Confucianism for the Twenty-First Century [1 ed.] 9783737015776, 9783847115779

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Global East Asia

Volume 10

Edited by Chun-chieh Huang

Advisory Board: Roger T. Ames (Peking), Don Baker (British Columbia), Carl Becker (Kyoto), Michael Friedrich (Hamburg), David Jones (Kennesaw), Bent Nielsen (Copenhagen), Jörn Rüsen (Essen), Kirill O. Thompson (Taipei), John A. Tucker (East Carolina), Ann Waltner (Minnesota)

Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker (eds.)

Confucianism for the Twenty-First Century

V&R unipress

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: https://dnb.de. Printed with friendly support of the NTU Academic Development Foundation. © 2023 by Brill | V&R unipress, Robert-Bosch-Breite 10, 37079 Göttingen, Germany, an imprint of the Brill-Group (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Germany; Brill Österreich GmbH, Vienna, Austria) Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2365-7871 ISBN 978-3-7370-1577-6

Contents

Preface

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Roger T. Ames The Confucian Philosophy of Family Feeling as a Resource for a New Geopolitical Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

Torbjörn Lodén Confucianism and the Global Challenges of the Twenty-First Century

. .

57

Alan T. Wood Confucian Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Jana S. Rosˇker Confucian Ethics of Relations and Alternative Models of Social Organization in Periods of Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 John A. Tucker Toward a More Compassionate Economic Order: The Confucian Imperative for Greater Wealth Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Yong Huang Why Toleration Is Not a Value/Virtue? The View from Confucius

. . . . 153

Edward Y. J. Chung Yi Toegye on Self-Reflection and Ultimate Human Life: A Korean Neo-Confucian and Comparative Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

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Contents

Heiner Roetz An Overlooked Dimension of Intergenerational Justice? A Note on Filial Piety in the Age of the Ecological Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Yi-Huah Jiang From the Inner Sage to the External King: The “End” of Human Life and Its Realization in Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Sébastien Billioud Historicity and Relevance of the Confucian Revival in Contemporary China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Guoxiang Peng Rethinking Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism: A Confucian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Chen Sun (edited and translated by Kirill O. Thompson) Social Harmony and Economic Progress: Confucian Philosophy and Global Sustainable Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Jörn Rüsen Epilogue: Questions, Comments, and Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Preface

This volume presents the thoughts, reflections, and proposals of contemporary scholars of Confucianism worldwide responding to the global challenges of our century. Since the time of Confucius, Confucians have eschewed escapism, and instead considered it their socio-political responsibility to facilitate the achievement of peace and brotherhood throughout the world. With the Covid-19 pandemic, the horrors of predatory warfare, and challenges facing democracies at every turn, the twenty-first century has left many feeling abandoned in a whirlpool of uncertainty, where once healthy waterweed has been uprooted from its underwater niche and thrown about on turbulent waves, while junky flotsam has settled below, polluting the riverbeds of our times. If Confucius and his disciples were alive today, we can only wonder as to what they might say. The authors of this book, each in their own way, have sought to explore how Confucianism, as an ancient and yet vital, resilient, and multifaceted teaching, might be relevant to contemporary challenges. We venture to offer possible solutions to the problems of our age from the perennially engaged perspective of Confucianism. As editors, we are grateful to all contributors to this volume who have formulated their thoughts during these days of global pandemic, social and political turmoil, and widespread uncertainty and anxiety. Our special thanks are due to our senior friend Professor Jörn Rüsen who, from the perspective of a nonConfucian scholar, has read all chapters in the volume and then offered his incisive comments and reflections on them as a whole. The financial support of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture in Taipei is also gratefully acknowledged; without its generous funding, this project might not have come to fruition. And our special thanks also goes to Eric Vognild for his careful, very professional copy-editing of this volume. Without his efforts, this volume would have been a far more awkward undertaking. Chun-chieh Huang John A. Tucker

Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker

Introduction

I.

Opening Remarks

The twenty-first century is a century of uncertainty and anxiety. The rivalry between globalization and counter-globalization, the “democratic recession” in many democratic countries, the development of automation and artificial intelligence, and most recently and tragically, the deadly spread of the Covid-19 pandemic constitute a strong whirlpool of depression into which many people may be drawn. Given such difficult times that already define much of our century, one may become curious: What would a Confucian scholar say to our twenty-first century? This volume includes essays authored by scholars whose specialty is Confucianisms. We say “Confucianisms” rather than “Confucianism” because we are reflecting on the multidimensional expressions and practices of Confucianism, i. e., “Confucianisms,” from the multifaceted perspectives of East Asia and globally in relation to the challenges of the twenty-first century. The topics discussed in this volume include Confucian role ethics, Confucian democracy, Confucian economic thinking, Confucian ideas on self-cultivation, Confucian filial piety, Confucian conceptions of economic development and social harmony, and so on. In each and every case, the essays in one way or another all pertain to what is in all of the varied Confucian traditions in East Asia, the quintessential core Confucian value, “humanity” (ren 仁), sometimes translated as humaneness, benevolence, and compassion. Therefore, in this introduction, before presenting a synopsis of the essays comprising this volume, we would like to make some remarks on the various nuances, meanings, and developments of the Confucian notion of humanity, historically and philosophically, as a prelude to the varied explorations of its contemporary relevance.

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II.

Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker

Meaning and Development of the Confucian Notion of Humanity

If there is one word in the time-honored Confucian traditions in East Asia that may serve as a resource for global ethics in the twenty-first century, that word would be humanity (ren 仁). In order to tackle the contemporary relevance of the Confucian notion of humanity/humaneness, this introduction contains three parts: the first part deals with the meaning and the development of the Confucian notion of humanity in history; the second part ponders over the three major questions pertaining to global ethics as raised by the pandemic since 2020; the third section illustrates how Confucian discourses on humanity might serve as a possible agenda in our age of uncertainty. In the history of Confucian humanism, ren has had many divergent meanings which can roughly be divided into four categories: (1) ren as the location of physical and mental relief; (2) ren as an incessantly procreating capacity for value judgment; (3) ren as social ethics; and (4) ren as political endeavor. The first two belong to the inner realm of individual human beings and the latter two belong to the outer realm of human society and beyond. Confucians emphasize that humanity must necessarily penetrate through and interconnect both the inner and the outer realms, and that it is most fundamentally the “humane mind” (ren xin 仁心) that constitutes the foundation of “humane governance” (ren zheng 仁政). As Ying-shih Yu (余英時, 1930–2021) observed, the development from the inner realm to the outer realm of humanity can aptly be called the “Confucian project.”1 In view of this, we shall next discuss these four dimensions of the meaning of humanity/humaneness in historical and philosophical sequence. First, Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (c. 372–c. 289 BCE) often explained humanity as the place in which people could put their body and heartmind at ease and let their spirit roam freely. Confucius said: “Of neighborhoods, one that embraces humanity and humaneness (ren) is the most beautiful. How can a man be considered wise who, when he has the choice, does not dwell in humaneness?” (里仁為美。擇不處仁，焉得知) (Analects 4:1).2 Humanity and humaneness, in Confucius’ thought, are the proper spiritual homeplace of humankind. Secondly, humanity originated, in Confucius’ and Mencius’ view, in the capacity of the human heart-mind to make value judgments, a process which is 1 Yu Ying-shih 余 英 時 , “Shishuo rujia de zhengti guihua 試 說 儒 家 的 整 體 規 劃 (On the Confucian Project),” in his Song Ming Lixue yu zhengzhi wenhua 宋 明 理 學 與 政 治 文 化 (Song Ming Neo-Confucianism and Political Culture) (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2004), 388–407; the term appears on 400. 2 D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1992), BK. IV, 28.

Introduction

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both incessant and regenerative. Confucius’ disciple Youzi (有子, 508/518–? BCE) said, “The gentleman devotes his efforts to the roots (ben 本), for once the roots are established, the Way will grow from them. Being good as a son and obedient as a young man are, perhaps, the roots of a man’s character.” (其為人也 孝弟，而好犯上者，鮮矣；不好犯上，而好作亂者，未之有也。君子務 本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其為仁之本與) (Analects 1:2).3 In the above excerpt, the phrase “once the roots are established, the Way will grow from them” means that if a person stands firmly on and maintains their moral foundation, their value consciousness will be generated through a process of incessant procreation. Thirdly, humanity was identified as constituting the interactive relations between “self” and “other,” the core value of which is “loving people” (ai ren 愛人). When Confucius’ disciple Fan Chi (樊遲, 505 or 514–? BCE) inquired about the meaning of humanity, the Master replied: “Love your fellow man” (Analects 12:22).4 And, when another student, Zhonggong (仲弓, 522–? BCE), asked about the same, Confucius responded with, “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” (己所不欲，勿施於人) (Analects 12:2).5 What Confucius implied here was that humanity is made possible by taking others into serious consideration. This is humanity as interpersonal social ethics. Fourthly, humanity was also taken to be a political endeavor, namely, what Mencius called “humane governance” (ren zheng 仁政). Thus, Confucius’ conception of the superior man — and consequently that of humanity — metaphorically progresses by moving through a series of concentric circles, proceeding from the self to the family, society, the state, and finally up to all-underheaven (tianxia 天下).6 To put the significance of Confucian humanity in a nutshell, we may be warranted in saying that the idea of the perfectibility of man underlies each of the four meanings. In the Confucian humanist tradition, to be human is to be humane. Moreover, it is one’s autonomous decision to be either humane or inhumane. This foundational idea in Confucian humanism contrasts sharply with the idea of the fallibility of man in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the development of the concept of ren as the core value of Confucian humanism, Confucius and Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200) offered two of the most 3 4 5 6

D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects, BK. I, 3. D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects, BK. XII, 117–118, esp. 117. D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects, BK. XII, 109. For a detailed illustration of the four meanings of humanity in East Asian Confucianisms, see Chun-chieh Huang, Dongya rujia renxue shilun 東亞儒家仁學史論 (A Historical Treatise on the Humanity in East Asian Confucianisms) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2017), 136–149. Cf. Achim Mittag, “Reconsidering Ren as a Basic Concept of Chinese Humanism,” in Traces of Humanism in China, ed. Carmen Meinert (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010), 69–82.

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lofty and influential accounts. It was Confucius who succinctly pointed out the inseparability as well as the creative tension between humanity and propriety. It was Zhu Xi who composed his powerful “Treatise on Humanity” (Renshuo, 仁 說), setting forth the ontological and cosmological dimensions of Confucian discourses on humanity. By enhancing the level and scope of significance of a human life, Zhu Xi, through expounding the Confucian notion of ren (仁) as the “existentiality (beingness) of the existence of love” (愛之存在的存在性),7 prompted Confucians to reach new boundaries in their “search for understanding of the greater self.”8

III.

Confucian Humanity/Humaneness and the Covid-19 Pandemic

The year 2020 may be remembered either as an annus mirabilis or an annus horribilis in the long history of human civilization. The Coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19), as Henry A. Kissinger worried, may change the post-war “liberal world order” forever.9 At least one scholar has suggested that the West must revise or abandon individualism to cope with the pandemic.10 A senior fellow at one think tank mentioned the fact that “at present the most helpful news about our ability to defeat the epidemic comes from what could roughly be called the Confucian cosmopolis.”11 The Taipei-based Foundation for the Sustainable Development of Chinese Culture has indicated that the number of deaths caused by Covid-19 per 100,000 population in the Christian cultural zone amounts to 58 times that in the Confucian cultural zone. It seems clear then that Confucian ethics are relevant to our times.12 Before we ponder the possibility of the Confucian learning of ren (仁) as a salutary resource for global ethics in these days when the pandemic is attacking 7 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體 (Substance of Mind and Substance of Human Nature) (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1968, 1973), 3:244. 8 Qian Mu 錢穆. Guoxue gailun 國學概論 (Introduction to Guoxue), in Qian Binsi xiansheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集 (The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi), ed. Editorial Committee of The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 1994–1998), 1:278. 9 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order,” Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2020, A/17. 10 Jan-Werner Müller, “We Must Help One Another or Die,” New York Times, March 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/opinion/coronavirus-politics.html. 11 Bruno Maçães, “Coronavirus and the Clash of Civilizations,” National Review, March 10, 2020, https://www.hudson.org/research/15801-coronavirus-and-the-clash-of-civilizations, accessed on June 22, 2020. 12 For a detailed illustration of the relevant statistics, see the 2020 online presentation of the Wang Dao Sustainability Index (WDSI). http://www.wangdaoindex.org/xmdoc?xsmsid=0I3 51573930519617185 accessed on March 2, 2021.

Introduction

13

us all over the world, we want to mention three important questions that have come to the fore since the pandemic began. The first is how to overcome the excessive individualism that has developed in modern culture since the Enlightenment. At the very least, this question pertains to recognizing and establishing the proper relationship between self and others. In other words, how might humanity maintain a dynamic equilibrium between individualism and communitarianism? The second is how to reestablish interactive relations between different sectors, be they people, societies, or states. The core of this issue lies in the ways of moving from contemporary “de-coupling” to future “reinterconnectedness.” And the last but most important question is how to keep one’s mind-heart unperturbed and calm even as the pandemic is spreading. This issue pertains to the proper relationship between the self and the world. The answer to these three questions has very much to do with a keyword, namely, reconciliation. Some sort of reconciliation between self and other, man and nature, and man and super-nature must be made before we can cope with the challenges of the pandemic. In the Confucian tradition, the best way to reconciliation lies in maintaining imperturbability within our minds. Confucius and Mencius both declared that they were able to maintain their minds unperplexed and unmoved as of age forty. Wang Yangming reported his spiritual enlightenment of “attaining innate knowledge” (zhi liangzhi 致良知) in his painful exile experience in Guizhou. And as Mencius asserted,13 “For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven” (盡其心者，知其性也，知其性，則 ¯ shio Heihachiro¯ (大塩平八郎 1783– 知天矣). Two later Confucian scholars, O 1836) of late-Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868) and Jeong Je-du (Cho˘ng chedu 鄭齊 斗, 정제두 1649–1736) of Joseon Korea (1392–1910), understood Mencius’ views much as did Wang Yangming, holding that once we attain the spontaneity and calmness of our mind, the “great chain of being” from self to others and to the ultimate reality can be established.

IV.

Confucian Humanity/Humaneness and the New Global Ethics

The cultural resources for a new global ethics after the pandemic may arguably be found in the Confucian humanism focusing upon the core value of ren (仁). The main theme or melody of the Confucian symphony of humanity was established on the humanist spirit of intersubjectivity in relations between people (and not 13 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1984), BK. VII, art. A, 265.

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between man and metaphysical or spiritual entities). In that way, East Asian Confucian discourse on humanity unfolded within the context of four major pillars of Confucian humanism, namely, the unity of body and mind, harmony between oneself and others, unity of heaven and man, and dialogue between the past and the present. The special emphasis given to the intersubjectivity of interhuman relationships in the Confucian philosophy of humanity carries new revelations for the world of the twenty-first century. A theoretically significant question pertaining to the core issue since the Covid-19 era, namely, reconciliation, is the question of the objectification of moral subjectivity. Confucius and Mencius fixed the original scope of humanity by fashioning the Confucian learning on humanity with an extremely powerful inner elan. Thus, discourse on humanity could not be confined to an abstract world of thought and reduced to an intellectual game — or as the Buddhists call it, mental proliferation (xilun 戲論, Skt. prapañca). Instead, with its inherent vitality, humanity and humaneness had to be put into practice and so issued a Weberian “calling” to intellectuals of all East Asian countries, arousing them to practice self-mastery in their everyday dealings with others in their greater social world. Confucian intellectuals set out from cultivation of their own moral characters (xiushen 修身) and committed to a form of statecraft that would extend benefits and aid to people. When Confucius discussed ren 仁 together with his disciples, he never defined its meaning but only emphasized the method of putting ren into practice. Confucian reflections on humanity were never just a series of theoretical discussions and inferences made by otherworldly hermits who resided in seclusion and considered themselves to be above the mundane world. On the contrary, though diverse in their content, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese discourses on humanity were all permeated with the never-altering quality of viewing the self and others as interpenetrating, such that what is outside and what is inside are comprehensively connected, with the connection extending between those above and those below, between men and women, etc. This idea of comprehensiveness is best expressed in Tan Sitong’s (譚嗣同, 1865–1898) Exposition on Humanity (Renxue 仁學). The inner force of East Asian Confucian discourse on humanity and humaneness has, with surging grandeur, enveloped and enhanced the exercise of royal power throughout East Asia. Consequently, the inner vitality of ren might inevitably answer the question “In what way can the moral subject of humanity and humaneness be objectivized?” Once the humane mind acquires its own practical realization and implementation in humane governance, this necessarily brings into play the structures of power that exist in the actual world. Confucius and Mencius first advocated the ideal of humane governance of the realm in the Spring and Autumn (722–464 BCE) and Warring States (463–222 BCE) periods when the au-

Introduction

15

thority of the Zhou royal line was already in decline and feudal lords were beginning to contend with one another in their struggle for supremacy. But after the great unification of the Chinese empire occurred in 221 BCE, Confucian scholars were confronted with the real supremacy of royal power. Thus, whereas the power possessed by the Confucian scholars who embraced and cherished the ideal of humane governance was conferred upon them by their ruler, their monarchs were in control of ultimate and absolute authority over them. Between sovereigns and Confucian scholars there existed a relationship of subordination, not one of coordination. The extreme inequality in power relations that existed between the two sides soon caused Confucian discourse to fall to a greater degree into “the arts of governance” (zhengshu 政術, or “the arts of politics”), and away from the domain of “philosophy of governance” (zhengli 政 理, “political philosophy”). In the end, Confucian learning on humanity could not be saved from becoming an “unfinished project,” and the ideal of humane governance became a discourse of “counter-factuality,” ultimately reduced to an everlasting nostalgia in the minds of Confucian scholars. Ren conveyed — as humanism, humanity, and humaneness — the most important cluster of ideas in the cultural tradition of East Asian Confucianisms. In the tradition of Confucian learning on humanity, the content of its thought experienced creative transformations in China, Japan, and Korea. The continuities and discontinuities, the processes of change and persistence turned ren into one of the most exciting movements in the symphony of East Asian cultures. Yet the ideal of humane governance and its concrete practice was betrayed by East Asian autocratic regimes, for it was under the control and restrictions imposed by royal authority upon East Asian Confucians that the great ideal of humane governance barely lingered on, growing ever denser, unable to develop and fully issue forth.14 If the main task for Asian thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries centered around the establishment and objectification of moral subjectivity, then we might well say that the challenge of the post-pandemic era lies in promotion of moral intersubjectivity. In the twenty-first century, as we strive for reconciliation, East Asian Confucian discourse on ren might reach new heights because in focusing on interpersonal relationships, it neither makes one completely abandon oneself by following others, nor does it make people completely surrender themselves to the pursuit of the self at the expense of their relationships to others. Hence, the latent intellectual resource of intersubjectivity implicit and yet in14 For a discussion on this point, see Chun-chieh Huang, “Human Governance as the Moral Responsibility of Rulers in East Asian Confucian Political Philosophy,” in Morality and Responsibility of Rules: European and Chinese Origins of a Rule of Law as Justice for World Order, ed. Anthony Carty and Janne Nijman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 270– 291.

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tegral to the Confucian notion and practice of ren is exactly what is required by humankind in the twenty-first century. With regard to the current world order, the twenty-first century is an age of multipolarity, and not at all an age of unilateral world order. This new configuration within the emerging world order of the twenty-first century is in urgent need of a new humanist spirit through which the core values of Eastern and Western civilizations might be fused together in harmony as its spiritual foundation. This is also the reason why, in the world of today, intercultural dialogue is of such vital importance. The long and unbroken tradition of East Asian Confucian discourse on humanity, which spans nearly three thousand years of human history, with its majestic humanist spirit and values affirmed through its thinking about notions such as the humane mind (ren xin 仁心), humane governance (ren zheng 仁政), and the kingly way (wang dao 王道), has the capacity to lead the world of the twenty-first century towards a state of symbiosis, common prosperity, and peace through reconciliation. It is imperative to listen to the call of Confucius from East Asia in our century.

V.

Chapter Synopses

From the teachings of Confucius as recorded in the Analects forward, the primary if not exclusive focus of virtually all expressions of Confucianism, in East Asia and globally, has been on ethics as an intrinsic, integral dimension of the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres. While Confucian solutions to the problem of how those who govern might best proceed have been varied, none has denied the primary importance of taking the people at large as the ultimate concern. Not surprisingly, when described with just one word, Confucianism is often characterized as a quintessential expression of humanism, i. e., an unrelenting concern, both philosophical and practical in nature, with the world of humans, their moral character, and their efforts to provide for a realm in which the wealth, natural resources, and creative capacities of all between heaven and earth might best be merged with the needs, hopes, dreams, and ambitions of humanity at large and the larger ecological environment that — at least according to one account, that of the Song dynasty (960–1279) Confucian, Zhang Zai (張載 1020–1077) in his “Western Inscription” (Ximing 西銘) — serves as both the father and mother of all that is. The essays comprising this volume, summarized in successive synoptic accounts below, convey variously the multifaceted core of Confucian humanism as a living ethic vital to the remainder of the twenty-first century.

Introduction

1.

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Confucian Philosophy of Family Feeling

In the opening essay, “The Confucian Philosophy of Family Feeling as a Resource for a New Geopolitical Order,” Roger Ames suggests that the Confucian philosophy of family feeling, grounded in its emphasis on “family reverence” (xiao 孝), might serve as the core of a minimalist morality informing a new, conceptually and practically reconfigured world geopolitical order embracing, rather than a collection of individualistic and often self-centered nation states, a more holistic and communal global order, one often conceptualized in Confucian terms as all-below-heaven (tianxia 天下). In light of the challenges of the twentyfirst century, tianxia offers a vision of a comprehensive order of world reality in which states exist not in fiercely independent competition with one another but instead as internally-dependent, complementary units working together for the common good of all in a shared geo-political ecosystem embracing diversity and creativity within the shared, organic environment of our dynamic and ever evolving cosmos. Ames argues that this new world order, conceived of as a kind of “worlding,” is intrinsically and isomorphically related to a move away from the excesses of ego-driven individualism. Moreover, it is one that embraces inclusively, rather than an ethics of the self and the possibility of radical selfishness, more positively the Confucian morality of the family as rooted in family reverence and family feeling. In Ames’ view, the still extant old-world order based upon individual nationstates egregiously echoes the excesses of individualism. Ames asserts that individualistically-driven approaches to social and political organization have repeatedly proven to be failures in addressing problems such as pandemics, pollution, inequities in resource and wealth allocation, and global hunger. Most typically, the old-world order — which Ames associates with the seventeenthcentury Westphalian system affirming absolute and ultimate sovereignty for each individual state — allows, rather brutally, as one means for resolving world problems nothing better than the self-destructive and barbaric solution of war. To provide for a more healthy, peaceful, and environmentally respectful global order, one upholding intra-nationalism rather than internationalism, Ames proposes the tianxia approach to relations between political entities at the state level, arguing that an outgrowth of this would be a new conception of human society grounded not in itself as a collection of individuals with each working for his/her own self-interests but instead, as an organic whole comprised of families working together, internally and externally, for the greater good of all. In the tianxia model of globalism, the world would be construed as an inwardly encompassing vital organism, without an exclusionary or discriminatory outside that sets an illusory us against them. In Ames’ view, this approach to understanding, in a moral and practical manner, people, polities, and the global order

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is the most promising and perhaps the only viable one for the twenty-first century.

2.

Confucianism and Global Challenges

In chapter two, “Confucianism and the Global Challenges of the Twenty-First Century,” Torbjörn Lodén approaches Confucianism as a living, resilient system of thought that despite many earlier critiques, including some pronouncements that it was either dead or at best simply obsolete and irrelevant to modern times, remains not only a vital option but moreover one full of possibilities for a future humanity and the pressing challenges of this century. In making his case, Lodén differentiates the “really-existing” Confucianism that often, in its political manifestations, is a distorted, bastardized expression of the multidimensional humanistic Confucian ideals affirming a shared human nature of goodness grounded in ethical principles and sensibilities that unite not only all of humanity but the human realm and the cosmos at large in an organic community seeking fulfillment through vital integration and fundamental cooperation at the ontological level as well as that of everyday life. Rather than dichotomize and differentiate East and West as essentially incommensurable and somehow in danger of what Samuel P. Huntington (1927– 2008) has called the “clash of civilizations,” Lodén emphasizes shared ground and the relatedness of the two, and how Confucianism, when uncompromised by those who would appropriate it for their own political purposes, offers insights for dealing with climate change, war, oppression and exploitation, the unequal distribution of wealth, and pandemics. Lodén highlights dimensions of Confucian thought especially valuable in our time including those of humanism, universalism, holism, the search for unity, the focus on moderation and harmony, the emphasis on duties, and the central role of study and learning. In the latter, Lodén sees not necessarily unique and unprecedented tenets but rather ones that in their shared, common presence in Confucianism and, potentially, some expressions of Western thinking, might offer solutions to the problems of modernity and avenues allowing for cultural diversity that well bypass the prospect of clashes and conflict.

3.

Confucian Democracy

Efforts to reconceptualize, along complementary lines, the global arena in terms of society, ethics, politics, and science, continue in the third chapter, Alan Wood’s “Confucian Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Perspective.”

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Wood’s essential claim is that Confucianism and democracy are complementary, “with democracy providing the institutional hardware, and Confucianism the moral software.” In support of his view, Wood notes the views of the midtwentieth-century New Confucian thinker, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, who held that in pre-Qin times, Confucianism harbored a “democratic spirit,” especially evident in its emphasis on the importance of the people. However, this spirit was compromised by the rise of increasingly autocratic imperial regimes from the Qin dynasty forward. As a result, while Confucianism continued as the learning on which candidates taking the civil service exam were tested, its democratic spirit was subordinated to the formalism of a curriculum designed to ensure professional success within an authoritarian bureaucratic regime. Yet as Wood emphasizes, the spirit of democracy is hardly foreign to Confucianism. Indeed, the essential compatibility of Confucianism and democracy is of utmost relevance to the future of China and humankind. In solidarity with Ames, Wood notes that the global dimensions of problems facing humanity today and the foreseeable future, those of climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics and disease, nuclear proliferation, and inequities in wealth, cannot be adequately dealt with via the radical individualism still widely operative at the local and national levels. Instead of a world order conceived of as a collection of individual nationstates in amoral competition with one another, with each seeking its own best interests, Wood observes that it will only be by means of “cooperative government on a global scale” that these problems might be solved. In “the Confucian outlook on life,” Wood sees qualities such as love, empathy, cooperation, and respect for others in life and learning that could rescue democracy from “tearing itself apart through its commitment to radical individualism.” Wood adds, for example, that with the Covid-19 pandemic, many Americans, excessively devoted to “their own private ideology of freedom” rather than the common good, exhibited “self-destructive selfishness” rather than a devotion to “the human family.” Rather than radical individualism, Wood calls attention to Confucianism’s potential contribution, its “faith in the essential morality and complementarity of the natural world.” This vision of holistic ethical complementarity Wood traces to the Song dynasty Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi, whose synthesis of earlier Neo-Confucian philosophies was most exceptional in its ability to find, through the notion of the Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極), their complementary nature so that rather than affirm an either/or approach elevating rational principle (li 理) or generative force (qi 氣), Zhu viewed the two ontological dimensions as complementary and inseparable aspects of all reality. Taking Zhu’s thoughts about the Supreme Ultimate as a starting point, Wood adds that Zhu’s vision is not an idiosyncratic, inherently contradictory one so

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much as a vision that foreshadowed in many respects the new paradigm shift in scientific theory away from the mechanistic, atomistic emphasis on a whole comprised of independent parts to a more organic, holistic grasp of things affirming their relational and mutual reciprocity. In the latter, the whole is understood as something more than a collection of its individual parts. This paradigm shift, conspicuously evident in early-twentieth-century quantum physics and its affirmation of the complementarity of opposites, represents a shift to a vision of things as long understood by Confucians such as Zhu Xi who, rather than insist on an either/or approach to reality, found cause for understanding things in terms of their complementary, organic nature embracing what might seem, at a superficial level, contradictory attributes. By incorporating such a deeply rooted Confucian holistic vision of things into our efforts to infuse democratic institutions with an ethical core, Wood foresees the possibility of a future empowered to meet, at the global level, the challenges of the remainder of the twenty-first century.

4.

Confucian Relational Ethics

The views of Ames and Wood resonate in the fourth chapter, Jana S. Rosˇker’s “Confucian Ethics of Relations and Alternative Models of Social Organization in Periods of Crises.” Rosˇker endorses the call for a new global order, one that goes beyond the failures of the nation-state system that has dominated the world for the last several centuries and which has, with the onset of new levels of globalization, proven to be bankrupt, incapable of meeting the global challenges facing humanity. Along with the modern nation-state, Rosˇker rejects the once regnant liberal individualism, a hangover from the Enlightenment and its elevation of the idea of “the free and autonomous individual subject.” Rosˇker contextualizes her critique of the nation-state and liberal individualism in relation to the pandemic, noting the extent to which dealing with the spread of the Corona virus globally has accelerated awareness of the ineptness of the ancien socio-political order, and heightened calls for a new, more global community engaged in active dialogue and so more fully capable of working together to deal with the myriad problems facing humanity, Covid-19 included. To facilitate this, Rosˇker presents a critical introduction to Confucianism and its “high valuation” on “interpersonal relationships, mutual empathy, and responsible autonomy.” More specifically, Rosˇker examines ways in which Confucian notions of personhood and autonomy might enhance, at the global cross-cultural level, the reinvigoration of “humanist values.” Rather than endorse widely repeated yet illinformed views about Chinese and East Asian societies as authoritarian in

Introduction

21

character and undergirded by a docile, easily led population mobilized without resistance for causes such as dealing with the recent pandemic, Rosˇker notes how the “original Confucian teachings emphasized ‘humaneness (ren 仁)’ and ‘rituality (li 禮),’” diversity and pluralism, and endorsed a number of “protodemocratic elements.” It is the humanistic philosophy of early Confucianism that Rosˇker elevates, not “the dogmatic state doctrine” and its “conservative normative ethic” more characteristic of “political Confucianism.” In Rosˇker’s view, teachings such as humaneness with their emphasis on the relational nature of ethics and the moral person’s mutual engagement and cooperation with other people, are more responsible for the successes of East Asian countries in their “democratic containment” of the pandemic than their supposedly authoritarian ruling elites and their allegedly docile subjects. By “relational ethics,” Rosˇker refers to the fact that in the Confucian social order of much of East Asia, people are an expression of the dynamic network of relationships that they are involved in through their ties with their fellow human beings. Noting how three of the five basic relationships of Confucian ethics (wu lun 五倫) are grounded upon family relations, Rosˇker suggests that the core Confucian ethical notion, humaneness, is in fact an outgrowth of family reverence (xiao 孝). On this count, Rosˇker concurs with Roger Ames and notably Li Zehou in extrapolating relational ethics from the core ethical sense of family reverence, and then takes that as a grounds for growing moral practice in the larger community. In this context, Rosˇker defends the collectivist tendencies of East Asian societies, affirming that instead of being the product of authoritarian regimes, they proceed from and in turn express a kind of individualism, one grounded in equality and mutual recognition rather than competition and domination of the other. Moreover, Rosˇker claims that mutual empathy and humaneness which are central to Confucian relationism, help to “assure the preservation of group solidarity and responsibility” and serve as solid and forceful tools for the solving of epidemic, ecological, and political crises of contemporary times.”

5.

Toward A More Equitable Economic Order

In the fifth chapter, “Toward a More Compassionate Economic Order: The Confucian Imperative for Greater Wealth Equity,” John A. Tucker shifts the focus to the problem of inequalities in wealth and resources. Taking Thomas Piketty’s recent works, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2013) and Capital and Ideology (2019) as a starting point, Tucker suggests that despite the short shrift Piketty gives Confucianism and Chinese history in his otherwise globally-oriented analyses, Confucianism offers a longstanding platform for achieving a

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more equitable distribution of wealth and resources. Tucker notes that in the Mencius, the so-called “well-field system” ( jingtian zhidu 井田制度, i. e., agricultural land distribution system) is proposed as a means of effecting not simply an equitable distribution of capital but instead, as a means of realistically achieving an authentically ethical society, one wherein all might be reasonably expected to embody the basic ideals of morality. Mencius’ thinking on the well-field system emerged from his realistic recognition that people cannot be expected to behave ethically unless they have the basics of food, clothing, and shelter. Lacking the latter, Mencius admitted that there was nothing that people would not do to obtain them. If provided with a means of achieving the material necessities for a decent life, a plot of land in Mencius’ scheme, then people would behave in a decent, indeed ethical manner. Such provision, Mencius suggested, was fundamental to achieving what he called “compassionate government” (ren zheng 仁政), often translated as “humane government” or “benevolent government.” Tucker acknowledges that a plot of land is often, in modern society, a rather archaic solution to the problem of inequities in wealth, and so calls for a contemporary hermeneutic of Mencius’ proposal wherein an egalitarian plot of land is reconceptualized as provision for the basic human needs for a decent life, including where necessary, food, clothing, shelter, education, and medicine. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Mencian thinking informing the wellfield system would energetically affirm that access to vaccines and decent health care ought not be a function of individual or even national wealth but rather, if we expect people to behave ethically, provided for all equitably as a fundamental expression of compassionate government.

6.

Toleration and Confucian Virtues

With the sixth chapter, “Why Toleration Is Not a Value/Virtue?: The View from Confucius,” Yong Huang argues that contrary to the relatively widespread respect and advocacy that tolerance has received in Western philosophical literature, including notably, the support of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, as well as in widely respected documents internationally such as the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Confucius’ thinking as recorded in the Analects, tolerance appears as a “fundamentally flawed” moral idea. Yet Huang adds that simply because Confucius did not emphasize tolerance of those who were immoral does not mean that he advocated intolerance. Instead of tolerance or intolerance, Confucius believed that those who did not deserve toleration, i. e., those who were immoral, ought to be greeted with moral education including non-coercive measures such as learning

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the classics. Also emphasized is the importance of uprightness in the person or persons conveying the moral education. Their example at the personal level is, according to Huang’s interpretation of Confucius, as important as the teachings themselves. Huang notes that the two characters included in the modern Chinese word for toleration, kuanrong 寬容, do appear individually in the Analects, but argues that therein they do not have the meaning of toleration as they do, when used together, in modern Chinese.

7.

Confucian Self-Reflection and Ecological Humanism

In the seventh chapter, “Yi Toegye on Self-Reflection and Ultimate Human Life: A Korean Neo-Confucian and Comparative Interpretation,” Edward Chung presents the basics of self-cultivation as expounded by the premier Korean scholar of Zhu Xi’s learning, Yi Toegye, and its ramifications for contemporary life in the twenty-first century. Chung examines Toegye’s theory and practice of self-reflection in light of four dimensions: (1) self-reflection and mind cultivation, (2) quiet-sitting contemplation and concentration, (3) self-reflection and reverential practice, and (4) being in harmony with nature. As Chung explains, one key to Toegye’s approach is mind cultivation which involves making the mind the master and center of the self so as to maintain single-minded concentration, orderliness, solemnity, and dignity of thought. Through such mind control, moral principles will become clear and selfish inclinations overcome as “the illuminating mind” makes manifest Heaven’s principle. One practical approach for realizing this embodiment of the moral way through self-reflection and achievement of spiritual equanimity is, in Toegye’s view, “quiet-sitting” ( jeongjwa 靜坐). Through this practice, Toegye believed that the scattered, dispersed body and mind might be reunited and Heaven’s principle manifested. Quiet-sitting, then, is the essential practice in Toegye’s approach to self-reflection and moral behavior. Through it, the virtue of reverence (gyeong 敬) — sometimes rendered as “holistic attentiveness,” “mindfulness,” and “seriousness” — is the first principle which, with cultivation, emerges daily in practical, physical expressions of self-reflection. With the latter, a more holistic path of ethical and spiritual cultivation is realized facilitating a “deeper and higher realm of human existence.” According to Toegye’s view of self-reflection, “the true human being manifests the Confucian belief in ‘forming one body with heaven and earth,’” enabling achievement of an “anthropocosmic harmony” in which all forms of life are respected and treated with integrity. This in turn lends itself to a kind of “ecological humanism” and an “ecological awareness integrating ‘religion, ethics, and aesthetics.’” Chung emphasizes that the contemporary relevance of Toegye’s

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thinking on self-reflection is found in its holistic approach to compassionate wisdom and “interaction with nature and other human beings.” Chung concludes that while Confucianism has been, recently, studied in relation to modernization, economic development, politics, and human rights, Toegye’s thinking reminds us of its importance for ethics, spirituality, and religion. It also is important in relation to the search for convergence among the world’s spiritual traditions and as a basis for global ethical and interreligious dialogue. In these respects, Toegye’s sixteenth-century exposition of the Confucian way of self-reflection remains very relevant to the twenty-first century.

8.

Intergenerational Justice and Filial Piety

In the eight chapter, “An Overlooked Dimension of Intergenerational Justice? A Note on Filial Piety in the Age of the Ecological Crisis,” Heiner Roetz questions the value of filial piety not only in Chinese history, wherein little evidence appears of its salutary impact on ecological concerns, but also in the present and the future. Instead of simply casting filial piety as a positive force, Roetz draws on a host of Western commentators such as Montesquieu (1689–1755), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), and Max Weber (1864–1920), as well as Chinese critics such as the May Fourth thinker, Wu Yu 吳虞 (1872–1949), who linked filial piety and the “spirit of despotism” in China, to remind readers that filial piety has been “the breeding ground of submissiveness, traditionalism, and nepotism” in ways that leave little to “no place in a Chinese society that deserved the predicate ‘modern’ .…” Roetz thus observes that filial piety, as he translates xiao 孝, “is not a first rank candidate” for possible Confucian contributions to the twenty-first century. Rather than filial piety, Roetz suggests that Confucianism, if it is to contribute to modernity, must instead build on not the family but “the human being in an open world, stress individual autonomy rather than parental authority, and transcend the limits of tradition.” Roetz clearly is at odds with Tu Wei-ming’s more positive thinking on xiao and the “richly textured” family structures needed to convey moral values and is so because he sees little evidence of such in the wake of the social changes from an agrarian society to “an industrial and service economy.” Roetz’s thinking also stands as a challenge to Roger Ames’ ideas as set forth in the opening essay of this anthology. Yet Roetz adds that xiao has meant more than “unconditional submissiveness,” i. e., it has also been linked to “principled moral vigilance that could lead to opposition, albeit moderate and never aggressive, and to clear rejection of following immoral, inhumane … orders of the parents as well as orders of the ruler.” But Roetz adds that these more critical, subjective dimensions of xiao were not the ones emphasized or forefronted in most traditional literature. In this

Introduction

25

context, Roetz notes that there is hope for xiao insofar as one can find in early texts filial piety associated with the careful use of resources, something that would, in his view, possibly contribute to an environmental ethics checking the ecological crisis by calling for preservation of the means for humanity to survive, though not, as has been argued, by extending xiao to the non-human realm. Roetz does not subscribe to what he refers to as “the currently abundant lyrical presentations of Confucianism as inherently cosmo-ecological.” His idea is rather that xiao might indirectly help to preserve the earth as the place of remembering the dead. It would thus enhance and ensure an intergenerational justice as an avenue to preservation of the world so as to have it relevant not simply to the present and future generations, but to those past as well.

9.

Inner Sagehood and External Political Achievement

In chapter nine, “From the Inner Sage to the External King: The ‘End’ of Human Life and Its Realization in Confucianism,” Yi-Huah Jiang examines two expressions of Confucianism in contemporary discourse and practice. One is the New Confucianism primarily emerging from Taiwan and Hong Kong and emphasizing the pursuit of a virtuous life and the achievement of inner sagehood. This school of Confucianism affirms adoption of institutions associated with Western liberal democracy as the preferred system of political organization. The thinking of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1904– 1982) well exemplifies this version of Confucianism. The second school of Confucianism is the Political Confucianism of mainland China which considers the pursuit of inner sagehood to be politically irrelevant, though not necessarily misguided. It rejects, however, the notion that Western liberal democracy is the best form of political organization, noting how democracy is “plagued by serious problems.” Instead, it suggests that China develop its own political order, one wherein Confucianism “would be promoted as the state philosophy and Confucians would rule the country without democratic election.” Two exemplars of this approach are Jiang Qing 蔣慶 (1953–) and Chen Ming 陳明 (1962–). Political Confucianism is the younger of the two lines of thought and, in part, has emerged by criticizing the seemingly accommodationist views of the New Confucians and their readiness to combine Chinese systems with those of the West. Much opposed to this perceived kowtowing, Jiang Qing, for example, has stated, “China is China, the West is the West. Confucianism is Confucianism, democracy is democracy… There is neither need nor possibility to combine the two,” thus dismissing the more accommodative and assimilative approach of the New Confucians in favor of an independent, distinctively Chinese line of development. Rather than partner with Western liberalism, Political Confucianism

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calls for a kind of Confucian Constitutionalism in which a largely symbolic ruling line composed of direct descendants of Confucius preside alongside an academy of scholars given the administrative task of guiding the operation of government. Political Confucianism, at least as developed by Jiang Qing, would have Confucianism serve as a “state religion.” Simply put, Political Confucians such as Jiang Qing call for the “re-Confucianization” of China. Yi-Huah Jiang sides with the New Confucians in their approach, maintaining that the Political Confucian plan for governance by Confucians is impractical and unrealistic, and that instead, the expectation of popular sovereignty, a cornerstone of democratic thought and practice, cannot be bypassed in favor of the philosopher-king approach. Similarly, New Confucianism faces problems as well, specifically, whether those who devote themselves to achieving inner sagehood will be realistically prepared to participate in a competitive democratic order wherein all players might not be so inclined to virtue and integrity. Jiang does not claim to have solved these problems but more modestly acknowledges them in relation to ongoing questions about possible roles Confucianism will play in the future vis-à-vis democracy and world politics, noting that the continued debate of New Confucians and Political Confucians over the role of Confucianism in the future of China is, itself, indicative of the extent to which the ancient teachings remain viable even in the twenty-first century.

10.

Historicity and Relevance of the Confucian Revival

In chapter ten, “Historicity and Relevance of the Confucian Revival in Contemporary China,” Sébastien Billioud examines the Confucian revival vis-à-vis “China’s evolving relations to time and historicity.” Billioud suggests that the rediscovery of Confucianism needs to be understood as part of a shift away from the Maoist era’s denunciation of Confucius and Confucianism, and toward a reaffirmation of traditional Chinese culture of all sorts, including Confucianism. Billioud traces this shift, at the popular grassroots level, to the early twenty-first century when “in the space of the people” (minjian 民間), the past was revived through reading groups focused on Chinese classics, etc., among children, adults, and even in commercial enterprises. Mou Zongsan and Jiang Qing and their followers — associated with New Confucianism and Political Confucianism respectively — emerged more prominently in this context. The minjian revival soon overlapped with a revival at the elite level including among local government employees and officials, making the revival both grassroots and a top-down phenomenon. One can see this in PRC President Hu Jintao’s 胡錦濤 (1942–) ideology of the “harmonious society” up to the more recent emphasis on morality and filial piety, albeit as often interwoven with

Introduction

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Marxist ideology. Redemptive organizations such as Yiguandao 一貫道 (the Way of Pervading Unity) have also played an important role in the revival of Confucianism. Equally contributing to the revival is a widespread sense of darkness about the times, even alienation from reality as encountered. At virtually every level, the Confucian past is accessed via classical texts which provide purported “oases of resonance” that offer hope, direction, and in some cases, escape from the pressures of modernity. The revival (or, as Billioud suggests, reinvention) of Confucian rituals stands as another significant dimension of the revival, one that has generated substantive and multidirectional resonance among practitioners. At the level of political elites, Chinese tradition — including Confucianism — is often integrated into discussions contextualizing the ruling polity, serving as a “back up” to the revolutionary culture (geming wenhua 革命文化) and its “red genes” (hongse jiyin 紅色基因). And thinking about the future of China assuming as it does a notion of progress and improvement, variously provides for a Confucian presence in education, business, ritual, and the party-state going forward. In this respect, Billioud sees China as “largely driven by the modern regime of historicity (i. e., the primacy of the future),” but a future understood “in its articulation with the past,” including various dimensions of Confucianism.

11.

Rethinking Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism

Chapter eleven, Guoxiang Peng’s “Rethinking Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism: A Confucian Perspective,” presents Confucianism as a “rooted cosmopolitanism” or “cosmopolitan patriotism” which can provide, theoretically and practically, for reconciliation of the tensions between cosmopolitanism and patriotism/nationalism. In Peng’s view, nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism are, at least at the superficial level, “divergent and contending rather than coherent and complementary ideals.” Peng understands patriotism positively as giving priority to the people of the same nation-state yet doing so “without focusing on the exclusion of people in other nation-states,” while nationalism, viewed in a less favorable light, tends to exclude or antagonize “people of other political-cultural communities.” Peng admits overlap, noting that “radical patriotism … is a virulent form of nationalism,” and as such was more what concerned Martha C. Nussbaum in her 1994 essay, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” Peng adds that cosmopolitanism goes beyond “particular values and identities that various nation-states respectively embrace,” promoting instead the ideal of world citizenship, embracing “universal values such as humanity, freedom, equality, and justice.” In this respect, cosmopolitanism “occupies the moral high ground.” Peng next considers how patriotism, particularistic in orientation, can

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be reconciled with cosmopolitanism, and suggests in this context that “conceptual and practical resources in the Confucian tradition — namely, humanity (ren), self, and all-under-heaven (tianxia 天下) … enable us to rethink the interrelationships between nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism.” Peng sees these values as transcending individual self-centeredness and also the particularistic vantage points of specific cultures and nation-states. Yet Confucianism also allows for difference, provided that difference exists in harmony with, and in allegiance, ultimately, to higher, transcendent, universal values. Peng thus describes the formation of Confucian world citizenship as a continuous extension of concentric circles centered around the self, expanding outward to the community, and eventually encompassing all-under-heaven. This vision, he notes, is grounded in the Great Learning’s approach to governing which sees it as an outgrowth of self-cultivation of the mind and heart. Elaborating on this, Peng describes Confucianism as providing for a “rooted cosmopolitanism” or a “cosmopolitan patriotism,” i. e., a cosmopolitanism that recognizes specific cultural grounds but which bends towards universalism in orientation and ultimate values. Reinforcing his claims, Peng notes that his thoughts are those of a Confucian scholar analyzing the problems of patriotism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism, and need not be the final answer. While asserting his belief in a common mind among humanity, he invites the thoughts of others representing different cultural perspectives on the same matter.

12.

Social Harmony and Economic Progress

In chapter twelve, “Social Harmony and Economic Progress: Confucian Philosophy and Global Sustainable Development,” Chen Sun — as masterfully translated by Kirill Thompson — discusses the question, “What does Confucianism have to offer for establishing global sustainable development?” Sun’s study draws on economic development theory, the life sciences, and Taiwanese socio-economic development in order to show how Confucian values contribute to a better and sustainable global future. Sun lists five propositions from Confucianism that could improve sustainable economic growth and development in the future: (1) that righteousness (yi 義) be regarded as prior to profit, and ethical value as prior to economic value; (2) that people should exercise self-control and personal restraint; (3) that people hold some things, such as the integrity of the social order in traditional society, in awe; (4) that politicians be positive role models; and (5) that business operations incorporate ethics. Sun emphasizes that the sustainability of business operations and the economic future of humanity depends on the implementation of business ethics, especially as defined by the core values

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of Confucian ethics: benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, and trust. He sees this path as the best to achieve social harmony and economic progress.

13.

Epilogue: Questions, Comments, and Reflections

The final chapter opens critical dialogue about the anthology as a whole and the perspectives it presents. This chapter presents the views of a respected senior scholar, Jörn Rüsen, whose research has focused not on Confucianism as such but rather intercultural comparative history and worldviews. Rüsen’s take on the essays is thus from outside the box and so presents somewhat unique insights into the whole. At the risk of oversimplification, he sees the essays as being too narrowly focused on Confucianism and too given to seeing differences between Confucian thinking and that of the West. Rüsen suggests that a more intercultural and comparative approach would have been more stimulating and fitting of the subject as it addresses the challenges of the twenty-first century and beyond. Yet as they stand, in Rüsen’s view, the essays suggest that the apparent contrasts between “moral commitment [Confucianism] against rationalism [the West], humanism against rationalism, tradition against progress” approximate the difference between pre-modern and modern thinking. This contrastive approach, Rüsen observes, “liberates the Chinese culture from the burden of modernity” and strips away “its capacity to contribute to the intellectual discourses of the last centuries … [leaving it] fenced in a romantic counterimage to modernity still cultivating the values of the world we have lost in the process of modernization.” Responding to Rüsen’s thoughts, the editors of this volume affirm that while the essays do indeed focus primarily on Confucianism, the intent is none other than that which Rüsen sees as ideal: they are meant to serve as a ladder of sorts taking humanity to a higher, more inclusive level of discourse about modernity and the problems facing it than has typically been characteristic of intellectual discussions about the future of mankind. Moreover, the Confucian traditions examined herein are not viewed, at least not by the authors themselves, as antithetical to modernity as such, ancient though they may be. Instead, Confucian traditions are affirmed as vital, resilient, and inherently relevant to the sociopolitical, economic, and environmental problems that continue to plague modernity as it moves further into the twenty-first century. Rather than opposed to progress and positive change, Confucian traditions as examined herein seek to facilitate those avenues to a more equitable future humanity and its relationship to the global biosphere integral to our well-being. Instead of being simply contrastive and oppositional, the essays herein seek to unify moral commitment and objective rationality, humanism and rationalism, and tradition and progress in

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recognition of the very organic nature of humanity and to best ensure its prospects for global peace, prosperity, and brother-and-sisterhood.

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Roger T. Ames

The Confucian Philosophy of Family Feeling as a Resource for a New Geopolitical Order

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6.

7.

The Argument The seismic sea change in the geopolitical order of the world that has accelerated over the first two decades of the twenty-first century requires nothing less than the reformulation of a new geopolitical order. The zero-sum Westphalian model of a modern state system with sovereign and equal nation states each playing to win has proven woefully inadequate to resolving the complex human predicament of our time. Applying the method of radical empiricism embraced by both Deweyan and Confucian pragmatisms provides a starting point for challenging the old ontological language of individual sovereign states and for reconceiving internationalism in organic, ecological terms as an intra-nationalism: the world organism as a vital and living inside without an outside. Dewey’s internationalism locates the nation state as a second-order abstraction within a world political ecology that can best be expressed in the holographic language of focus and field. The Confucian conception of global order captured in the expression “tianxia” intersects with Dewey’s internationalism, providing an alternative holistic method for promoting intra-nationalism that begins from the isomorphism of family, state, and world grounded in a regimen of personal cultivation. The perceived isomorphism among family, state, and world in Confucian philosophy gives rise to an alternative conception of the political in which governance is firmly rooted in personal cultivation within the institution of family. The ruler in serving as a role model for the shared values of the community together with the people in investing themselves heavily in achieving propriety in their family roles, function symbiotically in what we might call a Confucian “role politics.”

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8.

In looking to Confucian philosophy as a possible resource for a new geopolitical order, we begin by joining Michael Walzer in common cause in his search for a universal minimalist morality that can provide a limited but important solidarity among the world’s peoples and cultures. 9. Applying the pragmatic method to “justice” in search of specifically experienced meanings, we discover that justice as an ideal or principle has been a red herring that obscures the sense of fairness persons derive practically and incrementally from those bedrock feelings Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” 10. The prime moral imperative in the Confucian philosophy is “family reverence” (xiao 孝) that serves the tradition as the vehicle for the intergenerational transmission of the living, embodied culture. Its values of relational equity and an achieved diversity are rooted in personal cultivation within the institution of family. 11. Confucian morality is holistic, and true to its radical empiricism, rather than choosing impartiality over partiality in formulating its moral imperatives, it is inclusive of both. 12. An argument is made from the continuing narrative of Confucian philosophy that family feeling can serve as a universal minimalist morality in our search for a new world geopolitical order. And the question that arises is, given that the majority of the world’s population ground their values in family feeling rather than individual alternative, what would be the alternative?

II.

The Problem

Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the rise of East Asia and of China in particular has occasioned a seismic sea change in the economic and political order of the world. Given the differential effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on global business and trade, and in spite of the heavy American investment in making it otherwise, it is now estimated that China will become the world’s largest economy by 2028.1 This newly emerging geopolitical order is challenging the modern system of sovereign and equal nation states ushered in by the Westphalian Treaty more than three and a half centuries ago. Such a zerosum system of single international actors each playing to win has produced and continues to produce a culture of international anarchism in which each state is out for itself. This Westphalian model can be read as a scaled-up version of liberal 1 Indicative of this effort of the US to contain China is the US Senate’s bipartisan $250 billion United States Innovation and Competition Act designed specifically to counter China’s growing military and economic prowess.

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individualism replicating its defining values of individual autonomy and simple equality. This zero-sum game of winners and losers at an international level has proven to be wholly ineffective in addressing the pressing issues of our times: global warming, pandemics, environmental degradation, income inequities, food and water shortages, massive species extinction, proxy wars, global hunger, and so on. The issues defining this human predicament are themselves organically interrelated, and unless they are addressed in a wholesale manner, there can be no effective resolution. Traversing any and all national, ethnic, and religious boundaries, this perfect storm can only be engaged and weathered effectively by a global village working collaboratively for the good of the world community as a whole.

III.

A Method: Radical Empiricism

In searching for a starting point for thinking through and formulating a geopolitical framework that can meet the challenge of this ominous and accelerating human predicament, we might appeal to John Dewey’s postulate of immediate empiricism. As a philosophical method, Dewey’s radical empiricism requires that since all human problems arise within the “hadness” of immediate experience, their resolution must be sought through theorizing this same experience in our best effort to make its outcomes more productive and intelligent. In formulating this method, Dewey begins by asserting that … if you wish to find out what subjective, objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, activity, evil, being, quality — any philosophic term, in short — means, go to experience and see what the thing is experienced as.2

Dewey argues that all philosophical terms must be understood as the “thats” of specifically experienced meanings. Rather than beginning with abstract philosophical concepts, Dewey’s method provides us with a way of ascertaining what our terms of art actually mean.

2 John Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey (1899–1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston, 15 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 3:165.

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IV.

Confucian Philosophy as a Pragmatic Method

According to the classical pragmatists, pragmatism is a method rather than any specific philosophical doctrine. William James, for example, argues that … a pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.

And as James continues: the idea of pragmatism so described “does not stand for any special results. It is a method only.”3 We might observe that classical Confucian philosophy intersects with Deweyan pragmatism’s radical empiricism as a method of philosophical reflection in beginning from the wholeness and “hadness” of experience. In the Confucian case, experience is expressed as dao 道, or “everything that is taking place,” and the goal is not simply to “know” our way around this experience in a cognitive sense, but to “realize” the experience in the sense of making its best outcomes “real.” Again, as corollaries to this empiricist method, both pragmatism and Confucianism are aestheticisms, engaging experience holistically and inclusively. Both are perfectionist in seeing personal cultivation (Dewey’s “individuality” and the Confucian ren 仁) as the meliorative source of enhanced meaning and value, collapsing morality and education into moral education as nothing more than deliberate growth in relations. Both Deweyan pragmatism and Confucianism as ways of thinking are naturalisms in eschewing “supernatural” speculation. Hence, both offer a human-centered rather than a God-centered religiousness. And neither tradition will countenance any form of dualism such as mind/body, subject/object, self/other, reality/appearance, and so on, that would offend against the wholeness of experience. Confucius in developing his insights around the most basic and enduring practices within ordinary human experience — that is, personal cultivation in family and communal roles, family reverence, deference to others, propriety achieved in our roles and relations, friendship, a cultivated sense of shame, moral education, a communicating community, a family-centered religiousness, the intergeneration transmission of culture, and so on — has guaranteed the continuing relevance of this accumulating wisdom. In addition to being focused on such perennial human issues, one further “pragmatic” characteristic of Confucian philosophy certainly present in the words of Confucius himself, and that

3 The Works of William James, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, 19 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 1:31.

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has made his teachings so resilient in this living tradition, is the porousness and adaptability of his philosophy. His enduring contribution was simply to strive to take full ownership of the cultural legacy available during his time and place, to adapt this compounding wisdom from the past for the betterment of his own present historical moment, and then to recommend to future generations that they continue to do the same.4

V.

Dewey’s Internationalism and a New Geopolitical Order

If we apply this method of immediate empiricism to the language at play in the modern state system, we must allow that just as we have no experience of deracinated persons conceived of as autonomous and equal individuals, likewise the concept of independent sovereign and equal nation states is itself a fiction of the first order. Everything physically, intellectually, culturally is done in association. Nobody and nothing does anything by itself. As Dewey has famously remarked, “No man and no mind was ever emancipated merely by being left alone.”5 More fundamental than discrete individuals are the vital and always unique patterns of relations that collaborate to provide such very different persons with their focal identities within the social whole. We actually experience persons as matrices of interdependent roles and relations within a shared social organism, where each person embodies and reflects the entire organism from their own particular perspective. Indeed, the erstwhile discreteness of autonomous and equal individuals is nothing more than a retrospective and then habituated mental abstraction made from their living narratives. And the same observation can be made for the concept of sovereign and equal nation states. In his essay, “The Emancipation of the International Spirit,” Dewey insists that the complex geopolitical system must be understood in terms of what are fundamentally organic relations, with the sovereign nation state being only a second order abstraction from what is in fact an ecology of irreducibly interdependent practices: While economic forces have brought about the present world internationalism, the results extend far beyond industry and commerce. They extend beyond the political area, whether diplomatic or military. It is a commonplace that the discoveries of science and the fruitions of art now quickly become the possession of the whole world, and that 4 All translations unless otherwise noted are by the author. Analects 7:1: 子曰：「述而不作，信 而好古，竊比於我老彭。」The Master said, “Following the proper way, I do not forge new paths; with confidence I cherish the ancients — in these respects I am comparable to Old Peng.” 5 John Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey (1925–53), edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 17 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 2:340.

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the nations are sharers in a noble emulation…. It is matter of utilizing for good the economic interdependence of the peoples who inhabit the earth, and of making it possible for an international mind to function effectively in the control of the world’s practical affairs.6

Our penchant in politics for giving primacy to national sovereignty is anathema to, and is belied by, the growth in “trans-national interests” that require us to think internationally instead. Clearly, opines Dewey … the weal and woe of any modern state is bound up with that of others. Weakness, disorder, false principles on the part of any state are not confined within its boundaries. They spread and infect other states. The same is true of economic, artistic and scientific advances. Moreover the voluntary associations just spoken of do not coincide with political boundaries. Associations of mathematicians, chemists, astronomers; business corporations, labor organizations, churches are trans-national because the interests they represent are worldwide.7

Dewey’s “internationalism” gives rise to what we might describe as an organic, ecological doctrine of intra-national rather than inter-national relations. We commonly use the prefix “inter-” to suggest a joint, external and open relationship that conjoins two or more separate, and in some sense comparable, entities. For example, we use our “personal” computers to access the “internet” (“inter” + “network”) and to get onto “the web,” where the internet is the conjoining of a matrix of independent nodes each with its own secured integrity. By way of contrast, “intra-” meaning “on the inside,” “within,” references internal and constitutive relations contained within a given entity itself. “Intra-” has the immediate organic, ecological implications of a vital inside without an outside.

VI.

The Intra-nationalism of Confucian tianxia 天下 and a New Geopolitical Order

The idea of tianxia 天下 — conventionally translated as “all-under-Heaven” — is a familiar term in everyday Chinese parlance that simply means “the world.” But tianxia is also a geopolitical term found throughout the ancient canonical literature that has a deeper philosophical and historical meaning. Over the past few decades, the significance of this technical term as a possible Chinese framework for thinking about a new and evolving world order and a new model of world governance has, primarily in the Chinese literature, been a subject of much debate.

6 Dewey, Later Works, 3:349–350. 7 Dewey, Middle Works, 12:197.

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Although the understandings of tianxia are many, within the Chinese process cosmology, these interpretations generally begin from an ecological understanding of intra-national relations that acknowledges the mutuality and interdependence of all economic and political activity. The prominent contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽, for example, has captured this vision of a “vital inside without an outside” in his concept wuwai (無外): “no outside.”8 This notion of “no outside” is important because it obviates the familiar charge made against Zhao’s theory that because he uses the Chinese term tianxia rather than “global order,” and because he appeals to an event in early Zhou dynasty China as his example, he is advocating for a Chinese hegemony rather than a new geopolitical order. Tianxia as “taking the world as the world” assumes the primacy of vital relationality, thus relegating the nation state as a discrete, sovereign entity, to the status of a second-order abstraction from the unbounded organic relations that constitute it. When applied to the relations that obtain among nation states, intra-national relations within the organic global whole references a radical contextuality that might be characterized in Confucian language as the inseparability of the many focal aspects within their holographic fields (yiduobufen 一多不分). It describes a manifold of unique nation states within the political organism, China only being one among them, each construing the intra-national order from its own particular perspective. The one is many, the many one. The dynamic of this global ecology then is the emergence of an always provisional and resolutely unsummed totality of all orders. Said another way, absent in this model is any single, privileged, and dominant order that would override its others. This same continuing reformist dynamic is captured in the basic Confucian cosmological postulate of the inseparability of “forming and functioning” (tiyong 體用). The identity of each focal, holographic state emerges from its unique pattern of relations within the vital functioning of the world organism, and the living global ecology itself is the holistic and inclusive aesthetic order (rather than a reductionistic, rationalized order) engendered by the mutual accommodation of these unique focal states as this unbounded ecology is construed from the alternative perspective of each state. Where did China as an ecological tianxia world order come from? This is a question that over the past few decades has absorbed the thoughts of many of China’s best historians, and one that has also been engaged by philosophers such as Zhao Tingyang. Zhao, keenly aware of the persistent and pernicious asymmetry in the prevailing way we have gone about theorizing China according to Western concepts and categories, has tasked both Chinese and Western scholars 8 Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽, 天下的當代性：世界秩序的實踐與想象 (A Possible World of Allunder-heaven System: The World Order in the Past and for the Future) (Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2016), 75–79.

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alike to “rethink China” (chongsi zhongguo重思中國).9 “Rethinking China” thus conceived is relational: for those outside, it is “thinking with China” by trying to take China on its own terms. And for China itself, it is “thinking with the world community,” thereby trying to accommodate the world’s many different perspectives. Taking on this revisionist task himself, Zhao provides a profoundly original philosophical interpretation of China’s story that has real relevance beyond the Chinese narrative itself. Indeed, Zhao’s declared motivation in formulating his tianxia theory is that it be for the benefit of a contemporary world community in search of a new geopolitical order. Zhao asks: When the Central Plain (Zhongyuan 中原) was perceived by its inhabitants as the center of the world, what were the causes, the forces, and the destiny that coalesced across four millennia to sustain the vital and generative unity of China as a state, as a civilization, and as a history? In telling this story, Zhao is advancing a novel and compelling thesis on not only how we should understand China, but also how until recently, China has understood itself. Zhao introduces what he terms a distinctively Chinese centripetal “whirlpool” model of world order on the Central Plain of China to interpret the historical progression of tianxia identity construction. This process of identity formation was driven over time by a series of interrelated “cultural attractors” with perhaps the most significant among them being the Chinese written character. This writing system as a political and spiritual attractor includes by extension the canonical texts it has engendered that perpetuate a shared cultural identity and the political theology that is integral to it. These attractors from earliest times have drawn the many disparate populations on the Central Plain of China and the expanding circle of its surrounding territories into a political and cultural whirlpool. This vortex was already taking shape more than three thousand years ago during the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties, and from then continued in protean form down to the fall of the Qing dynasty little more than a century ago. The expansion of China was due not merely to the interchange among the disparate civilizations or to the lure of expansionist behaviour in the form of military conquest. Rather China’s growth was the result of the fusion over time of the distinctive contributions of the many contenders for political control as they were constantly being pulled into the swirls and eddies of the whirlpool. Zhao argues that being drawn into this whirlpool of growth and amalgamation, the peoples surrounding the plains on all four sides sought to win the greatest material benefits and greatest spiritual resources by shaping their ways of thinking and living around the evolving core spiritual culture of the Central Plain. This tianxia vision of world order was able to transform the fierce currents 9 Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽, 天下體系：世界制度哲學導論 (The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institution) (Beijing: People’s University Press, 2011), 1.

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of contention within the whirlpool itself into a shared identity that brought a significant degree of unity to the disparate cultures and peoples with their many different ways of living, and forms of governance. The values that governed this “worlding” process within the political organism were relational equity that respects the differences among the disparate cultures, and an achieved diversity that arose out of activating these differences in service to a shared well-being. In asking the question, “Whence China?” Zhao begins from an ontological answer that he draws from the first among the Chinese philosophical classics, the Yijing 易經or Book of Changes. A basic issue engaged by Zhao is how the ontology of “becoming” and the vital eddies within the whirlpool became the methodology of China’s evolution. The underlying explanation for existence itself is the unceasing process of procreation, of generation and regeneration.10 As the Book of Changes announces: “The greatest capacity of the cosmos is the production of life itself.”11 Importantly Zhao’s question is not “What is China?” which would suggest an analytical search for some necessary, essential, and defining element that rationalizes this geographical and political entity. Instead, Zhao suggests China as tianxia in its original formulation is an unbounded process of growth in world order that prompts us to think of global geopolitical order as a “how” rather than a “what.” For Zhao, tianxia so conceived is not a place, but a “taking place” — a world-making out of a centripetal whirlpool that over time has seized upon the mere “variety” of the constellations formed by many different cultures, and on the basis of their vital, ecological interdependence, has transformed them into a shared syncretic “diversity.” It is only as the differences that obtain among the many peoples have been activated to make a difference for each other that such a rich diversity has been achieved. Zhao, in reflecting on the emergence of this shared cultural and spiritual identity called China, dismisses the anachronistic language of the modern, particularly Western academy — terms such as the nation-state, nationalism, dynastic succession, and empire. Instead, he follows earlier philosophers such as Li Zehou 李 澤厚 in asserting that in the most ancient times an intimate relationship between shamanism, political leadership, and the evolving historical record produced the continuing awareness and spirituality integral to an evolving Chinese tianxia.

10 生生不已。 11 天地之大德曰生。

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VII.

An Isomorphism among the Familial, Political, and Global Orders

From its origins in the prehistoric past, an ever-evolving Chinese culture has been unique among the world’s civilizations, both in terms of its unbroken continuity, and in the rich and varied institutional, material, and conceptual artifacts its peoples have produced. Upon entering into China’s past, certain major themes emerge as they are repeatedly expressed in different facets of Chinese life. One of these themes is the centrality of the family that has thoroughly permeated the socio-political, economic, metaphysical, moral, and religious dimensions of Chinese history since at least the early Neolithic period. A fair argument can be made that all relationships within a Chinese world — social, political, and indeed cosmic relations — are conceived of as familial. Physical evidence of ancestral sacrifices has been found in archaeological remains from as early as the fifth millennium BCE. It should therefore come as no surprise that family reverence (xiao 孝) was one of the most basic and defining values of the Chinese people promoted from earliest times by Confucian philosophers. Indeed, one may even go so far as to say that for them, filial reverence was a necessary condition for developing any of the other human qualities of excellence. In the Confucian tradition, human morality and the personal realization it inspires is grounded in the cultivation of family feeling. Zhao Tingyang reflects on how first setting the root, and then on that basis, pursuing growth is the beginning and the projected end in the Confucian way of becoming consummately human: The primary issue for the human way is that of generation and regeneration, and the first step herein is growth. This is the starting point for the evolutionary thread of Chinese thought. The “doing” of growth must seek what a thing relies upon to be “deeply rooted and firmly planted” in its growth. Therefore, growth first of all requires putting down roots. The two metaphors of growth and putting down roots set out the path for Chinese thought.12

In the Confucian project of personal growth, the root must be set and firmly planted within the family itself. In reflecting on Confucian philosophy as a resource for an ecological geopolitical order, we must give full weight to the perceived isomorphism that obtains among the familial, political, and global orders (with the second two being simulacra of the first) as they are rooted in and 12 Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽, 惠此中國 (The Making and Becoming of China: Its Way of Historicity) (Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2016), 148–149: 人道问题首先正是“生生,” 而 “生生”的第 一步便是生长， 这正是中国思想演化线索的始发点。 生长之事， 必求生长之物 “深根 固柢”而使存在获得生长的依据，因此生长首先要扎根。 “生长”和“扎根”这两个隐喻表 示了中国思想的行径。

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emerge from a regimen of personal cultivation within the family. In Expansive Learning (Daxue 大學) as the first among the canonical Four Books that sets the Confucian project, we read: The ancients who sought to display their brilliant virtuosity to the whole world first effected proper order in their states; in seeking to effect proper order in their states, they first set their families right; in seeking to set their families right, they first cultivated their own persons…. From the emperor down to the common folk, everything is rooted in personal cultivation.13

This same organic symbiosis is described in a second of the Four Books, the Mencius: There is a popular adage heard among the people who all say: “The world, the state, the family.” The world is rooted in the state, the state in the family, and the family in one’s own person.14

The idea that the root of governance lies in the institution of family is stated explicitly in the Book of Documents as one of the Five Classics. Confucius is making an astute observation when he asserts that within this cultural tradition, the proper functioning of the institution of family is integral to the production of the sociopolitical order: Someone asked Confucius, “Why are you not employed in government?” The Master replied, “The Book of Documents says: ‘It all lies in family reverence. Being filial to your parents and finding fraternity with your brothers is in fact carrying out the work of governing.’ In doing these things I am participating in governing. Why must I be employed in government?”15

From earliest times, “family reverence” has served the Confucian tradition as its prime moral imperative. Morality as it is cultivated through the commitment to “consummate conduct in one’s roles and relations” (ren 仁) is thus an extension and expression of immediate family feeling. In the Analects we read: Exemplary persons concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having been properly set, the vision of the moral life will grow therefrom. As for family reverence and fraternal deference, they are I suspect, the root of consummate conduct (ren 仁).16

In this Confucian process of world-making, persons are imbricated as unique, relationally-constituted perspectives within family, polity, and cosmos. Through 13 Expansive Learning (Daxue 大學): 古之欲明明德於天下者先治其國；欲治其國者先齊其 家；欲齊其家者先脩其身 … 自天子以至於庶人，壹是皆以脩身為本。 14 Mencius 孟子4A5: 人有恆言，皆曰『天下國家』。天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本 在身。 15 Analects 2:21: 或謂孔子曰：「子奚不為政？」子曰：「《書》云：『孝乎惟孝、友于兄 弟，施於有政。』是亦為政，奚其為為政？」 16 Analects 1:2: 君子务本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其为仁之本与。

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dedication to the cultivation of deliberate growth in their own relations, every person has the capacity for bringing resolution and more distinctive, meaningful focus to the roles and relations that constitute them. At the center of this personal project, the meaning of the family is implicated in and dependent upon the productive cultivation of each of its members. Then by radial extension, the meaning of the community, polity, and the entire cosmos is in turn implicated in and ultimately derived from the cultivation of each person as a family member. To clarify this organic, ecological root metaphor, while allowing that all levels of order are ultimately derived from personal cultivation, we must avoid the inveterate habit of separating root as cause from the order as effect. Rather, root and canopy grow together symbiotically, with the tree spreading its roots outward beneath the earth and simultaneously stretching its branches upward towards the sky. While the root is certainly growing the tree, the tree is also in turn growing its roots. The root and its flourishing canopy are aspects of an interactive and organic whole that grow together symbiotically, or not at all. Importantly, while existential narratives themselves are certainly rooted in the lived lives of particular persons in particular families, they are also the unbounded and interpenetrating stories that in sum constitute their natural, social, and cultural ecologies. The isomorphism means that order at every level is inflected symbiotically in every other, where personal cultivation expands the meaning of the cosmos, and a more meaningful cosmos in turn provides an important resource for personal cultivation. In an essay entitled “Chinese National Sentiment,” Dewey expresses a familiar historical characterization of the Chinese population as being politically apathetic. He opines that … the central factor in the Chinese historic political psychology is its profound indifference to everything that we associate with the state, with government…. If the people were indifferent to government, the government, which in our western terminology we have to call the state, reciprocated…. Except for a few purposes well understood by custom, the central government was irrelevant to the life of the people.17

But rather than interpreting Chinese indifference to the state as a general political apathy, perhaps we need to ask whether the isomorphism defining the familial, political, and cosmic orders in the Confucian tradition does not in fact engender a different conception of the political in which family itself is seen as integral to and inseparable from social, political, and global governance. Dewey himself quite astutely understands that in this very different world of China, governance itself has a different point of reference. Rather than delimiting the political to the instruments and institutions of state, Dewey discerns that 17 Dewey, Middle Works, 11:216–218.

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… the actual government of China was a system of nicely calculated personal and group pressures and pulls, exactions and “squeezes,” neatly balanced against one another, of assertions and yieldings, of experiments to see how far a certain demand could be forced, and of yielding when the exorbitance of the demand called out an equal counterpressure…. Their social calculus, integral and differential, exceeded anything elsewhere in existence. This fact, and this fact only, accounts for the endurance of China for almost four thousand years of recorded history.18

While Dewey would make much of the transformation of associated living into the Great Community, the Confucian tradition would argue that Dewey’s Great Community can only be achieved by anchoring communal flourishing in the Great Family.

VIII. The Confucian Conception of the Political What then are the implications of this perceived isomorphism between family, state, and world for Confucianism’s conception of the proper functioning of governance at the local, state, and global orders? In the Analects, Confucius in speaking to the role of the ruler provides a classic statement of his conception of the political as what we might call a kind of Confucian “role politics”: The Master said: “Lead the people with administrative injunctions and keep them orderly with penal law, and they will avoid punishments but will not develop a sense of shame. Lead them with moral virtuosity (de) and keep them orderly through aspiring to propriety in their roles and relations (li), and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.”19

Confucius draws a contrast here between the quality of rule achieved by invoking laws and policies on the one hand, and that attained through education and moral suasion on the other. In the first instance, the people can be made orderly through coercive measures, but do not in this process of external imposition develop the sense of shame that would reflect their own personal commitment to the shared values of the community. Such a model of governance is unilateral in separating the ruler from the ruled, and is made tenuous and at best interim by the fact that it is externally imposed without internal confirmation by the people. Although the practical Confucius would certainly allow that laws are necessary as second order injunctions, for him the most effective way for the ruler to promote order in the community is through moral education. Such education takes the form of the ruler serving the people as a role model by demonstrating the 18 Dewey, Middle Works, 11:219–220. 19 Analects 2:3 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且 格。」

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community’s highest values in his own personal conduct, and purposively endorsing and promoting a sustained propriety in the family-based roles and relations of the people. When the people are thus inspired by the ruler both in conduct and exhortation to embody these family and communal values, their moral transformation brings with it a cultivated sense of shame the consequence of which is the people become self-ordering. And with this transformative moral education, the rulers need only reign over the people without having to impose their will upon them: The Master said, “How majestic they were, Yao and Shun, who reigned over the world but did not rule it.”20

Social and political order originates with and is sustained by the people investing themselves heavily in their own family-based roles without any compulsion required from outside. The Master said: “The Yi and Di barbarian tribes with rulers are not as viable as the various Chinese states without them.”21

Confucian “role politics” then is the symbiotic outcome of the ruler serving as a role model for the shared values of the community, and the people in their family and communal roles achieving a quality of propriety that sustains the social and political order. Reflecting back on the evolution of the state and China’s long story in particular, Dewey points out that the expectation in Chinese society historically has been that the regulative social and political order of the day is family-based, and comes largely from within rather than from above: For long periods of human history, especially in the Orient, the state is hardly more than a shadow thrown upon the family and neighborhood by remote personages, swollen to gigantic form by religious beliefs. It rules but does not regulate; for its rule is confined to receipt of tribute and ceremonial deference. Duties are within the family; property is possessed by the family.22

Characterizing this traditional Confucian model of local self-governance as it has continued through history, Dewey observes that … such a social system implies a high state of civilization. It produces civilized persons almost automatically. For the essence of civility, or of civilization, is the ability to live consciously along with others, aware of their expectations, demands and rights, of the pressure they can put upon one, while also conscious of just how far one can go in response in exerting pressure upon others.23 20 21 22 23

Analects 8:18: 子曰：「巍巍乎！舜禹之有天下也，而不與焉。」 Analects 3:5: 子曰：「夷狄之有君，不如諸夏之亡也。」 Dewey, Later Works, 2:261–262. Dewey, Middle Works, 11:219–220.

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The Search for a Minimalist Morality as the Basis for Universal Human Solidarity

Above I have argued that in the Confucian tradition there is a perceived isomorphism among family, state, and world in which the family itself has a key role in governance and thus gives rise to an alternative concept of the political. Michael Walzer in his Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad wants “to endorse the politics of difference and, at the same time, to describe and defend a certain sort of universalism.”24 I want to endorse Walzer’s claim that “there are the makings of a thin and universalist morality inside every thick and particularist morality.”25 Again, Walzer insists that “minimalist meanings are embedded in the maximal morality, expressed in the same idiom, sharing the same (historical/cultural/religious/political) orientation.”26 He makes a good argument that moral minimalism in the formulation of all thick moralities is not foundational as “a common idea or principle or set of ideas and principles” that would make it the same in every case.27 Nor is it some commonality at the end point of cultural differences. It cannot be reduced to generalizable procedures or generative rules of engagement. And as for the substance of thin morality, for Walzer such minimalism does not mean minor or emotionally shallow morality; on the contrary, thin and intensity come together as “morality close to the bone.”28 And what Walzer wants from this minimalism is nothing less than “a certain limited, though important and heartening, solidarity”29 that can bring the people of the world together. All good. But I want to follow the pragmatic method in asking after the “thatness” of morality as a specifically experienced meaning in order to save the inquiry from what I would call the sins of a reductionistic and exclusionary objectivism. Where I depart from Walzer is in his eliding the distinction between a minimalist morality and justice. Invoking the latter has led philosophers to seemingly endless attempts to formulate some abstract “principle,” “theory” or “idea” of justice that deflects the discussion away from its proper focus on immediate experience. As Robert Solomon argues, “… there is no coherent ideal of justice. Justice claims are always contextual and presuppose a local set of

24 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), x. 25 Walzer, Thick and Thin, xi. 26 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 3. 27 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 4. 28 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 4–15. 29 Walzer, Thick and Thin, 11.

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conditions and considerations.”30 For Solomon, the irreducibly contextual nature of morality and moral development arises from the fact that human beings are irreducibly social in our native instincts. He would insist that … what is natural in us is our sense of being-with-others, not just in affection and dependency but in that our sense of ourselves and our interests is, from start to finish, tied up with other people. What is natural in us, I want to argue, is neither self-interest nor global benevolence but reciprocity.31

I want to follow Solomon in abandoning any appeal to justice itself and focus on our sense of (not belief about) moral outrage, indignation, and the feelings that come with them when we encounter situations we deem immoral, and bring in Elizabeth Wolgast’s insistence that it all starts with family. Wolgast applies a Wittgensteinian understanding of the grammar of concepts such as justice as “forms of life” to argue that the emotional responses we have to immorality are themselves bedrock in their meaning and in need of no further explanation. As Wolgast insists, … we learn morality and the moral vocabulary together, and come to have a sense of injustice at the same time… [W]e not only learn behavior and meanings together but learn them very young.32

Not only is it that language “meshes with life,” but in Wolgast’s work she underscores the necessary and symbiotic roles of both parents and child within the family in cultivating their moral competence together through a shared sense of shame: The connection of a young child with her parents is not simply between an authority and an underling; it is a complicated, reciprocal relation in which the child’s behavior reflects back on the parent both as parent and person, and the parent’s example, both in expression and in action, serves as a pattern for the child. Morally speaking, you might say that they are mutually dependent and symbiotic, even though the child is in other ways dependent and immature.33

In highlighting the parent-child reciprocity in cultivating their moral agency, Wolgast explains what she takes to be Aristotle’s curious remark that only virtuous persons brought up in good habits are competent to discuss ethics, a remark perhaps made less curious because Confucius says the same thing.34 For 30 Robert C. Solomon, A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1990), 18. 31 Solomon, A Passion for Justice, 104. 32 Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Grammar of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 212. 33 Wolgast, The Grammar of Justice, 201. 34 “Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge…. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits.” Aristotle, The

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Solomon and Wolgast, we develop our sense of what is moral not from the application of some ideal, but practically and incrementally from earliest childhood in our families in the feelings we share as we respond to perceived instances of immorality. The growth of moral meaning and behavior takes place locally in the ecologies of family and community.

X.

The Familial Roots of the Ecology Language

The term “ecology” was coined by the German zoologist, Ernst Haeckel, in 1866 to describe the “economies” of living forms. The etymology of “ecology” is eco from the Gk. oikos meaning “household, habitat,” and logia meaning “the study of.” More generally, ecology means our best efforts to understand the vital, interdependent relations that obtain among organisms within their environments. Given the primacy of relationality in this alternative, eventful way of thinking about ostensive “things,” I and my several collaborators have over time introduced a holographic, “focus-field” language as a way of giving expression to such an “eventful” world as well as of distinguishing it clearly from our default ontological “thing” and “part-whole” way of thinking. The etymology of “focus” is L. focus meaning “hearth, fireplace” (figuratively, “home, family”) as the area or point of convergence that can be resolved into a clear image and thus be seen distinctly. Such a focus thus made “familiar” is the nucleus around which life in the home has traditionally taken place. And “field” is another term that, like focus, has a domestic, agrarian reference as the land that is farmed and grazed, and that supplies the family with the provisions to be prepared at the fireplace. From this core idea of hearth and home, focus has come to mean the “locus of divergence and convergence” of persons as organisms within a “field” environment — that is, the distinctive, continuing identity of a particular family that emerges from what members carry off from the home, and what they are able bring back to it. In applying this ecological way of thinking, we have to be self-consciously aware of our own ontology-informed commonsense that defaults to construing the furniture of the world as self-sufficient “things” rather than as interpenetrating events. A limitation of our own application of this holographic, focus-field language then is that it seems insufficiently dynamic to capture the process of ceaseless change and growth that attends the eventful lives of organComplete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1094b–1095b. See Analects 4:3: 子曰：「唯 仁者能好人，能惡人。」The Master said, “It is the consummate person (ren) alone who has the wherewithal to properly discriminate in cherishing some people while despising others.”

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isms always evolving and transforming in their environments. And again, in making use of the organic metaphor, we have to absolve it of its heavily freighted teleological assumptions as it is rooted in classical Greek ontology. On the other hand, this holographic focus-field language is particularly felicitous in explaining Confucian values where family is the governing cultural metaphor, and the notion of “family reverence” (xiao 孝) is the prime moral imperative. These terms that constitute the language of ecology become normative in taking the discussion back to an achieved resolution and propriety in the flourishing of family roles and relations.

XI.

Family Feeling in Confucian Philosophy as a Minimalist Morality

Both Deweyan internationalism and the Confucian tianxia conception of world order begin from the assumption that just as our sense of what is moral is the product of organic growth, nation states too function within a world ecology. Above I have appealed to Zhao Tingyang’s centripetal whirlpool metaphor in telling the story of an evolving Chinese tianxia model of global order. If we begin from the fact that the population of China is almost twice that of a combined eastern and western Europe, we can appreciate the scale of the diversity that has been pursued over the millennia among so many disparate peoples, languages, ways of life, modes of governance, and so on. While this diversity is truly profound, there has been enough of a shared minimalist morality to hold it together as a continuous civilization and history for four thousand years and counting. Zhao argues the shared identity that has provided the “continuity in change” (biantong 變通) over time lies in the written Chinese character and the classics engendered from this writing system. But what for me is missing in Zhao’s story is an account of the minimalist morality not only as it has been made explicit in these canonical texts, but also as it has been practiced across the centuries.35 It is the cluster of terms surrounding “family reverence” (xiao 孝) as the prime moral imperative that has made family feeling not only the explanation of the Con-

35 Sor-hoon Tan in “Confucianism and Global Distributive Justice” has this same reservation about Zhao’s conception of tianxia: “Zhao’s tianxia theory is clearly normative in recommending a model to guide changes in international relations he defends as desirable, and in acknowledging the Zhou’s tianxia system as ‘an ideal political concept,’ Zhao eschews the ethical…. A theory of global justice based on his tianxia philosophy would be antithetical to the primacy of the ethical in Confucianism… (ms. p. 8).” See Tianxia in Comparative Perspectives: Alternative Models for a Possible Planetary Order, edited by Roger T. Ames, Sorhoon Tan, and Steven Y. H. Yang (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2023).

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fucian minimalist morality, but also the root and the substance of the living Confucian social, political, and global order. The contemporary New Confucian scholar, Qian Mu 錢穆, insists that the family-based ritualized roles and relationships (li 禮) are a deep cultural identity to be distinguished fundamentally from the highly variable local customs (fengsu 風俗) that separate region from region in China. For Qian Mu, it is shared li rather than different customs that constitute the resilient and enduring fabric of Chinese culture: You might say that the jia (家), or “family,” is the place in Chinese culture where li is transmitted. But it is important to distinguish between jiating (家庭), “the family living group,” and jiazu (家族), the “family descent group.” It is through the jiazu that the standards of social relationships extend beyond the family to relatives. The descent group, which includes the relatives on both sides of the family, can only exist if the standards of li are applied. So, when the li are extended, a family descent group is made, and when they are further extended, a “people’s descent group,” or minzu (民族) is made. The Chinese are a minzu because the li set the standards in social relations for all of the people.36

Coordinated family “relations” (lun 倫) across generations then quite literally constitute the “fabric” (lun 綸) of the Chinese as a particular “people.” Using Qian Mu’s language, just as the “family living group” ( jiating 家庭), the “family descent group” ( jiazu 家族), and the “peoples’ descent group” (minzu 民族) are radial extensions synchronically and diachronically outward from the conduct of particular family members, it is the coherence in the conduct within these embodied roles and relations that constitutes the identity of the particular members themselves. Above we saw that the isomorphism among family, state, and world is rooted in a regimen of personal cultivation that begins from family roles and relations. Li itself is integral to this process of personal articulation — the growth and disclosure of an elegant disposition, an attitude, a posture, a signature style, and ultimately, a persistent and singular identity. Pursuing such refinement through the performance of li institutions and practices must be understood in light of the uniqueness of each participant engaged in the profoundly aesthetic project of becoming this exceptional and always inimitable person. Perhaps the best way of understanding the dynamics of “family reverence” (xiao 孝) as the prime moral imperative in the process of intergenerational transmission of the living cultural tradition is to appeal to the two cognate characters that speak to the physical, cultural, and narrative continuities within the enduring family lineage: that is, li 禮 as “embodied living” and ti 體 as “lived 36 Jerry Dennerline, Qian Mu and the World of Seven Mansions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 9.

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body.” The notion of li denotes a continuing, complex, and always novel pattern of invested institutions and significant behaviors that is embodied (ti), augmented, and reauthorized by succeeding generations as the persistent cultural authority that serves to unify the family lineages and clans ( jiazu 家族, shizu 氏 族) as a specific yet extended body of peoples (minzu 民族). A traditional cursive form of “lived body” (ti), and now the Chinese simplified graph and the standard Japanese character for body, is ti 体 with its 躰 and 骵 variants that all include the graph for “root” or “trunk” (ben 本). A first and hugely significant factor then, that we must consider in the construction of personal identity is the extent to which the very structure of our understanding and our practical habitude is “rooted” in and shaped by the fact of our embodied experience in its visceral connection to the world. In addition to being a determinate aspect of personal identity, our physicality is the site of the ongoing “embodying” (ti) processes of our always “discursive” bodies as they internalize our environments. Xiao quite literally describes and makes normative the lived roles and relationships that constitute the communities of elders and youth across successive generations, and the thick relations that obtain between the present generation and those generations that have gone before. It references the continuing process of physical and cultural embodiment from one generation to the next, and thus the inseparability of grandparents and grandchildren, of fathers and daughters, of progenitors and progeny, and how such familial roles can only be learned and lived together. These two terms li and ti are further informed by the qualitative dynamic “harmony” (he 和) we find pervasive in Confucian cosmology. While this term is conventionally translated simply as “harmony,” it is perhaps better understood holistically as the aspiration to optimize the creative possibilities of any particular situation — in the case of Confucian ethics, for example, the concerted effort to make the most of the roles as they are lived in family and community. Indeed, the centrality of family itself is best understood as a deliberate strategy for getting the most out of our intrapersonal relations. He as the commitment to make the most of any particular situation gives high value to what we might term an optimizing symbiosis that begins from and returns to family relations.

XII.

Deriving a Global Minimalist Morality from the Confucian Experience

In the Confucian tradition, the values of relational equity and an achieved diversity at the level of family, state, and world are corollaries to the primacy given to vital relationality, and stand as an alternative to the dominant liberal values of

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autonomy and simple equality. Equity takes the place of equality because it has room for the particularity that makes each person, family, and situation unique. And diversity does the work of autonomy in the sense that positive liberty is defined as each unique person participating fully in the life of the family, community, and nation state. Again, for this tradition the entry point for developing such moral competence is the institution of family and the family feeling that is natural to it. Thus, rather than equating morality with objective principles, Confucian philosophy is holistic in seeing an important role for both specific and more general considerations. That is, rather than invoking some transcendental moral standard or some faculty of impersonal reason as the single warrant for claiming impartiality — a strategy that is necessarily hobbled by the contingencies of always specific circumstances — the Confucian tradition develops an alternative understanding of impartiality and objectivity that is true to its commitment to holism. Even in the distinction made between subjective and objective perspectives, impartiality is served practically by extending one’s range of concern from the “master-eye view” (zhuguan 主觀) that might possibly be limited by some self-serving personal advantage (li 利) to the “guest-eye view” (keguan 客 觀) that in combination seek out what is most appropriate for all concerned (yi 義), including the interests of both the guest and the master. The point is that Confucian moral thinking is holistic. Equity for each unique person can only be respected and diversity among them achieved by giving full affordance to both partiality and impartiality rather than choosing between them.37 At the same time, these same values of equity and diversity extend beyond any narrowly conceived family or communal locus to guarantee the mutual implication and inseparability of ethical, economic, and ecological considerations, and offer an inclusive “intra-national” conception of the political as an alternative to the Westphalian notion of independent and equal sovereign states.

37 The spirit of the “capabilities approach” developed for the economics of welfare by Nobel Laurette Amartya Sen in the mid-1980’s shares this same concern that real justice must respect particularity. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

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XIII. Conclusion In Wang Chong 王充, the Han dynasty Confucian philosopher, there is a memorable passage: Sages take the whole world as their family without distinction between near or far, domestic or foreign. … In their undertakings the sages seek what is optimally appropriate. … The best and most sagacious would “family” the whole world.38

And we might look to Mencius who recommends precisely this strategy for effecting world moral order: Mencius said: “What people are able to do without learning anything are their ‘native capacities’; what they are able to realize without deliberation is their ‘native wisdom.’ There are no toddlers who are unaware that they love their parents, and as they grow up, there are none who are unaware of the respect that they have for their elders. Affection for parents is an expression of consummate conduct (ren); respecting elders is an expression of a sense of optimal appropriateness (yi). For no other reason than this, such values have to be encouraged throughout the world.”39

Can there be a holistic conception of the political without rooting it (zhagen 扎 根) and nurturing it (shengzhang 生长) in the most basic of human institutions, the family? What role does the institution of family have in producing the minimalist morality needed to secure a global commons? One recommendation for looking to family feeling as the minimalist morality needed to ground a new world geopolitical order might be the simple fact that the persistence of an inclusive, hybridic, and living Confucian culture over millennia is a fair demonstration of its effectiveness. And there are several insights to be found in the rather simple logic of Confucian family feeling. First, “morality,” deriving from “custom, mood, mode” (which we might associate immediately with dao 道 and de 德) is a continuing process that attends all human activity because given the various, always unique possibilities entailed by action, there is a need to act by choosing from among them what would be best. And selecting what is best and most meaningful in the situation is captured in the key Confucian philosophical term yi 義 that unsurprisingly means at once “what is most appropriate” and “what is most meaningful.” Morality in the sense of acting upon what is most appropriate — making the most of a situation — is the source of growth in meaning, and is thus ultimately the substance of intelligence itself.

38 聖人以天下為家，不別遠近，不殊內外… 聖人舉事求其宜適也…賢聖家天下。 （王 充論衡16.7–8） 39 Mencius 7A15: 孟子曰：「人之所不學而能者，其良能也；所不慮而知者，其良知也。 孩提之童無不知愛其親者，及其長也，無不知敬其兄也。親親、仁也，敬長、義也，無 他，達之天下也。」

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But why should we in our time follow the Confucian tianxia experience in its appeal to the institution of family as the source for a shared minimalist morality to serve as the basis for a changing geopolitical order? For most people, family is their highest value. There is perhaps nothing more familiar to everyone than family; after all, that is where the word “familiar” comes from. It has the potential of bringing all people together past the “us” and “them” binary. Basing a minimalist ethic on family feeling is thus inclusive in appealing to those initial conditions that are most broadly defining of the human experience. Even though families within thick moralities subscribe to different values and are certainly lived in importantly different ways, there is sufficient congruence at the thin level of family feeling to claim that this locus has the highest possibility of providing a common core morality for all of humankind. Family feeling satisfies the pragmatic requirement of beginning from specifically experienced meaning rather than concepts or theories, and also aligns with Walzer’s observation that thin morality and intensity come together as “morality close to the bone.” Loving others is a precondition for behaving morally — that is, for being appropriate and meaningful (yi) in one’s actions. And one can only learn to love others by being loved oneself — such intimacy is the only way. Proper family relations in infancy are an essential ground for socializing persons and integrating them into the community. Simply put, familial nurturance is not optional in the process of becoming moral. And given the bedrock nature of family feeling, it is in need of no further theorizing or persuasion. Its underdeterminacy allows family feeling to function analogically rather than essentially or categorically, getting us past many other distinctions that would divide us. Family is the schoolroom for our most basic values such as justice, where a just society cannot exist while injustice obtains within the family. At the same time, lived roles in families and their attendant values provide a concrete standard for determining what to do next and make moral judgments more effective than abstract principles such as justice and truth. “Because he is my brother” is a powerful argument that does not need to be theorized. Further, since everyone has a family, family reverence provides us the broadest possible basis for developing appropriate ethical feelings, where such feelings are more primordial and comprehensive than thinking or reasoning. Indeed, family plays a key role in producing moral persons. After all, family is that social institution with the greatest degree of success in getting the most out of its members. Generally speaking, we can claim that family is the communal locus to which persons willingly commit themselves utterly and without remainder — their time, their resources, their body parts, their very lives. Family is the governing metaphor in the Confucian worldview because it serves as a strategy for optimizing the creative possibilities available to persons in their relationships.

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The ultimate contribution that cultivated family relations makes to the vision of a moral life is preemptive rather than retributive. Ethics is about meaningful relations rather than particular motives, actions, or outcomes in isolation — the preoccupation of much contemporary ethical theory. Family feeling is the source of a positive sense of shame that enables self-governance without external compulsion, and that can be effective in preempting antisocial behaviors. Rather than offering a strategy for rational and principled calculation when confronted by difficult cases, it provides a fabric of family solidarity that in important degree can inhibit the emergence of disintegrative conduct. Better to preclude spousal abuse in the first place than to address the unhappy problem after the fact. Taken in the long term, family is the institution in the process of intergenerational transmission that serves as a conduit for the ongoing embodiment of living cultural traditions. At the end of the day, while human differences have high value as a resource for promoting cultural diversity, in order for these differences to be understood and activated, they must be informed by a more fundamental sense of a shared and situated sameness. The institution of family provides this ground. And finally, it is the model of human organization that can most effectively challenge the prevailing ideology of individualism and its pernicious self-interestedness by underscoring the inseparability of privilege and responsibility, of entitlements and obligations. Family teaches the wisdom of interdependence in which a good father can only be such with a good daughter, and hence he does better when his daughter does better. The immediate implication of a relational understanding of oneself rooted in family is that if other members of your family flourish, you flourish too, and by extension, if your neighbor does better, you do better. Without making it crass or commercial, the point is that a generous disposition redounds to your own happiness. One major problem is that the contemporary philosophical discourse in theorizing the conception of the political has not regarded family with its partial relationships as a relevant model for its regulative institutions or as a paradigmatic source of social and political order. And certainly many of the citizens of the developed nations, as well as the urban elites in those that are less-developed, subscribe to the liberal model of society and government based upon the Enlightenment understanding of human beings as free, rational, and autonomous individuals. But the great majority of the rest of the world’s peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East do not seem to define themselves in such individualistic terms. Their self-understanding is they are embedded in a social ecology of daughters and sons, mothers and fathers, spouses, siblings, cousins, neighbors, members of clans, all with close ties to specific geographic areas, and communities, religious and secular. Except for the Westernized urban elites in such areas, most of the people would define themselves in a much more rela-

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tional, “Confucian” language than in Enlightenment and modern liberal terms. With family-centered values rather than liberalism being the dominant norm among most of the world’s cultures, we have to resist our own cultural commonsense in either ignoring the institution of family or setting it aside as a special case in any discourse on a new geopolitical order. In a changing world cultural order, can the Confucian values of equity and diversity grounded in the institution of family be a challenge to dominant liberal values of autonomy and simple equality as a resource for real democracy and for the quality of internationalism that is needed to respond effectively to our shared human predicament? If in looking for resources for a changing geopolitical order we seriously desire to engage in an inclusive cross-cultural dialogue rather than merely a polemic, prudence would suggest that the familial terms must at least be allowed into the discourse, even if they do not come to dominate it. Families have been a source of economic strength and security in virtually every human culture, and arguably will remain such. It is doubtful that any national or transnational government will ever be able to provide adequate social welfare services that would diminish our reliance upon the institution of family for a population fast approaching seven billion in a resource-shrinking and ecologically fragile world. Reconstructing social, political, and moral philosophy in a more multi-ethnic and inter-religious global context in the twenty-first century must take this fact into account. Family feeling can be seen as necessary for living full social, moral, and religious human lives. The importance of intergenerationality in human relations and interactions can be appreciated anew; a different way of defining oneself can be envisaged; a more robust concept of social justice might replace the narrow definition currently in vogue; even death and dying may be approached differently. It is therefore an important philosophical task to inquire more deeply into the role of family feeling in the formulation of a minimalist ethic for a new geopolitical order.

Bibliography Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Dennerline, Jerry. Qian Mu and the World of Seven Mansions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Dewey, John. The Later Works of John Dewey (1925–53). Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 17 vols. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985. —. The Middle Works of John Dewey (1899–1924). Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 15 vols. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977. James, William. The Works of William James. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, General Editor. 19 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

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Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. Solomon, Robert C. A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1990. Tan, Sor-hoon. “Confucianism and Global Distributive Justice.” In Tianxia in Comparative Perspectives: Alternative Models for a Possible Planetary Order, edited by Roger T. Ames, Sor-hoon Tan, and Steven Y.H. Yang. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2023. Walzer, Michael. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. University of Notre Dame Press, 1994. Wolgast, Elizabeth H. The Grammar of Justice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. Zhao, Tingyang 趙汀陽. 天下的當代性：世界秩序的實踐與想象 (A Possible World of All-under-heaven System: The World Order in the Past and for the Future). Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2016. —. 惠此中國 (The Making and Becoming of China: Its Way of Historicity). Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2016. —. 天下體系：世界制度哲學導論 (The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institution), Beijing: People’s University Press, 2011.

Torbjörn Lodén

Confucianism and the Global Challenges of the Twenty-First Century

I.

Introduction: Vicissitudes of Confucianism in Modern Times

Fifty years ago, when I was a young graduate student of Sinology in Stockholm, Confucianism seemed to be dead, or at least dying. I knew that there were Confucian scholars in Taiwan and in Hong Kong and also in North America, but they seemed to represent an outdated creed with no future. For two millennia Confucianism had served Chinese emperors as an oppressive ideology, but the great rejuvenation of Chinese culture that had begun with the May Fourth New Culture Movement had liberated the Chinese people from this suffocating ideological yoke. Radical May Fourth intellectuals such as Hu Shi (1891–1962), Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) and others had explained how Confucianism stood in the way of modernization and, in spite of its excesses, the Chinese revolution led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976) seemed to be completing the historical task of getting rid of Confucianism. Western Sinologists and China scholars drew support for their rejection of Confucianism from Max Weber (1864–1920), one of the fathers of sociology, who had found that Confucianism lacked the notion of a transcendental dimension of reality in which ethics could be anchored and that therefore it also lacked the tension between ethical demand and human shortcoming that had enabled Christian Protestantism, especially Calvinism, to serve as a lever for the growth of capitalism and for modernization.1 While Weber and his followers contrasted Confucianism with Christian Protestantism, for Marxists and other Leftists both Confucianism and Christianity appeared as intellectually and spiritually oppressive ideologies. In the words of Karl Marx (1818–1883), they were “opium of the people.”2 1 Concerning Max Weber and Confucianism, see section V below. 2 This formulation — in the original German, “Die Religion ist das Opium des Volkes” — goes back to the introduction of Marx’s work Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right) written in 1843. The following year this introduction was

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Yet this one-dimensional dismissal of Confucianism as oppressive and outdated was not unquestioned. In the 1960’s the American scholar Joseph Levenson (1920–1969) had published his prophetic work Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, in which he predicted that after being disarmed as a major living ideology, Confucianism would be brought back to the central stage as a cultural legacy for the Chinese people to be proud of and anchor their identity in. Today we can see that his analysis captured an essential feature of the renaissance of Confucianism that we may witness today, that is, the role of Confucianism in defining the essence of Chineseness and Chinese nationalism. Levenson’s position was that of a dispassionate observer and analyst. He himself did not come out as a Confucian. However, a decade after Levenson, in 1977, Thomas Metzger (1933–) published his influential book Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture, which was a passionate defense of Confucianism against the criticism of Max Weber and his followers. Basing himself on the ideas of some contemporary Confucian thinkers, especially Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), Metzger showed that Confucian scholars, especially those that we associate with Neo-Confucianism, had indeed given expression to that tension between ethical demand and human shortcoming that Weber had found lacking. In Metzger’s view the fundamental precepts of Confucianism in no way stand in the way of modernization. On the contrary they may promote modernization, and modernization will finally make it possible to realize the basic Confucian values. 1977 was one year after the death of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The drastic political reorientation labelled “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang 改革開 放) that Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) would launch the following year meant that the People’s Republic of China became culturally and intellectually much more open and pluralistic than it had been. Literary and intellectual currents from the West, often associated with freedom and democracy, were introduced at an amazing speed and met with enthusiasm. Millions of people wanted to see China modernize and democratize, and more often than not this was seen as “Westernization.” The cultural traditions of China and the West were juxtaposed as antithetical. Chinese tradition was depicted as inward-looking, authoritarian and lacking the dynamism needed for successful modernization, whereas Western tradition was dynamic and promoting change. An archetypical example of this crude dichotomization of East and West was the TV series Yellow River Elegy or Deathsong of the River (Heshang 河殤) broadcast in 1988.3 published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, while the whole work came out only posthumously in 1927. 3 See Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang, trans. Richard Bodman and Pin Pin Wan (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991).

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However, the relative liberalization after Mao also opened up renewed interest in China’s indigenous traditions, not the least of which was Confucianism. Rather similar to Western currents of thought, New Confucianism that had earlier not been allowed in the PRC attracted enormous interest. When Tu Weiming 杜維明 (1940–), a well-known representative of New Confucianism, lectured in Beijing in the 1980s, the lecture hall could not house all interested students and colleagues, many of whom stood in the corridors listening to loudspeakers broadcasting his lectures. One feature of this New Confucianism was that it was presented as largely compatible with the democratic and humanistic values that were also taken as characteristic of Western thought. The famous Manifesto of 1958 authored by the leading Confucian scholars Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995), Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1902–1982) and Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887– 1969) had explicitly stated that modernization in terms of industrialization and democratization was not only compatible with Confucianism but would also make it possible to realize the basic Confucian values.4 Thus, New Confucianism was from the beginning open and, if you like, cosmopolitan, but at the same time it was Chinese, and this also accounted for its attraction. Somehow, it confirmed the equal value of Chinese culture as compared to Western culture. As we know, this question of the relative value of Chinese culture has been a central concern in China for a long time. In the perception of many Chinese people, Westerners have looked down upon China, especially since China’s decline that began with the Opium War. Behind the preoccupation with equal value, one may see lacking self-esteem and self-confidence. Now the Confucian tradition had gained new respectability and offered a secure haven where people could anchor their Chinese identity. In the 1980s, the dragon economies in East and Southeast Asia attracted attention for their spectacular economic development, and it became fashionable to seek for cultural factors behind the success of these countries.5 Especially in the case of Singapore, Confucianism was often included as part of the explanation for its economic success. Thus, in the 1980s the rejection of Confucianism as 4 The full title of this manifesto is Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan: women duo Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言： 我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同 認識, which the authors rendered into English as A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook. Parts of this text can be found in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 2. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 550–555. 5 Concerning the dragon economies, see, e. g., Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). The expression “four little dragons” refers to Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. But often, and rightly so, Japan has also been counted as a dragon.

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incompatible with modernization and modernity was no longer dominant. Both within and outside Chinese culture it had regained respectability as a major intellectual and spiritual tradition in the world. In the 1990s, interest in Confucianism in Mainland China continued to increase and became part of the core curriculum of “national studies” (guoxue 國 學), which quickly developed into a major scholarly discipline. Institutes for national studies mushroomed in universities and other institutions of higher learning all over China. The name “Confucius” was used to label the Confucius Institutes, set up to promote the study of Chinese all over the world.6 The Communist Party also used Confucianism to try to fill the ideological vacuum that the demise of Maoism had left behind. We may recall that in 2011 a statue of Confucius was erected on Tiananmen Square.7 But this was soon removed which probably shows that Confucius was still a controversial symbol among the Chinese leaders.8 Today in China and globally there are different kinds of Confucianism. There is the Confucianism that the Chinese government and its ideologues use to promote unity in China and to legitimize itself.9 But there are also attempts to define Confucian thought as an independent and significant intellectual and spiritual current in the world that may play an important role in dealing with the difficult challenges of our time, such as climate change and ecological destruction, the pandemic and other medical threats, inequality, human loneliness and unhappiness, the unequal distribution of wealth in the world — and war, even the risk of a major war that could lead to the extinction of human civilization. Chunchieh Huang’s initiative to compile this book is one example of this as is his major project to study “East Asian Confucianisms.”10 A modest attempt in this regard is

6 Concerning the notion of “national studies” (guoxue 国学), see Wang Xiaolin, “‘National Studies’ in China and Japan,” International Communication of Chinese Culture 3, no. 3 (2016): 413–426. Concerning “the specific characteristics of Chinese culture” (Zhongguo wenhua de teshuxing 中国文化的特殊性), see Fredrik Fällman, “China with ‘Chinese characteristics?’” What is China: Observations and Perspectives (Stockholm: The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, forthcoming). 7 See, e. g., https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Confucius-back-in-Beijing-with-a-statue-in-Tia nanmen-Square-20483.html. 8 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23confucius.html. 9 Concerning contemporary Confucianism that serves the ideological needs of the government, see e. g., Ge Zhaoguang, “If Horses Had Wings: The Political Demands of Mainland New Confucians in Recent Years,” https://www.readingthechinadream.com/ge-zhaoguang-if-ho rses-had-wings.html. 10 For more on Huang’s work with bibliographical references, see his website http://huang.cc.n tu.edu.tw/eng_about.html.

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the “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism” that my Finnish colleagues Jyrki Kallio, Matti Nojonen, and I published in 2021.11

II.

Dimensions of Confucianism

What then can we find in the Confucian tradition that may contribute to, alleviate, or even solve these and other problems? To discuss this big question in a meaningful way it is first necessary to clarify a meaning of Confucianism that is relevant in this context, to try to determine what Confucianism is and what it is not. In order to discuss this question, we may first make a distinction between on the one hand “really existing Confucianism,” referring to Confucianism as state ideology during much of the history of the Chinese empire as well as to its use as a tool in the hands of politicians today, and on the other “spiritual and intellectual Confucianism,” referring to Confucianism as a living spiritual and intellectual current which offers a fruitful perspective on the human predicament. I deliberately use the term “really existing Confucianism” to evoke the notion “really existing socialism” that Rudolf Bahro coined for his analysis of the political system in East Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall.12 “Really existing” in contrast to morally and intellectually serious beliefs and ideas held by individual people can probably be used about all major religions and ideologies as with really existing Christianity, really existing Islam, really existing Buddhism, really existing Marxism, really existing liberalism, etc. Furthermore, we may consider Confucianism as providing a fruitful perspective in order to underline that it should not be reduced to a set of fixed ideas and beliefs. The ideas that we meet in the classical texts must be seen in their historical context and be open to reconsideration. The Confucian tradition has evolved on the basis of a number of texts referred to as “classics” ( jing 經), the first category in the traditional classification of texts into four categories.13 In the tradition there have been slightly different ways of identifying which texts are classics, but the two most common ways by far have

11 Jyrki Kallio, Torbjörn Lodén, and Matti Nojonen, “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism” (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland, Nordic Network on Chinese Thought, April 2021), https://www.ulapland.fi/EN/Webpages/Nordic-Network-on-Chinese-Thought. 12 See Rudolf Bahro, Die Alternative: zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus (Köln: Europäische Vlg-Anst., 1977); English translation: The Alternative in Eastern Europe (London: NLB, 1978). 13 The other three categories are historical works (shıˇ 史), philosophical works other than the Confucian classics (zıˇ 子) and miscellanea, mainly literary works ( jí 集).

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been to refer to “The Four Books and the Five Classics” (Sishu wujing 四書五經) and “The Thirteen Classics” (Shisanjing 十三經).14 Since early times, the discussion within the Confucian tradition has had the form of interpretive commentaries on these classical texts. Much of this discussion has been philological: what do the sentences and individual characters in the classical texts mean? The point of departure has been that the Classics contain the truth, which it has been the task of the interpreters to unravel. But in fact, the interpretive commentaries not only clarified the meaning of the original texts but also added a lot to them. Today we may see how they enriched the ideas first presented in the classical texts and how together they resulted in an impressive hermeneutical tradition. It is within this tradition that Confucian thought has evolved.15 If we recognize the significance of this interpretive tradition, we will also understand that the commentaries accumulated over the years form an important object of study in themselves and not only for the light they throw on the original texts. Misinterpretations or distortions, although erroneous, may still be philosophically interesting and enriching. We should also be aware that what may at first glance appear as an example of misunderstanding the original meaning may in fact be a deliberate way of saying something new, disguised as a mere clarification. In recent decades the study of the legacy of interpretive commentaries as interesting in themselves has indeed deepened our understanding of the meaning of Confucianism. In this regard, the work of Chun-chieh Huang has been especially important.16 The Confucian tradition with its Classics and commentaries offers us a kind of language to think about the human predicament. This language consists of a number of terms, for example, ren 仁 “goodness,” “humaneness;” yi 義 “righteousness;” tian 天 “heaven;” xing 性 “nature;” shan 善 “goodness;” e 惡 “evil;” li 禮 “rites,” “propriety;” li 理 “principle;” zhong 忠 “loyalty;” shu 恕 “reciprocity;” zhi 知 “knowledge;” zhi 智 “wisdom;” qing 情 “feeling,” “actual circumstances;” gan 感 “feel;” jue 覺 “perceive;” lun 倫 “bond;” lunli 倫理 “ethics;” dao 道 “way;” de 德 “virtue;” junzi 君子 “noble person;” xiaoren 小人 “petty person,” etc. 14 Concerning these classics, see Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A New Manual (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 365–377. 15 For an excellent modern introduction to the traditional scholarship on the Classics, see Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚, Zhongguo jingxueshi shi jiang 中国経学史十讲 (Ten lectures on the history of the study of the classics), (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2002). 16 See, for example, Chun-chieh Huang’s path-breaking studies Mencian Hermeneutics: A History of Interpretations in China (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 2001), and East Asian Confucianisms: Dialectics between the Classics and Interpretations (Taipei: NTU Press, 2007).

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Translations of these terms can only give a rough and crude idea of their meaning, since they are charged with numerous different meanings. When we approach an old text, we must exert ourselves to understand how they are used in this particular text. It would be futile to try to capture one and only one essential meaning of each one of them.17 The different terms that we find in the language of Confucianism have been used to formulate some core issues, ideas, and beliefs. One fruitful approach has been to identify, as Benjamin Schwartz (1916–1999) did in a seminal article more than half a century ago, “polarities” which have figured prominently in the Confucian discussion.18 By polarities he meant themes with two poles, as it were, which are complementary rather than antithetical. The discussion has been about how the two poles should be balanced and where the emphasis should be placed rather than about rejecting one in favor of the other. One polarity that Schwartz identified was that of “self-cultivation” (xiushen 修 身 or xiuji 修己) leading to personal self-realization on the one hand and “ordering and harmonizing the world” (zhiguo ping tianxia 治國平天下) on the other hand. The emphasis has most often been placed on self-cultivation as a first necessary step towards creating a harmonious social order but now and then, as in the case of the Song Dynasty reformer Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), institutional reforms rather than personal cultivation have also been seen as decisive for achieving social improvement. Another polarity, closely related to the first one, was that of the “inner” (nei 内) and “outer” (wai 外) realms of reality. The inner realm refers to “the innate spiritual and moral capacities of the individual human being” considered in isolation from the outer realm, viz. “the objective social and cultural order.” From the perspective of traditional European thought, this polarity reminds us of the relation between ideas and matter, individual and society, consciousness and being. A third polarity, with close links to the previous two, was that of “knowledge” (zhi 知) and “action” (xing 行). To what extent should we act on the basis of knowledge and to what extent should action serve as a way to acquire knowledge? In the discussion about this polarity, Schwartz found not only different emphases but also “widely divergent notions of the nature and content of knowledge and the nature and content of action.” 17 The study of concepts occupies an important position in modern Confucian scholarship. Just to mention a couple of examples, see Zhang Dainian, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002) and Zhang Liwen 张立文 Zhongguo zhexue fanchou fazhan shi 中国哲学范畴发展史 (A History of the Evolution of the Categories of Chinese Philosophy) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1995). 18 Benjamin Schwartz, “Some Polarities in Confucian Thought,” in Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, ed. Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 3–15.

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These are the three polarities that Schwartz discussed in his seminal article. But in the rich Confucian discussion we may also find other polarities. Let me here mention but two. The first is the polarity of “honoring moral nature” (zun dexing 尊德性) and “following the path of enquiry and study” (dao wen xue 道問 學). This formulation goes back to the Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean), one of the Four Books of the Confucian canon, and played an especially important role in Neo-Confucian thought. While the representatives of the School of Mind-and-Heart, such as Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), argued that we must look into ourselves to find the important moral insights that should guide us in everything we think and do, the great Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and other representatives of the School of Principle emphasized the importance of observation and study of the external world, including books, to seek the truth about the world including human beings.19 These two orientations were archetypically articulated in the famous Goose Lake Monastery Debate of 1175 between Lu Xiangshan and Zhu Xi.20 Even though the views expressed on this polarity were often quite divergent, it is probably true to say that the difference was generally one of emphasis rather than total rejection of one of the poles. Furthermore, we may add a fifth polarity, viz., the polarity of sensual pleasure and moral principles. In the tradition, sensual pleasure as being something problematic has most commonly referred to the sensations we experience when our “desires” (yu 欲) or “human desires” (renyu 人欲) are satisfied, and in the discussion these in turn have been defined as “the appetite for drink and food and for sex” (yinshi nannü 飲食男女). From early times the question how sensual pleasures relate to ethical norms has been discussed. In the texts going back to pre-Qin times we often meet a rather generous view of sensual pleasure. In a famous passage, Mencius 孟子 (c. 372–289 BC), one of the founding fathers of Confucianism, makes it clear that it is fine for a ruler to indulge in sensual pleasure as long as he is willing to grant his subjects the same right to indulge.21 Some Neo-Confucian scholars, on the other hand, strictly dichotomized desires and moral principles. Zhu Xi said that while eating and having sex was necessary not to starve and to have children, the pleasures associated with these desires were highly problematic. In fact, the 19 Ying-shih Yü 余英時 (1930–2021) has brilliantly analyzed this polarity. See, e. g., his article “Morality and knowledge in Chu Hsi’s philosophical system,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1986), 228–254. 20 See Julia Ching, “The Goose Lake Monastery Debate,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1974): 161–178. 21 See, e. g., “Mencius once said to King Xuan of Qi: ‘You may be fond of women, but what is it to you so long as you share this fondness with the people?’” Mencius 1B/5, trans. D. C. Lau, Mencius: A Bilingual Edition, rev. ed. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2003), 39.

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School of Principle has often been associated with the slogan “preserve Heavenly principles and annihilate human desires” (cun tianli mie renyu 存天理滅人欲). Feelings or emotions, qing 情, are related, among other things, to sensual pleasures and thus are closely related to desires and in the Confucian discourse have a complicated relationship with reason and “principles.” In the Confucian tradition we can find a rich discussion of feelings.22 Not seldom, they were looked upon with suspicion, especially so by scholars belonging to the School of Principle (lixue 理學). In the intellectual universe of Neo-Confucianism, it was when feelings were evoked that things could begin to go wrong. In the realm of reality “above form” (xing er shang 形而上), there was stillness, no movement, and no feelings. In this realm there could be no evil or mistakes. But when perceiving something or receiving some kind of stimulus, then the human being reacts, he or she “moves” (dong 動), and in this process feelings are activated. This movement can also be described as a movement from the flawless realm “before form” to the realm “below form” (xing er xia 形而下), that is, the world where we live, perceive and act. In order for things not to go wrong, feelings have to be steered and controlled so that they conform to moral principles. An essential goal of selfcultivation was to learn to see to it that one’s feelings do not collide with moral principles. In the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) there was again a reaction among some scholars against this dichotomization of desires and ethics. For example, Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) described desires as the main force of life and considered the satisfaction of one’s desires, as long as this does not interfere with the desires of others, an essential part of a good life in accordance with moral demands.23 This again is a polarity where scholars and thinkers have regarded the relationship between the two poles differently and sought different ways to balance them or unite them. In addition to polarities in the sense that Schwartz gave this word, we may also find several questions or issues concerning human life and society that have been discussed in Confucian terms throughout the centuries. “Human nature” (xing 22 For an excellent introduction to feelings or emotion in Chinese philosophy, see Bongrae Seok, “The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/emo tions-chinese/. See also Halvor Eifring, “The Global Ethics of Emotions — What Ancient Chinese Philosophies Can Teach Us,” Diogenes 64, no. 1–2 (2022): 29–33. https://doi.org /10.1177/03921921221080814 and my article “Reason, Feeling, and Ethics in Mencius and Xunzi,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 4 (2009): 602–617. 23 Concerning Dai Zhen, see A. Chin and M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and Meanings (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990). See also my paper “On the Social Dynamics of Philosophical Ideas: Dai Zhen’s Critique of Neo-Confucianism,” Rendez-Vous, Festschrift in Honour of Marja Kaikkonen, special issue of Orientaliska studier 146 (2016): 113–145.

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性) stands at the center of a cluster of questions in the Confucian discussion: what are human beings like at birth? Are they “good” (shan 善) or “evil” (e 惡) or neither? If they are good, what does this mean? If they are evil, what is it that makes them evil? What does it mean to be “humane” and “good” (ren 仁), and how does humaneness relate to “righteousness” (yi 義)? What is the relationship between humans and “heaven,” or “the natural world” (tian 天)? What is the nature of “good governance” (renzheng 仁政)? How far can a ruler rule by his good example and to what extent is it necessary to use force? What does it mean to be “a noble person” ( junzi 君子)? Leading Confucian thinkers held that in principle everyone possesses the potential to become a noble person and even a “sage” (shengren 聖人) which is the highest stage a person can attain.24 In modern and contemporary Confucian thought, this notion that every human being is endowed with the potential to become a noble person plays a very important role.

III.

Confucian Options

The polarities and questions that I have just briefly touched upon are open-ended and not fixed dogmas that we have to accept or reject. They are resources at our disposal that can enrich us spiritually and intellectually. Many ideas and standpoints have been presented in the name of Confucianism and are available to us who live in the twenty-first century for study and evaluation. It is important not only to seek to understand the classical texts as accurately as possible but also to look beyond the accurate interpretations of these texts for ideas and values that are relevant today. People who draw inspiration from the Confucian tradition and even identify themselves as in some sense Confucians should not feel obligated to accept a certain idea just because it can be found in a classical text and is associated with a leading Confucian thinker. For example, it cannot be denied that Confucian thinkers have often looked upon women as a kind of second-class citizens in the Confucian tradition.25 It also seems out of the question to agree with some of the views about children and

24 For example, Mencius held that all humans have the capacity to become like the legendary sage-kings Yao and Shun (Mencius 6B/2). Also, Wang Yangming remarked “One’s innate knowledge is originally the same as that of the sage” and “All people have the same innate knowledge.” See Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu 傳習録, in Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming, trans. and ed. Wing-tsit Chan (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), 127, 167. 25 Consider, for example, Confucius’ words in the Analects 17:25: “Women and petty persons are the hardest to look after. Treat them in a friendly manner, and they become impertinent; keep them at a distance, and they take offense.” Burton Watson, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 125.

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raising children that many leading Confucians have expressed.26 One may of course point out that these authoritarian and oppressive views were expressions of the spirit of the time and that it would be unfair for us in retrospect to condemn them for their authoritarianism. Yet today it seems wrong and out of touch with the spirit of our time to subscribe to these views. Furthermore, we cannot deny that in the Confucian tradition obedience and loyalty to one’s superiors, at home and in society, has been emphasized far too much at the expense of the freedom of individual people and their possibility to realize their potential. Self-realization was very much an ideal already in the early tradition, but it has often been sacrificed in the name of obedience and loyalty. One may say that this was to a great extent a characteristic of the “really existing Confucianism,” but it seems hard to deny that the authoritarian perspective was much emphasized already in the classical texts. For people in the modern world to reject these aspects of the Confucian tradition there should hardly be a problem even if you find yourself in agreement with fundamental core values and perspectives. In the words of the “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism”: “In order to preserve the merits and restore the relevance of Confucianism, we must reclaim it from the perfidies of the past and present.”27 In order to be able to adhere to major philosophies and religions that have evolved over the course of many centuries, these must be considered not as collections of old and unchangeable dogma but as living organisms that develop and change with the times while preserving certain core ideas and perspectives. In the rich Confucian tradition, we can certainly also find values and ideas that are relevant for our time. Let me quote again from the “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism”: The early tradition emphasized “personal cultivation” (xiu shen 修身) as a means of attaining “inner sagehood” (neisheng 內聖) and “becoming a complete and mature person” (cheng ren 成人), capable of exercising “outer kingship” (wai wang 外王) by promoting goodness and fighting injustices such as nepotism and corruption. Through self-cultivation, a fully developed person avoids being reduced to mere a tool in the service of others. In the early tradition, we also find a recognition of the great value of education for all. Although hardly visible in state-sponsored Confucianism, the idea that good governance is governance for the material and spiritual well-being of the

26 On views about children in Confucianism, see e. g., Anne Behnke Kinney, Representations of Childhood and Youth in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), Ping-chen Hsiung, A Tender Voyage: Children and Childhood in Late Imperial China, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), and Pauline C. Lee, “Two Confucian Theories on Children and Childhood: Commentaries on the Analects and the Mengzi,” Dao 13, no. 4 (2014): 525–540. 27 Kallio, Lodén, and Nojonen, “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism,” p. ii. https://www.ulapl and.fi/EN/Webpages/Nordic-Network-on-Chinese-Thought.

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people, and the idea that a ruler relies for his legitimacy on the support of the people, are traceable throughout the Confucian tradition. While these ideas do not amount to a fullfledged democratic ideology, they are certainly aspects of democracy. Arguably, the Confucian tradition also contains ideals of subsidiarity and decentralization of power at the local level (fengjian 封建), introduced by, inter alia, Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682). Finally, in Confucian thought as expounded by thinkers such as Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Dai Zhen, we find the embryo of a scientific spirit in the insistence that knowledge must be based on the study of external reality and on rigorous analysis.28

Confucian Humanism The first feature of Confucianism that is relevant for our time and that I would here like to draw attention to is humanism, which expresses itself in different ways. There is no word in the Confucian language equivalent to “humanism,” but the ideas and values that we generally associate with humanism have certainly been present ever since the beginning. How should we understand “humanism,” what is the meaning of this word? A closer analysis would show that it may not be possible to find an exhaustive definition of “humanism” with which everybody agrees. Most people probably would like to identify themselves as “humanists,” and so to define this concept therefore almost inevitably becomes a way to express one’s own values. In Wikipedia, we find the following definition: A philosophical stance that emphasizes the individual and social potential and agency of human beings. It considers human beings as the starting point for serious moral and philosophical inquiry. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanism)

In another online resource, the digital Oxford Reference, we find the following “quick reference:” A philosophy or ethical system that centres on the concept of the dignity, freedom, and value of human beings. The belief that there is an essential human condition that emerges regardless of historical circumstance and that this can be used as the basis for developing an understanding of the past. (https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10. 1093/oi/authority.20111017141751899)

Often humanism is also taken to mean that the focus is on the mundane world rather than on divine and supernatural matters. For example, in the Oxford 28 Kallio, Lodén, and Nojonen, “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism,” p. ii. Concerning Confucianism and democracy, see, e. g., David Elstein, Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2015), and Albert H. Y. Chen, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Liberal Constitutional Democracy?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34, no. 2 (2007): 195– 216.

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Dictionary Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide (2001) we read that humanism is “a rationalistic system of thought attaching prime importance to human rather than divine or supernatural matters.” The ideas and values mentioned in these definitions we can also find at the core of Confucian thought, except for “freedom,” which one cannot say figures prominently in the Confucian tradition. One may in fact, as Chun-chieh Huang does, regard humanism as the “running theme” not only of Confucianism but of “the East Asian intellectual traditions.”29 In Huang’s words, “The East Asian humanist spirit affirmed the status of the human in the universe, stressed the ‘free will’ of the human and therefore the perfectibility and responsibility of the human.”30 According to a fundamental tenet of Confucian thought, human beings are endowed with the capacity to do good and create a better world, a better society. Confucius himself saw it as his main task to understand how to create a just and orderly society and bring this understanding to others, in particular the rulers of his time. He was convinced that through personal cultivation and study it is possible to attain this understanding. He and especially Mencius also held that once rulers really understood “the Kingly way” (wang dao 王道) of governance, they would also choose to follow this way and put an end to the prevailing chaos and bring about an orderly and just society with good livelihood for the people, and they believed that if the ruler followed the Kingly way, his subjects would follow him. Thus, the belief in the capacity of human beings to cultivate themselves and develop their innate qualities to bring about a better world has been central to Confucian thought from the very beginning. This belief is also at the core of humanism as generally understood. Mencius offered a basis for the belief that human beings are born with a moral capacity to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, and with a natural inclination to take delight in what is good and right and to abhor what is evil and wrong. He realized that human beings are prone to err, but he was convinced that compassion was innate, and he considered compassion to be the foundation of morality. His parable about an infant about to fall into a well is very forceful: Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers 29 For an incisive in-depth analysis of humanism in Confucian thought, see Chun-chieh Huang, “Humanism in East Asia,” in Oxford Handbook of Humanism, ed. Anthony Pinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 3–28. 30 Chun-chieh Huang, “Humanism in East Asia, 3.

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or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human.31

If human beings are allowed to grow up under decent circumstances, nourish their natural inclinations and do their best to acquire knowledge and understanding, then they will also do what is good and right. This is the essential meaning of Mencius’ belief in the goodness of human nature. “Noble persons” ( junzi 君子) are people who have realized this moral potential inherent in all human beings. In the words of Confucius, “the noble person is not a utensil.”32 While all people were in principle considered to have the potential to become noble persons, Confucius and his followers held that only a small fraction of mankind have realized to the full their potential to become noble persons. People, and especially noble persons, deserve respect and they should themselves be respectful. In this ethical universe, where not being reduced to a utensil is the hallmark of realized potential and where respect should be prominent in human relations, we can say that human beings possess dignity, although we may look in vain for a close equivalent to the word “dignity” in the lexicon of the classical Chinese language.

The Importance of Study Another central tenet of Confucian thought that is relevant and to which I would like to draw attention is the emphasis on study. In cultivating oneself and trying to reach enlightenment, study is seen as crucial. Study is demanding and takes effort, but on the other hand it also opens the road to enlightenment to all people, no matter of what background. In Confucius’ own words, “In education there are no class distinctions” (Analects 15:39). We may see the focus on study as an aspect of Confucian rationalism and intellectualism. People should seek both knowledge of the world and moral understanding by means of study, and study is an activity that must follow rational principles. The hermeneutical Confucian tradition is an impressive legacy of intellectual endeavors. Discussing the role of study in Confucian thought we must keep in mind that the meaning of study was very different in the old tradition from how people in the modern world look upon study. Traditionally, the object of study was to learn 31 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius: A Bilingual Edition (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), 73. 32 Analects 2:12.

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to understand the classical texts and thereby grasp the eternal truths discovered by the ancient sages. To study was to recapture old truths rather than to seek new insights. In this sense the intellectual universe of classical Confucianism was closed and inward-looking rather than open. In the contemporary world this meaning of study must be modernized and focus on the importance of creativity and reaching new insights. This kind of modernized view of study is already very much present in contemporary Confucian thought. The intellectual universe which constitutes the framework of Confucian study is rational and emphasizes the importance of separating true and false as well as right and wrong. In this universe there should be no room for superstition or alternative facts.33

The Quest for Unity and Harmony under Heaven An essential assumption underlying the emergence of Chinese thought in the Zhou dynasty was the idea that the world had once been characterized by order and harmony and that this golden age had decayed and turned into a situation characterized by disorder and conflicts. The notion “unity” was at the core of the thought of Confucius and has ever since permeated the Confucian tradition. In Confucianism the ideal ruler has the mandate to rule “all-under-heaven,” that is, the whole, unified world, not one area with a distinct group of people that is separated by boundaries. Early Confucian thought was universalistic. The classical texts of Confucianism speak to all humans no matter what their background is. One should respect differences, but the fundamental values were indeed universal. As Confucius’ disciple Zixia pointed out, “All men within the four seas are brothers” (Analects 12:5). Ironically, the official ideology in China today rejects the concept of “universal values” (pushi jiazhi 普世價值) as bourgeois and part of the attempt by Western countries to undermine the rule of the Communist Party.34 It follows that one may draw inspiration from Confucianism to work for global solutions and even a global government. In the Confucian universe, one should seek accord and reconciliation rather than sharpen contradictions. States are

33 Concerning the importance of rationality in our time, see Stephen Pinker, Rationality: What it Is, Why it Seems Scarce, Why it Matters (London: Penguin Books, 2021). 34 In July 2012 the Chinese Communist Party published internally the infamous “Document No. 9,” which draws attention to seven “problems.” One of these was “Promoting ‘Universal Values’ in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership.” See “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” The ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, https://www.china file.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

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regarded as contingent entities, which at best represent what is at the time the least bad organization. The search for unity and harmony is not limited to the world of humans. In the words of Chun-chieh Huang: East Asian Confucian humanists stressed interaction and fusion between seemingly opposing extremes, be it mind and body, self and others, man and nature, and the “past” and “present,” so as to maintain dynamic equilibrium and harmony in human existence.35

In the Confucian universe, “the unity of heaven and humans” (tian ren he yi 天人 合一) is an important notion. In the Confucian language, the word tian 天, which literally means “heaven,” often refers to “the natural world.” It goes without saying that this notion is highly relevant for contemporary discussions about the environment. As is well-known, family relations play a central role in Confucianism as the basis for discussion of moral principles. In premodern times most people were familiar with the notions of the Three Bonds between ruler and subject, father and son and husband and wife, and the Five Relationships between father and son, ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and friends.36 There is no denying that Confucianism has often made use of beautiful rhetoric on the importance of unity and harmony in order to impose an ideological orthodoxy on people as a means to legitimate oppression. This oppressive function we should see as a distortion of the positive Confucian legacy that we want to promote. Today an increasing number of people all over the world, representing various creeds and scholarly orientations, feel that the phenomenal scientific progress and socio-economic development of the past few centuries have been associated with analysis rather than synthesis to such an extent that human life and thought have been fragmented so that we easily lose sight of the wholeness of all being and our position in this.37 This fragmentation goes hand in hand with alienation and difficulties to deal in a meaningful way with basic existential questions. 35 Chun-chieh Huang, “Humanism in East Asia,” 16. 36 These notions occur again and again in the Confucian discussion. Early examples are the discussion of The Three Bonds in the chapter on music in the Book of Rites and Mencius’ discussion of the Five Relationships (3A/4). The Five Relationships also figure prominently in Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean), where the order of the first two is ruler and subject first, and then father and son. 37 See, e. g., Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical Letter on Ecology (24 May 2015) https://ca tholicclimatecovenant.org/encyclical; Glen T. Martin, “Holism, Fragmentation and Our Endangered Future: A New Vision and a New Hope,” https://www.academia.edu/10987960/Holi sm_Fragmentation_and_Our_Endangered_Future_A_New_Vision_and_a_New_Hope, no

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In the Western world, we have in recent decades seen many manifestations of this search for unity and wholeness as opposed to separation and fragmentation. Consider, for example, the emergence of new spiritual and religious currents such as New Age or the intensified interest in Buddhism. Too often these manifestations have been rather anti-rational, which has beclouded the fact that they are symptoms of a problem that modernity as we experience it has generated. This should not make us reject modernity, but we should seek ways in different areas to have analysis become the basis of synthesis and to overcome the tendency of separation and dichotomization. In order to deal effectively with humankind’s most urgent problems and challenges such as climate change and environmental pollution, poverty, migration, and nuclear armament we need to overcome the fragmentation of learning and adopt a holistic approach which brings together the insights from several different disciplines in the natural sciences as well as the humanities. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations is probably the most significant step taken so far in this direction. The global goals that are formulated within this framework are integrated, indivisible, and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental.38 The Confucian focus on the fundamental unity of all being, a kind of metaphysical and ontological unity, as well as on uniting what has been separated, offers a valuable spiritual resource to think about the human predicament in a holistic and universal perspective that seeks to be all-inclusive and at the same time totally rational and by no means anti-intellectual. In the words of “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism” again: A holistic outlook is central to the Confucian tradition. As Wang Yangming also said, “the ten thousand things are one body” (wanwu yiti 萬物一體). This all-inclusive “body,” or community, comprises all organisms, human beings but also animals and plants. In the words of Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), “All people are my siblings, all things are my companions” (min wu tongbao, wu wu yu ye 民吾同胞、物吾與也). Implicit in this notion is a call to us all to extend our feeling of consideration to every living being in our biosphere.39

date; idem. “One World Renaissance” https://oneworldrenaissance.com/2015/08/18/endors ements/; Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 38 Concerning Agenda 2030, see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/document s/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf. See also United Nations Secretary-General’s Report “Our Common Agenda” from 2021: https://www.un.o rg/en/content/common-agenda-report/. 39 Kallio, Lodén, and Nojonen, “Lapland Manifesto of Confucianism,” vii. https://www.ulapla nd.fi/EN/Webpages/Nordic-Network-on-Chinese-Thought.

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Avoid Extremism and Search for a Middle Way Closely linked to the focus on unity is the idea that one should avoid extremism and rather seek a kind of middle way, avoiding both going too far and not going far enough. This idea recurs again and again in Confucian texts. For example, this is the core message in Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean), where Confucius is quoted as saying, “Putting the Mean into practice represents the highest degree of human attainment.”40 This Confucian approach which emphasizes the importance of unity and moderation contrasts sharply with the view of contradictions as something good and as the motor of social development which has permeated Chinese radicalism for more than a century and has served as the foundation stone of Mao Zedong’s “philosophy of struggle” (douzheng zhexue 鬥爭哲學). In the contemporary world, increasingly globalized but also conflict-ridden, the Confucian emphasis on unity, harmony, and moderation are resources that properly used can help us deal with our problems and conflicts.

The Emphasis on Responsibility and Duties Confucian thinkers emphasize responsibility and duties to others rather than the freedom and rights of individuals. While realizing one’s potential is a central theme in Confucian discussions, this self-realization is not seen as standing in the way of fulfilling one’s obligations to others. On the contrary, to realize one’s potential means among other things to understand one’s obligation to others. Responsibility and duty refer primarily to other human beings but can also be extended to animals and the natural world. While the focus on individual rights and freedom in modern culture has been liberating for hundreds of millions of people, we can also see signs that this individualism has become too extreme, leading to narcissism and lack of solidarity and concern for the common good. In this regard Confucian thought has much to offer in terms of seeking a more balanced view of the relationship between the individual and other people, with animals and with the natural world.41 The features of Confucian thought that I have here briefly discussed constitute important intellectual and spiritual resources for dealing with the challenges that

40 Here quoted in Andrew Plaks’s translation. See his Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean) (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 26. 41 Cf. in this context Marianne Bastid-Bruguière’s brief but incisive analysis in her article “Liberty and Responsibility,” Diogenes 64, no. 1–2 (2022): 25–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/03 921921221080808.

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we are now facing, such as climate change and environmental destruction, international conflicts and war, various forms of exploitation, etc.

IV.

Shared Ground42

There is in the scholarly world a widespread notion that essential, unbridgeable differences separate the cultures of China and Europe. The proponents of this view like to talk about Chinese or Western culture in the singular rather than the plural, which seems to express an exaggerated view of the cultural homogeneity of the vast geographical areas of China and Europe. As for China, Confucianism is often taken to represent this imagined monolithic Chinese culture. But to what extent are the insights that we find in Confucianism really unique and to what extent do they distinguish Chinese thought from European or Western thought? According to one central and particularly tenacious idea, there is no transcendent perspective in the Chinese tradition.43 Chinese thought is seen as somehow incapable of reaching out beyond what exists in the here and now. I am not sure where this notion has its origin, but in modern times it has exerted enormous influence in the form that Max Weber gave it.44 Weber formulated his thesis against the background of his analysis of the role of Calvinism for the emergence of capitalism in Europe. What he identified as a dynamic element in Calvinist thought was exactly what he found missing in China. In his view, the Confucian ethic was not anchored in a transcendent dimension of reality. As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, he found that the tension between “ethical demand and human shortcomings” (zwishen ethischen Anforderungen und menschlicher Unzulänglichkeit), which in Europe had decisively contributed to Calvinism becoming a lever for social change, was missing from the Confucian tradition. 42 This section draws on two of my previous articles, “The Cultural Traditions of China and the Quest for a Global Ethic,” Diogenes 64, no. 1–2 (2022): 5–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/039219 21211068235 and “Chinese and Western Resources for a Global Ethic,” in Chinese and Western Resources for a Global Ethic: Studies in Honour of Samuel N.C. Lieu, ed. Gunner B. Mikkelsen and Ken Parry (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2022), 280–305. 43 The literature on the question of whether transcendence can be found in Chinese tradition and, if so, what the specific characteristics of Chinese transcendence have been has grown quite enormous over the years. One early and seminal contribution to this discussion is Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” Daedalus 104, no. 2 (1975): 57–68. 44 Concerning Weber’s views of Chinese thought, see Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth with an introduction by C. K. Yang (New York: The Free Press, 1968). For a collection of articles discussing Weber’s views of Chinese thought, see Wolfgang Schluchter, ed., Max Webers Studie über Konfuziamismus und Taoismus: Interpretation und Kritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1983).

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The idea that there is no transcendence in Confucianism, or for that matter, in traditional Chinese thought is the center of a cluster of conceptions of Chinese culture as essentially different. One such conception relates to the distinction between “guilt culture” and “shame culture.”45 To belong to a guilt culture implies having an inner moral compass based on values anchored in a transcendent dimension of reality which makes people feel guilt whenever they break a moral rule, no matter whether anyone knows about it or not. To belong to a shame culture, on the other hand, means to lack such an inner moral compass: the only thing that matters is whether you get caught red-handed or not. According to a widespread conception, European culture is a guilt culture while Chinese culture is more of a shame culture.46 Another widespread conception is that Chinese thought does not make some distinctions that are fundamental in European tradition, e. g., between essence and phenomenon, substance and accidents, and body and soul.47 None of these conceptions seems to be tenable. True, the core question whether there is transcendence in premodern Chinese thought is complicated, and an exhaustive treatment of it would require a much more comprehensive analysis than is possible here. But if we simply proceed on the basis of a simple definition of transcendence as a concept that refers to what goes beyond what we may perceive with our senses, then the transcendent perspective appears as a central element in the intellectual universe of Neo-Confucianism. In this universe, humans exist at the intersection of two dimensions of reality, the metaphysical dimension where the Heavenly Principles (tianli 天理) and the Way (dao 道) have their abode, and the physical dimension where we find the building material of everything, qi 氣, including human desires (renyu 人欲). The values that Neo-Confucianism defined are anchored in the world of Heavenly Principles and the Way, which undoubtedly is beyond what we may perceive with our senses. Furthermore, the main purpose of individual cultivation that Confucian scholars have advocated through the centuries has been to overcome the tension between ethical demand and human shortcomings.48 To use the distinction between guilt culture and shame culture as a way of differentiating between Chinese and Western culture also seems misleading. 45 Concerning the meaning of “guilt culture” and “shame culture,” see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, with a foreword by Ian Buruma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). 46 Concerning this question, see Ambrose Y. King and J.T. Myers, Shame as an Incomplete Conception of Chinese Culture: A Study of Face (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Social Research Centre, 1977). 47 See, e. g., François Jullien, Un sage est sans idée. Ou, l’autre de la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1998). 48 See Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

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Surely, there are people in China as well as in Europe who suppress their moral intuition and who lack an inner moral compass. But the notion of an inner moral compass is certainly not absent from Chinese tradition. On the contrary, it is central in Confucian moral philosophy as exemplified in the thought of Confucius and Mencius as well as in the classics the Great Learning (Daxue 大學) and the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸). What was the fundamental Neo-Confucian distinction between heavenly li 理 and qi 氣 about if not essence and phenomena? In the eighteenth century, the philosopher Dai Zhen criticized Neo-Confucian orthodoxy for making a radical distinction between body and soul.49 Thus, the cluster of conceptions around the notion of transcendence discussed here do not suggest that there are essential and unbridgeable differences separating Chinese or Confucian thought from Western thought. The view of Chinese and Western thought as essentially different entities is often based on an exaggerated assumption of the homogeneity and permanence of the respective traditions. In fact, great diversity is characteristic of both. For example, we may consider the widespread notion that the Chinese think in holistic terms, while Westerners rather think in individualistic or atomistic terms. According to this notion, the Chinese take their point of departure in an organic whole, while the Westerner proceeds from an individual thing or situation. It is true that a holistic perspective dominates in Chinese tradition, but there are certainly also examples of more atomistic views. Two of the most prominent scholars in the eighteenth century, Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738– 1801), once had a famous discussion about the principles of textual criticism. Dai argued that in interpreting a text one must proceed from the individual written character to the sentence, paragraph, and finally the whole work, while Zhang maintained that one must first form an opinion about the meaning of the whole and then proceed down via first the paragraph, next the sentence, and finally the individual character.50 Even though an atomistic view of the world has characterized much Western thought, this perspective has by no means been completely dominant. Suffice it here to refer to German idealism and Marxism as intellectual traditions largely based on holistic thinking.

49 Concerning literature on Dai Zhen, see note 23 above. 50 Ying-shih Yü (Yu Yingshi) has analyzed the discussion between Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng in his book Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng: Qingdai zhongqi xueshu sixiang yanjiu 戴震與章學城： 清代中期學術思想研究 (Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng: Studies on Scholarly Thought in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century) (Taibei: Huashi chubanshe, 1970).

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Dichotomizations of Chinese and Western thought often result from comparing modern Western culture with premodern Chinese culture. So much in Europe, and the West, changed from the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution and the beginnings of economic and social modernization onwards. If we compare pre-Enlightenment European thought to pre-modern Chinese thought, we will see many more commonalities than if we make the comparison between modern European and pre-modern Chinese thought.

Many Commonalities If we consider the historical circumstances under which the intellectual traditions of China and Europe have evolved, it should not be surprising that they share many commonalities. Like two big rivers the cultural traditions of China and Europe flow through the historical landscape. To chart in detail their respective courses, from their beginnings in prehistoric times until today, is an arduous task that has by no means been fully accomplished. But at least we can see that they have collected their waters from different sources and have also themselves given rise to innumerable tributaries, linking up with other cultures and with each other. For more than two thousand years there have been contacts between them.51 Throughout history, these contacts have made people in Europe marvel at how different the Chinese are, and likewise people in China have been amazed to observe how different the Europeans are. Sometimes the different “other” has been conceived as inferior, sometimes as superior. But contacts have also meant influence, so we cannot really speak of either a pure Chinese or a pure European tradition. Both traditions are by their nature hybrids.52 51 For an overview of the history of Chinese culture, which pays much attention to China’s encounters with the outside world, see Hsu Cho-yun, China: A New Cultural History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). Concerning early Chinese history, see Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds., Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Li Xueqin 李学勤, Xia Shang Zhou Wenming Yanjiu 夏商周文明研究 (Studies on the Civilizations of Xia, Shang and Zhou) (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2015). 52 Cf. George Coedès, Texts of Greek and Latin Authors on the Far East: From the 4th c. B.C.E. to the 14th c. C.E. Texts compiled by George Coedès; texts revised and translated by John Sheldon; with contributions by Samuel N.C. Lieu and Gregory Fox (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010) and Yu Taishan, (CASS) China and the Ancient Mediterranean World: A Survey of Ancient Chinese Sources, Sino-Platonic Papers 242, November 2013 (Philadelphia: Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations University of Pennsylvania, 2013), available on the Internet: http://sino-platonic.org/complete/spp242_china_mediterranean.pdf. Concerning Chinese images of the Western world focusing on the nineteenth century, see Jerome Chen, China and the West: Society and Culture 1815–1937 (London: Hutchinson, 1979). For those

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Of course, in many ways the two traditions are different, and there are also considerable differences within each respective tradition. Indeed, in comparing “China and the West” or even “the East and the West” one often underestimates the internal diversity of the East and the West while exaggerating the differences between the two. No matter whether we speak about differences within one of the traditions or between them, the differences seem to be not so much absolute dichotomies as variations on common themes. There is no unbridgeable gap that separates them.53 By virtue of their mutual influence the traditions of China and Europe are akin, they are “relatives.” More importantly, they share similar features that seem to be expressions of some fundamental likeness of human beings that transcends cultural and historical boundaries. We may see them as rooted in universal human nature. One example is humanism that we already discussed above. While Confucius said that the noble man is no utensil, Kant taught that human beings should be regarded as ends and not as means. These statements, one by a Chinese philosopher and one by a European philosopher, express a similar humanistic view of the dignity and integrity of human beings.54 To regard human beings as ends rather than means is historically closely linked to the idea that we should treat other human beings with respect. In the Christian tradition, human beings are described as created in God’s image and therefore in possession of dignity: “Do you not know that you are the temple of God and the Spirit of God dwells in you?”55 The good Samaritan recognized the dignity in the other and therefore cared for his life.56 In the Confucian tradition, jìng 敬 “respect” is a central notion.

53 54

55 56

who read Chinese, Wei Yuan’s 魏源 (1794–1857) compilation of material published in Haiguo tuzhi 海国图志 (Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries) published in 1842–1852 (the complete version published in 1852 contains one hundred juan) contains a wealth of material on premodern Chinese perceptions of the West. To my knowledge this work has not yet been the subject of a full-scale in-depth analysis. Concerning European images of China, see Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilization (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989). Cf. also Donald F. Lach’s monumental work, Asia in the Making of Europe, Vols. 1–3 (in nine books) (Chicago & London: Chicago University Books, 1965–1993). Cf. Zhang Longxi, Mighty Opposites: from Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Confucius’ words can be found in the Analects 2:12. Kant’s idea was that a rational being must never be treated only as a means. What he said was, in English translation: “So act as to treat humanity [Menschheit], whether in your own person or in that of any other, always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means.” Quoted from Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 6., Modern Philosophy, Part II Kant (New York: Image Books, 1964), 120. 1 Corinthians 3:16. The parable of the Good Samaritan is found in Luke 25–37.

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These views belong to a cluster of ethical principles where varieties of the golden rule play a central role. Jesus said, “Do to others as you would have them do to you,” while Confucius said, “Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself.”57 In very much the same vein, Kant formulated his categorical imperative, “Act only according to that maxim by which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”58 These ideas have deep historical roots both in China and in Europe that we can see as an expression of a humanism that bridges the gap between the cultures of China and Europe. All this is not to deny that there can be clashes between Confucianism and other traditions as there can be clashes between civilizations. Indeed, one may say that Samuel Huntington’s prediction about clashes between different civilizations has come true in the sense that the international conflicts that we have seen during the first decades of the twenty-first century do have cultural overtones.59 The most obvious example is probably the conflict between Islamism — as represented by, for example, the Islamic state or the Taliban — and liberal democracies. Similarly, the growing tension between China and the Western world can also be described as a conflict between cultures, where Confucianism is seen as defining the essence of Chinese culture. However, those who explain or legitimize these conflicts as clashes between different cultures or civilizations seem to base their views on ideologized and distorted interpretations of the traditions involved. In fact, these interpretations are determined more by political and economic factors such as the unequal distribution of wealth, education, and the vested interests of different groups and individuals than by the original content of the traditions themselves. When gauging the roles that Confucianism and other creeds have played in history and play today it is crucial to pay attention to their interpretations. One must try to understand as far as possible the mechanisms behind various interpretations and see how distortions and misinterpretations serve ideological purposes. This brings us back to the distinction between Confucianism as an open-ended, truth-seeking intellectual tradition, on the one hand, and the really existing Confucianism, on the other hand.

57 The Golden Rule in the words of Jesus are found in Luke 6:31 and Confucius’ negative formulation is found in the Analects 15:23. 58 Kant formulated his categorical imperative in Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik der Sitten from 1785. English translation by James Ellington under the title Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981). 59 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

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Concluding Observations

This chapter took its point of departure in the observation that fifty years ago Confucianism seemed to be dead, at least to me, a young Sinologist in Stockholm. Today we can see that Confucianism has not died but is very much alive and has undergone a veritable revival during the past half-century. One aspect of this revival is that more and more people recognize that Confucianism must not be reduced to what in this essay we call “the really existing Confucianism,” which is a distortion of the rich and multifarious Confucian tradition. In the really existing Confucianism, many ideas and ideals have often been distorted, not to say turned upside down. Just like in George Orwell’s Newspeak where war means peace, freedom slavery and ignorance strength, in the Confucian discourse far too often duty came to mean blind obedience, and beautiful humanistic words about goodness, righteousness, etc. concealed ugly and cruel realities. In the words of Lu Xun’s Madman: Scrawled all over each page are the words: “Confucian Virtue and Morality.” Since I could not sleep anyway, I read intently half the night until I began to see words between the lines. The whole book was filled with the two words — “Eat people.”60

But such distortion should not make us fail to recognize the original meaning of the ideals and values found in the Confucian tradition and their relevance in the twenty-first century. (1) Viewing human beings as rational and responsible creatures endowed with the capacity to realize their intellectual and moral potential and improve the human condition; (2) believing in a universal human nature that transcends cultural differences and in universally valid ethical principles; (3) deeming study as a key to realizing our full potential; (4) seeing human beings as forming a larger unity with animals and nature; and (5) understanding the importance of seeking moderation and avoiding extremism, of seeking accord and harmony and avoiding strife and conflict — these are all essential ingredients of the Confucian tradition. Considered as an integral part of all mankind’s cultural heritage, Confucianism offers insights and modes of thought that can help us deal with the great challenges of our time such as climate change, war, oppression and exploitation, the unequal distribution of wealth, pandemics, etc. We have identified some tenets of Confucian thought as especially valuable resources in our time. Humanism, universalism, holism, the search for unity, the focus on moderation

60 Lu Xun, “A Madman’s Diary,” in Lu Xun, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980), 42.

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and overcoming conflicts and contradictions, the emphasis on duties, and the central role of study are all such tenets. It should be added that for many Chinese people Confucianism serves as a haven where they can anchor their cultural identity. This is quite natural, not least because the Confucian tradition is so intimately connected with the Chinese language. Therefore, its role in defining Chinese identity should certainly not to be rejected, let alone condemned. But Confucianism is not exclusively Chinese; it belongs to all mankind and its outreach is universal. Therefore, the value of Confucianism in the twenty-first century is not only that it possesses tenets of thought that are badly needed in our time, but also that most intellectual and moral insights that we find in the Confucian tradition may be seen as variations on themes that can also be found in other traditions. Confucius was right when he said that by nature all humans are quite similar and that noble persons can maintain harmonious relations even when they differ. Cultural diversity is enriching and does not have to lead to clashes of civilizations.

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“Our Common Agenda.” 2021. United Nations Secretary-General’s Report. https://www. un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/. Pinker, Stephen. Rationality: What it Is, Why it Seems Scarce, Why it Matters. London: Penguin Books, 2021. Plaks, Andrew, trans. Ta Hsüeh and Ching Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean). London: Penguin Classics, 2003. Pope Francis. Encyclical Letter Laudato si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for our Common Home. London: Catholic Truth Society, 2015. https://www.vatican.va/conten t/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si. html. Schluchter, Wolfgang, ed. Max Webers Studie über Konfuziamismus und Taoismus: Interpretation und Kritik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1983. Schwartz, Benjamin I. “Some Polarities in Confucian Thought.” In Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, edited by Arthur F. Wright, 3–15. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Schwartz, Benjamin I. “Transcendence in Ancient China.” Daedalus 104, no. 2 (1975): 57– 68. Seok, Bongrae. “The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2021 Edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/ emotions-chinese/. Singer, Peter. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. Su, Xiaokang and Wang, Luxiang. Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang. Translated by Richard Bodman and Pin Pin Wan. Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991. Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 2019. https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20 Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf. Wang, Xiaolin. “‘National Studies’ in China and Japan.” International Communication of Chinese Culture 3, no. 3 (2016): 413–426. Wang, Yangming. Chuanxilu. See Chan, Wing-tsit 1965. Watson, Burton, trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Weber, Max. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. Translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth with an introduction by C. K. Yang. New York: The Free Press, 1968. Wei Yuan 魏源. Haiguo tuzhi 海国图志 (Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries) published in 1842–1852. 100 juan edition first published in 1852. https://zh.wikisource.o rg/wiki/%E6%B5%B7%E5%9C%8B%E5%9C%96%E5%BF%97. Wilkinson, Endymion. Chinese History: A New Manual. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. Vogel, Ezra F. The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. Yu, Taishan. China and the Ancient Mediterranean World: A Survey of Ancient Chinese Sources, Sino-Platonic Papers 242. Philadelphia: Department of East Asian Languages

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and Civilizations University of Pennsylvania, 2013. http://sino-platonic.org/complete /spp242_china_mediterranean.pdf. Yü, Ying-shih. “Morality and knowledge in Chu Hsi’s philosophical system.” In Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, edited by Wing-tsit Chan, 228–254. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1986. Yu, Yingshi (Yü, Ying-shih). Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng: Qingdai zhongqi xueshu sixiang yanjiu 戴震與章學城：清代中期學術思想研究 (Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng: Studies on Scholarly Thought in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century). Taibei: Huashi chubanshe, 1970. Zhang, Dainian. Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy. English translation Edmund Ryden. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002. Zhang, Liwen 张力文. Zhongguo zhexue fanchou fazhan shi 中国哲学范畴发展史 (A History of the Evolution of the Categories of Chinese Philosophy). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1995. Zhang, Longxi. Mighty Opposites: from Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Zhu, Weizheng 朱維錚. Zhongguo jingxueshi shi jiang 中国経学史十讲 (Ten Lectures on the History of the Study of the Classics). Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2002.

Alan T. Wood

Confucian Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Perspective

I.

Introduction: The Global Context

Few subjects are more relevant to the future of China and humankind than the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy. China needs the institutional benefits of democracy to reach its full potential, and humankind needs the moral insight of Confucianism to reach the next level of global governance. The human family is at a major inflection point. The problems confronting us today — climate change, environmental degradation, disease, nuclear proliferation, shortages of water and food, the globalization of crime, and many other issues — for the first time in human history can no longer be dealt with on a local or national level. Their scope is global. Only cooperative governance on a global scale — based on the institutional legitimacy of democracy and a global ethic rooted in the basic laws of nature itself (like Confucianism) — can address them successfully. These global challenges form the larger historical and geo-political context in which the subject of this volume — Confucianism in the twenty-first century — is embedded. My particular charge is to reflect on how Confucianism can contribute to democracy, and how democracy can contribute to Confucianism. The thesis of this paper is two-fold: (1) that the relationship between the two is complementary, democracy providing the institutional hardware, and Confucianism the moral software, and (2) that this relationship has the potential to help the world manage its collective challenges together. Democratic laws and institutions are ineffective when corrupted by people without moral principle. At the same time, moral principles by themselves are equally ineffective when political institutions have been coopted by various ruling elites to serve their own interests rather than the common good. A successful system of governance requires the presence of both moral forces and institutional structures that reinforce each other’s benefits and mitigate each other’s drawbacks. Unfortunately, the institutions of governance we have inherited from the past — the nation-state

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operating in an amoral international arena — were designed for competition not cooperation. They are no longer up to the task. The modern nation-state was forged in the crucible of war in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was a visible manifestation in politics of the doctrine of nominalism in philosophy that arose in the late Middle Ages in Europe and rejected the organic, holistic, and ecological worldview that had prevailed up to then. Nominalism gave rise to a new worldview that has been variously termed mechanistic, reductionist, and atomistic.1 Its defining principle was that reality is made up of parts that have no intrinsic relationship with each other. To be sure, this new way of thinking produced an explosion in knowledge that led eventually to the scientific and industrial revolutions. By prioritizing the particular and repudiating the universal, however, it also led to unintended consequences that favored competition over cooperation, freedom over equality, rights over responsibility, individual over community, autonomy over integration. The rejection of a universal ethic that accompanied these changes removed moral constraints that might otherwise have discouraged practices such as slavery, the opium trade, and the colonization of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century, with poisonous consequences that are still with us today. Then, in the first half of the twentieth century, European powers turned the guns of war on themselves in two devastating conflicts that ended the period of European domination of the world forever. Those wars were followed by almost fifty years of a Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was a brief moment when it appeared the world was moving toward a democratic future. Whereas in 1900 there were no countries in the world that qualified as full democracies, by 2000 there were 120.2 After the year 2000, however, the trend line began to change. The past twenty years have reminded us that democracies, once achieved, can also be lost. They can commit suicide, as they did in the first reverse wave of democratization in the 1930s personified by the fate of the Weimar Republic in Germany, followed by a second reverse wave in the 1960s and 1970s. We now seem to be in a third reverse wave from democratic to authoritarian rule in contemporary

1 The classic treatment of this subject is by the University of California Berkeley historian Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980). 2 Larry Diamond, director of the Center of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University, put it this way: “As Freedom House notes in its latest annual survey of freedom in the world, there was not a single country in 1900 that would qualify by today’s standards as a democracy…. By January 2000, Freedom House counted 120 democracies, the highest number and the greatest percentage (63) in the history of the world.” Diamond, “A Report Card on Democracy,” Hoover Digest, no. 3 (2000).

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Venezuela, Thailand, the Philippines, Hungary, and Turkey, among several others. During the thirty years that elapsed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, meanwhile, China abandoned Marxist-Leninist economic policies in favor of a free market open to global trade while retaining its authoritarian political structures. This transition led to the most dramatically successful period of economic growth in human history, lifting 700 million people out of poverty and catapulting China to become the largest economy in the world. Then, in 2020, the world was visited by a global pandemic that originated in China but that China was able to control effectively. The United States, on the other hand, not only failed to manage the pandemic but also revealed fundamental weaknesses in the very foundations of its own democracy when a significant proportion of the American population demonstrated a willingness to abandon democracy altogether in favor of authoritarian rule. The contrast between the success of China in protecting its own people from the pandemic, and the failure of the democracies around the world, including Europe and India, to do the same, together with the backsliding of hitherto democratic states, raised a fundamental question over the comparative efficacy of authoritarian and democratic forms of government. There are three parts to my argument. The first lies in the realm of institutions and considers the strengths and weaknesses of both democratic and authoritarian forms of governance. The second lies in the realm of civic morality, and considers the general characteristics of a Confucian and Neo-Confucian civic morality that is not grounded in religious traditions that vary in time and place but on the laws of nature shared by all peoples in the world, and is rooted in a relational framework of holistic complementarity (taiji 太極, the Supreme Ultimate) based on the Neo-Confucian synthesis of Zhu Xi. The third realm explores the new paradigm shift from a mechanistic to an organic, ecological, and holistic perspective (based on the rise of quantum physics, systems biology, network science, and deep ecology) that began in the twentieth century. We may be at the cusp of a convergence of East and West that captures the basic insights of traditional Confucianism and modern science to build an inherently moral perspective of mutual reciprocity, one that has potentially global significance.

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II.

The Realm of Institutions: Strengths and Weaknesses of Democratic and Authoritarian Forms of Governance

A.

The Relative Strengths of Democratic Governance

The core strength of democratic forms of government is freedom. It is the incubator of both individual creativity and social innovation that has driven evolutionary change from the beginning of life on earth to the present. In both the natural and human realms, freedom makes possible experiments that respond to changing circumstances from the bottom-up. Most of these experiments fail. Some, however, succeed and move the species forward. The larger context in which that freedom operates, to be sure, is defined by the constraints of inherited structures and processes — the rules that govern the system. As a whole, then, there is a balance between freedom arising from the bottom up and the authority of structure delivered from the top down. The structure provides order, continuity, and stability necessary for the effective functioning of a bureaucratic system to manage the inherent complexity of governance. Bottom-up processes provide organic and flexible responses to the constantly changing dynamics of local conditions so that policies emanating from the top can be modified at the bottom. The relationship of freedom and authority is therefore complementary. Too much of the former results in chaos; too much of the latter results in stasis or tyranny.3 A second strength is the discouragement of corruption and abuse of power. All forms of government are susceptible to corruption and abuse of power because of the inherent egoism of the human personality. The great advantage of democracies over all other forms of government in dealing with this constant temptation is through checks and balances — a free press, an independent judiciary, and grass-root organizations not controlled by the state — that minimize corruption and abuse of power. Elections provide a further opportunity for removing officials who have abused their power. In this way democracies can be said to be selfcorrecting. In Reinhold Niebuhr’s immortal words, “man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”4 A third strength of democracy is the legitimacy of the government. Because sovereignty rests with the people in a democracy and because the people select the individuals who represent them in public office, a democratic government can claim a greater degree of legitimacy than any other form of government. In a 3 I explored this topic in What Does It Mean to be Human?: A New Interpretation of Freedom in World History (New York: Peter Lang, 2001). 4 The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Scribner’s, 1944), xiii.

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democracy, the purpose of the state is to serve the people. In an authoritarian system, the purpose of the people is to serve the state.

B.

The Relative Weaknesses of Democratic Governance

Democracies also have weaknesses. Among the most important is paralysis. Because democracies are designed to enable interest groups to organize in favor of their own interests (the bottom-up part), and because those interest groups are often in direct conflict with each other, the result can be deadlock. On some level, the interests of the butcher and the cow can never be fully reconciled. Interest groups, which exist solely to promote their own interest even if it conflicts with the common good, can thus become an obstacle to good governance when they are not regulated. In addition, democracies are allergic to short-term pain, even when it is necessary for long-term benefit. Politicians who advocate policies that require sacrifice are often voted out of office in favor of politicians who promise shortterm benefits even when that produces long-term damage. The quintessential example of that is taxes, which people routinely reject even though those taxes pay for services the public wants and needs. Democracies are also poor with emergencies such as natural disasters or pandemics. In part this is due to the nature of all bureaucratic organizations, which are designed to do extremely complex routine tasks that follow existing rules. But emergencies are not routine. They require quick, decisive, top-down leadership that by necessity violates established process. Democracies add a further obstacle to fast top-down decision-making because they are designed for bottom-up participation, thereby discouraging the rapid mobilization of resources from the system as a whole. Democracies, like all other forms of government, are also susceptible to corruption of every kind (taking corruption to be the abuse of public institutions for private benefit). In the United States the redrawing of legislative districts by members of Congress and state legislators to guarantee their own reelection, the increasing role of money in lobbying and in election campaigns, and the ability of the wealthy to escape paying taxes, aided by the complicity of politicians whose campaigns are financed by the wealthy, are merely the most recent examples of a tendency to corruption that seems inherent in the human psyche. The last great weakness of democracies is the propensity of most voters to be guided by their emotions and not their reason. Few citizens pay attention to complex issues of public policy and foreign affairs. Many are not well-educated. Because of the human need for social solidarity, people are influenced more by how their friends vote than by their own reason. The result is that voters are

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capable of being manipulated by politicians who exploit their fears and hatreds, resulting in the election of officials who are manifestly unfit to govern. It was ever thus. Plato thought of democracy as mob rule, and even Aristotle thought the best form of rule was a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In the past, democracy was rare, and appears to have flourished only in relatively small societies, appearing even as early as hunter-gatherer societies where everybody participated in decision-making at some level. Democracy was actually practiced in many parts of the world even in very early times, but in societies that had not developed strong states with complex bureaucratic structures to collect taxes and administer state policies.5 Africa, Europe in the Middle Ages, and India were thus able to develop democratic policies of governance on the local level, whereas China and Middle Eastern states very early on had developed complex centralized state structures that covered large areas.6 China’s development of autocracy, in this sense, was due to its very success in unifying a large state over an extended period of time, just as Roman governance transitioned from a republican to an autocratic system of rule under Caesar Augustus when it needed to create a strong, centralized system of bureaucratic governance to manage a complex empire. Only in recent times did the institution of representative democracy appear with its own particular mix of strengths and weaknesses.

C.

What Are the Relative Strengths of Authoritarian Governance?

The relative strengths of an authoritarian system are in some ways the flip side of the weaknesses of a democratic system. Authoritarian systems can be more efficient in the short-term. They can get things done quickly because they can focus resources more efficiently without worrying about delays caused by the need to ensure participation by all parties (i. e., bottom-up input). In a similar vein, authoritarian governments are able to pursue more long-term policies because they don’t have to worry about opposition by people who experience short-term pain. This is certainly true in China in the last three decades, when

5 See David Stasavage, The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020). 6 According to Stasavage, “China presents the clearest alternative to the path of political development taken by western Europe. In China a bureaucratic order arrived at a very early date, and apart from interludes like the Spring and Autumn period, it persisted. It did so despite outside invasion, and successful outside conquerors simply co-opted the bureaucracy rather than dismantling it” (The Decline and Rise of Democracy, 164–165).

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capital resources were channeled into construction of a vast infrastructure of transportation and communication.7 In some ways China is in a class by itself. The structure of its government, and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism that it adopted as its guiding principle, was inherited from the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union eventually collapsed of its own accord, while China has presided over an economic miracle that has no precedent in world history. This is not the place to explain that remarkable achievement in detail, other than to suggest that its success may be owed less to its autocratic form of government and more to a cultural heritage that stresses rule by a highly educated and skilled administrative class whose very existence is buttressed by popular expectations for good governance rooted in the Confucian ethic. Thus, China represents the very best case that can be made for the efficacy of an authoritarian system, leading some observers to argue that it suits the Chinese people better than democracy.8

D.

What are the Relative Disadvantages of Authoritarian Governance?

Just as democracies suffer from weaknesses inherent in the nature of the system, so do authoritarian systems of governance. Because power in an authoritarian system tends to concentrate at the top, it lacks a robust system of checks and balances. Corruption becomes more and more severe with the passage of time if there are few natural impediments in its way. To be sure, authoritarian systems can impose campaigns intended to root out corruption, but some wit has noted that just as doctors don’t operate on themselves, neither can governments police themselves if there are no outside incentives for accountability. Because power in a top-down system discourages input from below, over time an authoritarian system risks losing touch with rapid changes that are taking place in the broader society, and therefore makes decisions that are based on an increasingly distorted understanding of reality. The hierarchical nature of an authoritarian system, a lack of autonomous institutions like a free press and an independent judiciary, and a strong tendency (in all organizations) for bureaucrats to tell their superiors what they want to hear (regardless of whether it is 7 Two interesting accounts of the skill and flexibility of the Chinese government’s policies of economic development are Yukon Huang, Cracking the China Conundrum: Why Conventional Economic Wisdom is Wrong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) and Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020). 8 The argument that China is too big for democracy has always mystified me. It seems to me that it is rather because China is so big that it needs democracy to foster diversity and flexibility at the local level.

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true or false), all reinforce these misperceptions. In addition, the general public is susceptible to manipulation by news controlled by the government.9 Unfortunately, propaganda is just that — a distortion of reality. Over time, decisions based on fiction rather than reality can result in escalating problems. In China the central government seeks to mitigate this weakness by responding quickly to violent outbursts of social unrest, and often moves aggressively to address instances of corruption that provoke these outbursts. The fact that the central government now allocates more money on domestic security than defense suggests that the government takes this issue very seriously.10 In that sense, then, the government does demonstrate a degree of accountability, but the cost in human conflict is high. The lack of freedom in an authoritarian system — and the accompanying corruption and abuse of power that results — tends to undermine the legitimacy of the government among the people. When people participate in decisionmaking, they are much more likely to accept the outcome of a decision (even when it is unfavorable to them) than they are to accept the outcome of a decision when they have not participated (even when the decision is favorable to them). People might be willing to accept the legitimacy of an authoritarian government when everything goes smoothly, but they will be much less likely to accept that legitimacy when the government fails (which happens to all governments at some point — no government can sustain a prosperous economy forever). Another weakness in an authoritarian system occurs during the transition to a new leader, when there is often a struggle for succession. During that struggle, the qualities necessary for survival — namely a ruthless pursuit of power — are not always the same qualities necessary for effective governance. At the very least there is a period of uncertainty. That can also happen in a democracy, of course, but in an authoritarian system there is no way to get rid of the ruler short of violence, which further undermines long-term cooperation.

III.

The Realm of Civic Morality

In the West, ethical and moral behavior was historically linked to religious faith. That worked as long as society was relatively homogeneous. The first cracks in that edifice in Western Europe appeared with the rise of nominalism that rejected all universals, and that laid the intellectual foundations of the Reformation. 9 Although this is true, the advent of the new technology of communication through social media has demonstrated how easy it is, even in a democracy, for the public to be manipulated by false information. 10 Yukon Huang, Cracking the China Conundrum, 113.

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When civil war between Protestants and Catholics threatened the very survival of Western civilization, peace was finally made possible only by severing the connection between politics and religion. The ensuing separation of Church and state led eventually to a further problem, however. If ethics are tied so closely to religious faith, what happens to universal values when there is a plurality of faiths, or no faith at all, and how does one make a claim to the universality of human rights on a mechanistic, nominalist platform that denies all universals? The Confucian tradition avoided this dilemma altogether because ethics were understood to be rooted not in religious faith (which differs) but in the basic laws of nature itself (which everyone shares in common), wherein everything is interconnected and therefore linked together in bonds of mutual responsibility. If the cosmos itself is moral, then our responsibility as part of that moral universe is to align our personal behavior as much as possible to those fundamental principles. The moral worldview of Confucius and Mencius was developed during a period of great political unrest when China was divided into many states at war with each other. While other thinkers concentrated on the techniques for gaining and retaining power, Confucius and Mencius emphasized the priority of ethical behavior. It was their particular genius to understand that stable and enduring political power ultimately rests on the legitimacy of the government, and the legitimacy of the government, in turn, rests on the physical welfare and the moral commitment of the people. Force alone can prevail only over the short term. Therefore, they and later thinkers, like Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 in the Han dynasty, derived their assertions of moral principle from a holistic frame of reference that grounded the actions of the ruler in the basic principles of nature. If the ruler failed to promote the welfare of the people, then power, through the agency of nature itself — the mandate of heaven, tianming 天命 — would be transferred to someone else. Xunzi was more blunt, noting in his powerful metaphor that the ruler is a boat and the people are the sea — the sea can support the boat, or the sea can capsize the boat. After the collapse of the Han dynasty, China fell again into a period of multistate warfare until it was reunified in the Sui and Tang dynasties, followed by yet another period of civil war before the rise of the Song dynasty in the tenth century. From the end of the Han to the beginning of the Song, moreover, Confucianism did not play a central role in the realm of political thought. In the Six Dynasties and Tang dynasty, Daoism and Buddhism had become the major schools of thought in China by focusing on the natural and spiritual realms respectively. By the early Song, it was clear that if Confucianism were ever to recover its preeminence, it would have to incorporate those other two perspectives. The ever-present challenge of unifying China therefore also became a conceptual challenge of integrating these three major philosophical traditions.

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The result was a re-birth of the Confucian ethic — beginning in the eleventh century — that we now refer to as Neo-Confucianism. The Song thinkers were confronted with the reality of a centralized authoritarian system that was itself no longer constrained by an aristocracy capable of limiting the power of the emperor. Their hope was that by fortifying a system of administrative governance by an educated elite devoted to Confucian principles of moral governance, they could limit the power of the emperor and govern in the public interest.11 Alas, they failed. The power of the emperor increased, not decreased, in the dynasties that followed the Song. For a moment, however, their confidence produced a remarkably creative synthesis. The brilliance of the Neo-Confucian revival in the Song was that it chose not to deny the validity of the Buddhist and Daoist traditions but instead to affirm them. The great philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 in the Southern Song wove all these various threads together into a masterful synthesis that later became the orthodox interpretation of Confucianism and the basis of the civil-service examination system until it was abolished in 1905. The unifying principle of Zhu Xi’s thought was the Supreme Ultimate, taiji 太極, represented by the yin-yang 陰 陽symbol. This concept had been first articulated in China in the middle of the first millennium BC, part of a larger school of Daoist thought that was eventually written down in early classics like the Yijing 易經. It represented a dualistic principle — an interactive balance of opposites — that was understood to be nothing less than the creative and organizing principle of the entire cosmos. It did not assume a linear movement, say, from some sort of Hegelian dialectic moving from thesis to antithesis, but a more dynamic and mutually interactive flow of each to the other simultaneously, a continuum between two poles in such a way that one cannot be understood except by reference to its relationship with the other, just as a line is defined as much by the empty space around it as by the line itself (indeed, without the space around it, the line would not exist). Instead of an adversarial contest between winners and losers, this relationship was more like the rhythm of a perpetual dance. It represented the creative principle of the universe, and the basic process of change in nature itself, thereby aligning the Confucian moral system of reciprocity with the fundamental laws of nature, the patterns of the cosmic order, and the abiding truths of the human spirit. It assumed that the constituent elements of nature are in a complementary relationship with each other, not either/or but both/and. It is a paradox, a mystery of contradictions that are nevertheless true, a duality of states that are both linear and sequential, but also relational, complementary, and simultaneous. Like a spiral staircase (or a double helix or a Möbius strip), it moves 11 I explored that thesis in Alan T. Wood, Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political Rights (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).

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forward and circles backward at the same time. Its explanatory power has only recently been discovered by Western science, where it became central to the new paradigm of thought that emerged only in the twentieth century, and that seems to offer a scientific confirmation of the Neo-Confucian perspective.

IV.

The Realm of Complementarity: Systems Biology/Physics/Ecology

The worldview most widely accepted in the scientific community from the Scientific Revolution to the beginning of the twentieth century, as noted above, was known variously as mechanistic, atomistic, linear, or reductionist. It assumed that nature was a machine, a whole defined solely by the collection of its individual parts, each having no intrinsic connection with the others. That whole, in turn, could be fully understood by reference to its constituent parts alone. The modern university, which chops human knowledge into bite-size chunks known as disciplines to be studied by specialists in relative isolation from other disciplines, is a monument to this understanding of the nature of reality.12 The counterpart of this view in political thought was the radical individualism of Enlightenment thinkers, for whom society was not a natural association but merely an artificial construct — the result of a social contract — entered into by individuals to promote their private benefit. Then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the mechanistic worldview that had dominated classical physics for so long was turned upside down by the discovery of a whole new world of quantum physics that did not behave according to the classical laws of physics. Behavior in the subatomic world defied the conventional understanding of one of the most central principles of Greek logic, the law of the excluded middle, which held that any statement about reality must be either true or false. If a given statement is true, then its opposite, by definition, must be false. In the subatomic world, however, that principle did not apply. Only quantum physics could explain it, and only by reference to the principle of the complementarity of opposites. This insight was key to understanding one of the most mysterious phenomena of physics — light. When light is measured as a particle, it acts like a particle. When it is measured as a wave, it acts like a wave.

12 Specialization is not bad. It is a necessary consequence of the exponentially expanding base of human knowledge. In promoting the breaking down of knowledge (disciplinary analysis) exclusively, however, it ignores the equally valid need to put the pieces together in new wholes (interdisciplinary synthesis). The structure of the modern university is therefore vertical, not horizontal.

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But how can that be? How can it be simultaneously both a particle and a wave, both matter and energy? Classical physics had no explanation that made sense. One of the pioneers of this revolution was Niels Bohr at the University of Copenhagen, who received the Nobel Prize in physics in 1922. When the Danish king conferred an award on him for his achievements, Bohr designed a coat of arms that featured the taiji symbol. Above the symbol he inscribed the Latin phrase “contraria sunt complementa,” opposites (or contraries) are complementary. He believed that this symbol most faithfully captured the paradoxical relationship between matter and energy that existed at the sub-atomic level. Matter flows into energy, and energy flows into matter. Which is not so much a matter of objective reality as it is a matter of how the subject chooses to measure it, such that objective and subjective also exist in a complementary relationship of dynamic interaction. Bohr made this concept central not only to his understanding of physics, but to his core philosophy in general, once remarking that the opposite of a truth is another truth.13 The Nobel Prize physicist Frank Wilczek has made the same point more recently in two books that focus on the principle of complementarity as the essence of wisdom.14 Meanwhile, during the time of this revolution in physics, the field of biology was also undergoing a series of profound transformations. By the second half of the nineteenth century philosophers and biologists began to notice that some phenomena in nature could not be explained by reductionist methods. When two flammable gases — hydrogen and oxygen — combine, for example, they form a non-flammable liquid, water; and when two toxic substances, sodium and chlorine, combine, they form table salt. This process came to be called “emergence,” which meant that the whole contains properties that emerge only at the level of the whole itself and cannot be understood by reference to the properties of the individual parts alone. Here as well the complementarity of opposites applied. It was not that the reductionist method was wrong, because the structure of water can indeed be reduced to its constituent elements. It was instead that the properties of water emerge only at the level of the whole, and that the entire evolutionary history of life on earth embodied a sequence of emergent wholes that could not be explained solely by reference to their structural, and non-living, chemical components. Atoms form molecules; molecules form organelles; or13 The best discussion of this for a general audience is still Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics (Boston: Shambala, 1975), further explored in Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture (New York: Bantam, 1984). See also Fritjof Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi, The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 14 Frank Wilczek, A Beautiful Question: Finding Nature’s Deep Design (New York: Penguin, 2015), and Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality (New York: Penguin, 2021). In his words, “you can’t do justice to the human condition without taking complementarity to heart” (Fundamentals, 207).

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ganelles form cells; cells form tissues; tissues form organs; and on up the pyramid of life. Each layer, starting with atoms, is at once an integrated and emergent whole composed of its own aggregate parts in the level below it, and an autonomous part of a larger whole in the level above it.15 Human consciousness itself, by the same token, cannot be explained by reference only to the individual neurons that comprise the brain. Consciousness is thus a preeminent example of emergence. The new understanding was radically different from the reductionist understanding that had preceded it. This new holistic paradigm in both physics and biology called for an entirely new conceptual frame of reference. The terminology varied from one field to the next but often was expressed by the terms “ecological” or “systems” or “complexity.” The basic insight was that everything is connected to everything else, and that the natural — and by extension the human — world is a function of complex and reciprocal relationships. Furthermore, every ecosystem operated according to rules that were not linear but relational and systemic. Those rules or patterns could not be fully understood by examining the parts in isolation but only by taking into account their mutual and interactive relationships. The world was assumed to be made up of a web of relationships that are inherently moral through the quality of reciprocity. Reciprocity is the core value, and the foundation of the fundamental ethical principle of the golden rule — to treat others as you want others to treat you. By helping someone else, therefore, one is helping oneself. By harming someone else, one is harming oneself. This principle of complementarity can also apply to the relationship between a reductionist and holistic worldview itself, as in, for example, the contrasting approaches of Chinese and Western medicine. Chinese medicine looks at the whole; Western medicine looks at the parts. Chinese medicine is preventive; Western medicine is curative. Chinese medicine concentrates on strengthening the internal immune system of a patient to fight off germs; Western medicine concentrates on using specific drugs to attack the germs after they have begun to do damage. Chinese medicine is systemic; Western medicine is mechanistic. Chinese medicine is general; Western medicine is specialized. In traditional times, wealthy Chinese paid their doctors a regular fee for keeping them healthy. When they got sick, they did not pay the doctors. (Imagine how that practice might improve the incentive system in modern medical care!) The great benefit of Chinese medicine is that it is suitable for the long term because it promotes efficiency and sustainability. A patient who doesn’t get sick very often will 15 Here, as before, one of the best introductions to this new development in the biological sciences is by Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems (New York: Anchor, 1997). Capra synthesizes the work of Gregory Bateson and Ilya Prigogine.

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consume few resources and will be able to contribute energy to the welfare of others.16 The analogy between the health of the body and the health of the body politic was, of course, the core principle in Plato’s Republic. Following that same analogy, the counterpart of Western medicine in a political state is a system of laws, which are designed to rectify a behavior harmful to society — the equivalent of an illness. But laws can only punish someone for doing what is wrong. They cannot inspire someone to do what is right. Laws are curative, not preventive. Only a system of moral belief can do that (as when Plato remarked that the level of morality in a given society is inversely proportional to the number of lawyers). Once again, any given society needs both. Their relationship is complementary. From this holistic perspective of the biological sciences, one could further argue that nature itself is democratic in the sense that, like democracy, nature is self-organizing. Although the natural world as a whole is hierarchical, nature has no overall organizer, no autocrat or monarch at the top calling the shots. On the contrary, its flexibility and adaptability come precisely because of the absence of any one entity at the top directing the parts. If there were such an entity, it would be unable to manage the infinitely complex interactions in the system as a whole. It operates according to principles that favor a constant interactive exchange of information among all the parts of a complex whole. The Daoist concept of nonaction, wuwei, is a remarkable expression of that principle that nature is spontaneous, operating most smoothly without interference from higher authority. It organizes itself. A whole new body of research has emerged in the past few decades arguing that humans are not primarily competitive but cooperative.17 Among the most interesting is the work of Martin Nowak, Professor of Biology and Mathematics at Harvard, who has argued that although mutation and selection were the great insights of Charles Darwin, the real engine of natural selection was not competition but cooperation.18 He speaks at length of the role that indirect and direct 16 To be sure, if I were to be diagnosed with an operable brain tumor, I would be inclined to opt for an interventionist form of surgery. But if I wanted to avoid getting a brain tumor in the first place, I would follow Chinese principles of preventive medicine. 17 I have explored some aspects of this trend in “Fire, Water, Earth, and Sky: Global Systems History and the Human Prospect,” The Journal of the Historical Society (September 2010): 287–318. 18 Martin A. Nowak, with Roger Highfield, SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (New York: Free Press, 2011). Elinor Ostrom, the first woman to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics, has spent a career focusing on the ways in which cultures all over the world have cooperated to deal successfully with common resources. My favorite is Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 2015). Evolutionary anthropologists Brian Hare and Vanessa Woods have published a fascinating study Survival of the Friendliest: Understanding our Origins and Rediscovering Our Common Humanity (New York: Random

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reciprocity have played in the evolution of the human species. In his closing remarks he also offers a statement about the relevance of democracy to the future evolution of our species: “We need to place more faith in citizens than leaders. Cooperation has to come from the bottom up and not be imposed from the top down. That is why, for example, democracy is a cornerstone concept, since this is a form of cooperation that grows from the roots.”19 Democracy’s great advantage, therefore, by following the principle of subsidiarity, decentralizes decisions to the lowest possible level with the maximum freedom. Over time, it is thus more likely to respond to change and crisis successfully. A rule of law, and a free press, flawed though they may be, and as susceptible to the temptations of corruption by money and power as are all other human institutions, still go a long way to enhance transparency and accountability so that information shared with all members of the system is more accurate and reliable than it would otherwise be.

V.

Final Thoughts

I would like to close with three further reflections on the suitability of a Confucian and democratic ethic for the future of China and the world. The first has to do with the hope that China will eventually evolve toward a democratic system of government. The second is the need for the Western understanding of democracy to move beyond a wholesale (and needlessly mechanistic) commitment to radical individualism. The third has to do with the future, given that the title of this anthology is Confucianism in the twenty-first century, four-fifths of which lie in the future. The humiliation visited on China by Western powers during the nineteenth century, and the collapse of centralized rule following the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, led Chinese intellectuals to undertake a sweeping critique of the Chinese tradition. Many, if not most, initially blamed Confucianism for China’s weaknesses. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, a new generation of intellectuals, labeled New Confucians, began to undertake a further reappraisal of the Chinese intellectual tradition with a view to integrating the past with the influences emanating from the West. Among the most important of those in-

House, 2020). Nicholas A. Christakis, Sterling Professor of Social and Natural Science at Yale University, has written a compelling argument for the importance of cooperation in Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society (New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2019). This list is just the tip of the iceberg. 19 SuperCooperators, 282.

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tellectuals for our purpose here was Xu Fuguan 徐復觀.20 His central thesis was that pre-Qin Confucianism exhibited a democratic spirit that was subsequently squelched by the institution of autocracy that lasted for the past two thousand years, and notes the passage in the Liji that the “world belongs to all,” and the passage in the Mencius that “the people are the most precious, the ruler comes last.”21 In emphasizing the natural and enduring conflict between Confucian scholar-officials and the autocratic system they were part of for the past two thousand years, Xu Fuguan distinguished himself from the other New Confucians in his generation.22 I share his overall assessment of autocracy. After the Song, when the autocratic powers of the emperor had immeasurably increased in China’s central government, China’s technological innovation began to stagnate. For complex reasons, China turned inward, closing itself off from interactions with those parts of the world that were moving forward in all kinds of new ways. Whereas China had once been the center of technological innovation, it lost its edge. The exam system, harnessed to the service of the centralized autocracy, and in spite of its genuine benefit of fostering an integrated worldview throughout China, may also have had the effect of discouraging creative thought.23 The situation in the West, as I have tried to articulate above, is different. There democracy is in danger of tearing itself apart through its commitment to radical individualism. What had once been a virtue became a vice when it was no longer balanced by a moral commitment to the needs of the community as a whole. The West is in danger of forgetting that our deepest human attributes stem from our sociability, our ability to cooperate, to love, to have empathy for others, and to learn from the experience of others. These qualities were central to the Confucian outlook on life, and are now being increasingly confirmed by the neurosciences, by complexity theory, by evolutionary biology, by ecologists, and even by 20 See Chun-chieh Huang’s excellent analysis in Xu Fuguan in the Context of East Asian Confucianisms, trans. by Diana Arghirescu (Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2019). I was struck by the similarity between Xu Fuguan’s view that the purpose of scholarship is not primarily the discovery of knowledge for its own sake (which was characteristic of the schools of textual criticism in the Qing period), but the application of that knowledge in improving life in the present. I couldn’t help noting that this driving motive was also shared by the Northern Song scholar Sun Fu 孫復 whose commentary on the Chunqiu was the central core of my own early scholarship (in Limits to Autocracy) and who was also criticized by his contemporaries for over-interpreting events in the past in order to apply them to the present. 21 Quoted in Huang, Xu Fuguan, 30. 22 Huang, Xu Fuguan, 23. 23 To be sure, there were exceptions, such as the burst of creativity at the end of the Ming and beginning of the Qing, but they remained exceptions. And it is also true that the monarchical system in the West at the time was not a haven of democratic theory either. But the system in Europe was nevertheless highly competitive between small states, much as it had been in China during the pre-Qin centuries when creativity flourished.

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physicists. The dangers of organizing society strictly on the basis of competition among individuals became instantly apparent when the Covid-19 pandemic arrived on the scene in 2020. It was as if Mother Nature was reminding us again that we have ignored her previous warnings about climate change. So she decided to send us another message, one that would give us plenty of time to stay at home and reflect on what we need to do and how we need to reform our thinking. Instead of listening, however, a large percentage of the public — at least in America — chose to ignore the common good in favor of their own private ideology of freedom at any expense, including the deaths of their own family members. American individualism increasingly looked more like self-destructive selfishness. My last thought has to do with the relevance of the Confucian ethic to the future of the human family. We can expect that in the remaining decades of the twenty-first century, technology will continue to transform the world in ways that we cannot even imagine. By the end of this century, artificial intelligence will surely have reached a point where machines will exceed the powers of the human mind in multiple realms, just as they have already been able to defeat the best human minds in chess and weiqi. Genetic engineering will also reach a level of expertise that will make possible the creation of whole new species of genetically modified humans. These thoughts were brought home to me with special force recently when I realized that my grandchildren will all live to see the twentysecond century, when these prospects will no doubt unfold. What kind of a governance system (autocratic or democratic) do we want our grandchildren to experience? What kind of a moral system do we want them to apply in making fundamental decisions about what it means to be human? What categories of analysis (mechanistic or holistic) do we want them to use as they take control of our future as a species to a degree never before possible? These are the real questions that coming generations will have to grapple with, and there is not a whole lot of time for them to prepare before these issues will present themselves with overwhelming urgency. These issues, moreover, are not neatly divided into academic disciplines, which means that the modern university may not be the place where they can be addressed most fruitfully ( just as the university was not the incubator of most of the breakthroughs of the Scientific Revolution). We will need to create new institutions, new think tanks, new shuyuan, new skunk works, that bring together the best minds in the world, regardless of academic specialization or credentials (including leaders in business and politics), and give them freedom to roam.24 24 In one of my few forays into administrative work, I had the opportunity to listen to a presentation by Rogers Hollingsworth from the University of Wisconsin to the Board of Regents at the University of Washington a few years ago. As part of a blue-sky project looking

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Their model might well be Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, who in the early years after the fall of the Qing sought out the best minds in China, regardless of formal academic training, disciplines, or ideological orientation, and challenged them to grapple with the biggest issue of their day — the future of China. One thing is clear. The insights of a Chinese philosopher 2,500 years ago and updated by another Chinese philosopher 800 years ago should be an essential part of future dialogues about the nature and destiny of humankind.

Bibliography Capra, Fritjof and Luigi Luisi. The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Christakis, Nicholas A. Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society. New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2019. Diamond, Larry. “A Report Card on Democracy.” Hoover Digest, no. 3 (2000). Huang, Chun-chieh. Xu Fuguan in the Context of East Asian Confucianisms. Translated by Diana Arghirescu. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2019. Huang, Yukon. Cracking the China Conundrum: Why Conventional Wisdom is Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Keltner, Dacher. Born to be Good: The Science of a Meaningful Life. New York: W.W. Norton, 2009. Mahbubani, Kishore. Has China Won?: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy. New York: PublicAffairs, 2020. Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980. Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. New York: Scribner’s, 1944. Nowak, Martin A., with Roger Highfield. Super Cooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed. New York: Free Press, 2011.

at the long-term future of the University, the Board had commissioned Hollingsworth to talk about his research on how some institutions over long stretches of time were able to cultivate breakthrough innovations in the sciences. His observations were surprising. Among the most interesting was his noting that small size was essential because it brought together specialists in diverse disciplines for meals and coffee that challenged them to think outside their normal disciplinary channels. The more that people interacted with specialists like themselves, the less likely they were to come up with breakthrough insights. He noted that bilingual and bicultural scientists were more open to new ideas and speculated that their brains were already primed to realize that there were many ways to look at the world. He recalled a conversation with an administrator at Rockefeller University who told him that they were looking for the rare scientist who was good at a specific area of knowledge but who also had an abiding passion in the really big hairy issues of science that transcended disciplinary boundaries. I mention this here because my subsequent conversations with Rogers frequently reminded me of the institution of the shuyuan during the Song.

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Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Smail, Daniel Lord. On Deep History and the Brain. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. Stasavage, David. The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. Wilczek, Frank. A Beautiful Question: Finding Nature’s Deep Design. New York: Penguin, 2015. —. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. Wood, Alan T. Asian Democracy in World History. New York: Routledge, 2004. —. Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political Rights. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995. —. What Does It Mean to be Human?: A New Interpretation of Freedom in World History. New York: Peter Lang, 2001. Woods, Hare and Vanessa Woods. Survival of the Friendliest: Understanding Our Origins and Rediscovering Our Common Humanity. New York: Random House, 2020.

Jana S. Rosˇker

Confucian Ethics of Relations and Alternative Models of Social Organization in Periods of Crises

I.

Introduction

Global crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, must be resolved through a process of global cooperation. Strategies to contain the spread of the viral disease cannot be confined to the narrow boundaries of individual nation-states. Within this framework, transcultural dialogues are not only possible, but also necessary and important. This chapter starts from the assumption that different models of ethics and humanism that have emerged in various cultural traditions can help us to create a new global ethics that can respond to these burning issues and to the general social demands of today’s globalized age. On this basis, it offers a brief introduction and analysis of the specific features of Confucian relational ethics and the relational constitution of personhood. The main aim here is to provide some theoretical foundations for future crisis resolution strategies and for the possible construction of such a new global ethics. Drawing on Confucian relational ethics, this chapter explores the connection between the cultural conditionality of Confucian moral philosophies and their possible implications for crisis resolution strategies. The desire to write about this topic arose in me immediately after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. As I write these lines, the pandemic has not yet been fully brought under control. At present, much of our lives are still on hold, and our mutual responsibility requires us to act in ways that are uncomfortable or even painful. Although we cannot know when all this will stop or what the post-pandemic “new normal” might look like, philosophy can change the way we respond to the situation in which we are caught. It can show us how to use this crisis as an opportunity to cultivate our sense of togetherness and mutual aid. Moreover, in these uncertain times, philosophy can awaken in us an awareness of our individual mortality and moral responsibility. Since this pandemic is a crisis of global proportions, all of humanity must be engaged to find a strategic solution to it. Therefore, knowledge and thoughts from different cultures and times may well prove helpful in such times.

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Thus, in such situations, it is especially important to consider ideas and ethical theories from different cultures. Dialogues between different forms of such intellectual legacies are therefore not only advisable but also necessary and the most sensible thing to do. Such exchanges, which could or should take place in the context of the current developments of globalisation, are important and valuable not only in terms of solving the current pandemic crisis, but also when taking into account other global problems that it is accompanied by and linked to, such as the constant environmental disasters,1 the ever-widening gap between rich and poor, the resulting migration crises, and so on. Indeed, solving such problems requires the cooperation and solidarity of the entire world population — something that will only be possible if there can be mutual understanding between different cultures and civilizations. As a Sinologist who is working on Chinese intellectual history, I will focus on the Chinese experience in this context, and in particular, as the title of this chapter suggests, on Confucian philosophy and ethics. Many people believe that human beings tend to be self-interested and guided by immediate goals. Unless curbed by appropriate information and hindered by insights into the existential significance of the relationship between the individual and society, this tendency becomes even more apparent in times of crisis. Especially in the modern world, concern about the risks of community contagion seems abstract and less important than the preservation of individual freedoms. If we are to develop other principles and embrace the values of cooperation and solidarity, we must modify and reshape our thinking so that it can proceed from a communal or social rather than an egocentric perspective. Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown that we need to put our moral theories into action in order to change our individual performances. It is in this context that Confucian relational ethics can certainly offer us useful and valuable alternatives, for, as we shall see, it is based on a different conception of humanity from that which has historically prevailed in Western culture. Within the framework of 1 In this context, it is worth noting that many contemporary Confucians and numerous Western scholars of Confucianism, such as Tu Weiming and John A. Tucker, repeatedly stress the importance of reviving the Confucian tradition of ecological thought. Tucker, for instance, places it in constructive dialogue with the concepts of “deep ecology” and “ecological egalitarianism” (Tucker 2013, 48), and Tu Weiming suggests (2001, 243) that such thinking has long been recognized by Confucians and manifests itself in the idea of the “unity of heaven and humanity” (天人合一). Although this expression as such is actually a rather modern term, for it does not appear in this form in any work of classical Chinese philosophy, it refers to the holistic nature of the classical Chinese worldview inherent in most of the dominant currents of traditional Chinese philosophical history. In this context, the epistemological aspects of bodily recognition (tiren 體認) or the unity of body and mind, as developed, for example, by the Modern New Confucian scholar Xu Fuguan, were also of utmost importance (cf. Sernelj 2014, 86).

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traditional Confucian ethics, personalities are constituted not by an emphasis on their individual particularities, but by their vital embeddedness in a dynamic social network created by their relationships with their fellow human beings. As such, this ethics can provide us with a whole range of valuable foundations for new forms of mutual empathy and solidarity, which are certainly among the most solid foundations for new crisis-solving strategies. Such transculturally conditioned theoretical foundations can help us to create new models of intersubjectivity and new foundations for more human-centred politics, legislation and decision-making systems.

II.

Confucianism: Original Teachings vs. Ideological Doctrine

As a Sinologist, I cannot forget that the coronavirus, which can cause a lung disease with high contagiousness and mortality, first appeared in China, and thus in the very cultural-linguistic space that is the core of my personal and professional interests, and therefore essential to the fundamental content of my research. However, although the onset of the pandemic can be located in this area, this is not the only reason why it is worthwhile to investigate the connection between China and the entire East Asia on the one hand, and the Covid-19 pandemic on the other. As the infection spread on a global scale and assumed pandemic proportions, it quickly became clear that it was the Sinic cultural and linguistic areas,2 rather than the Euro-American regions, that were more effective in stemming the tide of this viral epidemic and partly even eradicating it. The research on which this chapter is based has clearly shown that in seeking the reasons for the greater efficiency and effectiveness of Sinic cultural spaces, it is necessary to refute the unfounded claim that this is due to the allegedly autocratic practices of Sinic states, which act “top-down”3 and can do so because of the traditional “obedience” of their people. On the contrary, in the months following the epidemic, it became clear that measures were less effective in Sinic autocratic systems than in those countries of the region that are liberal democracies, such as Taiwan or South Korea. In this paper, I start from the assumption 2 Let me here briefly explain and define the term Sinic regions. These are the regions that have historically been heavily influenced by Chinese writing and also by some crucial cultural discourses that originated in China, especially Confucian ethics and the Chan Buddhist religion. These cultural regions include but are not limited to Eastern Asian countries; thus, in addition to China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, they also include Vietnam, Hong Kong, parts of Laos, and even Singapore. 3 In this context, many sociologists point out that, according to empirical research, Sinic successes were “both top-down, in that governments imposed strong control policies, and bottom-up, in that the people supported governments and followed government-mandated health measures (Sachs 2021, 93).

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that the real reasons for this better performance are more likely to be found in Confucian relational ethics, which does not start from the notion of an isolated individual and within which the contextualized human self and society are placed in a mutually complementary relationship. What underlies all liberal axiological systems, and what therefore constitutes the crucial moral foundation of today’s global modernization, are the European Enlightenment values based on the idea of a free and autonomous individual subject. The current pandemic has clearly shown that these values in their present form can no longer function as a coherent moral force even for Europe, let alone for all currently globalized and highly differentiated societies. However, the ideas of free and autonomous subjectivity and humanism are among the ideational foundations of modernization and constitute an important part of the European intellectual heritage, which still serves as the basis for numerous legal and ideological paradigms of today’s societies. It is therefore necessary to revive, improve and update the key humanist concepts of autonomy and free subjectivity, and to place them in a new framework of intersubjectivity in order to adapt them to the requirements of the present age. To achieve this goal, the tradition of European Enlightenment must be placed in a fruitful dialogue and dialectical relationship with similar and related intellectual heritages of non-European cultures. As a Sinologist, I will attempt to sketch the foundations of such a dialogue through an introduction and critical evaluation of the ethics of Sinic Confucianism, which represents a specific East Asian version of humanism, for it is based on a high valuation of interpersonal relationships, mutual empathy, and responsible autonomy. Within this dialectical framework, this chapter explores the ways in which specific Confucian notions of personhood and autonomy can contribute to a meaningful cross-cultural adaptation and revitalization of humanist values. Nowadays, the prevailing view of Confucian ethics is based on a number of prejudices, for in today’s world it is usually seen as a strictly normative, hierarchical ethic, supposedly based on gerontocracy, patriarchy, and the oppression of subjects by the ruling elites, who in this system supposedly demand absolute obedience from their people. The vast majority of today’s Western-trained philosophers are not too familiar with the deeper levels of Confucian ethical systems. The contemporary Berlin philosopher of Korean descent Byung-Chul Han, for example, sees the reasons for the more rapid establishment of pandemic control measures in the East Asian region as rooted in the autocratic traditions of those regions. Han writes: What advantages, compared to Europe, in the fight against the pandemic, can we find in the Asian system? Asian countries like Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have an authoritarian mindset, originating from their cultural tradi-

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tion (Confucianism). People are less rebellious and more docile than in Europe (Han 2020, 2).

Such assertions are populist, generalising, and without scientifically provable basis. First of all, the thesis of the alleged “all-around obedience” of people throughout the Sinic region compared to Europe and America, where people are supposed to be more critical and less docile (as the above statement implicitly implies), is completely ungrounded. It is based instead on the widespread assumption that Confucianism is a conservative normative ethic that advocates gerontocracy and the suppression of the individual in favour of the state. Few of those who blindly advocate such theses actually know the subject under discussion, and few know that the ethics of the original Confucianism was very progressive and critical of the social and political elites of the time for the period in which it arose. The original Confucian teachings emphasized “humaneness (ren 仁)” and “rituality (li 禮),” advocated diversity and pluralism, and also contained many proto-democratic elements. However, during the period of the first Confucian reform (i. e., the Han period, 206 BC–220 AD), there was an ideological misappropriation of Confucian teachings for the needs of a new state-building doctrine. These processes led to an assimilation of many elements of autocratic Legalism into the framework of the teachings and studies of Confucian ethics. In this way, a new state doctrine was formed out of proto-philosophical Confucianism (Bauer 1971, 117–140). Compared to the original philosophical ethics of Confucianism, which contained many pluralistic views and was highly contextual and based on flexibility and autonomy, it was a prescriptive, extremely rigid and restrictive set of social rules that received its institutional foundation somewhat later with the introduction of the civil service examinations, which required all candidates for government positions to uncritically adopt the contents of Confucian classics, especially their formal rules (Bauer, 117–140). While the latter became the basis not only of institutionalized Confucian state doctrine but also of constitutive social ethics characterized by strict vertical hierarchy, gerontocracy, discrimination against various marginalized groups, including women, social standardization, and suppression of individual autonomy, the former represents a dynamic and changeable framework of constant reopening of diverse philosophical questions, appreciation of social diversity, and negation of dogmatism and autocratic rules.4 4 See, for instance, the following commentary from the Confucian Chun Qiu Zuo Zhuan: “If the ruler says something is right, everyone says it is right. And if he claims something is wrong, then everyone will claim the same thing. But that’s like adding more water to an already watery soup — who would want to eat it? Or as if the instruments in an orchestra all played the same musical line — who would want to hear it? Such sameness is not good (君所謂可，據亦曰

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For at least a basic understanding of the respective traditional ideologies, therefore, we must first understand the differences between Confucianism as a humanistic philosophy, on the one hand, and Confucianism as a dogmatic state doctrine or conservative normative ethic, on the other. However, due to the complexity of the specific features that define Chinese political and ethical culture, these two currents have often overlapped throughout Chinese history: “Since rulers and scholar-officials joined themselves together to form an inseparable tie as members of the same community, culture and power existed in an unusually close relationship” (Huang 2014, 281). Nevertheless, for the sake of conceptual clarity and because of many specific elements that define each of the two approaches, we must distinguish between political and philosophical Confucianism, and for the purposes of this paper we will focus on the latter. We will thus be concerned specifically with Confucian ethics, which in turn cannot be separated from its philosophical (or metaphysical) foundations.5 At the heart of such Confucian humanism6 is the fundamental virtue of humaneness or co-humaneness (ren). The Chinese character with which this term is written consists of two parts; the left part denotes a human being, the right the number two, which also stands for the plural. So, the term ren tells us, among other things, that no human being can exist alone, isolated from other human beings. We can all survive (and even come into existence) only through our vital connections with other people. No person is an island, and we can therefore only live in communities with our fellow human beings. This interconnectedness can only work if most people in a community are aware of its vital importance; therefore, ren also implies a mutual empathy, the ability to identify with other people, to feel their needs and fears, and to understand their situation. Such mutual empathy is, of course, a foundation of social solidarity, which is of paramount importance, especially in times of widespread social crisis, such as 可，君所謂否，據亦曰否，若以水濟水，誰能食之，若琴瑟之專壹，誰能聽之，同之不 可也如是; Chun Qiu Zuo Zhuan, s.d. Shao Gong ershi nian, 2). 5 Chun-chieh Huang pointed out that this close relationship was already established before the second reform of Confucianism, as Zhu Xi, the most eminent Neo-Confucian philosopher from the Song Dynasty, highlighted this dual axiological nature of Confucian teachings by interpreting the Confucian concept of “dao 道” as both a metaphysical principle and an ethical norm (Huang 2011, 69). 6 Proponents of the Modern New Confucian movement have often emphasized that traditional Confucian teachings involve a “humanistic religion,” implying the unity or fusion of humanism and religion. Lee Ming-huei, for example, states that according to Mou Zongsan, “the humanistic focus of Confucianism has a religious dimension as its essence” (Lee 2017, 26). Lee also notes that Mou’s basic conception of the unity of morality and religion could be traced to the Modern Confucian “Manifesto on Chinese Culture for People All Over the World” (為中國 文化敬告世界人士宣言). In this paper, however, we will not discuss the possible transcendent elements of this specific type of humanism, but rather focus on its immanent ethics of relationships.

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the current Covid-19 pandemic. On the other hand, such solidarity based on mutual empathy is also the foundation of Confucian relational ethics, relics of which are still present, albeit often in a latent form, in most contemporary Sinic societies. This relational ethic, together with its elementary virtue of humaneness (ren), undoubtedly has much to do with promoting mutual interpersonal cooperation and solidarity among people. Therefore, such traditional ethical elements have, in my view, contributed much to the effective yet democratic containment of the pandemic in the Sinic region. In what follows, I will illuminate this conjecture through the lens of traditional Confucian relational ethics and its inherently humanistic values.

III.

Relational Self and Independent Individuality

With regard to the traditional structure of the relationship between the individual and society, there is a fundamental difference between the modern European (or “Western”) and the traditional Chinese socio-political system. While the former is based on the idea of a free and abstract individual, the Sinic social order is founded on a network of relationships and could therefore be called “relational virtue ethics” (Li Zehou and Liu Yuedi 2014, 209). This fundamental distinction leads to major differences in the ethical thinking prevalent in these two discourses of cultural philosophy, not only in terms of their respective views on the relationship between the individual and society, but also on the relationship between reason and emotion. Traditional Sinic societies were structured as networks of relations that connected individuals who were not constituted as isolated and independent entities but as so-called relational Selves, meaning that people were essentially related to one another and their social relationships largely determined their identities. In Confucian ethics, the human Self is always located in particular concrete situations and social environments; therefore, all conceptions of the person focus on his or her relationships. This also implies that a person’s chosen aspirations, failures, and achievements can only be understood in light of their interactions with others (Lai 2018, 64). Morality, then, is rooted in the harmonious interaction of different persons embedded in different social roles. Contemporary Chinese philosopher Li Zehou uses the term “relationism” or (in his own translation) “guanxi-ism” (Li 2016, 1076) to refer to such particularities of Confucian ethics that grounds morality in social relations rather than in individualism. Ancient Confucians defined the main structure of human social networks as consisting of five basic relationships (wu lun 五倫). This model can be regarded as a summary of the elementary human relationships in any civil society, as it consists of the familial, political, and comradely relationships. However, it also

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shows the Confucian emphasis on the family, as three of the five basic relationships are rooted in it. According to Li Zehou (2016, 1076), this is the basis of the relationism mentioned above. This social system infuses emotions into interpersonal relationships, with the sincere emotion of parent-child love being the root, substance, and foundation (Jia 2018, 156). Thus, it is no coincidence that in this view, the family was linked to the state through the ideal of a good citizen; in Confucian ethics, a good citizen had to be a good family member first. The core idea behind such a view is that regulating relationships within one’s family leads to a well-ordered state (see, e. g., Mengzi, s.d. Li Lou 1, 5).7 In their book Confucian Role Ethics: A Moral Vision for the 21st Century, Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames also emphasize that family reverence (xiao 孝) is the origin of virtuous social behaviour and the source of humaneness (ren). They refer to the model that Li Zehou called “relationism” as “role ethics” instead, emphasizing that it is a network of social roles that emerges from the roles of members within a family. In such roles, people’s lives are embedded in meaningful contexts. Moreover, the network is dynamic and multi-layered, because no one takes only one role, but everyone plays many of them. Before modern society, Confucian individuals existed for the totality of their family, clan, tribe, or religion (Li 2016, 1118). But in the context of Western-type modernity, which emphasizes the values of subjective autonomy, the totality (e. g., society) exists for the individual.8 Moreover, within the framework of Western individualism, personal uniqueness is given central importance because it is a basis for human creativity and progress. And since personal uniqueness is also an important issue when it comes to the relationship between society and the individual in general, let us take a closer look at its place within traditional Confucian philosophy. This is all the more important because many people mistakenly believe that Confucianism does not

7 天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。 8 In this context, one is inclined to ask whether the relics of traditional ethics are still relevant in the social behaviour and attitudes of people in modern societies based on the rule of law, principles of normative-rational justice, and individual rights. It is true, of course, that modernization has been brought from the West to most regions of the world and that it is accordingly grounded upon the individual-based values of the European Enlightenment. However, in most regions of the so-called Sinic area, many Confucian elements still remain in contemporary social ethics. This is evidenced by many empirical studies; see, for example, my own transcultural survey (Rosˇker 2012), which found that over 80% of Taiwanese informants believed that society is more fundamental than the individual, and 78% of them believed that morality is more important and fundamental than laws. In contrast, over 90% of European informants believed the opposite.

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allow for individual uniqueness, but rather tends to emphasize social unification and the merging of all individuals into an indiscriminate social whole.9 Many people see the Confucian moral Self and the Western unique individual as posited in mutual contradiction. However, common Western arguments based on the belief that the Chinese notion of the Self does not have strong “individualistic” connotations are largely too generalized. Moreover, the Western notion of an isolated, detached, and completely independent individual is also, to a large extent, merely a product of the ideologies of modernization. Confucian ethics is based on the idea of self-cultivation and self-realization. However, people who have been socialized in modern Western societies tend to see these concepts as relating to individual existence. In fact, however, the Confucian Moral Self is a relational Self. It can therefore only be constituted and cultivated through one’s fellow human beings, in community. Similarly, misunderstanding in Western arguments commonly arises from a failure to recognize that the term “individuality” has two different meanings (Hall and Ames 1998, 25). On the one hand, individuality refers to a concrete and indivisible entity with distinct characteristics that can be assigned to a particular class. As such, it is interchangeable and actually contradicts plurality. Such an individual has no discrete personality or distinct identity. As an element (or member) of a particular species or class, this “individuality” is replaceable and interchangeable. This concept of individuality represents the fundamental level of a human being, since an individual belonging to this category is merely the product of his or her own effort to survive. As Hannah Arendt writes: To be sure, he too lives in the presence of and together with others, but this togetherness has none of the distinctive marks of true plurality. It does not consist in the purposeful combination of different skills and callings as in the case of workmanship (let alone in the relationships between unique persons), but exists in the multiplication of specimens which are fundamentally all alike because they are what they are as mere living organisms (Arendt 1998, 212).

This solitude of any living creature struggling to survive is usually overlooked in Western literature; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the concrete organization of labor necessary for survival and the social conditions that accompany it require the simultaneous presence of a large number of people engaged in a particular task. Therefore, it seems that there are no barriers between them (Arendt, 212). 9 One of the many passages of the Confucian Analects in which this supposition is emphasized, for example, is the well-known quotation (Lunyu s.d. Zi Lu, 23) in which Confucius sets forth that morally conscious and cultured people know how to harmonize with others and are opposed to unification, while primitive and uneducated people prefer unification because they do not know how to harmonize (君子和而不同，小人同而不和).

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These individuals have no face, no definite, concrete personhood or identity. And yet it is precisely this concept of interchangeable, unitary individuality that forms the basis for the equality of all before the law, for the establishment of the concept of universal human rights, for equality of opportunity, and so on. This is the most generalized kind of equality, not pluralistic equality.10 However, as Hall and Ames (1998, 25) point out, it is precisely this kind of understanding of the individual that provides the basis on which it is possible to form the ideas of autonomy, equal rights, free will and similar concepts. This kind of Self belongs in the realm of the one-dimensional empirical Self, or, in Chinese terminology, in the realm of the “external king (waiwang 外王).”11

IV.

Personal Uniqueness vs. Faceless Collectivism

The concept of the individual, however, can also be linked to the ideas of singularity and uniqueness that exist outside of any species or class. In such a conceptualization of the Self, the equality of individuals is rooted in the principle of parity (Hall and Ames 1998, 25). This notion of uniqueness inherent in each individual is something that also strongly defines the specific Confucian idea of the human Self. According to numerous Confucian scholars, this uniqueness that underlies such a traditional idea of the Self is a value in itself (Fang 2004, 259). But this kind of uniqueness is not constituted by an isolated position or a demarcation of an individual from his or her fellow human beings. As part of the relational paradigm, it is shaped by the uniqueness of one’s position within the network of interpersonal and social relations. However, due to the prevailing understanding of individualism, there is a pervasive bias in the Euro-American regions as regards the traditional Sinic view of the Self: people in Western countries generally still see East Asians as people who are fundamentally subordinate to collectivist requirements and therefore do not know how to fully develop their individuality, autonomy, and personal freedom. In the Western view East Asian populations tend to think and act 10 This kind of equality is in fact a sameness, which is best expressed in collectivism. Actual equality, in the sense of an integral equal valuation of all human beings, is something quite different from sameness, and is possible only on the basis of a pluralistic conception of man, in which individuals are by no means all equal. It is also worth pointing out Arendt’s differentiation between the two concepts (cf. Arendt 1998, 213). 11 This is the second part of the traditional Chinese distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical self (Kupke 2012, 1), which usually manifested itself in the Confucian tradition as the problem of the relationship between the “inner sage and the external ruler (neisheng waiwang 內聖外王).” Ideally, these two concepts have a complementary and interdependent relationship, constantly seeking to harmonize with each other through their mutual interactions.

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“collectively.” The term collectivism is usually seen as the antithesis of individualism. Based on such a framework, many people believe that collectivism is essentially an autocratic or even totalitarian social system, as it supposedly does not take into account or value individual life. In a common view, such “collectivism” is typical of Sinic societies, which are often seen by Westerners as products of authoritarian and despotic traditions. In fact, just the opposite is true, for collectivism is a system that also proceeds from the notion of an individual whose Self and existence are constituted in isolation from his or her fellow people. Therefore, collectivism is in fact a form of individualism, and one in which all individuals are considered equal. Collectivist social orders, in the common Western view, refer to the mechanistic systems of a group or society in which individuals are dehumanized and relate to each other only in the pragmatic sense of enabling the most efficient forms of production or for the benefit of the whole social system as such. In this context, the position and work of individuals are defined by their subordination to the system as well as by their isolation from other individuals, since in a collectivist system people are related only by functions and objects and not by their personalities. In this sense, they are not only “equal” but practically the “same.”12 In such a system, individuals are a part of the faceless mass; comparable to small individual cogs functioning mechanistically within a large, all-encompassing machine. Hannah Arendt describes this system, which is only possible as a unity consisting of individuals deprived of their concrete identities, as follows: It is indeed in the nature of laboring to bring men together in the form of a labor gang where any number of individuals “labor together as though they were one,” and in this sense togetherness may permeate laboring even more intimately than any other activity. But this “collective nature of labor,” far from establishing a recognizable, identifiable reality for each member of the labor gang, requires on the contrary the actual loss of all awareness of individuality and identity (Arendt 1998, 213).

The equality of all members of a collective is actually a form of conformism based on the somatic experience of common labor, where “the biological rhythm of labor unites the group of laborers to the point that each may feel that he is no longer an individual, but in fact one with all the others” (Arendt, 214). Of course, this is precisely why certain systems of collectivism lend themselves well to autocratic, dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes, as they allow for effective centralized leadership and control over all individuals in society. Therefore, in the 12 We find a good illustration of this problem in Hannah Arendt’s distinction between the concepts of “equality” and “sameness” (Arendt 1998, 213). In European culture, this understanding of equality, which is actually based on sameness, stems from the basic concept of Christian doctrine, within which we are all equal (and at the same time completely the same) before God and death (Arendt, 235).

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context of liberal modernization, which emphasizes human autonomy and freedom, it is sometimes difficult to understand that collectivism is actually the most typical system that emerges from the most emblematic forms of individualism, in which the relationship between the individual and society is such that all individuals are equal. In this context, it is important to see that Confucian relationism is not at all a form of such an ideological understanding of collectivism. In relational societies, people are aware of the fact that no human being can really survive alone, without other people. Therefore, they tend to develop a contextualized sense of self (Arendt, 214). This specific type of individual personality is comparable to Jung’s (1953; 1976, 301, 402, 433) idea of so-called “individuation.” In the context of individuation, each person is understood to have an inimitable, completely unique combination of characteristics that are in themselves universal. All human faces, for example, have two eyes, two eyebrows, a mouth, and a nose. All of these elements are universal. But the shape, colour, size and texture of these elements in each face is unique, special and one of a kind. Individuation, then, is an ongoing process of culturalization that achieves the uniqueness of each person’s individual qualities through her particular and specific consolidation of factors that are, as such, universal in nature. Such self-realisation is part of traditional Confucian self-cultivation, a process of human unfoldment that is central to Confucian ethics. It is within such a framework that (co)humaneness or ren, this specific type of Confucian empathy and solidarity, can be most efficiently developed: Indeed, it is only through his or her uniqueness that a person can truly understand the significance and integral meaning of the social contexts and relationships of which he or she is a part. Therefore, a relational view of the Self and the Other is more realistic than assumptions based on the idea of an abstract individual. A completely isolated and independent individual Self does not exist in the real world. No human being can be separated from her feelings, intentions, and relationships.

V.

Individualism and Relational Models of Social Organization

In contrast to such a relational view, individualism, which is closely linked to the root of modern European values, turns out to be an egocentric and even selfish phenomenon, because it focuses on how one is different from everyone else rather than on how one relates to others. This is why Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames wrote: It increasingly seemed to us that describing the proper performances of persons in their various roles and the appropriate attitude expressed in such roles in their relationship to

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others with whom they are engaged … conform to our everyday experience much better than those abstract accounts reflected in the writings of the heroes of Western moral philosophy, past and present (Rosemont and Ames 2016, 9).

These different ways of conceptualizing the relationship between “Self” and “society” have important consequences for understanding how communities function in different cultures and how they respond to different crises. Empirical studies in cultural and environmental psychology suggest that the interdependent, relational Self tends to care more about others and better controls one’s own desires and behaviour in favour of collective social benefit (Silova et al. 2021, 3). The independent Self, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that “the individual comes before society” and therefore emphasizes individual autonomy and self-preservation. The independent Self therefore tends to exhibit values and attitudes that undermine collective efforts to solve problems of public interest (Silova et al., 3). Although the independent self has traditionally been a major cornerstone of Western civilization and further promoted as the key to achieving modernity from Descartes onward, its era of unthinking valorisation may now need to be brought to a close. To do so, we need to begin to recognize that self-construal manifests concretely in wider social arrangements and these arrangements, in turn, constitute the underlying driver of our current social trajectory. As such, rearticulating western Modernity’s dominant concept of Self (i. e., independent Self) might be necessary to effect a departure from the present catastrophe trajectory and move — collectively — towards sustainability (Komatsu et al. 2019, 11). A large-scale comparison by the British polling institute YouGov (Sachs 2021, 96) also suggests that people in Sinic societies — due to social norms and a better scientific understanding of the pandemic — demonstrate significantly higher willingness to engage in health-preserving behaviour than people in EuroAmerican regions. Both factors, namely the belief in the importance and positive function of social norms and the emphasis on critical education, can also be linked to elementary Confucian values. In several European and other Western countries, on the other hand, there have been public protests against even the most basic public health measures, such as the wearing of face masks, with agitators rejecting the mask requirement in the name of “freedom” (Sachs, 96). However, these people seem to have forgotten that one of the most elementary principles of classical liberal political theories is that the right to liberty and freedom stops at the limit of potential harm to other people in society. In his famous and highly influential essay, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote, “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully

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exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1998, 14). In the context of the Covid-19 crisis, Mill would certainly approve of the government’s request to wear face masks. And so would Confucius: While, as we saw in the previous section, Confucian relationism is in no way comparable to socalled “collectivism,” the Confucian Moral Self may well be compared to a free individual acting in accordance with such elementary liberal values.13 It is therefore understandable that numerous scholars have been critical of Western discourses, accusing them of a one-dimensional emphasis on individual autonomy and on the notion of unlimited freedom of choice. Such paradigms are ultimately always based on the assumption that individuals can be separated and abstracted from their social contexts, relationships, and even from those elements of the human condition that are actually vital to human life, such as the capacity and need for interpersonal relationships and mutual care (Fan 2010, 13). Compared with such models, Confucian relationism seems to be a model composed of interdependent relational individuals. In this context, Li Zehou writes: That people are raised and cared for by their families and communities leaves them with duties and responsibilities to this relationality and even their “kind” (humankind). People do not belong to themselves alone. The very first passage of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao jing) tells us that as our bodies are received from our parents, we are not allowed to harm them. If even harming one’s body is denounced, how could suicide possibly be allowed (Li Zehou 2016, 1131).

Relational ethics, as we saw above, is deontological ethics. In moral life, duty is of paramount importance. And even more complicated is the fact that such a life is full of self-control, for one must overcome (almost) all immediate instincts and desires. In relational social systems, the individual is not supposed to act as an independent moral agent, separate from his fellow human beings (Lai 2008, 6). But all this may not be as bad as it seems at first sight. In relationism, judgments about the individual are (almost) never defined in terms of an idealized standard of an independent Self. In such an understanding of the Self, it is the actual relationships and environments that define individual values, thoughts, motivations, behaviours, and actions in the first place. Moreover, in relationism, relationships are always characterized by multiplicity, mutuality, and complementarity: “A good teacher and a good student can only emerge together, and your well-being and the well-being of your neighbour are congruent and mutually dependent” (Rosemont and Ames 2016, 12). Ideally, not even the “unequal positions” that form the core of social ethics in all Confucian teachings, nor the strict hierarchy in which these positions are 13 Although the former is both immanent and transcendent, while the latter is merely a kind of “transcendental illusion,” they can nevertheless be compared on the purely conceptual level.

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embedded, are as terrible as one is inclined to think. For somehow it is clear, for example, that the differences between a baby and his parent automatically lead to unequal positions. Over the course of a lifetime, of course, that position can change completely.14 Even though relationism contains unequal positions — both parties involved in a given relation are complementary and equal to each other, both in the metaphysical and moral sense, since together they form a part of the social whole that consists of these interpersonal relations. This kind of ethics does not derive from the concept of normative justice, but from a tendency towards social harmony (he 和),15 which appears in the relational network of interactions between individuals, whose individual identities — as we have seen in the description of individuation — are perceived as harmonies of different combinations of the unique, particular characteristics of each of them. The network of relationships is dynamic and diverse since no individual in it forms a fixed specific identity or entity. Each individual in it is the bearer of numerous roles which are interwoven and complement and perfect each other. Thus, I myself am, say, a mother, but also a daughter; I am a teacher, but also a researcher, that is, I learn from the work of others. I am also a consumer, a singer, a driver, a citizen, a worker, etc. Analogously, my relationships with people are multi-layered and changeable. Therefore, in the network of relationality, I am never simply a fixed and unchanging entity, defined by my role within the network. As we have already indicated, Confucian relationism also contains a special kind of virtue ethics,16 though it is — unlike the ancient Greek virtue ethics — not based on the concept of the isolated individual, but rather defined by relations, or 14 This is not so readily true, for example, of the unequal relationship between ruler and subject, although in Confucianism, the former had to be benevolent and the latter was often regarded as the “root of the state” (minben民本); but Confucian scholars were never motivated to change the formal structure of these hierarchical relationships. Rather, they were inclined to allow the modifications of the concrete contents of the two oppositional conceptualizations at issue. These consisted mainly of patterns of behaviour, norms and possibilities. As mentioned earlier, however, in this chapter we are not concerned with reformist Confucian political theory, but instead focus on its ethics as a way of learning some new possible forms of alternative social organization. 15 This concept of social harmony is, of course, not to be confused with the ideologically abused concept of harmony manifested in the patriotic propaganda of the Chinese leadership. For a more detailed description of this problem, see Rosˇker 2019. 16 At this point, it should be noted that all three types of ethics that are considered basic categories of this discipline, namely virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and utilitarian ethics, are categories that emerged in the context of Western philosophy. Since the transfer of concepts and categories from one historical-cultural domain to another is a problematic process tied to different culturally conditioned frames of reference, we must take into account that none of the three above-mentioned categorizations is entirely suitable to define or describe the basic nature of Confucian ethics, which at the same time certainly belongs to the domain of deontological ethics (see, for example, Lee Ming-huei 2017, 94).

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relationships, which are emotional in their intrinsic nature. But many other authors point out that it is rational and even necessary to include, cultivate, and socialize emotions in visions of social systems, as they are rooted in biological instincts that need to be channeled into mechanisms of mutual aid (see Li Zehou 2016, 1097). Another feature of relationism that is important for crisis situations, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, is the factor of inequality of younger and older persons, which is certainly related to the inequality of near and far, outer and inner,17 etc. Confucianism emphasizes family relations in which people are automatically unequal. Therefore, relationism contains both a rational order and an emotional identification within conditions that are always concrete, unrepeatable, and connected with sensations and feelings. Concrete obligations, responsibilities and actions in this context are different for each individual, depending on the concrete, changeable situation in which they find themselves.

VI.

Conclusion

This view of social composition is especially important in times of crises, such as that of the Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, such times undoubtedly reinforce the need for cooperation that bridges the gap between the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand and his socio-relational Self on the other. It also poses a challenge to the artificially established dichotomies between the Self and the Other, or between the specific and the general, the particular and the universal. This understanding is rooted in the paradigm of contrastive complementarity since the uniqueness of the individual can be measured not only by his or her individual achievements but also by his or her social influence. And the latter, in turn, can be measured by an individual’s position within their contextual environment and their relationships with other individuals (Lai 2018, 88). From the perspective of ethics, such a web of relationships has several important implications, especially when compared to frames that postulate an individual’s independent stability. Both Confucian relationism and its corresponding role ethics represent a system in which people internalize the insight that they cannot survive alone, without their fellow human beings, and they therefore develop a contextual selfawareness. In China and most Sinic cultures, such self-awareness is more realistic precisely because each person, by virtue of his or her uniqueness, can actually understand the meaning and importance of the social contexts into which he or 17 The terms “outer” and “inner” in this context refer to positions of persons who are “inside” or “outside” certain social groups to which the subject associated with these persons belongs.

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she is embedded. Based on such fundamental premises, it is much easier to understand the concept and basic structure of relationism and similar social systems rooted in the principles of original Confucianism. Since such a foundation of models of familial and social organization is rooted in mutual empathy and humaneness, it can doubtless better assure the preservation of group solidarity and responsibility. The specific kind of solidarity, which has been developed in the framework of traditional Confucian deontology, is a solid and forceful tool for the solving of epidemic, ecological, and political crises of contemporary times.

References Arendt, Hannah. 1998. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bauer, Wolfgang. 1971. Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie: Konfuzianismus, Daoismus, Buddhismus. München: Carl Hanser Verlag. Chunqiu Zuo zhuan. s.d. 春秋左傳. In Chinese Text Project. https://ctext.org/chun-qiu-zuo -zhuan (Accessed: 15. 06. 2020). Fan, Ruiping. 2010. Reconstructionist Confucianism — Rethinking Morality After the West. Dordrecht: Springer. Fang Dongmei. 方東美. 2004. Zhongguo zhexue jingshen jiqi fazhan 中國哲學精神及其發 展 (The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy and Its Development). Taipei: Liming wenhua chuban she. Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. 1998. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. Albany, New York: SUNY. Han, Byung-Chul. 2020. “COVID-19 Has Reduced Us to a ‘Society of Survival.’” In Carmen Sigüenza (int.) and Esther Rebollo (int.). Euractive. 24. 05. 2020. pp. 1–4. https://www.e uractiv.com/section/global-europe/interview/byung-chul-han-covid-19-has-reducedus-to-a-society-of-survival/. (Accessed 08. 06. 2020). Huang, Chun-chieh. 2010. Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. —. 黃俊傑. 2011. Dongya wenhua jiaoliu zhongde rujia jingdian yu linian: hudong, zhuanhua yu ronghe 東亞文化交流中的儒家經典與理念：互動，轉化與融合 (Confucian Classics and Ideas in East Asian Cultural Exchanges: Interactions, Transformations, and Integrations). —. 2014. “Some Observations and Reflections.” In Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China, edited by Frederick P. Brandauer and Chun-chieh Huang, 281– 289. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. Jia, Jinhua. 2018. “Li Zehou’s Reconception of Confucian Ethics of Emotion.” In Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy, edited by Roger T. Ames and Jia Jinhua, 155–186. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Jung, Carl Gustav. 1953. Psychological Types or the Psychology of Individuation. (Translated by H. Godwin Baynes). New York: Pantheon books.

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—. 1976. Symbols of Transformation. Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Volume 5 of the Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Komatsu, Hikaru, Jeremy Rappleye, and Iveta Silova. 2019. “Culture and the Independent Self: Obstacles to environmental sustainability?” Anthropocene 2019(26): 1–13, http://d x.doi.org/10.1016/j.ancene.2019.100198. Kupke, Christian, 2012: “Subjekt und Individuum: zur Bedeutsamkeit ihres philosophischen Unterschieds in der psychiatrischen Praxis.” In e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 1, no. 11. Accesible at: http://www.jp.philo.at/texte/KupkeC2.pdf (Accessed: 06. 07. 2012). Lai, Karyn. 2018. “Global Thinking. Karyn Lai’s Thoughts on New Waves in Anglo-Chinese Philosophy.” The Philosopher’s Magazine 2018(1): 64–69. Lee, Ming-huei. 2017. Confucianism: its Roots and Global Significance. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Li, Zehou. 2016. “A Response to Michael Sandel and Other Matters.” Translated by Paul D’Ambrosio and Robert A. Carleo. Philosophy East and West 66, no. 4: 1068–1147. Li Zehou 李澤厚 and Liu Yuedi 劉悅笛. 2014. “Cong ‘qing benti’ fansi zhengzhi zhexue” 從 「情本體」反思政治哲學 (Reflections on Political Philosophy on the Basis of the Concept of “Emotive Substance”). Kaifang shidai 2014 (4): 194–215. Lunyu 論語 s.d. (Analects). Chinese Text Project. https://ctext.org/analects (Accessed: 07. 07. 2020). Mengzi 孟子. s.d. (Master Meng, Mencius). Chinese Text Project. https://ctext.org/mengzi (Accessed: 15. 06. 2020). Mill, John Stuart. 1998. On Liberty. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press. Rosemont, Henry Jr. and Roger T. Ames. 2016. Confucian Role-Ethics: A Moral Vision for the 21st Century? Taipei: National Taiwan University Press. Rosˇker, Jana S. 2012. “Cultural Conditionality of Comprehension: The Perception of Autonomy in China.” In Reinventing Identities: The Poetic of Language Use in Contemporary China (Dangdai Zhongguo shenfen chongjiande yuyan yunyong), edited by Cao Qing et al., 26–42. Tianjin: Nankai daxue chuban she. Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2021. “Reasons for Asia-Pacific Success in Suppressing COVID-19.” World Happiness Report 2021: 91–106. https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2021/reasons-for-a sia-pacific-success-in-suppressing-covid-19/ (Accessed 05. 05. 2021). Sernelj, Tea. 2014. “The Unity of Body and Mind in Xu Fuguan’s Theory.” Asian Studies 2, no. 1: 83–95. Silova, Iveta, Hikaru Komatsu, and Jeremy Rappleye. 2021. “Covid-19, Climate, and Culture: Facing the Crisis of (Neo) Liberal Individualism.” In: Norrag-Blog. (Accessed: 01. 06. 2021). https://www.norrag.org/covid-19-climate-and-culture-facing-the-crisis-o f-neoliberal-individualism-by-iveta-silova-hikaru-komatsu-and-jeremy-rappleye/. Tu, Weiming. 2001. “The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World.” Daedalus 130, no. 4: 243–264. Tucker, John A. 2013. “Dreams, Nightmares, and Green Reflections on Kurosawa and Confucian Humanism.” In Philosophizing in Asia, edited by Tsuyoshi Ishii and Lam Wing-keung, 47–92. Tokyo: UTCP (The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy).

John A. Tucker

Toward a More Compassionate Economic Order: The Confucian Imperative for Greater Wealth Equity

I.

Introduction

As one of the more powerful political ideologies in human history,1 Confucianism (rú xué 儒学), stands poised to emerge as a progressive global force more relevant to the twenty-first century than ever before, serving not as a singular, nation-bound ideology exclusive to China but more broadly as a family of multifaceted ethical discourses2 integral to the interrelationality of human becomings (rénjia¯n 人間),3 the interconnectedness of human communities (shèhuì 社会), and the ever-widening environmental concerns affecting the world at large, human and non-human (tia¯n xià 天下). Needless to say, this will necessarily be true mutatis mutandis, with less power and authority allotted to a single, quasi-absolute monarch, often referred to as “the ruler” ( ju¯n 君), “the king” (wáng 王), or “the son of heaven” (aka, “the emperor,” tia¯n zıˇ 天子), and more to a people-centered, compassionate form of governance concerned primarily with if not actively representing the best interests and welfare of humanity. Egregiously patriarchal, misogynistic, and ethnocentric biases of earlier Con1 Watanabe Hiroshi, A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901, trans. David Noble (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2012), 9. “Confucianism is perhaps the most powerful political ideology yet conceived by the human race.” 2 “Confucianism” suggests homogeneity and consensus when, in fact, there was complexity, diversity, and difference at every turn. Chun-chieh Huang’s (Huáng Chùn-chiéh 黃俊傑) suggestion, “Confucianisms,” plural rather than singular, avoids misrepresenting the teaching as homogenous and unified rather than diverse and multifaceted. See Chun-chieh Huang, East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Context (V&R Academics, 2015). And Huang, “Why Speak of ‘East Asian Confucianisms’?” in Confucianisms for a Changing World Cultural Order, ed. Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2017), 75–86. 3 Here the notion of “human becomings” and the interconnectedness of human societies draws on the thinking of Roger T. Ames’ Human Becomings: Theorizing Persons for Confucian Role Ethics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2021) which challenges the still dominant view, in ethical theory, of people as discrete individuals. Instead, Ames advances a Confucian view of humans as relationally evolving “intrasubjective” beings or, better yet, “becomings.”

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fucianisms will require recalibration in favor of more egalitarian and inclusive socio-political arrangements that are indeed well-precedented within the manifold of its traditions. With these and other modifications consistent with credible expressions of modernity and postmodernity, diverse expressions of Confucianism can and should be irrepressibly relevant well beyond the twentyfirst century because at their core are time-tested, spot-on ethical concerns issuing from and going to the very heart of human existence and humanity’s efforts to form more perfect social, political, and economic unions.4 In this chapter, expressions of Confucianism, especially as found in the Mencius (Mèngzıˇ 孟子), regarding the relationship of “compassionate government” (rén zhèng 仁政)5 and the “well-field” ( jıˇng tián 井田) system are examined in the hope of realizing what Jung-Yeup Kim has called “economic equity.”6 However, rather than simple fidelity to their ancient socio-political and philosophical context, the Mencius’ ideas are sensibly rethought as pertinent to the socio-economic realities of the twenty-first century. The chapter suggests that the Mencian imperative for economic equity, classically affirmed in the Mencius’ discussion of the well-field system, stands as a compelling precondition for a moral society, one that, of course, need not be tied to agrarian plots per se but rather can be reconceptualized more meaningfully and with greater relevance in general terms vis-à-vis the basic needs of contemporary and future humanity. Emphasis is on the Mencius’ claims about the necessity of fairly and equitably providing for the basic economic needs of humanity as a de facto precondition for realizing ethical behavior in everyday practice. The ideas of the Mencius, the Analects (Lúnyuˇ 論語) of Confucius, plus the writings of later Confucians are 4 Robert Cummings Neville’s Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000) advances, arguably, a pluralistic, resilient vision of the future of Confucianisms. Neville explains that one meaning of “Boston Confucianism” is found in “the general project of bringing the Confucian tradition into play with the other great civilized traditions in the creation of a world civilization.” Also, Kirill Thompson, “Mozi’s Teaching of Jianai (Impartial Regard): A Lesson for the Twenty-First Century,” Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4, Special Issue: Tenth East-West Philosophers’ Conference, “Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence (October 2014): 838–855, suggests, via the Confucian hermeneutics of Mòzıˇ 墨子 (ca. 470–391 BCE), the latter’s relevance to this century and beyond. 5 Here, the Confucian ethical notion rén 仁 is translated as compassion rather than, as is more commonly the case, “humaneness” or “benevolence.” The reason is that, especially in relation to economic matters, the notion affirms an interpersonal concern for the possible suffering, or more positively, the well-being of others at a very basic, intuitive level. In illustrating the inherent nature of rén, Mencius noted the immediate, caring reaction any person would have if they witnessed a child about to fall into a well. In Mencius’ view, the instinctive impulse to save the child from calamity indicated the extent to which people are hard-wired for moral sentiments and practice. 6 Jung-Yeup Kim, “Economic Equity, the Well-Field System, and Ritual Propriety in the Confucian Philosophy of Qi,” Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (October 2014): 856–865.

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also explored for helpful theoretical strategies that might broaden economic and ethical discourses along more globally inclusive lines in the hopes of ameliorating some of the failings of early twenty-first century capitalism, especially the problem of egregious inequalities in wealth, capital, education, and medical care. If implemented, these ideas might help humanity successfully meet a perennial ethical challenge: how to provide for, in practice, the welfare and moral decency of all.

II.

Lingering Concerns: The Twentieth-Century Confucian Roller Coaster

Optimism about the continued relevance of Confucianism might draw doubts if not disbelief from many. Such skepticism, however, is largely a byproduct of twentieth-century efforts to vilify Confucianism wholesale, blaming it for the weaknesses of the Qı¯ng 清 (1644–1912) dynasty during its final decades and then the missteps of Chinese political culture — at the center of which was supposedly some static, monolithic Confucianism — as it struggled to find a workable path to modernization. Revolutionaries determined to bring the Qı¯ng down, including Su¯n Zho¯ngsha¯n 孫中山 (Sun Yatsen, 1866–1925), had ostensibly little use for Confucianism, and much the same was true of many participants in the May Fourth Movement who attacked Confucian thinking as antithetical to the practical ideals of modern science and democracy. Others saw Confucianism as simply antiquated and historically irrelevant, especially when compared with the philosophical novelties of the day, socialism and communism, then widely viewed as the avant-garde of what lay beyond even modernity itself. Scholars such as Ka¯ng Yoˇuwéi 康有為 (1858–1927) who tried to salvage Confucianism in works like Confucius as a Reformer (Koˇngzıˇ gaˇizhì kaˇo 孔子改制考) ironically contributed to its decline because, in the minds of some at least, Ka¯ng appeared to be reformulating the core thrust of Confucianism for the sake of making it relevant even while, in so doing, hinting that its received form was at best decrepit if not obsolete. One of the voices affirming the modern importance of Confucian teachings, especially for economic interests, came from Japan: the entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi 渋沢栄一 (1840–1931) praised the teachings of Confucius as recorded in the Analects as of paramount importance for any business enterprise seeking to contribute to the betterment of society and make an ethically-grounded profit in the process. However, Shibusawa’s advocacy of Confucius’ teachings did not extend to Confucianism in general, and was, in an East Asian context and perhaps globally as well, tainted by his robust advocacy of Japanese interests in the

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economic development of China. To many critics, it seemed that Shibusawa’s admiration for Confucius was simply a subterfuge masking his hopes for the economic expansion of imperial Japan into all East Asia, and first and foremost into China.7 Later association with quasi-fascist regimes such as that regnant in imperial Japan prior to 1945 further discredited the teachings. While some scholars in the West recognized the difference between the twisted manipulations of Confucian teachings as opposed to their humanistic, ethical core, other voices — including those of John King Fairbank (1907–1991), Mary Wright (1917–1970), and Joseph R. Levenson (1920–1969) — helped establish the widely repeated view in American academia that hoary Confucianism had kept China from modernity.8 With the rise of Máo Zédo¯ng 毛澤東 (1893–1976) and the People’s Republic of China following the end of the Chinese Civil War, a new teacher seemed ascendant, making the earlier Confucians appear all the more extraneous. In the view of many, Confucianism was, if not dead, then a tainted, discredited ideology. Máo’s initiatives, including the Hundred Flowers Movement (baˇihua¯ yùndòng 百 花運動) of the mid-1950s and the Cultural Revolution (wénhuà dàgémìng 文化 大革命) of the 1960s, targeted Confucius and Confucianism as enemies of the state, ones to be denounced if not purged from the polity. Yet those denunciations of Confucian teachings were later recognized as ideological dimensions of 7 John H. Sagers, Confucian Capitalism: Shibusawa Eiichi, Business Ethics and Economic Development in Meiji Japan (Palgrave, 2018), 10–15. Sagers calls links between Confucianism and capitalism a “contested relationship.” Sagers’ other writings include Origins of Japanese Wealth and Power: Reconciling Confucianism and Capitalism (New York: Palgrave, 2006) and “Shibusawa Eiichi, Daiichi Bank, and the Spirit of Japanese Capitalism, 1860–1930,” Shashi: The Journal of Japanese Business and Company History (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg, 2014). Also see Gregory K. Ornatowski, “Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: A Study of the Adaptation of Confucian Values to Modern Japanese Economic Ideology and Institutions,” Journal of Socio-Economics 25, no. 5 (1996): 571–590. Ornatowski affirms the relevance of Confucian values but suggests that they have been so transformed by adaptation over time that they are today better understood as “post-Confucian” values. These include respect for learning, social harmony, and loyalty. Also see, John A. Tucker, “Confucianism, Capitalism, and Shibusawa Eiichi’s The Analects and the Abacus,” in A Concise Companion to Confucius, ed. Paul R. Goldin (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017), 305–329. 8 Fairbank’s views appear in John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) while Wright’s appeared in Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) and Levenson’s in the threevolume work, Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958–1965). Scholars of Korean and Japanese Confucian thinking advanced similar views. In Japan, one of the most influential scholars on this count was Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 (1914–1996) whose Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), an English translation of his Nihon seiji shiso¯ kenkyu¯ 日本政治思想史研究 (1952), remains one of the most influential though arguably outdated statements regarding Confucianism and Japanese history.

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egregiously mistaken initiatives that brought China devastating consequences due to Máo’s overall efforts to destroy the past in the hopes that doing so would somehow automatically create a new and successful China. An early counter-statement calling for a revival of Confucianism appeared in 1958 with the “Declaration to Humanity on behalf of Chinese Culture” (Wèi Zho¯ngguó wénhuà jìnggào shìjiè rénshì xua¯nyán 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣 言). This declaration, signed by Móu Zo¯ngsa¯n 牟宗三 (1909–1995), Táng Ju¯nyì 唐 君毅 (1909–1978), Xú Fùgua¯n 徐復觀 (1902–1982), and others, grew from ongoing efforts, often referred to as the “New Confucianism” (xı¯n rú jia¯ 新儒家) movement, tracing back to the 1930s and affirming the meaningfulness of Confucianism as an important cultural force for China and humanity even in modern, contemporary times. Yet the long-range significance of the declaration was overlooked by many who instead were captivated by sensational headlines of the 1960s as Máo’s anti-Confucian, anti-traditional Cultural Revolution replayed, with unprecedented levels of violence, the May Fourth Movement’s vilification of Confucius and Confucianism as responsible for everything wrong with China, masking in the process — though in a way little understood by the world at large at that time — the regime’s own complicity in tragic inhumanities. In the post-Máo years and especially with the rise of Dèng Xiaˇopíng’s 鄧小平 (1904–1997) socio-economic pragmatism, Confucianism has increasingly resurfaced as a still viable philosophical and cultural force. Leading voices in this global movement included Wing-tsit Chan (Chén Róngjié) 陳榮捷 (1901–1994), Cheng Chung-ying (Chéng Zho¯ngyı¯ng) 成中英 (1935–), Dù Wéimíng 杜維明 (1940–), Roger T. Ames (1947–), Chun-chieh Huang (Huáng Jùnjié) 黃俊傑 (1946–) and a contingent of American scholars critically questioning the Fairbank line. One of the most outstanding members of this group was William Theodore de Bary at Columbia University. De Bary’s sympathetic appraisals of Confucianism gained wide following in media discussions in the late-twentieth century, especially with the rise of successive East Asian economies: first Japan’s, then Hong Kong’s, Singapore’s, Taiwan’s, and Korea’s. Those seeking explanations for these East Asian “miracles” soon surmised that their commonly shared secular and this-worldly philosophical and cultural foundations — varied expressions of Confucianism — deserved renewed study as something more than old-fashioned ideological relics consigned to the dustbins of history.

III.

Confucian Capitalism: Common Sense or Common Myth

Increasingly popular interpretations of Confucianism as a positive, humane force in East Asian history have led some to another extreme (reminiscent of Shibusawa’s advocacy of the Analects as an essential manual for the en-

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trepreneur), seeing in expressions of Confucianism an ethic conducive to capitalism. Unlike Shibusawa, however, this new perspective is more expansive, extolling not only Confucius and the Analects but all of Confucianism. Beginning with the writings of the futurist Herman Kahn (1922–1983), numerous works have appeared addressing “Confucian capitalism,”9 positing an integral connection between Confucian heritage and the economically ascendent East Asia as led by the early maturers — Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore — followed rapidly by Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, and most colossally, mainland China. However, others, including Souchou Yao, a professor of anthropology at the University of Sydney, have criticized overly simplistic explanations of East Asian economic successes in terms of Confucian values. In his book, Confucian Capitalism: Discourse, Practice, and the Myth of Chinese Enterprise, Yao offers “a highly pessimistic view about the effects of culture, and the relevance of Confucianism,” for Chinese business. Yao notes “the Chinese squatters in ramshackle settlements in metropolitan Jakarta” and “the outskirts of Kowloon” as counterexamples conveniently omitted in facile accounts of Confucian capitalism. Yao suggests that Confucian capitalism is “less an intellectual analysis than an undertaking which celebrates the wealth and time-proven business acumen of powerful ethnic Chinese capitalists.” Apart from noting the admittedly ugly, even tragic underside of East Asian modernities, Yao claims that analyses touting the positive impact of Confucianism on capitalism derive in part from a “highly generalized and homogenized notion of Chinese culture” and “some pristine 9 Herman Kahn, World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979). Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper, The Japanese Challenge: The Success and Failure of Economic Success (Crowell, 1979). Kahn, “The Confucian Ethic and Economic Growth,” in The Gap between Rich and Poor, ed. Mitchell A. Seligson (Routledge, 1984), 78–80. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Post-Confucian Challenge,” The Economist, February 9, 1980, 67–72. Tu Weiming, “The Confucian Dimension in the East Asian Development Model,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 5, no. 4 (Second Quarter 1990): 59–70. Tu Weiming, ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Peter Berger, “An East Asian Development Model?” in In Search of an East Asian Development Model, ed. Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1988), 3–11. Also, Timothy Brook and Hy V. Luong, eds., Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), and Brook, “Profit and Righteousness in Chinese Economic Culture,” in Culture and Economy, ed. Brook and Luong, 27–43. Tak Sing Cheung and Ambrose Yeo-chi King, “Righteousness and Profitableness: The Moral Choices of Contemporary Confucian Entrepreneurs,” Journal of Business Ethics 54, no. 3 (October 2004): 245–260. Seok-Choon Lew, Woo-Young Choi, and Hye Suk Wang, “Confucian Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: The Significance of Filial Piety,” Journal of East Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (August 2011): 171–196. There are other noteworthy skeptics: Charles Wei-hsun Fu, “The Ideological Revitalization of Confucianism in Relation to East Asian Economic Development,” in Conference on Confucianism and Economic Development in East Asia (Taipei: Chung-hua Institute for Economic Research, 1989): 105–134.

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notion of ‘cultural heritage.’” Yao even calls the equation of East Asian “culture” with “Confucianism” a kind of “crude historicism.”10

IV.

One Enormous Problem: Wealth Inequalities

Rather than address the more expansive question of the possible relationship of Confucianisms to modern economic development along free-enterprise capitalistic lines, this chapter focuses on a more limited though important dimension: possible Confucian answers to the problem of inequalities in wealth. Several commentators with little specialized background in Confucianism have recently called attention to the burgeoning divide in wealth distribution, criticizing the ethical bankruptcy of modern capitalism as it allows wealth to be grown massively for a tiny sliver of society while the rest are left further and further behind. Foremost among these is Thomas Piketty (1971–), author of the award-winning Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The latter argues that as the rate of return on capital (r) exceeds the rate of economic growth (g), i. e., r > g, wealth comes to be concentrated in the hands of increasingly few, leading to potential social and economic disequilibrium. To reverse this, Piketty proposed progressive taxes on wealth enacted globally, allowing no escape for the extraordinarily wealthy seeking safe quarters for their riches. Such taxes on wealth would, in Piketty’s view, reduce egregious inequalities globally and hamper gross accumulation by the few while preempting incremental declines into relative poverty by the many. Capital in the Twenty-First Century made Piketty’s ideas the subject of extensive discussion in academic, political, and economic policy circles internationally, yet it also elicited considerable criticism, prompting him to downplay his focus on the rate of return on capital vis-à-vis the rate of economic growth in favor of a more comprehensive emphasis on his primary concern: inequalities in wealth distribution and ways in which they might be mitigated if not eliminated.11 10 Souchou Yao, Confucian Capitalism: Discourse, Practice, and the Myth of Chinese Enterprise (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3–13. 11 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2014). Piketty’s book, first published in French as Le Capital au XXIe siècle (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013), has received wide praise and many awards. It is one of the — if not the — most successful bestsellers ever published by Harvard University’s Belknap Press. Paul Krugman called the book “a magnificent, sweeping meditation on inequality.” Krugman, “Why We’re in a New Gilded Age,” New York Review, May 8, 2014, 15–18. George Grantham declared it “the most significant book …, on a theoretical plane, since Keynes’s General Theory (1936).” Grantham, “Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century: An Overview,” Basic Income Studies 10, no. 1 (2015): 7. Other economists including James Kenneth Galbraith and Lawrence Summers are more critical of Piketty’s methodo-

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Piketty’s Latest: Capital and Ideology

Piketty’s most recent thinking appears in another monumental work, Capital and Ideology, a sequel of sorts to Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and first published in 2019, just six years after the latter. In it, Piketty sidesteps the rate of return on capital and rate of economic growth formulas in favor of focusing on “ideologies,” i. e., “dominant narratives” generated “out of the clash of contradictory discourses” which in turn “justify” and “bolster” “the existing inequality regime.” Without such ideologies, Piketty claims, “the whole political and social edifice stands in danger of collapse.” The primacy of ideology is unequivocally affirmed in one of Piketty’s more memorable statements: “Inequality is neither economic nor technological; it is ideological and political.”12 Not surprisingly, Paul Krugman has suggested in his review of Capital and Ideology, that Piketty “turns Marx on his head,” reversing the relationship of matter and ideology that Marx had posited and instead privileging ideology as a dominant force in determining material relations. And Piketty himself admits as much, noting that unlike “Marxist” approaches according to which economic forces and relations of production determine a society’s ideological superstructure in an almost mechanical fashion,” Capital and Ideology insists “that the realm of ideas, the political-ideological sphere, is truly autonomous.” Krugman’s most compelling criticism of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology, however, concerns the thousand-page book’s credibility as it surveys history from beginning to end, East and West and all in between with an air of authority and expertise. Specifically, Krugman questions whether Piketty is “enough of a polymath” to serve as “a reliable guide to such a large territory,” one combining history, sociology, political analysis, and economic data for dozens of societies.”13 Piketty’s dismay at growing inequalities in wealth globally is, of course, laudable, and his latest non-Marxist focus on ideologies refreshing though perlogical assumptions. See Summers, “The Inequality Puzzle,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 32 (Summer 2014): 65–73. Galbraith, “Kapital for the Twenty-First Century?” Dissent 61, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 77–82. Adding to the controversy is Jean-Philippe Delsol, Nicholas Lecaussin, and Emmanuel Martin, eds., Anti-Piketty: Capital for the 21st-Century (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2017). 12 Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2020), 1–7. First published as Capital et Idéologie (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2019). Piketty’s latest work more fully addresses China, but apparently in offensive ways. See Sidney Leng, “China censors Thomas Piketty’s book that touches on nation’s growing inequality,” South China Morning Post, August 31, 2020, A6. Nathan VanderKlippe, “China blocks Piketty book on inequality as leadership prepares to declare victory over poverty,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), September 1, 2020. Unlike Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, his more recent Capital and Ideology has yet to be translated into Chinese, reportedly due to censorship. 13 Paul Krugman, “Capitalism Reconsidered,” New York Times, March 15, 2020, 11.

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haps overdone as a dialectical countermove. However, Krugman is right: Piketty’s skills as a polymath are somewhat stretched, especially vis-à-vis China and Confucianism. While his thinking overall appears ambitiously grounded in substantial, wide-ranging, even mind-boggling empirical studies and analyses, his thoughts on China are not a vast improvement on those of Max Weber’s (1864–1920) The Religion of China (1915).14 Indeed, despite their admirably ambitious global reach, Piketty’s works evidence scant grasp of China and its historically dominant ideological narrative, Confucianism, as relevant to the possibility of a more compassionate economic order. In Capital and the TwentyFirst Century, Piketty mentions China dozens of times, but characterizes it as a “poor and emerging” country (19, 28, 30, 38, 84, 240, 257, 415). Neither Confucius nor Confucianism, however, are so much as broached in Piketty’s first book, and only poorly so in his second.

VI.

Weberian Echoes

In Capital and Ideology, Piketty corrects this omission of Confucius and Confucianism, but only by brief inclusion of them in his discussion of “Ternary Societies and Colonialism: Eurasian Trajectories.” There, he addresses ways “colonialism affected the transformation of the Chinese inequality regime,” noting that until 1911, China was organized in a “trifunctional” ideological configuration as were Europe and India until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i. e., with nobles and clergy lording it over the common lot. Yet within the Chinese inequality regime, Confucianism, according to Piketty, was “closer to a civic philosophy than to a religion in the sense of Christian, Jewish, or Muslim monotheism or Hinduism.” In Piketty’s view, “Kongfonzi [sic] (Latinized as Confucius) was a peerless scholar and teacher who lived in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE … [who] crisscrossed China to deliver his lessons and demonstrate that peace and social harmony could be achieved only through education, moderation, and a search for rational and pragmatic solutions (which in practice were usually fairly conservative in terms of morals and included 14 Weber’s The Religion of China, published in 1915, was long overshadowed by Weber’s first book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–05). In 1951, The Free Press published Hans H. Gerth’s translation of the work, first entitled Konfuzianismus und Taoismus, or Confucianism and Daoism, more figuratively as The Religion of China. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber argued, contrary to Marx, that capitalism had arisen not from material dialectics but instead as an outgrowth of Protestant Christianity’s work ethic. In The Religion of China, Weber explained why China had not developed capitalism by citing Confucianism and Daoism as philosophies that tended to accommodate and harmonize with the world rather than engage it critically and independently. For an online version of The Religion of China see: https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.331/page/n5/mode/2up.

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respect for elders, property, and property owners).” Piketty adds that “as in all trifunctional societies, the moderation of scholars and men of letters was to play a central role in the political order, balancing the unruliness of the warriors.” This is virtually the extent of Piketty’s exploration of Confucius and ancient Confucianism. Surprisingly, there is no mention of Mencius. For some readers, the bungled Romanization of Kongfuzi’s 孔夫子 name as “Kongfonzi,” might prompt questions otherwise about the reliability of the analyses of Confucius, Confucianism, and Chinese socio-political culture.15 More generally, Piketty offers only a brief survey of ideology in Chinese history: “Confucianism — ruxue in Chinese (‘the teaching of the literati’) — thus became official state doctrine in the second century BCE and remained so until 1911, even as it underwent a series of transformations and exchanged symbioses with Buddhism and Taoism.” Then, skipping beyond history Piketty adds, in an admittedly positive way, From time immemorial Confucian literati were seen as scholars and administrators who placed their vast stores of knowledge and competence, their understanding of Chinese literature and history and their very strict domestic and civil morality at the service of the community, public order, and the state — rather than being seen as a religious organization distinct from the state.

This, he explains, was “a fundamental difference between the Confucian and Christian versions of trifunctionality, and it offers one of the most natural explanations of the unity of the Chinese state in contrast to the political fragmentation of Europe (notwithstanding the Catholic Church’s many attempts to bring the Christian kingdoms closer together).”16 Here again, the longue durée, comparative analysis of Confucianism as an ideological formulation, more secular than sacred, is hardly original, though the linkage of it to inequalities in wealth is somewhat so. But curiously absent is any consideration of normative 15 Cuı¯ Zhı¯yuán 崔之元, “China in Piketty’s Capital and Ideology,” Eurics: European Institute for Chinese Studies No. 6 (November 2020). http://www.eurics.eu/upload/document/202011300 41144_eurics-november.pdf. More positively, Cuı¯ admits that Piketty claims that China is the only “mixed economy” in the world today, with 70% of capital owned privately and 30% publicly. However, he then characterizes Piketty’s suggestion that China’s balance of capital might facilitate its role in “participatory socialism” as “thinkful wishing.” Also see Qín Huı¯ 秦 暉, “Dilemmas of Twenty-First Century Globalization: Explanations and Solutions, with a Critique of Thomas Piketty’s Twenty-First Century Capitalism,” translated by David Ownby, Reading the China Dream. https://www.readingthechinadream.com/qin-hui-dilemmas.html. Among other things, Qín notes that Piketty’s left-leaning first book was translated into Chinese (二十一世紀資本論 Èrshíyı¯ shìjì zı¯beˇnlùn) in an “eye-catching” way as The TwentyFirst Century’s Das Kapital. The Japanese translation opted for the less controversial 21 世紀 の資本 (21 seiki no shihon), or Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 16 Piketty, “Trifunctional Society and the Construction of the Chinese State,” Capital and Ideology, 389.

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Confucian thinking of a Mencian sort about the economic order, the problem of inequalities in wealth, and how to establish the economic grounds for the possibility of a moral, ethically well-founded society. In part, Piketty synopsizes Weber’s account of Confucianism as consisting “only of ethics,” “an innerworldly morality of laymen,” which taught “adjustment to the world, to its orders and conventions. Ultimately, it represented just a tremendous code of political maxims and rules of social propriety for cultured men of the world.”17 Rather than opposition and discord or a determination to preside over the “rational transformation of the world” that Calvinists supposedly embodied, the “orthodox” Confucian [Weber did recognize that there were heterodoxies, but didn’t give them much attention] sought to deploy “a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum.”18 Weber also claimed that “tensions between sacred and secular law were completely absent” and “alien to” Confucianism.19 While this might sound idyllic, in Weber’s view, however, world harmony fostered by this reduction of tensions between secular and sacred hampered the indigenous development of capitalism in China. But rather than explaining the absence of capitalism from Chinese history as with Weber, Piketty’s concern is with the presence or absence of inequalities in wealth. In Capital in the Twenty-first Century, Piketty found reason to admire China for having achieved a state wherein inequalities were not extreme, but with Capital and Ideology, he had less positive to say, given the increasingly evident inequalities concomitant with China’s burgeoning but top-heavy economic successes.

17 Weber, The Religion of China, 152, 235, 246, 248. Capital and Ideology does mention Weber twice, first in reference to Weber’s study of Hinduism and India (319), and then later in connection with Pomeranz’s thoughts on the “great divergence.” There, Piketty mentions Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (note 18, 378). While criticizing Weber’s work on Hinduism as ahistorical, Piketty does not take issue with Weber’s stress on “cultural and religious factors,” an approach at odds with Marx’s emphasis on material factors. Piketty’s focus on ideologies clearly resonates Weber’s on non-material dimensions of economics. 18 Piketty, Capital and Ideology, 227, 240. 19 Piketty, Capital and Ideology, 149. For Confucianism, “The world was the best of all possible worlds; human nature was disposed to the ethically good.” And “Like for truly Hellenic man all transcendental anchorage of ethics, all tension between the imperatives of a supra-mundane God and a creatural world, all orientation toward a goal in the beyond, and all conception of radical evil were absent. … Completely absent in Confucian ethic was any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and socio-political reality.” 227–228, 235–236.

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Confucianism and Communism

Having dispensed with three millennia of history via this trifunctionality hermeneutic, Piketty next jumps to the twentieth century and the PRC’s relationship to Confucianism, noting that some “may also be tempted to compare Confucianism, which in the history of the Chinese empire functioned as a civil ‘religion of state unity,’ to modern Chinese Communism, which in a different sense was also a form of state religion.” Piketty notes that in this view, the Confucian administrators and literati of the Hàn, Sòng, Míng, and Qı¯ng emperors “simply evolved into officials and high priests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), serving … the People’s Republic.” Moreover, “the Communist regime’s efforts to achieve national unity and social harmony” appear, in this scenario, as “merely a continuation of China’s Confucian past.” Thus, in the early twenty-first century, the CCP “restored Confucius to a place of honor….” Piketty admits that “such comparisons are fraught with difficulties” insofar as they “assume a continuity and determinism for which there is no evidence and prevent us from thinking about the complexity and diversity of China’s past — and, indeed, the complexity and diversity of all sociopolitical trajectories.”20 Unlike many scholars commenting on East Asia’s economic rise over the last half century who recognize a so-called “Confucian work ethic” including thisworldly Confucian values of honesty, trustworthiness, sincerity, respect, etc., Piketty does not emphasize connections between Confucianism and capitalism, whether intrinsic or coincidental, but instead suggests that Confucianism — despite its unpleasant history with Máo during the Cultural Revolution — has been accommodated and perhaps coopted by the Chinese Communist Party and the ruling elite of the People’s Republic of China. Piketty’s early work, which centered largely around the growth of inequalities in wealth among Western nations and considerably less so on non-Western ones, thus won praise from China’s leader, Xí Jìnpíng 習近平 (1953–), but his Capital and Ideology, which was more critical of China’s expanding inequalities in wealth, was not so well received with Chinese publishers who called for such substantial, censorial textual cuts that no PRC edition has arrived. Most egregiously, Piketty recognized no traditional grounds in Confucian economic thinking for mitigation of inequalities in wealth — in China and globally for that matter — which again suggests a meager grasp of that tradition and its potential contributions to Chinese economic life and, more broadly, that of the twenty-first century global arena.

20 Piketty, Capital and Ideology, 390.

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VIII. Etymological Interlude: Confucianism and “Economics” in East Asia Before proceeding, a few words about the meaning of “economics” might be helpful for understanding the relationship of Confucian thinking to Chinese and East Asian conceptions of the economic order. Textbook accounts emphasize that economics refers to the study of wealth — gold, silver, stocks, bonds, paper money, specie, land, real estate, plus commodities and services that have recognized value. But economics is not just about wealth: it studies how wealth comes to be, i. e., how it is produced, manufactured, or generated, and the ways and means of its distribution at large, i. e., it involves the study of how wealth is made and divvied up within a group, a society, a nation-state, and the larger global community. It also examines consumption patterns relating to how resources are used in the production of wealth, and then at an individual level by those who possess them.21 By extension, the economic order refers to socio-political structures wherein wealth is produced, consumed, and distributed according to various rules, regulations, and principles, some of which emerge from bottom up while others are controlled more systematically from on high by a governing body. Due to the close association of economic orders to political systems, early on the study of economics was referred to as the study of political economy, with the latter emphasizing how economic orders are often controlled by the power of politics and governments in deciding how limited resources, services, and commodities are produced, distributed, and consumed. In the nineteenth century, the Western words economics and political economy ended up being rendered in East Asian translations via new compounds, 經 濟 ( jı¯ng jì) and 經濟學 ( jı¯ng jì xué), composed of ancient components, 經 and 濟, that first emerged in significant proximity in a fourth-century text, the Bàopuˇzıˇ 抱朴子, attributed to the Eastern Jìn 晉 scholar, Geˇ Hóng 葛洪 (283–343). In chapter 10, “Clarifying Foundations” (míng beˇn 明本), the Bàopuˇzıˇ contrasts the “tasks of the Confucians” (rú zheˇ zhı¯ suoˇ wù yeˇ 儒者之所務也) and those of the 21 The English word economics derives from the Greek term οι᾿κονομία, a compound including οἶκος meaning “home,” and νέμω referring to regulation, thus signifying “management of the home” and presumably, at least as Aristotle supposedly used the term in his Economics (Οι᾿κονομικά), the resources/wealth needed to maintain a satisfactory life. Over time, the “home” grew into the larger polity, with οικονομία, rendered as oeconomia in Latin, referring to the management of wealth, resources, and services within the larger national community. The English word “economics” and the studies integral to it came to be established within the emerging academic disciplinary discourse of the early modern and modern periods with works such as Adam Smith’s (1723–1790) Wealth of Nations (1776), Thomas Malthus’ (1766– 1834) Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), John Stuart Mills’ (1806–1873) Principles of Political Economy (1848), and Alfred Marshall’s (1842–1924) Principles of Economics (1890).

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Daoists (dào jia¯ zhı¯ yè yeˇ 道家之業也), by associating “ordering the world and helping the common people” ( jı¯ng shì jì sú 經世濟俗) with the Confucians. In the phrase, “ordering the world and helping the common people,” the component terms of what became the East Asian gloss for “economics,” jı¯ng and jì, appear proximate one another, albeit with a more clearly political nuance than economic, though the latter was implicit and surely integral to the former. Indeed, “ordering the world” might well be translated, or at least interpreted, as “divvying up the world and its resources,” i. e., the work of political economy in practice. Earlier writings such as the Book of History (Shàng shu¯ 尚書) and the Analects used the terms jı¯ng and jì in ways that prefigured the Bàopuˇzıˇ’s formulation. In the Book of History, the “Books of the Zho¯u” (Zho¯u shu¯ 周書) speak of “ordering and managing (the capital)” ( jı¯ng yíng 經營), “ordering the calendar” ( jı¯ng lì 經 歷), and “ordering states” ( jı¯ng ba¯ng 經邦), in each case anticipating the Bàopuˇzıˇ’s reference to “ordering the world” ( jı¯ng shì 經世). Similarly, in the Book of History, the “Books of the Zho¯u” refer to the newly risen Zho¯u monarchy “helping the multitudes of people” ( jì zhào mín 濟兆民), with the latter reference again close to the Bàopuˇzıˇ’s four-character compound, jı¯ng shì jì mín 經世濟民, later abbreviated as jı¯ng jì. The Analects also includes passages wherein jı¯ng and jì anticipate the Bàopuˇzıˇ. In the final passage of chapter six, “Yo¯ng Yeˇ” 雍也, Confucius’ disciple, Zıˇ Gòng 子貢, asks whether someone capable of assisting people and helping the multitudes ( jì zhòng 濟衆) might be called compassionate (rén 仁). In reply, Confucius explains that such a person is not simply compassionate but rather, nothing less than a sage (shèng 聖). Confucius adds that even the ancient sage rulers Yáo 堯 and Shùn 舜 found themselves challenged on those counts. Confucius next explains the methodology of compassion (rén zhı¯ fa¯ng 仁 之方) as consisting in establishing others as one would wish to be established and helping to develop them as one would wish to be developed, or more simply put, treating others in a way comparable to one’s wishes for oneself,22 suggesting an integral and humanistic connection between compassion and the larger sociopolitical and economic project of helping and assisting people at large. In the Mencius, this politically nuanced linkage of compassion and an economic-ethical plan for rightly ordering the world and assisting the multitudes of humanity becomes more explicit, concrete, and detailed. Later, in the Suí 隋 dynasty, the Confucian scholar Wáng Tóng 王通 (584– 618), in Discussions of Master Wénzho¯ng (Zho¯ng shuo¯ 中説), brought these threads together, noting that in rites and music there is “a way of ordering and 22 Concordance to the Analects (Lùn yuˇ yıˇn dé 論語引得) 6:30, Harvard Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement Number 16 (Beijing: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1940), 11. Also, To¯yama Kaoru 遠山馨, “Rongo to keizaigaku” 論語と経済学, Seinan gakuin daigaku toshokan ho¯ 西南学院大学図書館報 96 (1983): 1.

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helping things” ( jı¯ng jì zhı¯ dào 經濟之道) that, more fully stated, consists in “ordering the world and helping people” ( jı¯ng shì jì mín 經世濟民). In the Sòng ¯ nshí 王安石 (1021–1086) and then 宋 and beyond, the Confucian scholar Wáng A a growing number of later scholar-statesmen including Gù Yánwuˇ 顧炎武 (1613– 1682), in opposition to the “study of [metaphysical] principle” (lıˇ 理) advocated by Zhu¯ Xı¯ 朱熹 (1130–1200), likewise spoke of jı¯ng jì 經濟 as an abbreviated reference to “ordering the world and helping people,” that is, vis-à-vis more concrete matters related to politics, government, and socio-economic administration.23 Thus, although Confucianism is often thought of as a system oriented all but exclusively toward ethical, political, humanistic, and cosmological matters, it has also been, and quite significantly, long concerned with matters of political economy especially as they relate to managing wealth and its distribution in ways conducive to orchestrating and governing a healthy and ethically grounded humanistic society.

IX.

Mencius on Morality and Economic Equity

Piketty most likely would like Mencius, making his omission of him all the more surprising. In the Mencius (3A/3), the intrinsically related problems of morality and economic equity are addressed in specific, practical terms, providing seminal ideas on economic organization and the role of government intent on precluding, from the start, extreme material inequalities among the masses as well as the necessary foundations for a moral society. In brief, the text advocates a degree of laissez-faire enterprise but also ultimate government control of wealth and capital in ways ensuring not only equitable distribution of wealth but also an ethically well-founded society. Responding to Duke Wén of Téng 滕文公 regarding how to govern, Mencius stated that “people’s tasks should not be delayed,” meaning by this that people ought to be able to work their land and harvest a crop of grain. If the agrarian details are put to one side, Mencius’ suggestion is that people be allowed, without government interference, to mind their own business through their own work.

23 For a fuller discussion, see Féng Tia¯nyú 馮天瑜, “Chu¯gokugo Nihongo Seiyo¯go aida no so¯go denpa to honyaku no purosesu ni okeru ‘keizai’ to iu gainen no hensen” 中国語、日本語、 西洋語間の相互伝播と翻訳のプロセスにおける「経済」という概念の変遷, Nihon kenkyu¯: Kokusai Nihon bunka kenkyu¯ sentaa kiyo¯ 日本研究: 国際日本文化研究センタ ー紀要 (2005): 159–190.

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Mencius adds that “the way people behave”24 has everything to do with their “having a reliable livelihood” (yoˇu héng chaˇn 有恆產). When they have this, “they will have a reliable mind-and-heart” (yoˇu héng xı¯n 有恆心). But when they have no reliable means of living, “they will not have a reliable mind-and-heart.” If they have no reliable heart, then there is nothing that they will not do (i. e., criminal acts such as theft and murder) to gain a material means of support for themselves. Mencius then observes that punishing people who have fallen into crime because they had no reliable means of livelihood simply amounts to “entrapping people” (waˇng mín 罔民), and asks whether a compassionate ruler would do such. Mencius adds that a “worthy ruler” (xia¯n ju¯n 賢君) is respectful of others and frugal with his resources, only drawing resources from the people in accordance with established regulations. Mencius then quotes an earlier statesman, Yáng Huˇ 陽虎, who reportedly said, “those who are [primarily] intent on amassing wealth [for themselves] are not compassionate (wéi fù bù rén 為富不 仁), “while those who are compassionate will not be [primarily] concerned about amassing wealth [for themselves]” (wéi rén bù fù 為仁不富). More pointedly, Mencius asks how the ruler who fancies himself the parent of the people might actually be so if he leaves his people in such distress that old and young end up piled dead in ditches and canals?25 Following up on this exchange, Duke Wén later asked Mencius about the wellfield ( jıˇng dì 井地) system of land distribution. Mencius responded that “compassionate government (rén zhèng 仁政) must begin with establishing property boundaries between plots of land,” adding that if the boundaries are not correct (bù zhèng 不正), then the individual plots will be unequal (bù ju¯n 不鈞), and if unequal, the yield derived from them will be uneven (bù píng 不平). Mencius notes that “oppressive rulers and corrupt officials” (bào ju¯n wu¯ lì 暴君 汙吏) are often lax in establishing boundaries precisely so that they might maximize their take by short-changing the people. Mencius goes on to outline allotments of land according to a nine-square model, with the outer eight plots, equal in size, going to families, no doubt patriarchal, and described as “private” (sı¯ muˇ 私畝) land, suggesting a recognition of private property, while the central plot is deemed “public” (go¯ng tián 公田), with proceeds going to the ruling elite. The central plot is to be worked collectively by those holding the surrounding equal plots, even as those plot holders “befriend (xia¯ng yoˇu 相友) and help one another (xia¯ng zhù 相助)” in their labors, coming to live together in a “friendly 24 Wing-tsit Chan, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 66. Chan translates this opening clause as “The way according to which people conduct their lives ….” 25 Concordance to the Mencius (Mèngzıˇ yıˇn dé 孟子引得) 3A/3, Harvard Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement Number 17 (Beijing: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1940), 18–19.

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and peaceful” way. Mencius allows, in concluding his summary of the well-field system, that “modifying and adapting it” (rùn yì 潤澤) will be up to the ruler and his ministers.26 This system of land distribution was referred to as the “well-field” system because the written word jıˇng 井 that otherwise means “a well” resembled, simply as a graph, a checkerboard grid of eight equal units or plots surrounding a central unit or plot belonging to the ruler. The written character 井 thus symbolizes at the microscopic level the Mencian ideal of equitable division of wealth, to be carried out far and wide, not simply for the sake of economic equality but rather as the material basis providing for the practical realization of a morally responsible society. Mencius’ recognition of the downside of imperfections in an incorrectly divided well-field arrangement no doubt leaves ample room for the very inequalities he otherwise sought to preclude. However, his intent is clear: to establish an egalitarian basis for livelihood and a mutually oriented community wherein all share, work, and benefit together, for their own sake as well as that of the ruling elite responsible for establishing and maintaining the socio-economic system. If Mencius’ provision for modifications is given a more modern reading, amendments would be (1) that livelihood need not be a function of a maledominant family system and instead would allow for gender diversity and inclusion of all, and (2) that the system of socio-economic division, though described in agrarian terms, need not be tied to farmland and its wealth potential but instead could be rethought in terms of contemporary sources of wealth and sustenance such as provision for equal distribution of education, food, housing, and access to public facilities such as water, utilities, health services, and information systems. With these amendments, even if inequalities appeared, they would perhaps not be as egregious as otherwise. Indeed, as modified, the Mencian ideal of compassionate government and its intimate relationship to an egalitarian distribution of the basics of life and livelihood would go a long way toward creating a moral society. At the very least it should preclude the worst that Mencius feared: people engaging in unbridled wrongdoing, ad infinitum, because they lacked the very fundamental necessities of life. Mencius’ claim that a decent, reliable livelihood is a precondition for reliable moral behavior suggests that there might be a way forward avoiding inequities in material welfare that is, most importantly, ethically good for all. Yet Mencius was not a naïve communalist. The passage outlining his thoughts on the well-field system is followed by one relating the views of Xuˇ Xíng 許行, a proponent of radical communal primitivism. Xuˇ Xíng claimed that rulers should work in the fields side-by-side with the common people, prepare their own meals, and also govern the realm rather than live apart from the masses while exploiting 26 Concordance to the Mencius (3A/3), 19.

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them. Mencius responds by establishing that Xuˇ Xíng did not make his own hats, pots and pans, and iron plow but instead relied on artisans who devoted themselves to their manufacture. Mencius adds that likewise, governing is not something that can be undertaken alongside growing crops. Furthermore, Mencius notes that some — such as those who govern — will work with their minds (láo xı¯n 勞心), while others will engage in physical labor (láo lì 勞力). He also acknowledges that things are not, at their core, all the same (bù qí 不齊), but instead vary in quality and value. Trying to make things completely and totally equal for all (tóng zhı¯ 同之), according to Mencius, would be contrived (weˇi 偽), and so would ultimately bring chaos to the world below heaven. Rather than a radically egalitarian agrarian economy, Mencius allows for professional specialization as with the work of rulers and intellectuals who labor with their minds. And while radical egalitarianism might not be the Mencian ideal, his utopia is one which nevertheless largely precludes gross inequalities in wealth. Even thinkers such as Piketty might, then, find a place there.

X.

Early-Confucian Discussions of Profit

Mencius’ rejection of primitive communalism did not make him the darling of twentieth-century advocates of radical communism. But then again, when it comes to economic thought, Mencius is probably best known for his allegedly anti-capitalist distaste for “profit” (lì 利) or “profit-mindedness.” There is some truth in this, and the same applies to Confucius’ views on profit as recorded in the Analects, but the level of truth is rather superficial and hardly withstands nuanced scrutiny of the pertinent passages. What Confucius and Mencius objected to was not profit as such, but rather a hell-bent obsession with it to the near exclusion of all else. One of the first passages in the Analects (4:2) mentioning profit suggests that the wise man “profits [things with] compassion” (zhı¯ zheˇ lì rén 知者利仁), affirming profit that is caring and moral.27 Another passage, however, does reject prioritizing profit over consideration of others. It (4:12) states, “one who is obsessed with profit and acts accordingly breeds much resentment.”28 And then another in the same chapter contrasts the responsiveness of the ruler to what is just for all (yì 義), with the small-minded person’s responsiveness to [nothing more than personal] profit.”29 Oddly enough, in a later passage (9:1), the Analects claims that profit was a topic about which Confucius rarely spoke, but then in the 27 Concordance to the Analects (4:2), 6. 28 Concordance to the Analects (4:2), 6. 29 Concordance to the Analects (4:16), 7.

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same list of rarely discussed topics is “compassion” (ren 仁), about which Confucius spoke more often than any other.30 Then in 13:17, Confucius reportedly said, when asked about government, “don’t pursue trivial profits (xiaˇo lì 小利)” because doing so impairs realization of grander undertakings.31 While statements on profit in the Analects do vary, Confucius never denies that there might be forms of profit that facilitate pubic-minded undertakings which a good ruler should seek to realize. In 14:12, Confucius explains, more clearly and definitively, that a “complete person” (chéng rén 成人) is one who, when he sees profit ( jiàn lì 見利), thinks of what is just for all (yì 義).32 And in the final chapter of the Analects (20:2), Confucius explains that one of the most excellent approaches to government that a ruler might undertake consists in finding profit in what people consider profitable.33 These remarks show that Confucius’ views, as recorded in the Analects, affirm profit provided that it is coupled with a moral concern for the well-being of the larger community and what is in the ethical best interests of everyone. Mencius discussed profit in a more thematically consistent manner: in the opening passage of the Mencius (1A/1), King Huì 惠王 of the state of Liáng 梁, asks whether Mencius has a teaching that would profit his state. In response, Mencius asks why the king need speak [so exclusively] of profit, adding that when he does so everyone below will chime in and speak of nothing but what profits them. Instead of profit, Mencius recommends that King Huì concern himself more primarily with compassion and justice (rén yì 仁義).34 Here, Mencius’ intent is not to denounce profit but simply to subordinate it to ethical concerns that in his view should first and foremost inform its pursuit. Mencius is more than willing to shame those who seek profit by the lowest means imaginable, such as begging food and drink from those offering sacrifices to the deceased (4B/ 30 31 32 33 34

Concordance to the Analects (9:1), 15. Concordance to the Analects (13:17), 26. Concordance to the Analects (14:12), 28. Concordance to the Analects (20:2), 41. Concordance to the Mencius (1A/1), 1. Zhu¯ Xı¯’s Commentary on the Mencius (Mèngzıˇ zha¯ngjù 孟子章句). Zhu¯ adds that Mencius lays bare “the harm of [exclusively] seeking profit” by noting that prioritizing profit leads to “murder and thievery” (shì duó 弒奪). Unlike compassion and justice which are integral to the “human mind” and “express the commonality of heaven’s principles,” “the mind of profit (lì xı¯n 利心) expresses “the selfishness of human desires” (rén yù zhı¯ sı¯ 人欲之私). According to Zhu¯, if one follows selfish human desires in search of profit one will never attain it and moreover one will encounter harm. Zhu¯ quotes Master Chéng 程子 as observing that a prince ( ju¯n zıˇ 君子) would never disavow profit but that to make it the exclusive focus of one’s mind leads to harm. Master Chéng adds that if a prince emphasizes compassion and justice and avoids [exclusively] seeking profit then he will never not reap profit. Zhu¯ Xı¯ endorses Master Chéng’s view, Shisho shu¯chu¯ 四書集注, in Suzuki Yoshijiro¯ 鈴木由次郎 et al., eds., Shushigaku taikei 朱子學大系 vol. 8 (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha, 1974), 73–76.

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33),35 but he does not plain and simple condemn the profit mentality as though it were irredeemably evil. In a later passage (6B/4), Mencius returns to the theme first announced in the opening passage of the book, that a ruler’s exclusive emphasis on profit rather than compassion and justice will lead all below to do the same, resulting in ruin for the state.36 The point in these passages is that profit is fine when sought ethically in a compassionate and broadminded way so that it is not simply for oneself but for society at large.

XI.

Early-Confucian Discussions of Wealth: The Analects

In the Analects, Confucius is presented making one of the most significant remarks about wealth (fù 富) and government in all Confucian literature, one that foreshadows Mencius’ discussions of compassionate government. In 13:9, Confucius’ disciple Raˇn Yoˇu 冉有 asks what a ruler should do after gaining a wellpopulated state? Confucius responds that first the ruler should enrich people (fù zhı¯ 富之), and then provide moral teachings for them ( jiào zhı¯ 教之).37 With this statement, Confucius appears as an advocate, before Mencius, of providing a stable and reliable livelihood for the population as preliminary to expecting them to be moral. Insofar as Confucius states that people should be made wealthy first and then taught how to realize an ethical society second, he prefigures the Mencian view that compassionate government must first concern itself with the basic material welfare of the population‘‘ and then with moral expectations because in the absence of the former, the latter will not be realistic. Later, in the Sòng dynasty, Zhu¯ Xı¯’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) Commentaries on the Analects (Lúnyuˇ jízhù 論語集注) expressed a variation of the same, observing that “if people are made wealthy but not then taught (富而不教), they will act like animals. Therefore, schools must be established to clarify teachings of ritual propriety and justice.” The Confucian position, then, at least as expressed by Confucius, Mencius, and Zhu¯ Xı¯, does not deny the need to prioritize providing for the material well-being of people, even making them wealthy, but insists that the same be followed up necessarily by ethical training.38 35 36 37 38

Concordance to the Mencius, 34. Concordance to the Mencius, 47. Concordance to the Analects, 25. Later, commenting on 17:16, where Confucius asks rhetorically, “Is it possible to serve a ruler alongside a ‘coarse individual’ (bıˇ fu¯ 鄙夫),” Zhu¯’s Commentaries, quoting Hú Hóng 胡宏 (1105–1161), state, “One who sets his intentions [exclusively] on wealth and status is what Confucius means by a ‘coarse individual’” (bıˇ fu¯ 鄙夫). The latter could also be translated as “a rustic,” or “a villager,” or “a country bumpkin,” but the rural nuance seems less significant here than the suggestion that such an individual aspires for nothing more than wealth, i. e., demonstrates no learning of, nor intent on learning, rites and justice. Without the latter,

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Elsewhere, Confucius considers human reactions to wealth and poverty. In the Analects 14:10 (and in a variant of this passage in 1:15), he observes that it is hard to be poor and not resentful (pín ér wú yuàn 貧而無怨), but easy to be wealthy and not boastful (fù ér wú jia¯o 富而無驕).39 Again, the Analects suggests that good behavior is facilitated by if not built upon a decent level of material wellbeing. Along more high-minded lines, in the Analects 4:5, Confucius declares, “People want wealth and status (fú yuˇ guì 富與貴), but if they cannot be gotten ethically [literally, via the moral way (dào 道)], then they should not seek them. People don’t like poverty and lowliness, but if avoidance cannot be achieved ethically, then they should not be fled.”40 Confucius thus allows for no teleological suspension of the ethical, and certainly not for the sake of avoiding poverty or going after wealth. In 7:12, Confucius again affirms that pursuit of wealth is not necessarily evil provided that it is done in an acceptable, i. e., ethical, manner. There he states, “If it were appropriate to seek wealth, I would do so even if that meant working in a horse stable. If it were not, then I would choose to do something that I enjoyed [without regard for gaining wealth].”41 Confucius’ problem, then, was apparently not with wealth or its pursuit so much as the single-minded, hell-bent obsession with that pursuit to the exclusion of morality, compassion for others, and realization of the greater good. Later in the same chapter (7:16), Confucius again emphasizes the imperative that wealth be morally acquired in stating “Wealth and status acquired unjustly (bù yì ér fù qieˇ guì 不義而富且貴) are as distant to me as the clouds floating above.”42 In the following chapter, 8:13, he gives a new twist to the importance of morality to wealth by noting that “when the moral way prevails in a realm (yoˇu dào 有道), then poverty and lowliness are shameful. But when the way does not prevail (wú dào 無道), then wealth and status are shameful.”43 Along other lines, in 12:5, Confucius’ disciple, Zıˇ Xià 子夏observed that he had heard that “life and death were matters of fate, but wealth and status resided with [the decrees of] heaven (fù guì zài tia¯n 富貴在天).44 Strictly speaking, this

39

40 41 42 43 44

wealth was not in itself a redeeming or praiseworthy achievement. Indeed, Hú suggests that there are no lengths to which those who make wealth and status their purpose in life will not go. Hú Hóng’s work, Knowing Words (Zhı¯ yán 知言) was somewhat unique in Song philosophical literature insofar as it endorsed the well-field system. Concordance to the Analects, 27. In 1:15, Confucius is asked about “the poor man who does not suck up to others (pín ér wú chaˇn 貧而無諂) and the wealthy man who is not arrogant” (fù ér wú jia¯o 富而無驕). Confucius says this is fine, but suggests an even better way: for the poor man to find happiness (pín ér lè 貧而樂), regardless of his circumstances, and the wealthy man to be fond of the ritual behavior [rather than material pleasures] (fù ér hào lıˇ 富而好禮). Concordance to the Analects, 6. Concordance to the Analects, 12. Concordance to the Analects, 12. Concordance to the Analects, 15. Concordance to the Analects, 22.

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statement was not attributed to Confucius but nevertheless was included in the Analects and issued from a disciple without contest. The gist of the passage is that just as heaven provides for the bounty of life and productivity on a daily basis, its intent is for people to thrive and prosper abundantly, doing well in this world and benefitting from it provided that their engagement with things is ethical, considerate, and compassionate in relation to others. With moral authenticity in life comes the blessings of heaven in the form of wealth and status. In this respect, ethically gained wealth, status, and prosperity have, in the Analects, a cosmic, providential sanction. At the same time, life has its limit in the inevitability of death, an eventuality issuing not from heaven as such but rather from existential fate.

XII.

Discussions of Wealth: The Mencius

In the Mencius, similar views affirming the importance of wealth for human wellbeing and a well-ordered, ethical society appear. In 1B/5, Mencius explains to King Xua¯n of Qí 齊宣王 that “the government of a true king” (wáng zhèng 王政) is well-ordered in accordance with the well-field system and merciful to those in need. King Xua¯n admires Mencius’ accounts but when asked why he has yet to practice them responds that he has a sickness: “fondness of wealth” (haˇo huò 好 貨). Mencius replies that many earlier rulers had shared this fondness for wealth but they also allowed the common people they ruled to enjoy the same (yù baˇi xìng tóng zhı¯ 與百姓同之).45 Here, Mencius’ point is clearly that fondness for wealth is not necessarily wrong in and of itself provided that one allows that it be realized and enjoyed by all alike. Mencius returns to this topic in 7A/23 where he states, without dialogue, as general advice,

45 Concordance to the Mencius 1B/5, 6–7. Zhu¯ Xı¯’s commentary on this passage suggests that the king who is fond of wealth and can extend what he likes for himself to others is one who might become the king of all below heaven. Zhu¯ adds that fondness for wealth is one of many inclinations that the principles of heaven provide for and that are never absent from human feelings. Nevertheless, Zhu¯ cautions that when these inclinations, including fondness for wealth, are acted upon in accordance with principles and impartially in the world below heaven, then they match sages and worthies who fulfill their human nature. Those who follow selfish desires only for themselves are on par with base people who destroy heaven. Shisho shu¯chu¯ 四書集注, in Suzuki et al., eds., Shushigaku taikei 朱子學大系 vol. 8, 108–111. Commenting on 4A/14 where Mencius explains that in order to gain the realm, one must gain the minds and hearts of the people, Zhu¯ Xı¯ adds that human feelings (rén qíng 人情) are such that all desire long life, wealth, peace, and leisure, and by providing for these a ruler might gain their minds and hearts. Shisho shu¯chu¯, Shushigaku taikei vol. 8, 240.

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[Rightly] govern farmland and keep taxes light so that the people can grow wealthy (mín keˇ shıˇ fù 民可使富). Allow the people to harvest at the right time and employ them in accordance with ritual propriety so the wealth produced is never exhausted…. When a sage governs the realm below heaven he ensures that agricultural produce is as abundant as the basics of life, fire and water. When that is the case, how could the people not be compassionate 仁 towards one another?46

Zhu¯ Xı¯’s commentary quotes, with approval, an observation by another commentator, Yıˇn Tu¯n 尹焞, who noted, “This passage suggests that ritual propriety and justice for all emerge when there is sufficient wealth,” adding that “when people do not have a reliable livelihood, they will not have a reliable mind either” (mín wú cháng chaˇn zé wú cháng xı¯n 民無常産則無常心). It might be added that Yıˇn Tu¯n’s remark echoes one in the Hòu Hàn shu¯ 後漢書 (History of the Later Han Dynasty) which, in no uncertain terms, observes, “robbers and thieves emerge from poverty and hardships (盜竊起於貧窮 dào qiè qıˇ yú pín qióng).”47 Again, the Mencian message is that a reliable, sufficient livelihood is a precondition for a moral society. Rather than condemning it, the early-Confucian position as advanced in the Analects and Mencius is that wealth for all at a decent level be provided for the sake of realizing a moral, well-governed society.

XIII. Concluding Observations In the Analects and the Abacus, Shibusawa Eiichi emphasized the importance of the Analects — and that work alone — for the aspiring entrepreneur seeking to realize an ethical economy. Given Shibusawa’s early praise for Confucius’ thought, especially as it relates to profit and the search for profit, the analyses presented here are neither surprising nor necessarily original. However, Shibusawa had little good to say about Mencius or any later Confucians for that matter. There were good reasons for Shibusawa’s silence: Mencius acknowledged the conditional nature of political legitimacy at the highest levels, allowing even for the possibility of a change in dynastic line. For Shibusawa, an unwavering supporter of Japan’s imperial line, such political thinking was anathema. Yet just as offensive, perhaps, was Mencius’ thinking about the well-field system and its provision for, at least initially, more equity in wealth as a precondition for a moral society. The limits of Shibusawa’s enlightened understanding of Confucianism and the economic order appear, then, in his distaste for Mencius and later 46 Concordance to the Mencius, 52. 47 Shisho shu¯chu¯, Shushigaku taikei vol. 8, 397. The remark in the Hou Han shu is found in 王充 王符仲長統列傳, and online at https://ctext.org/hou-han-shu?searchu=%E7%A6%AE%E7 %BE%A9%E7%94%9F.

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Confucians who tended to extol Mencius’ expansive development of Confucius’ thinking. Shibusawa aside, if one’s concern is not simply with ideological systems but more importantly, the nature of sound foundations for greater equality in wealth distribution within an ethical polity, the views of Confucius and Mencius appear well worthy of elevation in the hopes that they might contribute to future thinking about the need to combat wealth inequalities globally and provide for the ethical fulfilment of humanity. In Mencius’ views, as well as those advanced by Confucius in his emphasis on first making people wealthy and then teaching them, we see what might be called the economic imperative at the core of Confucian thinking, one which affirms the importance of equitable wealth distribution to society in the expectation that only thereby can a moral society flow from it. Surely Mencius’ ideas on the well-field system are of limited value if they remain tied exclusively to arable land and agrarian societies, but if reinterpreted multidimensionally in light of modernity with necessary modifications in details so that the essentials of food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education replace the simple plot of farmland, Mencius’ thinking about the nature of compassionate government might well and rightly help shape twenty-first century economic policies at the global level so as to assist people throughout the world in realizing their fullest humanity, preempting the egregiously objectionable inequities in wealth of the contemporary world.

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Maruyama, Masao. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, transl. by Mikiso Hane. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Neville, Robert Cummings. Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000. Ornatowski, Gregory K. “Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: A Study of the Adaptation of Confucian Values to Modern Japanese Economic Ideology and Institutions.” Journal of Socio-Economics 25, no. 5 (1996): 571–590. Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century, transl. by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2014. —. Capital and Ideology, transl. by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2020. Qín, Huı¯ 秦暉. “Dilemmas of Twenty-First Century Globalization: Explanations and Solutions, with a Critique of Thomas Piketty’s Twenty-First Century Capitalism.” Translated by David Ownby. Reading the China Dream. https://www.readingthechinadrea m.com/qin-hui-dilemmas.html. Accessed Nov. 26, 2022. Sagers, John H. Confucian Capitalism: Shibusawa Eiichi, Business Ethics and Economic Development in Meiji Japan. New York: Palgrave, 2018. Shibusawa, Eiichi 澁澤榮一. Rongo to soroban 論語と算盤 (The Analects and the Abacus). Tokyo: To¯ ado¯ shobo¯, 1916. Summers, Lawrence H. “The Inequality Puzzle.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 32 (Summer 2014): 65–73. Thompson, Kirill O. “Mozi’s Teaching of Jianai (Impartial Regard): A Lesson for the Twenty-First Century?” Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (Oct. 2014): 838–855. To¯yama, Kaoru 遠山馨. “Rongo to keizaigaku” 論語と経済学. Seinan gakuin daigaku toshokan ho¯ 西南学院大学図書館報 96 (July 1, 1983): 1. Tu, Weiming 杜維明. “The Confucian Dimension in the East Asian Development Model.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 5, no. 4 (Second Quarter 1990): 59–70. —, ed. Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. Tucker, John A. “Confucianism, Capitalism, and Shibusawa Eiichi’s The Analects and the Abacus.” In A Concise Companion to Confucius, edited by Paul R. Goldin, 307–329. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017. VanderKlippe, Nathan. “China blocks Piketty book on inequality as leadership prepares to declare victory over poverty.” Globe and Mail (Toronto) (Sept. 1, 2020). https://www. theglobeandmail.com/world/article-china-blocks-piketty-book-on-inequality-as-leade rship-prepares-to/. Accessed Nov. 26, 2022. Watanabe, Hiroshi. A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901, trans. by, David Noble. Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2012. Weber, Max. The Religion of China, translated by Hans H. Gerth. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951. —. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribner, 1958. Wright, Mary. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.

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Yao, Souchou. Confucian Capitalism: Discourse, Practice, and the Myth of Chinese Enterprise. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002. Zhu¯, Xı¯ 朱熹. Shisho shu¯chu¯ 四書集注. Vol. 8 of Shushigaku taikei 朱子學大系,edited by Suzuki Yoshijiro¯ 鈴木由次郎et al. Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha, 1974.

Yong Huang

Why Toleration Is Not a Value/Virtue? The View from Confucius

I.

Introduction

Toleration or tolerance has now become almost universally regarded as one of the most important political values and/or personal virtues, if not the most important one, since the modern period.1 John Locke starts his famous “A Letter Concerning Toleration” by saying that “mutual toleration among Christians” is “the principal mark of the true church” (Locke 2010, 3). John Stuart Mill, in the same paragraph with his famous saying, “If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode,” asks rhetorically: “Why then should tolerance…extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents?” (Mill 2009, 115). Contemporary political philosopher John Rawls claims that his own trademark conception of justice as fairness “would complete and extend the movement of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual acceptance of the principle of toleration” (Rawls 1996, 154). Indeed, the idea of toleration has been written into the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” of 1948; and UNESCO declared 1995 as the “Year for Tolerance” and November 16 of each year beginning from 1996 as the “International Day for Tolerance.” Accordingly, a number of scholars have explored the idea of toleration in the Confucian tradition, claiming that it is also a political value and personal virtue that Confucians, particularly Confucius, promotes. In this chapter, however, I shall argue, by drawing on Confucius’s Analects, that tolerance as a moral idea is fundamentally flawed. To show this, we need first to see what toleration is.

1 While toleration is a better term than tolerance, I use them as if they are synonymous, largely because both are used in the literature referenced in this chapter.

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What Is Toleration?

According to Oxford English Dictionary, to tolerate, generally, is “to bear, endure” and, more specifically, “to allow to exist or to be done or practised without authoritative interference or molestation… to allow, permit”; “to bear without repugnance… to put up with.” Thus, as Catriona McKinnon points out, “the motto of the tolerant person is ‘live and let live,’ even when what she lets live shocks, enrages, frightens, or disgusts her” (McKinnon 2006, 3). In his painstaking study of toleration from both historical and conceptual perspectives, Rainer Forst provides a careful analysis of the concept of toleration and explains that there are three necessary components in it. The first is the objection component: “The tolerated convictions or practices are regarded as false or condemned as bad in a substantive sense” (Forst 2003, 18). This is obvious, as we don’t have the attitude of toleration toward convictions that we regard as true and practices that we regard as good, where we shall instead wholeheartedly endorse them. That can explain why I must have some grudge instead of gratitude if someone says that they are tolerating me. More importantly, here the convictions have to be regarded as false and practices bad with good reason and not purely subjectively or with prejudice. In other words, they are demonstrably false and objectively bad, and not simply because I regard them as false or bad due to my biases. Otherwise we would encounter what Forst calls “the paradox of the tolerant racist:” “someone with extreme racist antipathies would be described as tolerant (in the sense of a virtue) provided only he showed restraint in his actions (without changing his way of thinking). And the more such prejudices he had, the greater would be his scope of tolerance” (Forst 2003, 19). Some scholars argue that the objection here does not have to be based on good reasons, and a mere dislike can also count as objection (see Warnock 1987: 25–6). This would expand the scope of what counts as toleration, but then toleration could no longer be regarded as a moral value or virtue, as otherwise, as we have seen, a racist with dislike and indeed hatred, as long as he or she refrains from acting out this dislike or hatred, would also be regarded as a virtuous person. To illustrate, let’s imagine that there are two men. One of them considers members from a minority group to be inferior and would like to oppress them but refrains from doing so. Another considers these people to be equal, thus has no intention to oppress them, and thus does not actually oppress them. If the component of objection in toleration does not have to be based on good reasons, we would have to say that the first person has the virtue of toleration, while the second does not; and if toleration is a virtue, then we would have to say that the first person is more virtuous than the second, which is counter-intuitive. Moreover, let’s imagine that there is a third person, who not only thinks that

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members from a minority group are inferior but thinks that they should be eliminated from the face of the earth, and yet he refrains from doing it. Then we would have to say that the third person is even more virtuous than the first, since he needs to make a greater effort to let members of this minority group live than the first person, which is also counter-intuitive.2 So according to John Horton, who first formulated this paradox, we don’t judge people to be tolerant “merely because they don’t act intolerantly towards something they think is objectionable,” and “in characterizing an attitude as tolerant, we are typically interested in more than the fact that people have disposition not to interfere with some actions which they find objectionable. We are also interested in what sort of actions they find objectionable” (Horton 1994, 17). The second component of toleration is acceptance. As we have seen, if we don’t have objection to something, there is no need for us to tolerate it, as we would simply endorse it. Now If we don’t accept what we have objection to and act to suppress it, we become intolerant. To be tolerant toward something is then to accept what we have objection to. This is the acceptance component, which, according to Forst, “specifies that the tolerated convictions and practices are condemned as false or bad, yet not so false or bad that other, positive reasons do not speak for tolerating them. The important point here is that the positive reasons do not cancel out the negative reasons but are set against them in such a way that, although they trump the negative reasons (in the respect relevant in the corresponding context), and in this sense are higher-order reasons, the objection nevertheless retains its force” (Forst 2003, 20). It is here that we encounter the socalled paradox of moral toleration, as toleration here “involves refraining from preventing that which may properly be prevented” (Mendus 1988, 4). On the one hand, the objection component of toleration requires that we have good reasons to object to something, which means that the thing we have objection to is indeed false or bad, and thus it is proper to prevent it from taking place. On the other hand, the acceptance component of toleration requires that we have good reasons to not prevent it from taking place. So “it may sometimes be proper not to prevent that which may properly be prevented, and herein lies the paradox” (Mendus 1988, 4). Most of the philosophical ingenuity in the contemporary discussion of toleration has been displayed in showing how to solve this at least apparent 2 Moreover, without this needed emphasis on objective reasons for objection, we would not be able to distinguish two very different types of intolerance: one is to be intolerant of persons or things that one has no good reason to object to (for example, intolerant of another person because this person is of a different race), and another is to be intolerant of persons or things that he or she has good reasons to object to (a person who is intolerant and shuts down a person making a racist speech). So in this chapter, I’m using the term toleration in a narrow sense, to refer to the attitude of putting up with things or persons to which or whom one has good reasons to object.

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paradox. Generally speaking, there are two strategies. One is the weighting procedure: it is morally proper for us to prevent from taking place what we have good reasons to object to, when to prevent it from taking place will result in something we have more, better, or stronger reasons to prevent from taking place. This is the strategy most defenders of toleration take. The other is the so-called perceptual conception taken by David Heyd: “It treats toleration as involving a perceptual shift: from beliefs to the subject holding them, or from actions to their agent” (Heyd 1996, 11). In other words, it is a shift from the beliefs and actions which you find objectionable to their owner whom you accept. The third component of toleration is the “rejection component.” A tolerant person will accept certain beliefs and actions he or she regards as false and wrong with good reasons, but obviously such a person does not therefore accept any beliefs and actions he or she regards as false and wrong. In other words, tolerance cannot be unlimited, as otherwise it will lead to another paradox, identified by Karl Popper: “unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed and tolerance with them” (Popper 1966, 265). While we may ask whether no kind of intolerance can be tolerated, it is certainly true that there must be a limit to what we can tolerate. So, as Forst points out, “Here it is important to recognise that, in addition to the reasons for objection and reasons for acceptance, we need a third category of reasons, namely, those for rejecting convictions and practices, where the rejection can no longer be offset by reasons for acceptance. Hence one can speak of a rejection component” (Forst 2003, 23). This is something for sure, and the disagreement is only where to draw the line beyond which things are not tolerable. If we use Mill’s harm principle as a criterion and regard all behaviour that causes harm to others as intolerable, then what is tolerable is only behaviour that causes harm to the agent, along with beliefs/utterances that don’t cause immediate harm to others, and those causing harm to others can be the appropriate object of intolerance (see Warnock 1987, 123). Some scholars, however, argue that only some but not all behaviours that cause harm to others are intolerable. For example, D. D. Raphael argues that we should regard the infringement of rights as the criterion of the intolerable. This criterion not only takes anything one does to oneself out of the domain of the intolerable, since no one can do things to infringe on one’s own rights, but also takes some actions or the lack thereof that cause harm to others out of the same domain (Raphael 1988, 146). For example, someone is starving and an agent can but does not provide food to the starving person. We have good reasons to think this person’s action (or the lack thereof) is wrong as it causes harm to the starving person, but we can tolerate the person, since this starving person does not have a right against the agent to be

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provided with food and thus the person who does not provide the food does not infringe on the starving person’s right. Some other scholars seem to think that even some actions that infringe on others’ rights may also be tolerated. For example, Hagit Benbaji and David Heyd argue that the “tolerant attitude involves a certain kind of reconciliation with people who not only have done something wrong in the past, but insist on sticking to their objectionable conduct in the present and the future” (Benbaji and Heyd 2001, 567); “tolerance in the strict sense is granted only to people whose behaviour is held as objectively wrong” (Benbaji and Heyd, 568); acts of “tolerance take as their object behaviour that is objectively offensive, bad, or unjust” (Benbaji and Heyd, 575); and “tolerance is shown only by those who stand to lose something by restraining themselves from intervening, those who ‘suffer’ from the behaviour of the tolerated party” (Benbaji and Heyd, 576). It is in this sense that they claim that tolerance, just like forgiveness, is beyond obligation: it is supererogatory. With these three components of toleration, as Forst states, there are three normative domains. The first domain contains things on which or persons with whom we completely agree, where neither tolerance nor intolerance is appropriate; instead we fully accept them. The second domain contains things we purely object to with no reasons, or no good reasons, to accept them, where neither pure acceptance nor tolerance is appropriate; instead we completely reject them, i. e. we don’t tolerate them or we are intolerant of them. Between these two domains there is supposed to be a third one that contains things or persons to which or whom, while we have good reasons to object, we have better or stronger reasons to accept. This is where neither pure acceptance nor pure rejection is appropriate; instead we have better reasons to accept what we have good reasons to object to (Forst 2003, 24). It is in the third domain alone that tolerance is supposed to be a value or virtue. While it is relatively easier to draw the line between the first domain and the third domain than to draw the line between the second domain and the third domain, this is not the concern of this chapter, which is concerned with the value, or the lack thereof, of tolerance, which is about the third domain. I shall argue that toleration as a moral ideal, whether as a political value or as a personal virtue, is problematic at least in two respects. On the one hand, the people we are typically called on to tolerate are “ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious minority populations, migrant workers, immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, writers and intellectuals exercising their freedom of expression, and vulnerable groups in society,” listed in Article 19 of UNESCO’s “Declaration of Principles and Follow-Up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance.” These are people, however, to whom we don’t have good reason to object, and thus tolerance here is totally inappropriate. What is needed is respect instead. On the other hand, if there are people to whom or actions to which we do

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have good reasons to object, toleration, in the sense of putting up with them or in the same spirit of “live and let live,” is not an appropriate attitude either. What is needed is instead moral education. I make the first argument, drawing on the insights from the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, in a separate paper (Huang 2023). In the following, I shall make the second argument, drawing on ideas from Confucius’s Analects.

III.

Toleration or Education?

Is toleration (i. e., acceptance of what one has good reasons to object to) of immoral people or actions the right attitude to take? Confucius’s answer is “no.” One place to start our discussion of this Confucian view is Analects 14:34. Asked whether we should repay an injury with a good turn, Confucius responded: “If so what do you repay a good turn with? You repay an injury with uprightness, but you repay a good turn with a good turn.” Someone who causes an injury to me is certainly doing something immoral, which is one category of things we are supposed to tolerate if we take toleration as something supererogatory: an action that infringes the right of the person who is supposed to be tolerant of the action, and Confucius’s attitude is then clearly against toleration in this case. However, when we get clear about what Confucius means by “repaying injury with uprightness,” we will see that Confucius’s reasons against toleration will also apply to all other immoral actions: actions that infringe the rights of persons other than the one who is supposed to be tolerant, actions that do not infringe the rights of any other person but leave some people unaided and in this sense harmed, and actions that are wrong to the agent himself/herself, along with immoral beliefs/ utterances (such as racist ones) that, nevertheless, unlike the cry of fire in a crowded theatre, don’t cause immediate harm to others. What Confucius means by “returning an injury with uprightness” is subject to different interpretations. Elsewhere I have argued against a number of representative ones and developed one that I argue is most plausible (Huang 2003, Chapter 2). The character zhi 直 is used together with zheng 正 as zheng zhi 正直 and appears twice in the poem “Xiao Ming 小明” in the Minor Odes (Xiaoya 小 雅) of The Book of Poetry (Shijing 詩經). In the first appearance, it asks a superior person ( junzi 君子) “to carefully fulfil your official duties and associate with people of zheng zhi”; in the second appearance, the superior person again is asked “to carefully fulfil your official duties and love people of zheng zhi.” It’s not immediately clear whether these two characters here, zheng 正 and zhi 直, mean the same thing or different things and what they exactly mean. According to Mao Heng 毛亨, writing at end of the Warring States period, “to straighten the upright is to be straight (zheng zhi wei zheng 正直為正), while to straighten others’

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crookedness is to be upright (neng zheng ren zhi qu yue zhi 能正人之曲為直)” (Mao 2013, 1150). Although Mao’s comment does not say explicitly that zheng is related to oneself, since zhi is related to others, and zheng and zhi are here put in contrast or comparison, it is understood that, for Mao, zheng is related to oneself. More importantly, Mao makes it explicit that zhi is to correct other people’s crookedness. Before Mao, in Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn, Zuo Qiuming 左 丘明 provided a similar interpretation of zheng and zhi in his attempt to explain what benevolence (ren 仁) consists in. After quoting “carefully fulfil your official duties and love people of zheng zhi,” the lines containing the second appearance of zheng zhi in the Book of Poetry mentioned above, Zuo explains that “to be concerned with people’s welfare is to be virtuous, to straighten the upright is to be straight (zheng zhi wei zheng 正直為正), and to straighten the crookedness is to be upright (zheng qu wei zhi 正曲為直). These three combined are benevolence” (Duke Xiang, Year 7). Here, zheng and zhi acquire their different meanings. While the meaning of zheng is somewhat ambiguous, zhi clearly means to correct the crookedness of other people. Du Yu 杜預, a scholar in the Jin Dynasty, in his commentary on Zuo’s Commentary, explains that “zheng zhi wei zheng means to straighten one’s own heart-mind, while zheng qu wei zhi means to straighten others’ crookedness” (in Kong 1999, 853). Kong Yingda 孔穎達 of the Sui and Tang Dynasties further adds that “to make one’s own heart-mind straight and upright is straightness (zheng), and to use one’s own straightness to straighten others’ crookedness is uprightness” (Kong 1999, 853). According to the eminent contemporary Chinese philologist Yang Bojun 楊伯 峻 (1909–1992), Du’s view is based on Mao’s commentary on the original sentence in the Book of Poetry, and Du makes it explicit that zheng is related to self, while zhi is related to others. The only difficulty, as pointed out by Yang Bojun, is that “since one is already upright, what is the need of straightening?”; so he thinks that both Mao’s comment on zheng in The Book of Poetry and Du’s comment on zheng zhi wei zheng in Zuo’s Commentary are somewhat twisted, and he proposes to interpret zheng zhi wei zheng as “to act along one’s own straightened path” (Yang 2007, 952). This controversy on the meaning of zheng, however, should not concern us here, since our interest is in the meaning of zhi, and it seems that even Yang also agrees that zhi is directed to others’ crookedness: to correct it. If this is what zhi means, then we have a plausible understanding of Confucius’s view of “repaying injuries with uprightness (zhi).” Since the person who causes injury to me is supposed to be bad or crooked, when Confucius asks me to repay the person’s injury to me with my zhi, it means that I ought to correct this person’s crookedness, which of course is clearly different from toleration. The remaining question is whether Confucius uses the character zhi in the same way as it is used in Zuo’s Commentary. There is circumstantial evidence that

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he does. According to the traditional account, an account that was almost universally accepted before the Tang Dynasty, Zuo’s Commentary was authored by Zuo Qiuming. For example, Sima Qian 司馬遷 of the early Han states that after Confucius finished editing The Spring and Autumn, his students tried to understand its key points through the oral tradition: “Afraid that their different perspectives were resulting in different understandings, diverting from Confucius’s original intention, Zuo Qiuming, the gentleman from the state of Lu, provided detailed records of true events according to Confucius’s Spring and Autumn, resulting in Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn” (Records of the Grand Historian, “Chronology of the Twelve Dukes”). If Zuo Qiuming is indeed the author of Zuo’s Commentary, it adds some weight to the view that Confucius uses zhi in the same sense as it is used in Zuo’s Commentary, as Confucius speaks very highly of Zuo Qiuming in the Analects: “Zuo Qiuming is ashamed of clever words, insinuating facial expressions, and excessive respect, so am I. Zuo Qiuming is ashamed of concealing resentment against a person while appearing friendly to him, so am I” (Analects 5:25). It’s true that this view of Zuo Qiuming as the author of Zuo’s Commentary has been challenged since the Tang dynasty, even though it has not been fully discredited and most of the alternative views regarding the authorship of Zuo’s Commentary still align it very closely with Confucius in one way or another. There is more direct evidence, however, that Confucius indeed uses zhi in the sense of correcting others’ crookedness. To respond to his student Fan Ci’s question about benevolence (ren 仁), Confucius states that “to promote the upright (zhi) persons and demote the crooked ones can make the crooked ones upright (zhi)” (Analects 12:22). Here Confucius makes it clear that an upright person is one who can make the crooked person upright. His student Zi Xia further illustrates this point: “After becoming the emperor, Shun selected Gao Yao from among the people and promoted him, and then unbenevolent people were hardly seen; after becoming the emperor, Tang selected Yin Yi from among the people and promoted him, and then unbenevolent people were hardly seen” (Analects 12:22). Indeed, in his commentary on the line of zheng zhi in the Book of Poetry, Kong Yinda first quoted Du Yu’s explanation of these two characters and then quoted the above saying in Analects 12:22, pointing out that this is because “an upright person can straighten the crookedness of others” (Kong 2013, 1151). The Qing Dynasty scholar Liu Baonan 劉寶楠, commenting on this Analects passage, in his Corrected Meaning of the Analects, quotes both lines from Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn and Mao’s commentary on The Book of Poetry and says that “qu 曲 [in Zuo Qiuming and Mao Heng] is wang 枉 [here in the Analects]. Those who are wang are corrected by those who are upright, and so it can be seen that they are transformed into upright persons”; and he further explains that the reason that “unbenevolent people were hardly seen” is that

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“they were all transformed into being good, and it is in this sense that [Confucius says that putting the upright above the crooked] can make the crooked upright” (Liu 1990, 512).3 Another textual support is Analects 15:7, in which Confucius praises Shi Yu 史 魚in the state of Wei: “How upright Shi Yu was indeed! He was straight when Dao prevailed, and he was also straight when Dao failed to prevail.” Why does Confucius think that Shi Yu is a person of uprightness? Shi Yu was famous for remonstrating the wicked or non-upright king, King Ling of Wei, whom he served, in order to make the king upright, and he succeeded with the last resort: remonstration with his own corpse. According to Confucius’s Family Sayings, when he was about to die, he told his son that when alive, he was not able to persuade King Ling of Wei to promote the worthy person Qu Boyu and demote the bad person Mi Zixia, which shows that, as a minister, he was not able to rectify the king. So when dead, his body ought to be put in a side room instead of the main hall for the funeral. When King Ling asked his son why he put his father’s body in the side room, his son told the king what his father said. Hearing this, realizing it was due to his own fault, the king, feeling ashamed, immediately promoted Qu Boyu and demoted Mi Zixia, and had Yu’s body moved to the main hall for the proper funeral, which shows that the king was made upright by Shi Yu through remonstration with his corpse. In another place, Confucius said: “Ancient upright remonstrators ceased remonstration when dead, and there has never been one like Shi Yu who remonstrated with his corpse in order to move his king. How can this not be regarded as zhi!” (Kongzi Jiayu 22, 269). In his External Commentary on the Book of Poetry, after narrating the same story, Han Yin 韓嬰 says that Shi Yu was remonstrating with his life when alive and with his corpse when dead, which can be regarded as zhi, before quoting the lines from the poem of The Book of Poetry in which zheng zhi appeared for the first time (Han 1980, 7.21, 265). So it is important to see that when Confucius praises Shi Yu as zhi, he is not taking zhi as a self-regarding virtue; instead it is an other-regarding virtue in the sense that, being upright, Shi Yu makes King Ling of Wei upright. This is made more clear with the contrast that Han Yin makes with Qu Boyu, also mentioned in the same Analects passage by Confucius: “What a superior person ( junzi) Qu Boyu is! He served as an official when Dao prevailed, and he rolled himself up and hid himself when Dao didn’t prevail.” Although Confucius also praises Qu Boyu, he doesn’t regard him as upright (zhi). According to Han Yin, “This is how Qu 3 Xing Bing 郉昺 (932–1010) also uses “to straighten the crookedness of others is being upright (zheng qu wei zhi)” to explain the meaning of zhi as it appears in Analects 8:2, where Confucius says that “uprightness (zhi) without following rules of propriety becomes rudeness” (He and Xing 2000, 112).

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Boyu acts: externally loose and internally upright (zhi), happy to restrain himself with norms (yinkuo 隱括) and make himself, though not others, upright, and not unhappy when good institutions are abolished” (Han 1980, 2.15, 49–50). Commenting on this Analects passage, Chen Xiangdao 陳祥道 in the Northern Song period, in his Complete Interpretation of the Analects, first quoted the sentences from Zuo’s Commentary and then states that Shi Yu can be regarded as one who corrects others’ crookedness (Chen 1987). In his commentary on this passage of the Analects, the Qing Dynasty scholar Liu Baonan quoted this passage from Han and claimed that “while Qu Boyu also followed the way of uprightness (zhidao 直道), he is not as upright as Shi Yu… and Confucius doesn’t see him as being as worthy a person as Yu is” (Liu 1990, 618). To use the words of the Book of Poetry discussed above, we might say that Shi Yu is a person of zhi, while Qu Boyu is a person of zheng. The two keywords used in our interpretation of Analects 15:7 above, jian 諫 (remonstration) and yinkuo 隱括 (norms), can help us understand the character zhi in the sense of correcting others’ crookedness as it appears in a famous and otherwise controversial passage of the Analects (13:18). In this passage, the governor of She told Confucius that in his village there is an upright person who bears witness against his father stealing a sheep, to which Confucius responded: “in my village, an upright person is different: a father yin 隱 his son(’s wrongdoing), and a son yin his father(’s wrongdoing), and uprightness (zhi) lies in it.” Here uprightness is also related to some wrongdoer. According to the common understanding, yin means “not disclosing” or even “covering up.” Because family members love each other, upright family members will naturally want to cover up each other’s wrongdoing. In my view, however, uprightness in this passage still means to correct others’ crookedness. There are at least two possible ways to show this. On the one hand, as I have argued elsewhere, yin here indeed means “not disclosing” but not disclosing is not the end but merely a means. In Analects 4:18, Confucius says that “when serving your parents, (if they are wrong) you ought to gently remonstrate ( jian 諫) with them.” The purpose of remonstration with a parent is to help the parent correct the wrongdoing, but this purpose cannot be realized if one does it violently, and so Confucius emphasizes gentleness in remonstration. In other words, an intimate relationship is necessary for a successful remonstration. So if the father steals a sheep, and the son bears witness against him, it is unlikely that the son can remonstrate with his father, who will likely hold a deep grudge against the son for his failure to cover up the father’s theft. So in not disclosing his father’s wrongdoing lies the son’s uprightness (Huang 2013, Ch. 5; and Huang 2017). On the other hand, Liao Mingchun 廖明春 has argued that yin 隱 here should not be read as not disclosing or covering up but as yinkuo 隱括, which originally means to use tools to make crooked wood straight, with the expanded meaning of using

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moral norms to correct wrongdoers. So what Confucius says in this passage is that family members should correct each other’s moral faults, in which lies the uprightness (Liao 2015). What underlines Confucius’s view is his idea that an immoral person is an internally deficient one, analogical to a person who is externally, i. e., physically, deficient. When we see a person who is physically deficient, with disease, our appropriate attitude is to help the person cure the disease so that he or she can recover and become a healthy person. Similarly, when we see a morally deficient person, our appropriate attitude is not simply to accept the fact that they are morally deficient and leave them alone, i. e. tolerate them; instead we should do all that we can to help them cure their moral ills so that they can recover from them and become moral persons. For example, Confucius says, “I am really concerned about people who fail to cultivate their virtue, don’t go deep into what is learned, refrain from going in the right direction pointed to them, and don’t correct their immorality” (Analects 7:3). Confucius also says, “If you love someone, how can you not make him work hard, and if you are loyal to someone, how can you not teach the person?” (Analects 14:7). Perhaps what is more important is Confucius’s saying: “One who wants to get established (li 立) ought to help others get established, and one who wants to get completed (da 達) ought to help others get completed” (Analects 6:30). The last saying is often regarded as the Confucian version of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would like to be done unto, and this Golden Rule, according to the common understanding, means that, for example, as I would like to be offered food when hungry, drink when thirsty, medicine when sick, etc., so I ought to provide food, drink, and medicine when others are hungry, thirsty, and sick. Since the Golden rule is understood to be mainly concerned with one’s material, physical, or external needs, however, it is wrong or at least one-sided, or so I should argue, to regard the Confucian saying as an expression of the Golden Rule, because what Confucius is concerned with is not, or at least is not only, one’s material, physical, or external needs. This can be seen most clearly from the meaning of the two key verbs used here, li 立 and da 達. The meaning of da should be clear, as Confucius explains it elsewhere in a response to a question regarding the very meaning of da by his student Zizhang: “a person of da has an upright (zhi) character and loves rightness, examines people’s words and observes their countenances, and is anxious to humble oneself to others” (Analects 12:22). Here, Confucius makes it clear that da is related not only to moral matters generally but also to the moral character of zhi that we have been discussing above specifically. The best way to understand the meaning of li 立 is to see how it is used in the world’s shortest autobiography of Confucius, in which Confucius describes the second stage of his life: “I li myself at 30” (Analects 2:4).

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Many interpretations of this line have been provided in the commentary history, but hardly anyone interprets it in physical and material senses. For example, Huang Kan 皇侃 (488–545) understands it as being established in the study of the five classics. Since Confucius stated that, at the first stage of his life (at age 15) he fixed his will to study (classics), and “scholars of the ancients grasp one classic every three years, with 15 years from the age of 15 to 30, Confucius completes the process of learning the five classics, and it is in this sense that he said that he li himself at 30” (Huang Kan 1987, 348). Yang Shuda 楊樹達 (1885– 1956) interprets it as being established in ritual propriety (li yu li 立於禮), explaining that “as one starts to learn rituals at 20, one is largely accomplished in the program of rituals and thus can be established (li 立)” (Yang 2007, 27). This interpretation is supported by two other Analects passages: one’s virtue “arises from poetry, is established through rituals (li yu li 立於禮), and is accomplished in music” (Analects 8.8), and “not learning rituals, one cannot be established (li)” (Analects 16:13). Zhu Xi claims that “li 立 means to be established in the Dao and principle” (Zhu 1986, [23] 557). The eminent Qing dynasty scholar Liu Baonan 劉 寶楠 (1791–1855) reconciles all these interpretations, saying that “the interpretations of li as being established in the Dao and as being established in rituals can be united in being established in learning, since what one is supposed to learn is nothing but Dao and rituals” (Liu 1963, 24). With such an understanding of the meaning of li and da, of course we may still understand the Analects passage in question as roughly saying the same thing as the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would like to be done unto. Its focus now, however, is not on the material and physical aspects: I would like to eat delicious food, for example, and so I ought to let others eat delicious food, or I would not like to suffer pain, and so I ought to help others relieve their pain. Rather, it is on the moral aspects: I would like to be a superior person ( junzi 君子), and so I ought to help others become superior persons; or I would not like to be an inferior person (xiaoren 小人), and so I ought to help others not become inferior persons. In his On Ren in the Analects, Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1849) comments on this Confucian Golden Rule this way: “If one wants to be established in the way of filiality, one must also help others be established in the way of filiality. This is so called ‘being tireless’ (bukui 不匱) in ‘extending what one desires for oneself to others’ (xilei 錫類). If one wants to be accomplished in virtuous conduct, one must help others be accomplished in virtuous conduct. This is so-called ‘to love people in virtues’ (airen yi de 愛人以德)”; and he continues by connecting li in this passage to li in Analects 2:4 and da in this passage to da in Analects 12:22 as we examined in the last paragraph (in Liu Baonan 1963, 134). Perhaps considering it together with Confucius’s response immediately preceding this saying to Zigong’s question regarding “extensively confer benefits on the people and help all” (boshi yu min er neng jizhong 博施於民而能濟眾), Zhu

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Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) states that “these two characters [li and da] include both the inner and superficial dimension”; as the superficial dimension can be easily understood to be one’s material and physical needs, Zhu Xi immediately explains what he means by the inner dimension: “such as cultivation of virtue, the desire to get established in virtue” (Zhu 1986, [33] 846). In other words, as I desire to get established in virtue, I ought to help others get established in virtue. About this, he states more explicitly when he discusses with his students the saying that “when the rulers respect their parents common people become filial” in the Great Learning: “as I desire to be filial to my parents, loving to my brothers, and kind to my children, I must desire others are as filial to their parents, loving to their brothers, and kind to their children as I am…. I feel uneasy if only I can be so while others cannot…. It is not right that I am filial to my parents but let others not be filial to their parents, I respect my older brothers but let others not respect their older brothers, and I’m kind to my children but let others not be kind to their children” (Zhu 1986, [16] 361). So to say that we should not tolerate immoral people does not necessarily mean that we should be intolerant toward them. If we understand tolerance of immoral persons to be accepting their being immoral and intolerance to be punishing them for being immoral in an attempt to force them to be moral, then tolerance and intolerance do not exhaust all the options as they may appear; instead there is something between them, which is moral education. Moral education for Confucius consists of mostly non-coercive measures. One is moral persuasion (yanjiao 言教); but since an immoral person is immoral not because they don’t know what they do is immoral but because they lack the motivation to be moral, Confucius emphasizes sentimental education through poetry and music to motivate them to be moral as another measure; yet the singularly most important measure of moral education is for the educator to be a moral exemplar himself or herself.4 It is precisely negligence of this last measure of moral education that leads some scholars to think that Confucius indeed also promotes toleration, to which I turn now.

IV.

Confucius Promotes Toleration?

As I mentioned above, since the idea of toleration is so widely regarded as an important political value and personal virtue, many scholars have tried to find passages in the Analects to show that Confucius also advocates toleration. I shall 4 Of course, in some extreme situations, Confucius does not exclude the use of “punishment,” though not as retribution but as a way of rehabilitation, as long as it is preceded, accompanied, and followed by the ways of moral education mentioned above.

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examine these passages and argue why they are not conveying the idea of toleration. The passage that is perhaps most frequently used to show that Confucius advocates the idea of toleration is in Analects 15:15: “Those who demand a lot from themselves and hardly hold others responsible can rarely be resented.” In appearance, Confucius is saying that one should care about being a moral person oneself but should not care much about others’ moral faults. This idea seems to be supported by another passage, in which Confucius asks his students “to attack their own immoralities and not those of others” (Analects 12:21) (see Yan 1991, 35 and Miao 2006, 201). This, however, is a misunderstanding. As we have seen above, for Confucius, a morally upright person ought to make an effort to make non-upright persons upright. While there are many different ways to reach this goal, for Confucius, as we have seen at the end of the last section, the most important one is to make oneself a moral exemplar for others. On the one hand, if one is moral, then others will become moral too, and the Analects is full of such passages. For example, Confucius says that “if the ruler makes himself correct, what difficulty will the ruler have in governing the people? If the ruler cannot make himself correct, how can he make others correct?” (Analects 13:13); in another place, he says that “if you [a ruler] desire to be good, people will be good. The virtue of a ruler is like the wind, and the virtue of common people is like grass: The grass will bend when the wind blows across it” (Analects 12:19); if a ruler “is correct, then people will all follow with no need for commands; but if the ruler is not correct, then people will not obey even when commands are issued” (Analects 13:6); and “a ruler who governs by being virtuous himself can be compared to the Polar Star, which commands the homage of the multitude without leaving its place” (Analects 2:1). Thus, commenting on Analects 15:15, Pan Dexing 潘德興 of the Qing Dynasty states that “Great people aim to rectify themselves and then other people will become rectified. There has never been a person who is ultimately sincere and yet doesn’t have the power to move others, and there has never been a person who is not sincere and yet has the power to move others” (in Cheng Shude 1990, 1098). On the other hand, if there are immoral persons, instead of blaming them for their being immoral, superior persons examine themselves to see whether they have some deficiency in themselves, which either causes others to be immoral or makes themselves incapable of transforming others. Confucius says that “when seeing a worthy person, one ought to figure out a way to be their equal; when seeing an unworthy person, one ought to turn inside and examine oneself” (Analects 4:17). The second part of the passage has commonly been understood to mean that one ought to do one’s best not to become such an unworthy person oneself. It also implies, however, that one ought to examine how this person’s being unworthy may be attributed to one’s own moral imperfection. It is sig-

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nificant in this context that Zhu Xi connects Analects 15:15 with Analects 20:1, which first quotes the sage ruler Yao as saying that “if I do something wrong, it has nothing to do with the common people, but if the common people do something wrong, it is all my fault,” and then quotes King Wu as saying something similar: “if common people do anything wrong, it lies all in me.” Huang Kan explains that “because I [the king] am the leader (zhu 主) of the people, if I desire the good, people will desire the good. So any wrongdoing on the part of people should be attributed to me” (Huang Kan 1987, 521). Xing Bing 郉昺 (932–1010) also says that here the king “is blaming himself for his deficiency in transformative power” (He and Xing 2000, 304). It is in this context that Zhu Xi says that “common people’s wrongdoings are indeed conducted by the king himself” and then immediately explains what Confucius says in Analects 15:15: “it can be seen that the king demands a lot from himself and is reluctant to blame others” (Zhu 1994, 271). In this connection, it is also interesting to see how Yang Jing 楊倞 of the Tang dynasty uses the Analects 15:15 to comment on a passage in the Xunzi. In the chapter “Attracting Scholars,” Xunzi discusses the three steps of moral transformation of common people before quoting the passage from The Book of Documents about just punishment and execution. On this Yang Jing comments: “This is to say that even just punishment and just execution should not be used at the beginning. One should first teach and then punish. Yes, even when this proper procedure is followed, one should still humbly say that ‘it is because I have not handled things properly that people committed the crime.’ This is to demand a lot from oneself and be reluctant to blame others” (Xunzi 14, 140). There is another passage in the Analects that has often been used to show that Confucius advocates toleration (see Yan 1991, 14), even though what this passage records is not a saying by Confucius but one by the Duke of Zhou, who is speaking to the Duke of Lu, his son Boqin 伯禽: “Superior rulers don’t neglect their relatives and don’t cause their ministers to complain about not being used. Unless there are big issues, they don’t dismiss old relatives and ministers from office. They don’t require that every single person possess everything” (Analects 18:10). What is crucial here is the last sentence, wu qiu bei yu yi ren 無求備於一 人, about the nature of “everything” that is required or not required of people. Are these moral qualities or non-moral qualities? According to those who interpret this passage as implying the idea of toleration, what the superior ruler doesn’t require is that people ought to have moral perfection. In other words, we ought to put up with people who are morally imperfect. However, this is obviously not what this passage means. Since the two dukes are talking about employing people, what the Duke of Zhou is trying to say is that we ought to employ different people with different talents for different positions. Not only are there not any people complete with all conceivable talents, but there are hardly

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any positions that require people to have such an array of talents. We can see this if we read this passage together with a saying by Confucius himself: “when employing people a superior person uses them according to their capacities (qi zhi 器之)… and an inferior person requires them to have every talent (qiu bei 求 備)” (Analects 13:25). There are two revealing things here. On the one hand, whether one requires people to possess everything or not distinguishes whether a person is a superior or inferior person when employing others. On the other hand, and more importantly, it shows clearly the nature of the thing required of the employee, as Confucius here uses the word qi 器, which refers to people’s non-moral capacities. This interpretation has also been supported by many historical commentators on the Analects. For example, Xing Bing 郉昺 of the Song Dynasty states that the last sentence of the passage means that “one ought to employ people according to their capacities, and it is not right to require all capacities to be complete in any one single person” (He and Xing 2000, 290). Sima Guang 司馬光 of the Song Dynasty also says that “people’s capacities are all different. Even [the worthy ministers of Shun] Gao 皐, Kui 夔, Ji 稷, and Qi 契 are only each qualified for one office. How can we require that every common person be complete in all capacities?” (in Cheng Shude 1990, 1295). Liu Baonan 劉寶楠 of the Qing Dynasty agrees that “everyone’s ability is suitable for something. Great tasks should not be given to people of small abilities, and people undertaking great tasks do not have to have all abilities. Employ people according to their unique capacities, and so there is no need to require any one person to have all capacities” (Liu 1963, 401). The Comprehensive Mirror Assisting Governance records a saying supposedly by Zisi, which can also support our understanding of this Analects passage: “sages appoint officials in the same way as carpenters use pieces of wood: take advantage of their strengths and avoid their weaknesses” (Sima 1956, [Chronical of Zhou 1, King An, Year 25] 37). So, on the one hand, if we use people according to their capacities, then everyone can be used effectively. In this sense, Gu Menglin 顧夢 麟 of the Ming Dynasty states that “there is no one who possesses all capacities, but everyone has their own capacities. If you require that everyone has all capacities, then no one who has only one strength can be used” (Gu 2000, 421). On the other hand, if we can only make use of people with complete capacities, then no one can be used. Thus, Sima Guang first cites Confucius’s saying in question, “we ought to not require all capacities be complete in one person,” and then explains that we ought to “use what people are good at and avoid what they are weak at. Then, there is no one under heaven that cannot be used” (Sima 1922– 1937, 113–114). Analects 8:10 contains a statement that has also been thought to promote the idea of toleration: “unbenevolent people, when excessively detested, will lead to chaos.” In appearance, this supports the idea of toleration. On the one hand, you

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have objection to the unbenevolent person; on the other hand, to be intolerant of them will lead to chaos, which is worse than to leave them alone (see Yan 1991, 17). What Confucius means, however, is that, while the unbenevolent persons ought to be transformed, this goal can be reached only if the proper measures of transformation are adopted. According to Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, “unbenevolent persons ought to be gradually transformed through custom (fenghua 風化). If hated excessively, they might create more chaos” (in Liu Baonan 1963, 162); Xing Bing 郉昺explains it along the same lines: “we should humbly treat people with rituals (yi li sun jie 以禮孫接) if their nature is not good. We should not hate them excessively. Otherwise, they might be forced to create chaos” (He and Xing 2000, 116). Huang Kan’s 皇侃 interpretation is similar: “we ought to nourish unbenevolent persons with principle (yi li jiang yang 以理將養), hoping that they will realize it. If hated excessively, they might find no place to stand, which will necessarily lead them to create chaos” (Huang Kan 1987, 410). From this, we can see, while Confucius indeed asks us to be not intolerant toward unbenevolent people as doing so would only make them do more harm, he doesn’t ask us to be tolerant toward them in the sense of leaving them alone. In contrast, he still thinks that we should aim to transform them, with appropriate measures, including fenghua, yi li jie sun, and yi li jiang yang. Indeed, this passage should be read in conjunction with Analects 4:3 which relates, “only the benevolent people can love and hate others.” Of course, anyone can love and hate others. There are a few things, however, that Confucius emphasizes here. First, only truly benevolent people know who deserves our love and who deserves our hate, a point observed by many commentators. Second, since Confucius considers benevolence to be loving people (Analects 12:22), not only to love people but also to hate people in this passage are ways to love people. In other words, to hate people is a way to love them, which can only be explained if we understand hating people as a way to transform them into benevolent people. Third, only truly benevolent people know how to love and hate others. In other words, truly benevolent people don’t love all the people they love in the same way and hate all the people they hate in the same way. Rather, they love and hate each person in the way most appropriate to him or her. While the Chinese phrase used today to translate the English word “toleration,” kuanrong 寬容, does not appear in the Analects, each of the two Chinese characters of the phrase, kuan 寬, literally meaning “broad” or “loose,” and rong 容, literally meaning “accepting,” do appear in this ancient text. Unsurprisingly, scholars who argue that Confucius has the idea of toleration have not lost sight of the Analects passages that contain either of these two characters (see Yu 2018, 219–221; Miao 2006, 200–202; and Yan 1991, 15–17). I shall argue, however, that none of these passages express the idea of toleration as we understand it. We can first look at the passages containing the character kuan. In one place, Confucius

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responds to his student Zizhang’s question about benevolence (ren), saying that “to be able to practice five things under heaven constitutes ren” and the second on the list of the five is kuan because “if you are kuan, you can win people over” (kuan zhe dezzhong 寬則得眾) (Analects 17:6; see also 20:1). In another place, Confucius criticizes people for “occupying high places without being kuan” ( jushang bu kuan 居上不寬) (Analects 3:26). There have been several plausible interpretations of kuan in these passages. While they are not all consistent with each other, none of them can be interpreted as toleration. First, it is consistent with the main point we have been making so far: upon seeing others with moral faults, instead of blaming them, a superior person or ruler tends to find in himself the cause of their (other people’s) moral faults. This is most clear when the phrase kuan ze de zhong appears in Analects 20:1. As we have seen above, this section contains virtually the same sayings by King Tang and King Wu to the effect that when others have committed wrongdoings, they blame themselves for having not been able to transform these wrongdoers, and they are followed by Confucius’s saying “if you are kuan, you can win people over.” This shows that “to win people over” doesn’t simply mean that people are on your side or support you but that people have become moral, and this is because you are kuan, which means that you are holding yourself and not others responsible for the latter’s wrongdoing. Indeed it is in this sense that Hao Jing 郝 敬 of the Ming Dynasty, in his Detailed Explanation of the Analects 論語詳解, considers this idea of kuan together with the idea of Analects 15:15 we discussed above, saying that “to be kuan can win people over, and so a superior person demands a lot from oneself and rarely blames others” (Hao 1955, 154). Second, to be kuan means to not trace people’s misconduct in the past. This is an interpretation also provided by Hao Jing, who interprets the meaning of kuan in connection with Analects 5:23: “Boyi and Shuqi did not trace people’s past evils and thus they were hardly resented.” On this Hao Jing comments: “although evil persons are dislikeable, as soon as they correct themselves one should not dislike them. Don’t trace their past, and don’t hide anger. Then, there will be hardly anyone who harbors resentment towards you…. Therefore it is said that ‘to be kuan can win people over’” (Hao 1995, 154). Third, the person who is supposed to have the virtue of kuan in this context is the ruler, and kuan is related to the way he governs. In this respect, Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn records a saying by Confucius, explaining what governing with kuan means. In King Zhao, Year 20, upon dying, Zichan 子產 taught his son Dashu 大叔 about how to govern and talked about the difference between governing with kuan and governing with yan 嚴 (severity). Then Confucius first cited the poem, “Belabored People” (minglao 民勞) of the Major Odes (daya 大雅) from the Book of Poetry, to the effect that the people are tired; it’s almost the time for them to take a rest; provide some benefits to the

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people, so that they will be pacified. And then Confucius said that “this is to practice kuan to the people” (shi zhi yi kuan ye 施之以寬也) (Kong, 1407–1408). Here we can see that to govern with kuan means to not put too much burden on the people with complicated laws. So, as recorded in Zhu Xi’s Fine Meanings of the Analects and the Mencius (Lun Meng jing yi 論孟精義), Yang Shi 楊時 of the Song Dynasty states that “if one occupies a high position and yet is not kuan, then common people will not know where to put their hands and feet” (Zhu 2002, 7:636–637). Zhu Xi himself also argues that a ruler ought to regard kuan as the root, as kuan can win people over; if the ruler is only interested in exercising his power, the unfortunate result will be that “there are as many laws and edicts as a cow’s hairs” (in Hu 1987, 711:482). The character rong 容 appears in a conversation on Confucius’s view about interacting with people between two of Confucius’s students, Zixia and Zizhang. According to Zixia, one ought to “associate with those whom one should associate and refuse to associate with those whom one should not associate”; Zizhang disagrees: “that is different from what I’ve heard [from Confucius]. A superior person [or ruler] ( junzi) respects worthies and accepts (rong) all, praising the good and pitying the incompetent. If I’m a worthy person, whom can I not accept (rong)? If I’m not a worthy person, and people refuse to associate with me, then how can I refuse to associate with others” (Analects 19:3). Even if what Zizhang says represents Confucius’s own view, we still cannot say that Confucius is advocating toleration. It’s true that, unlike what Zixia says, Zizhang does say a superior person ought to accept (rong) all, but this acceptance is not coupled with objection, which defines toleration, since the “all” includes both worthy people (xian 賢) and the incompetent people (buneng 不能). Here we may understand incompetent people as morally deficient, as they are in contrast with worthy people. If we accept the unworthy people with objection, we cannot have any objection when accepting the worthy people, and here acceptance (rong) is an attitude toward both worthy and unworthy people. Moreover, while Zizhang does say that, in contrast to praising ( jia 嘉) good people, the appropriate attitude toward bad people is pity ( jin 矜). However, not only is pitying by itself an attitude different from objection, in Confucius, it doesn’t simply mean that a superior person or ruler has this attitude toward the badness of the person, but also toward the superior person/ruler’s own failure to prevent the person from becoming bad, which motivates the superior person to improve himself so that the bad person can be transformed. This point is made clearer in another Analects passage, in which the character jin also appears. This passage is attributed to another student of Confucius’s, Zengzi, who advises a new chief criminal judge: “the rulers have lost their way of governing, and as a result people have been disintegrated for a long time. If you find evidence of their criminal behavior, you should feel sorrow and pity (ai jin

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哀矜) instead of being happy” (Analects 19:19). Rulers ought to feel sorrow and pity for people’s criminal behavior, but why do these people engage in their criminal behaviors? It is because of the rulers’ own immoral governing, and so if there is any component that merits our objection, it should be directed toward rulers and their own way of governing; and if they want to eliminate people’s criminal behaviors, they need to transform themselves so that people can be transformed.

V.

Conclusion

Toleration is understood as accepting what one has good reasons to object to. I’ve left it for another occasion to argue that the typical things and people we are asked to tolerate are things and people we really don’t have good reasons to object to, and so the appropriate attitude called for is not toleration but respect. In the above, I have argued that, for Confucius, when we do have good reasons to object to things or people, we don’t put up with them, we don’t allow them to happen, and we don’t just live and let live. Instead, we do things to help others become moral, just as we do things to help persons with diseases get cured so that they can become healthy persons. It is in this sense that, while not advocating toleration, Confucius doesn’t promote intolerance toward people and things we have good reasons to object to, especially as intolerance is often connected with coercive interventions. If intolerance simply means that we cannot bear to see others fall into a moral abyss, analogous to our inability to bear to see a child fall into a well, then Confucius does advocate the intolerance. However, there are at least two salient features of this intolerance. On the one hand, while we can use force to stop the child from falling into a well, we cannot use force to stop someone from falling into a moral abyss. What is needed is moral education. This is made most clear by Confucius in Analects 2:3: “if you lead people with administrative regulations and unify them with punitive laws, people will try to avoid them but will have no sense of shame; if you lead people with virtue and unify them with rules of propriety, people will have a sense of shame and become good.” On the other hand, this intolerance is the intolerance more of oneself than of the morally bad person. As shown in our discussion above, for Confucius, we should find fault with ourselves, and take responsibility, for others being immoral. So the best way of moral education of others is to be a moral exemplar oneself. This is also indicated in part of the Analects passage we have just quoted: “to lead people with virtues,” i. e. to lead people by being a virtuous person oneself.

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Liu, Baonan 劉寶楠. 1963. Corrected Meanings of the Analects 論語正義. Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju. Locke, John. 2010. Locke on Toleration, ed. Richard Vernon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lukes, Steven. 1971. “Social and Moral Tolerance.” Government and Opposition 6: 224–228. Mao, Heng 毛亨. 2013. Commentary on the Book of Poetry. In Annotations and Commentary on Mao’s Book of Poetry 毛詩注疏. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe. McKinnon, Catriona. 2006. Toleration: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Mendus, Susan. 1988. “Introduction,” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miao, Runtian 苗潤田. 2006. “On Confucian Views of Toleration 論儒家的寬容思想.” Dongyue Luncong 東嶽論叢, 27 (6): 200–204. Mill, John Stuart. 2009. On Liberty. The Floating Press. Popper, Karl. 1966. The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1. 5th edition (revised). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Raphael, D.D. 1988. “The Intolerable,” in Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sima, Guang 司馬光. 1956. Comprehensive Mirror Assisting Governance 資治通鑑. In Li Zongdong 李宗侗 and Xia Deyi 夏德儀, Contemporary Annotations on Comprehensive Mirror Assisting Governance 資治通鑑今注. Taibei: Zhonghua Congshu 中華叢書. Sima, Guang 司馬光. Records of Examinations of the Past 稽古錄. Shanghai: Shangwu Yingshuguan. Warnock, Mary. 1987. “The Limits of Toleration.” In On Toleration, edited by Susan Mendus and D. Edwards. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Xunzi 荀子.1996. Annotated by Yang Jing 楊倞 and punctuated by Geng Xun 耿芸. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe. Yan, Shoucheng 严寿澂. 1991. “One of the Main Teachings of Confucius: Toleration 孔子 學說要旨之一：寬容.” Confucius Studies 孔子研究 4: 14–18. Yang, Bojun 楊伯峻. 2015. Annotations on Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn. Revised Edition. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Yang, Shuda 楊樹達. 2007. Explanations of the Analects 論語疏證. Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe. Yu, Kam-Por. 2018. “Two Conceptions of Tolerating in Confucian Thought.” In Toleration in Comparative Perspective, edited by Vicki A. Spencer. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and London: Lexington Books. Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1986. Classified Sayings of Master Zhu 朱子語類. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 2002. Complete Works of Master Zhu 朱子全書. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.

Edward Y. J. Chung

Yi Toegye on Self-Reflection and Ultimate Human Life: A Korean Neo-Confucian and Comparative Interpretation1

I.

Introduction

This chapter presents Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪, 1501–1570), the most eminent thinker and scholar of Korean Neo-Confucianism. It discusses the topic of self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) according to his theory and practice that directed his life experience as a scholar, mentor, thinker, and spiritual practitioner. I explore the way in which Toegye developed an insightful model of selfreflective cultivation that enhances and vitalizes the moral and spiritual depth of Neo-Confucianism. By using a textual and interpretive approach, this chapter presents Toegye’s famous writings such as Jaseongnok 自省錄 (Record of SelfReflection), Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖 (Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning), and the Four-Seven debate letters, in addition to his biography and philosophical letters. The chapter includes three sections: one addressing the Confucian Way, another dealing with self-reflection (consisting of four subsections), and a final section including concluding observations. The chapter is intended to offer an engaging discussion of Toegye’s thought vis-à-vis his holistic knowledge, experience, and insights. I conclude by articulating the Korean distinctiveness of Toegye’s ethics and spirituality of self-reflection as well as its contemporary relevance from a comparative standpoint of philosophy and religion.

1 I am pleased to acknowledge that my work on writing and editing this chapter is supported by an international Korean Studies Seed Program grant (AKS-2022-INC-2230004) through the Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service (KSPS), Academy of Korean Studies (AKS). I am grateful for this special grant, which includes full funding for my research and scholarly activities.

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The Confucian Way

Yi Toegye’s2 philosophical reputation and scholarly fame closely represent the socalled Seongnihak 性理學 (learning/school of human nature and principle) in Joseon Korea (1392–1910), which was also commonly known as the JeongJuhak 程朱學 (Cheng-Zhu school/learning) or Jujahak 朱子學 (Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism).3 This orthodox school of Neo-Confucianism is identified with Song Chinese thinkers such as Zhu Xi 朱熹 (Huian 晦庵, 1130–1200). Toegye passionately defended this mainstream tradition and developed an exceptional Korean legacy of its metaphysics, ethics, and spirituality. According to Eonhaengnok 言行錄 (Record of Toegye’s Words and Acts),4 he led the exemplary lifestyle of a Confucian scholar, engaging in study, public service, teaching, writing, and selfcultivation. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Toegye also influenced Tokugawa Japanese Neo-Confucians to establish their Shushigaku 朱子學 (Zhu Xi school). Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩 (1561–1619) and his follower Hayashi Razan 林羅 山 (1583–1657), the founders of Shushigaku, and their followers admired Toegye as the greatest transmitter of Korean Neo-Confucianism (Abe Yoshio 1965; 1970, 57– 59).5 In the West as well, Toegye has been highly regarded as “the commanding figure in Zhu Xi orthodoxy in Korea” (de Bary 1981, 197) and “a major source of inspiration for creative scholarship on Confucian philosophy and its modern scholarship” (Tu 1978, 467). Undoubtedly, Toegye left behind a great Korean legacy of learning, creative thought, and original writing, for which reason Western scholarship on Toegye and Korean Neo-Confucianism has grown significantly in recent years.6 2 Yi’s 李 given and courtesy names are “Hwang 滉” and “Gyeongho 景浩” respectively. His literary (pen) name is Toegye 退溪. Throughout this chapter, I refer to him as Toegye because this is how he has been best known traditionally, nationally, and internationally. 3 In Korea, “Cheng-Zhu 程朱” (“JeongJu” in Korean) is used interchangeably with “Jujahak” 朱 子學 because “Juja/Zhuzi 朱子” refers to the Song Chinese Neo-Confucian’s honorific title “master” 子 and his family name, Zhu, as this school was established by him. This tradition is also known as seongnihak/xingli xue 性理學 (learning/school of human nature and principle) because it emphasized the learning (hak/xue 學) of i/li 理 (principle/pattern/ground of being) and seong/xing 性 (human nature, nature), two of the most important concepts in the Zhu Xi school in China, Korea, and Japan. 4 Toegye’s Eonhaengnok 言行錄 appears in Toegye jeonseo 退溪全書 (Complete Works of Yi Toegye) (hereafter abbreviated as TJ), vol. 4, 9–261. 5 For details, see Chung 2016 (introduction) and 2021: 2–3. 6 Current scholarship in English includes several books: Kalton 1988; Kalton et al. 1994; Hyoungchan Kim 2018; Youn Sa-sun 1991; Chung 1995, 2016, and 2021 (a new book on Toegye’s moral and religious thought). De Bary and Haboush 1985 and Ro 2019a are two edited volumes on Korean Neo-Confucianism. For scholarly articles on the Korean Neo-Confucianism of Toegye and Yulgok, see Chan 1985; Tu 1978, 1982, 1985; Tomoeda 1985; Youn 1985; Kalton 2019; Ro 2019b; Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Seok 2018; Chung 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2019a-c. Korean-language works include those by Choe, Geum, Yun Sasun (Youn Sa-sun), and Yi

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Toegye developed a holistic interpretation of the Confucian Way, an intriguing topic that frequently appears in his major writings, including his letters to his disciples and his junior colleagues like Gi Gobong 奇高峯 (1527–1572) 7 and Yi Yulgok 李!谷 (1536–1584),8 another famous Korean Neo-Confucian. The senior master argued that a common “flaw” among many Confucians was their selfish desires to succeed “quickly” or “seek selfish fame.” This is why Toegye continuously emphasized the long-term practice of self-cultivation with consistency and sincerity. As included in Jasongnok 自省錄 (Record of Self-Reflection),9 Toegye’s letter to his junior colleague No Ijae "伊齋 (1515–1590)10 expresses his strong concern over the problem: Some people pretend to be wise and gain honor by falsifying themselves or by being deceitful and making up lies; in this case, any disaster or failure is truly a self-generated result…. Nowadays people are arrogant to one another, reject those who do good things….11

Here Toegye strongly repudiates the problem of “arrogance” and “deception” that obviously contradicts Confucian learning and ethics. He advises his bright junior colleague Yulgok: “Even if people of gifted talent or exceptional intelligence have arrived at their higher honors, they fall into the danger of taking selfish profits so they cannot act courageously.”12 This “defective” trend of seeking personal gain in learning and public profession was a national problem bound to ruin the true Confucian Way. In a letter to Gobong in 1558, Toegye used a more

7

8

9

10 11 12

Sangeun (see references for these works). Japanese works are Abe Yoshio 1965, 1970, 1977; Takahashi Susumu 1986. “Gobong 高峯” is Gi’s literary name whereas “Daeseung 大升” and “Myeongeon 明彦” are his given and courtesy names, respectively. Toegye highly regarded Gobong’s intellect and analytic reasoning for which reason he exchanged philosophical letters with his junior colleague during their famous Four-Seven debate (1559–1566) on emotions and self-cultivation. For this topic, see Kalton et al. 1994; Chung 1995, 2019b, 2021 (ch. 4). For other works, see n. 14 below. “Yulgok” !谷 is Yi’s 李 literary name whereas his given name and courtesy names are “I 珥” and “Sukheon 淑獻,” respectively. He greatly contributed to the development of Korean NeoConfucianism. For his life and thought, see Ro 1989, 2019b; Hyoungchan Kim 2018; Chung 1995, 1998, 2019a. Jaseongnok 自省錄 (1a–76a) — hereafter abbreviated as JSN — presents twenty-two scholarly letters and four philosophical essays Toegye wrote to close disciples and junior colleagues during his fifties. The entire text appears in TJ vol. 3, 151–190. Toegye compiled it to inspire his disciples and colleagues to follow the true Confucian way of self-cultivation. See Chung 2016 for a full-length study of Toegye’s life and thought according to JSN. Note that “Ijae 伊齋” was No’s 盧 literary name and “Susin 守愼” his given name. He had held a top government position as chief state councilor and was one of Toegye’s close junior colleagues. JSN 21: reply letter to No Ijae "伊齋. JSN 14: reply letter to Yi Sukheon 李淑獻 (Yulgok !谷).

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cautious tone in addressing the same problem.13 Although Toegye praised Gobong’s textual and philosophical reasoning during their six-year Four-Seven debate,14 the former also criticized his junior colleague for lacking real insights into personal cultivation.15 In these letters, the senior master remained a Confucian role model and warned his disciples and junior colleagues of the risks involved in the troubling reality of socio-political corruption. Toegye states: “The defect of seeking selfish fame has become much more serious and dangerous”; part of this problem is that unaccomplished Confucians are arrogant to “praise themselves too highly and try to become heroic about governing the state,” which will eventually fail.16 As Toegye advises them, “Remove all bad habits” that are based on selfish cravings or intentions.17 Toegye’s letter to his leading disciple Kim Donseo 金敦敍 (1531– 1598) also addresses the persistent “defect” of learning to seek quick selfish gain.18 Toegye advises his disciples on the daily cultivation and practice of moral principles (i/li 理),19 “As Master Yanping 延平 said, the principle (i/li) of the Way is to be cultivated in daily life. What a wonderful teaching, indeed!”20 Toegye mentions Zhu Xi’s teacher, Li Tong 李侗 (Yanping 延平, 1093–1163), because he liked Li’s simple teaching as can be seen in Li’s Yanping dawen 延平答問

13 JSN 20: letter to Gi Myeongon 奇明彦 (Gobong 高峯) — a separate letter. 14 Toegye’s Four-Seven letters appear in TJ 16: 8a–17: 6b (vol. 1, 402–430). The Korean FourSeven debate is an important source for his advanced philosophy of human nature and emotions in relation to metaphysics, self-cultivation, and moral psychology. Kalton et al. 1994 is an English translation of Toegye’s Four-Seven letters. For another full-length book, see Chung 1995. For scholarly articles, see Ching 1985; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Seok 2018; Tu 1985; Chung 1998, 2019b. Furthermore, consult Chung 2020, 46–52 on Jeong Jedu’s 鄭齊斗 (Hagok 霞谷, 1649–1736) Four-Seven interpretation according to his critique of Zhu Xi 朱子 and Korean Seongnihak 性理學 in relation to his “great synthesis of Wang Yangming 王陽明 Neo-Confucianism in Korea.” This book includes an annotated translation with commentary of Hagok’s most important text, Joneon 存言 (Testament) and his critique of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. 15 See Toegye’s Four-Seven letter to Gobong in JSN 18: reply letter to Gi Myeongeon 奇明彦; (Gobong 高峯). See also Kalton et al. 1994. See also Chung (1995, 2019b) for their comparative historical and philosophical discussion of Toegye’s and Yulgok’s Four-Seven letters. 16 JSN 17: reply letter to Gi Jeongja 奇正字 (Gobong 高峯). 17 JSN 12: letter to Gwon Homun 權好文. Gwon was one of Toegye’s disciples. 18 See JSN 13: reply letter to Kim Donseo 金敦敍. For Kim’s biography, see Chung 2016. 19 For the textual and philosophical flexibility of translating i/li 理 (principle/pattern/ground of being), gi/qi 氣 (vital/physical energy), or other key terms, see my Note on Transliteration, Translation, and the Citation Style at the end of this chapter. 20 JSN 2: reply letter to Nam Sibo 南時甫. Nam Sibo (1528–1594) was Toegye’s disciple. See Chung 2016 for Nam’s biography.

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(Yanping’s Letters Answering Questions).21 According to Toegye, “I wish that ‘if I hear the Dao (Way) in the morning, I can die in the evening’ (Analects 4:8).”22 This passage capturing Toegye’s experience of self-cultivation indicates his dignity and self-effacing character insofar as he quotes Confucius’s commitment to “hearing the Dao.” Toegye concludes that the Confucian way manages daily things and phenomena in private life as well as public life.23 The inner depth of Toegye’s thought goes beyond the rationalistic and ethical context of Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism. It is rooted in his practice and experience of self-reflection as follows.

III.

Self-Reflection

Toegye approached self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) by rigorously presenting its ideal and practice in his Jaseongnok 自省錄, Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖,24 the Four-Seven letters, and other major works. This section consists of four short subsections presenting its interrelated aspects: (A) self-reflection and mind cultivation, (B) quiet-sitting contemplation and concentration, (C) self-reflection and reverential practice, and (D) in harmony with nature.

A.

Self-Reflection and Mind Cultivation

Toegye emphasized self-reflection along with one’s genuine understanding and practice of moral principles (i/li 理).25 He had found its deeper meaning by highlighting simhak/xinxue 心學 (mind cultivation or learning of the heart-mind). He cites the Song Neo-Confucian Cheng Yi’s 程頤 teaching and relates it to selfcultivation: “Be orderly and dignified” and “be solemn and austere.”26 Toegye 21 Yanping 延平 was Li’s 李 literary name. Toegye respected his Yanping dawen 延平答問, an important text compiled by his disciple Zhu Xi on the basis of what the latter heard and learned from his teacher. 22 JSN 22: reply letter to Gi Myeongeon 奇明彦 (Gobong 高峯). 23 JSN 17: reply letter to Gi Jeongja 奇正字 (Gobong 高峯). 24 See TJ 7: 4b–35a (vol. 1, 195–211) for Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, one of Toegye’s most advanced and celebrated works, which includes ten diagrammatic essays and commentaries based on an integrated framework of Neo-Confucian metaphysics, ethics, and spiritual practice. See Kalton 1988 for a full translation of Seonghak sipdo with commentary. Chung 1995 and 2016 also discuss its philosophical, ethical, and religious aspects. 25 Eonhaengnok 言行錄 (Record of Toegye’s words and acts), 1: 16b in TJ vol. 4, 176. 26 JSN 7: reply letter to Jeong Jajung 鄭子中. The locus classicus of the frequently quoted teachings “Be orderly and dignified” and “Be solemn and austere” in the Neo-Confucian literature is the Book of Rites, “Meaning of Sacrifices”; see Legge’s translation (1970), Li Ki vol. 2, 216.

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also writes, “If one can cultivate oneself this way for a long time, moral principles will become clear.”27 In Zhu Xi’s formulation, this method means that “being single-minded is similar to holding the will firm.”28 Toegye therefore advised his junior colleagues like Gobong 高峯 that one’s cultivation of the Way includes single-mindedness.29 In other words, self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) as mind control facilitates moral cultivation both internally and externally. “The mind is the master [of the self]” that “firmly remains at the center of numerous phenomena.”30 This implies that the mind’s original essence is purely good, which resonates with Zhu Xi’s teaching of “‘the mind in itself ’ before the arousal of feelings.”31 In his Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖 as well, Toegye articulates mind cultivation in relation to selfreflective control32 by confirming the Cheng-Zhu teaching of single-minded concentration in terms of the classical doctrine of “preserving it [the mind].” As “Confucius said, ‘Hold onto it and it will remain, let go of it and it will disappear.’ It is perhaps to the heart-mind this refers.”33 Toegye advises his disciples to cultivate “the illuminating mind” without being arrogant or rushed in their learning. “Ensure that the mind is not hampered by [any selfishness].34 If your mind is realized in this way, your worries will be reduced. …”35 Overcome selfish feelings and thoughts in order to control the self. Virtuous life requires the mind to be united with moral principles (i/li 理) to the

27 JSN 7: reply letter to Jeong Jajung 鄭子中. Toegye is quoting Yishu 遺書 (Surviving works [of the Cheng brothers]), 15: 6b; my translation (see also Chan 1963, 555). This key statement also appears in Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Jinsi lu 近思錄 (Reflections on things at hand), 4: 45 (Chan 1967, 142). 28 See ZZQS 2: 8b and 2: 22b. 29 JSN 17: reply letter to Gi Jeongja 奇正字 (Gobong 高峯). 30 JSN 13: reply letter to Kim Donseo 金敦敍. 31 See ZZWJ 64: 28b; Chan 1963, 601. In this regard, Toegye’s Sim mu cheyong byeon 心無體用辨 (Critique on the saying that “the mind does not have substance and function”) is also relevant; see TJ 41: 16b–19a (vol. 2, 328–330). 32 Consult Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, sec. 8, Simhakdo 心學圖 (Diagrammatic essay on mind cultivation), TJ 7: 28b–30b (vol.1, 207–208) and sec. 7, Sim tong seongjeong doseol 心統性情圖 說 (Diagrammatic explanation of the saying that “the mind commands human nature and feelings”), TJ 7: 22b–25a (vol.1, 204–206). For these diagrammatic essays in English, see Kalton 1988, 160–164 and 120–127, respectively; see also Chung 1995, 62–64, 128–132, 168– 172. 33 This is what Confucius said according to Mencius. Toegye is likely quoting Mencius 6A/8; my translation (see also Lau 1970, 165 or Chan 1963, 63). 34 Toegye means that the moral-spiritual essence (che/ti) of the mind ought to be maintained pure and illuminating in the process of self-cultivation. This idea echoes Zhu Xi’s teaching appearing in his preface to Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句 (Commentary on the Words and Phrases of the Doctrine of the Mean); see also Zhu’s short question-and-answer conversation about the mind in ZZYL 5: 3b or ZZQS 44:2a (Chan 1963, 628). 35 JSN 1: reply letter to Nam Sibo 南時甫.

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extent that “you will not face any trouble with mind control.”36 In this regard, Toegye discussed Heaven’s principle (cheolli/tianli 天理) by integrating Zhu Xi’s idea and the classical doctrine of Heaven.37 Toegye’s Jaseongnok 自省錄 therefore emphasizes that moral principles (i/li 理) and virtues must be clearly distinguished from “selfish cravings” (sayok/siyu 私欲) because the former are manifested from Heaven’s principle,38 whereas the latter are stimulated by one’s turbid gi/qi 氣 (vital energy) and can therefore become potentially evil due to external influence.39 This is how Toegye draws serious attention to the virtuous and transcendent world of i/li 理 over the material, physical, and emotional world of gi/qi 氣.40 He therefore sees a way to remove selfishness by following moral principles, for which reason his Seonghak sipdo avers that the key to sagehood is to “preserve (hold fast to) Heaven’s principle” ( jon cheolli/cun tianli 存天理) and “transcend selfish cravings in the practice of self-cultivation.”41 This can be done by contemplative reflection and mind cultivation, which supports Toegye’s holistic notion of self-cultivation. In his famous lecture to the king, Toegye emphasizes the inner experience of Heaven’s principle through a self-reflective and self-regulating way as well: …. When the mind-heart is tranquil at night, you must experience Heaven’s principle within yourself. You should examine what you have done. Work at self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) and self-rectification every day. Once you get used to this practice, you will realize the truth of learning to become a sage.42

This insight is based on Toegye’s experience that appears to have enhanced Zhu Xi’s thought by intensifying its inner spiritual dimension. He recommended 36 JSN 7: reply letter to Jeong Jajung 鄭子中. 37 The Neo-Confucian idea of Heaven’s principle (or heavenly moral principles) is closely associated with the classical doctrine of Heaven (cheon/tian 天). According to the Doctrine of the Mean (chap. 1), “what Heaven imparts to human beings is called human nature; to follow our nature is called the Way” — a key teaching implying Confucian belief in Heaven as the transcendent moral power. This is also confirmed by Mencius. Heaven’s principle was originally set out by Zhu Xi 朱熹, and his follower Zhen Dexiu 眞德秀 (Xishan 西山 [l.n.], 1178–1235) in late Song China articulated this idea by emphasizing simhak/xinxue 心學 in terms of following Heaven’s principle and controlling selfish cravings. 38 Toegye’s notion of Heaven’s principle as the transcendent appears to have incorporated classical belief in Heaven or Heaven’s mandate (cheonmyeong/tianming 天命) as well. It somewhat concurs with Julia Ching’s view that Zhu Xi philosophically integrated classical religious belief with his Neo-Confucian idea of Heaven’s principle (Ching 2000, 69–70). 39 JSN 18: reply letter to Gi Myeongeon 奇明彦 (Gobong 高峯). 40 For more on this important theme of Toegye’s thought, see Chung 1995, 2016 (introduction). 41 Quoted from Simhakdo 心學圖, Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, TJ 7: 29a (vol. 1, 208). Consult Kalton 1988: 159–164 for his translation of this diagrammatic text. The same sentence is also mentioned in Toegye’s letter to Yi Pyeongsuk, TJ 37: 28b (vol. 2, 259). 42 Eonhaengnok 言行錄, 3: 22b in TJ vol. 4, 209.

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daily self-reflection and spiritual cultivation, together with the contemplative art of quiet-sitting, the focus of the next subsection.

B.

Quiet-Sitting Contemplation and Concentration

Toegye, an introspective and disciplined man, naturally loved reading and selfreflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省). According to Cheonmyeong doseol 天命圖說 (Diagrammatic explanation of Heaven’s mandate),43 he liked quiet-sitting ( jeongjwa/jingzuo 靜坐), the Neo-Confucian version of contemplation,44 to selfreflect and recover emotional and spiritual equanimity. As indicated in his biography as well, he found it useful as a way to “re-collect the dispersed self” and experience the mind-in-itself in its pure “unaroused state” (mibal/weifa 未發). As Toegye states, Only after quiet-sitting ( jeongjwa/jingzuo) can we re-collect the dispersed body and mind so that moral principles (dori/daoli 道理) can be united together. If the self is dispersed and not controlled, your body and mind will be in darkness and disorder.45

In other words, contemplative self-reflection helps control the self and overcome selfish feelings and thoughts. Toegye therefore recommended it in addition to moral practice and the study of things.46 He often practiced it especially at night when he could recover his serenity and harmony in both body and mind. In this regard, Toegye also highlighted simhak/xinxue 心學 (mind cultivation) as an essential part of the Confucian way,47 which is discussed in his Jaseongnok 自省錄 and Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖 as well. In Zhu Xi’s formulation, the method of internal control means that “being single-minded is similar to holding the will firm.”48 Toegye confirms Cheng Yi’s

43 TJ vol. 3, 144. Cheonmyeong doseol 天命圖說 is Toegye’s first major work: a ten-section philosophical essay on the meaning of Heaven’s mandate in relation to human nature. See TJ vol. 3, 140–144 for the entire essay. 44 Among certain Chinese thinkers in the Song and Ming periods, quiet-sitting generated different Neo-Confucian perspectives in opposition to the Daoist and Buddhist methods of meditation. It also occupied a prominent position among certain leading thinkers such as Wang Yangming. Two helpful books on this topic are R. Taylor 1986, 140–144; and 1991. 45 Eonhaengnok 言行錄, 1: 16b in TJ vol. 4, 176. 46 Eonhaengnok, 1: 16b in TJ vol. 4, 176. 47 I also note that Toegye’s self-reflective cultivation was inspired by Simgyeong/Xinjing 心經 (Classic for the heart-mind), a major text which was written by Zhen Dexiu 眞德秀, a leading Cheng-Zhu 程朱 scholar in late Song China. Due to Toegye’s influence, it became one of the most important Neo-Confucian texts in Korea. An excellent discussion in English of Zhen and Xinjing is de Bary 1981, 67–205. 48 Toegye is probably quoting ZZQS 2: 8b and 2: 22b.

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and Zhu Xi’s teaching of single-minded concentration49 and relates it to contemplation and self-control: “When the heart-mind remains one [single-minded], it naturally will not go wrong or [become] one-sided.”50 This means “being watchful [over what is unseen] and being apprehensive [over what is unheard]” — a key teaching originating in the Doctrine of the Mean. Overall, Toegye’s basic message is that self-reflection facilitates moral-spiritual cultivation both internally and externally. Toegye strongly recommends self-reflection along with reverence (gyeong/jing 敬) as follows.

C.

Self-Reflection and Reverential Practice

Toegye’s way of self-reflective cultivation emphasizes the virtue of reverence (gyeong/jing 敬) as well. The classical and Neo-Confucian idea of gyeong/jing embodies several meanings.51 In Song China, for example, Zhu Xi taught it as a virtuous attitude of reverence toward heaven and earth as well as seriousness in handling daily matters. Other meanings of gyeong are respect, reverential virtue, holistic attentiveness, “mindfulness” (Kalton 1988, 175–189), and “seriousness” (Chan 1963, 1967). Overall, I prefer to use “(holistic) reverence” in an integrated textual, ethical, and spiritual context. Master Zhu 朱子 said: “Reverence (gyeong/jing 敬) means mind concentration…. Otherwise, the mind will become dispersed.”52 According to Toegye’s Jaseongnok 自省錄, this means proper daily conduct by being “correct in movement and appearance and orderly in thinking and deliberating.”53 He also states, “Do not lose gyeong 敬…in dealing with daily phenomena.”54 The unifying heart of Toegye’s Confucian life was therefore the daily cultivation and practice of reverence.55 Toegye’s Cheonmyeong doseol 天命圖説 highlights selfreflective reverence as the heart of sagely learning. Before the mind is aroused (bal/fa 發), the learning of authentic persons (gunja/junzi 君 子) is to take reverence as the first principle and to put your effort into “preserving [the 49 Jaseongnok 自省錄 17: reply letter to Gi Jeongja 奇正字 (Gobong 高峯). 50 Jaseongnok 自省錄 7: reply letter to [disciple] Jeong Jajung 鄭子中. 51 According to the Book of Rites, “the self-cultivated person never lacks reverence” (see Book of Rites, “Summary of Ceremonies,” SBBY 1: 1a). Confucius also said: “Be reverent (gyeong/jing 敬) in handling daily affairs” (Analects 13:19). 52 Jinsi lu 近思錄 4: 48 (Chan 1967, 144). Furthermore, as Zhu Xi 朱熹 said, “make real effort. Then … the body and mind will be reverent, and the internal and external will be united” (ZZQS 2: 22a–b). 53 JSN 7: reply letter to Jeong Jajung 鄭子中, citing the Cheng brothers’ Yishu 遺書 15: 5a and 18: 3a. These two sentences are quoted by Zhu Xi 朱熹 as well; see ZZQS 2:22a–b; Chan 1963, 607. 54 JSN 13: reply letter Kim Donseo 金敦敍. 55 For contemporary Japanese comments on this topic, consult Takahashi Susumu 1986.

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mind] and nourishing [human nature].” After the mind is aroused, it is to put all of your effort into self-reflection. This is why the cultivation of reverence completes the beginning and end of [sagely] learning.56

After the mind is aroused as emotions or desires, it is vital to self-reflect and control the entire self — a key teaching originating in the Doctrine of the Mean. According to Toegye’s Simhakdo 心學圖 (Diagrammatic Essay on Mind Cultivation), the eighth section of Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, reverence is absolutely “the master of one, united heart-mind” (ilsim juje/yixin zhuzai 一心主宰) in the way of sagely learning (seonghak 聖學).57 Self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) provides a dedicated life of gyeong 敬: “Entering the Way (Dao), there is nothing more important than reverence. Never let it out of your mind; make no selfish effort…. This is the sagely method of mind cultivation.”58 The sagely way of self-cultivation means to be absolutely clear on the difference between Heaven’s principle (heavenly moral principles; cheolli/tianli 天理) and selfish cravings (sayok/siyu 私欲).59 Selfish cravings can become evil due to turbid gi/qi 氣 associated with one’s body or mind.60 This means to follow our moral nature mandated by Heaven’s principle61 by transcending selfish emotions and cravings. Toegye’s approach underscores what Julia Ching calls a religious “model of self-transcendence” (1977, 10; 1993).62 The Korean distinctiveness of Toegye’s interpretation centers around his experience of contemplative self-reflection ( jaseong/zixing 自省) and reverential cultivation. Gyeong 敬 is a holistic way of moral-spiritual cultivation that will enable one to realize the deeper and higher realm of human existence.63 As Toegye said in Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, sagely wisdom as the ultimate truth is to be attained through reverence by transcending all levels of selfishness.64 This ideal of human-and-transcendent unity reveals Toegye’s thinking and practice beyond philosophical and moral rationalism.

56 See Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, TJ 7: 33a (vol. 1, 210) and Cheonmyeong doseol 天命圖説, in TJ vol. 3, 144. 57 TJ 7: 29a (vol. 1, 208). 58 JSN 13: reply letter to Kim Donseo 金敦敍. 59 See Sim tong seongjeong doseol 心統性情圖説 in Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, TJ 7: 26b (vol. 1, 205). 60 TJ 16: 21a (vol. 1, 412). 61 Simhakdo 心學圖 in Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖, TJ 7: 29a (vol. 1, 208). 62 I also note that Toegye articulated Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 and Zhen Dexiu’s 眞德秀 idea of Heaven’s principle as the transcendent but eventually developed a more religious interpretation; for details on this topic, see Chung 2021. 63 Geum Jangtae, a leading Confucian scholar in Korea, points out that the “religious nature” of Toegye’s thought integrates his Neo-Confucian idea of reverence with the classical notion of “revering Heaven” (gyeongcheon/jingtian 敬天) (1998, 180–183). 64 TJ 7: 24b (vol. 1, 205) and 7: 33a (vol. 1, 210).

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It is a significant development of the Cheng-Zhu school, one that enhances Confucian ethics and spirituality. Toegye’s method encourages contemplative self-reflection, mind cultivation, and reverential virtue in harmony with nature as well.

D.

In Harmony with Nature

In Toegye’s view, the true human being manifests Confucian belief in “forming one body with heaven and earth” by accomplishing the highest stage of personal cultivation, as taught in the Doctrine of the Mean. Self-reflection is important because of its effort to cultivate this anthropocosmic harmony. By harmonizing one’s own emotions, desires, and thoughts properly one can truly respect all forms of life. So this is an engaging life of wisdom in harmony with nature. Toegye advises his disciples, Purify your mind by controlling its [selfish] fondness and cravings; live a pleasant life with spare time; appreciate landscape painting, calligraphy, or flowers; and take pleasure in watching stream fish and mountain birds. In this way, you can truly think congenially and not always dislike dealing with things so that your mind’s gi/qi 氣 (vital energy) may always remain pure and stable. Let it not deviate or become disorderly.65

As indicated in this passage, Toegye appreciated the natural, artistic, and aesthetic part of his Confucian life while enjoying calligraphy and landscape painting in harmony with the beauties of nature. This helped him cultivate the reverential self,66 which became important in his life and thought.67 Toegye’s spirituality of self-reflection resonates with our contemporary views. As Tu Weiming points out, Confucianism is a “spiritual humanism” because its core teaching remains “naturalistic and a spiritual project” (2011, 18).68 In other words, a self-reflective and compassionate life appreciates its natural and spiritual harmony and also concurs with what Tucker (2005) means by the “naturalistic imagery of Confucian religiosity.” In my view, ultimate human existence is not merely a physical and rational self but rather a transformative, holistic being who harmonizes its transcendent and immanent realities.

65 Jaseongnok 自省錄, sec. 1: reply letter to [disciple] Nam Sibo 南時甫. 66 From a similar angle, Mary Evelyn Tucker has discussed “the relevance of Chinese NeoConfucianism for the reverence of nature” (1991). See also Tucker 1998 and 2003; Tucker and Berthrong 1998 on the topic of Confucianism and ecology. 67 See TJ vol. 4, 209. 68 According to Tu (2004), the Confucian anthropocosmic view of nature emphasizes the relationship between Heaven, earth, and humanity as a dynamic and “interpenetrating” unity.

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Toegye’s poems express ultimate joy and pleasure in cultivating himself like a “flowing stream.”69 They show a genuine appreciation of the natural scenery in his hometown, including hills and rocks, moving clouds, streams, green fields, trees and flowers, flying or singing birds, garden ponds, and swimming fishes.70 Some of Toegye’s poems address his self-reflection on the unifying, transcendent principle (i/li 理); others also reveal his sense of awe and reverence (gyeong 敬) before the universe.71 Toegye’s nature poetry is compatible with Brasovan’s view (2017) that the vocabulary of Neo-Confucian cosmology supports the notion of “ecological humanism” that human life and nature are intimately connected.72 Its broader implication also allows us to discuss what Bergmann and Eaton (2011) call ecological awareness integrating “religion, ethics, and aesthetics.” The contemporary significance of Toegye’s love and spirituality of nature deserves our consideration because of its ecological, ethical, and religious vitality.73

IV.

Concluding Observations: The Contemporary Relevance of Toegye’s Thought

This final section presents the contemporary relevance and significance of Toegye’s thought. I hope to offer a thought-provoking discussion of his ethics and spirituality of self-reflection vis-à-vis his knowledge, experience, and insights. Toegye criticized that taking a shortcut approach is the most common defect to neglect personal cultivation and moral practice. He strongly repudiated selfish interests and cravings to succeed quickly for personal “fame” or “profits.” In other words, self-cultivation and virtuous life were defended and articulated by Toegye. The true Confucian way means to be self-reflective, contemplative, reverential, and virtuous. Toegye therefore talked about it as cultivation and engagement in one’s private and public life as well as in harmony with nature. From a broader comparative perspective, its modern implication is important for our discussion 69 See Toegye seonsaeng munjip 退溪先生文集 (Collected literary works by master Toegye), 1: 47. 70 Toegye seonsaeng munjip 退溪先生文集, 1: 28. Toegye composed over 2,300 poems, many of which were written during his retreat or retirement years. 71 For example, at age sixty Toegye composed Imgeo siboyeon, a famous, fifteen-poem work. Each poem has four lines, each of which consists of seven Chinese characters. See Toegye seonsaeng munjip 退溪先生文集, 3: 4. 72 From a similar angle, we can also relate Toegye’s self-reflective reverence for nature to P. Taylor’s thesis (1986) of “respect for nature: a theory of environmental ethics.” 73 For more details on this topic, see Chung 2011b and Chung 2021 (chap. 7: “Toegye’s Love and Spirituality of Nature: Toward a Modern Confucian Ecology”).

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of education and ethics in terms of intellectual, moral, and spiritual transformation. This type of holistic thinking is deeply rooted in Toegye’s life and thought, and its contemporary relevance can motivate us to envision the ultimate reality of human nature as something to be discovered through self-reflection and reverential cultivation in interaction with nature and other human beings. Confucian belief in the ontological essence of human goodness is embodied within Toegye’s creative originality that emphasizes the virtuous and transcendent world of i/li over the material and physical world of gi/qi 氣. The transcendent principle (i/li 理) of being plays an active role in the human reality of self-cultivation and moral practice. His insights certainly enrich the inner depth of Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism and also represent the moral-religious essence of Toegye’s spirituality whose implication is important for the pluralistic meaning of the transcendent — an implication that will vary according to different religions, worldviews, and languages.74 Toegye’s ethics and spirituality of self-reflection and ultimate humanity engage self-reflective, contemplative, and reverential practice, uniting the inner and outer pillars of self-cultivation in harmony with Heaven and Earth. He emphasized it to do good and remove selfishness and potential evil. This subtle religious tendency became important in his life and thought. Its contemporary implication is not just a (or my) philosophical argument or commitment but rather an existential “ultimate concern” to use Paul Tillich’s (1963) language of systematic ethics and theology. Virtuous wisdom appears to be a common denominator of attainment among the world’s philosophical and religious traditions.75 In my view, Toegye’s interpretation is grounded more religiously than Zhu Xi’s original thinking. It embodies a holistic commitment to the way of compassionate wisdom that is compatible with other spiritual traditions. Since the 1990s, numerous books have been published on the so-called global relevance of Confucianism especially in terms of modernization, economic development, politics, civil society, and education.76 However, we need to offset this 74 The contemporary, comparative notion of “spirituality” resonates with Toegye’s insights. For example, John Hick, a leading comparative philosopher of religion, points out that what we call “spirituality” or “religion” is basically about “inner response to the Divine, the Transcendent, Ultimate Reality” (Hick 2005, 5). For a good discussion of this engaging, interreligious point, see also Hick 1989, 1993. 75 From a similar perspective, Ching (2000) points out that the Confucian teaching of sagehood as self-perfection is religiously significant. In dialogue with Western philosophy, Angle (2012) also presents the “contemporary significance” of Confucian sagehood as “supreme human virtue” in terms of ethics and psychology. 76 For example, Vogel (1991) addresses East Asia’s “industrial Neo-Confucianism,” referring to the Confucian contribution to economic success in Japan and the Four Little Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Tu (1996) is also an edited volume on East Asian modernity, focusing on moral education and economic and political culture. Bell (2007)

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trend in the West by publishing more works on the contemporary significance of Confucianism as a form of ethics, spirituality, or religion.77 This is partly why I have chosen my topic for this chapter. Toegye took self-reflection as an integrated way of contemplation, mind cultivation, and reverential practice. It remains an open system of ethics and spirituality according to which a wise, virtuous person transcends the separation between the self and others, thereby extending reverential (gyeong 敬) compassion toward all living beings. It therefore means to overcome selfishness and potential evil and pursue one’s self-transformation. All forms of egoism, deception, arrogance, or defilement should be eliminated. This represents the heart of Toegye’s thought and also reminds us of its potentially universal meaning in harmony with the human, natural, and transcendent world. Toegye’s self-reflective simhak 心學 (mind cultivation), his nature poetry, and his philosophical and ecological insights enrich his holistic ethics and spirituality. This can only be significant for the contemporary relevance of Confucianism to handle our global environmental problems as well. For Toegye, self-cultivation unites the self-reflecting person with the natural and transcendent world. In other words, the wise and reverential self embraces all human and natural beings. The vitality of Toegye’s love and spirituality of nature will inspire the interreligious and inter-philosophical promotion of a reverential appreciation of nature and the development of new ecological values. examines Confucian political ethics and modern social issues such as civil society and government. Hon and Stapleton (2017) is a study of the “Confucian relevance” of social and political issues including capitalism. Ames and Hershock (2017) articulate Confucianism as “an international resource for an emerging world cultural order” in relation to global migration, wealth, and democracy. J. Chan (2015) explores the interplay between Confucian political thought and democratic institutions. Ming-huei Lee and Jones (2017) focuses on the “global significance” of Confucian political ethics. S. Kim (2020) also presents a Theory of “Confucian democracy” in terms of political participation and democratic values. 77 In recent decades, new books have been published on the ethical and religious themes of Confucianism: for example, Ching (2000) discusses Zhu Xi’s “religious thought”; Tu and Tucker (2004) is an edited volume on “Confucian spirituality”; Neville (2000) is a comparative theological study of Confucianism as “a portable tradition in the late-modern world”; Tucker and Berthrong (1998) is an edited volume on Confucianism and ecology; Ivanhoe (2002) discusses Mencius and Wang Yangming in terms of comparative ethics; Brasovan (2017) presents Neo-Confucian “ecological humanism”; Ng and Huang (2020) is an edited volume on Zhu Xi’s thought; Huang and Tucker (2014) is a comprehensive introduction to Japanese Confucian thinkers, covering metaphysics, ethics, spiritual practice, and political theory; Ames (2020) presents how Chinese Confucian classics portray “the ethical human being.” Examples of recent books on the Korean case include: Kalton et al. (1994), a translation of the Four-Seven debate letters; Ro (2019a), an edited anthology on Korean Confucian thought; Chung (2016), an annotated and commented translation of Toegye’s Jaseongnok; Chung (2020), a full-length study of Jeong Hagok and Korean Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism; and Chung (2021), a new book on Toegye’s religious thought: Korean Neo-Confucian ethics and spirituality.

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Self-reflection is significant for our modern discussion of Confucianism in terms of seeking a converging linkage among the world’s spiritual traditions. This will contribute to global ethical and interreligious dialogue. I can conclude that Toegye’s Korean vision for the ideal human being is a sixteenth-century experience, but it offers meaningful suggestions for Confucianism for the twenty-first century, despite the overwhelming influence of global technology, economy, and politics. What we discover in Toegye’s insights is a healthy philosophy of wisdom as well as a role model for ultimate human life and experience. I therefore affirm the Confucian tradition as a unique type of religious humanism and one that reminds us of our shared, ultimate concern for human dignity and universal harmony. The Korean master offers an engaging humanistic spirituality, which also points to the Korean distinctiveness of Toegye’s thought and its profound contribution to contemporary Confucianism. In my view, the contemporary significance of Toegye’s thought centers around the ultimate question of how to be truly human in the most genuine sense of this question. Since human beings are all subject to or conditioned by certain mundane factors, the very possibility of dehumanization cannot be ruled out. This seems to be evident in the existential dilemma of daily human life and actions. Toegye’s thought can play a vital role in discovering the converging ground of the world’s philosophical and spiritual traditions East and West, insofar as they pertain to the shared realization of the highest truth and goodness. The holistic essence of Toegye’s interpretation of self-reflection represents the scholarly depth and spiritual vitality of Korean Neo-Confucianism. This is not only an inspiring legacy of East Asian thought but also a highly interconnected and engaging model of ethics and spirituality for the twenty-first century.

Note on Transliteration, Translation, and Citation Style Korean names, terms, and titles are transliterated according to the updated Revised Romanization of Korean System. Chinese counterparts are according to the Pinyin system. Like traditional Chinese scholars, Toegye and other Korean scholars often referred to each other by given name, literary name (l.n.), or courtesy name interchangeably. The standard format we use is family name first and then other names. However, I also use the literary name if either it is better known nationally and internationally; for example, “Toegye” 退溪 [l.n.] for Yi Hwang 李滉, and “Yulgok” !谷 [l.n.] for Yi I 李珥. For the primary Korean sources cited, I provide only the Korean titles as is the standard style; for example, Toegye’s “Seonghak sipdo 聖學十圖” and “Jaseongnok 自省錄.” To avoid confusion, I indicate the titles of Chinese sources in Chinese only; for example, the Cheng brothers’ Yishu 遺書 and Zhu Xi’s Jinsi lu

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近思錄. With some exceptions, romanized philosophical terms are provided in both languages. The Korean pronunciation appears first followed by the Chinese with a slash (/) between them; e. g., “i/li” 理 (principle), “gi/qi” 氣 (vital energy), and “sim/xin” 心 (heart-mind). When any of Toegye’s letters or essays is cited, I translate it in such a way that each sentence or word is rendered as literally and as meaningfully as Toegye himself originally intended it to be. However, it is the style of my translation that should make clear to the reader why Toegye’s works are worth reading. I therefore take occasional liberties with the translation in order to enhance textual clarity or rhetorical flow. The literary genres and philosophical concepts as well as their spiritual meanings and religious implications motivate me to include commentary in the text or the appended notes. Consistency in the translation of Confucian terms can be difficult because they are often subtle or flexible in meaning due to their literal, philosophical, or moral-spiritual context. I therefore maintain the standard but flexible English rendering of most terms. I translate certain key words according to their different contexts. For example, the term sim/xin 心, one of the most important terms in Toegye’s thought, is translated sometimes as “mind” or “heart-mind.” The term seong/xing 性 is mostly rendered as “human nature” — which Toegye considered to be full of goodness. As is commonly done, I translate i/li 理 as “principle” (metaphysical) or “the ground of being,” but this term can also mean an omnipresent “pattern” or the moral “order” of all phenomena. It represents the original (ideal) essence of human goodness as well. The term gi/qi 氣 is translated as “vital/physical energy” or “material force” — its standard rendering in English. It brings each phenomenon or being into concrete existence and also determines its transformation, which may lead to either good or evil. References to primary sources such as Toegye’s biographies, letters, essays, and texts are cited in the footnotes, some of them are lengthy because further citation, textual description, or interpretive comments are provided. Toegye quotes many classical Confucian texts and Chinese Neo-Confucian masters directly or indirectly. When any of these primary references is quoted or paraphrased by Toegye or myself, I assist the reader by indicating both accuracy and reliability. If the quoted passage is already available in English and if it is translated properly, I adopt it and fully document its source in the notes (e. g., Chan1963, 1967; Lau 1970, 1979; Legge 1970). Otherwise, I indicate that I use my own translation. I use both in-text and footnote citations in all sections where I quote and discuss the primary or secondary sources. This blended citation style allows us convenience and consistency when quoting or citing Toegye’s or other original texts, their translations, or modern Western studies.

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Abbreviations JSN TJ ZZDQ ZZQS ZZWJ ZZYL

See Yi Toegye 1985a. See Yi Toegye 1985b. See Zhu Xi 1930a. See Zhu Xi 1714. See Zhu Xi 1930b. See Zhu Xi 1880.

References Primary Sources Yi Toegye’s Works Yi Toegye 李退溪. 1985a. Jaseongnok 自省錄 (Record of Self-Reflection), 1: 1a–76a. In Yi Toegye, Toegye jeonseo, vol. 3, 151–190. Yi Toegye 李退溪. 1985b. Toegye jeonseo 退溪全書 (Complete Works of Yi Toegye), enlarged edition, 5 vols. Seoul: Seonggyungwan University Press. Abbreviated TJ. Originally printed in 1843 as Toegye seonsaeng munjip 退溪先生文集 (Collection of Literary Works by Master Yi Toegye).

Other Primary Texts Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. 1967. Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-Ch’ien. New York: Columbia University Press. Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤. Yishu 遺書 (Surviving Works of the Two Chengs). In Sibu beiyao. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2016. A Korean Confucian Way of Life and Thought: The Chaso˘ngnok (Record of Self-Reflection) by Yi Hwang (T’oegye). Translated, annotated, and with an introduction. Korean Classics Library: Philosophy and Religion Series. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Gyeongseo 經書 (Collected Commentaries on the Four Books). 1972. Seoul: Seonggyungwan University Press. Kalton, Michael C., trans. 1988. To Become a Sage: The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning by Yi Toegye. New York: Columbia University Press. Kalton, Michael C., Tu Wei-ming, Young-chan Ro, and Ook-soon Kim, trans. 1994. The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought. Albany: SUNY Press. Lau, D. C., trans. 1970. Mencius. New York: Penguin Books. Lau, D. C., trans. 1979. Confucius: Analects (Lun yü). New York: Penguin Books.

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Legge, James, trans. 1970. The Chinese Classics. 5 vols. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, reprint. Sibu beiyao (abbreviated SBBY) 四部備要 (Complete Essentials of the Four Categories). 1920–1936. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju. Yi I (Yulgok) 李珥 (栗谷). 1985. Yulgok jeoneso 栗谷全書 (Complete Works of Yi Yulgok), 3 vols. Seoul: Seonggyungwan University Press. Abbreviated YJ. Zhu Xi. 1714. Zhuzi quanshu 朱子全書 (Complete Works of Master Zhu Xi). Abbreviated ZZQS. Zhu Xi. 1880. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu Xi). Compiled by Li Jingde (fl. 1263). Abbreviated ZZYL. Zhu Xi. 1930a. Zhuzi daqaun 朱子大全 (Great Compendium of Works by Master Zhu Xi). The Sibu beiyao edition. Abbreviated ZZDQ. Zhu Xi. 1930b. Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 (Collection of Literary Works by Master Zhu Xi). In Zhuzi daquan. Abbreviated ZZWJ. Zhu Xi. 1972. Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句 (Commentary on the Words and Phrases of the Doctrine of the Mean). In Gyeongseo.

Secondary Sources Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄. 1965. Nihon Shushigaku to Cho¯sen 日本朱子學と朝鮮 (Japanese Zhu Xi School in Relation to Korea). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Abe Yoshio. 1970. “Development of Neo-Confucianism in Japan, Korea, and China: A Comparative Study.” Acta Asiatica 19. Abe Yoshio, ed. 1977. Cho¯sen no Shushigaku Nihon no Shushigaku 朝鮮の朱子學, 日本の 朱子學 (Korean Zhu Xi School and Japanese Zhu Xi School). Vol. 12 of Shushigaku taikei 朱子學大系 (Great Compendium on the Zhu Xi School), 14 vols. Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha. Ames, Roger T. 2010. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Ames, Roger T. 2020. Human Becomings: Theorizing Persons for Confucian Role Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press. Ames, Roger T. and Peter D. Hershock, eds. 2017. Confucianisms for a Changing World Cultural Order. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Angle, Stephen C. 2012. Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bell, Daniel A., ed. 2007. Confucian Political Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bergmann, Sigurd and Heather Eaton, eds. 2011. Ecological Awareness: Exploring Religion, Ethics and Aesthetics. Studies in Religion and the Environment/Studien zur Religion und Umwelt, Bd. 3. LIT Verlag. Berthrong, John. 1998. Transformations of the Confucian Way. Boulder: Westview Press. Brasovan, Nicholas S. 2017. Neo-Confucian Ecological Humanism: An Interpretive Engagement with Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692). State University of New York Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany: SUNY Press.

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Chan, Joseph. 2015. Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chan, Wing-tsit. 1985. “How Toegye Understood Chu Hsi.” In Wm. T. de Bary and J. Kim Haboush, eds. The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. New York: Columbia University Press. Ching, Julia. 1977. Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study. New York/Tokyo: Kodansha International. Ching, Julia. 1985. “Yi Yulgok on the Four and the Seven.” In Wm. T. de Bary and J. Kim Haboush, eds., The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. Ching, Julia. 2000. The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi. Toronto/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 1995. The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok: A Reappraisal of the Four-Seven Thesis and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultivation. Albany: SUNY Press. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 1998. “Yi Yulgok on Mind, Human Nature, and Emotions: A Korean Neo-Confucian Interpretation Revisited.” Monumenta Serica – Journal of Oriental Studies 46: 265–290. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2004. “Confucian Spirituality in Yi T’oegye: A Korean Interpretation and Its Implications for Comparative Religion.” In Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds., Confucian Spirituality, vol. 2B, 204–225. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2010a. “T’oegye’s Religious Thought: A Neo-Confucian and Comparative Perspective.” In East Asian Confucianisms: Interactions and Innovations. New Brunswick: Confucius Institute and Rutgers University Press, 193–210. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2010b. “Yi T’oegye (1501–1570) on Self-Transcendence: A NeoConfucian and Interreligious Perspective.” Acta Koreana 13.2 (December): 31–46. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2011a. “Self-Transcendence as the Ultimate Reality in Interreligious Dialogue: A Neo-Confucian Perspective.” Studies in Religion 40.2 (June): 152–178. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2011b. “Yi T’oegye on Reverence (Kyo˘ng) for Nature: A Modern NeoConfucian Ecological Vision.” Acta Koreana 14.2 (December): 93–111. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2015. Korean Confucianism: Tradition and Modernity. Understanding Korea Series (UKS), no. 3. Seognam: The Academy of Korean Studies Press. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2019a. “Yi Yulgok (1536–1584) on Ki, Self-Cultivation, and Practical Learning.” In Suk Gabriel Choi and Jung-Yeup Kim, eds., The Idea of Gi/Qi: East Asian and Comparative Philosophical Perspectives. Lanham: Lexington Books, 95–114. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2019b. “History, Philosophy, and Spirituality of the Four-Seven Debate: A Korean Neo-Confucian Interpretation of Human Nature, Emotions, and SelfCultivation.” In Young-chan Ro, ed., Dao Companion to Korean Confucian Philosophy. New York: Springer, 75–112. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2019c. “Yi T’oegye on Transcending the Problem of Evil: A NeoConfucian and Interreligious Perspective.” Acta Koreana 22, no 2 (December 2019): 249–266. Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2020. The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea: The Chono˘n (Testament) by Cho˘ng Chedu (Hagok). London/Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing.

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Chung, Edward, Y. J. 2021. The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality. Palgrave Studies in Comparative EastWest Philosophy. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan. De Bary, William Theodore. 1981. Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mindand-Heart. New York: Columbia University Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore and J. Kim Haboush, eds. 1985. The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. New York: Columbia University Press. Geum Jangtae 금장태. 1989. Hanguk yugyo ui ihae 한국유교의 이해 (Understanding Korean Confucianism). Seoul: Minjok munhwasa. Geum Jangtae 금장태. 1998. Toegye ui sam gwa cheolhak 퇴계의 삶과 철학 (Toegye’s Life and Thought). Seoul: Seoul National University Press. Hick, John. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hick, John. 1993. The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press. Hick, John. 2005. “The Next Step beyond Dialogue.” In Paul Knitter, ed., The Myth of Religious Superiority Multifaith Explorations of Religious Pluralism, 3–12. Hon, Tze-ki and Kristin Stapleton, eds. 2017. Confucianism for the Contemporary World: Global Order, Political Plurality, and Social Action. Albany: SUNY Press. Huang, Chun-chieh, and John A. Tucker, eds. 2014. Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol. 5. New York/Dordrecht: Springer. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2002. Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thoughts of Mencius and Wang Yangming. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2015. “The Historical Significance and Contemporary Relevance of the Four-Seven Debate.” Philosophy East and West 65.2: 401–429 (April). DOI 10.1353/ pew.2015.0029. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2016. “The Four-Seven Debate.” In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Three Streams: Confucian Reflections on Learning and the Moral Heart-Mind in China, Korea, and Japan. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kalton, Michael C. 2019. “Toegye: His Life, Learning and Times.” In Young-chan Ro, ed., Dao Companion to Korean Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11. New York: Springer, 159–178. Kim, Hyoungchan. 2015. “The Li-Ki [Li-Qi] Structure of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Emotions and the Intention of the Four-Seven Debate: A Critical Reflection on the Methods of Explaining the Theories of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Emotions in Korean Neo-Confucianism.” Acta Koreana 18: 561–81. Kim, Hyoungchan. 2018. Korean Confucianism: The Philosophy and Politics of Toegye and Yulgok. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. Kim, Sungmoon. 2020. Democracy after Virtue: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lee, Ming-huei and David Jones, eds. 2017. Confucianism: Its Roots and Global Significance. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Neville, Robert C. 2000. Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World. Albany: SUNY Press.

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Ng, Kai-chiu and Yong Huang, eds. 2020. Dao Companion to Zhu Xi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol. 13. New York/Dordrecht: Springer. Ro, Young-chan. 1989. The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi Yulgok. Albany: SUNY Press. Ro, Young-chan, ed. 2019a. Dao Companion to Korean Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11. New York/Dordrecht: Springer. Ro, Young-chan, 2019b. “Yi Yulgok’s Life and His Neo-Confucian Synthesis” In Ro, ed., Dao Companion to Korean Confucian Philosophy, 179–196. Seok, Bongrae. 2018. “The Four-Seven Debate of Korean Neo-Confucianism and the Moral Psychological and Theistic Turn in Korean Philosophy.” Religions 9.11, 374. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9110374. Takahashi Susumu 高橋進. 1986. Toegye wa gyeong ui cheolhak 李退溪와 敬의 哲學 (Toegye and a philosophy of reverence). Translated from the Japanese by An Byeongju and Yi Gidong. Seoul: Singu munhwasa. Taylor, Paul W. 1986. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Taylor, Rodney. 1986. The Way of Heaven: An Introduction to the Confucian Religious Life. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Taylor, Rodney. 1991. Religious Dimensions of Neo-Confucianism. Albany: SUNY Press. Tillich, Paul. 1963. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. New York: Columbia University Press. Tomoeda Ryu¯taro¯. 1985. “Yi T’oegye and Chu Hsi: Differences in Their Theories of Principle and Material Force.” In Wm. Theodore de Bary and J. Kim Haboush, eds., The Rise of NeoConfucianism in Korea. Tu, Weiming. 1978. “Yi Hwang’s Perception of the Mind.” T’oegye hakbo (Journal of T’oegye studies) 19: 455–467. Tu, Weiming. 1982. “T’oegye’s Creative Interpretation of Chu Hsi’s Philosophy of Principle.” Korea Journal 22.2 (February): 4–15. Tu, Weiming. 1985. “T’oegye’s Perception of Human Nature: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Four-Seven Debate in Korean Neo-Confucianism.” In Wm. T. de Bary and J. Kim Haboush, eds., The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. Tu, Weiming. 1989. Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness. Revised edition. Albany: SUNY Press. Tu, Weiming, ed. 1996. Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tu, Weiming. 2004. “The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World.” In Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds., Confucian Spirituality, vol. 2B, 480–508. Tu, Weiming. 2011. “Keynote Speech.” Proceedings of the 5th Keimyung International Conference on Korean Studies: Ecology and Korean Confucianism. Keimyung University, Daegu, Korea, 15–22. Reprinted in Ecology and Korean Confucianism, edited by Academia Koreana. Korean Studies series 34, 7–21. Daegu: Keimyung University Press. Tu, Weiming, and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds. 2004. Confucian Spirituality, vol. 2B. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. 1991. “The Relevance of Chinese Neo-Confucianism for the Reverence of Nature,” Environmental History Review 15, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 55–67.

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Tucker, Mary Evelyn. 1998. “The Philosophy of Ch’i as an Ecological Cosmology.” In Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, eds., Confucianism and Ecology, 187–207. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. 2003. Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter Their Ecological Phase. Chicago: Open Court Publishing. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. 2005. “Ecology and Religion: Ecology and Confucianism.” Encylopedia.com, www.encyclopedia.com/environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcript s-and-maps/ecology-and-religion-ecology-and-confucianism. Tucker, Mary Evelyn and John Berthrong, eds. 1998. Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans. Cambridge: Center for the Study of World Religions/Harvard University Press. Yi, Sangeun 이상은. 1973. Toegye ui saengae wa hangmun 퇴계의 생애와 학문 (Toegye’s Life and Learning). Seoul: Seomundang. Youn (Yun), Sa-sun (Sasun). 1985. “T’oegye’s Identification of ‘To Be’ and ‘Ought’: T’oegye’s Theory of Value.” In William Theodore de Bary and J. Kim Haboush. eds., The Rise of NeoConfucianism in Korea. Yun, Sa-soon (Sasun). 1991. Critical Issues in Neo-Confucian Thought: The Philosophy of Yi T’oegye. Translated by Michael Kalton. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Yun, Sasun 尹絲淳. 1980. Toegye cheolhak ui yeongu 退溪哲學의 硏究 (A Study of Toegye’s Philosophy). Seoul: Korea University Press.

Heiner Roetz

An Overlooked Dimension of Intergenerational Justice? A Note on Filial Piety in the Age of the Ecological Crisis There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus. It shows an angel who seems about to move away from something he stares at. His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm. Walter Benjamin1

If written in German, the title of this essay would be Erinnerung und Innehalten. I had to choose a different heading, since the English language has no equivalents (neither has Chinese) for the German words Erinnerung — remembrance, commemoration — and innehalten — take pause, halt, stop — that would make the relation which will be my topic similarly audible and visible: the relation between remembering the dead and halting the ravaging of the earth, as a possible timely expression of the Chinese virtue of xiao — filial piety. Immanuel Kant writes in his programmatic essay of 1784, “Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?”, the following:

1 Benjamin 2006, 392 (“Es gibt ein Bild von Klee, das Angelus Novus heißt. Ein Engel ist darauf dargestellt, der aussieht, als wäre er im Begriff, sich von etwas zu entfernen, worauf er starrt. Seine Augen sind aufgerissen, sein Mund steht offen und seine Flügel sind ausgespannt. Der Engel der Geschichte muss so aussehen. Er hat das Antlitz der Vergangenheit zugewendet. Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten vor uns erscheint, da sieht er eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig Trümmer auf Trümmer häuft und sie ihm vor die Füße schleudert. Er möchte wohl verweilen, die Toten wecken und das Zerschlagene zusammenfügen. Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradiese her, der sich in seinen Flügeln verfangen hat und so stark ist, dass der Engel sie nicht mehr schließen kann. Dieser Sturm treibt ihn unaufhaltsam in die Zukunft, der er den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen vor ihm zum Himmel wächst. Das, was wir den Fortschritt nennen, ist dieser Sturm.”).

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An age cannot conclude a pact and conspire to put the succeeding age in a state wherein it must become impossible for it to enlarge its knowledge (in particular the so very urgent one) and purge it of errors, and generally to progress in enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, the original destination of which consists exactly in this progressing; and thus the descendants are fully entitled to reject those decisions as taken in an unauthorized and outrageous manner. The touchstone of all that can be decided as a law over a people lies in the question whether a people itself could have imposed such a law on it.2

Kant’s formulation is a classic expression of the self-understanding of a society that can count as “modern”: It no longer takes its orientation from older models, because they would enjoy genealogical authority, but it develops its program out of itself. It does not necessarily dismiss transmitted knowledge and ancient wisdom, but, ideal-typically, submits them to “criticism,” for Kant the mark of the age of enlightenment, in which “only that which has been able to withstand free and public examination” by reason will be granted “unfeigned respect.”3 Hegel has called this feature of a modern society “subjectivity,” something that he finds missing in China. China, for Hegel, is the eternal kingdom of the antipode of subjectivity — “substance,” the unquestioned and unmoved massive power of the inherited ways of life and given social order.4 He relates this, among other things, to the patriarchal structure of China where the monarch rules as a father over his children who “do not leave the moral family circle.”5 To my knowledge, the first Western author to highlight the family principle as the backbone of China and associate the “spirit of despotism” with it is Montesquieu. He sees the Chinese empire as based on the idea of parental rule, in which absolute authority as a numinous power does not tolerate any free action and insists on following the smallest regulations and respecting even the seem2 Kant 1968b, 8:57–58 (A 491) (“Ein Zeitalter kann sich nicht verbünden und darauf verschwören, das folgende in einen Zustand zu setzen, darin es ihm unmöglich werden muß, seine (vornehmlich so sehr angelegentliche) Erkenntnisse zu erweitern, von Irrtümern zu reinigen und überhaupt in der Aufklärung weiterzuschreiten. Das wäre ein Verbrechen wider die menschliche Natur, deren ursprüngliche Bestimmung gerade in diesem Fortschreiten besteht; und die Nachkommen sind also vollkommen dazu berechtigt, jene Beschlüsse, als unbefugter und frevelhafter Weise genommen, zu verwerfen. Der Probierstein alles dessen, was über ein Volk als Gesetz beschlossen werden kann, liegt in der Frage: ob ein Volk sich selbst wohl ein solches Gesetz auferlegen könnte?”). 3 Kant 1968c, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur ersten Auflage (1781), Kant 1968c, 3:13 (A XII) (“Unser Zeitalter ist das eigentliche Zeitalter der Kritik, der sich alles unterwerfen muss. Religion durch ihre Heiligkeit und Gesetzgebung durch ihre Majestät wollen sich gemeiniglich derselben entziehen. Aber alsdann erregen sie gerechten Verdacht wider sich und können auf unverstellte Achtung nicht Anspruch machen, die die Vernunft nur demjenigen bewilligt, was ihre freie und öffentliche Prüfung hat aushalten können.”). 4 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Philosophy of History), Hegel 1989, 12:147, and passim. 5 Hegel 1989, 12:156 (“Kinder, die aus dem moralischen Familienkreise nicht heraustreten”).

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ingly most trivial prescriptions, out-ruling any perspective for change.6 Montesquieu is echoed by Johann Gottfried Herder, for whom in China “everything is based on filial obedience” (“vom kindlichen Gehorsam geht dort Alles aus”),7 to the effect that innovation is impossible for all future times: Does it come as a surprise that such a nation has remained as it was for thousands of years? Even their moral and law books always go around in circles and say the same of filial duties in a hundred ways, precisely and carefully, with regular hypocrisy. Astronomy and music, poetry and the art of war, painting and architecture are with them as they were centuries ago, children of their eternal laws and immutably childlike constitution. The empire is an embalmed mummy, painted with hieroglyphics and wrapped in silk; their inner cycle is like the life of the sleeping winter animals.8

Filial piety, xiao 孝, as the heaviest millstone of the Chinese civilization has remained a topic in later literature. Max Weber, for example, in his influential essay Konfuzianismus und Taoismus (English: The Religion of China), calls filial piety “the one basic social duty” and “absolutely primary virtue” which “in case of conflict preceded all other virtues.” As the “final ethical standard,” it again and again obliges to one and the same social order as the “best of the possible worlds.” The result is the “reckless canonization of the traditional.”9 A similar critique of filial piety, certainly the most condemned of all traditional Chinese values, has been brought forward by the radical iconoclasts of the May Fourth Movement. Wu Yu 吳虞, for one, attacked the Confucian family as a school of a general submissiveness to authority. According to Wu, the kinship system, supported by xiao, has served as the “basis of despotism.”10 The debate has recently been revived, when Liu Qingping 刘清平 criticized Confucianism as a “consanguinism” that puts kin first at all costs and is among other things responsible for chronic corruption in China.11 For filial piety, then, as the breeding ground of submissiveness, traditionalism and nepotism, there would be no place in a Chinese society that deserved the 6 Montesquieu 1949, 1:303; cf. Roetz 1993, 9 and 283 n. 9. 7 Herder, Adrastea, Herder 1967, 24:7. 8 Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Herder 1967, 10:12–13 (“Kann man sich wundern, daß eine Nation dieser Art […] Jahrtausende hindurch sich auf derselben Stelle erhalten habe? Selbst ihre Moral- und Gesetzesbücher gehen immer im Kreise umher und sagen auf hundert Weisen, genau und sorgfältig, mit regelmäßiger Heuchelei von kindlichen Pflichten immer dasselbe. Astronomie und Musik, Poesie und Kriegskunst, Malerei und Architektur sind bei ihnen, wie sie vor Jahrhunderten waren, Kinder ihrer ewigen Gesetze und unabänderlich-kindlichen Einrichtung. Das Reich ist eine balsamierte Mumie, mit Hieroglyphen bemalt und mit Seide umwunden; ihr innerer Kreislauf ist wie das Leben der schlafenden Winterthiere.”) 9 Weber 1989, 352, 451, 360. 10 Wu 1985, 61–66. 11 See Liu 2003, 234–250, and 2007, 1–19. Cf. Roetz 2008, 41–44.

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predicate “modern,” because this virtue would undermine the very essence of such a society — individual freedom and openness to the future. An additional reason would be a sociological one, at least if “richly textured” family structures are regarded as necessary to provide the environment for imparting moral values, among them xiao, as Tu Weiming has argued.12 It is hard to see that such structures still exist after the social changes that have taken place in the course of the turn from an agrarian to an industrial and service economy and, of course, the one child policy of the People’s Republic and its lasting effects. A Confucianism that would ground its values on kin would be blind not only normatively, but also sociologically. It seems that xiao is not a first rank candidate for Confucian input to the twenty-first century, then. In order to contribute to modernity, Confucianism would rather first of all have to build on those elements of its ethics that do not address the role bearer in a family but the human being in an open world, stress individual autonomy rather than parental authority and transcend the limits of tradition — in short: elements that belong, in Hegel’s terms, in the realm of “subjectivity” rather than “substance.” The Book of Mengzi in particular contains such elements that have in fact served as the starting point of a reconstruction of Confucianism by modern “New Confucian” philosophers, providing, among other things, a “logical link”13 between Mengzi’s anthropology and political philosophy on the one hand and the ideas of democracy and human rights on the other, if strengthened against the more conservative and hierarchical tenets of Mengzi’s thought.14 I do not want to repeat the corresponding arguments here but turn to the question, what happens to xiao in such a reconstruction. Is there something that could be called “new piety,” xin xiao 新孝, in analogy to the “new outer kingship,” xin wai wang 新外王, that Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 has reinterpreted as democracy, in contradistinction to the original monarchical rule? Is there something in xiao that does not fall prey to the legitimate criticism and deserves to be rescued? The critique of xiao outlined above is certainly not unjustified. But if it becomes part of the ideology of a modernity that is “based on the destruction of all pre-given forms and contents,”15 it develops a problematic bias. As a matter of fact, filial piety had, at least in theory, a more complex architecture than is assumed in the critique, and this likewise applies to the Confucian relation to tradition in general with xiao as its central part. Xiao has not simply meant 12 13 14 15

Tu 2000, 205–206. Deng 1995. Cf. Roetz 2008, 202–214, and 2009, 359–375. Negt 2007, 240 (a member of the “Frankfurt school,” in his reflections on the “European myth of modernity” after a travel to China in 1980).

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unconditional submissiveness. It has rather implied a principled moral vigilance that could lead to opposition, albeit moderate and never aggressive, and to the clear rejection of following immoral, inhumane — literally: “animalish” — orders of the parents, as well as orders of the ruler.16 However, these critical — subjective17 — ingredients of filial piety, which become apparent most clearly in the Zidao chapter 子道 of the Xunzi 荀子, where “highest filial piety” 大孝 is identified with “following justice and not the father” 從義不從父, but are also to be found in passages of the Xiaojing 孝經,18 have not been foregrounded in the later propagation and practice of xiao. They are also absent from Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Xiaoxue 小學, the most important Confucian pedagogical text book, which on the other hand does not refrain from collecting authoritarian statements of hidebound Song Confucians to the effect that parents are always right.19 Nevertheless, the ancient texts bear witness that xiao, though its overall impact was conservative, was not simply referred to as the epitome of “substantial” conditions which immerse the individual in tradition and unquestioned structures of power but could be subordinate to “subjective” concerns, thus becoming an element of subjectivity itself — its only possible modern mode. In this connection, Lee Ming-huei’s 李明輝 analysis of Confucius’s understanding of mourning is particularly revealing. As he shows, Confucius’s defense of the three-year mourning period, a cornerstone of xiao, in Lunyu 17:21 is not a mere expression of ritualism, but is based on an idea of justice — one gives back to the parents what one has received from them in the early years of life.20 Similarly, we can read Confucius’s call for “returning to the rites” (fu li 復禮) in Lunyu 12:1, which presupposes to “overcome oneself” (ke ji 克己), thus a subjective decision, as a plea for solidarity with the endangered tradition that has not prevented the crisis of the Zhou society and yet, in spite of its failure, has for a long time enabled our existence.21 The human being, uprooted in the crisis, is no longer under the umbrella of tradition but, out of duty, rather takes the tradition into his or her own care. Seen in this light, in Confucian thought — as distinguished from the conventional historical practice — a line of reasoning, though probably not representing the mainstream, can be detected where the commitment to tradition including the commitment to filial piety is an element of an ethics of principles like justice and solidarity which is itself non-traditional.

16 Xunzi 29, 347, Roetz 1993, p. 65. 17 Disobedience is for Hegel an indication of “leaving substance,” thus of subjectivity (Hegel 12, 152: “Gehorcht er nicht, tritt er somit aus der Substanz heraus […]”). 18 Xiaojing 15, 26, see the translation in Yu 2015, 159. Cf. for this topic, Roetz 1993, 63–65. 19 Cf. Roetz 1993, 57–58. 20 Lee 2016. 21 Cf. the analysis in Roetz 2023.

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There has been an understanding of filial piety, then, which does not render the ethics that support it hopelessly outdated from a modern point of view. But is it conceivable that xiao could on this basis also make a positive contribution to modernity, going beyond the mere possibility of not outrightly standing in its way? And would not such a contribution be desirable, since not only would the patronizing of the new by the old have to be forestalled, as in Kant’s still valid quoted defense of enlightenment, but so would the total dismissal of the old by the new, in view of the fact that the ecological crisis has made preservation a task of equal importance as innovation? It is often argued that such a contribution of xiao to the future lies in upholding intact family relationships needed to shoulder the social burden of modern economies in view of non-existent or dismantled public welfare systems. There may be some truth in this. But it would neither be fair to nor bearable for families to heal the wounds inflicted by an economic liberalism that dissolves grown social structures on the one hand and tries to impose on them its costs on the other. What would be necessary is to restrict rather than compensate the destructive productivity of the modern system itself. Does xiao have something to say in this respect? Could the preserving function which it has always fulfilled still play a role today, beyond falling back into an anti-modern bondage to the old? As I see it, such an option suggests itself due to the fact that in the early Chinese texts, xiao is already brought together with the demand for a careful use of resources. It would thus allow for a more complex understanding of intergenerational justice, an idea with which environmental ethics has reacted to the ecological crisis,22 in order to ensure a sustained preservation of the means needed for future human beings to survive — today the central concern of the “Fridays for Future” movement. This is the most straightforward approach in terms of argument to stop the plundering of the earth, and if taken seriously, the plundering would stop immediately. To my knowledge, in the corresponding ethical discussion, “intergenerational” exclusively refers to the present and future generations. A responsibility is demanded of the older for the younger, whose capital should not be absorbed by a thriftless way of life (above all the “first world” way of life, to be sure). In contrast to this, the earlier perspective saw the future at an advantage over the present, as in Kant’s statement that “the older generations seem to do their cumbersome business only for the sake of the younger to prepare a platform from which they can go one step further.”23 How could he have imagined that a 22 Cf. Tremmel 2006. 23 Kant 1968a, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbu¨rgerlicher Absicht, A 391: “It is still strange that the older generations seem to do their cumbersome business only for the sake of the younger generation to prepare a platform from which they can go one step further, towards the target aimed for by nature, and that only the last generations will be lucky enough

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time was in the making where the optimistic assumption that the future humans are better off would be replaced by a totally “pessimistic paradigm.”24 This, too, is part of the ambivalent history of subjectivity — it leads not only to moral and political freedom, but also to the freedom of homo faber and homo oecomicus, with a destructive drive towards a total objectification of nature as well as of the other subjects. In order to be checked and counterbalanced, it would have to understand itself as an element of co-subjectivity with the fellow human beings not only of the present but also of the future. And what xiao gives us to consider is that the community of human beings would be incomplete without the members of a further generation — the older one, adding to intergenerational justice a third party and a second dimension. How does taking the elder and deceased into account as co-subjects relate to a careful rather than reckless use of resources and a less ravaging form of modernity? A first indication for the nexus in question can be found in Mengzi 1A/3, where we read that if “close-meshed nets are not allowed in ponds” 數罟不入洿 池 and “axes enter woods only at the proper time” 斧斤以時入山林, it will be possible for the people “to care for the living and mourn for the dead without having to grieve” 是使民養生喪死無憾也. Mengzi contrasts this with the gloomy reality of the Warring States era where the most disastrous wars go together with first signs of an early environmental crisis.25 A short sentence in the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記) makes the connection between xiao and ecology more visible: To fell a single tree and kill a single animal unless at the proper time contradicts filial piety. 斷一樹, 殺一獸, 不以其時, 非孝也.26

In my book of 1993, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age, I commented on this passage as follows: Unlike the Daoists and afterwards the Buddhists, the Confucians do not regard an animal as a being deserving special respect. On the contrary, respect is the differencia specifica which separates the treatment of animals from that of men. The treatment of

to dwell in this abode built by a long row of their predecessors (albeit not deliberately), who were not able to have their share in the joy they were preparing.” (Kant 1968, vol. 9, 37, translation Tremmel 2006, 2) (“Befremdend bleibt es immer hierbei: daß die ältern Generationen nur scheinen um der späteren willen ihr mühseliges Geschäft zu treiben, um nämlich diesen eine Stufe zu bereiten, von der diese das Bauwerk, welches die Natur zur Absicht hat, höher bringen könnten; und daß doch nur die spätesten das Glück haben sollen, in dem Gebäude zu wohnen, woran eine lange Reihe ihrer Vorfahren (zwar freilich ohne ihre Absicht) gearbeitet hatten, ohne doch selbst an dem Glück, das sie vorbereiteten, Anteil nehmen zu können.”) 24 Birnbacher 2006, 27. 25 Cf. Roetz 2013. 26 Liji 24, 621; cf. also, Dadai Liji 52, 181.

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animals is, basically, merely subject to the charge of moderation applying to the use of natural resources in general. One should not “fell a single tree and kill a single animal” if the “proper time” has not come. The violation of this rule is not criticized as a lack of respect for nature, but as “unfilial.” The definition of the offence is anthropocentric and refers to the harm done to the interests of the parents. Animals not only are no object of special moral commitment, but they are the counterpart of morality as such. Morality is the “little bit” which separates man from the brute, and he who does not possess the “four beginnings” of morals, says Mengzi, “is no human being.”27 The devaluation of non-human nature is the reverse side of Confucian humanism.28

In principle, I would still subscribe to this assessment. But it does not exhaust the possible meaning of the sentence from the Liji with regard to an effect of filial piety for another treatment of nature and for another, more endurable future than the one which is looming. What I have in mind is not the extension of xiao to the non-human world, which is, indeed, frequently claimed for Confucianism in the contemporary disucssion.29 The early Confucian texts may not deliver a unitary picture, and such positions can be found in later Confucianism.30 But nevertheless, the extension argument is at odds with passages in the ancient literature which clearly bespeak an instrumental and sometimes even inimical attitude towards nature and are all too conveniently played down or swept under the table in the currently abundant lyrical presentations of Confucianism as inherently cosmo-ecological.31 And the argument does also not fit in with the main content of the Liji chapter, which is sacrifice — commemoration of deceased human beings. The context is anthropocentric. But how does this go together with protecting natural resources? 27 Mengzi 4B/19, 2A/6. 28 Roetz 1993, 211. 29 Blakeley, for one, has argued, referring to Liji 24, that in Confucianism animals and trees are, “in some extended but significant way, beings that deserve moral consideration as kin. They are extended members of the family.” (Blakeley 2003, 142). Qiao 2012, 70, agrees with this reading. For similar interpretations of the passage as an expression of a moralized cosmic holism see e. g. Yao 2014, 581, and Zhuang 2015, 145. That in Confucianism filial piety is a “meta-ethical principle underlying the anthropocosmic worldview” is prominently argued in Tu 1989, 106. 30 Cf., e. g., the philosophy of Kaibara Ekken as described in Tucker 1989, 55. 31 To give an example, “setting fire to mountains and marshes and burning them off, so that the wild animals flee and hide” 烈山澤而焚之 禽獸逃匿, solemnized by Mengzi as the great achievement of the early rulers and cultural heroes that made the world habitable for humans in the first place (Mengzi 3A/4), does not appear all too eco-minded. The “harmonious ordering of the world” which Ivanhoe finds realized here (Ivanhoe 1998, 68) does not sound very pleasant for the animals and is certainly not to their advantage. Passages like this one (cf. also Roetz 2013, 35) make it difficult to see what the “great harmony of the biotic community” (Nuyen 2011, 564, with Tu Weiming), to which the Confucians are allegedly committed, actually consists in. If I had had to live as an animal in ancient China, I would definitely have preferred to do so under the Daoists rather than the Confucians.

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A concrete answer would be that resources have to be protected for the proper sacrifice itself, as a means to establish the link to the dead. But read symbolically, a wider intergenerational commitment ensues which does not exclusively address those to come, though it is them for whom it will be beneficial in the end. Intergenerational justice would then forbid consuming for oneself what belongs not only to posterity but also to the still living old and even to those whom we have to commemorate.32 As the only place of remembrance of the previous generations, the earth is also theirs, and we do not have the right to waste it on our own authority. Empathy with the fate of the old and the dead, above all the victims of the wreckful logic that culminates in the catastrophes of our era, means to ward off the destructive power of an all-devouring modernity oblivious to everything that has been. In pre-modern China under the influence of filial piety, nothing epitomizes the unity of erinnern, remember, and innehalten, stop, more than the rite of the three-year mourning, with a total halt of all other activities. For Elias Canetti, it was, for all civilizations, the only serious attempt ever “to wipe out the lust for survival”33 — the same lust which is the driving force behind the exercise of power and the will to dominate, other humans as well as nature. Seen in this light, the perspective of filial piety has something in common with the one of Benjamin’s angel who, driven into the future, looks back into the past, and, terrified, wants to stay in view of the fate of the dead. Might xiao, freed from all bondage to the old, but holding fast to giving them their due, help to avert that progress continues to be the all-devastating storm caught in the angel’s wings? In view of the fact that in China itself filial piety has not prevented severe damage to the environment already in historical times, long before the intrusion of the West,34 this might just be a faint hope. The way outlined in this paper as theoretically conceivable has up to now not actually been taken. Still, a modernity that does not put itself in a mediating, remembering — as it were “pious” or “Benjaminian” — rather than only a negating relation to the past will have no future.

32 One might speculate whether xiao could in principle also work bi-directionally as a common basis for responsibility for the older and the younger generation. Knapp (2019, 71, 77) mentions an account from the 5th Century AD where a mother macaque’s concern for her baby counts as filial behaviour. This contradicts the normal understanding of xiao, but it would be interesting to explore this issue further. I owe this idea to Marion Eggert who has analyzed Korean accounts of “humane” animal behavior (Eggert 2015). 33 Canetti 1979, 176. 34 Cf. for this topic, Elvin 2004 and Roetz 2013.

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Lee Ming-huei 李明輝. 2016. “Lunyu Zai Wo wen sannian zhi sang zhang zhong de lunlixue wenti” 論語宰我問三年之喪章中的倫理學問題. In Lee, Ruxue yu xiandai yishi (zengding ban) 儒學與現代意識 (增訂版), 213–240. Taipei: Taiwan daxue chubanshe. Liji. 1977. Wang Meng’ou 王夢鷗, Liji jinzhu jinyi 禮記今註今譯. Taipei: Shangwu. Liu Qingping. 2003. “Filiality versus Sociality and Individuality: On Confucianism as ‘Consanguinitism.’” Philosophy East and West 53 (2):234–250. Liu Qingping. 2007. “Confucianism and Corruption: An Analysis of Shun’s Two Actions Described by Mencius.” Dao 6 (1):1–19. Lunyu 論語. 1972. Lunyu yinde 論語引得. A Concordance to the Analects of Confucius. Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series; Suppl. 16, reprint. Taipei: Chengwen. Mengzi 孟子. 1973. Mengzi yinde 孟子引得. A Concordance to Meng-tzu. HarvardYenching Sinological Index Series; Suppl. 17, reprint. Taipei: Chengwen. Montesquieu. 1949. The Spirit of the Laws. Trans. by Thomas Nugent, two vols. New York: Hafner. Negt, Oskar. 2007. Modernisierung im Zeichen des Drachen. China und der europa¨ische Mythos der Moderne. Göttingen: Steidl. (first edition Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1988). Nuyen, Anh Tuan. 2011. “Confucian Role-Based Ethics and Strong Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Values 20 (4):549–566. Qiao Qingju 乔清举. 2012. Ruijia shengtai sixiang tonglun 儒家生态思想通论. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe. Roetz, Heiner. 1993. Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age. A Reconstruction under the Aspect of the Breakthrough towards Postconventional Thinking. Albany: SUNY Press. Roetz, Heiner. 2008. “Confucianism and Familism: A Comment on the Debate Between Liu and Guo.” Dao 7 (1):41–44. Roetz, Heiner. 2008. “Mengzi’s political ethics and the question of its modern relevance.” In The Book of Mencius and Its Reception in China and Beyond, edited by Chun-chieh Huang, Gregor Paul, and Heiner Roetz, 202–214. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Roetz, Heiner. 2009. “Tradition, Universality and the Time Paradigm of Zhou Philosophy.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36 (3): 359–375. Roetz, Heiner. 2013. “Chinese ‘Unity of Man and Nature’: Reality or Myth?” In Nature, Environment and Culture in East Asia: The Challenge of Climate Change, edited by Carmen Meinert, 23–39. Leiden: Brill. Roetz, Heiner. 2023. “Just Roles and Virtues? On the Double Structure of Confucian Ethics.” Forthcoming in Journal of Chinese Philosophy 50 (1). Tremmel, Jörg, ed. 2006. Handbook of Intergenerational Justice. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Tu Weiming. 1989. Centrality and Commonality. An Essay on Confucian Religiousness. Albany: SUNY Press. Tu Weiming. 2000. “Implications of the Rise of ‘Confucian’ East Asia.” Daedalus 129 (1):195–218. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. 1989. Moral and Spiritual Cultivation in Japanese Neo-Confucianism: The Life and Thought of Kaibira Ekken (1630–1714). Albany: SUNY Press. Weber, Max. 1989. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe vol. I/19. Edited by Helwig SchmidtGlintzer and Petra Kolonko. Tübingen: Mohr.

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Wu Yu 吴虞. 1985. Wu Yu ji 吴虞集. Edited by Zhao Qing 赵清 and Zheng Cheng 郑城. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe. Xiaojing 孝經. 1977. Huang Deshi 黃得時, Xiaojing jinzhu jinyi 孝經今註今譯, Taipei: Shangwu. Xunzi 荀子. 1978. Wang Xianqian 王先謙, Xunzi jijie 荀子集解, Zhuzi jicheng 諸子集成, Hongkong: Zhonghua. Yao Xinzhong. 2014. “An Eco-Ethical Interpretation of Confucian Tianren Heyi.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 9.4: 570–585. Yu Kam Por. 2015. “The Chinese Traditions of Filial Piety and the Confucian Philosophical Reconstructions.” Auf Augenhöhe. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Heiner Roetz, edited by Wolfgang Behr Licia Di Giacinto, Ole Döring and Christine Moll-Murata. Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung 38: 145–160. Zhuang Yue. 2015. “Confucian Ecological Vision and the Chinese Eco-city.” Cities 45: 142– 147.

Yi-Huah Jiang

From the Inner Sage to the External King: The “End” of Human Life and Its Realization in Confucianism1

I.

Introduction

One of the most puzzling phenomena in contemporary China is the reemergence of Confucianism over the past two decades, first in the form of guoxue re (國學熱 “the fashion for Sinology studies”) and dujing yundong (讀經運動 the “Reading Classics Movement”) among intellectuals and ordinary people, then in the establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world, the official worship of Confucius at Confucian temples, and finally, the public celebration and promotion of Confucianism by Xi Jinping, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). What does this all mean? Does it suggest that China is becoming a Confucian country again? Can this rejuvenated Confucianism provide an answer to the questions of how to lead a good human life and how to develop a good political system for the Chinese people? Confucianism was the primary cultural tradition of Chinese civilization for more than 2,000 years. Beginning in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Confucianism also became the major political discourse that provided imperial rule with legitimacy and regulated the behavior of rulers towards their subjects. It is no exaggeration to say that pre-modern China was basically a Confucian state, and the political institution was essentially a Confucian system, including government structure, recruitment of civil servants, mechanisms of accountability, and the people’s legitimate expectations for everyday life. Yet Confucianism lost its influence with the collapse of the Qing empire (1644–1911) and the formation of Republican China (1912). The May Fourth Movement of 1919, which declared that China must search for “science and 1 The chapter is a revision of my previous essay “Confucian Political Theory in Contemporary China,” Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018): 155–73. I focus here on the question of how Confucianism connects the inner virtues of a gentleman with the external achievement of his public service.

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democracy” and emancipate itself from the bondage of traditionalism, delivered a blow to the crumbling heritage. But the most devastating strike to Confucianism was the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when Mao Zedong (毛澤東, 1893–1976) launched a merciless attack upon Confucius by destroying all Confucian institutions and literature. Ever since the “Criticize Confucius” movement of 1973, residues of Confucianism had almost been wiped out in mainland China. Therefore, the recent resurgence of Confucianism is not only a backlash to the ideology behind the Communist ascent to power in 1949, but also a strong reaction to the anti-traditionalism of modern China. As a matter of fact, the significance of Confucianism for the Chinese people extends far beyond the realm of the political. It is a constitutive core of the Chinese weltanschauung and Chinese culture, more essential than all other philosophical heritages of China, such as Taoism, Legalism or Buddhism. The Confucian idea of how a good man ( junzi 君子) should behave and what a virtuous life he should lead, has remained the goal of education and the means to a meaningful life for centuries. Just like Aristotelianism in the West, Confucianism is both an ethics and political theory in China. It is impossible to understand the philosophical tradition if we sever its teaching of a good human life from that of a good politics (the external achievement). Moreover, those who are really excellent in their internal virtues are expected to serve the public and become excellent rulers or officers as well. In this chapter, I will first discuss the principal teachings of Confucian political theory in ancient times. Then I will analyze Confucianism’s arguments about the connection between inner self-cultivation (neisheng 内聖, “the inner sage”) and external political achievement (waiwang 外王, “the external king”). Third, I will examine the modern theory of New Confucianism in Taiwan and Hong Kong and the theory of Political Confucianism in mainland China, with an emphasis on comparing how they interpret the relation between the inner sage and the external king. Finally, I will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of both theories and provide my own opinions as to how the issue should be approached in the future.

II.

Political Theory of Traditional Confucianism

Before we examine the various Confucian discourses in contemporary China, it may be helpful to outline the major components of traditional Confucian political theory so that we can understand the consistency and difference between ancient Confucianism and its contemporary followers. With this purpose in mind, I only summarize the arguments that are relevant to Confucian political theory, but not all the teachings of Confucianism, such as its views of heaven and

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earth, life and death, family, education, art and literature. I divide the political theory of traditional Confucianism into the following five components: first, the vision of “commonwealth” (datong 大同) which is the ideal political and social life for Confucianism; second, the principle of benevolent politics (renzheng 仁 政), which illustrates how a benevolent king should rule his country; third, the rule of virtue (dezhi 德治), which delineates the virtues of a gentleman ( junzi 君 子) and the passage from a well behaved gentleman to an excellent ruler; and fourth, the practice of meritocracy (xianneng zhengzhi 賢能政治), by which the most virtuous and competent people will be elected to serve the public.

III.

The Ideal of the Commonwealth

Confucius (551–479 BCE) contends that the world (tianxia 天下 “all under the heaven”) should be common to everyone. It is not the asset or property of any single monarch or family. Although the kings or emperors are selected by divine will and entrusted by the people to govern the commonwealth, they are not the owner and dictator of the country but public servants who should promote the general welfare. An important Confucian text describes the ideal of a commonwealth under the rule of a benevolent king as follows: When the Great Way prevails, the world is shared by all. The virtuous and competent are elected to serve the public. Mutual confidence is fostered and good neighborliness cultivated. Hence, people do not regard as parents only their own parents, nor do they treat as children only their own children. Provision is secured for the aged till death, employment for the adults, and development for the young…. Therefore, people don’t engage in intrigue or trickery, nor do they engage in robbery, theft, and rebellion…. This is called the age of Commonwealth (Book of Rites).2

It is worth noting that the ideal of the Commonwealth (or great harmony) can be realized only in the last stage of human development. In Confucian political theory, there are three periods for human progress: turbulent ages, prosperous ages, and peaceful ages. What Confucius lived in was a turbulent age. It may be followed by a prosperous age, in which everyone can enjoy his own property and every king can pass his power to his successor in peace, if we can recover the “kingly way” (wangdao 王道) of the ancient sage-kings. However, the ideal of the Commonwealth can be achieved only in a peaceful age when everyone loves everyone else as his own family and the political power is always exercised by the virtuous and the competent rather than the inheritors of the royal family. The last

2 The Book of Rites, BK. 9 (Li Yun). My translation based on various versions.

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point is particularly important because it establishes the legitimacy of meritocracy and the connection between “inner sage” and “external king.”

IV.

Benevolent Government

When the world is not yet as perfect as the ideal of Commonwealth expects, the second best situation is to have a benevolent monarch and a stable hereditary system. Confucius is the first advocate for the concept of benevolence and benevolent government in Chinese history. He defines “benevolence” (ren 仁) in many ways, but the most famous definition is “to return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self” (克己復禮) (Analects 12:1).3 Rites are important for human beings because they reflect the natural order of heaven and the proper ethical relations between a person and those surrounding him. In order to cultivate oneself into a benevolent person, one must learn to overcome unnecessary and illegitimate desires with the faculty of reason, an experience quite similar to the generation of “positive liberty” described by Isaiah Berlin or Charles Taylor.4 Yet benevolence means more than positive liberty. Confucius contends that benevolence is not only a matter of overcoming oneself but also an attitude “to love your fellow men” (Analects 12:22).5 As he explains clearly in the Analects, a benevolent person would “not impose on others what you yourself do not desire,” and he would help others “to take their stand in that he himself wishes to take his stand” (Analects 15:24, 6:30).6 If a person can actualize the sovereign virtue of benevolence in his every behavior, he will be recognized as a true gentleman ( junzi). If a king can extend the principle of benevolence to his rule of the country, he will be celebrated as a benevolent king and supported by his people. Throughout Chinese history, the measures of benevolent government may vary from dynasty to dynasty, but the following policies seem to remain more or less the same: minimizing punishment and taxation; making the people capable of feeding their family, especially the elderly; building schools to educate the children; reestablishing the well-field system and demarcating the lands; keeping the market as open as possible; stopping all invasion, usurpation, and unjust war 3 D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1992), BK. XII, 109. 4 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 131–34; Charles Taylor “What’s wrong with negative liberty,” in The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honor of Isaiah Berlin, ed. Alan Ryan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175–93. 5 D. C. Lau tr., The Analects, BK. XII, 117. 6 D. C. Lau, Analects, BK. XV, 155; BK. VI, 55.

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(Mencius 3A/3, Xunzi ch. 9).7 As Joseph Chan correctly points out, the legitimacy of Confucian political order is based on a “service conception of authority,” and an authoritative political relation is marked by a “mutual commitment” of both the ruler and the ruled, namely, the rulers are committed to serving the people and the ruled willingly submit to being governed by the rulers.8 When the benevolent king can win the support of the people by providing them with the best service, it does not matter whether he is elected by the people through general election. What matters is whether he rules in a kingly way.

V.

The Rule of Virtue

Benevolence is the most important virtue for Confucius, yet there are many other virtues that are also essential to the cultivation of a gentleman. Primary virtues for the gentleman include filial piety, fraternal duties, loyalty, kindness, righteousness, sincerity, trustworthiness, humility, diligence, gentleness, perseverance, respectfulness, deference, etc. For those who want to serve in the government, the following political virtues are indispensable: trustworthiness, reverence, generosity, frugality, honesty, quickness, magnanimity, resoluteness, thoughtfulness, forgiveness, and so on. If one compares these virtues carefully with what Western political theorists would recommend for good citizens and leaders, one will find that they are slightly different in nature. For instance, there is not as much talk of individuality and toleration in Confucianism as in Western liberalism. Neither is political participation nor defense of political autonomy mentioned as frequently as in civic republicanism. The characteristic of a good man and a good leader is not quite identical in the East and the West. Confucianism provides that a virtuous leader can influence the behaviors of the subjects by making himself an example for the people. “By nature, the gentleman is like wind and the small man like grass. Let the wind sweep over the grass and it is sure to bend,” says Confucius (Analects 12:19).9 “When the prince is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is righteous, everyone else is righteous,” says Mencius (Mencius 4B/5).10 If the political leader can have a fundamental moral impact on the people, governance will become a matter of behaving oneself. The leader need not do too much except demonstrate his own 7 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2003), BK. 3A, 104–108; Eric L. Hutton, trans., Xunzi: The Complete Text (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016), BK. 9. 8 Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), 193. 9 D. C. Lau, Analects, BK. XII, 115. 10 D. C. Lau, Mencius, BK. 4B, 175.

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virtues. As Confucius contends, “The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars simply by remaining in its place” (Analects 2:1).11 This is a very interesting portrayal of the relation between the ruler and the ruled and is very similar to Taoism’s exaltation of wuwei (無爲 “no-doing” or “effortless doing”). Confucianism consciously abstains from the employment of harsh laws and punishments. Its confidence resides in the validity of the rule of virtue. “If a man is (virtuously) correct in his own person, then there will be obedience without orders being given” (Analects 13:6).12 In the Great Learning (a chapter of the Book of Rites that later became one of the “Four Books” in Confucianism), the connection between a person’s selfcultivation of inner virtue and his devotion to the external world is systematically established in an eight-step procedure: (1) investigate everything; (2) extend knowledge; (3) make your will sincere; (4) rectify your mind; (5) cultivate your personal life; (6) regulate your family; (7) bring order to the state; and (8) bring peace to the world.13 A person should educate and behave himself by practicing virtues every day so that he can become an “inner sage” first. Then he may have the opportunity to serve the public and contribute to his own country as well as the world — the enterprise of an “external king.” The passage from the inner sage to the external king will be well prepared if one is devoted to the study and exercise of virtue.

VI.

Practice of Meritocracy

If the rule of virtue cannot be realized in a political institution, it will merely be empty talk. In ancient China, there were basically two ways to recruit the virtuous and competent into government. The first was the recommendation system established by Emperor Wu (漢武帝, 156–87 BCE) in 134 BC and exercised during the Han dynasty (until 220 AD). People excelling in two kinds of virtue were to be recommended by local officials: the filial and incorruptible. Those recommended to the central government first served as junior officials in the court. Their capability and merit would be testified to by overseers for several years before they were sent to administer local governments.14 The second way of

11 D. C. Lau, Analects, BK. II, 11. 12 D. C. Lau, Analects, BK. XIII, 123. 13 Wing-tsit Chan, trans., “The Great Learning,” in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 86–87. 14 Yuri Pines, “Between Merit and Pedigree: Evolution of the Concept of ‘Elevating the Worthy’ in Pre-imperial China,” in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in

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recruitment was by imperial civil service examination, which began with the Sui dynasty (581–618) and lasted until almost the end of the Qing dynasty.15 People who wanted to serve as officials were required to pass the examination, which was a very complicated but fair system of competition. The examinations focused on Confucian classics, poetry, literature, calligraphy, and policy argument. Variations in the curriculum existed in different periods, but it is generally believed that those in good command of Confucian classics (especially the Four Books) would be virtuous and incorruptible officials. The political theory of traditional Confucianism delineated above lasted for thousands of years, providing imperial China with a discourse of legitimacy. It came to an end with the breakdown of the Qing Empire in 1911 and was almost eliminated during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In mainland China, the hereditary system and the imperial examination system were gone. The ideal of Commonwealth was substituted with the classless utopia of communism. The theory of benevolent government and virtuous rule were pushed to the side by authoritarian rule and dictatorship of the proletariat. However, in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the ideal of Confucianism was preserved, albeit rarely, in the writings of some New Confucian intellectuals, to whom we turn now.

VII.

New Confucianism in Taiwan and Hong Kong

When the Communists defeated the Nationalists and seized power in 1949, many intellectuals who opposed the CPC decided to retreat to Taiwan with the Nationalist government, while those who did not trust the Nationalist Party chose to reside in Hong Kong. Among the diaspora, there were some intellectuals who thought that traditional Chinese culture was on the brink of extinction, and that extra effort must be devoted to the preservation of Confucianism. As Chiang Kaishek (蔣介石, 1887–1975), the leader of the Nationalist Party, was more sympathetic towards and supportive of Confucianism than Mao Zedong, they had no choice but to cooperate with Chiang so as to preserve the endangered Confucianism, although few of them really agreed with Chiang’s authoritarian rule. Chiang was himself a true believer of Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1472–1529), the most famous Confucian scholar-officer in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Comparative Perspective, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Li Chen-yang (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 161–202. 15 Xiao Hong and Li Chen-yang, “China’s Meritocratic Examinations and the Ideal of Virtuous Talents,” in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Li Chen-yang (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 340–362.

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Wang created the theory of “unity of knowledge and practice,” (知行合一) emphasizing that knowledge without practice is not real knowledge. Wang also contended that it is the mind that shapes the world, and benevolence is the inner nature of human beings. Influenced by Wang’s teachings, Chiang was eager to revive Confucianism and other Chinese cultural heritages in Taiwan. When Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, Chiang countered it with the “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement,” which promoted the study of Confucianism, the construction of Chinese cultural facilities, and everyday practice of moral and virtuous behaviors. What the Confucian intellectuals tried to do, nevertheless, was different from Chiang’s political movement. They focused their attention on the interpretation of traditional Confucianism and searched for a real solution to the challenges faced by Confucianism in the modern age. Specifically, they wanted to know how the teaching of Confucianism could rescue Chinese people out of the moral catastrophe created by communism, how the political theory of Confucianism could adjust to the irresistible trend of democracy, and how the everlasting values of Confucianism might be appreciated by Westerners who do not understand Confucianism at all. Despite their differences, the New Confucians share the following consensus. First, they believe in the eternal values of Confucianism, such as the intrinsic goodness of human beings and the prioritization of self-overcoming, benevolent government, the rule of virtue, and harmonious society. They are confident that the core values of Confucianism will survive the disaster of communism and become popular again in the future. Second, they acknowledge that Western liberal democracy is better than traditional Confucian politics in encouraging individual autonomy and protecting the basic rights of ordinary people. Third, they think that Western social order is not necessarily preferable to the Confucian order because it tends to generate extreme individualism and materialism. This is an aspect of modern society that Confucian ethics can help rectify. Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995) is a good example of these assertions. Mou maintains that Confucianism is a “constant way” (changdao 常道) in the sense that it is eternal in time and universal in human nature. The development of Chinese Confucianism, in Mou’s eyes, can be divided into three major stages. The first period begins with the time of Confucius and ends with the demise of the Han dynasty. It is the “formative” age of Confucianism because all the essentials of the philosophical tradition (metaphysics, ethics, politics, social order) were forged during this period, especially when Emperor Wu of Han adopted Dong Zhongshu’s (董仲舒, 179–104 BC) suggestion to make Confucianism the official doctrine. The second period is from the Song dynasty to the Ming dynasty, when Confucianism took an inward turn and put more attention on the cultivation of one’s own mentality and spirituality. The third period is the present, when

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Confucianism was devastated by communism in China and overwhelmed by liberalism from the West. Mou thinks it is the mission of contemporary Confucianism to create a new possibility in which the positive side of Western culture can be absorbed and reconciled with the wisdom of Confucianism.16 In the third period, Mou argues that the most urgent mission is to create a new form of “external king” to replace the traditional “external king.” I explained above that Confucianism has a theory that encourages a gentleman to become an “inner sage” first and move progressively to the state of “external king.” The inner sage and the external king are closely related and mutually constituted. A virtuous gentleman without external contribution to the world is insufficient in his human flourishing; a successful public servant without admirable personality and mentality is not a genuine leader. The form of “external king” can be emperor, duke, minister, civil servant, local officer, etc. What is important is that there must be an institution or mechanism to make the pursuit of external accomplishment possible, such as the recommendation system in the Han dynasty or the imperial examination after the Sui dynasty. When the traditional political institution came to an end in 1911, nevertheless, a tremendous rupture tore the inner sage and the external king apart. It may still be possible to talk about “inner sage” in modern times, but the institution of “external king” is no longer applicable because the political order has been totally changed. The only way to revive Confucian political theory, Mou argues, is to create a new form of “external king,” that is, to figure out a new form of political institution so that the inner sage can find a way for his public service or external accomplishment.17 For Mou, the new “external king” is science and democracy. Science can help the Chinese people to learn more useful knowledge to improve their life, such as physics and medical science; while democracy can provide China with political modernization and solve problems that ancient politics cannot answer, such as the transition of political power and election of government officers. “Scientific knowledge is a material condition of the new external king, but it must be put under democracy for its full realization…. The key for modernization is not science, but democracy. The essence of modernization lies in liberty, equality and the human rights movement which are implicit in democracy.”18 Mou thinks that ancient China is very good at the “way of administration” but is extremely poor in handling the “way of politics.” Neither monarchy nor feudalism has a true way of politics because these systems do not realize that the commonwealth is owned by the people, not by any single family or clan. It is only 16 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Daode de lixiang zhuyi 道德的理想主義 (Moral Idealism) (Taipei: Xuesheng Press, 1992), 1–4. 17 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道 (The Way of Politics and the Way of Administration) (Taipei: Xueshen Press, 1980), 11–12. 18 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道, 15–16.

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in democracy that the principle of popular sovereignty is recognized and actualized. Just like many other New Confucians, Mou is ready to accept the institutions of Western democracy: elections, party politics, rule of law, checks and balances, freedom of expression, protection of human rights, etc. He does not think that Confucianism is “forced” to adopt democracy because there is already an inner inclination for democracy in Confucianism. What Confucianism needs to do is to simply develop this inner inclination and let democracy become an essential part of its politics.19 Mou’s positive attitude towards democracy is echoed by another leading New Confucian: Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1904–1982). Like Mou Zongsan, Xu contends that Confucianism is not contradictory to democracy in nature. As a matter of fact, Confucianism always places the welfare of the people as the top priority and is a strong defender of the “people-first” principle. Not only does Mencius clearly declare that the people are prior to the country and king, but other Confucian classics also assert that the will of heaven actually reflects the will of the people. “The people are not put beneath the ruler as merely the ruled; they stand above the ruler as representatives of heaven and deity,” says Xu.20 The problem, however, is that the emperors and kings in Chinese history always denied the subjectivity of the people and behaved as if they were the boss of the people. To rectify this distortion, Xu argues that we have no other choice but to adopt Western democracy. For Xu, the advantage of Western democracy is that it encourages ordinary people to be fully aware of their political subjectivity, and collectively thwart the ruler’s intention to become an arbitrary dictator. Periodic elections are therefore necessary, as are multi-party competition, division of powers, freedom of speech, freedom of association, the rule of law, etc. Any fantasy of developing Confucianism without adopting (or amplifying) democracy is doomed. What we need to do is march towards democracy consciously and bravely so that we can finish the uncompleted journey of Chinese culture and history. The passage from particularity to universality is a necessary development of human reason… I don’t believe that China has a different democracy… We must transform the political theory of Confucianism from one based on the ruler to one based on the ruled, and supplement it with individual self-consciousness, which has long been ignored in our history.21

Although Xu defends democracy without reservation, he is critical of individualistic liberalism. He thinks that individualistic liberalism is a “derivative” form of “genuine liberalism.” A “genuine liberalism” cherishes human ration19 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道, 19–25. 20 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 學術與政治之間 (Between Scholarship and Politics) (Taipei: Xuesheng Press, 1980), 51. 21 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 學術與政治之間, 42.

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ality more than human desire, emphasizes socialized individuality rather than atomized individuality, and highlights moral personality instead of materialistic interest. Confucianism is consistent with genuine liberalism because practicing benevolence itself is a process of liberating one’s innate rationality and becoming morally autonomous. It is also a process of self-awareness and personality-asserting.22 On this crucial point, Xu even thinks that Confucianism is much better than Western liberalism to connect with modern democracy for the former affirms the doctrine of “the rule of virtue,” which asks everyone to generate moral autonomy from within, while the latter can only check the arbitrary will of the ruler with its theory of the social contract and limited government, which comes from the outside. “I think democracy can be firmly rooted and well-functioning only after it accepts the philosophy of Confucianism,” contends Xu.23 To summarize, we find that the advocates of New Confucianism are confident in the superiority of Confucianism to Western moral philosophy, especially in the cultivation of inner sagehood, but they are ready to acknowledge the value of Western democracy as a political institution. They try to combine Confucianism and liberal democracy in a creative way so that the blended formula can meet the challenge of political modernization of traditional Chinese culture. They are the first generation of contemporary Confucianism that takes democracy seriously and attempts to revise traditional Confucian political theory to make it fit in with the democratic age. Nevertheless, they never got a chance to experiment with their theory either in Taiwan or Hong Kong, let alone mainland China. The real challenges of combining Confucianism and liberal democracy would surface only when Taiwan began its democratization in the mid-1980s and problems of partisan struggle, vote-buying, demagogue politicians, political polarization, capitalist penetration into the political process, etc., soon became an entrenched part of democratic life there. How to address these questions with Confucian philosophy will not be as easy as they thought in the 1950s and 60s.

VIII. Political Confucianism in Mainland China Confucianism was wiped out by Mao Zedong in the Chinese mainland after the CPC seized power in 1949. It was not until the mid-1980s that Confucian philosophy was reintroduced into China from Taiwan and Hong Kong as a result of China’s reform and open policies. At the beginning of the resurgence, mainland 22 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 學術與政治之間, 457–467. See also Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, , Xu Fuguan zawen bubian 徐復觀雜文補編 2 (Supplement to the Essays of Xu Fuguan,Vol. 2), ed. Li Hanji and Li Minghui (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2001), 57–83. 23 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 學術與政治之間, 53.

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Confucian intellectuals were overwhelmed by the scholarship and insights of New Confucianism from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Yet, as China’s political and economic strength grew rapidly during the 1990s, mainland Chinese Confucians became more and more self-confident and able to articulate their own views. They find that New Confucianism is too weak in terms of defending Chinese culture and overly susceptible to the influence of Western philosophy. The only way to make China really great again is to defy the influence of Western liberalism and democracy and make Confucianism the dominant, if not the official, ideology of China. It is true that not all contemporary Chinese Confucians are equally hostile to Western philosophy. Many of them turn to Confucianism simply because of their interest in the resurgence of Chinese studies in the past decade. And the spread of the “Reading (Confucian) Classics Movement” in civil society certainly has its sociological basis in an age when materialism and corruption have become increasingly unbearable for many people. Nevertheless, the voice that China should have its own way and should not follow the West is getting more attention than ever before. It argues that China should be proud of its own cultural heritage, especially Confucianism. It also argues that Western democracy is in serious trouble and China does not need to learn from it. Instead, China should develop some new political institution that reflects the spirit of Confucianism. What is most important, it maintains that Confucianism should be promoted to the status of state religion or civic religion so that it can be firmly implanted into the mind of every Chinese. We can take Jiang Qing (蔣慶) and Chen Ming (陳明) as two examples of the new school of thinking. Jiang Qing criticizes New Confucianism on two accounts: first, it is basically a “spiritual Confucianism,” not a “political Confucianism,” and therefore cannot really open up the possibility of a new “external king”; secondly, it is too vulnerable to Western philosophy and democracy, and cannot envision a new political framework that is completely based on Confucian tradition. Jiang acknowledges Mou Zongsan’s and other New Confucians’ scholarship of traditional Confucianism, especially their study of neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, but he thinks that their approach is “too individualistic,” “too metaphysical,” “too internalized,” and “too transcendental” to provide any help in the opening of “a new pathway to external king.” New Confucianism may be recommendable for the cultivation of the human mind or human spirit, but it does not create any great political institution except by imitating Western liberal democracy, which is unsuitable for China. Jiang asserts in a contemptuous tone when commenting on New Confucianism, “China is China, the West is the West.

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Confucianism is Confucianism, democracy is democracy…. There is neither the need for nor the possibility of combining the two.”24 The alternative that Jiang proposes for China is a Confucian constitutionalism based on “the kingly way” (wangdao 王道, what Daniel A. Bell translates as “the Confucian way of the humane authority”). It is devised to answer the problem of political legitimacy, or the problem of the “way of politics” in Mou Zongsan’s term. While Mou contends that China must adopt democracy as its “way of politics,” Jiang argues that it must develop a constitutionalism with Confucian characteristics which is founded on the kingly way. According to the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋公羊傳), the king is a person who can bridge heaven, earth and humanity. Therefore, the kingly way means that political power must have three kinds of legitimacy — that of heaven, earth and humanity. The legitimacy of heaven refers to a transcendent and sacred ruling will. The legitimacy of earth refers to a legitimacy that comes from history and culture as the latter arises out of a specific geographical space. And the legitimacy of humanity refers to the will of the people, which directly determines whether the people will obey a political power. The problem of Western-style democracy, says Jiang, is that it relies completely on the legitimacy of humanity, but has nothing to do with heaven and earth. On the other hand, the Chinese kingly way will include all three legitimacies, with the legitimacy of the sacred will of heaven prior to that of history/culture and the people.25 Constitutionally speaking, Jiang maintains that China must transform into a “republic with a symbolic monarchy” in which the direct descendant of Confucius should be the monarch and the academy of scholars should have the power to oversee the operation of the government. In the government, the executive is to be accountable to the legislative just like the cabinet is responsible to the parliament in the United Kingdom. However, since there are three different legitimacies of political authority, a tricameral legislature will be necessary to correspond to the three forms of legitimacy: a House of the Great Confucians that represents the sacred will of heaven, a House of the Nation that represents the

24 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan 政治儒學： 當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展 (Political Confucianism: The Shift, Character and Development of Contemporary Confucianism) (New Taipei City: Yangzhengtang Wenhua Press, 2003), 364. 25 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Gongyangxue yinlun 公羊學引論 (Introduction to Gongyan Scholarship) (Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Press, 1995), 1–60; Jiang Qing 蔣慶, “Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhang fangxi 王道政治是當今中國政治的發展方向 (The Kingly Way Is the Developmental Direction of Contemporary Chinese Politics),” in Jiang et al., Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主 張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland) (Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016), 1–64.

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history and culture of the country, and a House of the People that represents popular legitimacy.26 Jiang Qing’s Confucian Constitutionalism is frequently criticized for its conservative nature, but equally controversial is his design of recruitment for the House of the Great Confucians and the House of the Nation. In the former, he suggests that the speaker should be elected by a national association of Confucians, and all the members should be renowned Confucian scholars who are examined on their knowledge of the Confucian classics and assessed by a trial period of administration at lower-level parliaments, just like the ancient public servants who were recruited through the imperial examination or recommendation system. As for the House of the Nation, Jiang argues that its leader must be a direct descendant of Confucius, who will then appoint its members from “among the great sages of the past, descendants of the monarchs in history, descendants of famous people, of patriots, university professors of Chinese history, retired top officials, judges and diplomats, respected people from society as well as representatives of Daoism, Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity.”27 Finally, Jiang announces that Confucianism is not merely a school of philosophy but also a state religion. He argues that whenever China was powerful and prosperous throughout its history, Confucianism naturally became its state religion. In view of the rapid rise of China in the twenty-first century, Confucianism should make itself the dominant religion of the country again. Specifically, Confucianism should be recognized as the official religion (and ideology) of China and enjoy privileges that no other religions do. The government must resume the worship of heaven, earth, the nation, the various deities of nature, as well as Confucius and other national heroes. All the civil ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals, should be conducted according to Confucian rituals. Other measures of the “re-Confucianization” of China include the following: a new national examination of public servants focused on Confucian classics must be resumed; a new national association of Confucianism must be organized in the civil society and be granted the privileges of having its own properties, temples, fields, schools, social welfare institutions, publishers, TV channels, government guaranteed budget, places of assembly, etc. A Chinese Confucianism University at the national level and various Confucian Academies

26 Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), 27–96. Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhang fangxi 王道政治是當今中國政治的發展方向, 20–25. 27 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhang fangxi 王道政 治是當今中國政治的發展方向, 21–22.

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at the local level also must be erected and sponsored by the government, and the “Reading Classics Movement” should be further bolstered.28 There are many other contemporary Confucians who share the view that China must be re-Confucianized, such as Chen Ming (陳明),29 Kang Xiaoguang (康曉光),30 Yu Donghai (余東海),31 and Qiu Feng (秋風),32 although they may vary on their approaches to or measures of re-Confucianization. Chen Ming, for instance, contends that Confucianism must cooperate with the party-state of the CPC in rebuilding China’s political discourse, and he agrees with Jiang’s proposal to reintroduce Confucianism as a religion, but he does not think that political Confucianism is the best answer. He suggests that Confucianism should be understood and reconstructed as a civic religion rather than state religion.33 A political community, says Chen, must have its own consciousness of history and culture which underpins the everyday life of its people. The specific historical/ cultural consciousness of a given country constitutes the foundation of its civic religion, in which its people can find the meaning of their existence. Civic religion, therefore, is not merely the ceremonies and rituals that the people abide by, but the metaphysical and theological system that provides them with a sense of who they are and what they can anticipate in their afterlife. Confucianism is such a civic religion for the Chinese people, but it will not ask too much of them because it is not commonly believed by every citizen of the country. In order to be accepted by all the fifty-six ethnic groups of China, it must be a “thin” religion, not a “thick” religion, to borrow Michael Walzer’s terminology.34 Chen does not think that political religion is a good idea for Confucianism as it would become 28 Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhang fangxi 王道政 治是當今中國政治的發展方向, 26–40. 29 Chen Ming 陳明, “Chaozuoyou, tongsantong, xindangguo” 超左右、 通三統、 新黨國 (Beyond the Left and the Right, Connect the Three Traditions, New Party-State), in Jiang et al., Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化： “大陸新儒家”新主張, 65–132. 30 Kang Xiao-Guang 康曉光, “Wo weisheme zhuzhang ruhua” 我為什麼主張儒化 (Why I Propose Confucianization), in Jiang et al., Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張, 133–194. 31 Yu Dong-Hai 余東海, “Rujia gongshi he zhonghua yuanjing 儒家共識和中華願景 (Confucian Consensus and the Chinese Vision),” in Jiang et al., Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張, 195–234. 32 Qiou Feng 秋風, “Fuxing rujia, fuguei daotong 復興儒家， 復歸道統 (Rejuvenate Confucianism, Return to the Way of Dao),” in Jiang et al., Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張, 235–98. 33 Chen Ming 陳明, “Gongmin rujiao de jinlu” 公民儒教的進路 (The Approach of Civic Confucianism), in Zhongguo Kuanjian Qiwen 中國關鍵七問, ed. Chen Yizhong (Taipei: Linking Press, 2013), 177–212; Chen Ming 陳明, “Chaozuoyou, tongsantong, xindangguo” 超 左右、通三統、新黨國, 84–86. 34 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

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too authoritarian and oppressive for those who do not share it. Confucianism as a civic religion, by contrast, would be a more realistic option.35 Chen maintains that Confucianism can help the CPC to unify three different traditions of modern China: the Qing dynasty, the Republic of China (ROC; aka, Taiwan), and the People’s Republic of China. In orthodox Marxism-LeninismMaoism, the relation between the three historical periods is dialectical and confrontational. They represent the interest of the landlord, bourgeoisie, and proletariat respectively and have no way of reconciliation. Yet from the perspective of Confucianism, they are merely different moments of national development. The achievement of the Qing dynasty and the ROC should be acknowledged by the PRC so that the unity of history can be realized. Confucianism is beyond the left and the right and is a mild nationalism, so it should be able to connect the three traditions and make modern Chinese history a coherent totality which in turn will contribute to the realization of the “Chinese dream” of Xi Jinping.36 It is clear that most contemporary Confucians in mainland China are enthusiastic about Xi’s dream of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” They are eager to see Xi revive Confucianism even though they are aware that the CPC will not renounce Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in the foreseeable future. This position is severely criticized and ridiculed by Chinese liberals, but it seems inevitable that Confucianism will resume its affiliation and cooperation with the ruling power just as it did in the past. However, the Confucian Constitutionalism with the provision of a tricameral legislature and the idea of promoting Confucianism as the state religion or civic religion of China is so unrealistic that the chance of its being endorsed by the CPC is slim.

IX.

Conclusion

The relation between “inner sage” and “external king” is a significant issue in Confucian political theory. In this chapter, I have examined two major schools of contemporary Confucianism (New Confucianism in Taiwan and Hong Kong and Political Confucianism in mainland China) to see how they discuss the issue and what kind of “external king” (namely, political institution and practice) they propose to replace the ancient imperial system. New Confucians believe that Confucius is right in defining the “end” of human life to be a virtuous life, namely, cultivating the inner sagehood in oneself. But they contend that modern 35 Chen Ming 陳明, Gongmin rujiao de jinlu 公民儒教的進路, 188–201. 36 Chen Ming 陳明, “Chaozuoyou, tongsantong, xindangguo” 超左右、通三統、新黨國, 73– 76.

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Confucianism must adopt the institutions of Western liberal democracy as the way of the “external king.” They also argue that there is no essential conflict between the inner virtue of a gentlemen and the practice of liberal democracy. Political Confucianism, by contrast, argues that the pursuit of inner sagehood is politically irrelevant although it is not a bad idea in itself. However, Political Confucianism opposes New Confucianism’s suggestion to introduce Western liberal democracy as the realization of the external king. It argues that Confucianism does not need to learn from the West as the practice of Western liberal democracy is plagued by serious problems. It maintains instead that China should develop its own political order in which Confucianism should be promoted as the state philosophy and Confucians should rule the country without democratic elections, an idea that New Confucianism would find hard to accept. It is true that Confucianism must find a solution to the challenge of how to adjust its ethics to modern politics. Liberal democracy, communist rule and Confucian constitutionalism are proposed by different schools to be the answer to this challenging question. Comparatively speaking, I think the approach of New Confucianism is more feasible than Political Confucianism for the development of Confucianism in modern times. First, the question of popular sovereignty is an issue that modern Confucians cannot avoid. It is simply impossible to promote the descendants of Confucius, Mencius, or the offspring of ancient monarchs to be political leaders of China. It is too conservative and reactionary to be accepted by modern Chinese. Secondly, the assumption that Confucian scholars would be more competent and qualified than others to serve in the legislature and should be granted more power in decision-making is a groundless assertion, to say the least. Electoral democracy has been established in Taiwan and has remained robust since the 1980s. Elections were also introduced into mainland China decades ago and have been exercised at the local level. There is no reason to doubt that the Chinese people will ask for national elections in the future, if they have the opportunity. However, the approach of New Confucianism is not without its own problems. For example, the question of how to reconcile Confucian ethics with liberal democracy remains an enormous challenge because many problems were not anticipated by New Confucians when democracy was not yet a reality in Taiwan. Confucian gentlemen are expected to participate in politics, but they are not encouraged to compete with others for political power, economic profit or social reputation. If virtuous persons are to realize that they must struggle with vicious politicians instead of decent gentlemen, it is unlikely that they will sacrifice the accomplishment of inner sagehood for the pursuit of external achievement in democratic politics. There is also no guarantee that they will prevail in the process of political struggles. Confucian virtues such as benevolence, righteousness or sincerity are not necessarily compatible with the practice of electoral democracy.

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My analysis in this chapter is an initial effort to reflect on the modern reconstruction of Confucianism in contemporary China, and the possible tension between the inner sage and the external king in Confucianism. In addition to the authors examined in the above, some excellent scholars have also devoted a great deal to the study of contemporary Confucian political philosophy and its possible relations with modern democracy.37 My thought is that Confucianism will remain a powerful resource for modern Chinese people in their pursuit of human ends, especially the ideal of a virtuous person who internalizes benevolence, righteousness, sincerity, trustworthiness, humility, diligence, etc. Those who succeed in the practice of Confucian virtues will be respected as gentlemen with the nature of “inner sage.” Nevertheless, the Confucian pursuit of “external king” may be a different story. It is difficult to conceive how a person with the character of inner sage can play a significant role in either the communist party-state or the electoral democracy of Taiwan. Perhaps the best way to lead a virtuous life is to keep some distance from the political world and resist the temptation of creating a new form of external king in modern times. The passage from the inner sage to the external king may never be reconstructed in the way envisioned by New Confucianism or Political Confucianism, but that is not bad news for those who care more about the internal tranquility of their minds than about the external rewards of a successful political career.

Bibliography Angle, Stephen C. Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism. Cambridge: Polity, 2012. Bell, Daniel A. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015. Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Chan, Joseph. Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014. Chan, Wing-Tsit, trans. “The Great Learning,” in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Chen, Ming 陳明. “Chaozuoyou, tongsantong, xindangguo” 超左右、通三統、新黨國 (Beyond the Left and the Right, Connect the Three Traditions, New Party-State). In Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiao-Guang, Yu Dong-Hai, and Qiou Feng, Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 37 See Stephen C. Angle, Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Sungmoon Kim, Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), among others.

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(China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland), 65–132. Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016. Chen, Ming 陳明, “Gongmin rujiao de jinlu” 公民儒教的進路 (The Approach of Civic Confucianism). In Zhongguo Kuanjian Qiwen 中國關鍵七問, edited by Yizhong Chen, 177–212. Taipei: Linking Press, 2013. Hutton, Eric L., trans. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016. Jiang, Qing 蔣慶. “Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhang fangxi 王 道政治是當今中國政治的發展方向 (The Kingly Way Is the Developmental Direction of Contemporary Chinese Politics).” In Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiao-Guang, Yu Dong-Hai, and Qiou Feng, Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必 須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland), 1–64. Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016. Jiang, Qing 蔣慶, Gongyangxue yinlun 公羊學引論 (Introduction to Gongyang Scholarship). Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Press, 1995. Jiang, Qing 蔣慶, Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan 政治儒 學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展 (Political Confucianism: The Shift, Character and Development of Contemporary Confucianism). New Taipei City: Yangzhengtang Wenhua Press, 2003. Jiang, Qing. A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Edited by Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013. Jiang, Yi-Huah. “Confucian Political Theory in Contemporary China.” Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018): 155–73. Kang, Xiao-Guang 康曉光. “Wo weisheme zhuzhang ruhua” 我為什麼主張儒化 (Why I Propose Confucianization). In Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiao-Guang, Yu Dong-Hai, and Qiou Feng, Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒 化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland), 133–194. Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016. Kim, Sungmoon. Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Lau, D. C., trans. The Analects. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1992. Lau, D. C., trans. Mencius. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2003. Mou, Zong-San 牟宗三. Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道 (The Way of Politics and the Way of Administration). Taipei: Xueshen Press, 1980. Mou, Zong-San 牟宗三. Daode de lixiang zhuyi 道德的理想主義 (Moral Idealism). Taipei: Xuesheng Press, 1992. Pines, Yuri. “Between Merit and Pedigree: Evolution of the Concept of ‘Elevating the Worthy’ in Pre-imperial China.” In The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Chen-yang Li, 161–202. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Qiou, Feng 秋風. “Fuxing rujia, fuguei daotong 復興儒家，復歸道統 (Rejuvenate Confucianism, Return to the Way of Dao).” In Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiao-Guang, Yu

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Dong-Hai, and Qiou Feng, Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必 須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland), 235–98. Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016. Taylor, Charles. “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty.” In The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honor of Isaiah Berlin, edited by Alan Ryan, 175–93. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Walzer, Michael. Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994. Xiao, Hong and Chen-Yang Li. “China’s Meritocratic Examinations and the Ideal of Virtuous Talents.” In The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Chen-Yang Li, 340–362. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Xu, Fu-Guan 徐復觀. Xu Fuguan zawen bubian 2徐復觀雜文補編2 (Supplement to the Essays of Xu Fuguan, Vol. 2), edited by Han-Ji Li and Ming-Hui. Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2001. Xu, Fu-Guan 徐復觀. Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 學術與政治之間 (Between Scholarship and Politics). Taipei: Xuesheng Press, 1980. Yu, Dong-Hai 余東海. “Rujia gongshi he zhonghua yuanjing 儒家共識和中華願景 (Confucian Consensus and the Chinese Vision).” In Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang XiaoGuang, Yu Dong-Hai, and Qiou Feng, Zhongguo bixu zai ruhua: dalu xinrujia xinzhuzhang 中國必須再儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: The New Proposal of New Confucianism in the Mainland), 195–234. Singapore: Bafang Wenhua Chuangzuoshi, 2016.

Sébastien Billioud

Historicity and Relevance of the Confucian Revival in Contemporary China

I.

Introduction

For at least half a century, if not more, Confucianism seemed to have lost any relevance in Mainland China. In the context of Maoism, open references to this tradition were scarce and largely limited to ideological campaigns. Leaflets published during the Criticize Confucius, Criticize Lin Biao campaign launched in 1973 could thus describe the Sage as “A thinker stubbornly protecting the slavery system” and the most frequently encountered adjective associated with Confucius was probably “reactionary.”1 Some scholars, though, argued that Confucianism kept a structuring influence in the new polity, including at the ideological level and wrote about the Confucianization and the Sinicization of Marxism.2 Others demonstrated how sets of institutions often associated with the Confucian heritage, such as lineages, could informally endure, at least to some extent, despite constant campaigns of class struggles.3 Recent research on daily life in the Maoist era also provides some account of the enduring activities of religious sects, some of them with a Confucian orientation.4 But all this being

1 See for instance the leaflet: Kongzi, wangu di weihu nuli zhi de sixiangjia 孔子－顽固地维护奴 隶制的思想 (Anonymous propaganda leaflet, Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1973). 2 Within a rich literature on the topic see for instance Li Zehou 李澤厚, Makesizhuyi zai Zhongguo 馬克思主義在中國 (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 2006). Mollgaard also strongly emphasizes this point: “Chinese Marxism (Maoism) is inscribed in the Confucian tradition of moral transformation ….” Eske J. Mollgaard, The Confucian Political Imagination (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 3 Michael Szonyi, “Lineages and the Making of Contemporary China,” in Modern Chinese Religion II, 1850–2015, Volume 1, eds. Vincent Goossaert, Jan Kiely, and John Lagerwey (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 433–487. 4 See Steve A. Smith, “Redemptive Religious Societies and the Communist State, 1949 to the 1980s,” in Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism, eds. Jeremy Brown and Matthew D. Johnson (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2015), 340–364. This chapter provides a fascinating account of the fact that redemptive soci-

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said, it is difficult to deny that Confucianism, as a direct reference and a living resource, kept little relevance in the Mainland during this period. While different factors may explain the fact that Confucianism was ousted from the picture, one of them, namely the type of regime of historicity that prevailed in China at that time, is of a specific interest for us here. The People’s Republic embarked on what French historian François Hartog terms a “modern regime of historicity,” that is to say, a specific way of articulating the dimensions of time (past, present, future) that could be traced back in Europe approximately to the French Revolution and that was largely driven by a belief in history and progress. The lights to think about the present were no longer coming from the past (which was previously the case, when “history master of life” — historia magistra vitae — prevailed) but retrospectively from the future.5 In Koselleck’s words, the “space of experience” (i. e., the way the past “inhabits the present,” the way mixed layers of the past are present in people’s memories) and the “horizon of expectation” (i. e., the way the perception of the future impacts the present) tended to be dissociated: there was an increasing distance between the experiences provided by the past (deemed increasingly irrelevant) and the bright promises of the future such as they were introduced in the official (pervasive) narrative. The prevalence of this modern regime of historicity was in fact a global trend that could be observed everywhere worldwide but it took the most radical form in Marxist countries and especially in China where the relationship to things past was also narrowed to an extreme minimum.6 If Confucius could still be referred to, it was then primarily as a relic of the past devoid of any contemporary relevance and merely related to a specific phase of development of teleological (Marxist) history. This vividly contrasted with the situation prevailing in the Republic of China: In the continuity of the Japanese colonial era and the previous Kuomintang rule in the Mainland, Taiwan, under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, also engaged in the modern regime of historicity but did it without eties (including the Yiguandao which is the main case studied) significantly kept on with their activities throughout the Maoist era. 5 François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: Présentisme et expériences du temps (Paris: Le Seuil, 2003). The expression Historia magistra vitae obviously points to Western historiography, but taking past history as a light to think about the present was also of pivotal importance in China. Chun-chieh Huang underscores that “Chinese historians studied the past for the improvement of the present and reorientation of the future.” Chun-chieh Huang, “Some Notes on Chinese Historical Thinking,” in Chinese Historical Thinking, An Intercultural Discussion, eds. Chunchieh Huang and Jörn Rüsen (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2015), 198. 6 Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 349–375. I have already expounded this idea in Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism in Chinese Society in the First Two Decades of the 21st Century,” in The Cambridge History of Confucianism, ed. Kiri Paramore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

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severing links with the Confucian heritage. Thus, an official appropriation of Confucianism as a political tool could coexist with various forms of popular Confucianism, especially in religious groups.7 Mao’s death and the reform and opening policy implemented at the very end of the 1970s paved the way for the return of references to the past in general and to Confucianism in particular. This was a gradual shift that was far from unequivocal. Thus, “tradition” kept on being attacked by some during the “cultural fever” of the 1980s and its supposedly enduring influence was often held responsible for the failures of the Maoist period. The future (and its promises of modernization and progress) was still driving the prevailing regime of historicity but a “translation” took place and for many, it was then embodied by the Western (democratic and capitalistic) model. The famous documentary River Elegy reflects such a trend.8 However, a few initiatives to disseminate traditional culture in the population also started to take place. Suffice it to mention the Academy of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan 中國文化書院) launched in 1984 by a group of prominent Peking University scholars that offered traditional culture-related courses to people of all backgrounds (engineers, doctors, military personnel, students, etc.). More generally, fragments of the past — a “past” that was obviously a mix of memories, history, dreams, imagination, reinventions, etc. — gained some visibility, driven by all sorts of “fevers” (re 熱) for Ming history, national learning, traditional clothing, the art of tea, and so on. They materialized even before the massive development of the Internet in publications, TV series, movies, old photographs, exhibitions, heritage promotion, as well as in all sorts of commercial enterprises. This re-appropriation of references to the past (obviously a partial re-appropriation, with its taboos and share of amnesia) later on gained momentum — suffice it to mention the reactivation of a lineage culture with visible attributes such as reconstructed citang 祠堂 and genealogies in coastal China9 — and increased its scope, nourishing flights of social imagination 7 On the prevalence of “official Confucianism” during that period of time, see Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑, Zhanhou Taiwan de zhuanxing ji qi zhanwang 戰後台灣的轉型及其展望 (Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2006), 165–76, and Taiwan yishi yu Taiwan wenhua 台 灣意識與台灣文化 (Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2010), 201–233. On Confucianism in the context of popular religion and phoenix halls, see Philip Clart, “Confucius and the Mediums: Is There a ‘Popular Confucianism,’” T’oung Pao 89:1–3 (2003): 1–38. On Confucianism in the context of the Yiguandao in Taiwan during the Martial law period, see Sébastien Billioud, Reclaiming the Wilderness, Contemporary Dynamics of the Yiguandao (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 144–154. 8 Joël Thoraval, “La tradition rêvée: réflexions sur l’Elégie du fleuve de Su Xiaokang,” in Ecrits sur la Chine (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2021), 445–71. 9 Pan Hongli, “The Old Folks’ Associations and Lineage Revival in Southern Fujian Province,” in Southern Fujian, Reproduction of Tradition in Post-Mao China, ed. Tan Chee-Beng (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006), 69–96.

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building both upon ancient Chinese civilization and much more recent references. Paradoxically, the nostalgia for the Maoist period (and especially the 1950s) that could for instance be observed through the craze for red songs and a revived Mao cult also partakes in the same phenomenon. In brief, the space of experience of the population, characterized by the massive irruption of the past (or a “massive production of past”), has dramatically broadened itself in the recent decades. The regime of historicity that prevailed during the Maoist period is undergoing some progressive switch and such a trend is of key importance for getting an understanding of the popular rediscovery of Confucianism that really gained momentum at the start of the new century. In the following sections, I first provide a descriptive overview of the Confucian revival and its dynamics before analyzing what it tells us about China’s evolving relations to time and historicity. Within such a framework attention will also be paid to the motivations and objectives of the different actors involved and to what those tell us about the relationship of segments of the population to (late) modernity.

II.

The Facts: A Brief Overview of the Confucian Revival

A.

Grassroots beginnings

During the 1980s and 1990s interest in Confucian thought increased significantly and was reflected in the number of publications, academic conferences, renewed academic exchanges with overseas scholars (especially from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the US) and sponsored research projects on the so-called “contemporary new Confucianism” movement. All this is well-known and does not need to be further discussed here. It is only at the beginning of the 2000s that the Confucian revival started to develop in “the space of the people” (minjian 民間). It is significant to underscore that, contrary to what could often be read, this movement was originally not engineered by the authorities, even though the authorities, by somewhat loosening their grip on society (while monitoring the changes unleashed), made it possible. In other words, the agency was primarily in society. This revival was multifaceted and especially visible in the fields of education and “education-transformation” ( jiaohua 教化). Millions of children joined occasional classics reading classes and hundreds if not thousands of traditional institutions offering full-time classical education to small cohorts of students burgeoned throughout the country.10 10 There are no statistics, and one needs to remain cautious, but it is often mentioned that there could be up to 3000 traditional schools in the country. For an overview of this movement see

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All sorts of alternative pedagogical experiments took place: some were quite radical ones, solely based on rote learning of Confucian classics from morning to night, reminiscent of the type of education offered in some Muslim madrassas. Others were much more liberal ones, emphasizing a balanced style of education nurturing the personality as much as the acquisition of knowledge, drawing their inspirations from different traditions (not only Confucianism, but also Daoism) and emphasizing the importance of the relationship to nature. And many other enterprises could be located between the two ends of this continuum. These projects were and are still experiments: we now have nearly 20 years of hindsight and recent research reveals how their initiators often reflect upon their experiences and constantly adapt their pedagogies. Even though the number of students trained in these classical schools is extremely small compared to the whole student population, the phenomenon matters since it could give birth to a completely new generation of Confucian activists. But classical education is not limited to children: it could also be observed in the adult population with the reactivation of academies (shuyuan 書院),11 the activities of groups of volunteers disseminating classics in society (for instance in parks),12 and lectures given by or within religious organizations and temples (especially Buddhist ones).13 Noteworthy is also the striking promotion of Confucianism in companies by “Confucian merchants (or entrepreneurs)” (rushang). This is another phenomenon of significant magnitude considering that it encompasses thousands of companies across the country (some of them Wang Canglong, “The Making of the Confucian Individual: Morality, Subjectification and Classical Schooling in China” (PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh, 2018); Silvia Elizondo “‘C’est pour ton bien!’: Etude sur les expérimentations éducatives se réclamant d’un traditionalisme culturel en Chine contemporaine.” (PhD diss., Université de Paris, 2021). 11 Probably because of its ancient prestige, the word shuyuan (academies) is nowadays used as an emblem for a variety of different projects: traditional schools (for children), structures occasionally gathering a group of (adult) students around a master in order to study the classics and engage in self-cultivation, entities (sometimes sponsored by the local government) promoting in society programs focusing on traditional culture, structures training teachers, etc. 12 Sébastien Billioud, “Confucian Revival and the Emergence of Jiaohua Organizations: A Case Study of the Yidan Xuetang,” Modern China 37, no. 3 (2011): 286–314. 13 See for instance Ji Zhe, “Making a Virtue of Piety: Dizigui and the Discursive Practice of Jingkong’s Network,” in The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, ed. Sébastien Billioud (Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2018), 61–89. The group of Pure Land Buddhism Master Jingkong is extremely active in promoting the Rules of Disciples (Dizigui) in China. But it is not the only one and Confucian classics reading classes are offered by lots of Buddhist temples. I could for instance observe this in Guangzhou’s Guangmiao Temple. Confucian texts are sometimes considered to be an entry point into Buddhism, not due to their speculative dimension (Song-Ming speculative texts are generally not promoted) but because morality is a prerequisite to conversion to Buddhism. Besides, religious proselytism is forbidden in China, which is not the case of cultural promotion (not considered a religion, Confucianism comes under the category of “culture”).

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very large) and their employees.14 Apart from their purely business activities, these entrepreneurs do not hesitate to turn companies into Confucian “education/transformation” platforms, sometimes not devoid of a certain religiosity. By the same token, they also produce a civilizing discourse that often echoes official narratives of the authorities. Confucian enterprises, as hybrid entities entailing economic, educational, political and sometimes even religious dimensions, contribute to nuance the classical assumption that functional differentiation is a pivotal characteristic of modernity. Self-cultivation, prayers and rituals are also realms where the Confucian revival could manifest itself in a blatant way. Such a trend goes along with the reappropriation of various spaces (temples of Confucius and literature, ancestors’ halls, academies), the creation of completely new ritual spaces and structures or the utilization of spaces (e. g., stadiums, company premises, parks) that had originally no ritual function. Practices can be individual (e. g., meditation, writing prayer cards, practice of some of the “six arts” such as music or archery)15 or collective ones (cults of Confucius, Mencius, Zhu Xi, etc., rites of passage such as weddings or cappings, collective readings of classics in parks). Depending on the context, a reference to “religion” may be made or not: it is in fact noteworthy that the same types of activities (typically a ritual) are sometimes performed with the overt claim of being religious whereas at other times this religious dimension is vehemently denied (religion being then often associated with “superstition”: mixin 迷信). This brings us to the classical issue of the difficulties and limits of applying Western categories (religion, philosophy, etc.) to an object such as Confucianism. The revival has also been characterized by the recreation of Master-disciple lineages, sometimes claiming orthodoxy in the transmission of the Way (Daotong 道統). Interestingly, these lineages are not merely scholarly lineages, but they include activists who promote Confucianism but without engaging in any intellectual enterprises. Thus, Wang Caigui 王財貴, a retired Taiwanese philosophy professor, activist, and disciple of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, has in China dozens of disciples recognizing him as their Master and actively engaged in the promotion of Confucianism at the grassroots level. The same could be said about Jiang Qing 蔣慶 who is well-known for his intellectual defense of a political Confucianism, but who is besides also an interesting charismatic figure with 14 The first systematic sociological research on this topic has been written by Jiang (Fu) Lan in her Ph.D. dissertation: “Une étude sur le phénomène rushang en Chine contemporaine.” (Ph.D. diss., Université de Paris, 2021). 15 On individual rites (and especially prayer cards), see Anna Sun, Confucianism as a World Religion: Contested Histories and Contemporary Realities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). On music, see Ji Zhe, “Educating Through Music,” China Perspectives, 3 (2008), 107–117.

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many disciples carrying out all sorts of concrete projects in “the space of the people.” Disciples of these two prominent figures (that I just take here as emblematic examples among many others) also have their own disciples. Networks and spiritual lineages are recreated with deep ramifications in society, much beyond scholarly circles. This grassroots revival of Confucianism is of a large magnitude, involving all sorts of people from all kinds of backgrounds everywhere in the country. Existing research mentions workers, teachers, employees, cadres, technicians, businesspeople and entrepreneurs, peasants, students, etc. Some have been highly successful in the new conditions of the market economy and others much less so. Perhaps counterintuitively for a tradition often considered patriarchal and conservative, the agency of women is also important in this movement.16 The social and geographical diversity of this minjian revival is striking as is the fact that it cannot be attributed to the specific agency of any particular entity (the party, a religious group, or whatever). Of course, structured groups became involved in it — one can in a general way underline the influence of Taiwanese actors17 — and contributed to this revival. But it started quite spontaneously with small-scale initiatives burgeoning across the country. This is the reason why I believe that it is worth paying attention to the bigger issues of temporality and historicity that, linked to specific societal conditions (discussed below), created the conditions of possibility of this return of Confucianism. But at the same time, the revival must also be understood in its dynamic. If “minjian” is the word that probably characterized best its beginnings (with its double meaning of “nonofficial/fei guanfang 非官方” and “non-elitist/fei jingying 非精英”), the situation changed substantially afterwards.

B.

The Increasing Involvement of the Elites

It is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly and chronologically delineate phases of the Confucian revival since overlaps obviously exist between them. Suffice it to underscore that minjian beginnings were gradually followed by an increasing and finally massive involvement of the elites, be they scholarly, economic, or political. Admittedly, some scholars were involved as of the 1980s in the popularization of traditional culture in society but such an involvement remained limited; in fact, many were those who then considered that activists promoting 16 Anna Sun, Confucianism as a World Religion, 137–152. Many examples of this agency of women can also be found in Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, The Sage and the People, The Confucian Revival in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 17 One could mention Jingkong’s network, the Yiguandao, or Wang Caigui’s structure promoting Confucian classics.

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the classics without academic credentials did not have the intellectual legitimacy to do so. It is maybe among the business elites that the commitment to Confucianism developed rather early. The 2000s saw the growing involvement of these entrepreneurs to the Confucian cause: guoxue courses targeting that specific public started to proliferate, nourishing a widely shared ambition (the word “mission” could be often heard) to contribute to society by promoting traditional culture and Confucian education in companies. But the switch has been a significant one in the political realm. In many places, local governments increasingly supported initiatives related to the revival of traditional culture. Various factors may explain such a trend: local policies of heritage and tourism promotion (with obvious beneficial economic effects); implementation of upper ideological and political directives; but also the fact that many Confucian activists or officials convinced of the necessity for China to re-appropriate its tradition are working within the system. One should be cautious here: The Confucian revival can neither be understood as a mere instrumental top-down enterprise nor as a uniquely grassroots movement (even though grassroots agency matters). Confucianism is a value-system that is also widely supported by many within the Party-State, at all levels. Thus, doing fieldwork, it is not rare to encounter local cadres using their position to promote Confucianism-related activities. At the central level, “traditional culture” has also been increasingly incorporated in the ideological narrative of the Party-State: from Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” to the current promotion of morality and filial piety, examples are many of the instrumental use of Confucian-sounding references, but also of legalist ones. One should in fact not forget how intertwined these two traditions have remained in Chinese history: up to this day, “rule by virtue” and “by law” (backed up by, shu 術, tactics of pervasive surveillance adapted for an ideological age) are always considered complementary.18 By the same token, one should also keep in mind that such slogans are also incorporated in a modern socialist narrative; Marxist ideology is still the prevailing force in the current ideological cocktail in today’s China even though Confucian activists are often prompt to overemphasize the influence of the tradition they embrace.

18 On this topic, see Dingxing Zhao, The Confucian-Legalist State: A New Theory of Chinese History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Qin Hui 秦晖, Chuantong shi lun 传统十 论 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2003). Léon Vandermeersch explains how Confucianism was historically married to an ancillary Legalism. Léon Vandermeersch, Ce que la Chine nous apprend sur le langage, la société, l’existence (Paris: Gallimard, 2019), 88.

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Religious and Cultural Circulations

Although the Confucian revival was not originally a structured movement, the role of entities established out of the Chinese mainland (and especially in Taiwan) probably contributed to its subsequent momentum. Among these entities it is worth mentioning two networks: the aforementioned group of Wang Caigui and his followers, whose influence is pervasive in circles of Confucian activists and whose approach to the classics (intensive reading, memorization), though often criticized for its radicalism, had a deep impact in China; and the group of pure land Buddhism Master Jingkong 淨空法師 whose promotion of the Rules of Disciples attracted an important following. Apart from these two networks one also needs to emphasize the profound return in China of some ancient redemptive societies and among them, the Way of Pervading Unity (Yiguandao 一 貫道). “Redemptive societies” is a category coined by Prasenjit Duara in order to capture an important trend of the Republican period, namely the massive development of religious groups often characterized by their syncretism, the presence of a charismatic leadership, an apocalyptic vision of history and its end, and a number of practices (spirit-writing, vegetarianism). Among these organizations, some had a stronger Confucian orientation than others. One of them, the Yiguandao, emphasized within a syncretistic ideology, the prevalence of Confucianism (yi ru wei zong 以儒為宗) and considered itself the representative of a “renaissance of true Confucianism” (zhen ru fuxing 真儒 復興). This group was forbidden and crushed after 1949, instigating its withdrawal to Taiwan, Hong Kong and other places where it developed to the point of being probably today, with its millions of members, one of Asia’s largest new religious movements. Furthermore, the Yiguandao has now strikingly returned to Mainland China. Research on this topic remains scarce but it is important to underscore here that this return was largely made possible by the context of the Confucian revival. Confucian values and especially “filial piety” and more generally “Confucian education” are central for the group’s positioning in the mainland and there is evidence of overlaps between Yiguandao adepts and groups of Confucian activists. Besides, in the context of sensitive relationships between Mainland China and Taiwan, the Yiguandao (a politically rather “blue” group on the Taiwanese political spectrum) managed to navigate efficiently the troubled waters of cross-straits politics and engage, through its proxy organization, in discussions with representatives of the Chinese authorities to the point where concrete projects could even be authorized or jointly implemented (publications, rituals, promotion of classical texts).19 Of course, those projects were always cultural and related to Confucianism. There is no tolerance for 19 All these elements are discussed in Sébastien Billioud, Reclaiming the Wilderness.

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overtly religious activities, all the more so in the current context characterized by a tightening up of the country’s religious policy. As for most religious groups, the situation is increasingly difficult for the Yiguandao in today’s China. However, the presence of such a group — and of other groups emanating from a quite similar historical matrix — might potentially have some impact on the future development of popular forms of Confucianism in China. Now that the outlines of the Confucian revival have been briefly sketched, we can turn back to our reflection about how that revival may provide some insights into the regime of historicity prevailing in today’s China. By the same token, we will try to assess what both the revival and this regime tell us about today’s Chinese society.

III.

Critiques of the Darkness of the Present Times

Existing research on the Confucian revival often emphasizes the rather gloomy pictures that activists or sympathizers have about the conditions of today’s society. Present times are often presented as dark ones or, at least, since a variety of critical attitudes obviously exist, as far away from an ideal situation. This does not mean that pessimism prevails since we will later see that Confucianism is precisely supposed to constitute a remedy: optimism and utopia are certainly at the horizon of the movement.

A.

Loss of Moral Compass and Experiences of Dereliction

Recurrent critiques of contemporary society focus on the widespread loss of moral compass. In the course of fieldwork, several committed activists involved in very significant projects in education or rituals did not hesitate to introduce their own personal experience and describe their embrace of Confucianism as a radical switch from a previous period of dereliction when they had no control over or understanding of their lives: From 1997 to 2004, I was involved in business activities. I opened a hotel. It was a dirty industry, exclusively oriented toward money. We had to do things in contradiction with our most basic principles.…20 (In my previous business activity) I had all possible material goods, but my life was a hell. I went wild, committed lots of mistakes you know. When one has no education, no

20 Interview with Mrs. G., Confucian entrepreneur involved in the reactivation of ancient Confucian rites, Taiyuan, 2010, quoted in Billioud and Thoraval, The Sage and the People, 115.

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religion, no capacity of behaving in a really humane way, but lots of money, one can easily go wild….21

The centrality of money, the “contradictions with our most basic principles,” or the mention of “going wild” are more than mere individual experiences indifferent to the Chinese context. These elements perfectly square with well-documented accounts about the whirlpools of changes that affected Chinese society after the introduction of the market economy that shook up people’s understandings of the overall story or stories they found themselves part of as well as the proper understanding of themselves and of their orientation in the world (“what am I to do?”).22 These excerpts actually reflect the moral crisis at work in Chinese society, a crisis that is analyzed in depth by Ci Jiwei who construes it as “a crisis of willingness to act in conformity to moral norms for moral reasons” and hence as a crisis of zijue 自覺, awareness, that can be located “in the distinctive structure of the Chinese moral self.”23 As will be seen later, the rediscovery of Confucianism, that provides some with a compass to take courses of action deemed “right,” may also be thought of as a path of reconstruction of one’s subjectivity.

B.

Reified World and Experiences of Alienation

Judgments about the darkness of the present times are not only the result of feelings of personal dereliction and fall. They may also be linked to relations to the world that are experienced as unsatisfactory, reified or even destructive. These types of unsatisfactory relations apply to different realms, starting with the relation to one’s occupation and to others. Mr. R. was a worker in a shoe factory in the southern city of Dongguan (Guangdong province). He finally left his company after he found a job in a restaurant opened by a Confucian entrepreneur where he became, in his own words, “a student of Confucianism.” He explained the hardness of his previous life in the following terms: “at the factory in Dongguan, people were only thinking about money, there was no mutual trust, nothing. Here, we earn less, but the situation is totally different.”24 In the same restaurant, another employee, coming this time from the North-East, explained that he had resigned from his middle21 Interview with Mrs. D., Confucian entrepreneur and educator, Shenzhen, 2007, quoted in Billioud and Thoraval, The Sage and the People, 112. 22 On this topic see Xin Liu, The Otherness of Self, A Genealogy of the Self in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 182–83. 23 Jiwei Ci, Moral China in the Age of Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 12–23. 24 Interview, Shenzhen, 2007.

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manager job in a Walmart supermarket in Liaoning province because he could no longer stand the methods of the company and the overall pressure (the rhythms, the “overall atmosphere”) imposed on everyone.25 In her well-documented research on Confucian education, Silvia Elizondo also mentions several cases of Confucian educators totally disillusioned with their previous professional experiences. One of them, coming from Harbin where he had worked as a computer scientist, explained his former loss of enthusiasm for and interest in his job to the point where he only worked “to make a living.”26 Another one expressed himself in the following way: I worked in a Japanese company in Guangzhou and this is where I started to ask myself some questions about what I wanted to do. I don’t like life in big cities, it is too stressful…. I could observe how tired the (female) workers were; they couldn’t be very happy.… Suicides were not rare.27

These few examples unveil a number of well-known problems (pressure, work rhythms, unhappiness, lack of interest in one’s job and lack of valuable relations between people, burn-out, difficulties adjusting to living in big cities and following their hectic pace) that are not specific to Chinese society (though they can be especially pronounced in its highly competitive atmosphere) and others such as pervasive avarice or lack of trust (xin 信) also likely to be encountered in other contexts but that are constantly thematized in China. Apart from work and interpersonal relations, Confucian discourses lamenting society’s present situation also condemn the prevalence in society of a purely instrumental relation to the world. This is particularly visible in the field of education. Thus, those involved in the revival of Confucian education criticize the compulsory education system with the weight given to purely utilitarian knowledge (suffice it to mention the importance of mathematics) and competition: The educational system that is generalized throughout the world, and especially in China turns people into devices and trains them as if they had to be screwed up tight. This is contrary to human nature.28

The alleged failures of the system are, according to Confucian activists and followers, many: its inability to develop the personality of the kids and to teach them how to behave morally (zuo ren 做人); its crushing of individuality; its 25 Interview, Shenzhen, 2007. 26 Interview with Mr. BW, Beijing suburb, 2014, quoted by Silvia Elizondo in “C’est pour ton bien!” 145. 27 Interview with Mr. ZR, Beijing suburb, 2014, quoted by Silvia Elizondo in “C’est pour ton bien!” 145. 28 Interview, Wenzhou area, Zhejiang, 2018. Quoted by Silvia Elizondo, “C’est pour ton bien!” 139.

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failure, according to a factory worker that I interviewed, “to benefit ordinary people” (“compulsory education did not give me anything!” he emphasized)29; its failure to serve the country; and a sishu founder even bluntly posited that “enrolled in such a system, the children become increasingly stupid.”30 There is no need to multiply examples here. We now have quite a lot of field data available: critiques can be more or less radical but they basically run in the same direction.31 These negative judgments about the present and a reified way of relating to the world (e. g., to others, to one’s occupation, to one’s studies) could be analyzed, following German sociologist and philosopher Hartmut Rosa, as a general problem of alienation. Although he inherits from thinkers of Critical Theory, Rosa ascribes a new meaning to this ancient term and understands under this concept a type of relationship to the world whereby the latter becomes indifferent, if not hostile to the subject. The subject and the world are disconnected and, for the “alienated subject,” relationships to the world remain “dumb,” “silent” or mainly instrumental. In brief, there is no resonance any longer between these two poles.32 It is not difficult here to realize that, understood as such, the concept of alienation characterizes pretty well the few fieldwork examples that I just mentioned. Thus, the critique of the darkness of the present times largely becomes a critique of alienation. However, the most stimulating dimension of Rosa’s theory is the dialectical link that he establishes with another notion, namely resonance (Resonanz), a concept whereby the subject and the world affect and respond to each other.33 As we will soon see, the idea of resonance might be useful to understand why Confucianism or at least elements of the Confucian heritage offer life directions to an increasing number of people at the grassroots level. But before discussing this point, it is necessary to say a few words about official discourses and the darkness of the present times.

C.

Official Discourses and the Darkness of the Present Times

It is maybe paradoxical that official discourses regularly emphasize the darkness of the times and thus, at least to some extent, echo some of the Confucian critiques introduced above. Of course, this is no more than an echo since official narratives would in no way target institutions such as the existing compulsory 29 Interview, Shenzhen, 2007. 30 Interview, Taiyuan, 2010. 31 Several Ph.D. dissertations dedicated to Confucian education have been defended or are in progress. 32 Hartmut Rosa, Résonance, Une sociologie de la relation au monde (Paris: La Découverte, 2021), 271–286. 33 Hartmut Rosa, Résonance, 270–271.

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education system. And this is obviously an echo that needs to be understood within the context of a dialectic of critique and projection into the future (in brief, “there are flaws but the party’s agency is the solution”). The following excerpt is part of The Outlines for the Implementation of the Construction of a Civic Morals for the New Era, enacted by the State Council (Guowuyuan) in 2019: In some places and in some realms, at various degrees, there is a phenomenon of loss of moral compass and money worship; hedonism and extreme individualism are still relatively prominent. The moral conceptions of some of the members of society are blurred to the point where they disappear; there is no distinction any longer between right and wrong, good and evil, beauty and ugliness; what is right (yi 義) is forgotten at the sight of one’s profits (li 利) and profit is the only objective: one is ready to harm others for the sake of one’s profits, one is ready to harm the collectivity to maximize one’s personal interests; producing fakes and cheating, not acting in good faith (bu jiang xinyong 不講信用) are phenomena that have been treated for a long time but that are still enduring. Breaking the boundaries of public order and those between the respectable and the vulgar, being harmful to the happy life of the people, damaging national dignity and the feelings of the nation are also incidents that can sometimes happen….34

This narrative clearly overlaps with some of the discourses that can regularly be heard in Confucian circles, especially in respect to some of the terms that it mobilizes (e. g., the opposition between yi and li or the issue of trust) or in the denunciation of extreme individualism. This text was produced at the end of 2019 and the last sentence probably refers to the Hong Kong events and the protests against a controversial extradition law. Incidentally, it is noteworthy that comments by Hong Kong Yiguandao adepts and cadres (whom I take into account here considering the group’s claim for a Confucian identity) were at that time totally in line with the official discourse and strongly condemned these violent events and what they understood to be the moral collapse of the demonstrators (“a bunch of violent ruffians offending Heaven” who “don’t understand that democracy and freedom have to be anchored into morals and innate moral knowledge/liangzhi 良知”).35 The diagnosis regarding the dark side of society expounded in official discourses is interesting for us here not only because it tallies with popular accounts of the present situation and of modern society’s predicament but also, as will be explained later, because traditional culture, if not directly Confucianism, is, along with Marxism or, rather, under the guidance of Marxism, part of the advocated solution.

34 新时代公民道德建设实施纲要. 35 Sébastien Billioud, Reclaiming the Wilderness, 233–234.

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Reactivating Resources of the Past

The broadening of Chinese society’s space of experience — recalling here that this concept points to the way the past inhabits the present — is a multifaceted phenomenon and the Confucian revival is only one of its manifestations. It is also a complex phenomenon that includes a number of actors and ways to relate to the past likely to be in tension with each other: a grassroots activity (reading a classic, performing a rite, etc.) is neither a historical narrative nor a Confucian-sounding political slogan. The reactivation of an imaginary narrative about the past is also a dynamic that fuels both the present and the future in ways that may be completely different.

A.

The Classics as Living Resources and Vectors of Resonance

In the context of the Confucian revival, the past is first of all accessed via classical texts conveying a wisdom still considered relevant to the present time. In the course of fieldwork, scriptures typically encountered include the Four Books (and sometimes the Five Classics), the Classic of Filial Piety, the Rules of the Disciples and occasionally texts from later Confucian authors such as Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming. Such a past wisdom may also be actualized through modern texts and comments. Thus, compilations of sayings of Wang Fengyi 王鳳儀, the leader of the Universal Morality Society (Wanguo daodehui 萬國道德會, a major redemptive society of the Republican period) have been reprinted and promoted again in the Mainland by groups of young volunteers. Many people have also discovered the classics thanks to the commented versions of popularizers such as Nan Huaijin 南懷瑾 or even via modern media such as TV programs and the Internet.36 Finally, one should also mention the modern production of texts (many of them clearly in the Confucian tradition) by the means of spirit-writing. This is a common practice in the case of some Yiguandao branches and it probably constitutes — just imagine Confucius or any other sage delivering a message or a text to the living via a medium — the most tangible manifestation of the irruption of the past in the present.37 The enormous success of classical texts (and especially Confucian ones) in society might be explained by using Hartmut Rosa’s concept of resonance. For many of the people reading these classics and voluntarily re-appropriating them, 36 Fabrice Dulery, “Confucian Revival and the Media: The CCTV ‘Lecture Room,’” in The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, ed. Sébastien Billioud (Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2018), 302–330. 37 On spirit-writing practices within the Yiguandao, see my Reclaiming the Wilderness, especially the first two parts.

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they simply work: they constitute living resources, “oases of resonance” providing life directions, hope, reconciliation with the self, the feeling of acceding to another dimension of one’s life and escaping, at least momentarily, from the speed and the pressure of modern society. I mentioned above Mr. R. a former worker in a shoe factory, and I believe that his case provides a good example of this idea of resonance. With almost tears in his eyes, he mentioned to me how daily readings of the Analects of Confucius had literally transformed his perspective on life, offered the uneducated worker that he was an access to high culture and in the end changed his fate since he resigned from his factory. This case was one of the most moving ones I encountered in the field but by far not the only one. I could also mention the activists and disciples of Wang Caigui, some of them with no university education, who read the highly speculative texts of Mou Zongsan as if they were mere shanshu 善書 (books of morals usually distributed in temples) and could find therein sources of inspiration. All in all, it was striking for me to hear so many stories related to the transformative power of these texts among people who were not specifically intellectually equipped to delve into sophisticated hermeneutical analysis of their content. However, their approach to these texts was not primarily intellectual and, to the contrary, these commoners often articulated during interviews a kind of discourse that refused any intellectual approach to the classics (hence the idea of an “anti-intellectualism” that we developed elsewhere).38 In Taiyuan’s Confucius temple, a group of Master Jingkong’s followers read again and again the Rules of Disciples in a highly emotional atmosphere, sharing at the same time personal experiences. In a Hong Kong Yiguandao place of worship, courses and readings of the Confucian classics always attempted to link them to extremely concrete life examples so that (Mainland) participants, in the end, could make sense of them. In Beijing, groups of young volunteers read classics loudly, both collectively and individually, including breathing sequences, emphasizing slowness and incorporation of the texts. Examples could be easily multiplied. What basically matters is the relationship established between people and these texts and, through them, with the sages of old, which is also a new relation established to the world contrasting with the “alienation” described above. Rosa’s concept of resonance is especially inspiring in a Chinese context where it could be discussed, I believe, along with the ancient notion of ganying (感應) that points to the same type of experiences. All this being said, it is also necessary to emphasize that readings of the classics are far from always resonant. Experiments to inculcate classics in children in revived traditional schools sometimes fail miserably; the jiaohua (education/ 38 Billioud and Thoraval, The Sage and the People, 76–106.

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transformation) promoted by some entrepreneurs in their companies does not always generate the same kinds of “epiphanies” as what was described above but, sometimes, merely boredom and a feeling of constraint. And I am not even speaking here of the political inculcation of classical texts of which history provides so many examples. In brief, it leaves little doubt that classics reading may also end up in a reified relationship to the world.

B.

Rituals and Resonance

The revitalization (or, sometimes, the complete invention39) of Confucian rites constitutes a notable dimension of the Confucian revival. They can be personal or collective (rites of passage, rites to honor a sage or an ancestor). Sometimes, collective rites are linked to specific lineages (the descent of Confucius, Mencius, Zhu Xi, etc.) and can therefore be understood within a general trend of lineage revival. But this is not always the case. For which reasons do some ordinary people decide, in spring or autumn, to put on Ming garb and go to a Confucius or a Mencius temple to offer sacrifices to a sage? I was able to attend several of these ceremonies organized by commoners and observe a real process of ritual reinvention. After the Maoist episode, the ritual savoir-faire that managed to endure in Daoist networks had largely disappeared for Confucianism in Mainland China and self-proclaimed ritual masters (lisheng 禮生) had to start nearly from scratch in order to revive them. Ritual groups and networks took shape in all parts of the country, sharing experiences both via the Internet and on site. Striking for me was the observation of these exchanges: participants had to teach each other and collectively discover or invent what was, for them, working (ritual sequences, body positions, gestures, etc.). They were collectively producing a ritual experience full of reverence and solemnity, reactivating by the same token, for instance through the prayers that they read and burnt, a classical pattern of Chinese cosmology (observable in any popular religion temple), that is to say, the continuity between the visible and invisible dimensions of the universe. The settings in which the rituals I attended took place (beautiful temples in Shandong province set up in majestic natural environments with numerous venerable trees) were timeless, increasing the

39 Anna Sun emphasizes for instance that prayer cards in Confucius temples are a completely new phenomenon influenced by Japan and Shinto temples. Anna Sun, Confucianism as a World Religion, 162–63.

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impression of being, during the time of the ritual, in an oasis totally severed from the modern world.40 I think that it is again possible to reflect upon this experience — and upon the contemporary relevance of such an experience — using the concept of resonance. Such rituals, when they work, generate resonance, i. e., “arousal” (gan) and “response” (ying). We could posit that this resonance combines the three different dimensions discussed by Rosa. (1) It is at the same time, vertical, in the sense that it goes beyond the individuals, linking the participants, through what is also an aesthetic experience, to the spirit of the sages and more generally, to a whole worldview and an ancient history. It is important to underscore here that history and the past can of course constitute sources of vertical resonance. (2) The resonance is also horizontal in the sense that there is a resonance between the ritualists interacting with each other: in the end, they turn into a common ritual body and, beyond, into a community. (3) And the resonance is diagonal: Rosa includes objects in this category. In the case of a Confucian ritual, we have statues and tablets, ritual artifacts, and the temple itself. Again, these elements resonate with the participants. The rituals I am alluding to here and that I had the opportunity to observe, clearly worked and generated resonance. They are especially interesting in that they enabled participants who were just ordinary people (laobaixing) to escape for a while from their hectic daily lives and from a modern society where relations to the world are often silent and dumb. However, this does in no way mean that all rituals are successful at producing resonance. Elsewhere, we analyzed political ceremonies honoring Confucius that could hardly be described as “resonant.” Resonance implies a subtle relation between the outside and the inside — the stimulation/arousal and the response — and it also implies the affirmation or the construction of one’s subjectivity. In an authoritarian context, political ceremonials or political jiaohua (education-transformation) may potentially incur the risk of leading to an alienation of the self rather than to increased spheres of resonance.

40 Nature and the countryside are important elements within the popular Confucian revival and this is probably due to the fact that they are resonant. The countryside is resonant because it is considered by many as the place where, far away from the pace and changes of city life, tradition endures. But the natural environment is also often considered to facilitate an “embodied” relationship to the Confucian heritage and the classics. This explains why many classical schools are opened in a natural setting.

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Politics of the Past

The past, often encapsulated in vague catch-all labels such as “Chinese tradition” (Zhonghua chuantong 中華傳統) or “outstanding Chinese traditional culture” (Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua 中華優秀傳統文化) is increasingly mobilized in political discourses that, on the cultural front, tend to position the existing polity within a multi-layered historicity. Thus, Chinese culture/tradition is supposed to back up the revolutionary culture (geming wenhua 革命文化, that is, the “red genes” hongse jiyin 紅色基因 of the regime) and the “advanced socialist culture” (shehuizhuyi xianjin wenhua 社會主義先進文化 by which one should understand the contribution of the period of reform and opening) in shaping the “cultural confidence” (wenhua zixin 文化自信) of the nation. In the aforementioned document about civic morality enacted by the State Council, traditional culture is presented as “the inexhaustible source of moral construction” and it is suggested that the promotion of the ancient sages, national heroes, people with lofty ideals, along with historical remains, classics and more generally heritage (material or immaterial) should “make it possible for the genes of Chinese culture Zhonghua wenhua jiyin 中華文化基因 — one can underscore here the recurrence of a ‘genetic discourse’ — to get more thoroughly rooted in people’s thought and in their conception of morals.” It is noteworthy that this text also openly discusses the Way of filial piety (xiao dao 孝道) and mentions the very Confucian notion of jiaohua 教化. These overall guidelines translate into more practical measures, taken both at the national and at the local level. Thus, school curricula increasingly require classics reading (especially Confucian classics), along with other activities linked to traditional culture, in order to improve one’s moral character (pinde 品德).41 Traditional cultural content is also significant within the courses offered by the Party school. The intangible heritage promotion policy also manifests itself in the organization of all sorts of commemorations to celebrate the main figures of Chinese civilization and it is in this context that a Confucius cult (along with commemoration of the Yellow Emperor, Yu the Great, etc.) takes places in various temples across the country.42 But as mentioned above, existing research leaves little room to think that such cults are really “resonant.” More generally, these cultural politics and the way the past is increasingly mobilized recall the attempts that took place in Taiwan before the end of martial law. When they are not linked to tourism and economic development, objectives are clearly, through 41 Lige Bao, “Defining and Cultivating the ‘Chinese Kid’: The Current Construction of China’s Traditional Culture Education in Primary Schools” (forthcoming). In 2014, the Ministry of Education issued guidelines regarding the promotion of traditional culture in schools. 42 Billioud and Thoraval, The Sage and the People, 189–92.

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the production of national feelings and model citizens, to increase cohesion in and control of society while legitimizing and sanctifying the rule of the PartyState not only today, but also in the future. It is precisely to the future, this third dimension of time, that we now turn.

V.

The Promises of the Future

Projections into the future and visions of what the future could be or ought to be are central elements shaping the Confucian social, cultural, and political imaginations in today’s China. The underlying idea is that history still has a direction (in other words, the prevailing regime of historicity is still modern) and that Confucianism will be part of it (in other words, the modern regime will be different from the one that prevailed both during the Maoist period and during the subsequent phase of reform and opening).43 This understanding of the future impacts the present by shaping actions and behaviors of all these Confucian revivalists. However, these projections into the future may substantially differ depending on the actors. There is no real homogeneity here, which is not surprising considering how fragmented and diverse the Confucian revival is. Imagination is the root of both utopia and ideology (understood not only as a tool of distortion-dissimulation or legitimation-domination but also as a vector of integration)44 and revivalists can err on either one of these two sides. Taking the risk of oversimplification, I will briefly present here the perspectives of some of the actors.

A.

Perspectives of the Educators

Education for children is certainly a realm where utopia matters most since many of the existing experimental educational projects (traditional schools), often established in natural settings largely isolated from modern society, are already alternative models to compulsory education, its pressure, and so forth: they are already utopias for the present times.45 These projects, however, are also some43 Whereas teleology was driven by a Marxist conception of history during the Maoist period, another brand of teleology, driven by the infinite promises of GDP growth prevailed afterwards. 44 Paul Ricoeur, “L’idéologie et l’utopie: deux expressions de l’imaginaire social,” Autres temps 2, no. 1 (1984): 53–64. 45 On utopianism and Confucian education revival, see Sandra Gilgan, “Confucian Education and Utopianism: The Classics Reading Movement and its Potential for Social Change,” China Perspectives 2 (2022): 29–39.

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times thought of as the nascent sprouts of something bigger to come and in connection with the future. Thus, a Shanxi educator to whom I asked what young kids educated only with the classics will be able to do later replied by quoting the Great Learning: “They will engage in self-cultivation, regulate their families, govern the country and pacify the universe.”46 Another one, in Shenzhen, explained that the objective was “to produce sages, able to regenerate China.”47 As for Wang Caigui, whose influence we already mentioned, he outlined his thoughts in an interview: “We need to train the kind of people able to grasp ancient, modern, Chinese, Western knowledge and capable of shaping a new knowledge system.”48 Thus, for these activists, education entails the promises of the emergence of a completely different value and knowledge system; today’s young kids will be tomorrow’s Confucians and the actors of change. Education is not a personal matter, but a mission for the country. As for the classics, to which an almost magical performative dimension is ascribed since they are supposed to crystallize the wisdom of the past, they are the tools capable of making those dreams come true. Obviously, not all activists hold such grand plans and rather radical views but the conviction that a child with a clear Confucian compass will contribute to the future of the nation is definitely well-established.

B.

Perspectives of the Entrepreneurs

A range of motivations may encourage an entrepreneur to delve into “national learning” and promote Confucian jiaohua in his company. Among those motivations, some are certainly instrumental: Confucian education may be turned into a management tool or facilitate the creation of business networks. However, motivations of a completely different kind also exist. Many highly successful rushang are convinced that their duty, as economic elites, is to contribute to society, now and for the future, and they readily explain their commitments as stemming from a “sense of mission” (shiminggan 使命感). Sometimes, this sense of mission prompts them to develop Confucian educational projects on the side of their company.49 But sometimes it is the type of company that they strive to build that also reflects their perspective on society’s future. Jiang Lan’s research studies the case 46 47 48 49

Interview, Shanxi, 2010. Interview, Shenzhen, 2007. Quoted by Silvia Elizondo, “C’est pour ton bien!” 206. For the analysis of two cases in Yunnan province see Chung Yun-ying, “Belief and Faith: The Situation and Development of Confucianism in Yunnan Province,” in The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, 136–41.

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of the CEO of TW, a middle-size corporation (500 employees) operating in Guangdong in the electronic components sector, who, directly inspired by Confucian texts, has implemented in his company a profit-sharing system. Thus, 51% of the company’s profits are put in a fund to finance projects of societal interest, 25% are distributed to the employees, and what’s left is shared by the founders, the CEO and the members of the board of directors. This project is presented as a “model” and carries therefore an alternative vision of the role that capitalism could play and how it could contribute to Chinese society.50 In many other cases, projection towards the future among entrepreneurs is characterized by an appropriation of the Party-State’s discourse on civilization, national rejuvenation and the “China dream.” Even though such a stance might sometimes be merely opportunistic, one should not downplay the degree of adhesion to such a narrative and of eagerness to contribute to the odyssey of a great nation recovering its past power.

C.

Perspectives of the Ritualists

Again, here, a variety of perspectives exist and observation of rituals might not tell us much more about the future than the fact that some ritualists strive or dream to refocus ideology (understood positively as what binds and integrates people and society) on an alternative symbolic system. However, others may be bolder in their explicit claims and discourses about the relevance of a “unity of political and religious teaching” (zhengjiao heyi 政教合一) or of a “unity between politics and morals” (zhengde heyi 政德合一). Elsewhere, I analyzed the case of Zhou Beichen, a disciple of Jiang Qing who launched a ritual hall in Shenzhen with the ambition to set up a network throughout the country.51 He is an interesting case for his defense, in the continuity of a long history that can be traced back to the 1910s, of Confucianism as a religion but also as a “national religion” or guojiao 國 教. As a concession to modernity, Zhou does not call for a unity of the religious and the political but for “an integration of governance and teaching with a separation between the sacred and the secular.”52 In such a framework, the Confucian church would be assigned the responsibility to educate and transform the people ( jiaohua), whereas the “the secular king” would continue to govern. 50 Jiang Lan, Une étude sur le phénomène rushang en Chine contemporaine, chapter 4. 51 Sébastien Billioud, “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses: The Challenge of Structuring the Confucian Revival in the People’s Republic of China,” Oriens Extremus 49 (2010): 201–24. On the same topic see also Alex Payette, “La gouvernance confucéenne: moralité, othopraxie et expressions identitaires” (PhD diss., University of Ottawa, 2015), 95–130. 52 治教一體， 聖俗分權. Zhou Beichen 周北辰, Rujia yaoyi 儒家要義 (Hong Kong : Zhongguo guoji wenhua, 2009), 135.

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There is no room here to discuss this theme in depth: suffice it to underline that the quasi-utopian dimension of such a project — the imagination of a completely different future, though informed by the past — determines Zhou’s agency and his very concrete ritual projects.

D.

Perspectives of the Party-State

Finally, the picture would not be complete without briefly mentioning the PartyState. Its orientation towards the future is clear and there is no need to review the well-known narrative about “national rejuvenation” and the “China dream.” China has ambitions (and has actually already managed) to recover its position of great power. This horizon, the horizon of a “new era” (xin shidai 新時代), requires the mobilization of a “new man” (shidai xin ren 時代新人). This “new man” is a man who maintains a “spirit of struggle” (fendou jingshen 奮鬥精神) not merely for his little “individual self” (xiaowo 小我) but for the “large self” (dawo 大我), that is to say, for the collectivity.53 This kind of discourse is in itself not very new and echoes things that could be heard in other contexts (the New Soviet Man, Maoism, past Kuomintang discourses under the Chiang Kai-shek regime, but also to some extent in other authoritarian contexts). The text about the moral construction that was mentioned above explicitly displays an ambition to shape citizens for “this new era” and we already highlighted that, apart from its primarily socialist references, it was also peppered with many references to traditional culture. In guidelines dedicated to “moral construction” such references naturally tend to be overtly Confucian ones. But in other contexts blatant legalist references are increasingly included, thus perpetuating a very classical scheme of intertwinement between these two traditions. All in all, the Party-State now considers its legitimacy to be anchored in a multi-layered historicity that includes (positive) contributions of “traditional culture,” “revolutionary culture,” and “advanced socialist culture.” In that framework, the present times entail polarity: on the one hand, those are still considered dark; but on the other hand, this darkness is immediately negated by the promises of the future; and those promises are not a faraway horizon, they are already tangible, visible, present. The “new era” is the daily re-actualization and re-institution of the promises of the future (or of an imagination about the future) thanks to the agency of a Party-State now also claiming to inherit from the lights of the past.

53 培养担当民族复兴大任的时代新人, Xuexi shibao, 2018/10/10.

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Conclusion

We now arrive at the end of this reflection on the Confucian revival and I would like to conclude by coming back to François Hartog’s analysis of the regimes of historicity. In Western Europe, in the context of all sorts of disillusions about an increasingly threatening future and all sorts of identity concerns, the modern regime of historicity driven by a belief in the future gradually left room for the prevalence of the present, i. e., to what Hartog calls “presentism.” In China, the Confucian revival introduced in this chapter is merely one specific perspective among many others on the country’s relation to historicity and this enables us to raise hypotheses and questions but certainly not to draw conclusions. The hypothesis is that, contrary to Europe — and we could maybe speak of a real decoupling here — China probably continues to be largely driven by the modern regime of historicity (i. e., by the primacy of the future). However, the way the future prevails is now substantially different from what it used to be since it needs to be increasingly understood in its articulation with the past, a past which is not centered on “memory” (like in Europe) but that rather constitutes a broad reservoir nourishing various collective imaginations, both at the grassroots level and for the regime. From the vantage point of an analysis of the regimes of historicity, one could superficially consider that these two poles (grassroots Confucians and the authorities) seem quite attuned to a similar appropriation of the past. To some extent, this might be the case — and there is no doubt that a number of Confucian revivalists endorse the narratives of the Party-State. Nevertheless, tensions also endure between quests for resonance reflecting processes of (re)construction of one’s subjectivity in the hectic context of late modernity and political mobilizations that tend to downplay the importance of the individual self (xiaowo) for the sake of national cohesion and rejuvenation.

Bibliography Anonymous propaganda leaflet. Kongzi — wangu di weihu nuli zhi de sixiangjia 孔子－顽 固地维护奴隶制的思想. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1973. Bao, Lige. “Defining and Cultivating the ‘Chinese Kid’: The Current Construction of China’s Traditional Culture Education in Primary Schools” (forthcoming). Billioud, Sébastien. “Confucianism in Chinese Society in the First Two Decades of the 21st Century.” In The Cambridge History of Confucianism, edited by Kiri Paramore. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. —. Reclaiming the Wilderness: Contemporary Dynamics of the Yiguandao. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

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—. “Confucian Revival and the Emergence of Jiaohua Organizations: A Case Study of the Yidan Xuetang.” Modern China 37, no. 3 (2011): 286–314. —. “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses: The Challenge of Structuring the Confucian Revival in the People’s Republic of China.” Oriens Extremus 49 (2010): 201–24. — and Joël Thoraval. The Sage and the People. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Chung, Yun-ying. “Belief and Faith: The Situation and Development of Confucianism in Yunnan Province.” In The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, edited by Sébastien Billioud, 136–41. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2018. Ci, Jiwei. Moral China in the Age of Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Clart, Philip. “Confucius and the Mediums: Is There a ‘Popular Confucianism.’” T’oung Pao 89, no. 1 (2003): 1–38. Dulery, Fabrice. “Confucian Revival and the Media: The CCTV ‘Lecture Room.’” In The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, edited by Sébastien Billioud, 302–330. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2018. Elizondo, Silvia. “‘C’est pour ton bien!’: Etude sur les expérimentations éducatives se réclamant d’un traditionalisme culturel en Chine contemporaine.” PhD diss., Université Paris Cité, 2021. Gilgan, Sandra. “Confucian Education and Utopianism: The Classics Reading Movement and its Potential for Social Change.” China Perspectives 2 (2022): 29–39. Hartog, François. Régimes d’historicité: Présentisme et expériences du temps. Paris: Le Seuil, 2003. Huang, Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. “Some Notes on Chinese Historical Thinking.” In Chinese Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Discussion, edited by Chun-chieh Huang and Jörn Rüsen. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2015. —. Zhanhou Taiwan de zhuanxing ji qi zhanwang 戰後台灣的轉型及其展望. Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2006. —. Taiwan yishi yu Taiwan wenhua 台灣意識與台灣文化. Taipei: Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2010. Ji, Zhe. “Making a Virtue of Piety: Dizigui and the Discursive Practice of Jingkong’s Network.” In The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, edited by Sébastien Billioud, 61–89. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2018. —. “Educating Through Music.” China Perspectives 3 (2008): 107–117. Jiang Lan. “Une étude sur le phénomène rushang en Chine contemporaine.” PhD diss., Université Paris Cité, 2021. Koselleck, Reinhart. Vergangene Zukunft, Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989. Li, Zehou 李澤厚. Makesizhuyi zai Zhongguo 馬克思主義在中國. Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 2006. Liu, Xin. The Otherness of Self: A Genealogy of the Self in Contemporary China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Mollgaard, Eske J. The Confucian Political Imagination. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Pan, Hongli. “The Old Folks’ Associations and Lineage Revival in Southern Fujian Province.” In Southern Fujian, Reproduction of Tradition in Post-Mao China, edited by Tan Chee-Beng, 69–96. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006.

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Guoxiang Peng

Rethinking Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism: A Confucian Perspective

I.

Introduction

Nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism, and the complex entanglements among them have been much discussed in the fields of political philosophy and culture studies, not to mention their place in general discourses and reflections on culture. For example, Martha C. Nussbaum’s 1994 Boston Review article, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” promptly generated twenty-nine responses from readers. Such a substantial reaction to a seemingly abstract and theoretical essay was significant, especially at a time when the internet had not yet served as an instrument of instantaneous communication. The editor of Boston Review, Joshua Cohen (Cohen 1996), realizing the importance of the issue at hand, compiled an anthology that included eleven of those responses, together with five invited essays and Nussbaum’s replies. It appeared in 1996 as For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism.1 This book presents a deep, multidisciplinary, and sustained analysis of many of the core issues concerning patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Needless to say, patriotism and cosmopolitanism are issues not exclusive to the West. Issues of patriotism and cosmopolitanism have also engaged the attention of Chinese intellectuals and thinkers. In my view, these perennially relevant matters need to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency, given our current geo-political conditions, in light of Donald Trump’s nationalistic rhetoric and foreign policies, and China’s reinvigoration of ideology as a dominant principle of governance.

1 The authors in this volume are all distinguished scholars in the humanities in North America. Apart from Nussbaum, notable names include the late Hilary Putnam (1926–2016), Amartya Sen, not only the 1998 Nobel laureate in economics but a great thinker who had once been very close to Nussbaum, Charles Taylor, the winner of the Kluge Prize of 2015, Immanuel Wallerstein, the representative of world-systems theory, and Michael Walzer, a senior research Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton.

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In this chapter, I will not discuss or directly engage the views of Nussbaum or the other contributors to For Love of Country, although I will refer to and elaborate upon a number of issues they raise. Rather, my aim is to probe the related issues of nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism from the perspective of Confucianism and present some of my own observations and remarks. In doing so, I hope to highlight some of the defining characteristics of Confucianism. My arguments will proceed in the following way. First, I will examine nationalism and patriotism as two potentially related and possibly mutually transformed concepts in, but not limited to, a Chinese context. I will not endeavor to survey the literature on nationalism and patriotism but instead propose how we might define, differentiate, and avoid radicalizing these concepts from a Confucian point of view. Second, I will propose how to properly understand cosmopolitanism in terms of the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanism and point out a key problem that cosmopolitanism has to address. Third, I will examine the Confucian understanding of humanity (humaneness), self, and all-under-heaven, not only to present the Confucian perspective on these three issues but also to locate Confucianism in regard to the contrast between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Finally, based on my previous discussions and especially that concerning the Confucian understanding of humanity, self, and all-under-heaven, I will recommend Confucianism as a form of rooted cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitan patriotism, which, among various traditions in the world, can provide the theoretical and practical resources for reconciling the tension between cosmopolitanism and patriotism/nationalism. The Confucian perspective that I present here is not based on one or more particular Confucian figures or texts from Chinese or East Asian history. Rather, it is a view I have developed as a scholar of Confucianism and a Confucian scholar.2 While preliminary and offered merely as a sketch of what could be developed into a full and robust point of view, I hope and believe it may enrich our understanding of the interaction between nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism, which, on the surface, appear to be divergent and contending, rather than coherent and complementary, ideals.

2 There are recent works that approach the topic from the perspective of particular Chinese thinkers or texts. For example, Chai Shaojin (2011) explores the topic of cosmopolitanism from the perspective of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. Philip J. Ivanhoe (2014) considers how passages from the Analects might open up a new and productive view of the nature and aims of cosmopolitanism.

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II.

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Nationalism and Patriotism: Two Mutually Transformed Concepts

In For Love of Country, the debate was focused primarily on patriotism and cosmopolitanism. The issue of nationalism was not directly or extensively addressed, possibly because in North America, at least at the time the book was written, it was not regarded as an idea or ideology particularly relevant to its historical experience. In addition, in public and academic discourse, nationalism, at least in the English-speaking world, seems to have acquired a negative connotation as another word for or close relative of forms of jingoism based on notions of blood and soil. So, for contributors to For Love of Country, there seemed no pressing need to discuss nationalism. In the Chinese context, however, nationalism has long loomed large and continues to do so in such discussions. Particularly since the twentieth century when the unavoidably enhanced nationalism in China has been noticed and criticized by the West, a number of Chinese commentators and thinkers have questioned why similar feelings and behaviors advocated as positive patriotism in the West are regarded as negative nationalism in China. What exactly are the differences between nationalism and patriotism? For this reason alone, aside from patriotism and cosmopolitanism, nationalism needs to receive adequate attention in the Chinese context. While nationalism and patriotism have been studied and defined, they are not that easily differentiated. It is unnecessary to enumerate all the various definitions of these two concepts. What I want to point out is that nationalism does not necessarily have a negative connotation, while patriotism does not necessarily have a good connotation either. Certain conceptions of patriotism may well yield the same negative consequences that nationalism is said to have generated. Therefore, Nussbaum made a point to examine the limits of patriotism from a perspective of cosmopolitanism, which led to the lively debate in 1994. Why is it difficult to differentiate patriotism from nationalism? The reason lies in the fact that both are based upon the nation-state that commands the allegiance and identity of its citizens. It is a natural result that the development of human history has advanced to a period in which it is the nation-state rather than civilization that constitutes the basic structure of politics and society. Either nationalism or patriotism is a kind of feeling and behavior that identifies oneself with a certain nation-state that one thinks he or she belongs to. What is the difference between patriotism and nationalism? In my view, patriotism, generally regarded as “good/positive,” gives priority to the consolidation of the citizenry of the same nation-state without focusing on the exclusion of people in other nation-states. As such, it is a moral point of view: it

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can and often does involve criticizing oneself and one’s fellow citizens for not living up to the high ideals and aspirations that one takes as defining one’s nation. Such criticisms can be directed at shortcomings wholly within the state. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. and others called on American society to realize its highest ideals of equality, liberty, and justice for all. Such criticisms also can be focused on state actions occurring outside the state, such as when protestors against the Vietnam War called on their fellow Americans to stop supporting their government’s unwarranted military action or when proponents of various aid efforts or humanitarian interventions seek to generate support to relieve suffering that is occurring outside the nation-state. By contrast, nationalism, commonly viewed as “bad/negative,” seems intended to exclude or even attack people of other political-cultural communities; it encourages our least savory inclinations and offers a license for wrongdoing. This is seen in a common feature of almost all nationalist movements: they often are based upon grievances and resentments — real or imagined — against others. They focus on the wickedness and wrongdoing of others and invoke these as justifications for revenge, demands for reparations, or excuses for greed or aggression. A patriot, as described above, always urges us higher, to be at our best — to listen to the better angels of our nature. A nationalist always seeks to drag us down and encourages the demons that lie within us all. As Timothy Snyder (2017, 113) puts it, “A nationalist encourages us to be our worst, and then tells us that we are the best.” In this sense, patriotism is an internal constructive and consolidating force while nationalism is an externally driven force that is aggrandizing and expansive. Patriotism almost unavoidably generates a distinction between “us” and “them” when it consolidates the shared values, but as long as this discrimination does not become overt hostility toward and an attack on other people, it is not nationalism as such. Similarly, nationalism would naturally result in the reinforcement of people’s self-identity when it is hostile to or even an attack on other people. Numerous historical examples can be given of nations that went to war for the purpose of distracting from an internal crisis. However, as long as the purpose is not to consolidate the shared values of a people and community, but a tool to shift inner crisis, hostility to and attack on other people is still nationalism in a bad sense, not patriotism in a good sense. Simply put, the key to differentiating patriotism from nationalism is to check what feelings people have and what behaviors they engage in: are these enlisted in and do these encourage improving themselves and their states or assaulting others? The former is patriotism while the latter is nationalism. In this sense, obviously, those people who attack their compatriots and damage the belongings of their compatriots are not patriots but nationalists; what they have done is nothing but stupid and brutal. Of course, nationalism is not always bad. When a

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nation-state is invaded and its political and social structure is threatened, people of such a nation-state who fight against the invaders are not nationalists but patriots. Their behavior is self-protection. In this case, we can say that such forms of nationalism already are transformed into expressions of patriotism. If we have to acknowledge the fact that nationalism and patriotism can be mutually transformed and nationalism is not vile in every case or respect, similarly, patriotism may represent feelings and behaviors that are xenophobic, precisely the sort of pernicious possibility that Nussbaum wrote about. Indeed, since consanguinity, place of birth, mother tongue, and so on are primordial ties that cannot be chosen, patriotism can be regarded as actually a natural feeling of most human beings. Strong evidence for such a claim is found in psychological studies that confirm a strong natural inclination to distinguish between in-group and out-group (Brewer 1999) and to act dramatically differently to people based on this distinction. Such tendencies are also found in the deep human need to belong (Baumeister and Lear 1995). Normally, there is no need to purposely advocate it. For instance, right after the 9/11 attack, so many people in the United States bought flags for their own houses. As a result, flags soon were sold out. This is no doubt a reflection of patriotism. As for the response of the American government to this phenomenon, which called on people to calm down and return to their regular daily lives, it was a wise decision aimed primarily at preventing patriotism from being transformed into vile nationalist fervor. Radical patriotism, which is actually a virulent form of nationalism, invariably leads to jingoism and imperialism often leading to attacking other people. In this sense, what concerned Nussbaum was not patriotism but nationalism, as seen in her pointing to the potential problems inherent in the former. It is understandable that nearly all sixteen of the response-articles endorsed the positive aspects of patriotism. But the more important point is not the acknowledgement of patriotism but the understanding of cosmopolitanism, particularly how to deal with the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. This is the question that I now want to probe.

III.

Cosmopolitanism: Avoiding Generalities and Abstractions

The central idea of patriotism is to advocate loyalty and devotion to the core values of the nation-state to which a people belong. On the other hand, the main tenet of cosmopolitanism is to go beyond the particular values and identities that various nation-states respectively embrace. For a cosmopolitan, the ideal is to be a world citizen and embrace universal values such as humanity, freedom, equality, and justice. It is these universal values, and not the specific ideologies of

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various nation-states, that are the ground for value judgments and ethical human actions. There are voluminous works on the basic orientation of cosmopolitanism.3 What I want to appeal to is not these scholarly narratives but the substantial lived human experiences on which these narratives are based. For example, when Oskar Schindler saved so many Jews, despite his membership in the Nazi Party, he personified cosmopolitanism. Another example is the long avenue of trees in front of the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem. Each of these trees is in memory of a person or a family who also risked death to save a Jew or Jews. These “Schindlers” came from various countries and had different religious backgrounds. But just like the historical Schindler, they went beyond their respective countries and religions to save the lives of others because of their innate humaneness, with which everyone is endowed. The symbolic implication and significance of these trees are so powerful that Nussbaum, a cosmopolitan, mentioned them as a vivid example and used them as the starting point of her final reply to her critics in the last part of For Love of Country. Obviously, the core of cosmopolitanism is the principle that there are higher and more universal values of human beings that go beyond national and cultural boundaries. For a cosmopolitan, when universal values such as humanity, freedom, equality, and justice are in conflict with patriotism, priority is given to the former. On the surface, there seems to be an unavoidable tension between cosmopolitanism and patriotism. Furthermore, since cosmopolitanism advocates universal values — including humanity, justice, and human rights — and puts an emphasis on rationality and feeling unconstrained by various national ideologies, it occupies the moral high ground. But there is a fundamental problem that cosmopolitanism has to face, that is, how to avoid becoming a general and abstract idea promoted by only a few social elites. The real world is full of inequality. Patriotism and even nationalism in some cases mentioned previously are reasonable to a certain degree. For instance, without the Swadeshi Movement, India probably would still be colonialized by the British. China’s fight against the Japanese invasion during World War II, and the anti-apartheid movement led by Nelson Mandela in South Africa, are expressions of nationalism in the positive sense. What such nationalism or patriotism pursues and embodies are universal cosmopolitan values including humanity, justice, freedom, and equality, as pointed out by most of the sixteen articles in response to Nussbaum, although Nussbaum herself did not ignore the problems of cosmopolitanism. 3 Nussbaum already well articulated the orientation and features of cosmopolitanism in For Love of Country. For more recent discussions of cosmopolitanism, see Kwame A. Appiah (2006), Brown (2009), and Brown and Held (2010).

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Then, what we need to further consider is how patriotism, which emphasizes particularity, and cosmopolitanism, which advocates universality, can be reconciled. Can we find a middle ground that goes beyond the conflict between patriotism and cosmopolitanism and integrates the best of both? In my view, there are conceptual and practical resources in the Confucian tradition that enable us to rethink the interrelationships between nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism. Let me begin by introducing the Confucian understanding of three concepts: humanity (or humaneness), self, and all under heaven.

IV.

Confucianism: between Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism

Ren 仁, humanity or humaneness, is an idea and ideal that is central to Confucianism. Confucian ren is usually regarded as a discriminating form of love, to the extent that it emanates outward from the family, and therefore, it is not considered to be as capacious as its counterpart in other traditions, such as Christian agape or Buddhist karuna, which are taken to be universal and cosmopolitan values. This is a misunderstanding. The so called idea of “ai you cha deng 愛有差等,” which literally means “discriminating love,” does not have evidential support in the Confucian classics. Discriminating love is an empirical fact and natural feeling that everybody experiences. A Confucian is no exception. But this is not what Confucianism advocates. What Confucianism develops is a universal love based upon this empirical actuality. The goal is to move from that which is, represented by the discriminating love or differentiated love typical of the ordinary world as it is, to that which ought to be — the empathetic world of ren encompassing all that exists in the world. From the Confucian point of view, the love for parents and children is the most elemental feeling we experience. Take it as the starting point; we may then fully extend it not only to other people but to heaven, earth, and the myriad things. This extended love is what agape and karuna entail. In fact, for a Confucian, this extended love, as complete humanity (ren), involves not only human beings but also the entire world, including mountains, rivers, land, grass, trees, and even minerals. What Confucianism distinctively suggests is that the differentiated love that exists as a natural human feeling should be acknowledged as a basis and starting point. Otherwise, if we advocate that we should treat our neighbors as our parents from the very beginning, the actual result is likely to be that our parents unfortunately are treated as our neighbors. If this is so, then those noble and universal values such as fraternity and compassion would become hollow, abstract, and even self-deceiving slogans, because they would be devoid of social substance and practical application. Thus, on the one hand, Confucian ren acknowledges the empirical fact of differentiated love; on the other, it firmly be-

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lieves that only when our love can be extended to other people, heaven, earth, and the myriad things can our ren be fully realized. There is also a prevailing misunderstanding of the Confucian self as a kind of collectivism that ignores the self, such that the value of a self can only be ascertained when it serves as a cog in a larger machine. In light of Confucianism, no one can be understood as an isolated individual in Kierkegaard’s sense, or a monad without windows in Leibnitz’s sense. The construction of every “self” has to happen in interwoven relationships. On the other hand, Confucianism does not believe that every self is originally nothing and totally constructed only after it is born. For instance, Mengzi believes that the “four sprouts” (siduan 四端) of the heart-mind, namely, the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and dislike, the feeling of modesty and complaisance, and the feeling of right and wrong, are original moral feelings, innate to all human beings. For a Confucian, the innate knowing of the good as Mengzi defined it, which, Mou Zongsan has argued, is also the moral principle in Kant’s sense, is irreducibly the ultimate reality. This independent and irreducible personality or self is vividly indicated in many Confucian sayings. For instance, Kongzi himself said, “Is humanity far away? As long as I want it, it is here in me 我欲仁斯仁至矣” (Analects 7:29).4 “The commander of three armies may be taken away, but the will of even a common man may not be taken away from him 三軍可奪帥也，匹夫不可奪志 也” (Analects 9:25).5Also, Mengzi said that a “great person 大丈夫” should “not indulge in money and power, not give up his dignity due to poverty and mean conditions, not give in to intimidation and violence 富貴不能淫，貧賤不能 移，威武不能屈” (Mengzi 3B/7), according to which Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 (1890–1969), one of the great twentieth-century Chinese historians, developed his call for “independent personality and free thinking 獨立之精神、自由之思 想” as the ideal existential goal for the citizenry. Thus, the Confucian self should be understood this way: it can only be consummated in relation to others yet, being resolutely free and independent, cannot not be reduced to being simply a part of any larger structure. The Confucian understanding of the world is epitomized by the notion of tianxia (天下), namely, “all-under-heaven,” a concept germane to the issues of patriotism and cosmopolitanism.6 While we know that Kongzi travelled around 4 Translation from Chan (1969, 33) with minor modification by the author. 5 Translation from Chan (1969, 36). 6 Recently, there have been several works on “tianxia” or cosmopolitanism in the Chinese speaking-world. However, most such works are highly speculative constructions of an author’s own ideas rather than interpretations of Confucianism based on an historical or philosophical perspective. Some of these are illuminating, such as the article by Liu Qing 劉擎 (2015). Some, such as Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia Tixi 天下體系 (2005), primarily use the term “tianxia” to express the author’s own speculative theory, which has little relevance to its connotations as

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many principalities in China, we should realize that such travel at that time, during the Spring and Autumn period, was truly a transnational venture, completely different from how we travel between provinces in China today. Before the Qin dynasty, the writings, languages, currencies, and clothing of various principalities were different. Kongzi did not quite need a visa but obviously he had to face the challenges of the vast differences and diversities that existed. Kongzi did not promote his ideas only in his home principality of Lu. He once said “should the way fail to prevail, I prefer to float about on the sea by taking a raft 道不行乘 桴浮於海” (Analects 5:7).7 His world extended far beyond the so-called Middle Kingdom. So, it is not farfetched to regard Kongzi as a cosmopolitan and a world citizen. Furthermore, both the social-political ideal of the Great Commonwealth (datong 大同) expressed in the Book of Rites and what Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), a great Confucian of fifteenth-century China, said “regarding all under heaven as a family and the Middle Kingdom as one person 視天下為一 家,中國猶一人” in his Questions on the Great Learning hint clearly of a vision of cosmopolitanism. In the ultimate analysis, the Confucian universal core values — including humanity, justice, civility, wisdom, and trust — bespeak cosmopolitan orientations in that they seek to transcend not only individual selfcenteredness but also specific cultures and nation-states. On the other hand, Confucian cosmopolitanism, without ignoring differences and diversities, does not advocate a general, hollow, and abstract idea of uniformity. The principle that Kongzi expounds, not only for relationships between people but also for relationships between countries, is “harmony without unideveloped in the Chinese tradition. A response from the perspective of the Chinese tradition to works such as Zhao’s can be found in Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光’s article, “The Imagination of Tianxia: Politics, Thought, and Scholarship Behind a Utopian Project” (2015).While Ge’s criticisms primarily emphasize that Zhao’s presentation of “tianxia” lacks any substantial foundation in or reference to its Chinese historical context, other critiques, for example, that of William A. Callahan, have noted that it proposes “a system that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights” (Callahan 2008, 753). In my view, this kind of speculative use of the concept “tianxia,” which simply intends to endorse China’s political status quo, has actually nothing to do with Chinese tradition in general or with Confucianism in particular. While it presents itself in the guise of a Confucian proposal, it is far removed from the letter and violates the spirit of core Confucian teachings. Works by intellectuals who truly are immersed in the Chinese and Confucian traditions, not only Chinese such as Hu Shih 胡適 (1950) and Yu Ying-shih 余英時 (1997) but Westerners such as Wm. Theodore de Bary (1983, 1996) as well, have already clarified how and why an interpretation that “values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights” cannot legitimately claim to be a modern development of Confucianism. Since my analysis does not seek to enter into debates about the various narratives concerning “tianxia” in the current Chinese-speaking world, I deliberately use the term “shijiezhuyi 世界主義” instead of “tianxia” as the translation of cosmopolitanism in the Chinese context. 7 Translation by Lau (1992, 37) with minor modification by the author.

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formity (he er bu tong 和而不同),” the precondition of which is precisely acceptance of and respect for the difference and diversity among different individuals. Accordingly, the “kingly way” and “humane regime” that Mengzi advocates also denounce the pursuit of hegemony, giving priority to peace among different countries. In this sense, the Confucian ideal of all-under-heaven does not mean to unify the world with one ideology and one social-political structure. Rather, it means the great harmony of the various peoples and countries, each with their own distinctiveness.

V.

The Confucian Standpoint: A Rooted Cosmopolitanism

The Confucian views of humanity, self, and all-under-heaven suggest that there is a middle ground between the particularity of patriotism and the universality of cosmopolitanism. When we scrutinize the history of humankind, we realize that there have been radical and extreme developments of nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism that posed threats to human flourishing. For instance, once cosmopolitanism was promoted by the Communist International and the imperialist Soviet Union to establish a uniform world by eliminating the differences among various nations, countries, and cultures;8 it was a pernicious ideology, which should reasonably be countered by patriotism or even nationalism. In this situation, the dignity of the individual then should be advocated to fight against the erosion of a hollow and abstract utopia. When nationalism and patriotism were promoted to the extreme, such as the case of the Nazis in Germany, who discriminated against other races, invaded other countries, and launched mass genocide, the spirit of cosmopolitanism stepped forward to protect human dignity. History has already indicated that radical nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism all unavoidably lead to their opposites. As Nussbaum said, “To worship one’s country as if it were a god is indeed to bring a curse upon it.”9 In short, radical nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism are not reflections of the truth, kindness, and beauty that is rooted in our humanity; these 8 According to Wang Ban (2017, 14), Joseph R. Levenson in his Revolution and Cosmopolitanism (1971) connected tianxia with what he called “communism cosmopolitanism.” This strikes me as specious. Tianxia as a political and social ideal of Confucianism, not speculations/imaginations advocated by some contemporary scholars in the guise of Confucianism, is essentially incompatible with communism. The twentieth-century new Confucian scholars who exiled themselves to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and North America have already pointed this out forcefully and in detail. For example, one of the lifelong endeavors of Mou Zongsan was to criticize communism and clarify this essential incompatibility. See my book on Mou’s political and social thought (Peng 2016). 9 For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, 16.

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are not ideals for common good and justice. They are deceitful ideologies designed and deployed to fool the masses. The fall of Nazi Germany and the disintegration of the Communist International prove that false ideas are doomed to be punished by history and eventually abandoned by people, even though they proved popular and demagogic for a time. Hu Shih 胡適 (1891–1962), a leader of the Chinese renaissance in the early twentieth century, inspired by a Chan Buddhist master, warned passionate young people not to become befuddled and seduced by any authoritative and populist discourse, wherever it is from, whether Kongzi or Karl Marx.10 His warning still rings true today. To adjudicate the roles of nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism requires nuanced understanding of history and culture. Nussbaum pointed to the limits of patriotism and criticized radical patriotism that puts one’s race and country over others’, calling on people to pledge their loyalty to universal humanity rather than to the ideology of a particular people. She recommended the cosmopolitanism of the Greek philosopher, Diogenes. However, she also noted that world citizens do not necessarily need to give up their various local identifications, which are resources for individual self-enrichment. From a Confucian point of view, the formation of a world citizen is a process of continuous extension of a concentric circle, from the inner rings of self and family, through the middle rings of community, neighborhood, and state, to the outermost ring of the world. Such a process has already been clearly elaborated in the Great Learning, one of the most important Confucian classics. As it says, “The ancients who wished to illuminate their luminous virtue throughout the world would first govern well their states; wishing to govern their states, they would order well their families; wishing to order well their families, they would first cultivate their own persons; wishing to cultivate their own persons, they would first rectify their heart-minds; wishing to rectify their heart-minds, they would first make their thoughts sincere; wishing to make their thoughts sincere, they would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, their thoughts become sincere; when thoughts become sincere, the heart-minds are rectified; when heart-minds are rectified, their persons are cultivated; when their persons are cultivated, order is brought to their families; when their families are ordered, their states are well governed; when the states are well ordered, peace is brought to the world.”11

10 See his “Introducing My Own Thought 介紹我自己的思想,” a preface Hu Shih (1930) wrote to his Self-Selected Works of Hu Shih 胡適文選, a book designed particularly for young Chinese people. 11 Translation by de Bary and Bloom (1999, 330–331) with minor modification by the author.

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Seen in this light, through self-cultivation, “from the Son of Heaven to ordinary people,” with the establishment of a “one-body” worldview, the tensions between nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism are not insurmountable. Kwame Anthony Appiah once described his own political philosophy and ethics as “rooted cosmopolitanism,” referring to both his specific cultural origins and transcultural intellectual growth. In my view, similarly, Confucianism is a kind of rooted cosmopolitanism or a cosmopolitan patriotism.12 From the perspective of this cosmopolitan patriotism, any country and people should be understood in a context of the whole world and of the universal values shared by all people. The key to the possibility of either a rooted cosmopolitanism or a cosmopolitan patriotism is universal humanity and common good; the conflicts between individuals and countries stem from self-interest, which disregards these larger prerogatives. As Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1193), the twelfth-century Confucian master once said, “Sages appeared tens of thousands of generations ago. They shared this mind; they shared this principle. Sages will appear tens of thousands of generations to come. They will share this mind; they will share this principle. Over the four seas, sages appear. They share this mind; they share this principle.”13 I believe that in a general sense, both Western thinkers such as Nussbaum and Confucian thinkers tend to think alike, though they draw from different intellectual resources. Hence, any discussion of the nexus between nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism will benefit from having multicultural perspectives; in this chapter, I have endeavored to offer a Confucian one.

12 Although I borrow the term “rooted cosmopolitanism” from Kwame Anthony Appiah, this should not be taken to imply that the Confucian form of cosmopolitanism I am trying to develop and advocate here is the same as what he means by “cosmopolitanism.” The cosmopolitanism that Appiah has developed is based upon his own experience and primarily embedded in the setting of Western tradition. Comparatively, a Confucian cosmopolitanism has its own features, not only for having originated and developed in a different cultural context, but also as a way to carry out conversations across boundaries. The Confucian understanding of humanity (or humaneness), self, and all-under-heaven, which I briefly depicted in this article, exactly highlights the core features of Confucian cosmopolitanism. Compared with what Appiah elaborates in his relevant work, the nuances are not difficult to discern. But the resonance between them, in my opinion, is something that warrants that more attention be paid to the theoretical and practical implications of each. 13 Translation from Chan (1969, 579–580).

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References Appiah, Kwame A. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton. Baumeister, Roy F., and Mark R. Lear. 1995. “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation.” Psychological Bulletin 117 (3): 497– 529. Brewer, Marilynn B. 1999. “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate.” Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (Fall): 429–444. Brown, Garrett Wallace. 2009. Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Brown, Garrett Wallace, and David Held, eds. 2010. The Cosmopolitanism Reader. Cambridge: Polity Press. Callahan, William A. 2008. “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review 10: 749–761. Chai, Shaojin. 2011. “Wang Yangming and Chinese Cosmopolitanism in Comparative Perspective.” In China’s Search for Good Governance, edited by Deng Zhenglai and Sujian Guo, 201–228. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cohen, Joshua, ed. 1996. For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore and Irene Bloom, eds. 1999. Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. 1983. The Liberal Tradition in China. New York: Columbia University Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. 1996. The Trouble with Confucianism. Boston: Harvard University Press. Ge, Zhaoguang. 2015. “The Imagination of Tianxia: Politics, Thought, and Scholarship Behind a Utopian Project,” Reflexion 29:1–56. Hu, Shih. 1930. Self-Selected Works of Hu Shih, Shanghai: East Asian Library. Hu, Shih. 1950. “China in Stalin’s Grand Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 29, no. 1 (October): 11– 40. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2014. “Confucian Cosmopolitanism.” Journal of Religious Ethics 42, no.1 (March): 22–44. Lau, D. C., trans. 1992. Confucius, the Analects. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Levenson, Joseph R. 1971. Revolution and Cosmopolitanism: The Western Stage and the Chinese Stages. University of California Press. Liu, Qing. 2015. “Reconstruction of Global Imagination: from ‘All Under Heaven’ to New Cosmopolitanism.” Academic Monthly 8:5–15. Peng, Guoxiang. 2016. This-Worldly Concern of the Wise: Political and Social Thought of Mou Zongsan (1909–1995). Taipei: Lianking Publishing Company. Snyder, Timothy. 2017. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books.

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Wang, Ban, ed. 2017. Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics. Duke University Press. Yu, Ying-shih. 1997. “The Idea of Democracy and the Twilight of the Elite Culture in Modern China.” In Justice and Democracy: Cross-cultural Perspectives, edited by Ron Bontekoe and Marietta Stepaniants, 199–215. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Yu, Ying-shih. 2000. “Democracy, Human Rights and Confucian Culture.” The Fifth Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Distinguished Lecture in Asian Studies. Oxford: Asian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

Chen Sun

Social Harmony and Economic Progress: Confucian Philosophy and Global Sustainable Development Edited and translated by Kirill O. Thompson

I.

Introduction: From Traditional Society to Modern Society

What lessons does Confucian philosophy have to offer for establishing global sustainable development? This chapter draws on economic development theory, the life sciences, and Taiwanese socio-economic development, to show how Confucian values evolved with and reflect traditional society and institutions and, more importantly, how Confucian philosophy and values offer lessons for achieving sustainable global development. The economist Simon Kuznets (1901–1985) observed that global economic development has had two basic stages in human history, namely, a period of traditional stagnation and a period of modern growth. The period of traditional stagnation exhibited no sustained technological progress. Occasional progress in technology did improve productivity, causing total output and hence per capita output and per capita income to increase. However, increased per capita income improved living conditions causing population to increase, which pushed per capita income back to its original level. The Industrial Revolution led the world into the period of modern growth. Sustained technological progress ensued, inducing continual rises in labor productivity and total output, which surpassed population growth to enable per capita output and per capita income to increase steadily. In the present study, traditional society refers to the society of the period of traditional stagnation. Modern society refers to the society of the period of modern growth. “Growth” is a concept adopted from biology, reflecting that although the observations and analyses of growth theories are focused on changes in productivity and output, complex social and cultural changes are also involved in the process of growth. This is just like the growth of plants and animals, which is not simply a matter of getting taller and larger, but also involves complexities of internal changes. Early in the last century, the British neo-classical economist

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Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) wrote, “The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics.”1 [Introduced by the translator: Charles Wohlforth also describes the parallel dynamics of evolution and economy in periods of intense competition (as in modern society) versus periods of equilibrium (as in traditional society): Intense “competition drives evolution and economics toward complexity, diversity, greater capability, and the concentration of power, the one-way flow of evolution, economics, and history…. In the fast-evolving setting of excess wealth and competition, individual animals drive natural selection and improvement. But individuals don’t matter as much in ecosystems at equilibrium. Life becomes cyclic, ruled by external forces rather than innovation from within. G. Vermeij notes that human individualism receded as well during those long spans of history when growth and innovation were dormant. He characterized economically stagnant societies as community-oriented, conservative, socially stratified, religious, and hostile to newness. The advance of science and culture depended on investing in ideas that might not work. That kind of investing requires excess wealth.” (Italics added.)2 Evolutionary biologist Geertat Vermeij (1947–) also sees the same laws at work in economics and evolution and makes the startling remark: “We continue to obey the fundamental principles of economics that were set down at life’s beginning by inanimate, unintelligent processes, even as we invent startlingly novel abilities and institutions. Nothing in the historical record or in the arsenal of economic principles suggests that humanity can alter the directionality inherent in history even as we overwhelm the biosphere.”3]

II.

Confucian Ethics and Its Social Support System

Confucius (551–471 BCE) lived about 2,500 years ago, during the period of traditional stagnation in early China. In general, because of the overall economic stagnation, individual pursuits of wealth could not contribute to the wealth of society at the time. Total welfare arose from social harmony and stability instead of from economic growth. Confucius’ philosophy offered an “ethical priority” value perspective. He encouraged his students to practice self-cultivation, conduct themselves ethi1 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1920, eighth edition), 13. 2 Charles Wohlforth, The Fate of Nature: Rediscovering Our Ability to Rescue the Earth (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 92. 3 Geertat Vermeij, Nature: An Economic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

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cally, and be people of good character. His students later went on to contribute their efforts to society and advance social harmony and stability. As Confucius taught, the exemplary person ( junzi 君子) cultivates himself, not just to manifest inner reverence ( jing 敬), but to bring peace and security to others and the community (Analects 14:42).4 Ethics refers to the proper conduct of basic interpersonal relationships, the sorts of relationships that induce feelings of compassion and care in people. One’s personal practice of ethics is morality. Therefore, the words “ethics” and “morality” are closely connected. Ethics is expressed in one’s moral conduct, and morality is nothing but one’s personal practice of ethics. Morality refers to the moral character at the heart of ethics that one expresses in sincere conduct; in Confucius’ terms, the person of moral character is the exemplary person. Anticipating modernity, the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) held that ethics is a set of general principles produced by natural reason, which he called natural laws. In barbarous times, there are no moral limits, nor are there any legal constraints. People vie against each other for their personal benefit and regard other people as enemies. Even though each person has great freedom of action and largely can do as they please, they frequently encounter grave dangers and often fear for their life. In this sort of “state of nature” with danger lurking at every turn, any rational person would be willing to accept some general ethical principles and restrain their own behavior to have increased security. Even though the freedom of each person would be restrained by this sort of policy; as a rule, each person would have greater actual freedom. Moreover, with the implementation of such restraints, society would be more harmonious and secure, people would be more productive, and life would be more prosperous and meaningful. What Hobbes calls the Natural Law or the set of natural rules produced by natural reason are what we call ethics. Hobbes based his ethical theory on the self-interestedness of human nature. He held that self-interest is the motive force of human conduct but admitted that self-interest also has limits. Unlimited self-interest would be incompatible with rational personal interest. Therefore, we should call the sort of self-interest that Hobbes advocates “enlightened self-interest.”5 If ethics springs from love, concern, and the impulse to benefit others, then ethics is at once an intrinsic value of human nature and an ultimate end pursued in human life. However, if ethics springs from the self-interestedness of human nature, even if it is enlightened self-interest, then in cases where the dictates of ethics clearly 4 All quotations from The Analects of Confucius are adapted from D.C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The Analects (Lun-yu) (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1983). The citations are to chapter and verse in the Analects, which are the same in nearly all editions. 5 David Stewart, Business Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1996), 6–10.

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offer no benefit, or are contrary to one’s interest, how can one still be persuaded to act ethically? This is the point at which traditional Chinese culture and modern Western culture part company. Confucius remarks, “Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves” (Analects 2:3). In traditional Chinese culture, ethics meant to assume responsibilities and duties, not to acquire rights and benefits. Nonetheless, individuals’ rights and benefits would receive due consideration over time. If the people’s rights and benefits were seriously eroded due to an overly hierarchical social order, for example, social harmony and stability would be difficult to maintain. Therefore, ethics must be maintained in a fair and well-balanced social order.

III.

The Particularism and Universalism in Confucian Ethics

Confucian ethics is family-centered. Its circle of concern extends outward, from near to far. It extends from the family to the community, ultimately to those who one doesn’t know as well as those who one knows. Confucius said, “A young man should be a good son at home and an obedient young man abroad, sparing of speech but trustworthy in what he says, and should love the people but cultivate the friendship of his fellows. If he has energy to spare from such action, let him devote it to making himself cultivated” (Analects 1:6). Confucius makes two important points in this remark. First, ethics is more important than knowledge or the arts. One studies texts and cultivates the arts only after one has carried out one’s daily life duties, namely, family chores. Second, ethics has levels and degrees. Besides caring about others, we have other self-regarding duties, such as to be sincere in conduct and reserved in speech. While we take care not to harm others or do unto them as we would not have done unto us, we have special duties to our family relations and close friends. These concerns refer to the “three good virtues” of Adam Smith: “prudence,” looking after one’s interests; “justice,” not harming other people’s interests; and “benevolence,” augmenting other people’s interests. Why do we have so many special duties to family members and close friends? The family is one’s school of moral education and ethical staging ground. Thus, we speak of “family education” as important for the formation of moral character. Youzi said, “It is rare for a person whose character is such that he is good as a child and obedient as a youth to have the inclination to transgress against his superiors; it is unheard of for one who has no such inclination to be inclined to start a rebellion. The exemplary person devotes himself to his roots, for once the

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roots are established, the Way will grow therefrom. Being good as a child and obedient as a youth is, perhaps, the root of a person’s character” (Analects 1:2). Youzi, one of Confucius’ students, here touches on Confucius’ universalism and particularism. Family members, besides having the natural affection of living creatures, also have obligations, love, and all kinds of reciprocal relations in the social order and the family organization. The family is the foundation of society and looking after family members is a person’s most basic ethical duty. This moral requirement holds true across time and space, from past to present, around the world. This sense of ethical duty to one’s close family members is more deeply felt than the care and concern that one feels for people in general. Mencius (372–289 BCE) has an apt remark on ethical particularism and universalism: “Master Yang (440–360 BCE) advocates everyone for himself, which amounts to a denial of one’s prince. Master Mo (470–391 BCE) advocates love without distinctions, which amounts to a denial of one’s father. To ignore one’s father, on one hand, and one’s prince, on the other, is to be no different than the beasts” (Mencius 3B/9).6 Mencius deemed that Yang Zhu was only concerned about his own interests and had no conception of obligation to country or society, and that Mo Ti had impartial regard for everyone in the empire but no conception of the special ethical bonds associated with family ties. While Mencius’ view reflected his feudal, hierarchical society, some have argued that Yang Zhu’s egoism anticipates modern views, suggesting that society would benefit if people were to prioritize cultivating themselves so they would be capable and independent, and that Mozi’s impartial regard would be a necessary virtue as society evolves from a network of feudal clans to a secular society of roughly equal farmers, craftsmen, tradesmen, and traders. Benevolence (ren 仁) is the core concept of Confucianism. It is a complex concept, and in introducing benevolence Confucius was in fact creating a new ethical concept! 7 Therefore, every time a student asked Confucius about the meaning of benevolence, Confucius would give the matter further thought and offer a fresh answer that filled out the concept and suited that student! When Fan Chi asked about benevolence, the Master responded by asserting the basic import of benevolence: “Love others” (Analects 12:22). When students 6 All quotations from the Mencius are adapted from D.C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984). The citations refer to chapter and verse which are the same in all editions. 7 Translator’s note: Ren 仁 or benevolence was Confucius’ core value. The term originally meant kindness, but Confucius expanded it to mean acting with others in mind. In the context of traditional Chinese society, this meant fulfilling one’s defined interpersonal relationships with sincerity and dedication, starting from one’s family relations, to school, neighborhood, village, state, empire, world. Confucius contrasted this altruistic virtue with the self-seeking of those guided by their ego-self.

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began to discuss benevolence as a lofty ideal, the Master told them, “Is benevolence something far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is right here!” (Analects 12:30). When Zizhang asked about benevolence, the Master replied, “There are five matters, and whoever is capable of putting them into practice in the Empire certainly possesses benevolence.” Zizhang begged to know the details, “May I ask what they are?” The Master explained, “They are being respectful, tolerant, trustworthy, responsive, and generous. If a person is respectful, he will not be treated with insolence. If he is tolerant, he will win over the people. If he is trustworthy, his fellows will entrust him with responsibility. If he is responsive, he will achieve results. If he is generous, he will be good enough to be put in a position over his fellows” (Analects 17:6). Benevolence springs from a person’s inner heart and is manifested in one’s outer conduct where it has a decisive positive impact. Benevolence has a variety of arenas, such as family, society, profession, government, and one manifests it differently in each arena. The full realization of benevolence involves many factors, subjective and objective. Nevertheless, at root, realizing benevolence involves promoting the well-being of others. That is why, even though the practical minister Guan Zhong lacked the refinement of gentility and had flaws as a “gentleman,” because he had helped Duke Hwan of Qi maintain peace and stability in the Empire and had prevented the loss of life and property among the common people, Confucius regarded Guan Zhong as a man of benevolence, a moral attribution that few of the more elegant nobles could claim. Zigong said, “If there were a person who gave extensively to the common people and delivered assistance to the multitude, what would you think of that person?” The Master replied, “As to such a person, perhaps ‘sage’ would be the right word. Even Yao and Shun would have found it difficult to accomplish as much” (Analects 6:30). If a person were so gracious toward the people, granting the multitude such benefits, he would not just have carried out benevolence; he would have verily entered the realm of the sages.

IV.

Rites and Ritual Propriety Form Traditional Society’s Incentive System

As to the objective conditions of benevolence, for any society during any era, the practice of ethics is not only a requirement of personal excellence, it is also needed to sustain the social order by rewarding good and punishing evil and restraining and guiding the behavior of people in all social sectors. Regarding the relationship between ethics and rites, Zixia mentions a suggestive metaphor in the Analects.

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Zixia asked, “As to these lines in an ode, ‘Her entrancing smile dimpling, / Her beautiful eyes glancing, / Patterns of color on plain silk,’ what do they mean?” The Master replied, “There is first the plain silk. The colors come afterwards.” Zixia asked, “Do observances of the rites likewise come afterwards?” The Master responded, “It is you, Shang, who has cast light on the text for me. Only with a person like you can one discuss the Odes” (Analects 3:8). Since Confucius had not realized that preparing to apply makeup could be a metaphor for preparing to perform the rites, he said, “Only with a person like you can one discuss the Odes.” What do the rites follow? The rites follow benevolence; that is, they follow after ethics. The Master further said, “What can a person have to do with the rites who is not of benevolence? What can a person have to do with music who is not of benevolence?” (Analects 3:3). The rites constitute the social order, and they offer objective means for improving society. The Grand Historian Sima Qian (145–86 BCE) wrote: “Vast, bounteous virtue masters the myriad things and serves all the communities of people. By what human effort may such virtue be achieved? It emanates from the proper official conduct of the major rites. Looking into the additions and reductions of the rites of the Three Dynasties, one would realize that the rites had been designed in accordance with human emotions and the rites had been designed in accordance with human nature. The rites have a long history of evolution” (Sima Qian, The Grand Record of History (Shiji), “The Book of Rites” (“Lishu”). In a word, the rites may be regarded as patterns of social discipline. Sima Guang (1019–1088) wrote, Of the functions of the emperor (Son of Heaven), none is more important than observance of the rites. In observing the rites, nothing is more important than the roles. For the roles, nothing is more important than titles. What are called the rites? The network of rules and precedents of the rites. What are called roles? Ruler and minister are examples. What are called titles? Duke (gong), marquise (hou), noble (qing), and high official (daifu) are examples. Thus, as vast as the four seas, as multitudinous as the myriad peoples, binding on every person, no matter one’s peerless power and wisdom, none dare to run astray and not comply. How could it not be because the rites are the network of rules and precedents of the rites?! Through their auspices the emperor rules the three dukes, the three dukes regulate the nobles and high officials, and the nobles and high officials rule the officers (military and educational) and the common people. The social status of the noble people is above that of the common people, and the social status of the common people is below that of the noble people. The superiors in assigning missions to subordinates, it is as if their hearts and souls were moving hands and feet, the roots and trunk controlling branches and leaves; the subordinates in serving their superiors, it is as if their hands and feet were protecting heart and soul, the branches and leaves sheltering trunk and roots. They allow superior and subordinate to protect each other and the state to be orderly and secure. Therefore, it is said that,

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among the roles of the emperor, none is more important than proper observance of the rites. (From Sima Guang, Zizhi tongjing, “Zhou Ji 1.” Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government, “Zhou Rites.”)

In this passage, Sima Guang is describing the early Western Zhou royal feudal system. The social organization was simple. By imperial edict, resources were shared to preserve harmony and stability in the empire. By the Spring and Autumn Period of the Eastern Zhou, the authority of the emperor had weakened, and Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Wen of Jin, and three other feudal lords were called the Five Usurpers, for taking over the emperor’s role and authority to maintain order and peace in the empire. Reflecting on this situation, Confucius remarked, “When the Way prevails in the empire, the rites and music and punitive measures are initiated by the emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the world, they are initiated by the feudal lords. When they are initiated by the feudal lords, it is surprising if power does not pass from the emperor within ten generations. When they are initiated by the Counsellors, it is surprising if power does not pass from the feudal lords within five generations. When the prerogative to command in a state is in the hands of officials of the Counsellors, it is surprising if power does not pass from the Counsellors within three generations. When the Way prevails in the empire, the Commoners do not express critical views” (Analects 16:2). According to historical records, “After the five usurpers, there was no emperor above nor any regional leaders below in place to reward the worthy or punish the evil. The network of rules and precedents was severed.” Here, “regional leaders” referred to chieftains who had been feudal lords. That is, regional leaders would step in to play the role of the five usurpers. In the Western Han dynasty, the system of rites was restored. Sima Qian wrote in the Shiji, “Lishu,” “The human way is a mosaic of myriad sprouts; its compass and square penetrate in every direction, enticing by benevolence and righteousness,8 controlling behavior by rules and punishments. Therefore, those of ample virtue occupy seats of honor and those of double emolument are favored with grace and honor. Therefore, everywhere within the seas, the myriad people are blessed with good order.” Sima Qian recognized that human thought and conduct are influenced by all sorts of factors. It is complicated. However, no matter how complex things become, there is always a moral compass and ethical square to penetrate the situation. Society uses benevolence and righteousness as incentives to guide, and rules and punishments as restraints. Let virtuous people 8 Translator’s note: Righteousness or yi 義 was Confucius’ cardinal virtue for doing what was fitting and right, fulfilling one’s duty. Whereas benevolence was a positive, outgoing virtue, righteousness included judging right and wrong, and acting accordingly. These two virtues were mutually conditioning and supporting.

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of good character occupy lofty positions, let gifted people of accomplishment receive honor and respect. This sort of arrangement was for the sake of gathering all the resources within the seas, consolidating people’s efforts to reach the goals of society, also to advance the welfare of all the people. In this remark, Sima Qian suggested that the fundamental principle of a state’s stability and progress was to set up a sort of social incentive system that would lead everyone in society to pursue their own proper goals and result in society’s reaching its goals of stability and progress. Notably, like Confucius, Sima Qian prioritized the moral values of benevolence and righteousness over merit, reputation, profit, and emolument. This was a reflection of Confucius’ approach of ethical priority. Broadly speaking, the rites embraced three facets: rites (propriety), regulation (square), and social system. The rites were the formal system for manifesting ethics. Regulation was to maintain ethical distinctions, so that each person played their social roles properly. And regulation required the institutional support of the society. Confucius said, “I have heard that wherever people live, the rites are of the utmost importance. Without the rites, there is no way to adjust their supplications to the spirits of heaven and earth. Without the rites, there is no way to distinguish properly between ruler and minister, superior and subordinate, senior and junior” (Liji, “Ai Gong Wen”). In Confucius’ estimation, whether people will enjoy secure, happy, good lives, will largely depend on rites. Rites tell us how to offer sacrifices to the spirits of heaven and earth with propriety. Rites help us to distinguish between the positions of ruler and minister, superior and subordinate, and senior and junior. Rites help us to differentiate the appropriate degrees of affection between husband and wife, father and son, and elder and younger brother, so that marriage relations and friendship relations are maintained with proper affection and closeness. For this reason, the exemplary person ( junzi) will regard the rites with the utmost seriousness. Confucius made these remarks in old age, when he had returned to the state of Lu after gaining much experience during his travels to various states to offer his services.

V.

Economy, Society, and Human Relations in the Modern Growth Period

Entering the modern growth period, total welfare of the general public arises not only from social harmony and stability but also from economic growth and increased per capita income. When income exceeds consumption, the surplus becomes savings. Savings accumulated become wealth. The human impulse to pursue personal interest in terms of income and wealth is encouraged. Adam Smith wrote, “While self-interest is an inalienable part of human nature, the

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enlightened approach is to use personal incentives to establish a more prosperous society.”9 Smith did not worry that the pursuit of personal interest would cause harm to others. He said that while people’s impulse to seek self-interest is powerful, it is always restrained by “reason, principle, and conscience.” The ceaseless advance of technology propels an uninterrupted rise of productivity and increase of per capita income, so the people are liberated from the chains of poverty and able to satisfy their cravings for material pleasures, and then to go beyond crude materialism and begin to pursue autonomy and freedom. Modern economic growth changes human attitudes from negative acquiescence to positive aggression and from collectivism to individualism. The personal self is empowered and positively expressed; life is now devoted to pursuing personal goals. The social order is strained by centripetal forces and ever more difficult to maintain. For this reason, it becomes increasingly important for the self to adjust itself to society in accordance with ethics. Population trends have changed in step with changes in work. The traditional extended family has vanished and the modern family of two parents and one or two children — or even no children — is the norm. As to equality in education, the educational opportunities of women have increased, so their employment options have improved and they now freely enter the workforce to pursue their ideal career choices. Income has increased, the standard of living has been raised, fertility has decreased, health status has improved, vitality has extended, and longevity has increased. As a result of these changes marriages have become more and more difficult to maintain into old age, the divorce rate has increased, remarriage and multiple remarriages have become socially acceptable and are now deemed common and normal. The social function of the family in child rearing, pattern maintenance, resource sharing, unemployment and old-age insurance has gradually diminished. Relations between family members, clans, relatives and neighbors have weakened, while relations between friends, colleagues, professionals and general social connections are growing stronger.

VI.

As Civilization Advances, Family Affections Grow Distant

Adam Smith held that, besides ourselves, we are most concerned about our family members, including our parents, children, and siblings. At the same time, the degrees of concern differ. Our concern for our children exceeds that for our parents; our love for our children is boundless, even our respect for and gratitude 9 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Classics edition, 1981), 26–27.

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to our parents cannot compare. This is human nature. After children are born into the world, they are completely dependent on their parents’ care. However, the parents’ existence is not completely dependent on their children. From a natural perspective, infants are more important than elders, and infants attract even more concern. After all, the entire future depends on the survival of the children while little depends on the survival of the elders. This is a biological imperative. Our relations with our siblings are based on deep emotions that formed while growing up together. Our relations with nephews, nieces, and other kin, such as cousins, tend to grow faint and distant. Smith held that the affections between parents and their children and among siblings are just expressions of habitual sympathy and sensitivity because they are produced while living together under the same roof for extended periods. So, if one’s children live far away or one’s siblings are scattered, the affection between them will grow weaker. Smith did not believe in blood or biological affection; he thought that sort of emotion exists only in tragedies and romances. Smith said that the legal system alone was insufficient to fully protect people’s security and interests in traditional agrarian society. People of the same clan tended to live in close proximity to mount a common defense against outsiders. Their mutual dependence and intercourse were greater with one another than with people from other clans. Members of one clan, no matter how distant, would maintain strong relations with members of their clan in hopes of security and receiving better treatment than average. In modern commercial society, the legal system is complete and sufficient to protect everyone’s interests, so people of the same clan may pursue their own interests and benefits anywhere in society. With modernization and urbanization, not only does such traditional mutual concern decline, but clan origins and common ancestors are often forgotten. Smith said that as civilization advances, clan relations grow fainter and more distant.10

VII.

Ethical Concerns in Taiwan’s Process of Economic Development

On March 15, 1981, Kuo-ting Li (1910–2001), a former Minister of Economic Affairs, Minister of Finance, who has often been declared the architect of Taiwan’s economic development and godfather of the development of the high-tech sector, was invited to address the annual conference of the ROC Society for Sociology.

10 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment (Penguin Books, 2009), 258–265.

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Kuo-ting Li discussed the patterns of behavior of people in modern society based on his observations in Taiwan. He said that the people in modern society were so enthusiastic in pursuing their own interests that they ignored and even harmed the interests of others, particularly strangers with whom they had no particular relationship and the population in general. He attributed this deficiency to the lack of what he called “the sixth relationship” in ethics. The sixth relationship referred to a broad relationship beyond the five basic relationships of traditional Chinese society between parent and child, elder and younger siblings, husband and wife, ruler and minister, and friends. The sixth relationship includes an ethic of one’s personal interactions with strangers with whom one has no particular relationship as well as with the general population.

VIII. Kuo-ting Li’s “Sixth Relationship” Kuo-ting Li asserted that although people in Taiwan were generally courteous in society, they still only maintained truly polite relations with those they knew but not necessarily with those they didn’t know in society. He illustrated his point with two stories. In the first story, a foreigner taking a taxi told the taxi driver, “You Taiwanese say your land is the country of politeness. You don’t step ahead of others when you walk and you don’t sit in the seat for the guest of honor when you eat; why is it that when you drive you don’t yield to the other cars? The taxi driver replied, “I don’t know the other drivers, why should I yield to them?” In the other story, without a trace of irony a father scolded his child, “Why did you steal someone’s pencil? Don’t I take enough pencils from the office for you to use?” A foreigner who had resided in Taiwan for several years reported that when he was about to leave Taiwan a friend asked him what sentence could best describe Taiwanese society. He thought about it for a moment and replied, “It won’t matter if you have connections, but it will matter if you have no connections.”11 This explains the early stage of a modern society still transforming from a traditional society during which people still indulge in the warm ethics of the five relationships, while the sense of the sixth relation has yet to be developed. The five relationships involve definite reciprocal relations, as well as certain rights and duties. For example, the parents ought to be compassionate and the children filial. The elder sibling should be fraternal and the younger sibling respectful. Husband and wife should complement each other. Friends should cherish their trust. And, while the ruler should employ the ministers in accordance with the rites, the ministers should serve the ruler with loyalty, etc. Every 11 Translator’s note: “Connections” and “what matters” are expressed by the same term in Chinese, “guanxi 關係,” so the statement is based on a pun or equivocation.

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relationship has an important social function, and society also forms supervisory mechanisms, usually informal, to apply pressure on those who violate the norms of these relationships. However, the sixth relationship is indefinite and unrevealed. People do not feel much guilt about causing harm to people they do not know, no matter who they are or where they are. Since the harm would happen to anonymous others, people don’t feel concerned, sometimes to the extent of disregarding the interests of others with whom they have no relationship while pursuing their own interests or the interests of those with whom they are closely related. For this reason, we have witnessed not only disorderly traffic but corruption, fraud, and all sorts of violations of the common interests of society. The raw pursuit of personal interest sometimes cannot fulfill the general interest of the whole society, as Adam Smith held, because of shortcomings in the sixth relationship. Kuo-ting Li’s proposal about the sixth relationship stirred an enthusiastic response in society. Others even proposed a seventh relationship: the relationship between humanity and the environment, between society and nature. Upon seeing society’s enthusiastic response to his proposal, Kuo-ting Li published an article in the United Daily (Lian Ho Pao) on “Economic Development and Ethical Construction: Establishing the Self-Group Relationship in the Process of National Modernization” (March 28, 1981) to elaborate his proposal about the sixth relationship. He called the traditional five relationships “particularistic relationships” and modern society’s sixth relationship a “universal relationship.” The ethics of particularistic relationships belongs to the sphere of private morality while the ethics of universal relationships belongs to the sphere of public virtue. Economic development prompts social change and changes the formation and character of interpersonal relations. The traditional ethics of the five relationships is gradually receding while the modern ethics of the sixth relationship is taking shape. With technological advances and rising personal productivity, the impact of economic activity on society and the environment is increasingly great. For this reason, the ethics of the sixth relationship grows ever more crucial. Importantly, it mitigates and softens people’s greed for personal profit and lack of concern for public justice. It reduces the harm we cause to the interests of others with whom we have no particular relationship. If people don’t feel the sting of conscience, society will need to enforce appropriate punishments and penalties, thereby further undermining public virtue and ultimately forming a normless society. Thus, Kuo-ting Li said, “No country with a benighted people can maintain longterm economic progress.” He called on the people of Taiwan to have integrity regarding the proper use of public assets, cherish the public environment, maintain public order, respect third party interests, and be fair to strangers.

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Kuo-ting Li’s proposal of the sixth relationship received widespread public approval. Afterwards, his article was taught in Chinese literature classes at elite professional schools. Some scholars offered a different opinion. They claimed that Confucian ethics already includes the sixth relationship. As a matter of fact, however, Kuo-ting Li was addressing real social phenomena in Taiwan while the scholars were referring to the ideal ethics in Confucian thought. The lack of a support system for the ethics allowed a gap to appear between the social reality and the old ideals. The situation resembled the gap between social reality and ethics that Smith identified during the transition from agrarian society to modern commercial society in Scotland in the eighteenth century. In 1991, Kuo-ting Li and several of his supporters in industry and academia established the ROC Social Ethics Association (literally: “Association to Promote Group-Self Ethics” 中華民國群我倫理促進會). Kuo-ting Li was elected the first chairman of the society and actively promoted the ethics of the sixth relationship. The ethics of the sixth relationship or “self-group ethics” belongs to social ethics. Strictly speaking, self-group ethics refers to relations between the individual and the group or the general public but does not extend to relations between the individual and strangers in society at large. The ROC Social Ethics Association arranged a wide range of activities, including concerts, lectures, television shows, and the publication of books. They produced a theme song and designed a logo, as well, hoping to present the sixth relationship as an ethics of “extending love” or “extending one’s heart in love to other people.” Also, like Confucius’ ideal of benevolence as “loving others,” their stress on the sixth relationship as an ethics of extending love encouraged people to carry it out in daily life and establish a harmonious society in which personal interest and public good coincide. Still, while advances in technology and economic growth can be rapid, social and cultural change is a long-term process. Afterwards, observing the continued disarray in Taiwan’s government and society, Kuo-ting Li felt discouraged about promoting the sixth relationship and lost hope. He once said, “Now, even the five relationships are already nonexistent, not to mention the sixth relationship.” However, the five relationships belong to particularistic ethics, while the sixth relationship belongs to universal ethics. During the period of economic development and society’s change from the period of traditional stagnation to the period of modern growth, for particular relationships to grow distant while general relationships become more important than ever is simply a natural trend. Be it the five relationships, the sixth relationship, or the seventh relationship, ethics needs incentives from society in order to be generally accepted and followed. Because interpersonal relationships directly involve one’s personal interests and the interests of others, or even conflicts of interests, the greater the interests at stake, the closer the attention people pay. Restraining one’s will to

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pursue one’s own interests requires not only personal virtue but also the encouragement and restraint of society. Therefore, the promotion of the sixth relationship, as well as the seventh relationship, involves both the strengthening of personal morality and the establishment of a comprehensive social incentive system as a supporting mechanism. This is a crucial step needed for a traditional stagnant society to move into a modern growth society.

IX.

Taiwanese Social Trust Survey

In 2001, the ROC Social Ethics Association conducted its first Taiwan social trust survey, to measure the degree of social trust held for different roles in society. In 2002, a second survey was conducted. Afterwards, the survey was done once every two years. It was intended to detect changes in the degree of social trust held for different roles in society in order to detect changes in the conduct of interpersonal relationships and gather empirical support for the emerging factor of the sixth relationship in contemporary society. In the survey, “5” was a full score. For trust of social roles, the category “general people in society” represented the common people. How much trust does society place in general people? This provided insight into the extent to which society observes the sixth relationship. Ethically speaking, from traditional society to modern society, the degree of trust in the five basic relationships, mainly kin relations, should decrease while the degree of trust in the sixth ethical relationship, i. e., with people in general, should increase. According to the survey results, trust in family relations consistently scored about 4.7. This was the highest degree of trust registered for any relationship. Still, the respondents tended to hold such a high degree of trust only for their nuclear family members, namely, their spouse and children. Generally, however, the processes of modernization and urbanization caused interpersonal relationships to become distant. Modern urbanites have left their hometowns to toil in isolation in the big cities. In this situation, it was only very close family members in whom people placed deep trust. “General people in society” scored 2.8 and ranked 9th among the 12 roles observed in 2001. As the economy and society progressed, trust in the general people had notably increased in recent years, reflecting the improvement of the sixth relationship, which was consistent with the good impression of foreign visitors on the kindness and politeness of the Taiwan people. In the last three years surveyed until 2017, the score and ranking of “general people in society” had held respectively at 3.47–3.42 and ranked 6th–7th among a total of 14 roles. The roles ahead of “general people in society” included: family members, medical

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doctors, schoolteachers, basic government officials, police officers, and neighbors, taking 2017 for an example. The social factors that have long helped improve the sixth relationship include the advances of the public sector and business sector, or business enterprises. As the legal system and government regulations became more comprehensive, the rights and interests of individuals in society became more sufficiently protected. Moreover, business enterprises increasingly took business ethics and corporate social responsibility seriously and sought to establish a corporate culture of integrity and dedication to benefit society and protect the environment, strengthen the social foundation, and reduce the cost of trust. These factors combined to provide strong incentives for people to behave ethically, leading to the improvement of social trust.

X.

World Economic Development is Difficult to Sustain

Modern economic growth brings unprecedented affluence to people around the world. However, the widespread personal pursuit of wealth, national pursuit of economic growth, and unprecedented insatiable greed, make world economic development increasingly difficult to sustain. In the 1970s, the problem that most preoccupied the world was the depletion of natural resources. This problem arose because technological advances caused increases in the rate of use of natural resources. Since then, technological progress, which improves the efficiency of the use of resources, and discovery of new resources has temporarily eased the problem. Nevertheless, with continuing rapid global economic growth and increasing human population, the Earth’s accumulated billion-year reserve of natural resources of all kinds is being depleted at an accelerating rate, making the sustainability of future development problematic. Since the 1980s, the problem that has preoccupied the world has been climate change. Economic growth and population growth engender expanding economic activity, widespread burning of fossil fuels, and unprecedented releases of greenhouse gases, causing the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere to increase and global temperatures to rise. For the past 800,000 years until recent decades, the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere had ranged between 200–300 ppm. At present, that amount has surpassed 400 ppm, causing the average global temperature to rise by 1.2°C since the start of the industrial revolution two hundred years ago. Scientists predict that by 2030 the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere will reach 450 ppm, causing the average global temperature to rise by another 0.8°C. This is a conservative estimate. Extending this projection, by the end of the twenty-first century the average global temperature will rise by 4.8°C; the Arctic polar ice cap

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will melt completely, the oceans will rise by several meters, and many coastal areas will be flooded, including densely populated coastal areas with megacities; extreme weather and weather anomalies will be ever more frequent, natural ecologies will be disrupted or destroyed, mass extinctions will occur, and even the continued existence of humanity will be at risk. A critical problem concerning the reduction of the use of natural resources and alleviation of global warming is that countries differ in per capita income reflecting roughly whether they entered the modern growth era earlier or later. The world economy must continue to grow in order for poor countries to escape from poverty. In September 2000, the General Assembly of the United Nations ratified its statement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Based on World Bank estimates, the percentage of impoverished people in the world population had declined from 43.1% in 1990 to 20.6% in 2000, beating the target set by 5 years.12 By 2015, all of the MDGs set in 2000 had been met. In September 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations ratified the 2015–2030 statement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The most important goals were to end poverty and hunger, cease climate change, protect the oceans, and care for the Earth in order to achieve sustainable development. Sustainable development was first defined in 1987 by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as referring to “necessary economic development that satisfies the needs of the present without harming the ability of future generations to satisfy their needs.” At the Paris Climate Conference, held in December 2015 with participants from 195 countries, including 147 heads of state, 187 countries submitted a voluntary carbon reduction plan. On December 12, the Paris Agreement was ratified with the stated minimal goal of keeping the average global rise in temperature below 2°C and striving to keep it below 1.5°C. In 2016, the November 28 issue of Time magazine reported that the warming effect of the carbon dioxide already released into the atmosphere today would only be fully revealed after several decades. Even if the signatory countries could all meet their carbon dioxide reduction pledges, the global average temperature in 2100 would still rise by at least 2.7°C, surpassing the 2.0°C red line. Furthermore, on June 1 of 2017, not long after Donald Trump assumed office as the US president, he announced that the United States was pulling out of the Paris Agreement, which has made it increasingly difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of global carbon reduction efforts. The rich countries of the world must maintain steady economic growth in order to support the growth of the poor countries and reduce world poverty. 12 The World Bank, World Development Report 2003 — Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003), 5–6.

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Moreover, there are also poor people in the rich countries, so economic growth is also necessary for their income to be increased. In a word, the world economy must continue to expand. Even if world economic growth were to cease, the present amount of CO2 in the atmosphere would continue to drive climate change. The mindset of most people in the world can be expressed in an old Chinese saying, “One who won’t give up until reaching the Yellow River; one who won’t shed tears until seeing the coffin.” They only fear facing the moment when it is too late for regrets. Present economic growth is driven by technological advances that raise labor productivity and result in increasing per capita income, as a long-run supply side phenomenon. As to demand side policy: it is imperative to adopt an expansive monetary policy to increase the money supply, or an expansive fiscal policy to increase government spending. This sort of policy approach serves to increase aggregate demand, stimulating employment and production, thus increasing the economic growth rate. However, once the plateau of full employment is reached further increase in demand would lead only to inflation or a worsening of the balance of trade, and the effectiveness of demand-expansion policies would be lost. The theory of demand management was proposed by John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) to explain the Great Depression in the 1930s. According to this theory, during a recession, the government could adopt an expansionary monetary or fiscal policy to increase aggregate demand to achieve full employment. Since the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the investment prospects of the corporate world, Keynes advised the adoption of fiscal measures. However, such short-term policies designed in response to the business cycle have some drawbacks like gulping poison to slake one’s thirst when applied to long-term economic growth. The liberalization of the 1970s has led many countries to relax regulations and reduce taxes, enabling commodities to flow freely across borders. In the 1980s, China and India, the world’s two most populous countries, opened their economies and the communist regimes of East Europe collapsed, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. All of these formerly centrally planned command economies joined the world market; consequently, the world economy truly began to globalize. One of the most significant consequences of globalization has been the decline of the rate of inflation. Should the rate of inflation rise in any country, commodities world-wide would flow in, just as streams flow downward, keeping the inflation down. In fact, the rate of world inflation has been kept at a much lower level than before, and the magnitude of its fluctuation around the downward trend has been minimized since the 1990s. The decline of the rate of commodity price inflation thus encouraged central banks of major countries to relax the supply of money. Increasing the money

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supply in tandem with stable prices lets interest rates fall, pushing asset values to increase. As excessive money supply flows into the asset market in pursuit of higher asset values, the price of assets rises. Increases of asset prices produce capital gains, which attract more money, making asset prices grow even higher. Assets include real estate and financial assets, and financial assets consist of stocks and bonds. Real estate can be securitized to also become a financial asset. The deregulations of the 1990s led to the innovation of a number of financial offerings including, notably, securitization, collateralized debt obligations, structured finance products, derivatives and the financial assets insurance system which, combined with the oversupply of money, resulted in an overheated enthusiasm for pursuing the right “funds,” which in turn led to the 2008–2009 world financial crisis. With technological advances, machines increasingly replace labor, reducing demand for labor. Globalization facilitates the flow of capital and technology from developed countries into emerging market economies, and the development of industries in emerging market economies competes for employment in developed countries. Such factors combine to increase the share of income from assets in national income, while reducing that from labor, and also reducing the salaries and wage rates at the lower end of the workforce, thus worsening income disparity. The rise of asset prices further intensifies inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, because the lion’s share of assets stays firmly in the hands of the wealthy. The degree of disparity between rich and poor worsens apace, weakening society’s stability. Globalization facilitates the flow of capital between countries, inclining many countries to let their external debt increase. Developed countries encourage capital inflow to finance domestic investment and consumption due to inadequate savings. Emerging market economies seek to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) and portfolio investments to stimulate economic growth. The governments of all countries reduce taxes to encourage domestic investment, and increase spending to improve social welfare and infrastructure, thereby increasing their budget deficits. At the same time, low interest rates encourage the public and private sectors to borrow money. Demand-side policies are not very helpful to long-term growth. At present, almost all countries have accumulated too much national debt; little room has been left for fiscal policy to function flexibly. In the past, an increase in the money supply caused the rate of inflation in the commodities market to rise when the economy approached full employment, warning the monetary authorities to restrain the money supply. Now, as a result of the change in the world economic ecology, increases in the money supply have little effect on the rate of inflation in the commodities market, so the warning signal has shifted to the assets market. In this process, asset prices keep rising, the overall wealth of

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society keeps increasing in nominal terms, the inequality of distribution keeps worsening, and public and private debt keeps mounting. At present, the US Federal Reserve has been hesitant to raise its benchmark interest rate, worrying that a rise of the interest rate might cause the financial market to collapse, although maintaining a low rate of interest makes it difficult for monetary policy to be effective in case of a recession.

XI.

Confucian Ethics and Sustainable World Development

Modern growth society encourages individuals to pursue their own interest, thereby promoting the interests of the whole society. With ceaseless economic growth, per capita income increases ceaselessly. Surplus income becomes savings, and accumulated savings become wealth. As income and wealth ceaselessly increase and the people become increasingly affluent, they begin to pursue values that transcend material enjoyments, such as personal autonomy, freedom, and self-realization. Thus, as the economy continues to grow, the people’s personal aspirations ascend and their calls for rights and freedom grow stronger. However, unbridled freedom can adversely impact the social order, so it is impossible for everyone to have complete, unbridled freedom. Individuals must know how to exercise self-control and the social system must be adjusted with the times so that people may strive to realize their goals and together realize the goals of the whole society. This sort of social system is what we above called a “social incentive system.” It would function like the old system of rites in Confucius’ time. What is the aim of society? The aim of society is to provide total welfare for the general public of society, i. e., the greatest happiness of all the people. This goal is equivalent to the social harmony and stability sought in the traditional age of stagnation. However, in the modern age of growth, economic progress must be added to the picture. While economic growth can serve as the index of economic progress, progress is more meaningful than simple growth. Economic growth just means increasing output; economic progress includes enhanced quality of life. The achievement of a society is the product of the choices and efforts of all its people. However, individual conduct and choices are guided by values and constrained by norms. Values generally refer to the ultimate ends of human pursuits; they include ethical values, economic values, and social values. Ethical values pertain to seeking the perfection of individual character, economic values pertain to income and wealth, and social values include social status and reputation. Economic values and social values can be called worldly values. In Confucian thought, which reflects the traditional age of stagnation, the goals pursued by society are harmony and stability. Therefore, ethical values are taken seriously. In

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modern Western capitalist thought, the primary goal pursued is economic growth. Therefore, economic value is now taken very seriously. Norms include formal legal norms and informal social norms. While ordinary social norms are not sanctioned by law, they exert varying degrees of influence on the behavior of people in society and restrain individual behavior from crossing certain ethical limits. In fact, our everyday conduct is restrained more by the constraints of social norms than by the force of legal norms. Zengzi said, “One is subjected to the disapproving gaze of ten eyes and the pointing fingers of ten hands. Is this not a sign of severe reproach?”13 As Confucius implied (Analects 2:3), in a ritual shame society, even though punitive legal norms are in force, they need not be applied. Values and norms stand in need of enforcement mechanisms, the exercise of which is based on all sorts of social organizations. For example, economic values and social values are mainly provided by government and business. The enforcement of law depends on police and justice departments. If moral character were taken to be a prerequisite for government and business to offer economic as well as social values, people would certainly pay more attention to ethical value than to worldly values. In the traditional era of stagnation, ethics was taken to be more important than wealth. If wealth had not come to be taken as more important than ethics, would technology innovations have been commercialized and wealth created, thus leading to continuous advances of technology and economy? This is indeed a question that deserves investigation. However, since modern society takes wealth more seriously than ethics and over-emphasizes economic growth, economic development creates the difficult dilemmas of today, which, I suggest, could be solved by adopting Confucian thought and ethics.

XII.

Five Pertinent Confucian Propositions

First, righteousness must be regarded as prior to profit; ethical value must be regarded as prior to economic value. Sima Qian in the Shiji, “Mengzi, Xun qing liezhuan” 孟子荀卿列傳, wrote: After reading the words of Mencius, “When I went to the state of Liang, King Hui asked me, ‘How can you profit my state?’” (1A/1), I put down the book and sighed, reflecting, “Profit is the beginning of disorder.” Confucius rarely discussed profit, because he always guarded against it. For this reason, he said, “If one is guided by profit in one’s

13 Andrew Plaks, Ta Hsueh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean) (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 11.

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actions, one will incur much ill will” (Analects 4:12). From the emperor to the commoners, the harm of the love of profit is the same!

The reason why Confucius seldom mentioned profit was not because profit was not important; it was because people already took profit so seriously. The Master said, “Wealth and high station are what people desire, but unless I got them in the right way, I would not remain in them. Poverty and low station are what people dislike, but if I could not get rid of them in the right way I would not try to escape from them” (Analects 4:5). Wealth is an economic value. High station is a social value. The right way is an ethical value. They all are goals that people pursue, but ethical value is the most significant one in a person’s life. The Master said, “If wealth were a permissible pursuit, I would be willing even to act as a guard holding a whip outside the marketplace. If it is not, I shall follow my own preferences” (Analects 7:12). The Master said, “In the eating of coarse rice and the drinking of water, in the using of one’s elbow for a pillow, joy is to be found. Wealth and rank attained through immoral means have as much to do with me as passing clouds” (Analects 7:16). Taking ethical values seriously does not necessarily run counter to the pursuit of economic value. Righteousness and profit are not necessarily in conflict. However, people should not violate ethical principle in their pursuit of wealth. By acting uprightly, individuals may pursue their interest in a manner that contributes to the interests of the whole society. If everyone acts properly in pursuing their interest, economic growth need not destabilize or harm society and the environment. Only if people were to act in this way would world economic development become truly sustainable. Second, people should restrain themselves. In the traditional age of stagnation, resources were scarce and people learned to restrain themselves. In the modern age of growth, ample resources are available, which stokes people’s greed and avarice. When a person is not contented, it is like a snake trying to swallow an elephant. As Cao Cao said, “People suffer because they are discontented. Even when a person already possesses Lu, he still covets Shu.” However, the availability of resources can be exhausted and the world is limited, so people must accept that there are limits to what can be exploited or else they will never feel satisfied. True contentment comes from feeling fulfilled and happy. Unlimited freedom, particularly to pursue economic values, is psychologically destructive and ultimately destabilizes and breaks down the social

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order and harmony; hence, unbridled freedom is not a viable option. True freedom is limited freedom. In this spirit, Confucius said, “At fifty, I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty, my ear was attuned; at seventy, I followed my heart’s desires without overstepping the line” (Analects 2:4). Third, people should hold some things in awe. Confucius said, “The exemplary person stands in awe of three things. He stands in awe of the Decree of Heaven. He stands in awe of great personages. He stands in awe of the words of the sages” (Analects 16:8). “The Decree of Heaven” refers to the limitations that objective reality places on human life. “Great personages” refers to high officials and elders. “Holding great personages in awe” refers to feeling respect for the authority figures and social order in traditional society. “The words of the sages” refers to the wise adages of the sages, recorded in the Confucian classics. In the modern age of ceaseless technological advance and economic growth, the social norms and social order are ceaselessly beset by challenges. While human life should advance steadily, society still must offer stable models for people to emulate. The stability of human life also requires that people stand in awe of certain things, things they should remain vigilant about, so society will remain stable and harmonious while continuously progressing. Fourth, politicians should be positive role models. Democratic rule typically has the following problems, which arise in different countries to different extents. First, when politicians are candidates running for office, they harshly criticize the current administration and vilify the other candidates. They pander to and deceive the electorate by proposing overly idealized, unrealistic political views and policies. After they are elected to office, they do not pursue their political ideals or carry out their policy proposals, which in fact were unfeasible. Over time, this problem has caused many people to lose trust in politicians and have little respect for the government. Second, since elected political leaders have limited terms of office, they tend to take a short-term view in proposing and implementing major economic projects. They seldom propose visionary long-term plans, which stymies the country’s long-term development. As to economic problems, they adopt short-term measures to postpone the serious effects of the problems, which only lets the problems fester and worsen over time, like a chronic disease. This is not a responsible approach. Another approach, using long-term expansive financial measures and monetary measures, causes deep national debt and inflationary money oversupply. These are just two obvious examples.

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Third, the operation of democratic rule involves the eligible voters electing their local representatives to the national assembly or congress. Additionally, administrative bodies supervise and limit the actions of the democratically elected leaders; they also restrict the operations of the government. Representatives who represent the interests of the local electorate seek to keep the favor of their constituents by enacting policies that they favor and are to their benefit. This is not necessarily good for thinking in terms of the national good or the smooth operation of government affairs. Therefore, the administration of democratically elected governments tends to have low efficiency. The traditional political ideal of China is described in Liji, “Liyun Datong pian” as “select merit and ability” to ensure that the most meritorious and capable people hold office. The Master said, “A record of the rule of kings Wen and Wu is preserved on the wooden slats and bamboo strips. When they were alive, proper rule prevailed, but when they were gone, it ceased with them. The proper way of human beings encourages proper rule; the way of the earth encourages proper planting and growing. Proper rule, then, is the silkworm wasp transforming the larva of the silkworm into one of its own. Thus, proper rule lies in selecting the right people with upright character; it cultivates their character with the proper Way; and it cultivates the proper Way with benevolence.”14

However, what is regrettable is that benevolence is a seldom seen virtue in modern society. Therefore, modern politicians need to consider adopting the style of an exemplary person who “broadly benefits the people” and “cultivates the self and thereby brings welfare to the people.” In a word, they should not simply pursue their own position, authority, and fame, but devote their efforts to benefiting the entire society. Fifth, business operations should incorporate the element of ethics. Within the organizational framework constituting the social incentive system, government, justice, education, and business are all important sectors. In the traditional age of stagnation, when industry and commerce were not yet developed and the social structure was simple, most resources were under the control of the government. Honor, emoluments, wealth, and status were primarily conferred by the government. For this reason, the social incentive system lay in the hands of the governing authority, and government was the organization best positioned to promote ethical values. In the modern age, the resources in the government’s hands are relatively scarce. Moreover, the electoral system cannot avoid the risk that unscrupulous, corrupt politicians who, despite being immoral 14 Roger Ames and David Hall, Focusing the Familiar (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 99–101.

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and setting poor examples, will win elections. At the same time, the existence of an incorrupt judiciary depends on having a good education system. Unfortunately, modern education stresses knowledge at the expense of values and ethics, and has quietly been phasing out its traditional humanistic function of cultivating integrity and moral character and the desire to contribute to society. In today’s modern society, business enterprises are by far the largest organizations, possessing most of the resources of society. Over 70% of the workforce are employed in the business sector, where people earn their living, pursue their careers, fulfil their ideals, and attain self-realization. The sustainability of business operations depends on the implementation of business ethics, notably in terms of benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, and trust, the core values of Confucian ethics. Therefore, to incorporate Confucian ethics in business operations such that they are mutually reinforcing, is the ideal as well as the most effective way to achieve social harmony and economic progress, the ultimate ends pursued by all societies. [Translator’s insertion: Finally, as to the ethics of the sixth relationship concerning other people in society with whom one has no particular relationship, Confucius offers significant guidance. He presents the Silver Rule (his negative formulation of the Golden Rule) as the method of benevolent practice: He asserts that in one’s dealings with others, “one should not do unto others what one would not have done unto oneself” (Analects 7:2, 15:23). Further, in observing the Silver Rule, one disposes oneself and acts with thoughtfulness (zhong 忠)15 and feels empathy (shu 恕)16 for the other person (Analects 4:15). That this ethical approach applies generally and not just in specific relationships is supported by Confucius’ admonition to “love others” and his faith that if a person lives by zhong and shu and the Silver Rule, then “all people within the four seas are their brothers” (Analects 12:5). Perhaps the promulgation of such values in government and society would encourage people to be thoughtful, considerate, and ethical, increasing social trust and harmony in modern society.]

15 In modern Chinese, zhong refers to loyalty but in Confucius’ lexicon it was more about being dedicated and thoughtful. In that sense, it was akin to jing (reverence). The character itself is composed of “the mean, or utmost propriety (中庸)” (中) radical above the heart-mind (xin 心) radical, and thus connotes devotion to the mean or utmost propriety. In terms of ethics, that implies dedication to balance and fairness. 16 Again, the Chinese character is suggestive. It is composed of the character for “as if” (ru) over the heart-mind radical, and connotes imagining oneself in the position of another, which would be the basis for making ethical empathetic responses.

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An earlier version of this chapter was presented in Hong Kong on April 12, 2018. “World economic development and the contemporary mission of Confucian thought.”

Bibliography Ames, Roger and David Hall. Focusing the Familiar. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001. Lau, D. C., trans. Confucius: The Analects (Lun-yu). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1983. Lau, D. C., trans. Mencius. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984. Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics, eighth edition. London: Macmillan, 1920. Plaks, Andrew. Ta Hsueh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean). London: Penguin Books, 2003. Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Liberty Classics edition. Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1981. Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiment. Penguin Books, 2009. The World Bank. World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. The World Bank. World Development Indicators 2013. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2013. Vermeij, Geertat. Nature: An Economic History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Wohlforth, Charles. The Fate of Nature: Rediscovering Our Ability to Rescue the Earth. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010. Zhang, Xiaowei. 2019. Zong yo fengyu geng yo qing 縱有風雨更有晴. Taipei: Tianxia wenhua.

Confucius on the person of benevolence (renzhe 仁者): Zigong said, “If there were a person who gave extensively to the common people and brought help to the multitude, what would you think of him? Could he be called a man of benevolence?” The Master replied, “It is no longer a matter of benevolence with such a person. If you must describe him, ‘sage’ would, perhaps, be the right word. Even Yao and Shun would have found it difficult to accomplish as much.” (Analects 6:30)

Confucius on the exemplary person ( junzi 君子): Zilu asked about the exemplary person. The Master replied, “Such a person cultivates himself and thereby achieves reverence.” “Is that all?” “He cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to his fellows.” “Is that all?” “He cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to the people. Even Yao and Shun would have found the task of bringing peace and security to the people taxing.” (Analects 14:42)

Jörn Rüsen

Epilogue: Questions, Comments, and Reflections

It is not easy to write a comment addressing the contributions to this book. I am not an expert on Confucianism but one interested in intercultural comparison of world views and historical thinking.1 Confucianism is indeed one such world view. While it demands a comparative approach, here it mostly is presented as a paradigmatic text expressing the distinctive nature of Chinese thinking in contrast to Western thinking. From this perspective it naturally presents its normative evaluations emphasizing its superiority over modern Western trends in understanding the human world. The difference between the Western and the Chinese understanding becomes evident as the so-called modern Western understanding is considered. The value and importance of the Confucian tradition in Chinese thinking is illuminated. Western and Chinese traditions are put into a rather strong contrast: individualism stands against relationism (Rosˇker), moral commitment against objective rationality, humanism against rationalism, tradition against progress. This contrast comes very close to the difference between pre-modern and modern thinking. Thus, modernity seems to be a character of Western culture, and Chinese culture is contrasted against it. This position of contrasting prevents Chinese from thinking about the problems which are challenging the intelligentsia of today: the environmental and climate crisis are seen as a consequence of the industrial exploitation of nature and the dissolution of humanistic values is seen as a consequence of the evolvement of instrumental rationality at the cost of value rationality in understanding the human world. It would be misleading to liberate the Chinese culture from the burden of modernity. Shut in the limits of premodern forms of thinking it would lose its capacity to contribute to the intellectual discourses of the last centuries and remain fenced in a romantic counterimage to modernity still cultivating the 1 Jörn Rüsen, “Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparison of Historiography,” in History and Theory 35, no. 4 (1996): 5–22 (Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective).

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values of the world we have lost in the process of modernization. Especially the great contributions of Chinese modernizers and intellectuals would be left unrecognized, including, for example, Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) and the May Fourth Movement. Nevertheless, most articles in this volume present the Confucian tradition as a means to overcome the shortcomings of modernity by presenting premodern modes of thinking as welcome complements to the established modern discourses. Instead of contrasting Western and non-Western and modern and traditional intellectual attitudes and of preferring only one of these alternatives as convincing, a large variety and greater diversity of approaches and methods ought to be dealt with. But, in doing so, one might ask if this would not lead to relativism and arbitrariness? This danger could be avoided if the different positions were presented in a communicative way, in a mode of arguing with each other. In this case, a superior order of rules and strategies of communication would have to be added to the concepts of understanding the human world. These different possibilities could compete with each other, and all of them would be committed to a set of fundamental principles of meaning and argumentation instead of confrontation. It is an open question whether this way of arguing would lead to new insights into Confucianism and its place in the worldwide discourse of understanding humans and their cultural world. But it is the only chance to get rid of any struggle between different traditions and discourses and to gain a peaceful and humanistic approach to understanding the world of today and its manifold divergencies and controversies.

Chun-chieh Huang / John A. Tucker

Response

First, our most sincere thanks to Professor Jörn Rüsen for responding to the ideas advanced in this anthology, especially since he is not, as he readily admits, a specialist in Confucian studies. Yet it was precisely for that reason, i. e., because he approaches the material herein from outside of the limitations of the specialist’s box, that he was invited to comment on the book. After all, our hope is that the anthology will provide the educated public insights, drawn from Confucian traditions, into the problems of global modernity as they now manifest themselves in the twenty-first century. While some chapters in the anthology are more specialized than others, we hope that general readers might approach them and, each in their own way, find much to respond to as well in their own thinking about the challenges of twenty-first century modernity. With that in mind, Rüsen was invited, from the perspective of a non-specialist (albeit an exceptionally erudite one), to initiate the discussion. Our expectation was certainly not praise but instead exactly what he provided: provocative and stimulating questions about the thinking presented that in turn would prompt responses which hopefully might bring the purpose of the volume into better focus, and thus serve, in a somewhat innovative way, as a concluding set of observations on the whole. And surely, in taking this approach, we have somewhat preemptively, though in a small way, addressed one of Rüsen’s suggestions: that the subject matter be treated in a more comparative context rather than by simply contrasting Western thinking about the problems of the world with those issuing from Confucian traditions, all the while favoring the latter. No doubt, Rüsen is right: more comparative dialogue is in order if we wish to bring the potentially valuable contributions of Confucian traditions to global modernity into sharp relief. For now, at least, a beginning has been pioneered that will hopefully prompt greater communication, debate, and common discourse in the interests of advancing a more progressive future for all. Before going further, however, we feel it necessary to clarify the overall perspective of the authors of this volume. We hardly subscribe to the position of the English poet Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) who wrote, “East is East, West is West,

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and never the twain shall meet.” Instead, we are primarily in line with the Southern Song Neo-Confucian philosopher Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1193) who observed “In the East, there have been sages and in the West, there have been sages. They share equally the mind [of sagehood], and the same grasp of the principles of reality” (東海有聖人出，西海有聖人出，此心同，此理同).1 In other words, those contributing to this volume seek to stress the universality and the particularity of Confucian traditions in a global context in order to emphasize that their resilient and very commensurable values are of profound contemporary relevance to our twenty-first century. Rüsen hints that the ideas advanced in this volume might inadvertently tend “to liberate the Chinese culture from the burden of modernity.” Along related lines, he suggests that Chinese thinking highlighted herein amounts to “tradition” standing in opposition to “progress.” As a result, he observes that the difference between the two — Chinese and Western traditions — approximates “the difference between pre-modern and modern thinking.” There can be no question that some chapters do emphasize “relationism” over “individualism,” the importance of “moral commitment” rather than ethically blind “objective rationality,” and “humanism” rather than cold “rationalism.” However, in their appeals to more ethically and organically oriented Confucian traditions of humanism, the chapters in this anthology hardly should be construed as, in any real sense, antithetical to “progress.” It is indeed precisely for the sake of advancing the cause of human global progress in the twenty-first century that the anthology is offered, as a means of charting more inclusive and innovatively progressive approaches to realizing an enriched, more balanced and enlightened path towards modernity’s future than has thus far been realized by the often traditionbound Eurocentric advocacy of, if not reverence for, individualism and rationalism as self-sufficient panaceas for the multilayered challenges facing our world in its new millennium. The intent herein is certainly not to deny or undo ideals of the European Enlightenment blindly in some wholesale fashion so much as supplement, challenge, and enrich them with viable and indeed perhaps superior alternatives drawn from dynamic Confucian traditions that could well, going forward, meaningfully contribute to more fully global achievements in peace, prosperity, and goodness. As such the anthology hardly issues from an implicit philosophical imperialism that often haughtily and yet ultimately foolishly presumes to dominate if not monopolize answers to the still — centuries after the eighteenthcentury European Enlightenment began — myriad problems challenging humanity and our global world. In short, the anthology seeks to consider often 1 Wing-tsit Chan, ed. and trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 580.

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neglected alternatives to grander levels of progress and global improvement by exploring traditional Confucian avenues and approaches that have been so often, since Hegel and perhaps well before, flatly dismissed as fundamentally backwards and so written off as unworthy of serious consideration. The contemporary rise of East Asian political economies to positions of world power — though hardly attributable in any overly facile manner to the Confucian foundations at their bases — surely suggests, however, that notions drawn from Confucian traditions do not convey the antithesis of either progress or modernity, and hints that those traditions might well be fitting subjects of thoughtful, global reconsideration. The anthology admittedly draws primarily on Chinese Confucianism but it must also be emphasized that it is not exclusively Sinocentric in nature. Instead, it advances philosophically interpretive innovations from Chinese, Korean, and Japanese traditions as well as pioneering formulations by American, Canadian, and European thinkers seeking to grasp the enduring and vital traditions of Confucianism as relevant to contemporary and future modernities of the twentyfirst century and beyond. Rüsen, however, occasionally conflates the two, suggesting that the volume is so decidedly Sinocentric that it perhaps, due to its own very parochial center, precludes its relevance in any larger arena. Yet it must be remembered that, firstly, Chinese culture is much more multifaceted than Confucianism, and, secondly, that Confucianism is much more expansive and globally informed than its considerable homeland, China. Chinese culture is a truly multidimensional and dynamically organic entity, ever unfolding and very much alive and at the forefront of modernity today. And Confucianism, despite repeated and invariably premature reports of its demise, remains a vibrant force, philosophically and practically, throughout East Asia and beyond, especially as the East Asian diaspora, whether in global demographics or innovative developments in international philosophical discourse, has recalibrated forever glib notions about the longevity and enduring significance of the East Asian dimension of what Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) called the Axial Age in the intellectual history of humanity. Similarly, with increasing investment in scholarly exchanges as well as, at a more mundane level, multinational investments in China, the old “East” and “West” dichotomies are increasingly a thing of the past. Indeed, it is questionable given the longstanding exchange of ideas whether such dualities were not already obsolete centuries ago. After all, following the 1687 publication in Paris of the Jesuit work, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (Confucius: The Philosopher of China) in Latin, Enlightenment thinkers such as Leibniz (1646–1716), Montesquieu (1689–1755), and Voltaire (1694–1778)2 just to mention a few, came to 2 Walter W. Davis, “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment,”

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grips with the basics of Confucianism and soon offered their own interpretations of its philosophical significance for contemporaries. That aside, the present anthology seeks first and foremost to advance relevant insights from Confucian traditions, old and new, and not necessarily those of China as they might relate to the project of addressing global problems and building thereby a better future for all. At one point, Rüsen suggests that the anthology poorly addresses the environmental and climate crisis by blaming it on the Industrial Revolution. The latter, of course, first appeared in Britain and then the U.S. before spreading globally, often to the egregious detriment of environmental interests. While there can be little question about the connection between these, it must be emphasized that the present anthology also presents a more positive approach, outlining the progressive relevance of Confucian traditions for the contemporary world in relation to the environment. Most certainly, among the major crises we face in the twenty-first century, the single most imperative one may indeed be that which is sometimes referred to as the “climate emergency.”3 Over the last decade thousands of scientists worldwide as well as political and spiritual leaders globally, including even Pope Francis (1936–), have alerted humanity to this emergency. Some might imagine that Confucian traditions have nothing relevant to offer in our efforts to overcome it. However, Confucianism can indeed contribute, at least in the sense of theoria, to the formulation of a new ecological culture which, going forward, might help not only to resolve the climate crisis but moreover build a better, more sustainable environmental balance for the remainder of the twentyfirst century and well beyond. Especially relevant here are five key Confucian concepts grounded in tradition but pertinent in contemporary times to innovative ecological thinking: (1) harmony, (2) reconciliation, (3) the homocosmic continuum, (4) correlative thinking, and (5) organism. The first, “harmony,” refers to the ideal balance envisioned between people and Nature. In Confucian traditions, this harmony is achieved by maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between the two polarities, humanity and Nature, neither falling into an extreme anthropocentrism that privileges humanity exclusively nor backwards into sheer primitivism that elevates Nature over all else. This harmony is made possible by “reconciliation,” the second Confucian concept, which involves a paradigm shift from the “I-It” relationship between a person and Nature wherein the latter is construed as an inert thing, to the “I-thou” relation — drawing on Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) thinking4 — wherein Nature is viewed Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1983): 523–548. https://doi.org/10.2307/2 709213. 3 William J. Ripple et al., “World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency,” BioScience 70, no. 1 (January 2020): 8–12. https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biz152. 4 Martin Buber, I and Thou (Mansfield Centre, Connecticut: Martino Publishing, 2010).

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as a dynamic, vital “other” with which one should meaningfully and ethically engage. In Confucian traditions, Nature is not an “it,” but a “thou” that can and rightly should engage in creative and intimate dialogue with humanity. The third key concept is that of the “homo-cosmic continuum.” Once reconciliation between people and Nature is achieved, the human world and the world of Nature constitute a continuum rather than a rupture of opposites. This idea of “homo-cosmic continuum” is sanctioned within the time-honored Confucian tradition of “correlative thinking,”5 which is the fourth key concept. Within this Confucian mode of thinking, Heaven, Earth, and Man constitute a “great chain of being,”6 with Confucian characteristics. This correlative mode of thinking is a product of the traditional Confucian worldview permeated as it is by thinking about things in “organismic” terms. A variant of the latter, “organism,” is the fifth Confucian notion relevant to an improved environmental order. The organismic worldview, best explicated in the Appendix of the Book of Changes, also exhibits what Carl G. Jung (1875–1961) called the “principle of synchronicity”7 in Chinese thinking. Confucianism may additionally contribute to the making of a new ecological culture along two lines. The first centers around the traditional Confucian belief in a “homo-cosmic continuum” that regards the relationship between humans and Nature as a site of ongoing continuity rather than one of fractured, dichotomous rupture. Illustrating this, in the Analects, 11:26, Confucius’s pupil Zeng Dian 曾點 (c. 542–c. 475 BCE) expressed his fondness for bathing in a river, feeling the breeze on an altar, and then going home singing songs. Upon hearing this, Confucius commented, “I tend to agree with Dian.” Implicit in the fondness for roaming in Nature affirmed by Confucius and his pupil was the assumption of continuity between humans and Nature. The Mencius (2A/2) later developed this thesis when Mencius urged his followers to nurture their “flood-like qi” (浩然之 氣) to fill the space between Heaven and Earth. Mencius’s notion of a person’s “flood-like qi” was both that of an inner moral élan and simultaneously the vast and unyielding element of the natural world. It well conveys the understanding that we, human beings, best realize ourselves as integral components of a large continuum, and in turn grasp the latter as essentially non-dual with ourselves. This Confucian idea of the inherent continuity between mankind and Nature 5 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 2: History of Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 281. Benjamin I. Schwartz refers to it as “correlative anthropocosmology,” see Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 350. 6 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of Ideas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 3–23. 7 Carl G. Jung, “Forward,” in The I Ching or Book of Changes, ed. Richard Wilhelm, transl. Cary F. Baynes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), xxiv.

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may serve as a philosophical resource and even as an innovative foundation for a more viable ecological culture in the twenty-first century. Confucian traditions may also contribute, secondly, to a new and more sustainable ecological culture via their monistic view that humanity and Nature share an essential ethical dimension, namely, ren 仁 (variously translated as benevolence, humaneness, humanity, compassion). The great Neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) of the Southern Song authored an essay on the topic entitled “A Treatise on Ren” (仁説). According to Zhu, the mind of Heaven and Earth acts benevolently and compassionately in creatively creating things, including humankind. Humans are endowed with this same magnanimous mind of creative creativity as their own minds. Although the human mind received from Heaven penetrates and embraces all, its core character lies in ren. In Confucian traditions, ren functions as the moral element running through the ontological, cosmological, onto-ethical and ethico-psychological orders. After Zhu Xi, the idealist Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472– 1529) argued basically along similar lines regarding the ethical continuity of all things. Wang’s “Inquiry on the Great Learning” (Daxue wen 大學問), announced powerfully that the learning of the great man consists in “maintaining an essential unity with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things.” Both Zhu and Wang thus read a decidedly moral element into Nature and urged humankind to “form one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things”8 along essentially ethical lines, as a manifestation of cosmic benevolence and compassion for all. This second Confucian idea may be especially inspirational when we envision the possibility of creating a more sustainable ecological culture going forward. If industrial civilization can be characterized as a civilization of masculinity aiming at conquering Nature by Reason as preached by the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment philosophers,9 we are warranted in saying that the Confucian tradition might be conceptualized as an essentially feminine civilization. If the culture of the European Enlightenment may be characterized as a culture of “tough-mindedness,” Confucian culture may be described as a culture of “tender-mindedness.”10 The Confucian attitude toward Nature is inclined to the “nurturant parent model” rather than the “strict father model”11 as is more 8 For a fuller account of the above two points, see Chun-chieh Huang, Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010), 67–80. 9 Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932, 2003), 30–31. 10 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909). 11 George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 35. Also, Lakoff, “Metaphor, Morality, and Politics, Or, Why Conservatives Have Left Liberals In the Dust,” http://www.wwcd.org/issues/Lakoff.html.

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typically seen in the modern West. Since Confucius, a great number of Confucian thinkers have placed emphasis on the fact that the human world and the natural world exist in a state of symbiosis. Confucian philosophers stress that humans, being a product of Heaven and Earth, must join and partner with Heaven’s unending process of “ceaseless creative creativity” (shengsheng buyi 生生不已). The dynamics of “ceaseless creative creativity” within the universe and the myriad things of the world reside within the virtue of humanity (benevolence). Confucian traditions generally urge us to nurture and harbor our own inner morality through self-cultivation (xiushen 修身) so as to grow it for the benefit of family, society, the state, and the world of all-under-Heaven. And while some might consider traits associated with the feminine, tendermindedness, and being nurturant as indicative of weakness and inability, the profoundly powerful nature of the Confucian teachings is well-evidenced as they advance resiliently beyond two and a half millennia, in their extraordinary and unparalleled historical longevity. In conclusion, vital Confucian traditions still have much to offer and most certainly might well illuminate for us a way leading to the true reconciliation between humanity and Nature in the twenty-first century. This true reconciliation will manifest itself most fully through the way of “creative creativity” in our century and beyond. Hopefully this volume and the dialogue it will prompt will equally display this creativity and thereby lend itself as a steppingstone leading to new approaches and perspectives addressing the diverse challenges of twentyfirst century modernity.

Bibliography Becker, Carl L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932, 2003. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Mansfield Centre, Connecticut: Martino Publishing, 2010. Chan, Wing-tsit, ed. and trans. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Davis, Walter W. “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment.” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1983): 523–548. Huang, Chun-chieh. Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010. James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Jung, Carl G. Forward to The I Ching or Book of Changes. Edited by Richard Wilhelm. Translated by Cary F. Baynes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977. Lakoff, George. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

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—. “Metaphor, Morality, and Politics, Or, Why Conservatives Have Left Liberals In the Dust.” (1995). http://www.wwcd.org/issues/Lakoff.html. Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of Ideas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 2: History of Scientific Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Ripple, William J. et al. “World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency.” BioScience 70, no. 1 (January 2020): 8–12. Rüsen, Jörn. “Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparison of Historiography.” History and Theory 35, no. 4 (1996): 5–22. Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Contributors

Roger T. Ames is Humanities Chair Professor at Peking University, Senior Academic Advisor of the Peking University Berggruen Research Center, and professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Hawai’i. He is former editor of Philosophy East & West and founding editor of China Review International. He has authored several interpretative studies of Chinese philosophy and culture, and his publications also include translations of the Chinese philosophical classics. His most recent monograph is Human Becomings: Theorizing Persons for Confucian Role Ethics (2021). He has completed the Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy (2023) and its companion, Conceptual Lexicon for Classical Confucian Philosophy (2021). Sébastien Billioud is a professor of Chinese studies in the East Asian Studies Department, a member of the French Research Institute on East Asia, and codirector of the religion program at the University of Paris. His works include Thinking through Confucian Modernity, A Study of Mou Zongsan’s Moral Metaphysics (Brill, 2012), The Sage and the People: The Confucian Revival in China (co-authored with Joël Thoraval, Oxford University Press, 2015), The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition (Brill, 2018), and Reclaiming the Wilderness, Contemporary Dynamics of the Yiguandao (Oxford University Press, 2020). Edward Y. J. Chung is a professor of religious studies and chair of Asian Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island, Canada. He is the author of Emotions in Korean Philosophy and Religion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), A Korean Confucian Way of Life and Thought (University of Hawaii Press, 2016), Korean Confucianism: Tradition and Modernity (The AKS Press, 2015), and The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok (SUNY Press, 1995).

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Chun-chieh Huang is Distinguished Chair Professor of National Taiwan University and a member of Academia Europaea. He is the former dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at NTU (2008– 17). The Taiwan Ministry of Education conferred upon him the National Chair Professorship and the National Academic Award. Huang has pioneered the study of “East Asian Confucianisms” from a transnational, multi-lingual, transcultural perspective. His recent works include East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Contexts (2015); A Historical Treatise on the Humanity in East Asian Confucianisms (東亞儒家仁學史論, 2017); and Xu Fuguan in the Context of East Asian Confucianisms (University of Hawaii Press, 2019). Yong Huang is professor of philosophy and chair of the Department of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has served as president of the Association of Chinese Philosophers in America, co-director of the University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies at Columbia University, and co-chair of the Confucian Traditions Group of the American Academy of Religion. He is editor-in-chief of Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, and the book series, Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy (Springer). He is completing work on two books, Ethics of Difference: Learning from the Zhuangzi and Knowing to: Contemporary Significance of Wang Yangming’s Moral Philosophy. Yi-Huah Jiang is Bauhinia Chair Professor at National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan. He previously held a research position at Academia Sinica and taught political philosophy at National Taiwan University and the City University of Hong Kong. His research interests include political philosophy, liberalism, democratic theory, national identity, and Taiwanese politics. His writings include Liberalism, Nationalism and National Identity (1998), Essays on Liberalism and Democracy (2000), and Nationalism and Democracy (2003). He received the Distinguished Teaching Award from National Taiwan University (2001), and the Distinguished Research Award from the National Science Council (2002). Torbjörn Lodén is professor emeritus of Chinese language and culture at Stockholm University and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History, and Antiquities. He is currently head of the China Center at the Institute for Security & Development Policy in Stockholm. His publications include Rediscovering Confucianism (2006), Kinas vägval — från himmelskt imperium till global stormakt (China’s choice of road — from celestial empire to global great power, 2012), Konfucius samtal, a Swedish translation of The Analects of Confucius (2016), and “On the Social dynamics of Philosophical Ideas: Dai Zhen’s Critique of Neo-Confucianism” (2016).

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Guoxiang Peng is Qiu Shi Distinguished Professor of Chinese philosophy, intellectual history and religions at Zhejiang University and was professor at Peking University and Tsinghua University. Besides being the 2009 awardee of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award, he was also the 2016 Kluge Chair in Countries and Cultures of the North. His publications include The Unfolding of the Innate Good Knowing: Wang Ji and the Yangming Learning in Mid-Late Ming (2003/2005/2015), Confucian Tradition: Between Religion and Humanism (2007/ 2019), Revision and New Discovery: Historical Study of Pre-Modern Confucianism from Northern Song till Early Qing Dynasty (2013/2015), This-worldly Concern of the Wise: The Political and Social Thought of Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) (2016), The Methodology of Doing Chinese Philosophy (2020), Personal Cultivation as Spiritual and Bodily Exercise in Confucian Tradition (2022) and numerous articles. Heiner Roetz is senior professor for Chinese history and philosophy in the Faculty for East Asian Studies at Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany. His research focuses on classical Chinese philosophy, tradition and modernity in China, and transcultural philosophy. His publications include Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction of the Breakthrough towards Postconventional Thinking (State University of New York Press, 1994). He is also author of Man and Nature in Ancient China (Lang, 1984), Konfuzius (Beck, 2006), and coauthor, along with Hubert Schleichert, of Klassische chinesische Philosophie: Eine Einführung (Classical Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction) (Klostermann, 2021). Jana S. Rosˇker is co-founder and head of the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Her research focuses on Chinese epistemology, Chinese logic, and New Confucianism. She is editor-in-chief of Asian Studies, vice president of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy (ISCP), and founder, first president, and honorary member of the European Association of Chinese Philosophy. Her publications include Interpreting Chinese Philosophy: A New Methodology (Bloomsbury, 2021), Female Philosophers in Contemporary Taiwan and the Problem of Women in Chinese Thought (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2021), and Becoming Human: Li Zehou’s Ethics (Brill, 2020). Jörn Rüsen is Professor emeritus of the University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany. His research focuses on the theory, methodologies, and didactics of history and historiography, and comparative intercultural humanism in a globalizing world. His publications include For a Renewed Historics (in German; FrommannHolzboog, 1976), Fundamentals of a Historics (in German; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), Western Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Debate (Berg-

308

Contributors

hahn, 2002), History: Narration, Interpretation, Orientation (Berghahn, 2005), Meaning and Representation in History (Berghahn, 2007), Humanism in Intercultural Perspective, co-edited with Henner Laass (Transcript, 2009), and Evidence and Meaning: A Theory of Historical Studies (Berghahn, 2017). Chen Sun is an economist, educator, and public servant who has served as professor of economics at National Taiwan University, vice chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, president of National Taiwan University, Minister of National Defense, chairman of Industrial Technology Research Institute, and as Far Eastern Professor of Economics, Yuan Ze University. He is currently professor emeritus at National Taiwan University and chairman of the Taida Economic Research Foundation. His most recent book is A New Biography on Confucius: In Search of a New Model for World Development (2021). Kirill O. Thompson is a professor at National Taiwan University. A specialist in Zhu Xi and Chinese philosophy, he has published articles and reviews in Philosophy East and West, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, China Quarterly, etc., as well as a number of book chapters. His recent publications include, “Mining the Emotions… On the Power of Sensitive Reading,” in One Corner of a Square, ed. Ian M. Sullivan and Joshua Mason (University of Hawai’i Press, 2021); “Zhu Xi” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015, 2020); “Zhu Xi’s Ethical Theory,” in Dao Companion to Zhu Xi’s Philosophy, ed. Yong Huang and K.C. Ng (Springer, 2019); “Relational Self in Classical Confucianism” in Philosophy East and West (2017). He is also the Core Director of APSAFE (AsiaPacific Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics). John A. Tucker is a professor of history at East Carolina University in Greenville, North Carolina. His publications include Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ jigi and the Philosophical Definition of Early-Modern Japan (Brill, 1998), Ogyu¯ Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks: The Bendo¯ and Benmei (University of Hawaii, 2006), and Kumazawa Banzan: Governing the Realm and Bringing Peace to All below Heaven (Cambridge University Press, 2020). He edited Critical Readings on Japanese Confucianism (Brill, 2012), and co-edited, with Chun-chieh Huang, Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy (Springer, 2014). He is author of The Forty-Seven Ro¯nin: The Vendetta in History (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Alan T. Wood is professor emeritus of history at the University of Washington, Bothell. He has served as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and as Interim Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the University of Washington, Tacoma.

Contributors

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His books include Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political Rights (University of Hawaii Press, 1995), What Does It Mean to be Human?: A New Interpretation of Freedom in World History (Peter Lang, 2001), and Asian Democracy in World History (Taylor & Francis, 2004). He coauthored the ninth edition of World Civilizations and is working on a world history tentatively titled The Wisdom of Balance: A Biography of Humankind.