit applications o f the consociational model to C anada have so far been relatively few, 1 have included in section F a few studies on som ew hat peripheral them es, in som e cases them es that suggest avenues to be explored m ore fully from a consociational perspective. A. T H E O R E T IC A L A N D C O M P A R A T IV E S T U D IE S

A lm ond, G . A. “ C om parative Political Systems,” Journal o f P olitics, Vol. 18 (1956), 391-409. D aalder, H. “ Parties, Elites, and Political Developm ent in W est­ ern E urope,” in J. La Palom bara and M. W einer, eds., Politi­ cal Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), pp. 43-77. D aalder, H. “ C abinets and party systems in ten European dem ocracies,” A cta Politico, Vol. 6 (1971), 282-303. D aalder, H. “ T he Consociational Democracy Them e: a review article,” W orld Politics (forthcom ing, July 1974). D unn, J. A. “ Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict: A C om parison o f the Belgian and Swiss Experience," C om par­ ative Political Studies, Vol. 5 (1972), 3-39. Fogarty, M. P. Christian D emocracy in Western Europe. 18201953 (L ondon, 1957). H artz, L., et al. The Founding o f New Societies (New Y ork, 1964). H artz, L. “ Violence and Legality in the Fragm ent C ultures,” Canadian H istorical Review, Vol. 50 (1969), 123-140. K irchheim er, O . “ The W aning o f O pposition in Parliam entary Regim es,” Social Research, Vol. 24 (1957), 127-156. Lehm bruch, G . Proporzdem okratie: Politisches S ystem und politische K ultur in der Schw eiz und in Osterreich (Tubingen, 1967). L ehm bruch. G . “ T h e A m big u o u s C o alitio n in W est G e rm a n y ,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 3 (1968), 181-204. Lehm bruch, G . “ K onkordanzdem okratien im internationalen System ,” in E. O. Czem piel, ed., Die anachronistische Souver-

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an il a t, special issue o f th e P o litisch e V iertelja h ressch rift (1969), 139-163. Lehm bruch, G . “ Segmented pluralism and political strategies in C ontinental Europe: internal and external conditions o f ‘C on­ cordant D emocracy’ ” (Paper presented at the T orino Round Table o f the International Political Science A ssociation, 1969). Lehm bruch, G . “ Strukturen ideologischer K onflikte bei Parteienw ettbew erb.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 10 (1969), 287-313. L ijp h art, A . “ T ypologies o f D em o cratic S ystem s,” C om parative Political Studies, Vol. 1 (1968), 3-44. L ijphart, A. “ C ultural Diversity and Theories o f Political Integra­ tio n ,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 4 (1971), 1-14. L ijphart, A . “ Class voting and religious voting in the European democracies: a prelim inary rep o rt,” A cta Politico, Vol. 6 (1971), 158-171. Lijphart, A. “ Cleavages in Consociational D emocracies: a fourcountry com parison” (P aper presented at the Symposium on C om parative Analysis o f Highly Industrialized Societies, Bellagio, 1971). Lijphart, A. “ Linguistic Fragm entation and other D im ensions of Cleavage: a com parison o f Belgium, C anada, and Sw itzerland” (P aper presented at the N inth W orld Congress o f the Interna­ tional Political Science A ssociation, M ontreal, 1973). M oberg, D. O . “ Religion and Society in the N etherlands and in A m erica ,” A m erica n Q u a rte rly , Vol. 13 (1961), 172-178, and reprinted in Social C om pass, Vol. 9 (1962), 11-19. N ordlinger, E. A. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Occa­ sional Papers in International Affairs, 29, H arvard University, C am bridge, M ass., 1972). Social Compass, Vol. 9. nos. 1-2 (1962), 1-164. Special issue on “ Vertical pluralism .” Steiner, J. “ Conflict Resolution and D em ocratic Stability in Subculturally Segm ented Political S ystem s,” R es P u b lica , Vol. 1 I (1969), 775-798. Steiner, J. “ M ajorz und P ro p orz," Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 11 (1970), 139-146.

B. T H E N E T H E R L A N D S D aalder, H. “ Parties and Politics in the N etherlands,” Political Studies, Vol. 3 (1955), 1-16. D aalder, H. “ The Netherlands: O pposition in a Segmented Society,” in R. A . D ahl, ed.. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (N ew H aven, 1966), 188-236. D aalder, H., “ Leiding en lijdelijkheid in de nederlandse poli­ tiek ,” R es Publica, Vol. 9 (1967), 5-27.

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D e Boer, J . an d C am ero n , P. “ D utch R ad io : th e T h ird W ay ,” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1955), 62-69. G ielen, J. J., et al., Pacificatie en de Z uilen (M eppel, 1965). G oudsblom , J. Dutch Society (N ew Y ork, 1967). H eidenheim er, A. J. “ Elite Responses to Ontzuiling: Reels within Wheels in Dutch Broadcasting Politics” (P aper presented to the Eighth W orld Congress o f the International Political Sci­ ence Association, M unich, 1970). K ruijt, J. P. Verzuiling (2nd ed., Z aandijk, 1959). K ruijt, J. P. and G oddijn, W . “ Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociologisch proces,” in A. N . J. den H ollander et al, eds.. D rift en koers: Een halve eeuw sociale verandering in N eder­ land (3rd ed., Assen, 1968), 227-263, translated into French as “ C loisonnem ent et decloisonnem ent culturels com m e processus sociologiques,” Social C om pass, Vol. 9 (1962), 63-107. L ijphart, A. The Politics o f A ccom m odation: Pluralism and D em ocracy in the N etherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968). L ijphart, A. “ K entering in de N ederlandse politiek,” A cta Poli­ tico, Vol. 4 (1969), 231-247, with English sum m ary, 355. Socialism e en D em ocratic, January 1957. Special issue on verzuil­ ing. De Sociologische Gids, Vol. 3, nos. 3-4 (M arch-A pril, 1956). Special issue on verzuiling. C. A U S T R IA

Bluhm, W. T. “ N ation-Building: T he Case o f A ustria,” P o lity, Vol. 1 (1968), 149-177. Bluhm, W. T. “ Political Integration, C ultural Integration and Economic D evelopm ent” (P aper presented to the Eighth W orld Congress o f the International Political Science Associa' tion, M unich, 1970). Bluhm, W. T. Building an A ustrian Nation: the Political Integra­ tion o f a W estern S ta te (N ew Haven and London, 1973). D iam ant, A. “ T he G roup Basis o f A ustrian Politics,” Journal o f C entral European A ffa irs, Vol. 18 (1958), 134-155. Engelmann, F. C. “ Haggling for the Equilibrium : the R enegotia­ tion of the A ustrian C oalition, 1959,” Am erican Political Sci­ ence Review , Vol. 56 (1962), 651-662. Engelm ann, F. C. “ Austria: The Pooling o f O pposition,” in R. A . D ahl, ed. Political Oppositions in W estern Democracies (New H aven, 1966), 260-283. L ehm bruch, G . “ D as politische System O sterreich s in vergleich en d er P ersp ek tiv e,” O sterreich isch e Z e its c h r ift f u r d jfe n tliches R ech t, Vol. 22 (1971). 35-56. Powell, G . B. Social Fragm entation and Political H ostility: an A ustrian Case S tu d y (Stanford, 1970).

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Secher, H. P. “ Coalition G overnm ent: the case o f the A ustrian Second R epublic,” Am erican Political Science Review, Vol. 52 (1958), 791-808. Steiner, K . Politics in A ustria (Boston, 1972). Stiefbold, R. P. “ Elite-M ass O pinion Structure and C om m unica­ tion Flow in a C onsociational Democracy (A ustria)” (P aper presented to the A nnual M eeting o f the A m erican Political Science Association, Chicago, 1968). Stiefbold, R. “ Segmented Pluralism and C onstitutional D em oc­ racy in A ustria,” in N. Vig and R. Stiefbold. eds.. Politics in A dvanced N ations (New Y ork, A ppleton-Century-Crofts, forth­ coming).

D . B E L G IU M Claeys-van H aegendoren, M. “ R ecente tendenzen in de Belgische politiek,” A cta Politico, Vol. 7 (1972), 323-341, with English sum m ary. 400. D e Clercq, B. J. K ritiek van de Verzuiling (L ier, 1968). De M eyer, J. “ Verzuiling en doorbraak in de hedendaagse poli­ tiek ” (A ddress to European Study and Inform ation Centre, Brussels, April 3, 1967). Huyse, L. Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek (A ntw erp, 1970). L orw in, V. R. “ Belgium: Religion, Class and Language in N ational Politics,” in R. A. D ahl, ed.. Political Oppositions in W estern Democracies (N ew H aven, 1966), 147-187. Lorwin, V. R. “ Linguistic Pluralism and Political Tension in M od­ ern Belgium,” Canadian Journal o f H istory, Vol. 5 (1970), 1-23, reprinted in J. Fishm an, ed., Advances in the Sociology o f L an­ guage, Vol. II, (P aris and T he H ague, 1972), 386-412 M eynaud. J., Ladriere, J., and Perin, F. L a decision politique en Belgique: le pouvoir et les groupes (Paris, 1965). U rw in, D. “ Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: problem s o f institutionalization,” Political Studies, Vol. 18 (1970) 320-340. Van den Brande, A. “ Elem ents for a Sociological Analysis of the Im pact o f the M ain Conflicts on Belgian Political Life,” Res Publica. Vol. 9 (1967), 437-469.

E. S W IT Z E R L A N D G asser, A. “ D er 'freiwillige Proporz’ im kollegialen Regierungssystem der Schweiz,” Politische Studien, Vol. 17 (1966), 269-276. G irod, R. “ Le systeme des partis en Suisse,” Revue fran^aise de science politique. Vol. 14 (1964), 1114-1133.

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Keech, W. R. “ Linguistic Diversity and Political Conflict: Some O bservations Based on F our Swiss C antons,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 4 (April 1972), 387-404. K err, H. H . “ Social Cleavages and Partisan Conflict in Switzer­ land” (Paper presented at the N inth W orld Congress o f the International Political Science A ssociation, M ontreal, 1973). Lehm bruch, G . “ K onkordanzdem okratie im politischen System d e r Schweiz: Ein L ite ra tu rb e ric h t,” P o litisch e V ierteljahresschrift. Vol. 9 (1968), 443-459. M ayer, K. B. “ M igration, cultural tensions, and foreign relations: Sw itzerland,” Journal o f C onflict Resolution, Vol. II (1967), 139-152. M ayer, K. B. “ The Jura Problem: Ethnic Conflict in Sw itzer­ land,” S ocial Research, Vol. 35 (1968), 707-741. M eynaud. J. and Korff, A. L es organisations professionnelles en Suisse (Lausanne, 1963). M cR ae, K. D. Sw itzerland: E xam ple o f C ultural C oexistence (T oronto, 1964). Steiner, J. "N on-violent Conflict Resolution in D em ocratic Sys­ tems: Sw itzerland,” Journal o f C onflict Resolution, 13 (1969), 295-304. Steiner, J. G ewaltlose Politik und K ulturelle Vielfalt: H ypothesen entw ickelt am Beispiel der Schw eiz (Bern, 1970). Steiner J. A m icable A greem ent versus M ajority Rule: Conflict R eso lu tio n in S w itze rla n d (C h ap el H ill, fo rth co m in g , 1974). Revised and expanded version o f Gewaltlose P olitik und k u ltu ­ relle Vielfalt. F. C A N A D A

Ares, R. Dossier sur le pacte fe d e r a tif de 1867 (rev. ed., M on­ treal, 1967). C airns, A . C. “ The Electoral System and the Party System in C anada, 1921-1965,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 1 (1968), 55-80. See also the com m ent by J. A. A. Lovink and rejoinder by Cairns, ibid., Vol. 3 (1970), 497-521. Clark, L., ed., The M anitoba S chool Question: M ajority Rule or M inority Rights? (T oronto, 1968). C ook, R. Provincial A utonom y, M inority R ights and the C om ­ pact Theory, 1867-1921 (Studies o f the Royal Comm ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. 4, O ttaw a, 1969). Cornell, P. G . “ T he A lignm ent o f Political G roups in the U nited Province o f C anada, 1854-1864,” Canadian H istorical Review, Vol. 30 (1949), 22-46, reprinted in R. C. Brown, ed.. Upper Canadian Politics in the 1850’s (T oronto, 1967), 64-88

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Cornell, P. G . The A lignm ent o f Political Groups in Canada, 1841-1867 (T oronto, 1962). Forsey, E. A. “ The Problem o f ‘M inority’ G overnm ent in C an ­ a d a ,” Canadian Journal o f Econom ics and Political Science, Vol. 30 (1964), 1-11. G ibson, F. W. Cabinet Form ation and B icultural R elations (Studies o f the Royal Com m ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism , 6, O ttaw a, 1970). Irvine, W . P. Cultural C onflict in Canada: The Erosion o f Con­ sociational Politics (unpublished Ph. D . thesis, Yale U niver­ sity, 1971). Kwavnick, D ., ed.. The Trem blay Report: Report o f the R oyal Com m ission o f Inquiry on C onstitutional Problems (abridged version. The Carleton Library, N o. 64, T o ronto, 1973). Levitt, J., ed., H enri Bourassa on Im perialism and Biculturalism, 1900-1918 (T oronto, 1970). Lower, A . R. M . “ Two Ways o f Life: T he Primary A ntithesis of C anadian H istory,” Canadian H istorical Association R eport, 1943, 5-18, reprinted in C. Berger, ed. Approaches to Cana­ dian H istory (T oronto, 1967), 15-28. N oel, S. J. R. “ Political Parties and Elite A ccom m odation: Inter­ pretations o f C anadian Federalism ,” in J. P. M eekison, ed., Canadian Federalism: M yth or R eality (2nd ed., T oronto, London, etc., 1971), 121-140. N oel, S. J. R. “ T he Prime M inister’s R ole in a Consociational D em ocracy,” in T. A. H ockin, ed. A p e x o f Power: The Prime M inister and Political Leadership in Canada (Scarborough, 1971), 103-107. P resthus, R . E lite A cco m m o d a tio n in C anadian P olitics (T oronto, 1973). Royal Comm ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report (6 vols., O ttaw a, 1967-1970). In addition to the Report and the Preliminary R eport (O ttaw a, 1965), research findings appeared in two printed series. Studies and Docum ents, as well as in mim eographed form (distributed on microfilm by the C ana­ dian Library Association, O ttaw a). A full list and brief descrip­ tion of research projects appears in the R eport, Book I, A ppen­ dix V, 201-212. Senior. H. Orangeism: The Canadian Phase (T oronto. M ontreal, etc., 1972). Sim eon, R. Federal-Provincial Diplom acy: The m aking o f recent policy in Canada (T oronto, 1972). Van Loon, R. The Structure a n d M em bership o f the Canadian Cabinet (m im eographed, O ttaw a, 1966). A study prepared for the Royal Comm ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. W ade, M. ed.. Canadian Dualism: Studies o f French-English Relations (T oronto and Q uebec City, I960).

NOTES ON AUTHORS

V AL R. L O R W IN is professor o f history at the U niversity of O regon. He is the author o f The French L abor M ovem ent (1954), co-author and editor o f L abor a n d W orking Conditions in M od­ ern Europe (1967), and co-author and co-editor o f The Dimen­ sions o f the Past: M aterials, Problems, a n d O pportunities fo r Q uantitative W ork in H istory (1972). H e has served as an adviser on U nited States delegations to the International Labour O rganization, the Economic and Social Council, and the G eneral Assembly o f the U nited N ations. A R E N D L IJP H A R T is professor o f international relations at the University o f Leiden and formerly taught at the University of C alifornia at Berkeley. His principal research interests are in com parative politics (especially western dem ocratic systems) and international relations. In addition to the publications cited above he is author o f The Trauma o f D ecolonization: The D utch and W est N ew Guinea (1966). G E R H A R D L E H M B R U C H is professor o f political science at the University o f Tubingen. In addition to the w orks cited above he is co-author o f Einfuhrung in die Politikwissenschaft (3rd ed., 1970). JU R G S T E IN E R is professor o f political science at the U ni­ versity of N orth Carolina at C hapel Hill and also teaches at the Universities o f G eneva and Z urich. His current research interest is the study of decision-m aking in subculturally segm ented politi­ cal systems; am ong other publications he is author o f Am icable A greem ent Versus M ajority Rule: C onflict Resolution in S w itz­ erland (forthcom ing). H A N S D A A L D E R is professor o f political science at the U niversity o f Leiden. His ch ief publications are in com parative European politics, British and D utch governm ent, M arxism , and the politics o f the developing areas. He has published Cabinet R eform in Britain 11914-1963) and has contributed to a num ber of symposium volumes including S. C. Patterson and J. C. W ahlke, eds.. Comparative Legislative Behavior, and those cited in the Bibliography above. JA C O B P. K R U IJT was professor of sociology at the U niver­ sity o f U trecht from 1947 to 1968, and is now retired. He has w orked on the sociology of religion, work and leisure, the labour m ovem ent, class structure, family life and dem ography, and verti­ cal ideological pluralism, as well as on the history o f sociology with particular reference to W eber, D urkheim , Tonnies, and Steinmetz.

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A L F R E D D IA M A N T is professor o f political science at Indi­ an a University. In addition to the work excerpted in this volume he has published articles and chapters in books in the field of com parative bureaucracy and adm inistration. He is currently engaged in a study o f the political role o f the higher public bureaucracy in W estern Europe. P E T E R G . J. P U L Z E R is U niversity Lecturer in politics at Oxford and Student and T uto r o f C hrist C hurch. He is interested in the origins, com position, program m es, appeals, and followings o f mass m ovem ents, chiefly in W estern and Central E urope, and is cu rren tly w orking on m o d ern G e rm a n y . H is p u b licatio n s include The Rise o f Political A n ti-S em itism in G erm any and A ustria (1964) and Political Representation and Elections in Britain (2nd ed., 1972). R O G E R G IR O D is professor o f sociology in the University of G eneva and a form er executive secretary o f the International Sociological A ssociation. H is p u b licatio n s include A ttitu d e s collectives el relations hum aines: tendances actuelles des sciences sociales am ericaines (1952), Ouvriers et em ployes (1961), and M obilite sociale (1971). His present research is on longitudinal and contextual factors o f inequality, including inequality o f access to political influence. S. J. R. N O E L teaches political science at the University o f W estern O ntario. His main areas o f interest are C anadian feder­ alism and provincial politics. In addition to the articles already cited he is the author of Politics in N ewfoundland (1971) and is currently engaged on a study o f O ntario. W IL L IA M O R M SB Y is professor o f history at Brock U niver­ sity. In addition to the book draw n upon for this volum e he has w ritten many articles on C anadian history and has edited Crisis in the Canadas, 1838-39: The G rey Journals and L etters. His general area o f research interest is French-English relations in British N orth A m erica between 1760 and 1867. G E O R G E F. G . S T A N L E Y is currently D irector o f C ana­ dian Studies at M ount Allison University after a distinguished career as a historian at Royal M ilitary College, at the University o f British C olum bia, and with the C anadian Arm y. He has published ten books and num erous articles, his special interests being the history o f W estern C anada, military history, and C ana­ dian constitutional history. JA N IC E S T A P L E S is a graduate student in political science at C arleton University. T he editor, K E N N E T H D. M cR A E . is professor o f political science at Carleton University and a form er supervisor o f research for the Royal Comm ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. His-

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m ain areas o f interest are the history o f political ideas, C anadian and A m erican thought, and the com parative study o f plurilingual societies. His publications include a critical edition o f Jean Bodin, The S ix B ookes o f a C om m onw eale (1962) and a Royal C om m is­ sion study, The Federal Capital: Government Institutions (1969).

T H E C A R L E T O N LIBRARY

1.

lo r d

D u r h a m 's r e p o r t ,

edited and w ith an Introduction by G erald

M . Craig

2. THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA, 1865, edited and w ith an Introduction by P. B. W aite 3.

laurier : a study in

Canadian

politics by J. W . D a fo e , w ith an

Introduction by M urray S. D onnelly 4.

champlain : the life of fortitude by M orris B ish op, w ith a new

5.

the rowell / sirois report . B ook I. edited and w ith an Introduction

6.

Canada by R obert A . M acK ay revised and w ith an Introduction by the author

Introduction by the author by D on ald V. Sm iley the unreformed senate of

7. THE JESUIT RELATIONS AND ALLIED DOCUMENTS: A SELECTION, edited and w ith an Introduction by S. R . M ealing

8.

lord DURHAM’S mission to Canada by C hester N ew , edited and w ith an Introduction by H. W . M cC ready

9. THE RECIPROCITY treaty of 1854 by D onald C. M asters, w ith a new Introduction by the author 10.

political

UNREST IN UPPER CANADA, 1815-1836 by A ileen D unh am ,

w ith an Introduction by A . L. Burt

11. A HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN CANADA, Volum e I. by G . P. d eT . G la zeb ro o k , w ith a new Introduction by the author 12.

a history

01

transportation in

Canada , Volum e I I . by

G . P. deT . G lazebrook.

13. Till-. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF DOMINION-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS by W . A . M ack intosh, w ith an Introduction by J. H. D ales

14. THE FRENCH-CANADIAN OUTLOOK by M ason W ade, w ith a new Introduction by the author

I 5. THE WESTERN INTERIOR OF CANADA: A RECORD OF GEOGRAPHICAL discovery , 1612-1917. co m p iled and w ith an Introduction by John W arkentin

16.

thi c ourts and the

Canadian

constitution , com piled and

w ith an Introduction by W . R . Lederman 17.

money and

BANKING in Canada , com piled and w ith an Introduction

by E. P. N eufeld 18.

I RENCH-CANADIAN SOCIETY, Volum e I . com piled and w ith an Introduction by M arcel R ioux and Y ves Martin

19. THE CANADIAN commfrciai

revolution , 1845-1851 by G ilb ert N . T ucker, edited and w ith an Introduction by H ugh G . J. A itken

20. JOSEPH HOWE: VOICE of

nova scotia , com piled and w ith an

Introduction by J. M urray B e d ?

Q ii

■[ 0

0

7

21. LIFE AND LETTERS OK SIR WIIv k n v I aQ r IA Volunfa. lC by)D . D . Sk elton, edited and w ith an Introduction by D a v id M . L. Farr