Conflicted Are the Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo 9781441159052, 9781501300929, 9781441151667

Table of contents :
Cover
HalfTitle
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction: The Moderates and the Elusive Search for Peace
The moderates and the peace process
The moderates and the conflict resolution process
The moderates as a threat to the peace process
Layout of the book
2 The Road to Oslo
On the road to Oslo
Oslo and its critics
The Declaration of Principles and the three principles
Conclusion
3 The Road from Oslo
After Oslo: The challenge of implementation
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement
Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bankand Gaza Strip (Oslo II)
Hebron agreement
Wye River Memorandum
Israeli and Palestinian moderates after Oslo
Conclusion
4 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Talk the Talk?
Israeli and Palestinian rhetoric and the peace process
Conclusion
5 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Walk the Walk?
Barak’s election and the initial optimism pre-Camp David
The Camp David Summit
Camp David and the three principles
Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement
National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners
Conclusion
6 The Death of Oslo: What Lessons Can We Learn?
Oslo’s death and the three principles
Oslo’s death: Lessons for the future
Appendix A: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993
Article I: Aim of the Negotiations
Article II: Framework for the Interim Period
Article III: Elections
Article IV: Jurisdiction
Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations
Article VI: Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
Article VII: Interim Agreement
Article VIII: Public Order and Security
Article IX: Laws and Military Orders
Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation In Economic Fields
Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt
Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces
Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
Article XV: Resolution of Disputes
Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs
Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions
Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections
Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs
Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs
Appendix B: The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document (October 31, 1995)
Article I: The Establishment of the Palestinian State and Its Relations with the State of Israel
Article II: The Delineation of Secure and Recognized Borders
Article III: The Creation of Normal and Stable Inter-State Relations
Article IV: Schedule of Israeli Military Withdrawal and Security Arrangements
Article V: Israeli Settlements
Article VI: Jerusalem
Article VII: Palestinian Refugees
Article VIII: Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee
Article IX: Water Resources
Article X: Time Frame and Implementation
Appendix C: The National Conciliation Document
Preamble
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Conflicted Are the Peacemakers

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo Eric N. Budd

N E W Y OR K • L ON DON • N E W DE L H I • SY DN EY

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Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 175 Fifth Avenue New York NY 10010 USA

50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

www.bloomsbury.com First published 2013 © Eric N. Budd, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Budd, Eric N., 1963– Conflicted are the peacemakers : Israeli and Palestinian moderates and the death of Oslo / Eric N. Budd. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4411-5905-2 (alk. paper) 1. Arab-Israeli conflict–1993—Peace. 2. Peace-building—Middle East. I. Title. DS110.76.B83 2012 956.9405’4–dc23 2012027354 EISBN: 978-1-4411-5166-7 Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India Printed and bound in the United States of America

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Contents

Acknowledgments

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1 Introduction: The Moderates and the Elusive Search for Peace 2 The Road to Oslo 3 The Road from Oslo 4 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Talk the Talk? 5 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Walk the Walk? 6 The Death of Oslo: What Lessons Can We Learn?

1 25 45 73 97 123

Appendix A: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993 Appendix B: The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document (October 31, 1995) Appendix C: The National Conciliation Document

143 157 173

Bibliography Index

179 199

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Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support and assistance of a number of associations, institutions, and individuals. Several of the chapters were presented at various annual meetings of the Northeastern Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, and the Middle Eastern Studies Association. Thanks to the different discussants and audience members, the arguments in the book were strengthened and fine-tuned. Two of the chapters were presented at the first and second Pathways to Peace Conference hosted by Central Connecticut State University. In addition, an initial draft of Chapter 1 was presented at Muhlenberg College. The faculty and students at Muhlenberg College provided an excellent forum for me to present my work and gave me a number of important insights that helped me to develop the book. At Fitchburg State University, I have received a great deal of support from the administration, faculty, and students. A Research Fellowship from Fitchburg State enabled me to concentrate on the research, while also providing me with some funding for a research assistant and money to travel to Washington DC to conduct further research. I presented my initial thoughts on the role of the moderates in the peace process as part of Fitchburg State’s Harrod lecture series in a talk entitled, “Where Have All the Moderates Gone? The Elusive Search for Peace in the Middle East.” Bob Foley, Linda LeBlanc, and the entire staff at the Fitchburg State library have been extremely helpful, never complaining when I flooded them with interlibrary loan requests. My department at Fitchburg State offers the perfect combination of collegiality and the opportunity to interact with historians, economists, as well as political scientists. Our chair, Paul Weizer, and secretary, Karen Valeri, are always extremely supportive and helpful. My students in Introduction to Peace Studies (and other classes) endured my interjecting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process throughout the lectures and class discussions and provided me with lots of insights as I developed the manuscript. Similarly, John Chetro-Szivos,

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with whom I co-teach Introduction to Peace Studies, has been an invaluable colleague and friend. This manuscript benefitted from the kindness and generosity of lots of colleagues and friends. Joshua Spero, Rene Reeves, Sean Goodlett, Joe Moser, Jessica Glover, Mohsin Hashim, Kevin Costa, and Aruna Krishnamurthy all commented on the chapters and provided a number of key insights and suggestions. Ghaith al-Omari, Aaron David Miller, and Yezid Zayigh spent a lot of time with me when I interviewed them, and their insights are an invaluable addition to the book. Thanks to the editing skills of Elena Cordova, this book is not the stylistic mess I had originally presented to her. Marie-Claire Antoine of Bloomsbury has been a pleasure to work with, and thanks to her that this project came to fruition. Without all the love and support of my family, friends, and relatives this manuscript would never have been possible. Pureza, Linnea, and Josh provide all the love and happiness anyone could ever hope for, and more. Finally, this book is dedicated in loving memory of my mother, Helen G. Budd, and in honor of my father, Elihu M. Budd, with thanks for all their love and support over the years, and for instilling in me a deep commitment to peace and social justice.

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Introduction: The Moderates and the Elusive Search for Peace

This is a type of terrorism used by lunatic people who are prepared to strap explosives to their bodies, or place them in cars, in order to kill Israelis, and in order to eliminate the chance for peace in the most complex conflict which has existed between us and the Arab world—the conflict between us and the Palestinians.1 Yitzhak Rabin Israeli extremism has succeeded in pushing us into a circle of action and reaction and drowned us in a bloody situation, creating a climate in which it is difficult to give precedence to the political and negotiating aspect in managing the conflict.2 Mahmud Abbas I am forced to say that the extreme right in Israel is dancing on the blood (shed by) the Islamic extremist terrorist murderers, and trying to turn Israeli victims into a force against the (peace) accord. . . . The extremist murderers of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the tools of the extreme right wing in Israel.3 Yitzhak Rabin As soon as the shock of the (Rabin) assassination was over, the forces of extremism on both sides of the conflict were concluding an unwritten and unholy alliance to undermine the peace process. They revived all the factors of fear, hatred, and hostility between two peoples that were still feeling the beginning of the road to close the page of war and violence and to open a new page of co-existence, peace, and good neighborliness.4 Ahmed Qurei

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On September 13, 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians took the world by surprise when they came together on the White House lawn to sign the Declaration of Principles, an agreement they had negotiated in Oslo for resolving their conflict. The Oslo Peace Process, which started with so much hope and promise, is if not dead, then certainly is in critical condition.5 While there is no shortage of explanations for the breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process, the quotes above are indicative of one popular explanation that places the blame on extremists on both sides who deliberately sought to sabotage the peace process.6 Violence attributed to the Israeli far right as well as Hamas and/or the Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side, is seen as having undermined popular support for the Oslo peace process and as having stymied any further momentum as well. Extremists serve as “spoilers,” doing everything within their power to disrupt the peace process. With trust in the other side at a minimum, the extremists are able to play upon the lingering doubts of whether there really is a partner for peace on the other side. By stoking these doubts, the extremists are able to stymie the peace process by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, where peace is seen as impossible, and there is not a partner for peace. Extremist violence on both sides leads each partner to come to doubt the other. According to Barry Rubin: [I]ncessant bombings and shootings undermined the peace process’ confidencebuilding element—Israelis believed Palestinians still wanted to destroy Israel and that the Palestinian Authority was unwilling or unable to stop attacks. Palestinians thought Israel had no intention of relinquishing territory or accepting a Palestinian state—when Israel postponed negotiations or closed territories it was seen as Israel’s way of avoiding its commitments. By mobilizing people to action, extremist ideas had become—at least partly and temporarily—a self-fulfilling prophecy.7

Extremist violence is very effective at preventing any further progression of the peace process. In the face of extremist violence, the moderates lose control over the peace process, which creates room for the extremists to set the agenda. This dynamic is what is known as Gresham’s Law of Conflict. It occurs when the extremists drive out or eliminate the moderates, such that leaders begin to focus narrowly on staying in power and containing extremists at the expense of exploring a substantive compromise with the enemy. At a minimum, this implies that any peace process that emerges will be tentative, that posturing for domestic constituencies to prove that the leader is not giving

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away too much and that he is bargaining hard to achieve maximal goals will dominate, and that the process will be slow, crisis-driven, and always in danger of self-destruction.8

As we shall see, the preceding quote perfectly depicts the situation that has unfolded in the years since the launching of the Oslo Peace Process. So, are Israeli and Palestinian extremists solely to blame for the death of the Oslo Peace Process? Does the key to peace in Israel and Palestine lie in finding a way to sideline the extremists so that they cannot sabotage the peace process anymore? When I first started this project, I believed that the answer to both of those questions was a resounding “yes!” However, as time passed, I started to wonder whether, in fact, the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers themselves might share a large part of the blame for Oslo’s death? This book will argue that the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers, due to their inherent ambivalence over whether or not peace is really possible ended up sabotaging the very process they were trying to promote. After initially laying out an argument why the moderates, in other words peacemakers, are essential for the peace process, subsequent sections of this chapter will discuss why I believe the moderates cannot bring the peace process to fruition.

The moderates and the peace process Both the Israeli and Palestinian societies are internally divided between the hawks, doves, and the moderates. The hawks argue that peace with the enemy is not possible, and that there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate, while the doves would argue the opposite. According to the hawks, the doves are idealistic dreamers who endanger the nation’s security and survival with their futile efforts at conflict resolution. While ideology (political or religious) is the motivation for some hawks, for others geostrategic considerations are the source of their opposition to the peace process. The moderates, on the other hand, are torn. For a long time they shared the hawks’ pessimism, but as a result of developments on the national, regional, or international levels, they came to question their initial pessimism. It is important to recognize that these categories are not permanent but rather are very fluid. In other words, where an individual falls on this spectrum can change with time. For example, a hawk like Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon

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can moderate his views and unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip, an act he never would have considered previously. Chapter 4 will examine the rhetoric of moderates such as Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, two men whose moderate status some might question. However, during the years of the peace process, or in Barak’s case during the years in which he was in power, both Barak and Arafat adopted a more moderate stance. Thus, although Barak initially opposed the Declaration of Principles, once he became the Israeli prime minister he moderated his position and thus warrants inclusion as an Israeli moderate. Resolving intractable conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a multilevel game involving bargaining and negotiating on multiple levels. While in the past students of conflict resolution focused exclusively upon interparty negotiations, they have increasingly come to recognize the importance of the intraparty negotiations as well.9 Therefore, negotiations are not only taking place between the two adversaries but also within each adversary there are negotiations between the leader and his/her constituency as well as between the hawks, doves, and moderates. Furthermore, both sides have to negotiate with their external benefactors as well. The moderates bring the following qualities or skills to the negotiating table for their bargaining and negotiating at each level: l

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Credibility Persuadeability Flexibility/Practicality Empathy Collegiality

Credibility One might think that the doves on both sides would be the logical parties to make peace. However, the problem for the doves is that they lack credibility with the rest of society, and, as will be seen, with their adversaries as well. They are seen as being too soft, too weak, and too willing to make major concessions to the other side. The following quote powerfully captures the “credibility gap” the doves confront. “We felt a joint statement involving major substantive concessions by both sides that was signed by figures of such eminence—individuals who were well known in both camps and who were not identified and discounted as the usual ‘peaceniks’—might galvanize the moribund peace process.”10

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The moderates, on the other hand, have much more credibility. The moderates are seen as tougher and as better defenders of the national interest. Oftentimes the moderates have served in the military or defense establishments, which further enhances their credibility vis-à-vis the “peaceniks.” For example, Yitzhak Rabin’s history as chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces and as defense minister provided him with the social legitimacy necessary to move toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Tragically, as his assassination demonstrates, it was not sufficient for the Israeli extremists of the far right, but it was for the majority of Israeli society.) The moderates, who initially shared the hawks’ pessimism over the feasibility of peace and on the existence of a partner for peace, can reevaluate their earlier pessimism. If this happens, then due to their credibility they can lead others to reassess the situation as well. In other words, the moderates’ credibility can enable them to serve as a catalyst for a reassessment of the conflict’s status quo and thus of the peace process itself. Significantly, the moderates enjoy this credibility within their own society, as well as their adversary’s. Just as the moderates can facilitate a reassessment of the viability of the peace process on their own side, they can do the same for their enemy’s. The moderates can convince their enemy that there is a partner for peace with whom negotiations are possible. The moderates can help to overcome what Laura Eisenberg and Neil Caplan call the “Groucho Marxian” dilemma of Middle Eastern peacemaking, where “anyone willing to negotiate with me can’t be worth negotiating with.”11 Basically, what Eisenberg and Caplan are getting at is neither side wants to negotiate with the opposing side’s hawks, as it is deemed a waste of time. However, to negotiate with the enemy’s doves is seen as equally futile, since the doves are not seen as being able to deliver on any concessions they might make at the negotiating table. The moderates, on the other hand, would not only be more willing than the hawks to make concessions, but also be better able than the doves to deliver an agreement.

Persuadeability One of the defining characteristics of the moderates is their persuadeability. The moderates navigate between the inherent pessimism of the hawks and the optimism of the doves. While they initially tend to be more pessimistic, changes on the national, regional, or international levels can lead them to reassess their views. In Chapter 2 we will see how these changes brought the Israelis and

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Palestinians together at the negotiating table in Oslo. Whereas the moderates initially shared the hawks’ belief that violence was the only way to resolve the conflict, these changes persuaded them that the status quo is no longer tenable, and that force will not resolve the conflict. Furthermore, they were persuaded that it might be possible to achieve their goals peacefully. In order for the peace process to begin, moderates on both sides need to be persuaded that peace is possible. Basically, there needs to be “a turning point in a relationship between the parties, an event or change in conditions that triggers a reassessment of alternatives and adds negotiations to the strategies of conflict management that are seriously considered.”12 This “turning point” persuades the moderates that there is someone on the other side to negotiate with, and something about which to negotiate. According to Daniel Lieberfeld, there were five key developments that persuaded the Israelis and Palestinians to enter negotiations: l

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Each side concluded that the opponent cannot be coerced into giving up its national goals. Each side assessed that the status quo was untenable. Each side perceived enhanced possibilities for negotiation with the adversary. Leadership change on the government side brought security-minded pragmatists to power. Government leaders found that they had no alternative leaders with whom to bypass the primary adversary (emphasis in original).13

Persuasion can be seen as the linchpin for the entire peace process. Both sides need to be persuaded that peace is possible, and that there is a partner for peace on the opposing side, in order for the process to be able to commence, proceed, and ultimately succeed.

Flexibility/Practicality Another hallmark of the moderates is their flexibility, or practicality. Unlike the hawks, who tend to be much more ideological, the moderates are pragmatic. As a result, they are much more willing to compromise to achieve their goals. Leaders who are more ideologically driven tend to be less willing to make concessions, or to accommodate the opposing party’s needs and concerns. Such leaders will be much more dogmatic in negotiations, which is not conducive to negotiation.

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A major barrier to conflict resolution is the tendency of each side to view the conflict as a zero-sum game, where any gain for their adversary invariably represents a loss for their own side. To resolve the conflict, the two sides need to work together to create “win-win” solutions. Unfortunately, that is easier said than done, as it requires both sides to be very flexible and to make concessions. Flexibility facilitates creative problem solving, where the two sides reframe the issues that divide them and work together to come up with mutually beneficial solutions. Devoid of the ideological blinders that encumber the hawks, the moderates are able to approach the conflict with greater flexibility, compromising on the smaller issues to achieve their broader goals.

Empathy Empathy is an essential element for conflict resolution. Intractable conflicts drag on and on largely because the two sides are unable to understand one another’s needs, concerns, or interests; to accept the inherent truths in the other side’s national narrative; or to acknowledge their own role in perpetuating the conflict. According to Karen Rasler, “Protracted conflicts deescalate when adversaries assume new interpretations, understandings, and expectations of their opponents.”14 For these conflicts to deescalate, trust is required. Without some degree of trust, neither side will be willing to reach an agreement or implement it. As Robert L. Rothstein points out, [A]n expression of empathy—particularly if it is perceived as credible and sincere by the other—is valuable because empathy is the basis of most moral judgments: it may begin the process of diminishing distrust, and it may begin a useful process of communication, as distinct from an exchange of rhetorical barrages. In its absence, therefore, demonization of the other persists, distrust deepens, and exchanges are superficial and sometimes cynical or hypocritical— consider Arafat’s expression of disapproval of terrorist actions he himself had condoned or ordered.15

As we will see in Chapters 2 and 3, the Oslo process that unfolded was characterized by the demonization and distrust Rothstein discussed, and as Chapter 4 will reveal, the rhetoric of the two sides was as superficial, cynical, and hypocritical as he had anticipated. In short, the two sides never reconciled with one another. For reconciliation to occur, the two adversaries will have to come to accept each other and their differences. Herbert Kelman sees the following six

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psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance, and empathy runs through each of them: l

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Each side must acquire some insight into the perspective of the other. Each side must be persuaded that there is someone to talk to on the other side and something to talk about. Each side must be able to distinguish between the dreams and operational programs of the other side. Each side must be persuaded that mutual concessions will create a new situation, setting a process of change in motion. Each side must be persuaded that structural changes, conducive to a stable peace, have taken place or will take place in the leadership of the other side. Each side must sense a responsiveness to its human concerns and psychological needs on the part of its adversary.16

Due to the fact that they are less ideological than the hawks and are more pragmatic and flexible, the moderates would be more likely to exhibit empathy than the hawks.

Collegiality In order to resolve intractable conflicts, there needs to be an interparty and intraparty “coalition for peace” that is strong enough to overcome any opposition to the peace process from extremists on either side. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to form such a coalition. The doves on both sides represent the natural partners for such a coalition. However, despite their common interests, the doves have a hard time coordinating their efforts. According to Herbert Kelman, this is because they are “usually more sensitive to the reactions of their domestic constituencies than to the reactions of the other side.”17 Out of fear of how their words or actions will be interpreted by their countrymen, they will often appear to be less conciliatory than they really are. Tragically, in doing so, the doves tend to “undermine each other’s argument that there is someone to talk to on the other side and something to talk about.”18 The hawks, on the other hand, have it much easier. They share an opposition to the peace process and seek to perpetuate the status quo. Unlike the doves, who need to work together to achieve their common goal, the opposing hawks do not need to coordinate their efforts. Instead, they merely have to point to each other as proof that the enemy is implacable, and that negotiations are bound to

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fail. Thus, it falls upon the moderates to build and sustain an interparty as well as intraparty coalition for peace. Why are the moderates able to build such a coalition? The reason is that they represent the coalition’s “linking pins generating empathy and providing channels of receptive communication between their respective and more extremist teammates.”19 The moderates serve as the bridge that ties together the coalition members. Through their words and actions, they can bring together the two opposing sides and promote conflict resolution. Due in part to their credibility in society and also due to their pragmatic nature, the moderates can serve as the catalyst for new ways of looking at the conflict, as well as at the adversary. One of the main reasons why some conflicts are so intractable is the lack of empathy on the part of both sides vis-à-vis one another. The moderates can promote empathy as well as challenge the hegemonic assumptions concerning the conflict, the opponent, and themselves. For example, the moderates could: l

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question the reigning stereotypes of the opponent help to interpret the adversary’s behavior and rationale point out the other side’s concessions or conciliatory gestures show the extremists how their own behavior is interpreted by, and affects, the opponent promote problem solving and win-win solutions.20

The moderates bring a great deal to the table during the peace process. Due to their credibility, they are less susceptible to accusations of betraying the nation, and they can rally support for the peace process. Their persuadeability enables them to reassess their pessimism and cynicism vis-à-vis the process and the enemy, while their flexibility is essential for making the necessary concessions to reach an agreement. Without empathy reconciliation cannot occur, and the moderates’ collegiality helps them build the requisite “coalition for peace,” tying together supporters of the peace process on the opposing sides.

The moderates and the conflict resolution process Barbara Walter has argued that conflict resolution needs to be conceptualized as a three-stage process involving pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation of a negotiated agreement. As she cogently argues, each stage of the process

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is “driven by different causal factors and only by drawing clear conceptual and theoretical distinction between the stages (and then testing them with the appropriate indicators relative to the particular stage) can we begin to understand the full range of factors that truly bring peace.”21 It will be argued in this section that in each phase the moderates play a decisive role in pushing the process forward. However, the following section of the chapter will argue that the moderates will be unable to push the process through to its fruition due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and their enemy.

Pre-negotiation Pre-negotiation represents the initial phase of conflict resolution. It is what the Irish have referred to as “talks about talks.”22 Alternatively, in the words of Jay Rothman, it can be seen as “an integrated process in which highly placed representatives of parties in conflict prepare for negotiations by jointly framing their issues of conflict, generating various options for handling them cooperatively, and interactively structuring the substance and process of future negotiations.”23 This period in which the two sides are laying the groundwork for future discussions, proceeds in fits and starts. In the beginning, the doves are driving the process, as initially they are the only ones committed to the process or who even believe that peace is possible. However, due to their inherent difficulties in working together as well as due to their lack of credibility with society-at-large, they are not able to push the process forward. Only when the moderates ally with the doves will the talks begin to bear fruit. As was argued earlier, it is the moderates who can best represent the two opposing sides due to their credibility, pragmatism, and ability to convince the skeptics that there is something to negotiate about, as well as someone with whom to negotiate. Since these conflicts have dragged on and on, there is a great deal of skepticism on both sides concerning the possibility of resolving their conflict. As a result, a major role of the pre-negotiation phase involves overcoming the inherent pessimism on both sides about the chances for peace. Pre-negotiation can serve the following functions: l

Costs and Risks: During pre-negotiation, the opposing sides can assess the potential costs of negotiation as well as the risks involved. The moderates could serve as a buffer, thereby lowering the political costs of negotiations and helping to mitigate the risks incurred by the political officials.

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Requitement: Each side needs to be reassured that any concessions they might make will be reciprocated by the other side. The moderates have more credibility than the doves not only with members of their own society but also with the opposition. Thus, they can help convince the opponent that concessions will be reciprocated, something the doves cannot do. This is the case because the doves are not seen as being able to deliver, the way the moderates can. Agenda: At this stage, the adversaries can decide what is negotiable and what items will be left off the table. The pragmatic, less maximalist approach of the moderates can facilitate agenda setting during pre-negotiation. Participants: This is the stage when the “coalition for peace” needs to be constructed, and decisions made concerning who will participate in the negotiations. By adding their voices to those of the doves, the moderates can strengthen the forces for peace and shift the balance of power within their society toward the peace camp. Support: During pre-negotiation, the two sides need to gauge the level of internal support for concessions and other conciliatory gestures. As was argued above, the decision of the moderates to side with the doves and promote conflict resolution can be a decisive show of force for the proponents of negotiations. Bridges: Bridges will need to be built between the opposing sides and to move the adversaries from conflict to conciliation. Here, too, the moderates can play a key role in tying together the opponents and pushing them towards reconciliation.24

Negotiation After the two sides have “talked about talking,” the next phase involves face-toface negotiations. However, it is important to bear in mind that negotiations will not always take place. The talks will go nowhere unless the adversaries are able to form a stable coalition for peace and to reach a general consensus on what issues will be negotiated. Similarly, the negotiations will not invariably lead to the conclusion of an agreement. In successful negotiations, the following transpires: l

Diagnosis: The opposing sides ascertain what the problem is, what conciliatory gestures the opposing side would entertain, what their enemy’s goals are, as well as what they themselves want.

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Formulation: The adversaries need to find an overarching principle or formula that can define the conflict in a way that is agreeable to both sides. Application: This overarching principle or formula must then be applied to the specific issues or details in order to construct an agreement.25

The moderates can play a key role in diagnosing the nature of the conflict. This is because their approach is much less ideological and zero-sum than that of the hawks. Their pragmatic, non-maximalist approach will not only enable them to determine the issues that divide the two sides but also to come up with a formula for overcoming those differences and to apply it to those issues. One key ingredient for successful negotiations is flexibility. The adversaries need to be able to engage in “creative problem solving” where they will redefine the issues, reframe the conflict, and reevaluate their traditional view of the conflict as a zero-sum game.26 For this to occur, another essential ingredient for successful negotiations will be required as well: empathy. According to Morton Deutsch, issues become negotiable when the adversaries “learn to listen, understand, and empathize with the other party’s position, interests, and feelings.”27 The pragmatic nature of the moderates will not only make them more flexible in their negotiating positions but also more empathetic with regard to the needs of their opponent. A degree of insulation can also be essential for successful negotiations. Often, this insulation is necessary not only for the process in and of itself but also for any conciliatory gestures that the leaders might consider adopting.28 The opponents of the peace process on both sides will attempt to derail the negotiations with whatever means are at their disposal. Thus, insulation can be required to keep the negotiations on track. This insulation might involve holding the negotiations in secret, as was done by the Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo. Conciliatory gestures can also require insulation from attacks by the extremists. Leaders contemplating altering the status quo by making some concessions to the enemy often try to balance those gestures with countermeasures designed to appease their constituencies that oppose the peace process.29 In doing so, they send mixed messages that can derail the negotiations. The moderates can mitigate this tendency by serving as a buffer for the leader and thereby insulate his/her concessions from domestic attacks. Finally, the moderates could also push the peace process forward in an attempt to prevent the extremists on both sides from gaining too much power. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, concerns about the growing support

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for Hamas pushed the Rabin Government as well as Yasser Arafat together in an “awkward embrace.”30 Thus, the moderates’ pragmatic, nonideological approach combined with intraparty dynamics can enable them to push the negotiations to their fruition.

Implementation Negotiating an agreement is unfortunately only half the battle won. Now, that agreement has to be “sold” to the public and implemented. After the initial excitement of signing an agreement has worn off, the bitter reality of implementation comes into play. All of the doubts and skepticism about the opponent’s willingness to make peace will resurface. Part of this skepticism is due to the nature of the peace process itself. According to Robert Rothstein, neither side will be fully committed to the peace process because the negotiations tend to revolve around the lowest common denominator for an agreement, as well as lingering doubts about the adversary’s willingness or ability to implement the agreement, and fears that the opponent will not be able to win their public over to the agreement.31 Further contributing to the skepticism about the peace process will be the actions of the extremists on both sides. Determined to scuttle the agreement, the extremists will criticize the leaders for “selling out” the nation and will launch a series of violent attacks in order to undermine support for the agreement. The extremists’ attacks on the peace process combined with the lingering doubts about the process itself threaten to undermine the “coalition for peace” that the moderates had pieced together. For either side to be able to proceed with implementation, that coalition must remain intact. If the moderates stop believing in the peace process and thereby accept the hawks’ argument that true peace is impossible, then the peace process is doomed to failure. Thus, from prenegotiation through the negotiations as well as in implementation, the moderates can be seen as playing a pivotal role in determining whether the peace process will move forward.

The moderates as a threat to the peace process Up to this point, the moderates have been praised for their “persuadeability” that peace is possible, their flexibility, and their pragmatism. But are these

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characteristics necessarily virtues or could they in fact prove to be liabilities for the peace process? Furthermore, the moderates were praised for their credibility, empathy, and collegiality. But, while they might exhibit more of these qualities than some other members of society, will they be sufficient to bring the process to fruition? In the following chapters, the central thesis will be that the moderates are unable to bring the peace process to fruition because of their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and their enemy—in short, while they would like to believe that there is someone on the other side to negotiate with and something to negotiate about, they are not fully convinced. As a result, they end up sabotaging the very process they are supposed to be promoting. This argument is built upon three core principles. For the most part, when I discuss the Israeli and Palestinian moderates, they will be treated the same, such that moderates on either side will be expected to behave in a similar manner. Thus, Principles 2 and 3 do not differentiate between the moderates on the Israeli or Palestinian sides. In marked contrast, Principle 1 predicts that the moderates on the more powerful side (Israel) will act differently in certain ways than their moderate peers on the opposing side.

Principle 1 In situations where there is an asymmetrical distribution of power, moderates on the more powerful side will take advantage of this asymmetry to promote their side’s interests. One of the defining characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the asymmetrical distribution of power between the two sides. In order to understand fully the nature of the conflict as well as the challenges of resolving it, it is essential to appreciate this asymmetry. With their large army, nuclear arsenal, economic resources, and so on the Israelis are clearly in the dominant position. As a result, Principle 1 asserts that Israel will have much more influence on the ebb and flow of the peace process, as well as on what does or does not get placed on the table for negotiation. There are two indicators that will be used as evidence of Principle 1. First, in an asymmetrical distribution of power, it would be in the best interests of the dominant side to string out the process for as long as possible and to try to keep its options open. While both sides have come to recognize that the status quo is no longer tenable, the moderates on the stronger side, due to their preponderance

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of power, are not in nearly as much of a rush to reach an agreement. As a result, they will try to delay a final agreement for as long as possible, since the current situation is in their favor. Second, they will use the peace process to test their adversary so that they can alleviate their lingering doubts about the enemy. The peace process will be designed as a series of tests for the enemy and if they pass those tests, then they will be rewarded with a final peace agreement. As a result, the peace process will hinge on the adversary’s ability to pass the tests that have been set before it and thereby prove itself “worthy” of an agreement. The problem is that the moderates still have a lot of doubts about the enemy’s intentions. While they can be persuaded that peace is possible, the opposite is also true. In other words, they can also be persuaded that peace is not possible. After being pessimistic about the possibility for peace for so long, it is not easy for the moderates to switch gears suddenly and embrace the peace process, not to mention their adversary. The defining characteristic of the moderates is that they are persuadable, not that they are persuaded. So, each side can have its faith in the peace process, and in the enemy, shaken. As will be seen, “Israel contributed to the collapse in confidence in the peace process and to undermining Palestinian hopes. But the Palestinian intifada contributed to Israeli loss of faith and hope. Each side feels the other is not a partner with whom it is possible to reach a compromise.”32 The moderates are internally divided, torn between their hope that peace is possible, and their fears that the enemy cannot be trusted. As a result, there is an inherent ambivalence in the moderates that will affect how they approach the peace process and the enemy itself.

Principle 2 Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to commit themselves fully to the peace process. The moderates still have their doubts about the peace process and their adversary, and these doubts make it impossible for them to commit fully to the peace process. Conflict resolution entails risk, but neither side will be willing to take on those risks unless they are convinced of the viability of the peace process, and that their enemy’s intentions are benign. Because they harbor serious doubts on both accounts, the moderates will be risk averse and thus not fully commit themselves to the peace process. It will be argued that this only serves to heighten the moderates on the other side’s inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the

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peace process, enhancing their resistance to committing themselves fully to it. According to Ilana Kass and Bard O’Neill, “With both sides demonizing each other on religious/nationalist grounds, each new outrage served to reinforce visceral hatreds. Concurrently, it added credence to the zealots’ fundamental tenet of implacability, that is the notion that the other side is inherently incapable— and unworthy—of rational human interaction, let alone coexistence.”33 A number of indicators will be used as signs of Principle 2. First, due to their inability to commit themselves to the peace process, it is predicted that the moderates will pursue contradictory policies and employ conflicting negotiating approaches. One would expect to find a zigzag policy-making approach, with the moderates alternating between conciliatory and conflictual approaches to the enemy. Similarly, in negotiating they would be expected to alternate between integrative and distributive bargaining. While the former represents an attempt to create “win-win” solutions, the latter seeks to promote compromise, or concessions, and to basically “split the difference” between the two sides.34 In other words, with distributive bargaining the opponents still view the conflict as a zero-sum game rather than as a situation where “win-win” solutions are viable. Therefore, the second indicator used as evidence of Principle 2 will be whether the moderates continue to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. According to Karin Aggestam, the Israeli and Palestinian tendency to view their conflict as a zero-sum game can be attributed in part to the asymmetrical distribution of power discussed above as well as to the existential nature of their conflict. As she writes, “Asymmetrical identity based conflicts are more inclined to frame conflict as zero-sum, owing to strongly held enemy images.”35 Due to their nagging doubts about the enemy’s “true” intentions and about the feasibility of peace, I predict that the moderates will view the peace process as a continuation of the conflict, but by other means. Thus, they will try to attain at the negotiating table what they failed to win on the battlefield. In essence, the problem is that the moderates are still seeking a victory, rather than peace in and of itself. As a result, rather than seeking “win-win” solutions, they are still caught up in the zero-sum mind-set. This not only drives them to try to wring maximal concessions from their adversary but also allows them to accept the breakdown of the peace process if they do not get what they want. In describing the various sectoral groups involved with the peace process, John Darby calls those whom we have labeled the moderates the “Opportunists.” According to Darby, the virtue of the Opportunists is that they are persuadable that peace is possible. However, Darby also asserts that they “constitute a threat to the process

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through their willingness to risk its breakdown in an effort to obtain the best deal for themselves.”36 This willingness to countenance the breakdown of the peace process to promote their own interests will be our third indicator for Principle 2. Fourth, the moderates’ inability to commit fully to the peace process stems in part from their inherent pragmatism. Due to their pragmatic nature, they will continue to support the peace process as long as it is in their side’s best interests. Their support will be based upon practical considerations, not matters of principle. This pragmatism will enable the moderates to pull back from the peace process whenever they feel it is no longer in their best interests, but as we will see in the following chapters, in so doing it will only serve to heighten their adversary’s inherent ambivalence vis-a-vis the peace process. Finally, the moderates’ inability to fully commit themselves to the peace process will make them worry about how their fellow countrymen will interpret their actions and rhetoric. If they were fully committed to the process, their determination to pursue peace would be less contingent on popular approval, and they would be willing to pursue peace at any cost. Earlier it was argued that the moderates have greater societal credibility than the doves, which is certainly the case. However, the moderates still have to concern themselves with how their words and deeds are being interpreted by their peers. Thus, we would expect to find a “common strategy for decision-makers contemplating even a cautiously positive response to a conciliatory move by an adversary is to accompany the response with another action calculated to reassure—and to some degree to ‘buy off ’—intra-party opposition.”37 But, once again, it will be argued that in doing so, they only serve to heighten the internal conflict over the possibility for peace on their enemy’s side. Concerns over their credibility not only lead the moderates to balance conciliatory gestures with concessions to their hardliners but also prevent them from pushing the process forward. Thus, “each side is terribly fearful of being seen as surrendering to violence. So the more violence there is, each side says, if I stop the violence or if I enter into negotiations, then I will be seen as surrendering to violence.”38 The moderates are conflicted over the peace process, and as a result they pursue contradictory policies, alternating between conciliatory and conflictual approaches to their adversary; they continue to view the conflict as a zero-sum game, so they try minimize their own concessions while maximizing those of their enemy; they are inherently pragmatic, willing to walk away from the negotiations at any time if they cannot get what they want; and they worry about

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what their constituents will think of their actions at all times. Yet, one could argue that all negotiators would behave the same way, so why focus specifically upon the moderates? While that is undoubtedly true, such a focus is warranted because it shows how these actions, which represent the routine behavior of negotiators or peacemakers, are counterproductive and serve to sabotage the very peace process they are supposed to be promoting. The moderates’ inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and their enemy manifests itself not only in their inability to commit to the peace process but also in their seeming inability to commit to peace itself. In order to resolve an intractable conflict like the one between Israel and Palestine, reconciliation between the two peoples will be essential. But, because they are still torn over whether peace is possible and over whether there really is a partner for peace on the other side, the moderates are unable to promote reconciliation.

Principle 3 Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to reconcile with their adversary. According to Daniel Bar-Tal, societies that are trapped in intractable conflicts generally exhibit a conflictive ethos. As a part of this conflictive ethos, Bar-Tal asserts that the following societal beliefs are exhibited: a belief in the justness of one’s own goals; an emphasis upon security; a positive self-image; a sense of one’s own victimization; the delegitimization of the opponent; a strong sense of patriotism; a feeling of unity; and peace as the ultimate desire.39 To break out of this conflictive ethos, reconciliation will be needed. Reconciliation would entail a recognition of the justness of the other side’s goals, an appreciation of the enemy’s victimhood as well, and the legitimization of the adversary and his/her national narrative. The moderates would like to believe that there is someone on the opposing side with whom peace is possible, but they are not completely convinced. While they are willing to countenance the possibility that there is a partner for peace within the adversary, for them the jury is still out. For the moderates, the enemy has not yet completely proved itself. Until they do, the moderates are unwilling to completely change their view of the enemy, thereby mitigating the chances for reconciliation. Karin Aggestam and Christer Jonsson argue that the “persistence of old enemy images is a major reason why we see the breakdown of peace agreements in the implementation phase, since new interpretations of the post-war phase may be bitterly contested among the parties.”40

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However, the failure of the moderates stems from their inability to change their image of not only their enemy but also of themselves. Susan Wolf has argued that the significance of recognizing “the other” stems from the transformation of the “I.”41 In other words, both sides need to develop not only a new image of the enemy but also of themselves. The “resolution of long term conflicts requires changes in the groups’ national identities, such that affirmation of one group’s identity is no longer predicated on negation of the other’s identity.”42 Reconciliation would not only entail a reassessment of the images of the enemy and themselves but also of the national narratives behind the conflict. So “recognition of the equal worth of the Palestinians entails not only an acceptance of their narrative, but also transformation of the Israeli self-narrative and separation that is not mere evasion of assuming responsibility for the past.”43 Once again, due to their mixed emotions surrounding the peace process, the moderates are ill-equipped to reevaluate these national myths. The following indicators will be used as evidence for Principle 3: (a) the moderates will not reevaluate their image of the enemy; (b) the moderates will not reevaluate their images of themselves; and (c) the moderates will not reevaluate the national narratives of either side.

Layout of the book Table 1.1 summarizes the three principles that will be tested in the following chapters and lists the indicators that will be used as evidence for each principle. Chapter 2 examines the Oslo Peace process from pre-negotiation up through the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn. The chapter begins by examining the national, regional, and international developments that brought the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table. It specifically focuses on those factors that led the Israeli and Palestinian moderates to reassess the viability of the peace process, and whether or not there was a partner for peace on the opposing side. After a brief discussion of some of the different critiques of the Declaration of Principles, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the agreement in light of Principles 1–3 and the indicators listed in Table 1.1. Once an agreement is negotiated, it then has to be implemented, which is the focus of Chapter 3. Since the Declaration of Principles was not a peace agreement but rather an agreement to begin a peace process, a number of follow-up agreements were required in order to implement the Declaration of Principles and to push the process toward a final settlement. Chapter 3 will

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Table 1.1 Summary of principles and indicators Principle

Indicators

Principle 1: In situations where there is an asymmetrical distribution of power, moderates on the more powerful side will take advantage of this asymmetry to promote their side’s interests.

l

Principle 2: Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to commit themselves fully to the peace process.

l

l

l

l

l

l

Principle 3: Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to reconcile with their adversary.

l

l

l

The moderates on the stronger side will try to string out the process for as long as possible and keep their options open. The moderates on the stronger side will view the peace process as a test for the other side. The moderates will pursue contradictory policies, and in negotiations will alternate between integrative and distributive bargaining. The moderates will continue to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. The moderates will be willing to countenance the breakdown of the peace process in order to get the best deal for themselves. The moderates’ support for the peace process will be out of pragmatic considerations, not matters of principle. The moderates will worry about how their words and deeds are interpreted by other members of society. The moderates will not reevaluate their images of the enemy. The moderates will not reevaluate their images of themselves. The moderates will not reevaluate the national narratives on either side.

pick up the analysis from Chapter 2 with an examination of these follow-up agreements (the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Oslo II, Hebron, and the Wye River Memorandum) through the lenses of our three principles and their indicators. This chapter will not address the negotiations that took place in Taba after the Camp David Summit, or those between Abbas and Olmert in Annapolis or elsewhere. The Taba talks were not included because no agreement was reached, while those between Abbas and Olmert were excluded because they also did not culminate in an agreement, and because Olmert was not a moderate but rather was someone like Sharon who moderated his views to some degree over time. In Chapter 4, I conduct a discourse analysis of the rhetoric of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. This chapter focuses upon the speeches of three Israeli and three Palestinian leaders: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak on the Israeli side; and Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ahmed Qurei on the

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Palestinian side. Their rhetoric is analyzed based upon the three principles and the indicators listed in Table 1.1. The failure of the negotiations at Camp David is the primary focus of Chapter 5. For most Israelis, Camp David represented the time when an Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, made an unprecedented offer to the Palestinians. This raises an important question regarding whether the moderates are truly a threat to the peace process? If Barak’s offer was as generous and as unprecedented as he and the Israelis like to portray it, does that mean that Camp David is evidence that the peacemakers can in fact make peace? Or, does its failure support my contention that the peacemakers’ internal conflicts prevent them from bringing about a lasting peace? Chapter 5 addresses these questions. In addition, the chapter also examines the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement and the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners, two additional attempts to propose a final settlement of the conflict. The former was a joint Israeli–Palestinian effort, while the latter was an exclusively Palestinian initiative. While neither went anywhere, they are included to supplement the analysis of the Camp David Summit. Chapter 6 brings together the findings of the previous chapters. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss Principles 1–3 and their indicators in light of this book’s central thesis. In the latter part of the chapter, the death of the Oslo Peace Process will be examined to see what lessons future peacemakers could draw from its tragic death.

Notes 1 “Rabin: Peace ‘Must Lead to a Separation’ between Israelis and Palestinians,” The Mideast Mirror, January 24, 1995, Accessed July 12, 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis. com/universe/document?_m=be81e916b5aca0f795594ab02f401f27. 2 “Mahmud Abbas Delivers Speech, Speaks about Peace with Israel (3)” Open Source Center, February 18, 2006, Accessed March 9, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/ server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0. 3 Jonathan Ferziger, “Rabin: Autonomy ‘Overall Positive,’” United Press International, July 3, 1994, Accessed July 12, 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ document?_m=c96403388bccc0286f50c89e5eeda106. 4 “WAFA: PM Quray’s ‘Written Speech’ on 10th Anniversary of Rabin Assassination,” Open Source Center, November 15, 2005. Accessed March 9, 2009, www. opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0.

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5 Throughout this book, whenever I refer to the Oslo Peace Process I am referring to the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians that began in Oslo with the Declaration of Principles, as well as all of the subsequent official negotiations between the two sides. I am not referring to individual peace initiatives, or to the work of groups like Seeds of Peace, which are striving to promote peaceful interactions between individual Israelis and Palestinians. 6 Mark Rosenblum, “Netanyahu and Peace: From Sound Bites to Sound Policies?” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East and the Peace Process (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998), 42–3; Ziad Abu Zayyad, “Why Oslo Must Not Fail,” Palestine-Israel Journal 2, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 22; Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to Statehood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 13; Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), accessed via Ebsco Host July 22, 2003. 7 Rubin, Transformation of Palestinian Politics, 13. 8 Robert L. Rothstein, “A Fragile Peace: Could a ‘Race to the Bottom’ Have Been Avoided?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 5. 9 For example, see: Reuven Y. Hazan, “Intraparty Politics and Peacemaking in Democratic Societies: Israel’s Labor Party and the Middle East Peace Process, 1992– 1996,”Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 373; Dan Jacobson, “Intraparty Dissensus and Interparty Conflict Resolution: A Laboratory Experiment in the Context of the Middle East Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 3 (September 1981): 472–3; Herbert C. Kelman, “Coalitions across Conflict Lines: The Interplay of Conflicts within and between the Israeli and Palestinian Communities,” in Stephen Worchel and Jeffrey A. Simpson, eds, Conflict between People and Groups: Causes, Processes, and Resolutions (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993). 10 Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, “Preface,” in The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), IX. 11 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective,” in Ilan Peleg, ed., The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 6. 12 Michael Watkins, and Kristen Lundberg, “Getting to the Table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors,” Negotiation Journal 14, no. 2 (April 1998): 117. 13 Daniel Lieberfeld, “Conflict ‘Ripeness’ Revisited: The South African and Israeli/ Palestinian Cases,” Negotiation Journal 15, no. 1 (January 1999): 65.

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14 Karen Rasler, Shocks, Expectancy Revision, and the De-Escalation of Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Davis Occasional Papers, No. 81, September 2000), 2–3. 15 Robert L. Rothstein, How Not to Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome” and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, Peaceworks, no. 57, March 2006), 13. 16 Herbert C. Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance,” International Security 3, no. 1 (Summer 1978): 162–86. 17 Kelman, “Coalitions across Conflict Lines,” 237–8. 18 Ibid., 238. 19 Jacobson, “Intraparty Dissensus,” 472. 20 Ibid., 472–3. 21 Barbara F. Walter, “Re-Conceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process,” International Negotiation 7, no. 3 (2002): 300. 22 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, eds, Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflicts: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), 66. 23 Jay Rothman, A Pre-Negotiation Model: Theory and Training: Project on Pre-Negotiation Summary (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University, Policy Studies Paper, no. 40, 1990), 4. 24 I. William Zartman, “The Negotiation Process in the Middle East,” in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 63. 25 I. William Zartman, “Negotiation: Theory and Practice,” in Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr, eds, International Negotiation: Art and Science (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Report of a Conference on International Negotiation, June 9–10, 1983), 2. 26 P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation,” in Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell, eds, Flexibility in International Negotiations and Mediation (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995). Special issue: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 542 (November 1995): 45. 27 Morton Deutsch, “Commentary: On Negotiating the Non-Negotiable,” in Barbara Kelleman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds, Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1988), 252. 28 Christopher Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliation: Factors Contributing to Successful Olive Branches (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 239. 29 Ibid., 242. 30 Eisenberg and Caplan, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” 10. 31 Rothstein, “A Fragile Peace.”

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32 Guy Bechor, Sharing the Blame, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, January 2002, Accessed February 27, 2004, www.iwpr.net/index.p1?archive/sp/ sp_2002_01_24_2_Eng.txt. 33 Ilana Kass and Bard O’Neill, The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process (Lanham, MD: National Institute for Public Policy and University Press of America, 1997), 314. 34 Jay Rothman, “Negotiation as Consolidation: Prenegotiation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (1991): 32. 35 Karin Aggestam, “Mediating Asymmetrical Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 71. 36 John Darby, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2001), 49. 37 Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliation, 242. 38 The Search for Peace in the Middle East: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue. Proceedings of the International Media Encounter on the Question of Palestine, Organized by the United Nations Department of Public Information, June 18–19, 2001, Paris, France, 118. 39 Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000): 354. 40 Karin Aggestam and Christer Jonsson, “(Un)Ending Conflict: Challenges in Post-War Bargaining,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26, no. 3 (1997): 784. 41 Susan Wolf, “Comment,” in Amy Gutman, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), quoted in Amal Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000), accessed via Ebsco Host July 18, 2004. 42 Herbert C. Kelman, “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution: Experiences from Israeli-Palestinian Problem-Solving Workshops,” in Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, eds, Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity, vol. 3, 2001), 187. 43 Jamal, “Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse.”

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2

The Road to Oslo

After years of fighting and endless recriminations, the Oslo Peace Process took the world by surprise. The Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn was almost as dramatic a moment as when the Berlin Wall came crashing down. Unfortunately, while the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of hostilities and conflict between East and West, the signing of the Declaration of Principles represented just an initial step toward resolving the conflict. In Oslo, the two sides promised to set out together on the road to peace, but that road has proven a lot longer and a lot harder to travel, than it seemed in those heady days of 1993. In fact, today many critics of the Oslo Peace Process would say that the road has turned out to be a dead end. After an initial examination of the road to Oslo, this chapter will look at its critics, before examining the Declaration of Principles through the lenses of our three principles. Chapter 3 will pick up where this chapter leaves off by examining some of the major events and summits in light of our three principles.

On the road to Oslo Although Oslo caught the world by surprise, in hindsight there were a series of developments in the 1980s and early 1990s on the national, regional, and international levels that were propitious for an agreement.1 These changes pushed the peace process forward by creating a sense that there was something to negotiate about, and someone with whom negotiations were possible. The 1980s and early 1990s saw some major developments in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies. On the Israeli side, there was a growing sense that the status quo was no longer tenable. According to Galia Golan, in Israel

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers [T]he growing recognition that a compromise is necessary is apparently a result of a process that began during the intifada, which intensified following the Scud attacks on Israel during the Gulf War, and which may in fact be climaxing due to the deteriorating economic situation in the country. The average Israeli is tired of the continued threat to personal security of terrorism and daily violence accelerated by the intifada.2

The intifada played a very important role in pushing the Israelis to the negotiating table. In 1987, the intifada erupted throughout the occupied territories. The streets of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem were the sites of many confrontations between rock-throwing Palestinian youths and the Israeli Defense Forces. The intifada had a major impact on Israeli society but especially on such moderate leaders as Yitzhak Rabin, who gradually realized that a political solution was urgent when his generals told him that they could do no more against children throwing stones, and he perceived the negative influence this had on Israeli soldiers. He eventually also recognized the suffering of the Palestinians. Rabin’s realization was enabled by an ideology that did not analyze policy in messianic terms and by his perception that the present could diverge from the past. Rabin distinguished the intifada as a civil uprising of a politically aware population unlike previous acts of terrorism.3

Rabin’s ability to assess the situation based upon pragmatic, as opposed to ideological or “messianic” considerations, was instrumental in enabling him to embrace the peace process. Between the 1987 inception of the intifada and the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Rabin gradually came around to the idea of the peace process. Eitan Haber, who served as Rabin’s bureau chief, described the changes that took place in his former boss’ outlook, saying, “First there was the recognition that it was not possible to suppress the intifada by force. After that, he gradually recognized that we would not be able to continue to rule two and a half million Palestinians against their will.”4 Another development in Palestinian society that contributed to the change in how Israelis viewed the peace process was the rise of Hamas. Hamas is a militant Islamist group operating within the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas was established around the same time as the first intifada. With the rise of Hamas, Israel realized that it was better off dealing with Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), because otherwise Hamas represented their only viable alternative.5

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With these changes in Israeli and Palestinian society, came the final major development in Israel that facilitated the peace process: the return to power of the Labor Party. At that time, Israeli politics was dominated by the Likud and Labor parties, with the former tending to take a harder stance on negotiating with the Palestinians. However, the Labor Party has also tended to be dominated by hawks, although they traditionally have been less ideological and more pragmatic than those in the Likud Party.6 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Israeli Labor Party underwent a number of significant changes, which served to moderate its views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, Labor moved toward the Left politically, in order to accentuate its differences with Likud. Second, some of the more hawkish members of the party left to join other parties. Third, there was a growing awareness of the demographic challenges that Israel faced in its efforts to continue to dominate the Palestinian people. Finally, members of the party were fatigued by the seemingly intractable nature of the conflict.7 The Likud Party under Yitzhak Shamir was in power from 1986 to 1992, and Rabin was elected during this period. Rabin’s electoral victory was largely due to his credibility, which meant that that the Israeli people trusted Rabin to protect their security.8 Similarly, there were a number of significant developments on the Palestinian side that fostered a change in how the Palestinians viewed the peace process. The rise of the intifada not only served to push the Israelis toward the negotiating table but the Palestinians as well. This was the case because the intifada was a spontaneous movement that was outside of Arafat’s control. This scared Arafat and gave him an incentive to seek out a peace agreement with the Israelis in order to reestablish his credentials as the central leader of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Similarly, the rise of Hamas also served to push Arafat toward the negotiating table. Hamas gained a great deal of popularity within the Palestinian community due to its extensive social services network. Once again, the rise of a movement within Palestinian society that was outside of his control represented a threat to Arafat’s position and authority. In fact, one could argue that “Oslo came about largely as a result of Hamas’ challenge to the PLO.”9 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan convincingly argue that the rise of Hamas basically pushed Arafat and Rabin to the negotiating table and into each other’s arms. As they put it The rise in popularity and power of Hamas further caused Arafat and Rabin to look upon each other through new eyes. Both men feared that Hamas might

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers soon overtake the PLO as the object of the people’s loyalty and standard-bearer of the cause. Absolutely rejecting an Israeli-Palestinian compromise, Hamas unwittingly pushed the PLO and Israel into an awkward embrace. Rabin and his advisors calculated that between Arafat and Hamas, Arafat was clearly the lesser of two evils.10

While these developments were taking place within the Israeli and Palestinian societies, changes were simultaneously taking place within the Middle East that were also conducive to the peace process. As with the societal developments discussed above, these changes prompted the Israeli and Palestinian moderates to reassess the viability of the peace process and one another. Thus, both Rabin and Peres “diagnosed their political universe in the 1990’s differently than they had in the 1970’s. In the earlier decade they saw a conflictual environment in which they had little chance of achieving their basic political goals.”11 By the early 1990s that had started to change. Regionally, one of the major events in this period was Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War. In the wake of the Iraqi defeat, not to mention the eight years in the 1980s of bitter fighting between Israel’s twin enemies Iraq and Iran, it is not surprising that the Israeli leaders felt that their “political universe” looked a little less frightening. For the Palestinians, Saddam Hussein’s defeat was also highly significant. With Iraq’s defeat, the regional balance of power shifted even further in Israel’s favor, creating an incentive for the Palestinians to negotiate before their situation worsened even more. According to Ziad Abu-Amr, “Palestinian concessions are motivated by a sense of realism and pragmatism. Both the Palestinians of the occupied territories and the PLO are aware of the existing balance of power, which is clearly not in their favor. This balance of power has further tilted in favor of Israel since the end of the Cold War and, in particular, in the aftermath of the Gulf War.”12 The Gulf War was also significant because during the war, Arafat warmly embraced Saddam Hussein, thereby alienating the Kuwaitis, Saudis, and so on who participated in the US-led coalition against Iraq. When the war was over, these moderate Arab states were much less willing to provide economic aid to the PLO. As we shall see, the PLO’s treasury was already in dire straits due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, so this placed a major financial constraint on Arafat and the PLO, thereby helping to push him toward the negotiating table. The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the major global developments that facilitated the Oslo Peace Process. The Soviet Union had been a major donor to the PLO, so its collapse deprived the PLO of funds at a time when they were cut off from their primary regional benefactors as well. In addition, the

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Soviet Union had also bankrolled what was known as the “rejectionist front,” in other words the Arab nations that were opposed to any political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without Soviet support, the tide turned against these opponents of the peace process.13 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq served to strengthen the regional, and of course global, position of the sole remaining superpower. Within the Middle East, Iraq’s defeat showed that the United States could exercise its power with impunity. As a result, the United States was able to convince Israel and the Arab states to come together in Washington DC for a series of multilateral talks designed to try to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The talks convened in Madrid, before moving to Washington, and brought together Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, along with observers from Egypt and the Gulf States. Most importantly, there was a joint delegation of Jordanians and Palestinians, representing the first time that the Israelis agreed to negotiate with Palestinians, although the Israelis insisted that the Palestinian delegates had to come from the occupied territories and not be affiliated with the PLO. Although no formal agreement came out of these talks, they were still significant for several reasons. First, as was stated already, they represented the first time that the Israelis agreed to formally negotiate with Palestinians. Second, the negotiations showed the Israeli moderates that there were Palestinians with whom negotiations were possible, and also served to challenge their conviction in the zero-sum nature of the conflict.14 Third, since the negotiators were not affiliated with the PLO, Arafat was worried once again of losing control over the process. Finally, even though the Palestinian negotiators in Washington were not members of the PLO, it quickly became clear to the Israelis that Arafat was the sole Palestinian decision maker, which also helped to convince the Israelis that Arafat and the PLO was their only viable partner for peace. These developments on the national, regional, and international levels created a context that was conducive for the Oslo Peace Process. They helped to push each side to the negotiating table, because they led them to reassess the status quo, to reevaluate the possibility for peace, and to rethink their earlier conviction that there was no one on the other side with whom negotiations were possible.

Oslo and its critics While these developments were certainly conducive to the Oslo Peace Process, they in no way guaranteed that the secret negotiations in Oslo would be successful.

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Those negotiations were extremely difficult, and on numerous occasions were on the brink of breaking down. According to Uri Savir, who was one of the Israeli negotiators in Oslo, the negotiations were [c]onducted with great intensity for fifty hours or more at a time, with breaks only for two or three hours’ sleep and a hearty Norwegian meal, they resembled a marathon chess game fraught with feints, bluffs, and diversions. The confrontations were often brutal, the crises close to shattering. Sometimes the tension broke in near-hysterical laughter; sometimes we pushed each other almost to the point of rage. The emotional outbursts in those sessions buffeted us between hatred and empathy.15

Savir poignantly captures the intense emotions that ran through the negotiating process. After months of negotiations, the two sides reached a consensus around the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The Declaration of Principles was not a peace agreement resolving the conflict, but rather was an agreement to establish a framework for a peace process. In it, the Israelis and Palestinians committed themselves to working toward a permanent settlement of their conflict. With the Declaration of Principles, the two sides agreed to recognize each other’s right to exist and right to live within the borders of Israel/Palestine. The Declaration of Principles also represented an agreement in principle to a transfer of powers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the Israelis to the Palestinians. It also called for the redeployment of Israeli troops at least away from populated areas, and for the creation of an interim Palestinian self-government authority. The Declaration of Principles initiated what has come to be known as the Oslo Peace Process. In Oslo, the Israelis and Palestinians agreed that the Declaration of Principles would begin a process that was to last for no more than five years and would culminate in a permanent settlement, which would be based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These two UN Resolutions called for a return of all occupied territories and for negotiations to bring about a lasting peace in the Middle East. Permanent status negotiations were supposed to begin as soon as possible, but no later than three years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles. All of the most contentious issues, everything from the future of Jerusalem to the right of return for Palestinian refugees, were deferred to these permanent status negotiations. Furthermore, the Declaration of Principles was strangely silent on whether this final settlement meant the creation of an independent Palestinian state, or something else, and any discussion of Israeli settlement activity was left out as well.

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In Norway, away from the tensions in their homeland, the Israelis and Palestinians were able to come together to address their differences and work toward “win-win” solutions. This spirit of compromise, and the empathy that Savir referred to previously, is known as the “Oslo Spirit.” Unfortunately, as we shall see in the following chapters, the Oslo Spirit quickly dissipated and never permeated Israeli and Palestinian societies. The relative isolation of the negotiators, and the secrecy with which the negotiations were conducted, facilitated the development of this Oslo Spirit. However, while this secrecy was instrumental in negotiating an agreement, it proved counterproductive when the time came to actually implement the agreement. This was the case because the secret negotiations left the Israeli and Palestinian people outside of the process, so they were not as invested in the process as the negotiators, thereby mitigating their support for it. Also, due to the secrecy, there was “no input from people whose input would have been important—those with sensitivity to certain issues could have improved the document and made it more widely acceptable.”16 Besides the secrecy in which it was negotiated, another criticism of the Oslo Accords was that members of each side felt that their side had made too many concessions, while their adversary had scarcely made any. Before he became the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak opposed the Declaration of Principles because “they mandated Israeli withdrawals prior to Israel knowing whether the Palestinians would be willing to make concessions on core permanent status issues like refugees and Jerusalem.”17 Similarly, many Palestinians criticized the Oslo Accords because they felt the Israelis hadn’t made any real concessions. The well-known scholar Edward Said was one of the most vocal Palestinian critics of the agreement. According to Said For the first time in our history, our leadership has simply given up on selfdetermination, Jerusalem, and the refugees, allowing them to become part of an undetermined set of “final status negotiations.” For the first time in our recent past, we accepted the division of our people—whose unity we had fought for as a national movement since 1948—into residents of the occupied territories and all the others.18

Said was critical of Oslo not only because he felt that the Palestinians had given away too much but also due to the open-ended nature of the agreement itself. This was a common critique of the Accords. Just as the secrecy helped to make an agreement possible but proved counterproductive when the time came to

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actually implement the agreement, the same could be said for Oslo’s open-ended nature. In other words, while the use of vague terminology and the postponement of the most difficult issues for the final status negotiations enabled the two sides to reach an agreement, they were not conducive to actually resolving the conflict. So after the agreement, Arafat and his supporters were faced with the challenge of how to “convince any Palestinian that it is better to have a municipal form of self-rule instead of independence, redeployment of forces instead of withdrawal, ‘admission’ instead of the right of return, religious rights in Jerusalem instead of national political rights, and so on?”19 Oslo’s vagueness proved counterproductive not only when the time came to sell the agreement to the Israeli and Palestinian people but also throughout the subsequent negotiations, when both sides grasped that there was a huge gap between their interpretations of the Declaration of Principles. The Israeli reading stressed the civil and military powers that Israel was to retain after withdrawing its troops from Gaza and Jericho. Following a literal and legalistic interpretation of the declaration, this implied that Israel, as the official “source of authority,” would grant the Palestinians limited powers and, most important, retain direct control of the crossings in and out of Gaza to Israel and Egypt, including the right to decide who was entitled to enter and leave the Strip. . . . The Palestinian position demanded just the opposite. Israel had to withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, transfer control of the border crossings to the Palestinians, and patrol the international borders jointly with them.20

The Declaration of Principles was just the first step in a long process whose end was not determined. Although Arafat told his followers that the agreement would lead to a Palestinian state, that was not completely clear. Due to its open-ended nature, the agreement could be interpreted multiple ways, which would further complicate its implementation. In fact, one could even question whether Oslo represented an “agreement.” For Mark A. Heller, “The Declaration of Principles is not a peace agreement. It is, at most, an agreement to enter into an open-ended, multi-stage process leading to a peace agreement based on permanent status arrangements.”21 Another criticism of the Oslo Peace Process was that it really did not represent Palestinian self-rule. While the Oslo Accords did lead to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Israeli officials continued to wield considerable power and authority over the Palestinian people. As Edward Said pointed out, after Oslo

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“Israel has maintained its settlements and very partially redeployed its army. It controls land, water, security, and foreign policy for the Palestinian ‘self-rule’ authority.”22 In a surprisingly honest assessment of the Oslo Peace Process, a former legal advisor to the Israeli foreign minister declared,“We control electrical power, water resources, telecommunications and so on. We control everything. There are a number of natives who serve as middlemen. What could suit our purposes better?” He went on to advise the Israeli critics of the agreement to read the agreement because “If you read it, you not only will accept it, you will become its enthusiastic supporters. The power imbalance between us and the Palestinians never served our interests better in the past, not even before the Intifada.”23 The power imbalance that he referred to was evidenced in Oslo’s emphasis upon Israeli security needs, at the expense of the Palestinians. In selling Oslo to the Israeli people, Rabin promised them that their security would improve with the agreement. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this meant that Israeli security needs became the test by which they judged the peace process, such that when their security did not improve they pulled their support from the process. In addition [T]he preeminence given by Israelis to Israeli existential (viewed in military terms) and personal security concerns is precisely what alienates many Palestinians in the attempt to find common ground for dialogue, for two reasons. The first is the Palestinian belief that Palestinian security concerns (regarding both the emerging Palestinian state and the individual) are not given equal weight with those of Israel and Israelis, either by Israelis themselves or by many in the international community. The second reason is the Palestinian conviction that real security for Palestinians can only be achieved through the creation of a fully sovereign Palestinian state, something which a majority of Israelis is unwilling to grant at this time as an irreversible outcome of the peace process (and which a large minority of Israelis totally reject).24

The Declaration of Principles and the three principles There are many other critiques of the Oslo Peace Process, but in this section we will examine the Declaration of Principles through the lenses of our three principles.

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Principle 1 Principle 1 asserted that moderates on the stronger side would take advantage of the asymmetrical distribution of power to promote their own interests. Throughout the secret negotiations in Oslo, the Israelis clearly used their power to their own advantages. As will be discussed shortly, this was seen in their efforts to keep their options open for as long as possible, and in their tendency to view the peace process as a test for the Palestinians. As the dominant power, the Israelis were able to control the process by dictating the parameters for the negotiations. For example, the Israeli negotiators insisted that all discussions be limited to the present or the future. On the one hand, it was probably wise to avoid getting bogged down in a debate over past sins. On the other hand, the Israelis’ unwillingness to discuss the history of the conflict “led the Palestinians to the conclusion that they had not come to terms with it—or with them.”25 This was another example of a decision that was conducive to reaching an agreement, but as we will see in the next chapter, ultimately counterproductive when it came time to implementing it. The Israelis were not only able to limit the discussion to the present and future but also able to control what was, or was not, placed upon the table for negotiation. This was the most significant way that the asymmetrical distribution of power favored the Israelis. Through their ability to control what was under consideration, they essentially had the ultimate veto power over the negotiations. For example, while the talks began in January 1993, Rabin did not send an official representative to the negotiations until June of that same year. When Rabin’s representative, Joel Singer, finally arrived, the talks had to go back to the very beginning because the unofficial Israeli negotiators had made some concessions that went against Israeli policy. For example, they had failed to specify clear limits on Palestinian jurisdiction, had included East Jerusalem in the area of Palestinian self-rule, accepted the notion of a UN trusteeship in Gaza, and had agreed to binding third party arbitration in the event of any future disputes. These concessions were all retracted by Singer, sending the negotiations back to square one.26 The absence of a third party guarantor was especially significant, because it only served to reinforce both sides’ unwillingness to commit to the agreement, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Throughout the negotiations, the Israelis were clearly able to control what was on or off the table. Not surprisingly, Kelman argues that the “Declaration of Principles reflected—both in what it included and what it omitted—the power

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differential between the parties.”27 Similarly, Yezid Sayigh, who was one of the Palestinian negotiators during the early 1990s, argues that From the very first day, Israel has had a much greater ability to set terms. Starting with the terms of the Oslo Accord themselves: what was on the agenda for discussion, immediately, or for final stages? Since they held the ground, they could really determine far more than the PLO what was on the agenda, what was deferred, the division of powers, mechanisms—in particular the absence of an arbitrational mechanism involving third party roles, i.e., external actors, mediation, or arbitration.28

Israel’s ability to dictate the agenda and tenor for the negotiations led to the adoption of an incrementalist or gradualist approach to the negotiations. In the incrementalist approach, the two sides try to gain an agreement on a fairly weak or even vague treaty, under the assumption that the agreement can be gradually extended later on. Phased negotiations have been an Israeli-American concept, presumably intended to create an atmosphere of confidence and good will so as to enable agreement during the first, presumably easy, phase and to increase this confidence until the parties become able to tackle the tough issues at a later stage. That is the theory behind the two phases. It sounds reasonable and logical. In practice, however, this modality works to the advantage of the stronger party.29

The incremental approach served the Israelis well, because it enabled them to postpone discussions of the most contentious issues like Jerusalem and the right of return and to keep their options open for as long as possible. As Rabin puts it, “no dates are sacred.”30 According to Nadav Morag, Rabin “wanted to drag out negotiations with the PLO thus ensuring Israeli control over the territories and status quo situation for as long as possible.”31 Due to his lack of trust in Arafat and the Palestinians, Rabin wanted to defer any major concessions for as long as possible. He wanted to test the Palestinians in order to ensure that they were a real partner for peace. As a result, Rabin and his negotiators viewed the Declaration of Principles as the first of a series of tests for the Palestinians. As one of the Israeli negotiators of the Declaration of Principles puts it, “We withdraw, and what we get in exchange for territory is promises. But what happens if we are left with unfulfilled promises? We want to test it through phases.”32 Due to the asymmetrical distribution of power, the Israelis were able to cast themselves in the role of test administrator. As Rabin

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promised his people, “If the Palestinians do not pass the test of reality, we can instantly control any diversion by them from the path we have agreed on.”33 As Kelman argued, the Declaration of Principles clearly reflected the asymmetrical distribution of power. The Israelis’ ability—to set the agenda, to determine what was or was not negotiable, to send the negotiations back to square one, to guarantee an incrementalist approach, to defer any painful concessions, and to use the Declaration of Principles and entire peace process as a test for the Palestinians—were all a product of their preponderance of power.

Principle 2 Principle 2 stated that the moderates would not be able commit themselves fully to the peace process. As was discussed previously, one of the defining characteristics of the Oslo Peace Process was its graduality or incrementalism. Another would be constructive ambiguity. Due to their ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, both the Israeli and Palestinian moderates embraced constructive ambiguity. With constructive ambiguity, the two sides reach a deliberately vague agreement, postponing any decisions on the most contentious issues for a later, undeclared, date. On the one hand, being vague helps paper over irreconcilable differences. By respectfully agreeing to disagree, each party is thus left free to interpret in its own way any loosely defined word, nebulous clause, or particularly controversial agenda item. Ambiguity is also helpful in that it enables rapporteurs to cite a positive atmosphere, making it possible for them to report favorably on further progress and to promote what may often in reality be the false impression of a widening consensus and of a sustainable momentum.34

The problem with the Declaration of Principles was that its vagueness left it open to different interpretations by the two sides. So, while the Palestinians were convinced that the Declaration of Principles would lead toward an independent Palestinian state, the Israeli reading was completely different. Although this ambiguity might have been “constructive” in reaching an agreement, it was definitely counterproductive when the time came for implementing it. No matter how seemingly beneficial in immediate and momentary terms, diplomatic ambiguity in the larger, longer sense could well be inimical to what really matters in peacemaking—ultimate peace prospects. How much ill-will and recrimination have been caused just in the post-Oslo interim stage because of imprecision? The issue of what constitutes Israeli

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settlement “expansion.” The exact formula and timetable for abrogation by the PLO of its covenant clauses calling for Israel’s destruction. The degree of direct accountability on Arafat’s Palestinian National Authority for preventing and punishing acts of terror. And, to be sure, the timing and extent of military redeployment on Israel’s part as a prelude to the final negotiations.35

Constructive ambiguity’s imprecision meant that the agreement could be all things to all people. In other words, both sides were able to interpret the Declaration of Principles as saying what they wanted it to say, so it is not surprising that when the time came for implementing the agreement and for moving to the final status negotiations, both sides rejected the other’s interpretation. According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, Neither Rabin nor Peres thought that Oslo had unleashed a process that should and must culminate in a full withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the clear and unambiguous division of Jerusalem into two capitals, and a substantial implementation of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Constructive ambiguity facilitated an agreement in Oslo at the price of creating potentially irreconcilable misconceptions with regard to the final settlement.36

Due to their own inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, it is not surprising that the Israeli and Palestinian moderates embraced constructive ambiguity as a guiding principle for the negotiations. But did it also prevent them from committing themselves fully to the peace process? The history of the Oslo Peace Process seems to indicate that it did. According to Robert L. Rothstein, one of the problems with the Declaration of Principles, as well as with the Dayton and Good Friday Agreements, was that the central issues were postponed. Rothstein powerfully summarizes the challenges of Oslo, and of the inability of either side to commit to it fully when he writes, In such agreements, risks and uncertainties are so high that one cannot expect either side to make a full commitment to them: initial offers are likely to be hedged and minimal; doubts about the other’s willingness or ability to offer more or to implement commitments are generally great; each side has reasonable fears about the other side’s ability to get a substantive agreement through domestic political processes; and both sides are ultimately unhappy about the terms of any agreement and constantly seek to push its limits, renegotiate its terms, and get the other to move first. The parties to the conflict, in effect, seek to use the peace process for their own ends; actually achieving real peace may not rank very high on their list of priorities.37

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During the negotiations in Oslo, “the Israeli side was unable and unwilling to commit to even the vaguest allusion as to the nature of the final settlement with the Palestinians.”38 While the Declaration of Principles is indicative of the moderates’ inability to commit fully to the peace process, to what extent is it also a product of the indicators discussed in Chapter 1? On the one hand, the Declaration of Principles is not characterized by contradictory policies. While it certainly can be criticized for not going far enough and for leaving out key issues, it is not indicative of the zigzag policy-making style we will see in subsequent chapters. In addition, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Oslo tried to adopt integrative or win-win negotiating stances. On the other hand, while the following chapters will show how this integrative approach waned in the years after Oslo, it is also true that at Oslo distributive, as opposed to exclusively integrative, bargaining styles were seen as well. The fact that both sides continued to adopt a distributive negotiating style in Oslo is indicative of the fact that they continued to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. The negotiations in Oslo could be seen as a “hybrid of the concession/convergence process which is seen as leading to zero-sum outcomes and an integrative process of deductively implemented principles which leads to positive-sum outcomes.”39 On the one hand, I. William Zartman argues that the “Oslo negotiations can be explained as a process of constructing a formula—or really a sub-formula, the basic formula of ‘territory for security’ being already given—through ratcheted concessions until the ‘piles were equal’ and a coherent edifice covering the necessary space was in place.”40 But it is also true that in Oslo both sides tried to get the other side to make maximal concessions, while trying to minimize their own. Rabin had very low expectations for the negotiations in Oslo, until he was pleasantly surprised by a series of significant Palestinian concessions. As he puts it on four or five major issues they agreed to (things) I had doubted they would agree to. First, (keeping all of) Jerusalem under Israeli control, and outside the jurisdiction of the Palestinians for the entire interim period. Second, (retaining all Israeli) settlements. . . . Third, overall Israeli responsibility for the security of Israelis and external security. Fourth, keeping all options open for the negotiations on a permanent settlement.41

Since both sides sought to attain as many concessions as possible from their opponent, they were both willing to countenance the breakdown of the Oslo talks if need be. As a result, on numerous occasions the talks were on the verge

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of collapse. Both sides saw the Declaration of Principles as a way to achieve their goals, but they did not see “real peace” as their ultimate end. In other words, they saw the Declaration of Principles and the peace process it engendered as a new tactic in their strategy, not as an end in and of itself. By focusing upon the pragmatic reality, the two sides were able to reach agreement on the Declaration of Principles, thereby launching the Oslo Peace Process. The problem was that in doing so, the “Israelis and Palestinians saw the peace process as a means to advance political and traditional goals and not as a goal in itself.”42 By viewing the Peace Process merely as a means to an end, it became much easier to walk away from the process whenever they felt it was not serving their interests. But, it also meant that both sides were able to avoid the difficult task of reconciling with their enemy, as will be discussed in the next section. Pragmatism meant that each side was motivated by what the peace process meant for their side, with little, if any, thought about what it meant for their opponent. It is true that Rabin and Peres’ decision to recognize the PLO was motivated by rational considerations, in the sense of making use of a method of analysis and planning to bring about a projected result, but since their thinking was still predicated upon an assumption of Israel’s permanent asymmetrical rights vis-àvis the Palestinians, it cannot be said to have been nationalistically dispassionate in nature or motivated by cosmopolitan normative concerns.43

Finally, the fact that neither side was willing to make further concessions, or to commit fully to the peace process, stemmed in large part from their concern about how their actions would be interpreted by their own society. As we will see in the following chapters, this commitment failure proved fatal to the peace process because it not only made it impossible for the moderates on either side to get their people to commit to the process, but also created a self-fulfilling prophecy in which each side’s doubts as to whether the other was a real partner for peace reinforced their unwillingness to commit further to the peace process.

Principle 3 According to Principle 3, due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will be unable to promote reconciliation. In the Preamble to the Declaration of Principles, it states that the two sides “agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace

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settlement and historical reconciliation through the agreed political process.”44 However, outside of the Preamble, there is actually no talk of reconciliation. Instead, the Declaration of Principles reads like a document prepared by two teams of lawyers, rather than as an agreement to launch a new relationship, or to build a lasting peace. The Declaration of Principles did not represent a fundamental reevaluation by either side of their images of their enemy or themselves. This was true for both sides, but especially true for Israel. As Peter Ezra Weinberger points out, “In the Oslo Accords, the Government of Israel did not recognize the PLO as its equal, nor did it acknowledge that the Palestinians had an equal national right to the territory that both peoples claimed. The recognition process inherent in Oslo was not a prelude to a fundamental resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict but rather an innovative and multi-faceted attempt to consolidate Israeli control.”45 The fact that the Declaration of Principles did not fundamentally alter the existing relationship between the occupier and the occupied comes out further in the following quote, “In line with the centuries-old security doctrine, the primary consideration during negotiations at Oslo was to deter the enemy from developing military capacity and thereby threatening the peace. The Israeli team made it clear from the outset of the Oslo process that Israel would maintain overall responsibility for security.”46 If the Declaration of Principles engendered any reconciliation, it was solely on the individual, not national, level. Locked away in the Norwegian countryside, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators developed a great deal of camaraderie, respect, and empathy for one another. However, as the following chapters will reveal, this reconciliation did not permeate their respective nations.

Conclusion In the 1980s and 1990s, a series of developments helped to push the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table by leading to a reassessment on both sides of the status quo, of the feasibility of the peace process, and of the existence of a partner for peace. In Oslo, the two sides agreed to the Declaration of Principles, which initiated the Oslo Peace Process. The Israelis and Palestinians made a number of decisions that proved conducive to their reaching an initial agreement on the Declaration of Principles, but as will be seen in the following chapters, mitigated their ability to achieve a final resolution of the conflict. The secret

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nature of the talks, the vagueness of the language adopted, and the decision to avoid discussions of the past—while these decisions all facilitated the talks in Oslo, they made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the peacemakers to bring about a lasting peace. The Declaration of Principles was clearly a product of the asymmetrical distribution of power in the Middle East. The Israelis were able to use their power to control the negotiations in Oslo. Everything from what was or was not on the table, to the incremental nature of the Peace Process launched by the Declaration of Principles, was affected by the Israelis’ preponderance of power. As was anticipated by Principle 1, the Declaration of Principles is indicative of the Israelis’ desire to string out the process for as long as possible, and to use the process as a test for the Palestinians. The inability of the moderates on either side to commit fully to the Peace Process is also evidenced in the Declaration of Principles. Constructive Ambiguity was so attractive to both sides due to their own ambivalence vis-à-vis the Peace Process and one another. While the Oslo Spirit that permeated the talks in Oslo is indicative of an integrative negotiating stance, and an ability to move beyond a zero-sum outlook, neither side was able to overcome fully their inclination to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. The Declaration of Principles reflected the pragmatic nature of the moderates, where the Peace Process was merely a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. For the Declaration of Principles to have brought about a lasting peace, it would have to have initiated a reconciliation process between the two sides. Tragically, there is nothing in the Declaration of Principles that promotes reconciliation. Neither side is forced to reevaluate its images of its enemy, itself, nor of the national narratives that have perpetuated the conflict. The Declaration of Principles was merely a personal reconciliation between the negotiators on both sides, not a national reconciliation, and as a result its failure is not surprising.

Notes 1 I have deliberately avoided using any language in this section to imply that the situation was “ripe for resolution.” While the literature on ripeness was an important contribution to our understanding of conflict resolution, it tended to be too deterministic, too subjective, difficult to measure, to overlook the

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers intraparty dimension, and to fail to appreciate that there could be different types of stalemates, and that those different stalemates would elicit different types of responses. For example, see Christopher Mitchell, “Cutting Losses: Reflections on Appropriate Timing,” Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Working Paper no. 9, Fairfax, VA, 1995, 11; Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach (New York: Pinter, 1996), 10; Daniel Lieberfeld, “Conflict ‘Ripeness’ Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases,” Negotiation Journal 15, no. 1 (January 1999): 74; Gerald M. Steinberg, “Unripeness and Conflict Management: Re-Examining the Oslo Process and its Lessons,” Occasional Paper No. 4, Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Bar Ilan University, June 18, 2002, accessed July, 12, 2005, http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/conflict/Papers/ re-examiningolso.pdf. Galia Golan, “Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Israeli View,” in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 42. Yael Aronoff, “When and Why Do Hardliners Become Soft? An Examination of Israeli Prime Ministers Shamir, Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2–5, 1999, 22. Yoram Peri, “Afterword: Rabin: From Mr. Security to Nobel Peace Prize Winner,” in Yitzhak Rabin, ed., The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 355. Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, “Peace-making with the Palestinians: Change and Legitimacy,” in Efraim Kash, ed., From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel’s Troubled Agenda (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 171; Deiniol Jones, Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 117. This was the case because hawks in the Likud Party tended to be more motivated by religious considerations, while those in the Labor Party were more focused on geostrategic concerns. Myron J. Aronoff, and Yael S. Aronoff, “Domestic Determinants of Israeli Foreign Policy: The Peace Process and the Declaration of Principles to the Oslo II Interim Agreement,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East and the Peace Process (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998). Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 189. Wendy Kristianasen, “Challenge and Counter-Challenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 19.

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10 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective,” in Ilan Peleg, ed., The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 10. 11 Scott Crichlow, “Idealism or Pragmatism? An Operational Code Analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres,” Political Psychology 19, no. 4 (1998): 695. 12 Ziad Abu-Amr, “Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations: A Palestinian Perspective,” in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 28. 13 M. E. Ahrari, “The Peace Process and its Critics: Post-Cold War Perspectives,” in M. E. Ahrari, ed., Change and Continuity in the Middle East: Conflict Resolution and Prospects for Peace (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 21. 14 Bar-Simon-Tov, “Peace-making with the Palestinians,” 172–3. 15 Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 31. 16 Dana Francis, ed., Mediating Deadly Conflicts: Lessons from Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1998), 79. 17 Joseph Rynhold, “Making Sense of Tragedy: Barak, the Israeli Left, and the Oslo Peace Process,” Israel Studies Forum 19, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 17. 18 Edward W. Said, Peace and Its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1996): xxix. 19 Labib Kamhawi, “The Impact of the Latest Incidents in Israel on the Peace between Israel and the Palestinians,” in Hisham Sharabi et al., eds, Beyond Rhetoric: Perspectives on a Negotiated Settlement in Palestine, Part One: Critical Issues for the Final Status Negotiations (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, June 1996), 16. 20 Savir, The Process, 98. 21 Mark A. Heller, The Israel-PLO Agreement: What If It Fails? How Will We Know? Final Status Issues series: Israel-Palestinians, Study No. 1 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1994). 22 Said, Peace and Its Discontents, xxx. 23 Azmi Bishara, “Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process,” in George Giacaman and Dag Jørund Lønning, eds, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 221, quote originally appeared in the Ha’aretz in August 1996. 24 Jeffrey Boutwell, and Everett Mendelsohn, Israeli-Palestinian Security: Issues in the Permanent Status Negotiations (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 17. 25 Omar M. Dajani, “Surviving Opportunities: Palestinian Negotiating Patterns in Peace Talks with Israel,” in Tamara Cofman Wittes, ed., How Israelis and

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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 60–73. Michael Rubner, “The Oslo Peace Process through Three Lenses,” Middle East Policy 6, no. 2 (October 1998): 192–201; I. William Zartman, “Explaining Oslo,” International Negotiation 2 (1997): 199–200. Herbert C. Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 5, no. 2 (1999): 102. Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. Naseer H. Aruri, “Introductory Remarks,” in Hisham Sharabi et al., eds, Beyond Rhetoric: Perspectives on a Negotiated Settlement in Palestine, Part One: Critical Issues for the Final Status Negotiations (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, June 1996), 3. Ziad Abu Zayyad, “Why Oslo Must Not Fail,” Palestine-Israel Journal 2, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 20. Nadav Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,” Israeli Affairs 6, nos 3–4 (Spring/Summer 2000): 200–20. Lieberfeld, “Conflict ‘Ripeness’ Revisited,” 138. Savir, The Process, 96. Aharon Klieman, Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 47. Ibid., 48. Ben-Ami, Shlomo, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 247. Robert L. Rothstein, How Not to Make Peace:“Conflict Syndrome” and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, No. 57, March 2006), 12. Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity,” 206. Zartman, “Explaining Oslo,” 200. Ibid., 205. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 66. Uri Savir, Peace First: A New Model to End War (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2008), 34. Peter Ezra Weinberger, Co-opting the PLO: A Critical Reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993–1995 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 135. “Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993,” MidEast Web, accessed February 8, 2011, www.mideastweb.org/ meoslodop.htm. Weinberger, Co-opting the PLO, 47. Savir, Peace First, 35.

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3

The Road from Oslo

In the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis and Palestinians agreed to reach a permanent settlement within five years. As I write this, almost twenty years later, the two sides are no closer to reaching a final settlement than they were back in 1993. While Israeli and Palestinian extremists undoubtedly played a role in “spoiling” the peace process, this chapter and the following chapters will focus upon the role of the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers in sabotaging the peace process.

After Oslo: The challenge of implementation If the road to Oslo was full of roadblocks, dead ends, and detours, the road from Oslo has been even worse. The peace process has bogged down, so the two parties have never moved on to a final settlement. There has been no shortage of talks, with the two sides repeatedly coming together to try to resolve their differences and to push the process toward a final agreement. These talks have taken place all over the globe and involved a revolving cast of Israeli, Palestinian, and American negotiators, but to no avail. In this chapter, we will focus upon four of the major agreements they reached: Gaza-Jericho (May 1994), Oslo II (September 1995), Hebron (January 1997), and the Wye River Memorandum (October 1998). After briefly discussing each of these agreements, the following section will analyze them in light of our three principles. Chapter 5 will examine the Camp David Summit separately, as that was the one summit during which many people argued that the peacemakers came the closest to achieving a final settlement. Camp David differed from the talks discussed in this chapter because it was an attempt to reach a final settlement, as opposed to being an agreement to

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push the peace process forward incrementally. Also, the Camp David Summit did not produce an agreement. Similarly, neither the negotiations at Taba after Camp David nor the negotiations between Abbas and Olmert will be discussed because they did not culminate in an agreement. The Abbas-Olmert negotiations are also not considered because Olmert was not a moderate, and this book is focusing exclusively upon the impact of the moderates upon the peace process.

The Gaza-Jericho Agreement Since the Declaration of Principles was not a peace agreement, but rather just an agreement to start a peace process, it required a number of agreements just to implement its own provisions, not to mention talks for reaching a final settlement. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which is also known as the Cairo Agreement, represents the first of these agreements. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement granted greater autonomy to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and culminated in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, which was to be an interim administrative body until a final settlement was reached. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement called for a rapid Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Israel would continue to provide security from an external attack, with internal security split between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Israelis would also be responsible for the security of all Israelis and settlements in the region, while the Palestinians would handle internal security and public order for the Palestinians. Although the Palestinians did attain greater autonomy, and secure the release of 5,000 prisoners, the Agreement favored the Israelis in a number of ways. First, it prioritized the settlements and Israeli security considerations over Palestinian interests. Second, all of the settlers and settlements were beyond the purview of Palestinian jurisdiction. Third, it limited Palestinian access to land near the settlements. Finally, it maintained Israeli control over Palestinian land use and zoning decisions.1

Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II) After a long and arduous series of negotiations, in September 1995 the two sides agreed to the Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza

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Strip, which is also known as Oslo II. According to Dennis Ross, “The difficulty of crafting the Gaza-Jericho Agreement paled in comparison to what would be involved in bringing the Palestinian Authority to all of the Palestinian cities, towns, and villages of the West Bank.”2 The agreement represented the next stage in extending autonomy to the Palestinians and set the terms for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas, while still guaranteeing security for Israeli settlements. Oslo II led to the establishment of the Palestinian parliament with elections, but its primary focus was territorial. The Interim Agreement set the terms for further Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israel agreed to withdraw from another six towns in the West Bank, with an additional partial withdrawal from Hebron within six months. Basically, the agreement divided the West Bank into the following three zones: one of complete Palestinian control, partial Palestinian control, and complete Israeli control. Area A represented all areas where Israeli military control was transferred over to the Palestinian Authority. It included the Gaza Strip, Jericho, and seven major Palestinian population centers in the West Bank. In these areas, the Palestinian Authority had complete authority for internal security and public order. Area B comprised over 400 Palestinian villages and towns, where the Palestinian Authority was granted civil powers, but the Israeli military retained its overriding control over security. This enabled it to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens and to fight terrorism. Finally, Area C consisted of largely unpopulated areas as well as areas of significance for the security of the Israeli settlements. In Area C, Israel retained full responsibility for security as well as civil affairs. In addition, Oslo II called for three future Israeli redeployments in which parts of Area C would be transferred to Palestinian control. These redeployments would exclude the settlements as well as areas Israel deemed essential for the security of the settlements. Finally, the agreement also called for the creation of a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, although Israel retained the right to close this passage if it deemed it necessary to do so.3

Hebron agreement While Oslo II had called for an Israeli withdrawal from Hebron within six months, that did not take place. As a result, the Hebron Agreement really was not a new agreement, but rather an agreement to take the steps necessary to implement an earlier agreement. The negotiations that culminated in the Hebron Agreement

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were extremely difficult. This was largely due to the fact that Hebron differed from other Palestinian cities in the West Bank because it had over 400 Israeli settlers living right in the heart of the city. This fact made the negotiations over Israeli withdrawal especially challenging. The negotiations also fell victim to Israeli domestic politics, with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party as the Israeli prime minister in 1996. Netanyahu came to office as an opponent of the Oslo Peace Process. However, once in office he realized that if he stopped the process completely he risked a violent confrontation with the Palestinians, and Israel becoming an international pariah. In short, he realized that his political future was tied to that of Oslo. As we shall see, since Netanyahu realized that he could not kill the Oslo Peace Process, he set out to rework it, and to delay it, to better suit his, and Israeli interests. The negotiations over the Hebron Agreement reflect these motivations, yet it is also true that, “this agreement was both historic and revolutionary in the sense that it was the first time that an Israeli government led by a Likud leader had agreed on territorial compromise in the West Bank, thus dealing a major blow to the ideology of a Greater Israel.”4 The Hebron Agreement implemented the delayed Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, by dividing Hebron into two sectors—a Jewish sector comprising 20 percent of the city, with the remainder in the Palestinian sector. Israeli forces would redeploy from Hebron within ten days of the agreement, with the Palestinian Authority assuming responsibility for these areas. It is important to note that Netanyahu insisted on referring to this as a redeployment, not as a withdrawal, as redeployment did not entail the end of Israeli control.5 Israel would also retain responsibility for the security of the Jewish settlers living in Hebron, along with the Tomb of the Patriarchs. In addition, the agreement called for the establishment of Israeli-Palestinian intervention teams and patrols to provide security for the settlers. It also placed restrictions on the number of Palestinian policemen allowed, as well as how well armed they could be.

Wye River Memorandum Despite his opposition to the Oslo Peace Process, Netanyahu agreed to the Hebron Agreement as well as to the Wye River Memorandum. As was the case with the Hebron Agreement, the Wye River Memorandum did not represent a fundamental breakthrough, but rather was an agreement to implement what had been agreed to previously, but never implemented. According to Yossi Beilin,

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The Wye Summit was, in fact, superfluous. The 1995 interim agreement set out a timetable for Israeli withdrawals. When it was not implemented, it was replaced by the Hebron Agreement in 1997; when the Hebron Agreement was not carried out, an additional Israeli-Palestinian agreement was supposed to replace it, providing a third timetable for redeployment.6

In the Wye River Agreement, the redeployments would take place in three installments over the course of 12 weeks, with each installment conditional upon Palestinian actions to curtail terrorism. These actions would be verified by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In exchange for the Israeli redeployments, Netanyahu and his negotiators insisted on a Palestinian commitment to combat terrorism. Israel was supposed to withdraw its troops from an additional 13 percent of the West Bank over these three months, during which time the Palestinian Authority was supposed to work with the CIA to fight terrorism and arrest Palestinian extremists. Just over 14 percent of the land in the West Bank was to be transferred from joint Israeli-Palestinian control to exclusively Palestinian Authority, two corridors for safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be established, and Israel was also supposed to release over 700 Palestinian prisoners. While the initial Israeli withdrawal occurred, the subsequent ones were cancelled by the Israeli government.

Israeli and Palestinian moderates after Oslo Chapter 2’s analysis of the Declaration of Principles provided considerable evidence of our three principles, so this section will explore whether the same holds true for the period after the historic handshake on the White House lawn.

Principle 1 If the Declaration of Principles can be seen as a product of the asymmetrical distribution of power, can the same claim be made for the subsequent negotiations and agreements? It does seem to be the case that the Israelis were able to use their power to their own advantage. For example, in her discussion of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Laura Drake asserts, “It is true that the issues which form the substance of Palestinian existence, or non-existence, are left out of the agreement altogether, their postponement a reflection of the asymmetry of power in the regional environment.”7

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As a result of the asymmetry in power, in all of the agreements discussed in this chapter, the Israelis were able to ensure that none of their concessions threatened their ability to control the situation, not to mention the Palestinians. For example, after the Oslo II Agreement, Rabin and Peres were praised because “the agreement does not create irreversible facts in three critical areas— responsibility for security, the fate of the settlers, and Jerusalem. Less than a third of Judea and Samaria goes over to Arafat. If the accord hits serious snags, Israel will still hold key positions—the West Bank hills, Greater Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, and control over the roads. The key to the future of the territories is still in Israel’s hands.”8 As was the case in Oslo, the Israelis have been able to control what was, and was not, placed on the agenda, and thereby ensure that the course of future developments was in their hands. The asymmetry of power has enabled the Israelis to control the discourse in a way that the Palestinians cannot. As a result, “what started as a crusade for peace has proven to be a charade, as time and again Israeli officials have gone out of their way to remind the Palestinians that redeployment does not mean withdrawal, and that direct occupation was replaced by indirect occupation, and that self-rule does not mean independence.”9 The asymmetry of power enabled the Israelis to not only control the discourse during negotiations but also the implementation process afterward. In other words, the Israelis could not only determine what was or was not on the agenda but also what was or was not implemented in any agreement. The Palestinians felt that the Israelis consistently used the power differential to “preempt” earlier agreements and to “prejudice” their results. According to Mouin Rabbin, A simple comparison of the September 1993 Declaration of Principles (“Oslo”), the September 1995 Interim Agreement (“Oslo II”), the January 1997 Hebron Protocol, the October 1998 Wye Memorandum, and the September 1999 Sharm al-Shayk agreement reveals a clear pattern in which Israel first refuses to implement its own commitments, then seeks and obtains their dilution in a new agreement, subsequently engages in systematic prevarication, and finally demands additional negotiations, leading to a yet further diluted agreement.10

The asymmetry of power enabled the Israelis to control not only what concessions were agreed to, but even more significantly, what concessions were actually made. As Ron Pundak points out, Israel on its part did not implement the three stages of the second redeployment, stipulated in the Interim Agreement, did not withdraw from territories which

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were supposed to be transferred to the Palestinians; completed only one section out of four with regard to the freeing of Palestinian prisoners; did not undertake the implementation of the safe passage connecting the West Bank and Gaza; repeatedly delayed the permit to build an airport and maritime port in Gaza, prevented the transfer of monies belonging to the Palestinian Authority for extended periods of time; and continued to establish new settlements, to annex territories for new settlements and expand existing ones.11

The preceding quotes highlight not only the Israelis’ ability to control the agenda of the negotiations but also their efforts to string out the process for as long as possible, as was anticipated in Principle 1. As Netanyahu told the Israeli Knesset after reaching the Hebron Agreement, “We are using the time interval in the agreement to achieve our goals: to maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth necessary for the defense of the state, to insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land, and to propose to the Palestinians a suitable arrangement for self-rule but without the sovereign powers which pose a threat to the State of Israel.”12 Echoing Rabin’s statement that no dates were sacred, Netanyahu pledged that his government would conduct negotiations with “the time, the ability, and the freedom for political maneuver.”13 While this lackadaisical approach to deadlines certainly served the Israelis well, it is not surprising that it did little to instill faith in the Palestinians that the Israelis would implement their end of the agreements. The Israeli proclivity toward incrementalism discussed in the preceding chapter enabled them to minimize their concessions to the Palestinians and thereby maintain control over the peace process. Israel was able to avoid making any major concessions to the Palestinians, because those decisions were postponed until the final status talks. Furthermore, Israel was able to ensure that it would be well positioned when those talks finally began by creating certain “facts on the ground” that further tilted the balance of power in its favor. In other words, Given the power imbalance with the PLO, graduality allowed Israel to unilaterally “create facts” through settlement building and land expropriations that altered the status of critical agenda items slated for final-status talks, such as Jerusalem and final borders. Absent prior specification of an acceptable range of outcomes or an obligatory mechanism for dispute resolution, power imbalances enable the stronger party to preempt phased agreements or prejudice their outcomes.14

From the initial negotiations in Oslo, through the various follow-up agreements and negotiations, the Israelis consistently viewed the peace process

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as a test for the Palestinians. From Rabin on, each Israeli leader saw Oslo as a test that the Palestinians would have to pass, before they could move on to the next phase of the peace process. Thus, their support for Oslo was conditional on how the Palestinians performed in this test. The Israelis made it perfectly clear that Oslo was a test they were administering to the Palestinians. So when Rabin and Arafat met, “For the rest of the session, Rabin, typically, lectured Arafat about security as the key test for the Palestinians, and Arafat, just as typically, presented Rabin with a number of requests.”15 With Rabin in the role of lecturer, and Arafat cast as the suppliant, one clearly sees the impact of the asymmetrical distribution of power. Describing an August 10, 1994, meeting between Rabin and Arafat, Uri Savir reveals how Rabin demanded that the Palestinians do a better job at containing the violence, “‘This is your test,’ he told the chairman almost menacingly.”16 The Israelis’ predilection for incrementalism and their tendency to view the peace process as a test for the Palestinians, reinforced each other. In other words, they used these tests to string out the process for as long as possible. This becomes painfully clear in the following excerpt from Dennis Ross, who was the primary US negotiator for the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks during this period. Barak presented us with a paper that he wanted us to present to the Palestinians as our own. Not only did it pose questions as if the Palestinians had a test they must pass, but it walked back some of the key moves Shlomo had made. Now, instead of 10.5 percent, the territory to be annexed was 11.3 percent; now, instead of at least three villages in the current municipal boundaries of east Jerusalem to become part of sovereign Al-Quds, it was one village. On almost every issue there was a retreat. This is what Barak had put us on hold for thirteen hours to do.17

Israeli security became the ultimate arbiter of the peace process. If the Israelis felt more secure, then the Palestinians were passing their test and thus the peace process could move forward, but if they did not feel more secure, then the process was placed on hold. Palestinian security, or Palestinian needs, did not enter into consideration, or perhaps more appropriately, were not part of the examination. As Yoram Peri points out, “The fact that since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 the Palestinian population had not attained tangible benefits (such as a settlement freeze or accelerated economic development) was not seen, in Israel’s hegemonic military thinking, as relevant.”18

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As was discussed previously, thanks to their hegemonic position, the Israelis were able to ensure that incrementalism and constructive ambiguity were two of the guiding principles for the peace process. A third characteristic of the Oslo Peace Process was reciprocity. Reciprocity tied any advances in the peace process to improvements in Israeli security. After signing the Hebron Protocol, Netanyahu touted the agreement before the Israeli Knesset, saying, “We established the principle of reciprocity—in an official document—as a basis for the continuation of the permanent status negotiations. This is now an integral part of the agreement.”19 Reciprocity served the Israelis well. With reciprocity, Israel was able to control the peace process because Israel was cast in the role of judge, the final arbiter of whether or not the Palestinians were doing enough to ensure Israeli security. For example, in the Wye Memorandum, the redeployment of Israeli forces would take place in three installments over 12 weeks, but each installment was contingent on a number of tasks that the Palestinian Authority had to complete first. So, “in effect, the linking of redeployments to the myriad and unidimensional ‘security actions’ puts the Palestinians on a kind of probation, making them atone, reform, and prove their innocence in order to restore partial control over twelve percent and direct control over one percent of that part of Palestine (about twenty three percent) that was conquered in 1967 instead of 1948.”20 In its role as judge or arbiter of the peace process, Israel was able to place the Palestinians on probation and control the flow of the process. In essence, Israel was able to control Oslo’s timetable, with regard to future redeployments, not to mention the final status talks. Thus, “the linkage of Palestinian security performance and Israeli implementation effectively gives Israel an ‘override’ with regards to timetables included in the agreement.”21 While their ability to control the process served the Israelis well, the same cannot be said for the peace process itself. With the Israelis cast in the role of judge, it only served to heighten the Palestinians’ sense of the power differential, as well as their doubts over the Israelis’ true intentions. According to Palestinian negotiator Abed al-Razak, the problem was that the Israelis [h]ave a narrow understanding of the meaning of security. You must understand the answer lies in a change of the psychological atmosphere. If you force us to do something, Arafat will not be able to abide it. If you appoint yourselves judges of what’s right and what’s wrong, you’ll destroy the good will that exists between your people and us. The way to bring about a radical change in the

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers atmosphere, which, in the end, will serve both sides’ interests, is to create a security partnership.22

Similarly, according to Omar Dajani “Unfortunately, the ‘tendency of Israeli negotiators to dictate positions without justifying them reinforced Palestinians’ concern Israelis were less interested in a new relationship of equality than a modification of the existing arrangement.”23 Without such a new relationship, reconciliation, and thus peace, would prove elusive. Due to the asymmetrical distribution of power, Israel was able to promote its interests in the peace process, as predicted in Principle 1. Israeli hegemony enabled them to serve as the judge or arbiter over the peace process and to control its ebb and flow. As predicted, the Israelis did attempt to keep their options open, and to view the peace process as a test for the Palestinians. On the other hand, the Israelis weren’t the only ones who tried to keep their options open for as long as possible. According to Uri Savir, “On the part of the Palestinians, this was done by playing for time and avoiding an examination of details. On the Israeli side it was done by exploiting time and becoming obsessed with minutiae.”24 Or as Aaron David Miller puts it, “You had an asymmetry of power, which cut both ways. The Palestinians manipulated the power of the weak and the Israelis manipulated the power of the strong; each in their own way, a formidable power. But together, it created a dysfunction that basically brought the entire enterprise down on their heads.”25 While the Palestinians, as predicted, clearly sought to push the process forward more rapidly than the Israelis, they also tried to keep their options open for as long as possible. As will be discussed in the section below, neither side was able to commit fully to the peace process, hence both sides ended up keeping their options open. Also, “neither side was willing to completely give up its negotiating assets, including the ability to inflict violence, pain, and suffering.”26 Thus, both sides tried to improve their position before the “real” negotiations began. Similarly, the Israelis were not the only ones who viewed the peace process as a test for the other side. The Palestinians did not trust the Israelis, so they also viewed the peace process as a test of Israeli intentions. As Yezid Sayigh points out, First, it’s valid and legitimate for parties to, in effect, test each other. I mean, the Palestinians should have made it more explicit that they, too, needed to test Israeli intentions, and that they looked at things like settlement activity as an example, or a very bad example, of that. Because all peace processes are about

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building trust and therefore, the fact that the Israelis said that we need to test the Palestinians in and of itself I don’t see it as highly, sort of, unacceptable or unreasonable.27

Although both sides viewed the peace process as a test, due to the power differential the Palestinians did not have the same ability to assume the role of judge over the Israelis. While they might have been testing the Israelis, they did not have the same ability to fail the Israelis as their more powerful adversary did. The Oslo Peace Process offers qualified support for Principle 1, because while the Israelis did indeed behave as it predicted, the weaker side exhibited some of the same behaviors as well. However, while both sides sought to string out the process and viewed the peace process as a test for their adversary, due to the asymmetry of power the weaker side’s ability to achieve those aims was significantly less. Thus, while Principle 1 was wrong to expect that the stronger actor would behave differently than its weaker adversary, it was correct in pointing out that the power differential will have a significant impact on the peace process, and is thus something that needs to be given greater consideration in future peace processes.

Principle 2 Throughout the Oslo Peace Process, one could legitimately question how committed the two sides were to the process. As we will see in the following two chapters, their words and deeds often revealed their lack of real commitment. For example, while defending Oslo II before the Knesset, Rabin said, “I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”28 In other words, Rabin was reaffirming his commitment not to the Oslo Peace Process, but rather to the settlements. On both sides, there was a great deal of ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, and as a result the agreements that they reached contained a great deal of ambiguity. After the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the “focus has been on its ambiguity and vagueness or on what the agreement does not say.”29 The agreements were deliberately vague, and as we will see in the following section, they failed to force either side to reevaluate their images of one another. As Uri Savir points out, “Neither expressed a true change of feeling toward its

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erstwhile enemy. The fusion of long habit with the anticipation of revolutionary change led to an often ambivalent process, one that alternated between retreat into the familiar and bursts of creative energy.”30 As Principle 2 predicted, we find the Israeli and Palestinian moderates implementing contradictory policies and employing conflicting negotiating styles. Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the occupied territories oscillated during the Oslo years. Thus, while the years after 1993 were marked by the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, they also witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of settlements in the occupied territories. While domestic political considerations go a long way to explaining this increase, this inherent contradiction in Israeli policies is still troubling.31 Equally troubling is the following excerpt from Shlomo Ben-Ami’s Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, “‘Instead of making peace you always look more as if you are getting ready for the next war.’ This complaint, made to me by Abu-Ala during our secret negotiations in May 2000 in Harpsund, the summer residence of Sweden’s prime minister south of Stockholm, was not entirely baseless.”32 One finds a great deal of oscillation in Israeli policies throughout the Oslo years. While one would expect this fluctuation to occur with changes in the government, these dramatic shifts were also occurring within administrations. So, the policy-making process under Barak was labeled “schizoid” and that of Netanyahu was seen as constantly “zigzagging.”33 As was discussed previously, Netanyahu recognized that he could not completely kill Oslo, so he sought to stall the agreement for the time being and dilute any agreement. Thus, “an agreement to pull out of Hebron was followed by a decision to break ground for an Israeli settlement in Har Homa, which previously had been Palestinian land near Jerusalem. Tough talk about the need for amendment of the Palestinian National Charter was followed by a groundbreaking Likud proposal ultimately to give back a total of forty percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians.”34 Similarly, Israeli negotiating styles zigzagged as well. During their secret negotiations in Oslo, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators came together to try to find “win-win” solutions to the conflict. Together, they utilized problem-solving or integrative negotiating techniques. They developed a sense of camaraderie, mutual trust, and respect. This spirit of cooperation is what is known as the “Oslo Spirit.” However, after Oslo this Oslo Spirit quickly dissipated on both sides, such that the negotiations reverted to a more conflictual or distributive style. Throughout the negotiations after Oslo, the Israeli negotiating style oscillated between

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competitive and problem-solving frames of negotiation. Karin Aggestam attributes this shift not only to the increase in the number of negotiators involved in the process but also to the asymmetrical distribution of power between the two sides.35 According to Ron Pundak, this change was due to the fact that the Oslo Spirit never really diffused beyond the small group of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who came together in Oslo. As he points out, The “Oslo Spirit” which won over the traditional leaderships, neither permeated to the level of the Israeli officials who formulated the complicated system of the implementation agreements (the “Gaza and Jericho Agreement” and the Interim Agreement of September 1995), nor to those who were in charge of negotiating with the Palestinians on translating the agreements into concrete actions.36

Since the Oslo Spirit never permeated either society, the negotiations discussed in this chapter and the following chapters were much more contentious than those in Oslo. The negotiations turned into legalistic battles, with each side trying to score points at the other’s expense. This becomes clear when one realizes that while the Declaration of Principles was only 20 pages, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement ran closer to 300. According to Robert Rothstein, in negotiations like those between the Israelis and Palestinians, one finds, “Generosity will be limited, demands to dot every ‘i’ and cross every ‘t’ will be pervasive, fighting over every inch of territory or every symbolic concession will be nasty, and leaders will be under pressure to display toughness and to rationalize why they say one thing to one audience and something else to another.”37 Part of the problem was that after the initial negotiations in Oslo, the cast of characters involved with the negotiations changed considerably, particularly on the Israeli side. For the Israelis, the subsequent negotiations were dominated by military personnel who were steeped in the military ethos that placed greater emphasis upon Israeli security interests. In short, “Israeli negotiators who embraced the ‘spirit of Oslo’ were supplemented and in some cases replaced by professional military and intelligence officials, so that the national security subculture began to dominate the Israeli team.”38 Similarly, when describing the peace talks that he participated in, Yezid Sayigh states, It was clear that it needed a mental shift for some people. When the proposals were put forward whether by the Israelis themselves, by the Americans, or in some cases by other Palestinians, some reactions from some of the negotiators or political leaders of the Palestinian side, and I imagine that being the same on

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers the other side, would be that the Israelis will gain this, or the Israelis will gain that. It is a novelty, the idea that, well, a negotiation is meant to benefit both sides; it needs to be win-win. You can’t measure whether to accept a proposal or not purely based on whether the Israelis also benefit from them or not. I mean, you have to measure every proposal carefully, see what you got out of it, and as long as you weren’t being penalized for it, or it wasn’t something where the Israelis were simply trying to improve their position without giving a genuine return. I mean, every negotiator has to, in a certain way, carefully look for tradeoffs.39

The Oslo Spirit was indicative of a problem-solving approach to the conflict, so its failure to permeate Israeli society, as well as the negotiators for the subsequent agreements, is indicative of the fact that they still viewed the conflict as a zero-sum game. The same held true for Palestinian society. The problem is that “both sides still see themselves as victims of injustices inflicted by the ‘Other’— either as victims of terror (Israelis) or as victims of uprooting (Palestinians). This self-image results in a strong belief in the majority on both sides that genuine resolution of the conflict, as contrasted with its technical resolution, is very difficult to be achieved, if at all possible.”40 Both sides continued to view the conflict as a zero-sum game, and to blame the other side for perpetuating the conflict. As we will discuss in the next section, neither side reevaluated its images of the enemy. However, for our present purposes, the fact that both sides continued to blame the other side for the conflict contributed to their inability to commit to the peace process, because they were still not fully convinced that there truly was a partner for peace on the other side. As a result, both sides sought to use the peace process to promote their own interests. As Ian Lustick points out, this creates a context where “every ‘legal’ opportunity within the agreement to constrain, fault, or punish the other side, or to advance one’s own side’s claims against those of the adversary, is vigorously pursued.”41 In using the peace process to promote their own interests, each side tried to maximize the concessions of their adversary, while minimizing their own. In his discussion of the Taba talks, Uri Savir writes, The Taba talks highlighted a paradox that would grow more irksome as time went on. While committed to achieving a division of power with the Palestinians, Israel tried to impose on them a security doctrine requiring everything Israel considered important to remain in its control. The Palestinians were likewise asking for the impossible. They wanted to separate themselves completely from

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Israel without taking into consideration Israel’s vital interest: combating violent opposition to the peace process as the foundation of a joint strategy. Thus, contrary to the guiding principle of the Oslo negotiations, each side wanted to extract the maximum from the other, rather than exploit the advantages of partnership.42

Both sides used the inherent vagueness of Oslo’s language to try to maximize their own position. In his discussion of the Hebron Agreement, Dennis Ross writes that Netanyahu “was asking me daily to push Arafat to finish, clearly hoping to minimize his own concessions and getting me to deliver Arafat.”43 Providing further evidence of how “constructive ambiguity” is counterproductive when the time comes to actually implement an agreement, Ross writes of the road map to peace: It had fifty-two paragraphs, and each side interpreted each one differently. The Israelis had a very expansive definition of the Palestinian responsibilities to dismantle terrorist infrastructure under the terms of the roadmap; the Palestinians had a minimalist definition. Similarly, the Palestinians had a maximal definition of Israeli responsibilities to restore normal life and freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth; the Israelis had a minimalist one.44

Adding further damage to the peace process is the tendency of both sides to downplay those concessions their enemy does make. In the Oslo Peace Process one finds a great deal of what psychologists refer to as Reactive Devaluation. This occurs when “the respondent infers (by a simple ‘heuristic’) that any proposal offered to an adversary must be good for the side offering it and bad for the side receiving it.”45 By devaluing the enemy’s concessions, it serves to reinforce their doubts about the enemy’s intentions, and to perpetuate their ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process. As Tamar Hermann and David Newman point out, there was “a great deal of symmetry in the way that each side minimized the significance of the concessions made by the other. Each also perceived its own concessions as constituting far-reaching manifestations of good-will, not sufficiently appreciated by the other.”46 Due to their lingering doubts over the enemy’s intentions, and over the process itself, the moderates on both sides are willing to walk away from the peace process if they do not feel that it is serving their interests. Not surprisingly, this lack of commitment does little to strengthen the commitment of the opposing side. The counterproductive nature of each side’s willingness to walk away from

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the negotiations is evident from the following excerpt from Yossi Beilin’s The Path to Geneva. Barak had taken an “all or nothing” approach: While he had been ready to concede, he was also prepared to “expose the true face” of the other side; he believed such an outcome was nearly as valuable as an agreement. So it was all or nothing, and the dichotomy with Barak was very dangerous from the start. There was also, on the Palestinian side, the undercurrent of a threat to resort to violence if there were no results by the end of the year, since Barak had promised a final agreement by that point. It was a situation boiling over with frustration, set to worsen with a failure to fulfill the promise to conclude negotiations, especially since the earlier deadline of May 1999 had already passed.47

Both sides’ willingness to walk away from the negotiations if they were not getting what they wanted can be attributed to the fact that in both cases their support for the process was due to pragmatic considerations, not matters of principle. Pragmatism was a defining characteristic of the Oslo Peace Process, and while it proved helpful in reaching an agreement, it was not conducive to its implementation. While this pragmatism served each side’s interests, it did not serve the overall peace process. This was the case because it meant that their support for the peace process was conditional on it meeting their interests. As Rabbi Michael Lerner points out, “Consider the way that Oslo was implemented. Neither side felt that they could embrace the other and reach out with a spirit of generosity. Instead, they tried to show how ‘realistic’ they were by maintaining an appearance of ‘cynical detachment’ from the very process they were seeking to validate. No enthusiasm means no real commitment.”48 By maintaining their appearance of “cynical detachment,” the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers sabotaged the peace process they were trying to promote in two key ways. First, this detachment prevented them from ever bringing their people into the peace process. Since they were detached from the process, how could we expect their constituents to behave any differently? So, “one of the regrettable consequences of Rabin’s and Arafat’s consummate pragmatism is that they did not draw their publics into this evolving partnership. They preferred to see and present themselves as pragmatists yielding to necessity rather than as visionaries preparing for a process of long-term reconciliation.”49 In the following section we will see how this failure to bring in the Israeli and Palestinian people prevented reconciliation. However, it also served to sabotage the peace process by reinforcing the doubts on the opposing side of whether they

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really were committed to the peace process. Since the moderates on both sides still have lingering doubts over whether or not peace is possible, and whether or not there truly is a partner for peace on the other side, it does not take a lot to fuel those doubts. As Rabbi Michael Lerner puts it, When the members of “the other side” [whether that be Israelis for some, Palestinians for others] hear that kind of discourse, their most paranoid concerns seem justified. They become less willing to trust because they’ve heard “the other side” talking in the cynical language of self-interest. The warnings of the critics begin to sound more persuasive than their own peace and reconciliation convictions, and so they tend toward wanting to take fewer actions of a generous sort themselves.50

Throughout the Oslo process, the Israeli and Palestinian officials were constantly worried about what the “critics” were saying or doing. As predicted in Principle 2, the moderates on both sides were very concerned with how their words or deeds would be perceived by their constituents. As a result, throughout the process one finds them balancing any concessions to their adversary with concessions for their hardliners. While Rabin was Prime Minister, his administration’s motto was, “If you want to make dramatic concessions on peace, you must show the public you can take drastic measures for security.”51 Israeli and Palestinian officials viewed the peace process through the lenses of their own domestic political situation. This was true of all of the officials, on both sides of the conflict. Therefore, the peace process was plagued by a forward-backward movement, where every concession to the opponent had to be balanced with a concession to one’s hardliner constituents. So, ironically, Netanyahu had to overcome his coalitional opposition to peace by espousing the tactics of what Neil Lochery has termed “payback,” which in turn further complicates the peace process. His efforts to get his right-wing partners and his wider coalition to approve the agreement compelled him to initiate policies to assure or bribe them. The announcement of a plan to construct 6,500 housing units for 30,000 Israelis at Jabal Abu Ghunaym/Har Homa, and the “Bar-On for Hebron” affair must be understood against this background.52

One finds Arafat behaving in a similar fashion and with similar consequences. Arafat was constantly worried about how the Palestinian public, not to mention the entire Arab world, would interpret his efforts in the peace process. According to Barry Rubin, “Arafat’s style was one of ceaselessly maneuvering, balancing and juggling factions and options.”53 As Rubin points out, through his constant

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maneuvering to maintain Palestinian unity, Arafat ended up giving “veto power” to the extremists. Shlomo Ben-Ami felt that Arafat “would never convey a clear message of peace and reconciliation to the Israeli public. A born master of double talk, he always preferred the language of ambiguities. Throughout his life as a terrorist and guerilla leader, Arafat avoided an open confrontation with his rivals in the movement.”54 Unfortunately, this only served to slow the peace process further by reinforcing Israeli doubts as to whether he really was a partner for peace. The same held true for Israeli concessions to their hardliners. In worrying about how their words or deeds would be interpreted by their fellow countrymen, they failed to stop to consider how they would be interpreted by members of the opposing side. As we will see in Chapter 4, “pronouncements intended for domestic audiences were seized upon by the other side’s rejectionists as confirmation that the enemy’s goals remained maximal.”55 Weakening the peace process even more was the tendency of leaders on both sides to tear down the other side’s leader, so as to build up their own popular support. While this played well domestically, it was not conducive to forging a partnership for peace. One finds the Israeli leaders constantly criticizing Arafat and questioning his commitment to peace, with Arafat and the other Palestinian officials doing the same about the Israelis. As Hanan Ashrawi points out, “Each side of the precarious Palestinian-Israeli peace had become dependent on the other to sustain its political investment in peace; yet the leadership of each side seemed to have to negate the credibility of the other to maintain support for the peace process within its own camp.”56 The history of the Oslo Peace Process provides lots of evidence that supports Principle 2 all too well. Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis each other and the peace process itself, the Israeli and Palestinian moderates have had a difficult time committing to the peace process. From their adoption of constructive ambiguity as a guiding principle for negotiations, to their zigzag approach to policies and negotiations, zero-sum outlook, and pragmatic approach, the moderates on both sides’ support for the peace process remained conditional. But with no real commitment on the part of the officials, how could they expect their citizens, or, for that matter, their enemy, to commit to it?

Principle 3 Unfortunately, the years that have passed since the historic handshake on the White House lawn have not seen a reconciliation between the two peoples. Each

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side continues to blame the other for the breakdown of the peace process, rarely stopping to ponder how their own actions have served, or continue to serve, to perpetuate the conflict. Whatever reconciliation has occurred since Oslo, has been strictly on an individual level. The Declaration of Principles was possible because a group of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators came together in Oslo and developed a mutual respect, trust, and empathy—the Oslo Spirit discussed previously. Tragically, that spirit of reconciliation never spread to the wider Israeli and Palestinian societies. As Yossi Beilin points out, “This matter is deeply entwined with the way each side views the other, the great differences in attitudes toward particular words and deeds. The long years of the interim arrangement did not create any real closeness or mutual understanding.”57 Part of the problem was that the Oslo Peace Process left the regional asymmetrical distribution of power in place. In other words, although the Israelis made a number of concessions to the Palestinians, those concessions in no way altered the balance of power. As Peter Ezra Weinberger asserts, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and Oslo II “suggest a broad strategy in which Palestinians would receive concessions in form of devolved powers but which nonetheless reinforced Israel’s power over them.”58 Raja Shehadeh makes a similar argument, after analyzing the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in regard to Israeli concessions on legal jurisdiction, land rights, and water access. He finds that “in the three key areas, then the legal and administrative arrangements imposed on the Palestinians by the occupying authority were either preserved or augmented.”59 The Declaration of Principles and the agreements discussed in this chapter all failed to fundamentally alter the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and, if they did anything, actually served to reinforce it. Without such a change, reconciliation and a final settlement will be impossible. By focusing their energy on minimizing their concessions, and battling over every “i” or “t” in the agreements, the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers doomed the peace process by ensuring that it would not fundamentally alter their relationship. In her analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Laura Drake highlights the Agreement’s use of the term “interim period” rather than “transitional period.” As she points out, “if the Palestinians are to enjoy a ‘transition,’ they can expect real and historic change, away from occupation and toward independence. If the upcoming stage is ‘interim,’ however, it could indicate nothing more than a period of restructuring for an existing occupation.”60 Sadly, the latter has proven to be the case.

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Neither side ever really reconsidered how it viewed “the other.” This failure to reassess their image of the enemy made reconciliation impossible. The Israelis and Palestinians were able to negotiate to reach a peace agreement, but that is not the same thing as reaching peace. Tamar Hermann and David Newman make an important point when they write, “it is important to differentiate between the tangible negotiable aspects of peace and the deeper rooted perceptions of the ‘other’ as constituting a long-term threat, when attempting to understand the changes which have, or have not, taken place.”61 As the dominant power, the Israelis continued to view the Palestinians, and the conflict itself, through the lenses of Israeli security needs. Admittedly the days when Israelis denied that the Palestinians were even a separate people were over, but that is not the same thing as recognizing the Palestinians as their equals. So, “the basic Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians continued unabated, and the patronizing attitude of occupier to occupied remained. It was not replaced by a relationship of equality required of former adversaries headed in a new political and historical direction.”62 The fact that the Palestinians felt that the Israelis had never changed their perception of the Palestinians was powerfully expressed by Ahmed Qurei, when he said, “But you continue to behave like our masters. It seems to me that a good part of your army is not aware of the partnership implied by the agreements. Each time we pass through a checkpoint—and there are many of them—your soldiers try to trample on our dignity by making us wait for hours or by throwing our identity cards on the ground so we have to stoop before them in public.”63 Reconciliation would require a rethinking of the images of the other within the military, all levels of government, and society-at-large. Tragically, this never occurred. As Dennis Ross observed, The political decision was to devolve authority to the Palestinians and get Israel out of the business of running their lives. Yet the security officers, the civil administration, the Finance Ministry, and trade, agricultural, and customs officials who managed daily life with the Palestinians never internalized the spirit of that decision. Rather than turning over responsibility to Palestinians, too often the Israeli officials remained preoccupied with ensuring that the Palestinians could not do anything that might be damaging to Israeli interests.64 Yezid Sayigh offers a similar assessment of the problem, when he argues, To my view, the security establishment, but also the key elements of the political establishment, have not really come to terms with what it means to allow meaningful Palestinian independence, sovereignty, statehood. I just don’t think that

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the real price, and I don’t just mean in terms of terms of territory, but in terms of loss of veto power and control over key aspects of the Palestinian sovereign jurisdiction, I don’t think this has really been accepted on the Israeli side, among the critical mass, let’s say.65

Similarly, the Palestinians also never reassessed their image of the Israelis. As a result, they never fully appreciated how the Israelis felt about, and responded to, the ongoing violence by Palestinian extremists. Further complicating any attempt at reconciliation, the Israelis and Palestinians never reevaluated their images of themselves, and particularly their role in the conflict. The difficulty in doing so becomes clear from the following excerpt from David Grossman, an Israeli author. This [peace] is a condition in which—years from now—the two sides [Israeli and Palestinian] will be able to give themselves a new kind of definition—not one contrasted with an enemy, but one that turns inward. One dependent not on the fear that they might be destroyed but instead on the natural development of a nation, on its system of values and the various facets of its character. This is a decisive change. . . I can definitely see that such a process of defining ourselves, the Israelis, will bring about tremors and changes. It will require a painful assessment of our definition of ourselves today in relation to our Jewish heritage. It will force us to confront our complicated history anew, and to consider the possibility of choosing a new way of relating to the world outside us.66

So, did either side undergo the “tremors and changes” associated with the birth of a new identity? Writing of the Rabin-Arafat handshake, Michael Barnett asserts “that event represented not simply a pledge to make amends with a longtime enemy, it also signaled a watershed moment when Israel confronted itself, who it was, and who it was to become.”67 Chapter 4’s discourse analysis of the speeches of the Israeli leaders will explore whether Oslo really was such a watershed moment in Israel’s identity. Most of the evidence points away from such a reading. For example, the Wye Agreement’s basic premise could be construed as placing the entire onus of the blame for the breakdown of the peace process on the Palestinians.68 Or as Uri Savir puts it, In Eilat we were dismantling the occupation, but some of our people could hardly bring themselves to change. Some of the administrators found it almost unbearable to sit down in Eilat with representatives of their “subjects.” We had been engaged in dehumanization for so long that we really thought ourselves “more equal”—and at the same

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers time the threatened side, therefore justifiably hesitant. The group negotiating the transfer of civil powers did not rebel against their mandate, but whenever we offered a concession or a compromise, our people tended to begin by saying: “We have decided to allow you . . .”69

Directly connected to their inability to reevaluate their images of themselves and their enemy is their inability to reassess the national narratives or myths that drive each side. Oslo’s failure can partly be traced to its failure to force each side to come to terms with the other’s national story, as well as their own. The reason why these national narratives are so significant is that in telling their story, each side tends to negate the other’s story. For example, a significant element of the Israeli narrative is that the Jews returned to the Holy Land, and built up the State of Israel in what was an empty land. While there is a great deal of truth to the Israeli story, it completely ignores the existence of the Palestinian people in that supposedly “empty land.” Each side needs to recognize that its national story is just that—a story. In any story, there can be multiple perspectives and multiple “truths.” For reconciliation to occur, there must be an appreciation that [t]his narrative is not the only reasonable account of events and circumstances. This acceptance is also a necessary condition for dialogue, accommodation, and eventual reconciliation. A community is not required to disavow its own narrative. But it does need to be receptive to compromise, and that necessitates an appreciation not only of the humanity of the adversary but also of the fact that it does not have a monopoly on morality and truth.70

As was discussed previously, at Oslo the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agreed to focus on the present and the future, so as to avoid getting bogged down in debates over the past. While this made perfect sense logistically, and certainly facilitated their agreement, it was not conducive to reconciliation. Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank make a convincing argument when they write, “The decline of the Oslo process can be explained, in part, by the failure of the participants to think rhetorically, namely about the importance of symbols, audience adaptation, and the timing of messages.”71 The Oslo Peace Process did not entail a reconsideration or rectification of the Israeli or Palestinian myths or symbols. Thus, “there was no reconsideration of the mythic origins of either side’s national identity, or of the historical assumptions that each side held about itself or the other.”72

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Not only has there not been a reconsideration of their national narratives, but one could argue that the peace process has actually served to reinforce or strengthen the power of these stories. For example, after Oslo one finds Israeli officials embracing the notion of “separation.” This can be seen most dramatically with Sharon’s decision to unilaterally pull out of Gaza and to build the separation wall, but it manifested itself in the policies of Sharon’s predecessors and successors as well. The goal of separation has been described as an attempt by Israel to “wish the Palestinians away,” or to return to the “empty land” pre-1948.73 For reconciliation to occur, Louis Kriesberg emphasizes the following four components: shared truths, justice, mutual regard, and mutual security. In analyzing the breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process, he writes, There has been little truth telling or truth sharing by members of one side about the injuries suffered by people on the other side for which they had significant responsibility. Rather, members of each side usually point to how they have been injured or victimized by people from the other camp. Members of each side are quite aware of the atrocities committed by persons in the other camp—persons they regard as terrorists, assassins, and violators of human rights. Members on each side are less familiar with such conduct when done by their people; indeed, in certain cases, they honor them for their heroism.74

The preceding quote from Kriesberg epitomizes the Israeli and Palestinian moderates’ inability to reconcile with each other, because as it was predicted in Principle 3, they have not reevaluated their images of self, each other, or of the national narratives that motivate each side.

Conclusion The Oslo Peace process, which started with such optimism and hope back in 1993, has failed to live up to its initial promise. Extremist violence has undoubtedly played a role in Oslo’s death, but so, too, has the moderates’ ambivalence vis-àvis the peace process. The negotiations in Oslo were just the first step in a long and arduous process that has stymied implementation of the Declaration of Principles or a permanent resolution of the conflict. The Declaration of Principles was unusual in that it was not a peace agreement, but rather an agreement to start a process that was supposed to culminate in a peace agreement. The various

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agreements discussed in this chapter—the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Oslo II, the Hebron Agreement, and the Wye River Memorandum—were either designed to push the process forward incrementally, or just to implement finally what had been agreed to previously, but never implemented. Part of the problem was that the defining principles of the peace process— open-endedness, incrementalism, reciprocity, constructive ambiguity, and pragmatism—were all conducive to reaching an agreement, but proved counterproductive when the time came for actually implementing the agreement and pushing the process to actual peace and reconciliation. Chapters 2 and 3 have sought to show how these principles have manifested themselves in, and determined the course of, the Oslo Peace Process. These chapters have also sought to show the underlying logic behind these guiding principles and to tie that logic to our three principles. In short, due to the asymmetrical distribution of power emphasized in Principle 1, we find the open-endedness, incrementalism, and reciprocity predicted. Similarly, Principles 2 and 3’s focus upon the moderates’ inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and one another, is evidenced in their predilection for constructive ambiguity and pragmatism. Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, and their adversary as well, it is not surprising that the moderates on both sides were drawn to these guiding principles. Essentially, these guiding principles enabled both sides to postpone fully committing themselves to the peace process. However, by holding back on their own commitment to the process, how could they expect their constituents, or their enemy, to behave any differently? By failing to reevaluate their “truths,” national narratives, and images of themselves and their adversary, the Israelis and Palestinians have not been able to reach reconciliation. Tragically, the Israeli and Palestinian peace process seems to be caught in the classic “chicken or the egg” conundrum. Without reconciliation, neither side is willing to commit to the peace process. But, without peace there cannot be any reconciliation.

Notes 1 Peter Ezra Weinberger, Co-opting the PLO: A Critical Reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993–1995 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006): 97; and Raja Shehadeh, “Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 20–2.

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2 Dennis Ross, The Missing Piece: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004), 188. 3 Ibid., 198. 4 Hassan A. Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988–2002 (New York: Routledge Courzon, 2004), 122. 5 Lamis Andoni, “Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 3 (1997): 28. 6 Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996–2004 (New York: RDV Books/Akashic Books, 2004), 76. 7 Laura Drake, “Between the Lines: A Textual Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” Arab Studies Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 1–36, accessed via Ebsco Host, March 15, 2011. 8 Geoffrey Aronson, ed., “Oslo ll Accords Herald New Era in Israeli-Palestinian Relations,” Settlement Report 5, no. 6 (November–December 1995), accessed March 1, 2011, www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-5/no.-6/oslo-ii-accords-herald-new-er a-in-israeli-palestinian-relations. 9 Labib Kamhawi, “The Impact of the Latest incidents in Israel on the Peace between Israel and the Palestinians,” in Hisham Sharabi, eds, Beyond Rhetoric: Perspectives on a Negotiated Settlement in Palestine, Part One: Critical Issues for the Final Status Negotiations (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, June 1996), 7. 10 Mouin Rabbin, “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 71. 11 Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002). 12 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron,” January 16, 1997, Statement given at Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed March 15, 2011, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1997/1/PM+Netanyahu+Stat ement+to+Knesset+on+H. 13 Melissa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process,” Middle East Policy 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 82. 14 Daniel Lieberfeld, “Post-Handshake Politics: Israel/Palestine and South Africa Compared,” Middle East Policy 6, no. 3 (1999): 138. 15 Ibid., 97. 16 Ibid., 147. 17 Ross, The Missing Piece, 684. 18 Yoram Peri, “The Political-Military Complex: The IDF’s Influence Over Policy towards Palestinians Since 1987,” Israel Affairs 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 338.

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19 Andoni, “Redefining Oslo,” 26. 20 Naseer H. Aruri, “The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu’s Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 19–20. 21 Andoni, “Redefining Oslo,” 26. 22 Peri, “The Political-Military Complex,” 339, also quoted in Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 193. 23 Omar M. Dajani, “Surviving Opportunities: Palestinian Negotiating Patterns in Peace Talks with Israel,” in Tamara Cofman Wittes, ed., How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 69–73. 24 Savir, The Process, 82. 25 Author’s Interview, March 9, 2009, Washington, DC. 26 Khalil Shikaki, “Ending the Conflict: Can the Parties Afford It?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 40. 27 Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. 28 Yitzhak Rabin, Rabin’s Final Defense of Oslo ll, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories 5, no. 6 (November 1995), accessed March 1, 2011, www. fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-5/no.-6/pdf. 29 Drake, “Between the Lines,” 1–35. 30 Savir, The Process, 93. 31 Robert L. Rothstein, “A Fragile Peace: Could a ‘Race to the Bottom’ Have Been Avoided?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 54; and Jan De Jong, “The Geography of Politics: Israel’s Settlement Drive after Oslo,” in George Giacaman and Dag Jørund Lønning, eds, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 78. 32 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 247. 33 Jerome Slater, “What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Political Science Quarterly 116 (Summer 2001): 179; and Savir, The Process, 311. 34 Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 242. 35 Karin Aggestam, Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988–1998 (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1999), 184. 36 Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba,” 96.

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37 Robert L. Rothstein, How Not to Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome” and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, Peaceworks, No. 57, March 2006), 14. 38 Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Conclusion: Culture as an Intervening Variable,” in Tamara Cofman Wittes, ed., How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 135. 39 Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. 40 Tamar Hermann and David Newman, “A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking,” in John Darby and Roger MacGinty, eds, The Management of Peace Processes (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 109. 41 Ian S. Lustick, “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process between Political Partnership and Legality,” Cornell International Law Journal 30, no. 3, accessed online via Lexis/Nexis (July 22, 2003): 743. 42 Savir, The Process, 100. 43 Ross, The Missing Piece, 282. 44 Ibid., 795. 45 Ifat Maoz, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz, and Lee Ross, “Reactive Devaluation of an ‘Israeli’ vs. ‘Palestinian’ Peace Proposal,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 4 (August 2002): 532. 46 Hermann and Newman, “A Path Strewn with Thorns,” 118. 47 Beilin, The Path to Geneva, 28. 48 Rabbi Michael Lerner, The Geneva Accord and Other Strategies for Healing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2004), 131. 49 Herbert C. Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 5, no. 2 (1999): 105. 50 Lerner, The Geneva Accord, 132. 51 David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 87. 52 Barari, Israeli Politics, 122–3. 53 Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to Statehood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4. 54 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 215. 55 Lieberfeld, “Post-Handshake Politics,” 138. 56 Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 14.

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72 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70

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Conflicted Are the Peacemakers Beilin, The Path to Geneva, 280. Weinberger, Co-opting the PLO, 94–5. Shehadeh, “Questions of Jurisdiction,” 22. Drake, “Between the Lines,” 1–35. Hermann and Newman, “A Path Strewn with Thorns,” 143. Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba,” 96. Savir, The Process, 167. Ross, The Missing Piece, 765. Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. Dov Waxman, The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending/ Defining the Nation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 107, excerpt from David Grossman, “Suddenly Human Contact,” in Death as a Way of Life: Israel Ten Years after Oslo (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003), 602. Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1999), 6. Aruri, “The Wye Memorandum,” 22. Savir, The Process, 208. Mark Tessler, “Narratives and Myths about Arab Intransigence towards Israel,” in Robert L. Rotberg, ed., Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History’s Double Helix (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Indiana Series in Middle Eastern Studies, 2006), 175. Rowland and Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity, 266. Ibid., 268–9. Bernard Wasserstein, Israelis and Palestinians: Why do they Fight? Can they Stop? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 151; and Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “A Peace without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the Limits of Israeli Consciousness,” in George Giacaman and Dag Jørund Lønning, eds, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 62. Louis Kriesberg, “The Relevance of Reconciliation Actions in the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, 2000,” Peace and Change 27, no. 4 (October 2002): 556.

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4

Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Talk the Talk?

If there is one thing that the Israelis and Palestinians can agree upon, it is that each group sees itself as committed to the peace process, while attributing Oslo’s failure to the other side. Oslo has broken down into a series of mutual recriminations, with each side lamenting the fact that the other side isn’t more like them, and thus a real partner for peace. However, if either side were to take an honest look at itself, what would they find? In this chapter we will analyze the words of the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers, and then, in the following chapter, we will examine their deeds. After a peace agreement has been negotiated, it then has to be implemented. For an agreement to be successfully implemented, the two sides need to “sell” the agreement to their people. Did Oslo fail because one or both sides failed to sell it to their people? Furthermore, what does the language used by the Israeli and Palestinian moderates reveal about their thoughts on the peace process? Does their language reveal an inherent ambivalence vis-a-vis the peace process as it was argued in the preceding chapters, and if so, does it support or refute our three principles? Finally, if this inherent ambivalence is evidenced in their rhetoric, can Oslo’s failure be attributed, in part, to their inability to “talk the talk?” In this chapter, we will analyze the speeches and rhetoric of the following six officials, three of them Israelis and three Palestinians: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Yasser Arafat, Mahmud Abbas, and Ahmed Qurei. While some might question their designation as moderates or peacemakers, there is no question that they were the predominant forces in both camps in pushing the peace process forward. I have chosen not to include Benjamin Netanyahu or Ariel Sharon, partly because both were hawks who moderated (to some degree), but also to focus on an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian officials. Between 25 and 45 speeches for each leader were examined.1

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Israeli and Palestinian rhetoric and the peace process Not surprisingly, it is the Palestinian officials who emphasize in their speeches the asymmetric distribution of power, not the Israelis. Since the power differential serves the Israeli interests, they are best served by not drawing attention to it. The Palestinians, in contrast, emphasize the asymmetry in order to put pressure on the Israelis to make concessions. In his speech marking the tenth anniversary of Rabin’s assassination, Qurei said, “Nevertheless, we believe that the stronger side in the equation—the side that holds most of the cards in both its hands—bears a bigger share of the responsibility. Its strong tilt behind the temptations of the logic of force wasted a lot of time, opportunities, and blood.”2 Since they see the Israelis as holding most of the cards, the Palestinians view the Israelis as ultimately accountable for whether Oslo succeeds or fails. While it is undoubtedly true that the Israelis hold most of the cards, by focusing upon the asymmetrical distribution of power, it enables the Palestinians to avoid looking at their own role in perpetuating the conflict. So, while Qurei’s following assessment of the situation on the ground is certainly correct, it fails to acknowledge how the Palestinians’ use of force has affected the peace process, “There are no rules to the game. There currently are rules for just one player who is allowed to do as he pleases. Israel is allowed to be belligerent, to kill, to invade, assassinate, destroy, close down the homeland, close roadblocks, erect roadblocks, and close down seaports and points of entry; it does everything through force and only through force.”3 Principle 1 predicted that the dominant power would use the peace process to promote its own interests, and specifically that it would try to string the process out for as long as possible, keeping its options open. The speeches given by the Israeli officials do seem to support this argument. Speaking of the final status negotiations, Uri Savir reportedly declared, “[Former autonomy negotiator] Yosef Burg taught us how to drag things out when we do not want to progress.”4 As it was discussed previously, Rabin believed that “no dates were sacred.”5 In his speeches and rhetoric, one finds ample evidence that Rabin was not in any rush to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinians. As Rabin declared when he accepted the UNESCO Peace Prize, “We are going along slowly and cautiously, one step at a time, because the enemies of peace are even more numerous than we imagine. Because extremists on both sides are lying in wait for us, and we—Israelis and Palestinians, alike—must not fail. At every step we must think, consider we—Israelis and Palestinians alike—must not fail. At every step, we must think, consider, weigh, check, and beware.”6

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Prior to his acceptance of the Declaration of Principles, Rabin expressed his belief that the peace process would unfold very gradually, as when he stated, “The thing is gradual progress, the importance is in the direction not in the concrete end.”7 While there is no doubt that Rabin’s election pushed the peace process in a positive direction, his belief that the “end” didn’t matter is highly questionable, especially for the Palestinians. It is extremely unlikely that the Palestinians were convinced that the direction was more important than the end they sought. One also has to wonder how Palestinian moderates, who already had nagging doubts over Israeli intentions, and over whether the new Israeli government really was a partner for peace, interpreted this statement. The Israelis were not in a rush to reach a resolution to the conflict, and as the dominant power, they were determined to make sure that the Palestinians realized that they would not be rushed into an agreement. As Rabin stated, It is possible that I made a mistake when I assigned too little time for discussions and encouraged exaggerated expectations, but if this is interpreted in Damascus, Amman, Beirut, and in the Palestinian camp, as [if we are] racing against the clock, that we would be pushed to a solution just [so as to be able] to obtain an achievement, there could be no greater mistake. In order to reduce the danger for our children, in order to provide security to the people of Israel, we have, and shall have, all the time in the world.8

While Rabin was justified in declaring that he would do whatever was necessary to ensure the security of the Israeli people, one cannot help but wonder how the Palestinian people felt when they heard the Israeli leader say that there was “all the time in the world” to reach an agreement. After Rabin’s assassination, Peres was seen as backtracking from the idea of a Palestinian state. According to one of his close associates, “Peres has been talking about it a lot recently, and it was really strange to hear him say that a Palestinian state will be established only in Gaza and Jericho and that the rest of the territory will remain an autonomy which in time—and he means a long time—will become a tripartite confederation.” True to this concept, Peres has avoided specifying at this time what he will be prepared to grant the Palestinians in these territories, begging even the question of an exact border demarcation.9

Once again, to hear Peres, who is widely regarded as a more “dovish” Israeli leader, backtracking from the idea of a Palestinian state and reviving the idea of a confederation with Jordan, must not have made the Palestinians feel too confident in their “partner for peace.”

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Rabin and Peres were both committed to an incremental approach to the peace process. The Israelis sought to postpone any discussion of the more contentious issues for as long as possible by promoting a very gradual, step-by-step approach. As the dominant actor, this served their interests well. By moving slowly and cautiously, the Israelis were able to maintain control over the peace process and ensure that their vital interests were not affected. As Rabin puts it, “With the Palestinians, we are dealing with an interim agreement for a transitional period, limited in time, before negotiations on a permanent settlement. Without this step-by-step movement, everything will fall apart. Any attempt to move from the present situation to a permanent solution will lead to either an explosion or a stalemate. Take only the issue of Jerusalem: if we begin negotiating over the status of Jerusalem, [it will result in] deadlock.”10 Incrementalism enabled the Israelis to keep their options open for as long as possible. Even before the Declaration of Principles was agreed to, Rabin stated in an interview that “in our perception, the interim agreement should leave options, not only one solution.”11 Rabin was able to support the Declaration of Principles because it did not tie Israel to a single solution, but rather kept the resolution open-ended, which is exactly how he and the Israelis wanted it. At a news conference after the historic handshake on the White House lawn, Rabin said, At this stage there are clear-cut positions, but at least—and this is the advantage of the DOP [Declaration of Principles]—it evades Jerusalem as an issue for the purpose of the establishment of the Gaza first, Gaza-Jericho first. And the autonomy of the interim, the ISGA [Interim Self-Government Arrangements], this is the achievement of the agreement, that it avoids Jerusalem. It was not avoided in the past, and as a result, no agreement was reached since Camp David through the Madrid peace conference until this agreement.12

Principle 1 predicted that the Israelis would use the power differential to promote their own interests, and in doing so they would try to string the process out for as long as possible. While the rhetoric of Rabin and Peres clearly supports this contention, the rhetoric of Ehud Barak does not. In Chapter 5 we will discuss Camp David, and how Barak moved away from incrementalism to try to push through his solution to the conflict; his actions and rhetoric do not support Principle 1 the way Rabin’s and Peres’s do. However, in the rhetoric of all three Israeli leaders we find their viewing the peace process as a test for the Palestinians.

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Throughout the speeches of these Israeli peacemakers, there is a constant refrain—that the peace process is a test to see if the Palestinians truly are a partner for peace. Repeatedly, each leader hammers home the idea that if the Palestinians passed their test, then Israel would agree to push the process forward. As Rabin said in his press conference after signing the Declaration of Principles, “I believe it’s a change if the commitments will be fulfilled, and we have decided to take a chance, to put him (Arafat) into a test.”13 In viewing the peace process as a test, Israel set itself up as the judge of Palestinian actions. Again, only if Israel decided that the Palestinians had passed their test, would it agree to push the process forward. Speaking before the Israeli Knesset, Rabin reassures them, We are aware of the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not—up until now— honored its commitments to change the Palestinian Covenant, and that all of the promises on this matter have not been kept. I would like to bring it to the attention of the members of the house that I view these changes as a supreme test of the Palestinian Authority’s willingness and ability, and the changes required will be an important and serious touchstone vis-à-vis the continued implementation of the agreement as a whole.14

Similarly, as Barak puts it after the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, The test will be in the implementation, and not in gestures. I advise all of us to pay less attention to gestures, and to focus on the reality. There is a whole list of detailed understandings regarding actions to be taken on the path to the calming of the situation. If the Palestinian side will comply with the understandings, we will do our share, and calm is indeed restored, this will be a very important change. The test, once again, is in the implementation of the understandings.15

By viewing the peace process as a test, the Israelis are able to ensure that they can control the process’ ebb and flow. In addition, they are able to pretty much guarantee that the process will breakdown, by setting the Palestinians up to fail. In other words, by creating a test that they know the Palestinians will not pass, they can stymie the peace process, and at the same time make it appear as if the Palestinians are the sole cause of the problem. For example, in his second term as prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to accept the principle of a Palestinian state, provided the Palestinians recognized Israel as a Jewish state, and agreed that the refugee problem would be resolved outside of Israel’s borders, among other demands. Netanyahu’s father was quoted as saying that “his son had set conditions he knew the Palestinians would never be able to

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accept.”16 Similarly, as we will see in Chapter 5, Barak viewed his peace offer at Camp David as a test that the Palestinians were likely to fail. In their rhetoric, one finds the Israeli leaders repeatedly using the peace process as a test for the Palestinians, pushing incremental solutions to the conflict, trying to keep their options open, and, with the exception of Barak, seeking to string the process along for as long as possible. Does one find evidence to support Principle 2’s contention that the peacemakers on either side would be unable to fully commit to the peace process? The following quote from Rabin seems to suggest an unequivocally affirmative answer to that question. As Rabin reassured the Israeli Knesset after the ratification of the Interim Agreement, “I must emphasize that we have not committed ourselves, and I repeat, we have not committed ourselves to the scope of the redeployment at each stage.”17 While his Israeli constituents might have found Rabin’s words reassuring, it is doubtful that the Palestinians did as well. Some of the evidence to support Principle 2 would entail oscillating policies vis-à-vis the peace process, or fluctuating negotiating styles. On both sides, we find a zigzag approach toward the Oslo Peace Process. On numerous occasions, Rabin stated his firm belief that Israel should “negotiate for peace as [if] there is no terror and violence and we cope with terror and violence as [if] there are no peace negotiations.”18 In other words, Israel would simultaneously prepare for war and for peace. Similarly, in a 1994 address before the United Nations, Arafat waved a leafy olive branch above his head, and declared, “I come bearing an olive branch in one hand,” and after brandishing his pistol, he went on, “and the freedom fighter’s gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”19 Unfortunately, between the signing of the Declaration of Principles and his death, Arafat’s rhetoric often left the Israelis wondering if he still held onto that olive branch. While pursuing the peaceful resolution to the conflict, Arafat’s comments were often less than pacific. Speaking at a mosque in Johannesburg in 1994, Arafat told the crowd, “You have come to fight Jihad [holy war] to liberate Jerusalem, your third shrine. Jihad will continue. Jerusalem is not [just] for the Palestinian people, it is for all the Muslim nation.”20 Similarly, in 2002, Arafat declared, “We are going to Jerusalem in our millions, God made me one of the Jerusalem martyrs.”21 While the Palestinian authorities said that Arafat simply meant that he was a martyr for the Palestinian cause, to the Israelis it sounded like Arafat was comparing himself with the suicide bombers. Arafat heightened Israeli apprehension regarding his true intentions later that year, when he told the Palestinian Legislative Council, “The destiny for

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all of us, our generation, and our people has been to suffer this much because our demand, objective, and dream is true freedom and full independence in the independent state of Palestine, with holy Jerusalem as its capital, whether they like it or not. Those who do not like it, they can go down to Sa’ib [Urayqat] and drink from the Dead Sea.”22 Once again, while such rhetoric undoubtedly appealed to many of Arafat’s constituents, as well as to Palestinian hardliners, his echoing of the Arab threat to drive the Israelis into the sea certainly added to Israeli doubts about whether he was a true partner for peace. When Arafat died, and Abbas replaced him as the Palestinian president, many hoped that the change in leadership foretold a dramatic change in how the Palestinians would pursue the peace process. However, that has not proven to be the case. Under Abbas, one finds the same oscillating policies. The following description of the August 2009 Fatah Conference, their first in 20 years, illustrates the inherent contradictions in Fatah’s policies, whether under Arafat or Abbas. The day was filled with contradictory messages reflecting the disarray in Fatah. A huge poster on the wall bore the legend “Resistance is the legitimate right of our people” alongside a black-and-white photograph from the 1960’s of a Palestinian youth with a gun. Mr. Abbas reminisced about the early years of armed struggle against Israel. But he also stressed the need for new, more appropriate forms of resistance while pursuing negotiations for an independent Palestinian state.23

Abbas, like Fatah and Arafat before him, remains torn over the appropriate approach to the conflict. As a result, none of them can fully commit to the peace process, so they frequently pursue contradictory policies. In February 2008, Abbas was quoted in the Jordanian newspaper the Al Dustour as saying, “At this time, I object to the armed struggle, since we are unable to conduct it; however, in future stages, things may change.”24 As it will be discussed shortly, the preceding quote epitomizes the fact that Abbas’s commitment to the peace process is based solely upon pragmatic considerations. Paralleling their zigzag approach to the peace process, the Israeli and Palestinian moderates still view the conflict as a zero-sum game to some extent, although on rare occasions they have been able to move beyond its narrow constraints. On the one hand, in his speech marking the fifth anniversary of Rabin’s assassination, Barak seemed to have moved beyond the zero-sum approach when he stated, “Peace will come. But it will not be attained through capitulation or by one side vanquishing the other. Neither will it be achieved by fiat or the exercise of force on our part, or through imposition on us by the

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international community.”25 Later on in the same speech, Barak reassured the Palestinians that “faithful to Yitzhak Rabin’s endeavor, we want to make peace with you—a peace of honor and neighborliness, a ‘peace of the brave,’ a peace that has no losers, only winners.”26 Interestingly enough, Qurei expressed similar sentiments on the tenth anniversary of Rabin’s assassination, when he said of Oslo, “All this was based on the philosophy of optimizing the gains of the two sides, entrenching an atmosphere of mutual trust, and demonstrating understanding and appreciation by each side for the needs and requirements of the other side. With this spirit and vision that we wish to renew today, we achieved long-range positive results to a complex historic issue.”27 On the one hand, the fact that Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem to have moved beyond a zero-sum outlook, could just be indicative of self-censorship, whereby, out of political correctness, Israeli and Palestinian officials simply avoid talking of winners and losers. On the other hand, since such self-censorship was not exhibited elsewhere (even at times when it probably should have been), such an explanation is not particularly satisfying. It seems probable that the moderates have recognized that a total victory is not possible, such that some concessions will be necessary. By embracing the peace process, therefore, the moderates were forced to give up their dreams of a total victory. While their rhetoric seems to have transcended a zero-sum outlook, the change has not been complete. After the Oslo II Agreement of September 1995, Shimon Peres declared, “We screwed the Palestinians.”28 Though Peres is often seen as one of the most moderate, even dovish, of all Israeli officials, he, too, clearly views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a game with winners and losers. According to Jan de Jong, “Although it is true that Peres has employed the language of peace more often than any leader and has been more willing to admit some claims of the Palestinians than his predecessors as Israeli Prime Minister, he offered nothing to the Palestinians that Israel could not happily live without.”29 Both sides recognize that some concessions will be necessary, but that does not stop them from trying to maximize those that they wring from their adversary, while simultaneously trying to minimize those that they make. For example, in a speech marking the anniversary of the creation of the state of Israel, which the Palestinians refer to as the Day of al-Nakba, or the Catastrophe, Arafat said, “The road to peace is as clear as the sun, the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops and soldiers from Arab territories . . . and a return of Palestinian refugees.”30

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Although the roadmap to a just peace was as clear as the sun to Arafat, for many Israelis it probably seemed more like Arafat was asking for the moon. In addition to trying to wring maximal concessions out of their adversary, the moderates, as Darby predicted, are willing to countenance the breakdown of the peace process if they do not get what they want. As Rabin told the Israeli Knesset in 1992, “It is said in our sources: ‘Seek peace and pursue it’—and we seek peace. We desire it—but not at any price.”31 That Israel would pursue peace, but not at any price, was a refrain found throughout the speeches of the Israeli leaders, and among their counterparts on the Palestinian side as well. In June 1993, while the Oslo negotiations were in full swing, Rabin told the audience at the Keren Hayesod Conference, I feel that it is my responsibility to explore every possibility to bring about peace. But there are red lines that we cannot cross. Jerusalem is first and foremost. More than anything else, if there is something which symbolizes the Jewish people, the Jewish faith, the Jewish belief and the Jewish hope, it is Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the heart, the soul of the Jewish people and therefore, whoever believes that any Government of Israel can compromise on united Jerusalem under our sovereignty, fools himself. . . . They have to know that the present Government of Israel is ready for peace, ready for compromise—but not at the expense of Jerusalem and the security of the people of Israel.32

Like his mentor (Rabin), Barak was also not willing to pay any price for peace, and had his red lines beyond which he would walk away from an agreement. As he promised the Israeli people before leaving for the Camp David Summit, If there is an agreement, it will only be one that will strengthen the security of Israel, its economy, and its regional and international standing. Otherwise, there will be no agreement. If there is an agreement, it will only be one that will comply with the principles, to which I committed myself before I was elected, and principles I have consistently and repeatedly stressed: a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty; the 67 borders will be amended; the overwhelming majority of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty; no foreign army in the area west of the Jordan River; and a solution to the problem of refugees outside Israeli sovereign territory.33

Barak echoed his earlier statement when he returned home empty-handed from Camp David. As he told the Israeli people, “We were not prepared to relinquish

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three things: the security of Israel, those things that are holy to Israel, and the unity of our People. If we will be faced with the alternative between compromising one of these and a confrontation, the choice is clear to every Israeli.”34 Both sides were willing to walk away from the negotiations if they could not get the peace that they wanted. As Prime Minister Qurei puts it, “We will not accept the peace they want. In that case, there will never be peace, not for this generation and not for future ones.”35 Similarly, in an interview in The New York Times, Arafat stated, “But we will only sit down as equals, not as supplicants; as partners, not as subjects; as seekers of a just and peaceful solution, not as a defeated nation grateful for whatever scraps are thrown our way.”36 As it will be discussed shortly, in all the leaders’ speeches we can find examples of them “talking the talk” of peace and reconciliation that would seem to indicate that their commitment to the peace process was one founded upon deep principles, not mere pragmatism. In the speeches and rhetoric of Arafat, however, one does find numerous examples of his referring to the peace process as a “strategy” or as a “strategic option.”37 According to Arafat, I would like to start by explicitly reiterating to all our strategic option, which we adopted after careful consideration and sound calculations. When I speak of the strategic option, I mean the peace option, the peace of the brave. We did not adopt this option out of weakness or impotence but out of a sound realization of the supreme interests of the Palestinian people and a thorough and reasonable calculation of all our national circumstances, the developments in our Arab and regional environment, and the major international changes in the world we live.38

Arafat’s speech undoubtedly helped to reassure the Palestinians that the peace process was the right strategy, but in doing so he probably reinforced Israeli doubts about whether he was really committed to just peace, or was simply using the peace process as a new tactic in the conflict. One finds similar rhetoric in Abbas’s speeches. For example, in 2008, Abbas released a statement in which he declared that the peace process was a “strategic choice and we have the intention of resuming.”39 Similarly, in 2006 Abbas declared “The presidency, and the government will continue to respect our commitment to the negotiations as a strategic, pragmatic political choice.”40 All the leaders, Israeli and Palestinian alike, were painfully aware of how their words and deeds would be interpreted by hard-line members of their own societies. When asked to compare the different Israeli prime ministers with

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whom he had negotiated, Abbas said “Some think of the future of their party and whether it will rule or not. An Israeli prime minister cannot take historic decisions if he comes to the negotiations afraid his government would fail.”41 Eytan Haber advised Rabin that “Oslo is a dirty word and that we must therefore think of a different format for an arrangement with the Palestinians in order to be able to market it better.”42 But if the peacemakers were so ambivalent about the agreement themselves, how could they possibly market it to their people? While the rhetoric, and the results to date, supports Principle 3’s contention that the moderates will not be able to reconcile with their adversary, one does find talk of reconciliation in their speeches. In 1994, when Yitzhak Rabin received the UNESCO Prize, he declared, Peace will be tasted in the Palestinian coffee poured into the cups of Israeli friends. It will be heard in the applause of Israeli audiences for the performance of a Palestinian theater troupe, and in the jeers of the rival soccer fans when Khan Yunis plays against Tel Aviv. Peace will be seen when an Israeli driver yields the right of way to his Palestinian counterpart—vice-versa: when a Palestinian policeman gives a ticket to an Israeli driver—and the other way around. Peace lies in the grin of an Israeli doctor delivering Palestinian newborn, and in the smile of a Palestinian lifeguard toward Israeli bathers on the beach. That, ladies and gentlemen, is peace.43

Shimon Peres offered similar sentiments when he spoke at the White House at the signing of the Declaration of Principles. In his speech, Peres called upon the Israelis and Palestinians to “turn from bullets to ballots, from guns to shovels. We shall pray with you. We shall offer you our help in making Gaza prosper and Jericho blossom again.”44 Yet, despite their flowery language of reconciliation, a deeper analysis of their discourse reveals that the moderates have not completely reconciled with one another. The fact that Oslo did not represent a complete reconciliation could be seen clearly in Rabin’s ambivalence as he shook Arafat’s hand on the White House lawn. As Rabin told the Israeli Knesset one year later, “It is not with an easy heart that we approached the signing with the Palestinians. Bitter memories of the 100 years of bloody conflict weighed, and still weigh, heavy upon complete reconciliation.”45 True reconciliation would entail a reassessment of each side’s images of their enemy, as well as of themselves, and of their national myths. In some instances, one does find statements acknowledging the pain and suffering of the other side. For example, in his inaugural address, Mahmud Abbas declared, “We do not

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ignore the suffering of Jews throughout history. And in exchange, we hope that the Israelis will not turn their back to the suffering of the Palestinians, which include displacement, occupation, colonization and continuous oppression of the Palestinians.”46 Similarly, when Barak presented his new government to the Israeli Knesset, he stated, To our Palestinian neighbors I wish to state that the bitter conflict between us has caused deep suffering to both our peoples. There is no point now in settling accounts for historical mistakes. Things might have been done differently, but we cannot change the past. We can only improve the future. I acknowledge not only the suffering of my own people, but also the suffering of the Palestinian people. It is my desire to end violence and suffering and to work with the elected Palestinian leadership, headed by Chairman Yasir Arafat, in partnership and respect to find together an honourable and agreed upon arrangement for co-existence in freedom, prosperity, and good neighbourly relations in this beloved country in which two peoples will live forever.47

The moderates not only acknowledged the pain and suffering of their adversary, but they also (initially) recognized them as partners for peace. For years the moderates had shared the hawks’ belief that there was no partner for peace on the other side, but then they started to reassess their view. As Rabin told the Israeli Knesset, “The telephone rang in Cairo years ago, and it is now ringing in Gaza and Jericho, in Amman, in Damascus, and in Beirut. And we, gentlemen, are lifting up the receiver—and there is someone saying hello on the other side.”48 However, just as the moderates can be persuaded that there is a partner on the other side for making peace, they also can be persuaded of the opposite. Thus, in the speeches examined, it becomes clear that while the moderates initially believed that they had found a partner for peace, as the Oslo Peace Process bogged down, that conviction was shaken, if not shattered all together. After the Camp David talks ended without an agreement, Barak declared, Today I return from Camp David, and can look into the millions of eyes and say with regret: We have not yet succeeded. We did not succeed because we did not find a partner prepared to make decisions on all issues. We did not succeed because our Palestinian neighbors have not yet internalized the fact that in order to achieve peace, each side has to give up some of their dreams; to give, not only to demand.49

Barak’s belief that the Palestinians are constantly placing demands upon the Israelis is indicative of an Israeli belief that they are the ones who are constantly

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giving, while the Palestinians are constantly taking. In other words, it is indicative of the fact that the Oslo peace process has done little to alter the Israeli views of the Palestinian people. After leaving office, Barak told an interviewer that the Palestinians have no compunction about telling lies. According to Barak, the Palestinians “are products of a culture in which to tell a lie . . . Creates no dissonance. They don’t suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judaeo-Christian culture.” Barak went on to say that “truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only that which serves your purpose and that which doesn’t. They see themselves as emissaries of a national movement for whom everything is permissible. There is no such thing as ‘the truth.’”50 Similarly, despite all of his years of negotiating with the Israelis, it is unclear how much Arafat’s views about them ever changed. As he told in an emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Israelis “want to wipe out our existence on our land, the land from which Prophet Muhammad, May God’s peace and blessings be upon him, ascended to Heaven and the cradle of Jesus Christ, May God’s peace be upon Him. They try with all means to obliterate and destroy our holy places and to Judaize our Jerusalem.”51 With both sides failing to reassess their images of the other, it is not surprising that they both tend to blame each other for the lack of progress in the peace process. At the conclusion of Camp David, Barak placed all the blame for the talks’ failure on Arafat. As he stated, “Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat’s positions on Jerusalem are those which prevented the achievement of an agreement.”52 Similarly, in the year 2000, Arafat placed all the blame for the lack of progress in the peace talks upon Israel’s shoulders when he told the Arab Summit, We should . . . put a final end to all causes of aggression, killing, and suffering. This will happen only when Israel is forced to submit to international legitimacy, implement the signed agreements, stop aggression, open the international border posts, lift the siege on our cities and people, and withdraw from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the Syrian territories and the last Lebanese territory in Shab’a.53

While Arafat had a long list of things the Israelis had to do in order to bring about peace, he was noticeably silent on what the Palestinians needed to do as well.

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The moderates not only attribute any failures in the peace process to the actions of the other side, but they also see any successes as indicative of the adversary’s changing its behavior, and thus becoming more like themselves. In other words, for the moderates, peace is only possible when the enemy starts behaving the same way they do, or perhaps more accurately, the way that they would like to think that they behave. As it will be discussed shortly, they apparently never reassess their own actions. Thus, when Peres, Rabin, and Arafat received the Nobel Peace Prize, Peres said, “I believe it is fitting that the prize has been awarded to Yasser Arafat. His quitting the path of confrontation in favor of the path of dialogue, has opened the way to peace between ourselves and the Palestinian people, to whom we wish all the best in the future.”54 Barak echoed Peres, asserting that peace would only be possible if the Palestinians became more like the Israelis. As he told the Israeli Knesset, “I know very well that we can expect difficult negotiations, marked by crises and ups and downs, before reaching the desired target. If the other side musters the same degree of determination and goodwill toward reaching an agreement as we have on our side, no power in the world can prevent us from reaching peace here.”55 Both sides wish that their enemy was as committed to peace as they are, because neither side has really looked in the mirror and questioned the strength of their own commitment. Peres touted Israel’s resolve to attain peace when he said, “I don’t know of any other nation that was attacked on so many occasions, where they won, gave back, won, gave back. This is the whole picture.”56 But is that really the entire picture? Similarly, in the following quote Qurei places all of the blame for Oslo’s failure upon the Israelis, which also isn’t the complete picture. The flaw is not in Oslo, but in its implementation by the Israeli side. Eight years have passed since the Oslo agreement was reached. The Israelis wasted five years, in which they did not implement anything. Therefore, the flaw is not in Oslo, but in the Israeli policy, which has apparently discovered that it cannot implement the Oslo agreement and, consequently, is unable to respond to the resolutions of international legitimacy. This is especially since the Oslo agreement is based on the resolutions and the Security Council.57

While their rhetoric reveals that the moderates’ commitment to the peace process was halfhearted or incomplete, it also shows that their ability to reconcile with one another suffers a similar fate. In other words, just as their ambivalence visà-vis the peace process was seen in their zigzag approach toward it, it is also

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evident in their halfhearted reconciliation. On the one hand, both sides can “talk the talk” of peace and reconciliation, but on the other hand, their subsequent words and deeds reveal the hollowness, or incompleteness, of that talk. Some aspects of their national myths could be reevaluated or rejected in the name of the peace process, but others remain sacrosanct and thus untouchable. As Rabin told the Israeli Knesset when he presented to them the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II), Here in the land of Israel, we returned and built a nation. Here, in the land of Israel, we established a state. The land of the prophets, which bequeathed to the world the values of morality, law, and justice, was, after two thousand years, restored to its lawful owners—the members of the Jewish people. On its land, we have built an exceptional national home and state. However, we did not return to an empty land.58

While Rabin was rejecting the traditional myth that that the Israelis had arrived to an empty land, he still had not acknowledged that there could be more than one “lawful owner” of the Holy Land. To do so, would have entailed a reassessment of the enemy’s national myths as well, something which the moderates are not yet prepared to do. The moderates cling to their national myths in which their side is always the innocent victim, and the adversary is the source of all of the problems. As a result, they never reconsider their adversary’s national myths to see if there might not be some truth to them. For example, Barak disparaged the Palestinian refugees’ dream of returning to their homes, when he stated, The third issue—that of the refugees—is a tougher one to solve because of the long-cultivated myth of “return” that holds the Palestinians in its thrall, the prolonging of hardship in the refugee camps, and a half century of dependence on international aid that stopped short of any rehabilitation effort. Anyone even vaguely familiar with the conflict can understand that the demand to acknowledge the 1948 refugees’ “right of return” is an unrealistic one, and there’s no chance whatever that Israel will accede to it. [Israel will not accept any responsibility, legal or moral, for the creation of the refugee problem. It should be recalled that this problem arose as a result of a war initiated by the Arabs because of their rejection of the 1947 UN partition resolution and their declared intention to destroy the Jewish community of Palestine and crush the State of Israel at its birth.]59

Both sides consistently downplay the validity and rationality of the other’s national myths. While Barak could not seem to understand the hold of the

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“myth” of the right of return over the Palestinian people, the Palestinian officials have also tended to downplay or denigrate Israeli ties to the land. As Abbas told an interviewer from an Israeli Arabic newspaper, But the one who wants to forget the past does not turn around and say the Temple is underneath the al-Haram Al-Sharif. They are asking us to forget what happened to the refugees only 50 years ago. I am a refugee; I am still alive. Then they claim that they had a temple 2000 years ago. I defy them to prove this; even if it is true, we will not accept it. This is not the logic of someone who wants peace.60

Since neither side was willing to reassess the other’s national narratives, or the logic that drove it, they were unable to reconcile or commit to the peace process.

Conclusion Implementation is the final, and perhaps most challenging, stage of conflict resolution. Once an agreement has been negotiated, the officials need to get popular support for the agreement, and put its provisions into practice. This chapter’s examination of the rhetoric of the Israeli and Palestinian officials shows just how challenging a task that is. The moderates would like to believe that peace is possible, and that there is a partner for peace on the other side, but they are not completely convinced. This indecision, or inherent ambivalence, is expressed loudly and clearly in their rhetoric. As a result, their language makes them seem almost Janus-faced, as they talk of peace and war. In their speeches we can find them working out their own ambivalence, or wrestling with their own demons, as they discuss the peace process. But, as it will be discussed shortly, it is very difficult for a leader to sell an agreement to someone else that he/she does not fully support, and it is even more difficult to convince an adversary of his/her commitment to the peace process, when he/she has yet to convince him/ herself! The discourse analysis of the Israeli and Palestinian officials revealed a considerable degree of ambivalence in the words of each of the officials. While this ambivalence was most powerfully illustrated when Arafat went to the United Nations bearing an olive branch and his gun, it was also evident in Rabin’s need to reassure the Israeli Knesset that his government had not made any real

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commitment to the Palestinians. Thus, there is considerable support for all three principles in the leaders’ speeches. Principle 1 predicted that the Israelis would use the asymmetrical distribution of power to promote their own interests. Not surprisingly, it was the Palestinians who highlighted the uneven distribution of power in their speeches, even as they used it to try to gain some leverage in the negotiations. The Palestinians attempted to use their weaker position as a way to force the Israelis to make greater concessions to them, and to garner international support for their cause. At the same time, with the exception of Barak, one finds the Israeli leaders promoting an incremental approach to the peace process, as we anticipated in Principle 1. Similarly, all of the Israeli officials declared over and over again in their speeches that the peace process was a test for the Palestinians, and that any future progress would depend on whether or not the Palestinians passed that test. The speeches also reveal considerable support for Principle 2’s assertion that the moderates would not be able to commit completely to the peace process. Once again, this was powerfully revealed when Rabin felt compelled to reassure the Knesset that he had not made any commitment to the Palestinians, but in many other ways as well. While the officials claim to have moved beyond a zero-sum outlook, at times their innermost thoughts reveal this is not completely the case, as when Peres proudly declared that the Israelis had “screwed” the Palestinians. Both sides still strive to wring maximal concessions from the other side, while minimizing their own. Also, they are both willing to walk away from an agreement if they cannot get everything they want. But perhaps most significantly for this chapter’s analysis, their inability to commit to the peace process makes them especially concerned about how their constituents will interpret their words. But, as it will be discussed shortly, their concern over how their words and deeds will be perceived fails to take into account their extended audience, particularly the other nation which is listening in as well. The officials’ speeches also revealed their inherent ambivalence toward reconciliation, as was predicted in Principle 3. On the one hand, one can find plenty of flowery references to peace and reconciliation in the language of both sides. But their rhetoric also supports the argument that while the moderates can be persuaded that there is someone on the other side with whom peace is possible, they can also be persuaded of the opposite. The moderates’ ambivalence vis-à-vis the enemy shows itself clearly in their speeches. So, Barak can baldly assert that the Palestinians have no compunction when it comes to lying, and Arafat can unequivocally state that the Israelis are trying to wipe out the

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Palestinian people. The officials’ speeches reveal that neither side has reevaluated its image of the enemy, of itself, or of the national myths that motivate either side. Without such a reevaluation, however, there can be no true reconciliation. The fact that the moderates on both sides can readily be persuaded that peace is not possible, and that there is not a partner for peace on the other side, poses another serious challenge to implementation. Both sides would like to believe that peace is possible, and that there is a true partner for peace, but they remain pessimistic. As a result, it does not take a great deal to convince them of the futility of the peace process, and of the evil intentions of their so-called partner for peace. Each side closely monitors the words and deeds of the other for any sign that their partner is wavering in their commitment to the peace process. Thus, when the Israeli and Palestinian officials worry about how their words will be taken by their own people, they forget the fact that they also have an audience within their enemy who is listening to their every word. Yezid Sayigh points out that Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, generally, whether Hamas, etc., however, having entered into a political engagement with the Israeli public, with Israel, needed to, critically, to learn how to speak to Israel at their level and in all its differences (ethnic, class, and other communities.) And people like Arafat failed fundamentally to understand how Israelis think, or what they wanted, or how to talk to them. I think that, frankly, that emanated from the fact that I don’t think he paid much attention to his own public.61

The discourse analysis has revealed numerous instances of Arafat, as well as the other leaders on both sides, making statements that were undoubtedly designed to shore up support on his own side, and to reassure his constituents (moderate and hard-liner alike), but in so doing he failed to stop to consider how those words would be interpreted by the other side. As a result, Palestinian and Israeli leaders alike helped to shatter the enemy moderates’ conviction that they were in fact a partner for peace, and thus they have made it even harder for the enemy moderates to fully commit to the peace process. Thus, in supporting Principles 1, 2, and 3, the speeches provide a picture of Israeli and Palestinian moderates who are torn over the Oslo Peace Process. Principle 2 predicts that the moderates on either side will be unable to commit to the peace process, while Principle 3 predicts that they will be unable to reconcile with one another. If both are true, then it is really not surprising that the Oslo agreement broke down over implementation. In order to implement the agreement, it had to be sold to the Israeli and Palestinian people. But, how

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could the officials on either side possibly sell an agreement to their people that they were not fully committed to? Similarly, how could these officials possibly get their two peoples to reconcile with one another, when they could not even reconcile their own conflicting emotions? As Uri Savir acknowledged, “Our own rhetoric toward the Palestinians was a combination of support for the process and a somewhat condescending, didactic approach. Therefore throughout most of this period of historic transition, pictures and words were often not synchronized, which led to the public’s confusion.”62 With the public confused, and the leaders conflicted, the Oslo Accords’ days were clearly numbered.

Notes 1 The breakdown of the speeches was the following: Rabin: 35, Peres: 25, Barak: 45, Arafat: 30, Abbas: 25, and Qurei: 25. 2 “WAFA: PM Quray’s ‘Written Speech’ on the 10th Anniversary of Rabin Assassination,” Open Source Center, November 15, 2005, accessed March 9, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway. 3 “Prime Minister Quray interviewed on Peace Process, Domestic Affairs,” Open Source Center, November 13, 2005, accessed March 9, 2009, www.opensource.gov/ portal/server.pt/gateway. 4 “Peres Seen Backtracking on Palestinian Track,” Open Source Center, November 29, 2005, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway. 5 Ziad Abu Zayyad, “Why Oslo Must Not Fail,” Palestine-Israel Journal 2, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 20. 6 “Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Accepting the UNESCO Peace Prize (July 6, 1994)” in Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin, eds, The Israel-Arab Reader (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 466. 7 “Interview with Prime Minister Rabin in Die Welt,” Israeli MFA Website, vols 13–14: 1992–4, accessed August 22, 2006. www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20 Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%1947/1992–1994. 8 “Statement by Prime Minister Rabin,” Israeli MFA Website, vols 13–14: 1992–4, accessed September 27, 2006, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/ Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%1947/1992–1994. 9 “Peres Seen Backtracking on Palestinian Track.” 10 “Interview with Prime Minister Rabin in Al-Hayat,” Israeli MFA Website, vols 13–14: 1992–4, accessed September 21, 2006, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20 Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%1947/1992–1994. 11 “Interview with Prime Minister Rabin in Die Welt.”

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12 “Israeli News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, Monday September 13, 1993,” accessed via LexisNexis, July 12, 2007. 13 Ibid. 14 “Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Ratification of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement,” The Knesset, October 5, 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MAFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/10/ PM+Rabin+in+Knesset 15 “Excerpts from Remarks by Prime Minister Ehud Barak after the Conclusion of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit,” Sharm el-Sheikh Airport, October 17, 2000, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mideastweb.org/sharm2.htm 16 Isabel Kershner, “Netanyahu’s Talk of Peace Finds Few True believers,” The New York Times, July 20, 2009, A9. 17 “Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.” 18 “Interview with Prime Minister Rabin in Die Welt.” 19 Mike Williams, “Interview with Yasser Arafat,” July 22, 2002, BBC Radio, accessed July 5, 2007, www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/archive/international/arafat/ shtml. 20 Carmel Gerber, “Arafat Calls for Holy War for Jerusalem,” United Press International, May 17, 1994, accessed via LexisNexis, July 12, 2007. 21 Rachel Harvey, “Analysis: Mistrust Deepens,” January 27, 2002, BBC News, accessed July 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_East/1785390.stm. 22 “Full text of Arafat’s Speech at PLC Session 15 May,” Open Source Center, May 15, 2002, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway 23 Isabel Kershner, “Abbas Urges ‘New Start’ at Fatah Conference,” The New York Times, August 5, 2009, A5. 24 Isabel Kershner, and Taghreed El-Khodary, “Gaza Rocket, Fired at Israel, Pierces a Fragile Calm,” The New York Times, March 12, 2008, A6. 25 Ehud Barak, “Address by Prime Minister Ehud Barak on the Fifth Anniversary of the Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin,” November 8, 2000, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+ Israeli+leaders/2000/Address=by. 26 Ibid. 27 “WAFA: PM Quray’s ‘Written Speech’ on 10th Anniversary of Rabin Assassination,” Open Source Center, November 15, 2005, accessed March 9, 2009, www. opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway 28 Noam Chomsky, “Eastern Exposure: Misrepresenting the Peace Process,” The Village Voice Literary Supplement, February 6, 1996, http://www.chomsky.info/ articles/19960206.htm, accessed September 8, 2012.

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29 Robert L. Rothstein, “A Fragile Peace: Could a ‘Race to the Bottom’ Have Been Avoided?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 56. 30 “Bloodshed on Israel Anniversary,” BBC News, May 5, 2001, accessed July 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_East/1332856.stm. 31 Yitzhak Rabin, “Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin,” October 26, 1992, Israeli MFA Website, vols 13–14: 1992–4, accessed August 21, 2006, www. mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20 since%1947/1992–1994. 32 Yitzhak Rabin, “Address by Prime Minister Rabin to Keren Hayesod Conference,” June 23, 1993, Israeli MFA Website, vols 13–14: 1992–4, accessed September 27, 2006, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20 Relations%20since%1947/1992–1994. 33 Ehud Barak, “Statement by Prime Minister Ehud Barak Prior to His Departure for the Camp David Summit,” July 10, 2000, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/ Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/ 2000/Statement+b. 34 Ehud Barak, “Statement by Prime Minister Barak at Press Conference upon the Conclusion of the Camp David Summit,” July 25, 2000, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Is raeli+leaders/2000/Statement+b. 35 “Prime Minister Quray Interviewed on Peace Process, Domestic Affairs,” Open Source Center, November 13, 2005, accessed March 9, 2009, www.opensource.gov/ portal/server.pt/gateway. 36 Yasser Arafat, “The Palestine Vision of Peace,” Interview published in The New York Times, February 3, 2002, reprinted at bitterlemons.org, accessed September 11, 2007, www.bitterlemons.org/docs/arafat.html. 37 For example, see Arafat, “Full Text of Arafat’s Speech,” or “Israel Rejects Arafat Talks Offer,” BBC News, March 11, 2001, accessed June 20, 2007, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/middle_East/1214286.stm 38 Yasser Arafat, “Arafat Independence Anniversary Speech,” Open Source Center, May 15, 1998, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/ gateway. 39 Helene Cooper, and Isabel Kershner, “Under Pressure, Abbas Says He’ll Talk Peace, but Actual Dialogue May be Remote,” The New York Times, March 6, 2008, A12. 40 Steven Erlanger, and Greg Myre, “Hamas and Abbas Clash over Path for Palestinians,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006, A1.

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41 Mahmud Abbas, “PLO’s Mahmud Abbas Interviewed by Israeli Arabic paper on Peace Process Issues,” Open Source Center, August 25, 2000, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway. 42 “Peres Seen Backtracking on Palestinian Track.” 43 “Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Accepting the UNESCO Peace Prize,” July 6, 1994(not 1995) in Walter Laquer and Barry Rubi, eds, The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 2001). 44 Shimon Peres, “Let Us All Turn from Bullets to Ballots,” Vital Speeches of the Day 59, no. 24 (October 1, 1993): 739–40. 45 Yitzhak Rabin, “Policy Statement by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset, 3 October 1994,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 182. 46 “Mahmoud Abbas Speech to the PLC,” http://www.nad-plo.org/speeches/ abumazen5.html, accessed June 20, 2007. 47 “Ehud Barak’s Speech: Highlights,” BBC News, July 6, 1999, accessed July 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/387914.stm. 48 “Policy Statement by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset, 3 October 1994,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 49 “Statement by Prime Minister Barak on his return from the Camp David Summit,” July 26, 2000, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Statement+b, accessed June 20, 2007. 50 Brian Whitaker, “Lying Is Cultural Trait of Arabs, Says Barak,” The Guardian, May 23, 2002, Accessed June 20, 2007, www.guardian.co.uk/israel/ story/0,2763,720416,00.html, originally quoted in Benny Morris, “An Interview with Ehud Barak,” The New York Review of Books 49 (June 13, 2002), 42–5. 51 “Arafat Speech to Muslim Ministers,” BBC News, May 26, 2001, accessed July 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/ media_reports/1353393.s. 52 Barak, July 25, 2000. 53 Arafat, October 21, 2000. 54 Peres, December 10, 1994. 55 Mideast Mirror, July 7, 1999. 56 “Israel’s Peres Defends Israel’s Peace Process Record in Interview to UK Daily,” Open Source Center, August 5, 2003, accessed March 9, 2009, www.opensource. gov/portal/server.pt/gateway. 57 “PA’s Quray: Oslo Agreement ‘Is Not Dead,’” Open Source Center, September 1, 2001, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway.

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“Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.” Barak, November 8, 2000. Abbas, “PLO’s Mahmud Abbas Interviewed,” Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 252.

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5

Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Walk the Walk?

In the preceding chapters, we have explored the role of the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers in the death of the Oslo Peace Process. In Chapter 3, we saw how their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and one another led to the loss of the “Oslo Spirit,” and influenced the various negotiations that occurred over implementing the Declaration of Principles. Similarly, Chapter 4 showed how their rhetoric revealed their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis Oslo, and not only expressed their views on the peace process and one another, but also further reinforced those views in self-fulfilling prophecies. This chapter will build on these preceding chapters to explore some of the actual proposals for a final settlement of the conflict. The 2000 Camp David Summit between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat has been the subject of almost as much contentious debate as the Oslo Peace Process itself. As a result, both sides have developed their own national narratives surrounding the Summit. According to Barak, the Israelis, and their supporters in the United States and beyond, Camp David represented an unprecedented offer that Arafat and the Palestinians failed to accept. If that is the case, Barak’s offer would seem to refute this book’s contention that the peacemakers’ inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process prevents them from being able to push the peace process to its fruition. Therefore, the Camp David Summit serves as a perfect test for our three principles, and will serve as the primary focus of this chapter. In addition, we will also examine two other instances when the moderates tried to push the process toward a final settlement: the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement and the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners. By examining these two attempts, along with the Camp David Summit, it enables us to examine an Israeli proposal (Camp David), a joint Israeli-Palestinian proposal (Beilin-Abu Mazen), and finally an exclusively Palestinian effort (National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners.)

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Barak’s election and the initial optimism pre-Camp David Barak’s election in 1999 was initially met with a great deal of hope, optimism, and heightened expectations by both the Israeli and Palestinian supporters of the peace process. Outgoing Israeli prime minister Netanyahu was seen as an opponent of the peace process, and as someone who had used his office to slow the process down. The return of the Labor Party to power was viewed as an essential development for reviving, and accelerating, the peace process. Unfortunately, several of Barak’s initial actions and statements questioned that early optimism. First, he decided to pursue a “Syria First” policy, where he tried to fast-track a peace agreement with Syria, rather than focus his attention on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In doing so, however, Barak heightened the Palestinians’ concerns over the Israelis’ true intentions. As Charles Enderlin points out, “Mistrust is setting in. Barak is leading the Palestinians to believe that negotiations with them are of lesser importance.”1 Second, Barak actually never met Yasser Arafat until several months after he became prime minister. Third, he refused to implement the third redeployment of Israeli forces, as it had been agreed upon in the Interim Agreement of September 1995. While Barak justified his decision by promising that this redeployment would be part of a framework agreement that would be reached with the Palestinians no later than February 2000, that promise did little to reverse the Palestinians’ growing sense of unease. Further weakening their faith in him was his attempt to modify the Wye River Memorandum. With the Palestinians growing increasingly apprehensive over whether Barak was truly a partner for peace, he added fuel to the fire of their doubts when he stated his belief that UN Resolutions 242 and 338 did not apply to the border regions among Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Those resolutions call upon Israel to withdraw from all territories it occupied during the 1967 and 1973 wars. According to Barak’s interpretation of the resolutions, “In the case of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, we are talking about states that have recognized, agreed borders with us. In the past, on that same border there was belligerent action, the results of which led to Israel holding onto territory. Resolution 242 refers to these territories. There is no such border on the West Bank.”2 Since Resolution 242, along with Resolution 338, was commonly viewed as the basis for the entire Oslo Peace Process, Barak’s statement caused considerable consternation among the Palestinians, as well as among Oslo’s Israeli supporters.

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On the Palestinian side, the initial optimism that greeted Barak’s election quickly withered away. Barak’s actions and rhetoric, combined with the situation “on the ground,” contributed to the Palestinians’ loss of optimism. There was a wide gap between their heightened expectations with Barak’s election, and the existing reality—specifically the Barak administration’s policy of continuing to build settlements in the Occupied Territories, the ongoing humiliations that surrounded the checkpoints, and the continuing economic crisis.3 As a result, “The Palestinian public and the ‘street’ leadership—which originally was a supporter of the peace process and of the need to reach reconciliation with Israel—came to the conclusion that Israel did not in fact want to reach a fair agreement to end the occupation and grant the Palestinian people ‘legitimate rights.’”4 Similarly, the initial optimism on the Israeli side waned as well. Barak’s failure to reach an agreement with Syria, combined with the continuation of violent attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups, contributed to Israeli unease.

The Camp David Summit Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel offered the Palestinians a real state in virtually all of the West Bank and Gaza; he put forward a credible solution for the Palestinian refugee issue; he offered Yasir Arafat a mosaic of Palestinian administrative control and sovereignty over the Arab areas of Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Thomas L. Friedman, “It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over,” The New York Times, July 26, 2000

The preceding quote from Thomas Friedman captures the reigning view of the Camp David Summit: that Barak had made an extremely generous offer to the Palestinians, only to have his overtures rebuffed by Arafat. However, does this really capture what transpired at Camp David? With its term of office drawing to a close, the Clinton administration decided to make one final effort to bring about a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. Basically, the United States and Israel pressured the Palestinians to agree to a summit. Arafat initially opposed meeting at Camp David because he felt that the situation was not yet “ripe” for an agreement. He felt that negotiations should continue between the two sides for at least several

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more weeks before they would be ready for a summit. The Palestinians tried to relay their concerns to the Clinton administration, but their fears went unheard. Ultimately, Arafat agreed to meet with the Israelis at Camp David largely because he did not feel like he could refuse President Clinton, and because he faced an increasingly discontented populace. In hindsight, Arafat’s analysis of the situation was correct. Both Barak and Clinton were interested in moving quickly toward a summit, but their haste was fueled more by their own domestic political considerations, or concerns about their historical legacies, rather than an accurate reading of the current situation. Barak’s governing coalition was on the verge of collapse, due to his lack of success in achieving an agreement with either the Syrians or the Palestinians, and due to his failure to engage other Israeli leaders, not to mention the Israeli populace, behind his policies. Barak believed that if he made some major concessions to the Palestinians, they would then agree to a final settlement, which he was convinced he could then sell to his people.5 Similarly, Clinton hoped that an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement could be his legacy, and thereby mitigate the damage from the Monica Lewinsky scandal and his subsequent impeachment by the United States House of Representatives. Clinton and Barak pushed Arafat to agree to the Camp David Summit even though he was right that the current situation really was not conducive to a final settlement. Domestic political considerations trumped any consideration of whether or not it was an opportune time for a summit. In addition, little thought was given to the potential ramifications of a failed summit. According to Aaron David Miller, Camp David was a mistake because You don’t go to a high-risk, high-stakes summit unless there is a measure of—not certainty; let’s call it probability—let’s call it possibility—that you can essentially conclude an agreement. You go to a summit with a sense of where the gaps are. You go to a summit with a sense of how to close those gaps. Above all, you go to a summit with the understanding that if in fact it fails, you in essence have a fallback strategy to compensate for that failure.6

Due to their domestic political concerns, neither Barak nor Clinton listened to Miller, Arafat, or any of the others who were arguing against holding such a “high-risk, high-stakes summit.” On July 11, 2000, the Camp David Summit (which is also known as Camp David II so as to differentiate it from the 1979 Summit between Begin and Sadat), began. As it will be discussed shortly, Barak came to Camp David seeking to subvert the Israeli-Palestinian incremental

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negotiating style, and to replace it with an all-or-nothing final settlement. At Camp David, Barak did cross a number of bridges that his predecessors had refused to consider. Barak essentially offered the Palestinians a Palestinian state consisting of the Gaza Strip, a little more than 90 percent of the West Bank, and some of the Arab sections of East Jerusalem. He offered the Palestinians 91 percent of the West Bank, plus a land swap involving 1 percent of land in pre-1967 Israel, and to dismantle some Israeli settlements. In return, his offer called upon the Palestinians to accept Israel’s annexation of several Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem; a number of measures designed to ensure Israeli security such as the presence of an early warning station in the West Bank; and an Israeli presence at the Palestinian border crossings. In addition, Barak’s offer made only a passing gesture to the Palestinian right of return by allowing only a small number of Palestinians into Israel through a family reunification program.7 According to Barak and most Israelis, Barak’s offer at Camp David was unprecedented and extremely generous. Unfortunately, the Palestinians did not see his offer in quite the same light. In fact, according to Ron Pundak, Barak’s offer “was only generous compared to the traditional position of Israel’s right-wing, which never seriously wanted peace, or to Barak’s opening position in the talks which, as even he himself subsequently realized, was unrealistic.”8 The main criticism of Barak’s offer is that it was “unrealistic,” because it failed to take into consideration the basic Palestinian reality. According to Charles Enderlin, “[A]t no time was Arafat offered a Palestinian state on more than 91 percent of the West Bank and, at that, without recognition of his complete sovereignty over the Arab quarters of Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount.”9 Similarly, Jeremy Pressman asserts that while Barak did make an unprecedented offer at Camp David, he “neglected several elements essential to any comprehensive settlement, including: the contiguity of the Palestinian state in the West Bank, full sovereignty in Arab parts of East Jerusalem, and a compromise resolution on the right of return of Palestinian refugees.”10 Each of these issues must be addressed before the Palestinians will be willing to accept a final settlement, but Barak’s offer failed to appreciate that fact. One of the primary Palestinian criticisms of Barak’s offer was that the Palestinian state it envisioned was not contiguous in the West Bank. With Barak’s offer, Israel would have retained 69 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, where roughly 85 percent of all of the Jewish settlers lived. By holding on to these settlements, the area under Palestinian control was essentially divided into 2–3 separate zones. For some Palestinians, Barak’s offer would have created “at least

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three Palestinian ‘sovereign cages.’ There would be no real Palestinian territorial contiguity. They would have no control and sovereignty on main arteries of transportation. The Jordan valley would still be controlled by the IDF—even if Palestinians were granted some kind of control there.”11 By dividing the West Bank into these noncontiguous zones of Palestinian control, it would have ended up “denying Palestinians the ability to exercise and enforce governmental and security functions, develop a coherent economic policy, or promote development opportunities.”12 Even if one were to argue that those concerns were overblown, there was no denying the fact that the offer’s resemblance to the apartheid policy of carving out homelands made it completely unacceptable to the Palestinians. Barak’s offer also failed to meet the Palestinians’ needs surrounding the future of Jerusalem. Again, while his willingness to countenance the division of Jerusalem was unprecedented, it still did not go far enough. The Palestinians sought full sovereignty over the Arab sections of East Jerusalem, but Barak was not prepared to offer them that. As a result, the Israelis would have retained considerable sovereign rights in the Palestinian part of Jerusalem. His offer failed to recognize the Palestinians’ right to “complete sovereignty over the Arab quarters of Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.”13 The future of the Haram al-Sharif / Temple Mount became a major source of contention during the negotiations at Camp David. The Palestinians grew very concerned when the Israeli negotiators at Camp David demanded sovereignty both above and below the grounds of the Temple Mount, due to the Temple’s ruins underground. According to Menachem Klein, this claim stoked fears within the Palestinians that dated back to the 1920s when the Palestinian leadership told its people that the Jews sought to build the third temple on the ruins of Muslim shrines.14 Since the Palestinians already had considerable doubts as to whether Barak and the Israelis really wanted peace, this claim only served to heighten their doubts, and thereby made it less likely that they could agree to Barak’s offer. The Palestinians’ doubts over Barak’s true intentions were reinforced by his token gesture on the right of return issue. As it was stated previously, Barak’s offer would have allowed a small number of Palestinians to enter Israel under a family reunification program. However, Barak also insisted that in accepting his offer, the Palestinians would have had to officially declare the conflict over. In doing so, they would have been renouncing any future claim for a “right to return.” This was “something that the PLO institutions never confirmed in the past and never authorized Arafat to accept. This demand, if accepted by the Palestinians, would

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signify their agreement to give up their national narrative, which of course was inconceivable.”15 As it will be discussed shortly, Barak’s offer can also be seen as indicative of the “peacemakers” inability to reevaluate the national narratives that drive their enemies, or themselves. The Palestinians also objected to all of the security measures designed to enhance Israeli security, without any recognition of the Palestinian need for security as well. As it was discussed previously, throughout the Oslo Peace Process, a common Palestinian complaint was that the Israelis always privileged their own security needs, without acknowledging those of the Palestinians. Unfortunately, Barak’s offer only seemed to reinforce that complaint. Barak’s offer called for the Israelis to establish three early warning stations in the West Bank, to maintain a presence at the Palestinian border crossings, and to retain control over the Jordan Valley for anywhere from 6 to 21 years so as to protect Israel from a potential invasion by the Arab states.16 In addition, the Palestinian state established would be demilitarized. From the Israeli perspective these demands were all perfectly reasonable, but for the Palestinians they only served to reinforce their doubts over what type of state the Israelis actually envisioned for them, if it was even a state at all. Another criticism of Barak’s offer was that he never clearly stated what the end result of a final settlement would be. As it was discussed previously, throughout the Oslo Peace Process the Israelis and Palestinians used “constructive ambiguity” to try to push the peace process forward. Barak was deliberately vague about what he envisioned for the Palestinians after a settlement. Barak and the Israelis never came out and stated categorically that if an agreement was reached, it would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Instead, they “chose to hide behind such terms as ‘a political entity.’ Barak himself used this term in the beginning of the talks, which only reinforced the Palestinians’ belief that Israel did not mean statehood and did not genuinely wish to reach a settlement of the dispute.”17 Clearly, by failing to propose the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state, by not addressing such essential issues as the future of Jerusalem and the right of return, in its extensive security demands and privileging of Israeli security concerns over those of the Palestinians, and by evading the question of what the end result of a final settlement would be, Barak’s offer left much to be desired from the Palestinian perspective. It was undoubtedly an unprecedented offer, but it still did not go far enough in order to achieve a lasting peace. Even Barak’s chief negotiator, Shlomo Ben-Ami, acknowledged that Barak’s concessions “fell far short of even modest Palestinian expectations.”18 Part of the problem was

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that the Palestinians felt that in agreeing to the Declaration of Principles they had already given up a large part of their claim to Palestine, and now Barak was asking them to concede even more. As Marwan Barghouti puts it, “We agreed to make do with 22% of historic Palestine. At Camp David, you tried to take from this small portion an enclave here, a bloc there, the Jordan Valley, border crossings, Jerusalem. This is a state? This is a solution? This is justice?”19 Leaving aside questions over how generous Barak’s offer really was, there are several other arguments made about why Camp David ended in failure. One set of explanations focuses upon procedural errors. For example, neither side appreciated the damaging impact that the messages they were sending out to their home audiences would have on their adversary’s faith in the peace process. The importance of recognizing who your audience is represents one of the important lessons from Oslo’s death, as it will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. An alternative explanation for Camp David’s failure asserts that neither Israel nor the United States ever ascertained the Palestinians’ “bottom line” for an agreement.20 Other explanations attribute Camp David’s failure to the inherent weaknesses of the two leaders, Arafat and Barak. Arafat did not communicate effectively with his chief negotiators, while Barak’s aloof nature was viewed as an insult to Arafat and the Palestinians. Aaron David Miller argues that part of the problem lay in the negotiating tactics of Barak and Arafat. Barak had his own strategy and timetable: keep his cards close, avoid letting Arafat pocket any of his concessions, build pressure, and wait to see where the Palestinians were going. Arafat’s strategy was to be hyper passive and see what was on the table but never authorize his negotiators to lay down authoritative positions.21

For countless reasons, the Camp David Summit was doomed to failure. In the next section we will examine the Summit through the lenses of our three principles, before turning our attention to the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement and the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners.

Camp David and the three principles While the Palestinians undoubtedly played a role in Camp David’s failure, this section will focus exclusively upon Barak and the Israelis. An exclusive focus on the Israelis is warranted in that it was the Israeli proposal at Camp David that

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seems to contradict my assertion that moderates cannot bring the peace process to fruition.

Asymmetrical distribution of power Did the asymmetrical distribution of power affect Barak’s offer and his ability to achieve a final settlement? Principle 1 predicts that moderates on the dominant side will take advantage of the asymmetrical distribution of power to promote their side’s interests. As part of this principle, it is argued that the dominant power will try to keep its options open for as long as possible, thereby delaying an agreement, and that it will view the peace process as a test for its adversary. Does Camp David support, or refute, these predictions? In some ways, Camp David does seem to support Principle 1. According to Ron Pundak, a major problem with the negotiations at Camp David was “a notion of asymmetry of power that set the tone of the talks with the Palestinians.”22 Barak came to Camp David looking for a final settlement, but that settlement would be his settlement not a communal settlement, in other words the Israelis’ and the Palestinians’. So, Barak essentially “developed a largely private vision of a comprehensive solution, worked with the American Administration to ‘impose’ it on the Palestinians at Camp David, and then intended to sell the settlement to the Israeli people.”23 However, the very idea that peace can be imposed by the stronger power is highly suspect. Instead, a lasting peace must be the product of bargaining and compromising by the two adversaries. While Barak’s actions seem to support Principle 1, the same does not hold true for its prediction that the dominant power will try to string out the negotiating process for as long as possible. Rather than trying to keep his options open for as long as possible, Barak was trying to push the process to fruition. In fact, Barak had grown disenchanted with the incrementalism of the Oslo Peace Process; whereas Principle 1 predicts that the dominant power will push such a gradual or incremental approach.24 Barak wanted to move directly to the final status negotiations because he felt that an interim agreement would cost as much politically as a permanent agreement. As he puts it prior to the Camp David Summit, “I am not going to pay any higher political price, and will delay everything until the permanent status agreement.”25 This statement only served to heighten the Palestinians’ doubts about Barak, and to deflate their initial optimism upon his election. While Barak’s decision to push for a final

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settlement seems to be uncharacteristic for a leader of the dominant power in an intractable conflict, the fact that he sought to impose his settlement on the Palestinians is not. Barak’s actions before, during, and after Camp David support Principle 1’s prediction that the dominant power will view the peace process as a test for its adversary. Barak viewed Camp David as a test for Arafat and the Palestinians. He doubted whether Arafat was really committed to the peace process, so the Camp David Summit was seen as a test to see whether there really was a Palestinian partner for peace. When he met up with Arafat at Sharm el-Sheikh, after Camp David had failed, Barak said The test will be in the implementation, and not in gestures. I advise all of us to pay less attention to gestures, and to focus on the reality. There is a whole list of detailed understandings regarding actions to be taken on the path to the calming of the situation. If the Palestinian side will comply with the understandings, we will do our share, and if calm is indeed restored, this will be a very important change. The test, once again, is in the implementation of these understandings.26

Barak not only saw Camp David as a test for Arafat and the Palestinians, but he also could be viewed as setting up the Palestinians to fail that test. In other words, one could argue that his offer at Camp David was intended to be a test that he knew the Palestinians were unlikely to be able to pass (i.e. accept). According to Yossi Beilin, “Barak had an ‘all or nothing’ approach: While he had been ready to concede, he was also prepared to ‘expose the true face’ of the other side; he believed such an outcome was nearly as valuable as an agreement. So it was all or nothing, and this dichotomy with Barak was very dangerous from the start.”27 Barak’s offer, and the entire summit itself, was a product of the asymmetrical nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This asymmetry can be seen in the initial pressure on the Palestinians to agree to a summit, the nature of the talks, Barak’s attempts to impose his solution upon the Palestinians, and in his tendency to view the Summit as a test for Arafat and the Palestinians. Thus while Barak’s rejection of incrementalism runs counter to the expectations of Principle 1, everything else about Camp David is supportive of it.

Inability to fully commit to the peace process The Camp David Summit also seems to support Principle 2’s prediction that the moderates will not be able to fully commit to the peace process. On the one hand,

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the fact that Barak went further than any of his predecessors, or successors, in making concessions to the Palestinians would seem to belie this argument. On the other hand, Barak’s actions and rhetoric also seem to support it. It appears as if Barak was willing to commit himself to the peace process, as long as it was his peace process. Furthermore, since we have already seen that while Barak’s offer was unprecedented that it still did not go far enough, one could argue that adds further support to this position. However, it is actually in the criterion used as evidence for this principle that we find the greatest support for it. As predicted, one sees a lot of vacillation in the position of Barak and the Israelis. In describing the dramatic shifts, or the zigzag nature of its policy making, it has been argued that “Barak’s performance in office was so strange that it does not seem an exaggeration to term it schizoid.”28 Prior to coming to office, Barak had been a hard-liner, initially opposing the Oslo Peace Process out of security considerations. But once in office, he embraced Rabin’s legacy and sought a final settlement. However, he was, and continues to be, torn over the process. Barak has admitted that he feels a greater affinity for the views of the pro-settlement National Religious Party, rather than those of the Meretz Party, which is typically viewed as the party most supportive of the Oslo Peace Process.29 Barak was torn throughout the process, and many Palestinians felt that he was preparing for conflict even as he was talking peace at Camp David. According to Ghaith al-Omari, “When he was arguing and negotiating in Camp David, he was already working on the attack—the media attack plan. While he was arguing, negotiating, he was already constructing the no-partner narratives.”30 Despite making his unprecedented offer to the Palestinians, Barak continued to view the peace process as a zero-sum game. In fact, Yossi Beilin has acknowledged that one of the mistakes of Camp David was “that it was kind of a zero-sum game, rather than a serious readiness to seek compromises.”31 From the very beginning of his administration, Barak’s actions were indicative of a zero-sum approach to the conflict. For example, according to Menachem Klein, Barak pursued his Syria First policy because, “Among other reasons, he believed that if Israel reached an agreement with Syria, the Palestinians would be left isolated. Israel would then be able to broker a better agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”32 Further evidence of Barak’s zero-sum perspective comes from his rhetoric. Barak proudly declared, “I’ve put Arafat up against the wall, the way he was in Beirut in 1982. This is his last chance to conclude an accord with me. Arafat doesn’t make decisions except under pressure.”33

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Camp David also supports Principle 2’s prediction that the peacemakers will try to maximize their adversary’s concessions, while minimizing their own. In discussing what happened at Camp David, Barak said, Here’s the truth: Barak did not give away a thing. I did not give away a thing. I made clear, and I am proud of it, that in exchange for an end to the conflict and giving up the right of return, 80% of the settlers under Israeli sovereignty, recognition of the security needs of Israel, and of its affinity to the holy places, we will be ready for painful, defined concessions that lead to a Palestinian state.34

At Camp David, Barak sought to minimize Israeli concessions while maximizing those of the Palestinians. In addition, since, as it was discussed previously, he viewed the Summit as a test for the Palestinians, he was willing to walk away from his offer if he could not get his agreement. As he said on his return from Camp David, We were not prepared to relinquish three things: the security of Israel, those things that are holy to Israel, and the unity of our people. If we will be faced with the alternative between compromising one of these areas and a confrontation, the choice is clear to every Israeli . . . . Israel was prepared to pay a painful price to bring an end to the conflict, but not any price.35

Barak’s willingness to walk away from Camp David without an agreement stemmed from his pragmatic nature. Barak himself has acknowledged how torn he was over the peace process, stating, “Emotionally, I feel like a right-winger, but in my head I am realistic, pragmatic.”36 As the preceding quote makes clear, Barak was driven by pragmatic considerations. After overcoming his initial opposition to the Oslo Peace Process, Barak came to support it, but out of purely pragmatic considerations. In fact, Robert Rowland and David Frank assert that Barak took pragmatism to a whole new level, when compared with his predecessors. As they put it, At several points we have argued that Labor in general and Peres in particular were often weakened because they defended an ungrounded pragmatism. That is, their position on security and other issues were not tied to any principle but were only an assessment of what could be done tactically at the time. With Barak, however, the situation was somewhat different. One of his ultimate principles was itself pragmatism.37

Finally, Barak’s actions and rhetoric support Principle 2’s prediction that the peacemakers will be concerned about how their constituents will view their

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actions. Barak was worried about how Israeli rightists would view his policies. As a result, he continued to build settlements in the Occupied Territories, while simultaneously pursuing the peace process. At Camp David, as it was discussed earlier, the Israelis demanded sovereignty both above, and below, the ground at the Temple Mount. This demand “was politically motivated—Barak wanted to market his agreement with the Palestinians to religious and hawkish-nationalist camps by a dramatic change in the status of Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount.”38 The problem with this was that “Barak’s actions led to a classic case of misaddressed messages: the intended recipients of his tough statements—the domestic constituency he was seeking to carry with him—barely listened, while their unintended recipients—the Palestinians he would sway with his final offer—listened only too well.”39 This was a perfect example of how peacemakers can sabotage the very peace process they are trying to promote due to their concerns over how society will view them, which will be discussed in the final chapter.

Inability to reconcile with the enemy The inconsistencies in Barak’s words and actions can make it difficult to state definitively whether he was unable to reconcile with the Palestinians. While he talked of peace, the fact that he wanted to impose his settlement on the Palestinians calls his intentions into question. Furthermore, a 1999 paper prepared by his administration’s peace team, assumed that Israeli military strength would be necessary to maintain the peace for at least 30 years after an agreement, and it “envisaged ‘coexistence’ rather than ‘peace.’”40 Barak is indicative of the difficulty that peacemakers have in changing their views of the enemy. After the Camp David Summit ended in failure, Barak was quick to blame the Palestinians for this failure. At the press conference upon the conclusion of the Summit, he stated, “We must not lose hope. The vision of peace is not dead, but it suffered a heavy blow because of the Palestinian stubbornness. The Palestinians must deal with their extremist elements, and both sides must work together to prevent a deterioration into violence.”41 During the question and answer period after his statement, Barak reiterated his belief that the Palestinians were to blame for the Summit’s failure, when he said, “It’s painful to realize that the other side is not ripe for peace, but it’s always better to know the realities than to delude ourselves. And I still hope that when they will consider

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what are the real alternatives what await all of us down the stream, they will have an opportunity to make up their minds once again.”42 Barak’s actions and rhetoric are indicative not only of the peacemakers’ inability to reevaluate their images of the enemy, but also of themselves. Thus, Barak placed the entire onus of the blame for the Summit’s failure upon the Palestinians, without acknowledging any role that he, or his negotiators, or the Americans might have played. This can be seen in the assessment of Camp David offered by Dan Meridor, from Barak’s administration, who asserts, “To look for mistakes on the Israeli side? Yes, there might have been mistakes in the behavior of this person or that person, not preparing well this or that, but these are minor details.”43 Similarly, as Barak puts it after the outbreak of the intifada, “We are not the ones who chose the path of violence. This, unfortunately was the choice made by Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian leadership. We realize that we will have to pay a heavy price for peace.”44 Any Israeli role in putting them on that path went unmentioned, but most importantly, unrecognized. Throughout the Oslo Peace Process, one of the major barriers to reconciliation was that the Israelis and Palestinians never broke out of their traditional roles of occupier and occupied. Due to the asymmetrical distribution of power, there was always the sense that any concessions Israel made to the Palestinians were due to Israeli benevolence, whereas Palestinian concessions were part of their “test” to prove that they were a worthy partner for peace. Thus, while Barak’s offer was unprecedented, it still was indicative of the Israeli tendency as occupier to try to dictate the peace process. So, for Ron Pundak, Camp David’s failure could be traced in part to “a condescending attitude towards the Palestinians.”45 Or as Jeremy Pressman puts it, “At Camp David, Israel’s position—whether intended or not—was arguably an extension of the occupation under a different guise.”46 Just as Barak failed to reassess his images of the Palestinians as well as of the Israelis, he never reevaluated the national myths of either side. At Camp David, Barak failed to appreciate the importance of the right of return for the Palestinians, and tried to get them to forgo that right, which was something Arafat and the Palestinians could not accept. In trying to get the Palestinians to forsake their national narrative, Barak was unwilling to do the same for the Israelis. When he was questioned about the right of return, Barak declared unequivocally, “We cannot allow even one refugee back on the basis of the ‘right of return.’ And we cannot accept historical responsibility for the problem.”47 However, until both sides reassess these national narratives, reconciliation will remain impossible.

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Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement Two years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, a draft agreement was reached for a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement, which is also known as the Beilin-Abbas Agreement, called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with al-Quds as its capital, by no later than May 5, 1999. The primary negotiators were Yossi Beilin, who was a member of the Rabin government and an advisor to Shimon Peres, and Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) for the Palestinians. Beilin, Abbas, and a small team of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for over a year and half in various locations. There remains considerable debate surrounding the agreement, especially with regard to how well-informed Rabin and Peres were concerning the nature and scope of the negotiations. The agreement was finalized on October 31, 1995, just four days before Rabin’s assassination. As a result, Rabin never signed off on the agreement, and Peres refused to do so as well after he took over as Prime Minister in the wake of Rabin’s death. On the Palestinian side, Abbas denied an agreement even existed, and repudiated the agreement as well. Before examining the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement in light of our three principles, a few caveats are in order. First, the agreement was just a draft agreement, so there is no way of knowing what would have happened if Rabin had not been assassinated. Second, since the negotiations occurred outside of the purview of the official negotiations, it is not at all clear whether the agreement represents anything more than a proposed solution from a select group of Israelis and Palestinians. Finally, the agreement epitomizes the views of the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers who are the most committed to the process, so their proposals for a solution are not necessarily typical of their moderate counterparts. In many ways the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement appears to refute Principle 1. On the one hand, it does not read as an Israeli solution that is being imposed upon the Palestinians, but rather as a joint agreement representing both peoples’ hopes for peace. Unlike Barak’s proposal at Camp David, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement appears to be much more sensitive to the needs and concerns of both sides. One also does not find the incrementalism that plagued the Declaration of Principles and all of the negotiations discussed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, there is none of the reciprocity that was discussed previously. The agreement lays out a series of steps that will culminate in the

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creation of an independent Palestinian state, but in no way are these steps presented as conditional upon the Palestinians passing certain tests. On the other hand, in some ways the agreement could be seen as a product of the asymmetrical distribution of power highlighted in Principle 1. The Palestinians made some very significant concessions in the agreement. For example, they agreed to accept al-Quds as their capital, and to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. In addition, they also agreed to give up the right of return. While Israel agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state, one cannot help but come away from the agreement with the sense that the Palestinians had made some major concessions to their stronger adversary. Also, there is a sense that some of the Palestinian concessions were not matched by Israeli ones. As Khalil Barhoum points out, “Regarding settlements, the agreement states that ‘individual Israelis who have their permanent domicile within the Palestinian state shall be offered Palestinian citizenship or choose to remain as alien residents, all without prejudice to their Israeli citizenship.’ Is this not a continuation of the colonization of Palestinian territories especially since no reciprocal measures are granted to Palestinians who wish to reside in Israel?”48 The absence of such reciprocal measures could be taken as a product of the asymmetrical distribution of power, but in other ways the agreement does not reflect this asymmetry nearly as much as the other agreements, or as Barak’s proposal, did. Similarly, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement could be seen as both refuting and supporting Principle 2. On the one hand, the fact that these Israeli and Palestinian moderates were able to reach an agreement refutes the contention that they are unable to commit to the peace process. On the other hand, since Abbas subsequently denied the very existence of an agreement, and repudiated the agreement, supports that contention. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement not only lacks the incrementalism and reciprocity of other negotiations, but also, to a certain degree, their use of constructive ambiguity. Throughout the agreement, it is clearly stated that the end result will be an independent Palestinian state within the agreed borders. But it was not completely clear what had been agreed on, since the agreement was vague on how those borders were to be determined. According to Khalil Barhoum, the agreement was vague in this area, and in others as well. For example, he points out that the provision allowing the Israelis to maintain early warning stations for 12 years was deliberately vague. As he notes,

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Although the 12-year period sounds finite enough, there is nothing definite about the language in which this particular provision is couched: “Three early warning Stations and three Air Defense Units will be maintained until May 5, 2007 or until peace agreements and bilateral security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties are attained, whichever comes last.” Naturally, Syria may be defined as a relevant party, but what about Iraq or Libya? What if neither country ever felt compelled to conclude the said “peace agreements and bilateral security arrangements with Israel? Are the Palestinian people then expected to mortgage their independence and sovereignty?”49

Finally, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement could be seen as both refuting and supporting Principle 3 as well. On the one hand, the Palestinians’ willingness to concede the right of return represents a major reevaluation of their national narrative. The Agreement declares that the Palestinians recognize that “the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable.”50 In doing so, the Palestinians were not rejecting their national narrative, but they were acknowledging that the story was going to have a different ending than the one for which they had hoped. So, did the Israelis reevaluate their national narrative as well? It is not clear whether they did or not. On the one hand, the agreement states, “Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947–1949. It further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation of moral and material losses.”51 While the Israelis were acknowledging the Palestinians’ suffering, what went unstated, and unrecognized, was any Israeli role in the suffering, not only from 1947–9, but in the ensuing decades as well.

National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners In spring 2006, a small group of Palestinian prisoners being held in Israeli jails released the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners. With representatives from Fatah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, this all-Palestinian peace initiative represented the spectrum of

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Palestinian nationalism. The document consisted of 18 points, and called for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, so as to facilitate the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, called for a national referendum among the Palestinian people on the document, but before that could occur the prisoners from Hamas and Islamic Jihad that had signed the document witdrew their support for it. It should come as no surprise that the document was very controversial. Some embraced the document as a Palestinian peace proposal and as an important plan for resolving the conflict. Others were less sanguine, noting that the Palestinians never officially recognized Israel’s right to exist in the document. While this is undoubtedly true, the document could be seen as implicitly recognizing the State of Israel because it calls for the creation of a Palestinian state exclusively in the Occupied Territories, rather than in all of Palestine. Another source of controversy was that unlike the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement that saw the right of return as no longer “practicable,” the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners adamantly asserted the Palestinian right of return. In addition, rather than repudiating resistance to the Israeli occupation, the document invokes “the right of the Palestinian people to resist and to uphold the option of resistance of occupation by various means and focusing resistance in territories occupied in 1967 in tandem with political action, negotiations and diplomacy whereby there is broad participation from all sectors in the popular resistance.”52 Israel completely rejected the document, declaring that it was not a peace plan as some were calling it. Israeli opposition stemmed from the reasons discussed above, as well as the fact that the document never explicitly stated that it sought a two-state solution and did not offer any specific guarantees for Israeli security. Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert saw it as a nonstarter, and justified his rejection of the document by stating, They don’t even mention the State of Israel, they don’t even refer to the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and they insist on the right of return which is the almost automatic, outright destruction of the State of Israel. So why should I accept something that challenges the very fundamental principles of Israel’s existence to become a basis for some improvement? The referendum is an internal game between one faction and the other. It is meaningless in terms of the broad picture of chances towards some kind of dialogue between us and the Palestinians.53

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Although nothing ever came out of the document, since it represented an all-Palestinian peace proposal we will briefly examine it in light of our three principles. On the one hand, the fact that this document came from the weaker side would seem to preclude any attempt to analyze the document through the lenses of Principle 1. Thus, not surprisingly, the document does not represent an attempt to string out the peace process, nor does one find the reciprocity or testing discussed previously. Yet, in reading the document there is a sense that it is a product of the asymmetrical distribution of power. The authors are clearly responding to, and pushing up against, Israeli hegemony. As it states in the document’s preamble, In order to confront the Israeli scheme that aims to impose the Israeli solution and to blow up the dream and right of our people in establishing their independent state with full sovereignty; this scheme that the Israeli government intends to execute in the next phase based on concluding the apartheid wall and the Judaization of Jerusalem and expansion of Israeli settlements and the seizure of the Jordan Valley and the annexation of large areas from the West Bank and blocking the path in front of our people in exercising their right in return.54

The document does seem to support Principle 2. The decision of the prisoners from Hamas and Islamic Jihad to remove their signatures from the agreement, which was reminiscent of Abbas’s earlier repudiation of the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement, calls their commitment to the peace process in question. In addition, the document is rife with ambiguity, as one would expect. As it was mentioned previously, the document never explicitly recognizes the State of Israel, it never states whether it is calling for a two-state solution, and never defines what sort of “peace” it envisions for the future. The Palestinians had clearly learned well from the Israelis the value of constructive ambiguity when it comes to reaching an agreement. As predicted in Principle 3, the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners does not represent an attempt to reconcile the Israelis and Palestinians. There is none of the flowery language of peace and reconciliation we found in other agreements, and as it was mentioned previously, Israel hardly figures in the discussion. If anything, the document is really an attempt at reconciliation within the Palestinian community. Its authors seem to have been more concerned with promoting internal reconciliation, rather than with Israel. Thus, the fourteenth point of the document calls upon the Palestinian people “to denounce all forms

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of division that could lead to internal strife; to condemn the use of weapons in settling internal disputes and to ban the use of weapons among the people; to stress on the sanctity of Palestinian blood and to adhere to dialogue as the sole means of resolving disagreements.”55 When it comes to calling for any reconciliation with the Israelis, or for a reevaluation of their views of the Israelis, or for a reassessment of their national narrative, the document is strangely silent.

Conclusion At Camp David an Israeli moderate, Ehud Barak, tried to push the Oslo Peace Process to fruition, thereby seemingly refuting our argument that the moderates’ inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process will prevent them from doing so. While Barak’s offer was unprecedented, a closer examination of the offer—as well as of Barak’s words and actions, not to mention of Barak himself—reveals an awful lot of contradictions, or ambivalence. This ambivalence, which is inherent in moderates like Barak, is an important, but often overlooked, piece in explaining the failure at Camp David. One of the challenges of resolving intractable conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from the asymmetric distribution of power. On the one hand, as predicted in Principle 1, the Israelis did try to use their predominance to promote their interests at Camp David. Thus, Barak tried to force Arafat “up against a wall,” and to “impose” an agreement on the Palestinians. On the other hand, the fact that it was Barak and the Israelis who were pushing for a final settlement refutes Principle 1’s prediction that the dominant party will try to keep its options open for as long as possible by stringing out the negotiations. Barak wanted to turn the Oslo Peace Process on its head, by rejecting the incrementalism that had characterized it. This incrementalism was exactly how Principle 1 predicted that the dominant power would behave, so this principle cannot explain his actions. A possible explanation comes from the fact that the final settlement Barak was pushing for was his settlement, so he was using the Summit to try to promote Israeli interests. Because Barak really did not trust Arafat and the Palestinians, he viewed Camp David and the entire process as a test for the Palestinians, as it was predicted by Principle 1. Through his attempt to impose his settlement on the Palestinians, as well as by his use of their acquiescence to his demands as a test

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for the Palestinians, Barak set up the Palestinians to fail, and was only too glad to proclaim their failure after Camp David. In trying to impose his settlement on the Palestinians, Barak was also showing that he still viewed the conflict as a zero-sum game, as predicted in Principle 2. Barak’s settlement represented considerable concessions by the Palestinians, over Jerusalem, the right of return, and so on, while he tried to minimize the Israeli concessions. Despite Barak’s stated willingness to make “painful concessions” for peace, his proposal tried to shift that pain onto the Palestinians as much as possible. He was also willing to walk away from Camp David without an agreement if the Palestinians would not meet his demands, as it was also predicted by Principle 2. Barak was very internally divided over the peace process. After initially opposing the Oslo Agreement, he later came to support it. But, throughout his administration he was torn. While his offer represents a greater commitment than that of any of his predecessors, or successors, he still could not fully commit to the process. This was evidenced in the zigzag nature of the peace process during his administration, as well as his support for the process out of strictly pragmatic considerations, rather than as a matter of principle. In addition, throughout his term of office he was worried about how the members of Israeli society would interpret his words or deeds. As a result, he repeatedly sent out mixed messages, which only served to heighten the Palestinians’ growing mistrust and apprehension. Finally, Barak’s internal turmoil over the peace process prevented him from reconciling with the Palestinians. As predicted, he never reevaluated his views of the Palestinians, the Israelis, or either side’s national myths. After the Summit ended in failure, Barak was very quick to blame Arafat and the Palestinians, without even acknowledging the role he and his negotiators played. Thus, while Camp David might represent a time when an Israeli moderate tried to push the process to fruition, it also reveals how the inherent contradictions within these moderates are a major barrier to their ability to do so, and thus to a lasting peace. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement and the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners represent two other proposals for a final settlement. While neither proposal went anywhere, and both proposals were subsequently repudiated by some of their original supporters, they still warrant our attention. As a joint Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement is the more significant of the two. It offers a glimpse at what a final settlement

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will look like, if the two sides can ever resolve their inherent ambivalence over the peace process and one another. There were some strong points to the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement. First, unlike Barak’s proposal at Camp David, this was not something that was being imposed by the stronger side on its weaker opponent. Second, it avoided the incrementalism of previous agreements by setting clearly defined dates for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In doing so, it also avoided the constructive ambiguity that we found in all of the other rounds of negotiations. Finally, there was none of the reciprocity or testing by the Israelis. Israeli concessions were not conditional on Palestinian actions or behavior, the way they were in the other agreements. However, as it was the case with the Declaration of Principles and all of the other agreements or proposals discussed, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement did not represent a reconciliation between the two nations. Just like the Declaration of Principles, the agreement represented the personal reconciliation of a small group of Israeli and Palestinians negotiators, but never transcended this small group. While the Palestinians did acknowledge that the current situation made the right of return impracticable, the agreement did not force either party to reevaluate their images of each other, themselves, or their national narratives. Without such a reconciliation, any peace proposal—whether an exclusively Israeli or Palestinian initiative, or the result of a joint effort—will represent little more than talk, and will not set the two parties on the path to peace.

Notes 1 Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003), 135. 2 Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996–2004 (New York: RDV Books/Akashic Books, 2004), 115. 3 Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” In Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 89. 4 Ibid. 5 Louis Kriesberg, “The Relevance of Reconciliation Actions in the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, 2000,” Peace and Change 27, no. 4 (October 2002): 548–9.

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6 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 2008), 6. 7 Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened At Camp David and Taba?” International Security 28, no. 2 (2003): 5–43, accessed September 11, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v028/28.2pressman.html; and Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 269–70. 8 Ron Pundak, “The 1967 Lines Should Have Been the Basis for Negotiations,” in Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, eds, The Camp David Summit— What Went Wrong? (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 153. 9 Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 324. 10 Pressman, “Visions in Collision,” 6. 11 Jerome Slater, “What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Political Science Quarterly 116 (Summer 2001): 171–99. 12 Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story of the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 318. 13 Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 324. 14 Menachem Klein, A Possible Peace between Israel and Palestine: An Insider’s Account of the Geneva Initiative, translated by Haim Watzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 15 Ephraim Lavie, “The Road Map: Political Resolution Instead of National Narrative Confrontation,” Palestine-Israel Journal 10, no. 4 (2003): 88. 16 Pressman, “Visions in Collision,” 16, Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 208, 213. 17 Pundak, “The 1967 Lines,” 154. 18 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 297. 19 Pressman, “Visions in Collision,” 35, quoted in Ben Kaspit, “Assassinate Me. So What? You’ll Miss Me Yet: The Intifada Will Continue Even After Me,” Ma’ariv, November 9, 2001, 3. 20 Pressman, “Visions in Collision,” 40. 21 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 301. 22 Pundak, “The 1967 Lines,” 153. 23 Rowland and Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity, 270. 24 Ibid., 269–70. 25 The Search for Peace in the Middle East: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue (Proceedings of the International Media Encounter on the Question of Palestine, Organized by the United Nations Department of Public Information, 18–19 June 2001, Paris, France), 108.

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26 Ehud Barak, “PM Ehud Barak’s Remarks—Sharm El Sheikh Conference,” October 17, 2000, MidEast Web Historical Documents, Accessed June 20, 2007, www. mideastweb.org/sharm2.html. 27 Beilin, The Path to Geneva, 28. 28 Slater, “What Went Wrong?,” 179. 29 Ibid. 30 Author’s Interview, March 11, 2009, Washington, DC. 31 Yossi Beilin, Khalil Shikaki, Ziad Abu-Zayyad, Reuven Merhov, moderated by Danny Rubinstein and Nasser A. Jawad, “Taking Stock: Looking at the Past, Searching for the Future,” Palestine-Israel Journal 8, no. 3 (December 2001): 25. 32 Klein, Possible Peace between Israel and Palestine, 5. 33 Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 276. 34 Ehud Barak, “Ehud Barak on Camp David: ‘I Did Not Give Away a Thing,’” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 86. 35 Ehud Barak, “Statement by Prime Minister Barak at Press Conference Upon the Conclusion of the Camp David Summit,” July 25, 2000, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 20, 2007, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+bvy+I sraeli+leaders/2000/statement+b. 36 Slater, “What Went Wrong?” 179. 37 Rowland and Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity, 259. 38 Klein, Possible Peace between Israel and Palestine, 115. 39 Rowland and Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity, 270, originally quoted in Robert Malloy and Hussien Agha, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” The New York Review of Books 48 (August 9, 2001): 60. 40 Joseph Rynhold, “Making Sense of Tragedy: Barak, The Israeli Left, and the Oslo Peace Process,” Israel Studies Forum 19, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 13. 41 Barak, “Statement by Prime Minister Barak.” 42 Ibid. 43 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Camp David, Oslo, and the Future,” An Interview with Minister Dan Meridor, Palestine-Israel Journal 9, no. 3 (2002): 64. 44 Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 321. 45 Pundak, “The 1967 Lines,” 153 46 Pressman, “Visions in Collision,” 37. 47 Bernard Wasserstein, Israelis and Palestinians: Why do they Fight, Can They Stop? (New Haven: Yale University press, 2003), 157; originally quoted in Benny Morris, “An Interview with Ehud Barak,” The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002, pp. 42–5. 48 Khalil Barhoum, “Barak’s Proposals Echo the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement,” The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development, February

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5, 2001, accessed April 11, 2011, www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ ContentDetails/i/2121/pid/v. Ibid. “Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement 1995,” accessed April 11, 2011, www.mideastweb. org/beilinabumazen1.htm. Ibid. “National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners—June 28, 2006,” Bitterlemons, accessed September 11, 2007, www.bitterlemons.org/docs/prisoners.html “Analysis of the Palestinian National Accord (the ‘Prisoners’ Document’),” Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, accessed April 11, 2011. www.conferenceofpresidents.org/media/user/images/prisonersdoc.pdf. “National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners.” Ibid.

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6

The Death of Oslo: What Lessons Can We Learn?

As the years have ticked by since the 1993 Declaration of Principles, unmet deadlines have come and gone, with the two sides seemingly no closer to reaching a final agreement than they were when they first started the peace process. Tragically, the Oslo Peace Process, which started out with so much optimism and hope, has bogged down, if not died completely. While it is undeniable that Israeli and Palestinian extremists have played a key role in Oslo’s death, in this book I have argued that the role of the Israeli and Palestinian moderates in killing the peace process must be acknowledged as well. The moderates initially shared the hawks’ pessimism vis-à-vis the peace process but ultimately pushed the process forward when they decided that there was someone on the other side to negotiate with, and something about which to negotiate. However, the problem is that they were not completely convinced of this fact, so they retained an inherent ambivalence toward the peace process. This inherent ambivalence ultimately ended up sabotaging the very process they were supposed to be promoting. Table 6.1 summarizes the three principles that served as the basis for this book’s thesis, and the indicators we have used to test their validity.

Oslo’s death and the three principles Principle 1 focused upon how the asymmetrical distribution of power between the Israelis and Palestinians affected the peace process. Students, as well as practitioners, of conflict resolution need to recognize that most conflicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian one, involve two adversaries who are very

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Table 6.1 Summary of principles and indicators Principles

Indicators

Principle 1: In situations where there is an asymmetrical distribution of power, moderates on the more powerful side will take advantage of this asymmetry to promote their side’s interests. Principle 2: Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to commit themselves fully to the peace process.

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Principle 3: Due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides will be unable to reconcile with their adversary.

l

l

l

The moderates on the stronger side will try to string out the process for as long as possible and keep their options open. The moderates on the stronger side will view the peace process as a test for the other side. The moderates will pursue contradictory policies, and in negotiations will alternate between integrative and distributive bargaining. The moderates will continue to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. The moderates will be willing to countenance the breakdown of the peace process in order to get the best deal for themselves. The moderates’ support for the peace process will be out of pragmatic considerations, not matters of principle. The moderates will worry about how their words and deeds are interpreted by other members of society. The moderates will not reevaluate their images of the enemy. The moderates will not reevaluate their images of themselves. The moderates will not reevaluate the national narratives on either side.

unevenly balanced in terms of their power. Due to the asymmetrical distribution of power, the dominant power can control the flow of the peace process. As predicted in Principle One, the Israelis definitely attempted to use the power differential to their advantage. Primarily, they sought to control the ebb and flow of the process. With the exception of Barak, who tried to impose his solution at Camp David, Israeli leaders sought to string out the process for as long as possible. For Rabin, no dates were sacred, and according to Uri Savir, who negotiated the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis know how to “drag things out when we do not want to progress.”1 In order to control the peace process, the Israelis promoted incrementalism. Theoretically, by postponing the difficult decisions, incrementalism can enable the two sides to reach an agreement. But, in reality it serves the interest of the

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dominant power by not requiring it to make any major concessions, and it enhances the weaker side’s doubts as to whether peace is really possible. Further magnifying their doubts is the tendency of their stronger adversary to view the peace process as a test for their weaker opponent. Every Israeli prime minister from Rabin to Netanyahu has viewed the Oslo Peace Process as a test for the Palestinians. With their leaders constantly telling them that the Palestinians were being tested by the peace process, it is not surprising that the Israeli people have come to view Oslo the same way. Unfortunately, this meant that their support for the peace process became tied to how well they felt the Palestinians were doing on their “test.” According to Aaron David Miller, Here you had an occupier and the occupied. This made the issue of the test just brutal, because the underlying logic of Oslo was that you could deposit trust and confidence over time in a kind of bank, and that ultimately there would be enough at the end to justify and warrant tacking on the difficult issues, but this broke down almost immediately, other than in the personal relationships between the negotiators themselves. We confused and conflated this to mean somehow that the Israelis and the Palestinians trusted one another.2

By viewing the peace process as a test, the Israelis are setting themselves up as the test designer, implementer, and judge. This is problematic because it not only puts control over any future progress squarely in the hands of just one side but also enables the Israelis to create a test in which they know the Palestinians will fail. As it was predicted in Principle 1, the Israelis undoubtedly sought to use their preponderance of power to promote their own interests, and they sought to do so by keeping their options open for as long as possible, and viewing the peace process as a test of Palestinian intentions. But, nonetheless, it is also true that the Palestinians sought to promote their own interests by keeping their options open for as long as possible, and viewing the process as a test of Israeli intentions as well. Not unlike the Israelis, the Palestinians have tried to use the power differential to their own benefit, in this case by arguing that a disproportionately stronger Israel could afford to make concessions that the Palestinians could not. However, the Palestinians’ ability to use their weaker status to gain leverage in negotiations is fairly limited. In addition, while the Palestinians might view the peace process as a test for the Israelis, due to the power differential they do not have the Israelis’ ability to serve as test designer, implementer, and most

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importantly, judge. Principle One accurately predicted how the Israelis would respond to the asymmetry of power, but the failure of this principle to recognize that the weaker side could also strategically attempt to exploit such power differentials does not mean that students of conflict resolution should ignore power asymmetries. The reality is that in such situations, the stronger side can use its strength to its own advantage by controlling the ebb and flow of the peace process. In Principles 2 and 3, the asymmetrical distribution of power is not deemed significant. Thus, in these principles, it is expected that the moderates on both sides will behave similarly. Principle Two predicted that due to their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates on both sides would be unable to commit to it. That definitely has proven to be the case. Because of their ambivalence toward the peace process, both sides embraced “constructive ambiguity” as a negotiating strategy. While constructive ambiguity facilitated reaching an interim agreement, it made it extremely difficult to actually implement that agreement and move on to a final, comprehensive agreement. Constructive ambiguity allowed the two sides to reach no more than a deliberately vague agreement that postponed any decision on the most contentious issues for a later date. This agreement was particularly problematic because, in trying to be all things to all people, it was open to multiple contradictory interpretations. Each side interpreted the agreement as saying what they wanted it to say, which not surprisingly led to future conflicts over the agreement’s implementation. The use of constructive ambiguity was a natural product of the two sides’ inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process. Due to their doubts as to whether there really was a partner for peace on the other side, or whether peace was even possible, both sides exhibited contradictory negotiating stances as well as policies. While Arafat’s wielding an olive branch and a gun during his speech at the United Nations might have been the most graphic example of this contradiction, there is no shortage of other examples on both sides of the conflict. Thus, during the negotiations in Oslo, the Oslo Spirit prevailed as both sides utilized a more problem-solving approach to the negotiations. As time passed, both sides adopted a more conflictual stance in the negotiations. Similarly, there was a great deal of “zigzagging” in the policies pursued by both adversaries. The waning of the Oslo Spirit was indicative of the fact that the two sides continue to view the conflict as a zero-sum game. At Oslo they tried to come up with win-win solutions, but later they reverted to trying to wring maximal concessions out of their opponent, while minimizing their own. Each side’s

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willingness to countenance the breakdown of the peace process if they were not getting what they wanted was further indication of the waning of the Oslo Spirit, or in other words, of their lack of commitment to the peace process. Each side had its red lines that it would not cross, and it was willing to see Oslo die if need be. Neither side would have been so willing to accept Oslo’s death if their support for Oslo had been a matter of principle, rather than solely out of pragmatic considerations. Because they were solely motivated by pragmatic considerations, Israeli and Palestinian officials expended a great deal of time and energy worrying about how their words and deeds would be interpreted by their constituents in general, and by their hard-liners in particular. As a result, we find the leaders on both sides feeling obligated to combine any concession to the enemy with a concession to hard-liners on their own side. So, the Israeli leaders would balance any concessions to the Palestinians with agreements to build new settlements in the Occupied Territories, and so on. Similarly, according to Ghaith al-Omari, On the one hand, Arafat continued speaking about negotiations, about diplomacy, about the peace process. On the other hand, he allowed, and some would even say even encouraged, violence to continue, which created very strange, mixed signals to the public. Suddenly they didn’t know, are we in a peace process or are we in a war? And Hamas, I think, seized on this ambiguity, and provided clarity. Hamas says, “No, this process gets you nowhere. It’s all about resistance; it’s all about violence.”3

Extremists on both sides seized on this ambiguity to prove their case—Hamas was able to use it to prove the futility of the peace process, while Israeli hawks used it to prove that Arafat and the Palestinians were not reliable partners for peace. This ambiguity also heightened the doubts of the moderates on the opposing side as to whether there really was a partner for peace on the opposing side of the table. Because they are still not fully convinced as to whether they have a partner for peace, or whether peace is even feasible, the moderates on both sides cannot commit fully to the peace process. But, because they cannot fully commit to the peace process, they also are not able to reconcile fully with their adversary. In short, there is a “chicken and the egg” problem that plagues the peacemakers. In order for them to commit fully to the peace process, they would need to reconcile with their enemy, but they cannot reconcile with their enemy until they have fully committed to the peace process. This, and some other chicken

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and the egg problems that have plagued the peace process will be discussed in the following section. On the Israeli side, reconciliation would entail accepting the Palestinians as a separate people, and accepting the creation of an independent Palestinian state. According to Yezid Sayigh, I don’t think that the Israelis have fundamentally internalized, and I mean the Israeli political and security establishment, the idea that the Palestinians are just someone else, and if the Israelis don’t want to incorporate them as Israeli citizens with full rights, then they have to allow them to go their own way. The continued attempts to invent and reinvent new modes of control, and veto power, mean that fundamentally they really have not let go, and they have not been able to let go.4

For the Palestinians, reconciliation would entail recognizing Israel’s right to exist, and the Jews’ rights to share the Holy Land. On numerous occasions, the Palestinians upset the Israelis by questioning their rights to the land, and particularly Jewish claims to different holy sites. Reconciliation would entail both sides reevaluating not only the images they have of self and other but also the national narratives that fuel the conflict. As was predicted in Principle 3, the Israeli and Palestinian moderates continue to cling to their stereotypical images of their adversary. So, Barak is able to boldly claim that the Palestinians have no compunction to lie, and Arafat did not think twice when declaring that the Israelis were out to “Judaize” all of Jerusalem. But since they never reevaluate their images of their enemy, they also never reevaluate their images of themselves. Thus, both sides continue to see only honorable intentions and actions on their behalf, and the mirror image of dishonorable intentions and actions on the part of their enemy. By failing to reevaluate their self-image, both sides fail to acknowledge their own role in perpetuating the conflict. The Israelis and Palestinians are willing to trumpet the other side’s failings as a peace partner, but are noticeably silent when it comes to their own shortcomings. National narratives play a key role in igniting and perpetuating all nationalist conflicts. However, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these narratives are even more potent, because they are infused with the religious, cultural, and existential beliefs of the two peoples. Yet, without a reevaluation of these narratives, the two sides will never accept each other as equals, whose “truths” are just as valid as their own. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians must recognize the legitimacy of the other’s claim to the land, and come up with a new narrative

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that draws upon both sides’ truths so that they can move forward to finally resolving the conflict. With no shortage of explanations for the death of the Oslo Peace Process, there is no shortage of culprits upon whom to place the blame for its death. Surely, extremists on both sides used violence to help kill the peace process. While their approach was less violent, the peacemakers on both sides also contributed to Oslo’s death. Due to their inherent ambivalence toward the peace process, they were unable to fully commit to the process, and thus were never able to get their people to fully commit as well. Without any commitment, Oslo’s days were clearly numbered.

Oslo’s death: Lessons for the future Between the divisions within the Palestinian community and the return to power of Netanyahu on the Israeli side, the current situation is not particularly conducive to peace. However, there are a number of lessons that we can learn from Oslo’s death for the next time, or for other efforts to resolve intractable conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian one.5

Mind the gap It is generally accepted among students of international relations that an uneven distribution of power is conducive to conflict, as it creates an incentive for the stronger party to attack its weaker adversary. Students and practitioners of conflict resolution also need to recognize how this asymmetry can perpetuate conflicts and impede conflict resolution. Unlike the Cold War, which pitted two relatively equal powers, most intractable conflicts involve two enemies that are not so evenly balanced. No matter whether they are the stronger or weaker party to the conflict, states are going to do whatever they can to protect their interests. States do not differ in this aspect. But where they do differ is in their relative ability to control the peace process to protect those interests. With its large army, nuclear arsenal, and advanced industrial economy, Israel clearly holds most of the cards when the two sides come to the negotiating table. While the fact that both sides found the status quo no longer tenable pushed them toward Oslo, Israel’s need for a final agreement is not as pressing as the Palestinians’. Barak sought to impose his

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solution upon the Palestinians at Camp David, but one also gets the sense that every Israeli prime minister from Rabin to Netanyahu has been willing to wait as long as he deemed necessary to get his own solution. Yet, paradoxically, even for the Palestinians a final settlement is not so urgent. According to Aaron David Miller, “Now you would argue in the face of it that if there is a negotiation that is characterized by urgency, it’s the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. But therein lies the perverse sort of paradox of it. Yes, it’s painful but it is not that painful that either the leaders or their constituents are moved to basically resolve it. In short their capacity to absorb and administer pain is virtually unlimited, even to this day.”6 The asymmetrical distribution of power essentially puts Israel in the driver’s seat when it comes to the peace process. Israel can determine what is or is not on the table for negotiation and can control the pace of the negotiations as well. The Palestinians are cast in the role of supplicants and essentially told that they should appreciate whatever they receive. As Yezid Sayigh described it, The Israeli attitude, and I think someone like Shimon Peres really exemplifies this, take the attitude that if they give the Palestinians something it is because the Israelis are generous, and that the Palestinians basically have zero and anything they get, therefore, they should be thankful for. It’s the general attitude that I point to, to view any Palestinian claim as not fundamentally legitimate, in and of their own right, without any independent merit, and that in a way, it’s entirely really up to the Israelis to determine if there’s an issue at all, a case to answer to or not, and if so, how. It’s not just about power, but also the arrogance of power if you like.7

Rabin liked to say that Oslo was “the peace of the brave,” but in order to achieve a lasting peace I would argue it will need to be “the peace of the equals.” However, the asymmetrical distribution of power in the Middle East makes that extremely difficult to achieve by perpetuating the “arrogance of power.”

Slow and steady does not always win the race The Israelis and Palestinians have adopted an incremental or gradual approach to the peace process. Due to the lack of trust on the part of the two sides, that makes sense in many ways. However, incrementalism also has its limitations. In order for an agreement to be implemented, the vast majority of the people on both sides must support the agreement. The problem is that it is easy for the people to lose patience with incrementalism. If the people do not see any direct

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benefits from the peace process, they will no longer support it. Israeli support for Oslo dissipated when the attacks by Palestinian extremists failed to subside. Similarly, due to the perpetuation of the Israeli settlements, the roadblocks and other humiliations, and the dashing of the Palestinian hopes that their living standards would improve, the Palestinians lost faith in Oslo as well. Incrementalism must be combined with some tangible and timely benefits for both sides; otherwise, people will quickly lose faith in the peace process. According to Robert L. Rothstein, what is needed is gradually accelerating incrementalism that Differs from traditional incrementalism by establishing as early as possible— perhaps tacitly among leaders at the start—a mutually agreed-upon set of shared goals to be achieved in defined stages of the process. I would begin with a major effort by the international community—and Israel as the stronger party—to improve standards of living and quality of life for the Palestinian people and would focus on meeting basic human needs, such as health, sanitation, clean water, housing, and education. Commitments on implementation of proposals can be loose and permissive at this stage, but commitments not to violate certain tacit agreements on certain red flag issues must be firm—or the slide downward could accelerate once again.8

This is not a test One of the major barriers to the resolution of any conflict is the inherent lack of trust between the two sides. Therefore, it is probably not surprising that due to a lack of faith in their enemy’s good intentions, both sides tend to view the peace process as a test in which their adversary must prove itself. What is of crucial significance for the peace process is how one approaches this test. If, as the dominant power, you choose to view the peace process as a test that you will design, implement, and judge, then you are creating a situation where you have control over the entire process. In short, the fate of the peace process lies in the hands of the tester, who is able to unilaterally decide whether their adversary has “passed,” and thus can move on to the next level of the peace process. Compounding the problem is the fact that the test designer can create a test in which he/she knows that the enemy will fail. Self-fulfilling prophecies can be created, whereby the more powerful side either makes demands for further concessions that they know the other side will never accept, and/or they require their opponent to do something that they know will be politically untenable.

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Barak viewed Camp David as a test for the Palestinians, and thus as an opportunity to “expose” Arafat and the Palestinians when they failed his test. Similarly, each Israeli government has viewed the Palestinians’ ability to stop the violence as the test for the Palestinians, but since the violence was being perpetrated by Hamas and other groups outside of the Palestinian Authority’s control, was this a test which the Palestinians could have ever really passed? By creating a test that they can be fairly confident that their adversary will fail, the dominant power is also able to make their enemy look bad, while they themselves come out looking good. When the enemy fails the test, then the onus of the blame for the breakdown of the peace process can easily be placed on them. So, when Camp David ends in failure, it is all the Palestinians’ fault, and had nothing to do with either Barak or the Israelis. In addition, by telling their people that the peace process is serving as a test of the enemy’s true intentions, when the enemy fails this test, it only serves to reinforce the people’s doubts as to whether there really is a partner for peace on the other side.

Commit, commit, commit A lack of trust is a major impediment to conflict resolution. For years, both sides were convinced that there was no one on the opposing side to negotiate with, or anything about which to negotiate. While the moderates can be persuaded that peace is possible, they are not completely convinced. As a result, they hold back from a full commitment to the peace process, but in doing so, they make it less likely that the peace process will succeed. Since both sides still harbor serious doubts about the intentions of the other side, if party A fails to commit, then neither will party B. But by their not committing, it only serves to reinforce the conviction within party A that their decision not to commit to the peace process was the correct one, as clearly party B was never going to really commit itself to a lasting peace. When the political leaders refrain from fully committing themselves to the peace process, they can hardly expect their own people to do otherwise. But in order to implement a peace agreement, such a commitment by the people on both sides is necessary. It will be impossible to get all Israelis and Palestinians to support the peace process, so the best that can be hoped for is that the vast majority of both peoples would support it. But if the leaders themselves cannot fully commit to the process, then they will never be able to get their people to do so.

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Unconstructive ambiguity Constructive ambiguity has been a popular negotiating style for the Israelis and Palestinians. By postponing the most contentious issues until a later date, constructive ambiguity enables the opposing sides to come together in a preliminary agreement. In theory, subsequent negotiations will then build upon these initial negotiations, and thereby facilitate a final, comprehensive agreement. The problem with this is that while constructive ambiguity is productive when it comes to achieving the preliminary agreement, when it comes to achieving the final one, it is counterproductive for a number of reasons. First, its ambiguity or vagueness is only constructive when it comes to actually reaching that initial agreement. By leaving the details deliberately vague, the two sides are able to come to a consensus. However, that consensus quickly breaks down once they try to implement the agreement. Inevitably, that is when debates break out over what the agreement actually means, what the two sides meant when they signed off on the agreement, what is expected of both sides, what are the next steps that need to be taken, and so on. The opposing sides spend more time arguing over what the initial agreement meant, and whether they are abiding by the agreement, than on how to push forward to a final settlement. Second, such ambiguity allows the agreement to mean different things to different people. If the details are left vague, then both sides can read into the agreement whatever they want it to say. So, for Arafat and the Palestinians, Oslo was clearly the first step toward a Palestinian state. However, for Rabin and the Israelis, Oslo’s meaning was not so crystal clear. It might be leading to a Palestinian state, but that was something to be decided upon at a later date. According to Shlomo Ben-Ami. “Neither Rabin nor Peres thought that Oslo had unleashed a process that should and must culminate in a full withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the clear and unambiguous division of Jerusalem into two capitals, and a substantial implementation of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Constructive ambiguity facilitated an agreement in Oslo at the price of creating potentially irreconcilable misconceptions with regard to final settlement.”9 After all, if everyone can interpret the agreement as saying what they want it to say, how will they be able to agree on what needs to be done to implement the agreement, or to push it to the next phase? Third, constructive ambiguity creates an incentive to try to maneuver so as to better position oneself before the final agreement. Both sides tried to change the situation on the ground to better suit their interests, but in so doing undermined

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confidence not only in each other, but also in the belief that a final agreement was even possible. According to Yezid Sayigh: In other words we should have been confronting the violations immediately because what happened was the blurring of the line, the shifting of the goal posts, the absence of benchmarks meant that both sides, fundamentally undermined the process in the coming years and both sides effectively understood that it was in their interest to maximize what they held in the immediate term so as to improve their position when it came to the final negotiation and that was a fundamentally negative and counterproductive dynamic. It was partly due to the Oslo process being open-ended and ambiguous.10

Finally, constructive ambiguity makes it difficult to get anyone to commit to the peace process. By leaving everything so vague, and by aiming for the lowest common denominator in the negotiating process, it makes it extremely difficult to get anyone to embrace the agreement enthusiastically. Ghaith al-Omari described how this ambiguity made it extremely difficult for either side to commit itself to the peace process when he said, If the Palestinians were told that any further re-deployment would really have been conditional on their control of the security situation, I think they would have been more diligent about it. If other incentives were given to the Israelis, that any continuation of the peace process and the benefits that would come from it, would be contingent on settlements, they would have been more diligent in that.11

In essence, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process suffers from another chicken and the egg problem—the moderates on both sides cannot commit to the peace process because of their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process, so they adopt constructive ambiguity during their negotiations. But through the use of constructive ambiguity, it makes it impossible for them to really commit to the peace process. Thus, although ambiguity, by facilitating a preliminary agreement, appears to be constructive or productive, when it comes to the peace process as a whole, it is neither.

Don’t lose that Oslo Spirit The Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who came together in Oslo developed a great deal of camaraderie, mutual respect, and friendship. During the negotiations, the two sides tried to come up with win-win solutions, and tried—albeit not

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completely successfully—to move away from their traditional zero-sum outlook. After Oslo, old patterns of behavior, and traditional perspectives on the conflict, returned. The Oslo Spirit, which had initially been so full of hope and promise, quickly dissipated. As the Oslo Spirit waned, so too did the prospects for a lasting peace. By reverting back and forth between more conflictual and conciliatory negotiating stances, both sides sabotaged the peace process. Part of the challenge of conflict resolution is that you have to get both parties simultaneously to be willing to make dramatic concessions to the opponent. This simultaneity is difficult, such that what usually happens is when one side is being more accommodating, its opponent has adopted a more hard-line stance, and vice versa. This only serves to heighten the doubts on either side as to whether peace is even possible, or if there is a partner for peace on the opposing side.

When the going gets tough, the tough do not get going Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are perfectly willing to countenance the breakdown of the peace process if they do not get what they want. For example, prior to his departure for Camp David, Barak made it perfectly clear that he would walk away from the negotiating table if the Palestinians failed to meet his bottom line. While both sides must protect their national interests, being so willing to walk away from the peace process only serves to heighten your adversary’s doubts as to the strength of your desire for peace. Both sides were also willing to walk away from the peace process whenever the going got particularly difficult. By being so willing to shut down the peace process whenever the attacks by the extremists were their most virulent, the moderates basically played into the extremists’ hands. As Louis Kriesberg points out, “When outrages and atrocities were committed by elements of the other side, the response of the Israeli government and the PLO leadership was to interrupt the peace process, instead of accelerating it.”12 Kriesberg contrasts the Israeli-Palestinian approach with what happened in South Africa, for example when Mandela and De Klerk refused to let the assassination of one of Mandela’s close associates, Chris Hani, derail their negotiations to end apartheid. In marked contrast, since they were unwilling to press on no matter what happened, the Israeli and Palestinian moderates allowed the extremists on both sides to derail, and ultimately kill, Oslo.

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Pragmatism has its limits With so much at stake for both sides, pragmatism is not only important, it is clearly essential. But the problem with solely pragmatic leadership is that they are unable to make the kind of commitment that is necessary to sell the peace process to their own people. As Rabbi Michael Lerner points out, “[C]onsider the way that Oslo was implemented. Neither side felt that they could embrace the other and reach out with a spirit of generosity. Instead, they tried to show how `realistic’ they were by maintaining an appearance of `cynical detachment’ from the very process that they were seeking to validate. No enthusiasm means no real commitment.”13 And without such enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the leadership, there will be no such enthusiasm or commitment on the part of the people as well. Pragmatism also instills a “stop-and-go” nature to the peace process. While the asymmetric distribution of power discussed above enables the stronger side to control the ebb and flow of the peace process, the pragmatic nature of the leadership of both sides serves as a brake for the peace process. In essence, the peace process is held hostage by the leaders’ pragmatism, and moves forward in fits and starts based upon the leaders’ perception of the current situation. Since their support for the peace process is out of pragmatism, rather than out of principle, the officials have a hard time promoting reconciliation, as it will be discussed below. For reconciliation to occur, the two sides must accept each other as equals, and acknowledge each other’s truths. Reconciliation, in short, represents a principled commitment to the peace process and conflict resolution. As Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin points out, “The enthusiasm with which the peace process was received by liberal circles in Israel was not because of a belief that it signaled a real compromise between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but rather because it seemed to signify an opportunity to get rid of them and consequently to recreate the concept of the `vacant land.’”14 As we will discuss shortly, the failure to reassess such national narratives as that of the “vacant land” is a major barrier to reconciliation between the two peoples.

Remember who your audience is Both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders expended a great deal of time and energy trying to appease their own hard-liners. In both cases, we find the officials engaged in an elaborate balancing act where concessions to the other side must

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be counterpointed by concessions to hard-liners on one’s own side. So the Israeli leaders would combine concessions to the Palestinians with cabinet decisions to build more settlements, and Arafat would be sure to follow any concessions to the Israelis with a fiery speech promising to liberate Palestine. In short, the Israeli and Palestinian officials were very cognizant of who was listening to their words, and watching their actions, among their own people. The problem was that they failed to appreciate the fact that their words and deeds have a wider audience, particularly within their adversary. With both sides harboring serious doubts as to the true intentions of their enemy, it does not take a great deal to shatter one’s faith in your partner for peace. Therefore, when the Israeli or Palestinian officials make these verbal or behavioral concessions to their hard-liners, it might shore up their own popular support, but it also seriously threatens the viability of the peace process. How could we expect the Palestinians to commit to the peace process when they see the Israelis building more and more settlements in the Occupied Territories? Similarly, why should the Israelis commit to a peace process with the Palestinians when Arafat’s rhetoric hearkens back to a time before Oslo? If their so-called partner for peace is not sounding or acting particularly peaceful, how could we blame them for coming to doubt not only their “partner” but also the entire peace process itself?

You + Me = Us In order to resolve any conflict, the relationship of the two adversaries must inevitably undergo a significant change. Conflicts occur between two parties that are interdependent, and so that relationship needs to change in order to move past the conflict. If that does not happen, then there will just be a cold peace where there is no fighting, but no real “peace.” For the Israelis and Palestinians to bring a lasting peace to the region, and avoid the cold peace we find between Israel and Egypt, they will have to create an entirely new relationship with one another. One of the major drawbacks of the Oslo Peace Process was that it really did not represent an attempt to create a new relationship between the two adversaries. If anything, Oslo was viewed as a divorce, or at the very least a separation, rather than as a commitment to a new relationship. According to Khalil Shikaki, “On the first occasion that the government began to feel the pressure of violence, with the major suicide attack in early 1995, Rabin immediately turned to

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the concept of separation. Now the concept of separation assumes that the Palestinians are a sort of enemy and that security can only be achieved through separation, not integration. Oslo, on the other hand, was all about integration.”15 The idea of separation represents an attempt to return to the myth that prior to contemporary Jewish settlement of the State of Israel, the Holy Land had been an “empty land.” But as Bernard Wasserstein points out, “‘separation’ represents for many left-wing Israelis a civilized alternative to ‘transfer.’ Yet, the two concepts are really different sides of the same coin. Both rest on the illusion that Israel can, in some manner, wish the Palestinians away.”16 Sharon’s decision to unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces from Gaza is indicative of this desire to “wish away” the Palestinians. However, the reality is that neither side can just wish away the other side, so in order to resolve the conflict, the two sides will have to work together. Just as Barak was unable to impose his solution to the conflict at Camp David, Sharon was unable to unilaterally bring peace to the region by withdrawing from Gaza. But by trying to wish away the other side, both sides sought to avoid having to reassess their images of self and the other. Intractable conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian one are perpetuated by the stereotypical images the two sides have of themselves and of each other. Both sides invariably see only the most benign and honorable intentions and actions on their own part, and the mirror image of the opposite intentions and actions on the part of their adversary. Peace and reconciliation will entail an honest reassessment of those images, intentions, and actions, something which neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were forced to do by Oslo. According to Ron Pundak, “The basic Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians continued unabated, and the patronizing attitude of occupier to occupied remained. It was not replaced by a relationship of equality required of former adversaries headed in a new political and historical direction.”17 Similarly, “the Palestinians tended to underestimate the painful significance for Israel of the murderous terrorist attacks by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.”18 Oslo never forced the two sides to gain a new understanding of their adversary, or about their relationship. As Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank point out, the “Oslo negotiators restricted the negotiations to the present and the future— the mythic origins of Palestinian and Israeli identity and the historic assumptions both people held about the other, were left intact.”19 Not surprisingly, this made reconciliation extremely difficult, if not impossible. By failing to force the two sides to reassess their images of each other, themselves, or the national narratives

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of either side, Oslo’s efforts to bring about a lasting peace were doomed from the start.

Escaping the chicken and the egg Part of the reason why the Oslo Peace Process has bogged down is that it is plagued by the following chicken and the egg conundrums: l

l

l

Because they cannot commit fully to the peace process both sides employ constructive ambiguity in their negotiations, but because of constructive ambiguity no one can commit to the peace process. Neither side is willing to reconcile with the other without a commitment to the peace process, but neither can commit to the peace process without reconciliation. The Palestinians say that they cannot guarantee Israeli security without any movement on the peace process, but the Israelis will not move forward on the peace process without an improvement in their security.20

How can the Israelis and Palestinians escape these conundrums? Both sides need to address their inherent ambivalence vis-à-vis the peace process and commit themselves without reservation to the peace process. Until that happens, the peace process can never move forward because the Israelis will not commit if the Palestinians do not, and the Palestinians will not commit if the Israelis do not. The leaders on both sides need to commit themselves fully to the peace process, and then get their people to do the same. Then, when the extremists on either side try to sabotage the peace process, rather than putting the process on hold, the two sides will accelerate it instead, thereby not only reaffirming their commitment to the process, but also reassuring their partner for peace as to the strength of their commitment. Commitment will entail showing the people tangible benefits of the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian support for Oslo waned because neither side saw any real improvement on the ground. For the Israelis, security did not improve, and for the Palestinians, Oslo failed to produce a cessation in the building of Israeli settlements, or of the humiliations associated with the occupation. How could people support the peace process when it failed to make their lives noticeably better? Therefore, it is imperative that in the future, the negotiations must produce some clear results.

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Results would facilitate commitment to the peace process not only by making the people feel that the peace process was in their best interests but also by enhancing their faith in the peace process, as well as in their adversary. The dearth of trust is a major impediment to conflict resolution, and makes it difficult for either side to commit to the peace process. One of the glaring weaknesses of the Declaration of Principles was the absence of a third party security guarantee. Barbara Walter’s work has shown the importance of such guarantees for ending conflicts.21 A final agreement will require a third party that is seen as neutral and acceptable by both sides, which will guarantee their security. As Yezid Sayigh points out, “The role of the external actors, which could have changed the incentives in negative or positive ways for both sides, or for the public on both sides, which might generate some kind of pressures, that external role, I think, has been abdicated in effect by the principal players, that is the United States administration, secondly, the European Union, since the start of the process in 1993.”22 By leaving out such a third party role, Oslo made it extremely difficult for either side to trust the peace process. So, their lack of commitment to Oslo is not surprising. As a sign of their commitment to the peace process, both sides must open an honest dialogue within their societies, and between their societies, over the conflict. The two adversaries need to openly and honestly confront the stereotypical images and national narratives that have perpetuated the conflict. In doing so, they will be able to create a coalition for peace that ties together the supporters of peace within their society, and within the two peoples. Then, and only then, can the death of Oslo lead to a new life for both people.

Notes 1 “Peres Seen Backtracking on Palestinian Track,” Open Source Center, November 29, 2005, accessed March 10, 2009, www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway. 2 Author’s Interview, March 9, 2009, Washington, DC. 3 Author’s Interview, March 11, 2009, Washington, DC. 4 Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. 5 There are numerous lessons we can draw from Oslo’s death. In this section I will just examine those that logically follow from Principles One, Two, and Three. 6 Author’s Interview, March 9, 2009, Washington, DC. 7 Ibid.

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8 Robert L. Rothstein, How Not to Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome” and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, Peaceworks, No. 57, March 2006), 33. 9 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 247. 10 Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone. 11 Author’s Interview, March 11, 2009, Washington, DC. 12 Louis Kriesberg, “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 3 (2001): 389. 13 Rabbi Michael Lerner, The Geneva Accord and Other Strategies for Healing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2004), 131. 14 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “A Peace without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the Limits of Israeli Consciousness,” in George Giacaman and Dag Jørund Lønning, eds, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 62. 15 Yossi Beilin, Khalil Shikaki, Ziad Abu-Zayyad, Reuven Merhov, moderated by Danny Rubinstein and Nasser A. Jawad, “Taking Stock: Looking at the Past, Searching for the Future,” Palestine-Israel Journal 8, no. 3 (December 2001): 27. 16 Bernard Wasserstein, Israelis and Palestinians: Why do they Fight? Can They Stop? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 150–1. 17 Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” in Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’Oz, and Khalil Shikaki, eds, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 96. 18 Ibid., 97. 19 Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, Shared Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 268–9. 20 This observation was made by Yaacov Peri, the former head of Shin Bet, quote from Melissa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process,” Middle East Policy 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 88. 21 Barbara Walter, “Re-Conceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process,” International Negotiations 7, no. 3 (2002): 304. 22 Author’s Interview, March 6, 2009, via telephone.

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Appendix A: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I: Aim of the Negotiations The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II: Framework for the Interim Period The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

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Article III: Elections 1.

2.

3.

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV: Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations 1. 2.

3.

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

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The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI: Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 1.

2.

Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII: Interim Agreement 1. 2.

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”) The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

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4.

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The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII: Public Order and Security In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX: Laws and Military Orders 1. 2.

The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry

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into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation In Economic Fields Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV .

Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces 1.

After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

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In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV: Resolution of Disputes 1.

2. 3.

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles. or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan”, the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

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Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions 1. 2.

This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. For the Government of Israel For the P.L.O. Witnessed By: The United States of America The Russian Federation

Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections 1. 2.

3.

Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues: a. the system of elections; b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 1.

The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the

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3.

4.

5.

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withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement. The above agreement will include, among other things: a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives. b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters. c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers. d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon. e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes. f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims. g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: a. Gaza – Egypt; and b. Jericho – Jordan. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the

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6.

151

Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following: 1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period. 2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources. 3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines. 4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank. 5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza

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6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

Declaration of Principles

Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint IsraeliPalestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media. Any other programs of mutual interest.

Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs 1.

The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

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3.

153

The Development Program will consist of two elements: a. an Economic Development Program for the ‘West Bank and the Gaza Strip. b. a Regional Economic Development Program. c. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will consist of the following elements: 1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program. 2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan. 3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.) 4. A Human Resources Plan. 5. Other programs. d. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements: 1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step. 2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area. 3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) – Dead Sea Canal. 4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects. 5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification. 6. Interconnection of electricity grids. 7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources. 8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan. 9. Regional cooperation in other spheres. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

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Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements A. General Understandings and Agreements Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. Specific Understandings and Agreements Article IV It is understood that: 1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis. 2. The Council’s jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2) It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows: 1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon. 2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected. 3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office. 4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on

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a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2) The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5) The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. For the Government of Israel For the P.L.O. Witnessed By: The United States of America The Russian Federation

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Appendix B: The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document (October 31, 1995)

Though this agreement was neverly formally adopted by either Israel or the Palestinians, the ideas expressed, particularly with regard to establishing the capital of a future Palestinan state in a suburb of Jerusalem known as Abu Dis, have often been cited as potential solutions to some of the outstanding issues.

Framework for the conclusion of a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES, RESOLVES THE CORE PROBLEM AT THE HEART OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT AND COMMENCES AN ERA OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE CONTRIBUTING THEREBY TO THE STABILITY, SECURITY, AND PROSPERITY OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST. The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter “the P.L.O.”), the representative of the Palestinian people; WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991; AIMING at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects; REAFFIRMING their adherence to the commitments expressed in the Declaration of Principles (hereinafter “the DOP”) signed in Washington D.C. on September 13th 1993, the Cairo Agreement of May 4th 1994, and the Interim-Agreement of September 28th, 1995; REAFFIRMING their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security;

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DECLARING as null and void any agreement, declaration, document or statement which contradicts this Framework Agreement; DESIROUS of reaching a full agreement on all outstanding final status issues as soon as possible, not later than May 5th 1999, as stipulated in the DOP; HEREBY AGREE on the following Framework for a Final Status Agreement;

Article I: The Establishment of the Palestinian State and Its Relations with the State of Israel 1.

2.

As an integral part of this Framework Agreement and the full Final Status Agreement: a. The Government of Israel shall extend its recognition to the independent State of Palestine within agreed and secure borders with its capital al-Quds upon its coming into being not later than May 5th 1999. b. Simultaneously, the State of Palestine shall extend its recognition to the State ofIsrael within agreed and secure borders with its capital Yerushalayim. c. Both sides continue to look favorably at the possibility of establishing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, to be agreed upon by the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine (hereinafter: “the parties”) will thereby extend mutual recognition of their right to live in peace and security within mutually agreed borders as defined in Article II of this agreement and in the Final Status Agreement. In particular, the Parties shall: a. Recognize and respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political andeconomic independence. b. Renounce the use of force, and the threat of force as an instrument of policy and commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of all disputes between them. c. Refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts of violence, subversion or terrorism against the other party. d. Take effective measures to ensure that acts of or threats of violence do not originate from or through their respective territories, including

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e. f.

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their airspace and territorial waters, and take appropriate measures against those who perpetrate such acts. Undertake not to join, assist, or cooperate with any military or security coalition, organization, or alliance hostile to either party. Exchange and ratify the instruments of peace between them as shall be defined in the full Final Status Agreement.

Article II: The Delineation of Secure and Recognized Borders 1.

2.

3. 4.

The secure and recognized borders between the State of Israel and the future State of Palestine are described in the attached Maps and in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement. The Parties recognize that these borders, including their respective subsoil, airspace and territorial waters shall be inviolable. The parties shall define the route and mode of implementation of, as well as the extent of, territory to be yielded by Israel for the agreed extra-territorial passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (as described in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement). The border in the Jerusalem area is to be delineated in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of this Framework Agreement. The Parties shall recognize the final borders between the two states as permanent and irrevocable.

Article III: The Creation of Normal and Stable Inter-State Relations 1.

2.

Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty, the Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations between them and to promote economic and cultural relations including the free movement of people, goods, capital and services across their borders. The Parties shall continue to cooperate in all areas of mutual interest and will seek to promote jointly and separately similar regional cooperation with other states in the area and the international community.

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The Parties shall seek to promote mutual cultural relations and will encourage mutual programs for the dissemination of their respective national customs, folklore and traditions between them. The Parties shall secure freedom of access to places of religious, and historical significance on a non-discriminatory basis. Access to, worship in, and protection of all holy places and sites shall be guaranteed by both Parties.

Article IV: Schedule of Israeli Military Withdrawal and Security Arrangements 1.

2.

In implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the parties agree that the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall be carried out in three stages: a. Withdrawal from the Central areas of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip, (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map/s), to commence not later than May 5th 1999 and be completed not later than September 4th, 1999; b. Withdrawal from the Eastern areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement), to commence not later than September 5th 1999 and be completed not later than January 4th, 2000; c. Withdrawal from the Western areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement) to commence not later than January 5th 2000 and be completed not later than May 4th 2000. Thereafter Israel shall maintain a minimal residual force within agreed military compounds and in specified locations. This residual force will comprise: a. Three reinforced battalions, two existing Military Emergency Stores, and integral logistical forces (their location and terms of lease, duration, mode of deployment, function and numerical strength, are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement). b. Three Early Warning stations and three Air Defense Units as defined and agreed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement will be maintained until May 5th 2007 or until peace agreements and bilateral security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties are attained, whichever comes last.

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4.

5.

6.

161

The Parties agree to the formation of an Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (hereinafter “the CSC”) to oversee the implementation of Israel’s military withdrawal, to establish the modalities governing its residual military presence, and to coordinate all other security matters (its structure and authorities are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement). The CSC shall also implement an agreed schedule for the introduction of Palestinian Security Forces (hereinafter “PSF”) into Palestinian territories commensurate with and parallel to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Parties agree that the CSC shall commence its deliberations not later than May 5th, 1998 (see Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement). Joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols will be held along the Jordan River as well as along both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian border, in order to deter, prevent and combat the infiltration or organization of cross-border terrorism and other forms of violent activities. The mandate and duration of these patrols shall be determined by the CSC, as detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement. The Parties agree that the State of Palestine shall be demilitarized. The PSF shall remain subject to agreed limitations as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement. By mutual agreement, and not before May 5th 2007, Palestinian self-defense capabilities shall be negotiated by the Parties. The Parties agree that the co-sponsors and other parties agreed upon, shall be invited to guarantee the arrangements for Israel’s military withdrawal and other bilateral security agreements as stipulated in this Framework Agreement. In their capacity as guarantors, the said third-parties shall also be invited to participate in observation, verification and other technical duties to be agreed in the CSC. The said third parties shall accordingly be requested to establish and finance a permanent International Observer Force (hereafter the IOF) whose mandate and functions are described in Annex Two of the Final Status Agreement.

Article V: Israeli Settlements 1.

Subsequent to the establishment of the Independent State of Palestine and its recognition by the State of Israel as described in Articles I and III of this agreement: a. There will be no exclusive civilian residential areas for Israelis in the State of Palestine.

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b.

c.

d.

e.

Individual Israelis remaining within the borders of the Palestinian State shall be subject to Palestinian sovereignty and Palestinian rule of law. Individual Israelis who have their permanent domicile within the Palestinian State as of May 5th 1999, shall be offered Palestinian citizenship or choose to remain as alien residents, all without prejudice to their Israeli citizenship. Within the agreed schedule for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories as described in Article IV and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement, the Israeli Government and its security forces shall maintain responsibility for the safety and security of Israeli settlements outside the areas of Palestinian security jurisdiction, pending the transfer of said areas to full Palestinian rule. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in Palestine and Palestinian citizens in Israel.

Article VI: Jerusalem 1. 2.

3.

Jerusalem shall remain an open and undivided city with free and unimpeded access for people of all faiths and nationalities. The Parties further agree that a reform of the current Jerusalem Municipal System and its boundaries shall be introduced not later than May 5th 1999, and shall not be subject to further change by law or otherwise, unless by mutual consent, prior to the fulfillment of the provisions of paragraph 9 below. This reform shall expand the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and shall define the city limits of the “City of Jerusalem”, to include: Abu Dis, Eyzariya, ar-Ram, Az-zaim, Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Givon, and adjacent areas in the attached map/s. Within the “City of Jerusalem”, neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians will be defined as “Palestinian boroughs” The exact borders of the “City of Jerusalem” and of the Israeli and Palestinian boroughs are delineated and described in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map/s. The number of Israeli boroughs and of Palestinian boroughs will reflect the present demographic balance of 2:1. This proportion will be updated in accordance with the modalities, criteria and schedule as described in Annex Three to this Final Status Agreement.

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

163

The Parties agree to maintain one Municipality for the “City of Jerusalem” in the form of a Joint Higher Municipal Council, formed by representatives of the boroughs. These representatives will elect the Mayor of the “City of Jerusalem” In all matters related to the areas of the “City of Jerusalem” under Palestinian sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Palestine. In all matters related to the areas of the “City of Jerusalem” under Israeli sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Israel. The “City of Jerusalem” shall consist of the Joint Higher Municipal Council, two sub-municipalities – an Israeli sub-municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Israeli boroughs, and a Palestinian sub-municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Palestinian boroughs – as well as a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area as described in paragraph 12 below. The Parties further agree that the municipality of the “City of Jerusalem” shall: a. Delegate strong local powers to the sub-municipalities including the right to local taxation, local services, an independent education system, separate religious authorities, and housing planning and zoning, as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement; b. Develop a twenty-five year Master Plan for the “City of Jerusalem” with agreed modalities for its balanced implementation, including safeguards for the interests of both communities. c. Provide for Israeli and Palestinian citizens resident within the jurisdiction of the City of Jerusalem Municipality and sub-municipalities to vote and seek election for all elected posts as shall be specified in the Jerusalem Municipal bylaws. Within the “City of Jerusalem” both parties recognize the Western part of the city, to be “Yerushalayim” and the Arab Eastern part of the city, under Palestinian sovereignty, to be “al-Quds” (see attached Map/s). Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty between them: a. The Government of the State of Palestine shall recognize Yerushalayim, as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Israel. b. The Government of the State of Israel shall recognize al-Quds, as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Palestine.

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9.

The ultimate sovereignty of the area outside Yerushalayim and al-Quds, but inside the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, shall be determined by the parties as soon as possible. Each party maintains its position regarding the sovereign status of this area. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee for determining the final status of this area shall be established not later than May 5th, 1999 and shall commence its deliberations immediately thereafter. Without prejudice to the determination of the final status of this area: a. Palestinian citizenship shall be extended to Palestinian residence of this area. b. In certain matters Palestinian citizens residing in this area shall resort to Palestinian law (as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement). c. The Parties will enjoy free access to and use of the Qalandia Airport in this area. A new designated Palestinian terminal shall be constructed, to commence operation concurrent with the signing of the Treaty of Peace (for the modalities of operation, see Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement). 10. The Parties acknowledge Jerusalem’s unique spiritual and religious role for all three great monotheistic religions. Wishing to promote interfaith relations and harmony among the three great religions, the Parties accordingly agree to guarantee freedom of worship and access to all Holy Sites for members of all faiths and religions without impediment or restriction. 11. In recognition of the special status and significance of the Old City Area (see map/s) for members of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths, the parties agree to grant this area a special status. 12. The Parties further agree that: a. The Palestinian sub-municipality shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Palestinian citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property. b. The Israeli sub-municipalies shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Israeli citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property. c. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Party Committee to manage all mattersrelated to the preservation of the unique character of the Old City Area (its structureand modalities are detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).

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d.

In case of a dispute between the two sub-municipalities on matters related to the Old City Area, the issue shall be referred for a decision to the Joint Parity Committee. 13. The State of Palestine shall be granted extra-territorial sovereignty over the Haram ash-Sharif under the administration of the al-Quds Awqaf. The present status quo regarding the right of access and prayer for all, will be secured. 14. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre shall be managed by the Palestinian sub-Municipality. The Joint Parity Committee, shall examine the possibility of assigning extra-territorial status to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. 15. Supervision of persons and goods transiting through the “City of Jerusalem” shall take place at the exit points. Other security matters related to persons, vehicles and goods suspected of involvement in hostile activity are dealt with in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

Article VII: Palestinian Refugees 1.

2.

3.

Whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in international law and natural justice, it recognizes that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable. The Palestinian side, thus, declares its readiness to accept and implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this is possible, the welfare and well-being of these refugees. Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947–1949. It further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses. The parties agree on the establishment of an International Commisssion for Palestinian Refugees (hereinafter “the ICPR”) for the final settlement of all aspects of the refugee issue as follows: a. The Parties extend invitations to donor countries to join them in the formation of the ICPR.

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b.

4.

The Parties welcome the intention of the Government of Sweden to lead the ICPR and to contribute financially to its activities. c. The Government of Israel shall establish a fund for its contribution, along with others, to the activities of the ICPR. d. The ICPR shall conduct all fundraising activities and coordinate donors’ involvement in the program. e. The ICPR shall define the criteria for compensation accounting for: (1) moral loss; (2) immovable property; (3) financial and economic support enabling resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps. f. The ICPR shall further: (1) adjudicate claims for material loss; (2) prepare and develop rehabilitation and absorption programs; (3) establish the mechanisms and venues for disbursing payments and compensation; (4) oversee rehabilitation programs; (5) explore the intentions of Palestinian refugees on the one hand and of Arab and other countries on the other, concerning wishes for emigration and the possibilities thereof; (6) explore with Arab governments hosting refugee populations, as well as with these refugees, venues for absorption in these countries whenever mutually desired. g. The ICPR shall implement all the above according to the agreed schedule defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement. The ICPR shall be guided by the following principles in dealing with the “refugees of 1948” and their descendants as defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement: a. Each refugee family shall be entitled to compensation for moral loss to a sum of money to be agreed upon by the ICPR. b. Each claimant with proven immovable property shall be compensated as per the adjudication of the ICPR. c. The ICPR shall provide financial and economic support, enabling the resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps. d. The refugees shall be entitled to financial and economic support from the ICPR for resettlement and rehabilitation.

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5.

6.

7.

167

The State of Israel undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. Israel will continue to enable family reunification and will absorb Palestinian refugees in special defined cases, to be agreed upon with the ICPR. The Palestinian side undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. The Palestinian side shall enact a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently resident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas. The PLO considers the implementation of the above a full and final settlement of the refugee issue in all its dimensions. It further undertakes that no additional claims or demands arising from this issue will be made upon the full implementation of this Framework Agreement.

Article VIII: Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee 1.

2. 3.

The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee (hereafter: “IPSC”), which will commence activities upon the signing of this Framework Agreement. This IPSC shall be authorized to deal with all matters related to the smooth transition between the Interim Agreement and Final Status Agreement. The IPSC shall also coordinate activities related to the implementation of the Final Status Agreement.

Article IX: Water Resources 1. 2. 3.

4.

The Parties agree that they possess the same natural water resources essential for each nations livelihood and survival. Water rights and issues are laid out in Annex Five to the Final Status Agreement. With a view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all water problems between them, the Parties jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources should not in any way harm or imperil the water resources of the other. The Parties further agree to the following:

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a.

5.

6.

The development of existing and new water resources to increase availability and minimize wastage. b. The prevention of contamination of water resources. c. The transfer of information and joint research and the review of the potential for water enhancement. The Parties agree to prepare as soon as possible, but not later than May 5, 1999, an agreed upon coordinated separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers that will guarantee optimal use and development of water resources for the benefit of the Israeli and Palestinian nations. The Parties agree to seek to extend their joint co-operation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in particular with regard to the waters of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea and to seek to promote wider regional understanding on the exploitation and management of water resources in the Middle East.

Article X: Time Frame and Implementation A. The Preparatory Period: May 5th 1996 to May 4th 1999 1.

2.

With the signing of this Framework Agreement and its entry into force not later than May 5th 1996, the Preparatory Period for Final Status shall commence. Immediately thereafter, the Parties shall: a. Establish the IPSC (Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee) along the lines laid down in Article VIII. b. Extend invitations to donor countries to join the Government of Sweden and themselves in formation of the ICPR (International Commission for Palestinian Refugees). The Preparatory Period shall end not later than May 4th 1999. During this period it is agreed that the following shall be implemented: a. The Final Status Agreement with all Annexes will be prepared, based on the agreements and principles laid down in this Framework Agreement. b. Consequently, and based on the mechanisms for border delineation set out in Annex One to the Final Status Agreement, the joint

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delineation of borders and official extra-territorial and other passages shall be finalized. c. The Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (CSC) shall be established and commence its deliberation, not later than May 5th 1998. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in the State of Palestine, and Palestinian citizens in the State of Israel. d. The Parties shall invite the co-sponsors to the Peace Process and other agreed upon third parties, to establish an International Observer Force (IOF) as agreed upon in Annex two to the Final Status Agreement. e. The Government of Israel shall establish a program to encourage Israeli settlers to resettle within Israel’s sovereign territory. Settlers wishing to take part in this program shall be compensated by the Israeli government before January 1st, 1999, according to guidelines to be announced within three months of the entry into force of this Framework Agreement. f. The agreed upon reformed Jerusalem Municipal System shall be inaugurated not later than May 5th 1999. g. Both sides shall prepare and agree on a Jerusalem Master Plan as described in Article VI. h. In accordance with Article VII of this Framework Agreement, the PLO shall establish a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas. i. The Parties shall promote the work of the ICPR as stipulated in Article VII to this Agreement. j. The Parties shall prepare an agreed upon coordinated, separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers. k. As soon as possible, but not later than May 4th 1999, the interim period shall come to an end and a full Final Status Agreement shall be signed and a Peace Treaty shall be initiated.

B. The Implementation Period: May 5th 1999 to May 4th 2000 1.

With the signing and entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the implementation of the Final Status settlement will commence. The creation of the Independent State of Palestine within

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2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

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secure and recognized borders shall be promulgated by the PLO and its relevant agencies. Immediately thereafter, but not later than within two months, the Peace Treaty shall be signed. The Government of the State of Israel shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine and to al-Quds as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement. The Government of the State of Palestine shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel and to Yerushalayim as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement. Provisions relating to the normalization of Israeli-Palestinian relations shall be implemented as described in Article III. Upon entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall commence and the agreed security provisions shall be implemented according to the schedule described in Article II and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement. Within the “City of Jerusalem” elections for the two sub-municipalities will be held. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area (as outlined in Article VI paragraph 12 to this agreement), and a proportional (2:1) Joint Higher Municipal Council which will elect the Mayor of the “City of Jerusalem” The parties agree to continue to work jointly and separatly within the framework of the multilateral working groups and other relevant fora towards: a. The establishment of a Middle East free from hostile coalitions and alliances; b. The creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction both conventional and non-conventional within the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable settlement.

C. The Post-Implementation Period: May 5th 2000 to May 4th 2007 1.

Israeli residual forces shall remain on Palestinian territory. The CSC shall continue to coordinate Israeli and Palestinian security needs.

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171

Responsibility for the security of Israeli citizens residents in the State of Palestine, shall remain with the CSC.

D. The Post-November 5th 2007 Period Remaining Israeli residual forces shall withdraw from the Palestinian State contingent on the attainment of peace treaties and security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties. Source: Temporary International Presence in Hebron

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Appendix C: The National Conciliation Document

A conference, tasked with coming up with a comprehensive Palestinian national dialogue, was held in the cities of Ramallah and Gaza on May 25 and 26, 2006. The event was held under the patronage of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), in response to a call by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and in partnership with the head of the Government and representatives of the National and the Legislative councils, representatives of national and Islamic forces and representatives of civil society organizations. The closing statement highlighted the conciliation document composed by prisoners in Israeli jails, which was considered as a basis for maintaining the dialogue. The decision was taken to form a national dialogue committee headed by Abbas and which, after lengthy discussions, concluded the following agreement on a national conciliation document. In the name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful, “Abide by the decree of God and never disperse” (a verse from the Holy Qur’an)

Preamble Emanating from a high sense of national and historical responsibility, and because of the dangers facing our people, and stemming from the principle that rights cannot be relinquished and the occupation cannot be legitimized, and with the intention of reinforcing and consolidating the internal Palestinian front and preserving national unity in the homeland and in the Diaspora, and for the purpose of confronting the Israeli design which aims to impose an Israeli solution on our people, crushing their dreams and hindering their right to establish their independent fully sovereign Palestinian stage—the scheme that the Israeli government intends to implement during the upcoming phase, comprising the construction and completion of the

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separation wall, the Judaization of Jerusalem, the expansion of Israeli settlements, the seizure of the Jordan Valley, the annexation of vast areas of the West Bank, and the blocking of our people from exercising their right of return; and with the end of preserving the accomplishments and acquisitions our people have achieved throughout their long struggle, and in loyalty to our martyrs, prisoners, and injured, and because we are still in the phase of liberation, grounded in a high sense of nationalism and democracy; all this dictates the adoption of a political and resistance strategy commensurate with these challenges, and the success of the comprehensive Palestinian national dialogue, based on the Cairo Declaration and the urgent call for unity and solidarity, we therefore present this document (the national conciliation document) to our great steadfast people, to President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership, to the Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, to the Cabinet, to the Speaker and members of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), to the Speaker and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), to all Palestinian forces and factions, to all nongovernmental and popular organizations and institutions, and to the leaders of Palestinian public opinion in the homeland and the Diaspora. This national conciliation document is considered an integral package and the preamble is part and parcel of it. 1.

2.

The Palestinian people in the homeland and the Diaspora seek to liberate their land, to obtain the evacuation of the settlements and settlers, the removal of the separation wall, to stop the annexation, and to achieve their right to freedom, return and independence. In this spirit, they look to exercise their right to self-determination, including the right to establish their independent state on all the territories occupied in 1967, with al-Quds al-Shareef [Jerusalem] as its capital; to secure the right of the refugees to return to their homes and properties, from which they were driven out, and their right to compensation; to obtain the liberation of all prisoners and detainees, without exception or discrimination, basing their claims in all this on the historical right of our people on the land of their fathers and forefathers, on the UN Charter, and on international law and legitimacy. To accelerate the implementation of that which was agreed upon in Cairo in March 2005 pertaining to the reinvigoration and reactivation of the PLO and the incorporation of all the forces and factions in accordance with democratic principles, which solidifies the position of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of all the Palestinian people wherever they may be, and in keeping with the changes on the Palestinian scene and

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3.

4.

5.

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which strengthen the position of the PLO as the competence that can meet the changes on the Palestinian arena and can assume its responsibilities in leading and mobilizing our people in the homeland and the Diaspora; and to defend their national, political and human rights in the various forums and circles in all the international and regional arenas. Furthermore, our national interest calls for the formation of a new PNC before the end of 2006 through elections whenever possible, according to the principle of proportional representation, and by consensus if elections are not possible, according to mechanisms to be laid down by the higher committee deriving from the Cairo Declaration. It also calls for the preservation of the PLO as a broad front and framework and a comprehensive national coalition that incorporates and will remain the highest political reference of all the Palestinians in the homeland and in the Diaspora. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation, to preserve the option of resistance by various means, and to concentrate the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967, concomitantly with political action, negotiations and diplomacy. To pursue the popular resistance against the occupation in all its forms and policies and to focus on the expansion of the participation of the various groups, fronts and sectors of our people in this popular resistance. To formulate a Palestinian plan aimed at comprehensive political action; to unify Palestinian political discourse based on the Palestinian national goals as put forth in this document and on Arab legitimacy and international resolutions that grant justice to our people and that safeguard the rights and constants of our people, implemented by the PLO and its institutions and the PNA with its president and government, the national and Islamic factions, civil society organizations, and public figures and operatives. To accomplish this with a view to mobilize and consolidate Arab, Islamic and international political, financial, economic and humanitarian backing for our people and its PNA; to win their support for the right of our people to self-determination, freedom, return, and independence; and, furthermore, to confront Israel’s plan to impose any unilateral solution on our people, and the oppressive siege against us. To protect and strengthen the PNA as it is the nucleus of our future state and was born out of the struggle, sacrifices and sufferings of the Palestinian people; to stress that higher national interests call for the upholding of the PNA Basic Law and the laws in force, and to respect the authority and responsibilities of the president who was elected according

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to the will of the Palestinian people through free, open and democratic elections. Also, to respect the authority and responsibilities of the government that was given the vote of confidence by the PLC elected in free, democratic and fair elections. To focus on the importance and need for creative cooperation between the presidency and the government, and on the importance of joint action and periodic meetings between them to bring about and reinforce cooperation and complementarity according to the Basic Law and for the sake of the higher interests of the Palestinians; additionally, to focus on the need for comprehensive reforms in PNA institutions, especially the judiciary, abiding by its authority, and securing the implementation of all its rulings, and the consolidation and endorsement of the sovereignty of the law. 6. To work on forming a national unity government that secures the participation of parliamentary blocs, and the political forces desirous of participating on the basis of this document and a joint program designed to advance the Palestinian condition on the local, Arab, regional and international levels. To confront any challenges through the building of a national and strong government that enjoys Palestinian popular and political support from all forces, as well as Arab and international backing. To implement a program of reform to develop the national economy and encourage investment, to fight poverty and unemployment, and to extend the best possible care to the groups that have born the brunt of steadfastness, resistance and intifada and have been victims of Israeli aggression, especially the families of martyrs, prisoners and injured, and the owners of homes demolished and properties destroyed by the occupation. 7. To acknowledge that the task of conducting the negotiations falls within the jurisdiction of the PLO and the President of the PNA, predicated on the adherence to the Palestinian national goals as stated in this document with the condition that any agreement pertaining to the matter be referred to the new PNC for ratification and endorsement, or presented for a general referendum in the homeland and the Diaspora whenever possible according to a law that regulates it. 8. To recognize the liberation of the prisoners and detainees is a sacred national duty that must be assumed through all possible means by all Palestinian national and Islamic forces and factions, and by the PLO and the PNA President and government, the PLC and all the resistance forces. 9. To double the efforts to support and care for the Palestine refugees and defend their rights and to work for the holding of a popular conference

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

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for the refugees, proceeding from follow-up committees, with its duty to stress on the right of return, to adhere to this right, and to call on the international community to implement Resolution 194 which stipulates the right of the refugees to return and to be compensated. To work on forming a unified resistance front to be called “the Palestinian resistance front,” to lead and engage in resistance against the occupation and to unify and coordinate action and resistance, and to define a unified political reference for the front. To observe the democratic system and to hold regular, general, free and open elections in accordance with the law, for the presidency, the PLC, and local and municipal councils, and unions, syndicates and societies, and to respect the principle of a peaceful and smooth transfer of authority; and to ensure the principle of separation of powers, to undertake to protect the Palestinian democratic experience and any democratic choice and its outcomes; and to respect the sovereignty of the law, individual and public freedoms, human rights, freedom of the press, and equality among the citizens in rights and duties without discrimination; and to protect the achievements of women and to enhance and promote them. To reject and denounce the oppressive siege that is being led by the U.S. and Israel against our people and to call on the Arab brethren at the popular and official levels to support the Palestinian people, the PLO and the PNA and to call on the Arab governments to implement the political, financial, economic resolutions of the summits and the decisions carried by the media supporting the Palestinian people and their national cause; to stress that the PNA is committed to the Arab consensus and to joint Arab action that supports our just cause and the higher Arab interests. To call on the Palestinian people to strive for unity and solidarity, to unify their ranks and to support the PLO and the PNA with its president and government; to endorse the people’s steadfastness and resistance in the face of Israeli aggression and siege and to reject any interference in internal Palestinian affairs. To denounce all forms of rifts and discord and whatever leads to internal strife; to condemn and ban the use of weapons, and to forbid the use of arms among the members of one people in settling internal disputes regardless of the justification; to stress on the sanctity of Palestinian blood and to adopt dialogue as the sole means of resolving disagreements. To promote freedom of expression via all means, including the opposition to the Authority and its resolutions, based on the endorsement of the law for the right of peaceful

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15.

16.

17.

18.

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protest and the organization of marches, demonstrations, and sit-ins, on the condition that these are peaceful and weapon-free, and to proscribe any acts of vandalism against private or public property. To look for the most appropriate means and mechanisms to allow for the continuing participation of our people and their national, political, and social forces wherever they may be in the battle for freedom, return, and independence; and to take into consideration the new situation of the Gaza Strip which makes it a true force of the steadfastness of our people and an example in the use of efficient means and methods in resisting the occupation while taking the higher interests of our people into consideration. To reform, develop and modernize the Palestinian security apparatus in all its branches in a manner that allows them to better assume their task in defending the homeland and the people, and to confront aggression and occupation; to maintain security and public order, to enforce laws, to end the state of chaos and lawlessness, to end armed parades and the public display of weapons and to confiscate them as this brings considerable harm to the resistance and distorts its image and threatens the unity of Palestinian society; to coordinate and restructure the relationship between the security forces and the resistance forces and formations, and to regulate and protect the possession of weapons. To call on the PLC to continue issuing laws that regulate the work of the security apparatus in its various branches and to work towards issuing a law that bans the exercise of political and partisan involvement by members of the security services, and to require them to abide by the elected political reference as defined by law. To work on the expansion of the role and presence of international solidarity committees and peace-loving groups to support our people in their steadfastness and just struggle against the occupation and its practices, against settlements, the separation wall, and annexation, and to work towards the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice at The Hague pertaining to the dismantlement of the separation wall and the settlements and their illegal presence.

Signed by: FATEH, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad Movement, PFLP, and DFLP. Note: Islamic Jihad expressed reservations on the clause pertaining to the negotiations. Translated from Arabic by the Palestine-Israel Journal.

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Index Abbas, Mahmud 1, 20, 46, 73, 79, 82–4, 88, 111–12, 114–15, 173–4 Abbas-Olmert Negotiations 46 al-Quds 52, 111–12, 158, 163–5, 170, 174 Ambiguity 36, 55, 115, 127, 133–4 see also Constructive Ambiguity Ambivalence 3, 10, 14–15, 17–18, 20, 36–7, 39, 41, 55, 59, 62, 67–8, 73, 83, 86, 88–9, 97, 116, 118, 123–4, 126, 129, 134, 139 Arafat, Yasser 4, 7, 13, 20, 25–9, 32, 35, 37, 50, 52–3, 59–62, 65, 73, 77–86, 88–90, 97–102, 104, 106–7, 110, 116–17, 126–8, 132–3, 137 Asymmetrical Distribution of Power 14, 16, 20, 34–6, 41, 49, 52, 54, 57, 63, 68, 74, 89, 105, 110, 112, 115, 123–4, 126, 130 Barak, Ehud 4, 20–1, 31, 52, 56, 60, 73, 76–81, 84–7, 89, 97–112, 116–17, 124, 128, 129, 132, 135, 138 Barghouti, Marwan 104 Beilin, Yossi 21, 48, 60, 63, 97, 104, 106–7, 111, 118 Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement (BeilinAbbas Agreement) 21, 97, 104, 111–18 Camp David Summit 20, 21, 45, 81, 97, 99–110 Clinton, William Jefferson 99–100 Confederation (with Jordan) 75, 158 Constructive Ambiguity 36–7, 41, 53, 59, 62, 68, 103, 112, 115, 118, 126, 133–4, 139 Covenant (Palestinian) 37, 77 Credibility 4–5, 9–11, 14, 17, 27, 62 Day of al-Nakba 80

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Declaration of Principles 2, 4, 19, 25–6, 30–3, 35–41, 45–6, 49–50, 57, 63, 67, 75–8, 83, 97, 104, 111, 118, 123–4, 140, 143–55 Distributive Bargaining 16, 20, 124 Doves 3–5, 8, 10–11, 17 Empathy 4, 7–9, 12, 14, 30–1, 40, 63 Empty Land 66–7, 87, 138 Extremists 2–3, 5, 8–9, 12–13, 45, 49, 61, 65, 74, 123, 127, 129, 131, 135, 139 Fatah 79, 113 Final Settlement see Permanent Settlement Final Status talks 158–70 Gaza Strip 4, 26, 30, 32, 46–9, 81, 98, 101, 107, 111, 114, 143–5, 159–60, 167, 169, 178 Gaza-Jericho Agreement 20, 46–9, 55, 57, 63, 68 Gradualism see Incrementalism Gresham’s Law of Conflict 2 Gulf War 26, 28 Hamas 1–2, 13, 26–8, 90, 99, 114–15, 127, 132, 138, 178 Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount 101–2, 109 Hawks 3–8, 12–13, 27, 42n. 6, 73, 84, 123, 127 Hebron 20, 45, 47–9, 51, 53, 56, 59, 61, 68, 171 Hebron Agreement 47–9, 51, 59, 68 Hegemony (Israeli) 54, 115 Implementation 9, 13, 18, 32, 37, 45, 47, 50–1, 53, 57, 60, 67, 77, 86, 88, 90, 106, 113, 126, 131, 133, 143, 146, 151, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 170, 174, 176, 178

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Incrementalism 36, 51–3, 68, 76, 105–6, 111–12, 116, 118, 124, 130–1 Integrative Bargaining 38 Intifada 15, 26–7, 33, 110, 176 Islamic Jihad 1–2, 113–15, 138, 178 Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip 46–7 Jericho 20, 32, 45–7, 49, 55, 57, 63, 68, 75–6, 83–4, 144–5, 148–51 Jerusalem 26, 30–2, 34–5, 37–8, 50–2, 56, 76, 78–9, 81, 85, 99, 101–4, 112, 114–15, 117, 128, 133, 144, 149, 154, 157, 159, 162–5, 169–70, 173–4 Knesset 51, 53, 55, 77–8, 81, 83–9 Labor Party 27, 42n. 6, 98 Likud Party 27, 42n. 6, 48 Military (Israeli) 5, 32–3, 37, 40, 47, 52, 57, 64, 109, 145–50, 154–5, 159–61, 170 Miller, Aaron David 54, 100, 104, 125, 130 National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners 21, 97, 104, 113–18, 173–8 Negotiation 2, 4–6, 9–14, 17, 19–20, 22n. 5, 25, 29–32, 34–8, 40–1, 46–51, 53, 54, 56–60, 67, 74, 76, 78–9, 81–3, 86, 89, 97–9, 102, 105, 111–12, 114, 118, 124–7, 130, 133–5, 138–9, 143–5, 148, 154–5, 175–6, 178 Netanyahu, Benjamin 48–9, 51, 53, 56, 59, 61, 73, 77, 98, 125, 129–30 Occupied Territories 26, 28–31, 47, 56, 99, 109, 114, 127, 137 Olmert, Ehud 20, 46, 114 Oslo II see Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Oslo Peace Process 2–3, 19, 22n. 5, 25, 28–30, 33, 36, 39–40, 48, 53, 55, 59–60, 62–3, 66–8, 78, 84–5, 97–8, 103, 105, 107, 109–10 Oslo Spirit 31, 41, 56–8, 63, 97, 126–7, 134–5

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Palestinian Authority 2, 33, 46–9, 51, 53, 77, 114, 132, 150 Palestinian Liberation Organization 26–9, 35, 37, 39, 51, 102, 135, 167, 169–70, 173–7 Peres, Shimon 20, 28, 37, 39, 50, 73, 75–6, 80, 83, 86, 89, 108, 111, 130, 133 Permanent Settlement 30, 38, 45, 76, 143 Persuadeability 5, 9, 13 Pragmatism 10, 13, 17, 28, 39, 60, 68, 82, 108, 136 Pre-Negotiation 9–11, 13, 19 Qurei, Ahmed 1, 20, 64, 73–4, 80, 82, 86 Rabin, Yitzhak 1, 5, 13, 20, 25–8, 33–5, 37–9, 50–2, 56, 60–1, 65, 73–81, 83–4, 86–9, 107, 111, 124–5, 130, 133, 137 Assassination of 1, 5, 74–5, 79–80, 111, 135 Reactive Devaluation 59 Reciprocity 53, 68, 111–12, 115, 118 Reconciliation 7, 9, 11, 18–19, 39–41, 54, 60–8, 82–3, 86–7, 89–90, 99, 110, 115–16, 118, 128, 136, 138–9, 143 Redeployment 30, 32, 37, 47–50, 53, 78, 98, 147–8 Rejectionist Front 29 Right of Return 30, 32, 35, 37, 87–8, 101–3, 108, 110, 112–14, 117–18, 133, 165, 173, 176 Road Map to Peace 59 Ross, Dennis 47, 59, 64 Said, Edward 7, 31–3 Savir, Uri 30–1, 52, 54–5, 58, 65, 74, 91, 124 Settlements 33, 38, 46–7, 51, 55–6, 99, 101, 109, 112, 115, 127, 131, 134, 137, 139, 144, 150, 154–5, 161–2, 173, 178 Shamir, Yitzhak 27 Sharm al-Shayk 50 Sharon, Ariel 3, 20, 67, 73, 138 Soviet Union 28–9 Spoilers see Extremists Syria First Policy 98, 107

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Index Taba 20, 46, 58 Temple Mount see Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount Tomb of the Patriarchs 48 UN Partition, 1947 87 UN Resolutions 242 and 338 30, 98 Washington Talks 29

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West Bank 26, 30, 46–51, 56, 98–9, 101–3, 107, 111, 114–16, 143–54, 159–60, 167, 169, 174 West Bank, Areas A-C 47 Wye River Agreement 20, 45, 48–9, 68, 98 Zero-Sum Game 7, 12, 16–17, 20, 29, 38, 41, 58, 62, 79–80, 89, 107, 117, 124, 126, 135

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